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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 32(1)(ii) — Depreciation on Intangible Assets — Payment for Non-compete fees — Whether by payment of non-compete fees the assessee can be said to have acquired a commercial or business right similar to the intangible assets enume

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6 ITO v. Medicorp Technologies India Ltd.

ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Chennai

Before H. S. Sidhu (JM) and Ahmad Fareed (AM) ITA No. 2328/Mds./2007

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 16-1-2009
Counsel for revenue/assessee : Shahji P. Jacob/ K. Ravi

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 32(1)(ii) — Depreciation on Intangible Assets — Payment for Non-compete fees — Whether by payment of non-compete fees the assessee can be said to have acquired a commercial or business right similar to the intangible assets enumerated in S. 32(1)(ii)of the Act — Held, Yes. Whether claim of depreciation is admissible on non-compete fees paid by the assessee — Held, Yes.

Facts :

The assessee-company was in the business of manufacture and distribution of bulk drugs and intermediaries, and exporting these products to the USA, Canada, Europe and Australia. Another company, Medispan Limited (MS) was engaged in the business of development and production of medical and pharmaceutical formulations and had been exporting it to various South American, African and South-East Asian countries. The assessee with an intention to expand its market reach to South American and African countries, for its own products as well as for other formulations, drugs and medicines, entered into an agreement dated 12-7-2000, whereby MS agreed to transfer the business and activities of its export division to assessee for a consideration of Rs.5.33 crores. Clause III of the agreement inter alia provided for break-up of various components of the consideration of Rs.5.33 crores. It was provided that the consideration of Rs.5.33 crores comprises Rs.2 crores towards compensation for MS accepting noncompete obligation in respect of export of bulk drugs, pharmaceutical products and formulations. In the computation of total income filed along with the return of income, the assessee had claimed the payment of Rs.2 crores towards non-compete obligation as revenue expenditure. The AO rejected the claim. The assessee made an alternative claim before the AO that depreciation be allowed u/s.32(1) of the Act on the non-compete fee. The AO rejected this claim also. The CIT(A) held that depreciation on this sum of Rs.2 crores be granted u/s.32(1) of the Act. Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal considered the legislative history and scope of the provisions dealing with the benefit of ‘depreciation’ under the Act. It noted that the scope of S. 32(1) was widened by the Finance Act, 1999 by allowing depreciation in respect of ‘intangible assets’ w.e.f. 1-4-1999. This has been achieved by introducing clause (ii) in S. 32(1) of the Act. Prior to this, depreciation was allowable only in respect of ‘tangible assets’ viz. buildings, machinery, plant or furniture. It stated that the words ‘being intangible assets’ appear in clause (ii) by way of a nomenclature, to contradistinguish the items appearing in clause (ii) from those appearing in clause (i). It noted that the provisions of S. 32(1)(ii) w.e.f. 1-4-1999 not only extended the benefit of S. 32 to the ‘intangible assets’ but also gave therein an ‘inclusive’ definition of the ‘intangible assets’, for this purpose. It stated that one can say that clause (ii) contains an ‘inclusive’ definition of ‘intangible assets’, for the purpose of S. 32.

The Tribunal found that it was an admitted fact that the payment of Rs.2 crores was made by the asses-see-company to ward off competition in the export business which was acquired by it from MS. Therefore, it concluded that what was acquired by the assessee by paying this amount of Rs.2 crores was a business/commercial right. It observed that it is clear from the language of clause (ii) of S. 32(1) that each of the terms, know-how, patents, copyright, trade mark, licences, or franchises represents a ‘business or a commercial right’. It then proceeded to examine the ‘nature’ of these business/commercial rights and compared their ‘nature’ with the ‘nature’ of the impugned business/commercial right which was acquired by the assessee and concluded that in the case of copyright, trade mark, licence, and franchises also the owners have exclusive business/ commercial rights, and if there is a breach they can sue. It held that similar was the nature of the impugned right acquired by the assessee. It further stated that if the business/commercial right of a patent, copyright, trademark, licence and franchise fulfils the conditions of being intangible asset, then surely the impugned business/commercial right acquired by the assessee also fulfils that condition by way of a logical corollary. The decision of Madras Tribunal in the case of A. B. Mauria India Pvt. Ltd. was held to be not applicable in the facts of the present case. The Tribunal held that the payment of Rs.2 crores made by the assessee under agreement dated 12-7-2000 to ward off competition was a business/commercial right which was similar in nature to copyright, trade mark, licence and franchises and therefore qualified for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal observed that the decision of ITAT, Chennai, in the case of A. B. Mauria India Pvt. Ltd., on which reliance was placed on behalf of the Revenue, does not support the case of the Department on the facts of the case in the present appeal.

Case referred to :

1. A. B. Mauria India Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 1293/ Mds./2006, dated 23-11-2007)

 

S. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether an addition can be sustained merely on the basis of statement made at the time of Survey — Held, No.

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5 Dy. CIT v. Premsons

ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai
Before R. S. Syal (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM) ITA No. 4698/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 15-1-2009 Counsel for revenue/assessee : Pitambar Das/ Reepal Tralshawala

S. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether an addition can be sustained merely on the basis of statement made at the time of Survey — Held, No.

Per R. S. Syal :

Facts :

A survey action u/s.133A of the Act was conducted on the office premises of the assessee along with its two sister concerns on 15-1-2003. During the course of survey, physical stock in the case of the assessee was found to be excessive by Rs.21,14,146. Statement of Mr. Bharat Gala, partner of the assessee firm, was recorded. The assessee admitted to surrender a sum of Rs.50 lakhs as additional income over and above the income recorded in the books of accounts with the following bifurcation :

Towards excess stock Rs.21 lakhs

Towards any other discrepancy Rs.29 lakhs

After the close of survey but before the close of the year the assessee retracted from the surrender made during survey, vide its letter dated 24-3-2003. The assessee mentioned in its letter that the surrender was obtained forcefully by the survey team.

The assessee filed its return of income declaring total income of Rs.25,20,483 which included the surrender of Rs.21.14 lakhs towards difference in closing stock. The remaining portion of Rs.28.85 lakhs agreed by the assessee at the time of survey was not offered for taxation.

While assessing the total income of the assessee, the AO held that retraction was an after thought and further since the assessee had not maintained quantitative stock register, it was not possible to check the sales and purchases of different items dealt in by it. He also held that accounting of sales was such that it was open to manipulation. He, therefore, made an addition of Rs.28.85 lakhs.

The CIT(A) held that the books of accounts ought not to have been rejected and also the addition of Rs.28.85 lakhs was deleted by him. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal on these two grounds.

Held :

As regards rejection of the books of accounts by the AO, the Tribunal held that the books of accounts can be said to be properly maintained when correct income can be deduced therefrom. It is not only the arithmetical inaccuracy in the books of accounts which would call for the resorting to the provisions of S. 145(3). Since during the course of survey physical stock was found to be excessive as compared to the books of accounts, the Tribunal held that the books of accounts were rightly rejected by the AO.

As regards the addition of Rs.28.85 lakhs, the Tribunal noted that the real question before it was whether addition can be sustained simply on the basis of statement recorded at the time of survey. The Tribunal noted that the Kerala High Court has in the case of Paul Mathew & Sons held that addition cannot be sustained simply on the basis of statement recorded at the time of survey. The Madras High Court has in the case of S. Khader Khan Son, held that S. 133A does not empower any Income-tax authority to examine any person on oath and hence such a statement has no evidentiary value. The Tribunal also observed that the Circular dated 10-3-2003 issued by the CBDT which makes it clear that no attempt should be made to obtain undue confession from the assessee during search or survey proceedings is indicative of the fact that the Department is also not oblivious of the practice by which the Revenue Authorities obtain undue confession from the assessee during search or survey. The Tribunal held that in view of the verdict of the two High Courts and the position reaffirmed by the CBDT through its Circular, it is abundantly clear that no addition can be made or sustained simply on the basis of statement recorded at the time of survey/search. It further held that in order to make an addition on the basis of surrender during search or survey, it is sine qua non that there should be some other material to correlate the undisclosed income with such statement. The Tribunal noted that the surrender to the extent of Rs.28.85 lakhs was specifically ‘towards other discrepancy’. The assessment order had no mention of any such discrepancy found as a result of survey throwing light on undisclosed income. There was nothing on record which could correlate such income offered by the assessee during the course of survey with any other discrepancy. The Tribunal was of the view that there is no basis for sustaining the addition in question.

Cases referred to :

  •     Paul Mathew & Sons v. CIT, (2003) 263 ITR 101 (Ker.)
  •     CIT v. S. Khader Khan Son, (2008) 300 ITR 157 (Mad.)

S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty for concealment — Claim made under bona fide belief rejected and penalty imposed — Whether penalty can be levied — Held, No.

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4 Kisanlal Sarda v. ACIT

ITAT Pune Bench ‘A’ Pune
Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and Mukul Shrawat (JM) ITA No. 241/PN/2006


A.Y. : 1994-95. Decided on : 29-8-2008 Counsel for assessee/revenue : B. V. Jhaveri/
S. Bains

S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty for concealment — Claim made under bona fide belief rejected and penalty imposed — Whether penalty can be levied — Held, No.

Per Mukul Shrawat :

Facts :

The case before the Tribunal was about a penalty being levied on account of the claim of inadmissible higher rate of depreciation. The facts of the case were, the assessee in the earlier two years had claimed depreciation @ 40% in respect of two vehicles which were given on hire and the same was allowed. The assessee’s claim for the same in the year under appeal was negatived by the AO on the ground that during the year, the main activity of the assessee was not that of running the vehicles on hire, hence he was entitled to depreciation @ 25% only. On appeal the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order. For claiming depreciation at the higher rate, the AO levied penalty of Rs.4.68 lacs, which was confirmed by the CIT(A).

Before the Tribunal the Revenue relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra & Co. and contended that once the addition was accepted by not filing appeal against the same, the assessee has no right to challenge the levy of penalty.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the claim by the assessee of depreciation at the higher rate was based on the advice given by his chartered accountant. Secondly, it was not the case of the Revenue that there was a deliberate attempt to conceal the vital facts of the case pertaining to the claim of depreciation, and all the necessary information on the basis of which the correct claim of depreciation had to be allowed was on record and furnished by the assessee. Accordingly, relying on the ratio in the decisions listed at S. Nos. 2 to 6 below, it held in favour of the assessee. Further, it also referred to the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Dilip N. Shroff, where in the context of the penalty u/s.271(1)(c), the Court had observed that the AO was required to arrive at a finding that the explanation offered by the assessee was false. Based on the same, the Tribunal reversed the orders of the authorities below and allowed the appeal.

Cases referred to :

  •     Dilip N. Shroff 291 ITR 519 (SC)
  •     Orion Travels Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, 87 TTJ 246 (Mum.)
  •     Kalyani Enterprises v. ACIT, 86 TTJ 767 (Mad.)
  •     ITO v. Tolaram Phusanan, 88 TTJ 1040
  •     Udan Research & Flying Institute Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT, (2007) 17 SOT 494 (Mum.)
  •     ACIT v. Malhotra Mukesh Satpal, (2008) 113 TTJ 401 (Pune)

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 50C — Whether provisions of S. 50C are applicable only in respect of computation of income under the head ‘Income from Capital Gains’ and that the said Section cannot be invoked where the income is assessed as business income und

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3 Inderlok Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO, Circle 5(2)(1)
ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai
Before A. L. Gehlot (AM) and R. S. Padvekar (JM)
ITA No. 4376/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on : 5-2-2009 Counsel for assessee/revenue : A. H. Dalal / S. K. Singh

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 50C — Whether provisions of S. 50C are applicable only in respect of computation of income under the head ‘Income from Capital Gains’ and that the said Section cannot be invoked where the income is assessed as business income under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ — Held, Yes.

Per R. S. Padvekar : Facts :

The assessee had constructed a building on land held by it as stock-in-trade. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration two flats in the building constructed by the asses-see were sold for a consideration of Rs.60 lakhs and Rs.40 lakhs, respectively. The Stamp Authorities had for the purposes of levy of stamp duty valued the flats at Rs.78,41,500 and Rs.72,81,456, respectively. The assessee accepted the valuation done by the Stamp Authorities. The assessee declared profit @ 8% of the sale price. The profit declared by the assessee was offered for taxation under the head ‘Income from Business’. The AO assessed profit arising on sale of these two flats under the head ‘Income from Business’, but made an addition of Rs.51,22,956. This amount represented the difference between valuation adopted for the purpose of the stamp duty and actual sale consideration shown by the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted S. 50C deals with transfer of a ‘capital asset’ being land or building or both and it provides for replacing the value adopted or assessed for the purpose of stamp duty more particularly u/s.48 of the Act in place of value or sale consideration shown by the assessee if it is lower than the value adopted or assessed for the purpose of levy of stamp duty. It observed that the expression ‘capital asset’ has specific relevance with S. 45 which provides for taxing gain on transfer of ‘capital asset’ as capital gain. The Tribunal upon consideration of the language of the provisions of S. 50C of the Act and also the intention of insertion of the provisions of S. 50C as mentioned in the Explanatory Circular No. 8, dated 27-8-2002 issued by the CBDT, held that there should not be any cloud of doubt that S. 50C has application only to the extent of determining sale consideration for computation of capital gain and it cannot be applied for determining the income under other heads.

 

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S. 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether income from DEPB and drawback eligible for deduction — Held, Yes.

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2 ACIT v. Podar Associates
ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Jaipur
Before I. C. Sudhir (JM) and B. P. Jain (AM) ITA No. 579/JP/2008

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 13-8-2008 Counsel for revenue/assessee : Jai Singh/ Mahendra Gargieya

S. 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether income from DEPB and drawback eligible for deduction — Held, Yes.

Per B. P. Jain :

Facts :

One of the issues before the Tribunal was about the allowability of deduction u/s.80IB with respect to income earned by way of DEPB and drawback. The CIT(A) had held in favour of the assessee.

Held :

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the income from DEPB and drawback went to reduce the cost of purchase and therefore, income to that extent was derived from the eligible undertaking. According to it, a similar view was expressed by the Gujarat High Court in the case of India Gelatine and Chemical Ltd. where the Court had also distinguished the decision in the case of Cambay Electric Supply Co. Ltd.. Further, it also referred to the provisions of S. 28(iiid), whereunder such receipt is treated as business profit. Accordingly, relying on the decisions of the Jaipur Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Vijay Industries and in the case of Garment Craft India Ltd. and also on the Delhi High Court decision in the case of Eltek SGS Pvt. Ltd., it upheld the order of the CIT(A).

Cases referred to :

  1. CIT v. India Gelatine and Chemical Ltd., 275 ITR 284 (Guj.);


  2. Vijay Industries (ITA No. 247/JP/05 dated 29-6-2007);


  3. Garment Craft India Ltd. (ITA No. 105/JP/06 dated 28-9-2007);


  4. CIT v. Eltek SGS Pvt. Ltd., 300 ITR 06 (Del.);


  5. Cambay Electric Supply Co. Ltd., 113 ITR 84 (SC)

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Rule 8D read with S. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Expenditure disallowable with reference to exempt income — Disallowed expenditure is the subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal — Whether Revenue justified in its contention to apply the ratio o

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1 ACIT v. Indexport Ltd.
ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai
Before Sushma Chowla (JM) and Abraham P. George (AM) ITA Nos. 1941 and 2200/Mum./2004

A.Y. : 2000-01. Decided on : 29-1-2009 Counsel for revenue/assessee : Sanjay Agarwal/ Nishant Thakkar

Rule 8D read with S. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Expenditure disallowable with reference to exempt income — Disallowed expenditure is the subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal — Whether Revenue justified in its contention to apply the ratio of the Special Bench decision rendered in the matter — Held, Yes but the disallowance cannot exceed the amount originally disallowed by the AO.

Per Sushma Chowla :

Facts :

One of the issues before the Tribunal was regarding the disallowance of expenditure u/s.14A. The AO had disallowed the aggregate sum of Rs.15.2 lacs consisting of interest of Rs.8.46 lacs and other expenses of Rs.6.74 lacs under the said provisions of S. 14A. The interest amount was computed by applying the ratio of investment attributable to tax-free income earned by the assessee to total investments, including the current assets, to the sum of interest paid by the assessee. The other expenses were estimated at 10% of the total of other expenses incurred by the assessee. On appeal, the CIT(A) gave partial relief by restricting the disallowance of other expenses at 5% of the total of such expense. Being aggrieved with the order of the CIT(A) qua the other expenses, the assessee as well as the Revenue, both appealed before the Tribunal.

Before the Tribunal, the Revenue challenged the order of the CIT(A) in giving partial relief to the assessee and also sought to apply the ratio of the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. in support of its contention for the enhanced sum of disallowance.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the Special Bench in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. has held that the provisions of Rule 8D are explanatory in nature and are applicable to all the pending cases. Therefore, even though the Tribunals in the case of the assessee in respect of the earlier years had fully allowed the expenses incurred, including the interest paid, following the Special Bench decision, it remitted back the matter to the AO with a direction to recalculate the disallowance. However, the order passed was with a condition that the amount of disallowance should not exceed the amount originally disallowed by the AO.

Case referred to :

ITO v. Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd., 26 SOT 603 (Mum.) (SB)

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S. 272A(2)(e) : No penalty imposable where net income before deduction u/s.11 below taxable limit

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Tribunal News

1) Hitesh D. Gajaria v. ACIT


ITAT ‘K’ Bench, Mumbai

Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and

P. Madhavi Devi (JM)

ITA No. 992/Mum./2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 22-2-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Deepak Shah/

Manvendra Goyal

S. 271B r.w. S. 44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty
for failure to get accounts audited — Assessee, a chartered accountant by
profession, being proprietor and also a partner in a firm — Gross receipts
excluding his share of income from the firm was less than Rs.10 lacs — Penalty
imposed for failure to get the accounts audited — Whether AO justified — Held,
No.

Per P. Madhavi Devi :

Facts :

The assessee was a chartered accountant by profession. He had
a proprietory concern besides being a partner in Bharat S. Raut & Co. During the
year, he received share of profit and remuneration from the said firm, each of
which was more than Rs.10 lacs. However, the gross receipts earned by his
proprietary concern were less than Rs.10 lacs. According to the AO, the
provisions of S. 44AB were applicable. However, the assessee relying on the
opinion of the senior counsel contended that partner’s allocated amounts were
not gross receipts as contemplated in S. 44AB and accordingly, he was not
required to get the accounts audited. However, the AO did not agree and levied a
penalty u/s.271B r.w. S. 274 of the Act. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the
AO’s order.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that assessee’s major income was not from
profession, but from the share of his profit from the professional firm.
According to it, share of profit cannot be equated with income from profession.
Further, it noted that the assessee had relied on the opinion of the senior
counsel, where-in it was opined that it was not necessary to get the accounts
audited. Therefore, relying on the Jodhpur Bench decision in the case of Dr.
Sunderlal Surana, the Tribunal held that the assessee had reasonable cause for
the failure to get his accounts audited as required u/s.44AB of the Act.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the lower authorities was deleted.

Case referred to :


Dr. Sunderlal Surana v. ITO, (2006) 105 TTJ (Jd) 907


2) ITO
v.
Lalitaben B. Kapadia



ITAT ‘K’ Bench, Mumbai

Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and

P. Madhavi Devi (JM)

ITA No. 8763/Mum./2004

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 20-9-2007

Counsel for assessee/revenue : N. R. Agarwal/

Milind Bhusari

S. 55A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Reference to
Valuation Officer — Value returned by the assessee was more than the fair market
value arrived at by the Valuation Officer and accepted by the AO — Whether
action of the AO in making reference to the Valuer justifiable — Held, No.


Per P. Madhavi Devi :

Facts :

The assessee had returned income under the head long-term
capital gain from the sale of immovable property. For the purpose, the assessee
had shown fair market value (FMV) as on 1-4-1981 as Rs.10 lacs. U/s.55A, the AO
made reference to the Valuation Officer who valued the property at Rs.6.6 lacs
as on the said date. On appeal, the CIT(A) took the FMV at Rs.9.36 lacs. Being
aggrieved, the Revenue appealed before the Tribunal.

Held :

According to the Tribunal, reference u/s.55A could be made
only if the AO was of the opinion that the value returned by the assessee was
less than its FMV. The act of the AO in accepting the valuation made u/s.55A,
which was undoubtedly less than the FMV claimed by the assessee, proved that the
AO was of the opinion that the assessee’s claim was more than its FMV. Thus,
according to the Tribunal, the AO was not justified in making reference to the
Valuation Officer. Therefore, relying on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in
the case of Rubab M. Kazerani, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue.

Case referred to :


Rubab M. Kazerani v. JCIT, 97 TTJ (TM) 698 (Mum.)


3. Manisha R. Chheda v. ITa Mukesh P. Chheda v. ITa ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and P. Madhavi Devi OM) ITA No. 5961 and 5962/Mum./2004
A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on: 17-8-2007 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Pradeep Kapasi/ Chet Ram

s. 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Power to revise AO’s order – AO making certain additions to the income returned – Whether the Commissioner has power to revise AO’s order in order to sustain the addition but on different reasons – Held, No.

Per J. Sudhakar Reddy:

Facts:

In their return of income filed, both the assessees had returned besides other income, income from agriculture. According to the AO, the assessees had not proved with evidence that they were engaged in agricultural activities. Therefore, the income so declared was treated by the AO as income from other sources.

According to the CIT, the reasons for additions given by the AO were grossly inappropriate and inadequate for sustaining the additions. In order to strengthen the case of the Revenue, he held both the orders passed by the AO as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Accordingly, he directed the AO to make fresh assessment. The assessees challenged the orders passed by the CIT before the TribunaL

Held:

According to the Tribunal, the crr wanted to indicate the same thing what the AO had indicated, but for different reasons. It further observed that an order u/ s.263 cannot be passed for giving additional reasons or substituting reasons by a higher authority to support the same cause. According to it, when the AO had in fact rejected the claim of the assessee, it cannot be said that any prejudice was caused to the Revenue. Merely because the CIT was not happy with the reasons given by the AO, the same did not give jurisdiction to invoke the powers conferred on him u/ s.263. The Tribunal further observed that once an addition was made, the issue if appealed against, travelled to the First Appellate Authority whose powers were co-terminus with that of the Assessing Officer. The first appellate authority, according to the Tribunal, can always, if he feels that the reasoning given by the Assessing Officer was not sufficient, strengthen the order by giving his own reasons, if the situation so permitted. If the assessees did not carry the matter in appeal, the assessment orders attain finality. Thus, it was noted that, in either case, the scheme of the Act does not permit the supervisory Commissioner to give additional reasons for supporting the same additions that had been made by the AO.

For the reasons stated as above, the Tribunal quashed both the orders passed by the CIT u/ s.263 and allowed the appeals filed by the assessee.

4. Boon Industries v. ITO ITAT ‘K’ Bench, Mumbai Before O. K. Narayanan (AM) and Sushma Chowla OM) ITA No. 6736 and  6737/Mum./2006 A.Ys. : 1998-99 & 1999-2000. Decided on: 27-11-2007

Counsel  for assessee Zrevenue :

Prakash  Jhunjhunwala/Malathi Sridharan

S. 271(1)(b) read with S. 142(1) and S. 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Penalty for non-compliance with notices issued – On the facts held that penalty cannot be imposed.

Per O. K. Narayanan:

Held:

The penalty of Rs.0.2 lac each imposed for the years under appeal for non-compliance of statutory no-tices issued u/s.142(1) and S. 143(2) were deleted by the TribunaL According to it, it cannot be said that the assessee was indifferent in the matter and did not co-operate with the assessing authorities, when it complied with the requirements twelve times out of the sixteen times. It further held that the non-compliance cannot be said to be willful when the time given to the assessee to attend be-fore the AO was only four to six days. According to it, the failure of the assessee to sought adjournment or inform the AO was not that much material in the light of the conduct of the assessee by appearing before the AO for not  less  than twelve times.

5. Jayram Rajgopal Poduval v. ACIT ITAT ‘H’ Bench, Mumbai Before R. S. Syal (AM) and Sushma Chowla OM) ITA No.  7072/M/2004 AY. : 2001-02. Decided on:    18-1-2008 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Rajan Vora/ B. K. Singh

S. 6(6) of the Income tax Act, 1961 – Resident but not ordinarily resident – Whether the two conditions specified in the provisions are cumulative – Held, No.

Per  R. S. Syal :

Facts:

The  assessee’s stay in India in the  preceding 10 years was as under:


According to the AO, the assessee was not ‘non-resident’ in 9 out of 10 years and had also resided in India for more than 730 days in the preceding 7 years. Hence, he held that the status of the assessee was ‘Resident and ordinarily resident’ (ROR). According to the CIT(A), in order that a person could be considered as Resident but not ordinarily resident (RNOR), he must fulfil the following two conditions given in S. 6(6)(a) viz. :

  •     He has not been resident in India in nine out of the ten previous years; and


  •     He has not during the seven previous years preceding that year been in India for a period of 730 days or more.

 
Since the assessee’s stay in India was for more than 730 days in the 7 preceding years, he, relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Pradeep J. Mehta, dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) uses the term ‘or’ and not ‘and’ between the two conditions given therein. Accordingly, the person would be considered as RNOR if he complies with either of the two conditions given therein. It dis-agreed with the CIT(A) that in order to qualify as RNOR, the assessee should fulfil both the condi-tions. In the case of the assessee, since he was not resident in India in nine out of ten previous years, his status would be that of RNOR. In support it also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case 4 of Morgenstern Werner.

Cases referred to :

1. Cl’T and Another v. Morgenstern Werner, (2003) 259 ITR 486 (SC)
2. PradeepJ. Mehta v. CIT, (2202) 256 ITR 647 (Guj.)

Note: The provisions of S. 6(6) have been substituted by the Finance Act, 2003 w.e.f. 1-4-2004. As per the substituted provisions, in order to qualify as RNOR, the person should be non-resident in nine out of ten previous years. The other alternative condition remains unchanged.


6. Innerwheel Club of Bombay v. ADIT ITAT ‘e’ Bench, Mumbai Before O. K. Narayanan (AM) and P. Madhavi Devi OM) ITA No.  4855/Mum.l2003

AY. : 1999-2000.  Decided on: 12-10-2007 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Jayesh Dadia/ J. K. Garg

S. 272A(2)(e) r.w. S. 139(4A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Penalty for failure to file return of income – Net income before claiming deduction u/s.11 be-low the taxable limit – Whether AO justified in levying penalty for delay in filing of return – Held, No.

Per  P. Madhavi Devi  :

Facts:

The assessee was a public charitable trust eligible for deduction u/s.ll. During the year under appeal, its gross total income was Rs.0.71 lac and after deducting establishment expenses of Rs.0.7Iac, the surplus remained was only Rs.353. It filed its return of income on 15-5-2000. For delay in filing return of income, the AO imposed a penalty of Rs.13,500 which was confirmed by the CIT(A).

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the AO had not rejected the audited accounts of the assessee. And as per the accounts, the net income of the assessee was below taxable limit even before claiming deduction u/s.11.
 
Therefore, relying on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Durgadevimata and of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Purakh Chand Askaran Pugella Charitable Trust, the Tribunal held that the AO was not justified in levying penalty.

Cases  referred to:

1. Durgadevimata  v. lTG,  (ITA No. 36/M/2000)
2. Purakh Chand Askaran Pugella Charitable Trust, 124 Taxman (Mag) 74 (Del.)

S. 6(6) : The two conditions specified in the provision are not cumulative

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5) Jayram Rajgopal Poduval
v. ACIT


ITAT ‘H’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. S. Syal (AM) and

Sushma Chowla (JM)

ITA No. 7072/M/2004

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 18-1-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Rajan Vora/

B. K. Singh

S. 6(6) of the Income tax Act, 1961 — Resident but not
ordinarily resident — Whether the two conditions specified in the provisions are
cumulative — Held, No.

Per R. S. Syal :

Facts :

The assessee’s stay in India in the preceding 10 years was as
under :

No.


Assessment Year

No. of
days in India

1.

1991-92

29

2.

1992-93

15

3.

1993-94

23

 

(A)

67

 4.

1994-95

24

5.

1995-96

92

6.

1996-97

366

7.

1997-98

365

8.

1998-99

359

9.


1999-2000

365

10.

2000-01

366

 

(B)


1,937

 

(A)
+ (B)

2004

According to the AO, the assessee was not ‘non-resident’ in 9
out of 10 years and had also resided in India for more than 730 days in the
preceding 7 years. Hence, he held that the status of the assessee was ‘Resident
and ordinarily resident’ (ROR). According to the CIT(A), in order that a person
could be considered as Resident but not ordinarily resident (RNOR), he must
fulfil the following two conditions given in S. 6(6)(a) viz. :

  • He has not been resident in India in nine out of the ten previous years; and

  •     He has not during the seven previous years pre-ceding that year been in India for a period of 730 days or more.

Since the assessee’s stay in India was for more than 730 days in the 7 preceding years, he, relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Pradeep J. Mehta, dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) uses the term ‘or’ and not ‘and’ between the two conditions given therein. Accordingly, the person would be considered as RNOR if he complies with either of the two conditions given therein. It disagreed with the CIT(A) that in order to qualify as RNOR, the assessee should fulfil both the conditions. In the case of the assessee, since he was not resident in India in nine out of ten previous years, his status would be that of RNOR. In support it also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case 4 of Morgenstern Werner.

Cases referred to :

    1. CIT and Another v. Morgenstern Werner, (2003) 259 ITR 486 (SC)

    2. PradeepJ. Mehta v. CIT, (2202) 256 ITR 647 (Guj.)

Note: The provisions of S. 6(6) have been substituted by the Finance Act, 2003 w.e.f. 1-4-2004. As per the substituted provisions, in order to qualify as RNOR, the person should be non-resident in nine out of ten previous years. The other alternative condition remains unchanged.


S. 271(1)(b) : Penalty for non-compliance with notices deleted, where inadequate notice given

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4) Boon Industries v. ITO


ITAT ‘K’ Bench, Mumbai

Before O. K. Narayanan (AM) and

Sushma Chowla (JM)

ITA No. 6736 and 6737/Mum./2006

A.Ys. : 1998-99 & 1999-2000. Decided on : 27-11-2007

Counsel for assessee/revenue :

Prakash Jhunjhunwala/Malathi Sridharan

S. 271(1)(b) read with S. 142(1) and S. 143(2) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty for non-compliance with notices issued — On the
facts held that penalty cannot be imposed.

Per O. K. Narayanan :

Held :

The penalty of Rs.0.2 lac each imposed for the years under
appeal for non-compliance of statutory notices issued u/s.142(1) and S. 143(2)
were deleted by the Tribunal. According to it, it cannot be said that the
assessee was indifferent in the matter and did not co-operate with the assessing
authorities, when it complied with the requirements twelve times out of the
sixteen times. It further held that the non-compliance cannot be said to be
willful when the time given to the assessee to attend before the AO was only
four to six days. According to it, the failure of the assessee to sought
adjournment or inform the AO was not that much material in the light of the
conduct of the assessee by appearing before the AO for not less than twelve
times.

 

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S. 263 : Commissioner has no power to revise AO’s order by giving additional reasons for sustaining same additions

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3) Manisha R. Chheda
v.
ITO


Mukesh P. Chheda


v. ITO


ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai

Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and

P. Madhavi Devi (JM)

ITA No. 5961 and 5962/Mum./2004

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 17-8-2007

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Pradeep Kapasi/

Chet Ram


S. 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Power to revise AO’s
order — AO making certain additions to the income returned — Whether the
Commissioner has power to revise AO’s order in order to sustain the addition but
on different reasons — Held, No.

Per J. Sudhakar Reddy :

Facts :

In their return of income filed, both the assessees had
returned besides other income, income from agriculture. According to the AO, the
assessees had not proved with evidence that they were engaged in agricultural
activities. Therefore, the income so declared was treated by the AO as income
from other sources.

According to the CIT, the reasons for additions given by the
AO were grossly inappropriate and inadequate for sustaining the additions. In
order to strengthen the case of the Revenue, he held both the orders passed by
the AO as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Accordingly,
he directed the AO to make fresh assessment. The assessees challenged the orders
passed by the CIT before the Tribunal.

