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[2015] 64 taxmann.com 26 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Kelly Services India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Gurgon-II

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Under Explanation to section 67, in case of associated concerns, when assessee paid service tax on book adjustment made prior to 10.05.2008, interest cannot be demanded for period prior to 10.05.2008.

Facts
For services received from overseas associated concern in FY 2006-07 and 2007-08, the assessee made book entries for consideration payable. Consideration for such services was paid in January 2011. An explanation was inserted u/s. 67 w.e.f. 10.05.2008, that in case of associated enterprise, the gross value charged shall include book entries made in the books of accounts of person liable to pay tax. Therefore service tax was discharged based on book entries, under reverse charge in January 2009 along with applicable interest. However, while quantifying interest, only period after 10.05.2008 was considered. However, department contended that interest is required to be paid prior to 10.05.2008 commencing from the date of book entries.

Held
The Hon’ble Tribunal noted that the Appellant did not contest interest paid for the period after 10.05.2008 but, only interest attributable for the period commencing from due date pertaining to the date of book entries up-to 10.05.2008, when explanation was inserted. It was noted that even in the Order-in- Original, the levy of interest is held to have commenced only after 10.05.2008. Relying upon decision of CESTAT in Sify Technologies Ltd. vs. CCE & ST [ Appeal No.ST/279/2010 dated 08-11-2010] on similar issue, the Hon’ble Tribunal observed that legislative intention of such amendment by way adding explanation was to introduce new provision and not to remove any doubts in existing provision. Decision of Larger Bench of the Tribunal in case of Commissioner of Customs vs. Skycell Communications Ltd. [2008 (232) ELT 434] was also relied upon which clarified that Explanation placing restrictions prejudicial to the assessee will not be retrospective. Consequently, the Tribunal held that there is no liability to pay interest on the book adjustments made prior to 10.5.2008.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 243 (Allahabad – CESTAT) Amit Pandey Physics Classes vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Kanpur

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Even though some portion of service tax as determined by central
excise officer is paid before issuance of show cause notice (SCN), such
prepayment cannot be reduced while quantifiying penalty u/s. 78.

Facts
The
appellant neither declared services in returns nor paid the service
tax. He admitted his mistake during investigation and paid around 75% of
such liability prior to issuance of SCN. In the SCN, penalty u/s. 78
was imposed on entire service tax liability by ignoring such service tax
already paid. It was contended that service tax liability was not
correctly determined as amount already paid was ignored and hence, after
considering service tax already paid, penalty should be levied only on
25% of service tax which remained unpaid.

Held
The
Hon’ble Tribunal observed that since the assessee was aware of the
provisions of service tax and yet failed to pay tax on due date, central
excise officer correctly determined total service tax liability of
assessee in terms of provisions of section 73(2). Accordingly,
imposition of penalty u/s. 78 was on total tax liability quantified in
SCN was also held to be correct.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 171 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Owens Corning (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Belapur

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Possession of components of capital goods in subsequent years is not
necessary for availing balance 50% CENVAT credit as per Rule 4(2)(b) of
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004

Facts
The Appellant, a
manufacturer of glass fibre, was using ‘bushings’ as components and
availed 50% of CENVAT credit in respect thereof as part of capital
goods. In subsequent year, such ‘bushings’ were re-exported for remaking
& assessee availed balance 50% CENVAT credit. By applying
provisions of Rule 4(2) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, revenue rejected
subsequent availment on ground that such capital goods were not in their
possession at the time of availment & ‘bushings’ received in
subsequent year are newly manufactured goods.

Held
The
Tribunal noticed that as per Rule 4(2)(b) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004,
balance CENVAT credit can be availed in sub-sequent financial year
provided capital goods other than components, spares & accessories,
refractories & refractory materials, moulds and dies, are in
possession of manufacturer of final product or output service provider.
It was held that ‘bushings’ being components, condition of possession of
same in subsequent year for availing balance 50% CENVAT credit is not
applicable.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 203 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi-III vs. Denso Haryana (P.) Ltd.

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Provision of ‘intellectual property service’ is complete on the date
of transfer/permission to use the same. When such date is before
introduction of service tax on such services, even though royalty
payments are received over a period of time including period post
introduction of service, service tax not leviable.

Facts
The
agreement for transfer of technology and right to manufacture and sell
products using same technology was entered into before levy of service
tax on ‘Intellectual Property Services’ came into force. As per payment
terms, consideration was required to be paid by making one-time lump sum
payment in addition to a running royalty based on number of products
manufactured using technology transferred. The revenue initiated
proceedings against appellants to recover service tax under reverse
charge in capacity of service recipient on amounts of royalty paid after
period in which ‘Intellectual Property Services’ were brought into
service tax net, based on the contention that appellants were providing
continuous supply of service.

Held
Relying upon
decision in the case of Modi-Mundipharma (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE [2010] 24 STT
343 (New Delhi – CESTAT), the Tribunal held that transfer of technology
in the present case cannot be held to be continuous supply of service
merely because of periodic payments. Provision for service was complete
as soon as technology was transferred. Revenue’s contention that use of
technology over number of years covered by periodic payments would form
the basis for continuous supply of service was rejected. Since transfer
of technology took place before introduction of service tax on
intellectual property services, it was held as not liable to service
tax.

2015 (40) STR 1069 (Tri.-Mum.) Bank of Baroda vs. CST, Mumbai

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If the assessee has a bona fide belief and service tax liability is paid voluntarily for the period beyond normal period of limitation, liability of interest does not arise.

Facts
The appellant paid service tax under protest along with interest for a disputed matter during the pendency of the proceedings. At the adjudication stage, the matter was contested on merits as well as on limitation. The adjudicating authority confirmed service tax demand with interest but dropped penalties. The service tax liability was not contested further in view of the clarification on the subject matter. However, interest liability was contested for extended period as they had no intention to evade service tax. Department argued that irrespective of the intention to evade service tax or otherwise, interest liability arises.

Held
In view of the clarification, the appellant’s appeal failed on merits. With respect to the liability of interest, the Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Narmada Fertilizers Co. Ltd. 2012 (285) ELT 336 (Guj.), had observed that if the period of limitation had expired and if the assessee has paid service tax voluntarily, SCN was not valid. Further, having regard to the intention of legislature it was held that in any case, it was not open for department to recover interest. The above decision was held to be squarely applicable in the present case since the appellant had a bona fide belief which was undisputed by the department. Accordingly, demand of interest was set aside.

2015 (40) STR 1146 (Tri.-Mum.) CCE, Nasik vs. Deoram Vishrambhai Patel

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Renting of property by individual co-owners is a service provided in individual capacity and not as association of persons.

Facts
The respondents are co-owners of a property which was neither divided nor legally partitioned. A Joint agreement was executed with banks to let out the said premises and collect rent and charges for amenities. Though first appellate authority had decided the case in favour of revenue for a partial demand of service tax, penalties were set aside except penalties u/s. 77 (1) (a) and 77 (2) of the Finance Act, 1994. Department filed an appeal arguing that there was no documentary evidence to prove the partition of property and the agreement was a composite agreement for renting out entire property and commonly used for business. Further it was stated that the Small Scale Service Provider’s exemption was available ‘qua service’ and not ‘qua service provider’ and therefore, in the present case, the exemption was not available. Since there was intentional suppression of facts, penalties u/s. 76 and 78 of the Act were applicable. Relying on Shiv Sagar Estate 1993 (201) ITR 953 (Bom.), the Respondents contested that adjudicating authority grossly erred in holding him and his brothers as association of person.

Held
The Tribunal observed that since service providers were individuals, co-owners of the property were not liable to pay service tax jointly or severally. The property was jointly owned; lease agreements were entered in their individual capacity, the monthly rent was received by each co-owner equally and all the co-owners had obtained separate service tax registration. As was evident from records, they had paid appropriate service tax before initiation of investigation. Therefore, penalties u/s. 76 and 78 were not imposable.

Is a 2008-like financial crisis in the making ? – Volatility in the financial markets shows fears over China are widespread

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Are we headed for a 2008-like financial crisis? George Soros, the man with the reputation of breaking the Bank of England thinks so. “When I look at the financial markets, there is a serious challenge which reminds me of the crisis we had in 2008,” Soros was quoted as saying by Bloomberg. The veteran hedge fund manager is worried about China and thinks it is finding the adjustment difficult. Volatility in the financial markets last week showed that the fear is widely shared across the world.

The Chinese economy is slowing and is being steered towards a more sustainable growth model, which is not dependent on manufacturing exports. However, dealing with past excesses and ensuring a soft landing is an issue. China contributes about 16% to world gross domestic product (GDP) and has provided strength to the global economy after the 2008 financial crisis. A sharp slowdown in China will not only affect overall global growth, but will be particularly harsh for its close trading partners.

A sharp slowdown will have a disproportionate impact on commodity exporters. In fact, the slowdown in China is one of the biggest reasons for the weaknesses in commodity prices.

Weakening economic activity is not the only problem. China is also witnessing serious capital flight. To be sure, policymakers want a weaker currency but are worried about disorderly depreciation. It is being reported that the central bank burnt at least $100 billion in December 2015 alone to defend the renminbi. The worry is that China will once again use weaker currency to support economic activity, which has prompted some of the businesses and households to move out of renminbi-denominated assets. There is also a high-debt angle to the story. According to McKinsey, total debt in China in mid-2014 was at 282% of GDP, which is higher than the debt of some of the advanced economies, such as the US and Germany, and has quadrupled from the level in 2007. Over-investment and slower growth would naturally make debt servicing difficult.

There are layers of issues confronting China at this stage which will keep the financial markets guessing. However, as things stand today, it is difficult to argue that the world is close to a 2008-like financial crisis. In 2008, part of the US economy was engaged in excessive speculation, expecting that good times will continue, and when financial conditions tightened, the result was a collapse in asset prices—a perfect Minsky moment—which brought the financial system to a standstill.

Conditions in China are a little different. China is not essentially struggling to contain speculation and assetprice inflation, but is shifting to a different growth model. It has accumulated excesses in terms of over-investment in various sectors, but debt is mostly concentrated with state-owned enterprises. In fact, households in China are in a lot better shape than they were in the US in 2008. Further, the US was far more financially integrated with the rest of the world than China is today, which will limit the impact. Also, unlike the US, China’s financial system is tightly controlled by the state.

This is not to suggest that a crisis in China will not have any impact on the global economy, but it is unlikely to be close to 2008. However, commodity export-dependent economies will remain in a difficult spot, as demand will remain capped because of a slowdown in China and weak global growth.

What does this mean for India? Policymakers in India will have to remain vigilant and find ways to grow at a time when global growth is likely to remain tepid for an extended period. India will also have to convince global investors that it does not belong to the typical commodityexporting emerging market pack, and is also not suffering from some of the problems that China is facing. Foreign portfolio flows could become more volatile because of a change in investor preference away from emerging markets.

India should, therefore, prepare the ground for attracting foreign direct investment, which is more serious in nature and is likely to be attracted to a long-term growth promise.

(Source: Extracts from the Editorial in Mint dated 11-01-2016)

Property held by a Hindu Female is her Absolute Property – N’est-ce pas?

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Introduction
The above Title, ‘Isn’t a Hindu Female’s Property, her Absolute Property?’, may appear as a rhetoric question to readers! However, having said that it would be interesting to note that the question is not as cut and dried as it appears and this issue has travelled all the way to the Supreme Court on numerous occasions. Thus, while it is quite easy to understand in theory that right to property is a vested right of a Hindu female under the Hindu Succession Act, it becomes quite difficult to understand its implications given the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The issue is thrown into sharper focus by the seeming dichotomy under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”), which deals with property of a Hindu female. A recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Jupudy Pardha Sarathy vs. Pentapati Rama Krishna, Civil Appeal No. 375/2007 (Jupudy’s case) has analysed the position laid down by various judgments on this subject.

Section 14 of the Act
The Act governs the position of a Hindu intestate, i.e., one dying without making a valid Will. The Act applies to Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and to any person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or a Jew. The Act overrides all Hindu customs, traditions and usages and specifies the heirs entitled to such property and the order of preference among them. Section14 which is the crux of the issue needs to be studied closely.

Section14(1) states that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whenever it may be acquired by her, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Thus, the Act lays down in very clear terms that in respect of all property possessed by a Hindu female, she is the full and absolute owner and she does not have a limited/restricted right in the same. The explanation to this sub-section defined the term, “property” to include both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift (from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage), or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. Thus, an extremely wide definition of property has been given under the Act. Property includes all types of property owned by a female Hindu although she may not be in actual, physical or constructive possession of that property – Mangal Singh & Ors vs. Shrimati Rattno, 1967 SCR (3) 454. The critical words used here are “possessed” and “acquired”. The word “possessed” has been used in its widest connotation and it may either be actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law. In the context in which it has been used in section 14(1) it means the state of owning or having in one’s hand or power – Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami vs. Setra Veerayya and Ors. (1959) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 968. The use of the words ‘female Hindu’ is very wide in scope and is not restricted only to a ‘wife’ – Vidya (Smt) vs. Nand Ram Alias Asoop Ram, (2001) 1 MLJ 120 SC.

In Deen Dayal & Anr. vs. Rajaram, (1971) 1 SCR 298, it was held that, before any property can be said to be “possessed” by a Hindu woman as provided in section 14(1), two things are necessary: (a) she must have a right to the possession of that property and (b) she must have been in possession of that property either actually or constructively. However, this section cannot make legal what is illegal. Hence, if a female Hindu is in illegal possession of any property, then she cannot validate the same by taking shelter under this section.

Section 14(2) carves out an exception to section14(1) of the Act. It states that nothing contained in sub-section (1) of section 14 shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. Thus, if a female Hindu acquires any property under any instrument and the terms of acquisition, as laid down by such instrument, itself provided for a restricted or a limited estate in the property then she would be treated as a limited owner only. In such an event, she cannot have recourse to section 14(1) and contend that she is an absolute owner.

Whether sub-section (1) or (2) of section 14 apply to a particular case depends upon the facts of the case – Seth Badri Pershad vs. Smt. Kanso Devi, (1969) 2 SCC 586. In this decision it was further held that sub-section (2) of section 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-section (1). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property. It further approved of the observations of the Madras High Court Rangaswami Naicker vs. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad 387 that section14(2) made it clear that the object of section 14 was only to remove the disability on women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of which a women’s right was restricted.

Factual Matrix of Jupudy’s case
A person had 3 wives and his 1st wife had predeceased him. His 3rd wife had no child and so, under his Will, he left her a house to be enjoyed for her life and after her life it was to go to his son from his 2nd wife. He also left her certain washroom facilities and right to fetch water from the well during her lifetime. All of these were also to devolve on his son after her death. The focussed issue before the Apex Court was whether the right to these properties so bequeathed on the 2nd wife was her absolute property by virtue of section 14(1) or whether it was a limited estate u/s. 14(2) since she was made an owner only for her lifetime?

Decisions on Section14
Several decisions of the Supreme Court have analysed section14(1) and section14(2) in depth. Some of the important ones are discussed below.

R.B.S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar, AIR 1962 SC 1493

The Supreme Court held that by section14(1) the legislature converted the interest of a Hindu female, which under the customary Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited interest, into an absolute interest and by the Explanation thereto gave to the expression “property” the widest connotation. The Court held that the Act conferred upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance, and swept away the traditional limitations on her powers of dispositions which were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate. She was under the Act regarded as a fresh stock of descent in respect of property possessed by her at the time of her death.

Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628

If a lady is entitled to a share in her husband’s properties then the suit properties must be held to have been allotted to her in accordance with section14(1), i.e., as an absolute owner inspite of the fact that the deed in question mentioned that she would have only a life interest in the properties allotted to her share.

Eramma vs. Verrupanna, 1966 (2) SCR 626

The Supreme Court held that mere possession of property by a female does not automatically attract section 14(1) of the Act.

MST. Karmi vs. Amru, AIR 1971 SC 745

A person died leaving behind his wife. His son pre-deceased him. He gave a life-interest through his Will to his Wife. It was held that the life estate given to a widow under the Will of her husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Act. Section14(2) would apply to such a situation and it would not become an absolute estate. The female having succeeded to the properties on the basis of her husband’s Will she cannot claim any rights over and above what the Will conferred upon her. This is one of the important decisions which have gone against the tide of conferring absolute ownership on the Hindu female.

V. Tulasamma vs. Sesha Reddi, (1977) 3 CC 99

In this landmark case, the Supreme Court clarified the difference between sub-section (1) and (2) of section 14, thereby restricting the right of a testator to grant a limited life interest in a property to his wife. case involved a compromise decree arising out of decree for maintenance obtained by the widow against her husband’s brother in a case of intestate succession. The compromise allotted properties to her as a limited owner. The Supreme Court held that this was a case where properties were allotted in lieu of maintenance and hence, section14(1) was clearly applicable. Thus, the widow became the absolute owner of these properties.

The Court held that legislative intendment in enacting s/s. (2) was that this subsection should be applicable only to cases where the acquisition of property is made by a Hindu female for the first time without any pre-existing right. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, such acquisition would be pursuant to her pre-existing right not be within the scope and ambit of section 14(2) even if the instrument allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property. S/s. (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of s/s. (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to s/s. (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any preexisting right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. It further held that a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is’ concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow. Though the widow’s right to maintenance is not a right to property, it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in the property, i.e. it is a jus ad rem, not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court.

Smt. Culwant Kaur vs. Mohinder Singh, AIR 1987 SC 2251 / Gurdip Singh vs. Amar Singh 1991 SCC (2) 8

The provisions of section 14(1) of the Act were applied because it was a case where the Hindu female was put in possession of the property expressly in pursuance to and in recognition of the maintenance in her/where the wife acquired property by way of gift from her husband explicitly in lieu of maintenance.

Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma, (1991) 4 SCC 312

The Apex Court dealt with a life estate granted to a Hindu woman by a Will as a limited owner and the grant was in recognition of pre-existing right. Tulasamma’s decision was followed and section 14(1) was held to apply. The Supreme Court also held that the contrary decision in the case of Mst. Karmi cannot be considered an authority since it was a rather short judgment without adverting to any provisions of section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. The judgment neither made any mention of any argument raised in this regard nor there was any mention of the earlier decisions on this issue.

Nazar Singh vs. Jagjit Kaur, (1996) 1 SCC 35 / Santosh vs. Saraswathibai, (2008) 1 SCC 465 / Subhan Rao vs. Parvathi Bai, (2010) 10 SCC 235

Applying Tulasamma’s decision it was held that lands, which were given to a lady by her husband in lieu of her maintenance, were held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several restrictive covenants accompanying the grant. According to the Court, this proposition followed from the words in sub-section (1) of section14, which insofar as is relevant read: “Any property possessed by a female Hindu … shall be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner.”

Shakuntala Devi vs. Kamla and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 390

A Hindu wife was bequeathed a life interest for maintenance by her husband’s Will with a condition that she would not have power to alienate the same in any manner. As per the Will, after death of the wife, the property was to revert back to his daughter as an absolute owner. It was held that u/s.14(1) a limited right given to the wife under the Will got enlarged to an absolute right in the suit property.

Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, (2006) 8 SCC 75 / Sharad Subramanyan vs. Soumi Mazumdar (2006) 8 SCC 91

The Supreme Court in these well-considered decisions held that the antecedents of the property, the possession of the property as on the date of the Act and the existence of a right in the female over it, however limited it may be, are the essential ingredients in determining whether subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act would come into play. Any acquisition of possession of property by a female Hindu could not automatically attract section14(1). That depended upon the nature of the right acquired by her. If she took it as an heir under the Act, she took it absolutely. If while getting possession of the property after the Act, under a devise, gift or other transaction, any restriction was placed on her right, the restriction will have play in view of section14(2) of the Act. Therefore, there was nothing in the Act which affected the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act did not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deemed fit. His Will could not be challenged as being hit by section 14(1) of the Act. When he validly disposed of his property by providing for a limited estate to his wife, the widow had to take it as the estate fell. This restriction on her right so provided, was really respected by section 14(2) of the Act. Thus, in this case where the widow had no pre-existing right, the limited estate granted to her under her husband’s Will was upheld u/s. 14(2).

Nazar G. Rama Rao vs. T. G. Seshagiri Rao (2008) 12 SCC 392

The Court held that if no issue was framed and also no evidence was led to substantiate the plea that the female was occupying the premises in lieu of maintenance, section 14(1) cannot automatically apply to every case.

Final Verdict in Jupudy’s case
After analysing a host of decisions and the legal principles, the Supreme Court in Jupudy’s case held that the bequest under the Will to the 3rd Wife was in the nature of maintenance even though the express words maintenance were not mentioned in the Will. She was issueless and the husband was duty bound to maintain her. Hence, he gave her the house and access to incidental facilities. Accordingly, section14(1) applied and the limited right stood enlarged into an absolute estate by virtue of a pre-existing right of maintenance. The Court observed that no one disputed the genuineness of the Will and the fact that the 3rd Wife continued to enjoy the said property in lieu of her maintenance and hence, the decision of G. Rama’s case cannot apply here.

Conclusion
Section14(1) is a very important piece of legislation when it comes to ensuring protection of a Hindu female’s rights over property. It ensures that a lady is an absolute owner in respect of her property. However, it is also essential that this is provision is used as a shield and not a sword. Section14(2) ensures that what was originally acquired as a limited owner does not automatically enlarge into absolute ownership. One important principle which emerges from the numerous Court cases is that, applicability of these two sub-sections has to be tested on the facts of each case and there cannot be one straight-jacketed approach to all cases. Due care should be taken in drafting a Will under which a Hindu lady is getting a limited estate to demonstrate that it is in effect a restricted interest and not something in lieu of maintenance.

Will – Transfer of property – Will becomes effective only after death of testator – Limitation Act, does not strictly apply for granting probate.

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The State of Meghalaya & Anr vs. Bimol Deb & Anr. ; AIR 2015 Meghalaya 48 (HC).

Writ petition was filed challenging the order of additional Dy. Commissioner (Revenue), Shillong on granting the probate. It was submitted that, as per the Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2010, no one can make a Will to transfer the property from one living person to another living person and that the Will in question was not a Will at all, but it was made for the purpose of transfer of land by the testator of the Will.

The Hon’ble Court observed that The Meghalaya Land Transfer Act, 1971 is a law passed by the State legislature. There is no definition that, “transfer of property” shall also include within its meaning “WILL” under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines “transfer of property” as an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself, and one or more other living persons; and ‘to transfer property’ is to perform such act”.

The definition of “WILL” can be found only in the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in Section 2(h) “WILL” means the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death.”

Now, the word “convey” in section 5 has been further defined in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 in section 2(10). “Conveyance” includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether movable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos (between living persons) and which is not specifically provided for by Schedule I”.

The upshot of the above legal position is that, ‘transfer of property’ will include only between living person and the same is the meaning of conveyance also which will include only between living persons. However, Will is a testament by a legal declaration bequeathing the right of property to a living person in future. A Will becomes effective only after the death of the testator. A Will is a last wish of a dead person.

Analysing various provisions of The Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2010, the Court held that, if we read the definition of “Transfer of property” and “Conveyance” quoted and discussed above, it becomes very apparent that, by including “WILL” within the meaning of “Conveyance”, the State legislature has rewritten the definition of “conveyance” which is an illegal exercise of power; but the State legislature in the first place has no power to alter the definition of conveyance legislated by the Parliament. The inclusion of “WILL” has to be struck down as illegal since the State legislature cannot overstep in the field of Union list while legislating law. The issue of succession is solely in the field of the Union list and not in the Concurrent list. Safe legal inference can be drawn that the insertion of WILL in clause 2(d) of the Meghalaya Land Transfer Amendment Act, 2012 quoted above is a blatant case of illegal legislation and is liable to be struck out. The subsequent amendment in section 3A restricting the devolution of property only to immediate family members will have to meet the same fate and to be struck down. The Court also observed that as per the limitation is concerned Article 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not strictly apply for granting probate.

Tribunal – Early hearing – Application must be considered :

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Payadhi Foods P. Ltd. vs. UOI 2015 (325) ELT 705 (Cal.) (HC)

The Petitioner filed an application for early hearing of a pending appeal before the CESTAT which was dismissed on the ground that the appeal would be considered in due course.

The Hon’ble court observed that the appeal which was filed in the year 2010 had not reached to its logical conclusion as yet. The Court observed that though it was not oblivious of the reality where the docket of the Tribunal is burdened with enormous litigation filed before it, but equally this Court cannot lose sight of the responsibilities of the statutory authority to render justice effectively and expeditiously. When an application is taken out seeking for an early hearing of the said appeal, the Tribunal ought to have fixed the date but should not have thrown the said application at the threshold that it will be taken up in due course. The court observed that the justice would be sub-serve if the CESTAT is directed to fix up a date and hear out the said appeal within the time frame.

Gift Deed – Cancellation – Suspicious Circumstances – It is settled principles of law that negative cannot be proved

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Smt. Sita Sundar Devi vs. Savitri Devi & Ors. AIR 2015 Patna 217 (HC)

Plaintiff filed the suit for declaration that the gift deed dated 09.05.1967 purportedly executed by him in favour of defendant Nos. 2 to 4 is fraudulent, illegal and void. The plaintiff also prayed for cancellation of the gift deed.

The lower court recorded the finding that the plaintiff had no cause of action and, therefore, was not entitled to any relief. The court below also found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the gift deed was obtained from him by fraud and as such, the gift deed is not a fraudulent, fabricated and illegal document. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed.

The Hon’ble High Court observed that it is settled principles of law that a registered document is presumed to be genuine unless the contrary is proved. However, this presumption is rebutable. Once the plaintiff denied its execution with his knowledge and alleged fraud describing how the fraud was played on him, it was for the defendant to have explained the facts, which have been denied by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff has shown the circumstances and the reason as to why he would have gifted his entire property to the the defendants, who are not close relatives without making any provision either for himself or for his wife and the daughter, grand-daughters etc. When these facts were brought on record, it was for the defendants to have satisfactorily explained the matter.

The court further observed that, it is the case of the defendants that plaintiff has purchased the stamp, therefore, it was for the defendants to prove this fact because the plaintiff has denied in so many words and it is settled principles of law that negative cannot be proved.

Once the plaintiff denied the facts, the presumption of genuineness of the gift deed stands rebutted and the onus shifted on the defendants to prove positively the fact asserted by the defendants.

It is settled principles of law that for proving fraud, the circumstance is to be shown satisfactorily to the conscience of the Court because no direct evidence will be found. Here, the plaintiff has proved the fact that he has his wife, daughter, grand-daughters and son-in-law whom he loves. Now the question is, can it be believed that one person will gift all the properties to some persons, who are either not related or distantly related without making provision even for himself and his wife? The court held that, this cannot be the natural conduct of a person.

This is one of the strong circumstances which raises a strong suspicion about the genuineness of the gift deed as there is no explanation at all. Can it be believed that the plaintiff’s love and affection towards his wife, daughter, grand-daughters and son-in-law and even towards himself was lesser than the love and affection towards the defendants?

The other aspect is that in fact the plaintiff was in need of money when he was ailing and was being treated. In such circumstances, he would have sold the property for arranging money but he did not sell. Rather, he obtained assistance from the defendants and then gifted everything, which again creates a strong doubt.

All these are the circumstances, which have been proved by the plaintiff, which clearly indicate that in fact the defendants played a fraud on the plaintiff and got the gift deed executed by him.

In view of above, the Court held that the plaintiff had been able to prove that the defendants fraudulently got the gift deed executed. As such the gift deed was not a genuine document and no title passed on the defendants on the basis of this gift deed.

Nominations – Securities – Nominee continues to hold the Securities in trust and as a fiduciary for claimants under succession law : Succession Act 1925 Section 58:

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Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar vs. Jayshree Jayant Salgaonkar AIR 2015 Bom 296

The issue arose as to whether the decision of a learned single Judge of Court in Harsha Nitin Kokate vs. The Saraswat Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Ors. 2010(112) Bom. LR 2014 was per incuriam and not a good law wherein the Court had considered the provisions of section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 and Bye-Law 9.11 under the Depositories Act, 1996, and found that once a nomination is made, the securities in question: automatically get transferred in the name of the nominee upon the death of the holder of the shares.

In the present matter the Hon’ble Court observed that The Depositories Act, 1996. is an act to provide for regulation of depositories in securities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

This Act has nothing whatever to do with succession or disposition inter vivos. Plainly, the Depositories Act is concerned with the regulation of depositories, i.e., those entities providing depository services, and not in relation to the holders of the securities in such services, or the manner in which those security-holders might choose to conduct their affairs or to leave the distribution of these securities either to be governed by actions and deeds inter vivos, testamentary succession or inheritance.

A nomination, though said to be a ‘testament’, requires no probate or other proof ‘in solemn form’. Witnesses need not be in the presence of the nominator. Witnesses need not act at the instance of the nominator. Witnesses need not see the nominator execute the nomination. No nomination can be assailed on the ground of importunity, fraud, coercion or undue influence; section 61 of the Indian Succession Act is wholly defenestrated, as is section 59. There can be no codicil to a nomination. There is no particular form for a will, but there are requirements attendant to its proper making. These do not apply to all nominations. Even the requirement of witnesses is a matter of prudence rather than statute. If that be so, no nomination per se requires attestation, and if that be so, it is admissible in evidence u/s. 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 without the evidence of any witness (simply because a witness to a nomination is not, in any sense, an ‘attesting witness’). But no Will can be so read in evidence without such evidence. From the fundamental definitions to the decisions cited, it is clear that a nomination only provides the company or the depository a quittance. The nominee continues to hold the securities in trust and as a fiduciary for the claimants under the succession law. Nominations u/ss 109A and 109B of the Companies Act and Bye-Law 9.11 of the Depositories Act, 1996 cannot and do not displace the law of succession, nor do they open a third line of succession.

Judicial Process – Judicial Composure and Restraint – Judicial accountability and discipline are necessary to the orderly administration of justice.

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State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr vs. Anil Kumar Sharma & Anr. (2015) 6 SCC 716

The substantial question of law that was raised in this appeal was, as to what extent a High Court can exercise its powers in issuing directions on judicial side, relating to the procedure to be adopted in criminal trials. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring the observation in A. M. Mathur vs. Pramod Kumar Gupta (1990) 2 SCC 533, observed that judicial restraint and discipline are necessary to the orderly administration of justice. The duty of restraint and the humility of function has to be the constant theme for a Judge, for the said quality in decision-making is as much necessary for the Judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary.

Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect, that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the court as well to other co-ordinate branches of the State, the executive and the legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process.

No person, however high, is above the law. No institution is exempt from accountability, including the judiciary. Accountability of the judiciary in respect of its judicial functions and orders is vouchsafed by provisions for appeal, revision and review of orders.

The Apex Court held that in view of law laid down by the Court, as discussed above, the High Court had clearly erred in law in treating the writ petition, which was filed for quashing of an FIR and had become infructuous, as a Public Interest Litigation, and issuing sweeping directions, without there being sufficient data and material before it to pass directions. There is no requirement u/s. 173 Code of Criminal Procedure for the Investigating Officer to produce the accused along with the charge-sheet. The High Court did not care to see that where there are several accused and only some of them could be arrested and remanded to judicial custody, and others are on bail, how all of them can be produced together by the police.

DAUGHTER’S RIGHT IN COPARCENARY – IV

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The 2005 amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”) by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (“the Amendment Act”) and the issue of daughter’s right in coparcenary property have now been a subject matter of substantial litigation all over the country. My articles in BCAJ published in January 2009, May 2010 and November 2011 made an attempt to explain the legal position as per the cases decided by several High Courts.

In the article published in May 2010, we had examined the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Valliammal vs. Muniyappan (2008 (4) CTC 773) which had relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheela Devi & Ors. vs. Lal Chand & Anr. reported in (2006) 8 SCC 581; 2007(1) MLJ 797 (SC) and other decided case law and come to the following conclusion:- “Therefore, it is clear that a daughter would get benefit of the Amendment Act only if her father is alive at the time of coming into force of the Amendment Act.”

Amongst varying controversial issues arising out of the Amendment Act, one of the major issues was as to whether the Amendment Act had retrospective effect and in which type of cases a daughter of a coparcener would get right in coparcenary property by birth.

With a view to make this article self-explanatory, it is necessary to reproduce here Section 6(1) of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act:-

“6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.
– (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, –

(a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;
(b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son;
(c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son,and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004.”

While several High Courts have considered the question of retrospectivity, there was no consistency in the approach. The different views taken by High Courts on the question are reflected in the following case law:-

In the case of Pravat Chandra Pattnaik & Ors. vs. Sarat Chandra Pattnaik & Anr., AIR 2008 Orissa 133, the Orissa High Court held that looking into the substance of the provisions (of section 6), it is clear that the Act is prospective. It creates substantive right in favour of a daughter from the date when the amended Act came into force i.e. 9.9.2005, whenever she may have been born.

In the case of Sugalabai vs. Gundappa A. Maradi & Ors. (2007) 6 AIR Kart. R 501, the Karnataka High Court held that as soon as the Amendment Act was brought into force, the daughter of a coparcener becomes by birth a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son and that there is nothing in the Amendment Act to indicate that the same will be applicable only in respect of a daughter born on or after the commencement of the Amendment Act.

The Madras High Court in the case of Valliammal vs. Muniyappan (2008 (4) CTC 773) held that the father of the daughter claiming interest in the coparcenary property having died prior to the Amendment Act and the succession having opened to the properties in question before such amendment the daughter was not entitled to any share in the coparcenary property.

In the case of Sadashiv Sakharam Patil vs. Chandrakant Gopal Desale – ( (2012)1 Mah LJ 197; (2011) 5 Bom C.R. 726), the Bombay High Court held that for the purpose of getting benefit of the amended provision it is not necessary that the birth of the daughter should also be after commencement of the amending act and that by virtue of the Amendment Act, the daughter of a coparcener becomes by birth a coparcener even if she was born before the Amendment Act coming into force.

In Vaishali Ganorkar vs. Satish Ganorkar (AIR 2012 Bom 101), the division bench of the Bombay High Court (headed by Chief Justice Mr. Mohit Shah) disagreeing with some other High Courts’ decisions to the contrary, held that only daughters born after 9th September 2005 (being the date of commencement of the Amendment Act) would get benefit under the Amendment Act. It also held that the new rights granted to a daughter which would affect vested rights would be on a wholly different footing and cannot be applied retrospectively. Although appeal to Supreme Court against the said decision was dismissed (2012 (5) Bom CR 210) the question of law was kept open.

In another case of Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari vs. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari reported in AIR 2014 Bom 151, the division bench of the Bombay High Court (also headed by Chief Justice Mr. Mohit Shah) has reconsidered its own earlier decision cited above and held that a bare perusal of sub-section (1) of section 6 would clearly show that the legislative intent in enacting clause (a) is prospective i.e. daughter born on and after 9th September 2005 will become a coparcener by birth but the legislative intent in enacting clauses (b) and (c) are retroactive and give rights to the daughter who was already born before the amendment and who is alive on the date of amendment coming into force. The court has further held that however if the daughter of a coparcener had died before 9th September 2005, her heirs would have no right in the coparcenary property.

It appears that in view of lack of clarity in the language of the provisions of amended section 6(1) of the Act, different High Courts had put emphasis on some particular wording in the Section in support of their decisions. Thus, while there were different decisions from High Courts, there was no finality and the confusion (and resultant litigation) continued.

Now, the controversy as to whether the Amendment Act is retrospective or not has been settled by a very recent decision of the Supreme Court dated 16th October 2015 in the case of Prakash and Ors vs. Phulavati and Ors. (2015 (6) Kar LJ 177) which has not yet been reported in any official reporter.

In that case the plaintiff Phulavati filed a suit before Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Belgaum for partition and separate possession to the extent of oneseventh of her share in the coparcenary property held by her late father Yeshwant, who had died on 18th February 1988. During the pendency of the suit the Amendment Act was passed and the plaintiff amended the plaint to claim a share as per the Amendment Act. The suit was contested and the Trial Court partly decreed the same in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon preferred first appeal before the Karnataka High Court claiming that she had become coparcener under the Amendment Act and was entitled to inherit the coparcenary property equal to her brothers. The High Court followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Sekar vs. Geetha and others (AIR 2009 SC 2649) and held that any development of law inevitably applies to a pending proceeding and in fact it is not even to be taken as a retrospective applicability of the law but only the law as it stands on the day being made applicable. Therefore, the High Court considered the case in light of the provisions of the Amendment Act. The High Court (AIR 2011 Kar 78) held that the plaintiff was entitled to a share in the coparcenary property. In appeal by the defendant Prakash to the Supreme Court it was held that the rights of a daughter under the Amendment Act are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born.

The effect of the Amendment Act is now clear. Therefore the law now stands that a daughter of a coparcener, who is living as on 9th September 2005, shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she would have been a son. It is irrespective when such daughter is born.

Let us hope that this final legal position now prevails without any further complications.

When Regulators Overlap: Competition Commission of India and the Draft Indian Financial Code 2015

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The Indian regulatory landscape is dotted with several sectoral regulators. Each of these specialised sectoral regulators is entrusted the task of maintaining the market dynamics of its own sector and preventing market failure. However, often their regulatory mandates overlap with each other, and nowhere is this blurring of boundaries more pronounced than in the efforts to foster and fuel competition in the Indian economy.

The Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) is a specialised sector-agnostic regulator tasked with preserving and promoting competition. Given its pansector mandate, it is no surprise that the CCI often ventures into the domain of sectoral regulators. Many sectoral regulators, such as the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, Insurance Regulatory & Development Authority, Securities and Exchange Commission and the Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board, are also meant to independently encourage competition in their respective markets. Given the already existing jurisdictional tension among regulators with overlapping functions, the Government of India (‘GoI’) has further obscured the sectoral delineations with the Draft Indian Financial Code 2015 (‘Draft 2015 Code’) which was released on July 23, 2015 by the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (‘FSLRC’).

The Draft 2015 Code seeks to regulate the financial sector and financial agencies, including the Financial Authority, the Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’), the Financial Redress Agency, the Resolution Corporation, the Financial Stability and Development Council and the Public Debt Management Agency (together called the ‘Financial Regulators’). When in place, it will replace a plethora of existing laws and attempt to bring coherence and efficiency to financial regulation in India.

The Competition Act, 2002 (‘Competition Act’) currently allows sectoral regulators to make references to the CCI on competition law issues and vice versa. Furthering this theme of inter-regulator cooperation, the Draft 2015 Code seeks to impose an obligation on the CCI to make a reference to the Financial Regulator, albeit as a nonvoting participant, when it undertakes any proceedings under the Competition Act where at least one of the parties is a financial services provider. In such cases, the Financial Regulator would be entitled to nominate a member or senior official to attend CCI proceedings. On the other hand, under the Draft 2015 Code, the Financial Regulator would be obligated to make a reference to the CCI to report any conduct of a financial service provider which it believes to be in violation of the Competition Act.

However, the Draft 2015 Code goes further and empowers the CCI to intervene in the issuance of any regulations, guidance or codes proposed by the Financial Regulators, if it feels they will, or are likely to, create any restriction or distortion of competition in the market for financial products or financial services (‘Negative Effect’). The CCI may comment even when the Negative Effect has been created on account of ‘a feature or combination of features of a market that could be dealt with by regulatory provisions or practices’. ‘Features of a market’ include both the structure of the market for financial products/ services as well as the conduct of financial service providers and/or consumers (even if this conduct is not in the market for the concerned financial product/services).

However, the CCI’s powers, as envisaged under the Draft 2015 Code, do not stop at the provision of commentary alone. The Financial Regulator in question is also required to respond to the CCI outlining what action it proposes to take to address the concerns raised by the CCI or provide reasons if it is not adopting any such actions. Nonetheless, if the CCI continues to remain of the opinion that a Negative Effect is/will be created, the CCI may issue binding directions to the Financial Regulator requiring it to take particular actions to remedy the same. These binding directions would need to be submitted to the Central Government and receive parliamentary approval. While the intention behind the Draft 2015 Code may have been to advance and nurture free and fair competition in the market for financial services and products it does raise certain fundamental issues which need closer scrutiny.

Vast increase in the powers of the CCI – While the requirement of parliamentary approval of any binding directions by the CCI does signal an acknowledgment by the FSLRC that these powers should be exercised sparingly by the CCI; given the absence of any specific guidelines to this effect, the end result could be a vast increase in the CCI’s powers. This could result in significant distortion of the boundaries between sectoral regulators and the CCI, particularly when the Financial Regulators are trying to address distinct structural and/or conduct related issues in the market.

CCI review of policy decisions in the financial services/products market – The CCI is a pan-sectoral regulator with the mandate to promote competition across all markets in India. However, the Draft 2015 Code empowers the CCI to influence policy decisions of the Financial Regulators if it is of the opinion that these decisions cause a Negative Effect in the market. While Financial Regulators focus on correcting specific issues in the markets for financial services/products, the CCI’s intervention could alter the focus of the policy actions in question.

Intervention in proceedings before the CCI – As mentioned earlier, any proceeding under the Competition Act where at least one of the parties is a financial services provider, the Financial Regulator would be entitled to nominate a member or senior official to attend the CCI’s proceedings, albeit as a non-voting participant. Such a nomination mechanism appears to be a reasonable way to lend sectoral expertise to the CCI’s proceedings, but the extent to which the said nominee may participate in the proceedings is not clear. Even without a vote, any active intervention by the nominee could influence the proceedings. This is especially so in cases where a Financial Regulator is a party to the proceeding., This provision may create due process issues that could effect enforcement under the Competition Act since the procedural guidelines on the conduct of nominees during the CCI’s proceedings are pending and unclear.

Competition regulators in other jurisdictions have not been granted similar powers of review and oversight into the financial sector. Whilst the Draft 2015 Code is a positive step towards harmonising various financial norms and regulators, it could blur the line between the mandates of financial and competition regulators. Comprehensive guidelines that delineate the extent of CCI oversight on the market for financial services and products in India, as distinct from its own mandate under the Competition Act could bring welcome clarity. Equally, some clarity on the role and participation of other stakeholders in CCI proceedings is also needed.

Treatment of Capital Expenditure on Assets Not Owned by the Company

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Sometimes, circumstances force an entity to incur capital expenditure which is not represented by any specific or tangible assets. For example, an entity may agree with a local authority to pay the cost or part of the cost of roads to be built by the authority. In this case also, the roads will remain the property of the Municipal body. Whether such expenditure should be capitalised or not, is a matter of debate and the solution will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Consider two scenario’s as given below. The discussion is based on Indian GAAP, but would be equally relevant for Ind-AS purposes as well.

