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S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Assessee included miscellaneous income without reducing 90% — Penalty cannot be levied simply because assessee had not reduced 90% of other incomes

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51 (2010) 124 ITD 353 (Delhi)

Model Footwear (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 22-5-2009


S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Assessee included
miscellaneous income without reducing 90% — Penalty cannot be levied simply
because assessee had not reduced 90% of other incomes

S. 271(1)(c) — Last year for claiming deduction u/s.80I was
A.Y. 1996-97 — Inspite of this, assessee claimed deduction u/s.80I — No
explanation offered by assessee in this regard — Explanation I to S. 271(1)(c)
applicable — Penalty to be levied.

Facts :

The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHC of Rs. 1,52,63,904.
While doing so, the assessee included interest income, miscellaneous income and
excess provision written back in the profit without reducing 90% thereof. The
AO, by applying the Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC, excluded 90% of aforesaid
amounts and worked out deduction u/s.80HHC. He also initiated penalty
proceedings u/s.271(1)(c).

The Assessing Officer further noticed that the assessee had
also claimed deduction u/s.80I. The AO noted that the assessee was entitled to
deduction only up to A.Y. 1996-97. The AO thereafter asked the assessee to give
reasons as to why the claim of deduction u/s.80I should not be disallowed. No
reply in this regard was furnished by the assessee. The AO, therefore, held that
the claim of deduction u/s.80I was incorrect. He also initiated penalty
proceedings u/s.271(1)(c).

The CIT(A) confirmed the above additions. Thereafter, the AO
proceeded with penalty proceedings.

The CIT(A) confirmed that penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is leviable
in the assessee’s case.



Held :


(1) The question of excluding interest income and
miscellaneous income is dependent upon the nature of incomes — Whether they
are directly connected to operations of the assessee’s business. Simply
because the assessee had claimed deduction without reducing 90% of aforesaid
incomes, it cannot be said that the assessee has concealed income or has
made incorrect claim. The assessee’s claim was a bona fide one and assessee
has disclosed all material facts. Hence, no penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is to be
levied.

(2) As far as deduction u/s.80I is concerned, penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) has been correctly levied. No reason or explanation was given
by the assessee as to why it made a claim for deduction u/s.80I when it was
known to the assessee that the deduction is available only up to the A.Y.
1996-97.

The Assessing Officer started making enquiry and on enquiry,
the assessee informed the AO that the first year of deduction was A.Y. 1989-90.
Even, thereafter the assessee did not withdraw the claim made u/s.80I.

Hence the Explanation I to S. 271(1)(c) is squarely
applicable to assessee’s case inasmuch as the assessee failed to offer any
explanation.


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S. 40A(9) — Where the contribution made to any fund is a bona fide one, the same should not be hit by the disallowance of S. 40A(9).

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50 (2010) 124 ITD 332 (Cochin)

ACIT v. State Bank of Travancore

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 8-8-2007

 

S. 40A(9) — Where the contribution made to any fund is a bona
fide one, the same should not be hit by the disallowance of S. 40A(9).

Facts :

The assessee had contributed Rs.50 lakhs to Retired Employees
Medical Benefit Scheme. This was pursuant to the Associate Bank Officers’
Association’s (‘union’) demands from the management of the State Bank of India
and its subsidiaries. After negotiations between the management and the union,
it was agreed to formulate a medical scheme for retired officers. As per terms
of agreement between the management and the union, the assessee paid Rs.50 lakhs
as its contribution towards formulation of the scheme.

On perusal of the tax audit report, the AO disallowed the
said contribution on the ground that the said contribution is subject to the
provisions of S. 40A(9). The CIT(A) held in favour of the assessee.

Held :

The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee on the following
grounds :

(1) The basic intention for inserting Ss.(9) to S. 40A was
to discourage the practice of creating camouflage trust funds, etc. ostensibly
for the welfare of employees and transferring huge funds to such trust as
contribution.

(2) In the given case, there was an agreement signed by the
management and the union and contribution made by the assessee was in
pursuance to this agreement. Hence, it was a contractual obligation of the
assessee and the contribution was a bona fide one. Further, in the case of
assessee the fund is not in the control of the assessee.

The assessee would not be hit by the provisions of S. 40A(9).

51 (2010) 124 ITD 353 (Delhi)

Model Footwear (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 22-5-2009

 

S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Assessee included
miscellaneous income without reducing 90% — Penalty cannot be levied simply
because assessee had not reduced 90% of other incomes

S. 271(1)(c) — Last year for claiming deduction u/s.80I was
A.Y. 1996-97 — Inspite of this, assessee claimed deduction u/s.80I — No
explanation offered by assessee in this regard — Explanation I to S. 271(1)(c)
applicable — Penalty to be levied.

Facts :

The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHC of Rs. 1,52,63,904.
While doing so, the assessee included interest income, miscellaneous income and
excess provision written back in the profit without reducing 90% thereof. The
AO, by applying the Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC, excluded 90% of aforesaid
amounts and worked out deduction u/s.80HHC. He also initiated penalty
proceedings u/s.271(1)(c).

The Assessing Officer further noticed that the assessee had
also claimed deduction u/s.80I. The AO noted that the assessee was entitled to
deduction only up to A.Y. 1996-97. The AO thereafter asked the assessee to give
reasons as to why the claim of deduction u/s.80I should not be disallowed. No
reply in this regard was furnished by the assessee. The AO, therefore, held that
the claim of deduction u/s.80I was incorrect. He also initiated penalty
proceedings u/s.271(1)(c).

The CIT(A) confirmed the above additions. Thereafter, the AO
proceeded with penalty proceedings.

