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Speculative business: Section 43(5) proviso (d): A. Y. 2006-07: Proviso (d) to section 43(5) inserted w.e.f. 01-04-2006: Transactions in derivatives on recognised stock exchange not deemed speculative: Rule prescribing conditions for notification framed on 01-07-2005: Notification in January 2006: Notification has retrospective effect: Loss in derivative transactions during July 2005 and September 2005 is not deemed speculative:

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CIT vs. NASA Finelease P. Ltd.; 358 ITR 305:

The assessee was engaged in the business of dealing in securities and investments. The assessee had claimed a loss of Rs. 1,90,29,988 in derivative transactions during the period July, 2005 and September, 2005 and claimed that it is not deemed speculative in view of exclusion in proviso to clause (d) to section 43(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Notification dated 25th January, 2006 notifying the National Stock Exchange and Bombay Stock Exchange for that purpose. The Assessing Officer held that the loss was speculative loss u/s. 73, and since the derivative transactions were during the period July, 2005 to September, 2005, they were violative of proviso (d) to section 43(5) and the benefit of Notification dated 25th January, 2006 is not applicable for those transactions. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit u/s. 43(5) proviso (d) read with the said Notification dated 25th January, 2006.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Notification No. 2 of 2006, dated 25-01-2006, issued by CBDT does not specify any particular date and simply notifies the National Stock Exchange and Bombay Stock Exchange under proviso (d) to section 43(5) of the Act. Issue of notification obviously had to take some time as it involved processing and examination of applications etc. This was a matter relating to procedure and the delay in issue of notification or even framing of the Rules was due to administrative constraints.

ii) The delay occasioned, as procedure and formalities have to be complied with, should not disentitle or deprive an assessee, specially, when the transactions were carried through a notified stock exchange. The notification was procedural and necessary adjunct to the section enforced w.e.f. 01-04-2006.

iii) The rule and notification issued in the present case effectuate the statutory and the legislative mandate. There was no reason to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal.”

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Penalty: Concealment: Section 271(1)(c): A. Y. 2002-03: Assessee, a limited company, made a claim for deduction of loss in the course of assessment proceedings: AO rejected the claim and imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(c): Penalty not justified: Liberal view is required to be taken as necessarily the claim is bound to be scrutinised both on facts and law:

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CIT vs. DCM Ltd.; 262 CTR 295 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2002-03, in the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 143(3), the assessee company made a claim that the loss of Rs. 95.55 lakh on account of loan granted to its subsidiary DCM International Ltd., which was written off, was deductible as business expenditure or in alternative as capital loss. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim and also imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) for concealment of income. The Tribunal deleted the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It is not disputed or denied that the loan in fact was granted and has been also written off. There was no concealment or furnishing of inaccurate facts. Case is completely covered by Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c). It is not disputed that full factual matrix or the facts were before the Assessing Officer at the time of assessment when this claim was made. The fact that scrutiny assessment was pending is a relevant and important circumstance to show the bona fides of the assessee as he was aware that the claim would be examined and would not go unnoticed.

ii) Secondly, the claim was rejected in view of the legal position, which was against the assessee and not because of statement of incorrect or wrong facts. Law does not bar or prohibit an assessee for making a claim, which he believes may be accepted or is plausible. When such a claim is made during the course of regular or scrutiny assessment, liberal view is required to be taken as necessarily the claim is bound to be carefully scrutinised both on facts and in law. Full probe is natural and normal.

iii) Threat of penalty cannot become a gag and/ or haunt on assessee for making a claim which may be erroneous or wrong, when it is made during the course of the assessment proceedings. Normally penalty proceedings in such cases should not be initiated unless there are valid or good grounds to show that factual concealment has been made or inaccurate particulars on facts were provided in the computation.

iv) There is no merit in the present appeal and the same has to be dismissed.”

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Industrial undertaking: Deduction u/s. 80-I: A. Ys. 1993-94 and 1994-95: Profit must be derived from industrial undertaking: Ownership of industrial undertaking is not a condition precedent:

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Krishak Bharti Co-operative Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT: 358 ITR 168 (Del):

The assessee had an ammonia/urea plant at H. Just next to it and within its premises, the Hazira ammonia extension plant, which manufactured heavy water, had been set up and established by the Heavy Water Board, which was part of the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India. There was an agreement between the assessee and the Government of India whereby the assessee operated and maintained the heavy water plant. The heavy water plant belonging to the Heavy Water Board and the ammonia/urea plant of the assessee were both integrated with each other. The process of manufacture of the heavy water plant was dependent on the supply of synthesis gas enriched with deuterium which was a by-product of the assessee’s ammonia/ urea plant. The assessee received service charges from the Heavy Water Board and claimed deduction u/s. 80-I in respect of it. The claim was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Assessing Officer on the ground that the industrial undertaking manufacturing heavy water was not a part of the ammonia/urea plant of the assessee. It held that the service charges received by the assessee from the Heavy Water Board could not be treated as having been derived from an industrial undertaking of the assessee.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) A provision in a taxing statute granting incentives for promoting growth and development should be construed liberally.

ii) A plain reading of section 80-I(1) and (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, would indicate that the ownership by the assessee of an industrial undertaking from which assessee derives profits and gains is not a stipulated condition. The only thing that has to be seen is whether the source of the profit or gains is an industrial undertaking.

iii) The service charges received by the assessee were profits and gains derived from an industrial undertaking and were eligible for a deduction u/s. 80-I.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Works contract: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) r/w. section 194C: Assessee running coaching classes for competitive exams: Agreement with franchisees: Not a works contract: Tax not deductible at source on payment to franchisees: Amount paid to franchisees not disallowable u/s. 40(a)(ia):

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CIT vs. Career Launcher India Ltd.; 358 ITR 179(Del):

The assessee was a company engaged in providing education and training for various preparatory examinations like IIM, IIT, designing, etc. These services were provided across the country through education centres run by the assessee itself or by its franchisees. For the A.Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07, the Assessing Officer disallowed the amounts paid to the franchisees relying on section 40(a)(ia) on the ground that the assessee had not deducted tax at source which it was obliged to do u/s. 194C of the Act. The Tribunal deleted the disallowance and held that the agreement was not for making any payment to licensee for any work done for the assessee and that it was a case of sharing of fees for carrying out respective obligations under a contract. It held that neither section 194C nor section 40(a) (ia) was applicable.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The agreements with franchisees were not the simple cases of the assessee engaging certain other persons to conduct the learning centres for which they were to be paid. The agreements were much more complex and reflected a business arrangement, as opposed to a contract for carrying out a work. Both the parties, the assessee and the licensee had entered into this agreement only in their mutual interest and for mutual gains. It was a simple case of permitting the use of its trade name or reputation by the licensees for a consideration.

ii) The provisions of section 194C and section 40(a)(ia) were not applicable to the facts of the case.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) r/w. s/s. 9(1)(vii) and 195: A. Y. 2007- 08: Circular in force during relevant year not obliging to deduct tax at source: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) not proper: Subsequent withdrawal of Circular not relevant:

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CIT vs. Model Exims; 358 ITR 72(All):

In the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer disallowed an amount of Rs. 57,49,489 paid to overseas entities as commission relying on section 40(a)(ia) on the ground that tax is not deducted at source u/s. 195 of the Act. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the assessee that the assessee was not obliged to deduct tax at source on the said payments in view of the Circular Nos. 23 of 1969, 163 of 1975 and 786 of 2000 and accordingly the said payments were not taxable in the hands of the recipients. The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance and held that the Circular No. 7 of 2009 withdrawing the above said circulars was operative only from 22nd October, 2009, and not prior to that date and had no bearing in the instant assessment year. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Circulars did not oblige the assessee to deduct tax at source. The assessment in question for the A. Y. 2007-08 would be governed by the Circular, which was operative at the relevant time. The assessee was not entitled to deduct tax at source.

ii) Circular No. 7 of 2009, dated 22-10-2009, withdrawing the earlier Circulars became operative only from that date. The Circulars in the relevant year were binding on the Department and the Assessing Officer did not have any right to ignore the Circulars and to disallow u/s. 40(a) (ia) of the Act, for non-deduction of tax at source u/s. 195.”

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Fees received for assistance/services provided to Indian companies to whom loans, etc. are provided by the financial organisation from UK is business income — In absence of PE, is not chargeable to tax in India.

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JDIT v. M/s. Commonwealth Development Corporation

(2010) TII 102 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

Article 7, 12(5) & 13 of India-UK DTAA

S. 2(28A) of Income-tax Act

Dated : 25-2-2010

11. Fees received for assistance/services provided
to Indian companies to whom loans, etc. are provided by the financial
organisation from UK is business income — In absence of PE, is not chargeable to
tax in India.

Upfront appraisal fee received by the UK financial
organisation constitutes ‘interest’ in terms of S. 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act
— However, such appraisal fee is not ‘interest’ in terms of India-UK DTAA.

Front-end fee recovered from the investee to whom
debt support is provided, is, ‘interest’, under the Income-tax Act as also DTAA.

Capital gain from transfer of shares in Indian
company is chargeable to tax in India.

Facts :

The assessee, a statutory corporation established
in the UK (CDC) was engaged in the business of providing loans to, and making
investment in shares of, Indian companies. The issue pertained to taxation of
the following four receipts :

(i) Director’s fees received from the Indian
companies for assistance/services rendered by CDC to Indian companies.

(ii) Appraisal fees received by CDC for
determining future profitability and worthiness for projects of Indian company
before CDC disbursed loans by way of convertible bonds, shares or debts to the
Indian Investees.

(iii) Front-end fee claimed to have been charged
for recovering cost of post-appraisal, other than cost of legal documents
which was the obligation of the investee.

(iv) CDC had sold certain shares of an Indian
company which were admittedly held as capital asset. It was the claim of CDC
that shares were held outside India and were sold outside India and hence not
taxable in India.

Held :

The ITAT held that :

  • Having regard to
    the earlier decision of the ITAT in appellant’s own case, assistance provided
    to the investee companies was not in the nature of fees for included services.
    In terms of DTAA, such income would not be taxable in India.



  • Upfront appraisal
    fee was ‘interest’ within the scope of S. 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act. In
    view of ITAT :



  • Upfront appraisal fee
    was charged before advancing loan or making investment of any kind.



  • S. 2(28A) covered
    service fee or other charges for debt incurred. Additionally, it also included
    service fee or other charges in respect of any credit facility which has not
    been utilised.



  • The first limb of
    S. 2(28A) which covered service fee/charge for debt incurred was not attracted
    in the present case as the appraisal fee was recovered even before any debt
    was incurred. However, being service fee for credit facility not utilised,
    such fee was ‘interest’.



  • Though such amount
    was ‘interest’ in term of the Income-tax Act, it was not ‘interest’ under DTAA
    as definition of interest under DTAA is restrictive and covered only income
    from debt claim.



  • Taxpayer’s
    contention that front-end fee is not related to debt investment is not
    acceptable. Front-end fee was charged by the taxpayer only if the investment
    was made in the form of debt and not for investment in the form of equity. No
    information was provided about the services for which front-end fee was
    charged. In the circumstances, the income was regarded as having direct nexus
    with the debt claim. Hence, it was ‘interest’ both in terms of the Income-tax
    Act as also DTAA.



  • Capital gain earned
    by CDC on transfer of shares of an Indian company was chargeable to tax in
    India. The ITAT rejected contention of the taxpayer that such income can be
    regarded as income arising from sale of asset outside India.



  • Share of a company
    represents bundle of rights. Though the shares are freely transferable, a
    contract between transferer and transferee regarding sale of shares is not
    complete till it is approved by the company and change of name in the register
    of a shareholder. The share in a company gives right to the shareholders to
    participate in profits as also in liquidation proceeds. Transfer of shares of
    an Indian company results in transfer of right to property/capital assets
    situated in India, irrespective of where the transfer is effected. In lieu
    thereof, charge to capital gain is attracted in terms of S. 9(1)(i) of
    Income-tax Act, which is not relieved by DTAA.

 

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Compensation received by UK buyer pursuant to arbitration award, on account of failure of Indian entity to meet its export obligation — Business income — In absence of PE, not chargeable to tax in India.

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Goldcrest Exports v. ITO

(2010) TII 124 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

Article 5, 7(1) of India-UK DTAA;

S. 9(1) of Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 7-9-2010

10. Compensation received by UK buyer pursuant to
arbitration award, on account of failure of Indian entity to meet its export
obligation — Business income — In absence of PE, not chargeable to tax in India.

Interest on arbitration award has the same
character as the underlying compensation.

The Indian payer has no obligation to deduct tax at
source.

Facts :

The taxpayer (GCE) was engaged in the business of
export/import and trading in various commodities. Through the involvement of an
Indian broker, GCE entered into contract with the UK buyer (UKCO) for supply of
certain commodities. GCE cancelled the contract. Pursuant to arbitration
proceedings initiated by UKCO, the arbitrators awarded compensation to UKCO. The
compensation was based on the difference between market price of the commodities
agreed to be supplied and the contracted price. GCE was also asked to pay
interest from the date of arbitration award till the date of payment.

GCE made provision in respect of the compensation
and the interest payable and claimed that as business expenditure.

The tax authorities denied the deduction primarily
on the ground that no tax was deducted at source in respect of the provision.

Held :

The ITAT held that :

(i) The compensation was in the nature of
business income as it was arising out of the trading contract between GCE and
UKCO. Hence, it was covered under Article 7 of the DTAA.

(ii) In absence of PE of UKCO in India, there was
no tax liability. Consequently, there was no tax withholding obligation on GCE.
Involvement of an independent agent in India does not alter the position.

(iii) Compensation payable pursuant to
arbitration award loses its original character and assumes the character of a
judgment debt. Interest payable also partakes the character of compensation.

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Interest paid directly to shareholders by taxpayer’s PE is allowable as a deduction while computing taxable profits of PE in India.

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Besix Kier Dabhol, SA v. DDIT

ITA No. 4249/Mum./07

Article 7(3)(b), of India-Belgium DTAA

S. 36(1)(iii) of Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2002-03. Datede : 10-11-2010

9. Interest paid directly to shareholders by
taxpayer’s PE is allowable as a deduction while computing taxable profits of PE
in India.

Currently, ITA or DTAA does not contain any
anti-abuse provisions on thin capitalisation. In absence of specific
restriction, deduction of interest on loan paid by taxpayer’s PE to its
shareholders is allowable.

Facts :

The taxpayer, a Belgian company, was constituted as
a joint venture (between Belgium and UK shareholder contributing to equity
capital in 60 : 40 ratio). It was set up for construction of a fuel jetty in
India. The operations were intended to be carried out through the taxpayer’s
project office (PE in terms of Article 5 of DTAA) situated in India. To fund the
project, taxpayer raised debt funds from its two shareholders, in the same ratio
as their equity stake in the JV i.e., 60 : 40. The loan resulted in
significantly high debt-equity ratio of 248 : 1 for the taxpayer.

The taxpayer claimed interest payments on such
borrowed funds as deductible expense in computing profits of PE.

Relying on Article 7(3)(b) of the DTAA, the Tax
Authority, disallowed the interest payments by equating the same to payments
made by a branch to its HO.

Held :

On the following grounds, the ITAT held that
interest paid directly to shareholders would be allowable as a deduction :

(i) The taxable entity is the Belgian company
(i.e., taxpayer) and not the Indian PE, even though tax liability of the
taxpayer is confined to profits attributed to its PE in India.

(ii) The profits attributable to the Indian PE
are required to be computed under normal accounting principles and in terms of
general provisions of the ITA. This accounting approach has been approved by
the Supreme Court in Hyundai Heavy Ind Ltd.2

(iii) Since the only business carried out by the
assessee is the project in India, its entire profits are taxable in India and
all expenses incurred to earn such income are deductible in computing its
taxable income.

(iv) A company and its shareholders have a
separate existence as well as identity and contracts between a company and its
shareholders are just as enforceable as contracts with any independent person.
The limitation contained under Article 7(3)(b) restricts deduction for
interest paid to HO (except for banking companies), unless it is for
reimbursement of actual expenses. In the current case, interest has been paid
to an outside party i.e., shareholders. Hence, the limitation in Article
7(3)(b) cannot apply.

(v) Thin capitalisation rules have been resorted
to by various jurisdictions in order to protect themselves against erosion in
their legitimate tax base by financing a disproportionate ratio of debts.
Belgium also has thin capitalisation rules which restrict interest deduction
if the debt-equity ratio exceeds 1 : 7. In India, the proposed DTC 2010 seeks
to provide for remedial legislative framework to counter erosion of tax base
under General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR) by permitting re-characterisation of
debt into equity. Currently however, India does not have any thin
capitalisation rules and there cannot be adverse implications on that count.

(vi) Merely because a suitable limitation
provision is considered desirable and attempts are being made to legislate
anti-abuse provisions, it would not render the effort to take advantage of
exiting provision of the DTAA illegal.

 

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The Delhi Tribunal in the case of Microsoft Corporation, US & its affiliates (2010 TII 141 ITAT-Del.-Intl.), recently adjudicated on the issue whether the use of or the right to use (including the granting of licence), in respect of computer program, amou

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8. Microsoft Corporation v. ADIT

ITA No 1331 to 1336 of 2008

Article 12(3) of India-US DTAA

S. 9(1)(vi) of Income-tax Act

A.Ys. : 1999-00 to 2004-05. Dated : 26-10-2010

Reliance Industries Ltd.

(2010) TII 154 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

Article 12(3) of India-US DTAA

S. 9(1)(vi) of Income-tax Act

Dated : 29-10-2010

The Delhi Tribunal in the case of Microsoft
Corporation, US & its affiliates (2010 TII 141 ITAT-Del.-Intl.), recently
adjudicated on the issue whether the use of or the right to use (including the
granting of licence), in respect of computer program, amounts to royalty or
business profits (sale of copyrighted articles). In this case, the software
copies were sold/delivered to Indian distributors, who in turn, sold these
products to re-sellers/end users in India. Microsoft Corporation, being the
registered owner of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in Microsoft software,
entered into an end-user licence agreement, directly with end-users. The
Tribunal, having regard to various agreements, observed that a copyrighted
article cannot be treated as a product, and the payments made are for the
licence granted in the copyright and other IPRs in the product, and will amount
to ‘royalty’ under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the India-US tax treaty.

However, in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd, on
the issue of whether consideration paid to a US resident for licensing of
computer software would be in the nature of ‘royalty’, the Mumbai Tribunal held
that the payment was for the purchase of a copyrighted article and not the
copyright itself. Furthermore, the Mumbai Tribunal stated that it is incorrect
to hold that computer software on a media continues to be an intellectual
property right. Therefore, the payment made for the purchase of software cannot
be termed as ‘royalty’.

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Sale of goods to non-AEs cannot be taken as comparable under CUP, if there are significant differences in quantity sold, geography and customer profiles.

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ACIT v. Dufon Laboratories

(2010) TII 26 ITAT-Mum.-TP

S. 92C of Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 26-3-2010

7. Sale of goods to non-AEs cannot be taken as
comparable under CUP, if there are significant differences in quantity sold,
geography and customer profiles.

Facts :

An Indian company (ICO) was engaged in the business
of processing and export of chemicals. ICO sold majority of its products to its
AE in the USA. A small quantity (constituting about 2.5% of overall sale) was
sold to small enterprises in Asia. The independent parties were small-time
buyers who bought in small quantities for resale to other laboratories. However,
AE in USA purchased large quantities and resold to big corporate houses. Resale
by AE was in the competitive markets of USA and Europe.

The average price charged by ICO to AE worked out
to Rs. 440 per kg. as against the average price of Rs. 617 per kg. charged to
non-AE.

Rejecting the taxpayer’s contention that the sale
price to non-AEs was not the right basis for comparable price, the tax officer
made adjustment by adopting the transfer price based on average realisation from
non-AEs.

Incidentally, the assessee had a profit margin of
about 49% even without taking into account the adjustment, whereas the AE in the
USA had incurred losses.

Held :

Considering the following factors, the ITAT held
that the transaction with AEs was on ALP :

  •   The turnover
    quantity to AEs was more than 50 times that of the non-AEs. Such difference in
    magnitude would have major bearing on the price.


  • In Ranbaxy
    Laboratories Ltd. v. ACIT1, ITAT had held that a particular entity in a
    particular country should be compared with a similar entity in the same
    country as geographical situations would, in several ways, influence transfer
    pricing.


  •   Transactions with
    high-profile clients with which AE dealt were different when compared to small
    sales to non-AEs, who were small players in South East Asian business. Also,
    AEs dealt in competitive market.


  •   The adjustment was
    not justified also on the ground that it resulted in transfer price being
    higher compared to the price recovered by AEs from the independent customers.



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On facts, certain services rendered from outside India were not made available and hence, the consideration was not FIS under Article 12. Also, such offshore services could not be linked to PE in India for determining income attributable to the PE.

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  1. DIT v. Scientific Atlanta Inc.,



(2009) 33 SOT 220 (Mum.)

Articles 7, 12, India-USA DTAA

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 3-7-2009

Issue :

On facts, certain services rendered from outside India were
not made available and hence, the consideration was not FIS under Article 12.
Also, such offshore services could not be linked to PE in India for
determining income attributable to the PE.

Facts :

The appellant was a tax resident of USA. It had entered
into a VSAT Agreement with an Indian company to provide Satellite Network
Communication System together with the installation and commissioning services
associated with the initial installation. During the relevant year, the
appellant earned income from various sources. It furnished item-wise detail of
the income and also the reasons for taxability or non-taxability of such
income. The appellant contended that two items of income – Project Management
& Engineering Support and Factory Acceptance Tax (‘PMES&FT’) were not taxable
because they pertained to the provision of administrative and technical
services from outside India which were provided to facilitate timely execution
of the project. Further, although such services were technical they were not
‘fees for included services’ (‘FIS’) under Article 12 of India-USA DTAA as
they did not make available any technical knowledge, experience, etc. Hence,
the income from these services would qualify as ‘business income’ and would be
governed by Article 7. The appellant stated that even though it had PE in
India for rendering installation services, income from PMES&FT was not
attributable to that PE as the services were not performed in India.

The AO did not accept contentions of the appellant. After
discussing the nature of the services in his order, the AO held that these
‘hybrid services’ were performed by the appellant to provide Satellite Network
Communication System. He further observed that when a series of technical
works/services were performed to achieve a desired result, the nature of such
works/services should be analysed in connection with the end results. He held
that, alternatively, PMES&FT consisted of development and transfer of a
technical plan or technical design. The AO concluded that in either case, the
services were in the nature of FIS subject to Article 12 of India-USA DTAA and
taxable @15%.

In appeal, the CIT(A) held that: the appellant did not make
available technology, skill, etc.; the services were inextricably and
essentially linked to the supply of equipment and should therefore take the
same character as the supply of the equipment. He also noted that since PMES&FT
services were not FIS, the income would be ‘business income’ and under Article
7, only income relatable to PE could be taxed in India. Therefore, he held
that as the services were performed outside India, income from those services
was not attributable to the PE.

Held :

To understand scope and meaning of the term ‘make
available’, the Tribunal referred to the decisions in Intertek Testing
Services India P. Ltd., In re
(2008) 307 ITR 418 (AAR) and Mahindra &
Mahindra Ltd. v. DCIT,
(2009) 30 SOT 374 (Mum.) (SB) and observed that the
AO had interpreted ‘make available’ in an erroneous manner. It held that by
rendering PMES&FT services from outside India, the appellant did not ‘make
available’ any technical knowledge, skill etc. and as such Article 12 did not
apply. Hence, the consideration cannot be treated as FIS.

Where a taxpayer has a PE in India, under Article 7(1),
business profits can be taxed in India only to the extent they are
attributable to the PE in India. As the consideration was received for
rendering services outside no part of the services rendered from outside India
could be linked to the PE in India for determining income attributable to the
PE in India.

 

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Unlike sub-clause (ii), sub-clause (i) of S. 245N(a) does not specifically restrict the scope to the tax liability of a non-resident and hence, advance ruling could also be in relation to a transaction by a non-resident even if it does not involve determi

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  1. Umicore Finance, In re




(2009) 318 ITR 78 (AAR)

S. 245N(a), Income-tax Act

Dated : 7-7-2009

Issue :

Unlike sub-clause (ii), sub-clause (i) of S. 245N(a) does
not specifically restrict the scope to the tax liability of a non-resident and
hence, advance ruling could also be in relation to a transaction by a
non-resident even if it does not involve determination of tax liability of
non-resident.

Facts :

The applicant was a Luxembourg company. It had entered into
a transaction for purchase of the entire equity capital of an Indian company.
The Indian company was originally formed as a partnership and later registered
itself as a company under Part IX of the Companies Act, 1956. In terms of S.
47(xiii) of the Act, if more than 50% of the voting power in the company
continues to be held by the erstwhile partners of the partnership for a period
of not less than 5 years, no capital gain is chargeable. However, pursuant to
the transfer of shares, the erstwhile partners would not have held more than
50% of the shares for a period of not less than 5 years and therefore, the
relevant condition would be violated.

The AAR observed that, prima facie, the
determination sought by the applicant was in relation to the tax liability of
an Indian company and hence, it was doubtful whether the non-resident
applicant can seek advance ruling on this question. In response to the notice
issued by the AAR, the applicant stated that due to certain stipulations in
the Share Purchase Agreement, unless capital gains tax payable by the acquired
Indian company is determined, purchase consideration payable by the applicant
cannot be determined. Further, its obligation to provide the audited financial
statements of the acquired Indian company was also dependent on the
determination of capital gains tax liability. The applicant contended that the
ruling sought was within the definition of ‘advance ruling’ in sub-clause (i)
of S. 245N(a) of the Act.

Held :

In contrast to the language in sub-clause (ii), the
language in sub-clause (i) of S. 245N(a) of the Act is wider. Unlike
sub-clause (ii), sub-clause (i) does not have any specific requirement that
determination should relate to the tax liability of a non-resident. Due to the
stipulations in the Share Purchase Agreement, capital gains tax arising in
case of the acquired Indian company has a direct and substantial impact on the
applicant, the question raised by the applicant falls within the definition of
‘advance ruling’ in S. 245N(a) of the Act.

 

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In view of Explanation 1 in S. 90, higher rate of tax applicable to foreign company cannot be said to be discriminatory.

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New Page 2



  1. JCIT v.
    State Bank of Mauritius Ltd.



(2009 TIOL ITAT Mum.)

S. 37, Income-tax Act;

Articles 7, 24, India-Mauritius DTAA

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 16-10-2009

Issues :


(i) In view of Explanation 1 in S. 90, higher rate of
tax applicable to foreign company cannot be said to be discriminatory.


(ii) In view of absence of ‘subject to limitation under
domestic law’ provision in Article 7(3) of India-Mauritius DTAA, restrictions
under Income tax Act on allowance of travel, entertainment, etc. expenses do
not apply.

Facts :

The appellant was a Mauritius company. It had a PE in
India.

In accordance with the provisions of the Finance Act,
stipulating 55% as the rate of tax applicable to a foreign company, the AO
sought to tax the income of the appellant @ 55%. The appellant contended that
in terms of Article 24, which provides for non-discrimination, its status was
equivalent to domestic company as defined in S. 2(22A) of the Act and hence,
the rate of tax should be 40%, as applicable to a domestic company. However,
relying on the ruling of AAR in Societe Generale (1999) 236 ITR 103 (AAR), the
AO applied tax rate of 55%.

The PE had incurred certain travelling and entertainment
expenditure. While assessing the income, the AO restricted the allowance of
expenditure by applying limitation provisions of S. 37(2) of the Act. The
appellant contended that such restriction cannot be enforced as
India-Mauritius DTAA did not incorporate such restriction.

In appeal, the CIT(A) accepted the contention of the
appellant and upheld that :

(a) The rate of tax applicable to the income of the
appellant should be the same as that applicable to a domestic company and

(b) The restriction u/s.37(2) cannot be enforced.


Held :

On appeal by the department, the ITAT held as under :

(i) Applicable rate of tax :

The Finance Act 2001 inserted Explanation 1 in S. 90 with
retrospective effect from 1st April 1962. The said Explanation provides that
in case of a foreign company, the charge of tax at a rate higher than that in
case of a domestic company shall not be regarded as less favourable. In
Chohung Bank v. DDIT,
(2006) 102 ITD 45 (Mum.), the Tribunal has also
taken similar view. Following the said decision and the amended S. 90, the
rate of tax should be the higher rate applicable to a foreign company.

(ii) As regards limitation on allowance of
expenditures :


Unlike the ‘subject to the limitations of the taxation laws
of that Contracting State’ provision normally incorporated in Article 7 of
most DTAAs, Article 7(3) of India-Mauritius DTAA does not incorporate such
restriction. Therefore, restriction provided in S. 37(2) of the Act cannot be
enforced. The ITAT took note of provision of India France treaty to conclude
that restriction of income computation as per provisions of the Act needs to
be specifically agreed upon.


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No expenditure/allowance can be deducted from royalty/FTS income earned by non resident pursuant to agreement entered into prior to 1st April 2003.

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New Page 2



  1. DDIT v. Pipeline Engineering GmbH (2009) 125
    TTJ 534 (Mum.)



S. 44D, S. 44DA, S. 115A, Income-tax Act;

Articles 7, 12, India-Germany DTAA

A.Y. : 2000-01 & 2001-02. Dated : 19-12-2008

Issues :


(i) No expenditure/allowance can be deducted from
royalty/FTS income earned by non resident pursuant to agreement entered into
prior to 1st April 2003.


(ii) S. 44DA does not have retrospective effect.


(iii) Authority to read down a provision vests only in a
High Court or Supreme Court.


(iv) As Article 12(5) [dealing with royalty/FTS
effectively connected with PE] excludes applicability of Article 12(1) and
(2), cap on rate of tax in Article 12(2) cannot apply.

Facts :


The appellant was a German company, and also a tax resident
of Germany. It was engaged in the business of providing engineering
consultancy services for oil and gas pipelines transmission systems. The
appellant had set up a PE in India. It entered into an agreement with an
Indian company for providing consultancy services. The agreement was entered
into before April 1, 2003
1.
Pursuant to the agreement, the appellant had earned royalty/fees for technical
services (‘FTS’) through its PE in India. The appellant had offered entire
income for tax in terms of S. 44D of the Act without claiming deduction of any
expenses. In the subsequent year, the appellant claimed that in terms of
Article 12(2) of India-Germany DTAA, tax should be chargeable @10% instead of
20% and further that the income should be computed after deduction of expenses
incurred by the PE. It also claimed that although the fees were within the
scope of Article 12, by virtue of Article 12(5), they should be treated as
business profits and subjected to Article 7. Thus, the income should be
computed after allowing expenses of the PE.

The AO concluded that the allowance of expenditure of PE
was subject to S. 44D of the Act and hence no deduction could be allowed.
Further, in terms of S. 115A, the income should be taxable @20%. The CIT(A)
upheld the Order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal, the appellant contended that :



  •  As the
    taxpayer had incurred loss in its Indian operations carried through PE, as
    per Article 7(3) of India-Germany DTAA read with S. 44D and S. 115A of the
    Act, its income cannot be taxed @20% of the gross receipts.



  •  If
    Article 7(3) is applied, actual expenses incurred for earning income should
    be allowed and hence question of invoking S. 44D cannot arise.



  •  Once the
    income is to be computed as business profits, provisions of S. 44D relating
    to royalty would not apply.



  •  The
    intention of insertion of S. 44DA was to harmonise the provisions of the Act
    and the DTAA, to bring non-resident on par with resident as regards taxation
    of royalty or FTS. S. 44DA is a clarificatory provision to be applied
    retrospectively.



  •  The
    taxpayer had choice of being assessed as per Article 12, in which case, the
    gross receipts would be taxed @10% without deduction of any expenditure.



Held :


(i) Allowance of expenses and deductions :


S. 44D as amended was applicable for computing royalty or
FTS received by the non-resident in pursuance of an agreement made before 1st
April 2003. The non-obstante clause in S. 44D(b) specifically provides that no
expenditure or allowance shall be allowed while computing income by way of
royalty or FTS. Hence, no deduction would be allowed even if the income is to
be computed under Article 7 of DTAA which requires computation of income to be
done in accordance with provisions of the Act.

(ii) Reading down the provisions of S. 44D :


The theory of reading down the provisions of the statute
can be applied only when such provision is violative of fundamental right.
Only the High Court or the Supreme Court can decide such issue and, if
necessary, apply the theory of reading down.

(iii) S. 44DA being clarificatory and having retrospective effect :


The Finance Act 2003 completely changed the scheme of
taxation of royalty or FTS. Hence, provisions of S. 44DA cannot be regarded as
clarificatory.

(iv) Non-discrimination article and its impact :


Article 24 of India-Germany DTAA is in two parts. The first
part provides that income of non-resident through a PE shall not be less
favourably taxed than that of a resident. The second part of Article 24 carves
out an exception to provide that limitation on deductibility of expenses in
computation of PE profit in accordance with provisions of the Act is not
protected by non discrimination article. As a result, Article 24(2) does not
affect operation of S. 44D of the Act.

(v) Applicable rate of tax :


As the recipient has PE in India and as income is
effectively connected with PE in India, such income is covered by provisions
of Article 12(5). In such situation, royalties or FTS received by non-resident
would be governed by Article 7 and paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 12 are
expressly made non-applicable. The income is therefore to be treated as
business profits to be computed as per domestic law. Once paragraph (5) of
Article 12 excludes applicability of paragraphs (1) & (2), the cap in respect
of rate of tax in paragraph (2) cannot be applied. Hence, in terms of S. 115A,
the applicable rate of tax would be 20%.


Interest on fully convertible bonds till date of conversion, taxable in India as interest.

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New Page 1

Part C — International Tax Decisions



7 LMN India Limited


In re
[No. 769 of 2007] (AAR)

S. 2(28A), S. 90 of IT Act; Article 11 of India-USA DTAA

Dated : 10-10-2008

Issue :

Interest paid to a non-resident investor on fully and
compulsorily convertible bonds till the date of conversion is taxable in India
as interest.

Facts :

The applicant, a non-banking financial company of India, had
issued fully convertible bonds to LMCC of USA.

As per the Bond Subscription Agreement :

(a) The bonds were convertible into equity shares at the
end of five years from the date of issue.

(b) Interest was payable on the bonds on half-yearly basis,
irrespective of whether the applicant made profits or not.

(c) Until conversion, the bonds were to be treated as debt
instruments.

(d) The bonds ranked in priority to equity shares in the
event of winding-up/liquidation of the applicant-company.

(e) Upon conversion, the equity shares issued were to rank
pari passu with the existing equity shares.


The basic issue before the AAR was about tax implications and
consequential withholding tax obligation in respect of interest paid/payable to
the investor up to the date of conversion of bonds into equity shares.

Held :

Payment made to LMCC of USA up to the date of conversion of
bonds into equity shares was held to be interest in terms of definition of
‘interest’ u/s. 2(28A) of the IT Act as well as under the India-USA DTAA.

The AAR noted that under the IT Act, the term ‘interest’ is
defined in a broad manner to include interest payable in any manner in respect
of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred. Under the India-USA DTAA, it is defined
to mean income from debt claims of every kind, including income from bonds or
debentures.

Payment of interest pre-supposes borrowal of money or the
incurring of a debt. Raising of funds by means of fully convertible debenture is
a well-known commercial and business practice. Debenture creates or recognises
existence of a debt which remains to be so till it is repaid or discharged.

The convertibility of debentures does not affect its
characteristic feature of being a debt. The AAR held that conversion was the
mode of discharging the debentures and the debt would be extinguished on handing
over the fully-paid equity shares at the agreed price and at the agreed time to
the bondholder. The Supreme Court’s decisions in the case of CWT v. Spencer &
Co.,
(1973) 88 ITR 429 (SC) and Eastern Investments Ltd. v. CIT,
(1951) 20 ITR 1 (SC) were relied upon to support the proposition.

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L o n d o n S t a r D i a m o n d C o m p a n y ( I ) P . L t d . vs. D C I T In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “D” Bench, Mumbai Before Vijay Pal Rao, (J. M.) and D. Karunakara Rao, (A. M.) I.T.A. No.6169/M/2012 Assessment Year: 2009-2010. Date of Order: 11.10.2013 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Soli Dastur and Nikhil Ranjan/Dipak Ripote

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Section 43(5) – Loss on forward exchange contracts held as incidental to export activity hence allowed as business loss.

Facts:
The assessee is engaged in the business of trading and manufacturing of rough and polished diamonds. It had entered into forward contracts with the banker to safeguard against the exchange fluctuations of export considerations/sale profits as per RBI guidelines. Total of forward contracts entered into during the was Rs. 135.99 crore and the cancellation thereof aggregated to Rs. 126.3 crore. The total exports during the year was Rs. 107.57 crore. Total outstanding receivable in foreign exchange was much higher than any of these figures. It filed its return of income declaring the total income of Rs. 35.29 lakh. The AO examined the applicability of the provisions of section 43(5) of the Act in general and clause (c) of the proviso to section 43(5) in particular and held that the foreign exchange contracts constituted speculative transactions under the said provisions and treated the loss on cancellation thereof of Rs. 4.69 crore as the speculation loss and assessed the income of the assessee at Rs. 5.04 crore. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Before the tribunal, the revenue relied on the orders of the AO and the CIT(A) and contended that the certain data showed that the total of Forward exchange Contracts on certain dates were more than the exports receivable and also questioned the asssessee‘s failure to demonstrate the paisa to paisa and date-wise correlation between the Forward Contracts and the Export Invoices.

Held:
The tribunal laid down the following principles:

• Considering the judgment of the Calcutta High court in the case of CIT vs. Sooraj Muill Magarmull (129 ITR 169) which was followed by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Badridas Gauridu Pvt. Ltd. (261  ITR 256), it held that the Forward Contracts are commodities falling in the definition of speculative transactions governed u/s. 43(5);

• Forward exchange contracts when entered into with the banks for hedging the losses due to foreign exchange fluctuations on the export proceeds, are to be considered integral or incidental to the export activity of the assessee and therefore, the losses or gains constituted the business loss or gains and not the speculation activities. For the purpose it relied on the decisions of the Mumbai tribunal in the case of D. Kishorekumar and Co. (2 SOT 769), the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Badridas Gauridu (P) Ltd. (supra) and the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sooraj Muill Magarmull (supra).

The tribunal then noted that the loss suffered by the assessee on account of the cancellation of forward exchange contract was broadly of two types viz., loss suffered on cancellation of matured contracts (Rs. 4.15 crore) and loss suffered on cancellation of pre-matured contracts (Rs. 64 lakh). According to the tribunal, the former being related to the Forward exchange contracts which are integral or incidental to the exports of the diamonds, should be allowed as business loss in view of the binding High Court or Tribunal decisions/ judgments in the case of D. Kishore kumar and Co (supra), Badridas Gauridu Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Sooraj Muill Magarmull, (supra). In the case of loss suffered on cancellation of pre-matured contracts, the tribunal observed that the onus is on the assessee to explain satisfactorily why the assessee resorted to premature cancellation of some FCs. Further, it observed that it is not required that there must be 1:1 precise correlation between Forward exchange Contacts and the corresponding export invoice. So long as the total Contracts does not exceed the exports of the year plus outstanding export receivable, the Forward exchange Contracts can constitute hedging transaction‘. In the case of loss suffered on cancellation of pre-matured contracts, the tribunal allowed the loss of Rs. 42 lakh accepting the explanation of the assessee that the maturity date of those contracts fell during the weekend days and therefore, the assessee cancelled the contracts three days prior to the due date. As regards the other contracts cancelled prior to longer than three days it held that losses therefrom should also be allowed as business loss so long as the same are integral part of the exports. However, according to it, the assessee needs to answer as to why it went for premature termination and the onus was on the assessee as per the ratio of the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Josef John (67 ITR 74). Accordingly, to examine this part of the loss, the matter was remanded to the AO.

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Green Infra Ltd. vs. ITO ITAT Mumbai `G’ Bench Before D. Manmohan (VP) and N. K. Billaiya (AM) ITA No. 7762/Mum/2012 A.Y.: 2009-10. Decided on: 23rd August, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Porus Kaka/ Abha Kala Chanda.

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S/s. 56, 68. Share premium being a capital receipt cannot be charged to tax as income.

Facts:
In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) observed that an amount of Rs. 47,97,10,000 was credited under Share Premium. He observed that the assessee company was incorporated on 03-04-2008 and had collected share premium of Rs. 47,97,10,000 on allotment of shares of face value of Rs. 10 each at a premium of Rs. 490 per share. He asked the assessee interalia to justify the premium charged with specific reference to basis of valuation, furnish note on factors considered for allotting shares at a premium.