Held :

According to the Tribunal, the CIT wanted to indicate the
same thing what the AO had indicated, but for different reasons. It further
observed that an order u/s.263 cannot be passed for giving additional reasons or
substituting reasons by a higher authority to support the same cause. According
to it, when the AO had in fact rejected the claim of the assessee, it cannot be
said that any prejudice was caused to the Revenue. Merely because the CIT was
not happy with the reasons given by the AO, the same did not give jurisdiction
to invoke the powers conferred on him u/s.263. The Tribunal further observed
that once an addition was made, the issue if appealed against, travelled to the
First Appellate Authority whose powers were co-terminus with that of the
Assessing Officer. The first appellate authority, according to the Tribunal, can
always, if he feels that the reasoning given by the Assessing Officer was not
sufficient, strengthen the order by giving his own reasons, if the situation so
permitted. If the assessees did not carry the matter in appeal, the assessment
orders attain finality. Thus, it was noted that, in either case, the scheme of
the Act does not permit the supervisory Commissioner to give additional reasons
for supporting the same additions that had been made by the AO.

For the reasons stated as above, the Tribunal quashed both
the orders passed by the CIT u/s.263 and allowed the appeals filed by the
assessee.




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S. 55A : AO cannot make reference to valuation officer when value returned as at 1-4-1981 is more than fair market value determined by valuation officer

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2) ITO
v.
Lalitaben B. Kapadia



ITAT ‘K’ Bench, Mumbai

Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and

P. Madhavi Devi (JM)

ITA No. 8763/Mum./2004

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 20-9-2007

Counsel for assessee/revenue : N. R. Agarwal/

Milind Bhusari


S. 55A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Reference to
Valuation Officer — Value returned by the assessee was more than the fair market
value arrived at by the Valuation Officer and accepted by the AO — Whether
action of the AO in making reference to the Valuer justifiable — Held, No.

Per P. Madhavi Devi :


Facts :

The assessee had returned income under the head long-term
capital gain from the sale of immovable property. For the purpose, the assessee
had shown fair market value (FMV) as on 1-4-1981 as Rs.10 lacs. U/s.55A, the AO
made reference to the Valuation Officer who valued the property at Rs.6.6 lacs
as on the said date. On appeal, the CIT(A) took the FMV at Rs.9.36 lacs. Being
aggrieved, the Revenue appealed before the Tribunal.

Held :

According to the Tribunal, reference u/s.55A could be made
only if the AO was of the opinion that the value returned by the assessee was
less than its FMV. The act of the AO in accepting the valuation made u/s.55A,
which was undoubtedly less than the FMV claimed by the assessee, proved that the
AO was of the opinion that the assessee’s claim was more than its FMV. Thus,
according to the Tribunal, the AO was not justified in making reference to the
Valuation Officer. Therefore, relying on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in
the case of Rubab M. Kazerani, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue.

Case referred to :


Rubab M. Kazerani v. JCIT, 97 TTJ (TM) 698 (Mum.)


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Payments made for charter hire charges to a non resident shipping company for transporting merchandise from one foreign port to another foreign port is not royalty chargeable to tax in term of provision of S. 9 of the Act.

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  1. M/s. ACIT v. Kin Ship Services India (P) Ltd.



(Cochin) (31 SOT 375)

S. 9, S. 40(a)(i), S. 195, Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 26-3-2009

Issue :

Payments made for charter hire charges to a non resident
shipping company for transporting merchandise from one foreign port to another
foreign port is not royalty chargeable to tax in term of provision of S. 9 of
the Act.

Facts :

The assessee is engaged in shipping and other related
activities such as stevedoring, clearing and forwarding. During A.Y. 2004-05,
the assessee made certain payments to non resident companies for charter hire
charges.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that payments made by the
assessee on account of charter hire charges were in the nature royalties and
therefore such payments were taxable in the hands of recipients in term of S.
9(1)(vi) of the Act. The AO disallowed the payment by invoking provisions of
S. 40(a)(i) of the Act by alleging that the assessee failed to deduct tax at
source.

The assessee contended that the payments made for charter
ship hire is not in the nature of royalty. It was claimed that the assessee
had not acquired any right on the foreign ships nor had it acquired any
property in the ship by chartering it. The ships were hired following
international chartering protocol for transporting merchandise from foreign
port to another foreign port and hence the payments cannot be held to be in
the nature of royalty.

The CIT(A) accepted the contentions of the assessee by
relying on the ruling in the case of Ind Telesoft (P) Ltd. (267 ITR 725) (AAR
New Delhi).

Held :

The ITAT held :

(a) The payments made by the assessee company were in the
nature of payments for chartering ships on hire for doing the business
outside India. The payments did not satisfy the test laid down in S. 9 of
the Income-tax Act, 1961.

(b) To constitute royalty, payments have to be for use of
specified assets. The tribunal concluded that the ship hire charges did not
satisfy this test by observing :

‘Royalty means consideration for the transfer of all or
any rights in respect of a patent, invention, model design, secret formula
or processes or trade mark or similar property. A plain reading makes it
clear that the charter ship hire payments made by the assessee do not fall
under the above category. The royalty also means consideration for imparting
of any information concerning the working of, or the use of, a patent,
invention, model design, secret formula or process or trade mark or similar
property. The payments made by the assessee do not have nay of these
characteristics.’

(c) The liability to deduct tax at source u/s.195 is cast
on the assessee only when the payment is made to a non-resident which is
chargeable under the provisions of the Income-tax Act. In the present case
since payments made by the assessee do not fall u/s.9 and the payments do
not take the character of any sum chargeable to tax under this Act,
provisions of S. 195 are not applicable.

(d) When S. 195 does not apply, there cannot be a
violation of that section and consequently question of disallowance
u/s.40(a)(i) does not arise.

 

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German company is not liable to pay tax in respect of its supervision activity in India which is expected to last for about 2 months.

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  1. Pintsch Bamag

(AAR) (2009 TIOL 23 ARA IT)

AAR No. 790 of 2008

Dated : 11-9-2009

Issues :

German company is not liable to pay tax in respect of its
supervision activity in India which is expected to last for about 2 months.

Independent sub-contractor’s time is not to be added for
determining threshold for construction of PE.

Article 5, 12, India-Germany Treaty; S. 9(1)(vii),
Income-tax Act.

Facts :

The applicant, a German company, was awarded a contract by
Tuticorin Port Trust (TPT) on 28th November, 2006 through the process of
international bidding.

The scope of work for the contract was ‘work design,
fabrication supply, transportation, delivery, installation and maintenance of
mild steel, navigational channel and fairway buoys, mooring gear and solar
operated navigational lighting equipments’ in relation to Sethu Samudram Ship
Channel Project being executed by TPT in Tamil Nadu.

The applicant sub-contracted certain part of work to
independent third parties in India. Though the agreements with the
sub-contractors were entered into in 2006, formal permission for
sub-contracting was obtained from the TPT in June, 2009.

The following work was to be undertaken by the applicant :

(i) Study of the technical requirements in relation to
the execution of the Contract.

(ii) Designing of Fairway Buoys, Mooring Gears and Solar
Operated Navigational Equipments.

(iii) Supply of critical components to sub-contractors,
if required.

(iv) Supervision of installation of equipments and other
items mentioned in the Main Contract, as and when the installation is
carried out by the sub-contractor.

The scope of work mentioned in point (ii) and (iii) above
was to be executed by the applicant’s office in Germany.

(v) The work at point (iv) was to be carried out in India
and for this purpose two engineers were to be deputed to India. The work was
expected to last for not more than 2 months.

Before the AAR, the applicant contended that as per clause
(i) of Article 5.2 of the India Germany DTAA, it is not expected to have
Permanent Establishment in India and in absence thereof, no part of income is
liable to tax in India. In this regard the applicant placed reliance on the
decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Vishakapatnam Port
Trust,
(144 ITR 146).

The revenue contended that the sub-contractor is
undertaking various activities which constitute the core of the contract work
entrusted to the applicant. All the activities undertaken by the
sub-contractor are on behalf of the applicant and in connection with the
execution of the contract between the applicant and TPT. As a result, length
of construction of PE needs to be reckoned having regard to time spent by the
sub contractor. Alternatively, place of manufacture of the sub-contractor
constitutes permanent establishment of the applicant itself. Still
alternatively, the revenue contended that length of construction PE needs to
be reckoned.

The revenue authorities also contended that the services
rendered for designing are taxable as fees for technical services under
Article 12.4 of the Indo German DTAA.1

Held :

AAR held :

  • The work/project of the
    applicant are in the nature of construction project. As a consequence,
    article 5.2 gets attracted and therefore duration test of six months
    necessarily applied to determine whether the applicant has taxable presence.

  • AAR referred to and relied on
    earlier ruling in the case of Cal Dive Marine Construction (Mauritius) Ltd.
    315 ITR 334 to conclude that once construction PE clause is attracted,
    minimum period test has to be necessarily applied. The fact that the
    applicant may have a project office or a workshop for the purpose of
    carrying out contract work does not bring the establishment of the applicant
    within the other clauses of Article 5(2) to the exclusion of requirement of
    minimum duration test of construction PE. In case of construction PE, a
    specific provision dealing with construction or assembly project, prevails
    over the other general clauses of Article 5(2). An office or workshop,
    established as a part of or incidental to the execution of a construction or
    assembly project does not alter the minimum period test contemplated by
    construction PE.

  • The fact that sub-contractor
    is only a nominee carrying out the work which otherwise would have been
    performed by the applicant does not transform the workshop of the
    sub-contractor into the PE of the applicant. The sub-contractor cannot be
    treated as a dependent agent of the applicant. Article 5 of the treaty
    regards a place to be a PE only if the applicant carries on business through
    such place. The concept of PE conveys the idea that the enterprise has
    visible presence in the other country. The presence can be either in the
    form of applicant’s own PE or the presence of dependent agent. The
    independent contractor does not satisfy any of these tests.

  • The revenue’s reliance on OECD
    commentary which indicates that the time taken by a sub-contractor needs to
    be added for reckoning threshold of PE of general contractor is limited in
    its application to a situation where the building site is set up by the main
    contractor and the services of the sub-contractor are deployed in aiding the
    execution of such building project with conjoint effort of contractor and
    sub-contractor. In case of the applicant, the sub-contractor carries out
    fabrication and assembly at a place away from the installation site by
    independently running such facility and does not get covered by this
    contingency.

  • The aspect of comprehensive
    responsibility being that of the contractor as also the furnishing of
    performance guarantee by applicant does not alter the legal position above.

S. 142(2A) and S. 142(2C). The amendment to S. 142(2C) by insertion of the words ‘suo moto or’ w.e.f. 1-4-2008 is prospective and prior to this date AO could not grant extension of time except on an application by the assessee.

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  1. Bishan Saroop Ram Kishan Agro Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT

ITAT ‘A’ Bench, New Delhi

Before K. G. Bhansal (AM) and

George Mathan (JM)

ITA Nos. 3413, 3415, 3416, 3459, 3068 and

3670/Del./2008

A.Ys. : 1999-2000 to 2005-06. Decided on : 18-9-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Rano Jain &

V. Mohan/Pratima Kaushik

S. 142(2A) and S. 142(2C). The amendment to S. 142(2C) by insertion of the words ‘suo moto or’ w.e.f. 1-4-2008 is prospective and prior to this date AO could not grant extension of time except on an application by the assessee.

Per Bench :

Facts :

On 7-10-2004 there was a search action on the assessee. The last panchnama was drawn on 6-12-2004. As per provisions of S. 153B(i), the assessment u/s.153A could be completed upto 31-12-2006. On 12-12-2006, the AO passed an order directing the assessee to get his accounts audited u/s.142(2A) and the time given for filing audit report was 90 days. Thus, due date for furnishing audit report u/s. 142(2A) was 12-3-2007.

Due to alleged non co-operation by the assessee, the AO, at the request of the auditor, vide order dated 7-3-2007 extended time from 12-3-2007 to 20-4-2007. Subsequently, two more extensions, of one month each, were granted vide orders dated 17-4-2007 and 17-5-2007. The audit report was finally submitted on 4-6-2007 and the assessment order was passed on 3-8-2007.

The assessment order passed u/s.153A was challenged on the ground that it was barred by limitation. It was contended that since special audit had been ordered on 12-12-2006 and was to be completed on 12-3-2007 and as per the provisions as they stood at the relevant point of time the AO did not have the power to suo moto extend the time limit for completion of special audit u/s.142(2A). Extension granted by the AO at the request of the auditor resulted into a suo moto extension being granted by the AO. Consequently, as per provisions of S. 153B(1) the time limit for completion of assessment expired on 11-5-2007. Since assessment order was passed on 3-8-2007 it was barred by limitation.

On an appeal to the Tribunal,

Held :

The provisions of S. 142(2A) do not provide for any time limit for completion of the special audit. However, S. 142(2C) specifies that the AO can, at his discretion, give any time limit subject to a maximum of 180 days from the date on which the direction u/s.142(2A) is received by the assessee. The provisions of S. (2A), S. (2B), S. (2C) and S. (2D) of S. 142 are to be read together as a complete code. It cannot be held that the provisions of S. 142(2A) have a stand alone position and are unfettered by S. 142(2C).

The Tribunal noticed that the assessee had not made an application for extension of time. The extension of time granted by the AO, at the request of the auditor, was held to be suo moto action of the AO. The Tribunal on perusal of the memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2008 as also Circular No. 1 dated 27-3-2008 explaining the amendment to the proviso to S. 142(2C) held that the power to suo moto extend the time limit for completion of audit u/s.142(2A) was available to the AO w.e.f. 1-4-2008 and before such date, the extension could have been made only at the request of the assessee. The extensions granted by the AO were held to be without jurisdiction and accordingly such extensions could not extend the limitation. The exclusion as provided in Explanation (ii) to S. 153B was read to be 90 days being a period between 12-12-2006 to 12-3-2007.

The Tribunal upheld the claim of the assessee that the assessment was barred by limitation.

 

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S. 234C — Interest u/s.234C is not payable if, on the date of payment of advance tax it is not known whether the demerger scheme will be sanctioned or not and from which date it would be sanctioned.

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  1. Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. Dy. CIT



ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and

D. Karunakara Rao (AM)

ITA No. 7646 & 7647/Mum./2007

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 20-8-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Arvind Sonde &

Sampat Kabra/K. K. Das

S. 234C — Interest u/s.234C is not payable if, on the date
of payment of advance tax it is not known whether the demerger scheme will be
sanctioned or not and from which date it would be sanctioned.

Per R. K. Gupta :

Facts :

The assessee, pursuant to a demerger scheme, acquired
cement business of L & T Limited from 1-4-2003. The scheme of demerger was
sanctioned by the Bombay High Court on 22-4-2004 effective from 1-4-2003 as a
result of which the income for the period from 1-4-2003 to 31-3-2004 became
taxable in the hands of the assessee. The assessee had not paid advance tax in
respect of this income. Consequently, the Assessing Officer charged interest
of Rs.44,94,392 u/s.234C.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
where it contended that interest is not payable since on the due dates for
payment of advance tax there was no liability to pay tax. It was further
submitted that if the liability to pay advance tax arises on account of
subsequent event, i.e. demerger sanctioned after the end of the
previous year then in such an event it cannot be said that the assessee was
liable to pay advance tax on due dates specified in S. 210. The CIT(A)
dismissed the ground by observing that the assessee was liable for payment of
advance tax u/s.208 with all consequences of law to pay interest u/s.234B and
u/s.234C. He held that since there was a shortfall in payment of installments
of advance tax, liability of interest u/s.234C is automatically attracted.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where it was also contended on behalf of the assessee that it was impossible
to pay advance tax as it was not aware whether the demerger scheme would be
sanctioned and if yes, from which date.

Held :

The Tribunal observed that the liability to pay advance tax
in respect of cement business had arisen consequent to the sanction of the
demerger scheme by the Bombay High Court on 22-4-2004 i.e. after the
due dates of payments of advance tax. The Tribunal noted that the tax
liability arising after the date of sanction of the demerger scheme has been
paid by the assessee while filing its return of income along with interest
u/s.234A & B. It held that payment of advance tax in respect of cement
division was an impossible situation. The Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Reliance Energy Ltd. in ITA No. 218/Mum./05 (order dated 24-1-2008)
has after considering several decisions of the Tribunal and discussing the
doctrine of impossibility held that an assessee cannot be forced to do an
impossible task.

S. 48 — Capital gains on sale of land — Land purchased out of borrowed funds — Whether registration charges and interest paid on borrowings eligible for deduction and indexation — Held, Yes.

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  1. Ishtiaque Ahmad v. ACIT



ITAT Bench ‘C’, New Delhi

Before D. R. Singh (JM) and

K. G. Bansal (AM)

ITA No. 863/D/2009

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 28-8-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : J. J. Mehrotra/

D. N. Kar

S. 48 — Capital gains on sale of land — Land purchased out
of borrowed funds — Whether registration charges and interest paid on
borrowings eligible for deduction and indexation — Held, Yes.

Per K. G. Bansal :

Facts :

The assessee had purchased a piece of land in October 2006
out of borrowed funds. The land was sold in the year under appeal. While
returning income as long term capital gains — it claimed registration charges
of Rs.4.63 lacs and the interest paid by him during the years 1997-98 to
2001-02 aggregating to Rs.72 29 lacs, as the cost of improvement. The claim
was disallowed by the AO. On appeal the CIT(A) allowed the claim qua the
registration charges, however, the claim for indexation was denied. In respect
of interest paid, the CIT(A) agreed with the AO and held that the interest
payable on loan taken for acquisition of the land was not part of the cost of
acquisition/improvement.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the registration charges paid was
treated as cost of improvement of the land and as such allowed as deduction by
the CIT(A). Referring to the provisions of second proviso to S. 48, it agreed
with the submission of the assessee that the provisions contained in clause
(ii) shall have the effect as if for the words ‘cost of acquisition’ and ‘cost
of any improvement’, the words ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ and ‘indexed cost
of any improvement’ had respectively been substituted. Therefore, it was held
that the assessee was entitled to indexation with reference to the
registration charges paid.

In respect of interest paid — the Tribunal agreed with the
assessee that as held by the Delhi High Court in case of CIT v. Mithlesh
Kumari,
the actual cost of the asset need not be only those costs incurred
on the date of acquisition. Accordingly, relying on the decision of the Delhi
High Court (supra), it held that interest paid on borrowed funds for
purchase of land after its actual purchase constituted cost of the land. It
further held that in terms of second proviso to S. 48, the cost has to be
indexed for working out the capital gains.

Case referred to :


CIT v. Mithlesh Kumari, (1973) 92 ITR 9 (Del.)

 

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S. 37(1) — Business expenditure — Reimbursement of expenditure incurred in running the school — Whether allowable — Held, Yes.

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  1. Tata International Ltd. v. ACIT



ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai

Before A. L. Gehlot (AM) and

Sushma Chowla (JM)

ITA No. 5591/M/2005

A.Y. : 1999-2000. Decided on : 11-9-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Dinesh Vyas/

R. P. Meena

S. 37(1) — Business expenditure — Reimbursement of
expenditure incurred in running the school — Whether allowable — Held, Yes.

Per A. L. Gehlot :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in the business of export. One of
the issues before the Tribunal was regarding the allowability of expenditure
incurred on the maintenance of a school run by TATA at Dewas. The school was
situated at the place where the assessee’s factory was located and substantial
number of students of the school were children of the assessee’s employees.
During the year the assessee had paid the sum of Rs.1,88,540 by way of
reimbursement, part of the expenditure incurred in running the School. The
same was disallowed by the lower authorities.

Held :

According to the Tribunal, the case of the assessee was
covered by the Tribunal decision in the assessee’s own case for the A.Ys.
1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95 which was later affirmed in the
assessee’s own case for the A.Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99. Noting the fact that the
school was situated at the same place where the assessee’s factory was located
and substantial number of students of the school were children of the
assessee’s employees, the expenditure claimed was allowed.

Case referred to :

Tata International Ltd. ITA No. 4823 to 4825/M/2005 dated
26-3-2009.

 

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S. 28, S. 36(1)(vii), S. 37. Amount paid by the assessee under Performance Guarantee Bond is allowable as a business loss/expenditure. Mere fact that the assessee has claimed the amount written off in the course of business as ‘bad debt’ does not preclude

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6. Anang Tradevest Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO

ITAT ‘A’ Bench,
Mumbai

Before D.
Manmohan (VP) and

Abraham George
(AM)

ITA No.
10/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2003-04.
Decided on : 10-8-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue :

Prakash Jhunjhunwala/R.
S. Srivastava

S. 28, S.
36(1)(vii), S. 37. Amount paid by the assessee under Performance Guarantee
Bond is allowable as a business loss/expenditure. Mere fact that the assessee
has claimed the amount written off in the course of business as ‘bad debt’
does not preclude him from claiming the same as business loss/expenditure.

Per Abraham P.
George :

Facts :

The assessee, as a
part of its business activity, was introducing certain clients to M/s. Joindre
Capital Services Ltd., who entered into share purchase and sale transactions
for such clients. As per the terms of the agreement entered into between the
assessee and M/s. Joindre Capital Services Pvt. Ltd., assessee had to
indemnify Joindre Capital Services Ltd., in case clients introduced by the
assessee failed to honor any of their commitments.

During the previous
year in respect of three parties, assessee had shown a sum of Rs.11,90,779 as
bad debts written off. The Assessing Officer (AO) held that such claim could
not be allowed since assessee was a sub-broker and the debt was never taken
into account for computing the income of the assessee for the relevant
previous year or any preceding previous years.

The CIT(A) held that
the bad debt written off was rightly disallowed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where disallowance of bad debt of
Rs. 11,90,779 was taken as a ground. In the course of the hearing, the
assessee withdrew the original ground and by way of an additional ground
claimed that this sum of Rs.11,90,779 paid under a performance guarantee bond
be allowed either as business expenditure u/s.37(1) or as business loss. On
behalf of the assessee it was contended that the Tribunal has in the case of
India Infoline Securities (P) Ltd. v. ACIT, (25 SOT 123) (Mum.) held
that losses incurred by an assessee in the course of his business as a stock
broker, on account of default of his clients, could be claimed as a business
loss.

Held :


Neither the AO nor the CIT(A) had gone through the agreement entered into by
the assessee with Joindre Capital Services Ltd., for verifying whether such
claim could be allowed as business expense or loss. The fact that the assessee
had claimed the amount as bad debt would not preclude it from claiming the
amount as business loss or expenses, since the write off was done in the
course of business only.

With a view to
verify whether the claim of the as-sessee was in relation to clients
introduced by it to M/s. Joindre Capital Services Ltd., as also whether the
indemnity agreement with Joindre Capital Services Ltd. was applicable, in
relation to such write off effected by the assessee, the Tribunal set aside
the orders of the AO and the CIT(A) and restored the matter back to the AO for
considering the issue afresh in accordance with law after giving proper
opportunity to the assessee to represent its case.

S. 271(1)(c) — Penalty for concealment of income — Whether non bifurcation of short term capital loss from the overall business loss amounted to concealment of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income — Held, No.

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  1. Nera (India) Limited v. DCIT

ITAT ‘F’ Bench, New
Delhi

D. R. Singh (JM)
and K. G. Bansal (AM)

ITA No.
107/Del./2009

A.Y. : 2004-05.
Decided on : 4-8-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue :
A. K. Mittal/

Sunita Singh

S. 271(1)(c) —
Penalty for concealment of income — Whether non bifurcation of short term
capital loss from the overall business loss amounted to concealment of income
and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income — Held, No.

Per D. R.
Singh :

Facts :

The assessee had
filed return of income declaring business loss of Rs.1.37 crore. During the
course of assessment proceedings, it was noticed by the AO that the Auditors
in Form No. 3CD had reported that debit to the Profit & Loss account included
capital expenditure by way of fixed assets written off amounting to Rs.l0.17
lacs, which was not added back by the assessee. The same was added to the
income (reduced from the loss) of the assessee and the business loss was
assessed accordingly. According to the AO since the assessee accepted the
mistake only after the show cause was issued, he was of the view that the
assessee had concealed his income and furnished inaccurate particulars of
income. He therefore levied penalty of Rs.3.65 lacs u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act.
On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the same.

Before the Tribunal
the assessee explained that instead of classifying the sum of Rs.10.17 lacs as
short term capital loss, which was allowable to be carried forward u/s.70 of
the Act, the assessee in its return made a technical error of not bifurcating
short term capital loss from the overall business loss of the company. The
assessee claimed that the same cannot by any assumption be deemed to be
concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of the income.

Held :

According to the
Tribunal, a mere omission or negligence would not constitute a deliberate act
of suppression. It agreed with the assessee that its explanation cannot be
treated as false and inaccurate simply because of its mistake in wrongly
classifying heads of loss. Accordingly, the penalty imposed was deleted.

S. 195, S. 244A. When tax which was deducted at source and deposited with the Government pursuant to an order passed u/s. 195(2) of the Act is refunded to the assessee, upon the CIT(A) deciding the appeal in favor of the assessee, the assessee is entitled

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  1. 2009 TIOL 602 ITAT Mum.

Addl DIT
v.
Reliance Infocomm Ltd.

ITA No. 6100 to
6110/M/2008

Dated : 9-9-2009

S. 195, S. 244A.
When tax which was deducted at source and deposited with the Government
pursuant to an order passed u/s. 195(2) of the Act is refunded to the assessee,
upon the CIT(A) deciding the appeal in favor of the assessee, the assessee is
entitled to refund of amount paid with interest u/s.244A.

Facts :

The assessee
approached the DDIT, International Taxation, with a request to issue a
certificate for making payment to M/s. ECI Telecom — NGTS Ltd., Israel, for
purchase of certain software for the purpose of operation of Wireless
Telecommunication Network, without deduction of tax at source. The DDIT passed
an order u/s.195(2) of the Act holding that the payment was in the nature of
‘Royalty’ and accordingly, tax was required to be deducted at source. The
assessee deducted the tax and made payment to the authorities as directed by
the aforesaid order passed by the DDIT.

The assessee
preferred an appeal against the said order u/s.195(2) of the Act, which was
allowed by CIT(A). Pursuant to the appeal order, the DDIT passed an order
giving effect to the order of CIT(A) and granted refund of amount paid by the
assessee but did not grant interest on the amount refunded on the ground that
refund has arisen not under the Income-tax Act as such.

Aggrieved, assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the assessee was entitled to
interest u/s.244A of the Act on the refund of TDS u/s.195.

Aggrieved by the
order of CIT(A) directing the DDIT to grant interest on refund of TDS, Revenue
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal found
the issue under consideration to be covered against the revenue by various
decisions including the decision of ITAT in the case of Tata Chemicals Ltd.;
16 SOT 418 and in the case of Star Cruises India Travel Services Pvt. Ltd. in
ITA No. 6498 & 6500/Mum./06 order dated 24th March, 2009 (2009 TIOL 351 ITAT
Mum). Since the facts were identical to the decisions mentioned above the
Tribunal confirmed the order passed by CIT(A) and held that the assessee is
entitled to interest on refund of amount paid pursuant to an order passed u/s.
195(2).

The appeal filed by
the department was dismissed.

S. 70(3), S. 111A, S. 115D. As per the provisions of S. 70(3) r.w. S. 111A and S. 115AD, the assessee has an option to set off the short term capital loss against the short term capital gains. Short term capital loss suffered after 1-10-2004 could be set

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  1. 2009 TIOL 547 ITAT Mum.

First State
Investments (Hongkong) Ltd.
v. Addl. DIT (International Tax)

ITA No.
2895/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2005-06.
Dated : 23-7-2009

S. 70(3), S.
111A, S. 115D. As per the provisions of S. 70(3) r.w. S. 111A and S. 115AD,
the assessee has an option to set off the short term capital loss against the
short term capital gains. Short term capital loss suffered after 1-10-2004
could be set off against short term capital gains earned before 30-9-2004.

Facts :

For A.Y. 2005-06,
the assessee computed short term capital gain of Rs.331.33 lakhs. The amount
of short term capital gain and short term capital loss for the period upto
30-9-2004 and after 30-9-2004 was as under :

Particulars

upto 30-9-2004

after 30-9-2004

Total

 

Rupees in lakhs

Short term capital
gain

36.54

472.16

508.70

Short term capital
loss

8.14

169.23

177.37

Total

28.40

302.93

331.33

The assessee sought
to set off the short term capital loss suffered in the period after 30-9-2004
against short term capital gain for a period before 30-9-2004 and contended
that the short term capital gain upto 30-9-2004 was Rs.Nil and that the entire
short term capital gain was for a period after 30-9-2004 and therefore was
taxable @ 10%.

According to the
Assessing Officer, the assessee could not set off the short term capital loss
for a period after 30-9-2004 with the short term capital gain arising in a
period prior to 1-10-2004 since in the period prior to 1-10-2004 short term
capital gain was chargeable at normal rates whereas in the period after
30-9-2004 short term capital gain on which STT was paid was chargeable at
concessional rate of 10%. He, held that Rs.28.40 lakhs is capital gain for the
period upto 30-9-2004 and Rs.302.93 lakhs is capital gain arising during the
period after 30-9-2004.

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

S. 80, S. 139(3) and S. 139(5) — Loss return filed within time could be revised and loss carried forward.

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  1. (2009) 119 ITD 119 (Delhi ITAT)

Escorts Mahle
Ltd.
v. DCIT

A.Y. : 2001-02.
Dated : 21-3-2008

S. 80, S. 139(3)
and S. 139(5) — Loss return filed within time could be revised and loss
carried forward.

Facts :

The assessee company
filed a return of loss on 31-10-2001 which was accompanied by the unaudited
profit and loss account and balance sheet. Further the tax audit report was
also not filed. On 27-3-2003, the assessee company filed another return in
which a higher loss was claimed. The profit and loss account, balance sheet
and audit report were attached to subsequent return.

The assessing
officer took the view that since the return filed on 31-10-2001 was not
accompanied by audited accounts, the same was not a valid return. He,
therefore, considered the return filed on 27-3-2003 as the first valid return.
Further, he held that since the return filed on 27-3-2003 was filed beyond the
time limit prescribed u/s.139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), the
loss declared therein could not be carried forward.

The CIT(Appeals)
held that the return filed on 27-3-2003 was revised return filed u/s.139(5) of
the Act and took the place of the original return filed on 31-10-2001. It
should, therefore, be taken to have been filed within the time limit
prescribed u/s.139(3) of the Act.

On Revenue’s appeal,
the Delhi ITAT observed that the assessing officer processed the return filed
on 31-10-2001 u/s.143(1) of the Act and also did not issue any defect notice
u/s.139(9) of the Act. Thus, the said return cannot be said to have been
considered as invalid return. This being the case, the return filed on
27-3-2003 was to be treated as valid revised return. The revised return took
the place of original return and the original return having been admittedly
filed within time allowed u/s.139(1) of the Act, the loss was to be carried
forward. The return of loss filed on 31-10-2001 was filed in accordance with
S. 139(3) of the Act and could be validly revised u/s.139(5) of the Act.

Even though assessee might have committed a serious economic offence, yet he could not be charged to income unless it was proved beyond doubt that said income was generated to him alone.

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  1. (2009) 119 ITD
    71 (Bang.)

Ibrahim Vittal
v. ITO, Ward 2(3), Mangalore

A.Y. : 2003-04.
Dated : 25-4-2008

Even though
assessee might have committed a serious economic offence, yet he could not be
charged to income unless it was proved beyond doubt that said income was
generated to him alone.

Facts :

A search was made in
the residence of appellant u/s.37(3) of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999
(FEMA) on the basis of certain information by Directorate of Enforcement
(DOE). During search, some documents were seized which disclosed that assessee
had received a cash of Rs.23,15,000. The contention of assessee that it was
received from his brothers and brother-in-law working abroad for construction
of their houses was rejected by DOE and penalty was imposed on him. On this
basis, AO treated the said money as unexplained and taxed it u/s.69A. On
appeal to CIT(A), it confirmed the addition. On appeal to Tribunal, it held
that the AO did not make any independent enquiries. Rather he relied upon the
letter received from one of the brothers-in-law which was signed by him on
behalf of all the other persons and hence was not having any evidential value.
In a search conducted under FEMA, no other property was confiscated from
assessee. Hence, the assessee had received the amount on behalf of his
brothers and brothers-in-law.

It was not the case
of the AO that the assessee had made any investments or the assessee was found
to be the owner of any bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles. So, the
AO was not right, in law, in completing the assessment u/s.69A.

