Section 20(1) of the RTI Act: Penalties Section 20(1) provides for penalty on Public Information Officer (PIO). Sub- section (1) provides six types by default –
PIO — refuses to receive an application for information,
— does not furnish information within the time provided under the Act,
— malafidely denies the request for information,
— knowingly gives incorrect, incomplete or misleading information,
— destroys information which is the subject of the request,
— obstructs in any manner in furnishing the information.
If any of the above is committed without any reasonable cause it is provided that the Commission shall impose a penalty on PIO at Rs.250 per day but not exceeding Rs.25,000 .
Issue that has been raised from time to time is whether word ‘shall’ makes impositionof penalty mandatory or ‘shall’ here means ‘may’ and it is optional for CIC to levy or not to levy the penalty.
On 11th April, 2011, CIC Shailesh Gandhi has ruled as under in the case of complainant Mr. Attar Singh v. PIO, Vivekananda College:
The RTI application was furnished on 04-02-2010. The information was provided on 08-04-2011 after the decision of CIC.
After the hearing in the matter of penalty, CIC writes:
If without reasonable cause, information is not furnished within the time specified under sub-section (1) of section 7, the Commission is duty- bound to levy a penalty at the rate of Rs. 250 each day till the information is furnished. Once the Commission decides that there was no reasonable cause for delay, it has to impose the penalty at the rate specified in section 20(1) of the RTI Act and the law gives no discretion in the matter. The burden of proving that denial of information by the PIO was justified and reasonable is clearly on the PIO as per section 19(5) of the RTI Act.
Decision:
As per the provisions of section 20(1) of the RTI Act 2005, the Commission finds this a fit case for levying penalty on Mr. Rajender Kumar Wadhwa, PIO & Administrative Officer. Since the delay in providing the information has been over 100 days, the Commission is passing an order penalising Mr. Rajender Kumar Wadhwa Rs.25000 which is the maximum penalty under the Act.
The Chairman, Vivekananda College is directed to recover the amount of Rs.25000 from the salary of Mr. Rajender Kumar Wadhwa and remit the same by a demand draft or a Banker’s Cheque in the name of the Pay & Accounts Officer, CAT, payable at New Delhi and send the same to Shri Pankaj K. P. Shreyaskar, Joint Registrar and Deputy Secretary of the Central Information Commission, 2nd Floor, August Kranti Bhawan, New Delhi-110066. The amount may be deducted at the rate of Rs.5000 per month every month from the salary of Mr. Rajender Kumar Wadhwa and remitted by the tenth of every month starting from May 2011. The total amount of Rs.25000 will be remitted by 10th September, 2011.
[Mr. Attar Singh v. PIO, Vivekanand College, University of Delhi. Decision No. CIC/SG/C/2010/000502/11484- Penalty]
Section 2(h): Public Authority
Madras High Court (Madurai bench) in a judgment delivered on 06-07-2010 has extensively discussed the words ‘includes’ and ‘substantially financed’ as they appear in section 2(h) which defines ‘Public Authority’.
R. Sivaprakasam sought xerox of the day book pertaining to a receipt of Rs.3, 00,000 received by Karanthai Tamil Sangam (Sangam). Same was denied to him. Subsequently, in response to RTI application made District Registrar, Thanjavur directed Sangam to furnish xerox of the day book as above. This direction is put to challenge in the writ petition.
Sangam submitted that information sought is not ‘information’ as defined u/s2(f), Sangam is not a public authority as defined u/s2(h) and in any case information sought is exempt u/s 8.
Hereunder, I am confining only to the part of the judgment deciding on applicability of section 2(h).
In one earlier judgment the Madras High Court had held as under:
The word ‘substantial’ is not defined in the Act. For the word ‘substantial’ it is not possible to lay down any clear and specific definition. It must be a relative one, however, ‘substantial’ means real or actual as opposed to trivial. ‘Substantial’ also means practicable as far as possible, hence the word ‘substantial’ not to be construed as higher percentage of the estimated amount or otherwise.
The Court then reproduced certain paras (NOs.15 to18, 21&23) from the said judgment as under:
“15. If we look at the definition of section 2(h), it is clear that the appellant-company does not come under the provisions of section 2h(a), (b), (c) or (d), but thereafter section 2(h)(d) of the definition clause uses the word ‘includes’. It is well known that when the word ‘includes’ is used in an interpretation clause, it is used to enlarge the meaning of the words and phrases occurring in the body of the statute. Reference in this connection can be made to G. P. Singh’s ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ in the 10th edition of the said treatise, the learned author formulated that when the word defined is declared to ‘include; such and such, ‘the definition is prima facie extensive’ (page 175 of the book). In support of the aforesaid formulation, the learned authority has referred to a number of decisions. The latest decision referred to in support of the aforesaid proposition was rendered in the case of Associated Indem Mechanical P. Ltd. v. W. B. Small Industries Development Corporation ltd., AIR 2007 SC 788 of the report, the learned judges held as follows:
“10. The definition of premises in section 2(c) uses the word ‘includes’ at two places.It is well settled that the word ‘include’ is generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used those words of phrases must be construed as Comprehending, not only such things, as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include [see Dadaji al ias Dina v. Sukhadeobabu AIR 1980 1 SCR 1135, Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. AIR (1987) 2 SCR 1 and Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P. AIR 1989 SC 335: (1989) SCC 164.”]
16. Therefore, obviously the definition of bodies referred to in Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act would receive a liberal interpretation, and here the words which fall for interpretation are the words ‘controlled or substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.’
17. We are here concerned with the interpretation of the definition clause in the RTI Act. The Act has been enacted ‘in order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority’. In the Preamble to the Act, it is made clear that ‘democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed’. From the Preamble to the Act it is clear that revelation of information may cause conflict with the other public interest including efficient operations of the Governments, but the Act has been enacted to harmonise these conflicting interests while preserving the paramountcy of the democratic ideal.
18. The RTI Act thus attempts to inculcate openness in our democratic republic. It has to be accepted that one of the salience of openness in democracy is an access to information about the functioning of the public authorities.
21. The RTI Act is virtually enacted to give effect to citizen’s right to know. Citizen’s right to know has been construed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court a
