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JD(S) chief defends tainted netas

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Former Karnataka Chief Minister and JD(S) chief H. D.
Kumaraswamy brazenly stated that he saw nothing wrong in fielding criminal
candidates for elections if they looked ‘winnable’.

Kumaraswamy said his criterion for handing tickets to
criminals was simple : he should have the support of party workers and people,
and be able to win. Asked whether it was right to bring criminals into politics,
he asked, “What’s wrong ? It’s a chance to reform them. If they change, isn’t it
better for society ? Moreover, if people want a criminal to contest, how can we
reject him only because of his
background ? There are so many politicians with clean image but engaged in
anti-social activities. Why aren’t such white-collar criminals ever questioned
?’’ Kumaraswamy asked.

(Source : The Times of India, dated 23-3-2010)

(Note : What kind of public welfare programmes and policies
these criminals, when elected, will frame ? What happens if they hold a cabinet
berth ? And, what happens if they become CM or PM ? Can you expect any
political, social, judicial or educational reforms from such criminal elements
?)

 

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New foreign asset disclosure rules enacted

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On March 18, 2010, President Obama signed H.R. 2847, the
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, into law. There are a number
of international tax provisions in the Act.

One of the provisions is new Code § 6038D. This section,
titled ‘Information with Respect to Foreign Financial Assets,’ is effective for
taxable years beginning after March 18, 2010 (2011 for calendar year taxpayers).

Code § 6038D applies to individuals who hold one or more
interests in ‘specified foreign financial assets,’ if the aggregate value of all
such assets exceeds $ 50,000. If the section applies, the individual must attach
to his/her tax return for that year certain basic information about the foreign
financial assets. The rule also applies to domestic entities formed or availed
of to hold specified foreign financial assets.

The penalty for failure to disclose is the (standard) $
10,000 with a reasonable cause exception. The penalty can increase where the
taxpayer has been notified of the failure to file and the taxpayer continues to
not file.

(Source : intltax.typepad.com/intltax, dated 18-3-2010)

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Operations of foreign accounting firms — India would want full reciprocity

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Turning the table on the Big Four audit firms about their
India plans, Corporate Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid has asked them to spell
out unambiguously if they intend to start full-fledged operations in India, and
be fully accountable for their operations in the country if permits are given.
Also, India would want full reciprocity —that is, permission for Indian
accounting firms to carry out full-fledged operations, with the same level of
freedom, in the Big Four’s home countries.

The Minister said that these audit firms — KPMG, Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers — haven’t stated
clearly enough how they would roll out their operations in India.

President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
Amarjit Chopra echoed the Minister’s views, stating that though foreign firms
are very keen to carry out full-time practice in India they shy away from taking
any responsibility. “Foreign audit firms are doing surrogate practice in India.
They want to practice here, but do not want to take any responsibility. That’s
astonishing,” he said. Chopra added even ICAI would look at ways to tighten the
auditing practice in India in the coming months.

(Source : www.indianexpress.com, dated 19-3-2010)

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Ancestral property cannot be gifted away, says Bombay HC

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No part of an ancestral family property can be ‘gifted’ away,
the Bombay High Court has held in a significant order while resolving the
dispute over a 69-year-old gift deed. Justice C. L. Pangarkar declared as void
the document dating back to 1941, which said that Miraj resident Mallapa had
gifted a portion of his ancestral property to his second wife Chandrabai ‘out of
love’.

Referring to Hindu laws, Justice Pangarkar held that the
‘coparcener’ or co-heir had no power to gift a joint family property, unless he
is the sole surviving legal heir.

Justice Pangarkar pointed out that as per Mitakshara, a
person can gift a portion of the family property only during certain
eventualities — “during distress for the sake of the family and especially for
pious purposes’’.

(Source : The Times of India, dated 18-3-2010)

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Include CAs in CBI teams on corporate scam probes

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The CA institute is keen on having a role in the probes
undertaken by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or Serious Frauds
Investigation Office (SFIO) on any financial irregularities or corporate scams.
“We want an ICAI representative to be included in their (CBI or SFIO) team
whenever they go to any State. A chartered accountant would come in handy in
tracking the money flows in any such scams,” Mr. Chopra said. The decision to
approach the Government for this purpose was taken at a specially convened
meeting of the ICAI Central Council here.


(Source : The Hindu Business Line, dated 14-3-2010)

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Hyundai’s Chung told to pay $ 60 mn

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Hyundai Motor Co. Chairman Chung Mong Koo was ordered to pay
70 billion won ($ 60 million) to the carmaker following his 2008 conviction for
breach of duty.

The Seoul Central District Court also today ordered Kim Dong
Jin, the carmaker’s former vice-chairman, to pay 55 billion won to the company,
court spokesman Kim Seong Soo said by phone.

Solidarity for Economic Reform, which led shareholders suing
for damages, said it would appeal to a higher court to seek more money. Chung,
71, was found guilty of embezzlement and breach of duty in 2008 and given a
three-year suspended jail sentence before being pardoned by South Korean
President Lee Myung Bak. “We welcome the court’s ruling that management had a
clear responsibility in this case,” Kim Hong Kil, a researcher at Solidarity for
Economic Reform. The group had asked the court to force Chung and Kim to pay
563.1 billion won to the automaker.

(Source : Business Standard, dated 9-2-2010)

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IIM-A grads look for money and more

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The lure of high salaries is back on IIM campuses this
placement season, but students aren’t getting swayed. They’re looking for job
offers that give them a work-life balance.

Students at the country’s premier management institute, the
Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad (IIM-A), have moved up many notches on
the hierarchy of needs. The bulge of pay packets isn’t the only thing that
entices them in selecting an employer.

“There seems to be an increasing awareness about work-life
balance in Generation Y. Their outlook on life is far different from the
youngsters of the 1980-90 generation. The general perception that youngsters in
age group of 20-25 years offer to work for longer hours is fast changing,” he
says.

(Source : The Economic Times, dated 24-2-2010)

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49 lakh I-T refunds pending : Govt.

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The government today said around 49 lakh cases of income-tax
refunds are pending with the Revenue Department. The statutory time limit to
process the return and issue refund in financial year 2009-10 is March, 31,
2011,” Minister of State for Finance S. S. Palanimanickam informed the Rajya
Sabha in a written reply. Guidelines have been issued by the CBDT to process all
returns and issue refunds expeditiously.


(Source : Business Standard, dated 9-3-2010)

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Idle chitchat can leave you miserable — Indulging in deep and meaningful conversations makes people happier

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Those idle chats at the coffee machine about the weather or
last night’s TV may seem perfectly harmless. But don’t be so sure. Indulging in
chitchat, gossip and small talk can leave you feeling miserable, scientists
claim. According to psychologists from the University of Arizona in the US, a
person’s well-being is directly related to indulging less in small trivial talks
and more in deep and meaningful conversations. “Profound conversations have the
potential to make people happier. The findings suggest that a happy life is
social and conversationally deep, rather than solitary and superficial,”
co-author Matthias Mehl said.

The other, less surprising, finding was that happy people
tend to spend less time alone. The happiest participants spent 25% less time
alone and 70% more time talking than the unhappiest.

(Source : The Times of India, dated 8-3-2010)

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IFRS convergence : CBDT to start talks with CA institute

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The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) plans to intensify
discussions with the ICAI to examine the direct tax issues arising out of the
proposed convergence of the Indian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
with the IFRS. “We have not addressed the issue of IFRS so far. But we intend to
do that and talks will begin in right earnest in this regard with the Institute
of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI),” Mr. S. S. N. Moorthy, Chairman of the
Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), told Business Line here. The convergence
with IFRS is expected to happen in three phases beginning April 1, 2011.

The draft Direct Taxes Code, in the present form, is very
averse to IFRS and does not recognise fair value measurements or the concept of
present values for taxation purposes. It could however benefit Indian companies
with international presence or even multinationals here as they would be able to
support their transfer pricing claims in a better manner through the common IFRS
platform now available in many countries. Another important issue is that IFRS-based
financial statements are consolidated financial statements and there is concept
of group tax. But in India, there is no concept of group tax and the Indian
Income-tax Department looks at each entity separately. Meanwhile, ICAI
Vice-President, Mr. G. Ramaswamy, said that the CA institute had recently set up
a joint study group comprising CBDT and Income-tax Department officials and that
the discussions are expected to intensify in coming days.

(Source : The Hindu Business Line Newspaper, dated 5-3-2010)

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India v. China — The roads not taken

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China stimulated its economy with a huge burst of capital
investments while India chose to spend more on salaries and subsidies. The
numbers speak for themselves. In 2009, the Chinese government built or renovated
35 airports, threw open 4,640 km of highways, laid out 5,200 km of new rail
lines, upgraded 264,000 km of power lines and renovated 800,000 buildings for
good measure.

India continues to nurture a massive revenue deficit while it
cuts essential capex.

(Source : Quick Edit in Mint, dated 9-3-2010)

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Coaching classes to hire CAs

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At Ahmedabad-based Fountainhead, a little-known coaching
academy for chartered accountants, February 20 was a day of celebration. The
two-year-old chartered accountants’ training institute was playing host to a
recruiting team from global consulting firm Ernst & Young (E&Y), rated among the
world’s top four. It got 11 of its students placed with the consulting firm.

Corporates, including international audit and consulting
firms like E&Y, KPMG and PWC, are looking beyond placement through apex
professional body Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) and
directly approaching training institutes in smaller cities to save on costs and
meet the growing requirement for CAs in a recovering economy.

E&Y and PWC have been visiting coaching classes in Jaipur,
Indore and Chandigarh for the past two years. Ahmedabad is the latest addition
in their hiring itinerary. Jaipur, India’s largest centre for CA training,
contributes 10-12% of the total number of chartered accountants every year.

Costs play a huge role in companies going directly to
training academies. ICAI, which plays a facilitator in recruitments, invites
companies and charges them around Rs.1.5 lakh.

With economic growth slated to reach 8%-plus levels this
year, the demand for chartered accountants is expected to see a 50% rise. ICAI
hopes to place 3,000 CAs, up from 2,000 graduates last year.

(Source : The Economic Times, dated 5-3-2010)

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With due respect to the ‘Faculty’

Light Elements

With the advent of mandatory CPE hours there is mushroom
growth of faculties in the country. Thanks to the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India. Well, faculties are growing from grassroot to local, state
and national levels. In the past the organisers would be facing the problem of
audience. But now due to mandatory CPE hours there is no shortage of audience,
morning, afternoon, evening, I mean at any point of time. Really, CPE hours has
made magical impact on the professional fraternity. We have ‘back-to-the-school’
kind of feeling. No ‘bunking’ of CPE hours.


Introduction of faculty — one of the organisers does this job
with a smiling face and turning his head incessantly towards the faculty to
check his beaming face, who is adjusting himself in the chair and whispering in
the ear of the next to him. He begins “Ladies and gentleman, today’s faculty,
none other than bla bla bla, . . . . all of us know him very well, he doesn’t
need introduction . . . .”, but still he continues for next 5 to 10 minutes or
more [testing your patience] . . . . faculty’s record-breaking academic career,
then comes his professional and social contributions in terms of books he
authored, lectures at various forums he delivered, chairmanship, membership,
directorship he held in various prominent organisations, companies, cooperative
banks, cooperative societies [excluding the housing society where he lives]
public trusts, NGOs of local, state, national or international repute, his
career as visiting faculty . . . . , his extra curricular activities like
mountaineering, cycling, singing, dancing, yoga, his love for birds and animals
[once in fact I heard the faculty having purchased a ‘race horse’] so on so
forth . . . . eventually asking the faculty to take charge of the proceedings
[perhaps having realised that he is encroaching upon the time allotted to the
faculty of the day], he ends the introduction. Thank God ! Indeed the audience
breathes a sigh of relief.

At the end of the introduction there is a loud applause till
the faculty reaches the podium. Then come corrections by the faculty in his ‘bio
data’ rehearsed by the overenthusiastic curtain-raiser. It brings cheers in the
auditorium.

Generally our national game ‘cricket’ comes handy for the
faculty to begin with. For example, if there are two lectures in succession and
the faculty happens to deliver the first lecture, he invariably compares himself
with ‘opening batsman’ [most of the time Sachin Tendulkar or Sunil Gavaskar] or
compares his lecture as ‘first inning’. Sometimes the faculty being an ardent
fan of cricket keeps on referring cricketing terms like one day, test match,
20-twenty, slog overs, bouncers, googly, silly point, etc. during the course of
his lecture. However, ironically the audience experiences the fatigue of a test
match ended in ‘draw’ at the end of the lecture.

Some faculties are not techno-savvy and some are
techno-savvy, they resort to PowerPoint presentation. What they do is simply go
on explaining contents of image after image on the screen with the help of a
laptop on the podium. [it may sound harsh to read . . . . it is just like
‘copying’ from book in the examination]. Tight rope walk for the audience, to
read the contents of the image on the screen as well as digest what the faculty
is explaining in his most clumsy language, further to note down the citation
thrown by the faculty ‘out of his pocket’ as a special bonus. [Note that you
need to activate your physical ‘faculties’ like hearing, seeing, reasoning and
writing at a time to absorb what the ‘faculty’ is conveying.] It is a regular
practice of asking for ‘once more’ to the citation referred by the faculty on
the lines of ‘once more’ to filmy song in the orchestra. I wonder what they do
with the citation so noted down on the chit of the paper back home.

More often than not when the learned faculty is explaining
the ‘judicial view or trend’ in the country, he refers decisions of various High
Courts and the Supreme Court, obviously on the same ‘issue’ (note that any Court
is referred and addressed as ‘Honorable Court’ without fail even while
ridiculing the ‘decision’ of such Court) right from Kashmir to Kanyakumari one
after another, that too with chronological antecedents spanning from British
rule to Mahatma Gandhi Rule (at present we are under “Mahatma Gandhi Rule) I
mean pre- and post-Independence. It reminds me of Hanuman jumping from one
palace to another palace in the kingdom of Ravana in his effort to douse his
tail on fire. Eventually Hanuman burns the entire Lanka of Ravana. So does the
faculty, I mean the audience experiences a total ‘washout’.

At the end of the lecture there is ‘Sawal-Jabab’, I mean
question-answer session. It is like ‘dare show’ either for the faculty or for
the audience depending upon the nature of subject dealt with by the faculty. If
the subject is a general subject like capital gain, business expenditure,
depreciation or MAT, etc. the question-answer session turns out to be ‘dare
show’ for the faculty, because most of the questions are hypothetical one
sprouting from ‘instant imagination’ of the members of the audience. On the
contrary, if the subject is a ‘special’ subject like transfer pricing,
derivative transaction, or cross-border transactions, any accounting standard,
etc., the question-answer session ‘if at all’ takes place [more particularly in
mofussil area] it is ‘dare show’ for the audience. This ‘dare show’ bares the
importance of CPE hours in a true sense, look at the quality of queries raised.

Handling of question-answer session is a skilled job for the
faculty. Well, normally he wants to wind it up quickly, so at the outset, he
declares “Due to time constraint I would not be able to answer all questions”.
What few questions he answers he answers in ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ style. For some
questions he complains about illegibility of handwriting of the queriest, so
those questions remain unanswered. Looking at some questions he is shrewd enough
to declare that “I have replied this question in my lecture, I think the
queriest was sleeping or was not in the hall”. Next few questions he prefers to
reply in writing, obviously replies would be sent to the organisers in couple of
weeks. Sometimes the faculty cross-questions the queriest to answer, so that the
queriest gets embarrassed, consequently the original question dissolves in the
air. Mischievous queries are left out deliberately in consultation with the
organiser sitting next to the faculty.

What do newly qualified accountants want

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9 What do newly qualified accountants want




1. Competitive salary

2. Enjoyable and interesting work

3. Opportunities for promotion

4. A lively and sociable working environment

5. A convenient location

6. Rarely having to work more than 40 hours a week

7. A good pension scheme

8. …

9. …

10. A reputed employer

10. Opportunities to work abroad

12. State-of-the-art offices

(Source : AccountancyMagazine.com, January 2008)

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Share Transfer Agency Service

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II. Tribunal :




12. Share Transfer Agency Service :



Karvy Consultants Ltd. v. CCE, Hyderabad, 2008 (10) STR
166 (Trib.-Bang)

â Service tax was
demanded on the activity of the appellant of Registrar and Share Transfer Agency
treating the same as Business Auxiliary Service. Relying on the ratio of
decision in the case of Sathguru Management Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. CCE, Hyderabad
2007 (7) STR 654, which in turn had relied on the decision in the case of CCE
v. Ankit Consultancy Ltd.,
2007 (6) STR 101 (Trib. Del) wherein it was held
that Share Transfer Agency and Registrar Services were not covered as Business
Auxiliary Services prior to 1-5-2006 (when a separate category for Share
Transfer Agency was notified), the appeal was allowed.

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Self-adjustment of excess payment

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II. Tribunal :


11. Self-adjustment of excess payment :



M/s. Narnolia Securities P. Ltd. v. CST, Ranchi, (2008
TIOL 538 CESTAT-Kol.]

â The appellant had
paid service tax on behalf of four other service providers and later came to
know that service providers had also paid taxes separately, adjusted the same
against subsequent payment.


The Revenue contended that Rule 6(3) did not permit this.


It was held the appellant’s contention that they were under
genuine belief that such adjustment was permissible under Rule 6(3) as ST-3
returns filed disclosed such adjustments which confirmed the bona fides
of the appellant. The Tribunal stated that the Department has at no stage
advised the appellant to claim a refund for excess payment, instead of making
adjustments on their own and that such adjustments are not permitted by Rule
6(3). Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, a lenient view was
taken.

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Port Service

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II. Tribunal :


10. Port Service :


Stevedoring whether a port service and transport charge
incurred by CHA — whether taxable ?



Kin-ship Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE–Cochin, [2008
TIOL 584 CESTAT Bang.]

â CHA licensed to
undertake stevedoring activity at Cochin port was asked to pay service tax
considering the activity as Port Service. Relying on the decisions in the cases
of Homa Engineering Works v. CCE Mumbai, 2006 (1) STR 19 (Tri.-Mum),
New Mangalore Port Trust v. CST, Bangalore
, 2006 (4) STR 448 (Trib.-Bang),
Velji P. & Sons (Agencies) P. Ltd. v. CCE, Bhavnagar, 2007 (8) STR 236
(Tri.-Ahmedabad), the issue being no longer res integra was not
considered as Port Service. Secondly, since the said CHA charged transport
charge separately in its bills, the same was treated as reimbursable expense and
demand was set aside.

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Income tax (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2009 — Notification no. 37/2009 dated 21 April 2009

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18. Income tax (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2009 —
Notification no. 37/2009 dated 21 April 2009


The CBDT had amended the depreciation rate and provided for
enhanced depreciation on new commercial vehicles acquired after 1st January,
2009 and before 1 April 2009. By a recent amendment, the benefit is extended.
The benefit of enhanced depreciation on commercial vehicles shall now be
available for vehicles acquired up to 30th September 2009.

 

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There are certain corrections made in ITR 2 and ITR 5 vide Notification no. 35/2009 dated 13 April 2009.

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17. There are certain corrections made in ITR 2 and ITR 5
vide Notification no. 35/2009 dated 13 April 2009.

 

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Income tax (10th Amendment) Rules, 2009 —Notification 36/2009 dated 13 April 2009

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Income tax (10th Amendment) Rules, 2009 —Notification
36/2009 dated 13 April 2009

A new clause is inserted in Form 3CD for reporting interest
inadmissible under Section 23 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006.

 

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Amendments in Income-tax Rules relating to TDS/TCS provisions — Notifi-cation No. 31/2009, dtd. 25th March, 2009

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15. Amendments in Income-tax Rules relating to TDS/TCS
provisions — Notification No. 31/2009, dtd. 25th March, 2009



 


The CBDT has notified Income-tax (8th Amendment Rules),
2009 in respect of TDS/TCS payments and compliance requirements with effect
from 1 April 2009. The highlights of these amendments are as under :

Rules in relation to TDS on salary payments :


Rule No.


Amendments effective 01 April 2009


30(1)

If the credit is on the date up to
which accounts of the employer/deductor are made, then TDS to be deposited
within two months from the end of the month in which amount is credited to
the account of the employee/deductee.

In any other case, within one week from the end of
the month in which tax deducted/Income-tax due.


30(2)/(3)


Quarterly deposit of TDS on 15 June, 15 September,
15 December, 15 March, if the tax officer permits in special cases with
the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner.


30(4)/(5)


E-payment of tax in Form No.17 by way of internet
banking facility or use of credit/ debit card.


31(2)


a) In case of TDS on Salary
payments : 
TDS Certificate (Form 16) to be issued within one month
from the end of the financial year i.e., 30th April following the
relevant financial year.

b) In other cases :

§
If the credit is up to the date up to which the accounts of the deductor
are made, TDS Certificate (Form 16A) to be issued within one week from
the date on which tax deposited.


§
In case of a consolidated certificate/TDS under Section 194D, within one
month from the end of the financial year (i.e., 30th April).


§
In all other cases, within one month from the end of the month in which
tax deducted.



c) In case of quarterly payments of TDS in special
cases, within 14 days from the date of payment of Income-tax.


31(4)


The tax officer to grant credit of TDS on duplicate
Form 16 /16A after obtaining an indemnity bond from the employee and get
the payment certified from the prescribed person.


31A(3)


Compliance statement to be filed (Form 24C) by 15th
July, 15th October, 15th January for first three quarters of the relevant
financial year, respectively, and 15th June following the last quarter.


31A(4)


Quarterly statement of TDS to be filed in Form
24Q/26Q/27Q by 15th June following the financial year.

The new Rules in relation to tax collected at source :


New Rule 37BB along with new forms for furnishing of information under Section 195(6) of the Act have been prescribed —Notification no. 30/2009, dated 25 March 2009.

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New Rule 37BB along with new forms for furnishing of
information under Section 195(6) of the Act have been prescribed —Notification
no. 30/2009, dated 25 March 2009.

The CBDT has issued Income-tax (Seventh Amendment) Rules,
2009 effective 1 July 2009, wherein the method of issuing a CA certificate for
the purpose of non-resident remittances has been changed. As per the modified
procedure, new forms have been introduced viz.,

G Form 15CB to be issued by a Chartered Accountant in
which detailed explanations are required for arriving at the rate of
withholding tax

G Form 15CA is required to be filled in by the payer and
submit electronically on the Income- tax website

G Thereafter a printout of such electronically submitted
Form 15CA needs to be signed and submitted by the payer prior to remitting
the payment.

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Development Control Regulations

Laws and Business

1. Introduction :


1.1 The erstwhile Press Note 2 of 2005 and para 5.23 of the
current Circular 1 of 2010 on Foreign Direct Investment issued by the Ministry
of Commerce are some of the most contentious Press Notes. S. 80-IB(10) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 has given rise to some of the most interesting issues.
Article 25 of Schedule I to the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 witnesses the maximum
debate. What do all these laws have in common ? They all deal with Real
Estate
! ! If there was a competition for the one sector in India which is
regulated by the maximum laws, then Real Estate would win hands down. It is
regulated by several laws, both Central and State and often there is no
co-ordination of definitions used under one law with those under another law.
This leads to confusion, ambiguity and litigation.

1.2 The Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay,
1991 (‘the DC Regulations’) are one of the several laws which impact real
estate development in Maharashtra. These Regulations have been framed under the
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (‘the MRTP Act’). As the
name suggests, these Regulations are applicable only for the city and suburbs of
Mumbai. The MRTP Act provides for the town planning and the development of land
for public purposes within the State of Maharashtra.

1.3 The importance of these Regulations stems from the fact
that they define several terms which are not defined elsewhere under other laws,
but are nevertheless used under those laws. Thus, the definitions under these
Regulations could serve as a guide in dealing with complexities under those
laws. This Article examines some of the key provisions of the DC Regulations.

2. Important definitions :


2.1 The DC Regulations lay down some important definitions
which one often comes across when dealing with real estate.

2.2 Building — A building means a structure
constructed with any materials for any purpose. The definition also includes a
part of a building. This is the most important definition since a good part of
the DC Regulations revolve around the construction of buildings. Thus, the term
‘building’ includes, those used for residential, office, educational, etc.,
purposes. A high-rise building is defined to mean a building which has a height
of 24 meters or more above the surrounding ground level.

2.3 Built-up area — It means the area covered
by a building on all floors including the cantilevered portion, if any. A
cantilever in common parlance means a projecting structure, such as a beam, that
is supported at one end and carries a load at the other end or along its length,
e.g., a beam supporting a balcony. Areas specifically excluded are not
counted for built-up area calculations.

2.3.1 Some of the exclusions from the definition of built-up
area are :


    (a) Basement area which may be used for parking, storage, bank deposits, housing equipment used for servicing the building, electric sub-station, etc. The basement area cannot exceed the lower of twice the plinth area of the building or the plot area.

    (b) Covered parking spaces as specified in the DC Regulations.

    (c) Balcony areas provided they are not more than 10% of the floor area from which they project.

    (d) Areas for recreational open spaces such as elevated/underground water reservoirs, electric sub-stations, pump houses, pavilions, gymnasiums, club houses, other sports and recreation facilities, swimming pools, etc.

    (e) Certain types of features permitted in open spaces, such as sanitary blocks, covered parking spaces, pump room, meter room, water tank, dustbins, plant nursery, etc.

    (f) Area covered by certain types of stair-case rooms, lift rooms, passages, etc.





2.3.2 The definition of this term is useful not only under
the DC Regulations, but also under the Stamp Act. Stamp duty on a conveyance is
payable on the built-up area of the property transferred. As per the Stamp Duty
Ready Reckoner if the built-up area is unascertainable it is presumed to be 20%
more than the carpet area.

2.3.3 For the purposes of FDI in real estate, the minimum
built-up area must be 50,000 sq. mts. The issue which arises here is that what
is the meaning of the term ‘built up area’ ? The DIPP Circular does not
define this term. One of the conditions under the Circular is that the project
shall conform to the norms and standards, including land use requirements and
provision of community amenities and common facilities, as laid down in the
applicable building control regulations, bye-laws, rules, and other regulations
of the State Government/Municipal/Local Body concerned. Hence, it stands to
reason that the definition of this term should be understood in the context of
which it is approved by the Municipal/Local Authority which sanctions the
building plans. E.g., land development in the city of Mumbai is regulated
by the Development Control Regulations of 1991. Thus, if the DC Regulations
treat something as a part of the built-up area, then it stands to reason that
the same should be so counted even for the purposes of reckoning whether the
project is FDI compliant.

2.4 Carpet area — This is the net usable floor
area within a building excluding area covered by walls. It also excludes any
area specifically excluded from computation of the floor space index. The
Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1963 requires every Flat Ownership Agreement
and every advertisement for the project to mention the carpet area of the flat
sold.

2.5 FSI — The term FSI means Floor Space Index.
FSI has been defined under the Regulations to mean the quotient of the ratio of
the combined gross floor area of all floors in a building to the total area of
the plot. However, the areas which are specifically exempted under the
Regulations are excluded from the computation of the FSI. Thus, FSI would be
computed as under :

Total Covered Area on all floors

Total Plot Area

Hence, the FSI quotient denotes the total constructed area
which is possible on a given plot of land. For instance, if the area of a plot
of land is 100 sq. mts. and the prevailing FSI quotient for that area is 1.33,
then the total possible constructed area on that plot would be 1,330 sq. mts.
The FSI computation and the permissible FSI varies depending upon the location
of the plot, the nature of intended use, etc. For instance, additional FSI is
allowed for Slum Rehabilitation Projects, redevelopment of cessed buildings,
hotels, etc.

2.6 Plinth — One often comes across this term in the real estate sector. It means the portion of the structure between the surface of the surrounding ground and the surface of the floor immediately above the ground. Plinth area on the other hand means the built-up covered area measured at the floor level of the basement or any other storey.

2.7 Plot means a parcel or piece of land which is enclosed by definite boundaries.

    Construction process:

3.1 In a variety of laws, such as S. 80-IB(10), Circular 1/2010 issued by the DIPP, etc., one comes across terms like the commencement of the project, completion of the project, obtaining of all statutory approvals, etc. Hence, it becomes important to understand the process involved in constructing a project, what steps are involved and what approvals are required.

3.2 Given below is a brief description of the processes and the approvals/certificates required for projects in Mumbai:
   a) Plan submission: The initial plan is submitted to?the?BMC?to?obtain a No Objection Certificate or approval based on guidelines laid down under the DC Regulations. A notice is to be given to the BMC along with a host of prescribed documents, such as the title documents, site plans, layout plan, building plan, etc.

 b)   Intimation of disapproval: This permission is an in-principle approval with respect to the plans submitted subject to conditions set out in the plans. The Intimation of Disapproval or IOD is worded in a very unique fashion. It gives an impression that the development has not been approved. However, actually it means that the development would be approved if the objections specified therein are addressed. Following compliance with these conditions, a Commencement Certificate is granted at various stages set out in the conditions. The IOD allows the developer to vacate and rehabilitate existing tenants and demolish existing structures. The developer is required to submit drawings of the proposed building for a project, together with details of the plot survey and survey drawings to the concerned planning authority.

 c)   Commencement certificate: The CC is required to commence work. The builder submits various documents as evidence of compliance of the conditions set out in the plans delivered with respect to intimation of disapproval at the time of applying for this certificate. Examples of such documents include no objection certificates from relevant authorities for cutting trees, from the Airport Authority of India for height clearance with respect to airport distance, structural design and drawings submissions and temporary structure permissions. Further, approvals for parking layout and a soil investigation report, for example, are also required to be in place at the time this application is made for obtaining a commencement certificate up to the plinth level. The CC is valid for 4 years, but needs to be renewed every year.

 d)   Further/full commencement certificate: This certificate is an endorsement with respect to the commencement certificate. This endorsement to undertake construction above the plinth level for which there are formal inspections by the officials of the BMC. It may be obtained either in phases or at one time for the entire project.

    e) Building Completion/Occupancy certificate: The Occupancy Certificate or OC is granted on the completion of the project and is required for occupants to move into their respective apartments. Some of the documents required to obtain this approval are?: a Structural Completion Certificate, a Lift Completion Certificate, a No Objection from the Fire Department and a Storm Water Drain Compliance Certificate. On receipt of these documents, the BMC inspects the work and issues a Certificate of Acceptance of the Completion of the Work. Once this Certificate is received, the builder submits the Development Completion Certificate along with the completion plan to the BMC. If the BMC is satisfied that there is no deviation from the sanctioned plans, then it grants an OC within 21 days or it may refuse to grant the OC. There are a good number of buildings in Mumbai where even though all flats are sold, the OC has not been obtained. The grant of the OC signifies the completion of the project.

   f)  Permanent electricity and water connection: This certificate is obtained after the occupancy certificate has been awarded.

    Consequences of violation:

4.1 In cases of DC Regulation violations, i.e., where the constructed area exceeds the maximum FSI permissible under the Regulations and/or allowed under the DRC, the BMC has power to demolish the illegal construction. It can also recover the costs of such demolition from the accused. In addition, a penalty for unauthorised development/use of a property otherwise than for the purpose it was planned may be imposed in the form of an imprisonment and a fine.

4.2 A very famous case in this respect is that of Pratibha Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. where the Society violated the FSI laws by constructing an unauthorised additional area of up to 24,000 sq.ft, equivalent to 8 additional areas. Ultimately, the matter went to the Supreme Court which upheld the demolition of the illegally constructed floors. While concluding the Supreme Court observed that “this case should be a pointer to all the builders that making of unauthorised construction never pays and is against the interest of society at large”.

4.3 Recently, an important decision was rendered by the Bombay High Court in the case of a writ petition filed by Sudhir M. Khandwala, writ petition No. 1077 of 2007. The case pertained to the demolition of illegally constructed Gaurav Gagan building and the petition was filed by the flat owners seeking re-spite from the BMC’s Orders. The High Court refused to stay the demolition and refused to regularise the unauthorised construction.

Dissolution of a Partnership Firm : SC Decision

I. Introduction

    1.1 The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (‘the Act’) provides for registration of partnership firms with the Registrar of Firms. Registration under the Act is voluntary and not compulsory as in England. However, u/s. 69 of the Act, in the case of firms which are unregistered, the partners of the firm cannot file any suit in a Court. Thus, this is a disability for all unregistered firms.

    1.2 In spite of the above disability, the partner of an unregistered firm is entitled to sue for dissolution of the firm. This position was amended in the State of Maharashtra by the introduction of S.69(2A) and S.69(3)(a). Hence, partners of an unregistered firm in the State of Maharashtra, could not even sue for the dissolution of the firm or for realisation of the property of a dissolved firm.

    1.3 This amendment in Maharashtra caused a great deal of hurdles for partners of unregistered firms and was challenged as being unconstitutional. The Bombay High Court upheld the validity of this amendment. Recently, the Supreme Court, in the case of V. Subramaniam v. Rajesh Raghuvendra Rao, Civil Appeal No. 7438 of 2000 decided on 20th March, 2009, had an occasion to consider the Constitutional validity of this important amendment. This article analyses this important judgment and the principles laid down therein.

II. Existing Legal Position

    2.1 S.69 of the Act provides as under :

        “69. Effect of non-registration — (1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.

        (2) No suits to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.

        (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect —

            (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm; or

            (b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909), or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920), to realise the property of an insolvent partner.”

    2.2 The Maharashtra Amendment Act of 1984 inserted sub-section 2A in s.69 with effect from 1st January, 1985 which read as follows :

        “(2-A) No suit to enforce any right for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm, unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.

        Provided that the requirement of registration of firm under this sub-section shall not apply to the suits or proceedings instituted by the heirs or legal representatives of the deceased partner of a firm for accounts of a dissolved firm or to realise the property of a dissolved firm.”

        It also replaced the aforesaid clause (a) of subs-section 3 of S.69 of the Act and the amended S.69(3) read as follows :

        “(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (2-A) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect —

        (a) the firms constituted for a duration up to six months or with a capital up to two thousand rupees; or”

    2.3 The net effect of the amendments in the State of Maharashtra were as follows :

        (a) A partner in an unregistered partnership firm could not file a suit for :

        (i) dissolution of the firm; or

        (ii) accounts of a dissolved firm; or

        (iii) realising the properties of a dissolved firm.

        (b) The only exception when he could do so was where the firm was only 6 months old or its capital was up to Rs. 2,000 only.

Thus, a partnership firm could come into existence without being registered, but it could not go out of existence (dissolved) since it was not registered.

III. Principles laid down by the SC

    3.1 The Bombay High Court had upheld the validity of the above provision which prevented a partner of an unregistered firm from suing for dissolution. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant, V. Subramaniam, preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court laid down various important principles in its judgment.

    3.2 Firm not a separate legal entity

    The Court observed that unlike in the case of a company, a firm is not a separate legal entity and it does not have a personality distinct from its partners. The registration of a firm also does not give it the status of an artificial juridical person. The partners are the real owners of the firm’s property. The property belongs to the partners. This position is distinct from that in the case of a company.

3.3 Constitutional validity

3.3.1 The Supreme Court held that Art. 300A of the Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of his property except by authority of law. Sub-section 2A deprived a partner from his share in the property of the firm and that too without any compensation. The Court observed the various ways in which deprivation of property can take place by :

(a) Destruction   of property   as held  in Chiranjit  Lal Chowdhuri  vs. UOI, AIR
1951 SC 41.

b) Confiscation   of property  as held  in Ananda Behera vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 17.

c) Revocation of a proprietary right granted by a ‘private proprietor’ as held in Virendra Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 447.

d) Seizure of goods as held in Wazir Chand vs. State of H.P., AIR 1954SC 415 or seizure of immovable property as held in Virendra Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 447.

e) By assumption of control of a business in exercise of the ‘police power’ of a State as per the decision in Virendra Singh vs. State of U.P.

f) A municipal  authority,  which,  under statutory powers, pulls down dangerous premises as per the decision in Nathubhai Dhulaji vs. Municipal Corporation, AIR 1959 Born. 332.

g) An insolvent being divested of his property as per the decision in Vajrapuri Naidu, N. vs. New Theatres, Carnatic Talkies Ltd., 1959(2) MLJ 469.

3.3.2 The Court also held that the amendment was violative of Art.14 of the Constitution which guarantees the right to equality. Under the present law, partners of an unregistered firm were placed on an unequal footing vis-a-vis partners of a registered firm. Further, the amendment was ultra vires Art, 19(1)(g) which guaranteed all persons the right to practise any profession or trade. The State was empowered to reasonable restrictions on this right. However, a reasonable restriction meant that the limitation should not be arbitrary or unjust or excessive. A proper balance should be struck between the restriction and the fundamental right of freedom granted by Art. 19. A law is invalid if it is arbitrary and of excessive nature and goes beyond what is in public interest as held by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597.

3.3.3 The Court observed that the amendments were crippling in nature. It would have the effect that the partnership cannot be put to an end by filing a suit for dissolution. It may happen that a dishonest partner who was in control of the business or if he is stronger than the rest, can deprive the other partners of their dues from the firm. This would be extremely unjust and unfair. The Court observed that the Section created a situation, where businessmen will be very reluctant to enter into unregistered firms since they would not be able to dissolve the firm and get back the money which they have got in the firm.

IV. Conclusion

The Court ultimately held that the amendment was ultra vires of Art. 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution and hence, it was struck down as being unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Act in Maharashtra should now be read as if it does not contain sub-section (2A) and the revised clause (a). Thus, a partner of an unregistered firm can now sue for dissolution or for accounts or for property of such a firm.

Limitation period for economic offences

Laws and Business

1. Introduction :


The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (‘the Code’) provides
for the method and manner in which criminal cases, prosecutions, etc. would be
tried in the Courts. The Code also provides for the limitation period after
which the Courts would not entertain any prosecutions in respect of certain
offences (including economic offences) under various Acts. The Code also
provides for certain exceptions to these provisions, i.e., cases in which
the period of limitation does not apply. These provisions are very important,
especially, in light of the fact that recently, the Department of Company
Affairs, the SEBI, etc., have started launching prosecutions on a large scale.
This Article examines these provisions.


2. Limitation Period for certain Offences :


2.1 Under the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Code, the
period of limitation in respect of taking action under various enactments has
been provided. The object of enunciating a bar on prosecutions was explained by
the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Punjab v. Sarwan
Singh,
AIR 1981 SC 722. The Supreme Court held that the object in putting a
time limitation on prosecution is clearly to prevent parties from filing of
vexatious and belated prosecutions.

2.2 Definitions :


2.2.1 S. 467 provides that the ‘period of limitation’
means the period specified in S. 468 for taking cognizance of an offence.

2.2.2 Although S. 190 provides that a Magistrate of the first
class would take cognizance of any offence on receipt of a complaint of facts or
a report from the Police, the Code does not define the term anywhere. The term
‘cognizance’ may be defined to mean the judicial recognition or the
judicial notice of any cause of action. According to the Supreme Court in the
case of Darshan Singh, cognizance takes place at a point when a
Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence.

2.3 Specified periods :


S. 468 provides the periods of limitation after the expiry of
which a Court shall not take cognizance of an offence. These periods are :

(a) 6 months, if the offence is punishable with fine only,
e.g., S. 299 of the Companies Act, specifies a fine of up to Rs.50,000.

(b) 1 year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment
for a term not exceeding 1 year, e.g., S. 292A of the Companies Act
specifies a term of up to 1 year for failure to constitute an Audit Committee.

(c) 3 years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, but not exceeding 3 years, e.g., S. 77A
of the Companies Act specifies a term of up to 2 years for buying back of
securities otherwise than in the manner prescribed u/s.77A.


When two or more offences are tried together, the period of
limitation shall be determined with reference to offence for which punishment is
more severe or where the punishment is most severe. It may be noted that no
provision has been made in case of offences punishable with more than 3 years.
Thus, S. 468 would not apply to such cases of offences.

2.4 Inapplicability of S. 468 :


The above limitation period specified in S. 468 has been made
inapplicable to certain economic offences by the Economic Offences
(Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974
. Any offence under an Act or any
provisions thereof, specified in the Schedule to this Act is not affected by the
period of limitation specified in S. 468. Some of the important Acts specified
in the Schedule are as under :

(a) The Income-Tax Act, 1961

(b) The Interest Tax Act, 1974

(c) The Wealth-tax Act, 1957

(d) The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956

(e) The Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (now known as
the Central Excise Act, 1944)

(f) The Customs Act, 1962

(g) The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (it may be
noted that the Schedule has not been amended to include the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999). S. 49(3) of the FEMA provided for a limitation period
of 2 years from the date of its commencement for any Court/officer to take
cognizance of an offence committed under FERA. This period expired on 1st May
2002.

(h) The Capital Issues (Control) Act, 1947 (it may be noted
that the Schedule has not been amended to include the Securities & Exchange
Board of India Act, 1992)

(i) The Indian Stamp Act, 1899

(j) The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951

2.5 Maharashtra State Amendments :


In addition, in the State of Maharashtra, by virtue of the
Maharashtra Taxation Laws Offences (Extension of Period of Limitation) Act,
1977,
Chapter XXXVI of the Code has been made inapplicable to any offences
punishable under the following Acts :

(a) The Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959

(b) The Maharashtra State Tax on Professions, Trades,
Callings and Employments Act, 1975

Further, by virtue of the Maharashtra Taxation Laws
Offences (Extension of Period of Limitation) Act, 1981,
the period of
limitation in the State of Maharashtra, in respect of offences under certain
Acts has been extended to the time specified therein instead of the time
specified in S. 468 of the Code. The extended period of limitation for these
offences is as under :

(a) 3 years where the total amount of tax or duty involved
in the case of the said offence is Rs.25,000 or more; and

(b) 1 year in all other cases

An important Act to which this extended period applies is the
Bombay Stamp Act, 1958.

2.6 Computation of the period :


The period of limitation u/s.469 of the Code, commences :


(a) on the date of the offence; or

(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer or the identity of the offender is unknown :

2.7 Continuing offence:

S. 472 provides that for a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. The term continuing offence has not been defined and thus, one must depend upon the language of the Act. In Maya Rani Punj v. CIT, 157 IT 330 (SC), the Supreme Court observed that if a duty continued from day to day, then its non-performance from day to day was a continuing wrong. The Madras High Court’s decision in the case of C. K. Ranganthan v. ROC, 45 SCL 500 (Mad.) has held that an offence u/s.211(7) of the Companies Act, 1956, i.e., relating to non-compliance of the balance sheet and profit loss account with the requirements of S. 211 and Schedule VI, is not a continuing offence. It is a one-time offence and there is a period of limitation which must be filed within one year as per S. 468(2)(b) of the Code. The Court further held that non-compliance of financial statements with the requirements of Schedule VI gives rise to a single default and to a single punishment. The provision does not contemplate that the obligation to secure compliance continues from day-to-day until the compliance is actually met, nor does it provide that continuance of business without securing compliance becomes a continuing offence. The Court also held, relying upon its earlier decision in the case of Asst. ROC v. H. C. Kothari, 75 Compo Cas. 688 (Mad), that the ROC was deemed to have knowledge of the offence when the statements were received by him. Hence, the period of limitation of one year would also commence from such date.

3. Auditor’s duty:

The Auditor can provide value added services to his clients by enlightening them about the periods of limitation in respect of any likely prosecutions against them or any suits which they have preferred against any person. He should enquire during the course of his audit as to whether any prosecution proceedings have been launched against the auditee or its officers and what would be the consequences. This becomes very important when dealing with offences under the Companies Act, Rent Act, Bombay Stamp Act, Registration Act, etc. It needs to be repeated and noted that the audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is exercise  of ‘due  care’.

Using Generalised Audit Software (GAS) for Fraud Detection

Internal Audit

Introduction :


Ray the Head — Audit, Risk Management and Forensics of a
manufacturing major — ‘D & B’ was making a presentation on ‘Role of Internal
Audit and Management Assurance Services in detecting indicators of frauds — that
is — red flags’ to the Audit Committee, because the Audit Committee had
queried :

“To what extent should internal audit be responsible to
detect indicators of frauds and provide early warning signals ?”


The presentation sought to present the role of the internal
auditor in the context of the new IT-enabled business environment and the focus
of the assurance teams on IT controls, risk management, physical document-based
audits and compliance requirements under various regulations. One important tool
that could be used in this scenario is Generalised Audit Softwares (GAS). These
tools aid an assurance team to identify trends, patterns and query data for
other indicators of fraud while maintaining the cost of review and timeliness of
conclusions.

The Audit Committee was supportive of the presentation made
by Ray and asked him to implement the GAS and present the red flags detected as
a result of the forensic review in the next quarter meeting.

Methodology :

The Chief Internal Auditor set up a mid-size team within the
department to take the initiative of implementing the GAS in the Company. The
team comprised 2 senior audit officials (who among them had a wide range of
experience in various process activities of the company like procurement, sales,
finance and administration), a Certified Fraud Examiner and an Information
Systems Auditor. The team also retained the services of a retired CBI Officer
who was an expert in economic offence interrogations.

The entire audit manual was reviewed and specific forensic
objectives were mapped for possible audit tests that could be conducted using a
GAS and otherwise. The method of using the GAS was debated and discussed by the
group in a way that data integrity, confidentiality and availability of the
production server was not compromised and the objectives were also met.

While it was not possible to log onto the production server
due to access restrictions maintained by the Database Administrator, the team
was faced with a challenge to import data for further analysis.

The team decided to connect to specific data dumps (Print
Report Dumps from various modules of the ERP like materials, sales, etc.)
provided by the DGM-IT. The data dump was provided by running a File Transfer
Protocol (FTP) on the Reporting Server, which is also used for reporting tools
like Discoverer.

Illustrative observations highlighting the red flags detected

(In all these instances, the audit scope was suitably
modified and was followed through to its conclusion
)

Accounts payables :

Potential employee-vendor nexus :

The engagement team obtained key master data concerning
vendors and employees. The vendor master data had crucial field data like
telephone number, address, tax code, and bank account number. The employee
master data had vital fields like date of birth, bank account number, PAN, etc.

The team solicited special approvals from the ‘Supply Chain
Management Wing’ and the ‘Human Resources Wing’ to obtain confidential and
privileged master data. Upon getting the data in hand, the team extracted the
data into the GAS and set up the imported data for key comparisons.

The JOIN function was used to link the two databases on the
telephone number and bank account field individually. A quick review of the
result indicated some unexpected linkages, for example, the
address fields for some of the vendors and employees seemed to resemble each
other — similar but not the same. Interrogation followed this crucial data
crunching exercise, where surprise calls were placed to the registered telephone
numbers. On the basis of voice recognition and investigative visits, it was
conclusively stated that key vendor-employee links existed within the company.

Payroll :

Employees who have not availed of sick leave, casual leave or
travel leave in the last 3 years.

The investigation team consulted with the Human Resources
Wing of the company. Employees who tend to attend work regularly without leave
are normally watched by forensic auditors. These employees could be at the heart
of a long-drawn, deep-rooted system fraud as they normally assume key roles in
the organisation without much segregation of duty for long tracts of time. Their
supervisors never suspect their actions and continued service is considered a
merit.

The data under consideration was ‘leave availed’ data for the
last 3 years and employees on company rolls for the last 3 years.

Upon flat file report import, all the employees who had
consumed leave in the last 3 years were summed up. This summation file was
excluded from the file of all employees on the company rolls for the last 3
years using the JOIN function.

The resultant file brought to the fore existing employees of
long-standing nature, who had never consumed leave. In fact on a closer review
with the HR Wing, many of the cases detected were also on the CLOSE-WATCH
OVERTIME list.

The input was used to modify the audit objectives and tests
for identifying any irregularity.

Accounts Receivables :


Inconsistent scheme discount rates offered by Billing to different customers against the same scheme.

The fields of reference relevant to the red-flag being tested were identified as :

  • Authorised  by
  • Scheme number
  • Scheme discount  rates
  • Gross sale value.

The process of interrogation followed was as such:

  • Field  manipulation,   appending   a computed virtual  numeric  field discount  % with the criteria (Scheme discounts*100/Gross sale value), rounded off to the nearest integer.

  • Navigating  to analysis in the menu tool bar and selecting duplicate  key exclusion –  Celebrated De-Dup  Test.

  • In duplicate key exclusion, identifying different discount % values for the same scheme number.

  • A list of cases where varying discount % had been applied for the same scheme number was easily identified.

  • Some cases were extremely glaring, with the discount % being as high as 45%, where the scheme warranted a discount of 15% only.

These cases were taken up for one on one interrogation with the Billing clerks, to ascertain their motive.

Information Technology:

Detecting transactions out of office hours in Access Logs

The fields of reference relevant to the objective being tested were:

  • Start time

  • End time

  • User ID

  • User name

  • Particulars

The process of interrogation in the GAS was elaborate and clear.

  • Extraction  on the Access Log File.

  • A criterion was  designed using the function .NOT. @betweenagetime(StartTime, 1/10:00:001/, 1/22:00:001/) .OR… NOT. @betweenagetime(End Time, 1/10:00:001/, 1/22:00:001/)

  • This criterion helped isolate all transactions out of the normal working hours of 10 AM to 10 PM. Here both Start time and End time were trapped.

  • The Indexed Direct Extraction function of GAS is very popular on large databases, say, upwards of 100 million transactions. The function first sorts the entire database and then runs the equation through the sorted database. Hence, the results are processed faster as compared to running a direct extraction command on an unsorted database.

Cases observed revealed extensive prolonged login sessions by the Database Administrator during late night sessions. Few cases revealed attempted access by an unknown user with super-user rights. It was later discovered that this user was created during the last system migration with unlimited access and change modification rights. Ironically his user profiles had not been deleted or disabled permanently within the system.

Conclusion:

Some of the indicators that were highlighted using the GAS existed all these years. But the auditor did not have the tool to identify the same within a reasonable timeframe and also provide assurance in other areas. It therefore allowed the audit team to move beyond the ‘priority’ set by the Audit Committee. The IT was also excited about the possibilities which such a tool could have for their forensic security reviews also on a regular basis and initiated a review of the same with special watch on cyber security. Further, Ray made it mandatory for the company’s outsourced internal auditors to use a GAS for their branch audits using similar methodologies as them.

As a seasoned user of the GAS, Ray laid down the structure for Continuous Control Monitoring of specific forensic objectives through automation of tasks and scheduling within the GAS.

The Audit Committee appreciated the innovative steps taken by Ray, including his efforts at clarifying the role of internal auditor in fraud identification. All audit plans included some dimension of fraud reviews without going in for full investigation.

Consent Orders to settle violations of Securities Laws — A review on completion of two years

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Securities Laws

1) April 2009 marks the second anniversary of the Guidelines
issued in April 2007 (referred to herein as ‘the Scheme’) issued by SEBI to help
quickly settle proceedings initiated against parties for violations of specified
provisions. The Scheme has been discussed several times earlier in this column
— firstly at the time of its introduction and, later, highlighting a few cases
settled.

2) It may be recollected that the Scheme is essentially
intended to help settle existing or potential proceedings for alleged violations
of specified securities laws. A person facing or anticipating to face
proceedings for alleged violations could simply come forward with an offer to
settle the case by way of a Consent Order to be passed by SEBI. A Chapter of
this Scheme covers compounding of offences, but here, the Consent Order Scheme
is discussed. It may be recollected that the inspiration for this Scheme was the
US Model where more than 90% of cases are settled in such a manner.

3) The author intends to review :

  •      How has the Scheme fared in the 2 years of its existence ?

  •      What type of ‘consent orders’ have been passed ?

4) Such a review is important to :

  •      help parties who are contemplating to avail of the Scheme.