S. 147 — Reopening of the assessment for the second time to take a different view on the same matter is bad in law and liable to be quashed.

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  1. (2009) 119 ITD 21 (Mum.)

Aum Chemicals
v.
ACIT, Palghar
Circle, Palghar

A.Y. : 1998-99.
Dated : 30-4-2008

Held 1 :

S. 147 —
Reopening of the assessment for the second time to take a different view on
the same matter is bad in law and liable to be quashed.

Held 2 :

S. 45 — A
partnership firm consisting of 2 partners was converted into company —
Partners were given shares of Company A to the extent of their credit balances
in Capital Account — It was held that since the condition of distribution of
capital assets on dissolution of firm is not fulfilled, S. 45(4) is not
applicable. Even otherwise after deducting cost of capital which was equal to
book value, capital gain would be nil.

Fact 1 :

The assessee firm
decided to sell its assets and liabilities to a private limited company.
Subsequently, the said consideration was distributed among partners and the
firm was dissolved. The Assessing Officer reopened the assessment and added
certain amount as Short Term Capital Gain u/s.45(4). The CIT(A) deleted the
addition. Afterwards AO again reopened the assessment on the ground that the
partners made an arrangement to avoid tax by not assigning values to
individual assets and added the value difference of assets to the income of
the assessee. On appeal to Tribunal, it held that there was nothing on record
to show that there was any failure on the part of assessee. It had disclosed
all material facts at the time of first reopening of assessment. Hence, it was
not permissible to reopen the assessment on the same reason to take different
view. Consequently, second time reopening of assessment was bad in law and
liable to be quashed.

Fact 2 :

On distribution of
assets and liabilities to the company, the company allotted shares to partners
in proportion to their capital contribution. The AO taxed short term capital
gain by invoking provisions of S. 45(4). It was held that for invoking S.
45(4) following two conditions are to be satisfied :

    1. Transfer by way
    of distribution of capital asset.

    2. Transfer should
    be on the dissolution of the firm or otherwise.

There is a
difference between vesting in private limited company and distribution of
capital assets. In case of vesting of property, the property vests in the
company as it exists. On the other hand, distribution on dissolution
presupposes processes of division, realisation, encashment of assets and
apportionment of the realised amount.

In the given case
there was no transfer of assets on dissolution of firm. Hence, first condition
is not satisfied. Further, even if S. 45(1) is applied, the full value of
consideration for the firm is book value of assets as allocation of shares had
no correlation of vesting of properties in company. Hence, capital gain would
be Nil.

Powers of CIT(A) — Rule 24 of Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963 — Whether CIT(A) can dismiss appeal for want of prosecution by assessee — Held, No. Whether CIT(A) is bound to dispose of appeal on merits, even when there is default of non-appearance — Held, Y

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31 2008 TIOL 601 ITAT Mum.


British Pharmaceutical Laboratories v. ACIT

ITA No. 6263/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 1999-2000. Dated : 1-10-2008

Powers of CIT(A) — Rule 24 of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
Rules, 1963 — Whether CIT(A) can dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution by
the assessee — Held, No. Whether CIT(A) is bound to dispose of the grounds of
appeal on merits, even when there is a default of non-appearance by the
appellant — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

The assessee filed a return of income declaring a loss of
Rs.2,19,69,182. The Assessing Officer passed an order u/s.143(3) of the Act
assessing the total income of the assessee at Rs.19,75,603. Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A), but failed to attend the
proceedings before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) did not record decision on merits on
the ground of assessee’s failure to attend the proceedings and by taking a
clue from the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Multiplan (India)
Ltd., he dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal.

 

Held :

The Tribunal noted that under Rule 24 of the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963 the Tribunal has the power to dismiss an appeal
for want of prosecution and it is also empowered to recall that order, if
satisfied about the existence of reasonable cause subsequently shown by the
appellant. The Tribunal held that since the CIT(A) does not have such a power
under the Income-tax Act, 1961, he is bound to dispose of the grounds of
appeal on merits, even when there is a default of non-appearance by the
appellant. Since the CIT(A) had not recorded decision on merits, the Tribunal
set aside his order and restored the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for
fresh disposal in accordance with law, after giving reasonable opportunity of
being heard to the assessee.

 


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S. 254(2) — The order pronounced at the conclusion of the hearing is an order of the Tribunal — It cannot be called a tentative order or a prima facie view — If there is mistake apparent on record, the order pronounced in the Court which is an oral order

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

14 (2010) 36 DTR (Chennai) (TM) (Trib) 42
ITO v. M. Vijayan/ITO v. Smt. V. Meenakshi
A.Ys. : 1999-00 to 2004-05. Dated : 18-12-2009

 

S. 254(2) — The order pronounced at the conclusion of the
hearing is an order of the Tribunal — It cannot be called a tentative order or a
prima facie view — If there is mistake apparent on record, the order pronounced
in the Court which is an oral order can be recalled to rectify such mistake.

Facts :

In this case, a survey u/s.133A was conducted at the business
premises of the assessee (M. Vijayan). During the course of survey, certain
documents pertaining to income and investment were found. Sworn statements were
recorded from the assessee and his wife. On the basis of sworn statements
supplied during the course of the survey, the Assessing Officer inferred that
the income and investment shown in the name of the wife actually belonged to the
assessee and he therefore made the impugned addition in the hands of the
assessee on substantive basis and in thehands of the wife on protective basis.

Upon assessee’s appeal, the learned CIT (A) found that the
wife had independent sources of income. He also found that there is no finding
that the money was actually invested by the husband or that he enjoyed the
profits earned from the business and investment in the name of his wife. Hence,
he allowed the assessee’s appeal and deleted the addition in the hands of the
husband.

Upon further appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal decided the
issue in favour of the assessee relying on the decision of the jurisdictional
High Court in the case of CIT v. S. Khader Khan Son, (300 ITR 157) (Mad.)
wherein it was held that the materials collected and the statements recorded
during the survey u/s.133A were not conclusive piece of evidence by itself. The
order was pronounced in the open Court as well as communicated orally to the
parties concerned.

The Judicial Member subsequently proposed to recall the order
on the ground of non-consideration of the judgment of the jurisdictional High
Court in the case of H. Shahul Hameed v. ACIT, (258 ITR 266) (Mad.). Difference
of opinion arose between the Members regarding refixing the matter for hearing
and also on merits of the issue and therefore the matter was referred to the
Third Member.

Held :

The order pronounced at the conclusion of the hearing is an
order of the Tribunal. It cannot be called a tentative order or a prima facie
view. In the present case, the order is pronounced as well as communicated
orally to the parties concerned and hence it is an order. De hors the facts of
the present case, if there is mistake apparent on record, the order pronounced
in the Court which is an oral order can be recalled to rectify such mistake.

In the present case, there was no search but only survey
u/s.133A. In the decision of S. Khader Khan Son (supra), the jurisdictional High
Court has distinguished the provisions of S. 132(4) with those of S. 133A and
held that the material collected and statements recorded during the survey
u/s.133A are not conclusive piece of evidence and that the same cannot be the
basis for making any addition. Therefore the judgment based upon which the
Judicial Member has proposed to recall the order is not applicable to the facts
of the case. Further, the fact that the Judicial Member had to devote nearly
twenty-five pages to point out the error and then to set it aside for
reconsideration, itself proves that the conclusion of the Judicial Member is the
result of a long drawn-out process of reasoning on points where there may
conceivably be two opinions and thus, there was no mistake apparent from record.

Further, instead of acting upon what had been conclusively
pronounced in the Court, the Judicial Member kept the matter pending with him
and expressed his opinion to reopen the case after three months as against the
long-standing convention of passing dissenting orders within fifteen days.
Therefore, the matter cannot be refixed for hearing on the ground that there is
a mistake apparent from record.

 

levitra

S. 22 and S. 24 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Rent, being only a surrogate measure of annual value, has to be reduced by the expenses not connected with property but incurred by landlord for enjoyment of property by tenants, such as salary and bonus to sw

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  1. (2009) 120 TTJ 1127 (Ahd.)


J. B. Patel & Co. (Co-owners) v. Dy. CIT

ITA No. 4033 (Ahd.) of 2004

A.Y. : 1993-94. Dated : 29-2-2008

S. 22 and S. 24 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Rent, being
only a surrogate measure of annual value, has to be reduced by the expenses
not connected with property but incurred by landlord for enjoyment of property
by tenants, such as salary and bonus to sweeper, pumpman and liftman and
electricity charges for pump motor and common passage.

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee computed
rental income under ‘Income from House Property’ after claiming deductions in
respect of the following expenses :

(a) Salary and bonus paid to sweepers/pumpman/liftman

(b) Electricity charges for pump motor and common
passage.

Since these expenses were not covered by S. 23 and S. 24,
the Assessing Officer denied the assessee’s claim. The disallowance was upheld
by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal, deciding in assessee’s favour, noted as
under :

(1) The rent being charged by the assessee is only a
surrogate measure of the said annual value. The expenditure on the aforesaid
items, i.e. the salary (including bonus) to the maintenance staff of
the facilities such as electric motors, lift, cleaning, etc., as well as
that on the electricity consumed in respect of any common area and the
electric motors, is not attributable directly to the house property as such,
but to its enjoyment by the tenants/users thereof.

(2) In a given case it may happen that the said
expenditure is incurred by the tenant or tenants (collectively), with the
landlord having no locus standi or role therein. Who incurs the expenditure
in the first instance is only a matter of mutual arrangement or convenience
and thus, of no consequence where the bona fides of such expenditure are, as
in the present case, not in doubt. The rent being charged by the assessee,
which represents the measure of its annual value, would, in such a case
stand correspondingly reduced.

(3) As such, although the assessee, being entitled only
to the deductions in respect of the said expenditure in the computation of
income under the said head of income only in terms of its provisions, would
not be entitled to the impugned deductions, we consider that the annual
value of its house property be assumed at the reduced value, i.e.
after deducting the impugned amounts (from the rental), being only in
relation to the expenditure required to be necessarily incurred for the
enjoyment/user of the relevant property and, therefore, can only be
considered as having been included at the said amount, i.e. at cost
by the two parties in the determining of the rental.

(4) The standard deduction admissible to the assessee on
account of repairs @ 1/6th of the annual value of its house property is in
relation to the repairs, whether actually incurred or not, by the assessee
during the relevant year. The impugned sums are not in relation to any
repairs to the house property, but for the maintenance of the facilities
enjoined therewith and necessary for its useful enjoyment.

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S. 143(1) and S. 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Provisions of S. 263 are not applicable where only intimation u/s.143(1) has been issued.

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 120 TTJ 1009 (Agra) (TM)


Vinod Kumar Rai v. CIT

ITA No. 234 (Agra) of 2005

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 21-11-2008

S. 143(1) and S. 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Provisions of S. 263 are not applicable where only intimation u/s.143(1) has
been issued.

For the relevant assessment year, the CIT passed a revision
order u/s.263 in respect of the return of income processed u/s.143(1). Before
the Tribunal, the assessee contended that the processing u/s.143(1) is neither
an assessment nor an assessment order and the same cannot be subjected to
revision u/s.263 and the revision order made by the CIT may, therefore, be
declared as bad in law.

On account of difference of opinion between members of the
Bench, the matter was referred to the Third member u/s.255(4).

The Third Member held in favour of the assessee. The Third
Member noted as under :

(a) After an intimation u/s.143(1) is issued, the
Assessing Officer had full power to issue a notice u/s.143(2) and make a
regular assessment u/s.143(3). The Assessing Officer could also proceed
u/s.147/148, if applicable.

(b) There was no explanation as to why these provisions
were not applied in this case.

(c) Various High Courts in India are not unanimous
whether provisions of S. 263 are applicable where only intimation u/s.143(1)
has been issued, whether such intimation is an order or assessment to
attract provisions of S. 263. The Supreme Court, at an appropriate time,
will take up and settle the issue.

(d) It is clear from the record that two reasonable views
of the matter are possible. In such a situation, it has been laid down by
the Supreme Court in numerous cases that the view which is favoring the
assessee has to be taken.

Therefore, it was held that the intimation u/s.143(1)
cannot be sought to be revised u/s.263.

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S. 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Commercial right comes into existence whenever the assessee makes payment of non-compete fee and such non compete right is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation.

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 120 TTJ 983 (Chennai)


ACIT v. Real Image Tech. (P) Ltd.

ITA No. 201 (Mad.) of 2007

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 15-2-2008

S. 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Commercial right comes
into existence whenever the assessee makes payment of non-compete fee and such
non compete right is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation.

During the relevant assessment year, the non-compete fees
paid by the assessee in pursuance of non-compete agreements entered into by it
with certain companies was claimed as revenue expenditure and the claim was
disallowed by the Assessing Officer. Under an application to the Joint CIT
u/s.144A, the assessee made an alternate plea for treating such fees as
capital expenditure — it should be treated as an intangible asset u/s.32 and
depreciation be allowed accordingly. The Jt. CIT did not allow the same,
holding that the payment was capital in nature i.e. neither a revenue
expenditure nor a capital expenditure. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s
claim.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, allowed the assessee’s claim for depreciation :

(b) ACIT v. Radaan Media Works India Ltd., ITA No.
2241 (Mad.) of 2006 dated 14-12-2007

(c) Techno Shares & Stocks Ltd. v. ITO, (2006) 101
TTJ 349 (Mum.)

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) When a businessman pays money to another businessman
for restraining the other businessman from competing with the assessee, he
gets a vested right which can be enforced under law and without that the
other businessman can compete with the first businessman.

(2) When by payment of non-compete fee, the businessman
gets his right what he is practically getting is kind of monopoly to run his
business without bothering about the competition.

(3) Generally, non-compete fee is paid for a definite
period which in this case is five years. The idea is that by that time the
business would stand firmly on its own footing and can sustain later on.
This clearly shows that a commercial right comes into existence whenever the
assessee makes payment for non-compete fee.

(4) The term ‘or any other business or commercial rights
of similar nature’ has to be interpreted in such a way that it would have
some similarities as other assets mentioned in clause (b) of Expln. 3. The
other assets mentioned are know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks,
licences, franchises, etc. In all these cases no physical asset comes into
possession of the assessee. What comes in is only a right to carry on the
business smoothly and successfully and, therefore, even the right obtained
by way of non-compete fee would also be covered by the term ‘or any other
business or commercial rights of similar nature’ because after obtaining
non-compete right, the assessee can develop and run his business without
bothering about the competition. The right acquired by payment of
non-compete fee is definitely an intangible asset.

(5) This right (asset) will evaporate over a period of
time (of five years in this case) because after that the protection of
non-competition will not be available to the assessee. This right is subject
to wear and tear by the passage of time, in the sense that after the lapse
of a definite period of five years, this asset will not be available to the
assessee and, therefore, this asset must be held to be subject to
depreciation.

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S. 56(2)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Interest-free loan obtained by assessee from sister concerns for purchase of a flat from one of them cannot be said to be without consideration because while the assessee was benefited by interest-free loan, lende

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 121 TTJ 145 (Mumbai)


Chandrakant H. Shah v. ITO

ITA No. 3966 (Mum.) of 2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 12-1-2009

S. 56(2)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Interest-free
loan obtained by assessee from sister concerns for purchase of a flat from one
of them cannot be said to be without consideration because while the assessee
was benefited by interest-free loan, lenders were benefited by profit embedded
in the sale consideration, hence not exigible to tax u/s.56(2)(v).

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee took
interest-free loans of Rs.54.70 lacs from four builders (sister concerns) for
purchasing a flat from one of them. The assessee was also employed with one of
the concerns. The Assessing Officer formed an opinion that the assessee was
working with the group for several decades and, hence, having regard to the
said association, these parties gave such a huge loan to the assessee without
any security and interest as a mark of gratitude irrespective of his repayment
capacity and, therefore, in the absence of any obligation on the part of the
assessee to repay these loans, the entire transaction was of the nature of
gift which was given a colour of loan. Accordingly, he added a sum of Rs.54.45
lacs after giving a rebate of Rs.25,000 u/s.56(2)(v) to the total income of
the assessee.

The CIT(A) held that such loan transactions were abnormal
in the sense that there was no interest or any repayment stipulation, and
hence, the said sums were without consideration and upheld the addition.

The Tribunal, relying on various decisions, deleted the
addition.

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) All these loans have been shown in the balance sheet
submitted along with the return of income as loans and the lenders have also
confirmed the same as such. Thus, apparently, it is a case of loan
transactions and not a case of gift.

(2) Since some of the loans were repaid partly/fully, it
was a material fact so as to rebut the presumption of the Assessing Officer
that the assessee was not under any obligation to repay the loans and this
fact also proves the assessee’s claim that no opportunity was granted by the
Assessing Officer to the assessee before making such addition.

(3) This type of addition also leads to a situation of
having two provisions for charging one type of income i.e. the
legislature has provided two charging sections i.e. S. 68 and S. 56
(2)(v) which cannot be possible. In that case, the legislature would have
made the provisions of S. 56(2)(v) either of overriding nature by stating
that ‘notwithstanding anything contained in S. 68’ or by providing for
applicability of provisions of S. 56(2)(v) in any other manner, in case
provisions of S. 68 could not be invoked. When a specific provision exists
in law for a particular thing, then that thing is liable to be examined
thereunder only and if that item cannot be taxed under that provision, then
that thing cannot be charged to tax under other provisions of the Act.

(4) In the present case, it is not that provisions of S.
68 were not applicable at all and, hence, the Assessing Officer invoked the
provisions of S. 56(2)(v). On the contrary, the Assessing Officer has made
necessary enquiries in that regard and he has not made addition u/s.68 for
the reason that all the requirements of that section i.e. identity,
creditworthiness and genuineness of transactions have been proved. Hence, a
loan transaction has to be treated as a loan transaction only and it should
be examined in the light of provisions of S. 68 and not under provisions of
S. 56(2)(v) and for this reason alone, this addition is liable to be
deleted.

(5) It is important to note that in S. 56(2)(v), the term
‘consideration’ is neither prefixed by the word ‘adequate’ nor it is
suffixed by the words ‘money or money’s worth’. Hence, if in any transaction
there exists consideration as per the provisions of the Indian Contract Act,
1872 such transaction would not come into the ambit of this section.

(6) Consideration for a promise may consist of either
some benefit conferred on the promisor or detriment suffered by the promisee
or both. Hence, on this criteria, the assessee has gained by way of
interest-free loan and the lenders have suffered by giving interest-free
loans and such suffering has got some value and, therefore, the said
transaction cannot be said to be without consideration.

(7) There is another very important aspect of the matter,
i.e. lenders have sold the flat to the assessee. In that sale
consideration, they have earned profit because it is nobody’s case that the
flat to the assessee has been sold at cost. Therefore, lenders have also
derived some benefit which has got value and, therefore, the same forms
consideration for giving interest-free loans to the assessee. Other three
lenders are the sister concerns of the company who actually built or sold,
hence the benefit derived by such company is a good consideration for other
three lenders. Benefit conferred to a third party not connected with the
promissor or promise in a pecuniary capacity would also be a good
consideration to support the transaction. There can be consideration without
any apparent monetary consideration and the only requirement is that the
consideration should create a legal relationship between the contracting
parties and this fact is not in dispute in the present case. Hence, the
transaction is with consideration. The term ‘consideration’ in legal sense,
is somewhat different from what is generally understood and the Revenue’s
decision is based on general understanding and, therefore, the same is not
correct in law. The transaction meets all the requirements of general law
which is only to be looked into while invoking provisions of S. 56(2)(v)
and, therefore, it is a transaction having a consideration and, therefore,
the same does not fall within the ambit of the provisions of S. 56(2)(v) for
this reason also.

 

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S. 14A and S. 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (i) Interest on funds borrowed for acquisition of shares is to be taken into account towards the cost of acquisition for the purpose of computation of capital gains as prescribed u/s.48(ii)

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 120 TTJ 397 (Pune)


Balan alias Shanmugam Balkrishnan Chettiar v.
Dy. CIT

ITA No. 1859 (Pune) of 2005

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 31-1-2008

S. 14A and S. 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 :


(i) Interest on funds borrowed for acquisition of
shares is to be taken into account towards the cost of acquisition for the
purpose of computation of capital gains as prescribed u/s.48(ii)


(ii) Capital gain on the sale of shares being part of
the total income of the assessee and not an exempt income, S. 14A has no
application.



For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer and
the CIT(A) disallowed the assessee’s claim for inclusion of interest paid on
funds borrowed for investment in shares in the cost of acquisition for the
purpose of computing capital gains.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, held in favour of the assessee :

(a) CIT v. Mithilesh Kumari, (1973) 92 ITR 9
(Del.)

(b) Addl. CIT v. K. S. Gupta, (1979) 119 ITR 372
(AP)

(c) CIT v. Maithreyi Pai, (1984) 43 CTR 88 (Kar.)/
(1985) 152 ITR 247 (Kar.)

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) In the past, the assessee had always capitalised the
interest.

(2) S. 48 says that capital gain is to be computed by
deducting from the consideration the cost of acquisition of the asset and
the cost of any improvement thereto.

(3) Once it is established that the assessee had borrowed
the funds for acquisition of shares and the burden of interest had been
capitalised, that interest burden cannot be segregated from the amount of
investment.

In response to the argument of the Revenue that since
interest had a nexus to exempt income, the provisions of S. 14A should be
applied, the Tribunal noted as under :

(1) The words ‘in relation to income which does not form
part of the total income under this Act’ mean if an income does form part of
the total income, then the related expenditure is out of the ambit of the
applicability of S. 14A. The capital gain shown by the assessee had formed
part of the total income of the assessee. Otherwise also, capital gain is
not exempt income and without any ifs and buts, always being taxed in the
hands of a taxpayer. Therefore, the Revenue authorities have proceeded on a
wrong premise that the interest expenditure was in respect of an income
which was exempt or did not form part of the total income.

 

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S. 28(i) and S. 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Profit from sale of shares out of investment portfolio was taxable as capital gains and not as business income.

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 120 TTJ 216 (Luck.)


Sarnath Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 301 (Luck.) of 2006

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 20-12-2007

S. 28(i) and S. 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Profit
from sale of shares out of investment portfolio was taxable as capital gains
and not as business income.

The assessee-company was dealing in shares both as business
as well as investment and keeping separate accounts in respect of the two
portfolios. Valuation of holdings in investment portfolio was done at cost
only and holdings were reflected in Balance Sheet as investment. For the
relevant assessment year, the profit on sale of shares out of the investment
portfolio was treated by the Assessing Officer as business income and not as
long term capital gain. The CIT(A) upheld the addition.

The Tribunal held that the said profit was to be treated as
long term capital gain and not as business income. The Tribunal’s decision was
arrived at after examining various decisions.

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) The material on record showed that the assessee had
clear independent portfolios for investment in shares as well for trade and
it has kept separate accounts in respect of the two portfolios.

(2) The shares which were sold out of investment
portfolio during this year and on which capital gains have been offered by
the assessee were held by it for more than two years and in some cases for
more than three years.

(3) No material is brought on record by the Department to
show that demarcation line between business and investment is hazy or that
assessee has not maintained an investment portfolio and it was dealing in
shares only like a trader.

(4) Valuation of holdings has been done at cost for
investment portfolio. They were reflected in the Balance Sheet as
investment.

(5) The frequency of such purchase or sale in this
portfolio is not large enough to doubt that the investment portfolio is only
a device to pay lesser taxes by parking some stock-in-trade in the
investment portfolio.

(6) Turnover to stock ratio in investment portfolio is
very low as compared to that in trading portfolio. Further, there is no
material to show that these shares in the investment portfolio were also
traded in the same and like manner as those which were in stock-in trade
portfolio.

(7) All the sales out of the investment portfolio were
identifiable to purchases made in the same portfolio.

(8) In view of the above facts, the assessee had
discharged its primary onus by showing that it was maintaining separate
accounts for two portfolios and there was no intermingling. The onus then
shifted on the Revenue to show that apparent was not real. There was no
material brought in by the Revenue to show that separate accounts of two
portfolios were only a smoke screen and there was no real distinction
between the two types of holdings. This could have been done by showing that
there was intermingling of shares and transactions and the distinction
sought to be created between two types of portfolios was not real but only
artificial and arbitrary.

Therefore, in absence of any material to the contrary and
on appreciation of cumulative effect of several factors present, it was held
that the surplus was chargeable to capital gains only and the assessee was not
to be treated as trader in respect of sales and purchases of shares in the
investment port-folio.

 

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 194A — Whether a chit fund agreement is not a money lending contract but a special type of contract — Held, Yes. Whether in a scheme of chit fund there is neither any money borrowed nor any debt incurred, the dividends paid by th

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New Page 1

  1. 2009 TIOL 328 ITAT (Bang.)


ITO v. Margasoochi Chits Pvt. Ltd.

ITA No. 995/Bang./2008

A.Y. : 2005-2006. Dated : 16-1-2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 194A — Whether a chit fund
agreement is not a money lending contract but a special type of contract —
Held, Yes. Whether in a scheme of chit fund there is neither any money
borrowed nor any debt incurred, the dividends paid by the foreman to the
subscribers of the chit cannot be said to be answering the definition of
interest — Held, Yes.

Facts :

In these cases the AO relying on the instructions issued by
CBDT held that the dividend payments made to the subscribers of chit fund were
in the nature of interest and were liable for deduction of tax at source
u/s.194A. Since the assessees had not deducted tax u/s.194A, the AO passed
orders u/s.201(1) and u/s.201(1A) in respect of five assessees for the
impugned assessment years by creating demand on the dividends paid but not
subjected to tax deduction at source. Since identical orders were passed in
all the fifteen appeals they were taken up together by the Tribunal.

The CIT(A) held that a chit agreement is not a money
lending contract, but a special type of contract and any payment with
reference to a chit agreement being referred to as interest payment does not
arise and installments in chit fund being non-refundable in nature cannot be
equated with ‘deposit’ and consequently, the dividend or discount credited to
the account of the subscribers would not constitute interest. He also held
that the CBDT circulars are not binding on the appellate authorities.

Aggrieved by the orders of CIT(A), Revenue preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the scheme of Chit Funds is
regulated by The Chit Funds Act, 1982 and S. 3 in Chapter I of the Chit Funds
Act provides that the provisions of the Act override all other laws,
memoranda, articles, etc. save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act. In
view of the non obstante clause the Tribunal held that the definitions of the
expression ‘discounts’, ‘dividends’, ‘prize amount’ as given in the said Chit
Funds Act will prevail over similar definition as found in the Income-tax Act.
The Tribunal held that in a scheme of chit fund there is neither any money
borrowed nor a debt incurred and since interest is defined in the Income-tax
Act as interest payable in any manner in respect of any monies borrowed or
debt incurred (including deposit) and in a chit fund there is neither any
money borrowed nor a debt incurred, the dividends paid by the foreman to the
subscribers of the chit cannot be said to be answering the definition of
interest. The Tribunal held that the demands created u/s.201(1) and
u/s.201(1A) were not justified. It upheld the order of the CIT(A) and
dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue.

 

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 40(a)(ia) and S. 194C — Whether an agreement entered into by the assessee with distributors whereby revenue was shared was a works contract and therefore liable to TDS u/s.194C — Held, No.

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New Page 1

  1. 2009 TIOL 273 ITAT (Del.)


Competent Films Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO

ITA No. 3397/Del./2008

A.Y. : 2005-2006. Dated : 9-2-2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 40(a)(ia) and S. 194C — Whether
an agreement entered into by the assessee with distributors whereby revenue
was shared was a works contract and therefore liable to TDS u/s.194C — Held,
No.

Facts :

The assessee company was engaged in the business of running
of cinema hall, canteen and food courts. It had entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with M/s. Mukta Movies Distributors (Distributors) which
inter alia provided that — the assessee was to be a booking agent for
the cinema hall for three years; the assessee had exclusive rights to book
Hindi films for the said cinema and to run a certain number of shows daily as
per the local laws; the MOU also fixed the rate of admission to the cinema
hall; stated revenue at full capacity and the amount due to the assessee on a
weekly basis subject to the exceptions provided in the MOU.

The distributor raised a bill on the assessee under which
the daily collections were shown and after reducing the payment to be made to
the assessee for the cinema hall hired, a bill was raised for the balance by
the Distributor which bills were paid by the assessee. The Assessing Officer
(AO) held that the MOU was in the nature of a works contract and held the
assessee liable to deduct tax at source u/s.194C. Since the assessee had not
deducted tax on payments made to distributor pursuant to the said MOU, the AO
disallowed a sum of Rs.72,43,965 by invoking provisions of S. 40(a)(ia).

The CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO. Aggrieved, assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal upon a close reading of the agreement held it
to be a profit sharing agreement. It further held that the agreement was not
for services rendered but for sharing the profits with the assessee. Following
the ratio of the decisions of Ahmedabad Bench of ITAT in Sunsel
Drive-in-Cinema (P.) Ltd. v. ITO,
(2006) 5 SOT 64 (Ahd.) and Mumbai Bench
of ITAT in ITO v. Shrinagar Cinemas (P.) Ltd., (2008) 20 SOT 480 (Mum.)
it held that there was no works contract and, therefore, the assessee was not
liable to deduct any tax u/s.194C of the Act. The Tribunal found that the
distributor has only given the right to exhibit the films and the assessee had
only rendered the services of exhibiting the films and therefore the question
of deduction of tax by the assessee did not arise. The claim of the assessee
was allowed.

 

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 158BFA — Whether for levy of penalty u/s.158BFA issuance of notice is mandatory — Held, Yes. Whether in the absence of issuance of pre-requisite notice, the entire penalty proceedings are to be held as illegal and without jurisdi

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New Page 1

  1. 2009 TIOL 300 ITAT Bang.


ITO v. H. E. Distillery Pvt. Ltd.

IT(SS)A No. 28 (Bang.)/2008

Block Period : 1-4-1990 to 18-1-2001 Dated : 30-1-2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 158BFA — Whether for levy of
penalty u/s.158BFA issuance of notice is mandatory — Held, Yes. Whether in the
absence of issuance of pre-requisite notice, the entire penalty proceedings
are to be held as illegal and without jurisdiction — Held, Yes.

Facts :

The assessee, in response to notice u/s158BC, filed return
for block period on 13-8-2001 admitting undisclosed income of Rs.73,80,526.
The AO assessed the undisclosed income at Rs.2,42,47,658 and initiated
proceedings for levy of penalty u/s.158BFA(2) on the ground that the assessee
failed to disclose the income and furnished inaccurate particulars of income.
Against the order assessing undisclosed income the assessee filed an appeal on
the ground that business loss suffered by the assessee during the block period
and depreciation have to be set off against undisclosed income. The CIT(A) and
the Tribunal decided the appeal against the assessee.

The assessee vide letter dated 15-12-2005 was asked to
offer explanation to the proposed penalty. No reply was received from the
assessee. The AO levied a minimum penalty of Rs.1,18,40,726.

The assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A) and challenged
levy of penalty on the ground that no notice for initiation of penalty was
issued. The CIT(A) cancelled the penalty.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where on behalf of the Revenue it was inter alia contended that the assessment
order did mention that penalty proceedings u/s.158BFA(2) are initiated; the
assessee attended the proceedings for levy of penalty; during the penalty
proceedings when the AO was transferred the new AO did issue a notice before
imposing penalty. It was submitted that CIT(A) took a rigid and narrow view
that physical service of notice was a must before imposition of penalty for
concealment. The intention of the AO to levy penalty was never in doubt.

Held :

The Tribunal relying on the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of 82 ITR 821, 61 ITR 147, 76 ITR 696, 168 ITR 705 and also on the
decision of the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in IT(SS)A. No.
21/Bang./2001 in the case of Nemichand held that issuance of notice is a
pre-requisite for assuming jurisdiction to levy penalty u/s.158BFA(2) and in
the absence of issuance of a pre-requisite notice, the entire penalty
proceedings were held to be illegal and without jurisdiction. It held that
CIT(A) was perfectly justified in canceling the penalty. The Tribunal
confirmed the order of CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.

