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Learning Events at BCAS

1. Finance Corporate & Allied Laws Study Circle – Demystifying common problems in Valuation held on Tuesday, 08th September 2026 @ Virtual |Speaker: CA Snehal Pawar

CA Snehal Pawar dealt with the topic in detail, from inception to conclusion. She also highlighted some of the Do’s and Don’ts in a valuation exercise.

While the purpose, scope, use and user of valuation is very critical, the stress test of each component of forecast cannot be undermined. The entity’s business, industry, segment information, forecast horizon, growth linked reinvestment, terminal growth and terminal margin etc. requires focused attention. She reiterated the golden words of an ex-regulator – ‘marrying Narratives to the Numbers’. Asking qualitative questions and quantifying its impact will aid the valuation exercise.

She drew attention to some of the avoidables, e.g. mismatch of numerator with denominator, use of old comparables, hockey stick forecast. She also touched upon the Auditor’s responsibility in respect of a valuation reflected in financials audited by it.

Last, but not the least, CA Snehal Pawar emphasized on documentation of the communication, stress test of the manner of arriving at a conclusion.

She diligently answered all the queries of the participants.

CA Snehal Pawar truly demystified the common problems in valuation providing value addition to the participants.

2. BCAS Tree Plantation Drive 2026 – Visit to Jawhar, Palghar

Tribute to Mother Nature and a payback to the community:

On 06th September 2026, BCAS Foundation, in association with Keshav Srushti Foundation, undertook a meaningful tree plantation and community outreach initiative at Khidse and Ghodichapad villages in the Jawhar-Palghar region. Twenty-one volunteers participated in the visit, experiencing first-hand how environmental conservation, when thoughtfully planned with the community, can also create sustainable livelihoods and help reduce migration from rural areas.

As part of the initiative, BCAS Foundation adopted 25 wadis across Khidse & Ghodichapad. The project involved planting 2,500 fruit-bearing trees and 7,500 mogra plants, with a contribution of ₹6 lakh from BCAS Foundation.

The initiative goes beyond conventional tree plantation. It has been conceived as a sustainable livelihood model for local families. While the fruit-bearing trees will provide long-term environmental and economic benefits, the mogra plants are expected to begin flowering within about five months. The flowers will be collected by villagers and transported to Mumbai’s Dadar flower market, creating a recurring source of supplementary income for participating families.

The volunteers received a warm traditional welcome from the residents of Khidse village and took part in the symbolic plantation programme. Mr. Rohit from Keshav Srushti Foundation, along with the local karyakartas, explained the implementation of the project, including beneficiary selection, plantation and maintenance, market linkages and the expected economic benefits.

The interaction offered a valuable insight into how sustainable livelihood opportunities can enable families to earn within their own villages, reducing the need to migrate in search of employment. It was a powerful reminder that protecting nature and empowering communities can go hand in hand.

The warmth of the villagers extended beyond the plantation activity. They graciously hosted lunch for the visiting volunteers, followed by everyone joining in the traditional Tarpa folk dance. The experience brought alive the culture, hospitality and collective spirit of the community and made the visit memorable for all.

Tree plantation2026

Extending the Spirit of Service

The outreach continued with a visit to Divya Vidyalaya, a special school serving nearly 100 special students with visual, intellectual & mental disabilities. The institution is led by its Principal, Pramila Tai Kokad, a recipient of the President’s Award for her contribution to the social and tribal welfare work.

The students warmly welcomed the volunteers with songs and dances, creating an atmosphere filled with enthusiasm and affection. The visit also gave the volunteers an opportunity to understand the specialised care, infrastructure and dedication required to educate and nurture children with different needs.

Divya Vidyalaya has developed innovative facilities suited to its students, including a science laboratory on wheels, a specially designed play area and learning aids adapted for children with disabilities. These facilities encourage learning through touch, sound, guided activities and practical experiences, making education more accessible and engaging.

Recognising the importance of this work, BCAS Foundation contributed ₹2 lakh towards supporting the school’s ongoing educational and developmental activities.

The Jawhar-Palghar visit thus became much more than a plantation drive. It brought together environmental conservation, livelihood creation, education and inclusion—four important dimensions of meaningful community development. It demonstrated that the true impact of service lies not merely in financial contributions, but in creating opportunities, strengthening communities and inspiring people to participate in a larger social purpose.

The initiative also reflects the broader spirit of BCAS Foundation’s social outreach, which seeks to touch lives through diverse causes, including the educational upliftment of underprivileged tribal children, eye camps in remote interiors, support to Divyaang schools and the establishment of digital classrooms in villages.

Every such initiative is, in its own way, a tribute to Mother Nature and a payback to the community—an expression of gratitude for what we have received and a commitment to sharing it with those who need it most.

BCAS Foundation places on record its sincere appreciation to Keshav Srushti Foundation, the local karyakartas, the residents of Khidse and Ghodichapad, and the management and team of Divya Vidyalaya for facilitating such a meaningful and enriching experience.

Above all, the Foundation expresses its heartfelt gratitude to all its generous donors, whose continued support makes these initiatives possible and enables the spirit of service to reach communities far beyond our immediate surroundings.

3. Lecture Meeting on Recent Judicial Pronouncements under GST held on Thursday, 03rd September 2026 @ Virtual | Speaker: Mr. J K Mittal Sr Advocate.

  • A virtual lecture meeting was held on the above topic to discuss the recent judicial pronouncements under GST.
  • President Kinjal Shah welcomed the speaker and participants, and briefed them about the activities of the society. Vice President Mandar Telang introduced the speaker and handed over the proceedings to him.
  • Mr. Mittal’s talk covered the following contentions issues emerging from recent judicial pronouncements under GST:

a) Condonation of Delay:

  • Can Limitation Act be applied to GST appeals in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in SV Global (decided February 9, 2026)?
  • Whether the Appellate Authority/ Tribunal must follow this decision to condone the delay or they are strictly bound by the provisions contained under the GST.

b) Authorized Service of Notices: The scope of service of notice (section 169) in view of the recent decision in Lakshmi Traders.

c) Limitation: The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Safe Corn Life Science and the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in GR Infra (August 19, 2026) and Tata Steel (August 25, 2026), which held that without specific findings of fraud or willful misstatement, Section 74 proceedings cannot be initiated.

d) Pre-deposit: The applicability of amended pre-deposit provisions to proceedings initiated prior to the amendment, recently dealt by the Delhi High Court in Gaurav Jain (July 31, 2026), was discussed.

e) Taxability and Valuation of Corporate Guarantees: The recent decision of the Gujarat High Court in Torrent Power and the internal inconsistencies and probable arguments were discussed.

f) Section 16 (2) (c): The recent decision surrounding the denial of Input Tax Credit (ITC) under Section 16(2)(c) due to a supplier’s failure to remit tax were discussed.

  • The speaker also addressed various queries raised by the participants.
  • The meeting was attended by more than 348 participants.

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Lecture Meeting on Recent Judicial Pronouncements under GST

4. Women’s Study Circle — SAKHI CIRCLE! meeting on “Money Matters -Financial Freedom and Planning” held on Thursday, 27th August 2026@ Virtual | Speaker: Sneha Jain

We are delighted to share that the first Sakhi Circle Meeting for the Financial Year 2026 -2027 was successfully conducted on 27th August 2026. The session featured Ms. Sneha Jain, founder of Wealth Trust Capital Services, as the guest speaker. The event was inaugurated by Mr.Kinjal Shah, President, BCAS and witnessed enthusiastic participation from approximately 30 members.

The two- hour interactive session focused on the theme “Financial Freedom and Financial Planning”, emphasizing the importance of taking charge of one’s financial future through informed decision-making and disciplined financial management. The speaker provided valuable insights into key aspects of personal finance, including budgeting and systematic savings along with goal based investing.

Participants gained a deeper understanding of the significance of financial independence, the power of compounding and the benefits of developing sustainable wealth creation strategies. The discussion also highlighted practical approaches to managing financial risk, reducing financial stress and aligning investments with the individual’s life goals.

The session was highly engaging and well received by the attendees who appreciated the practical guidance and actionable takeaways shared throughout the discussion. The session inspired women to strengthen their financial awareness, make informed choices and work towards long term financial security.

The inaugural Sakhi Circle meeting for the Financial Year 2026 – 2027 marked a successful beginning to a platform dedicated to the empowerment and holistic development of women professionals. The overwhelming response and active participation from attendees, coupled with the engaging discussion and sharing of experiences, fostered a collaborative learning environment that enabled participants to gain practical insights, broaden their perspective on personal finance and wealth creation, and further strengthen their understanding of financial well –being and independence.

BCAS looks forward to continuing this journey with many more inspiring sessions that foster learning, networking and personal growth among members.

5. Indirect Tax Laws Study Circle Meeting on GST issues in e-commerce and OIDAR services held on Tuesday, 25th August 2026 @ Virtual | Speaker: CA Rahul Pansari (Group Leader) & CA Rishabh Singhvi (Group Mentor)

  • The Indirect Taxes Laws Study Circle of the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society conducted a virtual session on “GST Issues in E-commerce and OIDAR Services” on 25th August 2026. The session primarily focused on practical and legal issues arising in the e-commerce ecosystem, with particular emphasis on the role and GST liability of e-commerce operators and suppliers making supplies through such platforms. The discussion commenced with the SaaS model vis-à-vis the commission model and examined whether a change in the commercial model alters the GST character of the underlying supply.
  • The scope of Section 9(5) of the CGST Act, particularly the expression “supplied through” an electronic commerce operator, was examined through practical parameters such as pricing, invoicing, payment collection, customer interface, allocation of services and contractual arrangements. The case studies further covered e-invoicing, ITC restrictions, classification of housekeeping services, defaulting sellers, incorrect tax rates, TCS and the potential GST exposure of e-commerce operators.
  • The session also briefly introduced the issues relating to OIDAR services; considering the breadth and complexity of the subject, it was felt that OIDAR merits a separate dedicated session for comprehensive discussion.
  • The meeting also touched upon e-commerce exports, including overseas warehousing, determination of export value, refund of accumulated ITC, marketplace and fulfilment charges, Customs implications and subsequent return of goods to India.
  • The case-study-driven approach facilitated active examination of the issues from both legal and practical perspectives. The session witnessed participation from approximately 85–86 members.

6. FEMA Study Circle Meeting on “Decode Key ODI Cases” held on Friday, 21st August 2026@Virtual | Speaker: Chairman: CA Harshal Bhuta, Group leader: CA Hansh Gangar.

The session was designed to deal with practical issues arising under the Overseas Investment Rules and Regulations, 2022.

The Group Leader began by unpacking the scope of “Real estate activity” under Rule 19 of the OI Rules through a series of case studies examining whether acquisition and leasing of immovable property overseas, varying degrees of renovation or reconstruction of such property, and provision of bundled hospitality services would each fall within or outside the restricted meaning of real estate activity.

Thereafter participants were walked through the permissibility of various swap-of-shares structures – ODI-ODI swaps, FDI-FDI swaps, and the cross combinations of FDI-ODI and ODI-FDI swaps, mapping each to the relevant enabling provision under the OI Rules and the NDI Rules. The discussions also covered cases highlighting open areas on which the Rules are currently silent.

Detailed discussion followed on the conditions governing deferred consideration under Rule 7 of the OI Regulations. Through case study, the distinction between deferred consideration vs. contingent consideration and its FEMA implication was highlighted. The session also covered the evolving and inconsistent approach adopted by AD Banks on ODI into financial services since the liberalisation introduced in August 2022.

The Group Leader and Chairman even touched upon other key matters such as absence of a prescribed debt-equity ratio for financial commitment by way of debt, write-off or restructuring of overseas investment, issuance of a corporate guarantee without an explicit closure clause and ambiguity introduced in the revised Form APR regarding reporting of profits and retained earnings.

Throughout the session, group members participated actively by raising queries and sharing their own practical experiences on the issues discussed. The session was full of practical case studies and highly interactive.

7. Direct Tax Laws Study Circle Meeting – “Taxation of motor vehicles across different categories of assessees and under all heads of income” held on Thursday, 20th August 2026 @ Virtual | Speaker : CA Divya Jokhakar

The session comprehensively analysed direct tax implications of motor vehicles across all income heads and taxpayer categories under the Income-tax Act, 1961 alongside mapped provisions under the Income Tax Act, 2025.

For salaried employees, perquisite valuation under Rule 3 was examined, highlighting that fixed presumptive monthly rates apply for mixed personal and official use irrespective of whether the vehicle is employer-owned, leased, or financed via bank loans.

Employers providing leased cars can claim the entire lease rental as a business deduction under Section 37(1), whereas owned vehicles are capitalised to claim depreciation under Section 32.

In business taxation, standard depreciation applies at 15% for motor cars, 30% for commercial vehicles running on hire, and 40% for electric vehicles, while loan interest qualifies as a business deduction under Section 36(1)(iii).

For operating leases, lessees must reverse Ind AS 116 ROU asset amortisation and finance interest in the tax computation to claim actual lease rentals paid under Section 37(1).

Motor cars used purely for personal purposes are classified as personal effects under Section 2(14), making them non-capital assets and rendering any resulting capital gain or loss outside the tax net.

Motor vehicles are excluded from the definition of ‘property’ under Section 56(2)(x), ensuring that gifts of motor cars remain tax-free in the hands of the recipient regardless of whether received from a relative or non- relative.

On the withholding front, TCS under Section 206C(1F) at 1% on retail vehicle sales exceeding ₹10 Lakhs prevails, overriding buyer TDS obligations under Section 194Q.

Crucial ITR disclosure mandates were highlighted, including Form 16 perquisite reporting, Schedule DPM depreciation schedules, and mandatory asset cost reporting under Schedule AL for incomes exceeding ₹50 Lakhs.

The speaker used practical case studies to illustrate real-world applications, perquisite offsets, TCS credit entitlements under Rule 37-BA, and international cross- border sales under Section 195.

8. Seminar on Documentation for Professional Excellence in Direct-tax Compliances held on Monday, 17th August 2026 @ Virtual | Speakers: CA Priya Vora and CA Saroj Maniar

The Direct Tax Committee of the BCAS organised a virtual seminar on “Documentation for Professional Excellence in Direct-tax Compliances” on 17th August 2026. The seminar sought to emphasise the growing importance of robust documentation in ensuring compliance, maintaining professional quality and building an effective defence during assessments, reviews and litigation. CA Priya Vora addressed the participants on documentation in tax audit assignments. She discussed engagement protocols, clause-wise audit documentation, management representations, reliance on third-party information, peer review and TAQRB requirements. CA Saroj Maniar dealt with documentation relating to tax compliance, return filing and certifications. Her session also covered record-keeping for advisory engagements, legal opinions, residential status, trusts, succession matters and positions adopted in tax filings. The speakers highlighted common documentation gaps and shared practical guidance on standard operating procedures, digital documentation protocols and quality control. The seminar received a good response, with 90 members and non-members registering from across the country. The practical insights and comprehensive coverage of the subject were highly appreciated, and the seminar received excellent feedback from the participants.

Scan to watch online at BCAS Academy

Seminar on Documentation for Professional Excellence in Direct-tax Compliances

9. Interactive training session for Officers of EOW

The 4i Committee of Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS) organised an interactive training session on “How to Read Financial Statements and its Importance in Financial Fraud Investigation, with Practical Case Studies” for officers of the Economic Offences Wing (EOW). The session was held at the Office of the Senior Inspector of Police (Admin), Economic Offences Wing, Commissioner of Police Office Compound, Mumbai, and was attended by approximately 150 senior investigating officers from the EOW.

Interactive Training Session

The session was conducted by CA. Mahesh Bhatki, who provided valuable insights into the interpretation and analysis of financial statements, including cash flows, related-party transactions and notes to accounts. The session also included an interactive Q&A and open-house discussion, enabling participants to engage with the trainer and gain practical perspectives relevant to financial fraud investigations.
The event was graced by DCP Pankaj Dahane, Joint CP Rajesh Pradhan and DCP Sangramsingh Nishandar, whose presence added significance to the programme and reflected the importance of strengthening professional knowledge and collaboration in the area of financial fraud investigation.

The programme concluded marking an enriching and meaningful learning interaction between the accounting profession and law-enforcement authorities. The Economic Offences Wing expressed its gratitude to BCAS for organising the training programme, appreciating the Society’s efforts towards supporting and strengthening the professional capabilities of its investigating officers.

10. Indirect Tax Laws Study Circle Meeting on Search & Seizure under GST: Law, Safeguards and Strategy held on Friday, 14th August 2026 @ Virtual | Speakers : CA Sumit Jhunjhunwala (Group Leader) & Sr. Adv. Prakash Shah (Group Mentor)

  • The discussion covered GST search, inspection, seizure and investigation powers under Section 67, focusing on the distinction between Sections 67(1) and 67(2), search authorisations, DIN, panch witnesses, INS-02 and procedural safeguards.
  • Key insights were shared on the limits of seizure powers, including cash, bullion, goods liable to confiscation, third-party records and electronic devices, with emphasis on relevance, proportionality and protection of third-party data.
    • The session examined DRC-03 payments during search/investigation, distinguishing voluntary payment under Section 74(5) from coercive recovery, and discussed DRC-04, refund under Section 54 and writ remedies under Article 226.
  • The discussion covered Section 70 statements, retractions and evidentiary issues, including advocate presence, videography, Article 20(3), legal opinions, retracted statements and cross-examination of third-party witnesses.
  • Participants also examined arrest under Section 69, provisional attachment under Section 83 and ITC blocking under Rule 86A, including written grounds of arrest, necessity of arrest, independent satisfaction and the impermissibility of negative blocking of the electronic credit ledger.
  • On ITC eligibility, the session discussed Sections 16(2) and 155, particularly cases involving non-existent suppliers, and the importance of establishing actual receipt and consumption through e-way bills, transport records, weighbridge slips, gate entries, banking records and stock/production records.
  • The session provided practical guidance on responding to searches and investigations at the ground level, including recording contemporaneous objections, preserving evidence and identifying appropriate statutory and constitutional remedies.

The study circle session witnessed active participation with around 72 members logging in and engaging in healthy and high-quality technical discussions.

11. ITF Study Circle meeting on “Intellectual Property Rights: Statutory Framework & Royalty Taxation.” held on Friday, 7th August 2026 @Virtual. | Speakers: Chairman of the session – CA Ganesh Rajagopalan & Group Leader – CA Smeet Madlani.

The session began with the opening address by the Chairman of the session on the background and brief introduction of concept and issues to be discussed in the case studies.

Post that, the Group Leader discussed each case study in detail discussing its nuances as well as possible views on the same.

The session also had a variety of views on multiple issues from the participants of the session.

The session concluded with closing remarks by the Chairman of the session and the Group Leader.

12. Joint Country Series on Tax – USA event jointly with IFA (India Branch) held from Monday, 3rd August 2026 to Thursday, 6th August 2026@Virtual.

The International Tax Committee of BCAS along with IFA had conducted 4 days webinar on “Joint Country Series on Tax – USA” in the first week of August 2026 wherein different speakers from USA as well as from India were invited to give the presentations and share their knowledge. At BCAS, we had 239 registrations from participants across several cities from India. The webinar was followed by a panel discussion covering practical case studies. The topics covered included Basics of USA Tax for Individuals, Estate and Trust Taxation including Exit Tax, Corporate Taxation including CFC, GILTI, Subpart F, FTC, Transfer Pricing, etc. The selection of the topics was to enable Indian tax practitioners to get knowledge of US tax which can enable them to advise their clients having presence in India as well as in USA from Indian tax as well as US tax perspective. This series received lot of appreciation from the participants.

Scan to watch online at BCAS Academy

Joint Country Series on Tax - USA

13. FEMA Study Circle Meeting on Modes & Mechanics of Foreign Investment in India and gain practical insights into the FDI Route, FPI Route, FVCI Route Etc held on Friday, 17th July 2026 @Virtual | Speaker: CA Yog Bakshi

The session evaluated every investment route against four consistent parameters: entry route conditions, sectoral caps, FDI-linked performance conditions, and pricing guidelines under Rule 21.

Possible instruments were evaluated like – share warrants, hybrid instruments and so on.

The FDI route was analysed through Rule 2(r)’s two-limb test, distinguishing unlisted companies (any stake qualifies) from listed companies (10 percent threshold determines FDI versus FPI classification).

The FPI route covered SEBI registration requirements, investor-group aggregation limits and interplay with sectors where FDI is otherwise prohibited.

The recent development about Individual PROI (repatriable) (erstwhile NRI repat) route was discussed as a distinct portfolio investment channel with its own ceilings, separate from FPI.
The NRI/OCI non-repatriable route was highlighted as unique, with all four regulatory levers disapplied under the Schedule IV deeming fiction treating such investment as domestic.

LLP and FVCI routes were addressed comparatively, noting conditional entry requirements for LLPs and a narrower scope of pricing relief available under the FVCI framework than commonly assumed.

The Investment Vehicle route concluded the session, raising concerns around downstream investment structuring through AIFs, ending with a consolidated comparison table across all routes.

The session was highly interactive. The speaker presented the Modes of inbound investment in a structured and practical manner.

II. BCAS OUTREACH & ENGAGEMENTS

1. Meeting with CA Mahesh Thakkar, Chairman – FIDC.

. Meeting with CA Mahesh Thakkar, Chairman - FIDC.

The Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS) had the privilege of hosting CA Mahesh Thakkar, Chairman, Finance and Industry Development Council (FIDC), the RBI-recognised representative body for NBFCs, for an interaction with the BCAS President CA Kinjal Shah, Office Bearers CA Mandar Telang, CA Kinjal Bhuta, CA Mrinal Mehta, CA Samit Saraf, and Immediate Past President and Chairman of the Accounting & Auditing Committee CA Zubin Billimoria.

The interaction provided an opportunity for a useful preliminary exchange on areas of mutual interest and potential collaboration, including capacity building, research, publications and other professional initiatives.

As a step towards strengthening this association, BCAS was pleased to have FIDC as a Support Partner for the BFSI Conclave, which was on 7th and 8th September 2026 at Taj Ginger Hotel, T1 Mumbai. The collaboration marks a promising beginning towards a meaningful and mutually beneficial relationship between the two institutions.

2. BCAS Delegation Meets Hon. Governor of Maharashtra

BCAS Delegation Meets Hon. Governor of Maharashtra

A delegation of the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS) had the privilege of meeting the Hon. Governor of Maharashtra, Shri Jishnu Dev Varma, to discuss opportunities for leveraging the professional expertise of Chartered Accountants towards strengthening financial education and supporting the MSME sector.

The discussions focused on two key initiatives:

Financial Education for University Students:

BCAS proposed collaborating with the University of Mumbai to provide students with practical and industry-oriented knowledge in Accounts, Taxation and Finance. The initiative aims to bridge the gap between academic curriculum and the practical requirements of the professional and business environment.

Capacity Building for MSMEs:

The delegation also proposed structured training and capacity-building programmes for MSMEs, covering areas such as financial management, taxation, regulatory compliance, governance, internal controls and business sustainability. The objective is to equip MSMEs with the knowledge and capabilities required for sustainable growth and improved financial and governance practices.

As a way forward, it was proposed to constitute a Joint Committee comprising relevant stakeholders to develop and implement these initiatives. The ADC to the Hon. Governor will coordinate with the concerned Ministries and stakeholders for developing a suitable pilot programme.

The Hon. Governor also welcomed the proposal to explore extending similar MSME-focused initiatives to Tripura and the wider North-Eastern region, thereby creating opportunities for BCAS to contribute its professional expertise towards capacity building and economic development in the region.

The meeting marked a significant step towards translating the knowledge and expertise of the profession into practical initiatives in education, entrepreneurship and economic development.

III. REPRESENTATION

Representation to the Reserve Bank of India on Foreign Investment Rules

On Monday, 31st August 2026, the International Taxation Committee of the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS) submitted a comprehensive 15-page representation to the Chief General Manager of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Mumbai, highlighting key issues and suggesting necessary clarifications and amendments to the foreign investment regulatory framework.

The representation, led and signed by BCAS President CA Kinjal Shah, Committee Chairman CA Mayur Nayak and Co-Chairman CA Anil Doshi, covers 11 crucial areas concerning definitions, eligibility, operational and pricing safeguards, and regulatory gaps.

Key recommendations include addressing registration requirements for proprietary concerns, recognising capital contributions in partnership firms as equity, clarifying the distinction between FDI and FPI based on control, and providing clarity on pricing of share transfers between non-residents. The representation also urges restoration of the convertible notes framework for start-ups, exemption of non-repatriable investments from FLA return filing, and issuance of separate regulations governing acquisition of immovable property by non-residents.

Scan to Read the Full Representation

Representation to the Reserve Bank of India on Foreign Investment Rules

IV. BCAS IN NEWS & MEDIA

  •  BCAS News

BCAS has been featured in several news and media platforms, showing our active involvement, professional contributions, and commitment to the field. This reflects the growing recognition of BCAS in the public and professional space.

Link: https://bcasonline.org/bcas-in-news/

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BCAS NEWS

Statistically Speaking

1. JUMP IN WIND POWER IN INDIA

Top states in India with installed capacity in GW

2. RISE IN DIRECT TAX COLLECTIONS FOR THE PERIOD*

RISE IN DIRECT TAX COLLECTIONS FOR THE PERIOD

3. AI INVESTMENT IN INDIA

Enterprise AI investment grew 119% in a single year in India above the global average of 110% Today only 22% of Indian enterprises have AI testing, auditing and risk-assessment processes in place
54% of Indian organisations are deploying AI agents, but only 11% have moved to autonomous workflows AI is projected to account for more than a fifth of the average IT budget by 2027

Source: ServieNow Enterprise AI Maturity Index 2026

4. INSTALLATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS BY INDUSTRY – WORLD

INSTALLATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS BY INDUSTRY - WORLD

5. THE MOST SPOKEN LANGUAGES WORLDWIDE

Speakers in millions

Miscellanea

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

# In a Rare Show of Industry Unity, Anthropic’s Dario Amodei, OpenAI’s Sam Altman and xAI’s Elon Musk Call for a Deliberate Slowdown in Frontier AI Development

In one of the most striking moments in the history of the artificial intelligence industry, the chief executives of the three companies at the very frontier of AI development — Anthropic’s Dario Amodei, OpenAI’s Sam Altman and xAI’s Elon Musk — publicly aligned over the weekend of 12th–13th September 2026 in calling for a deliberate slowdown in the pace of frontier-model development. The catalyst was a 3,800-word essay published by Dr. Amodei on his personal website on 12th September 2026, in which he outlined “serious” risks including loss of human control over advanced systems, and proposed a three-step plan centred on giving independent evaluators “employee-like access” to internal model behaviour — without, he argued, sacrificing commercial advantage or America’s lead in AI. Elon Musk endorsed the essay on X within hours with the terse post “Dario is right”.

Sam Altman followed with an unusually candid X post the same day: “I agree with Dario that we need to pace the frontier. This has been a primary topic of discussions we’ve had at OpenAI in recent weeks. Committing to having independent evaluators with employee-like access is a great idea, and we will do the same.” In a companion interview, Altman conceded that “no lab has solved alignment”, described a 10% probability of catastrophic outcomes as “unacceptable”, and confirmed that OpenAI has been pausing training runs pending safety review — signalling that a much-anticipated 2026 initial public offering is now unlikely. The proximate trigger was the resignation earlier that week of Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon, who publicly warned that frontier labs were racing towards self-improving systems without “acting responsibly”.

(Source: CNBC – dated 14th September 2026)

# Open-Weight AI Returns to Centre Stage: Meta Ships Muse Glimmer 30B and Alibaba Releases the Largest Open-Weight Model in History

In parallel with the price war among proprietary providers, the open-weight AI ecosystem staged a decisive return to prominence in August 2026, with more than eleven major model releases in twenty days. Meta open-sourced its Muse Glimmer 30B model under the Apache 2.0 license on 12th August 2026, making it freely runnable on a single 24 GB consumer GPU and immediately propelling it to the top of the MCP Atlas local-model benchmark. Alibaba matched Meta’s move at scale with the release of Qwen 3.8-Max, a 2.4-trillion-parameter multimodal model with a one-million-token context window — the largest open-weight model in history — alongside a compact 27-billion-parameter variant that, for the first time, brings frontier-grade coding capability to a single-GPU consumer setup. NVIDIA committed to day-zero open-weight availability for its Nemotron 3.5 Lightning model.

The commercial calculus of open-weight releases has changed. Where a year ago open-weight models trailed proprietary frontier models by roughly a generation, they are now competitive at or near the frontier at a fraction of the total cost of ownership — with the added advantage of local deployment, which fully eliminates cross-border data-transfer and third-party-processor exposures.

(Source: Reuters – dated 25th August 2026)

WORLD NEWS

#New Delhi Hosts the 18th BRICS Summit as India’s Middle-Power Diplomacy and Regional Assistance to Nepal Sharpen Its Global Profile

India hosted the 18th BRICS Summit at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi on 12th and 13th September 2026 — its fourth BRICS chairship after 2012, 2016 and 2021 — with President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping among the confirmed attendees. The summit’s agenda covered local-currency settlements, resilient supply chains, food and energy security, reform of global financial institutions and, distinctively for this edition, an emerging “third way” on the digital economy: sovereign national systems that are nonetheless technically interoperable, with India’s UPI and Indonesia’s QRIS integration cited as a live example. The main challenge remained the political difficulty of finding common ground across the grouping’s eleven members, whose positions remain divided on major geopolitical questions.

New Delhi’s diplomatic moment was reinforced by a striking humanitarian and energy response to the catastrophic floods in Nepal, where the death toll has crossed one thousand and roughly ten per cent of Nepal’s electricity generation capacity has been disrupted, forcing Kathmandu to import power from India to cover domestic shortages. Indian, Chinese and Nepalese rescue teams have been operating jointly in the affected districts. Taken together — the BRICS chairship, the digital-economy initiative and the visible role as regional first responder — the developments underscore a shift in India’s external posture from participation to authorship of the emerging Indo-Pacific order. For Indian businesses and advisors, the implications include a widening set of preferential trade and payment channels within BRICS+, fresh transfer-pricing complexity in local-currency invoicing, and additional scrutiny of cross-border humanitarian and CSR flows under FCRA and s.135 of the Companies Act, 2013.

(Source: Reuters – dated 15th September 2026)

FINANCE

# Mumbai Cements Its Grip on India’s Mutual Fund Industry as March 2026 City-Wise AUM Data Show the Top Three Cities Commanding More Than Half of the Nation’s MF Wealth

The city-wise Assets under Management (AUM) data for March 2026, published by the Association of Mutual Funds in India (AMFI) and analysed by Cafemutual on 9th July 2026, tells a compelling story of urban concentration deepening at the top of the Indian mutual fund industry. Mumbai, Delhi and Bengaluru together commanded 50.4% of total industry AUM in March 2026, up sharply from 45% a year earlier. Mumbai alone accounted for 28.97% of the industry, adding a staggering INR 5 lakh crore to its AUM in a single year — the largest absolute addition of any city. Delhi added INR 3.86 lakh crore and Bengaluru added INR 1.1 lakh crore, meaning that the top three cities together accounted for approximately 75% of the industry’s total AUM addition of INR 13.28 lakh crore between March 2025 and March 2026.

The data also captures a striking dispersion at the periphery. Dhanbad emerged as the single most surprising entrant, with its AUM more than doubling from INR 12,623 crore to INR 26,139 crore — a 107% jump in a year — while Thane, the satellite city of Mumbai, recorded a 155% rise from INR 4,651 crore to INR 11,881 crore. Surat has secured its position among the top ten cities, while Ahmedabad and Chennai have swapped positions with Ahmedabad now standing sixth. Seventeen entirely new cities — including Palghar, Panchkula, Gurugram, North Goa, Ernakulam and Mohali — have entered the top 110 for the first time, even as the “other cities” bucket (beyond the top 110) has contracted by INR 34,402 crore.

(Source: Cafemutual.com – dated 9th July 2026)

ENVIRONMENT

# Earth Records Its Hottest August in 176 Years of Data as Antarctic Sea Ice Falls to Third-Lowest on Record and El Niño Intensifies

According to a monthly report released on 10th September 2026 by NOAA’s National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), August 2026 was the hottest August on Earth since modern record-keeping began in 1850. The global surface temperature stood at 1.32°C above the 20th-century average, eclipsing the previous joint August records of 2023 and 2024 by 0.08°C, with NASA and the European Copernicus Climate Change Service both concurring in the assessment; Copernicus rated August 2026 as the hottest single calendar month in recorded history, tied with July 2023. Global average surface air temperature was 1.65°C above the pre-industrial baseline, breaching the 1.5°C safety threshold of the Paris Agreement for the first time since November 2025. At least 364 weather stations set outright all-time heat records during the month.

The cryosphere data was equally sobering. Antarctic sea ice extent in August 2026 was the third-lowest on record for the month, at approximately 1.26 million square kilometres below the 1981–2010 August average — a shortfall roughly equal to the combined land area of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Arctic sea ice extent was the seventh-lowest in the forty-eight-year satellite record, and the Arctic region as a whole recorded its third-warmest August. The World Meteorological Organisation has confirmed that the El Niño event in the tropical Pacific is now firmly established and will intensify into a “very strong” event through the coming months, with material implications for rainfall and temperature patterns extending well into 2027.

(Source: NOAA / Yale Climate Connections – dated 10th September 2026)

Is It Fair To Deny Tax Neutrality To A Demerger The MCA Has Just Approved?

A promoter walks into her Corporate Law Advisor’s office wanting to hive off one business line from another. Her group is unlisted, clean on defaults, and comfortably under the two hundred crore rupee borrowing threshold. The Corporate Law Advisor gives her the good news first: under the amended Rule 25(1A) of the Companies (Compromises, Arrangements and Amalgamations) Rules, 2016, her restructuring qualifies for the fast-track demerger route under section 233 of the Companies Act, 2013. No NCLT filing, no year-long wait for a hearing date. Board approval, member and creditor consent, a registered valuer’s report, and the Regional Director’s confirmation, and the whole process is completed in a few months.

Then she meets her tax adviser, and the mood changes. The very same transaction, cleared in full by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, is not a “demerger” for the purposes of section 2(35) of the Income-tax Act, 2025. No tax neutrality. Capital gains arise at the company level on the transfer of the undertaking, her shareholders may face capital gains on shares they receive for no cash consideration at all, and the accumulated losses of the demerged company cannot travel to the resulting company. She asks the question any reasonable person would ask: how can one arm of government call this a legitimate restructuring and another arm tax it as though she had sold the business to a stranger? Strip away the statutory cross referencing, and that is the only question this piece is really about.

WHAT SECTION 233 ACTUALLY REQUIRES

It would be one thing if section 233 were some kind of back door, a loophole thin enough to justify the tax department’s suspicion. It is not. A company using the fast-track route needs board approval from both companies involved, a notice inviting objections sent to the Registrar, the Official Liquidator, and anyone likely to be affected, approval from members holding at least ninety percent of shares and creditors representing nine tenths in value, a declaration of solvency backed by an audited statement of assets and liabilities, and, since the 2025 amendment, a mandatory report from a registered valuer under Form CAA-11. Where the transaction falls in the newly added unlisted company category, an auditor’s certificate in Form CAA-10A must independently confirm that the borrowing threshold and no default condition are actually met. The Regional Director can still refer the matter to the NCLT if objections are substantive. This is a supervised, document heavy, professionally certified process. It is faster than sections 230 to 232, but faster is not the same as unsafe.

WHY THE TAX LAW STILL SAYS NO

Section 2(35) of the Income-tax Act, 2025, carrying forward Section 2(19AA) of the 1961 Act, recognises a “demerger” only where the transfer happens pursuant to a scheme under Sections 230 to 232 of the Companies Act. Section 233 is simply absent from that definition, and it always has been, going back to Sections 391 to 394 of the 1956 Act. This was not an oversight in the new legislation. The Select Committee that examined the Income-Tax Bill, 2025 was specifically asked by stakeholders to bring Section 233 within the tax neutral definition, and the Ministry of Finance’s response, recorded in the Committee’s report presented to the Lok Sabha on 21st July 2025, rejected the request on three grounds: the exclusion was never intended to change, section 233 lacks the scrutiny of a court monitored process, and widening the definition would be a policy change beyond the Committee’s remit. The Select Committee accepted this, and the Bill went through unchanged. So, this is not a gap waiting to be noticed. It is a considered position, defended in Parliament, and it deserves to be argued with rather than dismissed as a drafting slip.

TESTING THE MINISTRY’S REASONING

Take the Ministry’s central objection seriously for a moment: without a Tribunal in the room, could valuations under Section 233 be gamed to manufacture a tax advantage? It is a fair worry in the abstract. But it has to be tested against what the September 2025 notification actually built into the process, not against how Section 233 looked before that amendment. A registered valuer’s report is now compulsory. Registered valuers do not operate in a vacuum; they answer to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, which sets their qualifications code of conduct, and the disciplinary consequences for getting things wrong. Add to that the auditor’s certificate confirming eligibility, and the Regional Director’s own power to escalate a contentious scheme to the NCLT, and the picture that emerges is not one of an unsupervised free for all. The premise on which the tax exclusion was defended before the Select Committee has, in real terms, moved since that defence was written. An objection that made sense against the old Section 233 does not automatically survive against the amended one, and nobody appears to have gone back and asked whether it still holds.

There is also a simpler point buried under all the procedure. The substantive conditions that actually earn tax neutrality, going concern transfer, book value transfer of assets and liabilities, proportionate allotment of shares, and three fourths shareholder continuity, have nothing to do with which forum approved the scheme. A Section 233 demerger that satisfies every one of those conditions produces an identical economic result as a Section 232 demerger that does. The business moves, the shareholding continues, and nothing is monetised. Taxing one and not the other is not protecting revenue from abuse; it is taxing a label.

WHO ACTUALLY CARRIES THIS COST

Section 233 was never meant for everyone. It started out for small companies, wholly owned subsidiaries, and start-ups, and even after the 2025 expansion widened the categories to structures where the holding company can be listed, the route isn’t automatically an easy one for a listed group to use. You need creditors representing nine tenths in value and members holding ninety percent of the total shares on board, a materially higher bar than the three fourths in value threshold that governs an ordinary NCLT scheme. For a widely held listed company, clearing that is genuinely difficult, in some ways harder than just going to the Tribunal. So, this was never built as a backdoor for large corporates to dodge scrutiny. Its real purpose was to take routine, lower risk restructurings off an NCLT docket that’s already stretched thin with other litigation, and free up the Tribunal for matters that actually need it.

And at every stage, the Registrar of Companies and the Regional Director are watching the file, so the idea that this route runs unsupervised doesn’t hold up either. What it does mean is that the companies that can actually clear that ninety percent bar, mostly smaller unlisted businesses, family groups splitting up ahead of a succession, start-ups tidying their structure before the next funding round, are exactly the ones with the least room to absorb a capital gains bill on a transaction that generated no cash at all. The tax exclusion doesn’t land evenly. It lands hardest on the very businesses the 2025 expansion was meant to help, and it pushes them straight back toward the slower, costlier route Section 233 was supposed to let them skip. Handing someone ease of doing business with one clause and quietly taking its value back with another isn’t easy to defend as fair, however sound the technical justification may seem on paper.

SO, IS IT FAIR?

Return to what the Ministry of Finance actually told the Select Committee, and the case begins to come apart on its own terms. The first ground was continuity: “There is no omission per se. The provisions are in line with the present Income-tax Act, 1961.” That sounds tidy until one recalls why Section 233 was never in the old definition to begin with. It could not have been. Section 233 did not exist under the Companies Act, 1956, the fast-track route was introduced only with the 2013 Act. Silence in the 1961 law was not a considered exclusion; it was simply the absence of the thing being described. And “staying in line with the present Act” turns out to be a selective principle in any case, since the Income-tax Act, 2025 departs from its 1961 predecessor in plenty of other places where Parliament decided change was warranted. If continuity could give way there, it is hard to see why it had to be preserved here.

The second ground was more pointed: “We have not made it tax neutral because that is not supervised by any court or tribunal. This is done by the assessee themselves.” That framing treats the Regional Director’s confirmation as though a company were signing off on its own scheme. It is not. A Regional Director (RD) heads the office for an entire region, supervises the Registrars of Companies and the Official Liquidators working under that office, and exercises powers of the Central Government delegated specifically for this purpose, including the power to call for information and inspect a company’s books of account under Section 206 of the Companies Act, 2013. An RD is also formally designated a Head of Department. None of that amounts to self-certification. There is also something faintly awkward about one ministry doubting the rigour of an authority sitting under another ministry, especially when Finance and Corporate Affairs have been held by the same Minister. If regulatory comity means anything, the Supreme Court’s direction in CCI vs. Bharti Airtel Ltd. [(2019) 5 SCC 796], asking regulators to work with each other rather than around each other, ought to apply at least as easily within one minister’s portfolio as it does across two.
The third ground was the valuation worry itself: “Fast track mergers are non-court monitored and therefore the valuations thereof can result in tax implications or avoidance.” That was a defensible position once. It is harder to sustain after 4th September 2025, when the amended rules made a registered valuer’s report mandatory for every Section 233 scheme, filed in Form CAA-11 and backed, for the newly added categories, by a separate auditor’s certificate in Form CAA-10A.

Tested against the Ministry’s own three grounds, none of them survive.

WHAT WOULD MAKE IT FAIR

The fix does not need to be dramatic, and it does not cost the exchequer anything it was ever entitled to collect. A reorganisation that rearranges value rather than realising it was never meant to be taxed; that is the entire premise behind tax neutral demergers in the first place. Amending Section 2(35) of the Income-tax Act, 2025 to bring Section 233 schemes within the definition, on satisfaction of the same substantive conditions already applied to Section 232 schemes, would fix this without opening any new door to abuse. That is not what fair regulation is supposed to look like, and it is worth saying so plainly rather than leaving it to a footnote in a tax opinion.

EPILOGUE

There is a larger question of policy direction sitting underneath all of this. Is it not that an envisaged Viksit Bharat needs Viksit Regulations? The kind that is prepared to sustain businesses willing to take risk and create employment, not one where the ease of regulation offered by one ministry is quietly withdrawn by another. The vision of a Viksit Bharat rests, in no small measure, on Viksit compliance, a regulatory architecture that is proportionate, purposive, and calibrated to commercial reality rather than to inherited form. If the fast-track route is to serve the ease of doing business objective it was created for, tax treatment must move from a forum-based test to a substance based one. That is the difference between compliance that merely exists and compliance that is Viksit, developed and fit for the purpose it is meant to serve.

Regulatory Referencer

1. Govt. amends FEM (NDI) Rules; allows inventory-based e-commerce entities to export goods manufactured or produced in India

Central Government has amended the FEMA (Non debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 to permit an e-commerce entity to undertake an inventory-based model of e-commerce, exclusively for goods or products manufactured or produced in India, in accordance with the Foreign Trade Policy 2023 read with Handbook of Procedures and FEMA Export of Goods & Services Regulations, 2015. The existing restrictions on Business to Consumer (B2C) transactions and inventory-based e-commerce as specified in serial numbers 15.2.1 to 15.2.4 will not apply to such export of goods or products.

(Notification No. S.O. 4870(E). [F.NO. 1/4/2026-EM], dated 2nd September 2026)

(A.P. (DIR Series 2026-27) Circular No. 20 dated 2nd September 2026)

2. RBI withdraws seven superseded FEMA circulars as part of regulatory rationalisation

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) formally withdrew seven obsolete or superseded circulars under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) as part of its ongoing regulatory cleanup – most of them to do with External Commercial Borrowings – regulations for which were recently amended substantially.

(A.P. (DIR Series 2026-27) Circular No. 21, dated 8th September 2026)

(Prove The Relationship!)

Arjun (Chanting) Hare Krishna! Hare Krishna!

Shrikrishna (A little annoyed). Arjun, why are you calling me every now and then?

Arjun Bhagwan, we are facing deadlines after deadlines. Like the waves of the sea.No respite. So chanting your name gives me some relief.

Shrikrishna Your grumbling is endless. I am also tired of hearing it.

Arjun (Surprised) Bhagwan, for so many years, I never saw you so annoyed. You are ‘sthitapradnya’ (of balanced mind). What has made you so agitated?

Shrikrishna Today my auditor did height of stupid queries!

Arjun Why? What happened? What did he ask?

Shrikrishna He asked me to prove that Rukmini is my wife! From my company some payment was made to Rukmini. So he declared it as a related party transaction.

Arjun That’s correct.

Shrikrishna Now the entire world knows that Rukmini is my wife. We were married thousands of years ago.

Arjun Yes. I wonder why he asked such a question. Do you have your marriage certificate?

Shrikrishna It may be there. But now after so many years, how to trace it? It must be in Dwarka.

Arjun By the way, who is the auditor of your Mathura Dairy Pvt. Ltd?

Shrikrishna One Mr. Paresh.

Arjun Ohhh! Paresh? I know why he does so. Paresh is himself pareshan because of such related party reporting.

Shrikrishna Why?

Arjun In some other company some remuneration was paid to a director’s wife. It was properly reported

Shrikrishna Then?

Arjun That director was a divorcee He had obtained divorce order 8 years ago! Then 4 years ago he got remarried. Remuneration was pad to his present wife.

Shrikrishna Then it should be reported. What is wrong about it? Why is he troubling me?

Arjun Bhagwan, that director’s former wife has now challenged the divorce order.

Shrikrishna Let her challenge. How does it matter to us?’

Arjun No, Lord. The ex-wife has filed a complaint against Paresh for misconduct to our Institute. She says, she alone is the real wife! Therefore, the reporting is wrong! Ha! Ha!! Ha!!!

Shrikrishna Non-sense! Auditor has to go by director’s declaration for this point. This complaint would be thrown out!

Arjun Bhagwan, I agree. But life is not that easy for us CAs. The procedure will take at least a couple of years to resolve even such a simple case.

Shrikrishna Do they mean that in your working papers, you should gather these evidences as well? What if it is paid to brother, sister, parents? or to children?

Arjun You are omniscient! You have to guide us. I am adding it to my checklist of Working Papers to be gathered!

Shrikrishna I closed Dwapar Yuga and declared the beginning of Kaliyuga. I am convinced that now, Kaliyuga is in its full swing. I have full sympathy for you CAs after this experience. There should be some mechanism in place to reject such complaints at the threshold.

Arjun Now even God cannot save us. Right?

Both laugh. Ha! Ha!! Ha!!!

OM SHANTI.

This dialogue is based on how our ICAI disciplinary mechanism is being misused unfortunately, our own members instigate people to file such complaints and cause nuisance to CAs.

M/s Jindal Poly Films Limited v. Ankit Jain & Ors.: Minority public shareholders holding over threshold can maintain class action suit against promoter related-party transactions under Section 245.

14. M/s Jindal Poly Films Limited V/S Ankit Jain & Ors

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Principal Bench (New Delhi)

Company Appeal (AT) No. 47 Of 2026

Date of Order:26th February, 2026

The NCLAT upheld that Section 245 of the Companies Act, 2013 is not limited to continuing acts in present and can be legally activated for past and concluded transaction and also observed that Power of NCLT under Section 245 are exceptionally wide and allow for reliefs, damages, or compensation to be claimed from or against third parties, including directors, promoters, and consultants.

FACTS

A class action petition under Section 245 of the Companies Act, 2013 was filed before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). They alleged that the promoters and management systematically orchestrated, undervalued, and concealed three major fraudulent financial transactions to their own benefit, causing an asset/value erosion of over `2,500 crores to M/s JPFL and its minority public shareholders.

Where the interlocutory application (IA) was filed by the management of M/s JPFL to challenge the maintainability of the main petition filed by Ankit Jain & Others (minority public shareholders) under Section 245 and NCLT comprehensively dismissed the management’s maintainability application and admitted the shareholders’ class action petition based on the following determinations:

i) Satisfaction of the Numerical Threshold: The NCLT noted that in the case of a listed public company, Rule 84(3)(ii)(b) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 (NCLT, Rules) requires a minimum shareholding threshold of 2% of the total share capital to institute/file a class action. Since the petitioners cumulatively held 4.99% of the share capital, the threshold was satisfied.

ii) Establishment of a Prima Facie Case: The NCLT reviewed the financial layout detailing the three disputed related-party transactions (the multi-crore undervaluation of preference shares, suspicious loan write-offs, and cut-rate subsidiary asset sales). It noted that the transactions themselves were not denied by the company and these figures established a sufficient basis for forming a prima facie opinion that the affairs were conducted in a manner prejudicial to the company and its members, which was sufficient to initiate the proceedings.

iii) Benevolent Scope of Section 245: The NCLT observed that Section 245 is a benevolent piece of legislation designed to protect shareholders and depositors against management malpractice. It explicitly stated that the provision enables shareholders to initiate actions for the benefit of the company itself. It was categorically rejected the argument that the availability of alternative remedies under Section 241-242 (Oppression & Mismanagement) should discredit or block a valid class action suit under Section 245.

Therefore, NCLT in its order directed the issuance of a public notice of the Company Petition to all public shareholders of M/s JPFL in terms of Rule 87 of the NCLT Rules, 2016. Thereafter, M/s JPFL filed an appeal, challenging an order of the Ld. NCLT before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi (NCLAT).

ORDER

NCLAT found no reason to interfere with the NCLT’s order with rejection of the argument of M/s JPFL and completely dismissing the appeal with following observations in its order:

i) Section 245 extends to past and concluded transactions: It was ruled that Section 245(1)(g)(iii) uses the word “or” to separate “wrongful act or conduct” from “any likely act or conduct”, which structurally covers past completed events alongside future ones and noted that fundamental reliefs explicitly written into the class action statute such as damages or compensation can only logically be granted for transactions that have already been concluded in the past.

ii) Class actions cover “derivative” benefits for the Company: The NCLAT held that the Indian Parliament explicitly intended for Section 245 to apply when a company’s assets are siphoned off by its own promoters or management. Replying on the “J.J. Irani Committee Report (2005)” and stated that class actions protect the interests of both the members and the company itself.

iii) Promoters blocked from using the “Stale Transaction” defense: The NCLAT observed that because the promoters intentionally concealed the transactions at the time of commission, they cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own wrongdoing by calling the transactions “stale” or “concluded” later on.

iv) Validation of the NCLT’s assessment: the NCLAT verified that the respondents held 4.99% of the share capital of M/s JPFL, comfortably clear of the mandatory 2% statutory minimum required for listed companies to file a class suit and agreed that the shareholders acted in absolute good faith, having diligently demanded answers from management of M/s JPFL before approaching the Tribunal.

P Balaraman & 5 Others v. The India Envelopes Ltd.: Corporate powers cannot be exercised to secure collateral benefits for directors; improper property sales constitute oppression and mismanagement

13. P Balaraman & 5 Others V/sThe India Envelopes Ltd & 2 Others National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai Bench

Case Reference: CP/45/CHE/2021

Order dated 1st September, 2026

“Corporate powers cannot be exercised to secure collateral benefits for the directors themselves or for entities in which they have a personal interest…The fiduciary obligation of candour is not confined merely to statutory disclosures but extends to every material circumstance capable of influencing the informed decision of the shareholders.”

FACTS

  • The petition was filed under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 (CA 2013) by six minority shareholders of The India Envelopes Ltd. (IEL), holding about 1% of the share capital but constituting more than one-tenth of total members, thus meeting the threshold under Section 244.
  • IEL’s business of manufacturing paper envelopes had become commercially unviable, leaving its immovable property at Chidambaram as its sole valuable asset.
  • Shareholders had passed special resolutions in 2016 and 2018 authorizing the Board (including Respondents 2 & 3, the Managing Director and Director) to sell the property for the benefit of the company and shareholders.
  • However, Respondents 2 & 3, who also controlled National Sewing Thread Company Ltd. (NSTC), executed a Tripartite Agreement (03.08.2017) with NSTC and its trade creditors.
  • The agreement contemplated sale of IEL’s property with proceeds diverted to discharge NSTC’s liabilities (₹4.16 crore), after setting aside ₹1 crore for IEL’s statutory dues.
  • Petitioners alleged this was done without shareholder approval, amounting to diversion of IEL’s assets for NSTC’s benefit.
  • NSTC later entered CIRP, and its Resolution Plan was approved in 2021, subsuming the liabilities covered under the Tripartite Agreement.

Petitioners’ Contentions

  • The Tripartite Agreement was illegal, ultra vires, and oppressive as it diverted IEL’s sole asset for NSTC’s benefit.
  • Directors acted in conflict of interest, breaching fiduciary duties under Section 166 of the CA 2013.
  • The agreement was beyond the authority conferred by shareholders’ resolutions, which only permitted sale for IEL’s benefit.
  • Post approval of NSTC’s Resolution Plan, the agreement became inoperative and unenforceable.

Respondents’ Defence

  • Denied oppression and mismanagement, claiming shareholders were kept informed.
  • Asserted that the Tripartite Agreement was only a mechanism to sell IEL’s property at a fair price with ₹1 crore earmarked for IEL’s dues.
  • Claimed no diversion of assets or guarantee for NSTC’s debts, and that decisions were bona fide and in compliance with law.

Tribunal’s Findings

  • The Tribunal held that Respondents 2 & 3 abused their fiduciary position by executing the Tripartite Agreement without disclosure to shareholders.
  • Observed that “Corporate powers cannot be exercised to secure collateral benefits for directors themselves or for entities in which they have a personal interest.”
  • The fiduciary duty extends beyond statutory disclosures to all material facts influencing shareholder decisions.
  • The Tripartite Agreement was a breach of fiduciary duty, amounting to oppression and mismanagement.
  • With NSTC’s Resolution Plan approved, the liabilities under the Tripartite Agreement stood subsumed, making the agreement inoperative. No parallel enforcement was permissible.

HELD

  • The execution of the Tripartite Agreement in the facts and circumstances of the present case, constitutes a breach of their fiduciary duties as Directors and amounts to acts of oppression and mismanagement within the meaning of Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013.
  • The execution of the Tripartite Agreement on behalf of IEL, without disclosure or approval of the shareholders for the true purpose for which it was executed and in breach of their fiduciary duties, shall not bind the internal management or future affairs of IEL. Respondents shall not, either by themselves or through any person claiming under them, rely upon or act upon the said Agreement so as to deal with or encumber IEL’s property or divert the proceeds thereof contrary to this order.
  • Respondents are permanently restrained from implementing, acting upon, enforcing or otherwise giving effect to the Tripartite Agreement or from dealing with IEL’s immovable property for the purpose of discharging the liabilities of NSTC or any third party, except with the prior approval of the shareholders obtained after full disclosure of all material facts and in accordance with law.
  • IEL shall be at liberty to sell, transfer, alienate or otherwise deal with IEL’s immovable property strictly in accordance with the Special Resolutions after obtaining such statutory approvals as may be required under law. The entire sale consideration realised therefrom shall belong exclusively to IEL and shall be brought into IEL’s accounts for utilisation towards the revival of its business, repayment of its own lawful liabilities, or such other legitimate corporate purposes in accordance with law. No portion of the sale proceeds shall be diverted or applied towards the discharge of liabilities of any third party without the express approval of the shareholders obtained after full and complete disclosure of all material facts.

Terminology, Triggers, And Disclosure Requirements – SAST SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 2011

The SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 2011 (SAST Regulations) govern direct or indirect acquisitions of shares, voting rights, or control in listed target companies. The primary trigger for a mandatory open offer—providing minority shareholders an exit mechanism—is reaching or exceeding the 25% voting rights threshold. Holdings of Persons Acting in Concert (PACs), under general or deemed categories, aggregate towards triggering open offer and disclosure obligations. Automatic exemptions under Regulation 10 apply to specific transactions like inter-se transfers. Event-based disclosures are mandatory within two working days upon crossing 5% shareholding or subsequent 2% changes.

INTRODUCTION

India’s takeover framework evolved alongside the growth of its securities market, beginning with the introduction of open offer in the Listing Agreement in 1990s and the statutory establishment of SEBI under the SEBI Act, 1992. The first dedicated takeover code was introduced in 1994 and was subsequently replaced by the 1997 Regulations following the recommendations of the Bhagwati Committee. With increasing takeover activity and regulatory experience, SEBI undertook a comprehensive review through the Takeover Regulations Advisory Committee (TRAC), which ultimately led to the emergence of the 2011 Regulations. The framework has continued to evolve through subsequent amendments, with the latest amendment to the Regulations being notified on December 5, 2025 which is known as the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 2011 (“SAST Regulations” or “SAST” or “Takeover Code” or “Code”).

OBJECTIVE OF THE TAKEOVER CODE

The importance of the SAST Regulations lies in providing an orderly and predictable framework for transactions that can significantly alter the ownership or control of a listed company. Such transactions involve multiple stakeholders with potentially different interests. While an acquirer may seek to pursue a substantial acquisition or takeover without the regulatory framework becoming unduly onerous, public shareholders need transparency and a fair opportunity to participate when such a change in ownership or control takes place. The Takeover Code, at its core, is the framework that seeks to balance these interests by regulating the manner in which substantial acquisitions and takeovers are undertaken, while protecting the interests of public shareholders through prescribed disclosure and open offer mechanism.

APPLICABILITY AND FRAMEWORK

Applicability of the Regulations

The SAST Regulations apply to the acquisition of shares, voting rights or control in a target company, whether such acquisition is made directly or indirectly. The starting point, therefore, is to determine what constitutes a “target company” and what constitutes “shares” or “voting rights” for the purposes of the Regulations.

A target company is a company whose equity shares are listed on a stock exchange. Accordingly, the SAST framework is concerned with acquisitions involving companies having a listed equity share capital, and does not extend to unlisted companies, companies that are yet to list or companies having other classes of listed securities.

The scope of shares, however, extends beyond the commonly understood equity shares. It includes any security which entitles its holder to exercise voting rights, and expressly includes depository receipts having a voting entitlement in the target company. Accordingly, warrants or other convertible securities may fall within the definition if they carry an exercisable right to vote. An acquirer might obtain voting rights on preference shares due to non-payment of declared dividend for two years or more or by operation of law. Accordingly, voting rights arising on acquiring any share or security by whatever arrangement are recognised under the SAST framework over and above the rights embodied in equity shares.

Accordingly, the applicability of SAST requires consideration of:

(i) whether the entity is a target company,

(ii) whether the acquisition involves shares or voting rights covered by the Regulations, and

(iii) whether it results in acquisition of control.

Whether a particular transaction attracts the SAST framework would ultimately depend on the applicable thresholds, triggering provisions, the manner in which the acquisition is undertaken, the identity of the acquirer and persons acting in concert (“PACs”), subject to certain carved out exemptions. The same can be understood in detail by the regulatory framework.

The Art of the takeover

Regulatory Framework

The SAST Regulations read with the relevant SEBI circulars and Master Circular, provide the governing and procedural framework for open offer triggers, exemptions, disclosures, the process and related compliances. Together, they answer four key questions –

(a) what is being acquired;

(b) does the acquisition trigger an open offer;

(c) if triggered, how is the open offer to be carried out;

(d) what disclosure and compliance obligations must be followed.

The most important trigger is the 25% threshold as mentioned under Regulation 3, where if an acquirer, together with PACs, acquires shares or voting rights which take their aggregate holding to 25% or more, an open offer obligation is generally triggered. An open offer is an offer made by the acquirer to the shareholders of the target company inviting them to tender their shares in the target company at a particular price. The primary purpose of an open offer is to provide an exit option to the shareholders of the target company on account of the change in control or substantial acquisition of shares, occurring in the target company.

The above can be understood better by an example: if an acquirer already holds 20% and proposes to acquire another 5.5%, taking its holding to 25.5%, the acquisition would generally trigger an open offer. The Regulations also permit an acquirer who already holds 25% or more, but below the maximum permissible non-public shareholding of 75%, to increase their holding by up to 5% in a financial year without triggering an open offer, subject to the conditions of the Regulations (creeping acquisition).

To understand the Takeover Code better, it is essential to be familiar with some of the frequently used terms. Some are relatively straightforward, while others have been the subject of considerable regulatory and judicial interpretation.

1. Who can be an Acquirer?

“Acquirer” means any person who, directly or indirectly, acquires or agrees to acquire whether by himself, or through, or with persons acting in concert with him, shares or voting rights in, or control over a target company. An acquirer can be a natural person, a corporate entity or any other legal entity. For example:

  •  XYZ Group has three group companies acting in concert that acquire 9%, 9%, and 8% (totalling to 26%) of listed G Ltd. Under SAST, because these entities are PACs, their collective holding may trigger the open offer requirement. Each entity is an acquirer while they are collectively considered as PACs.
  • Where an entity acquires convertible warrants that entitle it to acquire more than 25% of the voting rights, the acquisition may trigger the open offer requirement even though the equity shares are acquired only upon conversion of the warrants.
  • A family trust acquiring shares in a listed company may itself be an “acquirer” and where it acts in concert with the promoter group, it may also be treated as a PAC.

2. What is an Acquisition?

“Acquisition” means, directly or indirectly, acquiring or agreeing to acquire shares or voting rights in, or control over, a target company. Here, acquisition has a broader meaning than simply purchasing the shares in the target company via secondary transfers or fresh issues. Over and above an agreement or mutual understanding, one can acquire shares pursuant to a scheme of merger / demerger sanctioned by the NCLT or corporate actions like rights issue, buyback and many other ways, subject to applicable exemptions.

There is also the concept of an indirect acquisition which occurs when a person acquires another company or business which, in turn, gives them sufficient voting rights or control over a listed target company to trigger an open offer. For example, A Ltd acquires B Ltd which holds 30% of listed C Ltd. A Ltd may therefore be treated as indirectly acquiring C Ltd.

Further, it is imperative to check the date of listing as well as date of acquisition. This is especially important in case of companies going for a public issue. Shares or voting rights held by a person pre-IPO shall also be considered as “acquisition” at the time of listing.

Shares acquired through an encumbrance are treated as an acquisition, while shares released from an encumbrance are treated as a disposal. Here, ‘encumbrance’ shall include any restriction on the free trade of the shares, pledge, lien or non-disposal undertaking or any arrangement/covenant in the nature of above.

3. What constitutes as Control?

Another way of acquisition is via Control. Under SAST, control is not merely a measure of ownership, but of the rights and arrangements through which influence over the target company is exercised. The term “Control” includes the right to appoint a majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or person acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including be virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders’ agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner: Provided that a director or officer of a target company shall not be considered to be in control over such target company, merely by virtue of holding such position.

SEBI has also expressly recognised that acquisition of control is a separate limb of the takeover framework. It is an approach where the law looks into corporate governance, and therefore, tries to determine who is actually directing the affairs of the company in addition to the persons holding the shares.

4. Understanding PACs

The definition of persons acting in concert (PACs) is not limited to the person whose name appears as the purchaser in the transaction documents. Close business association between two or more persons or them being part of the same promoter group does not by itself make them PAC. A relationship arising merely by accident or chance is not sufficient to prove them as PAC. If such persons join hands with a shared objective but that is not to substantially acquire the shares or voting rights or control over a target company, then they would not be PAC.

To be a considered a PAC, one must fulfil certain “bright line” tests where there is a common purpose, agreement or understanding and active co-operation to gain control over or substantially acquire a company. Concert is the meeting of minds where one doesn’t necessarily need a signed legal document to be a PAC. The intention, mode of acquisition, source of acquisition, object of acquisition together with the timing are considerations we simply cannot ignore during our assessment of PACs. The Regulations divide them into two categories – General Category and Deemed Category of PACs.

(i) General PAC Category

For the General Category, the starting point is whether persons share a common objective or purpose of acquiring shares or voting rights in, or exercising control over, the target company and, whether same is pursuant to a formal or informal agreement or understanding, directly or indirectly cooperate towards that objective.

For example, two independent investors may meet privately and agree to purchase shares simultaneously so that they can jointly exercise the control over the target company. Friends and acquaintances do not share a structural, corporate, or institutional relationship by default (unlike immediate family or subsidiaries). Therefore, they are not automatically deemed to be acting in concert. However, if their stock purchases align and there is evidence such as chats, synchronised funding arrangements, or a verbal understanding to acquire the shares, they could be treated as PACs based on their actual conduct, a common objective and coordinated action.

Another interesting aspect is where an independent lender providing finance on arm’s-length terms would not, by itself, be a PAC. However, where financing rights extend beyond customary lender protections and enable acquisition of shares or control, SAST PAC provisions may need to be examined.

(ii) Deemed Category of PACs

The Deemed Category is where certain categories of persons are deemed to be PACs, unless the contrary is established. These include, among others, companies within the same management or control, a company and its directors, promoters, members of the promoter group, and immediate relatives. Similar deeming provisions apply to specified fund and intermediary relationships, subject to the conditions prescribed under the Regulations. For example, a mutual fund, its sponsor, trustees and AMC; a portfolio manager and its client who is an acquirer may be deemed to be PACs under the Regulations, unless the contrary is established. The deeming provision creates a rebuttable presumption and therefore, the onus is on the concerned persons to establish that the PAC relationship does not, in the given circumstances, result in them acting in concert. Failure to prove that there is no linkage or coordination amongst them in their trading strategies may result in them collectively facing penal consequences such as aggregating their combined shareholdings, which can trigger mandatory open offer requirements.

5. Exemptions and Relaxations

Regulation 10 deals with specific exemptions from the open offer obligation, whereas Regulation 11 enables SEBI to grant relaxation from the obligations under appropriate circumstances, subject to certain conditions. The exemption under Regulation 10 is automatically available where the prescribed conditions are satisfied, with prior intimation in some cases and post-facto reporting with the prescribed fee and timeline in others, as specified in the Takeover Code. Regulation 11, in contrast, allows an acquirer to approach SEBI for relaxation from a specific obligation where the circumstances warrant such relief. The application must be made before the transaction is executed, and SEBI’s written order must be obtained before proceeding with the transaction.

Some of the more commonly encountered exemptions under Regulation 10 include inter-se transfers among specified relatives, promoters and persons under common control subject to prescribed conditions and disclosure history; acquisitions pursuant to rights issues; acquisitions pursuant to sanctioned schemes of arrangement, merger or demerger; acquisition pursuant to transmission, inheritance, or succession; and certain acquisitions made by specified intermediaries such as stock brokers, market makers, merchant bankers, etc in the ordinary course of business.

To sum it up, an acquisition may be exempt from the open offer obligation, but it does not necessarily escape the disclosure framework.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

The disclosure framework is essentially an event-based reporting mechanism that ensures transparency in the transfer, acquisition, and encumbrance of shares in listed target companies. The SAST Regulations treat the open offer requirement distinctly from the disclosure requirement. For an acquirer and its PACs together, it becomes important to check both the triggers separately.

Regulation 29, which talks about disclosures, should be interpreted at an inception stage and at a continuous level where the disclosure should happen within two working days from intimation of allotment acquisition/disposal of the shares or voting rights to the target company and all the exchanges where it is registered, in the disclosure formats prescribed by SEBI.

At the inception stage, any person, who along with PACs crosses the threshold limit of 5% of shares or voting rights, has to disclose their aggregate shareholding and voting rights. With regards to continual disclosures, any person who holds 5% or more of shares or voting rights of the target company is required to disclose any change in such shareholding or voting rights that exceeds 2% of the total shareholding / voting rights.

In both the cases, disclosure is required to be made within two working days to the target company at its registered office and to every stock exchange where the shares of the target company are listed, in the format prescribed by SEBI.

The purpose of these disclosures is not merely to record that a numerical threshold has been crossed, but to make significant changes in the ownership of a listed company visible to the market. A shareholder crossing 5% signals that it has built a material stake in the company, while the subsequent 2% disclosure requirement ensures that further material increases or reductions do not go unnoticed. This transparency also helps prevent significant changes in ownership from being built up unnoticed or through coordinated transactions that could distort the market’s understanding of who is acquiring control in the company. For investors, these disclosures therefore provide a trail of changes in significant shareholdings and voting power, enabling them to take informed decisions.

GOOD PRACTICES TO BE SAST COMPLIANT

The Code in itself is extensive, and the natural question that arises is – when does a transaction trigger an intimation or disclosure?

For regular traders and investors, continuous tracking is essential. It is advisable to maintain a consolidated record of the trading activity of the acquirer and all PACs from acquisition through sale. While the statutory threshold is 5%, monitoring at a lower internal threshold, say 4.5%, provides a useful compliance buffer.

Post the first disclosure, the key is to understand that the “change” in shareholding or voting rights needs to be calculated at every purchase /sale and their cumulative sum, if over 2%, will trigger a disclosure. The calculation must account for changes in both the numerator and, where applicable, the denominator due to changes in the company’s share capital. Importantly, the tracking does not reset at the end of each financial year, and may need to continue over several years.

SAST may appear to be a matter of mathematics and precision. But the numbers tell only part of the story; understanding the transaction is where the art lies.

Bandana Pattanayak v. Initiating Officer: Property purchased in relatives’ names using brother’s unevidenced loan funds constitutes a benami transaction, satisfying future benefit provisions.

11. 2026 (8) TMI 817 (SAFEMA – New Delhi)

Smt. Bandana Pattanayak, Shri Anup Majee and Shri Ashok Pattanayak v. Initiating Officer, Kolkata

Date of Order : 09.7.2026

In absence of the means to purchase the property by the Benamidar and in absence of documentary evidence to establish the amount given to the Benamidar as a loan by the Beneficial Owner, the property purchased in the names of the sister and brother in law (benamidars) from the funds transferred by the brother (brother-in-law) will be a Benami Transaction.

The condition regarding future benefit under section 2(9)(A) of the PBPT Act is not confined to a specified period and can take place any time in the future. Moreover, such condition need not be satisfied at the time of provisional attachment.

FACTS

The Appellants are Mr. Anup, Smt. Bandana and Mr. Ashok. It was the case of the Initiating Officer that Mr. Anup, who is the Beneficial Owner herein has purchased three properties in the names of his sister, Smt. Bandana and brother-in-law, Mr. Ashok who are the Benamidars. The consideration for purchase of properties was paid by Mr. Anup. Since the properties were purchased in the names of the sister and the brother in law of the Beneficial Owner, who did not contribute the consideration and otherwise could not show the means to purchase the three properties in a row for ₹2,65,00,000, the proceedings were initiated under the provisions of the PBPT Act.

The Adjudicating Authority, vide order dated 31.05.2025 confirmed the provisional attachment of the properties made under section 26(3) of the PBPT Act.

The Appellant filed appeal before the Tribunal challenging the order of the Adjudicating Authority and contending that:

(i.) The amount for purchase of the properties was transferred by way of a loan and therefore could not be considered as a benami transaction;

(ii.) The Beneficial Owner – Mr. Anup being the brother had a right to transfer the amount to his sister and brother in law out of natural love and affection; and

(iii.) The requirement of future benefit under section 2(9)(A) of the PBPT Act remained to be proved by the Respondent and in absence of the satisfaction of the basic requirement of the definition of Benami Transaction, the transaction was not a Benami Transaction and therefore the order of the Adjudicating Authority confirming provisional attachment deserved to be set aside.

HELD

The Tribunal held that the argument of the Appellant that the amount was transferred as a loan was not supported with any loan document and therefore without any proof. The Tribunal affirmed the finding of the Adjudicating Authority that if the Appellant was within his right to give the amount out of love and affection, the Appellant could have gifted the property instead of transferring the funds for the purchase of the property. The Tribunal also held that the sister and the brother-in-law of the Beneficial Owner did not have the means to purchase the properties in their names. With regard to the contention of the Appellant that the condition regarding the future benefit under section 2(9)(A) was not satisfied, and therefore the transaction was not a Benami Transaction, the Tribunal held that the term ‘future benefit’ under section 2(9)(A) of the Act is without earmarking to any particular period. The benefit can happen or arise any time in future without the limitation of period. The condition regarding future benefit need not necessarily be satisfied at the time of provisional attachment. Further, the records revealed that the Beneficial Owner had availability of unaccounted and undisclosed funds and therefore the same were utilised for his future benefits. Thus, the appeal filed by the Appellants was dismissed.

Miscellanea

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

# In a Rare Show of Industry Unity, Anthropic’s Dario Amodei, OpenAI’s Sam Altman and xAI’s Elon Musk Call for a Deliberate Slowdown in Frontier AI Development

In one of the most striking moments in the history of the artificial intelligence industry, the chief executives of the three companies at the very frontier of AI development — Anthropic’s Dario Amodei, OpenAI’s Sam Altman and xAI’s Elon Musk — publicly aligned over the weekend of 12th–13th September 2026 in calling for a deliberate slowdown in the pace of frontier-model development. The catalyst was a 3,800-word essay published by Dr. Amodei on his personal website on 12th September 2026, in which he outlined “serious” risks including loss of human control over advanced systems, and proposed a three-step plan centred on giving independent evaluators “employee-like access” to internal model behaviour — without, he argued, sacrificing commercial advantage or America’s lead in AI. Elon Musk endorsed the essay on X within hours with the terse post “Dario is right”.

Sam Altman followed with an unusually candid X post the same day: “I agree with Dario that we need to pace the frontier. This has been a primary topic of discussions we’ve had at OpenAI in recent weeks. Committing to having independent evaluators with employee-like access is a great idea, and we will do the same.” In a companion interview, Altman conceded that “no lab has solved alignment”, described a 10% probability of catastrophic outcomes as “unacceptable”, and confirmed that OpenAI has been pausing training runs pending safety review — signalling that a much-anticipated 2026 initial public offering is now unlikely. The proximate trigger was the resignation earlier that week of Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon, who publicly warned that frontier labs were racing towards self-improving systems without “acting responsibly”.

(Source: CNBC – dated 14th September 2026)

# Open-Weight AI Returns to Centre Stage: Meta Ships Muse Glimmer 30B and Alibaba Releases the Largest Open-Weight Model in History

In parallel with the price war among proprietary providers, the open-weight AI ecosystem staged a decisive return to prominence in August 2026, with more than eleven major model releases in twenty days. Meta open-sourced its Muse Glimmer 30B model under the Apache 2.0 license on 12th August 2026, making it freely runnable on a single 24 GB consumer GPU and immediately propelling it to the top of the MCP Atlas local-model benchmark. Alibaba matched Meta’s move at scale with the release of Qwen 3.8-Max, a 2.4-trillion-parameter multimodal model with a one-million-token context window — the largest open-weight model in history — alongside a compact 27-billion-parameter variant that, for the first time, brings frontier-grade coding capability to a single-GPU consumer setup. NVIDIA committed to day-zero open-weight availability for its Nemotron 3.5 Lightning model.

The commercial calculus of open-weight releases has changed. Where a year ago open-weight models trailed proprietary frontier models by roughly a generation, they are now competitive at or near the frontier at a fraction of the total cost of ownership — with the added advantage of local deployment, which fully eliminates cross-border data-transfer and third-party-processor exposures.

(Source: Reuters – dated 25th August 2026)

WORLD NEWS

#New Delhi Hosts the 18th BRICS Summit as India’s Middle-Power Diplomacy and Regional Assistance to Nepal Sharpen Its Global Profile

India hosted the 18th BRICS Summit at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi on 12th and 13th September 2026 — its fourth BRICS chairship after 2012, 2016 and 2021 — with President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping among the confirmed attendees. The summit’s agenda covered local-currency settlements, resilient supply chains, food and energy security, reform of global financial institutions and, distinctively for this edition, an emerging “third way” on the digital economy: sovereign national systems that are nonetheless technically interoperable, with India’s UPI and Indonesia’s QRIS integration cited as a live example. The main challenge remained the political difficulty of finding common ground across the grouping’s eleven members, whose positions remain divided on major geopolitical questions.

New Delhi’s diplomatic moment was reinforced by a striking humanitarian and energy response to the catastrophic floods in Nepal, where the death toll has crossed one thousand and roughly ten per cent of Nepal’s electricity generation capacity has been disrupted, forcing Kathmandu to import power from India to cover domestic shortages. Indian, Chinese and Nepalese rescue teams have been operating jointly in the affected districts. Taken together — the BRICS chairship, the digital-economy initiative and the visible role as regional first responder — the developments underscore a shift in India’s external posture from participation to authorship of the emerging Indo-Pacific order. For Indian businesses and advisors, the implications include a widening set of preferential trade and payment channels within BRICS+, fresh transfer-pricing complexity in local-currency invoicing, and additional scrutiny of cross-border humanitarian and CSR flows under FCRA and s.135 of the Companies Act, 2013.

(Source: Reuters – dated 15th September 2026)

FINANCE

# Mumbai Cements Its Grip on India’s Mutual Fund Industry as March 2026 City-Wise AUM Data Show the Top Three Cities Commanding More Than Half of the Nation’s MF Wealth

The city-wise Assets under Management (AUM) data for March 2026, published by the Association of Mutual Funds in India (AMFI) and analysed by Cafemutual on 9th July 2026, tells a compelling story of urban concentration deepening at the top of the Indian mutual fund industry. Mumbai, Delhi and Bengaluru together commanded 50.4% of total industry AUM in March 2026, up sharply from 45% a year earlier. Mumbai alone accounted for 28.97% of the industry, adding a staggering INR 5 lakh crore to its AUM in a single year — the largest absolute addition of any city. Delhi added INR 3.86 lakh crore and Bengaluru added INR 1.1 lakh crore, meaning that the top three cities together accounted for approximately 75% of the industry’s total AUM addition of INR 13.28 lakh crore between March 2025 and March 2026.

The data also captures a striking dispersion at the periphery. Dhanbad emerged as the single most surprising entrant, with its AUM more than doubling from INR 12,623 crore to INR 26,139 crore — a 107% jump in a year — while Thane, the satellite city of Mumbai, recorded a 155% rise from INR 4,651 crore to INR 11,881 crore. Surat has secured its position among the top ten cities, while Ahmedabad and Chennai have swapped positions with Ahmedabad now standing sixth. Seventeen entirely new cities — including Palghar, Panchkula, Gurugram, North Goa, Ernakulam and Mohali — have entered the top 110 for the first time, even as the “other cities” bucket (beyond the top 110) has contracted by INR 34,402 crore.

(Source: Cafemutual.com – dated 9th July 2026)

ENVIRONMENT

# Earth Records Its Hottest August in 176 Years of Data as Antarctic Sea Ice Falls to Third-Lowest on Record and El Niño Intensifies

According to a monthly report released on 10th September 2026 by NOAA’s National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), August 2026 was the hottest August on Earth since modern record-keeping began in 1850. The global surface temperature stood at 1.32°C above the 20th-century average, eclipsing the previous joint August records of 2023 and 2024 by 0.08°C, with NASA and the European Copernicus Climate Change Service both concurring in the assessment; Copernicus rated August 2026 as the hottest single calendar month in recorded history, tied with July 2023. Global average surface air temperature was 1.65°C above the pre-industrial baseline, breaching the 1.5°C safety threshold of the Paris Agreement for the first time since November 2025. At least 364 weather stations set outright all-time heat records during the month.

The cryosphere data was equally sobering. Antarctic sea ice extent in August 2026 was the third-lowest on record for the month, at approximately 1.26 million square kilometres below the 1981–2010 August average — a shortfall roughly equal to the combined land area of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Arctic sea ice extent was the seventh-lowest in the forty-eight-year satellite record, and the Arctic region as a whole recorded its third-warmest August. The World Meteorological Organisation has confirmed that the El Niño event in the tropical Pacific is now firmly established and will intensify into a “very strong” event through the coming months, with material implications for rainfall and temperature patterns extending well into 2027.

(Source: NOAA / Yale Climate Connections – dated 10th September 2026)

DCIT v. Bharathi & Anr.: Statement in cross-examination admitting ownership prevails over income tax statements in determining Benami property transactions.

10. 2026 (8) TMI 1327 – (SAFEMA – New Delhi)

DCIT (BPU), Chennai v. Bharathi & Anr

Date of Order: 18.08.2026

Where the Benamidar admits the knowledge of the transaction and the ownership of the property by way of a statement in cross-examination before the Adjudicating Authority under Prohibition of Benami Property Transaction Act, 1988 (PBPT Act), such a statement would prevail and the transaction cannot be said to be a Benami Transaction under PBPT Act merely on the basis of statement recorded by the Benamidar in the proceedings carried out under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

FACTS

A search was conducted on M/s. Shobhikaa Impex Pvt. Ltd. (SIPL). Based on the evidence gathered during the course of search, it was found that there was a benami transaction in the name of Smt. R. Bharathi and others.

It was found in the course of search that SIPL had inflated its expenses to reduce the taxable income by claiming bogus expenses under the head Job Work / Contractors. This was without the actual receipt of goods or services and without the actual payment to the job workers. The expenses were shown to be payable and accounted as liability under Trade Payables. The corresponding entry on the asset side was shown by way of increase in the Investments / Fixed Deposits and Closing Stock. Subsequently, the Trade Payables were converted into Securities Premium. This modus operandi was admitted by the Directors of SIPL through a sworn statement during the course of search carried out under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (IT Act).

During the Financial Year 2017-18, the Trade Payables in the form of Job Work Charges were converted into Securities Premium Reserve in the name of job workers by allotting them equity shares of ₹100 at premium of ₹750. For this purpose, separate bank accounts, email ids, etc. were created in the name of job workers which were actually operated by persons of SIPL for statutory obligations. The funds were routed through bank transfers / cheques so as to show it as a real business transaction, all with the intention of evading taxes.

In the course of investigation, it was found that M/s. Abhaa Knittings, was a proprietary concern of Smt. Bharathi who was one of the job workers and whose name appeared in the Trade Payables and also under the head Share Capital in the books of SIPL. However, no such corresponding asset in the form of shares was reflected in the books of account of the M/s. Abhaa Knittings, the proprietary concern owned by Smt. R. Bharathi. Further, various documents such as unsigned share certificates of SIPL in the name of Smt. R. Bharati, cheque book, letterheads and blank bills in the name of M/s. Abhaa Knittings were found from the premises of SIPL. Smt. R. Bharathi was neither aware of any such transaction carried out in her name nor was she aware of being a creditor of SIPL. Further, she was also not aware of allotment of shares in her name and the subsequent buy back or the receipt and transfer of funds for it. Accordingly, a case was made out under the provisions of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 (PBPT Act). It was held by the Initiating Officer that the definition of benami transaction under section 2(9)(C) of the said Act covers within its ambit a transaction where the owner of the property is not aware of or denies knowledge of the ownership. Since in this case the job workers were not aware of the allotment of the shares made to them, section 2(9)(C) was held to be applicable and an order for provisional attachment of the properties was made.

However, the order for provisional attachment was not confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating Authority noted that the statement recorded by the Respondent, Smt. R. Bharathi was different during the investigation carried out under the Income-tax Act from that stated by her in the cross-examination before the Adjudicating Authority.

The Appellant Department filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal contending that:

(i.) The liability created under Trade Payables was bogus and the job workers were not aware of the liability.

(ii.) The job workers were not aware of the shares allotted to them in their names.

(iii.) Subsequently, the shares were bought back by transferring the shares to the Managing Director.

(iv.) The consideration for buy back of shares from the job workers were carried out through Wire Transfer and the amount was ultimately received in cash through intermediate entities.

(v.) The documents such share certificates, bank pass books, cheques, etc. were found from the custody of SIPL and therefore a case of benami transaction under section 2(9)(C) of the PBPT Act was made out.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the issue for consideration before it was where there was contradiction in the statements made under the Income-tax Act and the statement made in cross-examination in the proceedings under the PBPT Act, which one would prevail. The Tribunal held that the statement, though recorded in cross-examination before the Adjudicating Authority, under the proceedings carried out under the provisions of the PBPT Act would prevail over any other conflicting statement recorded under any other statute. The Tribunal observed that in the cross-examination before the Adjudicating Authority, the Respondent had admitted that she was aware of the allotment of shares and the other transactions related to it. Once it was admitted, there was no case against the Respondent under section 2(9)(C) of the PBPT Act. The Tribunal further held that while it may be a case of evading taxes by recording bogus liability in the name of job workers, however, in so far as the provisions of PBPT Act were concerned, the position was that the job worker admitted that they were aware of the transactions and remained to be the owner of the shares. Therefore, section 2(9)(C) of the PBPT Act was not applicable. Most importantly, the Tribunal held that the proceedings were initiated merely on the basis of borrowed satisfaction. Unless the ingredients of Benami Transaction defined under section 2(9)(C) of the PBPT Act were satisfied, the case would not be met under the provisions of section PBPT Act.

In addition to the above, the Tribunal remarked that the Initiating Officer had not considered the fact that an order in favour of the Respondent SIPL was passed by the Interim Board for Settlement under section 245-B(4) of the IT Act, where the Trade Payables were held to be genuine. However, the Tribunal clarified that section 245-B of the IT Act shall not override the provisions of the other statute. Further, an order passed by the Settlement Board would be final and conclusive on the proceedings of the nature undertaken by the Income-tax Department and not to the present proceedings which were under a different statute.

In view of the foregoing, the appeal was dismissed and the issue was decided in favour of the Respondent Benamidar.

Arpit Katyal v. Initiating Officer: Purchase from fictitious entity non-filer triggers Benami property prohibition provisions under Section 2(9)(B).

9. [2026] 188 taxmann.com 417 (SAFEMA– New Delhi)

Arpit Katyal v. Initiating Officer

Date of Order: 06.07.2026

Section 2(9)(B) applies to a transaction of purchase from a fictitious entity. The entity was held to be fictitious on the grounds that it was a non-filer of income-tax returns, its GST registration was for trade in metal but appellant claimed to have purchased cloth and fabrics from it, the entity was not found at the location, its bank account details were not shared by the appellant.

In a case covered by section 2(9)(B) i.e. where a transaction is a fictitious transaction, attachment would be in the hands of the beneficial owner who is involved in making fictitious transaction.

FACTS

The proceedings commenced as a result of the information that the Appellant was involved in purchase of material from fictitious entities one of whom was identified to be Sanmati Trading Co. (STC). The Appellant had recorded purchases of cloth and fabrics from STC for which payment was made through banking channels The Initiating Officer (IO) held the transaction to have been carried out in a fictitious name. Since the Appellant was not able to produce STC and the summons could not be served in the absence of existence of the entity, the IO tried to find out income-tax returns and found STC to be a non-filer of returns. Its GST registration was for trade in metals but the Appellant claimed to have purchased cloth and fabrics from STC. The appellant claimed to have made payment to STC through banking channels but did not provide the details of bank account of STC. On physical verification, STC was not found on location and also the summons sent were returned undelivered. The Appellant failed to provide a credible explanation for the cash deposits in the account of Asian Fabrics, which was around the same time when payments were made to STC. The IO held that the payments made to STC were nothing but rounding of money resulting in benami transactions. The IO made a provisional attachment to the extent of benami transaction.

The Adjudicating Authority (AA) confirmed the provisional attachment order.

Aggrieved, the Appellant filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the issue before it is, whether STC can be said to be a fictitious company or entity merely for the reason that it was a non-filer of income-tax returns. The Tribunal held that this cannot be the sole ground but this can be supported by other material to find out whether the entity is fictitious or not. It noted that the transaction by the Appellant with STC was for supply of clothes and fabrics. However, no relevant material could be placed on record by the appellant, despite the initial burden being discharged by the respondents to prove a case of benami transaction. The Tribunal noted that the respondents had referred to GST registration details of STC which were for metal trade and not cloth and fabrics. This was the second issue. Non-existence of the entity at the location, on physical verification, was the third issue. Summons were returned undelivered because neither the firm nor Ms. Reeta Devi were found available. Also, non-availability of details of bank account of STC was the fourth issue. Notice issued by the AA to STC remained undelivered. The Tribunal noted that the Appellant failed to defend its case by producing evidence that the allegations made are incorrect and false and that STC was, in fact, in active business and not a fictitious entity. The bills examined by AA of about Rs 3 lakh were found to be without proof and specific mention of account number of the entity and had no acknowledgement of supply of material and mode of delivery. The Tribunal held that the transaction was fictitious and, therefore a case u/s 2(9)(B) of the PBPT Act was made out.

As regards the argument that it is only the benami property which can be attached and not the amount lying with the appellant in its bank account and also that the attachment of the property can be in the hands of the benamidar and not the beneficial owner as has been done in the present case. The Tribunal held that generally if a case is made out u/s 2(9)(A) of the PBPT Act or any provision other than section 2(9)(B), the provisional attachment of the property may be caused in the hands of the benamidar. However, the aforesaid is not the universal legal proposition and in any case section 2(9)(B) is an exception to it. It held that it is for the reason that when the transaction is fictitious, the question would not arise. It would be in the hands of the beneficial owner who is involved in making fictitious transaction. The Tribunal held that the attachment of property of the appellant cannot be said to be illegal.

Compilers’ Note: The nexus, if any, between the Appellant and Asian Fabrics in whose account cash was found to be deposited is not coming out from the order.

ICAI and Its Members

I. ICAI Tools

ICAI MSME Verification Tool

This tool has been developed by the Centre for Audit Quality Committee (CAQC) of ICAI, as a facilitative tool to assist users in verifying the MSME status of an entity based on information available on the Government portal (https://www.udyamregistration.gov.in/)

https://forms.gle/hbMKkqzVxB4FCuJd6

II. ICAI Publications

1. DCMM 3.0 – Digital Competency Maturity Model Version 3.0 – Third version

DCMM 3.0 has been comprehensively updated to reflect the contemporary digital environment in which CA firms operate. The framework has been designed to help firms assess their present level of digital maturity, identify capability gaps and formulate a structured roadmap for continuous improvement.

2. Background Material on Non-Corporate Entities

This publication aims to provide preparers, auditors, reviewers, academicians and other stakeholders with greater conceptual clarity and practical insights into the application of the Guidance Note.

3. MCQs on Ind AS 117

This volume builds upon the foundation established in Volume I, extending coverage to advanced aspects of the Standard. The MCQs are designed not only to strengthen conceptual clarity but also to assess the application of the Standard through practical situations, transition challenges and interactions with other Indian Accounting Standards.

4. Corporate Restructuring Beyond IBC: Emerging Issues and Recommendations by IB and VSB, ICAI and CLC, ICAI.

This publication examines the evolving landscape of corporate restructuring beyond the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, addressing emerging legal, regulatory and commercial issues. It presents a comprehensive analysis of alternative restructuring mechanisms, identifies key challenges, and offers recommendations to strengthen India’s restructuring framework.

All Publications can be read at: https://publication.icai.org/

III. ICAI Announcements

1. Empanelment as faculty members for the Certificate Course

The Internal Audit Standards Board now invites applications from experienced professionals for empanelment as faculty members for the Certificate Course. Eligible members should possess:

  • A minimum of five years of experience in the banking sector and/or concurrent audit of banks.
  • Experience in delivering technical lectures, seminars, or training programmes for Chartered Accountants or other professional forums.
  • Demonstrated expertise in one or more subjects covered under the Certificate Course.

Interested members are requested to submit their detailed profile/resume, clearly indicating their areas of expertise, professional experience, and teaching experience, through the following Google Form: https://forms.gle/Q95P1ori5BeHys5DA

Last date for submitting response is October 05, 2026.

2. ICAI AWARDS for Excellence in Financial Reporting 2025-26

To recognise and encourage excellence in preparation and presentation of financial information.

I. Public Sector Banks

II. Private Sector Banks (including Foreign Banks)

III. Life Insurance Sector

IV. Non-Life Insurance Sector

V. Financial Services Sector (including NBFC Other than Banking and Insurance)

VI. Manufacturing and Trading Sector (including entities engaged in processing, mining, plantations, oil & gas enterprises) (Turnover equal to ₹5000 crores or more)

VII. Manufacturing and Trading Sector (including entities engaged in processing, mining, plantations, oil & gas enterprises) (Turnover less than ₹5000 crores)

VIII. Service Sector (Other than financial services sector)

IX. Infrastructure and Construction Sector

X. Not-for-Profit Sector

XI. Public Sector Entities

XII. Co-operative Banks

Last date of Submission 15th October, 2026

More details: https://www.icai.org/post/research-committee

3. ICAI Sustainability Reporting Awards 2025-26

Launch of 5th ICAI Sustainability Reporting Awards 2025-26. Excellence in Sustainability Reporting Standards Board (BRSR).

Nomination period: 17th September 2026 to 15th November, 2026.

https://resource.cdn.icai.org/94300srsb-aps6327-brochure.pdf

IV. GIST of ICAI Opinions

1. Classification of Bank Fixed Deposits Held under Lien as Current or Non-Current Assets under Ind AS Framework

A. Facts of the Case

The Company, a Central Public Sector Enterprise, avails Bank Guarantee (BG) and Letter of Credit (LC) facilities from various banks. The arrangements include both general lien over the Company’s deposit portfolio and specific fixed deposits placed as margin money or security against individual BG/LC facilities. The deposits generally have an original maturity of less than twelve months.

During the supplementary audit for FY 2024-25, the C&AG auditor observed that certain bank deposits classified as current assets were held under lien against borrowings/BGs/LCs having claim periods extending beyond twelve months. The auditor contended that deposits amounting to ₹22,257.31 lakh, being subject to such long-term claims, were not realisable by the Company within its operating cycle and should therefore have been classified as non-current assets.

The Company contended that the deposits had original maturities of less than twelve months and were accordingly classified as current assets under Schedule III to the Companies Act, 2013.

B. Query

The Company sought the Committee’s opinion on the classification of bank fixed deposits having
an original maturity of less than twelve months but held under lien against BGs, LCs or borrowing facilities extending beyond twelve months from the reporting date.

The Company also sought clarification on whether classification should be determined primarily by the original contractual maturity of the deposit or by the period for which the underlying lien arrangement continues, and on the appropriate accounting treatment where deposits are held under general lien arrangements without specific linkage to individual BGs, LCs or borrowing facilities.

C. Points considered by the Committee

The Committee noted that classification of an asset as current or non-current has to be assessed at the reporting date based on the criteria in Ind AS 1 and Schedule III. For bank balances and fixed deposits, the relevant considerations are whether the asset is expected to be realised within twelve months and whether it qualifies as cash or a cash equivalent.

The Committee notes that Ind AS Schedule III requires bank balances other than cash and cash equivalents (which meet the definition of ‘current asset’) to be presented as ‘financial assets’ under ‘current assets’. Further, it requires ‘Balances with banks to the extent held as margin money or security against the borrowings, guarantees, other commitments’ to be disclosed separately.

The Committee observed that the classification cannot be based solely on contractual maturity. The substance or economic reality, including the Company’s expectation regarding realisation at the reporting date, has to be considered. Thus, where restrictions arising from lien arrangements are such that the deposit is not expected to be realised within twelve months, or the deposit is required to be continued or renewed to support long-term BG/LC/borrowing arrangements, it would not qualify as a current asset.

The Committee further considered the presentation and disclosure requirements under Division II of Schedule III. Bank balances held as margin money or security against borrowings, guarantees and other commitments are required to be disclosed separately.

D. Opinion

The Committee opined that bank deposits held under general or specific lien arrangements as margin money or security for guarantees or credit facilities should be presented as financial assets under current assets, with separate disclosure in the financial statements, provided that, despite the restrictions arising from the lien, the deposits continue to meet the definition of a current asset.

The Committee further opined that classification of the deposits cannot be based solely on their contractual maturity and must also consider the substance or economic reality regarding the expectation of realisation at the reporting date.

To read full opinion: https://resource.cdn.icai.org/94132cajournal-sep2026-opinion-1.pdf

2. Accounting treatment of expenditure incurred on repair, recovery and reinstallation of damaged subsea assets during construction phase of abc-field, under Ind AS framework

A. Facts of the Case

The Company, a major crude oil and natural gas producer, was developing an offshore oil field through LSTK contracts. During the development phase, two critical subsea assets—SDU-1234 and associated Umbilical UM-1234—were installed in February 2023. Subsequently, during demobilisation of a drilling rig, the SDU toppled and the umbilical was displaced by about 20 metres. Investigation indicated that the damage was most likely caused by the rig’s anchor. At that time, the subsea production system was incomplete and non-functional, and First Oil was achieved only on 7 January 2024 after the damaged assets were recovered, repaired, reinstalled and integrated.

The Company incurred approximately ₹309.77 crore towards the recovery, repair and reinstallation works and capitalised the expenditure as CWIP, subsequently transferring it to PPE. The Company considered the expenditure to be directly attributable to bringing the production system to the condition necessary for its intended use. The C&AG, however, objected to the capitalisation, contending that the expenditure represented abnormal amounts of resources and should not form part of the asset cost.

The Company also expected recovery of the reinstatement cost under the Contractor’s All Risks insurance policy. The Loss Adjuster had recommended a settlement, which had been accepted by management, although final confirmation from the insurer was awaited.

B. Query

The Committee was asked to opine on whether the expenditure incurred for reinstatement of the damaged subsea assets during the development/construction phase could be capitalised under Ind AS 16 and the ICAI Guidance Note on Accounting for Oil and Gas Producing Activities. It was also asked how the expected insurance proceeds should be accounted for: whether by reducing the cost of the related asset or by recognising the amount separately in profit or loss when it becomes virtually certain/receivable.

C. Points considered by the Committee

The Committee first observed that the subsea assets had already been installed and subsequently damaged during rig demobilisation. Therefore, the reinstatement expenditure represented subsequent rectification of damage rather than expenditure incurred to complete an unfinished construction activity. It accordingly had to be evaluated as subsequent expenditure under Ind AS 16.

The Committee noted that Ind AS 16 requires all PPE expenditure to be evaluated under its recognition principle. Accordingly, only expenditure directly attributable to bringing the asset to the location and condition necessary for its intended operation can be capitalised. Further, abnormal amounts of wasted material, labour or other resources cannot be included in the cost of PPE. Whether a particular expenditure constitutes an abnormal cost requires judgement based on the specific facts and circumstances, including the nature of the activity and normal practices in the relevant industry.

Importantly, therefore, the fact that the expenditure was incurred during the development/construction phase does not, by itself, make the entire reinstatement expenditure capitalisable. The Committee held that the Company must determine, on the facts, whether the expenditure is directly attributable under Ind AS 16 and whether any part represents abnormal costs. The resulting expenditure may accordingly be capitalised or charged to profit or loss.

The Committee also distinguished the damage/reinstatement expenditure from ordinary “repairs”. Since the assets had been damaged after their installation, the expenditure was subsequent expenditure and not routine day-to-day servicing. The Committee further noted that, when the damage occurred, the Company was required to assess any impairment under Ind AS 36, and determine whether any previously capitalised asset or component had to be derecognised because it no longer generated future economic benefits.

With regard to insurance recovery, the Committee applied the specific requirements of Ind AS 16 dealing with compensation from third parties. Compensation relating to impaired, lost or given-up PPE is a separate economic event and is recognised in profit or loss when it becomes receivable; it is not adjusted against the cost of the replacement or reinstated asset.

D. Opinion

The Committee held that the treatment requires judgement under Ind AS 16. The expenditure should be capitalised only to the extent it satisfies the recognition and measurement requirements, particularly the requirement of being directly attributable to bringing the PPE to the condition necessary for intended use. Any abnormal cost must be recognised in profit or loss. The Company must also assess impairment and possible derecognition arising from the damage.

The expected insurance proceeds relating to the damaged subsea assets are to be treated as compensation from a third party and recognised in profit or loss when they become receivable, rather than being deducted from the cost of the reinstated asset.

To read full opinion: https://resource.cdn.icai.org/94133cajournal-sep2026-opinion-2.pdf

3. Accounting Treatment of Restoration Obligation under a Service Concession Arrangement

A. Facts of the Case

The Company is an SPV established for execution of a railway gauge-conversion project under a 30-year Service Concession Arrangement with the Ministry of Railways. Under the concession agreement, the Company is required to keep the project assets in proper working condition and replace assets whose codal lives expire during the concession period, with the replacement cost being borne by the Company.

During the audit of FY 2023-24, the C&AG observed that the Company had not recognised a provision for the restoration/replacement obligation on the ground that a reliable estimate was not available. The C&AG considered that the obligation could be estimated and that a provision should be recognised.

In FY 2024-25, the Company estimated the total replacement/restoration obligation at ₹14,200 lakh over the remaining concession period. It recognised ₹1,045.25 lakh in FY 2024-25, and proposed to recognise the balance progressively over the remaining concession period. The C&AG considered this to be a short provision of ₹13,154.75 lakh and contended that the entire estimated obligation should be recognised.

The Company considered the obligation to be a maintenance/restoration obligation that arises progressively as the service potential of the railway assets is consumed. It therefore proposed systematic recognition of the expense over the concession period, with discounting and finance cost for the unwinding of the discount.

B. Query

The Committee was asked whether the Company’s approach of recognising the restoration  obligation progressively over the period up to the date when the restoration obligation arises, by charging annual expenses and finance cost to the Statement of Profit and Loss, is appropriate under Ind AS.

It was also asked whether the C&AG’s suggested approach of recognising the entire estimated obligation upfront in the Statement of Profit and Loss would be appropriate.

C. Points considered by the Committee

The Committee proceeded on the basis that the arrangement falls within Appendix D to Ind AS 115 and that the Company’s restoration activities represent maintenance obligations, without any upgrade element. Under paragraph 21 of Appendix D, contractual obligations to maintain or restore infrastructure to a specified level of serviceability are to be recognised and measured in accordance with Ind AS 37 at the best estimate of expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the reporting date.

Under Ind AS 37, a provision is recognised only when there is a present obligation arising from a past event, an outflow of resources is probable and a reliable estimate can be made. The provision represents the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the obligation. Where the time value of money is material, the provision is measured at present value and the unwinding of the discount is recognised as finance cost.

The Committee considered the nature of the Company’s obligation to be particularly relevant. The restoration obligation arises from the use of the project assets during the operating phase. Assuming that the service potential of the assets is consumed evenly over their useful lives, the best estimate of the obligation at each reporting date would increase progressively with the use of the assets. Accordingly, the provision should be increased through annual charges to profit or loss over the useful life of the respective assets until their expected replacement/restoration date.

The Committee therefore accepted the in-principle approach of building up the provision progressively, rather than recognising the entire estimated replacement cost upfront. However, it specifically stated that it had not examined the computation of the provision made by the Company.

D. Opinion

The Committee held that the restoration obligation arising from use of the project assets should be recognised and measured under Ind AS 37 at the best estimate of expenditure required to settle the present obligation at each reporting date.

Where the obligation increases proportionately with the use of the assets, the provision should be recognised progressively through annual charges to profit or loss over the useful life of the respective assets up to their expected replacement/restoration date. The provision should be discounted to present value where the time value of money is material, and the unwinding of the discount should be recognised as borrowing/finance cost in the Statement of Profit and Loss.

Accordingly, the Committee concluded that the in-principle approach followed by the Company of progressively recognising the restoration provision is in accordance with Ind AS 37, rather than recognising the entire ₹14,200 lakh obligation upfront. The Committee, however, did not examine the Company’s actual computation of the provision.

To read full opinion: https://resource.cdn.icai.org/94134cajournal-sep2026-opinion-3.pdf

V. ICAI Disciplinary Cases

4. AKK, Resolution Professional of MMDPL v. CA. RAD

Ref. No.: PR/196/2022/DD/263/2022 DC/1931/2024

Disciplinary Committee, Bench-I (2025-26)

Order dated: 5 February 2026

A. Facts of the Case

CA. RAD was the statutory auditor of MMDPL for FY 2018-19 and 2019-20 and had also certified various statutory e-forms, including Form AOC 4. The Company had availed a loan of ₹25 lakh from Paragon Finance Ltd. The loan was subsequently not repaid, resulting in dishonour of the repayment cheque and initiation of CIRP proceedings before the NCLT. The complainant, being the Resolution Professional, alleged irregularities in the Company’s financial statements and statutory filings.

 B. Allegations

The principal allegations related to wrongful preparation and certification of financial statements and statutory forms for FY 2018-19 and 2019-20.

The Committee noted, inter alia, that the documents uploaded on the MCA portal contained:

  • unsigned financial statements for FY 2019-20;
  • absence of UDIN in the audit report;
  • missing Notes to Accounts;
  • incorrect computation of Reserves & Surplus;
  • incorrect Net Worth and Turnover reported in Form AOC-4;
  • differences in dates appearing on the financial statements and audit report; and
  • absence of MGT-9 for the relevant years.

A further allegation was that the Respondent was unable to substantiate the financial figures reported in the financial statements and failed to produce the audit records/documents relied upon for his audit and certification.

C. Respondent’s Defence

The Respondent submitted that the signed financial statements were available with him but the client’s ROC consultant had inadvertently uploaded unsigned statements. He stated that UDIN had been generated but was not appearing in the uploaded PDF because of formatting issues. He also contended that the Notes to Accounts were prepared separately but were not uploaded by the Company/ROC consultant.

The Respondent further submitted that the discrepancies in figures were clerical in nature and that data entry in AOC-4 was undertaken by the Company’s staff. He attributed certain work to junior staff under his supervision and stated that the Company’s data had subsequently been tampered with or deleted from his system. He also denied responsibility for the Company’s loan default,stating that the loan was based on financial statements for FY 2017-18, which were not audited by him.

D. Findings of the Committee

The Committee held that attributing errors to junior staff or the Company’s ROC consultant did not absolve the Respondent of his responsibility as auditor and certifying professional. The ultimate responsibility for the accuracy, completeness and compliance of the audit report and certification remained with him.

On examination of the AOC-4 filings, the Committee found that the FY 2019-20 financial statements attached to the MCA filing did not contain the signatures of the Directors and Auditor, and the Notes to Accounts were missing for both years. It also noted the absence of UDIN in the FY 2019-20 audit report, incorrect Reserves & Surplus, and incorrect Net Worth reported in AOC-4. The Committee accordingly held the Respondent guilty of the first allegation.

With respect to the audit documentation, the Committee emphasised that a statutory auditor is required to obtain and retain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence supporting the audit opinion. The Respondent’s contention that the Company’s data had been deleted or tampered with did not absolve him. The Committee held that failure to maintain audit working papers and inability to substantiate the financial figures forming the basis of the audit report demonstrated gross negligence and lack of due professional care.

E. Conclusion

The Committee held CA. RAD guilty of professional misconduct under Item (7) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, relating to failure to exercise due diligence or gross negligence in the conduct of professional duties.

 F. Punishment

The Committee ordered:

Reprimand, fine of ₹1,00,000, as well as removal of the Respondent’s name from the Register of Members for three months. The fine was required to be paid within 60 days of receipt of the order.

5. S.P.C. vs. CA. P.K.G.

File No.: PR/70/2018/DD/124/2018/DC/1949/2024

Date of Order: 05.02.2026

(Findings dated 22.12.2025)

Statutory audit – incorrect reporting of statutory dues and auditor’s involvement in preparation of accounts.

Background

The Respondent was the statutory auditor of M/s BTCO and M/s MTCO for several years, reportedly up to FY 2014-15. The complaint concerned the Respondent’s audit of BTCO and principally related to reporting of statutory dues, his alleged involvement in preparation of the Company’s accounts, and non-disclosure of agreements for sale of three parcels of land.

Key Allegations

  • In the Independent Auditor’s Report for FY 2014-15, the Respondent reported that BTCO was regular in payment of statutory dues, including Provident Fund, ESI, Income-tax and Sales-tax, although PF dues had remained unpaid for several years.
  • The Respondent was alleged to have been involved in preparation and compilation of BTCO’s accounts for FY 2013-14, despite being its statutory auditor.
  • Three agreements for sale of BTCO’s land were entered into in 2012, but the Respondent allegedly failed to disclose the transactions in the audit reports for FYs 2012-13 to 2015-16.

Respondent’s Defence

In relation to the PF dues, the Respondent contended that the demand relied upon by the complainant was raised after the audit report and that the PF dues were accrued but were not legally due because recovery proceedings had been stayed.

Regarding preparation of accounts, he denied preparing the financial statements and stated that he had merely suggested independent accountants and facilitated payment to them. In relation to the land transactions, he contended that only agreements for sale had been entered into, full consideration had not been received and the amounts received were appropriately shown under Other Current Liabilities.

Findings

The Committee found the Respondent’s reporting on PF dues to be contradictory. While his statutory audit report stated that BTCO was regular in payment of statutory dues, his own Tax Audit Report in Form 3CD disclosed that the Company was in default. The Committee therefore concluded that the Respondent was aware of the PF default. It rejected the argument that the stay of recovery proceedings extinguished the liability; according to the Committee, the stay merely suspended recovery. The non-disclosure therefore amounted to failure to report a material misstatement.

On preparation of accounts, the Committee relied on the Respondent’s bill dated 9 September 2014, which specifically charged BTCO for “Compilation and preparation of Accounts for the year ended 31st March 2014”. The Committee concluded that the Respondent was directly involved in preparing the financial statements. It held that subsequently auditing those accounts created a self-review threat and impaired auditor independence, contrary to Section 144 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the ICAI Code of Ethics.

However, the Committee rejected the allegation relating to non-disclosure of the land sales. The Respondent produced the break-up of Other Current Liabilities showing advances received against the proposed land sales and produced sale deeds establishing that the actual sales were completed only on 20.02.2018. Applying AS 9, the Committee held that the sales could not have been recognised in the earlier financial years because the significant risks and rewards had not yet been transferred. The accounting treatment was therefore found appropriate, and the Respondent was held not guilty on this allegation.

Charges Established

The Respondent was held guilty of professional misconduct under Items (6) and (7) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949: failure to report a material misstatement known to him and failure to exercise due diligence/gross negligence in professional duties.

Punishment

Reprimand and fine of ₹1,00,000, payable within 60 days of receipt of the order.

6. Case: M.K.S. vs. CA. S.K.T.

File No.: PR/G/234/2021/DD/195/2021/DC/1964/2025

Date of Order: 05.02.2026 (Findings dated 22.12.2025)

Failure of statutory auditor to report non-compliance relating to a single shareholder in a private company.

Background

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs directed the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) to investigate the affairs of PIHL and its 21 group companies. The SFIO investigation concerned alleged collection of funds from investors through various camouflaged schemes.

The Respondent was the statutory auditor of RCPPL, a PIHL Group company, for FYs 2011-12 to 2014-15. The specific charge considered by the Disciplinary Committee related to the financial year 2012-13, when the Company’s financial statements disclosed that all 3,00,000 shares (100%) were held by PINPL.

Key Allegation

The Respondent was alleged to have failed to report/qualify his audit report for FY 2012-13 despite the Company having only one shareholder, contrary to Section 12 of the Companies Act, 1956, which required a private company to have at least two persons for its incorporation.

Respondent’s Defence

The Respondent stated that during the audit, he had noticed that the Company had only one shareholder and had advised the management to rectify the statutory non-compliance. According to him, the management subsequently transferred one share to Mr. BB, and this was reflected in the financial statements for FY 2013-14.

He therefore contended that corrective action had been taken before issuance of his audit report and, consequently, he did not consider it necessary to qualify the report. He also stated that there was no intention to suppress any fact or mislead stakeholders.

Findings

The Committee noted that the FY 2012-13 financial statements themselves disclosed 100% shareholding in PINPL, establishing that the Company had only one shareholder during that year. In the following year, PINPL held 2,99,999 out of 3,00,000 shares, indicating that one share had subsequently been transferred to another individual.

The Respondent was specifically asked to provide the dates on which the shares were transferred. He was unable to provide the dates, stating that the relevant shareholder register and share-transfer forms had been returned to the Company after audit.

The Committee held that Section 12 of the Companies Act, 1956 required a private company to have at least two persons, whereas RCPPL had only one shareholder as disclosed in its FY 2012-13 financial statements. The Committee also noted that, in response to questions from the SFIO, the Respondent had admitted that there was no reference to this fact in his audit report and that he had not qualified the report.

The Committee consequently concluded that the Respondent had failed to report the statutory non-compliance and had not exercised due diligence in disclosing a material fact known to him.

Charges Established

The Respondent was held guilty of professional misconduct under:

  • Item (5), Part I of the Second Schedule – failure to disclose a material fact known to him which was necessary to be disclosed in the financial statements; and
  • Item (7), Part I of the Second Schedule – failure to exercise due diligence / gross negligence in professional duties.

Punishment

Reprimand and fine of ₹1,00,000, payable within 60 days of receipt of the order.

Class Action Suits: A New Dawn in Minority Protection

Section 245 of the Companies Act, 2013 introduced class action suits in India, enabling minority shareholders and depositors to seek legal remedies from the NCLT against management conduct prejudicial to their interests. For listed companies, members holding at least 2% share capital can file.

India’s first class action suit arose in Jindal Poly Films Ltd., where shareholders challenged undervalued related-party transactions causing a ₹2,500 crore loss. The NCLT admitted the plea, making 45,000 public shareholders litigants, and NCLAT upheld it. Though 29 shareholders obtained a Supreme Court order referring the dispute to arbitration, other minority shareholders petitioned for a recall.

INTRODUCTION

Many of us would have read about class action suits, which are very popular in the USA. They are a form of litigation where several of the aggrieved come together under one roof to file a common suit against one or more persons. India, till recently, had not witnessed any such litigation. However, the Companies Act, 2013 has introduced specific provisions for Class Action Suits as a form of minority protection. Recently, Corporate India witnessed the first Class Action Suit by shareholders against a Promoter in the case of Jindal Poly Films Ltd. Let us examine this important facet of shareholder activism in more detail.

WHAT IS A CLASS ACTION SUIT?

The Law Lexicon, 4th Edition by P. Ramantha Aiyar defines the term class to mean a homogeneous section of people grouped together because of certain likeness or common traits and who are identifiable by some common attributes State of AP v P. Sagar, AIR 1968 SC 1379.

Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, 5th Edition defines the term action to mean the invocation of the jurisdiction of a court by writ or any other matter. It is a civil proceeding.

Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines the term class action as a means by which, where a larger group of persons are interested in a matter, one or more may sue or be sued as representatives of the class without needing to join every member of the class. There are general requirements for the maintenance of any class suit – persons constituting the class must be so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court and the named representatives must be such as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all of them.

Thus, simply put, many people who have a common cause of action, come together as a single unit to litigate rather than each filing a separate lawsuit. Think of it as similar to the phrase made famous by the Author, Alexandre Dumas ~ “All for One and One for All!”

COMPANIES ACT, 2013

Meaning – The Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”) has, for the first time in Indian corporate history, expressly provided for a class action suit. S.245 of the Act, which came into force from 1st June 2016, provides that a prescribed number of members/depositors or any class of them may file a class action suit before the NCLT if they are of the opinion that the management or conduct of the affairs of the company is being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company or its members or depositors.

Prescribed Number – The minimum number of members required for filing a class action suit before the NCLT is as follows:

(a) in the case of a company having a share capital, not less than 100 members or not less than 5% of the total number of its members, whichever is less. However, all the applicants must have paid all calls and other sums due on their shares;

(b) (i) members holding not less than 5% of the issued share capital of an unlisted company;

(ii) members holding not less than 2% of the issued share capital of a listed company;

c) in the case of a company not having a share capital, not less than 1/5th of the total number of its members;

(d) not less than 100 depositors or not less than 5% of the total number of its depositors – whichever is lower; or

(e) depositor or depositors to whom the company owes 5% of the total deposits of the company.