  •      assist those who may contemplate availing of the Scheme in future.

  •     make people aware of the fact that such a Scheme exists.

5) A review will also help to know what type of cases are
typically being settled and in what manner. Obviously, precedents have value as
they would be normally followed in similar cases. Thus, parties may know what is
the likelihood of their cases being settled and at what costs. A good example is
of cases in the recent IPO scam where it was alleged that certain parties made
fictitious/benami applicants. The cases settled clearly specify the manner in
which cases are settled. Even more important, cases not settled but in respect
of which the party preferred to continue the proceedings before SEBI also show
the type of penalty and other action taken by SEBI.

6) Apart from this, from a policy perspective, it is worth
considering whether the qualitative objectives of the Scheme were also achieved
and whether, in particular, the cases settled are the type of cases that merited
settlement and also whether the settlement process is fair.

7) It may be worth quickly reviewing the Scheme and its very
broad procedure. Any person who faces or expects to face any proceedings by SEBI
for any violation of specified provisions of Securities Laws (such as the SEBI
Act, Regulations issued there-under, etc.) can make use of this Scheme. The
person would have to come forward to settle the matter and give its offer for
settlement. The offer is to be made to the High Powered Advisory Committee, a
Committee formed of 3 independent members and headed by a retired Judge. The
procedure for making an application under the Scheme and the actual proceedings
are fairly simple and non-legalistic. The role of the HPAC is to impartially
review the status of the matter and also give its recommendation to SEBI. In
practice, the HPAC goes a step further and attempts to facilitate the settlement
itself. One often gets a pleasant surprise in the proceedings when one gets
friendly support from the HPAC itself which points out the weaknesses of SEBI’s
case in an attempt to persuade SEBI to come forward to a reasonable settlement.
Of course, a party trying to get away cheaply may also be reprimanded, albeit
gently, and the risks of allowing the application for Consent Order being
rejected are also highlighted. When and if a settlement is reached, the party is
asked to deposit the settlement amount and a Consent Order is passed. Usually,
this means the end of the existing, potential and even related proceedings in
connection with the alleged violation.

8) An important thing to note is that it is not necessary
that the parties opting for settlement under the Consent Order should admit
any of the allegations — in fact, settlement does not mean admission of guilt
.
Often, the issue is buying peace at a cost which otherwise may be incurred in
fighting and pursuing the matter. One could take the example of crossing a
traffic signal and the Traffic Police alleging that we have crossed when the
signal was red. It is possible that the sheer nuisance value of fighting the
matter in Court may not be worth it and a smaller fine accepted may be found to
be an expedient alternative.

9) How has this Scheme fared in the last 2 years ? By any
benchmark, it is a success
. In the first three months of 2009, around 90
cases have been settled through consent orders, while in 2008 more than 250
cases were settled. A sum of more than Rs. 10 crores is reported to have been
collected through the process. Also, a substantial portion of this amount
relates to the ‘disgorgement’ of the profits made by persons in the alleged IPO
scam.

10) Cases have been settled irrespective of the level at
which they were pending — whether at the very initial stage of investigation or
adjudication or when they were pending before the Securities Appellate Tribunal
or even when they were pending before the Supreme Court.

11) The type of cases that have been settled reveal that
violations were varied, for example :

  •     technical violations

  •      serious cases of fraud and price manipulation

  •      information filed beyond the prescribed time, say, under the SEBI Takeover Regulations

  •     allegations of insider trading

  •     serious ‘allegation’ of price manipulations including synchronised or circular or false trading.

12) Settling allegations under the Scheme is not a stigmatic
or shameful act that would bring a sense of dishonour or even a need of
justification. There are at least two important reasons for this. Firstly, the
allegation being settled may not necessarily be one of a serious nature.
Secondly, as stated earlier, there is no requirement of admitting any violation.
Cases are settled not because the parties necessarily feel that they are guilty,
but often the objective is to avoid the tortuously long and expensive
proceedings. The result is that persons who have taken benefit of the Scheme and
settled cases include many very well-known companies. These include ING Vysya
Bank, UBS Emerging Markets Equity Relationship Fund, Thomas Cook (India)
Limited, J. P. Morgan Indian Investment Trust, HDFC Bank Limited, DSP Merrill
Lynch Limited, Apollo Tyres Limited, etc., as can be seen from the published
orders.

13) Another noteworthy experience is that the settlement process is quite fast and very often it is completed and closed within a period of a few months of making the application. Contrast this with the fact that proceedings for many matters that are more than 5 years old are being initiated now.

14) Then there is another area of observation. Settlement is normally made by offering a sum of money as settlement charges. However, in some cases, administrative charges have also been agreed to be paid as part of the settlement. Interestingly, the offer may also be in ‘kind’ in the sense that a party may agree not to access the capital markets for a specified period of time. Particularly in IPO cases, parties have offered the amount of profits made by way of disgorgement. This not only helped the amount of profits made being disgorged but the controversy as to whether SEBI could legitimately disgorge such profits is also avoided.

15) The Consent Order Scheme, without exaggerating, can thus be accepted to be a fairly good success. What are the criticisms levelled against the Scheme?

16) A major criticism is that serious cases relating to fraud and price manipulation are also settled. Allegations of false trading, etc. or other types of fraudulent activities or price manipulation, or the recent IPO scam, etc. are some examples of matters settled through Consent Orders.

17) The question is whether such cases should at all be settled and that too in some cases by paying the profits made with or without nominal extra legal charges. Would not such a practice create an absence of fear of law amongst would-be scamsters that the worse that can happen to them is that the profits would be lost and that too if they are caught in the act? Clearly, there is some basis for this concern.

18) The other side is that it may be very difficult in some of such cases to get a guilty verdict, considering also the prolonged legal proceedings involved, and considering that in some cases, evidence may not easily be forthcoming. Some of such cases may also be of a time when the prevailing law was not comprehensive to cover the transactions and or effective enough to provide deterrent punishment.

19) Another thought is whether such a continuing settlement Scheme is desirable. It literally:

1. creates a forum for avoidance of the regular proceedings to punish violations and it creates an almost assured way of facing reduced punishment.

2. diverts attention from the complexities of such laws and procedures and its reform.

However, we should not forget that such Schemes arise also because of complexities in the law relating to its enforcement.

20) Another concern is that the Consent Orders are not detailed enough. Typically, the order is of just one or two pages which merely refer very briefly to the allegations. There is no detailed background of the allegations, facts, etc. given. No reasoning is also given why the particular matter was settled and why it was settled at the amount at which it was settled.

21) All in all, though, the Scheme has received the success it deserves. It helps reduce the backlog of cases keeping SEBI free to focus on serious cases. It also helps parties bring the issue to a quick end particularly where it is technical.

Pushing corporate governance through mutual funds — SEBI’s recent circular creates unique dilemmas for listed companies

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Securities Laws

SEBI recently made an innocuous appearing requirement for
mutual funds that has far-reaching implications on listed companies and on the
mutual funds. Simply stated, the SEBI Circular (SEBI/IMD/CIR No. 18/198647/2010,
dated March 15, 2010) now requires mutual funds to disclose in their annual
report as to how they voted at general meetings in respect of each of the shares
held by them in respect of specified matters. There are a few other connected
requirements.

As will be seen, these requirements have equal — if not more
— implications on the listed companies wherein shares are held. But let us first
outline the requirements. Incidentally, this article discusses only the
requirements relating to ‘corporate governance’ in the Circular and not other
requirements relating to ASBA, brokerage and commission, etc.

Firstly, it is required that the Asset Management Companies
(‘the AMCs’), i.e., the entities that manage the mutual funds, should disclose
‘their general policies and procedures for exercising the voting rights in
respect of shares held by them’. This disclosure is to be given on the website
of the AMC as well as in the annual report distributed to the unit-holders for
the financial year 2010-11 and onwards.

Secondly, disclosures in a similar manner and timing are to
be given of the ‘actual exercise’ of the proxy votes at general meetings of such
investee companies in respect of the following matters :

(a) Corporate governance matters, including changes in the
state of incorporation, merger and other corporate restructuring, and
anti-takeover provisions.

(b) Changes to capital structure, including increases and
decreases of capital and preferred stock issuances.

(c) Stock option plans and other management compensation
issues.

(d) Social and corporate responsibility issues.

(e) Appointment and removal of directors.

(f) Any other issue that may affect the interest of the
shareholders in general and interest of the unit-holders in particular.

The first annual report in which such disclosure is required
to be made is away more than a year from now and hence it may appear that the
implications would be realised/felt at that time. However, that may not be true
for at least two reasons.

(a) Firstly, since it is now mandated that such disclosures
have to be made, and since public disclosures often result in immediate public
scrutiny, the AMCs/mutual funds should today start considering as to how they
should vote.

(b) Secondly, while the schedule for disclosure in the annual
report is clear enough, the timing for disclosure on the website is not. Is such
disclosure required immediately, or as and when the vote is cast ?

(c) Thirdly, just as the mutual fund is now immediately
concerned with how it would vote, the investee company would also face the
implications of :

  • a possibly changed
    approach to voting by the mutual fund; and


  • disclosure of how a
    mutual fund shareholder voted at its general meetings.


Having outlined the requirements, let us consider some issues
in some detail.

This requirement is not, unlike what has been incorrectly
reported in the press, a new or even ‘innovative’ one. In fact, it is a
requirement simply copied — a copy of a good, even if a little inappropriate,
requirement — from the west where this is a fairly standard requirement. This
requirement is extensively discussed in most corporate governance reports (see
for example the Hample Committee Report). What is more, many large institutional
shareholders in western countries publicly declare, in great detail, their
voting policies. Even, statutorily, in 2003 the SEC of USA has mandated a
similar requirement.

However, is this requirement appropriate to India — or, more
specifically, does it have such important consequences in India as it has in
western countries ? Indeed, any step towards making listed companies and their
Promoters more accountable to shareholders and otherwise raising the levels of
corporate governance are obviously welcome. However, this requirement continues
to reflect the approach in India of adopting western practices where the facts
are different. In the west, the mutual funds and other institutional
shareholders hold a significant stake in such companies and hence can easily bar
proposals of management as according to the Hample Committee report which is
almost two decades old, institutional shareholders held more than 60% of the
shares in listed companies. The shareholding of the Promoters/management in the
west was usually below 10%. The situation in India is different (almost
opposite) where the Promoters clearly dominate the shareholding, usually with a
clear majority holding. Even if mutual funds participate and even vote against,
the mutual fund vote cannot reject a proposal. The situation is similar to
wagging of its tail by the dog — the difference is that in the western
countries, the dog is the institutional shareholder who can wag the tail, i.e., the Promoters. In India, the mutual
funds are the tail and they can hardly wag the dog !

Interestingly, this is one of the first of ‘external’
corporate governance requirements in the sense that it applies to a person other
than the listed company itself. Clause 49 had this limitation of scope purely on
account of its placement in the listing agreement that applies only to the
listed company.

These requirements apply only to AMCs/mutual funds. But these
are not the only collective investment vehicles in India and others include
insurance companies, FIIs, NBFCs, etc. This limited scope is obviously because
SEBI does not have jurisdiction over other entities. One will have to see
whether the respective authority governing such other institutional investors
will also issue similar requirements.

The spirit behind such requirement is obviously to make
mutual funds active investors. As the SEBI Circular states — “It was felt that
mutual funds should play an active role in ensuring better corporate governance
of listed companies”. The disclosure requirement is an indirect pressure to
ensure that they are actively involved in important issues relating to the
company since their votes would now be disclosed.

However, at the cost of repetition, while this may make sense in a situation where such institutional shareholders dominate the holding, it is meaning-less in a Promoter-dominated company. True, there have been some cases where serious opposition by major shareholder has helped. However, there is a tendency to point out the finger-countable cases where exceptional interest taken in the rare public-shareholder dominated company and conclude that such exceptions prove the rule that there is a lot of scope for shareholder activism in India.

Also SEBI has not mandated that mutual funds should vote. It has just required such institutions using public money to disclose whether and how they are voting. But this transparency is sufficient to put them on guard.

One wonders whether this can have negative effect. Isn’t it likely that many mutual funds may want to play extra safe and oppose, at least by casting a vote against every resolution that could possibly be slightly or potentially controversial ? Their vote may not make a difference to the out-come, but such a step may help them avoid controversy later on. A vote cast may be viewed critically later by the media and others though with the benefit of hindsight. Of course, some mutual funds may want to remain objective and not act in this manner, but obviously there would be a subtle pressure to play safe. On the other side, companies who are at the receiving end may find it a little embarrassing to explain why certain mutual funds voted against their proposals.

Of course, it was not that mutual funds presently do not participate. Actually, often, many companies sound off institutional investors informally (though often the spirit, if not the letter, of insider trading regulations may be violated) what views they have in respect of major proposals, even where the Promoters command a significant stake. Thus, often, the mutual funds would have already given their views and hence may not bother to participate further or vote. This may now change.

In the end, in a little lighter vein, I wonder whether the requirements could and should end with mutual funds. After all, the technique of achieving the objective of entities that have public involvement through disclosure could apply to other persons too. For example, would it not make sense to require Independent Directors to also disclose the votes that they cast on important matters ? ! While one may argue that Board Meetings where they cast their vote are confidential events, this may also be a way in which there is pressure and accountability on these directors who are in a situation similar in some respects to mutual funds.

Recent amendments relating to Corporate Governance

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Securities LawsThis series of articles
introducing securities laws for listed companies to the lay reader continues . .
.


Developments in securities laws are churned out through many sources — decisions of SEBI through decisions of its Adjudicating Officers/Whole-time Members, of the Securities Appellate Tribunal, through Informal Guidance, through Circulars, amendments of Regulations and so on and on, not to speak of relatively rarer amendments in the parent enactments themselves. It is then worth reviewing, from time to time, some of these important amendments to update our knowledge. Let us consider here one very recent development (as per SEBI’s Circular of 8th April 2008) that has far reaching implications. This Circular amends the corporate governance requirements as contained in Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement.

Let us first consider a quick background of the scheme of
corporate governance through the Listing Agreement.


Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement :

As readers would be aware, provisions relating to Corporate
Governance for Listed Companies are mainly contained in Clause 49 of the Listing
Agreement. Wisely or otherwise, in India, for Listed Companies, the principal
provisions relating to Corporate Governance are contained neither in an
enactment, nor in any subordinate law such as Regulations or Rules, but in the
Listing Agreement. What is the real status of the Listing Agreement as a law can
itself be the subject of a lengthy article. Two comments are, however, only made
here. Firstly, the Listing Agreement allows for quick amendment with a simple
direction to the stock exchanges by SEBI being sufficient. Secondly, however,
though purists will continue to question its status of ‘law’, where
non-compliance could have punitive consequences, in practice, there are several
real and serious consequences possible for a Listed Company for its violation.
Hence, it is assumed that listed companies will give this Clause of the Listing
Agreement all the seriousness any law deserves.

Clause 49 contains a myriad of requirements, many of which
are modelled on the UK and US models.

Independent Directors :

A pillar (though unduly emphasised in India) of Corporate
Governance is the concept of Independent Directors. The logic of having
Independent Directors is not far to see. The promoters or management of the
company control a company in most aspects. If there are persons who are not
connected with the promoters and are otherwise unbiased and have no conflicting
interest, they may be able to see the decisions of the promoter or management
from an independent context rather than from the Promoters’ self-interest. Thus,
the requirement of Independent Directors. The issue of the number and proportion
of Independent Directors has generated a lot of debate. Initially, the Western
model was almost blindly copied. However, over a period of time, some changes
have been made to suit Indian conditions. Prior to the recent amendment, and
very broadly stated, the requirement relating to the number of Independent
Directors was broadly as follows.

If the Company had an Executive Chairman, the Company should
have at least one-half of its Board consisting of Independent Directors. If not,
the corresponding ratio should be at least one-third. There are refinements to
these and other requirements and clarifications also, but this aspect is
focussed in this article, since that is the principal subject of the amendment.

Independent Directors to be at least 50% of the Board in case
of Promoter non-executive Chairman :

It is now provided where, even if the Chairman is
non-executive
, if he is related or connected to the promoters in the
specified manner, then the ratio of Independent Directors of the total Board
size would have to be at least 50%.

The text of the new proviso creating this requirement is
given below :

“Provided that where the non-executive Chairman is a
promoter of the company or is related to any promoter or person occupying
management positions at the Board level or at one level below the Board, at
least one-half of the Board of the company shall consist of independent
directors.”


This amendment has far-reaching implications. In my view, the
amendment has been unduly glorified by the press and others, and on the other
hand its unfair side has not been seen. There is often a strong taboo in the
minds that as soon as ‘investor protection’ is stated as the intent of a
proposal, it becomes sacrosanct, forgetting for a time that promoters are as
much investors as any other — and more often than not, they hold more than half
of the share capital of a company. However, let us consider various implications
of this amendment.

Who is a ‘non-executive’ Chairman ?

The term ‘non-executive’, though not defined, is well
understood. It is obviously the opposite of a ‘executive’ director. Typically,
an Executive Director is a working director having executive responsibilities,
for example, a Whole-time Director such as a Finance Director is an Executive
Director. An Executive Director generally has his source of livelihood or at
least a material source of earnings from the Company. It would be safe to
conclude, though not so specifically laid down in the Clause, that a
non-executive director is, by definition, not independent.

Who is an ‘independent’ director ?

This term is easy to grasp, but difficult to define. Clause 49 attempts an elaborate definition of this term, but it is not proposed to analyse it here. A simple way to understand it is that an Independent Director should have at least two qualities. He should not be related or connected in specified ways to the Promoters. He should also not have financial or other specified relations with the Company. Thus, it is important to note that he has to be independent not only with regard to the Promoters but also with regard to the Company. To give an example of the latter connection, if he holds 2% or more of the voting shares, he is not an Independent Director.
 
Chairman    – executive, non-executive, etc. :

An analysis of some of the ills in companies in the West showed that when the posts of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer were combined and held by the same person, there was undue concentration of power giving scope for misuse and domination of the Board and the Company. Thus, a serious thought was given in Western countries as to how to create a balance to this power centre. The thinking was that if these two posts were combined, there should be sufficient number of Independent Directors.

This concept was also adopted in India and till the recent amendment of April 2008, it was provided that where there was an Executive Chairman, at least half of the Board should consist of Independent Directors.

However, at least as per the Indian Company Law, the Chairman, solely by virtue of this post, has few significant powers. He is more of a titular head. One power sometimes forgotten is that he may have a casting vote and thus, where the votes are equally balanced, he gets an extra vote to settle the decision. However, even this can be easily taken away. Thus, except for certain powers, mostly administrative, he is like any other director and has just one vote on the Board.

Of course, the intangible impact of a Chairman cannot be underrated. Normally, it is difficult to convince the Promoter Group to have an external director as a Chairman. Even the shareholders and others would like to see the head of the Promoter Group as ‘Chairman’. Imagine an Anil Ambani group company without Anil Ambani as Chairman, or the Reliance Industries group without Mukesh Ambani as Chairman, the Tata Group without Ratan Tata and the Baja] Auto group without Rahul Bajaj as Chairman and so on.

Who is a ‘Promoter-connected’ Chairman:

The amendment now places an Executive Chairman at par with a Chairman who is connected with the Promoters or the management.

Under the following circumstances, the Chairman would become, what I have loosely termed as, Promoter-connected Chairman:

  • If he is a Promoter.

  • If he is related  to any Promoter.

  • If he is related to a person occupying a management position at the Board level or one level below the Board.


Some comments and implications of the amendment:

I believe the implications  of this amendment  could be very far reaching.  While I do not have statistics with me, typically, normally  a Listed Company  in India is promoter-controlled,   the Chairman  is from the Promoters’  Group.  The first implication  would be that  all these  companies  would  have  to get a non-promoter  Chairman  or increase the number  of Independent Directors  to at least 50%.

It could be easy and simplistic to comment that, since the Chairman is only a titular head, the Board could simply appoint one of its existing Independent Directors as Chairman and solve the problem. After all, we Indians  are supposed  to be practical people!  However,  apart  from  some  factors  discussed  earlier,  prestige,   ego  and  similar  issues would also play their role. Hence, the change would require  a change  in ‘mindset’.

The amendments made by this Circular of SEBI dated 8th April 2008 have been brought forth with immediate force. The Circular of SEBI directs stock exchanges to amend the Listing Agreements to make these changes and no time has been given for making the changes by the companies in their Board. As this article goes to press, though, I could not lay my hands on the notifications of leading stock exchanges such as BSE and NSE amending the Listing Agreement.

Other  amendments    made by the  Circular:

There are a few other amendments made by the said Circular of SEBI. For example, it is now required that a vacancy in the post of an Independent Director should be filled within 180 days. In a way, it is tightening of the norms since apparently some companies used to delay the appointment indefinitely. However, looked at in another way, the amendment now gives a reasonable time of about six months  to get a new  Independent Director .

There are few other changes including changes in the non-mandatory requirement.

Conclusion:

Listed companies would thus  need  to consider  on how to restructure their Boards to come into line with the new requirements. I would dare comment that many Chartered Accountants will benefit by being appointed as Independent Directors since many companies would still want their Chairman to be from the Promoters Group. However, in other cases, Chartered Accountants also have a chance of being appointed as the Chairman of the Board. This is both an opportunity and challenge to the ‘professionals’, particularly Chartered Accountants.

Conviction

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NamaskaarI have earlier shared my thoughts on ‘commitment’ and
‘comparison’. I believe that there can be no ‘commitment’ to a thought or an
ideal or an action unless one is convinced of the virtue of the action. The same
equally applies to an act of ‘compromise’. Hence, in this article I will deal
with ‘compromise’ and ‘conviction. These two also in a manner control our lives.
Ludwig Erhard defines ‘compromise’ as the art of dividing a cake in such a way
that everyone believes he has the biggest piece’.

Do we realise that we make ‘compromises’ every day.
Compromise made without conviction leads to unhappiness — whereas compromise
made with conviction leads to satisfaction and happiness.

True ‘Compromise’ happens only when one is convinced that compromise results in a win-win situation or it is best of the
worst options. In both options there are no regrets because, I repeat, conscious
compromise happens only when one is convinced that the solution is in one’s own
interest. Any action taken without conviction results in misery. The question I
have is :

Are we conscious of our convictions ?

Before we get into the answer let us examine how dictionary
defines

‘conviction’.





‘A strong persuasion or belief-awakened consciousness,
strong belief on the ground of satisfactory reasons or evidence, a settled belief or opinion’.


Firstly, whilst practising our profession we have to be first
convinced about the fairness of the financial statements before we certify the
same as ‘true and fair’. Secondly, whilst arguing an issue before an authority —
conviction in an argument makes all the difference in our presentation. I know
advocacy is an art and is said to have no connection with conviction — for
example — a lawyer advocating for a person accused of murder will do his best to
save his client, but defence based on conviction that the accused has not
committed murder will have a different


impact. I believe any action based on conviction smells different and sends a
very effective message.

Let us consider a few examples :


  • We prefer
    democracy over dictatorship because we as a nation are convinced it is a
    better form of government.

  • We practise team-building
    because we are convinced it is good for our organisation and gives better
    results.


  • We prefer consensus over
    conflict because it is our conviction that consensus brings harmony.


  • Mohandas became Mahatama
    because of his conviction in truth.


  • Arjun agreed to fight the
    war with his kith and kin once he was convinced that it was not only right but
    also moral.


  • Paramhansa Ramakrishna
    suffered pain of cancer and didn’t seek relief from Ma Kali because of his
    conviction in ‘Karma’.


  • Jesus’ conviction in
    forgiveness made him say ‘Father forgive them for they know not what they do’.


  • Every action of human
    repentance is based on the conviction of having done wrong.


  • Churchill won the second
    world war because of the conviction of the British that he will win the war.


  • Obama delayed committing
    additional troops to Afghan war till he was convinced that there is no
    alternative or is the best of options.


The message of the above examples is : Without conviction
there is no convincing action.

Swami Dayanand Saraswati in his book on ‘Teachings of Gita’
says that values are initially taught to us by our parents and teachers. One
acts according to those values in one’s childhood, but unless one adopts those
values as one’s own values, the same are easily overlooked and transgressed.
Hence, to live a life according to ‘values’ one has to be convinced of the value of those ‘values’.

We have heard about it, we have read about it, hence we know
that there is no difference between ‘atma’ and ‘parmatama’, but we are not
convinced about it — the paradox is that we will experience and realise this
truth only when we are convinced — that is why it is said :

‘Guru vaka mol mantra’.

The ‘Guru Mantra’ helps us get convinced about the truth that
there is no difference between ‘atma and parmatama’.

Conviction plays a very important part in our lives and compromise based on
conviction is the basis of a happy life. Hence, to have a successful and
harmonious life, let us live our life with ‘conviction’.

levitra

Death, be not proud

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Namaskaar

This writing is inspired by the article, “O death, You must
listen”, by C.A. Ashok Dhere, in the Namaskaar column of BCAJ, March, 2009.

We, who are all born, are certain to die, one day or the
other. It is the only certainty in life. So why be afraid of death ? From a
statistician’s point of view, it is a 100 % probable event. Only the day, date,
time and the mode of happening of this event is not certain or at least not
accurately predictable to any ordinary human being (Astrological prediction
apart). And this human ignorance of the actual day, date of our death is on
purpose, as intended by our Divine Father. If I knew the exact date and mode of
my death, I would be restless all my life. Each day would be an agony, counting
backwards 10, 9, 8, . . . . . 2, 1.

Shakespeare has written “Death, Be not Proud !” Even if I die
one day, as all mortals do, I shall be immortal through my writings. And what a
true way to be victorious over Death. A man is known after he has left this
world, not through his body, but by his work and attainments.

We all dread ‘death’ because of our constant
body-consciousness. We identify ourselves with the body and role that we are
playing in this world Drama. We erroneously think and feel that we are a
physical body with a spirit (energy) within. We are educated that when the
spirit (soul energy) is with the body, we are living beings, and when the energy
leaves the body, we die. But actually, we are all immortal, divine, spiritual
beings (software), with physical bodies (hardware), for manifestation and
experience through the senses.

This ‘SHIFT’ in our understanding from ‘Body-Consciousness’
to ‘Soul-Consciousness’ makes us all brave and truly learned to face Death, as
and when it comes.

After all, what is death ? It is only a change in dress and
address of the spirit — energy. In this life, we wore a particular
(male/female), unique dress to facilitate us to perform our tasks, in a
particular geographical location. After death, we just change our physical robe
and walk into another physical garment, with some other family of soul-friends.
So, why worry ? We are all immortal souls. Even so-called ‘death’ cannot do us
apart. This is the true teaching of Bhagwad Geeta.

Death is just like walking through a door from one room to
another. Death is actually the beginning of a new Life. Death opens up new
opportunities for newer lessons to be learned and for newer experiences, by
mind-consciousness.

It is only because of our limited perception of ‘one body one
life’, that we rejoice at the occasion of birth and weep at the event of death.
Spring or summer follows autumn or winter, to be again followed by the cycle of
spring and autumn. Similarly, death follows life, to be again followed by life
hereafter . . . . till eternity.

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Tend your garden regularly

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Namaskaar

A garden is normally a square or a rectangle, so is life and
it has four quadrants. In the first two write-ups we have considered the
triology of ‘mind and body’ complex, the ‘family’ and the ‘society’. This one
aims to focus on ‘work-place’ — a place where an individual either
physically or mentally spends, according to some sociologists, 70% of his
working life. It is the work-place which completes the garden. It is the area
where one seeks the fulfilment of one’s goals in the arena of materialism — it
is the work-place which gives him success, fame and wealth. Money is important
and is required to meet the material needs of an individual, his family and also
enables him to discharge his obligation to society. The contribution of
work-place depends on how one approaches it — some disdain it, whereas others —
leaders — cherish it, because they consider the ‘work-place’ as their Karma
Bhoomi
.


However, I believe that everyone of us is a leader. In other
words, both the ‘peon’ and the ‘president’ are leaders, though their arenas of
operation may be different. The first quality of a successful leader is a sense
of ownership. We all have experienced peons who own the
‘work-place’. They take pride in keeping the work-place clean, ensure things are
in place, report on time and observe discipline. They also ensure customers are
attended to. A ‘peon’ is essentially the first point of contact with the
customer. The second person who controls the work-place is the secretary who
owns
the boss. This is the individual who at times enthuses — nay enforces
discipline on the boss. How many times we have experienced when in the midst of
a discussion the secretary reminds us of another appointment for which we may be
getting late. This person through exemplary dedication enforces ‘discipline’ —
the second essential ingredient of being a leader.

What applies to a peon or a secretary, applies equally to
everyone at the work-place. I have taken these two as an example to emphasise
basic qualities of ownership, dedication and discipline required in an
individual to enjoy and enrich the ‘karmabhoomi’.

Coming to what makes a leader a ‘leader’ — the
boss. I believe in addition to the qualities of ownership, dedication,
discipline and pride in one’s work, a leader should have the capacity to
envision
and execute with passion, coupled with a strong sense of
care and share
. To give credit where it is due is the hallmark of a leader.
To discipline and be disciplined, to exhibit patience with impatience, to be a
catalyst of change & progress and to have the capacity to blend autocracy with
care, are the ingredients of the cocktail that is the ‘leader’. He is an enigma,
yet simple and straightforward. It is these qualities which make the leader make
the work-place a challenge — a battlefield — which also in full measure has the
elements of ‘care and share’. Let us not forget that success can be achieved by
instilling ‘fear’, but success based on fear is not lasting. Success lasts where
both ‘vision’ and ‘execution’ are shared by the entire team. In other words, a
good leader not only rules the heads, but also the hearts. So let us also make
the fourth quadrant of our garden beautiful by tending it regularly with
discipline, dedication and the manure of ‘care and share’.

Let us always remember that leadership is a privilege
and is the prerogative of everyone of us. It is the exercise of this
prerogative that makes the garden of life complete.

In conclusion, I would urge that to make all the four
quadrants — our garden of life — beautiful, successful and satisfying, let us
‘tend it regularly’.

We work to earn a living to survive. We work to earn money to do things we
enjoy. We work because we enjoy work. Above all, work should bring in personal
satisfaction.

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Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004

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4. Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 :


4.1 Input Service :


Definition of input service with reference to any service
used by a manufacturer is amended and thereby restricted to include only those
services which are directly or indirectly used in relation to the manufacture of
final products and clearance of final products up to the place of removal
instead of ‘from the place of removal’.

Since the integration of credit rules vide CENVAT Credit
Rules, 2004 to facilitate credit of central excise duty and service tax across
goods and services, divergent views prevailed to interpret the term ‘input
service’ and more particularly, in the context of a manufacturer. On one hand,
services such as those in relation to modernisation, renovation, sales
promotion, market research and even auditing, credit rating, share registry,
etc. are specifically termed as input services and on the other hand in the
context of transportation of goods in a number of disputes, beginning with the
case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. CCE, Ludhiana 2007 (6) STR 249
(Tri.-Del.), the meaning of the term ‘input service’ was interpreted narrowly,
and accordingly, credit of service tax paid on outward transportation of
manufactured goods in a process of sale was not considered allowable. In a
number of decisions, this decision was followed. However, in case of India
Cement & Others v. CCE,
Tirupati 2007 (8) STR 43 (Tri.-Bang), it was held
that it is well covered within the main part of the definition and will squarely
fall within the meaning of the words ‘used in or in relation to the manufacture
of final products’ to constitute ‘input service.’ Considering diverse opinion on
interpretation of the term by the two Co-ordinate Benches, the matter has been
referred to a Larger Bench of the Tribunal of which the decision is still
awaited. The decision for all practical purposes will impact only cases pending
once this issue for the period until February, 2008 as post March 01, 2008, the
amendment in the definition has restricted the coverage. The question that
arises in any rational mind is that on one hand the Government made a move
forward in the direction of value added concept by specifically extending credit
in respect of service tax paid on activities relating to business such as
coaching and training, computer networking, credit rating, etc. which do not
have a direct relationship with manufacturing activity and also allowing credit
on post-manufacturing expenses of advertisement, sales promotion and market
research. What rationale is applied in narrowing the meaning in another context
in the same definition by modifying the words ‘from the place’ to ‘up to the
place’ ? The otherwise liberal and wide purview of the expression ‘whether
directly or indirectly in or in relation to the manufacture of final products

appeared harmonious with the inclusive part of the definition prior to the
amendment and therefore the restriction appears not only inconsistent and
contradictory within the language of the definition, but also with the spirit of
extension of CENVAT credit and therefore, can be described as a backward step
from the movement towards the Goods and Service Tax (GST).

4.2 Introduction of proportionate CENVAT
credit :


Given the complexities in multifarious business enterprises,
examined below primarily is provision of Rule 6(2) of the CENVAT Credit Rules,
2004 (CCR) :

4.2.1 Rule 6(2) of CCR :


Where a manufacturer or provider of output service avails
of CENVAT credit in respect of any inputs or input services and manufactures
such final products or provides such output service which are chargeable to duty
or tax as well as exempted goods or services, then, the manufacturer or provider
of output service shall maintain separate accounts for receipt, consumption and
inventory of input and input service meant for use in the manufacture of
dutiable final products or in providing output service and the quantity of input
meant for use in the manufacture of exempted goods or services and take CENVAT
credit only on that quantity of input or input service which is intended for use
in the manufacture of dutiable goods or in providing output service on which
service tax is payable.

How does one maintain separate accounts for receipt,
consumption and inventory of input services
meant for use in output service
and exempted service ? Unlike goods, quantification of services cannot be done
precisely and especially in case of services like telephone, security, auditing,
management consultancy, maintenance or repairs and many others, except
segregating on proportional basis, no other method is possible to maintain
separate account of receipt and consumption. In the scenario, condition of
maintaining separate accounts of receipt and consumption of input services used
for taxable output services and exempted services appears unrealistic. This is
besides the fact that the term ‘inventory’ being inapplicable to ‘input
services’, is faultily used in the context thereof. As a result, until 31st
March 2008, the only option left was to utilise only twenty percent of CENVAT
credit in case of all service providers providing both taxable and exempted
services and this led to huge accumulation of unutilised CENVAT credit balance
appearing as an asset in books of account.

4.2.2 New substitution :


An attempt now is made to overcome this by substituting the
said Rule 6(3) of the CCR with effect from April 01, 2008 by introducing an
option for a manufacturer to pay 10% of the value of exempted goods and for
service provider to pay 8% of the value of exempted services. In the
alternative, the manufacturer or the output service provider is required to pay
an amount equal to CENVAT credit attributable to inputs and input services used
for the manufacture of exempted goods or for providing exempted services, as the
case may be. The procedure for determining the portion of duty of service tax
inputs or input services is specified in Rule 6(3A).



  • Whichever option a manufacturer or an output service provider may exercise
    under the sub-rule 6(3), the option is not permitted to be withdrawn during a
    financial year.



Business Restructuring & CENVAT Credit

1 Business Restructuring :

    In the fast changing corporate environment, business restructuring has become very common. Some of the more common modes of business restructuring are as under :

  •      Merger/Amalgamation of Companies
  •      Takeover of One Company by Another
  •      De-Merger of Companies
  •      Sale of Business
  •      Transfer of Business to a Joint Venture
  •      Lease of Business to Another Company
  •      Conversion of Partnership into a Company
  •     Restructuring through part IX of the Companies Act, 1956.

    The Finance Act, 1994 and Service Tax Rules, 1994 do not contain specific provisions for implications arising out of different modes of business restructuring. However, CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) contain Rules for transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance under certain circumstances.

2 General Implications :

    On amalgamation or merger, the running business of amalgamating entity as going concern, vests by virtue of Court Order in the amalgamated entity. The amalgamated entity thus steps into the shoes of the amalgamating entity and takes over all assets and liabilities including rights under contracts/agreements, etc. of amalgamating entity without break in continuity of business.

3 CENVAT Credit :

    The provisions contained in Rule 10 of CCR are briefly stated as under :

        a) Transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance in CENVAT Credit Account from the Transferor to the Transferee is permitted in case of change in ownership or change in site resulting from the following :

            – Sale

            – Merger

            – Amalgamation

            – Lease or

            – Transfer to a joint venture

        b) The arrangement of transfer should explicitly provide for transfer of liabilities of the old factory/business.

        c) According to Rule 10(3) of CCR, transfer of CENVAT Credit shall be allowed only if the stock of inputs or in process or capital goods are also transferred along with the factory or business premises to the new site or ownership. Further, the same are to be duly accounted to the satisfaction of the Dy Commissioner/Asst Commissioner of Central Excise. (DC / AC).

4 Some Issues :

4.1 What is Sale, Merger, Amalgamation, etc. for the purpose of CCR :

The different modes of business restructing specified under Rule 10(1) of CCR are not defined under CCR. Hence, recourse would have to be made to meanings attributed to the said terms in common parlance/relevant statutes/judicial pronouncements, etc.

Some of the meanings attributed to the different modes of restructuring under Dictionaries/Judicial Rulings, etc., are given hereafter for ready reference :

a) Sale :

According to Section 2(h) of Central Excise Act, 1944

‘Sale’ and ‘purchase’ with their grammatical variations and cognate expressions, mean any transfer of the possession of goods by one person to another in the ordinary course of trade or business for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration.

b) Merger/Amalgamation :

  •  According to HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND : “Neither reconstruction nor ‘amalgamation’ has a precise legal meaning.”

  •  ‘Amalgamation’ is a blending of two or more existing undertakings into one undertaking, the shareholders of each blending company becoming substantially the shareholders in the company which is to carry on the blended undertaking. There may be amalgamation either by transfer of two or more undertakings to a new company or by the transfer of one or more undertakings to an existing company. [Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. VII, para 1539 (Page 855). [See also Baytrust Holdings Ltd. vs. I.R.C. (1971) 3 All ER 76 : (1971) 1 WLR 1333 : Brooklands Selangor Holdings Ltd. vs. Inland Revenue Commissioner, (1970) 2 All ER 76 (Ch D].

  •  The term ‘amalgamation’ contemplates not only a state of things in which two companies are so jointed as to form a new company, but also the absorption and blending of one by the other. [Re. : Walker’s Settlement, (1935) 1 Ch 567 : (1935) 5 Com Cases 412]

  • In a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ‘amalgamation’ is explained as a state of things under which either two companies are so jointed as to form a third entity or one is absorbed into or blended with another. [Cf. S. S. Samayajulu vs. Hope Prudhomme & Co. Ltd., (1963) 2 Comp LJ 61 (AP).]

c) Transfer :

The word ‘transfer’ is comprehensive and is regarded generally as comprehending within its scope transfers both voluntary and involuntary. In the absence of distinct genus or category, no presumption can arise that the word ‘transfer’ must be construed in the sense of a voluntary act of transfer since ‘sale’ ‘exchange’ or ‘relinquishment’ are, in the normal acceptation of those terms, voluntary acts. The words (a) sale, (b) exchange, (c) relinquishment, and (d) transfer must, accordingly, be given their plain and natural meaning and there is no justification for restricting the wide comprehension of the last of the four words to voluntary transfers by the application of the ejusdem generis rule. [Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. CIT 113 ITR 655 (SC)]

d) Joint Venture :

Joining together of two or more business entities or persons in order to undertake a specific business venture. A joint venture is not a continuing relationship such as a partnership. [Barron’s Dictionary of Accounting Terms]

e) Lease :

  • An agreement whereby the lessor conveys to the lessee, in return for rent, the right to use an asset for an agreed period of time. [‘Guidance note on accounting for leases’ issued by ICAL]

  • An agreement conveying the right to use property, plant, or equipment (land or  depreciable assets,) usually for specified purposes and for  a stated period of time. [Dictionary for accountants by Kohler.]

  • Legal agreement whereby the lessee uses real or personal property of the lessor for a rental charge. The contract may provide for the time period of lease, designated purposes and restrictions. [Barron’s Dictionary for accounting terms.]

4.2 Modes of business restructuring not specified under CCR:

Rule 10 of CCR provides for transfer of Unutilised CENVAT Credit Balance only in 5 specific situations, viz. Sale, Merger, Amalgamation, Lease or Transfer to a Joint Venture. A question could arise as to what would happen in a case not strictly falling under the aforesaid specific situations. Strictly speaking there could be practical difficulties.

However, as regards situations which are strictly not covered by Rule 10(1) of CCR, it is felt that though the sub-rule does not contain clear-cut provision, since the procedures prescribed under the erstwhile Proforma Credit Scheme would apply mutatis mutandis to the MODV AT [CENVAT] Scheme, a recourse could be made to the procedure laid down in Ministry’s Circular No. 14 / 79, dated 7-4-1979 in terms of erstwhile Rule 56A(6) of erstwhile Central Excise Rules. It would appear that the same would be equally relevant for CCR.

4.3 Capital Goods:

Under CCR, in regard to capital goods, only 50% of the Credit can be availed in the year of receipt and balance 50% can be availed only in the subsequent year.

In this regard, Rule 4(2)(b) of CCR is reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

“The balance of CENV AT credit may be taken in any financial year subsequent to the financial year in which the capital goods received in the factory of the manufacturer, or in the premises of the provider of output service, if the capital goods other than components, spares and accessories, refractories and refractory materials, moulds and dies and goods falling under [heading 6805, grinding wheels and the like, and parts thereof falling under heading 6804] of the First Schedule to the Excise Tariff Act, are in the possession of the manufacturer of final products, or provider of output service in such subsequent years.

Hence, in case of business restructuring, if 50%” of credit is availed by a Tranferor company prior to merger, issues could arise as to whether in- such cases balance 50% can be availed by the new Transferee entity after merger.

In the case of Shri Chamundeshwari Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CCE (2007) 217 ELT 65 (Tri.-Bang) capital goods were leased out with the unit and 50% of duty credit was availed wherein the unit was not in possession of lessee. However, the entry was reversed and Cenvat Credit was never utilised. Under the said circumstances, the Tribunal held that availment of credit was irregular, but in view of reversal, penalty and interest was not imposable.

It would appear that the matter needs to be addressed through appropriate amendment under CCR.

4.4 Transfer of all assets & liabilities:

Rule 10(3) of CCR specifically provides that transfer of business of a service provider, should specifically provide for transfer of liabilities of such business.

An issue that arises for consideration is, whether in cases where through inadvertence a specific mention is not made in the takeover document for transfer of liabilities, can the Service Tax Authorities deny transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance at the end of transferor?

In the case of Reliance Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. vs. CC & CE (2007)215 ELT 254 (Tri.-Mum), the takeover document did not specify that the Transferee took over the liabilities also of the Transferor with assets. However, at the time of surrender of registration, the Transferee had by way of letters, undertaken to assume the liabilities of the Transferor arising on and after the date of transfer. In light of the above, the Tribunal held that there was sufficient compliance of Rule 10(2) of CCR.

Despite the above ruling, it would appear that proper care should be taken while drafting takeover documents.

4.5 Existence of Stocks at the end of Transferor:

Rule 10(3) of CCR provides that transfer of CENVAT Credit shall be allowed only if stock of inputs/Capital goods is also transferred alongwith the business premises and inputs/ Capital goods on which Credit has been availed of are duly accounted to the satisfaction of DC/ AC.

An issue that arises for consideration is, whether physical existence of stocks of inputs/Capital goods is necessary, for transfer of UnutiIised Credit Balance at the end of transferor to the transferee.

It is a settled principle laid down by the Supreme Court in CCE vs. Dai [chi Karkaria Ltd. (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC) that MODVAT/ CENVAT mechanism does not require one to one correlation between inputs and outputs.

There has been a consistent attempt by the Central Excise Dept. to deny transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance in cases where there are no physical stocks at the end of the transferor .

However, the trend of judicial rulings appears to be consistent as well, to the effect that existence of physical stocks is not necessary if other conditions under CCR are complied with. In this regard, reference can be made to the following rulings:

  • Aar Aay Products vs. CCE, (2003)157 ELT 40 (Tri.-Delhi).
  • CCE vs. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., (2005) 191 ELT 660 (Tri.-Chennai)
  • CCE vs. Smithkline Beecham Consumer Health Care Ltd., (2007)209ELT96 (Tri.-Chennai).
  • Shree Ram Multi-Tech Ltd. vs. CCE, (2007) 217 ELT 136 (Tri.-Chennai).
  • Kevin Enterprises  Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, (2007) 219 ELT 181 (Tri.-Mumbai).

4.6 Transfer of Unutilised CENV AT Credit in proportion to duties paid in stocks at the time of transfer

Efforts are often being made by the Central Excise Authorities to restrict the transfer of Unutilised CENVAT Credit Balance to the extent of duties paid in stocks at the time of transfer.

As stated earlier, since no one-to-one correlation is required between inputs and outputs, matching of duties in Stocks and Balancein CENVAT Credit Account would be against the settled principles laid down by the .r Supreme Court.

In this regard, attention is drawn to a recent Madras High Court ruling in CCE vs. CEST AT (2008)230 ELT 209 (MAD) wherein it has been held that CENVAT Credit Rules do not require transfer of Credit corresponding only to the quantum of inputs transferred.

Goods Transport Agency — (GTA) Service

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3. Goods Transport Agency — (GTA) Service :


Hitherto, recipient of service of a goods transport agency
paying service tax on 25% of the value of transport freight, faced difficulty in
claiming abatement of 25% without producing evidence of ful-filment of
conditions of non-availment of CENVAT credit and/or non-utilisation of benefit
under Notification No. 12/2003-ST. The evidence was presented by obtaining a
declaration from each GTA as to fulfilment of the above conditions. Collection
and maintenance of such declarations and presenting to the Department was found
to be a difficult exercise. Further, for the field formations also, it was
cumbersome to verify the required declarations in order to satisfy the
conditions laid down under the Notification. To free the abatement provision for
GTA from the conditions laid down under Notification No. 1/2006-ST, a separate
Notification No. 13/2008-ST has been issued. However, simultaneously, definition
of the term ‘output service’ is amended in the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR)
to exclude GTA service therefrom. Thus, no CENVAT credit can be availed by a GTA
service provider. It may be noted at this point that consequentially, the
Government has missed omitting sub-clause (zzp) of clause (105) relating to
goods transport agency from the definition of ‘capital goods’ in Rule 2(a)(B) of
the CCR. Nevertheless, receiver of service of GTA paying service tax at an
effective abated rate of 3.09% can claim CENVAT credit of service tax paid on
GTA service, if the same is ‘input service’ for the purposes of CENVAT Credit
Rules, 2004 of service tax paid on GTA service.

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Threshold exemption under Notification No. 6/2005-ST

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2. Threshold exemption under Notification No. 6/2005-ST :


The threshold limit for small service providers has been
increased from 8 lakh rupees to 10 lakh rupees for the Financial Year 2008-2009
onwards. Consequently, the aggregate value of taxable services provided by a
service provider during the Financial Year 2007-2008 up to a maximum of 10 lakh
rupees would be eligible for the increased limit for the financial year
2008-2009. To state in other words, if a person provided taxable services of
aggregate value of Rs.8 lakh in the F.Y. 2007-08, he does not pay any service
tax. However, if his taxable services exceed Rs.8 lakh, but do not exceed Rs.10
lakh, he is liable to pay service tax @ 12.36% on the value of services by which
the eight lakh limit is exceeded. For instance, if the aggregate value of
services provided during F.Y. 2007-2008 is Rs.9.50 lakh, service tax on Rs.1.50
lakh would be payable. However, since the aggregate value of taxable services
has not exceeded Rs.10 lakh, no service tax would be required to be paid until
the aggregate value of taxable services provided exceeds Rs.10 lakh in the F.Y.
2008-2009. Consequently, upon upward revision of the threshold exemption limit,
the turnover limit for obtaining registration is also increased from Rs.7 lakh
to Rs.9 lakh.

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Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax), Rules, 2007

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1. Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax), Rules,
2007 :


Works contract service was notified with effect from June 01,
2007. Simultaneously, Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service
Tax) Rules, 2007 (Composition Scheme) were prescribed. Service providers of
works contract service in accordance therewith enjoyed an option to pay service
tax under Composition Scheme @2% of the gross contract value, instead of paying
12.36% on the service element of the contract value calculated in accordance
with the method prescribed in Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules.

After much controversy and following the ratio of decision in
the case of Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2006 (3) STR 124
(Trib.-Del) in a catena of Tribunal decisions, it was held that transactions of
works contract could not be vivisected to levy service tax only on the portion
of a composite contract. Consequently, works contract service was notified to
levy service tax on the component other than that chargeable to VAT/sales tax.
Considering that valuing service component in accordance with the method
prescribed in Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules is not only lengthy, but also
questionable at any point of time, exercising option of the Composition Scheme
was advantageous on all counts including presumptive tax rate of 2%, wherein
liability would further get reduced as persons paying under the Scheme are
eligible for CENVAT credit of service tax paid on input services.

However, the Government vide its Circular No. 98/2007-ST,
dated 4-1-2008 clarified that works contracts in process as on June 01, 2007
were not eligible to register under the new category of services, as works
contracts cannot be vivisected.

This gave rise to a controversy as to whether the contracts
in process were liable for service tax at all in terms of decisions in cases of
Daelim Industrial Company (supra) and Larsen & Toubro, 2006 (3) STR 223
(Tri.-Del) or they were liable under their respective categories like
construction services or erection, commissioning and installation services.
Works contractors who had registered under the relevant category and paid
service tax after claiming abatement @67% of the gross value charged, faced a
dilemma unless they decided to terminate the ongoing contract pending
completion. The Circular issued by the Board being binding on the subordinate
authorities of the Department, if contractors opted to pay service tax @2% under
the Composition Scheme after registering under the works contract category,
litigation would be inevitable. Approach of the Board meant dual standards. When
a category like commercial construction service or erection, commissioning or
installation was introduced, the Government did not mean to exclude the ongoing
contracts from the purview of service tax, and accordingly, value of pending
contract on the date of introduction of the relevant category was required to be
offered for taxation. This indeed was independent of the questionability of
coverage of works contract under the service tax law prior to introduction of
category of works contract with effect from June 01, 2007.

Given the above scenario, only the contracts executed post
June 01, 2007 had the option of the Composition Scheme and the 2% rate of tax. A
majority of works contracts of construction or commissioning or installation
would involve a period longer than a year and in a number of cases even over two
years. Therefore, within a period of nine months, insignificant number of works
contracts undertaken after June 1, 2007 might have reached completion stage.
From March 01, 2008, now vide Notification No. 77/2008-ST, the rate is increased
to 4%.

The increase in rate adversely affects all contractors who
opted for the Composition Scheme, as the increase essentially means a dent on
their margin. There is a view held by some professionals that doctrine of
promissory estoppel should apply in this case. The poser is, whether legally
does the increase in rate involve principle of promissory estoppel ? Rule 3(3)
of the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax) Rules,
2007 provides that option of paying service tax under these rules once exercised
is not allowed to be withdrawn until the completion of a contract. Given the law
that a person is not allowed to withdraw the option until the completion of the
relevant works contract, how much weightage can be given to the Board’s Circular
viz. DOF 334/1/2007-TPU of February 28, 2007, which inter alia
stated :

Under Composition Scheme, the assessee is required to pay
2% of the total value of the works contract as service tax
“. As
against this, the scheme prescribed payment of “service tax equivalent to 2% on
the gross amount charged for the works contract”
. (emphasis supplied). The
Circular being more of a clarificatory nature, cannot be beyond the scheme of
the law, it appears doubtful to apply doctrine of promissory estoppel on the
basis of a decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of CC Calcutta v.
Indian Oil Corporation,
2004 3 SCC-488 wherein it was held that departmental
Circulars or Clarifications issued u/s.37B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 would
be covered by the doctrine of ‘promissory estoppel’. The above Circular not
being one u/s.37B, and more in the nature of issue of guidance note on
introduction of new provision, challengeability of the increased rate on the
above ground appears doubtful, although it is undoubtedly unfair on the part of
the Government to double the rate of tax within nine months of its introduction.


