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Business expenditure – Capital or revenue expenditure – Section 37 – A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09 – Development charges on research and testing of components – Revenue expenditure

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CIT vs. JCB India Ltd.; 376 ITR 621 (Del):

For the A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09, the assessee had claimed that development charges on research and testing components is revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim on the ground that in several previous assessment years the plea of the assessee that it was revenue expenditure was accepted.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The assessee incurred the development charges on research and testing of components. This did not result in a benefit to it of enduring nature so as to characterize the development charges as capital expenditure. Testing of products and components is essentially a continuous process which permeats different accounting years. It is an integral part of the routine manufacturing and monitoring activity. It can not obviously be a one-time event.

ii) The Revenue had not been able to persuade the Court that an error had been committed in any of the previous assessment years where the assessee’s explanation was accepted and the expenditure on development charges was treated as revenue expenditure.

iii) In the facts and circumstances of the case, the rule of consistency was adopted and the plea of the revenue to remand the matter to the Assessing Officer for a fresh determination was declined.”

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Income or capital receipt – A. Y. 2008-09 – An amount received by a prospective employee ‘as compensation for denial of employment’ was not in nature of profits in lieu of salary. It was a capital receipt that could not be taxed as income under any other head

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CIT vs. Pritam Das Narang; [2015] 61 taxmann.com 322 (Delhi)

In terms of employment agreement, the assessee was to be employed as CEO of M/s ACEE Enterprises (‘ACEE’). The ACEE was unable to take assessee on board due to sudden change in its business plan. The ACEE paid compensation of Rs. 1.95 crore to assessee as a “onetime payment for non-commencement of employment as proposed”. The assessee had not offered such compensation to tax. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of assessee on the ground that u/s. 17(3)(iii) receipt by the assessee of any sum from any person prior to his joining with such person was taxable. The CIT(A) deleted the addition and held that section 17(3)(iii) had been brought in to account for taxing ‘joining bonus’ received from the prospective employer as profit in lieu of salary. The ITAT upheld the findings of CIT(A).

In appeal by the Revenue, the ld. Counsel of department urged that since the wording of section 17(3)(iii) was that “any amount received from any person”, it was not necessary that the amount had to be received only from an employer in order that such sum be brought to tax in the hands of an assessee under the head ‘profits in lieu of salary’. It was submitted that the expression any person could include a prospective employer in the present case.

The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The interpretation sought to be placed by revenue on plain language of section 17(3)(iii) could not be accepted. The words “from any person” occurring therein have to be read together with the following words in sub-clause (A): “before his joining any employment with that person”. In other words, section 17(3)(iii) pre-supposes the existence of the relationship of employee and employer between the assessee and the person who makes the payment of “any amount’ in terms of section 17(3)(iii).

(ii) Therefore the words in section 17(3)(iii) cannot be read disjunctively to overlook the essential facet of the provision, viz, the existence of ’employment’, i.e., a relationship of employer and employee between the person who makes the payment of the amount and the assessee.

(iii) The other plea of revenue that said amount should be taxed under some other head of income, including ‘income from other sources’, was also unsustainable. In case of CIT vs. Rani Shankar Mishra [2009] 178 Taxman 324 (Delhi), it was held that where an amount was received by a prospective employee ‘as compensation for denial of employment’, such amount was not in nature of profits in lieu of salary. Thus, it was a capital receipt that could not be taxed as income under any other head.”

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[2015] 61 taxmann.com 238 (Bombay) – Anurag Kashyap vs. UOI.

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High Court refused to interfere with adjudication proceeding which covered the period for which application was filed by the Petitioner under VCES. Held that, Petitioner can take all the arguments and contentions possible in law before adjudicating authority, including inviting his attention to relevant paragraphs in the said scheme.

Facts:
The petitioner filed declaration under Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Scheme (VCES) for the period July 2012 to December 2012. While the due date for filing of application was 31/12/2013, in August 2013, department issued order for attaching bank accounts of the petitioner and recovered certain amount from the petitioner under recovery proceedings u/s. 87(b). The petitioner filed a letter with the department for adjusting the amount so recovered against 50% of the amount declared under VCES. However no certificate of discharge (VCES-3) was issued to the petitioner. Subsequently, show cause notice was issued by the department in June 2014 for the period July 2012 to August 2013. The petitioner expressed apprehension in the course of hearing before the Court that since the proceedings under VCES are not closed by Designated Authority under the Scheme by issuing VCES-3 in terms of section 107(7) of the Scheme, the show cause notice which is issued and required to be adjudicated proceeds on a wrong and incorrect assumption and that adjudication (including for the period covered under VCES), will take place before a distinct adjudicating officer, who is not a designated authority under the Scheme. The petitioner also submitted that in absence of such a declaration as required under the scheme, the adjudicating authority will proceed to recover not only the duty amount but also interest and penalty in respect of period covered under the Scheme. The petitioner also clarified that the object of writ was not to interfere with the ongoing proceeding but prayed for issuing direction to the Designated Authority for issuing necessary VCES-3 in terms of section 107(7) of the Scheme.

Held:
The High Court observed that the basis of determination of service tax demand and the period and the liability declared by the petitioner under the VCES are clearly brought out in the show cause notice. Therefore, the Court disposed of the application expressing a view that the submissions made by the petitioner before the Court can also be made before the adjudicating authority in the course of adjudication and if VCES-3 has not been issued, it would be open for the petitioner to urge that failure on the part of the authority to issue such a declaration should not visit him with any tax demand including of interest and penalty. It further held that merely because the show cause notice is going to be adjudicated by a distinct authority does not mean that the petitioner is prevented from canvassing appropriate pleas and therefore, the petitioner can always raise such pleas as are permissible in law including by inviting the attention of the authority to the Scheme and its clauses or paragraphs and sub-paragraphs.

[Note: Readers may note that the issue whether the period covered under VCES can also be adjudicated by any authority other than Designated Authority under different show cause proceedings is left open by the Hon. Court.]

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[2015] 61 taxmann.com 423 (Madras High Court) – Southern Properties & Promoters vs. CCE.

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High Court refused to interfere with Tribunal’s order directing
pre-deposit in respect of flats constructed by developer for landowner
under a development agreement, adopting the valuation based on price
charged by assessee builder on flats sold to other flat owners – No view
as to appropriate valuation rule is expressed.

Facts:
The
Appellant entered into a joint venture agreement with a land owner for
construction of flats according to which the appellant owned 48 flats
and land owner owned 24 flats as his share equivalent to the land. The
appellant paid service tax only in respect of 48 flats. Department
contended that construction of flats allotted to landowner would also
attract service tax. The adjudicating authority held that the
construction of flats for landowner constitutes a taxable service under
the category of “construction of residential complex” u/s. 65(105)(zzh)
and liable to service tax.

Before the Tribunal, the Appellant
contended that the appellant had not received any consideration in the
form of money in respect of 24 flats handed over to the landowner and
therefore tax should be demanded on the basis of the cost of land.
However, the Tribunal directed pre-deposit relying upon Rule 3 of the
Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, holding that the value
of taxable service should be equivalent to the value of taxable service
rendered in relation to the flats sold to independent persons.
Aggrieved by the said order of predeposit, the Appellant filed appeal
before High Court.

Held:
The High Court observed that
the Appellant has made specific admission before adjudicating authority
that its services would fall under the category of “construction of
residential complex service”’. Even otherwise, a prima facie view was
taken that the nature of the services provided by the appellant is
construction of flat to the land owner and the transfer of land is only
for the purpose of providing such taxable service. It further held that
where there is no monetary consideration in the transaction; then
section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 provides for various methods for
valuation and it is for the appellant to establish its plea before the
Tribunal as to why the cost of land is to be considered for the purpose
of valuation. The High Court categorically refused to express any view
as to whether the transaction would fall under Rule 2 or Rule 3 of
Valuation Rules and left the matter open for consideration by the
Tribunal. The Appeal was accordingly dismissed without interfering with
the order of Tribunal ordering pre-deposit.

[Note:
Readers may note that in this appeal, it appears that dispute is only
with respect to the adoption of taxable value and not as to whether
allotment of flats by developer to landowner constitutes a taxable
service or not. The issue of taxability of service has not been
considered either by the High Court or by Tribunal in the present case.
For analysis of the Tribunal’s judgment, readers may refer to BCAJ April
2015 issue.]

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$3 trillion excess debt

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The IMF debt estimate can become a ticking bomb given the downturn in economic growth combined with the prospect of higher interest rates in US

Companies from emerging markets have been on a borrowing spree in recent years. Now the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has estimated that these companies have over-borrowed around $3 trillion, which can become a ticking bomb given the downturn in economic growth combined with the prospect of higher interest rates in the US. It is not usual for a top official at the multilateral lender to speak about the prospect of a “a vicious cycle of fire sales and volatility”.

Such chaos is definitely not inevitable, but the next year could yet see massive swings in asset prices—in case the most dire possibility becomes a reality. A sharp increase in risk premiums could push many over-leveraged companies from emerging markets over the edge. Indian policymakers will also have to figure out a way to manage the triad of risks that IMF has talked about in its new Global Financial Stability Report.

The upshot: there could be trouble round the corner. (Source: Quick Edit in Mint dated 09-10-2015.)

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Reduce Sulphur in diesel, First of All – Without clean fuel, vehicles cannot cut pollution

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Delhi must stop beating about the bush on air pollution and, instead, speedily reduce sulphur content in diesel to proactively improve environmental standards. Slapping an environmental cess on trucks entering Delhi might actually worsen pollution levels, with traffic choked at toll gates.

The Centre, in announcing last week India’s intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) for climate action, said it aims to improve fuel standards “in the near future”.

India is not obliged to set out its actual target dates in a negotiating document. Yet, as the expert committee, headed by Saumitra Chaudhuri, then member, Planning Commission, noted last year, in the business-as-usual scenario, the deadline to improve fuel quality is 2025 “or even beyond”.

The panel stressed that reducing sulphur levels in diesel is essential to reduce tailpipe emissions, particulate matter and oxides of nitrogen. The government needs to speedily improve fuel quality nationally.

As the expert panel noted, Bharat Stage-III diesel, with sulphur in the range of 350-500 particles per million (ppm) is still supplied in much of the country. BS-IV (sulphur levels at 50 ppm) is now increasingly available in the major towns, but vehicles on long-distance routes are more likely to run on BS-III fuel. The expert report emphasised that BS-IV diesel is a must for pollution abatement devices like catalytic converters to function. It added that when sulphur content reduces to 10 ppm (BS-V), the efficiency and durability of the onboard pollution control devices improve. However, to move to ultra-low sulphur fuel requires capital investment of the order of Rs 80,000 crore in oil refineries. The report called for a 75 paise sulphur cess per litre of automotive fuel to reach BS-V by 2020, and BS-VI by 2024.

The report was submitted last May, before the slide in oil prices. The government needs to address the root cause of urban air pollution and, given the far softer oil prices, levy an appropriate charge on auto fuel sales to revamp refineries.

We must in the near future move to BS-V fuel norms and not wait to do so only by 2020.

(Source: Editorial in The Economic Times dated 09-10-2015.)

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Co-operative society – Deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a) (i) – A. Ys. 2008-09, 2009-10 and 2011-12 – Byelaws of society not prohibiting other co-operative societies from being its members – Assessee is not a co-operative bank – Assessee entitled to deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i)

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Quepem Urban Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. vs. ACIT; 377 ITR 272 (Bom):

For the A. Ys. 2008-09, 2009-10 and 2011-12, the Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i), on the ground that the assessee was a primary co-operative bank. The Tribunal upheld the decision.

On appeal by the assessee, the Bombay High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) There was no dispute between the parties that the assessee was a co-operative society as the society was registered under the Goa Co-operative Societies Act, 2001. Its transactions with non-members were insignificant or miniscule. On the above basis, it could not be concluded that the assessee’s principal business was of accepting deposits from the public and, therefore, it was in banking business. Besides, the qualifying condition 3 for being considered as a primary co-operative bank is that the bye-laws must not permit admission of any other co-operative society. This is a mandatory condition, i.e., the bye-laws must specifically prohibit the admission of any other cooperative society to its membership. The Revenue had not been able to show any such prohibition in the bye-laws of the assessee.

ii) The assessee could not be considered to be a cooperative bank for the purposes of section 80P(4) of the Act. Thus, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act.

iii) The authorities should restrict the benefit of deduction u/s. 80P of the Act only to the extent that the income is earned by the assessee in carrying on its business of providing credit facilities to its members.”

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[2014] 36 STR 543 (Kar) CST, Bangalore vs. Team Lease Services Pvt. Ltd.

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CENVAT credit on group mediclaim services is an input service under Rule 2(l) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Facts:
The appellant claimed CENVAT Credit on input service on group mediclaim services for the period April 2007 to September 2010 and the said credit was allowed by the Tribunal. The revenue aggrieved by the Tribunal’s order filed the instant appeal.

Held:
The appeal was dismissed as reliance was placed on the cases of (i) Commissioner vs. Micro Labs Ltd. – 2011 (24) STR 272 (Kar) and (ii) Commissioner vs. Stanzen Toyotetsu India Pvt. Ltd. – 2011 (23) STR 44 of the same Court wherein the said CENVAT Credit was allowed.

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Assessment pursuant to search in case of third party – Section 153C: A. Ys. 2006-07 to 2011- 12 – ‘Satisfaction’ that the documents found in search belong to third party is a precondition – ‘Satisfaction’ should be recorded and should be supported by material on recorded – Presumption that the document belongs to the searched person has to be rebutted:

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Pepsi Food (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT; 270 CTR 459 (Del); CIT vs. Pepsi India Holdings (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT; 270 CTR 467 (Del):

In these cases, the petitioners filed writ petitions and challenged the validity of notices issued u/s. 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petitions and held as under:

“i) Whenever a document is found from a person who is being searched, the normal presumption is that the said document belongs to that person. It is for the Assessing Officer to rebut that presumption and come to the conclusion or “satisfaction” that the document in fact belongs to somebody else.

ii) There must be some cogent material available with the Assessing Officer before he arrives at the satisfaction that the seized document does not belong to the searched person but to somebody else. Surmises and conjectures do not take the place of “satisfaction”. Mere use or mention of the word “satisfaction” or the words “I am satisfied” in the order or the note would not meet the requirement of the concept of satisfaction as used in section 153C.

iii) In order that the Assessing Officer of the searched person comes to the satisfaction that documents or material found during the search belong to a person other than the searched person, it is necessary that he arrives at the satisfaction that the said documents or materials do not belong to the searched persons. First of all, it is nobody’s case that the J Group had disclaimed the documents in question as belonging to them. Unless and until it is established that the documents do not belong to searched person, the provisions of section 153C do not get attracted.

iv) In the satisfaction note, there is nothing to indicate that the seized documents do not belong to the J Group where search took place. Secondly, the finding of photocopies in the possession of the searched person does not necessarily mean and imply that they ‘belong’ to the person who holds the originals. Further, the Assessing Officer should not confuse the expression ‘belongs to’ with the expression ‘relates to’ or ‘refers to’.

v) Going through the contents of the satisfaction note, one is unable to discern any “satisfaction” of the kind required u/s. 153C. Ingredients of section 153C have not been satisfied in this case. Consequently, the notices u/s. 153C are quashed.”

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Appeal before CIT(A) – A. Y. 2003-04 – Claim made for the first time before CIT(A) – CIT(A) can allow the claim on the basis of material on record:

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CIT vs. Mitesh Impex; 367 ITR 85 (Guj): 270 CTR 66 (Guj):

In the return of income for the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee had not made the claim for deduction u/s. 80HHC and 80- IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 though the assessee was entitled to such deduction. For the first time the assessee made the claim for deduction before the CIT(A). CIT(A) allowed the claim on the basis of the material on record. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Courts have recognised the jurisdiction of CIT(A) and Tribunal to entertain new ground or a legal contention. A ground would have a reference to an argument touching a question of fact or a question of law or mixed question of law and facts. A legal contention would ordinarily be a pure question of law without raising any dispute about the facts. Not only such additional ground or contention, the Courts have also recognised the powers of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal to entertain a new claim for the first time though not made before the Assessing Officer.

ii) This is primarily on the premise that if a claim though available in law is not made either inadvertently or on account of erroneous belief of complex legal position, such claim cannot be shut out for all times to come, merely because it is raised for the first time before the appellate authority without resorting to revising the return before the Assessing Officer.

iii) Therefore, any ground, legal contention or even a claim would be permissible to be raised for the first time before the appellate authority or the Tribunal when facts necessary to examine such ground, contention or claim are already on record. In such a case the situation would be akin to allowing a pure question of law to be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

iv) This is precisely what has happened in the present case. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal did not need to nor did they travel beyond the materials already on record, in order to examine the claims of the assessee for deduction u/ss. 80-IB and 80HHC of the Act. We answer the question against the revenue and in favour of the assessee.”

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Reassessment: Reopening at the instance of audit party – Sections 147 and 148 – A. Y. 2009- 10 – AO contested the audit objection but still reopened the assessment – Reopening is at the instance of the audit party – AO has not applied mind independently – Reopening is bad in law:

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Raajratna Metal Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT (Guj); SCA No. 7140 of 2014 dated 30-07-2014:

For the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessment of the assessee petitioner was completed by an order u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 24-12-2010. Subsequently, a notice u/s. 148 dated 11-03-2013 was issued for reopening the assessment. The assessee’s objections were rejected.

On a writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the notice u/s. 148, the Gujarat High Court found that the audit party had raised objections as regards the issue in question but the Assessing Officer had contested the audit objections and supported the assessment order. The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)To satisfy ourselves, whether the reassessment proceedings have been initiated at the instance of the audit party and solely on the ground of audit objections, we called upon the Advocate for the Respondent to provide the original file from the Assessing Officer. On perusal of the files, the noting made therein and the relevant documents, it appears that the assessment is sought to be reopened at the instance of the audit party, solely on the ground of audit objections.

ii) It is also found that, as such, the Assessing Officer tried to sustain his original assessment order and submitted to the audit party to drop the audit objections.

iii) If the reassessment proceedings are initiated merely and solely at the instance of the audit party and when the Assessing Officer tried to justify the assessment order and requested the audit party to drop the objections and there was no independent application of mind by the Assessing Officer with respect to the subjective satisfaction for initiation of reassessment proceedings, the impugned reassessment proceedings cannot be sustained and the same deserve to be quashed and set aside.

iv) Present petition succeeds on the aforesaid ground alone, i.e., the assessment was reopened solely on the ground of audit objections raised by the audit party. Consequently, the impugned reassessment proceedings are hereby quashed and set aside.”

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Disallowance u/s. 14A – Expenditure relating to exempt income – Section 14A and Rule 8D of I. T. Rules – A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09 – Disallowance cannot be made if there is no exempt income or if there is a possibility of the gains on transfer of the shares being taxable:

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CIT vs. Holcim India P. Ltd. (Del): ITA Nos. 299 and 486 of 2014 dated 05-09-2014:

The Tribunal held in this case that disallowance u/s. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be made if there is no exempt income or if there is a possibility of the gains on transfer of the shares being taxable. On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) On the issue whether the assessee could have earned dividend income and even if no dividend income was earned, yet section 14A can be invoked and disallowance of expenditure can be made, there are three decisions of the different High Courts directly on the issue and against the Revenue. No contrary decision of a High Court has been shown to us. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in CIT vs. M/s. Lakhani Marketing Inc. made reference to two earlier decisions of the same Court in CIT vs. Hero Cycles Limited, 323 ITR 518 and CIT vs. Winsome Textile Industries Ltd. 319 ITR 204 to hold that section 14A cannot be invoked when no exempt income was earned. The second decision is of the Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Corrtech Energy (P.) Ltd. [2014] 223 Taxmann 130 (Guj). The third decision is of the Allahabad High Court in CIT vs. Shivam Motors (P) Ltd;

ii) Income exempt u/s. 10 in a particular assessment year, may not have been exempt earlier and can become taxable in future years. Further, whether income earned in a subsequent year would or would not be taxable, may depend upon the nature of transaction entered into in the subsequent assessment year.

iii) It is an undisputed position that assessee is an investment company and had invested by purchasing a substantial number of shares and thereby securing right to management. Possibility of sale of shares by private placement etc., cannot be ruled out and is not an improbability. Dividend may or may not be declared. Dividend is declared by the company and strictly in legal sense, a shareholder has no control and cannot insist on payment of dividend. When declared, it is subjected to dividend distribution tax;

iv) What is also noticeable is that the entire or whole expenditure has been disallowed as if there was no expenditure incurred by the assessee for conducting business. The CIT(A) has positively held that the business was set up and had commenced. The said finding is accepted. The assessee, therefore, had to incur expenditure for the business in the form of investment in shares of cement companies and to further expand and consolidate their business. Expenditure had to be also incurred to protect the investment made. The genuineness of the said expenditure and the fact that it was incurred for business activities was not doubted by the Assessing Officer and has also not been doubted by the CIT(A).

v) In these circumstances, we do not find any merit in the present appeals. The same are dismissed.”

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Capital Gains – Status of Assessee – Compensation received on acquisition of inherited land by the Government is to be assessed in the hands of the sons in their status as “individual’s” and not jointly in the status of “Association of Persons.”

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CIT vs. Govindbhai Manaiya [(2014) 367 ITR 498 (SC)]

Capital Gains – Interest on the enhanced compensation u/s. 28 of 1894 Act is to be taxed in the year in which it is received.

The respondents were three brothers. Their father died leaving the land admeasuring 17 acres and 11 gunthas to the three brothers and two other persons who relinquished their rights in favour of the brothers. A part of this, bequeathed land was acquired by the State Government and compensation was paid for it. On appeal, the compensation amount was enhanced and additional compensation along with interest was awarded. The respondents filed their return of income for each assessment years claiming the status of “individual.” Two questions arose for consideration before the Assessing Officer. One was as to whether these three brothers could file separate returns claiming the status of the “individual” or they were to be treated as an “association of persons” (AoP). The second question was regarding the taxability of the interest on the enhanced compensation and this interest which was received in a particular year was to be assessed in the year of receipt or it could be spread over the period of time.

The Assessing Officer passed an assessment order by treating their status as that of an AOP. The Assessing Officer also refused to spread the interest income over the years and treated it as taxable in the year of receipt.

The High Court held that these persons were to be given the status of “individual” and assessed accordingly and not as an AOP and that the interest income was to be spread over from the year of dispossession of land, that is the assessment year 1987-88 till the year of actual payment which was received in the assessment year 1999-2000 applying the principles of accrual of income.

The Revenue approached the Supreme Court challenging the decision of the High Court.

The Supreme Court observed that the admitted facts were that the property in question which was acquired by the Government, came to the respondents on inheritance from their father, i.e., by the operation of law. Furthermore, even the income which was earned in the form of interest was not because of any business venture of the three assesses but it was the result of the act of the Government in compulsorily acquiring the said land. In these circumstances, according to the Supreme Court, the case was squarely covered by the ratio of the judgment laid down in Meera and Co. [(1997) 224 ITR 635 (SC)] inasmuch as it was not a case where any “association of persons” was formed by volition of the parties for the purpose of generation of income. This basic test to determine the status of AOP was absent in the present case.

In so far as the second question was concerned, the Supreme Court held that it was also covered by its another judgment in CIT vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) reported in [(2009) 315 ITR 1 (SC)] albeit, in favour of the Revenue, in which it was held that whereas interest u/s. 34 was not treated as a part of income subject to tax, the interest earned u/s. 28, which was on the enhanced compensation, was treated as a accretion to the value and, therefore, part of the enhanced compensation or consideration making it exigible to tax. After holding that interest on the enhanced compensation u/s. 28 of the 1894 Act was taxable, the court dealt with the other aspect, namely, the year of tax and answered this question by holding that it had to be taxed on receipt basis, which meant that it would be taxed in the year in which it is received.

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Search And Seizure – Block Assessment – Surcharge – The charge in respect of surcharge, having been created for the first time by insertion of proviso to section 113 was substantive provision and hence was to be construed as prospective in operation and was effective from 1st June, 2002.

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CIT vs. Vatika Township P. Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466 (SC)

There was a search and seizure operation u/s. 132 of the Act on the premises of the assessee on 10th February, 2001. Notice u/s. 158BC of the Act was issued to the assessee on 18th June, 2001, requiring him to file his return of income for the block period ending 10th February, 2000. In compliance, the assessee filed its return of income for the block period from 1st April, 1989 to 10th February, 2000. The block assessment in this case was completed u/s. 158BA on 28th February, 2002, at a total undisclosed income of Rs. 85,18,819. After sometime, the Assessing Office on verification of working of calculation of tax, observed that surcharge had not been levied on the tax imposed upon the assessee. This was treated as a mistake apparent on record by the Assessing Officer and, accordingly, a rectification order was passed u/s. 154 of the Act on 30th June, 2003. This order u/s. 154 of the Act, by which surcharge was levied by the Assessing Officer, was challenged in appeal by the assessee. The said order was cancelled by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-I, New Delhi, vide order dated 10th December, 2003, on the ground that the levy of surcharge is a debatable issue and therefore, such an order could not be passed resorting to section 154 of the Act. The undisclosed income was revised u/s. 158BA/158BC by the Assessing Officer, vide his order dated 9th September, 2003, to Rs.10,90,000, to give effect to the above order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), and thereby removing the component of the surcharge.

As the Department wanted the surcharge to be levied, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Central-I), New Delhi, issued a notice u/s. 263 of the Act to the assessee and sought to revise the order dated 9th September, 2003, passed by the Assessing Officer by which he had given effect to the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), and in the process did not charge any surcharge. In the opinion of the Commissioner of Income Tax, this led to income having escaped the assessment. According to the Commissioner of Income Tax, in view of the provisions of section 113 of the Act as inserted by the Finance Act, 1995, and clarified by the Board Circular No. 717, dated 14th August, 1995, surcharge was leviable on the income assessed. According to the Commissioner of Income Tax, the charging provision was section 4 of the Act which was to be read with section 113 of the Act that prescribes the rate and tax for search and seizure cases and rate of surcharge as specified in the Finance Act of the relevant year was to be applied. In this particular case, the search and seizure operation took place on 14th July, 1999, and treating this date as relevant, the Finance Act, 1999, was to be applied.

The Commissioner of Income Tax, accordingly, cancelled the order dated 9th September, 2003, not levying surcharge upon the assessee, as being erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The Assessing Officer was directed by the Commissioner of Income Tax, to levy surcharge at 10 % on the amount of income-tax computed and issue revised notice of demand. The order covered the block period 1st April, 1989, to 10th February, 2000. This order of the Commissioner of Income Tax u/s. 263 of the Act was passed on 23rd March, 2004. The assessee filed the appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) against the said order of the Commissioner of Income Tax. The Tribunal, vide its order dated 23rd June, 2006, allowed the appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal held that the insertion of the proviso to section 113 of the Income-tax Act cannot be held to be declaratory or clarificatory in nature and was prospective in its operation. Against the order of the Tribunal dated 23rd June, 2006, the Revenue approached the High Court of Delhi by way of an appeal filed u/s. 260A of the Act for the block period 1st April, 1989 to 10th February, 2000. This appeal was been dismissed, vide order dated 17th April, 2007 by the High Court.

The High Court took the view that the proviso inserted in section 113 of the Act by the Finance Act, 2002, was prospective in nature and the surcharge as leviable under the aforesaid proviso could not be made applicable to the block assessment in question of an earlier period, i.e., the period from 1st April, 1989, to 10th February, 2000, in the instant case.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the issue about the said proviso to section 113, viz., whether it is clarificatory and curative in nature and, therefore could be applied retrospectively or it is to take effect from the date, i.e., 1st June, 2002, when it was inserted by the Finance Act, 2002, was considered by its Division Bench in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta [(2008) 297 ITR 322 (SC)]. The Division Bench held that the said proviso was clarificatory in nature. However, when the instant appeal came up before another Division Bench on 6th January, 2009, for hearing, the said Division Bench expressed its doubts about the correctness of the view taken in Suresh N. Gupta and directed the Registry to place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench.

A five judge Bench was constituted to hear the matter. The Supreme Court held that on examining the insertion of the proviso in section 113 of the Act, it was clear that the intention of the Legislature was to make it prospective in nature. This proviso could not be treated as declaratory/statutory or curative in nature. The Supreme Court observed that in Suresh N. Gupta itself, it was acknowledged and admitted that the position prior to amendment of section 113 of the Act whereby the proviso was added, whether surcharge was payable in respect of block assessment or not was totally ambiguous and unclear. The court pointed out that some Assessing Officers had taken the view that no surcharge was leviable. Others were at a loss to apply a particular rate of surcharge as they were not clear as to which Finance Act, prescribing such rates, was applicable. The surcharge varied from year to year. However, the Assessing Officers were not clear about the date with reference to which rates provided for in the Finance Act were to be made applicable. They had four dates before them, viz.:

(i) Whether surcharge was leviable with reference to the rates provided for in the Finance Act of the year in which the search was initiated;
(ii) The year in which the search was concluded; or
(iii) The year in which the block assessment proceedings u/s.158BC of the Act were initiated; or
(iv) The year in which block assessment order was passed.

In the absence of a specified date, it was not possible to levy surcharge and there could not have been an assessment without a particular rate of surcharge. The choice of a particular date would have material bearing on the payment of surcharge. Not only the surcharge was different for different years, it varied according to the category of assesses and for some years, there was no surcharge at all.

According to the Supreme Court, the rate at which the tax is to be imposed is an essential component of tax and where the rate is not stipulated or it cannot be applied with precision, it could be difficult to tax a person. In the absence of certainty about the rate because of uncertainty about the date with reference to which the rate is to be applied, it could not be said that surcharge as per the existing provision was leviable on block assessment qua undisclosed income. Therefore, it could not be said that the proviso added to section 113 defining the said date was only clarificatory in nature. The Supreme Court took note of the fact that the Chief Commissioners at their conference in 2001 accepted the position, that as per the language of section 113, as it existed, it was difficult to justify the levy of surcharge.

The Supreme Court held that the charge in respect of the surcharge, having been created for the first time by the insertion of the proviso to section 113, was clearly a substantive provision and, hence, has to be construed prospective in operation. The amendment was neither clarificatory nor was there any material to suggest that it was so intended by Parliament. Furthermore, an amendment made to a taxing statute could be said to be intended to remove “hardships” only of the assessee, not of the Department. On the contrary, imposing a retrospective levy on the assessee would have caused undue hardship and for that reason Parliament specifically chose to make the proviso effective from 1st June, 2002.

The Supreme Court overruled the Judgment of the Division Bench in Suresh N. Gupta treating the proviso as clarificatory and giving it retrospective effect.

Taxability of Carbon Credits

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Synopsis
Purchase and Sale of Carbon Credits is undertaken globally as a part of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is targeted towards reduction of Green Houses Gases in the atmosphere. Under this mechanism, Carbon Credits are purchased and sold for a consideration. The taxability of the gains arising from such sale have been a matter of litigation. The esteemed authors have analysed the conflicting decision and discussed the intricate points related to the taxability under the Income-tax Act, 1961 of the consideration received on the sales of these credits.

Issue
To limit concentration of Green House Gases (GHGs), in the atmosphere, for addressing the problem of global warming, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992. Subsequently, to supplement the convention, the Kyoto Protocol came into force in February 2005, which sets limits on the maximum amount of emission of GHGs by countries. The Kyoto Protocol commits certain developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions. In order to enable the developed countries to meet their emission reduction targets, the Kyoto Protocol provides three market-based mechanisms, one of which is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

Under the CDM, a developed country can take up a GHG reduction project activity in a developing/least developed country where the cost of GHG reduction is usually much lower, and in consideration for undertaking the activity the developed country would be given carbon credits for meeting its emission reduction targets. Alternatively, entities in developing/least developed countries can set up a GHG reduction project, in their respective countries, get it approved by UNFCCC and earn carbon credits. Such carbon credits generated, by the entities in the developing/least developed country, can be bought, for a consideration, by the entities of the developed countries responsible for emission reduction targets. Under the CDM, carbon credits are measured in terms of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) where one CER is equal to 1 metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, and for which a certificate is issued, which certificate is saleable.

The question has arisen, under the Indian tax laws, as to whether the consideration received by an entity for sale of carbon credits generated by it is of a capital nature or a revenue nature, and whether such amount is taxable or not. Incidental questions are whether such income is eligible for deduction under chapter VIA and whether it is liable for MAT. While the Hyderabad, Jaipur and the Chennai benches of the tribunal have taken the view that sale proceeds of carbon credits are not taxable, being capital receipts arising out of environmental concerns and not out of the business, the Cochin bench of the tribunal has taken the view that the sale proceeds of such carbon credits are taxable as a benefit arising out of business.

My Home Power’s case
The issue first arose for consideration before the Hyderabad bench of the tribunal in the case of My Home Power Ltd vs. Dy. CIT 21 ITR (Trib) 186.

In this case, the company was engaged in the business of power generation through biomass power generation unit. During the relevant year, it received 1,74,037 Carbon Emission Reduction Certificates (CERs) or carbon credits for the project activity of switching off fossil fuel from naphtha and diesel to biomass. It sold 1,70,556 CERs to a foreign company and received Rs. 12.87 crore. It accounted this receipt as capital in nature and did not offer it for taxation.

The assessing officer treated the sale proceeds of the CERs to be a revenue receipt, since they were a tradable commodity, and even quoted on stock exchanges. He accordingly added a net receipt of Rs. 11.75 crore to the returned income. The Commissioner(Appeals) confirmed the order of the assessing officer and further held that it was not income from business and was therefore not entitled for deduction u/s. 80-IA.

Before the Tribunal, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the main business activity of the assessee was generation of biomass-based power. The receipt had no relationship with the process of production, nor was it connected with the sale of power or with the raw material consumed. It was also not the sale proceeds of any by-product. It was further argued that CERs were issued to every industry, which saved emission of carbon, and was not limited to power projects. Further, the certificates were issued keeping in view the production relating to periods prior to the previous year. It was claimed that the amount was not compensation for loss suffered in the process of production or for expenditure incurred in acquisition of capital assets.

It was further argued that the certificates issued by the UNFCCC under the Kyoto protocol only recognised the achievement made by the assessee in emitting lesser quantity of gases than the assigned quantity, and had no relation to either revenue or capital expenditure incurred by the assessee. The certificate itself did not have any value unless there were other industries which were in need of such certificate, and was not dependent on production. In a hypothetical situation where all the industries in the world were able to limit emissions of gases to the assigned level, it was argued that there would be no value for such certificates issued by UNFCCC.

It was claimed that the process of business commenced from purchase of raw material and ended with the sale of finished products, and that the gain was not earned in any of the in-between processes, nor did it represent receipt to compensate the loss suffered in the process. Therefore, the amount did not represent any income in the process or during the course of business. It was also claimed that the amount did not represent subsidy for establishing the industry or for purchase of raw material or a capital asset. UNFCCC did not reimburse either revenue or capital expenditure, and in fact did not provide any funds, but merely certified that the industry emitted a particular quantity of gases as against the permissible quantity. It was therefore not a subsidy granted to reimburse losses. In fact, no payment was made by UNFCCC, but only a certificate was issued without any consideration of profit or loss or the cost of acquisition of capital assets.

It was also argued that the amount could not be considered to be a perquisite, as it was not received from any person having a business connection with the company, and was not received in the process of carrying on the business. It was claimed that unless there existed a business connection, no benefit or perquisite could be derived.

It was also claimed that the amount did not fall within the definition of income u/s. 2(24). It did not represent an incentive granted in the process of business activity, as the amount was not received under any scheme framed by the government or anybody to benefit the industry or to reimburse either the cost of the raw material or the cost of capital asset. The amount was not an award for the revenue loss suffered by the company, as it was granted without relevance to the financial gains or losses. The payment was made without any relevance to the financial transactions of the assessee and there was no consideration for paying this amount. The amount was paid in the interest of the international community and not in the interest of industry as such, or in the interest of the assessee as a compensation for the loss or expenditure during the course of business, and was therefore a sort of gift given by UNFCCC for the distinction achieved by the assessee in achieving emission of lesser amount of gases than the assigned amount. It was therefore not an income within the meaning of section 2(24) or section 28.

Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Sterling Foods 237 ITR 579, for the proposition that just as certificates issued by the government for export of goods which were capable of sale, was held as not arising from the industrial undertaking, but from the export promotion scheme of the government, so also such CER certificates were attributable to the climatic protection scheme of the UNFCCC, which had no relevance to the business activities of the assessee.

It was further pointed out that under the draft Direct Taxes Code (DTC), such items were regarded as income, yet no amendment had been made to the Income-tax Act to bring such items to tax as income. Therefore, the intention of Parliament was not to tax such CERs till such time as DTC came into force.

It was pointed out that in the case of subsidies, subsidies received on revenue account alone would be taxed as income, while subsidies received on capital account were not to be taxed, but would be reduced from the cost of the capital asset for the purposes of claiming depreciation. Further, subsidy received for the public good was held as not taxable. In the case of the assessee, the amount did not represent composition for loss on revenue account, nor a gain during business activities, nor a reimbursement of any capital expenditure. It was claimed that the amount received was for public good and was therefore not taxable.

Besides claiming that it was a capital receipt, it was alternatively claimed that the income was not assessable for the relevant assessment year, since it related to reduction of carbon emissions during earlier years, that the amount was eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA since the assessing officer was of the view that it was connected to the production of power and that, if it all it was to be taxed, the expenditure relatable to earning certificates had to be arrived at by taking into consideration the assets used and the materials consumed in the earlier years and such amount had to be reduced from the gross receipts to arrive at the taxable amount.

On behalf of the revenue, it was argued that the underlying intention behind the technological implementation by a company in the developing world is not only to reduce the pollution of atmosphere, but also to earn some profit from out of excess units that can be generated by implementation of the CDM project. It was claimed that the CER credits can be considered as goods, as they had all the attributes of goods, viz. utility, capability of being bought and sold, and capability of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed. According to the revenue, the purchase agreement between the assessee and the foreign company indicated that the sale transaction of CERs was nothing but a transaction in goods.

It was further argued on behalf of the revenue that by implementing the CDM project, the assessee got the benefit of efficiency in respect of reduction of pollution. Had there been no other benefits attached to it, under normal circumstances, the assessee would not have bothered to obtain CERs. It was because of the expenditure incurred for implementation of the project as a pollution reduction measure that the assessee got the benefit of the certificates. The expenditure incurred was claimed in its profit and loss account. Since it was known that the UNFCCC certificates had intrinsic value and had a ready market for redemption or trading, the assessee obviously pursued obtaining of these certificates. Further, these certificates were traded and were therefore akin to shares or stocks transacted in the stock exchange, and were therefore revenue receipts rightly brought to tax by the assessing officer.

The Tribunal observed that carbon credits were in the nature of an entitlement received to improve world atmosphere and environment, reducing carbon, heat and gas emissions. According to the Tribunal, the entitlement earned for carbon credits could at best be regarded as a capital receipt and could not be taxed as a revenue receipt. It was not generated or created due to carrying on of business, but it accrued due to world concern. Its availability and assumption of the character of transferable right or entitlement was only due to the world concern.Therefore, the source of carbon credits was world concern and environment, to which the assessee got a privilege in the nature of transfer of carbon credits. Therefore, the amount received for carbon credits had no element of profit or gain and could not be subject to tax in any manner under any head of income.

According to the Tribunal, carbon credits were made available to the assessee on account of saving of energy consumption and not because of its business. Transferable carbon credits was not a result or incidence of one’s business but was a credit for reduction of emissions. In its view, carbon credits could not be considered to be a by-product. It was a credit given to the assessee under the Kyoto Protocol and because of international understanding. According to the Tribunal, the amount received was not received for producing and selling any product, by-product or of rendering any service in the course of carrying on of the business, but was an entitlement or accretion of capital, and hence income earned on sale of these credits was a capital receipt.

The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills Ltd. 57 ITR 36, where it was held that consideration for transfer of surplus loom hours by one mill to another mill under an agreement for control of production was a capital receipt and not an income. It was held that such sale proceeds was on account of exploitation of a capital asset, and it was a capital receipt and not an income. According to the Tribunal, the consideration received by the assessee for carbon credits was similar to the consideration received by transfer of loom hours.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that carbon credits was not an offshoot of business, but an offshoot of environmental concerns, and that carbon credits did not increase profits in any manner and did not need any expenses. It was a nature of entitlement to reduce carbon emissions, with no cost of acquisition or cost of production to get such entitlement. Therefore, carbon credits was not in the nature of profit or in the nature of income, but a capital receipt.

The view taken by the Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal in this decision was followed by the Chennai bench of the tribunal in the cases of Ambika Cotton Mills Ltd vs. Dy CIT 27 ITR (Trib) 44 and Sri Velayudhaswamy Spinning Mills (P) Ltd vs. Dy CIT 27 ITR (Trib) 106 and recently, the Jaipur bench in the case of Shree Cements Ltd. vs. ACIT, 31 ITR(Trib) 513 has followed the decisions of the Chennai bench.

    Apollo Tyres’ case

The issue again came up before the Cochin bench of the Tribunal in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. ACIT 149 ITD 756, 31 ITR(Trib) 477.

In this case, the assessee received Rs. 3.12 crore from sale of CERs or carbon credits generated in the gas turbine unit. The assessee claimed that the income earned on sale of carbon credits was directly and inextricably linked to generation of power and that the assessee would therefore be entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA. However, the assessing officer and the DRP held that the income was not derived from eligible business and was therefore not eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee raised an additional ground that the income received on sale of carbon credits was in the nature of capital receipt, and therefore not liable for taxation.

On behalf of the assessee, it was argued before the tribunal that the entitlement to carbon credits arose from the undertaking of the developed countries to reduce global warming and climate change mitigation across the world. It was claimed that carbon credits was an incentive provided to a project which employed a methodology to effect demonstrable and measurable reduction of emission of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The mechanism provided for trading CERs provided an opportunity to the holder of such certificate to dispose of the same to an actual user to acquire such credit to be counted toward fulfilment of its committed target reduction. Therefore, the mechanism provided by the United Nations provided an incentive for employment of new technology which helped in emission reduction, and therefore contributed to the desired object to protect the world environment. The purpose of Kyoto protocol was to protect the global environment and incorporate green initiative by adopting new technologies. The underlying object of CERs by the UNFCCC was focused on climate change mitigation by reducing the harmful effect of GHG emission and not to ensure that the recipient of such CER could run his business in a more profitable or cost effective manner.

It was argued on behalf of the assessee that all capital receipts were not income, but only capital gains chargeable u/s. 45 by virtue of the specific definition contained in section 2(24) (vi). Reliance was placed on the decision of the Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal in the case of My Home Power Ltd. (supra) for the proposition that the amount received on transfer of carbon credits was a capital receipt, and therefore not liable for taxation. It was alternatively argued that in case the tribunal found that the income on sale of carbon credits was a revenue receipt, then the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA, because it was inextricably linked to the business of the assessee.

On behalf of the revenue, it was argued that income or amount received by termination or sterilisation of a capital asset would fall in the capital field, but if the amount was received in the course of regular business activity due to sale of a product or entitlement incentive received due to a scheme of the government or the international community, then it would fall in the revenue field. According to the revenue, in the case before the tribunal, there was no sterilisation of any capital asset. The assessee generated power by using a gas turbine. What was given to the assessee was an incentive in the course of its regular business and therefore the amount received on sale of carbon credits had to be treated as a revenue receipt.

It was further submitted that the income on sale of carbon credits was not derived from the industrial undertaking. Though there might be a nexus between the business of the assessee and the receipt of income on sale of carbon credits, the income had to be necessarily derived from the industrial undertaking. In the case before the Tribunal, the income was derived on account of the scheme of the UNFCCC and not from the industrial undertaking. It was therefore argued that the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA.

The Tribunal analysed the concept of carbon credits. According to it, carbon credits was nothing but an incentive given to an industrial undertaking for reduction of the emission of GHGs, including carbon dioxide. It noted that there were several ways for reduction of emission of GHGs, such as by switching over to wind and solar energy, forest regeneration, installation of energy-efficient machinery, landfill methane capture, etc. According to the Tribunal, it was obvious that carbon credits was nothing but a measurement given to the amount of GHG emission rates in the atmosphere in the process of industrialisation, manufacturing activity, etc. Therefore, carbon credits was a privilege/entitlement given to industries for reducing the emission of GHGs in the course of their industrial activity.

While considering whether the receipt was a capital receipt or a revenue receipt, the Tribunal analysed the decision of the Hyderabad bench of the tribunal in the case of My Home Power Ltd. (supra). It noted that the Tribunal in that case had placed reliance on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills Ltd. (supra), and that it had held that the amount received on sale of carbon credits was on sale of entitlement conferred on the assessee by UNFCCC under Kyoto Protocol. It also noted that sale of carbon credits did not result in sterilisation of any capital asset.

Analysing the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills Ltd. (supra), the Cochin bench of the Tribunal noted that in the case before the Supreme Court, it was accepted by the revenue at the lower levels that the loom hours were assets belonging to each member and that it was only at the Supreme Court level, that the revenue contended that the loom hour was a privilege, and not an asset. The Supreme Court did not consider the aspect of whether the loom hours was a capital asset, since it had been accepted to be a capital asset, right up to the proceedings before the High Court, and a change in stand was not permitted by the Supreme Court. It was based on these facts that the Supreme Court held that the receipt on sale of loom hours must be regarded as capital receipt and not as income. The Tribunal according held that the said decision did not really help the case of the assesee as it was delivered on the facts of the case and therefore found that the Hyderabad bench was unduly influenced by the said decision of the Supreme Court in concluding that the carbon credits were capital assets.

The Cochin bench of the Tribunal noted that in the case before it, right from the assessment proceedings before the assessing officer till before the Tribunal, the assessee had not made any claim that the carbon credit was a capital asset as defined in section 2(14). Further, the assessee had claimed deduction u/s. 80-IA in respect of sale of carbon credits. Therefore, the assessee had effectively conceded that carbon credits were not capital assets. According to the Tribunal, had the assessee claimed that the carbon credits were capital assets, it would not have claimed deduction u/s. 80-IA on the income derived from sale of the carbon credits. The Tribunal observed that the assessee itself treated the carbon credits as an entitlement or privilege generated in the course of business activity.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture of tyres and for the purpose of captive consumption, the assessee generated electric power by using a gas turbine. In the process of power generation, the assessee reduced emission of carbon dioxide and therefore received carbon credits. According to the Tribunal, it was obvious that carbon credits were obtained by the assessee in the course of its business activity. The Tribunal was of the view that when the carbon credits was an entitlement or privilege accruing to the assessee in the course of carrying on of manufacturing activity, it could not be said that such carbon credits was an accretion of a capital asset. It noted that carbon credits was not a fixed asset or tool of the assessee to carry on its business. According to it, the sale of carbon credits was a trading or revenue receipt.

The Tribunal also considered the aspect of whether import entitlement was at par with carbon credits. It noted that both import entitlements and carbon credits came from a scheme, one of the government and one of the UNFCCC under the Kyoto protocol. It was therefore of the view that both were on par. Following the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of OK Industries vs. CIT 42 CTR 82, which had held that import entitlement was generated in the course of business activity and could not be treated as an asset within the meaning of section 2(14), the Tribunal held that carbon credits also could not be treated as capital assets.

The Cochin bench of the Tribunal observed that the provisions of section 28(iv) read with section 2(24)(vd), which brought to tax the value of any benefit or privilege arising from business, were not brought to the notice of the Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal in the case of My Home Power Ltd. (supra), and that therefore that decision was not applicable to the case before it.

The Tribunal therefore held that the sale of carbon credits constituted revenue receipts and profits and gains of the business u/s. 28(iv) read with section 2(24)(vd).

    Observations

Sale proceeds of carbon credits have not been specifically included in section 28, or in the definition of income u/s. 2(24). The legislature when desired, has amended the Income-tax Act to include certain specific receipts as income, even though the character of such receipts may not necessarily be in the nature of income. For instance, profits on sale of import entitlements and certain other specified receipts are specifically included as an income u/s. 28(iiia) to (iiie) read with section 2(24)(va) to (ve). Similarly, amounts received under an agreement for not carrying out any activity in relation to business is specifically taxable u/s. 28(va) read with section 2(24)(xii). The Cochin bench of the Tribunal does not seem to have considered this important fact of the omission, to expressly provide for the taxation of the carbon credits, which fact convey the intent of the legislature to not expose such receipts to taxation, which intent is further strengthened by clause(ii) to the proviso to section 28(va).

There is a specific exclusion, from taxation, under the clause(ii) to the proviso to section 28(va) for compensation received from the multilateral fund of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer under the United Nations Environment Programme. Such compensation is similar in character to carbon credits, in the sense that both are received under a multilateral convention for protection of the environment for doing or not doing a particular activity, which results in environment improvement. The intention therefore appears to be not to tax such amounts, since these are rewards for benefiting the world and public in general.

The Cochin bench of the Tribunal seems to have been largely influenced by the fact that the assessee, in the initial stages before the tax authorities, had taken the stand that the amount was taxable and was relatable to its power generation business. It therefore proceeded on the footing that the assessee itself had considered the carbon credits as the receipts arising from its power generation business.

The fact that carbon credits are transferable or that they are traded on stock exchanges is irrelevant for deciding the fact as to whether they are capital receipts or revenue receipts. Similarly, it is not necessary that all benefits arising from business activity are of a revenue nature. For instance, by carrying on business, goodwill or a brand may be generated, which is of a capital nature. In fact the various receipts, now specifically made taxable under different clauses of section 28 aforesaid, are the cases of business receipts in the nature of capital, that are made taxable under specific legislation.

The real issue is whether the carbon credits, even where regarded as benefits or perquisites, arise from the business? The Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal, relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Sterling Foods (supra) to take a view that the export entitlements did not arise from the business of the industrial undertaking, but from the scheme of the Government. The view of the Cochin bench of the Tribunal, however meritorious, that the carbon credits arose on account of the manner in which the business was carried on, and was not totally divorced from the business activity, is at the most debatable. Considering the importance of the environment protection and the need to promote the measures to protect it, the Government should specifically amend the law if it believes that the carbon credits are taxable as income. In fact, the intention seems to have been to tax it once the DTC came into force, as the draft DTC had provisions for taxing such amount. If the intention is to tax it now, the Income-tax Act needs to be amended on the lines of Clauses (va) to (ve) of section 2(24) and Clauses (iiia) to (iiie) of section 28 for that purpose.

However, for the time being, the issue seems to have been concluded in favour of the assessee, by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which approved the decision of the Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal in the case of CIT vs. My Home Power Ltd., 365 ITR 82. The Andhra Pradesh High Court agreed with the findings of the Tribunal that carbon credit is not an offshoot of business, but an offshoot of environmental concerns, and that no asset is generated in the course of business, but is generated due to environmental concerns. According to the High Court, the carbon credit was not even directly linked with power generation. The High Court held that the amount received on sale of excess carbon credits, was a capital receipt, and not a business receipt or income.

TRANSFER PRICING METHODOLO GY – RESALE PRICE METHOD AND COST PLUS METHOD

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1 Introduction

The concept of
‘Transfer Pricing’ analysis refers to determination of ‘Arms Length
Price’ of transactions between related persons [also known as Associated
Enterprise (AE)]. The computation of Arm’s Length Price is required to
be based on a scientific approach and methodology, wherein the fair
value of transaction between two or more related persons is determined
as if the relationship would have not influenced the pricing of
transaction.

The various transfer pricing methods used in India are as follows:

Traditional Transaction Methods:
• Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method (CUP)
• Resale Price Method (RPM)
• Cost Plus Method (CPM)

Transaction Profit Methods:
• Profit Split Method (PSM)
• Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM)

In
the October issue of BCAJ, an analysis of CUP method was discussed. In
this article, we will be analysing Resale Price Method (RPM) and Cost
Plus Method (CPM).

2. Resale Price Method – Meaning:

2.1 The Provision of Income Tax Act:

Under the Indian Income tax law, the statutory recognition of this method is provided in section 92C of Act read with Rule10B.

Rule
10B(1)(b) prescribes the manner by which arm’s length price can be
determined using RPM. The relevant extract is as follows:

“Determination of arm’s length price u/s. 92C

10B.
(1) For the purposes of s/s. (2) of section 92C, the arm’s length price
in relation to an international transaction or a specified domestic
transaction shall be determined by any of the following methods, being
the most appropriate method, in the following manner, namely :—

(a)…

(b) R esale price method, by which,-

(i)
the price at which property purchased or services obtained by the
enterprise from an associated enterprise is resold or are provided to an
unrelated enterprise, is identified;

(ii) such resale price is
reduced by the amount of a normal gross profit margin accruing to the
enterprise or to an unrelated enterprise from the purchase and resale of
the same or similar property or from obtaining and providing the same
or similar services, in a comparable uncontrolled transaction, or a
number of such transactions;

(iii) the price so arrived at is
further reduced by the expenses incurred by the enterprise in connection
with the purchase of property or obtaining of services;

(iv) the price so arrived at is adjusted to take into account the functional and other differences, including differences in accounting practices,
if any, between [the international transaction or the specified
domestic transaction] and the comparable uncontrolled transactions, or
between the enterprises entering into such transactions, which could
materially effect the amount of gross profit margin in the open market;

(v) the adjusted price arrived at under sub-section;

(iv)
is taken to be an arm’s length price in respect of the purchase of the
property or obtaining of the services by the enterprise from the
associated enterprise.”

Based on the plain reading of the rule,
it can be observed that RPM is applicable in case the property is
purchased or service is obtained from an AE and resold to an unrelated
party. Accordingly, RPM would be suitable for distributors or resellers
and is less useful when goods are further processed or incorporated into
other products and where intangibles property is used.

However,
it is pertinent to examine whether RPM can be used in a reverse
situation i.e. when the property is purchased or service obtained by an
enterprise from an unrelated enterprise which is thereafter resold or
are provided to an AE.

In this respect, the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Gharda Chemicals Limited vs. DCIT [2009-TIOL-790- ITAT-Mum]
had an occasion to consider this issue and rejected RPM on the ground
that RPM could be applied only in a case where Indian enterprise
purchases goods or obtain services from its AE and not in a reverse
case.

The resale price method focuses on the related sales
company which performs marketing and selling functions as the tested
party in the transfer pricing analysis. RPM is more appropriate in a
business model when the entity performs basic sales, marketing and
distribution functions and there is little or no value addition by the
reseller prior to resale of goods.

Further, if the sales company
acts as a sales agent that does not take title to the goods, it is
possible to use the commission earned by the sales agent represented as a
percentage of the uncontrolled sales price of the goods concerned as
the comparable gross profit margin. The resale price margin for a
reseller performing a general brokerage business should be established
considering whether it is acting as an agent or a principal.