Class Action Minority Protection

Relief that can be sought – The class action suit can be for seeking all or any of the following relief orders from the NCLT:

(a) to restrain the company from committing an act which is ultra vires the Articles of Association or Memorandum of Association of the company;

(b) to restrain the company from committing a breach of any provision of the company’s Articles of Association or Memorandum of Association;

(c) to declare a resolution altering the Memorandum or Articles of the company as void if the resolution was passed by suppression of material facts or obtained by misstatement to the members or depositors;

(d) to restrain the company and its directors from acting on such resolution;

(e) to restrain the company from doing an act which is contrary to the provisions of the Act or any other law for the time being in force;

(f) to restrain the company from taking action contrary to any resolution passed by the members;

(g) to claim damages or compensation or demand any other suitable action from or against—

(i) the company or its directors for any fraudulent, unlawful or wrongful act or omission or conduct or any likely act or omission or conduct on its or their part;

(ii) the auditor/ audit firm of the company for any improper or misleading statement of particulars made in his audit report or for any fraudulent, unlawful or wrongful act or conduct; or

(iii) any expert or advisor or consultant or any other person for any incorrect or misleading statement made to the company or for any fraudulent, unlawful or wrongful act or conduct or any likely act or conduct on his part;

(h) to seek any other remedy as the Tribunal may deem fit.

Considerations by the NCLT – In deciding whether an action is maintainable, the Act provides that the NCLT would consider the following:

(a) whether the member or depositor is acting in good faith in making the application for seeking an order;

(b) any evidence before it as to the involvement of any person other than directors or officers of the company on any of the matters on which relief is sought;

(c) whether the cause of action is one which the member or depositor could pursue in his own right rather than through an order under this section;

(d) any evidence before it as to the views of the members or depositors of the company who have no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter being proceeded under this section;

(e) where the cause of action is an act or omission that is yet to occur, whether the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would be likely to be—

(i) authorised by the company before it occurs; or

(ii) ratified by the company after it occurs;

(f) where the cause of action is an act or omission that has already occurred, whether the same could be, and in the circumstances would be likely to be, ratified by the company.

While considering the desirability of an individual/separate action as opposed to a class action, the NCLT may consider whether admitting separate actions by members/depositors would create a risk of :

(a) inconsistent or varying adjudications in such separate actions;

(b) adjudications that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members, i.e., completely settle or resolve the claims of other members;

(c) adjudications which would substantially impair or impede the ability of other members of the class to protect their interests.

In addition, the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 provide that the NCLT may, while considering the admissibility, also take into account the following:

(a) whether the class has so many members that joining them individually would be impractical, making a class action desirable;

(b) whether there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(c) whether the claims or defences of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defences of the class;

(d) whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Procedure – A member of a class action under s.245 of the Act is entitled to opt-out of the proceedings at any time after the institution of the class action, with the NCLT’s permission. Subject to this, the procedure, briefly stated, is as follows

(a) a public notice shall be served on admission of the application to all the members or depositors of the class;

(b) all similar applications prevalent in any jurisdiction should be consolidated into a single application and the class members or depositors should choose a lead applicant;

(c) two class action applications for the same cause of action shall not be allowed;

(d) the cost or expenses connected with the application for class action shall be defrayed by the company or any other person responsible for any oppressive act.

Binding Order – Any order passed by the NCLT shall be binding on the company and all its members, depositors and auditor/audit firm or expert or consultant or advisor or any other person associated with the company. Violation of the Order is punishable with a fine ranging from ₹5 lakhs to ₹25 lakhs. Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years and with a fine ranging from ₹25,000 to ₹1 lakh.

NCLT ORDER IN JINDAL POLY FILMS

The very first class action suit under s.245 was filed in the case of Ankit Jain v. Jindal Poly Films Ltd., [2026] 183 taxmann.com 491 (NCLT – New Delhi). In that case, shareholders holding 4.99% (which was more than the 2% threshold) filed a class action suit against a listed company. Their plea was that certain related party transactions between the company and promoter entities pertaining to sale of certain shares held by the company should be set aside or, alternatively, the class members should be compensated for the loss arising from such transactions. It was alleged that the transactions were grossly undervalued and resulted in a loss of approximately ₹2,500 crore to the listed company and a proportionate loss to its public shareholders.

The NCLT held that the essential ingredient of s.245 of the Companies Act, 2013 was to file an application before the NCLT to seek various remedies if, in its opinion, the management or conduct of the affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the company or its members or depositors. The condition precedent, being the formation of an opinion, which prima-facie should state that the affairs of the company were not conducted in a just manner and which were against the interest of the company or against the interest of the members/shareholders. The right to initiate actions against third parties like experts and advisers for any incorrect, misleading statements or any fraudulent, unlawful or wrongful act, made it clear that the conduct of affairs of the company, past, present and continuing actions could also be impeached when and if it was conducted in a manner prejudicial to the company and its members or depositors. It was wide enough to cover all kinds of transactions in relation of any of the provisions of the Act, Rules etc. It was a special enactment to class of shareholders, depositors and the like. Hence, the contention of the Respondent that past and concluded transaction should not be allowed to be raised may not be justified.

It also held that s.245 had been differently drafted in the Indian context and was different from the American Law. The comparison with the American Law may not be appropriate because the Indian Parliament was quite conscious of the fact that the class action can be initiated by depositors, members of the company to enforce certain action against the company itself. Section 245 of Companies Act 2013, provided for various kinds of relief given the backdrop of Indian Corporates and investors. Section 245 was a benevolent legislation to provide relief to shareholders, depositors against the company and for other relief(s) past, present and future. This should be seen in contradiction to a case filed by a third party or a public authority or a person who had no direct cause or relation with the company. It held that under the Indian Jurisprudence, the Parliament in its wisdom gave a right more defined than a derivative action, in respect of shareholders in a public limited company. This provision sought to address the issue where there were numerous or large number of shareholders and all of them joining was impracticable, where the question of law in relation to such fact was common to the class. Under s.245 of the Companies Act, the class action envisaged a process of safeguarding the interest of depositors/ shareholders in relation to the conduct of affairs of the company.

Merely because there is another option available under sections 241-242 (of filing an oppression and mismanagement plea) that could not per se dis-credit a class action under s.245 if the other parameters for initiating the proceedings under Section 245 were met by the Petitioners. All that was required was shareholding of 2% of total share capital in a
listed company and a justifiable prima facie opinion of the NCLT. Accordingly, the NCLT admitted the plea. This made all the 45,000 public shareholders of the company a separate class who were now litigants.

NCLAT UPHOLDS THE ORDER

This Order of the NCLT admitting the plea was upheld by the NCLAT in Jindal Poly Films Ltd. v. Ankit Jain, [2026] 183 taxmann.com 736 (NCLAT- New Delhi). It further held that under s.245(1) of the Act, the NCLT had very wide powers and reliefs thereunder can be sought against third parties, including directors and promoters of the company. The plea was empowered “to seek any other remedy as the Tribunal may deem fit”, which was a residuary provision taking within its ambit the matters which are not subsumed within other sub-clauses. In regard to the plea against past actions, the NCLAT held that the impugned transactions had been systematically orchestrated over a period of time and executed in a manner that its illegality (undervaluation, etc.) was deliberately, and with fraudulent motive/purpose, never brought to the attention and knowledge of the public shareholders. Having allegedly concealed the transactions at the time of commission, the company, the promoters, directors now could not take benefit of their own wrongdoings. The fact when such transactions came to the knowledge of the respondents would be a relevant fact. Thus, it agreed with the NCLT on this issue. The NCLAT further held that the NCLT was of the prima facie opinion to initiate the proceedings. However, it was always open to the company/promoters to deny the allegation and refute the charge. Hence, it concluded that NCLT had satisfied itself regarding fulfilment of all requisite pre-conditions under s.245 read with relevant Rules. Thus, it was not inclined to interfere in the impugned order and the appeal against the admission by the NCLT was dismissed.

SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT

Subsequent to the NCLAT Order, the main applicant in the class action suit was substituted with another member – Monet Securities P Ltd. This applicant, 28 other shareholders and the company filed a consent application before the Supreme Court requesting that the NCLT Petition be disposed-off and instead the matter be referred to arbitration. The application stated that on a review of the nature of the disputes and considering efficacy of the remedy, the matter would be better suited to adjudication through arbitration. It left the choice of arbitrator to the Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court disposed of the class action suit and instead referred the matter to arbitration by its order in Jindal Poly Films Limited vs Monet Securities Private Limited, CA No. 8709/2026, Order dated 8th June 2026.

Aggrieved by this Order, a group of shareholders filed a Miscellaneous Application before the Supreme Court seeking a recall of its earlier 8th June Order. It was contended that the Supreme Court had not been informed that the proceedings before the NCLT had already acquired the character of a class action, with thousands of non-promoter minority shareholders becoming parties to the proceedings following statutory public notice. It was contended that an entire class consisting of all non-promoter minority public shareholders were part of the class, whereas the consent application was filed only by 29 shareholders. It was argued that this material fact was not disclosed before the Supreme Court and it was not open to one or a few shareholders to withdraw a class action suit. The Supreme Court has concluded all hearings in this matter and has reserved the matter for judgment.

EPILOGUE

The entire episode of Jindal Poly Films seems like a mystery film. Just when one thought there was an ending, there is a twist in the climax. One wonders how, in the absence of an arbitration agreement (which is the foundation of any arbitration), could the matter be referred to arbitration? Further, and more importantly, can an entire class of shareholders (over 25% of the shareholders in this case) be bound by an arbitration accepted by a few of them? Does this not defeat the very concept of a class action suit? When the threshold for filing a class action suit is 2% of the capital, then should not the same yardstick be applied for withdrawing the suit? When 45,000 shareholders were admitted as litigants, could 29 shareholders file a consent decree? It would be interesting to see the developments in this case. However, one thing is for sure, class action suits are here to stay and corporate India may expect to hear more on this!

Maya Banerjee v. Union of India: Arrears of family pension are payable from the date of employee’s death, not restricted by subsequent delayed approach.

34. Maya Banerjee v. Union of India & Ors.

2026 INSC 959

August 20, 2026

Family pension – Arrears – Conflicting decisions of coordinate Benches – Tarsem Singh and S.K. Mastan Bee – Subsequent Bench of equal strength bound by earlier decision – Doctrine of per incuriam – family pension payable from the date it fell due. [Railway Services (Pension) Rules; Constitution of India, Arts.21, 141]

FACTS

The appellant was the widow of a Railway employee who died in service on 12.11.2000. She was an illiterate woman and was unaware of her husband’s service details. Her husband was nevertheless dismissed from service after his death, contrary to the Railway Board’s circular requiring disciplinary proceedings to be closed upon death of the employee.

The appellant’s claim for family pension was not acted upon. She subsequently obtained a civil court decree declaring the date of her husband’s death. The High Court ultimately directed payment of family pension but restricted the arrears to the period from 2014, when she first approached the Central Administrative Tribunal.

The appellant claimed pension from the date of her husband’s death. The Union of India relied upon Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2008) 8 SCC 648, under which consequential relief of arrears in pension matters would ordinarily be restricted to three years preceding the filing of the writ petition. The appellant relied upon S.K. Mastan Bee v. General Manager, South Central Railway (2003) 1 SCC 184, where family pension was granted from the date on which it became due despite the widow’s delayed approach.

HELD

The Supreme Court noted that Tarsem Singh (Supra) and S.K. Mastan Bee (Supra) were decisions of Benches of equal strength and that their approaches regarding arrears of family pension were in conflict.

The Court reiterated that a coordinate Bench cannot take a contrary view from an earlier decision of a Bench of equal strength. If it disagrees with the earlier decision, the proper course is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. A subsequent coordinate Bench cannot simply disregard the binding precedent.
The Court further explained the doctrine of per incuriam. A judgment may be treated as per incuriam where its ratio is irreconcilable with an earlier decision of an equal or larger Bench or where a relevant statutory provision or binding authority was not brought to the Court’s attention. The doctrine applies to the ratio decidendi, and must be applied sparingly.

On the merits, the Court held that S.K. Mastan Bee (Supra) directly dealt with the claim of a widow for family pension and was therefore the more appropriate precedent. Since Tarsem Singh (Supra) had not considered the earlier decision, the Court followed S.K. Mastan Bee (Supra).

Family pension was a valuable right and property in the hands of the appellant. In the circumstances, restricting the arrears to 2014 would cause grave injustice, particularly when the appellant was not responsible for the delay and the Railways themselves had failed to discharge their obligation to compute and offer the family pension.

The High Court’s order was modified, and the appellant was held entitled to family pension from the date of her husband’s death, with the entire arrears carrying interest at 6% per annum.

Manav Bhanot v. National Highway Authority of India: Compensation benefits for highway land acquisitions determined before 01.01.2015 are computed under Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

33. Manav Bhanot v. National Highway Authority of India

2026 INSC 973 September 8, 2026

Land acquisition – National Highways Act – solatium and interest – applicability of 1894 Act or 2013 Act – compensation determined before 1.1.2015 – benefits to be computed under 1894 Act.

[National Highways Act, 1956, Ss.3G, 3H; Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, Ss.24, 105]

FACTS

The appellant’s land was acquired under the National Highways Act. The notification under section 3A was issued in 2011, and the declaration under section 3D was made in 2012.

The Competent Authority determined compensation on 11.07.2014. The appellant received part of the compensation but disputed the quantum, resulting in an arbitration proceeding. The dispute before the Supreme Court concerned the statute under which solatium, interest and interest on solatium were required to be computed.

The appellant contended that the beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act should apply. NHAI contended that the 2013 Act became applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act only from 01.01.2015 and that the compensation had already been determined before that date.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that landowners whose lands are acquired under the National Highways Act are entitled to solatium, interest on compensation and interest on solatium. The question is under which enactment these benefits are to be computed.

For acquisitions under the National Highways Act, the determination of compensation by the Competent Authority under section 3G(1) constitutes the equivalent of an award. Where such determination was made before 01.01.2015, the compensation benefits are to be computed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Where the determination was made after 01.01.2015, the provisions of the 2013 Act would apply.

In the present case, the Competent Authority determined compensation on 11.07.2014, before the 2013 Act became applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act from 01.01.2015. Consequently, although the appellant was entitled to solatium, interest and interest on solatium, the same were to be computed under the 1894 Act.

The Court accordingly allowed the appeal to that limited extent and remanded the matter to the Competent Authority for computation and disbursal of the benefits under the 1894 Act.

Lakshmi Mohan v. Airtech Projects Engineers Pvt. Ltd.: Minor shortfall in EMD prescribed by sale notice does not invalidate auction sale under SARFAESI Act if cured.

32. Lakshmi Mohan (Dead) through LHs. & Anr. v. Airtech Projects Engineers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

2026 INSC 909 August 21, 2026

SARFAESI – Auction sale – Earnest money deposit – Shortfall in EMD prescribed by sale notice – Subsequent deposit of 25% of sale consideration – Technical non-compliance causing no prejudice – validity of auction not affected. [Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002; Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, Rr.8, 9]

FACTS

The borrower defaulted in repayment of a cash-credit facility and the Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. A possession-cum-sale notice required intending bidders to deposit EMD of Rs. 21,50,000/- and stipulated that an offer without EMD would be rejected.

The auction purchasers submitted their bid with EMD of ₹21,15,000/-, resulting in a shortfall of ₹35,000/. Their bid of ₹2,17,40,000/- was the highest. On the date of auction, they deposited a further amount which brought the total deposit to 25% of the bid amount, as required by Rule 9(3). The balance consideration was subsequently deposited and a sale certificate was issued and registered.

The DRAT held that the auction was invalid for non-compliance with the sale notice. The High Court ultimately upheld the DRAT’s decision.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that conditions in a tender or auction notice must be distinguished between essential conditions of eligibility and ancillary or subsidiary conditions. While essential conditions ordinarily require strict compliance, a technical deviation which causes no substantial prejudice or injustice may not invalidate the transaction.

The requirement of EMD of ₹21,50,000/- was a non-statutory condition incorporated in the sale notice to filter out non-serious bidders. Both bidders had deposited ₹21,15,000/- and the Bank had entertained both bids.

More importantly, the auction purchasers deposited 25% of the sale price, inclusive of the EMD, on the date of the auction, thereby complying with the statutory requirement under Rule 9(3). The earlier shortfall of ₹35,000/- therefore caused no prejudice either to the competing bidder or to the borrower and did not affect the validity of the bid.

The Court further held that the delay in payment of the balance consideration could not invalidate the sale since the Bank had agreed to extend the period for payment in view of the pending litigation, and the balance was deposited immediately after the borrower’s challenge was dismissed.

The DRAT and High Court judgments were set aside. The Bank was directed to refund the surplus sale proceeds of ₹1,33,94,054/- to the borrower with interest at 7% per annum from 23.03.2010.

Ravi Kant Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh: Maintenance Tribunal under Senior Citizens Act possesses incidental power to order eviction of children to ensure maintenance and protection.

31. Ravi Kant Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

2026 LiveLaw (SC) 824

August 4, 2026

Senior citizens – Maintenance and protection – Eviction of children from senior citizens’ property – Power of Tribunal to order eviction – incidental power necessary to enforce maintenance and protection.

[Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, Ss.7, 8, 16, 27; Constitution of India, Arts.21, 41]

FACTS

The appellant was the owner of a residential house in Lucknow. His son and daughter-in-law were residing in the premises. The appellant’s aged mother had allegedly been compelled to leave the premises and reside in an old age facility.

The appellant approached the District Magistrate under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act seeking eviction of his son. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate directed eviction and the District Magistrate affirmed the order.

The High Court, relying upon an earlier decision, held that the authorities under the Act had no power to order eviction and quashed the orders. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal constituted under the Act possesses the power to order eviction where such eviction is necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of a senior citizen or parent.

Section 8 empowers the Tribunal to conduct an inquiry by summary procedure with powers of a Civil Court, while section 27 bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. Where a statute confers jurisdiction upon an authority, it impliedly confers such ancillary powers as are necessary to make that jurisdiction effective.

Accordingly, the power to order eviction is an incidental power necessary for enforcing the statutory right of maintenance and protection.

The Court relied upon S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner AIR 2021 SC 177, Samtola Devi v. State of U.P 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 445 and Kamalakant Mishra v. Additional Collector 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 947, and held that the High Court’s reliance upon the contrary earlier decision was misconceived.

The orders of the High Court were set aside, and the eviction orders passed by the authorities under the Act were restored.

Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar: Absence of express stipulation for specific performance in agreement to sell does not bar decree for specific performance.

30. Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar

2026 LiveLaw (SC) 682

July 14, 2026

Specific performance – Agreement to sell – Clause providing for refund of earnest money in event of non-execution of sale deed – Absence of express stipulation for specific performance is no bar – Co-owner’s undivided share valid subject matter of transfer – Limits of interference with concurrent findings in second appeal. [Specific Relief Act, 1963, S.23; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, S.100]

FACTS

The appellant entered into an agreement to sell with the respondent, a co-owner of the property, for purchase of his undivided half share for `12,50,000/-. The appellant paid `9,00,000/- as earnest money. The agreement stipulated that if the sale deed could not be executed, the respondent would refund the earnest money.

The date for execution of the sale deed was twice extended, and a further sum of `60,000/- was paid. The appellant appeared before the Sub-Registrar on the stipulated dates, but the respondent did not.

The Trial Court found the agreement to have been duly executed and the appellant ready and willing to perform his obligations, but declined specific performance on the ground that the agreement provided only for refund of earnest money. The First Appellate Court decreed specific performance.

In the second appeal, the High Court affirmed the findings regarding execution of the agreement, payment of earnest money and readiness and willingness, but nevertheless held that the transaction was not genuine and restored the decree of the Trial Court.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that section 23 of the Specific Relief Act does not preclude specific performance merely because the agreement stipulates payment or refund of a sum in the event of breach. The question is whether the stipulated sum was intended to give the defaulting party an option to pay money in lieu of performance.

The clause in the present case merely required refund of earnest money if the sale deed could not be executed. It contained no language conferring an option upon the vendor to discharge the contract by refunding the earnest money. The stipulation therefore reinforced the obligation to perform and did not constitute a substitute for performance.

The Court further held that an undivided share of a co-owner in immovable property is a valid and marketable subject matter of transfer. The fact that the co-sharer was not a signatory could not, by itself, cast doubt on the genuineness of the agreement.

The High Court had also exceeded its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC by disturbing concurrent findings of fact without recording any finding of perversity. The First Appellate Court is the final court on questions of fact, and its findings regarding execution of the agreement, readiness and willingness and the falsity of the defence could not be reopened merely because another view of the evidence was possible.

The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the decree for specific performance passed by the First Appellate Court was restored.

From Published Accounts

COMPILER’S NOTE:

Few leading companies in India now publish a Tax Transparency Report to highlight the tax related matters, approach to tax, tax governance, managing tax risk, tax strategy, approach to compliance, advocacy and relationship with regulators and global contribution to tax. Given below are relevant extracts of a Tax Transparency report and Assurance Report thereon.

Tata Motors Passenger Vehicles Limited (formerly Tata Motors Ltd)

Extract of Tax Transparency Report FY 2025-26

INTRODUCTION

We recognize that the tax that we account for, and pay is an important aspect of our wider economic and social impact of the Tata Motors group. Tata Motors PV as always is guided by the Tata Code of Conduct, hence accountability remains rooted in all aspects of its decision. The focus is not only product sustainability but also operational sustainability with strong governance structure around all practices including tax. In furtherance to our endeavour last year, we hereby present our approach to tax related matters and Global Tax & Other Contributions in this 2nd Tax Transparency Report, thereby endorsing our continued commitment to tax accountability that in turn plays a key role in sustainability. This would also address the changing tax environment globally, requiring public disclosures of tax related parameters.

Global Tax and other contributions summary

(Discontinued Operation) April to June 2025

Particulars FY26
Revenue
Contribution
16,730
2,322

CATEGORY WISE SUMMARY

CATEGORY WISE SUMMARY

The graphs present data for only Tata Motors PV entities for FY 2025 and FY 2026. The data for commercial vehicles undertaking entities are provided for parity with Financial Statement as discontinued operation in a separate table.

Our approach to tax

At Tata Motors PV, we place strong emphasis on fulfilling our tax related obligations across the Group, guided by the core values embedded in the Tata Code of Conduct. Our responsible approach to taxation extends beyond governance and accountability frameworks and includes continuous capability building through structured training programs for our tax professionals. These programs focus on audit preparedness, evolving tax legislation, and developments in the dynamic tax and regulatory environment.

We are firmly committed to full compliance with the tax laws and regulations of the jurisdictions in which we operate, with zero tolerance for non-compliance. All tax positions and decisions are grounded in applicable local tax laws and, where required, are reviewed and validated by external experts. Business decisions are driven by commercial substance and are never motivated by artificial or aggressive tax planning. Tata Motors PV is committed to paying taxes in the jurisdictions where economic value is created, reflecting our belief that accountable and efficient operations are central to sustainable success. Our stakeholders, including customers, investors and shareholders, vendors, and employees place a high premium on accountability, of which being a responsible taxpayer is an essential element. Accordingly, our tax function is guided by clearly articulated tax principles that are aligned with our business conduct and ethical standards across our global operations.

KEY TAX PRINCIPLES

The following are the key principles in relation to our approach to tax matters and the conduct of our tax affairs. We adhere to a transparent approach, ensuring full disclosure of our activities to all stakeholders.

1. Compliance

We act with integrity, both within the letter and spirit of all tax legislation and relevant international standards. We have a zero tolerance to tax evasion, including the evasion of tax by third parties associated with our business. As a commercially driven organization, we consider the tax consequences and do not engage in transactions without commercial substance with the sole purpose of avoiding tax. In making business decisions we seek to maximize value to our stakeholders. Tax decisions are driven by core values of integrity, unity and responsibility and planning is driven by commercial rationale. Our commitment to ethical taxation is built on a foundation of unwavering integrity and rigorous adherence. We approach our responsibilities with earnest sincerity, ensuring the timely payment of all relevant taxes in all the jurisdictions we operate.

2. Robust internal controls

We proactively seek to identify, manage, and mitigate any potential tax risks, staying abreast of key changes and trends in tax matters through our internal control systems and external advisors/consultants as needed. Our internal controls have stringent escalation matrix at strategic intercepts to ensure critical decisions and positions are evaluated from all perspective.

3. International tax

We embrace business unity to ensure that our international tax affairs are aligned and kept current with the substance of our business operations and international tax guidance. We do not engage in any form of artificial tax structuring. Our subsidiaries are located in countries where the business has significant substance. We claim reliefs, credits, incentives and exemptions that are legislated in these countries as applicable to our operations.

4. Stakeholders relationship

We seek to maintain trusting, transparent and constructive relationships with tax authorities, and proactively participate in dialogues with industry and advocacy bodies to shape effective future tax policy and create shared value. We believe in open communication with all our stakeholders regarding our business substance and any tax related decisions. Our approach to tax disputes is open dialogue or adoption of available dispute resolution options in local jurisdictions.

5. People

We invest in our people, as we strongly believe that their continued learning and growth is essential for us to deliver on all our commitments. In line with current trend, it is our continuous endeavour to ensure that our people at every department adopt and leverage technology.

OUR APPROACH TO TAX GOVERNANCE AND RISK

Our corporate philosophy is in tandem with Tata Group’s enduring legacy of integrity, transparency, accountability, trusteeship and ethical governance. Tata Motors PV corporate philosophy derives and exercises its commitment to ethical, transparent and accountable governance practices through its corporate governance framework. Our corporate governance practices are consistent with international best practices and standards. Our governing principles are driven by a sense of responsibility and fairness, ensuring that our leaders and our work are always guided by the best interests of all our stakeholders. Both, approach to tax governance and risk are treated as strategic enablers of sustainable value creation, not merely statutory obligations. This approach to governance percolates to the tax function within the group.

The Board of Directors, supported by its committees, ensures that the Company is able to conduct its business responsibly and uphold the best interests of its diverse stakeholders by ensuring fairness, independence and transparency in all its decisions through the governance framework. They specifically review all financial and non-financial information. Tata Motors PV has a robust internal tax governance framework, which includes, clearly defined tax policies and internal controls, dedicated in-house tax and finance teams, oversight by senior management and the Board as well as regular internal reviews and audits.

We at Tata Motors PV, appreciate our operational complexity being spread across multiple jurisdictions with various complex regulations. This lends an inevitable inherent degree of tax uncertainty in the operational level, which might not always be visible and hence immediately addressable. However, we address tax uncertainties by partnering with business to provide timely tax advice. At all times, our endeavour is to ensure that such business decisions are evaluated for all tax implications and vetted by local tax experts to ensure adherence to all local tax regulations as well as compliances.

MANAGING OUR TAX RISK

The Company’s tax operating model is designed to ensure effective governance and oversight, with the direct tax and indirect tax verticals reporting independently to senior leadership. Each vertical is further structured to provide centralized support to multiple Group entities across key tax functions. The Company continues to retain responsibility for its entire legacy tax litigation portfolio, which is managed appropriately by leveraging historical knowledge, documentation, and experienced in house teams.

Further, through creation of joint ventures like the global shared service and digital/ artificial intelligence focused entities the Company ensures alignment across its group entities with respect to tax solutions and IT infrastructure supporting the same.

This collaborative operating model is underpinned by consistent governance principles, strong internal controls, and shared accountability frameworks, ensuring that tax operations across the Group are aligned with the Company’s overarching compliance and ethical standards.

The centralized tax model operates through two distinct but complementary dimensions:

Centralized Drive: Planning, strategy, overall compliance review, advisory, assessments, investigations & litigations, have a centralized approach. This includes initiatives aimed at unlocking of funds through driving tax refunds, credits, Lower Deduction Certificate (LDC), disposal of litigations etc. It ensures uniform tax positions through proactive initiatives. It provides support for restructuring, and Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) activities of the group and assisting in simplifying the Related Party Transactions (RPT) policy and benchmarking. The various international tax updates and changes are coordinated as they form the core of advocacy initiatives.

Centralized Delivery: The operational support in terms of compliances is performed centrally, wherever possible. Process improvements through implementation of automation & analytics is a focus. Support is provided to the various entities in the group through the central delivery mechanism.

We seek to take a unified and consistent approach to tax positions and compliance, whilst acknowledging that each country has its own tax law and practice that must also be taken into account. Working closely with the business and applying relevant expertise and capabilities, we align business strategy with robust compliance. Where required, we seek external validation of any positions taken. Based on the magnitude of the impact, the decision mechanism flows to the Audit Committee (AC) and the Board of Directors.

The preservation of the governance and compliance framework is facilitated by appropriately qualified and experienced tax resources supported with technology. The tax and finance function teams consist of several qualified accountants with the skills, knowledge and experience to manage the Company’s tax affairs, who undertake mandatory Continuing Professional Development (CPD) training to stay up to date with the relevant tax compliances. Further they are supported with customized adoption of technology to monitor and ensure global compliance standards are met [including management of any litigations]. Tools are used for preparation of essential reports including tax computations, GST, deferred tax, Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) and RPT.

TAX STRATEGY

The Company maintains a robust tax risk management and control framework, designed to ensure adherence to our key tax principles and support responsible decision making across the organisation. This framework is reinforced through periodic internal reviews, regular refresh of tax policies, and the use of independent external advisors where interpretational complexities or uncertainties in tax law arise. As a Group, Tata Motors PV maintains a conservative and limited appetite for tax risk, and, guided by the Tata Code of Conduct, continuously endeavours to identify, assess, and mitigate tax risks at every level of the decision-making process.

Day to day management of tax affairs rests with the dedicated tax function, comprising an appropriate blend of experienced and qualified tax professionals. The tax function also plays a strategic role by advising senior management on Group tax strategy, policy formulation, and significant business transactions, ensuring that commercial decisions are supported by sound and compliant tax outcomes.

1. Tax controls

Strong tax controls form the foundation of our tax governance framework. These include tax policies, standard operating procedures, defined approval matrices, and multi layered review mechanisms. Technology enabled controls are increasingly deployed to monitor compliance timelines, track statutory filings, validate data integrity, and support accurate reporting across jurisdictions.

2. Risk management and governance

Tax risk is managed as an integral component of the Company’s overall enterprise risk management framework. Potential tax exposures whether arising from legislative changes, complex transactions, interpretations, or audits are identified early and assessed for materiality and likelihood. Material tax risks and positions are escalated through defined governance channels and ensuring appropriate oversight by senior management This structured governance ensures accountability, consistency in tax positions, and alignment with the Company’s risk appetite.

3. Tata Code of Conduct

All tax professionals across geographies are onboarded and operate in strict adherence to the Tata Code of Conduct, which places a strong emphasis on integrity, ethical behaviour, transparency, and accountability. Given that tax impacts not only the Company but also the broader social and governmental ecosystem, heightened awareness of tax risks and responsibilities is considered non-negotiable across the tax function. Integrity is embedded in every action and decision related to tax planning, compliance, and reporting.

4. Engagement and dealings with tax authorities

The Company strives to maintain open, transparent, and constructive relationships with tax authorities across jurisdictions. Engagements with authorities whether in the context of assessments, audits, investigations, or litigation are conducted in a professional and cooperative manner, supported by accurate documentation and timely disclosures. Positions taken by the Company are well reasoned, technically supported, and aligned with applicable laws. To further strengthen the governance, the tax function leverages technology-based solutions to track compliance obligation, streamline processes, enhance efficiency, and manage risks, including review and escalation mechanisms. These tools support compliance monitoring, litigation management, and preparation of critical tax reports, enabling proactive risk identification and informed decision-making.

OUR APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE

We adhere to the regulatory compliances pertaining to all taxes including RPT as required by the various jurisdictions in which we operate. Our approach to some of the key requirements are as below:

Annual compliances: Tata Motor PV group of companies, continue to monitor and execute centrally the annual compliances with maker-checker review framework. Controllers and/or CFO review and approve basis controls designed and implemented around the tax functions. There are customised tools developed to monitor these controls that are continuously tested by in house teams and auditors.

Litigation mitigation: Our standard approach is to adopt well validated and strong tax positions on controversial or any tax adjustments. Endeavour remains to partner with the tax authorities at adjudication stage. The group may also enter into Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) / Bilateral Advance Pricing Agreements (BAPA) where practical.

Litigation: Robust monitoring system includes centralized litigation repository. Further, the standard procedure involves representation through best of the counsels including senior counsels in appellate and court matters.

BEPS 1.0: CbCR is prepared centrally, with insights, review and approval by Group Controller. Masterfile is similarly developed centrally with similar review and approval mechanism being adopted.

BEPS 2.0: Tata Motors PV is currently working on Global Information Return (GIR) filing and adhering to Public CbCR requirements. Company has already initiated adherence to the various notification requirements in the countries that have adopted the above mandates.

RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS

Tata Motors PV as a group have multiple transactions not only amongst its various subsidiaries but also with other Tata Group entities. For example, information technology services are from Tata Consultancy, while distribution of its cars in Africa region is conducted through Tata International, both part of the Tata Group. However, for any such transaction, utmost care is taken to ensure that arm’s length principle is adhered to by the transacting entities within the Tata Motors PV group. We have adopted technology to ensure that such related party transactions are not conducted without an arm’s length policy in place that is vetted by professionals and basis materiality is also approved by the AC or the shareholders, as required under Securities Exchange Board of India (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (SEBI (LODR)), in India. The Company ensures continuous apprising of its team on the various changes and updates of the SEBI (LODR) as well as other country specific requirements to ensure that compliance requirements for all related party transactions are adhered to. In Indian context, the Company at the beginning of each financial year places all its related party transaction details including, transacting entity names, value of transaction and the arm’s length pricing policy for an ‘Omnibus’ approval to the AC. It has implemented the revised standard format as effective from September 2025 under the SEBI(LODR) requirement for reporting its related party transactions to the AC. The Company also reviews Omnibus versus actual transactions on a quarterly basis and changes, if any, are considered. New transactions are evaluated for arm’s length pricing before being concluded.

Further, we are monitoring the EU public disclosure of CbCR to ensure that the same is conformed to as required by a non-EU headquartered multinational. Globally, we also proactively reach out to tax authorities for negotiating APAs wherever it is a practical solution.

ADVOCACY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH REGULATORS

We at Tata Motors PV believe in open and transparent communication with all our stakeholders. Tata Motors PV considers regulators and government bodies as strategic stakeholders, not just compliance authorities. Engagement is designed to ensure full regulatory compliance, contribute to policy development, and align business growth with national priorities. Our approach to tax authorities and other industry regulators also endorses similar approaches.

Effective engagement with regulators enables Tata Motors PV to anticipate and adapt to regulatory changes early, reduce compliance and operational risks, influence progressive automotive and EV policy, maintain strong governance and ethical standards and support national priorities on safety, sustainability, and mobility.

This reinforces Tata Motors PV’s reputation as a responsible and trusted automotive manufacturer. Thus, the Tax Heads in India participate through industry bodies such as Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM), Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) as well as at Tata Group level for effective industry related advocacy.

In JLR and Tata Technologies Limited (TTL) entities too, stakeholder engagement is treated as a core governance and sustainability mechanism, risk management and social impact. The primary objective of engagement with government and regulators is to ensure compliance and contribute to policy development. The typical engagement mechanisms include direct dialogue with national and regional governments, participation in industry associations and consultations. This has resulted in proactive regulatory alignment and reduced compliance risk during business transformation.

We have been closely working with government and tax administrator on policy, administration and technology related issues. In the various other jurisdictions we operate, our approach to policy matters relating to our industry has been similar. We work with the local industry bodies and government to communicate our position on any policy decisions.

As far as tax authorities are concerned, we maintain an amicable relation basis our approach of paying the right amount of tax at the right time. However, there are at times certain interpretational issues that might result in litigations, which are usually addressed with help of external expert counsels. Wherever possible we also explore options of advance pricing arrangements both unilateral and bilateral.

In summary, Tata Motors PV engages regulators through structured consultations, industry representation, transparent compliance, and policy advocacy to ensure regulatory alignment, risk mitigation, and sustainable growth.

BACKGROUND

The Global Tax & Other Contributions summarized in this section provides the total payments made directly or indirectly to the Government. As a part of direct contributions, disclosures in relation to corporate tax, net indirect taxes, and other charges are aggregated for representation at each business group level. The indirect contributions include the payments made on behalf of other stakeholders to the Government, including withholding and payroll taxes. Other non-tax payments such as employer’s provident fund and employee pension scheme constitute the other contributions category.

Global tax & other contributions: Categories & examples of contributions

Direct contributions Corporate Tax

  1. Corporate Income Tax
  2. Surcharge and Cess
  3. Corporate Tax Credit and Incentives

Net Indirect Taxes

  1. Goods and Service Tax (GST)
  2. Custom Duties (all types)
  3. Value Added Tax (VAT)
  4. Sales and Use Tax

Other Charges

  1. Stamp Duty
  2. Property Tax
  3. Municipal Taxes
  4. Land Revenue
  5. Electricity Duties
  6. Apprenticeship Levy

Indirect contributions Withholding and Payroll Taxes

  1. Withholding Taxes Collected from employee/Payroll Taxes

  2. Withholding Taxes (WHT) collected from vendor

  3. Withholding Taxes collected from shareholder
  4. Tax Collected at Source (TCS) for Sale to Customers
  5. Professional Taxes
  6. Foreign Worker Levy
  7. Work Permit Levy

Other contributions

  1. Provident Fund
  2. Employee Pension Scheme
  3. Employee State Insurance
  4. Labour Welfare Fund
  5. National Insurance
  6. Social Security Fund
  7. Compensation Funds
  8. Disable Person Funds
  9. Gratuity Scheme
  10. Superannuation Scheme

GLOBAL TAX AND OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS FY26

₹32,574 Crores
Total Contributions
₹11,600 Crores
Indirect Contributions
₹19,518 Crores
Direct Contributions
₹1,456 Crores
Other Contributions

GLOBAL TAX AND OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS FY26

Tata Motors Limited

(Discontinued Operation) April to June 2025

Contributions (in Cr)
Total Contributions

Direct Contributions

Indirect Contributions

Other Contributions

2,322

1,987

287

48

GLOBAL TAX AND OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS FY25#

₹31,077 Crores

Total Contributions

₹ 9,620 Crores

Indirect Contributions

₹20,723 Crores

Direct Contributions

₹734 Crores

Other Contributions

GLOBAL TAX AND OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS FY25

# The comparative amounts have been presented as if, the Commercial Vehicles undertaking were discontinued in the prior period. Direct contribution excludes Stamp duty and Land Transfer charges accrued in books but not paid.

* Entity Schedule.

BASIS OF PREPARATION

Reporting entities

We have reported the Global Tax & Other Contributions to the Government by Tata Motors PV, our subsidiaries and joint operations (excluding associates and joint ventures). The contribution made by Tata Motors PV and its subsidiaries including branch offices are reported at full amounts and that for joint operations is reported in the proportion of shareholding. However, the entities which were liquidated/ demerged in the said financial year or are under process of liquidation or yet to commence operations or have insignificant operations as on March 31, 2026 have been excluded from reporting for that particular year, but if they have paid any taxes during the year, the entity has been considered for reporting. Further, certain foreign companies follow calendar year basis in multiple tax compliances, whereas our reporting period is April to March. Accordingly, for this reporting, the contributions paid as per our reporting period of April to March have been considered. The entire list of entities at business group level considered in this report has been included in the Entity Schedule.

METHODOLOGY

We have reported Global Tax & Other Contributions under cash basis unless otherwise mentioned below. The reporting methodology followed for each type of Global Tax & Other Contributions has been detailed below.

DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS

Corporate tax

This comprises Corporate Income Tax. These taxes are the actual payments made net of refunds (including interest) received during the financial year with respect to corporate income tax liability of the same year and/or of previous years. Typically, these taxes would be reflected in various statutory periodic forms/returns and statements/challans or any other documents being filed with the relevant government authorities, or audited cash flow statements, or bank statements evidencing the payments or statements from third party payment partners honouring the obligations.

OTHER TAXES AND CHARGES

This comprises stamp duty, property tax, land revenue, municipal tax, electricity duty borne (including cross subsidy surcharge paid), and any other similar contribution by the Company and its subsidiaries. The same have been compiled based on payments to the Government exchequer and/ or challans and bank statements.

NET INDIRECT TAXES

Amounts reported represent indirect tax payments remitted to the Government on cash basis. Indirect tax payments made for reverse charge liability and on imports paid in cash form part of the amount reported. However, it may be noted that the payment of taxes on procurements paid to vendors have not been considered here. Typically, the amounts reported under net indirect taxes have been obtained from various statutory periodic forms/ returns and statements/ challans/ relevant Government portals or any other documents being filed and maintained with the relevant Government authorities.

INDIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS

Indirect contributions include tax deducted at source (withholding taxes) from vendors and employees, taxes collected from customers and other payroll taxes. A withholding tax is an income tax to be paid to the Government by the payer of the income rather than by the recipient of the income. The tax is thus withheld or deducted from the income due to the recipient. Withholding taxes usually apply to payments made to employees, vendors, service providers, etc., of the Company. This also includes taxes collected on various payments received from customers for prescribed goods or services. In addition, payroll taxes include professional and work permit levies that are withheld from employee remuneration and paid to the Government by the respective companies in the capacity of an employer. Typically, these taxes are reflected in various forms, returns, statements and challans prescribed or approved by the Government for this purpose.

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS

Other contributions include contributions made by the employer to social security programmes for the benefit of employees as mandated by regulatory bodies. This includes the employer’s share in provident fund, including national insurance, employee pension scheme, social security and employee state insurance. Typically, these contributions are reflected in the returns, statements and challans prescribed or approved by the concerned statutory bodies for this purpose.

COVERAGE

The various heads of contributions are summarised in this report. The grouping of taxes under the heads of ‘Direct Contributions’, ‘Indirect Contributions and ‘Other Contributions’ is based on our understanding of the nature of taxes and its payment mechanism. Where date of actual cash inflow/outflow was not available, the tax payments shown as due in the relevant tax period has been considered for reporting.

Global tax and other contributions

Direct Contribution

Corporate Tax

  1. Corporate Income Tax
  2. Surcharge and Cess
  3. Corporate Tax Credit and Incentives

Net Indirect Taxes

  1. Goods and Service Tax (GST)
  2. Custom Duties (all types)
  3. Value Added Tax (VAT)
  4. Sales and Use Tax

Other Charges

  1. Stamp Duty
  2. Property Tax
  3. Municipal Taxes
  4. Land Revenue
  5. Electricity Duties
  6. Apprenticeship Levy

Indirect contributions

Withholding and Payroll Taxes

  1. Withholding Taxes Collected from employee/Payroll Taxes
  2. Withholding Taxes (WHT) collected from vendor
  3. Withholding Taxes collected from shareholder
  4. Tax Collected at Source (TCS) for Sale to Customers
  5. Professional Taxes
  6. Foreign Worker Levy
  7. Work Permit Levy

Other contributions

  1. Provident Fund
  2. Employee Pension Scheme
  3. Employee State Insurance
  4. Labour Welfare Fund
  5. National Insurance
  6. Social Security Fund
  7. Compensation Funds
  8. Disable Person Funds
  9. Gratuity Scheme
  10. Superannuation Scheme

Excluded amounts

The following are not included in the Global Tax & Other Contributions statement:

  •  Payment of indirect taxes on procurements paid to vendors
  • Any fees paid to the government and its authorities for various kinds of compliance, filings, penalties etc.

Currency

The currency considered for this report or the reporting currency is the Indian Rupee (₹). The data for Global Tax & Other Contributions to Government provided by any subsidiary in their local reporting currency, has been converted to ₹ based on the exchange rate that has been considered in preparation of Form AOC-01.

Independent Reasonable Assurance Report

Independent Reasonable Assurance Report to Tata Motors Passenger Vehicles Limited on Global Tax & Other Contributions

We (Name) were engaged by the management of Tata Motors Passenger Vehicles Limited (Formerly Tata Motors Limited) (‘Tata Motors PV’ or ‘the ‘Company’) to report on ‘Global Tax & Other Contributions’ section contained in the Company’s Tax Transparency Report for the financial year 2025-26 [the said section hereinafter referred to as ‘Global Tax & Other Contributions’], in the form of an independent reasonable assurance conclusion about whether Tata Motors PV statement that the Global Tax & Other Contributions is properly prepared, in all material respects, based on ‘Basis of Preparation’ attached to the Tax Transparency Report is fairly stated.

Tata Motors PV responsibilities

The management of Tata Motors PV are responsible for preparing the Global Tax & Other Contributions that is free from material misstatement in accordance with the Basis of Preparation and for the information contained therein. The management of Tata Motors PV is also responsible for preparing the Basis of Preparation. This responsibility includes designing, implementing and maintaining internal control relevant to the preparation and presentation of Global Tax & Other Contributions that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error. It also includes developing the Basis of Preparation. The Company is also responsible for preventing and detecting fraud and for identifying and ensuring that it complies with laws and regulations applicable to its activities.

Our responsibilities

Our responsibility is to examine the Global Tax & Other Contributions prepared by the Company and to report thereon in the form of an independent reasonable assurance conclusion based on the evidence obtained.

We conducted our engagement in accordance with International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000: Assurance Engagements Other Than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. That standard requires that we plan and perform our procedures to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the Global Tax & Other Contributions is properly prepared, in all material respects.

(Name) applies International Standard on Quality Control 1 and accordingly maintains a comprehensive system of quality control including documented policies and procedures regarding compliance with ethical requirements, professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

We have complied with the independence and other ethical requirements of the Code of Ethics for professional accountants issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants, which is founded on fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behaviour. The procedures selected depend on our judgment, including the assessment of the risks of material misstatement of Global Tax & Other Contributions whether due to fraud or error. In making those risk assessments, we have considered internal control relevant to the preparation and presentation of Global Tax & Other Contributions in order to design assurance procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purposes of expressing a conclusion as to the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over the preparation and presentation of Global Tax & Other Contributions. Our engagement also included assessing the appropriateness of Global Tax & Other Contributions, the suitability of the Basis of Preparation used by the Company in preparing the Global Tax & Other Contributions in the circumstances of the engagement, evaluating the appropriateness of the procedures used in the preparation of Global Tax & Other Contributions and the reasonableness of estimates made by the Company and evaluating the overall presentation of the Global Tax & Other Contributions. Reasonable assurance is less than absolute assurance.

The procedures performed by us have been included herein as Annexure – Assurance procedures – Global Tax & Other Contributions.

CONCLUSION

Our conclusion has been formed on the basis of, and is subject to, the matters outlined in this report. We believe that the evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our conclusion. In our opinion, the Global Tax & Other Contributions is properly prepared in all material respects, based on the Basis of Preparation.

Restriction of use of our report

In accordance with the terms of our engagement, this independent reasonable assurance report on Global Tax & Other Contributions has been prepared for the Company solely for inclusion in its Tax Transparency Report for the financial year 2025-26 and for no other purpose or in any other context.

Our report should not be regarded as suitable to be used or relied on by any party wishing to acquire rights against us other than the Company for any purpose or in any context.

Any party other than the Company who obtains access to our report or a copy thereof and chooses to rely on our report (or any part thereof) will do so at its own risk. To the fullest extent permitted by law, we accept or assume no responsibility and deny any liability to any party other than the Company for our work, for this independent reasonable assurance report, or for the conclusions we have reached. Our report is released to Tata Motors PV on the basis that it shall not be copied, referred to or disclosed, in whole (save for inclusion in Tata Motors PV Tax Transparency Report) or in part, without our prior written consent.

Annexure – Assurance Procedures – Global Tax & Other Contributions

  • Understand and examine the processes and controls at Tata Motors PV level in managing, collating and reviewing the data for the Global Tax & Other Contributions
  • Review the guidance provided/ instructions issued to locations / units / group entities by central team for their collation of various tax and other specified items
  • Review the country wise break-up of the tax and other specified items reported in the Global Tax & Other Contributions
  • Understand and examine the processes and controls at local country level for collation of tax and other specified items included in Global Tax & Other Contributions. This will include review of:
    O reporting to central team to ensure adherence of the guidance provided by the central team
    O processes for ensuring that all local country taxes are included within the reporting to central team
  • Review the basis on which the country level tax and other specified data reported has been captured, reviewed and consolidated to assess whether the data has been collected, consolidated and reported fairly
  • For the countries selected, perform trend analysis on the tax and other specified data for the reporting period to understand any material variances. Seek explanations for variances, if any
  • For the countries selected, verify the tax paid (on a sample basis) to the underlying documents
  • Compare the tax and other specified data in the report to the relevant disclosures in the consolidated financial statements for the reporting period.

Accounting For Damage To An Integrated Factory Under Construction

Under Ind AS 16 and Ind AS 36, damage to an asset under construction and its subsequent reinstatement are treated as separate economic events that cannot be netted off or automatically capitalised into Capital Work-in-Progress.

Accounting requires a four-step evaluation:

  1. Derecognise the lost asset’s carrying amount immediately as a P&L expense.
  2. Test remaining assets for impairment under Ind AS 36.
  3. Capitalise reconstruction costs if directly attributable, while expensing abnormal wastage to P&L.
  4. Recognise insurance compensation separately in P&L when receivable.

These principles apply even to integrated or turnkey projects.

BACKGROUND AND CORE ISSUE

When a company constructs a large integrated manufacturing facility and an unforeseen incident destroys an individual unit of the integral plant before commercial production begins, the fundamental accounting question arises: Is the destruction merely another construction cost to be accumulated in Capital Work-in-Progress (CWIP), or does it constitute a separate economic event requiring independent accounting treatment?

A common misconception is that all costs incurred prior to commercial operation must be capitalised. Under Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS), this automatic accumulation is incorrect. The framework requires clear segregation between the derecognition/impairment of the original asset, the capitalisation of replacement costs, and the recognition of third-party insurance compensation.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATE ECONOMIC EVENTS

As per Paragraph 66 of Ind AS 16 (Property, Plant and Equipment), impairments or losses of items, related insurance claims/compensation, and subsequent purchases or construction of replacement assets are separate economic events and must be accounted for separately:

  •  Derecognition/Loss: Handled under Ind AS 16 (Paragraph 67) / Ind AS 36.
  •  Insurance Proceeds: Recognised in profit or loss when receivable (Ind AS 16, Paragraph 65).
  •  Replacement Costs: Evaluated independently for capitalisation (Ind AS 16, Paragraphs 7 & 16).

This principle is supported by the ICAI Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) Opinion (Vol. XLV, Query finalised on 29 Jan 2026), which confirms that pre-commissioning asset damage and subsequent reinstatement are separate events that cannot be netted off or blindly added back into project costs.

FOUR-STEP ACCOUNTING EVALUATION

Accounting for Construction Calamities

1. Derecognition of the Destroyed Asset

  •  Ind AS Reference: Ind AS 16, Paragraph 67(b) & Paragraph 68.
  •  Treatment: The carrying amount of an item of PPE (or an identifiable component/CWIP balance) must be derecognised when no future economic benefits are expected from its use or disposal.
  •  Application: The fact that the factory is under construction does not justify retaining the lost asset’s cost in CWIP. If the carrying value of the specific damaged unit cannot be separately identified, a reasonable and supportable allocation method must be used to calculate and write off the lost carrying amount (Ind AS 16, Paragraph 70). The write-off is recognised as an expense in the statement of profit and loss.

2. Impairment Testing of Remaining Assets

  •  Ind AS Reference: Ind AS 16, Paragraph 63; Ind AS 36 (Impairment of Assets), Paragraphs 9 & 12.
  •  Treatment: The damage incident serves as an impairment indicator for the remaining assets and the overall project/Cash-Generating Unit (CGU).
  •  Application: Even though commercial production has not commenced, the entity must apply Ind AS 36 to evaluate whether reduced future cash flows, project delays, or increased completion
    costs require an immediate impairment loss write-down in Profit or Loss. As affirmed by the above-referred EAC, the lack of commissioning does not exempt an entity from Ind AS 36 testing.

3. Cost of Reconstruction

  •  Ind AS Reference: Ind AS 16, Paragraphs 7,16(b), & 22.
  •  Treatment: Reconstruction expenditure represents the creation of a replacement asset and is tested independently against capitalization criteria.
  •  Directly Attributable Costs: Costs directly attributable to bringing the replacement unit to the location and condition necessary for its operation are capitalised (Paragraph 16(b)).
  •  Abnormal Wastage Exclusion: Paragraph 22 explicitly excludes abnormal amounts of wasted material, labour, or other resources from the cost of a self-constructed asset. Rather, these are recognised as an expense in the statement of profit and loss. As highlighted in the above-referred EAC opinion, management must exercise judgement to distinguish between inherent, expected execution costs and abnormal inefficiency losses (which must be expensed immediately).

4. Insurance Compensation

  •  Ind AS Reference: Ind AS 16, Paragraph 65 & 66(c).
  •  Treatment: Third-party compensation for impaired or lost assets must be recognised as income in the statement of profit and loss when it becomes receivable.
  •  Netting-Off Prohibited: Insurance proceeds cannot be netted directly against reconstruction costs or deducted from the cost of the replacement asset.

NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION

  •  Carrying amount of destroyed unit: ₹100 crore
  •  Reconstruction cost incurred: ₹140 crore
  •  Insurance claim receivable: ₹120 crore

CORRECT ACCOUNTING TREATMENT:

  1.  Write off lost asset to P&L / Impairment: ₹100 crore (Loss)
  2.  Capitalise qualifying replacement cost to CWIP: ₹140 crore (Asset, assuming entire amount meets capitalisation criteria)
  3.  Recognise insurance claim when receivable in P&L: ₹120 crore (Income)

(Net P&L impact: +₹20 crore gain, subject to timing & terms). An entity needs to write off / derecognise lost asset as well as recognise impairment loss immediately on occurrence of loss event. However, it may so happen that insurance claim does not meet criteria for recognition of income in the same period and its recognition may need to be deferred to a subsequent period. This is likely to create a significant volatility in the statement of profit and loss.

Incorrect Treatment (Prohibited):

Netting off costs: ₹140 crore – ₹120 crore = Capitalise ₹20 crore net to CWIP.

IMPACT OF FACTORY INTEGRATION

Even if Unit A cannot function without Unit B, or if the entire project is constructed under a single Lump Sum Turnkey framework, standard accounting principles remain unchanged. Project interdependence does not alter the underlying economic reality of asset destruction. Distinguishing original costs, abnormal damage losses, and replacement expenditures ensures transparent financial reporting and prevents the improper hiding of abnormal losses within CWIP.

CONCLUSION

When a unit under construction is destroyed, Ind AS 16 and Ind AS 36 require a clear separation of economic events:

  1.  Derecognise or write down the destroyed original asset or portion of the original asset.
  2.  Assess remaining project assets for impairment under Ind AS 36.
  3.  Capitalise only qualifying directly attributable reconstruction costs (excluding abnormal wastage) under Ind AS 16. Abnormal wastage should be charged immediately to the P&L account.
  4.  Recognise insurance claims independently in Profit or Loss when receivable.

Recent Decisions in GST

I. SUPREME COURT

53. (2026) 45 Centax 331 (S.C.)

G.R. Infra Projects Ltd. Vs State of Madhya Pradesh Dated 19.08.2026

Section 74 of the CGST Act cannot be invoked mechanically to overcome GST Limitation Period specified under Section 73 of the CGST Act without substantiating and justifying the basis for allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts in SCN

FACTS

The Appellant was engaged in the business of construction of roads and highway projects. Summons was issued to the Appellant, and business premises were searched. Thereafter, intimation in DRC-01A was issued based on draft notice-cum-investigation report, against which Appellant filed its response objecting the demand. However, Department straightaway issued SCN under Section 74 of CGST Act alleging that the Appellant was involved in fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts without specifying any particular act or material substantiating such allegations. The Appellant challenged this SCN by filing a petition before the Hon’ble High Court on the ground that Section 74 was incorrectly invoked, and proceedings fall under Section 73 would be barred by limitation. The Hon’ble High Court dismissed the petition and decline to interfere at the SCN stage. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Hon’ble High Court, the Appellant preferred appeal against the said order before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Apex Court held that SCN issued under Section 74 of the CGST Act must itself specify proper basis and cogent material for alleging fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression of facts in the SCN, and cannot be supplanted by another notice subsequently. It further highlighted that mere reproduction of words such as fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts is insufficient to mechanically invoke extended period of limitation and justify issuance of SCN under Section 74. Accordingly, the Apex Court decided the issue in favour of the Appellant, and set aside the proceedings initiated against vide the said SCN.

Note: On similar lines, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tata Steel Ltd. Versus Union Of India (2026) 45 Centax 361 (S.C.) dated 25.08.2026 held that extended period of limitation under Section 74 cannot be invoked mechanically where SCN itself fails to expressly justify the presence of essential elements of fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression of facts. However, in this case, recognising the Supreme Court’s suo-motu order in Re:Cognizance of Extension of Limitation, which excluded period 15-03-2020 to 28-02-2022, the Show Cause Notice issued on 13-06-2025 was found to be beyond the extended period. However, the Hon’ble Court allowed the department liberty to issue a fresh Show Cause Notice under section 74 with proper foundational facts, provided the order is passed before 28-02-2027.

II HIGH COURT

54. (2026) 45 Centax 217 (Guj.)

Torrent Power Ltd. Vs Union of India

Dated 14.08.2026

Corporate Guarantee issued during the period prior to 26-10-2023 not impacted as insertion of Rule 28(2) of the CGST Rules, 2017 prescribing Valuation Mechanism would not have retrospective operation Deemed value of supply of 1% of Corporate Guarantee given would not apply where actual consideration charged is lower as “Whichever is Higher” in Rule 28(2) was read down

FACTS

The Petitioner had given Corporate Guarantees for its subsidiaries to banks and various financial institutions without consideration. The Department issued a SCN under Section 74 alleging that such corporate guarantees executed between the related parties as taxable supply, and demanded GST by considering value of supply as 1% of Total Guarantee given as per Rule 28(2) of the CGST Rules, 2017 introduced through Notification No. 52/2023-Central Tax dated 26.10.2023. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court challenging the applicability and retrospective operation of the valuation mechanism of 1% of amount guaranteed as per Rule 28(2) of the CGST Rules, 2017.

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court held that corporate guarantee furnished between related parties would constitute supply as per Section 7(1)(c) read with Entry 2 of Schedule I of the CGST Act, 2017 even where no consideration is charged. Further, the Court held that the expression “whichever is higher” in Rule 28(2) of CGST Rules, 2017 was read down as arbitrary to the extent that it denied the corporate guarantor the option to discharge GST on the actual consideration charged. With regard to retrospective operation of Rule 28(2), the Court held that GST levied on corporate guarantees prior to 26.10.2023 as per Rule 28(2) was harsh and unjust being disruptive of the legal and financial position of the then prevailing law and thereby violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the impugned proceedings were set aside, and the notice was quashed to the extent it was challenged.

55. (2026) 44 Centax 110 (Kar.)

GR Tech Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes

Dated 03.06.2026

When IGST was wrongly paid instead of CGST and KGST, the same can be adjusted against payment of correct CGST and KGST without levy of any interest or penalty

FACTS

The Petitioner had inadvertently treated intra-state supply as inter-state supply, and accordingly charged IGST instead of CGST and SGST. Thus, the Petitioner had disclosed and paid IGST liability in its returns resulting in excess payment of IGST and short payment of corresponding CGST and KGST liability. During audit, the Respondent contended that the Petitioner had to first discharge CGST/KGST along with interest and penalty, and thereafter claim refund of the IGST already paid. Subsequently, the proceedings under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 were initiated, and tax, interest and penalty were confirmed in the Adjudicating Order. Thereafter, proceedings for recovering CGST and SGST was initiated. The Petitioner filed an appeal against the Adjudication Order, which was dismissed on the ground of limitation. On the other hand, the Petitioner’s refund claim for IGST was also rejected on the ground that the refund was sought before the payment of CGST/KGST. Being aggrieved, a writ was filed before the Hon’ble High Court.

HELD

The Court examined the facts of the case, and based on its perusal of Section 77(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 read with Rule 92 of the CGST Rules, 2017, held that IGST paid instead of CGST/SGST cannot be subject to interest and penalty. Further, the Court by relying upon the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of Saji S. Vs Commissioner, State GST Department (2018 (19) GSTL 385 (Ker.), asked the authorities to consider the adjustment of IGST paid against CGST/KGST payable and remanded the matter for reconsideration on merits.

56. (2026) 46 Centax 29 (Bom.)

IBM India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Union of India

Dated 28.08.2026

Refund of proportionate pre-deposit paid at the time of filing Appeal ought to be granted where corresponding demand was partially dropped irrespective of whether the balance disputed demand is appealable further or not

FACTS

The Petitioner received an order passed by the Adjudicating Authority confirming GST demand to the extent of Rs. 48.96 Crores. The Petitioner filed an appeal against the said order where demand to the extent of Rs 31.45 Crores approximately was dropped, while sustaining the balance demand. The Petitioner filed a Refund application for the corresponding pre-deposit amount approximately to the extent of Rs. 3.14 Crores i.e. 10% of the demand reduced by Appellate Authority (31.45 Crores). However, the Department rejected the refund application stating the Petitioner’s proposed further appeal against the remaining demand. Aggrieved by such rejection of refund claim, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court.

HELD

The High Court held that the pre-deposit amount paid was only in the form of security deposit which was a pre-requisite for hearing an Appeal, and cannot be categorized as tax. The Court further held that once the partial relief is granted by way of reduced demand in Appellate Order, the Respondent is liable to refund the proportionate amount of pre-deposit. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition in favour of the Petitioner.

57. [2026] 190 taxmann.com 365 (Delhi)

Neha v. Union of India

Dated: 08.09.2026

Hon’ble Delhi High Court issued instructions to authorities nationwide not to allow any GST registration without mandatory biometric-based AADHAR authentication to prevent revenue loss and harassment of innocent persons by misuse of the identity.

FACTS

The issue before the Hon’ble Court was regarding fraudulent GST registration by some other person by using the PAN Card and Aadhaar Card numbers of the petitioner. The Petitioner placed on record certain suggestions for curbing the misuse of PAN Card and Aadhaar Card particulars of innocent persons for obtaining fraudulent GST registrations such as mandatory Aadhaar facial-recognition authentication, video KYC with PAN, Aadhaar and live prompt, IP address and device-location audit trail, pre-registration or risk-based physical verification, real-time PAN-use alerts and income-tax data matching, automated flagging of abnormal turnover spikes, Aadhaar-holder confirmation of GST registration, DigiLocker-based consent and registration alerts, DGARM risk parameters for first time use of PAN/Aadhaar for GST, Nomination of identifiable business corroborators etc.

HELD

The Hon’ble Court observed that even after a lapse of nine years, the Departmental machinery have failed to curb such malpractices, which not only affect citizens who have nothing to do with such GST registrations, but also result in huge loss to the Government. The Court noted that there were 2800 fraudulent GST Registrations obtained by using stolen or frozen PAN/AADHAR details involving detection of Rs.15,085 Crores of tax evasion.

It further observed that at present, biometric-based AADHAR authentication is carried out only if the system identifies the case as ‘risky’ on the basis of various parameters and data analytics, and held that respondents have failed to draw the attention of the court to any difficulty in mandating the biometric-based AADHAR authentication of the GST Registration. Accordingly, as an interim measure, the Hon’ble Court issued directions to all the authorities across the country not to allow any GST Registration without biometric-based AADHAR authentication henceforth with a liberty to the authorities to file objections qua any practical difficulty in its implementation.

III GST APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (GSTAT)

58. (2026) 45 Centax 389 (Tri. -GST-Kolkata)

Commissioner, CGST & CX, Kolkata North Vs Powertech Global Pvt. Ltd

Dated 05.08.2026

Section 74 cannot be invoked for demanding reversal of ITC under Rule 42/43 for past periods where sale of Duty Credits was specifically excluded from treating it as exempt supply for common credit reversal computation w.e.f. 05.07.2022 especially where appropriate disclosure under exempt supply were made in GST Returns

FACTS

The Respondent was engaged in the business of manufacture and export of electronic apparatus and equipment. It had not reversed ITC proportionately to the extent of outward exempt supply i.e. sale of MEIS Duty Credit Scrips during FY 2017-18 to FY 2019-20. Department issued SCN under Section 74 alleging that proportionate ITC was not reversed which was attributable to sale of Duty Credit Scrips under section 17(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 read with Rules 42 and 43 of the CGST Rules, 2017. Thereafter, an Order was passed under Section 74 confirming the above demand on account of non-reversal of ITC. The Petitioner filed an appeal against the Adjudication Order, where the demand was set aside on the ground that Sale of Duty Credit Scrips was specifically excluded from the aggregate value of exempt supplies in the computation of ITC Reversal as per Rule 42/43 by virtue of Notification No. 14/2022-CT dated 05.07.2022. Aggrieved by the appellate order, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble GST Appellate Tribunal.

HELD

The GST Appellate Tribunal held that the specific exclusion of Sale of Duty Credit Scrips from the aggregate value of exempt supplies while computing ITC Reversal as per Rule 42/43 was applicable prospectively from 05.07.2022, and could not be applied to prior periods. However, it was further observed that, Section 74 of CGST Act could not be invoked in this case as all the details of sale of Duty Credit Scrips were furnished by the Respondent in its GST Returns and the Appellant had failed to establish suppression of facts on the part of the Respondent. Consequently, the matter was remanded back, and required to be dealt with provisions of Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 after giving the appellant opportunity of being heard.

59. [2026] 190 taxmann.com 508 (GSTAT – BENGALURU)

I-NXT v. Sandeep Banga, Commissioner, Bengaluru Zone

Dated :15.09.2026

Mere ITC mismatch between GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A, when tax and interest are paid before SCN and the discrepancy arises from supplier-side default, does not establish fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression so as to invoke Section 74 or sustain a 100% penalty. Demonstrable nexus between the mismatch and deliberate non-disclosure by the recipient absent.

FACTS:

The genesis of the dispute was the information gathered by the officers of the anti-evasion wing, as a result of which the allegation of mismatch was made between the ITC claimed in Form GSTR-3B returns and the ITC available in Form GSTR-2A. The Assessee admitted the factum of excess availment of ITC but the same was due to oversight. It was further stated that the excess ITC was not utilised. The Appellant also paid tax before issuance of the SCN. Still, the Adjudicating Authority issued a show cause notice invoking the extended period of limitation under Section 74 of the Act alleging that the Appellant had suppressed the fact of excess availment of input tax credit in the Form GSTR-3B returns in contravention of the provisions of the Act and the rules, and that the payment of tax was made only as a result of verification conducted by the officers of the anti-evasion wing.

The Appellant contested the invocation of extended period and Section 74 before the First Appellate Authority, however, the Order held that the Assessee had paid the excess ITC amount only on being pointed out by the Department. It further held that the Assessee had not declared the fact of excess availment of ITC to the Department, and that there was a clear case of suppression of facts. The Appellate Authority, thus, confirmed the penalty at 100% of the tax as the Appellant had not paid the penalty at 15% of the tax, as required under Section 74 of the Act.

HELD

Relying on Tata Steel Ltd. v. Union of India [2026] 189 taxmann.com 520 (SC), the Hon’ble Tribunal held that the existence of mismatch can enable a proper officer to determine the tax liability under Section 73 but for the purpose of invoking Section 74, some thing more has to be done by the proper officer, and that there must be a clear link between the mismatch and the alleged fraud, wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts and mere use of the language is not enough.

It further observed that Sections 73(5) and 74(5) permit the person chargeable with tax to pay the tax along with interest before issue of a show cause notice. The term “the tax as ascertained by the proper officer” recognises the fact that the proper officer can point out the omission during an audit or verification, and once the tax payer accepts the officer’s ascertainment and pays tax along with interest, Section 73(6) mandates that the proper officer shall not serve any notice.

Regarding the charge of suppression, the Hon’ble Bench held that the term “suppression” is defined in Explanation 2 in section 74 as meaning non-declaration of facts or information which a taxable person is required to declare in the return, statement, report or any other document furnished under this Act or the rules made thereunder, or failure to furnish any information on being asked for, in writing by the proper officer”. However, for this to apply, there must be deliberate non-disclosure of facts or information in any return, statement, report or any other document required to be furnished by the tax payer under the Act or in case of failure to furnish any information by the tax payer. The Tribunal noted that in the present case, suppression was alleged on the ground of mismatch and not non-disclosure. Tribunal further noted that the excess availment of ITC was not due to default committed by the Appellant but by the third-party supplier, and accordingly held that default by a third-party supplier cannot be attributed to the appellant to sustain the charge of suppression.

The Hon’ble Tribunal accordingly set aside the Order-in-Appeal holding that in this case, the Adjudicating Authority and the Appellate Authority have not established any link between the mismatch and alleged suppression of facts, and that there was no dispute about the genuineness of the transaction or the suppliers.

60. [2026] 190 taxmann.com 509 (GSTAT – BENGALURU)

Conduent Business Services India LLP v. Commissioner of Central Tax Bengaluru East GST Commissionerate Dated :15.09.2026

Institutional hierarchy does not meet the “real danger of bias”. The routine audit discoveries under Section 65 do not automatically trigger extended limitation. When all records are with the GST Department and facts are known to both parties or are accessible via statutory records, non-disclosure does not amount to suppression.

FACTS

Audit proceedings were initiated against the appellant which resulted in a show cause notice issued under Section 74 in respect of three issues to the Appellant. The Adjudicating Authority confirmed agreed tax/interest, dropped Section 74 penalty for Issues 1 & 3, but confirmed penalty for Issue 2. The Appellant deposited 50% reduced penalty under Section 74(11) via Form GST DRC-03. The Revenue challenged the dropping of Section 74 penalty for Issues 1 & 3 pursuant to a Review Order passed by the Commissioner. The First Appellate Authority allowed Departmental Appeal and imposed Section 74 penalty on Issues 1 & 3. Before the Hon’ble Tribunal, the Appellant also challenged that the appellate proceedings before the First Appellate Authority were vitiated by an inherent institutional bias stating that the First Appeal before the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) was instituted pursuant to a Review Order passed by an officer of the higher rank of Commissioner of Central Tax. Hence, the hearing of the appeal by a subordinate officer—the Joint Commissioner (Appeals)—reeks of institutional prejudice.

HELD:

The Hon’ble Tribunal rejected the allegation of bias against the First Appellate Authority, relying upon the landmark decision of State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna (2001) 2 SCC 330 to hold that institutional hierarchy does not meet the “real danger of bias”. As regards to the merits of the case viz, confirmation of penalty under Section 74 by the First Appellant Authority, the Hon’ble Tribunal held that Section 74 is an extra-ordinary jurisdiction and the statute deliberately conditions this power upon the existence of specific, positive mens rea elements: fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. In absence of these specific elements, any tax shortfall falls strictly within the domain of Section 73. Applying the ratio in Tata Steel Ltd. v. Union of India [2026] 189 taxmann.com 520 (SC), it held that the OIO contained explicit, categorical findings of fact that all records, including GSTR-3B, GSTR-2A, and TRAN-1 declarations, which were fully available on the Departmental portal. There is no positive act of deliberate suppression or intentional misstatement alleged or established against the Appellant. It further held that the mechanism under Section 74 requires independent satisfaction of mens rea; issuance of an SCN under Section 74 does not automatically bind the adjudicator to confirm penal liabilities where deliberate intent is absent. The Tribunal further held that routine audit discoveries under Section 65 do not automatically trigger extended limitation or penal provisions, and judicial precedents firmly establish that audit detection without proof of an active, deliberate intent to evade tax cannot sustain charges under Section 74. Thus, when facts are known to both parties or are accessible via statutory records, non-disclosure does not amount to suppression. The Tribunal further held that where tax and interest are fully discharged prior to the SCN, and where allegations of fraud or suppression are unsustainable, the statutory mechanism under Section 73(5) read with Section 73(8) come into operation whereby the statutory scheme intends to grant immunity from penalty to taxpayers who settle their tax and interest obligations prior to formal adjudication, provided there is no deliberate intent to evade. The imposition of Section 74 penalties was thus held to be unsustainable.

61. [2026] 190 taxmann.com 596 (GSTAT -ERNAKULAM)

Tiger Steels vs Commissioner of State Tax

Dated: 16.06.2026

Any violation of the mandated time limit for issuing order specified in Section 129(3) of the CGST Act by the proper officer vitiates the entire proceedings and such delayed order is void ab initio.

FACTS

The Department intercepted the vehicle and issued order dated 28.06.2019 under Section 129 of the Central Goods & Service Tax Act (SGST & CGST Act) demanding tax and penalty for the release of the goods on the ground that the validity of the e-way bill which accompanied the consignment had expired on 25.06.2019. The Appellant remitted the amount demanded in the order by way of a bank guarantee and got the vehicle and goods released. The State Tax Officer, after the release of the goods, conducted adjudication as provided under Section 129 (1) of the SGST Act and initiated steps to invoke the bank guarantee. No order was communicated to the Appellant. The Appellant approached the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala, which directed the department to issue copy of the adjudication order to the Appellant, and also directed the State Tax Officer not to invoke the bank guarantee till the period of 4 weeks. The Appellant filed appeal before the first Appellate Authority, which was dismissed, and hence this appeal.

HELD

The Hon’ble Tribunal held that in terms of Section 129(3), it is mandatory on the part of the officer detaining or seizing the goods to pass an order for payment of penalty within seven days of the date of service of the notice. However, in this case, while the notice was issued on 28.6.2019, the order under Section 129(3) for payment of penalty was issued only on 26.7.2019, 28 days after the issue of notice. The Hon’ble Tribunal thus held that this blatant violation of statutory time lines renders the impugned Order void ab initio and nullity in the eyes of the law. The Hon’ble Tribunal referred to a number of precedents, and held that any violation of the mandated time limit specified in Section 129(3) of the CGST Act by the proper officer vitiates the entire proceedings. The Tribunal thus set aside the said order on the grounds of non-adherence to statutory time limits by the authority passing such order.

Recent Developments in GST

A. GSTN

(a) GSTN has issued Advisory dated 07.09.2026 informing about enabling of filing of appeals for cases involving NIL or Zero demand.

B. ADVANCE RULINGS

31. Feel Good Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. (AAR Order No. 05/WBAAAR/2026-27 dt.07.08.2026) (WB)

Pure Agent – Mandatory conditions need to be fulfilled

The facts are that the applicant, presently engaged in the restaurant business, proposes to expand its business operations by undertaking travel and accommodation booking agency services. In this category, it will act as a facilitator for arranging hotel accommodation for end customers through third-party agents. Under the proposed business model, the applicant intends to recover the actual cost of hotel accommodation from the customer as reimbursement, and separately charge a facilitation or service fee for arranging the booking. In this background, the applicant has raised question seeking a ruling as to whether the recovery of the actual hotel accommodation cost paid to the hotel or third-party agent can be treated as reimbursement incurred in the capacity of a pure agent and consequently exclude it from the value of supply, with GST being payable only on the facilitation or service fee charged by the applicant.

In its submission, applicant justified that it fulfils conditions of rule 33 for being Pure Agent and the ruling be given accordingly.

Applicant submitted that its facts are covered by Delhi AAR in M/s. TUI India Private Limited, Order No. 09/DAAR/2018 dated 28.06.2019 – 2019-VIL-230-AAR.

The ld. AAR observed that the applicant has not placed any proposed agreement or terms of agreement between him and the end customer on the one hand and between him and the Third-Party Agent on the other.

Referring to rule 33, the ld. AAR noted that the rule prescribes four mandatory cumulative conditions for qualifying as Pure Agent, namely: the supplier must enter into contractual agreement with recipient to act as pure agent to incur expenditure in course of supply; must neither intend to hold nor hold any title to goods or services procured; must not use for own interest the goods or services procured; and, must receive only actual amount incurred plus amount for services provided on own account. The ld. AAR also referred to the example given in the clarification given by CBIC on the above topic.

The ld. AAR observed that the applicant will place order to a Third-Party Agent for booking of rooms in a particular hotel. The hotelier will, as per proforma invoice placed before AAR, charge the room rent along with applicable GST in the name of the end customer disclosing the details of the booking agent. The booking agent will in turn issue bill in the name of the applicant charging separately the amount paid for room booking and other amount as his service charges. The end customer will receive a bill from the applicant in his name charging separately the amount paid to the booking agent as ‘reimbursement of hotel booking’ and another amount as service charge to be paid to the applicant.

In absence of agreement, the ld. AAR also observed that this invoicing pattern creates a scenario where the applicant holds the title to the services provided by the Third-Party Agent.

Consequently, the ld. AAR also held that the applicant is said to have used the service for his own interest of providing services to the end customer.

The ld. AAR also observed that there is one more agent in between and appears to be without knowledge of end customer. The ld. AAR held that application does not fulfil condition of rule 33 and therefore, held that applicant not entitled to benefit as ‘Pure Agent’.

32. Indovation Healthcare LLP (AAAR Order No. UKGSTARA-02/13.04.2026/01/2026-27 dt.10.07.2026) (Uttarakhand)

Healthcare Services provided to public, by Urban Health and Wellness Centres, are duly covered as exempt under entry 74 of Notification no. 12/2017- Central Tax (Rate) dt.28.06.2017.

The appeal is against the Advance Ruling No.05/2025-26 dt.17.03.2026 – 2026-VIL-68-AAR passed by the AAR, Uttarakhand.

The appellant sought Advance Ruling on the following questions:

“a. Whether the operation and management of Government Urban Health & Wellness Centres (UHWCs) / Ayushman Arogya Mandirs and Polyclinics by the Applicant under identical Operation & Management Agreements with Braithwaite & Co. Limited (PSU-executing agency), funded exclusively through 15th Finance Commission health grants routed via Braithwaite and Company Limited and providing healthcare services to citizens free of cost, constitutes exempt “healthcare services by a clinical establishment” under Entry 74 of Notification No. 12/2017- Central Tax (Rate)?

b. Whether, in the alternative, the said activities qualify as “pure services” provided to the State Government (through its designated PSU-executing agency under formal MoU) in relation to Article 243W functions (public health, hospitals, dispensaries – Twelfth Schedule Entries 6, 8, 23), and are therefore exempt under Entry 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate)?”

The ld. AAR denied benefit of entry 74 of Notification No. 12/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.

In appeal, appellant gave various details of its activities, the nature of relationship with Government, and the availability of exemption as healthcare service.

The ld. AAAR referred to observations of the AAR, where it is held that the operation and management of Government Urban Health & Wellness Centres (UHWCs) / Ayushman Arogya Mandirs and Polyclinics) by the Applicant under identical Operation & Management Agreements with Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. (PSU- executing agency) does not constitute exempt “healthcare services by a clinical establishment” under Entry 74 of Notification No. 12/2017 – Central Tax (Rate). The AAR has also found that the said activities do not qualify as “pure services” provided to the State Government in relation to Article 243W functions (public health, hospitals, dispensaries – Twelfth Schedule Entries 6, 8, 23), and are therefore not exempt under Entry 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). Accordingly, the services supplied by the Applicant are held liable to GST at the applicable rates under the CGST/SGST Act.

The ld. AAAR also examined, in detail, the scope of work. From the scope of work, the ld. AAAR observed that the Operating Agency is providing a composite healthcare facility management and operation services, including infrastructure, staffing, healthcare delivery, outreach activities, monitoring, and reporting obligations. It also noted that, the agreement indicates that healthcare delivery is not limited to medical treatment, but is a bundled activity comprising: clinical services, diagnostics services, pharmaceutical services, public health and outreach activities, facility management, human resource deployment, monitoring, and reporting. Thus, it is held to be comprehensive operation and management of healthcare facilities, rather than a mere supply of manpower or a standalone healthcare consultation service.

The ld. AAAR also noted that the actual beneficiaries of the services are members of the public visiting centres for diagnosis, treatment and healthcare. M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited neither receives medical treatment nor consumes healthcare services.

The ld. AAAR also observed that the AAR has focused primarily upon the contractual relationship and payment mechanism without adequately examining the actual activities undertaken at the Urban Health and Wellness Centres (UHWCs/UAAMs) and Polyclinics, which is incorrect.

The ld. AAAR also held that determination of taxability and classification of the supply cannot rest solely upon the identity of the payer. The true nature, substance and objective of the contract, the activities actually performed, and the ultimate purpose for which such activities are undertaken are equally relevant considerations.

In view of the above, the ld. AAAR reversed the advance ruling and held that appellant is entitled to exemption under entry 74 of Notification no. 12/2017-CT(Rate) dt.28.6.2017.

33. Chehar Industry Pvt. Ltd. (AAR Order No. GUJ/GAAR/R/2026/28/ (in Appl. No. Advance Ruling/SGST&CGST/2025/AR/47) dt.04.08.2026) (Guj)

Classification – Washing and laundry Soap

The applicant is engaged in the manufacture and trading of Washing/Laundry Soap in bar/cake form used for washing clothes or for toilet purposes. The applicant submitted that the GST rate and classification of these products have been revised vide Notification No.09/2025 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025, effective from 22.09.2025. It stated that there exists ambiguity regarding whether laundry soap and toilet soap are treated under a common heading or separately, and what HSN code is applicable for each product type. Accordingly, applicant has raised following questions.

“(i) What is the correct classification and applicable GST rate on Washing/Laundry Soap (in BAR or CAKE form) used for washing clothes or toilet purposes as per Notification No.09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 effective from 22.09.2025?

(ii) Whether such Washing/Laundry Soap for clothes and crockeries falls under the same GST rate and classification as Toilet Soap or under a separate tariff heading?

(iii) What are the applicable 8-digit HSN codes and Rate of GST for Washing Soap, Laundry Soap, Crockeries Soaps and Toilet Soap under GST law?”

The applicant submitted the typical chemical composition for their Semi-detergent oil-based soap and Detergent soap.

The ld. AAR referred to the relevant Chapter notes, relevant tariff headings and HSN notes of the relevant tariff heading under the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975), and found that Chapter 34 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975) covers “Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, “dental waxes” and dental preparations with a basis of plaster.” The ld. AAR noted that soaps are covered under heading 3401 of Chapter 34 of the Customs Tariff and hence referred to Chapter Notes to Chapter 34, Tariff Heading 3401 as well as HSN notes to Tariff Heading 3401.

The ld. AAR observed that in common parlance, soap is defined as a water-soluble sodium or potassium salt of fatty acids, typically produced through the saponification of natural oils or fats with an alkali (like sodium hydroxide for bars) and acts as a surfactant for cleaning and bathing with quality often determined by Total Fatty Matter (TFM). The main difference between toilet / bathing and laundry / washing soap is that Toilet / Bathing soaps are typically potassium salts of fatty acids, making them softer, while washing soaps (laundry soaps) are sodium salts of fatty acids, resulting in a harder consistency, with the key difference stemming from the use of potassium hydroxide (KOH) for bathing soaps versus sodium hydroxide (NaOH) for washing soaps during their production. The ld. AAR held that the applicant’s products do not fall under the definition of ‘toilet soaps.’

Referring to amended Notification, the ld. AAR held that the product of the Applicant is covered by entry no.66 of Schedule-II of Notification no.09/2025 – Central Tax (Rate) dt.17.9.2025, and is liable to GST at the rate 18%.

34. Luxor International Pvt. Ltd. (AAR Order No.4/2026-27 (in Appl. No.02/2026-27(ARN: AD050526002234L) dt.10.08.2026) (Uttarakhand)

Classification – End Use theory

A very interesting question arose before the ld. Uttarakhand AAR.

Applicant is engaged in the manufacture and supply of a comprehensive range of writing instruments, stationery products, educational kits, books, notebooks, and
corporate gifting solutions.

The said uncoated paper of a kind used for writing, printing or other graphic purpose, in rolls or rectangular (including square) sheets are classifiable under Heading 4802 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

The Applicant submitted that the physical and technical characteristics of the said paper are consistent with those of paper used in the manufacture of notebooks and exercise books, and the same shall be supplied only to customers who are engaged in or intend to use the same for the manufacture of notebooks and exercise books and proposes to obtain end-use declarations/purchase orders from buyers clearly specifying the aforesaid intended use, so as to satisfy the conditions of the exemption notification and discharge its evidentiary obligations as a supplier claiming the benefit of the exemption. The supply was claimed to be exempt referring to Notification no. 10/2025 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 [Entry 128]

The said entry reads as under:

“Notification No.

10/2025- Central Tax

(Rate) dated

17.09.2025

[Entry 128]

HSN 4802

Uncoated paper and paperboard, of a kind used for writing, printing or other graphic purposes, in rolls or rectangular (including square) sheets, of any size, other than paper of heading 4801 or 4803, used for exercise book, graph book, laboratory note book and notebooks.

Exempt”

The ld. AAR observed that the exemption should be proved within for corners of concerned Notification.

The ld. AAR observed that the present Notification though grant exemption based on end use, there is no provision requiring: execution of bonds; furnishing of certificates; submission of end-use declarations; post-supply verification; monitoring by jurisdictional officers; recovery procedure in case of diversion; or, maintenance of prescribed records. It also observed that in several taxation statutes, where the legislature intended exemption to operate upon end-use, it simultaneously prescribes documentary safeguards, certification requirements or administrative procedures to establish such end-use. However, no comparable statutory framework has been provided in the present notification, observed the ld. AAR.

The ld. AAR observed that it is not in position to decide correctness of granting exemption based on declarations, etc. The ld. AAR also observed that the words used are “used for” and not “intended to be used”.

The ld. AAR held that in the absence of any statutory deeming provision or prescribed certification procedure, the AAR cannot conclusively determine, at the stage of supply, that the goods satisfy the description “used for exercise book, graph book, laboratory notebook and notebooks”.

Due to above ambiguity, the ld. AAR declined to answer the question considering it as outside its purview.

35. Sardar Chemical Industries (AAR Order No. Advance Ruiling no.GUJ/GAAR/R/2026/30 (in Appl. No. Advance Ruling/SGST&CGST/2026/AR/09 dt.04.08.2026) (Guj)

Classification – Papad Khar

The appellant is engaged in the manufacture and supply of Papad Khar (also known as alkaline salt, sajji khar, or potassium carbonate-based alkaline compound). Applicant submitted that though it is presently classifying Papad Khar under HSN Code 2836 (Food Additives/Preparations) with 18% GST rate, as based on the detailed product analysis and technical opinion, Papad Khar should be correctly classified under either HSN Code 2501 (Common Salts – Natural/Rock Salt) liable @ 5% GST or HSN Code 2102 (Prepared Food Additives/Condiments) also liable @ 5% GST. The advance ruling is to seek correct classification and applicable GST rate.

The applicant submitted complete manufacturing process (stage-wise) for papad khar production, from initial preparation till final packaging by way of following chart:

“Stage Steps Key Activity
1-2 Water & Salt Boil Water  Add Salt (NaCL)
3-4 Chemical Mix Add Soda Ash  Add Soda Bicrabonate
5-6 Solidification Transfer to Container  Break & Dry
7 Finishing Package & Ready for distribution”

The ld. AAR noted that tariff heading 2501 covers three sub-headings i.e. Common Salt (HSN Code 25010010), Rock Salt (sub-heading 25010020) & others (25010090) but does not cover products that have been roasted, calcined, obtained by mixing or subjected to processing beyond that mentioned in each heading.

The ld. AAR noted that the product of applicant has been obtained following a manufacturing process involving mixing of sodium carbonate and sodium bicarbonate in to a mixture of heated water – containing common salt (sodium chloride) already dissolved in it – and subsequent transfer to strong durable containers by cooling and solidification after the mixture reaches the appropriate thickness, and thereafter breaking of the resultant solid material (papad khar) into manageable pieces and drying it completely. In view of above, the ld. AAR held that the product of the applicant does not fall within the ambit of heading 2501.

In respect of heading 2102, the ld. AAR held that heading 2102 covers Active yeasts (sub-heading 210210), Inactive yeasts (sub-heading 210220) & prepared baking powders (sub-heading 210230). After examining components and process, the ld. AAR concluded that ‘papad khar’ does not have the characteristics of ‘yeast’ and not covered by 2102.

Regarding correct classification, the ld. AAR analysed scope of heading 2836 and held that ‘papad khar’ would be aptly classifiable under heading 2836, more specifically under sub-heading 28362090 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975).

After fixing classification under 2836 2090, the ld. AAR referred to Notification No. 9/2025 – Central Tax (Rate) and Notification No. 10/2025 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 and held that the product falls under Entry No. 35 of Schedule II of Notification No. 9/2025 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 and is liable to GST at the rate 18%.

Decoding GSTAT – Early Trends From Select Decisions

The establishment of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (GSTAT) marks a major milestone in resolving GST disputes. Early rulings demonstrate key emerging judicial trends across four areas:

  • Procedural errors vs. evasion: Penalties under section 129 require intent to evade; genuine procedural defaults backed by documentary proof receive relief.
  • Procedural discipline: Statutory time limits, such as section 129(3)’s seven-day order limit, are strictly jurisdictional.
  • Legacy issues: Transitioned credits must be examined under erstwhile laws, with CESTAT remaining the proper forum for section 142(3) appeals.
  • Substantive provisions: Benches are prioritising substance-over-form, including allowing inverted duty structure refunds for ancillary packing materials

INTRODUCTION

The establishment of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (GSTAT) marks a significant milestone in the administration of GST law. For nearly a decade, a taxpayer aggrieved by an order of the First Appellate Authority had no option but to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That arrangement burdened the constitutional courts with intensely factual and technical tax disputes, and it raised the cost of litigation for businesses. With the GSTAT benches now up and running, one can look forward to a steady maturing of the GST legal landscape.

The Principal Bench and the State Benches were constituted in 2023-24, with members appointed and allotted to the benches in December 2025. The GSTAT portal was formally launched in September 2025 for filing appeals. The initial phase was marred by technical difficulties, and the Tribunal responded by introducing staggered filing. That was later rolled back, and the portal was opened for all appeals, with the outer time limit for filing fixed at 31 July 2026 for orders communicated before 1 May 2026.1


1 Notification dated 30 June 2026 issued under Section 112 of the CGST Act, 2017, 
superseding the notification dated 17 September 2025, 
fixing 31 July 2026 as the last date for filing appeals against orders communicated before 1 May 2026.

On the administrative side, the registry has been busy with a surge of online appeals. Physical and virtual hearings have begun in phases during 2026, with admission matters receiving priority, and the registry uploads the cause list a day in advance. Practitioners, however, are still finding their feet. Tracking the status of an appeal is difficult because cases are allotted to individual courts within a State Bench, and the manner of communicating hearing notices and of filing additional submissions or rejoinders is yet to be streamlined.

Against this backdrop, it is a good time to take stock of the jurisprudence that is beginning to emerge. This article looks at select decisions of the GSTAT benches under four heads:

  • Procedural lapses versus substantive evasion: Separating bona fide procedural errors from deliberate tax evasion, so that minor clerical or timing errors are not met with consequences meant for fraud, and marking out acts that do not amount to suppression.
  • Procedural discipline on the Revenue: Holding the administration to statutory timelines and prescribed procedure, and treating time limits framed in mandatory terms as going to the root of jurisdiction.
  • Legacy issues: Drawing the line between the erstwhile regimes (Central Excise, Service Tax and State VAT) and the GST framework, so that GST officers do not reopen legacy transactions, and appeals reach the right forum.
  • Substantive provisions: The reading of substantive provisions, including the evidence needed to support refund claims, the pre-deposit for appeals, and refund under the inverted duty structure.

The GSTAT Decoded

PROCEDURAL LAPSES VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE EVASION

Section 129 of the CGST Act, 2017, which provides for the detention and seizure of goods and conveyances in transit, was designed as an anti-evasion tool. It empowers mobile squads to intercept vehicles and to verify compliance with section 68 read with rule 138. In practice, however, aggressive enforcement has frequently resulted in heavy penalties for minor clerical errors, short digital delays, and administrative mishaps. The writ courts have stepped in and granted relief where the error was genuine and there was no intent to evade tax. The GSTAT appears to be taking a similar approach.

E-way bill lapses

In Lucknow Automotives,2 the vehicle carried a tax invoice for motorcycles, each bearing a traceable engine and chassis number. The e-way bill was generated only after interception, within nine minutes of it, yet the Tribunal declined to brush the lapse aside as an afterthought. It treated it as a bona fide procedural default that did not deserve the severity of a penalty under section 129.

Siddhi Vinayak Automobiles3 points toward the same direction. The consignment moved under e-invoices reported directly on the Government portal, though no e-way bill accompanied it, and the Tribunal thought it inappropriate to presume evasion from a movement whose details were already visible to the Department. The penalty was set aside on that footing and also because the order had been passed beyond the statutory time limit, which is discussed in Part 3.


2  M/s Lucknow Automotives v. Assistant Commissioner (Mobile Squad), 
Gonda & Ors., 2026 (8) TMI 1488 – GSTAT Lucknow (order dated 19 August 2026).

3 Siddhi Vinayak Automobiles v. Commissioner of Kerala State GST, 2026 (8) TMI 1052 – 
GSTAT Thiruvananthapuram (order dated 14 August 2026).

Both decisions sit comfortably with the line of High Court decisions that treats intent to evade tax as a necessary ingredient for a penalty under section 129. The provision is not to be applied mechanically to every contravention, and both the High Courts and the GSTAT have looked at the surrounding circumstances before deciding whether a penalty is warranted.

Afterthought e-way bills: where the benefit ends

The liberal approach in Lucknow Automotives and Siddhi Vinayak has its limits. In Om Prakash v. Islam Trading Co.,4 decided by the Lucknow Bench a day after Lucknow Automotives, the Tribunal considered, on the Department’s appeal, whether the rigour of section 129 could be relaxed for such contraventions. The goods, iron scrap, were moving on a manually prepared tax invoice with no e-way bill at all. The Tribunal held that generating an e-way bill after the event, particularly for goods prone to evasion, points to an intent to bypass the digital monitoring mechanism, and it restored the penalty.


4  Om Prakash v. Prop., Islam Trading Co., 2026 (8) TMI 1743 – 
GSTAT Lucknow (Appeal No. APL/79/LKC/2026, order dated 20 August 2026).

What separates this decision from the earlier ones is proof of bona fides. In Lucknow Automotives and Siddhi Vinayak, the taxpayer backed its explanation with a documentary trail, namely traceable goods or e-invoices reported on the portal. In Om Prakash, scrap moving on a hand-written invoice without an e-way bill invited suspicion, and the taxpayer could not dispel it. The principle cuts both ways: the benefit of a bona fide lapse is available only to a taxpayer who can demonstrate good faith.

Stock transfers under the same GSTIN

In M S Steels,5 a penalty under section 129 (100% of the tax involved) was imposed on a stock transfer between two premises of the same registered person under the same GSTIN, a movement on which, admittedly, no tax could be levied. The Revenue argued that “tax payable” is merely the measure of the penalty and does not require tax to be actually leviable. The Tribunal rejected the argument, following several High Court decisions on the point. The ruling implies that a penalty under section 129 requires a taxable supply within the meaning of section 7. It should be read with care: a transfer between two distinct registrations of the same entity stands on a different footing, since section 25(4) treats them as distinct persons and Schedule I treats supplies between them as supplies even without consideration.


5 M S Steels v. Commissioner of Kerala State GST, 2026 (8) TMI 1053 – 
GSTAT Thiruvananthapuram (Appeal No. APL/1/TVP/2026, order dated 14 August 2026).

The Tribunal did not treat the lapse as harmless. Moving goods without an e-way bill remains a contravention of rule 138(1)(ii), which covers movements for reasons other than supply, but the consequence lies in the specific penalty under section 122(1)(xiv) for transporting taxable goods without the cover of documents, and not in the tax-linked penalty under section 129.

The decision rightly reads a penal provision strictly. The reservation is a practical one. The residual penalty is a lighter deterrent, and the label of “stock transfer” could be misused to move taxable goods while staying clear of electronic monitoring, when the e-way bill regime is meant to track every movement, including non-supply movements. In our view, the answer lies in officers testing a claim of stock transfer against the delivery challan, the GSTIN and the stock records, and applying section 122(1)(xiv) where the lapse is established, rather than in stretching section 129.

Voluntary reversal of ITC through Form GST DRC-03

The Kolkata Bench in D.R. Steel Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd.6 refused to let a technical objection defeat a voluntary reversal of disputed ITC. The taxpayer had reversed the amount through Form GST DRC-03 but left the “reasons” column blank, which, according to the Revenue, left the true nature of the payment in doubt. The Tribunal held that Column 8 of Form DRC-03 is not a mandatory field under the GST rules, and that leaving it blank does not invalidate an otherwise valid debit from the electronic ledgers. It also noted that the Department itself had issued Form GST DRC-04 acknowledging the payment, and the Department could not be heard to say that there was no proof of payment.


6 Atanu Mondal (CGST) v. D.R. Steel Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2026 (8) TMI 1278 – GSTAT Kolkata.

PROCEDURAL DISCIPLINE ON THE REVENUE

Revenue officers have often treated statutory timelines and procedural rules as merely directory and have sought to justify delays or post-facto corrections in the name of protecting public revenue. The GSTAT benches have pushed back. In the cases discussed below, they held that timelines framed in mandatory terms and the procedural safeguards built into the statute go to the root of an officer’s jurisdiction.

Section 129(3): the seven-day timeline

Section 129(3) requires the proper officer to issue the notice within seven days of detention or seizure and to pass the order within seven days from the date of service of that notice. In Siddhi Vinayak Automobiles (supra), the order in Form MOV-09 was passed 47 days after the notice in Form MOV-07. The Tribunal held that the language of the provision is mandatory. A strict fiscal statute must be read that way, it reasoned, so that commercial assets are not held up for long periods and traders are spared harassment by mobile squads. Relying on a series of High Court precedents, it treated the seven-day period as a jurisdictional limit, and held that an order passed beyond it is illegal and without jurisdiction.

Bar on new evidence at the appellate stage

In Agarwala’s Bitumex Pvt. Ltd.,7 the Kolkata Bench barred the Revenue from relying on material that lay outside the show cause notice. The refund had been denied on the basis of toll plaza data and the cancellation of second-level suppliers’ registrations. In appeal, the Revenue tried to add fresh allegations, including correspondence from Customs authorities, the absence of regulatory licences for trading in the commodity and references to DGGI investigations. It had filed no application to place additional evidence on record and had shown no exceptional cause for not raising these matters in the show cause notice or during adjudication, although it knew the commodity involved from the start. Citing rule 45(1) of the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025 and rule 112(1) of the CGST Rules, 2017, the Tribunal held that without such a prayer, fresh allegations cannot be made against the taxpayer at the appellate stage. Put simply, the Revenue cannot keep moving the goalposts after the game has begun. The ruling gives taxpayers a useful answer where the scope of the enquiry is widened at the appellate stage.


7 Pr. Commissioner CGST & CX, Siliguri v. M/s Agarwala’s Bitumex Pvt. Ltd., 2026 (8) TMI 1279 – GSTAT Kolkata.

Evidence of fraud

The Revenue often invokes fraud or suppression to shelter behind the extended period of limitation. In Santhome Latex Enterprises,8 the Tribunal held that an allegation of suppression, unsupported by any independent evidence, does not meet the test of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression under section 74. The differences in question were visible from the data already available on the portal through Form GSTR-9C and GSTR-9, and could not therefore be characterised as suppression. That conclusion fits the statutory definition in Explanation 2 to section 74, which confines suppression to the non-declaration of facts or information that a taxable person is required to declare in a return or other document, or the failure to furnish information when asked in writing. The Tribunal also observed that an appellate authority cannot sustain an order on a ground that was not raised in the show cause notice. (For periods from FY 2024-25, the corresponding provision is section 74A.)


8 Santhome Latex Enterprises v. Commissioner of CGST, 2026 (8) TMI 1363 – 
GSTAT (Thiruvananthapuram Bench), Final Order No. 04/TVP/KERALA/2026 dated 21 August 2026.

LEGACY ISSUES

The migration of credit under section 140 has drawn close scrutiny of legacy credits and how they are assessed. The GSTAT benches have now begun to mark out where the powers of GST officers end and where the machinery of the legacy laws must be used.

Transitional credit: who may question it?

In Tata Unistore Limited v. Commissioner CGST, 9 the Thane Bench considered credit carried forward under section 140. The taxpayer’s case was that a credit balance transitioned to GST cannot be questioned in a GST proceeding, and can be examined only under the legacy provisions. The Tribunal agreed in substance. The Department cannot invoke the GST provisions to examine compliance with the erstwhile law when it had the powers to do so under that law. Section 174 saves the powers exercisable under the repealed enactments; it continues them under the old law, and it does not replace them or authorise a fresh examination of the earlier law through GST machinery. Where the Department had not challenged the credit under the Central Excise or Service Tax law, whether by audit, notice or recovery proceedings, credit that was admissible under the earlier law stood validly carried forward.


9 Tata Unistore Ltd. v. Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise, Navi Mumbai, 2026 (8) TMI 139 – GSTAT Thane.

Appellate forum for Section 142(3) refunds

In Kairav Chemofarbe Industries Limited,10 the Thane Bench, hearing a Revenue appeal against a refund sanctioned under section 142(3), questioned its own jurisdiction. Section 142(3) directs that a claim for refund of CENVAT credit or duty be disposed of in accordance with the existing law. Relying on the Larger Bench decision of the CESTAT in Bosch Electrical Drive India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Tax, Chennai,11 the Tribunal held that appeals arising from refund or credit rejection orders under section 142(3) are governed by the legacy laws. The proper forum for such disputes is therefore the CESTAT, and the GSTAT has no jurisdiction to decide them. The appeal was dismissed, with liberty to the parties to approach the CESTAT.


10 Commissioner, CGST & Central Excise, Raigad v. Kairav Chemofarbe Industries Ltd., 2026 (8) TMI 720 – GSTAT Thane.

11 M/s Bosch Electrical Drive India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Tax, Chennai, 2023-VIL-1352-CESTAT-CHE-ST (Larger Bench).

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: SUBSTANCE OVER FORM

The digitisation of GST administration has brought a certain rigidity, with officers at times overlooking the substance of the issue and fastening on technicality. The GSTAT benches appear to be emerging as a check on this tendency, insisting that the substance of the matter be examined and not merely its form.

Extraneous evidentiary demands

In Agarwala’s Bitumex (supra), the Kolkata Bench discouraged the use of extraneous data, such as toll plaza vehicle-tracking records, to deny genuine refund claims. The exporter’s claim had been rejected on the footing that the vehicles never crossed the toll gate, so the goods could not have been physically received. Relying on the Allahabad High Court’s decision in Raghuvansh Agro Farms Ltd.,12 the Bench held that such a requirement is not statutory and cannot be the sole basis for denial when the exporter has produced substantive documentary evidence, such as lorry receipts and shipping bills. Where the export itself is an undeniable fact, the Bench reasoned, the natural inference is that the purchases were genuine.

The Bench also noted that under the bill-to/ship-to arrangement recognised by section 10(1)(b) of the IGST Act, goods are often delivered directly to the port of export, or to another place chosen by the buyer, on the buyer’s instructions. The physical movement need not begin at the supplier’s registered place of business, and an inference drawn from the assumption that it must, is unsafe.


12  Raghuvansh Agro Farms Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2025 (12) TMI 1236 – Allahabad High Court.

Right of appeal and pre-deposit

The Hyderabad Bench in Reddy Veeranna Constructions Pvt. Ltd.13 held that the law governing the right of appeal, including the pre-deposit, is a substantive right that accrues on the date the dispute is initiated, that is, on the issue of the show cause notice. A later amendment does not alter it. The new proviso to section 112(8) of the CGST Act, 2017, which imposes a mandatory pre-deposit even where only a penalty is in dispute, therefore, does not apply to show-cause notices issued before 1 October 2025. This is consistent with the Calcutta High Court’s decision in Barjinder Singh Kohli v. Assistant Commissioner of Revenue,14 which held that no pre-deposit can be demanded where the appeal relates only to a penalty and no tax is in dispute.


13  Reddy Veeranna Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Appeal-I Commissioner & Ors., 2026 (8) TMI 215 – GSTAT Hyderabad.

14 Barjinder Singh Kohli v. Assistant Commissioner of Revenue, 2025 (11) TMI 294 – Calcutta High Court.

Refund under the inverted duty structure

In a welcome development, the Kolkata Bench in Tea Linker15 upheld an inverted duty refund where the credit had accumulated on account of packing material. The taxpayer bought bulk tea and sold packaged tea, both at 5%, but the packing material bore tax at 12%. The Revenue argued that since the principal input and the output were the same commodity at the same rate, there was no inversion, and it relied on paragraph 3.2 of Circular No. 135/5/2020-GST dated 31 March 2020. The Bench held that section 54(3)(ii) uses the word “inputs” in the plural and draws no distinction between principal and ancillary inputs, and that packing material is an input within the meaning of section 2(59). It read the Circular as addressing only a reduction in the rate of tax on the same goods over time, and therefore as having no application. Following the Delhi High Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,16 the Bench declined to let a circular narrow an entitlement that the statute confers.


15 Pr. Commissioner v. Tea Linker, 2026 (9) TMI 882 – GSTAT Kolkata.

16 Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Goods and Services Tax & Ors., 2023 (12) TMI 361 – Delhi High Court (W.P.(C) 10222/2023, decided on 5 December 2023).

CONCLUSION

The decisions reviewed in this article are a small sample: eleven orders from five benches, delivered over a few weeks. It is early days, and no appeal should be built on a single bench-level order. Even so, some clear currents are already visible. The table below sets them out, followed by our reading of them, and of what lies ahead.

Theme Early direction of the benches What to watch
Procedural lapses versus evasion Bona fide, documented lapses are excused; unexplained lapses on high-risk movements are penalised. Whether benches converge on a common test of intent; treatment of e-way bills generated after interception.
Procedural discipline on the Revenue Mandatory timelines, the boundary of the show cause notice and the standard of proof for fraud are being enforced. High Court view on whether the seven-day limit in Section 129(3) is jurisdictional.
Legacy matters GST officers cannot reopen legacy credits; appeals on legacy refunds lie to the CESTAT. Revenue challenge to the Tata Unistore reasoning; forum and limitation risk in transitional matters.
Substance over form The statutory text prevails over non-statutory checks and circulars. Reach of the “inputs” reasoning under section 54(3)(ii); pre-deposit on notices issued on or after 1 October 2025.

Our reading of the trends

First, the Tribunal is looking for evidence and not taking sides. Second, the Revenue is being held to the four corners of the law. Third, substance is being preferred to form. An appeal from a State or Area Bench lies to the High Court under section 117 of the CGST Act, though only on a substantial question of law, and the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 remains available for jurisdictional error, since the decisions of a tribunal are subject to judicial review.17 We expect the Revenue to carry at least three questions upward: whether the seven-day limit in section 129(3) is jurisdictional; whether GST officers can question credit transitioned under section 140 through the demand provisions of sections 73 and 74; and whether ancillary inputs such as packing material can, by themselves, support an inverted duty refund where the principal input and the output bear the same rate. Until those questions are answered, these rulings should be treated as persuasive and not final.

The GSTAT was meant to be a forum that decides GST disputes on their merits, promptly and by reasons that can be relied upon. The early orders give reason for measured optimism: they show an instinct for proportionality and for legal discipline, without a leaning towards either side. But theproof of the pudding will be in the consistency and speed of disposal, and in how these rulings fare in the High Courts. We will continue to track these developments.


17  L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 (Constitution Bench).

Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Omaxe Limited: Settlement Commission orders under Section 245D(4) are conclusive, barring Assessing Officers from initiating reassessment proceedings under Section 148.

8. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors. Vs. Omaxe Limited

(2026) 190 taxmann.com 551(SC)

Reassessment – Notice under section 148 of the Act – Proposing to disallow the deduction under Section 80IB(10) of the Act, 1961 – ITSC passed an Order under Section 245D(4) of the Act, 1961 wherein the deduction under section 80IB(10) was allowed – Order of ITSC conclusive – Also, Application under Section 245D(6) of the Act rejected – Notice to reopen the assessment invalid

The Assessee, a Public Limited Company was engaged in real estate business. The Assessee filed its return of income on 30.11.2006 for the Assessment Year (AY) 2006-07.

On 22.09.2005, the Revenue, under Section 132 of the Act, 1961, conducted a search and seizure at the Assessee’s business premises and the Associate Concerns, as well as the residential premises of its Directors.

On 30.11.2006, the Assessee filed the Return for the AY 2006-07, declaring taxable income of ₹89,20,76,630/- and claimed a tax deduction of ₹78,99,00,509/- [noted as ₹79,17,72,794/- in subsequent departmental proceedings] under Section 80IB(10) of the Act, 1961, in respect of the Housing Projects executed by the Assessee.

On 31.05.2007, during the pendency of the regular assessment for the AY 2006-07, the Assessee filed an Application under Section 245C of the Act for the AY 2000-01 to 2006-07 to settle the cases as disclosed in the Application filed before the Income Tax Settlement Commission (“ITSC”).

On 17.03.2008, the ITSC, under Section 245D(4) of the Act, 1961, passed the final Settlement Order.

For AY 2006-07, the ITSC accepted the additional income surrender of ₹18,00,000/- (Rupees Eighteen Lakhs). The total income before deductions was Rs. 89,20,76,630/-, and after allowing deductions under Section 80IB(10) of the Act, 1961, the ITSC determined the net taxable income for the AY 2006-07 to be ₹ 89,38,76,630/-.

According to the Revenue, on 17.12.2009 and 18.12.2009, the Investigating Wing of the Revenue conducted a fresh survey of the Assessee’s premises under Section 133A of the Act, 1961. According to the Revenue, the Assessee claimed a deduction under Section 80IB and, as part of an alleged manipulative process, was planning to transfer commercial portions of the projects executed on OMAXE City Lucknow, OMAXE City Sonepat, etc, to 100% subsidiary companies to maintain the commercial area, thereby enabling the Assessee to continue claiming the deduction under Section 80IB of the Act, 1961.

On 30.06.2010, a Notice under Section 148 of the Act, 1961 was issued for the AY 2006-07, proposing to disallow the deduction under Section 80IB(10) of the Act, 1961 to the extent of ₹55,58,96,486/-. The reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer (“AO”) for issuing the Notice under Section 148 were as follows:

A. A survey was conducted Under Section 133A on 17.12.2009 and 18.12.2009 at the Assessee’s premises. During the survey, the Investigation Wing impounded documents containing Minutes of a Meeting attended by Senior Executives, including the Director of Taxation, the V.P. Finance, the G.M. Legal, and the Company’s Auditors.

B. The impounded documents show that the Assessee’s Executives mutually decided, before finalising the balance sheet for the period ending 31.03.2009, to transfer the commercial portions of specific projects to 100% subsidiary companies at cost to strengthen their claim under Section 80IB of the Act, 1961.

C. Section 80IB(10)(vi) of the Act, 1961 provides that the built-up area of shops and other commercial units within a housing project must not exceed 5% of the aggregate built-up area or 2,000 sq. ft, whichever is lower.

D. Further, the impounded documents showed that the commercial area in several of the Assessee’s projects far exceeded the legal limit, making those projects ineligible for the deduction under Section 80IB(10)(vi) of the Act, 1961. Therefore, the Section 80IB deductions were wrongly claimed.

E. Hence, Rs. 55,58,96,486/- across four specific projects, i.e., OMAXE City Lucknow, OMAXE City Sonepat, OMAXE Heights Sonepat, and OMAXE Heights Faridabad, had escaped assessment, and these reasons were sufficient to issue a Notice Under Section 148 of the Act, 1961, for AY 2006-07.

In response, the Assessee filed objections on 20.09.2010 and 18.08.2011 against the proposed reopening of the ITSC Settlement Order dated 17.03.2008 for AY 2006-07. On 18.07.2011, the AO/First Appellant issued a Notice under Section 143(2) of the Act, 1961, seeking further details from the Assessee. In response to the said Notice, the Assessee filed Preliminary Objections, contending that the ITSC Settlement Order was conclusive under Section 245I and that the AO had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. The reply stated as follows:

A. That the Assessee has filed an application before the Settlement Commission for the determination of total income derived under the Act, 1961, and for the settlement of tax liabilities for AY 2006-07. The ITSC passed an Order under Section 245D(4) of the Act, 1961, computing the total income for AY 2006-07. Consequently, all matters relating to AY 2006-07 were settled and conclusive.

B. Section 245-I of the Act, 1961, mandates that every Order of settlement passed under Section 245D(4) is conclusive on the matters stated therein. The said Section strictly bars the reopening of any matter covered by such an Order in any proceeding under the Act, 1961 or any other law in force, except as otherwise provided under Chapter XIX-A of the Act, 1961.

C. On a plain reading of Section 245-I, the AO lacks statutory jurisdiction under the Act, 1961, to issue a Reassessment Notice Under Section 148 for the subject assessment year. Accordingly, the Notice dated 30.06.2010 was illegal, void ab initio, and bad in law.

D. The AO was requested to drop the proceedings initiated under Section 148 of the Act, 1961. In the event the proceedings were not dropped immediately, the Assessee requested the AO to supply a copy of the “reasons recorded” for issuing the Section 148 notice for AY 2006-07.

The AO, vide Order dated 03.10.2011, rejected the Assessee’s objections to the Notice dated 30.06.2010, which ultimately led to the reassessment Order dated 08.11.2011 under Section 147 of the Act, 1961. The AO disallowed the deduction under Section 80IB(10) and added back ₹65,65,17,999/- to the total taxable income for AY 2006-07.

On 04.01.2012, at the first instance, the Assessee filed Writ Petition No. 7975 of 2011 before the High Court of Delhi, challenging the Show Cause Notice dated 30.06.2010. The prayer was subsequently amended on 09.01.2012 to challenge the Reassessment Order dated 08.11.2011.

The High Court noted that on 29.10.2010, the CIT(C)-III, Delhi, filed an Application under Section 245D(6) of the Act, 1961, before the ITSC, seeking to declare that the Order dated 17.03.2008 in favour of the Assessee under Section 245D(4) is on account of misrepresentation of facts and is void under Section 245D(6) of the Act, 1961. After receiving the Assessee’s reply, the ITSC afforded the Revenue and the Assessee an opportunity of hearing on 30.11.2011 and, by Order dated 16.12.2011, rejected the Revenue’s Application dated 29.10.2010.

By Judgment and Order dated 13.07.20, the Writ Petition was allowed by the High Court, quashing the Reassessment Notice and Order. It was held that the ITSC has exclusive jurisdiction once an Application for Settlement is admitted, and that its final Order legally bars the AO from initiating reassessment in respect of the impugned Order passed by the ITSC.

On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that The Revenue’s argument for issuing the Reassessment Notice rests on the words in Section 245C of the Act, 1961, viz, “containing a full and true disclosure of his income which has not been disclosed before the Assessing Officer”, but it overlooks the expression in Section 245C, viz, “the manner in which such income has been derived”. According to the Supreme Court, on a plain construction of both the italicised expressions, what constitutes a case for consideration before the ITSC would be an Assessee making an Application containing a full and true disclosure of the Assessee’s income which has not been disclosed before the AO, and the manner in which such income has been derived. Therefore, the additional amount of income-tax payable in the disclosure will depend on the manner in which such income has been derived by the Assessee. The Supreme Court noted that in the case on hand, the Assessee had disclosed the revenue included in the Assessee’s gross total income and, by claiming deductions under the Act, 1961, the net income liable for tax was set out. Once the ITSC admits the case for settlement, the consideration is the return for the assessment year, including deductions. The Report is called for on the Assessee’s Application, and there is no gainsaying that, while participating in the Settlement before the ITSC, the Revenue allowed a deduction that is otherwise disallowable. The normal presumption is that the Revenue filed its Report on the Assessee’s application. Once the matter is concluded under Section 245D(4), the decision attains finality, outside the scope of judicial review.