 

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 36(1)(v), S. 40A(7) and S. 263 — Whether it is necessary for CIT to make further inquiries before cancelling the assessment order of the AO — Held, No. Whether the CIT can regard an order as erroneous on the ground that the AO sh

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New Page 1

  1. 2009 TIOL 317 ITAT (Mad.) SB


Rajalakshmi Mills Ltd.
v. ITO

ITA No. 1074/Mds./1987

A.Y. : 1981-82. Dated : 24-4-2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 36(1)(v), S. 40A(7) and S. 263 —
Whether it is necessary for CIT to make further inquiries before cancelling
the assessment order of the AO — Held, No. Whether the CIT can regard an order
as erroneous on the ground that the AO should have made further inquiries
before accepting the statements made by the assessee in his return — Held,
Yes. Whether the word ‘erroneous’ in S. 263 includes cases where there has
been failure to make the necessary inquiries — Held, Yes. Whether it is
incumbent on the AO to investigate the facts stated in the return when
circumstances would make such an inquiry prudent and the word ‘erroneous’ in
S. 263 includes cases where there has been failure to make such an enquiry —
Held, Yes. Whether it is correct to say that the provision made by the
assessee in the accounts for the purposes of making contributions to approved
gratuity fund should be allowed despite the fact that there was no incremental
liability towards the gratuity due for the assessment year under consideration
— Held, No.

Facts :

For the A.Y. 1981-82 the balance sheet of the assessee
company reflected provision for gratuity at Rs.7,85,600 which sum was claimed
by the assessee, in its return of income, u/s.36(1)(v). The AO allowed the
same without making any discussion in the assessment order. The Commissioner
of Income-tax (CIT) assumed jurisdiction u/s.263 as in his opinion the order
was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

The CIT found that the approved (sic actuarial) gratuity
liability as on 31-3-1981 and 31-3-1980 was Rs.55,35,469 and Rs.51,974,80
respectively. Hence, the amount payable as contribution to the fund was
Rs.3,37,989. The AO had allowed Rs.7,85,600. Accordingly, the CIT by relying
on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shree Sajjan Mills Ltd. (156
ITR 585) directed the AO to withdraw the excess allowance of Rs.4,47,611.

In an appeal to the Tribunal the assessee contended that
the conditions precedent for invoking S. 263 have not been satisfied and also
that it is entitled to claim deduction of Rs.7,85,600 being provision for
gratuity actually paid to an approved gratuity fund.

The President of the ITAT constituted a Special Bench to
consider the following questions :

(1) Whether the CIT was correct in invoking the
provisions of S. 263 and in withdrawing the claim of deduction of
Rs.7,85,600, allowed by the AO, being the amount actually paid to an
approved gratuity fund and in allowing incremental actuarial liability
worked out at Rs.3,37,989 ?

(2) Whether the assessee was entitled to claim deduction
of Rs.7,85,600 being the provision of gratuity in terms of S. 36(1)(v) of
the Act, actually paid to an approved gratuity fund on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case ?

(3) Whether the Appellate Tribunal’s order dated
21-6-1990 in ITA No. 529(Mds.)/87 rendered in the assessee’s own case for
A.Y. 1982-83 could be said to be an order rendered per incuriam and not
binding in view of non-consideration of correct legal position in this
regard ?


Held :

The Special Bench (SB) found that the AO had not made any
inquiries regarding the allowability of the sum of Rs.7,85,600 claimed by the
assessee as provision for gratuity actually paid to an approved gratuity fund.
The SB after considering the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of Rampyari Devi Saraogi v. CIT, (67 ITR 84) (SC) held as under :

“It is not necessary for the CIT to make further
enquiries before cancelling the assessment orders of the AO. The CIT can
regard the order as erroneous on the ground that in the circumstances of the
case the AO should have made further inquiries before accepting the
statements made by the assessee in his return. The reason is obvious. Unlike
a Civil Court which is neutral in giving a decision on the basis of evidence
produced before it, an AO is not only an adjudicator but also an
investigator. He cannot remain passive in the face of a return which is
apparently in order but calls for further enquiry. It is the duty of the AO
to ascertain the truth of the facts stated in the return when the
circumstances of the case are such as to provoke inquiry. The meaning to be
given to the word ‘erroneous’ emerges out of this context. The word
erroneous would include cases where there has been failure to make the
necessary inquiries. It is incumbent on the AO to investigate the facts
stated in the return when the circumstances would make such an inquiry
prudent and the word ‘erroneous’ in S. 263 includes the failure to make such
an enquiry. The order becomes erroneous because such an enquiry has not been
made and not because there is anything wrong with the order if all the facts
stated therein are assumed to be correct.”

Accordingly, it held that the order passed by AO was
erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue and that the
conditions precedent for exercising jurisdiction u/s.263 did exist in the
facts of the present case.

As regards the contention of the assessee that since the
provision was made by the assessee for the purpose of payment of a sum by way
of contribution towards the approved gratuity fund, the amount of provision
should be allowed within the meaning of S. 40A(7)(b), the SB following the
ratio of the decision of Madras High Court in CIT v. Loyal Textile Ltd.,
(231 ITR 573) held that it would be incorrect to say that provision made by
the assessee in the accounts for the purposes of making contributions to
approved gratuity fund should be allowed u/s.40A(7)(b)(i) despite the fact
that there was no incremental liability towards the gratuity due for the
assessment year under consideration. It held that an expenditure which is
deductible for income-tax purposes is towards a liability actually existing at
the time, but setting apart money which might become expenditure on the
happening of an event is not expenditure allowable under the law. Since the
assessee did not place anything to demonstrate the nature of liability nor was
there any material to come to a conclusion that the liability was an
ascertained liability the contention of the assessee was rejected.

No contract between assessee transporter and agents/suppliers who enabled the assessee to get the truck hired, but with truck owners and drivers — Deduction of tax u/s.194C not applicable

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38 Assessee engaged in Transportation of
goods — No contract between assessee and the agents/suppliers who enabled the
assessee get the truck hired, but with the truck owners and drivers — Deduction
of tax u/s.194C — Held, Not applicable.


 

Facts :

The assessee company is engaged in the business of
transportation of goods for various clients all over India on a contract basis.
The AO, subsequent to survey action u/s.133A, concluded that the appellant had
not deducted taxes properly on payments made to truck owners or agents in
accordance with the provisions of S. 194C. The assessee had made total payments
of Rs.17,08,39,119 to various parties whose trucks were engaged. The AO
estimated an ad hoc 90% of the total payment as payment exceeding
Rs.20,000 and computed tax liability thereon @ 1% + 2% surcharge. Further, he
also levied interest u/s.201(1A). The CIT(A) deleted the demand raised by the
AO, stating that the provisions of S. 194C were not applicable.

 

On appeal to the Tribunal, it was held that :

1. From various correspondences and confirmations, it is
clear that the suppliers/agents were contacted for reference purposes only and
the negotiations for a particular destination were made with the truck
drivers/owners and not with the suppliers/agents.

2. Further, no contracts were entered into between the
assessee and agent/supplier, but were entered into with the truck
owners/drivers. In addition, no payments exceeding Rs.20,000 were made to
truck owners/drivers and where the payment so exceeded, tax has been
appropriately deducted at source and deposited into the treasury.

3. Further, Circular 715 issued by the CBDT was squarely
applicable to the facts and thus, it was clear that if the contracts are with
the truck owners/drivers and GR is separate, then the payment made for the
truck has to be a separate payment. Consequently, it cannot be said that there
was contract with the suppliers and not with the truck owners/drivers. Hence,
the CIT(A) was held right in stating that the provisions of S. 194C were not
applicable.

 


Case referred to :


City Transport Corporation v. ITO, [(2007) 13 SOT 479 (Mum.)]

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Concept of ‘Real Income’ — Assessee-company did not recognise interest income on debentures due to financial difficulties of issues — No interest income accrued to the assessee.

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37 (2008) 300 ITR (AT) 159 (Delhi)


Pranav Vikas (India) Ltd. v.
ACIT

ITA No. 3322/Del./2004 (A.Y. 2001-02)

A.Y. 2001-02. Dated : 27-7-2007

Concept of ‘Real Income’ — Investment in debentures —
Assessee-company decided not to recognise interest income on debentures due to
financial difficulties of M/s. PAL Enterprise (P) Ltd. — Held that, No interest
income accrued to the assessee.

 

Facts :


The assessee-company had received interest free advance of
Rs.20 lakhs from M/s. Premier Automobiles Ltd. (PAL) for development of certain
products and since the said project was being delayed considerably, M/s. PAL
required the assessee to invest the said amount in their other group company
i.e.,
M/s. PAL Enterprise (P) Ltd. (PALEL) by way of 13% unsecured
optionally convertible debentures. For the F.Y. 2000-01, the assessee company
did not recognise the revenue arising out of interest on debenture, because both
M/s. PAL as well as M/s. PALEL became sick and there was no possibility of
recovery of any interest on the debenture. The AO made an addition of
Rs.2,40,000 disregarding AS-9 issued by ICAI, which was mandatory u/s.211(3C) of
the Companies Act, 1956 for the assessee company and the minutes of the BOD
acknowledging the uncertainty of collection of the said interest and the same
was also confirmed by the CIT(A).

 

On appeal to the Tribunal, it was held that :

1. The request of M/s. PALEL to treat the investment made
by the assessee-company as interest-free was accepted by it insofar as the
year under consideration is concerned and the right to receive interest income
on the said debentures, thus, was waived by it with prospective effect. The
decision to take the ‘appropriate measures’ as discussed in the meeting of the
BOD is to be understood to be restricted to the recovery of principal amount
and the interest accrued thereon for the earlier years.

2. Further, even if a decision of waiver is taken after the
F.Y., but within a reasonable proximity such that it results into a formal
resolution, it cannot be said that the said decision is inapplicable to the
relevant F.Y.

3. In the instant case, as the right to receive interest
income on the said debentures was waived by the assessee company for the year
under consideration, there was no real income that can be bought to tax in the
hands of the assessee company on accrual basis. Hence, the impugned order of
the CIT(A) was set aside deleting the addition of Rs.2,40,000.

 


Cases referred to :



(i) CCE v. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd., [(1995) 156 CTR
172];

(ii) Ashokbhai Chimanbhai [(1956) 56 ITR 42];

(iii) CIT v. Shoorji Vallabhdas and Co., [(1962) 46
ITR 144];

(iv) State Bank of Travancore v. CIT, [(1986) 158
ITR 102] and others.

 

(2008) 300 ITR (AT) 193 (Mumbai)

ITO v. Bhoruka Roadlines Ltd.

A.Y. 2002–03. Dated : 27-6-2007

S. 194C, S. 201 and S. 201(1A)


levitra

Sum received under non-compete agreement — Capital receipt.

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36 (2008) 300 ITR (AT) 113 (Delhi) (SB)


Saurabh Srivastava v. DCIT

ITA No. 3014 (Delhi) 2004

A.Y. 1998-99. Dated : 7-12-2007

S. 17(2)(v); S. 17(3)(i) and S. 28(ii)

Sum received under non-compete agreement — Held, that it is
capital receipt.

 


Facts :

The assessee, a computer engineer associated with software
and information technology, was the promoter, founder and the managing director
of a software company holding 866,450 shares therein. The company was taken over
by a U.K. group whereby 76% of the subscribed equity capital was agreed to be
transferred in favour of the U.K. company. In addition to share transfer
agreement, the U.K. group also entered into a non-compete agreement with the
assessee, whereby the assessee received a sum of Rs.1,07,36,570 as non-compete
fee for F.Y. 1997-98. Thereafter, under a new service agreement, the assessee
was employed as the managing director of the U.K. company and received salary
accordingly. The assessee claimed exemption of non-compete fees as being a
capital receipt.

 

The AO taxed the non-compete fee as revenue receipt
u/s.28(ii). The CIT(A) upheld the order of AO.

 

On appeal to ITAT, the Hon’ble Tribunal held that the said
non-compete fee is a capital receipt, not liable to tax and referred to the
following :

1. The non-compete agreement was independent, distinct and
separate from the service agreement.

2. It was not dependent on his continuing in employment
with the company.

3. It did not arise from employer-employee relationship.

4. The fee was received for accepting restrictive
covenants, as the assessee was restrained from carrying out any software
development activity for any other person who directly or indirectly competed
with the U.K. group.

5. Thus, the same was not taxable u/s.17.1

6. The assessee was not carrying on any business and the
non-compete fee did not arise in the course of business and hence was not
taxable as business income.

7. The same was also not liable to tax as capital gains or
as income from other sources.

 


Cases referred to :




(i) CIT v. Saroj Kumar Poddar, [(2005) 279 ITR 573
(Cal.)];

(ii) CIT v. A. S. Wardekar, [(2006) 283 ITR 432
(Cal.)];

(iii) Swamy (R.K.) v. Asst. CIT, [(2004) 88 ITD 185
(Chennai)] and others.

 

1 Clause (iii) of Ss.(3) of S. 17 was inserted w.e.f. the
Finance Act, 2001 and not with retrospective effect and hence was not
applicable for A.Y. 1998-99. However, the said amount, if received subsequent
to the introduction of the said sub-section may stand on a different footing
as compared to that, in the case discussed.


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S. 234B read with S. 208 & S. 209 : Assessee having only salary income not liable to pay advance tax.

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35 (2008) 21 SOT 549 (Delhi)


Asst. Director of Income-tax, International Taxation
v.
Western Geco International Ltd.

ITA Nos. 4847 to 4941 (Delhi) of 2007

A.Y. 2006-07. Dated : 21-2-2008

S. 234B read with S. 208 and S. 209 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 — There is no question of payment of advance tax by an employee whose total
income comprises of salary from which tax at source is to be deducted as per
statutory provisions and, hence, there is no question of applying provisions of
S. 234B to such a person who is not liable to pay advance tax.

 

Company ‘G’ was agent of many foreign nationals. It paid
salary to different non-resident assessees and filed returns on their behalf.
The assessees/employees only had salary income, which was subjected to deduction
of tax at source. They claimed deduction u/s.10(10CC) on account of tax paid by
the employer on their salary as per agreement. The Assessing Officer refused to
allow the said deduction and added tax paid on income through multiple grossing
instead of single grossing. This led to additional liability and demand
representing the difference between the assessed tax and tax deducted at source
leading to levy of interest u/s.234B for non-payment of advance tax. On appeal,
the CIT(A) held that the Assessing Officer was not right in levying interest
u/s.234B upon the assessees and, accordingly, deleted the same.

 

The Tribunal, following the decision in the case of
Motorola Inc. v. Dy. CIT,
(2005) 95 ITD 269 (Delhi) (SB) held that the
assessees were not liable to pay advance tax, and consequently, were also not
liable to pay any interest u/s.234B. The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) Clause (d) of S. 209(1) clearly provides that while
computing advance tax, the amount of income-tax which is deductible or
collectible at source, will be deducted from the advance tax payable. In other
words, advance tax payable will be reduced by the amount of tax at source
‘deductible or collectible’.

(2) Therefore, when tax is deductible or collectible at
source from salary, which is the only source of income, no advance tax would
be payable by such an employee.

(3) In the instant case, there was no dispute that total
income of the assessee was subjected to deduction of tax at source u/s.192.
The assessee had no amount of advance tax payable if tax at source deductible
from the assessee’s salary was taken into account.

(4) Advance tax is payable in the financial year on the
current income. It cannot be paid after the close of the year. However, a
salaried person, whose salary is subject to deduction of tax at source, cannot
come to know of any short recovery or no recovery of tax at source till the
close of the financial year in which tax is deductible. If the employer has
not correctly deducted tax at source from the salary in one month u/s.192, the
deficiency can be made good U/ss.(3) of S. 192. Therefore, the employer can
always make good the deficiency in deduction of tax at source within the
financial year. If in one month there is short deduction of tax at source, the
employer can make higher deduction in other months in the financial year and
make good the short deduction.

(5) Therefore, a salaried employee would not know that
there had been short, wrong or no deduction of tax at source unless the
financial year is over. By the time he would come to know about short recovery
or no recovery of tax at source in his case, the time for payment of advance
tax would be over. In case of short recovery the employer is liable to pay
interest and penalty and not the employee. That is the scheme of the Act.

(6) Therefore, there is no question of payment of advance
tax by an employee whose total income comprises of salary from which tax at
source is to be deducted as per statutory provisions. Further, there is no
question of applying provisions of S. 234B to such a person who is not liable
to pay advance tax.



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S. 115JB : Capital receipts which do not constitute income, cannot be brought to tax by S. 115JB.

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34 (2008) 21 SOT 79 (Mum.)


ITO v. Su-raj Jewellery (India) Ltd.

ITA Nos. 8800 and 8801 (Mum.) of 2004

A.Ys. 1997-98 and 2001-02.

Dated : 10-10-2007

S. 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital receipts which
do not constitute income under the Act cannot be brought to tax by employing
mechanism of S. 115JB.

 

For A.Y. 2001-02, the assessee credited certain capital
receipts to its profit & loss appropriation account and claimed that such
capital receipts did not form part of its book profits for the purpose of MAT
profit u/s.115J since they were not liable to tax. The Assessing Officer
rejected the claim of the assessee and included these sums in book profits for
the purpose of calculating MAT. The CIT(A), however, upheld the assessee’s
claim.

 

The Tribunal also allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal
noted as under :

(1) The intention of bringing S. 115JB on the statute was
that companies should be made to pay taxes on the basis of the net profits
shown in their profit and loss account. For the purpose of computing the MAT
profit u/s.115JB, business profits as declared in the profit and loss account
are to be considered by the Assessing Officer after making certain
adjustments.

(2) In this case, the assessee was not liable to pay any
tax on the capital receipt i.e., gain arising on transfer of its assets
to holding company. Such profit was exempt from tax u/s.47(v).

(3) Although for computing the MAT profit u/s.115JB,
business profits shown in the profit and loss account are to be adopted, in
case the said profits include certain receipts which are not in the nature of
income, the same are to be excluded before making any calculations in that
regard.

(4) Further, S. 349 of the Companies Act clearly provides
that credit for the profit arising on sale of any immovable property or fixed
assets of capital nature should not be taken into profit and loss account and,
accordingly, the profits/ gains arising on transfer of assets to the holding
company were not includible in the profits of the assessee-company.

(5) The CIT(A) had rightly held that capital receipts which
do not constitute income under the Act cannot be brought under the tax net by
employing the mechanism of S. 115JB and the said Section has not intended to
bring all non-income items within the domain of the Act.


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S. 14A : Interest paid on funds invested in shares which yielded no dividend income cannot be disallowed.

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33 (2008) 21 SOT 42 (Mum.) (SMC)


Shree Shyamkamal Finance & Leasing Co. (P) Ltd. v.
ITO

ITA No. 15 (Mum.) of 2006

A.Y. 2002-03. Dated : 15-10-2007

S. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Interest paid on funds
invested in shares which have yielded no dividend income cannot be disallowed
u/s.14A.

 

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee-company
which was engaged in the business of finance and investment in equity shares,
acquired unquoted equity shares of its subsidiary company out of unsecured loan
taken. The interest paid on the loan was claimed as deductible expenditure. The
Assessing Officer required the assessee to explain as to when there was no
income from investment and if any income accrued at all as dividend which was
exempt from tax u/s.10(33), then why should not the disallowance of interest on
loan be made u/s.14A. The assessee’s contention that since it had not received
any dividend and, further, since it had not claimed any exemption of income, S.
14A could not be applied was not accepted by the Assessing Officer and he
disallowed the interest expense u/s.14A. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.

 

The Tribunal, relying on the decision in the case of Jt.
CIT v. Holland Equipment Co. B. V.,
(2005) 3 SOT 810, held that no
disallowance could be made u/s.14A.

 

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) By virtue of S. 10(33), as it stood at relevant time,
dividend income referred to in S. 115-O does not form part of the total
income. If the assessee earned income which is not includible in the total
income, then the expenditure could be disallowed u/s.14A, because it speaks of
expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income which does not form
part of the total income.

(2) A reading of S. 14A makes it clear that while computing
the income under Chapter IV, deduction would not be allowed with regard to
expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to an income which does not
form part of the total income under the Act.

(3) In the instant case, there was no dividend income
earned by the assessee. Therefore, there was no income which could be termed
as ‘income which does not form part of the total income under the Act’.
Therefore, the provisions of S. 14A were not applicable.



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S. 28(iv) : Gift received by assessee in return for helping the donor on various occasions was not income

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32 (2007) 18 SOT 362 (Delhi)


ITO v. Sunil Mittal

ITA No. 4350 (Delhi) of 2004

A.Y. 2001-02. Dated : 28-9-2007

S. 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Gift received in
return for help rendered to a person on various occasions is not income within
the meaning of S. 28(iv).

 

During the year, the assessee received a gift of Rs.6 lacs
from a person whom he had helped on various occasions. The donor confirmed the
gift and the reason for giving the gift. The Assessing Officer, however, held
that gift was received during the course of the assessee’s business and,
accordingly, treated the same as income u/s.28(iv). The CIT(A) treated the gift
as genuine and deleted the addition made by the Assessing Officer.

 

The Tribunal held that the gift received by the assessee was
not income u/s.28(iv). The Tribunal observed as under :

(1) It was an accepted fact that the addition was not made
u/s.68 as unexplained cash credit. It was also accepted that the identity and
creditworthiness of the party were established and the transaction was
genuine.

(2) As per S. 28(iv), the value of any benefit or
perquisite, whether convertible into money or not, arising from the business
or the exercise of a profession, shall be treated as income chargeable to
income-tax under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’.

(3) The amount was received by cheque and was not in any
intangible form in the nature of benefit or perquisite. The amount was not
received in kind. Thus, it could not be treated as benefit or perquisite.

(4) The assessee helped the donor on various occasions.
Thus, it was not in the course of carrying on the assessee’s business that any
benefit or perquisite was received.

 


Therefore, the gift amount was outside the scope of income in
terms of S. 28(iv).

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S. 43(5) r.w. S. 28 and S. 73 — In case of a company, if part of its business consists of dealing in shares, then all types of transactions, whether delivery-based or non-delivery-based, would be treated as speculative transactions.

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41. (2009) 33 SOT 168 (Mum.)


Metropolitan Traders (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 30-6-2009

S. 43(5) r.w. S. 28 and S. 73 — In case of a company, if
part of its business consists of dealing in shares, then all types of
transactions, whether delivery-based or non-delivery-based, would be treated
as speculative transactions.

The assessee-company was dealing in cement and was also
engaged in the business of dealing in shares. During the relevant year, the
assessee had earned profit from sale of shares held as investments and
accounted for the same in the profit and loss account as speculation profit
and it set off the unabsorbed speculation loss brought forward from earlier
years from the aforesaid speculation profit and claimed allowance for the
same. The Assessing Officer referred to the definition of ‘speculation
transaction’ as contained on S. 43(5) and disallowed the assessee’s claim. The
CIT(A) confirmed the action of the Assessing Officer. He held, inter alia,
that as per the CBDT Circular No. 204 dated 24-7-1976, the object of the
provisions was to curb the device being resorted to by some business people to
manipulate and reduce the taxable income by booking speculative losses.

Relying on the decisions in the following cases, the
Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim :

(a) Prasad Agents (P.) Ltd. v. ITO, (2009) 180
Taxman 178 (Bom.)

(b) Samba Trading & Investment (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT,
(1996) 58 ITD 360 (Bom.)

(c) ACIT v. Sucham Finance & Investment (I) Ltd.,
(2007) 105 ITD 353 (Mum.)

(d) Starline Ispat & Alloys v. Dy. CIT, (2007) 14
SOT 140 (Mum.)

(e) Jt. CIT v. Kalindi Holdings (P.) Ltd., (2007)
106 TTJ (Pune) 292

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) Explanation to S. 73 states that if certain
conditions are fulfilled, then the transactions of purchase and sale of
shares would be treated as speculation transactions.

(2) The Legislature itself has used the phrase ‘purchase
and sale of shares’ in the Explanation without any qualification in
contradistinction to the term used in S. 43(5) where it is specifically
stated that the transactions are settled otherwise than by way of actual
delivery. Thus, the term ‘purchase and sale’ has to be given full effect and
its meaning cannot be restricted only with reference to such transaction
where delivery of shares has not been taken.

(3) The Revenue’s contention that only delivery-based
transactions as contemplated u/s.43(5) were to be considered as speculative
transaction was devoid of any merit, because then there was no necessity of
incorporating the Explanation to S. 73. The Explanation to S. 73 enlarges
the ambit of speculative transaction in case of such company where part of
its business is to deal in shares.

Provisions of clause (d) of S. 43(5) inserted with effect from 1-4-2006 which deem derivative transactions as non-speculative are clarificatory in nature and have retrospective application.

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  1. (2009) 33 SOT 1 (Mum.)


ACIT v.
Shreegopal Purohit

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 30-6-2009

S. 43(5) — Derivative transactions — Whether speculative :




(a) Provisions of clause (d) of S. 43(5) inserted with
effect from 1-4-2006 which deem derivative transactions as non-speculative
are clarificatory in nature and have retrospective application.


(b) Therefore, income from F & O transactions, being
non-speculative in nature, cannot be set off against speculation loss.



The assessee had earned income from Future and Option (F &
O) transactions. It suffered share trading speculation loss, jobbing loss and
bought forward speculation loss in the relevant assessment year. It had set
off the speculation loss of the current year as well as brought forward
speculation loss against the income from F & O transactions, treating the
latter as speculative income. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The
CIT(A) set aside the order of the Assessing Officer and allowed the claim of
the assessee.

The Tribunal, following the decision in the case of P.
S. Kapur v. ACIT,
(2009) 29 SOT 587 (JP), disallowed the assessee’s claim.
The Tribunal, noted as under :

(1) Derivative products are intangible and are not
capable of delivery or transfer. The transactions in derivatives are, thus,
not speculative as these lack the basic ingredients of speculative
transactions.

(2) Clause (d) of proviso of S. 43(5) inserted by the
Finance Act, 2005 deeming the transaction in derivatives as non-speculative
was clarificatory in nature, as it only clarified the existing position.
Therefore, it has retrospective application. Thus, transactions in
derivatives were held to be non-speculative and the income from such
transaction could not be set off against the speculation loss.

 



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S 45. Beneficial ownership of the balance FSI and right to use TDR was that of the members of the society. The members transferred the rights and received consideration for such transfer.

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Part B :
Unreported Decisions




ITO v. Ashok Hindu Co-op Hsg. Soc. Ltd.

ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai

Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and

R. K. Panda (AM)

ITA No. 630/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 29-9-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee :

K. K. Mahajan/Satish Modi

10. S 45. Beneficial ownership of the balance FSI and right
to use TDR was that of the members of the society. The members transferred the
rights and received consideration for such transfer.

Per N. V. Vasudevan :

Facts :

The assessee-society was the owner of land together with two
buildings situated thereon. The society had sixteen members who held, on
ownership basis, sixteen flats in the said buildings. It was possible to
construct additional flats on the existing buildings by utilising balance FSI of
the property and FSI that may be obtained from other properties under the TDR
scheme. The total area of the property was 1063.60 sq. mts., it was possible to
construct 11,448 sq. feet on the said property by procuring TDR FSI.

The society, at its Special General Body Meeting held on 15th
July, 2001 passed a resolution to the effect that the benefit of constructing
additional flats by utilising any FSI available on the said property and by
bringing in TDR/FSI belongs to the members equally. Each member thus became
entitled to 715.50 sq. feet by way of TDR/FSI. The society agreed that each
member would be entitled at their own costs to procure proportionate TDR/FSI and
to use his/her respective entitlement for constructing a new flat for himself or
each member may grant development rights to a common developer.

The developer vide agreement dated 29-8-2001 agreed to pay to
the society an amount of Rs.1,76,000 as well as carry out works of repairs and
improvements to the existing buildings and compound of the society in
consideration of the society permitting the developer to construct additional
floors from the entitlement of each of the members of the society.

The developers agreed to pay each of the members a lump sum
of Rs.7,00,000 as compensation for inconveniences and hardships faced or to be
faced by the members during and on account of additional construction. Further,
in consideration of the member granting development rights in respect of his/her
entitlement to the developers, the developers agreed to pay the member a lump
sum monetary consideration of Rs.7,20,000.

In the course of assessment proceedings u/s.147, the assessee
took the stand that by virtue of a resolution passed by the Managing Committee
of the society, the society has specifically authorised each of the members to
sell and transfer their proportionate rights in the FSI and development of the
building with the consent of the society, which means the society has renounced
its rights in favour of individual members and on the basis of this resolution
and upon renouncement of the rights in favour of individual members, the members
were fully authorised and having accepted the renunciation, have a legal
sanction to sell their proportionate right to the builders for development. The
income received by individual members is their individual income and the same is
not liable to be taxed in the hands of the society. The members had filed their
return of income offering to tax receipts on sale of their rights. The AO held
that since the society is the owner of the plot of land, the FSI/TDR is
available to the society and individual members cannot transfer the FSI/TDR
directly to the developers. He taxed the entire compensation received (including
amounts received by the members) in the hands of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who upon considering the definition of the
term ‘society’ as defined in the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act and also
the fact that the Bombay Stamp Act provides for payment of stamp duty by each
member at the time of purchase of individual flat and that such registered
agreements are deemed to be conveyance, held that capital gains have to be taxed
in the hands of the members of the society who have accounted for the same in
their individual returns of income. He allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal held that the order passed by the CIT(A) does
not call for interference. It held that the beneficial ownership was that of the
members of the society. It was the members who transferred the rights and
received consideration for such transfer. The Tribunal agreed with the view of
the CIT(A) holding the conclusion of the AO to the contrary to be not proper.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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S. 143(3) read with S. 252 — De novo Assessment pursuant to order of the Tribunal — Whether AO justified in enhancing assessed income while doing de novo assessment — Held, No.

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Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS


ITO v. Jabbal Woodcrafts India

ITAT ‘D’ Bench, New Delhi

Before C. L. Sethi (JM) and

K. G. Bansal (AM)

ITA No. 803/D/2009

A.Y. : 1997-98. Decided on : 24-9-2010

Counsel for revenue/assessee : A. K. Monga/

Salil Kapoor and Sonal Kapoor

9. S. 143(3) read with S. 252 — De novo Assessment pursuant
to order of the Tribunal — Whether AO justified in enhancing assessed income
while doing de novo assessment — Held, No.

Per K. G. Bansal :

Facts :

The assessee had filed return of income declaring total
income of Rs.1,980. The income was assessed u/s.143(3) at Rs.10.19 lac. This
order was set aside by the Tribunal to the file of the AO for making fresh
assessment after taking into account evidences including the evidence in the
form of books of accounts. In pursuance thereof, the assessment was framed
determining the total income at Rs.40.64 lac. The major addition was on account
of share application money of Rs.38.84 lac. The CIT(A) on appeal deleted the
addition made on this count.

Before the Tribunal, the Revenue contended that when the
Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the AO with a view to take into
account all the evidences, the AO was well within his right to consider all
matters, including the issue regarding share application money, which was not
the subject-matter of appeal before the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that although it has all the powers to
decide an issue before it, in any manner, the accepted position of law is that
it has no power to enhance the assessment. In such a situation, the order of the
Tribunal restoring the matter to the file of the AO cannot be construed in a
manner as to grant power to the AO to include a totally new issue, which has the
effect of enhancing the income. Thus, what cannot be done directly, cannot be
done indirectly also. Accordingly, it dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.


 

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S. 11 read with S. 12A(1)(b) — Non-filing of Auditor’s Report in Form 10B — Whether AO’s action of denying exemption justified — Held, No.

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Part B :
Unreported Decisions


ITO v. Sir Kikabhai Premchand Trust




ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai

Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and

R. K. Panda (AM)

ITA No. 5308/Mum./2009

A.Y. : 2006-07. Decided on : 22-9-2010

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Hemant Lal/

K. Shivaram and P. N. Shah

8. S. 11 read with S. 12A(1)(b) — Non-filing of Auditor’s
Report in Form 10B — Whether AO’s action of denying exemption justified — Held,
No.

Per N. V. Vasudevan :

Facts :

The assessee was registered as a charitable institution
u/s.12A of the Act. During the year, the assessee had earned capital gain on the
sale of immovable property, interest income, dividend and donation. It filed
return of income declaring total income at Nil. The AO noticed that the assessee
had not filed an Audit Report in Form 10B. The AO issued notices u/s.143(2) and
u/s.142(1) and amongst others, called for a copy of Form 10B. Simultaneously,
the AO also summoned one of the trustees u/s.131. During the interview on
3-10-2008 – to one of the questions viz., ‘Was any Audit Report prepared in Form
No. 10B which could not be filed for any reason ?’ the reply of the trustee was
‘No. Since the same was not applicable, no Audit Report in Form No. 10B was ever
prepared.’