The assessee filed a detailed reply explaining that the subscribers to the Memorandum of Association have subscribed to 50,000 equity shares of Rs. 10 each amounting to Rs. 5,00,000. These shares were allotted at par and all remaining shares were allotted at a premium. The Companies Act, 1956 does not specify the price at which shares are to be issued. Also, it does not limit the premium at which shares are to be issued. Share premium is a capital receipt and has to be dealt with in accordance with section 78 of the Companies Act, 1956. The assessee also filed internal valuation report which was obtained prior to issuance of equity shares at a premium. It was also contended that the assessee company is not required to prove the genuineness, purpose or justification for charging premium on shares. As regards chargeability of share premium u/s. 56(1), it was submitted that the share premium being a capital receipt is not income in its ordinary sense.

The AO was of the belief that premium charged on allotment is not justified. He was of the opinion that these funds were introduced by the assessee through the shareholders in the guise of share premium. He held that there is no basis for the estimates made in the valuations and that the values adopted are nowhere near to the actual and achievements. He also observed that the assessee did not have any hidden assets in the form of patents, copy rights, intellectual property rights or even investments, etc belonging to the company based on which the assessee would be likely to substantially enhance its profits. He also observed that of the total receipts of Rs. 47,97,10,000 an amount of Rs. 45,36,95,212 was invested in units of IDFC Mutual Fund and balance amounts were utilised for investments in shares of subsidiary companies, bank FDRs, advances to subsidiaries, etc. He held that the assessee has entered into a sham transaction. Accordingly, he invoked the provisions of section 56(1) of the Act and taxed the share premium under the head `Income from Other Sources’.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where the capital structure of the assessee company was explained. It was explained that IDFC Private Equity Fund-II is holding 98% shares in the assessee company and almost all the Directors of the assessee company are related with IDFC group.

Held: The Tribunal noted that the transaction of issue of shares at such a premium by a zero balance sheet company could raise eye brows but considering the subscribers to the assessee company, the test for the genuineness of the transaction goes into oblivion. It observed that 10,19,000 equity shares were subscribed and allotted to IDFC PE Fund II which company is a Front Manager of IDFC Ltd., in which company Government of India is holding 18% of shares. The contributors to IDFC PE Fund-II who is subscriber to the assessee’s share capital, are LIC, Union of India, Oriental Bank of Commerce, Indian Overseas Bank and Canara Bank all of which are public sector undertakings. Therefore, to raise eye brows to a transaction where there is so much involvement of the Government directly or indirectly does not make any sense.

No doubt a non-est company or a zero balance company asking for a share premium of Rs. 490 per share defies all commercial prudence but at the same time we cannot ignore the fact that it is a prerogative of the Board of Directors of a company to decide the premium amount and it is the wisdom of the shareholders whether they want to subscribe to such a heavy premium. The Revenue authorities cannot question the charging of such huge premium without any bar from any legislated law of the land. Details of subscribers were before the Revenue authorities. The AO has also confirmed the transaction from the subscribers by issuing notice u/s 133(6) of the Act. The Board of Directors contains persons who are associated with IDFC group of companies, therefore their integrity and credibility cannot be doubted. The entire grievance of the Revenue revolves around the charging of such huge premium so much so that the revenue authorities did not even blink their eyes in invoking provisions of section 56(1) of the Act.

Having gone through the provisions of section 56(1), the Tribunal held that the emphasis in section 56(1) is on `income of every kind’, therefore, to tax any amount under this section, it must have some character of “income”. It is settled proposition of law that capital receipts, unless specifically taxed under any provisions of the Act, are excluded from income. The Supreme Court has laid down the ratio that share premium realised from the issue of shares is of capital nature and forms part of share capital of the company and therefore cannot be taxed as revenue receipt. It is also a settled proposition of law that any expenditure incurred for the expansion of capital base of a company is to be treated as a capital expenditure as has been held by the SC in the case of Punjab State Industrial Corporation vs. CIT 225 ITR 792 and in the case of Brooke Bond India Ltd. vs. CIT. Thus the expenditure and receipts directly relating to the share capital of a company are capital in nature and therefore cannot be taxed u/s. 56(1) of the Act.

In the course of hearing, the DR raised the plea that the nature of transaction should be judged from the parameters of section 68 as well. Though, the counsel of the assessee raised a strong objection to such a plea, the Tribunal in the interest of justice and fair play, drawing support from the decision of SC in Kapurchand Shrimal vs. CIT (131 ITR 451) allowed the DR to raise this issue.

Considering the arguments of the DR, the Tribunal held that the identity of the subscribers has been established beyond all reasonable doubts nor have the revenue authorities questioned the identity of the shareholders. On facts, it held that the capacity of the shareholders cannot be doubted. To counter the argument of the Revenue that charging of premium of Rs. 490 per share is beyond any logical sense and that the transaction is a sham transaction, the Tribunal looked at the application of the funds so raised. It held that the ultimate beneficiaries of the share premium may clear the clouds over the transaction being alleged to be a sham.

The Tribunal fund that the assessee company invested funds in its three subsidiary companies wherein the assessee is holding 99.88% of share capital which meant that the funds were not diverted to an outsider. This, according to the Tribunal, cleared the doubt about the application of funds and the credibility of the company in whom the funds were invested.

The Tribunal held that it could not find a single evidence which could lead to the entire transaction to be a sham. It held that the revenue authorities erred in treating the share premium as income of the assessee u/s. 56(1) of the Act. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs. 47,91,00,000.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Umaben Shaileshbhai Sheth vs. DCWT ITAT Ahmedabad `D’ Bench Before A. Mohan Alankamony (AM) and Kul Bharat (JM) ITA No. 44 to 49/Ahd/2010 A.Y.: 2000-01 to 2005-06. Decided on: 4th October, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Vijay Ranjan/K. C. Mathews.

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Proviso to section 5(1)(vi) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. If the assessee’s share in the plot of land is less than 500 sq. mts., the benefit of the proviso cannot be denied to the assessee on the ground that the area of the entire plot is more than 500 sq. mts.

Facts: The assessee had joint share in a plot of land, admeasuring 567 sq. mts., allotted by Urmi Society, along with her husband. She was a joint shareholder as well. The Assessing Officer (AO) accepted that the assessee is the owner of half portion of the land but he denied the benefit of exemption to section 5(1)(vi) in an order passed u/s 24 r.w.s. 17 r.w.s. 16(3) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (WT Act).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CWT(A) who dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee on the ground that the assessee and her husband had disclosed the value of the plot of land in their taxable wealth while filing returns of net wealth for AYs 2006- 07 and 2007-08 and therefore, how can the value of the said plot be exempt in earlier years. He held that the market value of the plot of land allotted by Urmi Society is includible in taxable wealth.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held: The Tribunal noted that the CWT(A) had not given any basis as to how the proviso to section 5(1)(vi) is not applicable when there is a finding of fact by the AO that the assessee is treated owner of land less than 500 sq. mts. The only basis of denial of exemption by the CWT(A) was that the assessee had not filed the wealth-tax return for the earlier period. The Revenue had not placed reliance on any judicial pronouncement or on any provision of law to deny exemption. It further noted that as per proviso to section 5(1)(vi) of the WT Act, if plot of land is comprising an area of 500 sq. mts or less then no wealth-tax shall be payable by an assessee.

The Tribunal held that admittedly, the assessee has been treated as owner of one-half share in a plot of land admeasuring 567 sq. mts, therefore the right of the assessee is lesser than 500 sq. mts. The assessee cannot be fastened with a liability of tax which otherwise cannot be fastened under the WT Act. It held that on this piece of land, no wealth-tax is payable by the assessee in terms of proviso to section 5(1)(vi). It held that the CWT(A) erred in not granting exemption under proviso to section 5(1)(vi) of the WT Act. It directed the AO to allow exemption.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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ITO vs. Pritesh D. Shah (HUF) ITAT Ahmedabad `B’ Bench Before G. C. Gupta (VP) and T. R. Meena (AM) ITA No. 175/Ahd/2013

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S/s. 40(a)(ia), 194C, 194IA – Provisions of S/s. 194C, 194IA are not applicable to amounts paid by Clearing & Forwarding Agent, on behalf of his client, receipts whereof are issued in the name of the client.

Facts:
The assessee, a clearing & forwarding agent, had charged service charges known as agency charges from its clients whose goods were exported through various ports mainly in Gujarat & Maharashtra. In respect of the amounts paid by the assessee on behalf of its clients, receipts whereof were issued by the recipients in the name of the clients, the assessee did not deduct tax at source. The assessee contended that it was merely a facilitator in the export business of its clients. The assessee received from its clients reimbursement of amounts paid on their behalf and also service charges/agency charges. It was only the agency charges which were credited as income to P&L account of the assessee.

The Assessing Officer (AO) made an addition of Rs. 1,69,11,269; Rs. 23,01,424 and Rs. 26,76,785 u/s. 40(a) (ia) r.w.s. 194C & 194I of the Act on the ground that the assessee had failed to deduct tax at source on payments made by it on behalf of its clients.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee received railway freight, shipping freight, ICD charges, etc from its clients by way of reimbursement of expenses. It held that the assessee is merely a facilitator in the export business of its clients and facilitates to and fro movement of client’s goods both in land and overseas using road, rail, air and sea routes including temporary storage of the goods in custom bonded warehbouse for legal and procedural purposes, etc. The assessee received reimbursement of expenses incurred and also service charges. The Tribunal noted that the receipts were issued by various parties in the name of clients of the assessee and not in the name of the assessee and that it is only the agency charges which are credited to the P & L account of the assessee.

The Tribunal held that for applicability of provisions of section 194C and section 194I, the relationship of contractor and payee pursuant to contract between the parties is essential. In the facts of the assessee’s case, the Tribunal held that such a relationship is missing.

The Tribunal noted the finding given by CIT(A) that the clients of the assessee are reimbursing monies paid by the assessee to such agencies along with the assessee’s commission or handling charges and also that the CIT(A) has referred to number of decisions where the Hon’ble Courts have held that TDS provisions are not attracted in cases involving reimbursement of expenses held that addition on account of payments made to various parties on behalf of its clients by the assessee could not be sustained and deserves to be deleted. The Tribunal confirmed the order passed by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia): A. Y. 2009-10: Tax deducted at source on salaries of employees paid by another party on behalf of assessee: Assessee not required to deduct tax on reimbursement to that party: Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) cannot be made:

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CIT vs. Victor Shipping Services (P) Ltd.; 357 ITR 642
(All):

In the A. Y. 2009-10, M paid salary to the employees of the assessee on behalf of the assessee and also deducted tax at source as per law. The assessee reimbursed the amount to M. The Assessing Officer disallowed the payment made to M relying on the provisions of section 40(a)(ia), on the ground that no tax was deducted at source on such payment to M. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that since M had deducted tax at source on salaries paid by it on behalf of the assessee, the assessee was not required to deduct tax at source on reimbursement made by it to M, and when the expenses incurred by the assessee were totally paid and did not remain payable as at the end of the accounting period, the provisions of section 40(a) (ia) of the Act were not applicable. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Tax was deducted at source from the salaries of the employees paid by M, and the circumstances in which such salaries were paid by M for the assessee were sufficiently explained. For disallowing expenses from business and profession on the ground that tax has not been deducted at source, the amount should be payable and not which has been paid by the end of the year.

ii) The Tribunal had not committed any error in recording on facts, and no question of law arose for consideration in appeal.”

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 70 dated 8th November, 2013

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Third party payments for export/import transactions

This circular permits the payments for export/import of goods/software to be received from third parties, subject to the following conditions:

Export of Goods/Software

a) There must be a firm irrevocable order backed by a tripartite agreement.

b) Third party payment must come from a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) compliant country and through the banking channel only.

c) The exporter must declare the third party remittance  in the Export Declaration Form (EDF).

d) It is the responsibility of the Exporter to realise and repatriate the export proceeds from such third party named in the EDF.

e) Banks will continue reporting of outstandings, if any, in the XOS against the name of the exporter. However, instead of the name of the overseas buyer from where the proceeds have to be realised, the name of the declared third party must appear in the XOS.

f) In case of shipments being made to a country in Group II of Restricted Cover Countries, (e.g. Sudan, Somalia, etc.), payments for the same can be received from an Open Cover Country.

Import Transactions

a) There must be a firm irrevocable purchase order/ tripartite agreement in place.

b) Third party payment must be made to a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) compliant country and through the banking channel only.

c) The Invoice must contain a narration that the related payment has to be made to the third party named therein.

d) Bill of Entry must mention the name of the shipper as also the fact that the related payment has to be made to the third party named therein.

e) Importer has to comply with the related instructions relating to imports including those on advance payment being made for import of goods.

f) The amount of an import transaction eligible for third party payment must not exceed $100,000.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 69 dated 23rd November, 2013

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Press Release dated 27th September, 2013 –
Ministry of Finance, Government of India Notification dated October 11,
2013 issued by the Ministry of Finance (Department of Economic Affairs) –
G.S.R. 684(E)

Amendment to the “Issue of Foreign Currency
Convertible Bonds and Ordinary shares (Through Depository Receipt
Mechanism) Scheme, 1993”

Presently, unlisted Indian
companies that have not yet accessed Global Depository Receipts/Foreign
Currency Convertible Bond route for raising capital in the international
market are required to have prior or simultaneous listing in the
domestic market.

This circular permits, initially for a period
of two years, unlisted companies incorporated in India to raise capital
abroad without prior or subsequent listing in India. The Indian company
must fulfill the following conditions: –

(a) Unlisted Indian
companies can list abroad only on exchanges in IOSCO/FATF compliant
jurisdictions or those jurisdictions with which SEBI has signed
bilateral agreements.

(b) The ADR/GDR can be issued subject to
sectoral cap, entry route, minimum capitalisation norms, pricing norms,
etc. as per FDI regulations notified by the RBI from time to time.

(c)
The pricing of such ADR/GDR has to be determined in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 of Notification No. FEMA. 20
dated 3rd May 2000, as amended from time to time.

(d) The number
of underlying equity shares offered for issuance of ADR/GDR that have to
be kept with the local custodian has to be determined upfront and the
ratio of ADR/ GDR to equity shares has to be decided upfront based on
FDI pricing norms of equity shares of unlisted company.

(e) The
unlisted Indian company has to comply with the instructions on
downstream investment as notified by the RBI from time to time.

(f)
The capital raised abroad can be utilised for retiring outstanding
overseas debt or for bona fide operations abroad including for
acquisitions overseas.

(h) In case the funds raised are not
utilised abroad, the company must repatriate the funds to India within
15 days and such money must be parked only with banks recognised by RBI
and can be used for eligible purposes.

(i) The unlisted company will have to file reports with RBI as may be prescribed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 68 dated 1st November, 2013 Notification No. FEMA.292/2013- RB dated 4th October, 2013, Press Note No. 2 (2013 Series) dated June 3, 2013 – DIPP Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India – definition of ‘group company’

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This circular has modified Notification No. FEMA. 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000, by including the definition of the term ‘group company’ as follows: –

‘Group company’ means two or more enterprises which, directly or indirectly, are in position to:

(i) exercise 26%, or more, of voting rights in other enterprise; or

(ii) appoint more than 50% of members of board of directors in the other enterprise.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 63 dated 18th October, 2013 Memorandum of Procedure for channeling transactions through Asian Clearing Union (ACU)

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This circular states that the ACU Board of Directors at their meeting held on 19th June, 2013 have decided to include only transactions involving export/import of goods and services among ACU countries as eligible for payment under the ACU Mechanism. As a result, the old Para 7 and sub-paragraph (b) of Para 8 stands revised as follows: –

 Extant Para 7 and Para 8(b) to the Annex of A.P.(DIR Series) Circular No.35 dated 17th February, 2010

 Revised Para 7 and Para 8 (b) to the Annex of A.P.(DIR Series) Circular No.35 dated 17th February, 2010

 7. Eligible Payments
Transactions that are eligible to be made through ACU are payments –
(a) from a resident in the territory of one participant to a resident in the territory of another participant;
(b) for current international transactions as defined by the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund;
(c) permitted by the country in which the payer resides;
(d) not declared ineligible under paragraph 8 of this Memorandum; and
(e) for export/import transactions between ACU member countries on deferred payment terms.
Note: – Trade transactions with Myanmar may be settled in any freely convertible currency, in addition to the ACU mechanism.
8. Ineligible Payments

(b) payments which are not on account of current international transactions as defined by the International Monetary Fund, except to the extent mutually agreed upon between Reserve Bank and the other participants

 7. Eligible Payments
Transactions that are eligible to be made through ACU are payments –
(a) for export/import transactions between ACU member countries including export and import on deferred payment terms; and
(b) not declared ineligible under paragraph 8 of this
Memorandum
Note: –
Trade transactions with Myanmar may be settled in any freely convertible currency, in addition to the ACU mechanism.
8. Ineligible Payments

(b) payments that are not on account of export/import transactions between ACU members countries except to the extent mutually agreed upon between the Reserve Bank and the other participants

PART C: Information & Around

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Public Authority:
Aurangabad Information Commissioner has ruled that Global Towers, a franchisee of the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company (MSEDCL) for Aurangabad city, came within the purview of the Right to Information Act and was bound to provide information to power consumers.

RTI applicant, Hemant kapadia had made an application to Global Towers (GT) which was rejected by it on the ground that it was a private company and the RTI Act did not apply to it. MSEDCL representatives submitted before the Commission that all applications received from consumers under the RTI Act had been forwarded to Global Towers, but it did not respond and so no information could be given to Kapadia.

All along, Global Towers had taken the view that it would provide information to MSEDCL and that there was nothing wrong in denying information to consumers. In some cases, the firm did provide information, but it was submitted to. MSEDCL and not the consumers.

Information Commission ruled that GT had received substantial assistance form MSEDCL and owing to that assistance view the GT was able to perform and provide service. Accordingly, in the view of the Information Commissioner, GT comes under the purview of the RTI Act and is a Public Authority.

Panchayat head:
Bhadresh Vamja, a 21 year-old law student, who tenaciously used Right to Information (RTI) to fight corruption, has been elected as the sarpanch of Saldi village. He is also one of the youngest sarpanchs in the state of Gujarat.

Vamja is the second RTI activist to be elected to village panchayat for empowering people through RTI. Last year, blind activist Ratna Ala was elected as deputy sarpanch of Rangpar village in Surendranagar.

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PART A: order of high court

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Address in the RTI application, section 6(2) of the RTI Act:

A short judgment of Calcutta High Court-

RTI Activist, Mr. Avishek Goenka approached the Calcutta H.C. in a writ petition and submitted that the authorities should not insist upon the detailed address of the applicant as and when any application is made under the Right to Information Act.

He stated that giving full address would cause a threat to the activist and in fact there had been past incidents of unnatural deaths of activist in the field, presumably by the interested persons having vested interest to conceal the information that is asked for by the activist.

He submitted that the applicant would provide a particular post-box number that would automatically conceal his identity to the public at large.

The Court considered the relevant provisions of the RTI Act and stated: Section 6(2) of the Right to information Act, 2005 would clearly provide, an applicant making request for information shall not be required to give any reason for requesting the information or any other personal details except those that may be necessary for contacting him.

The court further stated:
Looking to the said provision, we find logic in the submission of the petitioner. When the legislature thought it fit, the applicant need not disclose any personal detail, the authority should not insist upon his detailed whereabouts particularly 

when post-box number is provided for that wouldestablish contact with him and the authority.

In case, the authority would find any difficulty with the post-box number, they may insist upon personal details. However, in such case, it would be the solemn duty of the authority to hide such information and particularly from their website so that people at large would not know of the details.

We thus dispose of this writ petition by making the observations as above. The Secretary, Ministry of Personnel should circulate the copy of this order to all concerned so that the authority can take appropriate measure to hide information with regard to personal details of the activist to avoid any harassment by the persons having vested interest.

[Mr. Avishek Goenka: W.P. 33290(W) of 2013 dated on20.11.2013.]

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Recovery of loan – Liability of guarantors – Is Co-extensive and Joint as well as Several: SFC Act 1951. Section 29 :

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Usha Rani & Anr vs. Delhi Financial Corporation & Ors AIR 2013 Delhi 207

The respondent No. 1 Delhi Financial Corporation sanctioneda loan of Rs. 14,58,000/- to respondent No. 2 Shyam Lal for purchase of a CNG bus. A Term Loan  Agreement-cum-Hypothecation Deed was executedin favour of respondent No. 1. The petitioners had  stood as guarantors for the loan taken by respondentNo. 2 from respondent No. 1. Since respondent No.  2 defaulted in payment of the loan taken from respondentNo. 1, the bus which was purchased from the funds provided by respondent No. 1, was seized by respondent No. 1 and was sold for recovery of its dues. The respondent No. 1 filed an application u/s. 32(G) of State Financial Corporations Act “ SFC Act” for issuance of recovery certificate against the petitioners as well as the principal borrower for recovery of Rs. 17,20,507 and future interest in terms of Loan Agreement-cum-Hypothecation Deed executed by them in favour of respondent No. 1.

The respondent No. 1 had initiated proceedings for recovery of the balance amount payable to it, from the petitioners they being guarantors of the loan taken by respondent No. 2. Being aggrieved the petitioners approached the Court.
The Hon’ble Court observed that the petitioners do
not dispute that they had stood as guarantors for the
loan taken by respondent No. 2 from respondent No.
1. The grievance of the petitioners is that respondent
No. 1 is not taking steps for recovering the balance
amount from respondent No. 2.

Since the petitioners had admittedly stood as guarantors for the loan taken by respondent No. 2, the liability of the guarantors being co-extensive and the liability of the principal borrower and the guarantors being joint as well as several, it is open to respondent No. 1 to recover its dues either from the petitioners or from respondent No. 2 or from all of them.

The legal position with respect to obligation of a guarantor to pay the amount guaranteed by him to the lender was upheld by the Apex Court in Industrial Investment Bank of India Ltd. vs. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala: JT 2009 (10) SC 533 where the apex court, after considering its earlier decision on the subject, inter alia, held as under:-

“30. The legal position as crystallised by a series of cases of this court is clear that the liability of the guarantor and principal debtors are co-extensive and not in alternative. When we examine the impugned judgment in the light of the consistent position of law, then the obvious conclusion has to be that the High Court under its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not justified to stay further proceedings in O.A. 156 of 1997.”

Since the liability of the petitioners is co-extensive and not in the alternative, no infirmity was committed by respondent No. 1 in seeking to recover the balance amount due to it, from the petitioners.

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Evidence – Unregistered Partition Deed – Admissibility – Nature of Document: Evidence Act, Section 91:

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Raj Gopal
Sharma vs. Krishna Gopal Sharma & Ors AIR 2013 Allahabad 187

The Hon’ble High Court held that u/s. 17(1)(b) of the Act, 1908, a document
recognising oral partition, if reduced to writing, need not to be registered
but if it is a document of partition, as such, it needs be registered,
otherwise by virtue of section 49 of Act, 1908, it would be inadmissible in
evidence. A partition of a property in a family precedes a settlement or
compromise between members of family as to how property commonly and jointly,
owned by them, should be settled among them.

The matter also came to be considered by a three Judge Bench in Kale and others
vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, AIR 1976 SC 807, and the apex
court concretised certain propositions considering the effect and essentials of
“family settlement” in para 10 of the judgment, and held as under:

(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family
disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of
properties between the various members of the family;

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud,
coercion or undue influence;

(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is
necessary;

(4) It is well-settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms
of the family arrangement are reduced to writing. Here also, a distinction
should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family
arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the
family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record
or for information of the Court for making necessary mutation. In such a case
the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties
and therefore does not fall within the mischief of section 17(2) [section
17(1)(b)] of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily
registrable;

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some
antecedent title, claim or interest or even a possible claim in the property
which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the
parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other
party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and
acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be
assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld, and the Courts will find no
difficulty in giving assent to the same;

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve
legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and
equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the
settlement.

In the present case, the document in question has been signed by Sri Mangelal
Sharma karta and witnessed by Sri Swaroop Singh Tomar. It does not contain
signatures of all the members of the joint family. It thus cannot be said that
it was a mere “family settlement” between members of the family and signed by
all the members. If the aforesaid document sought to be enforced so as to
determine title of respective parties, i.e. plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 on
the property of late Mangelal Sharma, it would have to be given status of
‘partition deed’ and its registration was necessary.

The aforesaid document had rightly been held inadmissible in evidence on
account of not being registered. However, since defendant No. 2 has already
sold his share in respect of house No. 3, applying principle of estoppel, as
upheld by Apex Court in Kale (supra), he has been excluded from partition of
property in dispute.

 

Chartered Accountant – Disqualification – Offence of bigamy – Moral Turpitude – Removal proper: Natural justice – Chartered Accountants Act, 1949: Section 8(v) and 20(1)(d)

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P. Mohanasundaram vs. The President, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, New Delhi & Anr.

AIR 2013 MADRAS 221

Appellant, a qualified Chartered Accountant, enrolled his name as Member of the Southern India Regional Council, Chennai. In the year 1984 matrimonial dispute arose between the appellant and his wife, which resulted in granting of divorce decree by the first Additional Family Court, Chennai on 13-11-2003, and the said divorce decree was confirmed by the High Court.

Before the said divorce decree was passed by the Family Court, the appellant’s estranged wife filed a complaint in the year 1990 before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Chennai, u/s. 494 IPC alleging bigamy. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai, tried the said complaint and convicted the appellant and imposed sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year by judgment dated 10-05-1999, which conviction was confirmed by the Supreme Court but the sentence was reduced.y reduction in sentence.

After a lapse of 4 years and 11 months, that was on 05-07-2009, the first respondent re-opened the said issue and sent a letter to the appellant stating that the conviction for bigamous marriage involves moral turpitude and therefore as per section 8 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, the appellant has to appear for an enquiry on 13-01-2009 at New Delhi to explain as to why his name should not be removed from the rolls/Register of Members. On 05-01-2009 the appellant sent a letter stating that by order dated 29-01-2004, the appellant was held ‘not guilty of any professional or other misconduct’ by considering the orders of the criminal court, including that of the Supreme Court dated 14-11-2003 and therefore no action need be initiated for the concluded matter. The first respondent, on 16-04-2010 passed an order removing the name of the appellant from the register of members.

The learned single Judge accepting the contentions raised by the respondents, upheld the order removing the name of the appellant from the Register of Chartered Accountants. The appeal is preferred against the said order.

The Hon’ble Court observed that it was not in dispute, after full trial, the appellant was convicted for the offence of bigamy and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. The said conviction and sentence was confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while confirming the conviction, reduced the sentence to that of sentence already suffered, as per the request made by the learned counsel for the appellant. Thus, it was beyond doubt that the conviction recorded in the criminal case against the appellant is subsisting as on today and the sentence imposed alone was reduced to the sentence already suffered.

The appellant’s contention that he was not heard before taking a decision to remove his name from the register was unsustainable as the appellant, in spite of giving opportunity to appear on 13-01-2009, not only failed to appear and he specifically took a decision not to appear. A person who refuses to appear in spite of receipt of notice for appearance, cannot be allowed to raise the plea of violation of principles of natural justice.

The next question considered was as to whether by virtue of the conviction for bigamous marriage the appellant sustained disability to retain his name in the register of Chartered Accountants.

One of the contentions of the appellant was that involvement of a person in an offence of bigamy is not coming within the purview of “moral turpitude”. The appellant and his estranged wife are Hindus, governed under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Section 17 of the Act states that marriage between two Hindus is void if two conditions are satisfied, viz., (1) the marriage is solemnised after the commencement of the said Act, and (2) at the date of such marriage, either party had a husband or wife living and the provisions of sections 494 and 495 shall apply accordingly. Thus, it was evident that if a Hindu marries with a person having a spouse living or he or she have a spouse living, marries any person, shall be liable for bigamy.

The Hon’ble Court held that the appellant married another woman, while the first marriage was subsisting, and had acted contrary to the law. Thus the offence of bigamy is coming within the meaning of “moral turpitude”. The conviction recorded against the appellant for bigamy stands even today though sentence was reduced to the period already undergone. Hence, the decision taken by the first respondent to remove the name of the appellant from the register maintained by the Chartered Accountants Council, which was upheld by the learned single Judge is valid and no interference was required.

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Advocates – Representing arrested or detained person – cannot be criticised: Advocate has duty to represent such person: Constitution of India & Advocates Act 1961

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K. Vijay Lakshimi (Smt) vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh & Ors AIR 2013 SC 3589

The Appellant was an advocate practicing in the courts at Markapur, District Prakasam in the state of Andhra Pradesh. The Andhra Pradesh High Court (Respondent No. 2 herein) had invited applications for the appointments to 105 posts of (Junior) Civil Judges. After the interviews, some 81 candidates from amongst the direct recruits were selected by a committee of Hon’ble Judges of the High Court, and this selection was approved by the Full Court on the administrative side. The Appellant was one of those who were selected,

However, it so transpired that whereas the other selected candidates were issued appointment letters, the Appellant was not. She, therefore, applied under the provisions of The Right to Information Act, 2005, to find out the reason of her non-appointment. She received a letter from the Respondent No. 1 which gave the following reason therefor:

I am directed to inform you that, adverse remarks were reported in the verification report, that your husband Sri. Srinivasa Chowdary, who is practicing as an Advocate in the Courts at Markapur is having close links with CPI (Maoist) Party which is a prohibited organisation.
of persons associated with this party, but she has never appeared in any such case. She further stated that her husband was a member of a panel of advocates who had defended political prisoners, against whom the district police had foisted false cases, and those cases had ended in acquittals. She disputed the bona-fides of the police department in making the adverse report, and relied upon the resolutions passed by various bar associations expressing that her husband was being made to suffer for opposing the police in matters of political arrests.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the decision taken by the State to not appoint a selected candidate for post of civil Judge in view of adverse police report without forwarding relevant papers to High Court for its consideration is contrary to Art 234 which specifically requires that these appointments are to be made after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court exercising jurisdiction in the concerned State. The High Court may accept the adverse report or it may not. Ultimately, inasmuch as the selection is for the appointment to a judicial post, the Governor will have to be guided by the opinion of the High Court. In the instant case in view of the letter from the Home Department, the High Court has thrown up its hands and has not sought any more information from the State.

In view of the mandate of Article 234, the High Court has to take a decision on the suitability of a candidate on the administrative side, and it cannot simply go by the police reports, though such reports will, of course, form a relevant part of its consideration. To deny a public employment to a candidate solely on the basis of the police report regarding the political affinity of the candidate would be offending the Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, unless such affinities are considered likely to effect the integrity and efficiency of the candidate, or unless  there is clear material indicating the involvement of the candidate in the subversive or violent activities of a banned organisation.

The appellant selected candidate could not be turned back at the very threshold, on the ground of her alleged political activities.

She, therefore, filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature. The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved by this decision, the Appellant filed an appeal to the apex court.

The Appellant stated that she was not a member of CPI (Maoist), nor did she have any connection with the banned organisation or with any of its leaders. She disputed that any such organisation, by name CMS existed, and in any case, she was not a member of any such organisation. She submitted that her husband must have appeared in some bail applications
The court further observed that all such accused do have the right to be defended lawfully until they are proved guilty, and the advocates have the corresponding duty to represent them, in accordance with law.

We cannot ignore that during the freedom struggle, and even after independence, many leading lawyers have put in significant legal service for the political and civil right activists, arrested or detained.

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Shareholders’ Agreements

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Synopsis

Shareholders’ Agreements are one of the definitive documents in case of an investment in a company. They are full of jargon which is often unintelligible to laymen and promoters signing without understanding them. This Article explains restrictive covenants, put options and veto rights found in Shareholders’ Agreements. It also analyses their validity under the Companies Act, 1956, the 2013 Act and the position for Listed Companies. Lastly, the Article examines the remedies for enforceability of such Agreements.

Introduction

Shareholders’ Agreements are one of the definitive documents which we witness in cases of an investment in a company by a Private Equity Fund, Foreign Direct Investor, etc. A Shareholders’ Agreement contains various restrictive covenants by theexisting promoters of the investee company, which usually are in the form of representations and warranties  as well as promises to do or abstain fromdoing certain acts. These promises are important for the investor to invest in the investee company  since they represent an assurance to him about hisexit route and other rights. One unique feature of Shareholders’ Agreements is that they are full of jargon which is often unintelligible to laymen.

Promoters, usually in a hurry to secure funds, end up signing on the dotted line of the Agreement without fully understanding the true repercussions of the Agreement. It is only later when these clauses materialise into reality that they wake up and smell the coffee but by then it is too late. Through this Article, let us understand better some of the important covenants which one come across in a Shareholders’ Agreement.

Restrictive Covenants

One or more restrictive covenants, such as, First Refusal, Tag Along, Drag Along, Russian Roulette, Texas Shoot-out, Dutch auction rights, etc., are usually found in Shareholders’ Agreement. These are briefly explained below:

(a) Right of First Refusal
This is the most common and easily understood covenant since it is found in the Articles of Association of all Private Companies. In case the Promoters desire to transfer any or all of their shares, the investor will have a Right of First Refusal, popularly called a RoFR, to purchase these shares. The pricing of the RoFR and the terms and conditions of the sale are the same as those that the promoter is offering to the prospective purchaser. In some cases, the promoter may also have a RoFR on the investor’s shares.

(b) Tag Along Rights

Tag along rights mean that if the promoters wish to sell their shares to anyone else, then the investor can tag along with them and offer its own shares. Example, a buyer has agreed to buy 50,000 shares from the promoter @ Rs. 100 per share. If the investor tags along with the promoter then either the buyer buys 50,000 from him also @ Rs. 100 or he buys 25,000 each  from the promoter and the investor. Thus, the investor gets an exit if the promoter gets one. These are also known as piggy back rights since the investor piggy backs on the promoter.

(c) Drag Along Rights

On the other hand, drag along rights mean that if the investor wishes to sell his shares to a third party and if that third party also requires that the promoters should sell their shares, then the investor can drag along the promoters. Example, a buyer has agreed to buy 50,000 shares from the investor @ Rs. 100 per share. If the buyer wishes to buy more share as a pre-condition, then the investor can drag along with him the promoter and in that case the promoter must also sell the same number of shares at the same terms as the investor. Thus, if the buyer wants to buy out the whole company and not just the investor’s stake, then the drag along clause would enable an investor to facilitate such a transaction.

(d) Russian Roulette

Not very popular in India, a Russian Roulette clause means that “you buy me out or I buy you out”. The investor specifies a price at which either the promoter sells to him or buys the investor out. This is often resorted to when there is a deadlock situation.

(e) Texas Shoot Out

A third party is appointed as a Referee. Both the investor and the promoter submit bids to the Referee. Whichever is the higher bid wins and the winner must buy out the loser at that price. This is an extreme deadlock resolution mechanism.

(f) Dutch auction

A modification of the Texas Shoot out, in a Dutch auction also bids are submitted to a Referee. Only in this case the bids are for the minimum selling price. The winner must buy out the loser at the price quoted by the loser.

(g) Pre-emptive Rights

The investor has pre-emptive rights to participate in any future issuance (other than the current round) of equity (and other instruments convertible into equity) by the company on terms and at a price determined by the company but not less favourable than those offered by the company to any other investor, to retain its fully diluted equity shareholding in the company. The investor has a 20% stake in a company which has a capital of 1 crore shares. The company decides to increase its share capital by a further issue of 20 lakh shares. The investor must be offered 4 lakh shares out of this further issue so that it can maintain its holding of 20% in the post-issue capital of the company.

(h) Put Option

The investor has a right /option but not an obligation to sell its shares to the promoter of the investee company in case the company does not give it an exit in the form of an IPO /an Offer for Sale/Buyback of the investor’s shares. Thus, the promoters are bound to buy out the investor at a predetermined  price or a pricing formula whichis specified upfront. This ensures an exit for the investor if all other methods fail.

The Supreme Court has recognised such rights in its decision in celebrated decision of Vodafone International Holdings, 341 ITR 1 (SC) and held as under:

“SHA, therefore, regulate the ownership and voting rights of shares in the company including ROFR, TARs, DARs, Preemption Rights, Call Options, Put Options, Subscription Option etc. in relation to any shares issued by the company, restriction of transfer of shares or granting securities interest over shares, provision for minority protection, lock-down or for the interest of the shareholders and the company. Provisions referred to above, which find place in a SHA, may regulate the rights between the parties which are purely contractual and those rights will have efficacy only in the course of ownership of shares by the parties.”

Validity of Restrictive Covenants under Companies Act, 1956

The Supreme Court has held that they are valid against a company only if they are a part of the Articles of Association or else they remain a private contract between shareholders – V.B. Rangarajan vs.  V. Gopalkrishnan, 73 Comp. Cases 201 (SC). While thishas been the cornerstone for the law on Shareholders’ Agreements, the Supreme Court in Vodafone (supra) has taken a contrary view. The Concurring Order of J. Radhakrishnan, states in relation to Rangarajan’s judgment as follows:

“This Court has taken the view that provisions of the Shareholders’ Agreement imposing restrictions even when consistent with Company legislation, are to be authorized only when they are incorporated in the Articles of Association, a view we do not subscribe.

Rangarajan’s decision was delivered by a Two-Member Supreme Court Bench, while Vodafone’s decision has been delivered by a Three-Member Bench, although the disagreement is expressed by the Concurring Judgment of one of its Members. It may be noted that the Vodafone decision has not expressly overruled Rangarajan’s decision.

Vodafone’s decision has further laid down that shareholders can enter into any Agreement in the best interest of the company, but the only thing is that the provisions shall not go contrary to the Articles of Association. The essential purpose of the Agreement is to make provisions for proper and effective internal management of the company. It can visualise the best interest of the company on diverse issues and can also find different ways not only for the best interest of the shareholders, but also for the company as a whole.

In the case of M.S. Madhusoodhanan vs. Kerala Kaumudi Pvt. Ltd., 117 Comp Cases 19 (SC) it was held that consensual agreements between shareholders relating to their shares do not impose restriction on transferability of shares and they can be enforced like any other agreement. Even if the company is a party to the Shareholders’ Agreement, the provisions relating to management of the affairs of a company cannot be given effect to unless the same are incorporated in its Articles of Association – IL &

FS Trust Co. Ltd vs. Birla Perucchini Ltd., 47 SCL 426 (Bom). Again, in Rolta India Ltd vs. Venire Industries Ltd., 100 Comp. Cases 19 (Bom), it was held that the shareholders cannot infringe upon the fiduciary rights and duties of directors. Any agreement by which the shareholders agreed not to increase the number of directors above a certain limit was not valid as long as the restriction was enshrined in the Articles of Association. The shareholders cannot dictate terms to directors except by amending the Articles. In Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. [2010] 7 SCC 1, it was held that a Family Arrangement MOU executed by the key personnel of a listed company was held not to be binding on the company since the contents of the MOU were not made public. It was held that the MOU did not fall under the corporate domain – it was not approved by the shareholders. Therefore, technically, the MOU was not legally binding.

A Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, in the case of Western Maharashtra Development Corporation vs. Bajaj Auto Ltd., 154 Comp Cases 593 (Bom), had ruled that a Shareholders’ Agreement of a public company containing restrictive covenants was invalid since the Articles of a public company could not contain covenants restricting the trans-fer of shares and it was contrary to Section.108 of the Companies Act, 1956. Subsequently, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in the case of Messer Holdings Ltd vs. Shyam Ruia, 159 Comp Cases 29 (Bom) has overruled this decision of the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. The Bombay Court here was concerned with the validity of a Right of First Refusal Clause. The Court held that the intent of section 111A of the Companies Act, 1956 dealing with free transferability of shares does not in any manner hamper the right of its shareholders to enter into private treaties so long as it is in accordance with the Companies Act, 1956 and the company’s Articles of Association. Had the Companies Act, 1956 wanted to prevent such private contracts it would have expressly done so.

Interestingly, a recent decision of the Delhi Court in the case of World Phone India vs. WPI Group Inc, 119 SCL 196 (Del) has held that even a provision in the Shareholders’ Agreement which is not contrary to the Articles of Association or the Companies Act, 1956 cannot be enforced against the company if the company is not a party to such an Agreement. While it was settled law that in case of a conflict the Articles would prevail but this decision lays down that even if the Articles are silent on an issue and not in conflict, the provisions of the Shareholders’ Agreement cannot be enforced against the company.

Thus, the issue of Articles vs. Shareholders’ Agreement has yet not reached a finality.

Position under Companies Act, 2013

The Companies Act, 2013 now provides that securities in a public company are freely transferrable but a contract or an arrangement in respect of transfer of securities in a public company shall be enforceable as a contract. This express provision sets at rest once and for all whether public companies can contain pre-emptive rights. This is a big boost for Private Equity/FDI/Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE) transactions since they almost always come with pre-emptive rights.

Position in the case of Listed Companies

It may be specifically noted that the Bombay High Court judgment in Messer Holdings (supra) was in the case of a listed company. Recently, the SEBI, taking a cue from the Companies Act, 2013, has issued a Notification under the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 1956, expressly permitting “contracts for pre-emption including right of first refusal, or tag-along or drag along rights contained in shareholders agreements or articles of association of companies”. Thus, these restrictive covenants can now expressly find their way even in Shareholders’ Agreements of Listed Companies, without the prior approval of the SEBI. It may be noted that even today the Articles of Association of several Listed Companies contain such pre-emptive rights.

