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2013] 38 taxmann.com 67 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) Gujarat State Petronet Ltd vs. CCE, Ahmedabad

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Whether service receiver can avail CENVAT credit of duties in respect of materials used by the service provider, as the service provider opted for benefit available to him under notifications specifically disentitling him to avail CENVAT Credit? Held, No.

Facts:

Appellant was engaged in rendering taxable service under the category of “Transport of goods through pipelines or other conduit service” u/s. 65(105)(zzz) of the Finance Act, 1994. It has adopted Engineering Procurement and Commissioning (EPC) model for laying of oil and gas transmission pipelines for which it received services of various EPC contractors for fabrication, assembly with equipments and devices, installation and commissioning of a pipeline system. The contract between the appellant and the contractors was on a lump sum basis; yet, two invoices were issued, one for sale of the materials (including pipes) and the other for the services rendered by them. EPC contractors claimed deduction in respect of the value of materials and goods sold in the course of rendering the taxable service and also did not take CENVAT credit of duties charged thereon under Notification 12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003. However, the appellant availed credit of duty paid on the pipes by the EPC contractors on the basis of duty paying documents issued by the manufacturer wherein, the pipes were in the name of the contractors and appellant was shown as consignee. The appellant used the said credit to discharge its service tax liability on its output service of “transportation of goods through pipelines or other conduit services”. Department denied such CENVAT credit to the appellant.

Held:

Exemption notification has to be interpreted strictly and when the explanation to Rule 3(7) of CENVAT Credit Rules specifically provides that once the benefit of a notification is availed, no credit would be available under Rule 3 in respect of duty paid on the inputs/capital goods in respect of which a service provider or a manufacturer has availed the benefit of Notification No. 12/2003. The restriction applies not only on the service provider but extends to the service recipient, also. Further, pipes were used for construction of pipeline by the EPC contractors and pipeline system is supplied/sold to the appellant. Pipes can be considered as inputs only for provision of service of construction/erection of pipelines and not otherwise. The Tribunal stated that the definition of input/capital goods in case of service provider is stricter than that applicable to the manufacturer. Therefore, pipes were ineligible for credit as inputs/capital goods. The Tribunal also held that the CENVAT credit on construction services pertaining to the period prior to 01-04-2011 is an eligible input service. The Tribunal also held that in case the service recipient has purchased material and given to the service provider and the same is utilised by the service provider for provision of its service and the material is supplied back to the service recipient, the service recipient is entitled to CENVAT credit if all other requirements of the definition of inputs/capital goods are satisfied. The Tribunal further held that in case of materials being bought by the service recipient and given to the service provider, CENVAT credit cannot be denied on the ground that the service recipient is not registered as first/second stage dealer, Rule 9(2) may be invoked which provides discretionary powers to the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner to allow CENVAT credit in respect of defective documents, if satisfied. However, charge of suppression was not upheld noting that non-disclosure of additional information to department cannot amount to suppression of facts.
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2013 (32) STR 93 (Tri.-Del) Mahindra World City Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur – I

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For tax paid on services consumed outside SEZ, exemption is not available under Notification No. 4/2004-ST dated 31st March, 2004.

In case service tax is paid on such services, the refund application should be filed u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 within 1 year from the relevant date as no procedure was prescribed under the said notification 4/2004.

Service recipient can claim refund of service tax only when incidence of service tax is not passed on.

Refund under Notification no. 9/2009-ST dated 4th March, 2009 is available subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions only.

Facts:
The appellant paid service tax due to ambiguity in Notification No. 4/2004-ST dated 31st March, 2004. Therefore, the appellant filed a refund claim in view of section 26(e) of the SEZ Act, 2005 read with Rule 31 of the SEZ Rules, 2006 which states that no service tax is leviable in relation to authorised operations in SEZ. The refund got rejected on the following grounds:

• Refund can be filed by the person who pays service tax and not by service recipient
• Unjust enrichment
• Part amount on the basis of time bar
• No provisions to refund service tax paid on services consumed outside SEZ.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that since service tax was not payable under Notification No. 4/2004-ST dated 31st March, 2004 but was paid by the appellant, they could claim the benefit of refund of service tax. However, there being no procedure to claim refund under the said Notification, the refund application ought to have been filed under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. The Tribunal held that refund claim was not filed within 1 year from the relevant date i.e., the date of payment of service tax and accordingly, part refund was held to be time barred. Since there were no provisions to refund service tax paid on services consumed outside SEZ, the Commissioner (Appeals) order upheld the rejection. Service recipient can claim refund of service tax only when incidence of service tax was not passed on. In the present case, there was no evidence to prove absence of unjust enrichment and thus refund was not available to the appellant. Though part period was covered by Notification No. 9/2009-ST dated 4th March, 2009, since the appellant had not filed refund claim under the said Notification No. 9/2009-ST and in absence of evidence on records of fulfilment of conditions prescribed under the notification, refund was not allowed.

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2013 (32) STR 217 (Tri.-Del.) Surya Consultants vs. CCEx., Jaipur-I

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Tribunal should follow the decision of jurisdictional High Court in case where contradictory judgements of other High Court exists—If any other decision discusses both the decisions then it should also be considered.

Facts:

Having been imposed penalty u/s.s 77 & 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 on confirmation of demand of tax, the appellant challenged the decision by relying on the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in CCE vs. First Flight Courier Ltd. 2011 (22) STR 622 (P&H). The respondent relied on the decision of Kerala High Court in Asst. Commr. of CE vs. Krishna Poduval 2006 (1) STR 185 (Ker) for imposition of penalties u/s.s 76 & 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Held:

Delhi Bench fell within the jurisdiction of Punjab & Haryana High Court and thus its decision had to be followed and not the contradictory decision of the other High Court pronounced before the said decision. The Tribunal also held that both the decisions stood discussed in CCE Haldia vs. Mittal Technopak Pvt. Ltd. 2012-TIOL-1507-CESTAT-KOL. This decision should have also been considered. The Tribunal followed the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court and set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) with consequential relief.
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Judicious economics – Time to consider the economic impact of recent SC judgments

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The Supreme Court is amongst India’s most respected and trusted institutions. Its rulings are rarely questioned on legal merits and the only way to get around the ones that cause discomfort to the government is to amend the law. The country can take great comfort from the stature and credibility of this institution when it comes to enforcing the rule of law. However, as desirable as it is that laws should be strictly enforced, there is a flip side to this. Significant decisions by the Supreme Court often have significant economic consequences. At no other time has this been more obvious than the present.

Over the past two years, a number of judgments have, notwithstanding their rectitude, had enormous macroeconomic impacts. The banning of iron ore mining in Karnataka and Goa significantly reduced exports of ore, which declined by over $4 billion over a two-year period. The coal imbroglio led to the Supreme Court cancelling all the licences that were issued to private entities, making the country dependent on imports for the foreseeable future. India, with its enormous thermal coal reserves, is now importing over $8 billion worth of coal – mainly to run power plants, which, ironically, were set up close to domestic coal beds. Likewise, the 2G telecom scandal, which resulted in the cancellation of several licences, disrupted the plans of several major foreign telecom companies, which had seen India as an attractive market for expansion. Potential foreign investors will now be extremely wary of entering the country with the risk that supposedly legitimate agreements and contracts are suddenly declared illegal. All these instances have contributed to an enormous increase in the economy’s external vulnerability, with the first two making a huge dent in the current account deficit and the third likely to make India a less attractive destination for foreign direct investment.

A number of fundamental questions arise here. First, whatever the legal merits of each instance of judicial action, should the Supreme Court not routinely consider the potential economic consequences of its decisions? It is clearly not required to do so now, but it would be reasonable to argue that the rule of law and economic well-being are important determinants of social welfare. If indeed the Supreme Court had considered the economic consequences, would its rulings have been somewhat different – perhaps allowing for a tightly monitored but phased compliance with environmental regulations in the case of iron ore, and an assessment of the genuineness of parties in the licence allocation processes? From a larger perspective, though, there is a particularly troubling question. Did the Indian economy achieve its best ever growth performance during 2003-08 on the basis of widespread violations of various laws and regulations? As compliance is more strictly enforced, is slower growth an inevitability? Only time will answer this question. Meanwhile, while there can be no compromise on regulatory compliance and the rule of law, a balance between this objective and its economic consequences needs to be worked out so that it can be achieved without too high a price being paid. It would be good practice for the Supreme Court to commission a rigorous economic impact analysis on key issues coming up before it while making a final ruling.

(Source: Business Standard dated 23.10.2013)
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Political Funding – Kejriwal gets it Right: Screen all Parties

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A probe ordered into the sources of funding of a political party — whether that order comes from the government itself or is prompted by the judiciary — would seem a move against a primary source of corruption in India. But why should such a probe be limited to one single party? Thus, while the Centre says it will investigate whether the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) violated rules on its sources of funding, it makes for an utterly skewed situation when other parties are not subject to a similar investigation. Reform of political funding is a key, perhaps the most significant, part of combating the malaise of corruption in India. As long as parties do not disclose their sources of income and how that money is spent, political corruption will continue to facilitate corruption within the wider polity.

Unless the move to investigate the transparency claims of the AAP widens into probing the secretive nature of how other parties — including the Congress and the BJP — collect funds, it would seem to be a bullying tactic against a political opponent. To its credit, AAP has maintained it can account for every donation it receives. The website of the party does have a donors list. And this is a welcome paradigm shift. There is nothing even remotely similar from the BJP and the Congress — the two parties facing the biggest threat from the AAP in the looming Delhi polls. And the AAP is perfectly right when it asks that the BJP and Congress be subjected to similar levels of transparency.

There is no comparison between the declared funds of AAP and that of the Congress and BJP. Add the amounts political parties do not declare, and we will have a humungous amount of money. Reforming such political funding is the larger goal. Targeting only a small, new political party is petty vendetta.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 13.11.2013).

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Fizz has Gone Out of India

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India has gone from a ‘must-invest’ to a ‘mustdeal- with’ country, PepsiCo Chairman and CEO Indra Nooyi said, expressing the ambivalence that many overseas businesses feel about a country that’s been tarnished by allegations of rampant political corruption, retrospective changes in law, policy reforms getting stuck and, to top it all off, an economic slump.

Uncertainties in tax policy, poor infrastructure and lack of clarity are among problems facing investors in India.

“‘Must invest’ means it’s a destination and GDP is growing. ‘Must deal with’ means there are infrastructure issues, the taxation policy is not clear or transparent. So people are saying, ‘Do I have to deal with India?’”

India-born Nooyi, who’s held the top job at PepsiCo for seven years, is still betting on the country as one of the company’s strongest markets.

Issues in India: Nooyi

“You have to fix the whole system,” she said. “Foreign investment can create the push, but the country has to create the pull, and if the country gives the pull, you can get lot of investments.” Nooyi said she asked Chidambaram about the minimum growth rate India needs to remain a healthy economy. “He said we need 8% growth, to stay healthy and come out of chronic unemployment. That’s an attractive growth rate if India can get back to it. That’s the growth rate he would like for India in the long term,” she said.

Nooyi said the fundamental reasons for investing in India haven’t gone away. “The middle class is still growing… You have a thriving striving democracy. Last 15 years, India has seen periods of incredible growth and years of sluggishness here and there,” she said.

“If you look at India, it has a fantastic population base — young, middle class still big and growing, an entrepreneurial culture, thriving democracy, a country that in the long-term still has lots of potential. We have to invest in the long-term fundamentals of the country. Hopefully, if companies keep showing their confidence in India, others will follow and the growth will pick up too.”

(Source: Extracts from an Article in the
Economic Times dated 12.11.2013)
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Giving the Babu a spine

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By asking that braces and struts be provided from all sides, will the Supreme Court be able to buttress the civil service spine so that it stands straight instead of bending over backwards, forward and sideways? Somehow, I doubt it. First, it is not certain that governments will do what the court has ordered. If the legislation asked for is not passed in three months, whom will the court haul up? The chief minister, or the speaker? That could provoke a constitutional crisis.

Second, some of what the court suggests as safeguards are already available to civil servants but have been used rarely. For instance, an officer can record oral instructions and send them to the minister for confirmation. One reason why this does not get done must be the threat of instant transfer to the boondocks, but an equally valid one is that officers have their own agendas and get into patron-client relationships with politicians fairly early in their careers. In a quid pro quo situation, no one is going to ask for written instructions. Third, the court assumes that officials would want a civil service board to decide on postings; this is far from clear, because one of the principal reasons why officials kowtow to ministers is the desire for preferred postings (or out-of-turn house allotments, or junkets). In short, the assumption that politicians are sharks preying upon helpless civil servants is a piece of fiction.

Fourth, no system can prevent a chief minister from choosing his own secretary as well as the chief secretary of the state. Between them, these two gentlemen pretty much have a clear field ahead of them – as the experience with the harassment of two IAS officers in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana should testify. Nor is it a good principle to adopt that all civil servants should have fixed tenures. It is worth following in situations like the one faced by A Raja as telecom minister; when his secretary refused to play ball, he simply got a more pliable man to replace him (with the Cabinet secretary/prime minister acquiescing). But equally, remember that Manmohan Singh as finance minister replaced his finance secretary and chief economic adviser, and put together a cohesive team. Is that flexibility to be always denied to a minister? Imagine a corrupt tax officer who has wangled a lucrative posting and who cannot then be touched for three years.

One must also ask: is the new facility of medical treatment overseas for IAS and IPS officials something that ministers thrust at reluctant officials? Is the utterly wasteful use of land in New Delhi’s New Moti Bagh for fresh government housing a ministerial or bureaucratic boondoggle? Bureaucrats have their private agendas just as ministers do and, let’s face it, a large number are as corrupt as any politician.

This is not to quarrel that the thrust of the court’s reform instinct should be disregarded. Rather, the room for flexibility and judgement should not be done away with, in the search for bulwarks against systemic abuse. Also, while it is necessary to stay the hand of politicians, so is it important to reform the bureaucracy. Hence, rule out mass transfers, not specific cases. Rule out more than one transfer in two or three years, so that there is no harassment. Professionalise the administration by reducing the scope for generalists to stray onto specialist turf, and introduce large-scale mid-level entry on contract. Have staggered retirement ages, as in the army – those who don’t make it to the next level in time are retired. Raise salaries, and fix them as a percentage of private sector pay at equivalent levels (as corruption-free Singapore does), but make government officials live as and among ordinary citizens, not as privileged rulers in special government enclaves.

Source: Weekend Ruminations by T.N. Ninan in Business Standard dated 02.11.2013)

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New global trade pacts may cut out India, China

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A new global trading system is being erected, almost unnoticed in India. One of its unstated aims is to check China’s rise through economic  discrimination. But it could end up discriminatingagainst India too.

Two major new international trade pacts are under negotiation. One is the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), creating a free trade area (FTA) of North America and East Asia (including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam and some others). For the first time, a once-protectionist Japan plans to join the US in a region of free trade and investment. The unstated but clear Japanese signal is that China must be checked. For this, it is willing to consider dismantling its traditional trade and investment barriers.

The second big FTA under negotiation is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), covering the US and the European Union. Historically, Europe has felt threatened by US multinationals, technology, and farm produce. The European Common Market came up with a common external tariff, aimed at binding together European members and standing up to competition from the US. But Europe’s recent economic stagnation, plus the rising threat from China, has concentrated minds wonderfully. Europe is now ready to consider a grand bargain with the US, mutually opening up investment, trade and services.

Earlier, the three economic giants — the US, Europe and Japan — saw one another as global rivals. Each sought to conclude FTAs with neighbours and selected developing countries, creating trade blocks within which each had tariff advanges tages. Now, for the first time, the three big players are seeking FTAs with one another.

What has changed? The rise of China, of course. Now, officials in Washington DC, Brussels and Tokyo will deny heatedly that either the TPP or TTIP is aimed against China. They will claim to be  merely carrying forward the logic of globalisationand global integration, a trend that has steadily deepened since World War II. But the strategic anti-China aim is clear.

Thus the world has shifted from multilateral deals (where all members agree to common conditions) to FTAs (where small groups extend mutual preferences, cutting out outsiders). India too has tried cutting deals with neighbours, but with few clear benefits, and some disadvantages. India has held preliminary talks on FTAs with the European Union and US, but these have run into serious headwinds.

Why? India is a more reluctant globaliser than trade rivals. In WTO, India always opposed free capital flows, free foreign bidding for Indian government contracts, untrammelled investment rights for foreign investors, liberal patent laws and lowered protection for agriculture. It is reluctant to give way on these issues in FTAs with the US or Europe.

But rival developing countries with fewer inhibitions have entered into dozens of FTAs with such conditions. This has given them a trade edge over India, one reason why Indian exports have risen so slowly over the last three years despite massive currency depreciation.

The richest countries are now moving to create giant economic agreements of their own. These, along with existing FTAs, will cover most international trade. This will cut out China. It may also cut out India, seriously disadvantaging it.

(Source : The Times of India dated 10.11.2013)

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List of Companies and Directors under Prosecution

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The Ministry of Company Affairs has put up the list of Companies and Directors against which prosecution has been initiated on its portal.

The search can be through the name of the Company/ Company Identification No (CIN) or through the Name of Director/Director Identification No. (DIN). The Details of the Court Name, Violation of Sections, Dates of Hearing, Fine details and the Final Verdict are listed therein.

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Clarification with regard to applicability of provision of section 372A of Companies Act 1956

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The Ministry of Company Affairs has issued a General Circular No 18/2013 dated 19-11-2013 clarifying that section 372A of the Companies Act 1956, pertaining to intercompany loans shall remain in force till section 186 of the Companies Act 2013 is notified.
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Exemption of section 182(1) to Companies incorporated as Electoral Trusts

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Vide Notification dated 7th November 2013, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has directed that Companies incorporated with the name containing “Electoral Trusts” and approved in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Electoral Trusts Scheme 2013, notified vide S O. 309 (E) dated 31st January 2013 and for which license was granted u/s. 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 shall be exempt from the provisions of section 293 A (1) (b) and (2) which has since been replaced by the provisions u/s. 182 (1) of the Companies Act 2013 now in force.
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Relaxation of last date and additional fee in filing of e-Form 23C for Appointment of Cost Auditor.

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Vide General Circular No. 17/2013, dated 1st November 2013 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has further relaxed the last date of filing the e-Form 23 C for Appointment of Cost Auditor to 30th November, 2013 or within 30 days of the commencement of the Company’s financial year to which the appointment relates, whichever is later. Earlier the time limit was extended to 31st October 2013.
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 74 dated 11th November, 2013

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Foreign investment in India – participation by SEBI registered FIIs, QFIs and SEBI registered long term investors in credit enhanced bonds

This circular permits SEBI registered Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs), Qualified Foreign Investors (QFI) and long term investors – Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF), Multilateral Agencies, Pension/Insurance/ Endowment Funds, foreign Central Banks – to invest in the credit enhanced bonds, as per paragraph 3 and 4 of A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 120 dated 26th June, 2013, upto a limit of $5 billion within the overall limit of $51 billion earmarked for corporate debt.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 73 dated 11th November, 2013

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Import of Gold by Nominated Banks/Agencies/ Entities

This circular clarifies the following:

1. Any authorisation such as Advance Authorization (AA)/Duty Free Import Authorization (DFIA) have to be utilised for import of gold meant for export purposes only and no diversion for domestic use will be permitted. However, for any AA/DFIA issued prior to 14th August, 2013 the condition of sequencing the imports prior to exports will not be insisted upon.

2. Entities/units in the SEZ and EOU, Premier and Star Trading Houses (irrespective of whether they are nominated agencies or not) can import gold exclusively for the purpose of exports only.

3. Exports towards fulfillment of obligation under AA/DFIA scheme will not qualify as export for the purpose of the scheme of 20:80.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 72 dated 11th November, 2013

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Foreign Direct Investment in Financial Sector –Transfer of Shares

Presently, a No Objection Certificate (NOC) is required from the respective financial sector regulator/ regulators of the investee company (if it is in the financial services sector) as well as transferor and transferee entities at the time of transfer of shares from Residents to Non-Residents. The NOC is to be filed along with Form FC-TRS with the bank.

This circular has done away with the requirement of obtaining NOC. As a result, no NOC needs to be filed along with Form FC-TRS. However, any ‘fit and proper/due diligence’ requirement as regards the non-resident investor as stipulated by the respective financial sector regulator will have to be complied with.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 71 dated 8th November, 2013 Advance Category – I Authorised Dealer Banks

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Presently, advance remittance for import of rough diamonds into India can be made to nine mining companies without any limit and without Bank Guarantee or Standby Letter of Credit, by an importer (other than Public Sector Company or Department/ Undertaking of the Government of India/State Governments), subject to certain conditions.

This circular states that the names of two of the said nine companies have been changed as under:

i. De Beers UK Ltd to De Beers Global Sightholder Sales Proprietary Ltd.

ii. BHP Billiton, Belgium to Dominion Diamond Marketing.

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2013-TIOL-1516-CESTAT-DEL M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi & Commissioner vs. Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.

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Where it was already established that extended period was applicable on account of suppression of facts, there cannot be any reasonable failure for payment of service tax—section 80 cannot be invoked and thus penalty u/s. 78 was upheld.


Facts:

The Appellant was engaged in management of cars/ scooter parking facilities at an airport under the license obtained from the airports authority on which the department confirmed the tax under “Airport Services”. The commissioner upheld the liability but dropped the penalties u/s.s 76, 77 and 78. It was contended that the demand was time-barred for the reason that the Airports Authority of India (AAI) did not authorise them to collect service tax until 01-03-2006 and as they were working on behalf of AAI, they were not a service provider. The revenuein its appeal contended that the order of the Commissioner was bad in law inasmuch as even after finding that the appellant collected service tax for the period 10-09-2004 till 31-03-2006, there was suppression of facts and demanded tax for the longer period. Therefore the penalties u/s.s 76, 77 and 78  were dropped wrongly by granting the benefit of section 80.

Held:

Perusing the Commissioner’s order, the Hon. Tribunal, rejecting the appellant’s appeal, observed that since the Commissioner upheld extended period and confirmed the whole of the demand affirming suppression of facts by the assessee, penalty u/s. 78 was leviable.

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Appeal against revision order under BST Act, 1959 — Maintainable — M.S.T. Tribunal

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VAT

A big controversy had arisen about maintainability of appeal
against revision order u/s.55 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959.

S. 55 of the BST Act, which contains provisions about
appeals, reads as under :

“(1) An appeal, from every original order, not being an
order mentioned in S. 56 passed under this Act or the rules made thereunder,
shall lie :

(a) if the order is made by the Sales Tax Officer, or any
other officer subordinate thereto, to the Assistant Commissioner;

(b) if the order is made by an Assistant Commissioner, to
the Commissioner;”

The revision order is passed by a superior authority u/s.57
of the BST Act, 1959. The said revision power is in the nature of supervision
power and the superior authority is entitled to call for records of order passed
by his subordinate authority and then to pass revision order as he may think
just and proper. Since commencement of the BST Act, 1959, such revision orders
were considered to be original orders for the purposes of S. 55 and appeal was
used to be maintained against the same, without any dispute.

However on 6-6-2006, the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench,
passed judgment in the case of Shiv Shyam Sales Enterprise. The said judgment
was in writ petition filed by the petitioner against the revision order passed
in his case. The argument of the Department was that the writ petition is not
maintainable as there is alternative remedy by way of appeal against the
revision order as per S. 55 of the BST Act, 1959. The High Court rejected this
prayer by making observations in para 6 as under :

“6. Perusal of S. 55 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act reveals
that it provides remedy of appeal from every original order. The orders
impugned in the present petition by the petitioner are passed in exercise of
revisional jurisdiction u/s.57 of the said Act, and therefore are not the
Original orders. It is therefore apparent that remedy of filing an appeal
u/s.55 is not available to the present petitioner. In such circumstances the
argument of alternative remedy holds no water. In any case the point as sought
to be raised ought to have been taken at the time of initial hearing when the
writ petition was entertained in the year 1989. In view of the law settled on
the point, such an argument cannot be allowed to be raised at the stage of
final hearing after expiry of long period. We therefore, find no merits in the
preliminary objection raised by the respondents.”

Based on the above observations, the authorities at the Sales
Tax Department felt that no appeal is maintainable against the revision order.
Thus, all the appeals against revision orders are kept pending by the Department
appellate authorities as well as by the Tribunal. The dealer community expected
that the Government would amend the law suitably on its own to mitigate the
hardships to dealers due to the above judgment. However, finding that no such
amendment is forthcoming, the matter was argued on the point of maintainability
before the Tribunal. The M.S.T. Tribunal has now decided this issue vide its
judgment in the case of Schenectady Beck (India) Ltd. (A. No. 98 & 99 of 2007)
and Others, dated 6-11-2009.

The Tribunal considered the issue from various angles.
Tribunal referred to the background of appeal provisions. The Tribunal also
referred to various judicial pronouncements about the binding nature of judgment
of jurisdictional Court as well as cases of mere observations, without binding
nature.

In particular, the Tribunal referred to judgments of the
Bombay High Court in cases of Swastik Oil Mills v. Mr. H. B. Munshi, (21
STC 383) and Mr. H. B. Munshi v. The Oriental Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd.
(34 STC 113), wherein it is observed that the revision is fresh proceedings and
this judgment is confirmed by the Hon. Supreme Court as reported in 21 STC 394.
The Department tried to counter the situation relying upon the above
observations by the Bombay High Court in para 6 (reproduce above) and further
emphasised that the judgment being of the Bombay High Court cannot be brushed
aside, but has to be followed.

The Tribunal, however, after elaborate discussion and giving
sound reasoning, held that the above judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shiv
Shyam Sales Enterprise does not decide anything contrary to settled scheme of
the BST Act. The Tribunal summed up its observations in para 32, as under :

“32. To sum up, the two-line observation in the case of
M/s. Shiv Shyam Sales Enterprises (supra), which has given rise to the
present dispute is made without being apprised of the well-settled legal
position as laid down by the past judicial authorities including the Hon’ble
Bombay High Court’s judgments in the cases like M/s. Swastik Oil Mills (supra).
In these circumstances, we respectfully prefer to be bound by these past
authorities rather than by the said two-line observation in the case of M/s.
Shiv Shyam Sales Enterprises (supra). We have also traced the origin of
the words ‘original orders’ in S. 55(1). The origin thereof is found in the
departure on 1-1-1960 from a ‘single appeal’ as obtaining in the 1953 Act to
‘two appeals’ as introduced in the Bombay Act. While providing the ‘two
appeals’ the Legislature has described all the orders other than the appeal
orders to be ‘original orders’ and has provided appeals thereagainst
u/s.55(1), if they are not specified as ‘non-appealable orders’ in S. 56. The
suo motu revision orders u/s.57 are neither specified in the list of
non-appealable order u/s.56, nor are they orders passed in appeals. In view of
this position, the revision orders are ‘original orders’ for the purposes of
S. 55 and hence appeals thereagainst lie u/s. 55(1).”

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the revision in the
original order for S. 55 and appeal is maintainable against the same
. The
judgment has given a much required relief to dealers/litigants in Maharashtra
and will go a long way to preserve one of the fundamental rights of dealer.

[Schenectady Beck (India) Ltd. (S.A. No. 98 & 99 of
2007) & Others, dated 6-11-2009]


Date of effect for registration in case of Amalgamation of Companies :

An interesting issue arose before the Bombay High Court in relation to the date of effect of registration. The facts are that transferor company amalgamated with transferee company vide an order of the Bombay High Court, dated 24-7-2003, under the Companies Act, 1956, in which the scheme of amalgamation was approved. As per the amalgamation scheme, the amalgamation was to be effective from 1-4-2002. The transferee company was not registered under BST Act, 1959, hence, applied for new registration on 19-8-2003. The transferee company requested to grant Registration Certificate effective from 1-4-2002. However, the registration authority considered the change in the Constitution from 1-4-2002 and finding that there is delay in making application (in case of change in the Constitution the application for new registration is required to be made within sixty days), granted R’C. effective from 19-8-2003 i.e., the date of application. The mean period from 1-4-2002 to 18-8-2003 became unregistered period. The prayer of the petitioner to grant administrative relief for giving retrospective effect to R. C. from 1-4-2002 was also rejected.

Hence the writ petition was filed in the Bombay High Court, The High Court analysed the situation and amongst others, observed that in case of retrspective effect to amalgamation, the party cannot be expected to apply within sixty days from such retrospective date. The 60 days’ time should be considered from the date of order of amalgamation by the High Court and if so applied within 60 days, then the registration should be granted from the effective date of amalgamation i.e., in this case from 1-4-2002. The High Court observed as under about this aspect :

“12. It is in these circumstances that this Court must consider the date for the purpose of moving an application and the starting point of limitation under Rule 7(1)(a-1). As earlier noted insofar as amalgamating company Floatglass India Limited, is concerned, considering the provisions, its certificate of registration was cancelled from 1-4-2002. In other words, M/s. Floatglass India Limited ceases to be company from that date and that must be the date to give effect to S. 19(6) and Rule 7(1)(a-1). There is therefore, an omission on account of the failure by the delegates to provide a corresponding rule to Rule 7(1)(a-1). In the absence of the Legislature providing and taking note of the fact that in such cases, the amalgamating company is not at fault, it will have to be construed that the time for making an application for registration will be 60 days from the date of the Court passing the order. On such application being made, the certificate of registration will have to be made effective from the anterior date given by the Company Court. This is only a procedural requirement. This would avoid hardship and give true effect to the mandate of the Legislature both under the BST and CST Act. No order of a Court should visit a party with liabilities and or undesirable conse-quences in the matter of tax. The rule must be so read to give effect to the legislative mandate. The date for applying for registration u/s.19(6) for a company, can only be the date of the Company Court’s order. If within 60 days of such order an application is made, then the expression succession to business in Rule 7(1)(1a)will also be so read. Under Rule 8(8)(a)(iii) then it will be the date the Company Court has ordered or the date provided in the scheme which will be the date of succession to business. This would obviate any difficulty to a party till such time the delegate makes a specific provision in Rule 8.”

[Asahi India Glass Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (25 VST 31)(Bom.)]

Recent amendments to MVAT Rules

External Confirmations – Proving Existence with External Evidence?

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Audit evidence is considered to be more reliable when obtained in a documented form directly by the auditor from sources independent of the entity being audited. The higher the auditors’ assessment of risk of material misstatement (including risk of fraud or error), the greater would be the need to obtain persuasive evidence to address those risks. Unless, there exists reasons to conclude otherwise, the auditor would usually place a higher reliance on evidence obtained directly from third parties or corroborating evidence obtained from independent sources. SA 505 provides guidance on the auditor’s use of external confirmation procedures to obtain audit evidence.

‘External confirmations’ is a process of obtaining audit evidence through direct written communication from a third party in response to a request for information about a particular financial item in the financial statements. For certain financial captions, circularising and obtaining independent external confirmations, is one of the most reliable substantive audit procedures, to assist auditors to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to validate the assertion of ‘existence’. Robust confirmation procedures can also serve as an effective tool to respond to fraud risks.

Confirmation requests are generally of two types:

a. Positive confirmation request—through this request, the confirming party responds directly to the auditor indicating whether the party agrees or disagrees with the information requested, or providing the requested information.

b. Negative confirmation request—the confirming party responds directly to the auditor only if the confirming party disagrees with the information provided in the request.

Usually, negative confirmations are used where there are a large number of small balances and the risk of material misstatement is assessed as low. A good example where negative confirmation can be used is for confirming vendor registration status under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act, 2006). Negative confirmation requests may be sent to vendors requesting them to confirm within a stipulated time, whether they are registered enterprises under the MSMED Act, 2006, failing which these would be considered as ‘nonregistered’ enterprises. Where detection risk is high, or the materiality of the account balance is high, positive confirmation will be needed to provide substantive evidence.

In common parlance, external confirmations are understood to be restricted to only bank balances, accounts receivables and payables. External confirmations could also be circularised for investments, borrowings, related party transactions, inventory in custody of third parties, loans and advances, property title deeds mortgaged, guarantees, contingent items, litigation and claims or items that are significant or outside the normal course of business.

External confirmations may also be used to confirm terms of agreements, contracts, or transactions between an entity and other parties or the absence thereof. For example, a request for confirmation of bank balances could also include the bank to confirm whether there exists any other exposure in respect of any other facilities availed by the enterprise. These could be in the nature of letters of credit, derivative contracts, forward contracts outstanding, bank guarantees provided, etc. All these could have implications for accounting and/or disclosures in the financial statements.

Generally, enterprises from whom external confirmation is sought are likely to be independent, ensuring that the evidence is reliable. However, the auditor needs to exercise greater professional scepticism and diligence in cases of related parties or where the confirming party might be economically dependent on the entity.

General reluctance to confirm is more likely due to misunderstanding of the purpose of the request. Debtors may misinterpret the confirmation as a demand for payment. Other parties may fear that confirmation might be binding if they should subsequently discover an error in their own records. Some respondents disclaim responsibility should their response be in error. This is usually the case with bank confirmations. However, this does not necessarily compromise the reliability of the confirmation. It is also pertinent to note that confirming parties may be more likely to respond indicating their disagreement with a confirmation request when the information in the request is not in their favour, and less likely to respond otherwise.

It is interesting to note that SA 505 provides guidance on audit procedures to be followed where an enterprise uses a third party to co-ordinate and provide responses to confirmation requests. Though not prevalent in India, this is a practice widely used in the US. In fact, certain financial institutions including banks in the US have taken the position not to respond to confirmation requests that are mailed or faxed, but accept audit confirmation requests sent only through Capital Confirmation, Inc. (CCI or Confirmation.com), a third party service provider which provides secure electronic confirmation services for auditors and their shared clients. The auditor in such cases would need to consider controls over the information sent by the entity to the service provider, the controls applied on processing of the data and controls over preparation and sending of the confirmation response to the auditor.

Let us now examine the practical application of SA 505 with a case study.

Case Study

ABC Limited is in the business of manufacturing and selling of chemical products. Sales are made to various dealers across the country. The usual credit period is 90 days. The sales for the year ended 31st March 20X0 aggregated Rs. 200 crore and debtors as at 31st March 20X0 amounted to Rs. 75 crore. The debtors listing comprised 350 customers. The management does not follow the practice of obtaining balance confirmations from its debtors.

The auditors of ABC are M/s. PQR & Co (PQR).Roger Smith, Assistant Manager with PQR, was the audit in-charge posted at ABC for the yearend audit. Roger selected 30 high value debtors having debit balances aggregating to Rs. 25 crore for circularisation. In respect of one customer – Genuine Chemicals Limited (GCL), from whom the outstanding was Rs. 10 crore (a material amount outstanding beyond the due date), the management refused to allow Roger to send the confirmation request as the management represented that currently there were ongoing negotiations with GCL, the resolution of which would get impacted by an untimely confirmation request. The mailing addresses for 27 parties were obtained by Roger from ABC’s sales account manager. Since the audit was currently under progress and Roger was posted at ABC’s office premises, Roger decided to courier the physical letters through the courier agency whose services were usually availed by ABC. The proof of dispatch (POD) had to be retained by the dispatch section of ABC as supporting evidence for payment of courier charges billed by the agency. The sales manager informed Roger that in respect of the remaining 2 parties, the business operations had moved to a new location and the new mailing address was not available. Hence for these parties, he requested that e-mails be sent by Roger for balance confirmation which were sent accordingly. For both the physical and the e-mail confirmation requests, the confirmation format used was as prescribed in PQR’s audit documentation standard. Further, return self-addressed envelopes were also enclosed with the physical confirmations couriered. Roger maintained a photocopy of all the confirmation requests circularised.

The debtors ledger for the year ended 31st March 20X0 was finalised by 10th April 20X0 and confirmations were sent by Roger on 15th April 20X0. The accounts were to be cleared by 5th May 20X0 as the board meeting to approve the accounts was scheduled for 10th May 20X0.

Responses were received from only 6 debtors (out of 29 circularised) as per details below.

On enquiry with the sales account manager, Roger was explained that even in the past when balances were circularised, the response received was abysmal. The customer pattern of ABC comprised a large pool of customers with small value balances. As such, the circularisation was not done with adequate rigour. Further, given the short time period between the date of circularisation and the date of accounts finalisation, the sales account manager informed that it was quite likely that some responses could be received post audit closure. For customers from whom no response was received, Roger verified subsequent payments, to the extent these were received until the date of audit. For customers from whom responses were received, Roger compared the confirmations received with the photocopies that he had retained in his file. He believed that the confirmations were in order. In respect of amount due to Genuine Chemicals Limited, Roger felt that given the sensitivity surrounding the pending negotiations, it would be appropriate not to send a confirmation request. Roger concluded on the work paper file that adequate work was done to comply with the requirements of SA505. Was Roger right in his conclusion?
 

Case Study analysis with the requirements of SA 505.

Design and dispatch of confirmation requests
•    There was no management’s authorisation or encouragement to the customers selected for confirmation to respond to PQR’s request. Response rate to confirmation requests sent by auditors, particularly in case of debtors, is to a large extent driven by management’s intent and the degree of follow-up.

•    Only high value positive balances were selected for circularisation. Roger should have built in an element of unpredictability by selecting even credit balances, if any, in the sample. Further, some debtors with low value amounts could also have been selected.

•    For circularising balance confirmation in respect of Genuine Chemicals Limited, the management’s refusal to send a confirmation request should have been a trigger to evaluate its implication on the assessment of risk of material misstatement, including risk of fraud and whether such a refusal results in a scope limitation. Roger should have corroborated the explanations provided by the management by examining correspondence, if any, that ABC had with the customer evidencing the impending negotiations. He should have by enquiry or by performing procedures such as verifying lawyers’ confirmations/invoices deduced whether any legal case was filed against Genuine Chemicals. Further, given that the amount was material and outstanding beyond the due date, the auditor should have determined the implication of the non-recovery on the financial statements as well as on the audit opinion. This would also need to be communicated to those charged with governance at ABC.

•    SA 505 requires the auditor to determine that the requests are properly addressed including testing the validity of some or all of the addresses on confirmation requests before these are sent out. Roger merely took the addresses as furnished by the sales account manager and did not perform procedures to verify the authenticity of the addresses provided.

•    It is pertinent to note that for administrative convenience, the courier agency usually employed by ABC was used by the auditor. SA 505 stipulates that the auditor needs to maintain control over confirmation requests sent. Use of client courier may preclude maintenance of independence and control over requests sent. Where the requests are sent under the control of the auditor, he is better positioned to track the status of deliveries. As the client courier was used, proof of dispatches and deliveries was not maintained as evidence of circularisation. Reputed courier enterprises provide an online-tracking status of confirmations couriered together with delivery status. Roger should have also enquired into the status of delivery of confirmations couriered and whether there were any undelivered returns.

•    The general practice is to circularise confirmations for year-end or quarter-end balances, but given the short period of time available post year-end for audit closure, Roger could have considered circularising confirmations for balances as at 28th February 20X0 in the month of March 20X0 and then performing roll-forward procedures performed from 28th February 20X0 until 31st March 20X0.

•    SA 505 mandates the auditor to send out additional confirmation request where a reply to the previous request has not been received. There were no second/third reminders sent by Roger in the instant case.

Results of External Confirmation procedures

Roger compared the original responses received with the photocopies of the confirmations that he had retained in the file to ensure that there were no alterations made to the confirmations sent originally. This was a good verification procedure followed for testing the authenticity of responses.

