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VAT on Builders and Developers

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Introduction

The historical background of works contract is very interesting. In a landmark judgment in the case of Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (9 STC 353) the Supreme Court held that it is the transaction of ‘sale’ within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, which can be covered by Sales tax legislations. It was held that the transactions of sale, which are completed by delivery, are sale transactions as per the Sale of Goods Act and such transactions can only be taxable under sales tax laws. Where there is a composite contract, like supply of materials and application of labour, it becomes a works contract transaction and cannot be covered by Sales tax legislations. After the above judgment, for number of years, the transactions of works contracts remained outside the scope of Sales tax legislations. It is in the year 1983, the Constitution was amended (46th Amendment), whereby, for enabling levy of Sales tax, deemed sale category was inserted. This was done by insertion of clause (29A) in Article 366 of the Constitution of India. One of such deemed sales category is ‘works contract’ transaction.

After getting powers to levy Sales tax on works contract transactions, States including Maharashtra made legislations for levy of Sales tax on works contract transactions. In Maharashtra, there was a separate Maharashtra Works Contract Act, 1989. Under the above Act, an issue arose, as to whether tax can be attracted on builders & developers, who come up with their own projects and while the construction is in progress, enters into agreement for sale of premises. In the DDQs issued at that time, it was held that such agreements cannot be liable under the Works Contract Act. Reference can be made to the DDQ in case of Unity Developer & Paranjape Builders (DDQ 1188/C/40/ Adm-12, dated 10-3-1988). It was held that there is no employer-contractor relationship between buyer of premises and builder. G. G. Goyal Chartered Accountant C. B. Thakar Advocate VAT Similar position is also repeated in DDQ in the case of M/s. Rehab Housing Pvt. Ltd. & Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (JV) (WC-2003/ DDQ-11/Adm-12/B-276, dated 28-6-2004). In this DDQ, the issue was about constructing tenements for contractee, where price was composite for land and construction. It was held that this is a contract for immoveable property and not covered by the Works Contract Act.

Change in situation

From 1-4-2005, the Works Contract Act is merged into the MVAT Act, 2002 and works contract transactions are covered by the said MVAT Act, 2002. However, still the above situation prevailed and there was no attempt to levy tax on builders & developers. However, in 2005, the Supreme Court delivered judgment in case of K. Raheja Construction (141 STC 298) (SC). In this case, noting that there is separate value for land and separate value for construction, the Supreme Court held the developer as liable to works contract. After the judgment in the case of K. Raheja Construction (141 STC 298) (SC), the VAT authorities held a view that ‘Under Construction Contracts’ are liable to VAT as works contract. The definition of works contract was introduced in the MVAT Act, 2002 on 20-6-2006. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Sales Tax issued Circular 12T of 2007, dated 7-2-2007 explaining that builders & developers, coming up with their own project but entering into agreements for sale of premises, when the construction is under progress, will be works contract transactions and accordingly liability as works contract will be required to be discharged under the MVAT Act, 2002. It was further explained that if the agreement is after completion of construction, then such agreements will not be covered.

In other words, ‘under construction contracts/ agreements’ were stated to be taxable under the MVAT Act, 2002.

 Matter before Bombay High Court After the above development, writ petitions were filed before the Bombay High Court challenging the above interpretation and proposed levy. The High Court has recently decided the said controversy by way of judgment in the case of the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry & Ors. (51 VST 168). The short facts and gist of arguments before the High Court can be noted as under: On behalf of petitioners (a) The amendment in definition of ‘sale’ is unconstitutional, if it is contemplating to levy tax on immovable property. (b) It was shown that the provisions refer to conveyance of land or interest in land, which means immovable property. It was also argued that in works contract the property should pass while executing the contract and not after completion. In case of premises, property passes after construction and conveyance and hence it is a sale of immovable property and not execution of works contract. (c) The works contract contemplates two elements i.e., labour and materials. If third element like land is involved, there is no works contract under Sales tax laws. (d) It was argued that there is no transfer of property to individual buyer of premises, but it is transferred to society by conveyance. Under the above circumstances, no works contract for individual buyers. Provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulations of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 (MOFA) and Model Agreement thereunder, were also referred to. (e) Unlike in the case of K. Raheja (cited supra), in case of agreement under MOFA, there is no separate price for land/construction and hence transaction cannot amount to works contract. (f) Under the MVAT Rules, 2005, there is Rule 58(1A) to grant deduction towards cost of land.

However, deduction is restricted to 70% of contract value. It was argued to be unconstitutional, as, if land value is exceeding 70%, it will amount to levy of tax on land value, which is not permissible.

 On behalf of Government

(a) There is no restriction that if land is involved, the State cannot isolate sale of goods from such contract.

(b) There can be various species of contract and ‘under construction agreement for premises’ is one such specie.

(c) The main argument of the Government was that as per the MOFA Act and Model agreement, buyer gets protection from various aspects like builder cannot change plan, no mortgage of land, etc. Therefore, citing stamp duty judgments, it was argued that construction, after entering into agreement, till completion, will amount to works contract.

(d) Rule 58(1A) is only for measurement of tax and hence not unconstitutional.

 Judgment of High Court

The High Court, after considering the above arguments, held that under construction contract is works contract and VAT can be attracted on the same. The main thrust of judgment is that by making agreement under MOFA, buyer gets some interest in the said flat/premises. The Construction thereafter is therefore works contract. The reasoning of the High Court can be noted as under:

“29. In enacting the provisions of the MOFA, the State Legislature was constrained to in-tervene, in order to protect purchasers from the abuses and malpractices which had arisen in the course of the promotion of and in the construction, sale, management and transfer of flats on ownership basis. The State Legislature has imposed norms of disclosure upon promoters. The Act imposes statutory obligations. The manner in which payments are to be made is structured by the Legislature. As a result of the statutory provisions, an agreement which is governed by the MOFA is not an agreement simplicitor involving an ordinary contract under which a flat purchaser has agreed to take a flat from a developer, but is a contract which is impressed with statutory rights and obligations. The Act imposes restrictions upon a developer in carrying out alterations or additions once plans are disclosed, without the consent of the flat purchaser. Once an agreement for sale is executed, the promoter is restrained from creating a mortgage or charge upon the flat or in the land, without the consent of the purchaser. The Act contains a specific stipulation that if a mortgage or charge is created without consent of purchasers, it shall not affect the right and interest of such persons. There is hence a statutory recognition of the right and interest created in favour of the purchaser upon the execution of a MOFA agreement.

Having regard to this statutory scheme, it is not possible to accept the submission that a contract involving an agreement to sell a flat within the purview of the MOFA is an agreement for sale of immovable property simplicitor. The agreement is impressed with obligations which are cast upon the promoter by the Legislature and with the rights which the law confers upon flat purchasers.”

Holding the above view, the High Court held that ‘Under Construction Contract/Agreements’ will be covered under the MVAT Act, 2002.

Conclusion

Therefore, as on today the State can levy tax on under construction agreements. However, matter is subject to the Supreme Court. It can be noted here that similar controversy in relation to the Karnataka State is already before the larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Larsen & Toubro Limited and Another v. State of Karnataka and Another, (17 VST 460) (SC). Therefore, the ultimate fate will depend upon the Supreme Court judgment.

CONCEPT OF MUTUALITY

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Relevance under Service tax

Though
the concept of ‘mutuality’ has been a subject-matter of extensive
judicial considerations under the Income tax Act and Sales tax laws, it
has been tested judicially to a very limited extent under Service tax.

However,
it assumed significance in the context of Club or Association Service,
the category introduced w.e.f. June 16, 2005, more particularly in the
context of co-operative societies, trade associations and clubs.

The
following Explanation was inserted at the end of section 65(105) of the
Finance Act, 1994 (Act) w.e.f. May 01, 2006: “For the purpose of this
section, taxable service includes any taxable service provided or to be
provided by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a
member thereof, for cash, deferred payment or any other valuable
consideration.” Attention is particularly invited to the following
Explanation inserted to newly introduced section 65B(44) of the Act
which now defines ‘service’ effective from July 01, 2012: “
…………………….

Explanation 2 — For the purpose of
this Chapter, — (a) An unincorporated association or a body of persons,
as the case may be, and a member thereof shall be treated as distinct
persons. ……………”

General concept

It is
widely known that no person can make a profit out of himself. The old
adage that a penny saved is a penny earned may be a lesson in household
economics, but not for tax purposes, since money saved cannot be treated
as taxable income. It is this principle, which is extended to a group
of persons in respect of dealings among themselves. This was set out by
the House of Lords in Styles v. New York Life Insurance Co., (1889) 2 TC
460 (HL). It was clarified by the Privy Council in English and Scottish
Joint Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Agricultural Income-tax, (1948) 16 ITR 270 (PC), that mutuality
principle will have application only if there is identity of interest as
between contributors and beneficiaries. It was the lack of such a
substantial identity between the participants, with depositor
shareholders forming a class distinct from the borrowing beneficiaries,
that the principle of mutuality was not accepted for tax purposes for a
Nidhi Company (a mutual benefit society recognised u/s.620A of the
Companies Act, 1956) in CIT v. Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd.,
(1964) 53 ITR 241 (SC).

Distinction between Members’ Club/Association and Proprietary Club/Association

(i)
The concept of mutuality and distinction between ‘Members’ Clubs’ and
‘Proprietary Clubs’ has been discussed in detail in a 6-Member Supreme
Court Ruling viz. Joint CTO v. Young Men’s Indian Association, (1970) 26
STC 241 (SC). (‘YMIA’) The relevant extract of discussion is set out
hereafter for reference.

If a members’ club, even though a
distinct legal entity, acts only as an agent for its members in the
matter of supply of various preparations and articles to them, no sale
would be involved as the element of transfer would be completely absent.
Members are joint owners of all the club properties. Proprietary clubs
stand on a different footing. The members are not owners of or
interested in the property of the club. To show the difference of
characteristics between Members’ Club and Proprietary Club, the Supreme
Court held that where every member is a shareholder and every
shareholder is a member, then the same would be called a Members’ Club.

In
a Members’ Club what is essential is that the holding of the property
by the agent or trustee must be holding for and on behalf of and not a
holding antagonistic to the members of the club. (ii) In CIT v. Bankipur
Club Ltd., (1997) 226 ITR 97 (SC), it was held by the Supreme Court
that there must be complete identity between contributors and
participators. If this requirement is fulfilled, it is immaterial, what
particular form the association takes. Trading between persons
associating together in this way does not give rise to profits which are
chargeable to tax. Facilities were offered only as a matter of
convenience for the use of the members. (iii) It was further held in
Chelmsford Club v. CIT, (2000) 243 ITR 89 (SC) that the surplus from the
activities of a club is excluded from the levy of the income-tax.

Applicability to a co-operative society

Where
a co-operative society deals solely with its members, right to
recognition for exemption on grounds of mutuality has been recognised
under income-tax in the following High Court rulings:

  • CIT v. Apsara Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., (1993) 204 ITR 662 (Cal.);
  •  CIT v. Adarsh Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., (1995) 213 ITR 677 (Guj.) and;
  • Director of Income-Tax v. All India Oriental Bank of Commerce and Welfare Society, (2003) 130 Taxman 575 (Del.).

 Judicial considerations under Service tax

The
Service tax authorities had issued show-cause notices to various clubs
demanding Service tax under the service category ‘Mandap Keeper’ on the
ground that the clubs have allowed the members to hold parties for
social functions. Two of such clubs disputed the levy before the
Calcutta High Court viz.:

  • Dalhousie Institute v. AC, (2005) 180 ELT 18 (Cal.).
  •  Saturday
    Club Ltd. v. AC, (2005) 180 ELT 437 (Cal.). In Saturday Club’s case, a
    members’ club permitted occupation of club space by any member or his
    family members or his guest for a function by constructing a mandap.

On the principle of mutuality, there cannot be

(a) any sale to oneself,
(b) any service to oneself or
(c) any profit out of oneself.

Therefore,
the Calcutta High Court held that the same principle of mutuality would
apply to income-tax, Sales tax and Service tax in the following words:
“Income tax is applicable if there is an income. Sales tax is applicable
if there is a sale. Service tax is applicable if there is a service.
All three will be applicable in a case of transaction between two
parties.

Therefore, principally there should be existence of two
sides/entities for having transaction as against consideration. In a
members’ club there is no question of two sides. ‘members’ and ‘club’
both are the same entity. One may be called as principal while the other
may be called as agent, therefore, such transaction in between
themselves cannot be recorded as income, sale or service as per
applicability of the revenue tax of the country. Hence, I do not find it
is prudent to say that members’ club is liable to pay service tax in
allowing its members to use its space as ‘mandap’.”

While
quashing the proceedings, the High Court referred to the decisions in
the case of Chelmsford Club v. CIT, (2000) 243 ITR 89 (SC) & CIT v.
Bankipur Club Ltd., (1997) 226 ITR 97 (SC)

Principles laid down by the Calcutta High Court under Service tax

(a)
The principles laid down by the Calcutta High Court in Saturday Club
& Dalhousie Institute discussed above have been followed in a large
number of subsequently decided cases. Some of these are:

  • Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. v. UOI, (2010) 20 STR 17 (Guj.)
  • Karnavati Club Ltd. v. UOI, (2010) 20 STR 169 (Guj.)
  •  CST v. Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd., (2009) 18 STT 227 (CESTAT-New Delhi)
  •  Ahmedabad Management Association v. CST, (2009) 14 STR 171 (Tri.-Ahd.) and
  •  India International Centre v. CST, (2007) 7 STR 235 (Tri.-Delhi)
(b)In CST v. Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd., (2009) 18 STT 227 (New Delhi-CESTAT) the Tribunal observed:

“using of facilities of club, cannot be said to be acting as its clients and hence, in respect of services provided to its members, a club would not be liable to pay Service tax in the category of club or association service.”

The Revenue’s appeal against the above ruling was dismissed by the Delhi High Court on technical grounds. It needs to be noted that, Explanation inserted at the end of section 65(105) of the Act w.e.f. May 01, 2006, has not been discussed in the aforesaid ruling.

Recent judgment in Ranchi Club Ltd. v. CCE & ST, (2012) 26 STR 401 (JHAR)

Background

A writ petition was preferred by Ranchi Club Limited for declaration that the Club was not covered under the Act and, therefore, was not liable to pay Service tax under ‘Mandap Keeper Service’ or under the ‘Club or Association Service’ categories and prayed for order of prohibition against Central Excise Division, Ranchi from enforcing any of the provisions of the Act.

Contention of the petitioner

Petitioner is a club which is a registered company under the Companies Act, 1956 and is giving service to its members but the club is formed on the principle of mutuality and, therefore, any transaction by the club with its member is not a transaction between two parties. When the club is dealing with its member, it is not a separate and distinct individual. It was submitted that in identical facts and circumstances, however, in the matter of imposition of sales tax, when the club was expressly included in the statutory definition of ‘dealer’ under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, so as to bring the club within the purview of taxing statute of the Madras Sales Tax, the Supreme Court, in YMIA case, considered the definition of the ‘dealer’ by which the club was declared as a ‘dealer’. The Court considered the definition of ‘sale’ as given in the Act of 1959 and Explanation-I appended to section 2(n), specifically declaring ‘sale’ or ‘supply or distribution of goods by a club’ to its members whether or not in the course of business to be a ‘deemed sale’ for the purpose of the said Act. In that situation, the Supreme Court considered the issue that when the club is rendering service or selling any commodity to its members for a consideration, whether that amounts to sale or not. The Supreme Court held that it is a mutuality which constitutes the club and, therefore, sale by a club to its members and its services rendered to the members, is not a sale by the club to its members. In sum and substance, the ratio is that for a transaction of sale, there must be two persons in view of this judgment as well as in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court delivered in the petitioner’s own case i.e., Tax v. Ranchi Club Limited, (1992) 1 PLJR 252 (PAT) (FB) (‘Ranchi Club’). The Full Bench considering the identical issue in the matter of imposition of income-tax observed that no one can earn profit out of himself on the basis of principle of mutuality and held that income-tax cannot be imposed on the transaction of the club with its members.

With the help of these two judgments, it was submitted that the petitioner was a club and was rendering services to its members and the same principle of mutuality applied to the facts of the case in view of the reason that the language in the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 and the provisions under the Income-tax Act are pari materia with the provisions which are sought to be applied against the writ petitioner for levy of Service tax.

Contentions of the Department

The Department submitted that the sale has its own meaning and the service is entirely different transaction which cannot be equated with the sale in any manner. They relied upon the book ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ by G. P. Singh, the then Chief Justice, M.P. High Court (3rd edition), wherein there is reference to a case wherein Bhagwati J observed that, for construction of fiscal statute and determination of liability of the subject to tax, one must refer to the strict letters of law. It was submitted that the statutory provisions are very clear which are sections 65(25a), 65(105)(zzze) as well as Explanation appended to section 65. It was also submitted that when the language of section is absolutely clear, then the meaning of the statute in fiscal matter should be given according to the language and words used in the section and cannot be interpreted on the basis of some ideology or some impressions or with the help of some other enactments. Each of the taxing statute may have its own definition and meaning and they are required to be given effect to, irrespective of the fact that meaning of the same word in different statute has been given differently. It was further submitted that the Supreme Court in the situation of imposition of Sales tax may have held that there cannot be sale by oneself to oneself and himself to himself, but the club can certainly render the service to its members and tax is on the service and the members are paying for the service to the club and, therefore, it is a service for consideration rendered by the club and is liable for tax.


Observations of the High Court

The question which was considered by the Supreme Court in YMIA case was that whether the supply of various preparations by each club to its members involves a transaction of sale within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. In para 15 of the judgement, the High Court quoted the Supreme Court as under:

“Thus in spite of the definition contained in section 2(n) read with Explanation 1 of the Act, if there is no transfer of property from one to another there is no sale which would be exigible to tax. If the club even though a distinct legal entity is only acting as an agent for its members in matter of supply of various preparations to them, no sale would be involved as the element of transfer would be completely absent. This position has been rightly accepted even in the previous decision of this Court”.

The Supreme Court held so after considering the English Law also and observed that the law in England has always been that members’ clubs to which category the clubs in the present case belong cannot be made subject to the provisions of the Licensing Acts concerning sale because the members are joint owners of all the club property including the excisable liquor. The supply of liquor to a member at a fixed price by the club cannot be regarded to be a sale. With regard to incorporated clubs a distinction has been drawn. Where such a club has all the characteristics of a members’ club consistent with its incorporation, that is to say, where every member is a shareholder and every shareholder is a member, no licence need to be taken if liquor is supplied only to the members. If some of the shareholders are not members or some of the members are not shareholders that would be the case of a Proprietary Club and would involve sale. Proprietary clubs stand on a different footing. The members are not owners of or interested in the property of the club. The Supreme Court observed that the above view was accepted by various High Courts in India. The Supreme Court, relying upon other judgments held that members’ club is only structurally a company and it did not carry on trade or business so as to attract the corporation profit tax. Therefore, in spite of specific inclusion of the club in the definition of the dealer in the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, the Supreme Court categorically held that , there cannot be transaction of transfer of property.

The Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of the petitioner itself (Ranchi Club case) after finding that the club was a limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, considered various clauses of the main objects of the club and relying upon various judgments, observed as under:

    Therefore, by applying the principle of mutuality, members’ clubs always claim exemption in respect of surplus accruing to them out of the contributions received by the clubs from their members. But this principle cannot have any application in respect of surplus received from non-members. It is not difficult to conceive in case where one and the same concern may indulge in activities which are partly mutual and non-mutual. True, keeping in view the principle of mutuality, the surplus accruing to a members’ Club from the subscription charges received from its members cannot be said to be income within the meaning of the Act. But, if such receipts are from sources other than the members, then can it still be said that such receipts are not taxable in the hands of the club? The answer is obvious. No exemption can be claimed in respect of such receipts on the plea of mutuality. To illustrate, a members’ club may have income by way of interest, security, house property, capital gains and income from other sources. But such income cannot be said to be arising out of the surplus of the receipts from the members of the club. “

Conclusion by the High Court

“It is true that sale and service are two different and distinct transactions. The sale entails transfer of property, whereas in service, there is no transfer of property. However, the basic feature common in both transactions requires existence of the two parties; in the matter of sale, the seller and buyer, and in the matter of service, service provider and service receiver. Since the issue whether there are two persons or two legal entities in the activities of the Members’ Club has been already considered and decided by the Supreme Court as well as by the Full Bench of this Court in the cases referred above, therefore, this issue is no more res integra and issue is to be answered in favour of the writ petitioner and it can be held that in view of the mutuality and in view of the activities of the club, if club provides any service to its members, may be in any form including as mandap keeper, then it is not a service by one to another in the light of the decisions referred above as foundational facts of existence of two legal entities in such transaction is missing.” (para 18)

Taxability of mutual concerns (up to 30-6-2012)

    a) According to one school of thought, the scheme of Service tax envisages a contractual relationship between the service provider and service receiver. Under a service contract, money flows from the service receiver and service is rendered by the service provider. The Courts have held that relationship between a mutual association and its members is governed by the principle of mutuality and is not one between two different entities. When a facility or amenity is provided to the members, it is so done by the members to themselves through the medium of their agent, the association. There cannot be an independent commercial transaction between a principal and his agent. Therefore, the very scheme of service tax is not applicable to the relationship between the members’ association and its members. Hence, the club or association service category (introduced w.e.f. June 16, 2005) would not apply to mutual concerns.

The ruling of the Jharkhand High Court in Ranchi Club discussed above strongly supports this view and more importantly it has considered the Explanation inserted at the end of section 65(105) of the Act w.e.f. May 01, 2006 to nullify the Calcutta High Court rulings of Saturday Club (supra) and Dalhousie Institute (supra).

    b) According to another school of thought, the Calcutta High Court ruling in Saturday Club & Dalhousie Institute case discussed earlier was in the context of Mandap Keeper Services wherein the relevant taxable service definition u/s. 65(105) of the Act, the service recipient was specified as ‘Client’. However, under the club or association service category, the relevant taxable service definition u/s.65(105)(zzze) of the Act, the service recipient is specified as ‘members’.

The distinction made by the Government is reinforced, if one closely examines, the taxable services definitions of all the newly introduced taxable services through the Finance Act, 2005 which clearly demonstrates that in the context of club or association services ‘members’ have been specified as service recipients liable to tax. Hence the ratio of Saturday Club’s case would not apply in the context of mutual concerns like club, associations, etc. The aforesaid view is reinforced by the insertion of Explanation at the end of section 65 of the Act w.e.f. May 01, 2006.

    c) Though principle of mutuality is relevant, it would appear that taxability of mutual concerns under Service tax remains a highly contentious and litigative issue.

Taxability of mutual concerns under the ‘negative list’ based taxation of services (w.e.f. July 01, 2012)

The terminology employed in Explanation 2 inserted in section 65B(44) of the Act which defines ‘Service’ is identical to that employed in Explanation to section 65(105) of the Act (up to June 30, 2012). Hence, it would appear that, principles of mutuality upheld by the Calcutta High Court in Saturday Club and Dalhousie Institute and the Jharkhand High Court in Ranchi Club, would continue to be relevant.

Further, under Sales tax a constitutional amendment was carried out, to enable States to levy sales tax on sale of goods by a club or association to its members. The same has not been carried out for Service tax.

However, it needs to be expressly noted that the is-sue is likely to be subject of extensive litigations.

Release of Publication on Digest of Full Bench Decisions of Central Information Commission

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BCAS Foundation jointly with Public Concern for Governance Trust (PCGT) released the publication on 26th June, 2012 at Kitab Khana, Mumbai at the hands of Ratnakar Gaikwad, State Chief Information Commissioner. The publication is the result of joint efforts by Ambrose Jude D’Cruz, Anil K. Asher, Advocate and Notary and Narayan K. Varma, Chartered Accountant.

Also present at the occasion were Pradip Thanawala and Pradeep Shah, Trustees, BCAS Foundation and Julio Ribeiro, Chairman, PCGT along with other well-wishers of BCAS Foundation and PCGT.

The publication will help the RTI applicants/activists to better equip themselves and will benefit the society at large. The book is available for sale at BCAS office. L to R: Ambrose Jude D’Cruz, Pradip Thanawala (President), Ratnakar Gaikwad (State Chief Information Commissioner), Julio Ribeiro, Pradeep Shah and Anil Asher.

 In March 2010 two NGOs viz. Public Concern for Governance Trust and BCAS Foundation published a book under the title ‘Right To Information – A Route To Good Governance’. All 2,000 copies printed are exhausted. I have a desire to revise the same and publish a revised and an enlarged edition of it, especially because the book is being appreciated by many who went through the same. However, due to my ill health since last ten months, I have not been able to progress on it. Hopefully, I shall soon do it. Many citizens are filing applications under the RTI Act. As PIOs and FAAs are still reluctant to part with the information, many Second Appeals are being filed before the CIC and SCIC. Many aspects of the law are not settled. Important law points are referred to a full bench for decision. Thus these decisions have a persuasive value. Hence in the meantime, above two NGOs decided to publish this “Digest of Full Bench Decisions of CIC”.

 Idea to publish this Digest was given to me by RTI activist and The Central Information Commissioner, Mr. Shailesh Gandhi. We then requested Mr. Ambrose Jude D’Cruz, Government Law College student to prepare this digest. He has taken lot of pain and had lot of interaction with Mr. Anil K. Asher and me. Finally he handed over the text for publication early this month. Mr. Anil K. Asher, advocate and RTI activist who, with his sister, Mrs. Hema Sampat and Narayan Varma runs RTI Clinic at BCAS on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Saturday every month since 2004, has thoroughly gone through the text, given good comments and revised text, drafted Head notes and notes wherever necessary.

 I have glanced through the text more than twice and final copy and prepared the contents. Full Bench decisions have been digested in a simple manner for easy understanding. An attempt has been made to compile these decisions for better appreciation of the provisions of the RTI Act. Where any party has filed writ petition in High Court / Supreme Court suitable note at the end of the case digested has been added. Any reader who may like to peruse the relevant full decision may do so on website www.cic.gov.in as per case reference given at the end of each case.

51 Decisions of full bench of CIC delivered from 2007 to 2011 have been digested in this publication. There is not a single F.B. decision on CIC website in 2012 till this date. We have also digested one full bench decision of Maharashtra State Information Commission, [Case No.52] wherein a very important law point was raised before the Maharashtra State Information Commission.

On CIC website there are 60 decisions listed. 9 of them are not digested here for the reasons printed elsewhere in this publication. Thus, digested cases number 52.

Playing cards have 52 cards (excluding Jokers). Our number of Digest of CIC decisions is also 52. But these are not playing cards, these are “paying” cards (decisions). On behalf of two NGOs and myself, we record our appreciation to Mr. Ambrose D’Cruz and Mr. Anil K. Asher for the pains taken by them to prepare this Digest of CIC’s Full Bench decisions. As noted by Mr. Shailesh Gandhi, the decisions of Full Bench of CIC shall have lot of persuasive value to the RTI applicants for submissions before PIO, FAA and the Commissioner. Each decision appears on fresh page.

Blanks at the end of many decisions may be used to update by the readers for making Notes. In case if any decision is confirmed or reversed by the courts subsequently, same may be noted.

We are confident that this publication will be useful not only to the RTI activists, Public Information Officers and First Appellate Authorities and various Public authorities, but also to Information Commissions in proper understanding of the various provisions of the Right to Information Act and quick disposal of the cases. Suggestions and opinions will be highly appreciated and duly acknowledged. We shall feel amply rewarded if the publication containing the digest of full bench decisions of the CIC succeeds in changing the mindset of Indian bureaucracy and help RTI activists in guiding the citizens in procuring the information. I am happy to note that both NGOs publishing this book have agreed to fix price to cover the cost incurred by them. I hope this book enhances the achievement of RTI objectives. R2i jai ho! Narayan Varma

 Message of Shailesh Gandhi, Central Information Commissioner

PCGT and BCAS are two of the leading organizations which have consistently supported Right to Information. I congratulate them on coming out with a very useful publication for all RTI users. They are publishing the digest of full bench decisions of the Central Information Commission, which could prove a very useful reference for users and Information Commissioners. Decisions given by Information Commissions have great persuasive value. RTI users could use these to persuade PIOs, First Appellate Authorities and Commissions to part with information. Full bench decisions of the Commission are generally accepted when they define certain principles, and over the next few years we will have built enough precedence in favour of transparency. I am aware Shri Narayan Varma has put in a lot of his commitment and time to getting this project together. He is one of the stalwarts of the RTI movement. I wish this project all success and am sure we will see many more useful contributions from PCGT and BCAS to further RTI. Love Shailesh All my emails are in Public domain. Mera Bharat Mahaan…Nahi Hai, Per Yeh Dosh Mera Hai.

Message of Ratnakar Gaikwad, State Chief Information Commissioner

 I am extremely happy to know that PCGT and BCAS Foundation are to release publication “Digest of FULL BENCH DECISIONS OF Central Information Commission” on 26th June, 2012. Undoubtedly, PCGT and BCAS Foundation have been doing pioneering work in the spread of RTI. Since, there are still many grey areas in RTI, it is in fitness of things that a publication containing Digest of FULL BENCH DECISIONS OF Central Information Commission is being released. This publication I am sure it will go a long way in throwing light and bringing clarity on many issues for various stake holders in the field of RTI. I would like to place record my high appreciation for the tremendous contribution being made by Shri Narayan Varma, and it is mainly due to his initiative that this project has materialized. I wish this unique initiative all the success and look forward to many such initiatives and contributions from PCGT and BCAS in the field to RTI. n

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Special Marriage Act

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Introduction

The Special Marriage Act, 1954, as the name suggests is an Act to provide for a special mode of marriage. Any person in India can marry under this Act, irrespective of their religion or faith. They can also get married according to any religious ceremonies or customs which they prefer, but if they wish to be governered by the Act then they need to get their marriage registered under this Act. However, in addition to providing for a special form of marriage, this Act also changes certain conventional succession patterns. It provides a very important deviation from the generally understood testamentary and nontestamentary succession for people married under this Act. That is what makes this Act important.

 Earlier, the Act also had provisions for registering the marriages of Indian citizens residing abroad. However, by virtue of the enactment of the Foreign Marriage Act, 1969, those provisions have been deleted from the Special Marriage Act.

Applicability of the Act

This Act applies to:

(a) Any person, irrespective of religion.

(b) Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, who get their marriage registered under the Act.

(c) Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews who get their marriage registered under the Act.

(d) Inter-caste marriages registered under the Act. For instance, a Hindu marrying a Muslim or a Parsi marrying a Jain. Conditions for Special Marriage A marriage can be registered under this Act irrespective of anything contrary contained in any other law relating to marriages.

The following conditions must be fulfilled:

(a) Neither party must have a living spouse. Thus, bigamy is not permissible.

(b) Each of the parties:(i) must be capable of giving a valid consent to the marriage and must be of sound mind. (ii) though capable of giving such valid consent, must not suffer from mental disorder which would render the person unfit for marriage and the protection of children. (iii) must not be subject to recurrent attacks of insanity.

(c) The male must be of at least 21 years and the female must be of at least 18 years.

(d) One of the important conditions for registering a marriage is that the parties must not be related to each other within degrees of prohibited relationship. The Act lays down a list of relatives in relation to a person who are treated as within degrees of prohibited relationship. For instance, a man and his mother’s sister’s daughter (i.e., his cousin sister) cannot get married. However, if a custom governing at least one of the parties permits a marriage between the degrees of prohibited relationship, then the marriage may be permissible. For instance, in some religions, a person is permitted to marry his/her cousin.
All the above conditions are cumulative.

Process of Special Marriage

 Whoever intends to get his marriage solemnised under the Act, must first give a Notice to the appropriate Marriage Officer. The Marriage Officer shall record the Notice received by him and enter a copy of the same in the Marriage Notice Book maintained by him.

 If any person has any objection to the marriage, then he can object only on grounds that one of the conditions (specified above) are not fulfilled.

The marriage can be solemnised after 30 days from the Notice. The Marriage Officer shall issue a Certificate of Marriage which is conclusive evidence that the marriage has been solemnised under the Act and that all formalities specified therein have been complied with.

Any marriage which has been performed by a ceremony in any other form, e.g., marriage between two Hindus or two Muslims, etc., may also be registered under the Act. Thus, already married couples can get their marriages registered under this Act. Once they get their marriage so registered, it would be deemed to be a marriage solemnised under the Act and all children born after the date of marriage ceremony shall be deemed to always have been legitimate children. The names of such children are also required to be entered into the Marriage Register Book. Effect of marriage on HUF Section 19 of the Act prescribes that any member of a Hindu Undivided Family who gets married under this Act automatically severs his ties with the HUF. Thus, if a Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain gets married under the Act, then he ceases to be a member of his HUF. He need not go in for a partition since the marriage itself severs his relationship with his family.

He cannot even subsequently raise a plea for partitioning the joint family property since by getting married under the Act he automatically gets separated from the HUF.

However, this provision of section 19 should be read subject to section 21-A of the Act. This section provides that where the marriage solemnised under this Act takes place between a person of Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina religion with a person who is also of Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain religion, then section 19 shall not apply. Thus, the severance from an HUF would take place only if a Hindu marries a non- Hindu.

Succession to property

Section 21 of the Special Marriage Act is by far the most important provision. It changes the normal succession pattern laid down by law in case of any person whose marriage is registered under the Act. It states that the Act overrides the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 with respect to its application to members of certain communities. The succession to property of any person whose marriage is solemnised under the Act and to the property of any child of such marriage shall be regulated by the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Thus, it removes the bar imposed by the Indian Succession Act, 1925, not only for the couple married under the Act, but also for the children born out of such wedlock.

 Wills by Muslims

The biggest impact of section 21 is in the case of Muslims. The Muslim Law prevents a Muslim from bequeathing his whole property in a will and allows him to make a will only qua 1/3rd of his estate. He can bequeath more than 1/3rd of his property if his heirs give consent to the same. However, the impact of a Muslim getting married under this Act is that the Indian Succession Act would apply to all cases of testamentary succession (i.e., through will) or intestate succession (i.e., without will) of such a Muslim. Hence, by merely solemnising or registering an already conducted marriage under this Act, a Muslim couple can bequeath their entire property in accordance with their wishes and not be bound by their personal Muslim Law restriction of 1/3rd or property.

This view has been upheld by the Bombay High Court in the case of Sayeeda Shakur Khan v. Sajid Phaniband, 2006 (5) Bom. C.R. 7. In this case, a Muslim couple got married as per Mohammedan Law. They once again got their marriage solemnised under the Act after a few years. On the death of the husband an issue arose amongst his heirs as to whether the succession should be as per Muslim Law? A single Judge of the Bombay High Court held that because the marriage of the deceased was registered under the Act, all succession would be as per the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and not as per the Muslim Law. It also held that such a person is entitled to bequeath his entire property and not just 1/3rd as per Muslim Law. This view was also held by the Bombay High Court in the case Bilquis Zakiuddin Bandookwala v. Shehnaz Shabbir Bandukwala, RP No. 41 of 2010 (Bom). It held that intestate succession of a Muslim marrying under the Act would be governed by sections 31-40 of the Indian Succession Act, whereas his testate succession would be governed by sections 57-58 of the Indian Succession Act.

Does a will of a Muslim require a probate?

Another question before the High Court in Sayeeda Shakur Khan v. Sajid Phaniband, 2006 (5) Bom. C.R. 7 was whether the will of such a Muslim requires a probate? It held that once the Indian Succession Act applies to a Muslim, then all the provisions of the Act would apply with equal force. Section 57 of this Act provides that any will by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains in the places within the local jurisdiction of the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras requires a probate. However, since the Special Marriage Act removes all restrictions for people married under the Act, the High Court held that the will of a Muslim requires a probate.

However, in the case of Bilquis Zakiuddin Bandookwala v. Shehnaz Shabbir Bandukwala, R.P. No. 41 of 2010 (Bom.), another Single Judge of the Bombay High Court has taken an exactly contrary view after considering the earlier judgment. The Court referred to section 58 of the Indian Succession Act which states that section 57 requiring a probate shall not apply to property of any Mohammedan. It also referred to section 213 of the Indian Succession Act which provides that an executor or a legatee cannot establish any right in a Court for which probate is not granted. However, section 213(2) exempts Muslims from this section. The Judge held that section 21 of the Special Marriage Act and sections 57, 58, 213(2) of the Indian Succession Act must be read together and reconciled. Since section 213(2) exempts Muslims from probates, there is no need for a Muslim to get a probate even if he is married under the Special Marriage Act.

Thus, there is a judicial controversy over whether or not a Muslim’s will needs a probate. However, since the second decision is later and has considered the earlier decision, reliance may be placed upon the same.

Role of a CA/Auditor

Normally, a CA in his capacity as an Auditor is not directly involved with wills and succession issues. Nevertheless, an Auditor can provide value added services to his clients if he is aware of the law in this respect. He can be of great assistance to his clients in cases of succession planning and estate planning.

Will — Evidence — Genuineness of will — Attesting witness — Requirement of law — Evidence Act, section 68.

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[ Bahadur Singh v. Pooransingh & Ors., AIR 2012 Rajasthan 74]

In an application for grant of probate of the will, the issue arose as to genuineness of the will. The respondent Pooran Singh through his father and natural guardian Shishupal Singh had filed an application before the Trial Court seeking probate of the will executed by Joothar Singh in favour of Pooran Singh. It was submitted before the Court that so far as genuineness of the will was concerned, it created a suspicion, since most of the witnesses were illiterate, they did not know the contents of the will and that they being either relatives or acquaintance of the said Shishupal Singh, the possibility could not be denied that they had put their thumb marks below the said writing at the instance of Shishupal Singh. The Court observed that concerned witness Shri Tarachand in whose handwritings the said will was written had specifically stated in his evidence that he had written as per the direction of Joothar Singh and in presence of the witnesses Hari Singh, Raghunath Singh, Shishupal Singh and others.

He had also stated that after the writing was over, he had read over the same to Joothar Singh and thereafter Joothar Singh and the witnesses had put their thumb marks. Apart from the fact that other witnesses Hari Singh, Brij Singh, Raghunath Singh and Shishupal Singh have corroborated the said version, no such suggestion was put to them in their respective cross-examination that the thumb mark of Joothar Singh was obtained on plain paper and the writing thereon was made subsequently by Tarachand or Shishupal Singh and thumb marks of other witnesses were also put subsequently.

There is no requirement of law that the attesting witness should know the contents of the will. The only requirement is that the testator of the will should put his signature or thumb mark, as the case may be, in presence of two or more witnesses and that the said witnesses also should put their signatures in presence of the testator.

 In the instant case, the said witness had stated that Joothar Singh had put his thumb mark below the said writing of the will and they had also put their respective thumb marks and signatures on the said will. Therefore, in absence of any substantial defence put up in the evidence by the defendants, the suspicion raised in the present appeal could not be said to be well founded.

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Will — Settlement deed or Will — Joint Will or Joint Mutual Will — Succession Act, 1925 — Section 2(4).

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[ Narayani & Anr. v. Sreedharan, AIR 2012 Kerala 72]

The issue arose for consideration in the matter as to whether the document in question was a will or a settlement. The Court observed that if by execution of the document right is transferred in praesenti, it can only be treated as a settlement deed.

On the other hand, if no right is transferred in praesenti and by execution of deed, provision is made only for transfer of the right, after the death of either or both of the executants, it could only be treated as a will. Where two executants of the deed who were husband and wife and it was provided in the deed that it was jointly agreed by the executants that they shall jointly possess the properties and enjoy them jointly during their lifetime and that, on the death of any one of them the properties are still available, then the surviving executant shall possess the same absolutely with the right of alienation and that if on the death of the surviving executant, the properties are available, they shall go to their children, the deed was a will and not settlement deed. Though the deed provided that the properties shall ultimately go to the children, there was no transfer of right, in praesenti in their favour. So also though it was provided that on the death of one of the executants, properties shall go to the surviving executant, it is subject to the availability of the properties on the death of either of the executants. There was no transfer of the right of one of the executants, during his/her life time to the other.

Thus, there was no transfer of any right in praesenti on the other executants. The Court further observed that a joint will is a single testamentary instrument constituting or containing the will of two or more persons based on an agreement to make a conjoint will. Two or more persons can make a joint will, which, if properly executed by each so far as his property is concerned, is as much his will. That will comes into effect on his death. Joint wills are revocable at any time by either of the testators during the life of either or after the death of one of them by the survivor. If the joint will is executed in pursuance of an agreement or contract between the executants to dispose of their property to each other or to a third person in a particular mode or manner and reciprocal in their provisions, it is a joint and mutual will. In a mutual will there is an agreement that neither of the testator shall have power to revoke it.

The surviving testator receives benefits from the document under the mutual will and hence the survivor is not entitled to revoke the will after the death of the testator as the deceased had agreed in pursuance of the agreement and hope and trust that the will be adhered to by the survivor. As the will takes effect only on the death of the testator, both the testators during their lifetime together can revoke or modify the mutual will. But on the death of one of the testators, the surviving testator is not competent to revoke the mutual will.

Where recitals in the will showed that though it was executed jointly by the husband and wife, there was no mutual agreement between them to divest their individual right and to vest his or her right in the other and it only provides that during their lifetime the properties shall be jointly possessed and enjoyed together and that on the death of one of the executants, if the properties are available, they shall go to the surviving executant to be enjoyed absolutely with even the power of alienation, it would be a joint will and not joint and mutual will, because it was clear that there was no divesting of the rights of the other executant and vesting of that right on first executant. It was more so as the will did not provide that executants have no right of revocation.

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Transfer — Transfer for benefit of unborn person — Transfer of Property Act, section 13.

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[ Sridhar & Anr. v. N. Revanna & Ors., AIR 2012 Karnataka 79]

 The appellants were minors when they instituted the suit through their natural guardian, their paternal grandmother. The case of the plaintiffs was that the suit properties were the self-acquired properties of their great-grandfather, Muniswamappa. He had, by three separate registered gift deeds dated 5-6-1957, one executed in favour of his wife Akkayamma and two in favour of his grandson Revenna (R) defendant in the suit, gifted the suit properties. It was further stated that the properties were in the occupation of tenants. Muniswamappa and his wife Akkayamma expired in the year 1960 and 1961, respectively. It is the case of the plaintiffs that under the gift deeds, neither Akkayamma nor Revanna had any right to alienate the suit properties as they were conferred with a limited interest to enjoy the properties during their lifetime and thereafter the properties were to devolve on the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding this limitation, the defendant No. 1

— Revanna had proceeded to alienate the suit properties under sale deeds in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 5. It is the case of the plaintiffs that such alienations were void and did not bind the plaintiffs. It was their case that they had a vested right immediately on their birth. The first plaintiff was born prior to the said sale deeds. The plaintiffs, therefore, alleged that the defendant Nos. 2 to 5 in collusion with the tenants in occupation of the suit properties were seeking to occupy the properties and to illegally demolish the same and therefore the plaintiffs would be deprived of their legitimate right and had proceeded to file a civil suit.

The Court observed that where the suit property was bequeathed by virtue of a gift deed by the donor in favour of his grandson ‘R’ and his unborn brothers and thereafter property was to devolve upon the male children of the grandson ‘R’, it could be said that gift deed created a life interest in favour of ‘R’ and since he did not have a brother, the property absolutely devolved upon the male children of ‘R’ i.e., the plaintiffs. Further ‘R’ had only life interest in the suit property and he had no right to alienate the same.