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Representation on Compounding under FEMA

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Representation

Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society
7, Jolly Bhavan No. 2, New Marine Lines,
Churchgate, Mumbai-400020.

The Chamber of Tax Consultants
3, Rewa Chambers, Ground Floor, 31,
New Marine Lines, Mumbai-400020.

Date : 23rd February, 2010

To

Chief General Manager,

Foreign Exchange Department,

Reserve Bank of India, Central Office,

Mumbai-400001.

Dear Sir,


Re : Joint Representation on Compounding under FEMA


First of all we thank you for giving us a personal hearing on
this subject. Considering the issues
discussed at the hearing, we have had discussions within our organisations.
Final drafting has taken some time. We are sorry for the delay.

We now submit as under :

1. Amnesty Scheme :


1.1 An Amnesty Scheme exclusively under FEMA may be announced
with effect from 1st April, 2010. It may remain open till 30th September, 2010.
In our opinion, this scheme will not violate Government’s undertaking to the
Honourable Supreme Court regarding future Amnesty Schemes.

1.2 We may divide the FEMA lapses & violations in following
categories :


Amnesty Scheme to cover bona fide
cases in following situations :


(i) Procedural Lapses e.g.,
Forms/declarations have not been filed in time or filed late. Other than the
above, the transactions per se are permitted; or would be permitted if
an application had been made.

(ii) Innocent Lapses — especially where there is no
loss of foreign exchange, or where the loss is minimal. (e.g., an NRI
has given a loan to his brother/friend.)

Amnesty Scheme NOT to cover :


(iii) Serious violations where transactions are not
permitted per se. (e.g., ECB funds used in stock market.)

(iv) S. 3 Violations like Smuggling, Hawala, etc. S. 8
violations like — Indian residents keeping funds abroad in violation of FEMA.

The Amnesty Scheme should be for all lapses covered under the
first two categories. (The above will need more elaboration. We can provide the
same.) A scheme which may be declared may carry detailed lists to avoid
ambiguity. The scheme may not cover violations listed under paragraphs (iii) and
(iv) above. Our entire representation does not cover these exclusions.

1.3 Wide publicity may be given and the scheme may be
explained by a series of conferences and lectures throughout the country.

More details of the scheme are given in Annexure 1.

After 30th September, 2010 a lenient scheme may be adopted
for compounding. This is discussed below.

2. Small offences :


2.1 A threshold-amount of small offences may be determined.
All lapses below the threshold may be ignored as far as compounding/penalty
procedures are concerned. For example, a limit of U.S. $ 20,000 or Indian rupees
ten lakhs per person per year may be fixed. These amounts may be considered
insignificant, not liable to any penal proceedings. For comparison, under the
Income-tax Act, all amounts earned by a person below Rs.1,50,000 per year are
totally exempt from Income-tax. The person is not liable to tax at all. This
leaves 96% of Indians outside tax discipline.

A blanket exemption may be abused. However, RBI will always
have the power to issue appropriate instructions under FEMA. RBI may refer a
case to the Enforcement Directorate whereever it finds a deliberate abuse of any
reliefs.

2.2 At present, while computing the amount of offence, series
of transactions are totalled up. For example, in case of an impermissible loan
by an NRI to a resident friend/relative, all receipts and payments during the
period are added and counted as several lapses. In fairness, the loan should be
considered as one violation. Peak amount outstanding during a period may be
considered as the amount of lapse.

3. Technical lapses :


Amounts above the threshold may be considered leniently if
they are technical lapses i.e., covered under the first two categories
listed in paragraph 1.2. Some illustrations of technical offences are considered
below and in Annexure 2.

4. NRI investment :


NRIs were specifically permitted around the year 1982 by the
then Finance Minister Mr. Pranab Mukherjee to invest in India through OCBs.
Around 1992, the scheme was further liberalised by the then finance minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh. Then because one Indian share-broker committed frauds through
Mauritius OCBs, in 2003 all NRIs were prohibited investment through OCBs. An
arbitrary step where innocent NRIs have been punished.

Unfortunately, NRIs still keep investing in India through
their own trusts or offshore companies. These are lapses, not violations. These
investments are not crimes. They should be dealt with leniently and regularised
with token compounding sums.

5. Compounding sums :


5.1 FEMA is not a revenue law. Compounding process is to
deter people from repeating FEMA lapses; and to save them from Enforcement
Directorate’s procedures. RBI may not be tough with common men and may not link
the amount of compounding sums with presumed gains made by the investors. The
compounding sum may be linked to the gravity of the offence concerned and
intention of the parties. It should not have any relationship with the amount of
investment or gains.

There have been cases where the Compounding Authority has
presumed gains where the investor has made no gains. This is arbitrary and
unjust.

5.2 S. 13 of FEMA is an indication of the amount of
compounding sum that the law-makers intended. In most cases, the compounding sum
may not exceed Rs.2,00,000. If the matter is found to be far more serious, the
Compounding Authority may specify the reasons in the Compounding Order and then
charge a higher amount.

5.3 Time for paying compounding sum should be 3 months. The
current time of 15 days is too short.

6. FIPB and RBI :


6.1 In case of FDI in real estate development, there is a difference of opinion between RBI and FIPB. Investors who would have taken FIPB ap-proval; or gone under automatic route as permitted by the Industrial Policy would naturally follow FIPB view. They should not be considered as violators of FEMA. Some day the difference would be resolved. Once the final policy is announced, investors should follow the policy. Until then all investments made and properties held should be permitted. Even after the announcement, past investments should not be disturbed.

6.2 At present, certain areas under FEMA are administered by FIPB and certain areas by RBI. In case of a violation of Industrial Policy, the investor has to go for regularisation to FIPB and for compounding to RBI. Dual procedures for one single offence is against natural justice. For all matters administered by FIPB, the regularisation and compounding powers should vest with FIPB. Since the Compounding Rules do not grant authority to FIPB for compound-ing, let FIPB give post facto approvals.

    Accused person’s views?:

7.1 Difference of opinion between two honest and knowledgeable persons is normal. Difference between FIPB and RBI is a strong illustration. Similarly, there can be differences between the RBI/ FIPB and a professional or an investor. When there is an honest difference of opinion in interpretation of law, no penalty may be levied.

7.2 Currently, the person making a compounding application has to admit the offence. This is unfair. A person should be allowed to represent his views.

It is normal that a person may not admit to the violation, but to buy peace, he is willing to pay the compounding sum. If the person is forced to admit a violation without an opportunity to defend himself, it will defeat the principle of natural justice.

An applicant may not agree with Compounding Authority’s order and may not pay the compounding sum. Transferring all papers submitted by him including evidences and confession to the Enforcement Directorate would amount to gross injustice.

7.3    Legal representation?:

Under FERA, people were regularly represented by professionals — chartered accountants and lawyers. Legally, even under FEMA, people have a right to be represented by professionals. In practice however, for almost ten years, RBI officers flatly and strongly refuse professionals’ representations.

Legal representation should be allowed for all matters including compounding.

    Appellate process?:

If the applicant does not agree with the Compounding Order, he should get an opportunity to appeal. This is necessary as there can be differences of opinions between RBI and the businessman. These can be resolved only by an independent Appellate Authority.

We suggest that the Executive Director, FEMA should constitute first Appellate Authority. Appropriate authority (more senior to the RBI Director) in the Fi-nance Ministry may constitute final Appellate Authority within the Government. Further appeal may lie in the appropriate Court of Law.

    A speaking Order?:

In order that the person can appeal, the compounding order should be a ‘speaking order’. i.e., the order should give full reasons for arriving at a particular decision. For example, “considering the circumstances, I am of the view that penalty should be Rs.?.?.?.?.?.”, may not be sufficient.

The order may state the specific circumstances that guided the Compounding Authority to come to a particular view. The order may also state the interpretation of the accused which is not accepted by the Compounding Officer. Reasons may be given.

    Compounding and post facto approval?:
The compounding order should mean that the trans-action has been approved. There should be no need for taking any further approval.

Alternatively, where an approval is required, both the compounding process and post facto approval should be given simultaneously. The time for such a process may be increased from 6 months to 9 months.

    Authorised Dealers (ADs)?:

Authorised Dealers (ADs) are the major stumbling block in FEMA compliance. RBI insists on all forms being filed through ADs. But the ADs are neither interested, nor competent to understand and implement FEMA.

Please introduce the procedure of E-Filing of all forms and even compounding applications and Amnesty applications. Where necessary, the Authorised Dealers’ report may be called for separately.

    Other FEMA issues?:

We submit that there are several rules which cause avoidable difficulties to the concerned persons. If the rules are made clearer, it will help in reducing the lapses and violations. These issues are separate from the Compounding rules. Hence we are not submitting anything on the FEMA rules in this representation.
We request you to allow us to submit separate representation for FEMA rules. We can first discuss the modalities before we submit the same.

We wish to once again thank you for allowing us to represent before you. We will be glad to discuss the matter personally. We request you to kindly grant us an appointment for discussion.

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,

For Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society    
Vice-President    
Mayur Nayak
    
For The Chamber of Tax Consultants
President
Gopal Kandarpa

E-payment of taxes

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Representation


April 9, 2008

To,

Mr. P. Chidambaram

The Hon’ble Finance Minister, Government of India,

North Block, Vijay Chowk, New Delhi-110001.



Ref : BCAS Representations on E-payment of Taxes


    The CBDT has vide Notification no. 34/2008, dated 13th March, 2008 introduced new Rule 125 making it mandatory for all corporates and other assessees obliged to get their accounts tax audited u/s. 44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to pay taxes electronically with effect from 1st April, 2008.

    The effort of the Tax Department in moving towards paperless system of tax payment and compliance by assessees as well as delivery of services to assessees by the Tax Department by harnessing Information Technology is well appreciated. BCAS has always been supportive of such measures. However, we would like to bring to your notice certain transitional difficulties encountered in e-payment of taxes by the assessees for which a clarificatory Circular from the Department would go a long way in allaying apprehensions of taxpayers.

    Firstly, though the new Rule permits electronic payment of taxes, either by availing net banking facility or by use of debit/credit card, the mechanism of payment by debit/credit card is not yet operational. Neither the Income-tax Department’s website, nor NSDL’s website presently offers the facility of making tax payment by using debit/credit card. For assessees like small companies not liable to tax audit or professionals or individuals/partnership firms having medium range turnover (say, Rs.40 lakhs to Rs.1 crore), use of debit/credit card is a cheaper and efficient option, since the directors and/or partners of such assessees would be already holding debit/credit cards.

    Secondly, a taxpayer has to necessarily open an account with one of the 26 banks which have been authorised to accept e-payment of taxes, if they are presently banking with other banks. This increases administrative cost for the taxpayers.

Thirdly, the payment gateways of several banks offering net
banking facility for tax payment have not yet fully stabilised. There are
several technical difficulties faced by the assessees while using the net
banking facility whereby online requests for tax payments are not getting
processed. For example, user id and password allotted by the bank is not
accepted, since the bank’s database is not updated, requests for higher limits
for payments by authorised users are not processed immediately by banks, time
lag in communicating user ids and password by the banks for security purpose,
etc, etc. Since it is critical for taxpayers to pay their taxes on time,
particularly taxes deducted at source, to avoid adverse consequences like
interest, penalty and disallowance of expenses u/s.40(a)(ia), many assessees
have preferred to pay taxes under the conventional method through cash/cheque
payment though technically they were under obligation to make payment by e-mode
as per Rule 125. It is learnt that banks are also accepting such payments.

It is, therefore, prayed that having regard to difficulties
faced in transitional period, it may be clarified that there will be no adverse
consequences for taxpayers who have paid taxes by cash/cheque though obliged as
per Rule 125 to make payment by e-mode for a period of at least six months from
1st April, 2008. Further, it is also requested that the facility of e-payment
may be extended to other banks also or alternatively other banks may be allowed
to open payment gateways for their customers to enable them to deposit tax with
one of the 26 authorised banks.

Thanking you,

We remain,

Yours truly,

Rajesh Kothari Pinakin Desai Rajesh S. Shah

President Chairman Co-chairman

Taxation Committee

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Good posture for a healthy you

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16 Good posture for a healthy you


Most of us work at a desk or on a computer, and it’s very
easy to slip into poor sitting habits. Make sure you follow proper techniques
for sitting, standing and driving.


Benefits : Many of us have a variety of bad postural
habits. Examples include shoe heels of more than two inches, carrying a heavy
bag over one’s shoulder, cradling the phone between your shoulder and ear, and
not sitting all the way back in a chair for proper support. Says Dr. Manish
Dhawan, Consultant, Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, New Delhi : “A good posture can
contribute to increased energy and stamina, better breathing, proper blood
circulation, and improved overall health. It reduces stress, fatigue and general
aches and pains in overstressed joints and overused muscles.”


Sitting : Sit with your shoulders back and backbone
upright. Your legs should be at a 90 degree angle to your thighs. Says Dr.
Harshvardhan Hegde, Consultant, Artemis Health Institute, Gurgaon : “Keep your
neck, back, and heels in alignment. Avoid the urge to slouch at your desk, and
do not sit in the same position for more than 30 minutes at a time.” A small,
rolled-up towel or a lumbar roll can help maintain the normal curves of your
back.


Standing : Says Dr. Dhawan : “Keep most of your weight on
the balls of the feet and not on the heels or toes. Your arms should hang
naturally.”


Driving : Says Dr. Hegde : “Sit with the back firmly
against the seat. The seat should be at a proper distance from the pedals and
steering wheel.” The headrest should support the middle of the head to keep it
upright. Tilt the headrest forward to make sure that the head-to-headrest
distance is not more than four inches.


Precaution : If back pain lasts for more than three days,
visit an orthopaedic specialist.

(Source : Business Today, 23-3-2008)

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UCBs rattled as farmers stop repaying loans

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15 UCBs rattled as farmers stop repaying loans


The Rs.60,000-crore debt waiver has left urban cooperative
banks (UCB) and credit cooperative societies (CCS) baffled. Despite having a
large exposure to agriculture lending, the UCBs and CCS are unsure of any
benefits the loan waiver has offered to other larger banks.

Maharashtra Cooperatives Minister Patangrao Kadam declared a
fortnight ago the waiver package would be applicable to all cooperative
institutions thus going beyond the ambit of the three-tier cooperative credit
structure. There are 28,000 CCS in Maharashtra. About 70% of them are in rural
areas and 80% of their members are small farmers. Their deposits are Rs.32,000
crore and loans amount to Rs.26,000 crore. The UCBs have deposits of Rs.78,000
crore and loans of Rs.44,000 crore.

Mr. Kadam’s statement has not helped the UCBs and CCSs as
there is no word either from Nabard, or the State’s Co-operative Department or
the Central Government. But the loanees have stopped paying back their
instalments to the UCBs and the CCS. The Institutions are worried that the
non-payment may end up widening their NPAs ahead of the closure of the current
financial year. These institutions are demanding that the Government should make
its stand clear on the issue or give relaxation in the prudential norms.

(Source : The Economic Times, 18-3-2008)

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Global golmal

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14 Global golmal


The Food Corporation of India may be much maligned for
pilferage. But then, pinching from government stocks seems to be irresistible
for just about everyone, everywhere. Especially when it comes to the essentials
of life. A recent US Congressional audit has found that over the past six years,
some 32,000 barrels of crude oil worth $ 1 million have been filched from the
high-security Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) of the United States. The
barrels would do the vanishing act in transit between the oil refineries and the
SPR tanks. Apparently, poor audit systems were to blame. Since new and tighter
systems are now being put in place, the government is hoping to plug this leak.
But with oil prices on fire, it is unlikely to be too long before bootleg
barrels are on the market again.

(Source : Business Standard, 18-3-2008)

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Indian students spend $ 13 bn a year on education abroad, says Assocham

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13 Indian students spend $ 13 bn a year on education abroad, says Assocham


Industry body Assocham today said over $ 13 billion is spent
every year by about 450,000 Indian students on higher education abroad as they
are not accommodated by domestic institutions.

Over 90% of students appearing for IIT and IIM entrance
examinations are rejected due to capacity constraints, of which the top 40% pay
to get admission abroad.

(Source : Business Standard, 18-3-2008)

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Former I-T officer forms new party

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11 Former I-T officer forms new party


Tired of the corruption in government machinery, he quit his
job as an Income-tax official and on Friday he announced the launch of a
political party to fight the ills. But A. C. Tejpal, ex-Commissioner of
Income-tax, has not yet decided if any candidate from his party will stand for
the next Lok Sabha elections as he awaits a response from the general public on
this move.

Tejpal put in his papers as Income-tax chief on March 28 and
has now actively jumped into politics with the launch of the Common Man Party of
India (CMPI). In a press meet, he said, “Our members have toured many villages
and there is a demand for a party that offers solutions to uproot corruption
from government functioning. The party has chalked out an agenda to check the
menace of injustice and corruption,’’ he said. He also said every member will be
contributing to the party fund.

(Source : The Times of India, April 2008)

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Thoughts on the business of life

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12 Thoughts on the business of life


All our talents increase in the using, and every faculty,
both good and bad, strengthens by exercise.

— Ann bronte

There are two kinds of talent, man-made talent and God-given
talent. With man-made talent you have to work very hard. With God-given talent,
you just touch it up once in a while.

— Pearl bailey

Genius does what it must, and talent does what it can.

— Owen meredith

A genius ! For 37 years I’ve practised 14 hours a day, and
now they call me a genius !

— Pablo de Sarasate

I have no talent; it’s just a question of working, of being
willing to put in the time.

— Graham Greene

Talent is nothing but a prolonged period of attention and a
shortened period of mental assimilation.

— Constantin Stanislavski

We are told that talent creates its own opportunities. But it
sometimes seems that intense desire creates not only its own opportunities, but
its own talents.

— Eric Hoffer

The great law of culture is : Let each become all that he was
created capable of becoming.

— Thomas Carlyle

A true talent delights the possessor first.

— Ralph Waldo Emerson

(Source : Forbes Asia, 10-3-2008)

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Unjust Enrichment and Refund of CENVAT Credit to Exporters

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1. Background :


Exporters of services experienced rough times during
the past four to five years claiming refund or rebate of service tax
paid on various input services used in exported services and there has
been tremendous amount of litigation already pending at different
levels, wherein various issues both legal and procedural have been
raised by the Department which inter alia include the following :

  • Whether the
    service per se can be considered export in terms of the Export Rules,
    2005.


  • Non-filing of
    declaration form prior to exporting service.


  • Inadequacy of
    documents evidencing export of service.


  • Services on
    which service tax paid is taken as CENVAT credit are not considered
    ‘input services’.


  • Inadequacy of
    documents for CENVAT credit.



  • Non-registration or late registration of the assessee as service
    provider.


  • Refund claims
    filed beyond limitation period u/s.11B of the Central Excise Act.


  • Refund
    relating to export of exempted service.


  • Refund
    inadmissible on account of unjust enrichment.


Realising difficulties faced by the export-oriented
units, the Government issued Circular No. 120, dated 19-1-2010 to
simplify and standardise refund procedure to expedite the process of
refund applications and grant refunds although the procedure is already
in place for granting rebate of service tax paid by cash or CENVAT of
input services or for claiming refund under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit
Rules, 2004. Question here is whether or not and how the doctrine of
unjust enrichment should apply to the refund claims filed by exporters
of services for service tax paid on input services. For this purpose,
the doctrine of unjust enrichment and provision of S. 11B need
examination.

2. Doctrine of unjust enrichment :

In ordinary course, when any claim of refund is filed
by an assessee, he is required to file an application of refund in the
prescribed format under the law along with required documentary
evidence. On receipt of the application, the Assistant Commissioner of
Central Excise or Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise after being
satisfied may himself make an order for the refund of the whole or any
part of tax. The claimed amount is refunded to the applicant only if the
incidence of tax has not been passed on by the applicant to any other
person; or else if the amount considered due to be refunded, is
transferred to the Consumer Welfare Fund as the claimant is not allowed
to be unjustly enriched i.e., the claimant cannot get an amount which he
has not suffered. This law cannot be better understood than by the
quotes per majority decision in the landmark judgment of Mafatlal
Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1997 (89) ELT 247 (SC) :

Á claim for refund, whether made under the
provisions of the Act as contemplated in Proposition (i) above or in a
suit or writ petition in the situations contemplated by Proposition
(ii) above, can succeed only if the petitioner/plaintiff alleges and
establishes that he has not passed on the burden of duty to another
person/other persons. His refund claim shall be allowed/decreed only
when he establishes that he has not passed on the burden of the duty
or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may be. Whether
the claim for restitution is treated as a constitutional imperative or
as a statutory requirement, it is neither an absolute right nor an
unconditional obligation but is subject to the above requirement, as
explained in the body of the judgment. Where the burden of the duty
has been passed on, the claimant cannot say that he has suffered any
real loss or prejudice. The real loss or prejudice is suffered in such
a case by the person who has ultimately borne the burden and it is
only that person who can legitimately claim its refund.”

Also interesting are the quotes of the Larger Bench
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandal
Ltd. v. CCE&C, 2005 (181) ELT 328 (SC) which have aptly and precisely
described this doctrine.

“31. Stated simply, ‘Unjust enrichment’ means reten-tion of a benefit by a person that is unjust or inequi-table. ‘Unjust enrichment’ occurs when a person re-tains money or benefits, which in justice, equity and good conscience, belong to someone else.

3.2 The doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’, therefore, is that no person can be allowed to enrich inequitably at the expense of another. A right of recovery under the doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’ arises where retention of a benefit is considered contrary to justice or against equity.

3.3 The juristic basis of the obligation is not founded upon any contract or tort, but upon a third category of law, namely, quasi-contract or the doctrine of restitution.

    From the above discussion, it is clear that the doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’ is based on equity and has been accepted and applied in several cases. In our opinion, therefore, irrespective of applicabili-ty of S. 11B of the Act, the doctrine can be invoked to deny the benefit to which a person is not otherwise entitled. S. 11B of the Act or similar provision merely gives legislative recognition to this doctrine. That, however, does not mean that in absence of statutory provision, a person can claim or retain undue benefit. Before claiming a relief of refund, it is necessary for the petitioner/appellant to show that he has paid the amount for which relief is sought, he has not passed on the burden on consumers and if such relief is not granted, he would suffer loss.”

Thus, in principle, it is just and fair that this doctrine is followed while granting a refund application. To better understand its applicability, it is necessary to briefly examine the relevant provisions of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, as Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 dealing with the service tax law does not contain specific provisions for claim of refund, but through its S. 83, specific provisions of the Central Excise Act including S. 11B have been made applica-ble to service tax as they apply in relation to excise duty. Accordingly, claim of refund for service tax also is governed by the provisions of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act discussed below.

    3. S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 :

Claim for refund of duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty

    1) Any person claiming refund of any duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty may make an application for refund of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty to the Assistant Commis-sioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise before the expiry of one year from the relevant date in such form and manner as may be prescribed and the application shall be accom-panied by such documentary or other evidence (in-cluding the documents referred to in S. 12A) as the applicant may furnish to establish that the amount of duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty in relation to which such refund is claimed was collected from, or paid by, him and the incidence of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty had not been passed on by him to any other person :

Provided that where an application for refund has been made before the commencement of the Cen-tral Excises and Customs Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991, such application shall be deemed to have been made under this sub-section as amended by the said Act and the same shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Ss.(2) substituted by that Act.
Provided further that the limitation (of one year) shall not apply where any duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty has been paid under protest.

    2) If, on receipt of any such application, the As-sistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Dep-uty Commissioner of Central Excise is satisfied that the whole or any part of the duty of excise and inter-est, if any, paid on such duty paid by the applicant is refundable, he may make an order accordingly and the amount so determined shall be credited to the Fund.

Provided that the amount of duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty as determined by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise under the foregoing provisions of this sub-section shall, instead of being credited to the Fund, be paid to the applicant, if such amount is relatable to –

    a) rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India or on excisable materials used in the manufacture of goods which are exported out of India;

    b) unspent advance deposits lying in balance in the applicant’s account current maintained with the Commissioner of Central Excise;

    c) refund of credit of duty paid on excisable goods used as inputs in accordance with the rules made, or any notification issued, under this Act;

    d) the duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty paid by the manufacturer, if he had not passed on the incidence of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty to any other person;

    e) the duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty borne by the buyer, if he had not passed on the incidence of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty to any other person;

    f)…………….

Provided ………..

    Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree, order or direc-tion of the Appellate Tribunal or any Court or in any other provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force, no refund shall be made except as provided in Ss.(2).

(4) & (5) ……………….

Explanation — For the purposes of this Section, :

    A) ‘refund’ includes rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India or on excisable materials used in the manufacture of goods which are exported out of India;

    B) ‘relevant date’ means, :

(a)  to (f)……………………………………

Perusal of proviso (a) to Ss.(3) indicates that in spe-cific terms, excise duty paid on exported excisable goods or excisable inputs used in the manufacture of such exported goods outside India qualifies to be allowed as rebate or refund. The law has specifically provided for this to be in tune with the broader and outer framework of the fiscal policy of the Govern-ment viz. zero rating of exports, whether of goods or services. An exporter–manufacturer may have paid such duty in cash or from his CENVAT credit account he is entitled to receive refund/rebate, provided he has presented the required documentary evidence and has followed the prescribed proce-dure for claiming refund or rebate, as the case may be. Similarly, with reference to proviso (c) to Ss.2 of S. 11B above, refund of CENVAT credit of duty paid as inputs under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is also available to an exporter. The question arises therefore is whether or not the doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable to refund in case of export of goods as well as of services.

A manufacturer exporting excisable goods often does not have potential to use accumulated CENVAT credit on inputs, when he wholly or substantially exports all that he manufactures and eventually, he is necessitated to claim either rebate of duty paid on excisable goods by making a payment of duty from CENVAT account on exports and claiming rebate of CENVAT credit or opting to file a refund claim of CENVAT of duty paid on inputs under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 as the case may be. In the scenario, the Tribunal in CCE, Kolkata-VI v. Black Diamond Beverages Ltd., 2006 (200) ELT 317 relying upon the earlier decision in the case of Dura Syntex Ltd., 2003 (154) ELT 422 (Tri.) held that in case of re-fund related to input credit, the principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable. Recently in Balkrishna Textiles P. Ltd. v. CCE, Ahmedabad-I, 2009 (239) ELT 279 (Tri.-Ahmd.) also, it was held that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is not applicable in respect of exports and S. 11B of the Central Excise Act specifically provides that credit on duty paid can be given as cash refund if admissible and principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable. In case of CC&CE Ahmedabad v. Dura Syntex Ltd. (supra), it was categorically held that principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable in view of the proviso (c) to Ss.(2) of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, which carves out an exception in respect of credit of duty. It is quite interesting to note that despite there being excep-tions in the proviso whereby the question of examining whether duty is passed on to the buyer does not arise as the refund relates to duty paid on Inputs and therefore arising out of input credit, the authorities while issuing show-cause notice repeatedly attempt to shift the onus to the assessee to prove that unjust enrichment has not arisen. In this frame of reference, the Supreme Court’s observation in Rochiram & Sons v. UOI, 2008 (226) ELT 20 (SC) is notable : “It is a cardinal principle of law which has been settled by a Bench of seven Judges of this Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries v. UOI, 1997

    ELT 247 (SC) that refund of a claim made by the assessee can be denied on the principle of undue enrichment if the assessee has passed on the burden to consumers. The principle would be equally applicable to the Revenue as well as it cannot have the double advantage.” The Supreme Court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. v. CIT I, Pune, 2007 (8) STR 193 (SC) held that even if the Revenue has taken an erroneous view of law, that cannot mean that withhold-ing of money is justifiable or not wrongful. Thus, it is imperative that the Government cannot withhold due refund to the claimants.

    4. Exporters of services :

In the above background and given the fact that there are no separate provisions as regards refund in the service tax law, by merely making provisions of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act applicable to service tax, intangibles like services are placed on par with goods. When services are invoiced to clients, ‘costing’ in most cases is difficult or almost impossible. There can neither be MRP (Maximum Retail Price) concept, nor can there be cost plus profit concept, especially for services provided by all professionals including investment bankers, architects, chartered accountants, legal services, management consultants, consulting engineers, etc. Even in the case of various other services requiring skills, it may or may not be possible to attribute precise ‘cost’ of a service as service is provided based on mental skills. Consequently, when the value of a service is recovered without service tax, yet whether the burden of tax paid on input service is still passed on to the recipient cannot be put to judgment. For argument’s sake, a professional ‘A’ may charge $ 100 for a task and for the same task ‘B’ may charge $ 500 and ‘C’ may charge $ 120. Would it mean that ‘C’ or ‘B’ have included incidence of tax in their price for their service and therefore there is unjust enrichment ? In fact, ‘A’ may charge $ 100 to one person and another $ 75 or $ 125 and yet in no way one can prove that burden of tax is necessarily passed on in one or the other case.

In a recent decision of the Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. S. Mohanlal Services, 2010 (18) STR 173 (Tri.-Ahmd.) in its second round of litigation, the Tribunal fully endorsed observations of the Commissioner Appeals viz. “the adjudicating authority’s reliance on the judgment in the case of Mafatlal Industries [1997 (89) ELT 247] is misplaced inasmuch as it relates to sale of goods wherein cost of inputs are necessarily incurred, whereas in the present case it is provision of services especially as commission agents wherein mental inputs are incurred which cannot be compared in monetary terms.” The Tribunal further observed, “the refund claim has been made u/s.11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 made applicable for service tax matters. S. 11B provides that where the amount is reliable to rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India, the amount shall be paid to the claimant. This means that provisions relating to unjust enrichment are not applicable in respect of export of services.”

Although a single Member Bench decision, the intangible characteristic of service being aptly considered, it should serve as a useful guidance for all refund claims made by exporters of services to reduce the amount of litigation.

Whilst it is in fitness of things to require a claimant to provide chartered accountant’s certificate that tax was not recovered from recipient of services or buyer, it will be equally fair not to stretch application of doctrine of unjust enrichment to exports too far. Non-granting of legitimate refund claim under one or the other pretext is a burning issue that several assessees face from the Department and an early resolution being need of the day, it is high time that the Board does the needful in the matter to remove impediments in genuine claims of exporters.

Part B : Some Recent Judgments

    I. High Court :

1.(a) Authorised Service Station : Whether C & F agency ?

CCE v. Amitdeep Motors, 2010 (17) STR 514 (All)

The assessee, an authorised dealer of cars was registered under the category of authorised service station. The assessee received commission from the manufacturer for sourcing orders for them from Government agencies, receiving the vehicles from them and delivering the same to the Government agencies. The Revenue sought to tax these servic-es as clearing and forwarding agent’s service. The Tribunal ruled that the services of arrangement of documentary requirements from the customers for principal, liaison with customers for timely delivery, delivery of vehicle to the consignees, sending of provisional receipt and inspection notes from con-signee to the principal and arrangement of way or entry permits required for dispatch of the vehicles, etc. could not be considered clearing and forward-ing services.

Not finding substantial question of law, the High Court dismissed the appeal.

    b) Whether services to bank for loans exempt under Notification No. 25/2009 ?

CCE v. Car World Autoline, 2010 (17) STR 449 (Ker.)

The assessee aided a bank to advance loans to parties and for recovery of the same. The Tribunal in its order stated that the assessee’s services were tax-able as business auxiliary services. It also stated that the assessee discharged its service tax liability under business auxiliary services from September 11, 2004. The Tribunal had allowed the assessee’s exemption claim under clause (e) of Notification No. 25/2004– ST, dated September 10, 2004.

The Revenue questioned whether the claim of the assessee was justified in light of the facts of the case. The clause (d) of the said Notification awarded exemption to business auxiliary services while the clause (e) awarded exemption to the banking and financial services. The relevant clause (d) and (e) are reproduced for ready reference :

“(d)    services provided to a client by a commercial concern in relation to the following business auxiliary services, namely :

    i) procurement of goods or services, which are inputs for the client;

    ii) production of goods on behalf of the client;

    iii) provision of service on behalf of the client; or

    iv) a service incidental or auxiliary to any activity specified in (i) to (iii) above;

    e) services provided to a customer by any body corporate or commercial concern, other than a banking company or a financial institution including a non-banking financial company, in relation to banking and other financial services.”

The Court stated that the assessee did not provide banking and financial services and hence the clause  was not applicable. The clause (d) was applica-ble, hence before declaring the eligibility, the Tribunal was required to consider it with reference to the agreement between the parties, the exact nature of service rendered by the assessee to the bank and whether any of the service so provided was covered under the categories (i) to (iii) and if so, whether any service rendered was incidental to the items of services mentioned in sub-clause (i) to (iii) of (d). Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for reconsideration after hearing both the sides and after calling for relevant records, etc.

    2. Violation of principle of natural justice : Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction :

Wasp Pump Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2010 (17) STR 613 (Bom.)
The petitioner manufactured pumps and also the inputs for the pumps. There was no dispute as to exemption for pumps or its classification. Later, the Revenue demanded duty on the CI castings holding that they were marketable goods. The assessee filed an appeal to Commissioner (Appeals), however beyond the time of limitation. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that he had no jurisdiction to condone the delay. Aggrieved by the order, the appeal was filed with the CESTAT and CESTAT confirmed that the Commissioner (Appeals) was right in not con-doning the delay. In view of that, the application for waiver was rejected and the appeal was dismissed.

Consequently a petition was filed with the High Court. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of U.P. v. Modh Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 which held that the Revenue before quantifying the demand ought to have given a hearing to the assessee and there being a violation of principle of natural justice, the Court could exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction. Plea was also made that the inputs were exempt from tax under relevant Notification. In the rejoinder it was also explained as to why they could not file the appeal in time.

The Court observed that generally when the alternate remedy sought was exhausted and the Tribunal for some reason declined to entertain the same, the Court normally does not interfere and exercise extra jurisdiction unless the order is a nullity in law. However, the order suffered from violation of principles of natural justice and denial of ‘fair’ hearing and therefore rejecting Revenue’s objection to extraordinary jurisdiction, the Court decided to hear the petition on merits. The Court relied on the Modh Nooh case (supra) and the Notifications cited by the petitioner. The Court also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in W.P.I.L. Ltd. v. CCE, 2005 (181) ELT 359 (SC) wherein pumps as well as parts thereof were held as exempted from excise duty. The case was therefore allowed quashing the order and remitting the matter back to the Tribunal to consider afresh assessment of duty after consid-ering the Notifications issued from time to time.

    II. Tribunal :

    3. Banking and Financial Services : Pre-closure charges :

Indusind Bank v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai 2010 (17) STR 565 (Tri.-Chennai)
The assessee did not pay service tax on pre-closure charges treating this as charges for loss of interest.

As per the Revenue, in a similar case, in appeal No. S/152/08, the Tribunal had ordered pre-deposit of 50% of the tax amount. Relying on the case of GE Money Financial Services Ltd. CST, Chennai 2009 (15) STR 722 (Tribunal), it was held that since the asses-see had not furnished the details pertaining to pre-closure charges to the Department till the assessee was audited by the Department, the invocation of longer period was justified. Also held that the pre-closure charges could not be equated with interest and therefore pre-deposit of 50% of the liability was ordered.

4.(a) CENVAT Credit : Whether input service is required to be reversed on removal of inputs :

J. S. Khalsa Steels (P) Ltd. v. CCE, Chandigarh 2010 (17) STR 517 (Tri.-Del.)

The assessee a manufacturer was also registered under the category of GTA. The assessee claimed CENVAT on the inputs, capital goods and input services. The assessee reversed the CENVAT credit on inputs and capital goods in terms of Rule 3(5) on clearance of the inputs.

The Revenue issued a SCN for non-reversal of credit on input services. The original authority and the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the demand.

It was contended by the appellant that Rule 3(5) provides for reversal of credit on capital goods or inputs and not for input services. It was also submit-ted that the Rule 2 defines input, input services and capital goods separately. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Chitrakoot Steel & Power Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Chennai (2008) 10 STR 118.

The Tribunal concurred with the appellant and set aside the order and held that no provision for rever-sal of input service existed in the law.

    b) Input services : Credit not to be restricted to ‘manufacture’ alone :

Jaypee Rewa Plant v. CCE, Bhopal 2010 (17) STR 519 (Tri.-Del.)
The assessee availed CENVAT credit on the invoices issued by the input distributor. The Revenue denied CENVAT credit on the services like rent-a-cab service, courier service, air travel agent service, maintenance and repair service and telephone service on the ground that no evidence was submitted to show that the said services were utilised for the manufacture of the final product. It was alleged in the SCN that the input services have been taken in or in relation to the handling of marketing of goods after the place of removal and hence not admissible.

Placing reliance on the decisions of the Larger Bench in the case of ABB Ltd. v. CCE & ST, Bangalore 2009 STR 468 (Tri.-LB) and also CCE Mumbai v. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri.-LB) it was held that input service credit cannot be restricted only in relation to the manufacture and their clearance from the place of removal. Hence the matter was remanded to original authority to allow the credit, subject to the input services being used in relation to the business activities and in the light of the Larger Bench decisions.

    c) Documents for claiming credit :

CCE, Vapi v. ITW India Ltd., 2010 (17) STR 587 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The assessee claimed CENVAT credit on input services including CENVAT on mobile bills. The Revenue contended that the invoices which captured the address of the centralised registered office at Silvassa, was improper document for claiming credit. Further the credit was considered not allowable on the mobile phones.

The Tribunal stated that there was no dispute that the input services received were utilised by the respondent and therefore the benefit could not be denied on the ground that the invoices bear the name and address of the head office or any branch. Reliance was placed on the case of Electro Steel Castings v. CCE, Calcutta 2001 (136) ELT 929 (Tri.-Kolkata).

As regards the credit on the mobile phones, the Tribunal relied on the judgment pronounced in the case of Indian Rayon Industries Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (4) STR 79 and CCE v. Excel Corp Care Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 436 (Guj.) and confirmed the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order.
    
5. CHA Services & Port Services :

Aspinwall & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Cochin 2010 (17) STR 496 (Tri.-Bang.)

The demand of service tax was confirmed under port services and CHA services. Further, as regards CHA services, the order stated that the assessee was given a contract indicating agency commission separately and hence the assessee would not be entitled to claim the benefit provided by the Board’s Circular No. 843/1/17-TRU; dated 6-6-1997. However, the Tribunal found that the assessee prima facie discharged obligation of tax and the amount other than commission was towards reimbursable expenses and in identical issue of the very assessee, this Bench has granted waiver of pre-deposit of the disputed amounts.

In the case of port charges, the issue was squarely in favour of the assessee as held in the case of Kinship Services Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Cochin 2008 (10) STR 331 (Tri-Bang) and also in assessee’s own case as decided by the Bench in 2009 (15) STR 466 (Tri.-Bang.).

Considering that prima facie case in favour of the appellant was made out, waiver was granted.

    6. Pre-deposit dispensed with for case on merits :

Aster Teleservices Pvt. Ltd. v. Commr. of Cus. & C. Ex., Hyderabad 2010 (17) STR 584 (Tri.-Bang.)

The assessee was rendering the following services :

    a) Erection of telecommunication tower

    b) Construction of petrol pumps, industrial buildings

    c) Erection and painting of telecommunication towers

    d) Erection and installation of telecom equipments (subcontractor)

    e) Erection of railway signaling system (railways)

The Revenue demanded service tax on activities mentioned in (a), (d) and (e) under the category of erection and commissioning. According to the Revenue the activities could not be considered as works contract as the entire material was supplied by the principal. Plea was made by the assessee to grant stay till the matter pending before the Larger Bench could be decided. They further submitted that while determining the liability, the adjudicating authority considered the invoiced amount instead of actual receipts.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee contested the liability on the ground that the activity was works contract. Considering that the decision was pending before the Larger Bench, and further that the assessee had substantiated their claim by producing sales tax returns and they had deposited about 25% of the service tax liability, the deposit was held sufficient and waiver was granted for the balance.

7.(a) Penalty : U/s.78 : Whether non-filing and non-payment necessarily indicate suppression ?

Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat v. Star Crane Service, 2010 (17) STR 576 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the penalty levied u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994. The Appellate Authority stated in its order that neither the show-cause notice made any allegation of existence of any suppressions, mismanagement, etc. with the intention to evade any payment of duty nor did the adjudicating authority recorded any such finding. Further the Commissioner (Appeals) also observed that the quantum of penalty could not exceed the amount of liability.

The Revenue contended that the assessee failed to apply for registration, pay service tax and failed to file return and this has to be held as suppression on the part of the assessee.

The Tribunal stated that in a number of cases it is held that non-application for registration does not construe suppression with an intent to evade duty in the light of fast-changing service tax law. The Revenue did not refer to any evidence of non-payment of tax due to any mala fide intention. Hence the order reducing penalty was good in law.

    b) Bona fide reasons : Penalty not leviable :

Bureau  of  Indian  Standards  v.  Commissioner  of Custom and Central Excise, Nodia 2010 (17) STR 527 (Tri.-Delhi)

The assessee is a national standard body under the administrative control of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and availing benefit under the Income-tax Act as charitable institution. The assessee’s training programme for development and implementation of quality environment, occupational health and safety, etc. on payment of fees was treated as commercial coaching & training by the Revenue and service tax, interest, penalty, etc. were demanded.

The assessee took up the issue with its Ministry and was advised to pay service tax with interest.

The Tribunal held that the facts and circumstances of the case indicated that the cause was reason-able for their failure to pay service tax undertaken by them and in absence of any intention to evade service tax, it is a fit case for invoking the provision of S. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

    c) Bona fide reasons :

Adani Enterprises Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad 2010 (17) STR 457 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

Penalty was imposed on the appellant receiving GTA services for several payments made delayedly. The reason for delay was explained as occurred on account of operational difficulty in implementation of new SAP software. The appellant paid interest of its own volition and several times made excess payment rather than short on account of software difficulty. The appellant relied on the decisions of C. Ahead Info. Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (A), Bangalore 2009 (14) STR 803 (Tri.-Bang.) and Santhi Casting Works v. CCE, Coimbatore, 2009 (15) STR 219 (Tri.-Chennai) as well as on the Board Circular No. 341/18/2004-TRU (Pt.), dated Dec 17, 2004 wherein the Department was directed not to impose penalty for procedural lapses in respect of GTA services till 31-12-2005. It also stated that no penalty would be levied unless default was on account of deliberate fraud, collusion, suppression, etc. Further the action of payment of service tax as a service recipient although they were not liable to pay it prior to 18-4-2006 indicated its bona fides. Further, the assessee contended that they were covered u/s.73 and not u/s.76 of the Act.

The Revenue’s contention was that the delay was very high as compared to the excess payment, as it ranged from 20 days to 166 days which was indicative of other reasons than mere software problem and that the SCN imposed penalty u/s.76 and u/s.73 was not invoked at all.

The Tribunal set aside the case holding that the assessee’s case was fit for waiver of penalty u/s.80 of the Act.

    d) In absence of suppression, penalty u/s.78 not leviable :

Sahara Power Products v. CCE, Mangalore 2010 (17) STR 463 (Tri.-Bang.)

The assessee was rendering repair and maintenance services of faulty distributor transformers of different capacities to Mangalore Electricity Supply. The Revenue issued a SCN as the assessee was not registered and also did not pay service tax. The Revenue demanded service tax from 1-7-2003 to 31-3-2006 invoking longer period of limitation along with interest and penalty u/s.76, u/s. 77 and u/s.78 of the Act. In response to the assessee’s appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) remanded the matter with certain directions. The adjudicating authority in the de novo order confirmed the service tax liability, interest and penalty u/s.76, u/s.77 and u/s.78. In the second round of appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed service tax along with interest and penalty u/s.76, u/s.77 and u/s.78 although in an earlier order, the Commissioner (Appeals) did not confirm any existence of suppression.

The Tribunal held that for the defaults of non-registration and non-payment of tax, penalty u/s. 76 and u/s.77 is leviable. However, the assessee paid service tax with interest without contesting and the Commissioner (Appeals) in his earlier order levied service tax from 1-6-2005 onwards, thus indicating non-invoking of longer period of limitation and non-existence of fraud or suppression, no penalty was leviable u/s.78 of the Act.

    8. Rebate : Export of Services :

Dell International Services India P. Ltd. v. CCE, Banga-lore 2010 (17) STR 540 (Tri.-Bang.)

The assessee, a 100% EOU call centre filed five rebate claims which were rejected primarily on the ground that they did not export taxable service and input services were not used for exported services. In assessee’s own case, earlier the Assistant Commissioner on detailed scrutiny found that services were taxable and this fact was not disputed. Similarly, in another claim of the assessee, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee provided taxable services. In case when an issue is settled between the parties, the same cannot be argued again by the Department. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Suptd. of Central Excise v. D.C.I. Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., 2005 (181) ELT 189 SC.

In order to determine whether the assessee was rendering business auxiliary services or the services rendered by the assessee were excluded from the definition of business auxiliary services i.e., information technology services, the cases of CCE, Hyderabad–IV v. M/s. Deloitte Tax Service (I) Pvt. Ltd., 2008 STR 266 (Tri.-Bang.) and Circular No. DOF No. 334/1/2008-TRU, dated 29-2-2008 were relied upon.

To refute the contention of the Department that the services exported were not taxable services but exempt services and hence the rules of export were not applicable, it was submitted that Rule 3 of the Export Rules applied to taxable services. In other words, there was no restriction on the exempted services from being eligible for benefit under the Export of Rules, 2005.

For the status of services as input services, decision of CCE, Mumbai-V v. M/s. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 STR 468 (Tri-LB) among others was relied upon, which held that CENVAT was allowable on input services utilised for business.

It was accordingly held that the conditions under the Notification 12/2005 were satisfied and rebate was allowed.

9.(a) Valuation : Inclusion of amount declared to Income-tax Department :

CCE, Chandigarh. v. Bindra Tent Service, 2010 (17) STR 470 (Tri.-Del.)

The assessee, a pandal and shamiana keeper pursuant to an Income-tax Department survey, deposited certain amounts, based on which, the Revenue demanded service tax on the amount deposited contending that the surrender of monies without explaining the source implied that the amounts related to the taxable services and the burden of proof to prove contrary was with the assessee.

The assessee pleaded that the amount deposited pertained accumulation in the previous six years and not of the particular year in question. In order to compute the undisclosed income only, it was taken as income in that particular year by the IT Department.

The Commissioner (Appeals) in his order placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Kipps Education Centre, Bhatinda v. CCE, Chandigarh wherein it was held that the income voluntarily disclosed before the Income-tax authorities could not be added to the taxable value merely based on presumption without evidence. The burden to prove evasion lay on the Department. Since no inquiry was conducted by the Department as to the assessee’s claim that monies deposited were of earlier period, no tax could be levied and accordingly, cross objections were disposed of.

    b) Club or Association Service : Membership deposit :

Adarsh Realty & Hotel Pvt. Ltd. v. Commr. of S. T. Bangalore, 2010 (17) STR 569 (Tri.-Bang.)

The Revenue demanded service tax under the Club or Association Services. The appellant paid service tax on the annual subscription of the members, health club and spa services, guest charges, banquet halls, laundry service, internet service and travel desk except on membership deposit and service tax was demanded on the entire revenue streams. They also deposited a sum of Rs.12,44,722, pursuant to the order of the Adjudicating Authority pertaining to membership deposit in dispute.

The Tribunal held that there being no dispute over other revenue streams, whether membership deposit is refundable or not, shall be considered at the time of the final disposal and since the assessee has deposited an amount disputed under the membership services, the pre-deposit of balance amount was waived and recovery was stayed.

    c) Simultaneous availment of CENVAT with abatement :

CCE, Vadodara v. Ram Krishna Travels Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (17) STR 487 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The assessee availed abatement under Notification No. 1/06-S.T. and CENVAT credit simultaneously. The Revenue demanded service tax due to non-availability of benefit of abatement. The assessee subsequently reversed the credit so availed.

The Commissioner (Appeals) by taking note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrapur Magnet Wires Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, 1996 (81) ELT 422 (All) and the High Court’s order in the case of Hello Minerals Water (P) Ltd. v. UOI, 2004 (174) ELT 422, held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) as the assessee had admittedly reversed the credit.

Order under Clause 12 of the Income Tax Ombudsman Guidelines, 2006

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Ombudsman Orders


In the past one year, the Ombudsman has been approached by a
few taxpayers, who have faced difficulties with the Income-tax Department. Some
excellent orders have been passed by the Ombudsman, providing much-needed relief
to harassed taxpayers. Many taxpayers are not aware of the types of relief that
the Ombudsman can provide. To encourage more taxpayers to take the benefit of
the services of the office of the Ombudsman for similar problems faced by them,
we intend to reproduce some orders passed by the Ombudsman. We reproduce one
such order below, in which the assessee received its refund pursuant to such
order. We also request readers to share their experience with other readers, by
sending in orders that may have been passed by the Ombudsman in their own or
their client’s cases, for reproduction in this column.
— Editor

Government of India

Office of the Ombudsman

Income-tax Department,

11th floor, Mittal Tower,

‘B’ Wing, Nariman Point, Mumbai-21.

Ref. No. Ombudsman/431/2007-08

Name & address of the assessee : ABC (I) Pvt. Ltd.

PAN No. : xxxxxx

A.Y. : 2006-07

Date of order : 12th March, 2008

Order under Clause 12 of the Income Tax Ombudsman Guidelines, 2006 :

1. The assessee, an advertising agency submitted on 8-2-2008
a grievance petition to the Ombudsman in which it indicated that although it had
claimed a refund of Rs.5,69,71,367 in its return of income for the A.Y. 2006-07,
it had not been granted the same so far. Enquiries made by them with the
Income-tax department revealed that the credit appearing in the department’s
records was only around Rs.1 crore.

2. Subsequently, a report furnished by the Chief Commissioner
of Income-tax, Mumbai-IV revealed that whereas the TDS claimed by the assessee
was to the tune of Rs.9.11 crores, this figure of TDS, according to the data
supplied to the Department by NSDL, was only Rs.2.37 crores. Only TDS entries of
Rs.66 lacs could be matched.

3. There appears to be some communication gap between the
assessee and the Department. The Department claims that instead of reconciling
the mismatch report and submitting only TDS Certificates in respect of entries
which did not match with the data provided by NSDL to the Department, the
assessee submitted four volumes of all its original TDS certificates. The task
of reconciliation was left to the Department. The Department has been unable to
perform this task so far to the satisfaction of the assessee. The assessee, on
the hand, claims that it has been extending full co-operation to the Department.

4. There is obviously considerable complexity involved in the
case for the reason that the assessee’s claim for refund is based on 757 TDS
Certificates, only a small proportion of which are reflected in the computerised
records of the Department.

5. To sort out these matters, a hearing was fixed on
10-3-2008 at 12.30 p.m. Shri . . . . . . . . . . . . ., C.A. and Shri
. . . . . . . . . . . . . Vice-President (Finance) attended on behalf of the
assessee and Shri . . . . . . . . . . . . ., Addl. CIT Rg. 6(3) and Shri
. . . . . . . . . . . . ., ACIT 6(3) attended on behalf of the Department.
Before me, both the Department as well as the assessee agreed as follows :

(i) The Department would ensure the settlement of the
assessee’s refund claim by 25-3-2008, as more than one and half years have
passed since the return was filed;

(ii) The assessee will extend full co-operation to the AO
in the reconciliation of mis-matched items;

(iii) The Department will be at liberty in accordance with
the law to make such verification as it deems necessary to ascertain the
correctness of the TDS claims, even after the issue of the pending refund;

(iv) Such verification however, if detailed, will not hold
up the assessee’s refund, and

(v) If directed, the assessee will comply with the
requirements of filing an Indemnity Bond and fulfilling all other formalities
in accordance with the extant procedures of the Department.