Scenario 1
The Company had to incur expenditure on the construction/ development of certain assets, like electricity transmission lines, railway sidings, roads, culverts, bridges, etc. (hereinafter referred to as enabling assets) for setting up a new refinery. This was required in order to facilitate construction of project and subsequently to facilitate its operations. The ownership of these enabling assets does not vest with the company. The moot question is whether such expenditure can be capitalised or has to be charged to the profit and loss account immediately. This question was raised in 2011 with the Expert Advisory Committee (EAC), and its view and the basis of conclusion was as follows:

View of EAC along with the basis of conclusion [published in CA Journal January 2011]

The expenditure on enabling assets should be expensed by way of charge to the profit and loss account of the period in which the same is incurred. As per the Committee, an expenditure incurred by an enterprise can be recognised as an asset only if it is a resource controlled by an enterprise. For example, the entity having control of an asset can exchange it for other assets, employ it to produce goods or services, charge a price for others to use it, use it to settle liabilities, hold it, or distribute it to owners.

Further, an indicator of control of an item of fixed asset would be that the entity can restrict the access of others to the benefits derived from that asset. In the given case the entity does not have control over the enabling assets and should therefore charge the same as an expense in the profit and loss account.

Author’s comments

In the author’s view, there is sufficient justification in existing literature to support capitalisation of the enabling assets as part of the overall cost of the refinery. This is discussed below.

As per paragraph 9.1 of AS-10, “The cost of an item of fixed asset comprises its purchase price, including import duties and other non-refundable taxes or levies and any directly attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use; any trade discounts and rebates are deducted in arriving at the purchase price. Examples of directly attributable costs are: (a) site preparation; (b) initial delivery and handling costs; (c) installation cost, such as special foundations for plant; and (d) professional fees, for example fees of architects and engineers. Further paragraph 10.1 states, “Included in the gross book value are costs of construction that relate directly to the specific asset and costs that are attributable to the construction activity in general and can be allocated to the specific asset.”

Paragraph 8 of AS-16 states, “The borrowing costs that are directly attributable to the acquisition, construction or production of a qualifying asset are those borrowing costs that would have been avoided if the expenditure on the qualifying asset had not been made. When an enterprise borrows funds specifically for the purpose of obtaining a particular qualifying asset, the borrowing costs that directly relate to that qualifying asset can be readily identified.” In the given case, the costs incurred on the enabling assets is directly related to the construction of the refinery. The expenses on the enabling assets are required solely for the purpose of bringing the refinery to its working condition for its intended use. For example, without the electricity transmission lines, the refinery will not be ready for its intended purpose.

Interestingly, the EAC [Volume 24 – Query no. 9] had dealt with a similar issue in 2004 with regards to the expenditure incurred on the catchment area of a hydroelectric power project. In the said matter, a dam was being constructed across a river for the purpose of creation of a reservoir so that water is stored and used for the purpose of generating electricity. The reservoir is dependent upon the catchment area for water. Continuous soil erosion results in sedimentation, and reduces the capacity of the reservoir and efficiency of the project (emphasised). Substantial expenditure was incurred towards extensive catchment area treatment measures. In the said matter, EAC opined that the expenditure on the catchment area treatment is capitalised with the cost of the dam. For determining which expenditure is directly attributable to bring the asset to its working condition for its intended use, factors such as whether the concerned expenditure directly benefits or is related to that asset may be considered. In other words, there has to be some nexus between the expenditure and the benefit/relationship with the asset.

The ‘unit of account’ (should not be confused with component accounting) concept is another interesting concept in accounting. Under this concept, it would be argued that what is being constructed is the refinery, and not the roads, culverts, etc. which are all required to construct the refinery. The enabling assets are required not for their own individual purposes but for the purposes of the refinery. The expenditure on the enabling assets is required as part of the cost of constructing the refinery. Therefore the entire project cost including those incurred on the enabling assets will be captured as cost of constructing the refinery. Once that is done, the refinery itself will be bifurcated into various components, so that component accounting can be applied.

In the EAC opinion it is argued that, the entity having control of an asset can exchange it for other assets, employ it to produce goods or services, charge a price for others to use it, use it to settle liabilities, hold it, or distribute it to owners. Further, an indicator of control of an item of fixed asset would be that the entity can restrict the access of others to the benefits derived from that asset. Unfortunately, the argument presupposes the refinery and enabling assets as separate unit of accounts (should not be confused with component accounting). In the author’s view, the unit of account or the asset under construction is the refinery (and not the enabling assets), and all the costs (including on the enabling assets) are related to constructing the refinery. The entity has control over the refinery and restrict the access of others to the benefits derived from the refinery. Thus by looking at the refinery as the unit of account, it is argued that all expenses directly related to constructing the refinery (including costs on enabling assets) should be capitalised.

The EAC opinion will have significant implications for a lot of companies that are in the process of constructing huge projects. In light of the various submissions above, the EAC may reconsider its position. The author is aware that this gap is likely to be plugged in the revised AS 10 under Indian GAAP.

Scenario 2
A mining company has to transport coal through road transport to the nearest railway siding which is around 40 k.m. away from the mines. The existing two lane road is also extensively used by local villagers causing inconvenience, traffic jams and accidents due to which blockage of roads and delay in delivery is a common phenomena. Hence, there was a business necessity and compulsion to widen this road to liquidate the coal stock and to maintain continuity of production. To find a solution to the management problem of transporting the coal, the company widened the two lane road to four lane. The road belongs to and is owned by the State Government. The question is whether expenses incurred for widening of two lanes road to four lanes which is not owned by the company can be recognised as intangible asset.

The appropriate standard would be AS 26 Intangible Assets. As per paragraph 14 of AS 26, an enterprise controls an asset if the enterprise has the power to obtain the future economic benefits flowing from the underlying resource and also can restrict the access of others to those benefits. From the facts of the case neither the land to be acquired for widening the road nor the road will be the property of the company. These will remain the property of the State Government. Further, it is noted that the nearby villagers will also be beneficiaries. From this, it appears that although the work of widening the road will facilitate unrestricted movement of coal for the company, the company does not enjoy control in terms of restriction of access of others to the benefits arising from the widened road facility. Therefore, one may argue that the ex penditure incurred on widening and construction of road on the land which is not owned by the company does not meet the definitions of the terms ‘asset’ and ‘intangible asset’. Accordingly, some may argue that such expenditure cannot be capitalised as an intangible asset.

However the author believes, similar to Scenario 1, the unit of account is not the road but the mine. Hence the above argument of control is not a valid argument. Nonetheless, this fact pattern is different from the one in Scenario 1. In Scenario 1, the expenditure was incurred for and incidental to the construction of an asset (the refinery). The company controls the refinery and hence the capital expenditure including the incidental expenditure incurred for construction should be capitalised as cost of refinery. In Scenario 2, no new asset is created and the expenditure incurred on widening the lane is with respect to an already functioning mine. Paragraph 60 of AS 26 is relevant here, which states “Subsequent expenditure on a recognised intangible asset is recognised as an expense if the expenditure is required to maintain the asset at its originally assessed standard of performance.” This is a matter of judgement. The company should carefully evaluate whether the expenditure incurred on widening the road has increased the originally assessed standard of performance of the mine. If for example, substantially more coal can be produced and transported, because transportation bottlenecks have been removed, one may argue that the originally assessed standard of performance of the mine is increased, and therefore the cost of widening the road will be capitalised as an intangible asset. One will have to make this assessment very carefully.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 415 (Delhi) Pepsico India Housing (P.) Ltd. v ACIT A.Ys.: 2002-03. Date of Order: 22.12.2015

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Section 92C of the Act – if taxpayer has exported goods to AE at cost and AE, in turn, has sold them at its purchase price, the transaction meets arm’s length standard, ALP adjustment addition is not justified.

Facts
The taxpayer was an Indian company and a membercompany of Pepsico Group. During the relevant assessment year, the taxpayer had exported certain goods, which, based on the functions performed by the taxpayer, could be classified in two categories. In respect of the first category of goods, the taxpayer performed all the functions and undertook risks similar to that of a normal trader in ordinary course of business. In respect of second category of goods, the taxpayer acted as mere facilitator and performed the function of a service provider. The taxpayer grouped all the exports together and benchmarked them.

According to the taxpayer, it enjoyed Star Export House status. To retain it, it had to export certain minimum value of goods. The sellers and the prices of the goods that it exported were finalized by the buyers and the taxpayer acted as mere facilitator. Hence, it exported the goods at the same price at which it purchased them. The loss incurred by it was due to forex rate fluctuations.

In his report, the Transfer Pricing officer (TPO) observed that: the taxpayer had incurred losses by exporting the goods to its AE at the same price at which it purchased; the taxpayer had not even recovered cost incurred on storage, transportation and interest; as per OECD transfer pricing guidelines, two or more transactions can be aggregated only if they are closely interlinked or continuous or form one integral whole and cannot be analysed separately.

The TPO further observed that not recovering remuneration from AE amounts to shifting of profits and, there was no justification for the taxpayer to undertake forex risk. Therefore, TPO determined the ALP and the adjustment to the income of the taxpayer.

Held

It was an admitted fact that the loss incurred by the taxpayer was only on account of foreign exchange fluctuation as the commodities were sold to the AE at the same rate at which these were purchased from the local market.

On a similar issue, in DCIT vs. Global Vantedge P Ltd4 (ITA Nos. 1432 & 2321/ Del/2009 and 116/Del/2011) the ITAT held that ALP adjustment cannot exceed  the amount received by the AE from the customer and the actual value of international transactions (i.e. the amount received by the taxpayer in respect of international transactions).

In the present case, the taxpayer had sold goods to AE at the same price at which they were purchased from the local market. The AE, in turn, had sold them to the customers at the same price at which they were purchased from the taxpayer.

Hence, the international transactions with AE met the arm’s length standard. Therefore, addition on account of arm’s length price of international transactions was not justified.

[2016] 65 taxmann.com 247 (AAR – New Delhi) Cummins Ltd. Date of Order: 12.01.2016

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Article 13 of India-UK DTAA – Fee for supply management service was neither Fee for Technical Services (FTS) nor royalties in terms of Article 13 of India-UK DTAA – not taxable in India in absence of Permanent Establishment (PE) in India.

Facts
The applicant was a company incorporated in the UK. An Indian company (“IndCo”) was engaged in the production of turbochargers. IndCo purchased turbocharger components directly from suppliers in UK and US. The applicant had entered into Material Suppliers Management Service Agreement with IndCo. In terms of the Agreement, IndCo paid supply management service fee @5% of the base prices of the suppliers to the applicant.

The issues before the AAR were:
(i) Whether supply management service fee was FTS or royalties in terms of Article 13 of India-UK DTAA ?

(ii) Depending on answer to (i), as the applicant did not have PE in India, whether the payments were chargeable to tax in India?

(iii) If supply management service fee was not chargeable to tax in India, whether they were subject to transfer pricing provisions under the Act?

(iv) Depending on answer to (i) and (ii), whether IndCo was liable to withhold tax on supply management service fees?

Held

IndCo engaged the applicant only to ensure market competitive pricing from the suppliers. The applicant maintained contract supply agreement with suppliers after identifying the products availability, capacity to produce and competitive pricing. The applicant did not impart its technical knowledge and expertise to IndCo which enabled it to acquire such skills and use them in future. Therefore, the services did not satisfy the ‘make available’ condition under India-UK DTAA .

Relying on the decisions in De Beers India Minerals Private Ltd. (346 ITR 467) and Measurement Technologies Limited (AAR No.966 of 2010), services in the nature of procurement services can never be classified as technical or consultancy in nature and they do not make available any technical knowledge, experience, know-how etc.

The services rendered in this case were managerial in nature. With effect from 11th February, 1994, managerial services were taken out from the ambit of FTS under India-UK DTAA and ‘make available’ clause was inserted. This clearly showed the intention to exclude managerial services and include ‘make available’ requirement.

As the services were related to identification of products and competitive pricing and not to the use of, or the right to use any copyright, patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process etc., they cannot qualify as royalties under Article 13 of India-UK DTAA .

Since the applicant had no PE in India, service fee was not chargeable to tax in India and hence, IndCo was not liable to withhold taxes.

PS: AAR held that the issue whether transfer pricing provisions applies is not applicable.

TS-10-ITAT-2016(Mum) Accordis Beheer B V vs. DIT A.Ys.: 2006-07. Date of Order: 13.01.2016

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Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA); Section 112 of the Act – Buy-back of shares under a scheme of arrangement was not “reorganisation” as contemplated in Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA, transfer did not qualify for participation exemption; however, the transfer qualified for concessional rate u/s. 112 of the Act

Facts
The taxpayer was a resident of Netherlands. It held 38.24% of shares of an Indian company (“IndCo”) whose shares were listed on Indian stock exchanges. During the relevant year, IndCo proposed a scheme of arrangement for buy-back of its shares. The said scheme was approved by the jurisdictional High Court. The taxpayer tendered all the shares held by it and received consideration resulting in capital gains. The taxpayer contended that in terms of Article 13(5)3 of India-Netherlands DTAA , the capital gains were not chargeable to tax in India.

According to the Tax Authority, since the taxpayer sold its shares to IndCo, which was an Indian resident, capital gain did not qualify for participation exemption under Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA . Further, according to him the concessional rate of 10% provided in the second proviso to section 112 of the Act was not applicable in case of the taxpayer and hence levied tax on capital gain @20%.

The moot point before the Tribunal was whether the shares tendered in the scheme by the taxpayer constituted “reorganisation” in terms of Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA .

Held
As regards whether buy-back is “reorganisation”

Since the scheme was approved by High Court, there was no colourable device.

Reorganisation should involve major change in financial structure of a corporation, resulting in alteration in rights and interests of security holders. In the present case, upon implementation of the scheme there was no change in the rights and interests of the shareholders. Only change was that pursuant to reduction of share capital the percentage of shareholding of the promoter group had gone up. That cannot be considered as change in the rights and interests of shareholders.

The reorganisation contemplated in section 390 of the Companies Act 1956 consists of either consolidation of shares of different classes, or division of shares into different classes, or both.

Transfer of shares pursuant to a buy-back scheme could not fall under the ambit of the term “reorganisation” since the objective of the scheme was not financial restructuring, but providing exit to non-resident shareholders.

As regards rate of tax

Having regard to the decisions in Cairn U.K. Holdings Ltd. (2013)(359 ITR 268)(Del) and ADIT vs. Abbott Capital India Ltd. (65 SOT 121)(Mum Trib), the taxpayer is entitled to the concessional rate of 10% under section 112 of the Act.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 162 (AAR – New Delhi) Satyam Computer Services Ltd Date of Order: 01.12.2015

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Sections 9, 195 of the Act – Payment of penalty decreed by Foreign Court, being payment to Government, not subject to tax and hence, will not be subject to tax withholding under the Act.

Facts
The applicant was an Indian company. The shares of the Applicant were listed on Indian stock exchanges. The Applicant had also issued American depository shares which were listed on New York Stock Exchange. SEC of USA had filed complaint with US Court for violation of American Securities Law by the Applicant. The Applicant filed its consent and undertaking with SEC without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint and agreed to pay penalty. The US Court levied civil penalty on the Applicant. The Court further decreed that “amount ordered to be paid as civil penalties pursuant to this Judgment shall be treated as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes”.

The AAR examined the issue whether penalty payable pursuant to decree of US Court, which was paid to US Court/Government of USA was liable to tax withholding under the Act.

Held
Penalty pursuant to the decree of Court will not be subject to tax liability. Consequently, question of tax withholding u/s. 195 of the Act will not arise.

[2016] 65 taxmann.com 246 (AAR – New Delhi) Aberdeen Claims Administration Inc. Date of Order: 19.01.2016

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Sections – 4, 5, 9, 45, 48 of the Act –Settlement amounts received by FIIs pursuant to waiver of right to sue for damages caused by fraud in financial statements was compensation for not pursuing the suit and involved surrender of capital asset (viz., “right to sue”); though it was a capital receipt, as the computation provisions failed, capital gains could not be calculated; hence, it was not taxable as capital gains.

Facts
Several FIIs were holding American depository shares and equity shares of an Indian listed company (“IndCo”). There was public disclosure by the CEO of the Indian company about manipulation of financial results of IndCo. As a result, the price of securities of IndCo dropped steeply and the FIIs were forced to dispose of the securities, suffering huge losses. Several investors initiated class action litigation against IndCo. While initially claims of FIIs were also consolidated with those of the other investors, subsequently, the FIIs filed request for exclusion with the Court. The FIIs then separately negotiated the terms of settlement with IndCo and its auditors pursuant to which IndCo and its auditors agreed to pay settlement amount to FIIs.

The issue before the AAR was whether the settlement amount received by FIIs from IndCo and its auditors was taxable in terms of the Act.

The FIIs contended as follows.

As regards sections 4, 5 & 9 of the Act

Since the settlement amounts were not received in the ordinary course of business of the Applicant, and the Applicant is not engaged in the business of suing and seeking settlement from third parties, they would not qualify as “income” for the purposes of the Act.

Since section 9 of the Act refers to only specific streams of income the settlement amounts cannot be said to be deemed to accrue or arise in India in terms thereof.

The settlement amounts were linked to a law suit that arose outside India and was not determined on the basis of value of the underlying shares of IndCo. The suit was linked to allegation of fraud/negligence. The settlement amounts were not sourced in India. Hence, the territorial nexus principle was not fulfilled. This was established from the fact that the FIIs had sold the shares prior to initiation of the action.

Therefore, the settlement amounts cannot be brought to tax u/s. 9 read with Section 4 and Section 5 of the Act. This is on the basis that the settlement amounts were not connected with the Applicant’s business in India but for release of claims of FIIs against IndCo and its auditors. Therefore, the settlement amounts have no territorial nexus with India.

As regards section 45 of the Act
The settlement amounts were received on account of destruction of capital assets (i.e. the right to sue IndCo and its auditors).

Assuming that the settlement amounts were subject to Section 45 of the Act cost of acquisition and cost of improvement of a right to sue cannot be computed. Hence, owing to failure of computation mechanism no Capital Gains could arise under Section 48 and Section 55 (3) of the Act2.

The settlement amounts were received as compensation for the injury inflicted on capital asset of the trading (Equity and ADS shares held FIIs) and therefore not subject to Section 45 of the Act.

A ‘right to sue’ is property (and thus Capital Asset as defined under Section 2 (14) of the Act). Inherently, as a matter of public policy, a ‘right to sue’ is not transferable. Thus, there cannot be any transfer of a right to sue under Indian law. Consequently, any capital receipt arising from a right to sue cannot be considered capital gains u/s. 45 of the Act. The Gujarat High Court has accepted this proposition in Baroda Cement and Chemicals vs. C.I.T. (158 ITR 636). Also, in Vania Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. C.I.T. (191 ITR 647), the Supreme Court has laid down that receipt on account of destruction of capital assets is not subject to capital gains.

The tax authority contended as follows.
The FIIs were pass-through entities engaged in the business of trading in securities and the loss was incurred by them in the course of that business. The recipients of the settlement amounts were the FIIs (and not participating investors) who were in the business of purchase and sale of securities.

Unlike an investor, Mutual Funds change their portfolios frequently and sometimes prefer even booking losses. The FIIs decide to move out of a market on local as well as international factors. The buying and selling of shares is done very regularly and frequently. These are characteristics of a trader and not of an investor. Merely because in order to attract investments the Government has decided to treat the gains of FIIs as capital gains, the same does not alter the basic character of the activity but only changes the matter of taxability.

Any fall in price of share cannot be regarded as destruction of asset. Rise and fall in prices of securities, be it for one reason or the other, is a normal business incidence and neither the rise in price creates an asset nor the fall in price destroys an asset. Capital receipt arises only when receipt is for destruction of the profit making apparatus or crippling of the recipient’s profitmaking apparatus. However, when the structure of the recipient’s business is so fashioned as to absorb the shock as one of the normal incidents of business activity the compensation received is no more than a surrogatum for the future profits surrendered. Hence, it should be treated as a revenue receipt and not a capital receipt.

The settlement amounts received were not for relinquishment or extinguishment of the right to sue but as a compensation for the loss of potential income suffered in the course of their business operations.

Held

In Union of India vs. Raman Iron Foundry, AIR 1974 SC 265, the Supreme Court has held that the only right which the party aggrieved by the breach of the contract has, is the right to sue for damages, which is not an actionable claim and it is amply clear from the amendment in section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, which provides that a mere right to sue for damages cannot be transferred.

However, in CIT vs. Mrs Grace Collis and other 2001 248 ITR 323, the Supreme Court has held that the expression “extinguishment of any rights therein” does include the extinguishment of rights in a capital asset independent of and otherwise than on account of transfer. Hence, the right to sue can be considered for the purpose of capital gains u/s. 45 of the Act.

In CIT vs. B.C. Srinivasa Setty (1981 128 ITR 294), the Supreme Court has held that the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code and a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply was not intended to fall within the charging section. It was further held that none of the provisions pertaining to the head ‘capital gains’ suggests that they include an asset in the acquisition of which no cost of acquisition at all can be conceived. It is clear that if right to sue is considered as a capital asset covered under the definition of transfer within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Act, its cost of acquisition cannot be determined. In the absence of such cost of acquisition, the computation provisions failed and capital gains cannot be calculated. Therefore, right to sue cannot be subjected to income tax under the head ‘capital gains’.

Since the settlement amounts have been received against surrender of right to sue, it cannot be considered for the purpose of capital gains u/s. 45 of the Incometax Act.

The settled legal position is that FIIs are not engaged in trading business. The facts also show that the shares were purchased as investors and not as traders and in the books of accounts also they were treated as capital investment.

While the settlement amounts were relatable to shares (i.e., if shares would not have been purchased the question of class action or right to sue would not have arisen), they were received not as part of business profit or to compensate the future income but as a result of surrender of the claim against IndCo and its auditors. Hence, even in accordance with the principle of surrogatum, such amounts were not assessable as income because they did not replace any business income.

Decoding Residence Rule through not so rhyming POEM – How Melodious is the Indian POEM – an Analysis

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“Residence” is one of the primary factors to fasten the tax liability
on any tax payer in a country, be it an individual, a company or any
other entity. Determination of a residential status of an assessee
assumes significant importance in international taxation. Elaborate
rules are prescribed in tax laws of every country and/ or in tax
treaties prevalent worldwide. One of such rules for residence of
companies accepted and followed worldwide is that of Place of Effective
Management. Finance Act, 2015 amended Section 6(3)(ii) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 dealing with Residence of companies from the “Control and
Management Principle” to the “Place of Effective Management” (POEM).
POEM is dealt with by both, the OECD and UN in their Model Commentaries.
In December 2015, CBDT came out with Draft Guidelines on determination
of POEM for a Company. This write-up highlights crucial aspects
regarding determination of residential status of a company taking into
account the concept of POEM.

Backdrop
Corporate
Residency has been one of the most important issues across the world.
With businesses moving across countries and with digital economy being
the flavour of the 21st century, countries are in a tiff to make sure
that they don’t lose their pie of taxes. The steps taken by the G20
Nations to prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) are in this
direction. In case of multinational companies, the structures adopted
are such that it becomes difficult to ascertain where its control and
management are situated. Countries worldwide have introduced various
concepts like POEM, Place of Management (POM), Control and Management (C
& M), Central Control & Management etc. to ascertain the
residency based on overall control and management of the company.

Concept of Corporate Residency before the Amendment

As
per Section 6(3) of the Act before the Amendment, the Income-tax law
was as under – “A company is said to be resident in India in any
previous year, if –

(i) It is an Indian company; or
(ii) During that year, the control and management of its affairs is situated wholly in India.” (Emphasis Supplied)

Hence,
a foreign company was treated as resident only if the control and
management of its affairs were situated wholly in India during that
year. It meant, even if a part of control was outside India, the company
was not regarded as resident and hence, it was subjected to tax only on
income sourced in India.

In the erstwhile definition it was
easy for a foreign company (which was controlled and managed from India)
to avoid Indian taxes on global income by artificially shifting/
retaining part of its C & M outside India. Typically, resident
Indians who have set up overseas companies could use the erstwhile
definition to their advantage.

It may be noted that the term
“Control and Management” was not defined in the Act. However, in general
parlance, it was understood that control and management did not mean
conducting day to day management of the company, but it referred to the
head and brain of the company that take major decisions for effective
functioning and managing of the company.

C & M being not
defined in the Act was a major bone of contention between the taxpayers
and revenue authorities. Let us look at some of the judicial rulings on
the interpretation of C & M:

C & M as per Indian Courts
In
Subbayya Chettiar (HUF) vs. CIT (19 ITR 168) (SC) Honourable Supreme
Court observed that C&M signifies the controlling and directive
power, the head and brain; and “situated” implies the functioning of
such power at a particular place with some degree of permanence.

In Narottam & Pereira Ltd. (23 ITR 454),
the Bombay High Court held that Control of a business does not
necessarily mean the carrying on of the business, and therefore, the
place where trading activities or physical operations are carried on is
not necessarily the place of control and Management. The High Court
disregarded the presence of strong manager overseas in favour of
controlling directors being situated in India. It was held that the
direction, management and control, ‘the head, seat and directing power’
of a company’s affair is situated at the place where the directors’
meetings are held and consequently, a company would be resident in India
if the meetings of directors who manage and control the business are
held in India.

In the case of Radha Rani Holdings (P) Ltd. [2007] 16 SOT 495 (Del),
it is provided that the situs of the Board of Directors of the company
and the place where the Board actually meets for the purpose of
determination of the key issues relating to the company, would be
relevant in determining the place of control and management of a
company1.

The meaning of the expression ‘control and management’
as used in section 6(3) (ii) of the Act was the subject matter of
judicial interpretation in the past. The legal position is well-settled
that the expression “control and management” means the place where the
‘head and brain’ of the company is situated and not the place where the
day-today business is conducted.

Professor Klaus Vogel, in his treatise, has observed that what is decisive is not the place where the management directives
take effect, but rather the place where they are given (Klaus Vogel on
Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd Edition, Para 105 on page 262). Thus,
it is “planning” and not “execution” which is decisive.

Finance Act – 2015 and Explanatory Memorandum on POEM

In
order to protect its tax base and to align provisions of the Act with
the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA s) entered into by India
with other countries, the concept of POEM was introduced vide amendment
to Section 6(3)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’).

According
to the amended definition, a company would be resident in India if it
is incorporated in India or its ‘place of effective management’ (POEM),
in that year, is situated in India.

POEM has been defined to
mean a place where key management and commercial decisions that are
necessary for the conduct of the business of an entity as a whole are,
in substance made.

The said amendment has significant impact
on various foreign companies incorporated by Indian MNC’s for Outbound
Investments and business operations outside India.

POEM and its Implications

Some
questions which may come to readers’ mind are (i) whether POEM is
different from the concept of C & M and if yes, how? (ii) What is
the impact of such difference? Before answering these questions, let us
analyse the definition of POEM in detail. We may compare and contrast
the concept of C & M while dissecting the definition of POEM.

POEM as defined by the Finance Act, 2015 has four limbs as follows:-

  • Key Managerial and Commercial decisions
  • Necessary for the Conduct of Business
  • Of an entity as a whole
  • in substance made.

Important
Factors relevant to POEM in India 1) Place where Board Meetings are
held O ne of the primary factors which may lead to effective management
rests with the place where the board meetings are held. Key Managerial
and Commercial Decisions are always meant to be understood as strategic
ones taken by the highest authority of the company. The Board of every
company is considered to be the head and brain of the company. However,
mere holding of board meetings might not hold ground if decisions are
made/taken at some other place. C & M Many courts have ruled that
one of the most important factors to determine C & M of a company is
where its head and brain i.e. Board of Directors is situated. Thus
location of board and decisions taken by them was crucial even for
determination of C & M as it is in the case of POEM.

2) Key Managerial and Commercial Decisions:-

The
intention of the legislation becomes clear from the word “key” inserted
in the definition of POEM. It implies that the decisions should be more
of strategic and should be above the day to day operational decisions.
It tries to distinguish the secretarial decisions taken at the board
meetings.

Similar was the stand in determination of C & M.

3) Operational management vs. broader top level management

The
decisions taken by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating
Officer might be managerial and commercial in nature but may not always
“key” in nature. For example, procurement of goods from vendors,
inventory management, offers and discounts for increase in sales etc.
would be classified as managerial and commercial decisions but not
strategic in nature. Such decisions might not be relevant for the
determination of POEM.

However, the decisions of opening a
new branch or launching of a new product, pricing policies, expansion of
the current facilities etc. which would have significant impact on the
business and on the company as a whole might be taken by the Board or
the Top Management of the Company. Such decisions would be more relevant
in establishing POEM.

All these factors are/were relevant in the determination of C & M as well.

4) Other relevant factors

There
are other relevant factors in the determination of POEM. They are the
place where the accounting records are maintained; the Place of
incorporation of the company; the primary residence of the directors of
the company, the details of the stewardship functions by the parent
company etc. The parent company should restrict itself from actual
running of the subsidiary. The guidance or influence of the parent
company should be limited.

All these factors are/were relevant in the determination of C & M as well.

From
the above discussion, one may conclude that POEM is a fact and
circumstance specific concept and hence, all relevant facts and
circumstances must be examined on case by case basis. POEM refers to
comprehensive control over the entity as a whole during the year and is
not the same thing as a part of the control of the entity residing in
India for the whole of the year. It may be possible that a MNC has a
flat structure and shared powers or large scale autonomy in the
organisation where there could be more than one place where C & M
are situated. However, when one looks at the Company as a whole (which
is the requirement under POEM) then, one would be able to narrow down
POEM to one place/country.

OECD/UN perspective on POEM

The
OECD Model Commentary2 states that “The place of effective management
is the place where key management and commercial decisions that are
necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business are in substance
made. The place of effective management will ordinarily be the place
where the most senior person or group or persons (for example Board of
Directors) make its decisions, the place where the actions to be taken
by the entity as a whole are determined”.

According to the UN Model Commentary in determining the POEM, the relevant factors are as follows:–

(i) the place where a company is actually managed and controlled;

(ii)
the place where the decision-making at the highest level on the
important policies essential for the management of the company takes
place;

(iii) the place that plays a leading part in the management of a company from an economic and functional point of view; and

(iv) the place where the most important accounting books are kept.

To summarise, the criteria generally adopted to identify POEM are:

– Where the head and the brain is situated.
– Where defacto control is exercised and not where the formal power of control exists.
– Where top level management is situated.
– Where business operations are carried out.
– Where directors reside.
– Where the entity is incorporated
– Where shareholders make key management & commercial decisions.

Different Shades of POEM, POM and PCMC

POEM
is interpreted differently by different countries. Countries like
China, Italy, South Africa, Russia etc. have adopted the concept of POEM
in their Domestic tax laws. However, countries like The U.K.,
Australia, Germany etc. although do not have the concept of POEM but
they have adopted the concept of ‘Central Management’ and ‘Control or Place of Management
and control as residence test for companies in their Statutes. Further,
POEM has been interpreted by countries in their own ways. This
interpretation can be observed from the reservations and observations of
various countries to the OECD Commentary.

BEPS and POEM
Final
Report of OECD on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), [Action
Point 6 on “preventing the granting on treaty benefits in inappropriate
circumstances”] prefers that in case of Tie-breaker for the
determination of treaty residence of a person other than individual, be
done by the Competent Authorities of respective states.

Draft Guidelines by CBDT on POEM

The
CBDT released draft guidelines for determination of POEM of a Company
on 23rd December 2015. A brief summary of the principles enumerated in
the draft guidelines is as follows –

POEM adopts the concept of substance over form.

The Company may have more than one place of management but it can have only one POEM at any point of time.

Residential
status of a person under the Act is determined every year. Accordingly,
for the purpose of the Act, POEM must be determined on year to year
basis. The determination would be based on facts and circumstances of
each case.

The
process of determining the POEM would primarily be based on whether a
company is engaged in ‘active business’ outside India or otherwise.

For
this purpose, a company shall be said to be engaged in ‘active
business’ outside India if all of the above conditions are satisfied –

For this purpose, an average of the data of the current financial year and two years prior shall be taken into account.

POEM guidelines for companies engaged in active business outside India:

The
POEM of a company engaged in active business outside India shall be
presumed to be outside India if the majority of meetings of the
company’s Board of Directors (BOD) are held outside India.

However,
in case the Board of Directors are standing aside and not exercising
its powers of management and such powers are being exercised by the
holding company or by any other persons resident in India, the POEM
would be considered to be in India.

Issues: Indian
Guidelines provide both objective and subjective criteria. On the one
hand it provides to look at the objective criteria for operations of
business such as earnings, assets, employee base, etc. (see the diagram)
while on the other hand, it also looks at actual control &
Management by BOD. Worldwide only control & management criteria
(decision making by BOD) are used. Indian Provisions for POEM are a
departure from International practice in that sense. POEM guidelines for
companies other than those engaged in active business outside India For
companies other than those engaged in active business outside India
(i.e. passive business), determining the POEM would be a two-stage
process:

First stage would be identifying/ascertaining person or
persons who are making the key management and commercial decisions for
conducting the company’s business as a whole.

Second stage would be the place where these decisions are being made.

Thus,
the place where management decisions are taken would be more important
than the place where the decisions are implemented. Some guiding
principles for determining the POEM are as follows:

Location where the company’s Board regularly meets and makes decisions can be the POEM of the company, provided the Board:

• retains and exercises its authority to govern the company; and

• in substance, makes key management and commercial decisions necessary for the conduct of the company’s business as a whole.


However, mere holding of a formal Board meeting would not be
conclusive. If key decisions by the directors are taken at a place which
is different from the location of the Board meetings, then such place
would be relevant for POEM.

A company may delegate (either
through board resolution or by conduct) some or all authority to
executive committee consisting of key senior management. In these
situations, location of the key senior managers and the place where such
people develop policies and make decisions will be considered as POEM.

The location of the head office
will be very important in considering the POEM because it often
reflects the place where key decisions are made. The following points
need to be considered for determining the location of the head office:


The place where the company’s senior management (which may include the
Managing Director, Whole Time Director, CEO, CFO, COO, etc.) and support
staff are located and that which is considered as the company’s
principal place of business or headquarters would be considered as the
head office.

• If the company is decentralised, then the
company’s head office would be the location where senior managers are
predominantly based or normally return to, following travel to other
locations, or meet when formulating or deciding key strategies and
polices for the company as a whole.

• In cases where the senior
management participates in meetings via telephone or video conferencing,
the head office would be the location where the highest management and
their direct support staff are located.

• In cases where the
company is so decentralised that it is not possible to determine its
head office, then the same may not be considered for determining the
POEM.

• Day-to-day routine operational decisions undertaken by
junior/middle management would not be relevant for determining the POEM.

• In the present age, where physical presence is no longer
required for taking key management decisions, the place where the
majority of the directors/ persons taking the decisions usually reside
would be considered for the POEM.

• If the above guidelines do
not lead to clear identification of the POEM, then the place where the
main and substantial activity of the company is carried out or place
where accounting records of the company are kept would be considered.

POEM to be a fact-based exercise: Examples of isolated instances would not necessarily lead to POEM

Issues:
If
a MNC holds its one of the Global Board Meetings in India, where
significant decisions are taken for its worldwide operations say group
policies are framed – can it lead to POEM? Perhaps not, being isolated
or one of its kind of meetings.

Place where accounting records
are kept may be considered for determination of POEM. This may lead to a
practical problem. What if mirror accounts are kept at two places?

Merely keeping accounting records should not lead to establishment of POEM.

Passive
Income: – Trading with a group company is considered as passive income.
When Transfer Pricing Regulations are in place this kind of provision
is uncalled for.

Objective and Subjective Criteria: – Ultimately
nothing seems to be clear. Each provision is with a caveat leaving to
lot of subjectivity and powers to Assessing Officers.

Local
Management: – It is provided that place of local management may not lead
to POEM but what is ‘local management’ is not defined.

As POEM
is sought to be clarified by way of guidelines, a moot question arises
whether guidelines be binding or override the provisions of law? In
fact, it is provided in the guidelines that they are neither binding on
the Income-tax department nor on the taxpayers. In such an event, what
is the sanctity of such guidelines?

Some Silver Linings

A
foreign company being completely owned by an Indian company would not
necessarily lead to POEM in India (Example – TATA Motors owning Jaguar
PLC).

One or some of the directors of a foreign company residing in India would not necessarily lead to POEM in India.

Local management of the foreign company situated in India would not be conclusive evidence for establishing the POEM in India.

Mere
existence in India of support functions that are preparatory or
auxiliary in nature would not be conclusive evidence for establishing
the POEM in India.

Other key points of the Guidelines

Guidelines
provide that the principles enumerated in the guidelines are only for
the purpose of guidance. In such cases, no single principle will be
decisive in itself.

POEM to be a fact-based exercise – a
‘snapshot’ approach cannot be adopted and activities are to be seen over
a period of time and not at a particular time.

In case the POEM is in India as well as outside India, POEM shall be presumed to be in India if it is mainly/ predominantly in India.

Prior
approval of higher tax authorities would be required by the tax officer
in case he proposes to hold a foreign company as resident in India
based on its POEM. The taxpayer must be given the opportunity to be
heard.

Does Guidelines on POEM sound similar to CFC Rules?

POEM, a step closer to CFC rules
Various
efforts have been undertaken by the Government of India to simplify the
Income-tax law in India5. The Finance Minister Shri Arun Jaitley at the
time of scrapping the Direct Tax Code (DTC) had mentioned that there is
no need of introducing DTC. Suitable amendments to the Income-tax law
would be made for the purpose of simplification.

The erstwhile
DTC contained the ‘Controlled Foreign Corporation’ Rules (CFC rules).
CFC rules, in principle, targets the offshore entities which are used to
park income in low or NIL tax jurisdictions. Similarly, POEM too tries
to achieve a similar objective. The guidelines defining ‘active business
outside India’ and ‘passive income’ are akin to provisions or
objectives of CFC Rules. No country in the world has such conditions for
determination of POEM which tries to achieve dual purposes.

Comments on the draft POEM Guidelines

Arbitrary use of powers

POEM, as a provision in the law specifically targets the unacceptable
tax avoidance structure(s). The use of shell/conduit companies is
discouraged. Considering subjectivity involved while determining POEM,
the draft guidelines are issued to narrow down its wide scope. However,
it has been specified that the guidelines are not binding on tax
authorities nor it is binding on the taxpayers. In such a case
guidelines are infructuous. Tax payers may fear that the provisions of
POEM may be applied harshly and interpreted in the widest possible sense
in favour of revenue.

Residency assumed, unless proved otherwise?
– The draft guidelines in current form seem to suggest that it’s assumed that you are resident barring a few exceptions.
– The wide subjectivity of guidelines can hamper Indian Entrepreneurship in the long run.
– Subsidiaries of Indian MNC’s particularly wholly owned subsidiaries
outside India would be facing an uphill task of establishing that the
POEM is not in India.
– The definition of passive income seems to be very wide and hamper genuine business transactions.

Whether the guidelines would have a retrospect effect??

Considering the wide scope of POEM, it was mentioned in the Explanatory
Memorandum of the Finance Act 2015 that the guiding principles would be
followed soon. However, it is unfortunate that the guiding principles
(in a draft format) have been issued at the fag end of the Financial
Year. In such cases, a question arises that whether these principles
would be applicable with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2015? The
answer seems to be “yes” as these are merely guidelines and not the law.
There is no question of retrospective effect. In fact what guidelines
say is supposed to be followed by companies in the normal course.

Summation
For
the purpose of determining POEM, it is the de facto control and
management and not merely power to control which must be checked. In the
redefined corporate tax residency regime of the domestic tax law (in
line with international principles), place of effective management has
become one of the relevant factors for the purpose of determining
residential status of a company. In such a scenario, the company would
be deemed to be resident of the Contracting State from where it is
effectively controlled and managed. The draft guidelines leave much to
the discretion of the Income-tax Authorities. We hope that the tax au
thorities are made accountable for their actions and certain fundamental
binding principles are laid down so that unnecessary litigation is
avoided. It is expected that the final guidelines will be modified and
litigation prone issues would be addressed. It would be interesting to
see how the Government and Income-tax authorities would view or evaluate
structures of various companies going forward. Prudence suggests that
applicability must be postponed for at least one year so that
unnecessary hardships to tax payers can be avoided. Further, this would
give an opportunity for hygienic check to taxpayers for their outbound
structures.

Sales made to Diplomatic Authorities etc.

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No.VAT.1515/C.R.102/Taxation-dated 15.1.2016

The Government of Maharashtra has amended Notification issued for the grant of refund of tax collected by any registered dealer on his sales made to the diplomatic authorities or international bodies or organisations.

Amendment in Schedule A

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No.VAT.1515/CR-169/Taxation-1 dated 2.1.2016

Maharashtra Government has amended Schedule A by inserting Entry 12B to exempt drugs and medical equipments used in dialysis for treatment of patients suffering from kidney disease as may be notified from time to time by the state government in the official gazette with effect from 2.1.2016.

PUBLIC LECTURE MEETING ON DIRECT TAX PROVISIONS ON THE FINANCE BILL, 2016

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Dear Members,

The wait for most awaited economic event of the country, Union Budget 2016 will be over on 29th February, 2016. The entire country is eager to know how the “Ease of doing business” unfolds. Will the Easwar Committee recommendations be accepted? Whether there will be any guidance on the GST applicability? Will this budget bring in more transperancy and accountability? How will the “Guiding Principles” of POEM take shape?. The Indian businesses are looking forward to long term measures on policy front which provides stability on tax front and enables proper planning. They envisage substantial scalable operations with support of qualitative direction from Modi Government to capitalise on opportunities for emerging markets like India. Whether the Modi Government will go that extra mile and deliver some path breaking measures in the forthcoming Budget, is looked upon with eagerness and anxiety. The future is promising and the pace has to be provided by the Finance Minister through his ultimate accelerator, Union Budget, 2016. The country awaits to see its future…..

In its endeavour to spread the knowledge far and wide, Shri S E. Dastur, Senior Advocate, will present his masterly analysis of the Direct Tax provisions of the Finance Bill, 2016. Details are as follows:

DAY & DATE : Friday, 4th March 2016

TIME    : 6.15 p.m.

VENUE    : Yogi Sabhagruha, Shree SwaminarayanMandir, Dadar (East), Mumbai – 400014

SPEAKER    : Shri S. E. Dastur, Senior Advocate

FEES : Free for all and open to anyone interested on the subject. Seats will be available on first come first served basis.

We trust you will attend this lecture meeting along with your Colleagues, Students & Friends.

Infinite Growth in a Finite World? – Hopium Economics has given us deeply-in-debt individuals, businesses and nations

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Economic growth is a central assumption to political and economic systems. It is the mechanism relied upon for improving living standards, reducing poverty to now solving the problems of over indebted individuals, businesses and nations. All brands of politics and economics assume sustainable, strong economic growth, combined with the belief that governments and central bankers can control the economy to bring this about.

But strong growth is not normal, being a recent phenomenon over the last two centuries. Economic activity and the wealth created have increasingly relied on borrowed money and speculation. It was based upon the profligate use of mispriced natural resources such as oil, water and soil. It relied on allowing unsustainable degradation of the environment.