As soon the plaintiffs were born, ‘R’ would lose the right to alienate the property as an interest is created in favour of the plaintiffs under the gift deeds which would be a prohibition for ‘R’ to alienate the property. The fact that ‘R’ had executed the sale deed in favour of the defendants would be immaterial. Plaintiffs were born prior to the sale transaction. If that be so, the property stood vested in the plaintiffs on their birth. Thus the property devolved on the plaintiffs immediately after the lifetime of ‘R’ since there were no other persons, who were capable of deriving such interest. The plea that ‘R’ and defendant purchasers had acted on the basis of the same would not absolve the defendants of their conduct as being illegal, since it was clearly against the law and there can be no estoppels against statute, nor can the defendants plead equity on that ground. The condition against the alienation imposed in the gift deed was not void. The plaintiffs consequently were held entitled to sale consideration received by ‘R’ under the sale deeds. The Court however declined the claim of the plaintiffs to recover the property.

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Tax on land and building — Towers for wireless communication system cannot be construed as building — Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, (14 of 1977) section 2(1A).

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[Wireless — TT Info Services Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., AIR 2012 (NOC) 180 (Kar.)]

The appellants herein who are the licensees under the provisions of the Telegraph Act, 1885 for providing telecommunication services to the general public had approached the Court by writ petitions. The petitioners had called in question the demands raised against the petitioners by the respective local bodies. The demands had been raised in respect of the erection of the base trans-receiver station. The contention on behalf of the petitioners therein was that the municipal authorities/local bodies have no authority to make physical demand in respect of the telecommunication towers installed.

The Court observed that the ‘structure’ which is the subject-matter in the instant case is considered, it is a metal pole or tower to which the antenna is attached and has the backup system at its base. No doubt, it would have to be fastened to the roof of the building or embedded to the land with concrete base, nuts, bolts and the height of the pole may vary from case to case. Such structure though may suggest an element of permanency, it does not belong to the genus of the type previously mentioned in the section defining the building. If the phrase used was ‘other structures’, the term would have been wider to include other structures without reference to the first part of the section. But when it states ‘other such structure’, the structure in question will have to be of nature of the items mentioned in the first part of the section. Therefore, the tower/post which is not relatable to the items mentioned in the first part cannot be construed as a building to bring it within the sweep of section 94 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act 1964, section 103(b) (i) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 and section 64 of the Karnataka Panchayath Raj Act, 1993.

The above provisions indicate that apart from the other specific items for which power to tax has been provided, the power is also to impose tax on land and building alone. In fact, in the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, the provision for tax on advertisements is exhaustive and includes ‘post’ and ‘structure’ and the term ‘structure’ has been explained further, but it only relates to advertisement. This in fact indicates that the telecommunication structure has not been indicated separately, nor does it get included in the definition of ‘building’. Therefore, the Court held that the telecommunication tower/post was not liable to tax under the existing power available to impose tax on ‘land’ and ‘buildings’.

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Cyber warfare — the next level

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About this write-up

This write-up is about a new type of worm/malware, which was in the news recently. The worm called Flamer attracted a lot of hype and media attention given the speculation regarding its likely impact. This write-up is an attempt to cull out some key takeaways for benefit of the readers.

Background

Cyberspace is no longer a benign place to surf. Viruses are getting increasingly nasty and complex over the years. But while worms were traditionally being used by hackers and cybercriminals either to display their prowess or steal information and money, it appears now that even nation–states are backing such crimes to target countries – a trend popularly known as cyber espionage and cyber warfare.

Cyber warfare – the next level – Flamer worm

Circa 2010, news reports started appearing about a new type of a worm i.e., Stuxnet1. What was different about this worm was that it was the first of its kind i.e., the level of complexity, its apparent motive and the intended victims were not the ‘usual’ businesses or gullible individuals. On the contrary, experts believed that this was a ‘first’ – a worm written by a sovereign nation with the sole purpose of disrupting infrastructure facilities in another territory. It was also a ‘first’ because the worm was no longer attacking the zeros and ones (computer code), this time it was attacking the devices that were controlled by these zeros and ones – with a view to disrupt their functionality. There was the nagging feeling . . . . . . the type you get when somebody really bad/capable of doing nasty thing says . . . . I’ll be back (like Arnold Schwarzenegger in Terminator). It was (painfully) obvious that Stuxnet wasn’t the last word on the topic and things were likely to heat up . . . . very soon . . . . Coming back to the present day, that nagging feeling has become a reality – Stuxnet appeared in 2010, Duqu surfaced in 2011. Sometime around May 20122, security experts started issuing warnings about the ‘Flamer’ worm aka W32. Flamer or sKyWIper.

Threat assessment

A senior analyst at a leading security firm, sharing his view on the subject reveals that this is the most sophisticated threat he has ever seen. The same security firm had undertaken a detailed analysis of the ground-breaking Stuxnet virus, which ‘purportedly’ targeted Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities two years ago, sending some of their centrifuges spinning out of control. The preliminary results shared by the senior analyst suggested that Flamer appeared to be even more complex than Stuxnet, and that it was an incredibly clever, comprehensive ‘spying programme’.

Grapevine reports suggest, “Flamer is a backdoor worm that goes looking for very specific information. It scrapes a mass of information from any infected machine and then sends it, without the user having any idea what is going on. The amount of information it can send is huge”.

Components identified3

A number of components of the threat have been retrieved and are currently being analysed. Several of the components have been written in such a way that they do not appear overtly malicious. Some of the components identified as malicious are:
• advnetcfg.ocx (0.6MB) (backdoor component)
• ccalc32.sys (RCA Encrypted Config file)
• mssecmgr.sys (6MB) (main compression component, LUA interpreter, SHH, SQL library)
• msglu32.ocx (1.6 MB) (Steals data from images and documents
• boot32drv.sys (~1kb) (Config file)
• nteps32.ocx (0.8MB) (performs screen capture)

This time it is different The one thing that everyone is sure about is that Stuxnet, Duqu and Flamer are definitely in another class than your typical spyware or fake antivirus threat. Experts universally agree that this complex software required a coding team and could not be achieved by a lone wolf coder. The complexity of the task has led many to presume only a nation-state would have the resources. Just as is being speculated in case of Stuxnet. It is interesting to note that unlike Duqu, Stuxnet and Flamer have the ability to infect systems via USB key, thus allowing them entry into facilities that are isolated from the Internet. They also use the same printer-driver vulnerability to spread within the local network. While all three worms are similar in the sense that all three are seriously modular (i.e., in a way that lets their command and control servers add or update functionality at any time), Flamer is definitely a step up.

  • Here is why: According to Kaspersky researchers, a Stuxnet infestation takes just 500KB of space, as against this, Flamer is an out-and-out giant at 20MB. Part of Flamer’s size involves the use of many thirdparty code libraries, prefab modules that handle tasks like managing databases and interpreting script code. Neither Stuxnet nor Duqu rely on third-party modules.

  • Given its size, Flamer is smart enough to mask its download impact. It is downloaded in multiple sessions. This is done to avoid giving itself away. In this respect, it is far more intelligent than its predecessors.

  • Stuxnet and Duqu used stolen digital signatures to fool antivirus softwares. Unlike these, Flamer doesn’t use a digital signature. Instead, Flamer uses some unique techniques for self-protection, chief among them is the ability to recognize over 100 antivirus installations and modify its behaviour accordingly. It uses five different encryption methods, three different compression techniques, at least five different file formats (and some proprietary formats too) and special code injection techniques.

  • Although Flamer is not concealed by a rootkit, it uses a series of tricks to stay hidden and stealthily export stolen data. One of its most amazing capabilities is the creation of a file on the USB stick simply named ‘.’ (dot). Even if the short name for this file is HUB001.DAT, the long name is set to ‘.’, which is interpreted by Windows as the current directory. This makes the OS unable to read the contents of the file or even display it. A closer look inside the file reveals that it is encrypted with a substitution algorithm.
  • Flamer is definitely complex. In one of the earlier reports on this threat, a security expert noted that it has at least 20 modules, most of which are still being investigated. Another expert remarked that one of its smaller modules is over 70,000 lines of C decompiled code and contains over 170 encrypted strings. As for what it does, you might better ask what doesn’t it do. Just about any kind of espionage you can imagine is handled by one of Flamer’s modules.

 

  • Flamer has very advanced functionality to steal information and to propagate. Using this toolkit, multiple exploits and propagation methods can be freely configured by the attackers. Information gathering from a large network of infected computers was never crafted as carefully as has been done in Flamer.

  • Stuxnet relied on an unprecedented four zero-day attacks to penetrate systems and Duqu managed with just one zero-day attack. Flamer didn’t use any zero-day attacks.
  •     Stuxnet and Duqu infestations automatically self-destructed after a set time; Flamer can self-destruct, but only upon receiving the auto-destruct code from its masters.

It’s worth noting that Flamer doesn’t necessarily do any of the things described above, not even replicate to other systems, unless it’s told to do so by its Command and Control servers. This combined with the fact that it uses many standard commercial modules has helped it get past behaviour and reputation-based detection systems (i.e., our commonly used antivirus systems).

It’s a live program that communicates back to its master. It asks, where should I go? What should I do now?

Experts say that Flamer is most likely capable to use all of the computers’ functionalities for its goals. It covers all major possibilities to gather intelligence, including keyboard, screen, micro-phone, storage devices, network, wifi, Bluetooth, USB and system processes.

To state simply, once a system is infected, Flamer begins a complex set of operations, including sniffing the network traffic, taking screenshots, recording audio conversations, intercepting the keyboard, and so on so forth.

Sounds just like a cold war (fiction) scenario — where highly trained, deep cover ‘sleeper’ agents were inserted deep inside enemy territory to attack the enemy from within. Takes me back to some of my favourite movies……..Salt, Killers, The impossible spy…….

Readers who are interested in more technical information may also look up the following:

  • http://www.symantec.com/security_respons/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-053007-0702-99&om_ rssid=sr-mixed30days

  •     http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/jumping-in-to-the-flames-of-skywiper

  •     http://www.mcafee.com/threat-intelligence/mal-ware/default.aspx?id=1195098

  •     h t t p : / / w w w . f – s e c u r e . c o m / w e b l o g / archives/00002371.html
  • http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2012/Kaspersky_Lab_and_ITU_Research_ Reveals_New_Advanced_Cyber_Threat

  •     http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/skywiper. aspx

  •     http://www.crysys.hu/skywiper/skywiper.pdf4

It would be a cliché to say, that this is not the last we have heard about this worm or that cyber warfare is now gaining momentum and therefore expect to read and hear more on this topic.

 1.    Read Cyber warfare the next level BCAJ October 2010

 2.    Unconfirmed reports suggest
Flamer was first reported as early as 2007

 3.    Source: www.symantec.com

Succession — Female Hindu dying intestate — Heirs related to an intestate by full blood shall be preferred to heir related to half blood — Hindu Succession Act, 1956, sections 15 and 18.

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[Heera Lal v. Smt. Tijiabai (since deceased) by L/ Rs, AIR 2012 (NOC) 189 (M.P)]

One Dwarka Prasad and plaintiffs Smt. Tijiabai and Smt. Dipiyabai were born out of the wedlock from the first wife of Ramratan. From the second wife of Ramratan the defendant No. 1 Heera Lal (step brother) was born, the defendant No. 2 Vinod Kumar is the son of defendant No. 1 Heera Lal.

The suit of the plaintiffs which was filed long back on 5-12-1985 is that the suit property was owned by Dwarka Prasad who had died in the year 1938 and after his death his widow Kalawati possessed the suit property and on coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 Kalawati became the absolute owner. No child was born out of wedlock of Dwarka and Kalawati and after the death of Kalawati, the plaintiffs who are the sisters of Dwarka Prasad became Bhumiswami of the suit property because the property in dispute devolved on them. Further, it had been pleaded by the plaintiffs that the defendant Heeralal was making yearly payment of the agricultural produce, but the same had been stopped by him with effect from 1978. Thereafter the plaintiffs submitted necessary application to get their names mutated in the Revenue record to which the objections were submitted by the defendants 1 and 2. However, the Revenue Court directed to mutate the names of plaintiffs in the Revenue record which was assailed by defendants by filing appeal, but it was also dismissed. Hence a suit for possession had been filed by the plaintiffs.

The Court observed that the disputed property fell in the share of Dwarka Prasad in the family partition which took place during lifetime of their father Ramratan. Thus, Dwarka Prasad was the sole owner of the suit property till he died in the year 1938.

 The plaintiffs are the real sisters of Dwarka Prasad and the defendant No. 1 Heera Lal is his step-brother. Since admittedly Kalawati (widow of Dwarka Prasad) having died leaving behind no issue, according to section 16 of the Act of 1956, her right would devolve under Rule 1 among the heirs specified in s.s (1) of section 15. Since Kalawati and Dwarka Prasad did not have any sons, daughters including children of any predeced son or daughter and Dwarka Prasad already having died during the lifetime of Kalawati, the right in the disputed property would devolve in the heirs according to Rule 2 of section 16. But, in the present case there is no heir in terms of Rule 2, hence the devolution of property would take place in accordance to Rule 3 of section 16. According to this rule, the property of the intestate female Hindu would devolve upon the heirs referred to in clauses (b), (d) and (e) of s.s (1) and s.s (2) of section 15 of the Act of 1956, which shall be in the same order and according to the same rules as would have applied if the property had been the father’s or the mother’s or the husband’s, as the case may be, and such person had died intestate in respect thereof immediately after the intestate’s death.

The property in dispute was of Dwarka Prasad and Kalawati inherited the disputed property from her husband and since there is no heir of Kalawati mentioned in the category 15(1)(a) of the Act of 1956, the property would devolve upon the heirs of her husband. If section 16(3) and section 15(1) (b) and class II of the Schedule to section 8 are kept in juxtaposition to each other and are read conjointly on the touchstone and anvil of the settled position of the law, the plaintiffs being the real sisters of Dwarka Prasad, the entire property in dispute of Kalawati would devolve on them.

 It is true that the defendant No. 1 Heera Lal is the step-brother of Kalawati’s husband Dwarka Prasad but he is half blood brother of plaintiffs. Section 18 of the Act of 1956 provides that the heir of full blood have preferential right over half blood. According to this section the heirs related to an intestate by full blood shall be preferred to heir related by half blood, if the nature of relationship is the same in every other respect and therefore the plaintiffs being the real sisters of Dwarka Prasad have preferential right over the defendant No. 1 Heera Lal who is the heir related by half blood of Dwarka Prasad.

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Revenue Recognition

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Revenue has been defined as income that arises in
the ordinary course of activities of the entity i.e., from sale of goods
or services. Ind AS 18 on Revenue Recognition prescribes certain
general principles for revenue recognition from transactions involving
sale of goods, rendering of services and the use of entity’s assets that
generate fees such as royalties, dividend and interest. Revenue is
recognised when it is probable that economic benefits of the transaction
will flow to an entity and costs are identifiable and can be measured
reliably. In this article, we aim to understand certain key principles
of revenue recognition prescribed under Ind AS 18 in case of multiple
element arrangements, customer loyalty programmes, transfer of assets
from customers and sale on extended credit terms by way of examples.
Multiple deliverable contracts:

Companies at times offer a broad range
of products and services to its customers. These arrangements are
sometimes negotiated with the customer through a single contract which
contains multiple deliverables that are separately identifiable and have
stand-alone value to the customer, for example an automobile company
sells vehicles to a customer along with an optional extended warranty of
three years for a composite price. In accounting for revenue in case of
multiple deliverable arrangements the company should identify
‘separately identifiable components’ for which revenue is recognised at
varied points of time as per the contract. The consideration for these
separate elements should be allocated on a fair value basis using either
the ‘Fair value method’ or the ‘Relative fair value method’. Under the
fair value method, the revenue equivalent to the fair value of all
undelivered contract is deferred, and the difference between total
contract price and deferred revenue is recognised as revenue on
delivered components. Under the relative fair value method, the total
contract price is allocated to each contract deliverable in the ratio of
their fair values as a percentage to the aggregate fair values of all
individual contract deliverables.

Let us consider the concept of
multiple deliverable arrangements by way of an example — Example 1:
Multiple deliverables A company sells a vehicle along with a contract
for an optional three-year extended warranty bundled along with it for a
contract value of INR 570,000. The fair value of the extended warranty
services is INR 60,000. The fair value of the vehicle without the
extended warranty services is INR 540,000. The entire consideration is
required to be paid upfront.
 Relative fair value method

Step 1: The above contract can be broken into the following identifiable components:

Step 2: Allocation of revenue based on their relative fair values — Contract value: INR 570,000

It
may be noted here that the aggregate fair value of delivered components
is INR 600,000 while the aggregate contract price is INR 570,000. As
such, there is a discount of 5% (i.e., 30,000/ 600,000) on the overall
contract as compared to its market price. Under the relative fair value
method, this discount of 5% is applied to each deliverable for revenue
recognition purposes. As such, the consideration allocated to vehicle is
INR 513,000 (i.e., 95% of INR 540,000) and that allocated to extended
warranty is INR 57,000 (i.e., 95% of INR 60,000).

Fair value method

It
may be noted here that under the fair value method, the consideration
allocated to the undelivered component is its entire fair value and the
remaining contract price is allocated to the delivered component. As
such, the consideration allocated to the extended warranty (i.e.,
undelivered component) shall be INR 60,000 while the remaining
consideration of INR 510,000 (i.e., INR 570,000 — INR 60,000) shall be
allocated to the sale of vehicle.

Customer loyalty programmes:

A
range of businesses, such as supermarkets, retailers, airlines,
telecommunication operators, credit card providers and hotels offer
customer loyalty programmes, which comprise of loyalty points or ‘award
credits’. Such award credits or loyalty points may be linked to
individual purchases or groups of purchases, or to continued custom over
a specified period. The customer usually redeems these award credits
for free or discounted goods or services.

For a programme to be accounted as a customer loyalty programme, it needs to contain two essential features:

 — the entity (seller) grants award credits to a customer as part of a sales transaction; and

 —
subject to meeting any other conditions, the customer can redeem the
award credits for free or discounted goods or services in the future.

For
instance, a customer receives a complimentary product with every tenth
product bought from the entity (seller). As the customer purchases each
of the first ten products, they are earning the right to receive a free
good in the future, i.e., each sales transaction earns the customer
credits that go towards free goods in the future.

 In accounting
for customer loyalty programmes the company estimates the fair value of
the award credits, generated through its loyalty programmes. The
consideration (for goods sold on which award credits are issued) is
allocated to the award credits based on either the fair value method or
the relative fair value method (as discussed above). Revenue is
recognised for the delivered goods based on the sale consideration
allocated to the goods sold while the sale consideration allocated to
the award credits are recognised when the award credits are redeemed.

 Let us understand the above principles with the help of an example —

Example
2: Customer loyalty programmes Company Q runs a loyalty scheme that
rewards customers’ spend at its stores. As per the scheme, customers are
granted 10 award credits for every INR 100 spent in Q’s store.
Customers can redeem their accumulated points towards a discount on the
price of a new product in Q’s stores. The loyalty points are valid for
three years.

During 2012, Q had sales of INR 1,000,000 and
accordingly granted 100,000 loyalty points to its customers. The
management expected only 80,000 loyalty points to be redeemed and that
the cost per point redeemed would be INR 0.8 per point. The management
has adopted fair value method for allocation of consideration to the
multiple deliverables i.e., initial sale of goods and award credits. Q
records the following entries in 2012 in relation to the loyalty points
granted in 2012:

Redemption of award credits in Year 1

During
2012, 30,000 points were redeemed, and at the end of the reporting
period, management still expected a total of 80,000 points to be
redeemed, i.e., a further 50,000 points will be redeemed over the next
two years.

At the end of the reporting period, the balance of
the deferred revenue is INR 40,000 [(50,000/ 80,000) x 64,000].
Therefore, the difference in the deferred revenue balance is recognised
as revenue for the year.



Redemption in year 2: change in estimates

During 2013, 35,000 points are redeemed, and at the end of the year management expects a total of 85,000 points to be redeemed, i.e., an increase of 5,000 over the original estimate. The redemption rate is revised based on the new total expected redemptions. As such, at the end of year 2, 20,000 award credits would remain outstanding i.e., 85,000 – 30,000 – 35,000, after considering the revised total award credits to be utilised and actual redemption of award credits.

At the end of the year, the balance of deferred revenue for 20,000 loyalty points shall be INR 15,059 [(20,000/85,000) x 64,000] which shall represent the closing balance in deferred revenue account. The differential amount in deferred rev-enue account of INR 24,941 (i.e., 64,000 – 24,000 – 15,059) shall be transferred to revenue. Q records the following entry in 2013 in relation to the loyalty points granted in 2012:


Alternatively, on a cumulative basis INR 48,941 is released from deferred revenue account to revenue, which can be calculated as (65,000/85,000) x 64,000.

The remaining balance in deferred revenue account of INR 15,059 shall be recognised as revenue in the year 2014.

Transfer of assets from customers:

Ind AS 18 provides guidance on transfer of property, plant and equipment (or cash for its acquisition) for entities that receive such assets from their customers in return for ongoing supply of goods or services. As such, the principles contained hereunder do not apply to gratuitous transfers of assets i.e., transfer of assets without consideration. Further, the guidance also cannot be applied to transfers that are in the nature of government grants or those covered under the service concession arrangements.

If it is concluded that the company has obtained control over the asset transferred by the customer, the company should recognise (debit) the transferred asset as its own asset (though it may not have the ownership). The corresponding impact of the transfer should be recognised as either revenue or deferred revenue, depending upon the obligations assumed by the company in lieu of the transferred asset.

Timing of revenue recognition

In determining the timing of revenue recognition, the entity (recipient) considers:

  •     what performance obligations it has as a result of receiving the customer contribution;
  •     whether these performance obligations should be separated for revenue recognition purposes; and
  •     when revenue related to each separately identifiable performance obligation should be recognised.

The accounting for transfer of assets from customers involves an analysis whether the control over the transferred asset is obtained by the company and if the control is transferred the asset will be recognised in the company’s balance sheet. The company is required to determine the obligations assumed by the company in lieu of the transfer of control over the transferred asset and if the above-mentioned obligations are in the nature of ongoing services, then revenue attributable to those obligations is deferred and recognised as the underlying services are rendered and obligations fulfilled where as to the extent that the obligations are fulfilled at the inception of the contract, revenue shall be recognised upfront. The assets transferred by the customer shall be depreciated over the useful life of the asset.

Let us understand the above principles with the help of an example

Example 3: Transfer of assets from customers

Company M enters into an agreement with Company N to outsource some of its manufacturing process. As part of the arrangement, Company M will transfer its machinery to Company N.

Based on a report submitted by independent valuer, the fair value of assets transferred is INR 100,000. Initially, Company N must use the equipment to provide the service required by the outsourcing agreement. Company N is responsible for maintaining the equipment and replacing it when it decides to do so. The useful life of the equipment is 5 years. The outsourcing agreement requires service to be provided for 5 years for a fixed price of INR 30,000 per year, which is lower than the price that Company N would have charged if the equipment had not been transferred. In such case the fixed price would have been INR 50,000 per annum.

Pursuant to a detailed analysis, Company N determines that the control over the equipment is transferred in its favour. Hence, Company N would have to initially recognise the asset at its fair value in accordance with Ind AS 16. Further, Company N would also have to recognise the revenue over the period of the services performed i.e., over 5 years. (Refer Table 1)

Table 1: Recognition of Revenue over Period
of Service Performed

 

INR

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Particulars

 

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year
5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Asset A/c

Dr.

100,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Deferred Revenue A/c

 

(100,000)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being transfer of control over the assets from
customer in lieu of rendering ongoing services)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bank A/c

Dr.

30,000

30,000

30,000

30,000

30,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Deferred Revenue A/c

Dr.

20,000

20,000

20,000

20,000

20,000

 

 

(100,000/5)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Revenue

 

(50,000)

(50,000)

(50,000)

(50,000)

(50,000)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being revenue recognised)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Depreciation A/c

Dr.

20,000

20,000

20,000

20,000

20,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Accumulated Depreciation

 

(20,000)

(20,000)

(20,000)

(20,000)

(20,000)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being depreciation provided over 5 years)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Extended credit terms:
When payment for goods sold or services rendered is deferred beyond the normal credit terms, and the company does not charge a market interest rate, the arrangement effectively constitutes a sale with financing arrangement and revenue should be recognised at the current cash price. The length of normal credit terms depends on the industry and economic environment in which the company operates.

Example 4: Sale on extended credit terms

Company K sells equipment to Company L for a total consideration of INR 1,000,000. The payment for this sale is deferred over a period of five years with regular payments of INR 200,000 each year to be made by Company L to Company K. No interest is charged by Company K to Company L and the normal credit terms of Company K are four months from the date of sale. The current cash price for the goods sold is INR 758,157. Considering the current cash price and the five annual payments of INR 200,000, the effective interest rate on the transaction works out to 10% p.a.

The sale by Company K to Company L is on deferred payment basis and beyond its normal credit terms. The total consideration under the terms of the arrangement is INR 1,000,000. However, revenue should be recognised at the current cash price i.e., the price at which the goods will be sold without such extended credit terms. The difference between the current cash price and the total consideration should be recognised as finance income over the extended credit period.

Accordingly, the revenue on the date of the transaction shall be recognised at its current cash price of INR 758,157. The difference INR 241,843 (i.e., INR 1,000,000 – INR 758,157) will be recognised as finance income over the period of the contract using the effective interest rate method.

The recognition of finance income based on effective interest rate of 10% is computed as shown in Table 2


Table 2: Recognition of Finance Income based on Effective Interest

Year

 

Opening Value

 

 

Interest

 

 

Payments

 

Closing Value

 

 

(A)

 

 

(B) = (A * 10%)

 

(C)

 

(D)=(A+B+C)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year 1

 

7,58,157

 

 

75,816

 

 

-2,00,000

 

6,33,973

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year 2

 

6,33,973

 

 

63,397

 

 

-2,00,000

 

4,97,370

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year 3

 

4,97,370

 

 

49,737

 

 

-2,00,000

 

3,47,107

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year 4

 

3,47,107

 

 

34,711

 

 

-2,00,000

 

1,81,818

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year 5

 

1,81,818

 

 

18,182

 

 

-2,00,000

 

 

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total interest

 

 

241,843

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Journal entries

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INR

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Particulars

 

 

 

Year 1

 

Year 2

Year 3

 

Year 4

Year 5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Debtors A/c

Dr.

 

758,157

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Sales A/c

 

 

 

(758,157)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being revenue recognised)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Debtor A/c

Dr.

 

75,816

 

63,397

49,737

34,711

18,182

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Finance Income

 

(75,816)

 

(63,397)

(49,737)

(34,711)

(18,182)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being finance income
recognised over the extended credit period)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bank A/c

Dr.

 

200,000

 

200,000

200,000

200,000

200,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To Debtor A/c

 

 

 

(200,000)

 

(200,000)

(200,000)

(200,000)

(200,000)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Being amount collected from debtors)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary:

Revenue recognition principles prescribed under Ind AS 18 and discussed in this article vary significantly from the currently applicable AS 9 – Revenue Recognition. The application of these principles will require significant judgment in several aspects while preparing an entity’s financial statement.

 

Deduction u/s.80-IB(10): Income from developing and building housing project: Land not owned by assessee: All other conditions satisfied: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80-IB(10).

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35. Deduction u/s.80-IB(10): Income from developing and building housing project: Land not owned by assessee: All other conditions satisfied: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80-IB(10).
[CIT v. Radhe Developers, 249 CTR 393 (Guj.)]

The assessee entered into a development agreement with the owners of the land for a housing project. The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80- IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim on the ground that the assessee was not the owner of the land. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal held that for deduction u/s.80-IB(10) of the Act it is not necessary that the assessee must be the owner of the land. The Tribunal also held that even otherwise looking to the provisions of section 2(47) of the Act, r/w section 53A of the Transfer of the Property Act, by virtue of the development agreement and the agreement to sell, the assessee had, for the purpose of incometax, become the owner of the land.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “Terms and conditions of development agreement showed that assessee had taken full responsibility for execution of the projects and the resultant profits or loss belonged to the assessee in entirety and all other conditions of section 80-IB(10) being satisfied, deduction u/s.80-IB(10) could not be disallowed to assessee on the ground that the land under development projects was not owned by the assessee and in some cases development permission was granted in the name of original land owners.”

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Charitable purpose: Sections 2(15) and 80G(5): Recognition u/s.80G(5): Objects of assessee-trust include conduct of periodical meetings on professional subjects and publishing and selling books/booklets on professional subjects: Activities are charitable in nature and cannot be construed to be in the nature of trade or commerce or business: Assessee is entitled to approval u/s.80G(5).

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34. Charitable purpose: Sections 2(15) and 80G(5): Recognition u/s.80G(5): Objects of assessee-trust include conduct of periodical meetings on professional subjects and publishing and selling books/booklets on professional subjects: Activities are charitable in nature and cannot be construed to be in the nature of trade or commerce or business: Assessee is entitled to approval u/s.80G(5).
[DI v. The Chartered Accountants Study Circle, 250 CTR 70 (Mad.)

The objects of the assessee-trust included conduct of periodical meetings on professional subjects, publishing books, booklets, etc., on professional subjects i.e., bank audit, tax audit, etc., and selling the same. The assessee filed an application in Form 10G to the Director of IT (Exemption), Chennai for grant of renewal u/s.80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The application was rejected on the ground that the assessee was publishing and selling books of professional interest to be used as a reference material by the general public as well as the professionals in respect of bank audit, tax audit, etc., and its activities are commercial in nature and will fall within the amended provision of section 2(15) of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Activities of the assessee-trust in publishing and selling books of professional interest which are meant to be used as reference material by the general public as well as the professionals in respect of bank audit, tax audit, etc., cannot be construed as commercial activities and, therefore, the assessee-trust was entitled to approval u/s.80G(5) of the Act.”

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Capital gain: Computation: Sections 48 and 49, and section 7 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957: A.Y. 1992-93: Cost with reference to certain modes of acquisition: Sale of jewellery inherited from son: Fair market value of jewellery as on 1-4-1974 should be arrived at by reverse indexation, from fair market value as on 31-3-1989 on basis of which Revenue had imposed Wealth Tax upon assessee: Reverse indexation is not to be done from date of sale held in December 1991 based on sale price.

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33. Capital gain: Computation: Sections 48 and 49, and section 7 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957: A.Y. 1992-93: Cost with reference to certain modes of acquisition: Sale of jewellery inherited from son: Fair market value of jewellery as on 1-4-1974 should be arrived at by reverse indexation, from fair market value as on 31-3-1989 on basis of which Revenue had imposed Wealth Tax upon assessee: Reverse indexation is not to be done from date of sale held in December 1991 based on sale price.
[Deceased Shantadevi Gaekwad v. Dy. CIT, (2012) 22 Taxman.com 30 (Guj.)]

 In the month of December, 1991, the assessee had sold certain jewellery which she inherited from her son. The assessee herself gave a declaration of fair market value of the selfsame jewellery as on 31-3-1989 based on the report of a registered valuer for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act and the Assessing Officer had accepted the said valuation. Further the assessee for calculation of the capital gains arising from sale of the aforesaid jewellery worked out the fair market value of the jewellery as on 1-4-1974 by following the method of reverse indexation. She adopted the base as the fair market value of the jewellery worked out as on 31-3-1989 on the basis of valuation done by the registered valuer. The Tribunal held that fair market value of the jewellery as on 1-4-1974 should be arrived at by reverse indexation from the date of sale held in December, 1991 based on the sale price and not from the fair market value as on 31-3-1989.

On appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) According to provisions contained in sections 48 and 49, 1-4-1974 should be treated to be the date in the instant case on which the jewellery was deemed to have been acquired by the assessee. There is no dispute that although the jewellery was transferred in the month of December, 1991, the assessee herself gave a declaration of fair market value of the selfsame jewellery as on 31-3-1989 based on the report of a registered valuer for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act as required under the said Act. It is admitted position that the Assessing Officer has accepted the said valuation and has not disputed the same for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act.

(ii) There is also no dispute that both the assessee and the Revenue agreed before the Tribunal that the method of reverse indexation should be the appropriate one for the purpose of ascertaining the fair market valuation of the jewellery as on 1-4-1974.

(iii) There is substance in the contention of the assessee that the Revenue having accepted the valuation of the same jewellery given by her as on 31-3-1989 as correct valuation for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act, there is no reason why the same valuation should not be treated to be a reliable base for the purpose of computing the capital gain under the Income-tax Act by the process of reverse indexation. There is no reason to disbelieve the valuation given by the assessee under the Wealth-tax Act as on 31-3-1989 based on the valuation assessed by a registered valuer in terms of the said statute. The Revenue having accepted the said valuation for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act is precluded from disputing the correctness of the selfsame valuation for the purpose of assessment of capital gain, as the factor of ‘fair market value’ is decisive for the purpose of both the Wealth-tax Act and in ascertaining the cost of acquisition under the Income-tax Act.

 (iv) Therefore, there was no justification for disbelieving the valuation of the selfsame jewellery given by the assessee as on 31-3-1989 for the purpose of Wealth-tax Act.

(v) Therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal was liable to be set aside. The Assessing Officer was to be directed to recalculate the capital gain by adopting reverse indexation based on valuation of jewellery given by the assessee as on 31-3-1989 for the purpose of Wealth-tax Act.”

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(i) On facts, lump-sum turn-key contract was a composite indivisible contract; and hence, the consortium was to be taxed as an AOP. (ii) As two consortium members had come together for gain, composite contract was awarded to the consortium (and not to individual members), an AOP was formed and mere internal division of responsibility or separate payment cannot undo the AOP. (iii) Work done outside India and supply of equipment and spares outside India were inextricably linked with the work of c<

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16. Linde AG, In re
(2012) 19 Taxmann.com 238
(AAR — New Delhi)
Section 2(31) of Income-tax Act Dated: 20-3-2012
Before P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman) & V. K. Shridhar (Member)

On facts, lump-sum turn-key contract was a composite indivisible contract; and hence, the consortium was to be taxed as an AOP.

As two consortium members had come together for gain, composite contract was awarded to the consortium (and not to individual members), an AOP was formed and mere internal division of responsibility or separate payment cannot undo the AOP.

Work done outside India and supply of equipment and spares outside India were inextricably linked with the work of consortium. Since the contract was indivisible and awarded to an AOP, payment receivable therefore was taxable in India.


Facts:

ONGC issued a tender for supply of a plant on lumpsum turn-key basis. The bidders were required to provide services for design, engineering, procurement, construction, installation, commissioning and handing over of the plant on turn-key basis. Two foreign companies entered into an MOU to bid jointly as a consortium. Thereafter, they also executed an ‘Internal Consortium Agreement’. The bid of the consortium was accepted by ONGC. Pursuant to the bid, ONGC entered into contract with the consortium. In terms of contract, the consortium had various rights and was subject to various obligations. The contract did not assign any individual role to the members of the consortium and the payments were also to be made to the consortium.

  • The applicant contended as follows. The agreement entered into by the members was a divisible contract and the respective scope of work, obligations and consideration of each member were clearly identified.

  • he obligations of the applicant were divisible in three parts: (i) supply of design, engineering of equipment, materials; (ii) fabrication, procurement and supply of equipment and material outside India; and (iii) supervision of installation, testing and commissioning of the equipment, materials at site in India.

  •  The offshore activities are not taxable in India.

  • In terms of Article 5(2)(i) of India-Germany DTAA, PE would come into existence only after the equipment reached site in India.

  • Relying on Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries v. Director of IT, (2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC), the contract should be split into separate parts and obligations of each consortium member should be considered independent from that of the other consortium member. Further, in terms of CIT v. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd., (2007) 291 ITR 482 (SC), income from offshore active were not taxable in India. The tax authority contended as follows.

  •  When the rights and obligations under the contract were that of the consortium, splitting up of a lump-sum turn-key contract only for taxation purpose would be artificial, particularly, if Explanation 2 to section 9(2) of Income-tax Act (which was inserted with retrospective effect) is considered.

  • The responsibility for establishing the project was that of the consortium. The consortium remained liable even after commissioning. Accordingly, consortium should be treated as an AOP.

  • The contract does not mention offshore or onshore supply of services, nor does it specify that title to the machinery shall pass on high seas or in the country of origin. The consortium’s risk continued until commissioning, testing, etc. Accordingly, the title to the machinery does not pass offshore. Ruling: The AAR observed and held as follows.

As regards divisibility of contract:

  • In Vodafone International Holdings B. V. v. Union of India, (2012) 341 ITR 1 (SC), the Supreme Court held that section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act is not a ‘look through’ provision and the Revenue/ Court should ‘look at’ the transaction as a whole and should not adopt a dissecting approach to ascertain the legal nature of the transaction.

  • A contract for sale of goods is different from that for erection and commissioning of plant since the latter also involves designing and engineering.

  •  The situs of an erection contract should be the place where the plant is to be erected.

  • Internal consortium agreement is only an internal arrangement between the members and the MOU cannot supersede or override the contract.

  • On holistic reading of the contract, it is an indivisible contract containing rights and obligations of ONGC and the consortium. As regards taxability of consortium as AOP:

  • This was a case of two co-adventures coming together for promotion of a joint enterprise with a view to make a gain. Composite contract was awarded to the consortium (and not to individual members) for the whole work and payment was to also be made only to the consortium. Hence, the consortium was to be taxed as an AOP.

  • The internal division of responsibility by the members, recognition of such division by ONGC or making of separate payments by ONGC to the two members cannot undo the formation of AOP. As regards taxability of work done outside India:

  • The contract is an indivisible whole. Even if a significant part of design and engineering work is done outside India, it cannot be viewed in isolation and apart from the contract since it is inextricably linked with the work of erection and commissioning undertaken by the consortium. Having regard to an indivisible contract and existence of an AOP, amount receivable in respect of design and engineering is liable to be taxed in India. As regards taxability of supply of equipment and spares outside India:

  •  Since the contract is indivisible and the consortium is to be taxed as an AOP, amount receivable in respect of supply of equipment, material and spares outside India is liable to be taxed in India.
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Having regard to MFN clause under India-France DTAA, scope of services can be restricted to that under India-USA DTAA. However, since India-USA DTAA does not include ‘managerial services’ in FIS whereas India-French DTAA includes the same in FTS, the restricted scope cannot supply in case of ‘managerial services’.

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15. Mersen India Private Limited In re (2012) 20 Taxmann.com 475 (AAR) Article 5, 7, 13(4) of India-France DTAA
Decided on: 16-4-2012
Before P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman) Present for the appellant: Chythanaya K. K. Present for the Department: Shweta Mishra

Having regard to MFN clause under India-France DTAA, scope of services can be restricted to that under India-USA DTAA. However, since India-USA DTAA does not include ‘managerial services’ in FIS whereas India-French DTAA includes the same in FTS, the restricted scope cannot supply in case of ‘managerial services’.


Facts:

The applicant Indian company (‘ICo’) was whollyowned subsidiary of a French company. The parent French company had another wholly-owned French subsidiary company (‘FrenchCo’). ICo entered into ‘Services Agreement’ with FrenchCo under which, FrenchCo was to provide certain services to ICo and ICo was to reimburse the expenses incurred by FrenchCo for providing these services. In addition to the expenses, ICo was to pay 5% of the reimbursed amount. The payment was to be remitted to France, net of withholding tax and withholding tax, if any, was to be borne by ICo. ICo had also entered into another agreement with FrenchCo which, however, was not the subjectmatter of ruling. ICo sought the ruling of AAR in respect of the taxability of the payments made to FrenchCo and particularly whether they were FTS in terms of Article 13(4) of India-France DTAA (read with the Protocol), or business profits in terms of Article 7 and, if they were business profits, whether they would be taxable as FrenchCo did not have a PE in India in terms of Article 5. Protocol to India-France DTAA contains MFN clause (Paragraph 7) and provides that if India enters into DTAA with an OECD country after 1st September 1989, and the scope or rate of tax under that DTAA is more restricted than that under India-France DTAA, the scope or rate of tax under India-France DTAA would also be restricted. India entered into DTAA with the USA on 12 September 1989 whereunder the scope of services was restricted by inclusion of the phrase ‘make available’. Hence, ICo contended that though India-France DTAA does not contain ‘make available’, the protocol to India-France DTAA should be considered to determine whether the payment is FTS. However, the tax authority contended that only lower rate of tax should be considered and the scope cannot be narrowed by considering the protocol.

Held:

The AAR observed and held as follows. l The fact of the transactions being undertaken on arm’s-length basis should be verified to determine whether income can still be attributed to PE. l In the absence of the phrase ‘make available’ in India-France DTAA, the concept may be borrowed from India-USA DTAA. However, as only technical and consultancy services are covered in India-USA DTAA, the concept of ‘make available’ can apply only in respect of those services. Since Article 13 of India-France DTAA also includes ‘managerial services’, and since it does not stipulate that they should be ‘made available’, the payments for ‘managerial services’ would be taxable as FTS. l Since ‘managerial services’ are specifically dealt with under Article 13, question of treating them as business profits under Article 7 does not arise.

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(i) Composite contract for installation and commissioning project cannot be split into parts for the purpose of taxation. (ii) Several consortium members who had come together for earning income, and the composite contract was awarded to the consortium. Hence, the consortium was liable to be taxed as an AOP.

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14. Alstom Transport SA (AAR No. 958 of 2010) 5(Unreported) Section 2(31) of Income-tax Act Dated: 7-6-2012
Before P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman)
Present for the appellant: N. Venkatraman, Satish Aggarwal, Akhil Sambhan,
Vinay Aggarwal, Atul Awasthi,
Present for the Department: Bhupinderjit Kumar

Composite contract for installation and commissioning project cannot be split into parts for the purpose of taxation.

Several consortium members who had come together for earning income, and the composite contract was awarded to the consortium. Hence, the consortium was liable to be taxed as an AOP.


Facts:

Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited (‘BMRC’) floated a tender for design, manufacture, supply, installation, testing and commissioning of signalling/ train control and communication systems.

The applicant was a tax resident of France (‘FrenchCo’). FrenchCo, together with several other companies, entered into a consortium agreement, which was executed and registered in India. The agreement mentioned that the members were to: co-operate on an exclusive basis to submit a joint tender to BMRC; to negotiate with BMRC to secure the contract; not to take up any additional work in respect of the work for which the tender was floated; to be jointly and severally bound by the terms of the tender; and to be jointly and severally liable to BMRC for all obligations under the contract.

The obligations of FrenchCo under the contract pertained to off-shore supply of plant and spares and off-shore designing and training of operating and maintenance personnel. FrenchCo sought ruling of AAR on the issue whether, the amounts received by FrenchCo as a member of the consortium, for the supply of plant and off-shore services were chargeable to tax in India in terms of Income-tax Act and India-France DTAA.

Ruling:

  • The AAR observed and held as follows.  A contract should be read as a whole in the context of the object sought to be achieved and it cannot be split into different parts for the purpose of taxation. The tender floated by BMRC was a composite tender, the bid submitted by the consortium was for the work tendered and the contract between BMRC and the consortium was for installation and commissioning of signaling and communication system. Such contract cannot be split into separate parts.
  • In Vodafone International Holdings B. V. v. Union of India, (2012) 341 ITR 1 (SC), the Supreme Court held that section 9(1)(i) of Income-tax Act is not a ‘look through’ provision and the Revenue/Court should ‘look at’ the transaction as a whole and should not adopt a dissecting approach to ascertain the legal nature of the transaction. Thus, impliedly, the Supreme Court has disapproved/overruled the approach adopted in Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries v. Director of IT, (2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC).
  • The consortium members came together for executing the project, were jointly and severally liable for performance of the obligations and their common object and purpose for coming together was to earn income. Hence, the consortium was to be taxed as an AOP. The division of obligation amongst members could not alter the status that was acquired while entering into the contract since the legal rights and obligations arising out of and undertaken under the contract would determine the status of the consortium.
  • Entire income under the contract was taxable in the hands of the consortium as on AOP.
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Indian subsidiary performing functions in India, which, in its absence, the parent would have been required to perform, constituted PE.