(Hardayal Singh)

Income Tax Ombudsman,

Mumbai

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Buffett warns on US recession

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New Page 1

10 Buffett warns on US recession


Warren Buffett told CNBC that while the US might not have met
the formal tests of recession, ‘most people’s situation — certainly their net
worth — has been heading south for a while now’. Meanwhile, Alan Greenspan, the
former Federal Reserve chairman, told the Financial Times that ‘the rate of
growth in economic activity is effectively zero’.

Greenspan said he was still not prepared to call a recession,
although he said, “The probability that we will experience some negative growth
is better than 50/50”. The former Fed chief said he would define a recession as
‘the onset of a significant set of discontinuities’ in an economy.

(Source : Business Standard, 5-3-2008)

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Chanakya on Finance and Accounting, 20th March 2013, at the Indian Merchants’ Chamber

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Lecture Meetings Chanakya on Finance and Accounting, 20th March 2013, at the Indian Merchants’ Chamber

Mr. Radhakrishnan Pillai (Speaker), Mr. Naushad Panjwani, Mr. Deepak Shah (President), Mrs. Yamini Dalal

In this lecture meeting held under the auspices of Shri Dilip N. Dalal Oration Fund, Mr. Radhakrishnan Pillai, a well-known Author and Management Trainer, explained relevance of Chanakya’s teachings contained in his treatise Kautilya’s Arthshastra, to present day business,with insights and practical examples. The main focus of the session was Chanakya’s teachings with respect to management of ‘Kosha’ which means ‘Treasury’ and four stages of Wealth, namely Wealth Identification, Wealth Creation, Wealth Management and Wealth Distribution. The presentation interlaced with witty comments kept the audience glued to their seats until the very end. The presentation is available at www.bcasonline.org and the video recording of the meeting is available as a webcast at www. bcasonline.tv to subscribers.

Provisions in Companies Bill relating to Auditors, 3rd April 2013, at the Indian Merchants’ Chamber

Mr. Kamlesh Vikamsey, Past President of the ICAI, explained and analysed various provisions of the Companies Bill 2012 that cast onerous responsibilities on the auditors and have far reaching implications. The speaker also explained the potential impact of the provisions and some key issues. The talk enthralled the full house audience consisting of senior and junior members in the profession as well as the students and left them with greater awareness about forthcoming responsibilities. Speaker’s presentation is available at www.bcasonline.org and the video recording of the meeting is available as a webcast at www.bcasonline.tv to subscribers.


Mr. Kamlesh Vikamsey (Speaker), Mr. Chetan Shah, Mr. Deepak Shah (President), Mr. Mukesh Trivedi

presentation is available at www.bcasonline.org and the video recording of the meeting is available as a webcast at www.bcasonline.tv to subscribers.

Interactive session on issues relating to Charitable Trusts, 10th April 2013, at the Indian Merchants’ Chamber


L to R: Mr. Mangesh Deshpande (Speaker), Mr. BharatKumar Oza, Mr. Gautam Nayak, Mr. Sanjiv Dutt (Speaker), Mr. Deepak Shah (President), and Mr. Govind Goyal

Charitable Trusts are faced with various issues pertaining to compliance under the Income-tax Act, 1961 as well as the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The Society organised an Interactive session with Mr. Sanjeev Dutt, Director of Income Tax (Exemption), and Mr. Mangesh Deshpande, Assistant Charity Commissioner, with the objective of apprising the authorities about difficulties faced by charitable trusts, understand perspective of the Authorities and bridge the gap between the two. In their presentation and talk, Mr. Sanjeev Dutt and Mr. Mangesh Deshpande explained their perspective and expectations from the Charitable Trusts and the Auditors and answered various queries raised by the participants. The sessions were chaired by Past Presidents Mr. Govind Goyal and Mr. Gautam Nayak.

Other programmes:

Workshop on “Practical Issues in Tax Deduction at Source”, 22nd March 2013, at the Navinbhai Thakkar Auditorium, Vile Parle, Mumbai


L to R: Mr. V. K. Pandey (Speaker), Ms. Saroj Maniar, Mr. Gautam Nayak, Mr. Deepak Shah (President), Mr. Jagdish Punjabi

The Taxation Committee organised this workshop where the following learned faculties spoke on the topics mentioned below:

FACULTY TOPIC
Mr. V. K. Pandey, CIT(TDS) Overview of TDS
Mr. Yogesh Thar, CA Section 192 – Salary including salary paid to expats
Mr. N. C. Hegde, CA Section 194A, Section 194C, Section 194J, Section 194H, Section 194I
Mr. Naresh Ajwani, CA Section 195 – Payment to Non-Residents
Ms. Babina Dinashan, Senior Manager, NSDL TDS Return Filing and Assessments -Tax Credits, Issues and Resolution
The workshop received enthusiastic response from over 500 participants including members from the Industry as well as the Profession, who appreciated the wealth of knowledge and experience shared by the Learned Faculties.

Seminar on EPC Contracts, 13th April 2013 at the JW Marriott, Mumbai


L to R: Mr. Ashish Ahuja (Speaker), Mr. Dhishat Mehta, Mr. Kishor Karia, Mr. Naushad Panjwani, Mr. Tarunkumar Singhal

The International Taxation Committee organised this seminar, where the following learned faculties covered the topics mentioned below:

The participants gained immensely from the wealth of knowledge and experience shared by the speakers.

Professional Accountant Course Batch XV – Convocation, 12th April 2013, at the HR College

The Human Resources Committee successfully completed Batch XV of its flagship course the Professional Accountant with the Convocation function to award “Professional Accountant” Certificates to 60 participants who successfully completed this Course. It was a memorable event for the participants who put in hard work to learn practical and theoretical aspects of day-to-day accounting and tax compliance from 23 sessions conducted between November 2012 to March 2013 while continuing pursuit of  their regular job. The participants acknowledged and appreciated the valuable learning from this course that would help them in their career and gave valuable feedback to help make this programme more effective.

The convocation function was graced by Ms. Indu Shahani, Principle of HR College, Professor Parag Thakkar, Vice Principal of HR College, Mr. Mayur Nayak, Chairman of the HR Committee, Mr. Bharat Oza, Convenor of the HR Committee, and Mr. Manish Reshamwala, Course Coordinator, along with other dignitaries.

I.P.C.C. Refresher Course, 9th, 10th, 16th, 17th, 23rd and 24th March 2013, Directiplex, Andheri

 IPCC Refresher course was conducted by Human Resources Committee for the first time in the suburbs at Directiplex, Andheri.

The following were the subjects and the faculties at this refresher course:


Nearly 50 students participated at this  Refresher Course which was co-ordinated by Mr. Hemant Gandhi, Convenor, and Ms. Smita Acharya, Member, of the HR Committee.

Income from house property: Section 23(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961: Allowance for self-occupation u/s.23(2) is available for HUF also.

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[CIT v. Hariprasad Bhojnagarwala, 342 ITR 69 (Guj.) (FB)]

The following question was considered by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court: “Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in holding that the benefit of section 23(2) is available to a Hindu Undivided Family?”

The High Court held as under: “

(i) The benefit of relief in respect of self-occupied property u/s.23(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is available only to the owner who can reside in his own residence. That means, the benefit of relief is available only to an individual assessee and not to an imaginary assessable entity.

(ii) A Hindu Undivided Family is nothing but a group of individuals related to each other by blood or in a certain manner. A Hindu Undivided Family is a family of a group of natural persons. The family can reside in the house, which belongs to the Hindu Undivided Family. A family cannot consist of artificial persons.

 (iii) There is nothing in the words used in section 23(2), which excludes its application to a Hindu Undivided Family.

(iv) The question is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

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Capital gains: Exemption u/s.54F of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2007-08: Purchase of residential house in joint names of assessee and his wife: Wife had not contributed: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s.54F to the full extent.

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[CIT v. Ravindra Kumar Arora, 342 ITR 38 (Del.)]

The assessee sold a land being a long-term capital asset and invested the sale proceeds in a residential house which was purchased in the joint name of the assessee and his wife. His wife had not made any contribution. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the house had been purchased in the joint names of the assessee and his wife. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) Section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a beneficial provision which should be interpreted liberally in favour of the exemption/deduction to the taxpayer and deduction should not be denied on a hyper-technical ground.

(ii) The condition stipulated in section 54F stood fulfilled. It would be treated as the property purchased by the assessee in his name and merely because he had included the name of his wife and the property purchased in the joint names would not make any difference. The assessee was entitled to exemption u/s.54F.”

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Recovery of tax: Stay of recovery during pendency of appeal: Section 220(6) of Income-tax Act, 1961: If prima facie the case is in favour of the assessee, stay should be granted for the full demand.

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The assessee filed appeal against the order u/s.201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 before the CIT(A). The assessee also filed an application for stay of the demand before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) observed that there is ‘enough strength in the plea of the assessee for stay of demand’. However, he directed to pay 30% of the demand.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under: “

(i) If on a cursory glance it appears that the demand raised has no leg to stand, it would be undesirable to require the assessee to pay full or substantive part of the demand. From the perusal of the materials brought on record, we are of the view that the Commissioner having himself expressed opinion on the order that there is enough strength in the plea of the assessee for stay of the demand, there was no occasion to direct for deposit of 30%.

(ii) In view of the above, we provide that during the pendency of the appeal the demand against the petitioner shall be kept in abeyance. However, the petitioner shall furnish adequate security in respect of the said 30% of the demand.”

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Recovery of tax: Attachment: Stay of recovery: Sections 220(1), 220(6) and 281B of Income-tax Act, 1961: Provisional attachment u/s.281B on 7-10-2011: Assessment order passed on 9-3-2012: Demand directed to be paid within 7 days instead of 30 days: Not proper: Application for stay of demand till disposal of appeal by CIT(A) rejected: Not just: High Court directed stay of recovery till disposal of appeal by CIT(A).

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[Firoz Tin Factory v. ACIT (Bom.), W.P. (L) No. 765 of 2012 dated 26-3-2012]

By an attachment order dated 7-10-2011, passed u/s.281B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 mutual funds of value Rs.36.54 crore were attached. The assessment order for the A.Y. 2010-11 was passed on 13-3-2012 raising a demand of Rs.36,56,61,776. Demand was directed to be paid within 7 days instead of 30 days as provided u/s.220(1) of the Act. The petitioner assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) and made an application u/s.220(6) of the Act dated 12-3-2012 for stay of demand till disposal of appeal by the CIT(A), which was rejected.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 “(i) The provisions of section 220(1) stipulate that the amount of demand shall be paid within 30 days of the service of the notice. The proviso stipulates that where the Assessing Officer has any reason to believe that it would be detrimental to the interest of Revenue if the full period of 30 days is allowed, he may direct, with the previous approval of the Joint Commissioner, that the demand shall be paid within a period less than 30 days. The power to reduce the period under the proviso cannot be exercised casually and without due application of mind. The question as to whether it would be detrimental to the interest of the Revenue to allow the full period of 30 days has to be addressed. The reasons as well as the approval which has been granted by the Joint Commissioner must be made available to the assessee where a copy of the reasons is sought from the Assessing Officer.

(ii) In the present case, a provisional attachment has already been made on 7-10-2011 u/s.281B. The attachment was to the extent of Rs.36.54 crore. That being the position, evidently there would have been no basis for forming a reason to believe that if the period of 30 days was to be observed u/s.220(1), that would be detrimental to the Revenue. Merely because the end of the financial year is approaching that cannot constitute a detriment to the Revenue. The detriment to the Revenue must be akin to a situation where the demand of the Revenue is liable to be defeated by an abuse of process by the assessee. This is of course illustrative, for what is detrimental to the Revenue has to be determined on the facts of each case and an exhaustive catalogue of circumstances cannot be laid down. Consequently, we find that there is absolutely no justification for the Assessing Officer for making an order of demand directing the assessee to deposit the entire demand by 16-3-2012. The action is highhanded and contrary to law.

(iii) The Revenue is adequately protected by the attachment u/s.281B. No coercive steps shall be taken for recovery of the demand, pending the appeal.”

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Recovery of tax: Stay of recovery during pendency of appeal: Section 220(6) of Incometax Act, 1961: AO and Appellate Authorities are not mere tax gatherers: They have to be fair to the assessee.

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[Nishit M. Desai v. CIT (Bom.), W.P. No. 653 of 2012; dated 15-3-2012]

The assessee is a professional. For the A.Y. 2009- 10, the Assessing Officer passed assessment order u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 determining the total income at Rs.22.43 crore as against the returned income of Rs.19.41 crore and raised a demand of Rs.1.18 crore. A refund of Rs.78 lakh was due to the assessee for the A.Y. 2010-11. The assessee filed appeal before the CIT(A) and also filed an application for stay of recovery till the disposal of appeal. The CIT(A) directed that the refund of Rs.78 lakh be adjusted and the balance of Rs.41 lakh be paid. He held that considering ‘the financial status and affairs’ of the assessee, the payment of the balance demand would not cause financial hardship.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“(i) The power which vested in the Assessing Officer u/s.220(6) and on the CIT(A) to grant a stay of demand is a judicial power. It is necessary for both the Assessing Officer as well the Appellate Authorities to have due regard to the fact that their function is not merely to act as tax gatherers, but equally as quasi-judicial authorities, they owe a duty of fairness to the assessee. This seems to be lost [Nishit M. Desai v. CIT (Bom.), W.P. No. 653 of 2012; dated 15-3-2012] The assessee is a professional. For the A.Y. 2009- 10, the Assessing Officer passed assessment order u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 determining the total income at Rs.22.43 crore as against the returned income of Rs.19.41 crore and raised a demand of Rs.1.18 crore. A refund of Rs.78 lakh was due to the assessee for the A.Y. 2010-11. The assessee filed appeal before the CIT(A) and also filed an application for stay of recovery till the disposal of appeal. The CIT(A) directed that the refund of Rs.78 lakh be adjusted and the balance of Rs.41 lakh be paid. He held that considering ‘the financial status and affairs’ of the assessee, the payment of the balance demand would not cause financial hardship. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under: “(i) The power which vested in the Assessing Officer u/s.220(6) and on the CIT(A) to grant a stay of demand is a judicial power. It is necessary for both the Assessing Officer as well the Appellate Authorities to have due regard to the fact that their function is not merely to act as tax gatherers, but equally as quasi-judicial authorities, they owe a duty of fairness to the assessee. This seems to be lost sight of in the manner in which the authority has acted in the present case.

 (ii) The parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction to grant stay of demand has been set out in several judgments of this Court, including in KEC International v. B. R. Balakrishnan, 251 ITR 158.

(iii) The assessee’s submissions on merits require consideration. The CIT(A) ought to have devoted a more careful consideration to the issue as to whether a stay of demand was warranted. As out of total demand of Rs.1.18 crore, Rs.78 lakh has been adjusted, the balance has to be stayed.”

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(2012) 25 STR 514 (Kar.) — Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. State of Karnataka.

(2012) 25 STR 514 (Kar.) — Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. State of Karnataka.

Facts:

The appellants were providing services related to telecommunication wherein electromagnetic waves were used for transmission of data generated by the subscriber to the desired destination. The case was whether sales tax or service tax should be levied.

Appellant’s contention:

The appellant contended that in their terms of contract there was no mention of the words ‘sale of goods’. The contract was one for rendering telecommunication services and that the consideration was paid for the services rendered to subscribers. Also they were of the view that Artificially Created Light Energy (ACLE) which was the form of energy used by the telecom service provider as carrier of data or information in optical fiber cable (OFC) broadband line without which data or energy could not be transmitted, came into existence when electrical energy was converted into light energy. The question was whether such a conversion was liable to sales tax or service tax. A technical report stated that telecommunication service providers were using optical fiber cables for transmitting messages or data using light energy which could be transmitted by a service provider either through copper wire, OFC, etc. The Department called it ACLE which had the characteristics of goods, whereas the experts did not agree to the same.

Department’s contention:

The Sales Tax Department (Department) contended that in case of contract in which the appellant claimed that it had no mention of the words ‘sale of goods’ were in fact sales and hence liable to sales tax. For imposition of tax on ACLE the Department contended that it was sale of goods which was liable to sales tax. In case of technical report, the Department was of the view transmission of message with the use of light energy from one network to another had the characteristics of goods.

Held:

The ACLE was a form of electromagnetic wave which was not marketable or abstracted or consumed or delivered or processed or stored and it was not something available in abundance of which service provider abstracted a portion. Hence these were services and liable to service tax. Also it was a contract of rendering services and the state was not empowered to levy sales tax. For the contract in question, it was a contract of service simpliciter and there was no element of sales involved in it.

Housing project: deduction u/s.80IB(10) of Income-tax Act 1961: A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005- 06: Multiple housing projects in one acre plot is permissible.

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[CIT v. Vandana Properties (Bom.), ITA Nos. 3633 of 2009 and 4361 of 2010 dated 28-3-2012]

The assessee-firm was engaged in the business of construction and development of housing projects. On a plot of land admeasuring 2.36 acres in Mumbai the assessee had constructed buildings A, B, C and D over a period of years, in respect of which no deduction u/s.80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was claimed. In the year 2001, the assessee became entitled to construct an additional building ‘E’ on the said plot of land. IOD was approved by the Municipal Corporation on 11-10-2002 and the commencement certificate was issued on 10-03-2003. For the A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005-06, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80IB(10) was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue the following issues were considered by the Bombay High Court:

(i) What is a housing project u/s.80IB(10)?

 (ii) Whether, if the approval for construction of ‘E’ building was granted by local authority subject to the conditions set out in the first approval granted on 12-5-1993 for construction of A and B buildings, construction of ‘E’ building is an extension of the earlier housing project for which approval was granted prior to 1-10-1998 and, therefore, benefit of section 80IB(10) cannot be granted?

(iii) Whether the housing project must be on a vacant plot of land which has minimum area of one acre and if there are multiple buildings and the proportionate for each building is less than one acre, deduction u/s.80IB(10) can be denied?

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) As the expression ‘housing project’ is not defined, it must have the common parlance meaning and means constructing a building or group of buildings consisting of several residential units. The approval granted to a building plan constitutes approval granted to a housing project. Construction of even one building with several residential units of the size not exceeding 1000 sq.ft. would constitute a ‘housing project’ u/s.80IB(10).

(ii) ‘E’ building is an independent housing project and not an extension of the housing project already existing on the plot, because when the earlier plans were approved, ‘E’ building was not even contemplated and came into existence much later. The fact that the approval was granted on the same terms as that granted to the other buildings does not make it an ‘extension’.

(iii) Section 80IB(10)(b) specifies the size of the plot of land but not the size of the housing project. While the plot must have a minimum area of one acre, it need not be a vacant plot. The object of section 80IB(10) is to boost the stock of houses. There can be multiple housing projects on a plot of land having minimum area of one acre.”

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Disallowance: Section 14A of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2007-08: Section 14A does not apply to shares held as stock in trade.

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[CCI Ltd. v. JCIT (Kar.), ITA No. 359 of 2011 dated 28-2-2012]

 The assessee was in the business as a dealer in shares and securities. In the relevant year, the assessee had earned dividend income of Rs.46,67,190. The assessee had incurred an expenditure of Rs.28 lakh as broking charges for availing interest-free loan of Rs.14 crore for converting partly-paid shares into fully-paid shares. The Assessing Officer estimated the expenditure incurred on earning the dividend income at Rs.27,24,330 u/r. 8D and disallowed the same u/s.14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer was not right in attributing the entire broking commission as relatable to earning of dividend income only. The broking expenditure has to be considered as business expenditure, as well. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to bifurcate all the expenditure proportionately and allow the expenditure in accordance with law.

The assessee filed appeal before the Karnataka High Court and raised the following question of law:

“Whether the provisions of section 14A are applicable to the expenses incurred by the assessee in the course of its business merely because the assessee is also having dividend income when there was no material brought to show that the assessee had incurred expenditure for earning dividend income?”

The Karnataka High Court decided the question in favour of the assessee and held as under:

“(i) When no expenditure is incurred by the assessee in earning the dividend income, no notional expenditure could be deducted from the said income. It is not the case of the assessee retaining any shares so as to have the benefit of dividend. 63% of the shares, which were purchased, are sold and the income derived therefrom is offered to tax as business income. The remaining 37% of the shares are retained. It is those unsold shares have yielded dividend, for which, the assessee has not incurred any expenditure at all.

(ii) Though the dividend income is exempt from payment of tax, if any expenditure is incurred in earning the said income, the said expenditure also cannot be deducted. But in this case, when the assessee has not retained shares with the intention of earning dividend income and the dividend income is incidental to his business of sale of shares, which remained unsold by the assessee, it cannot be said that the expenditure incurred in acquiring the shares has to be apportioned to the extent of dividend income and that should be disallowed from deductions.

(iii) In that view of the matter, the approach of the authorities is not in conformity with the statutory provisions contained under the Act. Therefore, the impugned orders are not sustainable and require to be set aside.”

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Capital asset v. Stock-in-trade: Section 50C of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2006-07: Section 50C does not apply to land & building held as stock-in-trade.

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[CIT v. M/s. Kan Construction and Colonizers (P) Ltd. (All.), ITA No. 1 of 2012 dated 9-4-2012.]

In the A.Y. 2006-07, the assessee had sold a plot of land which was held by it as stock-in-trade. The Assessing Officer held that the land was a capital asset and computed the capital gain by applying the provisions of section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim that the land was a stock-in-trade and that the provisions of section 50C are not applicable.

The Allahabad High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under: “

(i) For applicability of section 50C, one of the essential requirements is that an asset should be a ‘capital asset’. Whether sale of land is sale of capital asset or stock-in-trade is essentially a question of fact. The assessee is a builder and the investment in purchase and sale of plots was ancillary and incidental to its business. The assessee had treated the land as stock-in-trade in the balance sheet.

(ii) The Tribunal has rightly held that the provisions of section 50C are not applicable with respect to the sale of land which was not a capital asset.”

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Sections 14A read with section 2(22A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Interest in relation to investment in shares of foreign companies not to be disallowed u/s. 14A.

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6. (2013) 153 TTJ 181 (Mumbai)
ITO vs. Strides Arcolab Ltd.
ITA No.6487 (Mum.) of 2004
A.Y.2001-02. Dated 03-08-2012
 
Sections 14A read with section 2(22A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Interest in relation to investment in shares of foreign companies not to be disallowed u/s. 14A.

Facts
For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer made disallowance u/s. 14A in respect of interest on investment in shares on which assessee had earned dividend income which was claimed as exempt/s.10(33). The CIT(A), inter alia, held that only the dividend income received from a domestic company is exempt u/s. 10(33) [this was the section during A.Y.2001-02 – now it is section 10(34)]. Therefore, interest in respect of assessee’s investment in shares of foreign companies was not liable to be considered u/s. 14A.

Held

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order in respect of the above matter. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. Section 10(33), at the material time, exempted, inter alia, dividend referred to in section 115-O from the purview of taxation. Section 115-O talks of a `domestic company’.

2. On perusal of the definition of `domestic company’ u/s. 2(22A), it transpires that it is only Indian company or any other company, which has, in respect of its income is liable to tax under this Act, made prescribed arrangement for the declaration and payment of dividend. Obviously, this definition does not extend to foreign companies.

3. Therefore, the disallowance u/s. 14A is conceivable only in respect of investment made in the shares of domestic companies and not foreign companies.

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Sections 194H read with section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Mere distribution of the collected amount of commission does not require tax deduction if it is not shown as an expense.

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5. (2013) 55 SOT 356 (Delhi)
ITO vs. Interserve Travels (P.) Ltd.
ITA No.3526 (Delhi) of 2010
A.Y.2006-07. Dated 18-05-2012
 
Sections 194H read with section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Mere distribution of the collected amount of commission does not require tax deduction if it is not shown as an expense.

Facts

The assessee was engaged in business of travel agents. It had entered into a consortium agreement with 12 other members who were travel agents for booking air tickets through platform provided by `A’. The consortium members agreed that assessee would act as a lead member and authorised it to enter into contracts with `A’ to make collections and distribute monies to each of the consortium travel agents in proportion to segment bookings effected by each travel agent. The assessee collected commission for services rendered by other members and distributed said commission amongst members on priority basis. Though the TDS certificate issued by `A’ reflected commission of Rs. 65.72 lakh, the assessee distributed an amount of Rs. 52.22 lakh amongst members for services rendered by them in booking tickets, etc. Since assessee did not deduct tax at source while making payment of commission to travel agents, the Assessing Officer disallowed the amount of Rs. 52.22 lakh u/s. 40(a)(ia).

The CIT(A) held that since the amount of Rs. 52.22 lakh was not received for any services rendered by the assessee to `A’, the amount could not be treated as income of the assessee. Further, since the assessee did not claim the said amount as expenditure in its accounts, no tax was deducted at source by the assessee. Therefore, no disallowance could be made in terms of provisions of section 40(a)(ia).

Held
On further appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. As is evident from the terms and conditions of the consortium agreement, the payment by the assessee to other consortium members is not voluntary. The assessee is under a legal obligation in terms of the agreement to pay the amount to other consortium members in accordance with settled terms.
2. There is nothing to suggest that the assessee rendered any service to `A’. It is the settled legal position that income accrues when an enforceable debt is created in favour of an assessee. In other words, income accrues when the assessee acquires the right to receive the same. The terms of the consortium agreement do not reveal any such right in favour of assessee. Income of Rs. 52.22 lakh rightfully belonged to the other consortium members to whom the amount was distributed by the assessee.
3. Since the assessee only distributed the income in terms of the agreement and this did not amount to incurring of an expenditure nor did the assessee claim any expenditure, there was no infirmity in the findings of the CIT(A) in deleting the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia).

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ICAI and Its Member

1.    Code of Ethics

The Ethical Standards Board of ICAI has considered some issues relating to Code of Ethics. These issues are published on pages 1518-1520 of April, 2013, CA Journal. Some of these issues are as under.

(i) Issue No. 1
Can the name of a proprietary firm of a Chartered Accountant, after his death, be used by the C.A. who purchases the goodwill of the firm?

Response

The Council has taken the view that the goodwill of a proprietary firm of Chartered Accountant can be sold/transferred to another eligible member of the Institute, after the death of the proprietor concerned and the name of the firm can be used by the purchaser subject to following conditions:

(a)    in respect of cases where the death of the proprietor concerned occurred on or after 30-8-1998, if the sale is completed/effected in all respects and the Institute’s permission to practice in deceased’s proprietary firm name is sought within a year of the death of such proprietor concerned. In respect of these cases, the name of the proprietary firm concerned would be kept in abeyance (i.e. not removed on receipt of information about the death of the proprietor as is being done at present) only up to a period of one year from the death of proprietor concerned as aforesaid.

(b)    in respect of cases where the death of the proprietor concerned occurred on or after 30-8-1998 and there existed a dispute between the legal heirs of the deceased proprietor, the position is as under.

The information as to the existence of the dispute should be received by the Institute within a year of the death of the proprietor concerned. In respect of these cases, the name of the proprietary firm concerned shall be kept in abeyance till one year from the date of settlement of dispute.

ii) Issue No. 2
What is the meantime of communicating with the retiring auditor?

Response

Where a new auditor is appointed, the incoming auditor has an obligation to communicate the fact of his appointment to the retiring auditor and make enquiry as to whether there are any professional or other reasons why he should not accept the appointment.

This is intended not only as a mark of professional courtesy but also to know the reasons for the change in order to be able to safeguard member’s own interest, the legitimate interest of the public and the independence of the existing accountant. The provision is not intended, in any way, to prevent or obstruct the change.

The incoming auditor may not accept the audit in the following cases :-

(i)    Non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 224 and 225 of the Companies Act.

(ii)    Non-payment of undisputed audit fees by auditee’s other than in case of sick units for carrying out the statutory audit under the Companies Act, 1956 or various other statutes; and

(iii)    Issuance of a qualified report.

(iii) Issue No. 3
Can a member act as a Tax Auditor and Internal Auditor of an entity?

Response

The Council has decided that Tax Auditor cannot act as an Internal Auditor or vice-versa for the same financial year.

(iv) Issue No. 4

Can a Concurrent Auditor of a Bank also undertake the assignment of quarterly review of the same bank?

Response

The Concurrent audit and the Assignment of quarterly review of the same entity cannot be taken simultaneously as the concurrent audit is a kind of internal audit and the quarterly review is a kind of statutory audit. It is prohibited in terms of the ‘Guidance Note on Independence of Auditors’.

2.    EAC Opinion

Treatment of Expenditure on Stabilisation of Expanded Plant Declared Commercial.

Facts:


(i)    A company (company) engaged in petrochemicals business decided for an expansion project to enhance the production capacity of its mother plant by about 30%. The expansion project was of a complex nature requiring integration of its mother plant with various downstream plants. The execution of the project started in the year 2006.

(ii)    The company stated that after completion of the major activities of the said project, the existing plant was shut down from October, 2009 to February, 2010 for completing the installation, integration and commissioning of the project / plant. Although the existing plant which was shut down during this installation period came into operation from February, 2010, the Parallel Chilling Train and the Extended Binary Refrigeration (EBR) Compressor had not been successfully integrated. As a result, the capacity of the mother plant had not been ramped up and the increased feed from mother plant to auxiliary and other downstream plants had not been achieved. In view of this, the expansion project was not declared commissioned in February, 2010. The plant started operation at nearly 95% of the enhanced capacity (without one heater which was damaged in fire in July, 2009 and was under reconstruction) for about a month following the integration and commissioning of the EBR and the New Chilling Train (NCT) in May, 2010 and based on an internal certification, the management decided to go ahead with the capitalisation of the project in the books of account in June, 2010.

(iii)    In view of the frequent problems faced by the company post commissioning of the project, non-achievement of the expanded capacity of the plant and also considering the opinion given by the licensor, the management of the company has prospectively realised that the expansion project which was commissioned and capitalised in June, 2010 has not yet fully stabilised to operate at the enhanced capacity on a consistent basis.

(iv)    Therefore, the management of the company is of the opinion that (i) Till stabilisation and successful commissioning of the plant in compliance of the criteria and parameters recommended by the licensor, the company should consider costs relating to the expansion project so capitalised earlier as capital work in progress. (ii) All subsequent expenditure for rectification of the defects, shut down cost, revenues, gain and loss, etc., incurred during the commissioning and stabilisation period of this expansion project should form part of the project cost (iii) Capitalisation of all such costs as mentioned in point (i) and (ii) above in the books in the year of such successful commissioning.

Query:

(v)    On the basis of the above, the company has sought the opinion of the EAC on the aforesaid accounting treatment and whether the same is in conformity with the applicable accounting principles and Accounting Standards.

EAC Opinion

(vi)    The Committee notes that the basic issue raised in the query relate to accounting for expenditure on rectification of defects, shut down costs, revenues, gains and losses, etc., incurred during the stabilisation period of the expansion project after declaration of its commissioning and fitness for commercial production in June, 2010 and determination of the point of time when costs relating to expansion project should be capitalised along with the plant.

(vii)After considering the facts stated in (i) above and Paragraphs 9.4 and 9.4 of AS 10 – “Accounting for Fixed Assets” the Committee is of the view that the activities undertaken for stabilisation of plant cannot be treated as the test run as prescribed in the Standard. The purpose of test run, in the view of the Committee, is to ascertain whether the plant and machinery and other relevant facilities, as installed, give the commercially feasible output in terms of quality and quantity. If during the test run, the production standards are not met, normally, the production is stopped and necessary alterations/modifications are made in the plant and machinery. It may be necessary to carry out test runs(s) further until the output of commercially feasible quality and quantity is obtained. The Committee notes that in the company’s case, the plant after expansion was operational at 95% of the enhanced capacity and was able to produce the commercially feasible goods, and, therefore, was ready for commercial production in June, 2010. Accordingly, in the company’s case, capitalisation of expenditure on rectification of defects, shut down costs, revenues, gains and loss, etc. incurred after declaration of commissioning of the expansion project in June, 210 is not appropriate. Therefore, the question of writing back the costs related to the expansion project, capitalised earlier, in June 2010 to ‘capital work in progress’, as stated by the company does not arise.

[Pl. Refer Page nos. 1558 to 1561 of C. A. Journal – April , 2013]

3. ICAI News

(Note :    The page nos given below are from CA Journal of April, 2013)

(i)  ICAI Towers, BKC, Mumbai

ICAI Towers at BKC, Mumbai, was dedicated to ICAI members and students on 15-3-2013 by the Union Corporate Affairs Minister, Shri Sachin Pilot. The Towers has ground + 8 floors which will house the WIRC office as well as ICAI Decentralised office. This building is spread over 32090 sq. ft. (Page 1506)

(ii) Industrial Training for Articled Assistants

CA Regulations, 1988 provide scope for Industrial Training facilitating articled assistants real life exposure in office workings at industry and service organisations in order to develop their professional acumen. Industrial Training is highly benefiting to articled assistants in terms of practical knowledge & learning. The period of Industrial Training may range between nine months to twelve months during last year of the prescribed period of Practical Training under CA Course.

An articled assistant who has passed Intermediate (Integrated Professional Competence) Examination/

Intermediate (Professional Competence) Examination Professional Education (Examination-II)/Intermediate Examination may serve as an Industrial Trainee in any of the financial, commercial, industrial undertakings under an eligible member of the Institute working with such organisation. A list of registered organisations permitted to impart Industrial Training is available at the ICAI website.

Members are requested to inform and encourage their articled assistants to pursue industrial training by fulfilling the above eligibility. Detailed information and prescribed application forms are available on ICAI website www.icai.org as well from concerned regional offices of ICAI.

Members serving in such organisations/industries are also requested to apply separately in the prescribed form for empanelment of their organisation with the Institute for imparting Industrial Training (Page 1646).

(iii) Secondment of Articled Assistants

CA Regulations, 1988 provide scope for Secondment of articled assistant facilitating an opportunity for gaining practical experience in multi-disciplinary work and variety of business situations. A principal may second an articled assistant to other member/s with a view to provide him/her training in the areas where the principal/articled assistant may require. Secondment can also be availed during Industrial Training.

Such Secondment can be done under an eligible member whether in practice or in employment. A member can provide secondment upto maximum two articled assistants at a time. The minimum period of secondment shall be four months and the maximum period shall be one year which may be served with more than one member. During the period of secondment, the member with whom the articled assistant is seconded shall pay stipend at the rates prescribed under CA Regulations. A record of training imparted during secondment will be properly maintained.

For Secondment, a statement in the form containing particulars of training needs to be filed with the Institute within 30 days from the date of commencement of training on secondment.

Members may inform their articled assistants regarding secondment and encourage them to undergo secondment with an eligible member for training in the desired field. Detailed information and prescribed application form of secondment is available on ICAI website www.icai.org as well as with the concerned regional offices of ICAI. (Page 1646)

(iv) Quality Review Board

The Government of India has constituted Quality Review Board (QRB) u/s. 28A of CA Act. Details about its constitution and functions are published on page 1648 of CA Journal for April, 2013. Our members interested in working as “Technical Reviewers” for QRB can empanel their names with QRB as stated in ICAI Note at page 1648.

(v)    Notification about consequences of breach of C.A. Regulation 65

The Executive Committee of ICAI has noticed that some Articled Assistants are pursuing more than one study courses, besides C.A. Course, during their training period. This amounts to breach of CA Regulation 65. Council is taking a serious view about this non-compliance of CA Regulations. The Notification states that in the cases of Articled Trainees, who have not complied with this Regulation, ICAI will not grant Membership after they qualify for the period during which there was non-compliance. It is also clarified that appropriate action will be taken against the members who have trained such Articled Trainees (Page 1517).

Sections 45(4) read with section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Capital gain tax cannot be levied on firm on mere admission of partner if there was no distribution of any capital asset.

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4. (2013) 55 SOT 122 (Mumbai)
ITO vs. Fine Developers
ITA No.4630 (Mum.) of 2011
A.Y.2008-09. Dated 12-10-2012

Sections 45(4) read with section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Capital gain tax cannot be levied on firm on mere admission of partner if there was no distribution of any capital asset.


Facts

During the relevant assessment year, the assesseefirm of builders and developers admitted HDIL as a new partner with 50% share. The Assessing Officer held that on the date of admission, there was a plot of land costing Rs. 28 crore held by the firm and 50% of such amount was transferred in favour of the new partner HDIL on its admission in the firm. Accordingly to the Assessing Officer the assesseefirm was, therefore, liable to capital gain tax u/s. 45(4).

The CIT(A) held that :
a. During the relevant assessment year there was only admission of HDIL as new partner in the firm.
b. There was neither retirement nor distribution of assets nor revaluation of plot of land during the assessment year under consideration.
c. Mere admission of partners did not attract provisions of section 45(4).
d. During the continuance of the partnership-firm, rights of the partners were confined to obtaining the share of the profit and no partner could have exclusive claim to any assets.

Accordingly, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was set aside.

Held
On appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. It is not a case where firm was taken over by the new partner so that provisions of section 45(4) can be invoked. As per the settled principles of law of partnership, during the continuation of the partnership, partners do not have separate right over the assets of the firm in addition to interest in share of profits. The basis of the said proposition is that value of the interest of each partner with reference to the assets of the firm cannot be isolated and carved out from the value of the partners’ interest in the totality of the partnership assets.

2. In the case under consideration, asset of the firm, i.e., plot of land, was never transferred to anybody – it always remained with the assesseefirm only. From the date of purchase of the plot till 27-05-2008, when three partners retired, it was the asset of the firm and there was no change in the ownership of the said plot. Thus, there was no extinguishment of rights, as envisaged by section 2(47), in the case of assessee-firm.

3. From the very beginning of the partnership, the plot of land in question was treated as stockin- trade by the assessee-firm. Even on 31-03- 2008 it was shown as current asset (i.e. W-I-P) in the balance sheet. The Assessing Officer has nowhere rebutted/doubted this factual position.

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Guarantor’s Liability

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Introduction

How often have we come
across requests from close friends and relatives to stand as a guarantor
for a loan proposed to be taken by them? The loans could be housing
loans or for business. Further, one is also conversant with promoters of
companies/partners of firms standing as guarantors for loans obtained
by their entities. This is even true in case of large listed companies
where the promoters, managing directors, etc., are required to furnish
promoter guarantee. If the going is good and the original debtor meets
his dues, then all is well that ends well. However, what happens if the
original debtor cannot/does not meet his dues and the creditor/bank
invokes the guarantee furnished by the guarantor? Does the creditor have
to first approach the primary borrower or can he directly approach the
guarantor who may be in a better financial position than the borrower?
Let us look at some of the issues arising in this important aspect of
trade and commerce.

Meaning of Guarantee

Section
126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines a ‘contract of guarantee’
as a contract to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a
third person in the case of the third person’s default. Performance
guarantees/bank guarantees are also instances of contracts of guarantee.
For instance, Mr. A agrees to pay the housing loan amount borrowed by
Mr. C from a bank if Mr. C cannot/does not pay the loan. This is a
contract of guarantee.

A contract of guarantee is not a contract
in respect of a primary transaction but it is an independent
transaction containing independent and reciprocal obligations —
Industrial Finance Corp. v. Cannanore Spg. and Wvg. Mills, (2002) 5 SCC
54.

The person who gives the guarantee is called a surety or a
guarantor, the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the
creditor and the third person on whose behalf the guarantee is given is
called the principal debtor. Thus, the essentials of a guarantee are as
follows:

(a) It is a contract and so all the elements of a valid
contract are a must. Without a contract this section has no
application. Since a contract is a must, it goes without saying that all
the prerequisites of a contract also follow. Thus, if the contract has
been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, etc., then it is
void ab initio and the section would also fail — Ariff v. Jadunath,
(1931) AIR PC 79. The contract may be oral or written.

(b) There
must be a principal debtor-creditor relationship. Without this there
can be no contract of guarantee. The surety’s obligations arise only
when the principal debtor defaults and not otherwise.

(c) It is a tri-partite arrangement, involving the surety, the principal debtor and the creditor.

(d) There must be a consideration for the surety. If there is no consideration at all, then the surety agreement is void.

However,
anything done or any promise made for the benefit of the principal
debtor is sufficient consideration to the surety for giving the
guarantee. A contract of guarantee is a complete contract by itself and
separate from the underlying contract. Enforcement of an on-demand bank
guarantee in accordance with the terms of the bank guarantee would not
be the subject-matter of judicial intervention. The only reason why
Courts would interfere if the invocation is not as per the terms of the
guarantee or it has been obtained by fraud — National Highways Authority
of India v. Ganga Enterprises, (2003) 7 SCC 410.

Nature of liability

The
liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal
debtor. However, the contract may provide otherwise. Thus, the guarantor
has to pay all debts, interest, penal charges, etc., payable by the
principal debtor. He is liable for whatever the debtor is liable. Where
the liability arises only on the happening of some event, then the
guarantee cannot be invoked till such contingency has happened. Even if
winding-up proceedings have been filed against the principal debtor, the
surety would remain liable to pay to the creditor. A discharge of the
principal debtor by operation of law does not absolve the surety of his
liability — Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. OL, (1982) 3 SCC 358.

Continuing Guarantee

A guarantee which extends
to a series of transactions is a continuing guarantee. Whether or not a
contract is a continuing guarantee is to be ascertained from the
language of the transaction. For instance, Mr. A guarantees payment of
all dues by Mr. X to Mr. C in respect of goods supplied by Mr. C. This
is an example of continuing guarantee and does not come to an end with
the clearance of the first payment. A continuing guarantee can be
revoked at any time by giving notice to the creditor. However, the
revocation operates only in respect of future transactions.
Alternatively, the death of a surety revokes all future transactions
under a continuing guarantee.

Alterations

Any
variation made in the contract of guarantee without the guarantor’s
consent by the principal debtor and the creditor, discharges the
guarantor from all transactions after the variation. For instance, Mr. C
agrees to lend money on 1st June to Mr. B, repayment of the same
guaranteed by Mr. A. Mr. C instead lends on 1st April. The surety is
discharged from his obligations since the creditor may now demand a
repayment earlier than what was originally agreed upon. However, if
there is an unsubstantial alteration which is to the surety’s benefit,
then the surety is not discharged from his liability. However, if the
alteration is to the disadvantage of the surety, then the surety can
claim a discharge.

Discharge

The guarantor is
discharged by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor
by which the debtor is released of by any act of the creditor which
results in the discharge of the debtor. For instance, A guarantees the
repayment of the loan taken by X Ltd from C Ltd provided C Ltd supplies
certain goods to X Ltd. C Ltd does not supply the goods as agreed. A is
discharged from his guarantee. Similarly, a contract between the
creditor and the principal debtor under which the creditor gives a
concession or extends the time for repayment to the principal debtor,
releases the guarantor from his obligations.

If the creditor
does anything which affects the rights of the surety or omits to do
anything which we was required to do to the surety, then the guarantee
contract comes to an end. Thus, the creditor cannot gain out of any
negligence on his own accord.

However, it has been held that the
discharge of the principal debtor by virtue of a Statute/Notification
does not discharge the guarantor — SBI v. Saksaria Sugar Mills, (1986) 2
SCC 145.

Guarantor steps into shoes of creditor

On
discharge of the liability of the principal debtor, the guarantor steps
into the shoes of the creditor, i.e., he becomes entitled to all
actions and rights against the principal debtor which the creditor had.
He also becomes entitled to the benefit of all security which the
creditor had against the debtor, whether or not the surety is aware of
the security. The term ‘security’ includes all rights which the creditor
had against the property of the principal debtor on the date of the
contract — State of MP v. Kaluram, AIR 1967 SC 1105.

In case the creditor loses or parts with security without consent of the security, then the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of the security. In one case, the debtor gave a guarantee and a pledge of his goods as security for loan to a bank. The surety was aware of the pledge. However, the bank lost the goods due to its own fault. Held, that the surety was discharged from his obligations — State Bank v. Chitranjan Raja, 51 Comp. Cases 618 (SC).

Must creditor first proceed against debtor?

The law in this respect is very clear. The creditor is free to directly proceed against the guarantor instead of first approaching the principal debtor and then failing him, the guarantor/surety.

In Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad, (1969) 1 SCR 620, the Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the surety to pay the amount. On such payment he will be subrogated to the rights of the creditor under the Indian Contract Act, and he may then recover the amount from the principal debtor. The very object of the guarantee is defeated if the creditor is asked to postpone his remedies against the surety. In that case the creditor was a bank. It was held that a guarantee is a collateral security usually taken by a banker. The security will become useless if his rights against the surety can be so easily cut down.

In State Bank of India v. M/s. Indexport, (1992) 3 SCC 159, it was held that the decree-holder bank can execute the decree against the guarantor without proceeding against the principal borrower and then proceeded to observe:

“The execution of the money decree is not made dependent on first applying for execution of the mortgage decree. The choice is left entirely with the decree-holder. The question arises whether a decree which is framed as a composite decree, as a matter of law, must be executed against the mortgage property first or can a money decree, which covers whole or part of decretal amount covering mortgage decree can be execute earlier. There is nothing in law which provides such a composite decree to be first executed only against the principal debtor.”

In Industrial Investment Bank of India
Limited v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala, (2009)
9 SCC 478, it was held that the liability of the guarantor and principal debtor is co-extensive and not in alternative and the creditor/decree-holder has the right to proceed against either for recovery of dues or realisation of the decretal amount.

SARFAESI Act vis-à-vis Surety

A related question which arises is what is the position of the guarantor under the SARFAESI Act in case he gives a security for a loan borrowed by the principal debtor from a bank/financial institution. The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘the SARFAESI Act’) ensures that dues of secured creditors including banks, financial institutions are recovered from the defaulting borrowers without any obstruction. Secured creditors have been empowered to take steps for recovery of their dues without intervention of the Courts or Tribunals by directly taking over the properties of the borrowers.

In the case of Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the position of the guarantor under the SARFAESI Act. In this case, the guarantor mortgaged her property as security for the loan given by the bank to the principal debtor. She also executed an agreement of guarantee for the principal and interest amount. The loan account became an NPA and the bank directly approached the guarantor for the amounts due. On her failure to repay, the bank invoked

the provisions of the SARFAESI Act against her and took possession of her mortgaged property. The Supreme Court held that nothing prevents the bank from directly approaching the guarantor without first approaching the debtor. It further held that the action taken by the bank for recovery of its dues by issuing notices under the SARFAESI Act cannot be faulted on any legally permissible ground.

It further held that if the guarantor had any tangible grievance against the recovery proceedings under the

SARFAESI Act, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application u/s.17(1) of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The expression ‘any person’ used in the Act is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not

only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under the Act. Both, the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under the Act and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

Epilogue

The guarantor’s liability is like the proverbial ‘Sword of Damocles’ which is hanging by a very slender thread and can come down at any time. One may even rephrase the legal maxim of ‘Caveat Emptor’ to say ‘Guarantor be aware of what you guarantee’. Thus, it is very important that before giving any promoter/ personal guarantee, a person is well aware of the risks and consequences of the same.

Succession — Right of daughter-in-law — Devolution of interest — Notional Partition — Hindu Succession Act, 1956, section 6.

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The grievance of the appellant (Deft. No. 7) was that she being one of the daughters of the propositor should have been granted a decree for 1/3rd share in all the suit schedule properties, more particularly when it had been established on record that the suit schedule properties are the ancestral properties of the joint family consisting of plaintiffs and defendants of which her husband was a member. The Trial Court decided the issue in favour; however, due to some mistake the same is not reflected in the operative portion of the decree. Though a rectification application u/s.152 of CPC could be applied, however, the defendant No. 7 preferred the appeal.

The Court observed that the 7th defendant preferred the appeal with the ambitious intention of augmenting her share further. While 1/3rd share in terms of the judgment was the correct share to which the 7th defendant was entitled to, the further claim for augmenting her share by claiming a share in a share allotted to her father-in-law making a claim for 1/2 share is only an ambitious claim not tenable in law as the daughter-in-law in the family can claim only through her husband and not as a direct heir to her father-in-law. The appellant cannot get any share from out of the properties allotted notionally to the share of a father-in-law who was no more.

Even otherwise, in Hindu law the shares of joint family members are determined per stripes vis-àvis their position in the family and not by what they would have got with reference to a notional partition that has to be effected at that point of time when a member of the family who is no more as of now. This is not the legal position either by applying the customary law or by the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, the claim of the appellant for enhancing her 1/3rd share to ½ share was not tenable and the appeal was to be disposed by affirming 1/3rd share granted by the Trial Court.

Insofar as the sharing ratio particularly vis-à-vis the 4th plaintiff was concerned, a daughter in the family, who was married and the partition taking place subsequent to her marriage.

The 1/3rd share allotted to the 4th plaintiff by the learned Trial Judge becomes validated by the strides taken by the legislation in amending section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by Act No. 39 of 2005. The share claimed by the appellant in the dwelling units on the premise that a married daughter cannot get a share in the dwelling house of the family also does not sustain in the wake of the legislative development, which would apply while disposing of the appeal.

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Recovery — Hire-purchase agreement — Taking back the possession of vehicle by use of force is against provision of law and RBI Guidelines — Consumer Protection Act, section 21.

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[Citi Corpn. Maruti Finance Ltd. v. S. Vijayalaxmi, AIR 2012 Supreme Court 509]

On 4th April, 2000, at the initiative of the respondent, a hire-purchase agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondent, to enable the respondent to avail of the benefit of hire-purchase in respect of a Maruti Omni Car. Clause 2.1 of the hire-purchase agreement provided for payment of the hire charges in the manner stipulated in the agreement and it also indicated that timely payment of the hire charges was the essence of the agreement. On the failure of the respondent to pay the hire charges in terms of the repayment schedule, the appellant sent a legal notice to the respondent on 10th October, 2002, recalling the entire hire-purchase facility.

Pursuant to a request made by the respondent, the appellant made a one-time offer of settlement for liquidating the outstanding dues of Rs. 1,26,564.84p. for Rs.60,000, subject to payment being made by the respondent by 16th May, 2003, in cash. Thereafter, in keeping with the terms and conditions of the hire-purchase agreement, the appellant took possession of the financed vehicle and informed the concerned police station before and after taking possession of the vehicle from the residence of the respondent. It was also the appellant’s case that subsequent thereto, the date of the settlement offer was extended as a special case, but despite the same, the respondent failed to pay the amount even within the extended period. It is on account of such default that the appellant was constrained to sell the vehicle after having the same valued by approved valuers and inviting bids from interested parties.

In June, 2003, the respondent filed consumer complaint before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, against the appellant alleging deficiency in service on their part. By its order dated 22nd December, 2003, the District Forum, directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000, along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum, from the date of filing of the complaint till the date of payment, together with a further sum of Rs.5,000 towards harassment and cost of litigation. The National Commission, while dismissing the revision petition modified the order of the State Commission. The Commission directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.10,000 to the complainant/respondent by way of cost.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court observed that the lower forum had held that the vehicle had been illegally and/or wrongfully recovered by use of force from the loanees. The Court observed that recovery process should be effected in accordance with due process of law and not with use of force. Although till such time as ownership is not transferred to purchaser hirer normally continues to be the owner of goods, but that does not entitle him on strength of the agreement to take back possession of vehicle by use of force. Such acts are in violation of RBI guidelines. Hence, recovery by financial corporation was against process of law and RBI guidelines and hence order of Consumer Forum directing financial corporation to compensate the purchaser was proper.