The human race refuses to accept that it is not possible to have infinite growth and improvement in living standards in a finite world. As author Edward Abbey warned, “Growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of a cancer cell.”

Central to the problem is the level of indebtedness. Debt accelerates consumption, as borrowed funds are used to purchase something today against the promise of paying back the money in the future. Spending that would have taken place normally over a period of years is squeezed into a relatively short period because of the availability of cheap borrowing. Business overinvests misreading demand, assuming that the exaggerated growth will continue indefinitely, increasing real asset prices and building significant overcapacity.

Around 85% of the debt incurred over the last 30-35 years funded the purchase of existing assets or consumption rather than being used for creating new businesses or productive purposes which build wealth.

Global debt now stands at around $200 trillion (over 280% of the world annual produce), an increase of $57 trillion since 2008 when high debt levels brought the world to the brink of collapse.

“Hopium” economics cannot mask the problem of excessive leverage forever. The debt will have to be repaid out of future income or proceeds of asset sales, diminishing growth or savaging investment values. If as is likely, this debt cannot be repaid, then it will be written off, resulting in an unprecedented loss of wealth for savers. Compounding the problems of debt, resources and environment are challenges of slowing rates of innovation, lower improvements in productivity, demographics, inequality and exclusion. The amount of global arable land has remained relatively constant for the last decade at 3.4 billion acres. The annual increase in global population requires water flow equivalent to Germany’s Rhine River. The frequency of extreme weather events is increasing. In a Faustian bargain, policy makers sold the future originally for present prosperity and are now reselling it for a precarious and short-lived stability. There is a striking similarity between the problems of the financial system, irreversible climate change and shortages of vital resources like oil, food and water. In each area, society borrowed from and pushed problems into the future. Short term profits were pursued at the expense of risks which were not evident immediately and that would emerge later.

Kicking the can down the road only shifts the responsibility onto others, especially future generations. By postponing the inevitable, the adjustment becomes larger and more painful.

Economic problems feed social and political discontent, opening the way for extremism. In the Great Depression the fear and disaffection of ordinary people who had lost their jobs and savings gave rise to fascism. Writing of the period, historian A. J. P. Taylor noted, “[The] middle class, everywhere the pillar of stability and respectability … was now utterly destroyed … they became resentful … violent and irresponsible … ready to follow the first demagogic saviour.”

Humanity faces this, its greatest crisis, with, in the words of biologist E. O. Wilson, “palaeolithic emotions”, “medieval institutions” and delusions about its “god-like technology”.

But a new industrial revolution is not on the horizon. It is not clear how new smartphones and connectivity that feed cheap narcissism will address the urgent problems of the world. Progress on crucial problems like improving crop yields, cheap clean energy and its storage is slow.

Many new technologies such as robotics reduce living standards as they replace or deskill most workers. Innovation enriches a few people who control or finance the technology at the expense of the vast majority of the population, entrenching and increasing inequality.

The world is remarkably unprepared for the crisis that is unfolding. During the last half-century each successive crisis has increased in severity, requiring progressively larger measures to ameliorate its effects. Over time, the policies have distorted the economy. The effectiveness of instruments has diminished.

With public finances weakened and interest rates at historic lows, there is now little room for manoeuvre. Resource constraints and environmental problems are increasingly pressing. A new crisis will be like a virulent infection attacking a body whose immune system is already compromised.

Factual debate is replaced by what comedian Stephen Colbert calls “truthiness”, things which were not true but rather things one wishes were or actually believes to be true. Any challenge to the consensus of unlimited opportunity is crushed. As Tertullian wrote, “The first reaction to truth is hatred.”

(Source:Article by Shri Satyajit Das in The Times of India dated 08-01-2016)

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 39 dated January 14, 2016

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Export of Goods and Services – Project Exports

This circular provides that: –

i) The ‘OCCI’ will now be known as ‘Project Export Promotion Council’ (PEPC).

ii) Civil construction contracts can include turnkey engineering contracts, process and engineering consultancy services and Project construction items (excluding steel & Cement) along with civil construction contracts.

The Memorandum of Instructions on Project and Service Exports (PEM) containing the above changes is enclosed with this circular.

FED Master Directions dated January 4, 2016

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On January 4, 2016 RBI has issued the following 17 Master Directions (There is no Master Direction 1 & Master Direction 11). Each Master Direction consolidates / complies various instructions issued by RBI, from time to time, with respect to the Regulations covered in the Master Directions.

RBI will continue to issue directions to Authorised Persons through A.P. (DIR Series) Circulars in regard to any change in the Regulations or the manner in which relative transactions are to be conducted and the Master Direction will also be amended suitably.

2. M aster Direction – Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Nonresident Exchange Houses 3. M aster Direction – Money Changing Activities

4. Master Direction – Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999 5. Master Direction – External Commercial Borrowings, Trade Credit, Borrowing and Lending in Foreign Currency by Authorised Dealers and Persons other than Authorised Dealers

6. Master Direction – Borrowing and Lending transactions in Indian Rupee between Persons Resident in India and Non-Resident Indians / Persons of Indian Origin

7. M aster Direction – Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS)

8. M aster Direction – Other Remittance Facilities

9. M aster Direction – Insurance

10. M aster Direction – Establishment of Liaison / Branch /Project Offices in India by foreign entities

12. M aster Direction – Acquisition and Transfer of Immovable Property under Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999

13. Master Direction – Remittance of assets

14. Master Direction – Deposits and Accounts

15. Master Direction – Direct Investment by Residents in Joint Venture (JV) / Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) Abroad

16. Master Direction – Export of Goods and Services

17. Master Direction – Import of Goods and Services

18. Master Direction – Reporting under Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999

19. Master Direction – Miscellaneous

Confidential Information

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Every person, whether a corporation or an individual has his own secrets and/or information which they consider to be confidential in nature. The question that arises is how does one protect such information, which may be of a commercial nature. Of course, a person may choose never to divulge or disclose his secret or confidential information and in a manner of speaking, take the information to his grave, in which case the question of the information ever being misappropriated cannot and does not arise. However, if one had to divulge or disclose the confidential information for its commercial exploitation, then the question of preventing its misappropriation would surely arise.

If the confidential information is patentable in nature then one may choose to apply for a patent and seek protection. The confidential information which makes up the invention in such a case would be published through the patent office, considering the quid pro quo for the grant of a patent is the disclosure of such confidential information/ invention. However, in lieu of the disclosure the person/ corporation would get statutory protection and a monopoly for the term of the patent.

On the other hand, there may be information which is not patentable but which is otherwise not in the public domain and which is proprietary in nature. Such information would be entitled to protection under the law relating to confidential information. The law relating to protecting confidential information is a part of common law and is based on the broad principles that “If a defendant is proved to have used confidential information, directly or indirectly obtained from the plaintiff, without the consent, express or implied, of the plaintiff, he will be guilty of an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights1 ” and that “It depends on the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it. He must not make use of it to the prejudice of him who gave it without obtaining his consent.2”

A classic example of a Company deriving huge benefits out of its confidential information would be the case of Coca-Cola. The formula/recipe to the soft drink is a closely guarded secret known only to the top officials in the Company. A more local and indigenous example could be of the “Tunday Kebabs” in Lucknow. Before the brothers split a few years ago, it was believed that the recipe to their famous kebabs was known only to the male members of the family and not even revealed to the wives or daughters in the family so as to ensure the confidentiality thereof. Evidently, confidential information can be extremely valuable in certain cases. It is this very branch of law, which would in a sense be the broad basis of the non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements that are drawn up regularly, for example between two companies or between an employer and an employee.

This article is addressed towards explaining the basic concepts of the law relating to confidential information. I shall be addressing the basics of the law of confidential information such as when would the law apply, what information can be considered to be confidential, the springboard doctrine and the necessary requisites a Plaintiff must prove in an action for breach of confidence.

Confidential Information
The first and foremost aspect of the law of confidential information is that it is not restricted to cases of contractual obligations of confidentiality3. Hence, even if parties have shared confidential information with one another without entering into a formal agreement for non-disclosure or protecting confidentiality, the law would protect the disclosure of such information subject to the other requirements, explained hereinafter, being met. Hence, even if an employee was not bound by an express term of confidentiality, he would be bound by an implied duty of good faith to his employer not to use or disclose the confidential information.

At this juncture, it may be relevant to note that there is a distinction between preventing disclosure of confidential information and a clause in restraint of trade. As explained by the Bombay High Court in the case of Star India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Laxmiraj Nayak & Anr.5 , a distinction must be drawn between the confidential information imparted and the skill acquired by the employee. It cannot be said that the employee cannot be permitted to exercise his skill merely because it has been acquired by possessing a trade secret of any one. The Bombay High Court, illustrated its point by stating, inter alia, that “No hospital can prevent a heart surgeon from performing heart surgery in some other hospital by saying that the heart surgeon had acquired skill by performing heart surgeries in that hospital. It is a personal skill which the heart surgeon acquired by experience. Same is the case with the salesman who negotiates with the customer for the sale of the product of his employer. He learns from experience how to talk with different people differently and how to canvas for the sale of the product successfully. He knows the selling points of a particular product by experience. He acquires a good and sweet tongue if he is a salesman dealing with the female folks for the products required by them. He learns the art of tackling the illiterate people. He comes to know how to deal with the old and aged people. He knows the quality of his products. He knows the rates. He might perhaps also be knowing the cost of the products and the profit margin of the employer. All these factors cannot be called trade secrets.” Hence, what can be prevented by an employer is the use and disclosure of the confidential information by an employee but not the exercise of a skill by the employee.

The most important aspect, though would be as to what information can be treated as being confidential in nature. Does information become confidential merely because one entitles it as such. Is information to be treated as confidential merely because one party asserts it to be confidential. To illustrate, can Company A in a contract with Company B assert that information pertaining to the composition of its Board of Directors is confidential and cannot be divulged? To my mind, the answer to this question would be in the negative since this information would otherwise be available from a search of the records of the Registrar of Companies and would as such be in the public domain.

Thus, broadly speaking it is information which is not available in the public domain and which therefore, can be treated as being proprietary in nature that could be treated as being information which is confidential in nature. Even, at times information which is otherwise in the public domain may be treated as confidential since the maker of the document has used his brain and thus produced a result which can only be produced by somebody who goes through the same process6 .

The information must have a significant element of originality not already known in the realm of public knowledge. The originality may consist in a significant twist or slant to a well known concept. The originality may also be derived from the application of human ingenuity to well known concepts7. An example of a case where the originality of the information came from an application to a well known concept would be the “Swayamvar” case before the Delhi High Court. In that case, the Plaintiff sought to protect the idea of a TV show based on the concept of a Swayamvar. Even though the concept of a swayamvar was a well known concept and as such in the public domain, the Delhi High Court observed that “The novelty and innovation of the concept of the plaintiff resides in combining of a reality TV show with a subject like match making for the purpose of marriage. The Swayamvar quoted in Indian mythology was not a routine practice. In mythology, we have come across only two Swayamvars, one in Mahabharat where the choice was not left to the bride but on the act of chivalry to be performed by any prince and whosoever succeeded in such performance got the hand of Draupadi. Similarly, in Ramayana choice was not left to the bride but again on performance of chivalrous act by a prince who could break the mighty Dhanusha (Bow). Therefore, originality lies in the concept of plaintiff by conceiving a reality TV programme of match making and spouse selection by transposing mythological Swayamvar to give prerogative to woman to select a groom from a variety of suitors and making it presentable to audience and to explore it for commercial marketing. Therefore the very concept of matchmaking in view of concept of the plaintiff giving choice to the bride was a novel concept in original thought capable of being protected.8 ”

Hence, in each case, the confidential information would have to be identified with a degree of certainty and merely by entitling the information as confidential, the same would not become confidential. The person claiming the information to be confidential must be in a position to identify and assert how the information he claims to be confidential is in fact such information as is not available in the public domain and contains the element of originality as required in such cases.

Another facet of what information may be claimed as confidential pertains to cases where the information is partly public and partly private. In such cases also, the Courts have held that where confidential information is communicated in circumstances of confidence the obligation thus created would endure even after all the information has been published or is ascertainable by the public so as to prevent the recipient from using the communication as a spring-board9 . In Seager vs. Copydex Ltd.10 the Court, observed, inter alia, that “As I understand it, the essence of this branch of the law, whatever the origin of it may be, is that a person who has obtained information in confidence is not allowed to use it as a spring-board for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential communication, and spring-board it remains even when all the features have been published or can be ascertained by actual inspection by any member of the public …The law does not allow the use of such information even as a spring-board for activities detrimental to the plaintiff.”

The spring board doctrine refers to the fact that the recipient of information which is partly public and partly private cannot take advantage of the private information to spring board the development of his activities. As explained by Lord Denning, when information is mixed as in partly private and partly public, then the recipient must take special care to use only the material which is in the public domain11 .

Hence, the necessity and/or importance of identifying the confidential information would be paramount. Identifying the confidential information, however, is only but one aspect of what a Plaintiff would be required to prove in a case filed for breach of confidence. As held by the Bombay High Court in the recent case of Beyond Dreams Entertainment Private Limited vs. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited12, a Plaintiff would be required to prove three elements viz. that firstly, it must be shown that the information itself is of a confidential nature, secondly, it must be shown that it is communicated or imparted to the defendant under circumstances which cast an obligation of confidence on him. and that thirdly, it must be shown that the information shared is actually used or threatened to be used unauthorizedly by the Defendants, that is to say, without the licence of the Plaintiff. The High Court also observed that each one of these three elements had its own peculiarities and sub-elements.

Thus, in every case of breach of confidence, a Plaintiff would be required to plead and prove the aforesaid factors. A plaintiff to succeed in a case for breach of confidence would not only have to identify that the information imparted was confidential but also show that it was imparted under circumstances which implied a relationship of confidence and that there has been a threat to disclose and/or divulge such information.

Conclusion
Whilst the law on the subject is extremely vast, I hope that the above summarisation of the basic concepts of the subject, would make clear the minimum requirements that must be borne in mind whilst dealing with confidential information. The draftsman of a contract or a plaint would have to endeavour to determine whether or not there is any confidential information involved and to identify the same. It must be made clear to the recipient of the information that the information being shared is confidential in nature and cannot be divulged. It may be appreciated that it is very important to understand and identify what information is in the public domain and what information is private. It is essential that parties and/or draftsmen endeavour to identify the information which is not in the public domain and/or which cannot be arrived at without applying one’s mind. Parties must bear in mind that merely by labelling information as confidential it would not become confidential and that certain information even though not labelled confidential if given in circumstances implying confidence may be protected.

An endeavour has been made to codify the subject, by the Department of Science and Technology, by publishing a draft legislation titled the National Innovation Act of 2008, the preamble to which provides that it is, inter alia, “An Act to … codify and consolidate the law of confidentiality in aid of protecting Confidential Information, trade secrets and Innovation.” The draft legislation has however, not yet seen the light of the day and we continue to be governed by the vast amount of case law based on the common law principles of preventing breach of confidence.

Salary – Section 17(3) – A. Y. 1994-95 – Premature termination of service in terms of service rules – Payment of sum by employer to employee voluntarily with a view to bring an end to litigation – No obligation on employer to make such payment – Payment not compensation – Not profits in lieu of salary – Not liable to tax

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Arunbhai R. Naik vs. ITO; 379 ITR 511 (Guj):

The assessee was discharged from his services. Against the order of termination, he preferred an appeal to the higher authority in the company but did not succeed. In writ petition filed by the assessee the Single Judge directed reinstatement of his services. During the pendency of the appeal preferred by the employer against the order of the single judge, the assessee and the employer arrived at a settlement, in terms whereof, the amount was to be computed in the manner stated therein and was to be paid to the assessee. The assessee claimed that the amount of Rs. 3,51,308/- so received was capital receipt and was not liable to tax. The Assessing Officer did not accept the claim and the amount was added to the total income. The Tribunal held that the amount was taxable u/s. 17(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

On appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The services of the assessee were terminated in terms of the service rules and the amount was paid only in terms of the settlement, without there being any obligation on the part of the employer to pay any further amount to the assessee with a view to bring an end to the litigation.

ii) There was obligation upon the employer to make such payment and, therefore, the amount would not take the character of compensation as envisaged u/s. 17(3)(i). The amount would, therefore, not fall within the ambit of the expression “profits in lieu of salary” as contemplated u/s. 17(3)(i). The Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in holding that the amount of Rs. 3,51,308 received by the appellant pursuant to the judgment of the High Court was income liable to tax u/s. 17(3) of the Act.”

References and appeals to High Court – Sections 256 and 260A – Revised monetary limit of tax effect of Rs.20 lakh in CBDT’s Circular No. 21/2015 shall apply to pending references in High Courts u/s. 256 as they apply to pending appeals u/s. 260A as the objective of the Circular would stand fulfilled on application to references u/s. 256 pending in HCs where tax effect is less than Rs.20 lakh

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CIT vs. Sunny Sounds (P.) Ltd.; [2016] 65 taxmann.com 162 (Bom):

By a Circular No. 21/2015, CBDT prescribed tax limit of Rs.20 lakh for filing appeals before the High Court and the said limit is applicable for pending appeals also. The Bombay High Court has clarified that the circular is equally applicable to the pending references. The High Court held as under:

“Revised monetary limit of tax effect of Rs.20 lakh in CBDT’s Circular No. 21/2015 shall apply to pending references in High Courts u/s. 256 as they apply to pending appeals u/s. 260A as the objective of the Circular would stand fulfilled on application to references u/s. 256 pending in HCs where tax effect is less than Rs.20 lakh. Accordingly, since tax effect less than Rs.20 lakh, instant reference application returned unanswered and question of law raised left open to be considered in an appropriate case.”

Appeal – A. Y. 2006-07 – CIT(A) can consider the claim though not made in the return or the revised return

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Principal CIT vs. Western India Shipyard Ltd.; 379 ITR 289 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim made by way of a letter, during the assessment proceedings, for deduction of the bad debts written off by it on the ground that it could have only been made by way of revised return u/s. 139(5). CIT(A) accepted the claim and granted the deduction. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) could have considered such claim even during the course of appellate proceedings otherwise than by way of a revised return, he did not examine whether, in fact, the assessee had taken such debts into consideration while computing its total income. For that purpose, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for a decision afresh.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal was right in holding that while there was a bar on the Assessing Officer entertaining such claim without a revised return being filed by the assessee, there was no such restraint on the CIT(A) during the appellate proceedings. However, while permitting such a claim he ought to have examined whether in fact the bad debts were written off by the assessee in the first instance in the accounts and then taken into consideration while computing the income.

ii) Remand of the matter to the Assessing Officer for that purpose was, therefore, justified.”

Charitable purpose – Exemption – Sections 2(15), proviso, 11 – A. Y. 2009-10 – Object of trust to provide training to needy women in order to equip or train them in skills and make them self reliant – Nursing training provided at centre of Trust free of cost – Occasional sales or generation of funds for furthering objects but not indicative of trade, commerce or business – Proviso to section 2(15) not applicable – Trust entitled to exemption

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DIT vs. Women’s India Trust; 379 ITR 506 (Bom):

The assessee-trust formed to carry out the object of education and development of natural talents of people having special skill, more particularly women. It trained them to earn while learning. It educated them in the field of catering, stitching, toy making, etc. While giving them training, it used material brought from the open market. In the process some finished product such as pickles, jam, etc., were produced and which the assessee sold through shops, exhibitions and personal contacts. The Director of Income-tax held that the assessee has shown sales to the tune of 69,72,052/-. He accordingly held that the proviso to section 2(15) is applicable and hence the assessee was not entitled to exemption. The Tribunal found that the motive of the assessee was not the generation of profit but to provide training to needy women in order to equip or train them in these fields and make them self confident and self reliant. The Tribunal took the view that occasional sales or the trusts own fund generation were for furthering the objects but not indicative of trade, commerce or business. The proviso did not apply. The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Considering the fact that the trust had been set up and was functional for the past several decades and it had not deviated or departed from any of its stated objects and purpose, utilisation of the income, if at all generated, did not indicate the carrying on of any trade, commerce or business.

ii) The Tribunal’s view was to be upheld. The view was taken on an overall consideration and bearing in mind the functions and activities of the trust. In such circumstances it was not vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record.”

Depreciation – Plant – Pond specifically designed for rearing/breeding of the prawns had to be treated as tools of business of the assessee and the depreciation was admissible on these ponds. Judicial Discipline – Division Bench bound by a decision of a co-ordinate Bench – In case of different view, must refer the matter to a larger Bench

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ACIT vs. Victory Aqua Farm Ltd. (2015) 379 ITR 335 (SC)

The
question of law that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court
was as to whether ‘natural pond’ which as per the assessee was specially
designed for rearing prawns would be treated as ‘plant’ within section
32 of the Act for the purposes of allowing depreciation thereon. The
Supreme Court, at the outset, noted that one Division Bench of the High
Court of Kerala in the case of the same assessee (271 ITR 528) had on
earlier occasion decided the aforesaid question in the negative holding
that it is not a ‘plant’. However, another Division Bench by the
impugned judgment dated 14.10.2014, (271 ITR 530) even after noticing
the earlier judgment, had not agreed with the earlier opinion and has
rendered contrary decision.

The Supreme Court, therefore, was
constrained to remark that the Division Bench which has given the
impugned judgment dated 14.10.2004 should have referred the matter to a
larger Bench as otherwise it was bound by the earlier judgment of the
coordinate Bench.

However, since appeals were filed against both
the judgments and the validity of the judgment rendered in the first
case was also questioned by the assessee, the Supreme Court was of the
view that it was necessary to decide these appeals on merits, rather
than remanding the case back to the High Court to be considered by a
larger Bench.

The Supreme Court noted that the assessee was a
company doing business of ‘Aqua Culture’. It grew prawns in specially
designed ponds. In the income tax returns filed by the assessee, the
assessee had claimed depreciation in respect of these ponds by raising a
plea that these prawn ponds were tools to the business of the assessee
and, therefore, they constituted ‘plant’ within the meaning of section
32 of the Act. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the
assessee. The two Benches of the High Court took contrary views. The
Supreme Court observed that it was not in dispute that if these ponds
were ‘plants’, then they were eligible for depreciation at the rates
applicable to plant and machinery and case would be covered by the
provisions of section 32 of the Act.

According to the Supreme
Court, it was not even necessary to deal with this aspect in detail with
reference to the various judgments, inasmuch as the Supreme Court in
Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnataka vs. Karnataka Power Corporation
[247 ITR 268] had held that the building which could not be separated
from the machinery and the machinery could not work, without such
special construction had to be treated as plant.

The Supreme
Court recorded that an attempt was made by the learned counsel for the
Revenue to the effect that the pond in question was natural and not
constructed/ specially designed by the assessee. According to the
Supreme Court, it was not so. In the judgment dated 14.10.2004 of the
High Court, which had decided in favour of the assessee, the High Court
had specifically mentioned that the prawns were grown in specially
designed ponds. Further, this very contention that these were natural
ponds had been specifically rejected as not correct. Moreover, from the
order passed by the Assessing Officer, the Supreme Court found that this
was not the reason given by the Assessing Officer to reject the claim.
Therefore, finding of fact on this aspect could not be gone into at this
stage. According to the Supreme Court, the judgment dated 14.10.2004
rightly rested this case on ‘functional test’ and since the ponds were
specially designed for rearing/breeding of the prawns, they had to be
treated as tools of the business of the assessee and the depreciation
was admissible on these ponds. The Supreme Court, therefore, decided the
question in favour of the assessee and as a consequence, appeals of the
Revenue were dismissed and that of the assessee are allowed.

Income – Accrual – As the amounts of interest earned on the share application money to the extent to which it is not required for being paid to the applicants to whom moneys have become refundable by reason of delay in making the refund will belong to the company, only when the trust (in favour of the general body of the applicants) terminates and it is only at that point of time, it can be stated that amount has accrued to the company as its income.

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CIT vs. Henkel Spic India Ltd. (2015) 379 ITR 322(SC)

The assessee, a public limited company, came out with a public issue of shares on January 29, 1992, and the issue was closed on February 3, 1992. The application money received by the company was deposited with collecting banks or the bankers of the company, to which the amounts were transferred for 46 days. The interest earned on such deposits was sought to be taxed by the Assessing Officer as income for the assessment year 1992-93. The assessee’s contention was that the application money which had been received from the applicants for the allotment of shares was required to be and was kept in a separate bank account as required by section 73(3) of the Companies Act and that the interest earned on those moneys could not have been treated as income accrued to the company even before the allotment process was completed. The allotment process was completed only in the following assessment year after receipt of approval for listing the company’s share in Madras, Delhi, Ahmedabad and Bombay Stock Exchanges such approvals having been received on April 27, 1992, May 8, 1992 and July 6, 1992 respectively.

The Assessing Officer, though he had some doubt as to when the interest was credited to the account whether before or after March 31, 1992, counted the period of 46 days from the date of deposit and on that basis, held that the amount of interest accrued for the period prior to March 31, 1992, was liable to be taxed under the head, “Income from other sources” as the assessee had not commenced business in that year.

On appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) concurred with the view of the Assessing Officer and held that the interest that had accrued on the application money which had been kept in short-term deposits belonged to the assessee and was liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee on the basis of accrual. The Tribunal, on further appeal by the assessee, upheld the assessee’s view and set aside the orders of the Commissioner as also the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the Revenue, the High Court held that the company is not, u/s. 73, required to keep the money in a bank account which yields interest. There is, however, no prohibition in sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 73 against the money being kept in a bank account which yields interest. The interest so earned, however, cannot be regarded as an amount which is fully available to the company for its own use from the time the interest accrued, as that interest is an amount which accrues on a fund which itself is held in trust until the allotment is completed and moneys are returned to those to whom shares are not allotted. No part of this fund, either principal or interest accrued thereon, can be utilised by the company until the allotment process is completed and money repayable to those entitled to repayment has been repaid in full together with such interest as may be prescribed having regard to the length of period of delay in the return of money to them. It is only after the allotment process is completed and all moneys payable to those to whom moneys are refundable are refunded together with interest wherever interest becomes payable, the balance remaining from and out of the interest earned on the application money can be regarded as belonging to the company. The application money as also interest earned thereon will remain within a trust in favour of the general body of the applicants until the process outlined above is completed in all respects. The prohibition contained in sub-section (3A) of section 73 against the moneys standing to the credit in a separate bank account being utilised for purposes other than those mentioned in that sub-section, is absolute and the interest earned on the amounts in such separate bank account will remain a part of that separate bank account and cannot be transferred to any other account. As the amounts of interest earned on the application money to the extent to which it is not required for being paid to the applicants to whom moneys have become refundable by reason of delay in making the refund will belong to the company only when the trust terminates and it is only at that point of time, it can be stated that amount has accrued to the company as its income.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court noted that it was not in dispute that in the year 1993-94, the assessee had shown the income on account of interest received in the income tax returns and paid the tax thereon. The Supreme Court held that there was no error in the order passed by the High Court holding that the interest income accrued only in the assessment year 1993-94 and was taxable in that year only and not in the assessment year 1992-93. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Business Income- Remission or Cessation of Trading Liability – Settlement of deferred Salestax liability by an immediate one-time payment to SICOM – Sales-tax Authorities declining to grant credit of payment made to SICOM – No remission or cessation of liability – Section 41(1) (a) not attracted.

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CIT vs. S.I. Group India Ltd. (2015) 379 ITR 326 (SC)

The assessee had an industrial unit in the district of Raigad which was a notified backward area. The Government of Maharashtra issued a package scheme of incentives in 1993 by which a scheme for the deferral of sales tax dues was announced. The assessee had during the period May 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000 collected an amount of Rs.1,79,68,846 towards sales tax. Under the scheme, the amount was payable in five annual installments commencing from April 2010 and the liability was treated as an unsecured loan in the books of account of the assessee. The State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (SICOM) offered to the assessee an option for the settlement of the deferred sales tax liability by an immediate one-time payment. The assessee paid an amount of Rs.50,44,280 to SICOM which, according to the assessee, represented by net present value as determined by SICOM. Payment was made by the assessee to SICOM on June 26, 2000. The difference between the deferred sales tax and its present value amounting to Rs.1.29 crore was treated as a capital receipt and was credited in the books of the assessee to the capital reserve account.

The Assessing Officer in the assessment order for the assessment year 2000-01 brought the aforesaid difference of Rs.1.29 crore to tax u/s. 41(1) of the Incometax Act 1961. The appeal filed by the assessee before the Commissioner (Appeals) for 2000-01 as well as the appeal for 2001-02 came to be dismissed by the appellate authority. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by the assessee for these two assessment years by a common order. The assessee then moved the Tribunal in a miscellaneous application u/s. 254 which was dismissed.

The main contention of the assessee before the High Court was that the principal requirement for the applicability of section 41 of the Act is that the assessee must obtain a benefit in respect of a trading liability by way of a remission or cessation thereof. He argued that in the present case, there was no cessation of the liability of the assessee in respect of the payment of the sales tax dues and even if there was such a cessatioin, no benefit was obtained by the assessee. This contention was supported by the fact that the issue pertaining to the sales tax liability was decided by the Sales Tax Tribunal by its judgment dated February 8, 2008, and the Tribunal had specifically upheld the decision of the assessing authorities declining to grant credit to the assessee of payment which was made to State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (SICOM) of Maharashtra. This contention is accepted by the High Court holding that the net result of the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal dated February 8, 2008, was to uphold the decision of the assessing authority declining to grant credit of the payment made by the assessee to SICOM towards discharge of the deferred sales tax liability. As a matter of fact, on July 22, 2008, a notice of demand was issued under section 38 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act of 1959 to the assessee by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Navi Mumbai in the total amount of Rs.1,33,13,555. Having regard both to the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal on February 8, 2008, and the notice of demand issued on July 22, 2008, it was not possible for the court to accept the contention that there was a remission or cessation of liability. Since the record before the court did not disclose that there was a remission or cessation of liability, one of the requirements spelt out for the applicability of section 41(1)(a) had not been fulfilled in the facts of the present case.

According to the Supreme Court, the aforesaid facts, clearly demonstrated that the assessee had not been granted the benefit of the said cession for the assessment years in question. According to the Supreme Court, the High Court had rightly held that one of the requirements for the applicability of section 41(1)(a) of the Act had not been fulfilled in the present case.

The Supreme Court did not find any error in the order of the High Court and the appeals were accordingly dismissed.

Carry Forward of Loss and SECTION 79

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Issue for Consideration
Any loss incurred in the case of a company in which the public are not substantially interested (“closely held company”), in any year prior to the previous year shall not be carried forward and set-off, if there is change in the persons beneficially holding shares of such company with 51% voting power. In other words, the persons holding such voting power as on the last day of the previous year in which such set off is claimed are the same as the persons in the year or years prior to the previous year in which the loss was incurred.

The limitation contained in section 79 is relaxed in cases of change in the voting power in the following cases – (a) death of the shareholder, (b) gift to any relative of the shareholder, or (c) amalgamation or demerger of a foreign holding company, subject to prescribed conditions.

The relevant part of section 79 reads as “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, where a change in shareholding has taken place in a previous year in the case of a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, no loss incurred in any year prior to the previous year shall be carried forward and set-off against the income of the previous year unless- (a) on the last day of the previous year the shares of the company carrying not less than fifty-one per cent of the voting power were beneficially held by persons who beneficially held shares of the company carrying not less than fifty-one per cent of the voting power on the last day of the year or years in which the loss was incurred.”

It is common to come across cases wherein shares of a closely held company carrying 51% of voting power or more are held by another company (‘immediate holding company’), which company in turn is the subsidiary of yet another company (‘ the ultimate holding company’). An interesting controversy has recently arisen as regards application of section 79 in cases where shares with such voting power held by the immediate holding company are transferred to yet another immediate holding company of the same ultimate holding company.

Can such a change of shareholding from one subsidiary to another subsidiary company of the same holding company disentitle the closely held company from setting-off the carried forward loss, is a question that the courts have been asked to examine. While the Karnataka High Court has held that the closely held company shall be entitled to set-off the carried forward losses, the Delhi High Court has recently prohibited such set-off, ignoring its own decision in an earlier case.

AMCO Power Systems Ltd .’s case
The issue arose before the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. AMCO Power Systems Ltd. 379 ITR 375, wherein the court was asked to consider the question: “Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that the assessee would be entitled to carry forward and setoff of business loss despite the assessee not owning 51% voting power in the company as per Section 79 of the Act by taking the beneficial share holding of M/s. Amco Properties & Investments Ltd.?”

Admittedly, up to the assessment year 2000-01, all the shares of the company Amco Power Systems Ltd. were held by AMCO Batteries Ltd.(‘ABL’). In the assessment year 2001-02, the holding of ABL was reduced to 55% and the remaining 45% shares were transferred to its subsidiary, namely AMCO Properties and Investments Limited (‘APIL’). In the assessment year 2002-03, ABL further transferred 49% of its remaining 55% shares to Tractors and Farm Equipments Limited (‘TAFE ‘) and consequently ABL retained only 6% shares, its subsidiary APIL held 45% shares and the remaining 49% shares were with TAFE . Similar shareholding continued for the assessment year 2003-04. For easy understanding, shareholdings of the company for the relevant assessment years is given in the chart below:

For the assessment year 2003-04, the company filed its return of income on 28.11.2003, wherein NIL income was shown, after setting off losses brought forward from earlier years. The return of income was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the returned income was accepted on 6.2.2004. Subsequently, the case was taken up for scrutiny, and assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act was completed. The income of the company for the year was determined at Rs.1,34,03,589/. The assessment order did not allow the set off of losses of the earlier years, by invoking section 79 of the Act.

Aggrieved by the order of assessment passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act, the company preferred an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), inter alia, for denial of set-off of brought forward business loss, on the ground that the provisions of section 79(a) of the Act were not complied with. The Commissioner (Appeals) order confirmed that the company was not found to be entitled to set-off of the brought forward losses, considering the change in beneficial holding of 51% or more, as provided u/s. 79 of the Act.

Being aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), the company filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, challenging the denial of the benefit of set-off of brought forward losses. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the company, by allowing the benefit of set-off of brought forward losses. The Tribunal, in accepting the submission of the company, held that 51% of the voting power was beneficially held by ABL during the assessment years 2002-03 and 2003-04 also, and the company was thus entitled to carry forward and set-off the business losses of the previous years.

In appeal to the Karnataka High Court, the Revenue urged that, up to the assessment year 2001-02, there was no dispute that ABL continued to have 51% or more shares as its shareholding, as in that assessment year, ABL was holding 55% shares, and its subsidiary APIL was holding 45% shares. For the assessment year 2002-03, when ABL transferred 49% shares (out of its 55%) to TAFE , ABL was left with only 6% shares, meaning thereby, it was left with less than 51% shares. It was contended that, consequently, its voting power was also reduced from 55% to 6%, and the remaining 94% was divided between TAFE and APIL at 49% and 45% respectively. As a result the company was disentitled to claim carry forward and set-off of business losses in the assessment years 2002-03 and 2003-04. It was further submitted that even though APIL was a wholly owned subsidiary of ABL, both companies were separate entities, and could not be clubbed together for ascertaining the voting power. By transfer of its 49% shares to TAFE , the shareholding of ABL was reduced to 6% only. Thus, the provisions of section 79 of the Act were attracted for denial of the benefit of carry forward of losses to the company.

On behalf of the company, it was submitted that it was not the shareholding that was to be taken into consideration for application of section 79, but it was the voting power which was held by a person or persons who beneficially held shares of the company, that was material for carry forward of the losses. It was thus contended that as ABL was holding 100% shares of APIL, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of ABL, and fully controlled by ABL, even though the shareholding of ABL had been reduced to 6%, yet the voting power of ABL remained more than 51%. As such, the provisions of section 79 of the Act would not be attracted in the present case.

The Karnataka High Court noted the fact that ABL was the holding Company of APIL, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of ABL. The Board of Directors of APIL were controlled by ABL, a fact that was not disputed. The submission of the company that the shareholding pattern was distinct from voting power of a company, had force, in as much as, what was relevant for attracting section 79 was the voting power.

The High Court further noted that the purpose of section 79 of the Act was that the benefit of carry forward and setoff of business losses for previous years of a company should not be misused by any new owner, who might purchase the shares of the company, only to get the benefit of set-off of business losses of the previous years against the profits of the subsequent years after the take over. It was for such purpose, that it was provided that 51% of the voting power, which was beneficially held by a person or persons, should continue to be held for enjoyment of such benefit by the company. The court observed that though ABL might not have continued to hold 51% shares, it continued to control the voting power of APIL, and together, ABL had 51% voting power. Thereby, the control of the company remained with ABL as the change in shareholding did not result in reduction of its voting power to less than 51%. Section 79 dealt with 51% voting power, which ABL continued to have even after transfer of 49% shares to TAFE .

The Karnataka High Court noted that the Apex court, while dealing with a case u/s. 79(a) in CIT vs. Italindia Cotton Private Limited, 174 ITR 160 (SC), held that the section would be applicable only when there was a change in shareholding in the previous year, which might result in change in control of the company, and that every such change of shareholding need not fall within the prohibition against the carry forward and set-off of business losses. In the present case, the Karnataka High Court observed that though there might have been change in the shareholding in the assessment year 2002-03, yet, there was no change in control of the company, as the control remained with ABL, in view of the fact that the voting power of ABL, along with its subsidiary company APIL, remained at 51%.

The court also relied on the observation of the apex court in that case to the effect that the object of enacting section 79 appeared to be to discourage persons claiming a reduction of their tax liability on the profits earned in companies which had sustained losses in earlier years. The Karnataka High Court held that, in the case before them, the control over the company, with 51% voting power, remained with ABL. As such, the provisions of section 79 of the Act were not attracted. The court accordingly confirmed the finding of the Tribunal in this regard.

Yum Restaurants (India) Private Limited’s case
The issue came up again recently before the Delhi High Court in the case of Yum Restaurants (India) Private Limited vs. ITO in ITA No. 349 of 2015 dated 13th January, 2016 for the Assessment Year 2009-10.

The assessee, Yum Restaurants (India) Private Limited (‘Yum India’), was a part of the Yum Restaurants Group, whose 99.99% shares were held by its immediate holding company Yum Restaurants Asia Private Ltd.(‘Yum Asia’), with its ultimate holding company being Yum! Brands Inc. USA (Yum USA). 99.99% of shares of Yum India, initially held by ‘Yum Asia’, were transferred, pursuant to restructuring within the group, after 28th November 2008, to Yum Asia Franchise Pte. Ltd. Singapore (‘Yum Singapore’). The group decided to hold shares in Yum India through Yum Singapore and, therefore, the entire share holding in Yum India, was transferred from one immediate holding company, viz., Yum Asia, to another immediate holding company, Yum Singapore, although the ultimate beneficial owner of the share holding in Yum India remained the ultimate holding company viz., Yum USA.

The total income of Yum India was proposed to be assessed at Rs.40,65,40,535 in the draft order framed by the AO. In doing so, the AO, inter alia, disallowed the set off and carry forward of business losses incurred till AY 2008-09. By its order, the DRP upheld the conclusions reached by the AO and rejected Yum India’s submission as regards set off and carry forward of business losses. On the basis of the DRP’s order, the AO completed the assessment and assessed the income of Yum India.

In appeal to the ITAT , Yum India challenged the disallowance of the carry forward of business losses. By its order, the ITAT upheld the disallowances of the carry forward of business losses of earlier years. The ITAT referred to the change in immediate share holding of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore and held that, by virtue of section 79 of the Act, since there had been a change of more than 51% of the share holding pattern of the voting powers of shares beneficially held in AY 2008- 09 of Yum India, the carry forward and set off of business losses could not be allowed.

In the appeal filed by Yum India to the Delhi High Court, the company challenged the order of the ITAT , questioning the denial of the carry forward of accumulated business losses for the past years and set off u/s. 79 of the Act.

The Delhi high court noted that the AO did not accept the contention of Yum India, that since the ultimate holding company remained Yum USA, it was the beneficial owner of the shares, notwithstanding that the shares in Yum India were held through a series of intermediary companies.; In his view, section 79 required that the shares should be beneficially held by the company carrying 51% of voting power at the close of the financial year in which the loss was suffered; the parent company of Yum India on 31st March 2008 was the equitable owner of the shares but it was not so as on 31st March 2009; accordingly, Yum India was not permitted to set off the carried forward business losses incurred till 31st March 2008.

The court also noted that, in dealing with the issue, the ITAT had in its order analysed section 79 of the Act and noted that the set off and carry forward of loss, which was otherwise available under the provisions of Chapter VI, was denied if the extent of a change in shareholding taking place in a previous year was more than 51% of the voting power of shares beneficially held on the last day of the year in which the loss was incurred. The ITAT had noted that, in the present case, there was a change of 100% of the shareholding of Yum India. Consequently, there was a change of the beneficial ownership of shares, since the predecessor company (Yum Asia) and the successor company (Yum Singapore) were distinct entities.The fact that they were subsidiaries of the ultimate holding company, Yum USA, did not mean that there was no change in the beneficial ownership. Unless the assessee was able to show that notwithstanding shares having been registered in the name of Yum Asia or Yum Singapore, the beneficial owner was Yum USA, there could not be a presumption in that behalf.

Having examined the facts as well as the concurrent orders of the AO and the ITAT , the Delhi high court found that there was indeed a change of ownership of 100% shares of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore, both of which were distinct entities. Although they might be Associated Enterprises of Yum USA, there was nothing to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. The question of ‘piercing the veil’ at the instance of Yum India did not arise. In the circumstances, it was rightly concluded by the ITAT that in terms of section 79 of the Act, Yum India could not be permitted to set off the carried forward accumulated business losses of the earlier years.

Consequently, the Court declined to frame a question at the instance of Yum India on the issue of carry forward and set off of the business losses u/s. 79 of the Act.

Observations:
A company is required to show that there was no change in persons beneficially holding the shares with the prescribed voting power on the last day of the previous year in which the set off is desired. The key terms are; ‘beneficial holding’ and ‘ holding voting power’, none of which are defined in the Act nor in the Companies Act. The cases of fiduciary holding are the usual cases which could be safely held to be cases of beneficial holding. The scope thereof however should be extended to cases of holding through intermediaries, where the ultimate beneficiary is the final holder, who enjoys the fruits of the investment.

This principle can be applied with greater force in cases where the control and management rests with the ultimate holding company. Again ‘holding of voting power’ is a term that should permit inclusion of cases where the shares are held through intermediaries, and the final holder has the exclusive power to decide the manner of voting. If this is not holding voting power, what else could be?

Both the terms collectively indicate the significance of the control and management of the company. In a case where it is possible to establish that there has not been any change in the control and management of the company, that the control and management has remained in the same hands, the provisions of section 79 should not be applied.