According to the Supreme Court, the Revenue is not without recourse to realise tax on undisclosed income, even in cases filed under Chapter XIX-A of the Act, 1961. The Revenue has the option to move under Section 245D(6) of the Act, 1961 on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. The words “fraud and misrepresentation” depend on the circumstances and are to be decided on a case-to-case basis; by making out a case under either head, the ITSC’s Order is reopened, which ultimately leads to the Settlement Order being declared void. The normal
assessment procedure is restored or enabled, but not otherwise. If the jurisdiction of the AO under Sections 143(2), 148, 154, etc, is made independent and available for exercise again, the finality attached to the Settlement Commission will be defeated. The Parliament did not envisage this course. On the contrary, while reopening the issues before the ITSC is provided for, judicial review by the Constitutional Courts under Articles 226 and 32/136 is available, but the AO’s power to reassess the Settlement Order passed by the ITSC is unavailable.

In fine, through the mechanism under Chapter XIX-A of the Act, 1961, the Assessee and the Revenue avoid the crust and crumb. To wit, the Revenue avoids the crust by realising the crumb of tax on suppressed or undisclosed income through the Assessee’s voluntary disclosure. Similarly, through complete and fair disclosure of suppressed income and entries, the Assessee avoids the crust of penal interest, prosecution, etc, and the crumb offered is payment of tax beforehand. The Revenue and the Assessee must take the crust and the crumb together. By operation of Section 245C(3), the Assessee is precluded from withdrawing the Application filed under Section 245C. The Revenue can oppose continuation before the ITSC based on the material and grounds discovered during the search and seizure against the Assessee. The Revenue participates before the ITSC in the Assessee’s Application, including any income further disclosed by the Assessee. Therefore, the argument that, after the proceedings before the ITSC attain finality, the regular assessment/re-assessment is still available to the Revenue is contrary to the defining expressions in Sections 245C, 245D(2), 245D(3), and finally 245D(4) of the Act, 1961. The Revenue has to revisit the procedure under Section 245D(6) by making out a case before the ITSC, but not otherwise. Thus, the Assessee and the Revenue are aware of the crust and the crumb in this settlement procedure before the ITSC. Once the crust is avoided and the crumb is accepted, further crusts and crumbs are not the intention of Chapter XIX-A of the Act,1961.

The Supreme Court noted that in the present case, the Revenue availed the remedy under Section 245D(6) of the Act, 1961 before the ITSC, resulting in the findings recorded in the Order dated 16.12.2011, which had become final.

The Supreme Court therefore found no meritin the Appeal, and it was therefore dismissed.

Pr. CIT v. Rhythem Real Estates Pvt. Ltd.: Presumption under Section 132(4A) applies to searched persons, not third parties, requiring independent evidence for Section 69B additions.

13. Pr. CIT – 3 V/s Rhythem Real Estates Pvt Ltd.,

ITA No. 61 OF 2020, dated 19/08/2026, (Bom)(HC)

[Arising from order dated 25th April 2018 in Income Tax Appeal No. 3036/Mum/2016. Assessment Year 2006-07]

Section 69B – Unexplained Investment – On money – Seized documents from third party – contents of the documents seized during the search are presumed to be true – presumption referred section 132(4A), would apply to persons searched and not a third party.

The Assessee-Company was engaged in the business of real estate development. For Assessment Year 2006-07, the Assessee filed its Return of Income on 29th November 2006 declaring a loss of ₹44,492/. The assessment was completed under section 143(3) of the Act vide order dated 5th December 2008 computing the income of the Assessee as ‘Nil’, after disallowing the loss claimed.

Thereafter, on the basis of the information received from the Director of Revenue Intelligence (“DRI”), Mumbai, regarding payment of on-money in cash by the Respondent – Assessee for purchasing properties at New Delhi, the Assessing Officer reopened the assessment for Assessment Year 2006-07 under section 147, by issuing a notice under section 148 on 28th March 2013.

As mentioned by the Assessing Officer in the reasons recorded for reopening, it was the case of the Assessing Officer that during the search and seizure operation conducted in the residential premises of NITCO’s Dy. Manager (Accounts), two electronic storage devices (hard disk and pen drive) were found and recovered. A file found in the hard disk contained details of the payment made towards purchase of 36 landed properties in Maidan Garhi area of South Delhi during the year 2005. According to the copy of the said file in excel format attached to the letter of the Additional Director General, (DRI), the file contained details of the sellers/buyers of 36 landed properties, as well as payments made, both in demand draft and cash mode. As per the said information, the total amount paid for acquisition of the properties was to the tune of `54.29 crores comprising of a demand draft component of `14.43 Crores and a cash component of Rs. 41.86 crores. According to the DRI, the information relating to transactions involving the present Assessee was given at serial numbers 9, 10, 16 and 23 of the excel sheet. According to the DRI, from the information received, it was observed that the Assessee had paid on-money in cash amounting to `7.07 crores along with other cash payments totaling to `8.87 crores. Therefore, in the course of the reassessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer proposed to treat the cash payment made on account of on-money etc. as unexplained investment of the Assessee under section 69B of the Act. Though this addition was objected to by the Assessee vide its letter dated 14th March 2014, the Assessing Officer rejected the objections, and by relying upon the information received from the DRI, passed a reassessment order adding an amount of `8.87 crores as unexplained investment under section 69B of the Act.

The CIT (A) allowed the appeal filed by the Assessee, and directed the deletion of the addition of `8.87 crores to the income of the Assessee as an unexplained investment under section 69B of the Act.

The Revenue preferred an appeal, being ITA No. 3036/Mum/2016 before the ITAT. The ITAT upheld the order of the CIT (A) and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the CIT (A) concluded that apart from the file received from the DRI, the Assessing Officer had gathered no other evidence that the Appellant had paid any on-money. It was the Assessee’s specific case that the properties purchased were not easily saleable because of the restriction for permission of development from the Delhi Government and the fact that without Government approval they cannot even be registered by the Registrar.

In fact, the Assessee had called upon the Assessing Officer to himself inquire about the market rate in the vicinity on the date of purchase which would establish that the price paid and reflected in the balance sheet of the Assessee is commensurate with the prevailing market price. Despite this, the Assessing Officer made no independent inquiry to ascertain the market rate of the lands in the locality. In fact, even though a remand report was called from the Assessing Officer, the Assessing Officer vide its letter dated 18th August 2015 merely stated that all the documents forwarded to him were already considered while passing the Assessment Order under section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act. The CIT (A) concluded that even at the remand stage, the Assessing Officer did not make any further inquiries or produce any substantive or material evidence to establish payment of on-money by the Assessee.

The CIT (A), therefore, relying upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court, concluded that before any addition was made, there should be material on record as evidence. Additions made on the basis of presumption cannot be sustained in law. It was on this basis that the CIT (A) allowed the appeal of the Assessee and deleted the addition of `8.87 crores made by the Assessing Officer under section 69B of the Act.

The ITAT, also taking note of the detailed factual findings given by the CIT (A), upheld the order of the CIT (A) and dismissed the appeal. The entire dispute in the case was fact-driven. The Court noted that, the CIT (A) correctly concluded that apart from the file received from the DRI, the Assessing Officer gathered no other evidence that the Appellant had paid any on-money. In fact, the Assessing Officer did not even proceed to conduct an independent inquiry regarding the market rate of the lands in the locality in which the Assessee had purchased the property to come to the conclusion that there was a big difference between the market value and the price paid by the Respondent-Assessee, which would then lead to an inference that the Assessee had paid the difference in cash. On these facts, the appeal does not give rise to any substantial question of law.

Further, the provisions of section 132(4A), and the presumption referred to therein, would apply to persons searched and not a third party like the Respondent-Assessee. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. R. Metrani v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore [2006] 157 taxmann 325(SC) has categorically held that the presumption under Section 132(4A) is available only in regard to proceedings for search and seizure under section 132, and such presumption would not be available for framing a regular assessment. The Supreme Court has stated that section 132 being a complete code in itself cannot intrude into any other provision of the Act, and similarly other provisions of the Act cannot interfere with the scheme or the working of section 132 or its provisions. Since the Respondent-Assessee was not the person who was searched, the reliance placed on section 132(4A) by the Revenue was wholly misplaced. Hence, the Revenue appeal was dismissed.

Rajib Mukhopadhyay v. DCIT: Satisfaction notes issued ten months after completing assessment of the searched person are time-barred and invalid under Section 153C.

12. Rajib Mukhopadhyay V/s. DCIT, Circle – 42(3)(1)

[WP NO. 274 OF 2026 & 936 OF 2026, dated 17/08/2026, (Bom)(HC)]

[Assessment Years 2019-20 and 2020-21]

Section 153C: Satisfaction Note – time barred – as the same was not issued “immediately” and was issued ten months after the assessment proceedings of the searched person were completed.

The Petitioner submitted that the Satisfaction Notes dated 3rd August 2023 and 10th August 2023 were not recorded “immediately”, as stipulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax-III vs. Calcutta Knitwears [(2014) 362 ITR 673 (SC)]. Therefore, the notices issued under section 153C of the Act be quashed and set aside. The Petitioner relied on the decision dated 24th June 2026, passed in the Petitioner’s case for Assessment Years 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2021-22.

The Hon’ble court observed that for the aforementioned Assessment, this Court had already taken a view in the Petitioner’s own case that the notice dated 10th August 2023 issued under section 153C of the Act was time barred as the same was not issued “immediately” as per law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Knitwears (supra), since it was issued ten months after the assessment proceedings of the searched person were completed viz. on 27th September 2022. The Court also held that ten months was not a reasonable time by which the Satisfaction Note ought to have been issued by Assessing Officer of the searched person by relying upon its own decisions in Clear Channel India (P) Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [(2026) 184 taxmann.com 434 (Bom)] and Nippon Life India Asset Management Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [Writ Petition No.4516 of 2025 decided on 7th April 2026].

Considering the decision already taken in the Petitioner’s own case for the other Assessment Years, the above two Writ Petitions for quashing the notices dated 10th August 2023 issued under Section 153C of the Act for Assessment Year 2019-20 and 2020-21, were allowed.

Pr. CIT v. The Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.: An assessment order passed pursuant to a Section 263 revision order cannot survive after the revision order has been quashed

35. Pr.CIT v. The Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.: (2026) (9) TMI 872 (Bom):

A. Y. 2015-16: Date of order 28/08/2026:

S. 263 of ITA 1961

Revision of orders under section. 263 — Order passed under section. 263 quashed by the Tribunal — Appeal filed by the Department before the High Court — Pending the appeal before the High Court, assessment order passed by the AO under section. 143(3) r.w.s. 263 — Assessee’s appeal against the assessment order allowed — Department’s appeal dismissed by the Tribunal — Held that an assessment made pursuant to a revision order cannot survive after the revision order has been quashed — The fact that Department has challenged the quashing of 263 order before the High Court shall not come in the way.

An order dated 18/03/2020 was passed under section. 263 of the Act which was challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal quashed the order of the Principal Commissioner passed under section. 263 of the Act. Despite the fact that the Tribunal quashed the order of the Principal Commissioner under section. 263 of the Act, the Assessing Officer passed a consequential order under section. 143(3) r.w.s. 263 of the Act.

The assessee challenged the assessment order in an appeal filed before the CIT(A). The Ld. CIT(A), vide his order dated 28/03/2023 allowed the appeal of the assessee on the ground that the Assessing Officer was not correct in his action in passing the order under section. 143(3) r.w.s. 263 of the Act. Against the said order, the Department filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Department and held that order passed in pursuance of revision order passed under section. 263 which revision order itself has been quashed cannot survive. The Tribunal held that even though the Department did not accept the decision of the Tribunal in quashing the revision order passed under section. 263 and challenged the same before the High Court, it would not come in the way of disposal of the appeal before the Tribunal where the consequential assessment order was challenged.

Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the Department filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal of the Department and held as under:

“i) Merely because the Revenue is in appeal against the order dated 13 September 2021 passed by the Tribunal, whereby the order dated 18 March 2020 passed by the PCIT under section. 263 of the Act was quashed and set aside, would not bring about a situation where, in the absence of any subsisting order under section. 263 of the Act, the Assessing Officer would nonetheless have jurisdiction to proceed to pass the assessment order dated 31 October 2021.

ii) We find that the appeal does not give rise to any substantial question of law. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.

iii) We, however, clarify that, in the event the Revenue succeeds in Income Tax Appeal No. 938 of 2024, the legal consequences would follow and a fresh assessment order in that regard would be required to be passed in accordance with law. All contentions of the parties in the pending appeal are expressly kept open.”

Jyoti Sareen v. UOI: Reassessment notices issued by jurisdictional AOs without randomized automated allocation in a faceless manner under section 151A are void.

34. Jyoti Sareen v. UOI:

[2026] 190 taxmann.com 384 (P&H):

A. Y. 2020-21: Date of order 10/09/2026:

S. 147A r.w.ss. 148, 148A and 151A of ITA 1961/

Reassessment — Issuance of notice for re-opening — S. 151A read with the scheme framed thereunder — Notice required to be issued through randomized automated allocation and in a faceless manner — Notice issued by jurisdictional AO, not through randomized automated allocation and in a faceless manner, are invalid and without jurisdiction — Insertion of S. 147A vide Finance Act 2026 w.e.f. 01/04/2021 — With a non-obstante clause without amending section 151A or related scheme — To overturn judicial decisions and circumvent unfavourable rulings — Unconstitutional encroachment on judicial power — S. 147A unconstitutional — Notice issued by jurisdictional AO without using randomized automated allocation and not in faceless manner — Violative of S. 151A and the scheme framed thereunder — Notice under section. 148 held to be invalid.

The Assessee, a practicing Advocate, filed her return of income on 30/09/2020 for A. Y. 2020-21. The return was processed and an intimation under section. 143(1) of the Act was issued. Subsequently, on 15/03/2024, notice under section. 148 of the Act was issued by her jurisdictional Assessing Officer. As per the said notice, the Assessing Officer was in receipt of information that a search was conducted on 14/03/2022 in the case of the assessee or in case of a person in respect of which the assessee was assessable. Vide the notice issued under section. 148 of the Act, the assessee was required to file her return of income. However, the assessee was not informed of the reasons why re-assessment proceedings were being initiated against her.

The assessee challenged the notice issued under section. 148 of the Act by way of a writ petition before the High Court which petition was allowed vide order dated 19/07/2024 on the reasoning that the notice issued under section. 148 of the Act was in violation of section 151A read with the scheme framed thereunder. The High Court agreed with and relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Telangana High Court in Kankanala Ravindra Reddy v. ITO [2023] 156 taxmann.com 178, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2024] 162 taxmann.com 225 (Bom.) and the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in Ram Narayan Sah v. Union of India [2024] 163 taxmann.com 478 (Gauhati).

The judgements were challenged by the Department before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Pending disposal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, section 147A was inserted vide the Finance Act, 2026 which is made applicable with retrospective effect from 01/04/2021. Section 147A starts with a non-obstante clause and provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, order or decree of any court or in section 151A or in any scheme framed under section. 151A, for the removal of doubts, the Assessing Officer, for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A, shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the National Faceless Assessment Centre or any assessment unit referred to in subsection (3) of section 144B.

In light of the insertion of section 147A, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set-aside the judgments of the High Courts and remitted the matters to the jurisdictional High Courts for fresh consideration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the merits of the controversy and left all the contentions open to be decided by the respective jurisdictional High Courts.

Pursuant to the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court the assessee and several other assessees amended their original petition so as to include the challenge to the newly inserted section 147A of the Act.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the petition of the assessee and held section 147A to be unconstitutional on the ground that the legislature introduced the section so as to circumvent the unfavourable judgments of the High Courts and therefore such enactment was unconstitutional in the eyes of law. The High Court further held that the notices issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officer who was not selected through randomised automated allocation and in a faceless manner was invalid and without jurisdiction and in violation of section 151A and the scheme framed thereunder. The relevant observations of the High Court are as under:

“i) Section 147A of the Act begins with a non-obstante clause – “Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, order or decree of any court or in section 151A or in any scheme framed thereunder.” Through the retrospective enactment of section 147A, the legislature primarily sought to validate the notices issued to the assessees under section. 148 of the Act by their respective jurisdictional AOs by neutralizing the effect of judgments of the constitutional courts through which it had been held that notices issued to the assessees under section. 148 of the Act by their jurisdictional AOs were illegal because in terms of section 151A of the Act, read with the scheme framed thereunder, such notices were required to be issued only by a faceless AO.

ii) The doctrine of separation of powers is not an express part of the Indian Constitution but this doctrine is clearly visible from the scheme of our Constitution. The Indian Constitution makes a clear demarcation between the judiciary, executive and the legislature and seeks to maintain separation of powers between the three organs of the State. Such division is fundamental to the rule of law. A breach by either also negates equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. Under Articles 245, 246 and other companion Articles, read with the respective lists in the seventh schedule of the Indian Constitution, the legislature has the right to “make” laws which includes the power to amend the law but the legislature cannot “declare” what the law laid down by the constitutional courts was meant to be. The legislature also cannot directly annul a judgment of a constitutional court or through a mere declaration overrule a judicial decision. To permit so would allow the legislature to legislatively superimpose judgments which would have attained finality between the parties and that would result in chaos.

iii) Granted the legislative competence, the legislature can, even retrospectively, enact a law validating a statute which has been held by a Court to be illegal provided that through such validating law the legislature removes the basis or foundation of the judgment of the Court by curing the defect(s) pointed out by the courts in the statute as it existed before the promulgation of the validation law. The effect of the validating legislation should be such that the judgment of the Court pointing out the defect would have not been passed if the validating law existed before the Court at the time of delivering its judgment and that after taking into effect the validating law it should not be possible for the Court to arrive at the same decision. Through enacting the validating law, the legislature must bring the law in line with the decision of the Court. Setting at naught a decision of a Court without removing the defect pointed out through the decision of the Court is opposed to the rule of law and also breaches the doctrine of separation of powers recognized by the Indian Constitution. Abrogation is not to be used as a device by the legislature to by-pass an unfavourable judicial decision and that if the validating legislation is enacted solely with the intention to defy a judicial pronouncement, such legislation would be an example of legislature overreach and therefore, unconstitutional.

iv) The non-obstante clause, with which section 147A of the Act begins, seeks to wipe out the effect of any judgment, order or decree of any Court or whatever is contained in section 151A or in the scheme framed thereunder but in the non-obstante clause reference to section 130 of the Act or the scheme framed thereunder dated 28/03/2022 is conspicuously found missing. This fact assumes importance because the afore referred scheme was inter alia relied upon by the Telangana High Court in Kankanala Ravindra Reddy’s case (supra) to hold that a notice under section. 148 of the Act could only have been issued by a faceless AO.

v) Section 147A only seeks to remove doubts and clarify that an Assessing Officer for the purpose of issuance of notices under section. 148 and 148A of the Act shall mean and shall always deemed to have meant an Assessing Officer other that the National Faceless Assessment Centre or any assessment unit referred to in section 144B(3). Section 147A is noticeably silent with regard to the categoric findings returned by the constitutional courts that as per the scheme dated 29/03/2022, framed under section. 151A, allocation of AOs is required to be done randomly and through automated allocation.

vi) Thus, the aforementioned two reasons which inter alia formed the basis of the judgments of the Constitution Courts to set aside the notices issued under section. 148 of the Act were not cured through the retrospective enactment of section 147A. In fact, they even find no reference therein.

vii) The Constitution courts categorically held that in terms of section 151A of the Act, read with the scheme framed thereunder dated 29/03/2022, a notice under section. 148 of the Act could “only” be issued by a faceless AO. Through and even after the retrospective enactment of section 147A, section 151A of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder continue to exist on the statute book and without any amendment. Thus, the primary basis on which the constitutional courts had held that notices issued under section.148 of the Act could not have been issued by the assessees’ jurisdictional AOs has not been removed through the retrospective enactment of section 147A. Without amending section 151A of the Act or the scheme framed thereunder, the “clarification” made by the legislature through the retrospective enactment of section 147A that Assessing Officers for the purpose of issuance of notices under section. 148 of the Act mean and shall always deemed to have meant to be Assessing Officers other than the faceless AOs is in defiance of and in conflict with the law laid down by the constitutional courts. Through such “clarification”, the legislature visibly seeks to substitute its opinion over and above the findings returned by the constitutional courts which is legally impermissible. Section 147A is also clearly found to be in direct conflict with section 151A, read with the scheme framed thereunder, all of which provisions simultaneously exist in the same statute. In the absence of any amendment to section 151A and/or the scheme framed thereunder, simply because section 147A begins with a non-obstante clause, would not make its retrospective enactment pass the test of a constitutionally enacted validation law. Rather, by the retrospective enactment of section 147A, in the manner in which it has been done, the legislature has clearly trenched upon judicial power and through the introduction of section 147A the legislature directly seeks to upset findings returned through judgments of several constitutional courts. The attempt by the legislature is clearly to circumvent unfavourable judicial decisions.

viii) Even today, if a matter is listed before the constitutional courts which rendered the afore verdicts as to who is the competent Assessing Officer to issue a notice under section. 148 of the Act, there would be no change in the rendering of the above referred verdicts because such verdicts were primarily based on section 151A and the scheme framed thereunder dated 29/03/2022 which provision and the scheme still continue to exist on the statute book as they existed at the time when the judgments of the constitutional courts were rendered. In the light of the considered and categoric findings returned by the constitutional courts after carefully analyzing section 151A of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder that only a faceless AO can issue a notice under section. 148 of the Act, the “clarification” which is in clear defiance of and contrary to the afore findings, made by the legislature through the retrospective enactment of section 147A of the Act would be of no help to the respondents.

ix) Under section 151A(1) of the Act, the Central Government framed a scheme dated 29/03/2022 in clause 3(b) whereof it was specifically mentioned that such scheme applies to the issuance of notices under section. 148 of the Act. The object behind framing of the said scheme, which is clearly brought out on a bare reading of section 151A(1) of the Act, was that the scheme was framed for the purpose of imparting greater efficiency, transparency and accountability by eliminating the interface between the income-tax authorities and the assessees or any other persons. Under section. 151A(2) the Central Government, for the purpose of giving effect to the scheme made under section. 151A(1), by issuance of a notification in the Official Gazette, could direct that any of the provisions of the Act shall not apply or shall apply with such exceptions, modification etc. as the case may be but in terms of the first proviso to section 151A(2) no such direction could be issued after 31/03/2022. After having specifically included issuance of notices under section. 148 of the Act in the scheme framed under section. 151A(1) it was only till 31/03/2022 that the Central Government could have issued a notification for the exclusion of applicability of section 148 of the Act to the scheme framed under section. 151A(1) and not thereafter. Till 31/03/2022 no such notification was issued by the Central Government. What was prohibited under section. 151A of the Act could and should have not been done through the retrospective enactment of section 147A.

x) As per the memorandum which accompanied the Finance Bill, 2026, section 147A was being enacted in the light of emergence of divergent views of the constitutional courts with regard to the jurisdiction of Assessing Officers for issuance of notices under section. 148 of the Act. According to the memorandum, enactment of section 147A was necessary to bring certainty and clarity as also to avoid litigation. However, through the enactment of section 147A of the Act, none of the objects behind its enactment stand achieved. Rather, what followed the enactment of section 147A of the Act resulted in everything to the contrary. The “clarification” made through the retrospective enactment of section 147A was that an Assessing Officer, for the purpose of issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act, meant and was always deemed to have meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the faceless AO. Such “clarification” was in conflict with the findings returned by as many as nine constitutional courts of this country to the effect that as per section 151A of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder only a faceless AO could issue a notice under section. 148 of the Act. Section 151A and/or the scheme framed thereunder continue to exist on the statute book simultaneously with section 147A. Therefore, introduction of section 147A of the Act did not bring any clarity or certainty. It only added to the confusion.

xi) The other purpose behind enactment of section 147A of the Act was to avoid litigation but such enactment became the breeding ground of litigation as thousands of petitions on the issue in question are pending in at least in eight different High Courts across the length and breadth of this country and that such litigation is also not likely to end before the respective High Courts because the parties aggrieved by the judgment of the respective jurisdictional High Courts would likely take up the matter before the Supreme Court. If it is a judgment of the Supreme Court which is ultimately going to give a quietus to the entire matter then rather than, for the afore “objects”, retrospectively enacting section 147A, it was desirable for the respondents to have invited an early opinion of the Supreme Court at the time when cross petitions were pending before the Supreme Court, filed by the respective parties aggrieved by the divergent views expressed by different jurisdictional High Courts as that would have finally put a lid on this issue. In the light of the afore discussion, we have no hesitation to declare section 147A of the Act to be unconstitutional.

xii) After a careful reading of the scheme dated 29/03/2022, framed under section. 151A of the Act, we find that clause 3(b) of the scheme clearly makes it applicable to issuance of notices under section. 148 of the Act. Section 151A under which the said scheme has been framed, defines the purpose behind framing of the scheme which is to impart greater efficiency, transparency and accountability by eliminating the interface between the income tax authorities and the assessees. When clauses 2 and 3 of the scheme are harmoniously read with the purpose behind framing of the scheme, the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that as per the scheme framed under section. 151A, notices under section. 148 are required to be issued through randomized automated allocation and in a faceless manner. This is what is clearly conveyed through a plain reading of the scheme. Such interpretation is also in line with the intent of the Government of India behind introduction of the faceless regime. There is no other way that the scheme can be read to make it meaningful.

xiii) Thus, if on a plain reading of clause 3(b) of the scheme issuance of notice under section. 148 of the Act is required to be sent through randomized automated allocation and in a faceless manner, then issuance of notice under section. 148 of the Act cannot be permitted to be done in any other manner.

xiv) The phrase in the scheme dated 29/03/2022 “to the extent provided in section 144B of the Act with reference to making assessment or reassessment of total income or loss of the assessee” implies that Clause 3 of the said scheme does not apply to issuance of notices under section. 148 of the Act because section 144B specifically excludes reassessment proceedings under sections 148 and 148A. Such a submission does not warrant acceptance because when the scheme dated 29/03/2022 is read as a whole, the afore quoted phrase is found to apply only to Clause 3(a) of the scheme and this is so because assessment or reassessment is done under section. 147 of the Act. Further, clause 3(a) of the scheme makes the scheme applicable to proceedings under section. 147 of the Act and under clause 3(b) to issuance of notices under section. 148 of the Act. The scheme does not apply to any other proceedings under the Act. Therefore, if the afore submission of the respondents is to be accepted and the scheme is held not to apply to the issuance of notices under section. 148 then framing of the scheme dated 29/03/2022, under section. 151A of the Act, would itself be rendered as a dead letter because conduct of assessment, reassessment or re-computation under section. 147 of the Act, through randomized automated allocation and in a faceless manner, is already covered under section. 144B of the Act. As per the law settled by the Supreme Court interpretation of the scheme in question, which would render it to a dead letter, should be avoided.

xv) On a plain reading of the scheme framed under section. 151A of the Act, it is unambiguously found that clause 3(b) of such scheme clearly applies to the issuance of notices under section. 148 of the Act and requires such notices to be issued in a faceless manner. If the respondents’ submission is accepted then the whole purpose behind enactment of section 151A of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder to introduce a faceless regime as also to allocate AOs through automated allocation and in a random manner shall stand defeated. Once the scheme provides for randomised automated allocation of AOs there is no question of conferment of concurrent jurisdiction on faceless AOs and jurisdictional AOs. As discussed earlier, if a plain reading of the scheme in question requires notices to be issued under section. 148 of the Act through randomised automated allocation of assessing officers and in a faceless manner then there is no other way that these notices can be permitted to be issued.

xvi) Even otherwise, in the light of the conflict between the afore referred notifications issued under section. 120 of the Act by the CBDT and section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder, the provisions of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder shall prevail especially when such scheme has also been accorded approval by both the houses of Parliament.

xvii) Viewed from yet another angle, as mandated under the scheme framed under section. 151A of the Act, the impugned notices issued to the petitioners under section. 148 have also not been issued by AOs appointed randomly and through automated allocation rendering them illegal on this count alone.

xviii) In the light of the above discussion, after holding section 147A of the Act to be unconstitutional and directing it to be struck down, we further order setting aside of the notices issued to the petitioner(s) under section. 148 of the Act because such notices have not been issued through the process of randomized allocation of assessing officers and in a faceless manner as is mandated under section. 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated 29/03/2022.”

Pr. CIT v. J D Exim (P.) Ltd.: Unexplained cash additions under section 68 cannot be sustained when money was received in a prior financial year.

33. Pr.CIT v. J D Exim (P.) Ltd.:

(2026) 189 taxmann.com 801 (Del.):

A. Y. 2016-17: Date of order 18/08/2026:

S. 68 of the ITA 1961/S. 102 of ITA 2025

Cash Credit — S. 68 — Amount received in F. Y. 2006-07 as advance towards sale of land — Sale deed executed by Power of Attorney holder in F. Y. 2013-14 — Transaction came to knowledge of the assessee in F. Y. 2015-16 — Transaction of sale recorded and reflected in A. Y. 2016-17 — Since there was loss, the capital gain on sale of land was set-off against the capital loss — May be colourable device — However, section 68 cannot be resorted to in A. Y. 2016-17 as the amount was received in F. Y. 2006-07 — Addition under section. 68 in A. Y. 2016-17 cannot be sustained.

During the F. Y. 2006-07, the assessee received `10 crores as advance consideration for sale of land. However, the transaction was not culminated. The power of attorney holder of the assessee executed a sale deed in the F. Y. 2013-14. However, the assessee was not informed about the execution of sale deed by the power of attorney holder. The transaction of sale and the execution of sale deed came to the knowledge of the assessee in F. Y. 2015-16. Since the assessee came to the knowledge in F. Y. 2015-16, the assessee reflected the transaction in the return of income filed for A. Y. 2016-17. However, since the assessee had capital loss, the long-term capital gain arising from the transfer of land was set-off.

During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer observed and noted that the purchaser had recorded the transaction in F. Y. 2013-14 and held that recording of the sale transaction by the assessee in F. Y. 2015-16 relevant to A. Y. 2016-17 where the assessee had loss was a colourable device to set-off the loss against the gains. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer held that the advance of `10 crores taken by the assessee was unexplained and therefore added the same under section. 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the hands of the assessee in A. Y. 2016-17.

On appeal, the CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 10 crores under section. 68 of the Act was not justified for A. Y. 2016-17 as the assessee had received the amount in the F. Y. 2006-07.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Department and held as under:

“i) May be the assessee had adopted a device to avoid or to circuitously availing set-off of capital loss against the capital gain, which he had earned two years earlier. But for dealing with such situation or case, there were other and better modes or measures available with the Assessing Officer. For the purported avoidance or colourable device, taking recourse to section 68 of the Act of 1961, within the statutory framework was not permissible, more particularly, when the assessee had admittedly received the amount of `10 crores way back in the F. Y. 2006-07.

ii) The amount of `10 crores was received by the respondent/assessee in the F. Y. 2006-07 and, therefore, adding that amount in the year under consideration (A. Y. 2016-17) is against anybody’s comprehension. Such addition cannot be sustained.”

CIT v. Baba Gandha Singh Education Trust: Generating surplus funds by an educational trust does not justify cancelling Section 12AA registration without proof of non-object activities

32. CIT v. Baba Gandha Singh Education Trust: (2026) 489 ITR 217 (P&H): 2026 SCC OnLine P&H 17341: (2026) 350 CTR 336 (P&H):

Date of order 27/02/2026:

Ss. 2(15) and 12AA of ITA 1961

Charitable trust — Registration under section. 12AA — Charitable purpose — S. 2(15) — Cancellation of registration — Condition precedent — Finding that assessee is not carrying out its activities in line with its objects — Has to be proved with material on record — Mere generation of surplus money by itself is not a ground to cancel registration — No finding that assessee had generated surplus by indulging in any activity not as per its objects — Manner in which surplus used could not be dictated by — Assessee using surplus to invest in educational infrastructure — That assessee failed to use surplus to allow subsidy to poor students is not a ground for cancellation of registration.

The assessee-trust, Baba Gandha Singh Educational Trust, was pursuing educational activities. On application made by the assessee trust on April 11, 2007, the assessee trust was granted registration under section. 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, vide order dated August 29, 2007 with effect from April 1, 2007 for pursuing educational activities. On November 5, 2009, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Patiala issued a notice under section. 12AA(3) of the Act proposing to cancel the registration of the assessee-trust on the ground that it was generating surplus for the A. Y. 2002-03 to A. Y. 2007-08 and therefore went beyond the purpose for which registration was accorded to it. The assessee in its reply to the show-cause notice pleaded that it was imparting education and the surplus generated was ploughed back by way of investment in capital assets. In furtherance of its stated object generation of surplus by running the educational institution and its utilization for education purpose would not disentitle it from exemption/cancellation of registration under section. 12AA(3) of the 1961 Act.

The Commissioner of Income-tax vide order dated March 16, 2010, cancelled the registration under section. 12AA(3) of the Act, after review of copies of accounts filed by the Income-tax Officer, Barnala for the A. Y. 2002-03 to A. Y. 2007-08 holding that the assessee-trust was generating huge surplus year after year, which shows that the trust was not carrying on activity as per section 2(15) of the 1961 Act wherein charitable activity has been defined. While cancelling the registration under section. 12AA(3) of the Act, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Children Book Trust [(1992) 3 SCC 390; 1992 SCC OnLine SC 381.] and the judgment of the Hon’ble Uttarakhand High Court in CIT v. Queens’ Educational Society [(2009) 319 ITR 160 (Uttarakhand); 2007 SCC OnLine Utt 103.].

On appeal, Tribunal noticed that pertinently the Commissioner does not dispute that the assessee-trust was carrying on educational activities which is admittedly the dominant objective of the assessee-trust. Notably the assessee-trust is engaged in running schools and the Commissioner of Income-tax has not pointed out any other activity being carried out by the assessee-trust. The Tribunal thereafter allowed the appeal and set aside the cancellation of registration under section. 12AA of the 1961 Act in favour of the assessee-trust.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Department and held as under:

“i) From a plain reading of section 12AA(3) of the 1961 Act, it is apparent that registration can be cancelled when the Commissioner of Income-tax is satisfied that the activities of trust or institution are not genuine and are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of trust or institution as the case may be. A bare reading of section 12AA(3) of the 1961 Act, therefore, makes it mandatory for the Commissioner of Income-tax to conclude that the trust/institution is not carrying out its activities in line with the objects of the trust.

ii) In the present case, the Commissioner of Income-tax, while cancelling the registration under section. 12AA of the 1961 Act vide the order dated March 16, 2010, had recorded that (1) the respondent-trust is generating surplus since 2002-03 to 2007-08, and (2) that the trust has not waived fee of a large number of students as only fee of 56 students was waived out of 2,901 students, which is two per cent. of the total students showing the absence of any subsidy for the poor and needy.

iii) In fact, in the present case, the Commissioner of Income-tax has failed to find any deviation on the part of the respondent-society from the objects for which it was registered. There is no finding that the trust/society has generated a surplus by indulging in any activity which is not as per its objects. The manner in which surplus money has been used cannot be dictated by the Commissioner of Income-tax but can only be adjudged in accordance with the objects of the society. However, there is no such finding by the Commissioner of Income-tax as to attract the provisions of section 12AA(3) of the 1961 Act. Therefore, in the present case, the sole ground on which the certificate under section. 12AA of the 1961 Act was cancelled by the Commissioner of Income-tax is generation of surplus money.

iv) Therefore, mere generation of surplus money, if the same is in the course of providing education or education activities or for objects for which registration under section 12AA of the Act has been accorded, in that case, surplus money by itself cannot be a ground to cancel the registration. In the present case, there is a total absence of a finding by the Commissioner of Income-tax that the respondent-trust had generated surplus money by indulging in activities other than the objects for which it was registered or that the surplus amount was used for activities other than its objects.

v) In fact, the impugned order of the learned Tribunal goes to show that the learned Tribunal had rightly concluded that no basis for which registration can be cancelled under section. 12AA(3) of the Act has been given by the Commissioner of Income-tax and mere generation of surplus money cannot lead to the conclusion that the trust had not earned the same by running activities as per its objects. The learned Tribunal has rightly held that this needs to be proved with material on record.

vi) The learned Tribunal has rightly concluded that no violation of section 12AA(3) of the Act has been made by the respondent and mere generation of surplus continuously would not result in the assumption that the respondent had earned the same by violating its objects.

vii) The questions of law are thus answered in favour of the respondent and against the appellant in view of the above discussion.

viii) In view of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.”

Honda R & D Company Ltd. v. ACIT(IT): Cost-to-cost reimbursement of salary paid to seconded employees did not constitute fees for technical services under India-Japan DTAA.

14. [2026] 186 taxmann.com 1061 (Delhi – Trib.)

Honda R & D Company Ltd vs. ACIT(IT)

A.Y.: 2018-19 & 2022-23 Dated: 27 May 2026

Article 13 of India-Japan DTAA – Cost-to-cost reimbursement of salary paid to seconded employees did not constitute fees for technical services, and hence, could not be taxed in India.

FACTS

The Assessee was a tax resident of Japan. It was engaged in conducting research and development of Honda products. The Assessee seconded certain employees to its group companies in India. Under the terms of the secondment, the Assessee paid part of the salary payable to seconded employees in their home country and Indian entities reimbursed it on cost-to-cost basis.

The AO contended that salary reimbursement was in nature of fees for technical services (‘FTS’) under the Act and the India-Japan DTAA. The DRP upheld the draft assessment order.

Aggrieved by the final order, the Assessee preferred an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

From perusal of the secondment agreement, the ITAT observed the following:

  • during the secondment period, seconded employees were to be released from work obligations in their home country and worked solely for the Indian company;
  • during the secondment period, seconded employees were not to act on behalf of the overseas entity;
  • seconded employees were to act under direction and supervision of Indian entity;
  • Indian entity was to bear risk and assume responsibility for the work performed by seconded employees;
  • Indian entity was obligated to pay the whole of the salary; and
  • performance of seconded employees was to be evaluated by Indian entity.

The contract of employment between the Indian entity and seconded employees, read together with the secondment agreement, establish employer-employee relationship between the Indian entity and seconded employee.

On similar facts, in Advics Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (IT) [2024] 165 taxmann.com 716 (Delhi – Trib.), the Coordinate Bench noted differences to distinguish the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Centrica India Offshore (P.) Ltd. [364 ITR 336] and, in particular, that in Centrica, it was found that the foreign company had rendered services through its employees to Indian entities while being the employer of the personnel.

In Toshiba Corporation [2025] 181 taxmann.com 244, the Coordinate Bench, relying on the Delhi High Court’s decision in Boeing India (P.) Ltd [457 ITR 84], had held that once the payments are regarded as salaries to employees, they should be excluded from the scope of ‘FTS’.

IMAX Theatre Services Ltd. v. ACIT (IT): Rendering remote maintenance services through an independent Australian vendor’s employee staying under 90 days does not constitute a fixed place PE.

13. [2026] 186 taxmann.com 526 (Delhi – Trib.)

Imax Theatre Services Ltd. vs ACIT (IT)

A.Y.: 2022-23 Dated: 13 May 2026

Article 5 of India-Canada DTAA – On facts, maintenance services rendered in India through an Australian vendor, without satisfying disposal and permanence test, did not constitute fixed place PE in India. Also, since physical presence of Australian vendor in India was less than 90 days, no service PE was constituted.

FACTS

The Assessee was a tax resident of Canada. Canadian tax authority had issued a tax residency certificate (“TRC”) to it. The Assessee rendered maintenance services for IMAX theatres to Indian and global customers. The Assessee had engaged an Australian vendor to provide the services. Generally, the services were rendered remotely by accessing the systems. Sometimes, an employee of the vendor visited the premises of the customer. The LinkedIn profile of the vendor’s employee showed that he worked full-time for the Assessee.

On the basis of the LinkedIn profile of the employee of the vendor, the AO concluded that the activity of the Assessee constituted both a fixed place PE and a service PE. Therefore, he assessed 25% of receipts as income. The DRP was of the view that the activity constituted fixed and supervisory PE1. However, it reduced the attribution to 12.5%.

Aggrieved by the final order, the Assessee preferred an appeal before ITAT.

Before ITAT, the Assessee submitted an affidavit of the Australian vendor clarifying that it had multiple customers globally, including India, and the person was not an employee of the Assessee. The Assessee further submitted that vendor’s employee visited the premises of the Indian customers of the assessee for a total period of 67 days for rendering maintenance services, which was less than 90 days stipulated in the India-Canada DTAA for constituting service PE.


1 The threshold for determining supervisory PE under India-Canada DTAA is 120 days

HELD

The ITAT considered arguments of the Assessee and noted that the services were largely rendered remotely; the access to the theatre systems was limited to fixing bugs and troubleshooting, and the assessee had no unfettered access or right to control the customers’ systems.

The ITAT observed that none of the tests, i.e. place of business, disposal and permanence test, were satisfied in the case of the Assessee. Therefore, the provision of maintenance services did not constitute a fixed place PE.
The ITAT relied on Ernst and Young (EMEIA) Services Ltd. v. ACIT (IT) [2026] 184 taxmann.com 671 (Delhi – Trib.) to hold that services rendered remotely could not be considered for determining service PE. Since the presence of the vendor’s employee in India was below the required threshold, no service PE was constituted.

The LinkedIn profile of the Australian vendor’s employee is not conclusive proof of employer-employee relationship between the individual and the Assessee, especially when the Australian vendor had made an affidavit mentioning that the person was its employee.

In light of the foregoing, the ITAT held that maintenance services did not constitute PE of the Assessee.

Melongos India (P.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer: Each registered sale deed represents an independent transfer chargeable in its respective year, and appellate authorities may evaluate fresh deduction claims.

56. [2026] 138 ITR(T) 617 (Chennai – Trib.)

Melongos India (P.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer

A.Y.: 2013-14, 2014-15 & 2015-16 DATE: 25.03.2026

Sec. 45 read with sections 50C and 2(47), and Sec. 54D read with sections 54F and 54G – Capital gains – Assessee transferred immovable property through eight registered sale deeds executed across FYs 2012-13 to 2014-15 but offered entire LTCG in AY 2014-15 – Each registered sale deed constituted independent transfer and capital gains chargeable in respective years of transfer – Fresh claims for deductions under sections 54D, 54F and 54G though not made in original/revised return to be examined on merits by AO as restriction under Goetze (India) Ltd. applies only to AO and not to appellate authorities.

FACTS

The assessee-company owned immovable property situated in Chennai, which was acquired during FY 2004-05 for a consideration of Rs. 3,00,00,000 and transferred through eight registered sale deeds executed across FYs 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15 for an aggregate sale consideration of `7,40,95,500. The assessee offered the entire long-term capital gains in AY 2014-15.

During scrutiny for AY 2014-15, the AO noted that transfers occurred in multiple years, taxed only the portion transferred in FY 2013-14, invoked section 50C, and denied deduction under section 54D. Pursuant to the PCIT’s order under section 263, the AO passed a consequential order under section 143(3) read with section 263 for AY 2014-15 recomputing LTCG at about
`8.15 crores by adopting stamp duty value for the entire property under section 50C.

The AO initiated reassessment for AY 2013-14 under section 147 and brought to tax LTCG attributable to five sale deeds executed in FY 2012-13, determining LTCG at about `4.44 crores by applying section 50C. The AO also initiated reassessment for AY 2015-16 and taxed LTCG on the portion transferred in FY 2014-15.

For AY 2013-14, the CIT(A) upheld reopening of assessment and taxation of capital gains relating to FY 2012-13 transfers and sustained application of section 50C. For AY 2015-16, after an earlier remand by the Tribunal, the CIT(A) again confirmed that gains on two sale deeds transferred in FY 2014-15 were taxable in AY 2015-16.

For AY 2014-15, the CIT(A) held that only the portion transferred on 07.03.2014 was taxable in that year and directed computation confined to that portion with section 50C on a proportionate basis.

The assessee appealed to the Tribunal.

HELD

On the validity of reassessment proceedings under section 147 for AYs 2013-14 and 2015-16, the Tribunal held that since the returns were processed under section 143(1) and no scrutiny assessment was carried out, and the AO had gathered information during the scrutiny assessment for AY 2014-15 regarding non-offering of capital gains in the respective years, the AO rightly invoked the assumption of jurisdiction under section 147, and the reassessment proceedings were valid.

On the core issue of year of taxability, the Tribunal held that as per section 45 read with section 2(47), capital gains arise in the year in which transfer takes place, and each registered sale deed constitutes an independent transfer of a capital asset, therefore capital gains were chargeable to tax in the respective assessment years in which the transfers took place, and the assessee’s contention that the entire transaction should be taxed in a single year could not be accepted.

On the consequential order under section 263 for AY 2014-15, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)’s approach of restricting computation only to the portion of property transferred during the relevant year, but restored the computation to the file of the AO for limited purpose of re-computation.

On the claims of deduction under sections 54D, 54F and 54G, the Tribunal held that the restriction laid down in Goetze (India) Ltd. v. CIT [2006] 157 Taxman 1/284 ITR 323 (SC) applies only to the Assessing Officer and not to appellate authorities, and accordingly restored the issue to the file of the AO to examine the claim of deduction on merits.

The Tribunal further directed the AO to grant appropriate relief to avoid double taxation, as the assessee had contended that the same income had been subjected to tax in multiple years.

Addl. CIT, Special Range-7 v. PNB Gilts Ltd: Sufficient interest-free funds preclude interest disallowance under section 14A, and mark-to-market losses on stock-in-trade are allowable as legitimate valuation losses.

55. [2026] 138 ITR(T) 221 (Delhi – Trib.)

Addl. CIT, Special Range-7 v. PNB Gilts Ltd

A.Y.: 2012-13 & 2013-14                                                

DATE: 25.03.2026

Sec. 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) and 8D(2)(iii), and Sec. 36(1)(iii) read with Sec. 145A, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Expenditure incurred in relation to income not includible in total income and Interest on borrowed capital – Assessee NBFC held shares and bonds as stock-in-trade and earned exempt income – Assessee had sufficient interest-free funds (share capital and reserves of `577.64 crores) exceeding value of stock-in-trade yielding exempt income (`65.80 crores) – No disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) could be made – Disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) solely due to earning tax-free income unjustified – Provision for diminution/mark-to-market loss on securities held as stock-in-trade allowable as legitimate valuation loss.

FACTS

The assessee, a Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC) was engaged in trading in government securities and debt market instruments, and held shares and bonds as stock-in-trade. For A.Y. 2012-13, it earned exempt income comprising dividend of about `4.78 lakhs and interest on tax-free bonds of about `4.16 crores, aggregating to about `4.21 crores.

During assessment, the AO invoked section 14A and computed disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(ii) at about `3.93 crores and under Rule 8D(2)(iii) at about `34.25 lakhs, making a total disallowance of about `4.27 crores.

The AO also disallowed interest of approximately `30.61 lakhs under section 36(1)(iii) on the ground that the assessee had earned substantial tax-free interest income. Further, the AO disallowed a provision for diminution in market value of stock of about `6.56 crores.

In appeal, the CIT(A) observed that the assessee had interest-free funds (share capital and reserves) of about `577.64 crores, exceeding the average value of stock-in-trade yielding exempt income (about Rs. 65.80 crores), deleted the interest disallowance computed under Rule 8D(2)(ii), and sustained only about Rs. 34.25 lakhs under Rule 8D(2)(iii), and also deleted the additions under section 36(1)(iii) and on account of diminution in market value. The assessee appealed to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal held that no disallowance under section 14A could have been made in the absence of a valid and reasoned satisfaction recorded by the AO, as the satisfaction recorded was mechanical and bereft of application of mind, and relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2017] 81 taxmann.com 111, it was held that recording of proper satisfaction is a sine qua non for invoking section 14A.

Even otherwise, no disallowance of interest under section 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) could be made as the assessee had sufficient interest-free funds, and following the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT v. Reliance Industries Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2019, dated 2-1-2019) and the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Pr. CIT (Central) v. Ashok Apparels (P.) Ltd. [2019] 106 taxmann.com 63, where sufficient interest-free funds are available, a presumption can be made that investments are out of such funds and no interest disallowance can be made.

On the issue of disallowance under section 36(1)(iii), the Tribunal held that the AO failed to take into account the fact that the assessee had sufficient capital and reserve and surplus of `577.64 crores which was in excess of the amount of bonds and shares on which tax-free income had been earned, and it was to be presumed that the tax-free income was earned on account of interest-free funds available with the assessee.

On the issue of diminution in market value of stock, the Tribunal held that the depreciation in value of securities provided in the books of account represented a legitimate valuation loss of stock-in-trade, computed in accordance with RBI guidelines, recognized accounting principles, and the consistent method of accounting followed by the assessee, relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in United Commercial Bank v. CIT [1999] 106 Taxman 601, wherein it was held that banks are entitled to value their stock-in-trade at cost or market value, whichever is lower, and the resultant diminution represents an allowable deduction.

In the result, both appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.

Manish Pushkar Dayal Singhal v. Income-tax Officer: Penalty under section 271B was deleted because the assessee maintained a bona fide belief regarding turnover calculation thresholds for tax audit.

54. (2026) 189 taxmann.com 556 (Mum Trib)

Manish Pushkar Dayal Singhal v. Income-tax Officer

A.Y.: 2022-23 Date of Order : 12.08.2026

Sections: 271B, 44AB

Where the assessee bona fide believed that tax audit was not required since its turnover excluding GST was below audit threshold limit under section 44AB, in the absence of any evidence of deliberate or bona fide failure, such bona fide belief constituted reasonable cause and therefore penalty under section 271B was to be deleted.

FACTS

The assessee, an individual running the proprietary concern was engaged in manufacturing and selling packaging materials, filed his return for A.Y. 2022-23 declaring income of about Rs. 3.73 lakhs.

The assessment under section 143(3) read with section 144B was completed without variation. During assessment, the Assessing Officer noted from the assessee’s GSTR-1 that the total invoice value was about Rs. 11.59 crores inclusive of GST, exceeding the Rs. 10 crore threshold under section 44AB, whereas the Profit & Loss account reflected sales of about Rs. 9.82 crores net of taxes. Referring to section 145A(ii), the AO held that sales had to be considered inclusive of tax for determining tax-audit liability, and levied a penalty of Rs. 1.50 lakhs under section 271B for failure to get the accounts audited.

On appeal, the assessee contended that his total taxable value, as per GSTR-1, was about Rs. 9.83 crores — below the section 44AB threshold — but the CIT(A) held that the assessee had failed to establish that turnover was below the prescribed limit, and confirmed the penalty.
Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed as follows:

(a) The central issue in a penalty matter of this nature was whether the assessee’s failure to get his accounts audited was based on a bona fide belief that he was not liable for tax audit. The ICAI Guidance Note on Tax Audit lays down that where GST or any other tax is included in the sale price, no adjustment should be made for it while considering turnover, and courts have accepted the ICAI’s meaning of ‘turnover’ as a body having statutory recognition, following CIT v. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries, (2014) 364 ITR 144 (SC).

(b) Where two views on inclusion of GST in turnover are reasonably possible, it would be difficult to completely brush aside the assessee’s contention that he bona fide believed he was not liable to get his accounts audited under section 44AB, particularly where nothing was brought on record to establish that the assessee deliberately, knowingly, or with mala fide intention failed to comply with section 44AB.

(c) A bona fide belief of this nature has consistently been treated by Coordinate Benches as constituting reasonable cause sufficient to delete penalty under section 271B, since the levy of penalty under that section is discretionary and not automatic – see Smt. Snehal Rajendra Pathak v. ITO, ITA No. 3550/Mum/2014; Vighnaharta Trust v. DCIT (Exemption), ITA No. 3324/Mum/2023; and Sachin Marotrao Rangari v. ACIT, (2022) 143 taxmann.com 318/197 ITD 358 (Rajkot – Trib.).
Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the facts and circumstances did not warrant a finding that the assessee’s failure to obtain the tax audit report was intentional or contumacious, that his bona fide belief amounted to reasonable cause, and directed the AO to delete the penalty levied under section 271B.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Ameeta Jagdish Thackersey v. Income-tax Officer: Given conflicting judicial views regarding Portfolio Management Services fee deductions under section 48, the construction most favourable to the assessee applies.

53. (2026) 189 taxmann.com 433 (Mum Trib)

Ameeta Jagdish Thackersey v. Income-tax Officer

A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of Order : 10.08.2026

Section: 48

Since divergent Tribunal views existed on the allowability of Portfolio Management Services (PMS) fees under section 48, the interpretation favourable to the assessee was to be adopted and accordingly PMS charges were allowable as a deduction in computing capital gains.

FACTS

The assessee filed a return for A.Y. 2011-12 declaring total income of about Rs. 72.26 lakhs from salary, short-term capital gains and other sources. While computing capital gains, she claimed a deduction of PMS fees/charges of about Rs. 8.42 lakhs paid to her portfolio manager.

In assessment under section 143(3), the AO disallowed the PMS fees, holding that such charges were not expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer of a capital asset as required by section 48.

On appeal, the CIT(A) held that the fees, paid for purchase and sale of securities and allied activities, were not directly relatable to the cost of acquisition or transfer of specific securities, and upheld the disallowance.
Aggrieved, the assessee appealed to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed as follows:

(a) Divergent views had been expressed by different Coordinate Benches on the allowability of PMS charges under section 48. While the Mumbai Bench in ACIT v. Apurva Mahesh Shah, (2018) 172 ITD 127 (Mumbai), had held PMS fees not deductible, the Pune Bench in DCIT v. KRA Holding & Trading (P.) Ltd., (2012) 54 SOT 493 (Pune), the Mumbai Bench in Zarah Rafique Malik v. ITO (Int. Tax), (2026) 184 taxmann.com 287 (Mumbai – Trib.), and the Delhi Bench in ACIT v. Vireet Investments (P.) Ltd., (2024) 169 taxmann.com 379 (Delhi – Trib.), had taken the contrary view and allowed such deduction.

(b) Two reasonable and plausible views thus existed on the interpretation of section 48 in relation to PMS charges. The Supreme Court in CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd., (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC), had laid down the settled principle that where two reasonable constructions of a taxing provision are possible, the interpretation favourable to the assessee should be adopted, a principle consistently applied where conflicting judicial views exist and no binding decision of the jurisdictional High Court or the Supreme Court directly settles the controversy.

(c) The Revenue had not brought to notice any binding decision of the jurisdictional High Court or the Supreme Court specifically holding that PMS charges are not deductible under section 48.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that PMS charges of `8.42 lakhs were allowable as a deduction while computing capital gains under section 48.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Shri Sant Ram Memorial Education and Welfare Society v. Exemption Ward: Where a society runs multiple educational institutions from a common campus, receipts must be aggregated to determine exemption limits under section 10(23C)(iiiad).

52. (2026) 189 taxmann.com 174 (Chd Trib)

Shri Sant Ram Memorial Education and Welfare Society v. Exemption Ward

A.Y.: 2018-19 Date of Order : 03.08.2026

Section: 10(23C)(iiiad)

Where the assessee-society ran multiple educational institutions from a common campus with common infrastructure, management and ownership and maintained only consolidated accounts, the receipts of all the institutions were to be aggregated for determining the exemption under section 10(23C)(iiiad), and since such receipts exceeded the prescribed limit, exemption was rightly denied.

FACTS

The assessee, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and engaged in imparting education, filed its return for A.Y. 2018-19 declaring Nil income after claiming exemption of Rs. 23.22 lakhs under section 10(23C)(iiiad). During the relevant year, it ran Infinity Public School, SSR College of Education, Bachpan Play School and the Society itself.

Its case was selected for complete scrutiny primarily for claim of exemption under section 10(23C)(iiiad). The AO noted that the assessee had furnished only consolidated financial statements, and had not produced any working demonstrating eligibility for the exemption claimed. On examining the consolidated Income & Expenditure Account, the aggregate annual receipts of the educational institutions were found to be Rs. 1,85,10,445, exceeding the prescribed monetary limit of Rs. 1 crore under Rule 2BC. Treating all the educational activities as one composite institution, the AO aggregated the receipts, denied the exemption, and taxed the surplus of Rs. 9.70 lakhs, and also initiated penalty proceedings under section 270A.

On appeal, the CIT(A) affirmed the disallowance, recording that all units operated from the same campus with common infrastructure, management and ownership, and that separate buildings or courses did not create separate institutions.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed as follows:

(a) Section 10(23C)(iiiad) is intended to grant exemption to educational institutions having comparatively small annual receipts, so as to extend the benefit to genuinely small institutions without requiring them to undergo the rigours of approval under the other clauses of section 10(23C). The provision cannot, however, be interpreted to permit fragmentation of what is, in substance, one integrated educational institution into several artificial units merely to remain within the prescribed monetary limit.

(b) Both the AO and the CIT(A) had concurrently recorded a finding that all the educational activities were carried on by the same society from a common campus with common infrastructure, common management and common ownership. The assessee was unable to demonstrate that the alleged institutions maintained separate books of account, possessed independent administrative or managerial structures, or functioned as distinct educational entities; on the contrary, only consolidated financial statements of the society were maintained and produced.

(c) Whether separate educational institutions exist is essentially a question of fact, and in the absence of cogent evidence establishing independent existence, administration and accounting, mere nomenclature assigned to different wings or levels of education cannot be determinative. Accepting the assessee’s contention without supporting material would defeat the object of section 10(23C)(iiiad), which is intended to benefit genuinely small educational institutions, and not to permit fragmentation of receipts of one composite establishment.

Accordingly, the Tribunal agreed with the concurrent findings of the authorities above that the aggregate receipts of the educational institution run by the assessee exceeded the prescribed monetary limit during the relevant previous year, and that the assessee was consequently not entitled to exemption under section 10(23C)(iiiad).

In the result, the appeal of the assessee was dismissed.

Fatal Or Forgiven – How Courts Apply Mandatory Vs. Directory Rules

In tax law, statutory provisions are classified as mandatory or directory based on legislative intent rather than literal terms like “shall” or “may”. Mandatory rules govern jurisdiction, limitation periods, and substantive eligibility; strict adherence is indispensable, and failure to comply renders proceedings void regardless of prejudice. Conversely, directory rules regulate procedural and evidentiary mechanisms intended to facilitate administration. Courts allow substantial compliance for directory provisions whenever the underlying statutory purpose is fulfilled and no prejudice is caused. Modern courts apply a seven-factor test examining statutory purpose, non-compliance consequences, curability, and overall legislative scheme to determine a provision’s true legal character.

Statutory interpretation occupies a central position in every fiscal legislation. Unlike private law, where rights and obligations frequently arise from consensual arrangements, tax statutes derive their authority exclusively from legislative command. Every obligation imposed upon the taxpayer, every power conferred upon the Revenue authorities and every exemption, deduction or concession recognised under the statute owes its existence to parliamentary enactment. Consequently, the interpretation of statutory language, particularly whether a provision is mandatory or directory assumes exceptional importance, for it determines not merely the meaning of legislative provisions but also the limits of administrative authority and the conditions governing the exercise of statutory rights.

The jurisprudence governing mandatory and directory statutory provisions has acquired renewed significance following a series of recent judicial pronouncements under the (now repealed) Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”). A controversy arose before the Delhi High Court1, where the validity of a notice issued under section 143(2) was challenged. The petitioner contended that the failure to adhere to the format prescribed by the CBDT2 rendered the notice invalid and consequently vitiated the assessment proceedings initiated thereunder.


1 Bharat Bansal v. NFAC, W.P.(C) 2238/2026, CM APPL. 10798/2026 & CM APPL. 10799/2026

2 Instructions dated 23rd June 2017 and 13th October 2021

Rejecting the challenge, the Delhi High Court (HC) held that the CBDT Instructions were intended solely to regulate the internal functioning of the Income-tax Department and they neither conferred any enforceable rights upon the assessee nor imposed additional jurisdictional conditions beyond those prescribed by the statute. It was observed that the purpose of a notice under section 143(2) is to intimate the assessee that the return has been selected for scrutiny and assume jurisdiction and hence, mere omission to specify the category or reasons for scrutiny in the initial notice did not affect the validity of the said notice. The Court thus drew a clear distinction between statutory requirements governing jurisdiction and administrative instructions regulating departmental procedure, holding that non-compliance with the latter could not invalidate proceedings otherwise lawfully initiated under the Act.

This issue assumed greater significance in recent past as conflicting decisions of various benches of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) necessitated constitution of a Special Bench3. The Special Bench also adopted a similar analogy as the Delhi HC (supra) in holding that a format prescribed under the CBDT Instructions constitutes an administrative mechanism and cannot be elevated into a statutory condition precedent governing the validity of a notice issued under section 143(2).

On a separate note, the Karnataka HC4, while examining the issue, the High Court considered the object underlying the Document Identification Number (“DIN”) regime, namely ensuring authenticity, traceability and maintenance of an audit trail in departmental communications. The Court noted that the controversy did not involve a case where no DIN had been generated or communicated. Rather, the impugned orders had been uploaded through the prescribed electronic process, the DINs were subsequently communicated through authenticated intimation letters and the accompanying orders contained an incorrect DIN owing to a manual error.

Adopting a purposive interpretation of CBDT Circular No. 19 of 2019 and the related system instructions, the Court held that the requirement of quoting a DIN is mandatory, however, where the correct DIN is communicated through an authenticated intimation identifying the relevant order, the communication would not be rendered invalid merely because the DIN was not originally reflected in the order or was incorrectly mentioned due to a typographical mistake. The court considered the object underlying the DIN regime, and ruled in favour of the tax department by treating such defects are curable irregularities.5


3 M.D. Sons v. Income Tax Officer, [TS-1089-ITAT-2026(Bang)]

4 PCIT v. Unisys India Pvt. Ltd., ITA No. 55/2024

5 It may also be noted that the Finance Act, 2026 has introduced legislative changes dealing with electronic communications and departmental authorisations,
 while CBDT Circular No. 19/2019 governing the DIN mechanism stands withdrawn. 
The impact of these developments on pending disputes concerning DIN-related invalidity arguments remains to be judicially tested.

 

Fatal or Forgiven

It may be relevant to note here that in the past, a stricter approach to DIN compliance has been adopted by several HCs. The Bombay HC6 and Madras HC7, have held that a subsequent communication on DIN generation would not be sufficient compliance and the original communications were held to be non est in law.


6 Hexaware Technologies Ltd. v. ACIT, [2024] 464 ITR 430 (Bom),
7 CIT v. Laserwords US Inc., [2026] 486 ITR 159 (Madras)

The recent decisions of the HC’s as well as the Special Bench (supra) have thus noted that the format of the notice or insertion of DIN in a subsequent notice is a directory provision and does not prejudice the taxpayers. As long as substantial compliance is adhered to, the same was held to follow the procedure as mandated by law. The matter would have been fundamentally different, though, had there been no notice itself issued under section 143(2) or the DIN was never communicated to the taxpayers. This brings the focus to the germane issue that while certain provisions are so fundamental to the legislative framework that failure to comply necessarily invalidates the action taken under the statute, others merely regulate the way a statutory power is exercised or a statutory right is asserted, such that substantial compliance with the legislative objective may suffice. The logic of this distinction is that while a procedural formality facilitates the enjoyment of a benefit, a substantive condition determines whether the benefit can be claimed in the first place.

MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY PROVISIONS

A mandatory provision is one whose compliance constitutes a condition precedent to the validity of the statutory act. Such provisions ordinarily create jurisdiction, determine substantive rights or impose conditions that Parliament has expressly declared to be essential. Compliance with these requirements is indispensable because the statutory power or benefit itself comes into existence only upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions. Failure to comply with a mandatory requirement, therefore, ordinarily renders the action void, irrespective of whether any actual prejudice has been demonstrated. The emphasis is not upon the consequences suffered by the parties but upon adherence to the legislative command.

A directory provision, in contrast, regulate the manner in which an existing right or power is exercised. While compliance with such a provision is ordinarily expected, the requirement is not regarded as indispensable to the validity of the proceeding or the existence of the statutory right. The provision regulates the procedure through which an existing right is exercised or established rather than creating that right in the first instance. Consequently, where the legislative purpose has been substantially achieved and the procedural lapse does not defeat the object of the statute or prejudice the interests sought to be protected, courts have often regarded substantial compliance as sufficient.

Broadly, statutory requirements under the IT Act may be classified into three categories. First are judicial requirements, which confer authority upon the tax administration to initiate or continue proceedings. Secondly, substantive eligibility conditions determine whether a taxpayer is entitled to a statutory benefit, exemption or deduction. Thirdly, procedural and evidentiary requirements regulate the manner in which jurisdiction is exercised or statutory rights are claimed. While the first two categories ordinarily receive a mandatory interpretation, the third category is generally construed as directory unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.

Identification of the nature of a provision i.e. whether it is mandatory or directory has been a subject matter of judicial interpretation across statutes. Early judicial decisions tended to adopt a largely literal approach. The use of the word “shall” in a statute was generally treated as indicative of a mandatory requirement, whereas the word “may” was regarded as conferring discretion. However, experience soon demonstrated that such an approach produced inconsistent results. Legislatures frequently used mandatory language in relation to procedural requirements where strict compliance was never intended, while permissive language was sometimes employed in situations where a duty was clearly contemplated.

The Supreme Court8 in a landmark case marked an important departure from purely linguistic interpretation. The Court observed that the determination of whether a provision is mandatory or directory depends primarily upon legislative intent and not merely upon the language employed. This approach was developed further where the Supreme Court9 emphasised that the consequences of non-compliance, the object of the statute and the purpose of the provision must all be examined.

The evolution of the mandatory-directory doctrine within the Income-tax Act may be traced to early decisions that recognised the distinction between substantive statutory conditions and procedural requirements intended merely to facilitate tax administration. An important application was made by the Patna High Court10, wherein the Court examined whether the requirement under section 184(7) that a declaration for continuation of registration of a firm be furnished “along with the return of income” was mandatory or merely directory. Rejecting a purely literal construction, the Court held that the expression could not be interpreted to require physical simultaneity between the return and the declaration. What was material was that both documents were available before the Assessing Officer at the time of making the assessment. The Court observed that an overly technical interpretation would defeat the legislative object and place undue emphasis on procedural form rather than substantive compliance. The decision is significant because it represents one of the earliest judicial recognitions under the Act that procedural requirements intended to facilitate assessment should ordinarily receive a directory interpretation where the legislative purpose has been substantially fulfilled and no prejudice is caused to the Revenue.

The Delhi High Court11 further refined this jurisprudence where the Court was required to determine whether the prescribed time limit for rendering accounts under section 80G(5C)(v) constituted a mandatory condition or a directory procedural requirement. The Court emphasised that the determination could not rest solely upon the language employed by Parliament but required examination of the legislative purpose, the nature of the obligation and the consequences of non-compliance. Since the substantive conditions had already been fulfilled and the delay was procedural in nature, denial of the statutory benefit solely on account of delayed compliance would frustrate the legislative object and produce disproportionate consequences.

An equally significant contribution to the development of the doctrine is found in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court12. The controversy concerned section 12AA(2), which required the Commissioner shall dispose of an application for registration within six months and hence the question framed was whether failure to adhere to the prescribed time limit resulted in a deemed grant of registration. The Full Bench rejected such an interpretation and held that although the provision employed the expression “shall”, the absence of any statutory consequence for non-compliance indicated that the prescribed time limit was directory rather than mandatory and emphasized that the true test lies in examining the object of the provision, the statutory scheme and the consequences that would follow from either interpretation.

A significant aspect of the mandatory-directory doctrine emerges from the decision of the Sikkim High Court13 wherein the court held that not every statutory prescription carries the same legal consequence upon non-compliance and relied upon the doctrine of substantial compliance i.e. where the essential requirements of the statute have been satisfied, minor procedural deviations should not defeat substantive right.

We will now deal with certain illustrations of mandatory and directory provisions in the context of the Act are in the ensuing paragraphs.


8 State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 Supreme Court 912

9  Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board , AIR 1965 Supreme Court 895

10 Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sitaram Bhagwandas [(1976) 102 ITR 560 (Pat.)]

11 Church’s Auxiliary for Social Action v. Director General of Income-tax (Exemptions) [(2010) 325 ITR 362 (Del.)],

12 Commissioner of Income-tax v. Muzaffar Nagar Development Authority [(2015) 372 ITR 209 (All.) (FB)]

13 Balchand Udairam v. State of Sikkim [(1989) 180 ITR 530 (Sikkim)].

A. JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS

These are the clearest illustrations of mandatory provisions as jurisdiction constitutes the legal authority to act. If the statute prescribes a particular condition for assumption of jurisdiction, failure to satisfy that condition ordinarily renders the entire proceeding void irrespective of the merits of the case. Consequently, defects going to the root of the notice cannot ordinarily be cured through acquiescence, participation or waiver by the assessee.

The Supreme Court14 has observed that service of the prescribed notice is not merely procedural but constitutes a condition precedent to the validity of reassessment proceedings and the entire proceeding would be rendered illegal where the jurisdictional notice was absent. The doctrine of substantial compliance finds little application in such circumstances because the issue is not whether the power was properly exercised but whether the power existed at all.

The Supreme Court15 in the context of issuance of a notice under section 143(2) has held that it is mandatory act under the statute as it lays the foundation of jurisdiction and hence, is not merely procedural. This principle was reiterated16 by the Supreme Court which clarified that complete absence of notice cannot be cured through section 292BB. While defects in service may in certain circumstances be cured, the actual issuance of notice remains indispensable.

The Delhi and Bombay HC’s17 while examining the validity of approval granted under section 151 before issuance of a notice for reassessment, rejected the Revenue’s contention that the statutory approval constituted a mere administrative formality. The Court held that the approving authority is expected to independently examine the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer and arrive at its own satisfaction regarding the necessity of reopening the assessment. The judgment, thus, reinforces the principle that procedural safeguards incorporated by Parliament to regulate the assumption of jurisdiction are mandatory in nature and cannot be reduced to mechanical rituals. The requirement of prior sanction exists not for administrative convenience but to protect taxpayers against arbitrary exercise of reassessment powers.

Interestingly, the Finance Act 2026 has inserted section 292BC in the Act to retroactively18 provide that such approvals would be deemed to be administrative and supervisory in nature and shall not invalidate a notice. Although, generally legislature is within its powers to enact an amendment retroactively and can also amend a directory provision to be made mandatory19 whether the wordings in the retrospective amendment in section 292BC are sufficient to convert a mandatory provision into a directory one, without removing any lis or the fundamental basis in the original provision remains to be tested before the Courts, especially in light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court20 in the case of Prithvi Cotton Mills and Indian Aluminium Co. in this regard.


14 Y. Narayana Chetty v. ITO, 1958 (10) TMI 10 - Supreme Court

15 Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax v. Hotel Blue Moon, 2010 (2) TMI 1 - Supreme Court

16  CIT v. Laxman Das Khandelwal, 2019 (8) TMI 660 - Supreme Court

17 CIT v. SPL’s Siddhartha Ltd, [(2012) 345 ITR 223 (Del.)],
 United Electrical Co. (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [(2002) 258 ITR 317 (Del.)]; 
Svitzer Hazira Pvt Ltd vs Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, TS-6621-HC-2021

19 Retrospective w.e.f. April 01, 2021

20 Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Natraj Engineers (P) Ltd, Patna HC, TS-5877-HC-2015

B. LIMITATION PROVISIONS

Limitation provisions occupy a unique position in tax law. They do not merely regulate procedure, rather, they define the temporal boundaries within which statutory power may be exercised. Once the prescribed period expires, the authority itself ceases to exist.

The mandatory character of limitation provisions is particularly evident in reassessment cases. The power to reopen completed assessments exists only within the framework prescribed by Parliament. Once the statutory period expires, the authority to reassess stands extinguished. Courts, therefore, refuse to treat limitation periods as mere procedural requirements.

The same principle applies to assessment time limits prescribed under section 153. These provisions serve not merely administrative purposes but also protect taxpayers against indefinite uncertainty. The expiration of limitation, therefore, affects the very competence of the authority to proceed further.

C. EXEMPTIONS AND DEDUCTIONS

The IT Act contains numerous provisions granting exemptions, deductions and preferential treatment. Such provisions often prescribe multiple conditions including filing of returns, reports etc. Judicial decisions consistently distinguish between conditions that determine eligibility and conditions that regulate the manner of claiming the benefit.

An exemption or deduction represents a departure from the normal charging provisions of the Act and hence, eligibility conditions for such exemptions or deductions are ordinarily regarded as mandatory21.

Section 80AC is also one of the clearest illustrations of legislative intent transforming a procedural act into a mandatory condition. The provision links availability of specified deductions to timely filing of the return of income, which clarifies the intent of the Parliament to restrict eligibility of such deductions and exemptions on furnishing of timely returns.22

The requirement to obtain the audit report has also frequently been regarded as substantive because it ensures compliance with the statutory objective of independent verification. However, the requirement regarding the precise timing of filing the report has often been treated as procedural. Consequently, where the report existed and was furnished before completion of assessment proceedings, courts have frequently held that the deduction or exemption should not be denied merely because the report was not enclosed with the original return23.

Particularly in cases of exemption provisions, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court24 reaffirmed that exemption provisions in fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly and that the burden lies on the taxpayer to clearly establish that its case falls within the scope of the exemption. At the same time, the Court recognised the doctrine of substantial compliance, observing that while substantive and mandatory conditions governing eligibility must be strictly fulfilled, mere procedural or directory requirements may be treated more liberally where the essential statutory conditions have been satisfied. The judgment thus draws a crucial distinction between substantive conditions that create the entitlement to a tax benefit and procedural requirements that merely regulate its exercise, making it a cornerstone authority in determining whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory. The principles of this decision were echoed by the subsequent Supreme Court’s25 decision wherein the Court in the context of section 10B of the Act (treating it as an exemption section) held that furnishing of the declaration stipulated in section 10B and adherence to the prescribed timeline constituted mandatory conditions.

The Supreme Court26 in a landmark case while dealing with deduction claims where the prescribed audit report had not been filed along with the return but had been furnished before completion of assessment proceedings held that as the purpose underlying the requirement was to ensure that the necessary certification was available to the assessing authority, once the report was furnished during the assessment proceedings and before completion of the assessment, the statutory purpose stood fulfilled.

The Gujarat High Court27 and Calcutta High Court28 similarly recognised that the prescribed report exists to facilitate verification by the Revenue and not to create the substantive entitlement itself and if the report is ultimately furnished during the assessment proceedings, there is no dispute regarding satisfaction of the substantive statutory conditions, delayed filing should not automatically result in denial of the deduction.


21 Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality’, [1970 AIR 192], 

Indian Aluminium Co. v. State of Kerala [1996 AIR 1431]

22 U.P. Forest Corporation And Anr. V. DCIT, 2007 (11) TMI 699 - Supreme Court

23 Association Of Indian Panelboard Manufacturer v. DCIT, 2022 (12) TMI 1414 - Gujarat High Court

24 Dilip Kumar & Co., 2018 (7) TMI 1826 - Supreme Court (LB)

25 PCIT v. Wipro [2022] 140 taxmann.com 223 (SC)

26 CIT v. G.M. Knitting Industries Pvt. Ltd, 2015 (11) TMI 397 - SC Order

27  Zenith Processing Mills v. CIT [(1996) 219 ITR 721 (Guj.)]

28  Winro commercial (India), ITAT No 237/2022

D. LOWER CORPORATE TAX RATE UNDER 115BAA/115BAB

A contemporary illustration of this debate arises in the context of the concessional tax regimes under sections 115BAA and 115BAB. These provisions permit domestic companies to avail a lower rate of tax subject to satisfaction of specified conditions and the exercise of the option in the prescribed manner through Form No. 10-IC or Form No. 10-ID, as the case may be. A recurring controversy has been whether delay in filing the prescribed form necessarily disentitles an otherwise eligible taxpayer from claiming the concessional rate. While the Revenue has generally viewed timely filing of the form as a mandatory requirement, appellate authorities have increasingly examined the substance of the taxpayer’s conduct, including whether the option was unequivocally exercised in the return of income, whether tax was computed at the concessional rate and whether all substantive statutory conditions were satisfied.

The Allahabad High Court in this context29 held that where the assessee had clearly manifested its intention to opt for section 115BAA in its return of income and audit report, delay in filing Form No. 10-IC could be condoned upon demonstration of genuine hardship, observing that a procedural lapse should not deprive a taxpayer of a substantive benefit.

Similarly, the Gujarat High Court30 condoned the delay in filing Form No. 10-ID under section 115BAB, emphasising that the filing requirement is intended to facilitate exercise of the option and that substantive entitlement should not be denied where sufficient cause for the delay exists. The Mumbai Tribunal31 went a step further and held that even the filing of an incorrect form, namely Form No. 10-IB instead of Form No. 10-IC, constituted a curable procedural defect where the assessee had otherwise satisfied all conditions and unequivocally exercised the option for concessional taxation. These decisions suggest a growing judicial inclination to treat the prescribed forms as procedural mechanisms evidencing the exercise of a statutory option rather than as conditions governing the existence of the entitlement itself.


29 Cell Com Teleservices Private Limited Versus Union of India, [2025] 176 taxmann.com 712 (Allahabad)

30 M/s. Royal Led Equipments Pvt. Ltd. Versus Chief Commissioner Of Income Tax, [2025] 174 taxmann.com 61 (Gujarat)

31 ACIT, Circle -3, Thane Versus Magik Kraft Pvt Ltd, 2025 (10) TMI 1431 - ITAT MUMBAI

E. FORM NO. 67 (FOREIGN TAX CREDIT)

Sections 90 and 91 of the IT Act confer the substantive right to claim FTC, while Rule 128 prescribes Form No. 67 as the procedural mechanism through which the taxpayer furnishes particulars of foreign taxes paid. Judicial decisions, however, have increasingly recognised that the Rule regulates the manner of claiming an existing statutory right and does not itself create the entitlement to FTC.

Several benches of the ITAT have therefore held that the requirement of filing Form No. 67 is directory rather than mandatory, particularly where the form is furnished before completion of assessment or appellate proceedings and the substantive conditions for grant of foreign tax credit are otherwise satisfied32.


32 Hertz Software India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT [(2022) 139 taxmann.com 448 (Bang. - Trib.), 
Brinda Ramakrishna v. ITO [(2022) 135 taxmann.com 358 (Bangalore - Trib.)], 
Bhagwandas Tikamdas Khinani v. NFAC, 2022 (12) TMI 357 - ITAT Mumbai, 
Anuj Bhagwati v. DCIT, 2022 (9) TMI 1397 - ITAT Mumbai

F. REVISED RETURNS AND CARRY FORWARD OF LOSSES

Section 80 embodies the legislative principle that the statutory right to carry forward and set off certain losses is contingent upon timely compliance with the return filing requirements prescribed under the Act. The provision expressly disentitles a taxpayer from carrying forward specified losses unless the return claiming such loss is furnished within the time prescribed under section 139(1). The focus of the provision, therefore, is on the existence of a valid and timely loss return, reflecting Parliament’s intention to treat timely disclosure of the loss as a substantive condition for preserving the benefit.

The relationship between original returns and revised returns provides another important illustration of the mandatory-directory distinction. Accordingly, where an assessee has filed the original return within the prescribed period and has validly disclosed the loss sought to be carried forward, a subsequent revised return correcting computational or factual errors should not ordinarily result in denial of the already accrued statutory right. The revised return merely refines the contents of that return and should therefore be viewed as a procedural mechanism regulating the exercise of an existing right.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT33 illustrates the circumstances in which Parliament consciously transforms a procedural requirement into a substantive statutory condition. Interpreting the expression “due time” under the Act, the Court held that a return furnished under section 139(4) cannot be equated with a return filed within the due date prescribed under section 139(1). The legislature had deliberately distinguished between timely compliance and belated compliance, attaching different legal consequences to each. The judgment, therefore, demonstrates that where Parliament expressly links a statutory right or consequence to compliance within a specified period, the courts cannot dilute that requirement by treating subsequent compliance as equivalent. The decision represents an important illustration of legislative intent converting what may otherwise appear procedural into a mandatory statutory condition.


33 Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT [(2004) 266 ITR 1 (SC)]

TOWARDS A UNIFIED INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK – THE SEVEN-FACTOR TEST

A review of judicial decisions reveals that courts repeatedly return to certain common themes when determining whether a provision is mandatory, directory or discretionary. These tests may be synthesised into a unified interpretative framework.

  •  First Factor – Nature of the Right or Power Involved

The first inquiry concerns the nature of the right or power affected by the provision. Requirements affecting jurisdiction, limitation or substantive eligibility are more likely to be mandatory than those regulating procedure.

  • Second Factor – Legislative Purpose

The second inquiry concerns the purpose sought to be achieved. If strict compliance is necessary to fulfil the statutory objective, the provision is likely to be mandatory. If the purpose can be achieved despite procedural deviation, the provision may be directory.

  • Third Factor – Consequences of Non-Compliance

The third inquiry examines whether the statute specifies consequences for non-compliance. Express invalidation generally indicates mandatory intent, whereas silence may support a directory interpretation.

  • Fourth Factor – Presence or Absence of Prejudice

The fourth inquiry concerns prejudice. Where non-compliance causes no prejudice and the statutory purpose remains fulfilled, courts are more inclined to treat the requirement as directory.

  • Fifth Factor – Curability of the Defect

The fifth inquiry examines whether the defect can be cured without undermining the legislative objective. Curable defects are more likely to be procedural and therefore directory.

  • Sixth Factor – Public Interest Considerations

The sixth inquiry concerns broader public interests. Requirements designed to protect public revenue, prevent abuse or maintain regulatory oversight are more likely to be treated as mandatory.

  • Seventh Factor – Overall Legislative Scheme

The final inquiry requires examination of the statute as a whole. No provision can be interpreted in isolation. Its true nature emerges only when viewed within the broader legislative framework.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of tax jurisprudence demonstrates a gradual but unmistakable shift away from formalism and towards purposive interpretation. Modern courts increasingly recognise that not every statutory requirement serves the same function. Some provisions confer jurisdiction, some define entitlement, some regulate procedure and others confer discretion. Treating all such provisions identically would undermine legislative intent and distort the statutory scheme.

The distinction between mandatory and directory provisions, therefore, reflects a deeper principle. The law seeks strict compliance where Parliament intended strict compliance. It accepts substantial compliance where Parliament intended procedural facilitation. It requires reasoned decision-making where Parliament intended administrative flexibility. Ultimately, the inquiry is not whether parliament has employed the expression “shall “ or “may”, but whether the requirement under consideration lies at the heart of the statutory scheme or merely facilitates its effective administration. The answer to that question determines not only whether a provision is mandatory or directory, but also the legal consequences that follow its non-compliance. The recent judicial developments reaffirm that courts will continue to preserve this distinction by insisting upon strict compliance with jurisdictional and substantive conditions while applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to procedural requirements that do not defeat the legislative purpose.

Reading Climate Risk Like A Balance Sheet

Climate risk has evolved from an environmental issue into a core financial function, directly impacting balance sheets, asset valuations, and the cost of capital. It manifests as physical, transition, and liability risks that alter accounting estimates, including asset impairments and expected credit losses. Standardized frameworks like ISSB and India’s BRSR require rigorous disclosures, robust internal controls, and independent assurance over emissions data. Incorporating green bonds, climate due diligence, and carbon management into corporate strategy directly protects long-term enterprise value. Ultimately, finance leaders must look beyond historical numbers to price future climate risks into strategic capital allocation and investment decisions.

Climate risk no longer waits for the annual sustainability report. It shows up earlier- in impairments, provisions, credit ratings, insurance premiums, and the price a company pays for capital.

CLIMATE RISK HAS ENTERED THE FINANCE FUNCTION

Until recently, climate change was viewed largely as an environmental issue, while finance teams rarely considered it material unless the organisation belonged to a heavily polluting industry. That assumption no longer holds. Climate change, it turns out, reads a balance sheet just fine.

Around the world, climate-related events are reshaping financial statements, investment decisions, lending practices, and corporate strategy in ways that are no longer theoretical. A flood can impair manufacturing assets, a carbon tax can erode operating margins, and climate-conscious consumer behaviour can render once-profitable assets economically obsolete almost overnight.

For finance professionals, this represents a fundamental shift in the nature of the job. Climate considerations are steadily embedding themselves across every core finance function, from reporting and assurance to valuation, credit, and treasury. The real question isn’t whether climate change affects business, but whether finance professionals are equipped to measure its consequences well enough.

WHEN WEATHER BECOMES A BALANCE SHEET ITEM

The evidence isn’t waiting for anyone’s risk committee to catch up. The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2026 ranks extreme weather events among the world’s most severe long-term risks for the third year running. The California wildfires alone are estimated to have caused well over USD 250 billion in combined insured and uninsured losses, reshaping property valuations and insurance pricing.

Closer to home, the pattern is unmistakable with delayed monsoon and relentless heat. India’s peak power demand touched a record 270.82 gigawatts in May 2026. Independent estimates suggest that extreme heat alone could shave between 2.5 and 4.5 percent off India’s GDP by 2030 through lost labour hours in outdoor-intensive sectors. Investors, lenders, regulators, and boards are consequently demanding more robust assessments of climate-related risk. For finance professionals this means climate information is becoming unambiguously financially material.

THREE KINDS OF RISK, ONE FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Financially material through what channel, exactly? Climate risk breaks into three kinds, and each has begun to leave a distinct financial fingerprint on Indian businesses. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations now underpin the IFRS Sustainability Disclosure Standards, distinguishes two primary categories of climate risk — physical and transition. To these, prudential regulators such as the Bank of England add a third, liability risk, and this three-way split is what matters most to finance professionals.

Physical risks arise from the direct impacts of climate change, whether acute events such as floods and cyclones or chronic changes such as rising temperatures. India has experienced no shortage of either in recent years. These risks can also show up in less visible ways: a Climate Central analysis found that major Indian metros lost between 65 and 93 hours of sleep annually because of warmer nights.

Transition risks emerge as economies shift towards lower-carbon business models, as governments introduce carbon pricing, regulators strengthen disclosure requirements, and customers favour sustainable products. India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS), set to begin trading soon, illustrates transition risk in practical terms. Around 740 entities across major industrial sectors, together accounting for roughly 700 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, now carry legally binding emission-intensity targets for the compliance years 2025-26 and 2026-27. Entities that outperform their targets will earn tradeable Carbon Credit Certificates, while those that fall short must purchase and surrender an equivalent number, making carbon emissions an explicit, tradeable cost of doing business.

Climate Risk Reads your BS

Transition risk isn’t just a domestic story. From January 1, 2026, the European Union began fully enforcing its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), requiring EU importers of steel, aluminium, and cement to pay for the carbon embedded in each shipment, at €75.36 per tonne of CO2 equivalent for the first quarter of 2026 alone. India, lacking a domestic carbon price and reliant on older blast furnaces, is likely to bear close to double its fair share of total CBAM costs relative to its EU export volumes. For finance teams at exporting companies, this is now a live compliance cost: it needs audited embedded-emissions data, feeds directly into export pricing, and, left unaddressed, will surface within a few reporting cycles as a lost EU customer or a squeezed margin.

Liability risks, the third category, arise from the legal, regulatory, or reputational consequences of climate-related actions or omissions. Companies may face litigation over environmental damage, inadequate climate disclosures, or misleading sustainability claims, while financial institutions may face increased exposure from having financed assets that subsequently become stranded. These three risks converge in one place: the financial statements.

CLIMATE RISK AS AN ACCOUNTING ESTIMATE

There is no separate ‘climate accounting’ framework, and there doesn’t need to be. Climate risk simply alters the accounting estimates that already exist. Most accounting estimates rest on assumptions about future conditions, which climate change is now reshaping.

Consider property, plant and equipment. A manufacturing facility in a flood-prone region may continue to exist physically even as repeated climate-related disruptions reduce its expected economic benefit, while transition risk can render a carbon-intensive facility economically obsolete well before the end of its useful life. This naturally raises questions of impairment under Ind AS 36. The concept of a stranded asset captures this well: the asset need not be damaged at all, but loses value because regulation, technology, or markets make it commercially unattractive.

Financial institutions face a further consideration in the form of expected credit losses under Ind AS 109. If climate events cut repayment capacity or transition risk weakens profitability, default probabilities rise, and climate risk begins driving provisioning models directly. This is precisely why the RBI is pushing financial institutions to strengthen their climate risk management. It will require (though deferred) scheduled commercial banks and larger NBFCs to disclose governance, strategy, and risk management processes for climate-related risk. The RBI’s Financial Stability Report of June 2026 confirms banks and NBFCs remain well capitalised, though a subset could breach capital requirements under severe stress scenarios that increasingly include climate shocks. That is a signal that climate considerations now sit firmly inside mainstream prudential supervision.

In practice, a CA working out a bank’s provisioning would flag borrowers in flood-prone or carbon-heavy sectors and run them through the bank’s existing Ind AS 109 climate scenario, raising default probabilities or shifting a borrower into a riskier category, even without a missed payment, because climate risk has made their business meaningfully riskier than at origination.

The same thinking carries over to testing whether a company’s own assets have lost value, under a separate rule called Ind AS 36. For a carbon-intensive asset, projected future cash flows get revised downward to reflect falling demand or rising compliance costs, and the discount rate may also be nudged up to reflect the added risk. None of this requires learning a new accounting system. It simply means feeding a climate scenario into the same models CAs already run every reporting cycle.

SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING COMES OF AGE

Accounting estimates change the numbers inside the financial statements; what happens around those statements is shifting just as fast. Corporate reporting is undergoing one of its biggest transformations since the adoption of IFRS. Annual reports once focused on historical performance; investors now want a fuller picture of long-term value creation. This requires information about climate risk, governance, resource efficiency, resilience, and transition strategy. Globally, the International Sustainability Standards Board has established a common baseline for investor-focused sustainability disclosure through IFRS S1 and IFRS S2. Unlike earlier frameworks measuring societal impact, the ISSB approach focuses on how sustainability issues influence enterprise value and access to capital.

India has followed a similar trajectory. SEBI introduced the Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting (BRSR) framework for the top thousand listed entities by market capitalisation. BRSR Core has since strengthened the emphasis on assurance, extending to the full top thousand from FY 2026-27. For Chartered Accountants, this demands a deeper understanding of climate metrics, materiality assessment, internal controls over sustainability information, and the linkage between financial and non-financial reporting.

That data still needs an owner. Boards and audit committees increasingly ask who is accountable for sustainability figures, what controls govern their collection, and whether the same rigour applied to financial close applies here too. In practice this has meant extending internal controls over financial reporting to cover emissions data, energy consumption, and other metrics feeding into BRSR and ECL models.

This is not, however, a story confined to India’s largest listed companies. Most SMEs and unlisted businesses will meet climate risk long before any regulation directly requires them to report on it. For instance, this shows up when a large listed customer asks a supplier for Scope 3 data to complete its own disclosures, or a lender attaches a sustainability-linked covenant to a working capital facility. For CAs serving this segment, the work is less about disclosure frameworks and more about helping a client respond credibly to a customer or lender’s questionnaire.

MATERIALITY MAP: MAPPING WHAT MATTERS

Not every climate risk is worth reporting. Think of a simple two-axis plot: issues sorted by their likely financial impact on the business, and their significance to external stakeholders such as investors, lenders, and regulators. Issues that score high on both axes, such as carbon pricing exposure for a steel producer or physical flood risk for a coastal refinery, sit in the top right of the map and demand board-level attention and detailed disclosure. Issues that matter to stakeholders but carry limited financial consequence, such as biodiversity loss for a pure software business, can be monitored rather than actively managed.

This two-axis logic prevents organisations from spreading scarce management attention evenly across every conceivable climate issue and instead concentrates it on the handful that will actually move enterprise value or access to capital. For a diversified conglomerate spanning power, cement, ports, and financial services, the map looks entirely different business by business — a heatwave that barely registers for a ports business can be existential for a coal-fired power asset in the same group.

MEASURING EMISSIONS, THEN TRUSTING THE NUMBER

On the materiality map, one item shows up for almost every company: emissions. They come in three flavours worth telling apart. Every finance professional will increasingly need to read it fluently: the division of a company’s greenhouse gas footprint into Scope 1, Scope 2, and Scope 3 emissions under the GHG Protocol. This is the framework underpinning both BRSR Core and the CCTS.

Scope 1 covers direct emissions from sources a company owns or controls, such as the blast furnace at a Tata Steel plant or the kilns at an Ambuja cement facility. These are the emissions most directly within management’s control, which is why the CCTS sets its emission-intensity targets primarily against Scope 1 output.

Scope 2 covers indirect emissions from purchased electricity, steam, or heat. A textile unit in Tiruppur or an IT services data centre doesn’t burn coal itself, but the grid electricity it draws often comes from thermal power stations, so the emissions are attributed to the buyer rather than the generator. This is why so many Indian corporates such as Infosys are signing renewable power purchase agreements or investing in captive solar and wind capacity: doing so lowers Scope 2 emissions and, increasingly, the cost of capital attached to them.

Scope 3 is the widest and hardest category, covering all other indirect emissions across a value chain, upstream and downstream. For an automaker such as Tata Motors or Mahindra, Scope 3 includes emissions from steel and battery suppliers upstream and, more significantly, from millions of vehicles burning fuel on Indian roads downstream, a figure that can dwarf the company’s own factory emissions many times over. As Scope 3 sits largely outside a company’s direct control, it is the hardest to measure and the most contested in disclosure debates, yet for sectors like automobiles and oil and gas, it represents the largest share of climate-related financial risk.

For finance teams, this classification is a practical filter for materiality rather than an accounting curiosity. Scope 1 and 2 data feed directly into carbon compliance costs, lending covenants, and expected credit loss models, while Scope 3 data, though harder to verify, often reveals where the largest reputational and stranded-asset risks lie. BRSR Core already mandates Scope 1 and 2 disclosure for India’s largest listed companies, with Scope 3 moving from voluntary towards mandatory over coming reporting cycles. So building fluency in this classification is fast becoming as fundamental as reading a balance sheet.

Knowing the number is one thing. Trusting it is another. As sustainability disclosures become more important to investors and lenders, independent assurance becomes equally important to their credibility. This transition has already begun in India, with limited assurance over BRSR Core disclosures now applicable to the country’s largest listed companies. Yet the underlying challenge remains familiar to every Chartered Accountant: whether management’s assertions can be independently verified. The methodologies may evolve, but professional scepticism, evidence gathering, and documentation principles remain fundamentally the same, which means the assurance profession is expanding rather than being displaced by this shift. Once that data is assured, it stops sitting in a report and starts moving prices.

The real challenge here comes down to evidence. Financial statement audits rest on decades of well-established paper trails. Scope 3 emissions data doesn’t have that same track record; it’s pulled from suppliers and logistics partners, and sometimes estimated using industry averages. This means assurance providers, working under standards like SAE 3410 or the newer ISSA 5000, must be clear about what kind of check they’re doing: limited assurance, a lighter check based on inquiry and analytics, versus reasonable assurance, a much deeper check closer to a full financial audit. Most assurance on India’s BRSR Core disclosures today sits at the lighter, limited end, because the underlying data infrastructure isn’t mature enough yet.

Taking on this kind of work also brings its own risk: a CA who signs off on inflated sustainability claims or a misleading transition plan faces the same reputational and regulatory exposure as one who misses a financial misstatement. Increasingly, greenwashing allegations target the assurance provider too, making professional scepticism as much a liability question as a technical one.

PUTTING A PRICE ON CLIMATE RISK

While accounting standards determine how assets and liabilities are recognised, investors ask a sharper question: what will climate risk do to enterprise value over the life of an investment? Enterprise value rests on two variables, expected future cash flows and the discount rate applied to them, and climate risk moves both. Cash flows can shrink from higher costs or fading demand, while investors demand a higher return for climate-exposed businesses, pushing up the cost of capital and pulling enterprise value down.

Tata Power’s experience shows how precisely the market does this arithmetic. When its renewable energy arm raised ₹4,000 crore from a BlackRock-led consortium in 2022 at a valuation of around ₹34,000 crore, Tata Power’s own stock fell more than 7 percent in a single session, with analysts at the time attributing the fall largely to profit-booking after the announcement.

The same arithmetic runs in reverse for physical risk, and often faster. When Chennai flooded in December 2015, plants run by Ford, Renault-Nissan, Daimler, and Yamaha all shut down within days of each other, with Ford and Renault-Nissan alone losing roughly 3,000 vehicles between them, contributing to an industry-wide loss estimated at close to ₹1,000 crore. The flood itself lasted days; the disruption to order books, supplier payments, and insurance claims ran for weeks longer. That is the mechanism climate risk works through: a short-lived event cascades across operations, liquidity, and financing long after the water has receded.

BUYING A COMPANY, BUYING ITS CARBON

Mergers and acquisitions offer another illustration of how the finance professional’s role is expanding. Traditional due diligence has historically focused on financial statements, tax matters, legal disputes, and contractual obligations, but buyers now ask a further set of questions with equal seriousness: is the target exposed to significant flood or heat risk, will future carbon regulation raise its operating costs, how resilient is its supply chain, and how much capital will decarbonisation demand. Together, these questions form what’s now called climate due diligence which is understanding not just today’s profitability but whether it can be sustained.

Take the Adani Group’s 2022 acquisition of Holcim’s stake in Ambuja Cements and ACC. It was India’s largest M&A deal in infrastructure and materials, worth roughly USD 10.5 billion. Cement is one of the most carbon-intensive industries in the world. So buying a cement business means buying a long-dated carbon liability as decarbonising a kiln fleet takes decades, not years. Both Ambuja and ACC had already committed to net-zero by 2050 and the new owner didn’t walk that back. Instead, it went further, setting up independent board committees to oversee ESG performance. Ambuja then became the world’s first cement manufacturer to join the Alliance for Industry Decarbonization.

For a due diligence team, a target’s decarbonisation capex schedule and the credibility of its emission-reduction commitments are now as material to deal valuation as working capital or contingent tax liabilities. A mismatch between the public commitment and the capital earmarked to fund it will eventually surface as an impairment or a financing cost. Closing that gap takes capital and capital, these days, comes with strings attached.

THE NEW LANGUAGE OF CLIMATE CAPITAL

Those strings have created an entire new vocabulary of instruments, as markets have steadily learned to turn climate risk into tradeable debt. Green bonds require proceeds to be deployed exclusively for eligible environmental projects. India’s Sovereign Green Bond programme has mobilised over 44,000 crore rupees since its first tranche in January 2023. Sustainability-linked bonds take a different approach, tying the borrowing cost itself to measurable sustainability targets. Adani Electricity Mumbai’s USD 300 million issuance linked its coupon to a legally binding covenant of at least 60 percent renewable power in its procurement mix by the end of FY2027, with a step-up in the coupon rate if the target is missed.

A newer generation of instruments is emerging alongside these — transition bonds for hard-to-abate sectors like steel and cement, blue bonds for coastal and water projects, and catastrophe bonds that transfer physical risks such as cyclone losses to capital markets. For finance professionals, this expanding toolkit is becoming as relevant as conventional debt and equity structuring once was.

None of this financing happens on its own. The tax and customs system is also being adjusted to support it: Production Linked Incentive schemes worth tens of thousands of crores, a tax holiday under Section 80-IAC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and waived or reduced customs duty and GST concessions on clean-technology imports and renewable equipment. For a CA advising a manufacturing client, this relief is now just as material to the investment case as the financing itself.

HERO MOTOCORP’S GREEN TRANSITION

Hero MotoCorp built its entire business on internal combustion engines. That could have been an existential threat once transition risk arrived. Instead, the company turned it into an advantage. Consider the evidence. It hit zero-waste-to-landfill status across all its Indian facilities in 2024, a year ahead of its own 2025 target. It is the only Indian two-wheeler maker on the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index, two years running, with its score climbing from 69 to 75.
But the real story is the product. Hero’s electric brand VIDA nearly trebled its unit sales in FY 2025-26, to around 144,000 vehicles. Its share of India’s electric two-wheeler market climbed into double digits, reaching roughly 10 to 11 percent up from a low single-digit share two years earlier. Hero funded the entire shift from its own operating cash flow, not under regulatory pressure. Transition risk and transition opportunity are usually the same shift, seen at two different moments. Get there early, and it looks like opportunity. Get there late, and it looks like risk.

WHEN THE BUSINESS MODEL IS THE CLIMATE STRATEGY

Climate risk eventually asks a hard question to every business: whether its underlying business model can survive a lower-carbon, resource-constrained economy at all. A growing number of Indian companies are answering this by redesigning the model itself. Cement plants are now co-processing industrial and municipal waste as fuel, cutting emissions while solving a disposal problem for other industries. Large agribusiness companies are signing regenerative farming contracts to help smallholder farmers build more resilient crops and soil against erratic monsoons. The logic is simple: a company’s factories can be as efficient as they like, but if the farms feeding them fail, earnings suffer just the same. Protecting the farm is now as important as protecting the factory.

What unites these efforts is a shift in thinking. Sustainability is no longer a cost bolted onto an unchanged business. It is becoming the business model itself. So the real question for finance professionals isn’t just what a decarbonisation initiative costs. It’s whether the business, ten years out, still looks anything like the one being valued today.

FINANCE GETS A BIGGER JOB

That same tension between growth and transformation plays out at the scale of the entire economy. India’s climate journey is itself a paradox. It must keep expanding infrastructure, manufacturing, and energy access to power one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, while cutting the emissions intensity of its GDP by 45 percent from 2005 levels by 2030 and reaching net-zero by 2070. The draft Climate Finance Taxonomy, released by the Ministry of Finance, is one attempt to reconcile the two: it aims to clarify what genuinely counts as a climate-aligned investment, targeting around USD 250 billion a year in redirected finance while cutting down on greenwashing.

Perhaps the most significant opportunity of all lies beyond compliance altogether. Boards are increasingly asking whether climate risk should be built into capital budgeting, how to prioritise adaptation against mitigation investment, and which climate-related investments generate the greatest long-term shareholder value. These are strategic finance questions, and answering them well requires fluency in accounting, valuation, governance, and risk management all at once- precisely the combination Chartered Accountants have always been trusted to bring to the table.

Technology will automate many routine compliance processes, but interpreting climate scenarios and advising boards on capital allocation still requires human judgement. Forward-looking finance teams are already asking not what they must disclose, but what climate-related information would genuinely help them decide better, a shift that turns reporting from compliance into strategy. In practice, this means that they will design climate governance frameworks, conduct assurance engagements, advise on green financing, and help organisations tell genuine value creation apart from superficial sustainability claims.

CONCLUSION

Climate risk got filed under ‘environment’ for a long time. That’s not wrong, but it’s not the whole picture either. Turns out it should have been filed under ‘finance’ all along. At its core, it is about better financial decision-making in a world where the climate itself now moves economic outcomes.

The finance professional’s job hasn’t changed: measure value, protect stakeholders, enable good decisions. What has changed is the terrain. Tata Power’s stock didn’t move on a green narrative; it moved because investors were pricing real cash flows. Hero MotoCorp didn’t wait for a regulator to force its hand into electric vehicles; it moved early enough to fund the shift itself. Climate risk now sits inside asset valuations, lending decisions, insurance costs, supply chains, and corporate resilience. Whether newly qualified or thirty years into practice, every finance professional now needs to look past historical numbers and price in risks that haven’t happened yet.

The real opportunity here isn’t ticking a compliance box. It’s helping businesses allocate capital more intelligently and build something that still creates value in a warming world. Climate risk isn’t another line on the ESG checklist. It’s the next chapter in the story of finance itself. And as it has done before, the profession won’t just adapt to this change — it will help write it.

A Guide to Health and Wellness for CA Professionals

Corporate accounting and finance professionals often suffer from neck stiffness, shoulder aches, and fatigue due to prolonged sitting. To counter these preventable complaints, Dr Krupa Kadakia recommends four simple workplace habits:

  • Ergonomic Setup: Adjust your monitor, chair, and lumbar support to maintain proper posture.
  • Regular Movement: Alternate sitting with standing, take short walks, and break every 30–45 minutes.
  • Desk Exercises: Perform quick 2–3 minute workstation stretches, like thoracic extensions, to relieve stiffness
  • Sunlight Exposure: Get 15–20 minutes of daily sun exposure for vitamin D, immunity, and mood regulation.

These low-effort adjustments protect long-term vitality without disrupting your daily corporate workflow.

BACKGROUND

For most of the corporate accounting and financial professionals, the workday is spent almost entirely at a desk, reviewing spreadsheets, sitting through back-to-back calls and racing against deadlines. It is a routine which leaves no room to think about posture or movement, yet the human body was never designed for 8-10 hours of near total stillness. Human body is designed to move and exercise, the sedentary lifestyle nowadays contributes to most common workplace complaints of neck stiffness, aching shoulders, sore lower back and fatigue post afternoon.

Good news is, these aches and pains are preventable. They do not require a whole lot but some modifications around work to keep active. They require simple modifications around desk set up, stretches, a walk to the printer or kitchen. These are low effort strategies and easily doable at your workstation.

Following insights could be useful in preventing or helping aches, pain and or stiffness and improving health and wellness even being behind a desk.

The Desk Bound Professionals Survival

Insight 1: Ergonomic – foundation, not an afterthought Poor posture rarely announces itself with a single injury. It is usually the accumulation of things, hunched posture, screen height, etc. which then add up to chronic discomfort. This is why ergonomic set up requires attention. A proper ergonomic set up requires the following check list:

Monitor: top of the screen at or just below eye level and arm’s length away

Chair: feet flat on the floor, knees slightly lower than hips

Elbows: bent ~90 degree, close to body and wrist must be in neutral when typing

Lumbar support: a small cushion works to support your lower back

Screen distance: 20-30 inches away to reduce eye strain.

None of these adjustments is going to cost you much and they do not require special equipment’s. If something can be prevented why not make it a priority.

Insight 2: Movement beats Posture – Even a good posture held for too long can be a problem.

It can be tempting to think that ergonomics will fix everything. But the body is not built to hold any position – however correct for hours on end. Prolonged static position even if right can cause workplace related health risks. Movement is the KEY.

If you can get a standing desk, the goal is to not stand the whole day but alternate. Aiming for 30-60 minutes of sitting with 15-20 minutes of standing. Good use: when on calls, while reviewing documents, after eating snacks or lunch while doing some heel raises or mini squats.

Breaks matter as much as posture changes. Every 30-45 minutes either standing up or going on a loo break is the key. Every 2 hours, going for a walk – 3-5 minutes, example going to the kitchen to drink water, make coffee/tea/catching up with colleague. I would recommend a reminder system, either using stick pads on desktop to remind you to take a break for 3-5 minutes or reminder on your phone. These moments have dual function – helps in resetting the body and refresh your focus for next task.

Insight 3: Desk Exercises, helping “no time to exercise” into a non-issue.

Time is one of the barriers for professionals to keep active. Desk exercises solve this by requiring neither a gym nor change of clothes – just a few minutes at your workstation will do the magic.

There are some exercises that if incorporated in the day will help in avoiding muscle and joint pain.

  • Thoracic Extensions – helps in countering forward hunch while typing.

Sit in a chair and clasp both arms behind your head. Gently arch backward and look up toward the ceiling. Repeat 10 times. Could be done 2-3 times each day

Excersie 1

  •  Thoracic Rotations – helps in relieving stiffness through mid-back.

Sitting in the chair, arms across the chest and turning on either side. Repeat 10 times. Could be done 2-3 times/day

Excersie 2

  • Backward bend.

In standing, arms on hips, bending backwards, Repeat 6-8 times. Could be done 2-3 times/day.

Excersie 3

  •  Cervical retractions and shoulder rolling.

In sitting, thinking of forming a double chin, hold for 30 seconds*3 repetitions. Could be done 2-3 times/day

Excersie 4

  • Double leg calf raises.

In standing, 10/12 repetitions*2 sets. Once a day

Exercises 5

  • Sit to stand.

Sit to stand with hands across the chest/. 8-10 repetitions*2-3times/day

Exercises 6

None of these exercises need more then 2-3 minutes of your time in the day and can be done without leaving your desk. They will function as an ongoing physical therapy but with cheap insurance.

Insight 4: Don’t forget the sunlight

Amidst all the focus of posture and movement, one easy habit is always overlooked: SUN EXPOSURE. Getting roughly 15-20 minutes of sun exposure any time of the day supports vitamin D production, which plays an important role in bone health, immune function and mod regulation. Pairing this with any movement during the day is an easy way to fold sun exposure into a habit you are building.

Recommendations

Bringing the pieces together, a few habits will help to protect long term health without disrupting workflow:

  1. Audit the ergonomic set up once
  2. Build in reminder system
  3. Treat standing and walking as schedule, important as your work calls or meeting deadlines.
  4. 15-20 minutes of sunlight during the day

Section 5 Of Limitation Act: Condonation Of Delay Under GST

The debate centers on whether GST appellate authorities (FAA and GSTAT) can condone appeal delays beyond prescribed statutory limits. Grounded in precedents like Singh Enterprises and The Property Company, quasi-judicial tax bodies are statutory creatures, not “courts”. Consequently, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot extend appeal deadlines beyond statutory ceilings under Sections 107 and 112. Conversely, High Courts and the Supreme Court function as judicial courts where Section 5 applies. While Writ Courts under Article 226 retain constitutional power for exceptional cases (such as natural justice violations), they exercise strict self-restraint.

A debate is going on in the professional forums on whether the appellate authorities i.e., First Appellate Authority (FAA) or the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (“GSTAT”), being the creature of statute, have power to condone the delay beyond the condonable period prescribed in the statute. Section 107(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 (“Act”) requires a first appeal to be filed within three months of communication of the order. Section 107(4) of the Act permits the FAA to admit a belated appeal for ‘a further period of one month’ upon sufficient cause is shown. Section 112(1) of the Act requires an appeal to the GSTAT to be filed within three months of FAA order or Revisional Authority order. Section 112(6) of the Act permits GSTAT to admit a belated appeal (or cross-objection, subject to its own 45-day rule) within a further period of three months.

The FAA across India has rejected the appeals filed beyond the condonable period and the said orders are appealable before the GSTAT. Now, the taxpayers have filed the appeals before GSTAT for examining whether the GSTAT can condone the delay in filing the 1st appeal beyond the condonable period prescribed in the statute. Recently, the Principal Bench of GSTAT constituted a Special Bench to determine whether the First Appellate Authority has the authority to condone the delay beyond the statutory time limit.

This is not a new question. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has answered this question repeatedly since 2007 under the Central Excise, Customs and VAT laws, and, very recently, under the Companies Act as well. Yet every time a new fiscal statute comes along, the same question gets litigated afresh. This article explains the judicial precedents from the Central Excise, through VAT, into the Companies Act and applies it to below practical questions that every GST practitioner is facing today –

a. Whether the FAA and GSTAT can condone delays beyond what the statute permits;

b. Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act [“Act, 1963”] can rescue an appeal filed beyond the condonable period;

c. The position of the High Court and Supreme Court as GST appellate forums;

d. How far can a Writ Court condone the delay once the statutory door has closed?

With the above questions, let us understand the statutory framework under Section 5 and 29(2) of the Act, 1963 first. Section 5 of the Act, 1963 reads as follows –

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. – Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

From the above, we can identify that there are two important aspects. First, this power is given to a ‘court’ and not to every forum that decides disputes. Second, Section 5 of the Act, 1963 applies only to proceedings under general law (principally the Code of Civil Procedure). Its extension to a ‘special or local law’ such as a tax statute happens only through Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963, which reads as follows –

The GST Appeal Clock

“29(2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

Reading the two provisions together brings up the below two questions –

a. First, does Section 5 of the Act, 1963 apply to other than a court? (which is the point GST practitioners tend to overlook i.e., Section 5 applies only before a ‘court’)

b. Second, does the special law (Central Excise Act, VAT enactment, Companies Act or CGST Act), read as a whole, show an intention to keep Section 5 of the Act, 1963 out of its ambit?

A quasi-judicial authority or tribunal created by a tax statute is ordinarily not a ‘court’, so the gateway under Limitation Act will not be available unless the special law specifically gives the power to condone delay. It is this fundamental point which was recently and emphatically restated by the Apex Court in the company law context in case of The Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda1 (hereinafter referred as ‘Property Company’), which this article places at the Centre of the GST analysis, ahead of the more familiar ‘complete code’ debate.


1 Civil Appeal No.92 of 2026 (Arising out of S.L.P (Civil) No. 3906 of 2017)

Before proceeding further, let us understand the position under Central Excise, Service Tax, Customs and VAT context. In Singh Enterprises v. CCE, Jamshedpur2, the Apex Court examined the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which provides 60 days’ time limit to file an appeal with additional condonation period by a further 30 days. The Court held that the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, being creatures of statute, cannot condone the delay beyond the time limit prescribed in the statute. A specific 30 day upper cap shows a clear intent to exclude Section 5 of the Act, 1963. There was no law declared by Supreme Court that even though the Statute prescribed a particular period of limitation, this Court can direct condonation. That would render a specific provision providing for limitation rather otiose.


2 (2008) 221 ELT 163 (SC)

A year later, in Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd.3, a three-judge Bench went a step further. The provision in question is the unamended Section 35H of the Central Excise Act, 1944 governing reference applications to the High Court which prescribed 180 days with no condonable extension at all. The Court held that the Sections of the same Chapter i.e., Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G expressly grants a condonable extension but not in Section 35H and this silence itself is an indicator of exclusion and it binds even the High Court under Section 5 of the Act, 1963.


3 (2009) 236 ELT 417 (SC)

In VAT context, the Apex Court in case of Patel Brothers v. State of Assam4, examined Section 81 of the Assam VAT Act, 2003 which provides 60 days period for revision before the High Court, while Section 84 of the same Act made only Sections 4 and 12 of the Act, 1963 applicable to such proceedings. It was held that this selective adoption was itself a clear act of exclusion. If the Legislature wanted Section 5 to apply, it would have specified it exactly as it did elsewhere in the same Act (Sections 79 and 80, which gave the FAA and Tribunal forums an express further condonable period). The High Court, therefore, had no power to condone a 335-day delay.


4 (2017) 345 ELT 578 (SC)

Two years later, on almost identical facts under a sister enactment, the Apex Court reached the opposite result. In Superintending Engineer, Dehar Powerhouse Circle v. Excise & Taxation Officer5, it was held that Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 provides 90 days period for a revision and it was silent altogether regarding the Act, 1963. The Court distinguished Patel Brothers on precisely this ground and held that Section 5 stood attracted. Read together, the two cases show there is no standard rule that ‘tax statutes exclude Section 5’ or the reverse and each statute has to be read on its own text.


5 2019 (30) GSTL 193 (SC)]

Later, the Apex Court in case of Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd.6, while examining the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act has held that once the statutory appeal remedy has been foreclosed by limitation, a Writ Court should exercise self-restraint rather than routinely reviving it, doing so would make the limitation scheme meaningless.


6 2020 (36) G.S.T.L. 305 (S.C.)

Now, coming to Companies Act context, it is pertinent to examine the recent decision of the two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in case of ‘Property Company’, wherein it examined a similar question. Although the decision is in the context of Companies Act, it has laid down the principles which are equally applicable for every quasi-judicial GST forum, including GSTAT. In this case, the respondent sought registration of shares inherited under a will, more than two decades after probate, and approached the Company Law Board (“CLB”) under Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 with a delay of 249 days. The CLB condoned the delay, citing the respondent’s residence abroad and confusion during the transition from the 1956 Act and this decision was affirmed by the Calcutta High Court. Later, the Apex Court set aside both the orders and held that the CLB had no power to condone the delay, for two reasons as follows –

a. First, the Act, 1963 including Section 5 applies only to proceedings before ‘court’. A quasi-judicial body being a creature of statute does not automatically acquire that character. It must actually be shown to be a court.

b. Second, Section 433 of the Companies Act (which expressly gives the NCLT and NCLAT the power to apply the Act, 1963) cannot be read backwards to give the same power to the CLB, an earlier and different body, merely because both perform similar functions. The Court put it plainly –

“…the provisions of the Act, 1963…would only apply to suits, applications or appeals which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard… The absence of express exclusion, by itself, cannot be said to have conferred the CLB with the power to condone delay.”