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Month — Interpretation of term ‘Month’ — Number of days in that month is not criterion and month alone is criterion — General Clauses Act — Section 3(35).

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An application was filed by the appellant to declare respondents Nos. 1 and 2 as insolvents which was allowed by the lower Court. The appeal against the said order was allowed by the Additional District Judge on the legal aspect that the application filed by the appellant was barred by time without going into other contentions. Before the High Court the appellant contended that the order of the lower Court holding that the application barred by limitation was not correct. Admittedly, as per the provisions of section 9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act an application to declare a person as insolvent shall be filed within a period of three months from the date of act of insolvency. The act of insolvency, in this case was on 8-6-2001. The application was filed on 7-9-2001. The lower Appellate Court has considered that the period of limitation as 90 days and consequently, held that the application had been filed after a period of 90 days therefore barred by time.

The Court observed that there was nothing in the provisions u/s.9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act that the period of limitation is 90 days. As per section 3 s.s 35 of the General Clauses Act, ‘month’ shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. Therefore, it is not 90 days that has to be taken into consideration. Evidently, the months of July and August have got 31 days and consequently, the number of days in that month is not the criterion and the month alone is the criterion. In this connection, reliance was placed on a decision reported in in re V. S. Metha and others, AIR 1970 AP 234, wherein it was held by the Division Bench of the High Court that the expression ‘month’ in the statute does not necessarily mean 30 days, but goes according to the Gregorian calendar, unless the context otherwise requires. Therefore, when the period of three months was mentioned u/s.106 of the Factories Act in that case, the Court held that it does not mean 90 days and it means three calendar months.

Accordingly the appeal was allowed and matter was remanded to consider the matter on merits.

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A Report on Jal Erach Dastur Students’ Annual Day Function held on 23rd February 2013 at the Navinbhai Thakkar Auditorium, Vile Parle, Mumbai.

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The Students’ Forum of Human Resources Committee organised this function for the CA Students. The programme commenced with Saraswati Vandana and was followed by a welcome address by Mr. Naushad Panjwani, Vice President. Mr. Mayur Nayak, Chairman of the HR Committee, praised the efforts put in by students in organising this mammoth event and outlined various activities carried out by the Students Forum.

Mr. Nilesh Vikamsey central council member of the ICAI in his, the Keynote address , gave a very inspiring presentation titled “Power of Dream & Power of Positivity”.

To mark the Annual Day four competitions were held, namely, Essay Writing, Elocution, Debate and Talent Showcase. The results are as given below. 1.

Essay Writing Competition

The judges Mr. Vipin Batavia, Ms. Sangeeta Pandit and Mr. Mukesh Trivedi evaluated essays written by 59 students and prizes were awarded to the following three :

Award Name of the Participant Name of the Firm
First Prize Charmi Doshi Pradip Kapasi & Co.
Second Prize Aneri Merchant Rashmi Modi & Co.
Third Prize Mudit Yadav NMAH & Associates
2. Elocution Competition

The Elocution Competition was organised under the auspices of Smt. Chandanben Maganlal Bhatt Foundation and was graced by the presence of

Mr. Mukesh Bhatt, a family member, who presented the trophies to the winners.

Out of thirty-six students who participated in the elimination round, eight students made it to the final round. The judges of the elimination round were Ms. Shruti Shah, Mr. Nitin Shingala, and Mr. Mihir Sheth.

The judges for the final round were Mr. Suresh Prabhu, Mr. Atul Bheda, and Mr. Shrikant Kanetkar. As the competition was intense the Judges in their discretion awarded 5 prizes as against 3 normally declared.

The winners are as follows:

Award Name of the Participant Name of the Firm
First Prize Kartik Srinivasan Pankaj Parekh & Co
Second Prize Shweta Agarwal Churuwala & Associates
Third Prize Mudit Yadav NMAH & Associates
Consolation Prize Amishi Vora Pradip Kapasi & Co.
Consolation prize Kush ganantra Paras Sheth & Associates
3. DebatingCompetition
Out of fifty-one student participants in the elimination round, sixteen participants made it to the final round. The final round was moderated by Mr. Ashish Fafadia in his inimitable style by involving the audience and this made the debate even more interesting. He was assisted by Mr. Mukesh Trivedi and Mr. Krishna Kumar Jhunjhunwala, judges for competition.

The winners are as follows:

4. Talent Show

Out of the twelve nominations, nine participants were selected for the final round of the Talent Show that was judged by Mr. Suril Shah and Mr. Nipun Nayak. The following three performers were adjudged winners.

The winners are as follows:


The Annual Day was attended by nearly 300 strong audience comprising mainly of the students, who were enthusiastically supported by their appreciative Principals and Parents. The event was compered by Ms. Khushboo Shah and Mr. Chintan Shah with active support of Ms. Shweta Agarwal.

The participants and the audience bonded over a sumptuous and delicious dinner and left home refreshed by joyful learning and a fun-filled experience.

When gold falls – Govt cannot assume it will solve current account problem

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Gold prices, which have been falling for the last six months, have a major impact on the current account deficit. The precious metal is the second-largest item in the import bill. The current account deficit is running at $75 billion, and gold imports at $42 billion (April 2012-January 2013) account for over half that. Indian households are the biggest gold bugs in the world; they hold, according to some estimates, over 25,000 tonnes. The precious metal is now in the middle of the longest correction of the last 15 years, with the price down 15 per cent from the all-time highs of 2012. If the trend continues, it could considerably ease worries on the external front. Given that the first 10 months of 2012-13 saw imports of $42 billion, full-year imports will be lower than the $56 billion imported in 2011-12. But in January 2013, as prices fell, the month’s imports rose 23 per cent in volume terms, to over 100 tonnes. This spike was partly driven by speculation that import duty would be hiked in the Budget, which was not the case. However, if demand is elastic enough, the fear is that the import bill may actually increase despite lower prices. Indian prices track international prices closely, with a premium in the festive season as weddings account for a base demand of about 500 tonnes. The traditional fascination with gold has been reinforced by a 10-year bull run, at a compounded annual growth rate of over 19 per cent. Gold went up from about $300/ounce (about $11 a gram) in 2002 to an all-time high of above $1,900 ($66 a gram) in mid-2012 before dropping back to the current $1,600 ($53 a gram). In the past three years, its value as a hedge has also come into play as consumer inflation ran high. The reputation as a hedge against currency weakness and inflation may have been self-fulfilling. As fears of currency weakness developed, legendary traders such as George Soros and John Paulson took massive positions, driving prices up. The Indian government has tried several measures to reduce domestic gold demand, without much success. The import duty has been raised from two per cent to six per cent in phases. It cannot be raised further without attracting smuggling on a large scale. The 2013-14 Budget introduced the concept of inflation-indexed bonds, which may be an alternative hedge. Such an instrument would have to be structured and marketed in a fashion that appeals to conservative housewives, who view gold as a default asset.

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Judges must stay clear of policy matters unless in conflict with Constitution: CJI

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Judges should not normally interfere with policy matters unless they are in conflict with the Constitution and the law, Chief Justice of India Altamas Kabir said on Sunday at the end of a conference of chief justices of High Courts and state Chief Ministers. Judges should also refrain from commenting unnecessarily on other constitutional authorities, he said. “As a general principle, we don’t interfere.”

The CJI’s remarks can be seen as both introspection and a cautionary note to courts which have been very active of late in policy areas. The top court itself is dealing with several challenges to policy whether it be FDI in retail, coal block allocations or environmental clearances to major industrial projects.

The top court’s decision to set aside 2G spectrum licences over irregularities had marked a remarkable departure from courts’ reluctance to interfere in policy matters. Responding to a question about the proposed Judges’ Accountability Bill, which has a clause that bars judges from commenting on unrelated issues while dealing with a case, the Chief Justice said: “Unnecessary comments should not be made. I agree on that.”

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PM Manmohan Singh – Analytical lion, prescriptive lamb

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The speech given by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to business leaders last week was unfortunately overshadowed in media coverage by a largely vacuous speech by Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi to the same audience.

Singh provided a clear sense of how he looks at the current economic situation. There was little to fault there in terms of economic analysis, though one cannot miss the hidden irony that he spoke as if the policy mess created by his government since 2004 has no role in the current slowdown.

There are three significant points he made.

First, the general economic slowdown cannot be dealt with unless there is a revival in private sector investment. Singh believes investment depends on the psychological mood, or what John Maynard Keynes called animal spirits of entrepreneurs.

Second, Singh did well to highlight the absolute necessity to bring down the fiscal deficit, not only because of its inevitable inflationary consequences but also its role in undermining the India growth story. Once again, there was no mention of why we are close to a fiscal crisis. The fiscal deterioration began before the crisis, with the farm loan waiver in February 2008.

Finally, Singh warned that the current account deficit, still the single biggest risk to economic stability, will be higher than acceptable for at least a few more years. “We have to accept that our exports will be weak and our current account deficit…higher than it should be,” he said. “We have to learn to cope with these problems.” He added that India will have to plan to finance a high current account deficit for a few years.

Singh’s speech had professorial clarity of analysis but lacked a strong agenda one expects from a national leader. That is an old problem.

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Empowering a new CAG

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Many recent reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) have highlighted grave discrepancies in government expenditure and deliberate distortions of stated policies. These reports and their aftermath demonstrate the true potential of the office of the CAG to force action against corruption. As the custodian of the public purse, it is one of the key actors in the system of checks and balances envisaged under our Constitution. In fact, today the CAG is likely the most important functionary responsible for ensuring accountability of the government.

However, the CAG can do justice to this role only if he is competent, independent and suitably empowered. Sadly, the current framework compromises this, leaving room for abuse in appointments, as well as limiting the CAG’s authority to effectively perform his constitutional duties. This is particularly important now, as the appointment of a new CAG looms on the horizon.

The CAG’s appointment process is a legacy from the pre-Independence ‘not-accountable-to-Indians’ mindset, whereby it is entirely at the government’s discretion. Given the governing coalition’s exasperation with the incumbent, it is probable that this time around it will look for someone who is likely to be favorably inclined towards the government, or at the least be ineffective.

To ensure that the independence of the CAG does not depend on the morals of the government of the day, his appointment should reflect real checks and balances. My formula would have the CAG appointed by a committee consisting of the Speaker, the prime minister and the two leaders of the opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. Their choice should be by simple majority and, in the event of a tie, it should be referred to the Chief Justice of India to cast the deciding vote.

Many infrastructure projects are now undertaken in the PPP mode, involving transfer of public assets (for instance, oilfields) and revenue sharing between the government and the private sector. Many of these newer structures are presently outside the ambit of the CAG. This reduces oversight and creates avenues for corruption. Therefore, the scope of the CAG’s powers must be expanded to include such arrangements.

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Sales Tax – Best Judgment Assessment – Addition of Sales – Based on Quotations Against Which No Sale Bills Raised-Not Justified, Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act,1959.

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Facts

The dealer was assessed for the period 1991-92 under The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The assessing authority levied tax on estimation of turnover of sales based on quotations raised against which no sale bills were issued. The Tribunal in appeal, observing that there was no material to prove that the assesse had sold any goods to any individual or contractor, passed the order deleting the levy of tax on estimated turnover of sales. The Department filed appeal petition before the Madras high Court against the impugned order of the Tribunal.

Held

As observed by the Tribunal, there was no material for treating the quotations as sale bills and estimating turnover on the basis of the quotation. As rightly held by the Tribunal, the assessing authority had not probed the matter beyond treating quotation book as sale bill. Accordingly, the High Court confirmed the order of the Tribunal and dismissed the appeal filed by the Department.

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Section 253 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Direct stay application filed before Tribunal is maintainable and it is not a requirement of law that assessee should necessarily approach Commissioner before approaching Tribunal for grant of stay.

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(2012) 49 SOT 333 (Pune)
Honeywell Automation India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT
A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 24-2-2011

Section 253 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Direct stay application filed before Tribunal is maintainable and it is not a requirement of law that assessee should necessarily approach Commissioner before approaching Tribunal for grant of stay.

The assessee filed separate application for stay of demand before the Deputy Commissioner, before Additional Commissioner and finally before the Commissioner. None of these officials disposed of the assessee’s applications for stay of demand. The assessee-company thereupon filed application before the Tribunal for stay against the demand of arrears by the Revenue. The Revenue raised an objection that Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain directly stay application (DSA) without waiting for decision of the lower authorities.

The Tribunal dismissed the objections raised by the Revenue. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) The Act has conferred certain powers on the Income Tax authorities for discharging and 158 (2012) 44-A BCAJ 9 10 one such power relates to matters of stay of the demand. The assessee filed the stay application before the Assessing Officer, but the Assessing Officer did not take any action, be it a case of rejection or otherwise. The same is the fate of application lying with the Additional Commissioner. The Commissioner merely passed on the responsibility to his deputies instead of either staying the demand or rejecting the request for stay of the same or otherwise.

(2) While there is inaction on part of the Revenue on the applications for stay, the assessee is busy in making application for stay of demand from time to time fearing ultimate coercive action by the AO and its likely adverse effects on the business operations of the assessee.

(3) Regarding the DSA by the assessee before the Tribunal, the decisions of the Tribunal are in favour of the assessee for the proposition that it is not necessary that the assessee should necessarily approach the Commissioner of Income-tax before approaching the Tribunal for grant of stay.

(4) Therefore, DSA filed before the Tribunal is maintainable and it is not the requirement of law that the assessee should necessarily approach the Commissioner before approaching the Tribunal for grant of stay.

(5) It does not make any difference whether the assessee filed any application before the Revenue and not awaited their decisions before filing application before the Tribunal or directly approached the Tribunal without even filing the applications before the Revenue authorities when there exists threat of coercive action by the Assessing Officer.

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Section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Deduction allowable even if the building in which investment was made was under construction and assessee had paid entire amount as advance.

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(2012) 49 SOT 90 (Mumbai)
ACIT v. Sudhakar ram
A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 31-10-2011

Section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Deduction allowable even if the building in which investment was made was under construction and assessee had paid entire amount as advance.

The assessee earned long-term capital gain on sale of shares and claimed deduction u/s.54F in respect of investment in a new house. The Assessing Officer noted that the assessee had made investment in two new flats and the building was under construction stage and the assessee had chosen to pay the entire advance and, therefore, deduction u/s.54F could not be given.

The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal also held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted that since the assessee has paid the full consideration before the statutory period of 2 years from the date of sale of shares and has acquired the right in the two flats which is being constructed by the builder, the benefit of deduction u/s.54F cannot be denied to the assessee.

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Sections 147, 154 — Once there is retrospective amendment to the statute, the earlier order which is not in conformity with the amended provisions, can be rectified u/s.154 of the Act — In the absence of any fresh material, sufficient to lead inference of escapement of income, the AO cannot exercise jurisdiction u/s.147 r.w.s. 148 of the Act.

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(2012) TIOL 193 ITAT-Mum.
Binani Cement Ltd. v. DCIT
A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 27-1-2012

Sections 147, 154 — Once there is retrospective amendment to the statute, the earlier order which is not in conformity with the amended provisions, can be rectified u/s.154 of the Act — In the absence of any fresh material, sufficient to lead inference of escapement of income, the AO cannot exercise jurisdiction u/s.147 r.w.s. 148 of the Act.


Facts:

For A.Y. 2007-08, the assessment of total income of the assessee was completed vide order dated 23-3- 2007, passed u/s.143(3) of the Act. While assessing the total income, the Assessing Officer (AO) allowed a deduction of Rs.74,42,770 being the amount of interest on term loan from IDBI which was not paid as due, but was deferred by IDBI and such deferral was regarded as deemed payment.

Subsequently the Assessing Officer (AO) recorded the reasons which were supplied to the assessee vide letter dated 26-8-2009, and issued notice u/s.148. One of the reasons recorded was that on perusal of the assessment records it is noticed that in respect of the loan obtained by the assessee from IDBI, the assessee had not paid interest instalment amounting to Rs.74,42,770 which was deferred by IDBI. This had been treated as deemed payment of interest and was allowed as deduction. Upon receiving the copy of reasons recorded, the assessee objected to the issuance of notice u/s.148 on the ground that the time section 43B was amended after the assessee has filed its return of income, by Finance Act, 2006 with retrospective effect from 1-4-1989 to provide for disallowance of interest which has been converted into loan and also that since the amount under consideration has been paid in subsequent years it will not have any impact on the income-tax liability ultimately. The assessee consented that this can be rectified u/s.154 of the Act. The AO without disposing of the assessee’s objections proceeded to complete the reassessment and added the sum of Rs.74,42,770 to the total income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO in reopening the assessment u/s.147 r.w.s. 148 of the Act on the ground that the assessee has admitted one of the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that in view of the retrospective amendment of section 43B of the Act by the Finance Act, 2006, subsequent to the filling of the return, certain disallowance under this provision was called for, which was consented by the assessee by filing rectification petition vide letter dated 30-9-2009. The amendment was on the statute even at the time when the AO completed assessment u/s.143(3) of the Act. On behalf of the assessee, relying on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. DCIT, (325 ITR 102) (Bom.) it was contended that proceedings u/s.147 were being objected to as there was no escapement of income.
The Tribunal held that:

(1) Mere fresh application of mind to the same set of facts or mere change of opinion does not confer jurisdiction even after amendment in section 147 w.e.f. 1-4-1989.

(2) When a regular order of assessment is passed in terms of section 143(3), a presumption can be raised that such an order has been passed on application of mind. A presumption can also be raised to the effect that in terms of section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. If it be held that an order which has been passed purportedly without application of mind would itself confer jurisdiction upon the AO to reopen the proceeding without anything further, the same would amount to giving a premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicial function to take, benefit of its own wrong.

(3) Considering the ratio of the decisions of the Delhi High Court in the case of Jindal Photo Films Ltd. v. DCIT, 234 ITR 170 (Del.) and also the decision of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Kelvinator India Ltd., (256 ITR 1) which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in 320 ITR 561 (SC), in order to invoke the provisions of section 147, the AO is required to have some tangible material pinpointing escapement of income from assessment and in the absence of any fresh material, sufficient to lead inference of escapement of income, the AO cannot exercise jurisdiction u/s.147 r.w.s. 148 of the Act.

(4) The amendment to section 43B was available to the AO while framing assessment, even otherwise, based on the ratio of the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hindustan Unilever Ltd. (supra) it can be safely concluded that once there is retrospective amendment to the statute, the earlier order which is not in conformity with the amended provisions, can be rectified u/s.154 of the Act.

The Tribunal held that the jurisdiction is to be assumed by the AO u/s.154 of the Act and not 148 of the Act. The Tribunal allowed this issue of the assessee’s cross-objections.

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Section 255(4) — The opinion expressed by the Third Member (TM) is binding on the member in minority — Questions framed by the member in minority while giving effect to the opinion of majority are outside the purview of section 255(4) of the Act and have no relevance.

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(2012) TIOL 188 ITAT-Mum.-SB
Tulip Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT
A.Ys.: 2004-05 & 2005-06. Dated: 30-3-2012

Section 255(4) — The opinion expressed by the Third Member (TM) is binding on the member in minority — Questions framed by the member in minority while giving effect to the opinion of majority are outside the purview of section 255(4) of the Act and have no relevance.


Facts:

In an appeal filed by the assessee, the Tribunal was considering taxability of certain amounts as cash credits u/s.68 of the Act and also allowability of certain expenditure as a deduction. In the course of hearing before the Tribunal, the assessee filed certain additional evidence. After considering the evidence filed by the assessee before the lower authorities and also the additional evidence filed before the Tribunal, the Judicial Member (JM) decided both the issues in favour of the assessee, while the Accountant Member (AM) decided both the issues in favour of the Department. The members formulated questions to be referred by the President to the Third Member. The TM agreed with the JM and decided both the issues in favour of the assessee. At the stage of giving effect to the opinion of the TM, the JM passed an order in conformity with the order of the TM, whereas the AM observed that it is not possible to give effect to the order of the TM on the ground that the order of TM was contrary to the opinion expressed by the TM himself in his own order and that the TM had not considered various points of differences arising from the dissenting orders. He raised certain new questions on merits of the dispute and directed that the matter be referred back to the President. The JM did not agree and raised an issue whether the Members of the Bench could comment on the order of the TM instead of merely passing a confirmatory order in terms of section 255(4). The President on a reference made by the Division Bench referred the following question to the SB for its consideration:

“Whether on a proper interpretation of s.s (4) of section 255 of the Income-tax Act, the order proposed by the learned AM while giving effect to the opinion of the majority consequent to the opinion expressed by the learned Third Member, can be said to be a valid or lawful order passed in accordance with the said provision.”

Held:

(1) There is no doubt that the Accountant Member while agreeing with the questions formulated at the time of the original reference to the President of the ITAT has again framed three new questions at the time of giving effect to the opinion of the majority de hors the provisions of section 255(4) of the Act as he had become functus officio after he passed his initial draft order;

(2) The opinion expressed by the Third Member was very much binding on the Accountant Member. The Accountant Member who is in minority was bound to follow the opinion of the Third Member in its true letter and spirit. It was necessary for judicial propriety and discipline that the member who is in minority must accept as binding the opinion of the Third Member;

(3) On a difference of opinion among the two Members of the Tribunal, the third Member was called upon to answer two questions on which there was difference of opinion among the two members who framed the questions and the third Member in a wellconsidered order, answered the reference by giving sound and valid reasons agreeing with the views of the Judicial Member. Thus, the majority view was in favour of the assessee;

(4) The proposed order dated 18-2-2010 of the Accountant Member who is in the minority and had become functus officio wherein he has expressed his inability to give effect to the opinion of the majority and proceeded to frame three new questions to be referred to the President, ITAT again for resolving the controversy cannot be said to be a valid or lawful order passed in accordance with the provisions of section 255(4) of the Act. The SB held that the said order dated 18-2-2010 proposed by the Accountant Member to be not sustainable in law. It answered the question referred to it in favour of the assessee.

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Revision of Stamp Duty on Registration of Articles of Association in Kerala State

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Stamp Duty payable for registration of Articles of Association in Kerala revised from Rs.1,000/- to Rs.10,000/- with effect from 01-04-2013 vide THE KERALA FINANCE BILL 2013.

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Companies ( Acceptance of Deposits Amendments) Rules 2013

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide notification dated 21st March 2013 issued amendments to the Companies ( Acceptance of Deposits ) Rules 1975 whereby the following sub-clause is to be substituted in (i) in rule 2, in clause (b), for Clause (x):

“(x) any amount raised by the issue of bonds or debentures secured by the mortgage of any fixed assets referred to in Schedule VI of the Act excluding intangible assets of the Company or with an option to convert them into shares in the Company:

Provided that in the case of such bonds or debentures secured by the mortgage of fixed assets referred to in Schedule VI of the Act excluding intangible Assets the amount of such bonds or debentures shall not exceed intangible assets the amount of such bonds or debentures shall not exceed the market value of such fixed assets : Rule 11A of “The regional director of the Department of Company Affairs shall be authorised officer to make complaints under s/s. (2) of section 58AAA of the Act.”

is substituted as follows:

“The Regional Director or Registrar of Companies or any other officer of the Csdddddentral Government shall be authorised to make complaints under s/s. (2) of section 58AAA of the Act.

“Full version of the Circular can be accessed on http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/noti_ Rules_20130010_dated_21mar2013.pdf

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 98 dated 9th April, 2013

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Trade Credits for Imports into India – Review of all-in-cost ceiling This circular states that the all-in-cost ceiling, as under, in respect of trade credit will continue till 30th June, 2013.

Maturity period

All-in-cost ceilings over

 

6
months LIBOR for

 

the
respective currency

 

of
credit or applicable

 

benchmark

 

 

Up to 1 year

350 basis points

 

 

More than 1 year and up to

 

3 years

 

 

 

More than 3 years and up to

 

5 years

 

 

 

The all-in-cost ceiling will include arranger fee, upfront fee, management fee, handling/processing charges, out of pocket and legal expenses, if any.
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 96 dated 5th April, 2013

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Memorandum of Instructions governing money changing activities

This circular permits Authorised Money Changers (AMC) to sell, to foreign tourists/visitors, Indian rupees against International Credit Cards/International Debit Cards and obtain prompt reimbursement for the same through normal banking channels.

CIRCULAR 1 OF 2013 – D/o IPP F. No. 5(1)/2013-FC.I Dated the 05-04-2013

Consolidated fdi policy

The Government of India Ministry of Commerce & Industry Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (FC Section) has issued a new Circular laying down the Consolidated FDI Policy. This Circular replaces the earlier Circular and is effective from 5th April, 2013.

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Zenith Infotech – A Mini-Satyam? — Disturbing Findings and an Unprecedented SEBI Order

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SEBI’s Order and findings in Zenith’s case again present many disturbing things (Order No. WTM/RKA/ ISD/11/2013 dated 25th March 2013). How Promoters can take out monies from the Company belonging to creditors and shareholders. How existing laws seem ineffective in their prevention, enforcement of action against them and in recovery of lost monies which could end up being a prolonged process. Thus, creditors have to wait a long time and spend a lot of efforts and monies before they can get some of their dues. How shareholders would lose their monies – like in Satyam – and may finally have only some satisfaction that the Promoters are punished. And how SEBI resorts to drastic and desperate orders which though may appear to be justified and directly resolving the issue, may be tough to implement and have shaky foundation. It is quite possible considering certain related press reports that the role of Auditors here too may come under scrutiny. The audited accounts allegedly showed huge amount of liquid assets, which was higher than the liabilities but still the Company defaulted on its dues.

The unprecedented nature of the SEBI Order is that the SEBI has ordered the Board of Directors to give what is effectively a personal guarantee to SEBI, for an amount to cover those funds that have been used for purposes other than for which approval of shareholders was given.

Facts as per Order of SEBI
The Zenith case has been in the news for more than a year now. But a brief summary of the allegations leading to this Order may be worth recounting. It appears that Zenith was not in a position (despite supposedly having large liquid assets in its balance sheet) to repay the first tranche of its FCCBs that had become due for repayment. This, incidentally, caused default of 2nd of FCCBs tranche too on account of acceleration clause. To meet these liabilities, the Company approached shareholders for obtaining their approval for raising large sums of monies by borrowings and through sale of its divisions. SEBI states in its Order that the Company specifically communicated to shareholders that raising of funds through this manner was for repayment of FCCBs. Pursuant to this, the Company sold a division. This sale was in a fairly convoluted way for reasons not clear from the Order. More curiously, this also involved a series of related party transactions. Apparently, the division was first sold to a related party where the Promoters had a 60% stake. It appears (if one reads this Order with certain press reports), the division was eventually sold to a foreign entity.

However, the net sale proceeds of $ 48 million even through this route were not wholly and directly received by the Company. They were only partly received by the Company and the rest by a foreign subsidiary. Zenith received $21 million while the foreign subsidiary received $ 27 million. The Order states that such amount was paid to the foreign subsidiary “as consideration for Software & Intellectual Property Rights of MSD Division held by it”. A further consideration in the form of 15% of shares of another Company with the value of such shares, as stated by Zenith, was $7.4 million, was paid, again, to the foreign subsidiary.

Even after receipt of monies, these were used for payment mainly to related parties for purposes not wholly clear, for payment to creditors (not FCCBs holders) and purchase of capital assets. In other words, as SEBI alleges, not a rupee was paid to FCCBs holders.

Worse, SEBI alleges that the Company made several misleading/false statements and omissions though eventually it admitted the facts. The share price halved twice, once till the date of Company making disclosure and again after such date. In barely a few months, the price of the shares reduced from 190 to 45.

There were other allegations of false disclosures/ non-disclosures under the listing agreement, the SEBI Insider Trading Regulations, etc. Legal proceedings by the FCCBs holders for winding up, etc. are before the court.

Order of SEBI

SEBI passed an interim order directing two things. Firstly, it banned the specified Promoters from accessing the capital markets and dealing in securities.

Secondly, it directed the Board of Directors of the Company to give a bank guarantee in favor of SEBI within 30 days for the amount of $ 33.93 million allegedly diverted for uses other than repayment of FCCBs. The guarantee shall be valid for at least one year during which SEBI may invoke it to compensate the Company in case of adverse findings.

As is discussed later, the Board is not allowed to use the assets of the Company for giving this guarantee making it like a personal guarantee. As the Order states, the Board shall give such guarantee “without using the funds of ZIL or creating any charge on assets of ZIL”.

Effectiveness of laws in such situations

The manner in which the transactions were carried out raises questions once again as to the effectiveness of laws relating to companies. The Company allegedly used funds for purposes other than for what the shareholder approved. However, the consequences of this are curious. Firstly, this does not necessarily mean that the transactions carried out are null and void. Secondly, it is arguable that such transactions can be ratified in a subsequent general meeting and since the Promoters held 64% shares, this should have been easy. Thirdly, the punitive consequences under the Act on the Company, its Board and the Promoters are not stringent. This is of course assuming that the payments were genuine and not diversion/siphoning off of the funds as SEBI alleges. SEBI states:-

“…I note that the promoters/directors of ZIL have in a devious manner attempted to take away the assets of a listed company directly and indirectly for their own benefit or for benefit of entities owned and controlled by them. Such conduct of promoters /directors not only defeats the whole purpose of seeking shareholders’ approval for crucial decisions but also jeopardises the integrity of the securities market.”

However, even if there was diversion/siphoning off, there are no quick remedies for recovery of the monies, repayment to creditors and punishing the directors/promoters concerned.

The provisions concerning related party transactions again get highlighted. The restrictions on them seem flimsy in law and even flimsier in enforcement. Often, companies may get away by mere disclosure.

Direction to the Board of Directors to give guarantee
Coming to the SEBI direction for bank guarantee, many things are curious. Does SEBI have the power in the circumstances to direct the Board to give such a bank guarantee without using the Company funds? On first impression, this appears not only justified but the only appropriate way. The shareholders had authorised the Board to use the sale proceeds for repayment of FCCBs. However, they were used for other purposes. Thus, the Board ought to compensate the Company and for this purpose, giving a bank guarantee that SEBI may invoke to compensate the Company or perhaps directly the FCCBs holders may make sense. Nonetheless, several questions arise.

• Firstly, does SEBI have such powers at all? The powers are to be seen from several angles. Whether SEBI has the have power to punish/ remedy a violation of a provision of the Companies Act, 1956? Whether it has the power to direct the Board of Directors in this manner?

• Secondly, can it direct the Board of Directors as a whole without making a specific finding that it was they who approved such uses of funds? Or that they were negligent in monitoring the use of such funds?

• Thirdly, why not allow the Company, at least as an alternative, to get the funds back? Why insist only on a guarantee?

•    Fourthly, even if assuming that the funds were used for other purposes, what if such uses were genuine? For example, if the funds were used for payment to creditors, acquisition of capital assets, etc. There are no findings on record thatthese were bogus, just that these purposes were not for which the Company took approval.

•    Fifthly, what if the Company had (and still can, though this is highly unlikely now) obtained ratification of shareholders which, considering the 64% holding of Promoters, would have been quite easy?

•    Sixthly, is an Order to the Board as a whole without making a finding of role of the Promoters on one hand and the non-promoter directors on the other, fair and valid? How would it be enforced and punitive action taken, if they are unable to provide such a guarantee? Will the liability be joint and several?

Role of Auditors
While the Order, perhaps because it is directed towards role of the Board, does not discuss the Auditors’ role, if any. However, several press reports had stated that as per the audited accounts, the Company had huge amount of liquid assets, which was more than the total liability under both the tranches of the FCCBs. The Company still defaulted and in fact proposed to raise further funds.

While the SEBI Order does not discuss this, the memory of the Satyam’s case is too recent and one remembers how a large amount of liquid assets shown in that case turned out to be not genuine. One will have to see whether there are any problems in this case too and the implications on this on the role of the Auditors.

All in all, this case, assuming many of the allegations are found true, presents a murky and sordid state of affairs in listed companies and the ineffectiveness of laws, even though they are many and complex.

The case is likely to result in further developments soon, since SEBI has provided post-decision hearing and SEBI may pass a revised order. 30 days are given to the Board to furnish this guarantee and it is possible that they are unable to so provide. It appears quite likely that the Promoters/ Board may appeal to SAT. It will be worth seeing whether this case creates good precedents in law for keeping malpractices in check or it again shows that the action and remedies will be prolonged and perhaps finally ineffective for some or all of the parties who have lost money.

PART C: Informati on on & Around

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Information on ethical trails:

The Bhopal hospital has been at the centre of a long standing controversy over carrying out drug trials on poor gas victims but had refused to reveal information claiming confidentiality of the client- the drug companies, the hospital and the patients. The CIC has over-ruled the objections by the hospital and ordered it to reveal all information.

The hospital also contended that the trials were conducted when it was run by a trust – an autonomous body – and was not getting any grants from the Central or the State Government. It noted that the hospital had been taken over by the Government only in July 2010 since when the RTI rules should apply.

The CIC held, “Even if the patients do not agree to disclosure of the requested information, it is still open to this Commission to order disclosure of information in the larger public interest.”

Police Manual:
Maharashtra Chief Information Commissioner, Ratnakar Gaikwad has set at rest the prolonged debate over whether the Police Manual is confidential or otherwise. In a land mark order, Gaikwad held that within the meaning of the Right to Information Act, the Police Manual is not a confidential document and copy of it should be provided to applicant P K Tiwari.

“The police manual does not fall within the category of documents, which have been exempted from disclosure. The applicant should be allowed to inspect the manual and be provided the relevant papers. The director general of police should put up the entire manual on the website of the state police within a month.” Gaikwad said in his two page order.

“Taking into consideration the provisions of Section 8 of the RTI Act, it appears that refusal to provide the police manual is wrong. The view taken by the public information officer is contrary to the spirit of the RTI Act. It is essential for the common man to know the provisions of the police manual. Competent authorities should put up all such information on the website in larger public interest,” Gaikwad observed.

Motor Vehicles Tax:

The activist Sujit Nadkarni stumbled upon the scam under which the dealers of vehicles dupe the Government. The Modus operandi was

• On sale of a car, give customer a tax invoice showing that motor vehicle tax has been paid.

• Make a facsimile of the invoice, watering down the actual cost of the car and tax payable on it.

• Give the first invoice to the customer, and the second to the Government

• Pocket the difference in the amount, duping both customer and state exchequer

It was experienced by Nadkarni that when he purchased a Maruti Swift VDI on 30th March, 2008, he was issued an invoice, which said the car’s actual price was Rs. 4,35,886 and the final amount after taxes Rs. 4,90,349.

Nadkarni, however, noticed that another copy of the invoice was prepared by the car dealer for submission to the road transport authorities. The price of the car in this copy was shown as Rs. 4,21,766, while the final amount was Rs. 4,74,487.

While selling the car to Nadkani, the car dealer prepared two invoices with same number, one for the customer and the other for submission to RTO. The motor vehicle tax of Rs. 1,110 was thus evaded, although the same was collected by the car dealer from Nadkarni.

Nadkarni then conducted a sample survey of tax evasion by fraudulent invoicing. Under the Right to Information Act, he requested the Nashik RTO to furnish copies of all vehicle invoices sold in the area during 2006, 2007 and 2008.

There was, prima facie, a loss to exchequer of Crores of rupees. The transport commissioner is to conduct a detailed inquiry and file a report,” the division bench of justices A. M. Khanwilkar and A. P. Bhangale ordered.

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PART A: Decision of the High Court

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Section 2(h) of the RTI Act: Public Authority:

The question for consideration in the instant writ petition is whether the petitioner – Chandigarh University is “Public Authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (the “RTI Act”). The State Information Commission, Punjab had, by an Order dated 14.12.2012, answered such question in the affirmative. It is this order dated 14.12.2012, passed by the State Information Commission, Punjab that has been impugned before this Court.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, at the very outset, conceded that the petitioner- University was a creation by law made by the State Legislature i.e. the Punjab University Act, 2012 of the State of Punjab (Act No.7 fo2012). Learned counsel however, strenuously argued that the petitioner would not fall within the definition of ‘public authority’ u/s. 2(h) of the RTI Act. In furtherance of this submission, it was urged that the statements of objects and reasons of the Act have to be read with the provisions contained in the Act itself, while interpreting the provision. Reliance in this regard was placed upon a judgment of the Apex court in Rameshwar Parshad etc. vs. State of U.P. & others, AIR 1983 SC 383. It was argued that the objective of the RTI Act was not to victimise a private body, person or entity under the garb of eliciting information. The second limb of the argument raised by the learned counsel was that the petitioner University was not an authority or body of self-Government. Much emphasis was laid upon the expression “self-Government” to contend that the same would mean the Office of the Government or State itself which by act of law creates the said “public authority” to carry out the acts and deeds of the State as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel while impugning the Order dated 14.12.2012, passed by the State Information Commission, Punjab further argued that the petitioner-University is a privately owned and managed Institution which is not re ceiving financial assistance directly or Indirectly from the State and, accordingly, on this count alone cannot be construed as “public authority” as defined under the RTI Act.

The Court observed that there would be no quarrel as regards the first submission raised by the learned counsel that while interpreting the provision of the statute, due emphasis would have to be given to the statement of objects and reasons of the RTI Act. The statement of objects and reasons of the RTI Act indicate that it has “provisions to ensure maximum disclosure and minimum exemption, consistent with the constitutional provisions and effective mechanism for access to information and disclosures by authorities”. The pre-amble to the RTI Act notes that “democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to governed.”

The Court further observed that it is against such background that the provisions of the RTI Act as also definition of “public authority” under Section 2(h) would require to be interpreted. A wider definition would have to be assigned to the expression “public authority” rather than a restrictive one. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424 noted the importance of the context in which every word is used in the matter of interpretation of statute and held in the following terms:

“Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.”

On a plain reading of the provision, the expression “public authority” would include an authority or a body or an institution of self-government established or constituted by a law made by the State Legislature u/s. 2(h)(c) of the RTI Act. The legislature had made a conscious distinction between “by or under” which used in relation to the Constitution and “by” in relation to a Central or State Legislation. As such, it would not be enough for the body to be established under “a Central or State legislation to become a “public authority”. If this be so, then every Company registered under the Companies Act would be a “public authority”. However, this is not the case here. Admittedly, the petitioner-University is a body established by law made by the State Legislature. Clearly, the petitioner would be covered under the scope and ambit of the definition of “public authority” under Section 2(h)(c) of the RTI Act.

The requirement as regards a body being owned, controlled or substantially financed would only apply to the latter part of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act i.e. body falling within the meaning of Section 2(h)(d)(i) or (ii). Once it is shown that a body has been constituted by an enactment of the State Legislature, then nothing more need be shown to demonstrate that such a body is a “public authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h)(c) of the RTI Act.

The Court held that the submission made by the learned counsel to assert that petitioner- University was not a body of a “self-Government” and thereby would not be covered under the expression “public authority”, was also without merit. Self-Government as sought to be portrayed in the pleadings on record and at the stage of arguments would not be a requirement and essential ingredient for invoking the provisions of RTI Act. It would have been a relevant para-meter to fulfil the requirement under Article12 of the Constitution of India in relation to enforcement of the fundamental rights through Courts. The RTI Act, on the other hand, intends to achieve access to information and to provide an effective frame–work for effecting the right to information recognised under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

For the reasons recorded above, the Court found no infirmity in the impugned Order dated 14.12.2012, passed by the State Information Commission, Punjab holding the petitioner-University was a “public authority” u/s. 2(h) of the RTI Act.

[Chandigarh University vs. State of Punjab & Ors. CWP No. 1509 of 2013 decided on 01.03.2013] [Citation: RTIR I (2013) 353(P&H)]

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Related Party Transactions and Minority Rights – Part 1

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Background

Related party transactions
(RPTs) that treat shareholders inequitably or oppress minority tend to
damage capital market integrity. Therefore, RPT’s covering both equity
and non-equity transactions, is an important corporate governance and
regulatory issue, dogging the mind of the government. Some inter-company
transactions with 100 per cent owned subsidiaries might present no
great threat of abuse but others where a company has controlling and
minority shareholders, RPT’s can cause significant concern. Around the
world, group structures and concentrated ownership are normal, the
exceptions being the United Kingdom, United States and Australia.
Executive compensation is a key concern in certain jurisdictions,
particularly the United States and this is accompanied by the threat of
financial statement manipulation done in order to retain the job or
maximise compensation.

Every jurisdiction has over a period of
time developed its own mechanism to minimise the abuse of RPT’s, though
there is wide variability in their respective approach. At times, RPT’s
can be economically beneficial and necessary. Therefore, with some
exceptions such as loans to directors, RPTs are rarely banned, in most
jurisdictions. But there is a clear concern globally that such
transactions can be abused by insiders such as executives and
controlling shareholders and hence need to be regulated or monitored.
Searching for the right balance is a difficult but ongoing process which
keeps changing as institutions and economies change.

There are a
number of empirical studies focusing on the relation between the
corporation valuation and cash-flow ownership or control-ownership
wedge. A controlling shareholder often has control of a listed company
but with very few claims on its cash flows. This creates an incentive to
use RPTs to transfer cash to companies in which their rights are
greater. The empirical studies conclude that in general cash-flow
ownership and control-ownership wedge is associated with lower firm
value. Another study shows that the cost of debt financing is
significantly higher for such companies.

Extent of RPT’s in India1

In
India, there has been a tradition of operating through several
companies. The genesis of a multigroup organisation could be traced to
the licensing requirements, labour laws, FDI regulations, financial
structuring, joint ventures, tax planning, etc. For example, because FDI
is prohibited in e-retailing, a local structured entity is set up to
operate at a break-even level on behalf of the investors; and the
profits are retained in the wholesale entity. Subsidiaries are quite
common in the case of real estate companies, as they are the means of
owning a land bank. Whilst there are multiple reasons for group
structures and transactions between them, some of which are absolutely
necessary for various reasons there is no denying that group structures
have also been used to create inequitable treatment of minority
shareholders by the controlling shareholders.

India is
characterised by concentrated ownership and by the widespread use of
company groups, often in the form of pyramids in many different
activities and companies and with a number of levels. One study of the
1470 companies listed on the NSE indicated that as of March 2010
controlling shareholders (i.e. promoters) held 57 per cent of all shares
and institutional shareholders about 20 per cent (Bhardwaj, 2011). One
study (Balasubramanian et al., 2009) of 300 companies indicated that 142
included a shareholder with an ownership stake higher than 50 per cent.
A further 100 included a shareholder holding 30-50 per cent of the
equity. The actual holdings are likely to be more since holdings are
often hidden in other corporate bodies in a pyramid structure or in
benami names.

Ownership of Indian listed companies

Largest shareholder ownership stake Number of firms Per cent
75% and more 19 7
50.01%-74.9% 123 43
40.01%-50% 61 21
30.01%-40% 42 15
20.01%-30% 26 9
Up to 20% 18 6

1The statistical information is sourced from the OECD report Related
Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights Of the firms sampled
by Balasubramanian et al. (2009), 165 of them (a little over a half) are
part of an Indian business group which includes one or more other
public firms. Another study states that in 2006, 2922 companies were
affiliated with 560 Indian owned groups, a predominant majority of these
identified with specific families (Sarkar, 2010, p. 299).

Concentrated
ownership and group company structures are associated with a particular
structure of boards. One study found that 40 per cent of Indian
companies had a promoter on the board and in over 30 per cent of cases
they also served as an executive director (Chakrabarti et al., 2008, p.
17). Executives of one group company often serve on the boards of other
group companies as outside directors. Potentially concerning, Sarkar
reports that independent directors are also related to company groups,
with about 67 per cent of their directorships in group affiliates, and
notably 43 per cent of directorships concentrated within a single group.

RPT’s
are not only widespread in India but are also of significant value. An
analysis of company reports by the stock exchanges of 50 companies
indicates that loans, advances, and guarantees account for a high
percentage of net worth of the reporting companies, with subsidiaries
and associated companies accounting for the bulk (see Annexure 2). Key
management personnel, individuals and relatives accounted for an
insignificant share. One study of over 5000 firms for the period 2003-05
reported that most RPTs occurred between the firm and “parties with
control” as opposed to management personnel that is typically seen in
the United States (Chakrabarti et al., 2008).

Some studies
suggest that RPTs have been detriment to the interest of minority
shareholders and to valuations of those companies. Using a sample of 600
of the 1000 largest (by revenues) listed companies in 2004, one study
found that firm performance is negatively associated with the extent of
RPTs for group firms (Chakrabarti et al., 2008).

It is clear that
the structure and ownership of Indian listed companies creates
incentives that, is conducive to RPT’s. This could result in short
changing the minority and compromising their rights. Therefore, it has
to be balanced by corporate governance arrangements, company law,
financial regulations and regulatory environment.

An Expert
Committee (popularly known as JJ Irani Committee) to advise the
Government of India on the new Company Law was set up by the Ministry of
Company Affairs vide Order dated 2nd December, 2004. This eventually
culminated in the Companies Bill, which at the time of writing this
article has been passed by the Lok Sabha and is awaiting passing at the
Rajya Sabha and the final assent of the President of India. The
Companies Bill contains significant provisions to regulate RPT’s, many
of which are discussed in this article. Clause 49 of the listing
agreement contains SEBI’s corporate governance norms which includes
matters relating to RPT’s though they are not as comprehensive as the
Companies Bill.

Who is a related party?

One of
the biggest challenges in regulating RPT’s is defining a related party. A
related party obviously is someone with whom there is a special
relationship. Transactions are entered into with the related party which
may not be at arm’s length, and causes gain to the controlling
shareholders and loss to the minority shareholders. Whilst a spouse is a
related party, a close friend is not a related party under the
Companies Act. Marriage is a legal relationship and hence easy to prove,
friendship is not a legally solemnized relationship and hence difficult
to prove. Obviously such differences create challenges in defining a
related party. In India, there is a tradition of extended families
unlike in the West. Therefore typically in the western countries a
spouse and dependent children are relatives, but in India the regulators
have taken a more form based approach to define relatives and have
specified innumerable relationship. In the western countries, many would
not know who their daughters son’s wife is; but under Indian
legislation the law would treat them as relatives.

A comparison
of the related party definitions under Companies Bill, Companies Act and
Accounting Standards is provided in Annexure 1. The related parties
have been far more extensively defined under the Companies Bill. The
Companies Bill includes as related parties key managerial persons,
holding-subsidiary relationship, etc which were not hitherto covered
under the Companies Act. However, all three, i.e., the Companies Act,
Companies Bill and AS-18 Related Party Disclosures have deficiencies in
the way related parties are defined.

Example 1 & 2 explain
the deficiencies in the AS-18 definition of related parties, whereas
Example 3 explains the deficiencies in the Companies Bill definition.

The
Companies Bill requires RPT’s to be approved by a special resolution at
the general meeting, if the transaction is not in the ordinary course
or business or not at arm’s length. No member will be entitled to vote
on such resolution, if such member is a related party. However, it is
not clear which related parties will be considered for this purpose.
Consider Example 4. Subsidiary S intends to make royalty payment to
Parent P. It is clear that P is not entitled to vote on the special
resolution. However, it is not clear if investor A who owns 20% of S and
therefore S is a related party to A, entitled to vote or not. Further,
will it make any difference if A is also a related party to P? None of
these questions are clear under the Bill.

To
sum up, the definition of related party needs to be further tightened.
Further, both Companies Act and Companies Bill takes a form based
approach rather than a substance based approach in defining related
parties; particularly the way relatives are defined. The substance
approach would define relatives as financial dependants; whereas a form
based approach would actually spell out innumerable relations. This is
not particularly helpful, if one were to keep in mind, that crooks can
circumvent any law. They can use employees, friends, cooks, maids and
drivers to abuse the law. It is not possible for any legislation to
legislate beyond a point. Legislation cannot be a substitute for
stronger enforcement. Any attempt to substitute stronger enforcement
with legislation would only result in bad and cumbersome laws. Not to
forget there are unintended consequences of bad legislations, for
example, purchase of a share of a company by a distant relative with
whom one may have lost contact, could disqualify the person from being
an auditor or independent director of that company.


Which RPT’s are covered?

The
Companies Bill like the Companies Act contains restrictions over both
equity and non equity RPT’s. The non equity transactions covered under
the Companies Bill are far more comprehensive than the Companies Act and
practically covers almost all transactions (see Annexure 1). The BOD
has to consent to the RPT’s under both the Companies Act and the Bill.
The Companies Bill specifically casts a duty on independent directors to
ensure that adequate deliberations are held before approving RPT’s and
assure themselves that the same are in the interest of the company.

Materiality
thresholds are clearly necessary in establishing an efficient
management regime for RPTs. Care needs to be taken to ensure that a
material transaction does not escape regulation by breaking it into a
transaction of several small amounts. Under the Bill the requirements to
obtain a special resolution apply to a company whose paid up capital or
the RPT value is beyond a threshold amount. Those thresholds will be
prescribed by the rules, which are not yet exposed/published. U/s. 297
of the Companies Act, a company with a paid up share capital of not less
than Rs 1 crore, was required to take previous approval of the Central
Government.

The requirement of section 297 of the Companies Act
does not apply to purchase/sales which were made by cash at prevailing
market prices. Similarly, clause 188 of the Companies Bill does not
require a company to take a special resolution of non related parties on
a RPT, if that transaction was entered into in the ordinary course of
business and was at arm’s length. It is not clear when a transaction
would be not in the ordinary course of business. Given that the Bill was
heavily influenced by what happened in the case of Satyam, an example
of a transaction not in the ordinary course of business may probably be
the proposed transaction of acquisition of Maytas by Satyam, i.e.
acquisition of a real estate company by a software company.

Given
that a special resolution of disinterested parties is required only
when a transaction is not at arm’s length; there would be considerable
pressure on how the term arms length is interpreted. It is defined under
the Bill as “arm’s length transaction is a transaction between two
related parties that is conducted as if they were unrelated, so that
there is no conflict of interest.” The Indian Income-tax Act also
contains a somewhat similar definition. However, there are too many
questions around what is an arm’s length price. Who will judge what is
an arm’s length price? Can the arm’s length price determined under
Indian Income-tax Act be applied for Company Law purposes as well? What
if the income-tax assessing officer disallows the arm’s length price
determined by the company (for which it had not taken a special
resolution of disinterested parties) – would that mean that the company
has not complied with the requirements of the Bill? What if a continuing
royalty arrangement was approved by the Central Government u/s. 297 of
the Companies Act – would that need a special resolution of the AGM on
the Bill being enacted? The Ministry of Corporate Affairs will need to
provide guidance on these issues.

The Companies Bill also
imposes significant restriction on equity related RPT’s. These are
briefly described below and are set out in greater detail in Annexure 1:

•   
Loans/guarantees to directors and connected persons are prohibited both
under the Companies Act and the Bill. However, u/s. 295 of the
Companies Act, loans/guarantees can be extended to directors and
connected persons by obtaining Central Government approval. Under clause
185 of the Companies Bill, loans/guarantees can be extended to
directors/connected persons only in limited circumstances such as when
it is pursuant to a scheme applicable to employees or in the case of
companies whose business is to extend loans.

•    Loans and
investments under both the Companies Act and the Companies Bill are
subjected to overall limits of 60% of paid up share capital, free
reserves and securities premium or 100% of free reserves and securities
premium. Under the Companies Act any loan made by a holding company to
its wholly owned subsidiary is exempt. The Companies Bill does not
provide that exemption.