The Notification further provides that even agreements for put and call options on listed securities are permitted subject to the following conditions:

(i)    the title and ownership of the underlying securities is held continuously by the seller for a minimum period of 1 year from the date of entering into the contract;

(ii)    the price or consideration payable for the sale or purchase of the underlying securities pursuant to exercise of any option contained therein, is in compliance with all the laws for the time being in force as applicable;

(iii)    the contract is settled by way of actual delivery of the underlying securities; and

(iv)    the contract shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and Rules or Regulations made thereunder.

SEBI had in the cases of Cairn India Ltd., Vedanta Resources Plc. and Vulcan Rubber Ltd., held that an option arrangement in the case of shares of a listed company is not valid. This change in position is a welcome move.

Veto Rights/Affirmative Vote

Almost all investors want Veto Rights, i.e., certain specific fundamental issues, on which the company would not take a decision without the affirmative vote of the Investor. Thus, the Investor acquires a veto right on these issues. Some of the issues which may carry a veto include, alteration of the rights and privileges of the investor’s shares; change in the capital structure of the company; related party transactions with promoters in excess of certain limits; corporate reorganisation of the company; borrowing in excess of certain limits; change in the scope of the business; capital expenditure in excess of certain limit; commencement of any major litigation by the company; changes in key management personnel, etc.

By virtue of a veto, the investor has power to stall a decision of the company. However, in most cases, he does not have power to carry out a decision on his own behest. Thus, if he refuses the company cannot go ahead but if he proposes and the com-pany refuses then he cannot proceed on his own. A question often asked is that does the grant of such special rights make the investor a person in control of the company? This is a question of fact.

In the case of Subhkam Ventures (I) (P.) Ltd. vs. SEBI, 99 SCL 159 (SAT), the SAT held that the question to be asked in each case is whether the acquirer is the driving force behind the company and whether he is the one providing motion to the organization. If yes, he is in control but not otherwise. In short, control means effective control. In this case, the SAT held that the investor who had veto rights did not control the company. The SEBI contested it before the Supreme Court, where an interesting mutual consent agreement was arrived upon. The Supreme Court’s Order in SEBI vs. Subhkam Ventures, Civil Appeal No. 3371 /2010 states that certain facts changed after the SAT Order. Accordingly, the Court, by mutual consent, disposed of the appeal filed by SEBI by keeping the question of law open and it is also clarified that the order passed by the SAT will not be treated as a precedent. This leaves the all-important question yet open for interpretation. Some of the recent high-profile foreign takeovers/joint ventures have reportedly run into a roadblock with the SEBI on similar grounds. SEBI has questioned whether the grant of special investor protection rights to the foreign investor results into a sharing of management control with the Indian promoters?

Enforceability of Shareholders’ Agreement

A breach of a Shareholders’ Agreement would give rise to a suit for specific performance by the aggrieved party under the Specific Relief Act. However, in several cases, the Agreement itself provides that Arbitration would be the sole dispute resolution mechanism. It may further provide for Indian or Foreign Arbitration, e.g., in Singapore, London, Paris, etc.

In the case of Vodafone (supra), the Supreme Court held that the manner in which Shareholders’ Agreements are to be enforced in the case of breach is given in the general law between the company and the shareholders. A breach of such an Agreement which does not breach the Articles of Association is a valid corporate action but the aggrieved can get remedies under the general law of the land for breach of the Agreement and not under the Companies Act.

In the case of Chatterjee Petrochem (I) P Ltd vs. Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd., 110 SCL 107 (SC), an interesting issue arose. Certain disputes arose be-tween two sets of shareholders who were party to a Shareholders Agreement. The aggrieved party moved a petition for oppression u/s. 397 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Supreme Court held that in that case the breach of the Shareholders’ Agreement was a breach between two members of the company and not by the company itself. Hence, no occasion arises for filing a plea for oppression u/s. 397.

Conclusion

Shareholder Agreements have always attracted a lot of controversy and the spate of conflicting judgments have fueled the fire further. Parties to a Shareholders’ Agreement would be well advised to understand the implications of what they are getting into before signing such Agreements. Do Not Act in Haste and Repent in Leisure!!

Provisions For Management, Administration and Dividend Declaration Under the Companies Act, 2013.

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The Companies Act, 2013 has been passed by the Parliament. It has received the assent of the President on 29th August, 2013. After the Act is notified it will replace the existing Companies Act, 1956. By a notification dated 12-09-2013, 98 out of 470 sections of the Act have been brought into force from 12.9.2013. The provisions relating to Management and Administration of companies and other relevant provisions are contained in the following sections of the New Act. Draft Rules relating these provisions have been issued by the Government for
Public Comments.

(i) Chapter VII – Section 88 to 122 – Management and Administration.
(ii) Chapter VIII – Section 123 to 127 – Declaration of Dividend
(iii) Chapter VI – Section 77 to 87 – Registration of charges.

Most of these provisions are similar to the provisions in the existing Act. Some of the important provisions which require attention during the course of management, administration and Declaration of Dividends by Companies are discussed in this Article.

1 Register of Members:

1.1  The provisions relating to maintenance of Register of Members. Debenture holders and any other securities in the company in section 88 of the New Act are similar to the provisions in sections 150 to 152 and 152A of the existing Act. Draft Rules 7.1 to 7.6 provide for the procedure and also prescribes Form in which the Register is to be maintained.

1.2  Sections 89 and 90 of the New Act which correspond to existing section 187C and 187D provide for declaration to be made by a person who does not hold beneficial interest in the shares registered in the company in his name. Similarly, the beneficial owner has also to make this declaration. This declaration is to be made in the prescribed form and submitted to the company within the prescribed time limit. Particulars of changes in beneficial interest are also to be filed with the company within 30 days of change. The company has to register particulars of such beneficial interest and file a return in the prescribed form with the ROC within 30 days of receipt of such declaration. Draft Rule 7.7 prescribes Forms for this purpose and also provides for procedure for this purpose.

1.3  The Central Government is given power to investigate about the beneficial ownership of shares in the company by appointing one or more competent persons under new section 90.

1.4  The above Register of members, debentureholders etc. can be closed for an aggregate period of 45 days in each year, but not exceeding 35 days at a time, u/s. 91 which corresponds to existing section 154. If the above Register is closed for more than the above period, the company and every defaulting officer will be liable to pay penalty of Rs. 5,000/- per day of default subject to maximum of Rs.1 lakh. It may be noted that Section 91 has come into force from 12-09-2013. Draft Rule 7.8 provides for procedure for this purpose.

1.5  If the company fails to maintain the register u/s. 88, the company and every defaulting officer shall be punishable with minimum fine of Rs. 50,000/- which may extend to Rs. 3 lakh. In the case of continuing default fine upto Rs. 10,00/- per day can also be charged.

1.6  If a person required to make declaration of beneficial interest u/s. 89, without reasonable cause, fails to make the declaration, he will be punished with fine upto Rs. 50,000/- . In case of continuing default fine upto Rs. 1,000/- per day can also be charged. Similarly, if the company makes default in filing return giving particulars of these declarations with ROC as required u/s. 89(6), it shall be liable to pay minimum fine of Rs. 500/- which may extend to Rs. 1,000/-. In the case of continuing default, further fine upto Rs. 1,000/- per day for the period of delay can be levied.

2. Annual return:

2.1 New Section 92 which corresponds to existing sections 159, 161 and 162 provides for filing the Annual Return with ROC within 60 days of holding Annual General Meeting. If such AGM is not held the Annual Return should be filed with ROC within 60 days of the last date when AGM was due to be held. In such a case the company will have to file a statement specifying reasons for not holding the AGM in time.

2.2 Broadly stated the Annual Return is to be prepared in the prescribed form containing the following particulars as on the last day of the financial year.

(i) Its Registered Office, principal place of business, particulars of its holding, subsidiary and associate companies.

(ii) Its shares, debentures and other securities and shareholding pattern.

(iii) Its indebtedness.

(iv) Its members and debenture-holders along with changes therein since the close of previous financial year

(v) Its promoters, directors, key managerial personnel (KMP) along with the charges therein since the close of the previous financial year.

(vi) Meetings of Members or a class thereof, Board and its various committees with attendance details.

(vii) Remuneration of Directors and KMP.

(viii) Penalty and punishment imposed on the company, its directors or officers with details of compounding of offenses and appeals made against such penalty or punishment.

(ix) Matters relating to certification of compliances, disclosures as may be prescribed.

(x) Details in respect of Shares held by FIIs giving their names, addresses etc. and percentage of shareholding as may be prescribed.

(xi) Such other matters as may be prescribed.

The annual return is to be signed by a Director and company secretary/company secretary in practice. In the case of one person company and small company, it is to be signed by the company secretary or, if there no secretary, by the director.

In the case of a listed company or such specified companies, as may be prescribed, the Annual Return is required to be certified by a company secretary in practice in the prescribed form.

2.3 An extract of the Annual Return in the prescribed form should form part of the Board Report.

Draft Rules 7.9, 7.10, and 7.12 provide for Forms of Annual Return etc and procedure to be followed for filing the Annual Return with ROC.

2.4  If the company does not file the Annual Return within 60 days as stated above or within the extended time as provided in section 403 with additional fees, the company shall be punishable with the minimum fine of Rs. 50,000/- which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh. Similarly, every defaulting officer will be punishable with imprisonment upto 6 months or with a minimum fine of Rs. 50,000/- which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh or with both. Similar fine can be levied on the company secretary in practice if his certificate is not in conformity with the requirements of the section.

2.5  Section 93 is a new section which provides that every listed company should file a return in the prescribed form with ROC with respect to changes in the number of shares held by promotors and top 10 shareholders within 15 days of such charge. Draft Rule 7.11 prescribes Form No.7.10 for this purpose.

2.6  New sections 94 and 95 which correspond to existing sections 163 and 164 provide for place at which Registers, Returns and other documents required to be maintained by the company shall be kept. These registers, documents etc.will be open for inspection by shareholders, debenture holders etc. Draft Rules 7.13 and 7.14 provide for detailed procedure for this purpose. It is provided that the copies of Annual Returns should be preserved for 8 years and Register of Debenture Holders, Foreign register of Members etc. should be preserved for 15 years.

3. Procedure for General Meetings:

3.1 New sections 96 to 122 deal with procedure to be followed for holding Annual General Meeting, Extra ordinary general meeting and other related matters. These sections are similar to the existing sections 166 to 197. The provisions made in the new sections being similar to existing provisions, some of the important provisions are stated in the following paragraphs.

3.2    Annual General Meeting (Section 96)

(i)    One person company is not required to hold AGM.

(ii)    All other companies have to hold AGM once every year within the same time limit as provided in existing sections 166 and 210. The only difference is that the first AGM which at present can be held within 18 months of date of incorporation will now required to be held within 9 months of the closing of the first financial year.

(iii)    Under existing section 166 AGM can not be held on a ‘Public Holiday’. Now u/s. 96 AGM can be held on a “Public Holiday”. However, it cannot be held on a “National Holiday” as may be declared by the Central Government.

Further, under the new provision it is specifically provided that AGM can be held during business hours i.e. between 9.00 AM and 6.00 PM. The Central Government can grant exemption from this requirement, subject to such conditions which it may impose.

(iv)    If there is a default in holding ay AGM, the Tribunal can, on an application by any member, direct the company to hold such a meeting subject to such conditions as the Tribunal may specify under new section 97.

(v)    Similarly, the Tribunal, on its own or on an application by a Director or member, direct the company to hold any general meeting (other than AGM) subject to such conditions which it may specify under new section 98.

(vi)    If there is default in holding any general meeting, in accordance with the above direction of the Tribunal the company and every defaulting officer of the company will be punishable with fine upto Rs1 lac. In case of continuing default a further fine upto Rs.5000/- per day during which default continues can be levied under new section 99.

3.3    Extraordinary General Meetings:

The procedure for calling an Extraordinary General Meeting in new section 100 is the same as in the existing section 169. This procedure is laid down in Draft Rule 7.15. This section has come into force from 12-09-2013.

3.4    Notices for General Meetings:

(i)    New section 101 provides for notice to be given in writing or through electronic mode 21 clear days before the meeting in the same manner as provided in existing sections 171 and 172. However, a general meeting can be called by giving shorter notice if consent is given by at least 95% of members entitled to vote at such meeting.

(ii)    Explanatory statement is to be annexed with every notice concerning each item of special business to be transacted at the General Meeting. New section 102 which corresponds to existing section 173 provides for this requirement. It explains the material facts in respect of which the explanation as under is to be provided:

(a)    Nature of concern or interest, financial or otherwise in respect of each items of every director, manager, KMP, and their relatives.

(b)    Any other information and facts that may enable members to understand the meaning, scope and implications of the items of business and to take decision thereon.

(iii)    It is further provided in section 102 that if any item of specified business relates or affects any other company, the notice must disclose the extent of interest of every promoter, director, Manager or KMP of the company, if it is more than 2% of the paid up share capital of that company. This section has come into force on 12-09-2013.

(iv)    Where, as a result of the non-disclosure or insufficient disclosure in the statement to be furnished as above by the promoter, director, manager or KMP, any benefit accrues to any of these persons, he shall hold the same in trust for the company and compensate the company to the extent of the benefit received by him.

(v)    In the event of any contravention of this section, the defaulting promoter, director, manager, KMP or relatives of any of them shall be punishable with fine upto Rs.50000/-or 5 times the amount of the benefit received by such person, whichever is more.

(vi)    The procedure for giving Notice of the General Meeting is given in Draft Rule 7.16.

3.5    Quorum for the General Meeting:

Under the existing section 174 quorum required for the General Meeting of members of public companies is 5 members personally present at the meeting, unless the articles stipulate a larger number. New section 103 provides for a quorum based on number of members of the company as under, unless the articles provide for larger numbers.

(i)    5 Members personally present if the number of members on the date of meeting is less than 1,000.

(ii)    15 Members, if the number of members is between 1,000 and 5,000.

(iii)    30 Members, if the number of Members are more than 5,000.

For private companies, the quorum of 2 members continue, as at present. Section 103 has come into force on 12-09-2013.

3.6    Procedure for conducting General Meeting:

(i)    New sections 104 to 116, deal with the procedure for election of chairman, proxies, voting at general meeting etc. These provisions are similar to existing provision in sections 175 to 185 and 187 to 192A. Only section 108 is new. It provides that the Central Government may prescribe class of companies in which members will be allowed to exercise their voting rights by electronic means. It may be noted that Sections 104 to 107, 111 to 114 and 116 have come into force from 12-09-2013.

(ii)    At present, section 190 does not provide for any requirement that members who give special notice should hold some minimum voting power in the company. New section 115, now provides that such special notice for consideration of a resolution as required under the Act or Articles can be given by such number of members holding not less than one percentage of total voting power or holding shares on which such aggregate sum not exceeding Rs. 5 lakh, as may be prescribed, has been paid up. (Refer Draft Rule 7.21).

(iii)    It may be noted that new section 110 provides for passing resolutions by “Postal Ballot”. This provision is similar to existing section 192A. The company can use this procedure in respect of such items of business as the Central Government may by notification provide. (Refer Draft Rule 7.20 (16).

(iv)    Form of Proxy to be given u/s. 105 (Form No.7.11) is prescribed under Draft Rule 7.17. Procedure for voting through electronic means is given in Draft Rule 7.18. Similarly procedure for Poll process is provided in Draft Rule 7.18 and procedure for Postal Ballot is provided in Draft Rule 7.20.

3.7    Resolutions and Agreements to be filed with ROC:

New section 117, which corresponds to existing section 192, provides for filing of Resolutions and Agreements specified in section 117(3) with ROC within 30 days. In the event of contravention of the provision of this section the company shall be punishable with minimum fine of Rs. 5 lakh which may extend to Rs. 25 lakh. Similarly, every defaulting officer shall be punishable with minimum fine of Rs. 1 lakh which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh. Form No. 7.14 is prescribed by Draft Rule 7.22.

3.8    Minutes of Meetings:

(i)    New section 118 corresponds to existing sections 193 to 195 and 197. It provides for maintenance of minutes of proceedings of General Meetings, Board meetings and other meetings. It is specifically provided in this new section that while recording these minutes, the company shall observe the “Secretarial Standards” in this respect, issued ICSI as approved by the Central Government.

(ii)    In the event of non-compliance with the requirement of this section, the company will be liable to penalty of Rs. 25,000/- and every defaulting officer shall be liable to pay penalty of Rs. 5,000/-. If any person is found guilty of tempering with the minutes, he shall be punishable with imprisonment upto 2 years and with minimum fine of Rs. 25,000/- which may extend to Rs. 1 lakh.

(iii)    New section 119 which corresponds existing to section 196 provides for inspection of the minute books of general meetings of the company. If such inspection is refused, monetary penalty similar to the one stated in (ii) above can be levied on the company and the defaulting officer.

(iv)    Detailed procedure for this purpose is provided in Draft Rules 7.23 and 7.24.

3.9    Some New Provisions:

Sections 120 to 122 are new. They provide as under.

(i)    Maintenance and Inspection of Document in Electronic Form Section 120 provides that any document, record, register, minutes etc. which are required to be kept by a company and allowed to be inspected or copied by any person can be kept, inspected or copies given in electronic form in the prescribed manner. This is prescribed in Draft Rule 7.25.

(ii)    Report on AGM

Under Section 121 a listed company is required to prepare in the prescribed manner a report on each AGM stating that such meeting was convened, held and conducted as required under the companies Act. This report is to be filed with ROC within 30 days of conclusion of AGM. Draft Rule 7.26 gives the contents of this Report. In the event of contravention of this provision, the company will be punishable with minimum fine of Rs. 1 lakh which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh. Similarly, every defaulting officer will be punishable with minimum fine of Rs. 25,000/- which may extend to Rs. 1 lakh.

(iii)    One person company

Section 122 provides that sections 98 and 100 to 111 shall not apply to one person company (OPC) . If a company is required to transact any business by ordinary or special resolution u/s. 114, it shall be sufficient in the case of OPC if the said resolution is recorded in the minute book which shall be signed by the Director.

4.  Registration of Charges:

4.1 New Sections 77 to 87 deal with the procedure relating to Registration of charges. These provisions are similar to provisions of sections 125 to 127, 130, 134, 135, 137, 138 and 141 to 143 of the existing Act. For this purpose, section 2(16) defines the word ‘charge’ to mean “An interest or lien created on the property or assets of a company or any of its undertakings or both as Security and includes a Mortgage. Section 2(16) has come into force from 12- 09-2013. Broadly stated, the new provisions are as under.

(i)    U/s. 77 every charge on the property or as-sets (whether tangible or intangible) created by a company (whether public or private) shall be registered with ROC within 30 days of creation of such charge. For this purpose, the prescribed form will have to be filed with the fees. In the event of any delay, ROC can permit the registration of such charge within 300 days on payment of additional fees.

(ii)    The existing section 125(4) requires a company to register only 9 type of charges. Under the new provision every charge created by it on property, assets or undertaking is to be registered u/s. 77.

(ii)    ROC has to give a Certificate of such registration in the prescribed form.

(iv)    If the company fails to register a charge, the person in whose favour charge is created can apply to ROC in the prescribed manner, as provided in section 78.

(v)    ROC has to keep a Register of charges in the prescribed form. This Register will be open to inspection to any person on payment of fees.

(vi)    Any modification of charge is also required to be registered with ROC.

(vii)    On satisfaction of any charge, it is also to be registered with ROC within 30 days. In the event of delay, ROC can permit such registration within 300 days on payment of additional fees.

(viii)    The company has also to maintain a Register of charges in the prescribed manner. This register shall be open to inspection by any member or creditor or by any other person subject to such reasonable restrictions as the company may by its AOA, impose.

(ix)    If the company does not register such creation, modification or satisfaction of charge the company or any other person can apply to the Central Government u/s. 87. The Government can order such registration of charge or its modification, satisfaction etc. on such terms and conditions as it may consider appropriate.

(x)    Draft Rules 6.1 to 6.10 prescribes Forms to be filed with ROC and other procedure to be followed and documents to be maintained for this purpose.

4.2    A new provision is made in section 83. It authorizes the ROC to make entries in the Register of charges if any evidence is produced before him about creation of a charge or modification/satisfaction of charge on any property/assets by a company. ROC has to intimate the concerned parties about making such entry within 30 days.

4.3 If there is any contravention of the provisions, section 86 provides for the following penalties.

(i)    The company shall be punishable with a minimum fine of Rs. 1 lakh which may extend to Rs. 10 lakh.

(ii)    Every defaulting officer shall be punishable with imprisonment upto 6 months or with minimum fine of Rs. 25,000/- which may extend to Rs. 1 lakh or with both.

The above penalty can be levied even if the company has complied with the above provisions but filed the particulars of charges, modification or satisfaction etc. of the charges within the extended time as stated above. This section has come into force on 12-09-2013.

5.    Declaration and Payment of Dividend:


Declaration of Dividend:

5.1 New Sections 123 to 127 provide for declaration and payment of Dividends by a Company. These Sections are similar to existing sections 205 to 207. Broadly stated these provisions are as under:-

(i)    The dividend can be declared and paid only out of the following profits;

(a)    Profits of the financial year, after providing depreciation as stated in Section 123(2) read with Schedule II.

(b)    Accumulated profits of the earlier years, after providing for depreciation u/s 123(2) read with Schedule II.

(c)    Out of money provided by Central or State Government for payment of dividend in pursuance of a guarantee given by the Government.

(ii)    Existing section 205(2A) provides that a dividend can be declared for any financial year only after transferring such percentage of profit not exceeding 10%, as may be prescribed. In the new section 123, it is provided that such dividend may be declared or paid after transferring such percentage of its profits for the financial year to reserves as the Company may consider appropriate. Thus a Company can declare or pay dividend in any year even without making such transfer to reserves.

(iii)    In the event of inadequacy or absence of profits in any financial year, the company can declare dividend out of its “Free Reserves” in accordance with the prescribed Rules.(Refer Draft Rule 8.1)

(iv)    Board of Directors can declare “Interim Dividend” out of surplus available in the Profit & Loss Account and out of profits of the Financial Year upto the date of declaration of such dividend. If the Company has made a loss upto the end of the quarter, preceding the date of declaration of interim dividend, the Board cannot declare interim dividend at a rate higher than the average dividend declared by the Company during the preceding 3 Financial Years.

(v)    The amount of dividend, including interim dividend, has to be deposited in a Separate Scheduled Bank Account within 5 days from the date of declaration.

(vi)    It will be possible for the Company to utilise the profits and reserves for issue of Bonus
Shares or for payment of Unpaid amount on partly paid shares.

(vii)    It may be noted that a Company cannot declare or pay dividend if it has made de-fault in repayment of Deposits or Interest as provided in sections 73 and 74 till such time when the default continues.

(viii)    Draft Rules 8.1 and 8.2 provides for certain conditions to be complied with before declaring dividend.


5.2  Unclaimed Dividend Account:

(i)    If any dividend is not claimed or paid within 30 days from the date of declaration, it has to be transferred, within 7 days, to a “Unpaid Dividend Account” to be opened in a Scheduled Bank.

(ii)    If any amount of unpaid dividend is not claimed or paid within 90 days, the company has to put the list of such unpaid dividend on the website of the company or other approved website in the prescribed manner. Draft Rule 8.3 provides for procedure for this purpose.

(iii)    In the event of delay in transferring the amount to such special account, the company will have to pay 12% P.A. interest on the unclaimed dividend amount.

(iv)    If the unclaimed dividend is not claimed by any shareholder for 7 years, the company will have to transfer the said amount to “Investor Education and Protection Fund” as provided in section 125. Procedure for this is provided in Draft Rule 8.4.

(v)    Section 124(6) makes a departure from the existing provisions of section 205C and provides that even the shares on which dividend is not claimed for 7 years will have to be transferred to the above Fund. For this purpose, a statement in the prescribed form is to be filed with the Administrator of the Fund. The shareholder whose shares are so transferred to the above Fund will have to make a claim for return of such shares with the Administrator of the Fund in the prescribed manner. Draft Rule 8.5 gives detailed procedure for this purpose.

5.3    Investor Education and Protection Fund:

New Section 125, corresponding to existing section 205C provides for establishment of Investor Education and Protection Fund. Central Government is authorised to establish this Fund and prescribe Rules for its administration as provided in section 125. Besides the unclaimed Dividend outstanding for 7 years and shares relating to such dividend, the company has also to transfer the following amounts which have remained unclaimed for 7 years.

(a)    Application Money received by the Company for allotment of shares or securities and due for refund.

(b)    Matured Deposits due with Interest.

(c)    Matured Debentures due with interest.

(d)    Sale proceeds of Fractional Shares arising out of issue of Bonus Shares, Merger and Amalgamation.

(e)    Redemption amount of Preference Shares remaining unpaid or unclaimed.

Detailed provisions are made in section 125 for administration of “Investment Education and Protection Fund”, investment of funds, return of the funds to claimants and utilisation of surplus funds. Central Government has to prescribe Rules for this purpose. It is also provided that the existing balance in Investor Education and Protection fund created u/s. 205C of the existing Act shall also be transferred to the new fund to be established under new section 125. Further, amounts transferred to the existing fund u/s. 205C (2) (a) to (d) of the existing Act can be refunded to the concerned person according to the Rules to be prescribed under new section 125. Detailed provision is given in Draft Rules 8.6 and 8.7.

5.4    Penalties for Defaults:

(i)    If a Company contravenes provisions relating to unclaimed Dividends as stated in section 124, it will be punishable with a minimum fine of Rs. 5 lakh which may extend to Rs. 25 lakh. Similarly every defaulting officer will be punishable with a minimum fine of Rs. 1 lakh which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh.

(ii)    If a Company has declared dividend but the same has not been paid or the warrant for the dividend has not been posted within 30 days from the date of declaration, the following penalties can be levied.

(a)    Every director who is knowingly a party to the default will be punishable with imprisonment upto 2 years and with minimum fine of Rs. 1, 000/- per day during which such default continues.

(b)    The Company will have to pay interest @ 18% p.a. on the dividend amount for the period of delay.

Proviso to section 127 states that under cer-tain circumstances the above penalty under (ii)will not be leviable.

(iii)    It may be noted that the above minimum fine is leviable at fixed amount without reference to the amount of dividend in respect of which the default has occurred. To the extent the above penalty provisions are harsh.

(iv)    Section 127 has come into force from 12-09-2013.

6.    To Sum Up

6.1. The above provisions for Management and Administration of companies in the New Act are more or less on the same lines as the existing provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. These provisions are mostly procedural. The company management will have to comply with the new procedure in the day to day working. Some of the procedures have been streamlined in order to improve Corporate Governance and also to safeguard the interest of the stakeholders.

6.2 The provisions relating to declaration and payment of dividend have also been streamlined under the new Act. In order to protect the interest Fixed Depositors it is now provided that no dividend on equity shares can be declared during the period when default relating to repayment of Fixed Deposit or Interest due continues. However, the minimum fine to be levied for default relating to payment of dividend is fixed without reference to the amount of dividend involved. To this extent the provision is also harsh.

6.3 Taking an overall view of the provisions relating to management and administration of companies under the new Act, including provisions relating to declaration and payment of dividends, acceptance of public deposits and registration of charges it can be stated that these will streamline and simplify the day to day procedural requirements. The officers in charge of the management and administration of companies will have to be vigilant in complying with the new provisions to avoid any defaults. If the new provisions are complied with in the spirit in which they are enacted, the quality of Corporate Governance will improve to a great extent in the coming years.

GAP in GAAP— Acquisition of a Company with a Negative Net Worth

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Consider Company X with assets of Rs. 120 and liabilities of Rs. 220, and consequently a negative net worth of Rs. 100, which comprises of accumulated losses of Rs. 120 and share capital of Rs. 20. Company Y acquires 51% shares of Company X, directly from promoters, for a consideration of Rs. 25. Accordingly, Company Y would recognize in the consolidated financial statements (CFS) a net liability of Rs100, goodwill of Rs. 76 and a negative minority interest (MI) of Rs. 49. The question is how does Company Y account for the negative MI of Rs. 49?

View 1: The negative MI of Rs. 49 is reduced againstthe parent’s reserves in the CFS.
The author believes that it may not be appropriate to record the unabsorbed losses on MI at the date of acquisition in the parent’s reserves in CFS. Recording unabsorbed minority losses in the parent’s reserves in CFS would carry a presumption that the parent always owned the entity. This presumption is obviously not correct and hence this view is not tenable.

View 2: The negative MI of Rs. 49 is included in goodwill on acquisition
In accordance with paragraph 13 of AS 21, goodwill is determined as follows

(a) the cost to the parent of its investment in each subsidiary and the parent’s portion of equity of each subsidiary, at the date on which investment in each subsidiary is made, should be eliminated;

(b) any excess of the cost to the parent of its investment in a subsidiary over the parent’s portion of equity of the subsidiary, at the date on which investment in the subsidiary is made, should be described as goodwill to be recognised as an asset in the consolidated financial statements;

The parent’s portion of the equity at the date of acquisition should also include the MI losses (since the minority does not absorb it the parent will have to absorb it). Thus on the basis of the above MI losses should also be included in goodwill. The total goodwill should therefore be Rs. 125. This view seems an acceptable alternative.

View 3: The negative MI of Rs. 49 is included in MI
Paragraph 26 of AS 21 Consolidated Financial Statements states: “The losses applicable to the minority in a consolidated subsidiary may exceed the minority interest in the equity of the subsidiary. The excess, and any further losses applicable to the minority, are adjusted against the majority interest except to the extent that the minority has a binding obligation to, and is able to, make good the losses. If the subsidiary subsequently reports profits, all such profits are allocated to the majority interest until the minority’s share of losses previously absorbed by the majority has been recovered.” Paragraph 13(e) states: Minority interests in the net assets consist of: (i) the amount of equity attributable to minorities at the date on which investment in a subsidiary is made; and (ii) the minorities’ share of movements in equity since the date the parent subsidiary relationship came in existence.

Paragraph 26, prohibits the recognition of negative MI, unless there is a binding obligation by the minority to make good the losses. Thus no negative MI can be recognised in the CFS. However a careful reading of paragraph 13(e) suggests that losses at the date of acquisition relating to minority are attributable to minority.

Thus a negative MI can be recorded at the date of acquisition. However, losses subsequent to the acquisition should not be attributed to the MI.

View 4: The negative MI of Rs. 49 is ignored
It is not possible to ignore the negative MI, as the balance sheet would not tally. Hence this view is ruled out.

The author’s opinion is that View 2 & View 3 are appropriate under the circumstances.

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TS-527-ITAT-2013(Coch) English Indian Clays Ltd vs. ACIT (IT) A.Ys: 2004-2007, Dated: 18-10-2013

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Section 9(1)(vii) – Providing report on market survey and identifying potential customers are consultancy services taxable as FTS under the Act.

Facts:

The Taxpayer, an Indian company, had entered into an agreement with a Foreign Company (FCo) to study the market situation in South East Asia for the product manufactured by the Taxpayer. The agreement referred to these services as ‘consultancy services’.

The Tax Authority observed that the services are in the nature of consultancy charges under the Act and liable for withholding taxes as FCo did not carry out marketing services but was required to conduct market survey and identify potential customers.

However, the Taxpayer argued that FCo was engaged only for the purpose of marketing the Taxpayer’s product in South East Asian countries.The nature of the transaction is required to be determined on the basis of the substance and not by the nomenclature. Hence the payments cannot be considered as consultancy charges. .

Held:

The work of FCo is to identify the potential customers and file a report regarding the market strategy and developmental studies. The Agreement does not enable FCo to market the products of Taxpayer in South East Asian countries. FCo had to provide a market survey report based on which the Taxpayer could market its product. Hence the payments were in the nature of consultancy charges taxable under the provisions of the Act.

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TS-511-ITAT-2013(Coch) US Technology Resources Pvt Ltd vs. ACIT A.Ys: 2007-2008, Dated: 27-09-2013

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Article 12(4), India-USA DTAA – Provision of advisory services in relation to assisting in management and decision making are technical in nature and satisfies the test of ‘make available’ as stipulated under the India-US DTAA. Accordingly it is taxable as fees for included services (FIS).

Facts:
The Taxpayer is an Indian company (ICo) engaged in providing software development services to the customers based in India.

ICo had engaged an American company (FCo) to provide assistance, advice and support to ICo in management, decision making, sales and business development, financial decision making, legal matters and public relations activities, treasury service, risk management service and any other management support as may be mutually agreed between the parties.

For the above services, ICo made certain payments to FCo without deducting taxes and claimed the deduction for the same. I Co contended that the services rendered by FCo are mainly in the form of assistance in decision making; therefore, such services are clearly in the nature of management services, which is outside the ambit of definition of “FIS” under India USA DTAA. Further, it was argued that these services do not ‘make available’ any technical knowledge or expertise such that the person acquiring the service is enabled to apply the technology.

However the Tax Authority disallowed the payments on the grounds that such payments to non-residents were in the nature of consultancy fees on which tax was required to be withheld u/s. 195 of the Act. Also as soon as the advice or support is received, the same is available to ICo for using them in the decision making process of the management. Therefore, it may not be correct to say that the technical services were not ‘made available’ to ICo.

In terms of Article 12(4) of India-USA DTAA, FIS means payments of any kind to any person in consideration for rendering of any technical or consultancy services (including through the provision of services of technical or other personnel), if such services made available technical knowledge, etc.

Held:
Memorandum of Understanding between India and USA makes it clear that only services which are technical in nature can be considered for included services. Even consultancy services should be technical in nature.

The services rendered by FCo were used by ICo for making various management decisions. Tribunal also referred to the definitions of terms “management” and “decision making” from various management authors and observed that “Decision making is an act of selecting the suitable solution to the problems from various available alternative solutions to guide actions towards achievement of desired objectives”.

The knowledge accumulated by FCo through study, experience and experimentation with regard to management, finance, risk, etc. of a particular business is nothing but technical knowledge. In the era of technology transformation, the information/ experience gathered by FCo relating to financial risk management of business is technical knowledge. The knowledge and expertise of FCo would be used to support ICo in selecting suitable solution after considering all the alternatives available. Further FCo was giving training to the employees of ICo in making use of the inputs, experience, experimentation, etc. for taking better decision in order to achieve the desired objectives/goals.

The information and expertise made available to ICo was very much available with them and it could be used in future whenever the occasion arises.

Thus the management services provided by FCo were in the nature of FIS as per India-USA DTAA and subject to withholding tax in India.

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TS-555-ITAT-2013(Mum) M/s. A.P. Moller vs. DDIT (IT) A.Ys: 1997-2004, Dated: 08-11-2013

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Article 9, India-Denmark DTAA – Fiscally transparent Danish partnership qualifies for benefits under India-Denmark DTAA; management of a business by a representative cannot lead to an inference that the income of the entity whose business is managed belongs to the representative.

Facts:
The Taxpayer is a partnership firm established under the laws of Denmark. The Taxpayer is “managing owner” of two shipping companies (FCos) incorporated under Danish law. The shipping business and the vessels belong to FCos, which are engaged in the shipping business in international traffic at the global level.

FCos were tax resident of Denmark and also had their place of effective management (POEM) in Denmark.

The Taxpayer managed the shipping business of FCos throughout the world, including India, and also filed corporate tax return on behalf of FCos in India (which had been merged), showing the gross receipts from the shipping income in India and claiming benefits under Article 9 of India-Denmark DTAA wherein profits derived from operation of ships in international traffic are taxable only in the country in which the POEM of the enterprise is situated.

The Tax Authority contended that income from shipping business is taxable in the hands of the Taxpayer as there is no difference between FCos and the Taxpayer, which was acting as the former’s beneficial owner. A person who is a resident of contracting State is entitled to treaty benefit of a DTAA if income of such a person is subjected to tax in the resident country. As per the tax laws of Denmark, the partnership firm is regarded as a fiscally transparent entity. It is not taxed at the entity level but its partners are taxed on the income earned by the partnership firm. Since the Taxpayer is a fiscally transparent entity, the India-Denmark DTAA benefits are not available to it.

Held:
On applicability of benefits of India-Denmark DTAA to a fiscally transparent entity:
• A person who is resident of a contracting state is entitled to treaty benefits if it is liable to tax in that state. As per Danish laws, the partnership firm, as such, is not taxable.
• However, the entire income of the partnership firm is taxed in the hands of its partners and, therefore, the entire income earned by the partnership firm can be said to be fully taxable in the resident state.
• As long as income of the partnership is taxed, albeit in the hands of the partners in the resident state, the India-Denmark DTAA benefits cannot be denied. The basic purpose is whether or not the entire income is taxable in the resident state. The mode of taxability, whether in the hands of partnership or the partners, cannot be given much credence so long as the income is fully taxed in the resident state.
• Reliance was placed on the Tribunal’s ruling in the case of Linklaters LLP, [2012] 132 TTJ (Mum.) 20, to conclude that, even though the partnership firm is a transparent entity, once its income and profit is taxed in the hands of the partners, the treaty benefits should be extended to the partnership firm.

On taxability of shipping income:

• As per the Articles of Association of FCos, the Taxpayer acts as a representative of FCo and, in that capacity, it acts and carries out obligations on behalf of FCo and also files corporate tax return in India on its behalf.
• The Taxpayer can be compared to a CEO of a company who is managing the affairs of the company and this does not lead to any inference that the income of the company belongs to the CEO.
• Thus, the shipping income belongs to FCo only and not to the Taxpayer. Accordingly, the exemption under Article 9 was available to FCo, being resident of Denmark.

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Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P., Lucknow, [2012] 47 VST 66 (All)

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Sales Tax-Sale Price-Goods Kept in Bonded Warehouse by The Manufacturer Outside the State- Excise Duty Paid by The Purchaser Outside the State-Forms Part of Turnover-section 2(h) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Facts:

The company had transferred petroleum products from its bonded warehouse to bonded warehouse of other marketing companies situated outside the State of UP and excise duty was paid by the purchaser of goods when goods were removed from the bonded warehouse. The assessing authorities included the amount of excise duty paid by the purchaser in turnover of sales and levied tax under the CST Act. The assessment order passed by the assessing authority was confirmed by the Tribunal. The petitioner company filed a petition before the Allahabad High court against the order passed by the Tribunal.

Held

The excise duty is leviable on the manufacture of product and it is at the point of removal. No goods can be removed from the factory or warehouse without the payment of duty. Therefore the initial liability to pay the excise duty was on the manufacturer while removing goods from the factory to its warehouse. However, if the permission is granted to remove the goods from the factory or warehouse to another warehouse licensed u/s. 140 belonging to some other person, without payment of duty, the duty is payable on the clearance of goods from such warehouse. In such circumstances the payment of duty is only deferred or extended from the stage of removal of goods from the factory to warehouse of the manufacturer or purchaser, but the liability to pay the excise duty, which is chargeable and payable under the act, by the manufacturer does not cease. The incidence of excise duty is directly relatable to manufacture but its collection can be deferred to later stage as a measure of convenience or expediency.

The court after following various decisions of the SC held that the excise duty paid by the purchaser is liable to be included in sale price for the purpose of the levy of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

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State of Tamil Nadu vs. Sri Ram Packages [2012] 47 VST 59 (Mad)

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Central Sales Tax–Deemed Export-Sale of Packing Material to Exporter-Export by Agent of Purchasing Exporter-Exempt ion Allowed-Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, section 5(3)

Facts
The Department filed a petition before the Madras High Court against the order of Tribunal allowing claim of exemption from payment of tax on sale of packing material to the exporter although actual export was made by the agent.

Held

The Tribunal has recorded findings of facts that as per the contract the person who exported yarn is an agent of the buyer and concluded the transaction as falling under the category of principal/ agency transaction and allowed the claim. The Tribunal has thus reached a finding of a fact with reference to the transaction of the assessee by way of agency sale to an exporter and there is no scope to hold otherwise. Accordingly, the petition filed by the department was dismissed.

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Modi Industries Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and Others [2012] 47 VST 47 (All)

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Sick Industrial Unit-BIFR-Recovery Of Dues-As Per Assessment Order After Remand-Passed After Cut Off Date-For Period Prior to Cut Off Date-Is Current Outstanding Dues-Protected By Rehabilitation Scheme-Sick Industrial Companies (Special Protection) Act, 1985.

Facts
BIFR by order dated 12-03-2007, prepared rehabilitation scheme for the petitioner having cutoff date as of 30-06-2007. The UP Commercial Tax Department applied to BIFR to allow recovery of current dues. The BIFR passed order dated 26- 03-2008 permitting the Department to recover the current dues. The company filed writ petition before the Allahabad High Court against the said order passed by the BIFR.