The CIT(A) confirmed that penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is leviable
in the assessee’s case.


Held :

(1) The question of excluding interest income and
miscellaneous income is dependent upon the nature of incomes — Whether they
are directly connected to operations of the assessee’s business. Simply
because the assessee had claimed deduction without reducing 90% of aforesaid
incomes, it cannot be said that the assessee has concealed income or has made
incorrect claim. The assessee’s claim was a bona fide one and assessee has
disclosed all material facts. Hence, no penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is to be levied.

(2) As far as deduction u/s.80I is concerned, penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) has been correctly levied. No reason or explanation was given by
the assessee as to why it made a claim for deduction u/s.80I when it was known
to the assessee that the deduction is available only up to the A.Y. 1996-97.

The Assessing Officer started making enquiry and on enquiry,
the assessee informed the AO that the first year of deduction was A.Y. 1989-90.
Even, thereafter the assessee did not withdraw the claim made u/s.80I.

Hence the Explanation I to S. 271(1)(c) is squarely applicable to assessee’s
case inasmuch as the assessee failed to offer any explanation.

S. 10B — For claiming deduction the assessee need not own the plant and machinery by itself.

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49 (2010) 124 ITD 249 (Delhi)

ITO v. Techdrive (India) (P.) Ltd.

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 27-6-2008

S. 10B — For claiming deduction the assessee need not own the
plant and machinery by itself.

Facts :

The assessee is a private limited company. In its return of
income it claimed a deduction u/s.10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) in
respect of export of computer software. During the scrutiny assessment, the AO
found that the assessee did not have any plant and machinery to develop any
computer software on its own. The computer software developing was done in the
premises of Seacom, the subsidiary of the assessee for which the assessee paid
‘software development charges’. According to the AO, one of the basic conditions
for claiming deduction u/s.10B is that the assessee company should have its own
infrastructure. He denied deduction u/s.10B of the Act.

The CIT(A) held that the assessee was entitled to exemption
u/s.10B.

Held :

On appeal, the ITAT allowed deduction u/s.10B on the
following grounds :

(1) Relying on various judgments, the ITAT held that it is
not required that the assessee company should itself own plant and machinery.
Even if the assessee gets the articles manufactured from some other person but
under the control and supervision of the assessee, it must be taken as if the
assessee is the manufacturer.

(2) Further the development of computer software is a very
specialised field which requires specialised education, skills, etc. It is not
a mechanical job and more than machines, it is human skills that count.

(3) Further, Circular 694, dated 23-11-1994 also supports
the assessee’s case. The Circular accepts that computer programmes are not
physical goods but are developed through a process of intellectual analysis.
It also recognizes that in some cases it is possible for the assessee to
produce software at the client’s premises. In such case, the software
personnel sent by the assessee would obviously use the client’s equipment
only.

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S. 32 r.w. S. 147, S. 133A — Depreciation cannot be denied on asset forming part of block of assets is not used

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 Part A — Reported Decisions



50 (2008) 22 SOT 249 (Mum.)

Unitex Products Ltd. v. ITO

ITA Nos. 153 and 154 (Mum.) of 2003

A.Ys. 1996-97 & 1997-98. Dated : 25-1-2008

S. 32 r.w. S. 147 and S. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Once an asset was part of block of assets and depreciation was granted on that
block, it cannot be denied in subsequent year on the ground that one of the
assets was not used by the assessee in that year.

 

The Assessing Officer completed the assessments of the
assessee for the relevant years u/s.143(3). Subsequently, a survey u/s.133A was
carried out at the business premises of the assessee. On the basis of the
statement recorded of the estate manager (R), the Assessing Officer reopened the
assessment for A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1997-98 and disallowed the assessee’s claim for
depreciation and maintenance expenses of one building as R had stated that the
building was under structural renovation during the period and was vacated by
the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the Assessing Officer’s action.

 

The Tribunal reversed the orders of the lower authorities.
The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) Apart from R’s Statement, the Department had not
brought anything on record for negating the claim of the assessee with regard
to depreciation.

(b) Contrary to the facts possessed by the Assessing
Officer, the assessee had demonstrated that the building, though was under
renovation, yet was not totally abandoned; it had been using this building for
business purposes and it had incurred electricity expenses, telephone expenses
and made sales and purchases from this building. The assessee had also pointed
out that all correspondence was being made in that building only. The demand
notice was also served on these premises. It was also pointed out that
registered office address was also of this building.

(c) If one weighed the material produced by the assessee
vis-à-vis
the solitary statement of R elicited by the authority during the
course of survey, then scale would tilt in favour of the assessee, because the
statement was recorded U/ss.(3)(iii) of S. 133A without administering the oath
to R. This was information which required corroboration for deciding an issue
against the assessee. The Assessing Officer had not brought any corroborative
piece of evidence in support of this information.

(d) It was also submitted by the assessee that the building
was part of its block of assets. The Tribunal in Packwell Printers v. ACIT,
(1996) 58 ITD 340 (Jab.) has considered a similar issue. This order of the
Tribunal was subsequently followed in Natco Exports v. Dy. CIT, (2003)
86 ITD 445 (Hyd.), etc. According to these decisions, once the asset is part
of block of assets and depreciation is granted on that block, it cannot be
denied in the subsequent year on the ground that one of the assets was not
used by the assessee in some of the years. The user of the assets has to apply
upon the block as a whole instead of an individual asset. The Revenue could
not cite any other decision contrary to the said decisions of the Tribunal.

 


Therefore, the assessee was entitled to depreciation and other expenses in
respect of the building.