Now, let us evaluate whether the response received for each of the six confirmation requests were in order.

1    Universal Chemicals

The confirmation had an exception being the difference of Rs. 3 lakh in the amount confirmed. Roger did not merely rely on the explanation provided by the sales account manager that the difference was on account of delay in accounting by Universal Chemicals. He rightly performed additional procedures to corroborate the same. He obtained confirmation over a telephonic call and further backed it up with a reconciliation explaining the difference from the customer. He also tested year-end sales to Universal Chemicals for further corroborative support.

2    Cosmos Traders

The very fact that the revised confirmation did not have any difference as against a difference of Rs. 32 lakh (in the original confirmation) should have lead Roger to use more professional scepticism and consider performing additional work like testing the transactions with Cosmos and understanding the reasons for the difference and how the same was reconciled.

3    Jupiter Chemicals

The confirmation provided was signed by the purchase executive of Jupiter. Roger should have evaluated whether reliance should be placed on the person authorising the confirmation, the purchase executive in this case. Usually depending on the size and set -up of an enterprise, one would expect accounts staff with appropriate authority to authorise the confirmation. Further, the confirmation was delivered at ABC’s address as against PQR’s office. The auditor should have insisted that the confirming party send the confirmation directly to him duly authorised by a person responsible to do so.


4    Neptune Chemicals

The confirmation was provided by Neptune Dye-Stuff, a Neptune Chemicals affiliate, i.e., not by the original intended confirming party. Such a confir-mation should have raised doubts over reliability of the response received. Further, this would also have implications on the auditor’s assessment of risk of material misstatement (including fraud risk) requiring Roger to modify the nature, timing and extent of other planned audit procedures.

5    Star Traders

This response was received electronically through an Internet email account and has a risk of reliability because proof of origin and authority of the respondent may be difficult to establish, and alterations may be difficult to detect. In this case, the confirmation was sent from an Internet e-mail account and not from the own domain of the confirming party. In such instances, it would be difficult to validate/corroborate the identity of the sender. In case of e-mail confirmations, the auditor needs to consider whether the mail was encrypted, signed electronically using digital signatures, and apply procedures to verify website authenticity. The auditor may also telephone the confirming party to determine whether the confirming party did, in fact, send the response.

6    Mars Chemitech Private Limited

Given the fact that MCPL has been making losses, Roger should have applied greater professional scepticism in evaluating MCPL’s ability to pay the debtor balance due rather than mere reliance on the confirmation provided by it directly.

Roger should have performed adequate alternate audit procedures to mitigate the risk of low response. Fewer responses to confirmation requests than anticipated may indicate a previously unidentified fraud risk factor that requires evaluation in accordance with SA 240.

Concluding remarks

One of the prominent reasons for genesis of frauds which corporate India has witnessed is the ineffectiveness in implementation of external confirmation procedures.

Obtaining external confirmations is a basic audit procedure which has been in audit theory for years but has not been practiced with the rigor that it deserves. To a large extent, the success of these procedures is driven by management’s rigour and follow -up with the confirming party to respond to the auditor which brings back the question of management’s intention to reflect a true and fair position of the enterprise’s affairs. SA 505 sets out the procedures that need to be performed for external confirmations to be an effective audit procedure which auditors should bear in mind while discharging their duties.

Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia): A. Y. 2008-09: Amendment of section 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2010 is retrospective and is applicable for the A. Y. 2008-09 also:

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CIT vs. Naresh Kumar; 262 CTR 389 (Del):

In respect of the A. Y. 2008-09, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim that no disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) should be made in view of the amendment of section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010.

In appeal, the Revenue contended that the amendment is w.e.f 01-04-2010 and is not
retrospective, and accordingly, the amendment is not applicable for the A. Y. 2008-09. The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was justified in holding that the amendment made to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 should be given retrospective effect and applicable to A. Y. 2008-09 in question”

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Business expenditure: Bonus: Section 36(1) (ii): A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07: Bonus paid to director as per Board resolution: Directors rendering valuable services to company: Bonus not related to shareholding: Bonus deductible:

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CIT vs. Career Launcher India Ltd.; 358 ITR 179(Del):

For the A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the bonus paid to the directors on the ground that it would have been payable to the directors as dividend had it not been paid as bonus. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition. On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It was not disputed regarding bonus (a) that payment was supported by board resolutions, and (b) that none of the directors would have received a lesser amount of dividend than the bonus paid to them, having regard to their shareholding.

ii) Further, the directors were full-time employees of the company receiving salary. They were all graduates from IIM, Bangalore. Taking all these facts into consideration, the bonus was a reward for their work, in addition to the salary paid to them and was in no way related to their shareholding. It was deductible u/s. 36(1)(ii).”

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Assessment: Limitation: Section 158BC: Block Period ending on 14-09-2002: Exclusion of period during which assessment stayed by Court: Limitation resumes on date of vacation of stay and not from date of receipt of order by Department: Assessment barred by limitation:

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CIT vs. Drs. X-Ray and Pathology Institute Pvt. Ltd.;358 ITR 27(All)

On 14-09-2002, search was conducted at the assessee’s premises and a notice u/s. 158BC was issued on 29-04-2003. The assessee filed the return on 16-06-2003. The assessee filed writ petition and challenged the validity of search. By order dated 12-02-2004, the High Court stayed the assessment proceedings. The stay was vacated on 26-08-2009 and the copy of the order was received by the Assessing Officer on 09-11-2009. The Assessing Officer passed the assessment order on 22-06-2010. The Tribunal held that the limitation resumes on the date of vacation of the stay and accordingly the assessment was barred by limitation.

In appeal, the Revenue contended that the limitation resumes from the date of receipt of the order by the Department i.e. 09-11-2009 and accordingly the assessment was within the limitation period. The Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The provisions of the Act for filing of the appeal from the date of service of the order would not be attracted to calculate the period of limitation to complete the assessment. This was not a case of a particular act to be performed, but the arrest of the limitation by an interim order passed by the High Court.

ii) As soon as the order was vacated, the limitation would restart and exhaust itself on the period of limitation provided under the Act. The assessment was clearly barred by limitation.”

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Reassessment – Reason to believe that income had escaped assessment – The subsequent reversal of the legal position by the judgment of the Supreme Court does not authorise the Department to reopen the assessment [beyond a period of four years in a case where original assessment is made u/s. 143(3)], which stood closed on the basis of law, as it stood at the relevant time.

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DCIT vs. Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 129 (SC)

The Respondent-assessee was engaged in the business of civil construction works on contract basis and had claimed deduction u/s. 32A, 32AB, 80HH and 80HHB as under:

n the original orders of assessment for the said assessment years reliefs, inter-alia, u/s. 32A as claimed, were allowed in full for the assessment years up to 1989-90 and u/s. 32AB for the assessment year 1988-89 and 1989-90. The Respondent-assessee’s claim for relief u/s. 80HH and 80HHB was also allowed in the assessment order for assessment year 1984-85 but the claim for reliefs u/s. 80HHB for the assessment year 1985-86, 1987-88, 1988-99 and 1989-90 was not allowed in the assessments but the same were allowed in appeals by the appellate authority.

Later     on,     6     notices     all     dated     29th     July,     1994    were issued by the Petitioner u/s. 148 for reopening the assessments u/s. 147 for the assessment years 1984-85 to 1989-90, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in N.C. Budharaja and Co. (1993) 204 ITR 412, where the Supreme Court had held that an “article or “things” used in section 32A, 32AB and 80HH refers only to a movable asset and the words “manufacture or construction of an article” cannot be extended to construction of road,   building, dam or bridge, etc. and  Respondent-assessee was therefore not entitled to deduction u/s. 32A, 32AB or 80HH.

The     Respondent-assessee     filed     a    writ     petition     before the Calcutta High Court challenging all the six   notices     issued    u/s.     148.     The     single    bench    of     Judge of the Calcutta High Court (255 ITR 49) dismissed the    writ    petitions    holding    that    the    Assessing    Officer    had prima facie reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. On appeal, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (262 ITR 605) allowed the appeal of the Respondent-assessee. The Division Bench noted that the assessee had claimed benefit u/s. 32A/32AB and section 80HH/80HHB for the relevant assessment years. The Assessing     Officer     had     allowed     the     benefit     under     those    sections, having regard to the law as it stood then governing these provisions.  But there was divergence of opinion in the decision of the various High Courts.  Those benefits would be available only to an industrial undertaking. The assessee had claimed itself to be an industrial undertaking. But this question when came to be considered by the apex court in N.C. Budharaja and Co.’s case (supra), it held that the nature of business as were carried on by Respondent-assessee was not that of an industrial undertaking. The Division Bench held that this decision was rendered in September, 1993. Therefore, admittedly, this was the information on the basis reopening was permissible u/s. 147 but subject to  proviso thereunder. Admittedly, there was no allegation that amounts now sought to be made taxable were not disclosed and therefore it could not be said that there was any omission or failure to disclose fully and truly the materials necessary for assessment. The Petitioner had proposed to reopen the assessment only on the basis of the information derived by it from the decision in N.C. Budharaja’s case and as such the question of four years embargo would not be overcome by the Petitioner.

  On appeal to the Supreme Court by the Petitioner, the Supreme Court held that there was no error in the observation made by the Division Bench of the High Court that once limitation period of 4 years provided in section 149/149(1A) expires then the question of reopening by the Department does not arise. The Supreme Court further held that in any event, at the relevant time, when the assessment order got completed, the law as declared by the jurisdictional High Court, was that the civil construction work carried out by the Respondent-assessee would be entitled to the benefit of   section 80HH which was later reversed in the case of  CIT vs. N.C. Budharaja and Co. The subsequent reversal of the legal position by the judgement of the Supreme Court does not authorise the Department to reopen the assessment, which stood closed on the basis of the law, as it stood at the relevant time. The Supreme Court dismissed civil appeals accordingly.

Appeal to High Court – Substantial Questions of Law framed for consideration by court – The High Court’s power to frame substantial question(s) of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal has been admitted remains u/s. 260A(4) but this power is subject, however, to two conditions, (one) the court must be satisfied that appeal involves such questions, and (two) the court has to record reasons therefor

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CIT vs. Mastek Ltd. [2013] 358 ITR 252 (SC)

The appeal filed by the Revenue u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the “Act”) had been admitted by the High Court and following two substantial questions of law were framed for consideration of the appeal;

“(A) Whether the Appellate Tribunal has substantially erred in law and on facts in reversing the order passed by the Assessing Officer and thereby deleting the adjustment while computation of the arm’s length price of the international transactions of software services distributed by MUK (Associated Enterprise) by making an upward adjustment of Rs. 18,62,45,100?

(B) Whether the Appellate Tribunal has substantially erred in law and on facts in reversing the order passed by the Assessing Officer and thereby deleting the adjustment by way of human resource management services of Rs. 2,92,22,683 treating the same as an international transaction?”

The grievance of the Revenue before the Supreme Court was that by necessary implication, the other questions raised in the memo of appeal before the High Court stood rejected.

The Supreme Court observed that the Revenue was under some misconception. The Supreme Court noted that proviso following the main provision of section 260A(4) of the Act states that nothing stated in s/s. (4), i.e., “The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated” shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.

According to the Supreme Court, the High Court’s power to frame substantial question(s) of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal has been admitted remained u/s. 260A(4). This power was subject, however, to two conditions, (one) the court must be satisfied that appeal involves such questions, and (two) the court has to record reasons therefor.

In view of the above legal position, according to the Supreme Court, there was no justifiable reason to entertain the special leave petition.

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Writ – When an alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party it must exhaust the same before approaching the writ court—order of High Court quashing the notices issued u/s. 153C as being without jurisdiction set aside by the Supreme Court.

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CIT vs. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani [2013] 357 ITR 713 (SC)

The respondent-assessee purchased a plot of land from “Samutkarsh Co-operative Housing Society” (for short “the society”) being developed by one Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. In 2008, a search was conducted u/s. 132 of the Act, 1961, in the premises of the society and also at the office of Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. During the search certain documents were seized. Upon scrutiny, it was found that the seized documents reflected names of certain individuals including the assessee. Accordingly, for further proceedings the assessing authority had transmitted the seized documents to the jurisdictional assessing authority in whose jurisdiction the assessee was being assessed. After receipt of the said information/documents, the assessing authority has recorded a satisfaction note dated 7th October 2009, that, he has reason to believe that a case of escapement of income may exist and, therefore, the assessee’s case requires to be reassessed for the assessment years 2001-02 to 2006-07 u/s. 153C of the Act, 1961.

Accordingly, the assessing authority issued six show-cause notices u/s. 153C of the Act, 1961, to the assessee for assessment of income of the aforesaid six assessment years and directed him to furnish return of income in respect of the said assessment years in the prescribed form within 30 days of the receipt of the said notices, dated 7th October 2009.

Upon receipt of the notice, the assessee by letter dated 11th November, 2009, requested the assessing authority to furnish him with the copies of the seized documents on the basis of which the said notices were issued. The assessing authority had provided the said documents to the assessee, whereafter the assessee has approached the High Court in a writ petition questioning the six showcause notices dated 7th October, 2009.

The High Court elaborately examined the case at hand and delved into the statutory scheme for assessment in the case of search and requisition as prescribed u/s. 153A, 153B and 153C of the Act, 1961, and reached the conclusion that the documents seized by the assessing authority did not belong to the assessee and, therefore, the condition precedent for issuance of the notice u/s. 153C was not fulfilled. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and quashed the said notices issued by the assessing authority.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgement and order passed by the High Court, the assessing authority was before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that the jurisdictional assessing authority, upon having a reason to believe that the documents seized indicated escapement of income, had issued show-case notices u/s. 153C to the assessee for reassessment of his income during the assessment years 2001-02 to 2006-07. Thereafter, upon request of the assessee, the assessing authority had furnished him with the copies of documents seized. The assessee being dissatisfied with the said documents instead of filing his explanation/reply to the show-cause notices, had filed a writ petition before the High Court.

According to the Supreme Court, at the said stage of issuance of the notices u/s. 153C, the assessee could have addressed his grievances and explained his stand to the assessing authority by filing an appropriate reply to the said notices instead of filing the writ petition impugning the said notices. The Supreme Court remarked that it is settled law that when an alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party, it must exhaust the same before approaching the writ court.

The Supreme Court held that in the present case, the assessee had invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court at the first instance without first exhausting the alternative remedies provided under the Act. According to the Supreme Court, at the said stage of proceedings, the High Court ought not have entertained the writ petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to the said notices and upon receipt of a decision from the assessing authority, if for any reason it is aggrieved by the said decision, to question the same before the forum provided under the Act.

In view of the above, without expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the construction that was placed by the High Court on section 153C, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgement and order of the High Court. Further, the Supreme Court granted time to the assessee, if it so desired, to file reply/objections, if any, as contemplated in the said notices within 15 days time from the date of order. If such reply/ objections were filed within time granted by this court, the assessing authority would first consider the said reply/objections and thereafter direct the assessee to file the return for the assessment years in question. The Supreme Court clarified that while framing the assessment order, the assessing authority would not be influenced by any observations made by the High Court while disposing of the writ petition and if, for any reason, the assessment order went against the assessee, he/it would avail of and exhaust the remedies available to him/it under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

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Whether Assessee is Entitled to Interest on Delayed Payment of Interest on Refund? – Section 244A – Part II

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Introduction

3.1   As stated in PART 1 of this write-up, the apex court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. [Sandvik] took the view that the expression ‘amount’ appearing in section 244(1A) refers not only to the tax but also to the interest and it cannot be limited to the tax paid in pursuance of the assessment order. Accordingly, the Court held that in view of the express provision of the Act, an assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for delay in payment of amounts lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongfully and contrary to law. The Court also further took the view that even if there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, the compensation for delay is required to be paid as the Act itself recognises the principle that the Revenue is liable to pay interest when excess tax was retained and the same principle should be extended to the cases where interest was retained. For this, the Court also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Narendra Doshi referred to in para 1.4.1 of PART 1 of this write-up.

3.1.1   Subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case, the CBDT issued Instruction No. 2 dated 28th March, 2007 which is worth noting and hence the relevant part thereof is reproduced hereunder [209 CTR (Statute) 17]:

“Sub: Section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Refunds – Interest on – Grant of interest on refunds under section 244A simultaneously with issue of refund.

In terms of section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Act), an assessee is entitled to receive interest calculated in the manner provided in the said section on the amount of refund due under the Act. The interest is to be granted simultaneously with the refund and there should normally be no reason to grant refund without adding the entitled interest. In the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. vs. CIT (2006) 200 CTR (SC) 505 : (2006) 280 ITR 643 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, adversely commented upon the delay in grant of interest on refund and awarded compensation to the assessee for the said delay by the Department. While taking this view, the Supreme Court referred to the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of D.J. Works vs. Dy. CIT (1992) 102 CTR (Guj) 2 : (1992) 195 ITR 227 (Guj) wherein the High Court had held that though there is no specific provision for payment of interest on interest, but if interest on the refund is wrongfully retained, interest on interest would be payable. The Court further held that even assuming that there was no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, on general principles, compensation was payable to the assessee for the delayed payment of interest. The Court also recommended that action be initiated against the officers responsible for the delay.

2. It is necessary to remind all Assessing Officers that while granting refund to the assessee, care should be taken to ensure that any interest payable u/s. 244A on the amount of refund due should be granted simultaneously with the grant of refund and there should, in no case, be any omission or delay on the grant of such interest. Failure to do so will be viewed adversely and the officer concerned will be held personally accountable, inviting appropriate action.

3. These instructions may be brought to the notice of all officers working in your region for strict compliance. The Range Officers should be directed to carry out periodic test checks of cases within their jurisdiction to ensure that provisions of section 244A are scrupulously implemented. ………………”

3.1.2    After the above judgment of the Apex Court, the High Courts as well as the Tribunal have followed/ explained the same in various cases such as Motor General Finance Ltd. [320 ITR 881 (Del)], Gujarat Fourochemicals Ltd. [300 ITR 328 (Guj)], State Bank of Travancore [292 ITR (AT) 56 – Cochin), Delhi Tourism Transportation Corp. [(2012) 35 CCH 046 – Del Trib], Deutsche Bank AG [ITA Nos. 3789, 3790 & 4282/Mum/2010], etc. In these cases, the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case is understood as laying down the prin-ciple that the assessee is also entitled to interest on unpaid interest receivable by him on the refund due to him. When the correct interest is paid by the Revenue along with the refund, this issue was not considered as relevant. It may also be noted that the Ahmedabad Bench (TM) of the Tribunal in the case of Nirma Chemical Works Ltd. [125 TTJ 487] did not follow Sandvik’s case on the ground that it was a case prior to the assess-ment year 1989-90 (i.e., it was not rendered in the context of the provisions of section 244A) and also on the basis that it was a case where the interest has been granted in a writ as compensation and not as interest on interest under the Act. According to the Tribunal, section 244A(1)(a) grants interest only on that amount of refund which is out of the tax paid by the assessee by way of advance tax/TDS/TCS and not on the amount of interest due to the assessee but withheld by the Revenue. Section 244A(1)(b) provides for interest on refund in any other case in which case the interest has to be calculated from the ‘date of payment of the tax or penalty’. The Tribunal also stated that the Apex Court also considered certain deci-sions laying down a ratio that “the amount of refund” includes refund of tax as well as interest. According to the Tribunal, even in such a case the assessee will not be entitled to interest as unlike section 244 which grants interest on any amount of refund, section 244A provides for grant of interest on the amount of refund out of any tax/penalty paid by the assessee or collected from him and in any case, otherwise it requires the date of payment by the assessee. Even if the inter-est due to an assessee is considered to be a ‘refund of any amount’ u/s. 240 or under the opening part of section 244A(1) as held by the courts in certain cases, ‘it would not entitle an assessee to further interest on that amount of interest either under Clause (a) of section 244A(1) as it was not a refund out of any tax paid by him or collected from him; nor under Clause (b) of section 244A(1) as the interest is to start from the date of payment of tax or penalty and in the case of refund of interest, there cannot be the date of payment by an assessee’. Further, according to the Tribunal, the Supreme Court made it clear in para 40 of the judgment that there cannot be any doubt that the amount of interest on the refunded amount is as per the provisions of law as it then stood and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. When a specific provision has been made under the statute, such provision has to govern the field. The Tribunal then further stated that the AO is the statutory author-ity. The Tribunal, as an appellant authority, is likewise a statutory authority. It is not a court of equity. Therefore, it has to act as per the provisions of the Act and if a benefit or a relief is not available to an assessee under the Act, it cannot be granted on the grounds of equity or the general provisions of law as can be granted by the courts in their writ jurisdiction. Referring to the full Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. [146 ITR 452], the Tribunal held that though interest is compensatory in character, yet there is no right to receive interest other than by right created under a statute. According to the Tribunal, section 244A apparently reveals that there is a liability to pay interest on delayed payment of refund amount but the section does not provide for payment of any interest on interest, even though there is a delay in payment of such interest. Finally, the Tri-bunal held that looking to the language of section 244A, the assessee was not entitled to any interest on interest as it was not a case of the refund of amount out of any tax paid by or collected from the assessee nor it has a date of payment by the assessee from which it can run. It may also be noted that the phrase ‘date of payment of tax or penalty’ is also defined in the Explanation to section 244A(1) to mean that ‘the date on and from which the amount of tax or penalty specified in the notice of demand issued under section 156 is paid in excess of such demand’. However, it is worth not-ing that even u/s. 244(1A), the interest was required to be calculated from the date of excess payment and still the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case took the view that assessee is entitled to interest on unpaid amount of interest as mentioned in para 3.1 above. Under the circumstances, to what extent the distinction drawn by the Tribunal in the context of section 244A(1)(b) should hold good could be a matter of debate. It may also be noted that in this case the Tribunal did not have the benefit considering the judgment of the apex court in the case of H.E.G Ltd. and its effect referred to in para 3.1.3 to 3.1.3.3 as the same was delivered subsequently. As such, the view taken by the Tribunal in this case may not be necessarily regarded as correct.

3.1.3    The judgment of the apex court in the case of HEG Ltd. [324 ITR 331] is also worth noting. In this case, the Court was dealing with batch of appeals. At the outset, the Court stated that if a question is not properly framed then, at times, confusion arises resulting in wrong answers and the present batch of appeals is an illustration thereof. For this purpose, the Court noted the facts of the case of one of the appeals [SLP(SC) No. 18045/2009] for the assessment year 1993-94 and stated that the question framed by the Revenue with regard to the entitlement of the assessee to claim interest on interest u/s. 244A is erroneous. As such, the Court clarified that this is not a case where the assessee is claiming com-pound interest or interest on interest as is sought to be made out by the Revenue. The Court then dealt with a question as to what is the meaning of the words “refund of any amount becomes due to the assessee” in section 244A? In this context, the Court rejected the argument of the Revenue that the words “any amount” will not include the interest which accrued to the assessee for delay in refunding the amount and held as under [Page No. 333]:

“………….We see no merit in this argument. The interest component will partake of the character of the “amount due” under section 244A. It becomes as integral part of Rs. 45,73,528 which is not paid for 57 months after the said amount became due and payable. As can be seen from the facts narrated above, this is the case of short payment by the Department and it is in this way that the assessee claims interest u/s. 244A of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, on both the aforestated grounds, we are of the view that the assessee was entitled to interest for 57 months on Rs. 45,73,528. The principal amount of Rs. 45,73,528 has been paid on 31st December, 1997 but net of interest which, as stated above, partook of the character of “amount due” u/s. 244A.”

3.1.3.1 From the available facts in the above judgment, it seems that the total tax paid had two components, viz., TDS (Rs. 45,73,528) and tax paid after the original assessment (Rs. 1,71,00,320). It seems that the assessee was entitled to refund of Rs. 2,16,73,848 consisting of the above two components from which, it appears that refund of Rs. 45,73,528 (TDS component) was delayed by 57 months and the assessee had claimed statutory interest u/s. 244A for this delayed refund of Rs. 45,73,528 for a period from 1st April, 1993 to 31st December, 1997. Therefore, it appears that the amount of Rs. 45,73,528 represents the principal amount and does not seem to include any interest. As such, there is no clarity on the facts in the context of the above view expressed by the apex court.

3.1.3.2 It may be noted that in the above case, in the Head Notes of the ITR, references are given to various appeal numbers and it is also mentioned that such appeals are arising out of the judgment of the MP High Court in the case of CIT vs. H.E.G. Ltd. reported in 310 ITR 341 and of the Madras High Court in the case of Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd. reported in 294 ITR 438. There seem to be some confusion in this regard. The facts dealt with in the text of the judgment of the apex court are, it is stated, for the assessment year 1993-94 [seems to be in the case of H.E.G. Ltd.] and it appears that this assessment year was not covered in the judgment of the MP High Court reported in 310 ITR 341 in which the High Court has held that grant of interest on interest is permis-sible and this position does not change u/s. 244A. The judgment of the MP High Court for the assessment year 1993-94 could not be verified as the same was not available. Accordingly, in view of lack of clarity on the factual position, it seems difficult to take a view that the judgment of the MP High Court reported in 310 ITR 341 has been affirmed by the apex court as mentioned in the Head Notes of the ITR. This position gets further clarified by the fact that the apex court has also stated that the question does not relate to interest on interest. Notwithstanding this position, this judgment of the apex court supports the view that the words ‘amount due’ appearing in section 244A include interest and the interest component will partake of the character of the ‘amount due’ under section 244A. Similar view was also taken in Sandvik’s case in the context of section 244(1A) as mentioned in para 2.16 of PART 1 of this write-up.

3.1.3.3 The effect of the judgment of the apex court in H.E.G. Ltd. (supra) has been explained by the Delhi High Court in a recent judgment dated 6th September, 2013 in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation [ITA Nos. 167 & 168 of 2012]. This judgment has been delivered in the context of claim of interest u/s. 244A on account of delayed payment of interest after granting the refund of the principal amount. The High Court explained that if the refund does not include interest due and payable on the amount refunded, the Revenue would be liable to pay interest on the shortfall. This does not amount to payment of interest on interest. The Court has also explained this with example. According to the Court, the claim of such interest is on account of the shortfall in payment of the amount due and payable (including interest) and not a claim of interest on interest.

Gujarat Flourochemicals Ltd. vs. CIT – 300 ITR 328 (Guj)

4.1 The issue with regard to the entitlement of interest on interest also came up before the Gujarat High Court in the above case after Sandvik’s case. In this case, the brief facts were: The assessee had made certain payment to a foreign company (non-resident) and in that context on making an application for non-deduction of tax, the Assessing Officer (AO) had directed the assessee to deduct tax @ 30% on the basis which the assessee had deducted certain amount of tax and paid to the Government (it seems – somewhere in June 1987). Subsequently, the assessee realised that tax deducted and paid was excess on account of non-application of the principle of grossing up to its case at the relevant time and accordingly, claimed refund for such excess payment of tax which was granted (Rs. 10,26,868) by the AO vide order dated 30th November, 1990. Subsequently, the assessee claimed interest on such refund for a period from 1st July, 1987 to 30th November, 1990. There is some confusion in facts on terminal date i.e., 30-11-1990 or 13-11-1990. However, this is not relevant. The claim of the assessee was rejected by the CIT, CCIT as well as the CBDT. On these facts, the issue of grant of interest on such refund of excess tax paid came up before the Gujarat High Court in a writ petition filed by the assessee.

4.1.1 For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted that the question as to whether the assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for delay in payment of amount lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongly and contrary to law stands concluded by the apex court in Sandvik’s case. The Court also noted the subsequent instruction (referred to in para 3.1.1) issued by the CBDT in this regard. Based on this, the Court took the view that the assessee is entitled to interest as claimed and directed the Revenue to pay interest at the rate of 9% from 1st July, 1987 to 30th November, 1990. The Court also further directed to pay running interest at the rate of 9% on the amount of interest which may be granted to the assessee in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court.

4.1.2    It may be noted that in the above case, the Gujarat High court took the view that the assessee is entitled to interest on the amount refunded to the assessee as well as interest on such interest on general principles effectively relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case.

CIT vs. Gujarat Flourochemicals – 348 ITR 319 [SC – Division Bench]

5.1    It seems that the above judgment of the Gujarat High Court came up for consideration before the Division Bench of the apex court at the instance of the Revenue. The facts are not given in the case before the apex court. The Court also stated that this controversy arises in number of cases pending before the apex court. While dealing with this case, the Court noted that the short point which arises in the present case is: “What is the character of Tax Deductible at Source (TDS)/ Advance Tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961.” The Court further stated that the question which arises in this case is, whether interest is payable by the Revenue to the assessee if the aggregate of installments of Advance Tax/TDS paid exceeds the as-sessed tax? The Court also mentioned that this controversy arises in a number of cases pending before the Apex Court. Interestingly, it seems that, this question does not refer to liability of the Revenue to pay interest on interest but only refers to the liability of the Revenue to pay interest on excess payment of tax (i.e. Advance Tax/ TDS). However, it is also worth noting that the High Court had directed the Revenue to pay running interest on the amount of interest as mentioned in para 4.1.1.

5.1.1    In the above case, the assessee had relied on the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case. Referring to this, the Court stated that the main issue which arose for determination in Sandvik’s case was whether the assessee was entitled to be compensated by the Rev-enue for delay in paying to it the amounts admittedly due. The Court also doubted the correctness of the judgment in Sandvik’s case. In this context, the Court stated as under:

“The argument in Sandvik Asia [supra] on behalf of the assessee was that it was entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of the amounts lawfully due to it which were wrongly withheld for a long period of seventeen years. Vide Paragraph (23) of Sandvik Asia [supra], the Division Bench held that, in view of the express provisions of the Act, the assessee was entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of the amounts lawfully due to the assessee, which were withheld wrongly by the Revenue. With due respect, section 214 of the Act does not provide for payment of compensation by the Revenue to the assessee in whose favour a refund order has been passed. Moreover, in Sandvik Asia [supra], interest was ordered on the basis of equity. It was also ordered to be paid on the basis of Article 265 of the Constitution. We have serious doubts about the correctness of the judgment in Sandvik Asia [supra]. In our view, the judgment of this Court in the case of Modi Industries Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1995 (6) S.C.C. 396 correctly holds that Advance Tax or TDS loses its identity as soon as it is adjusted against the liability created by the Assessment Order and becomes tax paid pursuant to the Assessment Order. If Advance Tax or TDS loses its identity and becomes tax paid on the passing of the Assessment Order, then, is the assessee not entitled to interest under the relevant provisions of the Act?…”

5.1.2 The Court then referred to the relevant provisions of the Act [viz. sections 195, 195A, 214, 243, 244 etc.] and took the view that Sandvik’s case has not been correctly decided and referred the above issue arising in the above case as well as in other appeals to the Hon’ble Chief Justice for decision by a Larger Bench.

Gujarat Flourochemicals – 358 ITR 291 (SC – Larger Bench)

6.1    Based on the view of the Division Bench of the apex court referred to in para 5.1.2, the question of law involved in many cases [which, it seems, included the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Flouro-chemicals Ltd. (supra)] was referred to the Larger Bench (consisting of 3 judges) for consideration and authoritative pronouncement. In the context of the issue to be decided, the Court noted as under:

‘The question which arises in this case is, whether interest is payable by the Revenue to the assessee if the aggregate of installments of Advance Tax or TDS paid exceeds the assessed tax?’

6.2:    Referring to the judgment in Sandvik’s case, the Court stated as under:

“We would first throw light on the reasoning and the decision of this Court on the core issue in Sandvik case (supra). The only issue formulated by this Court for its consideration and decision was whether an assessee is entitled to be compensated by the Income-tax Department for the delay in paying interest on the refunded amount admittedly due to the assessee. This Court in the facts of the said case had noticed that there was delay of various periods, ranging from 12 to 17 years, in such payment by the Revenue. This Court had further referred to the several decisions which were brought to its notice and also referred to the relevant provisions of the Act which provide for refunds to be made by the Revenue when a superior forum directs refund of certain amounts to an assessee while disposing of an appeal, revision etc.

Since there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Revenue in refunding the amount due to the assessee this Court had thought it fit that the assessee should be properly and adequately compensated and therefore in paragraph 51 of the judgment, the Court while compensating the assessee had directed the Revenue to pay a compensation by way of interest for two periods, namely; for the Assessment Years 1977-78, 1978- 79, 1981-82, 1982-83 in a sum of Rs.40,84,906/- and interest @ 9% from 31.03.1986 to 27.03.1998 and in default, to pay the penal interest @ 15% per annum for the aforesaid period.”

6.2.1    The Court then stated that the said judgment has been misquoted and misinterpreted to say that in that case the Court had taken a view that the Revenue is obliged to pay interest on interest in the event of its failure to refund the interest payable within the statutory period.

6.2.2    Finally, explaining the effect of Sandvik’s case, the Court stated as under:

“As we have already noticed, in Sandvik case (supra) this Court was considering the issue whether an assessee who is made to wait for refund of interest for decades be compensated for the great prejudice caused to it due to the delay in its payment after the lapse of statutory period. In the facts of that case, this Court had come to the conclusion that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Revenue in re-funding certain amount which included the statutory interest and therefore, directed the Revenue to pay compensation for the same not an interest on interest.”

6.3 After explaining the effect of the judgment of Sandvik’s case as above, to decide the question of law referred to it, the Court held as under and referred back all the matters before a Division Bench to consider each case independently and take appropriate decision one way or the other:

“Further it is brought to our notice that the Legislature by the Act No. 4 of 1988 (w.e.f. 01.04.1989) has inserted section 244A to the Act which provides for interest on refunds under various contingencies. We clarify that it is only that interest provided for under the statute which may be claimed by an assessee from the Revenue and no other interest on such statutory interest.”

6.4      From the above decision of the Court, one may get an impression that the Court seems to have taken a view that Sandvik’s case was decided under pre-1989 provisions and from assessment year 1989-90, the interest on refund is payable u/s. 244A. As no reasonings are available in this judgment for the view taken by the Court, there is no clarity on this aspect. However, it would appear that the Larger Bench of the Court has not overruled the judgment in Sandvik’s case.  The Larger Bench of the Court also does not seem to have approved the view expressed by the Division Bench (referred to in para 5.1.2) that Sandvik’s case has not been correctly decided.  Instead, the Court has explained the view taken in Sandvik’s case and the effect thereof that in that case the Court had directed the Revenue to pay compensation for inordinate delay in refunding certain amount due to the assessee which included statutory interest and in that case, the Court had not decided that the Revenue is liable to pay interest on interest.    

Conclusion
7.1       From the judgment of three judge Bench of the Apex Court (Larger Bench) in the above case, it becomes clear that the assessee can claim only that interest which is provided under the Act and no other interest can be claimed by the assessee on statutory interest for delay in payment thereof. The similar approach was adopted by the three judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Panchanatham Chettiar [99 ITR 579]. As such, the assessee is not entitled to claim interest on interest unless there is a provision in the Act for the same.  

7.1.1     It is unfortunate that Larger Bench of the Apex Court has taken such a strict technical view of the issue which, in many cases, may involve the issue of equity and justice. In fact, with     this     judgment,    some    Revenue    Officials    may be tempted to delay payment of interest as that does not create any liability to pay further interest on the amount of interest wrongly withheld. This may happen in cases involving large amount of interest in this era of    unjustified    pressure    for    meeting    unrealistic revenue collection targets. This possibility was noted by the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case referred to in para 2.13.1 of Part 1 of this write-up wherein the Court has also opined that such actions and consequences seriously affect     the    administration    of     justice    and     the    rule of law.  It appears that this was also one of the factors considered by the Court to decide the issue in favour of the assessee in Sandvik’s case. Similar approach is found in the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation referred to in para 3.1.3.3.  Otherwise also, this position may be open to abuse and that is not in the long term interest of fair administration of tax laws.  Somehow, the Larger Bench of the Court in the above case has not appreciated this ground reality.  To be fair to the assessee, appropriate provision should be made in the Act itself to compensate the assessee in cases of delay in payment of interest due to the assessee. We only hope that the Revenue Officials will strictly follow the directions contained in the Instruction No. 2 dated 28th March, 2007 (referred to in para 3.1.1) issued by the CBDT after the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case.

7.2     From the above judgment, it seems to us that the Larger Bench in the above case has not decided that the assessee will not be entitled to claim compensation from the Revenue even if there is inordinate delay in payment of amount due to the assessee which may include statutory interest.  As mentioned in para 6.4, in the above case, the Court has not held that Sandvik’s case was wrongly decided. As such, as held in Sandvik’s case, in case of delay in payment of     ‘amount    due’     to     the    assessee     it    may    be possible for the assessee to claim compensation on such amount even if such amount includes statutory interest. Such a claim of the assessee should not be regarded as claim of interest on interest. It also appears that the claim for such compensation may be considered by the Courts and, as held by the Tribunal (TM) in the case of Nirma Chemicals (referred to in para 3.1.2), such a claim may not be entertained by the Tribunal or the lower authorities.

7.3    In the above context, it is worth noting that as mentioned in para 3.1.3.2, the Apex Court in the case of H.E.G. Ltd has held that the words ‘amount due’ appearing in section 244A include interest and the interest com-ponent will partake of the character of the ‘amount due’ u/s. 244A. It seems that this position is not disturbed by the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case as this has not been considered in the above case. This was also not the issue before the Larger Bench in the above case. It is also worth noting that the judgment of the apex court in H.E.G Ltd was also delivered by a three judge Bench of the apex court. With this position, the claim of interest u/s. 244A on the interest component of the ‘amount due’ may be regarded as claim of interest on shortfall in payment of ‘amount due’ and not as claim of interest on interest. As such, such a claim may be regarded as the claim under the provisions of the Act. This needs consideration even after the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case. In this context, the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation ( supra) is worth noting. At the same time, in this context, the view expressed by the Tribunal (TM) in the case of Nirma Chemicals (supra) may also be borne in mind.

7.4    In the cases of D. J. Works [195 ITR 227] and Chimanbhai S. Patel [210 ITR 419], the Gujarat High Court had taken a view that the assessee is entitled to interest on interest. As mentioned in para 1.4.1 of Part 1 of this write- up, the judgment of the Gujarat High Court was followed by the M. P. High Court in the case of Narendra Doshi and the judgment of the M. P. High Court in the case of Narendra Doshi has been affirmed by the apex court [254 ITR 606]. This is also relied on in Sandvik’s case to take a view that even if there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, the compensation for delay is required to be paid. In Sandvik’s case, as mentioned in para 2.9 of Part 1 of this write-up, a view was also taken that the decision of the apex court in Narendra Doshi’s case is on the merits of the matter, though it proceeded on the assumption that there was no provision in the Act grating interest on unpaid interest. Even this judgment in the case of Narendra Doshi was delivered by a three judge Bench of the Apex Court. It is worth noting that this judgment has also not been considered by the Larger Bench in the above case. The implication of this factual position may need consideration and we will have to wait and watch for the position which may ultimately emerge from this situation.

7.4.1 When the Division Bench of the apex court finally decides the issue on merit in the case of Gujarat Flourochemicals [or in any other case from the set of appeals forming part of the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case], some light may be thrown on the above. Let us hope for the development/ clarity in this regard at that stage.