Also,
if the property purchased in a controlled sale is resold to AE’s in a
series of controlled sales before being resold in an uncontrolled sale
to unrelated party, the applicable resale price is price at which
property is resold to uncontrolled party or the price at which
contemporaneous resale of the same property is made. In such a case, the
determination of appropriate gross profit will take into account the
functions of all the members of group participating in the series of
controlled sales and final uncontrolled sales as well as other relevant
factors

2.2 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators:

RPM
is also discussed in detail in the Transfer Pricing guidelines1
developed by OECD. It states that the method begins with a price at
which a product that has been purchased from an AE is resold to an
independent enterprise. This price (resale price) is then reduced by an
appropriate gross margin (i.e., “resale price margin”) representing the
amount out of which the seller would seek to cover its selling and
operating expenses and in the light of the functions performed make an
appropriate profit. Further, after making adjustment of other expenses
what is left can be considered as an Arm’s Length Price of the product
purchased from AE.

If there is material differences that affect
the gross margins earned in the controlled and the uncontrolled
transactions, adjustments should be made to account for such
differences. Adjustments should be performed on the gross profit margins
of the uncontrolled transactions.

The operating expenses in
connection with the functions performed and risks incurred should be
taken into account in this respect as differences in functions performed
are frequently conveyed in operating expenses.

The guidelines
also discuss the situation where such model should be used, practical
difficulties and application of the method in particular situations.

2.3 U N Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries:

Similar
to OECD guidelines, UN guidelines also provide guidance for RPM. The UN
practical manual states that the starting point of the analysis for
using the method is the sales company. Under this method the transfer
price for the sale of products between the sales company and a related
company can be described in the following formula:

TP = RSP X (1-GPM)

Where,

• TP = the transfer price of a product sold between a sales company and a related company;

• RSP = the resale price at which a product is sold by a sales company to unrelated customers; and
    GPM = the Gross Profit Margin that a specific sales company should earn, defined as the ratio of gross profit to net sales. Gross Profit is defined as Net sales minus cost of goods sold.

2.4 Most suitable situations for applicability of RPM:

The applicability of the method depends upon the facts of each case. However, various commentaries like OECD and UN has laid down situations where RPM would most likely be the suitable option in order to determine the arm’s length price. The same has been discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.

If comparable uncontrolled transactions can be identified, the CUP method may very well be the most direct and sound method to apply the Arm’s Length Principle. If the CUP method cannot be applied, however, other traditional transaction methods to consider are the Cost Plus Method and the Resale Price Method.

In a typical intercompany transaction involving a full-fledged manufacturer owning valuable patents or other intangible properties and affiliated sales companies which purchase and resell the products to unrelated customers, the resale price method is a method to use if the CUP method is not applicable and the sales companies do not own valuable intangible properties.

The situations where RPM could apply are discussed below:

    The OECD guidelines states that RPM can be used where the reseller does not add substantial value to the products. Thus the reseller should add relatively little or no value to the goods. It may be difficult to apply RPM where goods are further processed and identity of goods purchased from AE is lost. For example, let say a reseller is doing limited enhancements such as packaging, repacking, labelling etc. In this case, this sort of activities does not add significant value to the goods and hence RPM could be used for determining ALP.

However,  significant  value  addition  through  physical modification such as converting rough diamonds into cut and polished diamonds adds significant value to the goods and hence, RPM cannot be applied for such value added activity.

Another example could be, say, mineral water is imported from AE and sold in the local market by adding the brand name of Indian company, RPM cannot be applied since there is significant addition in value of goods due to the use of brand name of Indian company.

    A Resale Price Margin is more accurate where there is shorter time gap between purchase and sale. The more time that elapses between the original purchase and resale the more likely it is that other factors like changes in the market, in rates of exchange, in costs, etc, would affect the price and hence would also be required to be considered for comparability analysis.

    Further, in RPM the comparability is at the gross margin level and hence, RPM requires a high degree of functionality comparability rather than product comparability. Hence, a detailed analysis showing the close functional comparability and the risk profile of the tested party and comparables should be clearly brought out in the Transfer Pricing study report in order to justify comparability at gross profit level under RPM. Thus, RPM is useful when the companies are performing the similar functions.

However, a minor difference in products is acceptable if they are less likely to have an effect on the Gross Profit Margin. For example, Gross Profit Margin earned from trading of microwave ovens in controlled transaction can be compared with the Gross Profit Margin earned by unrelated parties from trading in toasters since both are consumer durables and fall within the same industry.

2.5 Steps in application of RPM:

    Identify the transaction of purchase of property or services;

    Identify the price at which such property or services are resold or provided to an unrelated party (resale price);

    Identify the normal Gross Profit Margin in a comparable uncontrolled transaction;

    Deduct the normal gross profit from the resale price;
    Deduct expenses incurred in connection with the purchase of goods;

    Adjust the resultant amount for the functional and other differences such as accounting practices etc that would materially affect the Gross Profit Margin in the open market;

    The price arrived at is the Arm’s Length Price of the transaction.

The application of the resale price method can be understood with the following example:

The international transaction entered into by AE1 Ltd. with AE2 Ltd. which should be determined on the basis of Arm’s Length Price.

In another uncontrolled transaction, AE1 Ltd. had purchased from unrelated supplier (K Ltd.) and sold to unrelated customer (M Ltd.) and earned Gross Profit Margin of 15%.

The differences in sale to K Ltd. and A Ltd. are on account of the following:

    Sale to A Ltd. was ex-shop and sale to M Ltd. was FOB basis. This accounted for additional 2% difference in Gross Profit Margin as sales price increased but corresponding expenses are not debited to trading but profit and loss account.

    Quantity discount was provided to A ltd and not M Ltd. Impact is 1% on GP margin.

The differences in purchase from AE2 and K Ltd. are as follows:

    Additional freight expenses incurred of Rs. 10 per unit and quantity discount received of Rs. 15 per unit on purchases from AE2 ltd and not on purchases from K Ltd. Further, Rs. 25/- towards custom duty is incurred on purchases in both the cases.

2.6 Advantages and Challenges of the RPM:

Advantages of RPM

    The method is based on the resale price i.e., a market price and thus represent demand driven method

    The method can be used without forcing distributors to in appropriately make profits. Hence, unlike other methods, distributor could incur losses on net basis due to huge selling expenses even if there is an Arm’s Length Gross Margin. Hence, this method could be used without distorting the figures.

Challenges of RPM

    Non availability of gross margin data of comparable companies from public database is the biggest challenge in applying RPM since Companies Act, 1956 does not require Gross Profit Margin calculation to be reported and Tax Audit Reports which contain Gross

Profit Margin are not available in public database. Hence, difficulty would arise on account of external comparables.

    Differential accounting policies followed across the globe makes application of RPM very difficult. Example:
    Some companies include exchange loss/gain in purchase/sale whereas some companies show it as part of administrative and other expenses. Example

    Some companies include excise duty on purchase in Purchase A/c whereas some companies show it as part of rent, rates and taxes.

    RPM is unlikely to give accurate result if there is difference in level of market, function performed or product sold. Further, due to lack of availability of information on functions performed by the comparables, comparing the level of functions is difficult.

    Another disadvantage is, for certain industries such as Pharmaceutical industry, wherein it is difficult to identify companies exclusively performing trading operations as most of the companies are into manufacturing and trading.

    Further, usage of RPM in case of services could be a challenge considering the difference of surrounding situations in service transactions vs. product transactions as well as the financial disclosure norms applicable for service entities.

2.7 RPM – Comparability Parameters:

The following factors may be considered in determining whether an uncontrolled transaction is comparable to the controlled transaction for purposes of applying the resale price method as well as to determine whether suitable economic adjustments should be made to account for such differences:

    Factors like business experiences (start-up phase or mature phase), management efficiency, cost structures etc that have less effect on price of products than on costs of performing functions should be considered. Such differences could affect Gross Margin even if they don’t affect Arm’s Length Prices of products.

    A Resale Price Margin requires particular attention in case the reseller adds substantially to the value of the product (e.g., by assisting considerably in the creation or maintenance of intangible property related to the product (e.g., trademarks or trade names) and goods are further processed into a more complicated product by the reseller before resale).

    Level of activities performed and risks borne by reseller. E.g., A buying and selling agent would obviously obtain higher compensation then a pure sales agent.

    If the reseller performs a significant commercial activity besides the resale activity itself, or if it employs valuable and unique assets in its activities (e.g., valuable marketing intangibles of the reseller), it may earn a higher Gross Profit Margin.

    The comparability analysis should take into account whether the reseller has the exclusive right to resell the goods, because exclusive rights may affect the Resale Price Margin.

    The reliability of the analysis will be affected by differences in the value of the products distributed, for example, as a result of a valuable trademark.

    In practice, significant difference in operating expenses is often an indication of differences in functions, assets or risks. This may be remedied if operating expense adjustments can be performed on the unadjusted gross profit margins of uncontrolled transactions to account for differences in functions performed and the level of activities performed between the related party distributor and the comparable distribution companies. Since these differences are often reflected in variation of the operating expenses, adjustments with respect to differences in the SG & A expenses to sales ratio as a result of differences in functions and level of activities performed may be required.

    The differences in inventory levels and valuation method will also affect the Gross Profit Margin.

    Further, adjustment on account of differences in working capital could also be considered (i.e., credit period for payables and receivables, the cycle of inventory, etc).

For RPM, product differences would be less relevant, since one would expect a similar level of compensation for performing similar functions across different activities for broadly similar products. Hence, typically RPM is more applied on the basis of functional comparability rather than product comparability. However, the distributors engaged in sale of markedly different products should not be compared.

Further, differences in accounting practices may be on account of:

    Sales and purchases have been accounted inclusive or exclusive of taxes;
    Methods of pricing of goods namely, FOB or CIF;

    Fluctuations in foreign exchange, etc.

In actual practice, the resale may also be out of opening stock. Similarly, the goods purchased during the said year may remain in closing stock. The process of determination under RPM culminates in cost of sales rather than value of purchases. This cost of sales should be converted into cost of purchases. For this, closing stock of goods purchased from AE should be added and opening stock of purchases from AE should be deducted.

2.8 Judicial Precedents on RPM:

The applicability of the said method on a particular transaction is subject matter of litigation. Some of the decisions are discussed in brief hereunder.

    DCIT vs. M/s Tupperware India Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 2140/Del/2011 & ITA No 1323/Del/2012]

    The tax payer operates as a distributor of plastic food storage and serving containers. It has subcontracted the manufacturing activity to contract manufacturers.

The moulds required to manufacture the product are leased in by the tax payer from the AE’s and thereafter supplied to contract manufacturers. The moulds are owned and developed by the overseas group entities.

    The tax payer contended that it did not add any value to the products and carries out the functions of a pure reseller. Further, the tax payer contended that it merely procures the moulds from the AE’s and supplies them to the contract manufacturers. Thereafter, it procures finished goods from contract manufacturers and sells them in Indian market without adding any value thereon. Further, there is strong correlation and interdependence between the purchase of mould and core activity of distributor. Accordingly, RPM is most appropriate method.

    The Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) rejected the same and computed the Arm’s Length Price by applying Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM).

    The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] deleted the said addition and the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal (ITAT) upheld the decision of CIT(A).

    ITAT held as follows:

    It is clear that there was hardly any value addition made by the tax payer relating to the transaction.

    The function of the tax payer was that of the reseller and hence RPM is the most appropriate method in this case.

    The TPO without any analysis concluded that

TNMM is the most appropriate method is not based on any facts relevant to the case.

    Mattel Toys (I) Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT

    The tax payer is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mattel Inc., USA. During the year under consideration, the tax payer imported finished goods and sold them in India as well as exported to AE’s. The tax payer also imported raw material from AE for manufacturing the toys in India.

    The tax payer had benchmarked the said transaction using TNMM and in their study report had rejected
RPM method.

    The TPO segregated the activities into 3 segments – (i) import of goods from AE and sale in domestic market; (ii) import of goods from AE and sold to AE; and (iii) import of goods from AE and export to third parties outside India.

    The TPO worked out operating margin for all the three segments separately and proposed an adjustment. The assessee had contended before TPO for adoption of RPM as most appropriate method. However, TPO rejected the contention of the tax payer.

    CIT(A) upheld the view of TPO and confirmed the addition.
    The tax payer before ITAT contended that for determination of Arm’s Length Price for distribution activity, RPM is most appropriate. Further, the tax payer contended that its gross profit margin was higher than that of comparables.

    ITAT held as follows:-

    The nature of product was not much relevant but the functions performed of the comparability are to be seen. It observed, “the main reason is that the product differentiation does not materially effect the Gross Profit Margin as it represents gross compensation after the cost of sales for specific functions performed. The functional attribute is more important while undertaking the comparability analysis under this method. Thus, in our opinion, under the RPM, products similarity is not a vital aspect for carrying out comparability analysis but operational comparability is to be seen.”

    It further held that gross profit margin earned by an independent enterprise was a guiding factor in
RPM.

    Accordingly, RPM is the most appropriate method for determining Arm’s Length Price for distribution activity. Since the tax payer had adopted TNMM, the matter is remitted back to TPO for de novo adjudication. ITAT directed TPO to determine the Arm’s Length Price based on fresh comparables after considering RPM as the most appropriate method.

 ITO vs. L’Oreal India Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No, 5423/ Mum/2009]

    The tax payer, a wholly owned subsidiary of L’Oreal SA

France, is engaged in business of manufacturing and distribution of cosmetic and beauty products.

    The tax payer operates in two business segments (i) manufacturing and (ii) distribution.

    It had incurred huge losses on account of selling and distribution activities incurred as a part of marketing strategy.

    In case of distribution segment, the tax payer adopted RPM as the most appropriate method. However, TPO rejected the taxpayer contention and concluded TNMM to be the most appropriate method.

    CIT(A) deleted the entire addition on the income of the tax payer.

    ITAT held as follows:-

    OECD states that in case of distribution and marketing activities, where the tax payer purchases from AE and sales to unrelated parties without adding much value, RPM is the most appropriate method.

    In the instant case there is no dispute that the tax payer buys the products from its AEs and sells to unrelated parties without any further processing.

    RPM has been accepted in preceding as well as succeeding years in respect of distribution segment of the taxpayer.

    Hence, RPM is appropriate method.

    Panasonic Sales & Services (I) Company Limited vs. ACIT [ITA No 1957/Mds/2012]

    The tax payer is a subsidiary of Panasonic Holdings

(Netherland BV) which is ultimately held by Matsushita

Electronic Co. Ltd., Japan.

    The tax payer is engaged in the import of consumer electronic products from its AE for sale in domestic market and also provides market support services.

    In case of purchase and resale activity, the tax payer adopted RPM method and for providing market support services, it adopted TNMM method. There was no issue in the value of international transaction and the method adopted by the tax payer to determine the arm’s length price. However, the dispute was as regards the determination of selling price and the calculation of gross profit margin.

    The TPO reduced the cash discount offered by the taxpayer for early realisation of dues on account of sales while calculating the gross profit margin. Further, the TPO added the freight and storage charges treating them as direct expenses in relation to purchase of goods.

    However, the tax payer contended that TPO erred in considering cash discount with trade discount. Further, the freight and storage expenses incurred are towards outward sales and not inward. The rules clearly states that only expenses incurred in connection with the purchases are required to be reduced from sales.

    ITAT held as follows:-

    Cash discounts offered to the customers are in nature of financial charges. Further, it is only an incentive
offered for early realisation. Thus held that TPO erred in equating cash discount with trade discount and that the cash discount in the present case was offered after completion of sales which is entirely different in nature from trade discounts.

    Further, in case of freight and storage expenses incurred the same were incurred towards the cost of packing and transportation of goods from the warehouse to the customers and hence in the nature of selling and distribution expenses. Thus, it cannot be reduced from the selling price to determine the cost of goods sold.

    Danisco (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT

    The tax payer is engaged in the business of manufacturing food flavours and trading of food additives/ingredients. For manufacturing, the tax payer purchases raw material from its AE. It also imports ingredients from its AE and resells them to its customers in India through distribution chain.

    During the year under consideration, the tax payer selected TNMM as the appropriate method to benchmark its transaction. Further, it also carried out supplementary analysis in case of import of goods using RPM as the most appropriate method.

    However, TPO rejected the 4 companies selected by the tax payer as comparables on the ground that these companies had negative net worth or persistent loses. Accordingly TPO made an adjustment.

    On filing of objections, Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) upheld the addition made by the TPO. The tax payer went into appal before ITAT.

    The tax payer contended that TPO erred in making

the addition on the entire transaction and failed to appreciate the fact that the tax payer had also undertaken transactions with third party. Further, the companies only in manufacturing activity and not in trading activity cannot be considered as comparables. Lastly, TPO should have used segmental accounts furnished by the tax payer to examine the trading and manufacturing activity separately and should have used RPM for trading activity as it is widely used method.

    Additionally, assessee relied on OECD guidelines and contended that it merely imported and resold goods without adding any value. Hence, RPM should be applied.

    ITAT accepted the contention of the tax payer and restored the matter to the file of TPO for fresh adjudication. It gave the direction to TPO to apply RPM as a most appropriate method for trading transactions of imported goods.

2.9    Berry Ratio – An alternate method of benchmarking for distributor arrangements:

In relation to the distribution arrangements, in addition to the application of RPM as a benchmarking method, International transfer pricing principles have evolved over time. In 2010, OECD updated its transfer pricing guidelines and analysed use of Berry Ratio as a financial indicator for examining the Arm’s Length Price.

The Berry Ratio compares the ratio of gross profit to operating expenses of the tested party with the ratios of gross profit (less unrelated other income) to operating costs (excluding interest and depreciation) of third party comparable companies.

The underlying assumption of the Berry Ratio is that there is a positive relationship between the level of operating expenses and the gross profit. The more operating expenses that a distributor incurs, the higher the level of gross profit that should be derived.

Generally, Berry ratio should only be used to test the profits of limited risks distributors and service providers that do not own or use any intangible assets.

The challenges in using Berry Ratio could be identifying functionally similar comparable entities; comparables used should not own or use significant intangible assets, classification of costs by the comparable entities etc.

However, Berry Ratio could be extremely useful where operating margins are used as a measure of profitability in distribution business with exponential growth patterns.

Having discussed the RPM at length, we will elaborate CPM in the forthcoming paragraphs.

    Cost Plus Method – Meaning:

3.1 The Provision of Income Tax Act:

Section 92C of the Act prescribes the method for computation of Arm’s Length Price, wherein Cost Plus Method (CPM) is enlisted as one of the methods. The same is not defined in the Act itself, but has been discussed at length in the Income Tax Rules.

Rule 10B prescribes the manner in which CPM can be applied. The text reads as follows:

“Determination of Arm’s Length Price u/s. 92C.

10B. (1) For the purposes of s/s. (2) of section 92C, the Arm’s Length Price in relation to an international transaction or a specified domestic transaction shall be determined by any of the following methods, being the most appropriate method, in the following manner, namely :—

    …

    …

    cost plus method, by which,—

    the direct and indirect costs of production incurred by the enterprise in respect of property transferred or services provided to an associated enterprise, are determined;

    the amount of a normal gross profit mark-up to such costs (computed according to the same accounting norms) arising from the transfer or provision of the same or similar property or services by the enterprise, or by an unrelated enterprise, in a comparable uncontrolled transaction, or a number of such transactions, is determined;

    the normal gross profit mark-up referred to in sub-clause (ii) is adjusted to take into account the functional and other differences, if any, between the international transaction or the specified domestic transaction and the comparable uncontrolled transactions, or between the enterprises entering into such transactions, which could materially affect such profit mark-up in the open market;

    the costs referred to in sub-clause (i) are increased by the adjusted profit mark-up arrived at under sub-clause (iii);
    the sum so arrived at is taken to be an Arm’s Length Price in relation to the supply of the property or provision of services by the enterprise;”

3.2 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational

Enterprises and Tax Administrators:

Cost Plus Method is discussed in the OECD Transfer Pricing guidelines2. It states that the CPM method begins with the costs incurred by the supplier of property/services in a controlled transaction for property transferred or services provided to an associated enterprise. An appropriate mark up is then added to the said cost, in view of the functions performed and the market conditions. Such price is known as the arm’s length price.

Thereafter, the guidelines go on to define the most appropriate situation where CPM may be used, i.e., if one of the following two conditions get satisfied:

    none of the differences between the transactions being compared, or between the enterprises undertaking those transactions, materially affect the cost plus mark up in the open market; or

    reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of such differences.

The guidelines also stress that in principle, cost plus methodology should compare margins at gross profit level, however there may be practical difficulties in doing so. Thus, the computation of margins should be flexible to such extent.

The OECD guidelines discuss, at length, the applicability of CPM to various situations, determination of appropriate cost base and various adjustments and practical difficulties that may arise for the application of this method.

3.3 UN  Practical  Manual  on  Transfer  Pricing  for Developing Countries:

The UN Practical Manual also discusses Cost Plus Method as a traditional transaction method, and goes on to define the same as per the OECD guidelines.

It further defines the mechanism of CPM, by prescribing the following formula:

TP = COGS x (1 + cost plus mark-up)

Where,

    TP = the Transfer Price of a product sold between a manufacturing company and a related company;
    COGS = the Cost of Goods Sold to the manufacturing company; and
    Cost plus mark-up = gross profit mark-up defined as the ratio of gross profit to cost of goods sold. Gross profit is defined as sales minus cost of goods sold.

From the above, it can be seen that UN Manual also prescribes the practical application of Cost Plus Method, and breaks down the process in formulae and practical steps.

3.4    Most suitable situations for applicability of CPM:

The applicability of a method varies from one case to the other. However, there are certain standard cases where CPM would, most likely, be the most suitable option. The said cases are discussed hereunder:

    Sale of semi-finished goods:

The application of CPM to the sale of semi-finished goods has been recommended by the OECD guidelines. However, in order to benchmark the transaction, a functional analysis of the same has to be conducted. Semi-finished goods are of various types, such as complete assembly of goods before sale, or a semi knocked down (SKD) condition. It has to be ascertained that how independent parties would arrive at a mark up, and determine their prices in such cases.

Hence, an appropriate cost base as well as mark up is essential to be derived at in order to benchmark the transactions, and arrive at the arm’s length price. The purpose of benchmarking is to ensure that prices set should give the same price to the associated enterprise as they would if the sales were made to independent parties. In such cases, internal comparable, i.e. sales made by the same manufacturer to associated enterprises as well as third parties, would be the ideal scenario.

However, if the manufacturer is not making similar sales to third parties, external comparables can also be used. For example, say, a manufacturer produces wheat products in a semi finished state, out of the raw material, and then sells the same to its AEs as well as non-AEs at a cost plus mark up of 15%. In this case, it is easy for the manufacturer to determine the cost of the raw materials and the mark up for the functions carried out. In this case, internal comparables are also available, and hence, the benchmarking process becomes considerably simpler.

    Joint facility agreements, or Long-term buy & supply arrangements:

The OECD guidelines recommend Cost Plus Method for agreements or arrangements where the manufacturer acts as a contractual manufacturer. A contractual manufacturer is typically one who carries low risk and carries out low-level functions, whereas an entrepreneurial manufacturer is the one who carries majority of the risk and has entrepreneurial and more complex functions. In these cases, functional analysis of the entity is important to determine the category of manufacturer. Mere claim of the entity is not sufficient, and the agreements as well as functions of the entity have to be verified.

After it is determined whether an entity is a contractual or entrepreneurial entity, the comparables can be selected accordingly. This is due to the fact that a contractual manufacturer, bearing low risks, would likely have a less mark up than an entrepreneurial manufacturer, who essentially bears majority of the risks involved.

For example, say, A is a contractual manufacturer, which produces spare parts of computer hardware for its AE, as per the instructions and technical know-how of the AE. In this case, the functionality of ‘A’ is easy to determine, as it is a simpler entity, and thus the costs can be most appropriately determined. Due to less complexity of functions, the mark up to the cost can also be computed as per the agreements with the AE as well as the functions performed by ‘A’. In such a case, CPM is the most appropriate method.

    Provision of services:

This is the third broad category which has been recommended by OECD guidelines for the use of CPM. In this category, CPM can be used wherein the services provided by the entity are low-end services. This is due to the fact that high end service providers do not charge fees on a cost plus basis. The true value in such cases is of the service provided, and not of the cost incurred for the provision of the same. For instance, a Chartered Accountant does not charge his fees based on the costs incurred for a study report, but for his expertise and service provided. In such cases, CPM is not the most appropriate method.

However, in low end services, such as in the case of job workers, the worth of the intangibles for value addition does not form a major part of the price, and hence, an appropriate mark up to cost can be easily determined. Hence, CPM is an appropriate method to derive the Arm’s Length Price.

In order to come to the decision whether CPM can be applied to a particular transaction/entity, the actual risk allocation has to be verified. The OECD guidelines3 provide an example, wherein the actual risk allocation is used to determine whether CPM can be used or not. The example reads as follows:

“Company A of an MNE group agrees with company B of the same MNE group to carry out contract research for company B. All risks of a failure of the research are born by company B. This company also owns all the intangibles developed through the research and therefore has also the profit chances resulting from the research. This is a typical setup for applying a cost plus method. All costs for the research, which the associated parties have agreed upon, have to be compensated. The additional cost plus may reflect how innovative and complex the research carried out is.”

Broadly, the CPM is most suitable to the aforesaid situations, but the applicability of the same varies on the facts of each case.

3.5    Situations wherein Cost Plus Method is NOT appropriate:

Furthermore, the UN Practical Manual4 has specified certain transactions wherein the application of CPM is not suitable. It states that where the transactions involve a full-fledged manufacturer which owns valuable product intangibles (i.e., an entrepreneurial manufacturer), independent comparables would be difficult to obtain. Hence, it will be difficult to establish a mark up that is required to remunerate the full-fledged manufacturer for owning the product intangibles. In such structures, typically the sales companies (i.e., commisionaries) will normally be the least complex entities involved in the controlled transactions and will therefore be the tested party in the analysis. The Resale Price Method is typically more easily applied in such cases.

3.6    Steps in application of CPM:

The steps for application of Cost Plus Method, as per

Rule 10B of the Indian Income Tax Act, are as follows:

    Ascertain the direct and indirect cost of production.

    Ascertain a normal gross profit mark-up to such costs.

    Adjust the normal gross profit mark-up referred to in

(2) above to take in to account the functional and other differences.
    The costs referred to in (1) above are increased by the adjusted gross profit mark-up referred to in (3) above.
    The sum so arrived at is taken to be an arm’s length price.

The application of the aforesaid steps is being shown in the following example:

    Production Costs of AE-India = 50

    20% = Gross Profit Margin on production costs earned by 3P-India on sales made by other Indian comparable companies

3.7    Advantages and Challenges of CPM:

Advantages of CPM:

    The applicability of CPM is based on internal costs, for which the information is readily available with the entity
    Reliance is on functional similarities

    Fewer adjustments are required on account of product differences than CUP
    Less vitiated by indirect expenses which are not “controllable”

Challenges of CPM:

    Practical difficulties in ascertaining cost base in controlled and uncontrolled transactions
    Difficulties in determining the gross profit of the comparable companies on the same basis, because of, say, different accounting treatments for certain items

    Difficult to make adjustments for factors which affect the cost base of the entity/transaction
    No incentive for an entity to control costs since the method is based only on actual costs
    The level of costs might be disproportionately lower as compared to the market price, e.g., when lower costs of research leads to the production of a high value intangible in the market

3.8    Peculiar Issues in Application of CPM:

The OECD guidelines examine various practical difficulties in the application of CPM, which are being discussed in brief, hereunder:
Determination of costs and mark up:

While, an enterprise would mostly cover its costs over a period of time, it is plausible that those costs might not be determinant of the appropriate profit for a particular transaction of the specific year. For instance, some companies might need to reduce their prices due to competitive pricing, or there might be instances wherein the cost incurred on R&D is quite low in comparison to the market value of the product.

Further, it is important to apply an apt comparable mark up. For example, if the supplier has employed leased assets to carry out its business activities, its cost cannot be compared to the supplier using its own business assets. In such a case, an appropriate margin is required to be derived. For this purpose, the differences in the level and types of expenses, in light of the functions performed and risks assumed, must be compared. Such comparison may indicate the following:

    Expenses may reflect a functional difference which has not been taken into account in applying the method, for which an adjustment to the cost plus mark-up may be required.

    Expenses may reflect additional functions distinct from the activities tested by the method, for which separate compensation may need to be determined.

    Sometimes, differences in expenses are merely due to efficiencies or inefficiencies of the enterprises, for which no adjustment may be appropriate.

    Accounting consistency:

Where accounting practices are different in controlled and uncontrolled transactions, appropriate adjustments need to be made in order to ensure consistency in the use of same types of costs. Entities might also differ in the treatment of costs which affect the gross mark-up, which need to be accounted for.

3.9    Critical Points while Determining the Cost Base:

In CPM, it is most important to ensure that all the relevant costs have been included in the cost base in order to determine the Arm’s Length Price. The basic principle is to determine what price would have been charged, had the parties not been connected/associated. The OECD guidelines have discussed the same in depth.

An independent entity would ensure that all costs are covered and that a profit is earned on a transaction with a third party. The usual starting point in determining the cost base would be the accounting practices. The AE might consider a certain kind of expense as operating, while the third party may not do so. In such cases, appropriate adjustments need to be made so as to ensure accounting consistency.

Further, in principal, historical costs should be attributed to individual units of production. However, some costs, such as the cost of materials, would vary over a period of time, and it would be appropriate to average the costs over the period in question. Averaging might also be appropriate across product groups or over a particular line of production, and also for fixed costs where the different products are produced simultaneously and the volume of activity fluctuates.

Another difficulty arises on the allocation of costs between suppliers and purchasers. It may be so that the purchaser bears certain costs so as to diminish the supplier’s cost base, on which mark-up would be computed. In practical situations, this may be solved by not allocating costs which are being shifted to the purchaser in the above manner. For instance, say ‘S’ is the manufacturer of semi-finished goods, and supplies to its AE, viz. ‘P’. For this purpose, ‘S’ purchases raw material from a third party. Ideally, the cost of idle raw material should be borne by the supplier, i.e., ‘S’. However, there might be mutual agreements, wherein the purchaser, i.e., ‘P’, bears such cost of idle raw material, and hence, the cost burden of ‘S’ goes down. In such cases, while deriving at the cost base, appropriate adjustments should be made.

Thus, it is evident that no straight jacket formula can be derived for dealing with all cases. It has to be ensured that there is consistency in the determination of costs, between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, so as to ensure that the appropriate Arm’s Length Price is obtained.

3.10 Cost Plus Model vs. Cost Plus Method:

Due to the ambiguity in the difference between Cost Plus Method and Cost Plus Model, the same is being discussed hereunder:

Cost Plus Model

    It is a pricing model

    Mark-up is added on operating costs/total cost
    Method adopted in fact is TNMM

    Comparison of Net Margins

Cost Plus Method

    Method of determining arm’s length price

    Mark-up is added on cost of goods sold

    Comparison of Gross Margins

3.11 Judicial Precedents on CPM:

The applicability, benchmarking and cost base of CPM has been debated in the courts of law, both Indian and International, time and again. Some of the major judicial precedents are discussed in brief hereunder:

Wrigley  India  Private  Limited  vs.  Addl.  CIT [(2011) 142 TTJ (Del) 23]:

    The taxpayer is a subsidiary of a US based company, engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of chewing gums.

    The import of raw materials by the taxpayer from its AE constituted 14% of the total raw material consumed.
The taxpayer was selling products in domestic as well as international market.

    In case of export to AEs, it benchmarked its transactions using TNMM.

    The TPO applied CPM, and held that since the goods exported were same as the ones sold in domestic market to unrelated parties, the domestic transactions could be used as ‘comparable’ to the international transactions.

    The ITAT upheld the additions made by using CPM, and observed that the goods sold to AE as well as non-AEs, were the same goods manufactured in the same factory using the same raw materials.

    The use of internal comparables was also upheld, as the raw material purchased from the AE was only 14% of the total consumption, and hence, internal CPM could be used by taking GP/direct cost of production as PLI.

    ITAT also held that though there was difference in domestic and export market, it should have had a positive impact on margins of the taxpayer as per capita income was higher in foreign countries than India and
the goods sold by the taxpayer were not ‘necessities of life’, but were consumed by middle and higher class people in the society.

    Thus, internal CPM was considered to be the most appropriate method.

    Diamond Dye Chem Ltd. vs. DCIT [2010-TII-20-ITAT-MUM-TP]:

    The taxpayer is engaged in the business of manufacturing Optical Brightening Agents (OBAs), and exported its products both to AEs and non-AEs.

    The sales made to AEs were more than 6 times of the sales made to non-AEs. The company adopted TNMM as the most appropriate method to benchmark the transaction.

    TPO rejected the said method, and adopted CPM as the most appropriate method, and made an addition of Rs. 3,07,89,380/-.

    The taxpayer preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) wherein it submitted that that there were a lot of functional differences between the sales made to AEs and those to unrelated parties, and hence, gross profit mark-up cannot be applied. Without prejudice to the same, the taxpayer also claimed that adjustments for differences on account of volume discounts, and staff & travelling cost of marketing and technical persons must be made while computing the Arm’s Length Price.

    The CIT(A) did not accept the contention of the taxpayer for application of TNMM as the most appropriate method. The CIT(A) confirmed the application of CPM by the TPO, but allowed the adjustment on account of “staff and travelling cost of dedicated marketing personnel”. Thus, the CIT(A) arrived at an ALP of 55.27%, and after allowing the benefit of +/- 5% range, confirmed the addition to the extent of Rs. 38,67,421/-.

    The ITAT upheld the use of CPM, and held that the taxpayer did not explain substantial differences in functional and risk profile to reject CPM. The ITAT held that the taxpayer could not satisfactorily explain as to what are the substantial differences in the functional and risk profiles of the activities undertaken by the taxpayer in respect of exports made to the AEs and non-AEs.

    The ITAT further held that since the cost data for the manufacture of products are available as per cost audit report, the report thereof is assured, and hence, CPM is the most appropriate method.

    However, it allowed discount adjustment on account of differences in volumes of sales since the sales made to AEs are almost 6 times to the sales made to non-AEs.

    ACIT vs. L’Oreal India Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 6745/M/2008]:

    The taxpayer is engaged in the business of manufacturing and distribution of cosmetic and beauty products, and is a 100% subsidiary of L’Oreal SA France.

    During the AY 2002-03, the taxpayer had purchased raw materials from its associated enterprise and had used CPM to benchmark the same.

    The Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) rejected the same, and computed the Arm’s Length Price by applying Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM).

    The CIT(A) deleted the said addition, and the ITAT upheld the decision of the CIT(A).

    ITAT held as follows:

    CPM adopted by the taxpayer is based on the functions performed and not on the basis of types of product manufactured, as normally the pricing methods get precedence over profit methods.

    Even according to the OECD guidelines, the preferred method is that which requires computation of ALP directly based on gross margin, over other methods which require computation of ALP in an indirect method, because comparing gross margins extinguishes the need for making adjustments in relation to differences in operating expenses, which could be different from enterprise to enterprise.

    CPM had been accepted by the TPO in subsequent assessment years.

    The Department went in appeal against the aforesaid order before the High Court, wherein the decision of the ITAT was upheld by the High Court.     

ACIT vs. MSS India (P.) Ltd. [(2009) 32 SOT 132 (Pune)]:

    The taxpayer is a 100% EOU, engaged in the business of manufacturing of strap connectors. It made sales to both its AEs and non-AEs.

    83% of the total sales were made to the AEs.

    It incurred a loss of 2.35% at the net level.

    In order to justify arm’s length price, the taxpayer used CPM as well as TNMM. In TNMM, the taxpayer compared its net loss to the other companies which were incurring more losses. While, in using CPM, the taxpayer used internal comparables, i.e., it compared the margins from AEs and non-AEs.

    TPO rejected the use of CPM on the basis that the division of cost was not verifiable. The comparables selected by the taxpayer were also rejected by the

TPO, and fresh comparables were selected.

    TPO applied TNMM to benchmark the transactions and make adjustments to the value of sales to derive at an arm’s length price.

    The CIT(A) and ITAT both upheld the use of CPM.

    The ITAT held as follows:

    The TPO rejected the use of CPM stating that “while distributing various costs, it is always difficult to exactly find out the correct ratio in which all these costs should be allocated and if the distribution of all these costs is not done correctly, it may give undesirable results”. The ITAT held that a method cannot be rejected merely because of its complexity.

    The relevant considerations for selection of appropriate method ought to be the nature and class of international transaction, the class of AEs, FAR analysis and availability, coverage and reliability of data, the degree of comparability between related and unrelated transactions and ability to make reliable and accurate adjustment in case of differences.

    It was not necessary that AEs should enter into international transaction in such a manner that a reasonable profit margin would be earned by the AE, but what was necessary that price charged for such transactions had to be at arm’s length.


    ACIT vs. Tara Ultimo (P.) Ltd. [(2012) 143 TTJ (Mum) 91]:

    The taxpayer, engaged in manufacture and trade of jewellery, sold finished goods to its AE and adopted CPM to compute ALP of the transaction, using Sales/ GP as the PLI.

    TPO rejected the ALP computation made by the taxpayer, and made an adjustment to the taxpayer’s income, using TNMM.

    On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the addition made, and the Revenue went into appeal before the ITAT.

    The ITAT made the following observations:

    CIT(A) examined only one aspect of the matter i.e. sales of finished goods to the AEs, but failed to examine other aspects of import of diamonds from

AE and export of diamonds to AEs. Hence, the ITAT held that the CIT(A) had erred in rejecting TNMM.

    The taxpayer had not placed on record any evidence to support ALP of diamonds imported and exported or to justify that the transactions were made at prevailing market price.

    In the absence of documentation to support use of direct method such as CUP, CPM or Resale Price method, it was imperative to use indirect methods of determination of ALP i.e., TNMM or profit Split method.

    The taxpayer had made comparison on ‘global level’ instead on ‘transaction level’. Further, one of the important input i.e., diamond had been imported from AEs where the arm’s length nature of the transaction was not established.

    In view of the above, ITAT rejected the CPM method, and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh determination.

    Conclusion:
Various guidelines have been developed to assist the countries in proper tax administration, as well as MNEs to reasonably attribute the appropriate profit to each jurisdiction. In a global economy, where MNEs play a prominent role, transfer pricing is a major issue for tax administrations as well as taxpayers. In order to ensure that the respective governments receive the revenue that they are entitled to, and that the MNEs pay proper tax without suffering the consequence of double taxation, various methods and guidelines have been developed.

Resale Price Method and Cost Plus Method, have been discussed at length herein. However, it is pertinent to mention that the facts of each case may be unique, and need to be scrutinised independently before coming to a conclusion for the applicability of the most appropriate method. The purpose of the method is merely to arrive at the arm’s length price, for which several adjustments may need to be applied. It is important to use the above method with suitable flexibility for the same. It is advisable to reject the other methods before accepting most appropriate method for computation of arm’s length price. In conclusion, it is the intent and the essence of the provisions and the method to be kept in mind, and not merely the procedure.

Further, recently OECD has launched an Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) identifying 15 specific actions needed in order to equip governments with the domestic and international instruments to address the challenge of MNEs adopting aggressive tax planning and profit shifting. The objective of this plan is to prevent double non-taxation and proper allocation of profits between various jurisdictions. The said objective can be achieved by appropriate FAR analysis and by selecting the most appropriate method for benchmarking the transaction between two associated enterprises.

Let us clean the nation

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Prime Minister Modi, in his Independence Day speech sounded the bugle for “Swachh Bharat Abhiyan”. Like his other actions, this emphasis on cleanliness in an Independence Day speech was unconventional. He set an agenda which was not a party agenda but a national one. Though the opposition did make an attempt to cast some doubts saying that it was only showmanship, their comments did not cut much ice with the Indian public, a majority of whom are already enamoured with PM Modi. Pursuant to the appeal actions have been taken by corporates and citizens groups. With their cooperation the movement should succeed.

While cleanliness of roads, water, and sanitation are all welcome projects, what is far more important is cleaning the cobwebs in the mind. Mr. Modi craftily invited leaders from opposition parties to join the movement. This created a flutter particularly when Mr. Tharoor appreciated the proposal. In our country, political parties have constantly stuck to their stereotyped roles. Praising the laudable actions of somebody who is on the other side of the political divide is seen as committing a sin and more often than not political parties wash their hands of such comments by saying that it is the personal view of that leader. All this has to change. It is time that opposition parties realise that it is their duty to oppose the wrong actions of the Government, but if there is something that needs to be supported it should be done, though the credit for the same may well go to one’s political opponents.

To establish that he is serious in his endeavour, the Prime Minister and his party should set an example. Physical cleanliness can be achieved over a period of time. What is much more important is cleanliness in public life. Parties would do well to ensure that their leaders enjoy an impeccable reputation in public life. Those with established criminal backgrounds should not be offered party tickets. Cleaning the political system should be the top priority.

Along with this Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, the four pillars of democracy also are in dire need of a clean up drive. Apart from politicians to whom I made a reference, somebody needs to wield the broom to clean the bureaucracy. What is necessary is a real intent to put honest upright bureaucrats at proper places. In this case, one needs swift and firm action. As I write this editorial, there are disturbing reports that an engineer of a local body who is alleged to have amassed huge wealth and against whom action by the anti-corruption bureau is pending has been reinstated. It is astonishing to note that such a person, will be heading the “vigilance department.” This is a cruel joke on the public and this action needs immediate correction. The media which has often played a stellar role in exposing the wrong deeds of public officials also needs to do a fair amount of introspection. While it is true that in this era of competition, media houses are often caught in the race to be first off the blocks, to give breaking news, it would be worth their while if they pause for a moment and ascertain whether what came to the knowledge was a fact or fiction. A comment in the media can cause immense damage to reputations. A clean and responsible media strengthens democracy. Finally, the judiciary which is considered as the saviour is also not free from its share of black sheep. The controversies about appointments to the highest court of the land leave a bitter taste in the mouth. As far as the lower judiciary and quasi-judicial authorities are concerned, a massive clean-up drive is necessary. Inefficient and corrupt incumbents at this level affect the general public. This is because it is these forums that are accessible and affordable to the public in their quest for justice.

While the nation is watching this movement with a great degree of expectation, is there a role that our profession can play? Can we contribute our mite to keep public life clean? While rendering services to our clients, keeping abreast of the various developments in the profession and sharpening our skill sets are definitely a prerequisite, what cannot be lost sight of are the qualities of integrity and independence. We must realise that our profession has this unique position akin to that of a family doctor. We enjoy the confidence of our clients for long periods of time. If we give them proper advice and inculcate the habit of complying with the law and regulations rather than making an attempt to sidestep them, we would have done our nation a great service. We must express our opinions without fear and in an independent manner. While I agree that we cannot do any moral policing, or impose principles on our clients, we must follow professional ethics ourselves, and render correct advice so that we go to bed with a clear conscience, with the satisfaction that we have done the best that we could. If we perform our role diligently, we would have gone a long way in giving our country a cleaner business environment.

Finally, we have recently celebrated the Festival of Lights and embarked on a new Samvat 2071, which promises to be a prosperous one. Let us try and ensure that it is a clean one as well. If actions of others in the past have sullied our mind, let us wipe the blackboard clean, and begin life with a new slate. We will then have contributed to the Swachh Bharat movement in the true sense.

levitra

Transfer Pricing – Issue of Shares at a Premium to Non-resident AEs – Whether alleged shortfall in Share premium can be taxed u/s. 92 of the Act

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Synopsis
In the past, we have seen lots of twists & turns in Transfer Pricing litigation One such interesting issue has been whether any such alleged shortfall in share premium can be taxed u/s. 92 of the Act under the pretext that the assessee has forgone the so called notional income on the funds that it would have received. In the case of Vodafone a pro-assessee judgment was pronounced by the Honorable Mumbai High Court where it was held that the transaction did not give rise to any ‘income’ from International Transactions and therefore TP provisions are not applicable.

Tele-Services (India) Holdings Limited, wherein total TP adjustment of Rs. 1,397.26 crore was made for the Assessment Year [AY] 2009-10. The assessment order of the AO was challenged in a Writ Petition before the Bombay HC and the Court, after comprehensively dealing with various contentions, vide its order dated 10th October, 2014 decided the issue in favour of the petitioner.

Similarly, a writ petition in the case of Shell India relating to issue of shares by it to its non-resident AE Shell Gas BV, wherein a total TP adjustment of Rs. 15,220 crore has been made for the Assessment Year [AY ] 2009-10, is being heard by the Bombay High Court [HC].

There are about 24 other assessees facing tax demands on similar grounds.

In this Article, we discuss the salient features of the HC’s decision in the case of Vodafone.

Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI (WP No. 871 of 2014, Bombay HC)

Brief Facts
1. The brief facts are as follows:

1. The Vodafone India Services Private Ltd. [Petitioner] issued certain equity shares to its holding company of face value of Rs. 10 each at a premium of Rs. 8,509 per share.

2. The petitioner contended that Fair Market Value [FMV] of the equity shares was Rs. 8,519 as determined in accordance with the prescribed methodology.

3. However, according to the AO and the TPO, the equity shares ought to be valued at NAV of Rs. 53,775 per share. Thus, the consequence of issue of shares by the Petitioner to its holding company at a lower premium resulted in the Petitioner subsidising the price payable by the holding company. This deficit was treated as a deemed loan extended by the petitioner to its holding company and periodical interest thereon is to be charged to tax as its interest income.

Issues involved

2. The main issues raised in the Writ Petition are as follows:

(a) Whether Chapter X of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [the Act] is a separate code by itself and the difference in valuation between ALP and the contract/ transaction price would give rise to income?

(b) Whether “Income” as defined in section 2(24) of the Act is an inclusive definition and it does not prohibit taxing capital receipts as income?

(c) Whether the forgoing of premium on the part of the Petitioner amounts to extinguishment/relinquishment of a right to receive fair market value and therefore, the issue of shares is a transfer within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Act?, and

(d) Whether the meaning of International Transaction as given in clauses (c) and (e) of the Explanation (i) to section 92B of the Act would include within its scope even a capital account transaction?

Petitioner’s Contentions
3. The petitioner contended that:

(a) Chapter X of the Act is a special provisions relating to avoidance of tax. Section 92 of the Act provides for computation of income arising from International Transaction, having regard to ALP. Section 92(1) of the Act which applies to the present facts, directs that any income arising from an International Transaction should be computed, having regard to the ALP. Thus, the sine-qua-non, for application of section 92(1) of the Act is that income should arise from an International Transaction. In this case, it is submitted that no income arises from issue of equity shares by the Petitioner to its holding company;
(b) T he impugned order dated 11th February, 2014 after correctly holding that the word ‘Income’ has not been separately defined for the purpose of Chapter X of the Act, yet proceeds to give its own meaning to the word ‘Income.’ This is clearly not permissible. The word ‘Income’ would have to be understood as defined by other provisions of the Act such as section 2(24) of the Act. A fiscal statute has to be strictly interpreted upon its own terms and the meaning of ordinary words cannot be expanded to give purposeful interpretation;
(c) Chapter X of the Act is not designed to bring to tax all sums involved in a transaction, which are otherwise not taxable. The purpose and objective is not to tax difference between the ALP and the contracted/book value of said transaction but to reach the fair price/consideration. Therefore, before any transaction could be brought to tax, a taxable income must arise. The interpretation in the impugned order to tax any amounts involved in International Transaction tantamount to imposing a penalty for entering into a transaction (no way giving rise to taxable income) at a value which the revenue determines on application of ALP;
(d) T he impugned order itself demonstrates the fact that the share premium on issue of shares is per se not taxable. This is so as the amounts received by the Petitioner on account of share premium has not been taxed and only the amount of share premium which is deemed not to have been received on application of ALP, alone has been brought to tax;
(e) I n case of issue of shares, it comes into existence for the first time only when shares are allotted. It is the creation of the property for first time. This is different from the transfer of an existing property. An issue of shares is a process of creation of shares and not a transfer of shares. Therefore, there is no transfer of shares so as to make Section 45 of the Act applicable. It was submitted that if the contention of the Revenue is correct, then every issue of shares by any Company would be subjected to tax;
(f) The issue of shares by the Petitioner to its holding company and receipt of consideration of the same is a capital receipt under the Act. Capital receipts cannot be brought to tax unless specifically/expressly brought to tax by the Act. It is well settled that capital receipts do not come within the ambit of the word ‘Income’ under the Act, save when so expressly provided as in the case of section 2(24) (vi) of the Act. This brings capital gains chargeable u/s. 45 of the Act, to tax within the meaning of the word ‘Income’;
(g) Attention was drawn to the definition of `Income’ in section 2(24) (xvi) of the Act which includes in its scope amounts received arising or accruing within the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act. However, it applies to issue of shares to a resident. Besides, it seeks to tax consideration received in excess of the fair market value of the shares and not the alleged short-fall in the issue price of equity shares. Thus, this also indicates absence of any intent to tax the issue of shares below the alleged fair market value as in this case;
(h) T he impugned order proceeds on an assumption, surmise or conjecture that in case the notional income, i.e., the amount of share premium forgone was received, the Petitioner would have invested the same, giving rise to income. It is submitted that no tax can be charged on guess work or assumption or conjecture in the absence of any such income arising; and
The impugned order itself demonstrates the fact that the share premium on issue of shares is per se not taxable. This is so as the amounts received by the Petitioner on account of share premium has not been taxed and only the amount of share premium which is deemed not to have been received on application of ALP, alone has been brought to tax;

    In case of issue of shares, it comes into existence for the first time only when shares are allotted. It is the creation of the property for first time. This is dif-ferent from the transfer of an existing property. An issue of shares is a process of creation of shares and not a transfer of shares. Therefore, there is no transfer of shares so as to make Section 45 of the Act applicable. It was submitted that if the contention of the Revenue is correct, then every issue of shares by any Company would be subjected to tax;

    The issue of shares by the Petitioner to its holding company and receipt of consideration of the same is a capital receipt under the Act. Capital receipts cannot be brought to tax unless specifically/expressly brought to tax by the Act. It is well settled that capital receipts do not come within the ambit of the word ‘Income’ under the Act, save when so expressly provided as in the case of section 2(24) (vi) of the Act. This brings capital gains chargeable u/s. 45 of the Act, to tax within the meaning of the word ‘Income’;

    Attention was drawn to the definition of `Income’ in section 2(24) (xvi) of the Act which includes in its scope amounts received arising or accruing with-in the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act. However, it applies to issue of shares to a resident. Besides, it seeks to tax consideration received in excess of the fair market value of the shares and not the alleged short-fall in the issue price of equity shares. Thus, this also indicates absence of any intent to tax the issue of shares below the alleged fair market value as in this case;

    The impugned order proceeds on an assumption, surmise or conjecture that in case the notional income, i.e., the amount of share premium forgone was received, the Petitioner would have invested the same, giving rise to income. It is submitted that no tax can be charged on guess work or assumption or conjecture in the absence of any such income arising; and

    The impugned order places reliance upon the meaning of International Transaction as provided in subsection (c) and (e) of Explanation (i) to section 92B of the Act to conclude that the income arises. It is submitted that Explanation (i)(c) to section 92B of the Act only states that capital financing transaction such as borrowing money and/or lending money to AE would be an International Transaction. However, what is brought to tax is not the quantum of amount lent and/or borrowed but the impact on income due to such lending or borrowing. This impact is found in either under reporting/ over reporting the interest paid/interest received etc. Similarly, Explanation (i)(e) to section 92B of the Act, which covers business restructuring would only have application if said restructuring/reorganising impacts income. If there is any impact of income on account of business restructuring/reorganising, then such income would be subjected to tax as and when it arises whether in present or in future. In this case, such a contingency does not arise as there is no impact on income which would be chargeable to tax due to issue of shares.

    Revenue’s Contentions

    Revenue contended that:

    Section 92(1) of the Act is to be read with section 92(2) of the Act. It is stated that a conjoint reading of two provisions would indicate that what is being brought to tax under Chapter X of the Act is not share premium but is the cost incurred by the Petitioner in passing on a benefit to its holding company by issue of shares at a premium less than ALP. This benefit is the difference between the ALP and the premium at which the shares were issued. Issue of shares by the Petitioner to its holding company, resulted in the following benefits to its holding company:

    Cost incurred by the Indian Co. for a correspond-ing benefit given to the Holding Co. After all, the Holding Co. has actually got shares worth Rs. 53,775/- each at a price of Rs. 8,159/- each.

    Benefit also accrues to the valuation of Holding Co. in the international market by taking undervalued shares of the subsidiary Co., by increasing the real net worth of the Holding Co.

Besides the above, at the hearing, following further sub-missions in support of the conclusion arrived by the impugned order were also advanced:

    The Petitioner does not challenge the constitutional validity of Chapter X of the Act or any of the Sec-tions therein. The Petitioner raises only an issue of interpretation. Moreover, the fact that the Petitioner-Company and its holding company are AEs within the meaning of Chapter X of the Act is also not disputed. Therefore, the provisions of Chapter X of the Act are fully satisfied and applicable to the facts of the present case;

    The Petitioner itself had submitted to the jurisdiction of Chapter X of the Act by filing/sub-mitting Form 3-CEB, declaring the ALP. Thus, the respondent-revenue were under an obligation to scrutinise the same and when found that the ALP determined by the Petitioner-Company is not cor-rect, the AO and the TPO were mandated to apply Chapter X of the Act and compute the correct ALP. Therefore, the Petitioner should be relegated to the alternate remedy of approaching the Authorities under the Act;

    The issue of Chapter X of the Act being applicable is no longer res integra as identical provision as found in Section 92 of the Act was available in sec-tion 42(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (1922 Act). The SC in Mazagon Dock Ltd. vs. CIT [1958] 34 ITR 368 – upheld the action of revenue in seeking to tax a resident in respect of profit which he would have normally made but did not make because of his close association with a non-resident. Further, the Court observed that it is open to tax notional prof-its and also impose a charge on the resident. The aforesaid provision of section 42(2) of the 1922 Act were incorporated in its new avtar as section 92 of the said Act. It was thus emphasised that the legis-lative history supports the stand of the respondent-revenue that even in the absence of actual income, a notional income can be brought to tax;

    Section 92(1) of the Act uses the word ‘Any in-come arising from an International Transaction’. This indicates that the income of either party to the transaction could be subject matter of tax and not the income of resident only. Further, it is submitted that for the purpose of Chapter X of the Act, real income concept has no application, otherwise the words would have been ‘actual income’. Therefore, the difference between ALP and the contracted price would be added to the total Income;

    It was further submitted that under the Act what is taxable is income when it accrues or arises or when it is deemed to accrue or arise and not only when it is received. Therefore, even if an amount is not actually received, yet, in case income has aris-en or deemed to arise, then the same is charge-able to tax. Thus, the difference between ALP and contract price is an income which has arisen but not received. Thus, income forgone is also subject to tax;     Chapter X of the Act is a complete code by itself and not merely a machinery provision to compute the ALP. Chapter X of the Act applies wherever the ALP is to be determined by the A.O. It is the hidden benefit in the transaction which is being charged to tax. Therefore, the charging section is inherent in Chapter X of the Act; Even if there is no separate head of income u/s.

14 of the Act in respect of International Transaction, such passing on of benefit by the Petitioner to its holding company would fall under the head ‘Income’  from  other  sources  u/s.  56(1)  of  the Act; and Section 4 of the Act is the charging section which provides that the charge will be in respect of the total income for the Assessment Year. The scope of total income is defined in section 5 of the Act to include all income from whatever source which is received or accrues or arises or deemed to be received, accrued or arisen would be a part of the total income. Therefore, the word ‘Income’ for purposes of Chapter X of the Act is to be given widest meaning to be deemed to be income aris-ing, for the purposes of total income in section 5 of the Act.