The Apex court, in Italindia Cotton Private Limited’s case (supra), held that section 79 would be applicable only when there was a change in shareholding in the previous year which might result in change of control of the company, and that every change of shareholding need not fall within the prohibition against the carry forward and set-off of business losses. The findings of the Apex court have been applied favourably by the Karnataka High Court in AMCO’s case (supra) to hold that, though there might have been a change in the shareholding in the assessment year 2002-03, yet, there was no change of control of the company., The control remained with ABL in view of the fact that the voting power of ABL, along with its subsidiary company APIL, remained at 51%. It is this reasoning that was perhaps missed in the case of Yum India (supra).

In another similar case, Indrama (Investments) Pvt. Ltd., (‘IIPL’) a company held 98% of the shares of one Select Holiday Resorts Private Ltd.(‘SHRPL’) and the balance shares of SHRPL were held by four individuals, who inter alia held 100% shares of IIPL. On merger of IIPL into SHRPL, the shares held by IIPL stood cancelled and the four individuals became 100% shareholders of SHRPL. The claim of the set off of carried forward of loss of prior years by SHRPL was rejected by the AO for assessment years 2004-05 and 2005-06, by application of section 79, holding that there was a change of shareholders holding 51% voting power.

The appeal of SHRPL was allowed by the Commissioner(Appeals) and his order was upheld by the ITAT in ITA No. 1184&2460?Del./2008 dt. 23.12.2010 in the case of DCIT vs. Select Holiday Resorts Private Ltd. The appeal of the Income tax Department to the Delhi High Court was dismissed by the court, reported in 217 Taxman 110. The Special Leave Petition of the Income tax Department was rejected by the Supreme Court. The high court, in this case, equated the case of transfer of shares on a merger, with that of the transmission of shares to the legal heir on death, to hold that there was no change of voting power for attracting provisions of section 79 to enable the AO to deny the set off of the carried forward losses.

The ratio of the decision of the court in SHRPL was not brought to the attention of the ITAT as also of the high court in Yum Restaurant’s case. Also the findings of the Karnataka high court in AMCO’s case(supra) were not brought on record. We are sure that had the judicial development on the subject been brought to the attention of the Delhi High Court in the case of Yum Restaurants (supra), the outcome would have been different.

Section 79 has been amended by the Finance Act, 1988 by the insertion of the first Proviso, that excludes cases of change in shareholding consequent to death or gift. The scope of the amendment has been explained by Cir. No. 528 dated 16.12.1988 and in particular by paragraph 26.3. The CBDT clarifies that the objective behind the amendment is to save the genuine cases of change from the hardships of section 79 of the Act. Kindly see Circular No. 576 dated 31.08.1990. The section has been further amended by the Finance Act, 1999, by insertion of the second Proviso to provide for exclusion of cases involving change in shareholding of an Indian subsidiary on account of amalgamation or demerger of a foreign company – again to save genuine cases of change from hardship of section 79 of the Act.

Clause(b) of section 79(now deleted) provided for nonapplication of section 79 in cases where the change was not effected to avoid payment of taxes or for reduction of taxes. The objectives behind introduction of section 79 and the development in law thereon, as also the amendments made therein from time to time, clearly show that the right to set off of carried forward losses of prior years should not be denied in genuine cases. Kindly see CIT vs. Italindia Cotton Private Limited, 174 ITR 160 (SC), where the court observed to the effect that, the object of enacting section 79 appeared to be to discourage persons claiming a reduction of their tax liability, on the profits earned in companies after take over, which had sustained losses in earlier years.

The Delhi High Court, in Yum India’s case(supra), importantly observed that the company had failed to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. In our opinion, the situation otherwise could have been salvaged, had the company produced evidence to demonstrate that the beneficial owner of shares was Yum USA.

It may not be proper, in our considered opinion, to be swayed by the status of the subsidiaries for taxation of the dividend or other income. It would well be perfectly harmonious to hold the immediate holding company liable for taxation and, at the same time, to look through it for the purposes of section 79, right up to the ultimate holding company. Such an approach would not defeat the purposes of the Act but would serve the cause of the scheme of taxation.

Income characterisation on sale of tax-free bonds

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Taxation in India existed since ancient times. It was a ‘duty’ paid to
the rulers. The incidence and rules of tax have changed. A peep into the
Indian history reveals that income was formally made a subject matter
of tax by Sir James Wilson in 1860. Over these years, the legislation
has been grappling with the ever-evolving concept of income. One of the
biggest ironies of income-tax statute today is its inability to define
‘income’. The reason is its dynamic characterisation.Levy and quantum of
tax in India depends on the genre of income. It is thus critical to
reckon the characterisation of income to impose the appropriate levy.
This exercise of characterising has only become complex with the
evolution of business. A recent addition to this complexity has been
introduction of Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (“ICDS”).

The
objective of introducing ICDS (previously styled as Tax Accounting
Standards) was (i) reduction of litigation; minimization of alternatives
and giving certainty to issues. The prescribed standards (in the form
they are currently) could have far reaching ramifications. It needs to
be closely examined if they have achieved the core objectives with which
they were introduced or are in the process of drifting away into a new
quagmire of controversies. A discussion is inevitable important to have a
firm ground to pitch in the newness that ICDS seeks to inject. This
write-up initiates a discussion on one such instance which interalia
finds no clarity or certainty under the ICDS regime:

An
assessee holds certain tax free bonds. These bonds are sold before the
record date for payment of interest. The question is whether the
difference between the sale price and the purchase price is to be
treated as capital gain or to be segregated into capital gain and
interest accrued till the date of sale? In other words, whether interest
accrues only on the record date or accrues throughout the year?

The
question under consideration is the ‘characterisation of receipt’ on
sale of the bonds before the record date. Whether such receipts in
excess of the purchase price is wholly chargeable to tax as ‘capital
gains’ or should it be apportioned between ‘capital gains’ and ‘tax free
interest income’? A corollary question which crops up is whether such
tax-free interest accrues only on the record date or throughout the year
on a de die in diem basis?

Section 4 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (“the Act”) imposes a general charge. The ambit of the charge is
outlined in section 5. Section 5 encompasses not only income actually
accruing in India, but also income deemed to accrue in India. ‘Accrual’
as a legal concept refers to the right to receive. It represents a
situation where the relationship of a debtor and creditor emerges.
Section 5 focuses on ‘accrual of income’, but does not outline the
timing of such accrual. Initially, accrual of interest income chargeable
to tax under the head ‘Income from other sources’ is being examined.

Time of accrual of interest income:
Section 56 of the Act mandates that interest on securities is
chargeable to tax under the head ‘Income from other sources’ if not
chargeable as ‘Profits and gains from business or profession’. The term
‘securities’ is not defined in the section. One may possibly borrow the
meaning of ‘securities’ from The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act,
1956 (“SCRA”). SCRA defines securities to include bonds. Accordingly,
interest on tax free bonds is enveloped within the provisions of section
56. Section 56 (although a charging section) does not provide for time
of accrual of interest income.

Section 145 of the Act requires
that income ‘chargeable’ under the head “Profits and gains from business
or profession” and “Income from other sources” be computed as per the
cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee. Section 145(2) empowers the Central Government to notify
Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (“ICDS” for brevity) to be
followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income.
The Central Government has currently notified 10 ICDS(s) vide
Notification No. 32/2015 dated 31.3.2015. These standards are to be
followed in computing the income where the ‘mercantile system’ of
accounting is adopted.

On traversing through the various
ICDS(s), two standards may be relevant in the present context – namely,
ICDS I & IV. The following paragraphs discuss the impact of these
standards on the issue under consideration:

ICDS I [Accounting policies] deals
with three accounting assumptions. The third accounting assumption is
that revenues and costs accrue as they are earned or incurred and
recorded in the previous year to which they relate. Incomes are said to
accrue under the ICDS when they are ‘earned’ and ‘recorded’ in the
previous year to which they relate. The cumulation of ‘earning’ and
‘recording’ of income connote accrual under ICDS.

Accrual as
understood u/s. 5 means a “right to receive” in favour of the assessee.
It is indicative of payer’s acknowledgement of a debt in favour of the
assessee. The question is whether ‘accrual’ u/s. 5 as hitherto
understood, is now to undergo changes in the light of the definition of
the said term under ICDS.

Lack of clarity in ICDS I:
Applying the ICDS definition, interest income accrues when it is earned
and recorded in the previous year. The Standard neither clarifies the
connotation of the term ‘earn’ nor does it specify the time and place of
recording the interest. “Earn” as per the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary means – “Receive or be entitled to in return for work done or
services rendered, obtain or deserve in return for efforts or merit”.
Earning is a phenomenon of the commercial world. It is depictive of an
event warranting a reflection in the financial statements. Accrual in a
legal sense traverses a little further. The earning of an income has to
translate/transform into a right to receive. An earning of income is the
cause of its accrual. Earning therefore precedes accrual. A lag is thus
conceivable between the two caused by time or other factors. ICDS in
attempting to equate the two is trying to blur the difference. The
attempt may not achieve its purpose as the definition (of accrual) is in
the realm of accounting and not in the sphere of section 5.

Even
otherwise, earning of income can be said to occur – (i) at the time of
investment; (ii) on a de die diem basis; or (iii) specific record dates
given in the instruments. As regards recording, a further question could
be, should the recording be done in – books of accounts or return of
income. Recording is generally referred to in relation to books of
account. If this were to be the inference, what about those assessees
who do not maintain books of account but earn interest? Throughout the
notification [notification no. 32/2015], it is clarified that ICDS does
not apply for the purposes of maintenance of books of accounts, although
the standard applies only to those who adopt the mercantile basis of
accounting. Interestingly therefore, it is arguable that ICDS would not
apply unless the mercantile basis of accounting is adopted. If no
accounting is employed, as books are not maintained, ICDS may not apply.
Although income is offered for tax on accrual basis, being one of the
parameters of section 5.

Ambiguity in ICDS I enhanced by the
language in ICDS IV: ICDS IV [on revenue recognition] provides revenue
recognition mechanism for sale of goods; provision of services and use
of resources by others yielding interest, royalty or dividends. Para 7
of the Standard deals with interest income. It reads as under:

“7.
Interest shall accrue on the time basis determined by the amount
outstanding and the rate applicable. Discount or premium on debt
securities held is treated as though it were accruing over the period to
maturity.”

The Standard specifies that interest shall accrue on
‘time basis’. Accrual of income under ICDS I refers to culmination of
earning and recording. Under ICDS IV, interest as one of the streams of
income, accrues on ‘time basis’. Time basis under ICDS IV is said to
satisfy the criteria of ‘earning’ and ‘recording’. The import of the
expression ‘time basis’ is however not clarified. Interest is inherently
a product of ‘time’. There cannot be any dispute about the involvement
of ‘time factor’ in quantification and claim to receive interest. The
Standard merely states that accrual of interest happens on time basis.
It is not clarified whether time based accrual means (i) an
‘on-going/real time’ accrual or (ii) an accrual based on the ‘specific
timing’ prescribed by the concerned instrument. Both these are offshoots
of time basis. The Standard does not pinpoint the mechanism of
determining the time of accrual. The latter portion of paragraph (7)
explicitly mentions that discount or premium on debt securities accrue
over the period of maturity. It is not a single point accrual. Such
clarity is conspicuously missing in the first portion of the para
dealing with interest income.

Role of Accounting Standards in ICDS interpretation: One
may observe that the language employed in all the notified ICDS is
largely influenced by the Accounting Standards. ICDS IV owes its genesis
to AS 9 [Revenue recognition]. Para 8.2 of the AS 9 mirrors para 7 of
ICDS IV. Para 13 of AS 9 reads as follows:
“13. Revenue arising from
the use of others of enterprise resources yielding interest, royalties
and dividends should only be recognised when no significant uncertainty
as to measurability or collectability exists. These revenues are
recognised on the following bases:
(i) Interest: on a time proportion basis taking into account the amount outstanding and the rate applicable.”

The
aforesaid AS deals with recognition on ‘time proportion basis’. The use
of the term ‘proportion’ in this expression is indicative of the
concept of recognising ‘part or share’ of income or part of a year.
Interest under the AS has thus been viewed to be a time based
phenomenon. The interest is thus mandated to be recognised on a spread
out basis. It is not on one specific date. However, ICDS IV does not
employ the term ‘proportion’. One could therefore believe that the
understanding in AS 9 cannot be imported into ICDS. The conspicuous
absence of ‘proportion’ in ICDS paves way for an interpretation which is
different from that of AS 9. The expression ‘time basis’ employed in
ICDS IV definitely appears to deviate from AS 9 theory of
proportionality. Thus, if interest is to be paid on specific dates,
‘time basis’ could mean accrued on those specific dates. Whereas ‘time
proportion basis’ would have meant accrual upto the year end at least,
if such date happens to be an intervening event between the specified
dates.

“Tax accounting” should not essentially be different from
commercial accounting. Tax accounting recognises and accepts commercial
accounting if it is consistent and statute compliant. Income recognised
as per such commercial accounting is the base from which the taxable
income is determined. Tax laws incorporate specific rules that cause a
sway from commercial accounting in determining the taxable income. This
disparity is caused by the different purposes of commercial accounting
and taxation; difficulties in precise incorporating economic concepts in
tax laws, etc. To reiterate, one of the issues where commercial
accounting may not synchronise with tax principles is “accrual of
income”.

The Guidance Note issued by ICAI on ‘Terms Used in
Financial Statements’ defines accrual and accrual basis of accounting as
under:

“1.05 Accrual
Recognition of revenues and
costs as they are earned or incurred (and not as money is received or
paid). It includes recognition of transactions relating to assets and
liabilities as they occur irrespective of the actual receipts or
payments.

1.06 Accrual Basis of Accounting
The method
of recording transactions by which revenues, costs, assets and
liabilities are reflected in the accounts in the period in which they
accrue. The ‘accrual basis of accounting’ includes considerations
relating to deferrals, allocations, depreciation and amortisation. This
basis is also referred to as mercantile basis of accounting.”

The
accounting definition of accrual and the definition provided by the
ICDS I is similar. The Guidance note on the “Terms used in financial
statements” explains that accrual basis of accounting may involve
deferral, allocation or non-cash deductions (such as depreciation/
amortisation).

For the reasons already detailed earlier, accrual
for tax purposes is different. This could be better appreciated on a
consideration of ICDS III which deals with Percentage of Completion
Method. Under this method, revenue is matched with the contract costs
incurred in reaching the stage of completion. This results in
recognising income attributable to the proportion of work completed
having satisfied the test of ‘earning’ and hence accrual from an
accounting perspective. Such accounting accrual may not satisfy the tax
concept of accrual which connotes a right to receive. Accounting accrual
is driven more by matching principles. Such a method cannot however
alter the meaning of accrual as understood in the context of section 5.
Judiciary, at various fora, has explained the meaning of the term
‘accrual’ in context of section 5. It may be relevant to quote two among
those several judgments on this matter:

(a) The Apex Court in
the case of E.D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1954) 26 ITR 27 (SC)
discussed the concepts of ‘accrual’, ‘arisal’ and ‘receipt’. The
relevant observations are as under:

“’Accrues’, ‘arises’ and
‘is received’ are three distinct terms. So far as receiving of income is
concerned there can be no difficulty; it conveys a clear and definite
meaning, and I can think of no expression which makes its meaning
plainer than the word ‘receiving’ itself. The words ‘accrue’ and ‘arise’
also are not defined in the Act. The ordinary dictionary meanings of
these words have got to be taken as the meanings attaching to them.
‘Accruing’ is synonymous with ‘arising’ in the sense of springing as a
natural growth or result. The three expressions ‘accrues’, ‘arises’ and
‘is received’ having been used in the section, strictly speaking
accrues’ should not be taken as synonymous with ‘arises’ but in the
distinct sense of growing up by way of addition or increase or as an
accession or advantage; while the word ‘arises’ means comes into
existence or notice or presents itself. The former connotes the idea
of a growth or accumulation and the latter of the growth or accumulation
with a tangible shape so as to be receivable
. It is difficult to
say that this distinction has been throughout maintained in the Act and
perhaps the two words seem to denote the same idea or ideas very
similar, and the difference only lies in this that one is more
appropriate than the other when applied to particular cases. It is
clear, however, as pointed out by Fry, L.J., in Colquhoun vs. Brooks
[1888] 21 Q.B.D. 52 at 59 [this part of the decision not having been
affected by the reversal of the decision by the Houses of Lords [1889]
14 App. Cas. 493] that both the words are used in contradistinction to
the word ‘receive’ and indicate a right to receive. They represent a
state anterior to the point of time when the income becomes receivable
and connote a character of the income which is more or less inchoate”

(b) The Apex Court in CIT vs. Excel Industries Limited (2013) 358 ITR 295 (SC) observed:

“19.
This Court further held, and in our opinion more importantly, that
income accrues when there “arises a corresponding liability of the other
party from whom the income becomes due to pay that amount.”

Thus,
judicially ‘accrual’ has been defined to mean enforcement of a right to
receive (from recipient standpoint) with a corresponding obligation to
pay (from payer’s perspective). It has the attribute of accumulation
inherent in it and a growth sufficient to assume a taxable form. It
denotes that the payer of the sums is a debtor. Interestingly, the
position in a construction contract is just the reverse, with the
contractor denoting the sums received as a liability in his books and
hence acknowledging himself to be debtor – a position contrary to what
the tax law demands for accrual.

Supremacy of section 5:
Section 5 outlines the scope of total income. It encompasses income
within its fold on the basis of accrual, arisal or receipt subject to
the residential status of the assessee and locale of income. Thus,
accrual, arisal and receipt form the basis for taxing incomes. This
canon of taxation is sacrosanct and has to be strictly adhered to. ICDS
owes its genesis from a notification which springs out of section 145.
It does not in any manner trespass the supremacy of section 5. It is
pellucid that the scope of the term ‘accrual’ in the context of section 5
remains sacrosanct and immune to ICDS. The definition of ‘accrual’ in
ICDS is the same as the definition housed in Accounting Standard I
issued u/s. 145(2).

This definition of AS 1 u/s. 145(2) has been
in existence from 1996. The presence of such definition, was not
understood to alter the understanding of section 5. The section should
not be different under the ICDS regime. The definition at best has a say
in accounting.

In such setting, ICDS should not in any manner
influence or affect the point of accrual in case of interest income. The
existing understanding of the term ‘accrual’ in the context of section 5
should hold good. The contours of our existing understanding of the
expression ‘accrual’ should be held as steadfast.

Point of accrual of interest income: The
point of accrual of interest income has been addressed by judicial
precedents. The dictum of the Courts does not appear to be unanimous.
The variety in the judgments is captured below:

(a) Interest on securities would be taxable on specified dates when it becomes due and not on accrual basis

In DIT vs. Credit Suisse First Boston (Cyprus) Ltd. 351 ITR 323 (Bombay), the Mumbai High Court observed as under:

“When
an instrument or an agreement stipulates interest to be payable at a
specified date, interest does not accrue to the holder thereof on any
date prior thereto. Interest would accrue or arise only on the date
specified in the instrument. A creditor has a vested right to receive
interest on a stated date in future does not constitute an accrual of
the interest to him on any prior date. Where an instrument provides for
the payment of interest only on a particular date, an action filed prior
to such date would be dismissed as premature and not disclosing a cause
of action. Subject to a contract to the contrary, a debtor is not bound
to pay interest on a date earlier to the one stipulated in the
agreement / instrument. In the present case, it is admitted that
interest was not payable on any date other than that mentioned in the
security.”

(b) Interest gets accrued normally on a day to
day basis, but when there is no due date fixed for payment of interest,
it accrues on the last day of the previous year.

In CIT vs.
Hindustan Motors Ltd. (1993) 202 ITR 839 (Calcutta), the
assessee-company did not charge interest for the relevant previous year
on the amount due to it by its 100% subsidiary. It was explained that
owing to difficult financial position of the subsidiary company, the
board of directors decided not to charge interest in order to enable the
subsidiary to tide over the financial crisis. The Revenue authorities
held that interest accrued on day to day basis whereas the decision not
to charge interest was taken by the assessee-company after the end of
the relevant accounting year, i.e., long after the accrual of interest.
In this context, the Calcutta High Court observed as under:

“In
our view, the income by way of interest on the facts and circumstances
of this case had already accrued from day to day and, in any event, on
31-3-1971, being the last day of the previous year relevant to the
assessment year 1971-72. Therefore, the passing of resolutions
subsequently on 10-5-1971, and/ or on 21-8-1971, in the meeting of board
of directors of the assessee- company is of no effect.”

(c) Interest accrues de die in diem [daily]

The Apex Court in the case of Rama Bai vs. CIT (1990) 181 ITR 400 (SC)

“…we
may clarify, is that the interest cannot be taken to have accrued on
the date of the order of the Court granting enhanced compensation but
has to be taken as having accrued year after year from the date of
delivery of possession of the lands till the date of such order.”

The
accrual of interest on de die in diem basis has been approved by CIT
vs. MKKR Muthukaruppan Chettiar (1984) 145 ITR 175 (Mad).

Apart
from these schools of thought, various circulars have propounded the
proposition that interest income must be offered to tax on an annual
basis. Some of such circulars are as under (although not in the context
of tax free bonds):

(a) Circular no. 243 dated 22.6.1978

Whether
interest earned on principal amount of deposits under reinvestment
deposit/recurring deposit schemes, can be said to have accrued annually
and, if so, whether depositor is entitled to claim benefit of deduction
in respect of interest which has accrued

1…..

2..

3.
The question for consideration is whether the interest at the
stipulated rate earned on the principal amount, can be said to have
accrued annually and if so whether a depositor is entitled to claim the
benefit of deduction, u/s. 80L, in respect of such interest which has
accrued.

4. Government has decided that interest for each
year calculated at the stipulated rate will be taxed as income accrued
in that year. The benefit of deduction u/s. 80L will be available on
such interest.

This was a concessional circular to help
assessees avail the benefit of section 80L over the years. The circular
does not provide any definitive timing of accrual. As evident in para 4,
the timing of taxation was a ‘decision’ of the Government and not the
enunciation of any principle.

(b) Circular no. 371 dated 21.11.1983

Interest on cumulative deposit scheme of Government undertakings – Whether should be taxed on accrual basis annually
1.
The issue regarding taxability of interest on cumulative deposit scheme
announced by Government undertakings has been considered by the Board.
The point for consideration is whether interest on cumulative deposit
scheme would be taxable on accrual basis for each year during which the
deposit is made or on receipt basis in the year of receiving the total
interest.

2. The Central Government has decided that the
interest on cumulative deposit schemes of Government undertakings should
be taxed on accrual basis annually.

3. The Government
undertakings will intimate the accrued interest to the depositors so as
to enable them to disclose it in their returns of income filed before
the income-tax authorities.

This circular also provides for
annual accretion of interest. Accrual does not await the due or maturity
date. The above convey a ‘decision’ of the Government. It does not
enunciate a principle of law.

(c) Circular no. 409 dated 12.2.1985

Interest on cumulative deposit schemes of private sector undertakings – Whether should be taxed on accrual basis annually

1.
The issue regarding taxability of interest on cumulative deposit
schemes of the private sector undertakings has been considered by the
Board. The point for consideration is whether interest on cumulative
deposit schemes would be taxable on accrual basis for each year during
which the deposit is made or on receipt basis in the year of receiving
the total interest.

2. The Central Government has decided that
interest on cumulative deposit schemes of private sector undertakings
should be taxed on accrual basis annually.

3. The private sector
undertakings will intimate the individual depositors about the accrued
interest so as to enable them to disclose it in their returns of income
filed before the income-tax authorities.

(d) Circular 3 dated 2.3.2010 [relevant extracts]

“In
case of banks using CBS software, interest payable on time deposits is
calculated generally on daily basis or monthly basis and is swept &
parked accordingly in the provisioning account for the purposes of
macro-monitoring only. However, constructive credit is given to the
depositor’s/ payee’s account either at the end of the financial year or
at periodic intervals as per practice of the bank or as per the
depositor’s/payee’s requirement or on maturity or on encashment of time
deposits; whichever is earlier.

4. In view of the above
position, it is clarified that since no constructive credit to the
depositor’s/ payee’s account takes place while calculating interest on
time deposits on daily or monthly basis in the CBS software used by
banks, tax need not be deducted at source on such provisioning of
interest by banks for the purposes of macro monitoring only. In such
cases, tax shall be deducted at source on accrual of interest at the
end of financial year or at periodic intervals as per practice of the
bank or as per the depositor’s/payee’s requirement or on maturity or on
encashment of time deposits; whichever event takes place earlier;

whenever the aggregate of amounts of interest income credited or paid or
likely to be credited or paid during the financial year by the banks
exceeds the limits specified in section 194A.

The circular
states that there could be multiple point of accrual for interest
incomes. It seeks to fasten tax withholding at the earliest point in
time.

Thus, the issue of time of accrual has received varied
interpretation on the basis of source of interest (vide a decree,
compensation, investment, etc.), terms of interest (whether payable on a
specific due date or otherwise), legal obligation and surrounding
circumstances. The alternatives discussed above can be captured in the
flowchart below:

Based on the alternatives outlined above, it is
to be examined whether interest accrues on the date of sale of bonds.
The question is whether timing of accrual (of interest) has a bearing on
the characterisation of receipts from sale of bonds. The impact can be
understood under the twin possibilities envisaged in the above diagram
as discussed below:

*
This principle may not apply in the present context since generally
interest is payable either on the stipulated dates or on withdrawal/
maturity. The case on hand contemplates a sale of instrument. The terms
of the bond may not permit interest receipt upto the date of transfer of
bonds

(a) If interest is payable on specific dates:

When
interest payable on specific due dates, the accrual of income concurs
with such dates (for the reasons already detailed earlier). If the due
date falls prior to the sale, the interest accrues in the hands of the
seller. If it is subsequent to the date of sale, the interest accrues in
the hands of buyer. The accrual of interest is distinct from sale of
bonds and the consideration involved therein.

Tax free bonds are
‘capital assets’ for the investor (assuming that the concerned assessee
is not in the business of investment in bonds). Sale of such capital
asset should culminate in capital gains or loss. There is no interest
receipt from the third party buyer as there is no debt due by the buyer
to the seller. The third party buyer of bonds is under no obligation to
pay ‘interest’. The liability to pay interest lies with the company
issuing the bonds. The diagram below explains the flow of transaction.

(b) If the interest is not payable on specific dates:

As
mentioned earlier, interest may not be received upto the date of
transfer of bonds. The receipt in such situations could be on maturity
if not on specific dates. The receipt of interest would be by the buyer
(on maturity) or specific dates. Interest accumulates, but does not
become ‘due’ and ‘payable/receiveable’ till the appointed date. The
seller thus parts away with the bonds and the legal right to receive
interest. Correspondingly, the payment made by the buyer is towards the
principal and interest element inbuilt in the bond. The question in such
an eventuality is whether the consideration receivable by the seller on
sale of bonds:

(a) Should be wholly considered as full value of consideration for sale of bonds [taxable as capital gains]; or

(b)
Should the consideration be split into consideration for sale [as
capital gains] and interest income [as other sources income].

As
mentioned earlier, tax free bonds are capital assets. Consideration on
transfer of bonds would ordinarily result in capital gains. Even if the
sale is made on ‘cum interest’ basis, one could still argue that the
amount received would constitute full value of consideration towards
transfer. Although the price paid by the third party may factor in the
interest component, the amount paid is towards ‘value’ of the bond. It
is not interest payment.

Accumulation of interest would step-up
the sale consideration. It does not alter the characterization of income
from capital gains to interest. At best, one could split the
consideration between ‘purchase price’ (of the bond) and ‘right to
receive interest’ (assuming interest component is factored in the
price). In which case, it would be sale of two separate capital assets
or an asset (tax bonds) along with congeries of rights associated
therewith.

It may be relevant to quote the observation of the
Mumbai High Court in the case of DIT vs. Credit Suisse First Boston
(Cyprus) Ltd. (referred above) wherein the Court observed:

“12.
The appellant’s submission ignores the fact that such securities or
agreements do not regulate the price at which the holder is to sell the
same to a third party. The holder is at liberty to sell the same at any
price. The interest component for the broken period i.e. the period
prior to the due date for interest is only one of the factors that may
determine the sale price of the security. There are a myriad other
factors, both personal as well as market driven, that can be and, in
fact, are bound to be taken into consideration in such transactions. For
instance, a person may well sell the securities at a reduced price in
the event of a liquidity crisis or a slow down in the market and/or if
he is in dire need of funds for any reason whatsoever. Market forces
also play a significant part.

For instance, if the rate of
interest is expected to rise, the securities may well be sold at a
discount and conversely if the interest rates are expected to fall, the
securities may well earn a premium. This, in turn, would also depend
upon the period of validity of the security and various other factors
such as the financial position and commercial reputation of the debtor.

13.
The appellant’s contention is also based on the erroneous presumption
that what is paid for is the face value of the security and the interest
to be paid for the broken period from the last date of payment of
interest till the date of purchase. What, in fact, is purchased is the
possibility of recovering interest on the date stipulated in the
security. It is not unknown for issuers of securities, debentures and
bonds, to default in payment of interest as well as the principal. The
purchaser therefore hopes that on the due date he will receive the
interest and the principal. The purchaser therefore, purchases merely
the possibility of recovery of such interest and not the interest per
se. It would be pointless to even suggest that in the case of Government
securities, the possibility of a default cannot arise. The
interpretation of law does not depend upon the solvency of the debtor or
the degree of probability of the debts being discharged. Indeed the
solvency, reputation and the degree of probability of recovering the
interest are also factors which would go into determining the price at
which such securities are bought and sold. There is nothing in the Act
or in the DTAA, to which we will shortly refer that warrants the
position in law being determined on the basis of such factors viz. the
degree of probability of the particular issuer of the security, bond or
debenture or such instruments, honouring the same.”

Based on
the above, one can conclude that excess of receipt on sale of bonds
over their costs should be categorised as ‘capital gains or loss’. The
splitting of consideration into two heads of income (with interest
falling under Income from other sources) is not a natural phenomenon. It
should be done when statutorily provided for. The law has specifically
provided for such split mechanism wherever deemed necessary. For
instance, circular 2 of 2002 explains tax treatment of deep discount
bonds. It provides that such bonds should be valued as on the 31st March
of each Financial Year (as per RBI guidelines).

The difference
between the market valuations as on two successive valuation dates will
represent the accretion to the value of the bond during the relevant
financial year and will be taxable as interest income (where the bonds
are held as investments) or business income (where the bonds are held as
trading assets). Where the bond is transferred at any time before the
maturity date, the difference between the sale price and the cost of the
bond will be taxable as capital gains in the hands of an investor or as
business income in the hands of a trader. For computing such gains, the
cost of the bond will be taken to be the aggregate of the cost for
which the bond was acquired by the transferor and the income, if any,
already offered to tax by such transferor (in earlier years) upto the
date of transfer. Thus, gains from such bonds, is specifically split
into interest and capital gains by a specific mechanism provided by the
circular.

Similarly, section 45(2A) [conversion of capital
assets into stock-in-trade] splits consideration into business income
and capital gains income. The statute may also provide for the reverse.
If the consideration includes more than one form of income, the statute
could conclude the whole of such consideration to be one form of income.
Further, section 56(2)(iii) [composite rent] concludes the whole of
consideration to be income from other sources although it contains
portion of rental incomes. Such ‘dissecting’ or ‘unified’ approach is
not prescribed for sale of bonds (whether sold cum-interest or
ex-interest).

The term ‘accrual’ connotes legal right to
receive. It is the enforcement of right to receive (from a recipient’s
standpoint) with a corresponding obligation to pay (from payer’s
perspective) [Refer CIT vs. Excel Industries Ltd (2013) 358 ITR 295
(SC)]. Thus, for an income to accrue, the right (of the income
recipient) and obligation (of the payer) must co-exist. Applying this
theorem in the present context, the question is whether the company
issuing bonds is under an obligation to pay interest when such bonds are
sold on ‘cum interest’ basis. Generally, interest on bonds would be
payable either on a periodic basis or on maturity. Bonds which are
issued without any terms on interest payouts are seldom in vogue. If
this proposition is accepted, then interest can be said to accrue only
on specific dates (being on periodic payout dates or maturity date). In
which case, interest always accrues to the buyer if the bonds are sold
on cum-interest basis. Consequently, consideration received on sale of
bonds would wholly constitute full value of consideration on transfer.
There is no interest element therein.

It may also be relevant to note that the definition of interest provided in the Act. Section 2(28A) defines interest as under:

“(28A)
“interest” means interest payable in any manner in respect of any
moneys borrowed or debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other
similar right or obligation) and includes any service fee or other
charge in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect
of any credit facility which has not been utilised”

The definition can be bisected as under –

(a)
interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or
debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right or
obligation); or

(b) any service fee or other charge in respect
of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit
facility which has not been utilised.

In the present context,
the payment is not towards moneys borrowed or debt or any service fee or
other charge in this regard. It is for purchase of assets. One cannot
therefore ascribe the color of interest to a consideration paid for
purchase of assets. The receipt of consideration cannot partake the
character of interest as there is no debt owed by the buyer to the
seller. There is a ‘seller-purchaser’ relationship. Thus, unless there
is a ‘lender-borrower’ relationship, the liability to pay or right to
receive interest does not arise.

The discussion would be
incomplete without a reference to the Apex Court verdict in the case of
Vijaya Bank Limited vs. CIT (1991) 187 ITR 541 (SC). In this case, the
assessee (bank) received interest on securities purchased from another
bank (as well as in the open market). The assessee claimed that
consideration paid towards acquisition of these securities was
determined with reference to their actual value and interest which
accrued to it till the date of sale. Accordingly, such outflow should be
allowed as a claim against interest income earned by the assessee
subsequent to purchase. In this context, the Apex Court observed as
under:

“In the instant case, the assessee purchased
securities. It is contended that the price paid for the securities was
determined with reference to their actual value as well as the interest
which had accrued on them till the date of purchase. But the fact is,
whatever was the consideration which prompted the assessee to purchase
the securities, the price paid for them was in the nature of a capital
outlay and no part of it can be set off as expenditure against income
accruing on those securities. Subsequently when these securities yielded
income by was of interest, such income attracted section 18.”

The
Apex Court adjudged that consideration paid for purchase of securities
is in the nature of ‘capital outlay’. It is not expenditure on revenue
account having nexus to interest income which it earned subsequently.
The entire consideration was thus concluded to be towards purchase of
bonds. When this dictum is viewed from seller’s standpoint, the entire
consideration received should constitute capital gains. There is no
interest element therein.

The possible counter to the aforesaid
discussion is that interest accrues on a de die diem basis.
Consideration received from the buyer which factors the interest element
has to be split between capital receipt and interest income. If such
split is not carried out, there may be a dual taxation. This could be
better explained through an illustration:

Mr X purchased a bond
for Rs.100. He wishes to sell this bond to Mr Y on a cum interest basis
at Rs.110. Interest accrued till the date of sale is Rs.10. In such an
eventuality, Mr X would have to bear capital gains tax on Rs.10 [being
110 (sale consideration) – 100(cost)]. Mr Y would have to discharge tax
on interest income (of Rs.10). Therefore, on an interest income of Rs.10
paid by the company, there is a taxable income of Rs.20 (being Rs.10
factored in capital gains computation of Mr X and Rs.10 as interest
income in the hands of Mr Y). One may argue that such absurd result is
unintended and cannot be an appropriate view.

However, this line
of argument can be answered by stating that there is no equity in tax.
This is an undisputed principle. The parties to the transaction being
taxed on Rs.20 (although being economically benefited by Rs.10) would
only reflect a bad bargain. Further, Mr Y would have to shoulder tax on
interest income (Rs.10) but would avail a deduction or a loss
subsequently of Rs.10 (being part of the purchase consideration of
bonds).

The learned author Sampath Iyengar in his treatise Law
of Income tax (11th edition at page 2661 – Volume II) has made a
reference on this matter (although in the context of section 18 of the
Act):

“15. Charge of interest on sale or transfer of
securities – (1) No splitting of interest as between seller and
purchaser – When an interest bearing security is sold during the
currency of an interest period, the question arises as to how far the
purchaser is liable in respect of interest accrued due before the date
of his purchase. It frequently happens that the purchaser pays to the
seller the value for interest accrued till the date of the sale, and
that the seller receives the equivalent of interest up to the date of
the sale from the purchaser. Nevertheless, for the purposes of revenue
law, the only person liable to pay tax is the person who is the owner of
the securities at the date when the interest falls to be paid. Such
owner is the person liable in respect of the entire amount of interest.
Though as between the transferor and the transferee, interest may be
computed de die in diem, it does not really accrue from day to day, as
it cannot be received until the due date. This section makes it clear
that the assessment is upon the person entitled to receive, viz, the
holder of the security on the date of maturity of interest. Further, the
machinery sections of the Act do not provide for taking separately the
vendor and the purchaser or to keep track of interest adjustments
between the transferor and transferees. Tax is exigible when the income
due is received and is on the person who receives. The principle is that
the seller does not receive interest; he receives the price of
expectancy of interest, and expectancy of interest is not a
subject-matter of taxation. The only person who receives interest is the
purchaser. Where an interest bearing security is sold and part of the
sale price represents accrued but hitherto unpaid interest that accrued
interest is not chargeable to tax, unless it can be treated as accruing
from day to day.”

To conclude, accrual is an intersection of
legal right to receive and a corresponding obligation to pay. Accrual
of interest on bonds is influenced by the contractual terms. A holder of
bond contractually holds the right to receive the interest. The
transfer of bonds results in passing on the interest (receivable from
the bond-issuing company) from the seller to the buyer. This benefit of
accumulated interest is discharged by the buyer in form of
consideration. The payment made by the buyer is for acquisition of bonds
which factors the interest element. The buyer however does not pay
‘interest’ to the seller. It is only the purchase consideration. It is
inconceivable that the purchaser would step into the shoes of the bond
issuing company and pay interest along with consideration for purchase
of bonds. Payment receivable by the seller of bonds would wholly be
included in the capital gains computation. There is no interest element
contained therein.

Financial statements form the substratum for
income-tax laws. They are two sides of the same coin, yet they operate
in their individual domains. There are inherent variations in commercial
and tax profits. Today’s accounting norms are distilled, refined and
robust. With an ‘ever evolving’ story of tax and accounting world, the
relationship remains complementary but not interchangeable. In any departure, commercial accounting norms would be subservient to tax principles.
Therefore, the attempt by ICDS to elevate the accounting principles to
match with the concept of accrual under the tax principles may not have
achieved its avowed objective.

Justice Easwar Committee Report – A Real Godsend

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When the Modi Government came to power there were huge expectations that significant tax reforms would be initiated. However, the first one and a half year belied these expectations. While the Prime Minister talked about ease of doing business, adopting a liberal tax regime, the situation on the ground has been totally different.

Possibly the disappointment of the business community, coupled with electoral reverses has spurred the government into action. The first indications of this change came in the form of the recent circulars issued by the CBDT. The circular raising the monetary limits in regard to litigation pursued by the Income tax department, before the Tribunal and High Courts, and that too with retrospective effect, reduced the pendency before these two forums. The instructions in regard to the manner in which scrutiny assessments were to be completed, when the selection was under CASS, also reflected a refreshing change in attitude.

In this light, the first recommendations of the Justice Easwar Committee are commendable and deserve to be substantially accepted by the Finance Ministry. The Committee was formed on 27th October 2015, to suggest amendments to the Income-tax Act 1961 (the Act), and the procedures thereunder. The terms of reference of the Committee were:

(a) identifying provisions that gave rise to litigation on account of difference in interpretation,
(b) studying provisions that hampered ease of doing business,
(c) identifying provisions of the act for simplification, and
(d) suggesting alternatives and modifications to ensure certainty and predictability of tax laws.

The Committee has a term of one year from the date of its constitution and was to issue its first recommendations by 31st January 2016. The Committee adhered to the timeline and its suggestions are indeed laudable. A perusal of the first batch of suggestions in the draft report indicates that, they are fair, recognise the problems faced by taxpayers on the ground and are capable of immediate implementation. The recommendations have been divided into two parts – one constituting amendments to the Act itself which could be incorporated in the Finance Bill and the other being directions to be issued by the CBDT in the form of circulars or instructions.

The Committee has addressed a number of provisions which have resulted in substantial litigation. The treatment of transaction in shares and securities as business income instead of capital gains, the irrational disallowances under section 14A, the problems caused by the invoking of section 50C at the time of registering of the conveyance when the transaction of transfer had taken place earlier, the notional income arising in the hands of the purchaser of property on account of difference between the purchase price and the stamp duty valuation have all been dealt with.

The problems faced by assessees on account of overzealous bureaucrats have also been mentioned. Audit objections, which are often the result of either an erroneous interpretation of the law or non-appreciation of the ambit of provisions, resulting in reopening and revision of assessments, even though the department really does not agree with the objections. This results in a spate of litigations and with the assessee succeeding in a majority of cases, there is no real ultimate collection of revenue. The amendments suggested to section 147 and 263 of the Act will effectively reduce this menace.

While the implementation of the above suggestions will reduce litigation, other recommendations reflect a fair mind. It is proposed that if an assessee has bona fide, relied on a decision of the Tribunal, a High Court or the Supreme Court and an addition is made to his income, no penalty should be levied. One really wonders whether the department would be in a position to accept this proposal, but it certainly establishes the principles of justice and equity have been recognised. It has also been recommended that even if penalty is levied, the collection should be kept in abeyance if the appeal on merits is pending adjudication before the Tribunal.

For more than a decade, high-pitched assessments and the consequential coercive collection of taxes has made the life of tax payers miserable. The pressure of unreasonable collection targets often forced even wellmeaning officers to resort to irrational assessments. A rethink about the stay provisions which have been recommended by the Committee would go a long way in reducing if not solving the problem.

Though the principle that a tax proceeding is not adversarial is well established, it is rarely adhered to on the ground. A specific provision enabling a taxpayer to make a fresh claim for an exemption, deduction or relief after he has filed the return of income, during the course of an assessment is welcome. If this suggestion is accepted it may reduce unnecessary litigation.

On the equity front the Committee has suggested substantial changes in regard to issue of refunds, interest thereon and adjustment of refunds against tax dues which are really not collectible. Obtaining tax credit is another area which was a headache for both, the assessees and the professionals. The Committee has also dealt with this area and the recommendations are pragmatic.

Finally, the proposal to postpone, the implementation of the Income Computation Disclosure Standards (ICDS), will be welcomed by both, taxpayers and professionals. In fact, the Committee has aptly indicated reservations of tax payers concerning ICDS in their present form.

In all, the first batch of suggestions are worthy of an applause. However, much more needs to be done on the front of accountability of the tax administration. There are suggestions in regard to time limits for disposal of petitions under sections 273A, 220(2A) etc., but a lot more is expected from the Committee. Structural changes, reform in tax policy may possibly be done in the second instalment of the report.