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(a) S. 23 — Notional interest on interest- free deposit cannot be considered for determining annual letting value. (b) Standard rent under Rent Control Act, can be taken as ALV; in absence of standard rent, municipal rateable value to be taken — If muni

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49 (2008) 22 SOT 245 (Mum.)

Delite Enterprises (P.) Ltd. v.
ITO

ITA Nos. 433, 2983-4887 and 5708 (Mum.) of 2005

A.Ys. 2001-02 & 2002-03. Dated : 26-2-2008

S. 23 of the Income-tax Act,.1961-




(a) Notional interest on interest-free deposit cannot
be considered for determining the Annual Letting Value (ALV)


(b) When Rent Control Act applies, only standard rent
can be taken as ALV; in the absence of standard rent, municipal rateable value
is to be taken and where municipal rateable value is less than actual rent,
then actual rent shall be the fair market value.


 


During the relevant assessment year, the assessee had let out
a property in New Delhi for an annual rent of Rs.0.60 lacs and took security
deposit of Rs.370.60 lacs. The assessee computed the annual letting value of the
said property u/s.23(1)(b) by taking the rent received at Rs.60,000 and offered
the same to tax in its return of income. It submitted before the Assessing
Officer that the Municipal Rateable Value (MRV) of the said property as per
Delhi Municipal Authority was Rs.22,230 only and, therefore, the higher of the
two had to be taken into consideration while computing the annual letting value
u/s.23(1)(b). The Assessing Officer held that there was an interest-free
security deposit of Rs.370.60 lacs and the interest had to be considered while
arriving at the fair market value of the property. He further held that S.
23(1)(b) was not applicable to the facts of the case and only S. 23(1)(a) had to
be considered. Further, the Assessing Officer relied upon some property
newspaper and computed the annual rent at Rs.14.40 lacs. The CIT(A) upheld the
order.

 

The Tribunal held in the assessee’s favour. The Tribunal
noted as under :

1. Interest on security deposit :



The Assessing Officer cannot consider notional interest on
deposit while arriving at the fair market value u/s.23(1)(b) of the Act. The
judgment of the jurisdictional High Court in case of J. K. Investors (Bombay)
Ltd. (2001) 248 ITR 723/112 Taxman 107 has been approved by the Supreme Court.

 


2. Determination of ALV


(a) A reading of the order of the Tribunal in ITO v.
Makrupa Chemicals (P.) Ltd.,
(2007) 108 ITD 95 (Mum.) shows that the
standard rent is the upper limit. The property in question was situated in
Delhi and was indisputably covered under the Rent Control Act. Hence, the
standard rent had to be arrived at. Further, fair market value should be based
on the facts and circumstances of the case.

(b) The Assessing Officer had not made any attempt
whatsoever to decide the standard rent and, under these circumstances, the
municipal rateable value assumed significance. As the actual rent received was
more than municipal rateable value, the actual rent received should be taken
as municipal rateable value. In any event, as the Rent Control Act applied to
the property in question, only standard rent could be taken as the annual
letting value. In the absence of standard rent, municipal rateable value was
to be taken. As municipal rateable value was less than the actual rent, the
actual rent would be the fair market value of property. Therefore, the
assessee had rightly computed annual letting value of the said property
u/s.23(1)(b) by taking into consideration actual rent received.

 

 

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S. 28(iv) — Gifts received by social reformer and philosopher from followers could not be taxed u/s.28(iv).

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48 (2008) 22 SOT 197 (Mum.)

Nirmala P. Athavale v. ITO

ITA No. 1084 (Mum.) of 2005

A.Y. 2001-02. Dated : 29-2-2008

S. 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Gifts received by a
social reformer and philosopher from followers in recognition of personal
qualities and noble thoughts could not be taxed u/s.28(iv).

 

The assessee, husband of the appellant, a well known social
reformer and philosopher and having lakhs of followers spread all over the
world, had established a movement called ‘Swadhyaya’ for the upliftment of the
masses. The assessee had devoted his whole life to the cause of this movement
and had never charged any fee or remuneration from his followers or the persons
who attended his lectures at any point of time. During the relevant previous
year, the assessee had received voluntary gifts of certain sum on his 80th
birthday from his admirers and well-wishers in recognition of his personal
qualities and noble thoughts and claimed the same to be exempt from taxation.
The Assessing Officer held that conducting spiritual discourses amounted to a
vocation and, hence, the provisions of S. 28(iv) were squarely applicable to the
instant case. The Assessing Officer, therefore, treated the amount of gifts
received by the assessee as his income from profession and brought the same to
tax. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the Assessing Officer.

 

The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities.
The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) The work done by the assessee was a mass movement or
campaign and not a vocation. Even if it was treated as vocation, then having
regard to the fact that the assessee had never charged any fee or remuneration
for his imparting of knowledge and practising of values based on ‘Shrimad
Bhagawat Gita’ and also the fact that the assessee did not have any vested
right to receive any kind of payment for these activities from his
disciples/followers, the gift made by the followers, without being under any
contractual or legal or customary obligations to do so, could not be treated
as a consideration arising out of carrying on of vocation.

(b) In Helios Food Improvers (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT,
(2007) 14 SOT 546 (Mum.) the Tribunal has held that the provisions of S.
28(iv) can be applied in a number of situations, but the bottomline or crucial
fact would always be circumvention of income by taking or receiving income in
other forms. Since, in the instant case, there was no intention of
circumvention of income on the part of the assessee or receiving income in
other forms, provisions of S. 28(iv) could not be applied.

(c) Further, the term ‘perquisite’ as per dictionary
meaning means ‘privilege or benefit given in addition to one’s salary or
regular wages’, which means that it is an additional benefit and not a
complete substitution of one’s income. The assessee had never charged any
consideration from his followers or persons who attended his lectures. Hence,
it could not be termed as ‘benefit’ or ‘perquisite’ within the meaning of S.
28(iv).