This reframes the debate for GST. Most common question that is being asked based on Singh Enterprises is whether Section 107 (or 112) of the Act impliedly excluded Section 5 of the Act, 1963? The Property Company insists on a prior question i.e., is the Appellate Authority, or GSTAT, a ‘court’ at all, so that Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963 even opens the gate to Section 5 in the first place? On this footing, the ‘implied exclusion’ debate becomes almost academic and the power to condone delay has to be found within Sections 107 and 112 of the Act themselves, because neither provision has stated that Section 5 of the Act, 1963 is applicable.

Coming to GST context, many High Courts held that Sections 107 of the Act is complete code that impliedly exclude Section 5 of the Act, 1963 beyond these ceilings relying on Singh Enterprises and Hongo India. Few of the decisions under GST include Penuel Excus (P) Ltd v. Additional Commissioner (Appeals)7, Garg Enterprises v. State of U.P.8, Abhishek Trading Corp. v. State of U.P.9, Nandan Steels & Power Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh10 and Venkateswara Rao Kesanakurti v. State of A.P.11, wherein it was held that CGST Act a self-contained code excluding Section 5 of the Act, 1963.


7 2023 (75) GSTL 582 (Kerala)

8 2024 (15) Centax 510 (All)

9 2024 (16) Centax 179 (All)

10 2023 (6) Centax 301 (Chhattisgarh)

11 2024 (23) Centax 43 (AP)

Against this, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in S.K. Chakraborty & Sons v. UOI12 has held that since provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 1963 have not been expressly or impliedly excluded by Section 107 of the Act of 2017, by virtue of Section 29 (2) of the Act of 1963, Section 5 of the Act of 1963 stands attracted and the FAA can condone delay beyond the four-month ceiling on sufficient cause. This has been followed in later Calcutta decisions in case of Arvind Gupta v. Assistant Commissioner of Revenue13; Partha Pratim Dasgupta v. Joint Commissioner of State Tax and Ors14.


12 2024 (15) Centax 172 (Cal)

13 (2024) 14 Centax 295 (Cal.)

14 (2024) 19 Centax 357 (Cal)

However, the High Courts in case of Yadav Steels v. Commissioner15 and Addichem Speciality LLP v. Special Commissioner-I, Delhi GST16 refused to condone delay beyond 4 months, holding that Section 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot extend the maximum condonable period provided under Section 107 of the Act, relying on Singh Enterprises, Hongo India and Glaxo Smith Kline and distinguishing ‘S.K. Chakraborty’. Also, the decisions of Calcutta High Court do not survive The Property Company test as the Appellate Authority cannot be considered as a ‘court’ for the purposes of Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963.


15 2024 (19) CENTAX 435 (All)

16 (2025) 27 Centax 145 (Del.)

In view of the above analysis and discussion, the answers to the questions framed are as follows –

(a) Whether GSTAT and the F AA can condone delays beyond the condonable period?

No, the FAA and GSTAT are both creatures of statute and cannot condone the delay beyond the time limit prescribed under the statute.

(b) Whether Section 5 of the Act, 1963 can rescue a belated appeal?

No, considering the above-referred judicial decisions. Until the Supreme Court resolves the conflict directly in the GST context, practitioners outside West Bengal should proceed on the footing that Section 5 offers no rescue beyond the statutory ceilings.

(c) The position of the High Court and Supreme Court as GST appellate forums?

Yes, because of the ‘court’ distinction in The Property Company. Section 117 (appeal to the High Court on a substantial question of law from a GSTAT order) prescribes 180 days and Section 117(3), expressly applies the Code of Civil Procedure’s appellate provisions consequent to which Section 5 of the Act, 1963 will come into picture as the High Court is unquestionably a court. Section 118 (appeal to the Supreme Court) attracts the CPC similarly.

(d) How far can a Writ Court condone the delay once the statutory door has closed?

Two separate questions here. First, where GSTAT rejects an appeal as filed beyond the condonable period provided under Section 112(6) of the Act, a further appeal under Section 117 of the Act lies only on a ‘substantial question of law’. Whether GSTAT correctly applied its own statutory ceiling is ordinarily not such a question and it is settled law applied to undisputed facts, so the High Court would ordinarily decline to re-open it, except where GSTAT itself misapplied the ceiling (say, miscalculated the date of communication).

Second, and more commonly litigated, is where a taxpayer approaches the jurisdictional High Court directly under Article 226, seeking either to compel condonation or to have the underlying order quashed. This power comes not from Section 5 of the Act, 1963 at all, but from the extraordinary, equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 (and, over subordinate tribunals, Article 227), which exists independently of any taxing statute’s limitation scheme. But the Apex Court has repeatedly cautioned against treating independence as a license, the governing principle, most clearly stated in ‘Glaxo Smith Kline’, is self-restraint, a Writ Court should not routinely use Article 226 to overcome the statutory framework. However, the restraint is not absolute. Writ jurisdiction survives on narrower, jurisdictional or constitutional grounds that are not really Section 5 discretion in disguise –

a. Violation of Natural justice: Where the appeal was rejected solely on delay without providing effective opportunity of being heard to explain the reasons for delay.

b. Want of jurisdiction or a fundamental-rights violation: Where the original order is wholly without jurisdiction or offends Article 14/19/21, a time-barred appellate remedy does not oust writ jurisdiction over such an order, a position recognized even in Singh Enterprises.

c. Non-communication or defective communication: Where limitations never validly began to run because the order was not properly served. Here the writ jurisdiction holds that no delay occurred in law, rather than condoning one.

d. Gross, demonstrable hardship, exercised sparingly: The writ jurisdiction is not per se barred merely because a statutory remedy is time-barred, though it remains extraordinary and sparingly used.

The source of the Writ Court’s power is constitutional, not statutory, and its extent is deliberately narrow as explained above but not as a routine substitute for a missed statutory condonation window.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A two decade of near-identical litigation across Central Excise, Customs, VAT, Companies Act and now GST forums suggest the problem is structural, not merely a matter of interpretation. Decision of The Property Company, though decided far from GST, gives more clarity to the practitioners as against the ‘complete code’ test alone. However, the Parliament (or the GST Council) should consider whether the current law position serves any real purpose. Express provision clarifying exactly how far the Act, 1963 applies to the Appellate Authority, Revisional Authority and GSTAT would also help the taxpayers to be more vigilant. Also, a large share of the condonation litigation is due to disputes on dates of communication, therefore, the cross-verification by SMS and e-mail (as GSTAT’s own portal already partly does) for all communications, would resolve a good fraction of these disputes before they even reach a condonation application.

Recent Amendments In The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules

The recent Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules amendments introduce several key compliance updates:

  • Key Functionaries: Formally defined under Rule 2(ca), affecting administrative expense calculations (capped at 20%) and restricting foreign nationals. Intimations require Form FC-6E.
  • Purpose and Territory: Registration is restricted to specified Scheduled purposes and States using Form FC-6F; modifications require MHA approval.
  • Domestic Use: Foreign funds must be utilized strictly within India for stated objectives.
  • Minimum Activity: Associations must spend at least ₹10 lakh over two financial years.
  • Form FC-4 Disclosures: Mandates reporting social media accounts, ultimate DAF donors, project-wise expenses, publications, and auditor UDINs.

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules 2011 (“the Rules”) prescribed under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act 2010 (“the Act”) have been amended vide notification dated 22.6.20261. This article contains an analysis of the key amendments in the Rules and in Forms.


1 The text of the Rules is given in the link: https://fcraonline.gov.in/9f211570-9722-4cc3-b17f-8bd3dcf78f99

PART I : AMENDMENT IN THE RULES

1. Key functionary

1.1. Background

Hitherto, the term “key functionary” was not defined. It has now been defined under rule 2(ca) as follows:

“key functionary”, in relation to a person other than an individual, includes—

(i) the Director of a company;

(ii) a partner in a firm;

(iii) a trustee of a trust;

(iv) the Karta of a Hindu undivided family;

(v) an office bearer, member of the governing body, managing committee or other controlling authority of a society, trust, trade union or association of individuals; and

(vi) any other officer or person, by whatever name called, who has control over, or responsibility for the management or affairs of such person;

FCRA 2026

1.2. Observations

The definition can be divided into four limbs:

(i) A person who is key functionary within the ordinary meaning of the term (since the definition is inclusive);

(ii) Director of a Company, partner in a firm, trustee of a trust, Karta of an HUF;

(iii) An office bearer, member of the governing body, managing committee or other controlling authority of a society, trust, trade union or association of individuals;

(iv) Any other officer or person, by whatever name called, who has control over, or responsibility for the management or affairs of such trust.

Limb (ii) consists of individuals where there is no ambiguity. In other limbs, there could be ambiguity in whether a particular individual is a key functionary or not. The subsequent paragraphs 1.4 to 1.9 analyse these limbs (i), (iii) and (iv)

1.3. Ordinary meaning of “key functionary” (first limb)

The terms “key” and “functionary” have been defined in dictionaries as follows:

Key

  •  “Chief; major; important; fundamental; pivotal; a key person in the company; key industries.” [Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary]
  • “Very important and having a lot of influence on other people or things.” [http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/]

Functionary

  • “a person who functions in a specified capacity, esp., in government service; an official; civil servants, bureaucrats, and other functionaries.” [Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary]
  • “A person who has to perform official functions or duties; an official.” [http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/]

Thus, in its ordinary sense, a “key functionary” means a person occupying an important position and exercising significant functions in an organisation, [but excluding the persons mentioned in limbs (ii) to (iv)]. It would also include an individual designated as “chief functionary”.

1.4. An office bearer, etc. (third limb)

The term “office bearer” is not defined in the Act/Rules.

Office

  • The word `office’ is normally understood to mean “a position to which certain duties are attached, esp. a place of trust, authority or service under constituted authority”. [See Oxford Shorter English Dictionary, cited in P. V. Narasimha Rao v. State, AIR 1998 SC 2120. Also see Statesman (Private) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb, AIR 1968 SC 1495, Mahadeo v. Shantibhai, 1969 (2) SCR 422; Satrucharla Chandrasekhar v. Vyricherla Pradeep Kumar, (1992) 4 SCC 404]
  • An ‘office’ means a public or private employment with certain duties to be performed [Dewan Joynal Abedin v. Abdul Wazed, (1988) 2 SCR 370]

Bearer

  • One that bears; a person or thing that carries, upholds, sustains, or brings something [Merriam-Webster]
  • A person who bears or carries something [Britannica Dictionary]

On a combined reading, the expression “office bearer” means holder of a position with certain duties attached to the position. On its own, this term is quite wide, but having regard to the following context, its meaning should be restricted to persons occupying very important position.

The “office bearer”

(a) must be a “key functionary” and therefore, he must be a person occupying an important position and exercising significant functions, authority or responsibility in an organisation, and does not cover every holder of any position.

(b) should be read in the context of the second limb, that is, he is akin to director, partner, trustee or Karta. All these persons occupy very important positions and similarly, office bearer should also occupy a very important position.

(c) should be read in the context of the fourth limb, that is, it should cover a person control over, or responsibility for the entire or substantially the entire management or affairs of the person, and not every person holding a position.

(d) In limb (iii) it could be argued that the word “or” should be read between “bearer” and “member” and so read the individual should be an office bearer of the governing body, etc.

1.5. Any other officer or person who has control over, or responsibility for the management or affairs of such person (fourth limb)

There could be two views on the meaning of the expression “control over or responsibility for the management of affairs of such person”.

1.5.1. View 1

The person should have control over, or responsibility for the entire management or affairs or substantially the entire management or affairs of the person. The arguments in support of this view are as follows:

(a) On a plain reading, “management or affairs of a person” should mean management or affairs of the association; the words “control or responsibility for partial management or affairs” cannot be read into the definition.

(b) The word “key” indicates that the provision is intended to cover persons occupying positions of substantial importance in the management of the organisation. Every individual responsible for partial or limited function cannot be considered “key” person. For example, an employee who is responsible only for accounts is not a “key functionary” under limb (iv).

(c) Limbs (i) to (iii) cover persons who, occupy important positions in the governance or management of the entity. Limb (iv), although residuary and wider, should also be read so : it would therefore be inappropriate to treat every person having responsibility for any individual aspect of the organisation’s activities as a key functionary.

(d) ‘Key functionary’ has significant implications under the Act/Rules. To illustrate

  • his salaries, etc. are considered as admin expenses (Rule 5).
  • The application for registration is to be accompanied by his affidavit (Rule 9).
  • If he is a foreign national, the association is not considered eligible for registration [Explanation 1 to Rule 9(5)].

Now, the officer or person referred to in limb (iv) is not construed narrowly, although he may not be a very important official,

  • his salaries, etc. will be considered as admin expenses
  • the application for registration will have to be accompanied by his affidavit.
  • the association shall not be considered eligible for grant of registration.

Ordinarily, this could include a Chief Executive Officer or any other person, irrespective of the designation, who exercises control over or has responsibility for the management or affairs of the organisation.

1.5.2. View 2

The reference to “management of affairs” should ordinarily connote responsibility or control of a sufficiently significant nature, rather than responsibility for merely a limited aspect of the organisation’s activities. However, it should not be restricted to entire management or affairs or substantially the entire management or affairs, as proposed in View 1. Accordingly, in determining whether a person falls within limb (iv), the following factors may be relevant:

  • the nature and extent of the person’s powers;
  • whether the person can make or materially influence significant decisions;
  • the extent of the person’s authority over the organisation;
  • whether the person has control over its operations or affairs;
  • whether the person is responsible for the organisation as a whole or only for a limited function; and
  • the actual functions and responsibilities performed, rather than merely the designation of the person

1.5.3. Conclusion

The matter is not clear but View 1 appears to be better view.

Thus, the definition of “key functionary” is very subjective and ambiguous and may require factual analysis as to whether a person is a key functionary or not.

If any new person is identified as “key functionary”, the association was required to file intimation in Form FC-6E within 45 days of 22.6.2026, that is, on or before 6.8.2026. Therefore, it is advisable to expedite this analysis and, if required, the said Form should be immediately filed after passing appropriate resolution of the Board of Directors, etc.

1.6. Suggestion

Where there is any ambiguity as to whether an individual is a “key functionary”, an explanatory note may be included in the relevant resolution of the Board, etc. explaining why the person is or is not being treated as a key functionary. This would provide a contemporaneous record of the basis on which the organisation has determined its key functionaries show its bona fides in case of any allegation of default.

1.7. Impact on administrative expenses (rule 5)

1.7.1. Text (relevant portion)

The following shall constitute administrative expenses:

(i) salaries, wages, travel expenses or any remuneration realised by the key functionaries of the person;

(ii) all expenses towards hiring of personnel for management of the activities of the person and salaries, wages or any kind of remuneration paid, including cost of travel, to such personnel;

(iii) all expenses related to consumables like electricity and water charges, telephone charges, postal charges, repairs to premise(s) from where the organisation or Association is functioning, stationery and printing charges, transport and travel charges by the key functionaries and expenditure on office equipment;

1.7.2. Observations

  • It appears that the salary, etc. of the “new key functionary” may be considered as administrative expenses from 22.6.2026.
  • The total of administrative expenses defrayed out of foreign contribution cannot exceed 20% of such foreign contribution. Thus, any increase in number of key functionaries may increase the total of administrative expenses and hence some admin expenses may have to be defrayed out of funds other than foreign contribution to ensure that the limit of 20% is not breached.

2. REGISTRATION LIMITED TO SPECIFIED PURPOSES/STATES AND INTIMATION BY EXISTING CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS

2.1. Background

Hitherto, the certificate of registration specified the purpose, that is, one or more out of cultural, economic, educational, religious or social (“cultural, etc.”) as specified in section 11 of the Act. These terms were not defined and accordingly they were to be interpreted in normal parlance and perhaps, on the basis of the facts stated in the application for registration.

Further, the activities could extend to entire India.

2.2. Text [Rule 9(1A)]

The certificate of registration shall specify the purpose or purposes and the States or Union territories for which registration is granted.

(b) Every application for registration shall mention—

(i) the purpose or purposes for which registration is sought, chosen only from such list of purposes as specified in the Schedule appended to these rules; and

(ii) the States or Union territories in which the association proposes to undertake the activities.

(c) Every association registered before the commencement of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Rules, 2026 shall, within one year of such commencement, submit to the Central Government an intimation in Form FC-6F specifying the purpose or purposes and the States or Union territories for which it seeks to retain its registration.

2.3. Observations

2.3.1. The application now requires

  •  the purpose of the association to be restricted to one or more out of the list of purposes as specified in the Schedule appended to the Rules (“Scheduled purposes” or “sub-purposes”) and
  • the States or Union Territories in which the association proposes to undertake the activities (“the States”).

2.3.2. An association registered before 22.6.2026 has to submit to the Central Government on or before 21.6.2027, an intimation in Form FC-6F, specifying the list of Scheduled purposes and the States applicable to it.

The intimation may have to be preceded by a resolution of the Directors, etc.

On a plain reading, only an intimation is required; no approval from Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is necessary.

2.3.3. The sub-purposes have to be selected from the Scheduled purposes & they cannot go beyond the purposes mentioned in the registration certificate, that is, cultural, etc. For example, if the association has been granted registration for “educational” purpose, it must select the sub-purposes from “educational” category and cannot opt for sub-purposes from any other category.

2.3.4. The Act merely requires that the association should have a definite programme in the cultural, etc. field. However, there is no restriction in the Act as to the meanings of the words “cultural, etc.” Further, the Act is also silent on whether the Rules can curtail the sub-purposes to those specified in the Schedule. In the circumstances, it is a moot point as to whether the restriction to Scheduled purposes by the Rules is ultra vires the Act or not.

2.3.5. In Noel Harper v. UOI, WP (Civil) No. 566 of 2021, the Supreme Court had reproduced the illustrative list of permitted activities as mentioned in the Annual Report (2004-2005) prepared by the MHA. A comparison of the said list with the Scheduled purposes shows that there are many items in the list which are not mentioned in the Schedule. A significant omission is that while the old list had “any other activities related to the above” as a residual clause, the Schedule does not have this clause. It could be argued that in spite of this omission, the individual entry in the Schedule has to be read liberally and should include ancillary and incidental activities. The exact scope of such activities will, of course, be fact driven.

2.3.6. It appears that, where the beneficiaries of an activity are located in a particular State, the activity may be regarded as undertaken in that State, even if the association does not have an office or other establishment in that State. For example, if the association conducts online training for beneficiaries based in Bihar, the activity may be considered as undertaken in Bihar. The fact that the employees who are imparting such training are based in Karnataka, or that the association does not have an office in Bihar, does not alter this position.

2.3.7. However, a distinction may be drawn in the case of internal training of the association’s own staff. If such training is an internal administrative or capacity-building activity rather than an activity undertaken for the fulfilment of the association’s stated purposes, it may not constitute an activity in the State where the staff training is conducted.

2.3.8. Thus, the focus should be on where the association’s charitable activities are actually undertaken, rather than merely on the residential location of its employees.

3. CHANGING PURPOSE OR STATE

3.1. Text [Rule 17B]

Change of scope of registration.- (1) An association registered under the Act which intends to change its area of operation by including or deleting any purpose or any State or Union territory specified in its certificate of registration shall apply, in Form FC-6F, for such inclusion or deletion, along with—

(a) a resolution of the governing body approving such application;

(b) the prescribed fee.

(2) The fees payable for inclusion of additional purpose or State or Union territory under sub-rule (1) shall be in accordance with sub-rule (4) of rule 9 and the proviso thereof.

(3) The Central Government may, after such inquiry as it deems fit, approve or reject the application under sub-rule (1).

3.2. Observations

3.2.1. After the intimation referred to in para 2 above is filed, the purposes & States can be added/deleted by filing Form FC-6F. However, before filing the application a resolution has to be passed by the governing body approving the application.

3.2.2. Such addition will require MHA approval.

The filing of Form FC-6F will entail fees of ₹300 per additional State and ₹300 per additional sub-purpose [Rule 9(4)].

The MHA may make such inquiries as it deems fit including a field visit, and then approve or reject the application.

3.2.3. Deletion of purposes and States require the same process too.

3.2.4. No statutory timeline is provided for approval / rejection by MHA

4. ASSOCIATIONS WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS OTHER THAN PIO AS KEY FUNCTIONARIES BARRED FROM REGISTRATION

4.1. Background

Hitherto, an FAQ was published on MHA website as follows:

“Whether foreigners can be appointed as Executive Committee members of an association seeking registration or prior permission?

Organizations having foreign nationals, other than of Indian origin, as members of their executive committees or governing bodies are generally NOT permitted to receive foreign contribution. However, foreigners may be allowed to be associated with such associations in an ex-officio capacity, if they are representing multilateral bodies, foreign contribution from whom is exempted from the purview of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010, or in a purely honorary capacity depending upon the person’s stature in his/her field of activity. Relaxation may be considered on case to case basis by an authority higher than the competent authority, if any of the following grounds is met:

1) the foreigner is married to an Indian citizen;

2) the foreigner has been living and working in India for at least five years;

3) the foreigner has made available his/her specialized knowledge, especially in the medical and health related fields on a voluntary basis in India, in the past;

4) the foreigner is a part of the Board of Trustees/Executive Committee in term so the provisions in an inter-governmental agreement;

5) the foreigner is part of the Board of Trustees/Executive Committee, in an ex-officio capacity representing a multilateral body which is exempted from the definition of foreign source.”

However, there was no express provision in the Act/Rules to the effect that associations with foreign nationals other than PIO as key functionaries are barred from grant of registration/prior permission.

4.2. Text [Explanation 1 to Rule 9(5)]

It is hereby clarified that an association having foreign nationals, other than those of Indian origin, as its key functionaries shall ordinarily not be considered eligible for grant of registration or prior permission under the Act.

Provided that the Central Government may, by order, specify such cases or circumstances in which foreign nationals may be permitted to be key functionaries of an association for the purposes of consideration of registration or prior permission, and the conditions to be fulfilled for such consideration.

4.3. Observations

Thus, an association with foreign nationals as key functionaries (other than PIOs) will not be ordinarily granted registration.

For the purposes of the proviso, the Central Government will specify the exceptional cases or circumstances; this could be on the basis of those listed in the above cited FAQ.

5. FUNDS ONLY FOR INDIA ACTIVITIES AND STATED OBJECTS

5.1. Background

Hitherto, the Act/Rules did not provide that foreign contribution could be utilized only for activities in India. However, Form FC-4, had, and continues to have, a question on whether “the Association has utilized any foreign contribution outside India?” [Sr. No. 8(xv)]

5.2. Text [Explanation 2 to Rule 9]

For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the foreign contribution so received shall be utilised only for activities carried out in India in accordance with the association’s stated objectives and for the purposes for which such contribution has been received.

5.3. Observations

5.3.1. Thus, foreign contribution must be used only for activities carried out in India, and only for stated objectives and registered purpose(s) for which it was received: it cannot be diverted to another cause even within India.

5.3.2. It may be argued that an expenditure incurred outside India would not, by itself, result in a violation of the Explanation, provided that the expenditure is integrally connected with, and facilitates, an activity that is actually carried out in India. For example, a computer is purchased outside India is used exclusively in India for carrying out the association’s teaching activities in India, it may be argued that the foreign contribution has ultimately been utilized for an activity carried out in India.

This is likely to be a fact-specific determination. The nature and purpose of each expenditure incurred outside India and the nexus between such expenditure and the activity carried out in India would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

5.3.3. Further, even if an expenditure is regarded as utilised for activity carried out in India, such expenditure may have implications under the Income-tax Act 2025.

5.3.4. As mentioned above, FC-4 continues to have a question on whether “the Association has utilised any foreign contribution outside India?” – para 8(xv). This appears to suggest that even if the Association incurs expenditure outside India for activity in India, it will need to report here and may be subject to further scrutiny.

5.3.5. The expression “stated objectives” appears to refer to the objects of the association as set out in its constitutional document, such as its Memorandum of Association and which are mentioned in the registration / renewal application.

5.3.6. The expression “purposes for which such contribution has been received” appears to refer to the specific purpose for which the foreign contribution has been received, that is, mentioned by the donor, but limited to Scheduled purposes selected by the association. Thus,

  • even where an activity falls within the association’s stated objectives, the utilization of the foreign contribution should be consistent with the specific purpose for which the contribution was received.
  • a foreign contribution cannot be received for a purpose other than the Scheduled purposes selected by the association, even if the donor so wishes. In such circumstances, the association should make an application for change in purpose referred to in para 3 above before receiving the contribution.

6. MINIMUM-ACTIVITY TEST

6.1. Background

One of the conditions for grant of registration is that the person making the application has undertaken reasonable activity in its chosen field for the benefit of the society for which the foreign contribution is proposed to be utilized [section 12(4)(b)].

Further, the Central Government may cancel the certificate if the holder of the certificate has not engaged in any reasonable activity in its chosen field for the benefit of the society for two consecutive years [section 14(1)(e)].

What amounts to reasonable activity was not explained in the Act/Rules.

6.2. Text [Rule 14A]

Utilisation of foreign contribution for reasonable activity. – For the purposes of cancellation under section 14 and renewal under section 16, an association shall be deemed to have undertaken reasonable activity in its chosen field for the benefit of society if it has utilised foreign contribution of not less than ten lakh rupees in the last two financial years for such purpose.

6.3. Observations

6.3.1. While the matter is not clear, it appears that the amount of Rs.10 lakhs excludes administrative expenses incurred by the association (since the same may not be regarded as activity for the benefit of the society).

6.3.2. Activity

The association has to undertake “reasonable activity”. The word “activity” is judicially explained in other contexts as follows:

  • The word ‘activity’ is wider than the word ‘business’. It connotes a specified form of supervised action or field of action. Read in the context of the profit-earning activity of a co-operative society it means the corporate activity of the society, that is to say, the combination of operations undertaken by the co-operative society whether or not they amount to a business trade or profession in the ordinary sense. [Kottayam Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd v. CIT, (1988) 172 ITR 443 (Ker)2]
  • …Normally, an activity would include an act done, a work done, a deed done, an operation carried out, execution of an act, provision of a facility etc. Where applicant receives the violation charges from contractors there is no activity done by both the parties. [Dholera Industrial City Development Project Ltd., In re, (2019) 108 taxmann.com 510 (AAR-GUJ)]
  • Webster’s New International Dictionary defines the word “activity” as “natural or normal function or operation;…” Another significant dictionary definition is: “ The state of action, doing; an exercise of energy or force; an active movement or operation; a physical or gymnastic exercise, an agile performance.

2  For the purpose of section 80P(2)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The word “activity or activities” of course as applied to various things has various meanings but the ordinary accepted meaning of the term when applied to any particular thing is that it covers everything that the individual or the corporation does.

[Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp v. Carson, 192 Tenn. 150 (1951)]

6.3.3. On a literal reading, this test is applicable for any renewal after 22.6.2026. Thus, it could apply retroactively for financial year 2024-25 and financial year 2025-26 . However, the matter is not clear.

Part II: Amendment in Forms

7. RENEWAL (FC-3C): 3-YEAR ACTIVITY HISTORY

For the renewal of registration, a year-wise detailed activity report of last three financial years is required to be attached [Note (c) at the end of the Form FC-3C].

The report should

(a) be detailed

(b) be year wise

(c) cover last three financial years

(d) cover all activities (except, perhaps, insignificant activities)

8. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FC-4 (ANNUAL RETURN)

8.1. Website + social-media disclosure

8.1.1. The annual return in Form FC-4 now requires disclosure of the following:

(a) official website of the association

(b) social-media accounts of the association.

[Sr. No. 1(c)]

8.1.2. Observations

(a) What is required is disclosure of “social media accounts” and not “social media posts.”

(b) The FC-4 provision refers to “Social Media Accounts of the Association” and not of its key functionaries (except where they are officially designated, named, or run primarily as the media voice of the association). This is different from the publication disclosure, where the Form FC-4 expressly refers to material published by the association or its key functionaries (see para 8.6).

(c) Any social media account of the association must be disclosed, even if the posting frequency is low or the account is dormant.

(d) The association will have to separately maintain records of any posts by the association, even if they are deleted from the account.

(e) Meaning of social media

The Rules do not define “social media” or specify an exhaustive list of platforms. Therefore, the expression should be understood in its ordinary and reasonably broad sense.

Online dictionaries define “social media” as follows:

forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos) [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social media]

websites and computer programs that allow people to communicate and share information, opinions, pictures, videos, etc. on the internet, especially social networking websites:

forms of media that allow people to communicate and share information using the internet or mobile phones:

[https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/social-media]

(f) The following could be considered as social media:

  • Facebook
  • Instagram
  • X (Twitter)
  • LinkedIn
  • YouTube Channel
  • WhatsApp Channel/Telegram Channel/Signal (if used as public communication channel)
  • Facebook/Instagram groups (if maintained/controlled by the association)

However, WhatsApp group for internal staff is not necessarily social media.

8.2. Ultimate-donor for Donor Advised Fund (DAF) / intermediary routes

8.2.1. Form FC-4 now requires the following details:

Details of ultimate donors in case of Donor Advised Funds/Other intermediary remittance vehicles

Sl. Name of intermediary Nature of intermediary Donor Advised Funds/Other intermediary remittance vehicles) Name of ultimate donor Address of ultimate donor Email address of ultimate donor Amount Rs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

[Sr. No. 2(ii)(aa)]

8.2.2. Meaning of DAF

The meaning of “DAF”, has been given by various AI platforms. Based on this, a DAF may be broadly summarised as follows:

(a) A DAF is a charitable giving arrangement under which a donor makes a contribution to a sponsoring charitable organisation (the “donee”).

(b) The donee holds and administers the contributed assets in a separate fund or account associated with the donor.

(c) The donor generally retains the right to recommend how and when amounts held in the fund should be distributed to eligible charitable organisations. However, the donor does not retain legal ownership of, or ultimate legal control over, the assets contributed to the fund.

(d) Irrevocable Contribution

Once a donor makes contribution to a donee, the contribution becomes the property of the donee. The donor ordinarily has no right to reclaim or withdraw the contribution.

(e) Donor’s Advisory Rights

The donor may generally recommend:

(i) the charitable organisations to which grants should be made;

(ii) the amount of each grant; and

(iii) in certain cases, the timing or purpose of the grant.

The donor may make recommendations but does not have legal control over the grants. The donee retains ultimate discretion to approve or reject the donor’s recommendations.

(f) Investment of Corpus

Until grants are made, the assets held in the DAF may be invested. Any investment income and appreciation generally remain within the fund and may subsequently be applied towards charitable grants to the donee.

(g) Illustration

Suppose “A” contributes ₹1 crore to a charitable institution (donee).

  • The ₹1 crore becomes the property of the donee.
  • “A” may recommend that ₹20 lakh be granted to Charity X, ₹30 lakh to Charity Y and ₹10 lakh to Charity Z.
  • The donee considers and approves those recommendations.
  • The remaining ₹40 lakh may continue to be invested by the donee and may be used for future charitable grants.
  • “A” cannot withdraw ₹1 crore.

In the above illustration, ‘A’ is a DAF

(h)      A DAF is distinct from a charitable trust.

Feature DAF Charitable Trust
Legal ownership Assets belong to the donee Assets belong to the trust
Advisory rights Donor may recommend grants, but the donee has the final say Trustees exercise powers in accordance with the trust deed and applicable law
Legal control Donee retains ultimate legal control Trustees generally exercise fiduciary control over the trust property
Establishment and management Generally simpler to establish and administer Requires creation and administration of a separate trust
Administrative burden Relatively low for DAF, as the donee generally undertakes the administration and compliance Relatively higher, as the trust has its own administrative and compliance requirements
Costs Generally lower Generally higher

(i) The expression “Donor-Advised Fund” is principally associated with the U.S. charitable and tax system.

(j) Relevance for FCRA and Form FC-4

For the purposes of disclosure in Form FC-4, there are two views

View 1

A contribution may be regarded as having been received from a DAF where the donor is treated as a DAF for the donor country purposes. Hence, even if the donation to the Indian association does not satisfy the features of a donation from DAF as mentioned in para 8.2.2, it will be automatically regarded as a
donation by a DAF if the status of the donor is a DAF.

Under this view, the DAF will have to furnish to the donee the details of ultimate donors even if the donation from the DAF does not have the features corresponding to those received by it from those ultimate donors.

View 2

A contribution may be regarded as having been received from a DAF only where, based on the relevant facts and documentation, the contribution is treated as a DAF contribution for the donor country purposes. Under this view, whether a particular contribution constitutes a donation from a DAF is fact-specific and should be determined on the basis of the legal and contractual arrangements governing the contribution, the nature of the donor’s rights, and the terms and conditions attached to the donation, etc. Accordingly, each contribution should be examined on its own facts and documentation.

Conclusion

View 2 appears to be a better view.

(k) Disclosure in Form FC-4

Where there is any doubt regarding the appropriate classification, it would be prudent to make an appropriate disclosure in Form FC-4, explaining the reasons for exclusion of a particular donation.

8.3. Detailed activity report

A detailed activity report every year is required to be attached [Sr. No. 3(a)(i)]

The activity report has to be “detailed”. Further, the format of Sr. No. 3(a) appears to suggest that the report has to be project-wise, location-wise, amount-wise.

8.4.     Project wise details

8.4.1. Background

Hitherto, the details of individual project/activity were not required.

8.4.2. Text

The following details are now required:

Sl. Name of project/activity Address/location Amount utilized on
Project/activity Fresh assets Admin. Exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

[Sr. No. 3(a)]

8.4.3. Observations

(a) The details are required for each and every project as well as activity. For meaning of activity, please see para 6.3.2 in Part I of this article.

(b) The association will now have to maintain project/activity wise details of amounts utilised on fixed assets/admin expense. It must make sure that the project-wise admin figures add up exactly to the master figure in FC-4.

(c) The details are required only to the extent foreign contribution has been utilised for the said purposes.

8.5.1. On the basis of cumulative requirements the foreign contribution transactions (receipt and payment) require the following details:

  • donor/grant — ultimate donor for DAF/intermediary inflows;
  • State where money is spent;
  • project/activity mapped to a registered purpose;
  • expense head — programme, fresh assets, or admin and
  • expense head — programme, fresh assets, or admin and

8.5.2. The association may consider preparing and filing a reconciliation between FC-4 and Form 112 under the Income-tax Rules 2026, in consultation with the tax auditor.

8.6. Details of publications

8.6.1. The requirement in Form FC-4 is as follows:

“8A Details of publications brought out by the association;

(i) Whether the association or its key functionaries has brought out any publication during the year: Yes/No

(ii) If yes, details of the publications:

Date of publication Nature of mass communication (Book, magazine, newspaper article, etc.) Title Published in/on (Name of newspaper/website where it is hosted etc.) Brief description of the article
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Note: As per section 3(1)(g), the association shall not engage in production or broadcast of any news or current affairs related matters through any mode of mass communication.

Thus, in essence, details of all publications brought out by the associations or its key functionaries are required to be disclosed.

8.6.2. The form does not ask for details of every communication made by the association or its key functionaries. It specifically asks for details of “publications” and, in describing the nature of mass communication, gives examples such as a book, magazine and newspaper article. It further requires the title of the publication and a brief description of the article. Hence, it could be argued that unless a publication is in the form of a book, magazine or newspaper, article, etc. it need not be covered in Form FC-4. To illustrate, a mere interview of a key functionary may not be regarded as a publication required to be disclosed in this table.

8.6.3. The publication should be brought out by the association or its key functionary. It appears that a book, magazine or newspaper published by a third party may still be regarded as brought out by the association, if it is authored by the association/key functionary.

The terms “publication”, “mass communication”, “published” and “article” have been defined in dictionaries as follows:

8.6.4. Publication

  • “publication” is, inter alia, “a published work”. [The Merriam-Webster Dictionary]
  • “publication” is a book, magazine, newspaper or document in which information or stories are published. [The Cambridge Dictionary]

Thus, in its ordinary sense, a publication generally connotes some identifiable work or material which is published. It does not necessarily extend to every communication made available to the public. The term is therefore wider than a printed book or newspaper, particularly in the digital age. A publication may, depending upon its nature, be made available electronically or on the internet. For example, if a key functionary writes a detailed article on a particular subject and gets it published in an online journal. The fact that it is hosted electronically would not prevent it from being regarded as a publication. At the same time, the mere fact that a communication is publicly accessible through social media or can potentially reach a large number of persons should not, by itself, make it a “publication” for purposes of item 8A.

8.6.5. Mass communication

  • Mass communication is communication directed to or reaching the mass of the people. [The Merriam-Webster Dictionary]
  • Mass communication is something such as television or the internet through which a message, story, etc., can be communicated to a large number of people at the same time. [Cambridge Dictionary]

Thus, “mass communication” is generally understood to mean communication directed to, or capable of reaching, a large number of people. However, the contents of the communication may not constitute a publication. This distinction is important. Social-media platforms are undoubtedly capable of mass communication. However, it does not follow that every post, photograph, video, announcement or other communication placed on a social-media platform is necessarily a “publication” required to be reported under item 8A.

8.6.6. Publish

  • Produced or released for distribution in a book, magazine, newspaper, etc. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/publish]
  • to make information available to people, especially in a book, magazine, or newspaper, or to produce and sell a book, magazine, or newspaper; [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/]

8.6.7. Article

  • a nonfictional prose composition usually forming an independent part of a publication (such as a magazine) wrote an article for the newspaper [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/]
  • a piece of writing on a particular subject in a newspaper or magazine, or on the internet: [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/]
  • a piece of writing included with others in a newspaper, magazine, or other print or online publication. “an article about middle-aged executives” [https://www.google.com/]

Thus, an “article” ordinarily refers to a piece of writing dealing with a particular subject and forming an independent part of a publication. It is generally more substantial and structured than an ordinary communication or announcement.

8.6.8. Social-media posts

The terminology ordinarily used by the principal social-media platforms also supports the distinction between a general social-media communication and an article. For example:

Platform Ordinary terminology
X (formerly Twitter) Post (formerly commonly called a Tweet)
Instagram Post; Reel; Story
LinkedIn Post; Article; Newsletter

Therefore, an ordinary post on X, Instagram or LinkedIn is not ordinarily described as an “article” merely because it is publicly accessible. For example, the following would not ordinarily be regarded as publications/articles:

  • a photograph of an event;
  • an announcement regarding an event;
  • a congratulatory message;
  • a short brief update regarding the activities of the association;’
  • an Instagram Story;
  • an Instagram Reel;
  • a short X/LinkedIn post;
  • a link or notice shared on social media.

Accordingly, the medium of publication is not determinative. The nature and substance of the material are more relevant.

8.6.9. Further, section 3(1)(g) reads as follows:

association or company engaged in the production or broadcast of audio news or audio visual news or current affairs programmes through any electronic mode, or any other electronic form as defined in clause (r) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000) or any other mode of mass communication;

It is also referred to in Note to Item 8A. This, gives an impression that the publication should be relating to audio news, or audio visual news or current affairs programmes.

8.6.10. Conclusion

For practical purposes, an association may therefore adopt the following approach:

Ordinary social-media communications such as routine posts, photographs, event announcements, short updates, reels and stories may ordinarily not be treated as publications/articles for purposes of item 8A. Substantive articles, reports or other identifiable published works disseminated through a website or social-media platform should, however, be examined separately and may require disclosure.

In case of ambiguity, appropriate disclosure may be made in Form FC-4.

8.7. UDIN of the auditor’s certificate

Unique Document Identification Number (UDIN) is 18-Digits system generated unique number for every document certified/attested by a full time practicing chartered accountants (CA). Now, it is mandated as per format of FC-4 that UDIN of both the auditor’s certificate and FC-specific financial statements is specified.

9. Summary

Significant changes have thus been made in the Rules. While the authors have taken the liberty to express their views, it will be prudent for the association to periodically check the MHA portal and ascertain whether the authors’ views are in conformity with the views if any expressed by MHA. In an appropriate case the association may have to alter its position.

From The President

JUDGEMENT IN A CHANGING PROFESSION

October is one of those months when the intensity of professional life becomes particularly visible. tax compliances, audit planning, quarterly closures, client expectations and regulatory developments converge, leaving little room for error or superficial judgement.

World Mental Health Day on 10 October is also relevant to the CA profession. In a profession where deadlines, client expectations and long working hours are part of everyday practice, mental well-being is closely linked to professional judgement and quality of work. Firms that encourage realistic workloads, effective delegation and adequate review time are not merely supporting employee well-being; they are strengthening professional quality.

READING BETWEEN THE TAX NUMBERS

The latest tax numbers provide the backdrop. As of September 17, 2026, net direct-tax collections stood at ₹12.1 lakh crore, up 13% year-on-year. Advance-tax collections rose 16.18% to ₹5.22 lakh crore, while corporate advance tax increased 18.09% to ₹4.16 lakh crore. Securities Transaction Tax collections rose sharply by 52.9% to ₹42,000 crore.

These are more than collection statistics; they reflect the continuing formalisation and digitisation of India’s economy, stronger compliance and growing economic activity.

For Chartered Accountants, the important question is what these numbers tell us about our changing profession.

Beyond the Numbers

FROM COMPLIANCE TO INTERPRETATION

A growing tax base and sophisticated information systems are changing expectations from professionals.

The CA’s value can no longer be defined merely by preparing financial statements, calculating tax or completing compliance requirements. Increasingly, stakeholders expect us to interpret information, identify risks, challenge assumptions and provide judgement.

The 18.09% growth in corporate advance tax invites deeper questions: what is driving corporate profitability, are earnings sustainable, do cash flows support reported performance, and what risks could emerge in the coming quarters?

The sharp increase in STT reflects the scale and dynamism of India’s capital markets, creating opportunities while demanding stronger understanding of transactions, taxation, governance and risk.

CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUDIT

The debate around the Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill brings the question of professional judgement into sharper focus. The proposed exemption from mandatory audit for prescribed classes of private companies raises an important issue: how do we balance ease of doing business with corporate accountability?

There is a legitimate case for proportionality, as companies differ in size, ownership and stakeholder significance. But the discussion should not be reduced to whether an audit is “necessary” or “unnecessary”. The relevant question is what purpose independent assurance serves, and where it creates value.

The profession should engage with regulatory reform, supporting proportionate regulation while articulating where independent assurance contributes to transparency and accountability. Our credibility will depend on showing that our position rests on evidence and public interest, not self-interest.

DIALOGUE WITH REGULATORS MATTERS

BCAS continues to strengthen its institutional engagement with regulators. During the month, along with CA Chirag Doshi, Chairman of the 4i Committee, and CA Himanshu Kishnadwala, Past President, BCAS, I met senior officials of the Serious Fraud Investigation Office, including Mr Love Kumar, Additional Director, and Ms Sawni Dikshit, Joint Director, and also met Mr Nitin Gupta, Chairperson, National Financial Reporting Authority.

Such interactions matter because the relationship between the profession and regulators should extend beyond compliance and inspection. Constructive dialogue helps regulators understand the practical consequences of regulatory requirements while enabling the profession to appreciate their objectives. Good regulation should not merely impose obligations; it should also create clarity, consistency and accountability.

DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND FINANCIAL INTEGRITY

The growing sophistication of money laundering, financial fraud and cross-border financial crime makes financial transparency important. The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, with its focus on illicit financial flows and terrorist financing, highlights the need for stronger cross-border information sharing. For Chartered Accountants, this reinforces the importance of AML and KYC discipline, transaction scrutiny and the integrity of financial information.

The Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 2026, replacing an 1891-era law, reflects the shift of financial records to electronic, digital and cloud-based environments. For Chartered Accountants, this is more than a legal development; it reinforces an important professional principle, that financial information must be traceable, reliable and capable of standing up to scrutiny. As records move across cloud platforms and automated systems, documentation, access controls and audit trails become integral to professional work.

Tomorrow’s professional must understand not only what a number says but also where it came from, how it was generated and whether it can be trusted.

AI: MORE EFFICIENCY, GREATER RESPONSIBILITY

Artificial intelligence is changing how professional work is performed, assisting with research, reconciliations, document review and data analysis. But an AI-generated output is not audit evidence merely because it appears plausible.

Professionals must understand the source data, limitations of the tool, parameters applied and procedures required to validate the output, and firms will need clear protocols covering confidentiality, documentation and accountability.

As routine procedures become automated, professional scepticism becomes more important, not less. The future CA may perform fewer repetitive procedures but will be expected to exercise greater judgement over the reliability of automated outputs.

THE PROFESSION AHEAD

I believe the profession must focus on three priorities.

First, protect the quality of professional judgement. Workload pressures must not compromise review, delegation or professional scepticism. Firms need an environment where professionals have time to think, not merely to finish.

Second, adopt technology without outsourcing accountability. AI and automation should make professional work smarter and deeper, never a substitute for responsibility.

Third, engage with regulatory reform, supporting simplification where it improves the business environment while articulating, with evidence, where assurance and accountability remain essential.

India’s tax numbers demonstrate the scale of economic formalisation, digital regulation is reshaping financial information, and AI is changing professional work. Yet one principle remains constant: the value of a Chartered Accountant does not lie in producing an answer; it lies in standing behind that answer.

Our challenge is not to handle more data, technology or regulation, but to ensure that, amid this change, we continue to bring what no system can fully automate: independent judgement, professional scepticism and the courage to ask the right question.

That is where the future value of our profession will be built.

CA. Kinjal Shah

President, BCAS

What Is A CA Firm Really Worth?

As Indian businesses expand globally, regulatory complexity increases and clients increasingly seek integrated, technology-enabled and multidisciplinary professional services, the traditional model of the small, partner-centric practice is being challenged. There is consequently a growing conversation and market need for mergers, consolidation and the creation of firms of scale, width and depth. The aspiration is not merely to create larger CA firms in terms of headcount or fee income. It is to build Indian professional institutions with the depth, geographical reach, specialist capabilities and institutional resilience to serve businesses of increasing size and complexity.

But mergers require something that the profession has historically not needed to discuss with the same intensity: valuation. A Chartered Accountant may spend decades building a practice. Clients are acquired, relationships deepen, people are trained, systems are established and a reputation is painstakingly built. Yet when the time comes to admit a new partner, merge with another firm, induct the next generation or plan succession, one deceptively simple question arises:

Beyond the Partner

WHAT IS THE FIRM ACTUALLY WORTH?

The question is more difficult than it appears.

In a conventional business, valuation can draw upon tangible assets, profits, cash flows, intellectual property and market comparables. A professional services firm is different. Much of what makes it valuable does not appear on its balance sheet. The office may be worth relatively little. Computers and furniture are hardly significant. Even the firm’s accumulated knowledge cannot simply be transferred to a buyer.

What is being valued, therefore, is largely the capacity to generate future professional income.

And that capacity has several components: client relationships, recurring assignments, brand and reputation, referral networks, systems and processes, quality of personnel, specialised expertise and, perhaps most importantly, the confidence that clients will continue to choose the firm even when the partner who originally brought them in is no longer there.

In 2025, Baker Tilly and Moss Adams agreed to merge in a transaction valued at approximately US$7 billion, creating the sixth-largest accounting firm in the United States1. Considering that the two firms together had around US$3 billion of revenue in 2024, it is evident that investors are not simply buying today’s fee income; value is also attached to recurring revenue, client relationships, people, capabilities, technology, brand and the potential to create additional value through scale.


1 http://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/baker-tilly-moss-adams-set-merge-7-billion-deal-wsj-reports-2025-04-21/

But the uncertain future presents a central paradox of professional-firm valuation: the asset that generates the revenue may be inseparable from the individual who generates it.

Therefore, the quest towards valuation should not begin by asking “What multiple of fees should my firm command?” but by asking “How much of my firm’s future earning capacity would survive if I were no longer there?”

That question brings valuation closer to the economic reality of professional services. A practical valuation can examine three questions:

First, what are the maintainable earnings? Historical profits need to be normalised for exceptional items, partner remuneration and one-off assignments. The objective is to establish the earnings that a successor could reasonably expect to maintain.

Second, how transferable is that income? Recurring statutory audits, tax retainers and established institutional assignments may have greater continuity than one-off advisory mandates. Revenue can be classified as institutionally owned, partner-dependent, repeatable or highly personal. The more revenue survives a change in personnel, the stronger the case for attributing value to the firm.

Third, what risks attach to those earnings? Client concentration, dependence on a few partners or referral sources, staff attrition, succession gaps, regulatory constraints and professional liabilities should influence the valuation.

A simplified framework could therefore be expressed as:

Enterprise Value = Maintainable Earnings × Appropriate Multiple ± Specific Adjustments

The multiple should not simply be borrowed from another firm’s transaction. It should reflect growth, recurring revenue, client retention, institutionalisation, profitability, succession depth and risk.

Maintainable earnings is a variable of the extent of institutionalisation. Documentation, technology, delegation, second-line leadership, client diversification, knowledge management and institutional branding may sometimes appear to be overheads. In reality, they are investments in the firm’s transferable economic value.

The ultimate test of scale is therefore not how many partners a firm has or how many crores it bills. It is whether the institution has acquired an economic life of its own and whether that value can outlast its individual partners.

Scale may create the opportunity. But institutionalisation is what creates value.

CA. Sunil Gabhawalla

Editor

कोSर्थवान् को दरिद्र: ! (Who Is Rich And Who Is Poor?)

This is a great message to the mankind, taken from Bartruhari’s Vairagya Shatak. Interestingly, Bhartruhari, was originally a King of Ujjain. He is believed to have lived in 5th century. He renounced everything to become a Sanyasi. His wife’s name was Pingala.

It is also believed that he is the same person who is known as Bartarinath in the Nath Pantha (Nath Sect).

He wrote three collections of verses (shlokas) viz Neeti Shatak (ethical conduct), Shringar Shatak (pertaining to romance) and Vairagya Shatak (relating to Renunciation).  All the three give great messages of wisdom and are worth studying.

The Paradox of Wealth

The text of the present shloka is: –

वयमिह परितुष्टा वल्कलैस्त्वम् दुकूलै –  We are happy in our simple clothes. You are Happy in your rich attire.

सम इव परितोषो निर्विशेषो विशेष 😐 – But the degree of our happiness is the same. There is no difference.

स तु भवतु दरिद्रो यस्य तृष्णा विशाला –  He is truly a poor person whose greed or thirst is not satiated

मनसि च परितुष्टे कोSर्थवान् को दरिद्र:|| – If both of us are happy, then who is rich and who is poor?

A poor or low profile person tells a king –

We are contented in our simple and coarse attire and you are happy in your very rich and silky dress. Your dress is luxurious. But there is no difference between the happiness of two of us. Both of us are satisfied at our respective places. In reality, he whose greed is not satiated will always remain poor.

We observe this scenario every day in our lives. Even in the vegetable market, rich people usually bargain more for petty things. Rich countries keep on fighting for more wealth. On the other hand, a country like Bhutan, which is not known for its material wealth properties has the highest happiness index. People have passion or craze to acquire and collect valuable items, dresses, furniture, antiques, show pieces, jewellery, diamonds, articles like studded watches, cars and what not! Desire still continues to acquire get something more!

Sometimes, a peon or lower level employee is happier than the owner or highly placed people. This does not imply or mean that we should be complacent. For progress, we must aspire or strive for more, better quality things. At the same time, we should be detached. This message is common in almost all philosophies of the world. All religions preach the same thing. Reduce the needs, reduce the attachment. That is the surest way of getting peace of mind. Greed always causes unrest. That unrest creates stress. It leads to health issues and mental disorders.

Unfortunately, many of the CA professionals compromise on all ethics to become super rich instantly. They continuously resort to undesirable or more things to have more and more wealth, recognition and positions.

They are never happy and contented, whereas a wise person, without much wealth is more contented and happy.

Let us aspire to make our country or society richer than pursue our ambition for personal wealth.

DDT cannot be charged on dividend paid to a shareholder who is granted immunity from taxation

10. [2025] 175 taxmann.com 707 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Polycab India Ltd. vs. ACIT

IT APPEAL NOS. 4671 AND 4672 (MUM.) OF 2023 A.Y.: 2018-19 to 2021-22

Dated: 16.06.2025

Section 115O

DDT cannot be charged on dividend paid to a shareholder who is granted immunity from taxation

FACTS

The assessee, a listed Indian company, had paid dividends to its shareholders, which included International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), a World Bank Group entity. In terms of International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) Act, 1958, IFC was exempted from all taxation on its assets, income, property, and operations. The assessee had discharged Dividend Distribution Tax (“DDT”) under Section 115-O of the Act on entire dividend paid by it. The Assessee applied for refund of DDT under Section 237 in respect of DDT relatable to IFC.

The AO rejected the application on the footing that if the argument of the Assessee were accepted, then dividend payable to every entity which was exempt was liable to be excluded from DDT. However, no such provision is envisaged under the Act.

The CIT(A) observed that in terms of decision of Special Bench in Total Oil India P. Ltd [2023] 149 taxmann.com 332 (Mumbai -Trib.) (SB), under section 115-O, it is not a tax paid by the company on behalf of the shareholder but a charge on profits distributed by the company. Accordingly, it upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved by the order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

Pursuant to sovereign commitment under IFC agreement, India enacted IFC Act, 1958. Section 9 of IFC Act provided immunity from taxation in respect of its assets, income, property operations, etc.

Section 115-O(1A) of the Act provided for reduction of certain amount from computation of DDT. Finance Act (No.2), 2009, amended section 115-O and provided reduction of dividends paid to National Pension System Trust (NPS Trust) referred to in Section 10(44) for discharging DDT.

Several institutions such as RBI, SEBI, IMF, etc. are exempt from levy of income tax due to overarching provisions of specific legislation enacted by the Parliament.

In the past, Courts have held that income tax immunity provided to salaries received by employees of certain foreign institutions (UN, IMF, etc.) equally applies to pensions received by them, even in absence of express provision under the Act. Therefore, there is no need for specific provision in income tax, if the Parliament had enacted an overarching provision.

The ITAT observed that the charge under 115-O was on dividend distributed by a company. However, it could not override the overarching immunity granted in respect of assets, incomes, operations and transactions of IFC. Any such interpretation was contrary to the intent of the legislature.

Accordingly, the ITAT held that DDT could not be charged in respect of dividend paid to IFC.

Article 5 of India – USA DTAA – Indian subsidiary of foreign parent company cannot constitute dependent agent permanent establishment merely because it provided marketing support activity, and in absence of PE, receipts of foreign company were taxable only in USA.

9. [2025] 175 taxmann.com 992 (Delhi – Trib.)

Zscaler Inc. vs. DCIT ITA NO. 3376 (DEL) OF 2023, 928 (DEL) OF 2025

A.Y.: 2021-22 to 2022-23 Dated: 18.06.2025

Article 5 of India – USA DTAA – Indian subsidiary of foreign parent company cannot constitute dependent agent permanent establishment merely because it provided marketing support activity, and in absence of PE, receipts of foreign company were taxable only in USA.

FACTS

The Assessee was a tax resident of USA. It was engaged in the business of providing security-based software solutions globally, and the software was provided to customers through its resellers/distributors. The Assessee had an Indian subsidiary (“I Co”), which rendered back-office services, sales support, and marketing services. The Assessee compensated I Co for its services at arm’s length.

Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence (P.) Ltd 432 ITR 471 (SC), the Assessee filed a Nil return of income for the relevant AYs on the footing that receipts from software did not constitute royalty. Further, the Company discharged equalization levy @ 2% of gross receipts and claimed exemption under Section 10(50) of the Act.

The AO contended that I Co secured orders for the Assessee by providing sales and market support services for software distribution in India; therefore, the activity constituted a dependent agent permanent establishment (“DAPE”) in India. The AO held that the provision of equalization levy was not applicable in view of alleged DAPE in India. The DRP upheld the draft order of the AO.

Aggrieved with the final order, the Assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD

In terms of reseller agreement, the Assessee and resellers had principal-to-principal relationship and only they were authorized to enter into contracts with customers. Entire sales of the Assessee were through the resellers or channel partners.

The Service agreement between the Assessee and I Co was confined to IT support and marketing support services. It did not confer rights to negotiate or conclude contracts on behalf of the Assessee to I Co.

The role of the subsidiary was confined to providing updates to the client about products and inquiring about their intent to renew the subscription. These services can only be classified as marketing support, and the agreement did not confer the authority to conclude contracts or secure orders on behalf of the assessee.

The burden of proof to substantiate that the Assessee had DAPE in India was on the revenue. The AO failed to establish involvement of I Co in procuring orders or maintaining stock on behalf of the Assessee.

Accordingly, the ITAT held that the activities of the subsidiary did not constitute DAPE in India.

Estimation of Income – Rejection of Books – Section 145(3) – Failure to conduct audit under Section 44AB – Income declared at 0.187% of turnover – Assessing Officer estimated income @ 10% of turnover – Tribunal held that in absence of audit and proper explanation for drastic fall in profits, estimation justified but rate excessive – Past effective NP rate of 1.52% accepted – Addition restricted accordingly – Partly in favour of assessee.

54. [2025] 125 ITR(T) 160 (Jaipur – Trib.)

Adworld Communications (P.) LTD. VS. DCIT

ITA NO:. 1049 (JPR.) OF 2024

A.Y.: 2011-12 Date: 29.04.2025

Estimation of Income – Rejection of Books – Section 145(3) – Failure to conduct audit under Section 44AB – Income declared at 0.187% of turnover – Assessing Officer estimated income @ 10% of turnover – Tribunal held that in absence of audit and proper explanation for drastic fall in profits, estimation justified but rate excessive – Past effective NP rate of 1.52% accepted – Addition restricted accordingly – Partly in favour of assessee.

FACTS I

A survey action under section 133A was carried out at the business premises of the assessee. As per the AST data available with the department, the assessee failed to comply with section 139 for the year under consideration, despite the fact that the assessee’s total business receipt was 7.96 crores. In view of this figure under the head ‘business’ and non-filing of return, a notice under section 148 was issued.

In response thereto, the assessee filed a return declaring total income of ₹1.49 lakhs, i.e. 0.187% of the gross receipts. It was observed by the Assessing Officer that despite the fact that the accounts of the assessee were liable to tax audit under section 44AB, no tax audit was got conducted.

In view of all the facts the case of the assessee was assessed while applying the provisions of section 145(3) and income was estimated after rejection of expenses claimed in the profit and loss account, at the rate of 10 per cent.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) partly allowed the appeal by sustaining the addition to the extent of 2.16 per cent of expenses claimed in the profit and loss account. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD I

The Tribunal observed that out of the total revenue of ₹7,96,67,680/-, the assessee had received ₹7,70,69,109/- from a single party, M/s Resonance Eduventures Ltd. In the preceding assessment year, the assessee had declared a net profit (NP) rate of 1.18% on a turnover of ₹10,60,05,001/-, amounting to ₹12,51,668/-. However, for the year under consideration, the NP declared was only 0.187% (the assessee having incorrectly calculated NP at 0.36% on an inflated turnover of ₹9,38,23,920/).

The Tribunal noted a significant fall in the assessee’s profitability and emphasised that the accounts for the relevant year were not duly audited, despite the statutory obligation under Section 44AB. This raised serious concerns about the credibility of the financial statements. Further, the assessee had also failed to file its return of income within the prescribed time, even though it was mandatorily required to do so regardless of the quantum of turnover.

It was also observed that in the preceding assessment year, the Assessing Officer had made a disallowance of ₹3,63,826/-, which had been accepted by the assessee. This resulted in an effective NP rate of 1.52%.

Considering these facts, the Tribunal held that the flat 10% addition made by the Assessing Officer was excessive and unjustified. However, since the assessee failed to justify the sharp decline in profitability and the absence of a statutory audit, an estimation was warranted.

Accordingly, the Tribunal partly allowed the appeal, restricting the addition to 1.52% of the turnover, in line with the previous year’s effective NP rate. The addition was thereby computed at ₹12,10,949/-, from which the self-declared income of ₹1,49,165/- was to be reduced.

Presumption set out in Section 292C of the Act does not apply since the documents in question was not found or impounded from the appellant’s premises but in the course of survey (not search) conducted against a third party.

53. [2025] 125 ITR(T) 1 (Jaipur – Trib.) 

Pushpa Vidya Niketan Samiti vs. ACIT

ITA NO.: 313 TO 315(JPR) OF 2024

A.Y.: 2015-16 TO 2017-18 Date: 24.03.2025 

Sec. 292C

Presumption set out in Section 292C of the Act does not apply since the documents in question was not found or impounded from the appellant’s premises but in the course of survey (not search) conducted against a third party.

FACTS

The assessee is involved in imparting school education in the name of Bhagat Public School and the administration of the same is being managed by Shri Naresh Jain. The assessee filed its return of income on 31.03.2016 under section  139(4) of the Act declaring total income at ₹1,03,060/-.Notice under section  148 of the Act was issued on 15.03.2019.

A survey under section  133A of the Act was carried out at the premises of the assessee and also at M/s. Quick Advertisement Co., Prop. Smt.Nisha Jain. During the survey at M/s. Quick Advertisement Co. certain documents were seized as containing list of students of Bhagat Public School respectively. These documents were confronted to Shri Naresh Jain who confirmed and admitted that these documents related to class wise actual fee collection of the student of Bhagat Public School and that the lower fee collection has been disclosed as compared to the actual fee collected by the Bhagat Public School. Shri Naresh Jain, Accountant on behalf the assessee surrendered a sum of ₹50 Lacs to cover all the error and omissions, but retracted from his statement.

The case of the assessee was assessed after making addition of ₹56,16,513/- without giving benefit of section 11 & 12 of the Act.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

The assessee had raised the following relevant grounds –

1. Statement recorded of Shri Naresh Jain u/s 131 of the Act was unauthorised and illegal. Consequently, there was no evidentiary value of such illegally recorded statement being without authority of Law.

2. The addition made by the Ld. AO on account of alleged suppressed school fees, was completely ignoring the consistently followed method of accounting, and other material available on record – Presumption set out in Section 292C of the Act does not apply to the appellant.

HELD

The Tribunal relied on the decision in the case of CIT s. S. Khader Khan Son [2008] 300 ITR 157 (Mad) [duly affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court], and confirmed that section 133A of the Act does not empower the authorities to record the statements; and statements obtained during the survey proceedings would not automatically bind the assessee.

The Tribunal referred to provisions of section 292C of the Act for the documents being seized. The Tribunal observed that there was a simultaneous survey at the premises of the assessee and M/s. Quick Advertisement Co., Prop. Smt. Nisha Jain and that the documents under consideration were found from M/s. Quick Advertisement Co., Prop. Smt. Nisha Jain and not from the control or possession of the assessee school.

The Tribunal observed that section 133A r.w.s. 292C of the Act, raises a presumption that the contents of books of account and other documents seized during the course of search is true. But it should be kept in mind that this presumption is only qua the person who is searched and/or from whose possession the books of account and documents are found and none else. Moreover, this presumption is rebuttable. In the given facts of the case, since the documents in question was not found or impounded from the appellant’s premises but in the course of survey (not search) conducted against a third party, the presumption set out in Section 292C of the Act does not apply to the appellant.

The Tribunal held that other than the calculation sheets found at the premises of M/s. Quick Advertisement Co., no further working was carried out by the AO to substantiate the same that it pertains to the assessee and that the calculations embedded were true to be considered for the purposes of taxation.

The Tribunal held that the statement recorded during the survey operations under section  133A of the Act has no evidentiary value and presumptions drawn under section  292C of the Act are also not in the favour of the Revenue.

In the result, the appeal by the assessee was allowed.

Where draft assessment order is passed in the name of a non-existent entity despite the Assessing Officer having been duly informed of the amalgamation, such an assessment is void and not a procedural irregularity that can be cured by invoking section 292B.

52. (2025) 177 taxmann.com 546 (Ahd Trib)

Man Energy Solutions India (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO

A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of Order: 11.08.2025

Sections : 144C, 292B

Where draft assessment order is passed in the name of a non-existent entity despite the Assessing Officer having been duly informed of the amalgamation, such an assessment is void and not a procedural irregularity that can be cured by invoking section 292B.

FACTS

Man Turbo India Pvt. Ltd. (MTIPL) stood amalgamated into Man Diesel & Turbo India Pvt. Ltd. (MDTIPL), w.e.f. 01.01.2013, pursuant to the Scheme of Amalgamation sanctioned by the Bombay High Court vide order dated 28.03.2014. The amalgamation scheme was made effective upon filing with the Registrar of Companies on 21.05.2015. The intimation of amalgamation was given to the AO as well as the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO). However, despite these prior intimations, the Transfer Pricing order dated 21.01.2016, draft assessment order dated 01.03.2016, Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) direction under section 144C(5) dated 13.12.2016 and the final assessment order dated 30.01.2017 were all passed in the name of MTIPL, which was a non-existent entity which had since amalgamated into MDTIPL.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal against the order passed by DRP before ITAT.

HELD

Following the decision of Supreme Court in PCIT v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., (2019) 416 ITR 613, other decisions High Courts and Tribunals as well as assessee’s own case in Man Diesel and Turbo India (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT [IT Appeal No. 1319 (Ahd.) of 2018, dated 12-2-2025], the Tribunal observed that where an assessment order is passed in the name of a non-existent entity despite the Assessing Officer having been duly informed of the amalgamation, such an assessment is void and not a procedural irregularity that can be cured by invoking section 292B.

The Tribunal further observed that the draft assessment order forms the very foundation of the final assessment process under section 144C and once the draft order is found to be vitiated for being passed in the name of a non-existent entity, the entire downstream proceedings-including the directions of the DRP and the final order-also stand vitiated. The mere reference to the correct name in the DRP order or final assessment order does not cure the foundational illegality.

The Tribunal also observed that issuance of an assessment order against a non-existent entity is a substantive illegality going to the root of the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer and cannot be cured by Section 292B, which only addresses procedural errors.

Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Where the employer paid a sum to LIC under a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) for allotment of annuity policy in favour of an employee payable in instalments in future, such sum cannot be taxed as perquisite in the hands of the employee in the year of purchase of annuity since the employee did not acquire any vested or enforceable right over the said amount in the relevant assessment year.

51. (2025) 177 taxmann.com 369 (Ahd Trib)

Biswas Manik vs. ITO

A.Y.: 2018-19 Date of Order: 08.08.2025 Section : 17

Where the employer paid a sum to LIC under a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) for allotment of annuity policy in favour of an employee payable in instalments in future, such sum cannot be taxed as perquisite in the hands of the employee in the year of purchase of annuity since the employee did not acquire any vested or enforceable right over the said amount in the relevant assessment year.

FACTS

The employer-company had taken annuity policy from LIC under a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) in favour of the retiring employees, including the assessee. The employer had paid a sum of ₹20 lakhs directly to LIC (not to the assessee) for allotment of annuity policy in the name of the assessee. The annuity was structured to be paid to the assessee only after four years, in the form of monthly instalments from LIC. The assessee claimed that since he had no access to, or right over, the amount in AY 2018-19, it cannot be considered part of his salary or perquisite income for that year under section 15 or 17 and that he had offered the annuity instalments received from LIC as income in his return in the year of receipt.

The AO issued a notice under section 133(6) to the employer. Based on the response and disclosure in Form 16, the AO held that the amount paid to LIC formed part of salary under Section 17(2)(v), being a perquisite in the nature of a contract for an annuity. Accordingly, he recomputed the salary of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee went in appeal before CIT(A), who upheld the addition made by the AO.
Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

The Tribunal observed as follows:

(a) Section 17(2)(v) includes within the definition of perquisite any sum paid by the employer to effect a contract for an annuity, subject to certain exclusions. However, in order for such a payment to be taxed in the hands of the employee, it is essential, as per section 15, that the amount is either due, paid, or allowed to the employee. The law is well settled that a contingent benefit or a non-vested future entitlement cannot be brought to tax in the year of payment by the employer unless the employee acquires a vested right in the amount.

(b) In the present case, the assessee acquired no such vested right in AY 2018- 19, and the annuity payments commenced only four years thereafter. Moreover, from the records it was observed that the assessee had in fact offered to tax, on accrual/receipt basis, the annuity income received from LIC in the relevant year under the head “Income from Salary.” Therefore, taxing the employer’s payment of ₹20,00,000/- in AY 2018-19 would amount to taxing the same amount twice – once at the stage of employer’s contribution and again at the time of annuity receipts-resulting in double taxation, which was impermissible in law.

(c) The Department’s reliance on Form 16 and Form 26AS was erroneous, as these do not override the substantive legal provisions under the Act.

(d) The employer’s payment to LIC was not made on behalf of the employee nor credited to his account; hence, it cannot be treated as income due, paid or allowed to him in that year.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that addition of ₹20 lakhs in AY 2018-19 should be deleted.
In the result, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Application for final approval under section 80G(5)(iv)(B) cannot be denied on the ground that the applicant had claimed exemption under section 11 / 10(23C) in the past. Amendment in section 80G(5)(iv) made by Finance Act 2024 is clarificatory in nature and applies retrospectively.

50. (2025) 177 taxmann.com 590 (Ahd Trib)

Akshat Education and Charitable Trust vs. CIT

A.Y.: N.A. Date of Order: 19.08.2025

Section: 80G

Application for final approval under section 80G(5)(iv)(B) cannot be denied on the ground that the applicant had claimed exemption under section 11 / 10(23C) in the past.

Amendment in section 80G(5)(iv) made by Finance Act 2024 is clarificatory in nature and applies retrospectively.

FACTS

The assessee was a registered public charitable trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, engaged in imparting education. The Trust had commenced its activities in 2014 upon receiving school opening permission and had been claiming exemption under section 11 and section 10(23C) in earlier years. However, it had never obtained approval under section 80G(5). For the first time, the Trust was granted provisional approval under section 80G(5) for the period from 22.06.2022 to A.Y. 2025-26. Pursuant to this, the appellant moved an application in Form 10AB on 06.02.2024 seeking final approval under section 80G(5).

CIT(E) rejected the application relying strictly on the wording of section 80G(5)(iv)(B), holding that since the assessee had already claimed exemption under section 11/10(23C), the application was outside the scope of maintainability.
Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

HELD

On the issue of delay of 137 days in filing the appeal, the Tribunal observed that since the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the prescribed time, the delay should be condoned.

On the issue of non-maintainability of the assessee’s application under section 80G(5)(iv)(B), the Tribunal observed that:

(a) The Finance Act, 2023 substituted clause (iv) of the first proviso to section 80G(5) with effect from 01.10.2023, and CBDT Circular No. 1/2024 dated 23.01.2024 has clarified that institutions which have already commenced activities shall make an application for regular approval under sub-clause (B) of clause (iv).

(b) This amendment is remedial and clarificatory in nature, intended to remove an anomaly, and therefore must be read as having retrospective effect.

(c) The amendment brought by Finance Act, 2024 only clarifies what was implicit even earlier, namely, that claiming exemption in prior years does not debar a trust from seeking approval under section 80G(5). The legislative intent is to encourage donations to genuine charitable institutions, and hyper-technical construction must give way to purposive interpretation.

(d) The assessee having already been granted provisional approval, and having fulfilled the procedural compliances, its application for final approval could not have been brushed aside on the sole ground of earlier claims of exemption under section 11/10(23C).

Following decision of coordinate bench in West Bengal Welfare Society vs. CIT(E) [IT Appeal Nos. 730 & 731/Kol/2023, dated 13-9-2023], the Tribunal held that the order of CIT(E) cannot be sustained.

Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee, quashed the order of the CIT(E) and restored the matter to the file of CIT(E) for examining the application afresh on merits.

Enhancement made by CIT(A), by exercising a power not conferred by section 251(2) being without jurisdiction needs to be deleted.

49. TS-596-ITAT-2025 (Delhi)

Toshiba Water Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT

A.Y.: 2014-15

Date of Order : 7.5.2025

Section: 251

Enhancement made by CIT(A), by exercising a power not conferred by section 251(2) being without jurisdiction needs to be deleted.

FACTS

The assessee, for assessment year 2014-15, filed its return of income declaring a loss of ₹10,46,67,132. The Assessing Officer (AO) completed the assessment under section 143(3) of the Act, made various disallowances and consequently determined the total loss to be ₹4,70,23,278. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who deleted most of the additions made by the AO except a sum of ₹81,10,231 in respect of balances written off.

However, CIT(A) enhanced the income by ₹1,54,68,280 on account of provision for contract loss. The assessee challenged this addition in the appeal filed by him to the Tribunal and also raised an additional ground contending that this is absolutely new source of income and that CIT(A) could not have invoked his powers of enhancement in terms of section 251(2) to make an addition on account of a new source of income.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the issue of disallowance of contract loss is an absolutely new source of income and that the CIT(A) cannot invoke his power of enhancement, in terms of section 251(2) of the Act, and make addition on account of new source of income. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Gurinder Mohan Singh Nindrajog vs. CIT [348 ITR 170 (Delhi)].

The Tribunal allowed the ground of appeal challenging the disallowance of contract loss while deciding the technical ground of the assessee viz. that the addition has been made by CIT(A) by exercising jurisdiction which was not conferred upon him pursuant to section 251(2) of the Act.

Claim for deduction, made in belated return filed under section 139(4), of capital gains under sections 54F and 54EC, not liable to penalty under section 271(1)(c).

48. TS-720-ITAT-2025 (Ahd.)

Tejas Ghanshyambhai Patel vs. ITO

A.Y.: 2016-17 Date of Order : 4.6.2025

Section: 271(1)(c)

Claim for deduction, made in belated return filed under section 139(4), of capital gains under sections 54F and 54EC, not liable to penalty under section 271(1)(c).

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, co-owner of immovable property, sold his interest in the property for a consideration of ₹1.80 crore and claimed deduction under section 54EC of ₹50,00,000 and deduction under section 54F of ₹36,27,254. The Assessing Officer (AO) denied the claim of deductions under section 54F and 54EC on the ground that the return of income was filed belatedly and also the return was revised belatedly. The AO completed the assessment by making an addition of ₹86,27,254 and demanded tax thereon.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal against the assessment which appeal was partly allowed. The AO thereafter proceeded with penalty proceedings and levied a penalty of
₹1,70,414.

Aggrieved by the levy of penalty, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO in levying penalty.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where relying upon a decision of co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in Jaysukhlal Ghiya vs. DCIT [ITA No. 324/Ahd./2020; Order dated 7.8.2024] it contended that the claim for deduction made in a belated return cannot be denied. Consequently, penalty levied by AO and confirmed by CIT(A) needs to be deleted.

HELD

At the outset, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) in quantum appeal set aside the assessment with a direction to AO to allow the claim of investment / deposit done on or before 31.7.2016 and proportionately allow the claim of deduction under section 54EC / 54F. While deciding the said appeal, the CIT(A) dismissed the ground challenging the initiation of penalty for the reason that it is consequential in nature and that no prejudice is caused to the assessee at this juncture. In the penalty proceedings, the assessee failed to participate, despite notice being sent even by speed post, resulting in levy of penalty for concealing income.

The Tribunal observed that CIT(A), in quantum proceedings, allowed the deduction under sections 54EC and 54F proportionately and therefore there is no concealment of income by the assessee. This part was not brought out in ex-parte penalty proceedings before the AO and in an appeal against penalty order before the CIT(A).

Having noted that the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Jaysukhlal Ghiya (supra) has held that when assessee furnishes return of income subsequent to the date filing under section 139(1) of the Act but within the extended time available under section 139(4) of the Act, the benefit of investment made up to the date of filing of return of income cannot be denied. Therefore, the Tribunal held, that in its opinion, there is no concealment of income in making a claim of deduction in a return of income filed belatedly. The Tribunal directed deletion of penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Act.

As per the provisions of section 70(2) of the Act, the short-term capital loss can be set off against gain from any other capital asset. Section 70(2) of the Act does not make any further classification between the transactions where STT was paid and the transactions where STT was not paid.

47. ITA 2134/Mum./2025

Schwab Emerging Markets Equity ETF

A.Y.: 2022-23 Date of Order : 11.6.2025 Section: 70

As per the provisions of section 70(2) of the Act, the short-term capital loss can be set off against gain from any other capital asset. Section 70(2) of the Act does not make any further classification between the transactions where STT was paid and the transactions where STT was not paid. Accordingly, the short-term capital loss arising from sale of shares subjected to Securities Transaction Tax (‘STT) can first be set-off against the short-term capital gains arising from sale of securities not subjected to STT instead of short-term capital gains arising from sale of shares subjected to STT.

FACTS

For the year under consideration, the assessee, a company incorporated in Mauritius, registered with the Securities and Exchange Board of India as a Foreign Portfolio Investor, filed its return of income on 07/11/2022, declaring a total income of ₹270,76,67,910. In the course of assessment proceedings, it was observed that the assessee computed the net short-term capital gains by setting off the short term capital loss (on which STT was paid), which is taxable at 15% under section 111A of the Act, against the short-term capital gains (on which STT was not paid), which is taxable at 30% under section 115AD of the Act, and thereafter, set off the balance loss against the short-term capital gains earned on the transaction of sale of share subjected to STT.

The assessee was asked to show cause as to why the set-off of lower taxable loss should not be denied with higher taxable gains, as the IT Rules have provided separate columns for set-off and carry-forward of losses. In response, the assessee submitted that section 70 of the Act allows the assessee to set off the losses of lower taxable gains with the gains of higher taxable gains. In support of its submission, the assessee placed reliance upon several judicial pronouncements, wherein a similar issue was decided in favour of the taxpayer.

The Assessing Officer (“AO”), vide draft assessment order dated 24/03/2024 passed under section 144C(1) of the Act, disagreed with the submissions of the assessee and held that computation of the net short-term capital gains by the assessee is not in order. The AO further held that the IT Rules have clearly defined separate columns for set-off and carry forward of gains of having differential tax rates. Accordingly, the short-term capital gain was computed by first setting off 15% loss against 15% gains.

The assessee filed detailed objections, inter-alia, against the addition made by the AO as a result of his not accepting the manner of set off adopted by the assessee. Vide directions dated 05/12/2024, issued under section 144C(5) of the Act, the DRP rejected the objections filed by the assessee and upheld the computation of capital gains made by the AO vide draft assessment order. The DRP further noted that this issue is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of DIT vs. M/s. DWS India Equity Fund, in ITA No.1414 of 2012, and there is no judicial finality on this issue.

In conformity with the directions issued by the DRP, the AO passed the impugned final assessment order under section 143(3) read with section 144C(13) of the Act computing the net short-term capital gains amounting to ₹2,95,96,810 taxable at 15% under section 111A of the Act and the net short-term capital gains amounting to ₹4,60,58,240 taxable at 30% under section 115AD of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the sole issue which arises for its consideration in the present appeal is whether the short-term capital loss (on which STT was paid) can be set off against short-term capital gains (on which STT was not paid). The Tribunal noted the provisions of section 70(2) of the Act, which deals with the set off of short-term capital loss and observed that as per the provisions of section 70(2) of the Act, the short-term capital loss can be set off against gain from any other capital asset. Section 70(2) of the Act does not make any further classification between the transactions where STT was paid and the transactions where STT was not paid. It held that the emphasis of the AO on the term “similar computation” also only refers to the computation as provided under sections 48 to 55 of the Act, and therefore, does not support the case of the Revenue.

The Tribunal noted the findings of the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal, while deciding a similar issue, in iShares MSCI EM UCITS ETF USD ACC vs. DCIT, reported in [2024] 164 taxmann.com 56 (Mum. -Trib.). The Tribunal in this case following the decision of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in CIT vs. Rungamatee Trexim (P.) Ltd. [IT Appeal number 812 of 2008, dated 19.12.2008], allowed the set off of short-term capital loss (on which STT was paid) against the short-term capital gains (on which STT was not paid).

It also found that similar findings have been rendered by the Co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal in favour of the taxpayer in the following decisions: –

i) Emerging Markets Index Non-Lendable Fund vs. DCIT, Mumbai, in ITA No. 4589/Mum/2023, order dated 05.08.2024.

ii) Vanguard Total International Stock Index Fund vs. ACIT (IT) – 4(3)(1), in ITA No.4656/Mum/2023, order dated 13.12.2024.

iii) JS Capital LLC vs. ACIT (International Taxation), reported in (2024) 160 taxmann.com 286 4. Dy.DIT vs. M/s. DWS India Equity Fund, in ITA No.5055/Mum/2010, order dated 11.04.2012.

It observed that the DR could not show any cogent reason to deviate from the aforesaid judicial precedents.

The Tribunal, following the aforesaid decisions, directed the AO to accept the methodology adopted by the assessee for the computation of the capital gains. The ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Imposition of penalty for violation of provisions of section 269SS of the Act towards consideration received in cash for sale of agricultural land by bringing the said consideration within the ambit of “specified sum” as defined under section 269SS of the Act is totally incorrect and defeats the very purpose of law.

46. TS-1252-ITAT-2025 (Hyd.)

Late Nimmatoori Raja Babu vs. ACIT 

A.Ys.:  2016-17 and 2017-18 

Date of Order : 12.9.2025

Section:  271D

Imposition of penalty for violation of provisions of section 269SS of the Act towards consideration received in cash for sale of agricultural land by bringing the said consideration within the ambit of “specified sum” as defined under section 269SS of the Act is totally incorrect and defeats the very purpose of law.

Receipt in cash, of genuine sale consideration of immovable property including agricultural land, before witnesses at the time of registration cannot be brought within the ambit of “specified sum” merely because it has been received in cash. 

FACTS

The Tribunal, in this case, was dealing with 3 appeals wherein levy of penalty under section 271D of the Act for AYs 2016-17 and 2017-18 amounting to ₹33,75,000;  ₹2,59,35,760 and ₹2,14,35,760 was under challenge.  The Tribunal took up appeal in the case of Late Nimmatoori Raja Babu for AY 2016-17 as the lead case.

The assessee, an individual, was one of the trustee of M/s Aurora Educational Society & Other Group Trusts.  In the course of assessment proceedings, consequent to search, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that assessee received consideration for sale of land in Raigir village to Incredible India Projects Private Limited.  The land was sold vide registered deed dated 24.6.2016 and assessee had admitted sale consideration of ₹33,75,000 per acre.  Since assessee failed to prove receipt of consideration by banking channels, the AO noted that the assessee violated the provisions of section 269SS of the Act and initiated penalty proceedings under section 271D and subsequently Joint / Additional Commissioner levied penalty, under section 271D, equivalent to 100% of the amount received in cash.

Aggrieved, by levy of penalty, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was submitted that –

i) right from the very beginning the assessee explained the source to be sale of agricultural land and the AO has accepted the source and not made addition to income but has initiated penalty for contravention of section 269SS;

ii) the expression “specified sum” cannot be stretched to consideration for transfer of property at the time of registration in presence of witnesses;

iii) the property sold by the assessee is agricultural land situated beyond the limit specified under section 2(14) of the Act and is therefore not a capital asset. The assessee was under a bonafide belief that accepting cash for sale of agricultural land does not attract provisions of section 269SS of the Act and consequently provisions of section 271D are not attracted.  The Tribunal, in a separate order, accepted the very same land to be an agricultural land.

HELD

At the outset the Tribunal noted that there is no dispute that the transaction is genuine and is recorded in Registered Sale Deed.  The land sold is an agricultural land and not a capital asset.  It noted that the assessee has explained that cash was received at the time of sale of agricultural land on the bonafide belief that agricultural land is exempt from tax and consequently receiving cash on sale of agricultural land will not attract provisions of section 269SS and 271D of the Act.  The Tribunal held that the provisions of section 271D are not automatic and exceptions of reasonable cause exonerates an assessee from levy of penalty.  In the present case, the assessee has satisfactorily demonstrated a `reasonable cause’ for acceptance of cash consideration for sale of agricultural land. There is no material brought on record by revenue to establish any malafide intention or tax evasion.

The Tribunal having noted that the provisions of section 269SS were amended by the Finance Act, 2015 and “specified sum” has been inserted in section 269SS examined the Explanatory Memorandum and observed that the purpose of the amendment is to curb the black money in immovable property transactions.  It held that, in its view, stretching the genuine consideration received for sale of an immovable property including agricultural land before the witnesses at the time of registration cannot be brought within the ambit of the term “specified sum” merely because the same has been received in cash.  The purpose of insertion of “specified sum” is only to check abuse of law by tax payers by entering into various kinds of agreements for transfer of immovable property showing consideration paid or received in cash and finally registration has not taken place.  It held that in a situation where consideration paid for transfer of any immovable property at the time of registration before witnesses and further, the said transaction is a genuine transaction and also part of regular books of accounts of the assessee or disclosed in the return of income filed for the relevant assessment year, then, the said transaction cannot be brought within the ambit of “specified sum” merely because the consideration has been received in cash. The Tribunal held that imposition of penalty for violation of provisions of section 269SS of the Act towards consideration received in cash for sale of agricultural land by bringing the said consideration within the ambit of “specified sum” as defined under section 269SS of the Act is totally incorrect and defeats the very purpose of law.

The Tribunal held that since, the assessee accepted the cash consideration for sale of agriculture land, which is outside the scope of capital asset as defined under section 2(14) of the Act and further, it is exempt from tax, the said transaction cannot be brought within the ambit of provisions of section 269SS of the Act, for the purpose of sec.271D of the Act.

The Tribunal, upon consideration of the decision of Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in Rakesh Ganapathy vs. JCIT [(2025) 170 taxmann.com 239] on which reliance was placed on behalf of the assessee, found it to be on identical set of facts in light of penalty under section 271D.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal held that the Addl. CIT, Central Range-2, Hyderabad erred in levying penalty under section 271D of the Act for contravention of section 269SS of the Act towards consideration received in cash for sale of agricultural land.   The CIT(A) without considering the relevant facts, has simply sustained the penalty levied by the AO. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the penalty levied under section 271D of the Act.

Taxation of Charitable & Religious Organisations under Income Tax Act 2025

The Income Tax Act, 2025 (effective 1 April 2026) restructures the taxation of charitable and religious organisations while largely retaining the substantive framework of the 1961 Act. The concept of “trusts” is replaced by “registered non-profit organisations” (NPOs), with detailed eligibility and registration requirements under section 332. Provisions earlier treated as exemptions are now computation provisions, classifying income into regular, specified, and residual categories, with differential tax treatment. Anonymous donations, impermissible investments, and violations in commercial activity attract strict tax consequences, including 30% levy and possible cancellation of registration. Key exemptions, such as corpus donations and reinvested capital gains, remain, while accumulations are permitted for up to five years. Compliance obligations relating to books, audit, returns, and investments are tightened, with harsher penalties for violations. The exit tax on accreted income and donation approval rules under section 133 also continue. Despite restructuring, complexity persists, raising risks of litigation

The Income Tax Act 2025 (“new Act”), which comes into force from 1st April 2026, has by and large retained the substance of the manner of taxation of charitable and religious organisations as existed in the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“existing Act”), but has significantly changed the structure of the provisions relating to taxation of charitable and religious organisations.

At the stage of the draft Bill, there had been a few major changes suggested in the provisions – withdrawal of the exemption for reinvestment of capital gains [current s.11(1A)] and of the option to spend the income in the subsequent year [current explanation to s.11(1)], extending the taxability of anonymous donations to all charitable-cum-religious trusts are some of the proposals. Fortunately, at the time of passing the Revised Bill, these proposals were withdrawn, and the existing exemptions broadly continue to operate.

In this article, an attempt is being made to analyse how the new provisions need to be read, and some of the changes that may apply on account of the changed structure of the law or changes in the language of the new law. While all major aspects are sought to be covered, it may not be possible to cover all the provisions, which run into 21 pages of the new Act, besides the items contained in the Schedules.

The new provisions are contained in part B of Chapter XVII, which consists of 7 sub-parts – registration, Income of regd NPO, commercial activities by regd NPOs, compliances, violations, approval for purposes of section 133, and interpretation.

1. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

The significant changes to the structure are analysed below:

1. The concept of a trust or institution holding property in trust for charitable or religious purposes has been replaced by a concept of registered non-profit organisation (“regd NPO”). A list of types of entities which can apply for registration as a regd NPO is laid down in s.332(1), which was not present in the current ITA. These are:

(a) A public trust;

(b) A society registered under Societies Registration Act, 1860 or under any law in force in India;

(c) A company registered under s.8 of Companies Act 2013 or under s.25 of Companies Act 1956 and deemed to have been registered under s.465(2)(g) of Companies Act 2013;

(d) A University established by law or any other educational institution affiliated thereto or recognized by the Government;

(e)An institution financed wholly or in part by the Government or a local authority;

(f) Investor Protection Funds set up by recognized stock exchanges, commodity exchanges or depositories, notified bodies administering any activity for the benefit of the general public, Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund, PM CARES Fund, Chief Minister’s Relief Fund, Swachh Bharat Kosh, Clean Ganga Fund, university/educational institutions and hospitals/medical institutions wholly or substantially financed by the Government or with annual receipts of less than Rs 5 crore, and notified bodies set up under a Central/State Act for dealing with housing accommodation, planning, development or improvement of cities, towns and villages, regulating or regulating and developing any activity for the benefit of the general public or regulating any matter for the benefit of the general public;

(g) Any other person notified by the CBDT.

Section 332(2) provides that such a person shall be eligible for registration if:

(a) It is constituted, registered or incorporated in India for carrying out one or more charitable purposes, or one or more public religious purposes, and

(b) The properties of such person are held for the benefit of the general public under an irrevocable trust –

i. Wholly for charitable or religious purposes in India; or

ii. Partly for charitable or religious purposes in India, if such person was constituted, registered or incorporated prior to 1.4.1962.

Therefore, a trust created after 1.4.1962 cannot apply for registration as a regd NPO if it is not constituted, registered or incorporated in India or any of its objects are for the benefit of the public or any persons outside India. This requirement is not contained in the current Act. This also seems to contradict the provisions of section 338 (analysed later), where income can be applied outside India with the prior approval of the CBDT. One fails to understand how an NPO can apply income outside India, if it does not have such an object permitting application outside India, in which case it would not be eligible for registration.

Further, in case of an NPO set up after 1.4.1962, it can only be wholly for charitable and religious purposes, as is the case under the existing law.

2. The earlier provisions of exemption contained in sections 10 and sections 11 to 13 were contained in Chapter III – Incomes which do not Form Part of Total Income. These were therefore exemption provisions. Under the new Act, the provisions are contained in sections 332 to 355, which are contained in Part B – Special Provisions for Registered Non-Profit Organisations of Chapter XVII – Special Provisions Relating to Certain Persons. These are now therefore computation provisions, and not exemption provisions. Certain specific provisions, such as those contained in clauses (iiiab), (iiiac), (iiiad) and (iiiae) of section 10(23C) continue as complete exemptions, being part of Schedule III, read with section 11 of the new Act, which deals with incomes not to be included in total income.

The switchover from a scheme of exemption to a scheme of computation may not have any significant impact, given that:

(a)  the provisions of section 14 (current section 14A) relating to disallowance of expenditure incurred for earning exempt income apply for the purposes of computing income under Chapter IV (i.e. under the heads of income) and not under Chapter XVII-B; and

(b)  the provisions of Alternate Minimum Tax under section 206 specifically provide for reduction of “regular income” of a regd NPO referred to in section 355 from the profits as per profit and loss account, in the definition of “book profit” in section 206(1)(c).

3. The exemption provisions contained for some specific types of important institutions, educational and medical institutions in clauses (iv), (v), (vi) and (via) of section 10(23C) have been merged with the general computation provisions for regd NPOs. Therefore, there is now only one regime of computation for regd NPOs under the new Act, as opposed to two exemption regimes under the current Act. A beginning for the merger of the two regimes had been made earlier under the current Act, by providing that with effect from 1.10.2024, no application for renewal of s.10(23C) approval would be made under that section, but would have to be made under section 12A, and by bringing the two exemption regimes almost on par with each other. Section 355(g) of the new Act provides that an approval under section 10(23C) would be a registration for the purposes of the new Act, and therefore an entity approved under section 10(23C) would be a regd NPO under the new Act.

4. Instead of all income from property held under trust, including donations, being considered for computation of exemption, and with loss of exemption for certain incomes under sections 11(3), 13 or section 115BBC,  incomes of a trust would now be categorised into 3 categories – regular income (85% of which is required to be applied), specified income (which is taxable at a flat rate of 30%) and residual income.

“Regular income” is defined in section 335 as:

(a) Income from any charitable or religious activity for which the NPO is registered, carried out by it in such tax year;

(b) Income derived from any property, deposit or investment held wholly for charitable or religious purposes by such regd NPO in such tax year;

(c) Income derived from any property, deposit or investment held in part for religious and charitable purposes by NPOs set up prior to 1.4.1962;

(d) Voluntary contributions received by such regd NPO in such tax year; and

(e) Gains of any permitted commercial activity carried out by such regd NPO in such tax year.

In the draft Bill, the word “receipts” had been used in place of the word “income” in items (a), (b) and (c), and in (b), the term used was “receipts, whether capital or revenue”. Fortunately, the language in the new Act has been rectified, with the term used now being “income”.

“Specified income” consists of anonymous donations and income which was so far taxable under section 115BBI, and includes the following:

(a) Taxable anonymous donations;

(b) Income applied for the benefit of specified persons;

(c) Income applied outside India without CBDT approval;

(d) Investment made in contravention of permitted investment pattern;

(e)Accumulated income, applied to purposes other than purposes of accumulation, or ceasing to be accumulated or set apart, or not applied within the period of accumulation, or credited or paid to another regd NPO;

(f) Income applied to purposes other than purposes for which it is registered;

(g) Business income determined by the AO in excess of income shown in books of account of the business undertaking.

Here too, in the draft Bill, the scope of anonymous donations had been proposed to include all anonymous donations received by a charitable-cum-religious trust. The new Act finally covers only anonymous donations received for a university/educational institution or hospital/medical/institution by such religious-cum-charitable trusts, besides all anonymous donations received by a charitable trust, as is the position under the current Act. Anonymous donations received by religious trusts continue to remain outside the purview of taxation as anonymous donations.

“Residual Income” is defined in section 355(j) to mean the total income without giving effect to the provisions of Part B of Chapter XVII, as reduced by regular income and specified income. Incidentally, the term “total income” is not defined in this Chapter. Section 2(108) defines total income as the total amount of income referred to in section 5, computed in the manner as laid down under this Act. Given that the headwise computation provisions would not apply (as discussed below), this would probably mean the sum total of all the incomes as computed after deductions and exclusions under Part B of Chapter XVII.

2. REGISTRATION

The provisions for registration of an NPO are contained in section 332(3), and are identical to those currently applicable under section 12A(1)(ac). Section 332(3) has a table listing out the 7 types of cases [currently found in clauses (i) to (vi)(A) and (B) of current section 12A(1)(ac)], giving the time limit for furnishing the application, time limit for passing the order by the CIT, and the period of validity of registration. The enhanced period of registration of 10 years for small NPOs having gross income of less than ₹5 crores in each of the preceding two years, introduced by the Finance Act 2025, has also been provided for in section 332(5).

As under the current Act, the CIT has been empowered to condone delay in making of the application if he finds that it was for a reasonable cause. There is now a specific provision in section 332(6) to the effect that if an application for registration is not made within the specified time and the delay in filing such application is not condoned, the NPO shall be liable to pay tax on accreted income under section 352.

The provisions of current section 11(7), which prohibit claim of exemption under section 10 except certain specific sub-sections, and which provide a regime for one-time switchover from section 10(23C) to section 11, are continued in section 333.

3. CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION

Section 12AB(4) of the current Act lists out the “specified violations” on the noticing of which, the CIT can cancel the registration of a trust, and the procedures for the same. Section 12AB(5) provides the time limit within which such order of cancellation, or refusal of cancellation, has to be passed.

Section 351 of the new Act now contains these provisions relating to specified violations, the procedure to be followed for cancellation and the time limits for passing of order by the CIT.

The list of specified violations is identical, except that it now covers violation of section 346. Section 346 deals with commercial activity by GPU trusts, and prohibits such activity unless carried out in course of GPU objects, aggregate receipts from such activity do not exceed 20% of total receipts of the regd NPO and separate books of account are maintained for such commercial activity. Therefore, if the receipts from commercial activity of a GPU trust exceed 20% of the aggregate receipts, this can result in cancellation of registration, which was not the position under the current Act.

4. COMPUTATION OF INCOME AND TAX LIABILITY

Section 334 provides that the tax payable by a regd NPO on its total income for a tax year shall be the aggregate of tax calculated at 30% of the specified income and calculated at the applicable rate for taxable regular income and residual income for the tax year.

As per section 334(2), the provisions of Chapter XVII would override all other provisions of the new Act, except the clubbing provisions contained in sections 96 to 98 of the new Act. Therefore, the computation provisions contained under the respective heads of income would not apply to a regd NPO. This is similar to the position prevailing under the current Act, where the CBDT had clarified vide its Circular No. 5-P (LXX-6) dated 19th June, 1968, that the income, for the purpose of computation of exemption, has to be taken on a commercial basis (as per books of account). One area of difference from the current Act would be in a situation where the entire income of the regd NPO is not exempt from tax, the income would be computed and taxed under this Chapter. Under the current Act, in some Tribunal decisions, a view had been taken that income which was not exempt was to be computed under the respective heads of income.

This would also mean that the tax computation contained in section 334 would apply irrespective of the nature of income. For instance, the tax on long term capital gains would be as per the provisions of section 334, and not at the rate of 12.5% prescribed under section 197 (section 112 of the current Act). Section 334 refers to the rate applicable on taxable regular income and any residual income. This rate is not spelt out in the new Act – it would probably be prescribed under the Finance Act each year. But, in case the regd NPO is a company, it will not be eligible for the concessional rate of tax for companies under section 200 (section 115BAA of the current Act).

A. Taxable Regular Income

Section 336 defines taxable regular income. Taxable regular income is nil, where 85% or more of the regular income has been applied or accumulated for charitable or religious purposes. Where less than 85% of the regular income has been applied or accumulated, the taxable regular income would be 85% of the regular income, less income applied for charitable or religious purposes or accumulated.

Voluntary contributions received by a regd NPO are included in the definition of income under section 2(49)(c).

B. Deemed Accumulated Income

This 15% of regular income (or unspent amount up to 15% where more than 85% of the regular income is spent), is treated as deemed accumulated income [section 343(1)]. As per the draft Bill, such deemed accumulated income was to be invested in modes permitted under section 350. This could have created difficulty, as such amount may not necessarily be available with the regd NPO (e.g. if 100 is donated to another regd NPO, 85% is treated as application and balance 15% may fall under deemed accumulation, but would not be available for investment, having already been donated). Fortunately, in the new Act, the provision is that if invested, it has to be invested in modes permitted under section 350 [current section 11(5)]. In other words, such investment is not mandatory, but only the modes of investment are mandatory. It is specifically provided in section 343(2) that deemed accumulated income is different from accumulated income under section 342 [current section 11(2)].

C. Exclusions from Regular Income

Section 338 provides that certain incomes shall not be included in the regular income. These are:

(a)  Income applied outside India where the CBDT has directed that such income shall not be included in the total income (i.e. income applied outside India with the approval of the CBDT). This approval can be granted for an NPO created before 1st April 1952 for charitable or religious purposes, or for an NPO created on or after 1st April 1952 for charitable purposes where such application of income outside India tend to promote international welfare in which India is interested.

(b) Corpus donations received by the regd NPO.

The language of the new Act in effect settles the controversy existing under the current Act as to whether, to claim exemption, the application has to be in India or charitable purposes has to be in India. The current Act uses the phrase “applied to such purposes in India”, which gave rise to this controversy. The Delhi High Court in National Association of Software & Services Companies, 345 ITR 362, had held that the application had to be in India, while the Karnataka High Court in Ohio University Christ College, 408 ITR 352, had held that the exemption was available if the purposes was in India. Since the new Act uses the term “income applied outside India”, where any application of income is to be made outside India, it would be excluded from income only if prior CBDT approval is obtained for such expenditure.

The exclusion of such income applied outside India (with CBDT approval) and corpus donations, implies that such incomes would not be considered for computing the deemed accumulated income of 15% (i.e. for computing 85% of regular income) in determining the taxable regular income.

D. Corpus Donations

“Corpus donation” is defined in section 339 to mean any donation made with a specific direction that it shall form part of the corpus of the regd NPO, provided that such donation is invested or deposited in one of the modes permitted under section 350 maintained specifically for such corpus. This is similar to the current section 11(1)(d), which requires investment of corpus donations in permitted modes and earmarking of investments.

E. Application of Income

What is considered as allowable application of income is contained in section 341. Sums applied for charitable or religious purposes in India for which the NPO is registered and paid during the year, are allowable as application of income. In case of donations paid to another regd NPO, 85% of the donations are allowable. If such donations are towards the corpus of the other regd NPO, the donation will not be allowable as application of income. As under the current Act, adjustments are required to be made for payments made out of corpus or out of loans or borrowings (not to be considered in the year of payment), and reinvestment back in corpus investments or repayment of such loan or borrowing (to be considered as application in the year of reinvestment or repayment). Cash payments exceeding ₹10,000 and amounts on which TDS which was deductible, but are not deducted, are not allowable as application of income. Similarly, deficit of earlier years is also not allowable as an application of income.

F. Deemed Application of Income- Option to Spend and Capital Gains

The option to spend income in subsequent year (or the year of receipt of income), currently contained in the explanation to section 11(1), which was proposed to be done away with in the draft Bill, has been finally retained in the new Act. This is contained in section 341(5), and is deemed to be an application of income. Similarly, the exemption for capital gains, currently in section 11(1A) of the current Act, which was also sought to be removed in the draft Bill, has been retained in the new Act. It will now be treated as a deemed application under section 341(9). Interestingly, while sub-section (8) of section 341 provides that application under sub-section (1) shall include deemed application where option is exercised under sub-section (5), similar provision is absent in respect of deemed application under sub-section (9) in respect of capital gains. However, the absence of such specific provision should not impact the allowability of capital gains as a deduction in computing taxable regular income.

G. Accumulated Income

As under the current Act, under the new Act also, a regd NPO has the option to accumulate its regular income for a period of up to 5 years. Here also, a form has to be filed stating the purpose and period of accumulation. The amount of accumulation has also to be invested in the modes permitted under section 350, as under the current Act.

Under the current Act, there has been a controversy raging for the last 34 years as to what can be stated to be the purposes of accumulation – whether some or all of the objects of the trust can be stated to be the purposes of accumulation has been a matter of litigation. Unfortunately, this controversy may continue even under the new law, given that it also does not bring about clarity on the issue.

On the contrary, a new issue could arise as to whether the accumulation can only be for a single purpose or whether it can be for multiple purposes, as permitted under the current law. This issue is on account of the use of the word in singular “purpose” in the new Act and not the plural “purposes” as in the current Act. It appears that the intention is not to restrict it to a single purpose, as the objective of the new Act is merely to use simpler language and not to bring about policy changes.

In the new Act also, change in purpose is permissible with the approval of the Assessing Officer (“AO”). Besides, the amount of accumulation cannot be utilized by donating to another regd NPO as under the current Act. Similarly, as under the current Act, on dissolution of the regd NPO, an application can be made to the AO to donate the amount of application to another regd NPO.

As mentioned earlier, the unspent accumulation or accumulation ceasing to be kept apart or that is donated to another regd NPO would be taxable as specified income.

5. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

Section 11(4) of the current Act applies to a business undertaking held in trust, and provides that the term “property held under trust” includes a business undertaking so held. Courts have taken the view that section 11(4) applied to a situation where the business itself was held in trust, while section 11(4A) applied in other cases where business was carried on. Therefore, the requirements of section 11(4A) of incidental business and separate books of account did not apply to cases covered by section 11(4). Section 344 of the new Act corresponds to section 11(4). It provides that where the property held by a regd NPO includes a business undertaking, and if a claim is made for benefits under these provisions, then the AO has the power to determine the income of such business undertaking as per the provisions of the new Act. The definition of “specified income” includes the addition made by the AO to the book income of such business undertaking – only the book income would qualify as regular income, eligible for deduction of application, deemed application and accumulation of income.

Under the current Act, the proviso to section 2(15) used the term “activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business or activity of rendering any service in relation to trade, commerce or business”. This applied only to trusts engaged in the object of advancement of general public utility (GPU trusts). Section 11(4A) used the term “business”. Section 11(4A) applies to both GPU trusts as well as non-GPU trusts. There was accordingly a distinction between the proviso to section 2(15), which uses broader terminology, and section 11(4A), which uses the term “business”. The new Act uses the term “commercial activity” in the context of both of these, and does not distinguish between these.

The term “commercial activity” has been defined in section 355(e) as means any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to trade, commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application or retention of the income from such activity. This is identical to the language of the current proviso to section 2(15), which was interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of ACIT(E) vs. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority [2022] 449 ITR 1 (SC). In that case, the Supreme Court held that any activity in furtherance of GPU objects where there was substantial mark up over cost would be regarded as in the nature of trade, commerce or business.

Two sections apply to trusts carrying on commercial activity – section 346 deals with GPU trusts, and section 345 deals with non-GPU trusts. In case of GPU trusts, the position under section 346 is the same as was earlier prevalent under the proviso to section 2(15). It provides that a regd NPO, carrying on advancement of any other object of general public utility, shall not carry out any commercial activity unless:

(a) Such commercial activity is undertaken in the course of actual carrying out of advancement of any object of general public utility;

(b) The aggregate receipts from such commercial activity/activities do not exceed 20% of the total receipts of such regd NPO of the relevant tax year; and

(c) Separate books of account are maintained by such regd NPO for such activities.

Section 345, applicable to non-GPU trusts or activities, provides that a regd NPO (other than that referred to in section 346) shall not carry out any commercial activity, unless:

(a)  Such commercial activity is incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the regd NPO; and

(b) Separate books of account are maintained for such activities.

Section 345 was meant to be the equivalent of section 11(4A), with the difference that section 11(4A) as applicable to GPU trusts has been incorporated in section 346. However, section 11(4A) used the term “business”, as opposed to the term “activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business or activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business”, which is a much broader term. Given that the same definition of “commercial activity” would apply to both section 346 (GPU trusts) as well as section 345 (non-GPU trusts), which definition is identical to that contained in the current proviso to section 2(15), it appears that the same meaning which earlier applied only to GPU trusts would now apply to non-GPU trusts as well. The interpretation of the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (supra) may now apply not only to GPU trusts, but also to non-GPU trusts. Therefore, some activities of non-GPU trusts, which resulted in surplus but were not considered as business for the purposes of section 11(4A), may now be covered by section 345. This would require maintenance of separate books of account for such activities.

What are the consequences of violation of sections 345 or 346? Violation of either of these provisions is regarded as a “specified violation” under section 351(1)(b), which can result in cancellation of registration of the NPO. Under the current Act, while violation of section 11(4A) is a “specified violation”, which can attract cancellation of registration, applicability of the proviso to section 2(15) is not such a specified violation and does not result in cancellation of registration. Therefore, under the new Act, if a regd NPO carries on a GPU activity which results in substantial surplus, and the  gross receipts from such activity exceeds 20% of the total receipts of the NPO, its registration can be cancelled, with consequent applicability of tax on accreted income. This is a drastic change from the current position, where there is only a loss of exemption for the year. This seems to be an unintended consequence of merger of the proviso to section 2(15) with section 11(4A) in so far as GPU NPOs are concerned.

Besides, currently, section 13(8) read with section 13(10) provides that in case the proviso to section 2(15) is attracted, while exemption would not be available, only the net income of the trust would be taxable. Section 353(1), corresponding to current section 13(10), provides for taxation of net income of a GPU trust which has violated section 346. However, there is no similar provision for violation of section 345 by a non-GPU trust, which may suffer tax on its gross income.

6. COMPLIANCES

A. Books of Account

Currently, the exemption under sections 11 and 12 is subject to the requirements of section 12A. Clause (b)(i) of section 12A requires the maintenance of books and other documents in the form and manner and at the place, as may be prescribed, where the income exceeds the maximum amount not chargeable to tax. Violation of this condition can result in loss of tax exemption for the relevant year.

Under the new Act, section 347 contains the requirement to maintain the books of accounts and other documents in prescribed form and manner and at the prescribed place. Section 353 provides that the consequence of failure to maintain books of account under section 347 shall be that the regular income as reduced by the expenditure referred to in section 353(3) shall be the taxable regular income, i.e. in other words, the benefit of accumulation, deemed accumulation, deduction for capital expenditure, corpus donations and donations to other NPOs shall not be available. It may be noted that the consequence is only for failure to maintain books of account, and not failure to maintain other documents.

B. Audit

Similarly, current section 12A(b) requires accounts to be audited if the income is above the income exemption threshold limit and the audit report to be filed, in order to get the benefit of exemption. This requirement of audit is now contained in section 348, with the consequences of failure to get books of account audited contained in section 353(1) being taxation of net income without certain deductions, similar to the consequences
of failure to maintain books of account. Here also, section 353(1) is attracted only for failure to get the books of account audited, and not for failure to furnish audit report.

C. Return of Income

Under the current Act, under section 139(4A), a charitable or religious trust claiming exemption under section 11 is required to file a return of income, if its income (before exemption under sections 11 & 12) exceeds the threshold exemption limit. This obligation is now contained in section 263(1)(iii) of the new Act, which requires a person other than a company or a firm to file its return of income if its income (before  giving effect to provisions of Chapter XVII-B)  exceeds the maximum amount not chargeable to tax (“threshold limit”). Current section 139(4C)(e) also requires institutions claiming exemption under clauses (iiiab), (iiiac), (iiiad), (iiiae), (iv), (v), (vi) and (via) of section 10(23C) to file their returns of income. Educational and medical institutions falling under the current clauses (iiiab), (iiiac), (iiiad), and (iiiae) of section 10(23C) would fall within the definition of “specified entity” under the new section 263(1)(iv) and will also be subject to the same obligation. There are no separate exemptions under the new Act corresponding to clauses (iv), (v), (vi) and (via) of the current Act, and these would therefore fall within the general exemption for regd NPOs, also covered by section 263(1)(iii).

Section 349 of the new Act provides that where the total income of a regd NPO exceeds the threshold limit, it has to furnish the return of income as per the provisions of section 263(1)(a)(iii) and (2), within the time limit allowed under section 263(1)(c). This time limit continues to be 31st October for persons whose accounts are required to be audited. Under the current Act, trusts are permitted to file returns within the time limits specified in sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 139 – i.e. even belated returns are permitted.

Section 353 provides that where any regd NPO fails to furnish its return under section 349, its taxable regular income shall be the net income without certain deductions (the same as in cases of failure to maintain books of account or failure to get books of account audited). Would this cover only cases of failure to file the return of income, or even delay in filing the return of income?  While section 353 refers only to failure to file a return under section 349, section 349 requires the return to be filed within the time allowed under section 263(1)(c). Therefore, even cases of delay may invite applicability of these provisions, unlike under the current law where filing of a belated return of income within the time limit under section 139(4) does not attract such consequence.

D. Permitted Modes of Investment

Section 350(1) of the new Act provides that the modes of investing or depositing the money under Chapter XVII-B shall be those specified in Schedule XVI. Section 350(2) further permits notification by the Central Government of other modes of investing or depositing money.

Schedule XVI lists out all the modes currently listed in section 11(5), including immovable property.
It even includes the other modes notified for the purposes of section 11(5) under rule 17C, such as units of mutual funds, equity shares of a depository, equity shares of an incubatee by an incubator, units of Powergrid Infrastructure Investment Trust, etc.

The permissible investments/deposits list in this Schedule also contains the exceptions which are currently listed under section 13(1)(d) and under clause (b) of the third proviso to section 10 (23C), such as:

(a) Assets held as part of the corpus as at 1st June 1973;

(b) Equity shares of a public company held by a university/educational institution/hospital/ medical institution as part of the corpus as of 1st June 1998;

(c) Bonus shares allotted on such shares held as corpus;

(d) Donations received and maintained in the form of jewellery, furniture or any other notified article;

(e) Any asset, other than those permitted under other clauses of this Schedule, if not held beyond one year from the end of the year in which the asset was acquired;

(f) Funds representing profits and gains of business.

Schedule XVI also has an interpretation clause, where various terms used in the Schedule are defined.

The consequences of violation of the provisions of section 350 are contained in S.No.4 of the table of specified income in section 337. It provides that any investment or deposit made in contravention of the provisions of section 350 out of any income, accumulated income, deemed accumulated income, corpus, deemed corpus or any other fund would be taxable as specified income in the year in which such investment or deposit is made.

Under the current provisions of section 13(1)(d), while exemption was lost on account of the impermissible investment to the extent of the impermissible investment, such loss of exemption could only be to the extent of income for the year. Therefore, if the gross income of the trust for the year was Rs 10 lakh, and an impermissible investment of Rs 1 crore was made out of the corpus or past accumulation, the income that could be taxed so far was only Rs 10 lakh (income for that year which suffered loss of exemption). Under the new Act, the entire Rs 1 crore would be treated as specified income and taxed at 30%. The consequences under the new Act are therefore far more stringent.

7. TAX ON ACCRETED INCOME

The provisions for tax on accreted income, a form of exit tax, currently contained in Chapter XII-EB, sections 115TD to 115TF, are now also part of Chapter XVII-B, being contained in section 352. The computation of accreted income is set out in the form of a formula in section 352(2). Section 352(4) contains a table specifying the cases attracting tax on accreted income, the specified date on which accreted income is to be computed, and the due date for payment of tax on accreted income in each case.

Delay in filing an application for renewal of registration continues to attract tax on accreted income, as under the current Act.

8. APPROVAL FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 133 (CURRENT SECTION 80G)

The provisions for approval for purposes of section 133 (corresponding to section 80G of the current Act) is also contained in Chapter XVII-B in section 354. The conditions for such registration under the new section 354 are the same as those contained in section 80G(5), except that the condition contained in clause (i) that the income is not liable to income tax by virtue of section 11 and 12 or section 10(23C) is omitted.

Section 354(2) contains a table, stating the types of cases, time limits for furnishing application, time limit for passing the order and validity of approval in each case. These are the same as those contained in the current Act.

The requirement of filing a statement of donations and for furnishing a certificate to the donor in respect of such donations continues under the new Act.

9. PENALTY & FEES

The existing penalty and fees applicable to religious and charitable trusts continue under the new Act – penalty for provision of benefit to related persons (current section 271AAE, new section 445), penalty for failure to deliver statement of donations or furnish certificate to donors (current section 271K, new section 464), and fees for failure to deliver statement of donations or certificate to donors within time (current section 234G, new section 429).

CONCLUSION

All in all, while the general provisions relating to charitable and religious organisations have remained broadly the same, the manner in which some of the changes have been carried out could possibly cause difficulty in some cases. One hopes that these are just drafting mistakes, which will be corrected in the forthcoming Budget.

However, the complexity of the provisions and procedures relating to regd NPOs still continues, with harsh consequences for even minor mistakes. Under such circumstances, unless the provisions are really simplified and made more reasonable, the large scale litigation in this area of income tax is likely to continue.