One hopes that the Finance Minister accepts the recommendations of the Committee and proposes appropriate amendments through the Finance Bill while presenting the forthcoming budget. Coupled with this, if there is a change in the mindset of the tax officers and reduction in corruption, a healthy atmosphere where doing business is really easy will have been created. It is said that taxes are the price one pays for civilisation. If taxes are administered fairly and humanely, citizens of this country will be more than willing to pay this price.

I’M NEVER GONNA DIE

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This statement ‘I am never going to die’ gives a feeling of ego. People find it as a manifestation of an egoistic mind. But actually looking from a different perspective, e – represents effective and go – indicates movement. The word ‘ego’ means going effectively.

Right from our childhood and also while studying we are taught that the soul is immortal and only the body dies, yet we seek immortality. Immortality can be achieved only by ‘going effectively’. ‘Going effectively’ means leaving footprints on the ‘sands of time’. When I recollect the people who had / have made an impact on the life of others, then many names surface on the sea of my mind and some will also come in your mind. Some of these are Mother Teresa, Swami Vivekanand, Mahatma Gandhi and even Steve Jobs. The issue is: are they alive today? The answer is yes because they have impacted the life of others. Hence, in order to remain alive as an immortal soul even after death, one requires great perseverance, a selfless dedication to rise as a phoenix from any difficulty for the service of mankind even after falling again and again.

In order to attain this immortality, one has to strive. It is not just visualisation, but efforts are required to crystallise this and to achieve this we have to develop patience and have patience to listen to and patience to learn to serve others.

When I ask someone ‘How are you?’; I need to actually listen to the reply. I need to absorb and understand what he wants to say. Only then I can be a good listener and will be able to serve the person better.

Why worry and hurry on an ongoing basis. Life is a gift of God in a box with different compartments, I need to open it in a gentle way and feel the magic of every moment and what each compartment has in store for me.

Though, while living, I feel that this life is too short to cherish each and every moment and to take part in this wonderful voyage. It is almost difficult with all kinds of flaws and weaknesses to enhance value in the society. Even then one has to utilise this greatest gift from the Almighty to add beauty to the deeds and actions carried out and to covet for immortality. I need to dance with the rhythm of God. I need to accept what the divine power has bestowed upon me and he will guide me in finding a place in the heart of those I serve.

I would further add that there is no need to drink nectar to remain alive. In the true sense, there is no death. Death is when people forget us. There will be a day when your remains will leave this world, but your aroma will still be there. The fragrance of your thoughts, the charm of your dreams will be in the breeze. The only essence one requires is a calm conscience, a profound silence with the inner self, an ethical and rational life and by rendering lasting service. Service in the welfare of others is the best way of achieving immortality.

Now, the answer to the question: Where I am going to live after disappearance of the physique? Well, I am going to find address in people’s heart. It is possible for each (one) of us to develop this within us, the desire to serve others without seeking even a ‘thank you!’

I would conclude by quoting:

I will be a shining star which will pass on little light even in darkest time.
I will be available in the colours of leaves to fulfill achievable desires of the world.
I will be the clear water to let you feel profoundness of life.
I will accompany the first ray from the sun to enlighten light in life.
I will be the innocent smile on the face to make your soul feel happy.
I will be the rainbow to fill your life with all the colours to make you feel bliss.
I will be the calm moonlight to make you free from all the worries of the world.
I will be the whole ocean to give you the feeling of deepest thoughts and the shells of happiness.

If nothing else, by this communication to wish you all a healthy and happy life, and with this wish arising from my heart – I will live in your heart.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 374 (Bombay) Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Kolhapur Commissionerate vs. Karan Agencies

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Activity of conducting or managing business for owner cannot be classified under category of ‘Business Support Services’ and profits retained therefrom are not liable to service tax.

Facts
The Assessee entered into a contract with the owner for conducting business of manufacturing and sale of liquor. Under the agreement, a fixed amount was paid to the owner and entire balance profit was retained by assessee. The books of accounts were maintained in the name of owner. Revenue raised demand of service tax under category of ‘Business Support Services’. The Tribunal held that, ‘Business Support Service’ covers only services of supporting nature to main activity and in the instant case, principal activities are done (i.e. activities of manufacturing and sale of liquor) for the owner. It was also noted that owner has paid service tax on fixed charges paid/retained by him under ‘franchisee services’. Aggrieved by the same, the Department preferred an appeal before the High Court.

Held
The Hon. High Court held that findings in the Tribunal’s order are essentially based on clauses of conducting agreement which has been referred to extensively and read together and harmoniously to conclude that the arrangement or deal in the present case is of such a nature that a unit is taken over for conducting and managing by the Assessee. The Assessee is responsible for any profits being generated or losses sustained. The nature of the transaction therefore would not fall within the meaning of support services for business or commerce.

Huge penalties being levied by SEBI following A recent Supreme Court decision

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Introduction
SEBI has recently passed several orders levying huge penalties, running into crores for defaults like non-filing of documents/information. What is interesting is that levy of such huge and flat penalties is said to be mandatory and inevitable following the mandate of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of SEBI vs. Roofit Industries Ltd. SEBI’s view is that such levy is unavoidable, it is effectively being held, even where there are no aggravating factors.

Summary of decision of Supreme Court and its immediate impact
The Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of section 15A(a) of the SEBI Act, 1992 which provides for “a penalty of one lakh rupees for each day during which such failure continues or one crore rupees, whichever is less”. The penalty of Rs. 1 lakh per day of such failure, the Court held, is absolute and non-discretionary. Thus, if there was a delay/failure of, say, 75 days, the penalty would be Rs. 75 lakh. However, if the delay was of more than 100 days, then the penalty would be Rs. 1 crore.

While the decision is on penalty u/s. 15A(a), in view of almost identical wording in other penalty provisions (except 15F(a) and 15HB of the SEBI Act), it will apply to those provisions too. Further, there are several similar provisions in the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 and the Depositories Act, 1996 to which the ratio of this decision will apply. To take an example of violation under another such provision, in case of insider trading, the penalty u/s 15G of the SEBI Act would be a flat Rs. 25 crore. If three times the profits from insider trading exceeds Rs. 25 crore, the penalty will be such higher figure.

Note, however, that these provisions in all the three statutes have been amended with effect from 8th September 2014. The amended provisions now provide for a relatively far smaller minimum penalty. However, for all such violations during the period 29th October 2002 to 7th September 2014, such flat and huge penalty would be imposable. Considering that such violations of non-filing of documents/information (e.g., non-filing of information relating to change in holdings under the Takeover/Insider Trading Regulations) have been routinely found in numerous cases, all such cases will face such large penalties.

Indeed, within a very short time after this decision, SEBI levied penalties as follows:-

1. Presha Metallurgical Ltd. and others (Rs. 8 crore)

2. Vipul Shah (Rs. 4 crore)

3. Sunciti Financial Services Private Limited (Rs. 2 crore)

4. Alok Electricals Private Limited and others (Rs. 1 crore)

Detailed Discussion on Decision
The essential facts before the Supreme Court in this matter were as follows (there were several cases of broadly the same category in appeal and the facts discussed here relate to one of them – Alkan Projects). SEBI had levied a penalty of Rs. 1 crore on one of such parties for nonsubmission of information sought by it. The information was required to investigate certain alleged manipulation, etc. in the shares of Roofit Industries Ltd. Alkan appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT ”). SAT noted that while the violation was clearly established, Alkan was in a bad financial position. It was impossible to recover such a large penalty, and thus it did not serve any purpose. In the event of non recovery, SEBI could prosecute Alkan but that, as SAT noted, would take a long time, considering the already existing backlog of similar cases. SAT also noted that the provisions of section 15J provided for certain factors to be considered for levy of penalty. While “impecuniosity” of the party was not specifically listed as a factor, SAT nevertheless held that it should also be considered while deciding the amount of penalty. SAT accordingly reduced the penalty from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 15,000.

SEBI appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order of SAT . It held that section 15J listed three exhaustive factors for consideration of penalty. No other factor, including “impecuniosity”, can be considered, the Court held. The wording of section 15(A)(a) was also definite and prescribed a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh per day (albeit with an upper limit of Rs. 1 crore) which the Court held to be absolute. According to the Hon’ble Court, the “clear intention” for such high penalty “…is to impose harsher penalties for certain offences, and we find no reason to water them down”.

The Supreme Court also held that the amended penalty provision left no discretion with the adjudicating officer (AO) and thereby, even “the scope of section 15J was drastically reduced” for this purpose. The Supreme Court also dealt with section 15I and whether it allows for discretion to the AO in such matters. According to the Hon’ble Court, the amendments taking away such discretion “ought to have been reflected in the language of section 15I, but was clearly overlooked”. However, it also noted that, post amendment with effect from 8th August 2014, the discretion was reintroduced into the law.

Following this decision, SEBI has levied huge penalties in several cases. It is apparent, from the clear wording of such orders of penalty, that it will follow the same course in all other cases before it of violations during this long period of approximately 12 years while this provision was in force. Mitigating factors would not go to reduce the penalty. Further, aggravating factors would not go to increase the penalty. It appears that sections 15I and 15J are thus by and large rendered otiose, of course for these limited purposes. (Note:- Ironically, the Supreme Court, in view of the peculiar facts of the case, and also on account of its ruling on whether the failure was a continuing one, held that the penalty would be a lower amount, since the failure was committed before 29th October 2002).

Critique
With due respect, the decision of the Supreme Court needs reconsideration.

Section 15I does specifically provide for discretion to the Adjudicating Officer. It provides that if the Adjudicating Officer “..is satisfied that the person has failed to comply with the provisions of any of the sections specified in subsection (1), he may impose such penalty as he thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of any of those sections.” The Hon’ble Court has, however, taken a view that section 15I should also have been amended to remove the discretion for cases where such penalty is leviable but this was “clearly overlooked” by the law makers.

The Court has held that the factors listed in section 15J are exhaustive, in view of the word – “namely”. Thus, it has held that other mitigating factors cannot be considered. It is submitted that a better interpretation of the section is that it obligates the AO to consider these factors and thus is a qualitative provision. If these factors are absent penalty may be reduced/not levied. If one or more of such factors are present, then depending on the intensity of such factors, higher penalty may be levied. Further, it is also submitted, considering the discretion inbuilt in section 15I, there is no bar in considering other mitigating or aggravating factors present in circumstances of each case.

Indeed, considering the contradictory and even ambiguous provisions of sections 15I and 15J, the Court could have, it is submitted with due respect, taken a view that discretion still exists for the AO.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court should have also considered that these penalty provisions have actually been applied fairly consistently in the past by SEBI (and upheld by SAT ) by applying penalties in a discretionary manner.

The Hon’ble Court should have also considered the absurd consequences of such an interpretation. To take an example, a violation of insider trading resulting in a profit of Rs. 1000 would nonetheless result in a penalty of Rs. 25 crore.

The view of SAT that impecuniosity should also be considered as a factor is also not devoid of merit. A penalty of, say, Rs. 1 crore on a person known to be insolvent is, as SAT rightly pointed out, only on paper. I had pointed out earlier in this column that the huge/record penalty of Rs. 7,269 crore levied by SEBI on PACL suffers from this same anomaly and defect and is thus equally meaningless/ on paper only.

It is also seen that before 29th October 2002 and on and after 8th September 2014, no such large and mandatory penalty was imposable. Even after 2014, though a minimum penalty is imposable, such minimum amount is relatively far small. It is inconceivable, in my view, that law makers could have considered levy of such huge and flat penalty, particularly considering that the matters with which the provisions relate to are not serious. Where they are serious, fairly large amount of penalties has indeed been provided for. If at all, it is respectfully submitted, the Hon’ble Court should have read down these provisions, instead of effectively reading down section 15I and 15J. I may add that the Supreme Court in Swedish Match’s case ([2004] 54 SCL 549 (SC)) did consider, in passing though, with the issue whether a penalty of Rs. 25 crore for non-compliance of making an offer is inevitable. However, the views there were not as emphatic and direct as in Roofit’s case.

Even otherwise, SEBI has also taken, in my view, a flawed stand with regard to another Supreme Court’s decision, viz., SEBI vs. Shriram Mutual Fund (68 SCL 216 (SC). SEBI considers (wrongly, in my opinion) this decision as holding that penalty should mandatorily follow a violation and there is no discretion to SEBI in the matter. While SEBI has not levied sky high penalties, as it has done following Roofit’s case, one hopes that this stand too is modified and made consistent with what the Hon’ble Court really mandated in that case.

Be that as it may, SEBI seems to be on a roll and is almost gleefully levying huge penalties. To me, it seems inevitable that the matter will go back to the Supreme Court. It is hoped that the Hon’ble Court reconsiders its view and holds that discretion still remains in matter of levy of penalty.

2015 (40) STR 881 (Guj) Riva Packaging Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Comm. of Service tax

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Territorial jurisdiction of the High Court

Facts
In the present case, dispute/show cause notice (SCN) was issued in Dadra & Nagar Haveli and an order confirming demand was passed. The Appellant challenged the order by filing an appeal before CESTAT’s Ahmedabad bench. CESTAT confirmed the demand. Thereafter the appeal was preferred before the Gujarat High Court.

Held
The High Court, on noticing that the dispute/SCN related to Dadra & Nagar Haveli, held that the Gujarat High court has no territorial jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter though the impugned order was passed by CESTAT ’s Ahmedabad bench. Accordingly, the Appeal was dismissed.

2015 (40) STR 833 (Sikkim) Future Gaming & Hotel Services (Pvt) Ltd vs. UOI

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An explanation cannot enlarge the scope of a provision

Facts
The Appellant, a lottery distributor purchased lottery tickets from the State Government and thereafter, sold them to stockists and resellers after adding profit margin. This Court in the Appellant’s own case under the earlier provisions of law had already held that the activity of promoting, marketing, organising or in any other manner assisting in organising games of chance including lottery, was an activity falling under the expression “betting and gambling” which is in the domain of the State Legislature and the Centre had no power to tax such an activity. Post the judgement, in the Finance Act 2015, an explanation had been inserted in the definition of service to enlarge the definition as to cover the activities of lottery distributors.

Held
The High Court observed that, the principal requirement of the definition of ‘service’ is that the activity should be carried out by one person for another and such activity should be for a consideration. Since the Appellant was acting in a principal to principal relationship with the State Government buying and selling the lottery tickets and was not rendering any service to the state, the activity could not fall in the definition of ‘service’ per se. It was further held that, if an activity is not covered in the definition of ‘service’, then the same cannot be made taxable by way of an insertion of explanation, as an explanation cannot enlarge the scope of a provision. Accordingly, explanation was declared to be ultra vires and struck down.

2015 (40) STR 1066 (Del.) Alar Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Delhi-I

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Limitation period of 1 year as provided u/s. 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 would apply to refund claims of taxable services only.

Facts
Refund claim of the appellant was rejected as time-barred vide section 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 without considering the appropriateness of taxability on services. Appellant claimed that it exported services and facts of the present case were identical to other three appeals heard jointly by CESTAT wherein refund was allowed.

Held
Having regard to pertinent judicial pronouncements, it was observed that only if refund claims pertain to taxable services, limitation period of 1 year would apply vide section 11B (supra). Accordingly, the matter was remanded back to decide the matter as per the terms provided by Delhi High Court in the present case.

Concept of “Gross Receipts” vis-à-vis MVA T Rules, 2005

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Introduction
Under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT Act) and the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 (MVAT Rules), the dealers are entitled to a set off. However, they are subject to conditions as may be prescribed in the Rules. For example, Rule 52 of MVAT Rules which prescribes eligibility to set off reads as under:

“52. Claim and grant of set-off in respect of purchases made during any period commencing on or after the appointed day.

(1) In assessing the amount of tax payable in respect of any period starting on or after the appointed day, by a registered dealer (hereinafter, in this rule, referred to as ‘the claimant dealer’) the Commissioner shall subject to the provisions of [rules 53,54,55 & 55B] in respect of the purchases of goods made by the claimant dealer on or after the appointed day, grant him a set-off of the aggregate of the following sums, that is to say,

(a) the sum collected separately from the claimant dealer by the other registered dealer by way of [tax] on the purchases made by the claimant dealer from the said registered dealer of goods being capital assets and [goods the purchases of which are debited to the profit and loss account or, as the case may be, the trading account],

(b) tax paid in respect of any entry made after the appointed day under the Maharashtra Tax on the Entry of Motor Vehicles into Local Areas Act, 1987, and

(c) the tax paid in respect of any entry made after the appointed day under the Maharashtra Tax on the Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2003.

(d) the purchase tax paid by the claimant dealer under this Act.”

Thus, to find out actual availability of set off reference is required to be made to Rules like Rules 53 & 54. Rule 53 prescribes reduction in set off whereas Rule 54 is about a negative list.

Rule 53(6)(b)
One of the Rules prescribing reduction in set off is rule 53(6). Rule 53(6)(b) is applicable to dealers in general. The said rule is reproduced below for ready reference.

“53. Reduction in set-off. –

(6) If out of the gross receipts of a dealer in any year, receipts on account of sale are less than fifty % of the total receipts, –

(a) …

(b) in so far as the dealer is not a hotel or restaurant, the dealer shall be entitled to claim set-off only on those purchases effected in that year where the corresponding goods are sold or resold within six months of the date of purchase or are consigned within the said period, not by way of sale to another State, to oneself or one’s agent or purchases of packing materials used for packing of such goods sold, resold or consigned:

Provided that for the purposes of clause (b), the dealer who is a manufacturer of goods not being a dealer principally engaged in doing job work or labour work shall be entitled to claim set-off on his purchases of plant and machinery which are treated as capital assets and purchases of parts, components and accessories of the said capital assets, and on purchases of consumables, stores and packing materials in respect of a period of three years from the date of effect of the certificate of registration.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-rule, “receipts” means the receipts pertaining to all activities including business activities carried out in the State but does not include the amount representing the value of the goods consigned not by way of sales to another State to oneself or one’s agent.” It can be seen that the rule provides for reduction or, in other words, restricted set off, when the receipts from sales are less than 50% of gross receipts. The Explanation under rule 53(6)(b) also provides meaning of gross receipts. There are disputes about meaning of gross receipts and how to compute it.

It can also be noted that if receipts from sales are less than 50% of gross receipts then set off is eligible only in respect of purchases which are sold within six months from the date of purchase. Therefore, the goods which are not sold like, consumed capital goods or goods which are not sold within six months are not eligible for set off.

Mutual Funds
Recently there was a controversy in relation to availability of set off to Mutual Funds. The Hon. M. S.T. Tribunal had an occasion to decide such an issue in case of UTI Mutual Fund (VAT SA 100 to 102 of 2014 dt.22.9.2015). The facts as narrated in the judgment are as under:

“The Appellant is a mutual fund registered with the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and is regulated under the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996. UTI Gold Exchange Traded Fund (UTI GETF) is one of the schemes of the Appellant and the same is also regulated by SEBI under the SEBI MF regulations.

3. As per the SEBI MF regulations, the balance sheet and revenue accounts of each scheme are required to be prepared separately and audited separately and no consolidated balance sheet of various schemes of a Mutual Fund is prepared. Thus, each scheme has a separate entity including separate receipts, funds, assets liabilities, etc.

4. As per the MVAT provisions, VAT is applicable on the turnover of sale of goods and the definition of goods specifically excludes securities. Therefore only UTI GETF is subject to VAT and not the other schemes of the Appellant as other schemes invested in securities and not in gold.

The Appellant obtained VAT registration simultaneously with the launch of UTI GETF and not earlier despite the other schemes of the Appellant dealer being in operation much before that. Thus the Appellant is assumed the role of dealer only on the launch of UTI GETF scheme and only this scheme should be considered and not any other scheme of the Appellant.”

From the above, it can be seen that the Mutual Fund has receipts from various schemes like relating to securities, gold etc.. Over all, the sales receipts are from the sale of gold whereas there are other receipts towards securities etc.. The main issue involved was whether the gross receipts should be computed considering receipts from all the schemes or only from gold scheme separately.

The argument was that under MVAT Act, only sale of goods can be considered as receipts and not other receipts which do not involve goods like shares, securities etc..

The Hon. Tribunal has dealt with the issue in the following words:
“The Learned representative of revenue has relied on the judgment of this Tribunal reported in the case of M/s. UTI Mutual Fund (present Appellant) vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (ST1) GJX 0626 STMAH wherein it is observed:-

“The set-off u/s. 48(1)(a)(ii) of MVAT Act is circumscribed with limitations. The limitations are (i) circumstances, (ii) conditions (iii) restrictions, as may be specified in the Rules. Rule 53 prescribe reduction in set-off in full or part, particularly Rule 53(6)(b) MVAT Rules prescribe restriction. Restriction is in the nature of duration of purchase and its sale. The restriction is where the receipts on account of sale are less than 50% of the total receipts, the setoff is permissible only on those purchases effected in that year where corresponding goods sold or resold within six months from the date of purchases. The “receipts” are explained in explanation. ”Receipts” means the receipts pertaining to all activities, including business activities carried out in the State.”

On the plain reading of section 48(1)(a)(ii) of MVAT Act r/w Rule 53(6)(b) and Explanation of MVAT Rules, it is clear that the receipts would include all activities of the dealer including business activities. Receipts which are concerning the activities not involving the sale of goods, are also included in “Total Receipts” in Rule 53(6) of MVAT Rules. The submission of Smt. N. R. Badheka does not have a legal base in law. Rule 53(6)(b) and explanation are within delegated powers conferred by section 48(1) of MVAT Act.”

26. The Learned Advocate Smt. Badheka has strongly contended that UTI GETF is dealing in equity and therefore only the receipts pertaining to the activity of UTI GETF ought to have been considered for grant of set off u/r. 53(6)(b) of MVAT rules. However, on going through the explanation attached to 53(6)(b), we find that the receipt means receipts pertaining to all activities including business activities carried out in the state and therefore in our considered opinion, the other activities of UTI Mutual Fund are also required to be taken into consideration while calculating the receipts for the purposes of set off as they are also business activities carried out in the State.

27. The basic rule of interpretation is laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Priyankan Sharan and Another (LIS/ SC/2008/1228) wherein it is observed:

“It is a well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statutes is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent”.

28. It is well settled that in the matter of grant of set off or exemption, the relevant provisions are required to be construed strictly. No liberal interpretation is permissible in such matters. On going through the explanation attached to Rule 53(6(b) of MVAT Rules, it clearly appears that receipts for the purpose of said rules means the receipts pertaining to all the activities including business activities of the dealer carried out in the State. The contention of Learned Advocate Smt. Badheka that only the activities of UTI GETF should be taken into consideration for the purposes of grant of set off u/r. 53(6)(b) is thus devoid of merit and cannot be accepted.”

Conclusion
Thus the interpretation lays down that the gross receipts should be computed considering receipts from all activities in Maharashtra. It will include receipts from sale of goods as well as non sale activities also. Further, Mutual fund is considered as one entity and cannot be considered scheme wise.

The ratio laid down above will also apply to other dealers. The dealers in Maharashtra are required to consider the above interpretation while computing the setoff.

Welcome GST – Part IV VAT (GST) in the European Union (‘EU’)

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Introduction
Note: The earlier write ups, under this series, covered the GST legislation in one country (comprising of several States). In comparison, the EU is unique in the sense that it comprises of several countries which have their own laws and tax legislation, but these laws conform to a common charter i.e. the EU directives.

The EU is a politico-economic union of 28 Member States that are located primarily in Europe. Presently, the following countries are members of the EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The EU operates through a system of supranational institutions and intergovernmental-negotiated decisions by the Member States. The supranational institutions are: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the Court of Auditors.

For the purposes of achieving a ‘single market’, the EU has developed a standardised system of laws and policies that apply in all Member States ensuring free movement of people, goods, services, and capital across Member States. The EU Value Added Tax (‘EUVAT’) is one such legislation. This tax is levied on goods and services supplied within the EU. While the EU’s supranational institutions themselves do not collect the tax, EU Member States are each required to adopt a VAT legislation that complies with the EU VAT code (read below about co-ordinated administration of value added tax within the EU).

EU VAT Area
The EU VAT area is a territory consisting of territory of all Member States of the EU and certain other countries which follow the EU rules on VAT . The principle is also valid for some special taxes on products like alcohol and tobacco. Goods are only considered as imported or exported if they enter or leave the EU area.

Authority and scope of the tax

The EU VAT system is regulated by a series of European Union directives issued by the European Council, the most important of which is the Sixth VAT Directive [Council Directive1 2006/112/EC of 28t November 2006 on the common system of value added tax]. The primary aim of the EU VAT directive is to harmonise VAT (content and implementation) within the EU VAT area. Besides this, the directive also specifies that VAT rates must be within a certain range. Some other key objectives of this directive are:

  • harmonisation of content and layout of the VAT declaration
  • regulation of accounting, providing a common legal accounting framework
  • detailed description of invoices2 and receipts3, meaning that Member States
  • have a common invoice framework
  • regulation of accounts payable
  • regulation of accounts receivable
  • standard definition of national accountancy and administrative terms.

The directive is updated from time to time, to address various issues arising from the movement of men, capital, material and services within the Member States and it includes “the place of supply of services” rules which have been in force since 1st January 2010. More recently, the directive was amended to rationalise the place of supply of services in respect of electronic services.

Co-ordinated administration of value added tax within the EU
VAT collected at each stage in the supply chain is remitted to the tax authorities of the concerned Member State and forms part of that State’s revenue. A small proportion goes to the EU in the form of a levy (‘VAT -based own resources’). Previously, in spite of the customs union, the differing VAT rates and the separate VAT administration processes resulted in a high administrative and cost burden for crossborder trade. The EU has tried to resolve this by developing the co-ordinated administration of VAT within the EU VAT area.

Key initiatives under the co-ordinated administration include:

Cross-border VAT is declared in the same way as domestic VAT , and thus, facilitates the elimination of border controls between Member States, saving costs and reducing delays. It also simplifies administrative work for freight forwarders.

‘Mini One Stop Shop’ simplification scheme (read more below) is one of the measures adopted to achieve the ‘Single market’ objective.

The value added tax principle

Output VAT: VAT on output supplies charged by a business and paid by its customers.
Input VAT: VAT that is paid by a business to other businesses on the supplies that a business receives
Input tax credit: A business is generally able to recover input VAT to the extent that the input VAT is attributable to its taxable outputs.

Input VAT is recovered by offsetting it against the output VAT for which the business is required to account to the government, or, if there is an excess, by claiming a repayment (refund) from the government. The net effect of this is that each supplier in the chain remits tax on the value added, and ultimately the tax is paid by the end consumer. The final consumer does not receive a credit for the VAT paid.

Destination based tax
Generally, VAT is charged on the ‘destination principle’ i.e. the supply of goods or services is taxed in the Member State where the goods or services are delivered commonly known as the ‘Member State of arrival’.

The mechanism for achieving this result is as follows:
The exporting Member State zero-rates the VAT. This means that the Member State of the exporting merchant does not collect VAT on the sale, but still gives the exporting merchant a credit for the VAT paid on the purchase by the exporter (in practice, this often means a cash refund).

The importing Member State ‘reverse charges’ the VAT . This means that the importer is required to pay VAT to the importing Member State at its rate. In many cases, a credit is immediately given for this as input VAT . The importer then charges VAT on resale in the normal way.

Exceptions are made to the destination based principle and are also made in case of:

supplies of goods such as: distance supply (i.e. mail order catalog sales or e-commerce supplies), supplies within EU to exempt/non-taxable legal persons and excise products (i.e. energy products, alcohol and alcoholic beverages and manufactured tobacco).

supplies of services such as: supply of transport, supply of real estate services, etc.

In such cases the tax is sometimes based on the ‘origin principle’ and collected in the State of origin, commonly known as ‘Member State of dispatch’. Supply of goods

Domestic supply
A domestic supply of goods is a taxable transaction where goods are received in exchange for consideration within one Member State. Thus, one Member State charges VAT on the goods and allows a corresponding credit upon subsequent resale of those goods.

Intra-Community acquisition
An intra-community acquisition of goods for a consideration is a taxable transaction on crossing two or more Member States. The place of supply is determined to be the destination Member State, and VAT is normally charged at the rate applicable in the destination Member State. However, there are special provisions for distance selling.

Distance sales

Distance sales treatment allows the vendor to apply domestic place of supply rules (ie., rules in the Member State of dispatch) for determining which Member State collects the VAT . This means that VAT is charged at the rate applicable in the Member State of dispatch. However, there are exceptions to this, for instance:

  • When a vendor in one Member State sells goods directly to individuals and VAT-exempt organisations in another Member State and the aggregate value of goods sold to consumers in that Member State is below the specified threshold4 in any 12 consecutive months, then such a sale of goods may qualify for a distance sales treatment.
  • supply of excisable goods to the UK (like tobacco and alcohol).

In the abovementioned cases of distance supply, where the supply of goods is made to final consumers in a Member State of arrival, the exporting vendor may be required to charge VAT at the rate applicable in the Member State of arrival. If a supplier provides a distant sales service to several EU Member States, a separate accounting of sold goods in regard to VAT calculation is required. The supplier then must seek a VAT registration (and charge applicable rate) in each such country where the volume of sales in any 12 consecutive months exceeds the local threshold.

Supply of services
A supply of services is the supply of anything that is not a goods. The general rule for determining the place of supply is the place where the supplier of the services is established (registered/incorporated), such as a fixed establishment where the service is supplied, the supplier’s permanent address, or where the supplier usually resides. VAT is then charged at the rate applicable in the Member State where the place of supply of the services is located and is collected by that Member State. This general rule for the place of supply of services (the place where the supplier is established) is subject to several exceptions. Most of the exceptions switch the place of supply to the place where the services are received. Such exceptions include the:

  • supply of transport services,
  • supply of cultural services,
  • supply of artistic services,
  • supply of sporting services,
  • supply of scientific services,
  • supply of educational services,
  • supply of ancillary transport services,
  • supply of services related to transfer pricing services,
  • and many miscellaneous services including
  • supply of legal services,
  • supply of banking and financial services,
  • supply of telecommunications,
  • supply of broadcasting,
  • electronically supplied services,
  • supply of services from engineers and accountants,
  • supply of advertising services, and
  • supply of intellectual property services.

The place of supply of services related to real estate is where the real estate is located. There are special rules for determining the place of supply of services delivered electronically. The mechanism for collecting VAT when the place of supply is not in the same Member State as the supplier is similar to that used for Intra-Community Acquisitions of goods, i.e. zero-rating by the supplier and reverse charge by the recipient of the services (if a taxable person). But if the recipient of the services is not a taxable person (i.e. a final consumer), the supplier must generally charge VAT at the rate applicable in its own Member State. If the place of supply is outside the EU, no VAT is charged.

(*It may be relevant to mention here that the current Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 which are effective from 1st July 2012 are based on the above rules)

Threshold and Registration
The threshold limits for registration are generally fixed by the Member State. The Sixth directive on EU VAT provides the threshold limit only in case of specific supplies such as distance supply, etc.

Businesses may be required to register for VAT in EU Member States, other than the one in which they are based if they supply goods via mail order to those states over a certain threshold. Businesses that are established in one Member State but receive supplies in another Member State may be able to reclaim VAT charged in the second State if they have a value added tax identification number. A similar directive, the Thirteenth VAT Directive, also allows businesses established outside the EU to recover VAT in certain circumstances.

REGISTERING FOR VA T USING MINI ONE STOP SHOP (MOSS)
To comply with the place of supply rules, businesses need to decide whether or not they want to register to use the EU VAT Mini One Stop Shop (MOSS) simplification scheme. Registration for MOSS is voluntary. If suppliers decide against the MOSS, registration will be required in each Member State where B2C supplies of e-services are made. With no minimum turnover threshold for the new EU VAT rules, VAT registration will be required regardless of the value of e-service supply in each Member State. EU MOSS registrations opened on 1st October 2014. (To be continued in the next issue of BCAJ)

Hiralal Chunilal Jain vs. Income tax Officer ITAT Mumbai “H” bench ITA No. 4547, 2545 & 1275/Mum/2014 A. Ys. 2009-10 & 2010-11. Date of Order: 01.01.2016

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Section 69C – Addition made only on the basis of bogus parties identified by the Sales tax department deleted.

Facts
The assessee, an individual, runs a proprietary business of trading in ferrous and non-ferrous metals. During the assessment proceedings, the AO found that the assessee had purchased goods worth Rs.7.21 lakh from Shiv Sagar Steel whose name was appearing in the list of bogus parties forwarded by the sales tax authorities and the name of the assessee was appearing as a beneficiary in the list. The AO directed the assessee to produce the party. However, the supplier was not produced by the assessee. Summons issued to the party could not be served on the given address. The AO held the purchase transaction as bogus and treated the entire purchase of Rs.7.21 lakh as unexplained expenditure u/s.69C.

Aggrieved by the order of the AO, the assessee appealed before the CIT(A) and submitted that the AO had relied upon the information supplied by the investigation wing of the Sales Tax Department (STD) but he had not supplied the copy of the statement of the party recorded by the STD. Further, the assessee was also not allowed to cross examine the party. According to the assessee, he had discharged his obligation by submitting details of purchases, sales and bank transactions. He had also produced stock register before the AO. There was no evidence that payments for the so called bogus purchases had come back to the assessee. All purchases and sales were recorded in the books of accounts, quantitative details were also maintained and the AO had also accepted the sales.

The CIT(A) noted that the STD had treated the suppliers of goods as suspicious dealer since during the investigation, the supplier had admitted that they had issued accommodation bills. Further, he also noted that the assessee was not able to produce the party. According to the CIT(A),it was quite possible that the assessee purchased the goods from the grey market and took accommodation bills from the said party. Therefore, he held that an addition of 20% of the purchase would be justified in order to fulfil the gap difference of Gross Profit (GP) for the alleged purchase as well to plug any leakage of revenue.

Before the Tribunal, in addition to what was submitted before the CIT(A), the assessee pointed out that the CIT(A) had ignored the vital fact that the Net Profit ratio was 1.7% and the GP ratio was about 7%. He also relied upon the decisions of the Mumbai Tribunal in the cases of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Rajeev G. Kalathil (67 SOT 52) and Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Tristar Jewellery Exports Private Limited (ITA 8292/Mum/2011 dated 31.07.2015) and the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nikunj Eximp Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (372 ITR 619).

Held
The Tribunal noted that the AO had not rejected the sales made by the assessee and had made the addition only on the basis of the information received from the STD. The assessee was also maintaining the quantitative details and stock register. According to the Tribunal, the AO should have made an independent inquiry. He also did not follow the principles of natural justice before making the addition. It also noted that the CIT(A) had reduced the addition to 20%, but he had not given any justification, except stating that the same was done to plug the probable leakage of revenue. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal reversed the order of the CIT(A) and allowed the appeal of the assessee.

C.R. Developments Pvt. Ltd. vs. JCIT ITAT `C’ Bench, Mumbai Before R. C. Sharma (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 4277/Mum/2012 A. Y.: 2009-10. Dateof Order: 13th May, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue : S. M. Bandi / Asghar Zain

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Sections 22, 28 – Notional income in respect of three unsold shops cannot be charged to tax under the head `Income from House Property’.

Facts
The assessee company, engaged in the business of construction and development, held 3 unsold shops as stock-in-trade. In the return of income, the assessee had not offered any notional income in respect of these shops on the ground that three shops held at the end of the year were its trading assets and therefore their annual value is not chargeable under the head `income from house property’ as profit on sale thereof shall be chargeable to tax under the head of income from business. The AO did not agree with the assessee’s contention and brought the notional rental income in assessee’s hands u/s.23.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who restored the matter back to the file of the AO with the direction to make an enquiry as to what would be the possible rent that the property might fetch.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where, on behalf of the assessee reliance was placed on the decision of the Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of M/s Perfect Scale Company Pvt. Ltd., [ITA Nos.3228 to 3234/Mum/2013, order dated 6-9-2013], wherein it was held that in respect of assets held as business, income from the same is not assessable u/s.23(1) of the Act whereas on behalf of the Revenue, reliance was placed on the order of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Ansal Housing Finance & Leasing Co. Ltd., 354 ITR 180 (Delhi) in support of the proposition that even in respect of unsold flats by the developer is liable to be taxed as income from house property.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Chennai Properties & Investments Ltd. vs. CIT, reported in (2015) 56 taxmann.com 456 (SC), vide judgment dated 9-4-2015 has held that the action of the AO in charging rental income received by an assessee engaged in the activity of letting out properties under the head Income from House Property was not justified. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that since the assessee company’s main object, is to acquire and held properties and to let out these properties, the income earned by letting out these properties is main objective of the company, therefore, rent received from the letting out of the properties is assessable as income from business.

On the very same analogy in the instant case, the assessee is engaged in business of construction and development, which is main object of the assessee company. The three flats which could not be sold at the end of the year were shown as stock-in-trade. Estimating rental income by the AO for these three flats as income from house property was not justified insofar as these flats were neither given on rent nor the assessee has intention to earn rent by letting out the flats. The flats not sold were its stock-intrade and income arising on its sale is liable to be taxed as business income. The Tribunal held that it did not find any justification in the order of AO for estimating rental income from these vacant flats u/s.23 which is assessee’s stock in trade as at the end of the year. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition made by estimating letting value of the flats u/s.23 of the Act.

[2015] 173 TTJ 507 (Mum) Hasmukh N. Gala vs. ITO A. Y.: 2010-11. Date of Order: 19.8.2015

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Section 54 – Conditions of section 54 stand complied when the assessee pays booking advance to a builder and the builder issues him a letter of allotment specifying the flat number and the specific details of the property. Deduction u/s. 54 cannot be denied on the ground that the new property was still under construction or that the legal title in the new residential house has not passed to the assessee within the specified period.

Facts
The assessee, an individual, was carrying on business of trading in glass. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee had vide sale agreement dated 8th December, 2009 sold a residential house for a consideration of Rs. 1,02,55,000. Long term capital gain computed on sale of this residential house, amounting to Rs. 88,37,096, was claimed to be exempt u/s. 54 of the Act on the ground that the assessee had on 6th February, 2010 issued a cheque of Rs. 1 crore to a builder for purchase of Flat Nos. 1 and 2 in a building known as Ramniwas at Malad(E). The assessee produced a copy of receipt of payment made by him and also an allotment letter dated 15th October, 2010 from the builder.

In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the construction of the new house was not completed even after two years from the date of transfer of old house. He held that giving of an advance could not be treated as a `purchase’ for the purposes of section 54 of the Act. The AO, denied the claim made u/s. 54 of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO on the ground that the assessee, though, has parted with money but has not acquired possession or domain over the new residential house.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal observed that the legal title has not passed or transferred to the assessee within the specified period and that the new property was still under construction. However, it also noted that the allotment letter by the builder does mention the flat number and has other specific details of the property. It noted the observations of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Kuldeep Singh (2014) 270 CTR 561 (Del.) where the Delhi High Court having noted the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Lal vs. CIT (2014) 269 CTR 1 (SC) and also having referred to the decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Smt. Shashi Varma vs. CIT (1999) 152 CTR 227 (MP) and of the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT vs. Smt. Bharati C. Kothari (2000) 244 ITR 106 (MP) opined that when substantial investment was made in the new property, it should be deemed that sufficient steps had been taken and it would satisfy the requirements of section 54 of the Act.

It observed that the parity of reasoning explained by the Delhi High Court squarely applied to the case being decided. It also noted that the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Shri Khemchand Fagwani vs. ITO (ITA No. 7876/Mum/2010, order dated 10th September, 2014), has allowed the claim of exemption under similar circumstances.

Following the precedents, the Tribunal allowed the claim made u/s. 54 of the Act.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

2016-TIOL-54-ITAT-AHM Ishwarcharan Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT – CPC TDS, Ghaziabad A. Ys.: 2013-14 and 2014-15. Date of Order: 23.12.2015

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Sections 200A and 234E – Adjustment in respect of levy of fees u/s. 234E is beyond the scope of permissible adjustments contemplated u/s. 200A. In the absence of enabling provision, such levy could not be effected in the course of intimation u/s. 200A.

Facts
The assessee company received intimations issued u/s. 200A wherein while processing TDS statements, fee u/s. 234E was levied for assessment years 2013-14 and 2014-15.

Aggrieved by the levy of fees u/s. 234E in an intimation issued u/s. 200A, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the levy.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal observed that the issue in all the appeals was squarely covered in favor of the assessee by the decision of ITAT Amritsar Bench in the case of Sibia Healthcare Private Ltd. vs. DCIT 2015-TIOL-798-ITATAMRITSAR vide order dated 9th June, 2015, wherein the Division bench interalia observed that post 1st June, 2015, in the course of processing of TDS statement and issuance of intimation u/s. 200A in respect thereof, an adjustment could also be made in respect of “fee, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E.”

The Tribunal further held that as the law stood, prior to 1st June, 2015, there was no enabling provision for raising a demand in respect of levy of fees u/s 234E. It held that section 200A, at the relevant point of time, permitted computation of amount recoverable from, or payable to, the tax deductor after making adjustment on account of “arithmetical errors” and “incorrect claims apparent from any information in the statement, after making adjustment for `interest, if any, computed on the basis of sums deductible as computed in the statement. No other adjustments in the amount refundable to, or recoverable from, the tax deductor, were permissible in accordance with the law as it existed at that point of time.

The Tribunal deleted the levy of late filing fees u/s. 234E, in all the eleven appeals, by way of impugned intimations issued.

The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed.

[2015] 155 ITD 167/61 (Chandigarh) Harpreet Singh vs. ITO A.Y. 2010-11. Date of Order – 31st July, 2015

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Section 271(1)(c), read with section 22, of the Income-tax Act, 1961- No penalty can be imposed in a case where assesse suo motu revises his return declaring additional income and has paid taxes thereon before any detection of concealment by revenue authorities.

FACTS
The assessee filed his return declaring certain rental income. Subsequently, the assessee suo moto revised its return wherein he included certain additional amount of rental income.

Since original return was not filed u/s. 139(1) within prescribed time, the Assessing Officer opined that return filed subsequently could not be treated as revised return. The Assessing officer thus completed assessment u/s. 143(3). He also passed a penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c) for concealment of particulars relating to rental income.

The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed penalty order.

On second appeal:

HELD
The Tribunal observed that in the instant case the assessee had offered additional rental income and paid the taxes thereon before any detection of concealment by the revenue authorities. No notice or query was raised regarding the rental income offered by the assessee for taxation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the assessee either concealed the income or furnished the inaccurate particulars of income. In this case, the rental income inadvertently omitted in the original return was voluntarily offered for taxation during the course of assessment proceedings. The assessee submitted that during the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee realized its mistake and pointed out the same to the Assessing Officer.

There was no detection of concealed income by the revenue authorities. The assessee voluntarily offered the rental income for taxation and the same was accepted by the Assessing Officer in the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the present case, it was held that no penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) can be validly levied. Therefore, the penalty levied by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) is cancelled.