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13. Aramex International Logistics (P) Ltd. In re
(2012) 22 Taxmann.com 74 (AAR)
Article 5 of India-Singapore DTAA
1Dated: 7-6-2012
Before P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman)
Present for the appellant: P. J. Pardiwala, Ravi
Praksh, Abhinav Ashwin, Karina Haum
Present   for   the   Department:   Shishir Srivastava
       

Indian subsidiary performing functions in India, which, in its absence, the parent would have been required to perform, constituted PE of the parent and consequently, income was attributable to the PE.


Facts:

The applicant was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of Singapore (‘SingCo’). SingCo was a member of a Group of companies, which were engaged in door-to-door express shipments and related transport services. A Group company incorporated in Bermuda (‘BermudaCo’) had a wholly owned subsidiary in India (‘IndCo’). BermudaCo had business arrangement with IndCo for inbound and outbound movement of packages within India. SingCo entered into agreement with IndCo for carrying on the business arrangement originally carried on by BermudaCo. The agreement was on principal-to-principal basis.

 In terms of the agreement:

(i) IndCo was non-exclusive agent of SingCo for transportation of packages in India.

(ii) IndCo had full discretion to open offices in India at its own expense. However, it was not to act on behalf of SingCo.

(iii) SingCo was responsible for transportation of packages throughout the world (outside India) and IndCo was not permitted to engage any service provider for rendering services outside India.

(iv) IndCo was also involved in domestic transportation of packages where the Group network was not used.

(v) Roughly, one-third income of IndCo was from its arrangement with SingCo.

(vi) SingCo was responsible for transportation of packages throughout the world (outside India) and IndCo was not permitted to engage any service provider for rendering services outside India.

(vii) SingCo was charging fees for providing certain support functions to IndCo. The issues raised before AAR were: l Whether, in terms of India-Singapore DTAA, IndCo constituted PE of SingCo in India? l Whether the receipts from outbound and inbound consignments were attributable to PE? l If the transactions between SingCo and IndCo were on arm’s-length basis, whether income could still be attributed to the PE? l If IndCo did not constitute PE, whether the fees received for support functions could be regarded as FTS under India-Singapore DTAA?

Held:

The AAR observed and held as follows.

  •   PE is a place of business which enables a nonresident to carry on a part of its business in another country. SingCo cannot carry on its business, unless it makes arrangement for delivery of packages in India, either directly or through another entity. IndCo performed several functions such as obtaining orders, collecting and transporting packages to a specified destination, etc., which, otherwise, SingCo/Group would be required to perform. Hence, under Article 5(1) of India-Singapore DTAA, IndCo would constitute PE of SingCo/ Group in India. l Further, IndCo secures orders in India for the Group and also has right to conclude contracts for the express shipments business of the Group. Hence, under Article 5(8) of India- Singapore DTAA, it is agency PE of the Group. The exception under Article 5(10) of India- Singapore DTAA would not apply merely by describing IndCo as an independent entity or a non-exclusive agent when the Group is carrying on its business in India through IndCo.
  • Since SingCo has a PE, income attributable to the PE is taxable in India and hence, payments made by IndCo to SingCo were subject to withholding of tax.
  • The fact of the transactions being undertaken on arm’s-length basis should be verified to determine whether income can still be attributed to PE.
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Order No. [F. No. 225/124/2012/ITA.II], dated 20-6-2012 — Order extending due date for filing Form 49C for F.Y. 2011-12.

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Rule 114DA of the Income-tax Rules read with Circular No. 5, dated 6-2-2012, provided that Liaison Office in India should electronically file Form 49C, within 60 days from the end of financial year. The CBDT has extended the due date of filing Form 49C for the financial year 2011-12, up to 30th September, 2012. For the financial year 2011-12, Form 49C can be filed in ‘paper mode’ instead of filing it electronically with digital signatures.

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AMENDMENTS IN DIRECT TAX PROVISIONS BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2012

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1. Background:

The Finance Minister presented the Budget
for the year 2012-13 on 16th March, 2012, and introduced the Finance
Bill, 2012, containing 154 clauses. Out of these, 113 clauses relate to
‘Direct Taxes’ and other 41 clauses relate to ‘Indirect Taxes’. There
was heated discussion on the various provisions of the Bill which
included over 30 amendments in various sections of the Income-tax Act
with retrospective effect. There was lot of protest in India and abroad
as most of these amendments would affect non-residents and will have
adverse effect on global trade. Inspite of this protest, the Government
could manage to get through the legislation with some changes. The
Finance Act, 2012, containing 119 sections relating to Direct Taxes is
now passed by both Houses of the Parliament and received the assent of
the President on 28-5-2012. Originally, the existing Income-tax Act was
to be replaced by the Direct Taxes Code (DTC) w.e.f. 1-4-2012. Since the
implementation of DTC is delayed, we will have to live with the
existing Income-tax Act for one more year. Some of the amendments made
by the Finance Act, 2012, will give some relief in the computation of
Income and Tax. However, some of the amendments, which have
retrospective and retroactive effect, will make the life of taxpayers
miserable.

 In particular, the retrospective amendments of some
of the sections of the Income-tax Act will increase the tax burden of
non-resident assessees and also increase their compliance cost. In this
respect, the tax litigation will also increase in the coming year. In
this article, the amendments made in the Incometax Act, Wealth-tax Act
and Securities Transaction Tax are discussed.

2. Rates of income tax, surcharge and education cess:

2.1
Relief in income tax: The tax slabs for individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI,
etc. have been made more beneficial. The exemption limit for these
assessees have been raised from Rs.1.80 lac to Rs.2 lac. As a result of
the revision of the exemption limit and realignment of some of the
slabs, tax liability of this category of assessees for A.Y. 2013-14 will
be less by Rs.2,000 in respect of income up to Rs.8 lac. In respect of
income above Rs.8 lac the reduction of the tax will be of Rs.22,000. For
senior citizens and very senior citizens there is no change in tax
payable on income up to Rs.8 lac. If the income is more than Rs.8 lac
the reduction in the tax liability in their cases will be of Rs.20,000.

2.2 Rates of income tax:

(i)
For individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI and Artificial Juridical person, as
stated above, the threshold limit of basic exemption has been increased
for A.Y. 2013-14. Individuals above the age of 60 years are treated as
‘Senior Citizens’ and those above the age of 80 years are treated as
‘Very Senior Citizens’. The rates of tax for A.Y. 2012-13 and A.Y.
2013-14 are as under:

(a) Rates in A.Y. 2012-13 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2012)

(b) Rates in A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2013)

No
surcharge is payable for A.Y. 2012-13 and 2013-14. However, education
cess of 3% (2+1) of the tax is payable for both the years.

 (ii)
The following table gives comparative figures of tax payable by
individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI, etc. in A.Y. 2012-13 and A.Y. 2013-14.

The above tax is to be increased by 3% of tax for education cess.

(a) Tax payable in A.Y. 2012-13 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2012)

(b) Tax payable in A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2013)

The
concessional rate of 15% plus applicable surcharge and education cess
which was provided for A.Y. 2012-13 has been continued for A.Y. 2013-14
also.

(vii) Rate of Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT)

The
rate of tax 18.5% plus education cess of 3% of tax which was payable as
AMT on income of LLP for A.Y. 2012-13 is now payable by all assessee,
other than a company, i.e., LLP, firm, individual, HUF, AOB, BOI, etc.
in A.Y. 2013-14. No surcharge is payable on AMT.

2.3 Surcharge on income tax:

(i)
As in A.Y. 2012-13, no surcharge is payable by non-corporate assessees
i.e., individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI, Firm LLP, co-operative societies, etc.
in A.Y. 2013-14. In the case of a company the rate of surcharge, if
income exceeds Rs.1 Cr, is 5% of income tax. As regards MAT u/s.115JB,
if the book profit exceeds Rs.1 Cr., rate of surcharge is 5%.

(ii) As regards TDS and TCS, no surcharge is required to be added to the rates of TDS or TCS.

(iii) In the case of dividend distribution tax u/s.115O and 115R the rate of surcharge on tax (i.e., 15%) is 5% of the tax.

(iv)
In the case of foreign companies, the rate of surcharge on income tax
is 2% of tax if the taxable income of the company exceeds Rs.1 Cr.
Similarly, the rate of surcharge on tax to be deducted u/s.195 in case
of foreign company is 2% of the tax if the income from which tax is
deductible at source exceeds Rs.1 Cr. 2.4 Education cess: As in earlier
years, education cess of 3% (including 1% higher education cess) of
income tax and surcharge (if applicable) is payable by all assesses
(Residents or non-residents). No education cess is applicable on TDS or
TCS from payments to all residents (including companies). However, if
tax is deducted from payments made to

(a) foreign companies,

(b) non-residents or

(c)
on salary payments to residents or non-residents, education cess at 3%
of the tax and surcharge (if applicable) is to be deducted.

3. Tax Deduction and Collection at Source (TDS and TCS):

3.1 Section 193: At
present, no tax is required to be deducted at source if interest
payable to a resident individual on debentures issued by a listed
company does not exceed Rs.2,500 in a year. This limit is increased to
Rs.5,000 w.e.f. 1-7-2012. This concession will now apply to debentures
issued by unlisted public companies as well as to interest payable to
resident HUF. The existing exemption in respect of interest paid on
debentures issued by listed companies which are held in Demat Account
will continue without any limit. The amendment in this section comes
into force on 1-7-2012.

 3.2 Section 194J — TDS from fees
from professional or technical services: This section is now amended
w.e.f. 1-7-2012. It will now be necessary for a company to deduct tax at
source from any remuneration, fees or commission paid or payable to a
director, if no tax is deductible u/s.192 under the head salary. The
rate for TDS is 10%. It may be noted that the manner in which the
section is amended indicates that this deduction is to be made
irrespective of the quantum of such payment in the year. As regards
professional fees, technical service fees, royalty, etc. to which this
section applies it is provided that tax is to be deducted only if
payment under each head exceeds Rs.30,000 in the financial year.
Therefore, in case of payment of fees to non-executive directors and
independent directors as ‘Director’s Fees’, the tax at 10% will be
deductible even if the total payment in the F.Y. is less than Rs.30,000
to each of them.

3.3 Section 194LA:

At present TDS from compensation on compulsory acquisition of immovable property at 10% is required to be made if compensation amount exceeds Rs.1 lac. This will now be required to be made if the compensation amount exceeds Rs.2 lac w.e.f. 1-7-2012.

3.4    Section 194LC:

This is a new section inserted in the Income-tax Act w.e.f. 1-7-2012. It provides for deduction of tax at the concessional rate of 5% plus applicable surcharge and education cess, in respect of interest paid to a non-resident, other than a foreign company. This interest should relate to monies borrowed by an Indian company from the non-resident at any time on or after 1-7-2012 and before 1-7-2015 in foreign currency from a source outside India. This borrowing should be (i) under a loan agreement or (ii) by way of issue of long- term infrastructure bonds approved by the Central Government. Further, the rate of such interest should not exceed the rate approved by the Government for this purpose.

3.5    Section 201 — Failure to deduct tax at source:

U/s.201, a person can be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of non/short deduction of tax at source. The AO can pass order for this purpose within a period of four years from the end of the financial year in a case where no returns for tax deducted at source have been filed. Section 201 is amended with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2010, to extend the time limit for passing the order u/s.201(1) for non/short deduction of tax from 4 years to 6 years from the end of the F.Y. in which payment is made or credit is given.

3.6    Section 206C — Tax Collection at Source (TCS):

This section provides for collection of tax at source from sale of alcoholic liquor, tendu leaves, timber, forest products, scrap, etc. at the rates ranging from 1% to 5% of the sale price. The scope of this provision for TCS is extended w.e.f. 1-7-2012 as under.

    i) In respect of sale of minerals, being coal or lignite or iron ore, tax is to be collected by the seller at the rate of 1% of the sale price.

    ii) However, such tax is not to be collected if the purchase of such goods listed in section 206C(i) is made by the buyer for the purpose of manufacturing, processing or producing articles or things or for the purposes of generation of power. For this purpose the buyer of such goods has to give a declaration in Form No. 37C.

    iii) In order to reduce the quantum of cash trans-actions in bullion or jewellery sector and for curbing the flow of unaccounted money in the trading system, it is now provided that the seller of bullion or jewellery shall collect from the buyer tax at the rate of 1% of the sale consideration. For this purpose it is provided that the collection of the above tax of 1% shall be made if the sale price in cash exceeds the following amounts:

    a. For bullion, if the sale price exceeds Rs.2 lac. It may be noted that for this purpose definition of ‘Bullion’ does not include coin or any other article weighing ten grams or less.

    b. For jewellery, if the sale price exceeds Rs.5 lac.

iii) It may be noted that this tax will be collected from the buyer even if the buyer has purchased bullion or jewellery for personal use or for manufacture or processing the same for his business. Further, it appears that persons who purchase bullion or jewellery for personal use will not be able to get credit for the tax collected at source because there will be no corresponding income from sale of bul-lion or jewellery in respect of which such credit for tax can be claimed. Further, the person making such payment for purchase of bullion or jewellery in cash will have to prove the source from which such cash is paid.

    iv) There are certain consequential amendments made in section 206C on the same lines as in section 201 . According to these amendments, if the seller, who is required to collect tax under this section fails to do so, he will not be deemed to be in default if he can establish that the buyer has filed his return u/s.139 and paid tax on his income after considering the goods purchased by him. Consequential provision for reduction in the period for which interest is payable u/s.206C is also made.

3.7    No Advance tax payable by senior citizens u/s.207:

This section provides for payment of Advance Tax in instalments. It is now provided, w.e.f. 1-4- 2012, that a senior citizen who has no income from business or profession will not be required to pay any Advance Tax.

    4. Exemptions and deductions:

4.1    Charitable trust:

Section 2(15) provides that if the object of advancement of general public utility involves carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, etc. and the aggregate value of the receipts from such activity exceeds Rs.25 lac, the trust will not be considered as charitable trust. New s.s (8) has been inserted in section 13 and a proviso has been added in section 10(23C), with retrospective effect from A.Y. 2009- 10, to provide that the trust or institution will not be granted exemption only for the year in which such receipts exceed Rs.25 lac. Such loss of exemption in that year will not affect the registration of the trust or institution u/s.12AA. The exemption can be claimed in subsequent years when such receipts do not exceed Rs.25 lac.

4.2    Section 10(10D) — Deduction of life insurance premium:

At present, any sum received under a life insurance policy, including bonus, but excluding amount re-ceived under Keyman Insurance policy, is exempt, provided the premium amount does not exceed 20% of the actual capital sum assured in any year during the policy period. Now, this limit is reduced to 10% in the case of an insurance policy issued on or after 1st April, 2012. Similar amendment is made u/s.80C, whereby it is provided that deduction in respect of life insurance premium, etc. in the case of insurance policies issued on or after 1st April, 2012 shall be avail-able only in respect of premium not exceeding 10% of the actual capital sum assured. It may be noted that in respect of life insurance premium paid on policies issued before 31-3-2012, the old limit of 20% of actual capital sum assured will apply.

‘Actual capital sum assured’ is also defined to mean the minimum amount assured under the policy on happening of the specified event at any time during the term of the policy, and excluding the value of any premiums agreed to be returned and benefit of bonus or otherwise over and above the sum actually assured. This is done to ensure that life insurance products are not designed to circumvent the prescribed limit by varying the capital sum as-sured from year to year. This amendment comes into force from A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year end-ing on 31-3-2013).

4.3    Section 10(23FB) — Venture Capital Company (VCC) and Venture Capital Funds (VCF):

    i) This section has been amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. Simultaneously, section 115U has also been amended. Section 10(23FB) provides that a VCC or VCF registered with SEBI and deriving income from investment in a Venture Capital Undertaking (VCU) is exempt from tax. VCU is presently defined to mean such domestic company whose shares are not listed in a recognised stock exchange in India and which is engaged in any one of the nine specified businesses. VCC and VCF registered with SEBI are granted a pass-through status and the income in the hands of the investor is taxed in the like manner and to the same extent as if the investment was directly made by the investor in the VCU.

    ii) The sectoral restriction that the VCU should be engaged in only the nine specified businesses is now removed. The definition of VCU is now amended to cover any undertaking referred to in SEBI (Venture Capital Funds) Regulations, 1996. As such VCC and VCF will be exempt from tax, irrespective of the nature of business carried out by the VCU, as long as it satisfies the conditions imposed by SEBI.

    iii) At present, the income received by any VCC/ VCF from VCU, is taxed on receipt basis in the hands of the investor and hence could result in deferral of taxation till the income is distributed to the investor. It is now provided that the income accruing to VCC/ VCF will be taxable in the hands of the investor on accrual basis.

4.4    Section 10(23BBH):

This new section is inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2013 to pro-vide for exemption from tax in the case of income of the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) from A.Y. 2013-14.

4.5    Section 10(48):

This is a new provision made w.e.f. A.Y. 2012-13 (1-4-2011 to 31-3-2012). This section provides for exemption in respect of any income of a foreign company received in India, in Indian currency, on account of sale of crude oil to any person in India. This is subject to the conditions that (i) the receipt of money is under an agreement which is entered into by the Central Government or approved by it the foreign company, and the arrangement or agreement has been notified by the Central Govern-ment and (iii) the receipt of the money is the only activity carried out by the foreign company in India. This provision is introduced in view of the mecha-nism devised by the Government to make payment to certain foreign companies in Indian currency for import of crude oil (e.g., from Iran).

4.6    Section 40(a)(ia):

This section provides for disallowance of payment to a resident if tax required to be deducted there from has not been deducted by the assessee. By amendment of this section it is provided that if the assessee establishes that the resident payee (de-ductee) has paid tax on this income before furnish-ing his return of income, the expenditure shall not be disallowed under this section. This amendment is made from A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 2012-13). Consequential amendment is made in section 201 to provide, w.e.f. 1-7-2012, that the payer shall not be deemed to be in default if he can prove that the payee has furnished his return u/s.139 and paid tax on such amount. However, the payer will have to pay interest from the due date till the date of filing return by the payee. This being a beneficial provision, it should be made applicable to earlier years also. This will reduce litigation on this issue. It will be pos-sible to argue that the above beneficial amendment will have retrospective effect in view of decision of CIT v. Virgin Creations, ITA No. 302 of 2011 (Calcutta High Court) in respect of similar amendment in the section by the Finance Act, 2010.

4.7 Section 80C:

As discussed in Para 4.2 above, section 80C is amended to provide that the deduction of LIP in respect of life policy taken out on or after 1-4-2012 shall be restricted to 10% of the capital value assured.

4.8 Section 80CCG:

This is a new section inserted w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 1-4-2012 to 31-3-2013) and provides as under:

    i) The deduction under this section can be claimed by an Individual who is a resident, if he acquires listed equity shares in accordance with the scheme to be notified by the Government. The assessee will be allowed deduction of 50% of the amount invested subject to the limit of deduction of Rs.25,000 in the computation of income for the year of investment. It may be noted that this deduction is not allowable to an HUF.

    ii) The above deduction is subject to the following conditions:

    a) The gross total income of the assessee for the relevant assessment year should not exceed Rs.10 lac.
    b) The assessee should make the above investment in retail category specified in the scheme.

    c) The above investment should be in listed equity shares as specified under the scheme.

    d) There will be locking period of 3 years for such investment.

    iii) If the assessee fails to comply with any of the above conditions in any year, the amount of deduction allowed in earlier years will be taxable in that year.


4.9    Section 80D:

Under this section deduction up to Rs.15,000 is allowed to an assessee (individual or HUF) for premium paid on mediclaim insurance policy. For senior citizens the limit for deduction is Rs.20,000. Now it is provided that, effective from Accounting Year 2012-13, if the assessee makes payment up to Rs.5,000 in a year for preventive health check-up, deduction will be allowed within the above ceiling limit. Further, age limit for senior citizens is reduced from 65 years to 60 years. It is suggested that this deduction upto Rs.5,000 should have been allowed over and above the existing ceiling limit of Rs.15,000 or Rs.20,000. The limits of Rs.15,000/20,000 were fixed in the year 2000 and deserve to be enhanced due to increase in medical cost and consequential increase in insurance premium.

4.10    Sections 80G and 80GGA:

Deduction for donation of Rs.10000 or more under these sections will not be allowed if the same is paid in cash. This provision will apply to donations made in the Accounting Year 2012-13 onwards.

4.11    Section 80IA(4)(iv):

Under this section an industrial undertaking engaged in the business of generation and distribution of power and allied activities is entitled to tax holiday for 10 years if such undertaking begins its activities on or before 31-3-2012. This date is now extended to 31-3-2013.

4.12    Interest from bank exempt u/s.80TTA:

This is a new section which has been introduced effective from A.Y. 2013-14 (accounting year ending 31-3-2013). Under this section, in the case an individual or HUF, interest from savings bank account with a bank, co- operative bank or post office bank up to Rs.10000 will not be taxable. This provision will not apply to interest on fixed deposit with banks.

4.13    Section 115-O:

At present, dividend distributed by a company out of the dividend received from its subsidiary company, which has paid Dividend Distribution Tax, is not liable to Dividend Distribution Tax once again. For this purpose, the dividend receiving company should not be a subsidiary of any other company. By amendment of this section, effective from 1-7-2012, the condition that “the company is not a subsidiary of any other company” has now been removed. Therefore, any domestic company (whether it is a holding company or a subsidiary company) receiving dividend from its subsidiary or step down subsidiary company and declaring dividend in the same year out of such dividend amount will be allowed to reduce the amount of such dividend for determining the liability to Dividend Distribution Tax if the subsidiary or step down subsidiary company has paid Dividend Distribution Tax that is payable.

    5. Income from business or profession:

5.1    Section 32(1)(iia):

At present, an assessee engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing is entitled to additional depreciation of 20% of the cost of the new plant and machinery in the year of acquisition. From A.Y. 2013-14, this benefit is now extended to an assessee engaged in the business of generation or generation and distribution of power.

5.2    Section 35(2AB):

According to the existing provisions of section 35 (2AB) weighted deduction at 200% of expenditure on approved in-house research and development by a company engaged in the business of biotechnology or in the manufacture of specified articles is allow-able up to 31-3-2012. This benefit is now extended up to 31-3-2017.

5.3    Section 35AD:

    i) Investment-linked deduction of 100% of capital expenditure (excluding expenditure incurred for land, goodwill or financial instrument) is allowed for certain specified businesses. In the list of specified businesses, there are at present 8 types of businesses. With effect from 1-4-2012, 3 new businesses have been added to this list. These 3 businesses re-late to setting up and operating (a) inland container depot, or container freight station, (b) warehousing facility for storage of sugar and (c) bee-keeping and production of honey beeswax which commence operations on or after 1-4-2012.

    ii) Further, the above investment-linked deduction is now enhanced to 150% of the capital expenditure incurred on or after 1st April, 2012 in respect of certain specified businesses which commence operations on or after 1-4-2012. These specified businesses are setting up and operating (a) cold-chain facility warehousing facility for agricultural produce, (c) building and operating a hospital with at least 100 beds, (d) developing and building affordable housing project and (e) production of fertiliser in India.

    iii) Further, it is provided that an assessee who builds a hotel of two-star or above category as classified by the Central Government and subsequently, continuing to own the hotel, transfers the operation thereof, the assessee shall be deemed to be engaged in specified business and will be eligible to claim deduction u/s.35AD. This amendment has been made with effect from A.Y. 2011-12.

5.4    New sections 35CCC and 35CCD:

These two new sections are inserted effective from A.Y. 2013-14. They provide as under:

    i. Section 35CCC provides that when an assessee incurs any capital or revenue expenditure for agricultural extension project notified by the CBDT, he will be allowed deduction of 150% of such expenditure.

    ii. Section 35CCD provides that where a company incurs expenditure (other than expenditure on any land or building) on any skill development project notified by the CBDT, it will be allowed deduction of 150% of such expenditure.

5.5    Presumptive taxation:

Section 44AD provides for presumptive taxation in respect of non-corporate assessees carrying on specified businesses and having a total turnover of less than Rs.60 lac. Under this section 8% of the total turnover is deemed to be the income from business subject to certain conditions. It is now provided that this section will not apply to a person having income from (i) a profession, (ii) commission or brokerage or (iii) any agency business. This amendment is made effective A.Y. 2011-12. Further, the limit of Rs.60 lac for total turnover is increased to Rs.1 crore w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 2012-13).

5.6    Section 44AB:

The limit of turnover/gross receipts for tax audit u/s.44AB has also been increased for business to Rs.1 Cr. And for profession to Rs.25 lac w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 as discussed in Para 17.2 below:

    6. Capital gains:

6.1 Section 47(vii):

This section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. It is now provided that when a subsidiary company amalgamates with a holding company, the requirement of the issue of shares of the amalgamated company on amalgamation will not apply.

6.2 Section 49:

At present, there is no provision to treat the cost of assets of a proprietary concern, converted into a company, or a firm converted into a company as the cost of the assets in the case of the company. It is now provided, w.e.f. A.Y. 1999 -2000, that the cost of assets on conversion of a proprietary concern or a firm into a company u/s.47(xiii), or 47 (xiv), in the hands of the company shall be the same as in the hands of the converting enterprise. Similarly, when an unlisted company is converted into LLP u/s.47(xiiib), the cost assets in the case of the company shall be treated as cost in the case of the LLP.

6.3 Section 50D:

This is a new section inserted w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. It provides that where the consideration received or accrued for transfer of a capital asset is not ascertainable or cannot be determined, then the fair market value of the said asset shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration on the date of transfer for computing the capital gain. This situation may arise in a case where the capital asset is transferred in exchange of another capital asset.

6.4 Section 54B:

At present, the benefit of exemption from capital gain on sale of agricultural land is available to the assessee on reinvestment of such capital gain for purchase of another new agricultural land within two years. One of the conditions is that the land should have been used by the assessee or his parent for agricultural purposes. This provision is amended, w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14, to provide that even if such land was used by the HUF, in which the as-sessee or his parent was a member, this exemption can be claimed.

6.5 Section 54GB:

This is a new section which is inserted w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 to provide that if an Individual or HUF makes capital gains on sale of a residential house or plot, he can claim exemption from Capital Gains Tax if he invests the net consideration in equity shares of a new SME company. Such SME company is required to invest this amount in purchase of new plant and machinery. This exemption can be claimed subject to the following conditions.

    i) The investee company should qualify as a small or medium enterprise under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Act, 2006. (SME).

    ii) The company should be engaged in the business of manufacture of an article or a thing.

    iii) SME company should be incorporated within the period from 1st of April of the year in which capital gain arises to the assessee and before the due date for filing the return by the assessee u/s.139(1).

    iv) The assessee should hold more than 50% of the share capital or the voting right after the subscription in the shares of a SME company.

    v) The assessee will not be able to transfer the above shares for a period of 5 years.

    vi) The company will have to utilise the amount invested by the assessee in the purchase of new plant and machinery. If the entire amount is not so invested before the due date of filing the return of income by the assessee u/s.139, then the company will have to deposit the amount in the scheme to be notified by the Central Government.

    vii) The above new plant and machinery acquired by the company cannot be sold for a period of 5 years.

    viii) The above scheme of exemption granted in respect of capital gains on sale of residential property will remain in force up to 31-3-2017.

The above conditions prescribed in the new section are very harsh. This section should have allowed the investment in existing SME company for the purpose of exemption. Further, investment in LLP, which satisfies the condition of SME enterprises, should also be permitted. The restricted time limit for acquiring new plant and machinery will create difficulties and, therefore, it should have been provided that the SME company should be allowed to make such investment in new plant and machinery within a period of 18 months from the date on which the assessee makes the investment in its equity shares. The period of 5 years for retaining the equity shares is too long and should have been reduced to 3 years. Similarly, lock-in-period for plant and machinery acquired by the SME company should be reduced from 5 years to 3 years.

6.6    Section  55A  —  Reference  to  Valuation Officer:

This section is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. Under this section, the AO can make a reference to the Valuation Officer with a view to ascertain the fair market value of the capital asset. At present, such reference can be made when the AO is of the view that the value disclosed by the assessee is less than the fair market value. In some cases it is held that when the assessee exercises his option to substitute fair market value of the capital asset as on 1-4-1981, for the cost of the asset, and if the AO is of the view that such market value as declared by the assessee was more, he cannot make a reference to the Valuation Officer. To overcome this position, this amendment provides that w.e.f. 1-7-2012 the AO can make such reference to the Valuation Officer. This amended provision will apply w.e.f. 1 -7-2012 but will have retroactive effect, inasmuch as, the AO can make such a reference to the Valuation Officer in respect of all pending assessments of earlier years.

6.7    Securities Transaction Tax (STT):

    i) Section 98 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, providing for rates of STT has been amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. The revised rates of STT in Cash Delivery Segment are reduced from 0.125% to 0.1%. Therefore, in the case of delivery-based transaction relating to equity shares of a company or units of equity ori-ented fund of a mutual fund entered into through a recognised Stock Exchange, the STT payable by a purchaser is reduced from 0.125% to 0.1% and a seller is reduced from 0.125% to 0.1% w.e.f. 1-7-2012.

    ii) In order to encourage unlisted companies to get them listed in recognised Stock Exchange, it is now provided that sale of unlisted equity shares by any holder of such shares, under an offer for sale to the public included in an Initial Public Offer (IPO), if subsequently such shares are listed on the recognised Stock Exchange, will be liable for pay-ment of STT at 0.2%. If such STT is paid, long-term capital gain on such sales will be exempt from tax and tax on short-term capital gain will be payable at concessional rate of 15% u/s.111A.

    7. Income from other sources:

7.1    Section 56(2)(vii):

Under this section any gift exceeding Rs.50,000 in any year received by an Individual or HUF on or after 1-10-2009 is taxable as income from other sources, subject to certain exceptions. One of the exceptions is about gift received from relatives of the individual as defined. Similar exemption is not given in respect of gifts from members of HUF. It is now provided, w.e.f. 1-10-2009, that gifts received by HUF from its members will be exempt. However, if such a gift is given by a member to such HUF, income from the property gifted will be clubbed with the income of the member u/s.64(2). In order to mitigate hardship experienced in practical life it is suggested that the following relationship should have been covered in the definition of relatives.

    i. Gifts by HUF to its members

    ii. Gifts to an Individual by any lineal descendant of a brother or sister of the Individual or his/ her spouse (i.e., gift by a nephew or niece to an uncle or aunt). Similar provision is made in section 314(214)(h) of DTC Bill, 2010.

7.2    Section 56(2)(viib):

This is a new provision inserted from the A.Y. 2013-14. It is now provided that where a closely held company issues shares to a resident, for amount received in excess of the fair market value of the shares, it will be deemed to be the income of the company under the head ‘Income from other Sources’. The fair market value for this purpose is the higher of the value arrived at on the basis of the method to be prescribed or the value as substantiated by the company to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. The company can substantiate the value based on the value of the tangible and intangible assets and various types of commercial rights as stated in the section.

This provision will not apply to amounts received by a venture capital undertaking from a venture capital fund or a venture capital company. Further, this provision will not apply to amount received from  non-resident, a foreign company or from a class of persons as may be notified by the Government. The provision appears to have been made with a view to ensure that excessive amount, representing revenue payment, is not received in the form of share premium and does not escape taxation.

7.3    Section 68:

This section deals with taxation of cash credits. The section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. This section now provides that in the case of a closely held company, if the amount credited in the name of a resident is by way of share application money, share capital, share premium or any such amount, by whatever name called, and the explanation offered for the credit is not considered to be satis-factory, such amount will be considered as income of the company. However, if the person (being a resident) in whose name the amount is credited offers explanation about the source and nature of the amount credited and such explanation is found to be satisfactory by the Assessing Officer this Section shall not apply. In the event of failure to do so, the entire amount credited will be taxed at the rate of 30% plus applicable surcharge and Education cess in the hands of the company.

This provision does not apply to amount received from a venture capital fund or a venture capital company. It will also not apply to the amount received from a non-resident or a foreign company.

7.4    Section 115BBD:

At present, this section provides that rate of tax, for dividend received by an Indian company from a foreign company in which it has share holding of 26% or more, is 15% for A.Y. 2012-13. This concession has been extended for one more year i.e., A.Y. 2013-14.

7.5 Section 115BBE:

This is a new section inserted from A.Y. 2013-14. The section provides that unexplained amounts treated as income (i) u/s.68 cash credits, (ii) u/s.69 unexplained investment, (iii) u/s.69A unexplained money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles, u/s.69B amount of investments, expenditure on jewellery, bullion or other valuable articles not fully disclosed in books, (v) u/s.69C — Unexplained expenditure, and (vi) u/s.69D — Amount borrowed or repaid on a Hundi in cash, will now be taxed at a flat rate of 30% plus applicable surcharge and education cess. No deduction for any expenditure or allowance will be allowed against such income.

    8. Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) (section 115JB):

8.1 Section 115JB is amended w.e.f. 1-4-2001 (A.Y. 2001-02) to provide that in the case of the income arising from life insurance business the tax under this section will not be payable. In other words, MAT provisions will not apply from A.Y. 2001-02 onwards in respect of income from life insurance business.

8.2 (i) The section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013 -14 to provide that in the case of a company, such as insurance, banking, electricity company, etc., for which the Form of Profit & Loss A/c. and Balance Sheet is prescribed in the Act governing such com-panies, the book profit shall be determined on the basis of the Form of Profit & Loss A/c. prescribed under that Act. Further, it is provided that in respect of companies to which the Companies Act applies, the book profit will be computed on the basis of the revised format of Schedule VI.

    ii) By another amendment of this section effective from A.Y. 2013-14, it is now provided that the book profit will be increased by the amount standing to the credit of revaluation reserve relating to reval-ued asset which has been discarded or disposed of, if the same is not credited to the Profit & Los A/c. This amendment is in order to cover cases in which revaluation reserve is directly transferred to general reserve on disposal of asset resulting in the gain that is not being included in the computation of book profits up to now.

    9. Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT)

9.1 Sections 115JC to 115JE for levy of AMT on ad-justed total income of LLP have now been extended to other non-corporate assessees such as individual, HUF, AOP, BOI, Firm, etc. w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. New section 115JEE has also been added from A.Y. 2013-14.

9.2 Provision for AMT was made last year for income of LLP w.e.f. A.Y. 2012- 13 in sections 115JC to 115JE. Now section 115JC is replaced by a new section and other sections 115JD to 115JE have been amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. A new section 115JEE is also inserted. The effect of these amendments is as under.

    i) The provisions of section 115JC will now apply to LLP and all other non-corporate assessees i.e., individual, HUF, AOP, BOI, Firm, etc. As provided in section 115JC the assessees will have to obtain audit report in the prescribed form before the due date.

    ii) In the case of an individual, HUF, AOP, BOI or Artificial Juridical person, AMT will not be payable if the adjusted total income does not exceed Rs.20 lac. (section 115JEE)

    iii) AMT is payable at 18.5% plus applicable surcharge and education cess of the adjusted total income if the amount of such tax is more than the tax payable on the total income computed under other provisions of the Income-tax Act.

    iv) Adjusted total income is defined to mean the total income computed under the Income-tax Act increased by (a) deductions claimed under Chapter VIA (section C) i.e., 80HH to 80 RRB (other than section 80P) and (b) deduction claimed u/s.10AA (SEZ income).

    v) Other provisions of sections (a) section 115JD for tax credit for AMT paid for 10 years, (b) Section 115JE applicability of other sections of the Income-tax Act and (c) Section 115JF— Definitions will continue to apply to LLP and also to other non-corporate assessees to whom sections 115JC and 115JEE for payment of AMT apply.

    10. Specified domestic transactions:

Section 40A(2) of the Income-tax Act empowers the AO to disallow payment to a related person for expenditure, if he considers that such expenditure is excessive or unreasonable, having regard to the fair market value of the goods, services or facilities for which such payment is made and claimed as a deduction in the computation of income. Similarly, sections 10AA, 80A, 80IA, 80IB, etc. provide that if there are any transactions of purchases, sales, etc. between two related persons, the AO can ap-ply the test of fair market value and make adjust-ments in the computation of income. In all these sections, the concept of ‘fair market value’ has not been specifically explained. Therefore, the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Glaxo Smithkline Asia (P) Ltd., 195 Taxman 35 (SC) observed that in order to reduce litigation, sections 40A(2) and 80IA(10) need to be amended to empower the AO to make adjustments to the income declared by the assessee, having regard to the market value of the transac-tions between related parties, by applying any of the generally accepted methods for determination of Arm’s- Length Price (ALP), including methods provided under Transfer Pricing Regulations. In view of the above, amendments are made in sec-tions 40A(2), 10AA, 80A and 80IA to provide that the ‘Specified domestic transactions’ will now be subject to Transfer Pricing Regulations contained in sections 92, 92BA to 92F — from A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 1-4-2012 to 31-3-2013). In brief, the effect of these provisions, from A.Y. 2013-14 (1-4-2012 to 31-3-2013) onwards will be as under.

10.1 The term ‘specified domestic transaction’ is defined in new section 92BA to mean the following transactions, other than the international transactions:

    a) Any expenditure in respect of which payment has been made or to be made to a person referred to in section 40A(2)(b). This will include remuneration, commission, rent, interest, etc. paid to a related person as well as purchases made from such person.

    b) Any transaction referred to in section 80A.

    c) Any transfer of goods or services referred to in section 80IA(8).

    d) Any business transacted between the assessee and other person as referred to in section 80IA(10).

    e) Any transaction, referred to in any other section under Chapter VI-A or section 10AA, to which provisions of sections 80IA(8) or 80IA (10) are applicable.

    f) Any other transaction as may be prescribed by Rules by the CBDT.

10.2 It is also provided that the Transfer Pricing provisions will not apply if the aggregate amount relating to the above transactions entered into by the assessee, in the relevant accounting year, does not exceed Rs.5 crore. It is not clear from the word-ing of the above section whether such aggregate amount is to be worked out by considering the amount of expenditure, purchases, sales, etc. under all the above sections taken together or whether the aggregate amount under each section i.e., 40A(2), 80A, 80IA, 10AA, etc. is to be separately worked out in order to determine the limit of Rs.5 crore provided in the section.

10.3    Section 40A(2):

This section provides for disallowance of revenue expenditure incurred by the assessee. The section does not apply to any revenue or capital receipt or to capital expenditure. Further, the section does not apply to any revenue expenditure which is capita-lised. Under this section, if any payment is made or to be made for any revenue expenditure to any ‘Related Person’, the AO can disallow that part of the expenditure which he considers to be excessive or unreasonable, having regard to the fair market value of the goods, services or facilities for which such payment is made and claimed as a deduction in computing the income. This section applies to the computation of ‘Income from Business or Profession’ and ‘Income from other Sources’. This section is now amended to provide that the fair market value for any payment to which the concept of specified domestic transaction applies shall be determined on the basis of arm’s-length price concept as provided in sections 92C and 92F(ii).

10.4    Section 80A:

Section 80A(6) refers to transfer of any goods or services held for the purposes of the undertaking, unit, enterprise, or eligible business to any other business carried on by the assessee. It also refers to transfer of goods or services held for the pur-poses of any other business of the assessee to the undertaking, unit, enterprise or eligible business. If the consideration for such transfer is not at the market value, then the AO can substitute the market value of the goods or services for such transfer. The expression ‘Market Value’ is defined in the Explanation to mean the price that such goods or services would fetch, if they were sold in the open market, subject to statutory or regulatory restrictions. This Explanation is now amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 to provide that the expression ‘Market Value’ in relation to specified domestic transactions shall now mean, in relation to any goods or services sold, supplied or acquired, the ‘Arm’s-length price’ as defined in section 92F(ii). It may be noted that this section applies to transfer of goods or services from one undertaking, unit or business owned by the assessee to another undertaking, unit or business owned by the same assessee.

10.5    Section 80IA:

S.s (8) and s.s (10) of this section are amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 as under.

    i) Section 80IA(8):

This provision refers to transfer of goods or services held for the purposes of the eligible business to any other business of the assessee. The section also refers to transfer of goods or services from any other business of the assessee to any eligible business. For this purpose, the expression ‘eligible business’ means business carried on by any indus-trial undertaking owned by the assessee carrying on business of infrastructure development, generation of power, telecommunication services, etc. as listed in section 80IA(4), for which 100% deduction is given u/s.80IA. Section 80IA(8) provides that transfer of goods or services between eligible business under-taking and other undertakings of the assessee shall be at market value. Now, it is provided that such transfers should be made at arm’s-length price as defined by the provisions of section 92F(ii).

    ii) Section 80IA(10):

This section provides that where it appears to the AO that, owing to the close connection between the assessee carrying on the eligible business and any other person, the course of business between them is so arranged that the profits of the eligible business for which 100% deduction is allowed u/s.80IA is shown at a figure higher than the ordinary profits in such business, the AO can recompute the profits of the eligible business for deduction u/s.80IA. The section is now amended to provide that, if the above arrangement between closely related parties involves specified domestic transactions, the AO shall compute the profit of the eligible business having regard to the arm’s-length price concept as defined in section 92F(ii).

    iii) Other sections:

It may be noted that the provisions of section 80IA(8) and 80IA(10) apply to certain other sections of the Income-tax Act also. These sections provide for deduction of income derived from various specified activities. In respect of transactions with related parties for claiming deduction from income, the above concept of arm’s-length price as applicable to specified domestic transactions will apply.

10.6 Since the concept of arm’s-length price is now extended to section 80IA(8) and 80IA(10), this concept will apply to transactions between related parties in computing income under the following sections:

    Section 10AA: Income from newly established units in SEZ.

    Section 80IAB: Income of an undertaking or enterprise engaged in the development of SEZ.

    Section 80IB: Income from certain industrial undertakings and housing projects, etc. (other than infrastructure development undertakings).

    Section 80IC: Income from certain undertakings set up in certain States such as Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, North-Eastern States, etc.

    Section 80ID: Income from hotels and convention centres set up in National Capital Territory of Delhi, and Districts of Faridabad, Gurgaon, Gautam Buddhha Nagar and Ghaziabad and other specified districts having ‘World Heritage
Site’.

    Section 80IE: Income from eligible business undertakings in North-Eastern States.

10.7    Other transactions:

The CBDT has been given power to prescribe, by Rules, other domestic transactions to which the above provisions will apply.

10.8    Effect of application of arm’s-length price concept:

As stated above, the concept of arm’s-length price (ALP) is now to be applied to certain domestic trans-actions. In view of this, the assessee who enters into specified domestic transactions will have to comply with the following sections w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14.

    i) Section 92: This section deals with computation of income from international transactions. It is now extended, w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14, to specified domestic transactions. Therefore, the concept of ALP which was applicable to international transactions up to now will now apply to specified domestic transactions also. S.s (2A) inserted in this section now provides that any allowance for an expenditure or interest or allocation of any cost, expense or income in relation to specified domestic transactions shall be computed having regard to the ALP.

    ii) Section 92C: This section deals with computa-tion of ALP in relation to international transactions. As stated above, this concept is now extended to specified domestic transactions. The section pro-vides for six alternate methods for determination of ALP.

    iii) Section 92CA: This section provides for reference by AO to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO). Such reference is to be made if the aggregate value of international transactions exceed Rs.5 cr. The TPO is given wide powers. The order passed by the TPO is binding on the AO and the AO has to complete the assessment in conformity with the order of the TPO. This section has now been amended and it is now provided that such reference is to be made by the AO to the TPO even in cases where the assessee has entered into specified domestic transactions. Since section 92BA states that transactions with related parties aggregating Rs.5 Cr. or more will be considered as specified domestic transactions, all cases in which these transactions are involved will have to be referred to the TPO.

    iv) Section 92D: This section provides for maintenance and keeping of information and documents by persons entering into international transactions.  This section is made applicable to specified domestic transactions. Therefore, all assessees who enter into specified domestic transactions, as stated above, will have to maintain the information and documents specified in this section. It may be noted that these records and documents will have to be maintained w.e.f. 1-4-2012, in the manner prescribed in Rule 10D.

    v) Section 92E: This section requires that an as-sessee entering into international transactions has to obtain report from a Chartered Accountant in the prescribed form No. 3CEB before the due date for filing the return of income. This requirement is now extended to specified domestic transactions from the A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 1-4-2012 to 31-3-2013).

    vi) Section 92F: This section gives definition of certain terms. The following definitions are relevant in the context of specified domestic transactions.

    a. ‘Arm’s-length price’: This term means a price which is applied or proposed to be applied in a transaction between persons other than associated enterprises, in uncontrolled conditions.

    b. ‘Transaction’: This term includes an arrangement, understanding or action in concert, whether or not it is formal or in writing or whether or not it is intended to be enforceable by legal proceedings.

    vii) Penalty u/s.271 and 271AA: By amendment of Explanation 7 of section 271, it is now provided that penalty under that section will be leviable in respect of amount disallowed out of the above specified domestic transactions u/s.92C(4). Similarly, penalt 2% of the amount can also be levied u/s.271AA for not maintaining records u/s.92D or not reporting such transactions u/s.92E or furnishing incorrect information.