 

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S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Assessee included miscellaneous income without reducing 90% — Penalty cannot be levied simply because assessee had not reduced 90% of other incomes.

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Part
A: Reported Decisions


48 (2010) 124 ITD 353 (Delhi)

Model Footwear (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. 1998-99. Dated : 22-5-2009

 

S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Assessee included
miscellaneous income without reducing 90% — Penalty cannot be levied simply
because assessee had not reduced 90% of other incomes.

The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHC of Rs. 1,52,63,904.
While doing so, the assessee included interest income, miscellaneous income and
excess provision written back in the profit without reducing 90% thereof. The
AO, by applying the Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC, excluded 90% of aforesaid
amounts and worked out deduction u/s.80HHC. He also initiated penalty
proceedings u/s.271(1)(c).

The CIT(A) confirmed the above additions. Thereafter, the AO
proceeded with penalty proceedings.

The CIT(A) confirmed that penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is leviable
in the assessee’s case.

Held :

The question of excluding interest income and miscellaneous
income is dependent upon the nature of incomes — whether they are directly
connected to operations of the assessee’s business. Simply because the assessee
had claimed deduction without reducing 90% of aforesaid incomes, it cannot be
said that the assessee has concealed income or has made incorrect claim. The
assessee’s claim was a bona fide one and the assessee has disclosed all material
facts. Hence, no penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is to be levied.

Note : The above issue was the main issue involved in the case.
The other issues being minor issues have not been reported.

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S. 271(1)(c) — The constitution of Special Bench itself suggests that there was some force in the claim of the assessee — If there is a debatable issue and action of the assessee is bona fide being based on adoption of one of the possible views, the penal

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Part
A: Reported Decisions


47 (2010) 39 DTR (Del.) (Trib.) 202

Pradeep Agencies Joint Venture v. ITO

A.Ys. : 2003-04 & 2004-05. Dated : 31-3-2010

 

S. 271(1)(c) — The constitution of Special Bench itself
suggests that there was some force in the claim of the assessee — If there is a
debatable issue and action of the assessee is bona fide being based on adoption
of one of the possible views, the penalty is not leviable.

Facts :

The assessee was an AOP and during the relevant assessment
years it filed return of income at nil and it was claimed that it had
distributed the profit amongst its members as per their respective shares which
are determined and defined in the joint venture agreement and all of them have
shown their share as income u/s.67A and, therefore, S. 167B(2) was not
applicable. The assessee supported its claim by relying on the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Murlidhar Jhawar & Purna Ginning & Pressing
Factory, 60 ITR 95 and also by Board’s Circular No. 75/19/191/62-ITJ, dated 24th
August, 1966.

The contention of the assessee was not accepted by the AO and
income was taxed in the hands of the AOP at maximum marginal rate as per S.
167B(2). The matter went up to the Tribunal and Special Bench was constituted.
The Special Bench held that the assessment made on the AOP is valid as reliance
could not be placed on the Circular as the same had lost its validity in the
light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ITO v. Ch. Atchaiah,
218 ITR 239 and also there was amendment in the provisions of the Act by virtue
of which the AO had lost option to the assessee either AOP or its members under
the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as compared to the provisions of the
1922 Act.

The penalty was levied on the ground that the assessee has
not come clean on the issue of taxing the income received by AOP u/s.167B(2) and
tried to mislead the Department.

Held :

It has to be kept in mind that quantum proceedings are
different and distinct from the penalty proceedings. In penalty proceedings,
mere confirmation of addition in quantum proceedings cannot be said to be
conclusive factor to hold that penalty is leviable. According to the facts of
the present case, right from the beginning it has been the case of the assessee
that its claim of filing substantial income in the hands of the members of the
AOP was supported by the decision of the Supreme Court, which was even
interpreted by the CBDT in its Circular to be applicable to the provisions of
the Income-tax Act, 1961. It is also the case of the assessee that even if the
legal position had been settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Ch. Atchaiah (supra), then also the Circular being a benevolent one could not
be refused to be applied by the Department unless the same is withdrawn. The
constitution of the Special Bench itself suggests that there was some force in
the claim of the assessee or at least the view taken by the assessee could not
be said to be totally devoid of merit. The reference of issue to the Special
Bench is indicative of the fact that there was a lot of debate on the issue
whether the benevolent Circular will prevail even after the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Ch. Atchaiah (supra). Thus, it is certainly a case
where two views of the matter were possible. Where there is a debatable issue
and action of the assessee is bona fide being based on adoption of one of the
possible views, the penalty is not leviable even if in the quantum proceedings
it was not finally accepted by the Tribunal.

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S. 80-IA — The eligibility for the claim of deduction u/s.80-IA by applying the restraints of S. 80-IA(3) cannot be considered for every year of the claim of deduction u/s.80-IA, but can be considered only in the year of formation of the business.

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Part
A: Reported Decisions


46 (2010) 39 DTR (Del.) (Trib.) 17

Tata Communications Internet Services Ltd. v.
ITO

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated : 26-2-2010

 

S. 80-IA — The eligibility for the claim of deduction
u/s.80-IA by applying the restraints of S. 80-IA(3) cannot be considered for
every year of the claim of deduction u/s.80-IA, but can be considered only in
the year of formation of the business.