•    The Companies Bill contains
restrictions on non-cash transactions involving directors. The Companies
Act does not contain similar restrictions.

•    The Companies
Act and the Companies Bill contain several provisions protecting
minority rights, though there are slight differences in the two
legislations. The important provisions are on changing shareholder’s
rights, appointment of directors by small shareholders, the requirement
to have a nomination and remuneration committee and stakeholders
committee, restriction on managerial remuneration and prevention of
oppression and mismanagement.

•    The Companies Bill imposes more elaborate responsibilities and duties on audit committees and independent directors.

•   
The Companies Bill provides the acquirer with powers to acquire shares
of dissenting minority shareholders in a scheme of merger/amalgamation
at a price determined by a registered valuer. The Companies Act also
contains similar requirements, except that there is no specific
provision for price to be determined by a registered valuer.
Numerous
provisions of SEBI are also designed to protect the interest of
minority shareholders. One such example is the open offer requirement in
the takeover code to provide a reasonable exit option to minority
shareholders.

Related Party Disclosures

AS 18
requires significant disclosures to be made in the financial statements
with respect to RPT’s. AS 18, among other matters, requires disclosure
of “any other elements of the RPT’s necessary for an understanding of
the financial statements.” An example of such a disclosure is an
indication that the transfer of a major asset had taken place at an
amount materially different from that obtainable on normal commercial
terms. However, this disclosure is rarely made.

The Companies
Bill requires disclosure in the BOD’s report of contracts/arrangements
with related parties. The report will also disclose justification for
entering into such transactions. These disclosure requirements are not
contained in the existing Companies Act. It may be noted that the
disclosure requirements under AS-18 and the Companies Bill would be
overlapping, but there are some significant differences. Firstly, there
are differences in the definition of related parties between AS-18 and
the Companies Bill. Secondly, AS-18 does not require to disclose
justification for entering into RPT’s; the Companies Bill requires such a
disclosure. AS-18 disclosures are made in the financial statements,
whereas the Companies Bill disclosures are required in the BOD’s report.
Finally, AS-18 allows aggregation of disclosures, the Companies Bill
does not allow aggregation of disclosures.

The Companies Bill
requires disclosure to the members in the financial statements of the
full particulars of loans given, investments made or guarantee given or
security provided and the purpose for which the loan or guarantee or
security is proposed to be utilised by the recipient of the loan or
guarantee or security. No such requirement exists under the Companies
Act. The Companies Bill also requires every listed company to disclose
in the BOD’s report, the ratio of the remuneration of each director to
the median employee’s remuneration and such other details as may be
prescribed. These disclosure requirements did not exist under the
Companies Act.
 
Post the Satyam episode, SEBI reacted with, inter
alia, new rules in February 2009 requiring greater disclosure of the
promoter shareholdings and any pledging of shares to third parties.
Those disclosures were found to be very useful by investors and
analysts. SEBI also requires promoters to make disclosures of changes in
their shareholdings to the stock exchanges.

The Duty of the Controlling Shareholders

In
some jurisdictions a controlling shareholder has a fiduciary duty to
other shareholders and the company. An abusive RPT would be against the
interests of non-controlling shareholders and thus represent a breach of
duty. A key feature in many jurisdictions is the duty of controlling
shareholders to other shareholders not to infringe the minority rights.
Such a duty opens another legal way of disciplining RPTs. There is an
oppression remedy in India with 447 cases lodged in 2011/12. However,
the process appears to be quite long with 1170 cases pending as at 31st
March 2012.

The Role of Board of Director’s and Audit Committees

Many
jurisdictions require BOD’s, particularly an independent committee to
play a significant role in minimizing the abuse of RPT’s. An important
aspect of the Corporate Governance framework in India concerning RPT’s
is Clause 49 issued by SEBI. With respect to RPTs, it contains the
following requirements:

•    Audit committees shall review annual
financial statements (before submission to the board for approval) with
particular reference to several factors, one of which is disclosure of
RPTs.

•    Audit committees shall also review, on a more general
basis, any statements of “significant RPTs (as defined by the audit
committee) submitted by management”.

•    Listed companies must
periodically give their audit committees a summary statement of
“transactions with related parties in the ordinary course of business”
as well as details of “material individual (related) transactions that
are ‘not in the normal course of business’ or not done on an arm’s
length basis (‘together with management’s justification for the same’)”.

•   
For subsidiaries, a significant transactions report must be given to
the holding company’s board along with the board minutes of the
subsidiary.

•    A quarterly compliance report on corporate
governance is required to be submitted to stock exchanges. One element
of this disclosure is the basis of RPT’s. Companies must also include a
section on corporate governance in their annual reports and it is
suggested that they include “disclosures on materially significant RPT’s
that may have potential conflicts with the interests of the company at
large”.

In this regard, the Companies Bill is more stricter and
requires pre-approval by audit committee of RPT’s. The Companies Bill
requires the Audit Committee to approve or modify transactions with
related parties and scrutinize inter-corporate loans and investments.
Further, the Companies Bill gives Audit Committee the authority to
investigate into any matter falling under its domain and the power to
obtain professional advice from external sources and have full access to
information contained in the records of the company.

There are
some safeguards for independent directors in the form of numbers. Thus,
in India, 50 per cent will be independent directors if the chairman is
an executive director or a representative of the controlling
shareholder; otherwise it is a third. There is also at least one
independent director from any holding company on the board of a material
non-listed subsidiary. Another protection of independence is via the
nomination and election of board members.

Director liability is
often put forward as a means of ensuring that directors and especially
independents fulfil their duties. The case of Satyam in India indicates
that liability is, nevertheless still important. The scandal has been a
shock for independent directors, with many resignations in the following
year as they reassessed their liability and damage to reputations.
Indeed, liability is sometimes the least important sanction. In Belgium,
France and Israel, it is reported that independent directors are very
concerned about their reputations.

The Companies Bill contains
numerous penalties on directors, and is more onerous than the Companies
Act. For example, with respect to RPT’s, it will be open to the company
to proceed against a director or any other employee who had entered into
such contract or arrangement in contravention of the requirements for
recovery of any loss sustained by it as a result of such contract or
arrangement. This disgorgement provision was not contained in the
Companies Act. Violating the requirements of clause 188 of the Companies
Bill could also land the director in jail for a period of one year.
Similarly violating the requirements of clause 186 with regards to loan
and investment could land the director in prison for two years. However
with respect to independent director’s liability, the Bill is far from
clear.

Clause 149(12) of the Companies Bill clarifies that
independent directors and other non executive directors shall be liable
only in respect of such acts of omission or commission by a company that
had occurred with his or her knowledge, attributable through Board
processes, and with the consent or connivance or where he or she had not
acted diligently. From this it appears that the clause seeks to provide
immunity to independent director’s from civil or criminal action in
certain cases. However clause 166(2) of the Bill seems to be a
contradiction. It states that the whole Board is required to act in good
faith in order to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of
its members as a whole and in the best interest of the company, its
employees and shareholders, the community, and for the protection of the
environment. This clause narrows the distinction between independent
directors and executive directors and also extends the responsibility of
the directors to protecting the environment and taking care of the
community.

The importance of independent board members around the
world in approving RPTs does raise questions whether independent
directors are really independent. Whether an independent director is
likely to stand against policy determined on a group basis by the very
shareholders who have often elected them? Particularly in India
independent directors see themselves as advisors to controlling
shareholders rather than as watchdogs who will ensure equitable
treatment of all shareholders. If controlling shareholders cease to be
pleased with the efforts of an independent director, such a director can
be certain that his or her term will not be renewed. Most investors
would not regard independent directors as effective in India,
particularly in the case of family owned companies.

The ability
of small shareholders to appoint a director of their choice under the
Indian Companies Act (and the Companies Bill) has been ineffective in
dealing with the issue of providing adequate representation to small
shareholders. This is because small shareholders have not been able to
galvanise themselves to appoint the director. In any case, a single
director appointed by small shareholders on a large board is generally
rendered useless.

The role of Minority shareholders

Taking
shareholders approval is a universal practice with regard to equity
RPTs but less common for non-equity transactions. However, clearly in
the context of concentrated ownership voting per se is not enough. Thus
Italy and Israel and to some extent, on an ex post basis, France, call
for approval only by disinterested shareholders, i.e. the majority of
the minority. Israel has also had to recognise another necessary policy
trade-off. Where there is a small free float there is always a
possibility of hold-up by some minority shareholders who can abuse their
position.

Given that independent directors may not be successful
or only partially successful in minimizing the abuse of RPT’s, two
other options were considered by the JJ Irani Committee. The JJ Irani
Committee deliberated on whether transactions/contracts in which the
company or directors or their relatives are interested should be
regulated through a “Government Approval-based regime” as is the case
under the prevailing Act or through a “Shareholder Approval and
Disclosure-based regime”. The Committee looked into international
practices in this regard and felt that the latter approach would be
appropriate in the future Indian context. SEBI felt that whilst the
shareholder approval was a good way of allowing each company to decide
for themselves, a majority shareholder could easily pass a resolution in
favour of the resolution. At the recommendation of SEBI, the Companies
Bill was drafted to require a special resolution of the company in which
the related party would not be allowed to vote. Whilst this addressed
the issue of oppression of the minority by the majority, concerns were
raised of potential “hold ups” which we discuss in the following
paragraphs.

Oppression of Majority by Minority

In
late 2004, KarstadrQuelle, Germany’s largest department-store operator,
risked bankruptcy without an increase in capital. The crisis got out of
hand after a small group of just six shareholders constituting only
0.24% of the entire share capital took legal action to challenge the
shareholders’ resolution to increase share capital urgently required to
rescue the company. KarstadrQuelle was forced into lengthy negotiations
it could ill – afford before finally reaching a settlement with the
minority shareholders. Under the German law just one minority
shareholder could hold a company to ransom and even ruin a company. A
single shareholder with only one share could block shareholders’
resolutions and put major decisions at risk by delaying plans by months
or even years through filing lawsuits.

Over the years,
Germany witnessed considerable growth in professional blackmailers who
touted themselves as Robin Hoods of the investment world. They rarely
had any interest in the company other than holding one share, so that
they could participate in an AGM tourism, challenge shareholders’
resolutions and arm twisting the companies into a hush settlement. This
had become a lucrative profession for them, nuisance to the companies
and rarely benefitted the minority shareholders. In the 15 years prior
to 2004, the number of shareholders’ suits had increased tenfold in
Germany. Around half of the suits were initiated from the same club of
professional minority investor, who brought about a hundred actions each
year. The German government reacted to the phe-nomenon of extortive
shareholders suits and came out with a new legislation UMAG in 2005
expected to partly remedy the problem of shareholder suits.

India
should learn from this experience of Germany. In the Companies Bill a
special resolution is required of non interested shareholders to approve
RPT’s. Given that the attendance of minority shareholders at AGM is
very low, it is possible that a small group of rabble rousers can expose
companies to the same blackmailing experienced by the German companies.
However, given that RPT’s need a special resolution only when they are
not in the ordinary course of business and not at arm’s length, the
requirement of a special resolution by minority shareholders should not
be seen as a harsh step. Besides, companies can make use of postal
ballot, if they believe that a transaction which is not at arm’s length
is actually good for the company and all its shareholders!

The Role of the Government/Regulator

The
dispensation of the Central Government approval for RPT’s and replacing
it with shareholders approval in the Companies Bill is a step in the
right direction, particularly keeping in mind that India needs to reduce
discretionary powers of the Government, at a time when corruption is at
an all time high. But that does not mean that the Government does not
have any role in the administration of RPT’s. Government should function
as a watchdog and ensure that laws are meaningfully enforced. Thus, in
enforcing the requirements of the Companies Bill, the Government will
have to ensure that the company in question has done the following (a)
interpreted meaningfully what is an arm’s length transaction (b)
provided adequate and sufficient disclosure of the proposed RPT to the
shareholders (c) clearly identified the related parties and the
disinterested parties on the transaction, and (d) followed the right
practices and an effective voting system to seek a special resolution of
the disinterested parties.

Government should ensure that there
is an effective voting system. Shareholder meetings and proxy voting
practices in India like many parts of Asia lack efficiency and
accountability. Voting processes need to be modernised to reflect best
market practices and the growing global interest in active share
ownership. Some investors strongly recommend conducting voting on all
resolutions at AGMs and EGMs by poll rather than by a show of hands that
often occurs at present, and allowing proxies to speak at meetings,
irrespective of whether the company law is amended on this point.

Section
179 of the Companies Act states that “any member or members present in
person or by proxy” may call for a poll if they hold shares in the
company giving them not less than 10 per cent of total voting power.
However, in practice it is often far from straight forward since in
part, some custodian banks will not do so, i.e. request a poll on the
basis of proxies received. Under the Companies Bill important matters
are voted by postal ballots, allowing investors to have their shares
counted on issues of significance. However, at the time of writing this
article the bill was not yet enacted and the rules were not yet exposed;
therefore it was not clear what important matters government would
require postal ballot on.

The problem of enforcement is a more
general one in India. Currently there are more than 3 crore cases
pending in various courts in India. Decade long legal battles are
commonplace in India. In spite of having around 10,000 courts (not
counting tribunals and special courts) India has a serious shortfall of
judges. A dispute contested until all appeals are exhausted can take up
to 20 years for disposal. Automatic appeals, extensive litigation by
government, underdeveloped alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution
like arbitration, and the shortfall of judges all contribute to the
state of affairs in Indian courts. Most important, since the same courts
try both civil and criminal matters, and the latter gets priority,
economic disputes suffer even greater delays.

In order to
improve efficiency of enforcement actions, the MCA proposed to change
the CLB to a Tribunal staffed by commercial professionals such as
lawyers and accountants. However, due to certain provisions with regard
to eligibility conditions and qualification requirements for
Chairpersons/member of the Tribunal, the proposal was successfully
challenged before the Supreme Court in 2010. The directions given by the
Supreme Court have been taken into account in the proposed new Company
Bill. If it is passed as planned a Tribunal will be established.
Tribunals will speed up the justice system, but critics argue that the
quality of justice system could fall further.

Compliance with
Clause 49 has been enforced by both the Bombay (BSE) and National (NSE)
Stock Exchanges. The chosen method appears to be through suspensions
either of a short term nature or in some cases for a considerable
period. De-listing is rarely used as that may not be in the interest of
the minority shareholders. The bulk of the problem appears to be PSU’s
and smaller companies, with the top companies mostly compliant. The
issue for the PSU concerns independent director requirements since SEBI
had earlier ruled that government nominees on PSU boards are not
independent per Clause 49’s requirements.

SEBI has been more
effective in blocking IPOs if companies fail to meet the required
standards, including those relating to RPT’s and loans/guarantees to
group companies. In cases of violation of the Listing Agreement, SEBI
has the power to appoint adjudication officers to levy penalties.
However, until recently even serious offences were consented under
SEBI’s consent mechanism scheme. Only recently SEBI decided not to
consent serious offences such as insider trading or fraudulent and
unfair trade practices, and expose them to the regular justice system.
However, in the absence of any significant powers, such as
“wire-tapping”, SEBI has found it extremely difficult to prove insider
trading cases.

The Special Appellate Tribunal (SAT) is a
statutory body set up to hear appeal against orders passed by SEBI. The
post of presiding officer of the SAT has been lying vacant since
November 2011 due to non availability of a suitable candidate. This was
hampering the smooth functioning of SAT. However, the selection norms
for the presiding officer have been eased and this issue may be soon
resolved. Another interesting perception is that a large number of SEBI
decisions are over ruled by SAT. This perception also needs to be
addressed by SEBI.

Multiple regulators in India is a thorny
issue. The RBI, MCA, SEBI & IRDA have frequent spat with each other.
These turf battles provide regulatory arbitrage to the wrong doers,
besides weakening the legislation and its implementation. The Financial
Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC) was constituted by the
Government of India, Ministry of Finance in March 2011, to look into the
legal and institutional structures of the financial sector in India.
The institutional framework governing the financial sector has been
built up over a century. There are over 60 Acts and multiples rules and
regulations that govern the financial sector, some of which are
outdated. The RBI Act and the Insurance Act are of 1934 and 1938 vintage
respectively. The main result of the work of FSLRC is a single unified
and internally consistent draft law that replaces a large part of the
existing Indian legal framework governing finance. This is work in
progress and even if accepted would take several years to implement.
Besides critics believe that a unified regulator in the financial sector
will not solve India’s problem. What may work in India small and
incremental steps, which cumulatively could have a significant impact.

Conclusions
RPT’s
that treat shareholders inequitably is no different from “sophisticated
stealing”. Some investors believe that more needs to be done about the
heart of the problem in India: the accountability of controlling
shareholders (i.e. promoters) to other shareholders. There is not just
one silver bullet that will serve to protect minority rights in the
presence of powerful insiders and potentially abusive RPTs.

India
has done a great deal to develop a sound corporate governance framework
both under the Companies Act and Clause 49 of the listing requirements.
The Companies Bill imposes far greater and onerous responsibility on
companies and independent directors to ensure that the abuse of RPT’s is
minimised. It is a significant step in the right direction and is a
significant improvement over the existing Act. However, there are still
some loose ends that need to be tightened. The definition of related
parties and relatives for one is a problem. The definition should be
sufficiently harmonised with respect to different bodies of law such as
accounting standards and income-tax law to avoid misunderstandings and
an excessive regulatory burden, thereby underpinning better
implementation and enforcement. Besides the Bill is not clear on which
related parties are not allowed to vote on a RPT resolution.

Under
the Companies Bill, the role of the board and its independent directors
is underpinned by the right of shareholders to have a say on certain
material RPT’s. In addition, it will be essential to improve the
efficacy of AGMs by ensuring the effective possibility to call for a
poll vote rather than a show of hands as is being done currently.
Providing minority shareholders right to approve RPT’s s might need to
be accompanied by safeguards to avoid potential hold-ups by a small
number of investors. At the same time appropriate regulatory
intervention is required to ensure that companies interpret the term
“arm’s length transaction” sensibly and that all transactions where
arm’s length price is questionable are brought to the AGM/EGM for
approval.

Finally, lack of meaningful enforcement,
multiple-regulators and an overburdened judicial system remain
significant concerns. While laws and regulations are in place, effective
means of redress is lacking. Steps need to be taken to strengthen law
enforcement by both the MCA/CLB/Tribunal and SEBI and especially to
remove civil cases from the overwhelmed court system. The Companies Bill
should not be seen as a panacea for all the current problems with
regards to minority rights and abusive RPT’s. To avoid circumvention,
continuous and close monitoring by the regulator is absolutely
necessary.

LEASE TRANSACTION — IMPORTANT JUDGMENT ABOUT LEASE OF ‘SPACE SEGMENT CAPACITY’ IN TRANSPONDERS IN SATELLITE

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Introduction :


Whether a particular transaction is a transaction for
‘Transfer of Right to use goods’ (Lease transaction), so as to be liable under
Sales Tax Laws, is always an issue of contest. There are a number of judgments
analysing the scope of deemed sale by way of lease transaction. Mainly two
aspects are required to be determined. One is, whether the subject matter of
transaction is ‘goods’ and the other one is, whether on the facts of the case
the transaction is of lease or not. If answer to both the issues is yes, the
next


issue arises is about situs of lease transaction.

Criteria for determining nature of lease transaction :

Up till today there are a number of judgments specifying the
criteria for determining the nature of lease transaction. Reference can be made
to the judgments in following cases :

(a) Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd., (126 STC 114) (SC)

In this case, amongst others, the Supreme Court held that to
be a lease transaction, there should be delivery of possession to the lessee.
Unless effective control given to party, no lease transaction takes place.

(b) Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., (145 STC 91) (SC)

The issue in this case was about levy of lease tax on
services provided by telephone companies. The Supreme Court held that no such
tax is applicable as the transaction pertains to service. While holding so, one
of the learned Judges on the Bench observed as under in para 98 about the nature
of taxable lease transaction :


    “98. To constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods, the transaction must have the following attributes :

    (a) There must be goods available for delivery;

    (b) There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

    (c) The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods — consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licences required therefor should be available to the transferee;

    (d) For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor — this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute — viz. a ‘transfer of the right to use’ and not merely a licence to use the goods;

    (e) Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.”





Thus, it can be said that whether a lease sale has taken
place or not, can be decided in light of the above criteria laid down by the
Supreme Court.

(c) Agrawal Brothers v. State of Haryana,


(113 STC 317) (SC)

In this case the dealer has allowed its shunting material to
the contractor to whom it has awarded contract for construction. Rent was
charged for the same. In this case the Supreme Court observed that to the extent
the shunting material is handed over to the contractor, the delivery of
possession takes place and therefore the transaction is liable to lease tax.

In light of the above judgments the criteria becomes clear
that if effective control is passed on to the lessee, then lease transaction
takes place, otherwise not.

Whether subject matter of transaction is ‘goods’


The second issue is to decide about the nature of item, which
is subject matter of lease transaction. If it is goods, then only taxable lease
transaction can take place. The term, ‘goods’, is also analyzed in various
judgments. Brief reference can be made to the following important judgments :

(a) Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., (145 STC 91) (SC)

In relation to meaning of goods the Supreme Court has
observed as under :

“54. The judgment in that decision is awaited. For the time being, we will assume that an incorporeal right is ‘goods’.

55. In fact the question whether ‘goods’ for the purpose of sales tax may be intangible or incorporeal need not detain us. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, (2001) 4 SCC 593, the value of drawings was added to their cost since they contained and formed part of the technical know-how which was part of a technical collaboration between the importer of the drawings and their exporter. It was recognized that knowledge in the abstract may not come within the definition of ‘goods’ in S. 2(22) of the Customs Act.

56. This view was adopted in Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh for the purposes of levy of sales tax on computer software. It was held :

“A ‘goods’ may be a tangible property or an intangible one. It would become goods provided it has the attributes thereof having regard to (a) its utility; (b) capable of being bought and sold; and (c) capable of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed. If a software, whether customised or non-customised, satisfies these attributes, the same would be goods.”

57. This in our opinion, is the correct approach to the question as to what are ‘goods’ for the purposes of sales tax. We respectfully adopt the same.”

(b) Tata Consultancy Services, (137 STC 620) (SC)

In para 17 the Supreme Court has observed as under :

“17.    Thus this Court has held that the term ‘goods’, for the purposes of sales tax, can-not be given a narrow meaning. It has been held that properties which are capable of being abstracted, consumed and used and/or transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored or possessed, etc. are ‘goods’ for the purposes of sale tax. The submission of Mr. Sorabjee that this authority is not of any assistance, as a software is different from electricity and that software is intellectual incorporeal property whereas electricity is not, cannot be accepted. In India the test, to determine whether a property is ‘goods’, for purposes of sales tax, is not whether the property is tangible or intangible or incorporeal. The test is whether the concerned item is capable of abstraction, consumption and use and whether it can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed, etc. Admittedly in the case of software, both canned and uncanned, all of these are possible.”

Situs of lease transaction:

If a lease transaction is a taxable lease transaction under Sales Tax Laws, then further issue is about the situs, i.e., where the sale has taken place. In this respect reference can be made to landmark judgment in case of M/s. 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (119 STC 182) (SC). In this case the Supreme Court has laid down as under about situs of lease transaction.

“35.    As result of the aforesaid discussion our conclusions are these:

    …………………….

    The appropriate Legislature by creating legal fiction can fix situs of sale. In the absence of any such legal fiction the situs of sale in case of the transaction of transfer of right to use any goods would be the place where the property in goods passes, i.e., where the written agreement transferring the right to use is executed.

    Where the goods are available for the transfer of right to use the taxable event on the transfer of right to use any goods is on the transfer which results in right to use and the situs of sale would be the place where the contract is executed and not where the goods are located for use.

    In cases of where goods are not in existence or where there is an oral or implied transfer of the right to use goods, such transactions may be effected by the delivery of the goods. In such cases the taxable event would be on the delivery of goods.
    The transaction of transfer of right to use goods cannot be termed as contract of bailment as it is deemed sale within the meaning of legal fiction engrafted in clause (29A)(d) of Article 366 of the Constitution wherein the location or delivery of goods to put to use is immaterial.”

Under the above background the Karnataka High Court had an occasion to deal with taxability of a particular transaction under the Karnataka VAT Act which is dealt with in the following judgment.

Antrix    Corporation    v.    Asst.    Commissioner    of Commercial Taxes, (29 VST 308) (Kar.):

In this judgment, delivered on 6-2-2010, the issue was about taxability of transaction of hiring of space segment capacity on transponders attached to IN-SAT Satellites. The facts are that, under the authority from the Department of Space of Government of India, the dealer entered into agreements with private parties for hiring of space in the satellite. The Sales Tax authorities considered the transaction as lease of goods liable to tax under the Karnataka VAT Act. The High Court has upheld the action of the sales tax authorities.

The High Court based on judgments cited above about ‘goods’, observed that the ‘Space Segment Capacity’ in transponders is goods by itself. The High Court also noted that they are capable of giving exclusive control to the parties. In respect of effective control the High Court observed that though the technical control on the satellite is of the dealer, (the satellite being controlled and operated by them), the ‘legal control’ is with the lessee. In respect of situs the High Court observed that though the satellite, in which the space is located and which is given on hire, is in orbit, which is 36000 kms away from the earth, still since the agreement is executed in Karnataka the situs will be in Karnataka. Accordingly the High Court justified the assessment of hire charges for space under Karnataka VAT Act, rejecting the writ petition of the dealer.

Conclusion:

The judgment will have considerable impact upon the judicial interpretation of nature of lease transaction.

Some Important Judgments Priority of Government Dues

Central Bank of India vs. State of Kerala and Others (21 VST 505)(SC)

    The facts before the Hon’ble Supreme Court were that the bank gave credit facilities to dealers against mortgage of moveable and immovable properties. When the bank sought to recover money by sale of properties through the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) the Sales Tax Department intervened saying that by virtue of specific provisions in the State Sales Tax Acts (like Section 26B in the Kerala Act and Sec.38C in the BST Act, 1959) sales tax recovery has priority and first charge. The banks were insisting that since the properties are mortgaged to them and since recovery is under Central legislations viz., the DRT Act, 1993 they have priority. The respective High Courts of Kerala and Bombay held in favour of State Sales Tax Authorities. Hence matters were taken to the Supreme Court by respective banks. The Supreme Court confirmed the orders of the High Courts. Various constitutional challenges were raised. The Supreme Court, after dealing with same, rejected the said challenges.

Short gist of observations on constitutional issues is as under :

    The Supreme Court held that Article 254 of the Constitution gets attracted only when both Central and State legislations have been enacted on any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and there is conflict between the two legislations. The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 have been enacted by the Parliament under Entry 45 in List I in the Seventh Schedule, whereas the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 and the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 have been enacted by the concerned State Legislatures under Entry 54 in List II in the Seventh Schedule. The two sets of legislations have been enacted with reference to entries in different Lists in the Seventh Schedule. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that Article 254 cannot be invoked for striking down the State legislations on the ground that they are in conflict with the Central legislations. The Supreme Court held that there is no ostensible overlapping between the two sets of legislations.

    The Supreme Court observed that there is no provision in either of 1993 or 2002 enactments by which a first charge has been created in favour of banks, financial institutions or secured creditors qua the property of the borrower. Under Section 13(1) of the 2002 Act, limited primacy has been given to the right of a secured creditor to enforce his security interest vis-à-vis Section 69 or Section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act. In terms of that sub-Section, a secured creditor can enforce security interest without intervention of the Court or Tribunal and if the borrower has created any mortgage of the secured asset, the mortgagee or any person acting on his behalf cannot sell the mortgaged property or appoint a receiver of the income of the mortgaged property or any part thereof in a manner which may defeat the right of the secured creditor to enforce security interest. The Supreme Court held that this primacy has not been extended to other provisions like Section 38C of the Bombay Act and Section 26B of the Kerala Act by which a first charge has been created in favour of the State over the property of the dealer or any person liable to pay the dues of sales tax, etc. Sub-Section (7) of Section 13 of the 2002 Act which envisages application of the money received by the secured creditor by adopting any of the measures specified under sub-Section(4) merely regulates distribution of money received by the secured creditor. It does not create a first charge in favour of the secured creditor, observed the Supreme Court.

    The Supreme Court also observed that the non obstante clauses contained in Section 34(1) of the 1993 Act and Section 35 of the 2002 Act give overriding effect to the provisions of those Acts only if there is anything inconsistent contained in any other law or instrument having effect by virtue of any other law. In other words, if there is no provision in the other enactments which are inconsistent with the 1993 Act or the 2002 Act, the provisions contained in those Acts cannot override other legislations. Section 38C of the Bombay Act and Section 26B of the Kerala Act also contain non obstante clauses and give statutory recognition to the priority of the State’s charge over other debts. These Sections and similar provisions contained in other State legislations not only create a first charge on the property of the dealer or any other person liable to pay sales tax, etc., but also give them overriding effect over other laws, held the Supreme Court.

    The Supreme Court analysed the background of the above legislations and observed that while enacting the 1993 Act and the 2002 Act, the Parliament was aware of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, wherein priority of the State dues was recognised. If the Parliament intended to create a first charge in favour of banks, financial institutions or other secured creditors on the property of the borrower, then it would have incorporated a provision like Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 or Section 11(2) of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and ensured that dues of banks, financial institutions and other secured creditors should have priority over the State’s statutory first charge in the matter of recovery of the dues of sales tax, etc. In the absence of any specific provision to that effect, it is not possible to read any conflict or inconsistency or overlapping between the provisions of the 1993 Act and 2002 Act on the one hand and Section 38C of the Bombay Act and Section 26B of the Kerala Act on the other. And the non obstante clauses contained in Section 34(1) of the 1993 Act and Section 35 of the 2002 Act cannot be invoked for declaring that the first charge created under the State legislation will not operate qua or affect the proceedings initiated by banks, financial institutions and other secured creditors for recovery of their dues or enforcement of security interest, as the case may be.

The Supreme Court also held that the State legislations creating first charge in favour of the State operate in respect of charges that are in force on the date of introduction of the provisions creating the charge.

Observing as above, in elaborate judgment, the Supreme Court confirmed the orders of the High Courts and held that the provisions creating first charge for recovery of sales tax dues will prevail upon the charge in favour of banks under the DRT Act, 1993 and Securitisation Act, 2002.

Certificate of Entitlement – Stretching back effective date in assessment proceedings! appeals against assessment orders

Whirlpool India Ltd. S.A.1212 of 2003 dt.18.3.2009 (Larger Bench of M.S.T. Tribunal)
 
The issue before the Larger Bench was from reference judgment passed by the 2nd Bench in S.A.1212 of 2003 dt.31.3.2008. The appellant has filed this S.A. against assessment order for 1997-98. He was granted Certificate of Entitlement (COE) under PSI 1993, effective from 16.9.98. The date of commencement of commercial production was 1.3.98 and the appellant was praying to stretch back the effective date of COE in the assessment proceedings from 16.9.98 to 1.3.98. The Referring Bench noted judgments in case of Prav Electro (S. A. 575 of 96, dated11.1.2002) and Hikal Ltd., wherein it is held that the effective date can be stretched back in second appeal against assessment order also. The Referring Bench held a different view that the effective date cannot be stretched back in appeal against assessment order. Therefore, the matter was referred to the Larger Bench.

The Larger Bench, on hearing both the parties, observed that stretching back in appeal against assessment order is not permissible. The Hon’ble Larger Bench gave its verdict on different points raised by the appellant as under:

  • In the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer has authority to change the effect of COE and grant benefits  of exemption  by doing so.

The Assessing Officer in assessment proceedings u/ s.33 has no authority to change the effect of COE. The benefits of exemption u/ s.41 are dependent upon Entitlement Certificate (EC) & COE. The benefits could only be claimed by the appellant in respect of goods manufactured and sold during the eligibility period mentioned in E.C. and COE.

  • The 1993 PSI, provides unconditionally for grant of COE from the date of commencement of commercial production.

On close reading of the provisions contained in 1993 PSI, such a proposition cannot be advanced. The said Scheme does not provide for the same.

  • Other COE, being a certificate under 1993 PSI, is administrative in nature. The Assessing Officer has authority to change its effect in assessment proceedings. As such by the Tribunal too.

No doubt COE is a part of 1993 PSI. However, for regulatory aspect, it has been accommodated in Notification entry E-3, 136 u/s.41 of the Act. The authority to grant exemption to a specified class of sales is delegated by law to the Government u/ s.41 of the Act. Thus the COE and its regulatory aspect for grant of exemption to a specified class of sale in the Act is well absorbed in Notification entry E-3/136 u/s.41 of the Act. By law the Assessing Officer has to strictly follow Notification entry E-3/136 while consid-ering exemption to a specified class of sales. He has no authority to change the effect of COE in assessment proceedings and hence the Tribunal.

The Bombay High Court in Great Eastern case lays the law that ‘the sales tax liability accrues when event of sale takes place. It cannot be extinguished by subsequent certification with retrospective effect.’

Thus the proposition, canvassed by the appellant, does not get any support of law.

  • The benefits of exemption could be claimed unconditionally by the appellant on possessing of COE without looking into the eligibility period mentioned in COE.

The sales tax benefits become available to Eligible Unit (EU) on the basis of EC and COE and not on the basis of COE alone. They are available in respect of goods manufactured and sold during the eligibility period mentioned in EC and COE. All the Package Schemes viz.,1979, 1983, 1988 and 1993 of the Government adopt the benefits during the eligibility period given in EC and COE, the 1993 PSI does not adopt a different period or a different terminology.

  • A liberal interpretation be made of Notification entry E-3/136, u/s.41 of the Act for allowing the benefits of exemption to the appellant in assessment.

The ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in Wood Papers case, warrants strict construction of Notification entry E-3/136 u/s.41 of the Act. A plain reading of the Notification and plain construction of the Entry do not advance the case of the appellant. There is no contingency for full play to be given to the appellant for exemption and more particularly in assessment when the Assessing Officer has no authority.

  • The judgment of the Tribunal in the case of Prav Electro Spark Ltd. does advance the case of the appellant,

The Tribunal’s judgment in the above matter does not advance the correct proposition of law declared by the Apex Court in Jeypore case for the explained reason.

  • The effect of COE could be changed in the assessment proceedings by the Assessing Officer  and  benefits    of exemption could be made available to the appellant.

The ratio of the Bombay High Court’s judgment in  the  case of Great Eastern Spinning & Weaving Mills demolishes  this proposition, so also the Wood Papers judgment of the Apex Court. Such a proposition  of the appellant also goes against the Notification  E-3/136 u/s.d lof the Act.

  • Substantial justice be done to the appellant since he was pursuing alternate remedy for change of effect of COE by representing to the Commissioner and the Government.

The appellant did not agitate on the effect given to EC & COE at any point of time u/ s.55 of this – Act. The alternative remedy claimed by the appellant being administrative in nature, it has no sanctity of law and it is not a matter concerning the lawful remedy. In the present case we are in appeal against assessment (and no appeal is before us against COE). The powers which we possess u/ s.55 of this Act pertain to a limited aspect of what the Assessing Officer can do in assessment, we can do it in appeal, or what the Assessing Officer was supposed to do in assessment but not done, can be done by the Appellate Authority. This is the authority explained by the Bombay High Court in the case of M/ s.Amar Dye Chem, we are in possession . of. There exists no case for substantial justice when a matter pertains to strict construction and strict compliance of exemption conditions, as held by the Supreme Court, and when exemption is dependent on EC and COE and not COE alone.

  • The Tribunal has an authority to change the effect of EC & COE to date of commencement of commercial production certified by IA in assessment proceedings.

The appeal proceedings before the Tribunal are against the assessment. The Tribunal could deal with the grounds of appeal in the manner and authority the Assessing Officer remains in possession of. The ratio of the Apex Court judgment in Wood Papers (cited supra) warrants a strict interpretation of exemption notification. It does not allow the Tribunal to act otherwise. Any attempt of granting exemption by amending COE and EC in assessment shall amount to violation of the position of law declared by the Apex Court. It would be in breach of Notification so also result in subsuming the Notification to the appellant’s proposition. It is not a proposition of law.

Thus the Hon’ble Larger Bench held that the issue of stretching back the date of COE cannot be entertained in the appeal proceedings against the assessment order.

VAT Audit — Writ Petitions

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VAT

Audit of Accounts


“It is a specialised job which can only be undertaken by the
person professionally competent and trained to audit.”

The Bombay High Court, by its order dated 28th March 2008,
disposed of the writ petitions filed by The Sales Tax Practitioners’ Association
of Maharashtra, The Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, The Bombay Small Scale
Industries Association, The Maharashtra State Tax Practitioners’ Associations
Federation, and others, challenging the constitutional validity of S. 61 of
Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002.

While rejecting all such petitions, the Honourable High Court
considered two major questions, which may be posed as follows :

1. Whether provisions regarding audit of accounts u/s.61(1)
of the MVAT Act, 2002 are constitutionally valid [particularly with reference
to Article 14, Article 19(1)(g) and Article 254 of the Constitution of
India] ? Held, Yes.


2. Whether advocates and sales tax practitioners can be
empowered to audit the accounts, u/s.61 of the MVAT Act, and give Report in
Form 704 ? Held, No.



The main contentions of the petitioners were :

  •  For the last 56 years, advocates and sales tax practitioners have been enjoying an equal-level field in practice before the Sales Tax Authorities.

  •  The impugned provision seeks to keep out a class of advocates and sales tax practitioners from their legitimate field of practice.

  •  This class of practitioners and advocates have attained appreciable standard of expertise to understand and interpret the sales tax laws before the tax authorities under the Act.

  •  The advocates also practice in the field of sales tax before the High Court and Supreme Court. Therefore, there is no reason to take away a vested right of such large class of practitioners in a bid to favour a particular class at the cost of rest of the categories.

  •  U/s.82 of the Act, various categories of persons are entitled to practise, who are called sales tax practitioners. They comprise (1) Advocates, (2) Chartered Accountants (3) Other persons who hold qualification prescribed under the Act and (4) Government servants of the Sales Tax Department upon their leaving or retiring from the service in the sales tax department.

  •  On account of the impugned legislation, this class of advocates and practitioners is being denied the rightful field of practice for certifying deductions and claims under the Act.

  •  Perusal of S. 61 as also the reading of the prescribed form of audit would show that the audit is in fact a statutory return of the dealer for the purpose of enabling the Sales Tax Officer to complete assessment and therefore, involves minor skills, which can be better performed by the advocates.

  •  As such, exclusion of advocates and sales tax practitioners from performing audit or carrying on audit is clearly discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable.

  •  Several other States in the country have provided that the value added tax audit can be done not only by the C.A., but also by other professionals, including advocates.

  •  Sales tax practitioners and also advocates have been guiding the trade in giving due information of the ever-changing sales tax laws, the implication of various claims and in filing the returns and appearing in assessment and if necessary in appeals.

  •  There has been no grievance made against the easily accessible and expert services of this class.

  •  The sales tax practitioners and advocates have been giving commendable services to the industries at all stages of sales tax proceedings.

  •  Their valuable guidance and help is easily accessible at affordable charges.

  •  By the amendment what is sought to be done is to have the assessment of tax liability under the Act assessed, approved and certified as the correct liability of a dealer by a third agency, who is described as class of persons called Chartered Accountants.

  •  The work that the chartered accountant has to do is to verify the return with full details and certify the legality or otherwise of the claims in the returns. This function of assessment for the tax dues from a dealer under the MVAT Act has already been assigned and entrusted to the Commissioner or its delegates or officers appointed under the said Act.

  • The industries, therefore, would be obliged to engage services of chartered accountants over and above their respective appointee from the class of sales tax practitioners or advocates.

  • On account of this, heavy financial burden would be cast on small-scale industries and such burden is a serious impediment to the trade and would cut into the net profit of the respective industry.

  • This action of the State is unreasonable and cannot be done even under its exercise of ancillary legislation. The State Legislature under Entry 54 of the State List can enact law taxing sales. However, any ancillary legislation or procedure must have nexus to the object of the Act. The mandatory provisions of engaging services of CA are not based on any object of the Act, and as such, the provision is not within the legislative competence of respondent State as an ancillary provision.

  • The State Legislature by the impugned provisions has outsourced their statutory powers to assess the tax to a third party. Such delegation of powers is destructive of basic tenet of law and its enforcement.

  • The payment to be made to the chartered accountant is over and above the payment for the services of a sales tax practitioner who keeps the dealer well informed.

  • The audit charges to be paid to a CA are perceptively heavy. The industry will have to pay heavy burden by way of audit fees.

  • This additional compliance cost in terms of money and waste of time is an added impediment.

  • This additional payment is in pith and substance nothing but compulsory levy amounting to tax by the State. Such action offends Article 265 of the Constitution.

  • The impugned enactment is contrary to Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, since it prohibits the members of the petitioners from practising their profession and trade of their choice without there being any valid reason. [Since the petition raising this issue was by the Maharashtra Sales Tax Practitioner Associations’ Federation, and, not joined by any individual as petitioner, challenging vires of Article 19(1)(g), the BHC has not considered the maintainability of the petition].

  • The impugned S. 61 has resulted in divisive exelusion of advocates and sales tax practitioners, as the traders would not like to engage services of sales tax practitioners or advocates for certification.

  • The result is that a large section of Practitioners in mofusil area and small towns will be rendered out of practice and consequently adversely affecting their livelihood.

  • The requirement of CA alone for the certification in form 704 is wholly irrelevant and arbitrary.

  • No purpose is served by CA’s certification of correctness under the garb of audit of books of accounts.

  •  S. 82 of the MVAT Act provides which categories of persons are entitled to practise under the said Act. Explanation to S. 61 carves out a separate class which does not serve the object of S.61.

  • It causes  equals  to be treated  unequally.  This violates  the equality  right  under  Article  14.

  • As there is no reasonable basis for the exclusion, the  provision  is arbitrary  being  violative  of Article  14.

The petitioners placed reliance in the judgments of Omprakash Sud and Ors. v. State of J. & K. and Ors., 1981 (2) SCC 270, Suneel Jetley and Ors. v. State of Haryana, 1984(4) SCC 296, Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University & Ors., 1989(2) SCC 145, Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. and Anr. v. Nilaybhai R. Thakore and Anr., 1999 (8) SCC 139 and in D. S. Nakara and Ors. v. Union of India, 1983 1 S.CC 305.

The petitioners also argued that S. 22 of the MVAT Act provides for audit (by the Department). S. 22(1)(a) to (e) contemplates all situations which require audit. This audit is carried out by the Officers empowered by the Commissioner or to whom powers have been delegated. S. 22 therefore, covers all situations which require audit. This situation arises after the returns are filed. There is no indication of any requirement of audit before filing of returns, and as such, S. 61 is directly in conflict with S. 22 and is ultra vires the scope of S. 22. S. 22(3) permits the audit to be conducted by an officer who may not be a chartered accountant. If S. 22 audit can be conducted by an officer who may not be a chartered accountant, then there is no reason why S. 61 audit cannot also be conducted by a person who is not a chartered accountant. S. 61 which requires audit only by a chartered accountant, therefore, is discriminatory. Reliance is placed on Municipal Corporation of Grater Bombay and Ors. v. Thukral Anjali Deokumar and Ors., (1989) 2 S.CC 249.

Before proceeding further, the Honourable High Court first made a reference to S. 61 of the MVAT Act and the amendments made thereto. The Court also referred to S. 82 of the MVAT Act and observed “S. 82 of the Act  permits  sales tax practitioners  and others set out therein, the right of appearance before any –  authority in proceedings under the Act. The right of appearance, therefore, has not been taken away. The right to appear subsists.  The limited  question  is whether u/s.61, the exercise of getting  the accounts audited, can be said to be part of the right to appear and plead before the Courts or judicial forums and or getting the accounts audited is part of the right conferred by S. 82 or in the alternative excluding other than chartered accountants and cost accountants is arbitrary or violative of the rights of these excluded categories to carryon their trade or profession. “

The Court also referred  to the dictionary  meaning of the expression  ‘audit’  and  ‘auditor’  as given in P. Ramanatha  Aiyar’s  Advanced  Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition,  Oxford  English  Dictionary  and  Mr. R. A. Irish’s book ‘Practical  Auditing’.  It also referred  to the discussion  on the subject in President,  Councillors and  Ratepayers  of the  Shire of Frankston  and Hastings v. Cohen, 102 C.L.R.  607 the High Court of Australia.

Responses  were invited from the respondents i.e., (1)the Government of Maharashtra and (2) the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

In its detailed reply, the Government of Maharashtra, through its Dy. Commissioner of Sales Tax submitted as follows:

“The Government of Maharashtra decided to introduce VAT system with effect from 1st April, 2005. At that time the Government decided to amend the VAT Act, 2002 in terms of the national consensus arrived at by the Empowered Committee of State
 

Finance Ministers. Accordingly, a draft bill was prepared for submission to the Government and it was made open for comments of the public. The amendment bill inter alia included a proposal on the request of advocates, tax practitioners and cost accountants to include them u/s.61 for tax audit along with the chartered accountants having stand-ing in profession for a period of 7 years or more. But there was no assurance directly or impliedly that such proposal will be accepted by the Govern-ment or enacted by the Legislature. Various aspects were considered including that under the Companies Act. S. 211(C) of the Companies Act requires that all companies in India must prepare their annual accounts in accordance with the Accounting Standards and get those accounts audited in accordance with the Auditing Standards laid down by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. The Government decided to continue the old provision of audit under MVAT i.e., audit u/s.61 only by chartered accountants.

Under the Companies Act, the Central Government has also constituted a National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACAS), which is required to recommend the Accounting and Auditing Standards. However, the Central Government did not issue any notification based on the recommendations of NACAS. The Accounting and Auditing Standards issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India are binding. Thus, no corporate entity can prepare its accounts by an method other than that provided by ICAL Similarly, no audit can be conducted without following Auditing and Assurance Standards (AAS) issued by ICAL

The Accounting and Auditing Standards issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India are based upon the Accounting and Auditing Standards issued by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). Accounting Standards Board of IFAC in the year 2002-2003 stands converted into independent Accounting Standards Board (ISAB). The Board to start with, Adopted Accounting Standards (AAS) issued by IFAC and now is in the process of revision of some of these Standards. The AS are very complex and there are major variances in respect of turnover of sales and purchases accounted as per AAS in the profit and loss account of the enterprise and turnover of sales and purchases which is required to be considered for the purpose of levy of tax under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002. Clear-cut comments on the major changes made by any firm in a given period in respect of accounting system, method of valuation of stocks and business model, etc. are required from the auditor.

These are complex accounting and audit issues which advocates, sales tax practitioners and company secretaries are not professionally qualified to handle.

S. 29 of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides that advocates would be the only class of persons to ‘practise the profession of law’. S. 33 of the Advocates Act bars any other professional to practise in any Court or before any authority, etc. S. 49 of the Advocates Act gives general powers to the Bar Council of India to make such rules. Under this power, the Bar Council of India has framed the rules, which prohibit an advocate from engaging in any other profession other than practicsing the profession of law. The requirement of S. 61 of the MVAT Act is of auditing of the books of accounts and giving a certificate of his conclusion after verification. This cannot be called as ‘practise the profession of law’.

The area u/s.61 is practising in the field of accountancy and auditing, which an advocate is not competent to undertake under the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India u/s.49 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

Parliament of the country has framed the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. U/s.2(2) the area in which a member of the Institute of Chartered Accounts of India (ICAI) can practise is defined. The practice of accountancy and auditing can be carried out by the chartered accountants who are members of ICAI and are holding a certificate of practice.

If the advocates embark on practice in the area of accountancy and auditing work, then it would amount to practice in accounting and auditing and thus will violate the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the rules framed thereunder by the Bar Council of India. Therefore, the advocates cannot be allowed to carry out the function of an accountant or of an auditor.

As regards sales tax practitioners, they are not governed by any professional Act. Any graduate having acquired a Diploma in Taxation or having passed specified accountancy examination and acquired such qualifications as are prescribed by the Central Board of Revenue or having retired as an officer from the Sales Tax Department, can enrol with the Sales Tax Department as a sales tax practitioner. He is not required to be a qualified auditor, nor is he governed by the strict discipline and acceptability required under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 for any acts of omission and commission in the conduct of audit. Hence, a sales tax practitioner cannot be expected to provide the level of assurance and creditability of the audit of the accounts of a VAT payer expected by the Revenue. Hence, while a sales tax practitioner is qualified to appear in proceedings, he cannot conduct audit u/s.61.

All over India, as per information available, 30 States and Union Territories have introduced VAT, either in the year 2005-2006 or in the year 2006-2007. Information about audit provision in two States i.e., Nagaland and Mizoram is not available. Out of the remaining 28 States, four States (Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim, West Bengal) have no provision for audit from independent professionals. Thirteen States and Union Territories have called for an Audit Report under the VAT Act exclusively from chartered accountants. These States are (i) Auranachal Pradesh, (ii) Bihar, (iii) Chattisgarh, (iv) Goa, (v) Madhya Pradesh, (vi) Maharashtra, (vii) Manipur, (viii) Meghalaya, (ix) Punjab, (x) Rajasthan, (xi) Dadra and Nagar Haveli, (xii) Daman and Diu, (xii) Chandigarh.

Another 7 States have called for Audit Report only from professionals who have knowledge in the field of accountancy i.e., chartered accountants or cost accountants. In those States the sales tax practitioners or advocates are not authorised to give the Audit Report, though they are allowed to represent. before the authorities. These States are (i) Assam, (ii) Delhi, (iii) Kerala, (iv) Orissa, (v) Tripura, (vi) Jammu and Kashmir, (vii) Uttranchal.

Only four States have allowed other professionals besides chartered accountants and cost accountants to conduct this audit. These States are (i) Andhra Pradesh, (Ii) Gujarat, (iii) Jharkhand and (iv) Karnataka.

The C.A.s were included after consideration and analysis of the facts as to their expertise and specialised training. The VAT is designed for the purpose of self- assessment by certifying returns by the C.As. The VAT is invoice-based system and the deductions are based on certification. A true and correct invoice of having paid Value Added Tax, in the treasury is required. It is therefore, necessary ingredient of certification of data contained in returns and encompasses entire sphere of verification of account books and vouchers. It is submitted that the experience of the income tax department shows that independent tax audit has improved the proper maintenance of books of accounts from the taxation point of view. The Empowered Committee had referred the issue to the Group of Commissioners of Sales Tax to decide the necessary provisions for audit. It was recommended by the said committee that the audit of certification of the books of accounts should be by specified authority only.”

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India in its reply, submitted that VAT is an invoice-based system, where the major thrust is on self-assessment of the tax liability by the dealer. It is necessary therefore to respect book-keeping requirements and also necessary to ensure that the particulars furnished by the dealer are true and correct. Consequently, in the interest of the State, the Legislature has found it necessary to have the accounts audited.

The audit is a specialised subject and the same is required to be carried out after detailed verification of the books of accounts applying the accounting and auditing principles. Audit of accounts requires expertise. The chartered accountants being experts in the field of accounting and auditing, the said Act rightly provides that the accounts be audited only by chartered accountants.

To consider the challenges under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g), the Hon’ble Court referred to S. 44AB of the Income-tax Act, which contains a similar provision for audit of accounts of persons whose total sales or turnover or gross receipts exceeds the pre-scribed limits. This provision, when introduced for the first time, was challenged before various High Courts. And the Supreme Court in an appeal before it, has upheld the legality of the Section. [T. D. Venkata Rao (SC) (AIR 1999 sC 2242)]

In the case of R. Sathya Moorthy and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1991) 189 ITR 491, the petitioner challenged the validity of S. 44AB of the Income-tax Act, before the Madras High Court. The challenge made was on behalf of Income-tax practitioners as also an assessee, to contend that u/s.44AB, as compulsory audit was restricted to chartered accountants, it violates both, Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.