    11. Taxation of non-residents:

Some of the sections dealing with taxation of non-residents have been amended with retrospective effect. These amendments will have far reaching effect. While presenting the Budget the Finance Minister has not made any mention about these far -reaching changes affecting non-residents in his Budget Speech. However, in the Explanatory Memorandum attached to the Finance Bill, 2012, the reasons for these retrospective amendments have been explained.

The effect of these amendments with retrospective effect will be that cases of many assesses may be reopened and they may be required to pay tax, interest or penalty for last 16 years. It appears that these amendments provide for taxing gain on sale of shares in foreign countries and therefore, the time limit of 16 years for reopening the assessments will apply to such transactions. It is, therefore, necessary that a specific provision should have been made that no interest or penalty will be payable if tax levied as a result this retrospective amendment is paid by the assessee. It may be noted that when sections 28 and 80HHC were amended by the Taxation Laws (amendment) Act, 2005, with retrospective effect, CBDT issued a Circular No. 2/2005 on 17-1-2006. In this Circular the tax authorities were directed not to levy any interest or penalty if tax levied due to these retrospective amendments was paid. The Circular also provided that the tax due as a result of the retrospective amendment can be paid in five equal yearly instalments. No interest was payable on such instalments. Let us hope that the CBDT issues similar Circular in respect of the tax payable as a result of these retrospective amendments made by the Finance Act, 2012.

11.3    Section 2(14):

This section defines that term ‘Capital asset’ to mean ‘Property’ of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession. However, assets in the nature of stock-in-trade, personal effects, agricultural land, etc. are excluded from this definition. Now, Explanation has been added w.e.f. 1-4-1962 to clarify that ‘property’ shall include and shall be deemed to have always included any rights in or in relation to an Indian company, including right of management or control or any other rights. This will mean that the term, ‘Capital asset’ shall now include a tangible as well as intangible property.

11.4    Section 2(47):

This section defines the word ‘Transfer’ in relation to a capital asset. This is an inclusive definition and includes transfer of a capital asset by way of sale, exchange, relinquishment, or extinguishment of rights in the asset, compulsory acquisition of the asset, etc. Now a new Explanation is added w.e.f. 1-4-1962 to clarify that the word ‘Transfer’ shall include, and shall be deemed to have always included, disposing of, parting with an asset or any interest therein, or creating any interest in any asset, directly, indirectly, absolutely, conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily. Such transfer may be by agreement made in India or outside India. This is irrespective of the fact that such transfer has been characterised as being effected, dependent upon or following from the transfer of shares of an Indian or foreign company. This will show that if any interest is created in the shares of an Indian or foreign company by agreement or even an action, it will be considered as a ‘transfer’ of capital asset u/s.2(47).

11.5    Section 9:

This section explains when income is deemed to ac-crue or arise in India in the case of a non-resident. The scope of this section is widened by addition of Explanation 4 and 5 below section 9(1)(i) w.e.f. 1-4-1962 as under:

    i) In section 9(1)(i) it is stated that any income shall be deemed to accrue or arise if it accrues or arises, directly or indirectly ‘Through’ or ‘From’ (a) any business connection in India, (b) any property in India (c) any asset or source of Income in India or (d) the transfer of a capital asset situated in India. Now, it is clarified in Explanation 4 that the word ‘Through’ in the above section shall mean and include (w.e.f. 1-4 -1962) — ‘by means of’, ‘in consequence of’ or ‘by reason of’. This explanation appears to have been introduced with retrospective effect to counter the decision of the Supreme Court in ‘Vodafone’ case which was against the Income-tax Department.

    ii) Similarly, Explanation 5 clarifies with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962 that an asset or capital asset being any share or interest in a foreign company shall be deemed to be situated in India if such share or interest derives, directly or indirectly, its value substantially from the assets located in India. It may be noted that the concept of holding interest in substantial value of assets located in India has not been explained or defined in this Explanation. This concept is explained in various other sections in the Income tax in different manner. This will be evident from reference to substantial interest in the following sections.

    a. Section 2(32): While defining ‘person having substantial interest in the company’ it is stated that if a person holds 20% or more of voting power it is considered as substantial interest.

    b. Section 40A(2): Under this section the provisions of transfer pricing are now made applicable in respect of domestic transactions. In the definition of related party, the concept of substantial interest in a company is to be determined by applying the test of 20% or more voting power.

    c. Section 79: For carry forward and set-off of losses of a closely held company, the concept of holding at least 50% holding of shares by shareholders who were shareholders on the last day of the year in which loss was incurred has been provided.

In view of the above, for determination of the tax liability on transfer of shares in a foreign company the concept of holding substantial interest in the value of assets located in India should have been clearly defined. Further, the section refers to share on interest in a foreign company which derives (directly or indirectly) its value substantially from the assets located in India. The word ‘value’ is also required to be defined otherwise there will be confusion as to whether the word ‘value’ refers to ‘book value’ or ‘market value’.

11.6    Section 9(1)(vi) — Royalty:

This Section provides that income by way of royalty earned by a non-resident is deemed to be income accruing or arising in India under the circumstances explained in this section. The concept of royalty for this purpose is now expanded, with retrospective effect from 1-6-1976 as under:

    i) New Explanation 4 is now added to provide that the transfer of any rights in respect of any right, property or information includes all or any right for use or right to use computer software (including granting of a licence) irrespective of the medium through which such right is transferred.

    ii) New Explanation 5 now provides that ‘Royalty’ includes consideration in respect of any right, prop-erty or information, whether or not (a) the posses-sion or control of such right, etc. is with the payer such right, etc. is used directly by the payer, or the location of such right, etc. is in India.

    iii) New Explanation 6 now provides that the expression ‘Process’ used in section 9(1)(vi), in-cludes transmission by satellite (including up-linking, amplification, conversion for down-linking of any signal), cable, optic-fiber or by any other similar technology. This is irrespective of the fact whether such process is a secret process or otherwise. It ap-pears that this provision has been made to over rule the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Aasia Satellite Telecommunication Co. Ltd. v. DIT, 332 ITR 340 (Del.).

The above amendments with retrospective effect from 1-6-1976 will create lot of practical difficulties. It is possible that the Tax Department may consider part of purchase consideration for software paid to a non-resident as royalty payment. This amendment, read with amendment of section 195, with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962, will create greater hardship to tax payers, as it will be impossible to comply with TDS provisions in respect of such payments made to non-residents in earlier years. It is also possible that the AO may invoke provisions of section 40(a)(i) and disallow such payment made to non-residential and claimed as revenue expenditure by the assessee in the earlier years.

It may, however, be noted that if any such payment is made to a non- resident in a country with which there is DTAA, the provisions in DTAA, if favourable, will apply in preference to the above provision.

11.7    Sections 90 and 90A:

Section 90 empowers the Central Government to enter into agreements with any foreign country or a specified territory for Double Taxation Relief (DTAA). Section 90A empowers the Government to enter into similar agreements with certain specified/ notified association in specified territories. Both these sections are amended as under:

    i) New s.s (2A) is inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2013 (A.Y. 2013-14) in section 90 to provide that the provisions of new sections 95 to 102 dealing with General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) will be applicable even if the provisions of DTAA are more favourable to the assessee. In other words, where GAAR is invoked, the assessee cannot seek protection of beneficial provisions of DTAA. Similar amendment is made in section 90A also.

    ii) New s.s (4) is inserted in section 90 w.e.f. 1-4-2013 (A.Y. 2013-2014) to provide that a non-resident cannot claim benefit of DTAA unless a certificate in the Form prescribed by the CBDT is obtained from the foreign country with which the Indian Govern-ment has entered into the DTAA. In this certificate such foreign country will have to certify the place of residence of the non-resident and such other particulars which the Indian Tax Department may require to decide whether the benefit claimed under a particular DTAA is available to the non-resident assessee. Similar amendment is made in section 90A.

    iii)  New Explanation 3 is inserted in section 90 w.e.f. 1-10-2009 to provide that any meaning as-signed through Notification u/s.90(3) to a term used in DTAA shall be effective from the date of coming into force of the applicable DTAA. Similar amend-ment is made in section 90A w.e.f. 1-6-2006.

11.8    Section 195:

    This section provides for deduction of tax at source (TDS) in the case of payments made to non-residents. This section is now amended with retro-spective effect from 1-4-1962. By this amendment it is provided in the new Explanation-2 that the obligation to comply with TDS provisions will apply, with retrospective effect, to all persons whether resident or non-resident. So far section 195 was understood to put the obligation for TDS on residents and non-residents who have a permanent establishment in India and who make payments to non-residents of Income taxable under the Income-tax Act. Now, w.e.f. 1-4-1962, the obligation is extended to a non-resident person who has (a) residence or place of business or business connection in India, or (b) any other presence in any manner whatsoever in India. It may be noted that the obligation for deducting tax at source (TDS) is never made under Chapter XVII of the Income-tax Act (sections 192 to 194, 194A to 194CC and 195) with retrospective effect. All these provisions for TDS, whenever introduced or amended, are from prospective dates to enable the payer to comply with the same. Even in the Finance Act, 2012, such provisions for TDS or amendments are made in sections 193, 194E, 194J, 194LA, 194LC and 195(7) only w.e.f. 1-7-2012. However, only Explanation 2 has been inserted in section 195(1) with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962. By putting such obligation to deduct tax on certain non-residents who were not covered by the section earlier will create practical difficulties for them. It may not be possible to deduct tax from payments covered by section 195 for earlier years and they may be saddled with huge Interest liabilities and other penal conse-quences under the Income-tax Act. TDS provisions in Chapter XVII puts an obligation on the payer of any amount to collect tax due by the payee and pay to the Government. This obligation is in the nature of vicarious liability. It is a well-settled principle of law that such vicarious liability cannot be saddled on a person with retrospective effect.

    ii) New s.s (7) has been inserted in section 195 w.e.f. 1-7-2012. By this amendment it is provided that the CBDT may, by Notification specify a class of persons or cases where the person responsible for paying to a non-resident, any sum, whether, chargeable to tax or not, can make an application to the AO to determine the appropriate proportion of sum chargeable to tax. On such determination tax will be deductible u/s.195(1) on that portion of the amount. Such determination by the AO may be by a general order applicable to all similar payments or may be specific order applicable to one specific transaction.

11.9    Section 163:

This section provides for liability of an ‘Agent’ of a non-resident to pay the tax or meet with obligations of a non-resident for whom he is recognised as an agent under this section. For this purpose    an employee of the non-resident, (b) a person who has any business connection with the non-resident, (c) a person from or through whom the non-resident receives any income, (d) a person who is the trustee of the non-resident or (e) a person (resident or non-resident) who has acquired by way of transfer a capital asset in India. The section provides for certain limitations on the vicarious li-ability of the agent. Section 149 provides that AO has to give notice to the person whom he wants to treat as agent of a non-resident. The time limit for giving such notice was 2 years from the end of the assessment year for which he wants to treat that person as agent u/s.163. This time limit is now extended to 4 years w.e.f. 1-7-2012. It is also pro-vided, by this amendment, that such notice can be given for any assessment year prior to A.Y. 2012-13. In other words, the AO can give such notice to any person to treat him as agent of a non-resident in respect of income assessable in the case of a non-resident for A.Y. 2008-09, after 1-7-2012 but before 31-3-2013. This amendment appears to have been made to recover tax from Vodafone by treating it as agent of the non-resident company in respect of capital gain alleged to have been made on transfer of shares of a non-resident company to another non-resident company. This tax is now proposed to be levied in respect of such transactions as a result of retrospective amendments of sections 2(14), 2(47), 9 and 195 as discussed above.

11.10  Section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012:

This section provides for validation of demands raised under the Income-tax Act in certain cases in respect of income accruing or arising, through or from a transfer of capital asset situated in India, in consequence of the transfer of shares of a foreign company or in consequence of an agreement or otherwise in a foreign country. This section also states that any notice sent or taxes levied, demanded, assessed, imposed, collected or recovered during any period prior to 1-4 -2012 shall be deemed to have been validly made. Such notice or levy of tax, etc. shall not be called in question on the ground that the tax was not chargeable. This cannot be challenged even on the ground that it is a tax on capital gains arising out of transactions which have taken place in a foreign country. This section will operate notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or any Authority. It appears that this section is inserted in the Finance Act to ensure that taxes collected in the Vodafone case or other similar cases are not required to be refunded. A question may arise about validity of such a provision for retention of taxes collected from certain assesses by the Govern-ment when any Court judgment or decree directs that such tax should be refunded to the assessee. Another question will arise whether the Government will be liable to pay interest on such amount retained under the validation provision if ultimately the Government has to refund the amount after some years of litigation.

11.11    Section 115A:

This section is amended with effect from 1-7-2012. It is provided that the rate at which Income tax shall be payable in the case of a non-resident, other than a foreign company, in respect of interest received from an Indian company engaged in specified in-frastructure activities, in respect of loan given in foreign currency under an agreement approved by the Government between 1-7-2012 to 30-6-2015, shall be taxable @ 5%. This tax shall be subject to deduction at source u/s.194LC w.e.f. 1-7-2012.

11.12    Section 115BBA:

This section is amended effective from A.Y. 2013-14 to provide that a non-resident, entertainer, such as a theatre, radio, television artist and musician, from performance in India will be taxable at 20% of gross receipts. It is also provided that in the case of a non-resident sports association, tax will be payable at 20% of gross receipts instead of 10% which is the existing rate. Consequential amendments have also been made for the purpose of TDS on these payments u/s.194E w.e.f. 1-7-2012.

11.13    Tax on long-term capital gain:

Section 112 has been amended from A.Y. 2013 -14 to provide that, in the case of a non -resident or a foreign company, capital gains tax payable on transfer of a long-term capital asset, being shares or securities which are not listed on the Stock Ex-change shall be 10%. For this purpose the long-term capital gain is to be computed without indexation or without taking advantage of foreign currency rate differences provided in section 48.

    12. Transfer pricing provisions:

In order to widen the scope of transfer pricing pro-visions and to clarify certain issues, the following sections are amended. Some of these amendments have retrospective effect.

12.1 Section 92B:

This section gives the meaning of ‘International Transaction’. This section is now amended with retrospective effect from 1-4-2002. By this amendment, it is provided that the expression ‘International Transaction’ shall include —

    i) the purchase, sale, transfer, lease or use of tangible property, including building, transportation vehicle, machinery, equipment, tools, plant, furniture, commodity and any other article or thing.

    ii) the purchase, sale, transfer, lease or use of intangible property, including transfer of owner-ship or the provision for use of rights regarding land, copyrights, patents, trademarks, licences, franchises, customer list, marketing channel, brand, commercial secret, know-how, industrial property right, exterior design or practical and new design or any business or commercial rights of similar nature.

    iii) capital financing, including any type of long-term or short-term borrowing, lending or guarantee, purchase or sale of marketable securities or any type of advance, payments or deferred payment receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business.

    iv) provision of services, including provision of mar-ket research, market development, marketing management, administration, technical service, repairs, design, consultation, agency, scientific research, legal or accounting service.

    v) a transaction of business restructuring or reorganisation, entered into by an enterprise with an associated enterprise, irrespective of the fact that it has a bearing on the profit, income, losses, or assets of such enterprise at the time of the transaction or at future date.

Further, the expression ‘Intangible Property’ has also been defined w.e.f. 1-4-2002 to include 12 items listed in the amended section. This refers to various types of intangible properties related to marketing, technology, artistic, data processing, engineering, customer, control, human capital, location, goodwill and similar items which derive their value from intellectual content rather than physical attributes.

12.2    Section 92C:

    i) This section deals with computation of arm’s-length price. In section 92C(1) six methods are provided for determination of ALP. Section 92C(2) states that the most appropriate method for this purpose shall be determined as provided in the Rules 10B and 10C framed by the CBDT. The second proviso to this section is now amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 to provide that if the variation between the ALP determined under the section and the price at which the international transaction has actually been undertaken does not exceed such percentage not exceeding 3% of the latter, as may be notified by the Government. Earlier this margin was ±5% which has now been restricted to ±3%.

    ii) Further, section 92C is amended by insertion of s.s (2A) with retrospective effect from 1-4-2002. The amendment is stated to be of a clarificatory nature. The effect of this amendment is that, in respect of first proviso to section 92C(2), as it stood before its substitution by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, the tolerance band of 5% is not to be taken as a standard deduction while computing ALP. However, it is also clarified that already concluded assessment proceedings should not be a reopened or rectified on the ground of retrospective amendment.

    iii) Section 92C(2) is also amended with retrospective effect from 1-10-2009. This amendment clarifies that the second proviso to section 92C(2) shall also be applicable to all proceedings which were pending as on 1-10-2009 i.e., the date on which the second proviso, as inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, came into force.

    iv) It may be noted that, as stated above, section 92C now applies to specified domestic transactions also from A.Y. 2013-14.

12.3    Section 92CA:

    i) This section deals with reference by the AO to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) in specified cases involving Transfer Pricing issues. S.s (2B) has now been inserted with retrospective effect from 1-6- 2002. It is provided by this amendment that if the assessee has not furnished the audit report u/s.92E in respect of an international transaction and such transaction comes to the notice of the TPO, during the course of proceedings before him, it will be possible for the TPO to consider this transaction as if it has been referred to him by the AO It is also provided in new sub-section (2C) that the AO shall not have power to reopen or rectify any assessment proceedings which have been completed before 1-7-2012.

    ii) As stated above, this section is now applicable to specified domestic transactions from A.Y. 2013-14. This will mean that assesses who have entered into specified domestic transaction exceeding Rs.5 Cr. in the accounting year 2012-13 onwards will have to appear before the AO as well as the TPO.

    13. Advance Pricing Agreement:

Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) mechanism is introduced by new sections 92CC and 92CD inserted in the Income-tax Act, w.e.f. 1-7-2012. This provision is similar to Clause 118 of the DTC Bill, 2010. This provision is introduced to provide certainty to the international transactions and will reduce litigation relating to transfer pricing issues. Section 92CC gives power to the CBDT to enter into an APA, with any person, determining arm’s-length price.

13.1    In brief, the provisions of section 92CC are as under:

    i) The CBDT, with the approval of the Central Government, can enter into an APA with any person (assessee) determining the arm’s-length price or specifying the manner in which such ALP is to be determined. This APA will relate to an international transaction to be entered into by that person.

    ii) The manner in which ALP is to be determined in the above APA may include any of the methods referred to in section 92C(1) or any other method, with such adjustments or variations, as the assessee and the CBDT agree upon.

    iii) Once APA is entered into by the CBDT with the assessee, the ALP for the international transaction, stated in APA, will be determined on that basis and the AO cannot invoke the provisions of sections 92C and 92CA.

    iv) APA referred to above shall be valid for such period not exceeding 5 years as specified in the APA.

    v) The above APA shall be binding on (a) the person in whose case and in respect of the transaction stated in the APA and (b) the Income tax Authorities in respect of the party to the APA for the transaction specified therein.

    vi) The above APA shall not be binding if there is change in the law or facts relating to the APA.

    vii) The CBDT, with the approval of the Govern-ment, can declare the APA as void abinitio, if it finds that the APA has been obtained by the assessee by fraud or misrepresentation of facts.

    viii) If the APA is declared as void by the CBDT, all the provisions of the Act shall apply as if such agreement was not entered into. For the purpose of taking any action against the assessee, in view of the cancellation of APA, the period from the date of the APA to the date of its cancellation will not be counted for determining the limitation period.

    ix) The CBDT will prescribe a scheme for the pro-cedure to be followed for entering into the APA.

13.2 The effect of the APA entered into by an as-sessee is explained in the new section 92CD as under:

    i) Where APA has been entered into by an assessee, the Income-tax return which pertains to a previous year covered under the above agreement and is already filed, the assessee has to file a modified return of income u/s.139 in accordance with and limited to the APA. This modified return has to be filed within 3 months from the end of the month in which APA is entered into.

    ii) Once the modified return of income is filed, the AO will have to assess, reassess or recompute the income, irrespective of the fact whether the assessment/reassessment proceedings are over or not, in accordance with the APA.

    iii) Where the assessment proceedings are completed, the reassessment proceedings are to be completed within one year from the end of the financial year in which modified return of income is filed. If the assessment proceedings are pending, the period of limitation for completion of these proceedings will be extended by 12 months.

13.3 Considering the wording of sections 92CC and 92CD and the intention of the legislation, it will be possible for any assessee, who has already entered into international transactions in the earlier years, to approach the CBDT after 1-7-2012 to enter into APA in respect of such transactions already entered into in the past. This will enable the assessee to apply to the AO that the pending assessments may be completed on the basis of APA. It appears that even if any appeals are pending for any of the earlier years, the assessee will be entitled to withdraw the appeals and approach the AO to make reassessment or recomputation of income for those years in ac-cordance with APA. For this purpose, the assessee should ensure that the APA covers all the earlier years for which disputes are pending.

13.4 Since the transfer pricing provisions have now been extended to ‘Specified Domestic Transactions’ also, it will be in the interest of the assessee and the Tax Department that the above provisions for Advance Pricing Agreement are extended to ‘Specified Domestic Transactions’ also. This will reduce litigation on the question of determination of arm’s-length pricing issues which will arise in relation to such domestic transactions.

    14. General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR):

14.1 This is a new concept introduced in the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act, 2012. Very wide powers are given to the Tax Authorities by these provisions. In new Chapter X-A, sections 95 to 102 have been inserted. In para 154 of the Budget Speech, while introducing the Finance Bill, 2012, the Finance Minister has stated that “I propose to introduce a General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) in order to counter aggressive tax avoidance schemes, while ensuring that it is used only in appropriate cases, enabling review by a GAAR panel.

14.2 The reasons for introducing GAAR provisions in the Income-tax Act are explained in the Explanatory Notes attached to the Finance Bill, 2012.

14.3 There was large-scale opposition to the introduction of this provision in the form suggested in the Finance Bill, 2012, and the DTC Bill, 2010, pending consideration of the Parliament. This opposition was voiced by various trade and industry bodies in India and abroad. The Finance Minister responded to the various suggestions made by members of the Parliament and various trade and industry bodies while replying to the debate in the Parliament on 7th May 2012.

14.4 GAAR provisions:

For the reasons stated by the Finance Minister, special provisions relating to GAAR have been made in sections 95 to 102 in the Income-tax Act from A.Y. 2014-15 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2014) and onwards. These provisions apply to all assesses (residents or non-resident) in respect of their transactions in India as well as abroad. Very wide powers are given to the tax authorities to disregard any agreement, arrangement or any claim for expenditure, deduction or relief. These provisions, broadly stated are discussed below.

14.5 Section 95:

This section provides that an arrangement entered into by an assessee may be declared to be an impermissible avoidance arrangement. The tax arising from such declaration by the tax authorities, will be determined subject to provisions of sections 96 to 102. It is also stated in this section that the provisions of sections 96 to 102 may be applied to any step, or a part of the arrangement as they are applicable to the entire arrangement.

14.6    Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement (section 96):

    i) Section 96 explains the meaning of Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement to mean an arrangement, the main purpose or one of the main purposes of which is to obtain a tax benefit and it —

    a. Creates rights or obligations which would not ordinarily be created between persons dealing at arm’s length.

    b. Results, directly or indirectly, in misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

    c. Lacks commercial substance, or is deemed to lack commercial substance u/s.97, or

    d. is entered into or carried out, by means, or in a manner, which are not ordinarily employed for bona fide purposes.

    ii) The Finance Bill, 2012, provided in the section that an arrangement whereby there is any tax benefit to the assessee shall be presumed to have been entered into or carried out for the main purpose of obtaining tax benefits, unless the assessee proved otherwise. It will be noticed that this was a very heavy burden cast on the assessee. However, this requirement has now been deleted and, as declared by the Finance Minister, the onus of proof is now on the Department who has to establish that the arrangement is to avoid tax before initiating the proceedings under these provisions.

14.7    Lack of commercial substance (section 97):

    i) Section 97 explains the concept of lack of com-mercial substance in an arrangement entered into by the assessee. It states that an arrangement shall be deemed to lack commercial substance if —

    a) The substance or effect of the arrangement, as a whole, is inconsistent with, or differs significantly from, the form of its individual steps or a part of such steps.

    b) It involves or includes

—  Round-trip financing
—  An accommodation party,
— Elements that have the effect of offsetting or canceling each other, or
— A transaction which is conducted through one or more persons and disguises the value, location, source, ownership or control of funds which is the subject matter of such transaction, or

    c) It involves the location of an asset or a transaction or the place of residence of any party which is without any substantial commercial purpose. In other words, the particular location is disclosed only to obtain tax benefit for a party.

    ii) For the above purpose, it is provided that round-trip financing includes any arrangement in which through a series of transactions —

    a) Funds are transferred among the parties to the arrangement, and
    b) Such transactions do not have any substantial commercial purpose other than obtaining tax benefit.

    iii) It is further stated that the above view will be taken by the Tax Authorities without having regard to the following.

    a) Whether or not the funds involved in the round-trip financing can be traced to any funds transferred to, or received by, any party in connection with the arrangement,

    b) The time or sequence in which the funds involved in the round trip financing are transferred or received, or

    c) The means by, manner in, or mode through which funds involved in the round-trip financing are transferred or received.

    iv) The party to such an arrangement shall be treated as ‘Accommodating Party’ whether or not such party is connected with the other parties to the arrangement, if the main purpose of, direct or indirect, participation of such party with the arrangement is to obtain, direct or indirect, tax benefit under the Income-tax Act.

v) It is clarified in the section that the following factor shall not be taken into consideration for determining whether there is commercial substance in the arrangement:

    a. The period or time for which the arrangement exists.
    b. The fact of payment of taxes, directly or indirectly, under the arrangement.
    c. The fact that an exist route, including transfer of any activity, business or operations, is provided by the arrangement.

14.8    Consequence of impermissible avoidance arrangement (section 98):

Under the newly inserted section 144BA, the Commissioner has been empowered to declare any arrangement as an impermissible avoidance arrangement. Section 98 states that if any arrangement is declared as impermissible, then the consequences, in relation to tax or the arrangement shall be determined in such manner as is deemed appropriate in the circumstances of the case. This will include denial of tax benefit or any benefit under applicable DTAA. The following is the illustrative list of conse-quences and it is provided that the same will not be limited to the list:

    i) Disregarding, combining or re-characterising any step in, or part or whole of the impermissible avoidance arrangement;

    ii) Treating, the impermissible avoidance arrangement as if it had not been entered into or carried out;

    iii) Disregarding any accommodating party or treating any accommodating party and any other party as one and the same person;

    iv) Deeming persons who are connected persons in relation to each other to be one and the same person;

    v) Re-allocating between the parties to the ar-rangement, (a) any accrual or receipt of a capital or revenue nature or (b) any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate;

    vi) Treating (a) the place of residence of any party to the arrangement or (b) situs of an asset or of a transaction at a place other than the place or location of the transaction stated under the arrangement.

    vii) Considering or looking thorough any arrangement by disregarding any corporate structure.

    viii ) It is also clarified that for the above purpose that Tax Authorities may re-characterise (a) any equity into debt or any debt into equity, (b) any accrual or receipt of capital nature may be treated as of revenue nature or vice versa or (c) any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate may be re-characterised.

14.9    Section 99:

This section provides for treatment of connected person and accommodating party. The section provides that for the purposes of sections 95 to 102, for determining whether a tax benefit exists —

    i)The parties who are connected person, in relation to each other, may be treated as one and the same person.

    ii) Any accommodating party may be disregarded.

    iii) Such accommodating party and any other party may be treated as one and the same person.

    iv) The arrangement may be considered or looked through by disregarding any corporate structure.

14.10 It is further provided in section 100 that the provisions of sections 95 to 102 shall apply in addition to, or in lieu of, any other basis for determination of tax liability. Section 101 gives power to the CBDT to prescribe the guidelines and lay down conditions for application of sections 95 to 102 relating to the General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR). Let us hope that these guidelines will specify the type of arrangements and transactions in relation to which alone the Tax Authorities have to invoke the provision of GAAR. Further, it is necessary to specify that if the tax benefit sought to be obtained by any arrangement is say Rs.5 crore or more in a year, then only the Tax Authorities will invoke these powers.

14.11  Section 102:

This section defines words or expressions used in sections 95 to 102 as stated above.

14.12 Section 144BA:

Procedure for declaring an arrangement as impress-ible u/s.95 to u/s.102 is given in this section. This section will come into force from A.Y. 2014-15.

    i) The Assessing Officer can make a reference to the Commissioner for invoking GAAR and on re-ceipt of reference the Commissioner shall hear the taxpayer. If he is not satisfied by the submissions of taxpayer and is of the opinion that GAAR provi-sions are to be invoked, he has to refer the matter to an ‘Approving Panel’. In case the assessee does not object or reply, the Commissioner shall make determination as to whether the arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement or not.

    ii) The Approving Panel has to dispose of the ref-erence within a period of six months from the end of the month in which the reference was received from the Commissioner.

    iii) The Approving Panel shall either declare an arrangement to be impermissible or declare it not to be so after examining material and getting further inquiry to be made. It can issue such directions as it thinks fit. It can also decide the year or years for which such an arrangement will be considered as impermissible. It has to give hearing to the assessee before taking any decision in the matter.

    iv) The Assessing Officer will determine conse-quences of such a positive declaration of arrangement as impermissible avoidance arrangement.

    v) The final order, in case any consequences of GAAR is determined, shall be passed by the AO only after approval by the Commissioner and, thereafter, first appeal against such order shall lie to the Ap-pellate Tribunal.

    vi) The period taken by the proceedings before the Commissioner and the Approving Panel shall be excluded from time limitation for completion of assessment.

    vii) The CBDT has to constitute an ‘Approving Panel’ consisting of not less than three members. Out of these three members, two members shall be of the rank of Commissioners of Income-tax and one member shall be an officer of the Indian Legal Service of the rank of Joint Secretary or above to the Central Government. It is not clear from these provisions whether the CBDT will appoint only one Approving Panel for the whole of the country or there will be separate Panels in each State. Considering the work load and considering the convenience of the assessees it is necessary to have one such Panel in each State.

    viii) In addition to the above, it is provided that the CBDT has to prescribe a scheme for efficient functioning of the Approving Panel and expeditious disposal of the references made to it.

    ix) Appeal against order of assessment passed under the GAAR provisions after approval by the appropriate authority is to be filed directly with the ITA Tribunal and not before the CIT(A). Section 144C relating to reference before DRT does not apply to this assessment order and, therefore, no reference can be made to DRT when GAAR provisions are invoked.

14.13 The above GAAR provisions will have far-reaching consequences for assessees engaged in the business with Indian or foreign parties. GAAR is not restricted to only business transactions. Therefore, all other assessees who are engaged in business or profession or who have no income from business or profession will be affected by these provisions. It appears that any assessee having any arrangement, agreement, or transaction with an associated person will have to take care that the same is at arm’s-length consideration. In particular, an assessee will have to consider the implications of GAAR while (a) executing a will or trust, (b) entering into partner-ship or forming LLP, (c) taking controlling interest in a company, (d) carrying out amalgamation of two or more companies, (e) effecting demerger of a company, (f) entering into a consortium or joint venture, (g) entering into foreign collaboration, or acquiring an Indian or foreign company. It may be noted that this is only an illustrative list and there may be other transactions which may attract GAAR provisions.

14.14 From the wording of the above provisions of sections 95 to 102 and 144BA it appears that the provisions of GAAR can be invoked in respect of an arrangement made prior to 1-4-2013. The CIT or the Approving Panel can hold any such arrangement entered into prior to 1-4-2013 as impermissible and direct the AO to make adjustments in the computation of income or tax in the A.Y. 2014-15 or any year thereafter. As stated in para 15.15 of the report of the Standing Committee on Finance on the DTC Bill, 2010, it would be fair to apply GAAR provisions prospectively, so that it is not made applicable to existing arrangements/transactions. It may be noted that no such provision is made in sections 95 to 102 and 144BA and, therefore, it can be presumed that the above GAAR provisions will have retroactive effect.

14.15 In section 101 it is stated that the CBDT will issue guidelines to provide for the circumstances under which GAAR should be invoked. Let us hope that these guidelines will specify that GAAR provisions will apply to all arrangements or transactions entered into after 1-4-2013 and also the type of arrangements or transactions to which GAAR will apply. It is also necessary to specify that GAAR provisions will be invoked if the tax sought to be avoided is more than Rs.5 crore, in any one year. This is also suggested by the Standing Committee on Finance in their report on the DTC Bill, 2010. As regards the procedure for invoking GAAR, section 144BA(4) provides that if the CIT agrees with the view of the AO to invoke GAAR, he should refer the matter to an Approving Panel. U/s.144BA(14) it is provided that the CBDT will appoint an Approving Panel consisting of two members of the level of Commissioners and one Law Officer. As suggested by the above Standing Committee in their report on the DTC Bill, 2010, such Panel should consist of a Chief Commissioner and two independent technical persons.

    15. Assessment, reassessment and appeals:

15.1    Section 139 — Return of income:

    i) This section is amended from A.Y. 2012-13 (Ac-counting Year ending 31-3-2012). The amendment now requires that a resident and ordinarily resident, who is otherwise not required to furnish a return of income, will be required to furnish his return of income before the due date for filing the return in the following cases:

    a) If the person has any asset located outside India. This will mean that if the person owns any immovable property outside India, any shares in a foreign company, any bank account or other assets outside India, he will have to file return even if the total income is below the taxable limit.

    b) If the person has any financial interest in any entity in a foreign country. This will mean that if the person is a beneficiary in any specific or any discretionary foreign trust, he will have to file his return of income whether he has received any benefit from the trust or not.

    c)If the person has signing authority in any account located outside India.

    ii) The above provision applies to a company, firm, individual, HUF or any non-corporate entity who is a resident and ordinarily resident. Such person will have to file return of income for the accounting year 1-4-2011 to 31-3-2012 (A.Y. 2012-13) and onwards. It may be noted that in a case where the person (whether resident or non-resident) has taxable income in India, he will have to give information about the above items in the form of return of income prescribed for A.Y. 2012-13.
    iii) At present, the due date for furnishing the return of income in the case of an assessee, being a company is required to file Transfer Pricing Re-port u/s.92E, is 30th November. It is now provided that the extended time limit up to 30th November will apply to all assessees who are required to fileTransfer Pricing Report u/s.92E. This amendment will come into force from A.Y. 2012-13.


15.2    Section 143 — Procedure for assessment:

At present, the return is required to be processed u/s.143(1) even if the case is selected for scrutiny. The section is now amended, effective from 1-7-2012, to provide that if the case is selected for scrutiny, the AO is not required to process the return of income u/s.143(1). This will mean that if the person has claimed refund in the return of income and his case is taken up for scrutiny, the refund if due, will be issued only after completion of assessment u/s.143(3).

15.3    Section 144C — Reference to DRP:

    i) This section is amended with retrospective effect from 1-10-2009. Under this section when the AO wants to make a variation in the income or loss, as a result of order passed by a Transfer Pricing Officer u/s.92CA(3), he has to pass a draft assessment order. If the assessee objects to the variation, he has to refer the matter to the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) u/s.144C. The DRP has power to confirm, reduce or enhance the assessment. There was a controversy as to whether this power of enhancement includes power to consider any other matter arising out of the assessment proceedings relating to the draft assessment order. To clarify this doubt, this section is now amended w.e.f. 1-10-2009 to provide that the DRP can consider any other mater relating to the draft assessment order while enhancing the variation. It may be noted that this amendment does not clarify whether the DRP can consider any other matter brought to its notice by the assessee which has the effect of reducing the income or increasing the loss.

    ii) Further, it is also clarified that the enhance-ment in time limit for computation of assessment, provided in this section 144C(13), will apply to time limit provided u/s.153 as well as u/s.153B w.e.f. 1-10-2009.

    iii) It may be noted that from A.Y. 2013-14, cases in which specified domestic transactions are there will now be referred to TPO. Therefore, the above procedure of making draft order and reference to
DRP will apply in such cases also.

15.4    Sections 147 and 149 — Reassessment of income:

These two sections dealing with income-escaping assessment and time limit for reopening assessment have been amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. These amendments will apply to any assessment year beginning on or before 1-4-2012. The effect of these amendments is as shown in Table on the next page.


    i) At present, the time limit for reopening assessments is 6 years. In a case where assessment is made u/s.143(3) and the income-escaping assessment is not due to failure of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment for that year, the time limit for reopening is 4 years. This time limit is now enhanced in specified cases.

    ii) It is now provided that if the income in relation to any asset (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India, chargeable to tax, has escaped assessment for any year, the time limit for reopening the assessment shall be 16 years. For this purpose, where a person is found to have any asset or any financial interest in any entity located outside India, shall be deemed to be a case where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. This provision will apply to a resident or a non-resident. In the coming years, this provision will have far-reaching implications.

    iii) It is now provided that if a person has failed to furnish the Transfer Pricing Report u/s.92E in respect of any international transaction, income shall be deemed to have escaped assessment. In such a case the AO can send notice for reopening assessment within the prescribed period.

    iv) Similar amendments are made in the Wealth Tax Act also.

    v) Reading the above provisions, it appears that in a transaction similar to the case of the famous VODAFONE the assessments of a foreign company which has made taxable capital gains or other income can be reopened for 16 years instead of 6 years as in such cases some assets will be located outside India.

15.5    Sections 153 and 153B — Time limit for completion of assessments:

These sections are amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. At present, the time limit for completion of assessment or reassessment proceedings is 21 months. In a case where reference is made to the Transfer Pricing Officer, the time limit for completion of assessment is 33 months. This time limit is extended as under:

15.6    Sections 153A and 153C — Assessment in case of search or requisition:

These sections are amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. Sections 153A and 153C of the Act lay down the procedure for assessment/reassessment in case of search or requisition. Presently, the notice for filing of returns of income and assessment thereof has to be given for six assessment years preceding the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisi-tion made.

It is now provided that the Central Government can notify cases or class of cases where the Assessing Officer shall not be required to issue notice for initia-tion of assessment/reassessment proceedings for six preceding assessment years and proceedings may only be taken up for the assessment year relevant to the year of search or requisition.

15.7 Sections 154 and 156:

    i) These sections have been amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. A statement of tax deduction at source is processed u/s.200A and an intimation is sent to the deductor as provided u/s.200A(1). At present, there is no provision for rectification or appeal against the said intimation.

    ii) It is now provided that any mistake apparent from the record in the intimation issued u/s.200A shall be rectifiable u/s.154. It is also provided that the intimation issued u/s.200A shall also be deemed to be a notice of demand u/s.156 and an appeal can be filed with the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) u/s.246A.

    iii) In actual practice there is considerable delay in passing order u/s.154 for rectification of mistake in any order passed by the AO It is, therefore, sug-gested that section 246A should be amended to provide that if rectification order is not passed by the AO within 6 months of filing such application the assessee will have a right to file appeal to the CIT(A). It may be noted that similar provision is made in clause 178 of the DTC Bill, 2010.

15.8    Section 245C — Settlement Commission:

Sections 245C dealing with application for settlement of cases has been amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. At present, an application can be filed before the Settlement Commission u/s.245C by a related person who has substantial interest of more than 20% of the profits of the business at any time during the previous year. Now, it is provided that the substan-tial interest should exist on the date of search and not at any time during the previous year.

15.9    Section 245N: Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR)

This Section is amended w.e.f. 1-4-2013 (A.Y. 2013-14). By this amendment it is provided that an assessee can approach the AAR for determination or decision whether an arrangement which is proposed to be undertaken by any person (resident or non-resident) is an impermissible arrangement as provided in sections 95 to 102. This will enable the person enter-ing into an arrangement to get an Advance Ruling from AAR if he apprehends that the AO may invoke GAAR provisions during assessment proceedings. As suggested earlier, this provision should be made available to persons entering into specified domestic transactions u/s.92BA.

15.10 Section 245Q — Fees for filing application for Advance Ruling:

Fees for filing an application before the Authority for Advance Ruling is increased from Rs.2500 to Rs.10000 w.e.f. 1-7-2012. The CBDT is now given power to increase or reduce the amount of fees from time to time by prescribing the necessary rule for this purpose.

15.11    Section 246A — Appealable orders before CIT(A):

The list of orders against which appeals can be filed before the CIT(A) has now been expanded. Now appeals can be filed before the CIT(A) against the following orders:

    i) The tax deductor can file appeal on after 1-7-2012 against the intimation issued u/s.200A relat-ing to short deduction of tax at source.

    ii) The assessee can file appeal against the order passed by the AO u/s.153A in search cases if such order is not passed in pursuance of the directions of the DRP. This will be effective from 1-10-2009.

    iii) The assessee can file appeal against the order of assessment or reassessment passed under new section 92CD(2) after furnishing the modified return based on the Advance Pricing Agreement as provided in the new section 92CC. This is effective from 1-7-2012.

    iv) Penalty order passed under new section 271 AAB where search has been initiated. This is effec-tive from 1-7-2012.

15.12 Section 253 — Appeals before ITA Tribunal:

    i) The following amendment is made w.e.f. 1-4-2013:

Any order passed by the AO u/s.143(3), 147, 153A or 153C in pursuance of the order passed by the CIT u/s.144BA(12) in accordance with the directions by the Approving Panel or the CIT, declaring any ar-rangement as impermissible avoidance arrangement, is appealable directly to the ITA Tribunal.

    ii) The following amendments are made with reference to DRP cases:

    a) The directions given by the DRP in the case of a foreign company or any person in whose case variation in the income arises due to order of the Transfer Pricing Officer are binding on the Assessing Officer. It is now provided that the Assessing Officer can also file an appeal before the ITA Tribunal against an order passed in pursuance of directions of the DRP in respect of objections filed on or after 1st July, 2012.

    b) The Assessing Officer or the assessee is entitled to file memorandum of cross objections on receipt of notice that an appeal has been filed by the other party.

    c) Any order passed u/s.153A or 153C in pursuance of directions of the DRP shall be directly appeal-able to the ITA Tribunal w.e.f. 1st October, 2009. Presently, such appeals are being filed with the Commissioner (Appeals).

15.13 Section 292CC — Authorisation and assessment in case of search or requisition:

This is a new section inserted w.e.f. 1-4-1976 to clarify the procedure for authorisation and assessment in certain cases of search or requisition. In the case of CIT v. Smt. Vandana Verma, 330 ITR 533 (All.) it was held that if search warrant is in the name of more than one person, then assessment cannot be made individually in the absence of any search warrant in the individual name. To overcome this judgment, it is now provided in this new section, with retrospective effect from 1-4-1976, that where a search warrant has been issued mentioning names of more than one persons, the assessment/reassessment can be made separately in the name of each of the persons mentioned in such search warrant.