In view of the above, it was submitted that the Petition should not be entertained.

    Findings/Decision of the HC

    Wider meaning of ‘Income’ is not permissible in absence of specific provision in the Statute

On the contention of the revenue that the definition of In-ternational Transaction in the sub-Clause (c) and (e) of Explanation (i) to section 92B of the Act should be given a broader meaning to include notional income, the HC held as under:

    While interpreting a fiscal/taxing statute, the intent or purpose is irrelevant and the words of the taxing statute have to be interpreted strictly;

    In case of taxing statutes, in the absence of the provision by itself being susceptible to two or more meanings, it is not permissible to forgo the strict rules of interpretation while construing it;

    The SC in Mathuram Agarwal vs. State of M.P. [1999] 8 SCC 667 had laid down the following test for interpreting a taxing statue as under:

 “The intention of the legislature in a taxation statute is to be gathered from the language of the provisions particu-larly where the language is plain and unambiguous. In a taxing Act it is not possible to assume any intention or governing purpose of the statute more than what is stated in the plain language. It is not the economic results sought to be obtained by making the provision which is relevant in interpreting a fiscal statute.

Equally impermissible is an interpretation which does not follow from the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. Words cannot be added to or substituted so as to give a meaning to the statute which will serve the spirit and intention of the legislature. The statute should clearly and unambiguously convey the three components of the tax law i.e. the subject of the tax, the person who is liable to pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is to be paid. If there is any ambiguity regarding any of these ingredients in a taxation statute then there is no tax in law. Then it is for the legislature to do the needful in the matter.”

    In view of the above, it was clear that it was not open to DRP to seek aid of the supposed intent of the Legislature to give a wider meaning to the word ‘Income’.

    Whether the definition of ‘Income’ u/s. 2(24) includes ‘Capital Receipt’

    Following decision of the Bombay HC in the case of Cadell Weaving Mill Company Private Limited vs. CIT [2001] 249 ITR 265 (Bombay) upheld by the Apex Court in CIT vs. D. P. Sandu Brothers Chembur Private Limited. [2005] 273 ITR 1 (SC), it could not be disputed that income would not in its normal meaning under the Act include capital receipts unless specified.

    Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act seeks to tax a Com-pany in which public are not substantially interest-ed, in respect of the consideration received from a resident on sale of shares, which is in excess of the fair market value of the shares, as Income from Other Sources. The amount received on issue of shares was admittedly a capital account transac-tion not separately brought within the definition of income, except in cases covered u/s. 56(2)(viib) of the Act. Therefore, in absence of express legisla-tion, no amount received, accrued, or arising on capital account transaction could be subjected to tax as income. Parliament had consciously not brought to tax amounts received from a non-resident for issue of shares, as it would discourage capital inflow from abroad.

    Neither the capital receipts received by the tax payer on issue of equity shares to its AE, a non-resident entity, nor the alleged shortfall between the so called fair market price of its equity shares and the issue price of the equity shares, could be considered as ‘Income’ within the meaning of the expression as defined under the Act.

    A transaction on capital account or on account of restructuring would become taxable to the extent it impacts income, i.e., under-reporting of interest received or over-reporting of interest paid or claim of depreciation, etc. It was only that income which had to be adjusted to the ALP. The issue of shares at a premium was a capital account transaction and not income.

    In tax jurisprudence, it is well settled that the fol-lowing four factors are essential ingredients to a taxing statute:

    subject of tax;

    person liable to pay the tax;

    rate at which tax is to be paid, and

    measure or value on which the rate is to be applied.

    There is difference between a charge to tax and the measure of tax (i) & (iv) above. This distinction is brought out by the SC in Bombay Tyres India Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in 1984 (1) SCC 467 wherein it was held that the charge of excise duty is on manufacture while the measure of the tax is the selling price of the manufactured goods.

    In this case also the charge is on income as under-stood in the Act, and where income arises from an International Transaction, than the measure is to be found on application of ALP so far Chapter X of the Act is concerned.

    The arriving at the transactional value/ consideration on the basis of ALP does not convert non-income into income. The tax can be charged only on income and in the absence of any income arising, the issue of applying the measure of ALP to transactional value/consideration itself does not arise.

    The ingredient (g)(i) mentioned above, relating to subject of tax is income which is chargeable to tax, is not satisfied. The issue of shares at a premium is a capital account transaction and not income.

    TP Provisions – Scope and Objective

    Section 92(1) of the Act has clearly brought out that ‘Income’ arising from an International Transaction is a condition precedent for application of

Chapter X of the Act. Transfer Pricing provisions in Chapter X of the Act are to ensure that in case of International Transaction between AEs, neither the profits are understated, nor losses overstated.

They do not replace the concept of income or expenditure as normally understood in the Act, for the purposes of Chapter X of the Act.

    Section 92(2) of the Act dealt with a situation where two or more AEs entered into an arrangement whereby, if they were to receive any benefit, ser-vice or facility, then the allocation, apportionment or contribution towards the cost or expenditure had to be determined in respect of each AE having regard to the ALP. It would have no application in Petitioner’s case where there was no occasion to allocate, apportion or contribute any cost and/ or expenses between the tax payer and the AE.

    The objective of Chapter X of the Act is not to punish Multinational Enterprises and/ or AEs for doing business inter se. Arm’s Length Price (ALP) is meant to determine the real value of the transaction entered into between AEs. It is a re-computation exercise to be carried out only when income arose in case of an International transac-tion between AEs. It does not warrant re-computation of a consideration received/given on capital account.

    Real income versus Notional income

Reliance by the Revenue upon the definition of Interna-tional Transaction in sub-Clauses (c) and (e) of Explanation (i) to section 92B of the Act to conclude that income had to be given a broader meaning to include notional income, as otherwise Chapter X of the Act would be ren-dered otiose/ meaningless, was held to be far-fetched.

It was contended by the Revenue that in view of Chapter X of the Act, the notional income is to be brought to tax and real income will have no place. The entire exercise of determining the ALP is only to arrive at the real income earned, i.e., the correct price of the transaction, shorn of the price arrived at between the parties on account of their relationship viz. AEs. In this case, the revenue seems to be confusing the measure to a charge and call-ing the measure a notional income. The HC found that there is absence of any charge in the Act to subject issue of shares at a premium to tax.

    Charging or Machinery Provisions

    Chapter X of the Act is a machinery (computation-al) provision to arrive at the ALP of a transaction between AEs. The substantive charging provisions are in sections 4, 5, 15 (Salaries), 22 (Income from house property), 28 (Profits and gains of business), 45 (Capital gain) and 56 (Income from other Sources). Even income arising from International Transactions between AEs had to satisfy the test of ‘Income’ under the Act and had to find its home in one of the above heads, i.e., charging provisions. Following the five member bench of the apex court in CIT vs. Vatika Township Private Limited [2014]

49 taxmann.com 249 (SC), in absence of a charg-ing section in Chapter X of the Act, it was not possible to read a charging provision into Chapter X of the Act.

    It was submitted that the machinery section of the Act cannot be read de-hors charging section. The Act has to be read as an integrated whole. The HC held that on the aforesaid submission also, there can be no dispute. However, as observed by the SC in CIT vs. B. C. Srinivasa Shetty 128 ITR 294, “there is a qualitative difference between the charging provisions and computation provisions and ordinarily the operation of the charging pro-visions cannot be affected by the construction of computation provisions.” In the present case, there is no charging provision to tax capital account transaction in respect of issue of shares at a pre-mium. Computation provisions cannot replace/ substitute the charging provisions. In fact, in B. C. Srinivasa Shetty (supra), there was charging provision but the computation provision failed and in such a case the Court held that the transaction cannot be brought to tax. The present facts are on a higher pedestal as there is no charging provision to tax issue of shares at premium to a non-resident, then the occasion to invoke the computation provisions does not arise. The HC therefore, found no substance in the aforesaid submission made on behalf of the Revenue.
 

    It was also contended that Chapter X of the Act is a complete code by itself and not merely a machinery provision to compute the ALP. It is a hidden benefit of the transaction which is being charged to tax and the charging section is inherent in Chapter

X of the Act. It is well settled position in law that a charge to tax must be found specifically mentioned in the Act. In the absence of there being a charging Section in Chapter X of the Act, it is not pos-sible to read a charging provision into Chapter X of the Act. There is no charge express or implied, in letter or in spirit to tax issue of shares at a premium as income. In the present case, there is no charging provision to tax capital account transaction in respect of issue of shares at a premium. Computation provisions cannot replace/substitute the charging provisions.

    The HC held that the issue of shares at a premium by the Petitioner to its nonresident holding company does not give rise to any income from an admitted International Transaction. Thus, no occa-sion to apply Chapter X of the Act can arise in such a case.

    Whether the Share premium is chargeable to tax as ‘Income from other sources’

    Share premium have been made taxable by a legal fiction u/s. 56(2)(viib) and the same is enumerated as ‘Income’ in section 2(24)(xvi) of the Act. How-ever, what is bought into the ambit of income is the premium received from a resident in excess of the fair market value of the shares.

    Whereas in this case, what is being sought to be taxed is capital not received from a non-resident i.e. premium allegedly not received on application of ALP. Therefore, in absence of express legislation, no amount received, accrued or arising on capital account transaction can be subjected to tax as income.

    Thus, neither the capital receipts received by the Petitioner on issue of equity shares to its holding company, a non-resident entity, nor the alleged short-fall between the so called fair market price of its equity shares and the issue price of the equity shares can be considered as income within the meaning of the expression as defined under the Act. Although section 56(1) of the Act would permit in-cluding within its head all income not otherwise excluded, it did not provide for taxing a capital account transaction of issue of shares as was specifically provided for in section 45 or section 56(2) (viib) of the Act and included within the definition of income in section 2(24) of the Act.

    Concluding Remarks

Thus, the HC held that the issue of shares at a premium by Petitioner to its AE did not give rise to any ‘Income’ from an International Transaction and therefore, there was no need to invoke TP provisions. The ruling surely comes as a morale booster for investors’ confidence and will also help improving the overall image of the Indian tax system. It goes without saying that the said principles should squarely apply to similar matters pending before the Bombay HC, namely Shell, Essar, etc., provided the basic facts are the same as those of Petitioner.

It seems that the tax department may take the matter to the SC and pass on the responsibility for taking a decision in this regard to the SC, instead of dropping the issue at this stage, as otherwise the dispute should not have actually traversed beyond the level of the DRP.

One can only hope that wiser counsel will prevail and the department as also the Government will accept the decision, issue a circular clarifying that except for specific charging provisions, capital receipts are not taxable and generally, use this opportunity to win/regain the faith of taxpayers and investors especially foreign investors.

Amendments to Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 Trade Circular 18T of 2014 dated 26.9.2014

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In this Trade Circular, various amendments carried out in Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 have been explained.

Now a composition & deemed dealer is required to file Annexure J1 & J2 along with half yearly return and details in Annexure C & D for entire year along with Second & last Half yearly return on or before 30th June of the succeeding year.

All dealers are also required to file Annexure J1 & J2 along with monthly, quarterly or half yearly return.

Dealers not liable for MVAT audit are required to file annual details in annexure C, D, G, H & I on or before 30th June of succeeding year.

Now a dealer who is unable to make quarterly application for declaration forms due to half yearly periodicity of return can apply for change in periodicity of returns to quarterly by email to peridiocity@mahavat.gov.in on or before 15th May of that financial year. Such change shall be final unless changed to monthly. Effective from F.Y. 2015-16.

Now, an option has been given in Registration Form 101 for a proprietor or partner to mention Adhar Card Number (UID).

Dealer having turnover between Rs. 60 lakh and Rs. 1 crore in F.Y. 2013-14 is required to file Annexures J1, J2,C,D,G,H & I for F.Y. 2013-14 along with return for the period ending on 30.9.2014. New Forms 604A & 605 have been prescribed.

SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Chargeability on transaction between joint venture and its members

Circular No. 179/05/2014 – ST dated 24th September, 2014

Vide this circular clarification has been provided with respect to chargeability of service tax on transaction between a joint venture and its members and vice versa post negative list regime of Service Tax with effect from 1st July, 2012 whereby all services are taxable subject to the definition of the service available in section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 other than the services specified in the Negative List and Mega Exemption notification.

The circular focuses on the issues of service tax implication on transactions in the nature of :

(a) cash calls or capital contributions made by the member to JV and
(b) Administrative services provided by member to JV.

The TRU has clarified that, according to Explanation 3 (a) under the definition of service, an unincorporated association or body of persons and its members are treated as distinct persons and hence taxable services provided by one to the other (i.e,. JV to member or vice versa) would be liable to service tax.

The circular specifically deals with the issue of cash calls / capital contribution made by members to the JV.

The circular clarifies that if cash calls are merely ‘transactions in money’ – they are excluded from the definition of service as per section 65B (44) of the Finance Act, 1994. Whether cash calls are in the nature of consideration for taxable service and not ‘transaction in money’ – would depend on the terms of the JV agreement in each case.

It is also clarified that JV may provide some taxable service in the form of agreeing to do something for direct benefit of the member or for the benefit of the third party on behalf of the member such as granting rights, reserving production capacity or providing an option on future supplies, for which the JV might have received cash calls in the nature of advance payments. Where member of the JV is providing services to the JV in his individual capacity, such as management of cash calls, administrative services, management of project office, etc. and the JV pays such member in cash (through pooled cash calls or otherwise) or in kind (i.e., goods, rights etc.), such services by member to the JV would be liable to service tax.

The TRU has specifically advised its field formations to carefully examine the applicability of service tax with reference to the specific terms / clauses of each JV agreement.

Services in relation to inward remittances from abroad Circular No. 180/06/2014 – ST dated 14th October, 2014

Vide this circular, Circular No.163/14/2012-ST dated 10.7.2012 is superseded clarifying the following issues in levy of service tax on the activities involved in the inward remittances :

(1) No service tax is payable on foreign currency remitted to India from overseas;

(2) Services provided by agent or the representation service provided by an Indian entity/bank to a foreign money transfer service operator (MTSO) in relation to money transfer falls in the category of intermediary service, therefore the same shall be subject to service tax;

(3) Service tax would apply on the services provided by way of currency conversion by a bank/entity located in India in the taxable territory to the recipient of remittance in India;

(4) Service tax is payable on commission received by sub-agents from Indian bank/entity;

(5) Service tax is payable on the amount charged separately, if any, by the Indian bank/entity/agent/sub-agent from the person who receives remittance in the taxable territory, for the service provided by such Indian bank/entity/ agent/sub-agent.

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Hindustan Zinc Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh And Others, [2012] 47 VST 1 (CSTAA)

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Inter-State Sale/Stock Transfer-Dispatch of Goods by Factory to its branch Out Side the State–To Meet Monthly Requirements Of Goods as per Order Placed To Branch By Customer- Transaction Of Inter-State Sale- Taxable In the State from Which Goods Dispatched By the Factory-Sections 3, 6 and 22(1B) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Facts
The appellant, a public sector Company, having stock point and Kolkata and factory in the State of Andhra Pradesh received orders from two customers of west Bengal for supply of Zinc and lead for supply of goods of specified quantity at specified rate as per schedule of delivery. One of the conditions of the order was that in case of breach of any condition of the contract, the sum of Rs. 50,000/- paid by the customer at the time of placing order, could be forfeited by the appellant company. The factory of the appellant company situated in Andhra Pradesh dispatched the goods to its Kolkata and Jharkhand branch showing the appellant company as consignor and consignee in all documents of transport of goods including excise gate pass. The Kolkata and Jharkhand branch of the company supplied goods to the customer and paid tax at applicable rate under the local sales tax law. The Company in the State of Andhra Pradesh showed the movement of goods to its Kolkata and Jharkhand branch as inter-State stock transfer. The sales tax authorities in AP assessed the above transaction by treating it as inter-State sale of goods taking place from the State of AP, which was confirmed by the State Appellate Tribunal. The Company filed appeal against the said judgment of Tribunal before the Central State Appellate Authority (CSTAA) u/s. 20 of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Held
The scope of an appeal filed u/s. 20 of The CST Act is wide inasmuch as an appeal lies against an order determining issues relating to stock transfers of goods in so far as they involve a dispute of inter-state nature. The authority has the right not only to consider any question of law that may arise, but also to reassess the facts and consider the correctness of the inference drawn by the lower authorities including the Tribunal.

The authority further held that specific orders were made by the branch office of the appellant company to the customers for sale of their products on the conditions mentioned therein. The customers placed orders for supply of specified quantity of goods in specified monthly quantities. It is true that even though the orders placed by the customers indicated the specified quantities to be supplied every month and the supplies did not always confirm to it, that by itself may not tilt the scale in favour of the appellant. Similarly, the fact that in some months, more quantities were supplied to the customers or that the goods sent from the factory to the branch were not earmarked may not also change the position. It is not for the Tribunal to consider each element individually and appreciate its impact on the transaction. On the other hand, it would be the proper thing to take note of all the circumstances, in the light of the facts available and come to a conclusion whether the movement of goods was triggered by the orders of purchase placed on the branch office.

The authority on an appreciation of all facts and circumstances confirmed the decision of the State Tribunal treating the transaction as inter-state sale taxable in the State of AP under The CST Act. It also directed the State of West Bengal and Jharkhand, to transfer the refundable amount of tax based on its order to the State of AP to which tax was due on the disputed transactions.

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[2014] 49 taxmann.com 561 (Mumbai – CESTAT) MSC Agency (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Thane-II

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Various charges collected by Steamer Agent from the importers/exporters of goods under different names are liable to service tax under Business Auxiliary Services with effect from 10-09-2014.

Facts:
Appellant registered under “steamer agency” also collected service charges from importers and exporters for various other services rendered in respect of the import/export cargo handled by appellant. Such services included; bill of lading fees; LCL consolidation charges; amendment charges for amendments in the bill of lading; facilitation/processing charges; administration charges for stamp duty; delivery order fees for taking delivery of cargo; documentation fees for export to USA; hazardous documentation charges for taking special care of hazardous cargo; bill of lading surrender charges; manifest correction charges; and detention waiver/refund processing charges. Appellant did not charge service tax on such service charges. According to department, these services merit classification under “Business Auxiliary Service” (‘BAS’). The Appellant contended that such other services cannot be taxed under BAS, since BAS encompasses services only when the same is rendered on behalf of another person, and services in the present case are not rendered on behalf of shipping lines.

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal analysed the scope of BAS u/s. 65(19) and held that the activities undertaken by the appellant for which service charges are collected are in respect of cargo imported or exported by their customers. Thus, these services were in relation to “procurement of goods or services, which are inputs for the client” and such services clearly fall under sub-Clause (iv) of section 65 (19) as it stood with effect from 10-09-2004. Even if it is held that these activities did not fall under sub-Clause (iv), they would certainly fall under sub-Clause (vii) namely “any service incidental or auxiliary to any activity specified in sub-Clauses (i) to (vi).” Even if the appellant had acted as a commission agent as claimed by them, they would fall under sub-Clause (vii) of Clause (19) of section 65 as the entry covered the services rendered as a commission agent.

The Tribunal further held that the contention of the appellant that to attract BAS, there should be 3 parties and the service should have been rendered “on behalf of the client”, is an incorrect argument. Rendering of service on behalf of the client applies only to sub-Clauses (iii), (v) and (vi) which relate to customer care management, production of goods and provision of services. The said condition does not apply to other sub-Clauses, including sub-Clause (iv) which is applicable in the present case. While upholding the invocation of extended period, Tribunal considered the fact that the appellant is service tax assessee since 1997 onwards and when the scope of BAS was expanded in the Budget 2004 and explained in the Circular, the appellant chose to ignore this circular, not taking reasonable precautions. Penalties u/s. 76, 77 and 78 were also upheld. However, for the period 10-05-2008 onward, only penalty u/s. 78 was held leviable in view of the amendment made in the said section vide Finance Act, 2008.

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2014 (35) STR 953 (Tri-Chennai) Arkay Glenrock (P) Ltd., Unit-II vs. CCE, Madurai

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Re-agitation before same authority after finalisation without filing an appeal before higher authority not possible. Refund of CENVAT is eligible for EOU clearing goods to another EOU.

Facts:
Appellant, an EOU engaged in the manufacturing of granite slabs exported goods and also clearing it to other EOU. On account of accumulation of CENVAT Credit, Appellant applied for a refund. The claim was allowed partially disallowing to the extent of clearance to another EOU. The first appellate authority allowed the entire claim considering supplies made to other EOU as export and sent the matter to adjudicating authority for sanctioning the balance refund. Adjudicating authority allowed entire refund claim and sanctioned the balance refund claim. Against this order, the department filed this appeal. The first appellate authority allowed department’s appeal in the second round and against which the Appellant preferred this appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal held that appeal filed by the department before the first appellate authority in second round was not maintainable as matter attended finality in the first round and since department did not prefer an appeal at first round, the issue could not be re-agitated again before the same authority.

On merits, the Tribunal held that since export benefits are granted when goods are sold to SEZ, on same principal benefits should also be granted for goods sold to EOU and following the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Essar Steel Ltd. vs. UOI 2010 (249) ELT 3 (Guj) allowed the appeal.

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2014 (35) STR 945 L & T Sargent & Lundy Ltd. vs. CCEx, Vadodara

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Export of service not to be regarded as exempt service for proportionate reversal of CENVAT Credit-Beneficial circular applicable retrospectively, while circular which creates liability or change has prospective effect.

Facts:
Appellant provided services locally as well as exported out of India. Service tax was charged on services provided in the country and services were exported without payment of service tax. The department was of the view that the CENVAT Credit utilisation has to be restricted to 20% on account of provision of exempted service namely export. The dispute pertained to the year 2007. Appellant argued that in the year 2008, CBEC had issued circular clarifying export of services would not be regarded as exempt services. However, department denied the benefit of circular stating the non-applicability for the period under dispute.

Held:
Tribunal held that Supreme Court has in Suchitra Components vs. CCE,, Guntur 2008 (11) STR 430 held that, a beneficial circular has to be applied retrospectively while an oppressive circular has to be applied prospectively and therefore allowed the claim of the Appellant.

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2014 (35) STR 946 (Tri-Delhi) Sarda Energy & Minerals Ltd. vs. CCE, Raipur-I

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Assessee is entitled to take credit of service tax paid on GTA service under reverse charge before its taxable date.

Facts: Appellant deposited service tax as a receiver of GTA service in December 2004. The liability to pay service tax as a receiver of service arose from January, 2005 onwards. Appellant after payment of service tax took CENVAT Credit. The Department denied the credit on the ground that the service was not taxable in the month of December, 2004.

Held: The Tribunal observed that credit is available on the basis of payment of service tax and not on the basis of whether or not service tax is payable. Though Appellant was not liable yet paid service tax, was entitled to take credit of the same as per the CENVAT Credit Rules.

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Payment of VAT on material portion exempt under Notification No.12/2003 – ST dated 20-06- 2013 in contract involving material and labour.

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(A) [2014] 49 taxmann.com 379 (Allahabad) – Mahendra Engineering Ltd.
The question of law before the High Court was whether abatement of cost of material replaced for repair of transformer as stipulated under Notification No. 12/2003. S.T. dated 20-06-2013 is admissible to the respondent or service tax is liable on gross value of bill charges from customers as laid down u/s. 67 of the Finance Act, 1994. The High Court noted that Tribunal has made observations that in the invoices issued by the assessee, the value of goods used, such as transformer oil and service charges are shown separately and in respect of the supply of consumables used in providing the service of repair, sales tax or, as the case may be, VAT is paid. The Tribunal, in this factual situation, observed that when the value of goods used was shown separately in the invoices on which sales tax or VAT has been paid, the service tax would be chargeable only on the service/labour component and the value of goods used for repair would not be includible in the assessable value of service.

Since this factual position was not disputed, the High Court dismissed the appeal having regard to the earlier judgment of the Division Bench in Balaji Tirupati Enterprises [2014] 43 taxmann.com 39 (All) on the ground that no substantial question of law was involved.

(B) [2014] 49 taxmann.com 421 (Allahabad) – S.K. Engineering Works vs. CCE&ST.

On examination of the records, the High Court allowed the writ and remanded the matter to assessing authority on the ground that the work contract of petitioner included service as well as supply of material the Notification dated 20-06- 2003 must be given effect to.

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[2014] 49 taxmann.com 345 (Madras) CCE vs. Sri Ranga Balaji Cotton Mills

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When it is proven that the respondents clandestinely cleared excisable goods, the assessee cannot escape penalty u/s. 11AC by paying the duty along with interest prior to the issuance of show cause notice.

Facts:
The question of law before the High Court was whether the Tribunal was right in setting aside the mandatory equal amount of penalty imposed by the lower appellate forum u/s. 11AC on a proven ground that the respondents had clandestinely cleared excisable goods. The Tribunal disposed of the appeal filed by the assessee at the admission stage itself on the ground that the duty was paid by the assessee prior to the issuance of show cause notice. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the Revenue filed appeal.

Held:
The High Court referred to the decision of Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Rajasthan Spg. and Wvg. Mills 2009 (238) E.L.T. 3, in which it was stated that, mere payment of differential duty whether before or after the show cause notice would not alter the situation and there would be liability towards penalty in case the conditions for imposing such penalty spelt out in section 11 AC of the Act are attracted. Relying upon the same, the High Court held that, the question of exonerating the assessee from payment of penalty does not arise and answered the question of law in favour of revenue.

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[2014] 49 taxmann.com 560 (Bombay) – Commissioner of Central Excise vs. Jyoti Structure Ltd.

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Even if extended period invoked u/s. 11A(4), for imposition of penalty u/s. 11AC, proof to satisfy ingredients of fraud, collusion or any willful conduct etc., necessary.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in manufacture of Galvanized Transmission Towers and parts thereof. The department observed that the assessee cleared these goods and parts thereof with remarks on the invoices that they were exempted from payment of excise duty. Commissioner (Appeals) after referring to Notification in this regard and after analysing the entire material on record concluded that the assessee acted bonafide on the advice/purchase order of the customer and availed the exemption. When it was pointed out later on that the condition No. 64 of the Notification is not fulfilled and the exemption is not available to the assessee, the assessee paid the amount of duty leviable together with interest thereon. Since there was nothing on record as to existence of fraud, collusion, any willful misstatement or suppression of facts, etc., so as to enable the Revenue to impose the penalty, the Commissioner (Appeals) set aside the penalty. Tribunal upheld the order of Commissioner. The case of the department was that when the Revenue invoked the extended period within the meaning of s/s. (4) of section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 for the purpose of payment of duty, then, a separate proof for satisfying the ingredients thereof is not necessary for imposition of penalty.

Held:
The High Court held that if the material produced is not pointing towards any fraud or collusion or any willful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention of the provisions of the Act or Rules with an intent to evade payment of duty, then, imposition of penalty is not called for.

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[2014] 49 taxmann.com 417 (Allahabad) H.M. Singh & Co. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax.

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Penalty set aside-mass ignorance amongst service providers to include the valuebonafide conduct of the assessee.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in providing taxable service of manpower recruitment and supply agency service. The assessee did not include provident fund payments received from service receiver in relation to manpower supplied to it, in the taxable value of services. The Department issued notice of demand levying penalty u/s. 77 and 78. The Assessee contended that he paid service tax including interest even before issue of adjudication order and the said amount was not included in the value of taxable service under bonafide belief that service tax was not applicable on it. The attention of the Court was also drawn to the fact that on the common issue 200 notices were sent by the revenue thus evidencing mass unawareness among the service providers regarding the issue.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court noted that at the material time, the department also observed that there appeared a general ignorance among the service providers as to whether the service tax was attracted on the component of provident fund received from the recipient of the service to whom the manpower services were provided. The High Court also observed that, appellant did not retain any of the amounts out of employer’s contribution to provident fund payments received from the service receiver towards the deputed employees, but deposited it in the account of the concerned employees maintained with the Provident Fund Commissioner. The High Court held that the conduct of the appellant in paying the entire amount of service tax dues together with interest even before the order of adjudication was passed is a factor which must weigh in the balance and hence there was no fraud, collusion, willful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention with intent to evade the payment of tax in this case. Accordingly, the penalty was set aside.

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2014 (35) STR 865 (Bom) Bharti Airtel Ltd. vs. CCEx, Pune-III

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Transmission tower, its parts and prefabricated building on which telecommunication equipments are erected are neither capital goods nor inputs for a telecom service provider.

Facts:
The Appellant engaged in providing cellular telecommunication service availed CENVAT Credit of excise duty paid on tower parts, shelters/prefabricated buildings (PFB) purchased by them and treated them as capital goods from October, 2004 onwards till March, 2008. This was objected to by the department.

Before first appellate authority, Appellant contended that tower and parts of tower were the part of “Base Trans-receiver Station” (BTS) which comprises of BTS transmitter, transformers, batteries, stabilisers, antenna, tower etc., which was a integrated system falling under Chapter heading 85.25 of the Central Excise Act and hence was capital goods eligible for credit. The BTS was used for providing the telecommunication service and hence credit availment was correct. It was also contended that tower and its parts were accessories of antenna. An independent argument about the coverage of these items as ‘inputs’ if they ought to be held as not capital goods was also advanced.

First appellate authority upheld the reversal of credit on all items except on BTS transmitter and antenna holding that each of these goods had independent functions hence cannot be treated as integrated system and held that even in SKD/CKD condition, these would be classifiable under 7308 heading and the said heading was not classifiable under capital goods definition. On the argument of inputs, first appellate authority held that since these items became an immovable property and hence could not be regarded as ‘inputs’ and confirmed the reversal along with interest and penalty.

Tribunal rejected appellant’s contention on the reasons advanced by the first appellate authority and confirmed the reversal of credit. On the issue of imposition of penalty and limitation, the Tribunal remanded the case to the first appellate authority.

Appellant challenged the reversal of credit before the High Court.

Held:
The High Court, after observing that tower and its part, PFB were fixed to the earth and after its erection they became an immovable property and therefore, held that these items could not be regarded as goods and hence argument about the coverage as inputs was held to be without force. Further, the High Court observed that in CKD/SKD condition the tower and its part was covered under chapter 7308 and hence the same were also not falling in the definition of capital goods. Further it was held that, an antenna could function without its erection (the tower and its part) and hence the argument that tower is the accessory of antenna was rejected and thus the appeal itself was rejected.

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Export order prior to “Sale” for section 5(3) of CST Act,1956

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Introduction
As per the provisions of Constitution, no tax can be levied on the transaction of sale in course of export. The term “sale in course of export” is defined in section 5 of the CST Act,1956. Section 5(1) defines direct export. There is also category of deemed export by way of section 5(3) of the CST Act,1956. The said section provides exemption to one sale taking place prior to actual export sale. The section is reproduced below for ready reference.

“S.5. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export. –

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in s/s. (1), the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export..”

Conditions required to be fulfilled
There are number of points of dispute in relation to interpretation of above section. As per the overall interpretation, following conditions are required to be fulfilled for earning exemption under this section.

1. There should be pre existing export order from the foreign buyer with Indian seller (Indian exporter).
2. The Indian exporter should purchase goods from another Indian vendor for compliance of above export order.
3. There should be actual export by the Indian Exporter.

Controversy
Number of controversies arise on account of interpretation of above conditions. The basic controversy sometime relates to date of sale by local vendor to exporter and the date of receipt of Indian export order by the exporter. The sales tax authorities interpret that the exporter should place order on the local vendor only after receipt of export order from the foreign buyer. The further argument of the dealer can be that the exporter can receive proposal for export or may initially receive export order verbally (and then confirmed subsequently in writing). The argument will be that even if the order is placed on receipt of verbal order or based on proposal it should be valid subject to the condition that before actual sale by the local vendor to Indian exporter there is a confirmed export order from the foreign buyer. Accordingly dealers argue that their sale to Indian exporter should be covered by section 5(3) and exempt. However, the litigation arises due to such difference in interpretation.

Recent Judgment
Hon. Bombay High Court has recently an occasion to deal with such a controversy. The reference is to judgment of Hon. High Court in case of Exide Industries Ltd. vs. The State of Maharashtra (W.P. No.12025 of 1012 dt. 4.8.2014)(Bom).

The short facts as narrated in the judgment are reproduced below.

“3. The short but very interesting question that has arisen for consideration before us is the interpretation of section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CST Act) and in particular s/s. 3 thereof.

Section 5(3) inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything contained in s/s. (1), the last sale or purchase of any goods, preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India, shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order in relation to such export. In the facts of the present case under a purchase order/agreement dated 5th March, 2004 M/s. Crown Corporation Pvt Ltd (hereinafter referred to as “M/s. Crown”) required the Petitioner to supply Submarine Navy Batteries of the type and specifications more particularly set out therein. On 25th May, 2004 the Algerian Navy placed a purchase order on M/s. Crown, for the supply of Submarine Navy Batteries. On 14th September, 2004, the Petitioner sold and supplied Submarine Navy Batteries to M/s. Crown, who in turn exported the same to the Algerian Navy. The ARE -1 was prepared by the Petitioner on 14th September, 2004 showing the Petitioner as the seller, M/s. Crown as the purchaser, and the Algerian Navy as the consignee. In these circumstances, the Petitioner contends that the sale effected by them of Submarine Navy Batteries to M/s. Crown, is exempt from the levy of sales tax under the BST Act by virtue of the provisions of section 5(3) of the CST Act. On the other hand, the Respondents contend that since the purchase order placed by M/s. Crown on the Petitioner on 5th March, 2004 was before the date when the Algerian Navy placed the purchase order on M/s. Crown (i.e., on 22nd May, 2004), the sale by the Petitioners to M/s. Crown did not take place after, and for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order of the Algerian Navy (i.e., on 22nd May, 2004). It was therefore not “for or in relation to such export” as contemplated under the provisions of section 5(3) of the CST Act. It is in this light that we are called upon to decide the interpretation of the said provision. After adverting to the facts, we will analyse the provisions of the CST Act in some depth, later in this judgment.”

After referring to the facts in detail, the Hon. High Court on merits of the case observed as under:

“26. Section 5(1) of the CST Act stipulates that a sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the export of the goods out of the territory of India, only if the sale or purchase either occasions such export, or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods after the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India. As, the section originally stood prior to its amendment in 1976 and thereafter in 2005, the sale by an Indian exporter from India to the foreign importer, alone qualified as the sale which had occasioned the export of the goods. According to the Export Control Order, exports of certain goods could be made only by specified agencies such as State Trading Corporations. In other cases also, manufacturers of goods, particularly the small and medium scale, had to depend upon some export houses for exporting their goods because special expertise was needed for carrying on the export trade. A sale of goods made to an export canalising agency such as State Trading Corporations or to an export house, in compliance with an existing contract or order, was inextricably connected with export of the goods. At the same time, since such a sale did not qualify as sales in the course of export, they were liable to State Sales Tax which corresponded in the increase in the price of the goods and made exports out of India uncompetitive in the fiercely competitive international markets. To tackle this problem, section 5 was amended by the Central Sales Tax (Amendment Bill, 1976) by inserting s/s. (3) therein to provide that the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for, or in relation to, such export. This is the legislative intent in inserting s/s. 3 to section 5 of the CST Act.

    The word “sale” also has been defined in the Central Sales Tax Act u/s. 2(g) which reads as under :-

2(g) ‘sale’ with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means any transfer of property in goods by one person to another for cash or deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration and includes –

    a transfer, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, of property in any goods for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

    a transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract;

    a delivery of goods on hire-purchase or any system of payment of instalments;

    a transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose

(whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

    a supply of goods by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

    a supply, by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service, is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, but does not include a mortgage or hypothecation of or a charge or pledge on goods.

As defined u/s. 2(g), a sale means any transfer of property in goods by one person to another for cash or deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration and also includes transfers as set out in clauses (i) to (vi) of section 2(g). In view thereof, the words “last sale” appearing in section 5(3) of the CST Act will have to be construed keeping in mind the definition of the word “sale” in section 2(g).

    Keeping in mind the provisions of section 5(3) and section 2(g), we have to decide whether the purchase order/agreement dated 5th March, 2004 placed by M/s. Crown on the Petitioner would be a “sale” as contemplated u/s. 5(3) r/w section 2(g) as contended by the Revenue, or whether selling and supplying the Submarine Navy Batteries to M/s. Crown on 14th September, 2004 would fall within the word “sale” as contemplated under the said provisions. To our mind, it is clear that the purchase order/ agreement dated 5th March 2004 between the Petitioner and M/s Crown can never be construed as a “sale” as contemplated under the provisions of section 5(3) of the CST Act. As set out earlier, section 2(g) defines the word “sale” to mean any transfer of property in goods by one person to another for cash or deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration and includes transfers as more particularly set out in clauses (i) to (vi) of the said section. We do not find that the purchase order/ agreement dated 5th March, 2004 can by any stretch of the imagination fall within the definition of the word “sale” in section 2(g). This is for the simple reason that the word “sale” contemplates inter alia transfer of the goods or a transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose or delivery or supply of goods [See. Section 2(g), Clauses (i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)] by one person to another. In the peculiar facts of this case and after carefully perusing the purchase order/agreement dated 5th March, 2004 between the Petitioner and M/s. Crown, we are of the view that there was no “sale” of the Submarine Navy Batteries by virtue of the said purchase order/agreement.

In the facts of the present case, there was no transfer of goods as contemplated u/s. 2(g) of the CST Act. On a perusal of the said agreement and its various clauses, at the highest, it can be said that the same amounts to an “agreement to sell”, that maybe performed at a future date by the Petitioner. It is this performance that translates into a “sale” of the Submarine Navy Batteries.

    In the facts of the present case, we find that in performance of the purchase order/agreement dated 5th March, 2004, the Petitioner sold and supplied the Submarine Navy Batteries to M/s. Crown on 14th September, 2004. This sale was after the date when the Algerian Navy placed its purchase order on M/s. Crown. The purchase order placed by the Algerian Navy on M/s. Crown was dated 22nd May, 2004. In this view of the matter, we find that the sale of the Submarine Navy Batteries by the Petitioner to M/s. Crown was the “last sale preceding the sale occasioning the export” as contemplated u/s.

5(3) and the same took place after, and for the purpose of complying with the purchase order dated 25th May, 2004, placed by the Algerian Navy on M/s. Crown. In view thereof, the sale of Submarine Navy Batteries by the Petitioner to M/s. Crown on 14th September, 2004 were deemed to be in the course of export as contemplated u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act and therefore, could not be taxed as a local sale under the provisions of the BST Act.”

    Conclusion

Thus the controversy is now resolved. The requirement is that there should be an export order prior to sale to Indian Exporter. Therefore, even if the local vendor supplies to the Indian exporter based on export proposal with the Indian exporter, but confirmed export order is received by the Indian exporter before actual sale by the local vendor to Indian exporter, still there will not be any difficulty in application of section 5(3) and exemption will be available.

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Supply & Installation of lifts – Sale or Works Contract?

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Introduction
Several controversies have revolved around the issue as to whether a transaction amounts to ‘sale’ or “works contract”. In several judgments, the issue has been dealt with different perspectives. In a very well-known decision in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Kone Elevators – [2005-(181)-ELT-156-(SC)], a Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that a contract of supply and installation of lift was one for sale and not a works contract as (a) the obligation of civil construction and preparatory work is that of purchaser of the lift and not of supplier and therefore (b) skill and labour employed for converting main components into end product was only incidental to components in the contract for sale. Consequent to the said judgment, several show cause notices were issued to the appellant proposing re-opening of assessment, as in a large number of cases in various States, the assessments were done considering the contracts as works contracts. In the State of Maharashtra, prior to the above decision in Kone Elevators’ case, the State treated contracts for sale and installation of lifts as works contracts as per the High Court’s decision in Otis Elevator Company (India) Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra – (1969)-24-STC-525- (Bom). However, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Kone Elevators (Supra) from 01-04-2006, the position was adjusted to the law laid down by the Three Judge Bench of Supreme Court.

In this background, M/s. Kone Elevators India engaged in the manufacture, supply and installation of lifts as well as civil constructions, while undergoing assessment for 1995-1996 in the State of Tamil Nadu, the Sales Tax Tribunal and later the High Court, held that activity of erection and commissioning of lift was works contract and not sale. As against this, in some other States, the assessments closed based on treating the transaction as ‘sale’ were proposed to be re-opened. Driven by the paradox, Kone Elevators India Private Limited filed a writ petition, wherein along with other special leave petitions, it was noted by the Three – Judge Bench that the question raised for consideration is whether the manufacture, supply and installation of lifts is ‘sale’ or “works contract” and that in 2005-(181)-ELT-156-(SC) (supra), the Bench had not noticed the decisions of Supreme Court rendered in State of Rajasthan vs. Man Industrial Corporation Limited – (1969-1-SCC-567, State of Rajasthan & others vs. Nenu Rani – (1970)-26-STC-268-(SC) and Vanguard Rolling Shutters & Steel Works vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax – (1977)-2-SCC-250 and therefore, found it appropriate to refer the controversy to the Larger Bench to resolve the discord and to decide whether contract for manufacture, supply and installation of lifts in a building is a contract for sale of goods, liable for sales tax/VAT under the State legislation or a works contract wherein labour and service components would be excluded from total consideration. Consequently, the Five Judge Bench of the Hon. Supreme Court by majority in Kone Elevator India Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Tamilnadu 2014 (34) STR 641 (SC) overruled the Three Judge Bench decision of 2005 considering it incorrect and held that individually manufactured goods such as lift, car, motors, ropes, rails etc., are components of lift and they are assembled and installed with skill and labour at site to become permanent fixture of building thus satisfying the fundamental characteristics of works contract. The judgment by the majority as well as the contrary view are briefly summarised below:

Some important decisions relied upon in Kone Elevators vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2014 (34) STR 641 (SC).

Before proceeding with the outline of the judgment, a few of the important decisions relied upon by the Larger Bench are briefly described below:

In Patnaik & Co. vs. State of Orissa 1965 (2) SCR 782 the issue involved related to construction of bodies on the chassis supplied to the contractor as bailee. It was held that such a contract being one for work and not a contract for sale, as the parties under the contract did not sell the bus bodies. The Bombay High Court in Otis Elevator Company (India) Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 1969 (24) STC 525 (Bom) held that manufacture, supply and installation of lifts is works contract as per the Bombay Lifts Act, 1939 read with Rules thereunder.

As against the above, in Union of India vs. Central India Machinery Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 847, the Apex Court held that the contract of manufacture and supply of wagon was nothing but a ‘sale’ and not works contract. However, post 46th Constitutional Amendment and insertion of a sub-Article 29A in Article 366 of the Constitution, in Builders’ Association of India and others vs. UOI & others (1989) 2 SCC 645 it was held that the works contract which was an indivisible one is by a legal fiction altered into a contract which is divisible into one for sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services and the property transfers when the goods are supplied in the works and goods involved in the execution of works contract. Therefore, composite contracts for supply and installation, construction of lift or flat are classified as “works contract”.

In case of Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. vs. State of A.P. (2000) 6 SCC 579 (relied on in the case of Kone Elevators 3 Bench Judgment – supra also), the Court held that if the thing to be delivered has individual existence before delivery as the sole property of the party delivering it, then it is a sale. If the bulk of the material used in construction belongs to the manufacturer selling the end product for a price, then it is a stronger pointer that contract in substance is of sale of goods and not one for labour. However, the test is not decisive. The Court finally ruled observed that it is not bulk of the material alone but the relative importance of material qua the work, skill and labour of the payee is also to be seen. If the major component of the end product is material consumed in producing the chattel to be delivered and skill & labour is incidentally used, the end product delivered by the seller to the buyer would constitute sale whereas if the main object of the contract is to avail skill and labour of the seller though same material may be used incidentally by investing skill and labour of the supplier, the transaction would be a contract of work and labour.

In Vanguard Rolling Shutter’s case (1977) 2 SCC 250, the Supreme Court while reversing the decision of the High Court had observed that material as supplied was not supplied by the owner so far as to pass as chattel simplicitor but affixing to one immovable property and after which it became permanent fixture and accretion to the immovable property. Further, the operation to be done at site was not incidental but a fundamental part of the contract and therefore it was a works contract. Similarly, in Man Industrial Corporation Ltd. (supra) also, the Court treated the contract for providing and fixing different windows of certain sizes as per specification, design, drawings etc., as contract for work and labour and a contract for sale for fixing the windows to the building was not incidental/subsidiary to the sale but was essential term of the contract.

In addition to the above, interalia the decisions such as State of Madras vs. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. AIR 1958 SC 560, Associated Hotel’s case (1972) 1 SCC 472, State of Gujarat vs. M/s. Variety Body Builders (1996) 3 SCC 500 etc. were discussed to appreciate the controversy and genesis of law in respect of works contract before dwelling upon the principles in relation to works contract to apply to manufacture, supply and installation of lifts. Nevertheless, it was also observed and noted that there is no standard formula by which a contract of sale could be distinguished from a contract of work as it depended on facts and circumstances of each case. Further, citing landmark judgment of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI

    Others 2006 (2) STR 111 (SC), which dealt with the issue of whether mobile phone connection was a transaction of sale or service or both, the Court observed that after 46th Amendment, the sale elements when covered under Article 366 (29A), the “dominant nature test” was not applicable and this was also reiterated in recent decision of the Apex Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd.’s case 2014 (34) STR 481 (SC) relied upon heavily while deciding the instant case of Kone Elevators.

    Core issue in brief:

The petitioners contended that supply and installation of lift cannot be treated as contract of sale. Each major component of crane has its own identity prior to installation and they are assembled/installed at site to bring ‘lift’ into existence and installation requires great skill and expertise and without installation, adjustment, testing etc. no lift could become operational in a building. Besides discussing various rulings on the subject matter, the petitioner’s counsel referred to Bombay Lifts Act, 1939 and Rules made thereunder to drive home the point that manufacture, supply and installation were controlled by statutory provisions under an enactment of the legislature which reflected that immense skill is required for such installation, as a result of which only lift becomes operational and lift is not sold like goods.

Various States like Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Orissa, Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana etc., have put forward their submissions. Those of which argued against the transaction being treated as a works contract, in substance, contended that even if a high degree of skill went into the installation was an inseggregable facet of the manufacturing process and would not be more than an article for sale on the basis of a special order and erection meant only a functional part of the system to bring the goods to use and hence it was the culmination of the fact of sale. The contract involved goods in any form intended for transfer but the completion of transfer involved certain activities, under any name but the term “deliverable state” as provided in section 21 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 was attracted and therefore the contract was purely of sale of goods. As against this, the States contending the contract as one of works contract, backed the theory that considering multifarious activities involved in the installation, it should be construed as works contract.

    Majority view:

Thoroughly considering Article 366(29A), the Larger Bench interalia importantly referred to three categories of contracts as explained in Hindustan Shipyard (supra) as follows:

“(i) the contract may be for work to be done for remunera-tion and for supply of materials used in the execution of the work for a price;

    it may be a contract for work in which the use of the materials is accessory or incidental to the execution of the work; and

    it may be a contract for supply of goods where some work is required to be done as incidental to the sale.”

Thereafter, it opined that the first contract is a composite contract consisting of two contracts, one of which is for the sale of goods and the other is for work and labour; the second is clearly a contract for work and labour not involving sale of goods; and the third is a contract for sale where the goods are sold as chattels and the work done is merely incidental to the sale.”

Also in detail was considered Larsen and Toubro (su-pra) wherein it was found to have been elucidated that after 46th Amendment, transfer of property in goods whether as goods or in some other form would include goods ceased to be chattels or movables or mer-chandise and become attached or embedded to earth. Thus goods which are incorporated into immovable property are deemed as good/s and therefore the narrow meaning given to the term “works contract” in Gannon Dunkerley-I (supra) no longer survives. Once the characteristics of works contract are satisfied in a contract, irrespective of existence of additional obligation, the contract does not cease to be a works contract because nothing in Article 366(29A)(b) limits the term “works contract”. In view thereof, the Larger Bench among other things reiterated what was stated in Larsen and Toubro (supra) “even if dominant intention of the contract is not to transfer the property in goods and rather it is the rendering of service or the ultimate transaction is transfer of immovable property, then also it is open to the States to levy sales tax on the materials used in such contract if it otherwise has elements of works contract”. The Bench noted that from their detailed analysis, the following 4 concepts emerge:

“(i) the works contract is an indivisible contract but, by le-gal fiction, is divided into two parts, one for sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services;

    The concept of “dominant nature test” or, for that matter, the “degree of intention test” or “overwhelming component test” for treating a contract as works con-tract is not applicable;

    The term “works contract” as used in clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution takes in its sweep all genre of works contract and is not to be narrowly construed to cover one species of contract to provide for labour and service alone; and once the characteristics of works contract are met within a contract entered into between the parties, any additional obligation incorporated in the contract would not change the nature of the contract.”

The Court went through the terms of the agreement in detail and referring to Richardson & Crudass Ltd. (1968) 21 STC 245 (SC), noted that they were also indicative of the fact that the whole contractual obligation was not divisible in parts and was intimately connected with labour and services undertaken by the applicants in erecting and installing the apparatus. Further, for functioning of lift in a huge building to carry persons to several floors calls for considerable technical skill, expertise, experience and precision in execution of work and therefore found it difficult to sever the agreement in two parts, one for sale of goods and another for services as the two are intimately connected. Severance is not possible and in fact it was an indivisible contract. For installation of the elevator, regard must be had to its technical facet, safety devise and actual operation and apart from it, it is an important fact that upon installation, it becomes a permanent fixture in the premises. Therefore, installation of a lift in a building cannot be regarded as transfer of a chattel as goods but a composite contract.

The Bench per majority view thus held that:

    The dominant nature test or overwhelming component fees is not applicable.

    A composite contract is works contract in terms of Article 366(29A)(B) of the Constitution, the incidental part of labour and services pales into total insignificance for determination of nature of contract.

    The conclusions reached in Kone Elevator (supra) were based on bedrock of incidental service for de-livery since the contract itself speaks about obligation to supply lift as well as its installation which conveys performance of labour and service. Hence fundamental characteristic of works contract are satisfied. The decision rendered in Kone Elevators (supra) does not lay down the law correctly and it is accordingly overruled.

    Contrary view:

According to the view expressed at great length by the Hon. Justice F. M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, by calling an activity as “works contract” by itself will not make the activity a works contract unless as explained in the document confirms to that effect. The contract according to the Bench, related only to supply a branded lift in the premises of the purchaser. Major part of the work is carried out by the purchaser in order to enable the petitioner to erect its elevator in the premises. In view of the nature of the prod-uct supplied, it has to necessarily assemble different parts in purchaser’s premises and thereby fulfill the contract of supply of lift in a working condition.

It was also noted emphatically that reference made by petitioner’s counsel to Bombay Lifts Act,1639 did not provide any scope to reach the conclusion that a contract between petitioner and the purchaser was one of works contact and therefore the submissions made in such re-gard were not acceptable. Next aspect dealt with this in contrary view is elaborate analysis of terms and condi-tions of the specimen contract of the petitioner with purchaser of the elevator. The first part of the contract related to preparatory work for the erection of the lift, the whole of which was observed to have been done by the purchaser whereas provision of ladder in the pit or steel fascia at every sill level were found to be only material and part of the lift and hence did not involve any work therein according to the Bench.

Another set of conditions related to prize variation clause captioned as “works contract.” The Bench making a threadbare analysis of conditions laid therein observed that the caption had nothing to do with the contents there-in. Under this very head, it was stipulated by way of pay-ments that claim for manufactured material had to be paid with material invoice and claim for installation relating to labour costs was required to be paid along with their final invoice. This was found to be indicative of contract be-ing divisible in nature and calling it an indivisible one is contrary to its own terms. The most glaring condition that 90% was payable on signing of the contract and 10% on commissioning of lift or in case of delay beyond control of appellant, then within 90 days of the material getting ready for dispatch itself was suggestive of the fact that the contract was separable, one for supply of material and minuscule portion for work involved. It was further found that receiving 90% upfront without having obligation to fulfill or suffer damages read along with other stipulations disclose that it was attributable towards manufacturing cost whereas the balance towards installation service. Therefore, it would have to be the contract of manufac-ture, supply and installation would be one of ‘sale’ alone and therefore could not be called works contract. Once conclusion reached accordingly, then application of Ar-ticle 366(29A)(b) could not be made.

The next in line, was the observation that as a general proposition, it is not appropriate to hold that whenever any element of works is involved, irrespective of its magnitude, all contracts should be held to be works contracts, though the contract may be for supply of goods. Such sweeping interpretations is inappropriate; what is omitted to be considered is whether in the first instance, by the essential ingredients of the contract, the essential ingredi-ents of ‘sale’ as defined in the Sale of Goods Act are present or absent for the purpose of levy of sales tax. If they are present, then going by the ratio of Bharat Sanchar Nigam’s case (supra), application of Article 366(29A) is not available. In the instant case, the essential ingredient of the contract was for sale of the lift and for this purpose, the petitioner also agreed to carry out installation. In Larsen & Toubro’s case (supra), the contract related to development of property which did not pertain to labour and services alone but also to bring into existence some element of works. Such a ratio considering the nature of contract dealt with could not have universal application to every contract. In the case on hand, when the contract itself was for supply of lift, simply because some work element was involved for installation of the lift, it cannot be held that the whole contract is a works contrathe Larsen

    Toubro (supra) at para 76 would apply in the peculiar facts of that case relating to the construction of building between developer and owner on one side and purchaser on the other.

In the instant case, since sale as defined under the Sale of Goods Act occurred when a lift was supplied and there-fore the question of deemed ‘sale’ did not arise. Also going by the dictum in Patnaik and Company (supra), the contract as a whole has to be examined to understand the real intention of the parties. Applying the said principle to the instant contract to ascertain a contract of ‘sale’ and “works contract”, it can be held that what was transferred by petitioner to the purchaser after its installation was lift as a chattel and this contract is nothing but a sale. To conclude, simply because some element of works is involved in a contract, the whole contract would not be-come works contract. Even after the 46th Amendment, if Article 366(29A)(6) is to be invoked, as a necessary con-comitant, it must be shown that terms of contract lead to conclusion that it is works contract. Unless a contract is proved to be a works contract, Article 36B(29A)(b) is not invokable. Alternatively, if the terms of contract lead to a conclusion of sale, it will attract the provisions of relevant sale tax contract. The Bench thus concluded that the instant case was sale of lift and therefore the decision in Kone Elev.ators (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was correct.

    Conclusion:

Considering that each of the views above, whether majority or otherwise has its own merits and due consideration of facts involved in the issue, it is hard to infer that sanity is necessarily statistical. Nevertheless, the majority view of the Apex Court is respected as law and a binding precent for all. Yet, it is difficult to conclude that controversy surrounding various composite contracts involving sale and works or services of different proportions would cease to exist, considering the fact that each transaction is unique on its own facts and each emerging issue may be different from the available precedents on the larger issue. However, on having a closer look, it is not an up-hill task to deduce that the chief cause of controversy is nothing but absence of a common legislation to tax sale and service. Non-taxability of one component or difference in rate of taxation under separate legislations and Centr-State tug of war are the main contributories to the litigation relating to composite contracts involving sale and works. When a common tax tool is available to tax both goods and services, irrespective of their proportion in a composite contract, the courts will not be required to hair-split and make microscopic observations to analyses their divisibility or otherwise or the elements of sale or service or interpret whether intangible element is goods or service. Every tax compliant corporate citizen is awaiting a day when one complies with the law under a legislation, the hanging sword of wrath under the other legislation no longer exists.