Held
The words “outstanding dues” and “current dues” are to be understood in the context of rehabilitation scheme prepared by the BIFR, and the object and purpose of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Protection) Act, 1985. The objectof preparing rehabilitation scheme is to give a protective umbrella to the sick units for rehabilitation to provide for deferment or for a different treatment of the payment of current dues, prior to the cut-off date which may be termed as outstanding dues. The current dues for the purpose of rehabilitation scheme are those which fall due after the cut-off date. The liabilities created, taxes falling due, assessed and demand rise after the cut-off date, do not fall within the provision of section 22 of the SICA Act. Any demand in pursuance of the assessment order, prior to the cut-off date had to be classified as outstanding dues to be protected by the scheme. In the case of reassessment, after remand of a period prior to cut-off date, the dues do not partake the character of current dues and is protected by the rehabilitation scheme. Accordingly, the writ petition filed by the company was allowed.

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[2013] 38 taxmann.com 298 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT), Kothari Infotech Ltd. vs. CCE

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Whether refund in respect of service tax paid on services exported in terms of Export of Service Rules, 2005 can be denied, if exporter service provider failed to file declaration required under Notification No. 12/2005? Held, No.

Facts:

The appellant was marketing agent of various printing machines in India supplied by its foreign supplier. It filed refund claim on 03-11-2008 in respect of service tax paid between the period from 13-04-06 to 09-02-07 under the category of “Business Auxiliary Service” on the ground that it was providing services as a commission agent to its foreign supplier and consideration in the form of commission in convertible foreign exchange. The appellant further contended that it was never liable to service tax under the category of “Business Auxiliary Service.”

Held:

The Tribunal held that, the services in the instant case constitute ‘export’ under Export of Service Rules, 2005 and hence, Rule 5 of Export of Service Rules, 2005 would be applicable. Non-filing of declaration vis-à-vis satisfying all the conditions under the said Rule 5 read with notification 12/2005-ST dated 19th April 2005 requires to be examined, the Tribunal referred to the judgment in the case of Manubhai & Co. vs. CST [Final Order No. A/1446/2010-WZB/Ahd., dated 17-9-2010 had clearly held that the requirement of filing of declaration is of procedural nature under notification and delay, if any, can be condoned. The Tribunal thus allowed refund claim file subject to the appellant filing declarations as required under the said notification read with Export of Service Rules, 2005 before the adjudicating authority.
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[2013] 38 taxmann.com 142 (Mumbai – CESTAT) I2IT (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE

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Whether mess charges and hostel fees, laptop charges are to be included in the value of ‘Commercial Training and Coaching Services’? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant was engaged in imparting education to students enrolled with them for various courses in fields of management, engineering and information technology. Issue before the Tribunal was whether the appellant is liable to pay service tax on that part of the value including mess charges, hostel charges and payment for the laptops supplied to the students.

Held:
The Tribunal held that, these charges are not consideration received for the providing the service of commercial coaching or training. Mess charges and hostel fees are for providing boarding and lodging to the students and cannot be attributed to the training or coaching rendered. Similarly, the amount recovered for the supply of laptops also cannot be attributed to the services rendered (it relates to supply of goods) and therefore, these amounts collected towards mess charges, hostel charges and laptops are excludable from the taxable value of the service rendered.

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2013 38 taxmann.com 145 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Gargi Consultants (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE, Allahabad

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Whether extended period is invokable if decision of Tribunal during the relevant period is in favour of the assessee but is subsequently reversed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court? Held, No.

Facts:

The appellant was engaged in providing “computer training” services during FY 2004-05 and was registered under the category of “Commercial Coaching & Training” service. Show-cause was issued demanding service tax on the ground that during the period July 2004 to March 2005 it has provided “computer training” and has not discharged service tax liability on the same. Appellant contended that that during the relevant period, all the decisions of the Tribunal were in its favour. Appellant also contended that the ‘computer training’ was vocational training and therefore exempt vide notification 9/2003-S.T. 12-06-2003 read with subsequent notification No. 24/2004-ST dated 10- 09-2004. Further it stated that the exemption in relation to ‘computer training’ was withdrawn vide notification 16-06-2005 and thus the same cannot have retrospective effect.

Held:

The Tribunal held that, although the issue on merits was no longer res integra, during the relevant period as Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunwin (supra) held during the period from 10-09-2004 to 15-06-2005, an assessee providing “computer training” services was required to pay service tax in as much as the subsequent notification effective from 16-06-2005 was only a clarificatory notification and was effective retrospectively. The Tribunal further held as such, there was a bona fide belief on the part of the appellant not to pay service tax on the “computer training services” on the basis of decisions being in its favour at that point of time. Thus, in the instant case, there was a bona fide belief on the part of the appellant and hence invocation of extended period was not justifiable.
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2013] 38 taxmann.com 67 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) Gujarat State Petronet Ltd vs. CCE, Ahmedabad

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Whether service receiver can avail CENVAT credit of duties in respect of materials used by the service provider, as the service provider opted for benefit available to him under notifications specifically disentitling him to avail CENVAT Credit? Held, No.

Facts:

Appellant was engaged in rendering taxable service under the category of “Transport of goods through pipelines or other conduit service” u/s. 65(105)(zzz) of the Finance Act, 1994. It has adopted Engineering Procurement and Commissioning (EPC) model for laying of oil and gas transmission pipelines for which it received services of various EPC contractors for fabrication, assembly with equipments and devices, installation and commissioning of a pipeline system. The contract between the appellant and the contractors was on a lump sum basis; yet, two invoices were issued, one for sale of the materials (including pipes) and the other for the services rendered by them. EPC contractors claimed deduction in respect of the value of materials and goods sold in the course of rendering the taxable service and also did not take CENVAT credit of duties charged thereon under Notification 12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003. However, the appellant availed credit of duty paid on the pipes by the EPC contractors on the basis of duty paying documents issued by the manufacturer wherein, the pipes were in the name of the contractors and appellant was shown as consignee. The appellant used the said credit to discharge its service tax liability on its output service of “transportation of goods through pipelines or other conduit services”. Department denied such CENVAT credit to the appellant.

Held:

Exemption notification has to be interpreted strictly and when the explanation to Rule 3(7) of CENVAT Credit Rules specifically provides that once the benefit of a notification is availed, no credit would be available under Rule 3 in respect of duty paid on the inputs/capital goods in respect of which a service provider or a manufacturer has availed the benefit of Notification No. 12/2003. The restriction applies not only on the service provider but extends to the service recipient, also. Further, pipes were used for construction of pipeline by the EPC contractors and pipeline system is supplied/sold to the appellant. Pipes can be considered as inputs only for provision of service of construction/erection of pipelines and not otherwise. The Tribunal stated that the definition of input/capital goods in case of service provider is stricter than that applicable to the manufacturer. Therefore, pipes were ineligible for credit as inputs/capital goods. The Tribunal also held that the CENVAT credit on construction services pertaining to the period prior to 01-04-2011 is an eligible input service. The Tribunal also held that in case the service recipient has purchased material and given to the service provider and the same is utilised by the service provider for provision of its service and the material is supplied back to the service recipient, the service recipient is entitled to CENVAT credit if all other requirements of the definition of inputs/capital goods are satisfied. The Tribunal further held that in case of materials being bought by the service recipient and given to the service provider, CENVAT credit cannot be denied on the ground that the service recipient is not registered as first/second stage dealer, Rule 9(2) may be invoked which provides discretionary powers to the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner to allow CENVAT credit in respect of defective documents, if satisfied. However, charge of suppression was not upheld noting that non-disclosure of additional information to department cannot amount to suppression of facts.
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2013 (32) STR 93 (Tri.-Del) Mahindra World City Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur – I

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For tax paid on services consumed outside SEZ, exemption is not available under Notification No. 4/2004-ST dated 31st March, 2004.

In case service tax is paid on such services, the refund application should be filed u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 within 1 year from the relevant date as no procedure was prescribed under the said notification 4/2004.

Service recipient can claim refund of service tax only when incidence of service tax is not passed on.

Refund under Notification no. 9/2009-ST dated 4th March, 2009 is available subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions only.

Facts:
The appellant paid service tax due to ambiguity in Notification No. 4/2004-ST dated 31st March, 2004. Therefore, the appellant filed a refund claim in view of section 26(e) of the SEZ Act, 2005 read with Rule 31 of the SEZ Rules, 2006 which states that no service tax is leviable in relation to authorised operations in SEZ. The refund got rejected on the following grounds:

• Refund can be filed by the person who pays service tax and not by service recipient
• Unjust enrichment
• Part amount on the basis of time bar
• No provisions to refund service tax paid on services consumed outside SEZ.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that since service tax was not payable under Notification No. 4/2004-ST dated 31st March, 2004 but was paid by the appellant, they could claim the benefit of refund of service tax. However, there being no procedure to claim refund under the said Notification, the refund application ought to have been filed under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. The Tribunal held that refund claim was not filed within 1 year from the relevant date i.e., the date of payment of service tax and accordingly, part refund was held to be time barred. Since there were no provisions to refund service tax paid on services consumed outside SEZ, the Commissioner (Appeals) order upheld the rejection. Service recipient can claim refund of service tax only when incidence of service tax was not passed on. In the present case, there was no evidence to prove absence of unjust enrichment and thus refund was not available to the appellant. Though part period was covered by Notification No. 9/2009-ST dated 4th March, 2009, since the appellant had not filed refund claim under the said Notification No. 9/2009-ST and in absence of evidence on records of fulfilment of conditions prescribed under the notification, refund was not allowed.

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2013 (32) STR 217 (Tri.-Del.) Surya Consultants vs. CCEx., Jaipur-I

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Tribunal should follow the decision of jurisdictional High Court in case where contradictory judgements of other High Court exists—If any other decision discusses both the decisions then it should also be considered.

Facts:

Having been imposed penalty u/s.s 77 & 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 on confirmation of demand of tax, the appellant challenged the decision by relying on the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in CCE vs. First Flight Courier Ltd. 2011 (22) STR 622 (P&H). The respondent relied on the decision of Kerala High Court in Asst. Commr. of CE vs. Krishna Poduval 2006 (1) STR 185 (Ker) for imposition of penalties u/s.s 76 & 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Held:

Delhi Bench fell within the jurisdiction of Punjab & Haryana High Court and thus its decision had to be followed and not the contradictory decision of the other High Court pronounced before the said decision. The Tribunal also held that both the decisions stood discussed in CCE Haldia vs. Mittal Technopak Pvt. Ltd. 2012-TIOL-1507-CESTAT-KOL. This decision should have also been considered. The Tribunal followed the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court and set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) with consequential relief.
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Judicious economics – Time to consider the economic impact of recent SC judgments

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The Supreme Court is amongst India’s most respected and trusted institutions. Its rulings are rarely questioned on legal merits and the only way to get around the ones that cause discomfort to the government is to amend the law. The country can take great comfort from the stature and credibility of this institution when it comes to enforcing the rule of law. However, as desirable as it is that laws should be strictly enforced, there is a flip side to this. Significant decisions by the Supreme Court often have significant economic consequences. At no other time has this been more obvious than the present.

Over the past two years, a number of judgments have, notwithstanding their rectitude, had enormous macroeconomic impacts. The banning of iron ore mining in Karnataka and Goa significantly reduced exports of ore, which declined by over $4 billion over a two-year period. The coal imbroglio led to the Supreme Court cancelling all the licences that were issued to private entities, making the country dependent on imports for the foreseeable future. India, with its enormous thermal coal reserves, is now importing over $8 billion worth of coal – mainly to run power plants, which, ironically, were set up close to domestic coal beds. Likewise, the 2G telecom scandal, which resulted in the cancellation of several licences, disrupted the plans of several major foreign telecom companies, which had seen India as an attractive market for expansion. Potential foreign investors will now be extremely wary of entering the country with the risk that supposedly legitimate agreements and contracts are suddenly declared illegal. All these instances have contributed to an enormous increase in the economy’s external vulnerability, with the first two making a huge dent in the current account deficit and the third likely to make India a less attractive destination for foreign direct investment.

A number of fundamental questions arise here. First, whatever the legal merits of each instance of judicial action, should the Supreme Court not routinely consider the potential economic consequences of its decisions? It is clearly not required to do so now, but it would be reasonable to argue that the rule of law and economic well-being are important determinants of social welfare. If indeed the Supreme Court had considered the economic consequences, would its rulings have been somewhat different – perhaps allowing for a tightly monitored but phased compliance with environmental regulations in the case of iron ore, and an assessment of the genuineness of parties in the licence allocation processes? From a larger perspective, though, there is a particularly troubling question. Did the Indian economy achieve its best ever growth performance during 2003-08 on the basis of widespread violations of various laws and regulations? As compliance is more strictly enforced, is slower growth an inevitability? Only time will answer this question. Meanwhile, while there can be no compromise on regulatory compliance and the rule of law, a balance between this objective and its economic consequences needs to be worked out so that it can be achieved without too high a price being paid. It would be good practice for the Supreme Court to commission a rigorous economic impact analysis on key issues coming up before it while making a final ruling.

(Source: Business Standard dated 23.10.2013)
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Political Funding – Kejriwal gets it Right: Screen all Parties

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A probe ordered into the sources of funding of a political party — whether that order comes from the government itself or is prompted by the judiciary — would seem a move against a primary source of corruption in India. But why should such a probe be limited to one single party? Thus, while the Centre says it will investigate whether the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) violated rules on its sources of funding, it makes for an utterly skewed situation when other parties are not subject to a similar investigation. Reform of political funding is a key, perhaps the most significant, part of combating the malaise of corruption in India. As long as parties do not disclose their sources of income and how that money is spent, political corruption will continue to facilitate corruption within the wider polity.

Unless the move to investigate the transparency claims of the AAP widens into probing the secretive nature of how other parties — including the Congress and the BJP — collect funds, it would seem to be a bullying tactic against a political opponent. To its credit, AAP has maintained it can account for every donation it receives. The website of the party does have a donors list. And this is a welcome paradigm shift. There is nothing even remotely similar from the BJP and the Congress — the two parties facing the biggest threat from the AAP in the looming Delhi polls. And the AAP is perfectly right when it asks that the BJP and Congress be subjected to similar levels of transparency.

There is no comparison between the declared funds of AAP and that of the Congress and BJP. Add the amounts political parties do not declare, and we will have a humungous amount of money. Reforming such political funding is the larger goal. Targeting only a small, new political party is petty vendetta.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 13.11.2013).

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Fizz has Gone Out of India

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India has gone from a ‘must-invest’ to a ‘mustdeal- with’ country, PepsiCo Chairman and CEO Indra Nooyi said, expressing the ambivalence that many overseas businesses feel about a country that’s been tarnished by allegations of rampant political corruption, retrospective changes in law, policy reforms getting stuck and, to top it all off, an economic slump.

Uncertainties in tax policy, poor infrastructure and lack of clarity are among problems facing investors in India.

“‘Must invest’ means it’s a destination and GDP is growing. ‘Must deal with’ means there are infrastructure issues, the taxation policy is not clear or transparent. So people are saying, ‘Do I have to deal with India?’”

India-born Nooyi, who’s held the top job at PepsiCo for seven years, is still betting on the country as one of the company’s strongest markets.

Issues in India: Nooyi

“You have to fix the whole system,” she said. “Foreign investment can create the push, but the country has to create the pull, and if the country gives the pull, you can get lot of investments.” Nooyi said she asked Chidambaram about the minimum growth rate India needs to remain a healthy economy. “He said we need 8% growth, to stay healthy and come out of chronic unemployment. That’s an attractive growth rate if India can get back to it. That’s the growth rate he would like for India in the long term,” she said.

Nooyi said the fundamental reasons for investing in India haven’t gone away. “The middle class is still growing… You have a thriving striving democracy. Last 15 years, India has seen periods of incredible growth and years of sluggishness here and there,” she said.

“If you look at India, it has a fantastic population base — young, middle class still big and growing, an entrepreneurial culture, thriving democracy, a country that in the long-term still has lots of potential. We have to invest in the long-term fundamentals of the country. Hopefully, if companies keep showing their confidence in India, others will follow and the growth will pick up too.”

(Source: Extracts from an Article in the
Economic Times dated 12.11.2013)
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Giving the Babu a spine

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By asking that braces and struts be provided from all sides, will the Supreme Court be able to buttress the civil service spine so that it stands straight instead of bending over backwards, forward and sideways? Somehow, I doubt it. First, it is not certain that governments will do what the court has ordered. If the legislation asked for is not passed in three months, whom will the court haul up? The chief minister, or the speaker? That could provoke a constitutional crisis.

Second, some of what the court suggests as safeguards are already available to civil servants but have been used rarely. For instance, an officer can record oral instructions and send them to the minister for confirmation. One reason why this does not get done must be the threat of instant transfer to the boondocks, but an equally valid one is that officers have their own agendas and get into patron-client relationships with politicians fairly early in their careers. In a quid pro quo situation, no one is going to ask for written instructions. Third, the court assumes that officials would want a civil service board to decide on postings; this is far from clear, because one of the principal reasons why officials kowtow to ministers is the desire for preferred postings (or out-of-turn house allotments, or junkets). In short, the assumption that politicians are sharks preying upon helpless civil servants is a piece of fiction.

Fourth, no system can prevent a chief minister from choosing his own secretary as well as the chief secretary of the state. Between them, these two gentlemen pretty much have a clear field ahead of them – as the experience with the harassment of two IAS officers in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana should testify. Nor is it a good principle to adopt that all civil servants should have fixed tenures. It is worth following in situations like the one faced by A Raja as telecom minister; when his secretary refused to play ball, he simply got a more pliable man to replace him (with the Cabinet secretary/prime minister acquiescing). But equally, remember that Manmohan Singh as finance minister replaced his finance secretary and chief economic adviser, and put together a cohesive team. Is that flexibility to be always denied to a minister? Imagine a corrupt tax officer who has wangled a lucrative posting and who cannot then be touched for three years.

One must also ask: is the new facility of medical treatment overseas for IAS and IPS officials something that ministers thrust at reluctant officials? Is the utterly wasteful use of land in New Delhi’s New Moti Bagh for fresh government housing a ministerial or bureaucratic boondoggle? Bureaucrats have their private agendas just as ministers do and, let’s face it, a large number are as corrupt as any politician.

This is not to quarrel that the thrust of the court’s reform instinct should be disregarded. Rather, the room for flexibility and judgement should not be done away with, in the search for bulwarks against systemic abuse. Also, while it is necessary to stay the hand of politicians, so is it important to reform the bureaucracy. Hence, rule out mass transfers, not specific cases. Rule out more than one transfer in two or three years, so that there is no harassment. Professionalise the administration by reducing the scope for generalists to stray onto specialist turf, and introduce large-scale mid-level entry on contract. Have staggered retirement ages, as in the army – those who don’t make it to the next level in time are retired. Raise salaries, and fix them as a percentage of private sector pay at equivalent levels (as corruption-free Singapore does), but make government officials live as and among ordinary citizens, not as privileged rulers in special government enclaves.

Source: Weekend Ruminations by T.N. Ninan in Business Standard dated 02.11.2013)

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New global trade pacts may cut out India, China

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A new global trading system is being erected, almost unnoticed in India. One of its unstated aims is to check China’s rise through economic  discrimination. But it could end up discriminatingagainst India too.

Two major new international trade pacts are under negotiation. One is the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), creating a free trade area (FTA) of North America and East Asia (including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam and some others). For the first time, a once-protectionist Japan plans to join the US in a region of free trade and investment. The unstated but clear Japanese signal is that China must be checked. For this, it is willing to consider dismantling its traditional trade and investment barriers.

The second big FTA under negotiation is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), covering the US and the European Union. Historically, Europe has felt threatened by US multinationals, technology, and farm produce. The European Common Market came up with a common external tariff, aimed at binding together European members and standing up to competition from the US. But Europe’s recent economic stagnation, plus the rising threat from China, has concentrated minds wonderfully. Europe is now ready to consider a grand bargain with the US, mutually opening up investment, trade and services.

Earlier, the three economic giants — the US, Europe and Japan — saw one another as global rivals. Each sought to conclude FTAs with neighbours and selected developing countries, creating trade blocks within which each had tariff advanges tages. Now, for the first time, the three big players are seeking FTAs with one another.

What has changed? The rise of China, of course. Now, officials in Washington DC, Brussels and Tokyo will deny heatedly that either the TPP or TTIP is aimed against China. They will claim to be  merely carrying forward the logic of globalisationand global integration, a trend that has steadily deepened since World War II. But the strategic anti-China aim is clear.

Thus the world has shifted from multilateral deals (where all members agree to common conditions) to FTAs (where small groups extend mutual preferences, cutting out outsiders). India too has tried cutting deals with neighbours, but with few clear benefits, and some disadvantages. India has held preliminary talks on FTAs with the European Union and US, but these have run into serious headwinds.

Why? India is a more reluctant globaliser than trade rivals. In WTO, India always opposed free capital flows, free foreign bidding for Indian government contracts, untrammelled investment rights for foreign investors, liberal patent laws and lowered protection for agriculture. It is reluctant to give way on these issues in FTAs with the US or Europe.

But rival developing countries with fewer inhibitions have entered into dozens of FTAs with such conditions. This has given them a trade edge over India, one reason why Indian exports have risen so slowly over the last three years despite massive currency depreciation.

The richest countries are now moving to create giant economic agreements of their own. These, along with existing FTAs, will cover most international trade. This will cut out China. It may also cut out India, seriously disadvantaging it.

(Source : The Times of India dated 10.11.2013)

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List of Companies and Directors under Prosecution

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The Ministry of Company Affairs has put up the list of Companies and Directors against which prosecution has been initiated on its portal.

The search can be through the name of the Company/ Company Identification No (CIN) or through the Name of Director/Director Identification No. (DIN). The Details of the Court Name, Violation of Sections, Dates of Hearing, Fine details and the Final Verdict are listed therein.

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Clarification with regard to applicability of provision of section 372A of Companies Act 1956

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The Ministry of Company Affairs has issued a General Circular No 18/2013 dated 19-11-2013 clarifying that section 372A of the Companies Act 1956, pertaining to intercompany loans shall remain in force till section 186 of the Companies Act 2013 is notified.
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Exemption of section 182(1) to Companies incorporated as Electoral Trusts

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Vide Notification dated 7th November 2013, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has directed that Companies incorporated with the name containing “Electoral Trusts” and approved in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Electoral Trusts Scheme 2013, notified vide S O. 309 (E) dated 31st January 2013 and for which license was granted u/s. 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 shall be exempt from the provisions of section 293 A (1) (b) and (2) which has since been replaced by the provisions u/s. 182 (1) of the Companies Act 2013 now in force.
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Relaxation of last date and additional fee in filing of e-Form 23C for Appointment of Cost Auditor.

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Vide General Circular No. 17/2013, dated 1st November 2013 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has further relaxed the last date of filing the e-Form 23 C for Appointment of Cost Auditor to 30th November, 2013 or within 30 days of the commencement of the Company’s financial year to which the appointment relates, whichever is later. Earlier the time limit was extended to 31st October 2013.
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 74 dated 11th November, 2013

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Foreign investment in India – participation by SEBI registered FIIs, QFIs and SEBI registered long term investors in credit enhanced bonds

This circular permits SEBI registered Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs), Qualified Foreign Investors (QFI) and long term investors – Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF), Multilateral Agencies, Pension/Insurance/ Endowment Funds, foreign Central Banks – to invest in the credit enhanced bonds, as per paragraph 3 and 4 of A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 120 dated 26th June, 2013, upto a limit of $5 billion within the overall limit of $51 billion earmarked for corporate debt.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 73 dated 11th November, 2013

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Import of Gold by Nominated Banks/Agencies/ Entities

This circular clarifies the following:

1. Any authorisation such as Advance Authorization (AA)/Duty Free Import Authorization (DFIA) have to be utilised for import of gold meant for export purposes only and no diversion for domestic use will be permitted. However, for any AA/DFIA issued prior to 14th August, 2013 the condition of sequencing the imports prior to exports will not be insisted upon.

2. Entities/units in the SEZ and EOU, Premier and Star Trading Houses (irrespective of whether they are nominated agencies or not) can import gold exclusively for the purpose of exports only.

3. Exports towards fulfillment of obligation under AA/DFIA scheme will not qualify as export for the purpose of the scheme of 20:80.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 72 dated 11th November, 2013

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Foreign Direct Investment in Financial Sector –Transfer of Shares

Presently, a No Objection Certificate (NOC) is required from the respective financial sector regulator/ regulators of the investee company (if it is in the financial services sector) as well as transferor and transferee entities at the time of transfer of shares from Residents to Non-Residents. The NOC is to be filed along with Form FC-TRS with the bank.

This circular has done away with the requirement of obtaining NOC. As a result, no NOC needs to be filed along with Form FC-TRS. However, any ‘fit and proper/due diligence’ requirement as regards the non-resident investor as stipulated by the respective financial sector regulator will have to be complied with.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 71 dated 8th November, 2013 Advance Category – I Authorised Dealer Banks

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Presently, advance remittance for import of rough diamonds into India can be made to nine mining companies without any limit and without Bank Guarantee or Standby Letter of Credit, by an importer (other than Public Sector Company or Department/ Undertaking of the Government of India/State Governments), subject to certain conditions.

This circular states that the names of two of the said nine companies have been changed as under:

i. De Beers UK Ltd to De Beers Global Sightholder Sales Proprietary Ltd.

ii. BHP Billiton, Belgium to Dominion Diamond Marketing.

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2013-TIOL-1516-CESTAT-DEL M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi & Commissioner vs. Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.

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Where it was already established that extended period was applicable on account of suppression of facts, there cannot be any reasonable failure for payment of service tax—section 80 cannot be invoked and thus penalty u/s. 78 was upheld.


Facts:

The Appellant was engaged in management of cars/ scooter parking facilities at an airport under the license obtained from the airports authority on which the department confirmed the tax under “Airport Services”. The commissioner upheld the liability but dropped the penalties u/s.s 76, 77 and 78. It was contended that the demand was time-barred for the reason that the Airports Authority of India (AAI) did not authorise them to collect service tax until 01-03-2006 and as they were working on behalf of AAI, they were not a service provider. The revenuein its appeal contended that the order of the Commissioner was bad in law inasmuch as even after finding that the appellant collected service tax for the period 10-09-2004 till 31-03-2006, there was suppression of facts and demanded tax for the longer period. Therefore the penalties u/s.s 76, 77 and 78  were dropped wrongly by granting the benefit of section 80.

Held:

Perusing the Commissioner’s order, the Hon. Tribunal, rejecting the appellant’s appeal, observed that since the Commissioner upheld extended period and confirmed the whole of the demand affirming suppression of facts by the assessee, penalty u/s. 78 was leviable.

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Appeal against revision order under BST Act, 1959 — Maintainable — M.S.T. Tribunal

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VAT

A big controversy had arisen about maintainability of appeal
against revision order u/s.55 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959.

S. 55 of the BST Act, which contains provisions about
appeals, reads as under :

“(1) An appeal, from every original order, not being an
order mentioned in S. 56 passed under this Act or the rules made thereunder,
shall lie :

(a) if the order is made by the Sales Tax Officer, or any
other officer subordinate thereto, to the Assistant Commissioner;

(b) if the order is made by an Assistant Commissioner, to
the Commissioner;”

The revision order is passed by a superior authority u/s.57
of the BST Act, 1959. The said revision power is in the nature of supervision
power and the superior authority is entitled to call for records of order passed
by his subordinate authority and then to pass revision order as he may think
just and proper. Since commencement of the BST Act, 1959, such revision orders
were considered to be original orders for the purposes of S. 55 and appeal was
used to be maintained against the same, without any dispute.

However on 6-6-2006, the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench,
passed judgment in the case of Shiv Shyam Sales Enterprise. The said judgment
was in writ petition filed by the petitioner against the revision order passed
in his case. The argument of the Department was that the writ petition is not
maintainable as there is alternative remedy by way of appeal against the
revision order as per S. 55 of the BST Act, 1959. The High Court rejected this
prayer by making observations in para 6 as under :

“6. Perusal of S. 55 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act reveals
that it provides remedy of appeal from every original order. The orders
impugned in the present petition by the petitioner are passed in exercise of
revisional jurisdiction u/s.57 of the said Act, and therefore are not the
Original orders. It is therefore apparent that remedy of filing an appeal
u/s.55 is not available to the present petitioner. In such circumstances the
argument of alternative remedy holds no water. In any case the point as sought
to be raised ought to have been taken at the time of initial hearing when the
writ petition was entertained in the year 1989. In view of the law settled on
the point, such an argument cannot be allowed to be raised at the stage of
final hearing after expiry of long period. We therefore, find no merits in the
preliminary objection raised by the respondents.”

Based on the above observations, the authorities at the Sales
Tax Department felt that no appeal is maintainable against the revision order.
Thus, all the appeals against revision orders are kept pending by the Department
appellate authorities as well as by the Tribunal. The dealer community expected
that the Government would amend the law suitably on its own to mitigate the
hardships to dealers due to the above judgment. However, finding that no such
amendment is forthcoming, the matter was argued on the point of maintainability
before the Tribunal. The M.S.T. Tribunal has now decided this issue vide its
judgment in the case of Schenectady Beck (India) Ltd. (A. No. 98 & 99 of 2007)
and Others, dated 6-11-2009.

The Tribunal considered the issue from various angles.
Tribunal referred to the background of appeal provisions. The Tribunal also
referred to various judicial pronouncements about the binding nature of judgment
of jurisdictional Court as well as cases of mere observations, without binding
nature.

In particular, the Tribunal referred to judgments of the
Bombay High Court in cases of Swastik Oil Mills v. Mr. H. B. Munshi, (21
STC 383) and Mr. H. B. Munshi v. The Oriental Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd.
(34 STC 113), wherein it is observed that the revision is fresh proceedings and
this judgment is confirmed by the Hon. Supreme Court as reported in 21 STC 394.
The Department tried to counter the situation relying upon the above
observations by the Bombay High Court in para 6 (reproduce above) and further
emphasised that the judgment being of the Bombay High Court cannot be brushed
aside, but has to be followed.

The Tribunal, however, after elaborate discussion and giving
sound reasoning, held that the above judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shiv
Shyam Sales Enterprise does not decide anything contrary to settled scheme of
the BST Act. The Tribunal summed up its observations in para 32, as under :

“32. To sum up, the two-line observation in the case of
M/s. Shiv Shyam Sales Enterprises (supra), which has given rise to the
present dispute is made without being apprised of the well-settled legal
position as laid down by the past judicial authorities including the Hon’ble
Bombay High Court’s judgments in the cases like M/s. Swastik Oil Mills (supra).
In these circumstances, we respectfully prefer to be bound by these past
authorities rather than by the said two-line observation in the case of M/s.
Shiv Shyam Sales Enterprises (supra). We have also traced the origin of
the words ‘original orders’ in S. 55(1). The origin thereof is found in the
departure on 1-1-1960 from a ‘single appeal’ as obtaining in the 1953 Act to
‘two appeals’ as introduced in the Bombay Act. While providing the ‘two
appeals’ the Legislature has described all the orders other than the appeal
orders to be ‘original orders’ and has provided appeals thereagainst
u/s.55(1), if they are not specified as ‘non-appealable orders’ in S. 56. The
suo motu revision orders u/s.57 are neither specified in the list of
non-appealable order u/s.56, nor are they orders passed in appeals. In view of
this position, the revision orders are ‘original orders’ for the purposes of
S. 55 and hence appeals thereagainst lie u/s. 55(1).”

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the revision in the
original order for S. 55 and appeal is maintainable against the same
. The
judgment has given a much required relief to dealers/litigants in Maharashtra
and will go a long way to preserve one of the fundamental rights of dealer.

[Schenectady Beck (India) Ltd. (S.A. No. 98 & 99 of
2007) & Others, dated 6-11-2009]


Date of effect for registration in case of Amalgamation of Companies :

An interesting issue arose before the Bombay High Court in relation to the date of effect of registration. The facts are that transferor company amalgamated with transferee company vide an order of the Bombay High Court, dated 24-7-2003, under the Companies Act, 1956, in which the scheme of amalgamation was approved. As per the amalgamation scheme, the amalgamation was to be effective from 1-4-2002. The transferee company was not registered under BST Act, 1959, hence, applied for new registration on 19-8-2003. The transferee company requested to grant Registration Certificate effective from 1-4-2002. However, the registration authority considered the change in the Constitution from 1-4-2002 and finding that there is delay in making application (in case of change in the Constitution the application for new registration is required to be made within sixty days), granted R’C. effective from 19-8-2003 i.e., the date of application. The mean period from 1-4-2002 to 18-8-2003 became unregistered period. The prayer of the petitioner to grant administrative relief for giving retrospective effect to R. C. from 1-4-2002 was also rejected.

Hence the writ petition was filed in the Bombay High Court, The High Court analysed the situation and amongst others, observed that in case of retrspective effect to amalgamation, the party cannot be expected to apply within sixty days from such retrospective date. The 60 days’ time should be considered from the date of order of amalgamation by the High Court and if so applied within 60 days, then the registration should be granted from the effective date of amalgamation i.e., in this case from 1-4-2002. The High Court observed as under about this aspect :

“12. It is in these circumstances that this Court must consider the date for the purpose of moving an application and the starting point of limitation under Rule 7(1)(a-1). As earlier noted insofar as amalgamating company Floatglass India Limited, is concerned, considering the provisions, its certificate of registration was cancelled from 1-4-2002. In other words, M/s. Floatglass India Limited ceases to be company from that date and that must be the date to give effect to S. 19(6) and Rule 7(1)(a-1). There is therefore, an omission on account of the failure by the delegates to provide a corresponding rule to Rule 7(1)(a-1). In the absence of the Legislature providing and taking note of the fact that in such cases, the amalgamating company is not at fault, it will have to be construed that the time for making an application for registration will be 60 days from the date of the Court passing the order. On such application being made, the certificate of registration will have to be made effective from the anterior date given by the Company Court. This is only a procedural requirement. This would avoid hardship and give true effect to the mandate of the Legislature both under the BST and CST Act. No order of a Court should visit a party with liabilities and or undesirable conse-quences in the matter of tax. The rule must be so read to give effect to the legislative mandate. The date for applying for registration u/s.19(6) for a company, can only be the date of the Company Court’s order. If within 60 days of such order an application is made, then the expression succession to business in Rule 7(1)(1a)will also be so read. Under Rule 8(8)(a)(iii) then it will be the date the Company Court has ordered or the date provided in the scheme which will be the date of succession to business. This would obviate any difficulty to a party till such time the delegate makes a specific provision in Rule 8.”

[Asahi India Glass Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (25 VST 31)(Bom.)]

Recent amendments to MVAT Rules

External Confirmations – Proving Existence with External Evidence?

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Audit evidence is considered to be more reliable when obtained in a documented form directly by the auditor from sources independent of the entity being audited. The higher the auditors’ assessment of risk of material misstatement (including risk of fraud or error), the greater would be the need to obtain persuasive evidence to address those risks. Unless, there exists reasons to conclude otherwise, the auditor would usually place a higher reliance on evidence obtained directly from third parties or corroborating evidence obtained from independent sources. SA 505 provides guidance on the auditor’s use of external confirmation procedures to obtain audit evidence.

‘External confirmations’ is a process of obtaining audit evidence through direct written communication from a third party in response to a request for information about a particular financial item in the financial statements. For certain financial captions, circularising and obtaining independent external confirmations, is one of the most reliable substantive audit procedures, to assist auditors to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to validate the assertion of ‘existence’. Robust confirmation procedures can also serve as an effective tool to respond to fraud risks.

Confirmation requests are generally of two types:

a. Positive confirmation request—through this request, the confirming party responds directly to the auditor indicating whether the party agrees or disagrees with the information requested, or providing the requested information.

b. Negative confirmation request—the confirming party responds directly to the auditor only if the confirming party disagrees with the information provided in the request.

Usually, negative confirmations are used where there are a large number of small balances and the risk of material misstatement is assessed as low. A good example where negative confirmation can be used is for confirming vendor registration status under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act, 2006). Negative confirmation requests may be sent to vendors requesting them to confirm within a stipulated time, whether they are registered enterprises under the MSMED Act, 2006, failing which these would be considered as ‘nonregistered’ enterprises. Where detection risk is high, or the materiality of the account balance is high, positive confirmation will be needed to provide substantive evidence.

In common parlance, external confirmations are understood to be restricted to only bank balances, accounts receivables and payables. External confirmations could also be circularised for investments, borrowings, related party transactions, inventory in custody of third parties, loans and advances, property title deeds mortgaged, guarantees, contingent items, litigation and claims or items that are significant or outside the normal course of business.

External confirmations may also be used to confirm terms of agreements, contracts, or transactions between an entity and other parties or the absence thereof. For example, a request for confirmation of bank balances could also include the bank to confirm whether there exists any other exposure in respect of any other facilities availed by the enterprise. These could be in the nature of letters of credit, derivative contracts, forward contracts outstanding, bank guarantees provided, etc. All these could have implications for accounting and/or disclosures in the financial statements.

Generally, enterprises from whom external confirmation is sought are likely to be independent, ensuring that the evidence is reliable. However, the auditor needs to exercise greater professional scepticism and diligence in cases of related parties or where the confirming party might be economically dependent on the entity.

General reluctance to confirm is more likely due to misunderstanding of the purpose of the request. Debtors may misinterpret the confirmation as a demand for payment. Other parties may fear that confirmation might be binding if they should subsequently discover an error in their own records. Some respondents disclaim responsibility should their response be in error. This is usually the case with bank confirmations. However, this does not necessarily compromise the reliability of the confirmation. It is also pertinent to note that confirming parties may be more likely to respond indicating their disagreement with a confirmation request when the information in the request is not in their favour, and less likely to respond otherwise.

It is interesting to note that SA 505 provides guidance on audit procedures to be followed where an enterprise uses a third party to co-ordinate and provide responses to confirmation requests. Though not prevalent in India, this is a practice widely used in the US. In fact, certain financial institutions including banks in the US have taken the position not to respond to confirmation requests that are mailed or faxed, but accept audit confirmation requests sent only through Capital Confirmation, Inc. (CCI or Confirmation.com), a third party service provider which provides secure electronic confirmation services for auditors and their shared clients. The auditor in such cases would need to consider controls over the information sent by the entity to the service provider, the controls applied on processing of the data and controls over preparation and sending of the confirmation response to the auditor.

Let us now examine the practical application of SA 505 with a case study.

Case Study

ABC Limited is in the business of manufacturing and selling of chemical products. Sales are made to various dealers across the country. The usual credit period is 90 days. The sales for the year ended 31st March 20X0 aggregated Rs. 200 crore and debtors as at 31st March 20X0 amounted to Rs. 75 crore. The debtors listing comprised 350 customers. The management does not follow the practice of obtaining balance confirmations from its debtors.

The auditors of ABC are M/s. PQR & Co (PQR).Roger Smith, Assistant Manager with PQR, was the audit in-charge posted at ABC for the yearend audit. Roger selected 30 high value debtors having debit balances aggregating to Rs. 25 crore for circularisation. In respect of one customer – Genuine Chemicals Limited (GCL), from whom the outstanding was Rs. 10 crore (a material amount outstanding beyond the due date), the management refused to allow Roger to send the confirmation request as the management represented that currently there were ongoing negotiations with GCL, the resolution of which would get impacted by an untimely confirmation request. The mailing addresses for 27 parties were obtained by Roger from ABC’s sales account manager. Since the audit was currently under progress and Roger was posted at ABC’s office premises, Roger decided to courier the physical letters through the courier agency whose services were usually availed by ABC. The proof of dispatch (POD) had to be retained by the dispatch section of ABC as supporting evidence for payment of courier charges billed by the agency. The sales manager informed Roger that in respect of the remaining 2 parties, the business operations had moved to a new location and the new mailing address was not available. Hence for these parties, he requested that e-mails be sent by Roger for balance confirmation which were sent accordingly. For both the physical and the e-mail confirmation requests, the confirmation format used was as prescribed in PQR’s audit documentation standard. Further, return self-addressed envelopes were also enclosed with the physical confirmations couriered. Roger maintained a photocopy of all the confirmation requests circularised.

The debtors ledger for the year ended 31st March 20X0 was finalised by 10th April 20X0 and confirmations were sent by Roger on 15th April 20X0. The accounts were to be cleared by 5th May 20X0 as the board meeting to approve the accounts was scheduled for 10th May 20X0.

Responses were received from only 6 debtors (out of 29 circularised) as per details below.