Facts :

The company was in the business of providing fax mail
services. The company started two new services being Internet services and
Internet telephony services as per the licence issued from the Department of
Telecommunication (DOT). The assessee claimed that as per the provisions of
S. 80-IA(4), the assessee was entitled to the deduction right from the A.Y.
2001-02 as the first invoice was made on 17th October, 2000. The assessee did
not claim deduction u/s.80-IA(4) for the A.Ys. 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04 and
the first year of claim u/s.80-IA(4) was for A.Y. 2004-05 and for the
A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005-06 the assessee had been granted the deduction where the
assessment orders were passed u/s.143(3) of the Act.

The AO denied the deduction u/s.80-IA(4) for A.Y. 2006-07 on
the ground that this was a new business in which the assessee had used the plant
and machinery previously used in its business of fax mail services.

Held :

The bar as provided in S. 80-IA(3) is to be considered only
for the first year of claim of deduction
u/s.80-IA. Once the assessee has been shown to have used new plant and machinery
which was not previously used for any purpose and it is established that the
undertaking is not formed by splitting up or reconstruction of a business
already in existence the assessee becomes entitled to the deduction u/s.80-IA.
In the subsequent years, the assessee may acquire fresh machinery and plant
whether new or previously used for any purpose. As the deduction is available on
the income of the undertaking and the bar provided u/s.80-IA(3) is in relation
to the formation of undertaking, once the formation is complete the development
of undertaking cannot be put under restraints of S. 80-IA(3) of the Act. The
eligibility for the claim of deduction u/s.80-IA by applying the restraints of
S. 80-IA(3) cannot be considered for every year of the claim of deduction
u/s.80-IA, but can be considered only in the year of formation of the
undertaking.

Even otherwise in the present case, the clause (ii) of S.
80-IA(4) having been inserted in S. 80-IA(3) w.e.f. 1st April, 2005 and the
business of the assessee has been formed and commenced much before 1st April,
2005, the restrictions placed by S. 80-IA(3) to the provisions of S.
80-IA(4)(ii) would not bar that assessee for continuing with its claim of
deduction u/s.80-IA.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 70(1), S. 80IA(5). An assessee running two separate undertakings can set off depreciation of the undertaking whose income is eligible for deduction u/s.80IA against business income of the other undertaking whose income is not eli

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

45 2010 TIOL 338 ITAT (Bang.)

Swarnagiri Wire Insulations Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated : 21-5-2010

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 70(1), S. 80IA(5). An assessee
running two separate undertakings can set off depreciation of the undertaking
whose income is eligible for deduction u/s.80IA against business income of the
other undertaking whose income is not eligible for deduction u/s.80IA.

Facts :

The assessee had two undertakings — one carrying on the
business of manufacturing of super-enameled copper winding wires and the other
carrying on the business of generation of power through windmills. The profits
of the undertaking generating power through windmills qualified for deduction
u/s.80IA, whereas the profits of the other business of manufacturing
super-enameled copper winding wires did not qualify for deduction u/s.80IA.
During the year under consideration, the assessee filed a revised computation of
income, claimed business income of Rs.60,00,829 from which it deducted
Rs.73,20,339 being loss/depreciation of undertaking generating power. The
Assessing Officer (AO) held that since the profits of the undertaking generating
power through windmill qualify for deduction u/s.80IA the loss/depreciation of
this undertaking cannot be set off against the income of the undertaking whose
profits do not qualify for deduction u/s.80IA. He, accordingly, denied the
set-off claimed by the assessee, but allowed it to carry forward the
loss/depreciation of undertaking generating power to the subsequent assessment
year.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
rejected the appeal of the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

(1) For the purpose of determining the quantum of deduction
as referred in Ss.(1) to S. 80IA in respect of an eligible business, the
computation will have to be done as if such eligible business was the only
source of income to the assessee in all the relevant years of claim commencing
from the initial assessment year.

(2) S. 80IA is a beneficial Section permitting certain
deductions in respect of certain income under Chapter VIA of the Act. A
provision granting incentive for promotion of economic growth and development in
taxing statutes should be liberally construed and restriction placed on it by
way of exception, should be construed in a reasonable and purposive manner so as
to advance the objects of the provision. It is a generally accepted principle
that the deeming provision of a particular Section cannot be breathed into
another Section. Therefore, the deeming provision contained in S. 80IA(5) cannot
override the S. 70(1) of the Act. The CIT(A)’s observation on this regard that
the specific provision of S. 80IA(5) have overriding effect is not acceptable.

(3) The assessee was entitled, as per provisions of the Act,
to claim depreciation on windmill at Rs.78,72,094 and had generated income from
windmill power generation business of Rs.5,51,755. Thus, the loss on account of
business eligible for deduction u/s.80IA was Rs.73,20,339. Since there was a
loss for the previous year, the question of deduction u/s.80IA did not arise.
The Tribunal held that as per S. 70(1), the assessee is eligible to set off this
loss of Rs.73,20,339 from another source under the same head of income. However,
during the subsequent assessment year, this loss has to be notionally carried
forward under the same source and set off before claiming deduction u/s. 80IA of
the Act.

The Tribunal directed the AO to set off the loss of the
assessee on windmill operations from the other source under the same head of
income. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 147, S. 148, S. 263. When CIT has after considering the explanations offered by the assessee dropped the proposed proceedings u/s.263, the AO has no locus standi to issue notice u/s.148 on the same set of facts.

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

44 2010 TIOL 350 ITAT (Bang.)

Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. v.
ACIT

A.Y. : 1988-89. Dated : 13-5-2010

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 147, S. 148, S. 263. When CIT has
after considering the explanations offered by the assessee dropped the proposed
proceedings u/s.263, the AO has no locus standi to issue notice u/s.148 on the
same set of facts.