Statistically Speaking

1.1. INDIA’S TRADE DEFICIT NARROWS

INDIA'S TRADE DEFICIT NARROWS

2. COUNTRIES THAT LOST THE MOST MILLIONAIRES IN 2025

COUNTRIES THAT LOST THE MOST MILLIONAIRES IN 2025

3. COUNTRIES THAT GAINED THE MOST MILLIONAIRES IN 2025

COUNTRIES THAT GAINED THE MOST MILLIONAIRES IN 2025

4. INDIAN STATES WITH THE LARGEST GEN-Z POPULATION

INDIAN STATES WITH THE LARGEST GEN-Z POPULATION

5. INCOME TAX RETURNS HIT NEW RECORD

INCOME TAX RETURNS HIT NEW RECORD

GST Cartoon

 

Learning Events At BCAS

1. Indirect Tax Laws Study Circle Meeting on “Section 74 Notices Under GST: Demands, Defenses & Dilemmas” held on Tuesday, 16th September, 2025 @ Virtual.

Group leader CA. Ganesh Prabhu Balakumar prepared five case studies covering various aspects of Section 74 of the CGST Act.

The presentation covered the following aspects with the background of the applicability of section 74 for detailed discussion:

  1. Issues relating to the classification of drones, procedural aspects of inspection proceedings u/s section 67 of the CGST Act, and whether misclassification may lead to suppression.
  2. Aspects relating to RCM on import of services, implications of treatment of transactions in the books of accounts and allegations of suppression.
  3. Whether every mismatch or lapse, classification differences, return reconciliations, delayed RCM, and ITC mismatches amount to fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression u/s 74, or should they be treated as clerical and interpretational errors u/s 73.

Around 102 participants from all over India benefited while taking an active part in the discussion. Participants appreciated the efforts of the group leader and the mentor.

2. Finance, Corporate & Allied Laws (FCAL) Study Circle –  AGM Related Compliances (W.R.T. Private Companies) including Recent Amendments in Directors’ Report & Annual Filings held on Tuesday, 2nd September 2025 @ Virtual.

The Finance, Corporate and Allied Laws Study Circle of the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS) organised a virtual session on 02nd September 2025 on the topic “AGM-related compliances (w.r.t. Private Companies) including recent amendments in Directors’ Report and annual filings.” The session focused on providing participants with a comprehensive understanding of the statutory provisions and practical considerations surrounding annual general meetings for private companies.

During the session, the speaker explained the latest regulatory updates and their implications on corporate governance and statutory filings. The discussion covered recent amendments impacting Directors’ Reports and annual filings, key timelines, and documentation requirements under the Companies Act. Various practical issues faced by companies were addressed, including common mistakes in annual filings and strategies to ensure timely and accurate compliance.

The session was highly interactive and was well-received by the attendees. A total of 65 participants benefited from the detailed discussion and gained clarity on evolving compliance requirements and best practices to manage statutory obligations efficiently.

3. Family Offices Summit 2025 held on 30th August 2025@ The Rooftop & Malabar Trident, Nariman point.

The Family Offices Summit 2025, organised by the Finance, Corporate & Allied Laws Committee of Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society, held on 30th August 2025 at Trident, Nariman Point, Mumbai, was a landmark summit that brought together leading voices from family businesses, investment management, and advisory practices. The day-long summit featured keynote addresses, thought-provoking panels, and engaging conversations that explored the evolving role of family offices in India and in the global arena.

Setting the Context – The Rise of Family Offices

The summit began with a keynote address by Mr Rishabh Mariwala, who eloquently captured the rise of family offices in India. He spoke about why family offices matter now more than ever, emphasising their role in professionalising wealth management, preserving legacies, and empowering the next generation to carry forward values and vision alongside wealth.

The international perspective on structuring family offices in Asia, the Hong Kong Perspective featured insights from Mr Jason Fong, who delivered a short video message, and Ms Joanne Zheng, who gave a presentation. Together, they highlighted Hong Kong’s evolving ecosystem for family offices and noted that Indian families are increasingly exploring global jurisdictions for wealth structuring. This shift underscores Hong Kong’s appeal as a hub for family offices, thanks to its favourable tax policies, strategic location, and professional services.

Ancient Wisdom for Modern Day Family Businesses

National award-winning author Dr Radhakrishnan Pillai delivered an invigorating talk on ancient wisdom for modern family businesses. Drawing from the Arthashastra and Chanakya’s principles, he connected timeless governance and leadership insights with today’s family business challenges. His address reminded participants that while structures and strategies evolve, the essence of values, vision, and governance remains constant.

Session 1: Family Offices in India – Emerging Trends & Realities

The first panel brought together diverse voices across two parallel discussions. Panel 1A, moderated by Mr Avik Ashar featured Ms Anupa Tanna Shah, Mr Rubin Chheda, Mr. Sachin Tagra  and Mr. Samir Shah. The discussion revolved around the growing sophistication of family offices, professional management, and the balance between preserving legacy and seeking growth through new asset classes.

Panel 1B, moderated by Mr Devashish Khanna, hosted Mr Amit Jain, Mr Rahul Khanna, and Mr Subeer Monga. This discussion focused on the realities of structuring, the need for governance frameworks, and the importance of aligning investment philosophy with family objectives. Together, both panels highlighted the vibrancy and evolving maturity of family offices in India.

Session 2: Smart Structuring – Tax-Optimized Wealth Transfer & Succession

Post lunch, the focus shifted to succession and tax-efficient structuring. Moderated by Mr Rutvik Sanghvi, the panel featured Dr Anup Shah, Mr Parthiv Kamdar, and Mr Tanmay Patnaik. The session explored practical approaches to wealth transfer, succession planning tools, and the nuances of tax implications across jurisdictions. The discussion underscored that succession is not merely a legal exercise but a delicate balance of family dynamics, governance, and foresight.

Fireside Chat – Global Playgrounds: Jurisdiction Shopping for Indian Wealth

One of the highlights of the summit was the engaging fireside chat between Mr Dinesh Kanabar and Mr Anand Bathiya. Their candid conversation on jurisdiction shopping unpacked the rationale behind families considering global structures for wealth, covering regulatory considerations, global opportunities, and challenges. The discussion was both practical and visionary, offering participants a clear sense of the opportunities available in an increasingly interconnected world.

Session 3: Family Offices as Strategic Partners in Alternative Funds

The third thematic session focused on family offices as active partners in alternative investment platforms. Moderated by Ms Kinnari Gandhi, the panel included Mr Aditya Jha, Mr Anurag Agrawal, Mr Manish Chhabra, and Mr Nirav Shah. The dialogue highlighted how family offices are now playing a strategic role in shaping investment ecosystems, co-creating ventures, and deploying patient capital to nurture long-term opportunities.

Session 4: Real-Life Case Studies in Succession Planning

The final session was a powerful exploration of succession in action, moderated by Mr. Amit Goenka. Esteemed panellists Mr Aashish Somaiyaa, Mr Ravi Sheth, Mr Shishir Srivastava, and Mr Vivek Rajaraman shared real-life experiences from different sectors. The dwiscussion illuminated both the challenges and best practices in ensuring smooth transitions, underscoring the importance of trust, governance, and preparation in sustaining legacies.

Concluding Note

The day’s deliberations made it abundantly clear that family offices are not merely financial structures but institutions of continuity, vision, and stewardship. The Family Offices Summit, 2025, was attended by 76 participants, 40 were BCAS members, and the remaining 36 were non-members. Further, 19 participants attended from 12 cities outside the Mumbai Metropolitan Region.

This informative Summit was competently coordinated by Kinnari Gandhi with the help of convenors Khubi Shah Sanghvi and Rimple Dedhia and the guidance of Kanubhai, Naushadbhai and Anandbhai.

Family Offices Summit

4. Webinar on Mastering Charitable Trust Compliances held on Friday, 29th August 2025 @ Virtual

The BCAS webinar on “Mastering Charitable Trust Compliances” was successfully conducted on Friday, 29th August 2025, over the Zoom platform. The session was led by CA Gunja Thakrar and CA Ujwal Thakrar, and attracted wide participation from across the country, with over 145 attendees joining in. The audience comprised a diverse mix of professionals, trustees, and compliance officers, with attendees from more than 40 cities, including Mumbai, Bengaluru, Ahmedabad, Chennai, Delhi, Jaipur, Coimbatore, and even remote locations like Tuensang and Bhimavaram.

The webinar was structured around key compliance areas for charitable and religious trusts under the Income-tax Act. CA Gunja Thakrar led the first half of the session, beginning with an explanation of the Audit Report in Form 10B / 10BB, focusing on the interpretation of the 49 clauses, key compliance expectations, and documentation frameworks. This was followed by an overview of ITR-7, highlighting its key schedules and the accurate reporting of total income. She also covered the nuances of Forms 9 and 10, with emphasis on their applicability and disclosure requirements.

In the second half, CA Ujwal Thakrar delved into the increasingly important area of renewal and re-registration under Sections 12AB and 80G. He offered practical guidance on assessing organizational readiness, fulfilling financial compliance prerequisites, and navigating critical timelines. His session also included tips on managing documentation workflows, engaging with regulatory authorities, and monitoring post-registration conditions — all essential for effective compliance in today’s regulatory environment.

The session concluded with an engaging Q&A round, where attendees raised practical concerns from their daily practice. With participants spanning ages from below 30 to above 60, and nearly 45% of them from outside Mumbai, the webinar served as a robust learning platform. The comprehensive structure and clarity of presentation made it especially valuable to professionals managing trust compliance, reinforcing BCAS’s role in continuous learning and capacity building within the profession.

BCAS Academy Link: https://academy.bcasonline.org/courses/webinar-on-mastering-charitable-trust-compliances/

5. Indirect Tax Laws Study Circle Meeting on “Use Of Technology in GST- Part 2” held on Friday, 29th August 2025 @ Virtual

The Bombay Chartered Accountant Society had organized the following Study Circle Meeting under Indirect Taxes on 29th August 2025.

Group leader CA Rahul Gabhawala prepared a step-by-step demonstration of the prompt use of technology in GST.

The Presentation covered the following aspects for detailed discussion:

  1. Use of Chat-GPT to create codes in order to carry out Login at the GST Portal.
  2. Use of Selenium Wrapper to teach test automation at the GST Portal.
  3. Use of Selenium Wrappers to make test automation more efficient, reliable, and user-friendly.
  4. Use of Codes in automating certain functions at the GST Portal.

Around 80 participants from all over India benefited while taking an active part in the discussion. Participants appreciated the efforts of the group leader.

This was Part 2 of the session; Part 1 was held on 25th July 2025, and the write-up was published in the September 2025 issue of BCAJ.

5. DigiSetu – The Tech Bridge for Senior Professionals held on 7th, 14th, 21st, & 28th August 2025  @ Virtual

Speakers:

  • Ms Mahima Bhalotia, Mumbai
  • Mr Rohit Khiste, Nashik
  • CA Tanmay Bhavar, Nashik
  • CA Anup Tabe, Pune

SUMMARY:

The Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society hosted a four-part online series, DigiSetu – The Tech Bridge for Senior Professionals, in August 2025 through its Technology Initiatives Committee. Designed to blend technology with simplicity, the initiative empowered senior Chartered Accountants to stay updated in a fast-changing digital world — without jargon or complexity.

The journey began with DigiRakshak – Smartphone Safety Secrets, equipping participants with tools to block spam, manage app permissions, and secure payment apps. DigiSavdhaan – Cyber Safety 101 spotlighted online threats and safe digital habits. DigiSahayak – Gadgets & Apps Every Senior Professional Should Know opened a world of productivity apps and smart gadgets, while the finale, DigiBadlaav – AI Basics for Senior Professionals, demystified AI through practical uses of ChatGPT, automation, and ethical insights.

Short, crisp, and highly practical, DigiSetu proved that technology need not overwhelm senior professionals. Instead, it can serve as a bridge to confidence, efficiency, and ease in daily practice.

BCAS Academy Link: https://academy.bcasonline.org/courses/digisetu-the-tech-bridge-for-senior-professionals/

6. Full Day Workshop on GST Appellate Tribunal held on Friday, 22nd August 2025 @ BCAS (Hybrid)

Session Topic Faculty
Session I Pre-preparation for Tribunal CA. Adv. Ishaan Patkar
Session II Understanding the Law and Procedure CA. Adv. Vinay Jain
Session III Drafting & Filing of GSTAT Appeals CA. Vinod Awtani

(1) 123 participants from across 45 cities in India had registered for the workshop, with 32 participants enrolling physically, all the way travelling from Panaji, Satara, Nashik, Navi Mumbai and Vadodara, apart from Mumbai

(2) The first session covered the pre-preparation aspects for the upcoming GSTAT and had a detailed discussion on

– Modes of discharging pre-deposits, acceptance of taxes already paid due to compulsion from the department, discussion on case laws relating to the legal validity of such issues in the erstwhile legacy IDT laws or GST laws for the previous level. Discussions also covered the amendments of 2025 for pre-deposits on penalty orders and their implications

– Understanding the distribution of appeals filed with the Principal Bench and State Bench, and how to segregate the place of supply matters

– Understanding the bandwidth of the professionals to manage the appeals across various benches if virtual hearings are not made available

– Action points for matters remanded back from the high courts

(3) The second session covered understanding the law and procedure pertaining to GSTAT

– A comprehensive discussion amongst the participants on the legal provisions, section 109 to section 113, and CGST Rule 110 to Rule 113A was covered

– Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025, being notified and covering detailed procedural aspects, were discussed threadbare.

– GSTAT Forms, which are other than the appeal forms, were also covered to complete the procedural aspects.

(4) The last session covered the practical aspects

– Drafting and Filing of GSTAT Appeals

– Paper Book Compilation

– Drafting of Statement of Facts and Grounds of Appeals and prayers

– Curing the defects, communication with Registry

– Condonation of Delay, Miscellaneous Applications, Additional Evidence, Corrections

– This session covered the finer points and care to be taken during the entire process of drafting. The Do’s and Don’ts

(5) The full-day workshop was completely interactive throughout the 3 sessions, with the queries of the participants attending both physically as well as virtually were discussed by the group and answered by the faculty.

Full Day Workshop on GST Appellate Tribunal

BCAS Academy Link: https://academy.bcasonline.org/courses/workshop-on-gst-appellate-tribunal/

7. ITF Study Circle Meeting on the Discussion on Demystifying SC’s Decision in Hyatt International held on 20th August 2025@ BCAS Hybrid.

The International Tax and Finance Study Circle organized a meeting (hybrid mode) on 20th August 2025 to discuss the implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Hyatt International.

Chairman of the session – Mr Prashant Maharishi

Group Leaders CA Rohit Jethani and CA Sangeeta Jain

  • The session opened with remarks from the chairman on his initial views of the Supreme Court ruling.
  • Post that, the group leaders began by discussing the concept of Permanent Establishment.
  • Next, the group leaders discussed the facts of the case, the contentions of the taxpayers and the tax authorities and the ruling by the Supreme Court.
  • Then the group leaders discussed the implications of the ruling. The chairman of the session also added key points at critical points in the discussion.
  • Many participants shared their views on the ruling and their practical experiences in dealing with similar situations.
  • The group leaders also presented certain key points from meticulously undertaken research on various aspects of the ruling.

The session closed with concluding remarks by the chairman.

8. Webinar on Filing of Income Tax Returns for AY 2025-26 held on Tuesday, 12th August 2025 @ Virtual

The webinar on “Filing of Income Tax Returns for AY 2025-26 (ITR 1 to 6)” was successfully conducted on Tuesday, 12th August 2025, via Zoom, and witnessed an overwhelming response with 500+ participants. The session was jointly addressed by CA Divya Jokhakar and CA Khyati Vasani, both of whom are eminent professionals with deep domain expertise in direct tax compliance.

The speakers provided a detailed walkthrough of the changes introduced in ITR Forms 1 to 6 for AY 2025-26, including recent disclosure enhancements and practical nuances of reporting under the updated forms. Special emphasis was placed on understanding the granular reporting requirements in light of CBDT’s clarification that the filing due date was extended specifically to accommodate the extensive changes. The session highlighted how even small inaccuracies in ITR filings could lead to serious implications in terms of tax and interest liabilities.

The webinar concluded with an engaging Q&A session where participants actively raised their queries on tricky reporting areas, which were addressed with clarity by the speakers. The event reinforced the critical role of tax professionals in the evolving compliance landscape and was aimed at enhancing the readiness of members and their teams to ensure accurate and timely filing of income tax returns.

YouTube: – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNkRsvnRhzI&t

9. Tree Plantation Drive 2025 held on 02nd and 03rd August 2025@ Vada, Palghar District.

On 2nd and 3rd August 2025, 24 BCAS members along with 6 BCAS staff, participated in a school visit and tree plantation drive organized by the BCAS Foundation. The visit began on the morning of 2nd August at Lakhani School, where the team proudly inaugurated a new Digital Classroom supported by the Foundation. Members interacted with students and teachers to understand their expectations and aspirations around digital learning.

Later that evening, the group visited MM School, where the BCAS Foundation had earlier implemented a Digital Classroom, along with a Library and Science Lab. Members had the opportunity to evaluate the positive impact of these initiatives, observing encouraging outcomes such as increased student engagement, heightened interest in learning, and a noticeable reduction in dropout rates. Witnessing the transformative power of technology and infrastructure in shaping young minds was both humbling and inspiring.

On 3rd August, participants visited Koseri Village in Casa District for a tree plantation drive. The villagers welcomed the BCAS team with a vibrant tribal dance, and school students offered a heartfelt prayer before the plantation began. Together, members, staff, and villagers planted 6,000 saplings across six villages, contributing to long-term environmental sustainability and rejuvenation of green cover in the region.

The visit also included an immersive experience at Keshav Srushti, where members explored the Oxygen Park and learned about the organization’s remarkable Gramya Vikas initiatives aimed at uplifting underprivileged rural and tribal communities. Keshav Srushti’s holistic efforts in education, skill development, and building self-reliant ecosystems left a deep impression on everyone. Planting saplings amidst such an inspiring environment of service and sustainability made the experience even more meaningful.
Walking through the Oxygen Park, breathing in the freshness, and witnessing how thoughtfully nature and development coexist offered members a rare pause from their fast-paced urban lives.  The two-day visit concluded with a renewed sense of gratitude and pride in being associated with BCAS Foundation, reaffirming the collective commitment to education, environmental care, and community upliftment.

Tree Plantation

II. REPRESENTATIONS

The Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS) has submitted three key representations to the Government:

1. Charitable Trust Compliance Extensions: On 4th September 2025, BCAS requested extensions and clarifications for charitable and religious trusts, highlighting practical and procedural difficulties. Key requests include:

  • Extending the due date for renewal of registration under section 12AB (Form 10AB) from 30th September 2025 to 31st December 2025.
  • Addressing the punitive tax on accreted income under Section 115TD due to procedural hurdles.
  • Seeking a single renewal form for Section 12AB and Section 80G approvals.
  • Requesting a lenient approach to rejections based on technical grounds.
  • Extending the due date for Form 10B/10BB beyond 30 September 2025 due to the late release of the ITR-7 utility (late August 2025).
  • Clarifying the filing timelines for Form 9A/Form 10

Link – https://bcasonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/BCAS-representation-letter-to-CBDT-Form-10A-12A1aci-and-renewal-of-12AB-extension.pdf

 

2. Income Tax Due Date Extensions for AY 2025–26: On 1st September 2025, BCAS requested extensions for Income Tax Return and Audit Report due dates for Assessment Year 2025–26, especially for audit cases. This request is due to the delayed release of ITR forms and utilities (some as late as August 2025), technical portal issues, overlapping deadlines, reduced working days, and increased compliance burdens. BCAS proposed extending deadlines for:

  • Tax Audit Reports (including Firms, Companies, Trusts) to 30th November 2025.
  • ITR Filing for audit cases to 31stDecember 2025.
  • Transfer Pricing Reports (Form 3CEB) to 31st January 2026

Link : https://bcasonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/BCAS-Representation-for-extension-of-due-dates.pdf

3. GST Reforms: On 30th August 2025, BCAS proposed “next generational” reforms for Goods and Services Tax (GST). These suggestions focus on structural improvements, rate rationalisation, and ‘Ease of Living’ for taxpayers. Key areas include simplifying registration processes, clarifying grounds for registration cancellation, improving input tax credit (ITC) rules, streamlining invoicing and return systems, and enhancing refund mechanisms.

Link : https://bcasonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/BCAS-Representation-GST-August-2025.pdf

Readers can read the full representation by scanning the QR code or visit our website www.bcasonline.org

III. BCAS IN NEWS & MEDIA

BCAS has been featured in several news and media platforms, showing our active involvement, professional contributions, and commitment to the field. This reflects the growing recognition of BCAS in the public and professional space.

Link: https://bcasonline.org/bcas-in-news/

Guarding Market Integrity: The Evolving Contours of SEBI’S PFUTP Framework

A. INTRODUCTION

The SEBI Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market Regulations 2003, commonly referred to as PFUTP Regulations, were introduced as a direct response to systemic weaknesses observed during the late 1990s and early 2000s pertaining to market manipulation, to meet its objective of preserving market integrity, ensuring investor protection, and promoting transparency in India’s securities markets.

These regulations are broad in scope having mix of principle and rule-based approach. It applies to all market participants whether individuals, entities, or intermediaries, and are designed to curb manipulative, deceptive, or unethical conduct in connection with securities trading, public offerings, and disclosures. It prohibits person from buying, selling or otherwise dealing in securities in fraudulent manner by using any manipulative or deceptive device.

The term “fraud” under PFUTP is defined expansively to “include any act, expression, omission or concealment committed whether in a deceitful manner or not by a person or by any other person with his connivance or by his agent while dealing in securities in order to induce another person or his agent to deal in securities, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or avoidance of any loss, and shall also include—

(1) a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of material fact in order that another person may act to his detriment;

(2)a suggestion as to a fact which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true;

(3)an active concealment of a fact by a person having knowledge or belief of the fact;

(4)a promise made without any intention of performing it;

(5)a representation made in a reckless and careless manner whether it be true or false;

(6)any such act or omission as any other law specifically declares to be fraudulent,

(7)deceptive behaviour by a person depriving another of informed consent or full participation,

(8)a false statement made without reasonable ground for believing it to be true.

(9) the act of an issuer of securities giving out misinformation that affects the market price of the security, resulting in investors being effectively misled even though they did not rely on the statement itself or anything derived from it other than the market price.

And “fraudulent” shall be construed accordingly.”

The PFUTP Regulations apply to all persons, regardless of whether they are registered intermediaries, institutional investors, listed companies, or individual market participants.

The wide scope is intentional, reflecting SEBI’s philosophy that market integrity depends not just on the conduct of regulated entities but also on all participants operating within the ecosystem. SEBI, through its investigative and adjudicatory mechanisms, is empowered to detect and act against such misconduct by leveraging surveillance data, trading patterns, and documentary evidence.

B. APPLICABILITY

These regulations apply to act occurring in connection with the buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in securities, whether on-exchange, off-market, or in public offerings. The regulations are also designed to capture both actual misconduct and attempted or intended wrongdoing, even if no loss or damage occurs. The expansive language ensures that enforcement is not limited to technical breaches but encompasses conduct that undermines fair play and transparency.

A landmark case that highlights the application of this definition is SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (SAT Appeal No. 44 of 2006). In this case, the Hon. Securities Appellate Tribunal upheld SEBI’s action against a market participant involved in circular trading to create artificial volumes in the shares of a company. The Tribunal observed that the intent behind the transactions was not genuine investment or trading interest, but rather to give a misleading appearance of market activity. The ruling reinforced that intent to manipulate or mislead, even in the absence of direct monetary gain, falls squarely within the definition of fraud under PFUTP.

This interpretation underscores the principle that SEBI focuses not only on outcomes but also on intent and conduct. In an emphatic demonstration of regulatory resolve, SEBI, between April 2024 and June 2025, initiated proceedings against large number of entities wherein the alleged contraventions spanned a wide spectrum of malfeasance ranging from price and volume manipulation, to front-running, dissemination of deceptive information, and fraudulent misstatements in financial disclosures. This scale of enforcement is emblematic of the regulator’s sharpened surveillance system.

The PFUTP framework is thus preventive as well as disciplinary, aimed at deterring unethical behaviour, penalizing the contraventions and ensuring fair, transparent, and trustworthy market operations.

C. KEY AMENDMENTS INTRODUCED UNDER THE 2024 REGIME

The SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) (Amendment) Regulations, 2024 (‘2024 Amendments’) brought important changes aimed at making the existing framework more effective in preventing and penalizing market abuses. These amendments broaden the definition of fraudulent activities, clarify what counts as manipulative behaviour, and address new types of misconduct seen in today’s markets. The main changes include:

I. INCLUSION OF MULE ACCOUNTS FOR INDIVIDUAL TRADING

One of the major updates in the 2024 amendments is the clear recognition of “mule accounts.” These are trading or bank accounts that, while registered in one person’s name, are actually controlled or operated by someone else. Such accounts have been used to hide the original identity of person behind securities transactions, reducing transparency and enabling market manipulation. By explicitly including mule accounts in the regulations, SEBI can now hold the actual controllers/beneficiaries accountable. Any transactions done through these accounts are considered manipulative, fraudulent, and unfair, and are therefore prohibited under the law.

II. INCLUSION OF MULE ACCOUNTS IN MANIPULATION OF CORPORATE ASSETS AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

While SEBI has previously dealt with these issues on misuse of company assets and the manipulation of financial reports by listed companies, this amendment specifically includes bringing Mule Accounts directly under the PFUTP regulations, wherein the diversion of assets or manipulation of earnings impacts the market price of a company’s securities, such actions are now clearly classified as fraudulent and unfair trade practices.

This change emphasizes that misconduct is construed as a serious abuse of the securities market. The amendment clearly states that these acts will always be considered violations under the regulations, removing any doubt about their legal status. This move also supports SEBI’s long-held view that corporate wrongdoing affecting market prices must be treated as market fraud.

D. DEALING IN SECURITIES CONSIDERED DEEMED TO BE FRAUDULENT PRACTICE

Regulation 4(2) of SEBI (PFUTP) Regulations provides an illustrative list of activities that constitute fraudulent, manipulative, or unfair trade practices. These include:

  •  Creating False or Misleading Market Appearances: Deliberate actions that give the illusion of active or genuine trading, misleading market participants about demand or supply.
  •  Dealing in Securities Without Intent to Transfer Beneficial Ownership: Transactions conducted merely to inflate, depress, or cause fluctuations in security prices, without any intention of actual ownership transfer, aimed at wrongful gain or loss avoidance.
  •  Artificially Securing Minimum Subscription: Fraudulently inducing subscriptions in securities issues, including advancing money to others to meet minimum subscription requirements.
  •  Inducing Price Manipulation Through Payments: Offering or agreeing to pay money or other benefits to any person, directly or indirectly, to cause artificial price movements.
  •  Manipulating Security Prices or Reference Benchmarks: Any act or omission that influences or manipulates the price of a security or its benchmark price.
  •  Publishing Misleading or False Information: Knowingly disseminating false or misleading statements about securities or the market to influence prices or investor decisions.
  •  Market Participants Trading Without Client Knowledge or Misusing Client Funds: Executing transactions on behalf of clients without their knowledge or consent, or misappropriating client funds or securities held in fiduciary capacity.
  •  Circular Trading: Engaging in a series of transactions between parties, including intermediaries, to create a false impression of market activity or to manipulate prices.
  • Fraudulent Inducement for Enhanced Brokerage: Persuading others to trade securities with the primary intent of increasing brokerage or commission income fraudulently.
  •  Falsifying Records by Intermediaries: Altering or backdating contract notes, client instructions, or account statements to misrepresent transactions or holdings.
  •  Insider Trading with Unpublished Price-Sensitive Information: Placing orders while in possession of material non-public information affecting security prices.
  •  Planting False News: To induce Sale or Purchase of securities
  •  Mis-selling of Securities: Knowingly making false/misleading statements, concealing/omitting material facts, etc.
  • Illegal mobilization of Funds by sponsoring or causing to be sponsored or carrying on or causing to be carried on any collective investment scheme by any person.

E. FRONT-RUNNING AND ITS DISTINCTION FROM INSIDER TRADING WITHIN THE PFUTP FRAMEWORK

Front-running is a critical aspect of SEBI’s PFUTP Regulations, designed to uphold fairness and transparency in securities markets.

Front-running arises where an intermediary or market participant leverages advance knowledge of a substantial impending order. The compliance concern here is the breach of fiduciary responsibility, particularly were brokers or dealers trade in advance of client instructions.

It differs from Insider trading, which pertains to trading while in possession of unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) relating to the company itself. The compliance obligation here centres on safeguarding confidential corporate information from misuse by insiders or connected persons.

Both practices are prohibited under SEBI regulations but rest on different sources of confidential information. The case pertaining to SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel, (2018) 207 Comp Cas 416 (SC), covers front-running as a fraudulent and unfair trade practice, allowing enforcement actions based on circumstantial evidence such as suspicious trading patterns and communication records.

In the above-mentioned order, the factors like market liquidity and order size relative to average volumes were considered to contextually assessed the case. Moreover, SEBI has expanded its vigilance to cover emerging market manipulation techniques, including coordinated digital campaigns designed to artificially influence security prices. While insider trading and front-running are distinct in theory, in practice, they often intertwine in market abuse investigations. For compliance professionals, this means implementing robust surveillance systems, strict internal controls, and information barriers to detect, prevent, and address both forms of misconduct effectively.

F. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The SEBI PFUTP Regulations serve as a cornerstone for maintaining the integrity, transparency, and fairness of India’s securities markets. Through continuous evolution, most notably the recent 2024 amendments, SEBI has strengthened its regulatory framework to effectively tackle a broad spectrum of manipulative and deceptive practices, including mule accounts, financial statement manipulations, front-running, and coordinated digital misinformation campaigns. These regulations not only emphasize the prevention of outright fraud but also target conduct that disrupts market functioning and investor perceptions.

Following measure may further strengthen the PFUTP Framework:

a) Regulatory Refinement: SEBI must continue to refine the PFUTP framework, particularly by codifying guidance on emerging trading practices, ensuring that the law remains both technologically neutral and forward-looking.

b) Surveillance and Forensics: Leveraging artificial intelligence, machine learning, and data analytics in trade surveillance will be indispensable to detect patterns of collusion, layering, spoofing, and other technologically sophisticated manipulations.

c) Institutional Safeguards: Strengthening the role of intermediary’s stockbrokers, asset managers, and depositories in embedding surveillance, information barriers, and fiduciary accountability will serve as the first line of defence against front-running, insider trading, and misuse of mule accounts.

d) Global Convergence: Given the transnational nature of financial flows and digital trading, enhanced cooperation with international regulators will be necessary to combat misconduct that transcends jurisdictions. This can further be combined with global measures undertaken for prevention of money laundering.

e) Investor Awareness and Deterrence: A culture of deterrence must be reinforced not merely through penalties but also through systemic awareness campaigns, enabling investors to identify and avoid manipulative schemes, particularly those propagated via digital platforms.

Ultimately, preserving market integrity demands collective vigilance, timely enforcement, and adaptive regulatory frameworks that respond swiftly to emerging threats. By aligning regulatory rigor with market realities, SEBI and stakeholders can ensure a fair and resilient securities ecosystem that safeguards investors and supports sustainable capital market growth.

Rising Role of Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance

In recent years, shareholder activism has emerged as a significant force reshaping corporate governance across the globe. This paper explores how active shareholders are increasingly pushing for greater transparency, accountability, and strategic realignment within companies. Shareholder activism now serves as a vital mechanism through which investors—particularly institutional and minority shareholders—exercise their rights to influence corporate policies, leadership decisions, and long-term strategies. The study demonstrates how activism enhances investor participation while acting as an important check on managerial discretion. It highlights the expanding role of institutional investors, the prevalence of proxy battles, and the growing impact of ESG-focused campaigns in redefining governance practices. Various forms of shareholder action are examined, including voting against management proposals, raising public concerns, engaging directly with boards, and seeking legal remedies where necessary. Special attention is given to the rise of ESG-driven activism, reflecting the shifting priorities of today’s investors. The paper also analyses the evolution of shareholder activism in India, shaped by regulatory reforms and changing market dynamics. Additionally, it considers the implications of activism for capital markets and discusses some potential drawbacks associated with shareholder interventions.

OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH ARTICLE

  • To trace the historical development of shareholder activism globally and in India, identifying the major drivers behind its growth.
  •  To explore how shareholders exercise influence through voting rights, proxy battles, litigation, engagement, and media campaigns.
  •  To highlight in brief the limitations, potential misuse, and regulatory hurdles associated with shareholder activism.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study follows a qualitative, descriptive, and exploratory research design to analyze the role of shareholder activism in modern corporate governance. It relies entirely on secondary data sourced from academic journals, books, SEBI guidelines, the Companies Act, 2013, stewardship codes, and proxy advisory firm reports. Case studies such as Invesco–Zee, Tata Motors, and Elliott Management campaigns are examined to understand strategies and outcomes. Content and thematic analysis techniques are applied to categorize activism into governance, financial, proxy, legal, and ESG-driven forms. The study focuses on listed companies, with emphasis on India, while acknowledging limitations of secondary data reliability.

INTRODUCTION & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Corporate governance refers to the framework of rules, practices, and processes through which companies are directed and controlled to ensure fairness, accountability, and protection of stakeholder interests. One of the most significant shifts in this field has been the rise of shareholder activism, which has redefined the relationship between companies and their investors. Traditionally, shareholders played a largely passive role, limited to receiving dividends and casting occasional votes. Today, however, they actively participate in shaping corporate policies and governance structures.
Shareholder activism represents deliberate and organized efforts by investors—whether individuals or institutions—to influence corporate decision-making. These efforts may take the form of private engagement with management, filing shareholder resolutions, launching public campaigns, or pursuing legal action. The objective extends beyond safeguarding shareholder value; it seeks to enhance governance standards, strengthen accountability, and promote sustainable long-term performance. Activists commonly focus on issues such as board independence, executive compensation, financial performance, ESG (environmental, social, and governance) practices, and corporate social responsibility.

Modern activism increasingly addresses pressing global concerns such as climate change, diversity, and business ethics, reflecting the evolving priorities of investors. By promoting transparency and accountability, shareholder activism acts as an effective system of checks and balances, discouraging managerial misconduct and unethical behaviour. It helps mitigate the agency problem—where managers prioritise personal gain over shareholder interests—by aligning corporate actions with the goals of shareholders and other stakeholders. Activism also compels companies to enhance disclosures on executive pay, related-party transactions, and risk management practices, thereby building investor confidence. Ultimately, it fosters ethical conduct, drives long-term value creation, and contributes to the development of a healthier and more resilient corporate ecosystem.

GLOBAL CONTEXT AND ORIGIN

Shareholder activism originated in the early 20th century in the United States, when minority investors began raising concerns over corporate mismanagement. It gained prominence in the 1980s during a wave of takeovers and restructuring led by activist investors and hedge funds, initially focusing on unlocking short-term financial gains. By the 1990s and 2000s, the scope of activism expanded, with institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds influencing corporate behaviour through proxy voting and shareholder resolutions. The 2008 global financial crisis further amplified calls for stronger governance, transparency, and risk management, solidifying activism as a mainstream mechanism for holding management accountable. More recently, activism has shifted toward environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues, with investors demanding corporate responsibility and sustainability. While the U.S. and U.K. remain leaders due to strong regulatory frameworks, emerging markets like India, Brazil, and South Africa are witnessing growing activism, driven by legal reforms and rising investor awareness. Despite variations across regions, the core goal remains to enhance shareholder value while promoting ethical and sustainable business practices.

TYPES OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM

Types of Shareholder Activism

Shareholder activism has evolved into a diverse and powerful mechanism through which investors influence corporate governance, strategy, and performance. Governance activism seeks to strengthen internal governance frameworks by advocating changes in board composition, removing underperforming directors, appointing independent directors, and enhancing board diversity, often urging separation of the CEO and Chair roles to avoid concentration of power. Its primary aim is to improve board oversight, promote accountability, and protect minority shareholder rights, thereby preventing mismanagement and insider abuse. Financial or performance-based activism, typically driven by hedge funds and institutional investors, focuses on unlocking value through restructuring, divestment of non-core assets, spin-offs, improving cost efficiencies, or revising dividend and buyback policies. Proxy activism leverages shareholder voting rights to challenge management proposals, propose resolutions, and mobilize support to influence decisions on mergers, executive pay, or governance reforms, often resulting in board changes or blocking unfavourable actions. Legal activism uses courts and regulators to address fraud, insider trading, related-party transactions, or breaches of law, with frameworks like India’s Companies Act, 2013 and SEBI rules strengthening minority protection. ESG activism, now a global trend, pushes companies toward responsible practices by demanding lower carbon emissions, improved labour standards, greater diversity, and transparent sustainability reporting, aligning business strategies with long-term societal goals. Public or media-based activism amplifies pressure by publishing open letters, releasing reports, or using social media to mobilize investor and public opinion, forcing management to act when private engagement fails. Collaborative activism, by contrast, relies on constructive dialogue between investors and management to achieve gradual improvements in governance and ESG practices without confrontation, fostering long-term relationships. Hostile or aggressive activism represents the most confrontational form, where shareholders acquire significant stakes to force major changes such as board replacement, management overhaul, or mergers, combining proxy fights, litigation, and public campaigns to achieve results. While sometimes criticized for prioritizing short-term gains, this approach can catalyse rapid reform in poorly governed companies, as seen in Carl Icahn’s 2013 campaign against Dell Inc., where he opposed Michael Dell’s buyout plan, rallied shareholder support, and used aggressive tactics to influence the outcome. Together, these forms of activism reflect the expanding role of shareholders as catalysts for accountability, strategic realignment, and sustainable value creation.

MECHANISMS & TOOLS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM

HOW SHAREHOLDERS INFLUENCE DECISIONS

Shareholder activism mechanisms empower investors to influence corporate decisions through voting, engagement, proposals, litigation, and campaigns, aiming to enhance governance, accountability, transparency, and long-term shareholder value within companies. The following table encapsulates the mechanisms and tools of shareholder activism –

Mechanism Description Typical Uses Example
Voting Rights Each share usually carries one vote, allowing shareholders to influence key decisions at AGMs/EGMs. Approving mergers/acquisitions, electing directors, amending bylaws, approving executive pay. Mutual funds voting against pay hikes in Tata Motors (2017).
Shareholder Proposals / Resolutions Shareholders meeting minimum ownership criteria can submit proposals to be voted on at the AGM. ESG disclosures, governance reforms, capital allocation changes. Proposal for ESG reporting at ITC.
Board Representation (Proxy Fights) Shareholders may nominate directors and solicit votes to replace existing board members. Shifting corporate strategy, replacing underperforming management. Engine No. 1 winning board seats at Exxon Mobil.
Engagement & Negotiations Private discussions with management before resorting to public confrontation. Reaching agreement on strategy without media pressure. LIC engaging with Infosys board on corporate governance issues.
Litigation / Legal Action Filing lawsuits against directors or management for breaches of fiduciary duties, mismanagement, or violation of laws. Stopping value-destructive deals, enforcing disclosure. Shareholders suing Fortis Healthcare board over sale to IHH.
Public Campaigns & Media Pressure Using press releases, interviews, and op-eds to sway public and investor sentiment. Pressuring management to change policies quickly. Elliott Management’s open letter to Arconic shareholders.
Coalitions & Alliances Institutional investors combine votes to amplify influence. Coordinated votes for board reforms. Institutional investors uniting in Vedanta delisting opposition.

Table 1 – Mechanisms & Tools of Shareholder Activism, Source – Authors

ROLE OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS

Proxy advisory firms are independent entities that analyze corporate governance matters and provide voting recommendations to institutional investors. They play a vital role in influencing shareholder decisions, particularly in large publicly listed companies where ownership is widely dispersed and no single investor has controlling power. Globally, leading players include Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, while in India, prominent firms include InGovern Research Services, Stakeholders Empowerment Services (SES), and Institutional Investor Advisory Services (IIAS). The primary function of proxy advisors is to evaluate shareholder proposals—covering issues such as board appointments, executive pay, mergers and acquisitions, and ESG-related resolutions—and issue voting recommendations. Since institutional investors oversee vast pools of capital and may lack the resources to thoroughly analyze every agenda item, these recommendations often exert significant influence on final voting outcomes.

Year Company Proxy Advisor(s) Involved Nature of Campaign Outcome
2018 Fortis Healthcare IiAS, InGovern Opposed proposed deal with Hero-Burman group; supported IHH Healthcare’s higher bid IHH Healthcare’s bid accepted by shareholders
2020 Eicher Motors IiAS Recommended voting against reappointment of Siddhartha Lal due to remuneration concerns Shareholders initially rejected pay proposal; revised proposal later approved
2017 Tata Motors SES, InGovern Recommended voting against certain directors over governance issues post-Tata–Mistry dispute Some directors faced reduced shareholder support; governance reforms initiated
2021 Zee Entertainment IiAS Supported shareholder demand for EGM to remove MD & CEO Punit Goenka EGM proposal gained traction; later merged with Sony Pictures Networks India
2019 Infosys InGovern Called for stronger whistleblower policy after allegations against CEO Infosys strengthened governance and disclosure practices

Table 3 – Examples for Indian Proxy Advisors, Source – Authors

 

USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA & TECHNOLOGY

Social media and digital technology have become powerful tools for shareholder activism, enabling investors to communicate, coordinate, and influence corporate decisions more effectively than ever. Activists now use platforms like Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, and dedicated campaign websites to directly engage both institutional and retail shareholders. These channels serve multiple purposes. They simplify complex corporate issues, making it easier for small investors to understand and participate in voting. They also support pressure campaigns, using public exposure and reputational risk to push companies to address governance lapses or strategic errors. Additionally, they allow activists to shape narratives and influence investor sentiment ahead of key events such as Annual General Meetings (AGMs). Real-world cases highlight this trend. In the U.S., Tesla shareholder activists have used Twitter to advocate for greater board independence and stronger governance. In India, retail investors on Telegram and WhatsApp have coordinated AGM voting strategies, enabling dispersed shareholders to act collectively and increase their influence.

ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL & RETAIL INVESTORS IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM

Shareholder activism refers to the efforts of investors to influence a company’s policies, governance practices, and strategic direction by exercising their rights as owners. In recent years, activism has surged globally, reflecting the growing influence of shareholders in shaping corporate decisions. Both institutional investors—such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurers—and retail investors—individual shareholders increasingly active through digital trading platforms—play important but distinct roles in this transformation. The following section explores how each group contributes to activism, the growing influence of retail shareholders, and the relative strengths and limitations of each.

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM

Institutional investors now play a central role in corporate governance due to the significant stakes they hold in publicly listed companies. Their large shareholdings give them considerable voting power, allowing them to influence outcomes at shareholder meetings far more effectively than dispersed retail investors. Unlike individuals, institutional investors engage actively in “stewardship” activities, monitoring the companies they invest in and intervening when governance or performance concerns arise. Their influence is most visible through proxy voting, where they routinely support or oppose proposals on executive compensation, mergers, board composition, and governance reforms. Many major asset managers have adopted formal policies to vote against boards that fail on critical issues such as diversity, independence, or ESG performance. Because institutional investors—particularly index funds—typically hold long-term positions, they often prefer engagement over divestment, using private discussions, open letters, voting campaigns, and even collaborations with activist hedge funds to drive change. Regulatory reforms have further encouraged institutional participation. For instance, India’s stewardship codes mandate institutional investors to monitor investee companies and engage constructively with management, signalling a shift from passive shareholding to proactive governance oversight.

RETAIL SHAREHOLDERS AND ACTIVISM

Historically, retail investors were considered passive participants in corporate governance, exhibiting what is often called “rational apathy”—the reluctance to invest time and resources in voting given their relatively small stakes. Traditionally, only about 25% of retail-owned shares were voted, compared with over 90% for institutional investors. However, this pattern is changing. Since 2020, retail participation in equity markets has surged worldwide, including in India, where retail investors’ share of NSE trading volumes rose from 33% pre-2020 to over 45% by 2023. Many of these new investors are younger, more financially aware, and increasingly willing to engage with corporate governance issues. Nonetheless, retail activism faces challenges: holdings are fragmented, coordination is difficult, and many investors lack the time or expertise to assess complex matters such as mergers or board nominations. Technology is helping to overcome these barriers. Social media platforms like Reddit, Twitter, and investor forums now enable retail shareholders to share information, coordinate voting, and exert collective influence. Online voting systems have also simplified participation, reducing procedural hurdles and making corporate engagement more inclusive.

EMERGING TRENDS & DIMENSIONS OF SHAREHOLDERS’ ACTIVISM IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Shareholder activism, once confined to concerns over dividends and board appointments, has evolved into a powerful driver of global corporate governance. Over the past decade, the scope of activism has broadened significantly, with both institutional and retail investors now engaging on deeper issues such as sustainability, ethical leadership, executive compensation, and board diversity. This shift reflects a move from purely profit-driven motives to purpose-driven investing. A major dimension of this evolution is the rise of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) activism. Shareholders increasingly demand reduced carbon footprints, enhanced gender and ethnic diversity, respect for human rights across supply chains, and stronger governance standards. These demands are not merely symbolic—they are backed by shareholder resolutions, proxy voting, and public campaigns. Executive pay has also become a focal point, with investors pressing for pay-performance alignment, tying incentives to ESG targets, increasing transparency in stock options, and curbing excessive compensation. Retail investors, empowered by digital platforms, online voting tools, and social media, have emerged as an influential force. They collaborate, participate in AGMs, submit resolutions, and raise governance issues publicly, effectively democratizing shareholder activism beyond large institutional funds. Companies that resist these evolving expectations face reputational damage, investor exits, and even leadership challenges, whereas those that embrace transparency, sustainability, and shareholder engagement are better positioned to achieve long-term competitive advantage. The convergence of ESG priorities, executive pay scrutiny, retail investor empowerment, and assertive hedge fund campaigns underscores how shareholder activism has become a multidimensional force—shaping financial performance while driving corporate accountability, inclusivity, and sustainable value creation.

IMPACT OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM ON THE SECURITIES MARKETS

Shareholder activism plays a pivotal role in shaping securities markets by fostering stronger corporate governance, greater transparency, and enhanced accountability. Activist interventions often prompt strategic shifts—such as restructuring, capital reallocation, or changes in leadership—that can boost investor confidence and attract new capital. These developments frequently lead to short-term stock price gains as markets anticipate improved performance. At the same time, activism can introduce volatility, particularly when campaigns become contentious or create uncertainty about a company’s future direction. Over the long run, however, activism generally strengthens corporate efficiency, supports sustainable growth, and aligns business decisions with the interests of both shareholders and stakeholders, ultimately contributing to healthier and more resilient markets.

Growth of Shareholder Activism Cases

RISKS AND CHALLENGES OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN INDIA

Shareholder activism is increasingly recognised as an important tool for strengthening corporate governance in India, yet it faces significant challenges due to the country’s unique ownership patterns, regulatory environment, and market conditions. One major concern is short-termism, as some activists push for quick returns, pressuring management to focus on quarterly results at the expense of long-term investments in research, innovation, and expansion. The promoter-dominated structure of most Indian companies further limits the impact of activism, as controlling families often hold majority stakes, making it difficult for minority shareholders—even with institutional backing—to effect meaningful change. Proxy advisory firms, though influential, may issue recommendations based on incomplete data or face conflicts of interest, potentially distorting voting outcomes. Legal barriers add to these challenges: under the Companies Act, shareholders must hold at least 10% ownership to initiate mismanagement cases, a threshold many retail investors cannot meet, while slow judicial processes weaken timely intervention.

Activism also carries the risk of misuse. Some investors may spread misleading information, engage in “empty voting” by temporarily acquiring shares, or pursue agendas that harm market fairness. ESG activism, though rising, sometimes results in symbolic compliance, with companies adopting check-the-box measures rather than implementing meaningful environmental or social reforms. Furthermore, activist campaigns can trigger internal board conflicts, delay decision-making, and lead management to adopt defensive measures that reduce transparency. At a broader level, high-profile activist campaigns can create market volatility, impose significant financial and reputational costs, and distract companies from core operations. In some instances, activism may even be initiated by competitors seeking to disrupt business, undermining long-term shareholder value and employee morale.

Thus, while shareholder activism has the potential to improve governance and protect investor interests in India, it requires balanced regulation, transparency, and responsible engagement to prevent misuse, safeguard long-term value creation, and maintain trust in corporate systems.

CASE STUDY: INVESCO VS. ZEE ENTERTAINMENT ENTERPRISES LIMITED

The clash between Invesco and Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. (ZEEL) is one of India’s most notable cases of shareholder activism, highlighting the rising assertiveness of institutional investors in demanding accountability and transparency when shareholder value is at risk. In 2021, Invesco Developing Markets Fund, which owned 17.88% of ZEEL, raised concerns over weak governance practices, related-party transactions, lack of transparency, and what it perceived as strategic drift under CEO Punit Goenka. With ZEEL’s stock underperforming and concerns about promoter dominance growing, Invesco requisitioned an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) seeking the removal of Goenka and two other directors, while proposing six independent directors to improve oversight and governance. ZEEL’s board rejected the requisition, questioning its legality and the nominees’ suitability, escalating the matter into a legal battle before the Bombay High Court. During the standoff, ZEEL announced a merger with Sony Pictures Networks India, seen as a strategic move to secure Goenka’s position and counter Invesco’s challenge. Invesco ultimately withdrew its EGM request, viewed as a tactical retreat rather than a defeat. The episode underscored the influence of institutional investors, the challenges of activism in promoter-driven companies, and the potential of activism to reshape governance and corporate strategy.

CASE STUDY: ELLIOTT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

Elliott Management Corporation, founded by Paul Singer, is one of the world’s most influential activist hedge funds, known for its assertive and highly strategic campaigns to influence corporate direction. The firm typically acquires significant minority stakes in underperforming or undervalued companies and then pushes for changes aimed at unlocking shareholder value. Elliott’s approach combines private negotiations with public activism, often through open letters, proxy battles, and, when necessary, litigation. Its philosophy revolves around identifying structural inefficiencies, governance weaknesses, or flawed strategies and advocating for reforms such as divestitures, leadership changes, capital reallocation, or improved shareholder returns. Unlike passive investors, Elliott is prepared for prolonged engagements, sometimes holding its positions for years until meaningful reforms are implemented. A well-known example of Elliott’s activism was its 2019 campaign against AT&T. After building a $3.2 billion stake, Elliott released a detailed letter criticizing AT&T’s acquisition strategy and capital deployment, urging a strategic review including asset sales and cost-cutting measures. The pressure prompted AT&T to announce a three-year plan to streamline operations, reduce debt, and refocus on core businesses. Similar campaigns at Twitter, SoftBank, and Hyundai Motor further underscore Elliott’s reputation as a determined, sophisticated activist capable of driving significant governance and strategic change.

WAY FORWARD FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA

Corporate governance in India has made notable progress in recent years with the introduction of stronger laws, SEBI regulations, and increasing investor awareness. Yet, further reforms are essential to make governance more transparent, effective, and geared toward long-term value creation. Strengthening the role of independent directors is a key priority. While they are tasked with protecting shareholder interests, many are neither fully independent nor actively engaged. A more transparent appointment process, coupled with regular training and capacity-building programs, would ensure they discharge their duties responsibly. Enhancing shareholder participation, particularly for retail investors, is equally important. Companies should leverage digital platforms—such as e-voting and virtual meetings—to simplify participation and enable small investors to influence decisions meaningfully. Legal processes also require streamlining. Lowering the minimum shareholding threshold for filing complaints and establishing faster, cost-effective dispute resolution channels would empower minority investors to raise concerns without delay. Stronger coordination between regulators like SEBI and the MCA is necessary to improve monitoring and ensure swift enforcement of governance standards. Finally, integrating ESG principles into board strategies, encouraging ethical leadership, and promoting investor education will foster a culture of good governance, ultimately boosting trust, competitiveness, and long-term corporate performance.

CONCLUSION

Shareholder activism has evolved into a powerful force in modern corporate governance, moving far beyond passive voting at annual general meetings to include proxy contests, litigation, public campaigns, and direct engagement with management. Both institutional and retail investors are now demanding greater transparency, accountability, and long-term value creation, making activism not only a reaction to governance lapses but also a catalyst for sustainable business practices. By holding boards and executives accountable, activism encourages responsible decision-making and strategic realignment that aligns with stakeholder interests. However, activism must be balanced carefully, as excessive pressure can lead to short-term decision-making or hinder long-term growth initiatives. In India and globally, its success will depend on strong regulatory frameworks, informed and active shareholders, and companies’ willingness to engage in constructive dialogue. Ultimately, shareholder activism reinforces the principle that corporations are not merely vehicles for profit but engines of sustainable value creation—representing both a challenge and an opportunity in today’s dynamic corporate landscape.

REFERENCES –

Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, Ailsa Röell, (2003), Chapter 1 – Corporate Governance and Control, Handbook of the Economics of Finance Volume 1

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1574010203010057

Kose John, Lemma W Senbet, (1998), “Corporate governance and board effectiveness”, Journal of Banking & Finance

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426698000053

Kevin Chuah, Mark R. DesJardine, Maria Goranova and Witold J. Henisz, (2024), “Shareholder Activism Research: A System-Level View”

https://journals.aom.org/doi/abs/10.5465/annals.2022.0069

Emma Sjostrom, (2008), “Shareholder activism for corporate social responsibility: what do we know?”

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/sd.361

Ulya Yasmine Prisandani, (2021), “Shareholder activism in Indonesia: revisiting shareholder rights implementation and future challenges”

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ulya-Yasmine Prisandani/publication/354390418_Shareholder_activism_in_Indonesia_revisiting_shareholder_rights_implementation_and_future_challenges/links/6699e87202e9686cd10dc3b3/Shareholder-activism-in-Indonesia-revisiting-shareholder-rights-implementation-and-future-challenges.pdf

Regulatory Referencer

DIRECT TAX : SPOTLIGHT

1. Extension of due date for filing of ITRs for the Assessment Year 2025-26 – Circular No. 12/2025 dated 15 September 2025

Due date for furnishing the Income Tax Return for Assessment Year 2025-26 in the case of assessees referred in clause (c) of Explanation 2 to sub-section (1) of section 139 i.e whose accounts are not subject to audit extended from 15 September 2025 (as per circular No.06/2025 dated 27 May 2025) to 16 September 2025.

2. Order under section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for waiver of interest payable under section 220(2) due to late payment of demand, in certain cases – Circular No. 13/2025 dated 19 September 2025

In several cases, income tax returns were processed and rebate under section 87A was granted on income chargeable at special rates. The rebate was withdrawn by carrying out rectification, which led to additional demands being raised. The circular provides that interest payable under section 220(2) shall be waived in cases where such demands are paid on or before 31 December 2025. However, if demand is not paid on or before 31 December 2025, the interest shall be charged under section 220(2) of the Act from the day immediately following the end of the period mentioned in section 220(1) of the Act

3. Extension of timelines for filing of various reports of audit for Financial Year 2024-25 (relevant to Assessment Year 2025-26) by auditable assesses- Circular No. 14/2025 dated 25 September 2025

The due date for furnishing of the report of audit under any provision of the Income-tax Act, for the Previous Year 2024-25 (Assessment Year 2025-26), in the case of assessees referred to in clause (a) of Explanation 2 to section 139(1) of the Act is extended from 30 September 2025 to 31 October 2025.

Recent Developments in GST

A. NOTIFICATIONS

i) Notification No.12/2025-Central Tax dated 20.8.2025

By above notification, the due date for furnishing FORM GSTR-3B for the month of July, 2025 for registered persons whose principal place of business is in the districts of Mumbai (City), Mumbai (suburban), Thane, Raigad and Palghar in the State of Maharashtra is extended up to 27.8.2025.

ii)  Notification No.13/2025-Central Tax dated 17.9.2025

This notification seeks to notify the Central Goods and Services Tax (Third Amendment) Rules 2025 to come into force from 22.9.2025.

iii)  Notification No.14/2025-Central Tax dated 17.9.2025

This notification seeks to notify category of persons under section 54(6). This notification is brought into force with effect from 1.10.2025.

iv) Notification No.15/2025-Central Tax dated 17.9.2025

This notification seeks to exempt taxpayer with annual turnover less than ₹2 Crore from filing annual return from 2024-25.

v) Notification No.16/2025-Central Tax dated 17.9.2025

By this notification clauses (ii), (iii) of section 121, section 122 to section 124 and section 126 to 134 of Finance Act, 2025 are brought into force from 1.10.2025.

B.  NOTIFICATIONS RELATING TO RATE OF TAX

i)  Notification No.9/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.9.2025

The above notification seeks to amend Notification No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017. There are seven Schedules giving rate wise list of goods as under:

(i) 2.5 per cent. in respect of goods specified in Schedule I;

(ii) 9 per cent. in respect of goods specified in Schedule II;

(iii) 20 per cent. in respect of goods specified in Schedule III;

(iv) 1.5 per cent. in respect of goods specified in Schedule IV;

(v) 0.125 per cent. in respect of goods specified in Schedule V;

(vi) 0.75 per cent. in respect of goods specified in Schedule VI, and

(vii) 14 per cent. in respect of goods specified in Schedule VII.

This notification is brought into force with effect from the 22nd day of September, 2025.

ii)  Notification No.10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.9.2025

The above notification seeks to amend Notification No. 2/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 which is regarding exemption on various goods. By this notification amendment is made regarding exemption to drugs or medicines and indigenous handmade musical instruments. This notification is brought into force with effect from the 22nd day of September, 2025.

iii) Notification No.11/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.9.2025

The above notification seeks to amend Notification No. 3/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, which relates to specific goods like goods required for Petroleum Operation etc. This notification is brought into force with effect from the 22nd day of September, 2025.

iv) Notification No.12/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.9.2025

The above notification seeks to amend Notification No. 8/2018-Central Tax (Rate) dated 25.01.2018, which is regarding lower rate of tax on Motor Vehicles. This notification is brought into force with effect from the 22nd day of September, 2025.

v) Notification No.13/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.9.2025

The above notification seeks to amend Notification No. 21/2018-Central Tax (Rate) dated 26.07.2018, which is regarding lower rate for handicraft goods. This notification is brought into force with effect from the 22nd day of September, 2025.

vi) Notification No.14/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.9.2025

The above notification seeks to provide rate of tax for various kinds of bricks. The notification is brought into force with effect from the 22nd day of September, 2025.

vii) Notification No.15/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.9.2025

The above notification seeks to amend Notification No 11/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017, which is regarding tax rate on services.

The notification is brought into force with effect from the 22nd day of September, 2025.

viii) Notification No.16/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.9.2025

The above notification seeks to amend Notification No 12/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 which relates to exempted Services.

This notification is brought into force with effect from the 22nd day of September, 2025.

ix) Notification No.17/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.9.2025

The above notification seeks to amend Notification No. 3/2017- Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, which relates to tax payment by E-Commerce Operators.

This notification is brought into force with effect from the 22nd day of September, 2025.

C. CIRCULARS

(i) Clarifications about discounts  Circular no.251/08/2025-GST dated 12.09.2025.

By above circular, clarifications on various doubts related to treatment of secondary or post-sale discounts under GST are provided.

D. ADVISORY

i)Vide GSTN dated 21.8.2025, information regarding the extension of due date of GSTR-3B for tax period July-2025 from 20th August, 2025 to 27th August, 2025 is provided.

ii)Vide GSTIN dated 28.8.2025, information regarding system enhancement for Order based refund is provided.

iii)Vide GSTIN dated 9.9.2025, information regarding filing of pending returns before expiry of three years is provided.

E. ADVANCE RULINGS

Classification – Pre-Packaged and Labelled Products

Eastern Zone Industries Pvt. Ltd.

(AR Order No.02/Odisha-AAR/2025-26 dt.24.6.2025)

The applicant presented a question in vague terms but Ld. AAR redefined the same as under:

“Whether GST is applicable on the commodity (Rice, Wheat flour (atta))”pre-packaged and labelled” more than 25 kg (say 26 kg, 30 kg & 50 kg pack) bearing a registered Brand Name? or GST is exempted on the said goods?”

Thus, the applicant sought for an advance ruling as to whether GST is applicable on the commodities like Rice, Wheat flour (atta) which are “pre-packaged and labelled” more than 25 kg (say 26 kg, 30 kg & 50 kg pack) bearing a registered Brand Name or whether GST is exempted on the said goods.

Applicant submitted that GST is applicable on specified food items when they are “pre-packaged and labelled” as defined in Notification No. 06/2022-Central Tax (Rate) which refers to Legal Metrology Act and Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules. It was added that GST was applicable on pre-packaged commodities which are required to make declarations under Rule 6 and 24 of Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules. Applicant presented various situations arising out of application of above narration.

On analysis the ld. AAR observed that initially GST @ 5% was made applicable on rice, wheat or meslin flour when “put up in a container and bearing a registered brand name” vide Sl. No. 51 & 54 of the Notification No.1/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, respectively.

The ld. AAR also noted changes made in said entries vide Notification No. 27/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 22.09.2017.

Lastly Notification No. 6/2022-Central Tax (Rate) dated 13th July2022 was issued, to be effective from 18.7.2022, wherein GST was made applicable on such commodities when it is “pre-packaged and labelled”.

The ld. AAR also examined the meaning of term “pre-packaged commodity” as defined in Legal Metrology Act (LMA) according to which, a pre-packaged commodity is a commodity which is:

1. Packed without purchaser being present;
2. May or may not be sealed;
3. Product has a pre-determined quantity.

The ld. AAR observed that above meaning suggests that, any goods which have been packed prior to identification of purchaser and which has a pre-determined quantity would be considered as “prepackaged” commodity.

Lastly the ld. AAR noted Notification No. 01/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 16.01.2025 by which the principal Notification01/2017-Central Tax (Rate) was amended and an exhaustive definition of “pre-packaged and labelled” commodity has been put in place.

Reference also made to FAQ bearing F. No.190354/172/2022-TRU dated 17.07.2022 in which explanation is given about applicability of above rates.

The ld. AAR concluded that with effect from 18th July,2022 the terms Registered Brand Name and Brand Name have been done away with. Accordingly, it is held that the ruling sought by the applicant regarding applicability of GST on commodities [Rice, Wheat Flour (i.e. Atta) “pre-packed and labelled” more than 25KG bearing a registered brand name has no relevance and the applicability of GST on such commodities will be decided by determining whether it is “pre-packed and labelled” as per Legal Metrological Act or not.

The ld. AAR disposed of the AR accordingly ordering that the GST rate on the commodity (rice, wheat flour (i.e. atta) is applicable as per tax rate vide notification 01/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 as amended vide Notification No. 27/2017-Central Tax (Rate), Notification No. 06/2022-Central Tax (Rate) dated 13.07.2022 and subsequently amended vide Notification No. 01/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 16.01.2025.

NATURE OF BACK-TO-BACK JOB WORK

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.

(AR Order No. Advance Ruling/SGST&CGST/2024/AR/16 dt.26.6.2025)

The applicant (BPCL) is involved in re-gasification of LNG & subsequently supplying the re-gasified LNG [RLNG] to its customers.

The applicant had entered into an agreement [Agreement dated 23.12.2013] with Petronet LNG Limited [for short – PLL], wherein PLL undertakes re-gasification activity of LNG on behalf of the applicant. The agreement is of a job work model, wherein the LNG supplied by the applicant is worked upon by PLL & thereafter transferred back to the applicant in RLNG form for which the applicant pays the required charges.

The applicant has also entered into an agreement (Agreement for subletting dated 18.11.2021) with M/s. GAIL (India) Ltd. (for short-GAIL) wherein the applicant has agreed responsibility of re-gasification on itself in respect of the LNG owned by GAIL. It was agreed that the re-gasification will be undertaken by PLL at their facility, on the direction of the applicant. The term of delivery of LNG for re-gasification and re-delivery to GAIL etc. were determined. It was also mentioned that the applicant shall not have title to LNG or RLNG;

GAIL pay job work charges to applicant and applicant raise tax compliant invoice. It was the submission that the entire contracts between applicant and GAIL is akin to a back-to-back job work arrangement wherein the applicant is responsible for undertaking job work activity through PLL.

In this respect applicant referred to various earlier precedents as well as Circular No.38/12/2018-GST dt. 26.3.2018.

With above background, applicant sought ruling as under:

“[i] Whether the applicant’s activity of providing service of regasification of LNG owned by GAIL/others would amount to rendering of service by way of job work within the meaning of section 2(68) of CGST Act, 2017 & GGST?”

The ld. AAR referred to definition of Job Work given in section 2(68) of CGST Act.

The ld. AAR also referred to Notification No. 11/2017-CT(Rate) dated 28.6.2017, as amended about rate of tax on job work services, particularly item 26(i)(id), which provides rate of 12% for job work charges and it is reproduced as under:

(id) Services by way of job work other than [(i), (ia), (ib), (ic) & (ica)] above 10 6% –

The ld. AAR referred to the clause in agreement between PLL and applicant and Agreement for subletting of Regasification capacity between BPCL and GAIL (India) Ltd. and noted the obligation of GAIL as well as applicant.

The ld. AAR also noted the averments made by the applicant that they are responsible for ensuring that PLL undertakes the job work; that GAIL pays applicant job work charges; that the title of LNG and RLNG always remain with GAIL & never gets transferred to BPCL or PLL; that the applicant raises tax invoices, and therefore the service rendered, should fall within the ambit of ‘job work’ as defined in section 2(68).

The ld. AAR also referred to clarification given in circular No. 126/45/2019-GST dated 22.11.2019 regarding scope of notification entry at item (id) related to ‘job work’, under heading 9988 of notification No. 11/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28.6.2017.

The ld. AAR confirmed that said service of re-gasification by way of job work is classifiable under serial no. 26(id) of heading no. 9988 of notification No. 11/2017-CT (R) dated 28.6.2017 as amended & is chargeable to GST @ 12%.

Applicability of GST on Interest for Pre-GST Transactions Shoft Shipyard Pvt. Ltd.

(AR Order No. Advance Ruling/SGST&CGST/2024/AR/26 dt.26.6.2025)

Certain relevant facts for this application are that the applicant had received a work order no. 703002 dated 21.5.2009, from GSL [Goa Shipyard Ltd] for construction of Hull of Ship and Towing. GSL held back amount of  ₹1.39 crores on account of losses which they claimed to have been incurred due to mistake on the part of the applicant, in respect of some other contract between the said parties.

Arbitration proceedings were initiated through Arbitration case No. 3/2004. The said proceedings culminated in award dated 29.9.2017, wherein the arbitrator held that the amount of ₹1.39 crore was payable to the applicant by GSL along with interest. The arbitrator further awarded

₹1.75 lakhs as arbitration costs to the applicant.

The applicant received the principal amount in March 2020 and the interest and the arbitration cost in the year 2024. The applicant did not pay any tax on the amount received since the work in respect of which the amount was received was completed in pre-GST era.

With above background, following questions were raised for advance ruling.

“[i] Whether in the facts & circumstances of the case, applicant is liable to pay GST on the “interest awarded under arbitration” & “costs awarded under arbitration” as received by the applicant?

[ii] If the answer to question No. 1 is affirmative, kindly clarify whether any supply is involved & what will be the time of determination of such supply involved, if any, and the rate of tax applicable thereon?”

The ld. AAR made reference to provision of section 12 regarding Time of Supply of Goods and Section 13 about Time of Supply of Services.

The ld. AAR also made reference to Section 142 regarding Miscellaneous transitional provisions.

The ld. AAR noted that the primary question posed before the Authority is whether the GST is payable on the ‘interest awarded under Arbitration’ and ‘costs awarded under Arbitration’ and received by the applicant.

The ld. AAR observed that as per section 12 of the CGST Act, 2017, the time of supply, in respect of goods is earlier of the date of issue of invoice or the date on which the supplier receives the payment. The ld. AAR noted that in present case, the invoice has already been issued and the manufacture, clearance, sale and the date of invoice have taken place in pre-GST period. Accordingly, the ld. AAR held that section 12(6) does not apply.

The ld. AAR relied upon Circular No. 178/10/2022-GST dated 3.8.2022 where in the scope of ‘consideration’ vis-à-vis ‘supply’ is discussed.

The ld. AAR also noted that since the transactions pertained to pre-GST period, the question of the amounts falling under the ambit of GST in terms of clause 5(e) of Schedule II does not arise.

Accordingly, the ld. AAR held that no GST is payable on the “interest awarded under arbitration” & “costs awarded under arbitration”, received by applicant.

Section 104 vis-à-vis Advance Ruling to be void

I_Tech Plast India Pvt. Ltd.

AAAR Order No. GUJ/GAAAR/APPEAL/13 (in application no. Advance Ruling/SGST&CGST/2024/AR/02) DT.31.7.2025

The present appeal was filed against the Advance Ruling no. GUJ/GAAR/R/2024/ dt.3.2.2024 (2024-VIL-25-AAR).

Earlier the appellant has applied for determination of rate of tax on supply of plastic toys under CGST and SGST and claim of ITC in relation to CGST-IGST paid separately in debit notes issued by the supplier in the current financial year i.e. 2020-21, towards the transactions for the period 2018-19.

The ld. AAR decided the application vide Advance Ruling no. GUJ/GAAR/R/10/2021 dated 20.1.2021 – 2021-VIL-205-AAR.

After order was passed the ld. AAR received communication about proceedings done by Directorate General of GST Intelligence Pune, wherein the applicant has even made substantial payments toward tax and interest.

Noting that above facts were never disclosed while seeking the ruling, ld. AAR granted personal hearing to the appellant to decide whether the order dated 20.1.2021was required to be declared as void ab initio in terms of sections 98 and 104 of the CGST Act, 2017.

After hearing, the ld. AAR observed that issue in DGGI was same about classification of plastic toys.

Noting above facts, the ld. AAR vide impugned ruling dated 3.2.2024 – 2024-VIL-25-AAR, held that the ruling dated 20.1.2021 – 2021-VIL-205-AAR, was void in terms of section 104 since there was suppression of material facts and misrepresentation of facts based on the sequential factual position and also findings on the issue.
In appeal before the ld. AAAR, the appellant submitted that the ruling is not hit by provision of section 104 as it was ‘primary scrutiny’ and not ‘proceedings’ and further the investigation has not culminated into any proceedings.

The ld. AAAR referred to Serial No.17 of the application Form in GST-ARA-01, which is the application form for Advance Ruling, which requires to state as under:

“17. I hereby declare that the question raised in the application is not (tick) -□
a. Already pending in any proceedings in the applicant’s case under any of the provisions of the Act

b. Already decided in any proceedings in the applicant’s case under any of the provisions of the Act”

The ld. AAAR held that the onus is on the applicant to declare whether there are any proceedings pending / decided against it in respect of the question on which a ruling is being sought. The applicant has declared that there is no pending/decided proceedings against him.

The ld. AAAR dealt with arguments of appellant in detail and observed that Section 98(2) enjoins the meeting of a certain threshold before which an application for advance ruling is considered and also once that threshold is crossed, the mandate of Section 104 comes into the picture which enjoins the applicant to disclose all the material facts before the Advance Ruling authority to enable it to take a considered view.

Ld. AAAR found that, pursuant to a letter from the DGGI, Pune, dated 15.9.2020, followed by other correspondences, appellant has conveyed to the DGGI that they have discharged their tax liabilities, along with due interest, for the year 2019-20 on 14.10.2020 and further that they had started charging the tax rate at 18% i.e., the rate contended by the DGGI to be the correct rate. Since all these facts, though directly related to the issue raised before the Advance Ruling Authority, were never disclosed in their application dated 30.11.2020, the ld. AAAR in its considered opinion held that appellant has failed to cross the bar of Section 104 of CGST Act,2017 and rejected the appeal filed by appellant.

Classification –“Cake Gel”

AB Mauri India Pvt. Ltd.

AAR Order No.KAR ADRG 20/2025 DT.28.7.2025

The applicant stated that they produce and distribute fresh yeast, bakery ingredients, spices and other functional ingredients in India and under the Bakery Ingredients segment, the Applicant inter alia manufactures a product ‘Cake Gel’ which is branded and marketed globally under the brand names ‘Rich Cake Gel’ and ‘Prime Classic Cake Gel’, collectively referred to as ‘Cake Gel’. It is a bakery food additive used in the cake batter to improve the quality of cake such that the cake is broader and fluffier.  It helps in the preparation of superior quality sponge cakes and other rich cakes.

The applicant has sought advance ruling in respect of the question “What will be the classification of the product ‘Cake gel’ and the rate of tax applicable on the said product?”

Applicant informed about ingredients as under:

Sl. No Ingredient Source INS
1 Water Natural NA
2 Emulsifier Plant INS 471
3 Emulsifier Plant INS 477
4 Emulsifier Plant INS 470(i)
5 Humectants Chemical INS 1520
6 Humectants Plant INS 422

The manufacturing process and its importance in manufacturing was explained. It was submitted that current the applicant is classifying the product under HSN 15179090, liable to tax @ 18%.

The application was interpreting that vegetable oil-based mixture or preparation is liable to tax @ 5% under entry 89 of Schedule I in Notification No.1/2017-CT(R) dt.28.6.2017 but on conservative basis it is paying tax @ 18% under entry 6 of Schedule III in said Notification.

Applicant made very elaborate submission about various related HSN and tried to sum up that the product Cake gel should be classified under HSN 15179090 as an edible mixture of vegetable oils with applicable GST rate at 5% as per Entry No. 89of Schedule I of the Notification No. 1-2017-IT(R) dated 28 June 2017.

The ld. AAR referred to classification modalities under GST. The clarification is to be done with relation to Custom Tariffs and corresponding HSN.

The ld. AAR observed that Chapter 15 covers only the preparations of animal, vegetable or microbial fats or oils or of fractions of different fats or oils whereas in the instant case, the major ingredients of the impugned product “Cake Gel” are Emulsifiers and Humectants. The ld. AAR held that though the Humectants may be derived from vegetable sources (like glycerine from vegetable oils), but they themselves are not vegetable oils or simple mixtures of them. They are chemically distinct ingredients. Emulsifiers and are processed compounds, often derived from oils, but chemically distinct. The ld. AAR held that since the “Cake Gel” is not made from vegetable oils as edible mixtures or preparations of animal, vegetable or microbial fats or oils, it does not merit classification under heading 1517. The ld. AAR held that item as covered by 2106.90.99 as it covers Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included.

Accordingly, the ld. AAR ruled that the rate of tax is 18% in terms of entry no.23 of Schedule III to the Notification no.1/2017-CT(R) dated 28.6.2017 as amended.

Goods And Services Tax

HIGH COURT

52. (2025) 31 Centax 136 (All.) K.C. Timber Products vs. Additional Commissioner dated 21.04.2025.

Appeal filed within prescribed time limit electronically cannot be rejected purely on the basis of delayed submission of certified copy of order under Rule 108 physically as the same is merely a procedural requirement.

FACTS

The petitioner was issued a SCN under section 73 of CGST Act for the F.Y. 2019-20 on account of mismatch between GSTR-3B, GSTR-1 and GSTR-2A. Thereafter, an order confirming demand was passed on 08.07.2021. The petitioner preferred an appeal electronically on 18.08.2021 enclosing all requisite documents including a copy of the order. However, the Respondent dismissed the appeal on 24.12.2024 on the ground that a certified copy of the order, as mandated under Rule 108 of the CGST Rules was physically filed belatedly. Being aggrieved by such dismissal, the petitioner has approached the Hon’ble High Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court after analyzing the factual matrix and relying on the decision of Chegg India (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India 2025 (97) G.S.T.L. 289 (Del.) held that filing of a certified copy as per Rule 108(3) of the CGST Rules 2017 was only a procedural requirement and non-filing thereof could not defeat a validly filed appeal. The High Court quashed the order dated 24.12.2024 dismissing the appeal and allowed the writ petition remanding the matter to be heard on merits.

53 (2025) 32 Centax 196 (Ker.) Mathai M.V. vs Senior Enforcement Officer, SGST Department, Ernakulum dated 24.06.2025.

Confiscation of vehicle done under section 130 of the CGST Act in absence of proper service of SCN under section 169 of CGST Act, 2017 are invalid and without jurisdiction. 

FACTS

The petitioner was the owner of a truck that was carrying goods belonging to Petro Chemicals that was detained by the respondent on 25.11.2024 and moved to a parking facility. The confiscation order for goods and the vehicle was passed on 21.12.2024 against Petro Chemicals alleging tax evasion but not against the petitioner. On 10.01.2025, the petitioner became aware of a detention order referring to proceedings under section 130 of the CGST Act. Being aggrieved by confiscation of the vehicle, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition before single judge in this High Court on 17.01.2025. However, single judge rejected the petitioner’s stand and dismissed the petition on the ground that respondent had communicated multiple times over WhatsApp. As the vehicle continued to remain in the custody of the respondent, the petitioner filed this Writ appeal challenging the detention and confiscation proceedings before Division Bench.

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court on perusal of section 130(1)(v) and 130(4) of the CGST Act, 2017 held that the vehicle owner must be given an opportunity of hearing to prove a lack of knowledge or connivance. It further stated that service of notice in WhatsApp mode, is not a valid mode of communication prescribed under section 169, and relying on Lakshay Logistics vs. State of Gujarat [2021] 126 taxmann.com 9 (Gujarat), the Court held that proceedings initiated under section 130 of CGST Act, 2017 in absence of any service of notice to concerned person is without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the confiscation order was quashed, and matter was remanded for reconsideration.

54. (2025) 32 Centax 163 (Guj.) Saurashtra Tin and Metal Industries vs. Union of India dated 06.05.2025.

Assignment of leasehold rights in an industrial plot is a transfer of immovable property falling outside the ambit of supply under GST 

FACTS

The petitioner was allotted an industrial plot in 1994, through a valid lease deed. The petitioner applied to the GIDC (Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation) for transfer of the plot to a third party, which was duly approved. On 24.02.2021, the petitioner executed a deed of assignment for transferring the plot to M/s. Janani Incast (third party) without charging GST. Subsequently, the respondent issued a summons which was followed by a SCN dated 26.11.2024, demanding Rs. 2.46 crore in GST on the transfer of leasehold rights, treating the same as a taxable supply of service. The petitioner’s response was disregarded and respondent passed an impugned order confirming the demand. Aggrieved by this, petitioner approached the High Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court held that the transfer of leasehold rights of an industrial plot by way of an assignment deed, amounts to transfer of immovable property and does not fall within the scope of supply under GST. Relying on its earlier decisions in Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry vs. Union of India 2025 (94) G.S.T.L. 113 (Guj.), Kabir Instrument and Technology vs. Union of India 2025 (95) G.S.T.L. 369 (Guj.) and Alfa Tools Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2025 (97) G.S.T.L. 125 (Guj.) (2025) 28 Centax 287 (Guj.). The Court observed that in the absence of any stay against these rulings, the respondent could not levy GST merely because the respondent intended to challenge them. Accordingly, the impugned order was quashed and set aside in favour of the petitioner.

54. (2025) 31 Centax 305 (Mad.) Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation (Villupuram) Ltd. vs. Additional Commissioner of Central Tax, Chennai dated 14.03.2025

Refund of tax paid under protest cannot be denied by disregarding binding Departmental Circulars, favourable and judicial precedents, merely because Department does not agree with the same. 

FACTS

The petitioner filed a refund application with the respondent for tax paid “under protest” on service of seconded employees availed from its foreign counterpart, where the same issue was disposed-off favourably by a High Court decision in their own case Thales India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Additional Commissioner (2025) 27 Centax 294 (Del.) (where the initial tax demand was quashed). However, the respondent (Assistant Commissioner) rejected the refund application because it did not agree with the precedents cited in the earlier High Court judgment, specifically Metal One Corporation India (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2024) 24 Centax 13 (Del.) and Circular No. 210/4/2024-GST. Aggrieved by this refusal to comply with a binding circular and judicial precedent, petitioner filed a fresh petition with the High Court for seeking refund of tax paid under protest.

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court held that petitioner was entitled to a refund based on the decision of Metal One Corporation India (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India (2024) 24 Centax 13 (Del.) where it was held that deemed value of services from a foreign affiliate should be ‘nil’ if no invoice was raised referring to Circular No. 210/4/2024-GST. Accordingly, High Court quashed the respondent’s order rejecting the refund, stating that the refund could not be withheld as the previous judgment had attained finality and was neither challenged nor stayed.

56. (2025) 31 Centax 387 (Bom.) Sundyne Pumps and Compressors India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India dated 16.06.2025.

Refund of unutilised ITC should be granted on inputs utilized for designing and engineering services to a foreign group company as the same qualifies as export of services.

FACTS

The petitioner, an Indian company, provided designing and engineering services to its group companies located outside of India. The petitioner has been periodically claiming refund of unutilized ITC for similar services. However, one of the refund applications filed by petitioner was rejected by the respondent alleging that the petitioner acted as an agent for its group companies. Being aggrieved by such rejection, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court.

HELD

Hon’ble High Court held that the petitioner providing services to a foreign parent or group company qualifies as an “export of services” falling under “zero-rated supply” under GST law. The High Court rejected the respondent’s argument that the petitioner was merely an ‘agent’ of the foreign company, emphasizing that they are separate legal entities which was also clarified by CBIC Circular No. 161/17/2021 dated 20.09.2021. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed in favour of the petitioner.

57. Liberty Oil Mills Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner (Appeals Thane) GST & Central Excise, Mumbai [2025] 178 taxmann.com 163 (Bombay) dated 02-09-2025.

Where the record suggests that the order was neither served electronically nor by post and the postal evidence contains inconsistencies and overwriting, an appeal filed within one month of actual receipt by the assessee is considered to be within the statutory timeframe prescribed under section 107 of the CGST Act.

FACTS

The petitioner challenged the Joint Commissioner (Appeals)’ order dismissing their appeal as time-barred, asserting the impugned order was neither uploaded on the portal nor communicated. The petitioner only became aware of the order after a show cause notice for a subsequent period in August 2023, prompting a request for the order copy, which was received on 17/08/2023. The appeal was filed within a month thereafter. The department relied on a postal report indicating service of the order on 11/04/2023, but the petitioner disputed this, stating only four documents were received and acted upon and the fifth (the impugned order) was not delivered. The petitioner further argued that inconsistencies and overwriting in the postal report cast doubt on proper service and actual receipt, justifying the appeal filing timeline.

HELD

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court observed that the postal report contains overwriting, suggesting that only four documents were actually delivered, not the fifth, which was the impugned order. The Court also stated that, as the petitioner filed an appeal against the fourth document in time, there was no reason not to file an appeal against the fifth document, i.e., the impugned order, if it was received on 11/04/2023. Furthermore, the petitioner’s prompt appeal against the Assistant Commissioner’s order, received shortly after it was issued, further supports the contention that there was no delay or inaction. Considering these facts cumulatively, the Hon’ble Court held that it is reasonable to accept that the order was not served on 11/04/2023 and the appeal filed on 11/09/2023 was held to be filed within the limitation prescribed under section 107 of the MGST Act.

58. Alstom Transport India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [2025] 178 taxmann.com 71 (Karnataka) dated 15-07-2025.

Reverse Charge Mechanism (RCM) does not apply to Secondment of employees by a foreign parent company when the employees work under the exclusive administrative and functional control of the Indian entity, are integrated within its organizational structure, follow its policies, have their salaries paid directly by the Indian entity subject to Indian income tax and TDS, and receive statutory employment benefits under Indian labour laws. 

FACTS

The petitioner employed the employees of the overseas group companies on a Secondment basis to work in India for a fixed tenure. The employment agreements were executed with each of these expatriate employees, detailing their appointments, salaries, and allowances. During the term of their secondment, these expatriates were placed on the petitioner’s payroll in India, and their salaries were paid directly by the petitioner after deducting applicable Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. While the expatriate employees were on its payroll, the overseas group entities continued to provide social security and related benefits available in their home countries, for which they raised debit notes on the petitioner. The petitioner has been discharging Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST) on a reverse charge basis, periodically, on the amounts specified in debit notes raised by the overseas group entities and has been availing Input Tax Credit (ITC). The authorities have raised no objections in this regard. The petitioner’s grievance arises from the issuance of a show cause notice demanding GST on the salaries paid to the said employees, alleging that this constitutes the import of “Manpower Supply Service” from its overseas affiliates.

HELD

The Hon’ble Court took cognizance of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Northern Operating Systems Pvt. Ltd.  [2022] 138 taxmann.com 359 (SC) and expressed that businesses must now assess Secondment arrangements on a case-by-case basis. Key factors include: who bears the economic burden and controls long-term employment; whether the posting is task-specific or open-ended; how salary is paid directly by the Indian entity or via the foreign company; and whether the secondee is absorbed into the Indian organisation or reverts to the foreign entity post-assignment, etc. As regards the facts of this case, the Court observed that expatriate employees were seconded by the foreign parent solely to render services to the petitioner in India. In the instant case, since these employees were under the exclusive administrative and functional control of the petitioner, were integrated into its organizational framework, and adhered to its internal policies, code of conduct, and disciplinary rules. Their salaries were paid directly by the petitioner and were subject to Indian income tax, including deduction of TDS and they were extended statutory employment benefits under Indian labour laws. The Court held that these facts collectively establish that the existence of a genuine employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the seconded personnel, falling squarely within the exclusion under Schedule III of the CGST Act and thereby not constituting a taxable supply.

The Court also referred to paragraph 3.7 of Circular No.210/4/2024-GST dated 26.06.2024 that clarified the legal position regarding cross-border intra-group services where full input tax credit is available to the recipient; and held that as no invoices were raised by the petitioner in respect of the services allegedly rendered by the foreign affiliate through seconded employees, the value of such services must be deemed to be ‘Nil’ . The Court thus held that due to the statutory exclusion under Schedule III and the clarificatory Circular issued by the CBIC, the demand raised by the revenue is liable to be set aside.

59. Anand and Anand vs. Principal Commissioner Central Goods and Services [2025] 178 taxmann.com 251 (Allahabad) dated 04.09.2025.

Section 107(11) of the CGST Act, 2017 specifically bars the Appellate authority from remanding any matter back to the adjudicating authority. Any such matter remanded back is unsustainable, and such an order is to be set aside.

FACTS

In the present case, the petitioner has filed an appeal; however, the Ld. first appellate authority remanded the matter, stating that the party had not produced any conclusive evidence, any agreement etc.

HELD

The Hon’ble Court held that plain reading of section 107(11) of the CGST Act indicates a mandatory bar for the Appellate authority for remanding the matter to the original authority. The Court also observed that in the earlier part of the impugned order, there are findings in favour of the petitioner herein and observations made in paragraph 17, where the non-production of evidence is stated, do not relate to the earlier findings returned in the impugned order. The Court accordingly set aside the latter part of the impugned order whereby the matter was remitted back to the adjudicating authority to decide the appeal in accordance with the law.

60. KC Overseas Education (P.) Ltd vs. Union of India [2025] 178 taxmann.com 35 (Bombay) dated 03-03-2025.

Recommending students to foreign universities, where the consideration is paid directly by those universities, qualifies as export of services and does not constitute intermediary services.

FACTS

Under an agreement with a foreign university, the petitioner recommended names of students to foreign universities abroad for enrolment, for which the foreign university paid consideration to the appellant. The department contended that the said transaction would not qualify for export of services as the place of supply is not outside India in light of the definition of ‘intermediary’ as defined in section 2(13) of the IGST Act.

HELD

The Hon’ble Court relied upon the decision in the case of Ernst & Young Ltd vs. Additional Commissioner, Central GST Appeals-II [2023] 148 taxmann.com 461 (Delhi) and also noted that in the assessee’s own case, the service tax tribunal has held the petitioner is providing services to universities and not to Indian students. It also noted that, having regard to the definition of ‘recipient’ under section 2(93) of the CGST Act, the recipient in this case would be foreign universities who are liable to pay the consideration to the petitioner and not the students. It further held that the petitioner would not fall within the definition of an intermediary as contained in section 2(13) and therefore would be entitled to a refund of the GST paid, subject to receipt of the consideration in foreign currency.

61. Mamaine Dey vs. UOI [2025] 178 taxmann.com 243 (Gauhati) dated 03-09-2025.

The Hon’ble Court directed the concerned officer to consider the application for restoration of registration, since post cancellation of GST registration and after expiry of the period stipulated for revocation of the cancellation of the GST registration, the assessee paid entire tax, along with interest and filed all the returns along with late fees as per Rule 22(4) of the CGST Rules.

The petitioner was a sole proprietor and registered under the GST. Because of non-filing of GST returns for a continuous period of six months, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice and an order was passed by cancelling the GST registration without assigning any reason. The petitioner argued that due to unfamiliarity with the online procedure, she was unable to respond to the show cause notice. Additionally, by the time she became aware of the notice, the deadline for submitting a reply had lapsed and the order was already uploaded on the portal. The petitioner also contended that she updated all her pending returns up to the month of March, 2024 as allowed by the GST portal and while updating her returns, she also discharged all her GST dues along with her late fees and interest. Thereafter, the petitioner tried to file the necessary application seeking revocation of GST cancellation, however, the same could not be filed as the time limit prescribed for filing of revocation application was elapsed and a message was displayed in the screen “timeline of 270 days from the date of cancellation order provided to taxpayer to file application for revocation of cancellation is expired”.

HELD

The Hon’ble Court noted that cancellation of registration entails serious civil consequences. It held that if the petitioner submits such an application and complies with all the requirements as provided in the proviso to Rule 22(4) of the Rules, the concerned authority shall consider the application of the petitioner for restoration of her GST registration in accordance with law and shall take necessary steps for restoration of GST registration of the petitioner as expeditiously as possible. The Court directed the concerned authority to consider the application of the petitioner for restoration of her GST registration in accordance with law and shall take necessary steps for restoration of GST registration of the petitioner as expeditiously as possible.

AIZ – MAKA / FALEA – TUKA

It was a chance visit to one of the churches in Goa on a routine professional visit. Travelling through the urban landscape and into the marshlands of Goa, I set my eyes on the church along the quiet road leading to another of the Goa villages. The serene church premises, set amongst the greens and perched on what looked like a hillock, exhibited peace and calm only to be outdone by a low-lying cemetery adjoining the church premises. In fact, the entrance gate of the cemetery could be seen from the church premises albeit as the exit gate.

I walked into the church premises absorbing the beauty of a well-kept area and entered the church building. After having spent a few reflective minutes inside, I walked to the open space in front of the building entrance and I was exactly positioned to see the road from the cemetery leading to its entrance.

However, what caught any attention was the plaque at the cemetery’s exit gate. At first it did not make sense as it was a transliteration of something in the Goan Konkani language. I read it once more but carefully. It read thus – “AIZ – MAKA / FALEA – TUKA”. It did not take long for my little brain to process what it meant – “Today – Me/ Tomorrow – You”

It struck me like a bolt of sudden enlightenment reaffirming what is the hard reality of our life and reminding me not only of life’s impermanence but also of its uncertainty.

I was also reminded of the Bulgarian essayist, Maria Popova, who very succinctly observed – “We live amid and inside emblems of the touching longing for permanence that both defines us and defies reality – our houses, these haikus of brick and hope so easily decomposed by a tremor of the earth or a tempest of the sky; our homes, so easily hollowed by death or indifference; bodies, these boarding houses for stardust”.

However, Saint Kabir provided me a beautiful reminder –

मत कर काया को अभिमान, काया गार से काची

ओ, काया गार से काची, रे, जैसे ओस रा मोती

झोंका पवन का लग जाए, झपका पवन का लग जाए

काया धूल हो जासी, काया तेरी धूल हो जासी

I thanked the Almighty for the fact that I did not require a catastrophe to appreciate the delicateness of life. As I walked back towards my car, my heavy legs gave me more time to think and ponder about how my living today should be, as it could be ‘me’ tomorrow. No matter what luxuries I am rolling in, I need to remember that even orchids have an autumn.

Hearing Cartoon

Miscellanea

1. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

#87% Find AI Shopping Faster, Yet 88% Continue to Choose Cash on Delivery

The “Retail Rewired Report India 2025” by NIQ reveals that Indian consumers are increasingly blending traditional shopping habits with AI-driven technologies, with 87% believing AI tools enable faster shopping and 60% feeling very comfortable with new tech for daily tasks.

The study, based on over 2,000 respondents across metros and Tier-2 cities, shows 96% have made online purchases, with more than half of shopping journeys starting in search bars and 47% on social media (rising to 52% for millennials and Tier-2 residents).

AI influences buying decisions through features like recommendations (50% usage), price comparisons (49%), review summaries (44%), and queries on availability/delivery (42%), while 60% use e-commerce apps in physical stores for price checks and offers.

Despite high digital adoption, concerns include data privacy (35%) and security (60%), and 88% prefer cash on delivery even as 63% use digital payments daily; incentives like free delivery (58%), instant cashback (55%), and discounts (48%) drive tech uptake.

The report urges businesses to balance seamless digital experiences with trust, transparency, and flexibility to meet evolving consumer demands.

(Source: India Express – 20 September 2025)

2. WORLD NEWS

#PM Modi turns 75 Highlights: Meloni, Putin, Bill Gates, Rajnikanth, Rishi Sunak share heartfelt wishes on PM’s birthday

Prime Minister Narendra Modi marked his 75th birthday on September 17, 2025, with widespread celebrations across India and globally, including the BJP’s “Sewa Pakhwada” initiative from September 17 to October 2, focusing on community service like blood donation and cleanliness drives.

He received an outpouring of wishes from world leaders, celebrities, and public figures via phone calls, social media, and public messages, highlighting his global stature and India’s strengthening international ties. Modi expressed gratitude for the “countless wishes, blessings, and messages of affection” from across India and overseas, including from leaders like Russian President Vladimir Putin, Italian PM Giorgia Meloni, Microsoft founder Bill Gates, former UK PM Rishi Sunak, and Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis.

Notable events included special prayers by the Bohra Muslim community in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the Burj Khalifa in Dubai illuminated with Modi’s portraits, “Happy Birthday” messages, and the Indian tricolour as a gesture of UAE-India friendship. Social media buzzed with tributes, including from Indian celebrities like Rajnikanth, Mohanlal, Shah Rukh Khan, Aamir Khan, Ajay Devgn, Alia Bhatt, and cricketers like Mohammed Siraj and Kris Srikkanth, while some opposition voices criticized the displays as paid promotions.

(Source: Financial Express 18 September 2025)

3. ENVIRONMENT NEWS

Air Conditioners as India’s Highest Greenhouse Gas-Emitting Appliance in India

A survey by the International Forum for Environment, Sustainability and Technology (iFOREST) highlights that air conditioners (ACs) are currently the highest greenhouse gas (GHG)-emitting household appliance in India, driven by electricity consumption, refrigerant leakage, and poor servicing practices, with AC-related GHG emissions reaching 156 Mt CO2e in 2024—equivalent to emissions from all passenger cars in India—and projected to rise to 329 Mt CO2e by 2035 without intervention, while Lifecycle Refrigerant Management (LRM) could avoid 500–650 Mt CO2e between 2025 and 2035. The study warns of rapid growth in AC ownership and emissions if not addressed, urging stronger regulations under India’s Cooling Action Plan, including LRM to reduce refrigerant demand and emissions by 25–30% by 2037–38 and implementing Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) for manufacturers, emphasizing environmental and economic benefits such as saving $10 billion in refilling costs and generating $25–33 billion in carbon credits.

Based on 3,100 households in 7 cities (Chennai, Pune, Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Mumbai, Delhi), where 98% own 3 to 5 star rated ACs, the survey reveals that 80% of households own ACs less than 5 years old (40% less than 2 years), with 87% owning one AC and 13% owning two or more, and AC numbers expected to triple to 245 million in the next 10 years; 40% of ACs are refilled annually (versus the global norm of every 5 years), requiring 32,000 tonnes of refrigerant refills in 2024, where an AC refilled every two years emits as much GHG as a passenger car; the average refill cost per AC is ₹2,200, with total household spending on refills at ₹7,000 crore ($0.8 billion) in 2024, projected to reach ₹27,540 crore ($3.1 billion) by 2035.

(Source: Hindu.com dated 16 September 2025)

4. SPORTS

#India aspires to be among top five sporting nations of world by 2047

Union Sports Minister Mansukh Mandaviya announced India’s ambition to become one of the top five sporting nations by 2047, marking the centenary of independence, during the opening ceremony of the Commonwealth Weightlifting Championships 2025 in Ahmedabad. He highlighted significant progress in the sports sector under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership, including reforms like the Target Podium Olympic Scheme for elite athletes, a new Sports Policy to enhance accessibility, infrastructure, and governance, and the athlete-centric Sports Governance Bill emphasizing women’s representation in federations.

Mandaviya also noted India’s goal to rank in the top 10 sporting nations within the next decade and its bid to host the 2036 Olympics, stressing the need for a robust sporting ecosystem to empower athletes and strengthen the nation. The event, attended by International Weightlifting Federation President Mohammed Hasan Jalood and Indian Weightlifting Federation President Sahdev Yadav, was praised for its outstanding organization and infrastructure.

Jalood described it as a “significant occasion,” while Mandaviya called it an indication of India’s emerging athletic power, stating, “This is not just about lifting weight, this is about empowering and strengthening the country.” The championships symbolize India’s growing prominence in global sports, aligning with broader initiatives to foster a sports culture through sequential reforms.

(Source: Hindu.com – 24 August 2025)

Law Of Escheat

INTRODUCTION

How many of us have heard the term “Escheat”? While at first blush it sounds like it is a new form of cheating, the reality is far from this. Escheat is a legal phrase of French origin which means that the property of a deceased, to which there are no legal claimants, falls to the State, i.e., reverts to the Government. This law is useful in cases of intestate succession since the Laws of India provide that in cases where there is no legal heir of the deceased, the State becomes the entity entitled to succeed to his estate. The Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co., Ltd vs. the State of Bombay, 1958 AIR 328 has held that the expression “abandoned property” or to use the more familiar term “bona vacantia ” comprises properties of two different kinds, those which come in by escheat and those over which no one has a claim. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 7, page 536, para. 1152, it is stated that ” the term bona vacantia is applied to things in which no one can claim a property and includes the residuary estate of persons dying intestate “.

The earliest exposition on this issue was by the Privy Council in the case of Collector of Masulipatnam v. Cavaly Vencata Narainapah (1859-1961) 8 M.I.A. 529. The Court held that the estate of a Hindu Brahmin, dying without heirs, escheats to the Crown, as the Sovereign power in British India. An estate taken by escheat is subject to the trusts and charges, if any, previously affecting the estate.

Article 296 of the Constitution of India is the constitutional provision enabling vesting of the property with the State Government if a person dies intestate and without any heir qualified to succeed to his or her property. It provides that any property in the territory of India which, if this Constitution had not come into operation, would have accrued to His Majesty or, as the case may be, to the Ruler of an Indian State by escheat or lapse, or as bona vacantia for want of a rightful owner, shall, if it is property situate in a State, vest in such State, and shall, in any other case, vest in the Union.

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956

This Act applies in case of a Hindu, Jain, Sikh or Buddhist dying intestate, i.e., without a valid Will. In such an event, in case of a Hindu male dying intestate, his estate devolves on his Class I legal heirs; else, his Class II heirs; else his agnates and if none, then his cognates. Similarly, in the case of a Hindu female dying intestate, her estate first devolves on her husband and children; if none, then on the heirs of her husband; if none, then on her parents; if none, then on the heirs of her father and lastly on the heirs of her mother.

However, consider a case where a Hindu male/female dies intestate and leaves behind no heirs at all to succeed to his property. In such a case, s.29 of this Act provides that such property shall devolve upon the Government and the Government would take such property subject to all obligations and liabilities to which an heir would have been subject.

Based on this enabling law, certain States have enacted specific Escheat Legislation. For instance, the Rajasthan Escheats Act, 1956 regulates the procedure for initiation of proceedings and making of enquiries in the matter of lawaris properties vesting in the State of Rajasthan under Article 296 of the Constitution of India. Maharashtra does not have such a specific Law.

The Supreme Court in State of Punjab v Balwant Singh, (1992) Suppl (3) SCC 108, has held that this section shall not operate in favour of the State if there is any other heir of the intestate. The section itself indicated that there must be failure of heirs. Failure of heirs meant the total absence of heirs to the intestate. It was important to remember that female Hindu being the full owner of the property became a fresh stock of descent. The phrase fresh stock of descent refers to an heir’s ability to inherit property, and pass it on to their own direct heirs, thereby creating a new line of succession separate from the original owner’s lineage. This would thus create a new line of succession. If she left behind any heir , her property could not be escheated. It is only in the event of the deceased leaving behind no heir to succeed, that the State steps in to take the property. The Court held that the State did not take the property as a rival or preferential heir of the deceased but as the Lord paramount of the whole soil of the country. It cited Halsburys’ Laws of England, 4th ed. Vol. 17 para 1439 wherein it was stated as follows:

“To whom land escheated – Escheat in the case of death intestate before 1926 was to the mesne lord is he could be found but, as since 1290 sub-infeudation has been forbidden, in the great majority of cases there was no record of the mesne tenure, and the escheat was to the Crown as the Lord paramount of the whole soil of the country.”

Again, in Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust through Velji Devshi Patel vs. Collector, Haridwar, 2017 (16) SCC 418, the Court explained the doctrine of escheat. It held that the postulated that where an individual died intestate and did not leave behind an heir who is qualified to succeed to the property, the property devolved on the government. Though the property devolved on the government in such an eventuality, yet the government took it subject to all its obligations and liabilities. Failure meant a total absence of any heir to the person dying intestate. When a question of escheat arose, the onus rested heavily on the person who asserted the absence of an heir qualified to succeed to the estate of the individual who had died intestate to establish the case. The law did not readily accept such a consequence. Where the Crown or Government claimed by escheat, the onus lay on it to show that the owner of the estate died without heirs. An estate taken by escheat was subject to the trusts, charges and legal obligations (if any) previously affecting the estate, e.g., mortgages and other encumbrances. It concluded that Escheat was a doctrine which recognised the state as a paramount sovereign in whom property would vest only upon a clear and established case of a failure of heirs. This principle was based on the norm that in a society governed by the rule of law, the court will not presume that private titles were overridden in favour of the state, in the absence of a clear case being made out on the basis of a governing statutory provision.

In State of Bihar vs. Radha Krishna Singh, (1983) 3 SCC 118, a Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court formulated the principle that it was well settled that when a claim of escheat was put forward by the Government the onus lay heavily on the appellant (that is the Government) to prove the absence of any heir anywhere in the world. Normally, the court frowned on the estate being taken by escheat unless the essential conditions for escheat were fully and completely satisfied. Further, before the plea of escheat could be entertained, there must be a public notice given by the Government so that if there is any claimant anywhere in the country or for that matter in the world, he may come forward to contest the claim of the State.

The Calcutta High Court in Debabrata Mondal vs. State of West Bengal, 2008 AIR Cal 13, was faced with an interesting case. A lady died, leaving behind her step-sons from her husband’s previous marriage. The State of West Bengal invoked the law of escheat on grounds that the stepchildren were not entitled to her property for inheritance. The High Court negated the attachment by the State and held that the Hindu Succession Act was very clear that the property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve upon the heirs of her husband, i.e., upon her husband’s children. Hence, there could not be any doubt that they were entitled to claim that the property left by the deceased and the same would devolve on them. Since they succeeded to their step-mother’s property, the Law of Escheat would fail.

INDIAN SUCCESSION ACT, 1925

This Act deals with intestate succession in case of persons other than that of a Hindu, Jain, Sikh, Buddhist or a Muslim. Thus, it would cover cases of Indian Christians, Parsis, etc. This Act provides that where the intestate dies without a widow and without leaving people who are kindred (i.e., persons descended from the same stock or common ancestor as his) to him, then his property shall go to the Government.

In his Commentary on “The Indian Succession Act”, 11th edition, 2015, LexisNexis, P. L. Paruck states that the reason of this law seems to be that the state as the protector of every citizen during his life is entitled to take his property as a reward for its services where there are no heirs to the deceased. In such cases, the Collector has powers to issue notices to the claimants of the property – Indian Timber and Plywood Corp Ltd, v Collector of Kozlikode, 1996 KLJ 564.

Thus, both the Hindu Succession Act and the Indian Succession Act have codified the Law of Escheat!

State of Rajasthan v. Ajit Singh & Others, SLP (C) NO(S).14721-14723/2024, Order dated 1st September 2025

This decision of the Apex Court dealt with an interesting issue of what happens when a Will of a Hindu deceased is held to be invalid? Can the law of escheat automatically apply in such a case? The Court analysed the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and that of the Indian Succession Act inasmuch as it pertained to a Will. It laid down the following waterfall mechanism:

(a) If a Hindu male had prepared a valid Will for his property then the Will would override the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act;

(b) If the Will is probated or proved before a competent court of law, then the legatees under the Will would succeed to the demised testator’s properties.

(c) If the Will was held to be invalid by a Court, then firstly as per the Hindu Succession Act, his estate would devolve upon his Class I heirs;

(d) If there is no heir of class I, then upon the Class II heirs;

(e) If there was no Class II heir, then upon his agnate (one person is said to be an “agnate” of another if the two are related by blood or adoption wholly through males);

(f) If there was no agnate then upon his cognate (one person is said to be a “cognate” of another if the two are related by blood or adoption but not wholly through males);

(g) It was only when the Will was declared invalid and also when all of the above legal heirs failed, that the principle of escheat would come into play.

(h) In other words, if a Will of a Hindu has been declared to be invalid and probate is not granted, then the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act would automatically apply as the deceased would have died intestate. It has to be then ascertained as to whether there are any Class I or Class II heirs, agnates or cognates. Only on the failure of any qualified heir being present to succeed to the properties, under the aforesaid Act.

(i) It is only when there is failure of heirs that the estate of an intestate Hindu would devolve on the Government under the Act. This means that till that stage arrives, the Government is a stranger to the probate proceedings as well as any proceeding regarding succession under the personal law.

(j) Merely because the State has invoked the escheat provisions, would not give locus standi to assail the grant of probate of the Will of the testator.

(k) Even in the event the probate has been granted illegally to the legatees of a Will inasmuch as the Will itself is not a valid Will, then under section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, only the persons who could have succeeded, by the Will could have filed an application for revocation of the grant of probate and none else.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that it was only in the event of intestate succession, that section 29 of the Act would apply and there would be a devolution of the estate of a deceased Hindu on the Government and not otherwise.

Strangers cannot be parties to intestate succession

One important fundamental difference between an intestate succession and a succession by a Will is that in the case of an intestate succession only heirs of the deceased can succeed to his property. These could be closer heirs or distant heirs. However, strangers cannot be a party to his estate. In the case of a valid Will, a testator is free to leave everything to strangers. India does not have forced heirship rules and hence, an Indian has full freedom to prepare his Will as per his wishes and bequeath to whomsoever he wishes. This issue has been elaborated eloquently by the Supreme Court in its decision in Krishna Kumar Birla vs. RS Lodha, (2008) 4 SCC 300 where it has held:

“Why an owner of the property executes a Will in favour of another is a matter of his/her choice. One may by a Will deprive his close family members including his sons and daughters. She had a right to do so. The court is concerned with the genuineness of the Will. If it is found to be valid, no further question as to why did she do so would be completely out of its domain. A Will may be executed even for the benefit of others including animals.”

CONCLUSION

The Law of Escheat is one more reason why it makes sense for every adult to make a valid Will. This would give one the discretion to decide who gets his estate after his lifetime. Otherwise, rest assured that the Government would always be there for those who have no one!

Is It Fair To Discriminate TDS Unfairly Over Advance Tax? The Curious Case Of Section 234B Of The Indian Income Tax Act

BACKGROUND

Section 234B of the Income Tax Act was introduced in the year 1988; It seeks to levy interest for non-payment of advance tax or payment of advance tax of an amount less than ninety percent of assessed tax.

However, Section 208 obligates the assessee to make payment of advance tax if the amount of advance tax payable is ₹10,000 or more. It defines the methodology of computing the advance tax and it gives credence to deduction of TDS while computing the advance tax to be paid.

It is further provided in Section 234B that where the pre assessment taxes (that is, total taxes paid during the financial year, prior to assessment that happens after the end of the Financial Year) paid are above 90 per cent of the finally assessed tax, no interest is leviable.

Also, Explanation 1 to Section 234B (extracted below) requires that TDS should be deducted while computing the advance tax payable as it recognises that TDS is part of the pre assessment tax.

[Explanation 1. – In this section, “assessed tax” means the tax on the total income determined under sub-section (1) of section 143 and where a regular assessment is made, the tax on the total income determined under such regular assessment as reduced by the amount of,1-any tax deducted or collected at source in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII on any income which is subject to such deduction or collection and which is taken into account in computing such total income;

In this article, we shall see that the Department computes interest on advance tax deficiency by treating TDS differently by adversely discriminating it vis a vis advance tax payment, even though both (advance tax and TDS) are, factually, logically and legally, pre assessment taxes.

THE ISSUE:

The department treats TDS with disdain and advance tax as a superior one. The department has provided a 234B interest calculator. The hyperlink of that site is https://incometaxindia.gov.in/Pages/tools/interest-234a-234b-234c-234d-tool.aspx

The following example may be keyed in and you will find to your surprise that 234B interest is calculated for a pure TDS case, even where the TDS coverage is more than 90% of the required advance tax liability.

For readers, you may input this example:

Assessment year 2025-26
Interest payable under section 234B
Tax payable on total Income ₹2,54,043
TDS/TCS ₹2,42,352
Advance tax paid 0
Balance ₹11,691

On pressing CALCULATE button it computes interest of ₹696 up to 19th Sep. 2025 (i.e. ₹116/- per month from 1st April 2025 for six months).

Now repeat the above example but key in 0(zero) for TDS/TCS and ₹2,42,352 in advance tax (which again is more than 90% of the advance tax liability) row, the 234B interest is ZERO. Ta da!!

Looks like that for levy of penal interest, the term pre assessment taxes cover only advance tax (paid directly) and indirect payments of tax (Tax withheld from and remitted on behalf of the assessee, though made in the same Financial Year), are fully disregarded.

It is inconceivable in logic how such a discrimination is justified between two types of pre assessment taxes remitted to Government, in the same Financial Year; Ideally, both types of payment are to be treated as fungible and the duo must be taken together and given credit against the advance tax due for the Financial Year.

Another example:

A Corporate whose estimated advance tax liability is ₹1 crore pays advance tax, say ₹91 lacs leading to a deficiency is ₹9 lacs, will not attract Section 234B interest, as it has fulfilled the 90% pre assessment tax obligation. This residual amount of ₹9 lacs is greater than ₹10,000; No Section 234B interest liability is triggered. Thus, it is obvious the small tax payer undergoes the hardships of Section 234B. The small tax payers are busy with their daily lives and don’t have the wherewithal to understand nuances of advance tax payments; it is not right to penalise for non-payment of advance tax, when the TDS coverage is more than 90% of the total tax liability while filing the return of income.

Another reason to treat TDS and advance tax on par.

IS IT FAIR?

Where the residual tax payable is ₹10,000 or more, TDS remitted from the taxpayer’s money is treated with no respect, while Advance tax payments are considered superior.

Some statistics and big picture:

From CAG report

Report No. 14 of 2024 (Direct Taxes)

(Source: Income Tax Department Time Series Data for financial year 2016-17 to 2021-22 and Press Information)

“More than ninety per cent of the tax collection is through voluntary compliance by taxpayers. TDS and Advance Tax are significant contributors to the pre-assessment tax collections. The direct tax collection through TDS, Advance Tax and Self-Assessment Tax has consistently increased over the years (except in year 2019-20). While a significant part of the Direct Tax collections accrue from voluntary compliance, less than 10 per cent of the tax collections are made through post-assessment procedures. Composition of TDS and advance tax figures in the year 2021 were around 47 and 51 percent respectively in relation to total pre assessment taxes.

  • Taxpayers are expected to self-assess and pay their taxes. Tax is also deducted while making payments (TDS) and collected at source (TCS).
  • As of 2022, about 93% of income tax collection was at the pre-assessment stage. These involved collection through TDS, advance tax, and self-assessment tax.”

The interesting question is whether TDS, which is also, undoubtedly, a pre assessment tax, (whereby money is transferred from the taxpayer to the credit of Government during the Financial Year, albeit through a different process, that is by a third party) is on par with Advance tax or not.

It is a mystery how the logic of the department is justified. The discriminatory treatment meted out to TDS remitted from taxpayer’s money, ends up imposing additional taxes from assessees, in above mentioned cases. It is well recognised by the Judiciary that interest is compensatory and is linearly related to the period and quantum of the relevant cashflow withheld. Resultantly, the distinction between the two types of cashflows poured into the Government kitty (one through TDS remitted by third parties
and another by direct payment as advance tax) defies logic.

APPEAL TO GOVERNMENT AND CONCLUSION.

The Government should be fair and logical and hence treat TDS and Advance tax on the same footing. Both result in cashflow to the tax department from the taxpayer as part of preassessment tax payment.

To say more clearly, where more than 90% of taxes have been remitted/recovered in the aggregate, in the financial year (whether by advance tax payments directly by the taxpayer or TDS remittances on behalf of the taxpayer), the levy of interest is not justified in the ₹10,000 threshold cases. Therefore Section 208 (new Sections 404 and 405 of the new Income Tax Act, 2025) and 234B (Section 424 of the new Income Tax Act ,2025) need to be amended suitably to address the anomaly so that TDS will be treated on the same footing as advance taxes.


1 Revised estimates have been used for 2024-25.; Sources: Starred Question No 231, Lok Sabha, March 17, 2025; Budget documents; PRS

Current Or Non-Current – Decoding The New Rules Under Ind As 1

Ind AS 1, Presentation of Financial Statements sits at the core of how Indian companies communicate financial position and performance. The Companies (Ind AS) Second Amendment Rules, 2025 refine this foundation by tightening when an entity truly has the right at the reporting date to defer settlement, defining what counts as “settlement” for classification purposes, and adding targeted covenant-risk disclosures when non-current classification depends on meeting covenants within the next 12 months.

The amendments draw a clear line in the sand firmly separating what qualifies as current versus non-current, leaving no room for subjective interpretation. A temporary Indian carve-out applies in financial year (FY) 2025-26 allowing a post balance-sheet waiver to avoid current classification (with disclosure). From FY 2026-27 this relief goes and India fully converges with IAS 1 on breaches at period-end where only the rights on the reporting date speak, and everything else is noise.

WHY THE AMENDMENTS MATTER

Under the old wording, preparers often asked: Does a covenant tested after year-end affect classification? Can we rely on a lender’s waiver after the reporting date? What if we intend to settle early? Different interpretations led to inconsistency. The amendments address these by anchoring classification solely to enforceable rights at period-end, regardless of intentions or subsequent actions.

Pre vs. Post Amendment Criteria

Pre-amendments criteria Pre-amendments criteria
An entity shall classify a liability as current when:

 

(a)
It expects to settle the liability in its normal operating cycle,

An entity shall classify a liability as

current when:

(a)
It expects to settle the liability in its normal operating cycle,

(b)
It holds the liability primarily for the purpose of trading,(c)
The liability is due to be settled within twelve months
after the reporting period, or
(b)
It holds the liability primarily for the purpose of trading,(c)
The liability is due to be settled within twelve months
after the reporting period, or
(d)
It does not have an unconditional right to defer settlement of the liability for at least twelve months after the reporting period. Terms of a liability that could, at the option of the counterparty, result in its settlement by the issue of
equity instruments do not affect its classification.
(d)
It does not have the right at the end of the reporting period to defer settlement of the liability for at least twelve months after the reporting period.
An entity shall classify all other liabilities as non-current. An entity shall classify all other liabilities as non-current.
When an entity presents current and non-current assets, and current and non-current liabilities, as separate classifications in its statement of financial position, it shall not classify deferred
tax assets (liabilities)
as current assets (liabilities).
When an entity presents current and non-current assets, and current and non-current liabilities, as separate classifications in its statement of financial position, it shall not classify deferred tax assets (liabilities) as current assets (liabilities).