WRIT PETITION MAINTAINABILITY

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SYNOPSIS

When an alternative remedy is
available under the Act, writ petition is not maintainable. However, in
various decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts have held
that if a issued is patently illegal or without jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the alternative remedy, writ is maintainable. In this
article, the author analyses of the recent SC ruling in the case of
Vijaybhai N. Chandrani which in his view is inconsistent with this
position and therefore requires reconsideration.

Brief Factual Background of the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

Recently,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani
[Civil Appeal No. 5888 to 5903 of 2013 dated 18.7.2013] has held that
writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court is not maintainable when
alternate remedy is available under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the
Act’). The brief background of the case is given hereunder:

In
the case of Vijaybhai (supra), the assessee purchased a plot of land
from Samutkarsh Co-operative Housing Society being developed by Savvy
Infrastructure Ltd. In 2008, a search was conducted u/s. 132 of the Act
in the premises of the Society and Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. During the
search, Assessing Officer (‘AO’) seized certain documents u/s. 132A of
the Act. One of the documents was loose sheet of paper containing list
of members under the heading “Samutkarsh Members Details”. One of the
names was that of the assessee and certain details were mentioned
against each name in different columns. On the basis of these documents
the AO issued notices u/s. 153C to the assessee to furnish his returns
of income for assessment years 2001-2002 to 2006-2007. Upon receipt of
the said notice, the assessee requested the AO to provide copies of the
seized material. The AO supplied copies of three loose sheets of paper
which, according to the assessee, did not belong to him. Under these
circumstances, the assessee moved a writ petition before the Hon’ble
Gujarat High Court challenging the aforesaid notices.

The
Hon’ble Gujarat High Court quashed the notices by holding that as the
said documents undoubtedly  did not belong to the assessee the condition
precedent for issuance of notice was not fulfilled and therefore the
action taken u/s. 153C of the Act stood vitiated. Though the Hon’ble
Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the correctness or
otherwise of the construction that was placed by the High Court on
Section 153C of the Act, it held that as alternate remedy was available
to the assessee, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ
petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to
the said notices. Upon receipt of a decision from the AO, if for any
reason assessee was aggrieved by the said decision, the same could be
questioned before the forum provided under the Act. Accordingly, the
order of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court was reversed.

Supreme
Court decisions on maintainability of writ petition – against
action/notice without jurisdiction – when alternative remedy is
available

It is a settled position that, generally, when
alternative remedy is available under the Act, writ petition is not
maintainable. However, in various decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court
and High Courts have held that if the notice issued is patently illegal
or without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the alternative remedy, writ is
maintainable. Some key decisions laying down the said ratio are quoted
hereunder:

• Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC)

“Mr.
Sastri mentioned more than once the fact that the company would have
sufficient opportunity to raise this question, viz., whether the
Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that under-assessment had
resulted from non-disclosure of material facts, before the Income-tax
Officer himself in the assessment proceedings and, if unsuccessful
there, before the Appellate Officer or the Appellate Tribunal or in the
High Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The
existence of such alternative remedy is not however always a sufficient
reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting
an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action.”
(Emphasis supplied).

• Foramer vs. CIT [2001] 247 ITR 436 (All) affirmed by Supreme Court in [2003] 264 ITR 566 (SC)

“As
regards alternative remedy, we are of the opinion since the notice
under section 148 is without jurisdiction, the petitioner should not be
relegated to his alternative remedy vide Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v.
ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC)…. .”

• UOI & Anr vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [2007] 001 CLR 0067 (SC)

“No
doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash
a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without
jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal.”

From
the above decisions, it is very clear that as a matter of practice writ
petition is not maintainable if alternative remedy is available under
the Act. However, in exceptional cases when the notices issued are
patently illegal or without jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that writ petition is maintainable.

Notice u/s. 153C in the case of Vijaybhai (supra) – without jurisdiction – liable to be quashed

In
the case of Vijaybhai (supra), the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court drew
distinction between the provisions of section 153C and section 158BD.
Whereas section 158BD seeks to tax any “undisclosed income” which “belongs”
to a person other than the person in whose case search has been carried
out, section 153C seeks to tax such other person only where “money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or books of account or documents seized” “belongs” to him. The Hon’ble High Court held “….it is an admitted position as emerging from the record of the case, that the documents
in question, namely the three loose papers recovered during the search
proceedings do not belong to the petitioner. ….it is nobody’s case that
the said documents belong to the petitioner. It is not even the case of
Revenue that the said three documents are in the handwriting of the
petitioner. In the circumstances, when the condition precedent for
issuance of notice is not fulfilled any action taken under s. 153C of
the Act stands vitiated.”
In the instant case, since it was an
admitted fact that the documents seized did not belong to the assessee,
the High Court held the notices issued u/s. 153C to be without
jurisdiction. In light of the above, having regard to the judgments
noted earlier, it is respectfully submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court should have upheld the judgment of the Gujarat High Court.

An
alternate remedy against an order passed pursuant to a notice cannot be
considered as an alternate remedy available against the notice which is
patently without jurisdiction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court did
not affirm the decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court supposedly on the
ground that the assessee had alternate remedies under the Act against
the notices issued. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held:

“…… at the
said stage of issuance of the notices under Section 153C, the assessee
could have addressed his grievances and explained his stand to the
Assessing Authority by filing an appropriate reply to the said notices
instead of filing the Writ Petition impugning the said notices. ….

In the present case, the assessee has invoked the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court at the first instance without first exhausting the alternate remedies provided under the Act. In our considered opinion, at the said stage of proceedings, the High Court ought not have entertained the Writ Petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to the said notices and upon receipt of a decision from the

Assessing Authority, if for any reason it is aggrieved by the said decision, to question the same before the forum provided under the Act. ….

Further, we grant time to the assessee, if it so desires, to file reply/objections, if any, as contemplated in the said notices within 15 days’ time from today. If such reply/objections is/are filed within time granted by this Court, the Assessing Authority shall first consider the said reply/objections and thereafter direct the assessee to file the return for the assessment years in question. We make it clear that while framing the assessment order, the Assessing Authority will not be influenced by any observations made by the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition. If, for any reason, the assessment order goes against the assessee, he/it shall avail and exhaust the remedies available to him/it under the Act, 1961. ….”

It is respectfully submitted that if the underlined portion of the judgment was not forming part of it, the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would have been on the lines of its earlier judgment in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd vs. ITO  [2003] 259 ITR 19 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a writ challenging notice u/s. 148 had directed the assessee/AO as under:

Thus, in the absence of the underlined part in the aforesaid judgment, as has happened in several writs challenging notices u/s. 148, the assessee would be able to approach the High Court after the AO’s order dealing with or rejecting the objections of the assessee against issue of notices u/s. 153C. As evident from the underlined part of the judgment quoted above, it is respectfully submitted that it appears that the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

a)  was either under an impression that there is a remedy under the Act against issue of notice u/s. 153C; or

b)     has    failed    to    appreciate    the    difference    between    an alternate remedy available against an order passed pursuant to a notice in contradistinction with an alternate remedy available against the issuance of the notice itself.

Conclusion:
In the light of the above, it is most humbly and respectfully submitted that the aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court requires reconsideration as:

(i)   the notice issued u/s. 153C was clearly without jurisdiction.

(ii)   there is no alternate remedy available under the Act against the issuance of notice u/s. 153C.

(iii)   in any case, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of cases notwithstanding the availability of an alternate remedy, a writ is clearly maintainable against an action/notice which is issued patently without jurisdiction.

Rethinking growth strategy

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Whenever I hear a politician saying that his party will fight elections on issues of development and growth rather than those that divide society, one takes that with a huge bag of salt. Whenever the youth of this country talk of growth, one is touched by the sincerity in their voices and the dreams in their eyes .

The issue really is, what is the nature of growth that we want and what are the ways and means to achieve it? In this editorial I am placing my thoughts before readers. I must admit that inspiration for this piece was a series of essays titled “Reimagining India“ recommended by a dear friend.

The world appears convinced that India has the potential to become an economic superpower, but the tragedy is that Indians are drowned in self-doubt. We have huge untapped talent. Away from Indian shores, Indians excel in universities and corporations. In the USA, Indians are number one in terms of per capita income. We must therefore believe that we have the ability to be the best in the world.

Our diffidence probably arises on account of being constantly compared with China’s growth model. If we continue to do so, we will always label ourselves as laggards. India cannot afford to grow like China nor should that be its aim. Our democratic coalition governments cannot become as ruthlessly efficient as China’s politburo nor should they aspire to be. Though we may not realise it today, the social costs of China’s economic expansion are obvious. While it may showcase its Shanghai infrastructure, many parts of China suffer from a poor quality of life and rank extremely low on the happiness index. There is a simmering discontent among certain sections of the public. An authoritarian regime, like the one in China, in a country like ours with a religious, community and caste diversity can result in an explosive situation.

While we must not blindly ape the China model, we must admit that we have made many mistakes since independence and it is time that we rethink the future. We have in the first four decades post-independence followed a protectionism policy believing that we were a defenceless lot , while record shows that with a more open global competition Indians have fared far better.

Even after the Indian economy was unshackled, there has been excessive importance to the information technology  and software sectors without realising that these are tertiary sectors and their growth, has benefitted the white-collared employees while ignoring the blue-collar workforce which is in fact our strength. While GDP increased, its distribution was skewed. We did not pay adequate attention to primary sectors – manufacturing and agriculture. The emphasis must now shift. Liberalisation of labour laws and fast tracking agricultural reforms can give the Indian economy the requisite depth and breadth.

While I believe that one must guard against an undue socialist bias that our economic policies once had, one cannot ignore the importance of an equitable distribution of national wealth. While the government must get out of business it must actively invest and intervene in core sectors. For example, the government must give emphasis to infrastructure which would give impetus to business and increase spending on health and education which would improve the quality of life of the masses.

However in doing so, limited government resources must be spent with well-defined priorities. In infrastructure while it is important to have more and improved airports, the priority should be to build more roads, bridges and railway tracks. While the ultimate goal is that latest developments in the medical field should be available to the public at affordable rates, the emphasis must be on ensuring primary health care. In education while we must encourage top-class universities and technical institutions, the government itself must spend on primary education. The Right to Education Act is a beginning and not the end. While increasing spending in these sectors one must use leapfrogging techniques to accelerate the growth. It would be worthwhile to explore using the broadband to deliver educational content to villages rather than the brick and mortar method of increasing traditional schools.

Finally we must recognise the ground realities and our social ethos. Diversity is a unique characteristic of our country. Rather than attempting to iron out our differences we must attempt convert them into virtues rather than vulnerabilities. Rather than keeping power centralised in the fear that the States would go astray I believe that giving the States greater autonomy in economic policies may be advisable. If the States go their own way, competition will push the laggards to perform better. This will invigorate the States who will ensure that investment comes their way. The better performing States will attract resources. Shifting of Tata motors from West Bengal to Gujarat is a case in point. The Centre should aid the weaker States to overcome the infrastructure deficit and leave them to compete, with each other. For a long time the four northern States Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh were described as BIMARU. This is a thing of the past. Bihar is making great strides and Madhya Pradesh ranks very high in terms of  various growth parameters.

These are some of the growth strategies that we need to adopt if we are to become an economic superpower. The world is convinced about the India growth story. It is time that Indians believed it!

Anil J. Sathe
Editor
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In Search of Godhead

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Robin Sharma, renowned author and a leadership guru has given an interesting story in his book “Who will cry when you die?” Thousands of years ago, it was believed that every one who walked upon the earth was god. But humankind abused its limitless powers. So the Supreme God decided to hide the Godhead, the source of all of this potential, so that no one could find it. An imperative question arose, where could such thing be hidden? The first suggestion of placing it deep into the ground was rejected as some one would find it, digging deep. The other options of placing it in the deepest ocean or the highest mountain were also turned down as some one would dive deep in the ocean or scale the highest peaks and find it some day. The Supreme God then found a solution to this. He decided to put this source of all power inside the hearts of every man, woman and child as they will never think of looking there.

The story appears so very true in today’s context considering the manner in which everyone is going about looking for God. The irony is that, all our actions including the devotion seem more because of the fear of God rather than the love of God. As put beautifully in the story, how many are able to look for God in a human being or for that matter, in every being, the ones that are marvelous creations of God? The need is to distinguish between the “Man made Murats” and “God made Murats”.

Atman, the soul, the Brahmn is the same in each and every being. One that is beyond body, mind and intellect. Those who have never tried to understand anything beyond the sensually perceivable world may raise the question, “If there is God, why can’t we see him? Such a question may be a matter of laughter for many. Our identification with body, mind and intellect in all our exchanges without even having a thought of the spirit (the Atman), is an example of how ignorant we are. Whenever we interact with anyone, we identify only with the mind, body complex and not the spirit. Atman or Brahmn, in all beings is the same. Brahmn pervades all activity.

In Kenopanisad, the guru explains God, Brahmn as:

That which indeed is the Ear of the ear, the Mind of the mind, the Speech of the speech, the Vital-air of the prana and the Eye of the eye. The wise having completely freed and risen above this world become immortal. [Kenopanisad – Mantra 2]

This may sound somewhat confusing at first instance as to what could be the Ear of the ear or the Eye of the eye. The answer is simple. It is known that we see through the eyes, but there is force within that enables the eyes to see, that force is Brahmn, God. So is with the ears. If eyes could see, then the body without life could also see. This enlivening force, the Brahmn, one which is non-dual resides in the heart of every human being is the substratum of the universe.

If there is one God in all then why don’t we see it? We do not see it because we operate only through the body, mind and intellect. This can be best understood with a small experiment. When a light passes through a prism, the output of one coloured light is reflected in various different colours. Single coloured light appears in many colours on the other side of the prism. Similarly, when the Brahmn operates through the prism of the body, mind and intellect, we see different individuals distinct from the one Brahmn rooted in all.

To love God is to love all. Lord Krishna in the 12th chapter of Bhagwad Gita has enumerated 35 qualities of a devotee. The first and foremost quality stated in verse 13 is on the same thought and in fact would disqualify many devotees. “One who hates no being”. Thus to love God, one needs to identify God everywhere, love all beings because the same God lives in all beings. Loving all fellow beings has been beautifully presented in a poem Abou Ben Adhem, by James Henry Leigh Hunt. The poet has illustrated the true devotion to God. Abou dreamt of an angel who was writing the names of those who loved God. He enquired whether his name was there in the list or not. When the angel replied that his name was not in the list, he then requested the angel to write his name in the list of those who loved his fellow-men. Angel wrote the name and left. The next night the angel came with the list of those whom God loved. This list had Abou Ben Adhem’s name on the top.

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Activities Relating to Purchase of Goods from India by a Liaison Office

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Synopsis
Under Section 9, income of a non-resident (NR) from a “business connection” in India would be deemed to accrue or arise in India. However, if the activities of NR are confined to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export the deeming fiction does not apply.

The scope of the phrase “operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India” has been a subject matter of controversy, with the Tax Department generally adopting a fairly narrow interpretation. In this feature the authors analyse the various judicial pronouncements in this regard.

Issue for consideration

An income of a foreign company or part thereof, attributable to its operations in India, is taxable in India provided such operations or activities are construed to be a ‘business connection’ within the meaning of the term as defined in Explanation 2 to section 9(1) of the Income-tax Act. Such an income is deemed to accrue or arise in India where it is found to be through or from any business connection in India, whether directly or indirectly. The said Explanation 2 provides that a business connection shall inter alia include any business activity, carried out through a person who habitually exercises an authority to conclude contracts in India on behalf of the non-resident, unless his activity is limited to the purchase of goods or merchandise for the non-resident.

Explanation 1(b) provides that income shall not be deemed to accrue or arise in India, where operations are confined to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

An issue has arisen in cases where an Indian liaison office of a foreign company purchases goods from India for its head office and carries out several activities incidental thereto. The courts have been asked, under the circumstances, to define the true meaning of the term ‘confined to purchase of goods in India’ and explain whether the activities that are carried out for effecting purchase of goods in India could be considered as an independent activity or as an integral part of the purchase of goods in India. In case of the latter, the activity shall not attract Indian taxation and in case of the earlier, it may expose the income attributable to such activity to taxation in India. Recently, the Karnataka High Court has held that such activities constitute purchase of goods in India, while the Authority for Advance Ruling has held the same to be not forming part of purchase.

Columbia Sportswear Co.’s case

The issue arose before the Authority for Advance Rulings In Re Columbia Sportswear Co, 12 taxmann. com 349. The company in this case was incorporated under the laws of the USA, a multinational wholesaler and retailer of outdoors apparel with global operations. It conducted research and development to develop marketable products outside India. In the year 1995, the company established a liaison office in Chennai for undertaking liaison activities, in connection with purchase of goods in India, which activities had subsequently been expanded to Bangladesh and Egypt. Besides coordinating purchase of goods from India, the Indian liaison office also assisted the company in purchase of goods from Egypt and Bangladesh and engaged in quality monitoring and production monitoring of goods purchased from these countries. The goods procured from Egypt and Bangladesh were directly sold to the company in the United States from those countries. In the year 2000, a support office was opened by the Indian liaison office in Bangalore with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India.

The company claimed that;

• its products were produced by independent suppliers worldwide including India.

• the Indian liaison office was involved in activities relating to purchase functions for the company and incidentally was engaged in vendor identification, review of costing data, vendor recommendation, quality control and uploading of material prices into the internal product data management system of the company besides monitoring vendors for compliance with its policies, procedures and standards related to quality, delivery, pricing and labour practices.

• the Indian liaison office did not have any revenue streams; it did not source products to be sold locally in India.

• it did not sell any goods in India and therefore no income arose from its Indian operations.

• no income could be deemed to have accrued or arose in India within the meaning of section 9(1) of the Act.

• its case was covered by Explanation 1(b) of s.9(1) (i) and could not be construed as a case of business connection.

• it did not undertake any activity of trading, commercial or industrial in nature in India.

• the expenditure of the liaison office was entirely met by remittances made by the company.

On these facts, the company approached the Authority seeking a ruling on the question whether, given the nature of the activities carried on by the liaison office, any income accrues or arises in India as per section 5(2)(b) of the Act? Whether the applicant can be said to have a business connection in India as per the provisions of section 9(1)(i) of Act read with Explanation 2? Whether various activities carried out by the India LO, as listed in the Statement of relevant facts (Annexure-III), are covered under the phrase, ‘through or from operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export’ as stated in part (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act?

The Authority in paragraph 8 of the decision noted the following facts surrounding the activities of the LO;

“The liaison office of the applicant in India is engaged in vendor identification, review of costing data, vendor recommendation, quality control and uploading of material prices into the internal product data management system of the applicant. The liaison office monitors vendors for compliance with its policies, procedures and standards related to quality, delivery, pricing and labour practices. The liaison office is engaged in quality monitoring and production monitoring for goods purchased from Egypt and Bangladesh. It coordinates, ascertains, monitors and verifies with the vendors to develop the material in line with the quality and aesthetic requirements of the product as provided by the applicant’s product design team. It undertakes laboratory testing of fabrics/garments in India in addition to inspecting the quality of the products. It reviews production and quality assurance including the monitoring of the labour practices compliance and periodic performance reviews. It conveys the orders placed by the applicant on to the suppliers and interacts with the suppliers in relation to capacity utilisation, quality assurance, on-time delivery performance and so on. The role of the quality control team in the liaison office includes executing pre-sourcing factory evaluations to determine the vendor’s ability to manufacture the product to the expectations of the applicant. The quality control team also gives quality training to the newly selected vendors and is responsible for communicating the quality processes of the applicant and expectations to suppliers. The team also ensures that standard methods, tools, machinery and layouts are used. The liaison office also summarises seasonal vendor quality performance for the consideration of the applicant. The liaison office also ensures compliance with the quality process including seeking to ensure that the targeted defect percentage is maintained. It also ensures that the requirements of environmental laws and labour laws of the country are obeyed by the suppliers.”

The Authority concluded that the applicant could not take benefit of Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1) (i) as, in its opinion, the activities carried out by the assessee were not confined to purchase of goods in India. The following findings and observations of the Authority are pertinent;

•    The liaison office had about 35 employees divided into 5 teams dealing with material management, merchandising, production management, quality control and administration support, constituting teams from finance, human resources and information systems.

•    Activities carried on by the liaison office related to ensuring the choosing of quality material, occasionally testing them for quality, conveying of requisite design, picking out of competitive sellers, the ensuring of quality, the ensuring of adherence to the policy of the applicant in the matter of procurement and employment, in the matter of compliance with environmental and other local regulations by the manufacturers – suppliers and in ensuring that the payments made by the applicant reach the suppliers.

•    In the matter of manufacturing of products as per design, quality and in implementing policy, the liaison office was actually doing the work of the applicant, which actually was in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling branded products, brands over which it had exclusive right.

•    The activities of the liaison office were not confined to India. It also facilitated the doing of business by the applicant with entities in Egypt and Bangladesh.

•    A person in the business of designing, manufactur-ing and selling could not be taken to earn a profit only by a sale of goods. The goods as designed and styled by the applicant could not be sold without it being got manufactured and procured in the manner designed and contemplated by the applicant.

•    It would be unrealistic to take the view that all the activities other than the actual sale of the goods are not an integral part of the business of the applicant and have no role in the profit being made by the applicant by the sale of its branded products. It was difficult to accept the argument that what was done in India by the liaison office of the applicant was only to expend money and all its income accrued outside India by the sale of the products.

•    All activities other than the actual sale could not be divorced from the business of manufacture and sale especially in a case like that of the applicant, where the sale was of a branded product, designed and got made by the applicant under supervision, under a brand owned by the applicant. Therefore, the argument on behalf of the applicant that all the activities carried on in India were confined to the purchase of goods in India, could not be accepted.

•    ‘Confined’ meant, ‘limited, restricted’. ‘Purchase’ meant ‘get by payment, buy’.

The Authority observed that what section 9(1)(i), Explanation 1(b) deemed in the case of a non-resident, was that no income arose in India to a person through or from operations which were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export but, in the case before it, the activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India were not confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. It further observed that the applicant, in fact, transacted in India its business of designing, quality controlling, getting manufactured consistent with its policy and the laws, the branded products it sold elsewhere and that those activities could not be understood as activities confined to purchase of goods in India for export from India.

Income resulting from manufacture, purchase and sale, in the opinion of the Authority, could not be compartmentalised and confined to one arising out of a sale only, and that the whole process of procurement and sale had to be completed to generate income. Getting manufactured and purchasing formed integral parts of the process of generating income and the liaison office acted as the arm of the applicant regarding that part of the activity, and its functions were not confined to purchase or mere purchase.

Another aspect that influenced the Authority’s decision was the fact that the activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India, was not confined to India but extended to Egypt and Bangladesh. Since the activities of the applicant in India included its business in Egypt and Bangladesh, it could not be stated that the operations of the applicant in India were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

The Authority therefore took the view that the activities of the liaison office gave rise to taxable income in India, not being exempt under explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i).

Nike Inc.’s case

The issue recently came up for consideration before the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nike Inc., 34 taxmann.com 170. The company in this case was engaged in the business of sports apparel with its main office in the USA and had globally located associated enterprises or subsidiaries. From its office in the USA, the company arranged for all its subsidiaries the supply of various brands of sports apparel for sale to various customers. It did not carry on any manufacture by itself. It engaged various manufacturers all over the world on a job-to-job basis and made arrangements with its subsidiaries for purchase of the manufactured goods directly and payment for the same to the respective manufacturers.

With a view to procure various apparel from manufacturers from various parts of the world, the company opened a liaison office in India and;

•    employed persons in various categories.

•    the rate or price for each apparel was negotiated by the liaison office with the manufacturer.

•    the quality of each apparel was also indicated and the samples so developed were forwarded to the US office.

•    the liaison office proposed and gave its opinion about the reasonability of the price, etc. and the US office decided about the price, quality, quantity, to whom to be shipped and billed.

•    the local manufacturer in India was conveyed of the decision by the office in the USA and once it was accepted, the local manufacturer carried on his activity.

•    the liaison office kept a close watch on the progress, quality, etc. at the manufacturing workshop and also kept a watch on the time schedule to be followed and rendered such assistance as may be required in the dispatch of the goods, including the actual buyer and the place for export.

For all these activities in India, the liaison office was receiving funds through banking channels from the USA.

For the relevant assessment years, the company filed returns of income declaring nil income. It contended that its activities were to carry on activities that were ancillary and auxiliary to the activities of its head office and other group companies and to act as a communication channel between the head office and parties in India. It claimed that in terms of Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i), no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India to a non-resident from operations which were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purposes of export. In terms of Circular No. 20, dated 7-7-1964, a non-resident would not be liable to tax in India on any income attributable to operations confined to purchase of goods in India for export, even though the non-resident had an office or an agency in India for the purpose, or the goods were subjected to any manufacturing process before being exported from India. Therefore, no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India to it, as its operations were restricted to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, even though it had a liaison office to facilitate sourcing of products from Indian suppliers.

The Assessing Officer held that the activities of the company were actually beyond its activities required as a liaison office and a part of the entire business was done in India through the liaison office and therefore, the income had accrued or arisen or deemed to have accrued or arisen to the company in India in view of clause (b) of s/s. (2) of section 5. He, therefore, held that the income of the company was chargeable to tax to the extent of income, which was attributable to the activities done in India or accruing or arising in India on its behalf by its liaison office. He further held that 5% of the export value could reasonably be considered as income attributable to India operations, i.e., income accruing or arising in India to the company.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that it was an admitted fact that the company was not involved in the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, which would have involved transfer of title of goods purchased from the seller to the purchaser and as no purchase took place in the name of the liaison office, it was not entitled to the exemption enumerated in section 9(1). He, therefore, upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

On second appeal, the tribunal held that the case before it was a case of purchase of the goods for the purpose of export by the assessee. It observed that in the absence of there being any prima facie contract between the assessee and the local manufacturer, the status of the liaison office was that of buyer’s agent, more so when the local manufacturer knew it only as the agent of the buyer i.e., the company had placed the orders on it with a view to buy the goods in the course of export and, as directed, export it to various affiliates of the company. It held that the Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) clearly applied to the company and hence, no income was derived by the company in India through its operations of the liaison office in India. It accordingly, set aside the orders of the lower authorities and granted relief to the company.

On appeal to the High Court by Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held that the activities of the assesssee were confined to purchase of goods in India and could not be construed to represent any business connection nor could it be said that it resulted in any deemed accrual or arising of any income in India.

In the context of the income accruing or arising from ‘business connection’, the court observed that till 2004, the word ‘business connection’ had not been defined. However, by the Finance Act, 2003, Explanation 2 was inserted in section 9(1)(i), which, though it came into effect from o1-04-2004, was clarificatory in nature. It further took note of the deletion of the Proviso to Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) by the Finance Act, 1964, with effect from 01-04 -1964, which deletion had the effect of exempting a non-resident from tax in India on any income attributable to operations confined to purchase of goods in India for export, even though the non-resident had an office or agency in India for the purpose, or even though the goods were subjected by him to any manufacturing process before being exported from India.

In the instant case, the court noted that the as-sessee was not carrying on any business in India though it had established a liaison office in India whose object was to identify the manufacturers, give them the technical know-how and see that they manufactured goods according to its specifications, which would be sold to its affiliates. It further noted that the person who purchased the goods paid the money to the manufacturer and in the said income the assessee had no right; the said income could not be said to be an income arising or accruing in India vis-à-vis the assessee; the evidence on record showed that the assessee paid the entire expenses of the liaison office.

According to the court, the payment by the non-resident buyer of some consideration to the assessee outside India, as per the contract between the as-sessee and the buyer entered outside India, was an irrelevant factor in deciding the accrual of income in India and in any case, even if any income arose or accrued to the assessee, it was outside India.

Noting the provisions contained in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(i) concerning the business connection and that the saving for the activities was limited to the purchase of goods or merchandise, the court observed that no income should be deemed to ac-crue or arise in India. The court observed that once the entire operations were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, the income derived therefrom should not be deemed to accrue or arise in India u/s. 9. It also observed that the activities of the assessee in assisting the Indian manufacturer to manufacture the goods according to its specification was to see that the said goods manufactured had an international market, and could therefore be exported. The Court concluded that the assessee was not earning any income in India, and, if at all it was earning an income outside India under a contract which was entered into outside India, no part of its income could be taxed in India either u/s. 5 or section 9.

In arriving at the conclusion in favour of the assessee, the court was guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd. vs. CIT ,23 ITR 101 (SC) (para 15) and CIT vs. R.D. Agarwal & Co. 56 ITR 20 (SC).

Observations

Clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) clarifies that no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India, in the case of a non-resident, through or from operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. It clearly conveys that a non-resident can carry an activity in India and such activity may signify a business connection so however the income through or from such activity, if confined to purchase, shall not be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

An activity that travels beyond purchase of goods in India shall expose the income, pertaining to such an activity, to taxation in India under the deeming fiction contained in section 9(1)(i) of the Act. Such an activity may be carried out by a non-resident himself or through his agent or a liaison office.

It therefore is essential, for an exemption from tax, that the activity is confined to purchase of goods for export. The term ‘confined’ to is not defined in the Act and, as has been seen, has been the subject matter of intense conflict. One view of the matter is that the term ‘purchase’ signifies placing of an order for purchase of such goods that are exported. The other view is that the term connotes carrying out all such activities that lead to placing an order of purchase of goods for export, i.e., all activities that precede the placement of an order are ‘purchase’. In the narrowest possible view of the term ’purchase’, the activity is restricted to placing the purchase order, while taking a broader view, even the activities leading to placing an order for purchase of goods shall be included in ‘purchase’ of goods.

The term ‘confined’, in the context, is defined to mean “restrict within certain limits of scope” by the Oxford Dictionary. An activity or activities whose scope is restricted to purchase of goods can be said to be confined under the meaning supplied by the Oxford Dictionary. A plain reading explains that the dictionary does not narrow down or limit a ‘purchase’ to the activity of placing the order of purchase. Isolating activities leading to purchase from its scope is not even implied.

The important thing is to ascertain that can an order for purchase be placed without necessarily undertaking the activities that lead to such an order, such as; identifying the product and its quality, short-listing a vendor, giving product specifications, negotiating the price and fixing it, defining the logistics and specifying the delivery schedule? If the answer, in the context of clause(b) is no, then carrying on the pre- purchase activities shall not result in any deemed accrual of income.

The dictionary meaning of the term ‘purchase’ is to acquire on payment or for a consideration. It needs to be appreciated that an acquisition is not limited to placing an order of purchase but involves the series of acts carried out to successfully acquire a thing and includes the act of payment effected, post purchase, for an acquisition. It is significant to note that the word ‘purchase’ is preceded by the word ’to’, collectively reading ‘to purchase’ and so read, it sets any doubts to rest about the true un-derstanding of the law. To purchase without doubt, shall rope in all activities that enables the placement of a purchase order leading in turn to purchase or acquisition of goods.

The Authority in Columbia Sportswear Co.’s case has refused to appreciate that the activities considered by it to be constituting a business nonetheless were part of an activity of purchase without which it was not possible to purchase goods, and in that view of the mater, such activities were confined to purchase of goods alone and that they were not to be isolated from the purchase of goods as was being represented by the revenue authority.

In contrast, the Karnataka High Court in Nike Inc.’s case took a pragmatic view by holding that the pre-purchase activities were activities that were part of purchase of goods and carrying on such activities did not amount to travelling beyond the scope of the exemption contained in clause (b).

One needs to appreciate that the Reserve Bank of India while permitting a foreign company to set up a liaison office in India ensures that the operations of such an office are restricted in its scope and does not include carrying on of the business in which case, the company shall be required to set up a branch in India. In fact, carrying on of the pre- purchase activities by a liaison office is within the scope of the permission of the Reserve Bank of India.

Another aspect that requires appreciation is that pre-purchase activities and purchase represent an expenditure and not an income and therefore, even on this account, it is difficult to hold that these activities by themselves can lead to any income or even a deemed income. A right must have emerged to enable the assessee to demand and receive an income before it can be taxed in the hands of the assessee. No such right can be said to have emerged for carrying out pre-purchase activities. The Supreme court in the case of Anglo-French Textiles Co. Ltd., 23 ITR 101(SC) held that no profit could be said to have arisen on mere purchase of goods in India. For some incoherent reason this aspect was not appreciated by the Authority. Secondly, for the purpose of bringing even a deemed income to taxation, it is essential that the income pertaining to such an activity is defined and it is only then that a deemed income could be brought to taxation, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Anglo-French Textiles Co. Ltd., 25 ITR 27(SC). The principle so laid down by the apex court has a legislative acceptance in the form of clause (a) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act. In the said case, the court held that distribution of profits over different business operations or activities ought only to be made for sufficient and cogent reasons. The principle was reiterated in the case of R.D. Agarwala & Co. 56 ITR 20 and was expressly relied upon by the Karnataka High Court in Nike Inc.’s case and was ignored in Columbia Sportswear co’s case by the Authority.

The following observations and findings of the court in Nike Inc.’s case are helpful in appreciating the intent of the lawmakers; “If we keep the object with which the proviso to clause (b) of Explanation 1 to s/s. (1)(i) of section 9 of the Act was deleted, the object is to encourage exports thereby the Country can earn foreign exchange. The activities of the assessee in assisting the Indian manufacturer to manufacture the goods according to their specification is to see that the said goods manufactured has an international market, therefore, it could be exported. In the process, the assessee is not earning any income in India. If at all he is earning income outside India under a contract which is entered outside India, no part of their income could be taxed in India either u/s. 5 or section 9 of the Act.”

The Authority seems to have been largely influenced by the fact that the Indian office of the foreign company undertook activities of similar nature in Egypt and Bangladesh which in its opinion was outside the scope of exemption granted under clause(b) of Explanation 1 of section 9(1)(i) of the Act. This is clear from the following observations and findings; ‘There is another aspect. The activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India, is not confined to India. It also takes up the identical activities as in India, in Egypt and Bangladesh. The applicant has only pleaded that the goods procured from Egypt and Bangladesh are not imported into India and are sold only to the applicant in the US. Whether products of the applicant are sold in Egypt and Bangladesh is not clear. Whatever it be, since the activities of the applicant in India takes in, its busi-ness in Egypt and Bangladesh, it cannot be stated that the operations of the applicant in India are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.”

The very same Authority in IKEA Trading (Hong Kong) Ltd., 176 Taxman 344 held that re-purchase activities were a part of the purchase of goods and did not take away the benefit of clause (b) of the said Explanation. It however chose not to follow the ratio of the said decision by observing that it was delivered on the facts of that case. In that case, on a finding that the applicant therein, a foreign com-pany having a liaison office in India was engaged only in purchase operations in India for export, it was held that no income was generated by such an activity in India to be taxed in India either from the standpoint of section 5(2) or section 9(1)(i) read with Explanation 1(b) of the Income-tax Act. The AAR in Columbia Sportswear co.’s case confirmed that it was true that the activities undertaken by the applicant therein included some of the activities undertaken by the applicant before it.

The Authority, with respect, was unduly swayed by the proposition that all activities other than the actual sale cannot be divorced from the business of manufacture and sale especially in a case where the sale is of a branded product, designed and got made by the applicant under supervision, under a brand owned by the applicant. What the Authority failed to appreciate is that while what was stated by it was otherwise true but was rendered irrelevant, in the context, by virtue of clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act, which clause specifically excluded an activity of purchase from being labeled as business connection. In that view of the matter, the conclusion of the authority based on the decisions delivered without the benefit of analysing the said clause(b) cannot, with respect, be said to be laying down a good law. It was incorrect to have rejected the contention of the applicant that the decision of the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd’s case (supra) did not govern the situation, anymore, in view of the addition of Expla-nation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, taking out activities of purchase while deeming the accrual of income.

The Authority, instead of appreciating the change in law, went on to hold that the activity of purchase cannot be totally divorced from the activity of sale leading to income and this principle, in its opinion, is not affected by the Explanation which only seeks to exclude income from activities limited to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. The principle that a purchase of raw material, getting goods manufactured and selling the product form an integral activity remains unshaken in the opinion of the Authority and hence a deemed income arose in the hands of the applicant even on purchase of goods for export form India.

The decisions in the cases of CIT vs. N.K. Jain, 206 ITR 692 (Del.) and Mustaq Ahmed, In 307 ITR 401 (AAR) were also relied on by the applicant in Columbia Sportswear co.’s case to argue that the effect of the Explanation as understood therein supported the position adopted by the applicant. These decisions in our opinion are relevant to the issue being considered here in as much as the issue in those cases was about what constituted a business conncection in cases where the Indian arm of the non-resident was carrying out activities that preceded placing an order for purchasing goods. The Authority, however, chose to ignore these decisions on the ground that can be best explained by reproducing the words of the Authority; “There was no argument based on the decision of the Supreme Court before the High Court. There was no reference to that decision and there was no consideration of an argument that a purchase could not be totally divorced from a sale in such cases. There is no ra-tio emerging that by virtue of the addition of the Explanation, the principle set down by the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd.’s case (supra) is no more relevant or binding.”

The Authority rather relied upon the decision In Mustaq Ahmed’s case (supra), to hold that the Authority, in that case, after noting the decision of the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textiles’ case and the history of the Explanation to section 9(1) (i)    of the Act, confirmed after a detailed discussion on the question, that the ratio of the decision in that case remained unaffected by the addition of clause (b) to Explanation 1 in the present Act and the principle enunciated in the decision applied with equal vigour, irrespective of Explanation 1(b). Yet another decision relied upon by the applicant In Angel Garment Ltd., In 287 ITR 341, concerning the purchase of goods by a liaison office was held by the Authority to be delivered on the facts of that case and was not applied.

It is true that the activity of purchase contributes to eventual profit and therefore it may not be correct to say that such an activity does not contribute to any income. But what is needed to be appreciated is that the income attributable to such activity of purchase has been specifically excluded from the purview of taxation by the legislature on insertion of clause(b). It is this fact which appears to have been missed by the Authority when it relied on the decision in the Anglo-French Textiles’ case that was rendered on a law that did not have any such exclusion. The whole process of procurement and sale has to be completed to generate income and surely purchasing goods forms an integral part of the process of generating income, but the income, if any, pertaining to such an activity requires to be excluded by the law contained in clause(b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1).

It is our considered view that the conflict on the issue discussed is not only avoidable but should be avoided by the Revenue by taking a pragmatic stand to include the activities leading to placing an order for purchase of goods in purchase of goods for export. In our opinion, the term purchase of goods is wide enough and should be so construed, in the present days, to include even manufacturing of goods for export out of India, more so when such goods are used for captive consumption by a non-resident.

The discussion here is valid in the context of the provisions of the Income tax Act. The taxation of the assessees governed by a Double Tax Avoidance Agreement will be determined largely by the provisions of such agreement.

Minority Shareholder Squeezeout – Multiple, Conflicting, Loosely Drafted Provisions

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Companies Act, 2013

The Companies Act, 2013, (“the Act”) is gradually coming into force, with 98 sections duly notified and several set of draft rules circulated for feedback. The target for the Act to fully come into force by end of this financial year seems achievable. But how desirable is such speedy implementation? The common argument for quick implementation is that the new law has been in contemplation/consideration for too long and it is high time we have a modern law. The reality is that each successive version of the Bill has seen major changes/new provisions which, both in terms of drafting and implications, have been inadequately discussed. Worse, and that is one of the issues presented in this article, there are provisions that seem to overlap or are in conflict with other laws. In particular, for some reason, the lawmakers have sought to duplicate requirements that SEBI has already framed. These include provisions relating to Independent Directors, Audit Committee, bonus shares and many others. In subsequent issues, we will discuss such duplicate provisions. To begin with, the vexed topic of ‘Minority Squeeze-out’ is considered here.