The petition was dismissed and an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court. While dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held as under:

“The chartered accountants by reasons of their training having special aptitude in the matters of audits. It is reasonable that they, who form a class by themselves, should be required to audit the accounts of businesses whose income exceeds RsAO lakhs and professionals whose income ex-ceeds Rs.10 lakhs in any given year. There is no material on record, and indeed, in our view, there cannot be, that an income tax practitioner has the same expertise as chartered accountants in the matter of accounts. For the same reasons, the challenge under Article 19 must fail, and it must be pointed out that these income tax practitioners are still entitled to be authorised representatives of assessees.”

In view of above, the Justice F. I. Rebello & R. S. Mohite of the Bombay High Court opined that once the Supreme Court has upheld the legality of S. 44AB of the Income-tax Act, where the same terminology was used and which ‘was also a provision pertaining to audit, in our opinion, and considering the object of both the provisions, which is prevention of evasion of tax dues, the challenge by the petitioners on the ground of infraction of Article 14 and 19 will have to be similarly rejected. There are practically no distinguishing features. The only distinction, if any, is that, whereas S. 44AB is for the purpose of ascertaining ‘total income’, S. 61 is for certification whether VAT had been correctly assessed, collected and paid.

The various submissions now made under Articles 14 and 19 in the challenge to S. 61 were also advanced whilst challenging S. 44AB of the Income-tax Act before the various High Courts. The Madras High Court had referred to judgments of various other High Courts which had decided the challenge to S. 44AB. The judgments of the High Courts are Mohan Trading Co. v. Union of India, 196 ITR 134 (MP). Rajkot Engineering Association v. Union of India, 164 ITR 148 (Raj), A. S. Sharma v. Union of India, (1985) 175 ITR 254 (A.P.) and T. S. Natraj v. Union of India, (1981) 155 ITR 81 (Kar.).

After noting various points from the above-referred judgments, the Court rejected the challenge based on Article 14 on the following grounds:

(i) Chartered accountants by reason of their training have special aptitude in the matter of audit. An income tax practitioner does not have the same expertise as the chartered accountants in the- matter of accounts. The argument therefore, that the effect of such a provision will be to exclude all other categories of authorised representatives except the chartered accountants from carrying on their profession is liable to be rejected, as they constitute two distinct classes having a nexus with the object of the provisions, which is evasion of tax dues.

(ii)The contention that such a provision brings in an oppressive restriction is also liable to be rejected as auditing accounts is a specialised job. It may be true that some income tax practitioners may also ac-quire that skill by sheer practice without passing the necessary examination. But that does not preclude Parliament from prescribing special qualifications with reference to the auditing of accounts.

(iii) Legal practitioners and chartered accountants are equal for the purpose of representation of assesses before the Assessing Authority, but they are not equals for the purpose of compulsory audit. The preferential treatment given to the chartered accountants for the purpose of compulsory audit does not militate against the rule of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. The terms ‘audit’, ‘auditing’ and the ‘functions of auditor’ clearly bring about the difference between the chartered accountants and others.

The object and purpose in providing compulsory audit is to facilitate the prevention of evasion of taxes, administrative convenience in quick and proper completion of assessments, etc. In the light of this object, chartered accountants and others cannot be said to be similarly situate. The qualifications and eligibility to be enrolled as income tax practitioners are entirely different from that of chartered accountants from the point of view of auditing.

(iv) Merely because apart from dealers whose turnover is more than 40 lacs, dealers dealing in liquor trade have also to get their accounts audited does not make the provision arbitrary. Such dealers are a class by themselves as they are carrying on a trade which is res extra commercium. They constitute a class by themselves and if the Legislature in its wisdom has provided that their accounts should be audited, it is neither unreasonable, nor treating them as a class arbitrary. The classification in the instant case is reasonable and has a nexus with the object which is to direct a class of dealers getting their accounts audited by a specialised agency,…so that there is no tax evasion.
 

On behalf of the petitioners, a distinction was sought to be made in certification under the Income-tax Act and under the VAT Act. In our opinion, the legality of the provisions or its non-arbitrariness is not dependent on the manner in which the form has to be filled, the contents thereof and the procedure. What is relevant is to consider the object of the Act and in selecting the class of professionals whether the Legislature has acted unreasonably or has imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right of the assessee and or income tax practitioners to carryon their occupation or profession. It must be noted that the chartered accoun-tants cannot certify the correctness and completeness of the sales tax returns, unless they audit the accounts of the dealer as maintained in the first part of S. 61. After audit, chartered accountant has to certify the various items in Part I of Form No. 704. These items are subject to audited observations of the chartered accountant and comments about the non-compliance, shortcomings, deficiencies, in the return filed by the dealer. There are various other requirements.

“Suffice it to say that it is a specialised job which can only be undertaken by the person professionally competent and trained to audit. Advocates are not qualified as observed by the Supreme Court in T. D. Venkatarao v. Union of India, 237 ITR 315. The other sales tax practitioner and retired employees definitely not.”

The settled law on the subject is that as 10Ifgas the twin tests of reasonableness of the classification and nexus with the object are satisfied, wisdom of legislation cannot be substituted. The State Legislature is free to decide in its wisdom as to how best to safeguard the State revenue. Different States may adopt different standards and policy of one Legislature may not be adopted by another Legislature, as the matter lies in the domain of policy making. Because some States have permitted sales tax practitioners to carryon audit need not necessarily mean that as the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra has not so provided, that would be arbitrary or that the classification considering the nexus of the object is arbitrary. It is for the State Legislature to decide how to protect its revenue and this is more true with regard to economic legislation. See R. K. Garg v. Union of India and Ors., 1982 Vol. 133 ITR 239 SC as also the observations of the Supreme Court in Para 16 in Directorate of Film Festivals and Ors. v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain and Ors., (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 737 wherein the

Court observed as under:
“16 ….    Courts    cannot    interfere    with  policy, either on the ground that it is erroneous or on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review …. “

Rejecting the challenge under Article 19(1)(g), the Court after referring to the Supreme Court’s decisions in V. Sasidharan v. Peter and Karunakar, 1984 (4) SCC 230, State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and Ors., (2005) 8 SCC 534 and Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344, observed: “in the instant case considering S. 82 of the VAT Act, the category of persons who are excluded from the ambit of explanation of S. 61 are not denied their right of appearance before the authorities under the Act. In other words, they are not prohibited from carrying on their profession.”

The High Court  further said that  there  is a difference between prohibition and restriction. Article 19(6) of the Constitution empowers the State to put reasonable restrictions in public interest. Apart from the power conferred on the State to impose reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6), there is a further power conferred under Article 19(6) of laying down professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising the profession as in the instant case.

Considering the tests laid down in MRF Ltd. v. Inspector, Kerala Government and Ors., 1998 (8) SCC 227 to judge the reasonableness of the restriction, can the provision which requires the audit to be done only by an accountant as explained, amount to an unreasonable restriction? In the matter of carrying out audit the State has chosen to confer that right only on a class of persons having expertise in the field. This cannot be said to be arbitrary or excessive in nature, so as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of the general public. That would be yet another reason as to why the challenge  under Article  19(1)(g) must fail.

Rejecting the challenge to the Constitutional validity of the Legislation under Articles 14 and 19 at the instance of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, The Court said :

“We may only point out that S. 29 of the Advocates Act till date has not been brought into force. Apart from that, one fails to understand the stand of the Bar Council after the decision of the Supreme Court in T. D. Venkatrao (supra) where the Supreme Court has accepted the fact that chartered accountants by the reason of their training have special aptitude in the matter of audit. The act of maintaining accounts is neither pleading, practice, nor acting.”

From the conclusion drawn by the Supreme Court and various High Courts and considering the contentions advanced, various challenge made by the petitioners including the challenge based on Articles 14 and 19, etc., the views expressed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, in the above decision, may be summarised as follows:

  • Chartered accountants by their training have special aptitude in the matter of audit.

  • Argument that it is oppressive restriction is re-jected as auditing accounts is a specialised job.

  • Legal practitioners and chartered accountants are equal for the purpose of representation of asses sees, but they are not equals for the purpose of audit.

  • Audit is a specialised job, which can be under-taken by a person professionally competent and trained to audit. Advocates and sales tax practitioners are not qualified.

  • Difference States may adopt different standards and policy.

  • Provisions u/s.61 have nothing to do.with provisions u/ s.22 of the MVAT Act. S. 22 is a special power conferred to the Commissioner.

  • The State has chosen to confer the right of auditing u/ s.61 only to CAs having expertise in the field. Therefore, challenge u/s.19(1)(g) must fail.

  • Following  SC judgment   in the  case  of L. M. Mahurkar  v. Bar Council  of Maharashtra,  (1996) 101 STC 541 & T. D. Venkatrao (supra), challenge to the constitutional validity of the legislation under Articles 14 & 19 at the instance of the Bar Council is rejected.

  • Audit of accounts by a chartered accountant does not amount to outsourcing the statutory power of the Government. It neither amounts to abdication, nor excessive delegation.

  • Such an exercise does not amount to conferring on the accountant a power to determine the correct tax liability of the dealer.

  • A certificate by CA is to enable the department to consider that the person having knowledge of audit and subject to the disciplinary control of its parent body has certified that the accounts are properly maintained.

  • This is to aid the officers in discharging their statutory duties.

  • The audit of accounts is to be conducted only in respect of certain specified class of dealers. The amount of fee which has to be paid is the amount to be decided between the dealer and that person whom he selects from amongst the accountants that are available. It cannot be said to amount to compulsory levy amounting to tax. Thus, challenging under Article 265 also fail.

  • The enactment is pursuant to the power of the State Legislature to make law within its competence. This does not attract Article 301.

The Bombay High  Court  thus  held:

“In our opinion, there is no merit in any of the petitions and consequently rule discharged in all the petitions. In the circumstances of the case, each party to bear their own costs.”


S/s. 2(15), 12A, 12AA(3) – In proceedings u/s. 12AA(3) it is not open to the DIT(E) to re-examine the objects of the trust to see if the same were charitable in nature.

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9. 2013-TIOL-256-ITAT-BANG
Kodava Samaj vs. DIT(e)
ITA No. 200/Bang/2012
Assessment Year: 2009-10.                                             
Date of Order: 08-02-2013

S/s. 2(15), 12A, 12AA(3) – In proceedings u/s. 12AA(3) it is not open to the DIT(e) to re-examine the objects of the trust to see if the same were charitable in nature.


Facts
The assessee, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, was granted certificate of registration u/s. 12A vide order dated 27-06- 1980. As per the Memorandum of Association, the main objects for which the assessee was formed were to preserve, protect and maintain, the traditional customs, culture, heritage and language of the Kodavas; to promote and advance the social, cultural, economic, educational, physical and spiritual progress and development of the members of the Samaja; etc. The DIT(E), in view of the proviso to section 2(15) which came into effect from 01-04-2009, was of the view that the certificate of registration granted to the assessee u/s. 12A should be cancelled by invoking the provisions of section 12AA(3), because, according to him, the assessee society was carrying on activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business. He held this view for the reason that the assessee was running schools & colleges but its predominant object was not education. Also, the assessee was running a recreation club having a liquor bar and provided tables for playing cards. He held that such activities cannot be called “charitable”. He also held that the assessee cannot take the plea that it is a charitable organisation since it is running a school and surplus, if any, generated from other activities is utilised for the development of education. For these reasons, the DIT(E) cancelled the registration by passing an order u/s 12AA(3).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the power to cancel registration already granted u/s. 12AA of the Act is contained in section 12AA(3) of the Act which states that the registration which has already been granted can be cancelled only in two situations mentioned in the section viz. (i) that the activities of the trust or institution are not genuine; and (ii) the activities of the trust or institution are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or institution. The Tribunal noted that there is no finding in the order of DIT(E) on the satisfaction of any of the two conditions mentioned in section 12AA(3). The Tribunal observed that from the facts noted by DIT(E) it does not follow that the activities of the trust are not genuine or that the activities are not being carried out in accordance with the objects. It also noted that the second proviso to the definition of “charitable purpose” provides that even if there are receipts from commercial activities below Rs. 25 lakh, it will still be considered to be a “charitable purpose”. It held that it is not open to the DIT(E) in an action u/s. 12AA(3) of the Act to examine the objects of the trust to see if the same were charitable in nature. That has already been done when registration was granted to the assessee u/s. 12AA(1) of the Act. It is not open to the DIT(E) to re-examine the objects of the trust in proceedings u/s. 12AA(3) of the Act. It noted that this proposition is supported by the following decisions, relied upon by the assessee –

(i) CIT v Sarvodaya Ilakkiya Pannai 343 ITR 300 (Mad)
(ii) Chaturvedi Har Prasad Educational Society v CIT 46 DTR (Lucknow)(Trib) 121
(iii) Bharat Jyoti v CIT 63 DTR (Lucknow)(Trib) 409. (iv) Karnataka Badminton Association v DIT(E) ITA No. 1272/Bang/2011, order dated 22.11.2012

The Tribunal quashed the order passed by DIT(E) u/s. 12AA(3).

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Section 271(1)(c) – Penalty cannot be levied when the dispute is not about the genuineness of the expenditure or the bonafides of the claim but only about the year of its allowability.

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8. 2013-TIOL-265-ITAT-MUM
Silver Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO
ITA No. 8444/Mum/2010
Assessment Year: 2005-06.                                            
Date of Order: 08-03-2013

Section 271(1)(c) – Penalty cannot be levied when the dispute is not about the genuineness of the expenditure or the bonafides of the claim but only about the year of its allowability.


Facts
The assessee company was engaged in the business of development of land and construction of buildings. In the course of assessment proceedings the assessee was confronted with certain expenses claimed by it in the return of income which were incurred in relation to projects which have not yet commenced and not in relation to the project whose income was offered for taxation. Upon being so confronted the assessee revised its return of income, though the revision was beyond the time limit prescribed in section 139, and disallowed a sum of Rs. 31,58,467. The AO, however, further found certain other expenses amounting to Rs. 6,47,000 which were not related to the project of the assessee in respect of which profits were offered for taxation but were relating to a project which had not yet commenced. The AO, disallowed Rs. 6,47,000 on account of expenses relating to project not yet commenced. He also initiated penalty proceedings. The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance in quantum proceedings. The AO levied penalty in respect of total disallowance of Rs. 38,05,470 made on account of expenses relating to projects yet to be commenced by holding that the assessee has furnished inaccurate particulars of income.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the levy of penalty.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held The Tribunal noted that the genuineness of the expenditure was not doubted by the AO and there was nothing in the orders of the lower authorities to doubt the bonafides of the assessee in claiming the said expenses as per the practice consistently followed. All the material particulars relating to the claim were furnished by the assessee and there was no allegation by the AO that such particulars were found to be incorrect or inaccurate. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court has in the case of Reliance Petro Products Ltd. observed that mere making of the claim, which is not sustainable in law, by itself will not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars regarding the income of the assessee and merely because the assessee’s claim has not been accepted, penalty cannot be attracted specially when there is no allegation that any particulars filed by the assessee in relation to his claim were found to be incorrect or inaccurate. The Tribunal noted that the dispute was only relating to the year in which the said expenses are allowable and not about the very deductibility of the expenses as the genuineness was not doubted at any stage. Considering all these facts, the Tribunal held that the penalty cannot be levied. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty levied by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Sections 50C , 55(2)(b), 251(1)(c): Fair Market value as on 1st April 1981 should be adopted as cost of acquisition while computing the capital gains during the course of assessment even when the assessee has not filed a revised return for the said claim.

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7. (2011) 133 ITD 172 (Mum)
Mrs. Gopi Shivani vs. ITO
A.Y 2005 -06
Dated: 30-11-2010

Sections 50C , 55(2)(b), 251(1)(c): Fair Market value as on 1st April 1981 should be adopted as cost of acquisition while computing the capital gains during the course of assessment even when the assessee has not filed  a revised return for the said claim.


Facts
The assessee had sold office premises for a consideration of Rs. 21,00,000/-. While computing the capital gains for his return of income the assessee had taken the cost as on 1st September 1968 as the cost of acquisition i.e the original cost for which property was acquired.

During the course of assessment the A.O replaced the full value of consideration with the stamp duty value (i.e Rs. 42, 27,104) of the property for the purpose of section 50C .

The assessee then submitted a valuation report stating the value as on 01-04-1981 as Rs. 3,80,000. He filed a revised calculation of capital gains claiming indexed cost of acquisition to be Rs. 18,40,000.

The A.O rejected the claim on the ground that no revised return had been filed. The CIT(A) upheld the order of the A.O and rejected the claim of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the Honourable ITAT.

Held
Section 55(2)(b) permits the assessee to adopt either the cost of acquisition or the fair market value as on 01-04-1981. The A.O chose to modify the capital gains calculation by replacing the full value of consideration with the stamp duty value ignoring the fact that the assessee had invested more than the capital gains derived in the NABARD bonds taking the original cost of acquisition.

Since the value under 50C was being increased and the capital gains sought to be reworked, the assessee chose to exercise the option given in the Act to adopt the fair market value. The A.O has not rejected the valuation by the registered valuer.

Thus, A.O had erred in not considering the claim of the assessee even without a revised return. Also CIT(A) had erred in not considering the claim of the assessee which is a legally permissible claim as per Section 251(1)(C) which empowers him to dispose of the appeal by passing any order as he deems fit.

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International Arbitration — Jurisdiction of Indian Court — Parties agreed for final settlement of disputes under International Chamber of Commerce.

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[Progressive Construction Ltd. v. The Louis Berger Group Inc. & Ors., AIR 2012 AP 38]

The appellant, namely, M/s. Progressive Construction Ltd., is a Public Limited Company. It is engaged in the business of and carrying out construction activities throughout the world, including India. The appellant stated that the Government of Sudan received assistance from the United States Agency for International Development under Sudan Infrastructure Services Project, which was being administered by respondent No. 1, namely, M/s. Louis Berger Group Inc. For execution of the said project, the respondent No. 1 issued notification inviting applications.

The respondent No. 1 invited bid by dividing the contract into packages. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 entered into an agreement with the appellant on 30-4-2009 for execution of contract work. According to the appellant, the respondent No. 1 to cover up its latches and to avoid payment to the appellant has resorted to issuing the impugned notice of expulsion dated 21-10-2009 expelling the appellant from the site. The appellant, pending initiation of arbitration proceedings, filed the petition u/s.9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 to declare the action of the respondent No. 1, in issuing notice of expulsion dated 21-10-2009 to the appellant and the consequences following therefrom as illegal and arbitrary, and to grant injunction restraining the respondent No. 1 from issuing letter of demand to the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 (Banks) in order to invoke/encash the bank guarantee and also restrain them from demanding any amount from the appellant pursuant to invocation of bank guarantee.

The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 having received the notice in the petition, filed counter inter alia stating that as per Clause 67.3 of the agreement, the parties have agreed to settle the disputes arising out of the agreement finally under the rules of American Arbitration Association. Therefore, the Civil Courts in India, which includes the Courts at Hyderabad, have no jurisdiction to entertain petitions in respect of the disputes arising out of the agreement. It was contented by the appellant that since it is an International arbitration, and as part of cause of action has arisen at Hyderabad, the appellant was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Courts at Hyderabad in India. The lower Court granted status quo to be maintained, however ultimately dismissed the petition.

On appeal the High Court observed that the arbitration proceedings u/s.9 of the Act cannot be equated with proceedings in a regular suit. The application u/s.9 is legislated to protect the interest of parties before initiation of arbitration proceedings or during the pendency of the proceedings. It is never the intention of the Legislature to by-pass the arbitration clause totally. While determining the application u/s.9 of the Act, it is required to determine the need to protect the property pending before the arbitration. Once the Court finds that it has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter, the only course open to the Court is to reject the application to enable the parties to go before the competent Court, instead of making a decision on merits. In case it proceeds and records the findings on merits, it would affect the rights of the parties on merits. The law is well settled that any finding or observations made by a Court, which has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit or application, would be Coram non judice (a Court which has no jurisdiction to decide the matter). In view of the above, the findings recorded by the lower Court that the appellant has no prima facie case in his favour for grant of interim relief u/s.9 of the Act and other findings recorded on merits, cannot be sustained and accordingly was set aside.

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Hindu law — Gift of undivided share by coparcener — Held to be void.

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[Subhamati Devi (Smt.) & Ors. v. Awadhesh Kumar Singh & Ors., AIR 2012 Patna 45]

The plaintiffs had filed the suit for declaration that the deed of gift dated 27-1-1989 executed by Ambika Singh in favour of the defendants was an illegal document and not binding upon the plaintiffs. One Bharosa Singh had executed a gift of deed in favour of Rashari Singh who was the predecessor of the plaintiffs. As the said gift of deed of the year 1919 was exclusively in the name of Rashari Singh, the plaintiffs asserted that Ramdhari Singh and his son Ambika Singh did not acquire any right, title and interest in the property covered by the said gift deed. The plaintiffs also stated that Ambika Singh had filed title suit No. 10 of 1989 for partition of the joint family property, including the properties covered by the gift of deed of 1919, and simultaneously he had executed a gift deed dated 27-1-1989 in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 7, which is a void document as a coparcener in his status as such he could not have executed or alienated the joint family property by way of gift. However, the defendants have contended that there was separation and Ambika Singh had separated from the joint family in the year 1982-83 and as such he was fully competent to execute the gift deed in question.

The Trial Court after considering the evidence had come to the finding that the gift deed dated 27-1-1989 by Ambika Singh was a valid and legal document. However, in appeal by the plaintiffs, the Appellate Court reversed the finding of the Trial Court and came to hold that the gift deed of Ambika Singh, who was a coparcener, was not a valid document with regard to coparcenary property.

On further appeal the Court observed that a mere assertion of separation is not sufficient to entitle a coparcener to alienate the coparcenary property by gift. In the present case this aspect is further fortified by the admitted fact of filing of title suit No. 10 of 1989 for partition by Ambika Singh accepting unity of title and jointness of possession over the suit land between parties to the suit in which the defendant/respondents of the present appeal were defendants and the property subject-matter of the gift deed had also been included in the suit property. The said suit was abandoned as per the submission of the counsel for the appellants, after the death of Ambika Singh. There is no evidence on record to establish the partition in the joint family of the appellant and the respondents. The Apex Court in (T. Venkat Subbamma v. T. Rattamma) AIR 1987 SC 1775 after taking notice of the authoritative texts on Hindu law and different decisions on the issue has affirmed the view and held:

“There is a long catena of decision holding that a gift by a coparcener of his undivided interest in the coparcenery property is void.”

For the reasons it was held that Ambika Singh had no right to gift the joint family property and as such has rightly reversed the decree of the Trial Court.

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Chartered Accountants can practice in LLP Format

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Limited Liability Partnership Concept

The Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (LLP Act) was passed by the Parliament in December, 2008. Some sections of this Act came into force on 31-3- 2009. Some of the other sections have come into force on 31-5-2009. The LLP Rules, 2009, have come into force on 1-4-2009. Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) is a new form of statutory organisation which is gaining its importance and opening new opportunities for practising Chartered Accountants. Section 3 of the LLP Act provides that LLP formed under the Act is a body corporate and is a legal entity separate from its partners. It is also provided that LLP shall have perpetual succession and any changes in its partners will not affect the existence, rights or liabilities of the LLP. In other words, the concept of LLP is akin to a partnership firm with the liabilities of the partners being limited to the amount of capital contributed by the partners. It is a better alternative to a private limited company. The status of the LLP under the Income-tax Act is that of a ‘Firm’. After the amendment of the Chartered Accountants Act, w.e.f. 1-2-2012, the status of LLP formed by Chartered Accountants in practice is also that of a ‘Firm”. Government Notification dated 23-5-2011 provides that for the purposes of section 226(3)(a) of the Companies Act, LLP formed by Chartered Accountants in practice will not be considered as a corporate body. In this article the features of the LLP Act with special reference to eligibility of Chartered Accountants to use LLP format for their audit and tax practice are discussed.

Formation of LLP

Any two or more persons can form an LLP for the purpose of carrying on any business, profession or occupation. Even the LLP can also be a partner in another LLP. It is necessary that at least one of the partners in LLP should be a resident in India. Every LLP should have two designated partners who are individuals, one of whom should be a resident in India. The restriction of 20 partners which is applicable to a partnership firm does not apply to LLP. In other words, LLP with any number of partners can be formed for carrying on any business or profession. It may be noted that u/s.10 (23) of the Income-tax Act the definition of ‘Firm’ includes LLP and all the provisions relating to a partnership firm apply to LLP.

The partners of LLP will have to select a name and apply to the Registrar of Companies (ROC) in Form No. 1 with prescribed fees for approval of such name. The ROC will approve the name only if it is not the same or similar to the name of a limited company, an LLP or a firm. After getting the approval for a name, the partners will have to file the following Forms with ROC with the prescribed fees and follow the following procedure for incorporation of LLP.

(i) Form No. 2 — Form of incorporation document to be signed by all partners who have to join LLP as partners.

(ii) Form No. 3 — Form for filing LLP Agreement. For this purpose LLP agreement will have to be executed.

(iii) Form No. 4 — Notice of appointment and cessation of partners, designated partners, consent of partners/designated partners or any changes in their particulars to be filed by LLP with ROC.

(iv) Form No. 6 — Particulars of names and addresses of partners or changes therein to be intimated by partners to LLP.

(v) Form No. 7 — Application for allotment of Designated Partner Identification Number (DPIN).

(vi) Form No. 9 — Consent to act as designated partner to be filed by such partner with LLP.

(vii) When the above forms are submitted to ROC, he will give certificate of incorporation in Form No. 16. The LLP will be deemed to have been incorporated on that day. It can start its business or profession from that date.

Relationship of partners

Upon registration of LLP, the partners will have to enter into a partnership agreement in writing. This agreement will determine the mutual rights and duties of the partners and their rights and duties in relation to the LLP. Persons who have signed the incorporation document as partners along with other partners, if any, can execute this partnership agreement. The information of this partnership agreement is required to be filed with ROC with Form No. 3. Whenever there are changes in the terms and conditions of the partnership, LLP has to file the details of the change in Form No. 3 with ROC and pay the prescribed fees for the same. If the partnership agreement is executed before registration of LLP, the partners will have to ratify this agreement after incorporation of LLP and file the details in Form No. 3 with ROC.

If the partners do not execute the partnership agreement, the relationship between the partners will be governed by the First Schedule to the LLP Act. This schedule provides that mutual rights and duties of partners of LLP shall be determined as stated in this schedule in the absence of a written agreement. Even if there is a written agreement, but there is no specific mention about any of the specified matters, such matters will be governed by the provisions of First Schedule to the LLP Act.

Any person may join the LLP as a partner if all partners agree to admit him as a partner. Similarly, a partner will cease to be a partner on his death, retirement or on winding up of the LLP in which he is a partner. For this purpose, the partners will have to execute a fresh partnership agreement recording the terms and conditions of the partnership with revised constitution. Intimation about admission of new partners or retirement of a partner will have to be given to the ROC in Form No. 3 and Form No. 4 within 30 days.

The rights of a partner to share profits or losses of LLP are transferable either in whole or in part. Such transfer will not mean that the partner has ceased to be a partner or that the LLP is wound up. Such a transfer will not entitle the transferee or assignee to participate in the management or conduct of the activities of the LLP. Similarly, the transferee will not get right to any information relating to the transactions of LLP.

The partnership agreement may provide for payment of interest on amount contributed by partner in LLP or remuneration payable to the partners. Further, the agreement will have to provide the share of each partner in profits or losses of LLP. The partnership agreement should also provide for the voting rights of each partner. The conditions relating to payment of interest, remuneration or share in profits or losses can be changed by amendments in the partnership agreement. It may be noted that under the Income-tax Act interest and remuneration paid to the partners is allowable as deduction from business or professional income of LLP if it does not exceed the limits provided in section 40(b). The provisions of section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act are applicable to an LLP since its status under the Income-tax Act is that of a ‘Firm’.

 Limited liability of partners

A partner of LLP is not personally liable, directly or indirectly, for any debts or obligations of LLP. However, a partner will be personally liable for any liability arising from his own wrongful act or omission. If such liability arises due to wrongful act or omission of any partner, the other partners will not be personally liable for the same. Each partner of LLP will have to contribute such amount for the business of LLP as may be determined by the partnership agreement. The liability of each partner will be limited to the extent of the amount as specified in the partnership agreement.

Designated partners

As stated earlier, at least two partners (individuals) have to be appointed as designated partners. It is also necessary that at least one of the designated partner is a resident of India. Appointment of such partners will be governed by the partnership agreement. In the event of any vacancy due to death, retirement, or otherwise, LLP has to appoint another partner as a designated partner within 30 days. Particulars of designated partners or changes therein have to be filed with ROC in Form No. 4. If LLP does not appoint at least two designated partners or if the number of designated partners fall below two, all partners shall be considered as designated partners. It may be noted that the designated partner has to give consent in writing to the LLP in the prescribed Form No. 9 of his appointment. LLP has to file this consent letter with ROC in Form No. 4 within 30 days of his appointment.

The following will be the obligations of designated partners.

(i)    They are responsible, on behalf of LLP, for compliance with the provisions of the LLP Act and Rules, including filing of any document, return, statement, etc. as required by the Act and the Rules.

(ii)    They are liable for all penalties imposed on the LLP for any contravention of LLP Act and the Rules.

(iii)    Every designated partner will have to sign the annual financial statements and annual solvency statement.

(iv)    Each designated partner will have to obtain a ‘Designated Partner Identification Number’ (DPIN). For this purpose, the application is to be made in Form No. 7.


Accounts and audit

LLP has to maintain such books of accounts as prescribed in Rule 24 of the LLP Rules. These books should be retained for 8 years. Such books may be maintained either on cash basis or accrual basis of accounting. It may be noted that the accounting year of each LLP will have to end on 31st March. LLP cannot choose accounting year ending on any other date. LLP has to prepare a statement of accounts and a solvency statement on or before 30th September each year. These statements have to be signed by the designated partners of LLP. The accounts of LLP have to be audited by a Chartered Accountant in accordance with Rule 24 of the LLP Rules. Under this Rule, such audit is compulsory if the turnover of LLP exceeds Rs.40 lac or contribution of partners in LLP exceeds Rs.25 lac. Rule 24 provides for procedure for appointment, removal, resignation, remuneration, disqualification, change of auditors, etc. There is no specific form of Audit Report which is required to be given. ICAI will have to issue guidance in this respect. The particulars of statement of accounts and solvency statement have to be filed with ROC in Form No. 8 on or before 30th October each year with the prescribed fees. LLP has to file an annual return with ROC on or before 30th May each year in Form No. 11 with the prescribed fees.

Conversion of partnership firm into LLP

Section 55 of the LLP Act provides that an existing Partnership Firm (Firm) can be converted into LLP by following the procedure laid down in the Second Schedule. Briefly stated, this procedure is as under.

(i)    A firm may apply to convert into an LLP if and only if the partners of the LLP to which the firm is to be converted, comprise all the partners of the firm and no one else.

(ii)    The firm will have to comply with the provisions of the Second Schedule to the Act.

(iii)    The firm will have to follow the procedure for getting the name of LLP approved and procedure for incorporation of LLP as stated above.

(iv)    Further, the firm has to apply for conversion into LLP to ROC in Form No. 17 with prescribed fees. The firm has to attach documents listed in that Form.

(v)    The ROC will then give certificate of conversion into LLP in Form No. 19.

(vi)    Thereafter, the LLP will have to inform the Registrar of Firms about conversion of firm into LLP in Form No. 14. The Registrar of Firms will then remove the name of the firm from his records. Thus, the firm will be deemed to have dissolved.

Effect of conversion of firm into LLP

If an existing partnership firm is converted into a LLP and registered as such, as stated above, u/s.55 of the LLP Act, the effect of such registration shall be as under. This is provided in Second Schedule.

(i)    On and from the date of registration specified in the certificate of registration —

(a)    all tangible and intangible properties vested in the firm all assets, interests, rights, privileges, liabilities, obligations, relating to the firm and the whole of the undertaking of the firm shall be transferred and shall vest in LLP without further assurance, act or deed, and

(b)    the firm shall be deemed to be dissolved and removed from the records of the Registrar of Firms.

(ii)    If any of the above properties is registered with any authority, LLP shall, as soon as practicable, after the date of registration, take all necessary steps as required by the relevant authority to notify the authority of the conversion and of the particulars of LLP in such medium and form as the authority may specify. If any stamp duty is payable under the relevant law, the same will have to be paid.

(iii)    All proceedings by or against the firm which are pending in any court, tribunal or any authority on the date of registration shall be continued, completed and enforced by or against LLP.

(iv)    Any conviction, ruling, order or judgment of any court, tribunal or other authority in favour of or against the firm shall be enforced by or against LLP.

(v)    All deeds, contracts, schemes, bonds, agreements, applications, instruments and arrangements subsisting, immediately before the date of registration of LLP, relating to the firm or to which the firm is a party, shall continue in force on or after that date as if they relate to LLP and shall be enforceable by or against LLP as if LLP was named therein or was a party thereto instead of the firm.

From the above discussion, it will be noticed that a partnership firm, with unlimited liability of partners, can now be converted into limited liability partnership (LLP) by following the above procedure. Such partnership firm after such conversion will not be required to comply with the provisions of the Partnership Act.

Taxation of LLP

The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, provides for taxation of LLP. In the definition of the term ‘Firm’ and ‘Partnership’ in section 2(23) of the Income-tax Act, it is stated that the term ‘Firm’ or ‘Partnership’ will include any LLP w.e.f. 1-4-2009. Further, the definition of a ‘Partner’ will include a partner of LLP. Therefore, all the provisions for taxation of ‘Firm’ will apply to LLP. The tax will be payable by the LLP at 30% plus Education Cess. No surcharge will be payable by LLP from A.Y. 2010-11. In view of this provision, no Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) will be payable by LLP. Similarly, no dividend distribution tax will be payable by LLP. As discussed above, the remuneration paid to working partners and interest to partners, subject to the limits prescribed in section 40(b), will be allowed in computing taxable income of LLP.

The return of income of LLP will have to be signed by a designated partner of LLP. If for some reason he is not able to sign the return, any partner can sign. New section 167 C is added to provide that each partner of LLP is jointly and severally liable to pay tax due from LLP if it cannot be recovered from LLP. If such partner proves that the non-recovery cannot be attributed to any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on his part in relation to the affairs of LLP, he will not be liable to discharge this liability. Similar provision exists in section 188A which applies to partners of a ‘Firm’. It may be noted that to this extent liability of partners LLP is unlimited.

Position under Chartered Accountants Act

The C.A. Act, 1949, has been amended by the Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Act, 2011 in December, 2011. This Amendment has come into force from 1-2-2012.

The following provisions are made by the Amendment Act.

(a) ‘Firm’ is defined in section 2(1)(ca) as under.

“(ca)    ‘Firm’ shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and includes —

(i)    The Limited Liability Partnership as de-fined in clause (n) of s.s (1) of section 2 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008.

(ii)    The sole proprietorship registered with the Institute”

(b)    ‘Partner’ is defined in section 2(1)(eb) as under.

“(eb)    ‘Partner’ shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, or in clause (q) of s.s (1) of section 2 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, as the case may be.”

(c)    ‘Partnership’ is defined in section 2(1)(ec) as under.

“(ec)    ‘Partnership’ means —

A.    a partnership as defined in section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, or

B.    a limited liability partnership which has no company as its partner.”

(d)    Further, the Explanation to section 2(2) is amended to clarify that “a firm of such chartered accountants” shall include a firm or LLP consisting of one or more chartered accountants and members of any other professional body having prescribed qualifications.

Hitherto, the terms ‘Firm’, ‘Partnership’ or ‘Partner’ were not defined. The Amendment Act of 2011 now defines these terms. Therefore, LLP in which partners are Chartered Accountants holding CoP and members of other recognised professions, as may be prescribed, are also partners will be entitled to practice as Chartered Accountants if LLP is registered by ICAI. Such LLP can undertake any audit or attest function.

Conversion of a CA Firm into Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)

ICAI has issued detailed guidelines for conversion of CA Firm into LLP on 4-11-2011. These guidelines are published on pages 939-941 of CA Journal for December, 2011. Some of the salient features of these guidelines are as under.

(i)    All existing CA firms who want to convert themselves into LLPs are required to follow the provisions of Chapter-X of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 read with Second Schedule to the said Act containing provisions for conversion from existing firms into LLP.

(ii)    In terms of Rule 18(2)(xvi) of the LLP Rules, 2009, if the proposed name of LLP includes the words ‘Chartered Accountant’ or ‘Chartered Accountants’, as part of the proposed name, the same shall be referred to ICAI by the Registrar of LLP and it shall be allowed by the Registrar only if the Secretary, ICAI approves it.

(iii)    If the proposed name of LLP of CA firm resembles with any other non-CA entity as per the naming Guidelines under the LLP Act and its Rules, then the proposed name of LLP of CA firm which includes the word ‘Chartered Accountant’ or ‘Chartered Accountants’, in the name of the LLP itself, the Registrar of LLP may allow the same name, subject to compliance with Rule 18(2)(xvi) of LLP Rules as referred above.

(iv)    For the purpose of registration of LLP with ICAI under Regulation 190 of the Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1988, the partners of the firm shall apply in ICAI Form No. ‘117’ and the ICAI Form No. ‘18’ along with copy of name registration received from the Registrar of LLP and submit the same with the concerned regional office of the ICAI. These Forms shall contain all details of the offices and other particulars as called for together with the signatures of all partners or authorised partner of the proposed LLP.

(v)    The names of the CA firms registered with the ICAI shall remain reserved for the partners as one of the options for LLP names subject to the provisions of the LLP Act, Rules and Regulations framed thereunder.

(vi)    There are provisions relating to seniority of firms.

(vii)    These guidelines will apply to conversion of proprietary firm into LLP.

(viii)    There are similar provisions for formation of new LLP by Chartered Accountants in practice.

Position for statutory audit under the Companies Act

In July, 2011 issue of CA Journal, the President has, in his letter to the members, specifically stated that LLP will not be treated as Body Corporate for the limited purpose of appointment of statutory auditors. Following is the extract from the President’s letter which clarifies that the Ministry of Corporate Affairs have clarified by Circular No. 30A of 2011, dated 26-5-2011 that LLP of Chartered Accountants will not be treated as Body Corporate and MCA has taken the view that LLP can be appointed as a statutory auditors of the company.

“Important Clarifications

LLP will not be treated as Body Corporate for Limited Purpose of Appointment as Statutory Auditors:

Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) has now become a new form of statutory organisation which is gaining its importance and opening up new opportunities for the practising Chartered Accountants. The practising Chartered Accountants can now take the advantage in forming/realigning their firms as Limited Liability Partnership. As per section 3(1) of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, since a limited liability partnership is a body corporate, it is precluded from appointment as Statutory Auditors of the company u/s.226(3)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956 which provides by way of disqualification for appointment of auditor of a company that a body corporate cannot be appointed as an Auditor. To remove this lacuna, on a representation made by us, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has clarified vide its Circular No. 30/2011, dated 26-5-2011 that Limited Liability Partnership of Chartered Accountants will not be treated as body corporate and has taken the LLP out of the purview of the definition of Body Corporate u/s.2(7)(c) of the Companies Act, 1956 and therefore, LLP can be appointed as Statutory Auditors of the company.”

It may be noted that in the Companies Bill, 2011, which is pending before the Parliament, section 139 dealing with appointment of auditors provides that any individual Chartered Accountant holding CoP or any firm of Chartered Accountants can be appointed as auditors of a company. Explanation to section 139(4) clarifies that a firm of Chartered Ac-countants shall include LLP practising the profession of Chartered Accountants. In view of the above, it is now evident that with effect from 1-2-2012, when the C.A. (Amendment) Act, 2011, has come into force, Chartered Ac-countants can join as partners and practice in LLP format. Such LLP will be eligible to be appointed as statu-tory auditors of a company under the Companies Act. Similarly, such LLP can also undertake tax audit assignment u/s.44AB of the Income-tax Act. Such LLP can also undertake any attest function under other laws as the definition of ‘Firm of Chartered Accountants’ in the C.A. Act now includes ‘Limited Liability Partnership’ registered with the Institute.

Taxation on conversion of a C.A. firm in LLP

As stated earlier, the C.A. Act has been amended with effect from 1-2-2012 to permit Chartered Accountants to practise in LLP format. ICAI has issued guidelines on 4-11-2011 for conversion of C.A. Firms into LLPs. ICAI is making all efforts to encourage those in business or profession to adopt LLP form of organisation. However, the Income-tax Act does not contain any specific provision granting exemption from tax on conversion of a Firm into LLP.

Since ‘Partnership Firm’ and ‘LLP’ are separate entities, on conversion of C.A. Firm into CA LLP the tax authorities are likely to treat such conversion as transfer of assets of the Firm to LLP. The tax authorities may treat this as transfer, as the firm will stand dissolved u/s.55 read with Second Schedule of the LLP Act, as discussed above. They may invoke the provisions of section 45(4) dealing with transfer of firm’s assets on dis-solution of the firm and levy capital gains tax on the difference between the market value of the assets of the firm on the date of such conversion and the cost of the assets of the firm.

It may be noted that section 47(xiii) and 47(xiv) of the Income-tax Act provides for exemption from capital gains tax on conversion of a firm or a proprietary concern into a limited company, subject to certain conditions. Further, the Finance Act, 2010, has inserted section 47(xiiib) to provide for exemption from capital gains tax on conversion of an unquoted limited company into LLP, subject to certain conditions. No such exemption is provided in the Income-tax Act when a firm is converted into LLP.

Explanatory Memorandum attached to the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2009, stated that since a partnership firm and LLP is being treated as equivalent, the conversion from partnership to LLP will have no tax implication, if the rights and obligations of the partners remain the same after conversion, and if there is no transfer of any asset or liability after conversion. If there is a violation of these conditions, the provisions of section 45 will apply and capital gains tax will be payable. This is a very vague statement and does not specify any conditions in clear terms. There is no specific provision made in the Income-tax Act for granting exemption when conversion of a partnership firm is made into LLP and all assets and liabilities of the firm are transferred to LLP.

It may be noted that the Standing Committee on Finance, while considering Clause 47 of the Direct Taxes Code, Bill, 2010 in para 4.14 of their report has recommended that the Ministry should modify this Clause so that conversion of a partnership firm into LLP does not attract any tax liability.

If the LLP format is to be made popular for Chartered Accountants and others, it is necessary that ICAI and various chambers, representing the business community, should strongly represent to the Government to amend section 47 of the Income-tax Act. This can be achieved by inserting a new clause similar to section 47(xiii), granting exemption from capital gains tax, to any firm, which is converted into LLP under the provisions of section 55 read with the Second Schedule of the LLP Act.

Mobile Payments — the future trend

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This write-up discusses some of the prevailing trends and products available for making payment by using a mobile phone. While there is a lot of similarity in the payment process, there are subtle differences in technologies used and accompanying advantages/ disadvantages. This write-up seeks to highlight some of the differences.

To say that the advent of mobile telephony in India has changed the lives of countless millions would be stating the obvious. Today, mobile phones are not just a means of communication, but they are much more. I am sure, neither Alexander Graham Bell (who invented the telephone in 1875) nor did Dr. Martin Cooper (who is credited with designing the first practical mobile phone back in 1973) ever imagined that one day in the future their invention would be used to:

  • Flash1 one’s status (funky, snooty, VFM)
  • Collect memories (photos)
  • Stay connected (Facebook & Twitter)
  • Keep updated (news, alerts)
  • Entertain (music, video)
  • Transact (m-commerce)
  • Influence people (Obama’s election campaign) 

Be that as it may, today, mobile phones are an integral part of our day-to-day environment and (at the cost of repeating myself2), their importance/ our dependence on this marvel of technology is growing by the day. Today, the phone has become the hub for all our activities, from e-mailing and browsing to paying bills and transferring money. In fact, mobile phones are fast replacing your credit/ debit/ATM cards (Plastic money) as a convenient mode of transacting. For the uninitiated, please watch the recent ads put up by Airtel, Indusind Bank. There are several active players3 and they offer the same or similar services, for a charge (of course). Here it is important to understand what is on offer, and then pare down expectations accordingly.

How does a mobile banking/wallet work?

Mobile banking (not to be confused with phone banking) allows you to conduct financial transactions on your phone just as you would at a bank branch or through Net banking. Banks are now evolving this facility as they launch innovative products (this sometimes entails installing an app on your phone). In the mobile banking segment, all telecom companies have tie-ups with different banks that allow you to avail of banking services.

  • The process is pretty simple, and the steps could be something like: Register with the service provider: Open an account with the concerned bank or telecom company.
  •  In case of a bank — register for Net banking.
  • Use a Java-based phone4.
  • Activate GPRS services on your connection, so that you can access the Net5.
  • Install the banks phone app.

To transfer funds, you will have to:

  • Log in using the bank’s app menu and input the mobile phone number or bank account number of the beneficiary.
  •  Message the PIN you receive from the bank to the beneficiary who will also receive a secret number.
  • The recipient will have to log in with both PINs at the ATM to withdraw the money.
  • If the funds are being transferred to a bank account, it will take about four working days.

Practical applications:

IndusInd Bank’s cash-to-mobile service enables customers to transfer money to anybody, including those who do not have an Indusind Bank account. A bank customer is required to download the bank’s app on his phone, and then put in the phone number of the person to whom he wants to send the money, along with the transaction amount. The bank sends a message to the remitter and the beneficiary, along with different PINs to each. The remitter is required to message his PIN to the beneficiary, who can then use both PINs and his mobile number to withdraw cash from an IndusInd Bank ATM. The service is free, but operator charges would apply. Also, the sender will need a Java-enabled handset. Airtel Money has a different offering.

Airtel Money can be used on any mobile phone, and you can register for it by dialling *404# or at an authorised Airtel Money retailer. There are two types of accounts. The first one is an express account, wherein you can load Rs.10,000, and use it to pay utility bills or for booking rail/flight tickets on travel portals. The upgraded version is called a power account, which can be loaded with amount up to Rs.50,000. This can be done through Net banking or an Airtel Money retailer.

Charges?

There is a minimum fee for each transaction. For instance, a transfer of up to Rs.500 will cost Rs.5, while higher transactions and up to Rs.10,000 will entail a fee of Rs.10. Under mobile banking, apart from the transaction charge, one also pays Internet charges and SMS charges to the service provider.

Other considerations:

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has capped the transaction limit to Rs.10,000 for all essential services like ticketing, utility bill payments, etc. For non-essential transactions, the limit is set at Rs.5,000. There is also a ceiling of Rs.50,000 for loading the wallet.

While online banking has picked up pace, mobile banking is currently subdued. One reason for this is that whenever a new technology is introduced in the market, it takes time for people to familiarise themselves with it, which is why the growth is slow. Phone technology is another problem area, as there are different platforms of mobile banking for different phones. Also, let us not forget the whole business of bandwidth — all these applications need secure and good connections.

 Presently, most banks have decided to take one step at a time. They are not pushing hardcore banking services, but only presenting mobile banking as an enquiry tool to entice customers to carry out transactions. For example, SMS alerts for bill payment may tempt you to pay the bill through the phone itself.

What’s in store for the future?

Notwithstanding the above, the advent of smart phones has definitely spelt good news for the mobile banking segment. Why? For starters, the younger generation today prefers to use mobiles more than PCs. Secondly, statistics7 suggest that there are approximately 13 million Internet users in the country, as against 911 million mobile phone users. Obviously, the numbers would justify future trends and investments.

This decade belongs to mobile telephone, and the use of phones (smart or otherwise) is going to be the trend of the future. Until then, bon chance.

1    On April 3, 1973 Dr. Martin
Cooper did show off to his rival Joel Engel, head of research at AT&T’s
Bell Labs by placing a call to him while walking the streets of New York City
talking on the first Motorola DynaTAC prototype.

 2    Refer to this feature in the BCAJ March 2010.

 3    Airtel, Oxicash, Paymate, ICICI, Citi, Indusind,
etc.

 4    Not required for Airtel Money.

  5    Not required for Airtel Money.

6     This is based on the
information available in public domain, there may other charges/conditions.
Readers are expected to do their own due diligence before subscribing to the
service.

   7  Released by TRAI in February 2012.


levitra

Section B : Miscellaneous

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The Company had initiated a voluntary recall of certain products as a precautionary measure against possible contamination due to the packaging integrity of such recalled products. The provision for loss due to products recalled is based on estimates made by the management by applying principles laid down in Accounting Standard – 29 ‘Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets’. Further it is not possible to estimate the timing/uncertainty relating to the outflow. The movement in the provision during the period is as under:
levitra

Day one fair valuation of financial instruments

This article
illustrates the accounting implications of day one fair valuation of assets and
liabilities on initial recognition and its subsequent measurement. When a
financial asset or financial liability is recognised initially in the balance
sheet, the asset or liability is measured at fair value (plus transaction costs
in some cases). Fair value is the amount for which an asset could be exchanged,
or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an
arm’s-length transaction.

In other words, fair value is an actual or estimated transaction price on the
reporting date for a transaction taking place between unrelated parties that
have adequate information about the asset or liability being measured.

The following are certain transactions where fair value on initial recognition
may be different than their transacted amounts.

1. Low-interest or interest-free loans Where a loan or a receivable is
transacted at market interest rates the fair value of the loan will equal the
transaction value. If a loan or a receivable is not based upon market terms,
then it is accounted for in accordance with IAS 39 which states that “the fair
value of a long-term loan or receivable that carries no interest can be
estimated as the present value of all future cash receipts discounted using the
prevailing market rate(s) of interest for a similar instrument (similar as to
currency, term, type of interest rate and other factors) with a similar credit
rating. Any additional amount lent is an expense or a reduction of income
unless it qualifies for recognition as some other type of asset.” In assessing
whether the interest charged on a loan is below market rates, consideration
should be given to the following factors:

  • Credit worthiness of the
    counter-party
  • The terms and conditions of the
    loan including whether there is any security
  • Local industry practice
  •  Local market circumstances.

In particular, the entity would
consider the interest rates currently charged by the entity or by others for
loans with similar maturities, cash flow patterns, currency, credit risk,
collateral and interest basis.

Initial recognition

A. Repayable on demand: A loan repayable on demand is not required to be
discounted, as the fair value of the cash flows associated with the loan is the
face value of the loan (due to it being repayable on demand).

B. Repayable with fixed maturity: The fair value of the interest-free loan is
the present value of all future cash flows discounted using the market-related
rate over the term of the loan. The rate used to discount an interest-free loan
is the prevailing market interest rate of a similar loan. Any difference
between the cost and the fair value of the instrument upon initial recognition
is recognised as a gain or a loss, unless it qualifies to be recognised as an
asset or liability. Subsequent measurement If the loan is classified by the
lender as a ‘loan and receivable’, the loan is measured at amortised cost using
the effective interest rate method. The fair value of the loan will increase
over the term to the ultimate maturity amount. This accretion will be
recognised in the income statement as interest income.

 For the borrower that measures the financial liability at amortised cost,
the liability will increase over the life of the loan to the ultimate maturity
amount. This accretion in the liability will be recognised in the income
statement as interest expense. Illustration — Nil interest loan between common
control parties When low-interest or interest-free loans are granted to
subsidiaries, in the separate financial statements of the investor, the
discount should be recognised as an additional investment in the subsidiary. In
the separate financial statements of the investee, the effect would be given in
the shareholders’ equity.