Overview of Key Requirements (Pre vs. Post Amendment Criteria)

Area Pre-Amendment Post-Amendment
Paragraph 69(d) – Core definition Liability classified current if due within 12 months or if no clear right to defer; wording left room for differing interpretations. Clarified: liability is current if the entity does not have the right, at the reporting date, to defer settlement for ≥12 months. Anchors classification
to enforceable rights existing at period-end.
Covenants (paragraph 72A–72B)  No explicit guidance on how covenants affect classification. New paragraphs added: covenants linked to period-end measures affect period-end classification (even if tested later); covenants tested only after reporting date do not.
Rollover rights (paragraph 73) Silent; practice varied. Explicit: liability is non-current only if an unconditional rollover right exists at period-end.
Breach at period-end (paragraph 74) No clear requirement; diversity in practice. Two-step change:

– FY 2025-26  transitional carve-out: waiver after year-end but before approval can avoid current classification (with Ind AS 107 disclosure).

From FY 2026-27: carve-out removed. If breach exists at period-end, liability is current, regardless of waiver. Only a grace period in place at period-end preserves non-current.

Grace period (paragraph 75) Not expressly codified. Non-current if, by reporting date, lender provides a grace period extending ≥12 months.
Intent / early settlement (paragraph 75A) Often debated; some looked to management intent. Clarified: classification is unaffected by management’s intention or by actual settlement after year-end.
Definition of “settlement” (paragraph 76A–76B) No definition. Settlement defined: transfer of cash/other resources or own equity instruments (with an exception for equity components classified under Ind AS 32).
Events after reporting (paragraph 76) Listed as non-adjusting events (refinancing, waivers,  grace, settlement). Temporarily deleted in 2025 text; reinstated from 2026.

Right to defer settlement

Earlier position (pre-amendment):

Under the pre-amended Ind AS 1, a liability could be classified as non-current only if the entity had an unconditional right to defer its settlement for at least twelve months after the reporting date. In practice, however, most loan agreements contain debt covenants that must be complied with either continuously (e.g., no change in control, no material adverse event) or at frequent intervals (e.g., quarterly or half-yearly debt-equity or current ratio tests). Although borrowers generally expected to comply, these conditions were not entirely within their control. This created uncertainty as to whether such loans met the strict “unconditional right” test. Different interpretations emerged in practice, leading to diversity in reporting and making it difficult for users to compare financial statements.

New position (post-amendment):

Post amendment, the standard no longer refers to an “unconditional right”; instead, it simply requires a right to defer settlement. This means that even a conditional right can support non-current classification of a financial liability or borrowing, provided it is substantive and exists at the reporting date.
A new paragraph also makes clear that, the right to defer settlement may be subject to compliance with covenants in the loan agreement. Only covenants requiring compliance on or before the reporting date are relevant for classification, even if the actual testing takes place after year-end.

Covenants that apply only after the reporting date (i.e., future covenants) do not affect classification. Instead, future covenants must be explained through disclosures in the notes, along with details of the related liabilities.

EXPECTED DEFERRALS AND INTENTIONS TO SETTLE EARLY

The amendments clarify that for a loan liability to be classified as non-current, the entity must hold a right to defer settlement for at least twelve months after the reporting date. Whether the entity actually intends to exercise that right is irrelevant.

The earlier reference to management’s expectations has been deleted, and a new paragraph makes this principle explicit: classification is unaffected by the likelihood of early settlement. Accordingly, if a loan meets the criteria for non-current classification, it remains non-current even if management intends or expects to repay within twelve months, or even if the entity actually repays the loan between the reporting date and the date the financial statements are approved for issue.

In such cases, the entity may need to disclose the timing of settlement in the notes to ensure users understand the impact on liquidity.

The amended standard also clarified that the “expected to be settled in the normal operating cycle” criterion for current classification is intended only for items such as trade payables and operating accruals that are part of working capital. This test does not apply to loans and similar financial liabilities.

IMPACT OF BREACHES TO DEBT COVENANTS – IND AS 1

The final amendments to Ind AS 1 retain a temporary carve-out for FY 2025-26 (periods beginning on or after 1 April 2025):

Material vs. minor breaches: Only a breach of a material covenant of a long-term loan triggers current classification. Breaches of minor provisions do not require reclassification.

Post-reporting date waivers: If there is a breach of a material covenant on or before the reporting date, the loan would normally be current.

However, under Ind AS 1 (FY 2025-26 only), if the lender provides a waiver after the reporting date but before approval of the financial statements, the loan may still be shown as non-current. Such waivers are treated as adjusting events.

From FY 2026-27 (periods beginning on or after 1 April 2026):

Both carve-outs are removed, and Ind AS 1 will be fully converged with IAS 1. That means, no distinction between material and minor breaches, i.e., any breach is relevant and waivers obtained only after the reporting date no longer cure the breach for classification. A liability is current if the breach exists at year-end, unless a grace period extending ≥12 months was already agreed at that date.

This transition means that entities preparing financial statements for FY 2025-26 can still apply the carve-out, but from FY 2026-27 onward, classification will strictly follow the principle that rights must exist at the reporting date.

To make the amendments easier to understand, here are some practical situations that show how classification works under revised Ind AS 1. In each case, the entity has a 31 March year end and a loan of ₹1,000 crores repayable on 31 March 2029.

Scenario 1 – Future covenant tests

The loan agreement requires compliance with debt covenants at the end of each quarter, i.e., 30 June, 30 September, 31 December, and 31 March 2025. The entity has complied with all covenants till 31 March 2025 and expects to comply going forward, but it is not fully within the entity’s control.

Analysis:

At the reporting date, the entity has the right to defer settlement for at least twelve months. Future covenant tests do not affect classification. Since there has been no breach up to 31 March 2025, the loan is classified as
non-current. The same conclusion would apply even if there were uncertainty about future compliance as the classification depends only on the position at the reporting date.

Impact across years:

There is no difference between FY 2025-26 and FY 2026-27 . Since no breach exists at the reporting date, the loan is non-current under both

Scenario 2 – Waiver before year-end

Same facts as Scenario 1 except that the entity anticipated in February 2025 that it might breach its covenant as at 31 March 2025. On 15 March 2025, it entered into an agreement with the lender under which the 31 March covenant test was waived. As a result, no breach on

31 March 2025 would give the lender the right to demand repayment, although future covenant breaches at later test dates could still trigger repayment.

Analysis:

Since the 31 March covenant was waived before the reporting date, there is no non-compliance at year-end. The entity therefore has the right to defer settlement for at least twelve months. Under the amended Ind AS 1, future covenant tests do not affect classification at the reporting date. The loan is classified as non-current.

Impact across years:

Because the waiver was obtained before the reporting date, the position is same under FY 2025-26 and FY 2026-27. Since no breach exists at the reporting date, the loan is non-current under both

Scenario 3 – Breach waived on reporting date

Same facts as Scenario 1 except that in this case, the entity did not comply with the covenant as at 31 March 2025, which gave the lender the right to demand immediate repayment. However, on the same date, the lender agreed to waive the non-compliance and confirmed it would not demand repayment for the breach at 31 March 2025. Future breaches at later covenant test dates could still trigger repayment.

Analysis:

Because the waiver was granted on the reporting date itself, the entity retained the right to defer settlement for at least twelve months. Under the amended Ind AS 1, future covenant tests do not affect classification at the reporting date. Accordingly, the loan is classified as non-current.

Scenario 4 – Short grace period

Same facts as Scenario 1 except that in this case, the entity did not comply with the covenant as at 31 March 2025, giving the lender the right to demand immediate repayment. On the same date, the lender agreed not to demand repayment until 30 April 2025. The lender also stated that if the entity complied with the covenant on 30 April 2025, it would not demand repayment for the 31 March breach. However, the lender retained the right to demand repayment for non-compliance with later scheduled covenant tests.

Analysis:

By agreeing not to act on the 31 March breach, the lender has effectively waived the non-compliance at the reporting date, but introduced an additional covenant test on 30 April 2025. Under the amended Ind AS 1, future covenant tests do not affect classification at the reporting date. Therefore, the entity is considered to have the right to defer settlement for at least twelve months after 31 March 2025. The loan is classified as non-current.

Impact across years:

The scenarios 1 to 4 above, use a 31 March 2025 year-end purely for illustration. The principles, however, apply equally to later periods — whether the reporting date is 31 March 2026 (first year of applying the FY 2025-26 amendments) or 31 March 2027 (first year after the FY 2026-27 convergence). For Scenarios 1 to 4, the outcome is unchanged across both years. Because any waiver (where relevant) exists at the reporting date, the entity clearly has the right to defer settlement for at least twelve months. The loan is therefore non-current under both FY 2025-26 and FY 2026-27 rules.

Scenario 5 – Breach waived after reporting date

Same facts as Scenario 1 except that in this case, the entity did not comply with the covenant as at 31 March 2025, giving the lender the right to demand immediate repayment. On the same date, the lender agreed not to demand repayment for one month (until 30 April 2025). At that point, the lender would reassess the entity’s covenant compliance and decide whether to continue the loan. The lender also retained rights for future covenant breaches at later scheduled dates.

Analysis:

Here, the lender has not waived the breach. Instead, it has only provided a short grace period of one month. Even if the entity complies on 30 April, the lender could still rely on the original 31 March breach to demand repayment. Therefore, the entity does not have a substantive right to defer settlement for at least twelve months. The loan must be classified as current.

Impact across years: The conclusion is the same under both FY 2025-26 and FY 2026-27 rules — a short grace period does not provide the right to defer settlement for twelve months. The loan remains current in both years

Scenario 6 – Intention to repay early

Same facts as Scenario 1, except the entity did not comply with the covenant as at 31 March 2025, giving the lender the right to demand immediate repayment. On 30 April 2025, the lender agreed to waive the non-compliance and confirmed it would not demand repayment for the 31 March breach. The lender still retained rights over future covenant breaches at later scheduled test dates.

Analysis:

At 31 March 2025, the entity did not have the right to defer settlement for at least twelve months — the waiver only came later.

Under IAS 1, such a waiver after the reporting date is a non-adjusting event, so the liability is current.

Under Ind AS 1 for FY 2025-26 (year ending 31 March 2026), India’s carve-out allows a waiver obtained after the reporting date but before approval of the financial statements to be treated as if it existed at year-end. The loan can therefore be shown as non-current.

From FY 2026-27 (year ending 31 March 2027), this carve-out is removed. The same facts will result in the loan being current.

Impact across years:

FY 2025-26: Loan is non-current (carve-out applies).

FY 2026-27: Loan is current (carve-out removed, aligned with IAS 1).

The above examples demonstrate how the amended Ind AS 1 brings clarity to the classification of liabilities as current or non-current. Under the pre-revised standard, treatment of future covenants was not explicitly addressed, which meant entities could arrive at different interpretations in practice. With the new guidance, the principle is clear: classification hinges on the rights that exist at the reporting date, not on expectations or post-date events.

The authors believe that it is therefore essential for entities to revisit past positions and ensure their policies and classifications are aligned with the amended requirements, particularly as the Indian carve-out on covenant breaches will be removed from FY 2026-27 onwards.

Example – Expected Early Settlement of Loan

As at 31 March 2025, an entity has a loan repayable in five years from the reporting date. The entity is planning to prepay this loan within the next three months. The financial statements of the entity for the year ended 31 March 2025 will be approved for issue on 31 May 2025.

In this case, the entity has a right to defer settlement for at least twelve months after the reporting date. The intention to prepay the loan does not affect classification. Hence, the liability is classified as non-current.

Will it make a difference if the entity has prepaid the loan before the financial statements were approved for issue?

The standard is clear that classification is based on the right of the entity at the reporting date. Hence, the loan will still be classified as non-current. However, the entity will be required to disclose the subsequent repayment as a non-adjusting event.

Will the position change if the entity has notified the bank of its intentions but has not entered into an irrevocable commitment to repay the loan within 12 months?

As stated above, the classification is based on the right of the entity at the reporting date. Hence, the loan will still be classified as non-current. However, the entity should make appropriate disclosures regarding its intention to prepay the loan.

What if the entity has entered into a binding agreement with the bank for early settlement before the reporting date and the said agreement is irrevocable?

In this case, the entity no longer has the right to defer settlement for at least twelve months at the reporting date. Accordingly, the loan is classified as current.

SETTLEMENT OF A LIABILITY BY ISSUE OF EQUITY INSTRUMENTS

Before the amendments, Ind AS 1 required that if a liability could be settled at the option of the counterparty by issuing equity instruments, this feature did not affect classification. For example, a convertible instrument repayable in cash after more than twelve months — but which the holder could choose to convert into equity at any time — was classified as non-current, since the cash maturity date was beyond twelve months.

The revised Ind AS 1 removes this clause. Now, settlement through the issue of equity instruments is also treated as settlement for the purpose of classifying a liability as current or non-current. The only exception is when the conversion option itself meets the definition of an equity instrument under Ind AS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation.

Practical impact:

Many companies have issued convertible instruments that are redeemable only after a fixed period but allow the holder to convert them into a variable number of shares at any time. Prior to amendments, these were shown as non-current. After the amendment, they must be treated as current liabilities, because the counterparty can demand settlement immediately through equity.

Example– Classification of Optionally Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares (OCRPS)

An entity issues OCRPS redeemable after 10 years (either mandatorily or if there is no qualified IPO by the end of year 10). The holder, however, can require conversion into equity shares at any time after issuance. Consider the following conversion formulas:
Scenario 1: OCRPS are convertible into a variable number of shares based on the fair value of equity shares at the conversion date.

Scenario 2: OCRPS are convertible into a fixed number of shares upfront, but with down-round protection (number of shares changes if new shares are issued at a lower price).

Scenario 3: OCRPS are convertible into a fixed number of shares upfront, with no down-round protection or other clauses that change the conversion ratio.

Response:

Earlier position (pre-amendment):

Before the amendments, Ind AS 1 stated that if a liability could, at the option of the counterparty, be settled through the issue of equity instruments, this feature did not affect its classification. In practice, this meant that the holder’s right to demand early conversion into equity was ignored when deciding current versus non-current classification. As a result, in all three OCRPS scenarios discussed, the liability could reasonably have been shown as non-current in the balance sheet for years 1 to 9.

Amended position (post-amendment):

Following the amendments, the option to convert into equity can be ignored only if it qualifies as equity under Ind AS 32. If the conversion feature fails the equity test, it must be considered in classification. Accordingly, the following treatment will apply in the balance sheet for years 1 to 9:

Scenario 1: The OCRPS are convertible into a variable number of shares, determined based on the fair value of the equity shares at the conversion date. Under Ind AS 32, such a conversion feature is classified as a liability, not equity. Because the holder can demand conversion (and therefore settlement) at any time, the entire instrument must be classified as a current liability in years 1 to 9.

Scenario 2: The OCRPS are convertible into a fixed number of shares upfront, but the terms include a down-round protection clause, which can change the number of shares to be issued if new shares are issued at a lower price. Because the host instrument is a financial liability, this conversion option fails the “fixed-for-fixed” test and therefore does not qualify as equity under Ind AS 32. Instead, it is treated as an embedded derivative liability.

Under Ind AS 109, the issuer may measure the whole instrument at fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL) or separate the host liability (at amortised cost) and the embedded derivative (at FVTPL). Regardless of the measurement approach, the conversion feature is not equity. Accordingly, the entire OCRPS must be classified as a current liability in years 1 to 9.

Scenario 3: The OCRPS are convertible into a fixed number of shares upfront, with no down-round protection or other clauses that could change the number of shares to be issued. In this case, the conversion option qualifies as equity under Ind AS 32. The host instrument, however, remains a financial liability. Because the conversion option is treated as equity, it is ignored for classification purposes, and the OCRPS liability is classified as non-current in the balance sheet for years 1 to 9.

In year 10, once redemption falls due within twelve months, the liability becomes current in all scenarios, under both the pre-amended and post-amendment standards. Year 10 treatment:

This example highlights how the amendment fundamentally changes practice: only conversion options that meet the strict “equity” definition under Ind AS 32 are ignored. All others bring the liability into current classification, even if legal maturity is much longer.

NEW DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

The amendments introduce detailed disclosure obligations when a liability from a loan agreement is classified as non-current, but the right to defer settlement depends on compliance with covenants falling due within the next twelve months. Disclosures required include:

(i) Information about the covenants:

(a) The nature of the covenants,

(b) When the entity must comply with them, and

(c) The carrying amount of the related liabilities.

(ii) If facts and circumstances suggests that the entity may face challenges in meeting such covenants, those circumstances must be disclosed. For example- indicate potential difficulty in compliance:

(a) The entity has already taken actions during or after the reporting period to avoid or mitigate a potential breach,

(b) The entity would not have complied with the covenants, if compliance had been assessed based on its circumstances at the reporting date

The authors believe that these disclosure requirements are entirely new for most entities. In the past, such disclosures were not made, both because there was no explicit requirement and because many companies considered covenant-related information to be confidential. With the amendments now in place, entities will have no choice but to comply. For instance, an entity with several loan arrangements and each with multiple covenants, may find itself required to disclose a long list of covenant details. In our view, the first set of disclosures (covering the nature of covenants, timing of compliance, and carrying amounts) will be necessary in all cases where:

(a) a loan liability is classified as non-current, and

(b) there are one or more covenants that require compliance within the next twelve months.

This requirement applies irrespective of whether management expects any difficulty in compliance.

With regard to the second disclosure, entities are expected to assess not only whether they have complied with covenants up to the reporting date, but also whether future difficulties may arise based on information available at that date. If such challenges are foreseen, they must be disclosed in the financial statements.

This requirement can be sensitive. Disclosure of potential difficulties may cause lenders, creditors, and other stakeholders to become more cautious, which in turn could accelerate the very risks being highlighted and reduce the chances of managing them successfully. To balance this, entities may also wish to explain how they plan to mitigate potential breaches. However, such disclosures should be factual, verifiable, and carefully worded to avoid inadvertently providing prospective financial information.

The amendments to Ind AS 1 apply retrospectively. For FY 2025-26 (periods beginning on or after 1 April 2025), companies must adopt the new rules including the temporary carve-out on covenant breaches and restate comparatives. From FY 2026-27 (periods beginning on or after 1 April 2026), this carve-out is removed, and Ind AS 1 is fully aligned with IAS 1. At that point, classification will depend only on rights that exist at the reporting date, and waivers obtained later will no longer change the outcome.

The amendments to Ind AS 1 mark a turning point in liability classification. FY 2025-26 is the clarity year: rights at the reporting date take centre stage, covenants and settlement are defined, and new disclosures improve transparency with a temporary waiver relief for breaches.

FY 2026-27 is the convergence year: the waiver relief ends, events after reporting return as disclosures, and India stands fully aligned with IAS 1. The authors believe that for preparers, the message is simple: focus on the rights that exist at the reporting date, review covenant terms carefully, and be ready to explain them clearly in the notes.

Income Tax Act, 2025 – An Overview

The Income-tax Act, 2025 replaces the 1961 law, effective from 1 April 2026, with the stated aim of simplification, modernisation, and digital alignment. It introduces a single “Tax Year”, logical reorganisation of provisions, removal of redundant clauses, and greater use of tables and formulae. The Act codifies faceless governance, modernises residence rules, streamlines assessment timelines, strengthens dispute resolution, and consolidates deductions and retirement benefits. It explicitly taxes Virtual Digital Assets (VDAs) and empowers authorities to access digital space during searches. While the Act improves readability and aligns with global practices, critics argue it largely preserves old complexities. Transitional provisions on losses, MAT credits, and incentives may trigger litigation. Key pain points—complex TDS/TCS rules, refund delays, weak taxpayer rights, and lack of automatic indexation—remain unresolved. Thus, the Act represents progress in design and digital readiness but is viewed as a missed opportunity for deeper structural reform.

 

The Income-tax Act, 2025(‘Act’) is introduced as a significant legislative reform in India’s direct tax landscape, replacing the six and a half decade old Income-tax Act, 1961(‘ITA’). While the core
principles of taxation and the scheme of taxation of income remain broadly the same, the 2025 legislation has the objective of introducing clarity, simplicity, and modernity to align with present-day business realities and digital compliance needs. The focus of the Act is on reducing complexity, consolidating provisions, and strengthening the governance framework.

It has attempted to improve taxpayer access and compliance by reorganising provisions logically besides removing obsolete provisions, consolidating duplicate rules, harmonising definitions, and introducing a formal “tax year” concept to align administrative and accounting practices. Special emphasis on use of plain English, sequential numbering, avoiding alphanumeric clauses is clearly visible.

The Act comes into effect from 1 April 2026 (Tax Year 2026-27 onwards). It contains the mandatory transitional provisions that ensures the continuity for pending matters under the ITA. It saves the applicability of the otherwise repealed provisions of the ITA for the ongoing assessments, appeals, and proceedings pending or initiated under the ITA, which will continue under the old law until concluded. New filings and compliances w.e.f. 1st April 2026 will fall under the framework of the Act. This phased transition has the effect of ensuring stability and avoiding disruption for taxpayers and the administration.

In 2017, the Prime Minister proposed replacing the Income-tax Act, 1961, echoing Kanga and Palkhiwala’s concern in their Eighth Edition of 1990, warning that excessive amendments had made the law a “national disgrace”. The revered authors also cautioned against mistaking constant change for progress and stressed stability in fiscal policy. The 2025 Act, while not a radical departure, represents a modernization of direct tax law. It emphasizes simplicity, digital readiness, global alignment, and dispute reduction. Key features include the tax year, consolidated deductions, faceless governance, and recognition of digital assets. Though concerns remain over search powers and delegated legislation, the Act promises clarity, stability, and reduced complexity.

For statistically oriented readers, the Timeline of the journey of the Bill to Act in 2025 is tabulated below:

Timeline of the journey of the Bill to Act in 2025 is tabulated below

The important recommendations of the PSC that made it into the final Act are consolidation of the faceless schemes and administration, enabling powers of the search party to access the virtual digital space, clarifying the rules for the tax treaty interpretation for undefined terms, need for DRP to pass a reasoned order, maintaining the status quo for determination of the annual value of the vacant house property, saving small taxpayers from penalties and continuity of rates and structure. The Legislature accepted the suggestions that the act of fixing the drafting anomalies in the ITA under the Act should not be construed as a policy change and the core architecture of the ITA is retained.

Structurally, the Act reorganises chapters and sections to group related concepts (residence, charge, exemptions, computation, assessments, appeals and penalties) in a more logical order. The Act replaces many legacy cross-references with self-contained provisions and removes archaic language.

A visible drafting change is sequential numeric sectioning (no “80C(a)(i)”) and an attempt to shorten and standardise definitions. The section count changed (some commentators note fewer words but reorganised numbering), but substance is largely intended to be continuous with earlier law unless expressly altered. The Act also reorganises timelines for assessment, reassessment and collection to be more consistent with modern IT systems and taxpayer needs.

Use of tables (increased to 57 from 18) and formulae (increased to 46 from 6) and illustrations in many sections instead of long textual (proviso/explanation) clauses are laudable and will have the effect in simplifying the otherwise complex provisions of law. This is intended to make computation / interpretation more straightforward. More use of schedules to group related items, clearer definition sections make the law easier to understand. Explanations / provisos are replaced by sub-sections or clauses, making the law modular.

Income tax in India began in 1860 to meet post-1857 financial needs, evolving through license and certificate taxes, and regular income tax in 1869, which was soon abolished. The 1886 and 1918 Acts formalized taxation, introducing six heads of income. The 1922 Act centralized administration, and was later replaced by the Income-tax Act, 1961, which became dense, amendment-heavy, and litigation-prone. Attempts to replace it with the Direct Tax Code (2012) failed. The Task Force appointed attempted to draft a modern, simplified tax law addressing global practices, faceless assessments, compliance reduction, and dispute minimization. The Income-tax Act, 2025 was enacted, modernizing and replacing the 1961 framework.

Territorial connection, and extraterritorial operation of the Act. The Bill introduced as a Money Bill, on enactment is made applicable to the whole of India, including the Union territories and the state of Jammu & Kashmir, as also to the Continental Shelf of India and the Exclusive Economic Zone of India for the extraction and production of mineral oils and the specified services, with the intended application to extra-territorial transactions. The extra-territorial operation of some of the deeming provisions of the Act should not render such provisions invalid or ultra vires the Indian legislature. Given a sufficient territorial connection or nexus between the person sought to be charged and India, levy of income-tax is validly extended to that person in respect of his foreign income. Like under the ITA, once the connection to the Indian territory is real, its extent is not relevant in considering the validity of the legislation. The connection under the Act is founded on the residence of the person or business connection within the Indian territory and the situation within India, of the money or property from which the taxable income is derived. These factors of the Act are sufficient to establish a territorial connection.

Constitutional validity: At first blush, the Act imposing the tax is constitutionally valid in as much as it has been passed by the legislature that was competent to pass it; and does not prima facie in its overall form contravene any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Being a law relating to economic activities, it will be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc. Unless and until a Court declares any provision to be ultra vires, the Act appears to be constitutionally valid and would be treated as such. In any case, there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute passed by the legislature, and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles.

Legislative Competence: In ‘pith and substance’ the legislation passed falls within the Seventh Schedule, List I and III of the Constitution of India. The four essential ingredients in a taxing statute namely: – (a) subject of tax; (b) person liable to pay the tax; (c) rate at which tax is to be paid, and (d) measure or value on which the rate is to be applied, are present in the Act. The Act that has been passed by the Legislature is within its competence to levy tax. Provisions carry the mechanisms and machinery for assessment of income and do not appear to be arbitrary. Provisions of presumptive taxation provide for opting out. Adequate transitional provisions are put in place and the classifications appear to be fair and reasonable. It contains the necessary machinery for levy of tax and its collection.

Article 246 read with Entry 82 of List I; Seventh Schedule of the Constitution empowers Parliament to levy taxes on income other than agricultural income. Article 265 requires that no tax be levied or collected except by authority of law. The 2025 Act, being a duly enacted parliamentary statute, satisfies this requirement. Article 14 (Equality clause) and Article 19 (1) (g) (Right to trade) place limits: taxation must not be arbitrary, discriminatory, or confiscatory. Classification for taxation under the Act appears to be valid as it is based on an intelligible differentia and has a rational nexus with the object of the law.

Thus, while particular provisions may face judicial scrutiny (especially transitional and incentive-related clauses), the Act as a whole stands on solid constitutional footing.

The Act is Exhaustive: The Act is Exhaustive in as much as it is a self-contained code, exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein. It however does not override the power of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, and of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, to issue, in appropriate cases, writs in the nature of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus or other directions or orders to examine the vires of the Act.

CONCEPTUAL & IMPORTANT CHANGES

1. Structural Overhaul and Simplification: The most visible feature of the Act is the streamlined structure. The ITA had around 819 sections spread across 47 chapters with a word count of nearly 500,000. The Act consolidates the provisions into 536 clauses under 23 chapters, reducing the word count to approximately 260,000.

  •  About 650 Provisos and 490 Explanations have been eliminated and are replaced by formula-based and tabular presentation wherever possible and/or are captured as sub-sections and sections.
  •  Presentation of the chapters follows a more logical sequence by first covering charging, compliance, assessments, TDS, TCS, taxes, recovery and dispute resolutions including the appeals followed by the penalty and prosecutions chapters in a linear manner.
  •  The simplification reduces interpretational ambiguities and ensures easier navigation for taxpayers, practitioners, and judicial authorities.

This design move alone is expected by the Government to improve compliance and cut down on litigation, which was often driven by complexity and multiple provisos.

2. Introduction of the “Tax Year”: One of the most important conceptual innovations is the replacement of the dual concept of “Previous Year” and “Assessment Year” with a unified “Tax Year.”

  •  Under the old regime, income was earned in the “Previous Year” but taxed in the “Assessment Year.”
  •  The new Act simplifies this by taxing income in the same Tax Year in which it accrues or arises.

This global best practice reduces confusion for taxpayers and aligns India with international tax systems. It also eliminates several interpretational disputes that arose from mismatches between the two years.

3. Emphasis on Digital Governance and Faceless Regime: The Act codifies India’s transition towards technology-driven administration.

  •  Faceless assessments, reassessments, appeals, and penalty proceedings are given a consolidated statutory foundation.
  • All schemes for reducing interface between taxpayers and officials are brought under one enabling provision, subject to parliamentary oversight.
  • E-filing of reports, returns, online payment of taxes, and digital communication of notices and responses are made the norm, reinforcing transparency and reducing subjectivity.

This shift supports the government’s vision of “minimum government, maximum governance” in tax administration.

4 Scope of taxation: One important conceptual strand in the Act is emphasis on “taxation on receipt” for certain items, and clearer rules for deemed income; the Act expressly addresses the issue of when income is to be treated as arising or being received. This clarity is intended to limit disputes over accrual versus receipt.

5. Residence: Residence rules have been rewritten to reflect modern mobility. The definitions and thresholds for residence and ordinarily resident status are rationalised to reduce uncertainty for digital nomads, expatriates and cross-border workers. Practitioners must check transitional rules carefully for individuals who change residence around the enactment date.

6. Deeming fictions: For particular classes of income (certain transfers of capital assets, stock-in-trade receipts from specified persons/entities) the Act contains express deeming provisions to tax amounts on receipt or on specified events — a shift intended to close gaps that previously caused mismatch and litigation.

7. Timelines and procedures for assessment, etc: The Act shortens and clarifies assessment and reassessment timelines, introduces clearer grounds and procedures for reopening assessments, and puts emphasis on pre-deposit and fast track dispute resolution mechanisms in some categories. It requires dispute panels to state points of determination and reasons for decisions.

These procedural changes aim to reduce lengthy litigation and multiple revisits of facts, but they also shift pressure onto initial fact-finding and show-cause stages. If case records are incomplete or notices poorly drafted, taxpayers may face hard choices within shorter windows.

8. Expanded Search and Seizure Provisions: The Act modernizes the powers of the revenue authorities in conducting the search and seizure operations.

  •  The Act explicitly empowers officers to access “virtual digital space” during searches.
  •  Tax authorities can access emails, social-media accounts, online trading platforms, and cloud storage, even by bypassing access codes.
  •  These powers aim to curb tax evasion in an era where digital transactions are widespread.

While such provisions strengthen enforcement, they also raise privacy and constitutional concerns, requiring careful implementation and judicial oversight.

9. Virtual Digital Assets (VDAs) Brought Within the Net: Unlike the ITA, the new law explicitly recognizes Virtual Digital Assets (VDAs) such as cryptocurrencies, NFTs, and digital tokens as capital assets or stock-in-trade.

  •  VDAs are included in the definitions of “property” and “income.”
  •  They are also covered under provisions relating to undisclosed income and search powers.
  •  The Act, while explicitly widening the coverage for “virtual digital assets” (VDAs), cryptocurrencies and income generated through online platforms, aims to update the tax-base, define reporting obligations, and (in some cases) prescribe withholding rules. The aim is to reduce ambiguity that existed under piecemeal amendments to the ITA.
  •  Simultaneously, withholding, reporting and data exchange rules are strengthened to leverage digital reporting (AIS, TDS/TCS modernisation). Practical implementation depends heavily on IT systems and data quality. That reliance both enables better compliance and creates operational risk if systems or guidance lag.

By acknowledging digital wealth, the Act ensures that taxation keeps pace with financial innovation, while providing clarity to investors and businesses dealing in such instruments.

10. Rule-Making Powers and Delegated Legislation: The Act strengthens the hands of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT).

  •  CBDT has been given wider authority to frame schemes, rules, and notifications to operationalise provisions.
  •  This reduces the need for constant legislative amendments while ensuring adaptability to changing circumstances.

At the same time, these rules must be placed before both the houses of the Parliament, preserving accountability and checks on delegated legislation.

11. Rationalisation of Deductions and Exemptions: The Act consolidates numerous deductions and exemptions which were earlier scattered across multiple sections.

  •  Benefits relating to gratuity, leave encashment, voluntary retirement, and commuted pension are grouped under one head for ease of reference.
  •  Deductions under sections like 80G (donations) and 80TTA/80TTB (interest income) are rationalised and clarified.
  •  Formula-based ceilings and tabular presentation make the provisions more user-friendly.

This rationalisation reduces duplication and ensures that taxpayers understand eligibility in a straightforward manner.

12. Modernised Dispute Resolution Framework: The Act seeks to address the chronic problem of tax litigation through enhanced dispute resolution mechanisms.

  •  The Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) must now record specific points for determination and provide reasoned directions.
  •  Provisions for Dispute Resolution Committees (‘DRC’s) offer relief to small taxpayers by enabling faster settlements.

By providing multiple forums and streamlining procedures, the Act aims to reduce prolonged litigation and increase certainty.

13. Anti-Avoidance and International Taxation: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) has been retained but clarified. Arrangements lacking commercial substance and aimed primarily at tax benefits will be disregarded.

  •  Treaty interpretation is codified: if a term is undefined in the treaty, the Act, or relevant notifications, it’s meaning may be sourced from other central laws.
  •  The Act attempts to update many international tax linkage points: residence tests, source rules, permanent establishment concepts and rules addressing cross-border digital supplies. It attempts to harmonise domestic law with BEPS/follow-up OECD standards and recent treaty models, but practical divergence and map-ping to treaty text will remain a complex exercise.
  • Issues will arise in interpreting domestic withholding obligations where treaties provide differing attribution rules; practitioners should watch guidance on treaty override, operation of tax credits and thin-capitalisation or withholding rules that interact with treaty relief.
  • This hierarchy of interpretation provides clarity and consistency in cross-border tax matters.

Such provisions strengthen India’s stance against aggressive tax planning while ensuring harmony with international tax laws.

14. Privacy, Safeguards, and Checks: While the Act grants sweeping powers for search and seizure, including access to digital devices, it simultaneously emphasizes transparency and accountability.

  •  Schemes for faceless procedures must be notified and laid before Parliament.
  •  The DRP’s requirement of speaking orders increases judicial discipline.
  •  Penalties are rationalised to ensure that taxpayers are not punished for minor or technical defaults.

Balancing enforcement with rights protection remains a key theme of the new Act.

15. Pension and Retirement Benefits: Retirement benefits have been streamlined for clarity.

  •  Provisions relating to pension, gratuity, and commuted pension are now consolidated.
  •  Exemptions are clearly defined with formula-based thresholds and moved into schedules for easier reference.
  •  The Act ensures that salaried employees and retirees can understand their entitlements without navigating through scattered provisions.

This will benefit senior citizens, a category often affected by interpretational challenges under the old law.

16. Transition: The devil lies in the details. Any new codification requires transitional rules. The Act contains express transitional provisions for pending assessments, appeals, unabsorbed losses, credits, and ongoing litigations. These provisions are crucial because they determine whether prior tax positions will be preserved or reinterpreted under the new drafting.

Practitioners must scrutinise each transitional clause: loss carryovers, depreciation bases, pending notices and the status of settled legal interpretation under the ITA may be dealt with differently. Early commentary warns that insufficiently precise transitional wording can spawn fresh litigation.

17. Penalties, compliance costs and rationalisation: The Act retains penalties but seeks to rationalise and tier them to reduce disproportionate fines for technical defaults. Nonetheless, new reporting obligations (especially for VDAs and platform economy) may increase compliance costs, particularly for small-medium enterprises and individuals unfamiliar with digital reporting.

Where no tax is payable or refund is due, the provisions for levy of penalty are relaxed to exempt such cases from levy of penalty in MSME and other small cases. Where levy of penalties is administrative and automated, appeals will likely increase if taxpayers perceive disproportionate enforcement; hence the interplay between automated data matching and human oversight is a systemic risk.

What Remains /Conserved: Some core principles remain unchanged and are retained:

  •  Tax rates/slabs have largely been retained; the new Act is not introducing new rates drastically in many segments.
  •  Fundamental heads of income (salaries, house property, business/profession, capital gains and other sources) remain but are refined.

REPEALS & SAVINGS AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR RETAINING THE LEGACY

Section 536 of the Act explicitly repeals the ITA. At the same time, it contains the savings clause for protecting the past operations. Actions already taken, rights acquired, or obligations incurred under the ITA remain unaffected by the repeal. Pending proceedings for example, assessments, reopening, reassessments, rectifications, appeals, penalties, references, revisions, or any related proceedings related to tax years beginning before 1 April 2026 would continue under the ITA; procedures. penalties and proceedings for the earlier years in respect of pre -1st April 2026 tax years would continue to be initiated and pursued as if the ITA has not been repealed but is continued and has remained in force. Pending proceedings before the tax authorities, initiated under the ITA and pending on 1 April 2026, will be adjudicated under the ITA. Refunds or defaults transiting into the Act after 1 April 2026, but relating to the proceeding under the ITA, shall be governed by the ITA for the period up to 31st March, 2025 and thereafter under the Act.

Importantly, no revival or reopening of the lapsed opportunities would be possible under the Act where the time limit to file an application, appeal, reference, or revision has already expired under the ITA on or before 1 April 2026; the Act does not revive or reopen any of them even if it offers longer periods. To reiterate, the legacy law of the ITA shall remain in force in the above referred cases even though the law is otherwise repealed w.e.f 01.04.2026. Law of limitation of the ITA shall apply to the filings, including of the appeals, and where such limitation had expired under the ITA before 1st April 2026, will not get the fresh lease of time under the Act, even if the latter provides more generous timelines.

Express provisions that save the application of the ITA ensures the legal continuity, guarantee a smooth transition without legal uncertainty and render fairness to taxpayers in as much as no pending matters or rights are disrupted or lost due to the repeal of the ITA. Importantly, administrative clarity is achieved with the clear demarcation between old and new regiments.

The principle underlying s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 providing for the savings for proceedings for liabilities incurred during the currency of the previous law may apply to a law that is repealed. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides for continuation of orders, notifications etc., issued under enactments repealed and re-enacted. In such instances, if repealed and re-enacted provisions are not inconsistent with each other, any order or notification made under the repealed provisions is deemed to be an order made under the reenacted provisions. Having noted the process, it appears that the prescription will fall short of ensuring the litigation free transition as is highlighted, while dealing with the shortfalls of the exercise.

KEY TRANSITIONAL AREAS AND CHALLENGES

During the transition from the ITA to the Act, several key areas, particularly the following require careful consideration;

  •  Pending assessments and reassessments initiated under ITA will continue under that law or may be deemed under the Act in specified cases. However, disputes may arise on whether the old or new procedure applies, particularly where reassessment timelines differ.
  •  Appeals already filed under the ITA will proceed before the existing appellate forums, but issues of forum shopping and jurisdictional objections may surface if the new Act alters hierarchy or timelines.
  •  Unabsorbed losses and depreciation under the ITA are intended to be carried forward into the new Act. Nonetheless, disagreements may occur regarding speculative or business losses, and whether the restrictions of the old law or the new law would govern such carry forwards.
  •  Similarly, MAT/AMT credits and tax credits such as TDS, TCS, and foreign tax credits accumulated under the ITA will be permitted under the new Act, though timing mismatches – especially for foreign tax credits claimed on accrual—could lead to litigation.
  •  Exemptions and deductions available under the ITA, including SEZ, start-up, and infrastructure incentives, will be grandfathered until expiry. Yet, ambiguity is likely where such benefits are linked to repealed provisions, leading to potential disputes on preservation of benefits.
  •  Corporate restructurings commenced under the ITA but completed after 2025 are intended to retain tax neutrality, though gaps may arise if the new Act omits certain neutralisation provisions, such as those relating to demergers or dividend upstreaming.
  •  Lastly, penalties and prosecutions for defaults committed under the ITA remain punishable under that law. Complications may occur where defaults span both the regiments, and constitutional challenges could arise if penal consequences differ between the two laws.

INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT

The Act of 2025 must be interpreted strictly according to its express words, with no tax imposed without clear legislative authority. Implied intentions or “spirit of the law” cannot create liability. The principle “there is no equity in taxation” applies, so equity cannot override statutory language. Ambiguities favour the taxpayer, and taxation cannot be extended by inference, analogy, or implication. Interpretation is confined to what is explicitly stated in the statute.

The Act of 2025 must be interpreted as a whole, ensuring harmonious construction so that no section renders another redundant and apparent inconsistencies are reconciled within the Act or with related statutes. Beneficial interpretation applies: where two meanings exist, the one most favourable to the taxpayer prevails, recognizing the power imbalance with authorities. Natural justice principles also apply unless explicitly excluded, requiring meaningful opportunity to be heard and substantive consideration of submissions. Ritualistic hearings or orders ignoring taxpayer arguments are unsustainable. Overall, interpretation must balance consistency, fairness, and protection of the taxpayer while furthering the Act’s purpose.

Legislative Simplification – Reality or Illusion? The Act has been presented as a major simplification exercise. Provisos, Explanations, and Non-obstante clauses have been formally removed, and definitions consolidated into a single section. The term ‘as maybe prescribed’ is replaced with ‘as prescribed’. The government has argued that this will reduce complexity and litigation.

Many of these important aids to interpretation, the meaning whereof is judicially settled, have merely been reintroduced as sub-sections or substantive provisions. If their language remains, but in a different form, it is debatable whether genuine simplification has been achieved. Historically, provisos, explanations, and non-obstante clauses served special interpretive functions. By converting them into sub-sections, the Act may blur distinctions and give rise to fresh interpretive disputes. Judicial rulings on the role and effect of these interpretive devices may or may not remain applicable. It is, therefore, premature to conclude that the changes will reduce litigation. Courts will ultimately determine their true import.

Provisos. Traditionally, a proviso carves out exceptions or qualifies the main provision. It cannot nullify the substantive enactment, but it may provide conditions or remedy unintended consequences. A proviso may:

  1.  Qualify or except certain cases from the main enactment.
  2. Impose mandatory conditions necessary to make the enactment workable.
  3. Become so integral as to acquire the colour of the main enactment.
  4. Serve as an explanatory addendum clarifying legislative intent.

Provisos must always be construed harmoniously with the main provision. In some cases, where necessary to give effect to legislative intent, a proviso may even operate retrospectively. In the circumstances, it is difficult to concur with the Government that the Provisos were a burden under the ITA and shifting them to the sub-sections shall retain the same meaning, more so where the understanding of the true import of the Provisos has been justified by the courts.

Explanations. An Explanation is designed to clarify ambiguities, widen scope, or reinforce the object of the Act. Generally, clarificatory and retrospective in effect, Explanations cannot override substantive provisions but can guide interpretation. They may explain phrases, supply missing links, or resolve vagueness in language.

Although ordinarily not substantive, Explanations can sometimes expand the scope of a section, depending on legislative intent. Courts will give effect to such intention even if the provision is labelled as an “Explanation.” It is again difficult to concur with the Government that the Explanations were redundant and its purpose is served by shifting to the main provisions; shifting them to the sub-sections may not retain the same meaning, more so where their understanding of the true import has been justified by the courts.

Non-Obstante Clauses. A non-obstante clause, typically beginning with “notwithstanding anything,” gives overriding effect to the section it qualifies, in case of conflict with other provisions. It is a legislative device to ensure primacy in specified circumstances. The scope of a non-obstante clause is determined by its context and the scheme of the Act. While it provides clarity in resolving conflicts, excessive reliance may undermine coherence.

The Act has replaced everywhere the term ‘notwithstanding’ with the new term ‘irrespective of’. Dictionary meaning of both the terms is interchangeable and therefore neither any harm nor any gain is perceived by the change; it does not complicate the act nor simplify the same.

Definitions and Undefined Words. The Act adopts a novel approach by consolidating definitions into a central section, while also retaining section-specific definitions where necessary. This is intended to create uniformity in interpretation.

However, contextual interpretation remains vital. Defined words ordinarily carry the statutory meaning unless context dictates otherwise. Extended definitions cannot override ordinary meaning unless compelling language demands it. One must ensure that definitions do not destroy the essence of the concept being defined. Thus, while the consolidated definition clause aids clarity, interpretation must remain context-sensitive.

As may be prescribed and As prescribed. At several places the Act, in the name of simplification, has used the term ‘ as prescribed’ in place of the term ‘ as may be prescribed’. It is not possible to corelate with the understanding of the government here. The two terms differ in its meaning as one used under the ITA was futuristic and the other used under the Act has its roots in present. The later requires that the prescription is mandatory and the failure to prescribe may not be made up by the later day prescription.

Deeming Provisions and Legal Fictions: The Act continues to extensively rely on deeming fictions. The best solution would have been to do away with such fictions by using such language that does not require fictions, and instead explains the intent in simple language for creating the effective charge of taxation. Use of legal fictions in the Act is an admission of the legislature of its’ inability to create a specific charge in simple terms. A deeming provision enlarges the meaning of a word or phrase beyond its ordinary sense. Legal fictions must be given full effect, carried to their logical conclusion, but only within the limits of the purpose for which they are created. Courts cannot extend them beyond their defined scope.

While legal fictions may include the obvious, uncertain, or even impossible, they cannot be applied in a way that causes injustice. They are legislative tools to remove doubt, broaden scope, or simplify administration, but require strict interpretation.

Relevance of Legislative History and Judicial Precedent: Legislative history, surrounding circumstances, and background may be considered to understand the object of the Act, though not to alter the plain meaning. Historical context helps identify the mischief the law seeks to remedy. Previous judicial interpretations of similar provisions may also be relevant, particularly where identical wording has been carried forward.

Where Parliament repeats phrases already judicially interpreted, one may infer that the same meaning was intended. At the same time, judicial interpretations under the 1961 Act will not automatically apply; their relevance must be tested in the context of the 2025 Act.

Rules, Circulars and Notifications issued in the context of the ITA may not automatically apply unless specifically provided by the legislature or accepted by the Central Board of Direct Taxes. Recommendation of the Parliamentary Select Committee on this aspect may be seen to understand the position of these useful aids of constructing the Act.

Key Litigation Issues Under the 2025 Act. Despite claims of simplification, several interpretive disputes are anticipated:

  1.  Ambiguity of Key Terms: Definitions of “business connection,” “virtual digital asset,” and “tax year” may give rise to litigation over scope and application.
  2.  Transition from ITA to Act: Whether facts arising before enactment are governed by the repealed Act or the newly enacted Act will be contested. Saving clauses, retrospective application, and transitional provisions will require judicial resolution.
  3. Set-off and Depreciation: Treatment of losses and unabsorbed depreciation carried forward from the ITA involving high-value cash-flow implications, will be fertile grounds for disputes.
  4. Corporate Restructuring: Lack of explicit provisions for tax neutrality in reorganisations, fast-track mergers, demergers, and dividend upstreaming may create asymmetries, leading to corporate tax litigation, more so in cases where the restructuring initiated under the ITA is concluded under the Act.
  5. AIS and Automated Matching: The Act relies heavily on Annual Information Statements (AIS) and automated data matching. Errors in data, lack of human oversight, and limited correction mechanisms may lead to unfair assessments. Taxpayers are expected to challenge these on grounds of accuracy and procedural fairness.

The Act of 2025 represents an ambitious attempt at simplification, but its true test will lie in judicial interpretation. While the express words of the statute remain paramount, the removal and reclassification of interpretive devices, such as provisos and explanations, may lead to fresh uncertainty. Courts will play a crucial role in shaping how the Act functions in practice.

Ambiguities in definitions, transitional provisions, and reliance on technology-driven assessments are likely to drive the first wave of litigation. Until judicial clarity emerges, taxpayers and advisors must proceed with caution, guided by the long-settled interpretive principles that taxation depends strictly on the language of the law, nothing more and nothing less.

IN THE END – MISSED OPPORTUNITY & ROAD AHEAD

Whether the Act of 2025 is a case of a missed opportunity, and what more could / should have been done which the reform did not quite deliver, is the question. While the Act of 2025 is a step forward in reformation of the income-tax law, many observers feel it could have gone further or could have addressed certain areas more fully. Let us first summarise what seem to be the gaps and then suggest what might have been done better.

WHERE THE ACT FALLS SHORT — WHAT IT MISSED

  1.  Incomplete simplification of core tax base and dispute-prone provisions
  •  Some core concepts like income, scope of total income, deemed income, capital receipts, revenue and capital expenditure and overlapping heads of income remain substantially unchanged, continuing old complexities and challenges.
  •  Deletion of the deeming fictions that provide for taxation of a receipt that is not an income by any stretch of imagination or of the provisions that presume higher income than the actual or real income.
  •  Making provisions redundant that provide for disallowance of the legitimate expenditure incurred in earning an income for defaults unrelated to income of a person.
  •  Scrapping of the provisions that mandate for compulsory payment in cases of persons following the mercantile system of accounting for a legitimate deduction.
  •  Removal of unfair limitations like mandatory filing of reports, return of loss or income including the revised return of income by due dates. All such provisions that limit the legitimate right to be assessed on the true and correct income irrespective of the date of filing should have been withdrawn.
  •  Provisions for reopening assessments (which are a large source of litigation and uncertainty), which have largely been retained.
  •  TDS/TCS rules remain complex; for example, TDS on partner’s salary, interest, drawings in partnership firms is retained, which leads to practical difficulties (many firms lack TAN, etc.).

     2. Refunds, late filing, fairness issues

  • No mandatory timelines for disposal of appeals / grievance petitions or revisional orders by the authorities. Delays in timely disposal continue to be pardoned.
  • Provisions for exemption from liability to pay interest for the period where the disposal of appeals are delayed by any appellate authority, including the courts.

     3. Uneven treatment, inequity, mismatch of incentives

  •  Savings-/investment-friendly incentives have not been significantly strengthened; some observers think the new tax regime doesn’t sufficiently reward long-term savings or investment relative to old regime obligations or expectations.
  •  Marginal relief under the Old Tax Regime (OTR) is less favourable compared to the New Tax Regime (NTR) in some respects, which may push taxpayers into making choices that are sub-optimal for their financial planning.

    4. Privacy, oversight and risk of overreach

  • The moulding of digital / algorithmic / data-driven triggers for reassessment and compliance is stronger in the 2025 Act but are not backed by the procedural safeguards, definitions, limits, oversight mechanisms; these are not sufficiently built in. This raises risks of arbitrary or heavy-handed action.

    5. Lack of clarity / roadmap in implementation

  • Though the law reduces sections, changes language etc., actual implementation (IT systems, staffing, training, taxpayer interface, etc.) might lag. Observers worry about capacity to handle digital records, data matching, appeals.
  • Transition rules (for those who have made long-term commitments under the old law, or whose income/assets fall across regimes) could have been more clearly spelt out.

     6. Missed opportunity in broadening tax base / reducing exemptions

  • Though the law claims simplification, many exemptions, deductions, overlapping rules remain. Some think the tax base hasn’t been meaningfully broadened in certain areas (like real estate, informal receipts, etc.).
  •  More progressive changes in rates or rebalancing burden could have been considered, especially as inflation erodes real thresholds. Tax slabs etc., still leave some taxpayers in discomfort.

    7. Support for smaller firms / MSMEs / those with low capacity

  •  Many of data requirements, reporting, TDS, digital obligations impose fixed overheads. Small businesses, partners without formal structures etc. find compliance burdens high relative to their capacity. Observers feel more relief provisions or simplified rules for such groups could have been included.

    8. Transparency, legislative oversight

  •  Some key provisions (like faceless assessments / appeals etc.) are moved to be governed by rules rather than being embedded in the law itself. This gives administrative flexibility, but reduces parliamentary visibility and makes redress harder.

The temptation to suggest what could have been done differently is irresistible; suggestions that may pave way for additional reforms. Some of them are;

  1.  Stronger deadlines mandating fixed timelines for every stage: issuance of notices, disposal of appeals by CIT (Appeals) and ITAT; grievance/redressal mechanisms; timeline for refunds etc.
  2.  Procedural fairness by ensuring the automatic stay of demands / assessments where appeals or rectification petitions are pending, to reduce hardship.
  3.  Wider margin of relief / incentives for savings and investments or simplified exemptions for retirement savings, health insurance, education etc., especially in the new regime. Possibly rebalancing marginal relief to make old regime less penalising for those with existing obligations.
  4.  Simplified regime for small businesses / partnerships including the presumptive taxation and lighter reporting (less frequent TDS / less frequent returns) for small firms or partners.
  5. Removal or postponement of the TDS obligations that create cash flow burdens (e.g. on partner salaries or drawings) especially where profit is uncertain.
  6.  Greater clarity on data / digital enforcement / rights by defining the safe harbour thresholds and introducing the de minimis rules for “unexplained income / assets / credits” so ordinary informal transactions aren’t penalised.
  7.  Stronger privacy protections and oversight for use of personal / digital data.
  8.  Meaningful expansion of the tax base by outreach to a good part of the population by covering the informal sectors, digital / gig economy more comprehensively.
  9.  Introducing transparency in the effective rate of taxation by pruning and consolidating the provisions for exemptions/deductions more aggressively.
  10.  Auto Indexation of thresholds, rates, etc. to adjust for inflation, cost of living etc. so that taxpayers are not pushed into higher tax brackets simply due to inflation rather than real income growth.
  11.  Transitional clarity, especially for those with investments, deductions etc under the old Act.
  12.  Continuity of harmless clauses for some years for minimising the disputes arising from overlapping rules.
  13.  Greater legislative embedding of taxpayer rights by including more rights of taxpayers (Taxpayer Charter) in the main body, not just in rules.
  14.  Ensuring transparency in reopening, reassessment, and appeal (for example, reasons to be stated, officer escalations etc.).
  15.  Continuous review mechanism that involves periodic review of the law, say every few years, involving stakeholders, to identify parts that are still overly burdensome or have led to disputes.
  16. Mechanism for better feedback and active public consultation and solicitation at the pre-legislative stage. An exercise should be carried out to measure the effect of the legal and economic effect and the counter-productive consequences of the Act for posterity.

Putting it all together, yes, there was a strong case for the enactment of the new law, it could have been much more transformative. Many observers feel that the legislature missed a great opportunity to really reform the income-tax law in preference for presenting the old wine in a new bottle; may be there was a lack of will or the courage to take the bull by its horns or was it the tacit acceptance that the law of income tax is beyond simplification? The government took a cautious path, balancing simplification with retaining significant legacy structures, possibly to avoid revenue risk or political backlash. The law improves readability, removes redundant parts, modernises in parts, these are all commendable, but many classic pain points remain. A tax administration which disposes of appeals promptly and reaches a fair and final settlement speedily, is itself to be classed as a tax incentive. But: it’s not fair to say the Act is a failure; it achieves many important reforms and is likely to reduce compliance costs and increase clarity.

The Act has achieved simplicity, readability. cohesiveness, lesser verbosity, modernity, some best global practices and removal of archaic provisions, has missed the structural issues like TDS complexity, refund fairness generally, appeals delays, taxpayers’ rights, MSME reliefs, automatic indexation of slabs with the passage of time. Some of the long-standing issues that cause taxpayers anxiety or litigation remained unaddressed or only partially addressed. Importantly the absence of clarity in the transitional provisions leaves a high potential source of disputes. In essence the Act is a step forward in form and readability, but not a game-changer in substance.

The Act’s strengths lie in modern language, logical regrouping of provisions, and an explicit intention to address digital economy issues and reduce routine litigation. It is a long-needed structural reform that aligns statute design with 21st century record-keeping and digital reporting.

Risks remain in drafting gaps, transitional complexity, and the speed at which administrative guidance will be issued. Simplification of language does not automatically ensure simplification of outcome; poor transitional drafting or omissions create new ambiguity and litigation.

Practitioners should act now to: map exposures, check transitional rules for each client, engage with the tax department’s FAQs and circulars, and prepare to litigate strategic issues if administrative clarification is delayed. The next 24 months will determine whether the Act delivers the promised reduction in disputes or simply reshuffles controversies.

It is a well-established principle of law that treatment given by the Assessee in its books of account is not decisive/conclusive for determining the taxable income under the Act.

15. Kedaara Captial Fund II LLP vs. Assessment Unit, National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC), Delhi and Ors.

[Writ Petition no. 2684 of 2025 dated: 09/09/2025 (Bom) (HC)]

It is a well-established principle of law that treatment given by the Assessee in its books of account is not decisive/conclusive for determining the taxable income under the Act.

The Petitioner is registered with SEBI as a Category II AIF – closed ended fund under the SEBI (AIF) Regulations, 2012. For the purposes of the Act, the Petitioner is regarded as an ‘investment fund’ as defined under Section 115UB. Resultantly, any income from investment activities earned is exempt under Section 10(23FBA). Such income is, however, taxable in the hands of the unit holders of the Petitioner. In other words, assessees like the Petitioner are granted a pass-through status under the Act.

During the year, the Petitioner implemented investments aggregating to ₹1,300.27 Crores using the capital raised from its unit holders. The total portfolio investments of the Petitioner as on 31st March 2022 was ₹8,665.75 Crores. It was an undisputed fact that the Petitioner neither sold any of the investments during the year nor did it earn any income from such investment activities. The only income earned by the Petitioner during the year was short term capital gains of ₹0.99 Crores on cancellation of certain forward contracts. The total expenses incurred by the Petitioner during the year was ₹118.99 Crores. In the books of accounts maintained, these expenses were debited to the statement of profit and loss for the year.

The Petitioner filed its Return of Income for the subject A.Y. 2022–23, declaring NIL income. Further, in such return, the income of short-term capital gains of ₹0.99 Crores was claimed as exempt under Section 10(23FBA) read with 115UB and taxable in the hands of the unit holders. Insofar as the expenses of ₹118.99 Crores incurred during the year, the Petitioner stated that no deduction whatsoever was claimed of such an amount. It was also stated that no carry forward of any loss under any head of income was claimed by the Petitioner. Moreover, it was also stated that a deduction of such an amount has also not been claimed by any of the unit holders as well.

The impugned assessment order was passed on 21st March 2025 disallowing the expenses of ₹103.15 Crores (expenses incurred towards management fees and other related costs of ₹15.84 Crores paid to its investment advisor, Kedaara Capital Advisors LLP, were allowed by the AO) and added the said amount under the head “profits and gains from business and profession” to the total income of the Petitioner. This amount was added by the AO on the ground that the expenses were “neither found genuine nor any income has offered against these expenses”. A notice of demand under Section 156 of the Act raising a tax demand of ₹49.02 Crores, as well as a penalty show cause notice, were also issued pursuant to the above assessment order.

The Petitioner filed the Writ Petition challenging the above order and the consequential notices issued by the AO. Amongst other grounds, the primary challenge was on the ground that the AO has added expenses to the Petitioner’s total income despite the fact that no deduction in respect of such expenses has been claimed either by the Petitioner or the unit holders. Therefore, the question of adding such an amount could never have arisen. The addition made therefore, was wholly without jurisdiction, perverse and arbitrary.

It was further contended that the AO miserably overlooked the fact that the Petitioner has been granted a pass through status under the Act. Therefore, assuming for the sake of argument that the Petitioner incurred non-genuine expenses, nevertheless, such an addition could not have been made in the hands of the Petitioner.

It was further contended that the unrealised gains reported in the financial statements of the Petitioner as ‘surplus’ does not constitute ‘income’ of the unit holders and is not taxable in their hands under Section 115UB. Secondly, in any case, it is a well-settled principle of income tax law that to determine the taxability of a particular item is not governed by how that item is treated by the counterpart assessee. Therefore, the treatment given in the hands of the unit holders cannot govern how the income of the Petitioner is to be determined. Accordingly, it was submitted that the addition made by the AO was completely unlawful, without jurisdiction and illegal.

On the first objection of the Revenue that the Writ Petition ought not to be entertained because there was an alternate remedy available to the Petitioner, the Hon. Court observed that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the Court can exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and interfere in the above matter when an assessment order is completely illegal, contrary to the clear mandate of law prima facie, without jurisdiction.

Further, it was well settled that the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining the Writ Petition, despite alternate statutory remedies, was not affected in a case where the authority against whom the Writ was filed has usurped its jurisdiction without any legal foundation.

The Hon. Court further observed that it was undisputed that the addition of expenses (of ₹103.15 Crores) made by the Assessing Officer in the impugned order was never ever claimed as a deduction by the Petitioner in its Return of Income. In other words, these expenses were never claimed as a deduction to give rise to the Assessing Officer to add back those deductions in the Income Returned by the Petitioner.

The Hon. Court further observed that the AO failed to recall the well-established principle of law that treatment given by the assessee in its books of account was not decisive/conclusive for determining the taxable income under the Act. Whether an assessee is entitled to a deduction or not entirely depends upon the provisions of the Act de hors the disclosure in its books of account. The Hon. Court referred to decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Company Ltd. vs. CIT [(1971) 82 ITR 363 (SC)], Taparia Tools Ltd. vs. JCIT [[2015] 55 taxmann.com 361 (SC)] and United Commercial Bank vs. CIT [(1999) 240 ITR 355 (SC)].

In view of the above, the Hon. Court held that the addition of ₹103.15 crores made by the Assessing Officer in the income returned by the Petitioner was wholly unsustainable. The Hon. Court further refused to remand the matter back to file of AO.

Penalty 270 A – Writ – Alternate remedy- No virtual hearing was given to the Petitioner as mandated by the Faceless Penalty (Amendment) Scheme, 2022: AY 2017-18

14. Man Truck & Bus India Pvt Ltd vs. The Assessment Unit, Income-Tax Department & Ors.

[WRIT PETITION NO. 5437 OF 2025 Dated: 09/09/2025. (Bom) (HC)]

Penalty 270 A – Writ – Alternate remedy- No virtual hearing was given to the Petitioner as mandated by the Faceless Penalty (Amendment) Scheme, 2022: AY 2017-18

On 30th November 2017, the Petitioner had filed its return of income declaring its income as “NIL” after a set-off of the brought forward loss of ₹17.14 Crores. Thereafter, assessment proceedings were completed; and an order was passed on 24th June 2021 under section 143(3) r.w.s 144C (3) of the Act making an addition of ₹31.15 crores, on account of a Transfer Pricing Adjustment.

Being aggrieved by this order, the Petitioner preferred an Appeal before the CIT (Appeals). The Petitioner had filed its Advanced Pricing Agreement Application with the CBDT as far back as on 26th March 2014, which finally culminated in the APA on

21st December 2021 during the pendency of the Appeal. The APA applied to A.Y. 2011-12 to A.Y. 2018-19. Since the APA was entered into between the Petitioner and the CBDT, under the provisions of section 92CD(1), the Petitioner filed its modified Return of Income on 30th March 2022. No assessment order was passed under Section 92CD(3). Therefore, according to the Petitioner, the modified Return filed by the Petitioner under Section 92CD(1) had become final and deemed to be accepted by the Department.

The AO passed penalty order dated 24th March 2025 imposing penalty on the Petitioner under Section 270A of the Act.

The Petitioner contended that since no addition has been made by the AO under Section 92CD(3), penalty proceedings could not lie against the Petitioner under Section 270A of the Act.
It was further contented by the Petitioner that it was mandatory for the officer levying the penalty to grant a virtual hearing to the Petitioner before passing the impugned penalty order. This submission was made based on the Faceless Penalty (Amendment) Scheme, 2022 formulated by the CBDT.

The Hon. Court observed that it was admitted by the Department that no order under Section 92CD(3) was passed by Respondent No. 2 and the mistake crept in the penalty order because the secondary adjustment of ₹14,16,49,404/- was not visible in the modified return of income filed by the Petitioner and no order under Section 92CD(3) was available with Respondent No.1 at the time of passing the penalty order.

The Hon. Court observed that it was not in dispute that the Petitioner had entered into an APA with the CBDT on 21st December 2021. It was also not in dispute that as per the provisions of Section 92CD(1), the Petitioner filed its return of income on 30th March 2022 and offered to tax a sum of approximately ₹14.16 Crores towards Transfer Pricing Adjustment as per the APA entered into between the Petitioner and the CBDT. The tax on this amount has also been paid by the Petitioner as admitted by the Revenue in its affidavit-in-reply. It was also an admitted fact that no order has been passed under Section 92CD(3) on the modified return of income filed by the Petitioner. All these facts have not been taken into consideration by Respondent No.1 before passing the impugned penalty order. Further, no virtual hearing was given to the Petitioner as mandated by the Faceless Penalty (Amendment) Scheme, 2022.

Therefore, the impugned penalty order was quashed and the matter remanded to the 1st Respondent to give a virtual hearing to the Petitioner and thereafter pass any fresh order after taking into consideration all relevant facts.

TDS — Payment without TDS — Disallowance u/s. 40a(ia) — Applicability of proviso to 40a(ia) — Inserted by Finance Act 2013 with effect from 01/04/2013 — Curative and beneficial in nature —Retrospective effect from 01/04/2005 — No dispute as that the recipients had paid taxes on such payments — No disallowance can be made u/s. 40a(ia)

40. [2025] TS – 1087 – HC (Bom.)

Principal CIT vs. Morgan Stanley India Capital Pvt. Ltd. A. Y. 2009-10 Date of order 14/08/2025

S. 43B of ITA 1961

TDS — Payment without TDS — Disallowance u/s. 40a(ia) — Applicability of proviso to 40a(ia) — Inserted by Finance Act 2013 with effect from 01/04/2013 — Curative and beneficial in nature —Retrospective effect from 01/04/2005 — No dispute as that the recipients had paid taxes on such payments — No disallowance can be made u/s. 40a(ia)

In the course of scrutiny assessment for the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer disallowed certain expenses of approximately ₹17.64 crores u/s. 40a(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on the ground that the assessee had not deducted tax at source.

The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance and held that it was merely a case of short deduction and in doing so relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT vs. S. K. Tekriwal (2012 SCC Online Cal13210). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Department.

The Bombay High Court concurred with the decision of the Calcutta High Court’s regarding the retrospective application of the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, introduced effective April 1, 2013 and dismissed the appeal of the Department and held as under:

“i) This proviso deems that an assessee, who fails to deduct tax under Chapter XVII-B but is not considered in default under the first proviso to Section 201(1), is treated as having deducted and paid the tax on the date the payee files their return of income.

ii) Despite the proviso’s introduction in 2013, the court, referring to the co-ordinate bench judgment in the case of Pr.CIT vs. Perfect Circle India Pvt Ltd (Income Tax Appeal No. 707 of 2016, decided January 7, 2019), held that its curative and beneficial nature warrants retrospective application from April 1, 2005, when the main proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) was enacted. Given that the payees (the assessee’s group companies) had paid taxes on the payments received, the Assessing Officer was incorrect in invoking Section 40(a)(ia) to disallow the expenses for the A. Y. 2009-10.

iii) Consequently, there is no substantial question of law requiring further adjudication.”

General Anti-Avoidance Rules — Scope of —Impermissible Avoidance Agreement — Purchase and sale of shares — Cumulative effect of purchase and sale of shares results in loss — No strong material established by the Department to show applicability of s. 96(1) except the timing of transaction — GAAR provisions not applicable — Order passed u/s. 144BA(6) set-aside.

39. (2025) 177 taxmann.com 726 (Telangana)

Smt. Anvida Bundi vs. DCIT

A. Y. 2020-21 Date of order 22/08/2025

Ss. 96 r.w.s 144BA of ITA 1961

General Anti-Avoidance Rules — Scope of —Impermissible Avoidance Agreement — Purchase and sale of shares — Cumulative effect of purchase and sale of shares results in loss — No strong material established by the Department to show applicability of s. 96(1) except the timing of transaction — GAAR provisions not applicable — Order passed u/s. 144BA(6) set-aside.

The Assessee, an individual, held investments in shares and securities. During the year, the assessee sold certain shares (already held by her) and earned long term capital gains of about ₹44.14 crores from sale of shares. In order to deploy the funds available from sale of shares, and keeping in mind the market trend, the assessee purchased shares of HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd. to earn short-term capital gains and thereafter to make long-term capital gains from subsequent disposal of investment. The assessee also invested in the units of mutual fund worth ₹32.92 crores during the year. Subsequently, the assessee sold shares of HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd. in the same year. The cumulative effect of purchase of shares of M/s. HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd. in the open market and sale of shares thereafter resulted in loss of ₹17.65 crores to the petitioner for the same Financial Year 2019-20.

The Department was of the view that the transaction of purchase and sale of shares of HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd. during the year amounted to Impermissible Avoidance Agreement (IAA) and the provisions of Chapter X-A, dealing with General Anti-Avoidance Rules were applicable to the said transactions. The assessee filed objections. However, the approving panel passed the order dated 21/03/2023 holding that the transactions undertaken by the petitioner so far as purchase and sale of shares of M/s.HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd., particularly taking into consideration the period of time during which the sale and purchase was made, amounts to “IAA”.

Against the said order, the assessee filed writ petition before the High Court on the contention that the Department had not met any of the criteria envisaged u/s. 96(1) of the Act to treat the transactions as IAA.

The Telangana High Court took note of certain admitted facts such as that the Department had not been able to show or has collected any material to prove that the purchase and sale of shares made by the petitioner was with any of their known persons or entity. There was no nexus between purchase and sale of shares of HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd. All the shares were sold through the stock exchange through the DMAT account of the assessee. The assessee was an investor in shares and the purchase and sale of shares by the assessee was not one of the isolated transactions specifically made to save tax. The transactions formed part of the return of the assessee and there was no new material to hold that the so-called arrangement was hit by the GAAR provision. Lastly, except for the timing of transactions, there was also no material to hold the transactions to be an IAA. In view of these facts, the High Court taking note of the report prepared by the expert committee under the Act regarding general anti-avoidance rules held that the report itself has categorically held that sale and purchase through stock market transactions would not come under the GAAR provisions. It was held that timing of a transaction or a taxpayer would not be questioned under the GAAR provisions on sale and purchase of shares made by the assessee. The Telangana High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“i) So far as the timing part is concerned, which perhaps was the strong point on which the authority concerned has passed the impugned order, it is necessary to take note of the report prepared by the expert committee under the Income Tax Act with regard to general anti-avoidance rules are concerned. The said report itself has categorically held that sale and purchase through stock market transactions would not come under the GAAR provisions. It was held that timing of a transaction or a taxpayer would not be questioned under the GAAR provisions on sale and purchase of shares made by the assessee.

ii) In view of the aforesaid factual matrix of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the Department has not been able to show any arrangement to have been made by the petitioner in the course of selling its shares of M/s.HCL Technologies Pvt. Ltd., and it was a pure trading done by the petitioner with no knowledge of purchase and sale carried out by the petitioner. In the absence of any strong material made available by the Department meeting the requirements and ingredients that are reflected under Section 96(1) of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that the writ petition deserves to be and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 23/01/2023 passed by respondent No.3 u/s. 144BA(6) of the Act for the A. Y. 2020-21 is set aside.”

Deduction u/s. 80-IA :— (A) Interest on FD — Funds kept aside periodically by way of FD — Obligation under the license agreement to replace cranes after a certain period — Funds parked in FD to meet contractual obligation — Funds were also parked in FD under a compliance order of the High Court due to a tariff dispute between the assessee and TAMP — Placement of FD imperative for the business — FD was not created for parking of surplus funds — Interest is eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA: (B) Interest on TDS refund — TDS wrongly deducted by customers — TDS was directly part of sales receipt of the assessee — Interest on TDS refund arose due to excess TDS deducted by the customers against the payment to be made to the assessee — TDS was part of business receipt of the assessee — Assessee entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA on interest received by it on TDS refunded to it.

38. [2025] 177 taxmann.com 707 (Bom.)

Gateway Terminals India (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT

A. Y. 2012-13 Date of order 26/08/2025

S. 80-IA of ITA 1961

Deduction u/s. 80-IA :— (A) Interest on FD — Funds kept aside periodically by way of FD — Obligation under the license agreement to replace cranes after a certain period — Funds parked in FD to meet contractual obligation — Funds were also parked in FD under a compliance order of the High Court due to a tariff dispute between the assessee and TAMP — Placement of FD imperative for the business — FD was not created for parking of surplus funds — Interest is eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA:

(B) Interest on TDS refund — TDS wrongly deducted by customers — TDS was directly part of sales receipt of the assessee — Interest on TDS refund arose due to excess TDS deducted by the customers against the payment to be made to the assessee — TDS was part of business receipt of the assessee — Assessee entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA on interest received by it on TDS refunded to it.

The assessee, a joint venture company, was engaged in the business of operating and maintaining a container terminal at Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) which was eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

During the previous year, the assessee earned interest income from FDs maintained with the banks. These funds were kept in FD with banks because under the license agreement with JNPT, the assessee was under an obligation to replace cranes after a certain period. These cranes were a significant portion of the machinery and equipment of the assessee. The failure to replace cranes as per the license agreement would result in revocation of the license. Therefore, a portion of funds were regularly deposited by way of FDs to meet contractual obligations required to be fulfilled in order to continue the business of maintaining the container terminal. Further, interest was also received on FD due to a tariff dispute between assessee and TAMP and, thus, funds were parked in compliance of order of High Court. In addition to the above, the assessee also earned interest on refund of taxes due to wrongful deduction of TDS by the customers of the Appellant.

In the return of income filed by the assessee, for the A. Y. 2012-13, deduction u/s. 80-IA was claimed which included the above interest income. The assessment was completed by allowing the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80-IA which included interest income on FD. The interest income on income-tax refund was taxed by the Assessing Officer under the head Income from Other Sources.

On appeal before the CIT(A), the CIT(A) enhanced the income of the assessee by denying deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Act in respect of interest on FD on the ground that it was not derived from an industrial undertaking. The Tribunal rejected the appeal filed by the assessee.

The assessee filed an appeal before the High Court against the said order. The assessee also filed miscellaneous application, which was rejected by the Tribunal. Against the order rejecting the miscellaneous application, the assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court.

The Bombay High Court disposed of both the appeal and the writ filed by the assessee and decided the issue in favour of the assessee and held as under:

“i) The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Act on the interest from FDs which was placed by the assessee for planning of replacement of equipments as per the provisions of the agreement with JNPT. The facts that the placement of fixed deposits was imperative for the purpose of carrying on the eligible business of the assessee. The placement of FDs was not for parking surplus funds which were lying idle. The assessee had used these FDs for purchasing cranes for the eligible business and there was a direct nexus between the FDs and the eligible business of the assessee. Thus, in view of the foregoing, the deduction in respect of interest on FD was allowed.

ii) TDS was wrongly deducted by the vendors/customers of the assessee from the payment made to the assessee for using the port facility and, therefore, the TDS wrongly deducted was directly a part of the sales receipt of the assessee from the eligible business. The TDS refund arose to the assessee due to the excess TDS cut by the customers against payment to be made to the assessee and therefore the TDS was a part of the business receipt of the assessee. Had the customers not deducted excess amount of TDS, the assessee would have received the surplus funds which would be used for the business purpose/ repayment of loans etc. The refund received by the assessee was an integral part connected with the receipt of business income by the assessee and the same could not be separated from the business of the assessee. In these circumstances, the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA, on the interest received by it on TDS refunded to it.”

Charitable institution — Exemption u/s. 11 — Charitable purpose — Applicability of proviso to s. 2(15) — Donations received from donors after deducting an amount shown as deduction of tax at source u/s. 194C and 194J — AO treating receipts as consultancy fees and contractual income based on deduction of tax at source rejected exemption u/s. 11 — Assessee’s revision petition u/s. 264 was rejected — Held, proviso to s. 2(15) cannot be invoked alleging that services rendered in relation to trade, commerce or business — Provison under which donor deducted tax alone could not determine nature of receipt — No element of trade, commerce or business activity established — Assessee is entitled to exemption — Assessment order and order rejecting revision petition set aside.

37. (2025) 476 ITR 489 (Delhi)

Aroh Foundation vs. CIT

A. Y. 2017-18 Date of order 05/02/2024

Ss. 2(15) proviso, 11, 12, 13(8), 194C, 194J and 264 of ITA 1961

Charitable institution — Exemption u/s. 11 — Charitable purpose — Applicability of proviso to s. 2(15) — Donations received from donors after deducting an amount shown as deduction of tax at source u/s. 194C and 194J — AO treating receipts as consultancy fees and contractual income based on deduction of tax at source rejected exemption u/s. 11 — Assessee’s revision petition u/s. 264 was rejected — Held, proviso to s. 2(15) cannot be invoked alleging that services rendered in relation to trade, commerce or business — Provison under which donor deducted tax alone could not determine nature of receipt — No element of trade, commerce or business activity established — Assessee is entitled to exemption — Assessment order and order rejecting revision petition set aside.

The assessee is a non-Governmental organisation registered as a charitable institution u/s. 12A, 12AA and 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee claims to have been working for the upliftment of the poor, underprivileged children and women, health, preservation of the environment and other social causes. In order to fulfil its charitable objectives, the assessee receives various grants from the Government as well as the private sector which is exempted from tax u/s. 11 and 12 of the Act. During the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2017-18, the assessee received the donations, which included receipts from donors who had deducted tax at source u/s.194C and 194J. The Assessing Officer denied exemption u/s. 11 and 12, treating these receipts as consulting fees and contractual income, invoking the proviso to section 2(15). The assessee’s revision petition u/s. 264 was rejected.

The assessee filed writ petition challenging the rejection order u/s. 264. The assessee contended that at no point of time, except for the A. Y. 2017-2018 was the charitable status of the assessee doubted by the respondent-Revenue and for all previous assessment years, specifically for the A. Ys. 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2015-2016, under similar circumstances, exemption u/s. 11 and 12 of the Act was granted to the assessee and even for the subsequent assessment year, i.e., the A. Y. 2018-2019 as well, similar benefit was extended. However, the benefits for the relevant assessment year in question have been denied merely on the ground that the donor has deducted tax at source u/s. 194C and 194J of the Act, while allocating requisite grants to the assessee.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“i) In the instant case, the sole reason to construe the receipt amounting to ₹5,90,42,892 received by the donors under the tax regime is founded on the assumption that the same is towards professional/technical services or contractual income as tax at source was deducted under sections 194C and 194J of the Act.

ii) We, prima facie, find no merit in the above mentioned rationale as firstly, that alone cannot be the basis to conclude the aforesaid receipt to be considered under the category of consultancy fees and contractual income. Secondly, there is no element of activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business. Thirdly, in the absence of any cogent reason, receipts in question cannot be “advancement of any other object of general public utility”.

iii) If the deductor in its Income-tax return, under misconception, deducts tax at source u/ss. 194C and 194J of the Act, the same would not disentitle the assessee to claim benefit u/s. 11 and 12 of the Act unless the case of the assessee is specifically hit by the proviso of section 2(15) of the Act, which is not the case here. The proviso to section 2(15) of the Act would not get attracted merely on the basis of deduction of tax at source by the donor under a particular head.

iv) It is thus seen that deduction of tax at source by donor would not be the determinative factor for denial of benefits u/ss. 11 and 12 of the Act. The respondent-Revenue, in the instant case, in the preceding years as well as in the succeeding years, under almost similar circumstances, has accepted the exemption claimed by the assessee u/s. 11 and 12 of the Act and, therefore, should not have deviated from its consistent approach in denying benefits to the assessee.

v) Accordingly, we find that the assessment order dated December 22, 2019 and the order passed by the revisional authority dated March 27, 2021 suffer from material perversity. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned orders are hereby, set aside. The receipt of ₹5,90,42,892 shall not be treated as income and the assessee is entitled for exemptions enshrined u/s. 11 and 12 of the Act.”

Business expenditure — Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) — Cash payment in excess of prescribed limit — Effect of s. 40A and rule 6DD — Payments to agents cannot be disallowed — Meaning of agent — Assessee’s supervisor acting as agent of assessee, and accounting to him for amounts received and disbursed to individual labourers — Supervisors not sub-contractors and payments made by them to labourers on assessee’s behalf not to be disallowed u/s. 40A(3).

36. (2025) 477 ITR 95 (Calcutta)

Sk. Jaynal Abddin vs. CIT

A. Y. 2006-07 Date of order 02/04/2024

S. 40A(3) of ITA 1961 and Rule 6DD of ITR 1962 and S 182 of Indian Contract Act, 1872

Business expenditure — Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) — Cash payment in excess of prescribed limit — Effect of s. 40A and rule 6DD — Payments to agents cannot be disallowed — Meaning of agent — Assessee’s supervisor acting as agent of assessee, and accounting to him for amounts received and disbursed to individual labourers — Supervisors not sub-contractors and payments made by them to labourers on assessee’s behalf not to be disallowed u/s. 40A(3).

The appellant-assessee is engaged in the business of embroidery and stitching. The assessee paid a sum of ₹1,21,49,190 for payment to labourers. According to the assessee, the aforesaid amount was paid to the labourers through supervisors who were employees of the assessee. The assessee used to draw a lump-sum amount from bank by cheque through his employees, i.e., supervisors for payment to be made to labourers. The supervisors used to make payment to labourers and give an account to the assessee in the form of a list containing payments made to each individual labourer. In none of the cases, the payment so made by the supervisors to individual labourer exceeded ₹20,000. The Assessing Officer, while passing the assessment order dated December 31, 2008 for the assessment year in question, i.e., A. Y. 2006-07, invoked section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by recording the following facts:

“The ground level labourers were not subject to professional tax, Employees’ State Insurance, provident fund, etc. There were no employer-employee relationship with the assessee and the labourers. The assessee simply got the work done by skilled labourers and the payment is ascertained on the basis of quality and quantity of the work done by them. The assessee in his submission dated December 30, 2008 further clarified that the job allotted to the worker are purely temporary. Workers are paid some times for few months even for a few days. Thus, labour welfare measures are neither taken up nor it is practicable. These workers are quite illiterate, partly homeless and fast changing the employer and work on piece rate on the condition of no work no pay.”

The Assessing Officer therefore inferred that the assessee could not produce satisfactory explanation for violation of the provisions of section 40A(3). Therefore, the Assessing Officer disallowed 20 per cent. of ₹1,21,49,191 that is ₹24,29,838 u/s. 40A(3) of the Act.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal and recorded the following finding of fact:

“I have carefully gone through the assessment order and explanation given by the appellant. The Assessing Officer has stated that the payments to the supervisor workers are in excess of ₹20,000 in cash for which he has disallowed the expenses in terms of section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act. It has already been held in the preceding paragraphs that the so-called sub-contractors are actually supervisor worker and employees of the appellant-firm. The payments made to them are meant for disbursement amongst the workers. It would be seen from the labour sheets that no single payment to the worker exceeds ₹20,000 in cash. The practice followed by the appellant is to withdraw the aggregate amount of labour charges from bank and to disburse the same amongst the individual workers through the supervisor. In not a single case, the individual payments to each worker ever exceeded ₹20,000 as would be seen from the monthly pay sheet and wage summary sheet. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances and having regard to the case laws cited above, it is held that the disallowance under section 40A(3) made by the Assessing Officer is not called for. Accordingly, the addition of ₹24,29,838 is deleted.”

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue and has recorded the following finding to hold that the supervisors are nothing but sub-contractors of the assessee:

“We observe that the assessee with each of the above so-called supervisors ledger account has enclosed the copies of weekly work sheet showing the name of worker, inter alia, amount paid to each of them. However, on the top of the said work sheet, name of the said supervisor is stated. It is observed that the assessee was making lump-sum payment on an ad hoc basis for the purpose of further disbursement to the workers and not as per the amount payable by them to the individual workers. We also observe from each page of the ledger account placed in paper book (supra) that there is a closing balance. Had these supervisors been merely an employee of the assessee along with the other workers, we are of the considered view that there was no question of any closing balance as on March 31, 2006. If the assessee had made the payments to them for the purpose of further disbursement, the assessee would have paid the amount to the so-called supervisors the amounts which were actually payable to them. However, this is not the case. Considering the entries in the ledger account, it fortifies the views of the Assessing Officer that the so-called group leaders or supervisors are nothing but sub-contractors of the assessee and the workers whose names are mentioned in the work sheet to whom the payments were made through respective so-called group leaders, who were working not under the assessee but under the said so-called group leader.”

On appeal by the assessee the Calcutta High Court framed the following substantial question of law for consideration:

“Whether the Tribunal was justified in law in judging the applicability of section 40A(3) of the Act with reference to the lump-sum amount paid to the leader of each group of workers for the purpose of disbursement to the individual workers on the appellant’s behalf and not with reference to the payment made to each individual worker and in holding that the group leader was the appellant’s sub-contractor or that the individual workers worked not under the appellant but under such group leader and its purported findings in that behalf are arbitrary, unreasonable and perverse?”

The Calcutta High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee, answered the question in favour of the assessee and held as under:

“i) On perusal of the assessment order, we find that the Assessing Officer has not disputed the specific case of the appellant-assessee that the supervisors are his employees. The specific stand of the appellant-assessee that the supervisors are his employees, was supported by books of account which were before the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer recorded the finding that since the provisions of Employees’ State Insurance, Provident Fund, etc., were not followed by the assessee, therefore, the individual labourers are not employees of the assessee. The Assessing Officer nowhere disputed the stand of the assessee supported by books of account that the supervisors are employees of the assessee. In paragraph 11 of the impugned order the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal recorded a finding based on surmise and presumption that the supervisors are nothing but sub-contractors of the assessee. This finding is perverse inasmuch as firstly it is not supported by any evidence and secondly it is contrary to evidence on record in the form of books of account that the supervisors are the employees who have been paid salary. Therefore, the finding recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the impugned order that the supervisors are sub-contractors, is perverse and is hereby set aside.

ii) Section 40A(3) of the Act afore-quoted, as it stood at the relevant time, clearly provides by the second proviso that no disallowance under this sub-section shall be made, where any payment in a sum exceeding ₹20,000 is made otherwise than by a crossed cheque drawn on a bank or by a crossed bank draft; in such cases and under such circumstances as may be prescribed, having regard to the nature and extent of banking facilities available, considerations of business expediency and other relevant factors. Circumstances as referred in the aforesaid second proviso to section 40A(3) of the Act, 1961 have been prescribed in rule 6DD of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Rule 6DD(1) clearly provides that no disallowance under sub-section (3) of section 40A shall be made where any payment in a sum exceeding twenty thousand rupees is made otherwise than by a crossed cheque drawn on a bank or by a crossed bank draft in the cases and circumstances where the payment is made by any person to his agent who is required to make payment in cash for goods or services on behalf of such person.

iii) Supervisors of the assessee acted as “agent” of the assessee. The word “agent” and “principal” has been defined in section 182 of the Indian Contract Act. An agent is a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with the third persons. The person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented, is called “principal”. Undisputed facts of the present case are that the appellant had withdrawn the amount from his bank account through his employees, i.e., supervisors for disbursement to individual labourers and the supervisors gave an account of the money so received for payment to labourers. Thus, the appellant-assessee is the principal and the supervisors acted as agent of the assessee. It is settled law that an authority of an agent may be express or implied. Submission of account by a supervisor acting as agent of the assessee, for the amount received and disbursed to individual labourers, leaves no manner of doubt that the supervisors who were employees of the assessee, acted as agents of the assessee for the purposes of disbursement of amount to the labourers. The payment so made by the supervisors had not exceeded ₹20,000 to any individual labourer. As per the provisions of section 211 of the Indian Contract Act, agent is bound to conduct the business of his principal according to the directions given by the principal or in the absence of such direction according to the customs which prevail in doing business of the same kind at the place where the agent conducts such business. In the present set of facts the supervisors acted as agent of the assessee in conducting the assessee’s business. There is no material or evidence on record to indicate or establish that the supervisors were sub-contractors. Under the circumstances, the finding recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that the supervisors were sub-contractors is perverse and contrary to law. Consequently, the said finding is hereby set aside.

iv) We have found that the supervisors acted as agent of the assessee to disburse the amount to individual labourers which in no case exceeded ₹20,000 to any individual labour. Therefore, in view of the circumstances prescribed in the second proviso to section 40A(3) of the Act, 1961 read with rule 6DD(1) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 and the above-referred provisions of the Indian Contract Act, the aforesaid payment of ₹1,21,49,190 cannot fall within the scope of section 40A(3) of the Act, 1961. Consequently, the disallowance to the extent of 20 per cent made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and to add it in the income of the assessee cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside.

v) For all the reasons afore-stated, the impugned order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to the extent it upholds the disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of the Act, 1961 for ₹24,29,838 cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. Consequently, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

Applicability of section 132A — Stolen property — Theft at the premises of the assessee — Criminal Case — Stolen property found by the police — Application to the Trial Court for possession of the stolen property — Objection by the Income-tax Department — Ownership documents submitted by the assessee — Objection of the Tax Department not maintainable.

35. (2025) 345 CTR 433 (MP)

Shravan Kumar Pathak vs. State of MP

A. Y. 2022-23 Date of order 09/05/2024

Ss. 132A of ITA 1961 and 397, 401 & 457 of Cr.PC

Applicability of section 132A — Stolen property — Theft at the premises of the assessee — Criminal Case — Stolen property found by the police — Application to the Trial Court for possession of the stolen property — Objection by the Income-tax Department — Ownership documents submitted by the assessee — Objection of the Tax Department not maintainable.

Assessee is an individual. In the facts of this case, a theft took place at the house of the assessee wherein cash amounting to ₹3 crores and 4 kgs of gold was stolen. A police complaint was filed by the assessee and an FIR was registered by the police. After making investigation, the police arrested the accused and recovered the stolen articles. The Assessee filed an application u/s. 457 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the trial court for handing over the possession of articles seized by the police in his favour.

Against the application moved by the assessee applicant u/s. 457 of the CrPC, the Department filed an objection that the applicant kept such a huge cash amount and gold in his house with an intent to avoid tax liability, which otherwise is a loss to the Government and as such, custody of the seized articles should not be handed over to the assessee. In addition, the Assistant Director, Income Tax, had also asked for the custody of the articles recovered from the thieves.

The application filed by the assessee was rejected by the Trial Court on the ground that the inquiry by the Department had not been concluded and the amount may be subject matter of confiscation and therefore it would not be proper to hand over the possession to the assessee applicant.

Against this order by the Trial Court, the assessee applicant filed a revision application before the High Court. The Madhya Pradesh High Court decided the issue in favour of the assessee and held as follows:

“i) From the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is clear that in a criminal case, if any stolen property is seized by the police from the accused, then the Income Tax Department cannot claim possession over the said seized property by issuing notice u/s. 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the reason that the same is a separate proceeding and can be initiated only after decision of the Court.

ii) The trial Court on a mere objection raised by the Income Tax Department cannot reject the application preferred by the applicant for the reason that it is the duty of the Court to see whether the person claiming possession over the seized articles, satisfies the Court by producing cogent evidence of his/her ownership or not. From the record of the trial Court, it reveals that while claiming title over the seized articles, the applicant has not only filed a certificate issued by the Tahsildar but also filed other relevant documents of his title over the same and as such, after considering the same, an order in this regard ought to have been passed, but the Court has failed to do so.

iii) Under such circumstances, the impugned order dated 08/04/2022 (Annexure-P/6) passed by the trial Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law and as such, it is hereby set aside.”

ICAI And Its Members

I.  REGULATORY UPDATE – ICAI ANNOUNCEMENT 

a)  Relaxation in compliance with the ‘Guidance Note on Financial Statements of Non-Corporate entities’ and ‘Guidance Note on Financial Statements of Limited Liability Partnerships’ for annual reporting period 2024-25

The ICAI has announced that compliance with the Guidance Note on Financial Statements of Non-Corporate Entities and the Guidance Note on Financial Statements of Limited Liability Partnerships, which were originally effective from April 1, 2024, has been relaxed for the annual reporting period 2024-25.

Application of these Guidance Notes during this period is voluntary. This relaxation does not affect the applicability of existing Accounting Standards or the Framework for Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements, which remain mandatory.

b)  Widening Scope of Mandatory Applicability of Audit Quality Maturity Model (AQMM) v.2.0 and Disclosure of Levels

CURRENT APPLICABILITY

AQMM is mandatory only for firms auditing:

  • Listed entities
  • Banks (other than Co-operative banks, except multi-state co-operative banks)
  • Insurance companies (excluding firms conducting only branch audits)

EXPANDED APPLICABILITY (PHASED MANNER)

  • From 1st April 2026
  • Firms auditing holding/subsidiary/associates/JVs of listed entities, banks (other than co-operative, except multi-state co-operative banks), and insurance companies (excluding branch audits).
  • Firms undertaking statutory audit of unlisted public companies with:
  • Paid-up capital ≥ ₹500 crores, or
  • Annual turnover ≥ ₹1000 crores, or
  • Outstanding loans, debentures & deposits ≥ ₹500 crores.
  • From 1st April 2027
  • Firms undertaking statutory audit of entities which have raised > ₹50 crores from public/banks/FIs during review period or any body corporate (including trusts) covered under public interest entities.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

  • AQMM v.2.0 level of a firm to be:
  • Hosted level-wise on ICAI website by Peer Review Board.
  • Printed on Peer Review Certificates issued to firms.

II. Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) Opinion – September 2025

Recognition of Liability towards Planned Expenditure for Stage-II Forest Clearance and Environmental Management Plan under Ind AS

FACTS OF THE CASE

  • A Government of India PSU engaged in bauxite mining, alumina/aluminium production, captive power generation and wind power.
  • For a newly allotted bauxite mine the Company obtained:
  • Stage-I Forest Clearance (Jan 2023) – paid ₹262.12 crore for compensatory afforestation etc., booked as Intangible Assets under development.
  • Stage-II Forest Clearance (July 2023) – subject to revenue-type activities (soil erosion control, green belt etc.) estimated at ₹9.89 crore.
  • Environmental Clearance (June 2023) – requires an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) with planned capital works/equipment of ₹120 crore and annual maintenance ~₹12 crore.
  • Company view: No liability recognised for ₹9.89 crore or ₹120 crore as the obligating event arises only on execution of the mining lease / commencement of operations.
  • C&AG Audit view: Present obligations exist once clearances are granted and undertakings given; non-recognition understates liabilities and capital work-in-progress.

QUERY

(i) Whether the Company’s approach of recognising liability for Stage-II forest clearance expenditure only on execution of mining lease is correct under Ind AS.

(ii) Whether liability for EMP expenditure should be recognised only when equipment is procured/works executed, or at the date of Environmental Clearance.

POINTS CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE

  • Ind AS 37 (Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets):
  • Provision requires a present obligation from a past event, probable outflow, and reliable estimate.
  • No provision for costs required merely to operate in the future; obligation must exist independently of future actions.
  • Obtaining Stage-II and Environmental Clearances and giving undertakings do not themselves create a present obligation; they are commitments for future operations.
  • Present obligation arises only when the Company performs activities that cause the impact requiring mitigation e.g., entering forest land, commencing mining, causing pollution.
  • Timing of recognition demands management judgement based on specific conditions and commencement of the obligating activity.

EAC’S OPINION

  • No provision should be recognised at the stage of giving undertakings or merely receiving clearances.
  • Liability and corresponding asset arise only when a present obligation exists, i.e., when mining operations/activities trigger the need to incur the specified mitigation or pollution-control expenditure.
  • Until then, these are capital commitments requiring disclosure, not recognition as liabilities or assets.

ICAI Journal – The Chartered Accountant September 2025 pages 115-121

Link: https://resource.cdn.icai.org/87967cajournal-sep2025-32.pdf

III. ICAI Awards Nomination

a) ICAI Awards for Excellence in Financial Reporting 2024–25

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India invites enterprises to participate in its prestigious Awards for Excellence in Financial Reporting.

HIGHLIGHTS

  • Objective: To recognise and encourage high-quality preparation and presentation of financial statements.
  • Awards: One Gold Shield and one Silver Shield in each category for the best annual reports.
  • Eligibility: Annual reports for financial year ending between 1 April 2024 and  31 March 2025.
  • Last Date: 15 October 2025.

AWARD CATEGORIES

Public & Private Sector Banks, Life & Non-life Insurance, Financial Services, Manufacturing & Trading (large and small turnover), Service Sector, Infrastructure & Construction, Not-for-Profit, Public Sector Enterprises, and Co-operatives.

PARTICIPATION

Submit entry form and documents online: https://bit.ly/efricao2025 and send hard copies to ICAI Research Committee.

b) ICAI–ZEE Business: CA Business Leader 40 Under 40 Awards

ICAI, in partnership with ZEE Business, invites nominations for the “CA Business Leader 40 Under 40 Award” to honour young Chartered Accountants driving innovation and growth in industry, entrepreneurship, and public service.

Why Apply

Gain national recognition, networking opportunities, and professional visibility while inspiring the next generation of CAs.

Categories

Manufacturing, Services, MSME, Start-up, BFSI, Women, Overseas, Others

Eligibility & Process

For ICAI members under 40. Entries validated by a process auditor and reviewed by an eminent jury.

Participation

Submit entry form and documents online by yourself or your employees:

♦ zeebiz.com/icai40under40

IV. ICAI BOARD OF DISCIPLINE CASES

1. Case: Dy. Registrar of Companies, WB vs. CA. P PR/G/354/2021/DD/64/2023/BOD/739/2024

Date of Order: 29.07.2025

Particulars Details
Complainant Dy. Registrar of Companies, West Bengal (MCA)
Nature of Case Negligence in safeguarding Digital Signature Certificate (DSC) and failure to appear before investigating authorities
Background Investigation into a shell company post-demonetisation scrutiny revealed that its tax audit reports for FY 2013-14 and 2014-15 were signed using the Respondent’s DSC. Summons were issued to the Respondent in 2018 but he failed to appear.
Key Allegations – Failure to appear before ROC Inspectors despite valid summons.

– Negligence in maintaining and safeguarding his DSC, enabling alleged misuse for filing tax audit reports without his knowledge.

– Failure to update ICAI with his current address, obstructing investigation.

Respondent’s Defence – Denied filing the tax audit reports and claimed he never received the 2018 summons.

– Stated he had moved residence and inadvertently not updated ICAI records.

– Alleged that a senior CA misused his DSC without consent when they shared office space.

Findings – Admitted to sharing DSC and failing to secure it.

– Provided no evidence of corrective action (no police complaint or revocation).

– Negligence compromised integrity of digital filing system.

– Defence of non-receipt of summons rejected; responsibility to safeguard DSC lies with holder.

Charges  Established Professional Misconduct under Clause (2), Part IV, First Schedule – “Other Misconduct”.
Punishment Reprimand under Section 21A (3) of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.

2. Case: CA. S. vs. CA. R. PR/162/2023/DD/200/2023/BOD/753/2024

Date of Order: 29.07.2025

Particulars Details
Complainant CA. S
Nature of Case Non-communication with previous auditor on acceptance of audit (breach of professional standard)
Background The Complainant alleged that the Respondent, on being appointed as statutory auditor of a client, accepted the audit engagement without first communicating in writing with the previous auditor as mandated by the Code of Ethics and the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.
Key Allegations Violation of the requirement to obtain a no-objection/communicate with the outgoing auditor before accepting the audit assignment.
Respondent’s Defence Appeared before the Board, acknowledged receipt of findings, and offered representation but did not disprove the allegation of non-communication.
Findings The Board held that the Respondent failed to communicate with the previous auditor prior to acceptance, constituting Professional
Misconduct under Item (8), Part I, First Schedule – failure to comply with provisions regarding acceptance of audit work.
Punishment Monetary penalty of ₹25,000 under Section 21A(3) of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.

3. Case: Shri S. Roy Superintendent of Police & Head of Branch, CBI EOW vs. CA. G PR/G/121/19/DD/238/2019/BOD/613/2022

Date of Order: 29.07.2025

Particulars Details
Complainant Shri Sudip Roy, Superintendent of Police & Head of Branch, CBI EOW, Kolkata
Nature of Case Other Misconduct – connivance in preparation of fake documents for car loan
Background A CBI case was registered in 2016 based on Allahabad Bank’s complaint. It was found that a Honda City car originally owned by a borrower group (HVPL / Tarun Textiles – NPA accounts) was transferred without consideration to the then Chief Manager of Allahabad Bank, Shri R.K. Singh. To cover the irregularity, Shri Singh obtained a ₹4 lakh car loan in March 2012 from Allahabad Bank by showing purchase of the same car from a second-hand dealer “M/s First Drive.”
Key Allegations – Respondent CA connived with Shri Anil Agarwal of M/s First Drive in preparing a fake bill/delivery challan of ₹4.70 lakh showing sale of the Honda City car to Shri R.K. Singh.
– The said bill was used by Shri Singh to obtain a car loan of ₹4 lakh from Allahabad Bank.- Respondent further arranged routing of ₹4.70 lakh through Hena Vincom Pvt. Ltd. and handed over cash to Shri Singh, thereby facilitating adjustment of funds.
Respondent’s Defence – Claimed the matter was over 10 years old, making it difficult to gather records.

-Denied direct involvement; argued allegations were based on contradictory third-party statements.

– Submitted that bills were forwarded only on request of the accused; the loan had already been applied on an earlier-dated bill.

– Requested charges to be quashed.

Findings – Respondent was aware of the parties and the transaction.

– Evidence showed he emailed bills/documents to Anil Agarwal, admitted during hearing to “mistakenly” forwarding them.

– Statements of Anil Agarwal and the Respondent himself established his role in arranging fake documentation and adjustment of ₹4.70 lakh.

– Board held him guilty of “Other Misconduct” under Item (2), Part IV, First Schedule, CA Act, 1949 read with Section 22.

Punishment Reprimand imposed by the Board of Discipline under Section 21A(3) of the CA Act, 1949.

GST Refunds Under Inverted Duty Structure

The inverted duty structure (IDS) under GST arises when inputs are taxed at higher rates than output supplies, leading to accumulation of unutilized input tax credit (ITC) and liquidity blockages. GST 1.0, with four tax slabs, intensified these anomalies, especially in sectors like textiles, footwear, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy, and EV manufacturing. GST 2.0, introduced after the 56th GST Council meeting in September 2025, rationalised rates into two slabs (5% and 18%), but IDS persists as inputs largely remain at 18% while many outputs fall to 5%. To ease working capital strain, the Council proposed provisional refunds of 90% and automatic refund mechanisms, though risks of fraud necessitate strong digital verification. Statutory provisions under Section 54 and Rule 89(5) govern refund eligibility, limited to input goods, with restrictions notified for certain sectors. Judicial rulings, including VKC Footsteps, Malabar Fuel Corporation, and Tirth Agro Technology, continue to shape the evolving refund landscape.

WHAT IS INVERTED DUTY STRUCTURE AND WHY IT OCCURS?

Inverted Duty Structure (IDS) means when the GST rate on inputs (input goods and/or raw materials used to manufacture final products) is higher than the tax rate on output supplies (finished goods) after manufacturing, processing or assembling goods. This situation results into the accumulation of unutilised Input Tax Credit (ITC), creating liquidity crunches and working capital shortages for manufacturers and suppliers.

Inverted Duty Structure is primarily a structural anomaly caused by the following factors:

  • Higher GST Rate on Inputs: It refers to a situation where the GST paid on input goods or raw materials (e.g., at 18%) is higher than the GST rate applicable on the finished goods or output (e.g., at 5%). This leads to accumulation of unutilised Input Tax Credit (ITC), resulting in working capital blockage and refund claims under the Inverted Duty Structure.
  • Changes in Tax Policy: Introduction of concessional or reduced GST rates on specific finished goods or services without proportionate reduction on their inputs can create an inverted duty structure. This disparity leads to accumulation of Input Tax Credit (ITC), causing cash flow challenges and frequent refund claims.
  • Sector-specific anomalies: It occur when industries use a mix of inputs taxed at higher GST rates and produce outputs taxed at lower rates. This mismatch creates a recurring Inverted Duty Structure (IDS), where input taxes exceed output liability, leading to excess Input Tax Credit (ITC) and dependency on refunds.

INVERTED DUTY STRUCTURE UNDER GST 1.0

Introduction of Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India was one of the largest indirect tax reforms aimed at simplifying the tax structure and harmonizing indirect taxes. But one of the major issues with businesses in this multiple rate regime is the Inverted Duty Structure.

Under GST 1.0, the existence of four tax slabs – 28%, 18%, 12% and 5% has created structural challenges for businesses. The large gap between high input rates (28%/18%) and lower output rates (12%/5%) has led to severe working capital blockages and persistent liquidity stress.

The Government recognized these challenges, providing a statutory framework for refund of unutilised ITC under the CGST Act, 2017 and related rules. The correct interpretation and enforcement of these provisions are important to make sure that businesses can reduce the financial hardship caused by IDS and maintain healthy cash flows.

However, Businesses often face the challenge of claiming large refunds under the inverted duty structure, but the slow and complicated processing delays the release of funds for months. The 12% GST slab, in particular, continued to be a hotspot for disputes, classification mismatches, and compliance challenges. To address these issues, the GST Council recently held its 56th meeting, focusing on rate rationalisation and measures to streamline the refund process.

INVERTED DUTY STRUCTURE UNDER GST 2.0

The 56th meeting of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council, held on September 3, 2025 unveiled one of the most far-reaching revisions to India’s indirect tax framework since the launch of GST. Referred as “GST 2.0”, the reform collapses the earlier four-rate structure into just major two slabs of 5% and 18% along with a higher rate of 40% for sin and luxury goods. This overhaul is designed to simplify compliance, bring predictability, and align taxation with broader economic priorities. The implications are far-reaching, promising a significant reshaping of the industry landscape.

Yet, despite the clear benefits, the changes bring a major operational complication: a rise of the inverted duty structure (IDS). Under the new regime GST 2.0, inputs/raw materials used in production remain taxed at 18%, while many finished goods now fall into the 5% or Nil category. A 13% gap between rates still creates inverted duty structure for on output goods/services with 5% slab. This mismatch locks up working capital and creates cash flow pressures for manufacturers – an issue the industry has struggled with even under the previous regime.

To offset this strain, the Council has recommended a new relief mechanism: granting a provisional refund of 90% on IDS situations and Zero-Rated Supplies as well. This step is aimed at easing liquidity constraints, ensuring smoother tax credit utilization, and allowing industries to maintain uninterrupted supply chains in the face of the revised tax rates.

Process of Automatic Refunds as Given In GST 2.0:

RISK OF AUTOMATIC REFUND:

  • Automatic refunds without strong checks increase risk of fraudulent claims.
  • Fake registrations and manipulated invoices can exploit refund systems.
  • Past GST frauds revealed massive input tax credit scams worth lakhs or crores.
  • Large-scale illegitimate refunds may strain government revenue.
  • Strong digital verification and AI-based monitoring are essential to prevent misuse.

SECTORS AFFECTED BY INVERTED DUTY STRUCTURE (IDS)

Inverted duty structure (IDS) under GST affects industries where the tax rate on inputs is higher than that on outputs, leading to accumulation of input tax credit. This, results into working capital issues. Addressing IDS is crucial to improve cash flow, boost manufacturing efficiency, and ensure a fair tax structure across the value chain. Following are illustrative examples of inverted duty structure

SECTOR INPUT GST RATE OUTPUT GST 1.0 RATE GST 2.0 RATE
Footwear Synthetic/Artificial leather PU, Chemicals, job work 18% Footwear upto

₹2,500 per pair

12% 5%
Textile/Garments Synthetic or artificial staple fibers, Machines 18% Apparel upto

₹2,500 per piece

5% 5%
Textile Job work Packing Material, Chemical, Colour, Machines 18% Textile Job-work

Processing

5% 5%
Pharmaceutical APIs, Packaging materials 18% Medicines 12% 5%
LPG Bottling & Distribution Bulk LPG Purchase 18% LPG Cylinder for Residential 5% 5%
Renewable Energy Solar Glass, Solar battery 18% Renewable energy devices 12% 5%
Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Components, Parts 18% Electric Vehicles (EV) 5% 5%
Bicycles Steel 18% Bicycles 12% 5%
Any Any Input Goods 5%/18% Supply to Merchant Exporter 0.1% 0.1%

Example of calculation of Inversion of ITC (Renewable Sector)

Particulars Outward GST@12% Proposed GST@5%
Value GST Total Value GST Total
Supply Value of

Renewable Devices

30,00,000 3,60,000 33,60,000 30,00,000 1,50,000 31,50,000
Cost of Manufacturing Renewable Devices:
Solar Cell @ 5% (earlier 12%) 15,50,000 1,86,000 17,36,000 15,50,000 77,500 16,27,500
EVA Sheet @ 18% 4,50,000 81,000 5,31,000 4,50,000 81,000 5,31,000
Solar Glass @18% 5,00,000 90,000 5,90,000 5,00,000 90,000 5,90,000
Aluminium Frame @ 18% 2,00,000 18,000 2,18,000 2,00,000 18,000 2,18,000
Cost of Manufacturing

Renewable Devices

27,00,000 3,75,000 30,75,000 27,00,000 2,26,500 29,66,500
Net Profit =

Supply – Manufacturing Cost

3,00,000 15,000   3,00,000 76,500
Inversion of Input Tax Credit Increased after decision of Reducing GST Rate [i.e., ₹76,500 – ₹15,000] 61,500

STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR IDS REFUND

Key sections of the CGST Act, 2017

  • Section 54(1): Any person claiming refund of any tax and interest, if any, paid on such tax or any other amount paid by him, may make an application before the expiry of two years from the relevant date in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

This section allows any person to claim a refund of tax and interest paid, within two years from the relevant date.

  • Section 54(3):  Subject to the provisions of sub-section (10), a registered person may claim refund of any unutilised input tax credit at the end of any tax period:

Provided that no refund of unutilised input tax credit shall be allowed in cases other than –

(i) zero rated supplies made without payment of tax;

(ii) where the credit has accumulated on account of rate of tax on inputs being higher than the rate of tax on output supplies (other than nil rated or fully exempt supplies), except supplies of goods or services or both as may be notified by the Government on the recommendations of the Council:

This section specifically enables the refund of accumulated ITC at the end of any tax period, on account of either zero-rated supplies made without payment of tax, or where the tax rate on inputs is higher than the tax rate on output supplies (except in cases of NIL-rated or exempt supplies or as notified by the Government).

Relevant Rules of CGST Rules, 2017

  • Rule 89-97A: Procedures for claiming refund of tax, interest, penalty, fees, or any other amount.
  • Rule 89(5): Formula for calculation of maximum refund under IDS

RESTRICTION OF REFUND UNDER IDS FOR CERTAIN OUTPUT SUPPLY OF GOODS

In accordance with Notification No. 05/2017-CT(R) dated 28.06.2017, as amended from time to time by Notifications No. 29/2017, 44/2017, 20/2018, 09/2022 and 20/2023, the Government has notified a list of goods for which refund of unutilized input tax credit (ITC) under Inverted Duty Structure (IDS) is restricted. These restrictions are applicable where the rate of tax on input goods is higher than the rate on output supply, yet no refund is permitted for the accumulation of ITC. The rationale behind such restrictions is to curb excess refund outflows in certain sectors and streamline credit accumulation aligned with policy objectives.

As per the consolidated list, restriction on refund applies to various vegetable oils such as soya-bean oil, groundnut oil, olive oil, palm oil, sunflower oil, and coconut oil, including their chemically unmodified forms (Tariff Items 1507 to 1518). Similarly, refund has been disallowed for certain coal and petroleum-related products (Tariff Items 2701 to 2703), imitation yarns (5605), and an extensive list of railway locomotives and related parts (Tariff Items 8601 to 8608), with effective restriction dates ranging from 01.07.2017 to 20.10.2023.

Further, It is important to note that certain restrictions imposed earlier on woven fabrics (Tariff Items 5007, 5111 to 5113, 5208 to 5212, 5309 to 5311, 5407-5408, 5512 to 5516, 5608, 5801, 5806 & 60) were lifted later. The restriction period for refund claims on these goods ended on 31.07.2018, thereby allowing refunds for ITC accumulated due to IDS for fabrics post that date.

The restriction on IDS refunds for specified goods reflects the government’s intent to rationalise refund outflows and prevent revenue leakage. Taxpayers dealing in such notified goods must carefully evaluate their eligibility before claiming refunds. Continuous updates to the list also highlight the need for regular compliance checks and policy awareness.

REFUND UNDER IDS FOR CERTAIN OUTPUT SUPPLY OF SERVICES

REFUND RESTRICTED

  • As per Notification No. 15/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, as amended by Notification No. 15/2023-Central Tax (Rate) dated 20.10.2023, refund of accumulated Input Tax Credit (ITC) under the Inverted Duty Structure (IDS) is not available for Construction Services of a Complex/Building meant for sale covered under Schedule II, Para 5(b) where Input goods (e.g., cement @ 28% @18%, steel @ 18%, marble @ 18%) are taxed at a higher rate than output services (1% for affordable units, 5% for others). Refund of accumulated ITC is not allowed under IDS for the same.

REFUND ALLOWED

  • Notification No. 15/2017 specified only para 5(b) of Schedule II (i.e., construction services), therefore, Works Contract Services covered under Schedule II, Para 6(b) read with Section 2(119) of the CGST Act is not restricted by the said notification. Hence, refund under IDS is allowed where works contract service involved public infrastructure and government projects taxed at concessional rates (e.g., 12%) before rate rationalisation and inputs for that is of higher rate.
  • Further, Other Services like Job work where the output service is taxed at a lower rate (e.g., 5%) compared to input taxed at higher rates (18%), Refund is allowed under IDS.
  • As per Circular No. 48/22/2018-GST, Fabric processors providing job work services (i.e., supply of services and not goods) are also eligible for refund under IDS.

It may be noted that the refund restriction under IDS applies only when the output is a supply of goods listed in the Notification, and not for all services. Thus, service providers, except those engaged in construction services under Para 5(b), remain eligible for IDS refunds.

RESTRICTION OF REFUND OF ITC OF INPUT SERVICE & CAPITAL GOODS

Section 54(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 provides that a registered person may claim a refund of any unutilized input tax credit (ITC) at the end of any tax period under two circumstances:

  1. Zero-rated supplies made without payment of tax; or
  2. Where credit has accumulated on account of the rate of tax on inputs being higher than the rate of tax on output supplies (i.e., Inverted Duty Structure or IDS).

The provision specifically mentions “on account of” higher tax on Inputs, which has raised questions about whether the refund is allowed only for input goods or also includes input services.

The term “inputs” under the CGST Act is defined in Section 2(59) as “any goods other than capital goods used or intended to be used by a supplier in the course or furtherance of business.” It does not include input services. This gave rise to confusion because Section 54(3)(ii) only refers to higher tax on inputs and is silent about services.

Initially, taxpayers interpreted that ITC on both input goods and input services could be included in the refund calculation under IDS. However, the government clarified this ambiguity through Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31st March 2020 and later re-clarified through Notification No. 14/2022-Central Tax dated 5th July 2022 (effective from 5th July 2022), and Rule 89(5) was amended.

These clarifications and amendments establish that:

  • Refund of ITC under inverted duty structure is available only on “input goods”.
  • Input services and capital goods are not eligible for refund under Section 54(3)(ii).
  • The formula under Rule 89(5) of CGST Rules was also amended accordingly to allow refund of net ITC pertaining only to input goods, excluding input services from the calculation.

This legal position has been upheld by courts as well. For instance, the Gujarat High Court in VKC Footsteps India Pvt Ltd. vs. Union of India had ruled in Favor of taxpayers, allowing refund of ITC on input services under IDS. However, the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. VKC Footsteps India Pvt Ltd., in 2021, reversed the High Court decision, upholding the government’s view that only input goods are covered for refund under IDS.

As a result, currently, under the Inverted Duty Structure, a registered taxpayer is not eligible to claim refund of accumulated ITC attributable to input services or capital goods. Only input goods, which are taxed at a higher rate than the output supplies, qualify for refund under Section 54(3)(ii).