ParmanandTiwari vs. Income-tax Officer “SMC(B)” ITAT bench: Kolkata Before Mahavir Singh, JM I.T.A No.2417/Kol/2013 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Decided on 02.09.2014 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: None / David Z. Chawngthu

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Section 199 and Rule 37BA – Credit for TDS granted even though the certificates issued were not in the name of the assessee.

Facts:
The assessee is an individual and a professional Chartered Accountant. Earlier, the assessee was a partner in the firm M/s. Tiwari & Co.The said firm was dissolved w.e.f. 30.12.2006 and the assessee became proprietor of this firm fromthe said date. During the course of assessment proceedings the AO found that all the TDS certificates were issued in the name of M/s.Tiwari & Co. with PAN which belonged to the erstwhile partnership firm.The assessee contended before the AO that he has included the underlying income in the TDS certificates in his return of income and accordingly, the credit for TDS should also be allowed to him in accordance with Rule 37BA of the Rules.The AO disallowed the claim of the assessee by observing that Rule 37BA of the Rules was inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2009 only and hence, the credit in the hand of the assessee cannot be allowed.

On appeal the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO stating that the credit of TDS cannot be given to the assessee as the deductee (in this case M/s. Tiwari & Co., partnership firm), had failed to file a declaration with the deductor as required under Rule 37BA.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the total income of the assessee included income qua the TDS certificates which were issued in the name of M/s. Tiwari & Co., the erstwhile partnership firm. It also noted that these receipts were earned by M/s. Tiwari & Co., as proprietary concern of the assessee. Further, the AO had also completed the assessment including therein the said income. However, the AO did not allow the credit for TDS on the ground that the TDS certificate is not in the PAN of Parmanand Tiwari, in his individual capacity. According to the tribunal the TDS certificates not being in the name of the assessee was only a technical breach. According to it, wrong submission of PAN by deductor does not debar the assessee from claiming credit of TDS deducted particularly when the income is assessed in the hands of the assessee. Further, according to the Tribunal, the insertion of the proviso to sub-Rule (2) of Rule 37BA was to mitigate the hardship faced by assessee for claiming credit of TDS. As regards whether the amended Rule is a beneficial provision and in turn could be declared as retrospective and applicable to all pending matters, the Tribunal referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Allied Motors Pvt.Ltd. vs. CIT (1997) 224 ITR 677 and held that the said amended Rule was retrospective in nature and would apply to all pending matter. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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DCIT vs. UAE Exchange & Financial Services Ltd. ITAT Bangalore `C’ Bench Before P. Madhavi Devi (JM) and Abraham P. George (AM) ITA No. 91/Bang/2014 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on: 10th October, 2014. Counsel for revenue/assessee: Dr. K. Shankar Prasad/Cherian K. Baby

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Section 32 – Printers, scanners, port switches and projectors qualify for depreciation @ 60% being the rate applicable to computers.

Facts:
The assessee company was carrying on business of money transfer, money changing, travel and ticketing, insurance support services and gold loan. In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee had claimed depreciation @ 60% on printers, scanners, Port switches, projectors, etc. He was of the view that these items qualify for depreciation @ 15% since these do not suffer same rate of obsolescence as computers and they cannot be classified as computers. He rejected the argument of the assessee that these are parts of PCs and cannot independently work in isolation. He, accordingly, allowed depreciation on these @ 15%.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) has followed the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Datacraft India Ltd. (40 SOT 295)(Mum)(SB) wherein it is held that routers and switches are to be classified as computer peripherals and depreciation at the rate of 60% be allowed. The CIT(A) had also considered the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. M/s. Bonanza wherein it is held that depreciation @ 60% is allowable on computer peripherals.

The Tribunal held that the printers, scanners, projectors as well as port-switches are all functionally dependent on computers and therefore, the order of CIT(A) is in consonance with the precedents on the issue. It observed that the DR was not able to place any other contrary decision before it. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Document Gift or relinquishment deed-Determination- Stamp Act, 1899, Article 55

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Srichand Badlani vs. Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi & Ors. AIR 2014 (NOC) 539 Del.

One of the co-owners can relinquish his share in a co-owned property in favour of one or more of the coowners. The document executed by him in this regard would continue to be a relinquishment deed irrespective of whether the relinquishment is in favour of one or all the remaining co-owners of the property. There is no basis in law for the proposition that if the relinquishment deed is executed in favour of one of the co-owners, it would be treated as a Gift deed. The law of stamp duty (as applicable in Delhi) treats relinquishment deed and gift deed as separate documents, chargeable with different stamp duties. It is not necessary that in order to qualify as a relinquishment deed, the document must purport to relinquish the share of the relinquisher in favour of all the remaining co-owners of the property. Even if the relinquishment is in favour of one of the co-owners, it would qualify as a relinquishment deed.

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Consent Decree – Appeal not maintainable – Party to approach the court which had recorded compromise and passed decree and establish that there was no compromise. [CPC O. 23 R.3]

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Smt. Lajja Devi vs. Khushi Ram Prajapat, AIR 2014 (NOC) 510 (Raj.)(HC.)

The Civil Misc. Appeal had been filed against the judgement and decree dated 05-11-2011, passed by the District Judge, Alwar whereby a consent decree u/s.13B of the Act of 2005 had been passed dissolving the marriage between the appellant–wife and the respondent-husband.

It was contended that the appellant is an absolutely illiterate lady and was married to the respondent on 31- 01-2009. It is submitted that the judgment and decree dated 05-11-2011 purportedly by consent for dissolution of marriage has been obtained fraudulently and the appellant at no point of time signed an application u/s. 13B of the Act of 2005, nor even entered the witness box before the District Judge, Alwar nor make any statement as attributed to her before the learned trial court. It is submitted that the judgment and decree for dissolution of marriage on 05-11-2011 is absolutely fraudulent and in fact an outcome of criminal enterprise.

The Court observed that section 96(3) CPC categorically states that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties. There is thus a clear statutory prohibition against filing of an appeal against a consent decree. Thus, the court held that u/s. 96(3) CPC, an appeal against a consent decree is not maintainable.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagar (D) by LR vs. Rajinder Singh & Ors. [AIR 2006 SC 2628 (1)] had the occasion to deal with a situation where a consent decree was sought to be impugned in appeal.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23, can be summed up thus :

(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in section 96(3) CPC.

(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) Rule 1, Order 43.

iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3A.

(iv) A consent operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23.

Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree, is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made.

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When Professionals have to run their firms…….

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Professionals are a unique blend of people who not only have to produce (i.e., service and manage clients), but also have to manage their flock (i.e., their people). When these professionals start assimilating management knowhow, they start shaping their firm’s destiny. Management knowhow usually comes very late in the day to most professionals and often from one’s own experiences and pitfalls; which means that the firm may have suffered multiple consequences till then. These could be in terms of stagnant growth, losing talented professionals, making do with mediocrity, or becoming a second rated firm for their “target” client segment.

Some of the questions that need to be soul searched are:

1. What is it that makes “running a firm” so difficult?
2. Why do we often hear that he is great tax professional, but a lousy leader of people?
3. Why do we often hear that he is a good people person, but lacks the technical skills to become a partner?
4. Why do talented professionals leave good firms?

Similarly, there are questions that abound within professionals that merit serious consideration.

The one word that seeks to address all of the above is “Leadership”.

When professionals have to run their firms…… how can you empower professionals to run their firms? Are they born with such talent? Can these abilities be imparted? Do these abilities need to be upgraded every few years? The answer is a resounding YES.

Almost everyone can be trained to be a good manager. And each good manager can develop himself to become a great leader.

A true professional will primarily concern himself with knowledge acquisition and upgradation, synthesis of facts and solution formulation for clients, and set a precedent for others to be inspired from and emulate. Additionally, he will be looking at market forces – competitors, new players, regulators, associates and other stakeholders, and constantly evaluate and reposition his firm’s strategy. He will be constantly mentoring his team and providing them valuable feedback on how they should be motivated to embrace the challenges of the profession. Professionals who excel at all of these are running their firms successfully.

In pursuit of the above goal of running a firm successfully, there are challenges galore:

? Analysis and interpretation of professional standards, law and regulations
? Human resources management
? Client servicing and delivery
? Risk Management and accountability
? Ethics and values
? Professional upgradation – Life Long Learning

ATTRIBUTES
One can look at the following attributes for a professional who is trying to lead his professional service firm (“PSF”) and the way to think about implementing and executing:

Focus:
Often when professionals are asked “what is the vision of your firm” and someone says to be the market leader or to be the best or to excel in so and so, it is often an empty rhetoric. There is no vision statement written nor do the other partners and/or the managers or even the associates are completely clueless on the founder/ partner’s vision for the firm. It is of paramount importance that there is laser focus (relentless) on the goals of the firm. The firm leadership in an inclusive manner defines the goals. It is the collective responsibility of each member of the firm to ensure that the goals are met. When there is an intent backed with adequate time and resources and coupled with “tone at the top”, goals will get executed. The quality of the execution is purely a derivative of passion and relentless focus.

Planning:
Planning comes naturally to professional service firms who manage projects, e.g., an audit firm is used to planning an audit engagement where there is deployment of resources (team members) and there is a time bound expectations of the final audit report. A well planned engagement is more likely than not going to result into a successful engagement. Conversely, professionals, especially sole practitioners and smaller firms who do not plan adequately often run into cost over runs due to delayed and inefficient completion of engagements. Project management principles always suggest efficient planning as the corner stone of any project.

Execution:
This brings us to execution. No professional service firm can grow or even sustain itself without quality execution and the resultant client satisfaction. Again, one has to remember the mathematical model of clients pay for lack of knowledge or ability. Execution drives the fair market value in the equation. At the end of the day what every client wants from a professional is a solution to their problem. Execution directly impacts the professionals’ perception in the eyes of the client. Professionals who deliver solutions to complex problems are considered premium professionals i.e., the high end intellectual class of professionals. Those who provide expertise and experience are the second category who command a relative premium over the general practitioner. This category primarily comprises of professionals with grey hair i.e. professionals with solid experience and a fair degree of expertise. The rhetoric is “trust us: we have been through this before”. The final category is out friendly neighborhood, general practitioner. He is the go to guy for all first level problems and for the bread and butter solutions.

Now, execution is laser focused in the first category of the premium expert as it is time which is very scarce and therefore commanding a very high premium for these professionals. Their processes are geared up to provide high quality focused execution. No wonder they are at the top of their game.

In the second category, execution is clinical and professional.

In the third category of the general practitioner, execution standards greatly differ from one professional service firm to another. Those firms that practice a high degree or high quality of execution focus will outshine the rest.

Solution:
Professional service firms have to learn to be solutions focused and not be perceived as problem creators or query raisers. Each business has its own dynamic of the professional problems and challenges. A professional service firm that believes in problem solving and thinking about solutions for its clients is a hands down winner. It is this solution centricity that brings us closer to client centricity: one of the key attributes of successful professional service firms. The culture of the firm has to encourage individuals into constantly thinking about client solutions. This again ties in to our model of clients pay for value.

Professionals get paid for the value they deliver. This is not just a clichéd statement. In the ever-growing complex environment, the larger organisations have in-house teams for all vital functions.

Example: It is not uncommon to have a separate M&A team that focuses on new acquisitions/inorganic growth opportunities. If insourcing is a given, why should a client pay to a consultant or a professional advisor? In a real world situation clients pay because either they do not know the solution or they do not know enough about the subject or even if they know, they may not have the ability to be sure about a final opinion – which is demanded by regulations or otherwise. Thus, when clients pay for value, what they are essentially doing is paying for the lack of knowledge and/or ability and/or time. Simply put,

Clients pay for value = Fair market value of lack of knowledge or ability or time

Value is what is perceived and what is delivered. A solution to a complex problem is value delivered, so also is out of the box thinking or innovative application of a tax position or a tax rule, such that it reiterates a client position or saves taxes for a client.

Often, clients are habituated to pay for what is not within their realms of expertise or functional subject matter area. Sometimes it is also to cover oneself from a potential risk of an adverse outcome.

Thus, when a professional demonstrates knowledge and ability to execute, if he delivers significant value, he can often command a premium on his normal charge out rates.

Dynamic Forces in Market Place:

Each country is constantly revisiting the relevance of accounting, tax and business rules and constantly looking at ways to keep them updated. Business transactions evolve constantly and the level of complexity keeps on growing. Demand and supply forces generate lot of incongruity between what is and what ought to be. In such a situation, the dynamic forces in the market place takeover and dictate how a particular profession will grow and respond to these forces. Businesses often reach out to the professional firms in terms of being the harbinger for change. It is upto the professional service firms to create systems that allow rapid response to these dynamic forces. A professional service firm has to be in alignment with the 7-S’ framework1 so as to seize the incongruency and the resultant opportunities that are thrown up.

Clients tend to expect real time responses to questions and day to day challenges. PSFs have to be organised and geared up to provide rapid responses to meet the client need and to answer “what is value to the client?”

III. Counseling vs. Advocacy

Advocacy by definition is all about articulating one’s professional ideals and channelizing the technical knowledge to a given client challenge and finally tying all of these together, to communicate the professional’s intent. It is of deep importance that a PSF leader wears a hat of an advisor when it comes to dealing with a client. It is often found that a deep dividing line can be created between completing a job versus providing professional advice/counseling. To meet this gap, if a professional wears the hat of an Advisor, it is far more permeable to further a client’s interest.

Counseling is all about conveying a point of view to a client. Thereafter, providing alternative scenarios of possible outcomes and associated results.

In contrast, advocacy is sheer representation of a client’s position before a target interest group (“TIG”). This TIG could be a regulatory authority, a court of law, an arbitration panel, a policy maker or even a client interest group. It is clear that when a client’s position is to be conveyed across this broad spectrum, it is the art of advocacy that helps remove all communication barriers and synthesises a technical argument in a manner that the TIG can see the underlying merit and accept the arguments.

Example: The eminent jurist, late Shri Nani Palkhivala, in the case of Kesavananda Bharati vs. the State of Kerala, articulated the matter before the Supreme Court and outlined the Basic Structure doctrine of the Constitution. The Basic Structure doctrine forms the basis of a limited power of the Indian judiciary to review, and strike down, amendments to the Constitution of India enacted by the Indian parliament which conflict with or seek to alter this basic structure of Constitution. Such was the power of his advocacy, that recalling Mr. Palkhivala’s performance during the hearing of the review petition, Justice Khanna remarked, “It was not Nani who spoke. It was divinity speaking through him.” Justice Khanna was speaking for an astounded and grateful nation.

It is therefore important for professionals to learn the art of advocacy as that will put them in good stead when providing representation and litigation advisory services to their clients.

Values, integrity, ethics

A professional is normally called upon for implementing any new policy or regulation. The members of the public trust a professional and inbuilt in that trust is integrity, values and ethics.

Integrity is a personal virtue, an uncompromising and predictably consistent commitment to honour moral, ethical, spiritual and artistic values and principles.

In ethics, integrity is regarded by many as honesty and truthfulness or accuracy of one’s actions.

Values can be defined as broad preference concerning appropriate courses of actions or outcomes. Values reflect a person’s sense of right and wrong or what “ought” to be. Types of values include ethical/moral values, ideological (religious, political) values, social values and aesthetic values. Values have been studied in various disciplines such as anthropology, behavioral economics, business ethics, corporate governance, political sciences, moral philosophy, social psychology, sociology and theology.

Nothing summarises this better than the phrase, “Doing the right things”..

Leadership    is    all    about    doing    the    right    things….

management is doing things right, said Peter F. Drucker.

It is so important for the leader in a PSF to set the tone about doing the right things. This, by implication, clearly means that always a leader has to focus on the right path. This is often tough and full of obstacles. Pursuing the right path is never easy and is like traversing a road full of twists and turns. One can never know what to expect at the next juncture. One can expect several resistances on the way including from one’s own fraternity in the firm. It is during this gruesome journey when the mantle of leadership is tested to its core. At that point, a leader of the PSF should consider the right path.

It is normally easy to take a convenient way out, which is full of short cuts and is devoid of any long term substance or depth. To add to this, the temptation of short term positive results create an indiscretion in one’s mind and a leader is often tempted to follow this wrong path in pursuit of short term gains. It is here that a true leader amplifies the spirit of leadership by pursuing the right path and embodying the universally acclaimed principle of doing the right things. The result is often long lasting and sustained and helps creating a firm that lasts and endures generations.

Zero tolerance:

It is important for a PSF to set a culture of zero tolerance for inappropriate conduct, accepting delivery that is less than optimal and enduring professionals who show scant respect for the basic tenets of professional ethics. The survival of individuals within a PSF environment that is cultured with zero tolerance goes a long way in establishing the righteousness and forbearance of morality, ethics and values, integrated with the basic social fibre and the deep rooted belief in doing the right things for the PSF. Zero tolerance also sets a clear roadmap for growth and sustenance of a PSF. All the firms that have grown and sustained over decades have shown tremendous affinity to the concept of zero tolerance.

Fearless approach:

Absolute clarity in one’s technical abilities leads to conduct which is fearless. It is often said that when there is nothing to lose, there is nothing to fear. Once a professional accepts that the final results are not in one’s hands, and therefore one should not endlessly worry about the outcome of a particular matter. What is more relevant and important is that the professional has given his or her best to a particular client situation and there is no technical deficiency in the final product. Thereafter, if a different view is taken by a competent authority, it is not really a reflection of the professional’s quality of delivery. Thus, there cannot be a question of aspersing any doubt on the technical ability of the professional. At that stage, the professional can truly find a sense of equilibrium in his professional practice. His “Dharma” is to conduct himself fearlessly and the resultant outcome will always be optimum.

Client centricity:

Quality work is not equivalent to quality service. If a professional in a PSF can ensure that client service is accorded paramount importance alongside the quality of the client delivery, what he would have created is a culture of “Client centricity” in the firm. All teams of various practice areas would keep the client at the centre whilst rendering their professional services. The client should feel that his or her needs and sensitivities are being addressed contemporaneously by the client service team. Client centricity also deals with ensuring that we do a better job than our competitors at listening to our clients and working out at finding out what they like and don’t like about dealing with us. We also have thoughtful, well executed plans to invest our time and resources in growing relationships with key clients, thereby earning and deserving their trust and future business. Finally, it deals with laying a greater emphasis in the firm’s measurement and reward systems on growing existing client relationships, rather than just pursuing new accounts and “rain-making”.

    In conclusion

When professionals have to lead and run their firms, a lot of the above needs to be implemented so as to sustain the firm. And to grow the firm, the leadership of the PSF has to connect the firm to the future and connect the professionals to the firm. Leaders will be expected to set direction, ensure execution, secure commitment and lead by example.

An auditor’s expert – a mere specialist or a Man Friday?

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Where an enterprise involves an expert to provide information necessary for the preparation of the financial statements, the auditor would need to decide whether he has the requisite knowledge and experience to evaluate on his own, the work performed by the expert or whether he needs to engage an ‘auditor’s expert’ so as to decrease the risk that material misstatement will not be detected.

In the previous article, we explained aspects that an auditor would need to consider where he himself chooses to evaluate the work of the expert rather than employing an ‘auditor’s expert’. We will now focus on audit considerations where an auditor elects to engage his own expert. SA 620 provides the requisite guidance in this regard.

An auditor’s expert refers to a person or organisation possessing expertise in a field other than accounting or auditing, employed or engaged by the auditor to assist him to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence for the purpose of the audit. SA 620 accentuates the need for the auditor to evaluate the expert’s objectivity and to establish a proper understanding with the expert of the expert’s responsibilities for the purposes of the audit.

An auditor’s expert could be an internal expert or an external expert. An auditor’s internal expert may be a partner or staff of the auditor’s firm or of a network firm. The internal expert could therefore be subject to quality control policies and procedures of the auditor’s firm. The auditor would be in a better position to exercise oversight over the functioning of the expert where he engages an internal expert.

Whereas an auditor’s external expert is not a member of the engagement team and may not be subject to quality control policies and procedures instituted by the audit firm. Where the auditor engages an external expert, he would need to exercise greater diligence in evaluating the objectivity of the external expert. Some of the factors that the auditor should be cognisant of while engaging an external expert are:

i. Enquire from the client of any interest or relationship that the client has with the auditor’s external expert that may affect the expert’s objectivity.

ii. Discuss with the expert whether he has any other interest in the client other than the present engagement for which he is being engaged by the auditor. Interests and relationships that may be relevant to discuss with the auditor’s expert include financial interests, business and personal relationships and provision of other services.

iii. Discuss whether there are any safeguards to prevent his objectivity from being impaired. Such safeguards could be in terms of code of conduct/independence requirements as prescribed by the professional body of which the expert is a member.

iv. The auditor should consider obtaining a written representation from the auditor’s external expert about any interests or relationships with the entity of which that expert is aware.

Other aspects that the auditor needs to consider while engaging internal or external experts are:

i. Whether the work of the auditor’s expert relates to a significant matter that involves subjective and complex judgments.
ii. Whether the auditor’s expert is performing procedures that are integral to the audit, rather than being consulted to provide advice on an individual matter.
iii. The competence, capabilities and objectivity of the auditor’s expert.
iv. Obtaining an understanding of the auditor’s expert’s field of expertise.
v. The nature, scope and objectives of the auditor’s expert’s work are agreed between the auditor and the auditor’s expert, regardless of whether the expert is an auditor’s external expert or an auditor’s internal expert.
vi. Whether the auditor’s expert will have access to sensitive or confidential entity information.

Application of SA 620 in practice
• Engagement of auditor’s internal expert

Due to complexities involved in various matters, which in turn leads to specialisation, many firms have separate departments which offer direct tax, indirect tax, transfer pricing and other advisory services. These departments employ professionals other than qualified accountants as well like lawyers, engineers, management graduates, corporate finance professionals etc., for rendering tax and advisory services.

It is a usual practice for auditors to refer client’s matters involving direct and indirect taxes having implications on financial reporting to tax specialists within their firm. These specialists need not necessarily be qualified accountants (could be tax lawyers). An illustrative list of factors that need to be borne in mind are:

a) Such specialists would be subject to relevant ethical requirements including those pertaining to independence.

b) Where an auditor engages such internal experts, it is important that such experts understand the interrelationship of their expertise with the audit process.

c) The fact that the auditor would be involving an internal expert from a different service line should be clearly articulated and agreed to in the terms of engagement agreed with the client.

d) T here should be a clear agreement between the auditor and the internal expert covering aspects such as, who would test the source data, consent of the expert to discuss his findings or conclusions with the client, whether the auditor would get access to and could retain the work papers of the expert and the manner and form of the report/findings that would be communicated by the expert.

For example, the auditor may seek assistance from an internal tax expert to evaluate the likelihood of pending cases involving tax demands raised by tax authorities being decided against the client. In such cases, there needs to be a clear agreement as to whether the internal expert would evaluate only the likelihood of the demands fructifying in favour or against the client or would the tax expert also comment on the adequacy of the tax provisions carried in the books. Likewise, in order to obtain comfort on the adequacy of tax expense/provision, the auditor may seek clearance from his internal tax expert on whether the transactions with related parties are at the arms’ from a transfer pricing perspective.

Similarly, the auditor may seek clearance from indirect tax experts on disputed indirect tax cases involving service tax, customs duty, excise etc. from the perspective of recording a provision or disclosure as contingent liability or otherwise.

A vital factor that the auditor should be cognisant of is whether the tax specialist (auditor’s internal expert) is rendering tax advisory services to the client. In such cases, the auditor needs to assure himself that the position advocated by the tax specialist in respect of tax matters that the audit team has requested for evaluation is not in any manner influenced by the existing relationship that the tax specialist has with the client. The auditor should be mindful of whether the quantum of fees billed by the tax specialist would in any manner impair the objectivity of the tax specialist in providing his clearance.

Another area where an auditor may seek assistance from an internal expert is testing of automated IT controls surrounding an accounting system to the extent that such controls have a bearing on financial reporting. Where clients deploy sophisticated IT systems to process large amounts of data for financial reporting, it may not be possible for the auditor to perform substantive testing manually. Take for instance, testing of revenue for a telecom client involving millions of subscribers or testing of interest on deposits accepted by bank having thousands of deposit accounts. In such cases, the Company would need to deploy high end ERP systems to initiate, record, process and report transactions. Given the IT environment in these enterprises, one would need to engage IT experts to test the general IT controls and application controls. The auditor may engage his internal expert having expertise in information technology to assist him in testing the controls. This would entail sharing of sensitive client data with the internal expert. Here again, the auditor would need to ensure that adequate safeguards are in place to maintain confidentiality of client information that is shared with the IT expert. Further, the auditor would need to verify the origin of the data, obtain an understanding of the internal controls over the data and review the data for completeness and internal consistency.

Another practical example of involvement of auditor’s internal expert relates to the involvement of specialists in corporate finance/financial risk management for testing the valuation of complex derivatives, business purchase, brand valuation etc. In these cases, management would have obtained the valuation of the derivatives/business purchase from a management expert and the auditors would need to obtain assurance that the valuation is appropriate. Given the highly technical nature of the valuation, an auditor may engage an internal expert to evaluate the underlying assumptions and methods for arriving at the valuation.

    Engagement of auditor’s external expert

Typically, general insurers need to make an estimate on the ultimate cost of claims to know the full cost of paying claims in order to set future premium rates. Further, they also need to set up reserves in their accounts to ensure that they have sufficient assets to cover their liabilities. Such reserves are in the form of Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) and Incurred But Not Enough Reported (IBNER).

Assuming a year end of 31st March, IBNR claim reserve is required in respect of claims that have occurred before 31st March, but the claim has not yet been reported to the insurer whereas IBNER is required in respect of claims that have been reported, but not yet closed.

In other words, IBNR is the liability for future payments on losses which have already occurred but have not yet been reported in the insurer’s records whereas IBNER refers to expected future development on claims already reported (i.e., claims which have not yet been recorded in full to its ultimate loss value).

Reserve for IBNR/IBNER is recorded by management based on actuarial valuation carried out by a management appointed actuary. In such determination, the appointed actuary follows the guidance issued by the professional body governing the actuarial profession in concurrence with the directions issued in this regard by the statutory authority regulating insurance business. The quantum of such reserves would be material to the financial statements of the insurance company.

In India, auditors usually include in their report a comment to the effect that they have placed reliance on the management appointed actuary for valuation of liabilities for IBNR and IBNER claims.

Auditors in certain jurisdictions overseas may appoint their own actuary(external expert)to assess the appropriateness of management’s judgments and assumptions used in the calculation of the reserves for reported claims. The actuary would review the methodology and assumptions used for calculating the reserve and comment whether they are in line with the related regulations and also comment on the reasonableness.

The auditors would nevertheless need to have discussions with the client and the actuaries and would need to perform the following with the assistance of its own expert:

    Determine the client’s overall methodology for generating the reserves for reported claims including changes compared to the previous period.

    Assess whether the auditor appointed actuary has adequately reviewed the appropriateness of managements judgments and assumptions used in the calculation of the reserves.

    Assess whether the overall reasonableness of the reserves for reported claims is appropriate given the consideration of historical evidence of the reasonableness of the previous periods level of the reserves for reported claims.

    Perform reconciliation of net earned premium, net claims paid together with net claims outstanding as appearing in the financial statements and the actuarial data inputs used by the actuary for the IBNR/IBNER computation.

Closing remarks

The decision of auditors of whether to employ their own experts or otherwise, should be taken only after very careful consideration of the risk of material misstatement in the relevant area of the financial statements and scrutiny of the status and the work of the management’s expert. Any decision in this regard should be influenced by the knowledge that, ultimately, the audit opinion is the sole responsibility of the auditor, and that this responsibility is not reduced by reliance on the work of a management’s expert or an auditor’s expert.

In terms of requirements of Indian GAAS, the auditor is not permitted to refer to the work of the auditor’s expert in the audit report containing an unmodified opinion, unless required by law or regulation. Further, even if any local law were to permit inclusion of such reference in the audit report, SA 620 mandates the auditor to state that such reference does not in any manner reduce his responsibility for the opinion issued.

Ind-AS Carve Outs

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Synopsis
You may be aware that adoption of the converged Indian Accounting Standards (Ind-AS) has been prescribed under the Union Budget 2014-2015, voluntarily from the fiscal year 2015-16 and mandatorily from the year 2016-17. The Ind-AS are formed in alignment with the principles of IFRS as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In this article, the learned author points out an illustration of the Ind-AS 40 ‘Investment Property’, wherein some differences between Ind-AS and IFRS have been noted. The author explains therein, the necessity to keep the carve-outs to the bare minimum while finalising the Ind-AS, to ensure that there is global acceptability for financial statements that are prepared using these standards once thay are issued.

The Honourable Finance Minister during the Union Budget 2014-15 announced that Ind-AS would be applicable voluntarily from the year 2015-16 and mandatorily from the year 2016-17. To meet the roadmap, swift measures need to be taken. One key step is the notification of the final Ind-AS on a priority basis. This will help companies in timely preparation for Ind-AS adoption. The author is confident that the ASB and the ICAI will meet our expectations and ensure that the final Ind-AS are notified promptly.

A major part of the world is now reporting under the IFRS as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The last of the developed countries to adopt the IFRS was Japan. Earlier, China too has adopted the IFRS, but retained only one difference between Chinese GAAP and the IFRS. As of now, there are only two significant countries that do not use the IFRS. One is the USA. However, the USA allows the IFRS for foreign private filers. It is also being hoped that the US may ultimately allow US companies to voluntarily adopt the IFRS in future. Besides, for a long time, the US and the IASB have been working together on numerous standards, which has resulted in the US slowly inching towards the US GAAP that is closer to the IFRS. The other significant exception to the IFRS adoption is India.

The IASB is an independent standard setting body comprising of 14 full-time members from different parts of the world. The IASB is also responsible for approving interpretations of IFRS. IFRS’s are developed through an international consultation process, the “due process,” which involves interested individuals and organisations from around the world. The development of an the IFRS is carried out during the IASB meetings, when the IASB considers the comments received on the Exposure Draft. Finally, after the due process is completed, all outstanding issues are resolved, and the IASB members have balloted in favour of publication, the IFRS is issued. This is a very time consuming process, but results in technically solid IFRS’s being issued. It takes into consideration the needs and realities of different countries, and tries to balance them. At times, some of these needs and realities could be conflicting, and it would be impossible to keep all countries happy all the time. Nonetheless, the bottom line remains that the standards should be technically robust, one that would reflect the substance of the underlying business and transactions in a fair and transparent manner.

Most countries that have adopted the IFRS, have adopted them as they are, i.e., without indigenising them to their local GAAP. There were many reasons for taking this approach. Foremost, their local GAAP was developed to meet some regulatory and other objectives such as taxes or capital adequacy or protecting creditors. They did not often reflect the true and fair picture and hence were not typically driven towards meeting the needs of the investors. This had to change and investor needed to be given precedence if capital formation and growth objectives were important for that country.

Most countries that did adopt the IFRS as it is, did so because it enhanced the credibility of the financial statements which resulted in low cost of capital. As major groups have companies all over the world, using one accounting language helped them in preparing consolidated financial statements seamlessly. Using one accounting language across their different companies in the world also meant that their management information systems and IT was consistent across the globe. This made their lives much more predictable, consistent and easier. Today most stock exchanges in the developed world either


require or allow the IFRS. Also, investors around the globe understand the IFRS and are very comfortable with it. Any country that departs from the IFRS will not receive any of the above benefits. For example, in countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong, local standards are largely aligned to IFRS, but there are very few differences. This does not allow Singapore/Hong Kong entities to demonstrate compliance with IASB IFRS.

The Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) and the Asian Corporate Governance Association (AGCA) recently released their seventh joint report on corporate governance in Asia. Among other matters, the report ranks 11 Asian markets on macro Corporate Governance (CG) quality. A perusal of the report extracts indicate that amongst the 11 Asian countries, India has got the lowest rating on accounting and auditing matters as it has not implemented IFRS. Due to the same reason, India’s rating has also declined vis-à-vis previous periods. The chart given above depicts this.

The adoption of Ind-AS will resolve these issues and bring India at par with the world at large that has adopted IFRS. To achieve full benefit, it is imperative that Ind- AS’s are notified without any major difference from IASB IFRS. If India were to implement the IFRS with too many differences, it would be akin to moving from one Indian GAAP to another Indian GAAP. It would not be possible for Indian companies to state that they are compliant with the IFRS, and hence, those financial statements will be treated as local GAAP financial statements. More importantly if an Indian company wants to prepare IASB IFRS financial statements in the future, it will have to convert again from Ind-AS to IASB IFRS.

At the same time, it is appreciated that accounting is an art, and not a precise science. Primarily, financial statements should reflect and capture the underlying substance of transactions. The accounting standards are drafted to ensure that underlying transactions are properly accounted for and also aggregated and reflected transparently in the financial statements. But as already pointed out, this is not a precise science, and people may have different views on how to achieve this objective. Also at times, countries depart from the basic objective of true and fair display, to help companies in difficulty and pursue other unrelated objectives. Hence, a country may desire to have a few carve-outs in exceptional circumstances from IASB IFRS. To illustrate, it is believed that in the Indian scenario, classification of loan liability as current merely based on breach of minor debt covenant, say, few days delay in submission of monthly stock statement to bank, does not reflect the expected behaviour of the lender (who may ultimately condone the violation) and may create undue hardship for Indian corporates.

On the other hand, the proposed removal of the fair valuation option under Ind-AS 40 with respect to investment property, does not appear to be reasonable as can be seen from the arguments in the table below. This is not typically a carve-out, but certainly removes one option provided in the IFRS.

Ind-AS 40 Investment Property

Background

IAS 40 allows entities an option to apply either the cost model or the fair value model for subsequent measurement of its investment property. If the fair value model is used, all investment properties, including investment properties under construction, are measured at fair value and changes in the fair value are recognised in the profit or loss for the period in which it arises. Under the fair value model, the carrying amount is not required to be depreciated.

Ind-AS 40 hosted on the MCA website does not permit the use of fair value model for subsequent measurement of investment property. It however requires the fair value of the investment property to be disclosed in the notes to financial statements. It is understood that the ICAI may now be proposing to retain fair valuation model for subsequent measurement of investment property. However, all changes in the fair value will be recognised in the OCI, instead of profit or loss. It is expected that the proposed fair valuation model may be similar to revaluation model under Ind-AS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment.

Technical perspective

Before issuing the IAS 40, the IASB had specifically considered whether there was a need for issuing separate IFRS for investment property accounting or should it be covered under the IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment. After detailed evaluation and consultation with stakeholders, the IASB decided that characteristics of investment property differ sufficiently from those of the owner-occupied property. Hence, there is a need for a separate IFRS. In particular, the IASB was of the view that information about fair value of investment property, and about changes in its fair value, is highly relevant to the users of financial statements.

An investment property generates cash flows largely in-dependently of other assets held by an entity. The generation of independent cash flows through rental or capi-tal appreciation distinguishes investment property from owner-occupied property. This distinction makes a fair value model (as against revaluation model) more appropriate for investment property.

The ICAI proposal for allowing fair valuation for investment property is unclear. Particularly, it is unclear whether a company will need to depreciate investment property. Since a company is not recognising fair value gain/ loss in P&L and on the lines of revaluation model in Ind-AS 16, it appears that companies may need to charge depreciation on investment property in profit or loss for the period. This means that while a company will charge depreciation on investment property to profit or loss; it will recognise fair value change directly in OCI. This may give highly distorted results.

In case of investment property companies, investors and other stakeholders measure performance based on rental income plus changes in the fair value. Under the ICAI proposal, no single statement will reflect such performance of an investment property company. A major global accounting firm had conducted a survey in India “IFRS convergence: an investor’s perspective.” Among the survey participants, 67% were in favour of allowing fair value model for investment property as an option to the cost model.

The author would therefore strongly support retaining the fair valuation option under IAS 40. India is at the threshold of introducing new structures such as REIT to provide a boost to the infrastructure and real estate sector. Fair valuation would be the most appropriate basis for investors to enter or exit out of these funds. Hence, retaining the fair valuation model under IAS 40 is imperative.

IASB IFRS may not necessarily provide the best answers in all cases, and there may be a few instances where the standards could have been much better. Nonetheless, the author believes that the standard setters and regulators will have to consider the benefit of these carve outs with the benefits lost as a result of departing from IASB IFRS. Ultimately, it is not about one-upmanship but aligning with the world. In my view, full adoption of IASB IFRS is a goal worth pursuing. At the same time the standards setters and regulators should engage with the IASB in resolving the Indian specific pain points amicably. As an alternative approach, the author suggests that companies should be allowed an option to adopt IASB IFRS, instead of Ind-AS, if they wish to.

In the long-run, the standard setters and regulators should work closely with the IASB so that any differences that arise are resolved more promptly. A mutually respectable relationship can be built with the IASB, where the IASB and the world can gain from India’s participation in the standard setting process and simultaneously India can also benefit from the process in improving its financial reporting framework.

TS-309-ITAT-2014(Mum) Everest Kanto Cylinder Ltd vs.ADIT A.Y: 2008-09, Dated: 25.09.2014

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Payment of guarantee commission and recovery of the same from subsidiary is an international transaction; Bharti Airtel decision distinguished.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian company, set up subsidiary in Dubai (F Co) for expanding its business in Dubai region. F Co obtained term loan for its working capital requirements and for capital expenditure from the foreign branch of an Indian bank.

Taxpayer provided corporate guarantee to the bank in India in respect of such loans by way of deed of guarantee. In return 0.5% guarantee commission was charged by the Taxpayer from its F Co. Guarantee commission collected from F Co was held to be at arm’s length by the Tribunal in the Taxpayer’s own case for the immediately preceding year.

The Taxpayer had an independent sanction “letter of Credit arrangement” between the bank in India in respect of Inland and foreign letter of credit, where 0.6% guarantee commission was to be paid by the Taxpayer to the bank in India for the bank guarantee provided. The schematic presentation of the facts is as below.

The Tax Authority computed the arm’s length price of corporate guarantee @3% (as against 0.5% made by the Taxpayer) and made certain additions in this regard. Such addition was also affirmed by the dispute resolution panel (DRP).

Taxpayer alternatively contended that the transaction of giving corporate guarantee to bank on behalf of F Co, is not an international transaction, and even if it is regarded as an international transaction, since the Taxpayer has recovered from F Co the comparable cost of guarantee commission charged, the transaction is at arm’s length.

Held:
The decision of Delhi Tribunal in case of Bharti Airtel Ltd (ITA No.5816/DeI/2012) is distinguishable on facts as no guarantee commission was charged in that case. The Delhi Tribunal excluded the transaction of giving corporate guarantee from the purview of international transaction on the plea that transaction of such a nature was not having any bearing on the profits, income or loss or assets of the enterprise.

However, in the present case Taxpayer has incurred cost for providing bank guarantee and has also recovered guarantee commission from its subsidiary. Both these transactions, have impact on the income as well as expenditure of the Taxpayer. Thus the transaction of corporate guarantee is an international transaction subject to TP provisions.

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Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Delhi `B’ Bench Before H. S. Sidhu (AM) and H. S. Sidhu (JM) ITA No. 3212/Del/2014 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 5th September, 2014. Counsel for revenue/assessee: Satpal Singh/ Sanjeev Kapoor

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Sections. 79, 271(1)(c) – Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is not leviable in a case where claim to carry forward capital loss was denied due to change in majority shareholding.

Facts:
For assessment year 2007-08 the Assessing Officer (AO) in an order passed u/s.143(3) of the Act assessed the returned income to be the total income. However, the claim of carry forward of loss of Rs. 23,09,722 was denied on the ground that there was a change in majority shareholding of the assessee and therefore by virtue of section 79 the said loss cannot be carried forward.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. The assessee after receiving the order of CIT(A) did not carry forward the capital loss of Rs. 23,90,722 in its return of income for AY 2012-13. The AO levied a penalty of Rs. 8,05,000 u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the carry forward of long term capital loss of AY 2005-06 and 2006-07 had been duly accepted as correct as per returns filed and assessment orders passed by the AO in the relevant years. In the AY 2006-07 the AO specifically mentioned that carry forward of long term capital loss is allowed.

The Tribunal also noted that in the assessment order of AY 2007-08 there was no mention that the assessee had furnished any inaccurate particulars of income or had made any wrong claim of carry forward of long term capital loss. The disallowance of carry forward of long term capital loss was on technical ground and not on account of any concealment of any particulars of income. The Tribunal noted that section 271(1)(c) postulates imposition of penalty for furnishing of inaccurate particulars and concealment of income. It observed that the conduct of the assessee cannot be said to be contumacious so as to warrant levy of penalty. The Tribunal held that the levy of penalty was not justified. It set aside the orders of the authorities below and deleted the levy of penalty.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Shri G. N. Mohan Raju vs. ITO ITAT Bangalore `C’ Bench Before P. Madhavi Devi (JM) and Abraham P. George (AM) ITA No. 242 & 243/Bang/2013 Assessment Years: 2006-07 and 2007-08. Decided on: 10th October, 2014. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Padamchand Khincha/ Dr. Shankar Prasad

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Sections. 143(2), 147 – AO cannot suo moto treat the return of income filed before issue of notice u/s. 148 to be a return filed in response to the said notice. Notice u/s. 143(2) issued before the assessee has filed a return in response to notice u/s. 148 cannot be treated as a valid notice.

Facts:
For the assessment year 2006-07 the assessee filed his return of income u/s 139 on 10.7.2007. In the computation filed along with the said return the assessee stated that it has received Rs. 97,80,000 which has been treated as capital receipt. The said return of income was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Act.

On 24.12.2009, a notice u/s. 148 of the Act was issued for reopening the assessment. In response to the said notice the assessee did not file any return of income. On 23.9.2010, a notice u/s. 143(2) dated 17.9.2010 was dispatched by registered post. On 5.10.2010, an authorised representative of the assessee appeared before the AO and stated that the return of income originally filed could be treated as return filed pursuant to the notice u/s. 148 of the Act. On 5.10.2010, the AO issued a notice u/s. 142(1) of the Act but there was no notice u/s 143(2) of the Act.

The AO completed the assessment u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act.

Aggrieved by the action of the AO in framing an assessment u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147 without issue of a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that in the case before it a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act had been issued to the assessee, but on the date when such notice was issued viz. 23.9.2010, assessee had not filed any return pursuant to the reopening notice u/s. 148 of the Act. It, further, noted that the first instance when the assessee requested the AO to treat the returns originally filed by it as returns filed pursuant to the notices u/s. 148 of the Act, was on 5.10.2010 which was clear from the narration in the order sheet. It observed that the crux of the issue is whether notices u/s.143(2) is mandatory in a reopened procedure and whether notices issued prior to the reopening would satisfy the requirement specified u/s. 143(2) of the Act.

The Tribunal noted that in the case of M/s. Amit Software Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 540(B)/2012 dated 7.2.2014), the co-ordinate Bench has after considering the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Areva T and D India Ltd. and also the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of M/s. Alpine Electronics Asia PTE Ltd. (341 ITR 247)(Del), held that section 143(2) of the Act was a mandatory requirement and not a procedural one.

If the income has been understated or the income has escaped assessment, an AO is having the power to issue notice u/s. 148 of the Act. Notice u/s. 148 of the Act issued to the assessee required it to file a return within 30 days from the date of service of such notice. There is no provision in the Act, which would allow an AO to treat the return which was already subject to a processing u/s. 143(1) of the Act, as a return filed pursuant to a notice subsequently issued u/s. 148 of the Act. However, once an assessee itself declares before the AO that the earlier return could be treated as filed pursuant to a notice u/s. 148 of the Act, three results can follow. AO can either say no, this will not be accepted, you have to file a fresh return or he can say that 30 days time period being over I will not take cognisance of your request or he has to accept the request of the assessee and treat the earlier returns as one filed pursuant to the notice u/s. 148 of the Act. In the former two scenarios, AO has to follow the procedure set out for a best judgment assessment and cannot make an assessment u/s. 143(3). On the other hand, if the AO chose to accept assessee’s request, he can indeed make an assessment u/s. 143(3). In the case before us, assessments were completed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147. Or in other words AO accepted the request of the assessee. This in turn makes it obligatory to issue notice u/s. 143(2) after the request by the assessee to treat his earlier return as filed in pursuance to notices u/s. 148 of the Act was received. This request, in the given case, has been made only on 5.10.2010. Any issue of notice prior to that date cannot be treated as a notice on a return filed by the assessee pursuant to a notice u/s. 148 of the Act. In other words, there was no valid issue of notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act, and the assessments were done without following the mandatory requirement u/s. 143(2) of the Act. This, it held, renders the subsequent proceedings invalid. The Tribunal, quashed the assessment done for the impugned years.

The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed.

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2014-TIOL-723-ITAT-DEL Rajasthan Petro Synthetics Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 1397 /Del/2013 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Date of Order: 22.8.2014

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Sections 2(47), 45, 50 – Taking over of the possession of the capital asset by the secured lendor does not amount to transfer of asset and short term capital gain on such transfer cannot be charged. A restraint on dealing with the assets in any manner resulting in from issuance of notice for recovery is merely a prohibition against private alienation and does not pass any title to the authority which held a lien or charge on the aforesaid class of assets.

Facts:
The assessee company was engaged in the business of manufacture and trade of synthetic yarn and freight forwarding. The assessee filed its return of income declaring a Nil income. The assessee submitted that it had borrowed loans from various financial institutions to purchase capital assets prior to 1999. When it ran into losses and upon its net worth being fully eroded, it became sick as per provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA). In the meanwhile, the assessee was served a notice u/s. 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI) from Stressed Assets Stabilization Fund (SASF) (a financial institution which had taken over the loans advanced by IDBI Bank Ltd) who was authorised to act on behalf of self and all the secured lenders of the assessee. The SASF took over physical possession of the secured movable and immovable assets of the assessee u/s. 13(4) of SARFAESI on 28.9.2007.

The assets of the assessee were sold by SASF sometime in March, 2008 for a sale price of Rs. 10 crore. The principal amount of loans outstanding to the secured lenders amounted to Rs. 97.42 crore, of which Rs. 24.46 crore was due on account of unpaid principal amount of borrowings utilised for working capital. It was stand of the assessee that the amount of Rs. 24.46 crore being the unpaid amount of working capital borrowings can form part of its taxable income and Rs. 72.96 crore (Rs 97.42 crore minus Rs. 24.46 crore) on account of unpaid principal amount of borrowings utilised for creation of depreciable fixed assets cannot form part of taxable income.

The Assessing Officer (AO) added a sum of Rs. 61,73,27,400 to the total income of the assessee as short term capital gain on the ground that the assets of the assessee have been sold for a certain consideration and in return the assessee has received as benefit waiver of entire loan of Rs. 97.42 crore outstanding in its books. Since the WDV of the assets as per books was Rs 11.23 crore the AO charged Rs 61.73 crore as short term capital gains.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The AO erred in applying the provisions of section 2(47) of the Act in considering that the secured lendor acquires title to the secured assets of the assessee company on taking over of possession of assets of the assessee by overlooking the fact that what the secured lenders acquired on taking over of the possession of the secured assets were merely a special right to execute or implement the recovery of its dues from dealing with those assets of the assessee company. Had the assessee company tendered the amounts payable to the secured lenders before the date of sale of such assets without any further act, deed or thing being required to be carried out or completed towards title of the assets, the assessee company could have regained or taken possession of the secured assets from the secured lenders.

The ownership rights in the assets did not at any stage stand transferred to the secured lenders by taking over the possession of the secured assets. Thus, the sale consideration received by the secured lender actually belonged to the borrower which by operation of law remained retained by the secured lenders to recover their costs, dues, etc. Further, if the consideration to the assessee is to be considered as the sale amount received by the lending banks, then, the loans waived by such banks (availed by the assessee for the purchase of capital assets such as land, building, plant and machinery, etc) was nothing but a capital receipt not liable for tax since neither the provisions of section 28(iv) nor section 41(1) of the Act are attracted.

This ground of appeal of the assessee was allowed.

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2014-TIOL-757-ITAT-MUM ITO vs. Dr. Jaideep Kumar Sharma ITA No. 3892/Del/2010 and 5784/Mum/2011 Assessment Years: 2007-08 and 2008-09. Dateof Order: 25.7.2014

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Section 40(a)(ia) – Second proviso to section 40(a)(ia), inserted w.e.f. 1.4.2013, is curative in nature and hence has retrospective effect.

Facts:
In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee was getting professional and technical services from SRL Ranbaxy and had paid Rs. 64,55,563 for the same. He held that tax on this sum was deductible u/s.194J of the Act. He also noticed that a sum of Rs. 88,689 was paid by the assessee for getting MRI envelopes, visiting cards, forms, etc printed for exclusive use of the assessee. This amount, according to the AO, was liable for deduction of tax at source u/s 194C of the Act. Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source on these amounts, he disallowed both these amounts u/s. 40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who deleted the addition of Rs. 64,55,563 by holding that assessee was an agent of M/s. SRL Ranbaxy Ltd. and hence was not liable for deduction u/s. 194J. He also deleted the addition of Rs. 88,689 by considering the said transaction to be purchase of goods and not a case of job work liable for TDS u/s. 194C.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the assessee filed necessary confirmation from the payee that they have paid the taxes on the amounts received from the assessee and contended that the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) is clarificatory and therefore operates retrospectively.

Held:
The Tribunal noted the second proviso, inserted by Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 1.4.2013, and held that even though the said proviso has been inserted w.e.f. 1.4.2013, the Agra Bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Rajiv Kumar Aggarwal (ITA No. 337/Agra/2013 order dated 29.5.2013) following the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CITR vs. Rajinder Kumar (362 ITR 241)(Del) held that the second proviso is declaratory and curative in nature and has retrospective effect from 1.4.2005.

Following the above mentioned decision of the Agra Bench, the Tribunal directed the AO to verify whether the payee has filed his return of income and paid taxes within the stipulated time. If it has done so, no disallowance u/s. .40(a)(ia) in respect of the above payments be made.

The Tribunal set aside the two cases to the file of the AO for the limited purpose of examination whether the payee has filed its return of income and paid taxes on the same within the stipulated time.

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2014] 150 ITD 34 (Mumbai) Agrani Telecom Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT A.Y. 2006-07 Order dated – 13th Sept 2013

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Section 37(1): If there is continuity of business with common management and fund, then even if the assessee starts a new line of business in a particular year, the payment made for carrying out running of such new business, is a business expenditure which has to be allowed in the year in which it has been incurred.

If the expenditure incurred by the assessee, to do business for earning some profit, does not impact its fixed capital, then such expenditure has to be reckoned on revenue account, even though the advantage from the expenditure so incurred, may endure in future.

Facts:
The assessee company was mainly engaged in the business of trading in telecom and security equipment and providing transportation service.

During the year under consideration, it had entered into the business of Fleet Management services and providing security products and networking solutions.

The assessee had paid consultancy charges to a consultant, who had provided various kinds of advisory services and had also contributed in identifying prospective customers, for rendering of the aforesaid services.

The Assessing Officer disallowed consultancy charges by treating the same as capital expenditure

On appeal before CIT(A), the assessee contended that the Assessing Officer had completely misunderstood the facts and that it had incurred the said consultancy charges only after setting up of the new business and for developing the existing new business, which was in the service industry.

On scrutinising the books of accounts of the assessee, CIT(A) noted that the income offered from new business services were meagre as compared to the income offered from existing business of trading and transportation service. He thus held that such consulting charges can neither be capitalised nor allowed as revenue expenditure. It was clear cut case of capital expenditure not allowable u/s. 37(1).
On appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:
For deciding the issue whether the expenditure is capital or revenue in nature, the concept of enduring benefit is quite a paramount factor but such test of enduring benefit cannot be held to be conclusive. There may be a case where expenditures have been incurred for obtaining advantage of enduring benefit but nonetheless they may be on revenue account. What has to be seen is the nature of advantage in a commercial sense, that is, whether it is in the capital field or for the running of the business. If the advantage is necessitating the business operations for enabling the assessee to do business for earning some profit without having impact on fixed capital, then such expenditure has to be reckoned on revenue account, even though the advantage may endure in future.

In the present case, there is no augmentation of asset to the assessee but the expenditure has helped the assessee to develop a proper guidance for running the new line of service industries. Thus, in our opinion, the payment for consultancy charges is on account of revenue field only and has to be allowed as revenue expenditure u/s. 37(1) as it is wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business.

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[2014] 150 ITD 48 (Bangalore) Smt. T. Gayathri vs. CIT(A) A.Y. 2009-10 Order dated – 8th Aug 2013

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Section 2(47), read with section 45- Amount received by assessee pursuant to a Court decree in lieu of her share in self acquired property of father who died intestate, cannot be said to result in ‘transfer’ as the provisions of section 2(47)(i) or (ii) of the Income-tax Act are not attracted.

Facts:

‘B’ died intestate leaving behind 4 sons and 6 daughters including the assessee, who filed a suit for partition of self acquired property of their father. The suit was ultimately compromised between the parties duly recognised by Court, according to which each daughter was to receive their 1/10th share in property coming to Rs. 87.5 lakh (for each daughter) from their brothers in cash.

The assessee’s brothers subsequently entered into a joint development agreement of the property, in terms of which, the developer directly paid Rs. 87.5 lakh each to the daughters of ‘B’ including assessee therein. On receiving the amount, the daughters of ‘B’ executed a release deed of disputed property in favour of their brothers.

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee did not offer this Rs. 87.5 lakh to tax under the head ‘Capital Gain’. The assessee took a stand that the amount was received as a result of a family arrangement, and therefore there was no transfer of asset to attract the provisions of section 45.

The assessing officer was of the view that the daughters of ‘B’, including the assessee, have sold the property to the developer and therefore, it was a case of transfer within the meaning of section 2(47), giving rise to long term capital gain, and hence he made certain additions to asseessee’s income under the head ‘capital gain’.

The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order of Assessing Officer.

On second appeal.

Held:
The 4 daughters of late ‘B’ filed suit claiming 1/10th share each over the properties left behind by ‘B’. The claim was on the basis that as class-I legal heirs under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, they are entitled to 1/10th share each over the properties of late ‘B’ who died intestate and in respect of the properties which were his self-acquired properties. The 4 sons claimed that the properties were joint family properties comprising of the 4 sons and late ‘B’. The trial court found the plea to be not acceptable and the plea of the daughters for 1/10th share each over the properties of the deceased was decreed.

The compromise recorded before the High Court recognises/ accepts the decree of the trial court and a decree in terms of the compromise was passed. The plaintiffs (4 daughters) and the 2 other daughters of the deceased gave up their right to mesne profits and took their share of the property in kind and not by way of division by metes and bounds. The compromise decree does not have any ingredients of a family arrangement and hence the money received by the assessee is not pursuant to a family arrangement.