    16. Penalties and prosecution:

16.1    Section 234E — Fees for delay in furnishing TDS/TCS statement:

This is a new section which has been inserted w.e.f. 1-7-2012. At present, section 272A provides for penalty of Rs.100 per day for delay in furnishing TDS/TCS statement within the time prescribed in section 200(3) or 206C(3). Newly inserted section 234E now provides for levy of fees of Rs.200 for every day of the delay in furnishing TDS/TCS state-ments. However, the total fee shall not be more than the amount of tax deductible/collectable for the quarter for which the TDS/TCS statement is delayed. The fee is to be paid before the delivery of the TDS/TCS statements. Consequently levy or penalty provided in section 272A(2)(k) is deleted. However, new section 271H has been added to levy of penalty under certain circumstances as discussed in Para 16.5 below. It may be noted that no appeal against levy of fees payable u/s.234E is provided in section 246A.

16.2 Section 271 — Penalty for concealment — Amendment w.e.f. 1-4-2013:

The transfer pricing regulations are extended to specified domestic transactions entered into by domestic related parties. If any amount is added or disallowed, based on the arm’s- length price determined by the Assessing Officer, it is now provided that such addition/disallowance shall be deemed to represent the income in respect of which particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished as provided in Explanation 7 to section 271(1) and it is liable to penalty accordingly.

16.3    Section 271AA — Penalty for failure to report, etc. of International and specified domestic transactions:

    i) Amendment w.e.f. 1-7-2012

At present, there is no penalty for non-reporting of an international transaction in the report filed u/s.92E or maintaining or furnishing or incorrect information of documents.

Therefore, a levy of penalty at the rate of 2% of the value of the international transaction is provided, if the taxpayer

    a) fails to keep and maintain prescribed information and documents u/s.92D(1) or (2)
    b) fails to report any international transaction u/s.92E, or
    c) maintains or furnishes any incorrect information or documents.
    ii) Amendment w.e.f. 1-4-2013

The above provision for levy of penalty u/s.271AA will apply if there is failure to comply with the above requirements in the case of domestic transactions also from A.Y. 2013-14.

16.4    Section 271G — Penalty for failure to furnish information or documents u/s.92D — w.e.f. 1-4-2013:

At present, section 271G provides for levy of penalty at 2% of the value of transaction for failure to furnish information or documents u/s.92D which requires maintenance of certain information and documents in the prescribed proforma by the persons entering into an international transaction. This penal provision will now apply to persons entering into specified domestic transactions for such failure effective from A.Y. 2013-14.

16.5    Section 271H: Penalty for failure to furnish TDS/TCS statements:

This is a new section which has been inserted w.e.f. 1-7-2012. In addition to fees payable under the newly inserted section 234E, section 271H also provides for penalty for not furnishing quarterly TDS statements within the prescribed time limit or penalty for furnishing incorrect information such as PAN of the deductee or amount of TDS deducted, etc. in the statements to be filed u/s.200 (3) or 206C(3). A penalty ranging from Rs.10,000 to Rs.1,00,000 is leviable for these failures. No appeal against the levy of this penalty is provided u/s.246A.

It is also provided that no such penalty will be levied if the deductor delivers the statement within a year from the due date and the person has paid the tax along with fees and interest before delivering the statement.

16.6    Sections 271AAA and 271AAB — Penalty on undisclosed income found in the course of search:

    i) At present, penalty in the case of search initiated on or after 1st June, 2007 is not liviable u/s.271AAA subject to certain conditions, such as:

    a) the assessee admits the undisclosed income in a statement u/s.132(4) recorded during the search,
    b) he specifies the manner in which such income has been derived, and
    c) he pays the tax together with interest, if any, in respect of such income.

Now, section 271AAA will not apply to search initi-ated on or after 1st July, 2012.

    ii) Newly inserted section 271 AAB now provides for levy of penalty on undisclosed income of specified previous years where search has been initiated on or after 1st July, 2012 as under:

    a) If the assessee admits undisclosed income during the course of search in a statement u/s.132(4), specifies the manner in which such income has been derived, pays the tax with interest on such income and furnishes return of income declaring such income, penalty shall be 10% of undisclosed income.
    b) If undisclosed income is not so admitted during the course of search, but disclosed in the return of income filed after the search and he pays the tax with interest, penalty shall be 20% of undisclosed income.
    c) In other cases, the minimum penalty shall be 30% subject to maximum of 90% of the undisclosed income.

16.7    Prosecution provisions — Sections 276C, 276CC, 277, 277A, 278 and 280A to 280D:

The effect of these amendments w.e.f. 1-7-2012 shall be as under:

    i) Section 276C — Wilful attempt to evade tax:

At present, if the amount of tax sought to be evaded exceeds Rs.1 lac, the punishment is rigorous imprisonment for minimum of 6 months and maximum of 7 years. The limit of Rs.1 lac is now raised to Rs.25 lac.

In other cases, the rigorous imprisonment period is 3 months minimum and 3 years maximum. The period of 3 years is now reduced to 2 years.

    ii) Section 276CC — Failure to furnish Returns of Income:

In this section also amendments similar to amendments in section 276C as stated in para (i) above are made.

    iii) Section 277 — False Statement in Verification:

In this section also amendments similar to amendments in section 276C as stated in para (i) above are made.

    iv) Section 277A — Falsification of Books of Accounts or Documents:

In this section the maximum term of imprisonment has been reduced from 3 years to 2 years.

    v) Section 278 — Abetment of False Return of Income and Statements:

In this section also amendments similar to amendments in section 276C as stated in (i) above are made.

(vi)    Sections 280A to 280D:

These new sections have been inserted w.e.f. 1-7-2012 with a view to appoint Special Courts to try specified offences under the Income-tax Act. It appears that these new provisions are made to strengthen the prosecution mechanism and expe-dite the disposal of prosecution cases under the Income-tax Act. In brief these provisions deal with the following matters:

    a. Providing for constitution of Special Courts for trial of offences under the Act.

    b. Application of summons trial for offences under the Act to expedite prosecution proceedings as the procedures in summons trial are simpler and less time consuming. The provision for summons trials will apply to offences where the maximum term of Imprisonment does not exceed 2 years.

    c. Providing for appointment of public prosecutors.

17.  Other amendments:
 17.1  Senior citizens:

In various sections of the Income-tax Act the age limit for senior citizens was fixed at 65 years. This has now been reduced to 60 years w.e.f.  A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 2012-13).

  17.2  Tax audit:
Section 40AB provides that an assessee carrying on business or profession has to get the accounts audited by a Chartered Accountant if the turnover or gross receipts exceed Rs.60 lac in the case of business or exceeds Rs.15 lac in the case of profession. The limit of turnover or gross receipts for this purpose has now been increased to Rs.1 crore in the case of business or Rs.25 lac in the case of profession. Further, date for obtaining tax audit report which is 30th September has been changed to the due date of filing return of income u/s.139(1) as applicable to the assessee. The amendment increasing the limit for turnover/gross receipts will come into force from A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 2012-13).

17.3    Section 115VG — Computation of daily tonnage income for shipping companies:

This section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. The Tonnage Tax Scheme for shipping companies was introduced by the Finance Act, 2005. This section provides for taxation of income of a shipping company on presumptive basis. Under this scheme, the operating profit of a shipping company is determined on the basis of tonnage capacity of its ships. The rates of daily tonnage income specified in the section have not been changed since 2005. By this amendment these rates are enhanced as under:

17.4    Section 209 — Advance tax calculation:

At present, for the purpose of calculation of advance tax liability, tax deductible or collectable at source was required to be reduced even though the tax was actually not deducted. Therefore, in such cases, there was no interest liability. Now it is provided that unless such tax is actually deducted, the advance tax liability. This amendment is made w.e.f. 1-4-2012.


17.5 Section 234D — Interest on excess refund:

This section is amended w.e.f. 1-6-2003. This section was inserted by the Finance Act, 2003, w.e.f. 1-6-2003 to enable the Government to recover amount of excessive refund granted u/s.143(1). The section provides for levy of simple interest at the rate of ½% for every month or part thereof on the excess amount of refund granted u/s.143(1) if, on regular assessment, it is found to be excessive. Interest is payable for the period starting from the date of refund to the date of regular assessment.

The Delhi High Court in DIT v. Jacabs Civil Incorporated, (2011) 330 ITR 578 held that this provision will apply from the A.Y. 2004-05 and no interest is payable for the earlier assessment years. To overcome this decision, it is now provided that interest shall be payable u/s.234D on excess refund for any earlier assessment years if the proceedings in respect of such assessment are completed after 1-6-2003.

    Wealth Tax Act :

    Section 2(ea) — Definition of ‘Assets’:

At present, any residential unit allotted to officers, employees or whole-time directors is exempt from wealth tax if the gross annual salary of such person is less than Rs.5 lac. This limit of gross annul salary is increased to Rs.10 lac. This amendment is effec-tive from A.Y. 2013-14.

    Section 17 — Wealth-escaping assessment:

This section is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012 — It is now provided in this section that if any person is found to have any asset or financial interest in any entity located outside India, it will be deemed to be a case where net wealth chargeable to tax has escaped as-sessment. In such cases the wealth tax assessment can be reopened by the AO within 16 years.

    Section 17A — Time limit for completion of assessment and reassessment:

This section is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. As discussed earlier, while considering the amendments in sections 153 and 153B of the Income tax, this amendment has the effect of increasing the time limit by 3 months for completion of assessment/reassessment proceedings.

    Section 45:

This section provides for exemption from wealth tax to section 25 companies, co-operative societies, social clubs, recognised political parties, mutual funds, etc. This list is now expanded to provide that the ‘Reserve Bank of India’ will not be liable to pay wealth tax w.e.f. 1-4-1957.

    To sum up:

19.1 From the above discussion, it will be evident that the amendments made in the Income-tax Act by this Budget are the most controversial. In par-ticular, the amendments affecting non -residents which have retrospective and retroactive effect will affect our relationship with many foreign countries and will affect our global trade. The Finance Minister has quoted in his Budget Speech Shakespear’s immortal words “I must be cruel only to be kind”. Reading the provisions relating to amendments in the Income-tax Act, one can say that this year he has been ‘Cruel’ with the non-resident taxpayers. Hopefully he may become ‘kind’ next year.

19.2 In his Budget speech, the Finance Minister has stated that his proposals relating the Direct Taxes will result in a net revenue loss of Rs.4,500 Cr. in the year and the proposals relating to Indirect Taxes will yield net revenue gain of Rs.45940 Cr. However, from his post-budget speeches before various trade bodies indicate that retrospective amendments in the Income-tax Act itself will yield revenue of about Rs.40000 Cr. Considering the stakes involved, it is evident that in the coming years we will witness a long-drawn tax litigation relating to interpretation of the retrospective amendments in the Income-tax Act.

19.3 Another provision which is likely to create lot of hardship to resident as well as non-resident tax-payer is about GAAR. It is true that the implementation of GAAR has been postponed to next year, there is apprehension that the Tax Department may hold arrangements made prior to 1-4-2013 as impermissible and make adjustments in the income for the year 1-4-2013 to 31-3-2014 and subsequent years. In other words, GAAR provisions may have retroactive effect. From the wording of GAAR provisions it is evident that it will now be difficult for resident as well as non-resident tax-payers to take any major decisions about the structure of any business transaction. Even the tax consultants will find it difficult to advise their clients about structuring or restructuring any business transaction. If the Government does not come out with a taxpayer-friendly Guidance Note, taking into consideration the business realities, the fear above invocation of GAAR will continue in the minds of all taxpayers and their tax consultants.

19.4 Another controversial provision which has been made this year relates to specified domestic transactions. By extending the scope of Transfer pricing provisions to these transactions, the compliance cost of the assessee will increase. At present no adequate data about domestic comparable prices is available in our country, and therefore, it will be difficult for assesses to maintain transfer pricing records and documents for this purpose. Since the provisions have been made effective from 1 -4-2012, many assesses may not be well equipped to maintain these records in this year. Since every case in which specified domestic transactions are entered into will be referred to the TPO, the entire assessment proceedings will become lengthy and time consuming. This will also increase compliance cost.

19.5 It is true that the tax burden of individuals, HUF, etc. has been reduced and some beneficial provisions have been introduced to remove some practical difficulties. But, it can be stated that these efforts are only half-hearted and there are many areas in which the taxpayers will have to face many practical difficulties.

19.6 The DTC Bill, 2010, is pending before the Par-liament. The report of the Standing Committee on Finance is also laid before the Parliament. This Bill was to be implemented from 1-4-2012. However, due to the delay in the legislative process it is stated that DTC will now be passed in the next session of the Parliament and will be made effective from 1-4-2013. In view of this, it is not clear why such controversial amendments are made this year in the last year of the life of the present Income-tax Act. By the time the taxpayers grasp the implications of these amend-ments, the new provisions of DTC will come into force from next year. When it became evident in the beginning of this year that DTC may be postponed by one year, it was felt that in this Budget some minimal amendments will be made in the Income-tax Act as and by way of parting gift to the taxpayer. But, after reading the controversial amendments in the Income-tax Act in this Budget, the taxpayers have felt that this Act has given a parting kick to the taxpayers in the last year of its existence.

Acknowledgement:

S. M. Jhaveri, Chartered Accountant has assisted the author in the preparation of this article.

No. VAT 1512/C.R. 46/Taxation-1, dated 31-5-2012.

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This Notification rescinds with effect from the 1st April 2012, the earlier Notification, No. VAT 1507/CR- 44/Taxation-1, dated the 6th December 2007.

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Notifications w.r.t. Schedule D: No. VAT 1511/C.R. 142(1)/Taxation-1, dated 16-5-2012. No. VAT 1511/C.R. 142(2)/Taxation-1, dated 16-5-2012. No. VAT 1511/C.R. 142(3)/Taxation-1, dated 16-5-2012

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While by the first Notification changes are effected in entries in Schedule D effective from 1-6-2012, by the second Notification, areas and periods covered under Entry No. 5 of Schedule D and by the third Notification, areas and periods covered under Entry No. 10 of Schedule D are notified. All the notifications are effective from 1-6-2012.

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No. VAT 1512/CR-61/Taxation-1, dated 1-6-2012.

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Act No. VIII has been gazetted on 25th April, 2012 and changes have been made in the MVAT Act vide Notification No. VAT-1512/CR-61, the Taxation-1. Consequential amendments are made in the MVAT Rules, 2005 by this Notification.

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Notification w.r.t. Schedule A: No. VAT 1512/C.R. 62/Taxation-1, dated 30-5-2012.

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By this Notification changes are effected in Entry 59 in Schedule A: Raisins & Currants Nil Rates of tax : Period extended up to 31st May, 2013.

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Compounding of Offences under the Service Tax — Notification No. 17/2012-ST.

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Service Tax (Compounding of Offences) Rules, 2012 have been introduced by which section 9A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 has been made applicable to Service Tax Law vide section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Accordingly, an application for compounding of offences and getting immunity from prosecution may be made, either before or after the institution of prosecution. Rules also prescribe forms, procedure, authorities, fixation of amount and powers to grant and withdraw immunity granted from prosecution.

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Settlement of Cases under the Service Tax Law — Notification No. 16/2012-Service Tax.

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The Central Government has introduced Service Tax (Settlement of Cases) Rules, 2012 by which sections 31, 32 and 32A to P of the Central Excise Act, 1944 made applicable to Service Tax Law vide section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 laying down the provisions of making application for the settlement of cases. The rules also prescribe form, manner of provisional attachment of property, etc.

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Rate of Tax – Entries in Schedule – Speakers for Car Stereos – Are Accessories of Car Stereos – Taxable as Electronic Goods and Not as Sound Transmitting Equipment – Entries 55 and 134 of Schedule I of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.

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10. State of Kerala v. Sigma Inc, (2011) 42 VST 47 (ker)

Rate of Tax – Entries in Schedule – Speakers for Car Stereos – Are Accessories of Car Stereos – Taxable as Electronic Goods and Not as Sound Transmitting Equipment – Entries 55 and 134 of Schedule I of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.


Facts

The dealer sold car stereos with or without speakers which was taxed @8% as electronic goods under Schedule Entry I 55 of the Act, whereas on sale of speakers without stereos, the tax was levied at 12% as sound transmitting equipment including loud speakers covered by the Entry 134 of Schedule I of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and held that speakers when sold without car stereos are also electronic goods taxable at 8% under Entry 55 of Schedule I. The Department filed revision petition before the Kerala High Court against the impugned order of the Tribunal.

Held

Under Entry 134 of Schedule I, ‘Sound Transmitting Equipment Including Loud Speakers are covered. The Department admitted that car stereos are not covered by Entry 134 and are covered by the general Entry 55 relating to electronic goods. The speakers suitable for attachment of car stereos will also be covered by Entry 55 of the Schedule I being accessories to electronic goods. The loud speakers which are not accessories to any electronic items like stereo, car stereos and radios are covered by Entry 55 and liable to tax @8%. The HC accordingly dismissed the revision petition filed by the Department.

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Rectification of Mistakes – Re-appreciation of Evidence on Records – Not Permissible – S. 37 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994.

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9. Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer v. Makkad Plastic, (2011) 42 VST 1 SC
    
Rectification of Mistakes – Re-appreciation of Evidence on Records – Not Permissible – S. 37 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994.

Facts

The Rajasthan Sales Tax Board, in an appeal filed by the Department, against the order in appeal passed, had allowed the appeal and upheld the assessment order passed by the assessing authority and confirmed the levy of tax at a higher rate as well as penalty. The Board, thereafter, upon application for rectification of mistake filed by the dealer, deleted the penalty, by passing order of rectification of mistake u/s. 37 of the Act. The Department filed revision petition, before the Rajasthan High Court against such order for rectification of mistake, which was dismissed by the High Court. The Department filed appeal before the SC against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court.

Held

Under Section 37 of the Act, the Board has the power to rectify any mistake which is apparent on record, which is neither a power of review or nor is it akin to the power of revision. But it is only a power to rectify a mistake apparent on the face of the record for which a re-appreciation of the entire records is neither possible nor called for. While passing the subsequent rectification order, the Board had exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence on record and held that there was no malafide intention on the part of the dealer for tax evasion. The SC set aside the orders passed by the Rajasthan High Court as well as the subsequent order for rectification of mistake passed by the Board and upheld the assessment order passed by the assessing authorities.

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Rent-a-cab service — Respondent having contract for making available various vehicles on request on hire to army — Held not liable for Service tax as the services similar to rent-a-cab scheme operator services, but not the same.

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44. (2012) 26 STR 219 (Tri.-Del.) CCE, Meerut-II v. Sapan Mehrotra.

Rent-a-cab service — Respondent having contract for making available various vehicles on request on hire to army — Held not liable for Service tax as the services similar to rent-a-cab scheme operator services, but not the same.


Facts:

The respondent had a contract with the Indian Army. The respondent was responsible for making available various means of transport such as buses, taxis, etc. on hire basis. The charges were defined in the contract. The Department levied Service tax considering the same as ‘rent-a-cab scheme operator service’ as the contract was for fairly long period. The CCE (appeals) held that the services of the respondent were not in the nature of rent-a-cab and therefore, set aside the demand of the Department. Against the Departmental appeal, the respondent argued that the vehicles were not given at disposal of the Indian Army and the services were similar to taxi services. The only difference was that the contract was for a longer period which is the prerequisite of rendering such services prescribed by the Indian Army. Moreover, the turnover in certain years was less than the basic threshold limit prescribed in Notification No. 6/2005, dated 1-3-2005.

Held:

The facts of the case were similar to that of taxi operator in the street. Such services were not liable to Service tax. Only the rates were for a fairly long duration, but the vehicles were not put at disposal of the army for a long duration. The appeal of the Department was dismissed.

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GAPs in GAAP — Accounting for Rate Regulated Activities

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Many governments establish regulatory mechanisms to govern pricing of essential services such as electricity, water, transportation, etc. Such mechanisms endeavour to maintain a balance between protecting the consumers from unreasonable prices and allowing the providers of the services to earn a fair return. These rate-regulation mechanisms result in significant accounting issues for service providers.

Company X, the owner of electricity transmission infrastructure and related assets, has been licensed for twenty years to operate a transmission system in a particular jurisdiction. Only one operator is authorised to manage and operate the transmission system. Company X charges its customers for access to the network at prices that must be approved by the regulator. Pricing structures are defined in the law and related guidelines, and are determined on a ‘cost plus’ basis that is based on budget estimates. Once approved, prices are published and apply to all customers. Prices are not negotiable with individual customers. Prices are set to allow Company X to achieve a fair return on its invested capital and to recover all reasonable costs incurred. At the end of each year, Company X reports to the regulator deviations between the actual and budgeted results. If the regulator approves the differences as ‘reasonable costs’, they are included in the determination of rates for future periods. The key question is that, can an entity recognise this difference which it would attempt to recover through rates for future periods as assets and liabilities?

To deal with this issue, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was working on the proposed IFRS for Rate Regulated Activities. Though the IASB paused its project, the ICAI recently issued the Guidance Note on Accounting for Rate Regulated Activities (GN). It is stated that the GN will apply both under the Indian GAAP and IFRS-converged standards (Ind-AS). Since the GN is still to be cleared by the National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACAS), the ICAI has not announced its applicability date. The GN applies to those activities of an entity which meet both of the following criteria:

(i) The regulator establishes the price the entity must charge its customers for the goods or services the entity provides, and that price binds the customers.

(ii) The price established by regulation (the rate) is designed to recover the specific costs the entity incurs in providing the regulated goods or services and to earn a specified return (costof- service regulation). The specified return could be a minimum or range and need not be a fixed or guaranteed return. The GN defines the ‘costof- service’ regulation as ‘a form of regulation for setting up an entity’s prices (rates) in which there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the entity’s specific costs and its revenues.’ However, the GN does not deal with regulatory mechanisms which prescribe rates based on targeted or assumed costs, such as industry averages, rather than the entity’s specific costs.

GN acknowledges that the rate regulation of an entity’s business activities creates operational and accounting situations which would not have arisen in the absence of such regulation. With cost-ofservice regulation, there is a direct linkage between the costs that an entity is expected to incur and its expected revenue as the rates are set to allow the entity to recover its expected costs. However, there can be a significant time lag between incurrence of costs by the entity and their recovery through tariffs. Recovery of certain costs may be provided for by regulation either before or after the costs are incurred. Rate regulations are enforceable and, therefore, may create legal rights and obligations for the entity.

The GN requires an entity to recognise regulatory assets and regulatory liabilities. Regulatory assets represent an entity’s right to recover specific previously incurred costs and to earn a specified return, from an aggregate customer base. Regulatory liabilities represent an entity’s obligation to refund previously collected amount and to pay a specified return. The following paragraphs explain the reasons provided in the GN for recognition of rate regulated assets and liabilities.

 (1) The Framework, defines an ‘asset’ as follows: “An asset is a resource controlled by the enterprise as a result of past events from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise.” In a cost-of-service regulation, the resource is the right conferred by the regulator whereby the costs incurred by the entity result in future cash flows. In such cases, incurrence of costs creates an enforceable right to set rates at a level that permits the entity to recover those costs, plus a specified return, from an aggregate customer base. For example, if the regulator has approved certain additions to be made by the entity in its assets base during the tariff period, which would be added to the asset base for tariff setting, the entity upon making such additions obtains the right to recover the costs and return as provided in the regulatory framework though the actual recovery through rates may take place in the future. While adjustment of future rates is the mechanism the regulator uses to implement its regulation, the right in itself is a resource arising as a result of past events and from which future cash inflows are expected.

(2) The cause-and-effect relationship between an entity’s costs and its rate-based revenue demonstrates that an asset exists. In this case, the entity’s right that arises as a result of regulation relates to identifiable future cash flows linked to costs it previously incurred, rather than a general expectation of future cash flows based on the existence of predictable demand. The binding regulations/orders of the regulator for recovery of incurred costs together with the actual incurrence of costs by the entity would satisfy the definition of asset as per the Framework since the entity’s right (to recover amounts through future rate adjustments) constitutes a resource arising as a result of past events (incurrence of costs permitted by the regulator for recovery from customers) from which future economic benefits are expected to flow (increased cash flows through rate adjustments).

(3) As regards the ‘control’ criterion in the definition of an asset as per the Framework, it may be argued that though the entity has a right to recover the costs incurred, it does not control the same since it cannot force individual customers to purchase goods or services in future. In this regard, it may be mentioned that the rate regulation governs the entity’s relationship with its customer base as a whole and therefore creates a present right to recover the costs incurred from an aggregate customer base. Although the individual members of that group may change over time, the relationship the regulator oversees is between the entity and the group. The regulator has the authority to permit the entity to set rates at a level that will ensure that the entity receives the expected cash flows from the customers’ base as a whole. Further, the Framework states that control over the future economic benefits is sufficient for an asset to exist, even in the absence of legal rights. The key notion is that the entity has access to a resource and can limit others’ access to that resource which is satisfied in case of the right provided by the regulator to recover incurred costs through future rate adjustments. Any issues regarding recoverability of the amounts should not affect the recognition of the right in the financial statements though they certainly merit consideration in its measurement.

    4. The Framework defines a liability as ‘a present obligation of the enterprise arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying economic benefits.’ In cost-of-service regulation, an obligation arises because of a requirement to refund to customers excess amounts collected in previous periods. In such cases, collecting amounts in excess of costs and the allowed return creates an obligation to return the excess collection to the aggregate customer base. For example, if the tariffs initially set assume a certain level of costs towards energy purchased but the actual costs incurred by the entity are less than such assumed levels, the entity would be obliged to make a refund following the ‘truing up’ exercise by the regulator. Such obligation is a present obligation relating to amounts the entity has already collected from customers owed to the entity’s customer base as a whole, not to individual customers. It is not a possible future obligation because the regulator has the authority to ensure that future cash flows from the customer base as a whole would be reduced to refund amounts previously collected. The obligation exists even though its amount may be uncertain. An economic obligation is something that results in reduced cash inflows, directly or indirectly, as well as something that results in increased cash outflows. Obligations link the entity with what it has to do because obligations are enforceable against the entity by legal or equivalent means.

Potential inconsistency with Framework

The IASB has been working on proposed IFRS for Rate Regulated Activities, since 2008. It issued an exposure draft of proposed IFRS in July 2009; however, it has not been finalised till date and the project has been paused. One key reason for the delay arises from strong view that regulatory assets and regulatory liabilities do not meet the definition of an asset and liability under the IASB Framework for Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements. The proponents of this view make the following arguments:

    1) One of the essential characteristics of a regulatory regime is that entities entering it get access to a large customer base in a market that requires a significant investment in infrastructure (i.e., natural ‘barriers to access’). In return, the entity agrees to accept the ‘economic burden’ of having to comply with operating conditions, one of which is the requirement to have the prices of the goods or services it delivers approved by the regulator. This ‘economic burden’ does not lead to a recognisable liability on day one, but may require the recognition of a liability if it leads to contracts becoming onerous as defined by AS-29 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets. Under Indian GAAP, any price paid to receive the right to operate in this regulated market will meet the definition of an intangible asset. However, if the regulator allows an entity to increase its future prices, this is not creating a separate asset, but granting the entity relief from the ‘economic burden’ of its operating conditions to put them partly in the same position as an entity in an unregulated market and allowing them to generate a normal return.

    2) A cause-and-effect relationship between a cost incurred and future rate increases may not be sufficient enough to justify the recognition of an asset, as this would apply to every entity reconsidering price setting for future periods based upon current year’s performance. For example, Widget Limited (the company) is
‘widget maker.’ It is not involved in rate regulated activity and does not have one-to-one contract with customers. The company is a dominant market participant having some monopolistic features. The company believes that it has incurred too many raw material costs in the current period. The company may make business decision to increase the price for transactions beginning the next year. The question is whether it is appropriate to recognise the incremental increase in sales price multiplied by the expected volume of sales for next year given that the link/reason the dominant market participant increased its price was because this year’s costs were too high (and therefore this year’s ‘reasonable profit’ expected by equity holders was not achieved).

    3) To support recognition of regulatory assets/ liabilities, the GN argues that the regulator negotiates rates on behalf of the whole customer base and a regulated entity therefore is comparable to an entity negotiating future prices with a specific customer, thereby binding both the entity and the customer. However, the contrary view is that rate regulation is a condition of the entity’s entry into the regulated market (i.e., a condition of the operating license) and does not create a separate asset. The entity has control over the right to operate in the regulated market, not over the future behaviour of its customers. Since the regulator did not guarantee the future recovery of any costs incurred, an asset controlled by the entity is not being created.

The Framework for Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements
under Indian GAAP is similar to that under IFRS. Therefore, one may argue that the GN is not in accordance with the Indian Framework, which is the base document and serves as a guiding principle in drafting of standards.

Conclusion

Whilst the author does not believe that the existing asset and liability definitions are met, one can understand why the standard-setter considered the recognition of regulatory assets and regulatory liabilities for entities that meet certain conditions, to provide decision-useful information. The author believes that the only way this can be done under the existing Framework is to state that the proposals in the GN are a departure from the Framework, and to provide clear guidance on the scope of the standard and to prohibit analogising. While all entities have the right to increase or decrease future prices, regulated entities have the following characteristics to justify a departure from the Framework: (a) Their prices and operational decisions are restricted and governed by the law and require regulatory approval.

    The economic impact of the regulation is to ensure that the regulated entity earns a specified return. (c) As noted in the GN, the regulator does act on behalf of the aggregate customer base with respect to price. Most importantly, the author believes a departure from the Framework is justified because the requirements would result in financial information that presents the economic effects of the regulation — that the entity will achieve a specified return.

A perusal of publicly available Indian GAAP financial statements of few companies engaged in power distribution indicates that they have recognised regulatory assets/ regulatory liabilities. From an Indian GAAP perspective, the Guidance Note is not expected to have any significant impact on these companies and would not change anything (other than legitimising current accounting practice). Therefore the author believes that the standard-setters should not have issued the Guidance Note in the first place and should actively participate in the ongoing effort of the IASB in developing a global standard for rate regulation.   

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide General Circular No. 10, dated 21st May 2012 issued Guidelines for declaring a financial institution as a Public Financial Institution.

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Full version of the Circular can be accessed at MCA website

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Ministry issues general clarification on Cost Accounting and Cost Audit Order.

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By General Circular No. 12/2012, dated 4th June 2012 the Ministry has issued general clarifications on Cost Accounting Records and Cost Audit Order No. 52/26/CAB-2010, dated 2nd May, 2011. It shall be applicable as under:

(a) For all companies wherein their products/activities are already covered under any of the erstwhile industry-specific Cost Accounting Records Rules and meeting with the threshold limits mentioned in the said Cost Audit Orders — in respect of each financial year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2011 i.e., from the financial year 2011-12 onwards.

(b) For all companies wherein their products/activities are for the first time covered under any of the revised industry-specific Cost Accounting Records Rules, and meeting with the threshold limits mentioned in the said Cost Audit Orders — in respect of each financial year commencing on or after the 7th December, 2011 i.e., from the financial year 2012-13 (including calendar year 2012) onwards.

In case of companies engaged in production, processing, manufacturing or mining of multiple products/activities, if any of their products/activities are not covered under the industry-specific Cost Accounting Records Rules, but are covered under the Companies (Cost Accounting Records) Rules, 2011 notified vide GSR 429(E), dated June 3, 2011 and wherein such products/activities are not covered under cost audit vide cost audit orders dated June 30, 2011 and January 24, 2012; such companies shall be required to file compliance report with the Central Government in accordance with the clarifications given vide para

 (a) of the MCA’s General Circular No. 68/2011, dated 30-11-2011.

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Ministry grants exemption from Mandatory Cost Audit to all units located in specified zones.

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Vide General Circular No. 11/2012, dated 25th May 2012, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued clarification regarding the coverage of the Cost Accounting Records and Cost Audit by granting exemption from Mandatory Cost Audit to units located in the specified zones.

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Ministry extends time limit for filing Form 11 for F.Y. 2011-12.

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Vide Circular dated 6th June 2012 the Ministry has extended the time limit for filing the mandatory Form 11(LLP) from 60 days to 90 days for the financial year ending 31-3-2012 effective 31st May 2012.

Full version of the Circular can be accessed on http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/General_Circular_ No_13_2012.pdf

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Limited Liability Partnerships integrated on MCA21.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs, has integrated the Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) under the platform of MCA21. As a result all state of the art services like credit card payment, online banking from six banks, payment through NEFT from any bank and host of other services will now be available for them.

Accordingly, all LLP forms except forms to be filed by Foreign LLP shall be processed and approved by respective Registrar of Companies (ROCs) of concerned state. The forms to be filed by foreign LLPs shall be processed and approved by the ROC, Delhi & Haryana.

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Cost Audit Reports and Compliance Reports to be filed after 30th June 2012 in new XBRL formats.

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Ministry of Corporate Affairs has mandated the cost auditors and the companies to file Cost Audit Reports (Form-I) and Compliance Reports (Form-A) for the year 2011-12 onwards (including the overdue reports relating to any previous year) in XBRL mode.

Therefore, filing of existing Form I – Cost Audit Report and Form A – Compliance Report shall not be allowed till 30-6-2012 by which time the new XBRL mode of filing will be ready and enabled.

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Company Law Forms changing where new Schedule VI is applicable.

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Currently Form 23AC, Form 23ACA, Form 23AC-XBRL and Form 23ACA-XBRL cannot be filed by those companies whose financial year is starting on or after 1-4-2011 as Revised Schedule VI is applicable for such period.

 New e-forms are undergoing revision to align with the Revised Schedule VI and new forms would be updated shortly.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 132, dated 8-6-2012 — Money Transfer Service Scheme.

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Presently, a single individual beneficiary can receive for personal e up to 12 remittances not exceeding INR156,614 each in a calendar year. This Circular has increased the number of remittances that an individual can receive from 12 to 30.

Thus, an individual can now receive for personal use up to 30 remittances each, not exceeding US INR156,614 in a calendar year.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 131, dated 31-5-2012 — Overseas Direct Investments by Indian Party — Online Reporting of Overseas Direct Investment in Form ODI.

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Presently, although banks can generate the UIN online for overseas investments under the Automatic Route, reporting of subsequent remittances for overseas investments under the Automatic Route as well as the Approval Route could be done online in Part II of Form ODI only after receipt of the letter from RBI confirming the UIN.

This Circular states that, in the case of overseas investments under the Automatic Route, UIN will be communicated through an auto-generated e-mail sent to the email-id made available by the Authorised Dealer/Indian Party. This auto-generated e-mail giving the details of UIN allotted to the JV/WOS will be treated as confirmation of allotment of UIN, and no separate letter will be issued with effect from June 1, 2012 by RBI, either to the Indian Party or to the Authorised Dealer. Subsequent remittances are to be reported online in Part II of form ODI, only after receipt of the e-mail communication/ confirmation conveying the UIN.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has decided to impose fees with effect from 22nd July 2012 on certain e-forms.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has decided to impose fees with effect from 22nd July, 2012 on certain e-forms to be filed with the ROC, RD or MCA (HQ) where at present no fee is prescribed. Fees will be applicable among others for Form 23B — being information by statutory Auditors to the Registrar of Companies Act u/s.224(1)(a) and Form 24A — Application to RD for Appointment of Auditors u/s.224(3) and others.

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Sections 28, 145 — Project completion method — In the case of an assessee following project completion method, receipts by way of sale of TDR, which TDR has direct nexus with the project undertaken, can be brought to tax only in the year in which the project is completed.

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16. Pushpa Construction Co. v. ITO ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai
Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and R. S. Padvekar (JM)
ITA No. 193/Mum./2010

A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 25-4-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Vipul B. Joshi/ A. C. Tejpal

Sections 28, 145 — Project completion method — In the case of an assessee following project completion method, receipts by way of sale of TDR, which TDR has direct nexus with the project undertaken, can be brought to tax only in the year in which the project is completed.


Facts:

The assessee, a partnership firm, engaged in construction activity especially the Slum Rehabilitation Programme (SRA Scheme) launched by the Government of Maharashtra, had undertaken two projects of slum rehabilitation, during the financial year 2005-06, which were not completed as on 31-3-2006. The assessee was following project completion method of accounting.

During the financial year 2005-06, the assessee sold TDR allotted to it by BMC, which TDR was directly linked to the projects undertaken by the assessee, for a consideration of Rs.2,67,29,626. Since the projects were not complete as on 31-3-2006, this amount was reflected in the balance sheet as on 31- 3-2006 as advance. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the contentions of the assessee and brought to tax the entire amount as income of the assessee for A.Y. 2006-07. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal where it was also submitted that the entire sale proceeds of TDR totalling to Rs.6,90,26,192 were reflected in the P & L Account for A.Y. 2008-09 and surplus income of Rs.2,78,59,939 was offered. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that admittedly the two slum rehabilitation projects were not completed in A.Y. 2006-07 and also that the TDR in quesetion had direct nexus with the two projects undertaken by the assessee. It found that the contention of the assessee is supported by the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT Central I, Mumbai v. Chembur Trade Corporation, (ITA No. 3179 of 2009) order dated 14-9-2011 and also the decision of Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of ACIT v. Skylark Building, 48 SOT 306 (Mum.) and also that the assessee has offered the amounts in A.Y. 2008- 09 when the projects were completed.

The Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and restored the matter back to the file of the AO with a direction to verify whether the assessee has offered sale consideration of TDR in question in A.Y. 2008-09. If it has so offered, then the same should not be taxed in A.Y. 2006- 07.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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Section 54 — Exemption from capital gains tax provided the amount is invested in purchase or construction of a flat within the prescribed time period — Held that (1) booking of the flat with the builder is to be treated as construction of flat; (2) the extended period u/s.139(4) has to be considered for the purposes of utilisation of the capital gain amount.

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15. Kishore H. Galaiya v. ITO ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai Before B. R. Mittal (JM) and Rajendra Singh (AM) ITA No. 7326/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2006-07 Decided on: 13-6-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Bhavesh Doshi/K. R. Vasudevan

Section 54 — Exemption from capital gains tax provided the amount is invested in purchase or construction of a flat within the prescribed time period — Held that (1) booking of the flat with the builder is to be treated as construction of flat;     the extended period u/s.139(4) has to be considered for the purposes of utilisation of the capital gain amount.


Facts:

  • The assessee along with his wife was joint and equal owner of the property being a residential flat at Mumbai which had been purchased by them in April 2002 for a consideration of Rs.21 lac. The flat was sold by them on 7-3-2006 for a consideration of Rs.45 lac in which the share of the assessee was Rs.22 lac. The assessee computed the long term capital gain from sale of the flat after deducting the indexed cost of acquisition at Rs.9.98 lac. The assessee purchased another flat jointly along with his wife for a total consideration of Rs.35 lac. The assessee had made total payment of Rs.14.62 lac till 16-2-2009. The assessee, therefore, claimed that he was entitled to claim exemption u/s.54 of the Act as the capital gain had been invested in the new residential flat. The claim for exemption was denied by the AO because the assessee: Failed to deposit the balance amount in the account in any of the specified bank as required u/s.54 and utilise the same in accordance with the scheme framed by the Government; and
  • Could not produce evidence regarding taking possession of the new flat. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance made by the AO. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue strongly supported the orders of the authorities below.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had booked the new flat with the builder and as per agreement, the assessee was to make payment in instalments and the builder was to hand over the possession of the flat after construction. Based on the clarification of the CBDT vide its Circular No. 472, dated 16-12-1993 read with Circular No. 471 dated, 15-10-1986 and the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Smt. Sunder Kaur Sujan Singh Gadh, (3 SOT 206), the Tribunal noted that the case of the assessee was to be considered as construction of new residential house and not purchase of a flat. Thus, the Tribunal held that in case the assessee had invested the capital gains in construction of a new residential house within a period of three years, this should be treated as sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 54. According to it, it was not necessary that the possession of the flat should also be taken within the period of three years. For the purpose, it relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Mrs. Hilla J. B. Wadia, (216 ITR 376). As regards the default pointed out by the authorities below regarding non-deposit of unutilised amount of capital gain in the Capital Gain Account Scheme, the Tribunal noted the submission of the assessee that it was only due to ignorance of law and intention of the assessee was always to utilise the amount for construction of flat and the assessee had kept the amount in the savings bank account which was utilised towards the construction of flat. According to the Tribunal, this was only a technical default and on this ground alone the claim of exemption cannot be denied, particularly when the amount had been actually utilised for the construction of residential house and not for any other purpose. The view was supported by the decision of the Jodhpur Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Jagan Nath Singh Lodha v. ITO, (85 TTJ 173). The Tribunal also agreed with the assessee’s contention that the due date of filing of return of income u/s.139(1) has to be construed with respect to the due date of section 139(4) as the s.s (4) provides for the extended period for filing return as an exception to the section 139(1) and considering this, there was no default as the entire amount of capital gain had been invested within the due date u/s.139(4). For the purpose, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ms. Jagrity Aggarwal (339 ITR 610).

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(1) Section 54F — Exemption of long-term capital gains where sales consideration is invested in purchase of a house — Whether purchase of house jointly with spouse is eligible — Held, Yes. (2) Section 94(7) — Purchase of units and sale thereof at loss after earning dividend — If date of tender of cheque for purchase of shares was considered as the date of purchase, then the sale was not within three months of purchase — Whether the provisions of section 94(7) attracted — Held, No.

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14. Vasudeo Pandurang Ginde v. ITO ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai
Before Vijay Pal Rao (JM) and N. K. Billaiya (AM)
ITA No. 4285/Mum./2009
A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 6-6-2012
Counsel for assessee/revenue: C. N. Vaze/ Rajan

Section 54F — Exemption of long-term capital gains where sales consideration is invested in purchase of a house — Whether purchase of house jointly with spouse is eligible — Held, Yes.

Section 94(7) — Purchase of units and sale thereof at loss after earning dividend — If date of tender of cheque for purchase of shares was considered as the date of purchase, then the sale was not within three months of purchase
— Whether the provisions of section 94(7) attracted — Held, No.


Facts:

(1) The assessee had made long-term capital gain on sale of shares. The sales proceeds were invested in purchase of row house and exemption u/s.54F was claimed. One of the grounds on which the exemption was denied by the AO was that the house purchased by the assessee was in the joint name of his wife.

(2) The assessee had purchased units of mutual funds of Rs.3 crore on 26-12-2003. On the very same date, the assessee received a dividend of Rs.1.16 crore. On 29-3-2004, the assessee redeemed the units for Rs.1.7 crore and thereby booked a shortterm capital loss of Rs.1.3 crore. The AO found that the cheque of Rs.3 crore for the purchase of units was actually realised on 30-12-2003 and therefore, according to him, the period of holding before the redemption of the said units on 29-3-2004 was only 88 days i.e., less than 3 months. Therefore, according to him, the transaction was hit by the provisions of section 94(7) of the Act. The AO was also of the view that the entire transaction of sale and purchase of mutual fund units was nothing but a colourable device for setting off of the capital gains arising on sale of shares. Accordingly, the set off of short term capital loss claimed by the assessee was denied. On appeal the CIT(A) confirmed the denial of exemption u/s.54F. While on the issue regarding applicability of section 94(7) he noted that the provisions of section 94(7) lays down three cumulative conditions, the non-fulfilment of any one of the conditions would result into non applicability of section 94(7). Thus, if the date of the purchase as claimed by the AO was 30-12-2003, then it cannot be said that the units were purchased within three months prior to the record date because the record date was 26-12-2003 when the dividend was declared. Thus, one of the conditions essential for application of section 94(7) is not fulfilled. Secondly, the CIT(A) noted that the mutual fund had accepted 26-12-2003 as the date on which the units were allotted to the assessee. Based on the said date, the second conditions viz. that the units are sold within a period of three months was also not fulfilled. Accordingly, it was held that the provisions of section 94(7) were not applicable. As regards the point raised by the AO that the entire transaction was a colourable device, the CIT(A) relying on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Walfort Share & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd., Appeal No. 18 of 2006 held that as the conditions of section 94(7) have not been fulfilled, no disallowance was permissible.