Facts :

The total income of the assessee was originally assessed
u/s.143(3) of the Act. The CIT proposed a revision u/s.263, but later on dropped
the same accepting the explanations offered by the assessee-company. The reasons
which prompted the CIT to issue notice u/s.263 were regarding technical know-how
fees, cash assistance and duty draw-back, consideration of doubtful debts for
the deduction u/s.32AB and matter regarding deduction u/s.80I. The reasons
recorded by the Assessing Officer (AO) for issuing notice u/s.148 and the
reasons reflected in the notice u/s.148 were nothing else but the very same
issues considered by the CIT for the purpose of S. 263 proceedings. The AO
having issued notice u/s.148 completed the assessment u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 147 of
the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings and contending that the
reassessment is bad in law and void ab initio. The CIT(A) upheld the order
passed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where it contended that when the CIT has dropped the proposed proceedings
u/s.263 on arriving at the satisfaction of the explanations offered by the
assessee-company, the AO has no locus standi to issue notice u/s.148 on the same
set of issues and thereafter to frame an assessment u/s147.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that in A.Y. 1987-88 on similar facts and
circumstances, a similar issue had arisen in the case of the assessee and the
Tribunal had in that case found that the Madras High Court has in the case of
CIT v. Ramachandra Hatcheries, (305 ITR 117) (Mad.) considered the same legal
issue i.e., whether S. 147 action is permissible in a case where proceedings
u/s.263 had already been dropped. The Madras High Court has in the said case
held that the AO has no jurisdiction to reopen an assessment u/s.147 so as to
circumvent the order of the CIT passed u/s.263, which had become final unless
and until the order was set aside by any process known to law.

The Tribunal also noted that when a Co-ordinate Bench has
already passed an order on an issue it has to follow the said order of the
Co-ordinate Bench unless the facts are different or new questions of law have
been raised or new materials have been placed. If the facts and circumstances
are the same and the law considered the same and the materials placed before the
Tribunal are also the same, the Tribunal has to follow the earlier decision of
the Co-ordinate Bench as that is the mandate of rule of judicial precedence and
that of judicial discipline. If the Tribunal does not follow the earlier
decision of the Co-ordinate Bench without valid reasons, it would be an
onslaught of the Rule of Law. Not to follow the order of the Co-ordinate Bench
would be ridiculed as a pompous show of self-righteousness. That is why the
Supreme Court has in the case of Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (178 ITR 548)
(SC) has held that the Tribunal has to follow its own decision and should not
differ from its earlier view simply because a contrary view is possible.

The Tribunal following the order for A.Y. 1987-88 held the
reopening of assessment made by AO to be bad in law and set aside the order
passed by the AO u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 147 of the Act.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 32(2) — Effect of substitution of S. 32(2) w.e.f. A.Y. 2002-03 is that unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier period is allowable under the new provision, but has to be dealt with in accordance with the old provision and is subje

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

43 2010 TIOL 340 ITAT Mum.-SB

DCIT v. Times Guaranty Limited

A.Ys. : 2003-04 & 2004-05. Dated : 30-6-2010

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 32(2) — Effect of substitution of
S. 32(2) w.e.f. A.Y. 2002-03 is that unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier
period is allowable under the new provision, but has to be dealt with in
accordance with the old provision and is subject to the limitation of being
eligible for set-off only against business income and for 8 years. Unabsorbed
depreciation relating to A.Ys. 1997-98 to 2001-02 cannot be set off against
non-business income of A.Y. 2003-04.

Facts :

During the assessment years under consideration the assessee
continued to derive income from the business of merchant banking activity. For
the assessment years under consideration the assessee claimed to set off
unabsorbed depreciation determined in A.Y. 1997-98 and A.Y. 1998-99 against
income under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’. The assessing officer did not
allow the claim.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Virmani
Industries Private Limited, (216 ITR 607) held that unabsorbed depreciation was
available to an assessee perpetually for set-off against the gross total income.

Aggrieved, the Department preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. The President constituted a Special Bench to consider the following
question :

“On the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the
unabsorbed depreciation relating to A.Ys. 1997-98 to 1999-2000 is to be dealt
with in accordance with the provisions of
S. 32(2) as applicable for A.Ys. 1997-98 to 1999-2000 as claimed by the
Revenue or the same has to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions as
applicable to A.Ys. 2003-04 and 2004-05 as claimed by the assessee.”

Held :

(1) The amendment to S. 32(2), by the Finance Act, 2001
w.e.f. 1-4-2002 is a substantive amendment. Amendment to a substantive provision
is normally prospective unless expressly stated otherwise or it appears so by
necessary implication. The substantive provision contained in S. 32(2) as
substituted by the Finance Act, 2001 w.e.f. 1-4-2002 is prospectively applicable
to A.Y. 2002-03 onwards.

(2) S. 32(2) is a deeming provision. A deeming provision
cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it is intended. By a legal
fiction, the amount of depreciation allowance u/s.32(1) which is not fully
absorbed against income for that year is deemed to be the part of depreciation
allowance for the succeeding year(s).

(3) S. 32(1) deals with depreciation allowance for the
current year and S. 32(2) uses the present tense to refer to allowance to which
effect ‘cannot be’ and ‘has not been’ given. This indicates that S. 32(2) speaks
of depreciation allowance u/s.32(1) for the current year starting from A.Y.
2002-03. Brought forward unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years cannot be
included within the scope of S. 32(2). If the intention of the Legislature had
been to allow such b/fd unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years at par with
current depreciation for the year u/s.32(1), u/s.32(2) would have used past or
past perfect tense and not the present tense. Further, the unabsorbed
depreciation for the period from A.Y. 1997-98 to A.Y. 1999-2000 has been
referred to as ‘unabsorbed depreciation allowance’ and given a special name and
cannot fall within S. 32(1) in A.Y. 2002-03.