On enquiry with the sales account manager, Roger was explained that even in the past when balances were circularised, the response received was abysmal. The customer pattern of ABC comprised a large pool of customers with small value balances. As such, the circularisation was not done with adequate rigour. Further, given the short time period between the date of circularisation and the date of accounts finalisation, the sales account manager informed that it was quite likely that some responses could be received post audit closure. For customers from whom no response was received, Roger verified subsequent payments, to the extent these were received until the date of audit. For customers from whom responses were received, Roger compared the confirmations received with the photocopies that he had retained in his file. He believed that the confirmations were in order. In respect of amount due to Genuine Chemicals Limited, Roger felt that given the sensitivity surrounding the pending negotiations, it would be appropriate not to send a confirmation request. Roger concluded on the work paper file that adequate work was done to comply with the requirements of SA505. Was Roger right in his conclusion?
 

Case Study analysis with the requirements of SA 505.

Design and dispatch of confirmation requests
•    There was no management’s authorisation or encouragement to the customers selected for confirmation to respond to PQR’s request. Response rate to confirmation requests sent by auditors, particularly in case of debtors, is to a large extent driven by management’s intent and the degree of follow-up.

•    Only high value positive balances were selected for circularisation. Roger should have built in an element of unpredictability by selecting even credit balances, if any, in the sample. Further, some debtors with low value amounts could also have been selected.

•    For circularising balance confirmation in respect of Genuine Chemicals Limited, the management’s refusal to send a confirmation request should have been a trigger to evaluate its implication on the assessment of risk of material misstatement, including risk of fraud and whether such a refusal results in a scope limitation. Roger should have corroborated the explanations provided by the management by examining correspondence, if any, that ABC had with the customer evidencing the impending negotiations. He should have by enquiry or by performing procedures such as verifying lawyers’ confirmations/invoices deduced whether any legal case was filed against Genuine Chemicals. Further, given that the amount was material and outstanding beyond the due date, the auditor should have determined the implication of the non-recovery on the financial statements as well as on the audit opinion. This would also need to be communicated to those charged with governance at ABC.

•    SA 505 requires the auditor to determine that the requests are properly addressed including testing the validity of some or all of the addresses on confirmation requests before these are sent out. Roger merely took the addresses as furnished by the sales account manager and did not perform procedures to verify the authenticity of the addresses provided.

•    It is pertinent to note that for administrative convenience, the courier agency usually employed by ABC was used by the auditor. SA 505 stipulates that the auditor needs to maintain control over confirmation requests sent. Use of client courier may preclude maintenance of independence and control over requests sent. Where the requests are sent under the control of the auditor, he is better positioned to track the status of deliveries. As the client courier was used, proof of dispatches and deliveries was not maintained as evidence of circularisation. Reputed courier enterprises provide an online-tracking status of confirmations couriered together with delivery status. Roger should have also enquired into the status of delivery of confirmations couriered and whether there were any undelivered returns.

•    The general practice is to circularise confirmations for year-end or quarter-end balances, but given the short period of time available post year-end for audit closure, Roger could have considered circularising confirmations for balances as at 28th February 20X0 in the month of March 20X0 and then performing roll-forward procedures performed from 28th February 20X0 until 31st March 20X0.

•    SA 505 mandates the auditor to send out additional confirmation request where a reply to the previous request has not been received. There were no second/third reminders sent by Roger in the instant case.

Results of External Confirmation procedures

Roger compared the original responses received with the photocopies of the confirmations that he had retained in the file to ensure that there were no alterations made to the confirmations sent originally. This was a good verification procedure followed for testing the authenticity of responses.

Now, let us evaluate whether the response received for each of the six confirmation requests were in order.

1    Universal Chemicals

The confirmation had an exception being the difference of Rs. 3 lakh in the amount confirmed. Roger did not merely rely on the explanation provided by the sales account manager that the difference was on account of delay in accounting by Universal Chemicals. He rightly performed additional procedures to corroborate the same. He obtained confirmation over a telephonic call and further backed it up with a reconciliation explaining the difference from the customer. He also tested year-end sales to Universal Chemicals for further corroborative support.

2    Cosmos Traders

The very fact that the revised confirmation did not have any difference as against a difference of Rs. 32 lakh (in the original confirmation) should have lead Roger to use more professional scepticism and consider performing additional work like testing the transactions with Cosmos and understanding the reasons for the difference and how the same was reconciled.

3    Jupiter Chemicals

The confirmation provided was signed by the purchase executive of Jupiter. Roger should have evaluated whether reliance should be placed on the person authorising the confirmation, the purchase executive in this case. Usually depending on the size and set -up of an enterprise, one would expect accounts staff with appropriate authority to authorise the confirmation. Further, the confirmation was delivered at ABC’s address as against PQR’s office. The auditor should have insisted that the confirming party send the confirmation directly to him duly authorised by a person responsible to do so.


4    Neptune Chemicals

The confirmation was provided by Neptune Dye-Stuff, a Neptune Chemicals affiliate, i.e., not by the original intended confirming party. Such a confir-mation should have raised doubts over reliability of the response received. Further, this would also have implications on the auditor’s assessment of risk of material misstatement (including fraud risk) requiring Roger to modify the nature, timing and extent of other planned audit procedures.

5    Star Traders

This response was received electronically through an Internet email account and has a risk of reliability because proof of origin and authority of the respondent may be difficult to establish, and alterations may be difficult to detect. In this case, the confirmation was sent from an Internet e-mail account and not from the own domain of the confirming party. In such instances, it would be difficult to validate/corroborate the identity of the sender. In case of e-mail confirmations, the auditor needs to consider whether the mail was encrypted, signed electronically using digital signatures, and apply procedures to verify website authenticity. The auditor may also telephone the confirming party to determine whether the confirming party did, in fact, send the response.

6    Mars Chemitech Private Limited

Given the fact that MCPL has been making losses, Roger should have applied greater professional scepticism in evaluating MCPL’s ability to pay the debtor balance due rather than mere reliance on the confirmation provided by it directly.

Roger should have performed adequate alternate audit procedures to mitigate the risk of low response. Fewer responses to confirmation requests than anticipated may indicate a previously unidentified fraud risk factor that requires evaluation in accordance with SA 240.

Concluding remarks

One of the prominent reasons for genesis of frauds which corporate India has witnessed is the ineffectiveness in implementation of external confirmation procedures.

Obtaining external confirmations is a basic audit procedure which has been in audit theory for years but has not been practiced with the rigor that it deserves. To a large extent, the success of these procedures is driven by management’s rigour and follow -up with the confirming party to respond to the auditor which brings back the question of management’s intention to reflect a true and fair position of the enterprise’s affairs. SA 505 sets out the procedures that need to be performed for external confirmations to be an effective audit procedure which auditors should bear in mind while discharging their duties.

Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia): A. Y. 2008-09: Amendment of section 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2010 is retrospective and is applicable for the A. Y. 2008-09 also:

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CIT vs. Naresh Kumar; 262 CTR 389 (Del):

In respect of the A. Y. 2008-09, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim that no disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) should be made in view of the amendment of section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010.

In appeal, the Revenue contended that the amendment is w.e.f 01-04-2010 and is not
retrospective, and accordingly, the amendment is not applicable for the A. Y. 2008-09. The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was justified in holding that the amendment made to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 should be given retrospective effect and applicable to A. Y. 2008-09 in question”

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Business expenditure: Bonus: Section 36(1) (ii): A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07: Bonus paid to director as per Board resolution: Directors rendering valuable services to company: Bonus not related to shareholding: Bonus deductible:

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CIT vs. Career Launcher India Ltd.; 358 ITR 179(Del):

For the A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the bonus paid to the directors on the ground that it would have been payable to the directors as dividend had it not been paid as bonus. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition. On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It was not disputed regarding bonus (a) that payment was supported by board resolutions, and (b) that none of the directors would have received a lesser amount of dividend than the bonus paid to them, having regard to their shareholding.

ii) Further, the directors were full-time employees of the company receiving salary. They were all graduates from IIM, Bangalore. Taking all these facts into consideration, the bonus was a reward for their work, in addition to the salary paid to them and was in no way related to their shareholding. It was deductible u/s. 36(1)(ii).”

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Assessment: Limitation: Section 158BC: Block Period ending on 14-09-2002: Exclusion of period during which assessment stayed by Court: Limitation resumes on date of vacation of stay and not from date of receipt of order by Department: Assessment barred by limitation:

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CIT vs. Drs. X-Ray and Pathology Institute Pvt. Ltd.;358 ITR 27(All)

On 14-09-2002, search was conducted at the assessee’s premises and a notice u/s. 158BC was issued on 29-04-2003. The assessee filed the return on 16-06-2003. The assessee filed writ petition and challenged the validity of search. By order dated 12-02-2004, the High Court stayed the assessment proceedings. The stay was vacated on 26-08-2009 and the copy of the order was received by the Assessing Officer on 09-11-2009. The Assessing Officer passed the assessment order on 22-06-2010. The Tribunal held that the limitation resumes on the date of vacation of the stay and accordingly the assessment was barred by limitation.

In appeal, the Revenue contended that the limitation resumes from the date of receipt of the order by the Department i.e. 09-11-2009 and accordingly the assessment was within the limitation period. The Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The provisions of the Act for filing of the appeal from the date of service of the order would not be attracted to calculate the period of limitation to complete the assessment. This was not a case of a particular act to be performed, but the arrest of the limitation by an interim order passed by the High Court.

ii) As soon as the order was vacated, the limitation would restart and exhaust itself on the period of limitation provided under the Act. The assessment was clearly barred by limitation.”

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Reassessment – Reason to believe that income had escaped assessment – The subsequent reversal of the legal position by the judgment of the Supreme Court does not authorise the Department to reopen the assessment [beyond a period of four years in a case where original assessment is made u/s. 143(3)], which stood closed on the basis of law, as it stood at the relevant time.

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DCIT vs. Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 129 (SC)

The Respondent-assessee was engaged in the business of civil construction works on contract basis and had claimed deduction u/s. 32A, 32AB, 80HH and 80HHB as under:

n the original orders of assessment for the said assessment years reliefs, inter-alia, u/s. 32A as claimed, were allowed in full for the assessment years up to 1989-90 and u/s. 32AB for the assessment year 1988-89 and 1989-90. The Respondent-assessee’s claim for relief u/s. 80HH and 80HHB was also allowed in the assessment order for assessment year 1984-85 but the claim for reliefs u/s. 80HHB for the assessment year 1985-86, 1987-88, 1988-99 and 1989-90 was not allowed in the assessments but the same were allowed in appeals by the appellate authority.

Later     on,     6     notices     all     dated     29th     July,     1994    were issued by the Petitioner u/s. 148 for reopening the assessments u/s. 147 for the assessment years 1984-85 to 1989-90, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in N.C. Budharaja and Co. (1993) 204 ITR 412, where the Supreme Court had held that an “article or “things” used in section 32A, 32AB and 80HH refers only to a movable asset and the words “manufacture or construction of an article” cannot be extended to construction of road,   building, dam or bridge, etc. and  Respondent-assessee was therefore not entitled to deduction u/s. 32A, 32AB or 80HH.

The     Respondent-assessee     filed     a    writ     petition     before the Calcutta High Court challenging all the six   notices     issued    u/s.     148.     The     single    bench    of     Judge of the Calcutta High Court (255 ITR 49) dismissed the    writ    petitions    holding    that    the    Assessing    Officer    had prima facie reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. On appeal, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (262 ITR 605) allowed the appeal of the Respondent-assessee. The Division Bench noted that the assessee had claimed benefit u/s. 32A/32AB and section 80HH/80HHB for the relevant assessment years. The Assessing     Officer     had     allowed     the     benefit     under     those    sections, having regard to the law as it stood then governing these provisions.  But there was divergence of opinion in the decision of the various High Courts.  Those benefits would be available only to an industrial undertaking. The assessee had claimed itself to be an industrial undertaking. But this question when came to be considered by the apex court in N.C. Budharaja and Co.’s case (supra), it held that the nature of business as were carried on by Respondent-assessee was not that of an industrial undertaking. The Division Bench held that this decision was rendered in September, 1993. Therefore, admittedly, this was the information on the basis reopening was permissible u/s. 147 but subject to  proviso thereunder. Admittedly, there was no allegation that amounts now sought to be made taxable were not disclosed and therefore it could not be said that there was any omission or failure to disclose fully and truly the materials necessary for assessment. The Petitioner had proposed to reopen the assessment only on the basis of the information derived by it from the decision in N.C. Budharaja’s case and as such the question of four years embargo would not be overcome by the Petitioner.

  On appeal to the Supreme Court by the Petitioner, the Supreme Court held that there was no error in the observation made by the Division Bench of the High Court that once limitation period of 4 years provided in section 149/149(1A) expires then the question of reopening by the Department does not arise. The Supreme Court further held that in any event, at the relevant time, when the assessment order got completed, the law as declared by the jurisdictional High Court, was that the civil construction work carried out by the Respondent-assessee would be entitled to the benefit of   section 80HH which was later reversed in the case of  CIT vs. N.C. Budharaja and Co. The subsequent reversal of the legal position by the judgement of the Supreme Court does not authorise the Department to reopen the assessment, which stood closed on the basis of the law, as it stood at the relevant time. The Supreme Court dismissed civil appeals accordingly.

Appeal to High Court – Substantial Questions of Law framed for consideration by court – The High Court’s power to frame substantial question(s) of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal has been admitted remains u/s. 260A(4) but this power is subject, however, to two conditions, (one) the court must be satisfied that appeal involves such questions, and (two) the court has to record reasons therefor

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CIT vs. Mastek Ltd. [2013] 358 ITR 252 (SC)

The appeal filed by the Revenue u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the “Act”) had been admitted by the High Court and following two substantial questions of law were framed for consideration of the appeal;

“(A) Whether the Appellate Tribunal has substantially erred in law and on facts in reversing the order passed by the Assessing Officer and thereby deleting the adjustment while computation of the arm’s length price of the international transactions of software services distributed by MUK (Associated Enterprise) by making an upward adjustment of Rs. 18,62,45,100?

(B) Whether the Appellate Tribunal has substantially erred in law and on facts in reversing the order passed by the Assessing Officer and thereby deleting the adjustment by way of human resource management services of Rs. 2,92,22,683 treating the same as an international transaction?”

The grievance of the Revenue before the Supreme Court was that by necessary implication, the other questions raised in the memo of appeal before the High Court stood rejected.

The Supreme Court observed that the Revenue was under some misconception. The Supreme Court noted that proviso following the main provision of section 260A(4) of the Act states that nothing stated in s/s. (4), i.e., “The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated” shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.

According to the Supreme Court, the High Court’s power to frame substantial question(s) of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal has been admitted remained u/s. 260A(4). This power was subject, however, to two conditions, (one) the court must be satisfied that appeal involves such questions, and (two) the court has to record reasons therefor.

In view of the above legal position, according to the Supreme Court, there was no justifiable reason to entertain the special leave petition.

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Writ – When an alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party it must exhaust the same before approaching the writ court—order of High Court quashing the notices issued u/s. 153C as being without jurisdiction set aside by the Supreme Court.

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CIT vs. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani [2013] 357 ITR 713 (SC)

The respondent-assessee purchased a plot of land from “Samutkarsh Co-operative Housing Society” (for short “the society”) being developed by one Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. In 2008, a search was conducted u/s. 132 of the Act, 1961, in the premises of the society and also at the office of Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. During the search certain documents were seized. Upon scrutiny, it was found that the seized documents reflected names of certain individuals including the assessee. Accordingly, for further proceedings the assessing authority had transmitted the seized documents to the jurisdictional assessing authority in whose jurisdiction the assessee was being assessed. After receipt of the said information/documents, the assessing authority has recorded a satisfaction note dated 7th October 2009, that, he has reason to believe that a case of escapement of income may exist and, therefore, the assessee’s case requires to be reassessed for the assessment years 2001-02 to 2006-07 u/s. 153C of the Act, 1961.

Accordingly, the assessing authority issued six show-cause notices u/s. 153C of the Act, 1961, to the assessee for assessment of income of the aforesaid six assessment years and directed him to furnish return of income in respect of the said assessment years in the prescribed form within 30 days of the receipt of the said notices, dated 7th October 2009.

Upon receipt of the notice, the assessee by letter dated 11th November, 2009, requested the assessing authority to furnish him with the copies of the seized documents on the basis of which the said notices were issued. The assessing authority had provided the said documents to the assessee, whereafter the assessee has approached the High Court in a writ petition questioning the six showcause notices dated 7th October, 2009.

The High Court elaborately examined the case at hand and delved into the statutory scheme for assessment in the case of search and requisition as prescribed u/s. 153A, 153B and 153C of the Act, 1961, and reached the conclusion that the documents seized by the assessing authority did not belong to the assessee and, therefore, the condition precedent for issuance of the notice u/s. 153C was not fulfilled. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and quashed the said notices issued by the assessing authority.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgement and order passed by the High Court, the assessing authority was before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that the jurisdictional assessing authority, upon having a reason to believe that the documents seized indicated escapement of income, had issued show-case notices u/s. 153C to the assessee for reassessment of his income during the assessment years 2001-02 to 2006-07. Thereafter, upon request of the assessee, the assessing authority had furnished him with the copies of documents seized. The assessee being dissatisfied with the said documents instead of filing his explanation/reply to the show-cause notices, had filed a writ petition before the High Court.

According to the Supreme Court, at the said stage of issuance of the notices u/s. 153C, the assessee could have addressed his grievances and explained his stand to the assessing authority by filing an appropriate reply to the said notices instead of filing the writ petition impugning the said notices. The Supreme Court remarked that it is settled law that when an alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party, it must exhaust the same before approaching the writ court.

The Supreme Court held that in the present case, the assessee had invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court at the first instance without first exhausting the alternative remedies provided under the Act. According to the Supreme Court, at the said stage of proceedings, the High Court ought not have entertained the writ petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to the said notices and upon receipt of a decision from the assessing authority, if for any reason it is aggrieved by the said decision, to question the same before the forum provided under the Act.

In view of the above, without expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the construction that was placed by the High Court on section 153C, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgement and order of the High Court. Further, the Supreme Court granted time to the assessee, if it so desired, to file reply/objections, if any, as contemplated in the said notices within 15 days time from the date of order. If such reply/ objections were filed within time granted by this court, the assessing authority would first consider the said reply/objections and thereafter direct the assessee to file the return for the assessment years in question. The Supreme Court clarified that while framing the assessment order, the assessing authority would not be influenced by any observations made by the High Court while disposing of the writ petition and if, for any reason, the assessment order went against the assessee, he/it would avail of and exhaust the remedies available to him/it under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

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Whether Assessee is Entitled to Interest on Delayed Payment of Interest on Refund? – Section 244A – Part II

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Introduction

3.1   As stated in PART 1 of this write-up, the apex court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. [Sandvik] took the view that the expression ‘amount’ appearing in section 244(1A) refers not only to the tax but also to the interest and it cannot be limited to the tax paid in pursuance of the assessment order. Accordingly, the Court held that in view of the express provision of the Act, an assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for delay in payment of amounts lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongfully and contrary to law. The Court also further took the view that even if there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, the compensation for delay is required to be paid as the Act itself recognises the principle that the Revenue is liable to pay interest when excess tax was retained and the same principle should be extended to the cases where interest was retained. For this, the Court also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Narendra Doshi referred to in para 1.4.1 of PART 1 of this write-up.

3.1.1   Subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case, the CBDT issued Instruction No. 2 dated 28th March, 2007 which is worth noting and hence the relevant part thereof is reproduced hereunder [209 CTR (Statute) 17]:

“Sub: Section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Refunds – Interest on – Grant of interest on refunds under section 244A simultaneously with issue of refund.

In terms of section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Act), an assessee is entitled to receive interest calculated in the manner provided in the said section on the amount of refund due under the Act. The interest is to be granted simultaneously with the refund and there should normally be no reason to grant refund without adding the entitled interest. In the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. vs. CIT (2006) 200 CTR (SC) 505 : (2006) 280 ITR 643 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, adversely commented upon the delay in grant of interest on refund and awarded compensation to the assessee for the said delay by the Department. While taking this view, the Supreme Court referred to the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of D.J. Works vs. Dy. CIT (1992) 102 CTR (Guj) 2 : (1992) 195 ITR 227 (Guj) wherein the High Court had held that though there is no specific provision for payment of interest on interest, but if interest on the refund is wrongfully retained, interest on interest would be payable. The Court further held that even assuming that there was no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, on general principles, compensation was payable to the assessee for the delayed payment of interest. The Court also recommended that action be initiated against the officers responsible for the delay.

2. It is necessary to remind all Assessing Officers that while granting refund to the assessee, care should be taken to ensure that any interest payable u/s. 244A on the amount of refund due should be granted simultaneously with the grant of refund and there should, in no case, be any omission or delay on the grant of such interest. Failure to do so will be viewed adversely and the officer concerned will be held personally accountable, inviting appropriate action.

3. These instructions may be brought to the notice of all officers working in your region for strict compliance. The Range Officers should be directed to carry out periodic test checks of cases within their jurisdiction to ensure that provisions of section 244A are scrupulously implemented. ………………”

3.1.2    After the above judgment of the Apex Court, the High Courts as well as the Tribunal have followed/ explained the same in various cases such as Motor General Finance Ltd. [320 ITR 881 (Del)], Gujarat Fourochemicals Ltd. [300 ITR 328 (Guj)], State Bank of Travancore [292 ITR (AT) 56 – Cochin), Delhi Tourism Transportation Corp. [(2012) 35 CCH 046 – Del Trib], Deutsche Bank AG [ITA Nos. 3789, 3790 & 4282/Mum/2010], etc. In these cases, the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case is understood as laying down the prin-ciple that the assessee is also entitled to interest on unpaid interest receivable by him on the refund due to him. When the correct interest is paid by the Revenue along with the refund, this issue was not considered as relevant. It may also be noted that the Ahmedabad Bench (TM) of the Tribunal in the case of Nirma Chemical Works Ltd. [125 TTJ 487] did not follow Sandvik’s case on the ground that it was a case prior to the assess-ment year 1989-90 (i.e., it was not rendered in the context of the provisions of section 244A) and also on the basis that it was a case where the interest has been granted in a writ as compensation and not as interest on interest under the Act. According to the Tribunal, section 244A(1)(a) grants interest only on that amount of refund which is out of the tax paid by the assessee by way of advance tax/TDS/TCS and not on the amount of interest due to the assessee but withheld by the Revenue. Section 244A(1)(b) provides for interest on refund in any other case in which case the interest has to be calculated from the ‘date of payment of the tax or penalty’. The Tribunal also stated that the Apex Court also considered certain deci-sions laying down a ratio that “the amount of refund” includes refund of tax as well as interest. According to the Tribunal, even in such a case the assessee will not be entitled to interest as unlike section 244 which grants interest on any amount of refund, section 244A provides for grant of interest on the amount of refund out of any tax/penalty paid by the assessee or collected from him and in any case, otherwise it requires the date of payment by the assessee. Even if the inter-est due to an assessee is considered to be a ‘refund of any amount’ u/s. 240 or under the opening part of section 244A(1) as held by the courts in certain cases, ‘it would not entitle an assessee to further interest on that amount of interest either under Clause (a) of section 244A(1) as it was not a refund out of any tax paid by him or collected from him; nor under Clause (b) of section 244A(1) as the interest is to start from the date of payment of tax or penalty and in the case of refund of interest, there cannot be the date of payment by an assessee’. Further, according to the Tribunal, the Supreme Court made it clear in para 40 of the judgment that there cannot be any doubt that the amount of interest on the refunded amount is as per the provisions of law as it then stood and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. When a specific provision has been made under the statute, such provision has to govern the field. The Tribunal then further stated that the AO is the statutory author-ity. The Tribunal, as an appellant authority, is likewise a statutory authority. It is not a court of equity. Therefore, it has to act as per the provisions of the Act and if a benefit or a relief is not available to an assessee under the Act, it cannot be granted on the grounds of equity or the general provisions of law as can be granted by the courts in their writ jurisdiction. Referring to the full Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. [146 ITR 452], the Tribunal held that though interest is compensatory in character, yet there is no right to receive interest other than by right created under a statute. According to the Tribunal, section 244A apparently reveals that there is a liability to pay interest on delayed payment of refund amount but the section does not provide for payment of any interest on interest, even though there is a delay in payment of such interest. Finally, the Tri-bunal held that looking to the language of section 244A, the assessee was not entitled to any interest on interest as it was not a case of the refund of amount out of any tax paid by or collected from the assessee nor it has a date of payment by the assessee from which it can run. It may also be noted that the phrase ‘date of payment of tax or penalty’ is also defined in the Explanation to section 244A(1) to mean that ‘the date on and from which the amount of tax or penalty specified in the notice of demand issued under section 156 is paid in excess of such demand’. However, it is worth not-ing that even u/s. 244(1A), the interest was required to be calculated from the date of excess payment and still the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case took the view that assessee is entitled to interest on unpaid amount of interest as mentioned in para 3.1 above. Under the circumstances, to what extent the distinction drawn by the Tribunal in the context of section 244A(1)(b) should hold good could be a matter of debate. It may also be noted that in this case the Tribunal did not have the benefit considering the judgment of the apex court in the case of H.E.G Ltd. and its effect referred to in para 3.1.3 to 3.1.3.3 as the same was delivered subsequently. As such, the view taken by the Tribunal in this case may not be necessarily regarded as correct.

3.1.3    The judgment of the apex court in the case of HEG Ltd. [324 ITR 331] is also worth noting. In this case, the Court was dealing with batch of appeals. At the outset, the Court stated that if a question is not properly framed then, at times, confusion arises resulting in wrong answers and the present batch of appeals is an illustration thereof. For this purpose, the Court noted the facts of the case of one of the appeals [SLP(SC) No. 18045/2009] for the assessment year 1993-94 and stated that the question framed by the Revenue with regard to the entitlement of the assessee to claim interest on interest u/s. 244A is erroneous. As such, the Court clarified that this is not a case where the assessee is claiming com-pound interest or interest on interest as is sought to be made out by the Revenue. The Court then dealt with a question as to what is the meaning of the words “refund of any amount becomes due to the assessee” in section 244A? In this context, the Court rejected the argument of the Revenue that the words “any amount” will not include the interest which accrued to the assessee for delay in refunding the amount and held as under [Page No. 333]:

“………….We see no merit in this argument. The interest component will partake of the character of the “amount due” under section 244A. It becomes as integral part of Rs. 45,73,528 which is not paid for 57 months after the said amount became due and payable. As can be seen from the facts narrated above, this is the case of short payment by the Department and it is in this way that the assessee claims interest u/s. 244A of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, on both the aforestated grounds, we are of the view that the assessee was entitled to interest for 57 months on Rs. 45,73,528. The principal amount of Rs. 45,73,528 has been paid on 31st December, 1997 but net of interest which, as stated above, partook of the character of “amount due” u/s. 244A.”

3.1.3.1 From the available facts in the above judgment, it seems that the total tax paid had two components, viz., TDS (Rs. 45,73,528) and tax paid after the original assessment (Rs. 1,71,00,320). It seems that the assessee was entitled to refund of Rs. 2,16,73,848 consisting of the above two components from which, it appears that refund of Rs. 45,73,528 (TDS component) was delayed by 57 months and the assessee had claimed statutory interest u/s. 244A for this delayed refund of Rs. 45,73,528 for a period from 1st April, 1993 to 31st December, 1997. Therefore, it appears that the amount of Rs. 45,73,528 represents the principal amount and does not seem to include any interest. As such, there is no clarity on the facts in the context of the above view expressed by the apex court.

3.1.3.2 It may be noted that in the above case, in the Head Notes of the ITR, references are given to various appeal numbers and it is also mentioned that such appeals are arising out of the judgment of the MP High Court in the case of CIT vs. H.E.G. Ltd. reported in 310 ITR 341 and of the Madras High Court in the case of Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd. reported in 294 ITR 438. There seem to be some confusion in this regard. The facts dealt with in the text of the judgment of the apex court are, it is stated, for the assessment year 1993-94 [seems to be in the case of H.E.G. Ltd.] and it appears that this assessment year was not covered in the judgment of the MP High Court reported in 310 ITR 341 in which the High Court has held that grant of interest on interest is permis-sible and this position does not change u/s. 244A. The judgment of the MP High Court for the assessment year 1993-94 could not be verified as the same was not available. Accordingly, in view of lack of clarity on the factual position, it seems difficult to take a view that the judgment of the MP High Court reported in 310 ITR 341 has been affirmed by the apex court as mentioned in the Head Notes of the ITR. This position gets further clarified by the fact that the apex court has also stated that the question does not relate to interest on interest. Notwithstanding this position, this judgment of the apex court supports the view that the words ‘amount due’ appearing in section 244A include interest and the interest component will partake of the character of the ‘amount due’ under section 244A. Similar view was also taken in Sandvik’s case in the context of section 244(1A) as mentioned in para 2.16 of PART 1 of this write-up.

3.1.3.3 The effect of the judgment of the apex court in H.E.G. Ltd. (supra) has been explained by the Delhi High Court in a recent judgment dated 6th September, 2013 in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation [ITA Nos. 167 & 168 of 2012]. This judgment has been delivered in the context of claim of interest u/s. 244A on account of delayed payment of interest after granting the refund of the principal amount. The High Court explained that if the refund does not include interest due and payable on the amount refunded, the Revenue would be liable to pay interest on the shortfall. This does not amount to payment of interest on interest. The Court has also explained this with example. According to the Court, the claim of such interest is on account of the shortfall in payment of the amount due and payable (including interest) and not a claim of interest on interest.

Gujarat Flourochemicals Ltd. vs. CIT – 300 ITR 328 (Guj)

4.1 The issue with regard to the entitlement of interest on interest also came up before the Gujarat High Court in the above case after Sandvik’s case. In this case, the brief facts were: The assessee had made certain payment to a foreign company (non-resident) and in that context on making an application for non-deduction of tax, the Assessing Officer (AO) had directed the assessee to deduct tax @ 30% on the basis which the assessee had deducted certain amount of tax and paid to the Government (it seems – somewhere in June 1987). Subsequently, the assessee realised that tax deducted and paid was excess on account of non-application of the principle of grossing up to its case at the relevant time and accordingly, claimed refund for such excess payment of tax which was granted (Rs. 10,26,868) by the AO vide order dated 30th November, 1990. Subsequently, the assessee claimed interest on such refund for a period from 1st July, 1987 to 30th November, 1990. There is some confusion in facts on terminal date i.e., 30-11-1990 or 13-11-1990. However, this is not relevant. The claim of the assessee was rejected by the CIT, CCIT as well as the CBDT. On these facts, the issue of grant of interest on such refund of excess tax paid came up before the Gujarat High Court in a writ petition filed by the assessee.

4.1.1 For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted that the question as to whether the assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for delay in payment of amount lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongly and contrary to law stands concluded by the apex court in Sandvik’s case. The Court also noted the subsequent instruction (referred to in para 3.1.1) issued by the CBDT in this regard. Based on this, the Court took the view that the assessee is entitled to interest as claimed and directed the Revenue to pay interest at the rate of 9% from 1st July, 1987 to 30th November, 1990. The Court also further directed to pay running interest at the rate of 9% on the amount of interest which may be granted to the assessee in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court.

4.1.2    It may be noted that in the above case, the Gujarat High court took the view that the assessee is entitled to interest on the amount refunded to the assessee as well as interest on such interest on general principles effectively relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case.

CIT vs. Gujarat Flourochemicals – 348 ITR 319 [SC – Division Bench]

5.1    It seems that the above judgment of the Gujarat High Court came up for consideration before the Division Bench of the apex court at the instance of the Revenue. The facts are not given in the case before the apex court. The Court also stated that this controversy arises in number of cases pending before the apex court. While dealing with this case, the Court noted that the short point which arises in the present case is: “What is the character of Tax Deductible at Source (TDS)/ Advance Tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961.” The Court further stated that the question which arises in this case is, whether interest is payable by the Revenue to the assessee if the aggregate of installments of Advance Tax/TDS paid exceeds the as-sessed tax? The Court also mentioned that this controversy arises in a number of cases pending before the Apex Court. Interestingly, it seems that, this question does not refer to liability of the Revenue to pay interest on interest but only refers to the liability of the Revenue to pay interest on excess payment of tax (i.e. Advance Tax/ TDS). However, it is also worth noting that the High Court had directed the Revenue to pay running interest on the amount of interest as mentioned in para 4.1.1.

5.1.1    In the above case, the assessee had relied on the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case. Referring to this, the Court stated that the main issue which arose for determination in Sandvik’s case was whether the assessee was entitled to be compensated by the Rev-enue for delay in paying to it the amounts admittedly due. The Court also doubted the correctness of the judgment in Sandvik’s case. In this context, the Court stated as under:

“The argument in Sandvik Asia [supra] on behalf of the assessee was that it was entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of the amounts lawfully due to it which were wrongly withheld for a long period of seventeen years. Vide Paragraph (23) of Sandvik Asia [supra], the Division Bench held that, in view of the express provisions of the Act, the assessee was entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of the amounts lawfully due to the assessee, which were withheld wrongly by the Revenue. With due respect, section 214 of the Act does not provide for payment of compensation by the Revenue to the assessee in whose favour a refund order has been passed. Moreover, in Sandvik Asia [supra], interest was ordered on the basis of equity. It was also ordered to be paid on the basis of Article 265 of the Constitution. We have serious doubts about the correctness of the judgment in Sandvik Asia [supra]. In our view, the judgment of this Court in the case of Modi Industries Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1995 (6) S.C.C. 396 correctly holds that Advance Tax or TDS loses its identity as soon as it is adjusted against the liability created by the Assessment Order and becomes tax paid pursuant to the Assessment Order. If Advance Tax or TDS loses its identity and becomes tax paid on the passing of the Assessment Order, then, is the assessee not entitled to interest under the relevant provisions of the Act?…”

5.1.2 The Court then referred to the relevant provisions of the Act [viz. sections 195, 195A, 214, 243, 244 etc.] and took the view that Sandvik’s case has not been correctly decided and referred the above issue arising in the above case as well as in other appeals to the Hon’ble Chief Justice for decision by a Larger Bench.

Gujarat Flourochemicals – 358 ITR 291 (SC – Larger Bench)

6.1    Based on the view of the Division Bench of the apex court referred to in para 5.1.2, the question of law involved in many cases [which, it seems, included the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Flouro-chemicals Ltd. (supra)] was referred to the Larger Bench (consisting of 3 judges) for consideration and authoritative pronouncement. In the context of the issue to be decided, the Court noted as under:

‘The question which arises in this case is, whether interest is payable by the Revenue to the assessee if the aggregate of installments of Advance Tax or TDS paid exceeds the assessed tax?’

6.2:    Referring to the judgment in Sandvik’s case, the Court stated as under:

“We would first throw light on the reasoning and the decision of this Court on the core issue in Sandvik case (supra). The only issue formulated by this Court for its consideration and decision was whether an assessee is entitled to be compensated by the Income-tax Department for the delay in paying interest on the refunded amount admittedly due to the assessee. This Court in the facts of the said case had noticed that there was delay of various periods, ranging from 12 to 17 years, in such payment by the Revenue. This Court had further referred to the several decisions which were brought to its notice and also referred to the relevant provisions of the Act which provide for refunds to be made by the Revenue when a superior forum directs refund of certain amounts to an assessee while disposing of an appeal, revision etc.

Since there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Revenue in refunding the amount due to the assessee this Court had thought it fit that the assessee should be properly and adequately compensated and therefore in paragraph 51 of the judgment, the Court while compensating the assessee had directed the Revenue to pay a compensation by way of interest for two periods, namely; for the Assessment Years 1977-78, 1978- 79, 1981-82, 1982-83 in a sum of Rs.40,84,906/- and interest @ 9% from 31.03.1986 to 27.03.1998 and in default, to pay the penal interest @ 15% per annum for the aforesaid period.”

6.2.1    The Court then stated that the said judgment has been misquoted and misinterpreted to say that in that case the Court had taken a view that the Revenue is obliged to pay interest on interest in the event of its failure to refund the interest payable within the statutory period.

6.2.2    Finally, explaining the effect of Sandvik’s case, the Court stated as under:

“As we have already noticed, in Sandvik case (supra) this Court was considering the issue whether an assessee who is made to wait for refund of interest for decades be compensated for the great prejudice caused to it due to the delay in its payment after the lapse of statutory period. In the facts of that case, this Court had come to the conclusion that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Revenue in re-funding certain amount which included the statutory interest and therefore, directed the Revenue to pay compensation for the same not an interest on interest.”

6.3 After explaining the effect of the judgment of Sandvik’s case as above, to decide the question of law referred to it, the Court held as under and referred back all the matters before a Division Bench to consider each case independently and take appropriate decision one way or the other:

“Further it is brought to our notice that the Legislature by the Act No. 4 of 1988 (w.e.f. 01.04.1989) has inserted section 244A to the Act which provides for interest on refunds under various contingencies. We clarify that it is only that interest provided for under the statute which may be claimed by an assessee from the Revenue and no other interest on such statutory interest.”

6.4      From the above decision of the Court, one may get an impression that the Court seems to have taken a view that Sandvik’s case was decided under pre-1989 provisions and from assessment year 1989-90, the interest on refund is payable u/s. 244A. As no reasonings are available in this judgment for the view taken by the Court, there is no clarity on this aspect. However, it would appear that the Larger Bench of the Court has not overruled the judgment in Sandvik’s case.  The Larger Bench of the Court also does not seem to have approved the view expressed by the Division Bench (referred to in para 5.1.2) that Sandvik’s case has not been correctly decided.  Instead, the Court has explained the view taken in Sandvik’s case and the effect thereof that in that case the Court had directed the Revenue to pay compensation for inordinate delay in refunding certain amount due to the assessee which included statutory interest and in that case, the Court had not decided that the Revenue is liable to pay interest on interest.    

Conclusion
7.1       From the judgment of three judge Bench of the Apex Court (Larger Bench) in the above case, it becomes clear that the assessee can claim only that interest which is provided under the Act and no other interest can be claimed by the assessee on statutory interest for delay in payment thereof. The similar approach was adopted by the three judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Panchanatham Chettiar [99 ITR 579]. As such, the assessee is not entitled to claim interest on interest unless there is a provision in the Act for the same.  

7.1.1     It is unfortunate that Larger Bench of the Apex Court has taken such a strict technical view of the issue which, in many cases, may involve the issue of equity and justice. In fact, with     this     judgment,    some    Revenue    Officials    may be tempted to delay payment of interest as that does not create any liability to pay further interest on the amount of interest wrongly withheld. This may happen in cases involving large amount of interest in this era of    unjustified    pressure    for    meeting    unrealistic revenue collection targets. This possibility was noted by the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case referred to in para 2.13.1 of Part 1 of this write-up wherein the Court has also opined that such actions and consequences seriously affect     the    administration    of     justice    and     the    rule of law.  It appears that this was also one of the factors considered by the Court to decide the issue in favour of the assessee in Sandvik’s case. Similar approach is found in the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation referred to in para 3.1.3.3.  Otherwise also, this position may be open to abuse and that is not in the long term interest of fair administration of tax laws.  Somehow, the Larger Bench of the Court in the above case has not appreciated this ground reality.  To be fair to the assessee, appropriate provision should be made in the Act itself to compensate the assessee in cases of delay in payment of interest due to the assessee. We only hope that the Revenue Officials will strictly follow the directions contained in the Instruction No. 2 dated 28th March, 2007 (referred to in para 3.1.1) issued by the CBDT after the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case.

7.2     From the above judgment, it seems to us that the Larger Bench in the above case has not decided that the assessee will not be entitled to claim compensation from the Revenue even if there is inordinate delay in payment of amount due to the assessee which may include statutory interest.  As mentioned in para 6.4, in the above case, the Court has not held that Sandvik’s case was wrongly decided. As such, as held in Sandvik’s case, in case of delay in payment of     ‘amount    due’     to     the    assessee     it    may    be possible for the assessee to claim compensation on such amount even if such amount includes statutory interest. Such a claim of the assessee should not be regarded as claim of interest on interest. It also appears that the claim for such compensation may be considered by the Courts and, as held by the Tribunal (TM) in the case of Nirma Chemicals (referred to in para 3.1.2), such a claim may not be entertained by the Tribunal or the lower authorities.

7.3    In the above context, it is worth noting that as mentioned in para 3.1.3.2, the Apex Court in the case of H.E.G. Ltd has held that the words ‘amount due’ appearing in section 244A include interest and the interest com-ponent will partake of the character of the ‘amount due’ u/s. 244A. It seems that this position is not disturbed by the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case as this has not been considered in the above case. This was also not the issue before the Larger Bench in the above case. It is also worth noting that the judgment of the apex court in H.E.G Ltd was also delivered by a three judge Bench of the apex court. With this position, the claim of interest u/s. 244A on the interest component of the ‘amount due’ may be regarded as claim of interest on shortfall in payment of ‘amount due’ and not as claim of interest on interest. As such, such a claim may be regarded as the claim under the provisions of the Act. This needs consideration even after the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case. In this context, the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation ( supra) is worth noting. At the same time, in this context, the view expressed by the Tribunal (TM) in the case of Nirma Chemicals (supra) may also be borne in mind.