The assessee, in response to the notices issued by the AO,
filed its reply and along with the same, it also filed an audit report in Form
10B dated 11-10-2006.

On 3-12-2008, the AO issued show-cause notice as to why the
exemption claimed u/s.11 should not be denied to the assessee. In reply, the
assessee filed two affidavits — one from the trustee who was interviewed by the
AO and second from the auditor who had audited the accounts. In his affidavit,
the trustee stated that his reply that he was a computer software consultant and
not an expert in the field of accountancy and taxation, and therefore, did not
know about the audit report in Form 10B had not been correctly recorded. He
further affirmed that he could not see what was being recorded by the AO on his
laptop and he had signed the statement without reading the content. While the
auditor in his affidavit confirmed that he had audited the accounts as per S.
12A(1)(b) and had issued his report in Form 10B on 11-10-2006.

However, the AO rejected the assessee’s explanation as
according to him :

  •   the statement recorded u/s.131 had evidentiary value;


  •   no explanation was offered in respect of omission to file report along
    with the return of income.


Accordingly, applying the provisions of S. 12A(1)(b), the
claim for exemption made u/s.11 was denied.

On appeal, the CIT(A) accepted the contention of the assessee
and allowed the appeal.

Before the Tribunal, the Revenue relied on the order of the
AO and submitted that the circumstances in which the Report was filed throw
doubts on the claim of the assessee that its books were duly audited as required
by the Act.

Held :

The Tribunal relied on the Calcutta High Court decision in
the case of CIT v. Hardeodas Agarwalla Trust, (198 ITR 511) where the audit
report obtained during the course of assessment proceedings was also accepted as
due compliance of law, and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. In coming
to this conclusion, it also relied on the fact that along with the return, the
assessee had also filed the Auditor’s Report obtained under the Bombay Public
Trust Act. Thus, according to it, the plea of the assessee of bonafide omission
to file Form 10B should not be rejected.

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S. 40A(3) read with S. 145(3) — Assessment made u/s.143(3) read with S. 145(3) — No disallowance made u/s.40A(3) — Whether AO’s order could be considered as erroneous — Held, No.

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Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS



Singhal Builders Contractors
v. Addl. CIT


ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Jaipur

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and

M. L. Gusia (AM)

ITA No. 393/JP/2010

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on : 3-9-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue :

Mahendra Gargieya/Irina Garg



7. S. 40A(3) read with S. 145(3) — Assessment made u/s.143(3)
read with S. 145(3) — No disallowance made u/s.40A(3) — Whether AO’s order could
be considered as erroneous — Held, No.

Per R. K. Gupta :

Facts :

The assessment was made by invoking provisions of S. 145(3).
Net profit @12% on contract receipts subject to allowance of depreciation and
interest to banks was adopted. The CIT found that disallowance to be made
u/s.40A(3) was not considered by the AO while applying net profit rate, hence,
his order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The
submissions of the assessee were rejected.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that as per the Allahabad High Court
decision in the case of CIT v. Banwarilal Banshidhar, (229 ITR 229), once the
net profit rate is applied by invoking the provisions of S. 145(3), no further
disallowance can be made u/s.40A(3). Further, since no contrary decision was
available, it held that the initiation of proceedings by the CIT u/s.263 was not
justified.

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S. 28 and S. 37(1) — Exchange loss arising on application of AS-11 — Allowable as business loss/expenditure — Ultimate utilisation of fund for investment purpose would not affect the al-lowability of loss.

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  1. Karisma Kapoor v. ACIT



ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai

Before D. K. Agarwal (JM) and

B. Ramakotaiah, (AM)

ITA No. 6780/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 20-10-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : K. Gopal/

Virendra Ojha

S. 28 and S. 37(1) — Exchange loss arising on application
of AS-11 — Allowable as business loss/expenditure — Ultimate utilisation of
fund for investment purpose would not affect the al-lowability of loss.

Per B. Ramakotaiah :

Facts :

The assessee was a film actress. She had shown her
professional receipts to the tune of Rs.6.12 crore and declared a total income
of Rs.6.04 crore. During the course of assessment the AO noticed that the
assessee had claimed foreign exchange loss of Rs.7.25 lacs. As per the
assessee the loss was arising out of exchange rate difference in the EEFC
account. The assessee had a large amount of dollar fund in the account at the
beginning of the year and after deposits during the year into the same
account, it was closed and converted into Indian Rupees. On conversion, due to
reduction in the value of dollar vis-à-vis Rupee, there was a
loss/reduction in the professional income accounted, which was claimed as a
loss.

This method of accounting, which was based on Ac-counting
Standard 11, was consistently followed by the assessee and the Department had
also assessed the profits earned therefrom in earlier years. However, during
the year, the AO disallowed the exchange loss, holding that the funds after
conversion were utilised for investing in tax relief bonds/fixed deposits.
Thus, since according to the AO, the utili-sation
of foreign currency balance was not for profes-sional purposes, the exchange
loss was disallowed.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue contended that the
Assessing Officer’s finding was correct that the amount was not utilised for
professional activities. It also relied on the decision of the Calcutta High
Court in the case of invest import and contended that the capital loss cannot
he allowed.

Held :

According to the Tribunal the facts do indicate that the
assessee had deposited her professional receipts in the said EEFC account.
Secondly, as noted by the CIT(A), the assessee was consistently following the
Mercantile system of accounting and also AS-11. Further, according to it, the
ultimate utilisation of the professional receipts after its conversion from
dollar to Indian Rupee was not material (relevant). The subsequent utilisation
of the amount cannot convert such loss as capital loss. According to it, the
Calcutta high Court decision relied on by the revenue, was distinguishable by
facts and hence, cannot be applied to the facts of the assessee’s case.

If further observed that the CIT(A) also erred in
up-holding that it was a notional loss. This was an actual loss after
conversion of balance in US $ into Indian Rupee. Accordingly, it was held that
the loss was an allowable loss against professional receipts.

Case referred to :


CIT v. Invest Import, 137 ITR 310 (Cal.)



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S. 28 and S. 45 — Gains arising to the society on sale of 50% of the areas constructed by the builder, at his own cost, by utilising additional FSI received by society from BMC in lieu of roads taken over by BMC are chargeable to tax as Capital Gains.

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  1. ACIT v.




Sai Ashish Bandra Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd.

ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and A. K. Garodia (AM)

ITA No. 5232/Mum./2004

A.Y. : 2000-2001. Decided on : 22-8-2007

Counsel for revenue/assessee : K. Kamakshi/

Vijay Mehta

S. 28 and S. 45 — Gains arising to the society on sale of
50% of the areas constructed by the builder, at his own cost, by utilising
additional FSI received by society from BMC in lieu of roads taken over by BMC
are chargeable to tax as Capital Gains.

Per R. K. Gupta :

Facts :

The assessee co-operative society was formed in 1971. The
land on which the building of the society stood had roads on two sides. The
BMC acquired some part of the society’s land in 1991 and again in 1994 for the
purposes of road widening and as compensation therefor granted additional FSI
to the society which the society decided to utilise on existing building.
Accordingly, the society entered into an Agreement with the builder pursuant
to which the builder agreed to put up the entire construction at his own cost
and in turn would be entitled to 50% of the area of the constructed flats. The
society was entitled to the balance 50% of the area of the constructed flats.
The construction was completed in 1999. Upon completion of construction, the
flats coming to the share of the society were sold for Rs.1,06,18,000. The
sale consideration of flats was returned by the society as long term capital
gains. The AO reassessed this amount under the head ‘Income from Business’ on
the ground that the society did not have funds for construction and therefore
it indirectly has obtained loan from the builder and has instructed the
builder for appointing architect for getting various sanctions of plans and
approvals to construct the flats. These factors, according to him, were
indicative that the society was engaged in a trade with profit motive.

Aggrieved, the society preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
where it contended that the income be assessed as long term capital gains or
alternatively, if it is assessed as business income, then, in terms of S.
45(2), fair market value of FSI on date of conversion should be taken as cost
for computing profits of the said business. The CIT(A) held that the income
was chargeable to tax as ‘Income from Capital Gains’.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

There is no evidence on record that the amount spent by the
assessee was loan. The builder was to put up construction at its own cost and
in turn would be entitled to 50% of the area of the constructed flats and
after completion of the project the remaining 50% of the area shall be given
to the society which can be sold by the society. BMC had allowed FSI to the
society in lieu of land taken over by the BMC. The Tribunal concurred with the
findings and decision of the CIT(A) viz. that there were no business
considerations in undertaking the transaction by the assessee, the assessee
could have either sold FSI or utilised it by constructing additional areas; by
deciding to utilise it in construction of additional areas it had maximised
its gains but maximisation of gains cannot by itself impress a transaction
with the character of business; the society did not have profit sharing
arrangement with the builder; the transaction under consideration cannot be
held to be a business transaction.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.



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S. 50C in the event of the assessee contending that valuation as done by Stamp Valuation Authority is not acceptable to him and asking the Assessing Officer to make a reference to the Valuation Officer, it is mandatory on the part of the Assessing Officer

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  1. Kalpataru Industries v. ITO



ITAT ‘H’ Bench, Mumbai

Before S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and

P. Madhavi Devi (JM)

ITA No. 5540/Mum/2007

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on : 24-8-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : K. Shivram/

Pradip Hedaoo

S. 50C in the event of the assessee contending that
valuation as done by Stamp Valuation Authority is not acceptable to him and
asking the Assessing Officer to make a reference to the Valuation Officer, it
is mandatory on the part of the Assessing Officer to make such a reference
notwithstanding that the assessee has not filed an appeal against such
valuation.

Per P. Madhavi Devi :

Facts :

The assessee, a partnership firm, filed its return of
income declaring total income of Rs.1,75,108. The assessee had sold its
factory premises for a consideration of Rs.15,05,000 and had shown profit on
sale of factory premises amounting to Rs.10,94,721. The market value of the
factory premises as per stamp valuation authorities was Rs.43,98,500. The
assessee drew the attention of the AO to the observations of the Bombay High
Court while admitting the petition filed by Practicing Valuers Association
and Others v. State of Maharashtra,
(Writ Petition No. 2027 of 2001) and
contended that the valuation given in the stamp duty ready reckoner cannot be
universally accepted. It was also submitted that it had not preferred an
appeal against the valuation as done by Stamp Valuation Authorities since the
purchaser had already paid stamp duty. However, the assessee requested the AO
to make a reference to the valuation cell of the Department as per the
provisions of S. 50C. The AO held that the reference to the valuation officer
is optional and since the assessee had not objected to the value adopted by
the stamp valuation authority there was no need to refer the matter to the
valuation officer. He, accordingly, adopted the value of the property at
Rs.43,98,500 and computed short term capital gain at Rs.35,89,503.

The CIT(A) confirmed the order passed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where it mainly argued that the matter be sent back to the file of the AO with
a direction to refer the same to the valuation officer for valuing the
property at market rate. It was also pointed out that the assessee was not the
owner of the land but was only a lessee and capital gain has arisen on
transfer of leasehold rights. It was also contended that in the case of
assignment of rights after obtaining necessary permission, S. 50C is not
applicable.

Held :

The assessee had transferred leasehold rights and had
itself offered capital gain on the same. S. 50C is a special provision for
determining full value of consideration in certain cases. The assessee while
making the claim before the AO has to satisfy him that the valuation adopted
by the stamp valuation authority is not based on sound criteria. In such a
case, the AO is bound to refer the matter to the DVO for arriving at the fair
market value of the property. The assessee had vide its letter filed with the
AO relied upon two decisions to the effect that the valuation given in the
stamp duty ready reckoner cannot be universally adopted. In such cases, it is
necessary for the AO to refer the matter to the DVO. The Tribunal has in
ITO v. Smt. Manju Rani Jain,
24 SOT 24 (Del.) and Mehraj Baid v. ITO,
(2008) 23 SOT 25 (Jodh.) held that the word ‘may’ used in S. 50C should be
read as ‘should’ and the AO has no discretion but to refer the matter to the
DVO for the valuation of the property. The Tribunal remanded the issue to the
file of the AO with a direction to refer the valuation of the property to the
DVO and determine the value in accordance with law.

The assessee’s appeal was allowed.


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S. 271(1)(c) — Penalty for concealment of income — Additions/disallowances sustained by the appellate authority — Whether sufficient ground for levy of penalty — Since full disclosure of particulars of transactions were made and additions were on ac-count

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  1. ACIT v. Enpack Motors Pvt. Ltd.




ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai

Before D. Manoharan (VP) and

R. K. Panda (AM)

ITA No. 914/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 23-10-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : S. K. Singh/

Arvind Dalal

S. 271(1)(c) — Penalty for concealment of income —
Additions/disallowances sustained by the appellate authority — Whether
sufficient ground for levy of penalty — Since full disclosure of particulars
of transactions were made and additions were on ac-count of different view
adopted, penalty cannot be imposed.

Per R. K. Panda :

Facts :

The assessee was a company incorporated in 1983. During the
year it had not carried on the business and it had returned a loss of Rs.1.41
crore. On account of the flood which took place on 26/27 July in Mumbai, all
its records and documents got destroyed and it was not able to produce
documents asked for by the AO. However, a copy of the police complaint and the
certificate issued by the Chartered Engineer evaluating the bad impact of the
flood and loss of material were furnished by the assessee. The AO however,
completed the assessment u/s.144 determining income at Nil after setting off
carried forward loss of Rs.11.15 lacs. The major disallowances made were as
under :


à
Stock valuation
 : A plot of land of Rs.6.56 crore, held as stock in
trade, was mortgaged to a bank. In order to recover its dues, the bank had
initiated the process of the sale of plot and the sale price mentioned was
Rs.5.2 crore. In view of the same, the assessee had valued the plot of land
at the said price thereby resulting into a loss of Rs.1.35 crore. The AO was
not satisfied with the explanation and disregarded the downward valuation of
stock;


à
Depreciation
 : Since the Company was defunct, according to the AO, it
cannot be allowed depreciation of Rs.9.74 lacs.


The assessee did not prefer any appeal when the AO’s order
was upheld by the CIT(A). The AO initiated penalty proceedings and after
hearing, held that the assessee was in default u/s.271(1)(c) read with
Explanation 4(a). He accordingly, levied penalty of Rs.54.46 lacs being the
minimum penalty @100% of tax sought to be evaded.

The CIT(A) on appeal cancelled the penalty levied as
according to him, no inaccurate particulars were furnished by the assessee and
the disallowance was not based on any independent evidence brought on record
by the AO.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue submitted that the
non-filing of any appeal against the assessment order amounted to the
acceptance by the assessee that it had furnished inaccurate particulars.
Further, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Dharmendra Textiles Processors & Others, it contended that mens rea was not an
essential condition for levying of penalty.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had made full
disclosure of all the particulars relating to the transactions in its accounts
filed with the Income-tax Department. The additions were made merely because
the AO did not share the views of the assessee. It was not disputed that the
plot of land was treated as stock in trade and was sold at a loss. As regards
claim for depreciation, it was noted that there were diverse decisions, both
for and against the assessee when the business was discontinued. As regards
the other expenses disallowed, it agreed with the assessee that in order to
maintain the corporate entity, certain expenses need to be incurred. Thus,
according to it, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dharmendra
Textiles was not applicable to the facts of the case of the assessee. Further,
according to it there was sufficient force in the assessee’s submission that,
in view of the huge amount of brought forward losses, no appeal was filed
against the CIT(A)’s order. For the reasons stated as above, it was held that
the CIT(A) was justified in cancelling the penalty.

Case referred to :

Dharmendra Textiles Processors & Others, 306 ITR 277 (SC).



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S. 70 read with S. 10A — Exemption u/s.10A was of income earned without setting off of loss of non-STPI unit — Loss of the non-STPI unit is allowed to be carried forward.

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  1. ACIT v. Honeywell Technology Solutions Lab
    Pvt. Ltd.




ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Bangalore

Before Shailendra Kumar Yadav (JM) and

A. Mohan Alankamony (AM)

ITA Nos. 344 & 345/Bang./2009

A.Ys. : 2003-04 & 2004-05. Decided on : 4-8-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee :

Vishweshwar Mudigonda/Preeti Garg

S. 70 read with S. 10A — Exemption u/s.10A was of income
earned without setting off of loss of non-STPI unit — Loss of the non-STPI
unit is allowed to be carried forward.

Per Shailendra Kumar Yadav :

Facts :

The assessee, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell, USA,
was engaged in the business of performing high quality software development,
offer testing and support services to other units of the Honeywell group. One
of its units was a 100% software development export oriented undertaking under
the Software Technology Parks Scheme of Government of India. One of the issues
before the tribunal was whether the exemption u/s.10A was of the income earned
without setting off of loss of the non-STPI unit.

Held :

Analysing the provisions of S. 10A, the tribunal noted
that :


à
The provisions of S. 10A were placed under Chapter III which only relates to
‘Incomes which do not form part of total income’;


à
The word ‘such’ refers to the profits and gains of the undertaking which is
engaged in the export of articles or things or computer software; and


à
The word ‘an’ which qualifies the word ‘undertaking’ means that it refers to
a single undertaking.


Referring to the provisions governing computation of
business income, it was noted that as per S. 29, profits and gains of business
are to be computed in accordance with the provisions contained u/s.30 to
u/s.43D. Thus, the provisions of S. 10A do not form part of the sections
mentioned in S. 29. It further noted that the provisions of S. 70 govern
setting off of a loss from one source against income from another source under
the same head of income. Therefore, it observed that since S. 10A was not
forming part of the sections mentioned in S. 29, business losses of the
undertaking whose income was not exempt u/s.10A cannot be set off against the
profits of the undertaking whose income is exempt u/s.10A. Further, relying on
the decisions of the Bangalore tribunal in the cases of Yokogawa India Ltd.
and in the case of Nous Infosystems Pvt. Ltd., the tribunal upheld the
decision of the CIT(A) directing the AO to allow exemption u/s.10A without
setting off of loss of non-STPI unit and consequently, allowing the carry
forward of such losses of non-STPI unit.

Cases referred to :



1. ACIT v. Yokogawa India Ltd., 111 TTJ 548/13 SOT
470 (Bang.);

2. Nous Infosystems Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO, (ITA No.
1042/ Bang./2007 dated 3-6-2008)



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S. 145 r.w. S. 35E — Change in method of accounting — Assessee engaged in prospecting and exploring minerals changed its method of capitalising expenditure incurred to charging same to P/L A/c. — Change bona fide.

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16 DCIT v. ACC Rio Tinto Exploration Ltd.


ITAT ‘C’ Bench, New Delhi

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and

K. G. Bansal (AM)

ITA Nos. 4908 /Del./2005

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 26-9-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Suresh K. Jain/

Salil Kapoor


S. 145 read with S. 35E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Change
in method of accounting — Assessee engaged in the business of prospecting and
exploring ores and minerals changed its earlier method of accounting of
capitalising the expenditure incurred to charging the same to profit and loss
account — Whether the change was
bona fide — Held, Yes.


Per K. G. Bansal :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in the business of prospecting and
exploring ores and minerals. As per its method of accounting, expenditure
incurred on such activities was capitalised. During the year under appeal the
assessee changed its accounting policy in respect of the same and the
expenditure incurred on such activities was charged to profit and loss account.
The AO did not accept the change for the following reasons :



  • Change was not bona fide and it was made only to get over the provisions of S.
    35E;



  • New method of accounting led to mismatch of the expenditure with the receipts;



  •  Business of the assessee i.e., mining minerals and ores, had not commenced;



  • To
    align its accounting policy with its parent company was not a good ground to
    justify the change.



The CIT(A) on appeal came to the conclusion that the assessee
was in the business of exploration, and not mining as held by the AO. Further,
being satisfied that the change made in accounting policy was bona fide, the
CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue contended that the assessee
had changed its policy only to frustrate the provisions contained in S. 35E of
the Act and submitted that the order of the AO be restored.

Held :

Referring to the main objects as per the Memorandum of
Association of the assessee company, the Tribunal noted that the assessee
company was formed to carry on the business of prospecting or exploring the ores
and minerals. According to it, the conclusion got further strength from the FIPB
approval received by the assessee, which was only for carrying out exploration
activity. Thus, the Tribunal held that the mainstay of AO that the business of
the assessee had not commenced and therefore, the expenses cannot be charged to
profit and loss account failed. Further, the Tribunal held that to align the
accounting policy with that of one’s parent, could be a valid ground and it did
not agree with the AO that it was not a good ground to permit the change.
According to it, the change would lead to more appropriate preparation and
presentation of the financial statement for the reason that the losses will not
unnecessarily be carried forward as work-in-progress, when there was none.


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S. 254 — When pendency of Department’s appeal not pointed out at hearing of appeal, no error in hearing only assessee’s appeal.

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15 ACIT v. Changepond Technologies Pvt. Ltd.


ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Chennai

Before T. R. Sood (AM) and Vijay Pal Rao (JM)

M.P. No. 137/Mds/08 in ITA No. 731/Mds/07

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 14-8-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Shaji P. Jacob/

H. Padamchand Khincha

S. 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) — When the
fact of pendency of Department’s appeal was not pointed out at the time of
hearing of the appeal of the assessee, can it be said that the Tribunal has
committed an error while hearing only the assessee’s appeal — Held, No.

Per Vijay Pal Rao :

Facts :

The Tribunal in ITA No. 731/Mds./2007 passed an order on
15-2-2008 in an appeal filed by the assessee, whereas the appeal filed by the
Department was not disposed of together. The assessee had made a petition with
the registry of the Tribunal for clubbing of both the appeals and being heard
together. Since the appeal of the Department was not heard along with the
assessee’s appeal, the Revenue filed this miscellaneous petition contending that
there was an error in the order of the Tribunal dated 15-2-2008. The Revenue
pointed out that the Apex Court in the case of Vijai Int. Udyog has held that
cross appeals of the assessee and the department should be heard together and if
the Departmental appeal is not heard along with the assessee’s appeal, then the
order passed in the assessee’s appeal is clearly erroneous. Thus, it was
contended that the appeal was disposed of by overlooking the mandatory direction
of the Apex Court and the order dated 15-2-2008 of the Tribunal may be recalled
and heard along with the appeal of the Department.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that admittedly, the fact of pendency of
Department’s appeal was not pointed out at the time of hearing of the appeal of
the assessee. The Tribunal observed that the appeal of the Department was
allowed by the Apex Court in the case of Vijai Int. Udyog, because both the
parties consented to the rehearing of the case. It also noted that the Apex
Court has in para 13 of the decision in the case of Vasant Manganlal Chokshi
held that unless and until the Department had pointed out to the Tribunal that
its appeal was also pending, the Tribunal cannot be said to have committed an
error by adjudicating only the assessee’s appeal. The Tribunal also noted that
though the order of the Apex Court in the case of Vasant Manganlal Chokshi was
by way of dismissal of SLP, it was a case of dismissal with reasons. As the Apex
Court had in the case of Kunhayammed & Others held that when the Apex Court
passes an order in SLP and also gives reasons, then such order would also
constitute binding precedent on the lower Courts. Accordingly, the Tribunal held
that it has not committed an error while hearing only the assessee’s appeal. The
Tribunal found that there was no error apparent from the order of the Tribunal.
The miscellaneous petition was rejected.

Cases referred to :



1. Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Vijai Int. Udyog, (152 ITR
111)(SC)

2. Commissioner of Customs v. Vasant Manganlal Chokshi,
(204 ELT 5) (SC)

3. Kunhayammed & Others v. State of Kerala & Another, (245
ITR 360) (SC)

4. V. M. Salgaocar & Bros. (P) Ltd. v. CIT, 243 ITR 383
(SC)

5. CIT v. Balwant Singh Arora, (180 ITR 400) (Punjab &
Haryana)

6. DCIT v. Smt. P. Shanti, (MP No. 266/Mds./2005) (ITAT —
Chennai)


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S. 147 r.w. S. 158BC — If Assessing Officer makes any additions in block assessment proceedings, then he cannot include said income either on substantive or protective basis for initiating re-assessment proceedings.

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  1. (2009) 32 SOT 597 (Mum.)


M. P. Ramachandran v. Dy. CIT

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 14-5-2009

S. 147 r.w. S. 158BC — If Assessing Officer makes any
additions in block assessment proceedings, then he cannot include said income
either on substantive or protective basis for initiating re-assessment
proceedings.

For the relevant assessment year, certain addition on
account of disallowance of advertisement expenditure made by the Assessing
Officer in block assessment proceedings was deleted by the CIT(A). In the
meantime the Assessing Officer re-opened the assessment. He held that since
substantive addition relating to the advertisement expenses made in the block
assessment was deleted by the first Appellate Authority and the appeal was yet
to be decided by the Tribunal, addition in the present assessment order was
also called for on protective basis. The CIT(A) upheld the assessment order on
the question of legality of the initiation of reassessment proceedings. On
merits, the CIT(A) reduced a part of addition made towards the advertisement
expenses.

The Tribunal held that the impugned amount did not qualify
for consideration in the reassessment. The Tribunal noted as under :

(2) Since the very foundation of S. 147 is to charge to
tax some income which has escaped assessment, it is sine qua non that
the income now sought to be taxed should be one which earlier escaped
assessment while determining the taxable income of the assessee. Once the
said income has been put to tax in the hands of the assessee, either under
the regular assessment or in the block assessment, the basic requisite
condition of the income ‘escaping assessment’ will become wanting.

(3) In this case, having made an addition in the block
assessment, the Assessing Officer was not justified in forming the belief
either on substantive or protective basis, that the same income has escaped
assessment in the instant year. Therefore, the initiation of reassessment
proceedings on this count could not be upheld.

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S. 22 and S. 28 — Income earned by company from leasing infotech park constructed by it on land (initially taken on lease and later acquired), construction financed by borrowings from banks secured on immovable property, providing various amenities charge

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14 Global Tech Park Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT


ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Bangalore

Before P. Mohanarajan (JM) and

K. K. Gupta (AM)

ITA No. 1021/Bang./2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 30-6-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue: H. N. Khincha/

Etwa Munda

S. 22 and S. 28 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) —
Whether income earned by a company from leasing information technology park,
constructed by it on land belonging to the company (which land was initially
taken on lease and was later on acquired) which construction was financed by
borrowings from banks secured on immovable property of the company, and
providing various amenities and services is chargeable to tax under the head
‘Income from Business’ and not ‘Income from House Property’ as assessed by the
AO — Held, Yes.

Per K. K. Gupta :

Facts :

The assessee developed the land allotted to it by Karnataka
Industrial Areas Development Board and constructed an information technology
park thereon. The information technology park consisted of two large blocks of
buildings with four floors in each block, service block, cafeteria, library,
gymnasium, utilities for staff, rest rooms, security, ATM, and Geodesic Dome.
The assessee provided/installed in the said information technology park
landscaping and construction of steel reinforced cement roads and high-security
compound wall fitted with motorised gate, huge water tank fitted with high
pressure-pumps, reservoir and sump, borewell, sewage treatment plant, lifts,
rainwater harvesting system, high-standard electrical installation including
transformer and generators, air conditioning, fire fighting and smoke detector
equipments, etc. Various amenities and services were provided in the nature of
maintenance of staff, monitoring of the generator room, water supply, etc. Land
and infrastructure were provided by the assessee by obtaining loan from a bank
which had mortgaged the immovable property and had also taken personal
guarantees of the Directors. The assessee received rental income from persons
with whom it entered into an agreement for leasing the information technology
park. The assessee considered rental income to be chargeable under the head
‘Income from Business’. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the lease
deed has been entered into by the assessee as absolute owner of the property
with the tenant and therefore placing reliance upon the decisions of Podar
Cement P. Ltd., East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. and Bhoopalam
Enterprises, he assessed rental income under the head ‘Income from House
Property’. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upheld the action of the
Assessing Officer. The assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal observed that the assessee was incorporated with
the sole intention of developing technology park for which it obtained leasehold
land from the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board and also obtained
loan from Union Bank of India for constructing super structure thereon. Such
conduct according to the Tribunal could not be considered as investment in a
property for earning rental income only. The Tribunal noted that since the lease
of the property was shown as part of the business activity, the income received
therefrom cannot be said as income received as a land owner but as a trader.
According to the Tribunal, if the property is taken on lease and thereafter
developed and leased it, is part of the business activity of the assessee as an
owner, and the income has to be treated as business income. The Tribunal found
that the activity was done by the assessee as a business venture and was in
accordance with the main object of the company. It observed that the intention
of any prudent businessman is to earn profit at a maximum level and investment
made in the business never lost its main intention for which the assessee was
incorporated. Since the entire cost of construction was met by way of obtaining
loan, it was found to be a risk as adventure in the nature of trade. According
to the Tribunal, the conversion from leasehold to ownership leads to a pure
commercial proposition resulting in a business venture carried out by the
assessee company. The Tribunal was of the view that the assessee’s providing
amenities, such as ward and watch, maintenance of common area, maintenance of
light in the common area, supply of water, providing lift, installation of
electric transformer, power to the lessees, providing generator, overhead water
tanks, maintenance of drainage, etc. clearly establish that the entire activity
is carried on in an organised manner to earn profit out of investment made by
the assessee as a commercial venture. The Tribunal noted that the case law cited
by the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Balaji Enterprises had
considered the Apex Court decision in the case of S. G. Mercantile Corporation.
It found the case law relied upon by the learned CIT(A) (Bhoopalan Commercial
Complex & Industries Pvt. Ltd.) to be distinguishable on facts. It found force
in the submission of learned counsel that the term ‘business’, as defined in the
provision of infrastructure facility as provided in sub-clause (iv) of S. 80IA
clearly explains the development and operation of the technology park, has not
been controverted by the authorities below. It noted that in the assessee’s case
the main intention was to exploit the immovable property by way of commercial
application and there was no room for doubting that the intention of the
assessee was in providing software development facility in the Electronic City
in the industrial area within the limits of Bangalore South District, Bangalore.
According to the Tribunal, any activity undertaken with a profit motive would
amount to business and not a mere return on investment when it is exploited. It
found the facts of the assessee’s case to be similar to those of Balaji
Enterprises and also S. G. Mercantile Corporation. In view thereof, the Tribunal
directed the AO to assess the rental income as from business.

Cases referred to :




1. East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. v.
CIT, 42 ITR 49

2. S. G. Mercantile Corporation (83 ITR 700) (SC)

3. CIT v. Podar Cement P. Ltd., 226 ITR 625 (SC)

Trading in derivatives — Derivatives are not a contract for purchase and sale — Consequently, trading in derivatives not speculative in terms of section 43(5) — Set-off of loss of derivative trading against gains of share trading permissible.

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26. (2010) 127 ITD
386(Chennai)

DCIT Circle (VI)

Vs

Paterson Securities (P) Ltd

A.Y.2004-05

Date: 26/12/2010

Trading in
derivatives-Derivatives are not a contract for purchase and sale- Consequently
trading in derivatives not speculative in terms of section 43(5)-Therefore
set-off of loss of derivative trading against gains of share trading
permissible.

Facts :

The assessee was a member of
the NSE and was engaged in purchase and sale of shares on his own account as
well as on behalf of constituents. The assessee filed a return claiming a set
off of the loss suffered on derivative transactions against profit from sale of
shares. The assessing officer was of the view that trading in derivatives was a
speculative transaction and therefore the loss suffered being in the nature of a
speculative loss could not be set off against other business income and was to
be carried forward.

Held :

A speculative transaction in
terms of section 43(5) is that transaction in which the contract for purchase or
sale is ultimately settled otherwise than by delivery. A derivative can be
traded on the exchange. But it is not a trade in share or stock. A derivative is
not a contract for purchase or sale of share, stock or commodity. A derivative
can be traded on the value of the underlying share or stock but is not a trade
in any actual share or stock. The definition of derivative in section 2(ac) of
the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act can also be referred to. The
transactions in derivatives are therefore not speculative transactions within
the meaning of section 43(5). The loss from these transactions had to be set off
against other income.

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Interest u/s.234B was not payable on advance tax liability due to sum payable on account of retrospective amendment.

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25. (2010) 46 DTR (Bang.)
(Trib.) 41

JSW Steel Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated :
31-5-2010

 

Interest u/s.234B was not
payable on advance tax liability due to sum payable on account of retrospective
amendment.