Now, it is to be examined as to whether the money received pursuant to a court decree in lieu of a share in the properties, can be said to result in a transfer attracting the provisions of section 2 (47) (i) or (ii) of the Act, though the other clauses of 2(47) of the Act are admittedly not applicable to the present case.

One of the reasons given by the learned CIT(A) is that u/s. 47(i) of the Act, it is only distribution of capital assets on the total or partial partition of a Hindu undivided family is not regarded as transfer and therefore in the present case which was not a case of partition of an HUF, there is a transfer u/s. 2(47) of the Act.

However, the view expressed by the CIT(A) is not acceptable. The provisions are intended to clarify that when a partition is made, no gains are made by the HUF and therefore levy of tax on capital gain, which can only be on the transferor, does not arise at all. Even in the absence of such a provision the revenue cannot seek to levy tax on capital gain because tax on capital gain can be imposed only on transferor and the HUF on a partition receives nothing. Therefore it cannot be said that provisions of section 47(i) of the Act by implication can justify levy of tax on capital gain wherever there is a partition between co-owners of properties which does not involve a HUF.

Partition is any division of real property or Personal Property between co-owners, resulting in individual ownership of the interests of each. In the present case, on death of Mr. B and his wife, their 10 children, 4 sons and 6 daughters became entitled to 1/10th share each over the property by way of intestate succession. A partition of the share of each of the 1/10th co-owner was effected through Court. Since a physical division by metes and bounds of each of the 1/10th share was not possible, the 4 sons took the property and the 6 daughters took money equivalent of their 1/10th share each over the property.

The sum received by the assessee is thus traceable to the realisation of her rights as legal heir on intestate succession and not to any sale, relinquishment or extinguishment of right to property. This is clear from the terms of the memorandum of compromise dated 11.1.2008 entered into between all the legal heirs of late Mr. B, which ultimately was recognised by the Court and a decree in terms of the compromise recorded and passed.

As per clause-2 of the compromise the property was valued at Rs. 8.75 crore. The sons agreed to take the property and further agreed that they would deposit Rs. 5.25 crore being the value of 6/10th share of the property. As per clause 4 of the memorandum of compromise the 6 daughters agreed that they would receive Rs. 87.50 lakh each towards their 1/10th share each over the property. Under clause-5 of the memorandum of compromise the daughters agreed to execute a release deed after the receipt of Rs. 87.50 lakh each by them. It is thus clear that the release deed which was later executed by the 6 daughters in favour of the 4 sons on 23.7.2008 was only to confer better title over the property and that document did not create, extinguish or modify the rights over the property either of the sons or the daughters.

Ultimately, the sum of Rs. 87.50 lakh was paid only through the Court and not at the time of registration of the deed of release. It is also significant to note that the document of release is between the 6 daughters and the 4 sons and the developer is not a party to the document. The developer is also not a party to the suit for partition. Therefore the conclusions of the revenue authorities that there was a conveyance of the share of the daughters in favour of the developer based on statement of the sons and the developer is contrary to the written and registered document and cannot be sustained.

The issue can be looked at from another angle as well. Suppose the deceased had left behind him deposits in a Bank Account and the bank pays l/10th each of such deposits to the legal heirs, would the receipt be chargeable to tax as income in the hands of the legal heirs. The answer is obviously in the negative. Suppose money is received in lieu of a share over immovable property of the deceased, as in the present case, it cannot be brought to tax, as it is not in the nature of income. In such an event it is not possible to compute the capital gain as there would be no cost of acquisition. The provisions of section 55(2) (b) & section 55(3) of the Act which provides for determining cost of acquisition in different situations cannot also be applied because, those provisions are applicable only for the purpose of section 48 and 49 of the Act. Section 48 and 49 of the Act would apply only when section 45 of the Act applies i.e., there is a transfer of a capital asset giving raise to capital gain. The AO was therefore not right in computing the capital gain in the manner in which he did so.

For the aforesaid reasons, the money received
pursuant to a court decree in lieu
of a share in the properties, cannot be said to result in transfer as it does
not attract the provisions of section 2 (47) (i) or (ii) of the Income-tax Act
and the revenue authorities were not justified in
bringing to tax amount in question as capital gain in the hands of the
assessee.

(2014) 108 DTR 255 (Pune) Malpani Estates vs. ACIT A.Ys.: 2008-09 to 2010-11 Dated: 30-01-2014

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Sections 80-IB(10) & 153A : Assessee is eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in relation to undisclosed income offered in a statement u/s. 132(4) in course of search and subsequently declared in return filed in response to notice u/s. 153A(1)(a)

Facts:
The assessee is a partnership firm engaged in construction business. It was subject to a search action u/s. 132(1) on 6th October, 2009. In the course of search, the partner of the assessee-firm in a statement recorded u/s. 132(4), admitted certain undisclosed income in relation to a housing project undertaken by the firm. The additional income declared was on account of on-money received from the customers to whom flats were sold in the said project. The assessee duly reflected such additional income in the returns of income filed in response to notice issued u/s.153A(1)(a) for the captioned assessment years as the profits from its housing project, and since the said housing project was eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10), it claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in relation to such additional income.

The Assessing Officer did not allow the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). Firstly, according to the Assessing Officer enhancement of claim u/s. 80- IB(10), was not permissible in an assessment u/s. 153A. Secondly, the on-money received by the assessee on sale of flats was not taxable as ‘business income’ and hence assessee was not eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10).

The Commissioner (Appeals) affirmed the action of the Assessing Officer in denying the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). As per the Commissioner (Appeals), the claim of the assessee was not maintainable because (i) the undisclosed income declared by the assessee could not be assessed under the head ‘business income’ but under the head ‘income from other sources’; and, (ii) the benefits of Chapter VI-A, which include section 80-IB(10), are not applicable to assessments made u/s. 153A to S. 153C.

The learned Departmental Representative submitted that the assessment in cases of search action or requisition are made u/s. 153A or 153C of the Act in order to assess undeclared incomes and such provisions are for the benefit of the Revenue and therefore a claim u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act cannot be considered in such proceedings, especially when such a claim was not made in the return of income originally filed u/s. 139 of the Act.

Held:
It is not in dispute that the assessee has derived income from undertaking a housing project, which is eligible for section 80-IB(10) benefits. In the return of income originally filed u/s. 139(1), assessee had claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in relation to the profits derived from the said housing project and the same stands allowed even in the impugned assessment which has been made u/s. 153A(1)(b) as a consequence of a search action u/s. 132(1).

It cannot be denied that the additional income in question relates to the housing project undertaken by the assessee. The material seized in the course of search; the deposition made by the assessee’s partner during search u/s. 132(4); and, also the return of income filed in response to notice issued u/s. 153A(1)(a) after the search, clearly show that the source of impugned additional income is the housing project. The aforesaid material on record depicts that the impugned income is nothing but unaccounted money received by the assessee from customers on account of sale of flats of its housing project. Clearly, the source of the additional income is the sale of flats in the housing project. Therefore, once the source of income is established the assessability thereof has to follow. The nature of income, thus on facts, has to be treated as ‘business income’ albeit, the same was not accounted for in the account books. In this manner, the stand of the Assessing Officer or of the Commissioner (Appeals) that the said income is not liable to be taxed as ‘business income’ cannot be accepted.

In terms of clause (i) of the Explanation to section 153A(2), it is evident that all the provisions of the Act shall apply to an assessment made u/s. 153A save as otherwise provided in the said section, or in section 153B or S. 153C.

Section 153A(1)(b) requires the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess the ‘total income’ of the assessment years specified therein. Ostensibly, section 80A(1) prescribes that in computing the ‘total income’ of an assessee, there shall be allowed from his ‘total income’ the deductions specified in Chapter VI-A. The moot point is as to whether the aforestated position prevails in an assessment made u/s. 153A(1)(b) or not?

Having regard to the expression ‘all other provisions of this Act shall apply to the assessment made under this section’ in Explanation (i) of section 153A, it clearly implies that in assessing or reassessing the ‘total income’ for the assessment years specified in section153A(1)(b), the import of section 80A(1) comes into play, and there shall be allowed the deductions specified in Chapter VI-A, of course subject to fulfillment of the respective conditions.

The other argument of the Ld. CIT-DR to the effect that the return of income was not accompanied by the prescribed audit report on the enhanced claim of deduction is too hyper-technical, and superficial. Pertinently, the Assessing Officer has not altogether denied the claim of deduction and in any case, the claim was initially made in the return originally filed, which was duly accompanied by the prescribed audit report.

The learned Departmental Representative supported the disallowance of claim on the basis of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. In the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, assessee wanted to set-off loss against the escaped income which was taxed in the re-assessment proceedings and the claim of such set-off was not made in the return of income originally filed. According to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the claim was not entertainable because the said claim not connected with the assessment of escaped income. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sun Engg. Works (P.) Ltd. (supra) only precludes such new claims by the assessee which are unconnected with the assessment of escaped income. In the present case, the claim of deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act was made in the return of income originally filed and in the return filed in pursuance to the notice u/s. 153A(1)(a) of the Act, the claim u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act is only enhanced and therefore, it is not a fresh claim. Therefore, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80- IB(10) even with regard to the enhanced income was well within the scope and ambit of an assessment u/s. 153A(1) (b) and the Assessing Officer was obligated to consider the same as per law.

Further, the claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) with regard to the additional income declared for A.Y. 2010-11 stands on an even stronger footing than in the other assessment years because in A.Y. 2010-11 there was no return of income originally filed but only a single return has been filed as per the provisions of section 139, though after the search action.

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(2014) 107 DTR 357 (Mum) Ramesh Gunshi Dedhia vs. ITO A.Y.: 2008-09 Order dated: 14-03-2014

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Section 80-IB(10): Notification No. 1/2011 dated 5-1-2011 restricting eligibility of section 80- IB(10) deduction to projects approved under Slum Rehabilitation scheme on or after 1-4- 2004 and before 31-3-2008 is inconsistent/ contrary to proviso to clauses (a) and (b) of section 80-IB(10)

Facts: The assessee had claimed deduction u/s. 80IB(10) in respect of profit from development of three housing projects under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS) of the Government of Maharashtra. The details of three projects under SRS projects are as under:—

The Assessing Officer denied the claim of the assessee on the ground that the conditions prescribed under clause (b) of section 80-IB(10) regarding minimum area of 1 acre of the plot had not been satisfied by the assessee. The assessee claimed that all the three plots of land should be considered as one project for the purpose of deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). The Assessing Officer did not accept the contention of the assessee and disallowed the claim of the assessee.

On appeal, apart from merging all the plots, the assessee had also contended that the slum rehabilitation scheme had been notified by the Board vide notification dated 05- 01-2011 and, therefore, the condition of minimum area of 1 acre of land was not applicable in the case of the assessee.

The CIT(A) noted that under the notification dated 5.1.2011 the slum redevelopment scheme of the Government of Maharashtra has been notified subject to the condition that the projects approved before 01-04-2004 do not fall under the scheme notified by the CBDT and since assessee’s project was approved before 01-04-2004, he confirmed disallowance.

Held: For the assessment years 2003-04 to 2005-06, the Tribunal had considered and held that assessee had not fulfilled the conditions laid down u/s. 80-IB(10) because assessee carried out development on three different plots; each of those plots was less than one acre. These plots were not contiguous to each other. Though these plots were located at Dharavi, Mumbai, they were at different places. In other words, there were other slums in between these three slum areas which were rehabilitated by the assessee.

For the assessment year 2006-07, the Tribunal by following the earlier order of this Tribunal has decided this issue.

The issue of merger of three plots for the purpose of area of plot being 1 acre had been decided against the assessee consistently by this Tribunal. Following the earlier years order of this Tribunal, there was no error or illegality in the impugned order of Commissioner (A).

As regards the benefit of proviso to section 80-IB(10), the conditions enumerated in clauses (a) & (b) are relaxed if the housing project is carried out in accordance with the scheme framed by the Central or State Government for reconstruction/redevelopment of slum area declared therein. However, such schemes are required to be notified by the Board in this behalf. It is pertinent to note that in the earlier years when this matter came before the Tribunal this scheme was not notified by the Board and only on 5-1-2011, the Board has notified the scheme.

As per this Notification, the Board has stated that this notification shall be deemed to apply to the projects approved by the local authority under the SRS scheme on or after 1-4-2004 and before 31-3-2008. It was further clarified that the income arising from such projects was eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) from the assessment year 2005- 06 onwards. The question arises whether while notifying the scheme the Board can attach any condition for the eligibility of the project to avail the benefit of proviso to section 80-IB(10)(a) and (b).

The deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) is available to the housing project which fulfils the conditions stipulated thereunder. One of the conditions is that the project is on the size of plot of land which has a minimum area of 1 acre under clause (b) of section 80-IB(10). An exclusion has been carved out under the proviso to clauses (a) and (b) of section 80-IB(10) whereby the condition stipulated under clauses (a) and (b) shall not apply to the housing project carried out in accordance with the scheme framed by the Central Government or State Government for reconstruction or redevelopment of area declared as slum area under the law. The projects of the assessee are under the slum rehabilitation scheme framed by the State Government which has been notified by the board vide notification dated 5-1-2011. The plain reading of the proviso inserted by the Finance Act, 2004 to clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (10) of section 80-IB clearly manifests the requirement of notification of the scheme so framed either by the Central Government or by the State Government. Also, it is relevant to see the intent of the Legislature while amending the provisions of section 80-IB(10), to relax the condition for such project under the slum rehabilitation scheme. The memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill, 2004 states that with a view to increase the redevelopment of slum dwellers, it has proposed to relax the condition of minimum plot size of 1 acre in case of housing project carried out in accordance with the scheme framed by the Central Government or State Government for reconstruction or redevelopment of existing building and notified by the board in this behalf. Thus, the intent of legislature is to exempt the condition of minimum of 1 acre plot size in the case where the housing project is carried out in accordance with the slum reconstruction scheme framed by the Central Government or State Government and such scheme is notified by the Board. Therefore, to avail the benefit of the proviso to clauses (a) and (b) of section 80-IB(10), the following requirements are to be satisfied, viz., (i) the housing project is carried out in accordance with the scheme of reconstruction or redevelopment of slum area (ii) such scheme is framed by the Central Government or State Government (iii) such scheme is notified by the Board in this behalf.

There is no dispute that the projects in question are carried out in accordance with the scheme for redevelopment of the slum area as framed by the State Government of Maharashtra and the same has been notified by the Board vide notification dated 5-1-2011. The second part of this notification contemplates a new condition which is not provided even under clause (a) of section 80- IB(10). The condition inserted in the notification says that the notification shall be deemed to apply to the projects approved by the local authority on or after 1-4-2004 and before 31-3-2008. This condition contemplated under the notification is repugnant to the conditions provided u/s. 80-IB(10). The proviso in question has been inserted to relax the condition provided under clauses (a) & (b) of section 80-IB(10) and not for adding any new condition which is otherwise not required for housing projects for availing the benefit of deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). Even otherwise the condition as stipulated in clause (a) of section 80-IB(10) with respect to sanction of the project is only for the time period of completion of the project and there is no such condition that if a project is approved prior to 1-4-2004, it is not entitled for the benefit u/s. 80-IB(10). Once the scheme is notified all projects carried out in accordance with such scheme are entitled for the benefit of the proviso whereby the conditions prescribed under clauses (a) and (b) are relaxed. Thus the second part of the notification dated 5-1-2011 is inconsistent/contrary to the proviso of clauses (a) and (b) of section 80-IB(10) as well as to the intent of the Legislature inserting the said proviso. The Board cannot insert a new condition in the provisions of a statute which is repugnant to the provisions itself as well as
against the very object and scheme of the said provision of the statute.
Accordingly the assessee was entitled for benefit of the proviso to clauses
and (b) of
section 80-IB(10) and, therefore, was eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) if
the other conditions as prescribed under clauses (c) to (e) are satisfied.

Income – Deemed dividend – Section 2(22)(e) – Loan to shareholder – Assessee shareholder let out premises to company – Company incurred substantial expenditure on repair and renovation of premises – Not a case of advance or loan – No deemed dividend in the hands of the shareholder:

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CIT vs. Vir Vikram Vaid; 367 ITR 365 (Bom):

The assessee holding 76.26% of the shareholding of a company had let out a premises owned by him to the company. The company incurred expenses of Rs. 2.51 crore towards construction and improvement of the premises which it continued to use. The Assessing Officer held that the amount of Rs. 2.51 crore was paid on behalf of the assessee. He therefore treated the sum of Rs. 2.51 crore as deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and made the addition. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held that it is not deemed dividend.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) No money had been paid to the assessee by way of advance or loan nor was any payment made for his individual benefit. The fact that the company had spent money had not been called into question. Thus, it was deemed that the company did spend Rs. 2.51 crore towards repairs and renovation on the premises owned by the assessee. There was no dispute about the fact that the company had taken the premises on rent.

ii) Thus, it was a case where the asset of the assessee may have enhanced in value by virtue of repairs and renovation but this could not be brought within definition of the advance or loan to the assessee. Nor could it be treated as payment by the company on behalf of the assessee shareholder or for the individual benefit of such shareholder.”

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Income: Deemed dividend – Section 2(22)(e) – A. Y. 2008-09: Assessee having current account with company and earning interest income by advancing funds to company – Credit balance only for a period of 55 days – No tax evasion – Section 22(e) not applicable:

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CIT vs. Suraj Dev Dada; 367 ITR 78 (P&H):

The
assessee was having a current account with a company DM and was earning
interest income by advancing money to the company as per its need. The
assessee was a shareholder of the company. The assessee’s account with
the company showed credit balance for a period of 55 days. In view of
the said credit balance, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs.
2,75,00,000/- u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the A. Y.
2008-09. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
The assessee had a running account with the company and had been
advancing money to it. The provisions of section 2(22)(e) of the Act
were not attracted in the present case as this provision was inserted to
stop the misuse by the assessee by taking the funds out of the company
by way of loan advances instead of dividend and thereby avoid tax.

ii)
In the present case, the assessee had in fact advanced money to the
company and there was a credit for only 55 days for which the provisions
of section 2(22)(e) of the Act could not be invoked.

iii) No substantial question of law arises in this appeal. Appeal is dismissed.”

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Capital gain – Expenditure incidental to sale – Section 48 – A. Y. 2006-07 – Expenditure for cancellation of earlier sale is deductible u/s. 48 as expenditure incidental to sale:

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CIT vs. Kuldeep Singh; 270 CTR 561 (Del):

In the return of income for the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee had disclosed capital gain on sale of residential house on which exemption u/s. 54 was claimed. In computing the capital gain the assessee had claimed a deduction of Rs. 7,50,000/- as expenditure incidental to the sale. Out of this amount, Rs. 5,00,000/- was the cancellation charges for cancelling the earlier agreement for sale and the balance Rs. 2,50,000/- is the brokerage paid for the same. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The Tribunal allowed the claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The finding of the Tribunal is that the assessee had entered into an earlier agreement to sell the property and had recovered Rs. 10,00,000/- from one AS. However, this agreement was cancelled to enable the assessee to enter into the transaction resulting in the capital gain. Rs. 10,00,000/- was refunded to AS and Rs. 5,00,000/- was paid as cancellation charges. Rs. 2,50,000/- was paid to one RK who acted as a broker in the first deal.

ii) The payments cannot be challenged on the ground that they were not genuine or were not made. Findings of the Tribunal are factual and cannot be categorised or treated as perverse. Similarly, it cannot be said in the facts of the present case that these payments were not directly relatable to the transaction for sale dated 03-06-2005, which had resulted in income by way of capital gains.

iii) By cancelling earlier transaction and ensuring that the rights created by the earlier agreement to sell do not obstruct the sale transaction, payments of Rs. 5,00,000/- to AS and Rs. 2,50,000/- to AK, have been made. Finding of the Tribunal in the said aspect is quite clear and on the basis of the said facts, the Tribunal has rightly held that the expenditure was incurred and was wholly connected with the sale transaction dated 03-06-2005. We do not think that any substantial question of law arises and thus the present appeal is dismissed.”

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Capital gain – Computation: Reference to DVO – Sections 48, 50C and 55A – A. Y. 2006-07 – Sale of immovable property in July 2005 – Consideration more than stamp duty valuation – Reference to DVO not justified:

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CIT vs. Gauranginiben S. Sodhan: 367 ITR 238 (Guj):

In July 2005, the assessee had sold an immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 8,51,00,000/- which was more than the stamp duty value of the property. In the course of the assessment proceedings for the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer referred the case to the DVO for valuation as on the date of sale and also as on 01-04-1981. The DVO valued the property as on the date of sale at Rs. 13,73,90,000/-. The DVO also valued the property as on 01-04-1981 at Rs. 94,00,000/- as against Rs. 1,03,00,000/- determined by the registered valuer of the assessee. As a result the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 81,57,643/- to the total income. CIT(A) deleted the addition on the ground that the reference to the DVO was not valid. This was affirmed by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The sale consideration reflected in the sale deeds was higher than the valuation adopted by the stamp valuation authority. The reference to the DVO for ascertaining the fair market value of the capital asset as on the date of sale in the present case was wholly redundant.

ii) The reference to the DVO for ascertaining the fair market value as on 01-04-1981 also was not competent. The assessee had relied on the estimate made by the registered valuer for the purpose of supporting its value of the asset. Any such situation would be governed by clause (a) of section 55A of the Act and the Assessing Officer could not have resorted to clause (b) thereof.”

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Business expenditure: Accrual of liability – A. Ys. 1988-89 to 1994-95 – Disputed enhanced power tariff – Amount not paid to electricity board – No acknowledgment of liability – No accrual of liability – Amount not deductible:

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Coromandal Garments Ltd. vs. CIT; 367 ITR 144 (T&AP):

In the year 1988-89, the A. P. Electricity Board had revised the power tariff. The assessee challenged the revision of the power tariff by filing a writ petition which was dismissed. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court. The assessee had not paid the enhanced tariff. In the A. Y. 1994-95, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 4,53,83,917/-being the difference in tariff for the period from 1988-89 to A. Y. 1994-95. The Assessing Officer and the Tribunal disallowed the claim.

On appeal by the assessee, the Telangana and the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The stand of the assessee was wavering throughout. In the three or four assessment years, for which the liability accrued, deduction was not even claimed. Except that the provision was made, it was neither stated that the amount was paid to the electricity supplier or that the liability had been acknowledged.

ii) It is only when the actual accrual takes place, that allowance can be permitted, irrespective of the actual payment. Such accrual would take place only when the matter is settled amicably between the parties to the contract or the adjudication has reached finality. Admittedly, nothing of that had taken place. Therefore, the appellate authorities had rightly rejected the claim of the assessee.”

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TS-594-ITAT-2014(Mum) The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd vs. ADIT A.Y: 2007-09, Dated: 19.09.2014

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• Interest paid by Indian branch (BO) to its foreign head office (HO) is to be allowed as deduction in terms of Article 7(2) and 7(3) of Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA ) between India and Japan and such Interest received cannot be taxed in the hands of HO on the principle of mutuality.
• Interest received by BO for deposits placed with HO/other branches is taxable in India.

Facts:
Taxpayer (HO) is a banking company incorporated in Japan. HO was engaged in carrying on banking operations in India under license from Reserve Bank of India, through a branch in India (BO), which constituted Permanent establishment (PE) for HO in India.

During the relevant financial year
• HO received interest from its BO in India
• BO received interest from HO and other overseas branches of HO for the funds of BO lying with HO and other foreign branches.

In computation of income of BO, being the PE,
• Deduction was claimed for interest payments made by BO to HO.
• Interest received by BO was not offered to tax on the basis of principle of mutuality.

Tax Authority disallowed interest payments made by BO on the grounds that the BO failed to withhold taxes on interest payments made to HO and also taxed the interest income of HO in India. Additionally, interest received by BO was also taxed on the basis that the same was attributable to the PE in India.

Held:
On interest paid to HO by BO:

As per Article 7(2) and 7(3) of DTAA between India and Japan, the interest paid by BO (being the PE) to HO is to be allowed as deduction in computation of profits of the BO as BO and HO are to be treated as a distinct and separate enterprise. However, interest received by HO from the branch cannot be taxed in the hands of HO on the ground of mutuality as held by Special Bench in the case of Sumitomo Corporation (147 TTJ 649)(Mum).

On interest received by BO from HO:
Under the Act, specific deeming provision u/s. 9(1)(v) will override the concept of mutuality and hence interest income of BO would be taxable in India. As a result interest earned by Indian branch is taxable in India.

Under the DTAA, no exemption has been provided for taxation of interest income of BO. Once the interest received by BO is deemed to be income of BO and there is no bar in the DTAA on its taxability then it cannot be excluded from computation of income earned by virtue of Article 7. Thus interest accrued or received by BO on funds lying with HO and other foreign branches should be taxable in India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 36 dated 16th October, 2014

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2000 (the Rules) – Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999

This circular states that powers of compounding have been further delegated to Regional Offices with immediate effect as under: –


Since three divisions of Foreign Investment Division (FID) viz. Liaison/Branch/Project office (LO/BO/ PO) division, Non Resident Foreign Account Division (NRFAD) and Immovable Property (IP) Division has been transferred to FED, CO Cell, Reserve Bank of India, 6, Sansad Marg, New Delhi – 110001 with effect from 15th July, 2014, the officers attached to the FED, CO Cell, New Delhi office are now authorised to compound the contraventions as under: –

The powers, as mentioned above, to compound contraventions have been delegated to all Regional Offices (except Kochi and Panaji) and FED, CO Cell, New Delhi respectively without any limit on the amount of contravention. Kochi and Panaji Regional offices can compound the above contraventions for amountof contravention below Rupees one hundred lakh (Rs.1,00,00,000/-). The contraventions of Rupees one hundred lakh (Rs.1,00,00,000/-) or more under the jurisdiction of Panaji and Kochi Regional Offices and all other contraventions of FEMA, not covered above, will continue to be compounded at Cell for Effective Implementation of FEMA (CEFA), Foreign Exchange Department, 5th floor, Amar Building, Sir P. M. Road, Fort, Mumbai 400001.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 35 dated 9th October, 2014

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Memorandum of Instructions for Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Non-resident Exchange Houses

This circular has expanded the list of permitted transactions with respect to Vostro Accounts from 13 to 14. Accordingly, remittances to the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund through the Exchange Houses is now permitted if the remittances are directly credited to the Fund by the banks and the banks maintain full details of the remitters. The revised list is as follows: –

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 34 dated 30th September, 2014

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Risk Management and Inter Bank Dealings : Hedging under Past Performance Route

Presently, resident importers can book contracts up to 50% of their eligible limit i.e., the average of the previous three financial years’ import turnover or the previous year’s actual import turnover, whichever is higher.

This circular has brought importers and exportors on par by pemitting resident importers to book forward contracts, under the past performance route, up to 100% of their eligible limit. Importers who have already booked contracts up to 50% of their eligible limit can book the forward contracts for difference arising as a result of the enhanced limits.

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SEBI corporate governance provisions further amended

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Background
SEBI had notified in April 2014 a fully revised Clause 49 (“the Clause”). This was immediately after the coming into force of corresponding provisions in the Companies Act, 2013, from 1st April, 2014. However, this new Clause 49 was to come into force from 1st October 2014. SEBI had issued earlier a Concept Paper to discuss proposed amendments consequent to enactment of the Companies Act, 2013, and was awaiting the provisions of that Act to come into effect. After having amended Clause 49, it had sought feedback from top 500 listed companies on issues they faced in implementing it. It had also otherwise generally sought suggestions. Based on such feedback, it made, on 15th September 2014, certain amendments to the revised Clause 49. The amendments are well in time considering that all, except one, of the provisions come into effect from 1st October, 2014. The revised Clause 49 was already discussed in an earlier article in this column. This article discusses the important amendments now made.

Applicability
Clause 49 applies to companies whose equity shares are listed on a recognised stock exchange. However, for the time being, the Clause shall not apply to following companies:-

1) Companies whose equity share capital is less than Rs. 10 crore and whose net worth is less than Rs. 25 crore. This position is with reference to the end of the previous financial year. If any of the limits are subsequently crossed, then the Company shall comply with the provisions within six months.

2) Companies whose equity shares are listed exclusively on SME and SME-ITP Platforms.

Woman Director
It was earlier required that the Board of Directors should have at least one woman director. This requirement, like other requirements, was to come into force from 1st October, 2014. It appears that SEBI has taken into account ground realities considering that it would be quite difficult for many companies to appoint a woman director by 1st October, 2014. Hence, the requirement is now amended to come into force from 1st April, 2015.

Note that no further qualifications are required for such woman director. She can be part of the Promoter Group. She can be an executive director. In particular, she need not be an Independent Director.

Independent Director – condition regarding pecuniary relationship
The “independence” of a director is judged, inter alia, with the fact whether he has or had in the past, pecuniary relationship with the Company or its holding or subsidiary companies or their Promoters or directors. Pecuniary relationship is commonly understood to be having monetary/ financial relationship.

The existing Clause provided that a person who had a pecuniary relationship in the current or two preceding financial years would not be an Independent Director. This obviously caused concern if a person had a negligible relationship which could not possibly affect his independence. Hence, now it is provided that there needs to be a material pecuniary relationship during the specified period with the specified person for a director to be said to have lost his independence.

What would constitute material has not been defined. Indeed, what constitutes a relationship is also not defined.

It also does not matter whether the relationship is or was at arm’s length and this is fair enough. A material pecuniary relationship does cast a shadow on independence.

Tenure of an Independent Director
There was a mismatch between the tenure specified under the Act and under the Clause. In particular, there was mismatch over whether the future tenure of an Independent Director could be reduced by the tenure he had already served in the past. The mismatch would have automatically resulted in a lower tenure for listed companies since in case of two provisions applicable, the stricter would have applied.

SEBI has amended the Clause to align its requirements to the Act. It has simply stated that the maximum tenure will be as per the Act and clarifications/circulars issued thereunder from time to time.

Disclosure of Independent Director’s terms of appointment
The existing Clause requires the Company to issue a formal letter of appointment to the Independent Director in the manner required under the Act. Further, this letter alongwith the profile of the Independent Director should be disclosed on the website of the Company and the stock exchanges.

The Clause has been amended in two aspects. Instead of the whole letter of appointment and the profile, only the terms and conditions of the appointment need to be disclosed. Further, such disclosure shall be only on the website of the Company.

The profile of the Independent Director does not have to be disclosed. Further, the requirement of formal letter of appointment does not apply to non-executive directors.

Training of Independent Directors
The Clause required that the Company should provide training to the Independent Directors to familiarise them with regard to the Company, their role, rights, responsibilities and certain other matters. The details of such training was required to be disclosed in the Annual report. Now, in a slight tweak to the requirement, it is required that the Company shall familiarise the Independent Directors for the same matters. Further, perhaps to save on printed pages, the information of training is now required to be given only in the website of the Company. The annual report will now give only the link to such information on the website. It is possible that the word training could have implied formal training conducted in classroom manner and hence the requirement was made less rigorous.

Chairman of Nomination and Remuneration Committee
The changed requirements now provide that the Chairman of the Company may be appointed as a member of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee. However, he cannot be Chairman of this Committee.

It may be recalled that this Committee is intended to be the screening, nomination and evaluation Committee for the Board, key managerial personnel etc.

Sale of shares/assets of subsidiaries
The Clause earlier provided that any sale of shares of a material subsidiary leading to reduction of holding to less than 50% should require a prior special resolution. Further, a similar approval was required for sale, disposal or leasing of more than 20% of the total assets of a material subsidiary. Now, an amendment provides for an exception to divestments made under a Scheme of arrangement that is duly approved by the Court/Tribunal.

Amendments related to related party transactions
There are several amendments made relating to related party transactions.

The definition of related parties has been seemingly narrowed and simplified but this is not wholly true. Earlier, the definition appeared to be quite extensive and covered several types of entities generally and specifically. Generally, persons who can control the other or have significant influence over the other were included. Having given this broad definition, certain parties were specifically included such as related parties as defined under the Act.

The amended definition has only two categories. One covers those parties as defined under the Act. Other covers those persons who are considered as related parties under applicable accounting standards. The definition under the Accounting Standards is wider and general. Hence, the list of related parties will continue to be broad.

The definition of material related party transactions has undergone a change. Earlier, a transaction or group of transactions would be material if they exceeded the higher of 5% of the annual turnover or 20% of the networth of the Company. Now, there are two changes. Firstly, the consolidated figures are used. Secondly, now there is only one criteria – the transactions would be treated as material if they exceed 10% of the annual consolidated turnover.

The definition of material related party transactions is relevant as such transactions need approval of the shareholders by way of a special resolution.

As a rule, all related parties transactions require prior approval of the Audit Committee. However, considering the fact that certain transactions may be of a similar nature and continuing throughout the year or frequent, a concept of omnibus approval has been provided for. The Audit Committee can grant such omnibus approval and then such transactions can be carried out without any further prior or post approval. However, there are certain conditions.

Firstly, the Audit Committee needs to satisfy itself that such transactions are needed and are in the interest of the Company.

The approval shall specify the name and of the related parties, the nature of the transaction, the period during which they may be carried out, and the indicative base price/current contracted price and the formula for variation if any. They may impose further conditions.

However, if the need cannot be anticipated or the details required are not available, the Audit Committee may still grant approval of upto Rs. 1 crore per transaction.

The Audit Committee would have to make a quarterly re-view of such transactions carried out pursuant to omnibus approval. The omnibus approval would have validity of one year. Related party transactions between two government companies will now not require approval of Audit Committee or of the shareholders by way of special resolution. There is a similar provision for transactions between a Company and its wholly owned subsidiary provided that the accounts are consolidated and placed before shareholders for approval.

A query had arisen regarding who can vote at the special resolution for approval of material related party transactions. It was earlier provided that “the related parties shall abstain from voting on such resolutions”. The question was where all entities that are related parties were barred from voting or whether only those related parties the transactions with whom were the subject of the special resolution. Now it is specifically clarified that all related parties are barred from voting, whether they are parties to such transaction or not.

    Conclusion

An attempt has been made to synchronise several of the requirements of Corporate Governance under the Act and under Clause 49. However, divergence remains in some areas. In case of listed companies to whom the Clause applies, such companies will have to comply with both. And in case of any overlap or contradiction, they will have to apply the narrower of the two provisions. Coupled with the requirements of e-voting which gives wider access to vot-ing to shareholders, the new requirements ensure much closer involvement of shareholders. Further, considering that (i) now a special resolution is required (ii) related parties are barred from voting, the shareholders have now an even greater say in case of related parties transactions. In these days of shareholder activism and vocal proxy advisory firms, related party transactions would particularly be under closer watch. All this augurs well for shareholder democracy in India and corporate discipline.

Section 8(1) (j) – Personal Information:

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A Few Facts of the case
The petitioner, Kashinath Shetye, was working as a junior engineer in the Electricity Department. The respondent no. 4, Dinsh Vaghela, applied to the Public Information Officer to supply information in respect of the petitioner on the following Electricity Department counts:

The information was in regard to the number of days of paid, unpaid sick, earned and casual leaves enjoyed by the petitioner.

The Public Information Officer gave notice to the petitioner to show cause as to why the information sought should not be supplied. The petitioner filed reply contending that the information being personal, should not be supplied and demanding or supplying of such information, would be an invasion of his privacy. The Public Information Officer i.e., the Superintendent Engineer, refused to supply the information on the ground that the department is exempted from supplying the information as it falls under clause (j) of section 8(1) of Right to Information Act. The respondent preferred appeal before the Chief Engineer, who dismissed the appeal. The appeal was preferred by him before the Goa Information Commissioner, which allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the authorities below and directed that the information be supplied as sought. Hence, the petitioner has come up in writ petition.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order is bad in law on two counts. (i) The information sought, is personal information and (ii) it invades the right of privacy and no larger public interest is involved.

The court noted:
The first thing that needs to be taken into consideration is that the petitioner is a public servant. When one becomes a public servant, every member of public gets a right to know about his working, his honesty, integrity and devotion to duty. In fact, nothing remains personal while as far as the discharging of duty. A public servant continues to be a public servant for all 24 hours. Therefore, any conduct /misconduct of a public servant even in private, ceases to be private. When, therefore, a member of a public, demands an information as to how many days leave were availed of by the public servant, such information though personal, has to be supplied and there is no question of privacy at all. Such supply of information, at the most, may disclose how sincere or insincere the public servant is in discharge of his duty and the public has a right to know.

“The next question is whether the applicant should be supplied the copies of the application at all. It was contended that the copies of the application should not be supplied for, they may contain the nature of the ailment and the applicant has no right to know about the ailment of the petitioner or his family. To my mind, what cannot be supplied is a medical record maintained by the family physician or a private hospital. To that extent, it is his right of privacy, it certainly, cannot be invaded. The application for leave is not a medical record at all. It, at the most, may contain ground on which leave was sought. It was contended that u/s. 8(1) (j), the information cannot be supplied. In this regard, it would be necessary to read proviso to that section. If the proviso is read, it is obvious that every citizen is entitled to have that information which the Parliament can have. It is not shown to me as to why the information as is sought, cannot be supplied to the Parliament. In fact, the Parliament has a right to know the ground for which a public servant has taken leave since his salary is paid from the public exchequer.”

In the circumstances, the court ruled that it does not find that the Information Commission committed any error in directing such information to be supplied. According to the court there was no substance in the writ petition, petition was dismissed.

[The High Court of Bombay at Goa: Writ petition No. 1 of 2009]

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Precedent – Reference to Full Bench – Cannot be made inview of larger Number of cases filed in subject matter. [Constitution of India Article 225.]

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Kalpana Rani vs. The State of Bihar AIR 2014 Patna 173 (FB)

The
reference had been made keeping in view the large number of cases filed
in the subject matter and not because the Bench did not agree with the
view expressed in the matter of Smt. Renu Kumari Pandey [(2011) (4) PLJR
297]. In the opinion of the Court, unless the latter Bench, for cogent
reasons, disagrees with the earlier view taken by the collateral Bench,
the question of referring the matter to a larger Bench shall not arise.
Reference can be had to the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in
the matter of Akhauri Krishna Kumar Sinha and Ors. vs. Mundrika Prasad
[MANU/BH/0108/1985 : 1986 PLJR 1119]. Nevertheless, as the Appeal has
come up for hearing before this Bench, the Appeal is heard and is
decided on merits.

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Precedent – Binding nature – Reference to Full Bench – Co-ordinate Bench cannot decide appeal on merits by taking contrary view.

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Jagadish Deka vs. The State of Assam & Ors. AIR 2014 Gauhati 143.

Once a decision was rendered by one Division Bench in one appeal arising out of common order, a fortiorari, such decision was binding on another Division Bench (whether consisting of the same Judges or other) to avoid passing of 2 conflicting orders in one case. If for any reason, the later Division Bench did not agree to the view taken by the earlier Division Bench, then it had no option but to refer the matter to a larger bench (Full Bench) to resolve the conflict, after setting out the reasons for their disagreement and the area of difference. The later Division Bench had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits by taking contrary view except to follow the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the earlier Division Bench and if they formed an opinion to take a contrary view then it was obligatory on the Division Bench to make a reference to the larger Bench and if they formed an opinion to take a contrary view then it was obligatory on the Division Bench to make a reference to the larger Bench to resolve the conflict. The jurisdiction to take a contrary view or/and to declare the decision “per incuriam” was with the Full Bench on a reference made by the later Division Bench and lastly: since no one brought the earlier decision to the notice of later Divison bench, a situation had arisen where a judgment came to be passed, which is in conflict with the earlier Division Bench judgment. Therefore, it has to be held as per incuriam.

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Business expenditure – Section 37(1) – A. Y. 2005- 06 – Payments for advertising and publicity to residents by assessee resident agent – Deduction u/s. 37(1) cannot be denied by invoking transfer pricing provisions merely because foreign principals (TV Channels) also benefit by the expenditure especially when benefit to foreign principals defy quantification – Such payments are not required to be reflected in Form No. 3CEB as these are resident to resident payments and not international

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CIT vs. N. G. C. Network (India) (P) Ltd.; (2014) 50 taxmann.com 240 (Bom):

The assessee is a company incorporated in India and engaged in the business of distribution of T.V. channels popularly known as National Geographic and History Channel. The assessee also acts as airtime advertising Sales Representative for its foreign principals NGC Asia and FOX. For the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee had claimed expenditure of Rs. 6,21,31,262/- u/s. 37(1) of the Act being the amount paid to residents for advertising and publicity. The Assessing Officer held that the benefit of the expenditure was not only to the assessee but also to the foreign principals. He found that such benefit was not disclosed in Form 3CEB. He allowed only one third of the expenditure and disallowed the balance two third. CIT(A) allowed full expenditure. He held that since expenses were made to Indian residents they were not covered in Form 3CEB as section 92 covers only international transactions. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A). On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The main grounds on which the revenue has questioned the order of the tribunal are (a) non-disclosure in form 3CEB of the fact that the principal is also a beneficiary of the advertising expenses; (b) that the advertising and promotional expenses are not wholly for the benefit of the assessee but it also benefited the principal who was an associated enterprise; (c) that advertising and publicity expenses were far higher than the amount of revenue earned and lastly, that although foreign principals i.e. Associated Enterprise benefited from advertising and publicity no compensation was paid by the foreign principals to the assessee to avail of such benefits.

ii) It was admitted position that the assessee is a agent of foreign principal and would naturally benefit from advertising carried on by agent in India. However, these benefits were not ascertainable. The contention of the assessee that the benefits were not ascertainable or taxable in view of extra territory appears to be correct and justified. In the instant case we find that the assessee has not suppressed any information. It has offered to tax its income from both business, namely, distribution business as well as advertisement and promotion business. In the assessment year in question, the Assessing Officer has proceeded to grant 33.33% of the total advertising expenses as allowable deduction. We do not find any justification for such restriction of the same.

iii) The contention that the expenditure should have been wholly and exclusive for the purpose of business of the assessee u/s. 37(1) read with provisions of section 40A(2) as being excessive and unreasonable does not appeal to us. There can be no doubt in the instant case, that in view of decision of the Supreme Court in Sassoon David (supra) it cannot be said that the expenditure was not wholly or exclusively for benefit of the assessee. The mere fact that foreign principals also benefited does not entail right to deny deduction u/s. 37(1). Furthermore, it is seen that all the amounts earned by the assessee were brought to tax, especially in view of the fact that the payment of expenses were made to Indian residents and there payments were not required to be included in Form 3CEB since section 92 which governs the effect of Form 3CEB covers only international transactions. Furthermore, it is seen that the respondents income from subscription fee is variable and through commission received on the advertising sales is 15% of the value of Ad-sales. The Assessing Officer’s contention that the assessee received fixed income is not justified and there is certainly, in our view, a direct nexus between the amount spent on advertising and publicity, and the appellant’s revenue

iv) Advertisers who advertise on these channels act through media houses and advertising agencies and they work to media plans designed in the manner so as to maximise value for the advertiser. They will evaluate expenditure with channel penetration in the market place inasmuch as only channels with high viewership would justify the higher advertising rates which is normally sold in seconds. Merely having high quality content will not ensure high viewership. This content has to be publicised. The great reach of the publicity, the higher chances of larger viewership. The larger the viewership, the better chances of obtaining higher advertisement revenue. The higher advertisement revenue, the higher will be commission earned by the respondent-assessee. Accordingly, we have no doubt that there is a direct nexus between advertising expenditure and revenue albeit the fact that there may be a lean period before revenue picks up notwithstanding high amount spent on such publicity. This justifies the higher expenditure vis-a-vis revenue noticed by the department.

v) It is also not necessary that the foreign enterprises must compensate the Indian agent for the benefit it receives or it may receive from the advertisement and promotion of its channels by agent in India. The agent in India earns commission from ad-sales and distribution revenue, both of which have sufficiently compensated the assessee. We would not expect the revenue to determine the sufficiency of the compensation received by the agent and as such we do not find any justification in this ground either.

vi) In the circumstances we answer questions of law in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In the result the appeal is dismissed.”

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TS-263-ITAT-2014(Mum) PMP Auto Components vs. DCIT A.Y: 2009-10, Dated: 22.08.2014

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Section 92B – Advancing loans to subsidiary is an international transaction; interest to be imputed as per transfer pricing provisions. Article 11 of India-Mauritius DTAA does not dilute this as the Article is applicable only in cases where interest actually arises in a contracting state and accrues to the resident of another contracting state and not in respect of notional income taxed under TP.

Facts:
The Taxpayer advanced loans to its subsidiary in Mauritius (FCo) without charging any interest. Tax Authority imputed notional interest on loan provided to F Co by determining the arm’s length interest. The Taxpayer contended that when no interest was charged by the Taxpayer no notional interest can be added under Transfer pricing (TP) adjustment. Alternatively, as the interest was not ‘paid’ by F Co to the Taxpayer, it would not be taxable in India as per the provisions of Article 11 of India-Mauritius DTAA

Held:
Transaction of loan given to the AE is an international transaction as per the provisions of section 92B; hence the arm’s length price has to be determined as per the transfer pricing provisions of the Act.

Article 11 of India-Mauritius DTAA applies to a case where interest actually arises in a contracting state and is paid to the resident of another contracting state. It is contemplated under Article 11 that payment is a pre-condition for taxing interest only in the circumstances when interest is arising in the contracting state and accrued to the resident of another contracting state. In other words, the provision of Article 11 defers the taxability of the interest arising but not received and, therefore, it is taxed only when it is received. In the case on hand, when the Taxpayer has not even admitted that the interest has arisen and accrued to it on the loan given to the AE, provisions of Article 11 of India-Mauritius treaty cannot be pressed into service and the same is hence taxable as per the TP provisions.

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TS-100-ITAT-2014(PAN) V.M. Salgaocar & Bro. Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Y: 2006-07 and 2007-08, Dated: 23.12.2013

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Sections. 9(1)(vi), 9(1)(vii) – Payment for sales and Marketing services does not amount to Royalty or fees for technical services (FTS) under the Act. Services do not satisfy “make available” condition under the India-USA DTAA , hence do not constitute fees for includes services (FIS)

Facts:
The Taxpayer carrying on hotel business entered into international sales and marketing agreement with a foreign company (F Co). These services included international sales and marketing services, special chain services, reservation system and special advertisement costs. F Co provided such services from outside India.

During the relevant financial year taxpayer paid sales and marketing fees and reimbursed certain expenses, without deducting taxes thereon. The Tax Authority disallowed the expenses on the ground that the Taxpayer was liable to withhold taxes on payments made to a non-resident.

Held:
Sales and Marketing services is not covered within Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) and hence outside the scope of royalty taxation under the Act.

The services rendered by F Co does not involve rendering of any managerial, technical or consultancy services rendered in India and therefore it cannot be regarded to be FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act. In view of this, the income received by taxpayer cannot be deemed to accrue and arise in India.

Under the India-US DTAA, on interpretation of ‘make available’ as per Article 12, reliance was placed on Bombay Tribunal decision in Raymond Ltd (86 ITD 791) which interpreted the term “make available” to mean that the person utilising the services must be able to make use of the technical knowledge etc. by himself in his business or for his own benefit and without recourse to the performer of the services in future. In the facts as the services provided by F Co did not make available the sales and marketing services to the Taxpayer the same was outside the ambit of FIS taxation.

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Risk-taking businesses shun governments paralysed by extreme risk aversion

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After the Tatas, Mahindras and TVS, it is the turn of Reliance Industries (RIL), India’s largest listed company, to start thinking of diversifying overseas. Part of the reason, understandably, is to spread the risk of operating in any one place across several countries. Many companies around the world take this route after reaching a certain scale. Aditya Vikram Birla and Lakshmi Mittal were early adopters of this ‘go-forth’ philosophy, driven in part by the oppressive economic climate of India in the 1970s and 1980s. The 1990s and 2000s saw dramatic growth at home and almost all companies profited handsomely from that. But over the last year or so, the policy climate has changed dramatically for the worse. It’s not that bad things are being written into policy; policy-making is frozen stiff and nobody wants to implement existing stuff. The main reason behind this policy paralysis is the paranoia that’s gripped mantris and babus ever since the Commonwealth and Adarsh scams blew up last year. The 2G probe, arrests and continued detention of ex-ministers, politicians, bureaucrats and company executives have fuelled this fear and Anna Hazare’s anti-graft movement has only exacerbated it. Why sign off on any file, however incongruous, when there’s the slightest chance that one might be held to task for it sometime in future? At the level of an individual, an aversion to risk can be an excellent survival strategy, prodding people towards prudent decision-making. But when an entire system is afflicted with extreme risk aversion, the outcome is the sort of debilitating paralysis that we see today. Governments gripped by this sort of affliction can stumble along for a while, but businesses need to invest and take risks if they are to grow. Unless the administration gets back to work smartly, capital will start looking outside India.
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CBDT’s business intelligence data warehousing to boost tax mop-up

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To enhance revenue realisation and catch tax evaders quickly, the Central Board of Direct Taxes is working on a comprehensive data warehousing system, which will transform the functioning of the Income-tax Department.

The external data base would complement the internal database of the Department which includes information on permanent account number (PAN), e-filing data, tax deducted at source, share transaction tax payments, annual information returns on high-value transactions and specific information gathered by the Central Information Branch.

According to an internal estimate of the Department, the size to be handled by the I-T warehouse could be around four billion data pieces. The Integrated Taxpayer Database Management System alone has over 600 million pieces of information, mobile numbers would throw up around 1.2 billion data pieces and PAN database had 120 million entries. Besides, there would be local data and also information gathered from different sources.

A senior Income-tax Department official told Business Standard the idea behind RFBIDW was to shift attention from individual assessee to groups such as families, business groups, trades, dealers in particular items and intermediaries for curbing tax evasion.

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DIARY OF A NOVICE

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Monday — Afternoon

I have a meeting in the company of my employer over lunch with executives of a multinational company. The company is a client of my employer. We are discussing issues relating to certain approvals that we need to obtain from some government departments for the client. My employer informs the executives that we need to take some extraconstitutional measures to speed up the process of approvals. The executives tell my employer that since their company is multinational, they are bound by the code of ethics which their principal has mandated to be observed in India. The code prohibits them from taking any extra-constitutional measures. I suggest to my employer that we could ourselves take the extra-constitutional measures and get reimbursed for the cost by way of higher fees that the multinational company may pay. My suggestion is not only accepted by all, but also appreciated. I rise in esteem in the eyes of everybody.

At night I wonder how come I could think of a suggestion I should have never been able to think of, given my nature. I am glad that I helped the executives observe their code. I learnt the lesson that it is possible to maintain moral standards through immoral means.

Tuesday — Morning

I am accompanying a senior tax counsel in the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. My employer has asked me to accompany the counsel, which was a reward for my brilliant suggestion that I made yesterday. Our client has engaged the counsel to argue a matter before the ITAT. Besides being a reward, my visit to the ITAT was necessary since I had worked as a lower-level income-tax authority. I am more aware of the facts than the counsel. That is the reason my employer has asked me to accompany the counsel, so that I can give my inputs on the facts, if required.

I am sitting just behind the Departmental Representative (DR). I start discussing the case with our counsel. The counsel snubs me for revealing the line of arguments that we are going to take, lest the DR should overhear and frame his strategy accordingly. I become silent. The members arrive in the Court Room. When our case is called out, the counsel stands up and makes an impressive presentation. I know he maintains silence about certain crucial facts. Then the DR makes his submissions. The members find themselves in an utterly confused state as regards the facts and decide to restore the matter back to the AO. Our counsel marches out of the Court room in a victorious manner.

At night
All along I had read and was taught that counsels are officers of the Court and counsels from both sides to a litigation are supposed to assist judges deliver justice. I always thought that everybody’s including the litigants’ interest was best served when justice was done. I always thought there was no winning or losing in a Court; it was all about securing justice. It is always justice that should emerge victorious in any Court, or so I thought. I thought justice could be secured by being transparent. Then, why did the counsels frame strategies and keep them from the other side? A case which would have been brought to a closure was restored back only because the counsels from both the sides did not assist the judges properly. I also suspect my counsel wanted the case go back to the officer for reasons best known to him. If that was so, he has succeeded in his attempt.

I now know it is all about winning and losing in courts. It is a battle in Court without conventional weapons. It is less about justice and more about winning. I learnt that there is no absolute justice.

I take a mild tranquilizer and go to sleep.

Wednesday — Morning

I am asked by my employer to appear before a government official. I go to his office. There are others waiting to meet the same officer. I overhear them talking that the officer is very upright. My heart gladdens to hear that. Perhaps it is my skepticism. I always take the stories of upright officer incredulously.

The usher asks me to go in. I find the officer upright. He tells me that I could not expect certain reliefs we had sought. I am also convinced that the law on this issue was against us. I give up and prepare to stand up. He then requests me to find out if my client could arrange for his son a distributorship of some products that my client manufactures. I nod in affirmation. He then suggests a way out for the relief that I had sought. I could modify our application for relief in a particular manner so that it would fall in a certain category, so as to enable him to grant relief we wanted. I agree to do so and leave.

At night I am glad to discover today that methods of grafts come in a variety of ways. I get a better sleep than I have had the two previous nights.

Thursday — Noon

I am at a seminar where my employer is the guest speaker. He has just finished his presentation. He is hugely applauded and I am proud to have an enlightened employer, though my heart tells me that he has created more issues in his presentation than he has answered.

We break for lunch. There is a murmur among the participants. Most of them find themselves more confused than they were in the morning. I see my employer with a dish in his hands, surrounded by such ignoramuses. They are trying to extract answers to some of the issues my employer has thrown in the presentation. My employer seems to be asking those people to come to his chamber.

At night I wonder whether my employer really possessed answers to those issues. I thought it was wise to believe in his prowess rather than be counted among ignoramuses. I also learnt that professionalism is not being true to one’s self; it is being true to others’ selves. Give answers what others want; not what you believe to be true.

I have a really sound sleep.

Friday — about 1.00 p.m.

There is an agitation organised by a professional body of which my employer and I are members. The agitation is against corruption. The agitation is planned for an hour post lunch. We all colleagues and my employer reach the venue of the agitation. I find in the melee those executives of the multinational company I had met on Monday, and the honest government officer. We all march with caps on our head and placards in our hands with anti-graft slogans from Gateway of India to the Taj Hotel. Our march ends there. I notice that those executives have vanished into the Taj Hotel. I do not know why. I had seen pangs of hunger on their face when they were walking in the march.

At night

I learnt today that everybody has the right to protest against corruption no matter who he is. I am happy I am growing wiser and wiser day by day. People around me also tell me that I show a good amount of maturity in my approach. They tell me that I am practical.

My days of slumber are over. I have deep sleep more so thinking that the next day is a Saturday.

Saturday — Day

I have nothing to write today. Office is closed. I will miss the opportunity of getting still wiser. I am surprised at my appetite for learning things every day.

I now bask in the glory of the knowledge of being a man who is wise, matured, and of all the things, ‘practical’. At night Only sound sleep.

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DAUGHTER’S RIGHT IN COPARCENARY

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Editor’s Note
Two articles by the learned author on the same subject were published in the Journal, (BCAJ — January 2009 and BCAJ — May 2010). This article explains the subject further.