7.4    In the cases of D. J. Works [195 ITR 227] and Chimanbhai S. Patel [210 ITR 419], the Gujarat High Court had taken a view that the assessee is entitled to interest on interest. As mentioned in para 1.4.1 of Part 1 of this write- up, the judgment of the Gujarat High Court was followed by the M. P. High Court in the case of Narendra Doshi and the judgment of the M. P. High Court in the case of Narendra Doshi has been affirmed by the apex court [254 ITR 606]. This is also relied on in Sandvik’s case to take a view that even if there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, the compensation for delay is required to be paid. In Sandvik’s case, as mentioned in para 2.9 of Part 1 of this write-up, a view was also taken that the decision of the apex court in Narendra Doshi’s case is on the merits of the matter, though it proceeded on the assumption that there was no provision in the Act grating interest on unpaid interest. Even this judgment in the case of Narendra Doshi was delivered by a three judge Bench of the Apex Court. It is worth noting that this judgment has also not been considered by the Larger Bench in the above case. The implication of this factual position may need consideration and we will have to wait and watch for the position which may ultimately emerge from this situation.

7.4.1 When the Division Bench of the apex court finally decides the issue on merit in the case of Gujarat Flourochemicals [or in any other case from the set of appeals forming part of the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case], some light may be thrown on the above. Let us hope for the development/ clarity in this regard at that stage.

WRIT PETITION MAINTAINABILITY

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SYNOPSIS

When an alternative remedy is
available under the Act, writ petition is not maintainable. However, in
various decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts have held
that if a issued is patently illegal or without jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the alternative remedy, writ is maintainable. In this
article, the author analyses of the recent SC ruling in the case of
Vijaybhai N. Chandrani which in his view is inconsistent with this
position and therefore requires reconsideration.

Brief Factual Background of the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

Recently,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani
[Civil Appeal No. 5888 to 5903 of 2013 dated 18.7.2013] has held that
writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court is not maintainable when
alternate remedy is available under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the
Act’). The brief background of the case is given hereunder:

In
the case of Vijaybhai (supra), the assessee purchased a plot of land
from Samutkarsh Co-operative Housing Society being developed by Savvy
Infrastructure Ltd. In 2008, a search was conducted u/s. 132 of the Act
in the premises of the Society and Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. During the
search, Assessing Officer (‘AO’) seized certain documents u/s. 132A of
the Act. One of the documents was loose sheet of paper containing list
of members under the heading “Samutkarsh Members Details”. One of the
names was that of the assessee and certain details were mentioned
against each name in different columns. On the basis of these documents
the AO issued notices u/s. 153C to the assessee to furnish his returns
of income for assessment years 2001-2002 to 2006-2007. Upon receipt of
the said notice, the assessee requested the AO to provide copies of the
seized material. The AO supplied copies of three loose sheets of paper
which, according to the assessee, did not belong to him. Under these
circumstances, the assessee moved a writ petition before the Hon’ble
Gujarat High Court challenging the aforesaid notices.

The
Hon’ble Gujarat High Court quashed the notices by holding that as the
said documents undoubtedly  did not belong to the assessee the condition
precedent for issuance of notice was not fulfilled and therefore the
action taken u/s. 153C of the Act stood vitiated. Though the Hon’ble
Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the correctness or
otherwise of the construction that was placed by the High Court on
Section 153C of the Act, it held that as alternate remedy was available
to the assessee, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ
petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to
the said notices. Upon receipt of a decision from the AO, if for any
reason assessee was aggrieved by the said decision, the same could be
questioned before the forum provided under the Act. Accordingly, the
order of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court was reversed.

Supreme
Court decisions on maintainability of writ petition – against
action/notice without jurisdiction – when alternative remedy is
available

It is a settled position that, generally, when
alternative remedy is available under the Act, writ petition is not
maintainable. However, in various decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court
and High Courts have held that if the notice issued is patently illegal
or without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the alternative remedy, writ is
maintainable. Some key decisions laying down the said ratio are quoted
hereunder:

• Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC)

“Mr.
Sastri mentioned more than once the fact that the company would have
sufficient opportunity to raise this question, viz., whether the
Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that under-assessment had
resulted from non-disclosure of material facts, before the Income-tax
Officer himself in the assessment proceedings and, if unsuccessful
there, before the Appellate Officer or the Appellate Tribunal or in the
High Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The
existence of such alternative remedy is not however always a sufficient
reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting
an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action.”
(Emphasis supplied).

• Foramer vs. CIT [2001] 247 ITR 436 (All) affirmed by Supreme Court in [2003] 264 ITR 566 (SC)

“As
regards alternative remedy, we are of the opinion since the notice
under section 148 is without jurisdiction, the petitioner should not be
relegated to his alternative remedy vide Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v.
ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC)…. .”

• UOI & Anr vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [2007] 001 CLR 0067 (SC)

“No
doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash
a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without
jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal.”

From
the above decisions, it is very clear that as a matter of practice writ
petition is not maintainable if alternative remedy is available under
the Act. However, in exceptional cases when the notices issued are
patently illegal or without jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that writ petition is maintainable.

Notice u/s. 153C in the case of Vijaybhai (supra) – without jurisdiction – liable to be quashed

In
the case of Vijaybhai (supra), the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court drew
distinction between the provisions of section 153C and section 158BD.
Whereas section 158BD seeks to tax any “undisclosed income” which “belongs”
to a person other than the person in whose case search has been carried
out, section 153C seeks to tax such other person only where “money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or books of account or documents seized” “belongs” to him. The Hon’ble High Court held “….it is an admitted position as emerging from the record of the case, that the documents
in question, namely the three loose papers recovered during the search
proceedings do not belong to the petitioner. ….it is nobody’s case that
the said documents belong to the petitioner. It is not even the case of
Revenue that the said three documents are in the handwriting of the
petitioner. In the circumstances, when the condition precedent for
issuance of notice is not fulfilled any action taken under s. 153C of
the Act stands vitiated.”
In the instant case, since it was an
admitted fact that the documents seized did not belong to the assessee,
the High Court held the notices issued u/s. 153C to be without
jurisdiction. In light of the above, having regard to the judgments
noted earlier, it is respectfully submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court should have upheld the judgment of the Gujarat High Court.

An
alternate remedy against an order passed pursuant to a notice cannot be
considered as an alternate remedy available against the notice which is
patently without jurisdiction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court did
not affirm the decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court supposedly on the
ground that the assessee had alternate remedies under the Act against
the notices issued. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held:

“…… at the
said stage of issuance of the notices under Section 153C, the assessee
could have addressed his grievances and explained his stand to the
Assessing Authority by filing an appropriate reply to the said notices
instead of filing the Writ Petition impugning the said notices. ….

In the present case, the assessee has invoked the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court at the first instance without first exhausting the alternate remedies provided under the Act. In our considered opinion, at the said stage of proceedings, the High Court ought not have entertained the Writ Petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to the said notices and upon receipt of a decision from the

Assessing Authority, if for any reason it is aggrieved by the said decision, to question the same before the forum provided under the Act. ….

Further, we grant time to the assessee, if it so desires, to file reply/objections, if any, as contemplated in the said notices within 15 days’ time from today. If such reply/objections is/are filed within time granted by this Court, the Assessing Authority shall first consider the said reply/objections and thereafter direct the assessee to file the return for the assessment years in question. We make it clear that while framing the assessment order, the Assessing Authority will not be influenced by any observations made by the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition. If, for any reason, the assessment order goes against the assessee, he/it shall avail and exhaust the remedies available to him/it under the Act, 1961. ….”

It is respectfully submitted that if the underlined portion of the judgment was not forming part of it, the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would have been on the lines of its earlier judgment in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd vs. ITO  [2003] 259 ITR 19 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a writ challenging notice u/s. 148 had directed the assessee/AO as under:

Thus, in the absence of the underlined part in the aforesaid judgment, as has happened in several writs challenging notices u/s. 148, the assessee would be able to approach the High Court after the AO’s order dealing with or rejecting the objections of the assessee against issue of notices u/s. 153C. As evident from the underlined part of the judgment quoted above, it is respectfully submitted that it appears that the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

a)  was either under an impression that there is a remedy under the Act against issue of notice u/s. 153C; or

b)     has    failed    to    appreciate    the    difference    between    an alternate remedy available against an order passed pursuant to a notice in contradistinction with an alternate remedy available against the issuance of the notice itself.

Conclusion:
In the light of the above, it is most humbly and respectfully submitted that the aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court requires reconsideration as:

(i)   the notice issued u/s. 153C was clearly without jurisdiction.

(ii)   there is no alternate remedy available under the Act against the issuance of notice u/s. 153C.

(iii)   in any case, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of cases notwithstanding the availability of an alternate remedy, a writ is clearly maintainable against an action/notice which is issued patently without jurisdiction.

Rethinking growth strategy

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Whenever I hear a politician saying that his party will fight elections on issues of development and growth rather than those that divide society, one takes that with a huge bag of salt. Whenever the youth of this country talk of growth, one is touched by the sincerity in their voices and the dreams in their eyes .

The issue really is, what is the nature of growth that we want and what are the ways and means to achieve it? In this editorial I am placing my thoughts before readers. I must admit that inspiration for this piece was a series of essays titled “Reimagining India“ recommended by a dear friend.

The world appears convinced that India has the potential to become an economic superpower, but the tragedy is that Indians are drowned in self-doubt. We have huge untapped talent. Away from Indian shores, Indians excel in universities and corporations. In the USA, Indians are number one in terms of per capita income. We must therefore believe that we have the ability to be the best in the world.

Our diffidence probably arises on account of being constantly compared with China’s growth model. If we continue to do so, we will always label ourselves as laggards. India cannot afford to grow like China nor should that be its aim. Our democratic coalition governments cannot become as ruthlessly efficient as China’s politburo nor should they aspire to be. Though we may not realise it today, the social costs of China’s economic expansion are obvious. While it may showcase its Shanghai infrastructure, many parts of China suffer from a poor quality of life and rank extremely low on the happiness index. There is a simmering discontent among certain sections of the public. An authoritarian regime, like the one in China, in a country like ours with a religious, community and caste diversity can result in an explosive situation.

While we must not blindly ape the China model, we must admit that we have made many mistakes since independence and it is time that we rethink the future. We have in the first four decades post-independence followed a protectionism policy believing that we were a defenceless lot , while record shows that with a more open global competition Indians have fared far better.

Even after the Indian economy was unshackled, there has been excessive importance to the information technology  and software sectors without realising that these are tertiary sectors and their growth, has benefitted the white-collared employees while ignoring the blue-collar workforce which is in fact our strength. While GDP increased, its distribution was skewed. We did not pay adequate attention to primary sectors – manufacturing and agriculture. The emphasis must now shift. Liberalisation of labour laws and fast tracking agricultural reforms can give the Indian economy the requisite depth and breadth.

While I believe that one must guard against an undue socialist bias that our economic policies once had, one cannot ignore the importance of an equitable distribution of national wealth. While the government must get out of business it must actively invest and intervene in core sectors. For example, the government must give emphasis to infrastructure which would give impetus to business and increase spending on health and education which would improve the quality of life of the masses.

However in doing so, limited government resources must be spent with well-defined priorities. In infrastructure while it is important to have more and improved airports, the priority should be to build more roads, bridges and railway tracks. While the ultimate goal is that latest developments in the medical field should be available to the public at affordable rates, the emphasis must be on ensuring primary health care. In education while we must encourage top-class universities and technical institutions, the government itself must spend on primary education. The Right to Education Act is a beginning and not the end. While increasing spending in these sectors one must use leapfrogging techniques to accelerate the growth. It would be worthwhile to explore using the broadband to deliver educational content to villages rather than the brick and mortar method of increasing traditional schools.

Finally we must recognise the ground realities and our social ethos. Diversity is a unique characteristic of our country. Rather than attempting to iron out our differences we must attempt convert them into virtues rather than vulnerabilities. Rather than keeping power centralised in the fear that the States would go astray I believe that giving the States greater autonomy in economic policies may be advisable. If the States go their own way, competition will push the laggards to perform better. This will invigorate the States who will ensure that investment comes their way. The better performing States will attract resources. Shifting of Tata motors from West Bengal to Gujarat is a case in point. The Centre should aid the weaker States to overcome the infrastructure deficit and leave them to compete, with each other. For a long time the four northern States Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh were described as BIMARU. This is a thing of the past. Bihar is making great strides and Madhya Pradesh ranks very high in terms of  various growth parameters.

These are some of the growth strategies that we need to adopt if we are to become an economic superpower. The world is convinced about the India growth story. It is time that Indians believed it!

Anil J. Sathe
Editor
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In Search of Godhead

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Robin Sharma, renowned author and a leadership guru has given an interesting story in his book “Who will cry when you die?” Thousands of years ago, it was believed that every one who walked upon the earth was god. But humankind abused its limitless powers. So the Supreme God decided to hide the Godhead, the source of all of this potential, so that no one could find it. An imperative question arose, where could such thing be hidden? The first suggestion of placing it deep into the ground was rejected as some one would find it, digging deep. The other options of placing it in the deepest ocean or the highest mountain were also turned down as some one would dive deep in the ocean or scale the highest peaks and find it some day. The Supreme God then found a solution to this. He decided to put this source of all power inside the hearts of every man, woman and child as they will never think of looking there.

The story appears so very true in today’s context considering the manner in which everyone is going about looking for God. The irony is that, all our actions including the devotion seem more because of the fear of God rather than the love of God. As put beautifully in the story, how many are able to look for God in a human being or for that matter, in every being, the ones that are marvelous creations of God? The need is to distinguish between the “Man made Murats” and “God made Murats”.

Atman, the soul, the Brahmn is the same in each and every being. One that is beyond body, mind and intellect. Those who have never tried to understand anything beyond the sensually perceivable world may raise the question, “If there is God, why can’t we see him? Such a question may be a matter of laughter for many. Our identification with body, mind and intellect in all our exchanges without even having a thought of the spirit (the Atman), is an example of how ignorant we are. Whenever we interact with anyone, we identify only with the mind, body complex and not the spirit. Atman or Brahmn, in all beings is the same. Brahmn pervades all activity.

In Kenopanisad, the guru explains God, Brahmn as:

That which indeed is the Ear of the ear, the Mind of the mind, the Speech of the speech, the Vital-air of the prana and the Eye of the eye. The wise having completely freed and risen above this world become immortal. [Kenopanisad – Mantra 2]

This may sound somewhat confusing at first instance as to what could be the Ear of the ear or the Eye of the eye. The answer is simple. It is known that we see through the eyes, but there is force within that enables the eyes to see, that force is Brahmn, God. So is with the ears. If eyes could see, then the body without life could also see. This enlivening force, the Brahmn, one which is non-dual resides in the heart of every human being is the substratum of the universe.

If there is one God in all then why don’t we see it? We do not see it because we operate only through the body, mind and intellect. This can be best understood with a small experiment. When a light passes through a prism, the output of one coloured light is reflected in various different colours. Single coloured light appears in many colours on the other side of the prism. Similarly, when the Brahmn operates through the prism of the body, mind and intellect, we see different individuals distinct from the one Brahmn rooted in all.

To love God is to love all. Lord Krishna in the 12th chapter of Bhagwad Gita has enumerated 35 qualities of a devotee. The first and foremost quality stated in verse 13 is on the same thought and in fact would disqualify many devotees. “One who hates no being”. Thus to love God, one needs to identify God everywhere, love all beings because the same God lives in all beings. Loving all fellow beings has been beautifully presented in a poem Abou Ben Adhem, by James Henry Leigh Hunt. The poet has illustrated the true devotion to God. Abou dreamt of an angel who was writing the names of those who loved God. He enquired whether his name was there in the list or not. When the angel replied that his name was not in the list, he then requested the angel to write his name in the list of those who loved his fellow-men. Angel wrote the name and left. The next night the angel came with the list of those whom God loved. This list had Abou Ben Adhem’s name on the top.

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Activities Relating to Purchase of Goods from India by a Liaison Office

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Synopsis
Under Section 9, income of a non-resident (NR) from a “business connection” in India would be deemed to accrue or arise in India. However, if the activities of NR are confined to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export the deeming fiction does not apply.

The scope of the phrase “operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India” has been a subject matter of controversy, with the Tax Department generally adopting a fairly narrow interpretation. In this feature the authors analyse the various judicial pronouncements in this regard.

Issue for consideration

An income of a foreign company or part thereof, attributable to its operations in India, is taxable in India provided such operations or activities are construed to be a ‘business connection’ within the meaning of the term as defined in Explanation 2 to section 9(1) of the Income-tax Act. Such an income is deemed to accrue or arise in India where it is found to be through or from any business connection in India, whether directly or indirectly. The said Explanation 2 provides that a business connection shall inter alia include any business activity, carried out through a person who habitually exercises an authority to conclude contracts in India on behalf of the non-resident, unless his activity is limited to the purchase of goods or merchandise for the non-resident.

Explanation 1(b) provides that income shall not be deemed to accrue or arise in India, where operations are confined to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

An issue has arisen in cases where an Indian liaison office of a foreign company purchases goods from India for its head office and carries out several activities incidental thereto. The courts have been asked, under the circumstances, to define the true meaning of the term ‘confined to purchase of goods in India’ and explain whether the activities that are carried out for effecting purchase of goods in India could be considered as an independent activity or as an integral part of the purchase of goods in India. In case of the latter, the activity shall not attract Indian taxation and in case of the earlier, it may expose the income attributable to such activity to taxation in India. Recently, the Karnataka High Court has held that such activities constitute purchase of goods in India, while the Authority for Advance Ruling has held the same to be not forming part of purchase.

Columbia Sportswear Co.’s case

The issue arose before the Authority for Advance Rulings In Re Columbia Sportswear Co, 12 taxmann. com 349. The company in this case was incorporated under the laws of the USA, a multinational wholesaler and retailer of outdoors apparel with global operations. It conducted research and development to develop marketable products outside India. In the year 1995, the company established a liaison office in Chennai for undertaking liaison activities, in connection with purchase of goods in India, which activities had subsequently been expanded to Bangladesh and Egypt. Besides coordinating purchase of goods from India, the Indian liaison office also assisted the company in purchase of goods from Egypt and Bangladesh and engaged in quality monitoring and production monitoring of goods purchased from these countries. The goods procured from Egypt and Bangladesh were directly sold to the company in the United States from those countries. In the year 2000, a support office was opened by the Indian liaison office in Bangalore with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India.

The company claimed that;

• its products were produced by independent suppliers worldwide including India.

• the Indian liaison office was involved in activities relating to purchase functions for the company and incidentally was engaged in vendor identification, review of costing data, vendor recommendation, quality control and uploading of material prices into the internal product data management system of the company besides monitoring vendors for compliance with its policies, procedures and standards related to quality, delivery, pricing and labour practices.

• the Indian liaison office did not have any revenue streams; it did not source products to be sold locally in India.

• it did not sell any goods in India and therefore no income arose from its Indian operations.

• no income could be deemed to have accrued or arose in India within the meaning of section 9(1) of the Act.

• its case was covered by Explanation 1(b) of s.9(1) (i) and could not be construed as a case of business connection.

• it did not undertake any activity of trading, commercial or industrial in nature in India.

• the expenditure of the liaison office was entirely met by remittances made by the company.

On these facts, the company approached the Authority seeking a ruling on the question whether, given the nature of the activities carried on by the liaison office, any income accrues or arises in India as per section 5(2)(b) of the Act? Whether the applicant can be said to have a business connection in India as per the provisions of section 9(1)(i) of Act read with Explanation 2? Whether various activities carried out by the India LO, as listed in the Statement of relevant facts (Annexure-III), are covered under the phrase, ‘through or from operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export’ as stated in part (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act?

The Authority in paragraph 8 of the decision noted the following facts surrounding the activities of the LO;

“The liaison office of the applicant in India is engaged in vendor identification, review of costing data, vendor recommendation, quality control and uploading of material prices into the internal product data management system of the applicant. The liaison office monitors vendors for compliance with its policies, procedures and standards related to quality, delivery, pricing and labour practices. The liaison office is engaged in quality monitoring and production monitoring for goods purchased from Egypt and Bangladesh. It coordinates, ascertains, monitors and verifies with the vendors to develop the material in line with the quality and aesthetic requirements of the product as provided by the applicant’s product design team. It undertakes laboratory testing of fabrics/garments in India in addition to inspecting the quality of the products. It reviews production and quality assurance including the monitoring of the labour practices compliance and periodic performance reviews. It conveys the orders placed by the applicant on to the suppliers and interacts with the suppliers in relation to capacity utilisation, quality assurance, on-time delivery performance and so on. The role of the quality control team in the liaison office includes executing pre-sourcing factory evaluations to determine the vendor’s ability to manufacture the product to the expectations of the applicant. The quality control team also gives quality training to the newly selected vendors and is responsible for communicating the quality processes of the applicant and expectations to suppliers. The team also ensures that standard methods, tools, machinery and layouts are used. The liaison office also summarises seasonal vendor quality performance for the consideration of the applicant. The liaison office also ensures compliance with the quality process including seeking to ensure that the targeted defect percentage is maintained. It also ensures that the requirements of environmental laws and labour laws of the country are obeyed by the suppliers.”

The Authority concluded that the applicant could not take benefit of Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1) (i) as, in its opinion, the activities carried out by the assessee were not confined to purchase of goods in India. The following findings and observations of the Authority are pertinent;

•    The liaison office had about 35 employees divided into 5 teams dealing with material management, merchandising, production management, quality control and administration support, constituting teams from finance, human resources and information systems.

•    Activities carried on by the liaison office related to ensuring the choosing of quality material, occasionally testing them for quality, conveying of requisite design, picking out of competitive sellers, the ensuring of quality, the ensuring of adherence to the policy of the applicant in the matter of procurement and employment, in the matter of compliance with environmental and other local regulations by the manufacturers – suppliers and in ensuring that the payments made by the applicant reach the suppliers.

•    In the matter of manufacturing of products as per design, quality and in implementing policy, the liaison office was actually doing the work of the applicant, which actually was in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling branded products, brands over which it had exclusive right.

•    The activities of the liaison office were not confined to India. It also facilitated the doing of business by the applicant with entities in Egypt and Bangladesh.

•    A person in the business of designing, manufactur-ing and selling could not be taken to earn a profit only by a sale of goods. The goods as designed and styled by the applicant could not be sold without it being got manufactured and procured in the manner designed and contemplated by the applicant.

•    It would be unrealistic to take the view that all the activities other than the actual sale of the goods are not an integral part of the business of the applicant and have no role in the profit being made by the applicant by the sale of its branded products. It was difficult to accept the argument that what was done in India by the liaison office of the applicant was only to expend money and all its income accrued outside India by the sale of the products.

•    All activities other than the actual sale could not be divorced from the business of manufacture and sale especially in a case like that of the applicant, where the sale was of a branded product, designed and got made by the applicant under supervision, under a brand owned by the applicant. Therefore, the argument on behalf of the applicant that all the activities carried on in India were confined to the purchase of goods in India, could not be accepted.

•    ‘Confined’ meant, ‘limited, restricted’. ‘Purchase’ meant ‘get by payment, buy’.

The Authority observed that what section 9(1)(i), Explanation 1(b) deemed in the case of a non-resident, was that no income arose in India to a person through or from operations which were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export but, in the case before it, the activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India were not confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. It further observed that the applicant, in fact, transacted in India its business of designing, quality controlling, getting manufactured consistent with its policy and the laws, the branded products it sold elsewhere and that those activities could not be understood as activities confined to purchase of goods in India for export from India.

Income resulting from manufacture, purchase and sale, in the opinion of the Authority, could not be compartmentalised and confined to one arising out of a sale only, and that the whole process of procurement and sale had to be completed to generate income. Getting manufactured and purchasing formed integral parts of the process of generating income and the liaison office acted as the arm of the applicant regarding that part of the activity, and its functions were not confined to purchase or mere purchase.

Another aspect that influenced the Authority’s decision was the fact that the activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India, was not confined to India but extended to Egypt and Bangladesh. Since the activities of the applicant in India included its business in Egypt and Bangladesh, it could not be stated that the operations of the applicant in India were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

The Authority therefore took the view that the activities of the liaison office gave rise to taxable income in India, not being exempt under explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i).

Nike Inc.’s case

The issue recently came up for consideration before the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nike Inc., 34 taxmann.com 170. The company in this case was engaged in the business of sports apparel with its main office in the USA and had globally located associated enterprises or subsidiaries. From its office in the USA, the company arranged for all its subsidiaries the supply of various brands of sports apparel for sale to various customers. It did not carry on any manufacture by itself. It engaged various manufacturers all over the world on a job-to-job basis and made arrangements with its subsidiaries for purchase of the manufactured goods directly and payment for the same to the respective manufacturers.

With a view to procure various apparel from manufacturers from various parts of the world, the company opened a liaison office in India and;

•    employed persons in various categories.

•    the rate or price for each apparel was negotiated by the liaison office with the manufacturer.

•    the quality of each apparel was also indicated and the samples so developed were forwarded to the US office.

•    the liaison office proposed and gave its opinion about the reasonability of the price, etc. and the US office decided about the price, quality, quantity, to whom to be shipped and billed.

•    the local manufacturer in India was conveyed of the decision by the office in the USA and once it was accepted, the local manufacturer carried on his activity.

•    the liaison office kept a close watch on the progress, quality, etc. at the manufacturing workshop and also kept a watch on the time schedule to be followed and rendered such assistance as may be required in the dispatch of the goods, including the actual buyer and the place for export.

For all these activities in India, the liaison office was receiving funds through banking channels from the USA.

For the relevant assessment years, the company filed returns of income declaring nil income. It contended that its activities were to carry on activities that were ancillary and auxiliary to the activities of its head office and other group companies and to act as a communication channel between the head office and parties in India. It claimed that in terms of Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i), no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India to a non-resident from operations which were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purposes of export. In terms of Circular No. 20, dated 7-7-1964, a non-resident would not be liable to tax in India on any income attributable to operations confined to purchase of goods in India for export, even though the non-resident had an office or an agency in India for the purpose, or the goods were subjected to any manufacturing process before being exported from India. Therefore, no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India to it, as its operations were restricted to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, even though it had a liaison office to facilitate sourcing of products from Indian suppliers.

The Assessing Officer held that the activities of the company were actually beyond its activities required as a liaison office and a part of the entire business was done in India through the liaison office and therefore, the income had accrued or arisen or deemed to have accrued or arisen to the company in India in view of clause (b) of s/s. (2) of section 5. He, therefore, held that the income of the company was chargeable to tax to the extent of income, which was attributable to the activities done in India or accruing or arising in India on its behalf by its liaison office. He further held that 5% of the export value could reasonably be considered as income attributable to India operations, i.e., income accruing or arising in India to the company.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that it was an admitted fact that the company was not involved in the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, which would have involved transfer of title of goods purchased from the seller to the purchaser and as no purchase took place in the name of the liaison office, it was not entitled to the exemption enumerated in section 9(1). He, therefore, upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

On second appeal, the tribunal held that the case before it was a case of purchase of the goods for the purpose of export by the assessee. It observed that in the absence of there being any prima facie contract between the assessee and the local manufacturer, the status of the liaison office was that of buyer’s agent, more so when the local manufacturer knew it only as the agent of the buyer i.e., the company had placed the orders on it with a view to buy the goods in the course of export and, as directed, export it to various affiliates of the company. It held that the Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) clearly applied to the company and hence, no income was derived by the company in India through its operations of the liaison office in India. It accordingly, set aside the orders of the lower authorities and granted relief to the company.

On appeal to the High Court by Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held that the activities of the assesssee were confined to purchase of goods in India and could not be construed to represent any business connection nor could it be said that it resulted in any deemed accrual or arising of any income in India.

In the context of the income accruing or arising from ‘business connection’, the court observed that till 2004, the word ‘business connection’ had not been defined. However, by the Finance Act, 2003, Explanation 2 was inserted in section 9(1)(i), which, though it came into effect from o1-04-2004, was clarificatory in nature. It further took note of the deletion of the Proviso to Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) by the Finance Act, 1964, with effect from 01-04 -1964, which deletion had the effect of exempting a non-resident from tax in India on any income attributable to operations confined to purchase of goods in India for export, even though the non-resident had an office or agency in India for the purpose, or even though the goods were subjected by him to any manufacturing process before being exported from India.

In the instant case, the court noted that the as-sessee was not carrying on any business in India though it had established a liaison office in India whose object was to identify the manufacturers, give them the technical know-how and see that they manufactured goods according to its specifications, which would be sold to its affiliates. It further noted that the person who purchased the goods paid the money to the manufacturer and in the said income the assessee had no right; the said income could not be said to be an income arising or accruing in India vis-à-vis the assessee; the evidence on record showed that the assessee paid the entire expenses of the liaison office.

According to the court, the payment by the non-resident buyer of some consideration to the assessee outside India, as per the contract between the as-sessee and the buyer entered outside India, was an irrelevant factor in deciding the accrual of income in India and in any case, even if any income arose or accrued to the assessee, it was outside India.

Noting the provisions contained in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(i) concerning the business connection and that the saving for the activities was limited to the purchase of goods or merchandise, the court observed that no income should be deemed to ac-crue or arise in India. The court observed that once the entire operations were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, the income derived therefrom should not be deemed to accrue or arise in India u/s. 9. It also observed that the activities of the assessee in assisting the Indian manufacturer to manufacture the goods according to its specification was to see that the said goods manufactured had an international market, and could therefore be exported. The Court concluded that the assessee was not earning any income in India, and, if at all it was earning an income outside India under a contract which was entered into outside India, no part of its income could be taxed in India either u/s. 5 or section 9.

In arriving at the conclusion in favour of the assessee, the court was guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd. vs. CIT ,23 ITR 101 (SC) (para 15) and CIT vs. R.D. Agarwal & Co. 56 ITR 20 (SC).

Observations

Clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) clarifies that no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India, in the case of a non-resident, through or from operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. It clearly conveys that a non-resident can carry an activity in India and such activity may signify a business connection so however the income through or from such activity, if confined to purchase, shall not be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

An activity that travels beyond purchase of goods in India shall expose the income, pertaining to such an activity, to taxation in India under the deeming fiction contained in section 9(1)(i) of the Act. Such an activity may be carried out by a non-resident himself or through his agent or a liaison office.

It therefore is essential, for an exemption from tax, that the activity is confined to purchase of goods for export. The term ‘confined’ to is not defined in the Act and, as has been seen, has been the subject matter of intense conflict. One view of the matter is that the term ‘purchase’ signifies placing of an order for purchase of such goods that are exported. The other view is that the term connotes carrying out all such activities that lead to placing an order of purchase of goods for export, i.e., all activities that precede the placement of an order are ‘purchase’. In the narrowest possible view of the term ’purchase’, the activity is restricted to placing the purchase order, while taking a broader view, even the activities leading to placing an order for purchase of goods shall be included in ‘purchase’ of goods.

The term ‘confined’, in the context, is defined to mean “restrict within certain limits of scope” by the Oxford Dictionary. An activity or activities whose scope is restricted to purchase of goods can be said to be confined under the meaning supplied by the Oxford Dictionary. A plain reading explains that the dictionary does not narrow down or limit a ‘purchase’ to the activity of placing the order of purchase. Isolating activities leading to purchase from its scope is not even implied.

The important thing is to ascertain that can an order for purchase be placed without necessarily undertaking the activities that lead to such an order, such as; identifying the product and its quality, short-listing a vendor, giving product specifications, negotiating the price and fixing it, defining the logistics and specifying the delivery schedule? If the answer, in the context of clause(b) is no, then carrying on the pre- purchase activities shall not result in any deemed accrual of income.

The dictionary meaning of the term ‘purchase’ is to acquire on payment or for a consideration. It needs to be appreciated that an acquisition is not limited to placing an order of purchase but involves the series of acts carried out to successfully acquire a thing and includes the act of payment effected, post purchase, for an acquisition. It is significant to note that the word ‘purchase’ is preceded by the word ’to’, collectively reading ‘to purchase’ and so read, it sets any doubts to rest about the true un-derstanding of the law. To purchase without doubt, shall rope in all activities that enables the placement of a purchase order leading in turn to purchase or acquisition of goods.

The Authority in Columbia Sportswear Co.’s case has refused to appreciate that the activities considered by it to be constituting a business nonetheless were part of an activity of purchase without which it was not possible to purchase goods, and in that view of the mater, such activities were confined to purchase of goods alone and that they were not to be isolated from the purchase of goods as was being represented by the revenue authority.

In contrast, the Karnataka High Court in Nike Inc.’s case took a pragmatic view by holding that the pre-purchase activities were activities that were part of purchase of goods and carrying on such activities did not amount to travelling beyond the scope of the exemption contained in clause (b).

One needs to appreciate that the Reserve Bank of India while permitting a foreign company to set up a liaison office in India ensures that the operations of such an office are restricted in its scope and does not include carrying on of the business in which case, the company shall be required to set up a branch in India. In fact, carrying on of the pre- purchase activities by a liaison office is within the scope of the permission of the Reserve Bank of India.

Another aspect that requires appreciation is that pre-purchase activities and purchase represent an expenditure and not an income and therefore, even on this account, it is difficult to hold that these activities by themselves can lead to any income or even a deemed income. A right must have emerged to enable the assessee to demand and receive an income before it can be taxed in the hands of the assessee. No such right can be said to have emerged for carrying out pre-purchase activities. The Supreme court in the case of Anglo-French Textiles Co. Ltd., 23 ITR 101(SC) held that no profit could be said to have arisen on mere purchase of goods in India. For some incoherent reason this aspect was not appreciated by the Authority. Secondly, for the purpose of bringing even a deemed income to taxation, it is essential that the income pertaining to such an activity is defined and it is only then that a deemed income could be brought to taxation, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Anglo-French Textiles Co. Ltd., 25 ITR 27(SC). The principle so laid down by the apex court has a legislative acceptance in the form of clause (a) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act. In the said case, the court held that distribution of profits over different business operations or activities ought only to be made for sufficient and cogent reasons. The principle was reiterated in the case of R.D. Agarwala & Co. 56 ITR 20 and was expressly relied upon by the Karnataka High Court in Nike Inc.’s case and was ignored in Columbia Sportswear co’s case by the Authority.

The following observations and findings of the court in Nike Inc.’s case are helpful in appreciating the intent of the lawmakers; “If we keep the object with which the proviso to clause (b) of Explanation 1 to s/s. (1)(i) of section 9 of the Act was deleted, the object is to encourage exports thereby the Country can earn foreign exchange. The activities of the assessee in assisting the Indian manufacturer to manufacture the goods according to their specification is to see that the said goods manufactured has an international market, therefore, it could be exported. In the process, the assessee is not earning any income in India. If at all he is earning income outside India under a contract which is entered outside India, no part of their income could be taxed in India either u/s. 5 or section 9 of the Act.”

The Authority seems to have been largely influenced by the fact that the Indian office of the foreign company undertook activities of similar nature in Egypt and Bangladesh which in its opinion was outside the scope of exemption granted under clause(b) of Explanation 1 of section 9(1)(i) of the Act. This is clear from the following observations and findings; ‘There is another aspect. The activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India, is not confined to India. It also takes up the identical activities as in India, in Egypt and Bangladesh. The applicant has only pleaded that the goods procured from Egypt and Bangladesh are not imported into India and are sold only to the applicant in the US. Whether products of the applicant are sold in Egypt and Bangladesh is not clear. Whatever it be, since the activities of the applicant in India takes in, its busi-ness in Egypt and Bangladesh, it cannot be stated that the operations of the applicant in India are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.”

The very same Authority in IKEA Trading (Hong Kong) Ltd., 176 Taxman 344 held that re-purchase activities were a part of the purchase of goods and did not take away the benefit of clause (b) of the said Explanation. It however chose not to follow the ratio of the said decision by observing that it was delivered on the facts of that case. In that case, on a finding that the applicant therein, a foreign com-pany having a liaison office in India was engaged only in purchase operations in India for export, it was held that no income was generated by such an activity in India to be taxed in India either from the standpoint of section 5(2) or section 9(1)(i) read with Explanation 1(b) of the Income-tax Act. The AAR in Columbia Sportswear co.’s case confirmed that it was true that the activities undertaken by the applicant therein included some of the activities undertaken by the applicant before it.

The Authority, with respect, was unduly swayed by the proposition that all activities other than the actual sale cannot be divorced from the business of manufacture and sale especially in a case where the sale is of a branded product, designed and got made by the applicant under supervision, under a brand owned by the applicant. What the Authority failed to appreciate is that while what was stated by it was otherwise true but was rendered irrelevant, in the context, by virtue of clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act, which clause specifically excluded an activity of purchase from being labeled as business connection. In that view of the matter, the conclusion of the authority based on the decisions delivered without the benefit of analysing the said clause(b) cannot, with respect, be said to be laying down a good law. It was incorrect to have rejected the contention of the applicant that the decision of the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd’s case (supra) did not govern the situation, anymore, in view of the addition of Expla-nation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, taking out activities of purchase while deeming the accrual of income.

The Authority, instead of appreciating the change in law, went on to hold that the activity of purchase cannot be totally divorced from the activity of sale leading to income and this principle, in its opinion, is not affected by the Explanation which only seeks to exclude income from activities limited to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. The principle that a purchase of raw material, getting goods manufactured and selling the product form an integral activity remains unshaken in the opinion of the Authority and hence a deemed income arose in the hands of the applicant even on purchase of goods for export form India.

The decisions in the cases of CIT vs. N.K. Jain, 206 ITR 692 (Del.) and Mustaq Ahmed, In 307 ITR 401 (AAR) were also relied on by the applicant in Columbia Sportswear co.’s case to argue that the effect of the Explanation as understood therein supported the position adopted by the applicant. These decisions in our opinion are relevant to the issue being considered here in as much as the issue in those cases was about what constituted a business conncection in cases where the Indian arm of the non-resident was carrying out activities that preceded placing an order for purchasing goods. The Authority, however, chose to ignore these decisions on the ground that can be best explained by reproducing the words of the Authority; “There was no argument based on the decision of the Supreme Court before the High Court. There was no reference to that decision and there was no consideration of an argument that a purchase could not be totally divorced from a sale in such cases. There is no ra-tio emerging that by virtue of the addition of the Explanation, the principle set down by the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd.’s case (supra) is no more relevant or binding.”

The Authority rather relied upon the decision In Mustaq Ahmed’s case (supra), to hold that the Authority, in that case, after noting the decision of the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textiles’ case and the history of the Explanation to section 9(1) (i)    of the Act, confirmed after a detailed discussion on the question, that the ratio of the decision in that case remained unaffected by the addition of clause (b) to Explanation 1 in the present Act and the principle enunciated in the decision applied with equal vigour, irrespective of Explanation 1(b). Yet another decision relied upon by the applicant In Angel Garment Ltd., In 287 ITR 341, concerning the purchase of goods by a liaison office was held by the Authority to be delivered on the facts of that case and was not applied.

It is true that the activity of purchase contributes to eventual profit and therefore it may not be correct to say that such an activity does not contribute to any income. But what is needed to be appreciated is that the income attributable to such activity of purchase has been specifically excluded from the purview of taxation by the legislature on insertion of clause(b). It is this fact which appears to have been missed by the Authority when it relied on the decision in the Anglo-French Textiles’ case that was rendered on a law that did not have any such exclusion. The whole process of procurement and sale has to be completed to generate income and surely purchasing goods forms an integral part of the process of generating income, but the income, if any, pertaining to such an activity requires to be excluded by the law contained in clause(b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1).

It is our considered view that the conflict on the issue discussed is not only avoidable but should be avoided by the Revenue by taking a pragmatic stand to include the activities leading to placing an order for purchase of goods in purchase of goods for export. In our opinion, the term purchase of goods is wide enough and should be so construed, in the present days, to include even manufacturing of goods for export out of India, more so when such goods are used for captive consumption by a non-resident.

The discussion here is valid in the context of the provisions of the Income tax Act. The taxation of the assessees governed by a Double Tax Avoidance Agreement will be determined largely by the provisions of such agreement.

Minority Shareholder Squeezeout – Multiple, Conflicting, Loosely Drafted Provisions

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Companies Act, 2013

The Companies Act, 2013, (“the Act”) is gradually coming into force, with 98 sections duly notified and several set of draft rules circulated for feedback. The target for the Act to fully come into force by end of this financial year seems achievable. But how desirable is such speedy implementation? The common argument for quick implementation is that the new law has been in contemplation/consideration for too long and it is high time we have a modern law. The reality is that each successive version of the Bill has seen major changes/new provisions which, both in terms of drafting and implications, have been inadequately discussed. Worse, and that is one of the issues presented in this article, there are provisions that seem to overlap or are in conflict with other laws. In particular, for some reason, the lawmakers have sought to duplicate requirements that SEBI has already framed. These include provisions relating to Independent Directors, Audit Committee, bonus shares and many others. In subsequent issues, we will discuss such duplicate provisions. To begin with, the vexed topic of ‘Minority Squeeze-out’ is considered here.