Facts :

The assessee, a public
limited company, in A.Y 2005-06 was not required to add back the amount set
aside for deferred tax liability to the net profits u/s.115JB. As such deferred
tax liability did not fall under any of the adjustments permitted in the first
part of the Explanation to S. 115JB. But the Finance Act, 2008 made a
retrospective amendment (from A.Y. 2001-02) whereby the book profit is required
to be increased by an amount of deferred tax and provision thereof. Interest
u/s. 234B was levied on the amount of tax payable u/s.115JB. However, the
assessee opposed such levy contending that when such retrospective amendment was
brought in, the impugned assessment year was already over and there arose no
occasion to provide for advance tax in case of deferred tax liability.

Held :

By the time the
retrospective amendment was made, the financial years 2004-05 to 2007-08 have
already been passed and hence the assessee had no occasion to add back the
deferred tax provision to compute the book profits u/s.115JB. Even though a
retrospective amendment is possible, a retrospective physical payment of advance
tax is not possible. The acclaimed principle lex non cogit ad impossibilia (law
does not command to do which is impossible to do) holds true.

Thus as the statutory
mandate to add back the deferred tax provision to the book profits u/s. 115JB
was unknown during the relevant previous year 2004-05, the levy of interest
u/s.234B on the incremental amount of tax computed u/.s115JB is not justified.

 

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Interest on loan taken for purchase of motor cars — In the absence of a specific provision in clause (H) of S. 115WB(2), the expenditure on payment of interest on loan taken for purchase of motor cars cannot be included to compute fringe benefits.

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24. (2010) 46 DTR (Pune)
(Trib.) 157

Brihan Maharashtra Sugar
Syndicate Ltd.
v.
DCIT

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated :
23-7-2010

 

Interest on loan taken for
purchase of motor cars — In the absence of a specific provision in clause (H) of
S. 115WB(2), the expenditure on payment of interest on loan taken for purchase
of motor cars cannot be included to compute fringe benefits.

Facts :

The assessee had incurred
Rs.54,28,382 as expenditure on running and maintenance of motor cars, which was
certified by the auditor. However, in the return of fringe benefits the assessee
had, from the aforementioned expense, excluded Rs.3,11,580 which pertained to
interest paid on loans taken for purchase of motor cars. The AO was of the view
that the words ‘repairs’, ‘running’ and ‘maintenance of motor cars’ shall cover
every expenses connected with use of motor cars in the business activities of
the assessee. Upon further appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Held :

In absence of specific
provision laid down u/s. 115WB(2)(H), the expenditure on payment of interest on
loan taken for purchase of motor cars cannot be included to compute fringe
benefits. Every required related expenses like repairs, running (including
fuel), maintenance of motor cars and amount of depreciation thereon have been
mentioned in specific wordings in the provision. Therefore, the interest paid on
loan taken for purchase of motor cars is not liable to Fringe Benefit Tax.

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S. 28(i) — Business Loss v. Capital Loss — securities held as current asset should be treated as stock-in-trade. The loss incurred on the same should be treated as business loss.S. 145 — Method followed by the assessee was cost or market price whichever

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23. (2010) 126 ITD 448
(Mum.)

DDIT v. Chohung Bank

A.Ys. : 1997-98, 1999-2000
to 2003-04

Dated : 25-6-2009

 

S. 28(i) — Business Loss v.
Capital Loss — securities held as current asset should be treated as
stock-in-trade. The loss incurred on the same should be treated as business
loss.

S. 145 — Method followed by
the assessee was cost or market price whichever is less — accordingly loss
should be recognised but appreciation in the value should not be booked.

Facts :

The assessee is a
non-resident banking company. It incurred a loss of Rs.77,000 on sale of
Government securities held as ‘current investments’. The Assessing Officer
treated the same as capital loss stated. The assessee contended that the
securities were as ‘current asset’ in the balance sheet as per the norms laid
down by the RBI. It was further contended that buying and selling of securities
was a normal business activity of a banking company and the current investments
were thus stock-in-trade.

Held :

As per the guidelines issued
by the RBI, the securities are to be divided into (i) permanent investments and
(ii) current investments. Permanent investments are the securities purchased
with the intention of retaining them while the current investments are the
securities purchased with an intention of trading to take advantage of
short-term price. Thus the securities in the nature of current investments
automatically become the stock-in-trade of the assessee and not investment. The
loss incurred is thus on account of stock-in-trade which is referred as current
investments by the assessee.

Facts :

The assessee had revalued
certain securities being a part of closing stock and incurred loss of Rs.45,000.
The same was debited to the profit and loss account. The Assessing Officer
observed during the course of assessment proceedings that the assessee had also
revalued certain other securities forming part of the closing stock and incurred
profit of Rs.15,43,400 on the same. This profit was not offered to tax. The
Assessing Officer held that the assessee incurred loss on revaluation of one
portion of the closing stock and profit on revaluation of the another portion of
the same closing stock. While the loss was claimed as deduction, the profit was
not offered to tax. The AO held that the assessee could not be allowed to follow
different methods for valuing different portions of stock. Accordingly, an
addition of Rs.15,43,400 was made.

Held :




1. The method ‘cost or
market price’ whichever is less is a recognised method of valuation of
closing stock. The logic behind this method is that the loss in the value be
recognised without recognising unduly the appreciation in the value of
stock.

2. The Circular issued
by the RBI for valuation and classification of investments states that the
valuation is to be done scripwise and further any appreciation in the value
should not be booked.

3. Further, this method
is being consistently followed by the assessee. Going by the method adopted
by the assessee as ‘cost or market price whichever is less’, there can be no
addition of appreciation on account of revaluation.




Note :
The other issues being minor, have been ignored
for the purpose of above gist.

 

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S. 271(1)(c) — A mere addition made by the Assessing Officer cannot be a ground to levy penalty.

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22. (2010) 126 ITD 416
(Ahd.)

Gruh Finance Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated :
16-5-2008

 

S. 271(1)(c) — A mere
addition made by the Assessing Officer cannot be a ground to levy penalty.

Facts :

For the year under
consideration, the assessee had claimed deduction u/s.36(1)(viii) to the tune of
Rs.1,55,75,000. The Assessing Officer recomputed the deduction to the extent of
Rs.84,24,228 and levied penalty u/s.271(1)(c).

Held :

Assessment proceedings and
penalty proceedings are both different. Explanation 1 to S. 271(1)(c) states
that amount added or disallowed in computing the total income shall be deemed to
be income in respect of which particulars have concealed. This deeming provision
is not an absolute one. The presumption is rebuttable and not conclusive. The
assessee in this case has duly submitted required explanation and other
documents. No material has been brought on record to show that the assessee has
concealed the income or has not provided sufficient explanation. A mere addition
made by the Assessing Officer cannot be a ground to levy penalty.

 

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S.194C and S. 194I — Payment made for hiring vehicles for transportation of its employees covered by S. 194C.

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21.  (2010) 126 ITD 289
(Delhi)

Royal Jordanian Airlines v.
DDIT

(Intl. taxation)

A.Ys. : 1995-96 to 1998-99
and 2000-01

Dated : 29-8-2008

S. 44BBA — provisions of
presumptive taxation cannot bring to tax notional income when actually there is
loss incurred by the assessee.

Facts :

The assessee is a
corporation established in Jordan and is engaged in the business of operation of
aircraft in international traffic. It filed nil returns for the relevant
assessment years. It was claimed that for these assessment years the assessee
had incurred losses both in its Indian and global operations and so no tax was
chargeable while computing income under the provisions of S. 44BBA.

The Assessing Officer on the
other hand contended that the assessee is governed by the provisions of S. 44BBA
and so 5% of the gross receipts should be chargeable to tax. The Revenue further
contended that S. 44BBA does not provide for computation at lower rate of profit
as provided in S. 44AD, S. 44AF, S. 44BB, etc.

Held :




1. Time and again
various courts have held that ‘income tax’ is a tax on income. S. 4 and S. 5
are the charging Sections and the pre-requisite of these Sections is
existence of income. Chapter IV is attracted for the purpose of computation
of income. Hence, unless and until there is income u/s.4 and u/s.5 there
cannot be computation of income. Chapter IV-D is a machinery provision and
S. 28 or Chapter IV-D itself does not create a charge.

2. Even though there is
no specific mention in S. 44BBA for computing tax at lower rate, in case of
losses, the provisions should be understood to have an inbuilt option for
the assessee to compute income at a lower sum.

3. The deeming provision
of S. 44BBA only deems 5% of certain receipts as income, however it does not
deem that every person is deemed to have earned income.

4. When there are
losses, the presumptive section cannot bring to charge what is otherwise not
chargeable to tax.



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If the capital asset is acquired out of borrowed funds and the interest paid on such amount borrowed has not been claimed as deduction, then the same may be added to the cost of asset while computing cost of acquisition on sale of asset.

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  1. (2009) 120 ITD 469 (Pune)


S. Balan alias Shanmugam v. DCIT

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 31-1-2008

If the capital asset is acquired out of borrowed funds and
the interest paid on such amount borrowed has not been claimed as deduction,
then the same may be added to the cost of asset while computing cost of
acquisition on sale of asset.

The issue relates to disallowance of interest for computing
the cost of shares while working out the short-term capital gains.

Facts :

The assessee was an individual working as a promoter and
builder and also had income from salary, rent and other sources. In the A.Y.
2002-03, the assessee sold certain shares and computed short-term capital
loss. On perusal of details, it was noticed by the AO that cost price of the
shares included the amount of interest paid on the borrowed funds. The AO
mentioned that the funds were borrowed for investment in shares. The AO
disallowed the interest component from the working of capital gains on the
ground that it was neither covered under the term ‘expenditure incurred wholly
and exclusively in connection with the transfer’, nor under the term ‘cost of
improvement’. In the opinion of the AO, interest was not covered u/s.48 of the
Act.

The CIT(A) has given the following reasons for confirming
the action of the AO :


à The
amount of interest should not be taken into account for determining cost of
capital asset u/s.48 of the Act


à The
intention of investment in shares was earning of dividend and since the said
dividend is exempt, interest expenditure in that regard should also not be
allowed in view of provision of S. 14A of the Act


à Whenever
the Parliament intends to allow interest as a deduction, then specific
provisions are incorporated such as S. 36(3) and S. 24(b) of the Act,
however it is not so in S. 48 of the Act.


à The
appellant had dominant intention of earning dividend income, therefore, the
provision of S. 14A was to be applied.


Before the ITAT, the appellant argued that borrowed funds
were utilised for acquisition of shares, interest on these funds was never
claimed as revenue expenditure and the main intention was to invest in shares
and not to trade in shares.

Held :

The Tribunal observed that even if it is a situation where
a capital asset is acquired out of borrowed funds having liability of
interest, and since it has been capitalised as cost of asset in the books of
account and never claimed as a revenue expenditure, then that too is towards
enhancing cost of such capital asset and cannot be segregated from cost of
acquisition. The appellant is entitled to deduct interest for the purposes of
S. 48 of the Act.

Further, analysing S. 14A of the Act, the ITAT held that
the issue is related to the transfer of the capital asset and not the revenue
generated. A situation may arise that on transfer of a capital asset, the gain
is taxable but not the incidental income, and if so, the expenditure having
nexus with the cost of acquisition has to be taken into account for the
computation of gain as prescribed u/s.48 of the act.


(6) On the face of the evidence in the shape of
confirmation letters, bank accounts, passports, etc., in the hands of the
assessee, it might be valid gift that would have convinced a reasonably
minded person, specially a person exercising a judicial function. The
accepted position of law is that merely because an assessee had agreed to
the assessment, it cannot bring in automatic levy of penalty.

(7) Therefore, the CIT(A) was right in deleting the
penalty and his order was to be affirmed.

Allowabilty of provision for warranties u/s.37 — Provisioning done by the assessee was made against ascertained liability, very much reasonable and made on relevant data.

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  1. (2009) 120 ITD 237 (Mum.)


Indian Oiltanking Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 23-1-2008

Fact I :

Allowabilty of provision for warranties u/s.37 —
Provisioning done by the assessee was made against ascertained liability, very
much reasonable and made on relevant data.

Fact II :

Book profits u/s.115JB — Provision for performance
warranties and preliminary and deferred revenue expenses added by the AO — As
regards preliminary and deferred revenue expenses there was change in the
accounting policy of the assessee — So the amount was written off — Nothing
against ICAI policy — So allowed as deduction for book profits u/s.115JB.

Fact I :

The assessee-company was engaged in providing oil terminal
services. During the relevant previous year, it started a new activity of
construction and operation of petroleum terminals also. Its first contract was
with the IOC wherein it was required to design and construct storage
facilities and also to provide services relating to handling, storage and
dispatch of petroleum products.

The assessee-company filed return of income declaring a
loss of Rs.14,73,34,669 as per normal provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(‘the Act’). In the course of assessment proceedings the AO added Rs.
4,83,72,135 being provision for performance warranties while computing
income/loss under normal provisions of the Act.

The Tribunal discussed the following case laws dealing
basically with allowance of provision for warranties :

(i) Bharat Earth Movers v. CIT, (245 ITR 428) (SC)

(ii) CIT v. Vinitec Corpn. (P.) Ltd., (278 ITR
337) (Del. HC)

(iii) Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand Ltd. (222 ITR 697)
(Privy C.)

(iv) CIT v. Indian Transformers Ltd., (270 ITR
259) (Ker. HC)

It observed that the common vein running through all the
above cases was that there was sufficient past data with the assessee to
justify the reasonableness of the warranty provisioning done.

In the given case the assessee had for the first time
executed the work and hence no past data was available. Since there was no
past data, the assessee made technical assessment and had it vetted by an
independent agency.

The Tribunal observed that just because the assessee has no
past data, it cannot by itself make him ineligible from making the claim,
especially when he has just started this line of activity.

The assessee has a technical assessment which is vetted by
an independent agency. The assessee has also filed industrial experience which
gives instances of failure/development of defects in oil industry. Further the
assessee had also submitted details of expenses incurred for rectification of
various damages during defect liability period after 31-3-2001 which came to
Rs.3,06,79,133 as against warrant provisioning of Rs.4,83,72,135.

The Tribunal held that provisioning done by the assessee
was made against ascertained liability, very much reasonable and made on
relevant data.

Fact II :

For computing book profits u/s.115JB, the AO made two
additions which were provision for performance warranties (as discussed in
Fact-I) and preliminary and deferred revenue expenses.

Held :

Provision for warranty is already held as an ascertained
liability and so the AO cannot make any addition to the net profit for the
purposes of S. 115JB.

As regards preliminary and deferred revenue expenditure,
there was a change in the accounting policy of the assessee and so the amount
was written off.

By writing off the balance remaining under its head
‘Preliminary and deferred revenue expenditure’ the assessee was only doing
what was prudent, in that, it was removing from the asset side of its balance
sheet a non-productive item and which in any case was not an asset at all.
Therefore, it was not doing anything contrary to any ICAI guideline. The CIT(A)
was very much right in following the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Apollo Tyres Ltd.

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S. 194J r.w. S. 40(a)(ia) — S. 194J does not apply to fees paid by stockbroker to exchanges.

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30 (2008) 25 SOT 440 (Mum.)


Kotak Securities Ltd. v. Addl.CIT

ITA No. 1955 (Mum.) of 2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 26-8-2008

S. 194J read with S. 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
S. 194J does not apply to transaction fees paid by stockbroker to stock
exchanges.

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
invoked S. 40(a)(ia) in respect of transaction charges paid by the
assessee-broker to the stock exchanges and disallowed the transaction charges
paid on account of non-deduction of tax at source. The CIT(A) upheld the
disallowance.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, deleted the disallowance :

(a) Techno Shares & Stocks Ltd. v. ITO, [ITA No. 778
(Mum.) of 2004]

(b) Tata Warehouse Securities v. Dy. CIT, [ITA No.
6600 (Mum.) of 2004]

(c) Kandwalla Finance Ltd. [ITA No. 6986 (Mum.) of 2002]

(d) Manjesh J. Patel [ITA No. 3710 (Mum.) of 1997]

(e) Peninsular Capital Market Ltd. v. Asst. CIT,
(2008) 19 SOT 421 (Cochin)

(f) Omprakash B. Salicha [ITA No. 11 (Mum.) of 2007, dated
12-3-2008]

(g) Skycell Communications Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, (2001)
251 ITR 53/119 Taxman 496 (Mad.)

 

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) To call a payment as ‘fees for technical services’ it
should have been paid in consideration of rendering by the recipient of
payment of (a) Managerial Service or (b) Technical or Consultancy Service.

(2) The stock exchanges merely provide facility to its
members to purchase and sell shares, securities, etc., within the framework of
its bye-laws. In the event of dispute it provides for mechanism for settlement
of dispute. It regulates conditions subject to which a person can be a member
and as to when and in what circumstances membership can be transferred,
cancelled, suspended, etc. The exchange provides for a place where the members
can meet and transact business. The stock exchanges do not render any
managerial service, nor do they render any technical consultancy service.

(3) The transaction fee paid is on the basis of volume of
transaction effected by a member. The transaction fee is not paid in
consideration of any service provided by the stock exchange. It is a payment
for use of facilities provided by the stock exchange and such facilities are
available for use by any member.

(4) Therefore, the transaction fee paid could not be said
to be a fee paid in consideration of any technical services rendered by the
stock exchange to the assessee. The provisions of S. 194J were, thus, not
attracted.

 


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S. 72A r.w. S. 35 — On demerger, unabsorbed capital expenditure on research u/s.35(1)(iv) not different from unabsorbed depreciation for S. 72A(4) and assessee entitled to carry forward unabsorbed research expenditure.

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29 (2008) 25 SOT 46 (Mum.)


ITO v. Mahyco Vegetable Seeds Ltd.

ITA No. 6171 (Mum.) of 2004

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 28-7-2008

S. 72A read with S. 35 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — On
demerger, unabsorbed capital expenditure on scientific research u/s.35(1)(iv) is
not different from unabsorbed depreciation for purposes of S. 72A(4) and,
therefore, assessee is entitled to carry forward unabsorbed scientific research
expenditure.

The assessee-company came into effect following demerger of a
division of ‘M’ Ltd. The assessee claimed the benefit of S. 72A(4) read with S.
35(4) in respect of unabsorbed depreciation and expenditure on scientific
research. The AO allowed the benefit of S. 72A(4) in respect of unabsorbed
depreciation. However, benefit of carry forward in respect of expenditure on
scientific research was denied. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order and allowed the
unabsorbed capital expenditure on scientific research to be carried forward.

The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) ‘Unabsorbed depreciation’ for the purpose of S. 72A has
been defined in Ss.(7) to mean so much of the allowance for depreciation of
the demerged company which remains to be allowed and which would have been
allowed to the demerged company under the provisions of this Act if the
demerger had not taken place.

(b) In S. 35(1)(iv) it can be seen that the unabsorbed
capital expenditure on scientific research has to be dealt with in the same
manner as the unabsorbed depreciation u/s.32(2). There is no difference in the
depreciation allowance and the allowance of capital expenditure on scientific
research u/s.35 but for the fact that the deduction which would otherwise have
been spread over a number of years in the form of depreciation is allowed in
the year of incurring of such capital expenditure u/s.35.

(c) On a conjoint reading of these provisions the
inescapable conclusion which follows is that the unabsorbed capital
expenditure of scientific research of the demerged company has been considered
as similar to and at par with the unabsorbed depreciation. The amount
representing the unabsorbed capital expenditure on scientific research
u/s.35(1)(iv) was not different from the unabsorbed depreciation for the
purposes of S. 72A(7) and, hence, the assessee was entitled to carry forward
the unabsorbed scientific research expenditure.

 


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S. 41(1) — Remission of principal of loan cannot be waiver of trading liability and not within purview of S. 41(1); remission not remission of depreciation claimed by assessee on assets acquired by loan amount

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28 (2008) 118 TTJ 563 (Visakha)


Coastal Corporation Ltd. v. Jt. CIT

ITA No. 407 (Vizag.) of 2006

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 30-5-2008

S. 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Remission of principal
portion of loan cannot be termed as waiver of trading liability and does not
fall within the purview of S. 41(1); remission of loan would not amount to
remission of depreciation claimed by the assessee on the assets acquired by
availing of the loan.

 

During the relevant assessment year, the company had, under
the Rehabilitation Scheme of the Government of India, opted for a one-time
settlement of term loans and interest. The reduction of principal amount payable
was credited to Capital Reserve. The waiver of the interest portion was
reflected as income and offered to tax. The Assessing Officer considered the
same in the assessment.

 

Subsequently, after the expiry of four years, a notice
u/s.148 was issued in respect of depreciation claimed by assessee on the fixed
assets in respect of which the term loan was reduced. The Assessing Officer held
that the claim of deduction towards depreciation is in the nature of expenditure
as it reduced the liability of the assessee to pay income-tax on such amount
and, thus, upon waiver of the loan liability which was utilised for purchase of
the asset, the consequent depreciation claimed thereon can be said to have been
recovered by the assessee and, therefore, provisions of S. 41(1) of the Act are
applicable. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.

 

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following cases
held that remission of principal portion of loan does not fall within the
purview of S. 41(1) :

(a) Polyflex (India) (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2002) 177 CTR
(SC) 93; (2002) 257 ITR 343 (SC)

(b) CIT v. Phool Chand Jiwan Ram, (1981) 131 ITR 37
(Del.)

(c) CIT v. Cochin Co. (P) Ltd., (1990) 81 CTR (Ker.)
115; (1990) 184 ITR 230 (Ker.)

 

The Tribunal noted as under :

1. As per the definition of ‘Actual Cost’ in S. 43(1), the
only deduction permissible from the actual cost is the amount which has been
met by any other person or authority. The words ‘which has been met by another
person or authority’ would mean the non-refundable amount given by any other
person or authority for the purpose of meeting the cost of the asset.

2. If the term loan is utilised for acquiring any asset, it
cannot be termed as ‘meeting of a portion of cost of the asset’.

3. There is no force in the contention of the Revenue that
in view of nexus between the term loan and acquisition of assets, remission of
loan will amount to remission of depreciation.

4. The principal portion of loan amount, which has been
waived, has not been claimed as deduction in any of the years. Hence, waiver
of principal portion of loan cannot be termed as waiver of trading liability
and, hence, the second clause of S. 41(1), relating to trading liability,
shall not be applicable in this case.


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S. 32(1)(i) and (ii) — Catering right acquired for consideration was tool for business and eligible for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii).

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27 (2008) 118 TTJ 344 (Mum.)


Skyline Caterers (P) Ltd. v. ITO

ITA No. 2965 (Mum.) of 2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 28-12-2007

S. 32(1)(i) and (ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Right of
catering acquired for a consideration was a tool to carry on business and
eligible for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii).

 

As per agreement dated 16-8-2000, the assessee paid Rs.27
lacs for acquiring the catering business for HLL along with equipment, etc.
lying at HLL canteen and debited the same to ‘Goodwill’ account in its books.
Depreciation @ 25% claimed by the assessee was disallowed by the Assessing
Officer on the following grounds :

(a) Goodwill does not find place in S. 32 as part of
intangible assets, which included only know-how, patents, copyrights,
trademarks, etc.

(b) The expression ‘similar nature’ in S. 32(1)(ii) would
not include the goodwill.

 

The assessee’s appeal did not find favour with the CIT(A) who
upheld the disallowance on the grounds that :

(a) the assessee had not acquired any commercial right.

(b) the entire payment was in fact on account of
non-compete clause which amounted to capital expenditure not covered by S.
32(1)(ii) of the Act.

 

The Tribunal, applying the decision in the case of
Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT,
(1971) 82 ITR 363 (SC), held in favour
of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. The combined reading of all the clauses and the preamble
of the agreement reveals that the assessee had paid the sum of Rs.25 lacs for
acquiring all the rights under the contract between the first party and HLL as
well as certain assets belonging to the first party. On the other hand, the
sum of Rs.2 lacs has been paid on the ground that the first party shall not
compete with the assessee either by himself or through his agents in any
business of catering at HLL canteen.

2. The payment of Rs.25 lacs was specifically made for
acquiring all the rights under the catering contract between R and HLL and for
acquiring articles and paraphernalia belonging to the first party which were
lying in the canteen.

3. Since the payment related to the acquisition of rights
under the contract, it cannot be said that the payment was either on account
of goodwill or on account of non-compete clause.

4. Merely because the assessee showed the said payment on
account of goodwill in the books of accounts, no adverse inference can be
drawn against the assessee.

5. A perusal of S. 32(1)(ii) shows that the Legislature has
specified certain intangible assets on which depreciation can be claimed,
namely, know-how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licences, franchises. These
specific intangible assets are followed by the expression ‘any other business
or commercial rights of similar nature’. In such a situation, the rule of
ejusdem generis
would apply. The general words take the colour from the
specific words. The specific words in the above Section reveal the similarity
in the sense that all the intangible assets specified are tools of the trade
which facilitate the carrying on of the business.

6. If this test is applied, then the rights acquired by the
assessee under the agreement would fall within the expression mentioned above
since the catering business at HLL canteen could be carried on only with the
help of such rights under the contract and, consequently, the assessee would
be entitled to depreciation.

7. The articles and paraphernalia lying in the canteen of
HLL acquired by the assessee, being tangible assets, would be eligible for
depreciation under clause (i) of S. 32(1) and, therefore, their value will
have to be ascertained by the Assessing Officer and the balance amount shall
be allocated for the intangible asset for the purpose of granting depreciation
under clause (ii) of S. 32(1).

 


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Assessment done u/s.16(3) — Whether it can be done after 4 years from end of A.Y. without assessee’s failure to disclose facts — Held, No.

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26 (2008) 303 ITR (AT) 145


C. K. Govindankutty Nair v. WTO


A.Ys. : 1989-90 to 1991-92. Dated : 31-5-2006

Where the original assessment has been completed u/s.16(3),
whether reassessment can be done after expiry of 4 years from the end of
assessment year without assessee’s failure to disclose facts — Held, No.

 

For A.Y. 1989-90, the assessee has adopted a particular value
of land (with area of 40 cents) and building for determining value of his
interest in the firm. Subsequently he filed a revised return to avail the
benefit of valuation under Schedule III read with S. 7(2) and declared a much
lower value of the said land and building. The Assessing Officer accepted such
lower valuations. The said firm was dissolved in 1986 and the Assessing Officer
held that assessee’s share — 10.580 cents of land and building was distinctly
identifiable and hence valuation of entire plot of 40 cents and building as one
unit resulted in escapement of wealth. The Assessing Officer initiated
reassessment u/s.17 which was upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On further appeal by the assessee, the ITAT held that :

1. S. 17 of the Wealth Tax Act is analogous to S. 147 of
the Income-tax Act.

2. Once assessment is completed u/s.16(3) of the Act, no
action can be taken by the Assessing Officer after the expiry of 4 years from
the end of the assessment year, unless

(a) there is a failure on the part of the assessee to
make a return under S. 14 or S. 15 or in response to a notice U/ss.(4) of S.
16 or S. 17(1); or

(b) the assessee fails to disclose fully and truly all
material facts necessary for his assessment.

3. A perusal of the assessment order clearly showed that
the fact of dissolution of the firm and the method of valuation was duly
disclosed before the Assessing Officer and he has applied his mind on the said
facts at the time of framing the original assessment.

4. Reassessment cannot be initiated on mere change of
opinion of the Assessing Officer. Therefore the reassessment proceedings
initiated by the Assessing Officer u/s.17 of the Act need to be cancelled.

 

Case relied upon :

(i) CIT v. Foramer France, (2003) 264 ITR 566 (SC)

 


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Whether claim for deduction made for first time before Commissioner (Appeal) is to be considered by him — Held, Yes.

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25 (2008) 303 ITR (AT) 110 (Cochin)


Thomas Kurian v. ACIT

A.Y. : 1999-2000. Dated : 5-5-2006

Whether a claim for deduction made for the first time before
the Commissioner (Appeal) is to be considered by him — Held, Yes.

The assessee, an exporter, did not claim deduction u/s.80HHC
in the return of income and not even before the Assessing Officer. Such claim
was made for the first time before the Commissioner (Appeals), who rejected the
claim.

On assessee’s appeal, the ITAT held that :

(i) Being a quasi-judicial authority, the Assessing Officer
must act in a fair and not in a partisan manner. He is duty bound to determine
the correct tax liability of the assessee.

(ii) In discharging such duty, he is bound to consider all
the deductions and exemptions available to the assessee.

(iii) When the facts were available with the Assessing
Officer that the assessee was in the export business of seafoods, he should
have asked the assessee why deduction u/s.80HHC has not been claimed.

(iv) The Commissioner (Appeal) should have asked for a
remand report from the Assessing Officer to verify the claim of deduction and
then decide the issue in accordance with law. He cannot plainly refuse to
consider a legal claim made by the assessee.

(v) The judgment of a larger Bench of Supreme Court in the
case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (229 ITR 383) should
prevail over the judgment of Division Bench in the case of Stepwell Industries
Ltd. (228 ITR 171). Hence the Department cannot reject the assessee’s claim by
relying on Stepwell Industries case.

Based on the above reasonings, the ITAT restored the matter
to the Assessing Officer for considering the assessee’s claim for deduction
u/s.80HHC in accordance with law.

Cases referred to :


(i) National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 229 ITR
383

(ii) Stepwell Industries Ltd., 228 ITR 171

 


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Whether CIT can pass order u/s.263 on grounds different from those in notice for revision — Held, No

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24 303 ITR (AT) 7


Colorcraft v. ITO (Mum.)

A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 12-5-2006

Whether the CIT can pass order u/s.263 on grounds different
from those specified in the notice issued for initiating revision proceedings —
Held, No.

 

The assessee filed its return for A.Y. 2000-01 claiming
deduction u/s.80HHC, which was allowed by the Assessing Officer during
assessment u/s.143(3). Subsequently, the Commissioner issued notice u/s. 263.
One of the grounds for revision stated in the notice was that deduction
u/s.80HHC was allowed on export profits including duty drawbacks which did not
qualify for deduction u/s.80HHC. However, subsequently a revision order was
passed holding that excessive deduction u/s.80HHC was allowed for 3 reasons :

(i) Export incentive should have been excluded in entirety
instead of 90%.

(ii) Excise Refund and Sales Tax Set-off should have been
included in the total turnover, and

(iii) Excise Refund and Sales Tax Set-off should have been
excluded from export profits.

 

On assessee’s appeal against the above order of revision
u/s.263, the ITAT held that :

(a) Before assuming jurisdiction u/s.263, the assessee
should be given an opportunity of being heard, by issue of a show-cause
notice.

(b) A person, who is required to show cause against a
proposed action, must know the basis of the proposed action. Then only the
opportunity granted will be an effective opportunity.

(c) There must be a nexus between the reasons stated in the
notice and the order passed u/s. 263.

 

Applying the above principles, the ITAT held that since in
the instant case, notice was issued for excluding duty drawback from the quantum
of deduction u/s.80HHC, but the revision order was passed on 3 altogether
different grounds, the revision order was not valid.

 

Cases referred to :


(i) Bagsu Devi Bafna v. CIT, (1966) 62 ITR 506
(Cal.)

(ii) CIT v. G. K. Kabra, (1995) 211 ITR 366 (AP)

 


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S. 2(14), 45 – For charging income under the head ‘capital gains’ it is not necessary for an assessee to be owner of the asset transferred.

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(Full texts
of the following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on
written request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to them,
Rs.30 per decision will be charged for photocopying and postage.)





4. Asian PPG Industries Ltd. v. DCIT


ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and

A. L. Gehlot (AM)

ITA No. 648/M/2009

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 9-2-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue : H. N. Shah/Daya Shankar

S. 2(14), 45 – For charging income under the head ‘capital
gains’ it is not necessary for an assessee to be owner of the asset transferred.

Per A. L. Gehlot :

Facts :

Under an agreement to lease entered into by the assessee with
MIDC on 27-1-1999 the assessee paid consideration of Rs.10 crores and took
possession of land. The agreement provided several conditions upon fulfilment of
which MIDC would execute a lease deed in favour of the assessee for a period of
95 years. The assessee could not comply with the conditions laid down in the
agreement dated 27-1-1999. Vide letter dated 22-1-2003, the assessee surrendered
the original documents, lease agreement and possession receipt dated 27-1-1999
to MIDC and also requested MIDC to sub-divide the plot into two parts. The
assessee received order dated 16-6-2003 from MIDC agreeing to refund a sum of
Rs.9,49,99,995 against a premium of Rs.10,00,00,000 paid towards acquisition of
leasehold land at Chakan. One part of the sub-divided plot was surrendered by
the assessee to MIDC and one part of the sub-divided plot was transferred by the
assessee to Lucas TVS by paying to MIDC transfer charges and balance
consideration payable on execution of supplemental agreement. Tripartite
agreement was entered into between the assessee, MIDC and Lucas Ltd. on
11-3-2004.