Illustrative examples

Assume the face value of the loan is Rs.100,000 and the fair value of the loan
is Rs.80,000 at the initial recognition date.

Case 1: Parent grants interest-free loan to the subsidiary

Case 2: Subsidiary grants an interest-free loan to its parent

Case3: Subsidiary grants an interest-free loan to another fellow subsidiary




Note: Deferred tax entries have been ignored

Accounting entries in the books of the

 

 

Parent in Case 3

Dr.

Cr.

Deemed Investment in
borrowing subsidiary

20

 

 

 

 

To deemed dividend
income from lending

 

 

subsidiary

(20)

 

 

 

 


2. Low-interest or interest-free loans to employees

Loans given to employees at lower than market interest rates generally are
short-term employee benefits. Loans granted to employees are financial
instruments within the scope of IAS 39 Financial Instruments. Therefore,
low-interest loans to employees should be measured at the present value of the
anticipated future cash flows discounted using a market interest rate. Any
difference between the fair value of the loan and the amount advanced is an
employee benefit. If the favourable loan terms are not dependent on continued
employment, then there should be a rebuttable presumption that the interest
benefit relates to past services, and the cost should be recognised in profit
or loss immediately. If the benefit relates to services to be rendered in
future periods (e.g., if the interest benefit will be forfeited if the employee
leaves, or is a bonus for future services), then the amount of the discount may
be treated as a prepayment and expensed in the period in which the services are
rendered. If the services will be rendered more than 12 months into the future,
then the entire benefit is a long-term benefit.

The above accounting treatment would not hold good if the loans are repayable on demand. This is because in absence of a fixed tenure and the feature of repayable on demand, the fair value of the loan would correspond with the amount of the loan.

3.    Interest-free security/lease deposits

Initial recognition

In case of the provider of the deposit, the deposit should be recognised at fair value. The difference between the fair value and transaction amount would be considered as a prepaid rent under IAS 17 for the provider.

Subsequent measurement
The loan is classified by the provider of the deposit as a ‘loan and receivable’; the loan is measured at amortised cost using the effective interest rate method. The fair value of the deposit will increase over the term to the ultimate maturity amount. This accretion will be recognised in the income statement as interest income and prepaid rent will be amortised on a straight-line basis as rent expense under the principles enunciated in IAS 17.

For the receiver of the deposit, the deposit shall be classified as a financial liability at amortised cost; the liability will increase over the life of the loan to the ultimate maturity amount. This accretion in the liability will be recognised in the income statement as interest expense and advance rent received will be amortised on a straight-line basis as rent income. The amortisation would be similar to the prepaid salary as illustrated above.

Illustration

Assume Rs.1,000,000 lease deposit has been given — interest-free for a term of 5 years. Assuming market rate of borrowing is 10% for the lessee and market rate for investments is also 10% for the lessor. The fair value on the first day of the lease would be Rs.620,931 (i.e., fair value as discounted).

The accounting would be as follows:

 

Accounting
entries

Dr.

 

 

Cr.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In
the books of entity

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

giving
the deposit

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Transaction
date —

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Initial
recognition of

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

deposit
at fair value

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and
difference treated

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

as
prepayment

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lease deposit receivable

620,921

 

 

 

 

 

 

Prepaid rent

379,079

 

 

 

 

 

 

To bank

 

1,000,000

 

 

 

End
of first period —

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.  Accretion of interest

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

on
deposit using

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

original
discount rate

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lease deposit receivable

62,092

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Interest income on

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

deposit

 

62,092

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Accounting
entries

Dr.

Cr.

 

 

 

2.  Amortisation
of

 

 

notional
prepaid rent

 

 

 

 

 

Rent expense

 

 

(i.e., 379079/5 years)

75,816

 

To prepaid rent

 

75,816

 

 

 

In
the books of entity

 

 

receiving
the deposit

 

 

 

 

 

Bank

1,000,000

 

To lease deposit payable

 

620,921

To rent received in advance

 

379,079

 

 

 

End
of first period —

 

 

1.  Accretion of interest on

 

 

deposit
using original

 

 

discount
rate

 

 

 

 

 

Interest expense on

 

 

deposit

62,092

 

To lease deposit payable

 

62,092

 

 

 

2.  Recording
additional

 

 

notional
rental income

 

 

Rent received in advance

75,816

 

To rent income

 

75,816

 

 

 

The aforesaid accounting principles would not apply if the lease is a cancellable lease, since then the security deposit would be repayable on demand and as explained above would need to be accounted at the transaction value.

Section A : Accountin g Treatment for Share Issue and IPO-related expenses

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Bajaj Corp. Ltd. (31-3-2011)
From Significant Accounting Policies:

Initial Public Offer (IPO) Expenses: All the IPO expenses amounting to Rs.1,896.25 lac are written off during the year and shown as exceptional item in the Profit & Loss Account.

IndoSolar Ltd. (31-3-2011)

From Significant Accounting Policies and Notes to Accounts:

Miscellaneous expenditure: Until 31st March 2010, the Company had an accounting policy to amortise share issue expenses over a period of 5 years. The share issue expenses amounting to Rs.308,863,060 incurred during the year and the balance of Rs.26,960,927 remaining unamortised as at 31st March 2010, has now been adjusted against the Securities Premium Account as permitted u/s.78 of the Companies Act, 1956, on account of a change in the accounting policy in the year ended 31st March 2011. Had the Company continued to follow the same accounting policy, the miscellaneous expenditure written off and the net loss would have been higher by Rs.34,778,485 for the year ended and miscellaneous expenditure would have been higher by Rs.301,045,502 as at 31st March 2011.

Subex Ltd. (31-3-2011)

From Significant Accounting Policies:

Preliminary and Share Issue Expenses: Expenses incurred during the Initial Public Offer, follow on offer and issue of Bonus Shares are amortised over 5 years. Other issue expenses are charged to the securities premium account.

 Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. (31-3-2011)

Deferred revenue expenses: Share issue expenses are amortised over a period of three years on a straight-line basis following the year of incurring the expenses.

levitra

GAPS in GAAP — Guidance Note on Accounting for Real Estate Transactions (Revised 2012) is in no-man’s land

Introduction

On account of the diverse practices, the ICAI felt it necessary to issue a revised Guidance Note titled Guidance Note on Accounting for Real Estate Transactions (Revised 2012) to harmonise the accounting practices followed by real estate companies in India. The revised Guidance Note should be applied to all projects in real estate which are commenced on or after April 1, 2012 and also to projects which have already commenced but where revenue is being recognised for the first time on or after April 1, 2012. An enterprise may choose to apply the revised Guidance Note from an earlier date, provided it applies it to all transactions which commenced or were entered into on or after such earlier date. The revised Guidance Note (2012) supersedes the Guidance Note on Recognition of Revenue by Real Estate Developers, issued by the ICAI in 2006, when this Guidance Note is applied as above. Though apparently the Guidance Note on accounting for real estate transactions is drafted in a simple and lucid manner, but when implemented, can throw a lot of implementation issues. Particularly, there are several requirements in the Guidance Note, which some may argue conflict with the accounting standards notified under the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules.

 Scope of the Guidance Note

One of the big challenges is with respect to scope of the Guidance Note, which is not very clear on several aspects. The Guidance Note scopes in development and sale of residential and commercial units. Would that mean that if a customer were to hire a real estate developer to construct a villa on the land owned by the customer and in accordance with the customer’s specification, that transaction would be covered under the Guidance Note? In the author’s view, this seems like a typical construction contract, to which AS-7 and not the Guidance Note would apply. The Guidance Note applies to construction-type contracts, for example, construction of a multi-unit apartment to be sold to many buyers. It is pertinent to note that though percentage of completion is applied under AS-7 and the Guidance Note, there are other significant differences which would give different accounting results. Consider another example. A real estate developer sells villas to customers. It enters into two agreements with each buyer: one for sale of land and other for construction of building. Can the company treat these two agreements separately and recognise revenue accordingly?

In a practical scenario, three possibilities may exist with regard to construction of villa. These possibilities and likely views are:

(1) Customer owns land and it hires real estate developer to do the construction according to its specifications. In this case, the arrangement seems like a typical construction contract to which AS-7 and not the Guidance Note will apply.

(2) Real estate developer sells land and constructed villa together as part of one arrangement in a manner that customer cannot get one without the other. In this case, it seems appropriate that the developer will apply Guidance Note to land and building together.

(3) Real estate developer sells land. The buyer has an option of getting construction done either from the developer or any other third party. Both the land sale and construction element are quoted/ sold at their independent fair values.

The Guidance Note does not specifically deal with this scenario. However, the author believes that the more appropriate view will be to treat the sale of land and construction of building as two separate contracts and apply revenue recognition principles accordingly. The Guidance Note applies to redevelopment of existing buildings and structures. This scope is very confusing. For example, very often existing housing societies may ask a developer to reconstruct a property, with detailed specification on structure and design and the right to change that specification before or during the construction. The developer (who is hired like any other contractor) in return is remunerated by a fixed amount or a part of the constructed property or land. The author’s view is that in these circumstances, AS-7 should apply, rather than the Guidance Note. This is because the said contract is a construction contract which is covered under AS-7 and not a construction-type contract which is covered under the Guidance Note. But consider another example of a SRA project in Mumbai. The real estate developer evacuates existing tenants, constructs a huge property to be sold to customers, and adjacently constructs a small building that will house the existing tenants. All through the builder acts as a principal. In such a scenario the Guidance Note will apply.

Can the Guidance Note be applied by analogy to construction and sale of elevators or windmills, etc.? Therefore, applying the guidance note by analogy, can entities manufacturing elevators or windmills, which are of a standardised nature, use the percentage of completion method? The scope of the Guidance Note is very narrow.

The Guidance Note should not be applied by analogy to any other activity other than real estate development. Depending on the facts and circumstances, either AS-7 or AS-9 should apply to construction and sale of elevators, aircraft, windmills or huge engineering equipments. The Guidance Note scopes in joint development agreements, but provides no further guidance on how joint development agreements are accounted for. Joint development agreements may take various forms. The accounting for joint development agreement will be driven by facts and circumstances. They could be joint venture agreements or they could represent the typical scenario where land development rights are transferred to the real estate developer by the land owner, and the legal transfers take place much later, for reasons of stamp duty or indirect taxes. Transfer of development rights on land is like effectively transferring the land itself. Where development rights are transferred, the author has seen mixed accounting practices. Some developers treat the transaction as a barter transaction and record the development rights acquired as land purchased with the corresponding obligation to pay the landowner at a future date. The payment to the landowner could either be in a fixed amount or a fixed percentage of revenue or a portion of the constructed property. Many developers do not account for the barter transaction.

A third option is to record the acquisition of the development rights at the cost of constructed property to be provided to the land owner. This option can be justified on the basis that the Guidance Note requires TDRs to be recorded at lower of net book value or fair value. Though there is no impact on the net profit on the overall contract, whichever method is followed, it would impact the grossing up of revenue and costs. It will also result in the grossing up of the balance sheet. Further though the overall profit is the same over the project construction period, due to the manner of computing POCM, year-to-year profit may vary under the three options. For better clarity the three options are enumerated below. (Figures in all tables are in CU=Currency Unit, unless otherwise stated)

Balance sheet

Particulars Option 1 Option 2 Option3
Share capital 100 100 100
Reserves 500 500 500
Equity 600 600 600
Loan liability 2,000 2,000 2,000
Liability to landowners
(to be paid by way of
transfer of constructed
property — long term) 2,000 1,500
Total liabilities 2,000 4,000 3,500
Total funds 2,600 4,600 4,100
Land (acquired thru JDA) 2,000 1,500
Other assets 2,600 2,600 2,600
Total assets 2,600 4,600 4,100
Debt/equity ratio 3.33 6.66 5.83
Particulars Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Sale of flats to outsiders  8,000 8,000 8,000
Transfer of flat to
land owners 2,000 1,500
Total revenue 8,000 10,000 9,500
Land cost 2,000 1,500
Construction cost 7,500 7,500 7,500
Total cost 7,500 9,500 9,000
Profit 500 500 500
% profit on turnover 6.25% 5% 5.26%


Is the Guidance Note in conformity with the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules?

AS-9, Revenue Recognition, applies to sale of goods and services. AS-7, Construction Contracts applies to construction contracts which are defined as “contracts specifically negotiated for the construction of an asset or a combination of assets that are closely interrelated or interdependent in terms of their design, technology and function or their ultimate purpose of use”. In respect of transactions of real estate which are in substance similar to delivery of goods, principles enunciated in Accounting Standard (AS) 9, Revenue Recognition, are applied. For example, sale of plots of land without any development would be covered by the principles of AS-9. These transactions are treated similar to delivery of goods and the revenues, costs and profits are recognised when the goods are delivered. In case of real estate sales, which are in substance construction-type contracts, a two-step approach is followed for accounting purposes.

Firstly, it is assessed whether significant risks and rewards are transferred to the buyer. The seller usually enters into an agreement for sale with the buyer at initial stages of construction. This agreement for sale is also considered to have the effect of transferring all significant risks and rewards of ownership to the buyer. After satisfaction of step one, the second step is applied, which involves the application of the POCM. Once the seller has transferred all the significant risks and rewards to the buyer, any acts on the real estate performed by the seller are, in substance, performed on behalf of the buyer in the manner similar to a contractor. Accordingly, revenue in such cases is recognised by applying the POCM. Once the revenue recognition conditions as per the Guidance Note are fulfilled, the POCM is to be applied mandatorily. In circumstances where the revenue recognition conditions are fulfilled, completed contract method is not permissible.

Accounting standards are notified under the Companies Accounting Standard Rules. The standards that deal with revenue recognition contract are AS-7 & AS-9. Accordingly the entire population of revenue contracts should either fall under AS -7 or AS-9. For example, a strict interpretation of a construction contract under AS-7 will lead one to the conclusion that a real estate sale is a product sale rather than a construction contract. By carving a new category in the Guidance Note, namely, in substance construction contract, for purposes of real estate development; some may argue that this Guidance Note falls in no -man’s-land and is not in accordance with the law. This line of thinking may be of particular interest to private companies that may find completed contract method more attractive for tax reasons.

Volatility in earnings

The Guidance Note imposes several conditions before a company can start applying the percentage of completion method on the real estate project. One of the conditions is that at least 25% of the construction and development costs should have been completed. One interesting aspect of the Guidance Note is that land cost is not included to determine if the 25% construction cost trigger is met. However, once the revenue recognition trigger is met, all costs including land cost is added to the project cost to determine percentage completion and the corresponding revenue and costs. This is likely to bring about a lot of volatility in the reported revenue and profit numbers. For example, let’s assume that land cost is 60% and development cost is 40%. As soon as 25% development cost is incurred, POCM commences. In this example, 70% of the costs (land cost of 60% and 25% of 40 on development), and corresponding revenue would be recognised at the point 25% development cost criterion is met. This would result in significant spike in the revenue and profit numbers. One of the main criticisms of the completed contract method is that it resulted in lumpy accounting. The manner in which POCM is applied as per the revised Guidance Note, it would fall into the same trap.

The examples below will explain more clearly how the revised Guidance Note results in volatility and how one could have avoided the volatility in the pre-revised Guidance Note.

RE Ltd. undertakes construction of a new real estate project having 20,000 square feet saleable area. The project will take 2 years to complete. Half the project is sold on day 1, and there are no further sales. All critical approvals are received upfront and all other POCM conditions are fulfilled at the end of Year 1. The construction and development cost is evenly spread in the two years at CU 150 million each. The total sale value of the units sold is Rs.400 million. Assume 50% amount is realised on all executed contracts and there are no defaults from customer side.

Particulars Year 1 Year 2
Area sold (sq.ft) 10,000 10,000
Estimated land cost (a) 300 300
Estimated construction cost (b) 300 300
Total estimated cost (a+b) 600 600
Actual cost incurred on land (c) 300 NIL
Actual additional construction cost (d) 150 150
Actual cost incurred on cumulative
basis (c+d) 450 600
Total sale consideration as per
executed agreements 400 400

Revenue as per POCM under revised GN

Particulars Year 1 Year 2
Total estimated project cost 600 600
Actual cost incurred 450 600
Stage of completion (% completion) 75 100
Cumulative revenue to be recognised
(400 x % completion) 300 400
Revenue for the period (a) 300 100
Land cost charged to P&L (b)
(300 x 10,000/20,000) 150
Construction cost charged to P&L (c)
(Actual construction cost incurred x
10,000/20,000) 75 75
Particulars Year 1 Year 2
Profit for the period (a-b-c) 75 25
Inventory — land cost 150 150
Inventory — construction cost of
unsold area 75 150
Total inventory 225 300

As stated earlier, consider that under the revised Guidance Note land cost is not included to determine the revenue trigger; but once the revenue trigger is achieved, land cost is included to determine percentage completion and the corresponding revenue and costs. As one can see in the above table this Guidance Note results in significant volatility in the revenue and profit recognised in Year 1 and Year 2, though the construction activity was evenly spread in the two years. This is because the land costs and the associated revenues get recognised in Year 1.

Revenue as per POCM under pre-revised GN

Particulars Year 1 Year 2
Total estimated project cost
(excluding land) 300 300
Actual cost incurred (excluding land) 150 300
Stage of completion (% completion) 50% 100%
Cumulative revenue to be recognised
(400 x % completion) 200 400
Revenue for the period (a) 200 200
Land cost charged to P&L (b)
(300 x 10,000/20,000 x % completion) 75 75
Construction cost charged to P&L (c)
(Actual construction cost incurred x
10,000/20,000) 75 75
Profit for the period (a-b-c) 50 50
Inventory — Land cost 225 150
Inventory — construction cost of
unsold area 75 150
Inventory 300 300

In the pre-revised Guidance Note the practice many companies followed was to allocate the land cost and revenue proportionately over the development activity. As one can see in the above table, one of the practices under the pre-revised Guidance Note results in a more stable recognition of revenues and profits. This is because the land cost and corresponding revenues are recognised in proportion to the development activity.

Revenue as per POCM if only 24% construction is completed under revised GN

Particulars Year 1 Year 2
Total estimated project cost 600 600
Actual cost incurred 372 600
Stage of completion for revenue
recognition threshold* 24% 100%
Stage of completion (% completion) NIL 100%
Cumulative revenue to be recognised
(400 x % completion) NIL 400
Revenue for the period (a) NIL 400
Land cost charged to P&L (b)
(300 x 10,000/20,000) NIL 150
Construction cost charged to P&L (c)
(Actual construction cost incurred x
10,000/20,000) NIL 150
Profit for the period (a-b-c) NIL 100
Inventory — land cost 300 150
Inventory — construction cost
(sold — no revenue recognised
+ unsold area) 72 150
Total inventory 372 300

Assumptions

  •    Same facts as POCM example except actual construction cost incurred
  •     Assume company has incurred CU72 million of construction cost in Year 1

*    First year POC = 72/300 = 24% (actual construction cost/total estimated construction cost)

In a slightly tweaked example (as seen in the above table), assume in Year 1 that construction cost of CU 72 million is incurred. This works out to 24% of the total construction costs. Hence revenue recognition trigger is not satisfied in Year 1. All of the revenue and costs get recognised in Year 2. This example demonstrates two things. One is that the Guidance Note would result in significant volatility in the revenue and profit numbers. Secondly, this example demonstrates how a rule-based standard can be abused. For example, by incurring a little more cost and crossing the 25% threshold, the developer could have recognised significant revenue and profits in Year 1.

What is a project?

The application of the POCM under the Guidance Note is done at the project level. The Guidance Note defines project as the smallest group of units/plots/ saleable spaces which are linked with a common set of amenities in such a manner that unless the common amenities are made available and functional, these units/plots/saleable spaces cannot be put to their intended effective use. The definition of a project is very critical under the Guidance Note, because that determines when the threshold for recognising revenue is achieved and also the manner in which the POCM is applied. The definition of the term ‘project’ in the Guidance Note is somewhat nebulous. Firstly, it is defined as a smallest group of dependant units. This is followed by the following sentence in the Guidance Note “A larger venture can be split into smaller projects if the basic conditions as set out above are fulfilled. For example, a project may comprise a cluster of towers or each tower can also be designated as a project. Similarly a complete township can be a project or it can be broken down into smaller projects.” Once the term ‘project’ is defined as the smallest group of dependant units, it is not clear why the word ‘can’ is used instead of ‘should’. Does it mean that there is a limitation on how small a project can be, but no limitation on how big a project could be?

The definition is nebulous. Consider an example where two buildings are being constructed adjacent to each other. Both these buildings would have a common underground water tank that will supply water to the two buildings. As either of the building cannot be put to effective use without the water tank, the project would be the two buildings together (including the water tank). Consider another example, where each of those two buildings have their own underground water tank and other facilities and are not dependant on any common facilities. In this example, the two buildings would be treated as two different projects. Consider a third variation to the example, where each of those two buildings have their own facilities, and the only common facility is a swimming pool. In this example, judgment would be required, as to how critical the swimming pool is, to make the buildings ready for their intended use. If it is concluded that the swimming pool is not critical to the occupancy of either of those two buildings, then each of those two buildings would be separate projects. Where it is concluded that the swimming pool is critical to put the two buildings to its intended effective use, the two buildings together would constitute a project. In the example, where two buildings are being constructed adjacently, and each have their own independent facilities and are not dependant on common facilities, one may argue that there is a choice to cut this as either a project comprising two buildings or two projects comprising one building each. If this is indeed the case, the manner in which this choice is exercised is not a matter of an accounting policy choice, but rather a choice that is exercised on a project-by-project basis. In the author’s view, a company should exercise such choice at the beginning of each project and not change it subsequently.

Recognition criteria — Some practical issues

Query
For the purposes of applying the POCM risks and rewards should be transferred to the buyer. Real estate construction involves various types of risks, such as the price risks, construction risks, environmental risks, ability of the real estate developer to complete the project, political risks, etc. There could be situations where the political or environmental risks may be very significant and put to doubt the developers ability to complete the project. Clearly both under the 2006 Guidance Note and the 2012 Guidance Note revenue should not be recognised. But in normal scenario’s how much weightage one would provide to price risks in determining the transfer of risks and rewards?

Response

As per the 2006 Guidance Note, the important criteria were the legal enforceability of the contract, the transfer of price risks to the buyer and the buyer’s legal right to sell or transfer his interest in the property. In contrast paragraph 3.3 of the 2012 Guidance Note states as follows: “The point of time at which all significant risks and rewards of ownership can be considered as transferred, is required to be determined on the basis of the terms and conditions of the agreement for sale. In the case of real estate sales, the seller usually enters into an agreement for sale with the buyer at initial stages of construction. This agreement for sale is also considered to have the effect of transferring all significant risks and rewards of ownership to the buyer, provided the agreement is legally enforceable and subject to the satisfaction of conditions which signify transferring of significant risks and rewards even though the legal title is not transferred or the possession of the real estate is not given to the buyer.” As can be seen the 2012 Guidance Note is nebulous, and is not explicit like the 2006 Guidance Note which clearly sets out the price risk as being most critical to the transfer of significant risks and rewards. At this stage it is not clear how this difference will impact accounting of the real estate sales. For example, a company may decide the construction, environment and regulatory risk as being more critical than the price risk. In those circumstances, would the company apply the completed contract method instead of the POCM? Therefore this will be a significant area of judgment, and could lead to diversity in practice if companies interpret this term differently. However, if a project has become highly uncertain because of political and environmental issues, revenue should not be recognised under either Guidance Note.

Query

Is payment of stamp duty and registration of the real estate agreement necessary to start applying POCM?

Response

In certain jurisdictions, one needs registered docu-ments for the purposes of obtaining a bank loan. In other cases, a customer may decide to register the documents later at the time of possession to save on the interest element on the stamp duty amount. It is important to understand this. POCM can be applied only when there is a legally enforceable contract. It is a matter of legal interpretation and the applicable legislation, whether an unregistered document is legally enforceable. If the agreement is legally enforceable, POCM can be applied. If the agreement is not legally enforceable, POCM cannot be applied. The same also holds true in the case of MOU or letter of allotment given by the builder to the customer instead of a complete legal agreement. The question to be answered invariably is whether the arrangement is legally enforceable.

Query

Very often real estate companies to protect the valuation of the property impose a lock-in restriction on a buyer for a reasonable period, which generally does not extend beyond the project completion period. Would lock-in restrictions preclude the application of the POCM till such time the lock-in rights exist?

Response
In the author’s view, such reasonable restrictive provision does not materially affect the buyer’s legal right. Accordingly, it can be argued that in such instances risks and rewards are transferred to the buyer. Hence POCM can be applied.

Query
In rare cases, real estate developers provide price guards to customers as an incentive to buy properties. For example, a guarantee is provided that should the real estate developer sell the property to subsequent buyers at a rate lower than the previous buyer, the real estate developer would reimburse the previous buyer for the fall in price. Would this preclude application of the POCM?

Response

If these restrictions are substantive, then it may be argued that price risks are not transferred and hence POCM should not be applied. In some situations the price guards may not be substantive, for example, a guarantee by the developer that subsequent sales would not be made at a price lower than 40% charged to the previous buyer may be irrelevant in a rising property market. In such cases POCM can be applied. In the author’s view if there are repurchase agreements or commitments, or put-and- call options, between the developer and the customer, which are substantive in nature, POCM cannot be applied in those circumstances.

Query

One of the conditions for POCM is environment clearance and clear land title. In few cases, this could be a highly judgmental area. Auditors may have difficulty in auditing the same.

Response

Past experience has been that some major projects were stalled mid-way in India, because of lack of environmental clearance, or the land title was questionable. The problem is further compounded because of myriads of clearances and complicated legislations. As an auditor, one would look at seeking clarity from the in-house legal department or an external law firm. Banks generally conduct due diligence on these projects before approving loan to the developer and the customer. Clearance of the project by various banks may provide additional evidence.

Query

One of the conditions for POCM is the 25% completion of construction and development costs. Whether borrowing cost capitalised would be included to determine if this 25% threshold is achieved?

Response

There is some confusion on this. In paragraph 2.2 of the Guidance Note borrowing cost is treated as a distinct category separate from construction and development costs. But paragraph 2.5 lists down borrowing cost as construction and development costs. Based on paragraph 2.2 borrowing costs will not be included to determine the trigger. Based on paragraph 2.5 borrowing costs will be included to determine the trigger. The best way to resolve this anomaly is to include borrowing costs relating to construction and development costs and exclude proportionate borrowing costs on land to determine the trigger.

The other issues around borrowing cost relate to allocation of borrowing cost and which borrowing cost qualify for capitalisation for the purposes of determining project cost and corresponding revenue. The EAC had earlier opined that borrowing cost relating to security deposit for the purposes of acquiring land or other assets is not eligible for capitalisation, because security deposit is not a project cost. Another question that arises when determining project cost for calculating POCM is whether proportionate borrowing cost on land should be included. One view is that land is ready for its intended use when acquired and hence borrowing cost should not be capitalised. Another view is that land and building should be seen as part of a project. If the project is considered as a unit of account, borrowing cost should be capitalised on the project which includes the land component till the project is ready for its intended use. The author believes that the latter is more appropriate given the emphasis on project as the unit of account in the Guidance Note.

Query

Real estate developers enter into innovative schemes with customers. A customer may pay the entire consideration upfront of CU 100 and receive the possession of the property after 2 years of construction. Alternatively the customer pays CU 121 after 2 years on receiving the possession of the property. Would the real estate developer consider time value of money and recognise an interest expense of CU 21 and revenue of CU 121 in the former case?

Response

Well, generally interest imputation is not done under Indian GAAP.

Query

Real estate developers usually pay selling commission to various brokers for getting real estate booking. Can a real estate company include such commission in project cost to apply POCM?

Response

The Guidance Note does not explicitly deal with selling commission paid to brokers. According to paragraph 2.4 of the Guidance Note, selling costs are generally not included in construction and development cost. This suggests a company cannot include selling commission in the project cost and it will need to expense the same to P&L immediately. However, some real estate companies may argue that this view is not in accordance with paragraph 20 of AS-7. Since the Guidance Note refers to AS-7 for application of POCM, implication of its paragraph 20 should also be considered. According to this paragraph “costs that relate directly to a contract and which are incurred in securing the contract are also included as part of the contract costs if they can be separately identified and measured reliably and it is probable that the contract will be obtained.” This is one more instance where the Guidance Note conflicts notified accounting standards. The ICAI should clarify this issue.

Query

With respect to onerous contract, at what level would the developer evaluate onerous contract – is it at the individual contract level or project level?

Response

At the project level, the overall project may be profitable, as the profitable contracts may outnumber the loss -making contracts. If the unit of account was the individual contract, then all contracts that are loss making, will require a provision for onerous contract. The Guidance Note requires such evaluation to be done at the project level rather than on each individual contract. Some may argue that this requirement of the Guidance Note is in contravention of the requirements of the notified accounting standard, namely, AS-29 which requires the provision to be set up at the individual contract level.

Query

How is warranty costs accounted for?

Response

Warranty costs are included in project cost. In practice there are different ways in which warranty costs are treated in the application of the POCM. Warranty costs are unique in the sense that they are incurred after the project is completed and can only be estimated. Firstly warranty is not a separate multiple element or service or sale of good or service. Rather it is part of the obligation of the developer to hand over the constructed property to the buyer. The author has seen mixed accounting practices for warranties. Some companies recognise warranty costs and the corresponding revenue when the project is completed, because that is the time, the warranty period effectively starts. Other companies recognise warranty costs and corresponding revenue throughout the construction period, on the basis that a percentage of the cost incurred would need reworking.

Assume the same facts as POCM example. Consider that RE also gives a 5-year warranty from water leakage and other structural defects. Based on past experience, RE estimates that it will incur warranty cost equal to 5% of total construction cost. Hence, additional warranty cost is CU 15 million (i.e., 5% of CU 300 million construction cost).

Option 1 — Consider warranty cost only when tower is handed over

Particulars Year 1 Year 2
Total estimated project cost
(excluding warranty) — (a) 600 600
Total estimated project cost
(including warranty) — (b) 615 615
Actual cost incurred
(excluding warranty provision) — (c) 450 600
Warranty provision — (d) NIL 15
Total cost including
warranty — (c + d) (e) 450 615
Stage of completion
(% completion) — (e)/(b) 73.17% 100%
Cumulative revenue to be
recognised (400 x % completion) 293 400
Revenue for the period 293 107

In this case, the company recognises warranty cost and related revenue only when tower is handed over. Warranty cost is factored in total estimated construction cost. Since no provision for warranty is made in Year 1, stage of completion is lower resulting in lower revenue being recognised in Year 1 (i.e., CU 293 million vis-à-vis CU 300 million in earlier scenario when there was no warranty cost). Lower revenue recognised in Year 1 gets recognised in Year 2 on completion of the project.

Option 2 — Consider warranty cost as and when revenue is recognised

Particulars Year 1 Year 2
Total estimated project cost
(excluding warranty) — (a) 600 600
Total estimated project cost
(including warranty) — (b) 615 615
Actual cost incurred (excluding
warranty provision) — (c) 450 600
Warranty provision (5% of actual
construction cost) — (d) 7.5 15
Total cost including warranty
(c + d) (e) 457.5 615
Stage of completion
(% completion) — (e)/(b) 74.39% 100%
Cumulative revenue to be recognised
(400 x % completion) 298 400
Revenue for the period 298 102

In this option, company follows a policy of recognising warranty as and when revenue is recognised. Hence company provides for warranty as and when work is carried out. In Year 1, company incurs actual construction cost of CU 150. Hence, it makes a warranty cost equal to 5% of actual construction cost incurred i.e., CU 7.5 in Year 1. Since warranty provision is made on an ongoing basis, stage of completion in Year 1 is higher vis -à-vis option 1. This results in higher revenue being recognised in Year 1.

Transfer of development rights

TDRs are recorded at the cost of acquisition; but interestingly in an exchange transaction, TDR is recorded either at fair market value or at the net book value of the portion of the asset given up, whichever is less. For this purpose, fair market value may be determined by reference either to the asset or portion thereof given up or to the fair market value of the rights acquired, whichever is more clearly evident. The principle of recording TDRs at lower of cost or fair value ensures that fair value gain on exchange of TDRs is not recognised in the financial statements but when fair value is lower than cost, it is recorded at fair value, so that impairment is captured upfront.

Typically under AS-26 and AS-10, recording of exchange transactions at fair market value is permitted. Under IFRS principles, exchanges that have substance are also recorded at fair market value. It is not clear why recording of exchanges with substance at fair market value is not permitted. By conjecture, the standard setters may be concerned about the possibility of abuse by recognising profits on exchanges that may not have substance.

Transactions with multiple elements

An enterprise may contract with a buyer to deliver goods or services in addition to the construction/ development of real estate. The Guidance Note gives example of property management services and rental in lieu of unoccupied premises as multiple elements. It further states that sale of decorative fittings is a separate element, but fittings which are an integral part of the unit to be delivered is not a separate element. Where there are multiple elements, the contract consideration should be split into separately identifiable components including one for the construction and delivery of real estate units. The consideration received or receivable for the contract should be allocated to each component on the basis of the fair market value of each component. For example, a real estate company in addition to the consideration on the flat, charges for property maintenance services for a period of two years, after occupancy. Such revenue is accounted for separately and over the two-year period of providing the maintenance services.

As already mentioned, the consideration received or receivable for the contract should be allocated to each component on the basis of the fair market value of each component. Such a split-up may or may not be available in the agreements, and even when available may or may not be at fair value. When the fair market value of all the components is greater than the total consideration on the contract, the Guidance Note does not specify how the discount is allocated to the various components. Under the proposed revenue recognition standard in IFRS, the allocation is done on a proportion of the relative market value. This in the author’s view is the preferred method. However, some may argue that the residual or reverse residual method may also be applied, in the absence of any prohibition in the Guidance Note. Under the residual method the entire discount is allocated on the first component and in the reverse residual method the entire discount is allocated to the last component.

Would one consider revenue on sale of parking slots as a multiple element? Unfortunately the Guidance Note does not elaborately define multiple elements. In the author’s view, parking slots are an extension of the construction and development of the real estate unit and hence should not be treated as a separate multiple element.

What about lifetime club membership fees? Will it be treated as a separate element? If the club is going to be transferred to the tenants or the housing society, then it should be treated as an extension of the real estate unit rather than a separate element. However, if the real estate developer will own and operate the club, it should be treated as a separate element.

Conclusion

As discussed at several places in this article, there are too many loose ends and too many matters of conflict between the notified accounting standards and this Guidance Note. Some may argue that the Guidance Note is ultra vires the law. These matters need to be appropriately addressed by the ICAI. In the author’s view, an appropriate response would have been to participate in the standard-setting process of the IASB; particularly with respect to the development of the new IFRS standard on revenue recognition, which requires the application of the POCM on real estate contracts.

Reality Check in Implementing the Revised Schedule VI

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Introduction

The Revised Schedule VI is applicable for the financial statements prepared for the periods commencing on or after 1 April, 2011. Since the year end for the majority of the Indian companies happens to be 31 March, the real impact of the changes brought out in the format of financial reporting in the form of Revised Schedule VI is going to be felt by the corporate world only now! By way of introducing the changes in the reporting format of the financial statements which was prevailing for several years and introducing new concepts and disclosure requirements, the Regulator has posed an onerous obligation on the finance professionals serving the Indian corporates to understand the nuances of the reporting requirements and extract the information required to ensure appropriate reporting and compliance. Though the Revised Schedule VI itself contains several explanatory provisions for the various new reporting requirements at a macro level, there are several matters which need to be micro managed and addressed carefully. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has issued a Guidance Note on the Revised Schedule VI providing implementation guidance on various aspects of the Revised Schedule VI. In view of the extent of the changes and the complications involved in applying the changed concepts in practical business scenarios, the first year of reporting under the Revised Schedule VI will throw several questions/ implementation issues. This article is aimed at discussing some of the implementation issues that may arise in presenting the financial statements as per the Revised Schedule VI and the suggested approach for dealing with the same.

Backbone of the Revised Schedule VI

  • The essence of the changes brought out by the Revised Schedule VI could be broadly summarised as under from a macro perspective:Changing the presentation of the financial statements in line with the expectations of the international investor community. ? Bringing in clarity/standardisation in the formats.
  • Making explicit that the requirements of the Companies Act, 1956 and the Accounting Standards would override the reporting requirements.
  • Introducing the robust concept of current and non-current classification of assets and liabilities. In the light of the above, several new disclosure requirements have been introduced and similarly some of the redundant disclosures have been omitted. It is quite obvious that the extent of additions is comparatively more than the disclosures which have been discarded. A careful analysis of the Revised Schedule VI would also highlight that the disclosures required now do not imply a simple representation of the figures but also a careful compilation of the various information with sound business knowledge. 

Implementation challenges

Various implementation challenges arising out of the Revised Schedule VI could be broadly summarised under the following categories:

  • Issues relating to Applicability
  • Issues relating to Presentation
  • Issues relating to Interpretation of Concepts/ Terms
  • Other Issues

The above classification is intended for analysing the practical problems logically so as to better understand the issue and deal with the same. Needless to add that the issues identified are not exhaustive but representative only.

Issues relating to applicability

The issues that arise with respect to the applicability of the Revised Schedule VI are discussed below:

Applicability for the consolidated financial statements

As regards the applicability of the Revised Schedule VI for the consolidated financial statements, the current requirement of AS-21 stipulates that the consolidated financial statements have to be prepared in accordance with the format closer to the stand-alone financial statements. In this regard, since the standalone financial statements are expected to be prepared as per the Revised Schedule VI, it is but natural to prepare the consolidated financial statements also in accordance with the Revised Schedule VI requirements. However, to the extent the information is not relevant for meeting the AS- 21 requirements, the same need not be included. It is worth noting that the information as stipulated under the Revised Schedule VI relating to various subsidiaries including foreign subsidiaries needs to be obtained well in advance to facilitate the preparation of the consolidated financial statements.

Applicability for tax purposes

If a company has a reporting period which is different from the tax financial year which is based on April-March, there is a need for preparing a set of separate financial statements for the financial year to meet the tax requirements. There is an issue regarding the format to be used for such reporting in view of the changes made in the reporting format for the statutory accounts prepared under the Companies Act, 1956. Since there is no format prescribed as per the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the financial statements specifically compiled for the tax financial year may be prepared using the Revised Schedule VI to the extent feasible.

Applicability for Clause 41 of the Listing Agreement As regards presentation of the information for meeting the Clause 41 requirements with respect to the statement of assets and liabilities, the SEBI, recently vide its Circular No. CIR/CFD/DIL/4/2012 dated 16 April 2012, has introduced a new format for reporting the results for listed companies which is in line with the Revised Schedule VI.

Issues relating to presentation

The various issues related to presentation aspects in the Revised Schedule VI could be summarised as under:

Data relating to previous year to be provided for comparative purposes

The Revised Schedule VI stipulates that the corresponding amounts have to be provided in the financial statements for the immediately preceding reporting period for all items shown in the financial statements including notes. This would result in representing the previous year financial data as per the Revised Schedule VI which has introduced several new concepts/requirements. With respect to certain requirements where the information is not readily available with the company, suitable disclosures have to be made in the financial statements explaining the same along with the reasons. Further, wherever the previous year audited numbers are represented in accordance with the Revised Schedule VI requirements, it would be better to provide a detailed reconciliation of the reclassifications carried out for making them comparable with the current year presentation.

Cash Flow Statement presentation

The Revised Schedule VI does not stipulate any format for the Cash Flow Statement similar to that for the Balance Sheet and the State of Profit and Loss. This would imply that the Cash Flow Statement needs to be prepared based on the guidance provided in AS-3. Since majority of the companies would present the cash flow statement using the indirect method involving the derived movements between two Balance Sheets, for the purpose of presenting the movements of the previous year, the Balance Sheet of the year preceding the previous year is the starting base. If the cash flow movements have to be presented using the terminologies/principles stipulated as per the Revised Schedule VI (such as Trade receivables, trade payables with current and non-current break-ups, etc.), the exercise of identification/ regrouping of the relevant Balance Sheet items in the year preceding the previous year also needs to be carried out using the Revised Schedule VI in addition to the representation required for the previous year Balance Sheet.

Since there is no stipulated format for the Cash flow statements in the Revised Schedule VI, the possibility of presenting the Cash flow statements as per the terminologies used in AS-3 which may not be in line with the Revised Schedule VI terminologies may also be considered wherein the movements can be continued to be provided as in the case of the past for the current year as well as for the previous year.

Cash and Cash Equivalents

As per the Revised Schedule VI, Cash and Cash Equivalents have to be presented separately on the face of the Balance Sheet. Further, the term Cash and Cash Equivalents have been defined to include balance with banks, cheques and drafts on hand, cash on hand and others. However, the term cash and cash equivalent has been defined differently under AS-3 as per which, cash comprises cash on hand and demand deposits with banks and cash equivalents are short-term, highly liquid investments that are readily convertible into known amounts of cash and that are subject to an insignificant risk of changes in value. In addition, the deposits can be considered as Cash Equivalent only when the original maturity period for the same is less than 3 months. Since the Revised Schedule VI clearly indicates that in the case of conflict, an Accounting Standard would prevail over the Schedule, there is a need for using the definition as per the AS-3 for Cash and Cash Equivalents with suitable disclosures for the other component which would imply suitable modification of the terminologies used in the Balance Sheet for presenting the Cash and Bank Balances. This view has been confirmed by the Guidance Note on Revised Schedule VI issued by the ICAI as well.

Another view could also be taken that the term Cash and Cash Equivalents defined as per AS-3 is applicable only for Cash Flow Statement preparation purposes and not necessarily for other purposes, which would imply that the reporting requirements as the per Revised Schedule VI may be presented as intended in the Revised Schedule VI with a suitable disclosure relating to the break-up of the Cash and Cash Equivalents as per AS-3 (for cash flow tie up purposes) and other items.

Issues relating to interpretation of concepts/ terms

Identification of Current Element

The Balance Sheet format in the Revised Schedule VI has been designed on the basis of classified Balance Sheet approach and hence requires all assets and liabilities to be categorised into current and non- current. One has to remember that while doing the categorisation, the term current will also include the current portion of the long-term assets and liabilities. Further, categorisations of employee benefit-related liabilities, provisions as current and non-current would pose practical difficulties and the same need to be planned upfront.

As part of this exercise of categorisation of the Balance Sheet, while applying the concept of operating cycle, identification poses practical challenges. In general, the term operating cycle is considered as the time required between the acquisition of assets for processing and their realisation in cash or cash equivalents. If a company has different operating cycles for different parts of the business, then the classification of an asset as current is based on the normal operating cycle that is relevant to that particular asset. In cases where the normal operating cycle cannot be identified, it is assumed to have duration of 12 months.

Materiality threshold for disclosure

As per the Revised Schedule VI, separate disclosure is required on the face of the Statement of Profit and Loss for (i) cost of materials consumed, (ii) purchases of stock-in- trade and (iii) change in inventories of finished goods, work-in-progress and stock-in-trade. In this regard, details of consumption of raw materials, purchases and work-in- progress are required to be given under ‘broad heads’.

The term ‘broad heads’ has not been defined under the Revised Schedule and the same needs to be decided taking into account the concept of materiality and presentation of a true and fair view of the financial statements. Such identification of broad heads requires careful consideration and exercise of professional judgment. Considering the general practice, application of a threshold of 10% of total value of purchases of stock- in-trade, work-in-progress and consumption of raw materials can be considered as acceptable for determination of broad heads. However, nothing prevents a company in applying any other threshold as well, duly considering the concept of materiality and presentation of a true and fair view of the financial statements. This position has also been reiterated by the ICAI in its Guidance Note on Revised Schedule VI in Para 10.7.

Identification of Other Operating Revenue

Revised Schedule VI requires specific classification of revenue into sale of products, sale of services and other operating revenue. Interpretation of the term Other Operating Revenue as required under the Revised Schedule VI would pose challenges to companies. This has to be carefully identified and differentiated from Other Income. Whether a particular income constitutes ‘Other Operating Revenue’ or ‘Other Income’ is to be decided based on the facts of each case and a detailed understanding of the company’s activities.

The term Other Operating Revenue would include revenue arising from the company’s operating activities, i.e., either its principal or ancillary revenue-generating activities, but which is not revenue arising from the sale of products or rendering of services.

Goods in transit for individual inventory items
Revised Schedule VI stipulates that the items of inventories of goods in transit need to be disclosed separately for each and every item of the inventory such as raw material, work -in-progress, finished goods, etc. (if any).

Other issues

Impact on ratios calculated for banking arrangements

The definitions for the terms current assets and current liabilities as per the Revised Schedule VI could lead to redefining the current ratios computed by the management and submitted for various banking and other arrangements. Similarly, the extent of cash and cash equivalents as per the Revised Schedule VI could be different from the liquid assets computed for various other purposes.

I GAAP v. Ind AS

Though the Revised Schedule VI is not expecting any change in the measurement yardstick used for accounting and reporting the financial results, there could be practical challenges in dealing with some of the disclosure aspects as per the Revised Schedule VI. For example, the stock options cost charged to the Statement of Profit and Loss needs to be disclosed separately as per the Revised Schedule VI; however, at present there is no accounting standard which deals with the accounting aspects of stock options. However, the ICAI has issued a guidance note on the subject. This poses challenges since basic accounting for stock options cost is not mandatory, whereas the disclosure requirements relating to the same are made mandatory through the Revised Schedule VI. This confusion would continue till the relevant Ind AS dealing with the accounting aspects of stock options becomes mandatory. Similar issues could arise with respect to other items as well where there is no accounting standard governing the basic accounting aspects but there is a disclosure requirement in the Revised Schedule VI.

Change in accounting policy for dividend income received from subsidiaries

As per the old Schedule VI, the parent company had to recognise dividends declared by subsidiary companies even after the date of the Balance Sheet if it pertains to the period ending on or before the Balance Sheet date. However, there is no such requirement as per the Revised Schedule VI. Hence, in line with the Accounting Standard 9 on Revenue Recognition such dividends will have to be recognised now as income only when the right to receive dividends is established.

This would also require a suitable disclosure in the financial statements regarding the change in the accounting policy followed by the company with respect to recognition of such dividend income from subsidiaries.

It is worth noting that though the Revised Schedule VI requires the disclosure of the proposed dividend as part of the notes, in view of the specific provisions of AS-4 ‘Contingencies and Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet date’ which specifically requires adjustment of the proposed dividend in the Balance Sheet, companies need to continue to adjust the proposed dividend in the Balance Sheet, though the declaration by the shareholders is pending. Till such time AS-4 is amended, this position would continue in view of the supremacy of the accounting standards over the Revised Schedule VI which has been stated specifically in the Revised Schedule VI itself.

Position regarding AS-30/31/32

As per the current position AS-30, 31, 32 on Financial Instruments have not been notified under the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006; hence, early application of these standards by a company is encouraged only subject to compliance of the of the other notified Accounting Standards such as AS-11, AS-13 and other applicable regulatory requirements which would prevail over AS-30, 31 and 32. If a company has early adopted Accounting Standards AS-30, 31 and 32, it could have challenges in presenting the financial statements as per the Revised Schedule VI.

For example, for an entity which has early adopted AS-30, 31, and 32, presentation of preference shares and determination of its status as liability or equity based on the economic substance could be an issue for dealing with the presentation requirements of Revised Schedule VI. This has been clarified by the ICAI vide its Guidance Note on Revised Schedule VI (Para 8.1.1.4) that since Accounting Standards AS-30 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, AS-31 and AS- 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosures are yet to be notified and section 85(1) of the Act refers to Preference Shares as a kind of share capital, Preference Shares will have to be classified as Share Capital.

Considering the above and the legal status of Accounting Standards AS-30, 31 and 32 which is recommendatory pending Notification by the Government, careful consideration has to be given with respect to the conflicts, if any, in the presentation between the same and the Revised Schedule VI which is part of the Companies Act, 1956.

Dealing with the requirements from other statutes

If there are any disclosure requirements which emanate from other statutes, the same needs to be provided in addition to the other disclosure requirements stipulated under Revised Schedule VI. For example, the disclosure requirements related to outstanding dues to micro small and medium enterprises should be disclosed in accordance with the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. The same position would continue in the case of disclosures required under the Listing Agreements with the stock exchanges.

Conclusion

Introduction of the Revised Schedule VI is a path-breaking initiative for the Indian corporate world in the era of globalisation. The changes brought out in the financial reporting through the Revised Schedule VI cannot be considered as a simple exercise of representation of numbers in a different format, but requires careful consideration of various factors duly reflecting the business considerations and the investor expectations. There is no doubt that application of the Revised Schedule VI is intended to bring the disclosure requirements of the Indian corporate financial statements in line with the prevailing international practice. The Indian corporates are in the process of responding to the expectations of the Regulators swiftly by gearing themselves to adapt to the new environment of financial disclosures. In this process, there are bound to be various challenges and implementation issues and hence would naturally lead to enhanced learning/experience. By way of properly planning and navigating the financial reporting exercise with utmost care and attention, and taking best use of the available guidance, the implementation challenges can be well managed.

Income arising upon buy-back of shares by a whollyowned Indian subsidiary of a foreign company is taxable in accordance with section 46A and not section 47(iv).

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RST in re
(2012) 19 taxmann.com 215 (AAR) Section 46A, 47(iv) of Income-tax Act Dated: 27-2-2012
Before P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman)
and V. K. Shridhar (Member)
Present for the appellant: Rajan Vora, Vinesh Kirplani, Srirupa Tandon
Present for the Department: V. S. Sreelekha

Income arising upon buy-back of shares by a wholly-owned Indian subsidiary of a foreign company is taxable in accordance with section 46A and not section 47(iv).


Facts:

The applicant, a German company (FCO), was a part of group of companies. FCO had a wholly-owned public limited subsidiary company in India (ICO). To comply with requirements of the Companies Act as regards the minimum number of members, one share each in ICO was held by six other companies as nominees of FCO. Also, FCO held shares in ICO as investment and not stock-in-trade. Subsequently, FCO received intimation from ICO for buy-back of shares at a price determinable in accordance with the RBI guidelines. FCO approached AAR on the issue whether transfer of shares in the course of the proposed buy-back by ICO was exempt u/s.47(iv) of the Income-tax Act. The Tax Department contended that upon buy-back, shares are extinguished and hence section 47(iv) has no application. Further, section 47 does not override section 46A. Also, section 46A was specifically introduced to deal with buy-back. Hence, the gain was taxable in India u/s.46A of the Income-tax Act or Article 13(4) of India-Germany DTAA. FCO contended that the charging section was section 45 and not section 46A. Section 46A was only clarificatory. Section 47(iv) and (v) apply generally to capital assets and to attract section 47(iv), it is enough if the share is a capital asset.

Ruling:

  • The AAR rejected FCO’s contention and held that income arising upon buy-back of shares by ICO would be taxable u/s.46A for the following reasons: Even if six other members of ICO are nominees of FCO, it cannot be postulated that FCO was holding all the shares in ICO. Section 45 is a general provision whereas section 46A is a specific provision dealing with purchase of its own shares by a company and hence, it should prevail over section 45.
  •  Speech of Finance Minister while introducing section 46A has made it clear that section 46A was enacted to deem that the amount received on buy-back was taxable as capital gain and not as dividend.
  • Since income is chargeable to tax under section 46A, the payment made by ICO would be subject to withholding tax.
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