(4) The effect of the amendment to S. 32(2) is that
unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier period is allowable under the new
provision, but has to be dealt with in accordance with the restrictions
contained in the old provision and is subject to the limitation of being
eligible for set-off only against business income. It can be carried forward
after a period of eight years.

(5) The legal position of current and brought forward
unadjusted/unabsorbed depreciation allowance in the three periods is summarised
as under :

A. In the first period (i.e., up to A.Y. 1996-97)

(i) Current depreciation, that is the amount of allowance
for the year u/s.32(1), can be set off against income under any head within
the same year.

(ii) Amount of such current depreciation which cannot be so
set off within the same year as per (i) above shall be deemed as depreciation
u/s.32(1), that is depreciation for the current year in the following year(s)
to be set off against income under any head, like current depreciation.

B. In the second period (i.e., A.Y. 1997-98 to 2001-02)

(i) Brought forward unadjusted depreciation allowance for
and up to A.Y. 1996-97 (hereinafter called the ‘First unadjusted depreciation
allowance’), which could not be set off up to A.Y. 1996-97, shall be carried
forward for set-off against income under any head for a maximum period of
eight A.Ys. starting from A.Y. 1997-98.

(ii) Current depreciation for the year u/s.32(1) (for each
year separately starting from A.Y. 1997-98 up to A.Y. 2001-02) can be set off
firstly against business income and then against income under any other head.

(iii) Amount of current depreciation for A.Ys. 1997-98 to
2001-02 which cannot be so set off as per (ii). above, hereinafter called the
‘Second unabsorbed depreciation allowance’ shall be carried forward for a
maximum of eight assessment years from the A.Y. immediately succeeding the
A.Y. for which it was first computed, to be set off only against the income
under head ‘Profit and gains of business or profession’.

C.    In the third period (i.e., A.Y. 2002-03 onwards)

(i)    ‘First unadjusted depreciation allowance’ can be set off up to A.Y. 2004-05, that is, the remaining period out of the maximum period of eight A.Ys. [as per (Bi) above] against income under any head.
(ii)    ‘Second unabsorbed depreciation allowance’ can be set off only against the income under the head ‘Profit and gains of business or profession’ within the period of eight A.Ys. succeeding the

A.Y. for which it was first computed.
(iii)    Current depreciation for the year u/s. 32(1), for each year separately, starting from A.Y.
2002-03 can be set off against income under any head. Amount of depreciation allowance not so set off (hereinafter called the ‘Third unadjusted depreciation allowance’) shall be carried forward to the following year.
(iv)    The ‘Third unadjusted depreciation allowance’ shall be deemed as depreciation u/s.32(1), that is depreciation for the current year in the following year(s) to be set off against income under any head, like current depreciation, in perpetuity.
(6)    The argument that the Department having taken a stand in Jai Ushin Ltd. [ITA No. 3412/ (Delhi)/2006] cannot argue to the contrary is not acceptable. Such limitation if placed on the Revenue will also have to apply to the assessee. Further, as a Special Bench is constituted to resolve conflict of opinion amongst different Benches, it will be too harsh to stop the assessee or the Revenue from arguing the case in the way they like.

(7)    The principle that if two interpretations are possible, then the view in favour of the assessee should be adopted cannot be applied in a loose manner so as to debar a superior authority from examining the legal validity of conflicting views expressed by lower authorities. This rule is applicable where the provision in question is such which is capable of two equally convincing interpretations and not otherwise.

S. 158BC and S. 158BD — Search warrant having been issued in the name of assessee’s husband, proceedings u/s.158BC cannot be initiated against the assessee

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  1. (2009) 120 TTJ 320 (Mum.)


Smt. Nasreen Yusuf Dhanani v.
ACIT

IT(SS)A No. 203 (Mum.) of 2002

Block Period : 1-4-1986 to 18-12-1996

Dated : 5-10-2007

 

The Assessing Officer passed the block assessment order in
the assessee’s case making huge additions of unclosed income. The assessee’s
plea that since there was no search warrant in the name of the assessee, the
Assessing Officer should drop the block assessment proceedings initiated in
her name was not considered.


The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, held in favour of the assessee :


(a) Jt. CIT v. Latika V. Waman, (2005) 1 SOT 535
(Mum.)

(b) Dhiraj Suri v. Addl. CIT, (2006) 99 TTJ 525
(Del.)/(2006) 98 ITD 187 (Del.)

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) Chapter XIV-B is a special procedure for making
assessment of search cases. These provisions of block assessment come into
picture only as a result of search action carried out u/s.132. On reading
the provisions of S. 132(1), it is clear that the section is person-specific
and not premises-specific as argued by the Departmental Representative. The
primary target for conducting a search action is the person who is in
possession of any unclosed income and the search party can enter and search
any building, place, vessel, vehicle or aircraft where the undisclosed
assets or incriminating documents are likely to be found in relation to such
person.

(2) It is an undisputed fact that there is no search
warrant issued in the name of the assessee. In respect of the Panchnama
issued in respect of the bank lockers, it is seen that the Panchnama is in
the names of husband and the assessee for the simple reason that the bank
lockers were in joint names of husband and wife, the name of husband being
first in all the lockers.

(3) As per S. 158BB(1) r.w. S. 132(1), the position is
clear that in order to assess undisclosed income of any person in accordance
with Chapter XIV-B, a search is a prerequisite for the initiation of block
assessment proceedings. Since there is no search warrant issued in the name
of the assessee, the block assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC cannot be
sustained.