What is buy-out vs. squeeze-out?

Simply described, minority Squeeze-out involves marginalising of and buying out of minority shareholders, often forced (hence the word “squeeze”) out of a lower value than fair value. As compared to buyouts which may be mandatory on the offers or but optional for the sellers, a squeeze-out gets greater publicity in case of listed companies though it is common in unlisted companies also. There was a time when companies sought to increase minority shareholding by issuing shares through a public issue. The process of listing ensured a higher issue price. Over a period, with increasing compliance and other requirements and depressed share prices, the status of listing can become burdensome. Worse, unscrupulous managements sometimes pursue acquisition of public (minority) shareholding at depressed value. Forced buybacks were thus seen in many companies (discussed earlier in this column) with minorities being bought off against their will and in many cases, at prices that were lower than fair value. The stratagem used was to carry this out through a court-approved scheme of arrangement/ reduction of capital where often the criteria for approval are different. The ignorant and scattered shareholders usually did not offer vigorous opposition. SEBI and stock exchanges took some belated inadequate action. Certain provisions such as requirement of pre-approval of schemes by stock exchanges were introduced. However, this was not enough and even circumvented.

Be as it may be, finally, the Act now makes certain specific provisions in relation to such minority squeeze-outs.

What do the new provisions in the Act provide?

Firstly, the new Act prohibits buyback of shares through schemes of reduction or arrangement. Thus, companies cannot buy back shares of shareholders through such schemes. Effectively, they will have to resort to the procedure for buyback of shares as prescribed in section 68 of the Act relating to ‘buyback of shares’. This means they will also have to follow the Rules that would be notified by the Central Government (for unlisted companies) and the Regulations as notified by SEBI (for listed companies). The provisions for buyback in the Act/ Rules/Regulations ensure that it cannot be forced upon unwilling shareholders. It is another issue that these provisions are not well drafted. Further, the provisions relating to buyback of shares suffer from several limitations, particularly the size of buyback. Hence, even genuine cases may face difficulties. Nevertheless, one abusive method will come to an end.

Secondly, there are two specific provisions that enable minority buy-outs. Essentially, they provide for purchase of shares of the minority shareholders when more than 90% of the shares are bought by a company or group. When minority shareholders are reduced to below 10%, they have minimal rights, except those provided generally by the Act or the articles of association. They have no powers to veto a general or special resolution. They also cannot file a petition complaining of oppression/mismanagement or initiate class action. The minority may thus want to have an opportunity provided by the majority shareholders to be bought out at a fair price, even if they did not avail of an earlier opportunity.

 Sections 235 and 236 deal with such situations. While section 235 is a slightly modified version of the existing section 395 of the Companies Act, 1956, section 236, though overlapping to an extent, provides for a different situation and procedure.

 Section 395, as may be recollected, provides for an opportunity and obligation both to an acquirer of 90% or more shares in a company to acquire the shares of the minority. The minority shareholders thus have a chance to exit the company.

Weak drafting

Section 235, however, continues the weak drafting of existing section 395 but with some modifications. It essentially provides that if a scheme or contract to acquire shares of a company is approved by more than 90% of shareholders (excluding shares held by acquirer company), then the shares of dissenting minorities may be acquired by the acquirer on the same terms. This section can be fairly dubbed as a squeeze-out provision since the acquirer can acquire the shares of the minority shareholders without the latter’s consent. The minority shareholders may, however, apply to the Tribunal and the Tribunal may give appropriate directions for relief. It appears that a window of negotiation for a higher price gets opened for the minority shareholders. The acquirer has the option, but not the obligation, to make such an offer to acquire shares of the minority shareholders. The minority shareholders, however, cannot force the acquirer to acquire their shares.

Section 236 is in many ways a variant of section 235 though with some important differences. Generally stated, it provides for an obligation for an acquirer/ persons acting in concert who have acquired 90% or more of the shares in a company to make an offer to the remaining shareholders. The offer has to be on the same terms and has to be valid for a prescribed period of time. Though the drafting is ambiguous at some places, it appears that the remaining shareholders are not under an obligation to sell their shares. Thus, it is not a squeeze-out. There is a provision that provides for negotiation by a specified section of the shareholders for a higher price. It is provided that in such a case, the higher price received by such shareholders will have to be distributed pro rata amongst the other shareholders who did not get such higher price. This is strange in one aspect. If a section of shareholders is given a higher price, the better course is to make the acquirer give such higher price to the other shareholders too.

Contrast with the SEBI Delisting Regulations Sections 235/236 apply to listed and unlisted companies. For listed companies, it is necessary to also consider the SEBI Regulations on delisting (SEBI (Delisting of equity shares) Regulations, 2009 or “the Regulations”). Simply put, the Regulations provide for procedure that Promoters/companies seeking to delist shares from stock exchanges need to follow. These Regulations are relevant in this context because the Promoters holding has to increase to at least 90% for delisting to be successful. The regulations also provide for the steps to be taken after the holding is increased to more than 90%. Some important steps relevant to the present context are as follows:

•    The proposed delisting has to be approved by a special resolution. Such special resolution has to be by a postal ballot thus giving all shareholders a better opportunity to participate.

•    Further, the resolution can be acted upon only if at least two-thirds of the non-Promoter share-holders approve delisting.

•    The Promoters have to make an offer to acquire the shares of non-Promoters.

•    A minimum benchmark offer price, based on recent prices and acquisitions by the Promoters, is fixed.

•    The offer needs to result in such number of acceptances that would make the holding of the Promoters higher of two figures. The first figure is 90% of the equity share capital. The second is the existing holding plus 50% of the non-Promoters holding. Thus, if the Promoters held 75%, then they should get at least 15% acceptances. If they held, say, 85%, then they should get at least 7.50% acceptances. If this minimum figure is reached, then the Promoters are entitled to delist the shares.

•    They are also required to make another offer and, in effect, keep it valid for the next one year, to acquire the remaining shares at the same price. The remaining shareholders have a right, but not an obligation, to offer their shares during this period. In other words, they may choose to remain shareholders, in the unlisted company.

If one compares these Regulations with section 235/236, clearly the Regulations give better protection to the minority shareholders, though they make it difficult for the Promoters to delist the company. The provisions of sections 235/236 and the Regulations are obviously not alternate to each other and both need to be complied with. Thus the stricter of the two provisions would apply. However, there may be a grey area as regards seemingly beneficial provisions. For example, if the provisions in the Act give a right to the acquirer to acquire the remaining shares, can the remaining shares be so acquired, though the Regulations do not provide such a right? One factor involved in interpreting this issue is whether a beneficial provision in the Regulations would override provisions in another enactment.

In any event, even for unlisted companies, section 235/236 are beneficial to those minorities who are reduced to such a number that their voice does not matter. The 90% majority acquirer also has an opportunity to acquire 100% control of the company so as to be able to run the company without any outside involvement. In the author’s opinion the provisions are worded in such a manner that the acquirer may escape from such obligation. Section 235 uses the term “transferee company” (including its nominees/subsidiaries) on whom such obligation is created. Thus, effectively, it will not apply if the acquirer is not a company or if the acquirer is more than one. This may even become a limitation on the acquirer if it seeks to acquire the shares in more than one entity. Section 236 is worded more broadly. However, several protections that are available in the regulations for listed companies are missing. Loose drafting is evident at several places.

Conclusion

To conclude, competition between two regulators to provide better protection to minority shareholders and generally other persons may seem commend-able. However, conflicting provisions may in the long run be counter productive and create hurdles for genuine transactions. Worse, unscrupulous companies may be found to resort to legislative arbitrage, seeking those provisions or methods that avoid both laws or use the ill-drafted one with lesser restrictions. The fact that the Act is carved in stone, in the sense of being very difficult to amend can only make matters more difficult. Ideally, SEBI, with its expertise, experience and resources, should be given a monopoly or at least a priority as far as listed companies are concerned.

Clinical trial test reports did not ‘make available’ technical knowledge, experience, know-how, etc. — Consideration is not fee for included services under India-Canada DTAA

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New Page 1

Part C — International Tax Decisions

 



6 Anapharm Inc, In re


(2008) 305 ITR 394 (AAR)

S. 9(1)(vii) of IT Act; Articles 5, 7, 12 of India-Canada
DTAA

Dated : 11-9-2008

Issue :

Issuance of clinical trial test reports to clients did not
‘make available’ technical knowledge, experience, know-how, etc. and
consideration thereof is not fee for included services under India-Canada DTAA.

Facts :

The applicant, a Canadian company, was a contract research
organisation which assisted pharmaceutical companies globally by providing
clinical and bio-analytical services for development of new drugs or generic
equipments of drugs already being marketed.

The applicant had entered into agreement with two Indian
pharma companies for undertaking clinical and bio-analytical studies. The issue
before the AAR was whether the fee received by the applicant from the Indian
pharma companies is subject to tax in India in accordance with the provisions of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act’) and DTAA between India and Canada.

For the purpose of undertaking clinical trials, the applicant
had devised product-specific methods/protocols which were in conformity with
international regulations and requirements of the drug authorities of the
various countries. Such methods/protocols belonged to the applicant and were not
shared with the clients. The applicant merely gave final reports/conclusions of
the trials to its clients. The applicant contended that the services rendered to
the Indian pharma companies did not result in transfer of any technical
experience, know-how or technical plan or technical design to the payers and
hence, did not satisfy the test of ‘make available’ under ‘Article 12 – Fees for
included services’ (‘FIS’) of the DTAA.

Held :

The AAR accepted the contention and held :

(i) There was some difference between S. 9 of the IT Act
and Article 12 of DTAA. Mere provision of technical services, in absence of
their being ‘made available’, was not enough to attract Article 12(4)(b).

(ii) To ascertain the meaning of the expression ‘makes
available’ as embodied in the treaty, the AAR referred to the similar
provision of India-USA DTAA and the annexed protocol. The AAR observed that
consideration paid can be regarded as ‘FIS’ only if the twin test of rendering
services and making technical knowledge available were satisfied. Reliance for
this was placed on the Bombay High Court decision in the case of Diamond
Services International Ltd. v. UOI,
(2008) 169 Taxman 201.

(iii) Though the services rendered were sophisticated in
nature, the applicant did not reveal to Indian pharma companies the process of
how it conducted clinical trials and related tests. A broad description or
indication of the type of test carried out before issuance of reports did not
enable Indian pharma companies to derive requisite knowledge to conduct the
tests or to develop the technique on their own.

(iv) Clinical procedure, analytical methods, etc., which
were proprietary items of the applicant, were not transferred, assigned or
handed over to Indian pharma companies. Mere handing over of reports of tested
samples and test compounds cannot be equated with making technology, know-how,
etc., available to the pharma companies.


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2013-TIOL-1541-CESTAT-MUM Commissioner of C. Ex., Pune vs. Aztecsoft Ltd.

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Testing and analysis of IT Software – specific amendment in the definition of “Technical Testing and Analysis” to bring within its fold testing and analysis of IT software with effect from 16-05- 2008. Activity not taxable prior to the said date under any category.

Facts:

The Department appealed against the order of the Hon. Commissioner dropping the demands of the assessee for the period prior to 16-05-2008 for providing services of testing and analysis of computer software. Since the definition of “Technical Testing and Analysis” service was specifically amended on 16-05-2008 to include the said activity, it was taxable only with effect from 16-05-2008 according to the assessee. The decision of Stag Software Pvt. Ltd. in 2008 (10) STR 329 (Tri-Bang) and Relq Software Pvt. Ltd. in 2011 (23) STR 449 (Kar) were relied upon.

Held:

Referring to the definition of “Technical Testing and Analysis” prior to 16-05-2008 and as amended with effect from 16-05-2008, the budget instructions letter 334/1/2008 – TRU dated 29-02-2008 was referred to and relying on the decision of Relq Software (supra) held that testing and analysis of IT software would be effective only from 16-05-2008 when the said activity was specifically included under technical testing and analysis service as IT software services were introduced on the said date. Similar amendments were made in the taxable services of Business Auxiliary Services, technical inspection & certification, management repair of properties and consulting engineer’s services to include IT software services.
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2013-TIOL-1504-CESTAT-DEL M/s. Ujjawal Parivahan Sahakari Samiti Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II

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Loading/unloading & transportation of limestone with processing cannot be classified as cargo handling services.

Facts:
The appellant entered into an agreement to provide services as a contractor for hiring of machines, equipments, crushing & screening plant and other services for production of low silicon limestone gitties. The Department issued a show cause notice and contended to levy tax on the said activities under the category of “Cargo Handling Services” for the period up to 09-09-2004 and under the category of “Business Auxiliary Services” for the period from 2004-08. The appellant contended that the activity of transportation/loading and unloading was only incidental to the actual activity of processing of goods carried out by them on behalf of their principals which became taxable only with effect from 16-06-2005 under Business Auxiliary Services.

Held:
Referring to the definitions of “Cargo Handling Services” and “Business Auxiliary Services” and discussing the rules for clarification laid down in section 65A, it was concluded that the essential characteristic of the composite service was not Cargo Handling Service. Allowing the appeal, it was held that the activity of transportation/loading and unloading was only incidental to the actual activity of processing of goods which formed the essential character and that such activity became taxable only after the amendment in the definition of “Business Auxiliary Services” with effect from 16-06-2005, the liability of which the appellant discharged under Business Auxiliary Service, thus no penalty was also found leviable.

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2013 (32) STR 86 (Tri.-Mum) Global Transgene Ltd. vs. Commr. of C. Ex., Cus. & S.T., Aurangabad

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Package containing only a mark showing the technology used which is not a logo or trademark or hallmark of the assessee, cannot be considered to be granting representational rights. Therefore, the same is not covered under franchise services.

Facts:
The appellant obtained licenses, for self-use and to transfer the technology to sub-licensees, from a Chinese company. Accordingly, the department contested that the activity of sub-licensing was covered under franchise services as franchise rights
were given to the sub-licensees. The appellants stated that the activity of sub-licensing was not covered under the definition of ‘franchise service’. The appellants also produced samples of products which did not contain any logo or hallmark or trademark of theirs. In fact, the package label  clearly indicated that the seeds were manufactured and marketed by sub-licensees in their own name. The agreement was for transfer of technology in the form of seeds for a consideration. Further, though they provided certain training, the same was common in case of imported technologies and it could not be construed as providing representational rights. Revenue argued that one of the sub-licensees stated that the appellants had granted right to use logo and 3D hallmark of the technology which are clearly identifiable with the appellants. Further, only after testing the seeds, the appellants supplied 3D hallmark.

Held:
The appellants were not granted any representation  rights to represent the Chinese company in India and the appellants neither were entitled to nor granted any representational rights to sublicensees. The mark denoted on the package was neither a logo nor a trademark or hallmark of the appellants but was only denoting that the seeds contained the technology. The case thus was decided in favour of the appellants.

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2013 (32) STR 113 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Vadodara – II

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Transactions between SEZ unit and DTA unit of the same entity are not leviable to service tax.

Facts:
The appellant set up 2 units viz. in an SEZ and in DTA. The SEZ unit also provided certain in-house work to DTA units. The respondents demanded service tax on the said transactions between SEZ and DTA units considering them as separate legal entities on the grounds that both the units were separately registered with the service tax department, raised invoices and fell under the definition of ‘persons’ as per the SEZ Act. The appellants contested that in the present case there was absence of two parties for the provision of taxable service by one person to another and also that the SEZ Act had no relevance for interpretation of the service tax law. Further, invoices were issued to satisfy SEZ law and internal monitoring purposes only. Also, SEZ Units never received any amount from DTA units as the same were interunit entries in books of accounts which were not taxable transactions.

Held:
Confirming the contentions of the appellant, the Hon. Tribunal held that merely entering into agreements and raising invoices did not mean SEZs were separate legal entities. Further, the definition of ‘person’ as per the SEZ Act, which included AOP or BOI, whether incorporated or not was not applicable in the present case as the units were not shown as AOP or BOI. Further, the presence of two persons was a must to levy service tax. In the absence of any definition under service tax law, the persons were held not to be separate legal persons and the transaction between SEZ and DTA units was not liable to service tax.

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2013 (32) STR 95 (Tri–Delhi) – Endurance Technologies Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commr. Of C. Ex., Aurangabad

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Service tax paid on mandap keeper services to celebrate the annual day function is eligible for CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The appellant manufacturer of assessable goods availed mandap keeper’s services to celebrate the annual day function which was attended by the employees, their family members and employees of their sister units and claimed CENVAT credit thereon. They relied upon Toyota Kirloskar Motor Pvt. Ltd. 2011 (24) STR 645 (Kar) and Ultratech Cement Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 577 (Bom.) in support of their claim. The revenue rejected the claim relying on the decisions of Manikgarh Cement 2010 (20) STR 456 (Bom.) and Eicher Motors Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 281 (Tri.-Del.).

Held:
Considering the inapplicability due to facts being distinct than in the present case than in the cases of Manikgarh Cement (Supra) and Eicher Motors Ltd. (Supra), the Hon. Tribunal relying on Toyota Kirloskar Motor Pvt. Ltd. and Ultratech Cement Ltd., allowed the claim of the appellant wherein the facts were similar.

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2013 (32) STR 209 (Tri.-Del) Kansara Modler Ltd. vs. CCEx, Jaipur-II

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Whether the receiver of services is entitled to utilise the CENVAT credit for payment of service tax under the Import Rules? Held, Yes.

Facts:
Appellant received “supply of tangible goods service” from outside India for the provision of its output services in India and utilised CENVAT credit for discharging the service tax payable as the service recipient of the said services. The department issued a show cause notice disallowing the utilisation of such CENVAT credit payment of service tax and confirmed the demand.

Held:
Referring to Rule 2(q) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of Service Tax Rules,1994 it was held that the Appellant was a person liable to service tax and thus becomes a taxable service provider under Rule 2(r) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and consequently becomes output service provider under Rule 2(p) of the said Rules. Thus the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) disallowing the payment under reverse charge mechanism vide CENVAT credit was set aside.

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2013 (32) STR 31 (Bom.) Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., S. T. & Cus., Raigad

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Input services used indirectly in or in relation to manufacture of final dutiable products even at a distant place, are eligible to avail CENVAT credit.

Facts:
The appellant was engaged in the manufacture of dutiable goods such as naphtha, ethane-propane, LPG and residual gases at its Uran plant and exempted goods such as crude oil and natural gases at its Mumbai offshore location. The crude oil was either directly sold from Mumbai Offshore or further used to manufacture goods at the Uranplant. The appellant being registered input service distributors, distributed CENVAT credit. Revenue contended that crude oil manufactured at Mumbai Offshore was sold to its buyers therefrom before the Uran plant came into existence. Therefore, crude oil, used at the Uran plant to manufacture dutiable products, cannot be termed as semifinished goods and thereby concluded that input services were entirely used for exempted products and no CENVAT credit was admissible.

Analysing the definition of input services, the appellant contested that the services used whether directly or indirectly in or in relation to the manufacture of a final product are eligible input services to claim CENVAT credit. Accordingly, the definition was wide enough to cover current instance and as per Rule 6(1) and Rule 6(2) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the appellant was entitled to CENVAT credit on pro-rata basis of service tax paid on the input services used in the manufacture of final dutiable products only.

Held:
Since the definition of input services under Rule 2(l)(ii) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, uses expressions “directly or indirectly” and “in or in relation to” in conjunction, the intention of the legislature was to widen the scope and purview of the entitlement. Merely because the appellant manufactured exempted goods, the revenue cannot disallow benefit of CENVAT credit on the input services used in or in relation to the manufacture of dutiable final product. The dutiable final products manufactured at the Uran plant were fundamentally premised upon the manufacturing process commenced at Mumbai Offshore i.e., manufacture of dutiable products was impossible unless the process starts at Mumbai Offshore and there is continuous supply of crude oil from Mumbai Offshore to the Uran plant. Therefore, relying on the Hon. Supreme Court’s decisions in case of Escorts Ltd. 2004 (171) ELT 145 (SC) and Solaris Chemtech Ltd. 2007 (214) ELT 481 (SC), it was held that the appellant was entitled to CENVAT credit of input services used even indirectly in manufacture of dutiable final products subject to Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

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Sale Price in Banquet Hall under MVAT Act, 2002

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Introduction
Under Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, (MVAT Act), tax is levied on the ‘sale price’. There are situations where the transactions are composite and only part of it would be liable to VAT. In case of Works Contract the situation is clear due to judicial pronouncements. However, there are new types of transactions coming up for determination of ‘sale price’. One such instance is sale price, for the purpose of MVAT Act, in case of charges for Banquet Hall. Banquet halls normally arrange programs as per requirement of clients. Entire arrangement includes various services including serving of food and drinks. For example, if a marriage function is arranged in a banquet hall, then there will be arrangement for a stage, furniture, decoration, music, etc. and also supply of food and drinks.

Banquet Hall, a composite transaction

In case of banquet hall, the service provider i.e. hotels etc., are liable to pay service tax. Simultaneously there being supply of food and drinks, VAT is also applicable. An issue arises as to on what amount VAT is payable. One view can be that the entire charges are liable to VAT. Other view can be that only that portion of price, which is relating to food and drinks, can be liable to VAT.

Determination of disputed question (DDQ) in caseof Tip Top Enterprises
The dealer, M/s. Tip Top Enterprises, filed an application for determination, before the Commissioner of Sales Tax, to get the issue of ‘sale price’ for banquet hall under the MVAT Act decided. In the DDQ dated 25-05-2009, the learned Commissioner of Sales Tax, rejecting all the arguments of the dealer, held that the whole amount charged by the dealer (banquet hall) is liable to VAT.

Decision of Tribunal in above case
The matter went to Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal by way of appeal no. 41 of 2009. In the appeal, on behalf of appellant, following arguments were reiterated.

a) Referring to definition of ‘sale price’ in MVAT Act which reads as under:

“Section 2(25) “sale price” means the amount of valuable consideration paid or payable to a dealer for any sale made including any sum charged for anything done by the seller in respect of the goods at the time of or before delivery thereof, other than the cost of insurance for transit or of installation, when such cost is separately charged,” it was submitted that the amount received against sale/supply of goods only can be considered and not the amount received for services as the ‘sale price’.

b) As per the definition of ‘sale’, the supply of food is deemed to be sale. The said definition  of ‘sale’ is as under in section 2(24) of MVAT Act, 2002:

“Section 2 (24) “sale” means a sale of goods made within the State for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge; and the words “sell”, “buy” and “purchase”, with all their grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall be construed accordingly;

Explanation,-—For the purposes of this clause,—

a. a sale within the State includes a sale determined to be inside the State in accordance with the principles formulated in section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956;
b.
i. the transfer of property in any goods, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

ii. the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract;

iii. a delivery of goods on hire-purchase or any system of payment by installments;

iv. the transfer of the right to use any goods or any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

v. the supply of goods by any association or body of persons incorporated or not, to a member thereof or other valuable consideration;

vi. the supply, by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service is made or given for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration:”

Accordingly, it was submitted that in a banquet hall transaction, only supply of food and drinks part is ‘sale’.

c) Relying upon judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in case of Builder Association of India vs. Union of India (73 STC 370), the above argument was reiterated, more particularly citing the following observation.

“The latter part of clause (29-A) of article 366 of the Constitution makes the position very clear. While referring to the transfer, delivery or supply of any goods that takes place as per sub-clauses (a) to (f) of clause (29-A), the latter part of clause (29-A) says that “such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods” shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made.”

Accordingly, it was submitted that under Article 366(29A)(f) only supply of goods is deemed to be a sale which can be subject matter of sales tax and not the total price of transaction. Therefore, it was urged that the levy on total amount was unconstitutional.

d) Based on judgment in case of Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (12 VST 371(SC), it was submitted that on the amount on which service tax is paid, VAT cannot be attracted, as both are mutually exclusive.

e) Citing judgment in case of Cap ‘N’ Chops Caterers vs. State of Haryana (37 VST 226) (P & H), it was submitted that the banquet transaction is in the nature of works contract and can be liable to the extent of goods value and service portion cannot be taxed.

f) Reliance was placed on the judgment in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91) (SC). In this judgment Hon. Supreme Court has observed that the receipts towards hotel activity are divisible.

g) Reliance was also placed on following observation of Hon. Supreme Court in case of T. N. Kalyan Mandpam (135 STC 480)(SC).

“42. In regard to the submission made on article 366(29A)(f), we are of the view that it does not provide to the contrary. It only permits the State to impose a tax on the supply of food and drink by whatever mode it may be made. It does not conceptually or otherwise include the supply of services within the definition of sale and purchase of goods. This is particularly apparent from the following phrase contained in the said sub-article “such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods”.

Contentions of the Department
a) Relying upon judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in case of K. Damodarsamy Naidu [(2000) (117 STC 1), it was contended that the whole amount is liable to VAT. In this judgment, the Hon. Supreme Court was considering sale price in case of Restaurant.

b) Department also relied upon judgment of Bombay High Court decision in East India Hotels Ltd. (99 STC 197). In this case the restaurant was claiming reduction from sale price on account of luxuries provided in restaurant like AC facility etc., on the ground that they are towards providing extra facilities. However, the Hon. High Court has held that the whole price is liable to sales tax.

Conclusion of Tribunal
Hon. Tribunal delivered its judgment in above appeal no. 41 of 2009 dated 23-04-2013 and referred to above arguments as well as looked into the factual position. Tribunal referred to booking documents for banquet hall. It was seen that the hotel has quoted separate charges, towards rent of hall, about food and drinks and decorating etc. The charges towards food and drinks were almost at par with charges for same menu, when provided by hotel, in other than banquet hall.

In view of the above factual and legal position Tribunal held that the sale price for food and drinks will be the price agreed between the parties. In other words, Tribunal disapproved the DDQ, that whole amount towards banquet hall is liable to VAT. As per Tribunal, VAT can be levied on amount towards food and drinks as agreed between the parties. In relation to decoration charges, which were also charged separately in the quotation, Tribunal held that the same items may attract tax as lease transaction.

The above judgment will be useful to avoid double taxation. In absence of such judgment, dealer may become liable to service tax as well as VAT on the same amount. This is not expected, hence, it will certainly give relief from such double taxation.

Education: A Taxable Commercial Training Service?

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Introduction:

Commercial training or coaching service was introduced in the service tax law from 1st July, 2003 by defining the expression, “commercial training or coaching” and “commercial training or coaching centre” in sections 65(26) and 65(27) respectively of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) as reproduced below:

Section 65(26):

““Commercial training or coaching” means any training or coaching provided by a commercial training or coaching centre”.

Section 65(27):

““Commercial training or coaching centre” means any institute or establishment providing commercial training or coaching for imparting skill or knowledge or lessons on any subject or field other than the sports, with or without issuance of a certificate and includes coaching or tutorial classes but does not include preschool coaching and training centre or any institute or establishment which issues any certificate or diploma or degree or any educational qualification recognized by law for time being in force.”

Consequently, taxable service in relation to this service was defined in section 65(105)(zzc) of the Act. Within a span of 4 to 5 years of the introduction of the service, in a significant number of cases, the co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal at Bangalore and Chennai pronounced various decisions wherein various large and well-known institutions were held to be not liable under this taxing entry mainly on account of their status as non-profit making or charitable institutions. Understandably, as a consequence thereof, the Government appended an explanation to the definition to section 65(105)(zzc) of the Act vide the Finance Act, 2010 to come into effect retrospectively from 01-07-2003. Thus, the relevant provisions read as follows:

Section 65(105)(zzc):

““Taxable service” means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by a commercial training or coaching centre in relation to commercial training or coaching.

Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression “commercial training or coaching centre” occurring in this sub-clause and in clauses (26), (27) and (90a) shall include any centre or institute, by whatever name called, where training or coaching is imparted for consideration, whether or not such centre or institute is registered as a trust or a society or similar other organization under any law for the time being in force and carrying on its activity with or without profit motive and the expression “commercial training or coaching” shall be construed accordingly.”

It is also relevant to note here that the Finance Act, 2011 with effect from 01-05-2011 amended the definition of commercial training or coaching centre in section 65(27) whereby exclusionary part of the definition was omitted and instead the said exclusion part was simultaneously declared exempt vide Notification 33/2011-ST from 01-05-2011.

Primarily, in terms of the above explanation, the scope of the service was expanded to exclude profit motive element. When the decision of the Madras Tribunal in Great Lake Institute of Management Ltd. (GLIM) vs. CST Chennai 2008 (10) STR 202 (Tri.-Chennai) was challenged by the Revenue in the Supreme Court, on noticing the above explanation the Apex Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and remanded the case for denovo consideration in the light of the said Explanation [2010 (19) STR 481 (SC)].

Larger Bench direction vide Interim Order No.ST/443/2013 in Great Lake Institute of Management Ltd. vs. CST Chennai & 5 others: [2013-TIOL- 1480-CESTAT-DEL-LB]

Recently, in a bunch of appeals filed before the Tribunal, a Division Bench prima facie doubted the reasons recorded in one of the decisions viz., Magnus Society vs. CC&CE, Hyderabad 2009 (13) STR 509 (Tri.-Bang). In this decision, a distinction was made between higher learning through a proper format of education imparted by institutions on one hand and those which are characterised as commercial training or coaching centres preparing students for entrance examinations to universities or the like. The matter therefore was referred to the Larger Bench of CESTAT (LB or the Bench). The limited reference however was made to examine whether the provisions relating to commercial coaching or training service as defined in sections 65(26), 65(27) and 65(105)(zzc) of the Act accommodate a distinction between imparting of specific skill by an institution such as in computer literacy, computer operations, spoken English or accountancy at one end and a broader format of education imparted by an institution of higher learning providing a course of instructions in MBA, management, computer science or similar disciplines. The Bench headed by Hon. President, CESTAT examined the said relevant statutory provisions in relation to commercial training or coaching services specifically considering the scope of the service in the light of the above explanation inserted with retrospective effect and also analysed various precedents including Magnus Society (supra), GLIM (supra) and a few others as summarised below.

On making primary examination of the statutory provisions, the Bench held a view that for an institution or establishment to claim immunity from the liability of service tax, it must establish any one of the following exclusionary parameters:

• The institute/establishment is not imparting skill, knowledge or lessons on any subject or field except sports.
• If the establishment is a pre-school coaching or a training centre.
• Institute/establishment which issues any certificate, diploma, degree or an educational qualification recognised by the extant law.

Thus, as per the preliminary remark of the LB, if any institute fails to fulfill any of the listed parameters, it would be considered a commercial training or coaching centre and consequently be liable for service tax.

Gist of analysis of various precedents:

In case of GLIM vs. CST, Chennai 2008 (10) STR 202 (Chennai), the appeal was allowed by holding that it being a recognised charitable organisation under the Income- tax Act, 1961 and engaged in public utility areas, profit motive was absent although it may have earned surplus. Since the decision was pronounced prior to incorporation of the Explanation and profit motive was excluded by virtue of the Explanation, the Supreme Court in Revenue’s appeal remanded the matter (2010 (19) STR 481 (SC) for denovo consideration in the light of the Explanation. Another pre- amendment decision in the case of Administrative Staff College of India vs. CC&CE, Hyderabad 2009 (14) STR 341 (Tri.- Bang), the Tribunal concluded that although profit might have been earned, the laudable objectives of the institution registered as a society could not be equated with those of a tutorial college and that the expression ‘commercial’ in the definition indicates that it qualifies coaching or training centre and not coaching or training. Further, that the registered society also exempted from income tax as charitable organisation cannot be considered a commercial centre. Revenue’s appeal to Supreme Court in this case was dismissed without recording any reasons—reported in 2010 (20) STR J117 (SC). In another decision in Magnus Society vs. CC&CE, Hyderabad (supra) following the decision in GLIM (supra), the appeal was allowed. In this case, in addition to the reason of absence of profit motive involved in services of the institution, Hon. Tribunal carved out distinction for the term ‘education’ as against coaching or training by observing that ‘education’ was a much broader term of which coaching and training was only a part and the breadth of the term education could not be encompassed in the definition containing narrow meaning. Institutes offering degrees recognised by law could not be covered within the ambit of the defined category of the service. This view was also reiterated in Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India vs. CE&CE, Hyderabad 2009 (14) STR 220 (Tri. -Bang) while noting that the states Governments have recognised ICFAI University by notifications and there also existed UGC recognition. Further, considering the exempt nature of the income, the activity being non-commercial was held as not liable for service tax. This deci-sion also was pronounced prior to incorporation of the explanation.

The stated provisions were also considered by the Kerala High Court in Malappuram District—Parallel College Assn. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 321 (Ker) wherein challenge was made on several grounds interalia including the grounds of discrimination and violation of Article14 of the Constitution. The pleas regarding education being non-taxable under the Constitution and coverage of parallel colleges by exclusionary clause were repelled. The Hon. Court however ruled that the impugned levy was discriminative since the burden of the levy ultimately fell on students and there was no ap-parent distinction between the students pursuing education in regular colleges or in parallel colleges. The case of Indian Institute of Aircraft Engineering vs. UOI & Ors 2013-TIOL -430-HC-DEL-ST also was discussed by the Bench with reference to what constituted approved institution regulated by law. In this case, the High Court had concluded that the institution in question provides education resulting in degree/diploma/qualifications recognised by law and therefore was covered by the exclusionary clause and consequently not subject to service tax. In addition to various decisions by CESTAT, decisions involving issue of entitlement to exemption from income tax on the ground of educational purpose, under the Income-tax Act also were discussed. The Bench however, noted that neither the precedents nor the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act assisted them significantly to interpret the scope of the expression “commercial training or coaching” or “commercial training or coaching centre” which was for their limited consideration.

Training & Education: Whether literal meaning relevant?

In addition to discussing various precedent decisions on behalf of the appellants, reference was made to various textual authorities to analyse contours of relevant terms such as teach, education, training, coach etc. to elucidate what the words meant and consequently to draw distinction between the concept of ‘training’ and ‘education’ or to examine whether they overlap. However, it was noted that when legislatively mandated definition was available, it is impermissible to look to extra textual guidance. “A good faith interpretation of section 65(27) requires that whatever skills/ knowledge/lessons are imparted on any subject or field, the activity must be considered to be training or coaching.”

Conclusion:

The Bench finally concluded that the retrospectively introduced Explanation in section 65(105) (zzc) of the Act redefined the scope of the expres-sion “commercial training or coaching” in section 65(26) by virtue of which a commercial element or profit motive became an irrelevant ingredient to bring an institute or establishment within the fold of “commercial training or coaching centre” nor would any organisational structure of registration of the entity as a trust or society would determine taxability. On analysing the other facet of the definition of “commercial training or coaching centre” in section 65(27), it was held that the training or coaching for imparting skill, knowledge or lessons on any subject or field constitutes commercial training or coaching and the scope of “training or coaching” could not be restricted by super-adding any conditions by parameters of course content, syllabus, duration, etc. The Bench declined to agree with the restricted interpretation pleaded or as was made in the precedent decisions and held that in the definition contained in section 65(27), there would be no rationale for engrafting an exclusionary clause broadly formulated other than what is specifically excluded viz., an institute or establishment which issues any certificate, diploma, degree or any educational qualification recognised by law. The Bench further held that since Parliament introduced the ‘Explanation’ retrospectively to clarify ambiguities to ascertain the expression ‘commercial’, recourse to guidance from precedents was not warranted. The reference to the Larger Bench was accordingly answered holding that the activities of imparting skill, knowledge, lessons on any subject or field or when imparted by an entity, institution or establishment which is excluded by a specific and legislated exclusionary clause would alone be outside the fold of the taxable territory. Considering the scope of the reference, the Bench declined to consider whether any of the appellants were taxable or otherwise in terms of the exclusionary clause in section 65(27) as it stood prior to its amendment with effect from 01-05-2011 and therefore the appeals stood remitted to the respective Bench to decide based on principles discussed above.

The direction provided by the Larger Bench is likely to have far-reaching implications on various institutions offering higher studies especially in absence of appropriate regulatory authority in this regard as the exclusion in terms of the direction of the Larger Bench is meant only for the degree, diploma, a certificate or any qualification recognised by the law for the time being in force. It appears therefore that the litigation hereafter would hinge mainly around whether a degree/ diploma certificate issued by an institution can be construed as one recognised under the law in force. It may be noted that in the new era of negative list based taxation effective from 1st July, 2012, what is specifically non-taxable is by way of entry in the “negative list” of services contained in section 66D of the Act is “education as a part of a curriculum for obtaining a qualification recognised by any law for the time being in force.” In addition to preschool education, higher secondary education and approved vocational courses. Thus, a course or education recognised by law is the sole criterion for non-taxability

Income of foreign company from satellite navigation and transponder capacity lease not royalty for equipment hire

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New Page 1

Part C — International Tax Decisions




5 ISRO Satellite Centre, In re


(2008) 220 CTR 13 (AAR)

S. 9(1)(vi), S. 90 of IT Act;

Article 13 of India-UK DTAA

Dated : 22-10-2008

Issue :

Income of a foreign company towards satellite navigation and
transponder capacity lease is not royalty for equipment hire.

Facts :

ISRO, the applicant, a part of the Department of Space,
Government of India, jointly with Airport Authority of India, was implementing
GAGAN Project (a satellite-based augmentation system) to provide seamless
navigation and tracking facility for civil aviation in India. For this purpose,
it entered into a contract with M/s. Inmarsat Global Ltd., UK (‘IGL’) for
availing of ‘Navigation Transponder Capacity’ for its GAGAN project.

As per the contract, the applicant had taken on lease the
space segment capacity which was utilised through data commands sent from the
ground station set-up by the applicant in India. The transponders for navigation
purposes were meant to dispatch satellite-based augmentation system signals in
space on specified frequencies which were accessed for GAGAN project. The
corrected or augmented data sent from the land station, and transmitted by the
said transponder over the footprint area of the satellite was to be used for
better tracking of planes. The applicant paid a fixed annual charge to IGL,
regardless of the actual use of the transponder capacity.

The issue before the AAR was whether the payment by ISRO to
IGL was royalty having regard to the provisions of the IT Act and the India-UK
DTAA, so as to be subject to tax withholding obligation u/s.195 of the IT Act.

The applicant submitted that the access to navigation
transponder did not amount to use of equipment as the applicant was not able to
operate or control the satellite or transponder. The applicant contended that
even if it was assumed that there was use of equipment, such use was not within
the Indian territory, but it was in space. The amount represented business
income and as there was no permanent establishment of IGL in India, the payment
was not exigible to tax in India.

The Revenue authorities contended that the exclusive capacity
of specific transponder was kept entirely at the applicant’s disposal. The
Revenue also contended that the transponder was under control of the applicant
and can be regarded as operated by applicant, as the transponder was responding
to the directions sent through the ground station of the applicant. Such
directions were held to be akin to operation of TV by remote control. The amount
was therefore claimed to be chargeable as royalty income.

Held :

The AAR accepted the applicant’s claim that the payment was
not royalty for equipment user. It held :

(i) Mere earmarking a space segment capacity of the
transponder for use by the applicant did not enable the applicant to get
possession (actual or constructive) or control of the equipment of IGL.