In the return of income the assessee claimed long-term
capital loss of Rs.3,69,08,837. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the
assessee had entered into a conditional MOU with MIDC, which entitled the
assessee to lease of land on long-term basis upon fulfilment of the conditions
mentioned in the MOU. Since the assessee did not fulfil the conditions, it never
got lease of land and consequently it never became owner of a capital asset, nor
did any right accrue in favour of the assessee. The AO held that since the
assessee never owned the capital asset which he could transfer there is no
capital gain/loss and the assessee was not entitled to carry forward the
long-term capital loss claimed by it.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
dismissed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal held that S. 2(14) which defines the term
‘capital asset’ uses the words ‘property of any kind held by an assessee’, these
words do not necessarily mean that the property which the assessee holds must be
his own. Any kindly of property by the assessee would come within the
definition. It is not possible to read the definition of capital asset in a
restrictive manner to mean that the property which the assessee owned by himself
alone would come within the meaning of ‘capital asset’.

The Tribunal noted the agreement was executed, consideration
was paid and possession of the plot was taken by the assessee. The assessee was
having rights in the plot was evident from the fact that after sub-division of
the plot one portion of the plot was given to M/s. Lucas TVS Ltd. vide agreement
dated 11-3-2004 wherein the assessee was one party along with MIDC and consent
of the assessee was taken. The Tribunal held that the surrender of rights of the
assessee amounted to extinguishment of his rights in land/capital asset and
therefore it attracts capital gains/loss.

The Tribunal set aside the orders of the Revenue authorities and allowed the
claim of the assessee.

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S. 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 29 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 — Rule 29 of ITAT Rules permits Tribunal to admit additional evidence for any substantial cause and for said purpose there is no requirement therein th

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66 (2010) 37 SOT 202 (Chennai) (TM)

Mascon Global Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 26-8-2009

S. 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 29 of the
Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 — Rule 29 of ITAT Rules permits
Tribunal to admit additional evidence for any substantial cause and for said
purpose there is no requirement therein that there should be a formal written
application before Tribunal for admission of additional evidence.

On appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee filed some additional
evidence in support of its claim. Although the Accountant Member accepted the
additional evidence, the Judicial Member objected that there was no formal
application u/r.29 of the ITAT Rules for admission of additional evidence.

The Third Member held that on going through the rule, no
requirement was found therein that there should be a formal written application
before the Tribunal for admission of the additional evidence.

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) These are rules of procedure and in a fit case and
depending on the circumstances it would be open to the Tribunal to admit
additional evidence when it is produced in the Court and an oral application
is made.

(2) Rule 29 permits the Tribunal to admit the additional
evidence for any substantial cause. The intention behind the rule is that
substantial justice should be done and the interest of justice should be the
overriding consideration.

(3) Therefore, there was no error in the Accountant Member admitting the
additional evidence.

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S. 69 read with S. 5(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — When assessee brings money into India through banking channel, onus on assessee u/s.69 stands discharged and S. 5(2)(b) does not apply.

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65 (2010) 37 SOT 146 (Chennai)

Smt. Sushila Ramasamy v. ACIT

A.Y. : 1995-96. Dated : 2-4-2009

S. 69 read with S. 5(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — When
assessee brings money into India through banking channel, onus on assessee
u/s.69 stands discharged and S. 5(2)(b) does not apply.

The assessee, a non-resident, had made substantial deposits
in non-resident accounts in Indian Bank. She filed her return of income showing
total income as NIL. The Assessing Officer passed assessment order and assessed
the aforesaid deposits as the income of the assessee u/s.69. On appeal, the
CIT(A) confirmed the Assessing Officer’s action.

The Tribunal held that since the assessee had brought the
money into India through banking channel, the onus on the assessee u/s.69 stood
discharged, and, therefore, it was not taxable in India u/s.5(2)(b). The CBDT
Circular No. 5 in F.No.73A/2(69)-IT(A-II), dated 20-2-1969 squarely supports the
case of the assessee.

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) It is seen from Ss.(2) of S. 5 that a person, who is
a non-resident, has to pay tax only on that income which is either received
by him in India or is deemed to be received by him in India or accrues to
him in India or arises to him in India or is deemed to accrue to him in
India or is deemed to arise to him in India during the year. The words ‘in
India’ appearing in Ss.(2) of S. 5 are crucial. The principle underlying S.
5 makes the chargeability of income depend upon the ‘locality’ of accrual or
receipt.

(2) A non-resident person, having money in a foreign
country, could not be called upon to pay income-tax on that money in India
because in respect of that money it will not be possible for the Assessing
Officer to say that it was either received by him in India or it was deemed
to be received by him in India or it accrued to him in India or it arose to

him in India or it was deemed to accrue to him in India or it was deemed to
arise to him in India.

(3) If a non-resident person, having money in a foreign
country, brings that money to India, through a banking channel, he cannot be
called upon to pay income-tax on that money in India, firstly for the
reasons stated above and secondly because the remittance of money into India
through banking channel will make the onus on the assessee u/s.69
discharged.

(4) If certain income, profits or gains was ‘received’ by
the assessee outside India, it does not become chargeable to income-tax in
India by reason of that money having been brought into India. This is
because what is chargeable is the first ‘receipt’ of the money and not a
subsequent dealing by the assessee with the said money. In that event, the
money is brought by the assessee as his own money which he had already
‘received’ and had control over it and it does not take the character of
income, profits and gains after being brought in India.

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S. 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If goodwill of business is damaged and later on some compensation is awarded in lieu of that, it would fall in category of loss to source of income and such receipt would be a capital receipt.

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64 (2010) 37 SOT 45 (Mum.)

Inter Gold (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Jt. CIT

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 5-1-2010

S. 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If goodwill of business is
damaged and later on some compensation is awarded in lieu of that, it would fall
in category of loss to source of income and such receipt would be a capital
receipt.

The assessee was importing gold bars from Union Bank of
Switzerland (UBS). In one consignment shipped by UBS there was excess supply of
some gold bars. The customs authorities seized the excess quantity and also took
legal action against the assessee-company. UBS accepted its mistake and admitted
the human error at their end. The appellate customs authority absolved and
acquitted the company. The company filed a suit against UBS in the High Court of
London. Finally, an out-of-court settlement was reached between UBS and the
company and UBS paid Rs.41.58 lacs as compensation against loss of reputation
and goodwill and Rs.14.46 lacs towards legal expenses, etc. The assessee offered
the sum of Rs.14.46 lacs for taxation voluntarily by including it in the
miscellaneous income and claimed the amount of Rs.41.58 lacs as capital receipt
not chargeable to tax in the computation of income. The Assessing Officer held
that the amount of Rs.41.58 lacs representing compensation received by the
assessee was a revenue receipt chargeable to tax. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld
the action of the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, ruled in favour of the assessee :

(1) CIT v. A.R.J. Security Printers, (2003) 264 ITR
206/131 Taxman 297 (Delhi)

(2) Oberoi Hotel (P.) Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) 236 ITR 903/103
Taxman 236 (SC)

(3) CIT v. Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn. Ltd., (1986) 161
ITR 386/27 Taxman 314 (SC)

(4) Rohitasava Chand v. CIT, (2008) 306 ITR 242/ 171
Taxman 147 (Delhi)

(5) Serum Institute of India v. Dy. CIT, (2008) 111 ITD
259 (Pune)

While treating the amount of Rs.41.58 lacs as a capital
receipt, the Tribunal noted as under :

(1) The word ‘income’ has to be understood in the generic
sense. If a receipt bears the traits of income as per the plain and natural
meaning, the same will still be included within the scope of S. 2(24) even
if there is no specific mention of such item in the definition clause.

(2) It is trite law that any receipt in the nature of
compensation, costs, damage, etc., by whatever name called, towards loss of
income is a revenue receipt. However, any receipt to compensate for the loss
of source of income is a capital receipt.

(3) Loss of source of income does not necessarily mean
that the source must be absolutely extinguished. If the source of income has
been severely beaten, thereby causing serious damage to the income-earning
apparatus itself, it will also be construed as the loss of source of income.

(4) As in this case, if goodwill of the business is
damaged and later on some compensation is awarded in lieu of that, it will
also fall in the same category of loss to the source of income and,
consequently, such a receipt will also qualify to be characterised as a
capital receipt.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 40(a)(ia), S. 44AE. Provisions of S. 44AE will be applicable to a person who has entered into an agreement with truck owner, by virtue of which he became owner of the trucks for the period of contract and his accounts are not aud

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63 (2010) TIOL 420 ITAT (Bang.)

B. V. Prabhu v. ITO

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated : 29-1-2010


Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 40(a)(ia), S. 44AE. Provisions of
S. 44AE will be applicable to a person who has entered into an agreement with
truck owner, by virtue of which he became owner of the trucks for the period of
contract and his accounts are not audited. Provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) will not
be applicable in respect of transport contract business when the income is
ascertained as per S. 44AE of the Act and accounts are not audited.

Facts :

The assessee obtained a contract from Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd. (IOC) for transportation of LPG cylinders and in turn, such transportation
was being done through another contractor. The balance sheet filed alongwith the
return of income showed amount receivable from IOC and also showed the amount
payable to transport contractor. No profit and loss account was prepared. Fixed
percentage of gross receipts was considered by the assessee to be its income.
The assessee used to retain a percentage of amounts received by IOC and the
balance was paid to truck owners with whom the assessee was having agreements.
The payments were made without deduction of income-tax at source. Credit was
claimed in respect of income-tax deducted at source by IOC. Before the Assessing
Officer (AO), it was contended that the provisions of S. 44AE are applicable and
therefore the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) do not apply. The AO held that the
transport business of the assessee was a contract with IOC and a sub-contract
with the truck owners and therefore, in view of the proviso to S. 194C(2), the
assessee was required to deduct tax at source in respect of payments made to
sub-contractors. Since no tax was deducted at source, he disallowed the
expenditure of Rs.11,26,500 u/s. 40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
where it contended that it merely acted on behalf of the truck owners and had
not entered into any sub-contract with the truck owners and also that it had not
debited the amount to profit and loss account and therefore the same cannot be
treated as expenditure to be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia). The CIT(A) noted that
the assessee had entered into a contract with IOC and had entered into agreement
with truck owners wherein he was described as transporter and truck owner was
treated as contractors. He held that the payments made to truck owners
constituted sub-contract payments and hence the provisions of S. 194C(2) were
applicable. He also held that the assessee did not own trucks and therefore the
provisions of
S. 44AE are not applicable. He confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal on perusal of the agreement entered into by the
assessee with IOC noted that it mentioned that the contractor (the assessee) was
owner and operator of new/old capacity trucks and had undertaken to maintain the
trucks in good working order for the period of the contract, the agreement inter
alia provided that the contractor had to pay the entire operation cost of the
trucks which include and be deemed always to include the expenses enumerated in
the agreement and the agreement also provided that the contractor shall not be
entitled to assign, subrogate, subject or part with his right under the contract
or change the ownership of the trucks. The contractor (assessee) was also
prohibited from changing constitution of its firm without obtaining prior
written consent of the Corporation.

The Tribunal also noted that in order to comply with the
clauses of the agreement entered into by the assessee with IOC, the assessee had
entered into an MOU with a truck owner wherein the truck owner agreed to act as
a manager of the transport business of the assessee. This MOU also provided that
upon the expiry of the contract the truck will be resold by the assessee to Shri
Athaulla Khan (the truck owner). The assessee under this agreement was entitled
to retain 3% of the commission.

As regards the contention on behalf of the assessee that the
assessee was registered with IOC and the truck owner was not registered with IOC
and therefore the contract was taken for the benefit of the person owning the
truck, the Tribunal observed that this may be de facto relationship. However,
one has to consider the legal agreements between the assessee and the IOC and
also considering the MOU between the assessee and the truck owner and from such
agreements, one has to draw a conclusion that de jure relationship of the
assessee with IOC was in the form of a person who has been awarded the contract.
The assessee was required to abide by the conditions mentioned in the agreement.

The Tribunal held that as per the agreement with the truck
owner, the assessee became the owner of two trucks for the period of contract.
The original truck owner became a manager for the transport business of the
assessee. In respect of contract with IOC, the assessee was owner of two trucks.
Since there was no tax audit report in respect of transport contract business,
therefore the income was to be ascertained as per S. 44AE of the Act. Once
income has been ascertained as per provisions of S. 44AE of the Act, then
provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) will not be applicable.

The Tribunal also upheld the alternative contention on behalf
of the assessee viz. that the AO should have restricted the disallowance to
Rs.5,14,725 being the amount paid by the assessee to the truck owner. From the
gross amount due to the assessee from IOC, deductions were made by IOC towards
diesel and TDS. IOC made deduction towards diesel made available for plying the
truck. The amount deducted by IOC was not paid to the truck owner, but only the
net amount received from IOC was paid to the truck owner and hence the amount on
which tax was deductible at source was the net amount of Rs.5,14,725.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 10A. Hiving off of a unit which was in the form of a branch office into a subsidiary company does not cause conversion of an existing unit into a new unit so as to disentitle the claim of deduction u/s.10A.

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62 (2010) TIOL 395 ITAT (Bang.)

DCIT v. LG Soft India Pvt. Ltd.

A.Ys. : 2004-05 & 2005-06. Dated : 19-5-2010

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 10A. Hiving off of a unit which was
in the form of a branch office into a subsidiary company does not cause
conversion of an existing unit into a new unit so as to disentitle the claim of
deduction u/s.10A.

Facts :

The assessee-company had claimed deduction u/s. 10A for both
the assessment years under appeal. The eligible undertaking which was earlier a
branch of a non-resident company/foreign company was hived off as a subsidiary
company. The Assessing Officer held that the new unit stated to be set up by the
assessee was made on reconstructing/splitting up of the existing unit and
pursuant to the provisions of S. 10A(2)(ii), the assessee is not entitled to
deduction u/s.10A. He also held that the plant and machinery in the new unit
have been installed by way of transfer. He denied the claim made by the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

As rightly pointed out by the CIT(A), the asses-see’s
undertaking existed in the same place, form and substance and did carry on the
same business before and after the change in the legal character of the form of
organisation. Formerly, it was a branch establishment of a non-resident
company/foreign company, but later on it was converted into a subsidiary
company. But for the above change of the organisational status, the same unit
continued to function throughout the time. Therefore, it is quite fruitless to
argue that the organisational change has caused conversion of the existing unit
to a new unit. There is no such splitting up or reconstruction of an existing
business in the case of a branch establishment becoming a subsidiary
establishment. The assessee’s unit satisfied all the conditions stipulated in
the Act and was entitled for the benefit. Therefore, as rightly held by the
CIT(A), a mere organisational change is not a ground to hold that the assessee
has violated the conditions stated in S. 10A(2)(ii). It is a case of only change
in the name and style. It is clearly possible to state that there was no
violation of the conditions laid down in S. 10A(2)(iii) as well.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 36(1)(vii), S. 36(2) — If brokerage is offered to tax, a sharebroker is entitled to deduction by way of bad debts u/s. 36(1)(vii) r.w. S. 36(2) in respect of the amount which could not be recovered from its clients in respect of

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61 (2010) TIOL 390 ITAT Mum.-SB

DCIT v. Shreyas S. Morakhia

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 16-7-2010


Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 36(1)(vii), S. 36(2) — If brokerage
is offered to tax, a sharebroker is entitled to deduction by way of bad debts
u/s. 36(1)(vii) r.w. S. 36(2) in respect of the amount which could not be
recovered from its clients in respect of transactions effected by him on behalf
of his client, apart from brokerage earned by him.

Facts :

During the assessment years under consideration the assessee
in its return of income claimed deduction of Rs.28,24,296 on account of amount
due to the assessee by his clients on account of transactions of shares effected
by him on their behalf. It was contended that the amount has become
irrecoverable and the same has been claimed as deduction after having written it
off from the books of account. Copies of ledger accounts were filed.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the claim of the
assessee on the ground that there was no other evidence filed by the assessee
except copies of ledger account to show that any action was taken against the
concerned parties to recover the amounts due from them. He also noted that the
Bombay Stock Exchange Card held by the assessee was already sold by him and the
business in respect of which the debt in question had arisen had ceased to exist
in the year under consideration.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
noted that the assessee had carried on business as a sub-broker and there was
hardly any difference between the business of share-broker and sub-broker. He
held that the business of the assessee had not ceased to exist on transfer of
membership card but the same continued during the year under consideration. He
also held that failure on the part of assessee to initiate recovery proceedings
could not be a ground for denying the assessee’s claim for bad debt u/s.
36(1)(vii). Accordingly, he allowed the claim of the assessee for deduction on
account of bad debt.

Aggrieved, the Department preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. In view of the conflicting decisions on the subject, the following
question was sought to be referred by the Division Bench to the Special Bench.
The President constituted a Special Bench to consider the following question :

“Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in
law, the assessee, who is a share-broker, is entitled to deduction by way of bad
debts u/s.36(1)(vii) read with S. 36(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect
of the amount which could not be recovered from its clients in respect of
transactions effected by him on behalf of his client, apart from the commission
earned by him.”

Held :

The Special Bench having noted that in order to claim
deduction u/s.36(1)(vii), one of the conditions that is required to be satisfied
as laid down u/s.36(2)(i) is that the debt claimed to be deductible as bad or
part thereof has been taken into account in computing the income of the assessee
of the relevant previous year or of any earlier previous year, observed that the
fundamental question is whether the said condition is satisfied in case of
share-broker where only the brokerage income is credited to the P & L account
and not the value of purchase of shares made on behalf of the clients. The SB
noted that the Supreme Court has in the case of T. Veerabhadra Rao K. Koteshwar
Rao & Co. (155 ITTR 152), in the context of loan given on interest, has held
that the debt was taken into account in computing the income of the assessee
when the interest income accruing thereon was taxed in the hands of the assessee.
It noted that the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that in order to satisfy
the condition stipulated in S. 36(2)(i), it is not necessary that the entire
amount of debt has to be taken into account in computing the income of the
assessee and it will be sufficient even if part of such debt is taken into
account in computing the income of the assessee. Applying this principle to the
share-broker, it was held that the amount receivable by the assessee on account
of brokerage is thus a part of debt receivable by the share-broker from his
clients against purchase of shares and once such brokerage is credited to P & L
account of the broker and the same is taken into account in computing his
income, the condition stipulated in S. 36(2)(i) gets satisfied.

The argument that the loss was suffered owing to breach of
SEBI guidelines framed to safeguard the interest of brokers the SB held that
when a share-broker has actually suffered a loss, whether such loss is suffered
by assessee as a result of not following the guidelines or even after following
such guidelines, is not going to change the fact that assessee has suffered such
loss. If the assessee broker has not followed such guidelines in a particular
case, it is a decision taken by him as a businessman taking into consideration
all the relevant facts and circumstances including his business relations with
the concerned clients. Even if it is assumed that such loss has been incurred by
the assessee as a result of not following the rules and regulations and
guidelines issued by the SEBI, the same cannot be equated to expenditure
incurred by the assessee for any purpose which is an offence or which is
prohibited by law.

The contention of the Revenue that the sale value of shares
remaining with the assessee should be adjusted against the amount receivable
from the client so as to arrive at the actual amount of bad debt should be
raised, if permissible, before the Division Bench.

The Special Bench held that the assessee, who is a
share-broker, is entitled to deduction by way of bad debts u/s.36(1)(vii) r.w.
S. 36(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the amount which could not be
recovered from its clients in respect of transactions effected by him on behalf
of his client, apart from the commission earned by him.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 251, S. 254. While the powers of CIT(A) are co-terminus with the powers of Assessing Officer, AO has no power to admit fresh claim otherwise than by way of revised return but Appellate Authorities including CIT(A) and ITAT have p

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60 (2010) TIOL 377 ITAT (Mum.)

Asian Paints Ltd. v. Addl. CIT

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 23-3-2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 251, S. 254. While the powers of
CIT(A) are co-terminus with the powers of Assessing Officer, AO has no power to
admit fresh claim otherwise than by way of revised return but Appellate
Authorities including CIT(A) and ITAT have power to admit such claim. The Apex
Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. has itself clarified that their finding
does not impinge on the power of ITAT u/s.254 of the Act, CIT(A) has similar
power u/s.251(1)(c).

Facts :

The assessee in its return of income did not make any claim
of Rs.98.36 lakhs on account of prior period adjustments. In the course of
assessment proceedings, it pressed such claim. The Assessing Officer (AO) did
not entertain the claim.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Goetze (India) Ltd. (284 ITR
323) (SC) held that the claim for deduction can be made only in the return of
income filed and that a claim which is not made in the return of income cannot
be subsequently made. He upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal having considered the observations of the
Supreme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. (supra) and also the powers of
the first Appellate Authority as examined by the Supreme Court in CIT v.
Nirbheram Deluram, (224 ITR 610) (SC) held as under :

(1) The Apex Court clarified in Goetze (India) Ltd.
(supra) itself that their finding does not impinge on the power of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal u/s.254 of the Act. We find that the CIT(A)
has also similar power u/s.251(1)(c) of the Act.

(2) The AO has no power to admit fresh claim otherwise
than revised return but Appellate Authorities including the CIT(A) and ITAT
have power to admit such claim.

The Tribunal held that without prejudice to its above finding
the claim of the assessee is in accordance with the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. The Tribunal in the interest of natural
justice and keeping in view the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of
Goetze (India) Ltd. remitted the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) with a
direction to decide the issue on merit in accordance with law and after
providing reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.

Compiler’s Note :

The above was one of the grounds before the Tribunal. Other
minor issues have not been covered above.

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S. 115JB — Long-term capital gain which is exempt u/s.47(iv) cannot be excluded from the book profits for the purpose of S. 115JB.

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59 (2010) 41 DTR (Hyd.) (SB) (Trib.) 449

Rain Commodities Ltd. v. DCIT

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 2-7-2010

S. 115JB — Long-term capital gain which is exempt u/s.47(iv)
cannot be excluded from the book profits for the purpose of S. 115JB.

Facts :

The assessee credited an amount of Rs.149.77 crores as profit
on transfer of assets to its wholly-owned subsidiary to its profit & loss
account. It claimed the exemption u/s.47(iv) of the Act. While working out the
book profits for the purpose of S. 115JB, the assessee reduced this profit and
claimed that it cannot form part of the book profits. A Special Bench was
constituted to adjudicate the matter.

Held :

The AO has power to alter the net profits as shown in the P &
L A/c only in two cases; (1) if it is discovered that P & L A/c is not drawn up
in accordance with Part II and Part III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act, (2)
if accounting policies, accounting standards are not adopted for preparing such
accounts and methods, rates of depreciation which have been incorrectly adopted
for preparation of P & L A/c laid before the annual general meeting.

Part II & Part III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act
require the P & L A/c of a company to disclose every material feature including
credits or receipts and debits or expenses in respect of non-recurring
transactions or transactions of an exceptional nature. As held by the Bombay
High Court in the case of CIT v. Veekaylal Investment Co. (P) Ltd., 249 ITR 597,
the capital gain should be included for the purposes of computing book profits
under MAT provisions.

It is an undisputed fact that the long-term capital gain
earned by the assessee is included in the net profit determined as per P & L A/c
prepared as per Part II and Part III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act. It is
not the case of the assessee that the capital gain earned by the assessee was
not included in the net profit determined as per P & L A/c of the assessee
prepared under the Companies Act. The taxability of capital gain is relevant
only for the purpose of computation of income under the normal provisions of the
Income-tax Act, and has nothing to do with the preparation of P & L A/c in
accordance with the provisions of Part II and Part III of Schedule VI of the
Companies Act. Under these circumstances, as long as long-term capital gain is
part of profit included in the P & L A/c prepared in accordance with the
provisions contained in Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act, it
cannot be excluded from the net profit unless so provided under Explanation to
S. 115JB for the purpose of computing book profit. In the absence of any
provision for exclusion of capital gains in the computation of book profit under
the above provision, the assessee is not entitled to the exclusion claimed. The
decision of the Calcutta Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sutlej
Cotton Mills Ltd. v. ACIT, 45 ITD 22 held to be reversed by the decision of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Veekaylal Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (supra).

The Ss.(5) of S. 115JB provides that “save as otherwise
provided in this Section, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to every
assessee, being a company, mentioned in this Section”. The contention of the
assessee that since all other provisions of this Act shall also apply, it is
entitled to reduce the long-term capital gain exempted u/s.47(iv) is not
accepted. All other provisions of the Act shall apply, but subject to the
provisions otherwise provided in S. 115JB. The provision for computing book
profit by increasing or reducing the net profit as shown in the P & L A/c
prepared in accordance with the provisions of Part II and Part III of Schedule
VI of the Companies Act are specifically provided in S. 115J or S. 115JA or S.
115JB itself, as the case may be, and consequently all other provisions of the
Act providing the manner of computation of total income under normal provisions
of the Act cannot be applied while computing book profit u/s.115J or u/s.115JA
or u/s.115JB, as the case may be. The decision of ITO v. Frigsales (India) Ltd.,
4 SOT 376 (Mum.) is overruled.


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Capital gains vis-à-vis business income — Transactions in shares.

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58 (2010) 41 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 426

Management Structure & Systems (P) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 30-4-2010

Capital gains vis-à-vis business income — Transactions in
shares.

Facts :

The assessee company is engaged in the management
consultancy, investment advisory and equity research services and also dealing
in investments. It filed return of income declaring profits of Rs.1.03 crores
earned by it on sale of shares as long-term and short-term capital gains. The AO
noted that the assessee was regularly dealing in the shares throughout the year
and held that the profit/gain earned from dealing in the shares is a business
income. Upon further appeal, the CIT(A) also confirmed the assessment order on
this issue.

Held :

The balance sheet filed by the assessee and as per the books
of account, the assessee has treated the entire investment in the shares as an
investment only and not as a stock-in-trade. Another important aspect to be
considered here is that the assessee is not a share-broker, nor is he having a
registration with any stock exchange. Moreover, some scrips are held for more
than five years and it is not the case of the AO that there were any derivative
transactions by the assessee, nor is it a case of the AO that there were
transactions without delivery. In the present case, both the authorities have
not disputed that the transactions are complete with delivery. The assessee has
not borrowed any money for investing in shares and used his own surplus funds
and these facts have not been disputed by the AO. In the case of the assessee,
in the preceding years, the assessee is consistently declaring the gain/profit
on the sale of the shares under the head ‘capital gains’ either
long-term or short-term and the same has been accepted by the AO. It is true
that the rule of res judicata is not applicable to the income-tax proceedings,
but at the same time, it is also well-settled principle that if there is no
change in the facts, then there should be consistency in the approach of the
Revenue authorities while deciding the tax liability of the assessee. Another
aspect to be considered here is that the assessee has received substantial
dividend and that is also disclosed. After considering the totality of the
facts, it was held that the transactions of sale and purchase of the shares by
the assessee cannot be treated in the line of trading in the shares, nor can it
be treated as an adventure in the nature of the trade.


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S. 194J — Various charges like VSAT charges, lease line charges, BOLT charges, Demat charges, etc. paid to stock exchange by member — Not in the nature of fees for technical services.

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57 (2010) 41 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 296

DCIT v. Angel Broking Ltd.

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 9-12-2009

S. 194J — Various charges like VSAT charges, lease line
charges, BOLT charges, Demat charges, etc. paid to stock exchange by member —
Not in the nature of fees for technical services.

Facts :

As a member of BSE and NSE, the assessee company had paid
various charges like VSAT charges, lease line charges, BOLT charges, Demat
charges, etc. to the stock exchange. According to the AO, the aforesaid sum paid
by the assessee to the stock exchange was a fee for technical services and,
therefore, the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source on such payment.
Since, the assessee had not deducted tax at source on such payment, the
aforesaid sum claimed as deduction was disallowed by the AO.

Held :

Following the decision of Skycell Communications Ltd. v. DCIT,
251 ITR 53 (Mad.) it was held that stock exchanges do not provide any technical
services by installing VSAT network. It is the facility provided to its members
and hence such payment cannot be said to be fees for any technical services
rendered. The AO in coming to the conclusion that the payment was for fees for
technical services has relied on the fact that the screen-based trading is a
sophisticated method of trading. This by itself will not be sufficient to hold
that technical services are rendered. The AO has held that services are not
available to the public at large but only to registered members, again this by
itself will not make the services in question as technical services. Another
reason given by the AO is the speed at which transactions were completed. This
again is not a relevant criteria for holding that the services rendered were
technical services. All the above features present in screen-based trading saves
time. This is the result of improved technology. That does not mean that stock
exchange is providing technical services. Stock exchanges are not the owner of
this technology to provide them for a fee to prospective users. They are
themselves consumers of the technology. Therefore the payment in question is not
fee for technical services.


levitra

S. 271(1)(c) r.w. S. 2(24) and S. 10(10D) — Taxability of assignment of Keyman Insurance Policy based on surrender value was highly debatable as to the year of taxability and also as to the amount — Penalty not leviable u/s.271(1)(c).

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New Page 1Part A: Reported
Decisions

34 (2010) 127 ITD 116
(Delhi)

Rajan Nanda v. Dy. CIT,
Central Cir. 3,

New Delhi

A.Ys. : 2003-04, 2004-05.
Dated : 15-5-2009

 

S. 271(1)(c) r.w. S. 2(24)
and S. 10(10D) — Taxability of assignment of Keyman Insurance Policy based on
surrender value was highly debatable as to the year of taxability and also as to
the amount of taxability, so it was held that penalty is not leviable
u/s.271(1)(c).

Facts :

1. Keyman Insurance Policy
taken on the assessee by the employer company was assigned to him in the year
subsequent to the year of the policy at a much lower value.

2. However the value was
paid by the assessee in a different year and the policy was assigned to him in a
different year. The case of assessee subsequently went to the Tribunal so as to
decide the year of taxability and amount of taxable benefits.

3. The Tribunal held that
the surrender value of the policy less value paid by the assignee to the
assignor and less subsequent premium paid will be the benefits accruing to the
assessee. The decision of the Tribunal was, in a way, against the assessee.

4. The AO subsequently
initiated penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) for concealment of income.

5. Also in A.Y. 2004-05 the
assessee received Rs.2.85 crore on maturity, which he claimed as exempt
u/s.10(10D) for an amount equal to 2.51 crore. The AO disallowed the exemption
and also initiated penalty proceedings for entering wrong amount and also for
concealment of income.

6. The above actions of the
AO was upheld by the learned CIT(A).

Held :

1. The assessee had
disclosed complete facts to the Department during the course of hearing and the
addition was entirely due the difference of opinion between the assessee and the
AO.

2. Since the year in which
the amount paid by the assessee to the assignor was different from the year in
which the policy was assigned to him, the issue was a matter of considerable
debate and discussion.

3. It was held that the
explanation tendered by the assessee was bona fide notwithstanding the fact that
sketchy disclosure was made in the return of income and the whole issue of
taxation of the amount was highly debatable.

4. Also for the A.Y. 2004-05
the issue of taxability of sum received on maturity of erstwhile Keyman
Insurance Policy, from the LIC was highly debatable.

5. Hence penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) was not leviable.

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S. 45 r.w. S. 28(i) — Assessee in business of real estate — Land held as investment — Agreement of sale entered in F.Y. 2002-03 — Full consideration received by F.Y. 2004-05 — Capital gains offered to tax in A.Y. 2005-06 — Taxed as business income in A.Y

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Part A: Reported
Decisions


33 (2010) 127 ITD 94 (Bang.)

Asha Housing Enterprises v.
DCIT

A.Y. 2003-04. Dated :
31-3-2010

 

S. 45 r.w. S. 28(i) —
Assessee was in the business of real estate — Land was held as investment —
Agreement of sale entered in F.Y. 2002-03 — Full sale consideration received by
F.Y. 2004-05 — Long-term capital gains offered to tax in A.Y. 2005-06 — AO held
it as business income for A.Y. 2003-04 — Held : Land to be treated as investment
and transfer is said to be complete in F.Y. 2004-05.