Held:

(1) The Tribunal noted that the total consideration for the house had been met by the assessee. According to it the assessee had added the name of his wife only for the sake of convenience. It also drew support from the provisions of section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that the share in the property will depend on the amount contributed towards the purchase consideration. Further, relying on the decisions listed below, the Tribunal held that since the total consideration for the house had been paid by the assessee, the exemption cannot be denied on this ground.

  • The decisions relied on are as under:  ITO v. Arvind T. Thakkar in ITA No. 7338/Mum./2005 vide order dated 29-4-2011;
  •  Ravinder Kumar Arora v. ACIT in ITA No. 4998/ Del./2010 vide order dated 11-3-2011; and
  •  DIT v. Mrs. Jennifer Bhide, (2011) 15 Taxmann 82 (Kar.). (2) As regards section 94(7) The Tribunal noted that the whole issue revolved around the date of purchase of units. The Tribunal agreed with the findings of the CIT(A) and the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
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Sections 40(a)(ia), 194H — Commission retained by credit card companies out of amounts paid to merchant establishment is not liable for deduction of tax at source u/s.194H.

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13. DCIT v. Vah Magna Retail (P) Ltd.
ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Hyderabad
Before D. Karunakararao (AM) and Saktijit Dey (JM)
ITA No. 905/Hyd./2011
A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 10-4-2012
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Dr. B. V. Prasad Reddy/None

Sections 40(a)(ia), 194H — Commission retained by credit card companies out of amounts paid to merchant establishment is not liable for deduction of tax at source u/s.194H.


Facts:

The assessee-company, engaged in business of direct retail trading in consumer goods, had claimed a deduction of Rs.16,34,000 on account of commission paid to credit card companies, which amount was disallowed by the AO u/s.40(a)(ia) on the ground that assessee failed to deduct tax at source u/s.194H of the Act. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) where it contended that the assesee only receives payment from bank/credit card companeis after deduction of commission thereon, and thus, this is only in the nature of a post facto accounting and does not involve any payment or credit to the account of the banks or any other account before making such payment by the assessee. The CIT(A) accepted the claim of the assessee for deduction of Rs.16,34,000 and observed as follows: “9.8 On going through the nature of transactions, I find considerable merit in the contention of the appellant that commission paid to the credit card companies cannot be considered as falling within the purview of section 194H. Even though the definition of the term ‘commission or brokerage’ used in the said section is an inclusive definition, it is clear that the liability to make TDS under the said section arises only when a person acts on behalf of another person. In the case of commission retained by the credit card companies however, it cannot be said that the bank acts on behalf of the merchant establishment or that even the merchant establishment conducts the transaction for the bank. The sale made on the basis of a credit card is clearly a transaction of the merchants establishment only and the credit card company only facilitates the electronic payment, for a certain charge. The commission retained by the credit card company is therefore in the nature of normal bank charges and not in the nature of commission/brokerage for acting on behalf of the merchant establishment. Accordingly, concluding that there was no requirement for making TDS on the ‘Commission retained by the credit card companies, the disallowance of Rs.16,34,000 is deleted . . . . .” Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

 The Tribunal found no infirmity in the reasoning given by the CIT(A). It upheld the order passed by the CIT(A). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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Section 14A — Disallowance u/s.14A applies to partner’s share of profits in a firm — ‘Depreciation’ is not an expenditure but an allowance, hence the same cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.

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12. Vishnu Anant Mahajan v. ACIT
ITAT Special Bench, Ahmedabad
Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa (President),
G. C. Gupta (VP) and K. G. Bhansal (AM)
ITA No. 3002/Ahd./2009
A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 25-5-2012
Counsel for assessee/revenue: Sunil H. Talati/S. K. Gupta with Kartarsingh

Section 14A — Disallowance u/s.14A applies to partner’s share of profits in a firm — ‘Depreciation’ is not an expenditure but an allowance, hence the same cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.


Facts:

The assessee, a partner in the firm, derived income by way of remuneration and interest from the firm in addition to the share of profits in the firm which was exempt u/s.10(2A). Apart from the income from the firm, the assessee also had income under the head house property, capital gains, interest income and dividend income. The assessee had suo motu disallowed 1/10th of depreciation allowance of motor car. The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed expenditure u/s.14A. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that since the share of profits from the firm is exempt u/s.10(2A), expenditure was required to be disallowed u/s.14A. Since the assessee derived 76% of professional income as share from firm and balance 24% by way of remuneration and interest income, the CIT(A) allocated the expenses to income not includible in total income u/s.10(2A). Thus, business income by way of remuneration and interest from firm was taxed in the hands of the assessee u/s.28(v) after allowing 24% of the expenditure. 76% of the expenditure was disallowed. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 Held:

A firm is not a separate entity under the general law, whereas under the Income-tax Act, it is a separate entity distinct from its partners. Remuneration and interest on capital of partners is allowed as a deduction to the firm and the same are taxable in the hands of the partners u/s.28(v), whereas the profits of the firm, after deducting remuneration to partners and interest on capital of partners, are taxed in the hands of the firm. The partners do not pay tax on the share of profits from the firm since the same are exempt u/s.10(2A). Section 10(2A) provides that the share of partner shall not be included in his total income, hence it is not possible to hold that share of profit is not excluded from the total income of the partner because the firm has already been taxed thereon. Since share of profits are excluded from the total income of the partner, section 14A would apply and any expenditure incurred to earn the share of profits needs to be disallowed. In the case of Hoshang D. Nanavati v. ACIT, (ITA No. 3567/Mum./2007 for A.Y. 2003-04, order dated 18-3- 2011), while considering the question as to whether depreciation is an expenditure or not, it has been held that section 14A deals only with the expenditure and not any statutory allowance admissible to the assessee. A statutory allowance u/s.32 is not an expenditure. Being in agreement with the decision of the DB in the case of Hoshang Nanavati (supra), the SB held that depreciation cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance: Non-resident: Sections 9 and 40(a)(i): A.Y. 2007-08: Income deemed to accrue or arise in India: Business connection not established: Mere entry in books of account of Indian payer does not mean that non-resident received payment in India: No income accrued in India: Tax need not be deducted at source: Expenditure not disallowable.

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32. Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance: Non-resident: Sections 9 and 40(a)(i): A.Y. 2007-08: Income deemed to accrue or arise in India: Business connection not established: Mere entry in books of account of Indian payer does not mean that non-resident received payment in India: No income accrued in India: Tax need not be deducted at source: Expenditure not disallowable.

[CIT v. EON Technology P. Ltd., 343 ITR 366 (Del.)]

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of development and export of software. In the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee paid commission to its parent company in the U.K. on the sales and amounts realised on export contracts procured by it for the assessee and the same was claimed as deduction. The Assessing Officer held that the U.K. company had a business connection in India and that commission income had accrued and arisen in India when credit entries were made in the books of the assessee in favour of the U.K. company and the income towards commission was received in India. He held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source and as there was failure to do so, disallowed the expenditure u/s.40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Commissioner (A) held that the ‘business connection’ was not established and allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Assessing Officer did not elaborate or had not discussed on what basis he had come to the conclusion that ‘business connection’ as envisaged u/s.9(1)(i) existed. The assessee had submitted that the U.K. company was a non-resident company and did not have any permanent establishment in India. The U.K. company was not rendering any service or performing any activity in India itself. These facts were not and could not be disputed.

(ii) The stand of the Revenue was contrary to the two Circulars issued by the CBDT in which it was clearly held that when a non-resident agent operates outside the country, no part of his income arises in India, and since payment was remitted directly abroad, merely because an entry in the books of account was made, it did not mean that the non-resident had received any payment in India.

(iii) The Assessing Officer did not make out a case of business connection as stipulated in section 9(1)(i) of the Act. He had not made any foundation or basis for holding that there was business connection and, therefore, section 9(1)(i) of the Act was applicable.

 (iv) The Appellate Authorities, on the basis of material on record, had rightly held that ‘business connection’ was not established.”

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Business expenditure: Capital or revenue: A.Y. 2003-04: Assessee tenant in premises contributed to reconstruction cost of premises with understanding that it will continue as tenant at the same rent: Expenditure is revenue expenditure.

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31. Business expenditure: Capital or revenue: A.Y. 2003-04: Assessee tenant in premises contributed to reconstruction cost of premises with understanding that it will continue as tenant at the same rent: Expenditure is revenue expenditure.
[CIT v. Talathi and Panthaky Associated P. Ltd., 343 ITR 309 (Bom.)]

The assessee was a tenant of 5000 sq.ft. in a building which was declared as unsafe. The assessee contributed Rs.1.5 crore for reconstruction of the building with the understanding that it will continue as a tenant at Rs.11,300 per month. In the A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee claimed the deduction of the said expenditure of Rs.1.5 crore. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that it is capital expenditure. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The assessee had not incurred any expenditure of capital nature. The expenditure did not result in the acquisition of a capital asset by the assessee. The assessee continued as before to be a tenant in respect of the premises.

(ii) By contributing an amount of Rs.1.5 crore towards the construction or, as the case may be, renovation of the existing structure, the assessee obtained a commercial advantage of securing tenancy of an equivalent area of premises at the same rent as before. Since there was no acquisition of a capital asset and the occupation of the assessee continued in the character of a tenancy, the expenditure could not be regarded as being of a capital nature.

(iii) The cost of repair/reconstruction of the tenanted premises was of a revenue nature and was allowable as and by way of deduction.”

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Appellate Tribunal: Adjournment: Section 255, Rule 32 of Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963: Where a case is adjourned by Tribunal by giving a last opportunity to counsel for assessee, same can be adjourned again on the next date, if sufficient or reasonable cause exists on that day.

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30. Appellate Tribunal: Adjournment: Section 255, Rule 32 of Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963: Where a case is adjourned by Tribunal by giving a last opportunity to counsel for assessee, same can be adjourned again on the next date, if sufficient or reasonable cause exists on that day.

[Mehru Electrical and Engg. (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2012) 22 Taxman.com 45 (Raj.)]

The assessee’s appeal before the Tribunal was fixed for hearing on 11-1-2010 and at the request of the counsel for the assessee, hearing of the case was adjourned to 9-2-2010 giving him a last opportunity. However, the counsel for the assessee moved an application before the Tribunal for adjournment of the case in advance on 8-2-2010 on the ground that he was going to Mumbai for some urgent work. On 9-2-2010 the Tribunal rejected the application for adjournment. It further heard the counsel for the Revenue ex parte and allowed the appeal of the Revenue. On appeal to High Court, the assessee contended, inter alia, that

(i) from the order of the Tribunal it was clear that adjournment application was rejected only on the ground that a last opportunity was granted to counsel for the assessee to argue the appeal, and

(ii) even if a last opportunity was granted on last date, it did not mean that on sufficient ground the case could not be adjourned again. The Rajasthan High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal and held as under: “(i) From the proceedings of the Tribunal dated 11-1-2010, it is clear that last opportunity was given and the case was adjourned for 9-2- 2010. Application for adjournment was filed on 8-2-2010, which was put up for consideration before the Tribunal on 9-2-2010. From the application, it appears that counsel for the assessee had to go to Mumbai due to some urgent work. No one was present on behalf of the assessee. The Tribunal, in absence of counsel for the assessee, rejected the adjournment application. (ii) Ordinarily it is not incumbent on the part of the Tribunal to adjourn the case again when a last opportunity had already been granted to the counsel for the assessee. However, there may be number of circumstances where adjournment becomes necessary in the interest of justice. If counsel for the assessee had to go for some urgent work to Mumbai and an application for adjournment was moved in advance, then in the interest of justice a short adjournment should have been granted. If number of opportunities had already been afforded to the counsel for the assessee, then adjournment could have been granted on payment of cost.

(iii) The Tribunal has not assigned any reason as to whether reason mentioned in the application for adjournment constituted sufficient cause for adjournment or not. Even if a last opportunity is granted and case is fixed for hearing and sufficient cause is shown on the date fixed for hearing, then the case can be adjourned and it should be adjourned in the interest of justice. In these circumstances, the Tribunal committed an illegality in rejecting the application for adjournment and in deciding the appeal ex parte.

(iv) Therefore, the ex parte order passed by the Tribunal deserved to be set aside. The case was to be remitted back to the Tribunal for decision afresh on merits.”

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Appeal to High Court: Power and scope: Section 260A: Jurisdiction to reassess: Question can be raised for the first time before the High Court.

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29. Appeal to High Court: Power and scope: Section 260A: Jurisdiction to reassess: Question can be raised for the first time before the High Court.
[Mukti Properties P. Ltd. v. CIT, 344 ITR 177 (Cal.)]

The assessee had not raised the issue as regards the jurisdiction to reassess before the Assessing Officer, Commissioner (A) or the Tribunal. For the first time the assessee raised the issue before the High Court in appeal u/s.260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Calcutta High Court admitted the question and held as under:

“A pure question of law which goes to the very root of the jurisdiction and further initiation of the proceedings can be raised at any stage, even at the stage of appeal to the Supreme Court.”

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Business expenditure — Banks — The provisions of clause (viia) of section 36(1) relating to the deduction on account of the provision for bad and doubtful debt(s) are distinct and independent of the provisions of section 36(1) (vii) relating to allowance of the bad debts — The scheduled commercial banks would continue to get the full benefit of the writeoff of the irrecoverable debt(s) u/s.36(1)(vii) in addition to the benefit of deduction for the provision made for bad and doubtful debt(s) u/s<

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[Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (2012) 343 ITR 270 (SC)]

The
assessee, a scheduled bank, filed its return of income for the A.Y.
2002-03 on October 24, 2002, declaring total income of Rs.61,15,610. The
return was processed u/s.143(1), and eligible refund was issued in
favour of the assessee. However, the Assessing Officer issued notice
u/s.143(2) to the assessee, after which the assessment was completed.
Inter alia, the Assessing Officer, while dealing, u/s.143(3), with the
claim of the assessee for bad debts of Rs.12,65,95,770, noticed that the
argument put forward on behalf of the assessee, that the deduction
allowable u/s.36(1) (vii) is independent of deduction u/s.36(1)(viia),
could not be accepted. Consequently, he observed that the assessee
having a provision of Rs.15,01,29,990 for bad and doubtful debts
u/s.36(1)(viia), could not claim the amount of Rs.12,65,95,770 as
deduction on account of bad debts because the bad debts did not exceed
the credit balance in the provision for bad and doubtful debts account
and also the requirements of clause (v) of s.s (2) of section 36 were
not satisfied. Therefore, the assessee’s claim for deduction of bad
debts written off from the account books was disallowed. This amount was
added back to the taxable income of the assessee, for which a demand
notice and challan was accordingly issued. This order of the Assessing
Officer dated January 24, 2005, was challenged in appeal by the assessee
on various grounds.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)
vide his order dated April 7, 2006, partly allowed the appeal,
particularly in relation to the claim of the appellantbank for bad
debts. Relying upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High
Court in the case of South Indian Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (2003) 262 ITR 579
(Ker.), the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the claim of
the appellant was fully supported by the said decision and since the
entire bad debts written off by the bank u/s.36(1)(vii) were pertaining
to urban branches only and not to the provision made for rural brances
u/s.36(1)(viia), it was entitled to the deduction of the full claimed
amount of Rs.12,65,95,770. Consequently, he directed deletion of the
said amount.

Being aggrieved from the order of the Commissioner
of Income-tax (Appeals), the Revenue as well as the assessee filed
appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin. Vide its order
dated April 16, 2007, while relying upon the judgment of the
jurisdictional High Court in the case of South Indian Bank Ltd. (supra),
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Revenue
on this issue and also granted certain other benefits to the assessee in
relation to other items.

However, the Department of Income-tax,
being dissatisfied with the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
in the A.Y. 2002-03, filed an appeal before the High Court u/s.260A of
the Act.

The Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam hearing the batch of appeals against the order of the Income
Tax Appellate Tribunal expressed the view that the judgment of that
Court in the case of South Indian Bank (supra) was not a correct
exposition of law. While dissenting therefrom, the Bench directed the
matter to be placed before a Full Bench of the High Court.

Vide
its judgment dated December 16, 2009, the Full Bench not only answered
the question of law but even decided the case on the merits. While
setting aside the view taken by the Division Bench in South Indian Bank
(supra) and also the concurrent view taken by the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the Full
Bench of the High Court held as under (page 181 of 326 ITR):

“What
is clear from the above is that provision for bad and doubtful debts
normally is not an allowable deduction and what is allowable under the
main clause is bad debt actually written off. However, so far as banks
to which clause (viia) applies are concerned, they are entitled to claim
deduction of provision u/ss.(viia), but at the same time when bad debts
written off is also claimed deduction under clause (vii), the same will
be allowed as a deduction only to the extent it is in excess of the
provision created and allowed as a deduction under clause (viia). It is
worthwhile to note that deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) is subject to s.s (2)
of section 36 which in clause (v) specifically states that any bad debt
written off should be claimed as a deduction only after debiting it to
the provision created for bad and doubtful debts. What is clear from the
above provisions is that though the respondent-banks are entitled to
claim deduction of provision for bad and doubtful debts in terms of
clause (viia), such banks are entitled to deduction of bad debt actually
written off only to the extent it is in excess of the provision created
and allowed as deduction under clause (viia). Further, in order to
qualify for deduction of bad debt written off the requirement of section
36(2)(v) is that such amount should be debited to the provision created
under clause (viia) of section 36(1). Therefore, we are of the view
that the distinction drawn by the Division Bench in the South Indian
Bank’s case between the bad debts written off in respect of advances
made by rural branches and bad debts pertaining to advances made by
other branches does not exist and is not visualised under the proviso to
section 36(1)(vii). We, therefore, hold that the said decision of this
Court does not lay down the correct interpretation of the provisions of
the Act. Admittedly, all the respondent-assessees have claimed and have
been allowed deduction of provision in terms of clause (viia) of the
Act. Therefore, when they claim deduction of bad debt written off in the
previous year by virtue of the proviso to section 36(1)(vii), they are
entitled to claim deduction of such bad debt only to the extent it
exceeds the provision created and allowed as deduction under clause
(viia) of the Act.

In the normal course we should answer the
question referred to us by the Division Bench and send back the appeals
to the Division Bench to decide the appeals consistent with the Full
Bench Decision. However, since this is the only issue that arises in the
appeals, we feel it would be only an empty formality to send back the
matter to the Division Bench for disposal of appeals consistent with our
judgment. In order to avoid unnecessary posting of appeals before the
Division Bench, we allow the appeals by setting aside the orders of the
Tribunal and by restoring the assessments confirmed in first appeals.”

Dissatisfied
from the judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, the
assessee filed the appeals before the Supreme Court purely on question
of law.

The Supreme Court held that the income of an assessee
carrying on a business or profession has to be assessed in accordance
with the scheme contained in Part D of Chapter IV dealing with heads of
income. Section 28 of the Act deals with the chargeability of income to
tax under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’. All
‘other deductions’ available to an assessee under this head of income
are dealt with u/s.36 of the Act which opens with the words ‘the
deduction provided for in the following clauses shall be allowed in
respect of matters dealt with therein, in computing the income referred
to in section 28’. In other words, for the purposes of computing the
income chargeable to tax, beside specific deductions, ‘other deductions’
postulated in different clauses of section 36 are to be allowed by the
Assessing Officer, in accordance with law.

Section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) provide for such deductions, which are to be permitted, in accordance with the language of these provisions. A bare reading of these provisions shows that sections 36(1) and 36(1)(viia) are separate items of deduction. These are independent provisions and, therefore, cannot be intermingled or read into each other. It is a settled canon of interpretation of fiscal statutes that they need to be construed strictly and on their plain reading.

The provision of section 36(1)(vii) would come into play in the grant of deductions, subject to the limitation contained in section 36(2) of the Act. Any bad debt or part thereof, which is written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee for the previous year is the deduction which the assessee would be entitled to get, provided he satisfies the requirements of section 36(2) of the Act. Allowing of deduction of bad debts is controlled by the provisions of section 36(2). The argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue is that it would amount to allowing a double deduction if the provisions of section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) are permitted to operate independently. There is no doubt that a statute is normally not construed to provide for a double benefit unless it is specifically so stipulated or is clear from the scheme of the Act. As far as the question of double benefit is concerned, the Legislature in its wisdom introduced section 36(2)(v) by the Finance Act, 1985, with effect from April 1, 1985. Section 36(2)(v) concerns itself as a check for claim of any double deduction and has to be read in conjunction with section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. It requires the assessee to debit the amount of such debt or part thereof in the previous year to the provision made for that purpose.

The Supreme Court, referring to the Circular Nos. 258, dated 14-6-1979, 421, dated 12-6-1988, 464, dated 18-7-1986 and the objects and reasons for the Finance Act, 1986, held that clear legislative intent of the relevant provisions and unambiguous language of the Circulars with reference to the amendments to section 36 of the Act demonstrate that the deduction on account of provision for bad and doubtful debts u/s.36(1)(viia) is distinct and independent of the provisions of section 36(1)(vii) relating to allowance of the bad debts. The legislative intent was to encourage rural advances and the making of provisions for bad debts in relation to such rural branches. Another material aspect of the functioning of such banks is that their rural branches were practically treated as a distinct business, though ultimately these advances would form part of the books of accounts of the principal or head office branch. According to the Supreme Court the Circulars in question show a trend of encouraging rural business and for providing greater deductions. The purpose of granting such deductions would stand frustrated if these deductions are implicitly neutralised against other independent deductions specifically provided under the provisions of the Act.

The Supreme Court further held that the language of section 36(1)(vii) of the Act is unambiguous and does not admit of two interpretations. It applies to all banks, commercial or rural, scheduled or unscheduled. It gives a benefit to the assessee to claim a deduction on any bad debt or part thereof, which is written off as irrecoverable in the amounts of the assessee for the previous year. This benefit is subject only to section 36(2) of the Act. It is obligatory upon the assessee to prove to the Assessing Officer that the case satisfies the ingredients of section 36(1)(vii) on the one hand and that it satisfies the requirements stated in section 36(2) of the Act on the other. The proviso to section 36(1)(vii) does not, in absolute terms, control the application of this provision as it comes into operation only when the case of the assessee is one which falls squarely u/s.36(1)(viia) of the Act. The Supreme Court noticed that the Explanation to section 36(1)(vii), introduced by the Finance Act, 2001, had to be examined in conjunction with the principal section. The Explanation specifically excluded any provision for bad and doubtful debts made in the account of the assessee from the ambit and scope of ‘any bad debt, or part thereof, written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee’. Thus, the concept of making a provision for bad and doubtful debts would fall outside the scope of section 36(1)(vii) simpliciter. The proviso, would have to be read with the provisions of section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. Once the bad debt is actually written off as irrecoverable and the requirements of section 36(2) satisfied, then, it would not be permissible to deny such deduction on the apprehension of double deduction under the provisions of section 36(1)(viia) and the proviso to section 36(1)(vii). According to the Supreme Court this did not appear to be the intention of the framers of law. The scheduled and non-scheduled commercial banks would continue to get the full benefit of write-off of the irrecoverable debts u/s.36(1)(vii) in addition to the benefit of deduction of bad and doubtful debts u/s.36(1)(viia). Mere provision for bad and doubtful debts may not be allowable, but in the case of a rural advance, the same, in terms of section 36(1)(viia)(a), may be allowable without insisting on an actual write-off.

The Supreme Court observed that as per the proviso to clause (vii), the deduction on account of the actual write-off of bad debts would be limited to the excess of the amount written off over the amount of the provision which had already been allowed under clause (viia). According to the Supreme Court the proviso by and large protects the interests of the Revenue. In case of rural advances which are covered by clause (viia), there would be no double deduction. The proviso, in its terms, limits its application to the case of a bank to which clause (viia)applies. Indisputably, clause (viia)(a) applies only to rural advances.

The Supreme Court further observed that as far as foreign banks are concerned, u/s.36(1)(viia)(b) and as far as public finance institutions or State financial corporations or State industrial investment corporations are concerned, u/s.36(1)(viia)(c), they do not have rural branches. The Supreme Court therefore inferred that the proviso is self-indicative that its application is to bad debts arising out of rural advances.

In a concurring judgment, the Chief Justice held that u/s.36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the taxpayer carrying on business is entitled to a deduction, in the computation of taxable profits, of the amount of any debt which is established to have become a bad debt during the previous year, subject to certain conditions. However, a mere provision for bad and doubtful debt(s) is not allowed as a deduction in the computation of taxable profits. In order to promote rural banking and in order to assist the scheduled commercial banks in making adequate provisions from their current profits to provide for risks in relation to their rural advances, the Finance Act inserted clause (viia) in relation to their rural advances, the Finance Act inserted clause (viia) in s.s (1) of section 36 to provide for a deduction, in the computation of taxable profits of all scheduled commercial banks, in respect of provisions made by them for bad and doubtful debt(s) relating to advances made by their rural branches. The deduction is limited to a specified percentage of the aggregate average advances made by the rural branches computed in the manner prescribed by the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Thus, the provisions of clause (viia) of section 36(1) relating to the deduction on account of the provision for bad and doubtful debt(s) is distinct and independent of the provisions of section 36(1)(vii) relating to allowance of the bad debts. In other wards, the scheduled commercial banks would continue to get the full benefit of the write-off of the irrecoverable debt(s) u/s.36(1)(vii) in addition to the benefit of deduction for the provision made for bad and doubtful debt(s) u/s.36(1)(viia). A reading of the Circulars issued by Central Board of Direct Taxes indicates that normally a deduction for bad debt(s) can be allowed only if the debt is written off in the books as bad debt(s). No deduction is allowable in respect of a mere provision for bad and doubtful debt(s). But in the case of rural advances, a deduction would be allowed even in respect of a mere provision without insisting on an actual write-off. However, this may result in double allowance in the sense that in respect of the same rural advance the bank may get allowance on the basis of clause (viia) and also on the basis of accrual write-off under clause (vii). This situation is taken care of by the proviso to clause (vii) which limits the allowance on the basis of the actual write-off to the excess, if any, of the write-off over the amount standing to the credit of the account created under clause (viia).

Note: The Court incidentally considered whether, when findings recorded in the other assessment year are accepted by the Revenue, it should be permitted to question the correctness of the same in the subsequent years. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted below:

The applicant has contended that as the similar claims had been decided in favour of the banks for the A.Ys. 1991-92 to 1993-94 by the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which had not been challenged by the Department, as such, the issue had attained finality and could not be disturbed in the subsequent years.

The above contention of the appellant-banks does not impress us at all. Merely because the orders of the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were not assailed in appeal by the Department itself, this would not take away the right of the Revenue to question the correctness of the orders of assessment, particularly when a question of law is involved. There is no doubt that the earlier orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had merged into the judgment of the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and attained finality for that relevant year. Equally, it is true that though the Full Bench judgment of that very Court in the case of South Indian Bank (supra), it did not notice any of the contentions before and principles stated by the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in its impugned judgment. As already noticed, the questions raised in the present appeal go to the very root of the matter and are questions of law in relation to interpretation of sections 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) read with section 36(2) of the Act. Thus, without any hesitation, we reject the contention of the appellant-banks that the findings recorded in the earlier A.Ys. 1991-92 to 1993-94 would be binding on the Department for subsequent years as well.

Section 26 — Income of co-owners of house property — Cannot be assessed as income of an association of persons (AOP) in spite of the fact that a return was filed in the legal status of AOP.

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30. (2011) 131 ITD 377 (Mum.) Sujeer Properties (AOP) v. ITO A.Y.: 2002-03. Dated: 28-1-2011

Section 26 — Income of co-owners of house property — Cannot be assessed as income of an association of persons (AOP) in spite of the fact that a return was filed in the legal status of AOP.


Facts:

A particular house property was co-owned by five persons. A return of income was filed by the association of persons (AOP) of these five persons declaring NIL income and claiming that income is to be assessed in the hands of the respective coowners of the building as share of each co-owners is predetermined. The assessment of AOP was subsequently reopened since the AO observed that the assessee had not paid any municipal taxes but had claimed the same in computation of house property. Before the ITAT, the assessee argued that in view of clear provisions of section 26, there was no question of first ascertaining the property income in the hands of the AOP and then ascertaining the share in the hands of each co-owner. He further argued that the entire exercise of filing of return of AOP was an entirely infructuous exercise and had no income tax implications at all. The DR argued that since the assessee had not taken up this plea of nontaxability while filing the original return, the same cannot be taken up before the Tribunal.

Held:

(1) Since the plea of non-taxability of income is a purely legal ground which does not require any further investigation of facts, there is no bar on dealing with the said plea.

(2) Further, there is a merit in the argument that the very act of filing return of income by the AOP as far as co-ownership of house property is concerned has no income tax implications. This is because the income from house property is to be taxed as per sections 22 to 26. There is no support for the proposition that annual value of the property is to be determined in the course of the AOP itself. So far as the income from house property is concerned, the Act does not envisage that annual value of the co-owned property, upon being determined in the assessment of the AOP, is to be divided amongst the co-owners in predetermined ratio.

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Section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Registration under charitable institutions — Trust formed for propagating the knowledge of Vedas cannot be said to be benefiting only a particular community — Registration cannot be denied on this ground.

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29. 2011) 131 ITD 370 (Cochin) Kasyapa Veda Research Foundation v. CIT A.Y.: 2008-09. Dated: 28-4-2011

Section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Registration under charitable institutions — Trust formed for propagating the knowledge of Vedas cannot be said to be benefiting only a particular community — Registration cannot be denied on this ground.


Facts:

The assessee-trust filed an application u/s.12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 seeking registration as a charitable trust. It was formed for preaching and propagating the knowledge of Vedas. The Commissioner of Income-tax was of the opinion that the trust was not benefiting the public at large and was confined to only the Hindu community. He thus cancelled registration u/s.12A of the Income-tax Act. He further passed an order declaring the trust as religious trust.

Held:

There is a very thin line of difference so as to identify whether the nature of activity is a charitable one or a religious one. The assessee-trust was formed to propagate and spread the knowledge of Vedas and Vedanta amongst the public so that they can change their living habits and take the necessary steps for the betterment of humanity. This would not only help the common public to improve their current status but also would enhance their ability to think about the humanity as a whole. The overall appeal of Vedas and its contents are universal and a representation of religious scriptures. The whole purpose of imparting education in Vedas is to promote the behavioural patterns of the people. Also as mentioned in the Trust deed, the other activities are pure charitable in nature. Thus, the assessee-trust was thus allowed a status of charitable trust.

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Section 11 of the Income-tax Act — Accumulation @ 15% should be calculated on the gross income and before deducting other expenses.

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28. (2011) 131 ITD 335 (Luck.) Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. DCIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 7-6-2010

Section 11 of the Income-tax Act — Accumulation 15% should be calculated on the gross income and before deducting other expenses.


Facts:

The assessee-trust has earned total receipts of Rs. 1.32 crore as per their books of accounts. As per the provisions of section 11 of the Act, it accumulated 15% of the receipts and claimed as an exemption. However, the AO computed exemption @ 15% after deducting administrative expenses.

Held:

According to section 11(a) of the Act, income derived from the property held by the trust and applied for religious or charitable purposes will be exempt. Where any income is accumulated, exemption to the extent of fifteen percentage of the said income will be available. The assessee-trust calculated the exemption on the basis of gross income received from the property. As per the AO and the CIT(A) the exemption should be calculated after deducting the expenses incurred for charitable purposes. Relying on the decision of CIT v. Programme for Community Organisation, (248 ITR 1) (SC) it was held that the exemption of 15% must be taken on the gross income and not on net income as determined for income tax purposes.

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Section 22 r.w.s 28(1) — Principle of res judicata though not applicable to income tax proceedings, principle of consistency applicable and in absence of any change of circumstances or non-consideration of material facts or statutory provisions, Department cannot change the stand taken in earlier years.

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27. (2011) 131 ITD 171 (Luck.)ACIT v. Harbilas Cold Storage and Food ProductsA.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 12-11-2010

Section 22 r.w.s 28(1) — Principle of  res judicata though not applicable to income tax proceedings, principle of consistency is applicable and in absence of any change of circumstances or non-consideration of material facts or statutory provisions, Department cannot change the stand taken in earlier years.


Facts:

(1) The assessee was engaged in carrying on business of running cold storage till 1989. Thereafter, the assessee made some alterations and additions in cold storage building and rented out certain portions for use as warehouse and office.

(2) The rent income was offered by the assessee as income under the head income from house property and the same was accepted by the Department in all earlier assessment years. Further, there was no change in facts in the year under consideration as compared to earlier years.

(3) However for the assessment year under consideration, the AO treated the income as profits and gains from business and profession on the ground that the assessee was not just letting property, but also providing various facilities.

(4) On appeal filed by the assessee, the CIT(A) held that the income is chargeable under the head income from house property only, thus allowing the appeal filed by the assessee.

 (5) Against the order of the CIT(A), the Department filed appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:

 (1) Though principle of res judicata is not applicable in tax proceedings, the principle of consistency is applicable as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Radhasoami Satsang (100 CTR 267) and the Jurisdictional High Court in case of Goel Builders (supra).

(2) Where an issue is decided either in one manner or other and the same has not been challenged by either of the parties, it would not be appropriate to change the position in subsequent years.

(3) The Department has got the right to depart from its earlier practice only on change of circumstances or non-consideration of material facts or statutory provisions.

(4) In the present case, no new facts have been brought on record by the AO so as to justify departure from the earlier stand taken by the Department.

(5) Thus, appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.

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Reassessment: Sections 143(3), 147 and 148: A.Y. 2004-05: Original assessment u/s.143(3): Notice u/s.148 beyond 4 years: No allegation in the reasons of failure on the part of the assessee to state fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment: Reopening not valid.

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38. Reassessment: Sections 143(3), 147 and 148: A.Y. 2004-05: Original assessment u/s.143(3): Notice u/s.148 beyond 4 years: No allegation in the reasons of failure on the part of the assessee to state fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment: Reopening not valid.
[Shriram Foundry Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, 250 CTR 116 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05, the original assessment was made u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently, on 10-2-2011 i.e., beyond the period of 4 years, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.148 for reopening the assessment. The reasons recorded for reopening are as under: “You have claimed a melting loss in excess of 7.24%, which is higher than what is found in the similar line of business. So the melting loss earlier allowed is excess.” Objections filed by the assessee were rejected. Thereafter the assessee filed a writ petition challenging the reopening.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 “(i) The original assessment was completed u/s.143(3). The assessment is sought to be reopened beyond a period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The jurisdictional condition is that in such case, before an assessment can be validly reopened, there must be a failure on the part of the assessee to state fully and truly all the material facts necessary for the assessment.

 (ii) There is no such allegation in the reasons which have been disclosed to the assessee. The Assessing Officer has purported to reopen the assessment only recording that according to him the melting loss of 7.24% which was claimed by the assessee is higher than what is found in a similar line of business. This ex facie would amount merely to a change of opinion.

 (iii) The reopening of the assessment u/s.148 is not valid. The consequential assessment order dated 30-12-2011 would have to be quashed and set aside.”

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Presumptive income: Section 44AE: A.Y. 2001- 02: Transporters: Section 44AE stipulates tax on presumptive income, which may be more or less than actual income: Assessee is not required to maintain any account books: No addition could be made as income from other sources on ground that assessee was not able to explain discrepancies in account books.

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37. Presumptive income: Section 44AE: A.Y. 2001- 02: Transporters: Section 44AE stipulates tax on presumptive income, which may be more or less than actual income: Assessee is not required to maintain any account books: No addition could be made as income from other sources on ground that assessee was not able to explain discrepancies in account books.
[CIT v. Nitin Soni, (2012) 21 Taxman.com 447 (All.)]

The assessee, a proprietor of transport business possessed eight trucks. In the income-tax return for the A.Y. 2001-02, he disclosed income u/s.44AE. The Assessing Officer made additions to the income of the assessee on ground that the assessee did not have sufficient withdrawals to explain as to how he had been meeting daily expenses. He held that the assessee must have got income from other sources. The Tribunal deleted the addition holding that it could not be treated as income from other sources.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

(i) Section 44AE inserted by the Finance Act, 1994 provides special provision for computing profits and gains of business of plying, hiring or leasing goods carriages. It opens with an non obstante clause by giving an overriding effect over sections 28 to 43C, in the case of an assessee who owns not more than ten goods carriages. Income of such assessee chargeable to the tax under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ shall be deemed to be the aggregate of the profits and gains, from all the goods carriages owned by him in the previous year, computed in accordance with the provisions of s.s (2).

(ii) The very purpose and idea of enactment of provision like section 44AE is to provide hassle-free proceedings. Such provisions are made just to complete the assessment without further probing provided the conditions laid down in such enactments are fulfilled. The presumptive income, which may be less or more, is taxable. Such an assessee is not required to maintain any account books. This being so, even if, its actual income in a given case, is more than income calculated as per s.s (2) of section 44AE, cannot be taxed. (iii) Thus, it follows the query of the Assessing Officer as to how the assessee met his daily expenses, there being no withdrawal and conclusion of additional income was uncalled for. (iv) The addition made by the Assessing Officer due to increase in the capital cannot be taxed u/s.56 as income from other sources as the accretion, if any, in the capital is relatable to profit from transport business of the assessee. A reading of the assessment order would show that the addition was made on account of excess generation of income of the assessee from the goods carriages business, u/s.56.”

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Method of accounting: Hybrid system: Section 145: A.Y. 1991-92: Amendment of Incometax Act w.e.f. 1-4-1997 not permitting hybrid system: Assessee can follow hybrid system in A.Y. 1991-92: Amendment of Companies Act in 1988 not permitting hybrid system: Not applicable.

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36. Method of accounting: Hybrid system: Section 145: A.Y. 1991-92: Amendment of Income tax Act w.e.f. 1-4-1997 not permitting hybrid system: Assessee can follow hybrid system in A.Y. 1991-92: Amendment of Companies Act in 1988 not permitting hybrid system: Not applicable.
[Pradip Chemical P. Ltd. v. CIT, 344 ITR 171 (Cal.)]

 For the A.Y. 1991-92, the assessee-company had followed hybrid system of accounting for the purpose of computation of income. The Assessing Officer discarded the hybrid system and adopted the mercantile system and made addition. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) The method of accounting referred to section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, prior to its substitution by the Finance Act, 1995. w.e.f. 1-4-1997, included hybrid or mixed systems of accounting and it was open to a company-assessee to follow the cash system of accounting in respect of a particular source of income and the mercantile system in respect of the others.

(ii) The provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, are meant for the requirement of the 1956 Act and in case of infraction thereof necessary consequences as provided in the 1956 Act itself follows. Section 209 of the 1956 Act does not have overriding effect over any other law, nor has the 1956 Act elsewhere provided that the provisions of the 1956 Act have overriding effect over income-tax and fiscal statutes.

(iii) The Tribunal was not right in holding that for the A.Y. 1991-92, the assessee could not follow the cash system for accounting for its interest income and in upholding the assessment of interest income on accrual basis.”

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 129, dated 21-5-2012 — Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings.

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This Circular provides that:

(i) The current Net Overnight Open Position Limit (NOOPL) of banks as applicable to the positions involving Rupee as one of the currencies will not include the positions undertaken in the Currency Futures/Options segment in the exchanges.

(ii) The positions in the exchanges (both Futures and Options) cannot be netted/offset by undertaking positions in the OTC market and vice versa. The positions initiated in the exchanges mt be liquidated/closed in the exchanges only.

(iii) The position limit for the Banks in the exchanges for trading Currency Futures and Options will be US INR6,265 million or 15% of the outstanding open interest, whichever is lower.

Further, Banks, whose positions are not in line with the above requirements, are required to bring down their positions to the above limits by June 30, 2012.

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SEBI AMENDS GUIDELINES TO SETTLE VIOLATIONS — Complex Provisions Make Professional Help Inevitable

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SEBI has recently, on 25th May 2012, made significant amendments to its guidelines for settlement of violations. In the process, they have made them so complex that, from the initial do-it-yourself simple scheme, now the new Scheme has made involving lawyers and accountants almost inevitable. There are several positive changes though and particularly some of the major criticisms of the earlier scheme have been addressed.

To recollect, in 2007, SEBI had introduced guidelines for settlement of alleged violations through consent orders and, in case of prosecution, through compounding. The Scheme was very simple and widely framed in its drafting and implementation. Any violation at any stage of punitive proceedings (or, even without proceedings) could be settled. The arbiter of what should be the agreed terms of settlement was an independent Committee (called High-Powered Advisory Committee or HPAC) though, being a voluntary settlement, obviously both sides had to agree. The settlement was usually very swift in practice, the procedures being so simple that even an educated layman could apply for it — and many did. Even the HPAC was co-operative in this regard and, in fact, as an unwritten rule, legal arguments and submissions were neither required, nor generally entertained though a fair and patient hearing was granted. Simple and brief orders were passed so that the spirit of the Settlement Scheme was upheld and a person who has not been held guilty was not seemed to be held guilty by the settlement order.

But, as was almost inevitable, the seeds of malaise were in the simplicity of the Scheme itself and serious concerns were raised. A major concern was that serious violations got settled and the stringent and exemplary punishment required in some cases was avoided through monetary penalties, even if those that appeared to be large. The settlement process was also felt to be opaque. Wide differences in settlement amounts were observed with no reason expressed explaining this and the brief orders giving no further clues. Settlement proceedings were sometimes felt to be used for delaying the regular proceedings. Inevitably, allegations — though unsubstantiated — of corruption were also made.

SEBI has taken the experience and criticism both of 5 years seriously — perhaps too seriously. Several types of serious violations have been put on the negative list though a small window of discretion even for such violations has been kept open. Many of the actual procedural details of the internal process of settlement have been formalised and made transparent. The time limits of making the application — both the earliest and the last dates — have been specified. A significant amendment is the introduction of a very detailed and fairly complicated method of determining what would be the amount at which a particular type of violation having the specified features would be settled. This is obviously to partly remove the discretion involved. On the other hand, it makes the settlement process complex requiring professional help unavoidable. The process itself becomes mechanical which to some extent is antithesis of a settlement process.

Let us consider some important amendments proposed.
First is the negative list of those violations for which settlement is not permitted. But before we examine some of important items in this list, some thoughts on what is the purpose of the settlement process. The objective of settlement is quite obviously to shorten the proceedings for investigating and punishing violations of securities laws. SEBI is benefitted as it saves time and costs, has the benefit of not having to prove the violation in accordance with due process of law and often also has the benefit of the party’s cooperation. Importantly, a punishment — even if lower than what could have been levied if the allegation had been proved — is also meted out. The party accused also saves on time and costs, gets benefit of a lower penalty and also does not have a stigma of a past violation attached, at least on record. Thus, the settlement process is — or, I think, ought to be — a consideration of how the inter- ests of justice and capital markets would be achieved on the facts of the case — a careful balance between the benefit of further proceedings with attached costs and delays and the likelihood of the accused going scot-free.

The offence of Insider trading is now prohibited from being settled. There was strong criticism that inside traders were getting away by settling their cases. Insider trading is in many ways an evil of capital markets. The perpetrator takes advantage of the trust reposed on him as an insider. He makes profits illegitimately by this trust. While some argue that it is a victimless crime, I believe that other shareholders usually do pay the cost. The need to punish such perpetrators is justifiable. However, the fair criticism of disallowing settlement is that insider trading is rather difficult to investigate and prove on facts though SEBI has put in a series of deeming provisions to make up. Prohibiting settlement of allegation of insider trading means that the long process of establishing it will have to be followed in all cases. It would have made better sense to put a higher settlement amount in such cases than an absolute ban. To clarify, though, violation of insider trading cannot be settled, other violations of the insider trading Regulations such as delay/default in disclosures, etc. can be settled.