What is buy-out vs. squeeze-out?

Simply described, minority Squeeze-out involves marginalising of and buying out of minority shareholders, often forced (hence the word “squeeze”) out of a lower value than fair value. As compared to buyouts which may be mandatory on the offers or but optional for the sellers, a squeeze-out gets greater publicity in case of listed companies though it is common in unlisted companies also. There was a time when companies sought to increase minority shareholding by issuing shares through a public issue. The process of listing ensured a higher issue price. Over a period, with increasing compliance and other requirements and depressed share prices, the status of listing can become burdensome. Worse, unscrupulous managements sometimes pursue acquisition of public (minority) shareholding at depressed value. Forced buybacks were thus seen in many companies (discussed earlier in this column) with minorities being bought off against their will and in many cases, at prices that were lower than fair value. The stratagem used was to carry this out through a court-approved scheme of arrangement/ reduction of capital where often the criteria for approval are different. The ignorant and scattered shareholders usually did not offer vigorous opposition. SEBI and stock exchanges took some belated inadequate action. Certain provisions such as requirement of pre-approval of schemes by stock exchanges were introduced. However, this was not enough and even circumvented.

Be as it may be, finally, the Act now makes certain specific provisions in relation to such minority squeeze-outs.

What do the new provisions in the Act provide?

Firstly, the new Act prohibits buyback of shares through schemes of reduction or arrangement. Thus, companies cannot buy back shares of shareholders through such schemes. Effectively, they will have to resort to the procedure for buyback of shares as prescribed in section 68 of the Act relating to ‘buyback of shares’. This means they will also have to follow the Rules that would be notified by the Central Government (for unlisted companies) and the Regulations as notified by SEBI (for listed companies). The provisions for buyback in the Act/ Rules/Regulations ensure that it cannot be forced upon unwilling shareholders. It is another issue that these provisions are not well drafted. Further, the provisions relating to buyback of shares suffer from several limitations, particularly the size of buyback. Hence, even genuine cases may face difficulties. Nevertheless, one abusive method will come to an end.

Secondly, there are two specific provisions that enable minority buy-outs. Essentially, they provide for purchase of shares of the minority shareholders when more than 90% of the shares are bought by a company or group. When minority shareholders are reduced to below 10%, they have minimal rights, except those provided generally by the Act or the articles of association. They have no powers to veto a general or special resolution. They also cannot file a petition complaining of oppression/mismanagement or initiate class action. The minority may thus want to have an opportunity provided by the majority shareholders to be bought out at a fair price, even if they did not avail of an earlier opportunity.

 Sections 235 and 236 deal with such situations. While section 235 is a slightly modified version of the existing section 395 of the Companies Act, 1956, section 236, though overlapping to an extent, provides for a different situation and procedure.

 Section 395, as may be recollected, provides for an opportunity and obligation both to an acquirer of 90% or more shares in a company to acquire the shares of the minority. The minority shareholders thus have a chance to exit the company.

Weak drafting

Section 235, however, continues the weak drafting of existing section 395 but with some modifications. It essentially provides that if a scheme or contract to acquire shares of a company is approved by more than 90% of shareholders (excluding shares held by acquirer company), then the shares of dissenting minorities may be acquired by the acquirer on the same terms. This section can be fairly dubbed as a squeeze-out provision since the acquirer can acquire the shares of the minority shareholders without the latter’s consent. The minority shareholders may, however, apply to the Tribunal and the Tribunal may give appropriate directions for relief. It appears that a window of negotiation for a higher price gets opened for the minority shareholders. The acquirer has the option, but not the obligation, to make such an offer to acquire shares of the minority shareholders. The minority shareholders, however, cannot force the acquirer to acquire their shares.

Section 236 is in many ways a variant of section 235 though with some important differences. Generally stated, it provides for an obligation for an acquirer/ persons acting in concert who have acquired 90% or more of the shares in a company to make an offer to the remaining shareholders. The offer has to be on the same terms and has to be valid for a prescribed period of time. Though the drafting is ambiguous at some places, it appears that the remaining shareholders are not under an obligation to sell their shares. Thus, it is not a squeeze-out. There is a provision that provides for negotiation by a specified section of the shareholders for a higher price. It is provided that in such a case, the higher price received by such shareholders will have to be distributed pro rata amongst the other shareholders who did not get such higher price. This is strange in one aspect. If a section of shareholders is given a higher price, the better course is to make the acquirer give such higher price to the other shareholders too.

Contrast with the SEBI Delisting Regulations Sections 235/236 apply to listed and unlisted companies. For listed companies, it is necessary to also consider the SEBI Regulations on delisting (SEBI (Delisting of equity shares) Regulations, 2009 or “the Regulations”). Simply put, the Regulations provide for procedure that Promoters/companies seeking to delist shares from stock exchanges need to follow. These Regulations are relevant in this context because the Promoters holding has to increase to at least 90% for delisting to be successful. The regulations also provide for the steps to be taken after the holding is increased to more than 90%. Some important steps relevant to the present context are as follows:

•    The proposed delisting has to be approved by a special resolution. Such special resolution has to be by a postal ballot thus giving all shareholders a better opportunity to participate.

•    Further, the resolution can be acted upon only if at least two-thirds of the non-Promoter share-holders approve delisting.

•    The Promoters have to make an offer to acquire the shares of non-Promoters.

•    A minimum benchmark offer price, based on recent prices and acquisitions by the Promoters, is fixed.

•    The offer needs to result in such number of acceptances that would make the holding of the Promoters higher of two figures. The first figure is 90% of the equity share capital. The second is the existing holding plus 50% of the non-Promoters holding. Thus, if the Promoters held 75%, then they should get at least 15% acceptances. If they held, say, 85%, then they should get at least 7.50% acceptances. If this minimum figure is reached, then the Promoters are entitled to delist the shares.

•    They are also required to make another offer and, in effect, keep it valid for the next one year, to acquire the remaining shares at the same price. The remaining shareholders have a right, but not an obligation, to offer their shares during this period. In other words, they may choose to remain shareholders, in the unlisted company.

If one compares these Regulations with section 235/236, clearly the Regulations give better protection to the minority shareholders, though they make it difficult for the Promoters to delist the company. The provisions of sections 235/236 and the Regulations are obviously not alternate to each other and both need to be complied with. Thus the stricter of the two provisions would apply. However, there may be a grey area as regards seemingly beneficial provisions. For example, if the provisions in the Act give a right to the acquirer to acquire the remaining shares, can the remaining shares be so acquired, though the Regulations do not provide such a right? One factor involved in interpreting this issue is whether a beneficial provision in the Regulations would override provisions in another enactment.

In any event, even for unlisted companies, section 235/236 are beneficial to those minorities who are reduced to such a number that their voice does not matter. The 90% majority acquirer also has an opportunity to acquire 100% control of the company so as to be able to run the company without any outside involvement. In the author’s opinion the provisions are worded in such a manner that the acquirer may escape from such obligation. Section 235 uses the term “transferee company” (including its nominees/subsidiaries) on whom such obligation is created. Thus, effectively, it will not apply if the acquirer is not a company or if the acquirer is more than one. This may even become a limitation on the acquirer if it seeks to acquire the shares in more than one entity. Section 236 is worded more broadly. However, several protections that are available in the regulations for listed companies are missing. Loose drafting is evident at several places.

Conclusion

To conclude, competition between two regulators to provide better protection to minority shareholders and generally other persons may seem commend-able. However, conflicting provisions may in the long run be counter productive and create hurdles for genuine transactions. Worse, unscrupulous companies may be found to resort to legislative arbitrage, seeking those provisions or methods that avoid both laws or use the ill-drafted one with lesser restrictions. The fact that the Act is carved in stone, in the sense of being very difficult to amend can only make matters more difficult. Ideally, SEBI, with its expertise, experience and resources, should be given a monopoly or at least a priority as far as listed companies are concerned.

Clinical trial test reports did not ‘make available’ technical knowledge, experience, know-how, etc. — Consideration is not fee for included services under India-Canada DTAA

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New Page 1

Part C — International Tax Decisions

 



6 Anapharm Inc, In re


(2008) 305 ITR 394 (AAR)

S. 9(1)(vii) of IT Act; Articles 5, 7, 12 of India-Canada
DTAA

Dated : 11-9-2008

Issue :

Issuance of clinical trial test reports to clients did not
‘make available’ technical knowledge, experience, know-how, etc. and
consideration thereof is not fee for included services under India-Canada DTAA.

Facts :

The applicant, a Canadian company, was a contract research
organisation which assisted pharmaceutical companies globally by providing
clinical and bio-analytical services for development of new drugs or generic
equipments of drugs already being marketed.

The applicant had entered into agreement with two Indian
pharma companies for undertaking clinical and bio-analytical studies. The issue
before the AAR was whether the fee received by the applicant from the Indian
pharma companies is subject to tax in India in accordance with the provisions of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act’) and DTAA between India and Canada.

For the purpose of undertaking clinical trials, the applicant
had devised product-specific methods/protocols which were in conformity with
international regulations and requirements of the drug authorities of the
various countries. Such methods/protocols belonged to the applicant and were not
shared with the clients. The applicant merely gave final reports/conclusions of
the trials to its clients. The applicant contended that the services rendered to
the Indian pharma companies did not result in transfer of any technical
experience, know-how or technical plan or technical design to the payers and
hence, did not satisfy the test of ‘make available’ under ‘Article 12 – Fees for
included services’ (‘FIS’) of the DTAA.

Held :

The AAR accepted the contention and held :

(i) There was some difference between S. 9 of the IT Act
and Article 12 of DTAA. Mere provision of technical services, in absence of
their being ‘made available’, was not enough to attract Article 12(4)(b).

(ii) To ascertain the meaning of the expression ‘makes
available’ as embodied in the treaty, the AAR referred to the similar
provision of India-USA DTAA and the annexed protocol. The AAR observed that
consideration paid can be regarded as ‘FIS’ only if the twin test of rendering
services and making technical knowledge available were satisfied. Reliance for
this was placed on the Bombay High Court decision in the case of Diamond
Services International Ltd. v. UOI,
(2008) 169 Taxman 201.

(iii) Though the services rendered were sophisticated in
nature, the applicant did not reveal to Indian pharma companies the process of
how it conducted clinical trials and related tests. A broad description or
indication of the type of test carried out before issuance of reports did not
enable Indian pharma companies to derive requisite knowledge to conduct the
tests or to develop the technique on their own.

(iv) Clinical procedure, analytical methods, etc., which
were proprietary items of the applicant, were not transferred, assigned or
handed over to Indian pharma companies. Mere handing over of reports of tested
samples and test compounds cannot be equated with making technology, know-how,
etc., available to the pharma companies.


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2013-TIOL-1541-CESTAT-MUM Commissioner of C. Ex., Pune vs. Aztecsoft Ltd.

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Testing and analysis of IT Software – specific amendment in the definition of “Technical Testing and Analysis” to bring within its fold testing and analysis of IT software with effect from 16-05- 2008. Activity not taxable prior to the said date under any category.

Facts:

The Department appealed against the order of the Hon. Commissioner dropping the demands of the assessee for the period prior to 16-05-2008 for providing services of testing and analysis of computer software. Since the definition of “Technical Testing and Analysis” service was specifically amended on 16-05-2008 to include the said activity, it was taxable only with effect from 16-05-2008 according to the assessee. The decision of Stag Software Pvt. Ltd. in 2008 (10) STR 329 (Tri-Bang) and Relq Software Pvt. Ltd. in 2011 (23) STR 449 (Kar) were relied upon.

Held:

Referring to the definition of “Technical Testing and Analysis” prior to 16-05-2008 and as amended with effect from 16-05-2008, the budget instructions letter 334/1/2008 – TRU dated 29-02-2008 was referred to and relying on the decision of Relq Software (supra) held that testing and analysis of IT software would be effective only from 16-05-2008 when the said activity was specifically included under technical testing and analysis service as IT software services were introduced on the said date. Similar amendments were made in the taxable services of Business Auxiliary Services, technical inspection & certification, management repair of properties and consulting engineer’s services to include IT software services.
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2013-TIOL-1504-CESTAT-DEL M/s. Ujjawal Parivahan Sahakari Samiti Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II

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Loading/unloading & transportation of limestone with processing cannot be classified as cargo handling services.

Facts:
The appellant entered into an agreement to provide services as a contractor for hiring of machines, equipments, crushing & screening plant and other services for production of low silicon limestone gitties. The Department issued a show cause notice and contended to levy tax on the said activities under the category of “Cargo Handling Services” for the period up to 09-09-2004 and under the category of “Business Auxiliary Services” for the period from 2004-08. The appellant contended that the activity of transportation/loading and unloading was only incidental to the actual activity of processing of goods carried out by them on behalf of their principals which became taxable only with effect from 16-06-2005 under Business Auxiliary Services.

Held:
Referring to the definitions of “Cargo Handling Services” and “Business Auxiliary Services” and discussing the rules for clarification laid down in section 65A, it was concluded that the essential characteristic of the composite service was not Cargo Handling Service. Allowing the appeal, it was held that the activity of transportation/loading and unloading was only incidental to the actual activity of processing of goods which formed the essential character and that such activity became taxable only after the amendment in the definition of “Business Auxiliary Services” with effect from 16-06-2005, the liability of which the appellant discharged under Business Auxiliary Service, thus no penalty was also found leviable.

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2013 (32) STR 86 (Tri.-Mum) Global Transgene Ltd. vs. Commr. of C. Ex., Cus. & S.T., Aurangabad

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Package containing only a mark showing the technology used which is not a logo or trademark or hallmark of the assessee, cannot be considered to be granting representational rights. Therefore, the same is not covered under franchise services.

Facts:
The appellant obtained licenses, for self-use and to transfer the technology to sub-licensees, from a Chinese company. Accordingly, the department contested that the activity of sub-licensing was covered under franchise services as franchise rights
were given to the sub-licensees. The appellants stated that the activity of sub-licensing was not covered under the definition of ‘franchise service’. The appellants also produced samples of products which did not contain any logo or hallmark or trademark of theirs. In fact, the package label  clearly indicated that the seeds were manufactured and marketed by sub-licensees in their own name. The agreement was for transfer of technology in the form of seeds for a consideration. Further, though they provided certain training, the same was common in case of imported technologies and it could not be construed as providing representational rights. Revenue argued that one of the sub-licensees stated that the appellants had granted right to use logo and 3D hallmark of the technology which are clearly identifiable with the appellants. Further, only after testing the seeds, the appellants supplied 3D hallmark.

Held:
The appellants were not granted any representation  rights to represent the Chinese company in India and the appellants neither were entitled to nor granted any representational rights to sublicensees. The mark denoted on the package was neither a logo nor a trademark or hallmark of the appellants but was only denoting that the seeds contained the technology. The case thus was decided in favour of the appellants.

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2013 (32) STR 113 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Vadodara – II

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Transactions between SEZ unit and DTA unit of the same entity are not leviable to service tax.

Facts:
The appellant set up 2 units viz. in an SEZ and in DTA. The SEZ unit also provided certain in-house work to DTA units. The respondents demanded service tax on the said transactions between SEZ and DTA units considering them as separate legal entities on the grounds that both the units were separately registered with the service tax department, raised invoices and fell under the definition of ‘persons’ as per the SEZ Act. The appellants contested that in the present case there was absence of two parties for the provision of taxable service by one person to another and also that the SEZ Act had no relevance for interpretation of the service tax law. Further, invoices were issued to satisfy SEZ law and internal monitoring purposes only. Also, SEZ Units never received any amount from DTA units as the same were interunit entries in books of accounts which were not taxable transactions.

Held:
Confirming the contentions of the appellant, the Hon. Tribunal held that merely entering into agreements and raising invoices did not mean SEZs were separate legal entities. Further, the definition of ‘person’ as per the SEZ Act, which included AOP or BOI, whether incorporated or not was not applicable in the present case as the units were not shown as AOP or BOI. Further, the presence of two persons was a must to levy service tax. In the absence of any definition under service tax law, the persons were held not to be separate legal persons and the transaction between SEZ and DTA units was not liable to service tax.

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2013 (32) STR 95 (Tri–Delhi) – Endurance Technologies Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commr. Of C. Ex., Aurangabad

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Service tax paid on mandap keeper services to celebrate the annual day function is eligible for CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The appellant manufacturer of assessable goods availed mandap keeper’s services to celebrate the annual day function which was attended by the employees, their family members and employees of their sister units and claimed CENVAT credit thereon. They relied upon Toyota Kirloskar Motor Pvt. Ltd. 2011 (24) STR 645 (Kar) and Ultratech Cement Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 577 (Bom.) in support of their claim. The revenue rejected the claim relying on the decisions of Manikgarh Cement 2010 (20) STR 456 (Bom.) and Eicher Motors Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 281 (Tri.-Del.).

Held:
Considering the inapplicability due to facts being distinct than in the present case than in the cases of Manikgarh Cement (Supra) and Eicher Motors Ltd. (Supra), the Hon. Tribunal relying on Toyota Kirloskar Motor Pvt. Ltd. and Ultratech Cement Ltd., allowed the claim of the appellant wherein the facts were similar.

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2013 (32) STR 209 (Tri.-Del) Kansara Modler Ltd. vs. CCEx, Jaipur-II

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Whether the receiver of services is entitled to utilise the CENVAT credit for payment of service tax under the Import Rules? Held, Yes.

Facts:
Appellant received “supply of tangible goods service” from outside India for the provision of its output services in India and utilised CENVAT credit for discharging the service tax payable as the service recipient of the said services. The department issued a show cause notice disallowing the utilisation of such CENVAT credit payment of service tax and confirmed the demand.

Held:
Referring to Rule 2(q) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of Service Tax Rules,1994 it was held that the Appellant was a person liable to service tax and thus becomes a taxable service provider under Rule 2(r) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and consequently becomes output service provider under Rule 2(p) of the said Rules. Thus the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) disallowing the payment under reverse charge mechanism vide CENVAT credit was set aside.

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2013 (32) STR 31 (Bom.) Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., S. T. & Cus., Raigad

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Input services used indirectly in or in relation to manufacture of final dutiable products even at a distant place, are eligible to avail CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The appellant was engaged in the manufacture of dutiable goods such as naphtha, ethane-propane, LPG and residual gases at its Uran plant and exempted goods such as crude oil and natural gases at its Mumbai offshore location. The crude oil was either directly sold from Mumbai Offshore or further used to manufacture goods at the Uranplant. The appellant being registered input service distributors, distributed CENVAT credit. Revenue contended that crude oil manufactured at Mumbai Offshore was sold to its buyers therefrom before the Uran plant came into existence. Therefore, crude oil, used at the Uran plant to manufacture dutiable products, cannot be termed as semifinished goods and thereby concluded that input services were entirely used for exempted products and no CENVAT credit was admissible.

Analysing the definition of input services, the appellant contested that the services used whether directly or indirectly in or in relation to the manufacture of a final product are eligible input services to claim CENVAT credit. Accordingly, the definition was wide enough to cover current instance and as per Rule 6(1) and Rule 6(2) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the appellant was entitled to CENVAT credit on pro-rata basis of service tax paid on the input services used in the manufacture of final dutiable products only.

Held:
Since the definition of input services under Rule 2(l)(ii) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, uses expressions “directly or indirectly” and “in or in relation to” in conjunction, the intention of the legislature was to widen the scope and purview of the entitlement. Merely because the appellant manufactured exempted goods, the revenue cannot disallow benefit of CENVAT credit on the input services used in or in relation to the manufacture of dutiable final product. The dutiable final products manufactured at the Uran plant were fundamentally premised upon the manufacturing process commenced at Mumbai Offshore i.e., manufacture of dutiable products was impossible unless the process starts at Mumbai Offshore and there is continuous supply of crude oil from Mumbai Offshore to the Uran plant. Therefore, relying on the Hon. Supreme Court’s decisions in case of Escorts Ltd. 2004 (171) ELT 145 (SC) and Solaris Chemtech Ltd. 2007 (214) ELT 481 (SC), it was held that the appellant was entitled to CENVAT credit of input services used even indirectly in manufacture of dutiable final products subject to Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

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Sale Price in Banquet Hall under MVAT Act, 2002

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Introduction
Under Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, (MVAT Act), tax is levied on the ‘sale price’. There are situations where the transactions are composite and only part of it would be liable to VAT. In case of Works Contract the situation is clear due to judicial pronouncements. However, there are new types of transactions coming up for determination of ‘sale price’. One such instance is sale price, for the purpose of MVAT Act, in case of charges for Banquet Hall. Banquet halls normally arrange programs as per requirement of clients. Entire arrangement includes various services including serving of food and drinks. For example, if a marriage function is arranged in a banquet hall, then there will be arrangement for a stage, furniture, decoration, music, etc. and also supply of food and drinks.

Banquet Hall, a composite transaction

In case of banquet hall, the service provider i.e. hotels etc., are liable to pay service tax. Simultaneously there being supply of food and drinks, VAT is also applicable. An issue arises as to on what amount VAT is payable. One view can be that the entire charges are liable to VAT. Other view can be that only that portion of price, which is relating to food and drinks, can be liable to VAT.

Determination of disputed question (DDQ) in caseof Tip Top Enterprises
The dealer, M/s. Tip Top Enterprises, filed an application for determination, before the Commissioner of Sales Tax, to get the issue of ‘sale price’ for banquet hall under the MVAT Act decided. In the DDQ dated 25-05-2009, the learned Commissioner of Sales Tax, rejecting all the arguments of the dealer, held that the whole amount charged by the dealer (banquet hall) is liable to VAT.

Decision of Tribunal in above case
The matter went to Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal by way of appeal no. 41 of 2009. In the appeal, on behalf of appellant, following arguments were reiterated.

a) Referring to definition of ‘sale price’ in MVAT Act which reads as under:

“Section 2(25) “sale price” means the amount of valuable consideration paid or payable to a dealer for any sale made including any sum charged for anything done by the seller in respect of the goods at the time of or before delivery thereof, other than the cost of insurance for transit or of installation, when such cost is separately charged,” it was submitted that the amount received against sale/supply of goods only can be considered and not the amount received for services as the ‘sale price’.

b) As per the definition of ‘sale’, the supply of food is deemed to be sale. The said definition  of ‘sale’ is as under in section 2(24) of MVAT Act, 2002:

“Section 2 (24) “sale” means a sale of goods made within the State for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge; and the words “sell”, “buy” and “purchase”, with all their grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall be construed accordingly;

Explanation,-—For the purposes of this clause,—

a. a sale within the State includes a sale determined to be inside the State in accordance with the principles formulated in section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956;
b.
i. the transfer of property in any goods, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

ii. the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract;

iii. a delivery of goods on hire-purchase or any system of payment by installments;

iv. the transfer of the right to use any goods or any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

v. the supply of goods by any association or body of persons incorporated or not, to a member thereof or other valuable consideration;

vi. the supply, by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service is made or given for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration:”

Accordingly, it was submitted that in a banquet hall transaction, only supply of food and drinks part is ‘sale’.

c) Relying upon judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in case of Builder Association of India vs. Union of India (73 STC 370), the above argument was reiterated, more particularly citing the following observation.

“The latter part of clause (29-A) of article 366 of the Constitution makes the position very clear. While referring to the transfer, delivery or supply of any goods that takes place as per sub-clauses (a) to (f) of clause (29-A), the latter part of clause (29-A) says that “such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods” shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made.”

Accordingly, it was submitted that under Article 366(29A)(f) only supply of goods is deemed to be a sale which can be subject matter of sales tax and not the total price of transaction. Therefore, it was urged that the levy on total amount was unconstitutional.

d) Based on judgment in case of Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (12 VST 371(SC), it was submitted that on the amount on which service tax is paid, VAT cannot be attracted, as both are mutually exclusive.

e) Citing judgment in case of Cap ‘N’ Chops Caterers vs. State of Haryana (37 VST 226) (P & H), it was submitted that the banquet transaction is in the nature of works contract and can be liable to the extent of goods value and service portion cannot be taxed.

f) Reliance was placed on the judgment in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91) (SC). In this judgment Hon. Supreme Court has observed that the receipts towards hotel activity are divisible.

g) Reliance was also placed on following observation of Hon. Supreme Court in case of T. N. Kalyan Mandpam (135 STC 480)(SC).

“42. In regard to the submission made on article 366(29A)(f), we are of the view that it does not provide to the contrary. It only permits the State to impose a tax on the supply of food and drink by whatever mode it may be made. It does not conceptually or otherwise include the supply of services within the definition of sale and purchase of goods. This is particularly apparent from the following phrase contained in the said sub-article “such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods”.

Contentions of the Department
a) Relying upon judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in case of K. Damodarsamy Naidu [(2000) (117 STC 1), it was contended that the whole amount is liable to VAT. In this judgment, the Hon. Supreme Court was considering sale price in case of Restaurant.

b) Department also relied upon judgment of Bombay High Court decision in East India Hotels Ltd. (99 STC 197). In this case the restaurant was claiming reduction from sale price on account of luxuries provided in restaurant like AC facility etc., on the ground that they are towards providing extra facilities. However, the Hon. High Court has held that the whole price is liable to sales tax.

Conclusion of Tribunal
Hon. Tribunal delivered its judgment in above appeal no. 41 of 2009 dated 23-04-2013 and referred to above arguments as well as looked into the factual position. Tribunal referred to booking documents for banquet hall. It was seen that the hotel has quoted separate charges, towards rent of hall, about food and drinks and decorating etc. The charges towards food and drinks were almost at par with charges for same menu, when provided by hotel, in other than banquet hall.

In view of the above factual and legal position Tribunal held that the sale price for food and drinks will be the price agreed between the parties. In other words, Tribunal disapproved the DDQ, that whole amount towards banquet hall is liable to VAT. As per Tribunal, VAT can be levied on amount towards food and drinks as agreed between the parties. In relation to decoration charges, which were also charged separately in the quotation, Tribunal held that the same items may attract tax as lease transaction.

The above judgment will be useful to avoid double taxation. In absence of such judgment, dealer may become liable to service tax as well as VAT on the same amount. This is not expected, hence, it will certainly give relief from such double taxation.

Education: A Taxable Commercial Training Service?

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Introduction:

Commercial training or coaching service was introduced in the service tax law from 1st July, 2003 by defining the expression, “commercial training or coaching” and “commercial training or coaching centre” in sections 65(26) and 65(27) respectively of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) as reproduced below:

Section 65(26):

““Commercial training or coaching” means any training or coaching provided by a commercial training or coaching centre”.

Section 65(27):

““Commercial training or coaching centre” means any institute or establishment providing commercial training or coaching for imparting skill or knowledge or lessons on any subject or field other than the sports, with or without issuance of a certificate and includes coaching or tutorial classes but does not include preschool coaching and training centre or any institute or establishment which issues any certificate or diploma or degree or any educational qualification recognized by law for time being in force.”

Consequently, taxable service in relation to this service was defined in section 65(105)(zzc) of the Act. Within a span of 4 to 5 years of the introduction of the service, in a significant number of cases, the co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal at Bangalore and Chennai pronounced various decisions wherein various large and well-known institutions were held to be not liable under this taxing entry mainly on account of their status as non-profit making or charitable institutions. Understandably, as a consequence thereof, the Government appended an explanation to the definition to section 65(105)(zzc) of the Act vide the Finance Act, 2010 to come into effect retrospectively from 01-07-2003. Thus, the relevant provisions read as follows:

Section 65(105)(zzc):

““Taxable service” means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by a commercial training or coaching centre in relation to commercial training or coaching.

Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression “commercial training or coaching centre” occurring in this sub-clause and in clauses (26), (27) and (90a) shall include any centre or institute, by whatever name called, where training or coaching is imparted for consideration, whether or not such centre or institute is registered as a trust or a society or similar other organization under any law for the time being in force and carrying on its activity with or without profit motive and the expression “commercial training or coaching” shall be construed accordingly.”

It is also relevant to note here that the Finance Act, 2011 with effect from 01-05-2011 amended the definition of commercial training or coaching centre in section 65(27) whereby exclusionary part of the definition was omitted and instead the said exclusion part was simultaneously declared exempt vide Notification 33/2011-ST from 01-05-2011.

Primarily, in terms of the above explanation, the scope of the service was expanded to exclude profit motive element. When the decision of the Madras Tribunal in Great Lake Institute of Management Ltd. (GLIM) vs. CST Chennai 2008 (10) STR 202 (Tri.-Chennai) was challenged by the Revenue in the Supreme Court, on noticing the above explanation the Apex Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and remanded the case for denovo consideration in the light of the said Explanation [2010 (19) STR 481 (SC)].

Larger Bench direction vide Interim Order No.ST/443/2013 in Great Lake Institute of Management Ltd. vs. CST Chennai & 5 others: [2013-TIOL- 1480-CESTAT-DEL-LB]

Recently, in a bunch of appeals filed before the Tribunal, a Division Bench prima facie doubted the reasons recorded in one of the decisions viz., Magnus Society vs. CC&CE, Hyderabad 2009 (13) STR 509 (Tri.-Bang). In this decision, a distinction was made between higher learning through a proper format of education imparted by institutions on one hand and those which are characterised as commercial training or coaching centres preparing students for entrance examinations to universities or the like. The matter therefore was referred to the Larger Bench of CESTAT (LB or the Bench). The limited reference however was made to examine whether the provisions relating to commercial coaching or training service as defined in sections 65(26), 65(27) and 65(105)(zzc) of the Act accommodate a distinction between imparting of specific skill by an institution such as in computer literacy, computer operations, spoken English or accountancy at one end and a broader format of education imparted by an institution of higher learning providing a course of instructions in MBA, management, computer science or similar disciplines. The Bench headed by Hon. President, CESTAT examined the said relevant statutory provisions in relation to commercial training or coaching services specifically considering the scope of the service in the light of the above explanation inserted with retrospective effect and also analysed various precedents including Magnus Society (supra), GLIM (supra) and a few others as summarised below.

On making primary examination of the statutory provisions, the Bench held a view that for an institution or establishment to claim immunity from the liability of service tax, it must establish any one of the following exclusionary parameters:

• The institute/establishment is not imparting skill, knowledge or lessons on any subject or field except sports.
• If the establishment is a pre-school coaching or a training centre.
• Institute/establishment which issues any certificate, diploma, degree or an educational qualification recognised by the extant law.

Thus, as per the preliminary remark of the LB, if any institute fails to fulfill any of the listed parameters, it would be considered a commercial training or coaching centre and consequently be liable for service tax.

Gist of analysis of various precedents:

In case of GLIM vs. CST, Chennai 2008 (10) STR 202 (Chennai), the appeal was allowed by holding that it being a recognised charitable organisation under the Income- tax Act, 1961 and engaged in public utility areas, profit motive was absent although it may have earned surplus. Since the decision was pronounced prior to incorporation of the Explanation and profit motive was excluded by virtue of the Explanation, the Supreme Court in Revenue’s appeal remanded the matter (2010 (19) STR 481 (SC) for denovo consideration in the light of the Explanation. Another pre- amendment decision in the case of Administrative Staff College of India vs. CC&CE, Hyderabad 2009 (14) STR 341 (Tri.- Bang), the Tribunal concluded that although profit might have been earned, the laudable objectives of the institution registered as a society could not be equated with those of a tutorial college and that the expression ‘commercial’ in the definition indicates that it qualifies coaching or training centre and not coaching or training. Further, that the registered society also exempted from income tax as charitable organisation cannot be considered a commercial centre. Revenue’s appeal to Supreme Court in this case was dismissed without recording any reasons—reported in 2010 (20) STR J117 (SC). In another decision in Magnus Society vs. CC&CE, Hyderabad (supra) following the decision in GLIM (supra), the appeal was allowed. In this case, in addition to the reason of absence of profit motive involved in services of the institution, Hon. Tribunal carved out distinction for the term ‘education’ as against coaching or training by observing that ‘education’ was a much broader term of which coaching and training was only a part and the breadth of the term education could not be encompassed in the definition containing narrow meaning. Institutes offering degrees recognised by law could not be covered within the ambit of the defined category of the service. This view was also reiterated in Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India vs. CE&CE, Hyderabad 2009 (14) STR 220 (Tri. -Bang) while noting that the states Governments have recognised ICFAI University by notifications and there also existed UGC recognition. Further, considering the exempt nature of the income, the activity being non-commercial was held as not liable for service tax. This deci-sion also was pronounced prior to incorporation of the explanation.

The stated provisions were also considered by the Kerala High Court in Malappuram District—Parallel College Assn. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 321 (Ker) wherein challenge was made on several grounds interalia including the grounds of discrimination and violation of Article14 of the Constitution. The pleas regarding education being non-taxable under the Constitution and coverage of parallel colleges by exclusionary clause were repelled. The Hon. Court however ruled that the impugned levy was discriminative since the burden of the levy ultimately fell on students and there was no ap-parent distinction between the students pursuing education in regular colleges or in parallel colleges. The case of Indian Institute of Aircraft Engineering vs. UOI & Ors 2013-TIOL -430-HC-DEL-ST also was discussed by the Bench with reference to what constituted approved institution regulated by law. In this case, the High Court had concluded that the institution in question provides education resulting in degree/diploma/qualifications recognised by law and therefore was covered by the exclusionary clause and consequently not subject to service tax. In addition to various decisions by CESTAT, decisions involving issue of entitlement to exemption from income tax on the ground of educational purpose, under the Income-tax Act also were discussed. The Bench however, noted that neither the precedents nor the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act assisted them significantly to interpret the scope of the expression “commercial training or coaching” or “commercial training or coaching centre” which was for their limited consideration.

Training & Education: Whether literal meaning relevant?

In addition to discussing various precedent decisions on behalf of the appellants, reference was made to various textual authorities to analyse contours of relevant terms such as teach, education, training, coach etc. to elucidate what the words meant and consequently to draw distinction between the concept of ‘training’ and ‘education’ or to examine whether they overlap. However, it was noted that when legislatively mandated definition was available, it is impermissible to look to extra textual guidance. “A good faith interpretation of section 65(27) requires that whatever skills/ knowledge/lessons are imparted on any subject or field, the activity must be considered to be training or coaching.”

Conclusion:

The Bench finally concluded that the retrospectively introduced Explanation in section 65(105) (zzc) of the Act redefined the scope of the expres-sion “commercial training or coaching” in section 65(26) by virtue of which a commercial element or profit motive became an irrelevant ingredient to bring an institute or establishment within the fold of “commercial training or coaching centre” nor would any organisational structure of registration of the entity as a trust or society would determine taxability. On analysing the other facet of the definition of “commercial training or coaching centre” in section 65(27), it was held that the training or coaching for imparting skill, knowledge or lessons on any subject or field constitutes commercial training or coaching and the scope of “training or coaching” could not be restricted by super-adding any conditions by parameters of course content, syllabus, duration, etc. The Bench declined to agree with the restricted interpretation pleaded or as was made in the precedent decisions and held that in the definition contained in section 65(27), there would be no rationale for engrafting an exclusionary clause broadly formulated other than what is specifically excluded viz., an institute or establishment which issues any certificate, diploma, degree or any educational qualification recognised by law. The Bench further held that since Parliament introduced the ‘Explanation’ retrospectively to clarify ambiguities to ascertain the expression ‘commercial’, recourse to guidance from precedents was not warranted. The reference to the Larger Bench was accordingly answered holding that the activities of imparting skill, knowledge, lessons on any subject or field or when imparted by an entity, institution or establishment which is excluded by a specific and legislated exclusionary clause would alone be outside the fold of the taxable territory. Considering the scope of the reference, the Bench declined to consider whether any of the appellants were taxable or otherwise in terms of the exclusionary clause in section 65(27) as it stood prior to its amendment with effect from 01-05-2011 and therefore the appeals stood remitted to the respective Bench to decide based on principles discussed above.

The direction provided by the Larger Bench is likely to have far-reaching implications on various institutions offering higher studies especially in absence of appropriate regulatory authority in this regard as the exclusion in terms of the direction of the Larger Bench is meant only for the degree, diploma, a certificate or any qualification recognised by the law for the time being in force. It appears therefore that the litigation hereafter would hinge mainly around whether a degree/ diploma certificate issued by an institution can be construed as one recognised under the law in force. It may be noted that in the new era of negative list based taxation effective from 1st July, 2012, what is specifically non-taxable is by way of entry in the “negative list” of services contained in section 66D of the Act is “education as a part of a curriculum for obtaining a qualification recognised by any law for the time being in force.” In addition to preschool education, higher secondary education and approved vocational courses. Thus, a course or education recognised by law is the sole criterion for non-taxability

Income of foreign company from satellite navigation and transponder capacity lease not royalty for equipment hire

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New Page 1

Part C — International Tax Decisions




5 ISRO Satellite Centre, In re


(2008) 220 CTR 13 (AAR)

S. 9(1)(vi), S. 90 of IT Act;

Article 13 of India-UK DTAA

Dated : 22-10-2008

Issue :

Income of a foreign company towards satellite navigation and
transponder capacity lease is not royalty for equipment hire.

Facts :

ISRO, the applicant, a part of the Department of Space,
Government of India, jointly with Airport Authority of India, was implementing
GAGAN Project (a satellite-based augmentation system) to provide seamless
navigation and tracking facility for civil aviation in India. For this purpose,
it entered into a contract with M/s. Inmarsat Global Ltd., UK (‘IGL’) for
availing of ‘Navigation Transponder Capacity’ for its GAGAN project.

As per the contract, the applicant had taken on lease the
space segment capacity which was utilised through data commands sent from the
ground station set-up by the applicant in India. The transponders for navigation
purposes were meant to dispatch satellite-based augmentation system signals in
space on specified frequencies which were accessed for GAGAN project. The
corrected or augmented data sent from the land station, and transmitted by the
said transponder over the footprint area of the satellite was to be used for
better tracking of planes. The applicant paid a fixed annual charge to IGL,
regardless of the actual use of the transponder capacity.

The issue before the AAR was whether the payment by ISRO to
IGL was royalty having regard to the provisions of the IT Act and the India-UK
DTAA, so as to be subject to tax withholding obligation u/s.195 of the IT Act.

The applicant submitted that the access to navigation
transponder did not amount to use of equipment as the applicant was not able to
operate or control the satellite or transponder. The applicant contended that
even if it was assumed that there was use of equipment, such use was not within
the Indian territory, but it was in space. The amount represented business
income and as there was no permanent establishment of IGL in India, the payment
was not exigible to tax in India.

The Revenue authorities contended that the exclusive capacity
of specific transponder was kept entirely at the applicant’s disposal. The
Revenue also contended that the transponder was under control of the applicant
and can be regarded as operated by applicant, as the transponder was responding
to the directions sent through the ground station of the applicant. Such
directions were held to be akin to operation of TV by remote control. The amount
was therefore claimed to be chargeable as royalty income.

Held :

The AAR accepted the applicant’s claim that the payment was
not royalty for equipment user. It held :

(i) Mere earmarking a space segment capacity of the
transponder for use by the applicant did not enable the applicant to get
possession (actual or constructive) or control of the equipment of IGL.

(ii) The applicant did not use or operate any equipment of
IGL.

(iii) The expression ‘use of space segment’ of transponder
had no reference to any operations performed by the applicant by means of the
transponder capacity.

(iv) The substance of the contract was the ‘facility’
provided to the applicant for the utilisation of space segment capacity of the
transponder for transmitting the augmented data by availing use of
bandwidth/connectivity capacity provided by IGL by using equipment. Such
facility was provided by IGL to the applicant and other customers also.

(v) The analogy of TV operations by means of a remote
control was inappropriate, since the ground station was an independent unit
and not an accessory to the satellite.

(vi) The recent ruling of the AAR in the case of Dell
International Services (P) Ltd., (2008) 218 ITR 209 was relied upon to support
that there was availment of standard service provided by the service provider.

(vii) Even though IGL was alleged to have its regional
office in India, no part of the receipts from the applicant could be said to
be attributable to any PE in India and hence, they were not exigible to tax in
India.


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Income of foreign company from golf tournaments on remote basis by hiring independent contractors not taxable in India

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New Page 1

Part C — International Tax Decisions



4 Golf in Dubai, LLC v. ADIT, In re


(2008) 306 ITR 374 (AAR)

Articles 5 & 7 of India-UAE DTAA

Dated : 13-10-2008

Issue :

Income of a foreign company from organising golf tournaments
on remote basis by hiring independent experienced local contractors is not
taxable in India.

Facts :

The applicant was a company registered in the UAE having its
registered office in Dubai. The applicant was an event organiser and had
affiliations with the European Professional Golf Association. It was engaged in
the business of promoting golf nationally as well as internationally by way of
organising golf tournaments in different countries.

The applicant organised two golf tournaments in India at
Eagleton in Bangalore and at Delhi Golf Club (‘DGC’) in Delhi. The applicant was
granted the right to use the premises to host the events at Bangalore and Delhi
against payment of a consideration. The tournaments were organised by hiring
independent third-party local contractors and service providers.