Facts :

The assessee firm was
engaged in real estate business. It had purchased land in the year 1992. On
22-6-2002, the assessee had entered into agreement of sale with A Developers for
Rs.12.25 crores. On the date of agreement, the assessee received a part payment
of Rs.5.25 crores. Thereafter, sale consideration was received in piecemeal in
the F.Ys. 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05. The assessee offered to tax the income
arising out of this transaction as long-term capital gains in the A.Y. 2005-06.

The Assessing Officer
assessed the income as business income arising in A.Y. 2003-04. The AO observed
that general power of attorney (GPOA) in the favour of developers was executed
in F.Y. 2002-03 and therefore transfer had taken place in A.Y. 2003-04.

Held :

1. The execution of GPOA
cannot be construed as transfer of property.

2. The AO was not having any
conclusive evidence to show that possession of property was indeed handed over
to the developers.

3. The agreement of sale
clearly stated that the vendor shall deliver the possession of property on the
date of sale and against payment of entire sale consideration. The supplemental
agreement also had stated that the vendors at request of purchasers have
permitted by way of licence to enter upon the property to do the work of
property and that the licence granted to the purchasers was on specific
condition that the same shall not be construed as possession u/s.53A of the
Transfer of Property Act.

4. The assessee had held the
said land as investment right from the time the land was purchased. In the F.Y.
2000-01, the assessee had sold a portion of property and treated the gain out of
the same as long-term capital gain. The Department had accepted the same. The
Department cannot now treat the land as stock-in-trade. A firm involved in real
estate business can hold land as investment and/or stock-in-trade.

5. In view of the above, the
assessee had correctly offered income as long-term capital gains for A.Y.
2005-06.

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S. 68 — cannot be invoked when source of the gift is properly explained and when the donor himself appears before the AO, confirming the gift.

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New Page 1Part A: Reported
Decisions

32 (2010) 126 ITD 145 (AGRA)
(TM)

Avnish Kumar Singh v. ITO

A.Y. 2002-03. Dated :
30-4-2009

 

S. 68 — Provisions of S. 68
cannot be invoked when source of the gift is properly explained and also when
the donor himself appears before the Assessing Officer (AO), confirming the gift
made.

Facts :

1. The assessee received an
amount of Rs.2,50,000 as a gift from Mr. Rakesh Walia (donor), a resident of
Delhi. The donor was friend of the assessee’s father, and had received some help
from the assesse’s father earlier. So he had made a gift to the assessee.

2. The assessee, during
assessment, produced before the AO copy of deed of declaration of gift dated
24-1-2002 executed by the donor, his affidavit confirming the gift with his
complete address, a copy of his PAN Card and proof that he is an old income
tax-assessee, a photocopy of his ration card, a copy of accounts of the donor in
the books of Balaji Trading Corporation, Delhi (Balaji) and his Balance Sheet as
on 31-3-2001. Also the donor himself was produced before the AO and he confirmed
the gift and also gave reasons to the AO for giving the gift.

3. The AO observed that the
donor himself was a person of low financial status having monthly income of
Rs.5,000. He has no fixed assets of his own including any immovable property or
fixed deposits. He had a deposit of Rs.1,25,000 with Balaji, from which he
received Rs.2,46,000 which he forwarded to the assessee as gift. However the
reason of deposit with Balaji was not explained.

4. The Assessing Officer was
satisfied with the identity of the owner, however he was not satisfied with the
source of the income. So he invoked the provisions of S. 68 which was upheld by
the CIT(A).

Held :

1. The ITAT observed that
there could be two possibilities of the situation :

Possibility 1 :

Genuiness of the gifts
stands to be proved in the lights of all the evidences brought on record by the
assessee (in the favour of the assessee).

Possibility 2 :

Considering the
creditworthiness and capacity of the donor and closeness and natural love and
affection between the donor and the donee, the source of the gift is doubtful
(in the favour of Revenue).

2. S. 68 provides for
charging the sum credited in the books of the assessee as the income of the
assessee, if the assessee offers no explanation as to the nature and source of
the same.

3. Since the assessee has
explained the nature and sources of the credit by way of a gift, which
satisfactorily explains the genuineness of the gift, it cannot be added to the
income of the assessee as unexplained income u/s.68.

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S. 40(a)(ia) as amended w.e.f. 1-4-2010 is clarificatory and to be treated as retrospective w.e.f. 1-4-2005.

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Part A: Reported
Decisions

31 (2010) TIOL 765 ITAT-Ahm.

Shri Kanubhai Ramji Makwana
v. ITO

ITA No. 3983/Ahd./2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated :
3-12-2010

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S.
40(a)(ia) — Provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) as amended by the Finance Act, 2010 w.e.f.
1-4-2010 are clarificatory in nature and therefore to be treated as
retrospective w.e.f. 1-4-2005, the date on which S. 40(a)(ia) has been inserted
by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004.

Facts :

The assessee, a contractor,
was required to get work done through sub-contractors. While assessing the total
income of the assessee, the AO disallowed a sum of Rs.1,16,58,614 u/s.40(a)(ia)
of the Act on the ground that the amount of tax deducted at source was not
deposited before the last day of the previous year.

Aggrieved by the order of
the AO the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who observed that the AO
has disallowed the amounts based on unamended provisions of S. 40(a)(ia). The
CIT(A) observed that the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) have been amended by the
Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1-4-2005, and the amended provisions provide that tax
deducted in the last month of the previous year can be deposited before due date
specified u/s.139(1) of the Act for furnishing return of income. Accordingly, he
granted relief to the extent of payments aggregating to Rs.53,02,227 in respect
of which tax was deducted in the month of March 2004 and was paid on 19-7-2005
i.e., before the due date of filing return of income.

Aggrieved the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that the amendment made
by the Finance Act, 2010 to provisions of
S. 40(a)(ia) w.e.f. 1-4-2010 is clarificatory in nature and since the tax
deducted has been deposited before the due date of filing return of income, no
disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) is called for.

Held :

The Tribunal after going
through the history of the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) observed that the
amendments brought out in S. 40(a)(ia) of the Act from time to time were
clarificatory and when an amendment is declaratory and clarificatory in nature,
the presumption against its retrospectivity is not applicable and amendments of
this kind only declare. It observed that it is no doubt true that, ordinarily, a
statute, and particularly when the same has been made applicable with effect
from a particular date should be construed prospectively and not
retrospectively. But this principle will not be applicable in a case where the
provision construed is merely explanatory, clarificatory or declaratory.

The Tribunal held that the
provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) as amended by the Finance Act, 2010 w.e.f. 1-4-2010,
which has newly been inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, w.e.f. 1-4-2005
to S. 40 of the Act is remedial in nature, designed to eliminate unintended
consequences which may cause undue hardship to the taxpayers and which made the
provision unworkable or unjust in a specific situation, and is of clarificatory
nature and, therefore, has to be treated as retrospective with effect from 1st
April, 2005, the date on which S. 40(a)(ia) has been inserted by The Finance
(No. 2) Act, 2004.

The Tribunal allowed the
appeal filed by the assessee.

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S. 244A — Interest on excess payment of S.A. tax becomes due from the date of payment of S.A. tax.

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30 (2010) TIOL 760 ITAT-Bang.

Addl. CIT v. Vijaya Bank

ITA No. 105/Bang./2009

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated :
30-9-2010

 


Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 244A — Interest on excess payment of self-assessment
tax becomes due from the date of payment of self-assessment tax.

 

Facts :

The assessment of total
income of the assessee, a nationalised bank, was completed u/s.143(3) of the
Act. Aggrieved by the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who partly allowed the appeal of the assessee.
While giving effect to the order passed by the CIT(A) the AO did not grant
interest u/s.244A on the self-assessment tax, amounting to Rs.15.50 crores, paid
by the assessee. The AO declined to pay interest on self-assessment tax on the
ground that there is no provision for allowing interest u/s.244A on the
self-assessment tax.

Aggrieved by the order of
the AO refusing to grant interest on self-assessment tax paid, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.
The AO pursuant to the CIT(A)’s order granted interest on self-assessment tax
paid from the date of regular assessment, as against the claim of the assessee
that the interest ought to have been calculated from the date of payment of
self-assessment tax.

Aggrieved by the order of
the AO granting interest on self-assessment tax paid from the date of regular
assessment, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the
assessee is entitled to interest u/s.244A on the excess payment of
self-assessment tax with effect from the date on which it was paid by the
assessee and directed the AO to grant interest u/s.244A to the assessee
accordingly. He also held that the assessee is entitled to interest on interest
u/s.244A of the Act by following the decision of the SC in the case of Sandvik
Asia v. CIT, (280 ITR 643).

Aggrieved, the Revenue
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal having
considered the Circular No. 549, dated 31st October, 1989 and also the decision
of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Sutlej Industries Ltd., (325 ITR
331) (Del.), which decision follows the decision of the Madras High Court in the
case of Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd., 294 ITR 438, upheld the
decision of the CIT(A) that the assessee is entitled to interest u/s.244A on
excess payment of self-assessment tax with effect from the date of payment of
self-assessment tax. The Tribunal held that the decision of the jurisdictional
High Court in the case of CIT v. MICO, (ITA No. 419 of 2003 dated 9th July,
2008), on which reliance was placed by the Revenue, is distinguishable on facts
since in that case the Court was dealing with payment of interest u/s.244A on
excess payment of advance tax, unlike the present case where interest is being
claimed on excess payment of self-assessment tax paid u/s.140A of the Act.

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S. 201(1) and S. 201(1A) — Where deductees have paid taxes, assessee not liable to make good short deduction. Interest not chargeable for period after payment by deductees.

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Part A: Reported
Decisions


29 (2010) TIOL 751 ITAT-Del.

The Executive Engineer,
Haryana State

Agricultural Marketing Board
v. ITO

ITA No. 2011 to
2014/Del./2010

A.Ys. : 2006-07 to 2009-10.
Dated : 10-9-2010

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S.
201(1) and S. 201(1A) — In a case where deductees have paid their taxes, the
assessee cannot be held liable to make good the short deduction of tax. Interest
cannot be levied after the date on which the tax has been actually paid by the
deductees.

Facts :

The assessee, an autonomous
body controlled by the Government of Haryana, short deducted tax at source. The
Assessing Officer (AO) issued a notice of demand for the amount of tax short
deducted by the assessee. He also levied interest u/s.201(1A).

Aggrieved the assessee
preferred an appeal to CIT(A) and contended that since the deductees have paid
their tax dues, the tax cannot be recovered from the assessee. Proof with regard
to some of the deductees was sought to be filed before the CIT(A) but the
assessee could not explain why the same was not filed before the AO. The CIT(A)
did not take into consideration the said evidence filed by the assessee and
rejected the appeals filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that the short
deduction was due to the fact that the assessee being government-controlled body
did not have provision of engaging private consultant and the staff being not
conversant with the provisions of the Act could not deduct proper TDS, deductees
have paid the taxes due from them, interest cannot be levied for a period after
the date when the deductees have paid their taxes and in respect of delay in
depositing TDS interest be levied up to the date of tender of the cheque and not
up to the date of its encashment.

Held :

The Tribunal held this to be
a case of genuine hardship faced by the assessee and observed that if such
payment is made by the assessee, then from whom the payment can be recovered as
the deductees are stated to have already paid the taxes and have submitted their
returns.

The Tribunal restored the
matter back to the file of the AO with a direction to verify the contention of
the assessee that deductees having paid their taxes, the assessee cannot be held
liable to make good the short deduction of tax. It also held that interest
cannot be levied after the date on which the tax has actually been paid by the
deductees. The AO was directed to give reasonable opportunity to the assessee to
place the evidence on record and thereafter re-compute the liability of the
assessee u/s.201 and u/s.201(1A).

As regards interest on
belated payments, following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT
v. Ogala Glass Works Ltd., (25 ITR 529) (SC), the Tribunal directed the AO that,
for computing interest u/s.201(1A), date of tendering of cheque be taken into
consideration and if the cheque is tendered within the due date and has also not
been dishonoured, then no interest be charged on the assessee for belated
payment on account of late encashment of cheques.

The appeal filed by the
assessee was allowed.

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S. 44AE — Assessee engaged in transport business employing own as well as the hired vehicles S. 44AE can be applied to business carried with own vehicles.

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Part A: Reported
Decisions


28 (2010) 47 DTR (Pune)
(Trib) 513

Anil Ramgopal Mali (HUF) v.
ACIT

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated :
31-12-2009

 

S. 44AE — Even when an
assessee is engaged in the composite business employing both own as well as the
hired vehicles from others, provisions of S. 44AE can be applied with respect to
business carried on through own vehicles.

Facts :

The assessee conducted
transportation business not only with two light commercial vehicles (LCVs) owned
by the assessee but also hired vehicles owned by others. The annual gross
receipts were Rs.91,33,192. The break-up of the turnover was : (a) on account of
two LCVs owned : Rs.63,93,234 and (b) other vehicles : 27,39,958. The Assessing
Officer levied penalty u/s.271B for not getting the books of accounts audited.
The CIT(A) also confirmed the order of penalty on the ground that the assessee,
who is engaged with the composite business employing both own as well as the
hired vehicles from others, is outside the ambit of S. 44AE.

Held :

The assessees with multiple
businesses are not barred entirely from availing the benefits of the provisions
of S. 44AE. The assessee with multiple businesses, which include the business of
plying etc. with their own goods carriage, are not only entitled to the benefits
of S. 44AE but also for the exclusion of the relevant turnover from the total
turnover of all the businesses of the assessee for the purpose of computation of
monetary limits for S. 44AB of the Act in view of the existence of S. 44AE(5).


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S. 292BB — Notice by an AO not having jurisdiction over the assessee — Not a mere irregularity, but an incurable illegality, incapable of being cured by recourse to S. 292BB.

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Part A: Reported
Decisions


27 (2010) 47 DTR (Del.) (Trib.)
33

ITO v. Naseman Farms (P)
Ltd.

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated :
14-9-2010

S. 292BB — The
jurisdictional defect of the notice having been issued by an AO not having
jurisdiction over the assessee, as such, is not a mere irregularity, but an
incurable illegality and is incapable of being cured by seeking recourse to the
provisions of S. 292BB.

Facts :

The assessee company,
registered with RoC, Delhi, was having its office at Delhi and it had filed its
tax returns for A.Y. 1998-99 to 2000-01 in Delhi. On the basis of enquiry
conducted by the Investigation Wing of the IT Department, reassessment
proceedings were initiated against the assessee for A.Y. 2001-02 by issuance of
notice u/s.148 by the AO at Agra. Then subsequently the case was transferred to
the AO at Delhi for completion of assessment, it having been found by the AO at
Agra that the return had been filed with AO at Delhi. The CIT(A) annulled the
reassessment on the ground that reassessment notice issued from Agra was without
any jurisdiction.

Held :

It is only an AO within the
meaning of S. 2(7A) of the Act, who can assess or reassess any escaped income
u/s.147 of the Act, of an assessee. It is only an AO within the meaning of S.
2(7A) of the Act, who can serve a notice u/s.148 of the Act on an assessee.
Herein, the AO at Agra not being the AO qua the assessee, he could not have
assessed or reassessed any escaped income of the assessee and he could not have
served the assessee with a notice u/s.148 of the Act.

S. 292BB seeks to deem an
action as provided under the Act, to have been done in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. But when, as in the present case, the notice itself was
not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, it was a jurisdictional
defect, which the provisions of S. 292BB of the Act cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be canvassed to cure.

A ‘proceeding’ as envisaged
by S. 292BB has to be a legally valid proceeding which here it is not, since the
notice for reassessment is bad in law. This also goes for the ‘inquiry’
mentioned in S. 292BB. The assessee, therefore, never appeared in any
proceeding, nor co-operated in any inquiry as required u/s.292BB and so S. 292BB
does not at all come into play.

Further, in the present
case, the assessee is nowhere aggrieved of any of the three situations i.e., (1)
that the notice has not been served on him, or (2) it has not been served on him
in time, or (3) it has been served on him in an improper manner. Rather, the
grievance of the assessee is that the notice served on him was not issued by an
AO having jurisdiction over him. Now this is a jurisdictional issue which goes
to the very root of the matter.

The jurisdictional defect of
the notice having been issued by an AO not having jurisdiction over the assessee,
as such, is not a mere irregularity, but an incurable illegality and is
incapable of being cured by seeking recourse to the provisions of S. 292BB.

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Section 54F r.w.s. 54 Investment in vacant land appurtenant to and forming a part of a residential unit is eligible for exemption u/s.54F, even if no construction is done on the appurtenant land.

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New Page 1

52 (2009) 34 SOT 152 (Delhi)

Addl.CIT vs Narendra Mohan
Uniyal

ITA No.1624 (Delhi) of 2009 and
Cross Objection No.157 (Delhi) of 2009.

A.Y.2006-07. Dated 31.08.2009.

Section 54F r.w.s. 54 Investment
in vacant land appurtenant to and forming a part of a residential unit is
eligible for exemption u/s.54F, even if no construction is done on the
appurtenant land.

Facts:

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee sold land
and invested the capital gains in a plot of land on which a residential house
was under construction and claimed exemption u/s.54F. The assessee also claimed
exemption u/s.54F in respect of investment in another continuous plot of land
which, according to him, was land appurtenant to the building constructed on the
first plot. The Assessing Officer held that exemption u/s.54F is provided only
if investment is in respect of a residential house and not for an empty plot.
He, therefore, held that the consideration invested in the purchase of the
second plot was not entitled to exemption u/s.54F, and restricted the exemption
to the extent of amount invested in purchase of the first plot. On appeal, the
CIT(A) held that the Assessing Officer had not adduced any evidence that the
second plot was not a contiguous one and it did not constitute a land
appurtenant to the building constructed within the statutory time limit u/s.54F.
He therefore, allowed the claim of deduction u/s.54F in respect of second plot.

Held:

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal noted
as under:

a. There is no rider u/s.54F that no deduction would be
allowed in respect of investment of capital gains made on acquisition of land
appurtenant to the building or on the investment on land on which a building
is being constructed. When the land is purchased and the building constructed
thereon, it is not necessary that such construction should be on the entire
plot of land, i.e., there is no denial of exemption on investment in a piece
of land which is appurtenant to the building and on which no construction is
made.

b. In the instant case, there was no dispute in the fact
that investment of capital gains was made within the statutory period and
within the same financial year. Another plot of land which was purchased by
the assessee was adjacent to the plot already purchased during the relevant
year itself out of capital gains. Only because construction was made on the
first plot of land, the exemption claimed in respect of investment made in
Adjacent plot of land, could not be declined when all the other conditions as
stipulated u/s.54F were satisfied.

c. Both the plots formed part of one residential unit and
were contiguous and adjoining to each other. Had it been a case of land not

appurtenant to the building so constructed, then the contention of the
Assessing Officer to the effect that investment of capital gains made in the
second plot not appurtenant to the building so constructed was not eligible
for exemption, could be favourably accepted.



d. On a proper appreciation of material available on record, it was clear
that the property purchased by the assessee was a single unit and was being
used for residential purposes.

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Section 50 r.w.s. 32 and 50C 1961: Depreciation u/s. 32 can be claimed on WDV only if on the last day of the year: (1) there is at least one asset in the block, and (2) there is some value of the block.

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51 (2009) 34 SOT 64 (Mum.)

Asst.CIT vs Roger Pereira
Communications (P.) Ltd.

ITA No.2099 (Mum.) of 2008.

A.Y.2004-05. Dated August 2009.

Section 50 r.w.s. 32 and 50C
1961: Depreciation u/s. 32 can be claimed on WDV only if on the last day of the
year: (1) there is at least one asset in the block, and (2) there is some value
of the block.

Facts:

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee sold one of
its four office premises. The Assessing Officer revoked Section 50C and taxed
the difference between the agreement value and the value adopted by the stamp
duty authorities as short-term capital gains u/s. 50. The CIT (A) deleted the
addition observing that Section 50 does not have any mention of stamp duty
valuation as is mentioned in Section 50C.

Held:

The Tribunal upheld the CIT (A)’s order. The Tribunal noted
as under:

a. Section 50 is a special provision which provides for
bringing to tax by way of short-term capital gains depreciable assets which
are transferred during the previous year. This section creates a deeming
faction and it cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it has been
enacted.

b. Further, since the block of assets continued to exist
even after the sale of the first office premises and the block had not become
negative, no capital gain arose.


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Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961: Depreciation is allowable on goodwill u/s 32 (1)(ii).

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50 (2009) 33 SOT 237 (Mum.)

Kotak Forex Brokerage Ltd. vs.
Asst. CIT

ITA No.2692 (Mum.) of 2007

A.Y.2001-02. Dated August 2009.

Section 32 of the Income Tax
Act, 1961: Depreciation is allowable on goodwill u/s 32 (1)(ii).

Facts:

Pursuant to an agreement, the assessee acquired the foreign
exchange broking business of a company for which it paid a certain amount
towards broking rights and towards goodwill and claimed depreciation on the
same. The Assessing Officer allowed depreciation on the business rights (being
commercial rights), but disallowed deprecation on goodwill on the ground that
goodwill had not been included in the definition of intangible assets which
included know-how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licenses, franchises or any
other business or commercial right. The CIT (A) confirmed the order of the
Assessing Officer.

Held:

The Tribunal, following the decision in the case of Skyline
Caterers (P.) Ltd. V. ITO [2008] 20 SOT 266 (Mum.) (SMC), allowed the assessee’s
claim. The Tribunal noted as under:

1. Goodwill paid by the assessee was towards the use of the
name ‘Kotak’ with the name of the assessee-company.

2. Goodwill was a bundle of rights which included, inter
alia, patents, trademarks, licenses, franchises, etc. Therefore, all these
rights are similar to the rights under goodwill. Applying the principles of
ejusdem generis, the meaning has to be extended to the phrase “other business
or commercial rights of similar nature”.

3. Business or commercial rights are rights obtained for
effectively carrying on business or commerce. Commerce is a wider term which
encompasses business in its fold. Therefore, any right which is obtained for
carrying on the business effectively and profitably has to fall within the
meaning of intangible asset.

4. Business or commercial rights should be of similar
nature as know-how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licenses, franchises,
etc.— all these are assets which are not manufactured or produced overnight,
but are brought into existence by experience and reputation. They assume
importance in the commercial world as they represent a particular benefit or
advantage or reputation built over a period of time, and customers associate
themselves with such assets. Similarly, goodwill is nothing but positive
reputation built by a person / company / business-house over a period of time.
Thus, goodwill is a “business or commercial right of similar nature”.

5. Thus, goodwill is also an intangible asset of the
similar nature referred to in clause (ii) of Section 32(1) and, therefore,
deprecation is allowable on the same.


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Disallowance u/s 40A(3) to be made only when there is expenditure claimed in return of income. Mere entries in books will not change the character of transaction.

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49 Saral Motors & General
Finance Ltd. vs Asstt. CIT

[2009] 121 ITD 50 (Delhi
Tribunal)

A.Y. 2001-02

Date of order: May 30, 2008

Disallowance u/s 40A(3) to be
made only when there is expenditure claimed in return of income. Mere entries in
books will not change the character of transaction.

Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of financing second
hand motor vehicles on hire purchase basis. The assessee financed the vehicles
identified by the purchaser and entered into hire purchase agreement. The
assessee in its profit and loss account had shown purchase price of these second hand motor vehicles as Rs.
79,14,700 and on the credit side, there was a contra entry of Rs.79,14,700
showing it as sale on hire purchase. The AO found that payments in excess of Rs.
20,000 aggregating to Rs. 23,37,000 were made to 32 parties. The AO required the
assessee to explain as to why 20% of the sum of Rs. 79,14,000 should not be
disallowed. The assessee submitted that transactions were not in the nature of
expenditure. They were simply loan transactions.

The AO observed that the real test, whether a particular
transaction was in the nature of expenditure was to be decided taking into
account how the transactions were entered in the books of account and treatment
thereof. The alleged advances formed part of trading activity. The AO further
observed that in the balance sheet stock on hire under hire purchase basis was
shown, which was nothing but stock in trade. Therefore, such transactions could
not be treated as advances. On this basis, the AO made a disallowance under
section 40A(3) of the Act.


Held:

On appeal, the Hon’ble tribunal held that assessee was not a
dealer in second hand motor cars. He let out the same. Only part of the amount
was financed by the assessee. The invoices were made in the name of the
purchaser. The past behaviour of the assessee also showed that it did not intend
to deal in cars. The assessee did not earn any profit on purchase or sale of
vehicles. It earned income on hire purchase transactions. For invoking the
provisions of section 40A(3), the amount must be claimed as expenditure. When
amounts paid have not been claimed as deductible expenditure while computing
business income, provisions of section 40A(3) cannot be applied. Mere entries in
the books of account will not change the character of financial transactions.
The addition so made was thus deleted.

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Exemption u/s 10(10C) to be allowed even if the scheme is not in accordance with Rule 2BA

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48 Dy CIT vs Krishna Gopal Saha

[2009] 121 ITD 368 (Kol.) (TM)

A.Y. 2002-03

Date of Order: July 31, 2009

Exemption u/s 10(10C) to be
allowed even if the scheme is not in accordance with Rule 2BA

Facts:

The assessee is a retired employee of State Bank. During the
year under consideration, the assessee opted for voluntary retirement under a
scheme named “Early Separation Plan” (ESP) floated by the bank. He received a
compensation of Rs. 18,87,798. The employer, vide its letter, stated that
employees availing the ESP Scheme are not eligible for exemption u/s 10(10C) of
the Act as the scheme was not in conformity with Rule 2BA(i) to (v). Therefore,
no deduction under section 10(10C) was allowed in the Form 16 issued by the
employer. The assessee, however, claimed exemption under section 10(10C) in the
return of income filed. The same was processed under section 143(1) of the Act.
The assessment was reopened u/s 147 and the claim u/s 10(10C) was disallowed by
the AO.

The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim. On Revenue’s appeal,
there was a difference of opinion between the members, and the matter was
referred to the “Third Member”.

Held:

The Third Member, in his order, relied on the case of SAIL
DSP VR Employees Association v UOI (262 ITR 638) (Cal.) which squarely applied
to the assessee. Their Lordship in the said judgment observed that section
10(10C) was inserted in order to make voluntary retirement attractive so as to
reduce human complements for securing economic viability of certain companies.
This object was elaborated by various departmental circulars and explanatory
statements issued from time to time. All these go to show that this was intended
to make voluntary retirement more attractive and beneficial to the employees
opting for voluntary retirement. Therefore, this has to be interpreted in a
manner beneficial to the optee for voluntary retirement, if there is any
ambiguity. A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case
of CIT vs. Nagesh Devidas Kulkarni (291 ITR 407) and the Karnataka High Court in
the case of CIT v P. Surendra Prabhu (279 ITR 402).

Following the above decisions, the amount received by the
assessee was allowed.

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The ratio of Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Arun Kumar vs. UOI – amended Rule 3 – retrospective amendment – is valid for levy of tax on employee, but not on employer for deduction of tax at source.

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47 Canara Bank vs. ITO 8(3),
Nagpur

121 ITD 1 (Nagpur)

A.Y. 2002-03 to 2006-07

Date of Order: July 4, 2008

The ratio of Supreme Court’s
judgment in the case of Arun Kumar vs. UOI – amended Rule 3 – retrospective
amendment – is valid for levy of tax on employee, but not on employer for
deduction of tax at source.

Facts:

The assessee, a public sector company, had provided
residential accommodation to its employees in addition to salaries. The rent in
respect of such accommodation was recovered from the employees. The rent charged
to employees was as per the Service Regulations, approved by the central
government.

The assessing officer, relying on the Supreme Court’s
judgment in the case of Arun Kumar vs. Union of India [2006] (286 ITR 89),
required the assessee to deduct tax and pay the tax on the concessional
accommodation provided to its employees, from assessment year 2001-02, i.e.,
retrospectively. As per the AO, the difference in the rate specified in amended
Rule 3 and the rent charged by the assessee was a benefit in the nature of
concession and, therefore, perquisite under Section 17(2) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (‘the Act’). The assessee ought to have deducted tax. Since the tax had not
been deducted, the assessee was in default under Section 192 read with Section
201(1A) of the Act.

Held:

On appeal to the Tribunal, the ITAT observed that a
retrospective amendment was to be given effect to, as it was there in existence
on the date from which it came into effect. The Tribunal, therefore, held that
the perquisite value is to be worked out on the basis of the amended provision
of Section 17(2) of the Act.

The Tribunal also held that a retrospective amendment could
be valid for levy of tax on the employee, but there exists no force in the
contention of the revenue that the employer would also be under responsibility
to deduct tax at source retrospectively.

Further, it observed, analysing the provisions of Sections
192(1), 192(1A) and 192(1B), Section 200 and Rule 30, that liability to deduct
tax is there on the date(s) when the salary is actually paid. If there was no
perquisite at the time when the tax was to be deducted at source, there would be
no liability to deduct tax. If a perquisite value is assumed by the
retrospective amendment after the period during which it was deducted, how can a
deduction be made on an earlier date? The retrospective amendment is for deeming
valuation of perquisites and cannot extend to deduction of tax at source
thereon.

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S. 271(1)(c) read with S. 271(1B) — The penalty was initiated for filing inaccurate particulars of income, but it was levied for concealment of income

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

13 (2010) 36 DTR (Agra) (Trib.) 453
ITO v. Chhail Behari
A.Y. : 2002-03 Dated : 15-10-2009

 

S. 271(1)(c) read with S. 271(1B) — The penalty was initiated
for filing inaccurate particulars of income, but it was levied for concealment
of income — If the satisfaction arrived at during the assessment proceedings was
for one reason, penalty cannot be levied for another reason — Even after
retrospective insertion of S. 271(1B), the difference between the two limbs of
S. 271(1)(c) is not erased and still remains.

Facts :

The Tribunal in appeal against the order levying penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) held that there was no proper satisfaction arrived at as required
u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. It was held that the satisfaction was qua ‘furnishing
inaccurate particulars of income’ as recorded in the assessment order, but in
the order levying penalty u/s.271(1)(c), the same was qua ‘concealment of
particulars of income’. Hence, the penalty was
deleted.

The Revenue filed a miscellaneous application and contended
that by the Finance Act, 2008, an amendment has been made retrospectively w.e.f.
1st April, 1989 to provide that where an assessment order contains a direction
for initiation of penalty proceedings, such an order of assessment shall be
deemed to constitute satisfaction of the Assessing Officer for initiation of
penalty proceedings for concealment in respect of any amount added or disallowed
in computing the total income or loss of the assessee. Thus it can be said that
the mention by the Assessing Officer of direction for initiation of proceedings
u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act in the assessment order would cover both the actions of
the assessee i.e., ‘concealment of particulars of income’ as well as ‘furnishing
of inaccurate particulars of income.’

Held :

If the satisfaction arrived at during the assessment
proceedings was for one reason, penalty cannot be levied for another reason
relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff
(291 ITR 519) (SC). Thus the Tribunal had not cancelled the penalty on the
ground that there was no satisfaction recorded in the assessment order. Even
after retrospective amendment, since the difference between two limbs of S.
271(1)(c) is not erased or is considered as one, the distinction between
‘concealment of particulars of income’ and ‘furnishing of inaccurate particulars
of income’ is still maintained. Hence it cannot be said that there is any
mistake apparent on record.

 

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S. 144 — CIT(A) set aside the assessment — No direction to re-do the assessment given — Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to re-do the assessment.

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

12 (2010) 123 ITD 53 (Chennai)
DCIT v. Jaya Publication
A.Ys. : 1991-92 to 1993-94. Dated : 30-11-2007

S. 144 — CIT(A) set aside the assessment — No direction to
re-do the assessment given — Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to re-do the
assessment.

The original assessment was set aside by the CIT(A).
Subsequently, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.142(1) of the Act. The
assessee complied with the said notice. However, not satisfied by the assessee’s
explanations, the Assessing Officer completed the assessment u/s.144 considering
the entire issues and making various additions. The assessee went in to appeal
on the ground that the assessment done by the Assessing Officer was without
jurisdiction and without any specific direction from the CIT(A).

Relying on various decisions, the Tribunal held that the
CIT(A) has set aside the assessment means that he has annulled the assessment,
since he has not given any direction to re-do the assessment. Hence, the
Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to re-do he assessment. The only remedy
with the Department was that it has to file an appeal against the order of the
CIT(A).

 

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