Serious fraudulent and unfair trade practices causing substantial losses to investors and/or affecting their rights cannot be settled. However, if the person makes good the losses to the investors, the case can be settled. These perhaps constitute the single largest of violations, but a more detailed analysis would be beyond the scope of this article. But suffice is to say that words such as ‘serious’, ‘substantial’, etc. are not defined and may lead to discretion.

Failure to make an open offer under the Takeover Regulations cannot be settled except where (i) the entity is willing to make an offer unless, in the opinion of SEBI, the open offer will not be in interest of shareholders or (ii) where SEBI has decided to refer the matter to adjudication.

Front running transactions also now cannot be settled. As is known, front running transactions involve trading in anticipation of information about impending large orders. As held in some earlier cases, persons connected with mutual funds, who came to know the impending large orders of the mutual funds, traded ahead (or shared such information) and the mutual fund’s investors thus had to buy/sell at a little adverse price because of the earlier orders so placed. Strangely, SEBI defines front running here — which is inappropriate since the law does not define this term — as placing or using non-public information on an impending transaction of substantial quantity. Generally, front running is understood to be a situation where a person in a position of trust having access to non-public information uses this information to carry out front running. The analogy is of an insider. And just as having unpublished information and trading on it does not necessarily make a person guilty of insider trading, the same way a person not connected with such an institution but who still in some way has information of impending large transactions cannot necessarily be held to be guilty of front running.
Other violations on the negative list include net asset value manipulation by mutual funds, failure to redress investor grievances, failure to comply with orders of specified SEBI officers, failure to comply with orders of summons, etc.

However, interestingly, discretion has been retained to settle cases even amongst the negative list, though no criteria has been laid down how such discretion will be exercised.

Another important amendment is that now time limits are specified for making the application.

First time limit is how early can the consent application be made. It is now provided that an application cannot be made before the investigation/inspection of the alleged default is complete. Earlier, the Guidelines provided that that the application could be made at any stage, but in case of serious and intentional violation, the settlement would not be made till the fact-finding process was complete. This was a sensible provision. If a person is coming forward voluntarily, then unless SEBI had indication that more violations could be detected, the matter should be taken up. An important purpose of settlement is to shorten the proceedings.

Second time limit is specification of the last date the application for settlement should be made. The earlier Guidelines had no last date. It is now provided that the application cannot be made more than sixty days from the date of serving the show-cause notice. This would sound fair. Sixty days for examining the show-cause notice, which is expected to be comprehensive, are sufficient to decide whether one wants to fight further or come forward and settle. A concern is whether the time taken for obtaining information and documents relied on in the notice but not provided upfront should be taken (though the law requires such information/documents be provided upfront, some times this is not done). However, there is discretion for extending this last date, if the delay is beyond the control of the applicant.

Repetitive consent applications are now restricted. If an alleged default takes place within two years of the last consent order, then that default cannot be settled through these Guidelines. Further, if two consent orders are already obtained, then no further applications can be made for a period of three years from the date of the last consent order. Strangely, a consent application/order once made for a certain violation, will bar consent order in the above manner for even any other type of violation. This is unlike, say, the Reserve Bank of India Regulations for compounding where restrictions are placed for repetitive compounding of ‘similar’ contraventions. Thus, one would have to be very careful in making a consent application.

A lump-sum non-refundable fee of Rs.5000 is now provided to be paid. This amount is irrespective of the amount involved in the alleged violation or its gravity.

The process of settlement has been changed. The applicant has to first appear before an internal committee of SEBI who will work out the terms of consent in accordance with the formula. These terms will then be forward to the HPAC for its recommendation. Finally, these recommendations of the HPAC will be sent to a Panel of two Whole-time Members of SEBI who will take a final decision and if they deem fit, increase or decrease the terms or reject the application. However, it is provided that this whole process should be ‘preferably’ completed within six months of registration of the consent application. While this period of six months may sound short, it may be recollected that in actual practice, earlier, the process used to be completed much earlier in many cases.

There is an elaborate and complex formula provided for determining the settlement amount. The formula is too detailed to be within the scope of this short article. Suffice is to say that the formula considers the stage at which the application is made, the nature of the violation, etc. and provides for quantitative parameters to determine the settlement amount. Clearly, this is to make the settlement more transparent and remove discretion and discrimination. Minimum amounts have also been provided depending upon the nature of the violation or the alleged perpetrator.

It has been stated — though with some ambiguity — that the minimum settlement amount for first-time applicants will be Rs.5 lac and in case of ‘name-lenders’, this minimum will be Rs.2 lac. Curiously, the minimum amount for second-time applicants is not specified. This minimum limit is strange and perhaps even inequitable. Firstly, even orders passed with due process by SEBI for minor offences have fine far less than Rs.5 lac. Secondly, this would obviously hit persons having made less serious violation. Serious violations even otherwise would be settled for, or punished with, higher amount.

Another common complaint was that the formal orders published do not bring out the facts properly and were too brief and opaque. Thus, one could not know what were the merits of the case and whether the case was fairly settled. To meet this criticism, on the one hand, as explained above, to a large extent, the discretion is diluted. On the other hand, it is now provided that the order shall be more detailed in specific matters including the facts and circumstances of the case. It will have to be seen though how much detailed the orders are in actual practice.

In conclusion, the experience of five years is brought out well in the amendments. While one will miss the simplicity of the earlier provisions and lament the complex new law requiring the need of professional help, it will be also fair to say that the earlier provisions were too simplistic. Where the basic matter itself is complex, the settlement has to be complex. A professional analysis of a complex matter is a must for fair and transparent dealing on both sides. One hopes though that in practice, the amendments are implemented in their true spirit, since the earlier Scheme, despite its short-comings, did set an enviable benchmark to settlement proceedings in India.

Reducing vulnerabilities crucial for emerging economies: RBI Governor Rajan

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Emerging economies like India have to work towards reducing vulnerabilities in their economies, said Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor Raghuram Rajan.

Lower interest rates and tax incentives can boost investments, he said, but consumer demand holds the key for economic growth.

“Emerging economies have to work to reduce vulnerabilities in their economies, to get to the point where, like Australia or Canada, they can allow exchange rate flexibility to do much of the adjustment for them to capital inflows,” said Rajan in his speech to the Economic Club of New York.

However, it takes time to develop the required institutions. In the meantime, the difficulty for emerging markets in absorbing large amounts of capital quickly and in a stable way should be seen as a constraint, much like the zero lower bound, rather than something that can be altered quickly, said the RBI governor. Due to this, he said, even while resisting the temptation of absorbing flows, emerging markets will look for safety nets. In the past, India has been attracting large foreign flows in domestic markets.

“We also need better international safety nets. And each one of us has to work hard in our own countries to develop a consensus for free trade, open markets, and responsible global citizenry. If we can achieve all this even as the recent economic events make us more parochial and inward-looking, we will truly have set the stage for the strong sustainable growth we all desperately need,” Rajan said.

Rajan also nudged international organisations like the International Monetary Fund to re-examine the “rules of the game” for a responsible policy. “No matter what a central bank’s domestic mandate, international responsibilities should not be ignored. The IMF should analyse each new unconventional monetary policy (including sustained unidirectional exchange rate intervention), and based on their effects and the agreed rules of the game, declare them in- or out-of-bound,” he added.

According to Rajan, the current non-system in international monetary policy is a source of substantial risk, both to sustainable growth and to the financial sector. “It is not an industrial country problem, nor an emerging market problem, it is a problem of collective action. We are being pushed towards competitive monetary easing and musical crises.” There is a need for stronger well-capitalised multilateral institutions with widespread legitimacy, some of which can provide patient capital and others that can monitor new rules of the game, said Rajan. The governor said industrial countries should export to emerging markets as a way to bolster growth. This is because they have done so in the past, too.

(Source: Article by Mr. Raghuram Rajan, RBI Governor, in ‘Business Standard’ dated 19-05-2015.)

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Technological disruption – How to ride out the apocalypse – IT services firms are facing fatal disruption. They need to be utterly committed to the shift.

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Kodak. Digital Equipment. Sun Microsystems. Nokia. Blackberry. These are but a small sample of once-great companies devastated by technological disruption. Even mighty Microsoft and Intel are struggling to reinvent themselves and stay relevant in a phone-first world. There are vital lessons in these stories for India’s vaunted IT services companies.

It is easy — and wrong — to assume that the companies that get disrupted were poorly managed. Disruptive changes are like big storms. They build up slowly and then break with terrifying ferocity.

So it’s quite easy to spot the brewing disruption. Take Kodak. Kodak developed the world’s first digital camera in 1975. It held all the most important patents pertaining to digital imaging. It realised the potential impact digital photography would have on its enormously lucrative film franchise. In 2005, Kodak was the leader in digital cameras. But they failed to ride the tiger and eventually failed.

The story is similar with Nokia, which launched one of the world’s first smartphones, the N Series Communicator in 1995, but understood too late that with the iPhone, the game shifted from devices to competition between ecosystems. These companies had market leadership, enormous resources, most of the technology and many smart managers. They saw the approaching disruption, yet failed to cross the chasm.

One factor why companies find it hard to navigate industry disruptions is complacence, even arrogance. When a company is sitting on billions of dollars of cash, fat margins and a good market share, it’s hard to create a sense of urgency in the organisation and with its shareholders.

Another factor is the ‘gravitational pull’ of the current or legacy business. The need to deliver quarterly earnings, serve existing customers, maintain profit margins, manage the many daily operational challenges, all consume the majority of resources and senior management attention. Too little focus goes towards embracing the brewing disruption.

A third reason is the fear of cannibalisation. The new model is, at least initially, much less profitable than the current business and so there is a big fear of margin dilution.

Microsoft’s cloud services, for instance, have nowhere near the profitability of its old Windows and Office businesses. However, some margin is much better than zero margin.

The new business model usually requires a very different mindset and new capabilities. In the IT services business, for example, success requires the ability to hold a proactive conversation with CEOs and CXOs about the digital transformation of their business, rather than simply responding to project requests for proposals (RFPs) issued by the IT department. Building these capabilities is nontrivial and time-consuming. Finally, there is governance. Though the boards of good companies are populated by accomplished leaders, few boards have independent directors with a visceral grasp of the magnitude of impending changes. It is all too easy then to remain focused on revenue growth and earnings per share until it’s too late.

One obvious sign of this is to look at how the CEO is compensated. All too often, it is based on the financial performance of the legacy business rather than the momentum of the future business model.

Until, of course, it is too late. India’s extraordinary IT services companies face just such a transition today. What can be done? First and foremost, strategic transformation must be the top priority of the boards of companies facing disruption. Strategy cannot simply be left to the CEO and management.

It has to be a collaborative endeavour. Second, make it clear that the CEO’s top priority is the strategic transformation, not merely delivering the quarter and align compensation accordingly.

Third, realise that there are two kinds of risk: the risk of omission, or doing nothing versus the risk of commission, or trying something different. The risk of commission is better than doing nothing and the urgency and consequences of failure are such that there should be no half-measures.

A significant reason why Kodak and others failed is because their responses to disruption were halfhearted or anaemic. This won’t work. To succeed, companies have to be ‘all-in’ or utterly committed to the shift.

This may mean making significant acquisitions, or bringing in very different talent, even though these moves have major risk and can blow up too. In nature, it is not the strongest species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the ones most adaptable to change.

(Source: Article by Mr Ravi Venkatesan in ‘The Economic Times’ dated 19-05-2015. The writer is a member of the board of Infosys and former chairman, Microsoft India)

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[2015-TIOL-1085-CESTAT-MUM] Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-ii vs. Syntel Sterling Bestshores Solutions Pvt. Ltd

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Input services without which the quality and efficiency of output services exported cannot be achieved are eligible for refund.

Facts:
The
Respondent is a BPO rendering services to the clients based abroad. A
refund claim was filed in respect of service tax paid on rent-a-cab
service, telephone service and rent. Adjudicating authority denied the
claim. On appeal, the first appellate authority allowed the refund
claim, aggrieved by which revenue is in appeal.

Held:
The
Tribunal relied upon the CBEC’s Circular No. 120/01/2010-ST dated
19/01/2010 which specifically provides that essential services used by
Call Centres for provision of their output service would qualify as
input services eligible for taking CENVAT credit as well as refund. It
further held that the expression ‘used in’ in the CENVAT Credit Rules
should be interpreted in a harmonious manner and accordingly as the
input services disallowed were essential to provide quality output
services, the refund should be granted.

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Refund – Self-assessment tax – Interest – Sections 140A, 244A(1)(a),(b) and 264 – A. Y. 1994-95 – Excess amount paid as tax on self-assessment – Interest payable from date of payment to date of refund of the amount

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Stock Holding Corporation of India Ltd vs. CIT; 373 ITR 282 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 1994-95, the Assessing Officer did not pay interest u/s. 244A in respect of the excess amount paid by the petitioner as self assessment tax. The petitioner’s application u/s. 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the Commissioner.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

“i) The requirement to pay interest arises whenever an amount is refunded to the assessee as it is a kind of compensation for use and retention of money collected by the Revenue.

ii) Circular No. 549 dated 31/10/1989, makes it clear that if refund is out of any tax other than out of advance tax or tax deducted at source, interest shall be payable from the date of payment of tax till the date of grant of refund. The circular even remotely did not suggest that interest is not payable by the Department on self-assessment tax.

iii) The tax paid on self-assessment would fall u/s. 244A(1)(b). The provisions of section 244A(1)(b) very clearly mandate that the Revenue would pay interest on the amount refunded for the period commencing from the date payment of tax is made to the Revenue up to the date when refund is granted by the Revenue. Thus, the submission that the interest is payable not from the date of payment but from the date of demand notice u/s. 156 could not be accepted as otherwise the legislation would have so provided in section 244A(1)(b), rather than having provided from the date of payment of the tax. Therefore, the interest was payable u/s. 244A(1)(b) on the refund of excess amount paid as tax on self-assessment u/s. 140A.”

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Search and seizure – Block assessment – Assessment of third person – For the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the assessing officer before he transmits the records to the other assessing officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act;

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CIT vs. Calcutta Knitwears
(2014) 362 ITR 673 (SC)

A search operation u/s. 132 of the Act was carried out in two premises of the Bhatia Group, namely, M/s. Swastik Trading Company and M/s. Kavita International Company on 05-02-2003 and certain incriminating documents pertaining to the respondent assessee firm engaged in manufacturing hosiery goods in the name and style of M/s. Calcutta Knitwears were traced in the said search.

After completion of the investigation by the investigating agency and handing over of the documents to the assessing authority, the assessing authority had completed the block assessments in the case of Bhatia Group. Since certain other documents did not pertain to the person searched u/s. 132 of the Act, the assessing authority thought it fit to transmit those documents, which according to him, pertain to the “undisclosed income” on account of investment element and profit element of the assessee firm and require to be assessed u/s. 158BC read with section 158BD of the Act to another assessing authority in whose jurisdiction the assessments could be completed. In doing so, the assessing authority had recorded his satisfaction note dated 15-07-2005.

The jurisdictional assessing authority for the respondentassessee had issued the show cause notice u/s. 158BD for the block period 01-04-1996 to 05-02-2003, dated 10- 02-2006 to the assessee inter alia directing the assessee to show cause as to why should the proceedings u/s. 158BC not be completed. After receipt of the said notice, the assessee firm had filed its return u/s. 158BD for the said block period declaring its total income as Nil and further filed its reply to the said notice challenging the validity of the said notice u/s. 158BD, dated 08-03-2006. The assessee had taken the stand that the notice issued to the assessee is (a) in violation of the provisions of section 158BD as the conditions precedent have not been complied with by the assessing officer and (b) beyond the period of limitation as provided for u/s. 158BE read with section 158BD and therefore, no action could be initiated against the assessee and accordingly, requested the assessing officer to drop the proceedings.

The assessing authority, after due consideration of the reply filed to the show cause notice, had rejected the aforesaid stand of the assessee and assessed the undisclosed income as Rs. 21,76,916/- (Rs.16,05,744/- (unexplained investment) and Rs. 5,71,172/- (profit element)) by order dated 08-02-2008. The assessing officer was of the view that section 158BE of the Act did not provide for any limitation for issuance of notice and completion of the assessment proceedings u/s.158BD of the Act and therefore a notice could be issued even after completion of the proceedings of the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act.

Disturbed by the orders passed by the assessing officer, the assessee firm had carried the matter in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeal- II) (for short ‘the CIT(A)’. The CIT(A), while rejecting the stand of the assessee in respect of validity of notice issued u/s. 158BD, had partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee firm and deleted the additions made by the assessing officer in its assessments, by his order dated 27-08-2008.

The Revenue had carried the matter further by filing appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’) and the assessee has filed cross objections therein. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties to the lis, had rejected the appeal of the Revenue and observed that recording of satisfaction by the assessing officer as contemplated u/s. 158BD was on a date subsequent to the framing of assessment u/s. 158BC in case of the searched person, that is, beyond the period prescribed u/s. 158BE(1)(b) and thereby the notice issued u/s. 158BD was belated and consequently the assumption of jurisdiction by the assessing authority in the impugned block assessment would be invalid.

Aggrieved by the order so passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue had carried the matter in appeal u/s. 260A of the Act before the High Court. The High Court, by its impugned judgment and order dated 20-07-2010, had rejected the Revenue’s appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal.

On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that section 158BD of the Act is a machinery provision and inserted in the statute book for the purpose of carrying out assessments of a person other than the searched person u/s. 132 or 132A of the Act. U/s. 158BD of the Act, if an officer is satisfied that there exists any undisclosed income which may belong to a other person other than the searched person u/s. 132 or 132A of the Act, after recording such satisfaction, may transmit the records/ documents/chits/papers etc., to the assessing officer having jurisdiction over such other person. After receipt of the aforesaid satisfaction and upon examination of the said other documents relating to such other person, the jurisdictional assessing officer may proceed to issue a notice for the purpose of completion of the assessments u/s. 158BD of the Act, the other provisions of XIV-B shall apply.

The opening words of section 158BD of the Act are that the assessing officer must be satisfied that “undisclosed income” belongs to any other person other than the person with respect to whom a search was made u/s.132 of the Act or a requisition of books were made u/s. 132A of the Act and thereafter, transmit the records for assessment of such other person. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court the short question that fell for its consideration and decision was at what stage of the proceedings should the satisfaction note be prepared by the assessing officer: Whether at the time of initiating proceedings u/s. 158BC for the completion of the assessments of the searched person u/s. 132 and 132A of the Act or during the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act or after completion of the proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal and the High Court were of the opinion that it could only be prepared by the assessing officer during the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act and not after the completion of the said proceedings. The Courts below had relied upon the limitation period provided in section 158BE(2)(b) of the Act in respect of the assessment proceedings initiated u/s. 158BD, i.e., two years from the end of the month in which the notice under Chapter XIV-B was served on such other person in respect of search initiated or books of account or other documents or any assets are requisitioned on or after 01-01-1997.

The Supreme Court held that before initiating proceedings u/s. 158BD of the Act, the assessing officer who has initiated proceedings for completion of the assessments u/s. 158BC of the Act should be satisfied that there is an undisclosed income which has been traced out when a person was searched u/s. 132 or the books of accounts were requisitioned u/s. 132A of the Act. U/s. 158BD the existence of cogent and demonstrative material is germane to the assessing officers’ satisfaction in concluding that the seized documents belong to a person other than the searched person is necessary for initiation of action u/s. 158BD. The bare reading of the provision indicated that the satisfaction note could be prepared by the assessing officer either at the time of initiating proceedings for completion of assessment of a searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act or during the stage of the assessment proceedings. According to the Supreme  Court,  it  did not mean that after completion of the assessment, the assessing officer could not prepare the satisfaction note to the effect that there exists income belonging to any person other than the searched person in respect of whom a search was made u/s. 132 or requisition of books of accounts were made u/s. 132A of the Act. The language of the provision is clear and unambiguous. The legislature has not imposed any embargo on the assessing officer in respect of the stage of proceedings during which the satisfaction is to be reached and recorded in respect of the person other than the searched person.

Further, section 158BE(2)(b) only provides for the period of limitation for completion of block assessment u/s. 158BD in case of the person other than the searched person as two years from the end of the month in which the notice under this Chapter was served on such other person in respect of search carried on after 01-01-1997. According to the Supreme Court, the said section does neither provides for nor imposes any restrictions or conditions on the period of limitation for preparation of the satisfaction note u/s. 158BD and consequent issuance of notice to the other person.

In the result, the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the assessing officer before he transmits the records to the other assessing officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act; (b) along with the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act; and (c) immediately after the assessment proceedings are completed u/s. 158BC of the Act of the searched person.

A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 54, dated 26-5-2010 — Remittance towards partici-pation in lottery, money circulation schemes, other fictitious offers of cheap funds, etc.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA

60 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 54, dated  26-5-2010 —
Remittance towards partici-pation in lottery, money circulation schemes, other
fictitious offers of cheap funds, etc.

This Circular reiterates that remittance from India in any
form towards participation in lottery schemes existing under different names,
like money circulation scheme or remittances for the purpose of securing prize
money/awards, etc. is prohibited under FEMA.

It also clarifies that any person resident in India
collecting and effecting/remitting such payments directly/indirectly outside
India will be liable for prosecution for contravention of FEMA as well as
regulations relating to Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti Money Laundering
(AML) standards.

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Direct Tax Instruction No. 4, dated 25-5-2010 — F.No. 275/23/2007-IT(B) — Certificate of lower deduction for non-deduction of tax at source u/s.197 of the Income-tax Act — matter reg

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59 Direct Tax Instruction No. 4, dated 25-5-2010 — F.No.
275/23/2007-IT(B) — Certificate of lower deduction for non-deduction of tax at
source u/s.197 of the Income-tax Act — matter reg.

1. I am directed to bring to your notice on the subject of
issue of certificates u/s.197 that by Instruction No. 8/2006, dated 13-10-2006,
it was laid down that certificates for lower deduction or nil deduction of tax
at source u/s.197 are not to be issued indiscriminately and for issue of each
certificate, prior administrative approval of the concerned Range Head shall be
obtained by the AO. Subsequently, Instruction No. 7/2009, dated 23-12-2009 read
with letter F.No.275/23/2007-IT(B) dated 8-2-2010 has laid down monetary limits
for prior administrative approval of the CIT-TDS or DIT-Intl. Taxation, as the
case may be. Such certificates are normally being issued at present manually
rather than through the ITD system.

2. To maintain centralised data of issue of such certificates
and facilitate better processing of the TDS returns filed by the deductors and
in continuation to the above instructions, I am directed to communicate that
henceforth w.e.f. . . . . . . . the certificates u/s.197 shall be generated and
issued by the AO mandatorily through ITD system only.

3. In case due to certain reasons, it is not possible to
generate the certificate through the system on the date of its issue, the AO
shall upload the necessary data on the system within 7 days of the date of issue
(manually) of the certificate.

4. The manner of issue of certificate u/s.197 through the
system, uploading of data in situation covered in para 3 above and the prior
administrative approval by the Range Head and by the CIT-TDS/DIT-Intl. Taxation
is given in the enclosed Annexure for guidance of all concerned.

5. The content of the above Instruction may be brought to the
notice of all officers working in your charge for strict compliance.

Hindi version will follow.

Sd/-
Tajbir Singh
Under Secretary (Budget)

Annexure—Note for issue of certificate u/s.197 mandatorily
through the system – uploaded on website viz.
www.bcasonline.org


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DTAA between India and Botswana notified : Notification No. 70/2008, dated 18-6-2008

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44 DTAA between India and Botswana notified : Notification
No. 70/2008, dated 18-6-2008

This DTAA had been signed on 8 December, 2006 but was pending
notification in the official gazette. It has now been notified and made
effective from 1-4-2009.

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Revised Forms ITR-2, ITR-3, ITR-4, ITR-5, ITR-6, ITR-7 and ITR-V, are notified — Notification No. 33/2010/ F.No.142/12/2010-SO(TPL), dated 11-5-2010.

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58
Revised Forms ITR-2, ITR-3, ITR-4, ITR-5, ITR-6, ITR-7 and ITR-V, are notified —
Notification No. 33/2010/ F.No.142/12/2010-SO(TPL), dated 11-5-2010.

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Explanatory Notes to Finance (no. 2) Act, 2009—Circular No. 5, dated 3-6-2010.

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57 Explanatory Notes to Finance (no. 2) Act, 2009—Circular
No. 5, dated 3-6-2010.

Circular No. 5, dated 3rd June 2010 is issued containing
Explanatory Notes to the Provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009.


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Revised Discussion Paper on DTC—

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56 Revised Discussion Paper on DTC—

The draft Direct Taxes Code (DTC) along with a Discussion
Paper was released in August, 2009 for public comments.

After considering the inputs given by various organisations
and individuals, major issues have been identified and Revised Discussion Paper
on DTC is released. This Revised Discussion Paper is available on finmin.nic.in
and incometaxindia.gov.in.


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Industrial Park Scheme, 2008 amended — Notification No. 37, dated 21-5-2010.

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Industrial Park Scheme, 2008 is amended to extend the last
date of commencement of the industrial park to claim deduction under clause
(iii) of Ss.(4) of S. 80-IA from 31st of March 2009 to 31st March, 2011.



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Income-tax (5th Amendment) Rules, 2010 — Notification No. 38, dated 21-5-2010.

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The date by which an industrial undertaking, claiming
deduction u/s.80IA(4)(iii) develops, develops and operates or maintains and
operates an industrial park has been extended from 31st March 2009 to 31st
March, 2011.


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Gratuity Exemption Limit Enhanced—Notification No. 43, dated 11-6-2010.

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The exemption limit under S. 10(10)(iii) is increased to ten
lakh rupees in relation to gratuity received by employees who retire or become
incapacitated prior to such retirement or die on or after the 24th day of May,
2010 or whose employment is terminated on or after the said date.


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Income-tax (6th Amendment) Rules, 2010 — Notification No. 41/2010, dated 31-5-2010.

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Rules 30, 31, 31A, 31AA, 37CA and 37D have been substituted,
which provide for time and mode of payment of TDS/TCS to the Government account,
issue of certificate of TDS/TCS and filing of quarterly statements thereof. The
said rules shall apply in respect of tax deducted/collected on or after 1st
April, 2010. The major amendments include :


  • Revised forms of TDS
    certificates to include the receipt number of TDS return filed by the tax
    deductor, which along with the PAN of the deductee and the TAN of the deductor
    would form the unique identification, based on which credit for TDS would be
    available.

  • Even the Government
    authorities are now required to furnish a monthly return electronically in new
    Form 24G.

  • The due date of filing
    the TDS return for the last quarter of the financial year has been pre-poned
    from 15th June to 15th May and the due dates for furnishing the TDS
    certificates have also been modified to 15th May for Form 16 to be furnished
    annually and fifteen days from the date of submitting TDS certificates for
    other non-salary TDS certificates to be issued quarterly.



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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50, dated 3-6-2008 — Export of goods and services — Realisation of export proceeds — Liberalisation.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 

54 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50, dated
3-6-2008 — Export of goods and services — Realisation of export proceeds —
Liberalisation.

 

This Circular has enhanced the present period of realisation
and repatriation to India of the amount representing the full value of goods or
software exported from the present period of six months to twelve months from
the date of export. There has been no change in the period of realisation in
case of exports by an SEZ unit or exports to overseas warehouses.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48, dated 3-6-2008 — Overseas Investments — Liberalisation/Rationalisation.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 

53 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48, dated
3-6-2008 — Overseas Investments — Liberalisation/Rationalisation.

This Circular has further liberalised the provisions of
Notification No. FEMA 120/RB-2004, dated July 7, 2004 in the following cases :

1. Overseas Investment in Energy and Natural Resources
Sectors — Indian companies can invest in excess of 400 % of their net worth as
on the date of the last audited balance sheet, after obtaining prior approval
of RBI, in the energy and natural resources sectors such as oil, gas, coal and
mineral oil.

2. Investment in Overseas Unincorporated Entities in Oil
Sector :

(a) ONGC Videsh Limited and Oil India Limited are
permitted to invest in overseas unincorporated entities in oil sector (for
exploration and drilling for oil and natural gas, etc.) without any limits.

(b) Subject to certain conditions, Indian companies can
invest up to 400% of their net worth as on the date of the last audited
balance sheet in overseas unincorporated entities in the oil sector.
Investments in excess of 400% of their net worth require prior approval of
RBI.

 



In case of capitalisation of exports — the time limit for
obtaining prior approval of RBI has been aligned with the time limit provided
for in the Foreign Trade Policy. Thus, prior approval of RBI for capitalisation
of export proceeds will be required only where the exports remain outstanding
beyond the period of realisation prescribed by the Foreign Trade Policy.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 46, dated 2-6-2008 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) by Services Sector — Liberalisation.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 

52 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 46, dated
2-6-2008 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) by Services Sector —
Liberalisation.

This Circular permits borrowers in service sector viz.
hotels, hospitals and software companies to avail ECB up to US $ 100 million,
per financial year, under the approval route for the purpose of import of
capital goods. This is in addition to the existing facility for availing trade
credit up to US $ 20 million per import transaction, for a period of less than 3
years.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 44, dated 30-5-2008 — Reporting under FDI Scheme — Revised procedure.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 

51 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 44, dated
30-5-2008 — Reporting under FDI Scheme — Revised procedure.

This Circular has made the following changes in respect of
reporting the details of the issue of shares/convertible debentures :

1. Form FC-GPR has been revised.

2. A standard format for reporting receipt of monetary
consideration for issue of shares/convertible debentures has been prescribed.
Upon receipt of this report, the concerned Regional office of RBI will allot a
Unique Identification Number.

3. A format for KYC report on the non-resident investor
from the overseas bank remitting the amount has been prescribed. This report
has to be submitted along with the report of receipt of money.

4. The annual report of all investments will now have to be
submitted before July 31 every year instead of June 30.


 

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 43, dated 29-5-2008 — External Commercial Borrowings Policy — Liberalisation.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 


50 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 43, dated
29-5-2008 — External Commercial Borrowings Policy — Liberalisation.

Presently, borrowers proposing to avail ECB up to US $ 20
million for Rupee expenditure for permissible end-uses require prior approval of
the Reserve Bank under the approval route.

 

This Circular has relaxed the above limit of US $ 20 million
for Rupee expenditure under the approval route as under :

(i) Borrowers in infrastructure sector can avail ECB up to
US $ 100 million.

(ii) Other borrowers can avail ECB up to US $ 50 million.

 


The all-in-cost ceilings in respect of ECB have been revised,
with immediate effect, as under :

Maturity
period

All-in-cost ceiling over 6-month LIBOR for the respective
currency of credit or applicable benchmark

  Existing
Revised
Three years
and up to five years
150 basis
points
200 basis
points
More than five
years
250 basis
points
350 basis
points

 

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 42, dated 28-5-2008 — Trade credits for imports into India — Review of all-in-cost ceiling.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 

49 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 42, dated
28-5-2008 — Trade credits for imports into India — Review of all-in-cost
ceiling.

This Circular has revised the all-in-cost ceiling in respect
of Trade Credits, with immediate effect, as under :

Maturity
period

All-in-cost ceiling over 6-month LIBOR for the respective
currency of credit or applicable benchmark

  Existing
Revised
Up to one year
50 basis
points
75 basis
points
More than one
year up to three years 
125 basis
points
125 basis
points

 

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Processing of returns of A.Y. 2007-08 — Steps to clear the backlog — Instruction No. 6/2008, dated 18-6-2008 issued by CBDT.

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48 Processing of returns of A.Y. 2007-08 —
Steps to clear the backlog — Instruction No. 6/2008, dated 18-6-2008 issued by
CBDT.

Kindly refer to above. The issue of processing of pending
returns has been discussed by the Board and following decisions have been taken
in order to clear the backlog :

(i) It has been decided that all CCsIT (CCA) should
redeploy officers and staff to clear the backlog in high pendency charges
keeping in view the overall work load including pendency of scrutiny cases.
Concerned CCsIT may take recourse to outsourcing of data entry as per standing
instructions of the Board/Directorate of Systems on the subject. For this
purpose, necessary funds would be placed at the disposal of the CCIT (CCA) for
outsourcing of data entry. CCsIT (CCA) should send proposals to the
Directorate of Income-tax (Systems) for outsourcing of data entry.


(ii) It has also been decided that in order to clear the
backlog of I-T returns for A.Y. 2007-08 in networked stations, 2D based AST
Software would continue to be used for processing the returns in ITR 1, 2, 3,
4. For non-networked stations, TMS Software would continue to be used.


(iii) Non-networked stations using TMS Software would be
provided CDs with OLTAS data as was done previously by the RCC so that the
Assessing Officers could verify tax payments.


(iv) In all I-T returns for A.Y. 2007-08 where the
aggregate TDS claim does not exceed Rs.5 lakh and where the refund computed
does not exceed Rs.25,000, the TDS claim of tax payer should be accepted at
the time of processing of returns. In all remaining returns, the AO shall
verify the TDS claim from the deductor or assessee as the case may be, before
processing the return. In all cases selected for scrutiny, all TDS claims
should be verified. In all cases where PAN was earlier found to be duplicate
or bogus and in cases where TDS certificates were called for processing
returns for the A.Y. 2006-07 but were not produced, the credit for TDS shall
be given after full verification.


(v) The rules in AST Software for matching OLTAS data with
the claim for credit made in the return are being modified to take care of the
common data deficiencies.


(vi) It has also been decided to launch a time bound TDS
drive to make those deductors who have not filed their TDS returns for F.Y.
2006-07 do so. The CsIT in charge of TDS functions are requested to follow up
cases where TDS returns were filed but PAN of some deductors were not reported
in TDS returns even though the TDS deducted from such deductees exceeded Rs.l
lakh. Information relating to such deductors/deductees will be provided by DIT
(Systems). This drive is to be an intensive two month campaign which is to be
monitored weekly by the Board and has to be completed by 31-8-2008. This drive
should be followed up by a concerted effort in improving TDS compliance.
Proforma of sending compliance report after TDS verification shall be sent
separately by DIT (Systems), New Delhi.




 



 

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Procedure for selection of cases for ‘scrutiny’ for non-corporate assessees

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47 Procedure for selection of cases for
‘scrutiny’ for non-corporate assessees



In supersession of earlier instructions on the above subject,
the Board hereby lays down the following procedure for selection of
returns/cases of non-corporate assessees for scrutiny during the current
financial year i.e., 2007-08.

 

2. The following categories of cases shall be compulsorily
scrutinised :


(i) All assessments pertaining to search and seizure
cases.


(ii) All assessments pertaining to surveys conducted
u/s.133A of the Income-tax Act.


(iii)
1All returns where deduction
claimed under Chapter VIA of the Income-tax Act is Rs.25 lakhs or above in
stations other than the cities on computer network.


(iv) 1All returns, including those of non-residents,
where refund claimed is Rs.5 lakhs or above in stations other than the
cities on computer network.


(v) (a) All cases in which the CIT (Appeals) or ITAT
has confirmed an addition/disallowance of Rs.5 lakhs or above or if the
assessee has conceded an addition in any preceding assessment year and
identical issue is arising in the current year. But if the issue involves
a substantial question of law, the cases may be picked up for scrutiny,
irrespective of the quantum of tax involved. However, if the addition has
been deleted by a superior appellate authority and the Department has
accepted that decision, the case need not be taken up for scrutiny.

(b) All cases in which an appeal is pending before the
CIT (Appeals) against an addition/disallowance of Rs.5 lakhs or above, or
the Department has filed an appeal before the ITAT against the order of
the CIT (Appeals) deleting such an addition/disallowance and an identical
issue is arising in the current year. However, as in (i) above, the
quantum ceiling may not be taken into account if a substantial question of
law is involved.


(vi) All returns filed by statutory bodies, marketing
committees and other authorities assessable to income-tax.


(vii) All cases of banks and non-banking financial
institutions with deposits of Rs.5 crores and above.


(viii) Cases of universities, educational institutions,
hospitals, nursing homes and other institutions for rehabilitation of
patients (other than those which are substantially financed by the
Government), the aggregate annual receipts (including donations credited to
the corpus/ any other fund) of which exceed Rs.10 crores in Delhi, Mumbai,
Chennai, Kolkata, Pune, Hyderabad, Bangalore and Ahmedabad and Rs.5 crores
in other places [Ref. S. 10(23c) & Rule 2BC].


(ix) All cases where exemption is claimed u/s.11 of the
Income-tax Act and the gross receipts (including donations credited to the
corpus/ any other fund) exceed Rs.5 crores in Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai,
Kolkata, Pune, Hyderabad, Bangalore and Ahmedabad and Rs.1 crore in other
places.


(x) (a) All cases where total value of International
Transactions (as defined u/s.92B of the Income-tax Act) exceeds Rs.15
crores).

(b) In all other cases where the Transfer Pricing Audit
carried out in the earlier year had led to an adjustment/addition to the
total income.


(xi) All cases of stockbrokers and commodity brokers as
well as their sub-brokers where brokerage received is disclosed at Rs.1
crore or above.


(xii) All cases of stockbrokers and commodity brokers as
well as their sub-brokers where there are claims of bad debts of Rs.5 lakhs
or more.


(xiii) All cases of professionals with gross receipts of
Rs.20 lakhs or more if total income declared is less than 20% of gross
professional receipts.


(xiv) All cases of deductions u/s.10A, u/s.10AA,
u/s.10BA, u/s.10B of the Income-tax Act exceeding Rs.25 lakhs.


(xv) All cases of contractors (excluding transporters)
whose gross contractual receipts exceed Rs.1 crore if total income declared
from contract work is less than 5% of gross contractual receipts.


(xvi) All cases of builders following project completion
method.


(xvii) All cases in which fresh capital introduced during
the year exceeds Rs.50 lakhs in Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Pune,
Hyderabad, Bangalore and Ahmedabad and Rs.10 lakhs in other cities.


(xviii) ¹All cases in which new unsecured loan introduced
during the year exceeds Rs.25 lakhs.


(xix) All cases in which deduction u/s.80IA(4), u/s.80IB,
u/s.80IC, u/s.80JJA, u/s.80JJAA, u/s.80LA, u/s.10(21), u/s.10(22B), u/s.
10(23A), u/s.10(23B), u/s.10(23C), u/s.10 (23D), u/s.10(23EA), u/s.10(23FB),
u/s.10(23G), u/s.10(37), u/s.10A, u/s.10AA, u/s.10B, or u/s.10BA of the
Income-tax Act is claimed for the first time.


(xx) *All cases in which loss from house property is more
than Rs.2,50,000.


(xxi) *All cases in which investment in property is more
than five times the gross receipts (i.e., purchase of property (008
from AIR)/[Gross total income (746) + Agricultural income (762) + Income
claimed exempt (125)>5]


(xxii) *All cases in which sum of short-term capital
gains u/s.111A and long-term capital gain is more than Rs.25 lakh.


(xxiii) *All cases in which sale of property has been
shown as per AIR return, but no capital gains have been declared in the
return of Income.


(xxiv) *All cases in which commission paid is more than
Rs.10 lakhs.


(xxv) *All cases having business of real estate with
gross turnover exceeding Rs.5 crores.


(xxvi) *All cases having business of hotels/tour
operations with gross turnover exceeding Rs.5 crores if net profit shown is
less than 0.05%


(xxvii) *All cases in which total depreciation claimed at
the rates of 80% and 100% is more than Rs.25 lakhs.


(xxviii) All cases in which net agricultural income is
more than Rs.10 lakhs.

Cabinet agreed to amend the DTAA between India and Syria : Press release dated 1-6-2008.

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46 Cabinet agreed to amend the DTAA between
India and Syria : Press release dated 1-6-2008.


 

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The Backward Glance of a Lion (History of BCAS for the 6th Decade)

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The backward glance of a lion

Prologue :


The Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society popularly
referred to as BCAS has completed 60 years of its useful existence. The
Diamond jubilee celebrations continued throughout the year including a very
well attended conference in November 2008. The year is coming to an end and I
have been entrusted with the responsibility of penning down the history of
last 10 years, a journey from Golden era to Diamond era.

It was one of our past Presidents and a former editor of
our prestigious journal late Ajay Thakkar who had in his inimitable style
written the history of our Society for the first 40 years. I had the good
fortune to write the continuation thereof for the next 10 years and that I
have already written and it is documented in August 1998 issue of our Journal.

The world today is in a rush, haste and constantly engaged
in a fierce battle against time. Add to this time constraint, technology has
given us increased heartbeats. Our present day life is spent on utilising
scarce time, sorting out competing demands on time and redistribution of time.
Whenever we speed up, we tend to slow down and neglect the past. It is said
that improved technology saves a lot of time. But what about human reflexes ?
One who travels normally by a bullock cart or a cycle, cannot adjust to the
jet speed immediately. We all have a desire to dazzle and aspire for
adulation. It is a very precious chemical compound consumed by all without
watching or caring for side effects. In such a scenario, whether people would
get time to read history ? Add to it, budget to be presented on 3rd July 2009.
Who really has time to read BCAS history for the last decade ?

In such a scenario, there is always a bit of diffidence and
hesitation about the utility of the work for the future. However it is also
said that the importance of a work is to be judged not from the immediate
gains. Recording of history is not for those who live in the present but for
those who will be our future. It may be a guide or a source of inspiration for
future. It is with this background and a hope that I am writing this history
for the last 10 years.

How do I describe this Journey from Gold to Diamond ? Shall
I ‘review’ the events of last 10 years ? No way. ‘Review’ is too often an
official document and a matter of discussion in a meeting. I therefore refuse
to describe History as a bald review. In Western Culture, there is a system of
looking at the past ‘in retrospect’. The idea is to look at the events of the
past in a critical manner. I do not propose such a look ‘in retrospect’. I, on
the other hand, would like to refer to the past events as a backward glance of
a Lion. Our Society is a lion institution. A lion has a habit of frequently
looking back. In vernacular it is known as ‘Sinhavalokan’. There is a
forward marching army ready to attack, but a keen observant lion is required
to have a backward glance, both for guidance for the future journey as well as
protection from a possible attack from behind as a result of some laxity. This
is more native and also positive. My attempt may therefore be looked as a ‘Sinhavalokan’.


Our Presidents :


In an organisation, those who are past Presidents or past
dignitaries are more ornamental designations and they are to be invited with
apparent respect for any function. With BCAS, it is exactly the opposite and
the past presidents do play a very keen and positive role throughout the year
for a collective success of the Society. They occupy positions as active
chairmen of various Committees or as committee members and they are permanent
invitees to the Managing Committee meetings. In fact, on an issue of great
importance, the President in office would convene a meeting of the past
Presidents to ascertain their views and seek their guidance. Although the
President of the Society is elected every year, he invariably enjoys the
blessings of elders in the Society.

This process of selecting/electing a leader has been
continued as per the previous tradition in a healthy manner even in the last
decade. There are some people who could look at this as imposition by the
seniors. In fact, in some quarters, BCAS is described as a closed door joint
family and people believe that it is difficult to get an entry into the
family. I would refer to BCAS as a closely-knit family. The door is always
open to those who wish to devote time and energy for the cause of the Society.
Views differ. The outcome for the last 60 years is for everyone to see. You
cannot think of becoming an office bearer or the President of the Society,
unless you have put in an active association with the activities of the
Society at least for a period 10 years. The process of selection has always
made equitable choices to give leadership to this organisation. There could be
aspirants, but they have to follow the process.