In conclusion, while Section 54(3) refers broadly to refund of unutilised ITC due to inverted duty, the restrictive interpretation and supporting rules/circulars clearly limit the refund eligibility to input goods only. Taxpayers should ensure proper classification and calculation while filing refund claims under IDS to avoid rejections or disputes.

REFUND OF ITC OF STOCK DUE TO RATE RATIONALISATION IN GST 2.0

The Government of India has recently announced its intent to rationalise GST rates across sectors to reduce complexities, broaden the tax base, and address revenue leakages. While such rationalisation is expected to bring uniformity and curb classification disputes, it also raises a practical challenge for businesses – what happens to input tax credits (ITC) accumulated on account of higher taxes already paid on inputs when output supplies suddenly face lower tax rates?

The key question is: Can taxpayers claim refund of such unutilized ITC under the Inverted Duty Structure, even though CBIC Circular No. 135/05/2020 restricts refunds where input and output goods are the same?

RESTRICTION BY CIRCULAR:

CBIC Circular No. 135/05/2020 dated 31-03-2020) disallowed refund of ITC under IDS where input and output goods are the same but taxed at different rates.

Further, as per the FAQ issued by the department on GST Rate Rationalisation based on the recommendations of the GST Council in its 56th meeting, it has been again clarified that the refund of Input Tax Credit (ITC) arising due to a difference in tax rates on the same input and output at different points will not be allowed under Section 54(3) of the CGST Act.

FAQ 10. Will I be allowed to take refund of accumulated credit arising out of inverted duty structure for supplies effected upto the date of effect of revised rate as notified?

The said issue has been clarified vide circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31.03.2020 (as amended), which states that refund of accumulated ITC in terms of clause (ii) of first proviso to section 54(3) of the CGST Act, is available where the credit has accumulated on account of rate of tax on inputs being higher than the rate of tax on output supplies. However, the input and output being the same in such cases, though attracting different tax rates at different points in time, do not get covered under the provisions of clause (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 54 of the CGST Act.

FORMULA AND CALCULATION OF REFUND

Refund Calculation Formula – Rule 89(5)

The refund mechanism under the Inverted Duty Structure (IDS) continues to be a controversial issue under GST, with Rule 89(5) of the CGST Rules creating systemic disadvantages for taxpayers. While the intention is to grant refund of unutilised input tax credit where the rate of tax on inputs exceeds that on output supplies, the formulaic construction of refund calculation leads to a double blow – first, by excluding input services & capital goods from the scope of “Net ITC,” and second, by deducting total output tax payable on inverted rated supplies in earlier period. This design results in a gross under-calculation of refund, especially in service-intensive businesses.

Old Formula and Its Drawbacks:

Refund Amount = (Turnover of inverted rated supply of goods and services × Net ITC ÷ Adjusted Total Turnover) – Tax payable on such inverted rated supply of goods and services.

Rule 89(5) was retrospectively amended via Notification No. 26/2018-Central Tax dated 13-06-2018 (effective from 01-07-2017) to replace “turnover of inverted rated supply of goods” with “turnover of inverted rated supply of goods and services.” However, the definition of “Net ITC” remains restrictive, covering only input goods while excluding input services and capital goods. As a result, although businesses accumulate credit on both goods and services, refunds are permitted only on a limited portion relating to goods. This distortion deepens because the formula deducts the full output tax on inverted rated supplies from the reduced “Net ITC.” Such a method overstates the deduction, leading to under-refunds or nil refunds, disproportionately harming industries like pharmaceuticals, e-commerce and exporters with higher input-service credits. While the Supreme Court in VKC Footsteps upheld the formula’s validity, it recognised this inequity and urged the GST Council to review the policy.

New Formula and its Improvements:

The Government amended Rule 89(5) through Notification No. 14/2022 – Central Tax dated 05.07.2022. The revised formula continues to retain the exclusion of input services but attempts to provide some relief by modifying the manner of calculating “tax payable on such inverted rated supply” in the second part of the formula.

Specifically, the amendment introduced “{tax payable on such inverted rated supply of goods and services x (Net ITC/ITC availed on inputs and input services)}”
However, this change was cosmetic at best, as it did not resolve the core issue that Input services continue to be excluded from “Net ITC” for refund eligibility.

After amendment, the maximum refund amount for IDS is determined using the following formula:

Maximum Refund Amount = {(Net ITC × Turnover of Inverted Rated Supply of goods & Services / Adjusted Total Turnover) – [{Tax Payable on such inverted Rated Supply of goods & services x (Net ITC/ITC availed on inputs & input Services}]

Where:

  • Net ITC: ITC availed on input goods during the relevant period.
  • Adjusted Total Turnover: Domestic Supply+ Zero Rated Supply (excluding domestic exempt supplies)

Example of Refund amount: (Pre & Post amendment)

  • Turnover of Inverted Rated Supply: ₹10,00,000
  • Adjusted Total Turnover: ₹12,00,000
  • ITC on Input Goods: ₹1,80,000
  • ITC on Input Services: ₹60,000
  • Output tax payable on Inverted Rated supply: ₹50,000

Pre amendment Refund amount

= (1,80,000 × 10,00,000/12,00,000) − 50,000
= 1,00,000

Post amendment Refund amount

= (1,80,000 × 10,00,000/12,00,000) – (50,000 x 1,80,000/2,40,000)
= 1,12,500

The refund is limited to the least of:

  • Refund calculated as per formula
  • Balance in electronic credit ledger after filing GSTR-3B for refund period
  • Balance in electronic credit ledger at the time of filing refund application

[Circular 125 – Amount of Maximum Refund that can be claimed as per ECL

In case of refunds pertaining to items listed at (a), (c) and (e) in para 3 of Circular 125, the common portal calculates the refundable amount as the least of the following amounts:

a) The maximum refund amount as per the formula in rule 89(4) or rule 89(5) of the CGST Rules (formula is applied on the consolidated amount of ITC, i.e. Central tax + State tax/Union Territory tax + Integrated tax);

b) The balance in the electronic credit ledger of the applicant at the end of the tax period for which the refund claim is being filed after the return in FORM GSTR-3B for the said period has been filed; and

c) The balance in the electronic credit ledger of the applicant at the time of filing the refund application]

REFUND OF ITC IN CASE OF INPUTS TAXED AT SAME OR LOWER RATE THAN OUTPUT

As per Circular No. 125/44/2019-GST dated 18-11-2019, it was clarified that while computing the maximum refund under Rule 89(5) of the CGST Rules, “Net ITC” includes ITC availed on all inputs during the relevant period, regardless of their tax rates, even if some inputs are taxed at the same or lower rate than the outward supply.

Example:

Particulars Value GST Rate Tax
Details of Input
Input A           500 5%             25
Input B        2,000 18%           360
2,500 385
Details of output
Output Y        3,000 12%     360
Particulars Amount
Net ITC (from inputs A & B) A 385
Turnover of inverted rated supply (Output Y) B 3,000
Adjusted total turnover C 3,000
Tax payable on Output Y (Inverted Rate Goods) (12% of 3,000) D 360
Maximum Refund = (A*B/C – D*A/A) 25

From the above example, it is evident that even though Input A attracts a lower GST rate (5%) than the outward supply Y (12%), the ITC on such inputs cannot be excluded while calculating Net ITC. As clarified, the refund computation under Rule 89(5) requires inclusion of all eligible ITC on inputs, irrespective of whether the input GST rate is lower, equal to, or higher than the output GST rate. Therefore, the entire ITC of ₹385 (including ₹25 from Input A) must be considered for refund calculation.

TIME LIMITS AND RELEVANT DATES

As per Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017, refund claims under Inverted Duty Structure must be filed within two years from the relevant date. The relevant date varies depending on the nature of refund claim. Below are the key timelines:

  • For Refund of unutilized ITC under IDS: The relevant date is the due date for furnishing return u/s 39 (i.e. GSTR-3B) for the period in which such claim for refund arises.
  • Refund arising from Judicial Orders (Court/Tribunal/Appellate Authority): The relevant date is the date of communication of the judgment, decree, order, or direction allowing the refund.
  • In Case of Deficiency Memo (Form GST RFD-01): The time period from the original filing of Form GST RFD-01 till the date of issuance of RFD-03 (deficiency memo) is excluded from the two-year limitation. A fresh claim filed after rectification of deficiencies is considered within time if the original application was within two years.

DOCUMENTATION FOR CLAIMING IDS REFUND

Statements Statement 1 under rule 89(5) – Calculation of Maximum Refund Amount
Statement 1A of Rule 89(2)(h) – Details of Inward & Outward Invoices
Annexure B – Statement of Purchase invoices – ITC & HSN
Certificates Self-Certificate where refund amount is less than 2 lakh rupees [Rule 89(2)(l)]
CA Certificate where refund amount is more than 2 lakh rupees [89(2)(m)]
Declaration/

Undertakings

Undertaking in relation to sections 16(2)(c)
Declaration under second and third proviso to section 54(3)
GST Returns GSTR-2A/2B of the relevant period
GSTR-01 and GSTR-3B of relevant period

INTEREST ON DELAYED REFUNDS

As per Section 56 of the CGST Act, read with Notification No. 13/2017-CT dated 28-06-2017, interest is payable on delayed GST refunds if not sanctioned within 60 days from the date of receipt of the refund application. The applicable rate and period of interest vary based on the type of refund and delay involved:

  • No interest is payable if the refund is granted within 60 days of the application.
  • For regular refund applications
    -6% p.a. interest is payable from the 61st day from date of original(1st) refund application till the actual date of refund credit.
  • In cases where the refund arises from an order of adjudicating authority, appellate authority, tribunal, or court, interest is payable
    -at 6% p.a. from 61st day of original(1st) refund application till 60th day of fresh (2nd) refund application or date of refund credit
    -at 9% p.a. from 61st day of Fresh (2nd) Refund application till date of refund credit

In case of Lupin Limited [Writ Petition No.610 of 2024] (Bombay High Court – Goa Bench), held that GST refunds delayed beyond 60 days of an appellate order attract 9% interest, while delays beyond 60 days from the original order attract 6% under section 56 of the CGST Act.

Circular No. 125/44/2019-GST clarifies that the refund is deemed complete only when the amount is credited to the applicant’s bank account. Hence, the interest period starts after 60 days from the date of application and continues until the date of actual credit to the applicant’s account.

In case of Raghav Ventures [W.P.(C) No. 12209 of 2023] (Delhi High Court, 2024), it was held that interest @ 6% on delayed GST refunds is a statutory right, automatic, and not dependent on the petitioner’s claim. Even if interest is not specifically claimed, it is payable under Section 56 if the refund is delayed beyond the statutory period. The court emphasized that such interest is mandatory and automatic in terms of the Act’s provisions.

IMPORTANT CASE LAWS RELATED TO IDS REFUND

  • VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd. [Civil Appeal No 4810 of 2021] (Supreme Court, 2021) – Upheld validity of Rule 89(5); refund not allowed on Input Services
    The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Rule 89(5) of the CGST Rules, which restricts refund of unutilised input tax credit in cases of inverted duty structure to input goods only, excluding input services. It held that Section 54(3) of the CGST Act grants refund entitlement subject to restrictions, and the legislature is empowered to distinguish between goods and services for refund purposes. The Gujarat High Court’s decision striking down Rule 89(5) as ultra vires was set aside, while the similar view of the Madras High Court upholding the Rule was affirmed. The Court concluded that policy choices on refunds fall within the legislature’s domain and cannot be invalidated merely for being inequitable. Any remedy for inclusion of input services in refund must come from legislative amendment, not judicial intervention.
  • Malabar Fuel Corporation [WP(C) Nos. 26112/2023, 20511/2023, 36699/2023] (Kerala High Court, 2024) – Refund allowed under IDS even with the same inward and outward supplies
    Company engaged in bottling LPG, paid GST at 18% on bulk LPG purchases but charged only 5% on domestic supplies after bottling. The Court examined whether a taxpayer can claim a refund under the inverted duty structure (IDS) when the input and output are the same goods, but the GST rate on the outward supply is lower than the GST rate paid on inward supplies.
  • The department’s argument was that IDS refunds are not allowed if the same goods are supplied outward, since refunds should only apply when different goods are involved.
  • The Court disagreed, holding that Section 54(3) of the CGST Act and Rule 89(5) only require one condition: that the rate of GST on inputs is higher than the rate on outward supplies. They do not require inputs and outputs to be different goods.
  • It also clarified that a CBIC circular No. 135/05/2020-GST cannot override the law. If the Act and Rules allow refund based on rate difference, a circular cannot impose extra restrictions.
  • As a result, the Court quashed the refund rejection order and directed the department to process the refund claim on its merits.
  • This judgment affirms that IDS refunds are driven by rate disparity, not by product variation.
  • Tirth Agro Technology Pvt Ltd [SCA No. 11630, 11635, 11647, 11649 of 2023) (Gujarat High Court, 2024) – Differential refund allowed as per new amended formula

The Court held that the amendment to Rule 89(5) of the CGST Rules, introduced by Notification No. 14/2022, is clarificatory and curative in nature and hence applicable retrospectively. It quashed CBIC Circular No. 181/13/2022, which had restricted the amendment’s benefit prospectively from 05.07.2022. Relying on its earlier decision in Ascent Meditech Ltd., the Court ruled that refund or rectification applications filed within the statutory two-year limit under Section 54(1) must be recomputed using the amended formula. Consequently, the rejection of petitioners’ claims for differential refund under the new formula was set aside. The respondents were directed to release the eligible refund amounts within three months.

The High Court’s decision is now even stronger because the Supreme Court, in Tirth Agro Technology Pvt. Ltd. (July 2025), refused to set aside it. The apex court noted that its earlier ruling in Ascent Meditech – which said the amended Rule 89(5) applies retrospectively—was already final. This means the High Court’s reasoning is not only valid within its own state but has also been effectively approved by the Supreme Court.

  • Patanjali Foods [SCA No. 17298 of 2024] (Gujarat High Court, 2025) – Refund for restricted goods allowed for period before notification

The Court struck down para 2(2) of CBIC Circular No. 181/13/2022-GST dated 10.11.2022, which applied the refund restriction on specified goods under Notification No. 09/2022 (effective 18.07.2022) to all applications filed after 13.07.2022, even for periods before the notification. It held such retrospective application to be arbitrary, discriminatory, and ultra vires Section 54 of the GST Act, violating Article 14. Since the notification itself had prospective effect, refund claims for pre-13.07.2022 periods could not be denied merely because they were filed later within the statutory two-year limit. The Court also held that once refund was sanctioned by a quasi-judicial order and not appealed, it attained finality and could not be reopened via a Section 73 notice. The impugned recovery order was quashed, and the petition allowed in favour of the assessee.

BENEFICIAL CIRCULARS UNDER IDS REFUND

Circular No. 37/11/2018 – Suppliers having merchant export supplies @ 0.05% / 1% can also claim refund under Inverted Duty Structure as per provision of the first proviso to Section 54(3) of CGST Act.

Circular No. 48/22/2018 – Clarifies that fabric processors (job workers) supply services, not goods. Since their output is job work services, not fabrics, Notification No. 5/2017–CT (Rate) does not restrict their refund eligibility. The refund restriction under section 54(3) applies only when the output supply is the goods listed in the notification. Hence, fabric processors are eligible for refund of unutilised ITC under the inverted duty structure.

Circular No. 79/53/2018 – Net ITC includes all input goods used in the course of business, even if not directly consumed in manufacturing. Items like stores, spares, packing materials, and stationery qualify as inputs if not restricted under section 17(5) and not capitalised. Revenue expensed items cannot be treated as capital goods.

Circular No. 173/05/2022-GST – Refund under Inverted Duty Structure allowed in case of same rate of inputs and output goods provided the output is supplied at a lower rate due to a concessional notification.

Circular No. 181/13/2022-GST – The restriction imposed vide Notification No. 09/2022-CTR dated 13-07-2022 on refund of unutilised input tax credit on account of inverted duty structure in case of specified goods falling under chapter 15 and 27 would apply prospectively only.

CONCLUSION

Despite the GST Council’s 56th meeting taking significant steps towards rate rationalisation, the issue of Inverted Duty Structure continues to affect several sectors. While rationalisation has eased the burden for some industries, many businesses still face blocked input tax credits, resulting in liquidity crunches and operational strain. This underscores the fact that structural anomalies within the GST framework require a more comprehensive and sector-specific approach rather than piecemeal adjustments.

To address this challenge, policymakers must intensify efforts to simplify rates and ensure timely refunds for affected sectors. Businesses, on their part, need to maintain strict compliance, robust documentation, and close monitoring of regulatory changes to safeguard working capital. A collaborative approach between industry and government, with continuous evaluation of rate structures, is essential to resolve IDS fully and sustain the growth momentum envisaged under GST.

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

8. Vijay Krishnaswami vs. The Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation)

(2025) 177 taxmann.com 807(SC)

Prosecution – The complaint was filed by DDIT after sanction of PDIT before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.II), Egmore, Chennai, on 11.08.2018 – Application under Section 245(C) was filed by the Appellant before the Settlement Commission later – On the date of lodging the prosecution, the finding of concealment of income or imposition of the penalty of more than ₹50,000/- was not recorded by the ITAT – Nothing was brought on record to show that any wilful attempt to evade the payment of tax was made by Assessee – No explanation had been put forth by Revenue to demonstrate as to why PDIT or DDIT did not comply the procedure while lodging prosecution in this case – The act of the authority in continuing prosecution was in blatant disregard to their own binding circular dated 24.04.2008 and in defiance to the guidelines of the Department – Further, in the settlement proceedings, Assessee had disclosed all material facts related to the computation of his additional income and fully satisfied the provisions of Section 245H – The Commission recorded a finding that overall additional income is not on account of suppression of any material facts and it did not disclose any variance from the manner in which the said income had been earned – As such the immunity from penalty under IT Act was granted in exercise of powers under Section 245H – Conduct of the authorities lacked fairness and reasonableness, and the High Court’s approach appeared to be entirely misdirected, having failed to appreciate the factual and legal position in right earnest

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution lodged with the help of proviso to Sub-section (1) to Section 245H was in defiance to the circular dated 24.04.2008, which was in vogue – the Revenue acted in blatant disregard to binding statutory instructions. Such wilful non-compliance of their own directives reflected a serious lapse, and undermined the principles of fairness, consistency, and accountability, which in any manner cannot be treated to be justified or lawful.

On 24.04.2016, search under Section 132 of the IT Act was conducted at the residence of the Appellant, and unaccounted cash of ₹4,93,84,300/- was seized. After taking statement of the Appellant under Section 132(4) of the IT Act, a show-cause notice was issued on 31.10.2017 as to why prosecution should not be initiated against him.

On assailing the same in the writ petition filed by the Appellant, it was dismissed on 17.11.2017 being premature, observing that issuance of show-cause notice is an administrative act and in absence of reply, it cannot be questioned in the writ petition.

The said order was put to challenge in Writ Appeal No. 1617 of 2017 which was dismissed as infructuous vide order dated 06.09.2020 taking into consideration the subsequent developments and the order of the Settlement Commission passed on 26.11.2019. The Division Bench observed that the complaint filed in furtherance to show-cause notice was not challenged before the learned Single Judge in a writ petition, therefore, the said issue cannot be looked into in this appeal, leaving it open to be decided in the appropriate proceedings.

During pendency, the Principal Director Income Tax (Investigation), Chennai, (in short “PDIT”) exercised power under Section 279(1) of the IT Act, and vide order dated 21.06.2018, accorded sanction to Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), Chennai, (in short “DDIT”) to initiate prosecution against the Appellant. Thereafter, Respondent-DDIT filed complaint on 11.08.2018 against the Appellant for an offence under Section 276C(1) alleging wilful attempt to evade tax with respect to assessment year 2017-2018 and for not filing the correct return of income.

Being aggrieved, the Appellant filed quashing petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (in short “CrPC”) being Crl. O.P. No. 28763 of 2018 along with Crl. M.P. Nos. 16786 and 16787 of 2018, praying for quashing of the complaint and pending proceedings.

Pertinently, the Appellant also filed an application under Section 245C of the IT Act on 07.12.2018 before the Settlement Commissioner, Additional Bench, Chennai, (in short “Settlement Commission”) disclosing the entire additional income and sought immunity from levy of penalty as well as prosecution in the matter of alleged evasion of proposed tax.

The Settlement Commission in exercise of powers under Section 245D(4) of IT Act, partly allowed the said application vide order dated 26.11.2019 and granted immunity from levy of penalty, refraining itself to grant immunity from prosecution due to pendency of quashing petition before the High Court of Madras.

By the order impugned, the High Court dismissed the quashing petition and referring the averments of the complaint, observed that for the assessment year 2017-2018, the amount seized has not been shown in earnings, which may amount to evasion of proposed tax. The defence put forth by the Appellant was that the seized amount was an earning of the assessment year 2016-2017 and not of assessment year 2017-2018 for which settlement has been arrived at as per the order of the Settlement Commission. The said defence did not find favour on the pretext that it can be taken by the Appellant during trial. It was also observed that the complaint was filed prior and the application before the Settlement Commission was subsequent. Therefore, the stand of the Appellant indicating that the seized amount was income of the assessment year 2016-2017 may also be looked into during trial. The question of competence of DDIT to initiate the prosecution against the Appellant under Section 279(1) of the IT Act also did not turn in favour of the Appellant in the order impugned.

On the basis of the submissions as advanced by the parties, the Supreme Court was of the view that on the facts, the following questions fell for consideration:

i) Whether continuation of the prosecution initiated by the revenue Under Section 276C(1) against the Appellant after passing an order by the Settlement Commission, would amount to abuse of process of Court?

ii) Whether in the facts of the present case, the High Court was justified to dismiss the quashing petition filed by the Appellant, and if not, what relief can be granted?

The Supreme Court noted that Section 276C deals with two situations. Sub-section (1) pertains to a wilful attempt to evade tax, penalty, or interest that is ‘chargeable’, ‘imposable’, or related to ‘under-reporting of income’. In contrast, sub-section (2) addresses the wilful attempt to evade the ‘payment’ of any tax, penalty, or interest under the Act. Therefore, both sub-sections operate in separate spheres and different stages. The fundamental distinction between the applicability of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) lies to the stage at which the offence allegedly occurs. Section 276C(1) is primarily intended to deter and penalize wilful and deliberate attempts by an Assessee for evasion of taxes, penalties and interest prior to their imposition or charging. The provision applies where there is a conscious and intentional effort to evade tax liability, distinguishing such conduct from bona-fide errors or differences in interpretation. The gist of the offence under Sub-section (1) of Section 276C lies in the wilful attempt to evade the very imposition of liability, and what is made punishable under this Sub-section is not the ‘actual evasion’ but the ‘wilful attempt’ to evade as described in the proviso to Section 276C.

The Supreme Court observed that for the allegations as alleged against Appellant, prosecution under section 279(1) was initiated by Respondent-DDIT in accordance with sanction given by PDIT. The Appellant also challenged the jurisdiction of the DDIT before the High Court, contending that she was not competent to initiate prosecution under section 279(1) of the IT Act.

On consideration of the provisions of section 279, the Supreme Court observed that, in addition to the other offences, looking to the allegations of the present case, the prosecution under section 276C may be lodged with permission of the PDIT. Sub-section (1)(a) creates a bar that the person shall not be proceeded under section 276C in relation to the assessment for the assessment year, of which penalty imposed or imposable on him, has been reduced or waived.

The Supreme Court further observed that the IT Act envisages a robust settlement mechanism under Chapter XIXA, which is titled ‘Settlement of Cases’. It was inserted by means of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 (41 of 1975) w.e.f. 01.04.1976. The said amendment was brought pursuant to the recommendations of the ‘Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee’, popularly known as the ‘Wanchoo Committee’, report of December, 1971. ‘Chapter 2’ of the said report, titled ‘Black Money and Tax Evasion’.

In furtherance to recommendations of the Wanchoo Committee, an amendment was brought adding Section 245H, specifying the power of the Settlement Commission to grant immunity from prosecution and penalty.

According to the Supreme Court, on bare reading of the recommendations of the Wanchoo Committee, it was clear that the Assessee from whom the recovery of the unaccounted money has been allegedly reported, may apply before the Settlement Commission disclosing full and true income and the manner in which such income was derived. On such application, the Commission as it thinks fit, may grant immunity from penalty and prosecution of any offence under the IT Act or under the Indian Penal Code or under any other Central Act on such terms and conditions with respect to the subject matter covered under the settlement. The proviso to section 245H(1) is, however, an exception from granting immunity in case where the complaint has been lodged before the date of receipt of application for settlement. At the same time, the prosecution in either situation of section 276C(1) ought to be for wilful attempt to evade or pay tax. On literal construction of the first proviso, the prosecution initiated before the date of receipt of the application under section 245C is saved, and the second proviso restrict the Settlement Commission to grant immunity from the prosecution as specified therein.

According to the Supreme Court, the aforesaid provisions do not, in any manner, affect the basic principles of criminal law that the prosecution has to prove the case on its own. In the facts, for an offence under section 276C(1), for which a prosecution was lodged, wilful attempt to evade tax or penalty, which may be imposable or chargeable, mens rea of the Assessee is required to be proved. In absence, lodging such prosecution would result into futility.

Therefore, the ancillary question which arises is about the efficacy of the continuation of the complaint lodged, even though saved under the first proviso to Section 245H, hampering the power of the Settlement Commission to grant immunity from prosecution.

The Supreme Court, perusing the backdrop, from the recommendations of Wanchoo Committee till the date amendment was brought introducing Section 245H in the IT Act granting power of immunity to Settlement Commission, noted that the Revenue was facing the challenge of minimal prosecution and also for effectively proving the prosecution, what recourse ought to be taken was an issue before them. Simultaneously, the Assessee who in bona-fide manner had disclosed the excess earning specifying the source without any suppression, were facing unnecessary prosecution. Therefore, to streamline the said situation the revenue has issued guidelines time and again. In the guidelines, it was specified that when an Assessee is making an attempt to evade tax or its payment or penalty, if established, it is incumbent on the officers of the revenue to lodge the prosecution. In this regard, circular dated 24.04.2008 was published. Clause 3.3.1 (iii) of the said circular deals with the offences under section 276C(1) of IT Act. The relevant Clause of the said circular is reproduced as under:

“(iii) Offences Under Section 276C(1): Wilful attempt to evade taxes

All cases where penalty under Section 271(1)(C) exceeding ₹50,000/- is imposed and confirmed by the ITAT (if any second appeal has been filed) shall be processed for filing prosecution complaint.

The case for prosecution under this Section shall be processed by the A.O. preferably within 60 days of receipt of the ITAT’s order, if any.

The intent of the above scheme is indicative of the fact that the Department shall proceed to file prosecution/complaint only in those cases wherein penalty exceeding ₹50,000/- has been imposed by ITAT, within 60 days from the date of order of ITAT.”

The Supreme Court noted that the said guideline was based on a judgment of ‘M/s. K.C. Builders Ltd. vs. CIT (2004) 2 SCC 731, wherein the Supreme Court laid down that if penalty for concealment fails, the initiation of the prosecution on the basis of the same material also fails. Therefore, it was advised that after confirmation of concealment of penalty by ITAT, the prosecution may be lodged in terms as specified in the above circular dated 24.04.2008.

Similarly, on 09.09.2019, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (in short “CBDT”) in exercise of power under Section 119 of IT Act issued clarification qua the criteria to be followed for launching prosecution in respect of certain categories of offence under the IT Act, including Section 276C(1). The relevant portion is referred as under-

“iii. Offences Under Section 276C(1): Wilful attempt to evade tax, etc.

Cases where the amount sought to be evaded or tax on under-reported income is ₹25 Lakhs or below, shall not be processed for prosecution except with the previous administrative approval of the Collegium of two CCIT / DGIT rank officers as mentioned in Para 3.

Further, prosecution under this Section shall be launched only after the confirmation of the order imposing penalty by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.”

The Supreme Court noted that the departmental circular dated 24.04.2008, Prosecution Manual, 2009, and CBDT’s circular dated 09.09.2019, provide when the prosecution ought to be lodged by Revenue. The said Circulars have been issued to regulate the lodging of prosecution in genuine cases and to weed out the problems of the tax payers, and also to understand when can the prosecution for Section 276 ought to be lodged and continued. The said circular and clarification have been brought after the statutory scheme of Section 245H(1) and the appended proviso.

The Supreme Court noting the precedents, observed that the Supreme Court has unambiguously held that that the circulars issued by the Revenue are binding on the authorities, and can tone down the rigour of the statutory provision. Therefore, it could be concluded that the circulars as discussed above are binding on the authorities who are administering the provisions of the IT Act.

The Supreme Court, after perusal of the provisions of the IT Act, various circulars issued by the department and also the judgments referred hereinabove, held that if an Assessee has made suppression of income without disclosing the manner in which the excess amount was earned and concealed the account making wilful attempt to evade the tax which may be imposable and chargeable or payable, he/she is required to be prosecuted. Therefore, the recourse to lodge prosecution was made permissible subject to the department’s circular dated 24.04.2008 which provided for confirmation by ITAT in case the penalty imposed under Section 276C(1) is exceeding ₹50,000/-. The Supreme Court noted that the said circular was in vogue on the date of the grant of sanction by PDIT to DDIT for lodging the prosecution against the Appellant. The said circular has been reaffirmed by the Prosecution Manual, 2009 and the clarification issued by the CBDT in 2019. As such, the circulars discussed above, were binding on the authorities and required to be adhered to while lodging the prosecution by the Revenue.

Admittedly, in the present case, the complaint was filed by DDIT after sanction of PDIT before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.II), Egmore, Chennai, on 11.08.2018. Application under section 245(C) was filed by the Appellant before the Settlement Commission later. On the date of lodging the prosecution, the finding of concealment of income or imposition of the penalty of more than ₹50,000/- has not been recorded by the ITAT. Nothing had been brought on record to show that any wilful attempt to evade the payment of tax by Assessee was made. No explanation had been put forth by Revenue to demonstrate as to why PDIT or DDIT did not comply the procedure while lodging prosecution in this case. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the act of the authority in continuing prosecution was in blatant disregard to their own binding circular dated 24.04.2008 and in defiance to the guidelines of the Department.

In contradistinction, the Settlement Commission passed an order under section 245D(4) on 26.11.2019. The said order is relevant, therefore, reproduced as thus:

“XX XX XX XX

PRAYER:

Immunity from penalty and prosecution

6.1 The applicant has prayed for grant of immunity from levy of penalty and prosecution. It could be seen that proceedings Under Section 276C(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 are pending before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras. In the circumstances, the applicant cannot be granted immunity waiver from prosecution, for the assessment years which are settled in this order.

6.2 However, the applicant has co-operated during the settlement proceedings. The applicant has disclosed all the facts, material to the computation of his additional income. Thus, the applicant has fully satisfied the provisions of Section 245H. The overall additional income is not on account of any suppression of any material facts in the application. The additional income offered does not disclose any variance from the manner in which the additional income had been earned. Hence, the applicant is entitled to immunity from penalties under the Income-tax Act for the assessment years which are settled in this order.

6.3 Immunity granted to the applicant by this order may be withdrawn, if he fails to pay including interest within the time and the manner as specified in this order or fails to comply with other conditions, if any, subject to which the immunity is granted and, thereupon, the provisions of the Income-tax Act shall apply as if such immunity had not been granted.

6.4 Immunity granted to the applicant, may at any time be withdrawn, if the Commission is satisfied that the applicant had, in the course of settlement proceedings, concealed any particulars, material to the settlement or had given false evidence and, thereupon, the applicant may be tried for the offence with respect to which the immunity was granted or for any other offence of which the applicant appear to have been guilty in connection with the settlement, and the applicant shall become liable to the imposition of any penalty and/or prosecution under the Act, to which the applicant would have been liable had not such immunity been granted.

7. The order shall be void Under Section 245D(6) if it is subsequently found that it has been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation of facts.

XX XX XX XX”

According to the Supreme Court, perusal of the said order made it clear that in the settlement proceedings, Assessee had disclosed all the facts material to the computation of his additional income and fully satisfied the provisions of Section 245H. The Commission recorded a finding that overall additional income is not on account of any suppression of any material facts and it does not disclose any variance from the manner in which the said income had been earned. As such the immunity from penalty under IT Act was granted in exercise of powers under Section 245H. From perusal of Section 245-I, it was clear that every order of settlement shall be conclusive as to the matters stated therein and no matter covered by such order shall, save as otherwise provided, be reopened in any proceeding under the Act or under any other law for the time being in force.

In view of the foregoing discussions, in conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution lodged with the help of proviso to Sub-section (1) to Section 245H was in defiance to the circular dated 24.04.2008, which was in vogue. It was the duty of the PDIT and DDIT to look into the facts that in absence of any findings of imposition of penalty due to concealment of fact, the said prosecution could not be proved against the Assessee. It seems, even after passing the order by the Settlement Commission on 26.11.2019 which was brought to the notice of the High Court, the authorities were persistent to pursue the prosecution without looking into the procedural lapses on their part. Such an act could not be construed in right perspective and the Revenue have acted in blatant disregard to binding statutory instructions. Such willful non-compliance of their own directives reflected a serious lapse, and undermined the principles of fairness, consistency, and accountability, which in any manner cannot be treated to be justified or lawful.

The Supreme Court reiterated that, in terms of Section 245-I, the findings of the Settlement Commission were conclusive with respect to the matters stated therein. Once such an order was passed, it was incumbent upon the authorities to inform the High Court that continuation of the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law, in particular when the Settlement Commission did not record any finding of wilful evasion of tax by the Appellant. Even otherwise, it was the duty of the High Court to examine the facts of the case in their right context and assess whether, in light of the above circumstances, the continuation of the prosecution would serve any meaningful purpose in establishing the alleged guilt. Upon a holistic consideration of the matter, the Supreme Court was of the view that the conduct of the authorities lacked fairness and reasonableness, and the High Court’s approach appeared to be entirely misdirected, having failed to appreciate the factual and legal position in right earnest.

In view of the foregoing discussions, the Supreme Court was constrained to allow these appeals setting aside the order impugned passed by the High Court. It was directed that prosecution lodged by the Revenue against the Appellant shall stand quashed. In the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed hereinabove, the Supreme Court imposed costs against the Revenue which was quantified at ₹2,00,000/- payable to the Appellant.

Letter To The Editor

Dear Sunil

Your editorial aptly covers Key Issues in GST (viz High Pitched Demands / Accountability on Dept officers / Dispute Resolution). If you recollect, these issues were discussed during interactions with TARC & were covered in Report. Unfortunately Detailed Report has been ignored by the Govt.

Unless these issues (alongwith actions of Severe Coercive actions) are addressed, there can be no Tax Reform in the real sense.

Warm Regards

Bakul B. Mody

From The President

My Dear BCAS Family,

The notification of Income Tax Act, 2025 following the assent by the Hon’ble President of India on 21st August, 2025 marks a watershed moment in the legislative history of the country in general and specifically for professionals like us. The Act will apply from 1st April, 2026 and will replace the more than 60 year old Income Tax Act,1961. Also, at the time of writing, the first of the many compliance deadlines related to the filing of the individual tax returns within the extended timelines of 16th September, 2025 has ended but there are still a series of never ending deadlines primarily on tax, audit and charity commissioner related matters over the next couple of months which will result in continuous compliance obligations for the concerned professionals. Finally, if that were not enough, the regular slew of filing deadlines on a periodical basis all year round makes us compliance mechanics or robots! This has tempted me to share my thoughts on the theme of compliance and its changing dynamics and its role for professionals and institutions like us.

The word compliance evokes thoughts about statutes, rules, deadlines, filings, and inspections. Whilst prima facie it appears as a “checklist-driven” obligation and an unavoidable cost of doing business in a regulated environment, it is far more than just adherence to law; it is the foundation of trust and governance on which sustainable businesses and institutions are built.

Changing Landscape of Compliance and Role of Professionals:

Compliance has evolved dramatically in the past few decades and has kept pace with the maturing and global integration of our economy on its journey towards becoming the world’s third largest economy in the next couple of years as projected by several experts. The compliance landscape has now widened from Corporate, Tax and Labour laws to a vast ecosystem encompassing accounting standards, securities regulations, environmental norms, data privacy and cyber security and social responsibility related legislations, amongst others. In today’s interconnected world, compliance is no longer limited to the “letter of the law” but extends to the “spirit of the law” and includes meeting the expectations of multiple stakeholders like shareholders, regulators, customers, employees, and the society at large.

The changing landscape of compliance primarily rests on the following pillars:

Tone at the Top – The corporate and industrial landscape is dominated by promoter and family driven enterprises which contribute to approximately 75% of India’s GDP. Consequently, compliance is primarily driven by the cultural mindset or the tone at the top and permeates to every level of an organization from the boardroom to the shop floor. When directors, both promoters and independent, and senior management demonstrate commitment to ethical practices, the message percolates across the organisation. There is now a greater shift towards separation of ownership from management by hiring outside professionals which has a positive impact on the compliance culture, though the undercurrents of promoter interference could occasionally surface.

On the flipside, the cost of non-compliance is not just financial in terms of fines and penalties but also erodes credibility, damages reputation and in extreme cases, can destroy institutions. History is replete with several recent examples where lapses in compliance, whether in financial reporting or corporate governance have led to catastrophic consequences for businesses, employees and investors.

Governance, Ethics and Risk Management – Companies which embrace compliance not as a burden but as a pillar of governance command better market value and earn greater trust since investors allocate more capital and employees and other stakeholders are more attracted to such companies. This can be achieved through various tools like robust internal controls, well-documented risk management frameworks and a transparent whistle-blower policy. These are not just “tick-box” measures but enable good governance in spirit.

Sustainability – Stakeholders are now benchmarking entities not only based on their financial performance but also on their impact on the environment and rewarding those companies which have a positive and sustainable impact thereon. This is enforced through legislative measures like ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) and Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting (BRSR) disclosures, Green Financing guidelines issued by the RBI and also several international frameworks like GRI reporting, Task Force on Climate Reporting Disclosures (TCFD), amongst others.

Technology and AI – The increasing complexity of regulatory frameworks and huge amount of data has made manual compliance nearly impossible. Technology is now a powerful ally in ensuring real-time monitoring, automation of filings and predictive risk analytics. From AI-driven audit tools to blockchain-enabled transparency, the compliance ecosystem is being reshaped by innovation.

The flip side is that we should not become slaves of technology whilst enforcing compliance but use it as a constructive enabler. The recent reports of non-existent case laws cited in a judgement by a trial court in Karnataka, using Chat GPT, which was challenged by the petitioner and the defendant as not having being referred to by them represents the AI Hallucinations phenomenon which produce responses that are fabricated, but seem logical on the surface, need to be guarded against. The bottom line is that technology is not a substitute for human judgement.

For Chartered Accountants, the changing landscape on compliance has widened their responsibilities. They are no longer just custodians of financial compliance; but are interpreters of governance and ambassadors of ethical business conduct. They are uniquely placed to bridge the gap between compliance as a statutory requirement and compliance as a governance enabler, by interpreting complex laws, designing control frameworks and guiding boards on ethical choices. In doing so, they help institutions transition from being reactive rule-followers to proactive value-creators.

BCAS as a Facilitator of Compliance:

Though BCAS is a voluntary autonomous body, it is a shining example of how voluntary compliance builds institutions of trust. Over its seven decades long journey it has earned the respect and confidence of its members and the larger community by being perceived as a conscience keeper of the profession through the programmes it conducts, publications and advocacy and social initiatives thereby moving towards the future where trust and transparency are non-negotiable.

Fostering Innovation through Trust:

I would like to conclude by quoting the author Stephen M.R. Covey who in the course of an interview emphasised the importance of trust in fostering innovation. Compliance by creating an environment of trust resonates with this principle – a principle that also defines the ethos of BCAS, where trust is non-negotiable!

“Compliance does not foster innovation, trust does. You can’t sustain long-term innovation, for example, in a climate of distrust”.

A big thank you to one and all!

Warm Regards,

 

CA Zubin F. Billimoria

President

From Published Accounts

COMPILER’S NOTE

Given below are relevant extracts from the financial statements and related disclosures for a company wherein auditors issued a qualified opinion in a situation when during the course of inventory verification huge discrepancies were noticed and investigation ordered thereon. In terms of Ind AS 8, a restatement of the financial statements was also carried out.

RAMKRISHNA FORGINGS LTD (YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH 2025)

FROM NOTES TO STANDALONE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS:

Note 26: Cost of materials consumed

For the year ended March 31, 2025

(in ` Lakhs)

For the year ended March 31, 2024 (Restated) (Refer note 47 & 52)  (in ` Lakhs)

 

Inventories at the beginning of the year (Refer note 14 & 47) 19,293.37 17,549.76
Additions pursuant to Amalgamation (Refer note 52) – 96.16
Add: Purchases 1,97,777.21 1,81,903.20
2,17,070.58 1,99,549.12
Less: Inventories as at end of the year (Refer note 14 & 47) 23,676.07 19,293.37
Cost of Materials Consumed 1,93,394.51 1,80,255.75
Inventories at the beginning of the year (Refer note 14 & 47) 19,293.37 17,549.76

Note 14: Inventories

As at March 31, 2025 (in ` Lakhs) As at March 31, 2024 (Restated) (Refer note 47 & 52) (in ` Lakhs)
(Valued at lower of cost or estimated net realisable value)
Raw Materials # 23,676.07 19,293.37
Work in Progress 29,410.79 39,875.79
Finished Goods # 30,341.35 13,723.58
Stores & spares (including packing material) # 23,378.59 21,174.89
Forgings Scrap 2,045.54 2,369.51
Less: Provision for Slow Moving Inventories (342.23) (462.23)
Total 1,08,510.11 95,974.91

# Includes goods-in-transit

a) Finished Goods ₹ 19,334.42 lakhs (March 31, 2024: ₹ 5,001.40 lakhs);

b) Raw Materials ₹ 199.84 lakhs (March 31, 2024: ₹ 192.03 lakhs);

c) Stores and Spares ₹ 195.89 lakhs (March 31, 2024: ₹ 94.65 lakhs)

Note 27: Increase in inventories of finished goods, work in progress and scrap

For the year ended March 31, 2025 (in ` Lakhs) For the year ended March 31, 2024 (Restated) 

(Refer note 47 & 52)

(in ` Lakhs)

Inventory at the beginning of the year (Refer note 14 & 47)
Work-in-progress 39,875.79 39,456.92
Forgings scrap 2,369.51 3,600.15
Finished goods 13,723.58 10,356.06
55,968.88 53,413.13
Inventory at the end of the year (Refer note 14 & 47)
Work-in-progress 29,410.79 39,875.79
Forgings scrap 2,045.54 2,369.51
Finished goods 30,341.35 13,723.58
61,797.68 55,968.88
Inventory loss capitalised on trial run during the year -1,557.07 -752.35
Additions pursuant to Amalgamation (Refer note 52) – 580.64
-7,385.87 -2,727.46

Note 47:

The Company carries out physical verification of inventory once in a year at the time of preparing annual financial statements. During the annual physical verification for the Financial Year ended March 31, 2025, it was noted that Work-In-Progress (WIP) book stock was higher than the physical stock in certain cases. At the request of the statutory auditors, the management of the Company convened an Audit Committee who appointed Independent External Agencies to initiate a joint fact-finding study for ascertaining the discrepancy in Inventory and reasons thereof. The Interim Joint Fact-Finding Report of the Independent External Agencies confirmed that certain erroneous entries/non- recording of rejections at plant resulted in overstatement of WIP / raw material / scrap inventory in the Financial Year ended  March 31, 2025 and previous Financial Year ended March 31, 2024 by ₹22,052.43 lakhs and ₹5,022.26 lakhs respectively. The independent external agencies are still in the process of completing their joint fact finding as regards the root cause analysis of the above and final report will be submitted by them within the statutory timelines under the Companies Act, 2013. This matter has been commented upon by the Statutory Auditors in their audit report. The management does not expect any further significant accounting impact on the books of accounts arising out of the balance part of joint fact-finding being carried out by the independent external agencies.

The Company has recorded the impact of the discrepancy in the physical verification in its books of accounts for the year ended March 31, 2025 and restated previous financial year comparative as per Ind AS 8 – Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors as follows:

Reported as at and for the year ended March 31, 2024

(in ` Lakhs)

Restated as at and for the year ended March 31, 2024*

(in ` Lakhs)

Cost of materials consumed 1,78,737.74 1,79,564.42
(Increase)/Decrease in inventories of finished goods, work in progress and scrap -7,066.03 -2,870.46
Profit Before Tax (PBT) 43,653.35 38,631.10
Profit After Tax (PAT) 32,606.93 27,584.68
Inventories as at March 31, 2024 1,00,350.75 95,328.50
Total Equity as at March 31, 2024 2,67,256.19 2,62,233.94

* without considering the impact of restatement due to merger of ACIL with the Company.

The Company is in the process of strengthening its systems & internal control including enhancing the frequency, scope and coverage of physical verification and scope of the Internal Audit.

FROM INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT

Basis for Qualified Opinion

As more fully disclosed in Note 47 to the accompanying standalone financial statements, during our observation of the physical verification, based on testing of sample of work-in-progress inventory with the book records, we noted that book stock was higher as compared to the physical stock and we requested management to initiate an independent investigation. The external agencies’ Interim Joint Fact-Finding Report highlights shortages in work in progress / raw material / scrap inventory quantities as at March 31, 2025 and as at March 31, 2024 which have been valued by the management at ₹22,052.43 lakhs and ₹5,022.26 lakhs respectively. The standalone financial statements for the year ended March 31, 2025 has been adjusted for the above including by way of restatement of the comparative figures for the year ended

March 31, 2024 as disclosed in the aforesaid note. Pending completion of the independent investigation, we are unable to comment on further consequential impact, if any, on the standalone financial statements.

FROM CARO REPORT

(ii) (a) The inventory has been physically verified by the management during the year except for inventories lying with third parties. In our opinion, the frequency of verification by the management and the coverage and procedure for such verification is not appropriate. Inventories lying with third parties have been confirmed by them as at March 31, 2025 and discrepancies were not noticed in respect of such confirmations. As more fully disclosed in Note 47 to the standalone financial statements, discrepancies of 10% or more in aggregate for Work In Progress and Forgings Scrap were noted on such physical verification which have been properly dealt with in the books of accounts. Discrepancy of 10% or more for other class of inventory were not noticed on such physical verification.

(xi) (a) In view of the reasons stated in the Basis of Qualified Opinion paragraph and more fully disclosed in Note 47 to the standalone financial statements, pending completion of the independent investigation, we are unable to comment as to whether there is any fraud by the Company or on the Company noticed or reported during the year.

(xiv) (a) The Company does not have an adequate internal audit system which commensurate with the size and nature of its business.

FROM REPORT ON ICOFR

Disclaimer of Opinion

We are unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence in respect of internal financial controls of the Company with reference to standalone financial statements, including with respect to the matter described in the Basis for Qualified Opinion paragraph of our auditor’s report on the standalone financial statements, to determine if the Company’s internal financial controls were operating effectively as at March 31, 2025. Accordingly, we do not express an opinion on Internal Financial Controls with reference to these standalone financial statements.

Explanatory paragraph

We also have audited, in accordance with the Standards on Auditing issued by ICAI, as specified under Section 143(10) of the Act, the standalone financial statements of Ramkrishna Forgings Limited, which comprise the Balance Sheet as at March 31, 2025, and the related Statement of Profit and Loss, including the statement of Other Comprehensive Income, the Cash Flow Statement and the Statement of Changes in Equity for the year then ended, and notes to the standalone financial statements, including a summary of material accounting policies and other explanatory information. We have considered the disclaimer of opinion reported above in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit tests applied in our audit of the March 31, 2025 financial statements of Ramkrishna Forgings Limited and this report affects our report dated May 31, 2025 which expressed a qualified opinion on those standalone financial statements.

FROM DIRECTORS’ REPORT

j) Disclosure

The Auditors noted that during the course of the ongoing physical verification of inventories (being conducted by the management and observed by the Firm), it was discovered that there is a discrepancy in Inventory and requested to appoint an independent external agency for further fact-finding into the recording of production / WIP quantity of inventories and subsequent movement thereof for the period from 1 April, 2024 to 31 March, 2025. They further requested to provide to the Statutory Auditors as per the timelines mentioned in Section 143(12) of the Companies Act, 2013 and rules prescribed thereunder the report of the independent external agency. Based on review of the final report of the Independent External Agency when received, the Audit Committee and the Board shall provide reply/observation to the Auditor within the timelines prescribed under the applicable law.

GENERAL

The Company has not revised any of its financial statements or reports except for the financial statement pertaining to the Financial Year 31st March, 2024 on account of finding of the Interim Joint Fact-Finding Report of the Independent External Agencies on account of discrepancy in the inventory and merger of ACIL Limited & Wholly-owned Subsidiary with the Company w.e.f 19th February 2024.

Working Papers

Arjun is in his office. Shrikrishna enters the office.

Arjun: (excited, stands up and welcomes him)  Ohh! Oh! Bhagwan, welcome, welcome. What a pleasant surprise!

Shrikrishna : How are you, Parth?

Arjun: With your blessings, Bhagwan, I am fine. Slogging as usual!

Shrikrishna : Is ITR pressure over?

Arjun: Lord, it was a nightmare! On the last day, I uploaded 80 returns!

Shrikrishna: Why do you keep it pending? Why don’t you keep on uploading as and when ready.

Arjun: That’s a dream of all CAs! But last 30 years, the same thing continues.

Shrikrishna: Don’t tell me all excuses – Clients don’t give data, staff are on leave, festivals in between and so on. Even after a liberal extension of time, you can’t manage it?

Arjun: Lord, we have no answer to this question.  Hum Aadat se majboor hain. (we  are the slaves of our habits).

Shrikrishna: What you lack is will-power and proactiveness. Anyway, I was passing by and saw the light in your office. So late in the night?

Arjun: Thank you, Lord. But tell me, what would you prefer? Tea or coffee?

Shrikrishna: Arjun, you know very well that right from my childhood, I have taken only milk! Anyway, why are you working so late?

Arjun: Now the next compliance! Audit. And, there is one Income tax query as to how a particular figure was arrived at 2 years before.

Shrikrishna : You don’t have that working?

Arjun: Bhagwan, our work is nothing but firefighting. Once we sign the statements and upload the returns, everything is gone! It goes out of our memory also. We get busy with the next deadline.

Shrikrishna: But you have to maintain your working papers.

Arjun: Yes, that is in the standards and in the textbooks. In reality, firms of our size never maintain working papers properly.

Shrikrishna : Why? No space?

Arjun: Space may be there, but nobody has time!

Shrikrishna: That’s very dangerous. Work should not only be done, but it should be seen that it is done. Work without documents is no work done at all!

Arjun: I agree with you. But we finish the audit and compliance at the 11th hour. From where the figures are derived, God alone knows. Many times, we make last-minute adjustments, and later, we forget those. Many entries are made in our Minds only!

Shrikrishna : But why adjustments?

Arjun: We need to perform a lot of acrobatics to reconcile everything with each other – Tax, GST, requirements of bankers.

Shrikrishna: And what about your Accounting principles and standards?

Arjun: That is incidental.  I know, it is not proper, but we are helpless.

Shrikrishna: But you need to do it in time, and seal your working papers in the system within 60 days after signing every audit.

Arjun: All that applies to big firms and large corporates.

Shrikrishna: Arjun, don’t take it so lightly. Working papers are a must.

Arjun: We take bank reco, cash and bank certificate, stock certificate and something in MRL!

Shrikrishna: Oh! Arjun, you may invite trouble. You need to maintain so many things.

Arjun : Like what?

Shrikrishna: Your correspondence with the client, your queries, their replies, noting of how you dealt with the queries, important contracts, bank loan sanction letters and other financial institutions. Most important –Third-party evidence, evidence that you tried to get, also, explanation of contingent liabilities.

Arjun: I attended a lecture about it, now I recollect it, as you are saying.

Shrikrishna: Actually, your Institute has issued very good guidelines on the working papers and documentation. The principle is very simple: whatever you do, document it immediately; and you do only what is documented. You have to issue an engagement letter as well.

Arjun: All that is easy to say but very difficult to implement.

Shrikrishna: One reason is that you are not upgraded and disciplined. So you cannot train others. Working papers are to be prepared by your staff and the articles that are involved in the concerned assignment. But for that, you need to train them properly.

Arjun: What you say is right. Now I remember, all my friends who have faced disciplinary proceedings had the same difficulty. No documentary evidence. Everything is done in good faith!

Shrikrishna: Remember, faintest of ink is stronger than the strongest of memories!

Arjun: But Bhagwan, most of our mid-size firms are focused on tax, advisory services.They don’t realise the importance of documentation.

Shrikrishna: That’s another misconception. It is not the case that documentation is required only for audit practice. It is equally essential for advisory services.

Your appointment letter, scope of work, client’s query in writing, your counter questions, data supplied by the client, study of the query, supporting case law, your thought process in replying to the query, your opinion and so on. If there are any debatable issues or risks, you should communicate them in writing. Otherwise, if anything goes wrong, the blame falls on you! Client will plead ignorant and say that he depended on you entirely.

Arjun: Yes, yes. I remember, in many cases, clients argued in tax proceedings that , their CA did everything.

Shrikrishna: Even for internal audit or assignments like accounts supervision, one should maintain notes of what one has done. Otherwise, the client feels that everything was proper in his office, and your services are redundant! Actually, you might have ensured that the wrong things are set right, but unfortunately, you cannot show what work you did!

Arjun: Bhagwan, in our Peer Review, all these things are seen and that is good for us;

Shrikrishna: In fact, the Peer Review booklet of your Institute can be a good guide as to what record you should maintain and how. There is a complete checklist.

Wake up, Arjun. There are difficult days ahead! Haven’t you read the orders of NFRA? They are in the public domain.

Arjun: Lord, as always, you have opened my eyes. This time, I will at least make a beginning. Our old habits die hard. Everything is not possible overnight!

Shrikrishna: I understand that. But please don’t try to justify your lacunae!

Arjun: Yes, Lord.

OM SHANTI.

(This dialogue is based on the importance of maintaining working papers and other documents. Members should try to implement these practices immediately since they will be signing the audit/tax audits now.)

A Partial Reform: Income Tax Act, 1961 2025

The enactment of the Income Tax Act, 2025, replacing the 1961 law, was expected to be a turning point in India’s economic history. After decades of functioning under a law designed for a socialist economy of the 1960s, taxpayers, investors and professionals anticipated a modern, simplified, and growth-oriented framework. Instead, what emerged is a repackaging of the old law with linguistic modernisation. The essence remains unchanged—an example of “old wine in a new bottle”, may be with some fizz. More troubling is the continuation of contradictory policy-making, where incentives are offered with one hand and clawed back with the other. This perpetuates uncertainty, fosters litigation, and erodes confidence in the stability of India’s tax regime.

CONFUSION IN POLICY MAKING

The core issue lies not in drafting style but in the confused approach of Indian tax policy. For decades, the government has introduced exemptions, deductions, and incentives, only to dilute or withdraw them through counter-provisions. This cycle undermines the very objective of incentives. Unfortunately, the 2025 Act has done little to change this mindset, merely replicating contradictions under a new facade.

CORPORATE EXEMPTIONS VS. MAT

A prominent example of contradiction is the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT). Companies have historically enjoyed various incentives, such as accelerated depreciation, SEZ benefits, and R&D deductions. Yet MAT ensures that even after availing these, companies must pay tax on book profits, with eventual credit available only after long delays. The 2025 Act retains this framework, leaving businesses uncertain whether to plan around incentives or assume MAT will negate them. The coexistence of MAT and corporate incentives symbolises the persistence of policy confusion.

INDIVIDUAL EXEMPTIONS VS. NEW TAX REGIME

For individuals, complexity remains. The law retains exemptions and deductions like HRA, LTA, 80C, health insurance, and housing interest—marketed as tools for savings and social goals. Simultaneously, it continues to offer a “simplified” concessional regime with lower rates but no exemptions. Taxpayers
must choose between the two annually, creating a duality that fosters arbitrage and uncertainty. If exemptions serve a social purpose, why neutralise them with a new regime? If simplicity is desired, why preserve the old? The contradictory design continues unresolved.

MULTIPLICITY OF CORPORATE TAX REGIMES

The corporate landscape has multiple tax regimes: a standard 30% rate, 22% concessional rate without exemptions, 15% rate for new manufacturing units. Instead of predictability, this multiplicity complicates decision-making. Companies must
assess not just economic feasibility but also how structural choices impact tax regime eligibility. Uniformity—a cornerstone of stable tax systems—is thus absent.

TDS PROVISIONS

Over the period of time, the scope of Tax Deduction at Source (TDS) has expanded excessively. The provisions continue in the new law as well. TDS is often levied at higher rates irrespective of final liability, leading to refund cycles, liquidity crunch, and administrative burden. While projected as a compliance tool, in effect it operates as an interest-free loan to the government, locking taxpayers’ funds unnecessarily.

FACELESS ASSESSMENTS

The government touts faceless assessments as a reform for transparency and reduced harassment. In reality, discretion and subjectivity persist. The system is described as not just faceless but sometimes “heartless” or even “thought-less”, as it lacks sensitivity and application of mind. Thus, the reform is cosmetic rather than substantive.

LITIGATION CONTINUES UNABATED

One of the greatest flaws of the 1961 Act was the massive litigation it spawned. Each Finance Act added ambiguities, creating grounds for disputes. The 2025 Act was expected to break this cycle through clarity, yet it reproduces many of the same ambiguous provisions. Already, new reassessment provisions have triggered over one lakh writs in High Courts, burdening the Supreme Court as well. Though higher thresholds for departmental appeals have provided some relief, excessive drafting complexity and aggressive departmental appeals ensure litigation remains “business as usual”

BROADER IMPLICATIONS

India’s growth story requires tax law that enables aspiration, investment, and integration with global markets. Instead, the 2025 Act replicates the rigidity and contradictions of the past. A trust deficit between taxpayers and authorities continues, with policy uncertainty deterring both domestic and foreign investment. It seems that the reform that was promised—a modern, principle-based, globally aligned framework—has been deferred.

CONCLUSION

The Income Tax Act, 2025 represents continuity rather than change. By retaining contradictions such as MAT vs. incentives, dual regimes for individuals, multiplicity of corporate tax rates, excessive TDS, and ambiguous drafting, it misses the chance to simplify and stabilise the tax system. The result is a law that perpetuates confusion, litigation, and distrust. True reform
would require not just rewriting but a fundamental change in philosophy: replacing complexity with simplicity, contradictions with clarity, and distrust with stability. Until then, Indian taxpayers will continue grappling with an uncertain system under the guise of reform.

Best Regards,

CA Sunil Gabhawalla

Editor

Pre-Deposits

INTRODUCTION:

It is a trite law that the issuance of a show cause notice creates only a contingent liability. The liability is confirmed only after adjudication. Once adjudicated, the authorities can initiate recovery of unpaid adjudicated dues after the lapse of the statutory time prescribed in this regard. However, can the recovery be initiated if the adjudication order is contested in an appeal? This is where the concept of ‘pre-deposit’ is relevant.

MANDATORY PRE-DEPOSIT PROVISIONS UNDER GST

The provisions of mandatory pre-deposit under GST are contained under section 107 (first appeal) and section 112 (second appeal to the Tribunal), both mandating pre-deposit as a condition precedent for filing appeals before the Appellate Authority and the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (GSTAT), respectively. The relevant provisions u/s 107 and 112 are tabulated below for reference:

 Section 107 Section 112
(6) No appeal shall be filed under sub-section (1), unless the appellant has paid—

(a) in full, such part of the amount of tax, interest, fine, fee and penalty arising from the impugned order, as is admitted by him; and

(b) a sum equal to ten per cent of the remaining amount of tax in dispute arising from the said order, [subject to a maximum of [twenty] crore rupees,] in relation to which the appeal has been filed:

(8) No appeal shall be filed under sub-section (1), unless the appellant has paid—

(a) in full, such part of the amount of tax, interest, fine, fee and penalty arising from the impugned order, as is admitted by him, and

(b) a sum equal to [ten per cent.] of the remaining amount of tax in dispute, in addition to the amount paid under sub-section (6) of section 107, arising from the said order, [subject to a maximum of twenty crore rupees] in relation to which the appeal has been filed:

[Provided that in case of any order demanding penalty without involving demand of any tax, no appeal shall be filed against such order unless a sum equal to ten per cent, of the said penalty has been paid by the appellant.] [Provided that in case of any order demanding penalty without involving demand of any tax, no appeal shall be filed against such order unless a sum equal to ten per cent. of the said penalty, in addition to the amount payable under the proviso to sub-section (6) of section 107 has been paid by the appellant.]
(7) Where the appellant has paid the amount under sub-section (6), the recovery proceedings for the balance amount shall be deemed to be stayed. (9) Where the appellant has paid the amount as per sub-section (8), the recovery proceedings for the balance amount shall be deemed to be stayed till the disposal of the appeal.

 

CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF PRE-DEPOSIT PROVISIONS:

The provisions relating to mandatory pre-deposit existed during the pre-GST regime under the central levies (service tax, customs, excise) and state levies (VAT, CST, etc.,). The constitutional validity of the said provisions was challenged before the Courts.

The Hon’ble High Court in Ganesh Yadav vs. UOI [2015 (39) S.T.R. 177 (All.)] upheld the constitutional validity of the pre-deposit provisions and held that the provisions were neither ultra vires, nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It further relied on Government of AP v. P. Laxmi Devi [2008 (4) SCC 720 followed] to conclude that in exceptional cases, writ jurisdiction could be exercised for relaxation from the applicability of the said provisions. A similar view was also followed by the Jharkhand High Court in Satya Nand Jha vs. UOI [2016 SCC Online Jhar 2323], as approved by the Supreme Court in [2017 (349) E.L.T A155 (SC)]. The Supreme Court also dealt with the constitutional validity of similar provisions under the VAT laws in Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Punjab [2019 (29) G.S.T.L. 737 (S.C.)] whereby following its’ own earlier decisions, it held as follows:

  •  The provisions mandating pre-deposit are not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, since they apply to all taxpayers [Anant Mills Co Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat – (1975) 2 SCC 175].
  •  The constitutional validity was to be upheld even in cases where no exception was granted. It further held that the first appellate authority cannot grant relaxation in such cases, as such powers would render the mandatory pre-deposit provision nugatory & meaningless. However, in cases involving arbitrary, exorbitant demands based on extraneous considerations, the taxpayer could exercise a writ remedy under Article 226 in view of Maneka Gandhi vs. UOI [(1978) 1 SCC 248], which held that arbitrariness violates Article 14 [P. Laxmi Devi – (2008) 4 SCC 720]. In fact, even the Tribunal did not have the powers to grant such an exception, as held in G.D. Goenka World Institute vs. Union of India [2018-VIL-513-P&H-CE]. It was held that the Tribunal, being a creature of statute, is bound by the provisions of Section 35F (as amended), which “gives no flexibility waiving off the pre-condition of a deposit,” and thus, “there would be no escape from pre-deposit as the Tribunal lacks the power to entertain the appeal without it”.

APPLICABILITY OF PROVISIONS: TO BE DECIDED BASED ON THE PERIOD OF DISPUTE OR THE DATE OF FILING THE APPEAL?

In Ganesh Yadav’s case, the High Court further held that the provisions applicable on the date of filing the appeal would be relevant for the applicability of pre-deposit provisions, and not the provisions applicable for the period of underlying dispute. For instance, if a demand for the period up to March 2014 is confirmed on 31st May, 2014 and the appeal is filed on

15th August 2014, the amended provisions would apply to such appeal, i.e., while filing the appeal, the mandatory pre-deposit provisions would apply.

However, the Kerala High Court in Muthoot Finance Ltd. vs. UOI [2015 (38) S.T.R. 1133 (Ker.)] (though dissented by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Nimbus Communications vs. CST, Mumbai [2016 (44) S.T.R. 578 (Bom.]) took a contrary view that the mandatory pre-deposit provisions would not apply when the lis in question commenced before 06.08.2014 and the taxpayer would have an effective alternate remedy of filing an appeal to the CESTAT without mandatory pre-deposit.

SCOPE OF PRE-DEPOSIT PROVISIONS

The pre-deposit provisions under sections 112 (6) / 112 (8) require the payment of a specific percentage of the tax in dispute. However, the demand that emanates from an Order under sections 73 or 74 can be due to non-payment or short payment of tax (on outward or inward supplies), or the wrongful availing or utilization of input tax credit, or the erroneous sanctioning of a refund. In other words, there are three categories of demand, i.e., (a) non-payment/short payment of tax, (b) wrong availment / utilisation of input tax credit, or (c) erroneous refund.

The question that arises is whether a demand of input tax credit, or erroneous refund, can also qualify as a demand of tax, especially when the verbiage of sections 73/74 uses different terminologies.

It may be contended that situations governed by illustrations (b) & (c) above cannot constitute tax in dispute, since input tax credit, as well as erroneous refund cannot be treated at par with tax. This view finds support from the prosecution provisions u/s 132 of the CGST Act, 2017, wherein by an Explanation, it is clarified that the term “tax” shall include the amount of tax evaded or the amount of input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised or refund wrongly taken under the provisions of this Act, the State Goods and Services Tax Act, the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act and cess levied under the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act. It may be noted that the deeming fiction is created only for the purposes of Section 132 and there is no such deeming fiction under sections 107 / 112 to expand the scope of “tax” for the purposes of determination of the pre-deposit. Even when one compares the current provisions with the provisions of Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, it can be noticed that a specific Explanation to Section 35F deemed inter alia, amount of erroneous CENVAT Credit taken to be duty demanded.

It may however be noted that the prevalent ground level view in the matter is to continue the earlier interpretation of deeming input tax credit and erroneous refund as ‘tax in dispute’. The GSTN portal which has automated the process of filing appeals including pre-deposits indeed considers all these three situations as warranting pre-deposit. Therefore, while it may be legally possible to argue that in cases involving demand of input tax credit / erroneous refund, the amounts payable u/s 107 (6)/ 112 (8) shall be nil, the said position will be subject to litigation.

ENTERTAINED VS. FILED

An important change in the pre-deposit provisions under the GST regime as compared to the erstwhile regime is the use of word “filed” instead of “entertained”. While section 35F provided that no appeal shall be entertained, sections 107/112 restrict the filing of an appeal in the absence of compliance with the mandatory pre-deposit provisions. The distinction between “entertained” and “filed” was discussed by the CESTAT in Prakash & Co. vs. Commissioner [(2024) 18 Centax 94 (Tri.-All)] wherein the Tribunal held that there is no bar in filing appeal without the complete mandatory pre-deposit. However, such an appeal could not be entertained without the requisite mandatory pre-deposit. It further held that the word “entertained” could not be equated with “filing”. Similarly, in Trikoot Iron & Steel Casting Ltd. vs. Additional Director General (Adj), DGGSTI (Adj. Cell), New Delhi [(2023) 9 Centax 38 (Tri.-Del)], the Tribunal granted an additional time of one month to comply with the pre-deposit provision, which the Tribunal subsequently extended. However, with the GST Law requiring payment of pre-deposit as a condition for filing, it may no longer be possible to defer the pre-deposit even in genuine cases beyond the date of filing the appeal.

QUANTIFYING PRE-DEPOSIT

The next distinction lies in the quantification of the pre-deposit amount. Under the erstwhile regime, there was no distinction between the disputed tax and admitted tax, i.e., even if only part of the tax demand was disputed, the pre-deposit was to be quantified at the prescribed percentage of the total demand. The CESTAT upheld this view in VKS Projects Ltd. vs. CST, Mumbai [2018 (10) G.S.T.L. 573 (Tri. – Mumbai)]

However, sections 107 & 112 split the demand into admitted and disputed amounts, requiring that the entire admitted demand be pre-deposited before filing the appeal, and the prescribed percentage would apply only to the disputed demand and must be paid before the filing of the appeal. The provisions use the word “has paid” and not “pays”. Therefore, if the taxpayer has already paid an amount that is more than 10% / 20% of the disputed demand before the filing of the appeal (and the same is appropriated against the demand), the requirement of making an additional payment while filing the appeal does not arise.

The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of whether such payments made under protest can be adjusted towards pre-deposit compliance or not in VVF (India) Limited vs. State of Maharashtra [(2023) 4 Centax 421 (S.C.)], in the context of Section 26(6A) of the Maharashtra VAT Act, 2002. It held that a taxing statute must be construed strictly and literally, and if the legislature intended to exclude such protest payments, a specific provision to that effect would have been made. This ruling emphasises that any payment made against the disputed liability, even before the final assessment order, contributes towards the mandatory pre-deposit.

However, it becomes essential to ensure that the payment of tax is intimated to the tax authorities before the adjudication is concluded, along with a request to appropriate such protest payments against the proposed demand. If the protest payments are not taken on record in the adjudication Order, the probability of the appellate authority / tribunal agreeing to treat such payments as protest payments and therefore, consider them towards compliance with the pre-deposit conditions would be unlikely. In such a circumstance, the taxpayer must consider filing an application for rectification of mistake.

At times, the taxpayers face specific administrative challenge. The appeals under GST are filed online. The adjudicating authority is required to issue the online summary of the Order, against which an appeal will be filed online and forms the basis for all future proceedings. However, while preparing the summary Orders, the payments made under protest are reduced from the demand confirmed. Therefore, while filing the online appeal form, the net demand (after appropriation) is reflected, and the demand confirmed does not match the corresponding demand in the detailed Order. In such cases, the taxpayer is unable to disclose the payment made under protest, and therefore, is unable to adjust such payments against the amounts payable under pre-deposit. The taxpayers should apply for rectification of the online summary in such cases, as any deviation in the pre-deposit amount generally results in the appellate authority rejecting the appeal for non-compliance with the pre-deposit provisions.

MANNER OF PAYMENT OF PRE-DEPOSIT

There has been a substantial controversy over how the pre-deposit can be paid. Under the erstwhile regime, the pre-deposit paid, either by GAR-7 challan or by debiting CENVAT account, was considered sufficient compliance with the pre-deposit provisions. The CESTAT, in SRD Nutrients Pvt Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Guwahati [2018-VIL-138-CESTAT-KOL-ST], interpreting Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (an analogous provision), observed that the section does not specifically mandate cash payment for pre-deposit. It held that if CENVAT credit is permissible for the payment of tax, the same can always be debited from the CENVAT account of an assessee. A similar view has been canvassed in the following decisions:

a) Emaar Mfg Land Ltd. vs. Commissioner [(2024) 17 Centax 268 (Tri.-Del)]

b) Kulithalai Municipality Appellant vs. The Commissioner of GST & Central Excise, Trichy [2021-VIL-301-CESTAT-CHE-ST]

c) Exelan Networking Technologies Pvt Ltd vs. Commercial Tax Officer [2020-VIL-76-MAD]

d) Akshay Steel Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India [2014 (304) E.L.T. 518 (Jhar.)]

However, with the advent of GST, the taxpayers faced the following issues:

a) Whether pre-deposit for appeals filed for the disputes under the erstwhile regimes after the introduction of GST could be made using the balances lying in the electronic cash/credit ledgers?

b) Whether pre-deposit for appeals filed for the GST Regime could be made using the balance lying in the electronic credit ledger?

The above issue emanated from sections 41 of the CGST Act, 2017, as applicable upto 01.10.2022 and section 49 (4) of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 41(2) of the CGST Act, 2017, before its amendment by the Finance Act, 2022, provided that the input tax credit availed shall be utilized only for payment of self-assessed output tax as per the return referred to in the said sub-section. Similarly, section 49(4) also restricted the use of the amount available in the ECR only for making payment towards output tax. The term “output tax” is defined u/s 2(82) to mean tax chargeable on taxable supply of goods or services or both made by him or by his agent, but excludes tax payable on reverse charge basis.

The Hon’ble High Court in the case of Jyoti Construction vs. Dy. Commissioner [2021 (54) G.S.T.L. 279 (Ori.)] held that the proviso to Section 41(2) (before amendment) limits the usage to which the ECR could be utilized. It cannot be used for making a pre-deposit payment at the time of filing the appeal, as per Section 107(6) of the OGST Act. While the above decision was in the context of GST regime, the Bombay High Court dealt with a similar issue for appeals under the erstwhile regime in Sodexo India Services Private Limited vs. UOI [2022 (382) E.L.T. 476 (Bom.)]. In this case, the Court set aside the Order-in-Appeal, dismissing the appeal where pre-deposit was made by DRC-03 utilizing cash, and directed the appellate authority to hear the matter on its merits. The Court also issued directions to CBIC to take a decision and pass suitable instructions on the validity of payments made through DRC-03 towards compliance with section 35F. Accordingly, the Board issued Instruction No. CBIC-240137/14/2022-SERVICE TAX SECTION-CBEC) dated 22.10.2022 as summarised below:

a) DRC-03 is not a prescribed mode for payment of pre-deposit, either under GST or service tax. Under GST, rule 108 (1) permits pre-deposit payment through the electronic cash/credit ledger and a separate DRC-03 is not required.

b) Pre-deposit is a requirement for filing the appeal and cannot be treated as arrears of tax. Therefore, it is not covered under the transitional provisions contained in section 142.

c) Therefore, pre-deposit payments for erstwhile regimes should be made in cash through the dedicated CBIC-GST integrated portal.

Subsequently, relying on the decision in Jyoti Construction, the CBIC instructions and section 41 of the CGST Act, 2017, the Tribunal in Jhonson Matthey Chemical India Private Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner [(2024) 18 Centax 371 (Tri.-All)] held that the credit lying in the electronic credit ledger can be utilized only for self-assessed output tax and cannot be utilized for making pre-deposit compliance since output tax cannot be equated to pre-deposit. By doing so, the Tribunal rejected the conclusion in Dell International Services vs. CCT [2019 (365) E.L.T. 813 (CESTAT)], wherein the CESTAT allowed pre-deposit to be made using CGST Credit, extending even to arrears of excise duty and service tax.

However, the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal permitted pre-deposit using ECR balances in Sapphire Cables & Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of CGST & CE, Belapur [(2024) 24 Centax 312 (Tri.-Bom)] and held as follows:

i) In view of section 174 of the CGST Act, 2017, the introduction of GST would not affect any proceeding relating to an appeal instituted after the commencement of GST, and a deeming friction is introduced to the effect that the proceedings under the erstwhile regime shall continue as if GST had not come into force.

ii) Therefore, CENVAT Credit available with Appellant on 01.07.2017 would be treated to have been in existence during filing of the appeal as if no transition to TRAN-1 had taken place. Under the erstwhile regime, it was an accepted practice to permit compliance with section 35F by utilising the CENVAT credit balance.

iii) The Board Instruction dated 22.10.2022 was issued after the appeal was filed and therefore, did not have retrospective effect.

Surprisingly, in D D Interiors vs. Commissioner [(2025) 30 Centax 405 (Tri.-Del)], following the decision in Jyoti Constructions and the Board Instructions, it was held that the pre-deposit payment made by cash, albeit using DRC-03, was not a valid mode of payment.

It is imperative to note that the Bombay High Court has distinguished the decision of Jyoti Construction in Oasis Realty vs. UOI [(2023) 3 Centax 86 (Bom.)] and held that the amount of ITC available in the electronic credit ledger can be utilized towards payment of the tax. Relying on CBIC Circular No. 186/18/2022-GST dated 27.12.2022, it explained the scope of section 49 (4) of the CGST Act, 2017 and held that any payment towards output tax, whether self-assessed in the return or payable as a consequence of any proceeding instituted under the MGST Act can be made by utilization of the amount available in ECR. The Court therefore concluded that there cannot be a restriction on utilising the ECR balance for complying with the pre-deposit provisions. In SKH Metals Ltd. vs. Union of India [2024-VIL-245-ALH], the Allahabad High Court specifically permitted the petitioner to utilize the amount available in the Electronic Credit Ledger to pay the 10% of tax in dispute as prescribed under Section 107(6) of the CGST Act.

The Gujarat High Court also followed a similar view in the case of Yasho Industries Limited vs. UOI [(2024) 24 Centax 338 (Guj.)], upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2025) 30 Centax 352 (S.C.). It may however be noted that the appeal against the contrary view of the Patna High Court in Flipkart Internet Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar [(2023) 13 Centax 83 (Pat.)] is still pending before the Supreme Court [(2023) 13 Centax 103 (S.C.)] where an interim stay is granted pending disposal of the appeal.

MODE OF PRE-DEPOSIT TO DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF THE UNDERLYING DEMAND

The discussion in the previous section shows that pre-deposit compliance could be made using the balance lying in the electronic credit register. However, section 49 (4) permits the utilisation of the balance lying in ECR only towards output tax, which excludes tax payable on a reverse charge basis. While the above decisions were in the context of output tax, in the context of erstwhile regime, the Tribunal has in Arunachala Gounder Textile Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Salem [2016 (46) S.T.R. 171 (Tri. – Chennai)] wherein the Tribunal, referring to the restriction on use of CENVAT credit towards payment of reverse charge liability, held that pre-deposit for RCM liability could not be discharged using credit balance. The same analogy may continue to apply even under the GST regime, since a similar restriction exists under GST as well.

This takes us to a dispute relating to an erroneous refund. Generally, a taxpayer becomes entitled to a refund based on a Refund Sanction Order passed by the Proper Officer. Such an Order becomes an appealable Order and therefore, if the Department is aggrieved with it, they must file an appeal u/s 107/112. Assuming the Department succeeds in the first appeal and the taxpayer wishes to file an appeal against it, the question that arises is whether the pre-deposit provisions u/s 112 will apply to such an appeal or not? A perusal of section 112 (8) indicates that the pre-deposit provision applies when there is a tax in dispute. The term “tax” as defined under Section 2(108) of the CGST Act means the tax leviable under the Act. The amount in question is not a tax on a transaction but a refund that is now sought to be recovered. A provision imposing an onerous condition on the right to appeal must be construed strictly. As such, the term “tax in dispute” cannot be expansively interpreted to include the recovery of a sanctioned refund. It can further be argued that the legislative construction of Section 112(8), by explicitly mentioning the pre-deposit made under Section 107(6), strongly indicates that it primarily envisages a scenario where a taxpayer, having lost at the first adjudication and having made a 10% pre-deposit to appeal to the first Appellate Authority, loses again and wishes to file a second appeal before the GSTAT. It can also be argued that by merely succeeding in an appeal against a refund sanction order does not result in the creation of a demand. The demand gets created when a notice is issued u/s 73 or 74, and therefore, unless there is an Order u/s 73 or 74, the pre-deposit provisions cannot apply, Therefore, a view can be taken that no pre-deposit is applicable in case of appeal involving erroneous refund.

In many cases, it is observed that the Department, instead of filing an appeal against Refund Sanction Order, directly issues a SCN u/s 73 or 74 and the demand is confirmed. Without going into the legality of this practice, the question that arises is whether, in such cases, the taxpayer would be required to comply with pre-deposit provisions or not? The answer to this would be in positive, since a demand is created against the taxpayer. This leads to the question of whether the pre-deposit could be paid using balance in electronic credit ledger, since the taxpayer has already received the refund in cash. The answer to this would be negative, applying the principles laid down in Arunachala Gounder Textile Mills, since the benefit has been taken in cash, its’ recovery can also be only by cash

REFUND OF PRE-DEPOSIT ALONG WITH INTEREST IF THE MATTER IS DECIDED IN FAVOUR OF TAXPAYERS

A critical aspect of the pre-deposit mechanism, which ensures fairness and upholds the principle of justice, is the provision for refund of the pre-deposited amount along with interest, should the final decision in the appellate proceedings be in favour of the appellant.

Section 115 of the CGST Act, 2017, explicitly addresses this. It stipulates that “Where an amount paid by the appellant under section 107(6) or section 112(8) is required to be refunded consequent to any order of the Appellate Authority or of the Appellate Tribunal, interest at the rate specified under section 56 shall be payable in respect of such refund from the date of payment of the amount till the date of refund of such amount”. This provision aligns with similar clauses in prior tax statutes, such as Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and Section 129EE of the Customs Act, 1962. Section 129EE, for instance, mandates interest at a rate fixed by the Central Government (not below 5% and not exceeding 36% per annum) on such amounts from the date of payment till the date of refund.

APPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION FOR REFUND OF PRE-DEPOSIT

Under the erstwhile regime, Courts have consistently held that the limitation does not apply to claims for refund of pre-deposit. The Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Alliance Francaise De Delhi vs. Commissioner [(2025) 27 Centax 183 (Tri.-Del)] has reiterated this principle under the erstwhile regime, wherein it held that the time limitation under Section 11B, ibid, is not applicable to the refund of pre-deposit.

However, under GST, section 54 prescribes a time limit for claim of refund of pre-deposit. Section 54 (1) thereof reads as follows:

(1) Any person claiming refund of any tax and interest, if any, paid on such tax or any other amount paid by him, may make an application before the expiry of two years from the relevant date in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

The term relevant date is further defined by explanation as follows:

(2) “relevant date” means—

… ….

(d) in case where the tax becomes refundable as a consequence of judgment, decree, order or direction of the Appellate Authority, Appellate Tribunal or any court, the date of communication of such judgment, decree, order or direction;
… …

In view of the explicit provisions, the Department has interpreted that the limitation applies to all refund claims, including the refund of the pre-deposit. However, the Madras High Court has in Lenovo India Private Limited vs. Jt. Commissioner [2023-VIL-799-MAD] held that the use of the word “may” in section 54 (1) means the taxpayer doesn’t need to file a refund claim within 2 years, and a refund application can be filed even beyond two years. The Jharkhand High Court recently followed this view in BLA Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Jharkhand [2025-VIL-103-JHR].

APPLICABILITY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO REFUND OF PRE-DEPOSIT PAYMENT:

It is a well-established principle that pre-deposit for filing an appeal is not a payment of duty or tax per se, but rather a deposit made as a condition for exercising the statutory right of appeal. Consequently, the refund of such pre-deposits is generally not subjected to the rigorous process of refund of duty under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (or Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962), which often involves the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
The Bombay High Court, in Suvidhe Ltd. vs. Union of India [1996 (82) E.L.T. 177 (Bom.)] held that Section 11B is “never applicable to such deposit since it is not a payment of duty but only a pre-deposit for availing the right of appeal”. The Court further emphasised that the “doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application to such deposit,” and therefore, the amount is “bound to be refunded when appeal is allowed with consequential relief”. This judgment quashed a show cause notice issued by the department for forfeiture of pre-deposit, terming it “thoroughly dishonest and baseless,” and ordered the refund with 15% interest per annum.

Similarly, in Swarna Techno Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Tax & C. Ex., Belgaum [2022 (379) E.L.T. 116 (Tri. – Bang.)], the Tribunal ruled that retention of excess pre-deposit (beyond the mandatory amount) was “without authority of law and in violation of Article 265 of Constitution of India”. Therefore, section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, had no application.

GROUNDS TO WITHHOLD THE REFUND OF PRE-DEPOSIT

However, it has been observed that the Department has generally been hesitant to sanction refunds of pre-deposit and interest. A common pretext for withholding the refund is the Department’s intention to file an appeal/ having already filed an appeal. The SC dealt with this issue in the pre-GST regime. In Atul Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat-II [2005 (188) E.L.T. 21 (Guj.)], The pre-deposit refund was withheld on the pretext that they were filing an appeal. The High Court rejected this, and directed the refund with 18% interest per annum if not paid within a fortnight, reiterating the Board’s circular against withholding refunds merely because the Department files an appeal. This was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2006 (194) E.L.T. A85 (S.C.).

However, under GST, the Department may invoke section 54 (11) which provides that if order giving rise to a refund is the subject matter of an appeal or further proceedings or where any other proceedings under this Act is pending and the Commissioner is of the opinion that grant of such refund is likely to adversely affect the revenue in the said appeal or other proceedings on account of malfeasance or fraud committed, he may, after giving the taxable person an opportunity of being heard, withhold the refund till he may determine.
However, the Commissioner’s action to withhold the refund on the pretext of a department appeal against an Order that is not stayed by a higher authority, may not go in line with the judicial principle laid down in Atul Limited and therefore, may be subject to judicial review.

INTEREST ON REFUND OF PRE-DEPOSIT

Section 115 provides for interest on refund of amount paid for admission of appeal. It provides that the amount paid u/s 107(6), or u/s 112(8), is required to be refunded consequent to any order of the Appellate Authority or of the Appellate Tribunal, and interest at the rate specified under section 56 shall be payable in respect of such refund from the date of payment of the amount till the date of refund of such amount.

Courts have consistently intervened to ensure timely refunds of pre-deposits with interest. In Amin Mehdi Merchant vs. S.M. Karnik, Asstt. Coll. Of Customs, Bombay [1995 (80) E.L.T. 777 (Bom.)], the Bombay High Court, noting the Department’s failure to grant refund despite the Appellate Collector’s order being upheld by CEGAT, ordered the refund with 12% interest per annum from the date of the Appellate Tribunal’s order till the date of payment. Similarly, in Eastern Coils Private Ltd. vs. Commr. of C. Ex., Kolkata-I [2003 (153) E.L.T. 290 (Cal.)], affirmed by the Supreme Court, it was held that if an appellate authority or Tribunal directs a refund, the governmental authority cannot be “a privileged person in refunding the same without interest”. However, if the Department does not sanction such interest, the taxpayer shall be required to follow up with the Department by filing a refund claim and follow the prescribed appellate procedure, and cannot seek direct recourse from the High Court, as held in Kaleesuwari Refinery Pvt. Ltd. vs. Asstt. Commr. of C. Ex., Chennai [2022 (379) E.L.T. 303 (Mad.)].

It must also be noted that the interest is payable not only on the tax pre-deposit, but also on interest/penalty paid as pre-deposit, as held by Mercedes-Benz India Pvt Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Tax, Pune-I [2020-VIL-179-CESTAT-MUM-CE].

In Brahmaputra Cracker and Polymer Ltd. Versus Commissioner of CGST & Excise, Dibrugarh [(2024) 24 Centax 112 (Tri.-Cal)], the taxpayer paid the entire tax under protest before filing the appeal. While dealing with a dispute relating to grant of interest on such dispute, the Tribunal held that interest was due only to the extent of mandatory pre-deposit and not the excess payment made. However, this decision is contrary to Principal Commissioner vs. Emmar Mfg Construction Pvt. Ltd. [2021 (55) G.S.T.L. 311 (Tri. – Del.)] wherein the Tribunal held that the amount deposited during investigation and/or pending litigation is ipso facto pre-deposit and interest payable on such amount to the assessee being successful in appeal. Perhaps, the decision of the Supreme Court in Sandvik Asia Limited vs. CIT [2006 (196) E.L.T. 257 (S.C.)], wherein it was held that the taxpayer must be compensated in case of excess collection of tax, or withholding of any amounts from an assessee without authority of law may be the deciding factor for this dispute.

CONCLUSION

The mechanism of pre-deposit under the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime stands as a formidable yet indispensable statutory precondition for accessing the appellate process. Its role as a sine qua non for the right to appeal, as enshrined in Sections 107 and 112 has been a subject of extensive deliberation, litigation, and subsequent legislative and administrative clarification. While the mandate to pre-deposit a specified percentage of the disputed tax is an established principle to safeguard revenue interests and filter frivolous litigation, its implementation has navigated a complex and evolutionary path since the inception of GST.

While the requirement of pre-deposit remains a critical and non-negotiable step in GST litigation, the journey from ambiguity to clarity, propelled by judicial intervention and responsive administrative action, has been noteworthy. The settled position on the use of the Electronic Credit Ledger, coupled with forthcoming legislative relaxations, reflects a maturation of the GST framework, striving to balance revenue security with the fundamental right of a taxpayer to a fair and accessible appellate remedy.

Company Law

14. In the matter of:

Modern Hi-Rise Private Limited 

Before Nclt Kolkata Bench, Court-Ii, Kolkata    

C.P. No. 238/KB/2024 

Date of Order: 9.9.2025

Reduction of Capital in any manner for the time being authorised by law: Does it allow transfer of amounts standing to the credit of Securities Premium to the Retained Earnings of the Company?

Held: No 

FACTS

  • Capital Reduction Petition was filed by the Petitioner Company pursuant to the NCLT Order dated 1.03.2019. NCLT had approved the Composite Scheme of Arrangement in the case of Himadri Dyes & Intermediates Limited (‘Transferor Company 1’), Himadri Industries Limited (‘Transferor Company 2’) and Himadri Coke & Petrol Limited (‘Transferor Company 3°) with Modern Hi – Rise Private Limited rans ‘MHPL’) i.e. the Petitioner Company (Company). As per the terms of the Scheme, the Company had issued 1,41,34,192 1% Non-Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares (“PS”) of ₹10 each, allotted on 28.03.2019 and outstanding as on 31.03.2024.
  •  PS are redeemable at par anytime within 20 years from the date of allotment. However, considering the fact that Company has performed exceedingly well, the management in consultation of PS has revised the redemption value to ₹120 i.e., the fair value at the time of issuance of such PS. The above-mentioned variation in terms of the PS of the Company is being carried out in accordance with the provisions of Section 48 of the Companies Act, 2013 (CA 2013) A Board Resolution was passed by the Company on 1.08.2024. The Company has obtained the consent of the PS holders for the proposed variation in terms as per Section 48 and 66 of the Act.
  • According to the provisions of Section 55 read with Section 52 of the Act, whenever the redemption of PS is made at a premium, the Company shall provide for such Premium on Redemption of PS (i.e., the amount paid over and above the face value of the PS at the time of redemption) out of profits available for dividend distribution, i.e., Retained Earnings of the Company.
  • As per the latest audited financial statements of the Company as on 31.03.2024, the Company has substantial amount of Securities Premium but there is not enough credit balance in the Retained Earnings to meet the Premium on Redemption of PS.
  • The Company was of the view that the funds represented by the Securities Premium are in excess of the Company’s anticipated operational and business needs in the foreseeable future. Thus, these reserves could be utilised to create future shareholder’s value in such a manner and to such extent, as the Board of Directors of the Company in its sole discretion, may decide from time to time and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and other Applicable Laws.
  • The Company wanted to transfer amounts standing to the credit of Securities Premium Reserves to the Retained Earnings of the Company.
  • The Regional Director (RD) report dated 22.11.2024 was filed with the NCLT Kolkata, Bench. RD made some observations, which inter alia, stated that the proposed reduction of share capital is not in consonance with the provisions of section 66 of the CA and not permit reclassification of Share Premium Account and transfer the same to Retained Earnings.
  • ROC further observed that Section 55(2)(a) reads as “No such shares shall be redeemed except out of the profits of the company which would otherwise be available for dividends or out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares made for the purposes of such redemption.” In the present case, the company is proposing to utilize its Securities Premium instead of Retained Earnings. Further, it is proposing to reclassify its Securities Premium into Retained Earnings. Both the aforesaid proposals cannot be allowed as they are not permissible under the provision of section 55 read with Section 48, 52 of the CA 2013.

EXTRACT FROM THE RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE ACT IN BRIEF:

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the securities premium account may be applied by the company—

(a) towards the issue of unissued shares of the company to the members of the company as fully paid bonus shares;

(b) in writing off the preliminary expenses of the company;

(c) in writing off the expenses of, or the commission paid or discount allowed on, any issue of shares or debenture of the company;

(d) in providing for the premium payable on the redemption of any redeemable preference shares or of any debentures of the company; or

(e) for the purchase of its own shares or other securities under section 68.

FINDINGS: 

  • The Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis and its Application to Section 52: The doctrine of ejusdem generis (Latin for “of the same kind”) is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation. It dictates that when general words in a statute follow a list of specific words, the meaning of those general words is confined to the same class or category established by the specific words. The purpose is to ensure that legislative intent is upheld by giving effect to every word in a statute, preventing general terms from being interpreted in a way that is overly broad or inconsistent with the specific terms. For the doctrine to be applicable, several conditions must be met:

 

  • The statute must contain an enumeration of specific words.
  • The enumerated words must constitute a distinct class or genus.
  • General words must follow the specific enumeration.
  • There must be no contrary legislative intent.

 

  • Applying the Doctrine to Section 52: Section 52(2) and 52(3) provide a closed and specific list of the purposes for which a company’s securities premium account may be used. These purposes form a distinct “class” of capital-related adjustments, such as:

 

  • Issuing fully paid bonus shares.
  • Writing off preliminary expenses.
  • Writing off share or debenture issue expenses.
  • Funding the premium on the redemption of preference shares or debentures.
  • Financing the buy-back of a company’s own shares.

The phrase “may be applied by the company” is therefore not an open-ended permission; it is limited by the specific list that immediately follows. The doctrine of ejusdem generis restricts the application of the securities premium account solely to the enumerated purposes, which are all capital in nature.

  • Securities Premium vs. Retained Earnings: they are not of a similar kind. Securities premium and retained earnings are fundamentally different, and their accounting treatment confirms this.
  • Distinct Nature: A securities premium is contributed capital— a capital receipt arising from shareholders paying more than the par value for shares. Retained earnings are earned profits, representing accumulated operational profits not yet distributed as dividends and it is revenue in nature. The specific list in Section 52 cannot be stretched to allow the securities premium to be used as retained earnings. Since, security premium is of capital nature, the legal principle of ejusdem generis and the distinct accounting classifications both confirm that they belong to different categories.
  •  The Article of Association (AOA) itself must be consistent with the Companies Act. Therefore, even if the AOA contains a specific clause, its legality is subject to the higher laws, and it cannot contradict them.
  • The moot point here is that whether such an Accounting Treatment can be allowed under the Proviso to Section 66(3) of the CA  2013. For ready reference the Proviso of Section 66(3) is reproduced hereunder:
    “Provided that no application for reduction of share capital shall be sanctioned by the Tribunal unless the accounting treatment, proposed by the company for such reduction is in conformity with the accounting standard specified in section 133 or any other provision of this Act and a certificate to that effect by the company’s auditor has been filed with the Tribunal.”
  • The ROC vide its letter dated 22.11.2024 has pointed out to Regional Director (ER), MCA that Auditor has given a certificate where he has not pointed out that the transfer of amount from ‘Security Premium Account’ to ‘Retained Earning’ is not in consonance with the provision of section 52 of Companies Act, 2013. Hence this matter may be referred to ICAI for professional misconduct.
  • Deviating from standard accounting principles by using non-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial measures carries the risk of presenting a misleading picture of an entity’s financial health. The CA 2013 and its predecessors have consistently required companies to prepare financial statements that provide a true and fair view of their financial position.
  • Consequently, the transfer of funds from the securities premium account to retained earnings is impermissible under the CA 2013, and is a clear violation of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in India as this may lead to misrepresentation of the financial statement.

CONCLUSION: 

On perusal of the records and, upon consideration of all relevant factors the Tribunal was of the opinion that the transaction recorded by the Company were not in conformity with the provisions of CA 2013 and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the Application filed under Section 66 seeking for reduction of the capital along with variation of terms of PS under section 48, 52 and 55 of the CA 2013 cannot be allowed in view of the Regional Director’s observation and non-fulfilment of the condition given under the Proviso to Section 66(3) of the CA 2013. Therefore, this application for Capital Reduction was rejected.

15. In the Matter of 

MILCENT APPLIANCES PRIVATE LIMITED

Registrar of Companies, Ahmedabad

Adjudication Order No. PO/ADJ/08-2025/AD/00583

Date of Order: 12.08.2025

Adjudication Order for violation regarding failure to inform ROC regarding vacation of Director amounting to violation of Section 167 of the Companies Act, 2013 for which penalty under Section 172 of the Companies Act, 2013 was imposed.

FACTS

Milcent Appliances Private Limited (MAPL) had filed a compounding application in e-Form GNL-1 vide SRN H644673635 dated 13.06.2019 for default committed under Section 167 of the Companies Act, 2013. In its application, MAPL submitted that Mr. PJP had vacated the office of Director under Section 167(1)(b) of the Company Act,2013 as he remained absent from all (5) five Board Meetings held during the financial year 2015–16, specifically on respective Board Meeting dates 1.04.2015, 22.06.2015, 3.09.2015, 31.12.2015, and 31.03.2016, despite notices being served to him through hand delivery.

Hence, as per the provisions of Section 167, MAPL was required to file e-Form DIR-12 within 30 days from the date of the Board Resolution (20.04.2016) passed for vacation of office by Mr. PJP i.e., by 19.05.2016. However, MAPL filed the said form DIR-12 on 12.03.2019, as there was a delay of 1027 days in reporting vacation of office by Director.

Accordingly, the Registrar of Companies (ROC) had submitted a report to the Directorate General of Corporate Affairs (DGCoA) on 21.06.2024, forwarding the matter for consideration. The DGCoA scheduled personal hearings on 8.10.2024 and 8.11.2024 to allow the applicants to present their case. However, no representative appeared, nor was any adjournment sought in response to emails sent by the DGCoA on 1.10.2024 and 24.10.2024.

The DGCoA vide email dated 11.05.2022, and subsequent instructions from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), had directed to ROC that all cases filed under the Companies Act, 1956 and Companies Act, 2013, which now stand decriminalized pursuant to the Companies Amendment Acts of 2019 and 2020, shall be considered under the “In-House Adjudication Mechanism” (IAM). These amendments, effective from 2.11.2018 and 28.09.2020, were aimed at promoting Ease of Doing Business and streamlining enforcement.

In line with these directions and in view of the default committed during the period 2016–17 to 2018–19, the matter falls within the purview of IAM. Accordingly, Adjudication proceedings were initiated under Section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013, against MAPL and the officers in default for violation of Section 167 of the Companies Act, 2013.

None of the representatives of MAPL / officers appeared during the adjudication proceedings.

PROVISIONS:

Section 167:  (1) The office of a director shall become vacant in case—

(b) he absents himself from all the meetings of the Board of Directors held during a period of twelve months with or without seeking leave of absence of the Board;

Penalty section for non-compliance / default if any

Section 172: “If a company is in default in complying with any of the provisions of this Chapter and for which no specific penalty or punishment is provided therein, the company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of fifty thousand rupees, and in case of continuing failure, with a further penalty of five hundred rupees for each day during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of three lakh rupees in case of a company and one lakh rupees in case of an officer who is in default.”

ORDER:

The AO, after having considered the facts and circumstances of the case concluded that MAPL and its directors were liable for penalty as prescribed under section 172 of the Companies Act 2013. However, MAPL was categorised under the ambit of Small Company.

Therefore, total penalty imposed was ₹2, 00,000/- (Two Lakhs only) i.e. ₹1,50,000/- (One lakh fifty Thousand only) on MAPL and ₹50,000/- (Fifty Thousand only) on its Director Mrs. JRP.

Amplifying an Auditor’s Obligation: Analysis of NFRA’s Order

The National Financial Reporting Authority’s (NFRA) order dated 26 December 2024 concerning the audit of Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited (ZEEL) underscores a significant expansion in the interpretation of “fraud” under the Companies Act, 2013. The controversy stemmed from Yes Bank prematurely appropriating ZEEL’s fixed deposits of ₹200 crore to entities linked with promoters. Though the funds were later restored with interest, NFRA held that the information available with auditor raised red flags that the auditors failed to address adequately. The order also highlights deficiencies such as reliance on limited internal inquiries, neglecting external confirmations and insufficient professional skepticism. It also juxtaposes the broader statutory fraud definition under Section 447 with the narrower auditing standard under SA 240, raising unsettled questions on thresholds like “reason to believe” and quantification of fraud. Ultimately, NFRA’s stance reinforces heightened auditor responsibility, especially regarding related-party transactions and concealed disclosures

INTRODUCTION:

Inquiries by the National Financial Reporting Authority (“NFRA”) into audits have resulted in important orders that clarify NFRA’s view of complex issues that come from the interpretation of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”) read with the Standards of Auditing. In this context, NFRA’s order dated December 26, 2024 (“Order”) regarding the statutory audit of Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited (“ZEEL” or “the Company”) is significant.

The Order addresses an alleged fraud that did not result in a loss. ZEEL’s fixed deposit proceeds were credited to other entities. However, the funds were immediately recouped, and the involved parties had no grievances. In this case, the NFRA concluded that the auditor did not comply with the Standards of Auditing and failed to report fraud U/s 143(12) of the Act.

The Order deliberates upon a spectrum of issues stemming from the broad and expansive statutory definition of “fraud,” found in Section 447 of the Act, and the unresolved tension on the auditors’ obligation to report fraud U/s 143(12) of the Act. Ultimately, the inferences drawn from Order, can cast additional, and possibly onerous, obligations on the auditor.

BACKGROUND:

The facts presented to the auditor (before issuance of the audit report) are as follows. ZEEL’s fixed deposit (“FD”) of ₹200 crore with Yes Bank was prematurely closed by Yes Bank in July 2019 and the corresponding funds were credited (“FD Appropriation”) to entities linked to and associated (“PLE”) with a ZEEL promoter and director (“Promoter”). Around 2 months later, the PLEs intimated ZEEL that Yes Bank had unilaterally credited the FD Appropriation funds to their accounts without the PLE’s knowledge and consent, and offered to remit the FD Appropriation funds to ZEEL along with interest, which they did subsequently1.

ZEEL sought explanations from Yes Bank on the FD Appropriation and, at the same time, acting on instructions from the Audit Committee, initiated an internal inquiry whose primary scope was assessing whether any authorised signatories had instructed Yes Bank to affect the FD Appropriation. The internal inquiry did not unearth any incriminating evidence2. Thereafter, on July 22, 2020, ZEEL and Yes Bank issued a joint statement stating that the FD Appropriation issue was resolved3.

The auditors had issued qualified audit reports for the quarters ending in September 2019 and December 2019, citing paucity of relevant information, including the non-availability of responses from Yes Bank regarding the FD Appropriation.4, On July 24, 2020, the auditors issued an audit report that did not cite any concerns or qualifications regarding the FD Appropriation.5 However, certain material facts that were not available to the auditor when the audit report was issued suggest that a fraud had occurred, as the FD Appropriation was effected by Yes Bank based on instructions issued by ZEEL’s Chairman, who had offered the FD as a security for loans availed by PLE’s.6


1 Para 18 and 19 of the Order

2  Para 20 of the Order

3   Para 21 of the Order

4   Para 27 of the Order

5   Para 21 of the Order

6   Para 23 and 25 of the Order

NFRA’S CRITICISM OF AUDITORS’ JUDGMENT

According to the Order, the auditor concluded that there was no basis to believe ZEEL’s officers or directors had committed fraud7. This conclusion appears to be based on the internal inquiry and the auditor’s procedures. Crucially, the internal inquiry focused on authorized signatories only and not on other officers or directors. This distinction becomes significant when viewed alongside subsequent evidence pointing to a broader circle of individuals who may have been involved or were aware of the true reasons for the FD Appropriation8.

NFRA has critiqued the auditor’s decisions on multiple fronts. First, it questioned the rationale for issuing a clean report without evaluating Yes Bank’s rationale and grounds for the FD Appropriation9. In NFRA’s view, the auditor should have formally sought external confirmation from Yes Bank, as the FD Appropriation was treated as a significant risk10. The Order also highlights that SA 33011 issued by the ICAI calls for external corroboration in high-risk scenarios. The Order opines that obtaining clarification directly from Yes Bank was essential in light of the significant reliance on explanations offered by the management.

Moreover, the Order identifies multiple red flags embedded in the information available to the auditor, that, in NFRA’s view, warranted deeper scrutiny:

  • The beneficiaries were PLEs, suggesting a heightened risk of inappropriate related-party transactions.
  • The promoters’ own explanations that they were coordinating with Yes Bank raised questions regarding the implicit reasons behind the FD’s Appropriation12.
  • An email from ZEEL dated February 2, 2019, showed that ZEEL anticipated Yes Bank might attempt to offset the FD against promoter liabilities13.
  • Yes Bank’s subsequent May 2020 letter (cited in the Order) included allegations against ZEEL’s management, hinting at broader corporate governance issues.14

According to NFRA, these red flags indicated a risk of unauthorized related party transactions, which should have led the auditor to exercise greater professional skepticism. NFRA opined that inquiries should have been expanded to evaluate the role and involvement of promoters and other officers. According to the NFRA, had the auditor insisted on explanations from Yes Bank and conducted a more thorough investigation, he/she could have uncovered evidence meeting the “reason to believe” threshold required for reporting under U/s 143(12) of the Act (“Section 143(12)”).


7   Para 27 of the Order

8   Para 25 of the Order

9  Para 28 of the Order

10 Para 17 of the Order

11 Para 31 of the Order.

12  Para 41 of the Order

13  Para 37 of the Order

14  Para 51 of the Order

CONCEALMENT OF INFORMATION AND FRAUD – JUXTAPOSED

The Order highlights a response dated October 11, 2019, from Yes Bank (“Yes Bank Response”), provided as an explanation in response to ZEEL’s query regarding the FD Appropriation15. Crucially, the Yes Bank Response was not disclosed to the auditor. According to the Order, the Yes Bank Response included evidence which showed that the Promoter had on September 4, 2018, authorised Yes Bank to appropriate the FDs in case of a default by PLEs. Notably, it also suggested a certain level of awareness within the leadership team of the Essel Group, of which ZEEL was a part, about Yes Bank’s intent to appropriate the FD16. NFRA has opined that had the auditor been apprised of these details, there would likely have been a reasonable basis to believe the occurrence of a fraud meriting reporting under Section 143(12).

At this juncture, it would be pertinent to highlight the friction between fraud as defined in Section 447 of the Act (“Section 447”) and fraud as contemplated in SA 240 – The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements (“SA 240”)17 . Fraud under Section 447 includes “acts with an intent to injure the interests of the company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or wrongful loss”. Therefore, acts that do not represent, entail, or result in a financial effect would constitute fraud under Section 447.

ICAI, in its guidance note on Section 143(12) (“Guidance Note”), has noted this divergence and has acknowledged that an auditor may not be able to detect acts that fall under the broader scope of Section 447, especially if the financial effects of such acts are not recorded in the company’s books of account or financial statements18.

Given these limitations, the ICAI has opined that for the purpose of reporting on fraud under Section 143(12), auditors should primarily consider the requirements of the SAs, including the definition of fraud as stated in SA 240, and plan and perform audit procedures to address the risk of material misstatement due to fraud as it impacts the financial statements19. In other words, an auditor has no obligation to identify a fraud that has no impact on the books of accounts or financial statements. It appears that the FD Appropriation squarely falls within the meaning of fraud under SA 240, as the underlying transactions were recorded in the books of accounts, even though ZEEL did not, ultimately, incur any loss.

Importantly, NFRA has also suggested that the concealment of the Yes Bank Response from the Audit Committee, as well as the auditors, may tantamount to fraud under Section 448 of the Act20, which criminalises “false statements” or “omissions of material facts” in documents or returns required under the Act. Conventionally, this provision is construed to apply to documented filings like annual returns, financial statements, or formal declarations. If this broader reading prevails, the statutory boundaries on what constitutes a “filing” or “document” for Section 448 purposes could expand significantly.

One may argue that nondisclosures or omissions during formal communications or Board-level deliberations that are affected under the framework of the Act but not in legally prescribed forms should not, on their own, be considered “false statements” under Section 448. NFRA’s interpretation suggests a more expansive scope that may expose directors and senior management to liability for any material omission in communications that fall within the framework of the Act.


15 Para 25 of the Order

16  Para 24 of the Order

17 Para 11 of SA 240 – The Auditors Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements

18 Para 31 of the Guidance Note on Reporting on Fraud under Section 143(12) of the Companies Act, 2013 (Revised 2016)

19 Para 32 of the Guidance Note on Reporting on Fraud under Section 143(12) of the Companies Act, 2013 (Revised 2016)

20 Para 25 of the Order

 

EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS – DICHOTOMY OF CONFUSION

A crucial topic not explored in depth is how NFRA’s characterization of the FD Appropriation as fraud under Section 447 compares with the rigorous criminal-law standard of “beyond reasonable doubt.” NFRA has asserted that the Promoter misused ZEEL’s funds21 to benefit the PLEs and that ZEEL’s management was complicit, basing this on delays in seeking explanations from Yes Bank and the concealment of the Yes Bank Response; actions NFRA deemed collectively suspicious22. However, proving an offense under Section 447, which is a criminal provision, requires meeting the high “beyond reasonable doubt” threshold, which is stringent than the “reason to believe” standard applicable to auditors under Section 143(12).

The Supreme Court23 explained the reasonable doubt standard in a recent verdict as “the requirement of law in criminal trials is not to prove the case beyond all doubt but beyond reasonable doubt and such doubt cannot be imaginary, fanciful, trivial or merely a possible doubt but a fair doubt based on reason and common sense”. In essence, the reasonable doubt standard requires the prosecution to establish a high degree of certainty but not absolute certainty. Simplistically, reasonable doubt exists when the prosecution’s evidence fails to exclude reasonable alternative explanations that are consistent with innocence and arise naturally from the evidence presented.

Moreover, while the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard has substantial legal precedent, the “reason to believe” standard in relation to its application under Section 143(12) has not been vigorously tested. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita defines “reason to believe”24 as “a person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise”. Reason to believe straddles the middle ground between knowledge i.e. absolute certainty and suspicion characterised by conjecture or doubt. It is a state of mind arrived at through a process of probable reasoning based on available facts, circumstances, and indicators. A person may not know for certain that a fact is true, but he/she possess enough information that a reasonable person would conclude it to be true25. As a result, sifting through and analysing discrete pieces of information—an inherently subjective exercise which at times would demand juristic knowledge—becomes more difficult in the absence of substantive guidance or case laws for an auditor.’ On the facts cited in the Order, it can be argued that the “reason to believe” standard was not satisfied as pivotal evidence i.e. the Yes Bank Response was not available to the auditor when the audit reports were issued.

Additionally, the Order also highlights the auditors’ views on the uncertainty surrounding the legal or contractual basis on which the FD Appropriation was affected26. While Yes Bank cited the Promoter’s letter as justification, there is no clear indication that this letter amounted to formal authorisation. Instead, the documents suggest that the Board of ZEEL did not approve the alleged lien or security arrangement as required under the Act, leaving open the question of whether Yes Bank had lawful grounds to appropriate the FD for the PLEs. That being said, this uncertainty buttresses the NFRA’s contention that the internal inquiry did not address all substantive questions, thereby warranting a deeper inquiry.


21 Para 53 of the Order.

22 Para 52 of the Order.

23 Goverdhan and Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh (09.01.2025 - SC) : MANU/SC/0069/2025

24 Section 2(29) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita

25 A.S. Krishnan and Ors. vs. State of Kerala (17.03.2004 - SC) : MANU/SC/0233/2004

26  Para 58 of the Order.

NFRA’S STANCE ON INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS

Additionally, NFRA appears to have deemed all internal inquiries or investigations as inherently unreliable without clearly articulating the rationale for this broad conclusion27. In this case, the internal inquiry was conducted by a longstanding ZEEL employee and was overseen by the Audit Committee. However, the Order does not appear to consider the involvement of the Audit Committee, which bears fiduciary responsibilities, including other institutional checks and balances that are typically instituted to mitigate potential biases and maintain objectivity. Furthermore, NFRA’s assertion that reliance on outcomes derived from internal inquiries would be tantamount to gross negligence may lead auditors to insist on engaging external investigators in most instances, which in turn can impose significant financial costs and operational challenges on companies.


27 Para 51 of the Order.

AMBIGUITY IN QUANTIFYING “AMOUNT OF FRAUD”

Another legally unsettled question concerns how to measure the quantum of fraud, if any, when the entity ultimately sustains no net financial loss. This determination is crucial as frauds exceeding INR 1 Crore are to be reported by the auditor under Section 143(12) of the Act. For instance, if funds had been diverted or, in other terms, “loaned” to related parties without any intent to misappropriate, does the “amount of fraud” equates to the principal sum initially diverted, or merely the interest cost?

While the Order does not deliberate on the quantification, it hints that the FD Appropriation amounted to a misappropriation, even though it was transient. The Act does not prescribe a fixed methodology for quantifying “amount of fraud” in such scenarios, raising questions on whether intangible or temporary impairments of a company’s funds qualify as the basis for fraud calculations.

CONCLUSION: THE EXPANDING ROLE OF AUDITORS IN DETECTING AND REPORTING FRAUD

The Order highlights the evolving expectations placed on auditors, particularly in the context of detection and reporting of fraud under the Act. The Order reaffirms the broad sweep of “fraud” under the Act, whereby even transient or fully remedied misapplications of corporate assets may lead to a potential obligation to report under Section 143(12). Whether all acts falling within the ambit of Sections 447 and 448 must invariably be reported by the auditor remains an ongoing challenge.

The Order suggests that, whenever a plausible suspicion arises, particularly in related-party contexts, an auditor must either gather conclusive exculpatory evidence or fulfil the statutory mandate to report potential fraud.

Allied Laws

29. Brij Bihari Gupta vs. Manmet and Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 6338 – 6339 of 2024/

2025 INSC 948

August 8, 2025

Motor Vehicle – Compensation – Liability – Transfer of vehicle from owner to driver – Not a legal transfer in the eyes of the law – Owner liable to compensate – Insurance company liable to indemnify owner – Insurance company cannot seek extinguishment of insurance policy on the basis of unrecognised transfer of vehicle. [S. 50, Motor Vehicle Act, 1988].

FACTS

The case arose out of a motor accident involving a goods vehicle in Chhattisgarh. Several petitions were made before the Hon’ble Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The Hon’ble Tribunal awarded compensation and held that (i) the registered owner, (ii) the driver (Appellant/ostensible owner of the vehicle), and (iii) the insurance company (Respondent) were jointly liable. Aggrieved, an appeal was filed before the Hon’ble Chhattisgarh High Court by the Insurance company – Respondent. The Hon’ble High Court observed that the car was not yet legally transferred in the name of the driver (i.e. the Appellant/ostensible owner), and the insurance policy was in the name of the registered owner and not the driver. Therefore, it was held that the liability of the insurance company to compensate extinguishes and falls entirely on the driver (Appellant). Aggrieved, an appeal was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the legal ownership of a vehicle, along with the corresponding liability, remains with the registered owner until a formal transfer of registration is effected in accordance with Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In the present case, the Hon’ble Court held that the registered owner continues to be liable for third-party claims irrespective of any informal transfer of possession or private agreement of sale. Reliance was placed on the earlier decision in the case of Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar & Ors. (2018) 3 SCC 1, which categorically held that the registered owner alone is responsible for third-party claims, even if the vehicle has been sold but the statutory transfer of registration is incomplete. Applying this principle, the Court rejected the insurance company – Respondent’s contention that liability had shifted due to a private sale agreement. It observed that contractual arrangements between the parties cannot override the statutory scheme designed to protect innocent third-party victims. Consequently, the insurance company – Respondent, being statutorily bound to indemnify the registered owner, was directed to compensate the deceased/injured, and the Hon’ble High Court’s order absolving the insurance company/Respondent was set aside.

30. Sanjit Singh Salwan and Ors. vs. Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan and Ors.

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 29398 of 2024/2025 INSC 988

August 14, 2025

Arbitration – Trust – Dispute –– Arbitral award – Accepted by both parties – Interim Relief – Challenge of arbitral award – Estoppel by conduct. [S. 92, Code for Civil Procedure, 1908; S. 9, 37 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996].