[2015] 155 ITD 140/61 taxmann.com 178 (Chandigarh) DCIT vs. Gulshan Verma A.Y. 2005-06. Date of Order : 14th July, 2015

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Section 68 – Where assessee received certain unsecured loan from a non resident, in view of fact that the said amount was advanced through an account payee cheque from NRE account of lender, no addition can be made u/s. 68 in respect of the said loan.

FACTS
The asseessee had taken an unsecured loan from one party ‘S’ residing in USA. The amount was obtained from an NRE account maintained by the lender with ‘C’ bank.

According to the Assessing Officer, the assessee failed to submit any evidence, viz. a copy of bank account of the lender in the country of his residence from where the funds were transferred to his NRE account maintained with ‘C’ bank. The Assessee also failed to submit any evidence regarding the remittance into the NRE account.

In the absence of the above-mentioned documents, the Assessing Officer held that the creditworthiness of the lender was not established and added the loan amount to the total income of the assessee u/s. 68.

The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the above treatment.

On Second appeal:

HELD
The Tribunal observed that in order to discharge the onus u/s. 68, the assessee must prove the following ingredients:-

1. The identity of the creditor
2. The capacity of the creditor to advance the money.
3. The genuineness of the transaction

There was no dispute regarding the identity of the creditor. The assessee had submitted a certificate from the manager of ‘C’ bank stating that ‘S’ holder of NRE account had transferred Rs. 4,25,000/- through a cheque on the account of the assessee.

The assessee had also produced the bank statement of ‘C’ bank before the authorities to demonstrate that ‘S’ had transferred the said amount to him. The assessee had also produced confirmation letter in the form of an affidavit of ‘S’ duly attested by ‘T’, Notary Public State of Meryland wherein ‘S’ had stated that he is a resident of USA. He had also confirmed giving of interest free unsecured loan from ‘C’ bank by way of cheque. The lower authorities were not in question about the authenticity of the affidavit. The only doubt was that the lender had not disclosed his source of income. The lower authorities also verified the passport of the lender.

There is no dispute that ‘S’ was maintaining an NRE account which was opened with an initial deposit of $10,000, i.e., Rs. 4,48,829/-. The ‘C’ bank had issued a certificate to this effect. The Assessing Officer raised an objection that the assessee failed to file a copy of the bank account of the lender in the country of his residence. The assessee had also submitted a copy of ITR filed in USA by ‘S’ for the period 01.01.04 to 31.12.04, wherein the annual income of $22,201 had been declared. There is no dispute about the financial capacity of the lender as well.

Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the income which the lender had reported in ITR, there was no reason to doubt the creditworthiness or the financial capacity of the lender and thus there can be no addition u/s. 68.

Therefore, the impugned addition was deleted.

Search and seizure – Retention of seized articles – Section 132A – A. Y. 2012-13 – IT authorities requisitioning silver articles of assessee from railway police for purpose of investigation – Assessment order taking note of such seizure but no addition on account of seized articles – IT authorities to hand over seized articles to assessee

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K. S. Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. vs. DIT; 379 ITR 526 (Guj):

The railway police seized silver ornaments from the authorised person of the assessee and registered a case u/s. 124 of the Bombay Police Act. The Railway police informed the Income-tax Department about seizure of the silver ornaments pursuant to which the Income-tax Department requisitioned the ornaments for the purpose of investigation under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Assessment order took note of the seizure but no addition was made on that count. Assessee’s applications for release of the articles were ignored.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The silver ornaments weighing 219.841 kgs. were requisitioned by the Income-tax Authorities in exercise of the powers of section 132A in the F. Y. 2011- 12. Thereafter the assessment was framed by the Assessing Officer of the assessee for the A. Y. 2012-13, whereby after taking note of such requisition made by the authorities, the return as filed by the assessee was accepted without making any addition on account of such seizure.

ii) Under the circumstances, without entering into the merits of the validity of the authorisation issued u/s. 132A and in view of the assessment order made in the case of the assessee, the Income-tax Authorities could no longer continue with the seizure of the ornaments and the seized ornaments were required to be returned to the assessee.

iii) The respondent authorities are directed to forthwith hand over the seized silver ornaments to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from today.”

Penalty – Concealment – Section 271(1)(c) – A. Y. 2008-09 – Capital gains – Exemption – Whether assesee entitled to exemption u/s. 54 or section 54F or neither pending before High Court – Addition itself debatable – Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) not justified

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CIT vs. Dr. Harsha N. Biliangudy; 379 ITR 529 (Karn):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 54/54F was pending before High Court for consideration. The Tribunal deleted the penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer u/s. 271(1)(c).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The imposition of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was for concealment of material particulars of income by the assessee or furnishing inaccurate particulars of such income. It was not the case of the Revenue that the assessee had furnished details with regard to the income derived from the sale and purchase of the properties. The question as to whether the assessee was to be given the benefit u/s. 54 or section 54F or was not to be given the benefit, was yet to be finalized by the High Court, where the appeal against the assessment proceedings was still pending.

ii) The assessee had given full description of the property which was sold by him and of the property purchased by him. Merely because the assessee was not to be given the benefit u/s. 54 as the property sold by the assessee was not a residential property it could not be said that there was concealment of material information by the assessee because complete details of the property sold by the assessee were given by him in the returns filed by him.

iii) Where penalty was imposed in respect of any addition where the High Court has admitted the appeal on substantial question of law, then the sustainability of the addition itself becomes debatable, and in such circumstances penalty could not be levied u/s. 271(1)(c).”

Exemption u/s. 10A – A. Y. 2000-01 – Relevance of date of notification of STPI – Assessee having been notified by STPI on 04/03/2000 is eligible for exemption u/s. 10A for entire A. Y. 2000-01 – AO was not justified in restricting the benefit for the period after 04/03/2000

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CIT vs. Soffia Software Ltd.; 281 CTR 594 (Mad):

The assessee was notified by the STPI on 04/03/2000 as eligible for exemption u/s. 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A. Y. 2000-01, the assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10A of the Act. The Assessing Officer restricted the exemption to the period after 04/03/2000/-. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The CIT(A) as well as the assessing authority fell into error by holding that registration as an STPI is a requirement for the assessee to claim the benefit u/s. 10A. Section 10A applies if an industrial undertaking has begun or begins to manufacture or produce articles or things during the previous year relevant to the assessment year.

 ii) In this case, the date of STPI notification is 04/03/2000. Therefore the assessee has begun or begins to manufacture or produce articles or things during the previous year relevant to the assessment year in the STPI unit and it will be entitled to deduction u/s. 10A in respect of profit attributed to export turnover. The Circular issued u/s. 10B cannot be made applicable to a case falling u/s. 10A.

iii) Furthermore, the circular which has been relied upon by the CIT(A) dated 06/01/2005, has no relevance to the A. Y. 2000-01. The assessee is eligible for exemption u/s. 10A for the entire A. Y. 2000-01.”

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) – A. Y. 2008-09 – Reimbursment of service charges is not taxable – Tax not deductible at source from such amount – Expenditure cannot be disallowed u/s 40(a)(ia) of the Act

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CIT vs. DLF Commercial Project Corporation; 379 ITR 538 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 19,09,83,236/- u/s. 40(a)(ia), for non deduction of tax at source on reimbursement of expenditure paid to DLF though the latter entity had deducted tax at source on the payments made by it as a facilitator on behalf of the assessee. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“It is undisputed that DLF deducted tax at source on payments made by it under various heads on behalf of the assessee. Further, it is also not disputed that the assessee deducted TDS on the service charges paid by it to DLF on reimbursement expenses. In such circumstances this Court holds that the entire amount paid by the assessee to DLF is entitled to deduction as expenditure.”

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 14A – Variable ‘A’ prescribed in the formula in Rule 8D(2)(ii) (to make disallowance in case of common interest expenditure) would exclude both interest attributable to tax exempt income as well as taxable income

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Principal CIT vs. Bharti Overseas (P.) Ltd.; [2015] 64 taxmann.com 340 (Delhi):

Considering the scope of Rule 8D(2)(ii) for computing disallowance u/s. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Delhi High Court held as under:

“i) The object behind section 14A (1) is to disallow only such expense which is relatable to tax exempt income and not expenditure in relation to any taxable income. This object behind section 14A has to be kept in view while examining Rule 8D (2) (ii). In any event a rule can neither go beyond or restrict the scope of the statutory provision to which it relates.

ii) Rule 8D (2) states that the expenditure in relation to income which is exempt shall be the aggregate of (i) the expenditure attributable to tax exempt income, (ii) and where there is common expenditure which cannot be attributed to either tax exempt income or taxable income then a sum arrived at by applying the formula set out thereunder. What the formula does is basically to “allocate” some part of the common expenditure for disallowance by the proportion that average value of the investment from which the tax exempt income is earned bears to the average of the total assets. It acknowledges that funds are fungible and therefore it would otherwise be difficult to allocate the sum constituting borrowed funds used for making tax-free investments. Given that Rule 8D(2)(ii) is concerned with only ‘common interest expenditure’ i.e. expenditure which cannot be attributable to earning either tax exempt income or taxable income, it is indeed incongruous that variable A in the formula will not also exclude interest relatable to taxable income.”

Comments and Suggestions on Draft Guiding Principles for Determination of Place of Effective Management (POEM) of a Company

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30th December 2015

To
The Director
Tax Policy & Legislation – I,
Central Board of Direct Taxes,
Room No 147-D, North Block,
New Delhi 110001.

Dear Sir,

Comments and Suggestions on Draft Guiding Principles for Determination of
Place of Effective Management (POEM) of a Company

On 23rd December 2015, the Central Board of Direct Taxes has released the draft Guiding Principles for Determination of Place of Effective Management of a Company for public comments and suggestions.

We give below our representation on, and suggestions in respect of the draft.

General

1. In principle, we welcome the issuance of guidelines, to bring further clarity on what constitutes a POEM in India, and which will help to reduce the subjectivity. This will help to reduce possible litigation in this regard.

2. While the purpose of the guidelines is to reduce the subjectivity as to what constitutes POEM in India, and to have greater certainty as to the existence or non-existence of a POEM in India, we believe that the draft guidelines are too subjective in nature, and leave too much room for interpretation by the assessing authorities. The guidelines, if issued in the present draft form, will therefore not serve the purpose behind the issue of such guidelines. We set out below some of the reasons as to why we believe the guidelines are too subjective. We suggest that, at least in the initial stages, the guidelines should be more objective, to prevent misuse of discretion by assessing officers.

Definition of “Passive Income”

3. The definition of “passive income” includes income by way of royalty, dividends, capital gains, interest or rental income. There are often instances where such incomes could be active incomes. For example, royalty for a research and development company or for a company providing value added services to a telecommunications company, interest for a bank or financial services company, rental income for a mall, etc., are incomes arising out of active business activity, and cannot be regarded as passive incomes. Such incomes of such types of companies need to be classified as active incomes.

Companies Carrying on Active Business
4. In case of companies carrying on active business outside India, in paragraph 7, it has rightly been laid down that the POEM shall be presumed to be outside India if the majority meetings of the board of directors of the company are held outside India. This is an objective test. However, paragraph 7.1 completely negates such objective test laid down under paragraph 7, by stating that if, on the basis of facts and circumstances, it is established that the board of directors are standing aside and not exercising their powers, which powers are being exercised by either the holding company or any other person resident in India, the POEM should be regarded as being in India.

This paragraph fails to appreciate the commercial reality that every company exists for the benefit of its shareholders. Therefore, it is inevitable that every holding company always exercises some amount of control over its subsidiaries, and that certain crucial decisions are always taken in principle by the holding company, particularly in case of wholly owned subsidiaries. The board of directors, which takes the final detailed decisions, is very often guided by the views expressed by and the needs of the holding company, though they may also have their independent views in relation to the relevant matter, and do consider the impact of their decisions on the subsidiary.

Further, though directors may be resident in India, it is not necessary that by virtue of their residence, decisions are being taken in India, since very often the directors would be visiting the country where the subsidiary is carrying on operations, and taking decisions during the course of such visits, in consultation with the local management of the subsidiary.

Paragraph 7.1, which is supposed to be an exception, rather than the norm, is likely to be taken as the norm by assessing officers, rather than the exception, rendering the provisions of paragraph 7 redundant. A view will likely be taken by most assessing officers, where even a couple of or a few decisions are taken by the holding company, which are confirmed by the board of the subsidiary outside India, or where a majority of the directors are resident in India, that the POEM is in India. This will lead to unwarranted litigation.

We therefore strongly recommend that paragraph 7.1 be deleted altogether.

Companies Carrying on Passive Business
5. The guiding principles laid down in paragraph 8.2 are many, and it is not clear as to in which order of precedence they are to be considered. It is possible that some guiding principles may indicate existence of POEM, while others may indicate non-existence of POEM. In such cases, invariably the assessing officer may take the view in favour of existence of POEM, while the assessee is of the view that there is no POEM, given the subjectivity of the guiding principles, leading to avoidable litigation.  It is therefore suggested that the guiding principles should be given in order of precedence, step by step, similar to the tie-breaker test contained in Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements for determination of residence. This will bring clarity and objectivity to the tests. This is important, at least in the initial years of the introduction of the concept of POEM.

Approval of CIT
6. Paragraph 11 provides that in case the assessing officer proposes to hold a company, on the basis of its POEM, as being resident in India, then he needs to seek the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner.

In order to prevent unnecessary harassment of foreign companies, it is suggested that even in cases where an assessing officer wishes to investigate the existence of POEM in India of a foreign company, he should seek such prior approval, giving his reasons for such investigation. Besides, instead of approval by the Commissioner/ Principal Commissioner, the approval required both for investigation, as well as for holding a foreign company as resident in India on the basis of existence of its POEM in India, should be that of the Chief Commissioner/Principal Chief Commissioner.

Other Suggestions
7. It is suggested that it should be clarified that in case a foreign company is regarded as being resident in India, based on its POEM being in India, it should yet to be entitled to all treaty benefits under the treaty of India with the country in which the foreign company is located.

8. Since the guidelines would be issued only in January 2016, it is suggested that the concept of POEM should be introduced only with effect from assessment year 2017-18. An amendment should be made to the Income Tax Act, 1961 through the Finance Act 2016, making the amendment in section 6(3) applicable with effect from assessment year 2017-18, instead of with effect from assessment year 2016-17.

For Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society
Raman Jokhakar
President Chairman,

Gautam Nayak
International Taxation Committee

Levy of Tax on Interest on NRE Deposits

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20th January, 2016

The Editor,
Bombay Chartered Accountants Journal
Mumbai.

Dear Sir,

Re: Levy of Tax on Interest on NRE Deposits

Presently, interest received on NRE Deposits by a Non Resident Indian (NRI) is exempt under section 10(4) of the Income-tax Act. However, the NRIs working and residing in advanced / western countries such as USA, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, Germany etc. are liable for tax in the respective home countries on their global income. In this respect, the Taxation Laws in foreign countries are at par with the Law in India [Section 5(1) of the Act] which mandates that a resident in India is liable to pay tax in India on all incomes from whatever source derived.

Now, in view of FAT CA in USA and other similar Laws in other countries, such NRIs are required to declare their Indian Financial Assets and income there from in their Home Countries and pay tax thereon, irrespective of Tax Treatment extended by Indian Government to the NRIs in respect of Income from their Foreign Exchange Deposits /Financial Assets. Therefore, it makes no sense for India to continue to have provisions like Section 10(4) exempting interest income of NRIs from certain bank deposits and Government Securities as the law abiding NRIs are bound to declare such Indian Income and pay tax thereon at full rate in their respective countries of residence.

Therefore, I feel that such Income should be taxed at a reasonable rate, say between 10-15%, so that the Tax Revenue is reasonably shared between the source country(i.e. India) and the country of NRI’s residence (Home Country). The NRI would not be a loser because he would get tax credit / set off in respect of taxes paid / withheld in India against his tax liability in his Home Country.

The tax rate under various Tax Treaties signed by India prescribe tax rate between 10% to 15%. Therefore, it would be eminently feasible to levy tax on NRE deposits @ 10% without causing any additional tax burden on NRIs or causing flight of capital /NRI deposits from India. Such a levy of tax needs to be properly explained/ communicated to the NRIs.

To facilitate easy tax compliance, the Law may prescribe rate of TDS on Interest earned by NRIs (including Interest earned by them on NRO deposits) @ 10%. However, in case of those NRIs who have such Interest income below basic exemption limit, they should be entitled to submit Tax Return like any other Indian Citizen and claim various exemptions and deductions available under the Law and claim refund of TDS which should be granted expeditiously.

In this manner, India can garner substantial tax revenue from NRIs without posing any additional tax burden on the NRIs or causing flight of NRI Deposits.

Yours sincerely,

Tarunkumar Singhal


Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – A. Y. 1996-97 – Assessee carrying on business of letting out properties – Payment to tenant for vacating premises – Rental income earned by the assessee is assessed under the head ‘Business’ and the compensation of Rs. 53,50,000/- paid by it for obtaining possession from lessee/tenant so as to earn higher income is an admissible revenue deduction

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Shyam Burlap Company Ltd. vs CIT; 281 CTR 458 (Cal):

The
assessee was the owner of the property and was carrying on the business
of letting out. The assesee had paid compensation of Rs. 53,50,000/- to
obtain possession from the lessee/tenant so as to earn a higher rental
income. For the A. Y. 1996-97, the assessee offered the rental income as
business income and claimed the deduction of compensation of Rs.
53,50,000/- as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer and the
Tribunal held that the rental income is assessable as house property
income and disallowed the claim for deduction.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Though in earlier assessment years the assessee had shown rental income as “income from house property”’ however, in this assessment year it has claimed rental income as business income, in view of the object as set out in clause 4 of its Memorandum of association. Since the object in the said memorandum permitted the assessee to carry on business in letting out properties and as 85% of the income of the assessee was by way of deriving rent and lease rentals, the income from rent constituted business income.

ii) Observations of the Tribunal that the assesssee had all along shown the income under the head “income from house property” cannot be a ground for treating the income as business income.

iii) Rental income earned by the assessee was assessable under the head ‘business’ and the compensation of Rs. 53,50,000/- paid by it for obtaining possession from lessee/tenant so as to earn higher income is an admissible revenue deduction.”

Supplier’ Cred it – Whet her de bt or trade payable ?

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Arrangements with respect to payment to suppliers
could vary substantially and may not always be straight-forward. To ease
working capital pressure, companies enter into structured transactions
that involve the supplier and bank/s. These are commonly referred to as
supply-chain finance, supplier finance, reverse factoring and structured
payable transactions. Broadly, the arrangement allows a company to pay
its supplier invoices when due (under the extended terms negotiated with
a supplier) and gives the supplier the option to accelerate collection
through a factoring arrangement. Under the factoring arrangement, the
supplier sells its receivables (i.e., invoices) from the company to the
bank at a discount. The company is then legally obligated to pay the
bank in full (i.e., the amount specified in the original invoice) since
the bank is now the legal owner of the receivables. Such an arrangement
may better enable a supplier to monetize the receivable that has
extended payment terms.

Can a company (buyer of goods and services) continue
to classify the liability related to the supplier’s invoice as a trade
payable or whether it must reclassify the liability as bank debt?

In
evaluating a structured payable arrangement, companies should determine
the classification based on the substance and individual facts and
circumstances, including the following:

What are the roles, responsibilities and relationships of each party (i.e., the company, bank and supplier)?

Is
the company relieved of its original obligation to the supplier and is
now obligated to the bank? However, being obligated to a bank instead of
the supplier does not necessarily mean that the liability is a debt.
One needs to further assess whether the liability to the bank entails a
financing element or it is merely a payment of the liability to the bank
instead of to the supplier.

Have any discounts or rebates been
received by the company that would not have otherwise been received
without the bank’s involvement?

Has the bank extended the date on which payment is due from the company beyond the invoice’s original due date?

The
terms of the structured payable arrangement must be carefully
considered to determine whether the arrangement changes the roles,
responsibilities and relationships of the parties. To continue
classifying the liability as a trade payable, the company must remain
liable to the supplier under the original terms of the invoice, and the
bank must have assumed only the rights to the receivable it purchased.
If the terms of the company’s obligation change as a result of the
structured payable arrangement, that may be an indication that the
economic substance of the liability is more akin to a financing
arrangement.

Under normal circumstances, a factoring arrangement
between a company’s supplier and a bank does not benefit the company.
That’s why it is important to understand whether the company receives
any benefit as a result of the structured payable arrangement. For
example, a bank may purchase a supplier’s receivables in a factoring
arrangement at 95% of its face amount. However, rather than collect the
full amount payable from the company, the bank may require the company
to pay only 98% of that amount. In this case, the company has received a
benefit that it would not have received without the bank’s involvement,
indicating that the liability may be more akin to a financing
arrangement.

If a structured payable arrangement with a bank
allows a company to remit payment to the bank on a date later than the
original due date of the invoice, that may also indicate that the
company has received a benefit that it would not have received without
the bank’s involvement, suggesting the liability may more be more akin
to a financing arrangement.

The analysis should focus on whether
the terms of the payable change as a result of the involvement of the
bank. If the payment terms do not change (i.e., the company must pay the
bank on the original terms of the invoice) the characteristics of the
payable may not have changed and would not reflect a financing. If the
terms of the payable have changed as a result of the bank’s involvement,
the characteristics of the liability have changed and it may no longer
be appropriate to classify the liability as a trade payable.

Other factors that may be considered include:

Is
the supplier’s participation in the structured payable arrangement
optional? If not, the company should evaluate whether the substance of
the transaction is more reflective of a financing.

Do the terms
of the structured payable arrangement preclude the company from
negotiating returns of damaged goods to the supplier?

Is the
company obligated to maintain cash balances or are there credit
facilities or other borrowing arrangements with the bank outside of the
structured payable arrangement that the bank can draw upon in the event
of noncollection of the invoice from the company?

Some
structured payable arrangements require that, as a condition for the
bank to accept an invoice from a supplier (i.e., the receivable) for
factoring, a company must separately promise the bank that it will pay
the invoice regardless of any disputes that might arise over goods that
are damaged or don’t conform with agreed-upon specifications. In the
event of a dispute, a company that agrees to such a condition would need
to seek recourse through other means, such as adjustments on future
purchases. This provision is typical among structured payable
arrangements since it provides greater certainty of payment to the bank.
However, this provision may indicate that the economic substance of the
trade payable has been altered to reflect that of a financing. It is important to consider the substance of any such condition in the context of the company’s normal practices.
For a company that buys enough from a supplier to routinely apply
credits for returns against payments on future invoices, this condition
might not be viewed as a significant change to existing practice.

In
some factoring arrangements, the bank may require that the company
maintain collateral or other credit facilities with the bank. These
requirements aren’t typical in factoring arrangements and may indicate
that the economic substance of the liability has changed to be more akin
to a financing arrangement. For the liability to be considered a trade
payable, the bank generally can collect the amount owed by the company
only through its rights as owner of the receivable it purchased from the
supplier. As can be seen from the above discussion, whether supplychain
finance should be presented as debts or trade payable is a matter of
significant judgement and would depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case.

Below are four simple examples, and the author’s opinion on whether those result in debt or trade payable classification.

1.
The company issues a promissory note to the supplier, agreeing in
writing to pay the supplier a fixed sum at a fixed future date or on
demand by the bank (discounting bank).

2. The company accepts a
bill of exchange and its banker simultaneously issues a bank guarantee
in favour of the supplier, making the bank liable to pay the supplier if
the company fails to honour its commitment on the due date. The bank
guarantee is not invoked at the reporting date. No interest is charged
to the company, and there is no impact on its credit limits.

3. The company buys goods from a supplier and needs to pay for them immediately.  as it does not have the cash, it arranges for a 90 day LC in favour of the supplier.  the supplier discounts the LC and receives payment immediately. the discounting charges/interest for 90 days is borne by the company. the credit limit of the company is utilised.

4. The company has entered into a separate credit limit with the bank wherein the bank will make payment to selected suppliers on company’s behalf.  as per the arrangement, the supplier will invoice the company with a credit period between 180 to 240 days. This is not a normal credit period which is also appropriately reflected    in    the    pricing    of    the    product.        The    bank    will    make    payment to the supplier after deducting discounting charges. At the due date, the company will make the full payment to the bank. The bank has no recourse against the supplier.

It may be noted that to take a proper view more detailed facts will be required, including the exact arrangement terms and the legal requirements/interpretations. on the basis of the limited information and above discussion it appears that the first     two     examples     represent     traditional     factoring     arrangement,    the    arrangement    would    result    in    the    classification    as    “trade    payables.”        In    the    last    two    examples,    the    classification would be more likely a “debt”.

[2015] 53 taxmann.com 102 (Bangalore – Trib.) A. Mohiuddin vs. ADIT A.Ys.:2012-13, Dated: 14.11.2014

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Sections – 195, 201 of the Act – since at the time of payment, the taxpayer was aware about exemption of capital gain in the hands of the non-resident payee, he was not required to withhold tax from payment.

Facts:

During the relevant tax year the taxpayer purchased a house property from a non-resident family member. The non-resident represented to the taxpayer that she had purchased residential house property about four months ago (i.e., within one year as required u/s. 54 of the Act) prior to the date of sale deed and that the consideration paid for the purchase was fully eligible for exemption u/s. 54 of the Act. Therefore, the taxpayer did not withhold tax from the payment.

Accordingly to the taxpayer, it was required to withhold tax u/s. 195(1) of the Act only if income chargeable to tax was embedded in the payment made by him and since no such income was embedded in the payment, he did not deduct tax.

The AO observed that the taxpayer had not followed the mechanism provided in section 195(2) and (3) for withholding lower or nil rate of tax. Accordingly, the AO held taxpayer as ‘assessee in default’ u/s. 201 and raised demand on him.

Held:

The ultimate levy of taxes is dependent upon exemption, deduction, etc. The seller was family member who had represented to the taxpayer at the time of payment of consideration that no tax was payable by her because of exemption u/s. 54.

These facts should be seen in the context of CBDT’s Instruction No. 02/2014, dated 26.02.2014 and particularly paragraph 3 thereof, which indicates that the AO is required to determine the appropriate proportion of sum chargeable to tax u/s. 195 (1) to ascertain the tax in respect of which the deductor should be deemed to be an ‘assessee in default’ u/s. 201.

Since, at the time of payment, the taxpayer was aware of the payment being not subject to tax because of exemption, he was not required to withhold tax.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 138 (Mumbai – Trib.) FedEx Express Transportation & Supply Chain Services India (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y. 2009-10, Dated: 10.12.2014

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S/s.- 92C of the Act – payments made to third
party on behalf of AE for services provided by third party, which were
fully reimbursed by AE, could not be included in total costs for
determining profit margin for benchmarking ALP.

Facts:
The
taxpayer was an Indian company (“ICo”) and a 100% subsidiary of a
Foreign company (“FCo”). Indian aviation regulatory authority had
granted approval to FCo to operate all cargo air services to and from
India. The taxpayer was engaged in providing customs clearance services
to FCo, which was its AE, relating to high value packages and low value
packages. However, since the taxpayer had license for custom clearing of
only low value packages, it outsourced custom clearance of high value
packages to a third party and coordinated with the third party to
provide services to FCo.

The TPO observed that the payments made
to the third party were not reflected in the profit and loss account
but were routed through the balance sheet. Further, though the taxpayer
had selected Profit Level Indicator based on cost, it had excluded the
payments made to the third party while applying markup on cost. On
examination of the agreement between the taxpayer and the third party,
the TPO deduced that the taxpayer had direct control and monitoring of
day to day activities of third party and according to the TPO, the
taxpayer had not given proper reason for excluding the payments made to
the third party from the cost base for applying markup. Accordingly, the
TPO made adjustment in respect of payments made to third party for
custom clearance of high value packages that were coordinated with third
party.

Held:

The taxpayer did not have license to
provide high value packages custom clearance services and it was merely
coordinating with third party for such services. It was not directly
rendering the services to the AE.

The role of the taxpayer was confined to making payment to the third party.

Mere
monitoring of activities of third party cannot per se lead to the
inference that the taxpayer is directly providing the services to AE.

The
net profit margin realized from the AE was to be computed only with
reference to the costs directly incurred by the taxpayer and it could
not be imputed on the cost incurred by third party which was reimbursed
by the AE because there was no direct cost of such services to the
taxpayer.

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[TS-775-ITAT-2014] [MUM-Trib] Morgan Stanley International Incorporated vs. DIT A.Y.: 2005-06, Dated: 18.12.2014

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Article 12 of India-US DTAA – employees deputed by American company to Indian company for providing support services constituted service PE; salary reimbursed to American company was business profit (and not FIS) from which salary costs were deductible.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a resident of USA and 100% subsidiary of another American company. The primary activity of taxpayer was to provide support services to group companies located in various countries including India. During the relevant tax year, the taxpayer entered into agreement with an Indian group company for providing support services. The taxpayer deputed five employees to its Indian subsidiaries. The employees were to work under the supervision and control of the board of Directors of that Indian companies, were to be accountable to Indian companies and their day-to-day responsibility was to be managed by Indian companies.

The taxpayer paid salaries of the deputed employees and also withheld tax from their salaries u/s. 192 of the Act. The Indian subsidiaries reimbursed the salaries to the taxpayer since the taxpayer had paid them on behalf of the Indian subsidiaries and only for administrative convenience of the Indian subsidiaries. As per the taxpayer, the amount reimbursed was purely salary costs, it did not have any income element and hence, it was not taxable in India. However, on conservative basis, the Indian companies withheld tax @15% under Article 12 of India-USA DTAA from the reimbursed amount.

The tax authority concluded that the taxpayer received consideration for the services provided by the deputed employees and hence, the consideration was taxable as FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act and as FIS under Article 12 of India- USA DTAA . CIT(A) upheld the order of the tax authority.

Before the Tribunal, the taxpayer contended as follows.

Amount received from Indian companies was reimbursement of salary costs without any income element and hence, question of taxability whether as FTS or FIS did not arise.

The deputed employees were under direct supervision and control of the Indian subsidiaries and hence, the ‘make available’ condition under India-USA DTAA was not fulfilled.

Even if deputed employees were considered to constitute service PE of the taxpayer, FIS provision would not be applicable. Consequently, relying on decision of the Supreme Court in DIT(IT) vs. Morgan Stanley & Co [2007] 292 ITR 416 (SC), the salary costs would have been deductible from the income, resulting in ‘nil’ income.

The tax authority contended that the business of the taxpayer was to provide support services through deputed employees who were highly qualified personnel having technical skills and experience. Hence, payment qualified as FIS under India-USA DTAA.

Held:

Relying on decision of theDelhi High Court in Centrica India Offshore (P) Ltd vs. CIT, [2014] 364 ITR 336 (Del) and decision of the Supreme Court in DIT(IT) vs. Morgan Stanley & Co [2007] 292 ITR 416 (SC), the Tribunal proceeded on the premise that the deputed employees were ‘real’ employees of the taxpayer who had come to India to render services and therefore, they constituted service PE of the taxpayer.

Once a service PE is created, FIS article will have no application since it excludes profits in connection with PE from its ambit. Hence, income should be taxed as business profits under Article 7.

While in Centrica’s case, Delhi High Court considered Article 12(6) of India-Canada DTAA , which embodies a similar provision, the issue of specific exclusion of PE profits from FIS article was not considered by Delhi High Court and hence, that decision cannot be applied.

For computing the business profits under Article 7, the reimbursement made by Indian companies has to be treated as revenue receipts and salary of the deputed employees paid by the taxpayer has to be allowed as deduction.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 1 (Jabalpur – Trib.) Birla Corporation Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Ys.: 2010-11 & 2011-12, Dated: 24.12.2014

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India-Austria DTAA , India-Belgium DTAA , India-
China DTAA , India-Germany DTAA , India- Switzerland DTAA , India-UK
DTAA and India- US DTAA ; section 5(2)(b), 9(1)(vii) the Act – Payments
made to non-resident suppliers of plant for installation/commissioning
services do not create an installation permanent establishment (PE),
since the activities did not exceed the threshold provided in the DTAA
s; FTS being a general Article and PE being a specific Article,
taxability of consideration should be confined to specific PE Article

Facts:
The
taxpayer is an Indian company engaged in manufacture and sale of
cement. During the relevant tax year, the taxpayer made payments to
certain non-resident suppliers for import of plant and machinery. The
suppliers were located in Austria, Belgium, China, Germany, Switzerland
UK and US. The suppliers also provided installation and commissioning
services and their technicians visited India for that purpose. The
taxpayer did not withhold tax in India on the ground that since the
plant and machinery were supplied from outside India, the payments for
the same were not chargeable to tax under the Act. The taxpayer
separately paid installation and commissioning fee and withheld tax @
10% thereon under the Act.

The tax authority concluded that:

the
contract was a “composite contact” or “works contracts”; ? taxpayer
paid the suppliers for supply of plant as well as installation and
commissioning services;

the consideration for provision of
installation and commissioning services was not paid separately but was
embedded in payments for supply of plant;

the taxpayer was
required to approach the tax authority for determination of chargeable
income and withholding tax thereon and in absence of that, was required
to withhold tax on the total payment.

Therefore, the tax
authority treated the taxpayer as “assessee in default” u/s. 195 read
with section 201 of the Act and held that the taxpayer should have
withheld tax @ 42.25% of the gross remittance amounts.

Held:
(i) As regards I. T. Act

Part
of the consideration for purchase of plant that can be attributable to
installation commissioning or assembly of the plant and equipment or any
supervision activity in connection thereto accrues and arises in India.

Hence, it is taxable u/s. 5(2)(b) of the Act since the related
economic activity is performed in India. Because income accrues or
arises in India, one need not look at deeming fiction u/s. 9(1)(vii) of
the Act. It is for that reason that definition of FTS in Explanation 2
to section 9(1)(vii) specifically excludes “consideration for any
construction, assembly. Mining or like project”.

The expression
installation, commissioning or erection of plant and equipment belongs
to the same genus as expression ‘assembly’. Thus, ‘assembly’ is excluded
from the scope of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act.

As regards DTAA

India
has entered into DTAA s with all the seven tax jurisdictions where the
suppliers are located. All these DTAA s provide minimum time threshold
under installation PE clause and the installation and commissioning work
by any supplier did not exceed the minimum time threshold under any of
the DTAA s.

Further, India-Belgium and India-UK DTAA
additionally provide that even when threshold time limit is not
exceeded, installation PE is constituted if the installation/
commissioning charges exceed 10% of the sale value of the plant. This
condition too was not fulfilled.

Accordingly, no installation PE
was constituted and even if a part of the consideration can be
attributed to installation/commissioning activities, it will not be
taxable in terms of Article 7 read with Article 5 of the relevant DTAA .

(iii) As regards FTS/FIS

Installation/commissioning activities are de facto in the nature of technical services.

While
FTS/FI S article dealing with technical services is a general
provision, Article dealing with installation PE is a specific provision.
In Union of India vs. India Fisheries (P) Ltd. [57 ITR 331 (1965)], the
Supreme Court has held that if there is an apparent conflict between
two independent provisions, the special provision must prevail over the
general provision. If, even when PE was not constituted, the income is
considered taxable under FTS Article, it would not only render PE
provisions meaningless but would also be contrary to the spirit of the
commentary on UN Model Convention.

Hence, if there are services
which are covered under a specific PE clause and also under FTS/FIS
provision, the taxability of consideration for such services must be
confined to that specific PE clause.

In case of India-UK and
India-USA DTAA , even if FTS/ FIS article applies, as the ‘make
available’ condition was not satisfied, the payment was not FTS/FIS.
Installation/ commissioning did not involve transfer of technology and
hence, such activities did not satisfy ‘make available’ condition.

As India-Belgium DTAA includes MFN clause, same tax position as India-UK/US DTAA applies.

Article
12(5)(a) of India-Switzerland DTAA specifically excludes “amounts paid
for … … services that are ancillary and subsidiary, as well as
inextricably and essentially linked, to the sale of a property” (i.e.,
plant in this case) from the scope of FIS. Accordingly installation/ commissioning charges were not FIS under India- Switzerland DTAA .

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Digest of recent important foreign decisions on cross border taxation

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In this Article, some of the recent important foreign decisions on cross border taxation are covered.

1. France Participation exemption – Administrative Supreme Court clarifies 5% participation threshold criteria

In a decision (No. 370650) given on 5th November 2014, the Administrative Supreme Court (Conseil d’Etat) ruled that the 5% participation threshold provided for by the French participation exemption regime does not relate to both capital and voting rights of a subsidiary, but only to capital. A parent company which holds at least 5% of the capital, but less than 5% of the voting rights of its subsidiary may therefore benefit from the participation exemption on dividends derived from shares carrying a voting right.

a) Facts: In 2008 and 2009, Sofina, a company resident in Belgium, received dividends from the French company Eurazeo, which were subject to a 15% withholding tax. Sofina held shares representing 5% of the capital of Eurazeo, all of which carried a voting right. However, the shares held by Sofina represented only 3.63% of the voting rights of Eurazeo in 2008 and 4.29% of the voting rights of Eurazeo in 2009. Sofina claimed the repayment of the withholding tax on the basis of the French tax authorities’ guidelines which, following the European Court of Justice decision in Denkavit II (Case C-170/05), provide that where a EU non-resident parent company which fulfils the domestic 5% participation requirement finds it impossible to set off the French withholding tax on dividends derived from its French subsidiary, such dividends shall not be subject to a withholding tax.

b) Issue: Under article 145(1)(b) of the General Tax Code, a company must hold at least 5% of the capital of its subsidiary at the date of payment of the dividends to benefit from the participation exemption. Article 145(6) (b)(ter) provides that the participation exemption shall not apply to dividends derived from shares which do not carry a voting right, unless the parent company holds shares representing at least 5% of both capital and voting rights of its subsidiary. The tax authorities took the view that these provisions imply that, in order to benefit from the participation exemption, a parent company shall hold shares representing at least 5% of the capital and at least 5% of the voting rights of its subsidiary. The firstinstance tribunal (tribunal administratif) dismissed the claim of Sofina, but the Administrative Court of Appeals (cour administrative d’appel) later ruled in favour of the Belgian company. The Conseil d’Etat confirmed the decision of the Administrative Court of Appeals.

c) Decision. The Conseil d’Etat ruled that:

– article 145 of the General Tax Code does not require, for the 5% participation in capital condition to be met, that a voting right be attached to every share held by the parent company, nor that voting rights attached to the shares, if any, be strictly proportionate to the portion of capital such shares represent;

– the fact that, under article 145(6)(b)(ter) of the General Tax Code, dividends derived from shares which do not carry a voting right may not be exempted, unless the parent company holds shares representing at least 5% of both capital and voting rights of its subsidiary, does neither mean nor imply that the application of the participation exemption is limited to parent companies which hold shares representing at least 5% of the capital and 5% of the voting rights of a subsidiary.

Dividends derived from shares carrying a voting right received by a parent company which holds at least 5% of the capital of its subsidiary may therefore be exempted under the French participation exemption, notwithstanding the fact that the shares held by the parent company do not represent 5% of the voting rights of the subsidiary.

2) Canada
Tax Court of Canada holds foreign exchange gains not realised on conversions of convertible debentures

The Tax Court of Canada gave its decision, on 4th November 2014, in the case of Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited vs. The Queen (2014 TCC 324). The taxpayer, Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited (Agnico), a taxable Canadian corporation, issued US-denominated convertible debentures in 2002 at an aggregate price of $ 143,750,000. The issue in the appeal was whether or not Agnico realised foreign exchange gains when the convertible debentures were converted and redeemed for Agnico’s common shares. The tax authorities argued that foreign exchange gains were realised because the conversions and redemption resulted in a repayment of the debt equal to its US dollar principal amount, which had decreased when translated to Canadian dollars. Agnico argued instead that the principal amount of the debt became irrelevant once holders exercised their rights of conversion, as most of them did. It submits that a gain could not have been realised because it borrowed far less than it paid out in Canadian dollar terms (i.e., CAD 228,289,375 borrowed and CAD 280,987,312 paid out, measured by the value of common shares issued to holders).

a) Background: Agnico produces gold. Its shares (Common Shares) were listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). In 2002, it issued convertible subordinated debentures (Convertible Debentures) at a price of $ 1,000 each, which traded on the TSX. Under the terms of an indenture, interest was payable at 4.5%, the principal amount was $ 1,000 and they were redeemable on or after 15th February 2006 for a redemption price (Redemption Price) equal to the principal amount plus accrued and unpaid interest. Agnico had the option of delivering Common Shares on redemption instead of cash. The holder had the option to convert the debentures for 71.429 Common Shares at any time prior to redemption or maturity. Most of the debentures were converted into Common Shares during 2005 and 2006. Most of the conversions took place after Agnico issued a notice of redemption late in 2005. Most investors availed themselves of the option to convert rather than being subject to the redemption because this yielded a higher number of Common Shares.

The tax authorities determined that Agnico realised deemed capital gains on the conversions and the redemption pursuant to section 39(2) of the Incometax Act. The amounts assessed are the same as if the principal amount had been repaid in cash. This resulted in assessments of deemed capital gains in the amounts of CAD 4,499,360 and CAD 57,676,430 for the 2005 and 2006 taxation years, respectively.

b) Court’s decision: The Court concluded that the consideration received for the issuance of the Common Shares was $ 14 per Common Share or US CAD 1,000 per Convertible Debenture. The Court then determined that the relevant amounts should be translated into Canadian dollars at the spot rates when the amounts “arose”. The date of translation relating to the issuance of the debentures was not in dispute, but the translation date for the amount paid out by Agnico on the conversions. The Court determined that the appropriate date was the date the debentures were issued, in which case there could be no gain. With respect to the redemption, however, the Court held that the terms of the indenture made it clear that the Common Shares issued on redemption are in satisfaction of the redemption price, which became due and payable on the date of redemption. As such, there was a foreign exchange gain on the date of redemption. In conclusion, no foreign exchange gains were realized on the conversions and the tax authorities’ determination of foreign exchange gain on the redemption was upheld.

3) European Union; United Kingdom

ECJ Advocate General’s opinion: Commission vs. United Kingdom (Case C-172/13) – Cross-border loss relief – details

Advocate General Kokott of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) gave her opinion in the case

Commission vs. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Case C-172/13). Details of the opinion are summarized below.

    Facts: Following the ECJ judgment in Marks & Spencer (Case C-446/03) on cross-border loss relief, the United Kingdom had introduced group relief in regard to foreign group members by amending the Corporate Tax Act with effect from 1st April 2006. In 2007, the Commission raised concern that the United Kingdom breaches freedom of establishment by imposing conditions on cross-border group relief that make it virtually impossible in practice to obtain such relief. After the United Kingdom had failed to comply with the Commission’s request to amend its legislation, the Commission brought an action before the Court.