(ii) The applicant did not use or operate any equipment of
IGL.

(iii) The expression ‘use of space segment’ of transponder
had no reference to any operations performed by the applicant by means of the
transponder capacity.

(iv) The substance of the contract was the ‘facility’
provided to the applicant for the utilisation of space segment capacity of the
transponder for transmitting the augmented data by availing use of
bandwidth/connectivity capacity provided by IGL by using equipment. Such
facility was provided by IGL to the applicant and other customers also.

(v) The analogy of TV operations by means of a remote
control was inappropriate, since the ground station was an independent unit
and not an accessory to the satellite.

(vi) The recent ruling of the AAR in the case of Dell
International Services (P) Ltd., (2008) 218 ITR 209 was relied upon to support
that there was availment of standard service provided by the service provider.

(vii) Even though IGL was alleged to have its regional
office in India, no part of the receipts from the applicant could be said to
be attributable to any PE in India and hence, they were not exigible to tax in
India.


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Income of foreign company from golf tournaments on remote basis by hiring independent contractors not taxable in India

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New Page 1

Part C — International Tax Decisions



4 Golf in Dubai, LLC v. ADIT, In re


(2008) 306 ITR 374 (AAR)

Articles 5 & 7 of India-UAE DTAA

Dated : 13-10-2008

Issue :

Income of a foreign company from organising golf tournaments
on remote basis by hiring independent experienced local contractors is not
taxable in India.

Facts :

The applicant was a company registered in the UAE having its
registered office in Dubai. The applicant was an event organiser and had
affiliations with the European Professional Golf Association. It was engaged in
the business of promoting golf nationally as well as internationally by way of
organising golf tournaments in different countries.

The applicant organised two golf tournaments in India at
Eagleton in Bangalore and at Delhi Golf Club (‘DGC’) in Delhi. The applicant was
granted the right to use the premises to host the events at Bangalore and Delhi
against payment of a consideration. The tournaments were organised by hiring
independent third-party local contractors and service providers.

The applicant received sponsorship fees, management fees and
income from sale of merchandise at the venue and over the Internet.

The issues before the AAR were :

(1) Whether the applicant was having a Permanent
Establishment (‘PE’) in India in terms of Article 5 of India-UAE DTAA ?

(2) Whether Eagleton or DGC could be deemed to be agency PE
of the applicant in India, since the tournaments were held at grounds of each
of these clubs and/or they were providing assistance to the applicant in
organising the golf tournaments ?

(3) If PE is held to have triggered the extent to which
various streams of events-related receipts can be attributed for taxation in
India ?

(4) Lastly, could there be taxation even in absence of PE
trigger either as fees for technical services or otherwise ?


It was the claim of the applicant that there were no tax
implications in India on the following counts :

(a) ‘Fixed place of business’ for PE trigger connotes a
specific geographic location of the enterprise where activities at that
location must endure for more than a temporary period. Since the tournament
lasted only for six to seven days, the requirements of Article 5(1) of the
India-UAE DTAA were not satisfied for emergence of base Rule PE as the
requisite degree of permanence was lacking. The applicant’s business of
organising golf was neither carried on regularly, nor was there certainty that
it will be carried on regularly.

(b) The applicant relied on OECD Commentary to support that
the place of business for PE emergence must be fixed i.e., it must be
established at a distinct place with a certain degree of permanence. In the
present case, the mere access to the place was not sufficient to hold that the
‘place’ was ‘fixed’ and was at the ‘disposal of the applicant’.

(c) There was no service PE as the applicant’s employees or
other personnel had not stayed in India for furnishing services for the
threshold period of 9 months as prescribed in the treaty.

(d) There was no Agency PE as the various third party
vendors with whom the applicant had entered into arrangements for organising
the tournaments were independent contractors who acted in their ordinary
course of business operations.

(e) The sponsorship fees and the management fees were not
‘royalty’, as such fees were not received as consideration for the use of or
right to use any patent, secret formula or information concerning any
industrial or commercial experience. The India-UAE DTAA does not have any
specific Article dealing with FTS and hence there can be no taxation even
assuming receipts are held to be FTS.


The Revenue authorities contended that :

(a) The applicant had a PE in India as it had a ‘fixed
place of business’ at its disposal. Reliance was placed on OECD Commentary to
the effect that if an enterprise has a certain amount of space at its
disposal, which is used for the business activities, it is sufficient to
constitute a place of business even in absence of formal legal right to own
the place. The commentary by Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Convention was
also referred to contend that regularly maintaining the same pitch in a market
place for weekly market would be enough to constitute a ‘fixed place of
business’.

(b) The service provider with whom the applicant had
entered into agreements, had provided the services for organising the events
and therefore could be regarded as agents of the applicant, thus constituting
an Agency PE for the applicant in India.

(c) The service PE threshold was crossed if the initial
visit of the Vice-Chairman of the applicant-company prior to the organisation
of events was taken into account.


Held :

The AAR ruled as follows :

(i) By organising and conducting golf tournaments at Delhi
and Bangalore for a week’s duration without repetition thereof, did not result
in the applicant carrying on business through a fixed place in India. The
essential ingredients of regularity, continuity and repetitiveness as conveyed
by the word ‘carried on’ were absent. Accordingly, no fixed place PE existed
for the applicant in India.

(ii) As regards the Agency PE, the AAR held that the
independent contractors or third-party vendors were acting in the ordinary
course of their business and were not devoted wholly or almost wholly on
behalf of the applicant in India. The activities of the third-party
contractors were not carried out wholly on behalf of the applicant. Hence,
there was no Agency PE of the applicant in India.

(iii) The service PE did not emerge in absence of ‘furnishing of services’ by a foreign enterprise. The concept of ‘furnishing of services’ is a bilateral concept which necessitates the existence of at least two parties i.e., a provider of services and a recipient of services. The presence of employees for enterprise’s own activities does not trigger service PE.

(iv) Though the event management fees received by the applicant could be brought to tax within the purview of FTS, in absence of specific provision in India-UAE DTAA dealing with FTS, the same could not be taxed. The management fees could not be brought to tax under the residual Article 22 dealing with ‘other income’.

(2013) 92 DTR 345 (Rajkot)(SB) Bharti Auto Products vs. CIT A.Ys.: 2009-10 & 2010-11 Dated: 06.09.2013

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Section 206C: A seller of scrap is liable for collection of tax at source irrespective of the fact that such a seller has not himself generated scrap from manufacture or mechanical working of materials undertaken by him. The mode of sale of scrap need not be necessarily akin to the auction or tender for this purpose but it can be any mode.

Section 206C(6A): First proviso inserted by the Finance Act, 2013 with effect from 01-07-2012, would apply retrospectively.

Facts:
The assessee imported brass scrap and sold it without collecting tax at source. The assessee’s case was that the brass scrap sold by him was not generated from the manufacture or mechanical working of material and therefore, it was not ‘scrap’ within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C. According to him, the provisions of section 206C would be attracted only when scrap was sold to a “buyer”, which is defined as a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode, goods of specified nature. It was submitted that sale of goods by an assessee to a buyer in retail sale of such goods cannot therefore be construed as sale to a buyer as such sale was not by way of auction or tender or any other like mode and therefore such transactions in retail sale between the assessee and his buyer would clearly be outside the scope of section 206C.

The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s explanation. He held that since the assessee had failed to collect the tax at source as required by section 206C(6) on the sale of scrap made by him to various dealers, he was liable to pay it u/s. 206C(6) alongwith interest u/s. 206C(7).

Held:
The isues in this case are
a) Is it necessary that the scrap should have been generated by the assessee himself from the manufacture or mechanical working of material undertaken by him in order to apply the provisions of section 206C?

Explanation (b) to section 206C defines ‘scrap’ as ‘waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials which is definitely not usable as such because of breakage, cutting up, wear and other reasons’. It is evident that the word ‘scrap’ occurs twice in the said definition. The first part of the definition, namely, ‘waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials’ seeks to cover both ‘waste’ as well as ‘scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials’. In the absence of any definition of the term ‘waste’ in the Act, one has to turn to its meaning as it is understood in common parlance. In common parlance, ‘waste’ is understood as something unusable or unwanted material. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘waste’ is something which has been ‘eliminated or discarded as no longer useful or required’. ‘Scrap’, on the other hand, represents something which is left over after the greater part has been used or consumed. ‘Scrap’ thus refers to the incidental residue derived from certain types of manufacture, which is recoverable without further processing. It is in this context that the words ‘from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials’ qualify the preceding word ‘scrap’ and not ‘waste’. The definition of ‘scrap’ as given in Explanation (b) is not limited to scrap fromthe manufacture or mechanical working of materials alone but extends to cover ‘waste’ also. Therefore, the scope of the term ‘scrap’ as defined in Explanation (b) cannot be interpreted so as to restrict its application to scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials alone.

The word ‘and’ in the expression ‘waste and scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials’ has been used to enlarge the scope of ‘scrap’, so as to cover both, i.e., waste as well as scrap from the manufacture or mechanical working of materials.

Section 206C seeks to prevent evasion of taxes. It therefore, needs to be construed in a manner that seeks to achieve the purpose for which it has been enacted.

Further, the use of the words ‘business of trading’ in the head note of section 206C makes it clear that the applicability of section 206C is not restricted to sale of scrap generated from the business of manufacturing undertaken by the assessee himself but covers sale of scrap in the business of trading in scrap also.

b) Should the mode of sale of scrap be akin to auction or tender in order to fall in the definition of “buyer” u/s. 206C?

It was submitted that the provisions of section 206C require a seller to collect the tax at source from the buyer (and from none else) on sale, inter alia, of scrap. Attention was drawn to the definition of ‘buyer’ as given in sub-clause(i) of clause (aa) of Explanation to section 206C, which defines a ‘buyer’ as ‘a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender, or any other mode, goods of the nature specified in the Table in sub-s. (1) ……’.

Placing reliance on the interpretative tools of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, it was contended that the phrase ‘any other mode’ in the expression ‘a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode …..’ in Explanation (aa)(i) would get its meaning from the words preceding it, namely, ‘by way of auction, tender’ and, therefore, the said phrase, namely, ‘any other mode’ would have to be construed narrowly and in the same sense as something akin to auction or tender.

It was contended that the assessee has sold the scrap in retail trade and not by way of auction or tender or any similar mode or mode akin to auction or tender and, therefore, it was not required to collect tax at source from them u/s. 206C as such purchasers in retail trade were not buyers within the meaning of Explanation (aa)(i) to section 206C.

The principles of ‘noscitur a sociis’ and ‘ejusdem generis’ apply only when meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute is required to be ascertained. If a given provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, there is no occasion to call in aid those rules.

The use of the word ‘or’ in the aforesaid expression shows that all the three phrases (namely, auction, tender or any other mode) are intended to carry independent meaning without being controlled by  each other. The words “any other mode” are words of wide amplitude and, therefore, cover all possible modes of sales in addition to specific modes of sales by way of auction or tender. Hence, they cannot be construed ejusdem generis or as referring to similar sales as those by way of auction or tender.

c) Does the first proviso to section 206C(6A) apply retrospectively?

The attention of Tribunal was also drawn to the first proviso inserted in section 206C(6A) with effect from 01-07-2012 which stipulates that the payer who fails to deduct tax on the payment made to payee shall not be deemed to be an assessee in default if the payee has paid the tax due on his returned income and fulfilled the other conditions specified therein.

In the aforesaid background, the issue that arises for consideration is whether the first proviso to section 206C(6A) is applicable to pending matters also notwithstanding the fact that it has been made effective from 01-07-2012.

Keeping in view the fact that the first proviso to s/s. (6A) of section 206C not only seeks to rationalise the provisions relating to collection of tax at source but is also beneficial in nature in that it seeks to provide relief to the collectors of tax at source from the consequences flowing from non/short collection of tax at source after ensuring that the interest of the revenue is well protected, thus, there is no hesitation to hold that the said proviso would apply retrospectively and, therefore, to both the assessment years under appeal.

(2013) 144 ITD 325 (Hyderabad) Vittal Krishna Conjeevaram vs. ITO A.Y. 2009-2010 Dated: 10th July, 2013

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Section 54F, read with section 54 – Capital Gains– The expression ‘a residential house’ appearing in sections 54 and 54F has to be understood in the sense that building should be of a residential nature and word ‘a’ should not be understood to indicate a singular number.

Facts:-
The assessee was a co-owner of a residential property. The assessee entered into a development agreement for construction of flats with a developer. As per development agreement the owner had to transfer 50 % of his land for superstructure received as consideration. The assessee received 7 flats towards his share. The Ld AO held that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 54F but only in respect of one flat out of seven flats. CIT (A) also upheld the order of AO.

Held:-
Both the sections, 54 and 54F, speak of either purchase or construction of “a residential house”. Following the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in case of. CIT v. Smt. K.G. Rukmini Amma [2011] 331 ITR 211, the Tribunal held that the expression “a residential house” as appears in section 54 of the Act, cannot be interpreted in a manner to suggest that the exemption would be restricted to a single residential unit. “A residential house” as mentioned in section 54(1) of the Act, has to be understood in a sense that the building should be of a residential nature and the word “a” should not be understood to indicate a singular number. Assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 54F in respect of all the seven flates.

Note:
As the decision of Special Bench, Mumbai in case of ITO vs. Sushila M. Jhaveri [2007] 107 ITD 327 (Mum.) (SB) has been disapproved by the High Court in case of CIT vs. Syed Ali Adil. [2013] 352 ITR 418, the same was not considered to be a good law and hence not followed. CIT vs. D. Anand Basappa [2009] 309 ITR 329/180 Taxman 4 (Kar.) followed CIT vs. Syed Ali Adil [2013] 352 ITR 418/215 Taxman 283/33 taxmann. com 212 (AP) followed

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[2013] 144 ITD 461 (Hyd) S. Ranjith Reddy vs. DCIT AY : 2006-07 Date of order : June 07, 2013

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Section 2(47) – joint development agreement – mere signing of agreement without any other performance cannot be termed as transfer for the purpose of capital gains.

Facts :
The assessee had received certain land from his late father. He, alongwith other family members entered into joint development agreement (joint venture) on 28-02-2006 with L constructions which itself held land in the same area. As per the agreement the assessee was to receive developed plots (i.e. constructed properties) in lieu thereof. The assessing officer, relying on the decisions of Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia [2003] 260 ITR 491 (Bom.) held that there was a transfer of land on 28-02-2006 itself.

Held:
The Hon’ble tribunal held as under: The joint venture project was in a nascent stage. In the concerned previous year, nothing happened other than the execution of the agreement. The transfer of an immovable property always contemplates transfer of an existing property, i.e., a property in praesenti. . As far as the assessee is concerned, there was only an agreement. The proposed project was still to be born as the offshoot of the assessee.

The assessee was not transferring any right or any property to ‘L’. The assessee assigned its landed property in favour of ‘L’ by the joint venture agreement between the assessee and ‘L’. There cannot be a sale to oneself. Nothing was exchanged in the previous year relevant to the assessment year under appeal. No rights are relinquished. It only proposes to redefine the rights.

The assessing officer has concluded that providing land for the purpose of development is a transfer. The consent given by the assessee to provide its land for developing the housing project is only one of the necessary stipulations of the whole scheme. It cannot be broken into an independent segment so as to conclude the same as transfer. The provision of land to facilitate the implementation of the joint venture is always to be read with other equally important stipulations.

Even though the agreement entered into is an enforceable one, that by itself does not take the character of an immovable property. The agreement speaks about the intentions of the parties. Once the project is completed and all the stipulations are satisfied, the parties may come to declare the final satisfaction of the agreements. Only at that point of time, the question really arises as to whether there was any transfer within the meaning of section 2(47). The housing project was a proposed project. As already stated, a transfer is contemplated only in the case of an existing property. In the present case the property was only in the nature of mutual rights. The project and development are yet to happen. Strictly, speaking, the projects and plans may happen or may not happen.

As far as applicability of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, it is one of the necessary preconditions that transferee should have or is willing to perform his part of the contract.

It is clear that willingness to perform for the purposes of section 53A is something more than a statement of intent; it is the unqualified and unconditional willingness on the part of the vendee to perform its obligations. It is only elementary that, unless provisions of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act are satisfied on the facts of a case, the transaction in question cannot fall within the scope of deemed transfer u/s. 2(47)(v).

Both the developer and the assessee were having the landed property. They pooled together the landed property along with some other parties who were owners of some other landed property and all parties together gave licence to the builder to enter the premises and construct houses. No sale was effected on the date of agreement. No consideration has passed between the parties on signing theagreement. Further from the date of signing of development agreement dated 28-02-2006 to 31-03- 2006, no progress has taken place in the said landed property which is subject-matter of the development agreement. Further, there was no consideration in the form of money that passed between the parties. There was no construction, whatsoever, that took place during the period. Even otherwise, there was a General Power of Attorney given by the assessee to the developer. In such a situation, it is only the actual performance of transferee’s obligation which can give rise to the situation envisaged in section 53A of the TP Act. On these facts, it is not possible to hold that the developer performed its obligation during the period in which the capital is sought to be taxed by the Revenue authorities. Thus, the condition laid down u/s. 53A of TP Act was not satisfied during the period. Once it is concluded that the developer did not perform the stipulation as required by the development agreement during the period under consideration and within the meaning assigned to the expression in section 53A of TP Act it cannot be said that there was a transfer u/s. 2(47)(v) so as to levy capital gain tax.

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[2013] 144 ITD 76 (Mum) Mattel Toys (I) (P) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT, Mumbai A.Y. 2002-2003 Order dated- 12.06.2013

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Section 92C – Transfer Pricing
(i) Resale price method is an appropriate method in case where resale takes place without any value addition to product – where the assessee had followed Transactional Net Margin method but later on during the assessment proceedings claimed that Resale Price Method be followed, the same should be considered.

(ii) An internal comparable can be followed for computation of ALP against external comparable where the assessee sends goods back to its associated enterprise (AE) to get a best available price in comparison to the sale made to a third party.

Facts I:
The assessee-company, a subsidiary of a U.S.A. company being its Associated Enterprise (‘AE’), was engaged in marketing and selling of toys and games imported from its AE. The assessee adopted Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) in its transfer pricing report and rejected the Resale Price Method (RPM). Further, the assessee claimed that RPM should be followed instead of TNMM which was rejected by the Commissioner as detailed analysis was given in the TP study report as to why RPM was not taken.

Held I:
The assessee is a distributor of toys and resells the same to independent parties without any value addition. In such situation, RPM can be the best method as there is no much alteration to the products which are resold by the assessee. On the other hand, TNMM can be resorted to only if the other methods have been rendered inapplicable. The revenue contended that once the assessee has chosen a method as appropriate then it should not resort to any other method at an assessment or appellate stage. If a particular method will not result in proper determination of the ALP then it will not serve the purpose of transfer pricing. Therefore, it was held that if at any stage of the proceedings, it is found that another method will result in more appropriate ALP then the assessment officers and the appellate Courts cannot reject the plea of the assessee.

Facts II:
The assessee resells the goods which are imported from the associated enterprise. The assessee in this case has sent the goods back to the associated enterprise. These goods were the unsold ones. The assessee preferred to return the goods to the AE as there was no demand for the product due to change in consumer preferences. The Transfer Pricing officer treated these goods as export to the AE.

Held II:
The assessee returned the goods to the assessee due to a negative trend in the market. It was stated that the assessee had suffered a greater loss while making sale in case of third party in comparison to the sale made to the AE. Thus, the margin of export sale to third party i.e internal comparable should be compared to the export sale made to the AE. Therefore, the issue was remanded to the file of the Transfer Pricing Officer for the purpose of carrying out comparability analysis under internal CUP.

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2013-TIOL-955-ITAT-PANAJI ACIT vs. Joe Marcelinho Mathias ITA No. 43/PNJ/2013 Assessment Years: 2009-10. Date of Order: 26.04.2013

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S/s. 45, 47(xiv) – In a case where an assessee transfers all its assets and liabilities to a private limited company and all conditions of section 47(xiv) are satisfied, AO cannot deny exemption on the ground that sale consideration was higher than the book value.

Facts:
The assessee, an individual, was carrying on business of real estate, as a sole proprietor, by acquiring land, developing the same by sub-dividing the same into plots and selling the said plots. The land was held as stock-in-trade. The net worth of the concern, as per audit report u/s. 50B(3) was Rs. 1.62 crore. On 31-03-2009, vide Deed of Succession, all the assets and liabilities of the proprietory concern were transferred to a private limited company for a consideration of Rs. 963 crore against acquisition of shares of a company at a high premium. The assessee contended that the transfer was covered by section 47(xiv) and therefore, the provisions of section 45 were not attracted.

The Assessing Officer (AO) was of the view that section 47(xiv) does not exempt capital gains if the assets are transferred at a value which is higher than the book value. He held that receipt of additional consideration by way of allotment of shares over and above the proprietor’s capital was in violation of conditions laid down in section 47(xiv). He held that since the assessee got additional income/benefit than what was due as per books of accounts this amounted to receiving any direct or indirect benefit other than by way of allotment of shares and therefore the assessee is not entitled to exemption. The AO taxed the capital gains and denied the benefit of section 47(xiv).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :
The assessee has disposed off the industrial undertaking to a private limited company and in exchange thereof, the assessee has received consideration by way of shares in the company. Therefore, this is a clear cut case of a transfer of an undertaking to a private limited company. Section 45 is applicable when there is a profit or gain arising from the transfer. Profit and gains will also include losses. The undertaking has been valued by the assessee more than the net worth, therefore, there is profit and gain and the provision of section 45 was clearly applicable in the case of the assessee. Once a capital gain arises and is chargeable to tax u/s. 45, section 47 provides for certain exceptions according to which certain transactions are not regarded to be transfer.

The only objection on the part of the revenue is that the assessee did not comply with the condition no. 3 of section 47(xiv) since assessee has received consideration by way of allotment of shares in the company and the value of those shares are more than the value of the assets as was disclosed in the books of the proprietory concern. In our opinion, the assessee has duly complied with the condition as stipulated in clause (c) to section 47(xiv). This proviso only requires that same proprietor does not receive any consideration or benefit directly or indirectly in any form or manner other than way of allotment of shares in the company. The words form or manner other than by way of allotment of shares in the company qualify the words `does not receive any consideration or benefit’ as well as `directly or indirectly’. This clearly denotes that proviso (c) permits receiving consideration or benefit directly or indirectly by way of allotment of shares in the company. It is not a case where the assessee has received any other consideration or benefit other than the allotment of shares in the company.

The Tribunal held that receipt of higher value of shares because of revaluation of assets at the time of succession cannot be treated as consideration or benefit received other than by way of allotment of shares. The Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A).

This ground of appeal of revenue was dismissed.

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2013-TIOL-941-ITAT-DEL Rachna Gupta vs. ITO ITA No. 5527/Del/2012 Assessment Years: 2003-04. Date of Order: 05.07.2013

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S/s. 147, 148 – Reassessment cannot be done on the basis of a notice issued at the address mentioned as per PAN data when the new address was available in returns of income filed.

Facts :
On 30-03-2010 the Assessing Officer (AO), with the prior approval of the Additional CIT, issued a notice u/s. 148 requiring the assessee to file return of income for AY 2003-04. The notice was issued at an address taken from PAN data. The address given in the PAN data was address of the employer of the assessee where she was then working. Subsequently, the said employer company had shifted its address and the change in address was intimated to ROC as well. In the return of income filed for AY 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06 (all filed before 30.3.2010) the assessee had stated her new address.

The assessee failed to comply with this notice and no return was filed. Thereafter, AO issued notices u/s. 142(1) on 09-06-2010, 06-08-2010 and 14-09-2010. The assessee claimed that it received first notice on 14-09- 2010. In response, the assessee filed a letter dated 22-09-2010 enclosing acknowledgement of Saral form and further stated that the assessee was not holding the relevant record for the assessment year and also that the initiation of the proceedings after lapse of six years was unjustified.

The AO was of the view that the provisions of the Act require issue of notice within a period of six years and not service thereof. The notice was issued within six years from the end of the assessment year. The AO completed the assessment by making an addition of Rs. 6,15,000.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A)who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :
The Tribunal noted that it is not disputed by the Department that notice dated 30-03-2010 u/s. 148 was issued at BE-63, Hari Nagar, New Delhi address. From the copy of returns filed for assessment years 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06 prior to 30-03-2010, it is evident that the address of the assessee was BK- 22, Shalimar Bagh, Delhi – 110 052 which was available with the Department and, therefore, admittedly the notice was issued at the wrong address. The 6 year period from the end of the assessment year expired on 30-03-2010. Therefore, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Eshaan Holding (P) Ltd. (2012) 344 ITR 541 (Del), it cannot be said that valid notice was issued u/s 148 to the assessee. The Delhi High Court had held as under:

“The first notice issued on January 29, 2004, by speedpost was said to have been served at the old address at East of Kailash. There was no proof of service on record. Even otherwise, this was not valid service because the assessee had already filed its return on November 28, 2003, and in this return address shown was Panchsheel Park. Thus, the record of the Department already contained the new address of the assessee. Before issuing notice u/s 148, it was expected of the Assessing Officer to have checked up if there was any change of address, because valid service of notice of reopening the assessment is a jurisdictional matter and this is a condition precedent for a valid reassessment.”

 Following the ratio of the above mentioned decision, the Tribunal set aside the order of CIT(A) holding that initiation of proceedings u/s. 148 was not legal and, therefore, consequent assessment order framed by AO is quashed.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Google Hangout – III

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About this write up: This write up is the 3rd part of the series of articles on Google Hangout. This write up focuses mainly on some of the more popular instant messaging apps. The article briefly describes some of the features of these apps and highlights how hangout appears to have an edge over its peers. This article is the third and final installment of a series of articles on this topic. The first write up dealt with the telecom ecosystem and the different messaging apps/options available to users. The write up also dealt with the rise and fall of these apps/options over time. The second installment mainly dealt with the apps like SMS and BBM and why they are losing momentum. In this write up, we will briefly look at the current favourites in the instant messaging apps space and how they compare with Google Hangout (or vice versa for that matter).

Popular instant messaging apps

The previous write ups have dealt in brief why instant messaging apps became popular. Some of the key factors were:

Cost factor: Short Messaging Services (i.e. SMS) became a rage during the time period when the cost of voice calls were sky high. Their popularity started declining when the telecom service providers started reducing the voice call rentals. As a matter of fact, the general perception today is that it is cheaper to call then to send an SMS especially when it cost 1p per second and 1 minute would cost Re. 1/- as against Re. 1 for just 140 characters /SMS.

Instant Communication: The fact that the message would be delivered instantly – almost anywhere in the world – to the persons phone was a huge advantage over emails. This was true before the Blackberry boys came in and before the smart phones joined the race. Even today, a good majority of the population prefers instant messaging to emails. To be candid, I can’t even recall when was the last time I shared a joke or a personal message with my friends or dear ones on email. As a matter of fact, not a day goes by when one of my colleagues or friends, etc. share that whatsapp, etc., have made it so much easier to connect with family members.

Ease of use: This perhaps is one of the most important factors, especially when seniors are concerned. The younger generation has always been known to be tech savvy and have the uncanny ability to adapt to the latest technological development. One would say that the younger generation thrives on the changes. As against this, the seniors find change unnerving, they prefer the security of the old, tried and tested. This is even a bigger hurdle when they have to take a number of steps to achieve the same goal. Instant messaging has changed that significantly. To give you a simple illustration, if you are using whatsapp and you create groups and include your parents, it gives them an opportunity to know what’s going on, etc. There is a small illustration later in this write-up on this.

Informal communication: This is another reason why instant messaging is very popular is that emails generally have been associated with formal communication as against this instant messaging is perceived to be less formal and mostly casual.

Mass reach: If one compares instant messaging with voice calls i.e. alerts for charges on your debit card, reminders for utility payments, etc. – which would you prefer. My vote would certainly go for instant messages – they are far less intrusive. Imagine receiving a telephone call everytime a charge was made on your card or a utility payment was due – one more voice to nag you….

That being said, let’s move on to the apps which are popular:

Popular instant messaging apps:

Whatsapp:
This one is my favourite. In fact I wrote an article recommending this app in the BCAJ. It is one of the apps (out of 75 on my phone) for which I have paid money (it’s free now) (have only 5 paid apps 70 are free).

This app is quite efficient. Apart from allowing you to send text messages, the user can also send photos, videos and sound files (this was added after we chat came on the scene). This app will help you save a lot of money on the phone bill (especially if you have an unlimited data plan). Some of the other useful features include group messaging, sharing location, time stamp. What I particularly like about whatsapp is that

• it works on a simple GRPS connection as well as a WIFI (no need for a data plan)
• I don’t need to add contacts separately (unlike BBM)
• Even if I change my phone, new messages will come to the new phone, even if I don’t have anyone’s PIN
• It works on all popular devices/operating systems

We Chat:
This is app is fast gaining popularity and there are several ads being aired on almost all channels. The biggest plus is that apart from texting (and the ones described above), users can also send voice messages.

To be honest, I don’t have much comment or experience in using this app. There were a couple of turnoffs however:

• One needs to register an account with we chat
• Why bother sending a voice message – just call
• Chinese ……snooping….

Skype:
Has been around for several years now, recently bought over by Microsoft. Quite popular even today. It is available on the desktop as well as on the phone. This was popular because it gave the users the ability to have a real time voice conference (one to one or one to many or many to many). Many seniors use this to talk to their dear ones living around the world. Once again, I don’t have much comment or experience in using this app. There were a couple of turnoffs however:

• The app is very resource hungry – takes a lot of space and RAM when in operation

• Voice quality is decent but the video is often grainy and jerky (could be a bandwidth or a hardware issue on either side – did not face the as much in google hangout though)
• Need to register an account. You could call on the phone but (I think) you have pay charges for this facility

Viber:
This app is also quite popular. The biggest plus is that it allows real time voice calls. Have tried this from my phone, there is some time lag but the voice clarity is pretty good (even on GPRS). The app gives you the convenience of group chatting and alerts you as and when users download and activate it on their phone (Whats app doesn’t give an alert). It is fairly popular and in many ways scores over skype due to ease of use and speed. Unlike skype, it doesn’t offer video chat. Recently, they have started offering a desktop version.

Google Hangout:
Google has taken its time testing this app….. moving from google chat to google talk and now hangout. This app works on most smart phones (desktop — its already linked to your gmail account). The pluses are that it allows you to send text messages and hold video conference. Have tried it a couple of times and when compared to Skype and Facetime (iPhone/iPad specific), the video quality is somewhere in between (better than skype but still miles away from facetime). Just last week, I was trying to get on a video chat with someone located in Canada and after 10 minutes of skyping he said why don’t we switch to google hangout it some much better. I think that more or less summed it up for me.

The next write up will focus on what google hangout has to offer and what the future may have in store for users. It will also be the concluding part of this series. Do look forward.

Disclaimer: The purpose of this article is not to promote any particular site or person or software. Further comments about various products and services are based on the user experience related information available in the public domain. There is no intention to malign any product or service in any manner whatsoever. The sole intention is to create awareness and to bring in to limelight some thought provoking content.

Waiver of interest : S. 234A, S. 234B and S. 234C of Income-tax Act, 1961 and CBDT Circular No. 400/234/95-IT(B), dated 23-5-1996 : A.Ys. 1991-92 and 1992-93 : Death of father who was looking after business : Entire tax paid voluntarily and extra amount a

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Reported :


  1. Waiver of interest : S. 234A, S. 234B and S. 234C of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 and CBDT Circular No. 400/234/95-IT(B), dated 23-5-1996 :
    A.Ys. 1991-92 and 1992-93 : Death of father who was looking after business :
    Entire tax paid voluntarily and extra amount also paid : Sufficient reason for
    non-payment of advance tax on time : Levy of interest set aside.

[V. Akilandeswari v. CCIT, 318 ITR 1 (Mad.)]

The petitioner was a minor during the A.Ys. 1991-92 and
1992-93. For these two years the returns were filed voluntarily and taxes were
paid. Assessment was completed and interest was levied u/s.234A, u/s.234B and
u/s.234C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioner’s application for waiver
of interest was rejected by the Chief Commissioner.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition filed by
the petitioner and held as under :

“(i) The fact of the death of the petitioner’s father who
was looking after the business and as well as that the petitioner’s mother
and guardian was a housewife unfamiliar with such transactions was not
denied by the Chief Commissioner. The petitioner had paid the entire tax
voluntarily and had also paid some extra amount. The claim made by the
petitioner was bona fide and genuine and the Chief Commissioner had
not exercised his discretion in terms of law.

(ii) Thus the levy if interest u/s.234A, u/s.234B and u/s.234C was set
aside and the petitioner did not need to pay any interest for the two
assessment years. The petitioner was not entitled to seek refund of the excess
amount if any paid.”

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TDS : S. 194A and S. 201 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Discount allotted to subscribers of chit : Discount is not interest : No liability to deduct tax u/s.194A : Order u/s.201 not valid.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. TDS : S. 194A and S. 201 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y.
    2003-04 : Discount allotted to subscribers of chit : Discount is not
    interest : No liability to deduct tax u/s.194A : Order u/s.201 not valid.

[CIT v. Sahib Chits (Delhi) (P) Ltd., 226 CTR 119
(Del.)]

The assessee is a chit fund company. The assessee had not
deducted tax at source on the amounts paid to its members on the chits
contributed by them. The AO held that there was default on the part of the
assessee company for not deducting tax u/s.194A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Therefore, the AO passed order u/s.201 and quantified the default amount at
Rs.8,17,683. CIT(A) and the Tribunal quashed the order.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following two questions were
raised :

“(a) Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in holding
that the assessee had not paid any interest to the subscribers of the chit
and such payment does not fall within the meaning of interest as defined
u/s.2(28A) of the Act ?

(b) Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in holding
that the assessee was not required to deduct the tax at source within the
meaning of S. 194A of the Act and as such the assessee was not in default
u/s.201 of the Act ?”

The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under :

“Distribution of bid amount or discount allotted to the
subscriber of the chit is not interest as there is no money borrowed or debt
incurred and therefore there is no question of deducting tax at source
u/s.194A.”

 

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TDS : S. 194I of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 : Premises owned by co-owners : Limit of Rs.1,20,000 is applicable to each co-owner.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. TDS : S. 194I of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 and
    2002-03 : Premises owned by co-owners : Limit of Rs.1,20,000 is applicable to
    each co-owner.

[CIT v. Manager, SBI; 226 CTR 310 (Raj.)]

In an appeal filed by the Revenue u/s.260A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 the following question was raised :

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the learned Tribunal was legally justified in holding with regard to
TDS u/s.194-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961 that when there are a number of
owners of a property, the limit or ceiling will apply to each and every
owner separately, notwithstanding the fact that the amount has been paid by
crediting the aggregate sum in the joint account of the owners ?”

The Rajasthan High Court held as under :

“(i) The property was of late Smt. Tej Roop Kumari, who
created registered trust in her lifetime on 10th October 1990, according to
which, her three sons and one grandson became absolute owners of the
property in definite shares.

(ii) Learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on Smt. Bishaka Sarkar v. UOI; 219 ITR 327 (Cal.), in which
it was held that rent paid to co-owners cannot be split up and co-owners
would come within the expression ‘other cases’, so deduction of tax at the
rate of 20% was justified.

(iii) It appears that the learned Judge of Calcutta High
Court did not take note of law laid down by the Apex Court in CIT v.
Bijoy Kumar Almal;
215 ITR 22 (SC), in which it was held that where
property is owned by two or more persons and their respective shares are
definite and ascertainable, they shall not, in respect of such property, be
assed as an AOP and that the share of each such person in the income from
that property shall be included in his total income, meaning thereby,
liability to deduct on the rental income received by each co-owner was to be
judged.

(iv) Thus, limit of Rs.1,20,000 was applicable to each
co-owner, and thus, no tax was to be deducted at source, and the learned
Tribunal has not committed any error in accepting the appeals of the
assessee.”

 

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Return of income : Doctrine of relation back : S. 140 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Return signed by company secretary : Defect curable : Subsequent valid return though filed late relates back to original return.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. Return of income : Doctrine of relation back : S. 140 of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Return signed by company secretary :
    Defect curable : Subsequent valid return though filed late relates back to
    original return.

[CIT v. Haryana Sheet Glass Ltd., 318 ITR 173
(Del.)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee-company had filed its
return of income on 1-11-2004 declaring a loss of Rs.10,38,98,405, which was
signed by the company secretary. Thereafter a revised return was filed on
5-10-2005 declaring loss of Rs.7,20,50,041, which was signed by the managing
director. The AO ignored the original return on the ground that the return was
not signed and verified in accordance with the provisions of S. 140 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. He further found that the revised return was filed
belatedly and therefore he did not take the said return into consideration.
The Tribunal held that signing of the return by the secretary was a curable
irregularity. Therefore, when the managing director signed and filed the
return, it should relate back to the date when the original return was filed
under the signature of the company secretary. Since that original/revised
return was within time, it could have been taken into consideration.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) If the irregularity in the original return is
curable, then the doctrine of relation back would apply, but if there is a
fundamental defect in the original return, which cannot be cured, then such
a doctrine cannot be applied.

(ii) It is clear that the secretary has signed the
return, who is otherwise, as per the provisions of the Companies Act,
competent to sign. The provision of S. 140 of the Income-tax Act mandates
that the managing director or some other responsible officers can sign.
Because of this reason, we are of the opinion that in a case like this, the
irregularity was curable and the doctrine of relation back was rightly
applied.”

 

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Return of income : Defective/invalid return : S. 140 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Return signed by company secretary : Defect curable : Opportunity to rectify defect should be given.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. Return of income : Defective/invalid return : S. 140 of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Return signed by company secretary :
    Defect curable : Opportunity to rectify defect should be given.


[CIT v. Bhiwani Synthetics Ltd., 318 ITR 177 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95, the assessee company had filed its
return of income on 30-11-1994 declaring a loss. The return was signed by the
general manager (finance) and the company secretary of the assessee. The
Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that since the return was not signed
by the managing director or a director as provided in S. 140(c) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, it was non est. The CIT(A) held that the defect
was a curable defect and an opportunity ought to have been given to the
assessee to rectify it. He, accordingly, directed the Assessing Officer to
give such an opportunity to the assessee. The Tribunal upheld the decision of
the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) We are of the view that on the facts of this case,
since there is nothing on record to suggest that the assessee has disowned
the return that was signed by the general manager (finance) of the assessee
and on the contrary, a power of attorney was given by the assessee to its
general manager (finance) for signing the return, it would have been
appropriate if an opportunity had been granted to the assessee to have the
return signed by the managing director or its director in accordance with
the directions given by the CIT(A).

(ii) There is nothing to suggest that any prejudice will
be caused to the Revenue if this direction is complied with.”


 

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Exemption u/s.11 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Exemption cannot be denied on the ground that it is not a trust: Filing of Form No. 10 : Revised form can be filed before completing assessment.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. Exemption u/s.11 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 :
    Exemption cannot be denied on the ground that it is not a trust: Filing of
    Form No. 10 : Revised form can be filed before completing assessment.

[CIT v. Simla Chandigarh Diocese Society, 318 ITR 96
(P&H)]

The assessee, a charitable society, claimed exemption
u/s.11 r.w. S. 12(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer
declined the claim on the ground that the assessee was a society and not a
trust. The Assessing Officer also raised objection that revised Form No. 10
was not furnished with the return. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The assessee could not be denied exemption u/s.11 of
the Act on the ground that it was not a trust but a society.