The applicant received sponsorship fees, management fees and
income from sale of merchandise at the venue and over the Internet.

The issues before the AAR were :

(1) Whether the applicant was having a Permanent
Establishment (‘PE’) in India in terms of Article 5 of India-UAE DTAA ?

(2) Whether Eagleton or DGC could be deemed to be agency PE
of the applicant in India, since the tournaments were held at grounds of each
of these clubs and/or they were providing assistance to the applicant in
organising the golf tournaments ?

(3) If PE is held to have triggered the extent to which
various streams of events-related receipts can be attributed for taxation in
India ?

(4) Lastly, could there be taxation even in absence of PE
trigger either as fees for technical services or otherwise ?


It was the claim of the applicant that there were no tax
implications in India on the following counts :

(a) ‘Fixed place of business’ for PE trigger connotes a
specific geographic location of the enterprise where activities at that
location must endure for more than a temporary period. Since the tournament
lasted only for six to seven days, the requirements of Article 5(1) of the
India-UAE DTAA were not satisfied for emergence of base Rule PE as the
requisite degree of permanence was lacking. The applicant’s business of
organising golf was neither carried on regularly, nor was there certainty that
it will be carried on regularly.

(b) The applicant relied on OECD Commentary to support that
the place of business for PE emergence must be fixed i.e., it must be
established at a distinct place with a certain degree of permanence. In the
present case, the mere access to the place was not sufficient to hold that the
‘place’ was ‘fixed’ and was at the ‘disposal of the applicant’.

(c) There was no service PE as the applicant’s employees or
other personnel had not stayed in India for furnishing services for the
threshold period of 9 months as prescribed in the treaty.

(d) There was no Agency PE as the various third party
vendors with whom the applicant had entered into arrangements for organising
the tournaments were independent contractors who acted in their ordinary
course of business operations.

(e) The sponsorship fees and the management fees were not
‘royalty’, as such fees were not received as consideration for the use of or
right to use any patent, secret formula or information concerning any
industrial or commercial experience. The India-UAE DTAA does not have any
specific Article dealing with FTS and hence there can be no taxation even
assuming receipts are held to be FTS.


The Revenue authorities contended that :

(a) The applicant had a PE in India as it had a ‘fixed
place of business’ at its disposal. Reliance was placed on OECD Commentary to
the effect that if an enterprise has a certain amount of space at its
disposal, which is used for the business activities, it is sufficient to
constitute a place of business even in absence of formal legal right to own
the place. The commentary by Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Convention was
also referred to contend that regularly maintaining the same pitch in a market
place for weekly market would be enough to constitute a ‘fixed place of
business’.

(b) The service provider with whom the applicant had
entered into agreements, had provided the services for organising the events
and therefore could be regarded as agents of the applicant, thus constituting
an Agency PE for the applicant in India.

(c) The service PE threshold was crossed if the initial
visit of the Vice-Chairman of the applicant-company prior to the organisation
of events was taken into account.


Held :

The AAR ruled as follows :

(i) By organising and conducting golf tournaments at Delhi
and Bangalore for a week’s duration without repetition thereof, did not result
in the applicant carrying on business through a fixed place in India. The
essential ingredients of regularity, continuity and repetitiveness as conveyed
by the word ‘carried on’ were absent. Accordingly, no fixed place PE existed
for the applicant in India.

(ii) As regards the Agency PE, the AAR held that the
independent contractors or third-party vendors were acting in the ordinary
course of their business and were not devoted wholly or almost wholly on
behalf of the applicant in India. The activities of the third-party
contractors were not carried out wholly on behalf of the applicant. Hence,
there was no Agency PE of the applicant in India.

(iii) The service PE did not emerge in absence of ‘furnishing of services’ by a foreign enterprise. The concept of ‘furnishing of services’ is a bilateral concept which necessitates the existence of at least two parties i.e., a provider of services and a recipient of services. The presence of employees for enterprise’s own activities does not trigger service PE.

(iv) Though the event management fees received by the applicant could be brought to tax within the purview of FTS, in absence of specific provision in India-UAE DTAA dealing with FTS, the same could not be taxed. The management fees could not be brought to tax under the residual Article 22 dealing with ‘other income’.

(2013) 92 DTR 345 (Rajkot)(SB) Bharti Auto Products vs. CIT A.Ys.: 2009-10 & 2010-11 Dated: 06.09.2013

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Section 206C: A seller of scrap is liable for collection of tax at source irrespective of the fact that such a seller has not himself generated scrap from manufacture or mechanical working of materials undertaken by him. The mode of sale of scrap need not be necessarily akin to the auction or tender for this purpose but it can be any mode.

Section 206C(6A): First proviso inserted by the Finance Act, 2013 with effect from 01-07-2012, would apply retrospectively.

Facts:
The assessee imported brass scrap and sold it without collecting tax at source. The assessee’s case was that the brass scrap sold by him was not generated from the manufacture or mechanical working of material and therefore, it was not ‘scrap’ within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C. According to him, the provisions of section 206C would be attracted only when scrap was sold to a “buyer”, which is defined as a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode, goods of specified nature. It was submitted that sale of goods by an assessee to a buyer in retail sale of such goods cannot therefore be construed as sale to a buyer as such sale was not by way of auction or tender or any other like mode and therefore such transactions in retail sale between the assessee and his buyer would clearly be outside the scope of section 206C.

The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s explanation. He held that since the assessee had failed to collect the tax at source as required by section 206C(6) on the sale of scrap made by him to various dealers, he was liable to pay it u/s. 206C(6) alongwith interest u/s. 206C(7).

Held:
The isues in this case are
a) Is it necessary that the scrap should have been generated by the assessee himself from the manufacture or mechanical working of material undertaken by him in order to apply the provisions of section 206C?

Explanation (b) to section 206C defines ‘scrap’ as ‘waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials which is definitely not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons’. It is evident that the word ‘scrap’ occurs twice in the said definition. The first part of the definition, namely, ‘waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials’ seeks to cover both ‘waste’ as well as ‘scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials’. In the absence of any definition of the term ‘waste’ in the Act, one has to turn to its meaning as it is understood in common parlance. In common parlance, ‘waste’ is understood as something unusable or unwanted material. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘waste’ is something which has been ‘eliminated or discarded as no longer useful or required’. ‘Scrap’, on the other hand, represents something which is left over after the greater part has been used or consumed. ‘Scrap’ thus refers to the incidental residue derived from certain types of manufacture, which is recoverable without further processing. It is in this context that the words ‘from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials’ qualify the preceding word ‘scrap’ and not ‘waste’. The definition of ‘scrap’ as given in Explanation (b) is not limited to scrap fromthe manufacture or mechanical working of materials alone but extends to cover ‘waste’ also. Therefore, the scope of the term ‘scrap’ as defined in Explanation (b) cannot be interpreted so as to restrict its application to scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials alone.

The word ‘and’ in the expression ‘waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials’ has been used to enlarge the scope of ‘scrap’, so as to cover both, i.e., waste as well as scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials.

Section 206C seeks to prevent evasion of taxes. It therefore, needs to be construed in a manner that seeks to achieve the purpose for which it has been enacted.

Further, the use of the words ‘business of trading’ in the head note of section 206C makes it clear that the applicability of section 206C is not restricted to sale of scrap generated from the business of manufacturing undertaken by the assessee himself but covers sale of scrap in the business of trading in scrap also.

b) Should the mode of sale of scrap be akin to auction or tender in order to fall in the definition of “buyer” u/s. 206C?

It was submitted that the provisions of section 206C require a seller to collect the tax at source from the buyer (and from none else) on sale, inter alia, of scrap. Attention was drawn to the definition of ‘buyer’ as given in sub-clause(i) of clause (aa) of Explanation to section 206C, which defines a ‘buyer’ as ‘a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender, or any other mode, goods of the nature specified in the Table in sub-s. (1) ……’.

Placing reliance on the interpretative tools of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, it was contended that the phrase ‘any other mode’ in the expression ‘a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode …..’ in Explanation (aa)(i) would get its meaning from the words preceding it, namely, ‘by way of auction, tender’ and, therefore, the said phrase, namely, ‘any other mode’ would have to be construed narrowly and in the same sense as something akin to auction or tender.

It was contended that the assessee has sold the scrap in retail trade and not by way of auction or tender or any similar mode or mode akin to auction or tender and, therefore, it was not required to collect tax at source from them u/s. 206C as such purchasers in retail trade were not buyers within the meaning of Explanation (aa)(i) to section 206C.

The principles of ‘noscitur a sociis’ and ‘ejusdem generis’ apply only when meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute is required to be ascertained. If a given provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, there is no occasion to call in aid those rules.

The use of the word ‘or’ in the aforesaid expression shows that all the three phrases (namely, auction, tender or any other mode) are intended to carry independent meaning without being controlled by  each other. The words “any other mode” are words of wide amplitude and, therefore, cover all possible modes of sales in addition to specific modes of sales by way of auction or tender. Hence, they cannot be construed ejusdem generis or as referring to similar sales as those by way of auction or tender.

c) Does the first proviso to section 206C(6A) apply retrospectively?

The attention of Tribunal was also drawn to the first proviso inserted in section 206C(6A) with effect from 01-07-2012 which stipulates that the payer who fails to deduct tax on the payment made to payee shall not be deemed to be an assessee in default if the payee has paid the tax due on his returned income and fulfilled the other conditions specified therein.

In the aforesaid background, the issue that arises for consideration is whether the first proviso to section 206C(6A) is applicable to pending matters also notwithstanding the fact that it has been made effective from 01-07-2012.

Keeping in view the fact that the first proviso to s/s. (6A) of section 206C not only seeks to rationalise the provisions relating to collection of tax at source but is also beneficial in nature in that it seeks to provide relief to the collectors of tax at source from the consequences flowing from non/short collection of tax at source after ensuring that the interest of the revenue is well protected, thus, there is no hesitation to hold that the said proviso would apply retrospectively and, therefore, to both the assessment years under appeal.

(2013) 144 ITD 325 (Hyderabad) Vittal Krishna Conjeevaram vs. ITO A.Y. 2009-2010 Dated: 10th July, 2013

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Section 54F, read with section 54 – Capital Gains– The expression ‘a residential house’ appearing in sections 54 and 54F has to be understood in the sense that building should be of a residential nature and word ‘a’ should not be understood to indicate a singular number.

Facts:-
The assessee was a co-owner of a residential property. The assessee entered into a development agreement for construction of flats with a developer. As per development agreement the owner had to transfer 50 % of his land for superstructure received as consideration. The assessee received 7 flats towards his share. The Ld AO held that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 54F but only in respect of one flat out of seven flats. CIT (A) also upheld the order of AO.

Held:-
Both the sections, 54 and 54F, speak of either purchase or construction of “a residential house”. Following the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in case of. CIT v. Smt. K.G. Rukmini Amma [2011] 331 ITR 211, the Tribunal held that the expression “a residential house” as appears in section 54 of the Act, cannot be interpreted in a manner to suggest that the exemption would be restricted to a single residential unit. “A residential house” as mentioned in section 54(1) of the Act, has to be understood in a sense that the building should be of a residential nature and the word “a” should not be understood to indicate a singular number. Assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 54F in respect of all the seven flates.

Note:
As the decision of Special Bench, Mumbai in case of ITO vs. Sushila M. Jhaveri [2007] 107 ITD 327 (Mum.) (SB) has been disapproved by the High Court in case of CIT vs. Syed Ali Adil. [2013] 352 ITR 418, the same was not considered to be a good law and hence not followed. CIT vs. D. Anand Basappa [2009] 309 ITR 329/180 Taxman 4 (Kar.) followed CIT vs. Syed Ali Adil [2013] 352 ITR 418/215 Taxman 283/33 taxmann. com 212 (AP) followed

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[2013] 144 ITD 461 (Hyd) S. Ranjith Reddy vs. DCIT AY : 2006-07 Date of order : June 07, 2013

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Section 2(47) – joint development agreement – mere signing of agreement without any other performance cannot be termed as transfer for the purpose of capital gains.

Facts :
The assessee had received certain land from his late father. He, alongwith other family members entered into joint development agreement (joint venture) on 28-02-2006 with L constructions which itself held land in the same area. As per the agreement the assessee was to receive developed plots (i.e. constructed properties) in lieu thereof. The assessing officer, relying on the decisions of Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia [2003] 260 ITR 491 (Bom.) held that there was a transfer of land on 28-02-2006 itself.

Held:
The Hon’ble tribunal held as under: The joint venture project was in a nascent stage. In the concerned previous year, nothing happened other than the execution of the agreement. The transfer of an immovable property always contemplates transfer of an existing property, i.e., a property in praesenti. . As far as the assessee is concerned, there was only an agreement. The proposed project was still to be born as the offshoot of the assessee.

The assessee was not transferring any right or any property to ‘L’. The assessee assigned its landed property in favour of ‘L’ by the joint venture agreement between the assessee and ‘L’. There cannot be a sale to oneself. Nothing was exchanged in the previous year relevant to the assessment year under appeal. No rights are relinquished. It only proposes to redefine the rights.

The assessing officer has concluded that providing land for the purpose of development is a transfer. The consent given by the assessee to provide its land for developing the housing project is only one of the necessary stipulations of the whole scheme. It cannot be broken into an independent segment so as to conclude the same as transfer. The provision of land to facilitate the implementation of the joint venture is always to be read with other equally important stipulations.

Even though the agreement entered into is an enforceable one, that by itself does not take the character of an immovable property. The agreement speaks about the intentions of the parties. Once the project is completed and all the stipulations are satisfied, the parties may come to declare the final satisfaction of the agreements. Only at that point of time, the question really arises as to whether there was any transfer within the meaning of section 2(47). The housing project was a proposed project. As already stated, a transfer is contemplated only in the case of an existing property. In the present case the property was only in the nature of mutual rights. The project and development are yet to happen. Strictly, speaking, the projects and plans may happen or may not happen.

As far as applicability of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, it is one of the necessary preconditions that transferee should have or is willing to perform his part of the contract.

It is clear that willingness to perform for the purposes of section 53A is something more than a statement of intent; it is the unqualified and unconditional willingness on the part of the vendee to perform its obligations. It is only elementary that, unless provisions of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act are satisfied on the facts of a case, the transaction in question cannot fall within the scope of deemed transfer u/s. 2(47)(v).

Both the developer and the assessee were having the landed property. They pooled together the landed property along with some other parties who were owners of some other landed property and all parties together gave licence to the builder to enter the premises and construct houses. No sale was effected on the date of agreement. No consideration has passed between the parties on signing theagreement. Further from the date of signing of development agreement dated 28-02-2006 to 31-03- 2006, no progress has taken place in the said landed property which is subject-matter of the development agreement. Further, there was no consideration in the form of money that passed between the parties. There was no construction, whatsoever, that took place during the period. Even otherwise, there was a General Power of Attorney given by the assessee to the developer. In such a situation, it is only the actual performance of transferee’s obligation which can give rise to the situation envisaged in section 53A of the TP Act. On these facts, it is not possible to hold that the developer performed its obligation during the period in which the capital is sought to be taxed by the Revenue authorities. Thus, the condition laid down u/s. 53A of TP Act was not satisfied during the period. Once it is concluded that the developer did not perform the stipulation as required by the development agreement during the period under consideration and within the meaning assigned to the expression in section 53A of TP Act it cannot be said that there was a transfer u/s. 2(47)(v) so as to levy capital gain tax.

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[2013] 144 ITD 76 (Mum) Mattel Toys (I) (P) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT, Mumbai A.Y. 2002-2003 Order dated- 12.06.2013

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Section 92C – Transfer Pricing
(i) Resale price method is an appropriate method in case where resale takes place without any value addition to product – where the assessee had followed Transactional Net Margin method but later on during the assessment proceedings claimed that Resale Price Method be followed, the same should be considered.

(ii) An internal comparable can be followed for computation of ALP against external comparable where the assessee sends goods back to its associated enterprise (AE) to get a best available price in comparison to the sale made to a third party.

Facts I:
The assessee-company, a subsidiary of a U.S.A. company being its Associated Enterprise (‘AE’), was engaged in marketing and selling of toys and games imported from its AE. The assessee adopted Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) in its transfer pricing report and rejected the Resale Price Method (RPM). Further, the assessee claimed that RPM should be followed instead of TNMM which was rejected by the Commissioner as detailed analysis was given in the TP study report as to why RPM was not taken.

Held I:
The assessee is a distributor of toys and resells the same to independent parties without any value addition. In such situation, RPM can be the best method as there is no much alteration to the products which are resold by the assessee. On the other hand, TNMM can be resorted to only if the other methods have been rendered inapplicable. The revenue contended that once the assessee has chosen a method as appropriate then it should not resort to any other method at an assessment or appellate stage. If a particular method will not result in proper determination of the ALP then it will not serve the purpose of transfer pricing. Therefore, it was held that if at any stage of the proceedings, it is found that another method will result in more appropriate ALP then the assessment officers and the appellate Courts cannot reject the plea of the assessee.

Facts II:
The assessee resells the goods which are imported from the associated enterprise. The assessee in this case has sent the goods back to the associated enterprise. These goods were the unsold ones. The assessee preferred to return the goods to the AE as there was no demand for the product due to change in consumer preferences. The Transfer Pricing officer treated these goods as export to the AE.

Held II:
The assessee returned the goods to the assessee due to a negative trend in the market. It was stated that the assessee had suffered a greater loss while making sale in case of third party in comparison to the sale made to the AE. Thus, the margin of export sale to third party i.e internal comparable should be compared to the export sale made to the AE. Therefore, the issue was remanded to the file of the Transfer Pricing Officer for the purpose of carrying out comparability analysis under internal CUP.

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2013-TIOL-955-ITAT-PANAJI ACIT vs. Joe Marcelinho Mathias ITA No. 43/PNJ/2013 Assessment Years: 2009-10. Date of Order: 26.04.2013

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S/s. 45, 47(xiv) – In a case where an assessee transfers all its assets and liabilities to a private limited company and all conditions of section 47(xiv) are satisfied, AO cannot deny exemption on the ground that sale consideration was higher than the book value.

Facts:
The assessee, an individual, was carrying on business of real estate, as a sole proprietor, by acquiring land, developing the same by sub-dividing the same into plots and selling the said plots. The land was held as stock-in-trade. The net worth of the concern, as per audit report u/s. 50B(3) was Rs. 1.62 crore. On 31-03-2009, vide Deed of Succession, all the assets and liabilities of the proprietory concern were transferred to a private limited company for a consideration of Rs. 963 crore against acquisition of shares of a company at a high premium. The assessee contended that the transfer was covered by section 47(xiv) and therefore, the provisions of section 45 were not attracted.

The Assessing Officer (AO) was of the view that section 47(xiv) does not exempt capital gains if the assets are transferred at a value which is higher than the book value. He held that receipt of additional consideration by way of allotment of shares over and above the proprietor’s capital was in violation of conditions laid down in section 47(xiv). He held that since the assessee got additional income/benefit than what was due as per books of accounts this amounted to receiving any direct or indirect benefit other than by way of allotment of shares and therefore the assessee is not entitled to exemption. The AO taxed the capital gains and denied the benefit of section 47(xiv).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :
The assessee has disposed off the industrial undertaking to a private limited company and in exchange thereof, the assessee has received consideration by way of shares in the company. Therefore, this is a clear cut case of a transfer of an undertaking to a private limited company. Section 45 is applicable when there is a profit or gain arising from the transfer. Profit and gains will also include losses. The undertaking has been valued by the assessee more than the net worth, therefore, there is profit and gain and the provision of section 45 was clearly applicable in the case of the assessee. Once a capital gain arises and is chargeable to tax u/s. 45, section 47 provides for certain exceptions according to which certain transactions are not regarded to be transfer.

The only objection on the part of the revenue is that the assessee did not comply with the condition no. 3 of section 47(xiv) since assessee has received consideration by way of allotment of shares in the company and the value of those shares are more than the value of the assets as was disclosed in the books of the proprietory concern. In our opinion, the assessee has duly complied with the condition as stipulated in clause (c) to section 47(xiv). This proviso only requires that same proprietor does not receive any consideration or benefit directly or indirectly in any form or manner other than way of allotment of shares in the company. The words form or manner other than by way of allotment of shares in the company qualify the words `does not receive any consideration or benefit’ as well as `directly or indirectly’. This clearly denotes that proviso (c) permits receiving consideration or benefit directly or indirectly by way of allotment of shares in the company. It is not a case where the assessee has received any other consideration or benefit other than the allotment of shares in the company.

The Tribunal held that receipt of higher value of shares because of revaluation of assets at the time of succession cannot be treated as consideration or benefit received other than by way of allotment of shares. The Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A).

This ground of appeal of revenue was dismissed.

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2013-TIOL-941-ITAT-DEL Rachna Gupta vs. ITO ITA No. 5527/Del/2012 Assessment Years: 2003-04. Date of Order: 05.07.2013

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S/s. 147, 148 – Reassessment cannot be done on the basis of a notice issued at the address mentioned as per PAN data when the new address was available in returns of income filed.

Facts :
On 30-03-2010 the Assessing Officer (AO), with the prior approval of the Additional CIT, issued a notice u/s. 148 requiring the assessee to file return of income for AY 2003-04. The notice was issued at an address taken from PAN data. The address given in the PAN data was address of the employer of the assessee where she was then working. Subsequently, the said employer company had shifted its address and the change in address was intimated to ROC as well. In the return of income filed for AY 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06 (all filed before 30.3.2010) the assessee had stated her new address.

The assessee failed to comply with this notice and no return was filed. Thereafter, AO issued notices u/s. 142(1) on 09-06-2010, 06-08-2010 and 14-09-2010. The assessee claimed that it received first notice on 14-09- 2010. In response, the assessee filed a letter dated 22-09-2010 enclosing acknowledgement of Saral form and further stated that the assessee was not holding the relevant record for the assessment year and also that the initiation of the proceedings after lapse of six years was unjustified.

The AO was of the view that the provisions of the Act require issue of notice within a period of six years and not service thereof. The notice was issued within six years from the end of the assessment year. The AO completed the assessment by making an addition of Rs. 6,15,000.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A)who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :
The Tribunal noted that it is not disputed by the Department that notice dated 30-03-2010 u/s. 148 was issued at BE-63, Hari Nagar, New Delhi address. From the copy of returns filed for assessment years 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06 prior to 30-03-2010, it is evident that the address of the assessee was BK- 22, Shalimar Bagh, Delhi – 110 052 which was available with the Department and, therefore, admittedly the notice was issued at the wrong address. The 6 year period from the end of the assessment year expired on 30-03-2010. Therefore, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Eshaan Holding (P) Ltd. (2012) 344 ITR 541 (Del), it cannot be said that valid notice was issued u/s 148 to the assessee. The Delhi High Court had held as under:

“The first notice issued on January 29, 2004, by speedpost was said to have been served at the old address at East of Kailash. There was no proof of service on record. Even otherwise, this was not valid service because the assessee had already filed its return on November 28, 2003, and in this return address shown was Panchsheel Park. Thus, the record of the Department already contained the new address of the assessee. Before issuing notice u/s 148, it was expected of the Assessing Officer to have checked up if there was any change of address, because valid service of notice of reopening the assessment is a jurisdictional matter and this is a condition precedent for a valid reassessment.”

 Following the ratio of the above mentioned decision, the Tribunal set aside the order of CIT(A) holding that initiation of proceedings u/s. 148 was not legal and, therefore, consequent assessment order framed by AO is quashed.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Google Hangout – III

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About this write up: This write up is the 3rd part of the series of articles on Google Hangout. This write up focuses mainly on some of the more popular instant messaging apps. The article briefly describes some of the features of these apps and highlights how hangout appears to have an edge over its peers. This article is the third and final installment of a series of articles on this topic. The first write up dealt with the telecom ecosystem and the different messaging apps/options available to users. The write up also dealt with the rise and fall of these apps/options over time. The second installment mainly dealt with the apps like SMS and BBM and why they are losing momentum. In this write up, we will briefly look at the current favourites in the instant messaging apps space and how they compare with Google Hangout (or vice versa for that matter).

Popular instant messaging apps

The previous write ups have dealt in brief why instant messaging apps became popular. Some of the key factors were:

Cost factor: Short Messaging Services (i.e. SMS) became a rage during the time period when the cost of voice calls were sky high. Their popularity started declining when the telecom service providers started reducing the voice call rentals. As a matter of fact, the general perception today is that it is cheaper to call then to send an SMS especially when it cost 1p per second and 1 minute would cost Re. 1/- as against Re. 1 for just 140 characters /SMS.

Instant Communication: The fact that the message would be delivered instantly – almost anywhere in the world – to the persons phone was a huge advantage over emails. This was true before the Blackberry boys came in and before the smart phones joined the race. Even today, a good majority of the population prefers instant messaging to emails. To be candid, I can’t even recall when was the last time I shared a joke or a personal message with my friends or dear ones on email. As a matter of fact, not a day goes by when one of my colleagues or friends, etc. share that whatsapp, etc., have made it so much easier to connect with family members.

Ease of use: This perhaps is one of the most important factors, especially when seniors are concerned. The younger generation has always been known to be tech savvy and have the uncanny ability to adapt to the latest technological development. One would say that the younger generation thrives on the changes. As against this, the seniors find change unnerving, they prefer the security of the old, tried and tested. This is even a bigger hurdle when they have to take a number of steps to achieve the same goal. Instant messaging has changed that significantly. To give you a simple illustration, if you are using whatsapp and you create groups and include your parents, it gives them an opportunity to know what’s going on, etc. There is a small illustration later in this write-up on this.

Informal communication: This is another reason why instant messaging is very popular is that emails generally have been associated with formal communication as against this instant messaging is perceived to be less formal and mostly casual.

Mass reach: If one compares instant messaging with voice calls i.e. alerts for charges on your debit card, reminders for utility payments, etc. – which would you prefer. My vote would certainly go for instant messages – they are far less intrusive. Imagine receiving a telephone call everytime a charge was made on your card or a utility payment was due – one more voice to nag you….

That being said, let’s move on to the apps which are popular:

Popular instant messaging apps:

Whatsapp:
This one is my favourite. In fact I wrote an article recommending this app in the BCAJ. It is one of the apps (out of 75 on my phone) for which I have paid money (it’s free now) (have only 5 paid apps 70 are free).

This app is quite efficient. Apart from allowing you to send text messages, the user can also send photos, videos and sound files (this was added after we chat came on the scene). This app will help you save a lot of money on the phone bill (especially if you have an unlimited data plan). Some of the other useful features include group messaging, sharing location, time stamp. What I particularly like about whatsapp is that

• it works on a simple GRPS connection as well as a WIFI (no need for a data plan)
• I don’t need to add contacts separately (unlike BBM)
• Even if I change my phone, new messages will come to the new phone, even if I don’t have anyone’s PIN
• It works on all popular devices/operating systems

We Chat:
This is app is fast gaining popularity and there are several ads being aired on almost all channels. The biggest plus is that apart from texting (and the ones described above), users can also send voice messages.

To be honest, I don’t have much comment or experience in using this app. There were a couple of turnoffs however:

• One needs to register an account with we chat
• Why bother sending a voice message – just call
• Chinese ……snooping….

Skype:
Has been around for several years now, recently bought over by Microsoft. Quite popular even today. It is available on the desktop as well as on the phone. This was popular because it gave the users the ability to have a real time voice conference (one to one or one to many or many to many). Many seniors use this to talk to their dear ones living around the world. Once again, I don’t have much comment or experience in using this app. There were a couple of turnoffs however:

• The app is very resource hungry – takes a lot of space and RAM when in operation

• Voice quality is decent but the video is often grainy and jerky (could be a bandwidth or a hardware issue on either side – did not face the as much in google hangout though)
• Need to register an account. You could call on the phone but (I think) you have pay charges for this facility

Viber:
This app is also quite popular. The biggest plus is that it allows real time voice calls. Have tried this from my phone, there is some time lag but the voice clarity is pretty good (even on GPRS). The app gives you the convenience of group chatting and alerts you as and when users download and activate it on their phone (Whats app doesn’t give an alert). It is fairly popular and in many ways scores over skype due to ease of use and speed. Unlike skype, it doesn’t offer video chat. Recently, they have started offering a desktop version.

Google Hangout:
Google has taken its time testing this app….. moving from google chat to google talk and now hangout. This app works on most smart phones (desktop — its already linked to your gmail account). The pluses are that it allows you to send text messages and hold video conference. Have tried it a couple of times and when compared to Skype and Facetime (iPhone/iPad specific), the video quality is somewhere in between (better than skype but still miles away from facetime). Just last week, I was trying to get on a video chat with someone located in Canada and after 10 minutes of skyping he said why don’t we switch to google hangout it some much better. I think that more or less summed it up for me.

The next write up will focus on what google hangout has to offer and what the future may have in store for users. It will also be the concluding part of this series. Do look forward.

Disclaimer: The purpose of this article is not to promote any particular site or person or software. Further comments about various products and services are based on the user experience related information available in the public domain. There is no intention to malign any product or service in any manner whatsoever. The sole intention is to create awareness and to bring in to limelight some thought provoking content.

Waiver of interest : S. 234A, S. 234B and S. 234C of Income-tax Act, 1961 and CBDT Circular No. 400/234/95-IT(B), dated 23-5-1996 : A.Ys. 1991-92 and 1992-93 : Death of father who was looking after business : Entire tax paid voluntarily and extra amount a

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Reported :


  1. Waiver of interest : S. 234A, S. 234B and S. 234C of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 and CBDT Circular No. 400/234/95-IT(B), dated 23-5-1996 :
    A.Ys. 1991-92 and 1992-93 : Death of father who was looking after business :
    Entire tax paid voluntarily and extra amount also paid : Sufficient reason for
    non-payment of advance tax on time : Levy of interest set aside.

[V. Akilandeswari v. CCIT, 318 ITR 1 (Mad.)]

The petitioner was a minor during the A.Ys. 1991-92 and
1992-93. For these two years the returns were filed voluntarily and taxes were
paid. Assessment was completed and interest was levied u/s.234A, u/s.234B and
u/s.234C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioner’s application for waiver
of interest was rejected by the Chief Commissioner.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition filed by
the petitioner and held as under :

“(i) The fact of the death of the petitioner’s father who
was looking after the business and as well as that the petitioner’s mother
and guardian was a housewife unfamiliar with such transactions was not
denied by the Chief Commissioner. The petitioner had paid the entire tax
voluntarily and had also paid some extra amount. The claim made by the
petitioner was bona fide and genuine and the Chief Commissioner had
not exercised his discretion in terms of law.

(ii) Thus the levy if interest u/s.234A, u/s.234B and u/s.234C was set
aside and the petitioner did not need to pay any interest for the two
assessment years. The petitioner was not entitled to seek refund of the excess
amount if any paid.”

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TDS : S. 194A and S. 201 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Discount allotted to subscribers of chit : Discount is not interest : No liability to deduct tax u/s.194A : Order u/s.201 not valid.

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Reported :


  1. TDS : S. 194A and S. 201 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y.
    2003-04 : Discount allotted to subscribers of chit : Discount is not
    interest : No liability to deduct tax u/s.194A : Order u/s.201 not valid.

[CIT v. Sahib Chits (Delhi) (P) Ltd., 226 CTR 119
(Del.)]

The assessee is a chit fund company. The assessee had not
deducted tax at source on the amounts paid to its members on the chits
contributed by them. The AO held that there was default on the part of the
assessee company for not deducting tax u/s.194A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Therefore, the AO passed order u/s.201 and quantified the default amount at
Rs.8,17,683. CIT(A) and the Tribunal quashed the order.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following two questions were
raised :

“(a) Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in holding
that the assessee had not paid any interest to the subscribers of the chit
and such payment does not fall within the meaning of interest as defined
u/s.2(28A) of the Act ?

(b) Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in holding
that the assessee was not required to deduct the tax at source within the
meaning of S. 194A of the Act and as such the assessee was not in default
u/s.201 of the Act ?”

The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under :

“Distribution of bid amount or discount allotted to the
subscriber of the chit is not interest as there is no money borrowed or debt
incurred and therefore there is no question of deducting tax at source
u/s.194A.”

 

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TDS : S. 194I of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 : Premises owned by co-owners : Limit of Rs.1,20,000 is applicable to each co-owner.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. TDS : S. 194I of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 and
    2002-03 : Premises owned by co-owners : Limit of Rs.1,20,000 is applicable to
    each co-owner.

[CIT v. Manager, SBI; 226 CTR 310 (Raj.)]

In an appeal filed by the Revenue u/s.260A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 the following question was raised :

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the learned Tribunal was legally justified in holding with regard to
TDS u/s.194-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961 that when there are a number of
owners of a property, the limit or ceiling will apply to each and every
owner separately, notwithstanding the fact that the amount has been paid by
crediting the aggregate sum in the joint account of the owners ?”

The Rajasthan High Court held as under :

“(i) The property was of late Smt. Tej Roop Kumari, who
created registered trust in her lifetime on 10th October 1990, according to
which, her three sons and one grandson became absolute owners of the
property in definite shares.

(ii) Learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on Smt. Bishaka Sarkar v. UOI; 219 ITR 327 (Cal.), in which
it was held that rent paid to co-owners cannot be split up and co-owners
would come within the expression ‘other cases’, so deduction of tax at the
rate of 20% was justified.

(iii) It appears that the learned Judge of Calcutta High
Court did not take note of law laid down by the Apex Court in CIT v.
Bijoy Kumar Almal;
215 ITR 22 (SC), in which it was held that where
property is owned by two or more persons and their respective shares are
definite and ascertainable, they shall not, in respect of such property, be
assed as an AOP and that the share of each such person in the income from
that property shall be included in his total income, meaning thereby,
liability to deduct on the rental income received by each co-owner was to be
judged.

(iv) Thus, limit of Rs.1,20,000 was applicable to each
co-owner, and thus, no tax was to be deducted at source, and the learned
Tribunal has not committed any error in accepting the appeals of the
assessee.”

 

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Return of income : Doctrine of relation back : S. 140 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Return signed by company secretary : Defect curable : Subsequent valid return though filed late relates back to original return.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. Return of income : Doctrine of relation back : S. 140 of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Return signed by company secretary :
    Defect curable : Subsequent valid return though filed late relates back to
    original return.

[CIT v. Haryana Sheet Glass Ltd., 318 ITR 173
(Del.)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee-company had filed its
return of income on 1-11-2004 declaring a loss of Rs.10,38,98,405, which was
signed by the company secretary. Thereafter a revised return was filed on
5-10-2005 declaring loss of Rs.7,20,50,041, which was signed by the managing
director. The AO ignored the original return on the ground that the return was
not signed and verified in accordance with the provisions of S. 140 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. He further found that the revised return was filed
belatedly and therefore he did not take the said return into consideration.
The Tribunal held that signing of the return by the secretary was a curable
irregularity. Therefore, when the managing director signed and filed the
return, it should relate back to the date when the original return was filed
under the signature of the company secretary. Since that original/revised
return was within time, it could have been taken into consideration.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) If the irregularity in the original return is
curable, then the doctrine of relation back would apply, but if there is a
fundamental defect in the original return, which cannot be cured, then such
a doctrine cannot be applied.

(ii) It is clear that the secretary has signed the
return, who is otherwise, as per the provisions of the Companies Act,
competent to sign. The provision of S. 140 of the Income-tax Act mandates
that the managing director or some other responsible officers can sign.
Because of this reason, we are of the opinion that in a case like this, the
irregularity was curable and the doctrine of relation back was rightly
applied.”

 

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Return of income : Defective/invalid return : S. 140 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Return signed by company secretary : Defect curable : Opportunity to rectify defect should be given.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. Return of income : Defective/invalid return : S. 140 of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Return signed by company secretary :
    Defect curable : Opportunity to rectify defect should be given.


[CIT v. Bhiwani Synthetics Ltd., 318 ITR 177 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95, the assessee company had filed its
return of income on 30-11-1994 declaring a loss. The return was signed by the
general manager (finance) and the company secretary of the assessee. The
Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that since the return was not signed
by the managing director or a director as provided in S. 140(c) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, it was non est. The CIT(A) held that the defect
was a curable defect and an opportunity ought to have been given to the
assessee to rectify it. He, accordingly, directed the Assessing Officer to
give such an opportunity to the assessee. The Tribunal upheld the decision of
the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) We are of the view that on the facts of this case,
since there is nothing on record to suggest that the assessee has disowned
the return that was signed by the general manager (finance) of the assessee
and on the contrary, a power of attorney was given by the assessee to its
general manager (finance) for signing the return, it would have been
appropriate if an opportunity had been granted to the assessee to have the
return signed by the managing director or its director in accordance with
the directions given by the CIT(A).

(ii) There is nothing to suggest that any prejudice will
be caused to the Revenue if this direction is complied with.”


 

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Exemption u/s.11 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Exemption cannot be denied on the ground that it is not a trust: Filing of Form No. 10 : Revised form can be filed before completing assessment.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. Exemption u/s.11 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 :
    Exemption cannot be denied on the ground that it is not a trust: Filing of
    Form No. 10 : Revised form can be filed before completing assessment.

[CIT v. Simla Chandigarh Diocese Society, 318 ITR 96
(P&H)]

The assessee, a charitable society, claimed exemption
u/s.11 r.w. S. 12(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer
declined the claim on the ground that the assessee was a society and not a
trust. The Assessing Officer also raised objection that revised Form No. 10
was not furnished with the return. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The assessee could not be denied exemption u/s.11 of
the Act on the ground that it was not a trust but a society.

(ii) The Commissioner (Appeals) had observed that the
assessee modified Form No. 10 in the course of assessment proceedings. The
modified Form No. 10 has been rejected by the Assessing Officer on the
ground that there was no provision in the Act for revising Form No. 10. It
was held that there was no specific bar prohibiting the assessee from
modifying the figure of accumulation. Form No. 10 could be furnished before
the assessing authority completes the concerned assessment.”

 

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Depreciation : S. 32 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2000-01 and 2001-02 : User of asset : Asset discarded and written off : Depreciation is allowable on WDV after reducing scrap value of asset discarded and written off.

New Page 1

 Reported :


  1. Depreciation : S. 32 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys.
    2000-01 and 2001-02 : User of asset : Asset discarded and written off :
    Depreciation is allowable on WDV after reducing scrap value of asset discarded
    and written off.

[CIT v. Yamaha Motor India (P) Ltd., 226 CTR 304
(Del.)]

In an appeal filed by the Revenue u/s.260A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, the following two questions were raised before the High
Court :

“(a) Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
(hereinafter ‘Tribunal’) was correct in law in directing the AO to recompute
the depreciation after reducing scrap value of the assets, which have been
discarded and written off in the books of account for the year under
consideration from the WDV of the block of assets ?

(b) Whether provisions of sub-clause (iii) to S. 32(1)
r/w. S. 43(6)(c)(B) are applicable to the present case when the assessee had
not complied with the primary conditions for eligibility of depreciation ?”

The Delhi High Court held as under :

“(i) The crux of the matter is : what is the meaning to
be ascribed to the expression ‘used for the purposes of the business’ as
found in S. 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The provisions of S. 32 pertain
to depreciation. The contention of the Revenue is that with respect to any
machinery for which depreciation is claimed u/s.32, the same cannot be
allowed unless such machinery is used in the business and since
discarded machinery is not used in the business, therefore, with respect to
the discarded machinery no depreciation can be allowed.

(ii) As long as the machinery is available for use,
though not actually used, it falls within the expression ‘used for the
purposes of the business’ and the assessee can claim the benefit of
depreciation.

(iii) No doubt, the expression used in S. 32 is ‘used for
the purposes of the business’. However, this expression has to be read
harmoniously with the expression ‘discarded’ as found in clause (iii) of
Ss.(1). Obviously, when a thing is discarded it is not used. Thus ‘use’ and
‘discarding’ are not in the same field and cannot stand together. However,
if a harmonious reading of the expressions ‘used for the purposes of the
business’ and ‘discarded’ is adopted, then it would show that ‘used for the
purposes of the business’ only means that the assessee has used the
machinery for the purposes of the business in earlier years. It is not
disputed that in the facts of the present case, the machinery in question
was in fact used in the previous year and depreciation was allowed on the
block of assets in the previous years. Taking therefore a realistic approach
and adopting a harmonious construction, the expression ‘used for the
purposes of the business’ as found in S. 32 when used with respect to
discarded machinery would mean that the user in the business is not in the
relevant financial year/previous year, but in the earlier financial years.
Any other interpretation would lead to an incongruous situation.

(iv) Therefore, the Tribunal was correct in law in
directing the AO to recompute depreciation after reducing the scrap value of
the assets which have been discarded and written off in the books of account
for the year under consideration from the WDV of the block of assets.”

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