    Advocate General’s Opinion: The AG opened her assessment by stating that it is necessary to examine whether legislation at hand breaches the freedom of establishment (article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and article 31 of the EEA Agreement). The AG continued by stating that contested legislation restrict the freedom of establishment because it imposes stricter requirements on claiming the advantages of group relief if a parent company establishes a subsidiary abroad than if it does so in its state of residence. According to the settled ECJ case law, such restriction is justified only if it relates to situations which are not objectively comparable or where there is an overriding reason in the public interest.

Regarding the objective comparability, the AG notes that although the objective comparability test should not be rejected, there is a significant and, to some extent, crucial difference in the situation of a parent company with a resident or a non-resident subsidiary. The AG concluded that difference must therefore be examined as a possible justification for unequal treatment, including a test of the proportionality of the national rules.

Going further, on overriding reason in the public interest, the AG refers to the ECJ decision in the Marks & Spencer case (C-446/03) by stating that this decision created the so-called “Marks & Spencer exception”. Based on that exemption, losses incurred by a non-resident subsidiary can be transferred to the parent company if those losses cannot be taken into account elsewhere, either for present, past or future accounting periods, in which connection the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer and the Member States are entitled to prevent abuse of that exception. The AG continued by noting that the regime created under this exception has proved to be impracticable and as such does not protect the interest of the internal market. According to the AG, its application also constitutes source of legal disputes because of four reasons:

– the possibility of loss relief elsewhere is in terms of fact really precluded only if the subsidiary has ceased to exist in law;

– the case in which the loss cannot by law be taken into account in the state in which the subsidiary is established, the “Marks & Spencer exception” comes into conflict with another line of case law;

the impossibility of loss relief elsewhere can be created arbitrarily by the taxpayer; and

– the parent company’s Member State is obliged, on the basis of the freedom of establishment, only to accord equal treatment which means that it is possible that a notional tax situation over a period of decades has to be investigated retrospectively.

In conclusion of the analysis of the “Marks & Spencer exception”, the AG stated that this exception should be abandoned because of numerous reasons. By abandoning the exception, the contradictions in the ECJ case law would be resolved and clear borders of the fiscal powers of the Member States would be established. As a second argument, the AG stated that this solution is in line with the requirement of legal certainty which provides for law to be clear and its application foreseeable. Finally, the AG concluded that the abandonment of the “Marks & Spencer exception” does not infringe the ability-to-pay principle as the Commission has claimed.

The AG finalised her assessment by stating that even the complete refusal of loss relief for a non-resident subsidiary satisfies the principle of proportionality. Any restriction on cross-border relief in respect of a subsidiary is thus justified by ensuring the cohesion of a tax system or the allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States.

In the light of the above, the AG proposed that the ECJ should:

–  dismiss the action;

–  order the European Commission to pay the costs; and

– order the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Finland to bear their own respective costs.

4) France; United States

Treaty between France and United States – French Administrative Supreme Court rules that participation exemption does not apply to dividends received through a US partnership

In a decision given on 24th November 2014 (No. 363556), the French Administrative Supreme Court (Conseil d’Etat) ruled that dividends received by a French corporation from a US corporation held through a general partnership registered in Delaware may not benefit from the participation exemption, even though such a partnership is transparent for tax purposes under Delaware law. Details of the decision are summarised below.

    Facts: The French corporation Artémis SA held 98.82% of the capital of the general partnership Artemis America, registered in the state of Delaware. This partnership, which did not elect to be treated as a corporation, held more than 10% of the capital of the US corporation Roland. The French corporation Artémis SA received from the partnership Artemis America a EUR 4.7 million share of the dividends distributed by the US corporation Roland to the partnership. Considering that such dividends could benefit from the participation exemption, the French corporation Artémis SA deducted them from its taxable result for year 2002. The French tax authorities, however, contested the deduction of the dividends.

    Issue: Does domestic law, combined with the provision of the France – United States Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1994) (the Treaty) and in particular of article 7(4) of the Treaty, allow the application of the participation exemption on dividends received by a parent company where such dividends are derived from shares held through a transparent US partnership?

Article 7(4) of the Treaty provides that “a partner shall be considered to have realised income or incurred deductions to the extent of his share of the profits or losses of a partnership, as provided in the partnership agreement (…). For this purpose, the character (including source and attribution to a permanent establishment) of any item of income or deduction accruing to a partner shall be determined as if it were realised or incurred by the partner in the same manner as realised or incurred by the partnership.”

    Decision: In accordance with the well-established principle of subsidiarity of tax treaties, the French

Administrative Supreme Court first applied domestic law and then considered whether the Treaty provisions might have an impact on domestic rules.

Domestic law

The Court explained that where the tax treatment of a transaction involves a foreign legal person, one should first determine the type of French legal person to which such foreign legal person is the closest in regard of all the characteristics and of the law ruling the formation and functioning of the foreign legal person. The tax regime which is to be applied to the transaction shall then be determined according to French law.
 

The Court noted that the partnership Artemis America was not treated as a corporation in the US and that, under the law of Delaware, it had a legal personality which was distinct from the one of its partners. Therefore, such a partnership should be viewed as a French partnership (société de personnes) ruled by article 8 of the General Tax Code, even though the partnership Artemis America is transparent for tax purposes under the law of Delaware (while French partnerships are semi-transparent).

Article 145 of the General Tax Code provides that the participation exemption may only apply to companies subject to corporate income tax which hold shares fulfilling certain conditions. The Court ruled that these provisions mean that a French partnership (société de personnes) may not benefit from the participation exemption insofar as it is not subject to corporate income tax, even in the case where its partners are subject to corporate income tax. In addition, the Court ruled that a parent company must have a direct participation in the capital of its subsidiary to benefit from the participation exemption. Therefore, a parent company may not benefit from the participation exemption on dividends derived from shares held through a French partnership.

Insofar as the US partnership Artemis America, which is comparable to a French partnership, stands between the French corporation Artémis SA and the US corporation Roland, the parent corporation Artémis SA is not allowed under domestic law to benefit from the participation exemption on the dividends distributed by the US corporation Roland.

The Treaty

The Court ruled that the purpose of article 7 of the Treaty is to allocate the taxing rights over profits realised by enterprises resident in one of the two contracting states. The only purpose of article 7(4) is to allocate such taxing rights when profits are realised by a US partnership. Pursuant to articles 7 and 10 of the Treaty, dividends distributed by a US corporation to a US partnership, a partner of which is a French corporation, must therefore be seen as dividends distributed to the French partner, thus being taxable in France. However, it does not result from article 7 of the Treaty that such dividends should be seen as dividends directly distributed to the partner for the application of French tax law.

Hence, the Court concluded that the Treaty does not include any provision allowing the French corporation Artémis SA to deduct from its taxable result its share of the dividends distributed by the US corporation Roland to the US partnership Artemis America, and dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

5) Finland; Hungary

Supreme Administrative Court: Private pension based on work exercised abroad not income from Finnish sources The Supreme Administrative Court (Korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO) gave its decision on 6th October 2014 in the case of KHO:2014:146. Details of the decision are summarised below.

    Facts: The taxpayer, A, has moved permanently to Hungary on 23 October 2005 and has been treated as a non-resident of Finland since 1st January 2009. In 2009, A received pension payments from a Finnish pension fund. The pension was based on work done for eight private employers between the years 1972 and 2002.

The first four employments were mainly exercised in Finland, whereas the four latter ones between 1988 and 2002 were exercised abroad.

The tax authorities taxed the pension payments fully whereas the Tax Appeal Board investigated the tax treatment based on each employment and ruled that the part which related to employment exercised abroad was not taxable in Finland. The tax authorities appealed against the ruling which was also upheld by the District Administrative Court of Helsinki.

    Legal background: Section 10 of the Income-tax Law (Tuloverolaki) includes a non-exhaustive list of items of income which are treated as derived from Finland. The list includes pension which is received from a pension insurance taken from Finland.

    Issue: The issue was whether or not the pension paid to the non-resident taxpayer is regarded as income from Finnish sources.

    Decision: The Court upheld the decisions of the Tax Appeal Board and the District Administrative Court and held that the pension income was not income from Finnish sources and not taxable in Finland as it related to work exercised abroad.

The Court acknowledged that it would be in accordance with the wording of the law to treat pension from a Finnish pension fund as income from Finnish sources. The Court, however, looked into the law proposal (HE 62/1991) (the Proposal) which added the pension insurance taken from Finland to the list of items of income which are treated as derived from Finland. The Proposal was explicitly referring only to pensions based on private pension insurances, whereas the tax practice about pensions based on obligatory pension insurances was that such pensions are taxable in Finland only if they were based on work exercised in Finland. This was also established in the unpublished decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (decision No. 3922 from 1990).

The Court emphasised that if the legislator wanted to change the existing practice, the Proposal should have explicitly stated this. Considering the Proposal and the tax practice, there were no grounds to change the interpretation so that pension insurance from Finland would cover obligatory pension insurance. The Court acknowledged that such interpretation may lead to double non-taxation of such pension due to the functioning of a tax treaty, which is likely not the intended effect of tax treaties. Despite this, there were no grounds to change the previous interpretation.

6) Finland; Switzerland

Treaty between Finland and Switzerland – Administrative Court of Helsinki: Licence fee for using group name and logo paid to a Swiss related party not deductible for Finnish company

The Administrative Court of Helsinki (Helsingin hallinto-oikeus) (the Court) gave its decision on 10th October 2014 in the case of 14/1103/4. Details of the decision are summarised below.

    Facts: A Finnish company (FI Co) has belonged to an international group since 1981. FI Co has been using the group’s logo since 1989 and the group’s name has been included in its name since 1995. In 2004, FI Co concluded a contract with a Swiss company (CH Co), which belongs to the same group and holds the rights to the group’s name and logo. Under the contract terms FI Co received the right to use the group’s name and logo in Finland and in return was charged a licence fee for the those rights. During the court proceedings, FI Co emphasised that the licence fee covered also other features of the brand, such as the mission and values of the group.

    Issue: The issue was whether or not the licence fee (royalty) FI Co paid to CH Co was a tax deductible business expense for FI Co.

    Decision: The Court held that the licence fee was not tax deductible for FI Co. The Court referred to section 31 of the Law on Tax Procedure which stipulates on transfer pricing adjustments between related parties and section 7 of the Business Income Tax Law under which all costs and expenses incurred for the purpose of earning, securing, or maintaining the taxpayer’s income are deductible for tax purposes. The Court emphasised that it is crucial whether an independent entity in similar circumstances would be willing to pay for such rights or were they simply benefits which FI Co accrued by belonging to a group.

As a starting point, the Court pointed out that the name and logo as well as the mission and values of the group are common for all entities belonging to the same group and indicate that the entity in question is part of a bigger entity. As such, those are benefits which accrue based on the group relationship without a fee. A fee can, however, be charged provided that the entity paying the fee can show that it has obtained commercial benefits from the contract.

The Court pointed out that FI Co has belonged to the group since 1981, used its logo since 1989 and attached the group name to its own name since 1995, whereas the licence fee was introduced only in 2004. Although these facts on their own are not decisive to deem the licence fee non-deductible, such facts have specific significance when no significant changes in the market position and circumstances have taken place. FI Co has not indicated that there has been a significant change in its market circumstances since 2000.

The Court held that FI Co had failed to show that the increase in its profits resulted from the contract. The benefits FI Co had accrued are benefits obtained based on the group relationship. As such, there were no grounds for CH Co to charge for such benefits and no business reasons for FI Co to pay for them.

Article 9 (associated enterprises) of the 1991 Finland-Switzerland tax treaty was mentioned as an additional legal basis for the decision although the Court did not elaborate more on the treaty aspects.

7) France; Germany

Treaty between France and Germany – French Administrative Supreme Court qualifies income derived from “jouissance” rights as dividend

In a decision (No. 356878) given on 10th October 2014, the French Administrative Supreme Court (Conseil d’Etat) ruled that the income derived from German “jouissance” rights (Genussscheine) within the meaning of German law is to be treated as dividend pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 9 of article 9 of the France – Germany Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1959) (as amended through 2001) (the Treaty).

    Facts: From 2004 to 2006, the French bank Caisse régionale du crédit agricole mutuel du Finistère received an income from securities issued by the German entity Landesbank Sachsen. These securities were denominated as “Genussscheine” in the issuance contract.

Under the contract, the annual income to be received by the French bank amounted to 6.6% of the nominal value of the securities, except:

– where and insofar as the payment of this amount would create or worsen a loss in the debtor’s accounts; or
– where, after a capital reduction resulting from debtor’s losses, the capital has not been built up to its former total nominal value.

The contract also provided that the amounts paid in relation to the “jouissance” rights (Genussscheine) were deductible from the profits of the securities’ issuer.

The income received by the French bank was subject to a 26.375% withholding tax corresponding to the corporate income tax and the solidarity tax due under the German tax legislation.

    Legal background: Article 9 (6) of the Treaty provides that the term “dividends” as used in this article means income from shares, “jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or other rights, not being debt claims, participating in profits.

In turn, article 9(9) of the Treaty provides that income referred to in paragraph 6 arising from rights or shares participating in profits (including “jouissance” rights or “jouissance” shares) and, in the case of Germany, income from a sleeping partner (stiller Gesellschafter) from his participation as such, and income from loans participating in profits (partiarisches Darlehen), and income from profit-sharing loans (Gewinnobligationen)) that is deductible in determining the profits of the debtor may be taxed in the contracting state in which it arises, according to the laws of that state.

    Issue: The French bank considered that it was entitled to a French tax credit amounting to the German withholding tax, pursuant to article 20(2)(a)(bb) of the treaty referring to    income    arising    from    rights    participating    in    profits,    that is     deductible     in     determining     the     profits     of     the     debtor    (article 9(9) of the treaty).

However, the french tax authorities took the view that the income derived from “jouissance” rights constituted interest, which is taxable only in the state of which the recipient is a resident (article 10 of the treaty), and refused to grant the tax credit.  The french bank made a claim against this decision. On 5th december 2011, the french administrative Court of appeals (Cour administrative d’appel),    confirming the judgment given by the administrative tribunal (tribunal administratif) on 28th  january 2010, ruled that, in regard to the terms of the issuance contract and especially of its provision    which    defines    “jouissance” rights as debt claims, the income derived from these “jouissance” rights cannot be     qualified     as     dividend     under     article     9(6)     of     the     Treaty.    Consequently, the German withholding tax cannot give rise to a tax credit in france.

In the course of the subsequent proceedings, however, the Conseil d’Etat ruled in favour of the french bank.

d)  Decision: The Conseil d’Etat noted that the following facts were not disputed:
–   the income received by the french bank was derived from “Genussscheine” within the meaning of the German legislation;    and

–   the income derived from “Genussscheine” is expressly mentioned as a dividend in paragraphs 6 and 9 of article 9 of the treaty in its German-language version, which is equally authentic pursuant to the treaty.

The Conseil d’Etat, therefore, concluded that the income received    by    the    French    bank    qualified    as    a    dividend    under    article 9(6) of the treaty.

Note. The case has been referred back to the administrative Court of appeals.

TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION

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BACKGROUND
The Indian transfer pricing regulations require taxpayers to maintain, on an annual basis, a set of extensive information and documents relating to international transactions undertaken with associated enterprises (AEs) or specified domestic transactions undertaken with related parties. Given that the burden of demonstrating the arm’s length nature of transactions between associated enterprises/ related parties rests with the taxpayer, one of the pivotal constituents of transfer pricing is documentation of the economic and commercial realities of business, methodology used, assumptions, etc. that aided in arriving at the transfer price.

In a world where multinationals are seated across various locations around the globe, with centralised functions, varied operations and complex inter-company transactions, documentation assumes a crucial role for taxpayers. India, with regard to documentation has been no different. Indian revenue authorities, with regards to documentation, have always been stringent, leading to significant litigation for multinational organisations. Rule 10D of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (the Rules) prescribes detailed information and documentation that has to be maintained by the taxpayer. While some of the requirements are general in nature, others are more specific to the relevant international transactions.

Further, in recent years, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been concerned with the effectiveness of current transfer pricing documentation guidance. As part of the several initiatives around Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), the OECD has released its action plan on transfer pricing documentation. Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan relates to re-examination of transfer pricing documentation seeking to enhance transparency to tax administrations, taking into consideration compliance costs for business. Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan proposes a replacement to ‘Chapter V- Documentation” of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines providing a general guidance on documentation process from the perspective of both the taxpayer and the tax administration and consists of the following three parts:

i) Master file containing information relevant for all Multinational group members;

ii) Local File referring specifically to material transactions of the local taxpayer, and analysis of the same; and

iii) T emplate of country-by-Country report (CBC) illustrating global allocation of profits, taxes paid, and other indicators of economic activity.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Section 92D of the Income-tax Act, 1962 (The Act) read with Rule 10D(1) of the Rules deal with maintenance of prescribed information and documentation by the taxpayer. The said requirement can be broadly segregated into two parts: I. The first part of the Rule lists out mandatory documents/ information that a taxpayer must maintain. The extensive list under this part can be further classified into the following three categories:

Enterprise-wise documents (capturing the ownerships structure, group profile, business overview of the tax payer and the AEs etc.). These documents would typically cover requirements of Rule 10D(1)(a) to (c) of the Rules

Transaction-Specific documents [capturing the nature and terms of contract description of the functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed (popularly known as ‘FAR ’ Analysis) of the each party to the transaction, economic and market analyses etc.] These documents would typically cover requirements of Rule 10D(1)(d) to (h) of the Rules; and

Computation related documents (capturing the methods considered, actual working assumptions, adjustments made to transfer prices, and any other relevant information/data relied on for determining the arm’s length price etc.). These documents would typically cover requirements of Rule 10D(1) (i) to (m) of the Rules.

II. The second part of the Rule provides that adequate documentation be maintained such that it substantiates the information/analysis/studies documented under the first part of the Rule. Such informationcan include government publications, reports, studies, technical publications/ market research studies undertaken by reputable institutions, price publications, relevant agreements, contracts, and correspondence, etc.

While the transfer pricing regulations have laid down the requirement for maintenance of various types of documents, tax payers need to assess and ensure that the extensiveness of each of the above documents/ information should be in sync with the nature, type and complexity of the transaction under scrutiny.

Further, Rule 10D(4) of the Rules require that all the prescribed information and documents maintained by the tax payer to demonstrate the arm’s length nature of the transactions documents and information have to be contemporaneously maintained (to the extent possible) and must be in place by the due date of the tax return filing. E.g.,Companies to whom transfer pricing regulations are applicable are currently required to file their tax returns on or before 30th November following the close of the relevant tax year. The prescribed documents must be maintained for a period of nine years from the end of the relevant tax year, and must be updated annually on an ongoing basis.

As an exception to the above, the Proviso to Rule 10D(4) of the Rules provides that if a transaction continues to have effect over more than one previous year, fresh documentation need not be separately maintained in respect of each year, unless there is a change in nature and terms of the transaction, assumptions made and/ or any other factor that would have a bearing on the transfer price. Given this, it is extremely important for tax payers to scrutinise, on a yearly basis, whether any fresh documentation is required to be maintained for any of the continuing transactions.

Further, there is relaxation provided in case of the taxpayers having aggregate international transactions below the prescribed threshold of Rs. 1 crore and specified domestic transactions below the threshold of Rs. 5 crore from the requirement of maintaining the prescribed documentation. However, even in these cases, it is imperative that the documentation maintained should be adequate to substantiate the arm’s-length price of the international transactions or specified domestic transactions.

The above documentation requirements are also applicable to foreign companies deriving income liable to tax in India.

The regulations entail penal consequences in the event of non-compliance with documentation requirement. Failure to maintain the prescribed information/document/reporting covered transaction/ furnishing incorrect information or document attracts penalty @ 2% of transaction value.

MAINTENANCE OF INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION

Typically, taxpayers undertake transfer pricing exercise culminating in a Transfer Pricing Study Report, which can be said to be meeting the information and documentation required to be maintained under law. Further, such Report would also form the basis of obtaining and furnishing the required Accountants’ Certificate (Section 92E of the Act). Such exercise generally involves the following steps: Information gathering

General information

This would include structural, operational /functional set up of the tax payer and the related parties and the group to which they belong to,information in the form of global transfer pricing policy, if any, etc.

Industry details

This would include tax payers’ key competitors’ information, pricing factors, etc.

Financial

Budgets (including process followed and assumptions) and earlier years’ financial statements (including segmental information if available). Further, details of government policies, approvals, any tax exemptions availed and past assessment would be relevant to understand.

Transaction specific

List of transactions with associated enterprises alongwith related commercial parameters, pricing methodology followed details of similar product dealings with third parties (by tax payer and associated enterprises), availability of comparable prices in public domain, etc.

Functional, Asset and Risk Analysis

Typically referred to as the “FAR analysis”, this is the key element to any transfer pricing exercise. It involves identifying functions performed, assets deployed and risks assumed by the parties to the transaction. The exercise entails determining income attribution between entities basis functions performed, assets deployed and risks assumed by the entities to the transaction.

Further, the above analysis facilitates process of determination of the “Most Appropriate Method” (‘MAM’), identifyingthe “tested party” and ultimately leading to economic/comparability analysis [determination of the Arm’s Length Price (‘ALP’)].

Determination of the MAM and the computation of the ALP

These are concluding steps of the transfer pricing exercise with following key elements:

Determination of the MAM for each tested transaction basis prescribed factors.

Identifying the tested party ie. one of the party to the transaction, which is the one that is least complex (functionally), not owning/owning few intangibles and in respect of which data is more reliable.

Having identified the tested party, one needs to undertake the comparability analysis and compute the ALP.

While undertaking the comparability analysis, it is important that right comparables are used. Further, in this regard, wherever required it is necessary to carry out necessary adjustments so as to have more robust comparability analysis.

As    regards    computation    of    the  ALP,    an    important component for the same is use of appropriate “Profit Level Indicator” (‘PLI’). There are no specific guidelines on the choice of PLI under law; hence, giving taxpayers an option. Further, in the context of Resale Price Method or the Cost Plus Method, the PLI usually adopted is gross margin on operating revenue and gross margin (mark up) on operating cost respectively. Under the Transactional Net Margin Method, the PLI depends on the nature of the transaction (ie, revenue or expense) in the hands of the tested party.

The whole of the above process (step wise) would need to be documented in detail with back up information/ details. Such documentation is typically maintained in the form of a Transfer Pricing Study Report from compliance perspective. Taxpayers undertake such studies on a yearly basis as required under law.

    CONCLUSION

Documentation is the most important and essential element of transfer pricing. From taxpayers perspective, documentation is critical to demonstrate compliance/ meeting with the arm’s length principle. From tax department’s perspective, it has the right to call for the documentation for verifying the compliance with the arm’s length principle.

Further, as discussed earlier, documentation has time and again been a matter of discussion/debate across jurisdictions and has been continues evolving process. The recent development at OECD (BEPS initiative discussed earlier) which seeks to replace its earlier guidance on transfer pricing documentation and proposing information to be provided in the master file and the CBC report; it is believed that the tax administrations will have the resources and information required to conduct a detailed analysis and focused audit.

    JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS

There have not been many precedents per se in the context of adequacy of the prescribed information and documentation maintenance requirements.

    In case of Cargill India Pvt. Ltd, the Delhi Tribunal had adopted a practical interpretation of documentation requirements laid u/s. 92D(3) read with Rule 10D of the Rules. The Tribunal had observed as under:

“It is clear from the consideration of Rule 10D and its various sub-rules, that documents and information prescribed under the above rule is voluminous and it would only be in the rarest cases that all the clauses of sub-rules would be attracted.

….

It is, therefore, clear that one or more clauses of Sub-rule (1) are applicable and not all clauses of the Rule in a given case. It would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case more particularly the nature of international transaction carried or service involved.”

As it can be seen from the above, the Tribunal noted that all kinds of information mentioned in Rule 10D of the Rules need not be maintained in each and every case. The nature of information that is relevant would vary depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Further, the Tribunal also observed that since the penalty leviable for non-compliance with requirements u/s. 92D(3) of the Act is onerous, its conditions must be strictly met. The notice u/s. 92D(3) of the Act cannot be vague and must require only information prescribed under Rule 10D of the Rules. It must also specify on which particular points the information is required.

Having stated as above, on the other hand, there are various decisions dealing with the importance of documentation in the context of determination of the MAM, selection of tested party and PLI, aggregation of transactions, relevance of FAR analysis, comparability analysis, including manner of identification of comparables, economic and other adjustments carried out so as to undertake meaningful profitability analysis, etc. The underlying principle in each of these precedents has been the need to have adequate and robust documentation, which ultimately assists both, the tax department and the tax payer. Wherever the tax payer has been found to having maintained such information and documentation, it has been able to successfully defend the transfer pricing adopted.

Trade Circular 2T of 2015 – Extension of time for filing VAT Audit Report in Form 704 for year 2013-14 dated 14-01-2015

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Due date for uploading of VAT audit report in Form 704 for the year 2013-14 has been extended from 15-01-2015 to 30-01-2015, and due date to submit the physical copy of the acknowledgement and the statement of submission has been extended to10-02-2015.

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Trade Circular 1T of 2015 – Revised Instructions regarding stay in appeals dated 07-01-2015

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In the Trade Circular, the Commissioner has explained that if an appellant receives some forms after the assessment order is passed then the appellant should produce the list in given format at the time of filing an appeal. The appellate authority will check the declarations as per the list and accordingly fix part payment. Declarations received up to the date of filing appeal will be considered to decide part payment and for granting stay.
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M/S. Cheema Paper Ltd. vs. Commissioner Trade Tax, (2012) 55 VST 473

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Entry Tax- Rate of Tax- Duplex Board- Ordinarily Used As Packing Material-Made out of Paper- Not Covered by Entry “Paper of All Kinds”, section 4 of The Uttar Pradesh Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007

Facts
The dealer company engaged in the manufacture of craft paper and duplex board. The Commercial Tax Tribunal confirmed levy of entry tax on duplex board holding it to be covered by entry relating to “paper of all kind”. The company filed revision petition before the Allahabad High Court against the impugned order of the Commercial Tax Tribunal.

Held
The definition of paper is of wide import which may include anything which is macerated in to pulp, dried and pressed and is used for writing, printing, drawing, decorating, covering wall or for packing purpose. But board whether card board or duplex board are different meant for packing purpose only and not for use as paper, as is understood in common parlance. The duplex board which undoubtedly is a product of paper and is used as packing material would not be paper covered by the entry of “paper of all kind” as contained in notification and liable for entry tax. Accordingly the court allowed the revision petition.

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M/S.Sanjos Paritosh Hospital V. Commercial Tax Officer, Thrissur and Others, (2012) 55 VST 208 (Ker)

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VAT- Dealer- Business- Private Hospitals Selling Medicines and Consumables to Patientsare Dealers and Liable to Pay VAT, S. 2(ix), (xv), (xx), (xliii) and (lii) of The Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003

Facts
The Kerala Private Hospital’s Associations, State Committee filed writ petition before the Kerala High Court disputing their liability under the Kerala Value Added tax Act (KVAT ).

Held
A comparative analysis of the provisions contained in the KGST Act which were considered by the court in case of P.R.S. Hospital [2004] 135 STC (ker) and the corresponding provisions of the KVAT Act show that statutory provisions remain the same although the KGST Act is replaced by the KVAT Act. Therefore following earlier judgment of division bench of Kerala High Court in P.R.S. Hospital the court held that the hospitals are carrying on a business and are dealers liable to pay vat on sale of medicines and consumable to patients. The court also upheld the constitutional validity of charging section 6 of the act. Accordingly the writ petition was dismissed.

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2014 (36) STR 1120 (Tri.-Del.) DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Jaipur-I

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CENVAT Credit of service tax paid on input services in respect of outdoor catering services for providing canteen facilities to the workers; maintenance of lawns and gardens within the factory as per the requirement of Pollution Control Board; maintenance of cycle stand located in the factory premises; and maintenance of guest house located adjacent to the factory premises is available?

Facts:
The appellants, manufacturer of fertilisers and chemicals availed CENVAT Credit on the following services which was disallowed:
• Outdoor catering services availed for providing canteen facilities to the workers;
• Maintenance of lawns and gardens within the factory as per the requirement of Pollution Control Board;
• Maintenance of cycle stand located in the factory premises; and
• Maintenance of guest house located adjacent to the factory premises.

The Appellants pleaded that canteen services were provided to the workers in view of the requirement under the Factories Act. Similarly, maintenance of lawns and gardens was mandatory requirement under the Pollution Control Board subject to which the permission for running the factory has been granted, maintenance of cycle stand was necessary requirement for the factory workers and the guest house was used by the guests of the company and hence, service tax paid on all these services should be allowed as CENVAT Credit.

Held:
CENVAT Credit in respect of outdoor catering service was admissible in view of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court’s decision in case of CCE, Nagpur vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd. (supra) 2010 (20) S.T.R. 577 as the number of workers in the appellant’s factory was more than 250 and it was mandatory to provide canteen facilities to the factory workers. Maintenance of lawns and gardens was a condition imposed by the Rajasthan Pollution Control Board which was necessary under relevant Acts. Hence, service tax credit in respect of the same was held admissible. Maintenance of cycle stand was necessary requirement and hence, It was also a cenvatable service. Maintenance of guest house, adjacent to the factory premises, was a necessary business requirement as the factory was located outside the City boundaries. Thus, in view of various decisions, maintenance of residential premises was associated with business activities and CENVAT Credit availed by the appellants was held as eligible.

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2014 (36) STR 1089 (Tri.-Del.) Delphi Automotive System P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner Of Cus. & S. T., Noida

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CENVAT credit of service tax paid on management service with respect to honouring, rewarding and entertaining employees and exemployees is allowed.

Facts:
The appellants were manufacturers of motor vehicle parts and AC parts. They took CENVAT Credit in respect of housekeeping and dry cleaning service, event management service for annual function for honouring, rewarding and entertaining employees and ex-employees and legal service. The appellants contended that since CENVAT Credit in respect of taxies for carrying their employees for the event was allowed, CENVAT Credit of service tax in respect of event management service engaged for the same function should be allowed. The appellants relied on Endurance Technologies vs. C.C.E Aurangabad-2013 (32) S.T.R. 95 (Tri.-Mum.) wherein credit in respect of mandap keeper for the annual day function was allowed. Also, the appellants cited the case of Toyata Kirloskar Motor Ltd. vs. CCE, LTU, Bangalore 2011(24) S.T.R. 645 (Kar) where it was held that organising a function cannot be separated from the business of manufacture. The Adjudicating Authority held that these services were not eligible for CENVAT Credit as their products can be manufactured without these services. The Adjudicating Authority also held them guilty of suppression of facts and therefore, imposed penalty and interest.

Held:
Relying on various pronouncements cited by the appellants, it was held that denial of CENVAT credit for cleaning services, legal services and management service was not sustainable. Adjudicating authority erred in holding that mens rea was not an essential factor for imposition of penalty under Rule 15 of the CENAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with section 11AC of Central Excise Act, 1994. With respect to penalty under section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944, suppression has to be brought out which involves mens rea. Since order-in-original did not bring out as to how the appellants were guilty of willful misstatement or suppression of facts, extended period of limitation was not justifiable and mandatory penalty could not be imposed.

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2014 (36) STR 1052 (Tri.-Mum.) Ashish Construction vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur

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Payment, after issuance of Show Cause Notice, specifically after a recorded statement of the assessee that he was not liable to pay service tax, should be treated as payment of service tax under protest or compulsion.

Facts:
The appellants availed small scale service provider’s exemption and after number crunching exercise, discharged service tax liability for F. Yrs. 2005-2006 to 2007-2008. The appellants deposited service tax under compulsion against issuance of Show Cause Notice. The appellants put forth various arguments to contend that the appellants were neither liable to pay service tax nor interest and penalties. The respondents alleged that the appellants were ineligible for the small scale service provider’s exemption since the appellants had opted for payment of service Tax.

Held:
Having considered the rival contentions, it was found that as per the statement recorded prior to issuance of Show Cause Notice, the appellants had mentioned that they were not liable to pay service tax. The appellants had paid service tax suo moto only after crossing the threshold exemption limit. Further, the appellants had paid service tax after issue of Show Cause Notice which was not a suo moto payment and the same needs to be treated as paid under protest or compulsion. In view of facts of the case, it was held that the appellants would be entitled to get refund of service tax paid under protest.

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2014 (36) STR 1050 (Tri.–Del.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana vs. Bishamber Lal Arora.

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Packing/unpacking by automatic/mechanized process is not covered under cargo handling services.

Proceedings initiated without following classification and valuation discipline, are liable to be set aside.

Facts:
Department issued Show Cause Notice to the Respondent assessee alleging non/short payment of service tax under coal handling and loading, manpower recruitment or supply agency and cleaning services.

The respondents contended that service tax was demanded without specifying categories and taxable values separately. Further, the respondents were merely collecting urea in bags from bagging plants and thereafter, these bags were stacked on the conveyor. The conveyor system then carried the bags to railway wagons or trucks. Accordingly, the services were not in the nature of cargo handling services. The respondents further argued that since the labourers were employed for removal of stones from coal through conveyor systems, these activities did not fall within the ambit of manpower recruitment or supply agency services. The respondents were only cleaning the conveyer belts and the conveyor system for efficient conveyance of goods and therefore, these activities cannot be considered to be cleaning services, leviable to service tax.

Learned Appellate Commissioner held that the respondents were not liable to service tax under following grounds:

The respondents were only engaged in packing and unpacking of bags by automatic/mechanized process and therefore, the services were not covered under cargo handling services.

Cleaning of conveyor system for transport of bags was not covered under cleaning services.

Since the employees were employed by the respondents and they were not the employees of the customer, the services were not manpower recruitment or supply agency services.

Held:
Agreeing to the decision delivered by the learned Appellate Commissioner and having regard to the fact that Show Cause Notice was defective and the proceedings were initiated without applying classification discipline, the appeal was dismissed.

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2015-TIOL-142-CESTAT-MUM Bombay Paints Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai- II

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Full credit availed on capital goods in the first year itself instead of 50%, at the most liable for interest, seeking reversal of credit and imposition of penalty is not warranted.

Facts:
The Appellant took 100% credit on capital goods used in manufacture. CENVAT Credit was denied to the extent of 50% and interest and penalty was also imposed.

Held:
Although, CENVAT Credit entitled was 50% in the first year instead of 100%, however the remaining credit of 50% is available in the subsequent year therefore at the most interest for the intervening period can be demanded and demand for duty and penalty was set aside.

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[2015-TIOL-108-CESTAT-MUM] – Matunga Gymkhana, Tahnee Heights Co-op . Hou. Soc. Ltd, Mittal Tower Premises Co-operative Society vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Services to members of club/co-operative housing society is not a service by one to another and is not liable for service tax.

Facts:
The demand of service tax in all these cases is based on the premise that the Appellants are providing “Club & Association” service.

Held:
Relying on the judgments of Ranchi Club vs. Chief Commr. Of C. Ex. & ST, Ranchi 2012 (26) STR 401(Jhar), Sports Club of Gujarat vs. Union of India-2013-TIOL-528- HC-AHM-ST and M/s. Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi-2014-TIOL-701-CESTAT-DEL701-CESTAT-DEL, where it was held that in view of mutuality and activities of the club there is no service by one to another and thus the levy of service tax is ultra vires, the appeals were allowed.

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[2014]-TIOL-2388-CESTAT-AHM Venketeshwar Filaments Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Vapi.

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Any stay order passed by the CESTAT, if it is in force beyond 07-08-2014 it would continue till the disposal of the appeal

Facts:
The Initial stay order passed by the Bench expires on 20- 08-2014

Held:
With the omission of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd proviso in section 35C(2A) vide section 103 of the Finance (2) Act,2014, there is no provision for making any further applications for extension of stay nor has the Tribunal have powers for hearing and disposing the applications from 07-08-2014. However, the initial stay order in force after 07-08-2014 does not lapse.

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[2014]-TIOL-2460-CESTAT-MUM M/s Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages P. Ltd vs. CCE, Nashik

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The outdoor catering service used in relation to business activities and not ‘PRIMARI LY’ meant for personal use or consumption of the employee, is a valid input service.

Facts:
The Appellant has availed CENVAT Credit on outdoor catering services provided to its employees post 01/04/2011 i.e. after the insertion of the clause in the definition of input service excluding services ‘primarily’ for personal use of the employees.

Held:
The word PRIMARILY used by the legislature should be given the due effect. The outdoor catering service is used in relation to business activities for all employees in general and forms a part of cost in relation to manufacture of the final product. It was also observed that since the expenditure did not form part of the salary of the employee as a cost to the company it was not meant for personal use, the credit cannot be denied.

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MindaSai Limited vs. Income Tax Officer ITAT Delhi ‘E’ Bench Before Pramod Kumar AM and A. T. Varkey JM I.T.A. No.: 2974/Del/13 Assessment year: 2009-10. Decided on 09.01.2015 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: AshwaniTaneja / J P Chandrakar

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(I ) Section 32(2) – Unabsorbed depreciationpertaining to assessment year 2002-03 or before can be set-off after a period of eight years.
(ii) Section 115JB – In the absence of exempt income addition to book profit applying provisions of section 14A cannot be made.

Facts:
Following issues amongst others were raised before the tribunal:

i). Whether the unabsorbed depreciation of Rs 4.39 crore which pertained to the assessment years 1999-2000 and 2000-01, can be set off against business income during the current assessment year;

ii) I n the absence of exempt income whether disallowance u/s. 115JB on the ground that the amount pertained to disallowance u/s.14A, can be made.

The assessee’s claim for set-off against business income of unabsorbed depreciation brought from the assessment year 1999-2000 and 2000-01, aggregating to Rs. 4.39 crore, was rejected by the AO as according to him the unabsorbed depreciation pertaining to the assessment years prior to the assessment year 2002-03 could only be carried forward for eight subsequent assessment years. For the purpose, he relied on a Special Bench decision of the Delhi Tribunal in thecase of DCIT vs. Times Guaranty Limited [(2010) 4 ITR (Trib) 210 MumbaiSB]. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the decision of the AO.

Applying the provisions of Clause (f) of Explanation to section 115JB(2) the AO disallowed expense of Rs. 2 lakh u/s. 14A. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order. Before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that since it has not earned any exempt income during the year, the disallowance u/s. 115JB was not called for. While the revenue relied on the orders of the lower authorities and contended that once the assessee has on its own accepted this disallowance, the adjustment u/s. 115JB in respect thereof was only a natural corollary thereto.

Held:
i) Re: Depreciation: The Tribunal referred to the decision of the Gujarat high court in the case of General Motors India Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT [(2013) 354 ITR 244(Guj)] and noted its “considered opinion” to the effect that “any unabsorbed depreciation available to an assessee on 1st day of April 2002 will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of section 32(2) asamended by Finance Act, 2001”. Accordingly, it observed that the legal position is that the restriction of eightyears, which was in force till the law was amended by the Finance Act 2001 w.e.f. 2002-03, does not come into play. Further, relying on the decisions in the cases of Tej International Pvt.Ltd.vs. DCIT[(2000) 69 TTJ 650] and ACIT vs. Aurangabad Holiday Resorts Pvt. Ltd. [(2007) 118 ITD 1], the Tribunal accepted the plea of the assessee.

ii) Re: Disallowance u/s 14A: Relying on the Delhi High Court’s decision in the case of CIT vs. Holcim India Pvt. Ltd. [2014 TIOL 1586 HC DEL IT] wherein it is held that unless there is an exempt income, disallowance u/s. 14 A cannot be invoked, the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s pleas and held that adjustment under Clause (f) of Explanation to section 115JB (2) cannot be made.

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66 SOT 266 (Mumbai – Trib) Tupur Chatterji vs. ACIT Assessment Year : 2018-09. Date of Order: 16.9.2014

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Sections 23(2), 24 –The restriction of Rs 1.50 lakh described in second proviso to section 24 is with reference of the property which is referred to in sub-section (2) of section 23. Restriction of Rs. 1.50 lakh does not apply to a property which is not let out and annual value whereof is not taken as nil nor is it a cumulative amount to be allowed as a deduction.

Facts :
The assessee was the owner of two properties, one of which was a flat in Marble Arch and the other was a flat in Nestle. The flat in Marble Arch was considered as self occupied property and the flat in Nestle was vacant throughout the previous year. The book value of the flat in Nestle was Rs. 57,22,000. This property was acquired by taking loan from bank. Interest of Rs. 3,50,641 was paid.

In respect of this property, the Assessing Officer (AO) considered Rs 4,00,540 (7% of book value of this property i.e. 7% of Rs. 57,22,000) to be its annual value. He restricted the claim for deduction of interest to Rs. 1,40,193 on the ground that the assesse could not be allowed a cumulative deduction more than Rs. 1,50,000 as per second proviso to section 24 of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
According to section 24(b), where the property is acquired, constructed, repaired or renewed or constructed with the borrowed capital than any interest payable on such borrowed capital would be an allowable deduction. The restriction of Rs. 1,50,000 described in second proviso is with reference to the property which is referred to in sub-section (2) of section 23. Section 23(2) would be applicable to a house or part of the house which either is in the occupation of the owner for the purpose of his residence or the same is not actually occupied by the owner for the reason that owing to his employment, business or profession carried on at any other place and he is to reside at that other place in a building not belonging to him and ALV of such property would be taken as nil. Undisputedly, the flat at Bandra falls under the category of property mentioned in section 23(2) fo the Act as AO did not assess the ALV of the said property as income of the assessee. Therefore, provisions of second proviso to section 24 would not be applicable and the case of the assesse would fall within clause (b) of section 24 in which there is no limit for allowability of the interest and the condition is that the said property should inter alia be acquired out of borrowed capital. In respect of the Nestle property the assessee has paid interest of Rs. 3,50,641. Interest deductible from ALV of Nestle property could not be restricted to any amount less than the interest paid by the assesse. The Tribunal directed the AO to give full deduction of interest paid of Rs. 3,50,641.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed by the Tribunal.

Compiler’s Note:
It appears that the assessee had interest of Rs. 9,807 in respect of borrowing for flat in Marble Arch and that is why the AO restricted interest on loan for Nestle property to Rs. 1,40,193 (Rs. 1,50,000 – 9,807).

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166 TTJ 627 (Cochin) ITO vs. Beacon Projects (P.) Ltd. Assessment Years: 2012-13 & 2013-14. Date of Order: 8.8.2014

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Sections 2(28A), 194A – Amount paid to intending buyer of flat in excess of amount paid by him is in the nature of interest u/s. 2(28A) liable for TDS u/s. 194A. The fact that the nomenclature of the amount debited to P & L Account was “Excess payment refund” does not change the character of the payment which is in the nature of interest.