(ii) The Commissioner (Appeals) had observed that the
assessee modified Form No. 10 in the course of assessment proceedings. The
modified Form No. 10 has been rejected by the Assessing Officer on the
ground that there was no provision in the Act for revising Form No. 10. It
was held that there was no specific bar prohibiting the assessee from
modifying the figure of accumulation. Form No. 10 could be furnished before
the assessing authority completes the concerned assessment.”

 

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Depreciation : S. 32 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2000-01 and 2001-02 : User of asset : Asset discarded and written off : Depreciation is allowable on WDV after reducing scrap value of asset discarded and written off.

New Page 1

 Reported :


  1. Depreciation : S. 32 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys.
    2000-01 and 2001-02 : User of asset : Asset discarded and written off :
    Depreciation is allowable on WDV after reducing scrap value of asset discarded
    and written off.

[CIT v. Yamaha Motor India (P) Ltd., 226 CTR 304
(Del.)]

In an appeal filed by the Revenue u/s.260A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, the following two questions were raised before the High
Court :

“(a) Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
(hereinafter ‘Tribunal’) was correct in law in directing the AO to recompute
the depreciation after reducing scrap value of the assets, which have been
discarded and written off in the books of account for the year under
consideration from the WDV of the block of assets ?

(b) Whether provisions of sub-clause (iii) to S. 32(1)
r/w. S. 43(6)(c)(B) are applicable to the present case when the assessee had
not complied with the primary conditions for eligibility of depreciation ?”

The Delhi High Court held as under :

“(i) The crux of the matter is : what is the meaning to
be ascribed to the expression ‘used for the purposes of the business’ as
found in S. 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The provisions of S. 32 pertain
to depreciation. The contention of the Revenue is that with respect to any
machinery for which depreciation is claimed u/s.32, the same cannot be
allowed unless such machinery is used in the business and since
discarded machinery is not used in the business, therefore, with respect to
the discarded machinery no depreciation can be allowed.

(ii) As long as the machinery is available for use,
though not actually used, it falls within the expression ‘used for the
purposes of the business’ and the assessee can claim the benefit of
depreciation.

(iii) No doubt, the expression used in S. 32 is ‘used for
the purposes of the business’. However, this expression has to be read
harmoniously with the expression ‘discarded’ as found in clause (iii) of
Ss.(1). Obviously, when a thing is discarded it is not used. Thus ‘use’ and
‘discarding’ are not in the same field and cannot stand together. However,
if a harmonious reading of the expressions ‘used for the purposes of the
business’ and ‘discarded’ is adopted, then it would show that ‘used for the
purposes of the business’ only means that the assessee has used the
machinery for the purposes of the business in earlier years. It is not
disputed that in the facts of the present case, the machinery in question
was in fact used in the previous year and depreciation was allowed on the
block of assets in the previous years. Taking therefore a realistic approach
and adopting a harmonious construction, the expression ‘used for the
purposes of the business’ as found in S. 32 when used with respect to
discarded machinery would mean that the user in the business is not in the
relevant financial year/previous year, but in the earlier financial years.
Any other interpretation would lead to an incongruous situation.

(iv) Therefore, the Tribunal was correct in law in
directing the AO to recompute depreciation after reducing the scrap value of
the assets which have been discarded and written off in the books of account
for the year under consideration from the WDV of the block of assets.”

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Educational institution : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Society running various educational institutions : Object of society also to serve church and nation : Not a ground for rejection of approval for exemption.

New Page 1

Reported :

  1. Educational institution : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : Society running various educational institutions :
    Object of society also to serve church and nation : Not a ground for rejection
    of approval for exemption.

[Ewing Christian College Society v. CCIT, 318 ITR
160 (All.)]

The petitioner-society ran various educational institutions
in the State of UP and it was not for the purpose of making profit. Its
application for approval for exemption was rejected by the Chief Commissioner
on the ground that the purposes for which the society has been established
were religious in nature and consequently the society could not be said to
exist solely for the purpose of education.

On a writ petition filed by the petitioner, the Allahabad
High Court held as under :

“(i) Merely because the object of the petitioner-society
was also to serve the church and the nation, that would not mean that the
educational institution was not existing solely for educational purposes.

(ii) Thus the order passed by the Chief Commissioner
could not be sustained and was set aside. The Chief Commissioner was
directed to pass a fresh order.”

 

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Charitable purpose : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Petitioner-foundation created for imparting, spreading and promoting knowledge, learning, education, etc. in fields related to profession of accountancy : Clearly falls in category

New Page 1

Reported :

 

  1. Charitable purpose : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : Petitioner-foundation created for imparting, spreading
    and promoting knowledge, learning, education, etc. in fields related to
    profession of accountancy : Clearly falls in category of institutions which
    are devoted to research and are of charitable nature : Petitioner entitled to
    exemption u/s.10(23C)(iv).

[ICAI Accounting Research Foundation v. DGIT
(Exemption),
226 CTR 27 (Del.)]

The petitioner-foundation was set up by the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), the main object of the petitioner being
to make it an academy for imparting, spreading and promoting knowledge,
learning, education and understanding in the various fields relating to
profession of accountancy, like accounting, auditing, fiscal laws and policy,
corporate and economic laws and policies, economics, financial management,
financial services, capital and money markets, management information and
capital systems, management consultancy services and allied disciplines. The
petitioner’s application for exemption u/s.10(23C)(iv) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 was rejected stating that the petitioner-foundation did not qualify for
exemption.

On a writ petition filed by the foundation the Delhi High
Court directed the Director General of I.T. (Exemption) to grant exemption to
the petitioner-foundation and held as under :

“(i) The objective of the petitioner-foundation would
fall within the expression ‘education’, as appearing in the definition
u/s.2(15).

(ii) On the basis of the activities of the foundation,
there is not even an iota of doubt that the petitioner-foundation is
involved in education and, thus, meets the description of ‘charitable
institution’.

(iii) Services provided to various Government bodies were
the research projects which were given to the petitioner-foundation having
regard to its expertise in this field. Therefore, these activities per se
would not bring out the petitioner-foundation out of the ambit of S. 2(15).
It can be said that the activities amounted to ‘advancement of an object of
general public utility’, which also appears in the definition of charitable
purpose in S. 2(15).

(iv) The only aspect, in this backdrop, which needs to be
considered is as to whether charging of amount from the MCD, KMC, etc. for
undertaking these research projects would make the activity commercial.
Merely because some remuneration was taken by the petitioner-foundation for
undertaking these projects would not alter the character of these objects,
which remained research and consultancy work. The important test is the
application of the amount received from those projects. It is nowhere
disputed that the receipts are utilised by the petitioner-foundation for the
advancement of its objectives. It is clear that most of the amount received
qua these projects was spent on the project and surplus, if any, is used for
advancement of the objectives for which the petitioner-foundation is
established.

(v) The amended definition of ’charitable purpose’ would
not alter this position. No doubt, proviso to this definition clarifies that
advancement of any other object of general public utility will not be
treated as charitable purpose if it involves the carrying on of any activity
in the nature of trade, commerce or business. However, what is not
appreciated by the respondent No. 1 is that merely on undertaking those
research projects at the instance of the Government/local bodies, the
essential character of the petitioner-foundation cannot be converted into
the one which carries on trade, commerce or business or activity of
rendering any service in relation to trade, commerce or business.

(vi) The impugned order of the respondent No. 1 is,
accordingly, set aside. Direction/mandamus is given to the respondent No. 1
to accord requisite exemption to the petitioner-foundation u/s.10(23C)(iv).”

 

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Bad debts : Deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Disallowance u/s.14A : Exemption u/s.80HHC allowed : Deduction of bad debts cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.

New Page 1





Reported :

  1. Bad debts : Deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act,
    1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Disallowance u/s.14A : Exemption u/s.80HHC allowed :
    Deduction of bad debts cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.

[CIT v. Kings Exports, 318 ITR 100 (P&H)]

The assesse was engaged in manufacture and export of
engineering goods. The assessee’s claim for deduction of bad debts
u/s.36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was disallowed by the AO on the
ground that the assessee had claimed deduction u/s.80HHC and the claim for bad
debts would be hit by S. 14A of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim.

On appeal by the Revenue the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“U/s.80HHC and u/s.14A, the expenditure incurred from
export income could not be held to be for earning income which did not form
part of total income, which concept was dealt with u/s.10 of the Act. S.
80HHC deals with deduction of the element of profit from export from taxable
income. Therefore, the claim of bad debt could not be disallowed.”

 

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Business expenditure : Disallowance u/s. 14A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : In the absence of nexus between exempt income and expenditure in question established by Revenue, the provisions of S. 14A cannot be applied.

New Page 1

 

Unreported :

  1. Business expenditure : Disallowance u/s. 14A of Income-tax
    Act, 1961 : In the absence of nexus between exempt income and expenditure in
    question established by Revenue, the provisions of S. 14A cannot be applied.


[CIT v. M/s. Hero Cycles Ltd. (P&H), ITA No. 331 of
2009 dated 4-11-2009]

The assesse is engaged in manufacturing of cycles and parts
of two-wheelers in multiple units. It earned dividend income, which is
exempted u/s. 10(34) and u/s.(35) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO made an
inquiry whether any expenditure was incurred for earning this income and as a
result of the said inquiry, addition of Rs.3,48,04,375 was made by way of
disallowance u/s.14A(3) of the Act. The Tribunal deleted the addition and
observed as under :

“(i) We find that the plea of the assessee that the
entire investments have been made out of the dividend proceeds, sale
proceeds, debenture redemption, etc., is borne out of record. One aspect
which is evident is that the interest income earned by the main unit exceeds
the expenditure by way of interest incurred by it, thus obviating the
application of S. 14A of the Act. Even with regard to the funds of the main
unit, the fund flow position explained shows that only the non-interest
bearing funds have been utilised for making the investment.

(ii) Thus, on facts we do not find any evidence to show
that the assessee has incurred interest expenditure in relation to earning
the tax exempt income in question. Therefore, merely because the assessee
has incurred interest expenditure on funds borrowed in the main unit, it
would not ipso-facto invite the disallowance u/s.14A, unless there is
evidence to show that such interest-bearing funds have been invested in the
investments which have generated the ‘tax exempt dividend income’.

(iii) As noted earlier, there is no nexus established by
the Revenue in this regard and therefore, on a mere presumption, the
provisions of S. 14A cannot be applied. In fact, in the absence of such
nexus, the entire addition made is required to be deleted. We accordingly
hold so.”

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon S.
14A(2) and Rule 8D(1)(b) to submit that even where the assessee claimed that
no expenditure had been incurred, the correctness of such claim could be
gone into by the AO and in the present case, the claim of the assessee that
no expenditure was incurred was found to be not acceptable by the AO and
thus disallowance was justified. We are unable to accept the submission.

(ii) In view of the finding reproduced above, it is clear
that the expenditure on interest was set off against the income from
interest and the investment in shares and funds were out of the dividend
proceeds. In view of this finding of fact, disallowance u/s.14A was not
sustainable.

(iii) Whether, in a given situation, any expenditure was
incurred which was to be disallowed, is a question of fact. The contention
of the Revenue that directly or indirectly some expenditure is always
incurred which must be disallowed u/s.14A and the impact of expenditure so
incurred cannot be allowed to be set off against the business income which
may nullify the mandate of S. 14A, cannot be accepted.

(iv) Disallowance u/s.14A requires finding of incurring
of expenditure. Where it is found that for earning exempt income, no
expenditure has been incurred, disallowance u/s.14A cannot stand. In the
present case finding on this aspect, against the Revenue, is not shown to be
perverse. Consequently, disallowance is not permissible.”


 

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KVSS : A.Y. 1993-94 : On 29-12-1998, the assessee AOP filed KVSS application in respect of appeal pending before Tribunal on basis of tax dues of Rs.24,04,600 : Rejection of application on ground that tax dues have been adjusted on 30-11-1998 against refu

New Page 1

 

Unreported :

  1. KVSS : A.Y. 1993-94 : On 29-12-1998, the assessee AOP filed
    KVSS application in respect of appeal pending before Tribunal on basis of tax
    dues of Rs.24,04,600 : Rejection of application on ground that tax dues have
    been adjusted on 30-11-1998 against refund in case of a member of AOP :
    Adjustment of tax dues and rejection of KVSS application invalid.

[M/s. Asia Corporation and Ors. v. CIT and Ors. (Bom.),
W.P. Nos. 782 and 783 of 1999, dated 14-9-2009]

Pending an appeal before the Tribunal for the A.Y. 1993-94,
on the basis of the tax dues of Rs.24,04,600, the assessee AOP had filed an
application under KVSS on 29-12-1998. The application was rejected by the
Commissioner on 24-2-1999 on the ground that there are no tax dues as on
30-11-1998, since in respect of one of the members of the AOP, namely,
Petitioner No. 1, refund had been ordered by the Assessing Officer for the A.Y.
1997-98 and that refund had been adjusted on 30-11-1998 against the dues of
the AOP.

The members of the AOP filed two writ petitions, one
challenging the adjustment of refund and the other challenging the rejection
of the KVSS application. The Bombay High Court allowed both the petitions and
held as under :

“(i) The grievance of the petitioner is that the order of
adjustment was passed without complying with the mandatory requirements of
S. 245 of the Income-tax Act. Our attention is invited to the provisions
which mandate that the refund can be adjusted against the dues of the
persons to whom the refund is due after giving intimation in writing to such
persons of the action proposed to be taken under the Section. It is
submitted that no notice as required u/s. 245 was served on the petitioner
proposing to make adjustment. This it is submitted would render adjustment
illegal, and consequently the order making adjustment has to be set aside.
Reliance for that purpose is placed on the judgment of this Court in
Suresh Jain v. A. N. Shaikh,
165 ITR 151 (Bom.) which was confirmed by
the Division Bench in A. N. Shaikh v. S. B. Jain, 165 ITR 86 (Bom.).

(ii) After considering the language of the Section and
the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, we find no reason to
take a different view than the view taken by the Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court, namely, failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of S. 245,
would result in the adjustment made becoming illegal.

(iii) As the application under KVSS was rejected solely
on the ground that there were no dues pending, and once in W.P. No. 783 of
1999 the order of adjustment passed on 30-11-1998 has been set aside,
consequently we will have to set aside the order under KVSS dated 24-2-1999
and consequently this petition will have to be allowed.”

 

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Depreciation — Membership card of Bombay Stock Exchange is an ‘intangible asset’ on which depreciation is allowable u/s.32(1)(ii).

Glimpses of supreme court rulings

12. Depreciation — Membership card of Bombay Stock Exchange
is an ‘intangible asset’ on which depreciation is allowable u/s.32(1)(ii).


[Techno Shares and Stocks Ltd. v. CIT, (2010) 327 ITR
323 (SC)]

The assessee-company filed its return of income for the A.Y.
1999-2000, disclosing a loss of Rs.10,77,276. The return was processed
u/s.143(1) on November 8, 2000. The case stood re-opened u/s.147 and the notice
u/s.148 was issued to the assessee on July 16, 2002. The assessee filed its
return of income under protest. The assessee filed its return of income pursuant
to the notice u/s.148 once again declaring loss of Rs.10,77,276, the same as was
in the original return of income. The main reason for reopening of the
assessment u/s.147 was the claim of depreciation by the assessee on the BSE
membership card amounting to Rs.23,65,000. The claim of depreciation of the
assessee was based on S. 32(1)(ii) which stood inserted by the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 1998, with effect from April 1, 1999. However, the said Section deals with
claims for depreciation of items acquired on or after April 1, 1998. The
assessee claimed before the Assessing Officer that the BSE membership card is a
‘licence’ or ‘business or commercial right of similar nature’ u/s.32(1)(ii) and
is, therefore, an intangible asset eligible for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii), the
submission of which was not accepted by the Assessing Officer. It was held that
membership is only a personal permission which is non-transferable and which
does not devolve automatically on legal heirs and, therefore, it is not a
privately owned asset. That, there is no ownership of an asset and that what
ultimately can be sold is only a right to nomination. Further, according to the
Assessing Officer, in the case of BSE membership, there is no obsolescence, wear
and tear or diminution in value by its use, hence, the assessee was not entitled
to claim depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii). This decision of the AO stood affirmed by
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved by the said decision of the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals), the assessee carried the matter in appeal to the Tribunal
which took the view that since the assessee had acquired a right to trade on the
floor of the BSE through the membership card, it was entitled to depreciation
u/s.32(1)(ii) of the 1961 Act. That, the said card is a capital asset through
which the right to trade on the floor of the BSE is acquired and since it is an
intangible asset the said assessee was entitled to depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii).

Against the said decision, the Department carried the matter
in appeal to the High Court which came to the conclusion, following certain
decisions of the Supreme Court, that the BSE membership card is only a personal
privilege granted to a member to trade in shares on the floor of the stock
exchange; that such a privilege cannot be equated with the expression ‘licence’
or ‘any other business or commercial rights of similar nature’ u/s.32(1)(ii);
that, there is a difference between acquiring a know-how, patent, copyright or
trade mark or franchise; that the expression ‘business or commercial rights of
similar nature’ in S. 32(1)(ii) of the 1961 Act would take its colour from the
preceding words. Namely, know-how, patent, copyright, trade mark and franchise
which belong to a class of intellectual property rights and applying the rule of
ejusdem generis, the High Court held that the expression ‘licence’ as well as
the expression ‘business or commercial right of similar nature’ in S. 32(1)(ii)
of the 1961 Act are referable to IPRs such as know-how, patent, copyright, trade
mark and franchise and since the BSE membership card does not fall in any of the
above categories, the claim for depreciation was not admissible on the BSE
membership card acquired by the assessee u/s.32(1)(ii). Consequently, the
appeals filed by the Department stood allowed.

On civil appeals against the decision of the High Court, the
Supreme Court observed that the question which it was required to examine was —
whether the right of nomination in the non-defaulting continuing member comes
within the expression ‘business or commercial right of similar nature’ in S.
32(1)(ii) of the 1961 Act ?

The Supreme Court held that on the analysis of the Rules of
the BSE, it was clear that the right of membership (including right of
nomination) got vested in the exchange on the demise/default committed by the
member; that, on such forfeiture and vesting in the exchange that the same got
disposed off by inviting offers and the consideration received thereof was used
to liquidate the dues owned by the former/defaulting member to the exchange,
clearing house, etc. (see Rule 16 and bye-law 400). It was this right of
membership which allowed the non-defaulting member to participate in the trading
season on the floor of the exchange. Thus, the said membership right was a
‘business or commercial right’ conferred by the rules of the BSE on the
non-defaulting continuing member.

The next question was — whether the membership right could be said to be owned by the assessee and used for the business purpose in terms of S. 32(1)(ii). The Supreme Court held that its answer was in affirmative for the reason that the rules and bye-laws analysed hereinabove indicated that the right of nomination vested in the exchange only when a member committed default. Otherwise, he continued to participate in the trading session on the floor of the exchange; that he continued to deal with other members of the exchange and even had the right to nominate a subject to compliance with the Rules. Moreover, by virtue of Explanation 3 to S. 32(1)(ii) the commercial or business right which was similar to a ‘licence’ or ‘franchise’ was declared to be an intangible asset. Moreover, under Rule 5, membership was a personal permission from the exchange which was nothing but a ‘licence’ which enabled the member to exercise rights and privileges attached thereto. It was this licence which enabled the member to trade on the floor of the exchange and to participate in the trading session on the floor of the exchange. It was this licence which enabled the member to access the market. Therefore, the right of membership which included right of nomination, was a ‘licence’ which was one of the items which fell in S. 32(1)(ii) of the 1961 Act. The right to participate in the market had an economic and money value. It was an expense incurred by the assessee which satisfied the test of being a ‘licence’ or ‘any other business or commercial right of similar nature’ in terms of S. 32(1)(ii).

The Supreme Court however clarified that the present judgment was strictly confined to the rights of membership conferred upon the member under the BSE membership card during the relevant assessment years. This judgment should not be understood to mean that every business or commercial right would constitute a ‘licence’ or a ‘franchise’ in terms S. 32(1)(ii) of the 1961 Act.

Capital or revenue expenditure — Development and prospecting expenditure — The question is to be considered in the light of the provisions of S. 35E(2) and not in the context of S. 37(1).

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  1. Capital or revenue
    expenditure — Development and prospecting expenditure — The question is to
    be considered in the light of the provisions of S. 35E(2) and not in the
    context of S. 37(1).

[Rajasthan State Mines
and Minerals Ltd. v. CIT,
(2009) 313 ITR 366 (SC)

In the assessment orders
passed for the A.Ys. 1998-99 and 1999-2000 in the case of the assessee, a
public sector undertaking of the Government of Rajasthan, the Assessing
Officer disallowed the expenditure towards developments and prospecting
charges treating it as capital in nature. The Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) referred to the provisions of S. 35E(2) which provide that any
expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively on any operation relating to
prospecting for any mineral or on development of a mine in the year of
commercial production and any one or more of the four years immediately
preceding that year shall be allowed as deduction equal to one tenth of the
amount of expenditure starting from the year the assessee is specifically
covered u/s.35E(2). The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) observed that
the assessee had claimed write off over a period of time and therefore the
claim should be more. It appears that Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)
had upheld the disallowance for the reason that prospecting expenses were
incurred on expenditure of corporate plan which did not pertain to
prospecting expenses. Before the Tribunal it was contended by the assessee
that this expenditure was incurred for orientation of the administrative set
up and this was revenue in nature, whereas, the Departmental Representative
had contended that this expenditure was of capital nature because corporate
plan expenditure was of enduring benefit to the assessee company. It appears
that Tribunal rejected the assessee’s appeal. On a further appeal, the High
Court, also appears to have rejected the appeal of the assessee with
reference to the provisions of S. 37(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court, on
assessee’s appeal, observed that it could not be disputed that, had the High
Court considered the claim of the appellant in the light of S. 35E(2), it
might have arrived at a different conclusion. The Supreme Court, therefore,
set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the matter back to the
High Court for considering the assessee’s appeal afresh on merits.



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Business expenditure — Whether aid given to the residents living in the vicinity of the factory of the assessee is a business expenditure allowable u/s.37 of the Act is a question on which finding of fact should be given by the Tribunal.

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  1. Business expenditure — Whether
    aid given to the residents living in the vicinity of the factory of the
    assessee is a business expenditure allowable u/s.37 of the Act is a question
    on which finding of fact should be given by the Tribunal.

[CIT v. Madras Refineries
Ltd.,
(2009) 313 ITR 334 (SC)]

During the previous year
relevant to the A.Y. 1993-94, the assessee’s claim with respect to social and
welfare community expenses was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. Aggrieved
by the said order, the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals), who allowed the appeal deleting the disallowance.
Against the said order, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal.

Further on an appeal,
following the decisions in CIT v. Madras Refineries Ltd., (2004) 266
ITR 170 and Cheran Engineering Corporation Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) 238 ITR
892, the Madras High Court held that the social and welfare community expenses
were deductible as business expenditure.

On an appeal before the
Supreme Court by the Revenue, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the
aid given to the residents living in the vicinity of the factory of the
assessees was a business expenditure allowable u/s.37 of the Income-tax Act.
The Supreme Court, however, did not find any finding on this aspect in the
judgment of the Tribunal as well as in the judgment of the High Court and
therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remitted the
matter to the Tribunal for de novo examination of this point in
accordance with law.

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Substantial questions of law — Whether the freight paid by the assessee (AOP) to truck owners who in turn are members of the said AOP is subject to TDS u/s.194C(2) of the Act, is a substantial question of law.

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  1. Substantial questions of law —
    Whether the freight paid by the assessee (AOP) to truck owners who in turn are
    members of the said AOP is subject to TDS u/s.194C(2) of the Act, is a
    substantial question of law.

[CIT v. Sirmour Truck
Operators Union (No. 1),
(2009) 313 ITR 26 (SC)]

[CIT v. Sirmour Truck
Operators Union (No. 2),
(2009) 313 ITR 27 (SC)]

M/s. Gujarat Ambuja Cements
Ltd. entered into a contract with M/s. Sirmour Trucks Operators Union, a
society, consisting of truck operators as its members. The question which
arose before the High Court was whether the freight paid by the assessee (AOP)
to truck owners, who in turn are members of the said AOP, is subject to TDS
u/s.194C(2) of the Act. According to the Supreme Court, the afore-stated
question was a substantial question of law and the High Court ought to have
decided the said question and ought not to have dismissed the appeals
summarily. The Supreme Court therefore remitted the matter to the High Court
for consideration in accordance with the law.

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Writ petition — Under Income-tax Act, the unit of assessment is a ‘year’ and hence it is not open to a court to direct by an omnibus order that all subsequent years are connected years and that income be treated in same manner for all the years.

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  1. Writ petition — Under
    Income-tax Act, the unit of assessment is a ‘year’ and hence it is not open to
    a court to direct by an omnibus order that all subsequent years are connected
    years and that income be treated in same manner for all the years.


[Dy. CIT v. Divya
Investment P. Ltd.,
(2004) 313 ITR 363 (SC)]

 

The assessee, a private
limited company, carried on the business, inter alia, of hire-purchase.
The assessee took on lease a land with existing structure. The lease deed was
entered into on October 30, 1986. The lease was for ten years. The assessee
demolished the structure and constructed a multi-storeyed building which was
let out to Canara Bank and others. The assessee received hiring charges and
maintenance charges from the lessees. Thereafter, the respondent filed its
return for the A.Y. 1997-98. The Assessing Officer held that it was an income
from house property and not from business as claimed by the assessee in its
return. The assessment order was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) and cases for earlier assessment years from 1992 to 2000 were
ordered to be reopened by issuance of notice u/s.148 of the Income-tax Act.

Aggrieved by the decision of
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the matter was carried in appeal to
the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that hire charges received by the assessee
were liable to be assessed as business income and not as income from property.

Against the notices issued
u/s.148 reopening the assessments, the assessee filed a separate writ petition
for each of the assessment years in which reopening was ordered. The High
Court held in all the writ petitions that the income should be treated as
business income and not as income from house property as held by the Tribunal.
The decision of the High Court was based on the fact that for one assessment
year of the assessee (viz. 1997-98), the Tribunal had held that income
should be treated as income from business and not as income from house
property and so long as this view of the Tribunal was not reversed, all the
subordinate authorities were bound by this decision.

On an appeal the Supreme Court
held that it was not open to the High Court to direct by an omnibus order that
all subsequent years were connected years and that income be treated only as
business income. Under the Income-tax Act, the unit of assessment is a ‘year’.
According to the Supreme Court the parties should have been relegated to move
the Tribunal by filing an appeal u/s.253(1) and it was not open to the High
Court to entertain the writ petitions.

The Supreme Court, however,
clarified that in this case there were two separate proceedings involved,
viz.,
the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) plus
proceedings u/s.148. Unfortunately, all proceedings were clubbed in the writ
petitions. The exact status of those proceedings was not known. If the
assessee objected to the reopening of assessment, then, it was required to
file revised returns. The Supreme Court refrained from expressing any opinion
in that regard. Similarly, if the decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) was sought to be challenged for a given year, then, the assessee
ought to have filed appeals u/s. 253(1) before the Tribunal. However, since
the writ petitions were pending in the High Court, the Supreme Court directed
that if appeals were required to be filed, then they shall be filed within
four weeks from the date of the order in which they shall not be dismissed on
the ground of delay.


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Substantial question of law — While allowing the deduction of expenditure, nature of such expenditure is required to be examined — Question of nature of expenses is a substantial question of law.

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  1. Substantial question of law —
    While allowing the deduction of expenditure, nature of such expenditure is
    required to be examined — Question of nature of expenses is a substantial
    question of law.

[CIT v. Oswal Agro Mills
Ltd., (2009) 313 ITR 24 (SC)
]

The Supreme Court observed
that in this case, the substantial question of law which arose before the High
Court u/s.260A was as follows :

“Whether the assessee is
entitled to deduction of Rs.1,16,89,327 incurred as ‘issue management
expenses’ ?”

On reading the judgments of
the Tribunal and the High Court, the Supreme Court found that the assessee had
succeeded only on the basis of ‘rule of consistency’. According to the Supreme
Court, the High Court should have examined the nature of the
said expenses, namely, ‘issue management expenses’. The Supreme Court was of
the view that substantial question of law did arise for determination.

Consequently, the Supreme
Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remitted the
matter to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

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Penalty — Concealment of income — Penalty can be levied u/s.271(1)(c) even in a case where positive income is reduced to nil after set off of carried forward losses of earlier years.

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  1. Penalty — Concealment of
    income — Penalty can be levied u/s.271(1)(c) even in a case where positive
    income is reduced to nil after set off of carried forward losses of earlier
    years.

[CIT v. R.M.P. Plasto P.
Ltd.,
(2009) 313 ITR 397 (SC)]

The question that came up for
consideration before the High Court was whether the Appellate Tribunal was
right in law and on facts in cancelling the penalty levied u/s.271(1)(c) of
the Act on the ground that there was loss assessed in the year under
consideration, without appreciating the fact that there was positive income
which was reduced to nil only after allowing set off of carried forward losses
of earlier years. The High Court dismissed the appeal following its decision
in the case of CIT v. Avon Flours P. Ltd., (2009) 313 ITR 400 (Guj.).

On appeal, the Supreme Court
allowed the appeal in view of the judgment of the larger Bench in CIT v.
Gold Coin Health Food P. Ltd.,
(2008) 304 ITR 308 (SC).

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Export business — Deduction u/s.80HHC — ‘Rights’ of movies for telecasting for a period of five year would fall in the category of articles of trade and commerce, hence merchandise — So far as films are concerned the word ‘lease’ is included in the meanin

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  1. Export business — Deduction
    u/s.80HHC — ‘Rights’ of movies for telecasting for a period of five year would
    fall in the category of articles of trade and commerce, hence merchandise — So
    far as films are concerned the word ‘lease’ is included in the meaning of the
    word ‘sale’.

[CIT v. B. Suresh,
(2009) 313 ITR 149 (SC)]

During the relevant A.Y.
1993-94, the assessee, B. Suresh, transferred feature film rights for
exploitation outside India and earned income in foreign exchange. The assessee
claimed deduction u/s.80HHC in respect of the said receipts. The Assessing
Officer held that the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC,
inter alia,
on the ground that the export was not of merchandise or goods
as contemplated u/s.80HHC, but was merely an export of ‘rights’ in the film.
This decision of the AO was overruled by the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals). When the matter came before the Tribunal at the instance of the
Department, there was already a judgment of the Bombay High in the case of
Abdulgafar A. Nadiadwala v. ACIT,
(2004) 267 ITR 488. Following the said
decision, the Tribunal and the High Court held that the assessee was entitled
to deduction u/s.80HHC. On an appeal by the Department, the assessee inter
alia
invited attention of the Supreme Court to the scheme of S. 80HHC to
point out that the word ‘sale’ would also include ‘lease’ as indicated in Rule
9A(7) which states that for the purposes of Rule 9A, the ‘sale’ of the rights
of exhibition of feature films would include the ‘lease’ of such rights.
Similarly, under Rule 9B(6), it has been, inter alia, provided that
‘Sale’ of rights of exhibition of a feature film would include ‘lease’ of such
rights.

The Supreme Court held that
the basic requirement of S. 80HHC is earning in foreign exchange and retention
of profits for export business. Profits are embedded in the ‘income’ earned.
Earning of income depends on sale of goods and services. Today the difference
between the two is getting blurred with globalisation and cross-border
transaction. Today with technological advancement one has to change the
thinking regarding concepts like goods, merchandise and articles. In the
instant case the assessee had bought rights of various decoders and had
recorded movies on beta-cam tapes which were transferred as telecasting rights
to Star T.V. for five years (it has a limited life). Hence, such ‘rights’
would certainly fall in the category of articles of trade and commerce, hence,
merchandise. On the question as to whether transfer of the said rights by way
of lease would attract S. 80HHC, the Supreme Court found merit in the
contention that under Rule 9A and 9B, the word ‘lease’ is included in the
meaning of the word ‘sale’. In conclusion the Supreme Court observed that
there was no infirmity in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Abdulgafar A. Nadiadwala (supra).

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Exemption — S. 10(5) — Leave travel concession/Conveyance allowance — For the purpose of S. 192, employer need not collect and examine the supporting evidence to the deduction submitted by the employees.

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  1. Exemption — S. 10(5) — Leave
    travel concession/Conveyance allowance — For the purpose of S. 192, employer
    need not collect and examine the supporting evidence to the deduction
    submitted by the employees.

[CIT v. Larsen and Toubro
Ltd.,
(2009) 313 ITR 1 (SC)]

A short question which arose
for determination in the civil appeal(s) before the Supreme Court was, whether
the assessee(s) was/were under statutory obligation under the Income-tax Act,
1961, and/or the Rule to collect evidence to show that its employee(s) had
actually utilised the amount(s) paid towards leave travel concession(s)/conveyance
allowance.

The Supreme Court held that
the beneficiary of exemption u/s.10(5) was an individual employee and there is
no circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) requiring the employer
u/s.192 to collect and examine the supporting evidence to the declaration to
be submitted by an employee(s).

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Business expenditure : Deduction u/s.37 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Agreement executed in August 2002 with retrospective effect from January 1, 2002 : Disallowances of expenses of January to March 2002 on ground that it crystallised in preced

New Page 1

Reported :

23. Business expenditure :
Deduction u/s.37 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Agreement executed in
August 2002 with retrospective effect from January 1, 2002 : Disallowances of
expenses of January to March 2002 on ground that it crystallised in preceding
year : Liability under agreement arises and accrues when agreement executed :
Addition cannot be sustained.

[CIT v. Exxon Mobil
Lubricants P. Ltd.,
328 ITR 17 (Del.)]

In August 2002, the assessee
had executed an agreement with M/s. Exxon Mobil Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. with
retrospective effect from January 2002. The expenditure under the said agreement
for the period January to March 2002 was also claimed as deduction in the A.Y.
2003-04. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim, holding that the
expenditure pertained to the preceding year resulting in the addition of the
equal amount. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The liability of the
assessee under the agreement had arisen and accrued in August 2002, when the
agreement was executed and, therefore, the liability of the assessee to pay
for the period January 2002 to March 2002 arose and crystallised in August
2002.

(ii) The Commissioner
(Appeals) had observed that the assessee had shown prior period expense
against which the prior period income was shown and the net amount had been
shown as expenditure in the profit and loss account. If the assessee had shown
the prior period income and the Assessing Officer had not excluded it while
working out the current years taxable income, then there was no reason on the
part of the Assessing Officer to disallow only one part of the prior period
adjustments, i.e., the prior period expenditure.

(iii) The addition made by
the Assessing Officer could not be sustained.”

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Deduction u/s.80-O of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Amount allowable is restricted to the total income and not to the income computed under the head business.

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Unreported :

21. Deduction u/s.80-O of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : Amount allowable is restricted to the total income and
not to the income computed under the head business.

[CIT v. M/s. J. B. Boda &
Co. P. Ltd. (Bom.),
ITA No. 3224 of 2009 dated 18-10-2010.]

The Assessing Officer
determined the amount eligible for deduction u/s.80-O at Rs. 1,29,41,830 being
50% of the income so received or brought into India. However, he restricted the
deduction u/s.80-O to
Rs. 69,70,000, being the total income under the head ‘Business’, on the ground
that allowing further deduction would amount to allowing the deduction from
income under other heads. The Tribunal found that the gross total income
exceeded Rs. 1,29,41,830 and therefore allowed the full claim of the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The only question
sought to be canvassed is that out of these deductions the admissible
deduction u/s.80-O ought to be limited to the extent of
Rs. 69,70,127 which represents business income. In other words, income from
interest and dividend shall not form part of the gross total income as defined
u/s.80B(5) of the Act.

(ii) Considering the
definition of the gross total income, it is difficult to hold that the
interest income and the dividend income would not form part of the gross total
income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

(iii) The view taken by
the Tribunal, in our considered view, is in consonance with what is stated
herein.”

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Business expenditure : S. 37(1) r/w S. 145 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Year in which deductible : Assessee following mercantile system of accounting claimed prior period expenses and was allowed every year : Doctrine of consistency would come into play : Tr

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Reported :

22. Business expenditure :
S. 37(1) r/w S. 145 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Year in which deductible :
Assessee following mercantile system of accounting claimed prior period expenses
and was allowed every year : Doctrine of consistency would come into play :
Tribunal justified in allowing prior period expenses claimed by assessee.

[CIT v. Jagatjit
Industries Ltd.,
194 Taxman 158 (Del.)]

The assessee-company was
following mercantile system of accounting. During the relevant assessment year,
it had claimed prior period expenses pertaining to earlier years on ground that
vouchers of such expenses from employees/branch employees were received after
31st March of the financial year. The Assessing Officer disallowed the said
expenses, holding that the nature of the expenses was such that they had
occurred and crystallised during the earlier years. The Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) On a scrutiny of the
facts, that had been brought on record, it was discernible that the assessee
had been claiming prior period expenses, on the ground that the vouchers of
such expenses from the employees/branch employees were received after 31st
March of the financial year. The said accounting practice had been
consistently followed by the assessee and accepted by the Department.

(ii) If a particular
accounting system has been followed and accepted and there is no acceptable
reason to differ with the same, the doctrine of consistency would come into
play. In the instant case, the said accounting system had been followed for a
number of years and there was no proof that there had been any material change
in the activities of the assessee as compared to the earlier years. Nothing
had been brought on record to show that there had been distortion of profit or
the books of account did not reflect the correct picture.

(iii) In the absence of
any reason whatsoever, there was no warrant or justification to depart from
the previous accounting system which was accepted by the Department in respect
of the previous years.

(iv) Therefore, there was
no merit in the instant appeal and the same was to be dismissed.”

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TDS : Consequences of failure : Limitation : Ss. 153, 201(1), (1A) : Period of limitation not prescribed : Reasonable period is 4 years.

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 31 TDS : Consequences of failure :
Limitation : Ss. 153, 201(1), (1A) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1990-91 :
Period of limitation not prescribed : Reasonable period is 4 years : Proceedings
initiated in 1999 for A.Y. 1990-91 : Barred by limitation.


[CIT v. NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation, 305 ITR
137 (Del.)]

The assessee is a Government-company of a foreign country and
is carrying on the business in India. In respect of its employees in India it
pays salary in Indian Rupees and also pays something called ‘global salary’ to
the employees in the home country. In respect of the salary paid to the
employees in India, the assessee deducted tax at source, but with respect to the
global salary, the assessee did not deduct tax at source. On November 19, 1998,
a survey was conducted by the Revenue in the premises of the assessee and these
facts came to light for the first time. The assessee did not dispute its
liability to deduct tax at source in respect of global salary and the tax due
thereon was paid by the assessee and interest was also paid. In December 1999,
the Assessing Officer issued show-cause notice, and thereafter passed an order
treating the assessee as being in default for the purposes of S. 201 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal cancelled the order holding that the
proceedings have not been initiated within a reasonable period of time.

 

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue and held as under :

“(i) There is no dispute that S. 201 of the Act does not
prescribe any limitation period for the assessee being declared as an assessee
in default.