Hindu Law is quite complex and it has become more complex in spite of (or possibly as a result of) its codification. As has been seen in case of other laws enacted by the Parliament, imprecise language has often resulted in spate of litigation for the exact interpretation of the law.

However, one cannot blame only the Legislature. One additional reason for the problem is that while some part of Hindu Law has been codified (e.g., succession, adoption, marriage), the rest of customary Hindu Law still remains uncodified. Subjects like joint family, coparcenary, etc. have not yet been codified. Moreover, rules under the old Hindu Law differ in respect of different schools of Hindu Law like Mitakshara, Dayabhaga, etc.

In my two articles on ‘Daughter’s Right in Coparcenary’ (BCAJ — January 2009 Page 509 and BCAJ — May, 2010 Page 15) I attempted to answer some of the questions affecting a daughter’s right in coparcenary and attempted to analyse some decided case law on the subject.

The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) was amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (‘the Amendment Act’) with effect from 9th September, 2005. Section 6 of the Act, which was substituted by the Amendment Act to the extent it is relevant to this Article reads as under:

“6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. — (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, —

(a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;

(b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son;

(c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son,

and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener:

Provided x x x

(2) to (5) x x x

Section 6 of the Act (as amended by the Amendment Act) inter alia provides that on and from the commencement of the Amendment Act, in a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener by birth becomes a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son. The section further provides that any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of the provision shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition.

In customary Hindu Law, according to Mitakshara School, the female heirs were not members of the coparcenary. With a view to remove gender discrimination in our laws and to give equal status to a female, various States in the country made State amendments in the Act conferring right on a daughter in the coparcenary property. However, such amendments were not done uniformly by all the States resulting in different provisions applicable in different States. Moreover, while certain rights were conferred on unmarried daughters, there were restrictions as to the rights of a married daughter. Therefore, the Amendment Act was supposed to bring about the uniformity in the country so as to give benefit to a daughter, irrespective of her being married or otherwise.

It is unfortunate that the amendments brought about by the Amendment Act have resulted in a large number of court cases spread over the country.

In my last article I have dealt with a question whether a daughter would get benefit of the Amendment Act if her father was not alive at the time of coming into force of the Amendment Act. In the present article I propose to deal with another controversy on interpretation of the amended section.

Section 6(1) of the Act starts with words ‘on and from’ and goes on to deal with ‘on and from’ the commencement of . . . . . . the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener’. The questions which have arisen before courts in this behalf are (i) what do the words ‘on and from’ signify and (ii) whether the words ‘by birth become a coparcener’ make the Amendment Act retrospective.

In the case of Sugalabai v. Gundappa & Ors., ILR 2007 Kar. 4790 [also 2008(2) Kar LJ 406], the Karnataka High Court had occasion to consider the effect of the words ‘on and from’. It has observed that the words ‘on and from’ mean ‘immediately and after’ the commencement of the Act. It is observed that in other words as soon as the Amendment Act came into force, the daughter of a coparcener becomes by birth a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son. The Court also observed that there was nothing in the Act which showed that only those born on and after the commencement of the Act would become coparceners and it was held that even a daughter who was born prior to the Amendment Act became a coparcener immediately on and after the Amendment Act.

It has been held in the case of Pravat Chandra Pattnaik & Ors. v. Sarat Chandra Pattnaik & Anr., AIR 2008 Orissa 133 that the aforesaid amendment was enacted for removing the gender discrimination that prevailed leading to oppression and negation of the fundamental right of equality to women and to render social justice by giving them equal status in society. The Act came into force from 9th September 2005 and the statutory provisions u/s.6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 thereof created a new right. The provisions are not expressly made retrospective by the Legislature. The Act is clear and there is no ambiguity. Therefore, words cannot be interpolated. They do not bear more than one meaning. The Act is therefore, prospective. It creates a substantive right in favour of the daughter. The daughter gets a right of a coparcener from the date when the Amended Act came into force. Consequently, the contention that only the daughters who were born after 2005 would be treated as coparceners was not accepted. It specifically clarifies that the daughter gets a right as a coparcener from the year 2005, whenever she may have been born.

In a very recent unreported judgment, the Bombay High Court has referred to the above cases with approval and taken similar view (see Sadashiv Sakharam Patil v. Chandrakant Gopal Desale — Appeal from Order No. 265 of 2011 etc. decided on 6th September, 2011). Accordingly, these decisions close (at least for the time being) that for the purpose of getting benefit of the amended provision it is not necessary that the birth of the daughter should also be after commencement of the Amendment Act.

Therefore, as per the Law laid down by Courts in above cases, on coming into force of the Amendment Act i.e., 9th September, 2005, the daughter of a coparcener becomes by birth a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son even if she was born before the Amendment Act coming into force.

The Karnataka High Court had an occasion to consider one new angle on the same subject. The question which arose before the Court was that while the daughter gets a right to be a coparcener from birth when can the right be said to start. In the case of Pushpalatha N. V. v. Padma V. reported in AIR 2010 Karnataka 124, the Court has inter alia held as follows:

“The Act when it was enacted, the Legislature had no intention of conferring rights which are conferred for the first time on a female relative of a coparcener including a daughter prior to the commencement of the Act. Therefore, while enacting this substituted provision of section 6 also it cannot be made retrospective in the sense applicable to the daughters born before the Act came into force. In the Act before amendment the daughter of a coparcener was not conferred the status of a coparcener. Such a status is conferred only by the Amendment Act in 2005. After conferring such status, right to coparcenary property is given from the date of her birth. Therefore, it should necessarily follow such a date of birth should be after the act came into force, i.e., 17th June, 1956. There was no intention either under the unamended Act or the Act after amendment to confer any such right on a daughter of a coparcener, who was born prior to 17th June, 1956. Therefore, in this context also the opening words of the amending section assume importance. The status of a coparcener is conferred on a daughter of a coparcener on and from the commencement of the Amendment Act, 2005. The right to property is conferred from the date of birth. But, both these rights are conferred under the Act and, therefore, it necessarily follows the daughter of a coparcener who is born after the Act came into force alone will be entitled to a right in the coparcenary property and not a daughter who was born prior to 17th June, 1956.”

Therefore, sum total of the principles laid down by the case law discussed above, is that while on coming into force of the Amendment Act dated 9th September, 2005, the daughter of a coparcener becomes by birth a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son even if she was born before the Amendment Act, such a right is subject to the condition that she is born after 17th June, 1956 i.e., coming into force of the Act. The daughter born before the Act came into force does not get any such right.

Consolidated Financial Statements presented in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (as permitted by SEBI)

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Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (31-3-2011)

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements

As permitted by Securities Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) Circular CIR/CFD/DIL/1/2010, dated 5th April, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SEBI Circular’), the Group has voluntarily chosen to present its consolidated financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards after taking benefit of the additional exemptions provided vide the SEBI Circular (hereinafter referred to as ‘IFRS’). Accordingly, the Group has :

prepared and presented the financial statements for the year ended 31st March, 2011 in accordance with IFRS instead of the accounting standards specified in section 211(3C) of the Companies Act, 1956 (‘Indian GAAP’);

elected to provide the figures for the comparative period as per Indian GAAP as permitted by the SEBI Circular and not as per IFRS as required by International Financial Reporting Standard 1, ‘First-time adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards’ and International Accounting Standard 1, ‘Presentation of Financial Statements’. However, as the classification of the individual line items is not consistent and comparable between the two periods, the figures for the comparative period are not presented alongside that of the current year. Accordingly, these consolidated financial statements should be read along with the consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31st March 2010 presented in the Annual Report for the year ended 31st March 2010;

not presented reconciliations between the equity and comprehensive income as per IFRS and Indian GAAP for the comparative period, as the Group has not prepared financial information in accordance with IFRS for the comparative period as indicated above; and

not presented a reconciliation of significant differences between the figures as disclosed as per IFRS for the year ended 31st March 2011 and the figures as they would have been if Indian GAAP was adopted for the year ended 31st March 2011 as required by the SEBI Circular as the Group has not prepared consolidated financial statements in accordance with Indian GAAP for this period.

These are the Group’s first financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS (see Note EE for explanation of the transition to IFRS).

Note EE — Transition to International Financial Reporting Standards

The transition from Indian GAAP to IFRS has been made in accordance with the principles laid down in IFRS 1, First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. As elaborated in Note A-2.2, the Group has voluntarily elected to use IFRS as permitted by the SEBI Circular along with the additional exemptions provided therein. Accordingly, the Group has transitioned to IFRS with 1st April 2010 being the date of transition.

1. First-time adoption exemptions applied

Upon transition, IFRS 1 permits certain exemptions from full retrospective application. The Group has applied the mandatory exceptions and certain optional exemptions, as set out below.

Mandatory exceptions adopted by the Group

(i) Financial assets and liabilities that had been de-recognised before 1st April 2010 under Indian GAAP have not been recognised under IFRS.

(ii) The Group has used estimates under IFRS that are consistent with those applied under Indian GAAP (with adjustment for accounting policy differences), unless there is objective evidence those estimates were in error.

Optional exemptions applied by the Group

(i) The Group has elected not to apply IFRS 3R Business Combinations retrospectively to business combinations that occurred before the date of transition 1st April 2010.

(ii) The Group has elected to use fair value as deemed cost at the date of transition for some items of property, plant and equipment (see Note H).

(iii) The Group has elected to use facts and circumstances existing at the date of transition to determine whether an arrangement contain a lease. No such assessment was done under Indian GAAP.

(iv) The Group has elected to designate some financial assets as available for sale at the date of transition. The Group has not taken the exemption to designate some financial instruments at fair value through profit or loss.

(v) The Group has elected to recognise all cumulative actuarial gains and losses for its defined benefit plans at the date of transition. Further, the Group has elected to use the exemption not to disclose defined benefit plan surplus/deficit and experience adjustment before the date of transition.

The following reconciliation and explanatory notes thereto describe the effect of the transition on the IFRS opening statement of financial position as at 1st April 2010. All explanations should be read in conjunction with the IFRS accounting policies of Glenmark Group as disclosed in Note A-3.

The reconciliation of the Group’s equity reported under Indian GAAP to its equity under IFRS as at 1st April 2010 may be summarised as follows:

Notes to the reconciliation

2. Foreign currency convertible bonds (FCCBs)

The Company had outstanding ‘zero coupon’ FCCBs as on 1st April 2010. Under Indian GAAP, the Company had chosen to adjust these premium payable on redemption to the additional paid-in capital. As per IAS 32, FCCBs issued by the Company are treated as a liability with an embedded derivative for the call option for conversion to equity shares. Finance costs for the period and the related liability has been computed using the effective interest rate method. The liability is re-measured at amortised cost at each reporting period. Further, the embedded derivative is fair value at the date of transition. Accordingly, the adjustments have been made to retained earnings.


3.    Share-based compensation

According to IFRS 2 — Share-based Payments, the Group has recognised share-based payments on fair value and has made an adjustment in the opening statement of financial position by charging such cost to retained earnings.

Under Indian GAAP the Group had an option to account for these options at intrinsic value and therefore no such cost was required to be recognised in the Income statement.

4.    Fixed Assets (Including Intangible assets)

(a) Intangible assets

Derecognition of intangible assets

On transition to IFRS, the Group undertook a detailed evaluation of its portfolio of product development assets and intangibles under development, which were previously classifieds intangibles and capital work-in-progress under Indian GAAP. Based on such evaluation, the Group determined that certain products/projects had been de- prioritised and that no future economic benefits were expected to flow to the Group from these products or products being developed under such projects. Accordingly such products/projects did not qualify to be carried forward as intangible assets and accordingly have been derecognised. The Group also determined that the de-prioritisation and the conditions considered for this evaluation excited prior to the date of opening statement of financial position and accordingly, theses intangible assets have been derecognised in the preparation of the opening statement of financial position with a corresponding adjustment to retained earnings as this adjustment relates to earlier periods. (Also refer note 1 on Intangible Assets.)

Reclassification of intangible assets
On transition to IFRS, the Group has reclassified certain assets into intangible assets. These assets were previously classified as fixed tangible assets and their classification has been rectified on preparation of the opening statement of financial position. (Also refer Note H on ‘Property, Plan and Equipment’.)

(b) Property, plant and equipment

Election to use of fair value as deemed cost

At the date of transition, the Group elected to measure some items of assets within property, plant and equipment at fair value as deemed cost. The items of assets fair valued include freehold land, factory and other buildings, plant and machinery and equipments. Depreciation under IFRS is based on this deemed cost. (Also refer Note H on ‘Property, Plant and Equipment’.)

Depreciation

Further, depreciation under Indian GAAP was computed by assigning a life to each item of property, plant and equipment. However, under IFRS, the Group has identified the cost/deemed cost of each significant part item of property, plant and equipment and assigned an estimate of useful life to each such significant part. Accordingly, the depreciation has been recomputed.

5.    Non-controlling interest

Under Indian GAAP, financial statements are prepared as per the requirements of Schedule VI of The Companies Act, 1956. Under Schedule VI, non-controlling interest is not included in the total stockholders’ equity and is disclosed separately on the face of the statement of financial position.

On transition to IFRS, the Group has included the non-controlling interest in the statement of equity under the total stockholders’ equity. Further, the non-controlling interest under IFRS has been calculated using the minority’s share of the net assets of the subsidiary.

6.    Proposed dividend

In preparation of the financial statements in accordance with Indian GAAP, the Company provided for proposed dividend and tax thereon to comply with the Schedule VI requirements of the Companies Act, 1956. On transition to IFRS, proposed dividend is recognised based on the recognition principles of IAS 37 — ‘Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets. Considering that the dividend has been proposed after the date of statement of financial position and becomes payable only after approval by the shareholders, there is no present obligation to pay this dividend as at the date of statement of financial position. Accordingly, the liability for proposed dividend and tax thereon has been reversed.

7.    Deferred tax

Deferred tax assets and liabilities under Indian GAAP were recorded only on timing differences. However, on transition to IFRS, deferred tax assets and liabilities are recorded on temporary differences. Further, on transition to IFRS, the carrying values of assets and liabilities have undergone a change as a result of the adjustments indicated above, and accordingly, the deferred tax position has been recomputed after considering the new carrying amounts.

8.    Presentation differences

In the preparation of these IFRS financial statements, the Group has made several presentation differences between Indian GAAP and IFRS. These differences have no impact on reported profit or total equity. Accordingly, some assets and liabilities have been re-classified into another line item under IFRS at the date of transition. Further, in these financial statements, some line items are described differently (renamed) under IFRS compares to Indian GAAP, although the assets and liabilities included in these line items are unaffected.

From Auditors’ Report on International Financial Reporting Standards

3.    We report that the consolidated financial statements have been prepared by Glenmark Group’s management in accordance with the requirements of International Accounting Standard 27, ‘Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements’ forming part of International Financial Reporting Standards (‘IFRS’) as permitted by SEBI Circular CIR/ CFD/DIL/1/2010, dated 5th April 2010 (‘SEBI Circular’).

4.    As described in Note A-2.2 to the consolidated financial statements, in the preparation of its first financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, Glenmark Group has not presented any financial information for the comparative period as required by SEBI Circular.

5.    As described in Note A-2.2 to the consolidated financial statements, Glenmark Group has not presented a reconciliation of significant differences between the figures as disclosed as per IFRS and the figures as they would have been if the notified Indian Accounting Standards were adopted, as required by SEBI Circular.

6.    Based on our audit and consideration of report of other auditors on financial statements and on the other financial information of the components, and to the best of our information and according to the explanations given to us, we are of the opinion that, subject to the omission of the disclosures described in paragraphs 4 and 5 above, subject to the omission of the disclosers described in para 4 and 5 above, the attached consolidated financial statements give a true and fair view in conformity with International Financial Reporting Standards as permitted vide SEBI circular:

GAPS IN GAP — Acounting for eviction costs by lesors

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Issue What is the accounting treatment, from a lessor’s perspective, for costs incurred by the lessor to evict tenants? Are these costs capitalised or expensed as incurred?

Scenario 1
A lessor makes compensation payments to evict the tenants in an investment property with the intention to refurbish/renovate the property.

Scenario 2
A lessor makes a compensation payment to evict a tenant in a multi-tenanted investment property with the intention to re-let the vacated space to a new tenant. The lessor has signed an agreement with the new tenant to occupy the space that the existing tenant is occupying. Under the agreement, the new tenant will pay a significantly higher rent than the existing tenant.

Scenario 3

The same fact pattern as Scenario 2, except that the lessor has not yet found a new tenant when it evicts the existing tenant.

Relevant literature

Under Indian GAAP the following accounting literature is relevant for concluding on this fact pattern.

Paragraph 20 & 21 of AS-10 Accounting for Fixed Assets

Paragraph 20 : The cost of a fixed asset should comprise its purchase price and any attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use.

Paragraph 21 : The cost of a self-constructed fixed asset should comprise those costs that relate directly to the specific asset and those that are attributable to the construction activity in general and can be allocated to the specific asset.

Paragraph 31 & 42 of AS-19 Leases Paragraph 31 : Initial direct costs, such as commissions and legal fees, are often incurred by lessors in negotiating and arranging a lease. For finance leases, these initial direct costs are incurred to produce finance income and are either recognised immediately in the statement of profit and loss or allocated against the finance income over the lease term.

Paragraph 42 : Initial direct costs incurred specifically to earn revenues from an operating lease are either deferred and allocated to income over the lease term in proportion to the recognition of rent income, or are recognised as an expense in the statement of profit and loss in the period in which they are incurred.

Author’s view Scenario 1 View A — Expense the eviction costs as incurred

The eviction costs are costs of terminating the existing lease. Therefore, they should be expensed as incurred.

View B — Capitalise the eviction costs It is necessary for the lessor to make eviction payments to the existing tenants in order to refurbish the property. The eviction costs are directly attributable to the property and meet the definition of construction costs of the property and are costs required to bring the asset to “the condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the manner intended by management”. Therefore, the costs should be capitalised.

Considering paragraph 20 & 21 of AS-10, the author believes that View B is more appropriate.

Scenario 2
View A — Expense the eviction cost as incurred

The eviction cost is a cost of terminating the existing lease, and does not represent a cost of the underlying investment property. Therefore, it should be expensed as incurred.

View B — Eviction costs are initial direct costs and hence can be either capitalised or expensed

Since the lessor has signed an agreement with a new tenant, it must evict the existing tenant in order to allow the new tenant to move into the property. The eviction cost is an initial direct cost incurred by the lessor to arrange the new lease.

For a lessor, paragraph 31 in the case of a finance lease and paragraph 42 in the case of an operating lease, allows either expensing or amortisation of the eviction cost. For finance leases, these eviction costs are incurred to produce finance income and are either recognised immediately in the statement of profit and loss or allocated against the finance income over the lease term. In case of operating lease, eviction costs are either deferred and allocated to income over the lease term in proportion to the recognition of rent income or expensed as incurred.

Hence, for scenario 2, the author believes that the eviction costs are initial direct costs and could be either expensed or capitalised (View B). Nonetheless, some may argue that initial direct costs include expenses such as legal fees and commission (as per paragraph 31) and not eviction costs. Hence they may favour View A, which requires compulsorily expensing as those costs are incurred.

Scenario 3
In the absence of a secured new lease contract the eviction of existing tenants and the costs incurred thereon would not constitute initial direct costs of entering into a new lease arrangement. Consequently, the author believes that such costs should not be capitalised. Nonetheless, some may still argue that under the Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements “An asset is a resource controlled by the enterprise as a result of past events from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise.” Therefore, based on the asset definition in the framework, some may argue, it is possible to capitalise and amortise such eviction costs.

Considering that these issues are highly debatable the ICAI may consider providing guidance.

levitra

Demed Dividend — Loans or Advances to Related Concerns

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Issue for consideration

Dividend is an income under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The term ‘dividend’ is inclusively defined in section 2(22), vide five clauses, (a) to (e). These clauses primarily provide for treatment of certain distribution or payments, by the company, as dividend to the extent of the accumulated profits of the company. Clause (e) provides for payment of certain loans and advances by a company to a certain category of shareholders or for the benefit of this category of shareholders, or to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest (popularly referred to as ‘deemed dividend’). This clause reads as under:

“(e) any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, of any sum (whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) made after the 31st day of May 1987, by way of advance or loan to a shareholder, being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than 10% of the voting power, or to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest (hereafter in this clause referred to as the said concern) or any payment by any such company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits;”

These loans or advances to the specified shareholders or for the benefit of such shareholders or to the concerns in which such shareholders are substantially interested, are therefore taxable as dividend. Such dividend is not subject to the dividend distribution tax u/s.115-O, and is therefore a taxable income, not exempt u/s.10(34) of the Act.

In cases of payments of loans and advances to the specified concerns, the following questions have arisen before the courts in the recent past, in interpretation of this provision, namely, (a) whether the dividend under this clause is taxable in the hands of a shareholder or in the hands of the concern receiving the loan; (b) should the person being taxed be the registered as well as the beneficial shareholder; and (c) whether in cases of the fiduciary holding, the recipient can be taxed even where he is not the registered owner of the shares by presuming the recipient concern to be the shareholder. While the Bombay High Court had approved the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal that the dividend be taxed in the hands of the shareholder, only and not in the hands of the concern and further that the shareholder has to be both a registered shareholder as well as the beneficial shareholder, recently the Delhi High Court in a dissenting decision has taken a different view of the matter, holding that such dividend is taxable in the hands of the concern receiving the loan or advance where the firm is a beneficial shareholder, not following its own decision in an earlier case.

Universal Medicare’s case The issue came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Universal Medicare Private Limited, 324 ITR 263.

In this case, an amount of Rs.32 lakhs was transferred from the bank account of one company to the bank account of the assessee-company. One of the directors held over 10% of the equity capital of the company, which transferred the funds and also held over 20% of the equity capital of the assessee-company. This transfer was part of a misappropriation by a senior employee, who had opened bank accounts and carried out certain transactions to defalcate funds.

The assessee claimed that the amount was neither an advance nor a loan to the assessee, but represented misappropriation of funds by the senior employee. Alternatively, it was forcefully contended that, even assuming that this was an amount advanced to the assessee, for the purposes of taxation, the deemed dividend would be taxable in the hands of the shareholder and not in the hands of the assessee to whom the payment was advanced. The Assessing Officer concluded that the section 2(22)(e) provided for taxation in the hands of the recipient company and that they were attracted the moment a loan or advance was made and that subsequent defalcation of funds was immaterial. Noting that all the requirements of section 2(22)(e) were fulfilled, the Assessing officer concluded that the loan was to be treated as deemed dividend in the hands of the recipient company and not in the hands of the shareholder director.

The Commissioner (Appeals) affirmed the order of the Assessing officer. The Tribunal reversed the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) on the reasoning that the amount was taxable in the hands of the shareholder director and not in the hands of the assessee-company and also on the fact that the amount was part of a fraud committed, and that the transaction was not reflected in its books of accounts of the company.

The Bombay High Court analysed the provisions of section 2(22)(e), and observed that the clause was not artistically worded. It noted that Parliament had expanded the ambit of the expression ‘dividend’ by providing an inclusive definition. It noted that the payment by a company had to be by way of an advance or loan. On facts, it noted that the Tribunal had found that no loan or advance was granted to the assessee-company, since the amount in question had actually been defalcated and was not reflected in the books of account of the assessee-company. According to the Bombay High Court, this was a pure finding of fact which did not give rise to any substantial question of law.

The Bombay High Court, on law, concurred with the construction placed on the provisions of section 2(22)(e) by the Tribunal. It held that all payments by way of dividend had to be taxed in the hands of the recipient of the dividend, namely, the shareholder; that the effect of section 2(22) was to provide an inclusive definition of the expression ‘dividend’ and clause (e) expanded the nature of payments which could be classified as dividend; that looking at the different types of payments covered by this clause, the effect of clause (e) was to broaden the ambit of the expression ‘dividend’ by taxing the shareholder where certain payments were made by way of a loan or advance or payments on behalf of or for the individual benefit of such a shareholder and that the definition did not alter the legal position that dividend had to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder and consequently, even assuming that the payment was dividend, the payment was taxable not in the hands of the assessee-company, but in the hands of the shareholder.

National Travel Services’ case

The issue again recently came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. National Travel Services, (ITA Nos. 223, 219, 1204 & 309 of 2010) dated 11th July 2011 (available on www.itatonline. org).

In this case, the assessee was a partnership firm, having three partners. It had taken a loan of Rs.28.52 crore from a company, in which the assessee had invested in equity shares constituting 48.18% of the capital of the company. However, the shares were acquired in the names of two of the partners of the assessee.

Before the Delhi High Court, the assessee highlighted that the issue as to whether the person to whom the payment was made should not only be a reg-istered shareholder but a beneficial shareholder as well was concluded by the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Ankitech Pvt. Ltd., (ITA No. 462 of 2009) and other cases, decided on 11th May 2011 (43-A BCAJ 327, June 2011 — full text available on www.itatonline.org), where the Court had held that the loan or advance could be taxed only in the hands of the shareholder, and not in the hands of the company receiving the loan or advance and had observed therein that the expression ‘shareholder, being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares’ referred to in section 2(22)(e) meant that the shareholder should be both a registered shareholder and a beneficial shareholder.

In addition, it was argued that for the purposes of income-tax, a partnership firm is different from its partners. A reference was made to various provisions of the Companies Act [including section 187(c) and section 153 read with section 147], and to SEBI guidelines on joint shareholding in respect of partnership firm, in support of the proposition that the partnership firm in its own right could be the shareholder as distinguished from the partners themselves. Reliance was placed by the assessee on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT v. Raj Kumar Singh and Co., 295 ITR 9, where the Court had held that the conditions stipulated in section 2(22)(e) were not satisfied where the assessee firm was not the shareholder of a company which gave the loan, but partners of the firm were its shareholders.

On behalf of the Department, it was argued that on first principles, under the Indian Partnership Act, a partnership firm was not a separate entity but was synonymous with the partners. It was argued that when shares were acquired by a partnership firm, for want of its own separate legal entity, the shares had to be bought in the names of partners, and in no case, shares could be held in the name of the partnership firm however, for all intended purposes, it was the partnership firm, which was the shareholder in such a case.

The Delhi High Court agreed that the person to whom the loan or advance was made should be a shareholder as well as beneficial owner and proceeded further to examine the question whether the assessee firm could be treated as a shareholder having purchased shares through its partners in the company, or whether the shareholder necessarily had to be a registered shareholder and hence the shares should have been registered in the name of the firm, itself. The Delhi High Court observed that if the assessee’s contention was accepted, a partnership firm could never come within the mischief of section 2(22)(e), because the shares would be necessarily purchased by the firm in the names of its partners since it did not have any separate entity of its own and the firm therefore could never be a registered shareholder.

According to the Delhi High Court, by requiring a firm to be a registered shareholder, the very purpose of enactment of this provision would be defeated, and this would lead to absurd results. The Delhi High Court observed that though a deeming provision had to be strictly construed, it had also to be taken to its logical conclusion by making the law workable and to meet that in case of the purchase of shares by the firm in the name of its partners, it was the firm which was to be treated as shareholder for the purposes of section 2(22)(e).

The Delhi High Court therefore concluded that a partnership firm was to be treated as the shareholder even if the shares were held in the names of its partners, and it was not necessary that the partnership firm had to be the registered shareholder. The loan received was held to be taxable as deemed dividends in the hands of the partnership firm.

Observations

The ratio of the decision in National Travel Services’ case where applied to the issues discussed here is that a person for being taxed has to be a registered and the beneficial shareholder so however in cases of the fiduciary ownership the beneficial owner can be presumed to be the registered owner even where he may not be the one. Such an assumption, found to be permissible in law by the Court, however makes no departure from the understanding held so far that the dividend under clause (e) can never be taxed in the hands of a specified concern where the concern is not holding any shares, beneficially or otherwise, in the capital of the company which makes the payment of the loan or advances. In cases where the payment is sought to be taxed on the basis of the common shareholder, the tax if any shall continue to levied in the hands of the shareholder only and not in the hands of the recipient concern. The ratio of the Court’s own decision in the case of Ankitech Pvt. Ltd. remains uncontroverted to that extent.

The Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT v. Hotel Hilltop, 313 ITR 116 (Raj.), held that in the case of a payment of an advance by a company to a partnership firm, where a shareholder of the said company holding 10% or more of the shares of the company and who also had substantial interest in the said partnership firm, the amount of payment could not be taxed as a deemed dividend in the hands of the firm, but would be taxed in the hands of the individual, on whose behalf or for whose individual benefit, being such shareholder and partner, the amount was paid by the company to the partnership firm.

The Special Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, in the case of ACIT v. Bhaumik Colour Pvt. Ltd., 313 ITR (AT) 146 (Mum., SB), has held that if a person is a beneficial shareholder but not a registered shareholder, or if a person is a registered shareholder but not the beneficial shareholder, then the provisions of section 2(22)(e) will not apply and in that view of the matter dividend u/s.2(22)(e) cannot be taxed in the hands of a concern where a certain shareholder is a partner with a substantial interest.

The decision of the Delhi High Court in National Travel Services’ case seems to be primarily applicable to cases of partnership firms owning shares in companies which shares are held in the names of their partners. As noted the decision does not seek to alter the understanding in respect of the loan or advances received by the firm where the firm does not hold any shares directly or indirectly through partners of the company in which case, it is only the shareholder who would be taxable i.e., a person who is the owner of the shares of the company and is also the partner of the firm and is otherwise the registered and the beneficial owner of the shares.

While the Delhi High Court has carved out an exception in the cases of partnership firms that own the shares of the company and such firms on account of the fact that partnership firms cannot hold the shares in their own names are holding the shares in the names of the partners. In doing so, the Delhi High Court has taken a view different from that of the Allahabad High Court and the Court in doing so has also not followed the ratio of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Raj Kumar Singh and Co.’s case (supra).

The concept that the reference to the term ‘shareholder’ means registered shareholder has been laid down by the Supreme Court as far back as in the cases of CIT v. C. P. Sarathy Mudaliar, 83 ITR 170 and Rameshwarmal Sanwarmal v. CIT, 122 ITR 1, which was in the context of an HUF as the shareholder of a company. In fact, even earlier a similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Howrah Trading Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 36 ITR 215, in the context of taxation of dividends in the hands of a shareholder who had not lodged his shares for transfer, though he had acquired a beneficial interest in the shares. These decisions were rendered in the context of the law as it stood prior to the amendment by the Finance Act, 1987 made effective from 1st April 1988.

The provisions of section 2(22)(e) were amended with effect from 1st April, 1988, by the Finance Act, 1987. Prior to the amendment, only a loan or advance to a shareholder, being a person who had a substantial interest in a company, or any payment by any such company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder, was taxable as dividend. The amendment introduced the requirement of the shareholder being a beneficial owner of shares holding not less than 10% of the voting power, as well as extended the definition to concerns in which such shareholder was a member or partner, in which he has a substantial interest. This amendment also inserted the definition of ‘concern’ in explanation 3(a), to mean an HUF, or a firm, or an association of persons or a body of individuals or a company.

Does the insertion of this requirement of beneficial ownership of shares mean that the concept of registered shareholder is no longer relevant and therefore once a person is found to be a beneficial owner the dividend will be taxable in his hands, irrespective of the fact that he is not a registered shareholder? The Special Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, in the case of ACIT v. Bhaumik Colour Pvt. Ltd., 313 ITR (AT) 146 (Mum., SB), has held that it is a principle of interpretation of statutes that once certain words in an act have received a judicial construction in one of the superior courts, and the Legislature has repeated them in a subsequent statute, the legislature must be taken to have used them according to the meaning which a Court of competent jurisdiction has given them. The Tribunal therefore held that the expression ‘being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares’ only qualifies the word ‘shareholder’ and does not in any way alter the position that the shareholder has to be a registered shareholder, nor substitute the requirement to a requirement of merely holding a beneficial interest in the shares without being a registered holder of shares. The Tribunal therefore held that if a person is a beneficial shareholder, but not a registered shareholder, or if a person is a registered shareholder, but not the beneficial shareholder, then the provisions of section 2(22)(e) will not apply.

The issue therefore is whether a partnership firm can be regarded as a shareholder in a company where the shares are held by the partners of the partnership firm for and on behalf of the firm. Similar can be the case where the shares are held by the karta of an HUF for and on behalf of the HUF and the trustee of a Trust for and on behalf of the Trust. Whether the shares are assets of the partnership firm or the individual assets of the partners would normally be determined based on how the firm and the partners have treated the assets — for instance, disclosure of the shares as assets of the partnership firm or the partners in their respective accounts, disclosure of the dividends as income of the partnership firm or the partners in their respective accounts, etc. While there may not be any dispute about the beneficial ownership of the firm over the shares, it is not possible to hold the firm as the legal owner in view of the corporate laws prohibiting the holding of shares in the names of the firm and in that view of the matter it is not possible to hold the firm as a registered shareholder and if that be so the dividend cannot be taxed in the hands of the firm and also not in the hands of the partners where the beneficial ownership is not with them.

The fact that a firm is specifically listed among the entities that are regarded as ‘concern’ indicates that the intention is also to rope in loans or advances to partnership firms, and to achieve that the payments to such concerns has to be taxed but will be taxed in the hands of such person who owns shares with certain percentage of voting rights and is also the partner holding a substantial interest in the firm. Dividend cannot be taxed in the hands of the firm in cases where the firm is not the owner of the shares as even the Delhi High Court does not suggest so. Where the firm is the owner of the shares it may not be taxable in its hands in view of the decisions referred to above. The ratio of the Delhi High Court decision therefore, if at all, applies only to a limited situation of a partnership firm, where the partnership firm treats the shares as its own assets, but the shares are held in the names of partners on behalf of the partnership firm.

Since the entire purpose is to tax dividends, and dividends can arise only to the shareholder, the better view of the matter is that it is only the shareholder who can be taxed, even if the advance is to a concern in which he is substantially interested, since the shareholder is deriving an indirect advantage or benefit through such concern.

Deductibility of Discount on Employee Stock Options – An analysis, Part1

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Introduction

It is an accepted fact that employees if recognised will reciprocate in a thousand ways. By acknowledging employee efforts, organisations can increase employee satisfaction, morale and self-esteem leading to increased business and income. Employee Stock Option Plan [commonly known as ESOP(s)] is a fallout of this thought.

Sustained competitiveness by any company hinges upon the quality of its human resources. This in turn has much to do with employee loyalty and commitment. A widely acknowledged method of giving the right incentive signals and rewarding loyalty is through an ESOP.

ESOP is a share-based payment to an employee in lieu of remuneration for his services. The philosophy behind ESOP is to imbibe a ‘sense of belongingness’ to the company. It is to enable them to participate in the organisation’s growth and prosperity. This is achieved by inviting them to be part owners of the company.

ESOP has evolved as a very potent tool to employee compensation. Variants to ESOP have also evolved. ESOP guidelines issued by the Central Government of India (reported in 251 ITR [st] 230) has enlisted various kinds of ESOP(s) – Employee Stock Option Plan, Employee Stock Ownership Plan, Employee Stock Purchase Plan, Stock Appreciation rights etc.

In an ESOP scheme, the company issues shares to its employees at a price lesser than its prevailing market value. To achieve this, a plan is put in place. The plan is approved and adopted by the company. Regulatory approvals, if required, are obtained. The plan generally provides for a compensation committee for evaluating performance of employees and recommending the allotment of options. These options entitle employees to become shareholders of the company. The difference between the price at which the company could have issued the shares in the “open market” and the reduced price is the benefit to the employees. The employee is compensated by the concession.

In other words, the company/ employer forgoes it ability, of getting higher money for the shares. The discussion in the ensuing paragraphs is whether such amount forgone or ‘loss’ suffered can be claimed as a deduction from an Income-tax standpoint.

This write-up is classified into the following segments:

A. Accounting Principles
B. Claim of ESOP under General Tax Principles
C. Claim of ESOP under specific provisions of Income-tax Act, 1961(the Act)
D. Some judicial pronouncements

PART A – Accounting Principles
Accounting/ regulatory aspects of ESOP(s) in India

When a company receives a sum which is lesser than the fair value of the share, it suffers a ‘loss’. This loss needs to be accounted for. A determination of the ‘nature of loss’ is important to enable the addressal of many issues. Whether this loss is compensation, and hence is to be accounted for in the profit and loss account? Or is it a premium on shares forgone and hence is a balance sheet item? Does it partake the character of benefit, hence a perquisite and thereby salary? Or is it in the nature of enabling employees to become shareholders of the company and hence a transaction inextricably linked to the share capital? Is the ‘discount’ a form of compensation? Or is the sufferance an abatement of the ability to get full value of shares? These are some questions associated with an ESOP.

A reference to the accounting principles or guidelines statutorily prescribed could help in ascertaining the nature of loss. Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (“ICAI”), two of the premier regulatory and statutory bodies have issued guidelines in this matter.

ICAI has issued a Guidance Note on “Accounting for Employee Share-based payments”. The Guidance Note specifies the treatment of discount on issue of ESOP (hereinafter referred as ‘ESOP discount’).

A. Guidance Notes issued by ICAI

ICAI is empowered to issue Guidance Notes. These are designed to provide guidance to its members on matters arising in the course of their professional work. Guidance notes resolve issues which may pose difficulty or are debatable. The Guidance Notes are recommendatory in nature. Any deviation from such guidance mandates an appropriate disclosure in the financial statements or reports.

Financial statements form the substratum for income-tax laws. These Financial statements of corporates have to be mandatorily prepared in accordance with accounting system/ standards prescribed by the ICAI. Thus the role of ICAI assumes significance. The courts have also recognised the importance of ICAI prescriptions in various cases.

The Gauhati High court in the case of MKB Asia (P) Limited v CIT (2008) 167 Taxman 256 (Gau) held that the income-tax authority has no option/ jurisdiction to meddle in the matter either by directing the assessee to maintain its accounts in a particular manner or adopt different method where the accounting system is approved by the ICAI.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v State Bank of Indore (2005) 196 CTR 153 (MP) held –

“it involves the manner and methodology of accountancy in claiming deduction. In cases of like nature, their Lordships of Supreme Court have always taken the help of methods adopted/ prescribed/recognised by the Indian Institute of Chartered Accountants as in the opinion of their Lordships, they are the best guide. In one of the cases CCE v. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. (1999) 7 SCC 448, their Lordships while supporting their conclusion while examining the case of Central Excise, made following observations in para 26:

“Para 26-The view we take about the cost of the raw material is borne out by the guidance note of the Indian Institute of Chartered Accountants and there can be no doubt that this Institute is an authoritative body in the matter of laying down accountancy standards.”
(Emphasis supplied)

The Supreme Court in the case of British Paints India Ltd. (1991) 188 ITR 44 (SC) relied on the guidance note issued by ICAI while adjudging a matter on stock valuation. Other instances are available of courts relying on guidance note. For example, guidance note on section 44AB has been relied on in understanding the total turnover of an agent (Kachha Arhatiya).

The Hyderabad Tribunal (Special Bench) in the case of DCIT v Nagarjuna Investment Trust Ltd (1998) 65 ITD 17 (Hyd) SB relied on the Accounting standard (IAS 17) and the guidance note issued by the ICAI while upholding the accounting methodology of lease equalisation.

As mentioned earlier, ICAI issued Guidance note on Accounting for Employee Share-based Payments (“ESOP Guidance note”). In the ESOP Guidance note, the discount on issue of shares is described as “Employee Compensation expense”. As the name suggests, this is viewed as ‘employee remuneration’ to be expensed in the Profit and loss account of the relevant year. It concurs with SEBI on the aspect of charge of such discounts against the profits. The Guidance Note acknowledges and thus approves the loss to be an item on revenue account.

The aforesaid accounting recommendations are guided by the principles of “Conservatism”, “Prudence” and “Matching Concept”. Conservatism and Prudence are concepts for recognising expenses and liabilities at the earliest point of time even if there is uncertainty about the outcome; and to recognise revenues and assets only when they are assured of being received. The concept of Prudence is now statutorily recognised by an explicit mention in Accounting Standard 1 issued u/s. 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”). ‘Matching principle’ signifies that in measuring the income for a period, revenue is to be adjusted against expenses incurred for producing that revenue.

Income referable to employee efforts gets captured in the ordinary course of accounting applying the principles of revenue recognition (Accounting Standard 9) . It is essential that the associated expenditure is also booked. ESOP discount is an associated cost. Non-recognition of ESOP discount in the Profit and Loss Account could inflate the reported profits for the year. The accounts would then not be reflective of a true and fair position of the performance of an entity. From an accounting standpoint therefore, ESOP discount needs to be charged against the business income. It is an item on revenue account.

Some of the relevant portion of the Guidance note is highlighted below –

    Preface

“Employee share-based payments generally involve grant of shares or stock options to the employees at a concessional price or a future cash payment based on the increase in the price of the shares from a specified level….The basic objective of such payments

is to compensate employees for their services and/ or to provide an incentive to the employees for remaining in the employment of the enterprise and for improving their performance…”

    Recognition (para 10)

“An enterprise should recognise as an expense (except where service received qualifies to be included as a part of the cost of an asset) the services received in an equity-settled employee share-based payment plan when it receives the services, with a corresponding credit to an appropriate equity account, say, ‘Stock Options Outstanding Account.”

   Measurement (para 15)

“Typically, shares (under ESPPs) or stock options (under ESOPs) are granted to employees as part of their remuneration package, in addition to a cash salary and other employment benefits… Furthermore, shares or stock options are sometimes granted as part of a bonus arrangement, rather than as a part of basic pay, eg, as an incentive to the employees to remain in the employment of the enterprise or to reward them for their efforts in improving the performance of the enterprise…”

B. SEBI guidelines

SEBI is a regulatory body established to protect the interests of investors in securities, regulate the securities market and for matters connected therewith. Newer types of financial instruments are emerging. Financial intermediaries have emerged performing a slew of complex functions. The implications of dealing/ investing in securities are continuously evolving, giving rise to a multitude of tax consequences. There is therefore an imperative need for such governing bodies to be involved in the matters of tax also. The increased interplay of SEBI and Income-tax Act is evidenced by SEBI provisions being incorporated in the Act. For instance the erstwhile proviso to section 17(2)(iii) [which was one of the sections on ESOP taxation] read –

“Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall apply to the value of any benefit provided by a company free of cost or at a concessional rate to its employees by way of allotment of shares, debentures or warrants directly or indirectly under any Employees Stock Option Plan or Scheme of the company offered to such employees in accordance with the guidelines issued in this behalf by the Central Government”.

The Central Government issued the guidelines referred to in the proviso above by Notification No. 323/2001 dated October 11, 2001, effective from April 1, 2000. The Guidelines enumerate various aspects that ought to be included in any Employees Stock Option Plan or Scheme. The guidelines, inter alia, provided that the plan or scheme shall be as per the SEBI Guidelines.

SEBI has also evidenced interest in ESOP taxation (although indirectly), by prescribing accounting guidelines. These guidelines require ESOP discount to be charged off to the profit and loss account over the period of vesting. Such prescriptions are bound to impact “total income” for tax purposes.

The SEBI guidelines prescribe not merely the accounting policies but also the precise accounting entries to be passed over the life of ESOP. As per the SEBI guidelines, discount associated with grant of stock options can be worked out by various methods. SEBI has prescribed its own method of calculation of the discount. It mandates deferring and spreading this discount over the vesting period. The aliquot share of discount required to be spread over is recognised as expenditure in the profit and loss account.

C. OECD recommendations

Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development (“OECD”) is set up to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the globe. OECD provides a forum in which governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to their common problems. This organisation has framed its model tax convention and commentaries. The commentary is modified from time to time and is considered by tax authorities across the globe. From an income-tax standpoint, they are relevant in interpreting and applying the provisions of bilateral tax conventions between countries.

Though India is not a member of the OECD, the model conventions and commentaries on OECD have been used as guidance in interpretation of the statute. The OECD Model Convention and commentary thereto though primarily meant for use by the OECD countries is often referred to and applied in interpreting Agreements of non-OECD countries also.

The Calcutta Income Tax Tribunal, in the case of Graphite India Ltd v DCIT (2003) 86 ITD 384 (Cal) acknowledged the importance and relevance of views of OECD. It observed as follows:

“In our considered view, the views expressed by these bodies, which have made immense contribution towards development of standardisation of tax treaties between various counties, constitute contemporanea expositio inasmuch as the meanings indicated by various expressions in tax treaties can be inferred as the meanings normally understood in, to use the words employed by Lord Radcliffe, international tax language developed by bodies like OECD and UN.”

In connection with ESOP also, the OECD convention and commentaries have made various observations. Some of the relevant portions are as follows:

–    Commentary to Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (2010) has housed the ESOP income under Article 15 (Taxation of Income from Employment). It states that ESOP is a reward for the employment services. It reads as follows:

“While the Article applies to the employment benefit derived from a stock option granted to an employee regardless of when that benefit is taxed, there is a need to distinguish that employment benefit from the capital gain that may be derived from the alienation of shares acquired upon exercise of the option.”

–    ESOP impact on transfer pricing (page 7 & 8): “b) Equity ownership vs. Remuneration

The analysis in this study starts with the premise that the granting of stock options is an element of remuneration just like performance-related bonuses or benefits in kind, even when stock options are issued by an entity that is distinct from the employer. In fact in many MNE groups the shares subscribed to or purchased by employees under stock option plans are sold as soon as authorised by the plan and applicable regulations, i.e. employees do not seek to exercise their prerogative as shareholders, apart from benefiting from an increase in value between the strike price paid and the value of the share at the date the option is exercised. Moreover, a stock option is a financial instrument which is valuable and which can be exercised in order to realise such value. Although, upon exercise, the holders of such options may acquire and decide to retain a share in the capital of an enterprise, this investment decision made by each employee is a distinct step from that of the remuneration, one that is occurring at a different point in time and that is of no relevance to the transfer pricing issue under consideration…..”
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, there are various accounting and statutory bodies governing the accounting and preparation of financial statements in India. Compliance with such prescribed norms is mandatory. The judicial precedents also have repeatedly respected such guidelines. This being the prevailing position, the tax treatment of ESOP discount should be in compliance with guidelines prescribed by ICAI and SEBI, as also OECD.

International practice

The international practices in relation to treatment of discount on ESOP to employees are on similar lines.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards

Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is a designated organisation whose primary purpose is to develop generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) within the United States. These principles are recognised as authoritative by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards is a formal document issued by the FASB, which details accounting standards and guidance on selected accounting policies set out by the FASB. All reporting companies listed on American stock exchanges have to adhere to these standards. Accounting Standard No. 123 details share based payments to employees. Some relevant portions from the same are as below:

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (revised 2004)

Para 1 – This Statement requires that the cost resulting from all share-based payment transactions be recognised in the financial statements. This Statement establishes fair value as the measurement objective in accounting for share-based payment arrangements and requires all entities to apply a fair-value-based measurement method in accounting for share-based payment transactions with employees except for equity instruments held by employee share ownership plans. However, this Statement provides certain exceptions to that measurement method if it is not possible to reasonably estimate the fair value of an award at the grant date. A nonpublic entity also may choose to measure its liabilities under share- based payment arrangements at intrinsic value. This Statement also establishes fair value as the measurement objective for transactions in which an entity acquires goods or services from nonemployees in share-based payment transactions. This Statement uses the terms compensation and payment in their broadest sense to refer to the consideration paid for goods or services, regardless of whether the supplier is an employee.

Para 9 – Accounting for Share-Based Payment Transactions with Employees

The objective of accounting for transactions under share-based payment arrangements with employees is to recognise in the financial statements the employee services received in exchange for equity instruments issued or liabilities incurred and the related cost to the entity as those services are consumed.

(Emphasis supplied)

International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS)

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an independent, privately funded accounting standard-setter based in London, England. IFRS is a set of accounting standards developed by the IASB. IFRS 2 deals with the share based payment to employees.

IFRS 2 on Share-based payment

“Para 1 – The objective of this IFRS is to specify the financial reporting by an entity when it undertakes a share-based payment transaction. In particular, it requires an entity to reflect in its profit or loss and financial position the effects of share-based payment transactions, including expenses associated with transactions in which share options are granted to employees.

Para 12 – Typically, shares, share options or other equity instruments are granted to employees as part of their remuneration package, in addition to a cash salary and other employment benefits. Usually, it is not possible to measure directly the services received for particular components of the employee’s remuneration package. It might also not be possible to measure the fair value of the total remuneration package independently, without measuring directly the fair value of the equity instruments granted. Furthermore, shares or share options are sometimes granted as part of a bonus arrangement, rather than as a part of basic remuneration, eg as an incentive to the employees to remain in the entity’s employ or to reward them for their efforts in improving the entity’s performance. By granting shares or share options, in addition to other remuneration, the entity is paying additional remuneration to obtain additional benefits. Estimating the fair value of those additional benefits is likely to be difficult. Because of the difficulty of measuring directly the fair value of the services received, the entity shall measure the fair value of the employee services received by reference to the fair value of the equity instruments granted.”

(Emphasis supplied)

The above extracts demonstrate the consensus that ESOP discount is a charge against profits and hence a Profit and Loss Account item. This ensures true and correct disclosure of the financial performance of the Company.

Based on the aforesaid discussion, one could discern that from an accounting perspective ESOP is a revenue item. This is the understanding of the accounting and regulatory bodies in India. The same view is shared by some of the international bodies/ practices as well.


PART B – Claim of ESOP discount under general tax principles

Income-tax relies on the general commercial and accounting principles in determining the taxable income. As a general principle, any expenditure incurred for the purposes of business is a ‘deductible expenditure’ for income-tax purposes.

Reliance of Income-tax laws on general/ commercial principles

“Tax accounting” is not essentially different from commercial accounting. Tax accounting recognises and accepts accounting which is consistent and statute compliant. Profit as per such commercial accounting is the base from which the taxable income is determined.

Tax laws may incorporate specific rules and departures from commercial accounting in determining the taxable income. To the extent, there are no specific departures, commercial accounting norms would prevail for tax purposes also. The earliest acknowledgement by the Courts of the relevance of appropriate accounting practices (while explaining the concept of accrual) can be found in the decision of the Privy Council in the decision CIT v Ahmedabad New Cotton Mills Co. Ltd (1930) 4 ITC 245 (PC). The Apex Court has thereafter upheld the significance of accounting practices on various occasions. Some of such judicial precedents and the relevant observations therein are as follows:

   P.M. Mohammed Meerakhan v CIT (1969) 73 ITR 735 (SC) –

“In the case of a trading adventure the profits have to be calculated and adjusted in the light of the provisions of the Income-tax Act permitting allowances prescribed thereby. For that purpose it was the duty of the Income-tax Officer to find out that profit the business has made according to the true accountancy practices.”

   Challapalli Sugars Limited v CIT (1975) 98 ITR 167 (SC) –

“As the expression “actual cost” has not been defined, it should, in our opinion, be construed in the sense which no commercial man would misunderstand. For this purpose it would be necessary to ascertain the connotation of the above expression in accordance with the normal rules of accountancy prevailing in commerce and industry.”

   CIT v U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation (1997) 225 ITR 703 (SC) –

“for the purposes of ascertaining profits and gains, the ordinary principles of commercial accounting should be applied so long as they do not conflict with any express provision of the relevant statute”.

   Badridas Daga v CIT (1958) 34 ITR 10 (SC) –

“Profits and gains which are liable to be taxed under section 10(1) of the 1922 Act are what are understood to be such according to ordinary commercial principles”

    Other judgments {Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v CIT (1971) 82 ITR 363 (SC)/ Madeva Upendra Sinai v Union of India (1975) 98 ITR 209 (SC)} –

“The assessable profits of a business must be real profits and they have to be ascertained on ordinary principles of trading and commercial accounting. Where the assessee is under a liability or is bound to make a certain payment from the gross profits, the profits and gains can only be the net amount after the said liability or amount is deducted from the gross profits or receipts”

The Act requires business income computation to be based on accounting practices and principles. Section 145 of the Act mandates business income for income-tax purposes to be computed under the ‘ordinary principles of commercial accounting’ regularly employed. The Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v Advance Construction Co P Limited (2005) 275 ITR 30 (Guj) held –

“Section 145 is couched in mandatory terms and the department is bound to accept the assessee’s choice of method regularly employed, except for the situation wherein the Assessing officer is permitted to intervene in case it is found that the income, profits and gains cannot be arrived at by the method employed by the assessee. The position is further well settled that the regular method adopted by an assessee cannot be rejected merely because it gives benefit to an assessee in certain years.”

Subsection 2 to section 145 empowers Central Government to notify accounting standards to be followed by an assessee. Central Government has till date notified two accounting standards. Accounting Standard I (relating to disclosure of accounting policies) requires accounting policies to be adopted so as to represent true and fair view of the state of affairs of the business. The concepts of “prudence” and “conservatism” have been injected into the income-tax laws through this standard. The standard defines ‘Prudence’ to be provision made for all known liabilities and losses, even though the amount cannot be determined with certainty and represents only a best estimate in the light of available information.

The considerations of prudence and conservatism have been adopted and accepted for tax purposes in several judicial precedents of late. Tax laws have also veered towards the adoption of the concept of matching principles in determining the quantum of income to be offered to tax. The case of Madras Industrial Investment Corporation v CIT (1997) 225 ITR 802 (SC) acknowledges the concept of matching expenses and revenues. The matching principle is applied by matching expenditure against specific revenues – ‘as having been used in generating those specific revenues’ or by matching expenses against the revenues ‘of a given period in general on the basis that the expenditure pertains to that period’. The former is termed as “matching principle on revenue basis” and the latter is termed as “matching principle on time basis”. The concept of ‘matching principle’ was again dealt with in detail by the Supreme court in the case of J K Industries Ltd v UOI (2008) 297 ITR 176 (SC).

As mentioned earlier, ESOP discount is an employee welfare measure. The income referable to the employee effort is recognised in the Profit and loss account. Matching principles would warrant the corresponding expenditure and/ or loss to be accounted in the Profit and loss account. Such discount when recognised in the Profit and loss account would also uphold the principle of prudence and conservatism.

Placing reliance on the commercial principles has been one of the elements of statutory interpretation. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute. It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent. In other words, a section/ provision of the statute shall not be divorced from the rest of the Act. Similarly, a statute shall not be interpreted so as to be inconsistent with other contemporaneous statutes. Where there is an inconsistency, the judiciary will attempt to provide a harmonious interpretation.

A statute is an edict of legislature. The Government enacts laws to regulate economic, social behaviors and conduct. A series of legislation may be passed for this purpose. These laws have specific objectives. Their interplay helps in determining the larger purpose. When such is the interdependence, the tax laws must operate in tandem with other prevailing statutes. Income-tax law has to be interpreted taking cognizance of other statutes.

Aid from other statutes in interpreting Income-tax law

Income-tax Act is an integrated code. The interpretation of a taxing statute has to be on the basis of the language employed in the Act unless the words/ phrases are ambiguous or gives scope for more than one interpretation. The Act being
a    forward-looking statute does not operate in isolation.