As a result, some persons who deserved to be Presidents may
not have made it to that position. Fragrance of a flower is enjoyable; but
some flowers have the fortune of becoming a garland for the God, some do get
an opportunity to be in close proximity of women, some flowers spread their
fragrance in the nature and fade away in the evening. This is life. Late Jal
Dastur in my view deserved to be the President of the Society. He contributed
to the journal very regularly. He was one such person who would read the
journal from line to line and also point out any shortcomings. He would also
contribute papers for the prestigious RRCs of the Society. He died as a result
of a tragic accident in the year 2005. It is one of those cases of a flower
which spread its fragrance in a very different way. He lives in the hearts of
our members and the interaction with him will always remain etched in memory.

I am recording below and recognising and felicitating our
Presidents in the last decade. The BCAS respects and acknowledges their
contribution for the cause of the Society.

S. 264 and S. 246A — Appeal against assessment made consequent to order passed u/s.264 is maintainable u/s.246A, but only to the extent of issues which have not attained finality in order passed u/s.264.

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38 Dr. A. Naresh Babu v.
ITO
(2010) 124 ITD 28 (Hyd.)
A.Ys. : 1996-97 to 2003-04. Dated : 5-9-2008


 


S. 264 and S. 246A — Appeal against assessment made
consequent to order passed u/s.264 is maintainable u/s.246A, but only to the
extent of issues which have not attained finality in order passed u/s.264.


Facts :

The assessee’s case was scrutinised and the Assessing Officer
passed the assessment order. The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A).
Later on the appeal filed before the CIT(A) was withdrawn. Thereafter the
assessee filed petition before the CIT seeking revision u/s.264. The CIT set
aside the assessments and restored the matter with certain directions on various
issues to the Assessing Officer to re-do the assessments afresh. The Assessing
Officer completed the assessment afresh.

Being aggrieved by the additions made by the Assessing
Officer in the fresh assessment, the assessee preferred appeal before the
CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that the assessments made in consequence to the order
passed by the CIT, particularly when the assessee’s case has been decided
u/s.264 on merits, cannot be subject matter of appeal before the CIT(A).

Held :

Appeal from fresh order passed by the Assessing Officer to
give effect to the revisional order passed u/s.264 is maintainable, but only
such issues can be taken in appeal which have not attained the finality in the
order passed u/s.264 of the Act.

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Ignorantia Juris

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The ‘WORD’

The ‘WORD’

N. C. Jain
Advocate

Ignorantia Juris

‘Ignorantia Juris’
is generally a defence against the violation of law which the courts are quite
circumspect in accepting in view of the legal maxim ‘ignorantia juris non
excusat’
or ‘ignorantia legis neminem excusat’ meaning that
ignorance of law does not excuse
. The principle holds that a person who is
unaware of a law may not escape liability for violating that law merely because
he or she was unaware of it.

2. The rationale behind the doctrine is that if ignorance of
law is taken as an excuse, it would be conveniently used by any person charged
with criminal offence or subjected to civil lawsuit without any conceivable
basis to decide on such ignorance. The law, therefore, imputes such knowledge to
all within the jurisdiction, no matter how transiently.

3. The maxim is juxtaposed to ignorance of facts relevant to
the charge of violation of law or commission of offence which is contained in
the maxim ‘ignorantia facit excusat’. While the ignorance of facts
excuses, ignorance of law does not.
If the heir pleads ignorance of the
death of his ancestors, he is ignorant of fact but ignorance of rights vested in
him on the death of ancestor is ignorance of law which does not generally afford
an excuse.

4. In order, however, for the maxim to apply it is necessary
that the law in question is properly published and distributed. In Harla v.
State of Rajasthan,
1951 AIR 467 where Jaipur Opium Act 1923 was passed by
Council of Ministers but not promulgated or published in gazette, the Supreme
Court observed that natural justice requires that before a law can become
operative, it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some
recognisable way so that all men may know what it is, or at very least, there
must be some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which
such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable
diligence. In the absence of any special law, or custom, it would be against the
principle of natural justice to permit the subjects of a state to be punished or
penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not,
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. The
court referred to the decision in Johnson v. Sargent, ILR 1944 Karachi
107 where such a publication or publicity was held to be necessary particularly
in regard to orders of empowered authorities as compared to Acts of British
Parliament which are publicly enacted. The debates in the case of Parliamentary
legislation are open to the public and the Acts are passed by accredited
representatives of the people who in theory can be trusted to see that the
constituents know what has been done. They also receive wide publicity in papers
and now, on wireless.

5. The maxim based on presumed knowledge of law, however,
stands considerably diluted with heavily increasing corpus of national
legislation which works more in favour of lawyers rather than citizens for whom
it is enacted. Taking a practical view, the Courts in genuine cases of ignorance
take account of total facts and circumstances including the object of
legislation, nature of default, its impact and its social cost. In cases
involving penal action, particularly in fiscal matters, where the determinative
issue is existence of reasonable cause or deliberate, contumacious conduct on
the part of the defaulter, ignorance of law is taken as a material factor. The
decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa,
(1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC) and similar other decisions could be taken as suggestive
of ignorance of law being taken as relevant to establish absence of guilty
intention when it lays down two basic requirements for imposition of penalty,
viz.
deliberate defiance of law and conscious disregard of obligation. Both
these mental states presuppose knowledge of law and obligations flowing
therefrom.

6. The Courts in taking such liberal view have even gone to
the extent of excusing defaults arising out of wrong legal advice given by
eligible legal consultants. In Shyam Gopal Charitable Trust v. DIT
(Exemption),
290 ITR 99, 105, Delhi High Court, while deciding appeal
against order of imposition of penalty u/s.272A(2)(e), recalled the observations
of the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. Krishna Kurup Madhava Kurup,
AIR 1971 Ker 211, which was approved and extracted by the Supreme Court in
Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. [1979] 118 ITR 507.

"I am of the view that legal advice given by the members of
the legal profession may sometimes be wrong even as pronouncement on questions
of law by Courts are sometimes wrong. An amount of latitude is expected in such
cases for, to err is human and laymen, as litigants are, may legitimately lean
on expert counsel in legal as in other departments, without probing the
professional competence of the advice".

The Court, however, made it clear that it cannot be taken as
laying down a general proposition that in all cases where the failure is
attributed to legal advice, it should be taken as constituting sufficient cause.

7. Such dilution in the application of ‘ignorantia juris
non excusat’
even though justified on grounds of modern day multiplicity and
complexity of litigation coupled with standard of education, is to be
resorted to with utmost caution and subjected to the satisfaction that such a
plea is without any taint of malafide or element of recklessness, gross
negligence or a mere ruse.
Willful or deliberate default or disregard of
obligation should not be camouflaged as bonafide mistake caused by ignorance of
law. In V. G. Paneerdas & Co. P. Ltd. v. CWT, 284 ITR 444, the Madras
High Court while commenting on the plea of ignorance of the provisions of
Finance Act 1983 bringing closely held companies into the ambit of wealth tax
observed "Going beyond the well known principles that the ignorance of law is no
excuse, it has to be pointed out that the assessee could not point out any
material fact showing that it was prevented from getting to know the relevant
provisions of the Finance Act 1983." In the facts of the case, the court held
that the provision was well published and a much discussed affair, it is clear
and unambiguous and the assessee was assisted in tax matt

Ex Abundanti Cautela

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The Word

A Latin expression, literally meaning ‘as abundant
caution’
is a legislative practice followed to obviate any possibility of a
view different from what is intended by the Legislature. By its nature,
therefore, a provision ‘ex abundanti cautela’ explains the provision
contained in a statute to put certain areas beyond controversy and clarify the
legislative intent in situations where a reasonable apprehension can exist of a
different interpretation being taken by the courts.


2. Strangely, a provision to provide certainty and clarity is
often itself a matter of controversy as to its nature. Whether a particular
provision is ‘ex abundanti cautela’ or an independent provision is quite
often a subject of debate. This issue becomes significant because the provision
not considered ‘ex abundanti cautela’ results in a restricted meaning
eliminating, by implication, all that is not said therein. On the other hand a
provision held ‘ex abundant cautela’ does not restrict the provision in
any way and allows it to have the meaning which it would have, even if the
cautioning provision had not existed. It merely dispels apprehension about a
possible view in respect of certain items/areas in relation to the provision to
which it is ‘ex abundanti cautela’.

3. A few examples will make the import of the expression
clear. Under the Central Excise tariff, item 17(2) is ‘paper subject to
coating’. The nature of item 17(3) inserted for the category ‘carbon paper’ was
subject matter of dispute in a case where demand was raised in respect of
‘carbon paper’, for the period prior to introduction of item 17(3). The
Department took the plea that the amendment was merely ‘ex abundanti cautela’,
as carbon paper was always covered under item 17(2). The Supreme Court after
considering the case from different angles, upheld the Department’s view that
carbon paper was covered by item 17(2) (Collector of Central Excise Kanpur v.
Krishna Carbon Paper Co.,
1988 AIR 2223).

4. In Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. v.
Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan,
(1957 AIR 104) — a case under the Industrial
Disputes Act — an employee was prosecuted for a charge of theft in 1950, but was
acquitted in 1952, after which he claimed reinstatement and compensation. The
employer refused to entertain the application, inter alia, on the ground
that the applicant was not an employee, as dismissed employees are not employees
under the Act. The Act in S. 2(10) defines an employee ‘to mean any person
employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work
for contract or hire or reward in any industry and includes an employee
discharged on account of any dispute relating to a charge, in respect of which a
notice is given u/s.31 or 32 whether before or after the discharge”
.
(emphasis supplied). It was argued on behalf of the employer that the inclusive
part of the definition reflects the legislative intention to include only those
who are proceeded against u/s.31 and u/s.32 and not all the discharged employees
in general, as otherwise there was no need for the further provision in S. 2(10)
that discharged employees would in certain cases be employees. Disagreeing, the
Supreme Court observed :

“In our opinion, the clause was inserted ‘ex abundanti
cautela
’ to repel a possible contention that employees discharged u/s.31
and u/s.32 of the Act would not fall within S. 2(10) and cannot be read as
importing an intention generally to exclude dismissed employees from that
definition.”


5. The provision ‘ex abundanti cautela’ is generally
in the form of a sub-section or an inclusive expression or explanations
expressly stated as ‘for benefit of doubt’ and also sometimes as non-obstante
clause. The examples of inclusive expression in tax laws can be multiplied.
Wherever the Legislature finds it difficult to express a term of wide import in
language, it leaves it open to the judiciary to provide meaning to it, taking
care to include or exclude specific areas where there can be possibility of
different interpretations, as a measure of precaution. The very definition of
‘income’ is of the nature. The same is the case with ‘transfer’ u/s.2(47),
‘salary’ u/s.17(1), ‘perquisite’ u/s.17(2) and host of other provisions where
specific areas are specified as included within these terms instead of a general
broad-based definition.

6. Examples of provisions expressly stated as for removal of
doubt can also be multiplied. One such example is explanation inserted in S.
10A, S. 10AA and S. 10B to repel the possibility of profits derived from the
site development of computer software not being treated as profit derived from
export of computer software. Another explanation in S. 10B dispels the possible
impression that cutting and polishing of precious and semi-precious stones do
not fall within ‘manufacture or produce’ in that Section. S. 263 which gives
power to the Commissioner of Income-tax to revise the order of the Assessing
Officer has provision ‘ex abundanti cautela’ by way of explanation to say
that orders passed by the Assessing Officer in pursuance of the directions
u/s.144A and orders passed by Joint Commissioners in exercise of power of
Assessing Officer conferred on them will be orders of the Assessing Officer,
subject to the revisional power of the Commissioner of Income-tax. More and more
explanations are being inserted, as a measure of precaution, to clarify the
legislative intention whenever there is any indication arising from the Court’s
decision that a view different from what is intended can possibly be taken.

7.    Even non-obstante clauses are sometimes taken as ‘ex abundanti cautela’. In a case relating to Administration Evacuation of Property Act, 1950 where the nature of a non-obstante provision contained in S. 12(1) came for consideration, the provisions “not-withstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the custodian may cancel any allotment or terminate any lease or agreement ….. ” was argued as being a provision which overrides a bar imposed by any law, but not the bar imposed by a contract under which the lease was held. The Supreme, Court, after considering various aspects of the case, came to the conclusion that the operative portion of the Section which confers powers on the custodians to cancel the lease or vary the terms thereof is unqualified and absolute and that power cannot be abridged by reference to the provision that it could be exercised “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law”. The non-obstante provision is obviously intended to repel a possible contention that S. 12 does not, by implication, repeal statutes conferring rights on lessees and cannot prevail as against them and has been inserted ‘ex abundanti cautela’. (Raibahadur Kanwar Rajnath & Others v. Pramod C. Bhatt, Custodian of Evacuee Property, 1956 AIR 105).

8. In deciding  as to whether  the expression  is ‘exabundanti cautela’ or not, the courts are generally guided by the object of the legislation and the purpose it is intended to serve. The following ex-tract from the decision rendered by Justice Krishna Iyer in R. S. Joshi STO, Guj. v. Ajit Mills Ltd., Ahd., & Another, 1977 AIR 2279 succinctly brings out the approach.

“A law has to be adjudged for its constitutionality by the generality of cases it covers, not by the freaks and exceptions it martyrs. The professed object of the law being clear, the motive of the Legislature is irrelevant to castigate an Act as a colour able device. The interdict on public mischief and the insurance of consumer interests against likely, albeit unwitting or ‘ex abundanti cautela’, excesses in the working of a statute are not merely an ancillary power, but surely a necessary obligation of a social welfare State.”

S. 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act — Since debts could not be recovered in spite of best efforts, whether assessee was entitled to deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) — Held, Yes.

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 321 (Chennai)


Preeti Tex v. Income-tax Officer,

Ward-II(4), Coimbatore

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 18-1-2008

S. 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act — Since debts could not
be recovered in spite of best efforts, whether assessee was entitled to
deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) — Held, Yes.

The assessee-firm had entered into a Cost, Insurance and
Freight (CIF) agreement with a certain Bangladeshi party for selling its
goods. When the goods reached Custom station of Benapole inside Bangladesh,
said party failed to pay for goods after having acknowledged receipt of goods
at Custom station. Therefore, the assessee claimed value of goods from foreign
buyer. Despite making an honest attempt to recover the said amount, the
assessee could not recover the same and, therefore, had written-off said
amount as bad debts in its books of account during the year and claimed
deduction of same u/s.36(1)(vii). The Assessing Officer rejected its claim. On
appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) found that there was no evidence on the
part of the assessee to show as to what legal steps were taken by it against
the buyer or its bank to recover its money. He, therefore, rejected the
assessee’s claim.

On second appeal : the ITAT held that :

(1) Under a CIF contract, seller is required to insure
the goods; to deliver them to the shipping company; to arrange for
affreightment; and to send the bill of lading and insurance policy together
with invoice and a certificate of origin to a bank.

(2) The documents are usually delivered by the bank
against the payment of price or against the acceptance of the bill.

(3) The property in the goods passes on to the buyer on
the delivery of documents. In the instant case, it was not disputed that the
buyer had got the delivery of documents.

(4) In a CIF contract the buyer has got to accept the
documents and to pay the price, even if the goods are destroyed or lost. In
that case, he has the remedy against the insurer to recover the loss.

(5) The whole documents the assessee relied upon had
clearly proved the completed wholesome CIF contract and the assessee had
taken an honest decision as contemplated on the part of the duty of the
seller. The insurance was perfectly made. All requirements of CIF contract
were satisfied. Therefore, the assessee could not be faulted with
transaction. As per the C&F terms, the goods were sold and the fact that the
goods had reached the Custom station was not at all disputed.

(6) The fact that the goods were lost or destroyed in a
fire at the Custom port in Bangladesh was also not disputed. Under the above
circumstances, the amounts were due under two of the invoices for goods sold
on C&F terms and the goods were exported on C&F terms after fulfilling all
the conditions for entering into C&F contract, the goods were covered by
transit insurance arranged by the buyer.

Under the above facts and circumstances, in spite of honest
efforts made by the assessee, the debts could not be recovered and in view of
the honest decision of the assessee the book debts were written-off for the
previous year relevant to the assessment year under appeal. Therefore, the
claim of the assessee was to be allowed.

S. 80IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether S. 80-IA(2) gives an option to assessee to claim relief u/s.80-IA for any 10 consecutive assessment years out of 15 years beginning from year in which undertaking or enterprise develops or begins to operate an

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 241 (Chennai)


Mohan Breweries & Distilleries Ltd. v. ACIT
(Chennai)

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 31-10-2007

S. 80IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether S. 80-IA(2)
gives an option to assessee to claim relief u/s.80-IA for any 10 consecutive
assessment years out of 15 years beginning from year in which undertaking or
enterprise develops or begins to operate any infrastructure facility, etc.,
and it does not mandate that first year of 10 consecutive assessment years
should be always first year of set-up of enterprise — Held, Yes — Whether
provision of S. 80-IA(5), treating eligible undertaking as a separate sole
source of income, is applicable only when assessee chooses to claim deduction
u/s.80-IA and same cannot be applied to a year prior to the year in which
assessee opted to claim relief u/s.80-IA for first time — Held, Yes.

The assessee-company had started three power projects, two
in the previous year, relevant to the A.Y. 1996-97 and one in the previous
year, relevant to the assessment year 1999-2000. In respect of the profits of
these power units, the assessee claimed deduction u/s.80-IA for the first time
in the A.Y. 2004-05. The Assessing Officer held that while computing the gross
total income of the eligible units, the notional brought forward loss incurred
by those units in earlier years had to be taken into account first and after
that, if any remaining profit was available then the deduction u/s.80-IA had
to be given.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of
the Assessing Officer. On second appeal, the ITAT held that :

(1) S. 80-IA gives an option to the assessee to claim
relief under this section for any 10 consecutive assessment years out of 15
years beginning from the year in which the undertaking or enterprise
develops or begins to operate any infrastructure facility, etc.

(2) S. 80-IA(2) does not mandate that first year of 10
consecutive assessment years should be always the first year of set-up of
enterprise.

(3) The provision of S. 80-IA(5) is applicable only when
the assessee chooses to claim deduction u/s.80-IA and if it has not chosen
to claim the deduction u/s.80-IA, S. 80-IA(5) cannot be made applicable.

(4) In the instant case, there was a categorical finding
by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) that the first year
claimed by the assessee was from the A.Y. 2004-05. Hence, the initial
assessment year could not be the year in which the undertaking commenced its
operations but it was the assessment year in which the assessee had chosen
to claim deduction u/s.80-IA. Therefore, there was no question of
setting-off notionally carried forward unabsorbed depreciation or loss of
earlier years against the profits of the units and the assessee was entitled
to claim deduction u/s.80-IA on the current assessment year’s profit.

Whether if application filed by assessee for additional time for removing the defect in the return u/s.139(9), is not disposed of or no action is taken and if Assessing Officer remains silent then time asked for by assessee would be treated as granted by

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 207 (Cochin)


Indus Motor Co. Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 24-1-2007

Whether if application filed by assessee for additional
time for removing the defect in the return u/s.139(9), is not disposed of or
no action is taken and if Assessing Officer remains silent then time asked for
by assessee would be treated as granted by Assessing Officer — Held, Yes.

The assessee-company filed its return of loss on
30-11-1998, but it could not attach the statutory audit report with it.
Consequently, the Assessing Officer issued letter to the assessee asking it to
rectify said defect. On receipt of the letter, the assessee filed application
requesting for extension of time till 5-3-1999 for filing the audit report as
per the deficiency letter. However, there was no communication from the
Assessing Officer in response to the said application of the assessee.
Subsequently, the assessee filed another return of loss on 5-3-1999 revising
the loss. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment u/s.143(3) but the
said loss was refused to be carried forward and set-off in future on the
ground that the assessee had filed its revised return of loss after the due
date. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the impugned order.

On second appeal, the ITAT held that :

1. As per the provisions of S. 80, if the return of
income is not filed as provided u/s.139(3) the loss determined shall not be
carried forward and allowed to be set-off under the relevant provisions.

2. S. 139(9) provides that if the return furnished by the
assessee is defective then the AO may intimate the defect to him and give
him an opportunity to rectify the defect within a period of 15 days or
within such further period on an application made by the assessee as the
Assessing Officer in his discretion may allow.

3. In the instant case, the assessee filed an application
requesting for further period to rectify the defect. It had requested the AO
for time up to 5-3-1999 to file the return. It was the duty of the AO to
dispose of the application filed by the assessee, either granting the
additional time or refusing the same. But the AO did not act on the said
application.

4. If the application filed by the assessee for
additional time is not disposed of or no action is taken and if the
Assessing Officer remains silent, then time asked for by the assessee would
be treated as granted by the Assessing Officer.

5. Another aspect to be considered was that if it was not
a valid return, then how the assessment was framed u/s.143(3). The returns
filed by assessee on 30-11-1998 as well as on 5-3-1999 were valid returns
and there was no bar to carry forward determined loss as per S. 80.

Whether as per S. 26, any income which is chargeable under head ‘Income from house property’ is to be assessed in hands of co-owners if their shares are ascertainable and such income cannot be taxed in hands of AOP — Held, Yes.

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 155 (Bang.)


ACIT v. S. Prabhakar Kamath

A.Ys. : 1995-96 to 1998-99

Dated : 30-4-2007

Whether as per S. 26, any income which is chargeable under
head ‘Income from house property’ is to be assessed in hands of co-owners if
their shares are ascertainable and such income cannot be taxed in hands of AOP — Held,
Yes.

The assessees, four individuals, purchased a plot of land
and thereafter constructed a commercial complex thereon. Each co-owner had
equal undivided share in the entire property. A part of the said complex was
given on rent. The assessees filed their individual returns separately, in
status of co-owners and showed the rental income under the head ‘House
property’. The Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s.148 to the assessees
stating that there was an AOP in existence and income from the commercial
complex was chargeable to tax in the hands of the AOP. Accordingly, the rental
income had been taxed as business income in the hands of the AOP. On appeal,
the Commissioner (Appeals) held that since share of all members was equal,
rental income should be assessed in the individual hands of the co-owners as
per S. 26.

On Revenue’s appeal, the ITAT observed that :

(1) It was an admitted position that rental income from
the property had been assessed in the hands of the individual co-owners upto
the A.Y. 1994-95.

(2) When the revenue had taken a stand that rental income
upto the A.Y. 1994-95 was assessable in the hands of individual co-owners,
then it could not take a different stand for the subsequent years,
particularly in view of S. 26. As per S. 26, any income which is chargeable
under the head ‘Income from house property’ is to be assessed in the hands
of co-owners if their shares are ascertainable and such income cannot be
taxed in the hands of the AOP.

Hence, rental income in question chargeable under the head
‘Income from house property’ was to be taxed in the individual hands of the
co-owners.

S. 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Expression ‘any other business or commercial rights of similar nature’ appearing in clause (ii) of S. 32(1) would include such rights which can be used as a tool to carry on business — Assessee entitled to claim depreci

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  1. [2008] 116 ITD 348 (Mum.) (SMC)


Skyline Caterers (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 28-12-2007

S. 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Expression ‘any other
business or commercial rights of similar nature’ appearing in clause (ii) of
S. 32(1) would include such rights which can be used as a tool to carry on
business — Assessee entitled to claim depreciation on amount paid for
acquisition of all rights under catering contract.

The assessee entered into an agreement with ‘R’ on
16-8-2000 for taking over the catering contract of ‘R’ with HLL against a
consideration of Rs.27 lakhs. Out of the said sum, the assessee paid a sum of
Rs.25 lakhs to ‘R’ as a consideration for acquiring all the rights under the
catering contract between ‘R’ and HLL and balance sum of Rs.2 lakhs was paid
to ‘R’ for not competing with the assessee. The assessee treated the said
amount of Rs.27 lakhs in its balance sheet as goodwill and claimed
depreciation thereon treating the same as commercial rights acquired by it.
The Assessing Officer held that depreciation is admissible only on know-how,
patents, copyrights, trade marks, etc. He further held that the expression
‘similar nature’ in S. 32(1)(ii) would not include goodwill. He, therefore,
disallowed the assessee’s claim for depreciation. On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeal) upheld the action of the Assessing Officer.

On second appeal, the ITAT held that :

(1) The nomenclature given to the entries in the books of
account is not relevant for ascertaining the real nature of the transaction.
The nature of transaction should be ascertained on the basis of the
agreement between the parties. Therefore, merely because the assessee showed
the said payment on account of goodwill in the books of account, no adverse
inference could be drawn against the assessee.

(2) The payment of Rs.25 lakhs was specifically made for
acquiring all the rights under the catering contract between ‘R’ and HLL and
for acquiring articles and paraphernalia belonging to ‘R’, which were lying
in the canteen. Hence, it could not be said that the payment was either on
account of goodwill or on account of not to compete with the assessee.

(3) The specific intangible assets referred to in S.
32(1)(ii) are followed by the expression ‘any other business of commercial
rights of similar nature’. The specific words in the above section reveal
the similarity in the sense that all the intangible assets specified are
tools of the trade, which facilitate the assessee carrying on the business.
Therefore, the expression ‘any other business or commercial rights of
similar nature’ would include such rights which can be used as a tool to
carry on the business. Since catering business at HLL canteen could be
carried on only with the help of such rights under the contract, the
assessee would be entitled to depreciation.

S. 80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether amendment by Finance Act, 2000 in provision of S. 80-IB(10) extending period for completion of eligible projects to 31-3-2003 was made with effect from 1-4-2001 apparently because as per pre-amended provision

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  1. [2008] 116 ITD 253 (Delhi)


Dy. CIT v.


Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd.

A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 15-2-2008

S. 80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether amendment by
Finance Act, 2000 in provision of S. 80-IB(10) extending period for completion
of eligible projects to 31-3-2003 was made with effect from 1-4-2001
apparently because as per pre-amended provisions, such period was prescribed
up to 31-3-2001 and date of 1-4-2001 given as an effective date for said
amendment cannot be read in a manner to say that same was applicable only for
and from A.Y. 2001-02 — Held, Yes.

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of
development of mini-townships, construction of house property, villas,
commercial complexes, etc. For the A.Y. 2000-01, the assessee’s claim for
deduction u/s.80-IB(10) in respect of profits derived from a housing project,
was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the assessee had
not produced the completion certificate in respect of the said project as
evidence of completion by 31-3-2003, as required by the Section. On appeal,
the Commissioner (Appeals), relying upon the Occupation certificate submitted
by the assessee as additional evidence, allowed the assessee’s claim for
deduction u/s.80-IB(10).

On 2nd appeal, the revenue raised a new plea that the date
of completion of project as earlier prescri-bed in S. 80-IB(10) as on
31-3-2001 was extended to 31-3-2003 by the Finance Act, 2000 only with effect
from 1-4-2001 and hence the benefit of extended date for completion of project
in order to make it eligible for deduction u/s.80-IB was not available to the
assessee for the assessment year 2000-01.

The ITAT observed that :

(1) As is clearly evident from the Explanatory note to
the Finance Bill, 2000, the purpose of amendments made by the Finance Act,
2000 in the provisions of S. 80-IB(10) was to extend the benefit available
under the said provisions even to the housing projects which would be
completed up to 31-3-2003 as against the period up to 31-3-2001 specified
earlier.

(2) The period of commencement of the said projects in
order to become eligible for benefits of S. 80-IB(10) was also
simultaneously specified as up to 31-3-2001 as against the period earlier
prescribed as on or after 1-10-1998, which clearly means that the intention
of the Legislature was to give the benefit of extended period of completion
to all the projects which had already commenced on or after 1-10-1998.

(3) The interpretation given by the Revenue may also lead
to absurd results in the cases of assessees following two different methods
of accounting to recognise the income derived from the projects eligible for
benefit u/s.80-IB. In a case where the assessee follows a project completion
method, he will be able to avail the benefit of S. 80-IB in respect of
entire profits of the projects completed after 31-3-2001 but before
31-3-2003, whereas the assessee following percentage completion method would
be able to avail the said benefits in respect of profits of the project
completed after 31-3-2001 but before 31-3-2003 only to the extent of profit
declared on percentage completion method in the A.Y. 2001-02 and subsequent
year and lose that benefit on the profits of the very same project declared
on percentage completion method in the A.Ys. 1999-2000 and 2000-01.

(4) It is a well-settled canon of construction that in
construing the provisions of beneficial Legislation, the Court should adopt
the construction, which advances, fulfils and furthers the object of the Act
rather than the one, which would defeat the same and render the benefit
illusory.

Based on the above observations, the ITAT held that the
amendment in the provision of S. 80-IB(10) extending period for completion of
eligible projects was made with effect from 1-4-2001 apparently because as per
pre-amended provision such period was prescribed up to 31-3-2001 and the date
of 1-4-2001 given as an effective date for the said amendment cannot be read
in a manner to say that the same was applicable only for and from A.Y. 2001-02
and the subsequent years. Therefore, the benefits of the amended provisions of
S. 80-IB(10) would be available in A.Y. 2000-01 even to the projects completed
within the extended period, i.e., 31-3-2003.

S. 292B r.w. S. 80, S. 139(1) and S. 139(3) — Assessee company having filed four returns in respect of its four units correctly disclosing all relevant information without causing any prejudice to Revenue, such mistake or defect stood removed by operation

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  1. (2009) 121 TTJ 289 (Mumbai) (TM)


Nicholas Applegate South East Asia Fund Ltd. v. Asst. DIT
(International Taxation)

ITA No. 3875 (Mum.) of 2005

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 23-1-2009

S. 292B r.w. S. 80, S. 139(1) and S. 139(3) — Assessee
company having filed four returns in respect of its four units correctly
disclosing all relevant information without causing any prejudice to Revenue,
such mistake or defect stood removed by operation of S. 292B and consolidated
revised return filed by assessee will relate back to the date of filing of
original returns entitling the assessee to claim carry forward and set off of
loss as claimed in original returns and consolidated in revised returns.

The assessee is a company incorporated in Mauritius under
the Protected Cells Companies Act having four cells/sub-divisions in India.
For the relevant assessment year, it filed separate returns of income in
respect of each cell in India within the time limit prescribed u/s.139(1)
showing short term capital loss and exempt dividend income. Subsequently, the
assessee realised that a consolidated return for all the four divisions was
required to be filed and, accordingly, it filed a revised return incorporating
the incomes/losses of the four divisions. The Assessing Officer treated the
original four returns as invalid and treated the consolidated revised return
as the original return and, since the same was not filed within the time
prescribed u/s.139(1), disallowed the assessee’s claim for carry-forward of
short term capital loss. The CIT(A) allowed the loss to be carried forward.

Since there was a difference of opinion between Members of
the Tribunal, the matter was referred to the Third Member. The Third Member
also held in favour of the assessee. The Third Member relied on the decisions
in the following cases :

(a) Swaran Kanta v. CIT, (1989) 176 ITR 291 (P&H)

(b) CIT v. K. Saraswathi Ammal, (1984) 39 CTR
(Mad.) 35/(1984) 146 ITR 486 (Mad.)

(c) Shirish Madhukar Dalvi v. ACIT, (2006) 203 CTR
(Bom.) 621/(2006) 287 ITR 242 (Bom.)

The Third Member noted as under :

(1) As per Circular No. 179 dated 30th September 1975 of
CBDT, S. 292B has been made to provide against purely technical objections
without substance coming in the way of the validity of assessment
proceedings. It is clear from the language of S. 292B that its aim is to
prevent any return of income, assessment, notice or other proceedings being
treated as invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission in
such return of income, assessment, notice, other proceedings which are in
substance and effect in conformity with and according to the intent and
purpose of this Act. Substance over form theory is the underlying philosophy
of S. 292B. If in substance and in effect, the return, notice or assessment
is in conformity with or according to intent and purpose of the Act, the
mistake, defect or omission is to be ignored.

(2) If significance of words ‘substance’ and ‘effect’ is
kept in mind, there is no justification to take the four returns separately
and in not considering them together. All the four returns were filed at the
same time with the same Assessing Officer and signed by the same competent
and authorised person. When the total effect of all the four returns is
taken into account, it is clearly found that the assessee did disclose full
information of total loss in time as was needed by the Revenue to compute
assessee’s income/loss. The Revenue has not pointed out any information
needed but not given in the four returns submitted by the four cells.

(3) There was a mistake in filing four returns instead of
one consolidated return of total loss of the assessee company. However, that
mistake, otherwise rendering the returns invalid, is fully taken care of by
provisions of S. 292B.

(4) Four cells of the assessee, by filing four returns,
in which total loss claimed by the assessee was disclosed, did comply in
substance and in effect with the intent and purpose of the Act. It is
nobody’s case that any prejudice was caused to the Revenue because of the
above defect and mistake.

(5) In such a situation, it is not correct to hold that
returns filed earlier were invalid, ineffective and of no legal consequence.
The revised return would, in such circumstances, relate back to the date of
filing of original return. The said return has to be taken along and
considered with the original four returns which contained complete
information for making an assessment. The technical mistake in the four
returns stood removed on filing of the consolidated return. To ignore date
of four returns is to ignore provisions of S. 292B.

The assessee was, therefore, entitled to carry forward such
losses for setting off the same in the subsequent year in terms of the
provisions of S. 80.

S. 10B, S. 32(2) & S. 72 : Set off of business loss and unabsorbed depreciation of earlier assessment years allowable against the profits and gains of unit eligible for deduction u/s.10B.

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31 (2008) 114 TTJ 881 (Chennai)


Ford Business Services Center (P) Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 308 (Mad.) of 2005 &

C.O. No. 170 (Mad.) of 2005

A.Y. 2001-02. Dated : 22-6-2007

S. 10B, S. 32(2) and S. 72 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Set-off of business loss and unabsorbed depreciation of earlier assessment years
is allowable against the profits and gains of a unit eligible for deduction
u/s.10B.

 

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee, engaged in
the business of IT-enabled accounting services and software development, claimed
set-off of carried forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation against the
income of the unit on which deduction u/s.10B was claimed. The Assessing Officer
and the CIT(A) disallowed the claim. The CIT(A) noted that once the profits and
gains of the unit are eligible for S. 10B deduction, it cannot be taken into
consideration for set-off u/s.70 or u/s.71 or for application of S. 72 and,
therefore, loss from other undertaking cannot be set off against this profit.

 

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal
observed as under :

(a) The heading of Chapter III of the Income-tax Act,
i.e.
‘Incomes which do not form part of total income’ cannot be conclusive
about the exact purport of any provision contained in the said chapter.

(b) When S. 10B was introduced w.e.f. 1st April 1989, there
was total exclusion of such income from the total income. Subsequently,
however, the total exclusion was removed and deduction was provided for.
Similar is the case for S. 10A, S. 10AA and S. 10BA.

(c) Once deduction u/s.10B has to be allowed, the total
income of the undertaking will enter the computation and then only deduction
will be given to the assessee. If that is the case, then the stand of the
CIT(A) that S. 10B is a secluded provision cannot be accepted. Had it been a
case where total exclusion from income was provided for, then perhaps, the
observation of the CIT(A) that such income cannot be taken into consideration
for set-off u/s.70, u/s.71, or u/s.72 would have been proper.

 


Therefore, the Assessing Officer is directed to consider the
set-off of unabsorbed business losses and depreciation after availing deduction
u/s.10B.

S. 54EC : Exemption cannot be denied when investment in bonds made in joint names

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30 (2008) 114 TTJ 803 (Del.)


ITO v. Smt. Saraswati Ramanathan

ITA No. 2624 (Del.) of 2007

A.Y. 2004-05. Dated : 19-7-2007

S. 54EC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Exemption cannot be
denied when investment in notified bonds is made in joint names of assessee and
her son and not in her own name exclusively.

 

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee invested
her capital gains income in notified bonds and claimed exemption u/s.54EC. The
Assessing Officer denied the exemption on the ground that the investment in the
bonds was in the joint names which is not permitted under the above Section
under which it is the assessee who has to invest the gains in her own name. The
CIT(A), however, held that there is no such requirement in the Section and since
the assessee had invested the sale proceeds of the shares in the REC bonds
without any contribution from her son, the Section was complied with and the
exemption cannot be denied.

 

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, allowed the exemption :

(a) Jt. CIT v. Smt. Armeda K. Bhaya, (2006) 99 TTJ
(Mum.) 358, (2005) 95 ITD 313 (Mum.)

(b) R. B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala v. CIT, (1971) 82 ITR
570 (SC)

(c) CGT v. N. S. Getti Chettiar, 1972 CTR (SC) 349,
(1971) 82 ITR 599 (SC)

 


The Tribunal observed as under :

(1) If development of infrastructure is the object of S.
54EC, it would hardly matter whether the investment is made in the name of the
assessee exclusively or in the joint names of the assessee and somebody else.
The only condition is that the funds used for the investment must be traceable
to the sale proceeds of the capital asset.

(2) The assessee was 69 years old at the relevant time and
it was only a matter of convenience and to avoid any problem in future that
the son’s name was included.

(3) It is difficult to imagine that it would have been the
intention of the Act to place restrictions on such freedoms given to the
citizens of the country or on their right to take such precautions in the
interests of a secure future. Income tax is only one aspect of life and that
too for a minuscule part of the citizens of this country.

(4) While everyone is given the freedom to make investments
in any name he likes, there is no reason why such freedom should be taken away
in the case of Income-tax assessees, when the substantial ingredients of the
Section are complied with and the sale proceeds of the capital asset are
channelled into the assets in the national interest which is the main and
vital requirement of the Section.

(5) It is a well-settled rule of interpretation in IT law
that a beneficial Section has to be construed liberally, having due regard to
the object which it intends to serve.

(6) The Assessing Officer has interpreted the word
‘invested’ in S. 54EC to mean “invested in the assessee’s name”, an approach
which has no justification as it adds words into the Section and also ignores
the purpose which the Section is intended to serve.


S. 32 & S. 43(6) : Assessee claiming depreciation for first time on assets purchased and used in earlier year, entitled to claim on the original cost of assets

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29 (2008) 114 TTJ 145 (Ahd.)


National Dairy Development Board v. ACIT

ITA No. 454 (Ahd.) of 2006

A.Y. 2003-04. Dated : 17-8-2007

S. 32 and S. 43(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Assessee not
being a taxable entity in earlier years, it was entitled to depreciation on the
original cost of the assets without reducing from original cost the notional
depreciation accounted for in the books of assessee.

 

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee claimed
depreciation for the first time on the original cost of certain assets, even
though these assets were purchased and used by it in earlier years.

 

The assessee claimed that as per the provisions of S. 43(6),
the WDV had to be computed by reducing the depreciation actually allowed against
the cost of the assets and that there was no concept of mental calculations of
the depreciation as having been allowed in the tax-free period. Therefore,
depreciation during the current year has to be computed on the original cost of
the assets. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the assessee, as in
his view, the principle governing the depreciation allowance is the effective
life of the depreciable assets and the expenditure incurred on its wear and tear
for the period of its consideration and since the assessee had been using the
assets in question for years, such assets must have depreciated greatly by their
use and some of them might have reached the stage of being discarded. Hence, in
order to arrive at the correct income, normal wear and tear of the assets had to
be taken into account. The CIT(A) upheld the AO’s order.

 

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, allowed the assessee’s claim :

(a) CIT v. Straw Products Ltd., (1966) 60 ITR 156
(SC)

(b) CIT v. Dharampur Leather Co. Ltd., (1966) 60 ITR
165 (SC)

(c) CIT v. Mahendra Mills, (2000) 159 CTR (SC) 381,
(2000) 243 ITR 56 (SC)

(d) Madev Upendra Sinai v. Union of India & Ors.,
(1975) 98 ITR 209 (SC)

 


The Tribunal observed as under :

(1) S. 32 provides for depreciation on the WDV of the
asset. S. 43(6) defines the WDV to mean, in case of asset acquired in the
previous year, the actual cost to the assessee and in other cases, the actual
cost to the assessee less all depreciation actually allowed to him under the
Act.

(2) The short controversy is whether the “WDV of the asset
is to be taken at the original cost or as reduced by the notional depreciation
accounted for in the books of assessee and deemed to have been allowed in the
earlier years when the assessee was not chargeable to tax”.

(3) The term ‘actually allowed’ means allowed actually
under the Act and not notionally.

(4) In the earlier years the assessee was not liable to tax
and, therefore, the question of allowing any depreciation to the assessee
would not arise. The depreciation of the exempted period cannot be said to
have been allowed to the assessee.

(5) Wherever the legislature has wanted to reduce the WDV
to be ascertained after allowing notional depreciation, it has specifically
provided so, e.g., in S. 10A(6) providing for the deemed allowance of
depreciation for the assessment years ending before 1st of April 2001. S.
10B(6) also provides for similar deemed allowance of depreciation for any of
the relevant assessment years ending before the 1st of April 2001.

(6) As the income of the assessee was exempt until the
earlier year, no notional depreciation can be assumed and, therefore, it would
be entitled to the depreciation on the original cost of the assets.

 


S. 40 (a)(i), read with S. 195, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – In view of Board’s Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000, no income had accrued or arisen in India either u/s.5(2) or u/s.9 in respect of selling commission, brokerage and other related charges paid

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 328 (Gauhati)


Jt. CIT v. George Williamson (Assam) Ltd.

A.Y. : 1995-96. Dated : 31-8-2007

S. 40 (a)(i), read with S. 195, of the Income-tax Act, 1961
– In view of Board’s Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000, no income had accrued
or arisen in India either u/s.5(2) or u/s.9 in respect of selling commission,
brokerage and other related charges paid to non-resident agents in respect of
sale of tea outside India and, therefore, no tax was deductible u/s.195.
Hence, disallowance made by Assessing Officer was liable to be deleted.

During the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
disallowed the expenditure on selling commission, brokerage and other expenses
in relation to overseas sales paid to non-residents without tax deduction
u/s.195. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the additions so made.

On revenue’s appeal : the ITAT held that :

1) S. 195 casts an obligation on an assessee to deduct
tax from the payments made to non-residents which are chargeable to tax
under the Act.

2) In Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000, the Board has
explained the applicability of S. 195, read with S. 40(a)(i), in relation to
commission paid to foreign agents. As per the said Circular, in respect of
commission and brokerage paid to foreign agents on export sales, no income had
accrued or arisen in India either u/s.5(2) or u/s.9 and no tax was, therefore,
deductible u/s.195. Consequently, expenditure on commission and related
charges payable to non-resident agents could not be disallowed u/s.40(a)(i) on
the ground that tax had not been deducted.

S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction claimed on the basis of advise of the tax consultant supported by tax audit report — Penalty cannot be levied on the disallowance of the same.

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39 (2010) 38 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 101
Yogesh R. Desai v. ACIT
A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 1-2-2010

 

S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction claimed on the basis of advise of
the tax consultant supported by tax audit report — Penalty cannot be levied on
the disallowance of the same.

Facts :

Deduction u/s.80-O was claimed by the assessee which could
not be justified during the assessment proceedings. Finally, the assessee
accepted before the AO that the deduction was claimed erroneously and
inadvertently, as guided by his tax consultant.

Upon disallowance of the same, the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was
levied by the AO which was confirmed by the CIT(A).

Held :

It is settled law that penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is a civil
liability and the Revenue is not required to prove willful concealment as held
by the Supreme Court in the case of UOI v. Dharamendra Textile Processors &
Ors., 306 ITR 277. However, each and every addition made in the assessment
cannot automatically lead to levy of penalty for concealment of income.

Even if some deduction or benefit is claimed by the assessee
wrongly but bona fidely and no mala fide can be attributed, the penalty would
not be levied. The claim of deduction u/s.80-O was claimed on the basis of
advise of the tax consultant supported by tax audit report. Therefore there is
no concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars on the part of the
assessee and hence the penalty was deleted.