(ii) S. 153(1)(a) prescribes the period of two years from
the end of the assessment year for completing the assessment. Therefore, the
time limit would be three years from the end of the financial year. Even
though the period of three years would be a reasonable period as prescribed by
S. 153 of the Act for completion of proceedings, we have been told that the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has, in a series of decisions taken the view
that four years would be the reasonable period of time for initiating action
in a case where no limitation is prescribed. The rationale for it seems to be
quite clear — if there is a time limit for completing the assessment, then the
time limit for initiating the proceedings must be the same, if not less.
Nevertheless the Tribunal has given a greater period for commencing or
initiation of proceedings. We are not inclined to disturb the time limit of
four years prescribed by the Tribunal and are of the view that in terms of the
decision of the Supreme Court in Bhatinda District Co-op. Milk Producers Union
Ltd. (2007) 9 RC 637; 11 SCC 363, action must be initiated by the competent
authority under the Income-tax Act, where no limitation is prescribed as in S.
201, within a period of four years.

(iii) It appears that the assessee paid the tax voluntarily
as well as interest thereon, but the acceptance of the liability by the
assessee would not by itself extend the period of limitation, nor would it
extend the reasonable time that is postulated by the scheme of the Income-tax
Act. The assessee cannot be put, in a sense, in a worse position merely
because it has admitted its liability. The fact that the assessee agreed to
pay the tax voluntarily cannot put the assessee in a situation worse than if
it had contested its liability.”

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Profits and gains from foreign projects: Deduction u/s.80HHB : Project in Iraq : Payment received as per terms of agreement between Govt. of India and Iraq in RBI bonds and interest on them : Deduction allowable on interest.

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 30 Profits and gains from foreign projects :
Deduction u/s.80HHB of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1997-98 and 2000-01 :
Project in Iraq : Payment held up due to war in Iraq : Payment received in terms
of agreement between Governments of India and Iraq in terms of RBI bonds and
interest on RBI bonds : Deduction u/s.80HHC allowable on interest component
also.


[CIT v. Arvind Construction Co., 172 Taxman 5 (Del.)]

The assessee carried out certain construction work in two
different projects in Iraq as a subcontractor of the Indian Railway Construction
Corporation (IRCON). On account of the outbreak of war in Iraq, the payments to
IRCON were held up. Subsequently, by an agreement between the Governments of
India and Iraq, a settlement was arrived at by which the payment would be made
to IRCON on the deferred basis. The total sum due to the assessee together with
interest was calculated at Rs.54.93 crores for the A.Y. 1997-98 and the said sum
was settled as under :

(i) RBI Bonds Rs. 42,69,91,452

(ii) ECGC Bonds Rs. 5,61,12,153

(iii) Interest on RBI Bonds Rs. 6,61,83,046

 

The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHB of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, inter alia in respect of interest on RBI Bonds. The Assessing
Officer rejected the claim on the ground that the interest on RBI Bonds was not
an income derived from the business activities of the assessee. The Tribunal
allowed the claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“We find that as regards the interest on the RBI Bonds,
this was part of the total settlement package by which the assessee was to
receive Rs.54.93 crores for the works undertaken in Iraq as a sub-contractor
of IRCON. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not possible to
view the interest received on the RBI Bonds as payment de hors the
activity of the assessee pursuant to the execution of the contract.”


 

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Hotel in a place of pilgrimage : Deduction u/s.80-IA(4)(iii) : Hotel certified by prescribed authority : IT Authority has no jurisdiction to decide on basis of own criteria that assessee not entitled to deduction

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 28 Hotel in a place of pilgrimage :
Deduction u/s.80-IA(4)(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Hotel granted
certification by prescribed authority : Income-tax authority has no jurisdiction
to decide on basis of his own criteria that assessee is not entitled to
deduction u/s.80-IA(4)(iii).


[Gujarat JHM Hotels Ltd. v. DGIT (Exemption), 305 ITR
386 (Guj.)]

The petitioner’s hotel was located at S, which is an
important place of pilgrimage as required u/s.80-IA(4)(iii) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. The petitioner made an application for exemption u/s.80-IA(4)(iii) of
the Act. In support of the necessary conditions the petitioner filed a
certificate issued by the Director, Tourism, Gujarat Govt., dated 18-6-1996 and
a certificate issued by the Department of Tourism, Govt. of India, dated
11-6-1996. The Director General of Income-tax (Exemption) rejected the
application. He observed that it was a well-known fact that S was an important
industrial town, having existent infrastructure/tourism facilities, to promote
industrial and tourism development and that a place like S did not require the
additional benefit of S. 80-IA(4)(iii).

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner and held as under :

“(i) A bare perusal of the documents furnished by the
petitioner vis-à-vis S. 80-IA(4)(iii) of the Act and Rule 18BBC made it
clear that the petitioner had fulfilled all the necessary conditions for grant
of the approval.

(ii) The authority had only considered that the petitioner
did not fulfil the pilgrimage test without dealing with the two certificates
issued by the prescribed authorities. Once the prescribed authorities grant
certificates, if the authority wants to reject it, valid and justifiable
reasons must be given therefor. Rejecting the application on merely
considering the fact whether S is a place which could be considered as
requiring approval for notification for promotion of pilgrimage, was an
extraneous consideration to the provisions of the Act and the Rules and the
benefit could not be refused to the petitioner on this ground.”


 

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Investment allowance : S. 32A : Computation : Agreement providing for escalation of price : Extra amount paid to be taken into account

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29 Investment allowance : S. 32A of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1986-87 : Computation : Actual cost to be determined
in each year : Agreement providing for escalation of price : Extra amount paid
in relevant year to be taken into account.


[DCIT v. Official Liquidator, 305 ITR 418 (Mad.)]

The assessee had imported machinery from Italy for polynostic
staple fibre plant and installed it in the accounting year relevant to the A.Y.
1981-82. The agreement for purchase provided for an escalation clause. In
pursuance of the escalation clause, the assessee made certain payments towards
cost of escalation of the machinery and escalation in the customs duty and
technical consultancy fees. The total payments amounted to Rs.1,40,60,651. For
the A.Y. 1986-87, the assessee filed a revised return wherein the investment
allowance was enhanced to Rs.47,20,648 from Rs.10,55,608 as originally claimed.
The Assessing Officer allowed the claim, but the Commissioner acting u/s.263
rejected the claim. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner.

 

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Export Profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC : Computation : Manufacture and export including job works : Investment in raw materials, labour, etc. on own account alone includible in total profit.

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27 Export Profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC :
Computation : S. 80HHC Expl. (baa) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Manufacture and
export including job works for others : Investment in raw materials, labour,
etc. by assessee on own account alone includible in total profit.


[William Goodacre and Sons India Ltd. v. CIT, 305 ITR
365 (Ker.)]

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and
export of products. The assessee was also engaged in doing job works for others
particularly exporters. The Assessing Officer excluded 90% of the job work
receipts from the business profit in the computation of the export profit by
referring to clause (baa) of the Explanation to S. 80HHC(4B) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the Kerala High Court remanded the
matter back to the Assessing Officer and held as under :

“(i) The scheme of S. 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961
provides for computation of the export profit of an assessee engaged in local
business and export business based on the formula provided in the Section to
find out the proportionate profit on export with reference to the total
turnover and total profit. Under the formula, eligible export profit is the
total profit divided by the total turnover and multiplied by export turnover.

(ii) The scheme of exclusion of certain items of income
which come within the description of business profits by virtue of the
inclusion clause contained in S. 28 of the Act, is to ensure that in the
course of working out the eligible export profit on a proportionate basis with
reference to the total turnover and export turnover, the net result should not
be a distorted figure. In other words, the formula seeks to achieve
determination of export profit as realistically and as near as possible. The
purpose of clause (baa) of the Explanation to S. 80HHC(4B) of the Act, is to
exclude such items of receipts which are not derived from business turnover.
Brokerage, commission, interest and rent, etc. are items which are essentially
in the nature of net receipts and are not derived out of total turnover of the
assessee. Besides the four items enumerated in clause (baa)(1), the charges or
any other receipt of a similar nature should also be excluded. If charges are
not comparable to any of these items, then such items cannot be excluded from
the business profits in terms of clause (baa) of the Explanation.

(iii) If raw materials are supplied by the awarder or if
the assessee purchased the raw materials separately in its name and claimed
separate re-imbursement, then the turnover of the transaction does not get
included in the total turnover and the receipt is net receipt, 90% of which
has to be excluded as charges under clause (baa).

(iv) The rubber backing charges and rubber edging charges
could not be excluded from the total profit by referring to clause (baa) of
the Explanation to the Section. The authorities below failed to consider the
claim of the assessee that it purchased raw materials on its own account and
used them in manufacture of the final product leading to value addition at the
assessee’s cost on the awarder’s raw material like doormats and coir carpets.
Unless the cost of the raw material is borne by the assessee in its own
account forming its sale value as total turnover, the assessee could not claim
the benefit of inclusion of full charges so collected in the total profit.

(v) If the entire raw material cost is borne by the awarder
and the assessee did only job work with machinery and employed its own labour,
such charges were comparable to commission or brokerage which were income
earned by incurring labour and other charges covered under clause (baa) of the
Explanation.”


 

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Educational Institution: Exemption u/s.10(22): Funds need not be invested in modes specified in S. 11(5).

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 26 Educational Institution : Exemption u/s.
10(22) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1997-98 : Funds of educational institution
need not be invested in modes specified in s. 11(5) : Effect of CBDT Circular
No. 712, dated 25-7-1995.


[DI (Exemption) v. Dalmia Shiksha Pratishthan, 305 ITR
327 (Del.)]

The assessee trust was imparting education through four
educational institutions. Up to the A.Y. 1996-97 the assessee was allowed
exemption u/s.10(22) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A.Y. 1997-98, the
Assessing Officer denied the exemption for the reasons that (i) the assessee had
let out a property owned by it on rent; (ii) the assessee had earned some amount
on sale of books and thus it existed for purposes of profit, and (iii) the main
ground was that the assessee had invested its funds with a non-Governmental
body. The Tribunal allowed the claim for exemption u/s.10(22).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) A perusal of the CBDT Circular No. 712, dated
25-7-1995 would show that there is no restriction regarding the mode of
investment of funds by an educational institution. There is no obligation that
an educational institution must invest its funds in the modes specified in S.
11(5) of the Act.

(ii) The rent from the property let out is only Rs. 4,500.
This amount was far too insignificant for taking a decision against the
assessee and denying it exemption u/s.10(22). The assessee had earned only an
amount of Rs.9,603 through sale of books. This could not be construed to mean
that the assessee did not exist solely for educational purposes but had a
profit motive. The assessee invested its funds and the intention was to use
the funds and any interest earned thereon for educational purposes.

(iii) For the subsequent assessment year, that is, A.Y.
1998-99, without there being any change in circumstances, the contention of
the assessee that it continued to be an educational institution and was
entitled to exemption u/s. 10(22) of the Act was accepted. The present A.Y.
1997-98 was the only odd assessment year for which the assessee has been
denied exemption and that too for reasons that were not at all germane to the
issue. The assessee was entitled to exemption.”


 

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Educational Institution : Exemption u/s.10(22) : Object of educating public in safety : All income used for promotion of objects : Entitled to exemption.

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25 Educational Institution : Exemption u/s.
10(22) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1993-94 : Registered society with object
of educating public in safety : Entire income used for promotion of objects of
society : Society entitled to exemption.


[DI (Exemption) v. National Safety Council, 305 ITR
257 (Bom.)]

The assessee was a society registered with the principle
object of educating the public concerning safety. For the A.Y. 1993-94, the
Assessing Officer denied the assessee exemption u/s.10(22) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, on the ground that the assessee is not a university or other
educational institute existing solely for educational purposes. The Tribunal
allowed the assessee’s claim holding that the assessee was covered within the
meaning of the term ‘any other educational institution’ u/s.10(22) of the Act.

 

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue and affirming the decision of the Tribunal held as under :

“The return filed for the A.Y. 1993-94 revealed that the
entire income has been utilised for the purpose of its objects. Therefore, the
finding of the Tribunal was not perverse and there was no substantial question
of law.”


 

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Capital gains : Immovable property : S. 50C : Constitutional validity : Provision not arbitrary or violative of Article 14 : Constitutionally valid.

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24 Capital gains : Immovable property : Cost
of acquisition : S. 50C of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Constitutional
validity : Complete safeguard provided for assessee in Stamp Act and Income-tax
Act : Provision not arbitrary or violative of Article 14 : Provision
constitutionally valid.


[K. R. Palanisamy v. UOI, 306 ITR 61 (Mad.)]

The assessee sold his capital assets for a price lower than
the market price. The Assessing Officer applied S. 50C of the Income-tax Act,
1961 for computation of capital gain. The assessee filed a writ petition
challenging the constitutional validity of S. 50C.

 

The Madras High Court upheld the validity of S. 50C and held
as under :

“(i) S. 50C of the Act was incorporated to prevent
large-scale undervaluation of the real value of the property in the sale deed
so as to defraud the Government of revenue it was legitimately entitled to by
pumping in black money.

(ii) Article 246 of the Constitution of India gives
exclusive power to Parliament to make laws in respect of the matters
enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule. The legislative competence of
Parliament to insert a provision for arresting leakage of income had been
considered by the Supreme Court in several cases and the uniform opinion in
all those cases was that the entries in the legislative Lists should be
construed more liberally and in their widest amplitude and not in a narrow or
restricted sense. Every safeguard had been provided under the provisions of
the Stamp Act to the assessee to establish before the authorities the real
value for which the capital asset had been transferred.

(iii) Thus, what was stated in S. 50C as real value
could not be regarded as a notional or artificial
value and such real value is determinable only after hearing the assessee in
accordance with the statutory provisions. There was no indication either in
the provisions of S. 50C of the 1961 Act, or S. 47A of the Stamp Act or rules
made thereunder about the adoption of the guideline value. Hence, the
contention that S. 50C was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India could not be accepted.

(iv) The principle of determining the market value of the
assets had been stated in detail in rule 5 of the Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention
of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 1968. Hence the question of the
guideline value forming the basis for determination of the full value did not
arise.

(v) Capital assets and trading assets or stock-in-trade
were treated differently under the scheme of the Act. They could not be
compared on par with each other by considering them as a class of assets. The
discrimination on the ground of valid consideration which answers the test of
intelligible differentia did not attract Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.

(vi) A provision could be rendered inoperative only when it
was found to be violative of the constitutional mandate. The provision could
not be rendered inoperative on the ground that the speech of the Finance
Minister or the administrative instructions issued by the Central Board of
Direct Taxes had not explained the reasons for incorporation of the provision
when the object was evident from the provision itself.


 

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Shares in subsidiary company (ordered to be wound up) : Written off : Deductible business loss.

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23 Business loss : Shares held in subsidiary
company : Subsidiary company ordered to be wound up : Shares became of
insignificant value and written off : Loss to be treated as business loss
eligible for deduction.


[CIT v. H. P. Mineral and Industrial Development
Corporation Ltd.,
305 ITR 111 (HP)]

One of the assessee’s subsidiary companies was ordered to be
wound up. The assessee had held the shares as stock in trade. The assessee
decided to write off the value of the shares held by it in the said subsidiary
company and claimed deduction of the same as business loss. The Tribunal allowed
the deduction, holding that there was no question of selling off the shares as
the subsidiary company had gone into liquidation.

 

On reference by the Revenue, the Himachal Pradesh High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Once a company had been ordered to be wound up, there was
no question of any party dealing in the shares of that company. The Tribunal
had come to a finding that the shares were stock-in-trade and had therefore,
allowed the loss. The loss had to be treated as a trading loss. The mere fact
that the shares were not sold was of no significance, since in fact the shares
could not have been sold and had become worthless.”

 

 

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IFRS reconstructs the accounting for Public Private Partnerships (‘PPP’)

IFRS

In India, many infrastructure contracts are executed on BOT
(build, operate and transfer) terms under which a company enters into a
contractual agreement with the government or any quasi-government agency to
construct an asset (for example, a road) and to operate it for a specified time
period, before transferring the asset back to the government at the end of the
contracted term.

BOT arrangements are common in areas such as roads, bridges,
airports and power plants. Under such arrangements, there are mainly two types
of contracts : (1) a fixed annuity-based contract under which the operator
company builds the infrastructure asset and gets annuity from the grantor (i.e.,
government body); and (2) a usage based (i.e., toll-based) contract under
which the operator builds the infrastructure asset and collects toll from users.

Under existing Indian GAAP (‘IGAAP’), companies recognise the
infrastructure asset as their own fixed asset, and depreciate it over the
concession period. The amount received from the government and the users of the
infrastructure asset is recognised as income over the period of the concession.
The accounting treatment for such contracts will change under International
Financial Reporting Standards (‘IFRS’). IFRIC 12 (IFRICs are interpretations to
IFRS) on Service Concession Arrangements provides guidance on accounting for
such
arrangements.

Scope of IFRIC 12 :

IFRIC 12 applies to public-to-private service concession
arrangements in which the grantor controls and/or regulates the services
provided and the price, and controls any significant residual interest in the
infrastructure.

Whether or not an arrangement is within the scope of IFRIC 12
will affect the nature of the assets that the operator recognises. For example,
for an arrangement that is within the scope of IFRIC 12, the operator does not
recognise public service infrastructure as its property, plant and equipment (PPE).

Public-to-private service concession arrangements :

While IFRIC 12 does not define public-to-private service
concession arrangements, it does describe the typical features of such
arrangements. Typically a public-to-private service concession arrangement
within the scope of IFRIC 12 will involve most of the following :

(a) Infrastructure is used to deliver public services :

IFRIC 12 states that a feature of public-to-private
arrangements is the public service nature of the obligation undertaken by the
operator.

(b) A contractual arrangement between the grantor and
the operator :


This is the agreement, often termed as concession
agreement, under which the grantor specifies the services that the operator is
to provide and which governs the basis upon which the operator will be
remunerated.

(c) Supply of services by the operator :


These services may include the construction/upgrade of the
infrastructure and the operation and maintenance of that infrastructure.

(d) Payment of the operator over the term of the
arrangement :


In many cases the operator will receive no payment during
the initial construction/upgrade phase. Instead, the operator will be paid by
the grantor directly or will charge users during the period that the
infrastructure is available for use.

(e) Return of the infrastructure to the grantor at the
end of the arrangement :


For example, even if the operator has legal title to the
infrastructure during the term of the arrangement, then legal title may
transfer to the grantor at the end of the arrangement, often for no additional
consideration. In most such arrangements in India, legal title does not pass
on to the operator even during the concession period.

Public-to-private service concession arrangements within the
scope of IFRIC 12 :

The scope of IFRIC 12 is defined by reference to control of
the infrastructure. An arrangement is within the scope of IFRIC 12 if :

(a) the grantor controls what services the operator must
provide with the infrastructure (control of services);

(b) the grantor controls to whom it must provide them
(control of services);

(c) the grantor controls at what price services are charged
(control of pricing); and

(d) the grantor controls through ownership, beneficial
entitlement or otherwise, any significant residual interest in the
infrastructure at the end of the term of the arrangement (control of the
residual interest).


Control of services :

The grantor may control the services to be provided by the
operator in a number of ways. For example, the services may be specified through
the terms of the concession agreement and/or a licence agreement and/or some
other form of regulation. All of these forms of control are consistent with the
scope criteria of IFRIC 12. Furthermore, the degree of specification of the
services may vary in practice. In some cases the grantor will specify the
services to be provided in detail and by reference to specific tasks to be
undertaken by the operator. In other cases the grantor will specify the services
that the infrastructure should have the capacity to deliver.

Control of pricing :

The grantor may control or regulate the pricing of the
services to be provided using the infrastructure in a variety of ways. The
criterion in IFRIC 12 is generally satisfied when the service concession
involves explicit and substantive control or regulation of prices.

In some cases, particularly when the grantor pays the
operator directly, prices (or a price formula) may be set out in the concession
agreement. In other cases prices may be re-set periodically by the grantor, or
the grantor may give the operator discretion to set unit prices but set a
maximum level of revenue or profits that the operator may retain. All of these
forms of arrangement are consistent with the control criteria in IFRIC 12.

Control of residual interest :

The simplest way in which the grantor may control the residual interest is for the concession agreement to require the operator to return all concession assets to the grantor, or to transfer the infrastructure to a new operator, at the end of the arrangement for no consideration. Such a requirement is a common feature of service concession arrangements involving concession assets with long useful lives, such as road and rail infra-structure. However, other forms of arrangement also are within the scope criteria of IFRIC 12.

‘Whole-of-life’ arrangements, that is, arrangements for which the residual interest in the infrastructure is not significant, are within the scope of IFRIC 12 if the other scope criteria are met.

Accounting for public service infrastructure cost and related revenue:
Accounting for construction/upgrade of infra-structure:

Under IGAAP, the operator recognises the infra-structure as its PPE. However for arrangements within the scope of IFRIC 12 under IFRS, the operator does not recognise public service infrastructure as its PPE, as the operator does not control the public service infrastructure. The control require-ment is determinative irrespective of the extent to which the operator bears the risks and rewards of ownership of the infrastructure.

IFRIC 12 characterises operators as ‘service providers’, who should recognise revenue in accordance with the stage of completion of the services as measured by reference to the fair value of the consideration receivable. This is irrespective of whether the sale consideration is guaranteed by the grantor or is variable based on the usage of infrastructure asset.

Accounting for sale consideration:

The operator recognises consideration received or receivable for providing construction/upgrade services as a financial asset and/or as an intangible asset depending upon the assessment of demand risk.

The operator recognises a financial asset to the extent that it has an unconditional right to receive cash from the grantor irrespective of the usage of the infrastructure.
The operator recognises an intangible asset to the extent that it has a right to charge fees for usage of the infrastructure.

Assessment of demand risk:

The grantor bears the demand risk to the extent it guarantees certain minimum sale consideration irrespective of the usage of the asset. To the extent the grantor bears the demand risk, the operator recognises a financial asset.

Where an arrangement does not guarantee sales consideration and the consideration is linked to the usage of the infrastructure, the demand risk rests with the operator. In such cases, the operator recognises an intangible asset. Even in cases where the arrangement provides a cap on total consideration to be collected from users but does not guarantee minimum sales consideration, the operator shall recognise an intangible asset.

Impact of borrowing costs:

Under IGAAP, borrowing costs incurred during the construction phase are capitalised as part of qualifying fixed assets. Under IFRS, the treatment of borrowing costs differs depending on whether the arrangement qualifies under the financial asset model or the intangible asset model (as discussed above) . In the intangible asset model, the borrowing costs are required to be capitalised to the intangible asset. However, in the financial asset model, the borrowing costs are charged to profits, as financial assets cannot be qualifying assets under borrowing cost standard (i.e., IAS 23).

Recognition and measurement of revenue:

We look at the recognition and measurement of revenue under both the above scenarios — financial asset model and intangible asset model.

Financial asset model:

When the demand risk is with the grantor (i.e., the grantor guarantees the collections that will be recovered over the concession arrangement), the arrangement is said to contain deferred payment terms where the construction revenue is recognised at fair value. It is subsequently measured at amortised cost; i.e., the amount initially recognised plus the cumulative interest on that amount cal-culated using the effective interest method minus repayments. Thus, the overall consideration is broken down into revenue and interest income.

Intangible asset model:

For arrangements where the operator earns revenue purely from collection of tolls that are not guaranteed by the grantor, the right to collect the toll revenue is obtained as a consideration for rendering construction services to the grantor. For accounting purposes, these transactions are treated as barter arrangements. Thus, for such infrastructure projects, companies are required to recognise construction revenue (corresponding amount is debited to the intangible asset i.e., right to collect toll revenue from users) during the course of the construction period; and the toll revenue is recognised separately on collection. The intangible asset is amortised to the income statement over its useful life.

As such, the total amount of revenue recognised over the term of the arrangement is greater than the cash flows received during the period.

Subsequent measurement of financial asset:

The operator accounts for any financial asset it recognizes in accordance with the financial instruments standards (i.e., IAS 39) . There are no exemptions from these standards for operators. As such, the operator is required to classify the financial asset as a loan or receivable, available-for-sale, or at fair value through profit or loss if so designated. Generally, such assets are recorded as loans and receivables.

Subsequent measurement of intangible asset:

IAS 38 allows intangible assets to be measured using either the cost model or the revaluation model. The revaluation model is permitted to be used only if there is an active market for that asset. In most cases there will be no active market for intangible assets recognised under service concession arrangements, and therefore the cost model will be used.

Under the cost model the intangible asset is measured at its cost less any accumulated amortisation and any accumulated impairment losses. The depreciation is based on the asset’s economic useful life, which is generally the concession period.

Financial statement impact for operators on transition to IFRS:
Construction phase of the arrangement:

Under IGAAP, the operator recognises the cost of construction of infrastructure as part of its fixed assets. The fixed assets are depreciated over its useful life (usually over the concession period). Under IFRS, the costs incurred during the construction phase are recognised in income statement as construction

costs (along with the corresponding construction revenue). As the construction cost is recognised upfront in income statement, there would be no impact of depreciation in future years. Thus cost recognised in income statement during initial years is higher under IFRS as compared to IGAAP. Further under IGAAP, no revenue is recognised during the course of the construction phase of the concession arrangement. Under IFRS, revenue is recognised during the course of construction activities (in line with construction cost, based on percentage of completion method). Thus, companies will recognise higher revenues and costs (and higher profits) during the construction period.                

Operation revenue:    
            
                
Under IGAAP, revenue is recognised during the operations phase based on the terms of the concession arrangement. Under IFRS, revenue is recognised depending on whether the concession arrangement falls into financial asset model or intangible asset model. When the operator recognises an intangible asset during the construction phase (i.e., it receives a right to collect fees that are contingent upon the extent of use of the public service), it recognises operation revenue as it is earned i.e., the toll collection is recognised as revenue. Thus there is no impact of IFRS transition on revenue recognition during operations phase. The intangible asset recognised during the construction phase is amortised to income statement over the term of the concession arrangement. Further unlike IGAAP where the fixed asset is capitalised at cost, IFRS requires capitalisation of the intangible asset based on the fair value of construction services. Thus in most cases, the carrying value of intangible asset and related depreciation/amortisation would be higher under IFRS.


When the operator recognises a financial asset during the construction phase (i.e., it receives an unconditional right to receive cash that is not dependent upon the extent of use of the public service), a portion of payments received during the operation phase is allocated to reduce this financial asset (including related imputed interest income. Thus revenue recognition during the operations phase is severely impacted, as a portion of the revenues currently recognized during the operations phase would be adjusted as a recovery of the financial asset.

The table alongside provides a summary impact of the service concession arrangements on transition to IFRS.

Impact of IFRS beyond accounting:

Indian Industry is cautious of the financial statement impact on account of transition to IFRS. However, contrary to the general belief, the impact of transition to IFRS is not restricted to impact on profits and equity.

Financial budget:

On account of transition to IFRS, the financial budgets and performance matrices would undergo a change. Consider, for instance, revenue recognition under financial asset model where the construction revenue is recognised during the course of the construction phase and only interest income/operations revenue recognised during the term of the concession arrangement. This may impact key performance indicators which form a basis on incentive payments to senior employees and also bank covenants (asset cover age ratio, etc.).

Communication with stakeholders:

Management would need to keep stakeholders informed on the change in profitability due to transition related issues.

Contractual impact:

Certain grantors charge companies a certain revenue share every year (which is a percentage of the reported revenues). In case of PPP arrangements accounted under the intangible asset model, total reported revenue is much higher than cash flows earned (as explained above), since the revenue reported during the construction phase is notional. This may lead to higher leakage of regulatory dues which are based on reported revenues.

Similarly, even in the case of a financial asset model, acceleration of revenue recognition (during the construction period) would result in acceleration of contractual cash payments for revenue share (even though the revenues reported have not been realized in cash).

Taxes:

There is a need felt for more clarity on taxation matters vis-à-vis IFRS transition, especially around GST and MAT.

Regulatory:

It remains to be seen whether the statutory financial statements that will now be prepared under IFRS will be accepted for the purposes of filing business plans with banks for borrowing purposes and with RBI/FIPB for investment purposes.

Redefining the systems, processes and data points:

Capturing information under IFRS at a transaction level would pose a significant challenge, atleast in the initial years. The biggest hindrance will be faced on reconfiguration of IT systems, where the investment of time, cost, resources and complexity should not be underestimated. Further, the entity needs to be relook at the process of collecting additional data required under IFRS and make consequential amendment to the internal controls.

While industry believes that the change in the accounting framework is a step in the right direction, they are in the process of estimating the exact impact on their business. The financial and non-financial aspects relating to the IFRS convergence need to be planned and tested in advance of the implementation date. Global experience has shown that the early adopters are generally more successful in managing the overall IFRS transition. The ear-ly-mover advantage not only provides adequate time to carry out required changes, but protects critical decisions being taken within the constraints of time and resources.

succession, survivorship, inheritance, purchase, partition, mortgage, gift, lease, etc., in any land, then he must give a notice of the same to the Talathi within three months of such event.

The Talathi would then enter such changes in a Register of Mutations which would alter the original record of rights.

5.4 Any person buying land especially in a rural or semi-urban area would be well advised to do a thorough title search by checking the Record of Rights, Register of Mutations, etc., which would show whether or not the land in question is an agricultural land, who is the owner, what important developments have taken place in respect of the land, etc.

5.5 In the next Article we shall look at the process for converting an agricultural land into a non-agricultural land.

IFRS — Closer to economic substance of the transaction

IFRS

One of the important aspects of convergence is that financial
reporting will be better aligned to the true economic substance of a
transaction. ‘Substance over form’ is one of the most important principles on
which International Financial Reporting Standards (‘IFRS’) are based. Detailed
Implementation Guidance (IG) and Basis of Conclusion (BC) for the accounting
treatment prescribed in the respective standards explain the underling economic
rationale for such treatment, which acts as a guide in implementation of the
intent behind the standards.

In general, Indian GAAP also tends to be principle focussed.
However, there are a number of areas where accounting guidance deviates from the
underlying economic substance (e.g., accounting for business
combinations, service concession arrangements or multiple element deliverables)
or in other situations tends to be prescriptive in nature (e.g.,
accounting for loan impairment losses by a bank, accounting for depreciation on
property, plant and equipments based on minimum rates prescribed). Similarly,
accounting is often governed by the terms of the legal contract.

This article highlights some of the important areas where the
accounting under IFRS is closer to the economic substance of the transactions as
compared to Indian GAAP.

Revenue arrangements with multiple deliverables (IAS 18) :

IAS 18 requires, in certain circumstances, to apply the
recognition criteria to each separately identifiable component of a single
transaction in order to reflect the underlying substance of the transaction.
Thus, under IFRS, multiple deliverable transactions (e.g., product sales
and subsequent servicing) are viewed from the perspective of the customer. What
does customer believe that he is buying ? If the customer believes that he is
buying a single product, the recognition criteria should be applied to the
transaction as a whole. Conversely, if the customer believes that there are a
number of elements to the transaction, then the revenue recognition criteria is
applied to each element separately.

Similarly, in certain cases the standard requires the
recognition criteria to be applied to two or more transactions together when
they are linked in such a way that the commercial effect cannot be understood
without reference to the series of transactions as a whole. Once again, the
focus is on the substance and the economic rationale for the transactions.

Example

Entity A sells software with an annual maintenance service
for a total consideration of Rs.1000. Entity A also provides similar annual
maintenance service to other customers at a consideration of Rs.200. In this
case, the sale of the software and maintenance contract would be regarded as
separate components. Revenue from the sale of the software Rs.800 (1000 — 200)
will be recognised when the software is delivered and other revenue recognition
principles are met, and revenue from rendering of maintenance services will be
recognised on a straight-line basis over one year. Now consider a situation
where the same contract is structured in a different manner and the sales
contract itself provides that the ‘price’ of the software is Rs.900 and the
price of the annual maintenance service is Rs.100. Typical practice under Indian
GAAP is to recognise revenue of Rs.900 upfront and recognise only Rs.100 as the
revenue over the maintenance period. Thus, what gets accounted is the legal form
of the contract and not the true economic substance of the sale transaction.
However under IFRS these two transactions will be linked together and each
component i.e., sale of software and annual maintenance service will be
accounted at its fair value i.e., Rs.800 and Rs.200 irrespective of the
values denominated in the contract, thereby reflecting the true economic
substance.

Consolidation based on control (IAS 27, IAS 28 and IAS 31) :

Definition of control under Indian GAAP is different from the
definition under IFRS. Indian GAAP permits consolidation based on the
ownership
of majority of voting power or the ability to control the
composition of Board of Directors. Thus, under Indian GAAP it is possible for
two entities to have ‘control’ over one investee company and both companies will
need to account the investee as a subsidiary.

The definition of control under IFRS has two parts, both of
which need to be met in order to conclude that one entity controls another :

(a) ‘the power to govern the financial and operating
policies of an entity’

(b) so as to obtain benefits from its activities.

The implication of the control principles under IFRS is that
companies cannot consolidate an entity only based on holding of current voting
interests. Since consolidation is based only on control, only one holding entity
will practically be able to demonstrate such control and hence there will never
be a scenario where the same entity is being consolidated by two separate
holding entities as a subsidiary.

Under IFRS, rights of each shareholder need to be carefully
evaluated by examining the shareholder’s agreement to determine the entity,
which has control, for consolidation. For example, an entity may own more than
50% of the voting rights in another entity and accordingly is able to
consolidate that entity with itself, currently under Indian GAAP. However due to
certain veto rights given to minority shareholders contractually, it may not be
in a position to unilaterally control that entity, and therefore may not be able
to consolidate that entity under IFRS as a subsidiary.

Example :

Two companies A and B come together to form a company X in
which company A holds 75% with 3 directors on the board of company X and company
B holds 25% with 2 directors on the board of company X. By virtue of majority
holding, company A consolidates Company X as a subsidiary under Indian GAAP. The
Articles of Association of company X states that for certain decisions, a
unanimous approval of the board of directors is required. These decisions
include approving the annual and semi-annual budgets of the company and
selection and appointment of senior management personnel. In such a case, under IFRS, company A does not control company
X, instead it shares joint control over it along with company B. Hence it shall
not consolidate company X as a subsidiary but account for it as a joint venture
arrangement. However, under Indian GAAP, A would continue to consolidate X,
though it does not have control over the operations, which do not reflect the
true economic substance of the transaction.

Acquisition method of accounting for business combinations (IFRS 3) :

Business combinations are the acquisitions of controlling stakes in entities and businesses like mergers, acquisition of a subsidiary or purchase of net assets of a division. Indian GAAP has limited guidance on the first-time accounting for such transactions and allows the pooling of interests method or the purchase method of accounting; IFRS recognises only the acquisition method for accounting for these transactions. Hence under IFRS, all business combinations are accounted for at fair value as on the acquisition date (excluding the specific scope ex-emptions given in the standard). This process involves the identification of intangibles subsumed within goodwill like customer relationships, favourable leases; fair valuation of contingent liabilities, contingent consideration and all other acquired assets and liabilities whether recognised or unrecognised in the acquiree’s balance sheet.

The objective of this accounting is to ensure that all items where the acquirer saw value and hence paid for it, are brought onto the books of accounts at their fair values. This would ensure appropriate reflection of the factors that affected the negotiation process of the transaction in the financial statements and bring accounting closer to the economic attributes inherent in the business combination.

Initial recognition of financial assets and liabilities at fair value (IAS 39) :

Under IFRS, initial recognition of all financial assets and liabilities is mandatorily required at its fair value. This helps in reflecting the true substance of a particular transaction. Consider the following situations:

  • Low interest loans given to subsidiary: Under Indian GAAP these are accounted at transaction value, however, under IFRS these are recorded at the fair value and the initial loss is considered as an investment in the subsidiary and the subsidiary accounts for it as a capital contribution. In the subsequent years the unwinding of the initial fair value loss is treated as an interest income by the parent and interest expense by the subsidiary.

  • Low interest loans given to employees: Under Indian GAAP these are accounted at transaction value, however, under IFRS these are recorded at the fair value and the initial loss is accounted as an employee cost based on the loan terms, thereby reflecting the true intent of compensating the employees in the financial statements.

  • Interest-free  security deposit for leased premises: Under Indian GAAP these are accounted at transaction value, however, under IFRS these are recorded at the fair value and the initial loss is accounted as a prepaid rent, which is amortised over the lease period, thereby reflecting the true operating expense (rental expenditure) in the financial statements.

  • Sales tax deferral schemes: Under Indian GAAP these are accounted at transaction value, however, under IFRS these are recorded at the fair value and the initial gain is accounted as a government grant, which is deferred over the grant period, thereby reflecting the true operating results of the company each year.

Contracts denominated in ‘third currencies’ (IAS 39) :

Sale or purchase contracts in the ordinary course of business may include payment terms denominated in a third currency i.e., a currency which is not the currency of either of the contracting parties. In such circumstances, the foreign currency element in the contract should be accounted for separately from the underlying contract, unless the payments required under the contract are denominated in one of the following currencies:

  •     the currency’ in which the price of the related goods or service being delivered under the contract is routinely denominated in commercial transactions around the world; and

  •     the currency that is commonly used in contracts to purchase or sell non-financial items in the economic environment in which the transaction takes place.

‘Routinely denominated’, as noted under the first bullet above, should be interpreted narrowly, so that an oil transaction denominated in U.S. dollars is one of the few transactions that qualifies for this exemption.

The separation of foreign currency derivatives would reflect the true risks that the entity has indirectly exposed itself to, on entering into the host contract. Such an embedded derivative is carried at fair value through profit and loss account.

Example:

An Indian entity contracts to lease an aircraft from a US entity for 12 months with prices denominated in Euros. Since Euro is not the functional currency of either of the contracting parties, both the seller and the buyer are indirectly exposing themselves to fluctuations of a foreign currency by way of the underlying contract to lease the aircraft. This would be considered an embedded derivative which requires separation and would be carried at fair value in the financial statements of both the contracting parties until the settlement of the underlying contract i.e., every month the fluctuation in exchange rates attributable to unpaid lease rentals will be recognised in the income statement (like accounting for a notional forward cover to buy Euros for the remaining period) and the monthly lease payments will be recorded based on the INR/ Euro exchange rate on the contract date.

Hence although the host contract would not specify the existence of a derivative; looking at the transaction in substance would result in the identification of an embedded foreign currency derivative (notional forward) and reflect the foreign currency risk that the entity is indirectly exposed to due to the arrangement. The ultimate reporting in the financial statement would result accounting for lease rentals at a fixed rate on the contract date (which is the real commercial transaction) and all other fluctuations in the exchange rate from the contract date to the monthly payment dates will be classified as a foreign exchange gain/loss.

Embedded lease contract (IFRIC 4) :

Companies sometimes enter into normal business transactions that share many features of a lease (lease is defined in paragraph 4 of IAS 17 Leases as ‘an agreement whereby the lessor conveys to the lessee in return for a payment or series of payments the right to use an asset for an agreed period of time’).

Unlike Indian GAAP, under IFRS, all arrangements meeting the definition of a lease should be accounted for in accordance with IAS 17 regardless of whether they take the legal form of a lease. This determination is based on the assessment of whether:

i) the fulfillment of the arrangement (commercial transaction) is dependent on the use of a specific asset or assets; and

ii) the arrangement conveys a right to use the asset.