With the modernisation and evolution of business, there could be occasions where one may have to refer other statutes to better understand certain terms or arrangements. This is done when the terms in the statute are technical in nature or dealing with a specialised matter. In such cases, the interpretation of income -tax law cannot be limited to the words in the Act itself. The Kerala High Court in the case of Moolamattom Electricity Board Employees’ Co-Operative Bank Ltd In re (1999) 238 ITR 630 (Ker) held –

“Resort to a different provision of another Act may also be permissible in the absence of a definition or where the term is technical in nature.”

There could also be situations where certain provisions in the Act lean or depend upon other laws in a particular matter/ context. In such cases, the provisions of such other laws will have to be considered. The Apex court in the case of CIT v Bagyalakshmi & Co (1965) 55 ITR 660 (SC) held –

“The income-tax law gives the Income-tax Officer a power to assess the income of a person in the manner provided by the Act. Except where there is a specific provision of the Income-tax Act which derogates from any other statutory law or personal law, the provision will have to be considered in the light of the relevant branches of law.”

ESOP discount involves forgoing of share premium receivable by the company. In the absence of any specific provision in the Act dealing with such discount, one may have to dwell into the commercial understanding of such discount. In doing so, one may take guidance (even if not strict compliance) from other statutes and regulatory guidelines prescribed in this regard.

In ACIT, Delhi v Om Oils And Oil Seeds Exchange Ltd (1985) 152 ITR 552 (Delhi) the High Court acknowledged the treatment of share premium by placing reliance on the Companies Act, 1956 (“Companies Act”)

“Such a payment and the right can properly be regarded as a capital asset and the money paid as on capital account. This is more so in view of the provisions of s. 78 of the Companies Act, 1956. The effect of s. 78 of the said Act is to create a new class of capital of a company which is not share capital but not distribution of the share premium as dividend is not permitted and it is taken out of the category of the divisible profit.”

The court relied on the principles in the Companies Act to conclude that share premium is a capital receipt.

One may therefore look at the guidance note issued by ICAI and SEBI regulations for treatment of ESOP expenses as well along with the treatment under the OECD convention.

In summary, Income-tax relies on the general commercial and accounting principles in determining the taxable income. This principle has got a statutory mandate through section 145 of the Act. Further, one may refer other statutes for appropriate interpretation of the Income-tax statute. Accordingly, the guidelines prescribed by the regulatory bodies such as the SEBI, ICAI, OECD need to be reckoned in computing the taxable income.

Bagyalakshmi & Co (1965) 55 ITR 660 (SC) held –

“The income-tax law gives the Income-tax Officer a power to assess the income of a person in the manner provided by the Act. Except where there is a specific provision of the Income-tax Act which derogates from any other statutory law or personal law, the provision will have to be considered in the light of the relevant branches of law.”

ESOP discount involves forgoing of share premium receivable by the company. In the absence of any specific provision in the Act dealing with such discount, one may have to dwell into the commercial understanding of such discount. In doing so, one may take guidance (even if not strict compliance) from other statutes and regulatory guidelines prescribed in this regard.

In ACIT, Delhi v Om Oils And Oil Seeds Exchange Ltd (1985) 152 ITR 552 (Delhi) the High Court acknowledged the treatment of share premium by placing reliance on the Companies Act, 1956 (“Companies Act”)

“Such a payment and the right can properly be regarded as a capital asset and the money paid as on capital account. This is more so in view of the provisions of s. 78 of the Companies Act, 1956. The effect of s. 78 of the said Act is to create a new class of capital of a company which is not share capital but not distribution of the share premium as dividend is not permitted and it is taken out of the category of the divisible profit.”

The court relied on the principles in the Companies Act to conclude that share premium is a capital receipt.

One may therefore look at the guidance note issued by ICAI and SEBI regulations for treatment of ESOP expenses as well along with the treatment under the OECD convention.

In summary, Income-tax relies on the general commercial and accounting principles in determining the taxable income. This principle has got a statutory mandate through section 145 of the Act. Further, one may refer other statutes for appropriate interpretation of the Income-tax statute. Accordingly, the guidelines prescribed by the regulatory bodies such as the SEBI, ICAI, OECD need to be reckoned in computing the taxable income.

PART C(1) – Claim of ESOP expense under specific provisions of the Act

Income-tax is a charge on income. The term ‘Income’ is defined in section 2(24) of the Act. The definition is an inclusive one and enlists various items which are to be regarded as income under the Act. Section 4 is the charging provision under the Act. The charge is defined vis-à-vis a person who is the recipient of income. The charge is in respect of the total income of a person for any year.

The scope of income chargeable to tax in India is dealt in section 5 of the Act. The income that is referred to in section 5 as chargeable to tax would have to be classified into 5 heads, by virtue of section 14. For each head of income, the law provides for a separate charging section and computation mechanism. Though section 5 is an omnibus charging section; for being taxed, the income would also have to satisfy, the separate charging and computation mechanism under the respective heads.

In the present case, the claim of ESOP expense is under the head “Income from profits and gains of business or profession” (“business income”). Section 28 outlines the charge in relation to such income. As per section 29, the income referred to in section 28 would be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 30 to 43D.

As regards claim of deductions in business income, Lord Parker in the case of Usher’s Witshire Brewery Limited v Bruce 6 TC 399, 429 (HL) said –

“Where a deduction is proper and necessary to be made in order to ascertain the balance of profits and gains it ought to be allowed… provided there is no prohibition against such an allowance.”

Income connotes a monetary return ‘coming in’ from definite sources. It is a resultant figure derived after considering the receipts and payments made there for. Not every receipt of business is income. A receipt could be capital or a revenue receipt. The Privy Council in the case of CIT v Shaw Wallace and Co 6 ITC 178 (PC) laid out tests to find out whether a particular receipt is ‘income’. According to that test, income connotes a periodical monetary return coming in with some sort of regularity or expected regularity from definite sources. The source is not necessarily one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return excluding anything in the nature of a mere windfall. ‘Capital receipts’ are not to be brought into account in computing profits under business head, apart from express statutory provisions like section 28(ii) and section 41. Section 28 envisages revenue profits which arises or accrues in the course of business.

Similarly, a disbursement is not allowable if it is of a capital nature. Capital items can be deducted from receipts only when the statute expressly provides so. Generally, the criteria which are invoked in distinguishing capital receipts and revenue receipts will also serve to distinguish between capital and revenue disbursements. This view was expressed by the learned authors Kanga and Palkiwala and was upheld by the High Court in the case of Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd v CIT (1969) 74 ITR 484 (P&H).

Accordingly, there is no single yardstick to determine whether an item (income or deductions therefrom) would be capital or revenue. There is no explicit statement or provision in the Act in this regard. This would be a fact specific exercise. What is generally an established fact is that disbursement of capital nature is not allowed/ deductible unless specifically provided for in the Act.

PART C(2) – Whether ESOP discount is capital in nature (not allowable)?

Claim of ESOP discount as a deduction is to be examined under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”. This head of income is housed in sections 28 to 44DB. Under section 28(i) the profits and gains of any business or profession carried on by the assessee at any time during the previous year is chargeable to tax. As per section 29, the income referred to in section 28 should be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 30 to 43D. Sections 30 to 36 confer specific deductions. Section 37 deals with expenditure which is general in nature and not covered within sections 30 to 36. The remaining sections enlist various categories of non-deductible expenditure (not relevant for the present discussion).

Sections 30 to 36 dealing with specific deductions do not deal with ESOP discount. The allowability of ESOP discount would have to be examined under section 37 – the residuary section. To examine eligibility of ESOP discount u/s. 37, the character of discount needs to be examined. If the discount is regarded as capital in nature, section 37 would prohibit its deduction. It is expenditure on revenue account that qualifies for deduction. From an accounting perspective ESOP discount is a revenue item (as discussed earlier). From an income-tax view point, whether such discount is capital or revenue in nature is the issue for consideration?

In the absence of an express definition of capital or revenue expenditure in the Act, one may have to rely on the various judicial precedents on this matter; the rationale adopted and the interpretation adjudged therein.

In the treatise ‘The Law and Practice of Income Tax’ by Kanga and Palkiwala, (9th edition – page 225) the learned authors observe –

“The problem of discriminating between capital receipts and income receipts, and between capital disbursements and income disbursements, has very frequently engaged the attention of the courts. In general, the distinction is well recognised and easily applied, but from time to time cases arise where the item lies on the border line and the task of assigning it to income or capital becomes much of refinement. As the Act does not define income except by way of adding artificial categories, it is to be decided cases that one must go in search of light.”

(Emphasis supplied)

In the context of ESOP discount, one notices two contradictory judgments – in the case of S.S.I. Limited v DCIT (2004) 85 TTJ 1049 (Chennai) and Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited (2009) 124 TTJ 771 (Del). The Chennai Tribunal held ESOP discount to be a revenue and allowable/ deductible business expenditure. The Delhi Tribunal however gave a contrary judgment. The Delhi Tribunal placed it reliance on the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Lowry v Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd (1940) 8 ITR 88 (Supp) [This is discussed in detail later in the write-up].

Before application of tests whether ESOP discount is a revenue (and therefore deductible) expenditure, one needs to enlist the arguments put forth in some of the decisions which held that ESOP discount is NOT an allowable expenditure (largely for the reason that it is a capital expenditure).

  –  ESOP discount are incurred in relation to issue of shares to employees. They are not relatable to profits and gains arising or accruing from a business/ trade. The Apex Court decision in the case of Punjab State Industrial Dev Corporation Ltd (1997) 225 ITR 792 (SC) and Brooke Bond India Ltd (1997) 225 ITR 798 (SC) have held that expenditure resulting in ‘increase in capital’ is not an allowable deduction even if such expenditure may incidentally help in business of the company.

–    ESOP discount does not diminish trading/ business receipts of the issuing company. The company does not suffer any pecuniary detriment. To claim a charge against income, it should inflict a detriment to the financial position. ESOP is a voluntary scheme launched by the employers to issue shares to employees. The intention is to only give a ‘stake’ to the employees in the organisation.

–    This discount is not incurred towards satisfaction of any trade liability as the employees have not given up anything to procure such ESOP.

–    Share premiums obtained on issue of shares are items of capital receipt. When such premium is forgone, it cannot be claimed as an ‘expenditure wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of the trade’.

Each of these points has been addressed in the following paragraphs and specifically in Part D (Judicial pronouncements).

PART C(3) – Deductibility of ESOP
discount under section 37

As discussed earlier, sections 30 to 36 enumerate specific deductions. The remaining deductions/ expenditure fall to be governed under the residuary section 37. Section 37 permits deduction of an “expenditure” (not being personal or capital in nature), which is wholly and exclusively incurred for the purpose of business of the assessee. ESOP discount is not specifically covered under sections 30 to 36. The allowability of such discount is therefore to be considered under section 37 of the Act.

Section 37, to the extent material reads as follows-“37( 1) – Any expenditure (not being expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee), laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”……”

In order to be eligible for a deduction under section 37, the following conditions should be cumulatively satisfied:

(i)    The impugned payment must constitute an expenditure;
(ii)    The expenditure must not be governed by the provisions of sections 30 to 36;
(iii)    The expenditure must not be personal in nature;
(iv)    The expenditure must have been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the assessee; and
(v)    The expenditure must not be capital in nature.
Each of the above is examined in seriatim except point (ii) which is satisfied (as mentioned before).

Condition 1 – Payment must constitute expenditure

Claim of ESOP discount as “expenditure”

The existence of an “expenditure” is the sine qua non for attracting section 37. The phraseology “expenditure……laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation” in section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is identical to the phraseology used in section 37 of the Act.

The term “expenditure” is not defined in the Act. In the absence of a definition, one may rely on the commercial understanding of the term; the definition in other enactments and deduce a meaning suitable to the context. Section 2(h) of the Expenditure Act, 1957 defines expenditure as follows:

“Expenditure: Any sum of money or money’s worth spent or disbursed or for the spending or disbursing of which a liability has been incurred by an assessee. The term includes any amount which, under the provision of the Expenditure Act is required to be included in the taxable expenditure.”

In the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Molasses Company (P) Ltd. v. CIT (1959) 37 ITR 66, the term “expenditure” was defined in the following manner:

“`Expenditure’ is equal to `expense’ and `expense’ is money laid out by calculation and intention though in many uses of the word this element may not be present, as when we speak of a joke at another’s expense. But the idea of `spending’ in the sense of `paying out or away’ money is the primary meaning and it is with that meaning that we are concerned. Expenditure’ is thus what is `paid out or away’ and is something which is gone irretrievably.”
(Emphasis supplied)

The expression ‘lay out’ is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘to spend, expend money’. The use of these words ‘laid out’ before ‘expenditure’ emphasise the irretrievable character of the expenditure.

In common usage, expenditure would mean outflow of money in satisfaction of a liability. This liability may be imposed or voluntarily agreed upon. A mere liability to satisfy an obligation is not “expenditure”. When such obligation is met by delivery of property or by settlement of accounts, there is expenditure.

However, ‘Expenditure’ may not always involve actual parting with money or property; actual disbursement of legal currency. For instance, if there are cross-claims, each constitutes an admitted liability qua the other party. When one of them pays to the other the difference between the two counter liabilities, the payer in effect pays the value of his/ her liability against payment due to him from the other party. In making payment of that difference, the payer in fact lays out expenditure equal to the liability due by him.

Satisfaction of cross-claims to a transaction involves both retention/ payment of money. The amount which is debited/ adjusted in the account settlement would constitute expenditure. This principle was upheld by the Apex court in the case of CIT v Nainital Bank Ltd. (1966) 62 ITR 638 (SC). It is a ‘net off’ of receivables against payables. This ‘netting off’ effectively discharges the entire payables.

Stock options are issued to employees at discount. This discount represents the difference between the market value of the shares and the strike price on exercise of options. The company forbears from receiving the full value on its shares. The primary meaning of expenditure no doubt involves monies going away irretrievably. In its indirect connotation it would also include amount forgone. Forbearance of profit could also thus be covered within the gamut of section 37.

Claim of expense under section 37 as “amount forgone”

The question whether expenditure can be said to be incurred when an assessee ‘forgoes profit’ out of commercial considerations must be determined upon facts of the case. Amount forgone represents an act of relinquishment. It is a relinquishment of commercial or pecuniary prospect. If the relinquishment is for the purposes of business it would fall to be considered under section 37.

In the case of Usher’s Wiltshire Brewery Ltd. v Bruce (1914) 84 L. J. KB 417; (1915) AC 433 a brewery company acquired freehold or leasehold interest in several premises in the ordinary course of its trade and let them to publicans who were tied to purchase their beer from the company. In consideration, the company charged the publicans a rent less than the full value of the licensed premises. The House of Lords held that the company was entitled to deduct the difference between the actual rent which it received from its tied tenants and the bonafide annual value as money wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of trade. Lord Loreburn said –

“on ordinary principles of commercial trading, such loss arising from letting tied houses at reduced rents is obviously a sound commercial outlay”

The above was upheld by Supreme Court in the case of CIT v S.C. Kothari (1971) 82 ITR 794. The Apex court in the case of CIT v Chandulal Keshavlal & Co (1960) 38 ITR 601 held that amount forgone for the purpose of business is an allowable expenditure. Section 10(2) (xv) of the 1922 Act required that the expenses must be laid out for the purpose of business of the assessee, and further that they should not be in the nature of capital expenditure. In Chandulal Keshavlal’s case, the managing agent’s commission was agreed at ` 309,114. However, at the oral request of the board of directors of the managed company the managing agent agreed to accept a sum of `100,000 only as its commission. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the commission amount forgone constituted expenditure for the managing agents. The Supreme Court held:

(i)    that in cases such as this case, in order to justify deduction the sum must be given up for reasons of commercial expediency: it might not be voluntary, but so long as it was incurred for the assessee’s benefit the deduction was allowable;

(ii)    that as the Appellate Tribunal had found that the amount was expended for reasons of commercial expediency, and was not given as a bounty but to strengthen the managed company so that if the financial position of the managed company became strong the assessee would benefit thereby, the Appellate Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that it was a deductible expense under section 10(2)(xv).   

Based on the aforesaid, one could claim the ESOP discount u/s. 37 as allowable. Such discount –

–    Is an amount forgone for the purposes of employee welfare

–    Is not a bounty/ gratuitous expense, but paid in lieu of employee service

–    Is aimed at retaining and encouraging the employees thereby benefitting the business of the Company

Claim of expense under section 37 as “losses”

As stated earlier, section 37 presupposes expenditure. Per contra, expenditure does not always mean that an amount should have gone out from one’s pocket. It could include a ‘loss’. A loss may be allowed as expenditure under section 37.

The Supreme Court in the case of CIT v Woodward Governor India (P) Ltd. and Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. (2009) 312 ITR 254 (SC) held that, loss arising on account of fluctuation in the rate of exchange in respect of loans taken for revenue purposes was allowable as deduction u/s. 37 of the Act.

In the case of M.P. Financial Corporation v CIT (1987) 165 ITR 765 (MP) the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the expression “expenditure” as used in Section 37 may, in the circumstances of a particular case, cover an amount which is a “loss” even though the amount has not gone out from the pocket of the assessee.

Thus, ESOP discount satisfies the first condition irrespective of whether it is characterised as ‘expenditure’, ‘amount forgone’ or ‘loss’. Non-capital expenditure incurred for the purposes of business should be covered under the omnibus residuary section

37.    Even otherwise, the same would be allowable under section 28. The deduction is founded on ordinary commercial principles of computing profits.

Condition 2 – Expenditure should not be personal in nature

A company is an artificial juridical person. It is a distinct assessable entity under the Act. A company being an artificial juridical person cannot have personal expenses. The ‘personal’ facet is associated with human beings. It is concerned with human body or physical being.

The Supreme Court in State of Madras v. G.J Coelho (1964) 53 ITR 186 (SC) held that personal expenses would include expenses on the person of the assessee or to satisfy his personal needs such as clothes, food, etc. Needs such as clothes, food are associated with human beings and not with any artificial juridical person. The Gujarat High court in the case of Sayaji Iron & Engineering Company v. CIT (2002) 253 ITR 749 held that a company cannot have any personal expenditure. Accordingly, ESOP discount cannot be disallowed branding it to be personal expenditure.

Condition 3 – Expenditure to be laid out wholly and exclusively for business

This is one of the most important and debated conditions of section 37. To qualify as a deduction u/s. 37:

–    The expense must be wholly and exclusively incurred; and

–    Such incurrence must be for the purposes of business.

Meaning of ‘wholly and exclusively’

The words “wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business” have not been defined in the Act. Judicial precedents have explained the meaning of this phrase. “The adverb ‘wholly’ in the phrase ‘laid out or expended. . . for business’ refers to the quantum of expenditure. The adverb ‘exclusively’ has reference to the object or motive of the act behind the expenditure. Unless such motive is solely for promoting the business, the expenditure will not qualify for deduction” – C.J. Patel & Co. v. CIT (1986) 158 ITR 486 (Guj). ESOP discount concerns wholly and exclusively with employee welfare measures.

Meaning of ‘For the purposes of business’

The expression ‘for the purpose of business’ in section 37(1) of the Act (corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act) is wider in scope than the expression ‘for the purpose of earning profits’. The Apex court in the case of CIT v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd (1964) 53 ITR 140 (SC) elucidating the concept “for the purpose of business” held –

“Its range is wide; it may take in not only the day-to-day running of a business but also the relationship of its administration and modernisation of its machinery, it may include measures for the preservation of the business and for the protection of its assets and property from expropriation or coercive process; it may also comprehend payment of statutory dues and taxes imposed as a pre-condition to commence or for carrying on of a business; it may comprehend many other acts incidental to the carrying on of a business.”
(Emphasis supplied)

This decision of the Apex court upheld the wide scope of the phrase ‘for the purposes of business’. It covers within its ambit all expenditure which enables a person to carry on and maintain the business, including any incidental or ancillary activities thereto. The range of this phrase is broad to encompass not only routine business expenses but also incidental expenses.

The wide scope of this phrase can also be appreciated by contrasting with the language used in section 57 of the Act. Section 57 of the Act enlists deduction allowable under the head “Income from other sources”. Similar to section 37, clause (iii) of section 57 is a residuary deduction available in case of “Other sources” income. However, there is a difference in the language – section 57 requires expenditure to be incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of making or earning such income.

In the treatise ‘The Law and Practice of Income Tax’ by Kanga and Palkiwala, (9th edition – page 1211) the learned authors observe –

“There is a marked difference between the language of section 37(1) and section 57(iii), both of which are residuary provisions under the respective heads; whereas this section [section 57(iii)] allows expenditure ‘laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of making or earning such income’, the allowance under section 37 is in wider terms – ‘laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business or profession’.

“For the purposes of business” alludes to business expediency. ‘Business expediency’ is a broad term. The best person to judge the business expediency is the businessman himself. Courts have consistently held that the necessity or otherwise of the commercial expediency is to be decided from the point of view of the businessman and not by the subjective standard of reasonableness of the revenue. The absence of business connection should not mar the application of the test of business expediency.

The Apex court in the case of S.A. Builders Limited v CIT (2007) 288 ITR 1 (SC) explaining the meaning and scope of the phrase “commercial expediency”, held –

“The expression “commercial expediency” is an expression of wide import and includes such expenditure as a prudent businessman incurs for the purpose of business. The expenditure may not have been incurred under any legal obligation, but yet it is allowable as business expenditure if it was incurred on grounds of commercial expediency.”

The test of the “need for expenditure” is alien to section 37. Any expenditure made on ground of commercial expediency is to be allowed even though there is no legal necessity or even if it is not for direct or immediate benefit of trade. A sum of money voluntarily expended indirectly to facilitate business is entitled to be allowed as expenditure on grounds of commercial expediency.

The following are some of the observations from judicial precedents which further explain “Commercial expediency”:

In the case of Atherton v British Insulated & Helsby Cables Limited 10 TC 155, 191 (HL), the court held –

“A sum of money expended, not necessarily and with a view to a direct and immediate benefit to the trade, but voluntarily and on the grounds of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business, may yet be expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of trade.”

The Supreme Court in the case of CIT v Panipat Woollen & General Mills Co. Ltd. [1976] 103 ITR 66 (SC) observed –

“The test of commercial expediency cannot be reduced in the shape of a ritualistic formula, nor can it be put in a water-tight compartment so as to be confined in a strait-jacket. The test merely means that the Court will place itself in the position of a businessman and find out whether the expenses incurred could be said to have been laid out for the purpose of the business or the transaction was merely a subterfuge for the purpose of sharing or dividing the profits ascertained in a particular manner. It seems that in the ultimate analysis the matter would depend on the intention of the parties as spelt out from the terms of the agreement or the surrounding circumstances, the nature or character of the trade or venture, the purpose for which the expenses are incurred and the object which is sought to be achieved for incurring those expenses”
(Emphasis supplied)

Loss due to ESOP discount is necessitated by business expediency. The business expediency is the compensation and recognition to its employees. Over the years the concept of master-servant relationship is fading. Sharing of wealth of an employer with his employee is the order of the day. Stock option is one such mode of employee participation deserving fiscal encouragement. The Directive Principles of State Policy, enshrined in the Indian Constitution, lays down that “the State shall take steps by suitable legislation or in any other way, to secure the participation of workers in the management of undertakings, establishment or other organisations engaged in any industry” (Article 43A).

ESOP is an employee retention and recognition strategy. It enables the company to beat the pace of attrition. There is a direct nexus between incurrence of this expenditure and the business of the Company. The expenditure so incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business and necessitated by commercial expediency, would satisfy the aforesaid condition.

Condition 4 – The expenditure must not be a capital expenditure

The demarcation between revenue and capital is not a straight jacket exercise. One may have to get into the facts of each case for such determination.

In Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v CIT (1955) 27 ITR 34, the Supreme Court held that due to diversity in the nature of business, a particular test cannot determine the nature of expenditure. The Supreme Court held that it is the object of expenditure which determines its nature. As per the Supreme Court “The aim and object of the expenditure would determine the character of the expenditure whether it is a capital expenditure or revenue expenditure. The source or the manner of the payment would then be of no consequence.”
(Emphasis supplied)

The nature of expenditure must be determined from the point of view of the payer. The Madras High Court in CIT v Ashok Leyland Ltd (1969) 72 ITR 137, 143 (affirmed by Supreme Court in (1972) 86 ITR 549) pointed out that the generally accepted distinction between ‘capital expenditure’ and ‘revenue expenditure’ is susceptible to modification under peculiar circumstances of a case. The relevant observations are as follows:

“A clear-cut dichotomy cannot be laid down in the absence of a statutory definition of “capital and revenue expenditure”. Invariably it has to be considered from the point of view of the payer. In the ultimate analysis, the conclusion of the admissibility of an allowance claimed is one of law, if not a mixed question of law and fact. The word “capital” connotes permanency and capital expenditure is, therefore, closely akin to the concept of securing something tangible or intangible property, corporeal or incorporeal rights, so that they could be of a lasting or enduring benefit to the enterprise in issue. Revenue expenditure, on the other hand, is operational in its perspective and solely intended for the furtherance of the enterprise. This distinction, though candid and well accepted, yet is susceptible to modification under peculiar and distinct circumstances”.

(Emphasis supplied)

The nature of business and expenditure are decisive factors in determining the answer to the controversy. Temptation to use decided cases must be avoided in answering the question whether a particular expenditure constitutes capital or revenue expenditure. The Supreme Court in Abdul Kayoom (KTMKM) v CIT (1962) 44 ITR 689 (SC) held –

“Each case depends on its own facts, and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough, because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, its broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. What is decisive is the nature of the business, the nature of the expenditure, the nature of the right acquired, and their relation inter se, and this is the only key to resolve the issue in the light of the general principles, which are followed in such cases.”

The aim and object of the expenditure is thus the decisive factor for determining whether a particular expenditure constitutes revenue or capital expenditure. This is ascertained by examining all aspects and surrounding circumstances. The nature of the business has to be seen. The issue must be viewed from the point of a practical and prudent businessman.

One has to determine ‘why’ the expenditure has been incurred by a businessman and not ‘how’ the expenditure has been funded by him. As observed by Supreme Court in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. case (supra), the source and manner of the payment is inconsequential for determining the nature of a particular expenditure. It is the aim and object of the expenditure that would determine its character. The Madras High Court in India Manufactures (P) Ltd v. CIT (1985) 155 ITR 770 held that for determining the nature of a particular expenditure, the manner of payment is not relevant. The Calcutta High Court in Parshva Properties Ltd v CIT (1976) 104 ITR 631 held

“…in order to determine whether the expenditure was deductible or not, it is necessary to find out in what capacity the expenditure was incurred.”

If the examination is limited to “how” the funds have been secured, the answer (to all share capital issue expenses) would be the same. It is the aspect of “why” that would help in appreciating the underlying difference in the motive, object and aim of the expenditure. The question “why” may involve determination whether the funds are for:

–   future expansion of the business;
–    the prolongation of life of an existing business;

–    forming a conceivable nucleus for posterior profit earning;

–    conduct of the business;

–    avoiding inroads and incursions into its concrete presence;

–    commercial expediency;

–    profit earning enhancement.

All of the above do not have the same purpose. The involvement and intensity with the business or its existence may not be uniform. The degree of association with the business or its conduct may vary. Some have their objective of profit earning or enhancement. Others concern the substratum of business. It would be unwise to characterise expenses associated with all the above as same. If the characterisation is not uniform, the associated expenditure is not to be branded in the same light. The attendant circumstances would have to be examined. These circumstances influence the characterisation of the associated payments.

The expenditure under discussion [viz., ESOP discount] would be allowed as business deduction only if the aim and object of the expenditure falls in the revenue field. As discussed repeatedly, the test of determining a disbursement to be ‘revenue’ in nature is fact specific. Characterisation of amounts as ‘income’ or ‘capital’ is determined as a matter of commercial substance, and not by subtleties of drafting, or by unduly literal or technical interpretations. The Apex Court in the case of Dalmia Jain and Co. Ltd. v CIT (1971) 81 ITR 754 (SC) while holding that expenditure incurred for maintenance of business is revenue in nature, observed – “The principle which has to be deduced from decided cases is that, where the expenditure laid out for the acquisition or improvement of a fixed capital asset is attributable to capital, it is a capital expenditure, but if it is incurred to protect the trade or business of the assessee then it is a revenue expenditure. In deciding whether a particular expenditure is capital or revenue in nature, what the courts have to see is whether the expenditure in question was incurred to create any new asset or was incurred for maintaining the business of the company. If it is the former it is capital expenditure, if it is the latter, it is revenue expenditure.”

As a general principle, an amount spent by an assessee for labour/ employee welfare would be deductible as revenue expenditure. Even if such expense results in an asset to the employees or third party – it is ‘revenue’ as far as it does not result in creation of capital asset for employer. Employee emoluments are revenue in nature. The Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v Machinery Manufacturing Corporation Ltd (1992) 198 ITR 559 (Cal) held –

“In our view, the question is now well settled. If the employer pays any amount to the employee which is by way of an incentive, in that event such amount shall be treated as additional emoluments and such payment is inextricably connected with the business and necessarily for commercial expediency. It cannot be said that the claim which has been made is de hors the business of the assessee. As will appear from the narration of facts, it was found that it was the payment made by the assessee for better performance and, accordingly, it must be held that such payment was for commercial expediency and incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business.”

The following points support the proposition that ESOP discount is an employee welfare measure and is bonafide revenue expenditure:

1.    Support in the Income-tax statute

ESOP benefit is taxable in the hands of the employees as ‘perquisites’ under section 17(2) of the Act. There is no dispute that salary is bona fide revenue expenditure eligible for deduction. Salary and its components would remain on revenue account whether it is paid in cash or in kind.

ESOP is remuneration in kind. It is a perquisite. It is a benefit or amenity. It is consideration for employment. The concept of ESOP evolves/ springs out from the employer-employee relationship.

Consideration for employment in the form of amenity, benefit was the subject matter of levy of fringe benefit tax. The circular of CBDT explaining and clarifying various aspects of ESOP is relevant in the context of the issue under consideration.

    Fringe Benefit Tax Circulars

The Central Board of Direct Taxes released a circular No 9/2007 dated September 20, 2007 containing frequently asked questions on ESOP. A number of issues had been raised by trade and industry at different fora after the presentation of the Finance Bill, 2007, after its enactment and also after the notification of Rule 40C.

In answer to question no. 9, the Board observed “Therefore, an employer does not have an option to tax the benefit arising on account of shares allotted or transferred under ESOPs as perquisite which otherwise is to be taxed as fringe benefit.”

FBT is a charge on expenditure. The circular acknowledges the fact that ESOP is a salary expense from the employer/ payer’s perspective. Once the payment is established as a salary, its deductibility should be unquestioned. ESOP discount is an allowable expenditure – being perquisite paid by the employer.

The FBT regime was amended to make the ESOP benefit, as susceptible to a levy of FBT. FBT by definition was a ‘consideration for employment’ in certain specified forms. ESOP discount thus constituted ‘employment related expenditure’ by the Act itself.

Section 115W(1)(b) provided for a levy of FBT on the value of concession in the context of travel. A ‘concession’ was thus conceptually encompassed within FBT since 2006. Finance Act 2008 extended the regime to cover “ESOP concession”.

As discussed earlier, section 37 is not limited to actual expenditure but also covers amount forgone. ESOP being a concession given to the employees, the same is squarely covered within the ambit of section 37.

Initially ESOP benefit was held to be outside the ambit of FBT due to the absence of computation mechanism. The law was amended and ESOP was subjected to FBT. The essence of ESOP continuing to remain a benefit or amenity to an employee and constituting a consideration for employment was confirmed.

Various questions and answer thereto in the Board circular have upheld the concept of determining nature of expenditure based on the proximate purpose. If the same yardstick is used in the case of ESOP discount, the proximate purpose is salary disbursement, incidentally resulting in increased share capital. ESOP discount thus remains revenue in nature.

    Tax withholding on salary payments under section 192

Section 192 in the Act imposes a responsibility on the employer to withhold taxes on salary payments. Salary includes perquisites. Perquisites would include benefit granted to an employee as ESOP(s). Section 192(1) of the Act reads –

“Any person responsible for paying any income chargeable under the head “Salaries” shall, at the time of payment, deduct income tax on the amount payable at the average rate of income-tax computed on the basis of the rates in force for the financial year in which the payment is made, on the estimated income of the assessee under this head for that financial year.”
(Emphasis supplied)

On a perusal of the above definition it is apparent that accrual of income and the act of payment must co-exist for the purposes of withholding tax under this provision. In the case of CIT v Tej Quebecor Printing Limited (2006) 281 ITR 170 (Del), it was held that if the salary due to the employee is not paid, there is no obligation to deduct tax at source. Conversely, if section 192 is applicable, then the law presumes a payment to have been made to an employee. Section 192 requires deduction of tax at the time of payment.

The Board issues a circular each year outlining the obligations of an employer relating to the deduction u/s. 192. Circular No. 8/2010, dated 13-12-2010 outlines such obligations for the financial year 2010-11.

Paragraph 5 of the circular mandates an employer to consider the “ESOP benefit” to an employee as a part of perquisite. Once it is a part of perquisites, it forms part of salary on which the liability to deduct tax at source fastens. The allotment of shares triggering the perquisite would constitute the act as well as the fact of payment. The circular reinforces the conclusion that ESOP benefit constitutes salary to an employee. Being a part of the salary, it should be regarded as revenue in nature and allowable as a deduction much like other perquisites.

2.    Nexus between benefit and expenditure

Under general principles, allowability of a deduction is not dependent upon character of income in the hands of the payee. In other words, the fact that a certain payment constitutes an income or capital in the hands of the recipient is not material in determining whether the payment is a revenue or capital disbursement qua the payer.

Macnaghten J said in Racecourse Betting Control Board v Wild 22 TC 182 “The payment may be a revenue payment from the point of view of the payer and a capital payment from the point of view of the receiver, and vice-versa.”

The Calcutta High Court in the case of Anglo-Persian Oil Co. (India), Ltd. v CIT (1933) 1 ITR 129 (Cal) held -“The principle that capital receipt spells capital expenditure or vice versa is simple but it is not necessarily sound. Whether a sum is received on capital or revenue account depends or may depend upon the character of the business of the recipient. Whether a payment is or is not in the nature of capital expenditure depends or may depend upon the character of the business of the payer and upon other factors related thereto.”

Income is taxable unless and otherwise exempt under the Act. However, expenditure operates on the principles of commercial expediency – it is allowable unless specifically prohibited by the Act. Based on commercial principles, ESOP discount should be an allowable expenditure in the hands of employer/ company. The fact that it does not get taxed or is taxed at a later point of time or is taxed under a different head in the hands of the employee would not be relevant.

The function of the ESOP discount forming part of employee’s income (and suffering tax accordingly) would thus support and sustain a claim for the same being reckoned as a revenue deduction in the hands of the employer. This principle has been supported by the courts on various occasions. Some of them are as below:

The Calcutta High court in the case of CIT v Britannia Industries Co Ltd (1982) 135 ITR 35 (Cal) held –

“We are fully in agreement with the view of the Tribunal that there cannot be any two different standards for assessment in respect of the employee and the employer. It is also equitable that what the payer gives is what the receiver receives.”

In the case of Weight v Salmon (1935) 19 Tax Case 174; 153 L.T.55, E.Lord Atkin said –

“..it would be a startling inconsistency to say that the director was to be taxed because he was receiving by way of remuneration money’s worth at the expense of the company, and yet that the company which was incurring the expense for purposes of its trade to remunerate the directors was not entitled to deduct that expense in ascertaining the balance of its profits and gains..”

3.    The ‘Act of giving’ and ‘act of receiving’ are two separate events

Issue of shares under ESOP scheme involves two actions. One is the giving of benefit to the employee (in the form of discount on share premium) and the other is receipt of premium by the employer/ company. They are distinct and separate from each other. The discount emerging out of the transaction is revenue in nature. It is different from the ‘premium receipt activity’ which is a capital item. Although they are inter-linked, they are two independent transactions. The act of giving a benefit would precede the act of receipt of premium. One cannot receive premium unless, the benefit is parted with. The sequence of occurrence of these two events is thus critical.

The purpose of ESOP discount has proximity to giving of benefit and not receipt of premium. Such discount emerges out of the act of giving benefit. The mere fact that subsequent receipt of premium is ‘capital’ in nature, should not militate the revenue character of the ESOP discount.

4.    There is no creation of capital asset

The expenditure is to be attributed to capital if it be made ‘with a view’ to bringing an asset or advantage, although it is not necessary that it should always result in an asset or advantage. Lord Viscount LC, in the course of the case [10 TC 155 (1926) AC 205] said –

“When an expenditure is made, not only for once and for all, but with a view to bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade, there is very good reason (in the absence of special circumstances leading to an opposite conclusion) for treating such an expenditure as properly attributable not to revenue but to capital.”

The test of enduring benefit or advantage cannot be reduced to a straight jacket formula. There may be cases where expenditure, even if incurred for obtaining an advantage of enduring benefit, may, nonetheless, be on revenue account. The test of enduring benefit may break down. Every advantage of enduring nature does not render the expenditure to be capital in character. It is only where the advantage is in the capital field that the expenditure would be disallowed for income-tax purposes. If the expenditure is incurred only to facilitate and promote business, then it would necessarily have to be considered revenue in nature and allowed as a deduction.

ESOP is a share-based payment of employee remuneration. Issue of ESOP(s) creates an ‘asset’ for the employees (in form of share investment in the Company). From a Company’s standpoint, such issue of ESOP results in emergence of a liability. It is an acknowledgment by the Company of an increase in the amount due to the shareholders. There is no capital asset created out of this transaction.

5.    ESOP – a consideration for employment services

An offer made to employee under ESOP is a mode of employee remuneration. This offer has direct nexus with the employment of a person with the organisation. Evidences of linkage with employee can be evidenced through terms of the ESOP agreement. Some of the typical clauses/ conditions are:

Eligibility criterion – wherein the person eligible for an ESOP would be employee of a particular class, or could be employee serving a certain span of time in the organisation; or could be employee who meets certain thresholds/ targets etc.

Vesting Schedule – The vesting of stock options is generally spread over a number of years of service. There could be different vesting schedule depending on the caliber and hierarchy of the employees in the organisation ladder, as also the philosophy adopted by the employee.

Transfer Restrictions or Lock in – Transfer of vested stock options are generally restricted and subject to particular occasions. The employees are not allowed to transfer options freely to others.

Termination/ Exit Clause – This clause generally provides the lapse of options on termination of employment.

The various conditions in the ESOP agreement provide the employment nexus to such stock options. The stock options are generally in appreciation of their past performances and an incentive to stay with the organisation on its growth path. They represent payment for services of the employees. These are payments/ losses borne by the employer. The discounts are offered in the course of employment. They are a form of salary payments for the services rendered. Accordingly, they are business expenditure allowable under the Act.

6.    Documentation

Documentation of any transaction is critical. Documents serve as the proof to decipher the intent of any transaction. These documents need to be interpreted based on the intention of the parties contained therein. The Apex Court in the case of Ishikawajma-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd v Director of Income-tax (2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC) commented on interpretation of documents. It held:

“In construing a contract, the terms and conditions thereof are to be read as a whole. A contract must be construed keeping in view the intention of the parties. No doubt, the applicability of the tax laws would depend upon the nature of the contract, but the same should not be construed keeping in view the taxing provisions.”

Commercial expediency and business intentions can be better understood when supported with appropriate and adequate documentation. A company is mandatorily required to maintain various documents.

An ESOP scheme also entails a huge amount of documentation. Most of these are available in the public domain. Commencing from the preliminary intent of the Board resolution, to issue of employee share certificate – there are various documents that are exchanged/ maintained.

The significance of documentation has been upheld by the Apex court in the case of CIT v Motors & General Stores (1967) 66 ITR 692 (SC) which quoted another landmark decision in the case of Lord Russell of Killowen in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminster. It held –

“It is therefore obvious that it is not open to the income-tax authorities to deduce the nature of the document from the purported intention by going behind the documents or to consider the substance of the matter or to accept it in part and reject it in part or to re-write the document merely to suit the purpose of revenue.”

The Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. M. Sreedharan (1991) 190 ITR 604 (Ker) held –

“Ground realities cannot be ignored. Existence of contemporaneous evidence and agreements should also be considered and interpreted having regard to the factual matrices.”

Documentation helps in determining tax incidence. They act as an evidence of the fact. Indian courts have repeatedly upheld the role of an agreement in the interpretation of the legal rights and obligations. A document has to be read as a whole. Neither the nomenclature of the documents nor any particular activity undertaken by the parties to the contract alone would be decisive.

It is an established principle of law that commercial documents must be construed in commercial parlance. These are business agreements and must be read as business men would read them. This principle was upheld by W T Suren & Co. v CIT (1971) 80 ITR 602 (Bom). In all taxation matters, emphasis must be placed on the business aspect of a transaction rather than the purely legal and technical aspect. This principle has been upheld in various judicial precedents; few of which are as follows:

–    CIT v Kolhia (1949) 17 ITR 545 (Bom)
–    Suren v CIT (1971) 80 ITR 602 (Bom)
–    Nilkantha v CIT (1951) 20 ITR 8 (Pat)

The following documents would assist in determining the nature of ESOP transaction:

    Director’s report

The intentions of the company are disclosed through the director report. Through their report, the directors spell out the impact on the revenue on account of ESOP. The reason to accommodate the loss is accounted to the shareholders. They are an intrinsic evidence to show that the shares were allotted by way of remuneration to compensate the services rendered in promoting, forming or running the company.

    ESOP agreement

This is an agreement between the company/ employer and the employee detailing the objectives, terms and conditions of the ESOP issue. This agreement details the aspects of scheme eligibility, terms, time-frames, rights and duties of each of the parties etc. This serves as a primary document of the ESOP transaction.

It is the drafting of this agreement and the nomenclature employed herein that has been the subject of a severe scrutiny of the Revenue authorities. ESOP is essentially an employee remuneration contract (in addition to the employee contract). However, as per the Revenue’s interpretation, the emergence of shares is to be superimposed on the employee remuneration element, coloring and converting the entire transaction as a “share issue” transaction.

The mere fact that the agreement intends to make the employees the stakeholders does not dilute or dilate the character of the transaction. The intent is to remunerate. It is recognition tool. The transaction is not to be re-written to say that it is a “share issue” transaction. By describing the allotment of ESOP as “towards giving equity stake”, the motive for conferring the benefit cannot be confounded.

It is a trite saying that remuneration need not generally be effected by systematic and recurring monetary payments. There could also be compensation in kind. ESOP is a typical example of a payment in kind.

7.    Utilisation of expenditure is important – not the source

A reason why ESOP discount is not regarded as revenue is possibly the attribute of ‘resultant permanency’. Share capital and the company’s existence are inseparable. Shares survive as long as the company exists. Possibly therefore, expenditure referable to increase in share capital is regarded as ‘capital in nature’.

The question is – whether the aspect of life of share capital is determinative? Or is it the purpose of utilisation that is decisive? Share capital may be utilised for creating a profit making apparatus. It may, on the other hands be utilised for a profit making activity. In the latter utilisation, the capital is churned over. It keeps changing form. In the former, the form remains largely unimpaired – save the depletion in value due to lapse of time or usage. This distinction should govern characterisation for tax purposes also.

It is not that every expenditure involving/ pertaining to the subject of share capital that is to be pigeonholed as not allowable as a deduction under section 37. The Supreme Court in its decision in CIT v General Insurance Corporation (2006) 286 ITR 232 held that expenses by way of stamp duty and registration fee for issue of bonus shares are revenue in nature. The Supreme Court held that the allotment of bonus shares did not result in the acquisition of any benefit or advantage of an enduring nature. In this decision, the Supreme Court no doubt approved the principle in the cases Brooke Bond India Limited v CIT (supra) and Punjab Industrial Development Corporation Ltd v. CIT (supra). However, it recognised that every expenditure connected with share capital is not necessarily capital in nature.

The Supreme Court in General Insurance Corporation’s case approved the decision of Bombay High Court in Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn Ltd v CIT (1984) 145 ITR 793. In the said decision, the Bombay High Court held it is not essential or mandatory that an expenditure incurred in connection with the raising of additional capital requires disallowance. The Bombay High Court in Shri Ram Mills Ltd v. CIT 195 ITR 295 interpreting its decision in Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation’s case made the following observation:

“In the case of Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn Ltd. v. CIT [1984] 145 ITR 793, this Court held that it was not that every expenditure incurred in connection with the raising of additional capital that required disallowance. Expenditure such as legal expenses, printing expenses, which a trader is expected, to incur in the course of its capacity as trader have to be allowed as revenue expenditure even though a part of them might relate to the raising of the additional capital”

It is to be noted that the Supreme Court in Brooke Bond India Limited v. CIT (supra) and Punjab Industrial Development Corporation Ltd v. CIT (supra) had affirmed the decision of Bombay High Court in Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation’s case.

The Jodhpur bench of Rajasthan High Court in CIT v. Secure Meters Ltd (2008) 321 ITR 611 held that expenses incurred in connection with issue of quasi equity viz., convertible debentures would constitute revenue expenditure. The Karnataka High Court recently in CIT v ITC Hotels Ltd. (2010) 190 Taxman 430 has held to the same effect.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Warner Hindustan Ltd v CIT (1988) 171 ITR 224 was called upon to adjudicate on two issues. The first issue was whether claim of the assessee-company that the legal and consultation fees in connection with the issue of bonus shares is an allowable business expenditure is correct or not? The second issue was whether the amount spent by the assessee-company by way of fees paid to Registrar of Companies for increasing its authorised capital was deductible as revenue expenditure? The High Court held that both would constitute revenue expenditure in the hands of the assessee-company. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court in Punjab Industrial Development Corporation Ltd v CIT (supra) disapproved the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court only with regard to the second issue and not the first issue. In other words, the Supreme Court had not questioned the revenue character of legal and consultation fees paid in connection with issue of bonus shares.

Besides, one could look at various instances wherein the utilisation of expenditure is important – the form or source is irrelevant. Today’s fast track business world does not intend to issue shares only for increasing the capital base. The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) has released Discussion Papers on various aspects related to Foreign Direct Investment. In a series of these Discussion Papers, ‘Issue of shares for considerations other than cash’ has also been included. This discussion paper enlists some of the instances wherein shares are issued on non-cash considerations towards the following:

–    Trade Payables
–    Pre-operative expenses/ pre-incorporation expenses (including payment of rent)
–    Others

These transactions when viewed from the income-tax standpoint, leaves us with the question – whether these are allowable expenses, when discharged in the form of shares. Would it be possible to hold that payment of ‘rent’ is not an allowable expenditure as the same has been discharged through issue of shares? Rent is certainly allowable for tax purposes. So would be fee for technical services which is paid for in shares. The same analogy should be extended to ESOP discount. ESOP discount arising on discharge of salary liability should be allowable in the hands of the employer/ company.

In summary, ESOP discount satisfies all the conditions stipulated for claim of expense under section 37 based on the following counts:

–    ESOP discount is a forbearance of profit and hence would qualify as an ‘expenditure’;

–    Even if such discount does not qualify as ‘expenditure’, it may be allowed as ‘profit forgone’;

–    It is not a an expenditure of personal nature;

–    Being an employee remuneration, the expenditure is laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the assessee – employee retention and recognition; and

–   The expenditure is not capital in nature.

(to be continued………)

What does ‘settlement’ mean?

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Recently one of the tax journals reported a judgment delivered by the Madras High Court in its writ jurisdiction on the powers of the Income Tax Settlement Commission.2 The honourable High Court in this judgment has held that the Settlement Commission does not have power to settle the case at the income higher than what is disclosed by the applicant in the settlement application, as the Law does not authorise the Commission to assess the applicant’s income. The High Court delivered this judgment following its similar decisions given in the cases of Ace Investments3 and Canara Jewellers.

The Court has reasoned that according to the provisions of the section 245C(1)5, the Settlement Commission can admit only such assessee’s settlement application who has made ‘full and true disclosure’ of its income before the Commission. The Court has held that making of ‘full and true disclosure’ is one of the pre-condition for valid application. Therefore, settling income higher than income disclosed by the applicant would amount to holding firstly, that the applicant’s income disclosure in the application was not ‘full and true’ and secondly, it would also amount to assessing the applicant’s income. The Court further held that the Commission should dismiss such application leaving the option to the applicant to work out the legal remedies when it becomes clear to the Commission that the disclosure of the applicant is not full and true. However, in any case, the Commission cannot proceed to assess the income of the applicant, as the Commission is not empowered to assess the income. Hence, the settlement order assessing the applicant’s income is without jurisdiction, bad in law and void ab initio.

In the backdrop of the above judgment, this article discusses some of the arguments on the powers of the Settlement Commission particularly as to whether the Commission has power to assess the applicant’s income. It also discusses the pre-condition of ‘full and true’ disclosure for the admission of the case before the Settlement Commission. It may be mentioned that the honourable Court did not have the occasion to consider and give its findings on many of the arguments advanced in this article, as the parties did not place the same before the Court.

Concept of ‘Settlement’ After this judgment, many have wondered and have raised a question as to if the Settlement Commission is not empowered to assess the income then what is the job of the Settlement Commission ? The obvious known answer to this question is that the job of the Settlement Commission is to ‘settle’ the income of the applicant. However, this answer leads to more fundamental questions as to what is the meaning of ‘settlement’ ? Does ‘settlement’ includes assessment ? Answer to these questions will vary; as the Act does not define the word ‘settlement’, nor does it provide clear answer to the second question. This article makes a humble attempt to answer these questions.

According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘settlement’ means ‘an agreement ending a dispute or lawsuit’. However, it also may be worthwhile to discuss ‘settlement’ conceptually rather than discussing only its legal meaning. The concept of ‘settlement’ may be a better-appreciated form the familiar occurrence of ‘out of the court settlement’6. The parties resolve the dispute among them possibly with the spirit of ‘give and take’ in the ‘settlement out of the court’. From it, one may infer that; ‘settlement’ is a resolution of the dispute possibly in the spirit of compromise shown by both the sides.

The Settlement Scheme in the Income-tax Act envisages a settlement incorporating the elements of compromise, according to which an applicant pays tax on the income not disclosed before the Income-tax Department and the Department in return may have to forego levying penalty and initiating prosecution. Further, both the sides give up their right to further appeal on the issues decided against them by the Settlement Commission. It may be recalled that the Supreme Court in Brijlal’s7 case has equated the dispute resolution method adopted by the Commission with arbitration. The similarity with the arbitration is not only with the Settlement Commission’s method of the dispute resolution but due to the fact that there is finality in the decision of the Commission and also due to the fact that the applicant cannot withdraw after he submits himself to the Settlement Commission. There is no provision under which the Department also can withdraw from the proceedings before the Commission. Finality of the order and submission without the possibility of the withdrawal thereafter, are essential ingredients of the alternate dispute resolution methods.

In the case of B. N. Bhattachargee8, the Supreme Court has held that the Settlement Commission is a Tribunal. It is obvious that the function of the Tribunal is to adjudicate the dispute between two parties. Based on these positions it becomes clear that the work before the Commission is limited to the resolution of dispute between two sides by way of arbitration on the issues raised by the applicant in its application and the issues raised by the Commissioner in its report on the applicant’s application. This jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission is provided in the section 245D(4) which reads as follows:

‘the Settlement Commission may, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, pass such order as it thinks fit on the matters covered by the application and any other matter relating to the case not covered by the application, but referred to in the report of the Commissioner u/ss.(1) or u/ss.(3)’

‘Settlement’ includes limited power of assessment The Supreme Court has held that the Settlement Commission passes the ‘Order’, but does not ‘assess’ income and its ‘Order’ is not described either as original assessment or reassessment.9 However, The Supreme Court in Brijlal’s case10 has mentioned that ‘When Parliament uses the word “as if such aggregate would constitute total income”, it presupposes that under the special procedure the aggregation of the returned income plus income disclosed would result in computation of total income, which is the basis for levy of tax on the undisclosed income is nothing but ‘assessment’.’ These decisions may appear to be contradictory on the Commission’s power of assessing income, however it is not so.

It may be necessary to understand the term ‘assessment’ for appreciating the above judgments. The Supreme Court has explained this term in the judgment delivered by the three-Member Bench in the case of S. Sanakappa11 as under:

‘. . . . the word ‘assessment’ is used in the IT Act in a number of provisions in a comprehensive sense and includes all proceedings, starting with the filing of the return or issue of notice and ending with determination of the tax payable by the assessee. Though in some sections, the word ‘assessment’ is used only with reference to computation of income, in other sections it has more comprehensive meaning mentioned by us above.’

The Act has entrusted the work of assessing income to the Assessing Officer by providing procedural machinery provisions and providing enabling powers such as carrying out enquiries and verifications. On the contrary, the Law has not empowered the officers of the Commission to carry out verifications to arrive at settled income although the Settlement Commission enjoys all the powers of the Income-tax Authority u/s.245F(1). Further, time provided to the Commission for settling the case is not the same as provided for completing the assessment. Therefore, the Act does not envisage the Commission the work of the assessing applicant’s income in the same way as the Law has entrusted it to the Assessing Officer in view of its limited jurisdiction, lesser time available, and in absence of the powers of carrying out enquiries and verification to the Officers of the Commission. Therefore the term of ‘assessment’ cannot have a comprehensive meaning as mentioned in the above judgment of the Supreme Court with respect to the work done by the Commission. This aspect is clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Brijlal12 by holding that, ‘It contemplates assessment by settlement and not by way of regular assessment or reassessment u/s.143(1) or u/s.143(3) or u/s.144 of the Act.’

However, the Commission is required to settle the issues before it in a fair manner taking assistance of the Officers of the Commission when necessary and by taking independent view of the issues which are required to be settled. The Commission in this process may determine income, which would amount to assessment as held by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Commission does have power to assess the applicant’s income, although limited to the issues before it.

This conclusion is also supported by the provisions of the section 245D(6). It provides that ‘Every order passed u/ss.(4) shall provide for the terms of settlement including any demand by way of tax, penalty or interest, the manner in which any sum due under the settlement shall be paid and all other matters to make the settlement effective…’ This provision does not make sense, if the Commission is not empowered to settle the case at the income higher than what is disclosed by it in the settlement application. The demand can only be raised if the Commission decides any issue against the applicant based on the records and evidence before it.

The Settlement Scheme is in favour of Revenue


The arbitration scheme of the Settlement Commission is different in certain aspects from the arbitration method provided in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Unlike the arbitration method provided in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Commission has powers to call and examine records of one of the parties before it — i.e., Income-tax Department, it also has suo motto power to have the issues investigated by the Commissioner, even when the Commissioner does not request for it. Moreover, it may be interesting to note that the Commission assumes all the powers of the Income-tax Authority after filing of the application before the Commission, but it does not assume the powers of the Court. Further, preconditions for the filing of application, such as requirement of disclosure of additional income not disclosed before the Assessing Officer and requirement of disclosure of the manner in which it was derived show that the scheme is designed in favour of the Revenue.

The legal provision that all the Members of the Commission are ex-Revenue Service senior officers and are not accounting professionals from outside the Department also support this proposition. Moreover, the Law does not create distinction among Members of the Commission, such as ‘Accountant Member’ and ‘Judicial Member’ as provided in the case of the Members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, considering powers of the Income-tax Authority given to the Commission, power to have investigation conducted, nature of pre-conditions for the valid application before the Commission and the composition of the Commission, it is clear that the Settlement Scheme is in favour of the Revenue. These aspects of the Settlement Scheme as against the provisions in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 otherwise do not make sense, but seem to have been provided with the object mentioned above.