FACTS

The Appellants and Respondents are the trustees of a school, namely Guru Tegh Bahadur Trust. After certain disputes, the Respondents removed the Appellant as a trustee. Thereafter, the Respondents instituted a suit for perpetual injunction restraining the Appellants from interfering with the school’s management. The learned Civil Court, however, dismissed the suit as barred by section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which restricts litigation involving public trusts. Thereafter, an appeal was filed before the learned Sessions Court. During the pendency of the appeal, both parties agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration, appointing a sole arbitrator. The arbitrator passed an award detailing management arrangement for the Trust, which the parties jointly accepted and incorporated into a court decree (consent decree). The Session Court dismissed the appeal accordingly based on the consent decree. Thereafter, the Appellants took steps to carry out their part of the obligations; however, it was contended that the Respondents failed to carry out their side of the obligations. Accordingly, an application was filed under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) seeking interim reliefs. The Respondents, however, challenged the validity of the arbitral award and contended that the award was passed with respect to the affairs of the management of the Trust. It was, therefore, barred under section 92 of the CPC. The Commercial Court accepted the contention of the Respondents and quashed the arbitral award. Aggrieved, an appeal was filed under section 37 of the Act. The order of the Commercial Court was affirmed by the Hon’ble High Court.

Aggrieved, an appeal was preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Respondent, having consciously submitted to arbitration during the pendency of the appeal, were estopped from later questioning its validity on grounds of non-arbitrability. The Hon’ble Court observed that the arbitral award was voluntarily accepted by both parties and had, on their joint request, been merged into a consent decree passed. Once such a decree had been passed, its binding force could not be nullified by subsequently raising technical objections under Section 92 of the Act. It was noted that the Respondents had not only acquiesced in the arbitration process but also derived benefits from the award, thereby precluding them from adopting an inconsistent stance. Reaffirming the principle that no party can blow hot and cold at the same time, the Court held that the Respondents’ conduct amounted to approbation and reprobation. Thus, the appeal was allowed and the orders of the High Court and Commercial Court were set aside.

31. Ramesh Chand (D) THR. LRS. vs. Suresh Chand and Anr.

2025 INSC 1059

September 01, 2025

Ownership through GPA/Will/Agreement to Sell – Not Valid Transfer of Title. [S.54, 53A, Transfer of Property Act, 1882; S. 63 Indian Succession Act, 1925; S. 68 Evidence Act, 1872]

FACTS

The Property in dispute was originally owned by Kundan Lal, the father of Appellant and Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 asserted ownership on the strength of documents executed, namely an agreement to sell, a general power of attorney, an affidavit, a receipt of consideration, and a registered will. According to Respondent No. 1, Appellant was residing as a licensee and later became a trespasser. It was further alleged that Appellant wrongfully alienated half the property to the Respondent No. 2, a purchaser, and accordingly sought possession, mesne profits, declaration of title, and a mandatory injunction. Appellant contested the claim and filed a counterclaim stating that the property had been orally transferred to him in 1973 and that he had been in continuous possession ever since, and alleged that the documents relied upon by Respondent No. 1 were forged or otherwise invalid and emphasised that in an earlier suit, the Respondent No. 1 had admitted Kundan Lal’s ownership. Upon remand, the High Court again dismissed the appellant’s appeal, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

HELD
The Supreme Court examined whether the documents relied upon by the Respondent No. 1 conferred any valid title. It was held that an Agreement to sell does not by itself transfer ownership but merely gives a right to seek specific performance. A General Power of Attorney only creates an agency and cannot confer ownership rights. The registered will was not proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Moreover, the will was surrounded by suspicious circumstances since the testator had four children, and no reasons were assigned for excluding three of them. The Court observed that mere registration of a will does not grant validity if legal proof is lacking. The Affidavit and receipt of consideration also did not confer ownership since title to immovable property worth more than one hundred rupees can only be transferred by a registered deed of conveyance. The Court further held that Respondent No. 1 cannot take the benefit of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act because he was not in possession of the property; indeed, the very filing of suit for possession showed that the possession remained with the Appellant. Consequently, the Respondent No. 1 failed to establish ownership or entitlement to possession. Upon Kundan Lal’s demise, succession opened to all his Class I heirs, and the Property must devolve accordingly. As regards Respondent No. 2, who had purchased half of the property from Respondent No. 1, the Court reiterated its earlier interim order that his rights would be protected to the extent of the share validly conveyed by Respondent No. 1. Beyond that, no independent rights could be claimed.

The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court.

32. Gian Chand Garg vs. Harpal Singh & Anr.

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 8050 of 2025

August 11, 2025

Settlement – between parties after conviction – Section 138 offence is compoundable at any stage. [S. 138 & 147, Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881]

FACTS

The complainant alleged that the Appellant had borrowed a sum and issued a cheque towards repayment, which was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. After service of notice, a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) was filed. The Judicial Magistrate convicted the Appellant and sentenced him to six months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The conviction was affirmed by the Sessions Court and later by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in revision. Subsequently, the parties entered into a compromise, where the complainant accepted settlement through demand draft and post-dated cheques. The Appellant sought modification of the High Court’s revisional order, which was dismissed as non-maintainable. Aggrieved, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that though dishonour of a cheque under Section 138 of the NI Act entails criminal liability, the offence is essentially civil in nature and has been made compoundable by Section 147 of the NI Act. Referring to earlier rulings, the Court proceedings cannot be allowed to continue. The Court observed that the complainant had accepted the compromise voluntarily and received payment in full settlement of the default sum. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed on the Appellant could not stand.

The appeal was allowed, the High Court’s order was set aside, and the conviction and sentence of the Appellant were quashed.

33. Shanti Devi vs. Jagan Devi & Ors.

[2025] INSC 1105 (SC)

September 12, 2025

Limitation – Sale deed – Fraudulent and void ab initio – No cancellation required – Limitation governed by Article 65 (12 years) and not Article 59 (3 years) – Suit for possession filed within 12 years held maintainable. [S. 59, 65, Limitation Act, 1963; S. 54, Transfer of Property Act, 1882]

FACTS

The plaintiffs claimed one-third share in agricultural land and challenged a sale deed dated 14-06-1973 executed in favour of the defendant, alleging fraud, impersonation and absence of consideration. The Trial Court dismissed the suit as time-barred. The First Appellate Court decreed the suit, holding the deed void and the suit within limitation under Article 65. The High Court confirmed the decree but applied Article 59.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that where an instrument is void ab initio, no cancellation is required, and a simpliciter suit for possession based on title is governed by Article 65 (12 years). Since the plaintiff never executed the deed and no consideration was paid, the transaction was a nullity. The suit filed in 1984, being within 12 years from the 1973 deed, was held within the limitation. Appeal dismissed.

Cartoon Tax

29th International Tax and Finance Conference

The 29th International Tax and Finance (ITF) Conference was held from 14th to 17th August, 2025, at Ananta Spa & Resorts, Jaipur. Organised by the International Taxation Committee of BCAS, the conference saw the participation of over 210 delegates, including senior professionals, experts, and other delegates from across the country. The conference featured well-structured sessions covering key topics in international taxation and finance, including recent developments, group discussions, paper presentations, panel discussions, practical challenges, and global trends. Eminent speakers and panellists shared valuable insights through technical presentations and interactive discussions, making the sessions both informative and engaging. In addition to technical learning, the conference also offered excellent opportunities for networking and informal interactions among professionals in a serene and rejuvenating setting. Overall, the 29th ITF Conference successfully continued its tradition of promoting professional excellence, collaboration, and knowledge-sharing in the field of international tax and finance.

The Conference covered the following:

Topic Faculty
Key Note Address: “Constitutional Limits in Taxation and Territorial Boundaries” Former Acting Chief Justice
Dr Vineet Kothari
Papers for Group Discussions
1. Corporate and Business Restructuring from a Tax and FEMA perspective – Confluence and Conflicts CA Siddharth Banwat

Mentor – CA Pinakin Desai

 

2. Cross-Border Structuring of Wealth for its Protection and Succession – Planning imperatives and legal controversies Dr CA Anup Shah
Paper for Group and Panel Discussion
Treaty Entitlement, Principal Purpose Test and GAAR – Case Studies Moderator – CA Ganesh Rajgopalan

Panellists – CA Anish Thacker & Sr. Adv. K K Chythanya

Papers for Panel Discussion
Investigations Under Black Money and FEMA: Practical Insights and Analysis (Fireside Chat) CA Gautam Nayak in conversation with CA T P Ostwal & Adv. Ashwani Taneja
Papers for Presentation
Intangibles in the globalised world: Sectoral Analysis from a tax and transfer pricing perspective Speaker – Sr. Adv. V. Sridharan
Global Information Exchange Standards – 2025 and Beyond – An Eye-opener Speakers – Mr Raman Chopra, Principal Commissioner, Central Charge, Delhi (Ex Member TPL)

and

Mr Gaurav Sharma – Additional Director of ADIT HRD CBDT

ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

The participants were divided into four groups, each group ably led by group leaders (aggregating to 25 across the three papers) who helped generate an in-depth discussion of the case studies from the papers. The paper writers visited each group to witness the brainstorming sessions.

An overview of each of the sessions follows:

Day 1: 14th August, 2025

The 29th International Tax and Finance (ITF) Conference commenced with impactful opening remarks by co-chair CA Rutvik R. Sanghvi.

This was followed by an insightful address by former Acting Chief Justice Dr Vineet Kothari on the theme “Constitutional Limits in Taxation and Territorial Boundaries.” His talk provided a nuanced legal perspective on the jurisdictional boundaries within which taxation laws operate, offering clarity on constitutional principles that govern legislative power in cross-border taxation matters.

The paper writer presented after the Group Discussion. The technical segment of the day concluded with a detailed presentation by CA Siddharth Banwat on corporate and business restructuring from a tax and FEMA perspective – confluence and conflicts. The session was guided by mentor CA Pinakin Desai. The session explored the intricate regulatory landscape professionals must navigate while advising on restructuring strategies. The paper provided practical insights into real-world transactions, drawing appreciation for its relevance and depth.

Day 2: 15th August, 2025

The second day of the conference opened on a patriotic note with a brief Independence Day celebration, bringing together all delegates in a spirit of unity and reflection.

This was followed by a fireside chat on the theme “Investigations under Black Money and FEMA: Practical Insights and Analysis.” The session featured CA Gautam Nayak in conversation with CA T. P. Ostwal and Advocate Ashwani Taneja. The discussion provided valuable insights into ongoing challenges in regulatory investigations, drawing from practical experiences, case studies, and policy perspectives. The interactive exchange allowed participants to gain a deeper understanding of both the technical and procedural aspects of black money laws.

In the afternoon, Dr CA Anup Shah delivered a comprehensive presentation on “Cross Border Structuring of Wealth for its Protection and Succession – Planning Imperatives and Legal Controversies” after the Group Discussion on the topic. The session examined the complex interplay between succession planning, wealth protection, and international structuring, with a focus on both legal and tax dimensions. Rich with practical examples, the presentation shed light on strategies adopted globally and their relevance in the Indian context, making it a highly engaging and thought-provoking session for the delegates.

Day 3: 16th August, 2025

The third day of the conference opened with a highly engaging session on “Global Information Exchange Standards – 2025 and Beyond – An Eye-opener.” The session was addressed by Mr Raman Chopra, Principal Commissioner, Central Charge, Delhi (Ex-Member TPL), along with Mr Gaurav Sharma, Additional Director of ADIT HRD, CBDT. Together, they offered a forward-looking perspective on global tax transparency frameworks and information-sharing mechanisms. Their analysis shed light on the impact of evolving exchange standards on multinational businesses and domestic taxpayers, while also highlighting India’s preparedness to adapt to these changes. The session provided delegates with an in-depth understanding of upcoming challenges and opportunities in this crucial area of international taxation.

The discussions were followed by a detailed paper presentation by Senior Advocate V. Sridharan on “Intangibles in the Globalised World: Sectoral Analysis from a Tax Perspective.” Drawing from his vast experience, he examined the complexities of intangible assets, their valuation, and their treatment under international tax and transfer pricing principles. The session offered sector-specific insights and addressed practical concerns faced by businesses and professionals in structuring and defending tax positions. The clarity and depth of the presentation made it one of the most enriching technical highlights of the conference.

Day 4: 17th August, 2025

The concluding day of the conference featured a comprehensive panel discussion on “Treaty Entitlement, Principal Purpose Test and GAAR – Case Studies”, after the Group Discussion. The session was moderated by CA Ganesh Rajgopalan, with panellists CA Anish Thacker and Senior Advocate K. K. Chythanya.

The panel examined the practical challenges and interpretational issues that arise in the application of treaty entitlement, the principal purpose test, and GAAR, drawing on case studies and judicial perspectives. The discussion brought out the complexities of balancing anti-avoidance principles with legitimate tax planning, while also offering practical insights for professionals advising in cross-border matters. The engaging exchange of views and depth of analysis provided a fitting conclusion to the conference, leaving participants with key takeaways for navigating an evolving international tax landscape.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Under the leadership of Chairman CA Chetan Shah and Co-Chairman CA Rutvik Sanghvi, and with the dedicated efforts of Conference Director CA Naman Shrimal and Co-Conference Director CA Utsav Hirani, the 29th ITF Conference was successfully concluded. Notably, this year saw nearly 50% participation from professionals outside Mumbai—an encouraging sign of growing national interest in the conference and its relevance across the country.

The smooth execution of the event was supported by — CA Jagat Mehta, CA Mahesh Nayak, CA Rajesh Shah, CA Kartik Badiani, CA Divya Jokhakar, CA Naresh Ajwani, CA Anil Doshi, CA Nemin Shah, CA Chaitanya Maheshwari and BCAS Events and Admin Team—whose attention to detail and behind-the-scenes commitment ensured a seamless experience for all delegates.

29TH INTERNATIONAL TAX AND FINANCE (ITF) CONFERENCE HELD ON 14-17 AUGUST 2025

29th International Tax and Finance (ITF) lighting lamp

29th International Tax and Finance (ITF) grp pic with Chief Justice Dr. Vineet Kothari

Group Photos of 29th International Tax and Finance (ITF) Participants

Goods And Services Tax

I SUPREME COURT

48 Commissioner of CGST vs. Deepak Khandelwal

[2024] 165 taxmann.com 715 (SC)

Dated: 14th August, 2024

Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the SLP filed by the department against the Order of Hon’ble High Court in the case of Deepak Khandelwal vs. Commissioner 2023 (77) G.S.T.L. 5 (Del.)

OBSERVATIONS OF DELHI HIGH COURT—

During the course of the search under sub-section (2) of section 67 of the CGST Acts, 2017 (the Act), the officer conducting the search may find various types of movable assets such as furniture, computers, communication instruments, air conditioners, etc. Those assets although falling under the definition of ‘goods’ cannot be seized, if the proper officer has no reason to believe that those goods are liable to be confiscated. The word ‘goods’ as defined under sub-section (52) of section 2 of the Act is in wide terms, but the said term as used in section 67 of the Act, is qualified with the condition of being liable for confiscation. Thus, only those goods, that are the subject matter of, or are suspected to be the subject matter of evasion of tax, can be seized and confiscated. It was also held that section 67(2) of the Act makes it amply clear that documents books or things may be seized if the proper officer is of the opinion that it shall be useful or relevant to any proceedings under the Act. The words “useful for or relevant to any proceedings under the Act” control the proper officer’s power to seize such items. To further clarify, the documents or books or things seized are required to be retained only for so long as it may be necessary “for their examination and for any inquiry or proceedings under the Act”. Once the said purpose is served, the books or documents or things seized under sub-section (2) cannot be restrained and are required to be released.

The department filed an SLP against the above Order of the High Court. However, the Supreme Court found it not to be a case of interference and therefore dismissed the SLP.

II HIGH COURT

49 Kannan Mahalingam vs. Commissioner of GST & Central Tax

(2024) 22 Centax 42 (Mad.)

Dated: 16th September, 2024

Order denying ITC on the ground of belated availment under section 16(4) was remanded back for fresh adjudication- considering the amendment proposed in Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2024.

FACTS

Petitioner was issued an Order-In-Appeal for the year 2018-19 confirming demand on account of delayed availing of Input Tax Credit (ITC) in violation of section 16(4) of the GST Act. Hence, the appeal.

HELD

Without going into merits, the High Court remanded the matter back to the Adjudicating Authority directing that a fresh order be passed after considering the amendments proposed in the Finance (No.2) Bill, 2024 addressing issues pertaining to a time limit for availing ITC under section 16 of the GST Act.

[Author’s comments: A similar view has also been taken by Cal. HC in the case of North Land Construction vs. State of West Bengal (2024 22 Centax 125 dated 20th August, 2024].

50 Baazar Style Retail Ltd vs. Deputy Commissioner of State tax

(2024) 22 Centax 99 (Cal.)

Dated: 19th August, 2024

Parallel proceedings cannot be initiated on the same subject matter for the same tax period.

FACTS

Petitioner was initially issued an SCN by Central Tax Authorities dated 30th September, 2022 for the period March 2019 to May 2019, against which the response was duly submitted. Subsequently, State Authorities i.e. respondent issued a SCN dated 27th December, 2023 and passed an impugned order dated 27th April, 2024 for the tax period F.Y. 2018–19 on the same subject matter. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner challenged the SCN issued by the respondent stating that Central Tax authorities had already initiated proceedings for the same tax period and subject matter which was duly participated.

HELD

High Court quashed SCN and a subsequent order was issued by the respondent by referring to section 6(2)(b) of the WBGST Act which prevents parallel proceedings by Central and State authorities for the same tax period and subject matter. Thus, the order passed was set aside. However, discretion was given to the respondent for issuing SCN for matters not covered by Central Authorities in an earlier SCN dated 30th September, 2022.

[Author’s comments: A similar view had been taken by Calcutta HC in the case of R.P. Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. versus Superintendent, CGST and Central Excise (2022) 1 Centax 284 (Cal.) dated 30th September, 2022 and Gauhati HC in case of Subhash Agarwalla versus State of Assam (2024) 15 Centax 482 (Gau.) dated 12th February, 2024.]

51 BGR Energy system Ltd vs. State of U.P

(2024) 21 Centax 287 (All.)

Dated: 29th July, 2024

The order passed without considering the petitioner’s request seeking additional time to respond due to ongoing CIRP proceedings was unsustainable.

FACTS

The petitioner was undergoing the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the supervision of an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP). During this period, the respondent issued a SCN dated 10th April, 2024 under section 73 of the UPGST Act, against which the petitioner submitted a partial response on 12th April, 2024. Petitioner further informed respondent about ongoing CIRP and requested time to seek permission from the IRP to properly contest the proceedings. However, IBC proceedings were discontinued vide an order passed by NCLAT, dated 15th April, 2024. Respondent passed an impugned order dated 26th April, 2024 without granting any further opportunity for a personal hearing. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred a writ petition, before this Hon’ble High Court.

HELD

High Court observed that once petitioner was undergoing CIRP and this fact was communicated to respondent, respondent should not have passed the impugned order during the pendency of the insolvency proceedings. The Court further noted that the order was passed without providing any opportunity of being heard. Hence, the Court directed the respondent to allow the petitioner to file a detailed reply to the show cause notice and the respondent to conduct fresh adjudication after providing the opportunity of being heard.

52 Kumar Cargo Solution vs. State of U.P.

(2024) 21 Centax 354 (All.)

Dated: 2nd May, 2024.

Penalty cannot be imposed under section 129 of CGST Act merely due to delayed presentation of e-invoice where there was no intention to evade payment of tax.

FACTS

Petitioner’s vehicle as well as goods was detained under section 129 of the CGST Act, merely due to the absence of an e-invoice available at the time of seizure. The petitioner downloaded the e-invoice and presented it on the same day. Further, an order imposing a penalty was passed against the petitioner. Being aggrieved by such detention, the petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the detention of its vehicle and goods by the respondent.

HELD

High Court held that no penalty could be imposed in the absence of any intention to evade payment of tax. Further, even if the petitioner did not possess an e-invoice at the time of seizure, it was submitted later on the very same day. Therefore, the Court set aside an impugned order dated 20th July, 2024 imposing penalty without any evidence of intent to evade payment of tax.

53 N.H. Lubricants vs. State of Rajasthan

(2024) 21 Centax 399 (Raj.)

Dated: 25th July, 2024

Writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised in cases involving factual disputes where there is no question of jurisdiction nor is there a violation of natural justice.

FACTS

Respondent issued an order demanding reversal of ITC alleging that the supplier firm was fake or non-existent and had not made the payment of tax. Being aggrieved by such demand, the petitioner filed a writ petition challenging an order for reversal of ITC under section 16 of CGST Act, 2017 stating that the respondent should have first pursued recovery from the supplier before proceeding against the petitioner.

HELD

The High Court, without going into the merits of the case, held that the existence of the supplier firm or its genuineness is a factual dispute. Accordingly, writ jurisdiction should not be exercised in cases when there is no jurisdictional issue or violation of principles of natural justice. The court further distinguished the judgments relied upon by the petitioner in its response. Thus, a petition was dismissed, with the Court emphasizing that the petitioner to avail alternative remedy and file an appeal within three months of the receipt of the order.

54 Mitali Shah vs. State of West Bengal

(2024) 21 Centax 407 (Cal.)

Dated: 8th July, 2024

The opportunity of being heard cannot be denied and the appeal ought to be decided on merits where the petitioner could not respond to SCN and subsequent order, since the same were not uploaded on the designated portal section.

FACTS

The petitioner was issued SCN and the subsequent order was uploaded in the “view additional notices and orders” section ex-parte of the GST portal. The petitioner challenged an adjudication order under the GST Act before the Hon’ble High Court.

HELD

High Court found that the SCN and the order were not properly served through the designated portal section. Also, there was confusion regarding the uploading of SCN and passing of the order due to which the petitioner was unable to submit an appropriate response. The Court disposed of the writ while directing the appellate authority to condone the delay in filing the appeal and pass a reasoned order on merits.

55 Parmar Sandip Chamanbhai vs. State of West Bengal

[2024] 166 taxmann.com 32 (Calcutta)

Dated: 12th August, 2024.

If the petitioner complies with the Court’s order regarding partial payment of a penalty and provides bank security for the remaining amount as per the said Order, their right to appeal becomes fully established. This right cannot be revoked by the department due to a failure to make additional pre-deposits as specified in section 107(6) of the Act.

FACTS

The petitioner had challenged the Order passed under section 129(3) of the CGST Act which the Hon’ble Court disposed off by allowing the petitioner the liberty to file an appeal, subject to the condition that the petitioner makes payment of a sum of ₹10 lakhs within a period of 10 days and files proof of such payment along with the bank guarantee for the balance amount of penalty in question. The petitioner had since secured the entire penalty amount as determined under section 129 and had the goods released upon executing a bond. In light of these facts, the petitioner once again approached the Hon’ble Court, requesting for the release of the bank guarantee of ₹5,22,500 so that the same could be utilized for making the payment of pre-deposit for preferring the appeal, which is a sum equal to 25 per cent of the penalty determined under section 129(3) of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017.

HELD

Hon’ble Court refused to give a refund of ₹5,22,500 to the petitioner. However, it held that the moment the petitioner made the payment of ₹10 lakhs and caused the bank guarantee to be executed in terms of the earlier Court order, the right of the petitioner to prefer an appeal crystallized into a full-fledged right which can neither be taken away nor can the respondent called upon the petitioner to make payment for any additional amount in terms of the proviso to section 107(6) of the said Act. It further held that authorities cannot withhold the right of the petitioner to prefer an appeal against the order passed under section 129(3) of the Act, interalia, on the ground that the petitioner has not made a further pre-deposit of 25 per cent of the determination already made under section 129(3) of the Act.

56 Subodh Enterprises vs. Union of India

[2024] 166 taxmann.com 363 (Andhra Pradesh)

Dated: 5th August, 2024.

Under provisions of the Official Language Act, 1963 and Rules framed thereunder, any communication of a Central Government office are required to be normally in both Hindi and English. However, any communication from a Central Government office to any person in region ‘C’ shall be in English. Hence, service of the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) only in Hindi language is not permissible.

FACTS

The petitioners approached to Hon’ble Court challenging the non-furnishing of the English translation of the hand-written orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) in Hindi language. The Commissioner (Appeals) defended the petition stating that Article 343 of the Constitution of India provided that “Hindi in Devanagari Script” with international form of Indian Numerals is the official language of the Union of India and that under Article 344 of the Constitution of India Official Languages Commission, has recommended for the progressive introduction of Hindi for official purposes. It was further stated that presidential order dated 2nd July, 2008 required 20% of the work to be carried out in Hindi, in regions categorized as ‘C’ region and hence the Commissioner (Appeals) is following the said orders as out of a total 619 orders issued by him only 113 orders are issued in Hindi language.

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court noted that a Committee consisting of Members of Parliament was appointed under Clause 4 of Article 344 to examine the recommendations of the Commission constituted under Article 344 in relation to a complete changeover to Hindi by 26th January, 1965. This Committee, after considering the views expressed by various persons, had expressed its opinion that a complete changeover to Hindi, by 26th January, 1965 was not practical and that a provision should be made, in pursuance of Article 344 (4) of the Constitution, for continued use of English, even after 1965 for the purposes to be specified by the Parliament, by law, as long as may be necessary. This approach was accepted by the Government and the Official Language Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was enacted.

The Hon’ble Court noted that as per section 3 of the said Act, English language shall continue to be used in addition to Hindi. Further, as per Rule 6 of the Official Language (Use for Official Purposes of the Union) Rules, 1976, both Hindi and English shall be used for all documents referred to in section 3(3) of the Act and it shall be the responsibility of the persons signing such documents to ensure that such documents are made, executed or issued both in Hindi and in English. Further, Rule 3(3) of the Rules stipulates that communications from a Central Government office to a State or Union territory in region ‘C’ or to any office (not being a Central Government office) or person in such State shall be in English.

Relying upon the above, it was incumbent upon the Commissioner (Appeals), to either serve a copy of the order passed by him in English or to serve copies of the orders passed by him in both Hindi and English. Consequently, service of the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) only in Hindi language is not permissible.

57 [Rekha S. vs. Assistant Commissioner

2024] 166 taxmann.com 289 (Madras)

Dated: 19th December, 2023.

The Court set aside the Order passed against the deceased person. However, taking into consideration the request made by the department, the petitioners were directed to file a response to the show cause notices issued by the department to the said deceased persons before passing the said impugned Order.

FACTS

The petitioners are the legal heirs of the deceased M. K. Girish, who was running a business as a sole proprietor. The said M. K. Girish passed away on 25th January, 2021, and the same was intimated to the respondent by way of an online application dated 29th June, 2022. Despite this, GST DRC-01A dated 6th July, 2022, and GST DRC-01 dated 21st November, 2022 was issued by the respondent in the name of deceased M.K. Girish. Thereafter, the aforesaid impugned assessment order was also passed by the respondent on 1st March, 2023 against the deceased person. Therefore, a writ petition was filed by the heirs contending that the said assessment order is liable to be set aside since the said proceedings were initiated against a deceased person. The department accepted the position but requested the Court that the said notices be treated as notice to all the petitioners, who are the legal heirs of M.K. Girish.

HELD

The Hon’ble Court held that since the impugned assessment order came to be passed against the deceased person, which is non-est in law, it is liable to be set aside. However, the Court directed petitioners to file a reply to notices issued

58 Ketan Stores vs. State of Gujarat

[2024] 166 taxmann.com 258 (Gujarat)

Dated: 9th August, 2024.

Detailed order specifying the basis of the summary order should also be issued along with the summary order. Hence, merely issuing a summary of order DRC-07 without a basis of summary could not be sustained and should be quashed.

FACTS:

The petitioner received a notice of provisional attachment of a bank account against the recovery initiated vide a summary order. The said summary of the order in Form GST DRC-07 related to discrepancies between GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A. The assessee contended that no detailed order existed, which formed the basis for the summary of an order issued in Form GST DRC-07, and that he was unable to decipher the conclusive figures in the summary of an order issued.

HELD:

The Hon’ble Court quashed the summary order and set aside the bank attachment holding that in the absence of any order for which a summary order was issued, the summary order and recovery proceedings cannot be sustained.

Reimagining Investment Advisory & Research Services

Editor’s Note: Late CA Jayant Thakur contributed to the Securities Law feature since 2006-07, since its inception, for nearly eighteen years on a month-on-month basis. After his passing the feature took a brief interval. We are delighted to restart this feature with new contributors CA Bhavesh Vora and CA Khushbu.

(Consultation Paper on Review of Regulatory Framework for Investment Advisers & Research Analysts)

BACKGROUND

SEBI (Investment Advisers) Regulations, 2013, and the SEBI (Research Analysts) Regulations, 2014, were established to regulate and streamline the activities of individuals and entities offering investment advisory and research analyst services. However, every regulation stands the test of time and must be revisited and redefined to commensurate with the evolving nature of business and adapt to the changing business trends.

In light of the growth in the securities market and a notable increase in investors, it is startling to see the current number of registered Investment Adviser (IAs) and Research Analysts (RAs) as compared to the large investor base. This discrepancy has resulted in a significantly low ratio of investment advisers per million individuals, leading to an increase in unregistered entities / individuals operating as IAs and RAs. It must be appreciated that SEBI has taken strict and timely action against such unregulated activities to protect the interests of investors.

At the same time, the Regulator has been a proponent for encouraging technological innovations in the best interest of the investors, to keep up with the changing trends in the industry. The regulators’ mindset to come one step closer to bringing parity to the role of investment advisers worldwide is demonstrated through its recent consultation paper.

“Investment Adviser” means any person, who for consideration, is engaged in the business of providing investment advice to clients or other persons or groups of persons and includes any person who holds out himself as an investment adviser, by whatever name called.

“Research Analyst” means a person who is primarily responsible for:

a) preparation or publication of the content of the research report; or

b) providing research reports; or

c) making “buy / sell / hold” recommendations; or

d) giving price target; or

e) offering an opinion concerning the public offer

With respect to securities that are listed or to be listed in a stock exchange, whether or not any such person has the job title of ‘research analyst’ and includes any other entities engaged in the issuance of research reports or research analysis

The Consultation Paper issued by SEBI regarding the Review of the Regulatory Framework for Investment Advisers and Research Analysts proposes several amendments aimed at establishing a regulatory landscape that is

a. Conducive to the evolving nature of IA and RA businesses

b. Adopting a principle-based approach

c. Simplifying compliance and reducing associated costs.

KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES

1. Relaxation in Eligibility Criteria for IAs and RAs

The proposed regulatory changes by SEBI aim to attract young professionals and ease of entry to Investment Advisory (IA) and Research Analyst (RA) roles by lowering the minimum qualification requirements from a postgraduate degree to a graduate degree. Additionally, IAs and RAs would be required to obtain only their foundational certifications instead of taking the same before expiry from the National Institute of Securities Markets (NISM) upon registration, with periodic updates focused on regulatory developments.

The proposal also recommends the elimination of prior experience and minimum net worth requirements, acknowledging that these roles are fee-based and do not entail managing client funds. Instead, IAs and RAs would be required to maintain a specified deposit, lien-marked to the stock exchange, to cover potential dues arising from arbitration or conciliation proceedings.

2. Allowing Registration as Both Investment Adviser and Research Analyst

The proposal to allow individuals or partnership firms to register for both IA and RA services stems from the overlapping nature of activities in these roles. This proposal aims to enhance service offerings while preserving regulatory integrity and maintaining an arm’s length relationship between IA & RA Activities.

3. Registration as a Part-Time Investment Adviser / Research Analyst

The proposed amendments to the registration criteria for IAs and RAs will allow individuals or partnership firms engaged in non-securities-related businesses to register as part-time IAs or RAs. This change addresses previous concerns regarding the required separation between advisory activities and other business pursuits.

Under the new rules, part-time IAs and RAs cannot manage client funds or provide advice on non-regulated investment products. They must obtain a no-objection certificate (NOC) from their employer if employed, limit their client base to a maximum of seventy-five clients at any given time, maintain a separation of advisory services from other business activities, and include a disclaimer in communications about non-IA / RA services, clarifying that they are not under SEBI’s jurisdiction.

Eligible professionals include educators, architects, lawyers, and doctors who may register as part-time IA / RA. Ineligible candidates are those advising on assets such as gold, real estate, or cryptocurrencies. For instance, a Chartered Accountant is providing security – specific / recommendations to its client even though as Part of tax planning / tax filing, he is required to seek registration as a part-time IA / RA. However, in the existing regulatory guidelines, a member of ICAI who provides investment advice to clients incidental to the professional services are exempt from seeking registration under IA regulations.

A Chartered Accountant providing investment advice must ensure that their conduct aligns with these ethical principles. The ICAI’s Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct outlines the fundamental principles and rules that members must adhere to in their professional activities. These principles include integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality, and professional behaviour.

4. Relaxations in the Designation of ‘Principal Officer’

Currently, non-individual IAs are required to appoint a managing director or an equivalent as the Principal Officer. However, industry feedback indicates that in organizations with multiple lines of business, these individuals may not be directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the investment advisory division.

To address this, the proposal allows such organizations to designate the business head or unit head of the investment advisory services as the Principal Officer, ensuring that they are responsible for overseeing these activities. In contrast, entities engaged solely as IAs must still appoint a managing director or designated director as the Principal Officer. Additionally, partnership firms are required to designate one partner as the Principal Officer, and those without eligible partners will be granted a timeline to restructure as Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs).

Furthermore, the proposal introduces a requirement for non-individual RAs and research entities to designate a Principal Officer, aligning the RA regulations with those of IAs. This move aims to ensure responsible oversight of business operations across both investment advisory and research functions.

5. Allowing Appointment of Independent Professionals as Compliance Officers

Currently, both IAs and RAs are required to appoint a compliance officer responsible for ensuring adherence to the SEBI Act and associated regulations. However, there have been industry requests to allow the appointment of independent professionals—such as Chartered Accountants (CAs), Company Secretaries (CSs), or Cost and Management Accountants (CMAs)—as compliance officers, rather than requiring a full-time officer.

Under the proposal, IAs and RAs can appoint independent professionals as compliance officers, provided that the Principal Officer submits an undertaking affirming their responsibility for compliance oversight. Additionally, independent professionals must hold relevant certifications from the National Institute of Securities Markets (NISM) to be eligible for this role. This approach seeks to enhance flexibility while ensuring robust compliance monitoring and reducing compliance costs within the IA and RA sectors.

6. Clarity in Activities that Can Be Undertaken by IAs — Scope of Investment Advice

IAs can offer financial planning that includes a mix of regulated securities and legally permitted unregulated assets. However, they may only provide investment advice on securities regulated by SEBI or products overseen by other financial regulators. Non-individual IAs wishing to advise on non-specified products must do so through a separate legal entity to maintain an arm’s-length relationship. Additionally, individual IAs are prohibited from advising on instruments outside those regulated by SEBI or other financial regulators. These changes aim to enhance client protection and ensure IAs operate within a clear regulatory framework, thereby reducing risks associated with unregulated advice and services.

7. Use of Artificial Intelligence (‘AI’) Tools in IA and RA Services

While AI tools can assist IAs and RAs in delivering personalized services tailored to client-specific needs, they may not always provide accurate or comprehensive outputs, especially in complex financial situations, and also raise concerns about data security, particularly regarding the sensitive information shared during interactions. Additionally, AI tools might lack transparency regarding the methodologies employed in generating recommendations, which is critical for ensuring compliance with risk profiling and suitability assessments.

To address these concerns, any IA or RA utilizing AI tools must fully disclose the extent of their use to clients, enabling informed decision-making regarding their services. Ultimately, the responsibility for data security and regulatory compliance remains solely with the IA or RA, regardless of how AI tools are employed in their advisory or research activities.

8. Flexibility for IAs to Change the Modes of Charging Fees to Clients

The proposed fee structure for IAs provides the liberty to switch between fixed fees mode (limited to R1,25,000 p.a.) and Asset under Advice (AUA) Mode at 2.5 per cent p.a. on AUA without any waiting time period, which under the existing regulations is a 12-month period. The maximum fee charged will be the higher of the two limits. For accredited investors, fee structures will be determined through bilaterally negotiated contractual terms, providing greater flexibility in fee arrangements while maintaining regulatory boundaries.

9. Relaxation in Requirement for Corporatisation by Individual IAs

The proposed changes to Regulation 13(e) of the IA Regulations would allow individuals to operate their advisory businesses without being compelled to transition into a corporate structure by broadening the requirement for compulsory corporatization of an individual IA i.e. 300 clients or fee collection of ₹3 Crore during the financial year, whichever is earlier.

10. Definitions of ‘research analyst’ and ‘research services

The IA Regulations require payment consideration for services rendered by investment advisors (IAs), but the current definition of “research analyst” under the RA Regulations does not explicitly mention any payment consideration, leaving room for arbitrary interpretation of the scope of services. To address this, a proposal suggests modifying the definition to state that only those providing research services “for consideration” should be classified as research analysts. “Consideration” would encompass any economic benefit, including non-cash benefits, received for such services.

Additionally, the proposal recognizes that some research analysts are currently offering services like model portfolios and stop loss target recommendations, which aren’t explicitly defined in the existing regulations. To adapt to industry practices, it is proposed that these services be included under the definition of research services provided by research analysts.

11. KYC Requirements and maintenance of record

Currently, investment advisors (IAs) must follow KYC procedures as specified by SEBI and maintain relevant records. However, research analysts (RAs) lack specific provisions for disclosing terms and maintaining client identification records. It is proposed that RAs also adhere to KYC procedures for fee-paying clients and maintain KYC records as mandated by SEBI. Both IAs and RAs are required to upload these records to the KRA system. Additionally, they must keep detailed client records, including personal information, service details, and fees charged. RAs must document disclosures of service terms and maintain records of client communications, while IAs providing execution services need to record client consent calls.

12. Clarity in the identification of ‘persons associated with research services’

The proposed changes to the RA Regulations aim to define “persons associated with research services” to align with existing definitions in the IA Regulations. This new definition will include any member, partner, officer, director, employee, or similar staff of a research analyst or research entity involved in providing research services to clients or the public. It specifically encompasses client-facing roles such as analysts, sales staff, and client relationship managers, regardless of their titles. However, it will exclude individuals performing purely clerical or administrative functions without any connection to research services or client interaction. This clarification seeks to enhance consistency and clarity in identifying personnel associated with research activities.

13. Exemption to Proxy Advisers from the RAASB framework

SEBI has established a framework for the administration and supervision of research analysts (RAs) through the RAASB, which also applies to proxy advisers (PAs) under the RA Regulations. This framework aims to effectively manage the anticipated growth in the number of RAs. However, SEBI has received requests from proxy advisers to be exempted from the RAASB framework, citing the distinct nature of their services and potential conflicts of interest when overseen by exchanges. In response, it is proposed that proxy advisers be exempt from the RAASB framework, with their administration and supervision falling solely under SEBI’s jurisdiction.

14. Eligibility of ‘partnership firm’ for registration as RA and certification requirement for its partners

Regulation 6(i) of the RA Regulations currently considers individuals, bodies corporate, and LLPs for registration as research analysts (RAs) and is proposed to be amended to explicitly include “partnership firm.” Additionally, Regulation 7(2) states that partners of a research analyst must hold a NISM certification. It is proposed to clarify that this requirement applies only to partners who are actively engaged in providing research services, aligning their qualification requirements with those outlined in Regulation 7(1).

15. Fees chargeable to clients by RAs

To establish a level playing field between Investment Advisors (IAs) and Research Analysts (RAs) regarding fee structures, it is proposed that RAs be subject to similar maximum fee limits as IAs. The proposed fee structure for RAs includes the following key points:

1. RAs may charge fees within limits set by SEBI, ensuring that fees are fair and reasonable.

2. RAs can charge a maximum of ₹1,25,000 per annum per family for individual clients, while this limit does not apply to non-individual clients, such as Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs), accredited investors, and institutional clients seeking proxy adviser recommendations.

3. RAs may charge fees in advance, but such advance payments cannot exceed one month’s fees.

4. If RA services are terminated prematurely, clients are entitled to a refund of proportionate fees for the remaining service period.

5. Unlike IAs, RAs cannot charge breakage, separation, or alienation fees upon early termination, as they do not incur the same fixed costs associated with client onboarding and assessments.

This framework aims to create consistency and fairness in fee structures across both roles.

16. Client-level segregation of research and distribution services by RAs

Currently, individual Investment Advisors (IAs) are prohibited from providing distribution services, and their family members cannot offer such services to clients advised by the IA. Additionally, if a client is receiving distribution services from other family members, the IA cannot provide advice to that client. Non-individual IAs must maintain client-level segregation between investment advisory and distribution services, ensuring an arm’s length relationship by operating through distinct departments.

This restriction is based on the principle that IAs should deliver unbiased advice, which could be compromised if they receive payments from product issuers under a distribution model. Similarly, Research Analysts (RAs) are expected to provide independent research, necessitating a clear separation between their research activities and any distribution services to avoid conflicts of interest.

To align RAs with the existing provisions for IAs, it is proposed that RAs also implement client-level segregation between research and distribution services. However, IAs and RAs providing advisory or research services exclusively to institutional clients and accredited investors may be exempt from these segregation requirements, provided that the investors sign a standard waiver acknowledging this arrangement.

17. Guidelines for recommendation of ‘model portfolio’ by RAs

According to Regulation 2(1)(u) of the RA Regulations, Research Analysts (RAs) are authorized to provide “buy / sell / hold” recommendations and price targets for securities listed or to be listed on a stock exchange. However, RAs have begun issuing “model portfolios,” which offer recommendations for multiple securities based on specific parameters, for which there are no existing guidelines for model portfolio recommendations regarding minimum disclosures, rationale, nomenclature, and performance.

To address this gap, it is proposed that SEBI shall issue guidelines for model portfolios created by RAs. This framework will include a clear definition of model portfolios and establish standardized reporting and disclosure requirements, which will be developed by the Industry Standards Forum (ISF) in collaboration with the RAASB and SEBI.

18. Disclosure of terms and conditions of services to the client

Currently, the RA Regulations do not mandate the disclosure of terms and conditions or clients’ rights, which may leave clients unaware of their entitlements in the event of grievances. To enhance transparency, it is proposed that Research Analysts (RAs) be required to provide explicit client consent and documentation outlining service conditions. Similar to Investment Advisors (IAs), RAs will also need to adhere to Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures for their fee-paying clients and maintain KYC records, as specified by SEBI.

These records should be uploaded to the KRA system according to SEBI guidelines. RAs and IAs will be required to keep comprehensive records of clients, including client lists, PANs, details of the services provided, and fees charged. Additionally, RAs must document disclosures regarding the terms and conditions of their services. Both RAs and IAs should maintain records of all communications with clients related to their services, including physical documents, emails, and messages. For IAs offering implementation or execution services, it is essential to record calls where client consent for such services is obtained.

19. Other regulatory changes concerning both IAs and RAs:

It is proposed to clarify the registration requirements for individuals providing investment advisory (IA) and research analyst (RA) services under Indian regulations based on the client’s domicile and the type of securities involved according to the provided matrix under:

Sr No. Domicile of Client / Investor Securities / asset class (Indian / Global) on which IA / RA services are provided

 

Whether a person providing

IA / RA services for

consideration (irrespective of

whether he is located in or

outside India) is required to

obtain registration as IA / RA

from SEBI

1

 

Person resident in India / NRI / PIO

 

Indian

 

Yes

 

2

 

Person resident in India / NRI/ PIO

 

Global (indices containing Indian securities as underlying) / Global (exclusively foreign securities)

 

No

 

3

 

Other than a Person resident in India / NRI PIO

 

Indian / Global (indices containing Indian securities as underlying) / Global (exclusively foreign securities) No

 

Additionally, persons located outside India can issue research reports on Indian securities without registration, provided they have an agreement with a registered RA or research entity. However, this arrangement does not impose regulatory responsibilities on the external party.

To ensure accountability, it is proposed that individuals outside India intending to provide research services to clients located in India related to securities listed or proposed to be listed on a stock exchange in India must obtain registration as RAs under the RA Regulations, by establishing a subsidiary or office in India for this purpose. This change aims to create clarity and regulatory oversight in cross-border advisory and research services.

20. Compliance Audit Requirements

Under the proposed regulations, IAs and RAs are required to undergo compliance audits. Currently, the regulations mandate audits conducted by members of ICAI / ICSI. However, the amendments allow firms to select auditors from various professional bodies such as ICMAI, enhancing flexibility in compliance audits. The proposal seeks to streamline the auditing process while ensuring adherence to regulatory standards.

21. Clarity in the applicability of IA Regulations / RA Regulations to trading call providers

If a trading call is given after assessing the client’s risk profile and product suitability, it is considered a “one-to-one” service and falls under IA Regulations. Conversely, if the trading call is made without such assessments, it is classified as a “one to many” service and falls under RA Regulations.

NAVIGATING THE ROAD AHEAD

As the Indian financial landscape evolves, the above changes seek to enhance accessibility and adaptability within the research and advisory sector, encouraging a greater pool of professionals to enter the market. However, while the intentions behind these proposals may be commendable, they raise critical questions that merit careful consideration within the context of these proposed changes, summarized as under:

  • The Balancing Act

Balancing compliance with operational efficiency is crucial to ensure that advisory firms can thrive without being overwhelmed by regulatory demands.

  • Segregation of Services

Maintaining a clear separation between research and distribution services is vital to upholding unbiased advisory practices.

  • Interplay of Technology & Data Privacy

While the use of AI tools can enhance service efficiency, the Indian financial advisory sector faces unique challenges in terms of data privacy and security and their co-existence can shape the future of the advisory industry.

  • Client Protection & Grievance Redressal

The expansion of IAs’ scope to include advice on unregulated assets can lead to significant risks, especially in a market where awareness of such products is limited. The potential for conflicts of interest in ancillary services, such as tax planning or real estate investment, can compromise the fiduciary duty owed to clients. A Separate Identifiable Grievance redressal channel will have to be developed for regulated and unregulated assets by the IA’s.

  • Bridging the Gap Between Experience & Young Minds

Given the complex nature of financial products, the lack of prior experience requirements for new entrants may create a gap in sound practical knowledge and understanding of market dynamics.

In summary, while the proposed changes aim to make investment advisory and research services more accessible and adaptable to evolving market dynamics, addressing these concerns comprehensively is essential to ensure that the regulatory framework not only promotes growth with the changing dynamics but also protects the interests of investors and maintains high standards of professional conduct.


Note from Authors:

The “Securities Law” feature of the BCAJ was contributed by the Late CA Jayant M. Thakur for many years with his insightful, exceptional, and thoughtful analysis. Those contributions have significantly benefitted many readers. We are deeply humbled to take his dedication forward and continue his commitment to excellence for the benefit of members.

Debentures – An Analysis

INTRODUCTION

Debentures are one of the most popular and common forms of instruments by which a company can raise funds. In spite of that, there is a lot of confusion and many myths surrounding them. The interesting part is that several laws deal with debentures and this has added to the complexity. Dealing with all of them in detail, as well as the tax issues concerning debentures would be a mammoth exercise but let us understand some of the key regulatory aspects pertaining to debentures.

MEANING UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT

The Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”) defines debentures in an inclusive manner as including debenture stock, bonds, or any other instrument of a company evidencing a debt, whether or not constituting a charge on the assets. Thus, the Act places bonds and debentures on the same footing. The word debt is not defined under the Act. A simple but clear definition of the word is found in Webb vs. Stenton [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 518, wherein it was defined as “……a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation, debitum in praesenti, solvendum in futuro.”. The Supreme Court in Kesoram Industries & Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. CIT, [1966] 59 ITR 767 (SC) has defined it as being applicable to a sum of money which has been promised at a future day as to a sum now due and payable. Debts were of two kinds: solvendum in praesenti and solvendum in futuro . . . A sum of money which was certainly and in all events payable was a debt, without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. A sum payable upon a contingency, however, was not a debt or did not become a debt, until the contingency had happened.

The Full Bench of the Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in D.G. (I&R) vs. Deepak Fertilizers & Petrochemicals Corpn. Ltd., [1994] 1 SCL 239 (MRTPC — Delhi) has given an elaborate definition of debentures. It held that a debenture is a choice in action and is in the nature of actionable claim and as such is subject to equities. It held that “Choices in action is a term which has its origin in English law and would ordinarily include, debts, benefits of the contract, damages for breach or tort, stocks, shares, and debentures”. Ordinarily a debenture constituted a charge on the undertaking of the company or some part of its property, but there may be debentures without any such charge, and under the law, it was not necessary that the debentures should create a charge. It also relied on the UK Commentary, Palmer on Company Law which stated that in modern commercial usage, a debenture denoted an instrument issued by the company, normally but not necessarily called on the face of it a debenture, and providing for the payment of a specified sum at a fixed rate with interest thereon. The Bench further held that Debentures were clearly not shares. They were simply specialty debts due from the company, which may or may not be secured by a charge on the company’s assets. A debenture-holder as such was not a member, but a creditor of the company. He had no share in the capital of the company, and his right to payment was not dependent on its profits. He had not, as a shareholder had, a voice in the management of the company’s affairs. Debentures were borrowed money capitalized for purposes of convenience. It further held that shareholders were the owners of the company till the company was folded up fully while debenture holders were only creditors of the company, sometimes secured and sometimes unsecured, and that too for a defined period. The rights of the shareholders and debenture holders were different as also were their remedies. A debenture was thus like a certificate of loan or a loan bond evidencing the fact that the company was liable to pay a specified amount with interest and although the money raised by the debentures became a part of the company’s capital structure it did not become share capital. Debentures are neither ‘stock’, nor ‘shares’.

Another important case dealing with debentures is the Supreme Court in Narendra Kumar Maheshwari vs. UOI, 1989 AIR(SC) 2138. It held that a debenture has been defined to mean essentially an acknowledgment of debt, with a commitment to repay the principal with interest. A debenture may be secured or unsecured. A compulsorily convertible debenture does not postulate any repayment of the principal. Therefore, it does not constitute a debenture in its classic sense. Even a debenture, which is only convertible at option has been regarded as a hybrid debenture. A non-convertible debenture need not be always secured.

Under the Companies Act, 2013, a debenture is not a loan. Unlike the 1956 Act, the 2013 Act does not state that a loan includes debentures. Hence, an investment in debentures would no longer be treated as a loan.

TYPES OF DEBENTURES

Debentures could be of various types:

(a) Listed or unlisted — even private limited companies are eligible to list their debentures on stock exchanges;

(b) Convertible (optionally / partly / fully / compulsorily) or non-convertible debentures (NCDs). The Supreme Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. vs. SEBI, [2012] 25 taxmann.com 18 (SC) has held that hybrid securities generally means securities that have some of the attributes of both debt securities and equity securities which, in terms of a debenture, encompass; and it has an element of indebtedness and element of equity stock as well. It held that optionally fully convertible debentures were hybrid securities but remained within the definition of the term ‘securities’ in section 2(h) of the Securities Contract Regulation Act;

(c) Bearer debentures where the amount is payable upon presentation by the holder;

(d) Transferrable or non-transferrable;

(e) Debenture stock where separate certificates for different debentures are not issued but one consolidated certificate is issued for the entire value raised by the debentures;

(f) Secured or unsecured- one myth prevalent is that unsecured debentures cannot be issued. Nothing could be further than the truth. If the debentures are secured, then charge creation formalities under the Act must also be fulfilled.

(g) Fixed term or perpetual debentures — unlike preference shares, the Companies Act does not prescribe any fixed tenure for debentures. Debentures can also be perpetual in nature. This is one of the most interesting facets of debentures. The issuer could also have an early call option under which perpetual debentures could be redeemed at the discretion of the issuer.

PROCEDURE FOR ISSUE OF DEBENTURES

S.71 of the Companies Act deals with the issue of debentures. In addition, Rule 18 of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 deals with certain procedures such as the issue of secured debentures, appointing of debenture trustees in case of secured debentures, etc. S.42 of the Act read with Rule 14 of the Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Rules, 2014 with a private placement of debentures.

If a company issues convertible debentures, then in addition to the above, it must comply with the provisions of s.62(1) of the Act read with Rule 13 of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 pertaining to issue of shares on preferential basis. This Rule applies to an issue of fully / partly / optionally convertible debentures.

DEBENTURE REDEMPTION RESERVE

The Act requires the creation of a Debenture Redemption Reserve (DRR) for the purposes of redemption of debentures. The DRR is created out of the profits of the company available for dividend payment. Different limits of DRR are prescribed based on the type of company and type of debentures. For instance, for unlisted companies, the DRR is 10 per cent of the value of debentures. DRR is only required if there is a profit. Further, DRR is only required up to the non-convertible portion of a debenture.

ARE DEBENTURES DEPOSITS?

The Companies (Acceptance of Deposit) Rules, 2014 state that secured debentures / compulsorily convertible debentures would be outside the purview of the definition of deposit under s.73 of the Companies Act. The amount raised by the issue of debentures should not exceed the market value of assets on which security is created. If the debentures are compulsorily convertible debentures, then they must be converted within 10 years.

Further, listed non-convertible debentures would also not be treated as deposits. This means that optionally convertible / partly convertible, unsecured, unlisted debentures would constitute a deposit under the Act unless they can be exempted under other exemption clauses of Rule 2(1) of the above-mentioned Rules.

ARE DEBENTURES SECURITIES?

The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, of 1956 defines “securities” to include debentures, debenture stock, or other marketable securities of a like nature in or of any incorporated company or other body corporate. Thus, debentures are securities.

ARE DEBENTURES GOODS?

The Monopolies &Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in J.P. Sharma vs. Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. [1991] 70 Comp. Cas. 378 (MRTPC) has held that in the definition of ‘goods’, as given in section 2(vii)of the Sale of Goods Act, debentures as such are not included though stocks and shares have been included. In Deepak Fertilizers (Supra), it was held that a debenture was issued to a debenture holder in accordance with the Companies Act and thereafter, a certificate of debenture was issued. Before a certificate of debenture was issued, a charge had to be created and the Certificate of Registration, endorsed on the debenture certificate. Debenture certificate in its deliverable state came into existence only then. It held that up to the stage of allotment, the money received by the company from the subscribers was merely subscription money and had to be kept in a separate account in accordance with provisions of the Companies Act. At this stage, the question of selling or trading in the debentures could not arise. Till the debentures were, therefore, actually allotted, the question of the company having issued debentures as transferable property did not arise as the debenture holder did not have any domain over the debentures. Accordingly, it concluded that debentures could not be regarded as ‘goods’.

The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in R.D. Goyal vs. Reliance Industries Ltd (2003) 1 SCC 81. It held that debentures would not come within the purview of the definition of goods as it was simply an instrument of acknowledgement of debt by the company whereby it undertook to pay the amount covered by it and till then it undertook further to pay interest thereon to the debenture-holders.

DEBENTURES AND IBC

The Supreme Court in Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. vs. UOI, [2019] 108 taxmann.com 147 (SC) observed that debenture holders were financial creditors under the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

In T. Prabhakarv. S Krishnan (Nippon Life India AIF Management Ltd.), [2022] 135 taxmann.com 346 (NCLAT — Chennai) it has been held that to sustain an application under the Code, an applicant ought to establish an existence of ‘debt’ which is due from the ‘corporate debtor’. The NCLAT held that a debenture holder was undoubtedly a ‘financial creditor’. There was no fetter in Law for the ‘debenture holder’ to file an application seeking to initiate corporate insolvency resolution without adding the ‘debenture trustee’.

DEBENTURES UNDER FEMA

The Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 deal with FDI in an Indian company. It states that “equity instruments” means equity shares, convertible debentures, preference shares, and share warrants issued by an Indian company. “Convertible debentures” are defined to mean fully, compulsorily and mandatorily convertible debentures. Thus, partly / optionally / non-convertible debenture is treated as debt under these Rules and would be governed by the Foreign Exchange Management (Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019 or the Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing and Lending) Regulations, 2018. For instance, permission is given for FPIs to invest in listed / unlisted NCDs issued by Indian companies; for NRIs / OCIs to invest in listed NCDs on repatriation / non-repatriation basis. Any other debenture would be treated as an External Commercial Borrowing and would be governed by the applicable ECB Regulations. This would include, rupee-debentures, rupee-bonds and masala bonds (Rupee denominated bonds listed on overseas exchanges).

STAMP DUTY

The Indian Stamp Act, of 1899 levies a duty @ 0.005 per cent on the issue of debentures. The earlier requirement of these debentures being marketable debentures has since been removed. The earlier confusion of whether debentures could be chargeable to duty as bonds has been removed and now, they would only be covered under the Article dealing with debentures. Transfer of debentures now attracts duty @ 0.0001 per cent.

DEBENTURES AND SEBI REGULATIONS

The SEBI (Issue and Listing of Non-convertible Securities) Regulations, 2021 deal with the procedure for listing of debt securities, which are non-convertible with a fixed maturity period. These include bonds, debentures, green debt securities, perpetual debt instruments, etc., issued by a private / public / listed company a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT), or an Infrastructure Investment Trust (InvIT).

If a company whose equity shares are listed wishes to issue convertible debentures, then the issue of the same would be treated as a preferential issue and would be governed by the provisions of the SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018.

DEBENTURES AND NBFC DIRECTIONS

NBFCs are permitted to issue Debentures. However, they need to consider whether the issuance would be a public deposit and hence, would the NBFC Acceptance of Public Deposits (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016 apply? For instance, the definition of public deposit excludes any amount raised by secured debentures or which would be compulsorily convertible into equity shares. Further, any amount raised by issuance of NCDs with maturity > 1 year and minimum subscription of ₹1 crore / investor would also be excluded from this definition.

In addition, the RBI (Non-banking Financial Company — Scale Based Regulation) Directions, 2023 contain certain directions. For instance, NBFCs-Middle Layer can augment their capital funds of issuing perpetual debt instruments. Such debt would be eligible for inclusion as Tier 1 Capital to the extent of 15 per cent of total Tier 1 Capital.

DEBENTURES ARE ACTIONABLE

CLAIMS

The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines an actionable claim to mean a claim to any debt, other than a debt secured by mortgage of immoveable property or by hypothecation or pledge of moveable property, or to any beneficial interest in moveable property not in the possession, either actual or constructive, of the claimant, which the Civil Courts recognise as affording grounds for relief, whether such debt or beneficial interest be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent. The Supreme Court in R.D. Goyal (supra) has held that debentures, having regard to the definition of ’actionable claim’ as defined in s. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, would constitute actionable claims except where they are secured by mortgage of immovable property or hypothecation or pledge of immovable property.

Under s.130 of this Act, the transfer of an actionable claim can be only by the execution of a written instrument, and thereupon all the rights and remedies of the transfer or shall vest in the transferee. However, the Act also provides that these provisions would not apply to debentures which are by law or custom negotiable.

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Standard Chartered Bank vs. Andhra Bank, 2006 (6) SCC 94 has held as follows:

“A debenture is an actionable claim. However, Section 137 of the Transfer of Property Act exempts debentures inter alia from the provisions of Sections 130 to 136 of the TP Act. Thus, with respect to debentures, there is no prescribed mode of transfer of property under the TP Act.”

ARE DEBENTURES NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS?

Is a debenture a type of a negotiable instrument? There is no express provision on this. However, an old decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mercantile Bank of India Limited vs. Capt. Vincent L. D’Silva, AIR 1928 Bom 436 held that debentures issued did not have the ordinary form of a negotiable instrument and were not negotiable instruments either under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or otherwise in the absence of evidence of custom or usage.

One of the types of debentures that can be issued is a bearer debenture, i.e., anyone who holds it can claim interest on due dates and repayment of principal on maturity. A register of holders of bearer debentures is not maintained by the issuer. While there is no express provision on this, considering the wordings of the Negotiable Instruments Act, of 1881 it could be construed that a bearer debenture would be covered within the definition of a bearer promissory note and hence, would become a negotiable instrument.

CONCLUSION

An issue of Debentures requires adherence to various myriad laws. When the tax and accounting issues are added, one gets an entire spectrum of provisions that should be kept in mind while raising funds by the use of debentures.

Recent Developments in GST

A. NOTIFICATIONS

i) Notification No.16/2024-Central Tax dated 6th August, 2024

The above notification seeks to make sections 11 to 13 of the Finance Act (No.1) 2024 operative. The sections 11 & 12 which are regarding provisions of Input Service Distributor (ISD), are to come into effect from 1st April, 2025. Section 13, which is relating to penalty under section 122A, is to come into effect from 1st October, 2024.

ii) The Finance (No.2) Act, 2024 (Act No.15 of 2024), in which amendments proposed in the Budget are incorporated, is assented to by the president on 16th August, 2024, and accordingly the Act has come into operation from 16th August, 2024.

B. CIRCULARS

The following circulars have been issued by CBIC.

(i) Clarification about advertising services — Circular no.230/24/2024-GST dated 11th September, 2024.
By the above circular, clarifications are given in respect of advertising services provided to foreign clients.

(ii) Clarification regarding ITC on demo vehicles — Circular no.231/25/2024-GST dated 11th September, 2024.
By the above circular, the position regarding the availability of input tax credit in respect of demo vehicles is clarified.

(iii) Clarification regarding the place of supply — Circular no.232/26/2024-GST dated 11th September, 2024.
By the above circular, clarifications are given in place of the supply of data hosting services, provided by service providers, located in India, to cloud computing service providers located outside India.

(iv) Clarification about refund regularization — Circular no.233/27/2024-GST dated 11th September, 2024.
By the above circular, clarifications are given regarding the regularization of refund of IGST availed in contravention of rule 96(10) of CGST Rules, 2017, in cases where the exporters imported certain inputs without payment of integrated taxes and compensation cess.

C. ADVISORY

  1.  Advisory dated 26th July, 2024 is issued regarding GSTR-1A.
  2.  The GSTN has issued an advisory dated 2nd August, 2024 giving information about changes in GSTR-8.
  3.  One more advisory dated 2nd August, 2024 is issued about biometric-based Aadhar authentication applicable to J&K and West Bengal. Further, such advisory is issued dated 24th August, 2024 in relation to Dadra, Nagar Haveli & Diu, and Chandigarh. By further advisory dated 6th September, 2024, a similar position is made applicable to Bihar, Delhi, Karnataka, and Punjab.
  4. There is information dated 23rd August, 2024 about the Introduction of the RCM liability/ITC statement.
  5.  An advisory dated 23rd August, 2024 has been issued about furnishing bank details before filing GSTR-1/IFF.
  6.  An advisory dated 3rd September, 2024 is issued about reporting interstate supplies to unregistered dealers in GSTR-1/GSTR-5.

D. INSTRUCTIONS

The CBIC has issued instruction No.2/2024-GST dated 12th August, 2024 by which guidelines are given for a second special all-India drive against fake registrations.

Further, CBIC has also issued instruction No.3/2024-GST dated 14th August, 2024 by which para 2(g) of Instruction no.1/2024-GST dated 30th March, 2024, which is regarding procedure in the investigation, is made applicable in relation to the audit also.

E. ADVANCE RULINGS

29. Exemption vis-a-vis functions under Article 243W
M/s. Navya Nuchu (AR Order No.A. R. Com/12/2023 dt. 9th February, 2024 (Telangana)

The applicant has entered into agreement with the Scheduled Castes Development Department, to rent its property.

Scheduled Castes Development Department provides hostel facilities to Students of Schedule Caste weaker sections and backward classes and renting of property from applicants, which was for creating a hostel facility. The argument of the applicant was that they are providing pure services by way of renting activity which is in relation to functions entrusted to a Municipality / Panchayat under Article 243W/243G of the Constitution of India and the same is covered under entry number 3 of Notification No. 12/2017, dt. 28th June, 2017 and hence exempt under GST Act, 2017. Accordingly, the following question was raised.

“1. Whether rent received from the Govt. SWCBH is taxable or not?”

The ld. AAR referred to entry at serial no.3 of notification 12/2017, which reads as follows:

“Pure services (excluding works contract service or other composite supplies involving supply of any goods) provided to the Central Government, State Government or Union territory or local authority or a Governmental authority by way of any activity in relation to any function entrusted to a Panchayat under article 243G of the Constitution or in relation to any function entrusted to a Municipality under article 243W of the Constitution.”

The ld. AAR observed that the contract entered by the applicant to provide their buildings on rent to the Government in an urban area shall be by way of an activity in relation to functions of the Municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution.

The ld. AAR, therefore, referred to Article 243W, and, held that the exemption should be directly related to the functions enumerated under Article 243W of the Constitution of India. The ld. AAR observed that the applicant is providing renting of buildings to GHMC and there is no direct relation between the services provided by the applicant and the functions discharged by the GHMC under Article 243W read with Schedule 12 to the Constitution of India. The Schedule 11 to the Constitution of India contains “Education including primary and secondary schools” at serial no.17. However, Schedule 12, which is in relation to Article 243W, does not contain such a specific entry. Therefore, activity cannot be said to be covered by functions enumerated under Article 243W, observed the ld. AAR.

Accordingly, the ld. AAR held that these services of renting of property do not qualify for exemption under Notification No. 12/2017 and answered the question accordingly, in negative.

30.Classification ‘Teicoplanin’ and ‘Caspofungin’
M/s. Stanex Drugs & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. (AR Order No.A. R. Com/16/2023 dt. 7th February, 2024 (Telangana)

The applicant is active in developing, Manufacturing & Marketing Domestic and Exporting comprehensive range of pharmaceutical formulations such as small value parental.

The applicant raised a question about the determination of the liability to pay tax on ‘Teicoplanin’ and ‘Caspofungin’.

The ld. AAR observed that the applicant is a manufacturer of parental dosage forms i.e., Drugs and Medicines.

The ld. AAR referred to the item “Drugs or Medicines” as enumerated in Schedule-I to Notification 1/2017 dt. 28th June, 2017 which is as follows:

“S. No. Chapter/Heading/ Sub-heading/ Tariff item

 

Description of Goods
180. 30 Drugs or medicines including their salts and esters and diagnostic test kits, specified in List 1 appended to this Schedule
181. 30 Formulations manufactured from the bulk drugs specified

in List 2 appended to this Schedule or pharmacopeia]

181A 30 Medicaments (including those used in Ayurvedic, Unani, Siddha, Homeopathic or Bio chemic systems), manufactured exclusively in accordance with the formulae described in the authoritative books specified in the First

Schedule to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940) or Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of India or the United States of America or the United Kingdom or the German Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia, as the case may be, and sold under the name as specified in such books or

pharmacopoeia]”

The ld. AAR observed that the commodity name is enumerated in the lists appended to the above schedule and the applicant’s commodities are enumerated in said list as follows:

“Sl. No. in List – 1 to Schedule-I Item
103 Capsofungin acetate
216 Teicoplanin”

 

Accordingly, the ld. AAR held that the above products are taxable at the rate of 2.5% CGST & 2.5% of SGST.

31. AIIMS — Exemption as “Governmental Authority”
M/s. All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AR Order No.A. R. Com/21/2023 dt. 8th February, 2024 (Telangana)

All India Institute of Medical Sciences (i.e. applicant, also referred to as AIIMS) is located in Bibinagar, a town in the YadadriBhuvanagiri district in the State of Telangana.

AIIMS is committed to offering top-tier medical education and training programs with an aim to produce skilled healthcare professionals who can meet the evolving healthcare needs of the nation.

The applicant has entered into contracts with several entities for getting inward services, like for the provision of house-keeping services and manpower supply services at AIIMS Bibinagar, for the provision of security services at college, hospital, and hostel facilities, and for Chartered Accountant services etc.

The above service providers charge 18% GST to applicants and it is currently paying said GST at 18% to service providers. However, applicants have to reverse the entire Input Tax Credit (ITC) availed by them on the above services as it is providing exempt services.

The applicant raised the following question:

“1. Whether All India Institute of Medical Sciences can claim GST Exemption on pure services received from Vendors?”

The contention of the applicant was that it is the Central Government and hence supplies made to it are exempt under entries 3 & 3A of Notification 12/2017. To support the claim that it is the Central Government, it submitted documentary evidence like,

“1. AIIMS, Bibinagar, falls directly under the purview of the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare (MOHFW) and is created by an Act of Parliament Act.

2. That Section 5 of the AIIMS Act 1956 designates them as an “Institute of National Importance”.

3. That they are financed by the Central Government by way of appropriation made by Parliament by Lawon this behalf under Section 15 of the said Act.

4. That their accounts are audited by the comptroller and auditor General of India.”

However, based on the above evidence, the ld. AAR held that the applicant is not a Central Government but a “Governmental Authority” as it is established by the Government by the Act of Parliament. The ld. AAR also observed that the entries at SR. No.3 & 3A of Notification 12/2017 are amended with effect from 1.1.2022 by which reference to Governmental Authority is deleted from the said entries. Therefore, the ld. AAR held that the applicant is not eligible for exemption under these two serial numbers and GST is payable by them.

32. ITC vis-à-vis Immovable Property
M/s. ArthanarisamySenthilMaharaj (AR Appeal No.04/2024 AAAR dt. 21st August, 2024 (TN)

This appeal is against the Advance Ruling No.07/ARA/2024 dated 30th April, 2024 – 2024-VIL-70-AAR passed by AAR on the Application for Advance ruling filed by the Appellant.

The appellant supplies ‘Renting of Immovable Property Service’ falling under Service Accounting Code 997212. The Appellant sought a ruling on the admissibility of Input Tax Credit (ITC) on the ‘Rotary Parking System’ falling under HSN code 8428, installed in its premises, which is rented. The AAR held that ITC is not eligible, being blocked u/s.17(5)(d), as immovable property.

In the appeal, the ground was reiterated that the parking system is in the course of business, as allied services for renting business.

It was argued that ultimately the Car parking facility would bring more revenue to the appellant as a result of more revenue to the GST department.

The argument was also made that the car system is movable and the observations about installation etc., to construe car parking as a system, by ld. AAR is not justified on facts. It was also argued that the parking system is plant and machinery.

Thus, the disallowance, holding the car parking system as immovable property, was objected to.

The ld. AAAR observed that a ‘Rotary Parking System’, as the name suggests, is a system in its own right, much more than an equipment, machinery, or apparatus, as it involves the functionality of various items like machines, equipment, motors, frame assembly, pallets, electrical panels, Hydraulic power packs, Operator boxes to floor/walls/columns and other electrical and electronic support system, a specialized civil foundation with steel structure to withstand the load, etc. and Rotary Parking, takes shape and becomes operational only at the site of the appellant when all the constituent parts are assembled first and installed over the civil foundation and steel framework specifically designed for this purpose. Therefore, the ld. AAAR held that it does not fall within the category of ‘plant and machinery’, and that they are very much part of the immovable property, that is being rented out.

After elaborate discussion, the ld. AAAR opined that within the facts and circumstances of this case, the ‘rotary parking system’, installed and commissioned at the premises of the appellant amounts to the construction of an immovable property, whereby the input tax credit on the purchase of ‘rotary parking system’, by the appellant becomes ineligible for ITC under Section 17(5)(d) of the CGST/TNGST Acts, 2017. Thus, the AR passed by AAR was confirmed.

Allied Laws

29 Sri Bhaskar Debbarmaand Ors vs. State of Tripura and Ors

AIR 2024 (NOC) 640 (TRI)

22nd May, 2024

Electronic evidence — Certification-Condition Precedent — Mandatory Requirement. [S. 65B, Indian Evidence Act, 1872].

FACTS

A Petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Hon’ble Tripura High Court challenging the actions of a Learned District Magistrate (D.M.) who conducted a raid at a marriage hall during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Petitioners were accused of violating strict lockdown protocols by holding a wedding beyond curfew hours. The Petitioner further claimed that the Learned D.M., accompanied by a team of over a hundred members, illegally raided the venue, abused his authority by mistreating guests, making unlawful arrests, and forcibly dispersing the gathering. The Petitioners further alleged that the entire incident was recorded on video, shared widely on social media, and is now presented as evidence before the Hon’ble Court in the form of a Compact Disk (CD). However, it was argued by the Respondents that the said CD was not certified as per the compulsory mandate of section 65B and section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence Act).

HELD

The Hon’ble Court, relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arjun Panditrao Kothkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyaland Ors [(2020) 7 SCC 1], held that certification of electronic evidence under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is a condition precedent and under no circumstances provisions of section 65B of the Evidence Act can be diluted. Therefore, the CD cannot be taken into evidence.

The Petition was, thus, dismissed.

30 Chitta Ranjan Meher and Ors. vs. Soudamini Meher

AIR 2024 Orissa 118

14th May, 2024

Registration — Part Performance of contract — Unregistered agreement to sale- Payment of stamp duty along with penalty — Cannot cure the defect of non-registration. [S. 53A, Transfer of Property Act, 1882; S. 35, Indian Stamps Act, 1899; S. 17(1-A), Registration Act, 1908].

FACTS

The Appellants (Original Plaintiff) had entered into two agreements to sell two properties to the Respondent (Original Defendant). The Respondent paid the agreed consideration, and possession of the properties was handed over. However, since the properties were subject to consolidation, and the proposed sale could lead to fragmentation, the Appellants submitted applications under Section 34 of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972, seeking permission from the consolidation authority. The agreements stipulated that the deeds of conveyance would be executed once this permission was obtained. Unfortunately, the permission could not be secured within the agreed time frame. Subsequently, the Appellants filed a suit seeking a declaration that the two agreements should be declared null, void, and inoperative. In response, the Respondent filed a counterclaim for specific performance of the contract. The agreements, being not properly stamped, were impounded by the Court, but the Respondent remedied this by paying the requisite stamp duty and penalty under section 35 of the Indian Stamps Act, 1899 (Stamps Act). The Learned Trial Court held that since the Respondent had paid the stamp duty and penalty, she was the rightful owner of the suit properties, leading to the dismissal of the Appellants’ application. This decision was subsequently upheld by the Learned District Court.

Aggrieved, a second appeal was preferred before the Hon’ble Orissa High Court (Cuttack Bench).

HELD

The Hon’ble Orissa High Court observed that the Appellants had handed over the possession of the suit property to the Respondent. Further, the respondent duly made the payment. Therefore, the counterclaim of the Respondent was in the nature of part performance (of the agreements to sell) as per the provisions of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TOPA) and not that of specific performance. The Hon’ble Court held that payment of stamp duty and penalty as per section 35 of the Stamps Act cannot cure the defect of non-registration as provided in Section 17(1-A) of the Registration Act, 1908 (Registration Act). Further, there is no provision by which it can be held that mere payment of stamp duty or penalty would validate the contract for the purpose of section 53A of the TOPA, thereby overcoming the bar of section 17(1-A) of the Registration Act. The Hon’ble Court, therefore, held that the counterclaim of part performance could not be entertained, and the appeal of the Original Plaintiff seeking for nullity of the agreement to sell was confirmed.

The appeal was, thus, allowed.

31 Shabna Abdullah vs. Union of India and Ors.

Criminal Appeal No. 3082 of 2024 Supreme Court

20th August, 2024

Judicial discipline — Earlier decision of co-ordinate Bench — Subsequent co-ordinate Bench cannot come to an alternate finding- Ought to have referred to larger Bench. [A. 22(5), Constitution of India; S. 3, Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974].

FACTS

Mr. Abdul Rao (detenue and brother-in-law of the Petitioner) was arrested along with other co-accused under section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 for allegedly sending contraband gold concealed in compressors of refrigerators along with unaccompanied baggage. The defence and the other co-accused were served with detention orders and grounds of detention. However, they were not supplied with material information, such as audio recordings of the voice messages pertaining to the WhatsApp conversations relied upon by the Detaining Authority for making such arrests. Therefore, a Writ Petition was filed before the Hon’ble Kerala High Court by the other co-accused, challenging the non-supply of critical information, which led to the arrests of the co-accused. The Hon’ble Kerala High Court (Division Bench) held that the non-supply of information vitally affected the rights of the accused under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, and thus the said detention was bad in law. Similarly, the sister-in-law of the detenue (i.e., Petitioner) had also filed a Writ Petition before the Hon’ble Kerala High Court. However, the Hon’ble Kerala High Court (Division Bench) dismissed the said Petition.

Aggrieved, an appeal was preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when the same grounds for detention and the same material were relied upon by the detaining authority, which the Hon’ble Kerala High Court (Division Bench) had rejected, another Division Bench of the same Court should not have disregarded the conclusion and come to an alternate finding. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also noted that the subsequent Division Bench ought to have referred the matter to the larger Bench if they were of the view that the earlier decision was not correct in law. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the detention was revoked.

32 The President vs. The State Information Commissioner

AIR 2024 Madras 239

6th June, 2024

Right to Information — Co-operative Society — Does not fall within the ambit of public Authority [S.2(h), Right to Information Act, 2005].

FACTS

Respondent No. 4, Mr. K. Jeeva, is a member of Petitioner’s Co-operative Society. Mr. Jeeva had filed a Right to Information (RTI) application before Respondent No. 3 (i.e., Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Society seeking information regarding loans extended by Petitioner-Co-operative Society to farmers between 2015 and 2021. Respondent No. 3 forwarded the application to the Petitioner-Co-operative Society and requested it to furnish the details of the same, to the extent possible, to Mr. Jeeva. Aggrieved by such a shocking request, Mr. Jeeva filed an appeal before the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Society (Respondent No. 2), requesting it to submit the relevant information regarding the Petitioner-Co-operative Society. Respondent No. 2, however, forwarded the application to Respondent No. 3 since Respondent No. 3 was the competent authority to provide the necessary information. Respondent No. 3 once again sent the application to the Petitioner-Co-operative Society with the same request. Aggrieved by the action of Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3, Mr. Jeeva filed a second appeal before the State Information Commissioner (Respondent No. 1). The State Information Commissioner directed the Petitioner- Society to provide all the information sought by Mr. Jeeva.

Aggrieved by the order, a Petition was filed before the Hon’ble Madras High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

HELD

The Hon’ble Madras Court observed that the Petitioner-Society was registered as a society under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, and was an autonomous body. Further, as per section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, a society does not fall within the definition of public authority. Therefore, relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. and Others vs. The State of Kerala and Others [2013 (7) MLJ 407 (SC)], the Hon’ble Court held that Co-operative Societies do fall under the ambit of the RTI Act.

Thus, the Petition was allowed, and the order of the State Information Commissioner was set aside.

33 C/M Arya KanyaPathshala Samiti and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors.

AIR 2024 Allahabad 238

25th April, 2024

Society Registration — Election for Committee Members — Election result placed before Registrar for recognition- Election invalidated by Registrar — No jurisdiction to invalidate elections — Ought to have referred to prescribed authority. [S. 25(2), Societies Registration Act, 1860].

FACTS

The Petitioner is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 (Act). Following a resolution passed on 30th October, 2021, the Society held elections to appoint members to the committee of management. The results of these elections were then submitted to the Assistant Registrar for official recognition. However, the Registrar declared the results invalid under section 25(2) of the Act, following a complaint from the Society’s President, who claimed that the resolution had not been signed by her.

Aggrieved by the Order, a Petition was filed before the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

HELD

The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court noted that the Registrar failed to provide the Petitioner an opportunity to present their case before declaring the elections invalid. Further, the decision was made solely on the basis of the President’s complaint without gathering any supporting facts. The Court also observed that, under section 25(2) of the Act, the Registrar does not have the authority to cancel or invalidate an election. Instead, the matter should have been referred to the prescribed authority in accordance with section 25(2). Thus, the Hon’ble Court set aside the Registrar’s order.

The Petition was allowed.

Taxability of Compensation for Reduction in Value of ESOPs

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Employee stock options (ESOPs) are granted to employees by the employer company or its parent company as an incentive. These ESOPs so granted can be exercised only after they vest in the employee over the vesting period, after which the employee can choose to exercise the vested ESOPs by applying for shares of the issuer company (employer or its parent) and making payment of the exercise price to the company. The shares are then allotted to the employee by the company.

Such ESOPs are taxable at the time of exercise of the ESOPs by virtue of clause (vi) of section 17(2) as a perquisite under the head ‘Salaries’. This provides that:

“(2) ‘perquisite’ includes the value of any specified security or sweat equity shares allotted or transferred, directly or indirectly, by the employer, or former employer, free of cost or at concessional rate to the assessee.

Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-clause –

(a) ‘specified security’ means the securities as defined in clause (h) of section 2 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956) and, where employees stock option has been granted under any plan or scheme therefore, includes the securities offered under such plan or scheme;

(b) …..

(c) Shall be the fair market value of the specified security or sweat equity shares, as the case may be, on the date on which the option is exercised by the assessee as reduced by the amount actually paid by or recovered from, the assessee in respect of such security or shares;

(d) ………….

(e) ‘Option’ means a right but not an obligation granted to an employee to apply for the specified security or sweat equity shares at a predetermined price;”

At times, it may so happen that the value of the shares for which ESOPs are granted is diminished before the vesting period and the employer may compensate an employee for the diminution in the value of his options, pending the exercise of the options. In such a case, even after the receipt of such compensation, the options continue to exist and can be exercised by the employee.

In one such case, a company compensated employees of its subsidiary for the diminution in the value of their vested but unexercised stock options. On rejection of an application by the employee to the AO, for lower deduction of tax at source, the Delhi High Court held that such compensation was not taxable as a perquisite under the head ‘Salaries’; the Madras High Court in the case of another employee of the same company held that such compensation was taxable as a perquisite and was therefore taxable under the head ‘Salaries’ and tax was deductible by the employer at source at the time of payment of such compensation. It is this controversy, fuelled by the conflicting decisions of the courts, that is sought to be addressed here on the question whether the receipt for compensating the diminution in value is a perquisite and is taxable under the head ‘Salaries’ and is therefore liable to tax deduction at source under s. 192 of the Act by the employer.

The Assessing Officer (AO) in the case before the Madras High Court had in fact conceded that the compensation received was not a perquisite that was taxable under the head ‘Salaries’, but had nonetheless proceeded to hold that the receipt was an income taxable under the head ’Capital Gains’. This issue was not before the Delhi High Court at all, and, therefore, obviously not examined by the court, and as such there is no conflict between the courts on the issue of taxation under the head ‘Capital Gains’. The issue, however, was extensively examined by the Madras High Court to hold that the receipt could not have been taxed as capital gains, though finally it held that receipt was a perquisite taxable under the head ‘Salaries’ and was liable to deduction of tax at source under s. 192 of the Act. For the sake of being comprehensive in reproducing the facts, the contentions and the counter contentions on the issue of capital gains and the findings in law of the Madras High Court are also reproduced for the benefit of the readers.

SANJAY BAWEJA’S CASE

The issue first came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of Sanjay Baweja vs. DCIT 299 Taxman 313.

In this case, the assessee was an ex-employee of Flipkart Internet Pvt Ltd (FIPL), an Indian company, which was a step-down subsidiary of Flipkart Pvt Ltd, Singapore (FPS), a Singapore company. FPS gave stock options (ESOPs) to its employees and the employees of its subsidiaries. The assessee had been granted ESOPs from November 2014 to November 2016 during the period of his employment with FIPL. Some of the ESOPs had vested in the assessee before he left the employment of FIPL, and the unvested ESOPs had been cancelled on account of termination of his employment with FIPL. Out of the vested ESOPs, some had been repurchased by Walmart when it acquired FPS, subsequent to the cessation of employment of the assessee with FIPL.

FPS divested another wholly owned subsidiary, PhonePe. Due to such divestment and subsequent distribution to the shareholders of FPS on account of dividend, buy-back, etc., the value of the ESOPs of FPS fell. The Board of Directors of FPS decided that while there was no legal or contractual right under the ESOP plan to provide compensation for loss in current value or any potential losses on account of future accretion to the ESOP holders, at its own discretion, it decided to pay USD 43.67 as compensation for each ESOP, subject to applicable withholding taxes and other tax rules in respective countries of various ESOP holders.

The assessee was, therefore, entitled to certain compensation from FPS for the diminution in the value of his remaining vested ESOPs. The assessee filed an application under section 197, seeking a nil declaration certificate on the deduction of TDS by FPS from such compensation.

The AO rejected the application of the assessee for nil deduction certificate on the following grounds:

  1.  While the assessee had contended that the amount receivable by him did not constitute income under section 2(24), this section provided an inclusive definition of “income”, which was not exhaustive. Therefore, even a receipt not specifically mentioned therein could still be includible in the taxable income of the assessee.
  2.  While the general rule was that every amount received by an assessee was taxable unless specifically exempt under any provision, the assessee had failed to quote any express provision under which this receipt was exempt from tax.
  3.  The assessee had stated that FPS intended to withhold full tax on the payment. If the amount receivable by the assessee was not an income and not taxable, then the question arose as to why the payer intended to withhold tax on it. This implied that the payer was satisfied that the payment was subject to withholding tax.
  4.  Since the assessee stated that he would be reporting this income as exempt in his tax return, and the quantum was quite substantial, there was a high probability that the tax return would be selected for scrutiny assessment, and the assessee’s claim will not be accepted by the AO, which would result in creation of tax demand. Issue of a nil TDS certificate would hence be detrimental to the interest of revenue and recovery of taxes.
  5.  The use of the phrase “directly or indirectly” in section 17(2)(vi) implies that the amount receivable by the assessee in this case would be covered under the purview of “perquisite”.
  6.  The compensation was linked to the vested ESOPs. ESOPs resulted in a taxable perquisite on the allotment of shares, equivalent to the fair market value less the exercise price of the shares so allotted, which was taxable under the head “Salaries” in the hands of the employee or ex-employee, as the case may be. Consequently, the compensation receivable on these ESOPs, even though from a former employer, on account of diminution in value of the underlying shares, should also have the same characterisation and tax treatment, and was hence taxable under the head “Salaries”.

The Delhi High Court noted that ,undisputedly, the assessee had not exercised his vested right with respect to the ESOPs till date, which showed that the right of holding the shares had not been exercised. It analysed the provisions of section 17(2)(vi). The Delhi High Court observed that the determination of whether a particular receipt tantamounted to a capital receipt or a revenue receipt was dependent upon the factual scenario of the case. It noted the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Saurashtra Cement Ltd 325 ITR 422 and Shrimant Padmaraje R Kadambande vs. CIT 195 ITR 877 in this regard. The Delhi High Court also took note of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Godrej & Co vs. CIT 37 ITR 381, where a one-time payment was given to the assessee in view of the change in contractual terms between the assessee and the management company. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the amount was received as compensation for the deterioration or injury to the managing agency by reason of the release of its rights to get higher termination, and was, therefore, a capital receipt.

As regards the AO’s argument that the amount was liable to be taxed since FPS intended to deduct TDS, the Delhi High Court observed that the manner or nature of payment, as comprehended by the deductor, would not determine the taxability of such transaction. It was the quality of payment that would determine its character and not the mode of payment. According to the Delhi High Court, unless the charging section of the Act elucidated any monetary receipt as chargeable to tax, the revenue could not proceed to charge such receipt as revenue receipt. The Delhi High Court referred to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Empire Jute Co Ltd vs. CIT 124 ITR 1 for the proposition that the perception of the payer would not determine the character of the payment in the hands of the recipient.

Referring to the provisions of section 17(2)(vi), the Delhi High Court noted that the most crucial ingredient of this provision was – determinable value of any specified security received by the employee by way of transfer / allotment, directly or indirectly, by the employer. As per explanation (c) to this provision, the value of the specified security could only be calculated once the option was exercised. In a literal reading of the provision, the value of specified securities or sweat equity shares was dependent upon the exercise of option. Therefore, for an income to be included as perquisite, it was essential that it was generated from the exercise of options by the employee.

On the facts of the case before it, the High Court noted that the assessee had not exercised options under the ESOP scheme till date but the options were merely held by the assessee. The Delhi High Court was, therefore, of the view that the options did not, therefore, constitute income chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee, as none of the contingencies specified in section 17(2)(vi) had occurred.

Besides, the Delhi High Court noted that the compensation was a voluntary payment and not a transfer by way of any obligation. It was important that the management proceeded by noting that there was no legal or contractual right under the ESOP scheme to provide compensation for loss in current value or any potential losses on account of future accretion to the ESOP holders. FPS, on its own discretion, had estimated and decided to pay USD 43.67 as compensation for each stock option held on the record date.

According to the Delhi High Court, it was elementary to highlight that the payment in question was not linked to the employment or business of the assessee but was a one-time voluntary payment to all the option holders of ESOP, pursuant to the divestment of PhonePe business from FPS. In the case before it, even though the right to exercise the option was available to the assessee, the amount received by him did not arise out of any transfer of stock options. It was a one-time voluntary payment not arising out of any statutory or contractual obligation.

Therefore, the Delhi High Court held that treatment of the amount of compensation as a perquisite under section 17(2)(vi) could not be countenanced in law, as the stock options were not exercised by the assessee, and the amount in question was a one-time voluntary payment made by FPS to all the option holders in lieu of disinvestment of PhonePe business.

NISHITHKUMAR MUKESHKUMAR MEHTA’S CASE

The issue again came up before a single judge of the Madras High Court in the case of Nishithkumar Mukeshkumar Mehta vs. Dy CIT 165 taxmann.com 386.

In this case, the assessee was an employee of FIPL to whom stock options had been granted by FPS. Compensation was announced by FPS at USD 43.67 per ESOP on divestment of PhonePe business as described above, with former employees to receive the compensation only on vested ESOPs which were not exercised, while existing employees would receive the compensation on all unexercised outstanding ESOPs, whether vested or unvested. Such compensation was proposed to be treated as a perquisite taxable under the head ‘salaries’ by FIPL, with deduction of tax at source under section 192 on that basis. The assessee applied for a nil tax deduction certificate under section 197.

The assessee’s application was rejected by the AO on the basis of the following:

  1.  While the compensation to be received was not chargeable under the head ‘Salaries’, the contention that it was not taxable as capital gains was found to be an illogical contention;
  2.  The value of compensation to be received represented the surrender value of PhonePe shares held by the assessee while holding the FPS ESOPs. Therefore, the claim that no asset was transferred was found to lack credence;
  3.  The surrender or relinquishment of right to sue and litigate was the asset transferred so as to earn this compensation and therefore, the transaction squarely fell under the provisions of section 45.

Therefore, the AO was of the view that there was a capital gain arising out of the transfer of a capital asset, which was taxable under section 45,and therefore, rejected the application u/s 197. Against this rejection of application under section 197, the assessee filed a writ petition to the Madras High Court.

On behalf of the assessee (incidentally represented by the same counsel who had appeared before the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Baweja’s case), before the Madras High Court, it was pointed out that the ESOPs were rights in relation to shares of FPS which had issued such ESOPs. They were, therefore, capital assets. Since the assessee continued to hold the same number of ESOPs before and after receipt of the compensation, there was no transfer of capital assets, and in the absence of transfer of capital assets, capital gains tax could not be levied. Compensation paid to the assessee was a capital receipt, and such capital receipt was taxable as capital gains only if gains accrued from the transfer of capital assets. Since capital assets were not transferred by the assessee, capital gains tax could not be imposed.

It was further argued on behalf of the assessee that it was never held that the asset transferred by the assessee was the relinquishment of the right to sue or litigate. The assessee had no right to receive compensation for the divestment of the PhonePe business by FPS. In the absence of a right to receive compensation, the payment was a discretionary one-time payment by FPS. Even if such compensation had not been paid, the terms of the ESOP scheme did not confer any rights on the assessee, including the right to sue. Further, a right to sue was not transferable as per section 7 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Therefore, the conclusion that the transaction fell within the scope of section 45 was untenable.

It was argued that since the receipt by the assessee was a capital receipt, the Income Tax Act did not provide for TDS thereon. While the Income Tax Act provides for machinery for the computation of capital gains, being the difference between the acquisition price and resale price, there was no machinery provision with regards to taxation of receipts such as compensation in relation to ESOPs. It was submitted that the order of rejection called for interference not only because the conclusion that there was a relinquishment of the right to sue was erroneous, but also because the order did not identify the provision of the Income Tax Act under which the assessee was liable to pay tax or under which tax was liable to be deducted at source.

Reliance was placed upon various judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts to support the propositions that the compensation was in the nature of a capital receipt, that capital receipts which are not chargeable under section 45 cannot be taxed under any other head, that capital gains tax cannot be imposed in the absence of a computation mechanism, that a mere right to sue cannot be transferred and that tax cannot be deducted at source if the payment does not constitute income.

On behalf of the revenue, it was submitted that ESOPs are capital assets, and that the ESOPs had a higher value while FPS held an interest in PhonePe. Since the value of ESOPs held by the assessee declined on divestment of the PhonePe business by FPS, the assessee had a right to sue for diminution of value. Since the compensation was paid as consideration for relinquishment of the right to sue, such relinquishment qualified as the transfer of a capital asset.

Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Madras High Court in K R Srinath vs. ACIT,268 ITR 436, where the court held that the compensation received for relinquishment of a right to sue for specific performance of a contract relating to the purchase of immovable property was a capital receipt, which was liable to capital gains tax. It was, therefore, argued that the amount of compensation received by the assessee was a capital gain which was taxable, because it accrued from the transfer / relinquishment of the right to sue for compensation for diminution in the value of the ESOPs.

On behalf of the assessee, in rejoinder, it was pointed out that in contrast to the facts of the case in K R Srinath (supra), the ESOP scheme did not confer a contractual right on the assessee to sue for specific performance.

The Madras High Court analysed the provisions of the ESOP scheme and the facts pertaining to the compensation. It then went on to analyse whether the ESOPs were capital assets. It noted that while shares were indisputably capital assets because they qualified as movable goods under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and the Companies Act, 2013, ESOPs were rights in relation to capital assets, i.e., right to receive capital assets subject to the terms and conditions of the ESOP scheme. Analysing the definition of capital assets, it noted that explanation 1 to section 2(14), which clarifies that property includes and shall be deemed to have always included any rights in or in relation to an Indian company, including rights of management or control or any other rights whatsoever, was not attracted, since the assessee had no rights in the Indian company of which he was an employee.

It, thereafter, went on to analyse the judgments relied upon by the assessee for the proposition that compensation was a capital receipt which was not taxable because it did not accrue from the transfer of a capital asset.

  •  In Kettlewell Bullen & Co Ltd vs. CIT 53 ITR 261 (SC) and Karam Chand Thapar & Bros Pvt Ltd vs. CIT 4 SCC 124, the compensation received for relinquishment of the managing agency was construed as a capital receipt because it was intended to compensate for the impairment of the source of revenue or profit-making apparatus.
  •  In Vodafone India Services (P) Ltd vs. UOI 368 ITR 1 (Bom), receipt arising out of a capital account transaction was held to be not taxable as income in the absence of an express legislative mandate.
  •  In Oberoi Hotel (P) Ltd vs. CIT 236 ITR 903 (SC), compensation received for relinquishment of rights of management of a hotel for a management fee calculated on the gross operating profits and right of first offer in the event of transfer / lease, was held to be for injury inflicted on the capital asset of the assessee, resulting in the loss of the source of the assessee’s income, and was, therefore, construed as a capital receipt.
  • On a similar basis, compensation for variation of the terms of the managing agency was held to be a capital receipt by the Supreme Court in Godrej & Co’s case (supra).
  • In Senairam Doongarmall vs. CIT 42 ITR 392 (SC), compensation received for acquisition of factory buildings adjoining a tea garden with consequential cessation of the production was held to be a capital receipt, while in CIT vs. Saurashtra Cement Ltd 325 ITR 422 (SC), liquidated damages received for failure to supply an additional cement plant was construed as a capital receipt.

According to the Madras High Court, the common thread running through all these cases was that the compensation was paid either for the loss of the profit-making apparatus or, at a minimum, for the sterilisation thereof. Hence, such compensation was held to be a capital receipt.

The Madras High Court observed that, at first blush, the ratio of these cases seems to apply to the case at hand because compensation was paid for the diminution in value of ESOPs and potential losses on account of future accretion to ESOP holders due to the divestment of the PhonePe business. It, however, noted the following significant differences on a closer examination. It noted that the ESOPs were contractual rights, and that the scheme included conditions regarding vesting, cancellation and transfer. In case of breach of the obligation by the insurer to allot shares upon exercise of the option in terms of the ESOP scheme, the assessee would have the right to claim compensation or sue for specific performance. Therefore, the ESOPs were contractual rights that may qualify as actionable claims (though not as defined in The Transfer of Property Act) or choses in action in certain circumstances.

Unlike in the case of managing agency or tea factory in the cited cases, ESOPs were not a source of revenue or profit-making apparatus for the holder because these actionable claims were intrinsically not capable of generating revenue (notional or actual) and could not be monetised, whether by transfer or otherwise, until shares were allotted. Even at the time of allotment,
there was a notional but not an actual benefit. Actual benefit accrued only upon transfer, provided there was a capital gain.

According to the Madras High Court, in all the cited cases, the compensation was received in relation to relinquishment of rights in revenue generating and subsisting capital assets, while in the case of ESOPs, the capital assets came into existence only upon allotment of shares, and revenue generation from the capital assets was possible only thereafter. Therefore, the compensation was not for the loss of or even sterilisation of a profit-making apparatus but by way of a discretionary payment towards potential (as regards unvested options) or actual (as regards vested options) diminution in value of contractual rights. This was supported by the FPS communication that referred to the compensation as being paid without legal or contractual obligation towards loss in value of ESOPs (and not shares).

The Madras High Court noted that the ESOP scheme did not contain any representation or warranty to ESOP holders that no action would be taken that could impair the value of the ESOPs, and therefore, there was no contractual right to compensation. It could, therefore, not be said that a non-existent right was relinquished.

The Madras High Court, therefore, concluded that ESOPs did not fall within the ambit of the expression “property of any kind held by an assessee” in section 2(14) and were consequently not capital assets. Therefore, the receipt was not a capital receipt.

Since the order of rejection by the AO concluded that a capital asset was transferred, the Court then went on to analyse the tenability of that conclusion. Since the ESOPs were not exercised, shares of FPS were not issued or allotted to the assessee, and therefore the assessee neither received nor transferred a capital asset. Since the ESOP scheme did not confer a right to receive compensation for impairment in the value of ESOPs, both the conclusion in the order of rejection the contention on behalf of the revenue, that compensation was paid towards relinquishment of the right to sue, by placing reliance on the decision in the case of K R Srinath, was untenable.

Given this conclusion, the matter could have been remanded by the Court to the AO. However, the counsel for the assessee confirmed to the Court that the relief claimed included a direction for issuance of a nil certificate, and therefore, it was not sufficient to remand the matter for reconsideration. The Madras High Court, therefore, went on to consider the manner in which the Income Tax Act dealt with receipts in relation to the holding of ESOPs. It noted that the definition of “salary” was inclusive and included perquisites, while the definition of “perquisite” was also inclusive and covered the value of a specified security. It analysed that the ESOPs granted to the assessee as an employee of a step-down subsidiary qualified as ESOPs under the Companies Act, 2013, and therefore, fell within the scope of explanation (a) to clause (vi) of section 17(2). It is in this light that the specific issue of whether the compensation paid to the assessee qualified as a perquisite had to be considered.

The Madras High Court noted the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Baweja’s case (supra), where the Delhi High Court had concluded that the one-time voluntary payment was a capital receipt, which was not liable to tax as a perquisite.

Analysing clause (vi) of section 17(2), the Madras High Court observed that since clause (vi) was illustrative of perquisite, it was not intended to tax the capital gains that may accrue if such specified security were to be sold by the allottee after capital appreciation. Instead, as the plain language indicated, clause (vi) took within its fold and treated as a perquisite the benefit extended to the employee or any other person from out of the grant of specified securities at concessional rates or free of cost. In the specific context of ESOPs, explanation (a) to clause (vi) explains the scope of “specified security” by using expression “includes the securities offered under such plan or scheme”, and not the phrase “includes the securities allotted under such plan or scheme”. Given that the assessee had not exercised the option in respect of the ESOPs held by him, shares of FPS were not issued or allotted to him. According to the court, the inference that followed was that “specified security” in the context of ESOPs was not confined to allotted shares but included securities offered to the holder of ESOPs. The use of “includes” instead of “means” also indicated that the phrase “securities offered under such plan or scheme” was not intended to be exhaustive.

The Madras High Court was of the view that the expression “value of any specified security… transferred directly or indirectly by the employer… free of cost or at concessional rate to the assessee” in clause (vi) was wide enough to encompass the discretionary compensation paid to ESOP holders to compensate for the potential or actual diminution in value thereof. Consequently, especially in view of the inclusive definition of perquisite, merely because the method of valuing the perquisite did not fit neatly into explanation (c) to clause (vi) of section 17(2), did not mean that it could not be taxed as a perquisite, provided the value of the perquisite could be determined. According to the High Court, to determine the value of the perquisite, the benefit that the employee or other person received from the specified security, though not by way of capital gains, should be determinable.

Addressing the issue of ascertainment of the benefit, the Madras High Court observed that ordinarily, the benefit would be the difference between the fair market value of the share and the price at which such share is offered to the ESOP holder. Since such monetary benefit would typically be realised, though notionally, only at the time of exercise of the option and remains a non-monetisable contractual right until then, the fair market price of the shares on the date of exercise of the option is reckoned and the price paid by the option holder is deducted therefrom to determine the value of the perquisite in the form of ESOP. Therefore, explanation (c) to clause (vi) prescribes that the value of the specified security is the difference between the fair market value of the shares on the date of exercise of the option and the price paid by the option holder. In the case before the court, the assessee received a substantial monetary benefit at the pre-exercise stage by way of discretionary compensation for diminution in the value of the stock options.

The Madras High Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Infosys Technologies Ltd 297 ITR 167, where the Supreme Court considered the question whether the issuer company was liable to deduct TDS under section 192 in respect of shares allotted under an ESOP scheme and subject to a lock-in for a period of five years. The relevant assessment year was 1999–2000, when clause (vi) was not applicable. After holding that the insertion of clause (vi) with effect from assessment year 2000–01 did not apply retrospectively, the Supreme Court held that the notional benefit that accrued from shares that were subject to a lock-in could not be treated as a perquisite because there was no cash inflow to the employees till the end of the lock-in period. The Madras High Court observed that while the principle that notional benefit cannot be taxed as a perquisite was formulated in a specific statutory context which no longer existed, the broader principle laid down therein to the effect that the benefit from the ESOP was to be determined for purposes of and as a prerequisite for taxation as a perquisite continued to apply.

The Madras High Court noted that in the case before it, actual monetary benefit was received at the pre-exercise stage by the assessee and other stakeholders. Such monetary benefit was paid to the assessee on account of being an ESOP holder, and ESOPs were granted to the assessee as an employee under the ESOP scheme. If payments had been made by the assessee in relation to the ESOPs, it would have been necessary to deduct the amount of such payment to arrive at the value of the perquisite. Since the assessee did not make any payments towards the ESOPs and continued to retain all the ESOPs even after the receipt of compensation, the Madras High Court was of the view that the entire receipt qualified as a perquisite liable to be taxed under the head “Salaries”.

Therefore, according to the Madras High Court, it was not necessary to consider whether it fell under any other head of income. Due to the conclusion that the compensation qualified as a perquisite and not as a capital receipt, as per the Madras High Court, the judgments cited in respect of capital gains, including those relating to the absence of the rate or computation mechanism or provision for TDS, lost relevance. For these reasons, the Madras High Court expressed its inability to endorse the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Sanjay Baweja (supra).

OBSERVATIONS

The crucial aspect in this controversy is whether the compensation received for diminution in value of ESOPs is a perquisite under the head ‘Salaries’ and if yes, whether the payer was liable to deduct tax at source. The incidental issue is whether the receipt is a capital receipt and the right granted of ESOPs is a capital asset or not. The Madras High Court addressed the issue of capital gains to hold that the employee in question was not holding a capital asset that was transferred resulting into capital gains but proceeded further to hold that the receipt in question was a perquisite liable to taxation under the head ‘Salaries’ and the employer was required to deduct tax at source.

An important point that is required to be noted, at the outset, is that in the case before the Madras High court, the AO had conceded and held that the compensation was not a perquisite under the head ‘Salaries’. In view of the definitive conclusion of the AO on the issue of perquisite, there was no dispute before the High Court on this aspect of taxation under the head ‘Salaries’. It is, therefore, intriguing that the Madras High court proceeded to hold, though it was not asked to do so, that the receipt of compensation was a perquisite that was taxable under the head ‘Salaries’ and was liable to deduction of tax at source under s. 192 of the Act. Could it have done so in the writ jurisdiction, where the issue before the court was perhaps whether the AO was right in holding that the compensation received was a capital gain and was subjected to the deduction of tax at source, when there is no provision for such deduction in respect of the payment of capital gains?

The logic of the Madras High Court was that ESOPs were merely rights to receive capital assets (shares) and not capital assets themselves. In doing so, the definition of “specified security”, which referred to securities as defined in section 2(h) of the securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, was not considered in depth by the High Court.

Section 2(h) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (SCRA) reads as under:

“securities” include—

(i) shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, debentures, debenture stock or other marketable securities of a like nature
in or of any incorporated company or other body
corporate;

(ia) derivative;

(ib) units or any other instrument issued by any collective investment scheme to the investors in such schemes;

(ic) security receipt ………….;

(ii) Government securities;

(iia) such other instruments as may be declared by the Central Government to be securities; and

(iii) rights or interest in securities.

Therefore, derivative or rights or interest in securities are also securities. Further, “derivative” is defined in section 2(ac) of SCRA as under:

“derivative” includes —

(A) a security derived from a debt instrument, share, loan, whether secured or unsecured, risk instrument or contract for differences or any other form of security;

(B) a contract which derives its value from the prices, or index of prices, of underlying securities.

Further, section 2(d) of SCRA defines “option” as under:

“option in securities” means a contract for the purchase or sale of a right to buy or sell, or a right to buy and sell, securities in future, and includes a teji, a mandi, a teji mandi, a galli, a put, a call or a put and call in securities.

An option is definitely a derivative, if not a right or interest in a security, and is, therefore, a security by itself. That being so, it would certainly be a capital asset. Therefore, the very basis of the distinction drawn by the Madras High Court in rejecting the decisions cited on behalf of the assessee, and in holding that such a right is merely a chose in action or only a right to receive a capital asset, does not seem to be justified. The fact that an ESOP is a capital asset is also supported by the well-settled view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Tata Services Ltd 122 ITR 594 and the Madras High Court in the case of K R Srinath (supra), where the High Courts had held that the right to acquire an immovable property or the right to specific performance under an agreement to purchase an immovable property was also a capital asset, the transfer or extinguishment of which was subject to capital gains tax. Besides, the Karnataka High Court in the case of Chittranjan A. Dassanacharya, 429 ITR 570 and the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in the case of N.R. Ravikrishnan, 155 ITD 355 have held that the right to acquire shares under ESOP was a capital asset and the holding period commenced with the date of grant.

The other angle in the logic of the Madras High Court was that the ESOP scheme did not contain any representation or warranty to ESOP holders that no action would be taken that could impair the value of the ESOPs, and therefore, there was no contractual right to compensation, and therefore, it could not be regarded as a transfer of any rights. On the facts of the case, it was clear that the payment was a voluntary one, and that the assessee was not entitled to any such compensation. The assessee also did not have any right to make such a claim for any compensation under the ESOP scheme. In fact, the assessee’s claim was that since there was no transfer, the amount received could not be taxed as capital gains.

The third basis of the Madras High Court decision was that section 17(2)(vi) was an inclusive definition and, therefore, applied to the compensation received. In this connection, the Madras High Court failed to take note of certain findings of the Supreme  Court in the case considered by it of Infosys Technologies (supra):

Unless a benefit /receipt is made taxable, it cannot be regarded as ‘income’. This is an important principle of taxation under the Act.
…..
Be that as it may, proceeding on the basis that there was ‘benefit’, the question is whether every benefit received by the person is taxable as income? It is not so. Unless the benefit is made taxable, it cannot be regarded as income. During the relevant assessment years, there was no provision in law which made such benefit taxable as income. Further, as stated, the benefit was prospective. Unless a benefit is in the nature of income or specifically included by the Legislature as part of income, the same is not taxable.

As per the Supreme Court, unless an item is specifically included in the definition of “perquisite”, it would not be taxable as a perquisite. This is directly contrary to the view taken by the Madras High Court that even if the compensation did not fall strictly within the definition of perquisite, it would still be taxable as a perquisite since the definition was an inclusive one. Clause (vi) clearly provides for both the date of taxation as well as the computation mechanism — if neither applies, the compensation received would not be taxable as a perquisite.

On the other hand, the various decisions cited on behalf of the assessee before the Madras High Court clearly point out that if a receipt is relatable to a capital asset, it is a capital receipt. Such capital receipt is chargeable to tax as capital gains only if there is transfer of a capital asset. If there is no transfer of a capital asset in connection with which the amount is received, in the absence of a specific charging provision, it is not subject to tax at all. In this case, there was no transfer of a capital asset at all by the assessee.

Therefore, the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Baweja’s case that such compensation was not a perquisite, not liable to be taxed under the head ‘Salaries’, and not subject to tax deduction at source, seems to be the better view of the matter.

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

9 C I T (E), Pune vs. Lata Mangeshkar Medical Foundation

(2024) 464 ITR 706 (SC)

Charitable Purpose — Exemption — Principle of consistency — High Court upheld the order of the lower authorities which allowed the exemption based on earlier appellate orders which had become final — Special Leave Petition dismissed

The Assessee Trust was running a hospital by the name “Deenanath Mangeshkar Hospital” in Pune. During the assessment proceeding for Assessment Year 2010–2011, the Assessing Officer (“AO”) denied the exemption under Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) and then vide assessment order under Section 143(3) of the Act, computed the total income at ₹18,16,02,520. The exemption under section 11 of the Act was denied because —

(i) The Assessee-Trust had not furnished proper information to the Charity Commissioner and there was a shortfall in making provisionsfor the Indigent Patients Fund (“IPF”). According to AO, Assessee should have credited an amount of ₹2.14 crores to the IPF as against ₹75.96 lakhs only.

(ii) The Assessee Trust had generated a huge surplus and therefore, the intention of the trust was
profit-making. AO was of the opinion that the hospital of Assessee did not provide services to the poor and underprivileged class of the society.

(iii) The Assessee-Trust was running a canteen in the hospital with a profit motive and was not providing free meals.

(iv) There was a violation of provisions of Section 13(1)(c) of the Act by Assessee-Trust as remuneration was paid to two individuals, viz., Mrs. Bharati Mangeshkar, who is a trustee with no significant qualification and Mrs. Meena Kelkar, mother of the trustee Dr. Dhananjay Kelkar, who also did not possess any qualification and was beyond 65 years of age.

Being aggrieved by this assessment order dated 22nd March, 2013, Assessee Trust preferred an Appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) (“CIT(A)”). The CIT(A) granted relief to Assessee-Trust by restoring the exemption under Section 11 of the Act.

Revenue challenged the said order before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (“ITAT”). The ITAT was pleased to dismiss the Appeal by an order dated 23rd June, 2017.

The order of the ITAT was challenged by the Revenue before the High Court. The High Court noted that CIT(A) while deciding the issue in favour of the Assessee noted that the facts in the year under Appeal, i.e., for Assessment Year 2010–2011 were identical to those of Assessment Years 2008–2009 and 2009–2010. The CIT(A) followed the orders of his predecessor for Assessment Years 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 and decided the issue in favour of the Assessee.

Revenue had challenged those orders of CIT(A) and filed an Appeal before the ITAT for Assessment Years  2008–2009 and 2009–2010. The co-ordinate Bench of the ITAT by an order dated 15th April, 2016 upheld the order of CIT(A).

According to the High Court, The ITAT for the assessment year 2010–11 had merely followed what its co-ordinate Bench held in its order dated 15th April, 2016 for Assessment Years 2008–2009 and 2009–2010. Since there was nothing on record that the order of ITAT dated 15th April, 2016 had been set aside or overruled in any manner by the High Court, the ITAT found no reason to interfere with the order of CIT(A). The High Court noted that the Appeals for those years were filed before the High Court for the earlier years had been dismissed on the ground of delay. In the circumstances, the High Court found no reason to interfere with the order of ITAT.

Revenue challenged the said order before the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition holding that no case for its interference was made out by the Appellant.

10 PCIT vs. Trigent Software Ltd.

(2024) 464 ITR 770 (SC)

Business Expenditure — Capital or Revenue — Software company abandoned a new software that it was developing — High Court holding that the amount spent was deductible as revenue expenditure — Special Leave Petition dismissed.

The assessee was engaged in the business of software development solutions and management. The assessment for the assessment year 2007–08 was completed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s 147. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of expenditure of ₹7.09 crores in respect of the development of software that was abandoned.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the claim of deduction holding that the expenditure for the development of a new product by the assessee was in the assessee’s existing line of business. The CIT(A) further held that though the assessee had shown the expenditure as capital work-in-progress for the earlier assessment years, the deduction had to be allowed as a revenue expenditure in the year in which the project in question was abandoned.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the view expressed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

The High Court held that the appellant was admittedly in the business of development of software solutions and management, and therefore its endeavour to develop a new software was nothing but an endeavour in its existing line of business of developing software solutions. Admittedly, the product that was sought to be developed never came into existence, and the same was abandoned. No new asset came into existence which would be of enduring benefit to the assessee, and, therefore the expenditure could only be said to be revenue in nature.

The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition of the Revenue holding that no case for interference was made out so as to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

11 Jt. CIT vs. Clix Capital Services Pvt. Ltd.

(2024) 464 ITR 768 (SC)

Penalty notice — Assessment order passed on 28th October, 2011 — Show cause notice u/s. 274 for imposition of penalty issued on 9th November, 2017 — High Court holding that the notice is barred by limitation — SLP dismissed

On 31st October, 2007, the assessee filed its return of income for the assessment year 2007–08 declaring a total income of ₹47,39,42,143.

A revised return of income was filed on 31st March, 2009 declaring the total income of ₹47,14,28,736. In the revised return the assessee inter alia added back certain expenses amounting to ₹84,62,03,987 by way of abundant caution, having regard to the provision of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. In the succeeding assessment year, that is, the assessment year 2008–09, the assessee claimed the said expense of ₹84,62,03,987 as a deduction, as the said amount had been actually expended.

The assessment order for the assessment year 2007–08 was passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act on 28th October, 2011 determining total income at ₹102,06,71,340.

The Assessing Officer, in an internal communication dated 9th September, 2013 addressed to the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax wrote that a penalty should be imposed on the assesee for failure to deduct tax at source qua assessment year 2007–08. A reminder was sent on 11th July, 2014. A notice u/s. 274 of the Act was issued on 9th November, 2017 calling upon the assessee to show cause as to why penalty should not be imposed u/d. 271C of the Act for the assessment year 2007–08.

The assessee filed a response on 19th December, 2017, inter alia raising a preliminary objection, namely, that the notice was barred by limitation.

The assessee filed a writ petition before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court which directed that an order be passed on the objection of the assessee.

This led to the passing of the order dated 14th June, 2018 which was followed by a second show-cause notice on 27th June, 2018.

The assessee once again approached the court and filed a writ petition challenging both the show cause notices.

The High Court observed that section 275 of the Act has two limbs. The first limb concerns the fixation of a period of limitation when the penalty is sought to be imposed as fallout of action taken in another proceeding. On the other hand, the second limb of clause (c) of sub-section (i) of section 275 of the Act fixes the period of limitation, where initiation of action of imposition of penalty is taken on a standalone basis, that is, not as a consequence of action taken in another proceeding.

For the second limb, the legislature has provided a limitation of six months from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated. But there is no indication, as to when the period of six months ought to commence. The High Court agreed with the assessee that the proceedings should be commenced within a reasonable period.

The High Court was of the view that the show cause notice dated 9th November, 2017 was delayed and therefore quashed the same.

On a special leave petition being filed by the Revenue, the Supreme Court dismissed the same holding that no case for interference was made out for it to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.