Examples  of such transactions    include:

  • outsourcing arrangements,

  • take or pay contracts in which purchasers make specified payments regardless of whether they take delivery of the contracted products or services.

Example:

Company A enters in a purchase contract with company B to purchase 1,000 units of C every month @ Rs.25 per unit. Product C can be manufactured on a specific machine M by company B. In case of shortfall every month, company B will compensate company A Rs.10 per unit of short-fall and entire output from machine M is availed by company A.

Under Indian GAAP, the above transaction is accounted as a normal purchase transaction @ Rs. 25 per unit. In case there is a shortfall, the payment amount is expensed as a penalty.

Under IFRS, this transaction is broken into its two constituents i.e.,

1) Lease of machine M given that company A is in substance paying a fixed amount of Rs 10 per unit to company A towards availability of machine for company A

2) Processing charges for manufacture of product C

Service  concessions    arrangement (IFRIC 12) :

IFRS contains specific guidance on public-to-private service concession arrangements under IFRIC 12. It applies to arrangements, wherein the public entity (referred to as grantor) is able to control the use of the infrastructure by specifying the nature of service, the recipient of the service and the price to be charged, and to retain significant residual interest in the infrastructure. In such cases, infrastructure is not recognised as property, plant and equipment of the private entity (referred to as operator) as the arrangement does not convey the use of the public service infrastructure to the operator. The operator, in turn, recognises and measures revenue in accordance with IAS 11 or IAS 18 for the service it performs i.e., construction, up gradation, operation, etc. The operator recognises the consideration receivable based on its nature as a financial asset or intangible asset or partly a financial asset and partly as intangible, based on the specific terms of the arrangement.

Under Indian GAAP, there is no specific guidance and this has resulted in varied practices. Generally, the operator capitalises the infrastructure cost in its books as fixed asset and revenue is recognised as services are rendered with the infrastructure. This asset is depreciated in accordance with the company’s depreciation policy or over the period of the service concession arrangement. Thus the revenue is not recognised as and when the efforts are expended and increases the volatility in the income statement with losses in initial period of a service concession arrangement and higher margins in the later period, which may not reflect the correct economic activity for a given period.

Example:

A grantor awards a concession to an operator to build and operate a new road. The grantor transfers to the operator the land on which the road is to be constructed, together with adjacent land that the operator may redevelop or sell at its discretion. Construction is expected to take 5 years, after which the operator will operate the road for 25 years. During these 25 years the operator has a contractual obligation to perform routine maintenance on the road and to resurface it as necessary, which is expected to be three times. At the end of the arrangement the road will revert to the grantor. The road is to be used by the general public. Toll for use of the road is set annually by the grantor. This arrangement is a public-to-private arrangement as the road is constructed pursuant to general transport policy and is to be used by the public. This would fall under the scope of IFRIC 12. Accordingly the operator will not recognise the road as property, plant and ‘ equipment; however he will recognise an intangible asset for the right to operate the road and collect toll from it.

Deferred taxes on unrealised profits of joint ventures/associates (IAS 12) :

Currently,    under    Indian    GAAP,    profits    of subsidiaries, branches, associates and joint ventures (‘investee companies’) are included in consolidated profits of the parent company. The consolidated performance results and net worth are accordingly reported to the shareholders of the parent under Indian GAAP. However one important aspect that is not reported is the impact of tax leakage when the profit earned by the investee companies will be transferred to the parent. Accordingly the consolidated profit and the net worth reported under Indian GAAP is grossed up to that extent, since the overall tax impact on the consolidated profit available to the parent company is not completely recorded in the books of account. Such deferred tax impact is accounted for in the consolidated financial statements under IFRS.

For example:

Parent company P consolidates undistributed profits of Rs.100 crores of associate company A in its consolidated financial statements. The dividend distribution tax rate in A’s jurisdiction is 15% and dividend received is exempt from tax in the hands of P. In this case, P should recognise a deferred tax liability of Rs.15 crores (at a rate of 15% on Rs.100 crares) in its consolidated financial statements which will ensure a correct presentation of the net worth to the shareholders.

Presentation of financial statements:

In India, Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956, which prescribes a detailed format for preparation and disclosure of financial statements, lays great emphasis on quantitative information such as quantitative details of sales, COGS, production capacities, amount of transactions with related parties, CIF value of imports and income and expenditure in foreign currency, etc. Contrary to the same, IFRS if more focussed on qualitative information for the stakeholders such as terms of related party transactions, risk management policies, currency exposure for the Company with sensitivity analysis, etc. To more correctly report the liquidity position of the Company, IFRS requires disclosure of all assets/ liabilities, whether they are current or non-current. Presently under Indian GAAP even long-term deposits and advances are disclosed under current assets,loans and advances, thereby not disclosing the true liquidity profile of the entity.

Conclusion:

IFRS aims to present  financial  statements  which are a reflection of the business and economic environment in which a company operates. The standard-setters strive to formulate principles which would help a company in applying judgment and reaching the ultimate goal of accounting which is closer to the economic value of transactions. This is clearly evident in the above discussions of accounting for business combinations, consolidation, embedded leases, embedded derivatives, etc. However, to achieve this goal, it is important that the principles are applied in their true spirit and in the manner in which they are intended.

Convergence brings a new perspective for Indian companies from the traditional Indian GAAP. It challenges them to look beyond the legal language of arrangements, shifting the focus to the substance of arrangements. Indian companies need to be prepared to face this new age of accounting and keep up with the evolving changes that are taking place in IFRS itself.

Power of Appellate Tribunal : To allow claim for deduction not made in return : Assessee claimed 1/5th revenue expenditure on deferred basis : Tribunal can allow full revenue expenditure on accrual basis.

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22 Appellate Tribunal : Power of : A.Y.
1990-91 : The Tribunal has power to allow claim for deduction which was not made
in the return of income : Assessee claimed 1/5th revenue expenditure on deferred
basis: Tribunal can allow full revenue expenditure on accrual basis.


[CIT v. Jai Parabolic Springs Ltd., 172 Taxman 258
(Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1990-91, the assessee had written off in the
books certain revenue expenditure over a period of 5 years from the relevant
assessment year and, accordingly, the assessee claimed deduction of 1/5th of the
expenses in the relevant year on deferred basis. The claim was allowed by the
AO. In appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the claim for deduction of the entire revenue
expenditure in the relevant year. The Tribunal restored the matter to the AO to
consider the issue afresh. The AO again disallowed the claim holding that the
same was not claimed in the return of income. The CIT(A) allowed the claim. The
Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

 

In appeal before the High Court, the Revenue contended that
the Tribunal was not right, in law, in allowing the deduction when no such claim
was made in the return of income. The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal
filed by the Revenue and held as under :

“(i) The revenue expenditure, which is incurred wholly and
exclusively for the purpose of business, must be allowed in its entirety in
the year in which it is incurred. It cannot be spread over a number of years
even if the assessee has written it off in his books over a period of a number
of years.

(ii) There is no prohibition on the powers of the Tribunal
to entertain an additional ground which according to the Tribunal arises in
the matter for the just decision of the case. Therefore, there was no
infirmity in the order of the Tribunal.”


 

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Educational institution : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2004-05 to 2007-08 : Merely because an educational institution accumulates income, it does not go out of consideration of S. 10(23C)(vi); If accumulation of surplus is wi

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Reported :

25. Educational
institution : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2004-05
to 2007-08 : Merely because an educational institution accumulates income, it
does not go out of consideration of S. 10(23C)(vi); If accumulation of surplus
is within parameters of Section, it will be entitled to benefit of S.
10(23C)(vi).

[Maa Saraswati
Educational Trust v. UOI,
194 Taxman 84 (HP)]

The assessee-trust was
established for educational purpose. The Commissioner declined to grant approval
to the assessee for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on
the ground that it had accumulated huge income and had been generating profit.

The Himachal Pradesh High
Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under :

“(i) The requirements for
approval u/s.10(23C)(vi) are : (1) the educational institution should exist
solely for educational purpose and not for the purpose of profit; (2) it
should not be an educational institution wholly or substantially financed by
the Government; (3) it should be an educational institution genuinely existing
for educational purpose and not for the purpose of profit; (4) its aggregate
annual income exceeds
Rs. 1 crore; and (5) it should be approved by the prescribed authority.

(ii) Under the third
proviso, it is made clear that the educational institution is entitled to
apply its income or accumulate it for application wholly or exclusively to the
objects for which it is established and in a case where more than 15% of its
income is accumulated on or after 1-4-2002, the period of the accumulation of
the amount exceeding 15% of the income shall, in no case, exceed five years.
Therefore, it is not as if the educational institution cannot generate any
surplus. Generating surplus and accumulation of income will not disqualify an
institution for the benefits of S. 10(23C).

(iii) Surplus is to be
understood in contradistinction to generation of income with the sole motive
of profit if one has to properly understand the legislative intent of S.
10(23C)(vi). Merely because an educational institution accumulates income, it
does not go out of consideration of S. 10(23C)(vi); it goes out only if
application of income is for the purposes other than education, since the
institution is to be established and maintained solely with the object of
imparting education.

(iv) In the instant case,
going by the accounts, prima facie, it appeared that there was no
question of generation of profit, though there was accumulation of surplus,
but in case the accumulation of surplus was within the parameters, the
assessee was entitled to succeed. In that context, the contention of the
assessee that there was no accumulation of income had also to be considered.”

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Capital gains : Computation : Depreciable asset : S. 50 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Land is not a depreciable asset : S. 50 not applicable where land forms part of whole undertaking which is transferred.

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Reported :

24. Capital gains :
Computation : Depreciable asset : S. 50 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Land is not a
depreciable asset : S. 50 not applicable where land forms part of whole
undertaking which is transferred.

[CIT v. Coimbatore Lodge,
328 ITR 69 (Mad.)]

The assessee was running a
lodge. The assessee transferred the lodge and claimed exemption u/s. 54EC of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for exemption.
The Commissioner (Alleals) and the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled
to exemption u/s.54EC of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Land is not the
depreciable asset. S. 50 of the Act deals only with the transfer of
depreciable assets. Once the land forms part of the assets of the undertaking
and the transfer is of the entire undertaking as a whole, it is not possible
to bifurcate the sale consideration in a particular asset.”


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Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC r/w S. 10A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Assessee is entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC for remaining 10% of profit, which was to suffer tax after applying S. 10A/10B.

New Page 1

Reported :

26. Export profit :
Deduction u/s.80HHC r/w S. 10A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Assessee
is entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC for remaining 10% of profit, which was to
suffer tax after applying S. 10A/10B.

[CIT v. Ambatturre
Clothing Ltd.,
194 Taxman 79 (Mad.)]

The assessee, an export
concern was entitled to deduction u/s.10A/10B and u/s.80HHC of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. For the A.Y. 2003-04 the assessee had claimed deduction u/s.10A/10B
of the Act and the same was allowed. The assessee had also claimed deduction
u/s.80HHC for the remaining 10% of the profit, which to suffer tax after
applying S. 10A/10B. The claim was allowed by the Assessing Officer.
Subsequently, the Assessing Officer rectified the assessment order u/s.154 and
withdrew the deduction allowed u/s.80HHC, holding that it amounted to double
deduction. The Tribunal cancelled the rectification order.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) According to the
Assessing Authority, such a claim made u/s.80HHC in respect of the remaining
10% of the profits amounted to a claim of double deduction, which was not
permissible. On the said basis, the Assessing Authority took the view that the
said issue was an apparent mistake on the face of the record, which he
rectified by passing his order dated 11-6-2007.

(ii) When we examine the
issue raised in this appeal, at the very outset, it will have to be pointed
out that even u/s.10A(6)(iii) of the Act, there is a specific
provision, which reads as under :

“No deduction shall be
allowed u/s.80HH or u/s.80HHA or u/s.80-I or u/s.80-IA or u/s.80-IB in
relation to the profits and gains of the undertaking; “

(iii) The very statutory
provision prescribing a prohibition in respect of the deductions in relation
to the profits and gains itself, has not specifically included S. 80HHC.
Apparently, it therefore would only mean that there was no prohibition for
claiming any deduction u/s. 80HHC while applying the benefits provided u/s.10A
of the Act. If that is the statutory prescription, by which the assessee was
entitled to claim a benefit u/s.80HHC in relation to the profits and gains
while invoking S. 10A, it will have to be concluded that the assessment order
in having allowed such a deduction of the remaining 10% of the profits earned
by the assessee, was not erroneous.

(iv) In any event, having
regard to such a statutory prescription available for the assessee to claim
the benefit u/s.80HHC in respect of the profits earned from S. 10A of the Act,
there is absolutely no scope for the Assessing Authority to have invoked S.
154 of the Act, in order to state that, that can be considered as an error
apparent, inasmuch as there was no error at all, much less, apparent error to
be rectified by the Assessing Authority.

(v) This conclusion of
ours is apart from the conclusion of the Tribunal in having held that in that
situation what was held by the Assessing Authority in the original assessment
order was a possible view and that cannot be considered as an error apparent
on the face of the records.”

 


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US & Globalisation

Editorial

President Obama’s visit to India a few days back was against
the backdrop of the toughest two years that the United States of America has
experienced since the 1930s. Unemployment in the USA is at an alarmingly high
level and there have been protests against outsourcing of work to India. Just
before his arrival, the US President also suffered a setback in the mid-term
elections to the Senate and the Congress. The President was frank when he said
he needed to create jobs back home and that is why he was in India. But the
visit of the President was possibly more ceremonial and it offered little in
terms of path-breaking policy or new agreements.

Obama, in his address to the Parliament, endorsed India’s bid
for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. While the statement pleased
everybody, one must not forget that Bill Clinton during his presidency had made
a similar promise to Japan. And Japan is yet not a permanent member of the UN
Security Council. It is also not out of place to mention that according to
Wikileaks, Hillary Clinton considers India as a self appointed frontrunner for
the permanent seat on the UN Security Council. So let us not get elated with the
promise of support to India. It is still a distant dream.

President Obama, at the Town Hall Meeting with students at
St. Xavier’s College, dealt with the issue of terrorism originating from
Pakistan. While we all commemorate the 2nd anniversary of 26/11, we need to
think about the point that the US President made when he mentioned that when
India is on the move economically, it is India that has the biggest stake in
Pakistan’s stability. We must appreciate that if Pakistan is stable, it has a
stable government, possibly the incentive to promote terrorism will itself be
diminished. It will help India to concentrate on issues of economic development.
Sometimes when we look at the problem from a different angle, it becomes
possible to find a solution. Certainly terrorism or support to terrorism in any
form is unacceptable, but can’t there be a novel way to tackle it effectively?

Another issue which Obama dealt with was how the USA looks at
globalisation. In the past, the USA was an extremely dominant player in the
world economy and it could set the terms while negotiating with others. It did
not matter if economies of other countries were not so open. Other countries
required goods and services from the USA and they could be obtained only on the
terms set by the USA. Today, things have changed. Now there is competition from
other countries like China, Brazil and India. This competition is perceived as a
threat by many in the USA. Today, the USA expects reciprocity from its trading
partners. It wants access to their markets. It wants India to open sectors like
banking, insurance, retail, etc. At the same time, today, the USA, which
advocates an open economy, is itself taking steps to protect its own industry
and Obama was justifying this protectionism followed by them. It is also true
that the President of the USA, like our own government, has also to consider
what is politically feasible and practical, which in terms of economic theory
may not be the best option.

So today, to get a good deal, whether as a nation or as a
private enterprise, we have to learn to understand our strengths as well as
weaknesses and negotiate well. It has become a matter of relative economic
strength, negotiating capacity and capability. Our mindset that Indians have to
sign on the dotted line while dealing with western countries has to change. At
the same time, we have to be efficient, quality conscious and professional in
our approach in our dealings. Let us hope we are able to make the most of the
opportunity that lies before the nation.

Indra Nooyi, Chairperson and CEO of Pepsico, who was one of
the important members of the delegation that accompanied President Obama to
India, explained the point made by the President subtly during the course of a
freewheeling interview to a television news channel. While stating that
globalisation was good and the process should not be reversed, she pointed out
that each country evolves a model that is right for that country. Each country
should evolve its own brand of capitalism but not retreat into protectionism.
She was frank yet subtle when she said that President Obama knows intellectually
that (big) business was very important. She was confident that the President
will be friendlier to business going forward. Similarly, while talking about the
need for India to develop its infrastructure, she said it was not the thought
that was lagging; it was the lack of will of the democratic system to make it
happen. The Prime Minister had to make sure he had to get it through the
political system.

The interview also gave some insight into Indra Nooyi’s HR
skills, her view of the world, how there is power diffusion from the
Judah-Christian world to the multi–religion world of the East and the Middle
East. She adroitly avoided giving a direct reply when asked if she would be the
next head of the Tata Group. Indra Nooyi, who was born and brought up in Chennai
and comes from a modest background, is proud of her Indian origin; but then she
also praised the USA for its incredible meritocracy. While she said she believed
in capitalism and as the CEO of a large multinational, advocated the opening of
markets, she also admitted that compulsions of a head of the government are
different. Running a country is far difficult than being the CEO of a large
corporate. Persons like her are in a sense, world citizens. They have a global
view, wide vision and a down-to-earth approach. They are intelligent and have
worked hard. But even they have to make sacrifices and lose out on the simple
pleasures of life to reach the position where they are today. And occasionally
that becomes obvious. One then realises that these persons are also ordinary
mortals like you and I.

Sanjeev Pandit

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Introduction of IFRS

Editorial

Many centuries ago, Indian
saint and philosopher Dnyaneshwar said ‘Hey Vishwachi Maazhe Ghar’ i.e., this
entire world is my home. Today, in the era of globalisation the world has, in
fact, become an economic village. Free flow of capital between various political
and economic jurisdictions has become a reality. On this background, a set of
robust accounting standards that results in transparent and informative
financial statements which are applicable across various jurisdictions, will
bring about comparability of financial statements reducing attendant risks and
costs to the investors and others. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
of USA and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have committed to
bring about convergence between International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
and US GAAP. The European Union has adopted IFRS through the process of
endorsement.

India started opening its
economy over a decade ago. Consequentially, there is a substantial increase in
inbound and outbound investments. Considering these developments, India has no
alternative but to align itself with the developments in the field of accounting
in the rest of the world.

Towards this objective, the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), in 2007, published a Concept
Paper on Convergence with IFRS in India. It decided to adopt IFRS
for public interest entities i.e., listed companies, banks, insurance companies and other large-sized
entities from accounting periods beginning on or after 1st April, 2011. It
proposed :



(a)
The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) should
determine whether each IFRS meets specified criteria set out in local
legislation/regulations;


(b)
ASB should endorse the IFRS in the form of IFRS-equivalent
Indian Accounting Standards. In rare circumstances, it may be necessary to
carve out certain IFRS requirements keeping in view the existing local
conditions in the public interest;


(c)
ASB should present the Indian Accounting
Standards so developed to National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards
(NACAS) for its approval for the purpose of Government notification.


The ICAI, in the Concept Paper
also proposed to formulate a separate standard for Small and Medium-sized
Entities (SMEs) based on standards that may be issued by the IASB for the SMEs.

Although, the present Indian
Accounting Standards are based on IFRS and are fairly consistent with them,
there are significant differences between Indian GAAP and IFRS. For example,
most Indian companies provide for depreciation at the rates prescribed in
Schedule XIV of the Companies Act. Under IFRS, depreciation is based only on the
useful life of an asset. AS 14 — Accounting for Amalgamations permits using the
pooling of interest method. It also permits accounting to be done based on the
treatment prescribed in the scheme approved by the High Court. This will not be
permissible under IFRS. Definition of subsidiary under the Companies Act is at
variance with the definition of subsidiary under IFRS. There is a conceptual
difference in AS 22 — Accounting for Taxes on Income and the corresponding IFRS.
Accounting for preference shares could also be different under IFRS.
Presentation of financial statements under IFRS is different from the form in
Schedule VI of the Companies Act. Concept of ‘Comprehensive Income’ is alien to
Indian GAAP.

Adopting IFRS will require
changes in the various laws, regulations and rules. The Ministry of Corporate
Affairs (MCA) needs to spell out its strategy in this respect. It needs to
clarify whether India would adopt IFRS and Interpretations issued by the
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) or it will
issue separate standards which converge with IFRS. The Companies Bill, 2009
proposes that a National Advisory Committee on Accounting and Auditing Standards
will be constituted to advise the Central Government on formulation and laying
down of accounting and auditing policies and standards. Effectively, the Central
Government will lay down the standards and ICAI will only be consulted by the
National Advisory Committee. Tax authorities need to consider the impact of
adopting IFRS and whether adoption will bring about further diversion between
the reported income and the taxable income leading to increased litigation in
the field of direct taxes. All regulators — SEBI, IRDA, Reserve Bank, MCA need
to deliberate on IFRS at the earliest.

IFRS themselves are not free
from criticism. IFRS are moving towards ‘fair value’ based accounting. In the
context of financial instruments, IFRS have come under substantial criticism.
There is a section that believes that valuation of financial assets at ‘fair
value’ or current market value aggravated the recent financial crisis. As a
result, very recently, the European Commission postponed the application of
first stage of IFRS 9 — Financial Instruments. European Central Bank and
European regulators believe that accounting rules should be a tool to ensure
economic and financial stability. Back home, the recent amendment to ‘AS 11 —
The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’ permitting amortisation of
certain foreign currency fluctuation differences, is an example of using
accounting rules to attempt to ensure economic and financial stability. This
would not be possible once IFRS are adopted.

IFRS themselves are under the
process of revision. There are various projects undertaken by IASB which will
bring about further changes in IFRS. Thus, the goal of convergence or
harmonisation itself is like shooting a moving target. If MCA decides to issue
separate accounting standards that converge with IFRS, the process will be even
more difficult, but India will have retained the right to make changes in IFRS
as applicable in India, where necessary.

The International Organisation
of Securities Commission (IOSCO) has a significant influence in formulation of
IFRS. These standards are therefore not necessarily suitable for SMEs
considering the cost of compliance and sophistication involved. Realising this,
IASB has recently issued a separate standard for application by SMEs. MCA, ICAI
and other stakeholders need to discuss the desirability or otherwise of its
adoption in India.

In the whole process, the accounting and auditing profession should not be caught unawares. The Journal has been publishing articles on IFRS for some time now. BCAS is celebrating December as ‘IFRS month’. In line with that, this issue of the Journal focusses on IFRS with three articles on the subject.

Experience shows that the Government issues notifications making new regulations only at the last moment and when infrastructure is still not fully in place. However, considering the importance of and complexities involved in the application of IFRS, one hopes that MCA will bring clarity to the issue at the earliest and make the transition to IFRS as smooth as possible.

Accounts, Audit & the Companies Bill

Editorial

The Companies Bill has finally seen the light of day. By
virtue of the fact that it was introduced in the Lok Sabha, whose term will
shortly come to an end, it is likely to lapse, and would have to be reintroduced
in the new Lok Sabha. This Companies Bill has been debated and discussed for the
past five years, and therefore there were high expectations that it would
address the various shortcomings of the present Companies Act.


The Companies Bill does contain some wholesome provisions
relating to accounts. Consolidated accounts will now be required by all
companies having subsidiaries. The format of the final accounts will be
prescribed by rules.

The National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards will
also now advise the Central Government on the formulation of auditing standards,
with the standards issued by the Institute being applicable until auditing
standards are laid down by the Central Government after consultation with the
National Advisory Committee on Accounting and Auditing Standards. Effectively,
the powers of the Institute are being whittled down so far as they relate to
prescribing auditing standards for audit of companies.

Auditors are to be expressly prohibited from providing
certain services to an audit client, such as accounting, internal audit, design
and implementation of financial information systems, actuarial services,
investment banking services, outsourced financial services, investment advisory
services, etc., most of which are in any case prohibited today under the Code of
Conduct. Management services is however also one of the prohibited services.

The disqualification relating to indebtedness of the auditor
is being broadened, with even the minuscule limit of Rs.1,000 being sought to be
done away with. Therefore, any indebtedness (even of Re.1) would attract
disqualification. However, so far as shareholding limit is concerned, a
percentage beyond which shareholding is not permissible would be prescribed,
instead of an absolute prohibition. Further, this prohibition would apply not
only to holding of the securities of the company itself, but also to holding of
securities of its holding company, its subsidiary, its fellow subsidiary or its
associate company.


Unfortunately, the format of the audit report has been made
more complicated instead of being simplified, with mandatory reporting on
certain additional items. Further, a couple of the items seem to indicate a lack
of understanding of the subject — for instance, whether the financial statements
comply with the accounting standards


and the auditing standards.

Obviously the financial statements cannot comply with the auditing standards —
only the audit process and the auditor’s report can comply with such standards.
Also, one of the points to be reported is the observations or comments of the
auditors which have an adverse effect on the functioning of the company. It is
obvious that the observations or comments of the auditors cannot have an adverse
effect on the functioning of the company, but may amount to an adverse comment
on the functioning of the company. A residual point “such other matters as may
be prescribed” leaves the door open for complicating the audit report further.


The most unfortunate part of the provisions relating to audit
is the punishment that can be meted out to an auditor of a company for
contravention of any of the provisions of S. 126 to S. 129 (powers and duties of
auditors and auditing standards, prohibition on rendering certain services and
auditor to sign audit reports, attend general meeting). The punishment
prescribed is a fine of between Rs.25,000 to Rs.5,00,000. For knowing or willful
contravention, the punishment is imprisonment up to one year or fine between
Rs.1,00,000 and Rs.25,00,000 or both.

The provisions unfortunately do not draw a distinction
between major and minor contraventions. For instance, with so many auditing
standards, it is possible that one small aspect of an auditing standard may not
have been complied with by the auditor. Or the auditor may have been prevented
by circumstances from attending the Annual General Meeting, though he may have
had every intention of doing so. There could have been valid reasons for not
following a particular auditing standard. To penalise an auditor under such
circumstances seems rather unfair, particularly given the fact that promoters of
companies are rarely penalised for gross violations by companies under their
control. One wonders whether it is a classic case of a situation where just
because the real culprit cannot be found or punished, the nearest person found
available is caught and punished for the misdeeds of the other !

One hopes that these provisions are rationalised before they
are enacted. I am sure that the Institute and the BCAS would also take up all
these and other issues with the Government.

Gautam Nayak

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Wealth tax : Asset : S. 2(ea) of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99 : Commercial asset used by assessee in business of letting out properties : Not an asset : Not chargeable to tax.

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Reported :

30. Wealth tax : Asset : S.
2(ea) of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99 : Commercial asset
used by assessee in business of letting out properties : Not an asset : Not
chargeable to tax.

[CIT v. Shankaranarayana
Industries & Plantations (P.) Ltd.,
194 Taxman 189 (Kar.)]

The assessee-company had
developed a property into a commercial complex and was deriving rental income
therefrom. Relying on the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996, the Assessing Officer
charged wealth tax on the said commercial complex for the A.Ys. 1997-98 and
1998-99, on the ground that the property was used for the commercial purposes
and was not excluded from the definition of the term ‘asset’ in S. 2(ea) of the
Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The Commissioner and the Tribunal accepted the claim of
the assessee and held that the assessee is in the business of letting out
properties and accordingly, the commercial complex in question was excluded from
the definition of the word ‘asset’ as is clear from the Circular of the Board.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal. The High Court
considered the amendments to S. 2(ea) of the Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act,
1996 and the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998. The High Court also considered the
memorandum explaining the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1996, the CBDT Circular No. 762,
dated 18-2-1998 explaining the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996 and
held as under :

“(i) After the amendment
came into force, the Central Board of Direct Taxes issued Circular No. 762,
dated 18-2-1998, explaining the substantive provisions of the Act relating to
direct taxes. The said amended Section was in force only for two years and by
the Finance Act (No. 2), 1998, the same underwent a radical change, wherein it
is said that any property which is in the nature of commercial building or
complex do not fall within the definition of the word ‘asset’ as defined
u/s. 2(ea) of the Act.

(ii) It is in this
background, the assessee claims that, as the asset in question is the business
asset of the assessee, and as the assessee is in the business of letting out
properties, as is clear from the Explanatory Note appended to the Bill as well
as the Circular issued by the CBDT after passing of the amendment, the asset
which he had let out did not fall within the definition of the word ‘asset’
and therefore, the company is not liable to pay wealth tax.

(iii) The explanatory note
and the CBDT Circular make it very clear that prior to the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 1996, the commercial properties were not included within the definition
of the word ‘asset’. Therefore, it was felt that if residential houses have
been taken as assets, there seems to be no reason why commercial properties
other than those used by the assessee wholly and substantially in the business
or his profession, will also be not taken as assets. Therefore, by an
amendment, commercial buildings which are not occupied by the assessee for the
purposes of his business or profession other than the business of letting out
property, shall be brought to tax under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.

(iv) Therefore, it is
clear that the intention was to stimulate investment in productive assets.
Therefore, the Parliament thought it fit to abolish the amended Act, excluding
the business assets, i.e., the commercial establishments, which are not
used by the assessee or which are let out, as they are not stimulative
investment. However, as is clear from the aforesaid Explanatory Note, the CBDT
circular and the subsequent action of further amending the said Section, it is
clear that the intention was not to tax business assets used by the assessee
for the purpose of his business or profession and also the business assets
which are let out, if the assessee is in the business of letting out
properties. All other types of commercial properties were brought to tax under
the Wealth-tax Act.

(v) Both the Appellate
Authorities after carefully going to the aforesaid Circulars, amendments,
Explanatory Note and keeping in mind the intention in enacting the Wealth-tax
Act as well as drastic amendment in the year, we are of the opinion that the
assessee was justified in claiming the exclusion of the properties which are
the subject of the matter of the proceedings, from wealth tax. We do not find
any error or illegality in the findings recorded by the Tribunal. Therefore,
no case of interference is made out.”

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TDS : Salary : S. 192 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1992-93 to 1998-99 : Assessee was an Indian company engaged in food processing business : Pursuant to a technical collaboration agreement, employees of Japanese company were deputed to India for workin

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Reported :


29. TDS : Salary : S. 192 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1992-93 to 1998-99 : Assessee was an Indian company
engaged in food processing business : Pursuant to a technical collaboration
agreement, employees of Japanese company were deputed to India for working in
assessee-company : Assessee deducted tax at source u/s.192 only on salary and
perks disbursed by it to employees of Japanese company : Assessee not liable to
deduct tax at source in respect of payments made by foreign company to its
employees.

[CIT v. Indo Nissin Food
Ltd.,
194 Taxman 144 (Kar.)]

The assessee was an Indian
company engaged in the food processing business. Pursuant to a technical
collaboration agreement entered into between the assessee-company and the
Japanese company, the employees of the Japanese company were deputed to India
considering their expertise in the business and they were working in the
assessee-company during the relevant assessment years. The assessee had deducted
the tax at source u/s.192 based on the salary and perks disbursed by it to the
employees of the Japanese company working with it. The Assessing Officer imposed
penalty u/s.271C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the assessee
company had failed to deduct tax at source in regard to the payments made by the
Japanese company to its employees who were working with the assessee-company.
The Tribunal deleted the penalty holding that the assessee was not liable to
deduct the tax at source in respect of the payments made by the foreign company.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

(i) It was not in dispute
that the assessee had paid salary to the employees who had been deputed from
the foreign company. S. 192 envisages the assessee to deduct the tax at source
in respect of the payments made by it to the employees. Therefore, the
assessee was required to deduct income-tax at source on the amount payable or
paid by it to its employees.

(ii) There was no record
to show that the amount paid by the foreign company to its employees was made
known to the assessee or the said amount was also disbursed to the employees
of the foreign company through the assessee. Therefore, it was not possible to
accept the arguments advanced by the Revenue, as S. 192 does not deal with
such cases. In the circumstances, when the payment was not made by the
assessee or the amount was not paid by a foreign company through the assessee,
the assessee was not required to deduct the tax at source u/s.192(1).

(iii) When there was no
violation of S. 192(1), the question of initiating the proceedings u/s.271C
did not arise.”

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Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 : Where AO adopts one of courses permissible in law or where two views are possible and AO takes one of possible views, Commissioner cannot exercise his powers u/s.263 to differ with vi

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Reported :


28. Revision : S. 263 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 : Where AO adopts one of
courses permissible in law or where two views are possible and AO takes one of
possible views, Commissioner cannot exercise his powers u/s.263 to differ with
view of AO even if there has been a loss of revenue: When a regular assessment
is made u/s.143(3), a presumption can be raised that order has been passed upon
application of mind and, though this presumption is rebuttable, yet there must
be some material to indicate that AO had not applied his mind to invoke
provisions of S. 263 : Validity of an order u/s.263 has to be tested with regard
to position of law as it exists on the date of the order.

[CIT v. Honda Seil Power
Products Ltd.,
194 Taxman 175 (Del.)]

For the A.Ys. 2001-02 and
2002-03, assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
allowing the claim for deduction u/s.80HHC and u/s.80-IB. The Commissioner
invoked the provisions of 263, on the ground that the Assessing Officer had not
applied the provisions of S. 80-IB(13)/80-IA(9) and had wrongly calculated the
deduction u/s.80HHC. The Commissioner, therefore, directed the Assessing Officer
to recalculate the allowable deduction u/s.80HHC. The Tribunal held that the
Assessing Officer had taken one of the possible views prevailing at the relevant
point of time and, therefore, his action could not be said to be ‘erroneous and
prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue’. Accordingly, the Tribunal
cancelled the order of the Commissioner passed u/s.263.


On appeal by the Revenue,
the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :



“(i) In cases where the
Assessing Officer adopts one of the courses permissible, in law, or where two
views are possible and the Assessing Officer has taken one of the possible
views, the Commissioner cannot exercise his powers u/s.263 to differ with the
view of the Assessing Officer, even if there has been a loss of revenue.


(ii) It is also clear that
while passing an order u/s.263, the Commissioner has to examine not only the
assessment order, but also the entire record. Since the assessee has no
control over the way an assessment order is drafted and since generally the
issues which are accepted by the Assessing Officer, do not find mention in the
assessment order and only those points are taken note of on which the
assessee’s explanations are rejected and additions/disallowances are made, in
the instant case, the mere absence of the discussion of the provisions of S.
80-IB(13), r/w. S. 80-IA(9), would not mean that the Assessing Officer had not
applied his mind to the said provisions.


(iii) When a regular
assessment is made u/s. 143(3), a presumption can be raised that the order has
been passed upon an application of mind. No doubt, this presumption is
rebuttable, but there must be some material to indicate that the Assessing
Officer had not applied his mind.


(iv) In the instant case,
there was no material
to indicate that the Assessing Officer had not applied his mind to the
provisions of
S. 80-IB(13), r/w. S. 80-IA(9). The presumption, that the assessment order
passed u/s.143(3) by the Assessing Officer had been passed upon an application
of mind, had not been rebutted by the Revenue. No additional facts were
necessary before the Assessing Officer for the purpose of construing the
provisions of S. 80-IB(13), r/w S. 80-IA(9). It was only a legal consideration
as to whether the deduction u/s.80HHC was to be computed after reducing the
amount of deduction u/s.80-IB from the profits and gains.


(v) There was no doubt
that the Assessing Officer had allowed the deduction u/s.80HHC without
reducing the amount of deduction allowed u/s.80-IB from the profits and gains.
He did not say so in so many words, but that was the end result of his
assessment order. It could not be said that the Assessing Officer had failed
to make any enquiry because no further enquiry was necessary and all the facts
were before the Assessing Officer.


(vi) The validity of an
order u/s.263 has to be tested with regard to the position of law as it exists
on the date on which such an order is made by the Commissioner. From the
narration of the facts in the Tribunal’s order, it was clear that on the date
when the Commissioner had passed his order u/s.263, the view taken by the
Assessing Officer was in consonance with the view taken by the several Benches
of the Tribunal. Therefore, the conclusion of the Tribunal, that the
Commissioner could not have invoked his jurisdiction u/s.263, was correct. As
a result, the Tribunal was correct, in law, in cancelling the order passed by
the Commissioner u/s.263.”

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Format and disclosures for financial statements prepared using IFRS

Refund : Interest u/s.244A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : TDS certificates submitted during assessment proceedings : Delay on refund not attributable to assessee : S. 244A(2) not attracted : Assessee entitled to interest u/s.244A.

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Reported :


27. Refund : Interest
u/s.244A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : TDS certificates submitted
during assessment proceedings : Delay on refund not attributable to assessee :
S. 244A(2) not attracted : Assessee entitled to interest u/s.244A.

[CIT v. Larsen & Toubro
Ltd.,
235 CTR 108 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 2001-02, the
assessment was completed by an order dated 31-3-2003 passed u/s. 143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. TDS certificates were filed in the course of the
assessment proceedings. Interest u/s.244A was denied on the ground that the TDS
certificates were not furnished with the return of income. The Tribunal found
that tax was deducted and deposited in the exchequer in time and that the
proceedings resulting in refund, has not been delayed for reasons attributable
to assessee. The Tribunal accordingly directed the Assessing Officer to pay
interest u/s. 244A for the period from
1-4-2001 to the date of refund.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under :

“(i) S. 244A(2) provides
that in the event the proceedings resulting in refund has been delayed for
reasons attributable to the assessee, the period of delay so attributable
shall be exclude from the period for which the interest is payable. In the
present case, S. 244A(2) is clearly not attracted. The proceedings resulting
in the refund was not delayed for reasons attributable to the assessee.

(ii) Though the TDS
certificates were not submitted with the return and were filed during the
course of the assessment proceedings, the Tribunal has noted that tax was in
fact deducted at source at the right time. In the circumstances, the Tribunal
was correct in holding that since the benefit of TDS has been allowed to the
assessee, interest u/s. 244A could not be denied only on the ground that the
TDS certificates were not furnished with the return of income. Tax was
deducted and deposited in the exchequer in time.

(iii) S. 244A(2) is not
attracted. The appeal, therefore, does not raise any substantial question of
law and is dismissed.”

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Important Representations of BCAS Incorporated in Amended Model GST Law

The draft model GST law released by the empowered Committee was hosted on the website of DOR inviting comments from stake holders and public at large. BCAS had made a detailed representation to the  finance minister on the model GST law.

“We are pleased to inform you that the Government has accepted most of our suggestions and incorporated the same in the amended model GST law released on 26th november 2016”.

Reproduced below is the detailed table of recommendations that have been accepted in the amended model GST law.

The CBDT has made the following amendments vide the Income-tax (Eighth Amendment) Rules, 2011 with effect from 1st November 2011

Changes in the due date of filing TDS returns and other amendments — Notification No. 57/2011/F. No.142/23/2011-SO(TPL), dated 24-10-2011.

The CBDT has made the following amendments vide the Income-tax (Eighth Amendment) Rules, 2011 with effect from 1st November 2011:

  •   The due date for filing TDS returns for Government deductees’ has been prescribed as 31st July, 31st October, 31st January and 15th May for the quarters ended 30th June, 30th September, 31st December and 31st March as mentioned in the Table in Rule 31A.

  •    Additional details to be furnished in the TDS returns of the payees who have furnished pre-scribed forms for non-deduction of TDS due to their taxable income being below the maximum prescribed limits.

  •  In cases where income is assessable in the hands of person other than the deductee, credit for TDS on such income would be given to the other person in cases where the deductee furnishes a declaration to that effect and deductor reports such tax deduction in the name of that other person.