Disclosure of ‘full and true’ income according to the applicant

In the case of the Ajmera Housing Corporation13, the Supreme Court has held that ‘full and true disclosure’ is one of the basic requirements for valid settlement application. The Supreme Court in this case has further held that unless the Commission records its satisfaction on this aspect, it will not have any jurisdiction to pass any order on the matters covered by the application. This judgment as understood by me, lays down the Law in the facts of the case, in which the applicant after disclosing Rs.1.94 crore before the Commission had revised its disclosure by filing revised application containing confidential annexure and related papers and offering additional income of Rs.11.41 crore. On these facts, the Supreme Court in para 36 of its order has held that the disclosure of the applicant could not be considered as ‘full and true’.14

It may be pointed out that the Act does not provide for fulfilment of this requirement at the satisfaction of the Settlement Commission. Therefore, in absence of the statutory requirement of ascertaining ‘full and true’ disclosure at the satisfaction of the Commission, fulfilment of this condition should be viewed from the applicant’s perspective. For example, applicant’s disclosure without including income on a legal issue may be ‘full and true’ according to the best of his knowledge and belief. However, merely because the Settlement Commission settling the case takes a view against the applicant on such an issue the applicant’s disclosure made in the application would not cease to be ‘full and true’. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Ajmera should be read as the Commission should record its satisfaction that the disclosure is ‘full and true’ to the best of knowledge and belief of the applicant at the stage of the admission of the application.

Moreover, the Law does not intend that the Commission arrive at satisfaction of ‘full and true’ disclosure at the stage of the admission of the case. Such a provision would not only make the entire process of the settlement redundant which is followed after the admission of the case, but also it is practically impossible to arrive at such a judgment without hearing both the sides at length and examining the records. It is settled that the Law does not require achieving the impossible.

The requirement of making ‘full and true disclosure’ is provided to ensure that the applicant honestly and with the bona fide intentions invokes the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission without playing the game of hide and seek. It is held in many Court judgments that the facility of the Settlement Commission for resolution of disputes is not available to the dishonest assessees.

Revival of the abated proceedings

Presently, neither the section 245HA of the Income-tax Act, nor the Clause 280 of the proposed Direct Taxes Code (DTC) allow revival of the abated proceedings before the Assessing Officer when the Court annuls the settlement order passed u/s.245D(4) or holds the settlement order void. It may be mentioned that the Finance Act 2008 had inserted such a provision in the section 153A on the search assessment to provide revival of the assessment or reassessment proceedings in case of the annulment of assessment or reassessment. Therefore, it would not be surprising that the Government would introduce such an amendment in the near future on similar lines in the Chapter-XIX-A of the Income-tax Act on the Settlement Commission to prevent the assessees taking the advantage by getting declared the Settlement Order void on technical grounds. At the same time, such annulment also prevents the reassessment of income due to lapse of the time permitted by law. The Government may find it difficult to accept such a situation, in which the assessees would get away by paying lesser revenue than what was due from it.

To conclude, this author is of the view that the Settlement Commission is empowered to settle the case at the income above what is disclosed before the Commission as the concept of ‘full and true disclosure’ should be viewed from the applicant’s perspective.

It is besides the point that an enactment of the Law is a dynamic process. Once the Law is amended as discussed above, the arguments and discussion on the topics such as this become irrelevant.

1. The author is Commissioner of Income-tax. The
views expressed in the article are personal views of the author and not
necessarily of the Government of India.

2. G. Jayaraman v. Settlement Commission (Additional Bench) (2011) 196 TAXMANN 552 (Mad.).

3. Ace Investments v. Settlement Commission (2003) 264 ITR 571 (Mad.), (2004) 186 CTR (Mad.) 486.

4. Canara Jewellers v. Settlement Commission (2009) 315 ITR 328 (Mad.), (2009) 226 CTR (Mad.) 79.

5  Section 245C(1).

‘An
assessee may, at any stage of a case relating to him, make an application in
such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, and containing a full and
true disclosure of his income which has not been disclosed before the Assessing
Officer, the manner in which such income has been derived, the additional
amount of income-tax payable on such income and such other particulars as may
be prescribed, to the Settlement Commission to have the case settled and any
such application shall be disposed of in the manner hereinafter provided:

6. Section 89(1) of the Civil
Procedure Code deals with the ‘Settlement outside the Court’

7       Bij Lal v. CIT, (2010) 328
ITR 477 (SC) at p-506, (2010) 235 CTR (SC) 417

8       CIT v. B. N. Bhattacgagee,
(1979) 118 ITR 461 (SC) at p-480, (1979) 10 CTR (SC) 354

9       Para-12, CIT v. Hindustan
Bulk Carriers, (2003) 259 ITR 449 (SC) at p-463, (2003) 179 CTR (SC) 362

10      Para-11, Bij Lal v. CIT,
(2010) 328 ITR 477 (SC) at p-501, (2010) 235 CTR (SC) 417

11      Para-2, S. Sankappa v. ITO, (1968) 68 ITR 760
(SC)

12      See note 9
13      Ajmera Housing Corporation
v. CIT (2010) 326 ITR 642 (SC), 234 CTR (SC) 642

14      At p 659, see note 12

Tax Acounting Standards – Do we need them?

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The Central Goverenment has recently exposed drafts of two Tax Accounting Standards which it proposes to issue under the provisions of section 145(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It may be recalled that soon after the introduction of the provision empowering the Central Government to issue accounting standards, two standards were issued, which were more or less inverbatim reproduction of the accounting standards issued by the Institute.

The Government believes that a tax payer can avoid payment of taxes by following a particular method of accounting and the standards issued by the Institute offer flexibility.

This belief of the Government is misplaced. The standards issued by the Institute alongwith Accounting Standards Interpretation have been adopted by the Government on the recommendations of the National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards and issued them as standards applicable to Companies under section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956. These standards do not provide for alternatives except in few cases. These exceptions are also for valid reasons and do not lead to avoidance of payment of taxes. In some cases it may only result in timing difference. Has the Government carried out study of revenue leakage or postponement of revenue due to the so called flexibility in the accounting standards? It may be of interest if the Government can publish the figures of lost revenue.

The attitude of the Ministry of Finance of trying to collect the revenue at the earliest without having regard to the business reality needs a change. One has seen this attitude in collection of Service Tax as well. Service Tax for the last quarter of the financial year has to be paid even before the end of the fiscal year.

In July 2002, the Government, appointed a Committee for formation of accounting standards. This Committee categorically recommended that separate accounting should not be issued under the tax law and where there is leakage of revenue appropriate legislative amendments should be made. The Government did not accept the reccomendations.

CBDT therefore constituted a new Committee in December 2010. The report of this Committee has not been made public. Based on the recommendations of this Committee, the drafts of two Tax Accounting Standards have been issued. CBDt proposes to issue more standards in due cource.

It is now proposed that based on the Tax Accounting Standards the tax payer should prepare a reconciliation statement. The tax payer, on the face of it will, not be required to maintain two sets of books of account, one in accordance with the standards issued by the Institute (or Company Accounting Standards) and another set in accordance with the Tax Accounting Standards. However, the Government has conveniently ignored the fact that enormous effort will be required to prepare the proposed reconciliation statement.

Instead of harmonising the taxable income with the accounting income and making computation simple, the computation of taxable income from income in the financial books will become cumbersome, leading to unintended errors. This will not reduce litigation but only increase it.

The Tax Accounting Standards will open a backdoor way for advancing the year of taxability of a receipt and postponing allowability of expenditure without amending the Income Tax Act. It will not be surprising if through these standards attempt is made to change nature of a receipt from capital to revenue .

Kautilya has propounded the theory that the king should collect tax the way bee collects honey from the flower without causing any damage to it. Citizens are willing to pay their fair share of taxes provided the tax rates are reasonable, administration is fair and transparent, policies of the Government inspire confidence in the taxpayers and there is mutual trust. Tax Accounting Standards will only make payment of taxes, a burdensome exercise, even more burdensome without corresponding benefits.

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Kabir and the art of giving

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Kabir is talked about a lot, admired a lot and even worshipped by many, but hardly followed. This is true of most of the great people. We end up becoming their admirers rather than followers. One of my senior colleagues in IAS used to tell me, that when people listen to talks of great achievers, most of them are ‘prabhavit’ (impressed), but rarely ‘parivartit’ (reformed). We go home and extol virtues of the great speaker, but most of the time fail to bring in our lives the changes suggested by that great person.

Even few couplets of Kabir are sufficient to change our lives provided we truly follow them.

Society is an amalgamation of people. If people are good, society will be good. All of us want others to be good, while for us we have different standards. And this is the reason for the pitiable state in which we find the society today.

One way to reverse this trend is to follow what Kabirji says —

And it is because of this lack of introspection and self-correction that we are still grappling with the same problems against which Kabirji fought centuries ago — Hindu-Muslim differences, casteism, religious fundamentalism, ritualism, etc. Today we are supposedly more ‘educated’ than what people were during Kabirji’s time. But these problems have taken a turn for the worse. When an illiterate like Kabir could raise his voice against all such evils and fight resolutely, then why we the so called educated cannot ? But how can we expect them to fight the woes of society when todays educated cannot even take care of their parents and when they fight bitterly with their siblings and stab their friends in the back.

Maybe it is because of our education system today. Earlier the two main purposes for which people sent their wards for education were ‘character-building and knowledge’. Now it just teaches a person to become a money making factory. Parents are heard telling their wards — quickly do a course so that you can start earning, or choose a course which will fetch crores of income. We are not bothered about gaining knowledge or becoming wise. One of the greatest educationist and visionary — Benjamin Franklin has said — “the greatest aim and purpose of all education is — service to society”.

Of what use is our education if we cannot put it to use to eradicate the social evils or fight against the injustice or illogical things happening in the society. If Kabirji could do, why can’t we ?

It is therefore heartening to see that BCAS is a place where the education that one had is being put to the service of society. In my numerous interactions with the members and on going through the Namaskar articles I have found that an earnest attempt is being made to do something about the various problems of the society. I have been particularly inspired by two of the senior members — Narayan Varma and Pradeep Shah and have been regularly working with them in my own small way. This article too is an outcome of that.

Coming back to Kabir, as I have mentioned earlier, we do not need to do too much research on all that he has said. Even if we can just understand and imbibe a few of his teachings from the ocean of wisdom that he gave, we can do wonders, both for ourselves as well as for the society.

As Namaskar very often champions the cause of ‘giving’, I would now quote some of Kabir’s sayings about ‘giving’ :

It is amazing to see how Kabir could pack so much wisdom in just one Doha ! It talks about contentment, compassion, seva and giving (even when there is barely enough). In his view, man should ask God to give him only as much as is required to fulfil his needs. Whereas we all continue to run after money and matter and realise very late in life that we failed to do all those things that make our life worth ‘living’.

Nature takes its own time and everything has its own pace. But today there is a mad rush for everything which leaves us all with lots of tensions, blood pressures and frustrations. We have to learn to do our jobs and detach ourselves from its results which would happen at their own pace. We have to be patient and not hanker after them.

What is the point of being a big person when you are of no use to anybody ? It is like being a date tree. It is tall but a passerby cannot get respite from the hot sun under its shade and its fruits are too high and cannot be eaten by people.

Trees do not eat their fruits; rivers do not drink their water. Saints live this life to do good to others.

Says Kabir that making gifts does not diminish one’s wealth just as taking a beakful of grains by a little bird does not diminish the grain heap or the river water does not diminish even though it is extensively usd by a large number of people.

Like when water starts increasing in the boat, we have to throw the excess water out of it, similarly when wealth starts increasing, we should start giving it away. Otherwise in both cases there is the danger of drowning.

I would like to conclude by repeating what I mentioned earlier. Kabir is not something that we should keep in the museum. We have to try to understand and imbibe his teachings in our lives. It will benefit us, our society, our country and even the entire world.

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PART B: THE RTI ACT, 2005

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12-10-2011 was the RTI Foundation Day.

RTI instrument completed six years of its glorious use to make India’s democracy participative and meaningful, in exposing many scams and for the first time in the history of our nation, put some of the MPs, MLAs, Ministers (including CM) and business magnets in jail.

BCAS foundation, PCGT and IMC held a function on 12-10-2011. The keynote address was delivered there by Justice (Retd.) Shri C. S. Dharmadhikari. We also brought out two-page supplement in MID DAY on 12-10-2011, the same is available to glance at in BCAS & PCGT Library.

This was followed by 6th Annual Convention 2011 on 14th & 15th October at Vigyan Bhavan, New Delhi.

I was invited by the Central Information Commission who organises this convention each year and I attended it.

Delegates from Maharashtra along with two Maharashtra Information Commissioners and a Central Information Commissioner here under at the 6th Annual Convention held a New Delhi.

Four speeches were delivered at the Inaugural session:

Welcome speech by Shri Satyananda Mishra, Chief CIC

Prime minister’s Inaugural Address

Address by Shri V. Narayanasamy, Hon’ble Minister of State (PMO & Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions)

Vote of Thanks by Shri M. L. Sharma, CIC. There were 4 technical sessions as under:

Group I : Transparency and accountability: with special reference to Public-Private Partnership Projects

Group II : RTI Act: potential and efficacy in curbing corruption and grievance redressal

Group III : RTI Act, exemption provisions and Second Schedule

Group IV : Experiences and Prospects of Information Commissions

Finally, presentations were made by chair persons and panelists of each of 4 groups, mostly through power-point presentations.

The Convention concluded with valedictory address by Shri Nitish Kumar, Chief Minister of Bihar.

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Part A: ORDER of the Supreme Court

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Education:
Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act: The Supreme Court has delivered a detailed judgment running into 23 printed pages. It is a landmark decision. Aditya Bandopadhyay had appeared for the Secondary School Examination, 2008 conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education (for short ‘CBSE’ or the ‘Appellant’). When he got the mark-sheet he was disappointed with his marks. He thought that he had done well in the examination but his answer-books were not properly evaluated and that improper evaluation had resulted in low marks. Therefore, he made an application for inspection and re-evaluation of his answer-books. CBSE rejected the said request by letter dated 12-7-2011, holding that it was exempt u/s.8(1)(e) of the RTI Act since CBSE shared fiduciary relationship with its evaluators and maintains confidentiality of both manner and method of evaluation and further the Examination By-laws of the Board provided that no candidate shall claim or is entitled to re-evaluation of his answer-book(s) or disclosure or inspection of answer-book(s) or other documents and further that the larger public interest does not warrant the disclosure of such information sought.

The appellant filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court heard and disposed of the said writ petition along with the connected writ petitions (relied by West Bengal Board of Secondary Education and others) by a common judgment dated 5-2-2009. The High Court held that the evaluated answerbooks of an examinee writing a public examination conducted by statutory bodies like CBSE or any University or Board of Secondary Education, being a ‘document, manuscript record, and opinion’ fell within the definition of ‘information’ as defined in section 2(f) of the RTI Act. It held that the provisions of the RTI Act should be interpreted in a manner which would lead towards dissemination of information rather than withholding the same; and in view of the right to information, the examining bodies were bound to provide inspection of evaluated answer books of the examinees.

Consequently, it directed CBSE to grant inspection of the answer books to the examinees who sought information. The High Court however rejected the prayer made by the examinees for re-evaluation of the answer-books, as that was not a relief that was available under RTI Act. The RTI Act only provided a right to access information, but not for any consequential reliefs.

On the above decision, CBSE came to the Supreme Court contending that they were holding the ‘information’ (in this case, the evaluated answer-books) in a fiduciary relationship and therefore exempted u/s.8(1)(e) of the RTI Act.

Decision:
Every examinee has the right to access his evaluated answer-books, by either inspecting them or taking certified copies thereof, unless the evaluated answer-books are found to be exempted u/s.8(1)(e) of the RTI Act.

Section 22 of RTI Act provides that the provisions of the said Act will have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Therefore the provisions of the RTI Act will prevail over the provisions of bye-laws/rules of the examining bodies in regard to examinations. As a result, unless the examining body is able to demonstrate that the answer-books fall under the exempted category of information described in clause (e) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act, the examining body will be bound to provide access to an examinee to inspect and take copies of his evaluated answer-books, even if such inspection or taking copies is barred under the rule/bye-laws of the examining body governing the examinations.

The SC then extensively discussed what is the meaning of ‘fiduciary relationship’ as in section 8(1)(e), dictionary meaning and as stated in number of Indian and US Court’s decisions and concluded: “We, therefore, hold that an examining body does not hold the evaluated answer-books in a fiduciary relationship. Not being information available to an examining body in its fiduciary relationship, the exemption u/s.8(1)(e) is not available to the examining bodies with reference to evaluated answer-books. As no other exemption u/s.8 is available in respect of evaluated answer books, the examining bodies will have to permit inspection sought by the examinees.”

The SC then also extensively and beautifully analysed the provisions of the RTI Act and its real purport, scope and meaning and concluded: “In view of the foregoing, the order of the High Court directing the examining bodies to permit examinees to have inspection of their answer-books is affirmed, subject to the clarification regarding the scope of the RTI Act and the safeguards and conditions subject to which ‘information’ should be furnished. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

[The above decision was delivered on 9-8-2011: Central Board of Secondary Education and Anr. v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Ors. It is reported in number of law magazines/journals, etc. including at 2011(8) SCALE 645]

[As it is one of the finest decisions to read and understand the real scope of the RTI Act, photo copy of the full decision will be made available both at BCAS and PCGT]

[This decision is followed by another very interesting, decision in the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Shaunak H. Satya & Ors. delivered on 2-9-2011 by the same two judges. It will be reported next month.]

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Practical Issues — Transfer Pricing Documentation and Certification

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Lecture Meetings

Practical Issues — Transfer Pricing Documentation and Certification

This lecture meeting was addressed by Rakesh Alshi, Chartered Accountant on 11th October 2011 at Walchand Hirachand Hall, IMC. The speaker gave an energetic presentation on the practical aspects of transfer pricing documentation in detail with many pertinent and relevant examples and answered many questions from the audience. The meeting received very enthusiastic response and was very well attended.

L to R: Rakesh Alshi, Speaker, Chetan Shah, Pradip Thanawala, President and Surin Kapadia

Other programmes

Workshop on Filing of Service Tax Returns

Half day workshop on ‘Filing of Service tax Returns’ was held on Friday, 7th October, 2011 at the Society’s premises and was attended by approx. 100 participants. The programme schedule included presentation and replies to the queries by the service tax officials viz. Sushil Solanki, Commissioner of Service Tax-I, Mumbai, Rishi Goel,


L to R: Sushil Solanki, Speaker, Suhas Paranjpe, Govind Goyal, Pradip Thanawala, President, and Rishi Goyal

Joint Commissioner of Service Tax and V. V. Brahmashatriya, Superintendent of Service Tax and also by the speakers of the evening Puloma Dalal and Sunil Gabhawalla, both Chartered Accountants.

Integrated Security Management — Practice Approach

On Saturday, 8th October 2011, the ‘Gulmohar’ conference room of BCAS was the venue for a unique event organised by the Information Technology & 4i Committee. An introductory workshop on ‘Integrated Security Management’ was conducted for the BCAS members by ‘Secure Matrix’ — an organisation specialising in the subject. The compact group of participants got an insight into the exciting and challenging world of ‘Information Security’ under the able guidance of Saurabh Dani and Dr. Harrold D’Costa, well known experts in this area.

Mr. Dani explained the importance of Information as an asset to the organisation and the need to secure the same. He explained the various vulnerabilities that exist in a computerised environment and thus the risks that an organisation is exposed to and how these vulnerabilities can be addressed by doing a vulnerability assessment. According to Mr. Dani, generally, IT vulnerabilities arose mainly from application software (85%), Operating Systems (8%) and Devices (7%).


L to R: Ameet Patel, Nikunj Shah, Pradip Thanawala, President and Saurabh Dani,
Speaker

Dr. D’Costa briefly highlighted various types of cyber crimes, modern trends in cybercrimes and also some of the relevant provisions of the amended IT Act along with various practical case studies. He also shared with the audience a few tips for detecting forged emails. The importance of cyber data and identities was highlighted by him by referring to the cyber will of late Steve Jobs of Apple Computers.

The workshop was indeed an enriching experience for all the participants.

Public Meeting to celebrate 6th Anniversary of The RTI Act

BCAS Foundation joined Public Concern for Governance Trust (PCGT) and Indian Merchants’ Chamber’s Anti-Corruption Cell (IMC) to celebrate 6th Anniversary of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI) on 12th October 2011 at Walchand Hirachand Hall, IMC.


L to R: Justice C.S. Dharmadhikari, Speaker, Narayan Varma, Julio Rebeiro, Speaker, Pradip Thanawala, President and Dara Gandhi, Speaker

Justice C. S. Dharmadhikari (retd.) delivered the keynote address and explained how Gandhiji’s objective was Freedom and not just Independence and this Freedom can be achieved only by increasing accountability and transparency through tools such as RTI.

Julio Rebeiro, Chairman — PCGT and Anti- Corruption Cell of IMC, Narayan Varma, Trustee — BCAS Foundation and PCGT, and Dara Gandhi, Trustee — PCGT, also addressed the audience and stressed on need to further strengthen RTI law and implementation. Students of Government Law College performed a street play highlighting how RTI can help in curbing menace of corruption in day to day life.

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Five tips top CEOs for young leaders

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1. Ambition is a must have, but don’t let it hurt those around you
— Adil Zainulbhai, MD McKinsey India

2. There is no need to hide your Failure, but you do need to flaunt what you have learnt from it — Harsh Mariwala, Chairman & MD Marico

3. Intellect is good, but combine it with Humility and you have an unbeatable combination. — Nitin Paranjpe, CEO, Hindustan Unilever

4. Generalists are OK, but leaders do need to have a clearly defined area of extraordinary competence — Pramod Bhasin, Non-executive VC, Genpact.

5. Think society, not just business. — Kalpana Morparia, CEO, JPMorgan India

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Greek tragedy

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Homer has stood on his head; it is now the Greeks who have been gifted a ‘Trojan’ horse. The gift is a financial bailout package, so that the country does not default on its international debt obligations. But the Greeks have looked to see what is inside the horse, and they don’t like what they see.

And why is Greece being put through the wringer ? Because the French and Germans don’t want their banks (which own much of Greek debt) to take a bigger ‘hair-cut’. Greece’s first bailout package asked debt-holders to write off 21% of the debt; the market now says the hair-cut should be 60%. If Europe’s banks took that hit, Greece could escape the torture to which its citizens think it is being subjected. Moral of the story: if you don’t manage your economy well, expect to get raped when the ‘rescuers’ come charging in.

It is a lesson to which India should pay heed. India is not in Greek shoes, but some lights are flashing red. Inflation is higher than in most countries; the trade deficit is high and the Reserve Bank of India says it is unsustainable; the budget deficit is both high and probably climbing; and the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio is about twice the average for emerging markets. All these point to poor macro-economic management, not in one or two years but over a longer period. And the world is beginning to take notice. India’s stock market is about the worst performer this year, foreign direct investment has crashed, and the rupee has lost more ground than almost all other currencies.

The government may be about to add to the risks, if the bleeding hearts at the National Advisory Council have their way on the universal provision of foodgrain at a price no more than 15% of that grain’s cost to the government—which means that Mukesh Ambani can get his wheat at the same price as a poor Jharkhand tribal. Both will also get their cooking gas at about half its cost. Other proposed entitlement programmes and subsidies will add to the government’s financial burden. Meanwhile, politicians’ thoughts are turning to the next elections, which means the tap could be opened wider. India’s macro-economic risk levels will then go up.

We are nowhere near Greece’s level of impecuniousness, but if we are not careful we could end up needing some help. Anyone here who likes Trojan horses?

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80% IITians lack quality: Narayan Murthy

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Lamenting the quality of engineers who pass out of IITs, Infosys Chairman emeritus N. R. Narayana Murthy has said there is a need to overhaul the selection criteria to the prestigious technical institutions.

Addressing a gathering of former IITians at a ‘Pan IIT’ summit in New York, Murthy said the quality of students entering IITs had deteriorated due to coaching classes that prepare engineering aspirants. He said save the top 20% who crack the tough IIT entrance exam and can “stand among the best anywhere in the world”, the quality of the remaining 80% of students leaves much to be desired. “They somehow get through the JEE. But their performance in IITs, at jobs or when they come for higher education in institutes in the US is not as good as it used to be. This has to be corrected. A new method of selection of students to IITs has to be arrived at,” Murthy said.

According to Murthy, for IITs to be counted among the best in the world, they must “transcend from being just teaching institutions to reasonably good research institutes”, at par with Harvard and the MIT, in 10-20 years. “Few IITs have done well in producing PhDs, but when we compare ourselves to institutions in the US, we have a long way to go,” he said, adding that the emphasis must be on research at the undergraduate level. He also said exams should test the independent thinking of students rather than their ability to solve problems.

Besides, Murthy lamented the poor English-speaking and social skills of IIT students, saying with politicians “rooting against English”, the task of getting good students was getting difficult. “An IITian has to be a global citizen and must understand where the globe is going,” he observed.

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Senior I-T authorities ignored computer system failure

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The apathy of income-tax (I-T) authorities caused a loss of around Rs.35,000 crore in tax collection in the city. The loss occurred, as information collected by the Department’s Central Information Branch (CIB), was not disseminated to concerned field officials from 2005-06 to 2009-10.

The information gathered by CIB is segregated automatically by the computer system and disseminated to concerned Income-tax Officers (ITOs), who do assessment work or to the investigation wing of the Department, which conducts searches. The Directorate of Systems of the Income-tax (I-T) Department in New Delhi handles the overall computer network system.

A letter, dated May 10, 2010 written by A. C. Tejpal, who was then Director of Income-tax (CIB), Mumbai, to the Indian Audit and Accounts Department, had said that the CIB had since 2005-06 to 2009-10 collected over 11.4 crore pieces of information (on unaccounted income) of which 2,247 were disseminated to concerned officials. It further mentioned that not a single piece of information was disseminated through computer system. In 2,247 pieces of information, the CIB found unaccounted income of Rs.14,758 crore on which total tax payable was Rs.5,000 crore. The CIB Mumbai was trying to get the system rectified since 2005.

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Any amendments must strengthen, not dilute, the RTI Act

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Union Law Minister Salman Khurshid’s remarks on the need to revisit the Right to Information (RTI) Act, on the ground that its purported ‘misuse’ was hampering ‘institutional efficiency’, displays the discomfort amongst the political and bureaucratic classes over an Act that has unprecedentedly empowered ordinary citizens.

The power of the RTI is manifest in the number of scams that have been unearthed by deploying it — be it a citizen seeking details about that perpetually unrepaired neighbourhood road or a multi-crore scam of national proportions.

In her address to the joint session of Parliament in 2009, President Pratibha Patil laid down the government’s agenda to put in place a public data policy that would “place all information covering non-strategic areas in the public domain”. This is fine. If at all there are amendments, then according to the author, it should be those that buttress and consolidate the RTI Act — providing protection for RTI activists and whistleblowers in general rather than seek to dilute it. But, the power of RTI is making our politicians rather uneasy everyday.

The author observes that an opaque state is essentially a colonial vestige, one that is impervious, mysterious in its workings, if not actually hostile towards ordinary citizens. On the other hand we require a state which envisages that disclosure of information is not just a citizens’ right, but also a fundamental duty where citizens can feel part of governance and its workings.

It seems our netas and babus, among others, would prefer the former. This must be resisted. The point is to strengthen democracy, not starve it of information.

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India’s higher education system needs better leadership

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The author has brought out the maladies in higher education system in India. The author comments that the assessment of ‘quality of research,’ the citations index used and the definition of ‘international outlook’ of staff, students and research has a pro-western bias. It is not therefore surprising that an analysis undertaken by UK’s Times Higher Education would list 75 universities from the US and 32 from Britain in the top 200! The perplexing question is therefore raised as to how BRIC countries are doing much better in spite of not having any world-class universities at the top. The question can also be asked if these lists are made to promote western, especially US and UK, institutions as destinations for bright young Asian students who are increasingly able to pay their way into high-cost western institutions. In spite of this, it is a very sad state of affairs that not a single Indian university finds a place in top 200 universities worldwide.

The quantitative growth of higher education in India, witnessed over the past decade — with more institutions, more seats, more posts and, above all, more funding, has not translated into equal qualitative development.

This despite the fact that India’s equally poorly-run schooling system produces hundreds of thousands of world-class pupils every year and many of them go to the best institutions worldwide and do shine. Clearly, India’s higher education needs a fix. It faces a huge leadership deficit with institutions unable to translate higher outlays into better outcomes. The deficit in leadership begins at the very top. For a prime minister who spent a part of his career as a university teacher and also Chairman of the University Grants Commission (UGC), Manmohan Singh has not paid enough attention to improving the quality of leadership in higher education in India. According to the author, the legislation appears to be in place, there appears to be no dearth of funding either public or private, but there is total lack of administrative and political leadership in education. India has been damned by a succession of ideologically oriented or plain bureaucratic leadership in higher education consisting of persons like Dr. Murli Manohar Joshi or Arjun Singh and the present incumbent Kapil Sibal is not steady in the ministry to make any mark. The author therefore states that India desperately needs better academic, administrative and political leadership in higher education.

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Reader’s view

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Sir,

Like any other professional Chartered Accountant, I am also reluctant to lift my pen and start writing. This is a nightmare for the Editor who expects a feed back through a column “Readers’ Views”. Successive editors, including yours truly, have failed to excite the readers to write. I therefore thought of taking a first step myself and comment on the editorial of October 2011.

I entirely agree with your view that “Preparation of financial statement is universally an object driven exercise, the reflection of the true state of affairs is rarely one of them.” It is certainly a bold written admission, but “true and fair state of affair” is many times a wishful thinking, a daydream or a utopia.

Accounting Standard and Auditing Standards and many variations thereof like IFRS, Ind. AS, AS original seem to be Greek and Latin to a businessman. You have referred to such standards as written in ‘Sanskrit’. I honestly believe that they must have been written in a language 10 times difficult than Sanskrit. Sanskrit is a very sweet and a lyrical language, much easier to understand, but not the language of so called Standards.

Standard also means that which is static, stands tall, guides a person like a lamppost when he is stranded in rough seawater. Standard is supposed to be a guide for a long time. It could be like a constitution — cannot be changed so easily. We however have standards, which undergo frequent changes like the rates of tax in annual Finance Acts.

The well-publicised, highly appreciated benefit of Standards is stated to be the easy understandability of financial statements by the users in the global village. One can digitise the terms, standardise the phrases but can we then effectively communicate? Language is supposed to be a means of communication, but it changes in tone, accent, meaning every 25 to 30 kilometres geographically. Any attempt for a universal accounting language is bound to be a solid ground for universal confusion. It will make most of the users of financial statements dependent on the so called experts for understanding the accounts of an entity in which they wish to invest. It would be therefore very easy to fool the retail investors whose exit may not be anticipated by the standard setters.

The crux of the matter is ‘cash flow’, both inflow and outflow. Any attempt of standardisation, which affects credit line (Inflow of either debt or equity) of a business entity or the tax burden (outflow of capital) of such an entity is likely to face stiff resistances and a devise would be tried to circumvent the reality. I have heard in one public meeting that at times mergers and acquisitions are undertaken to avoid facing an inconvenient accounting standard.

I do not undermine the importance or the necessity of standardisation. However, the rate of so called creation, setting up and most important — changes in such standards is alarming and confusing and if this persists, then the object of ‘true and fair’ would certainly be a story from fairy tale.

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Timelines for Company Law Settlement Scheme extended.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide General Circular No. 65/2011, dated 4th October 2011 has extended the Company Law Settlement Scheme till 15-12-2011. All the terms and conditions of the General Circulars No. 59/2011, dated 5-8-2011 and No. 60/2011 dated 10-8-2011 will remain the same.

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Timelines for submission of PAN extended.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide General Circular No. 66/2011, dated 4th October 2011 has extended the time for filing DIN-4 by DIN holders for furnishing the PAN and to update PAN details till 15-12-2011.

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Architects denied registration of companies/ LLPs.

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Vide Notification dated 10th October 2011, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has denied the Registration of Companies or LLP’s which have one of their objectives to do business of Architect as it contravenes the provisions of sections 36 and 37 of the Architect Act, 1972 whereby only an architect registered with the Council of Architecture or a firm (Partnership Firm under the Partnership Act, 1932 comprising of all architects) can be so registered. The matter is under examination in consultation with the Department of Legal Affairs.

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Timelines for clearance/approvals for ROC defined.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has on 22nd September 2011 amended Regulation 17 of the Companies Regulations 1956. With effect from 27th September 2011, whereby, except as otherwise provided in the Act, the Registrar cannot keep any document pending for approval and registration or for taking on record or for rejection or otherwise for more than 60 days from the date of filing, excluding cases where approval from Central Government or Regional Director or Company Law Board or Court or other competent authority is required.

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XBRL Filing Rules notified.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued the Companies (Filing of Documents and Forms in Extensible Business Reporting Language) Rules, 2011 on 5th October 2011. They shall be applicable to:

(i) all companies listed with any stock ex-change(s) in India and their Indian subsidiaries; or

(ii) all companies having paid-up capital of rupees five crore or above; or

(iii) all companies having turnover of rupees hundred crore or above.

It is provided that the companies in banking, insurance, power sectors and non-banking financial companies are exempted for Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) filing for the financial year 2010-11.

XBRL reports (instance documents) would be an attachment to the new e-forms. The MCA has also released a revised validation tool aligned to the recently revised taxonomy and business rules. This validation tool provides a human-readable output for companies to review in addition to conducting validation checks on the XBRL output.

The XBRL filing should include the directors’ report except the management discussion and analysis and the corporate governance report. These are required to be attached in pdf format. Chartered accountants, company secretaries and cost accountants in whole-time practice are required to certify the financial statements prepared in XBRL mode for filing on the MCA-21 portal. The certificate wordings are a part of the new e-Forms.

The Annexure for Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) Taxonomy for Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Accounts as required u/s.220 of the Companies Act, 1956 from the year 2010-11 can be accessed at IMCA website.

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Circular No. 2 — D/o IPP F. No. 5(19)/2011- FC-I Dated 30-9-2011 — Consolidated FDI Policy.

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The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India has issued Circular No. 2 containing the Consolidated FDI Policy. The Policy has come into effect from October 31, 2011 and subsumes and supersedes all Press Notes/Press Releases/ Clarifications/Circulars issued by DIPP, which were in force as on September 30, 2011.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 31, dated 3-10-2011 — Appointment of Agents/Franchisees by Authorised Dealer Category-I banks, Authorised Dealer Category-II and Full Fledged Money Changers — Revised guidelines.

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Annexed to this Circular are the amendments to certain instructions mentioned in the guidelines for appointment of Agents/Franchisees by Authorised Dealers Category-I, Authorised Dealers Category-II and FFMC.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 30, dated 27-9-2011 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) in Renminbi (RMB).

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This Circular permits Indian companies which are in the infrastructure sector, to avail of ECB in Renminbi (RMB), under the approval route, subject to an annual cap of US $ 1 billion. This approval of RBI will be valid for a period of three months from the date of issue of the approval letter and the loan agreement must be executed within this period.

Application in Form 83 for allotment of loan registration number (LRN) must be made within 7 days from the date of signing the loan agreement. In case the borrower fails to obtain LRN within the above period, the approval granted by RBI will stand cancelled.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 29, dated 26-9- 2011 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) from the foreign equity holders.

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Presently, a ‘foreign equity holder’ to be eligible as a ‘recognised lender’ under the automatic route must hold minimum paid-up equity in the borrower company as follows:

(i) For ECB up to US $ 5 million — minimum paidup equity of 25% held directly by the lender.

(ii) For ECB more than US $ 5 million — minimum paid-up equity of 25% held directly by the lender and debt-equity ratio not exceeding 4:1 (i.e., the proposed ECB does not exceeds four times the direct foreign equity holding).

This Circular clarifies that:

(i) Now onwards the term ‘debt’ in the debtequity ratio will be replaced with ‘ECB liability’ and the ratio will be known as ‘ECB liability’ — equity ratio to make the term signify true position as other borrowings/debt are not to be considered in working out this ratio.

(ii) Presently, only the paid-up capital contributed by the foreign equity holder is taken into account for the purpose of calculation of equity for ECB of or beyond USD 5 million from direct foreign equity holders. Henceforth, besides the paid-up capital, free reserves (including the share premium received in foreign currency) as per the latest audited balance sheet will be considered for the purpose of calculating the equity of the foreign equity holder. However, where there are more than one foreign equity holders in the borrowing company, the portion of the share premium in foreign currency brought in by the lender(s) concerned will only be considered for calculating the ECB liability-equity ratio for reckoning quantum of permissible ECB.

(iii) For calculating the ECB liability, not only the proposed borrowing but also the outstanding ECB from the same foreign equity holder lender should be considered.

Henceforth, ECB proposals from foreign equity holders (direct/indirect) and group companies will be considered under the Approval Route as under:

(i) Service sector units, in addition to those in hotels, hospitals and software, will also be considered as eligible borrowers if the loan is obtained from foreign equity holders. This would facilitate borrowing by training institutions, R & D, miscellaneous service companies, etc.

(ii) ECB from indirect equity holders may be considered, provided the indirect equity holding by the lender in the Indian company is at least 51%.

(iii) ECB from a group company may be permitted, provided both the borrower and the foreign lender are subsidiaries of the same parent.

However, it must be ensured that total outstanding stock of ECB (including the proposed ECB) from a foreign equity lender does not exceed 7 times the equity holding, either directly or indirectly of the lender (in case of lending by a group company, equity holdings by the common parent will be reckoned).

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 28, dated 26-9-2011 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy — Structured obligations for infrastructure sector.

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Presently, credit enhancement can be provided, under the Approval Route, by multilateral/regional financial institutions and Government-owned development financial institutions for domestic debt raised through issue of capital market instruments, such as debentures and bonds, by Indian companies engaged exclusively in the development of infrastructure and by the Infrastructure Finance Companies (IFC).

This Circular permits direct foreign equity holder(s) holding a minimum of 25%t of the paid-up capital and indirect foreign equity holder, holding at least 51% of the paid-up capital, to provide credit enhancement to Indian companies engaged exclusively in the development of infrastructure and to IFC. As a result, credit enhancement by all eligible non-resident entities will henceforth be permitted under the automatic route and no prior approval will be required from RBI.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 27, dated 23-9-2011 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) — Rationalisation and liberalisation.

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This Circular rationalises and liberalises ECB guidelines as follows:

(i) Enhancement of ECB limit under the automatic route

(a) Eligible borrowers in real sector, industrial sector, infrastructure sector can now avail of ECB up to US $ 750 million or equivalent per financial year under the automatic route as against the present limit of US $ 500 million or equivalent per financial year.

(b) Corporates in specified service sectors viz. hotel, hospital and software, can avail of ECB up to US $ 200 million or equivalent during a financial year as against the present limit of US $ 100 million or equivalent per financial year, subject to the condition that the proceeds of the ECBs should not be used for acquisition of land.

(ii) ECBs designated in INR

(a) ‘All eligible borrowers’ can now avail of ECB designated in INR from foreign equity holders under the automatic/approval route, as the case may be, as per existing ECB guidelines.

(b) NGO engaged in micro-finance activities can continue to avail of ECB designated in INR, as hitherto, under the automatic route from overseas organisations and individuals as per existing guidelines.

(iii) ECB for Interest During Construction (IDC)

Interest During Construction (IDC) will be considered as a permissible end-use for Indian companies which are in the infrastructure sector, under the automatic/approval route, as the case may be, subject to the following conditions: (a) That the IDC is capitalised; and (b) Is part of the project cost.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 26, dated 23-9-2011 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) — Bridge Finance for Infrastructure Sector.

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This Circular permits, under the Approval Route, Indian companies which are in the infrastructure sector, to import capital goods by availing of shortterm credit (including buyers’/suppliers’ credit) in the nature of ‘bridge finance’, subject to the following conditions:

(i) The bridge finance must be replaced with a long-term ECB;

(ii) The long-term ECB must comply with all the extant ECB norms; and

(iii) Prior approval must be obtained from RBI for replacing the bridge finance with a long-term ECB.

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Samsung Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. v. ADIT (2011) 13 taxmann.com 14 (Del.) Articles 5 & 7 of India-Korea DTAA A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 30-8-2011

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(i) On facts, turnkey contract found to be a composite contract.

(ii) On examination of documents, PO held to constitute PE.

(iii) PE under Article 5(3) can emerge even when it does not satisfy the requirement of Article 5(1) and (2).

(iv) On facts, activities of PO were not preparatory or auxiliary in nature as contemplated in Article 5(4).

Facts

The taxpayer, together with another Indian company, entered into turnkey contract with ONGC for survey, design, engineering, fabrication and installation of facility. In accordance with the contract, it opened a Project Office (‘PO’) in Mumbai after obtaining approval of RBI. The approval did not place any restriction on PO’s activities. The fabrication of equipment was given to an unrelated entity in Malaysia. The fabricated equipment was received in the subsequent tax year. The taxpayer filed the return of its income declaring loss in respect of its Indian operations. The loss was computed in accordance with Article 7 of India-Korea DTAA.

The taxpayer contended that:

As per Article 7(1) of DTAA, business profits could be taxed in India only if the business was carried on through PE in India. Hence, it was essential that a PE should be constituted. However, a fixed place of business carrying on only preparatory or auxiliary activities would not constitute a PE.

The PO was not involved in pre-contract meetings and it was set up after the contract was executed.

The PO had employed only non-technical personal and it only acted as interface between the taxpayer and ONGC.

Vis-à-vis the scope of overall project, the activities of the PO were merely preparatory or auxiliary and hence were covered within exemption scope of Article 5(4).

As per Article 5(3), installation PE comes into existence only if time threshold of nine months has elapsed. Since the taxpayer was involved in installation project, specific provisions of Article 5(3) should override the general provisions of Article 5(1) and (2). Also, an installation PE would be constituted only when installation activity is commenced.

Contract of taxpayer comprised two divisible components, namely, supply of fabricated equipment from Malaysia and installation of the same. The supply component cannot be attributed to installation PE which came into existence at a later point of time.

 The onus of proving that the PO was carrying out revenue generation activity was on the tax authority.

The tax authority contended that:

The PO was fixed place of business in India of the taxpayer. The resolution of the Board of Directors of taxpayer stated that the PO was opened for carrying on and execution of contract. PO was coordinating with ONGC on an ongoing basis and without such coordination, contract would not be executed. Therefore, PO constituted PE of taxpayer in India.

The contract showed that it was not divisible and hence, the income was taxable in India to the extent of the profit attributable to the PE. The PO was actively involved in bidding, negotiations, tendering and award of contract. Therefore, it was involved in execution of core functions of the taxpayer. Title to the goods passed to ONGC after the project was completed. The consideration payable was for the full contract to be executed in India. Income earned by the taxpayer even in respect of activities carried on outside India should be taxable in India as being attributable to PE in India.

The fixed place PE is based on ‘permanence test’, irrespective of the nature of business carried on. To cover the situation where ‘permanence test’ is not likely to be met, Article 5(3) lays down ‘duration test’. However, Article 5(3) does not preclude application of base rule PE, Article 5(3) does not override Article 5(1).

The contract showed that it was not divisible right from the beginning and hence, the income was taxable in India to the extent of the profit attributable to the PE.

Held
The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

(i) The contract commenced with survey and ended with commissioning of the facility. Existence of PO was a condition precedent to commencement of the contract. The contract price was fixed without any provision for escalation. The progress payments were provisional and based on milestone formula, which did not indicate that the payment was related to any component. Hence, on facts, the contract was a composite contract.

(ii) Several documents such as board resolution, RBI application, RBI approval, etc. showed that PO was not restricted from carrying on any business activity. Rather, the board resolution clearly mentioned that PO was for coordination and execution of the project in India. The documents indicated that all project-related activities were to be routed through PO. Hence, PO constituted base rule PE in terms of Article 5(1).

(iii) Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd., (2007) 291 ITR 482 (SC), which was relied on by the taxpayer, was concerned with a contract, which was divisible in two parts, namely, fabrication and installation. In that case, taxpayer merely had a liaison office which was not authorised by RBI to carry on any business. Also, fabrication was completed outside India and that taxpayer did not have any other place of business in India till such date. As against that, the taxpayer had set up PO for coordination and execution of the project. Taxpayer also, wholly or partly, carried on business activity in India and hence PO constituted a PE.

(iv) Article 5(1) defines PE as a fixed place of business. Article 5(2) enlarges the meaning of PE to specifically include certain kinds of establishments. Article 5(3) mentions the expression ‘likewise encompasses’ and mentions construction, assembly or installation project, etc. Thus, Article 5(3) further enlarges the term PE. Therefore, Article 5(3) is not an exclusionary clause which restricts scope of Article 5(1) and 5(2).

(v) The terms of the contract and the manner of carrying out of the work clearly suggested that PO had a role in all the activities of the contract. The taxpayer had not proved that the activities of the PO were preparatory or auxiliary in nature as contemplated in Article 5(4).

(vi) In absence of necessary material on record, the AO was not justified in attributing 25% of the offshore income to the PE and hence, the matter was restored to the AO for proper determination.

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Four Soft Ltd. (Unreported) (ITA No. 1495/Hyd./2010) Section 92B of Income-tax Act A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 9-9-2011

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Counsel for assessee/revenue: Rajan Vora/ V. Srinivas Before Shri G. C. Gupta (VP) and Shri Akber Basha (AM)

Corporate guarantee provided in respect of an AE is not an international transaction in terms of section 92B of Income-tax Act.

Facts
The taxpayer was an Indian company engaged in providing IT and ITES Services. The taxpayer had several kinds of international transactions with its AEs. Among others, the taxpayer had issued corporate guarantee to banks in respect of loan taken by its Dutch subsidiary (which was an AE). The TPO determined ALP of corporate guarantee commission @ 3.75% of the guarantee amount taking commission charged by bank as a benchmark. In appeal, DRP confirmed the action of TPO.

The taxpayer contended that:

for transfer pricing purposes, income from international transactions is to be computed as per section 92B of Income-tax Act;

corporate guarantee transactions are not covered within the scope of section 92B;

transfer pricing provisions do not stipulate any guidelines in respect of guarantee transactions; and

in absence of any charging provision, such transaction would not be subject to transfer pricing provisions.

The taxpayer further contended that provision of corporate guarantees in respect of subsidiary company was a normal business practice and the Dutch subsidiary did not receive any benefit, such as reduction in rate of interest by virtue of corporate guarantee provided by the taxpayer.

The tax authority contended that a guarantee is an obligation which the guarantor is liable to honour if the principal debtor does not discharge the debt.

Held
The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

Corporate guarantee provided by the taxpayer is not covered within the definition of international transaction in section 92B. No guidelines are stipulated in respect of such transactions. Unlike a bank or a financial institution, provision of corporate guarantee is incidental to the business of the taxpayer. In the absence of any charging provision, such transaction cannot be subjected to transfer pricing.

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Charitable purpose: Exemption u/s.10(23C) (iv) r.w.s 2(15) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2009-10 and onwards — Holding of classes and giving diploma/degrees by ICAI to its members is only an ancillary part of activities or functions performed by it and this, by itself, does not mean that ICAI is an educational institute:

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[ICAI v. DGIT, (2011) 13 Taxman.com 175 (Del.)]

The assessee, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), had filed an application in Form No. 56 for grant of exemption u/s.10(23C) (iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the A.Y. 2009- 10 onwards. It claimed that the institution was/ is established for charitable purpose as defined u/s.2(15); and that it was/is complying with all conditions/ pre-requisites and, therefore, was entitled to exemption u/s.10(23C)(iv). The application was rejected mainly on the following grounds. Firstly, the assessee-institute was holding coaching classes and, therefore, was not an educational institution as per the interpretation placed on the word ‘education’ used in section 2(15). Secondly, it was covered under the last limb of charitable purpose, i.e., advancement of any other object of general public utility and in view of the amendment made in section 2(15) with effect from 1-4-2009 for the A.Y. 2009-10 onwards, the assessee-institute was not entitled to exemption as it is an institution which conducts an activity in nature of business and also charges fee or consideration. It was earning huge profits in a systematic and organised manner and, therefore, it was not an institute existing for charitable purposes under the last limb of section 2(15). Thirdly, the assessee institute had advanced an interest-free loan to a sister concern, namely, ICAI Accounting Research Foundation and, thus, had violated the third proviso to section 10(23C) as the accumulated funds have not been invested in one or more specified funds/institutions stipulated in sub-section (5) to section 11.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee ICAI, set aside the order of rejection and remanded the matter back to the DGIT with directions. The High Court held as under:

“(i) A scrutiny of section 2(15) elucidates that charitable purpose for the purpose of the Act has been divided into six categories. The assessee-institute will fall under the sixth category, i.e., advancement of any other object of general public utility. The assesseeinstitute cannot be regarded as an educational institute as its main or predominant objective is to regulate the profession of and the conduct of Chartered Accountants enrolled with it. It is a statutory authority under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (the ‘CA Act’) and its fundamental or dominant function is to exercise overall control and regulate the activities of the members/enrolled as chartered accountants.

(ii) No doubt, the assessee holds classes and provides coaching facilities for candidates/ articled and audit clerks who want to appear in the examinations and want to get enrolled as chartered accountants as well as for members of the assessee-institute who want to update their knowledge and develop and sharpen their professional skills, but this is not the sole or primary activity. The assessee-institute may hold classes and give diploma/degrees to the members of its institute in various subjects, but this activity is only an ancillary part of the activities or functions performed by the assessee-institute. This one or part activity, by itself, does not mean that the assessee is an educational institute or is predominantly or exclusively engaged in the activity of education. It is engaged in multifarious activities of diverse nature, but the primary and the dominant activity is to regulate the profession of chartered accountancy.

(iii) Section 2(15) defines the term ‘charitable purpose’. Therefore, while construing the term business for the said section, the object and purpose of the said section has to be kept in mind. A very broad and extended definition of the term ‘business’ is not intended for the purpose of interpreting and applying the first proviso to section 2(15) to include any transaction for a fee or money.

(iv) The real issue and question is whether the assessee-institute pursues the activity of business, trade or commerce. The DGIT, while dealing with the said question, has not applied his mind to the legal principles enunciated above and has taken a rather narrow and myopic view by holding that the assesseeinstitute is holding coaching classes; and that this amounts to business.

(v) The assessee-institute provides education and training in their post-qualification courses, corporate management, tax management and information system audit. It awards certificates to members of the institute who successfully complete the said courses. The conduct of these courses cannot be equated and categorised as mere coaching classes which are conducted by private institutes to prepare students to appear for entrance examination or for pre-admission or examinations being conducted by the universities, school-boards or other professional examinations. The courses of the institute, per se, it does appear, cannot be equated to a private coaching institute. There is a clear distinction between coaching classes conducted by private coaching institutions and the courses and examinations which are held by the assessee-institute. A private coaching institute has no statutory or regulatory duty to perform. It cannot award degrees or enrol members as chartered accountants. These activities undertaken by the assessee-institute satisfy the requirement of the term ‘education’.

(vi) The question, which remains unanswered in spite of the aforesaid finding that the assesseeinstitute also undertakes educational activity, is whether it is carrying on any business, trade or commerce. This question requires an answer but remains unanswered as it was not addressed and examined in the impugned order in proper perspective. The reasoning given in the order is with reference to the fee charged, expenditure and profit earned. The impugned order is cryptic and a myopic view has been taken without examining the legal principles.

(vii) In view of the aforesaid, the instant writ petition is allowed and a writ of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order passed by the DGIT (Exemptions) with a direction to reconsider the application filed by the assessee-institute u/s.10(23C)(iv) in the light of the findings and observations made above. While setting aside the impugned order the DGIT is to be directed to examine the said aspect in the light of the observations and findings made above.”

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Charitable purpose: Exemption u/s.10(23C) (iv) r.w.s 2(15) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2005-06: CBDT approved ICAI for exemption u/s.10(23C)(iv) since A.Y. 1996-97: For A.Y. 2005-06 AO allowed exemption in assessment order u/s.143(3): DIT(E) passed order u/s.263 holding that the assessee is not entitled to exemption on the ground that coaching activity undertaken by ICAI amounted to business and no separate accounts are maintained: Order u/s.263 not sustainable.

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[DIT (Exemption) v. ICAI, (2011) 14 Taxman.com 5 (Del.)]

The assessee-institute, Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), is a statutory body established under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (‘the 1949 Act’) for regulating the profession of Chartered Accountants in India. The CBDT, had approved the ICAI for exemption u/s.10(23C)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 since A.Y. 1996-97. For the A.Y. 2005-06, the Assessing Officer completed the assessment u/s.143(3) of the Act, granted exemption u/s.10(23C) (iv) of the Act and computed the total income at Rs.Nil. Subsequently, the DIT (Exemption) passed an order u/s.263 on two grounds, namely, coaching activity was undertaken by the institute and the said activity was ‘business’ and not a charitable activity. In those circumstances, the institute was required to maintain separate books of account and, thus, there was violation of section 11(4A). Secondly, it was held that the institute had incurred expenses on overseas activities including travelling, membership of foreign professional bodies, etc., without permission from the CBDT as required u/s.11(1)(c) and, thus, income of the institute was not entitled to exemption as a charitable institution. On appeal, the Tribunal held that the power u/s.263 was wrongly exercised and the DIT was not justified in giving the directions on the two grounds relied upon by him.

On appeal, the Revenue questioned the findings of the Tribunal on the first ground, i.e., in respect of coaching classes, whether the same amounted to business and whether separate books of account were required to be maintained by the institute.

The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Tribunal examined the provisions of the 1949 Act and the role assigned to and undertaken by the institute. It was held that the institute has been created to regulate the profession of chartered accountancy and for this purpose the institute can and is required to provide education, training and monitor professional skills of the members. It is also required to provide education and training to students/articled clerks who are appearing in the examinations and aspire to be enrolled as member of the institute.

(ii) The aforesaid findings as to the object, purpose and role of the institute cannot be disputed. The DIT has taken a very narrow and myopic view and has not examined the question of object and role of the institute in proper and correct perspective. The order passed by him is devoid of reasoning. This has resulted in the error made by the DIT, which has been corrected by the Tribunal.

(iii) The second question which arises for consideration is whether activities of the institute mentioned above including those of holding classes for students/articled clerks/ members and charging fee for classes and for providing literature/material can be regarded as a business activity. Again, the order passed by the DIT is devoid of any reasons and relevant consideration on the aspects like of what is meant and understood by the term ‘business’. He proceeded on an erroneous basis that mere holding of classes amounts to business and the same was outside the scope, ambit and object of the institute. The last aspect is not correct. The order passed by the DIT is bereft of reasons and does not meet the requirement of section 263.

(iv) In these circumstances, the order passed by the DIT u/s.263 cannot be sustained and was, therefore, rightly upset and set aside by the Tribunal.”

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