Facts :
In the course of survey u/s. 133A, it was found that the assesse has debited in P & L Account of financial year 2011- 12, a sum of Rs. 31,37,341 and a sum of Rs. 43,21,593 in the P & L Account of financial year 2012-13 towards “Excess Payment Refund’’. The nature of this amount was as under –

The assesse received certain payments from customers who initially booked flats by making advance payments plus 1 or 2 installments. Due to various reasons, these customers could not fulfill the payment schedule and requested for a refund. After certain period, the assessee identified new customers and flats were sold at a higher rate than the previous price. After the sale, the assessee returned the payments received from previous customers with a margin, in order to maintain good business relationship. The excess amount paid was debited to ‘Excess Payment Refund’. No tax was deducted at source from such excess payment made.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the excess amount paid to customers was interest u/s. 2(28A) and the payment thereof required deduction of tax at source u/s. 194A of the Act. He, accordingly, regarded the assessee as an assessee-in-default.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that the provisions of section 194A are not applicable to the transactions undertaken by the assessee. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The excess payment made to the customers was in the nature of interest paid in respect of amount lying with the assessee. Mere nomenclature in the books of account will not change the character of actual payment which was precisely in the nature of interest as defined u/s. 2(28A) of the Act. Having reproduced the provisions of section 2(28A), the Tribunal observed that it is crystal clear from the plain reading of section 2(28A) of the Act, that money paid in respect of amount borrowed or debt incurred, is interest payable in any manner. The statutory definition given u/s. 2(28A) of the Act regards amounts which may not otherwise be regarded as interest, as interest for the statute. The definition of interest has been carried to the extent that even the amounts payable in transactions where money has not been borrowed and debt has not been incurred, are brought within the scope of its definition, as in the case of service fees paid in respect of a credit facility which has not been utilised.

In the instant case, the amounts were paid in respect of an obligation in respect of purchase of flat through agreement, therefore, no fault can be found on the part of the AO for treating these charges as interest and liable for TDS u/s. 194A of the Act. The mere fact that the assessee did not choose to characterise such payment as interest will not take such payment out of the ambit of definition of ïnterest’’, in so far as payment made by the assessee was in respect of an obligation incurred with earlier flat holder. The assessee has essentially incurred an expenditure and the amount of charges paid was with respect to the amount incurred by the flat agreement-holder and the period for which the money was so utilised by the assessee. The Tribunal reversed the order of CIT(A) and restored that of the AO on this issue.

This ground of appeal of the revenue was decided in favour of the revenue.

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(2014) 112 DTR 265 (Del) Thyssenkrupp Elevators (India) (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Y.: 2003-04 Date of order: 29.08.2014

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Section 32: Maintenance Portfolio (Annual Maintenance Contracts) acquired on slump basis and goodwill represented by excess of consideration over net value of all assets acquired are intangible assets eligible for depreciation u/s. 32(1)(ii)

Facts:
The assessee acquired the running business in terms of ‘undertaking sale agreement’ of the “Elevator Division” of M/s. ECE Industries Ltd. on a slump basis for a value of Rs. 20,32,10,000. Apart from acquiring various other assets of the said business, the assessee has acquired maintenance contracts of 3,578 elevators which was the main source of revenue for the assessee and also maintenance contracts for 1,001 elevators which were under the warranty period and which would start yielding revenue once the warranty period expires. This portfolio of various maintenance contracts was valued at Rs.18,34,74,000 and depreciation u/s. 32 was claimed on it by treating it as an intangible asset. The learned AO while disallowing the claim of assessee for depreciation on ‘maintenance portfolio’ observed that the assessee was following a ‘complete contract method’ and hence, was not eligible to claim depreciation, as there was no income from the said contracts offered to taxation. Aggrieved by the disallowance the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT (A). The learned CIT (A) observed that , the consideration can be equated to an amount paid to acquire income yielding apparatus which is nothing but capital in nature and cannot be inferred to result into a depreciable intangible assets.
Further, the excess of consideration over the net value of assets amounting to Rs. 1,85,44,612 was separately shown in the balance sheet and was treated to be ‘goodwill’ pertaining to the business. It was this value of goodwill that was claimed by the assessee as eligible for depreciation for the first time directly before the Tribunal based on the apex Court judgement in the case of CIT vs. SMIFS Securities Ltd. (2012) 75 DTR (SC) 417.

Held:
It was held that the aforesaid maintenance contracts were the very backbone of the business of the assessee. The fact that after the specified intangible assets referred to u/s. 32 (1)(ii) the words “business or commercial rights of similar nature” have been additionally used clearly demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to provide for depreciation only in respect of specified intangible assets but also other categories of intangible assets which were neither feasible nor possible to exhaustively enumerate. These annual maintenance contracts which constituted the whole and sole of the “maintenance division” business of the transferor and which was hitherto being carried out by the transferor, without any interruption were transferred under the said undertaking and sale agreement. The aforesaid intangible assets are, therefore, comparable to a licence to carry out the existing business of the transferor. In absence of the aforesaid intangible assets, the assessee would have to commence the business from scratch and go through the gestation period whereas by creating new/fresh business right, the assessee got an up and running business. It would be prudent to note that these AMC’s in terms of value only come next to the value of fixed assets. Thus, it is unambiguously clear from the various clauses of the agreement and documents available on record that the present agreement represents a bundle of rights in the form of commercial rights. Thus, by applying the principle of ejusdem generis, it was held that such AMCs should get covered within the expression “business or commercial rights of similar nature” specified u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act and accordingly eligible for depreciation.

Regarding the issue of depreciation on the goodwill, the Honourable ITAT relied upon the decision of CIT vs. SMIFS Securities Ltd. (supra) wherein it was held that excess consideration paid by the assessee over the value of net assets should be considered as goodwill of business. Accordingly, the depreciation on the same was also allowed u/s. 32(1)(ii) by considering it as falling within the expression “business or commercial rights of similar nature”.

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Mutuality Income: A. Y. 2005-06- Transfer fees received by Co-operative Housing Societies from incoming & outgoing members (even in excess of limits) is exempt on the ground of mutuality

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CIT vs. Darbhanga Mansion CHS Ltd (Bom): ITA No. 1474 of 2012 dated 18/12/2014: www.itatonline.org:

The
assessee, a Co-operative Housing Society, received a sum of Rs.
39,68,000 on account of transfer of flat and garage and credited it to
‘general amenities fund’ as well as ‘repair fund’. The assessee claimed
that the said receipt is exempted from tax on the ground of mutuality.
However, the Assessing Officer held that the principles of mutuality
will not apply. However, the CIT(A) and Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim by relying on Sind Co-operative Housing Society vs. ITO; 317 ITR
47 (Bom).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

i)
The very issue and the very question was raised repeatedly in the case
of the assessee society. Repeatedly, the Revenue has failed in
convincing the Tribunal that Sind Co-operative Housing Society will not
cover the Society’s case. The contribution is made to the repair fund or
to the general fund and credited as such. While it may be true that it
is occasioned by transfer of a flat and garage, yet, we do not see how
merely because there was cap or restriction placed on the transfer fees
or the quantum thereof, in this case the principle of mutuality cannot
be applied.

ii) The underlying principle and of a co-operative
movement has been completely overlooked by the Revenue. The Revenue
seems to be of the view that a Co-operative Housing Society makes
profit, if it receives something beyond this amount of Rs. 25,000. There
has to be material brought and which will have a definite bearing on
this issue. If the amount is received on account of transfer of a flat
and which is not restricted to Rs. 25,000/- but much more, then
different consideration may apply. However, in the present case, what
has been argued and vehemently is the amount was received by the Society
when the flat and the garage were transferred. Therefore, it must be
presumed to be nothing but transfer fees. It may have been credited to
the fund and with a view to demonstrate that it is nothing but a
voluntary contribution or donation to the Society, but still it
constitutes its income. However, for rendering such a conclusive finding
there has to be material brought by the Revenue on record. Beyond
urging that it has been received at the time of a transfer of the flat
and credited to such a fund will not be enough to displace the principle
laid down in the decision of Sind Cooperative Housing Society.

iii)
The attempt of the Revenue therefore is nothing but overcoming the
binding judgment of this Court. In the present case, the Commissioner
and the Tribunal both have held that the receipt may have been
occasioned by the transfer but the principle of mutuality will still
apply.

iv) It is a typical relationship between the member of
the Co-operative Society and particularly a Housing Society and the
Society which is a body Corporate and a legal entity by itself that is
forming the basis of the principle laid down by the Division Bench.
Co-operative movement is a socio economic and a moral movement. It has
now been recognised by Article 43A of the Constitution of India. It is
to foster and encourage the spirit of brotherhood and co-operation that
the Government encourages formation of Co-operative Societies. The
members may be owning individually the flats or immovable properties but
enjoying, in common, the amenities, advantages and benefits. The
Society as a legal entity owns the building but the amenities are
provided and that is how the terms “flat” and the “housing society” are
defined in the statute in question. We do not therefore find any reason
to deviate from the principle laid down in Sind Co-operative Housing
Society’s case and which followed a Supreme Court judgment.”

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Interest- Ss. 234A, 234B and 234C- A. Y. 1990- 91- Order levying interest should be specific- Order directing levy of interest as per rules is not sufficient

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CIT vs. Oswal Exports; 369 ITR 630 (T&AP):

If interest is leviable u/s. 234A, 234B or 234C, such levy of interest is mandatory and compensatory in nature but in order to levy interest under these sections, the Assessing Officer is specifically required to mention the specific section of charging interest, failing which, no interest could be levied under those sections.

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Education: Charitable purpose- Exemption u/s. 11-A. Y. 2007-08-Pre-sea and post-sea training for ships and maritime industry-Object of trust educational- Trust entitled to exemption u/s. 11

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DIT vs. Samudra Institute of Meritime Studies Trust; 369 ITR 645 (Bom):

The assessee was a trust established with the purpose of administering and maintaining technical training institutions at various places in India for pre-sea and post-sea training of ships and maritime industry as a public charitable institution for education, that is to provide on board and offshore training and continuing technical education for officers, both on the deck and engine side. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was not entitled to exemption u/s. 11. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We are of the opinion that the Tribunal has applied the correct test in concluding that the exemption u/s. 11 of the Act can be availed of by the respondent assessee. The Tribunal in paragraph 9.6 of the impugned order concludes that the assessee is giving training in the above area to seamen. All the courses may not be approved by the Director General of Shipping but that by itself is no ground to hold that the purpose is not charitable.

ii) The exemption u/s. 11 can be claimed and bearing in mind the object of the trust. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal and the CIT(A) have approached the issue correctly and in the light of the definition so also the tests laid down came to a factual conclusion that the respondent is entitled to exemption u/s. 11.

iii) This is not a case where the purpose can be said to run a coaching class or a centre. This is an institution which imparts education in the area of pre-sea and post-sea training to seamen so as to prepare them for all the duties. In such circumstances, we do not find that the concurrent findings of fact are vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of the record or perversity enabling us to entertain this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.”

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DTAA between India and Denmark-Section 9(1) (vi)-A. Y. 1991-92: Income deemed to accrue or arise in India-Danish company supplying equipment and information regarding installation of such equipment-Consideration received is not royalty-Not assessable in India

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DIT vs. Haldor Topsoe; ; 369 ITR 453 (Bom):

Under an agreement between a Danish company and an Indian company, the Danish company supplied equipment and information regarding installation of such equipment. For the A. Y. 1991-92, the Danish company claimed that its income consequent on the agreement was not taxable in India. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim. The Tribunal accepted the claim and held that the payments were not covered within the expression “royalty” provided u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which was much wider than the one provided in the DTAA between India and Denmark.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The equipment was supplied to the Indian party for which the Indian party made payment. The contract included stipulations for giving all information so as to guide the Indian party to install the equipment at site and thereafter to use it.

ii) In these circumstances, this was a mixed question and finding of fact had been rendered considering the peculiar facts and circumstances. The finding of fact was a possible one. There was no perversity or error of law apparent on the face of the record. The payments were not assessable in India.”

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Deemed income-Section 41(1)-A. Y. 2003-04- Remission or cessation of liability-Sales tax deferral scheme-Option in subsequent scheme for premature payment of net present value-No remission or cessation of liability of the difference- Difference is not deemed income u/s. 41(1)

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CIT Vs. Sulzer India Ltd.; 369 ITR 717 (Bom):

In the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee had opted for deferral scheme for payment of sales tax of Rs. 7,52,01,378/- under the deferral 1993 scheme of the Government of Maharashtra. The amount was allowed as deduction treating the option as deemed payment for the purpose of section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as per the circulars. The assessee also opted for the 2002 scheme for premature payment of net present value and paid an amount of Rs. 3,37,13,393/-. The Assessing Officer added the difference amount of Rs. 4,14,87,985/- as deemed income u/s. 41(1) of the Act. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held that the amount was not taxable u/s. 41(1) of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The first requirement of section 41(1) is that the allowance or deduction is made in respect of the loss, expenditure or a trading liability incurred by the assessee and the other requirement is that the assessee has subsequently obtained a benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of a remission or cessation thereof. The sales tax collected by the assessee during the relevant year amounting to Rs. 7,52,01,378/- was treated by the State Government as a loan liability payable after 12 years in six annual/equal installments.

ii) Subsequently, pursuant to the amendment made to the fourth proviso to section 38 of the 1959 Act, the assesee accepted the offer of the SICOM paid an amount of Rs. 3,37,13,393/- to the SICOM, which represented the net present value of the future sum as determined and prescribed by the SICOM. The State may have received a higher sum after a period of 12 years and in installments. However, the statutory arrangement and by section 38, fourth proviso did not amount to remission or cessation of the assessee’s liability assuming the liability to be a trading one. Rather that obtains a payment to the State prematurely and in terms of the correct value of the debt due to it. There was no evidence to show that there had been any remission or cessation of the liability by the State Government.

iii) A proper understanding of all this by the Tribunal cannot be termed as perverse. The view taken by it is imminently possible. Appeals are dismissed.”

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Deemed income- Section 41(1)- A. Y. 2004-05- Remission or cessation of liability- Sales tax deferral scheme-Option in subsequent scheme for premature payment of net present value- No remission or cessation of liability of the difference- Difference is not deemed income u/s. 41(1)

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CIT vs. Mcdowell and Co. Ltd.; 369 ITR 684 (Karn):

In the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee had opted for deferral scheme for payment of sales tax of Rs. 13,78,41,600/- under the deferral 1993 scheme of the Government of Maharashtra. The amount was allowed as deduction in the A. Y. 2003-04 treating the option as deemed payment for the purpose of section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 according to the circulars. In the subsequent year, the assessee opted for the 2002 scheme for premature payment of net present value and paid an amount of Rs. 4,25,79,684/-. In the A. Y. 2004-05, the Assessing Officer added the difference amount of Rs. 9,52,61,916/- as deemed income u/s. 41(1) of the Act. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held that the amount was not taxable u/s. 41(1) of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) As per the scheme the assessee was allowed to retain the sales tax as determined by the competent authority and pay the tax 15 years thereafter. The tax collected was deemed to have been paid and, therefore, the tax so collected could not be construed as income in the hands of the assessee.

ii) The tax so retained by the assessee was in the nature of a loan given by the Government as an incentive for setting up the industrial unit in a rural area. The loan had to be repaid after 15 years. Again, it is an incentive.

iii) However, by a subsequent scheme, a provision was made for premature payment. When the assessee had the benefit of making the payment after 15 years, if he is making a premature payment, the amount equal to the net present value of the deferred tax was determined at Rs. 4,25,79,684/- and on such payment the entire liability to pay tax/loan stood discharged. Again, it is not a benefit conferred on the assessee. Therefore, section 41(1) of the Act was not attracted.”

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Capital gain-Ss. 45 and 48- A. Y. 2007-08- Gains on sale of TDR received as additional FSI as per the D. C. Regulations has no cost of acquisition and is not chargeable to capital gains tax

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CIT vs. Sambhaji Nagar Coop. Hsg. Society Ltd (Bom); ITA No. 1356 of 2012 dated 11/12/2014: www.itatonline.org:

In this case, the Tribunal held that the gains on sale of TDR received as additional FSI as per D. C. Regulations has no cost of acquisition and accordingly is not chargeable to capital gains tax.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

i) Only an asset which is capable of acquisition at a cost would be included within the provisions pertaining to the head “Capital gains” as opposed to assets in the acquisition of which no cost at all can be conceived. In the present case as well, the situation was that the FSI/ TDR was generated by the plot itself. There was no cost of acquisition, which has been determined and on the basis of which the Assessing Officer could have proceeded to levy and assess the gains derived as capital gains.

ii) It may be that subsection (2) of s. 55 clause (a) having been amended, there is a stipulation with regard to the tenancy rights. In the present case, additional FSI/TDR is generated by change in the D. C. Rules. A specific insertion would therefore be necessary so as to ascertain its cost for computing the capital gains.

iii) Therefore, the Tribunal was in no error in concluding that the TDR which was generated by the plot/property/ land and came to be transferred under a document in favour of the purchaser would not result in the gains being assessed to capital gains.”

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Capital gain- Section 50C- A. Y 2009-10- Full value of consideration- Guideline value-Objection- Computation of capital gain by AO on basis of guideline value without referring to DVO u/s. 50C(2)- AO directed to work out capital gain invoking section 50C(2)

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S. Muthuraja vs. CIT; 369 ITR 423 (Mad)

In the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee had sold a immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 25,60,000/- as distress sale. For computing the capital gain the Assessing Officer applied section 50C and treated the guideline value of Rs. 39,63,900/- as the full value of consideration. In the objection letter, the assessee specifically pointed out that the sale was more in the nature of a distress sale and requested to take the actual sale consideration for working out capital gain. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim u/s. 50C of the Act. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer holding that there was nothing on record to show that the assessee had disputed the sale consideration of Rs. 39,63,900/- adopted for the purpose of stamp duty taken as basis under the Act and that the Assessing Officer had not rightly invoked section 50C.

On appeal by the assessee the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Assessing Officer’s order showed that having found such an objection, he committed a serious error in not invoking section 50C(2), that the error continued through out before every appellate forum and that there was no justification in the order of the Tribunal for taking the view that there was nothing on record to show that the assessee had disputed the sale consideration of Rs. 39,63,900/- adopted for the purpose of stamp duty for the purpose of working out capital gains.

ii) Hence the matter was restored to the files of the Assessing Officer to work out long-term capital gains by invoking section 50C(2).”

Note: Also see Appadurai Vijayaraghavan vs. JCIT; 369 ITR 486 (Mad)

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Business income or house property income- Ss. 22 and 28- A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2009-10- Rent from letting out buildings with amenities in software technology park is assessable as business income

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CIT vs. Information Technology Park Ltd.; 369 ITR 460 (Karn):

For the A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2009-10, the assessee had claimed that the rent received from letting out buildings along with other amenities in a software technology park as income from business. The Assessing Officer assessed it as income from house property. The Tribunal held that it constituted business income and accepted the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The assessee was engaged in the business of developing, operation and maintaining an industrial park and providing infrastructure facilities to different companies as its business. In view of that the lease rent was assessable as business income.”

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Business expenditure- Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia)- Despite stay by High Court, Special Bench verdict In Merilyn Shipping is binding on the ITAT due to judicial discipline

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CIT vs. Janapriya Engineers Syndicate (T & AP); ITA No. 352 of 2014 dated 24/06/2014; www.itatonline.org:

The
Tribunal had to consider whether in view of the Special Bench verdict
in Merilyn Shipping & Transport 146 TTJ 1 (Vizag), a disallowance
u/s 40(a)(ia) could be made in respect of the amounts that have already
been paid during the year and are not “payable” as of 31st March. The
Tribunal held that as the department’s appeal against the said verdict
was pending in the High Court and as the High Court had granted an
interim suspension, the AO should decide the issue after the disposal of
the appeal in the case of Merilyn Shipping by the High Court.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court held as under:

“We
are of the view that until and unless the decision of the Special Bench
is upset by this Court, it binds smaller Bench and coordinate Bench of
the Tribunal. Under the circumstances, it is not open to the Tribunal to
remand on the ground of pendency on the same issue before this Court,
overlooking and overruling, by necessary implication, the decision of
the Special Bench. We simply say that it is not permissible under quasi
judicial discipline. Under the circumstances, we set aside the impugned
judgment and order, and restore the matter to the file of the Tribunal
which will decide the issue in accordance with law and it would be open
to the Tribunal either to follow the Special Bench decision or not to
follow. If the Special Bench decision is not followed, obviously remedy
lies elsewhere.”

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Advance tax- Short payment- Interest u/s. 234CComputation of interest- A. Y. 2009-10- Interest u/s. 234C was to be calculated based on date of presentation of cheque for payment of tax and not on date of clearing of cheque

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CIT vs. REPCO Home Finance Ltd.;[2015] 53 taxmann. com 47 (Mad):

For the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer charged interest u/s. 234C for late payment of advance tax on the basis of date of clearing of the cheque. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that the interest has to be charged on the basis of the date of presentation of the cheque and not date of clearing.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The core issue to be considered in this case is whether interest u/s. 234C is to be calculated based on date of clearing of the cheque or date of presentation of the cheque.

ii) The issue raised in this appeal is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. [1954] 25 ITR 529, where it is held that the position is that in one view of the matter an implied agreement under which the cheques were accepted unconditionally as payment and on another view, even if the cheques were taken conditionally, the cheques not having been dishonoured but having been cashed, the payment related back to the dates of the receipt of the cheques and in law that dates of payments were the dates of the delivery of the cheques.

iii) It is not the case of the department that the cheque issued by the assessee was dishonoured. Once the cheque issued by the assessee is encahsed, in the light of the decisions referred (supra), the payment relates back to the date of receipt of the cheque.”

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Trust – Private Discretionary Trust – A discretionary trust is one which gives a beneficiary no right to any part of the income of the trust property, but vests in the trustees a discretionary power to pay him, or apply for his benefit, such part of the income as they think fit. The trustees must exercise their discretion as and when the income becomes available, but if they fail to distribute in due time, the power is not extinguished so that they can distribute later. They have no power to bi<

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CIT vs. Estate of Late HMM Vikramsinhji of Gondal (Civil) Appeal No.2312 of 2007 dated 16-4-2014.

The ex-Ruler of Gondal Shri Vikramsinhji executed three deeds of settlements (trust deeds) in the United States of America on 19th December, 1963 and two deeds in the United Kingdom on 1st January, 1964.

Perusal of the deeds of settlements executed in the U.K. showed that one Mr. Robert Hampton Robertson McGill was designated as the trustee, referred to in the deeds as ‘the Original Trustee’. These trusts were created for the benefit of (a) the Settlor, (b) the children and remoter issue for the time being in existence of the Settlor and (c) any person for the time being in existence who is the wife or widow of the Settlor or the wife or widow or husband or widower of any of them, the children and remoter issue of the Settlor. The trust deeds defined the expression “the Trustees” to mean and include the Original Trustee or the other trustees for the time being appointed in terms of the deeds of settlement.

During his life time, the settlor, Shri Vikramsinhji, was including the whole of the income arising from these trusts in his returns of income. The said income was also included in the two returns filed by his son Jyotendrasinhiji for the assessment year 1970-71. Thereafter, it appears that the assessee – Jyotendrasinhiji took the stand that the income from these trusts is not includible in his income. Jyotendrasinhiji also took the stand that inclusion of the said income in the returns submitted by his father for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1969-70 and by himself for the assessment year 1970-71 was under a mistake.

Jyotendrasinhiji approached the Settlement Commission with an application for settlement relating to income from the U.K. and U.S. trusts. As regards to the U.K. trusts, the Settlement Commission observed as follows:-

“So far as the U.K. trusts are concerned, clause (3) did never come into operation inasmuch as no additional trustees were appointed as contemplated by it. If so, clause (4) sprang into operation whereunder the entire income under the settlements flowed to the settlor during his lifetime and on his death, to his elder son, the appellant herein. In other words, these settlements are in the nature of specific trusts. In any event, the entire income from these trusts was received by the settlor during his lifetime and after the settlor’s death, by the appellant. Therefore, the said income was rightly included in the total income of the settler and the assessee during the respective assessment years.”

The Settlement Commission, accordingly, computed the taxable income of the Settlor under both the sets of trusts – U.S. and U.K. – for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1970-71 (up to the date of the death of the Settlor) as also the income of Jyotendrasinhiji for the assessment years 1970-71 to 1982-83.

The above order of the Settlement Commission reached the Supreme Court in a group of appeals. The Supreme Court, by its judgment dated 2nd April, 1993, Jyotendrasinhji vs. S.I. Tripathi & Others, (1933) Supp. (3) SCC 389, with regard to U.K. trusts did not consider the arguments advanced on behalf of the assessee on merits. The Supreme Court, however, observed that the question urged on behalf of the assessee was academic in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Before the Supreme Court, a group of 17 Appeals came up for hearing, 8 arising from the Income-tax Act, 1961 and 9 arising from the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. Of the 9 Wealth Tax appeals, one appeal related to ‘protective assessment’ for 18 assessment years, i.e, 1970-71 to 1976-77, 1978-79 to1979-80, 1981-82 to 1989-90. The remaining 8 Wealth Tax appeals related to assessment years 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74, 1974-75, 1975-76, 1976-77 and 1978-79. In so far as 8 appeals arising from the assessment orders passed under the Income-tax Act, 1961 were concerned, they related to assessment years 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-90, 1990-91and 1991-92.

From the copies of the returns and balance sheets relating to assessment years 1984-85 to 1991-92, the Supreme Court noted there from that there was an endorsement at the bottom of the statement of funds ending on 31st March of each previous year, ‘Net Income for the year retained.’

The Supreme Court observed that Clause 3 of the deeds of settlement executed in the U.K. left at the discretion of the trustees to disburse benefits to the beneficiaries. The endorsement made in the returns, as noted above, showed that income was retained by the trustees and not disbursed.

The Supreme Court noted that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, while considering Clause 3(2) and Clause 4 of the U.K. Trust Deeds referred to the findings of the Settlement Commission and observed that if the trusts were really intended to be discretionary, the trustees had a duty cast on them to ascertain the relative needs and personal circumstances of all the beneficiaries and to allocate the income of the trusts, among them from time to time, according to the objects of the trusts, however, the tell tale facts bring out the intention of the settlor to treat the trust property as his own. The settlor and after his death his son have been showing the income of foreign trusts in the returns of income filed from time to time. Had the trust deeds been really understood by the trustees and the beneficiaries as discretionary by virtue of the operation of Clause 3, one would have expected the state of affairs to have been different. Consequently, the Tribunal held that due to failure on the part of the Maharaja to appoint discretion exercisers as per clause 3(2), Clause 4 has become operative and the U.K. trusts have to be held to be specific trusts.

The Supreme Court further noted that the High court, however, did not agree with the Tribunal’s view on consideration of the relevant clauses of the U.K. Trust Deeds and various judgments of the Supreme Court as well as some High Courts and held that there were distinguishing features for assessment years under appeal and the previous order of the Settlement Commission and the earlier judgment of this Court. The High Court noted the following distinguishing features, viz., (i) the assessee has not admitted having received the income, (ii) the assessee has not received the said income and (iii) the assessee has not shown as taxable income in the returns of all the years under appeal. Having observed the above distinguishing features, the High Court was also of the view that on interpretation of the relevant clauses of the deeds of settlement executed in the U.K., character of the trusts appears to be discretionary and not specific.

The Supreme Court held that a discretionary trust is one which gives a beneficiary no right to any part of the income of the trust property, but vests in the trustees a discretionary power to pay him, or apply for his benefit, such part of the income as they think fit. The trustees must exercise their discretion as and when the income becomes available, but if they fail to distribute in due time, the power is not extinguished so that they can distribute later. They have no power to bind themselves for the future. The beneficiary thus has no more than a hope that the discretion will be exercised in his favour.

The Supreme Court having regard to the above legal position about the discretionary trust and the fact that the income has been retained and not disbursed to the beneficiaries, held that the view taken by the High Court could not be said to be legally flawed. Merely because the Settlor and after his death, his son did not exercise their power to appoint the discretion exercisers, the character of the subject trusts did not get altered.

In the opinion of Supreme Court the two U.K. trusts continued to be ‘discretionary trust’ for the subject assessment years.

The Supreme Court further held that the above position with regard to the discretionary trust was equally applicable to the controversy in appeals under the Wealth Tax Act. The High Court had taken a correct view that the value of the assets could not be assessed on the estate of the deceased Settlor.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals with no order as to costs.

48TH RESIDENTIAL REFRESHER COURSE (RRC ) OF BOMBAY CHARTERED ACCOUN TANTS SOCIETY (BCAS)

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Venue: Hotel Ananta Spa and Resort, Udaipur Dates: 8th January, 2015 to 11th January, 2015

The Residential Refresher Course is one of the flagship events of the BCAS. This year, the 48th RRC was held at Udaipur aptly called the city of lakes. More than 200 delegates from all over India converted Hotel Ananta for 4 days into a knowledge club. The Resort, nestled between the majestic Aravalli Mountains, dotted with flowering trees visited by birds of bright hues, crisp cool weather and mouth-watering cuisine, was a perfect backdrop for learning and networking.

DAY 1

Group Discussion of Mr. Sunil B. Gabhawalla’s paper titled “Issues in CENVAT Credit and Reverse Charge Mechanism under Service Tax”. The group leaders were Mr. Ganesh Prabhu Balkrishnan, Ms. Manju L. Navandar, Mr. Saurabh P. Shah, Mr. Rajesh R. Shah and Mr. Manmohan Sharma. Case Studies in Directors remuneration, Reimbursement of expenses to consultants, Sponsorships and Live Telecasts, Housekeeping services, Security services and the like, were heatedly discussed and consensus was sought to be reached for the answers in the groups.

This was followed by the Inauguration of the RRC by lighting of the lamp at the hands of chief guest, Dr. Adish C. Aggarwala. He also gave the key note address. Dr. Adish C. Aggarwala is also a Government Counsel in the Supreme Court and Delhi High Court. He was joined on the dais by the Chairman of the Seminar Committee Mr. Rajesh S. Shah, President Mr. Nitin P. Shingala, Vice President Mr. Raman H. Jokhakar along with the two Convenors, Mr. Bharat K. Oza and Mr. Salil B. Lodha.

The first technical session was by Mr. Khusroo Panthaky. He made a brilliant presentation on the topic “Companies Act, 2013- Provisions related to Accounts, Audit & Auditors – Issues and Implementation Challenges”. His presentation was peppered with humour and factual cases. He expressed concern of falling standards of audit and justified the statutory limit of signing 20 audits per signatory, which he advised must be adhered to not only in letter but also in spirit. This session was chaired by Mr. Nitin Shingala, President of the Society

DAY 2

Group Discussion of Mr. Pradip Kapasi’s paper on “Taxation of Some Entity Related Issues (Private Trust, HUF, AOP, Firm, Succession, Company). The group leaders had a tough time touching on all the issues in the paper and moreover, as often the group was divided on their opinions. The group leaders were Mr. Chintan J. Shah, Ms. Meghna Sarang, Mr. Pankaj Agarwal, Mr. Phalgune K. Enukondla, Mr. Sidhartha B.Karani and Mr. Vinod Kumar Jain.

Mr. Sunil Gabhawalla, in the second technical session, gave answers to the posers in his paper on reverse charge mechanism and cenvat credit. He replied to all the queries put to him by the group leaders who had compiled them after the group discussions. This session was chaired by Mr. Udaya V. Satahye, Past President of the Society

Mr. Pradip Kapasi in the third technical session, replied to the queries raised from the group discussion of his paper. In his inimitable style, he expained the complex provisions of Trusts, HUF, AOP, BOI, Business Trusts etc. This session was chaired by Mr. Ameet Patel, Past President of the Society.

The participants visited Nathdwara for Shreenathji Darshan that evening. The excellent arrangements made by BCAS for special Darshan gladdened the hearts of all those who felt they would always remember this 48th RRC for this wonderful experience.

DAY 3

Group Discussion of Mr. Milin Mehta’s paper on “Concept of deemed income and deemed gains -u/s. 56(2) (vii), (viia) and (viib), s. 69, s. 43CA & s. 50C”. The topic was very relevant and generated vibrant discussions in the groups. The Group Leaders were Mr. Bhavin R. Shah, Mr. Bipin K. Karani, Mr. Chetan Dhabalia, Mr. Neelesh Vithalani and Mr. Nimesh K. Chotani.

During the fourth Technical Session, Mr. Bhagirat Merchant presented his paper on ‘Strategic intent on Mergers and Acquisitions’. Being a Past President of the Bombay Stock Exchange, the highlight of his presentation was the

candid analysis of the recent M & A activities. His depth of hands-on knowledge and long standing experience with the Indian capital market made the presentation very interesting and thought provoking. His view that to ensure success in M & A activity, one has to look beyond accounting, legal and financial issues and consider corporate culture was an eye opener to all the participants. This session was chaired by Mr. K. C. Narang, Past President of the Society.

Thereafter, in the fifth technical session, Mr. Milin Mehta replied to all the queries raised by the participants during the group discussions. The paper writer’s exposure and his in-depth analysis made his talk very useful and interesting to the participants. He referred to various court decisions and explained the grey areas to the satisfaction of all. This session was chaired by Mr. Anil J. Sathe, Past President of the Society.

Later, the participants went for a city tour of Udaipur, visiting several places of interest of this heritage city.

In the evening, an entertainment program was organised for the participants. Rajasthani folk artists charmed all the delegates with their great music and breathtaking performances and the delegates were treated to a mouth watering traditional Rajasthani cuisine for dinner.

DAY 4

The final day had the Brain Trust Meeting with two stalwarts, Senior Advocate Mr. Saurabh Soparkar and Mr. Rajan Vora on Critical Income Tax issues including of Domestic and International Taxation. Mr. Ashok K. Dhere, Past President of the Society, chaired this technical session. Both the trustees very ably dealt with all the questions raised. They started by explaining the case study, questions arising, probable answers and court cases that could be relied upon.

They also explained controversies surrounding some issues, conflicting judgments and giving their interpretation of the same. Trustees gave a holistic view of various provisions and willingly shared their knowledge and expertise with the participants.

In the concluding session, the Chairman of the Seminar Committee Mr. Rajesh S. Shah thanked the delegates for their co-operation and active participation. He thanked the paper writers, brain trustees and BCAS staff. He specially thanked the President for his wholehearted support. He also thanked all the Group Leaders whose efforts were one of the key drivers for success of the conference. The Chairman thanked all the agencies especially the Resort management and the staff, for their help and support for the success of this RRC. A few first time participants and out-station participants expressed their thoughts, experience and suggestions about RRC. The President of the Society, Mr. Nitin Shingala thanked everybody for making this RRC memorable. He also thanked Chairman of the Seminar Committee Mr. Rajesh S. Shah and his team for carrying out this herculean task successfully.

Participants departed after lunch to their respective destinations by cherishing the memories of the 48th RRC and with a promise to meet again next year at the 49th RRC.

For more photoghraphs of the 48th RRC, Udaipur, please visit bcasglobal facebook page.

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A Clarion Call for Cohesive Growth, Amity – PM Narendra Modi outlines coherent vision, ambition at ET Global Business Summit

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Narendra Modi has always been good at making speeches to which his audience swoons, but his performance at the Airtel Economic Times Global Business Summit last Friday was a class apart. Eloquence was not the main thing. He dreamed big, envisioning an Indian economy 10 times as large as today’s. He presented a cogent economic philosophy, radiated the confidence that he would be able to execute the strategy flowing from this vision and called upon everyone, particularly businessmen and entrepreneurs, to join a mass movement of development that would embrace everyone and enrich everyone, while the government provides succour to empower the poor and the vulnerable. Most notably, he called for social peace and cohesion, calling them prerequisites of growth, almost as if responding to his critics on this score.

Vaulting Reasonableness on Growth
Modi’s invocation of a $20-trillion Indian economy might sound like ambition gone berserk: the figure is 25 per cent bigger than the world’s biggest economy today, while the Indian economy is less than $2 trillion. But consider: a real growth of 9 per cent, which India had reached comfortably before the crisis, along with inflation of 5 per cent, means a 14 per cent rate of nominal growth. At that pace, the economy would double in five years, quadruple in 10, be eight times as large in 15, and be more than 10 times as large in less than 18 years. At high income levels, economies tend to slow down, but India’s demographic dividend would sustain for two decades more and productivity gains would more than offset inflation differentials with the US. A $20-trillion economy is, thus, quite a reasonable target. But no leader has till now shown the gumption to articulate such vaulting reasonableness, to fire the ambition of the country’s youth.

Modi elaborated, for the first time, what precisely he means by minimum government, maximum governance. The government has no business to be in business, he said, but should do five things: provide public goods, manage externalities — whether negative ones like pollution or positive ones such as the productivity gains from mass education and skilling — control market power of companies, fill information gaps and provide welfare to those on the margins. Technology would enable the government to be competent, non-corrupt and efficient. Digital India would also advance education, healthcare and financial inclusion.

Growth for Jobs, Welfare

The objective of reform is welfare. Some reform would be driven from the top, others from below, through popular adoption of innovation. Both are important. The state can incentivise an additional 20,000 MW of generation capacity, but an equal impact can be made by people willingly saving power. Cleaning the Ganga, Swachh Bharat and a vibrant tourism industry are campaigns that feed into one another, and can succeed only with mass participation that lives out the principle that Small is Beautiful. The state has to abandon its mindset of command and control and empower the people.

Talk is cheap, and walking the talk is the tough part. It is indeed welcome that PM Modi has committed himself to nurturing education and healthcare, uplift of the downtrodden and social cohesion. This would address concerns that his big business orientation would hurt social development and welfare. Most vitally, identifying social peace as a precondition for prosperity offers a foil to the spirit of schism embodied in the words and deeds of the larger Sangh Parivar on whose shoulders Modi rode to Raisina Hill. They have to heed the PM’s call for social cohesion, if India is to attain its potential as an economy and civilisation. The point is to uphold, not vitiate, India’s tradition of unity in diversity.

(Source: The Economic Times, dated 19-01-2015)

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Indian literary classics made accessible

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At a time when there is raucous debate on India’s real and imagined past, a library of rare ancient Indian classics – one going as far back as 3 BCE – has been launched. A philanthropic initiative of Rohan Murty, the literary project is spearheaded by noted Sanskrit scholar Sheldon Pollock and published by the Harvard University Press.

The first set of books ranging from Bulle Shah’s works in Gurmukhi and the Akbarnama in Persian to Surdas’ poetry and Manucharitramu in Telugu was released by eminent economist Amartya Sen. Over the next seven years, the series, named the Murty Classical Library of India, will publish 48 volumes of these classic works, translated from around 14 Indian languages, including Sanskrit and near extinct vernacular forms.

“India has the single most complex and continuous tradition of multi-lingual literature in the world and a lot of it is inaccessible. MCLI will make this literature available in the best possible way for the general reader as well as students and scholars,” said Pollock. These books have the original script as well as an English translation on the facing page.

The library was meant to reiterate the fact that Indians have been storytellers to the world for centuries, and to redefine the idea of a “classic”.

Murty said he represented the general Indian reader who was curious about ancient India but had access to very few literary sources. “What was life like in ancient India? How did people live, die? What was its astronomy, maths, science like? There is so little discussion on any of these in our schools and colleges,” he said. “This literature will hopefully offer an exposure.”

The next set of translations will include Kamba Ramayanam, Ramcharitmanas, Ghalib’s poetry and 6 AD Sanskrit scholar’s work Kiratarjuniya and Bharatchandra’s Annada Mangal. The big plan is to have 500 books on the MCLI shelves.

Among the most riveting is Therigatha, Poems of the First Buddhist Women which is in Pali and composed by theris, the elder Buddhist nuns. They speak in touchingly honest verse of their spiritual struggles.

Murty promises a digital version of the library sometime soon, low cost or even free to access. “As a tech dreamer, I envision an MCLI with a button you can press and read Bulle Shah in Gurmukhi, Devnagari…a day will come when the communal politics of script will be resolved with the click of a button,” said Pollock.

(Source: Times of India – dated 16-01-2015)

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To Make in India, give a break to our tech & talent

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Prime Minister Modi boldly called for ‘Make in India’. The question is: How to Make in India? What will be the roadmap for Make in India? And, how do we go beyond Make in India — to research, design, develop, produce and thus truly ‘Create in India’?

In our opinion, the answer rests on five pillars.
Human Resource: India’s key advantage is its 500 million youth. By 2016, every fourth skilled worker added globally will be an Indian. But it is imperative to ensure employability of this human resource. As many as 82% of our fresh engineers are deemed to be “unemployable”. Unless the quality issue is addressed, Make in India will yield only low-cost, low-return employment for India. Research needs to be promoted to create new skill sets. This would require significantly higher spending on research from the current $36 billion (in terms of purchasing-power parity), less than 1% of GDP. In 2012, China spent $296 billion on R&D (2%) and the US $405 billion (2.7%).

Capital & Incubation: India incubates around 500 startups a year, China over 8,000. With little investor support and the banking system ill-equipped to assess these businesses, startups are like stepchildren in India. This runs against the global trend of funding innovative startups that rely on a few core competencies to invent products, a phenomenon called innovation capitalism.

We have to be ready to let go of old shackles before we realise new dreams. The Make in India campaign needs to plant and nurture homegrown enterprises than merely become an exclusive fishing zone for large MNCs. People should be encouraged to fund the campaign. Indian households hold gold worth $1,160 billion, more than half our GDP. Gold bonds linked to Make in India enterprises could be an option to explore.

Tech Infusion: Technology provides developing economies the ability to leapfrog certain stages of development. Our mobile phone revolution, for instance, leapfrogged the landline stage, growing from a million mobile connections in 1999 to over 700 million by 2013.

We need to build collaborations across nations based on technological abilities. A shining example is the BrahMos (Brahmaputra-Moscow) Cruise Missile co-developed by India and Russia. While India brought its knowledge in developing the targeting mechanism, Russia contributed with the propulsion system. It gave both nations the capability to develop and produce perhaps the best cruise missile system in the world, with a business volume of about $7 billion.

Today, India has world-class ability in IT, communication, pharmaceuticals and space — let us find collaborations for them. What do we need to leapfrog here? The stage of environmental degradation associated with manufacturing. Make in India, Make it Green.

Building the Ecosystem: Large telecom penetration is not good enough. Manufacturing requires infrastructure: it needs roads on which large trucks can run, it needs ports, and it needs a system that operates all this without hassles — and without corruption. As a democracy India is most conducive to breeding new innovations, but is hindered by the lack of proper intellectual property rights. Indians’ contribution to patents filed globally is less than 1%; Chinese account for 32%.

Domestic Consumer Leverage: Our vast consumer base has to be used as an incentive, to create collaborations with foreign companies. The untapped market is in the villages, with 70% of India’s population. Can it be the opportunity to propel Make in India?

Many people question, how can India — with its dreaded red tape and corruption — truly be a manufacturing powerhouse. The answer is perhaps still evolving. However, necessity is the mother of invention. Remember the beryllium diaphragm.

(Source: Extract from an article in the Times of India dated 18-01-2015 by Shri A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, former President of India & Srijan Pal Singh who heads 3-Billion Initiative, an NGO for sustainable development)

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