(4) If in the course of search of husband, any material
incriminating his wife had been found then the proper course for the
Assessing Officer would have been to issue a notice u/s.158BD. When specific
procedures are prescribed for persons who are searched and for persons in
respect of whom incriminating material is found, the AO cannot bypass the
prescribed procedures and issue notice u/s.158BC on a person who was not
subjected to search.


(5) In the case of the assessee, it was intimated to the
Assessing Officer (AO) vide letter dated 15th December 1997 that there is no
search warrant in her name and, hence, the block assessment pro-ceedings
initiated u/s.158BC need to be drop-ped and, even then, the AO has proceeded
to make assessment u/s.158BC. The entire proceedings undertaken by the AO were
bad in law and hence, the assessment is quashed.



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University established and adopted by Assembly of State and with the character of a body corporate as per the relevant Act, will fall within the definition of person in section 2(31)(vii).

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42 (2010) 127 ITD 164 (Delhi)

O. P. Jindal Global University v. CIT, Rohtak

Dated : 28-5-2010

Section 2(31) read with section 12AA :

 

1. University established and adopted by Assembly of State
and with the character of a body corporate as per the relevant Act, will fall
within the definition of person in
section 2(31)(vii).

2. University charging high fees from the students and not
meant for the benefit of people at large, however satisfying the conditions of
section 2(15) of imparting education i.e., systematic instruction, schooling
or training given to the youth to prepare them for works of life is eligible
for registration as a charitable institution u/s.12AA.

Facts:

The assessee was a university incorporated under the Haryana
Universities Act, 2006. As per the relevant Section of the Haryana Universities
Act, the assessee shall be a body corporate and shall have perpetual succession
and common seal. It shall have the power to sue and to be sued in its name.
However, it is not registered u/s.25 of the Companies Act and also not
registered under the Cooperative Societies Act. The assessee had applied for
registration u/s.12AA of the Act as a charitable institution.

The Ld. D.R. argued that, based on the facts, the university
was not a separate entity and was just an activity carried on by the sponsoring
body and therefore would not constitute a person u/s.2(31)(vii).

Held:

It was held by the Tribunal that the university established
and adopted by Assembly of State and with the character of a body corporate as
per the relevant Act, though not registered u/s.25 of the Companies Act or
though not registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, will fall within the
definition of person in section 2(31)(vii) i.e., an artificial juridical person.

Facts:

The next question after being satisfied that the
assessee-university is person u/s.2(31)(vii) is whether it qualifies for
registration as a charitable institution u/s.12AA.

The Ld. A.R. argued that the assessee-university was engaged
in imparting education in the field of law and administration. Objects of the
assessee-university were primarily aimed at awarding diplomas and degrees
granting fellowships and scholarships.

The definition of charitable purpose which existed at the
relevant point of time was in an inclusive manner to include education as one of
the many activities. The Ld. A.R. also relied on the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Sole Trustee Loka Shikshana Trust, which restricted the
meaning of education to impart instruction, schooling and training to prepare
the youth for the works of life.

The Commissioner argued that the assessee university was
charging higher fees and was not meant for the benefit of people at large.

Held:

The University satisfied the condition of imparting education
and should be thus granted registration u/s.12AA. If the purpose is education,
the requirement will be fully satisfied even if an activity for profit is
carried on in the course of actual carrying out the primary purpose.



Note : The other issues, being minor ones, have been ignored
while reporting the above decision.


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Section 4 — Compensation awarded for loss of income earning apparatus is in the nature of capital receipt. However interest awarded on delay in receipt of compensation is revenue in nature and is to be treated as income.

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41 (2010) 127 ITD 153 (Mum.)

Spaco Carburettors (I) (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT,

Range 5(3) Mum.

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 16-3-2009

 

Section 4 — Compensation awarded for loss of income earning
apparatus is in the nature of capital receipt. However interest awarded on delay
in receipt of compensation is revenue in nature and is to be treated as income.

Facts:

1. The assessee-company was engaged in the business of
manufacturing different types of carburettors. It entered in a Technical
Collaboration Agreement (TCA) with a Japanese company. As per the relevant
clause of the TCA, the assessee was entitled to use any improvement made in
technology of carburettors by the Japanese company. The Japanese company
developed a new product, in respect of which they refused to give any advice
to the assessee company.

2. Subsequently the matter was referred to the
International Court of Arbitration and the said Court awarded compensation and
interest in favour of the assessee-company.

3. The assessee-company claimed the same as capital receipt
and therefore not taxable. However the Assessing Officer treated the same as
revenue and charged to tax.

4. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that the compensation was in
the nature of capital receipt, hence out of the purview of tax. However
interest received on the compensation is revenue in nature and therefore
chargeable to tax.

5. The Ld. AR of the assessee submitted before the Tribunal
that the compensation awarded was in respect of the extinction of a source of
income and profit-earning apparatus and was not awarded for breach of a
contract of revenue nature. Hence it was capital in nature. Similarly interest
on compensation received by the assessee-company was attached to the
compensation awarded by the Court, hence it partakes the character of the
compensation.

6. Whereas Ld. DR argued that compensation was awarded for
non-existing income i.e., for future loss which is nothing but revenue in
nature.

Held:

1. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) in
respect of the compensation awarded to the assessee-company and treated the
same as capital receipt.

2. In respect of interest, the Tribunal held that it is a
well-settled principle that interest always bears the character of revenue
unless it is awarded as profit. Since interest received is for the loss to the
assessee for delay in receipt of compensation which the assessee was entitled
to receive in the year in which the breach occurred, it was of revenue nature
and consequently the Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) in respect of
interest on compensation.

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(a) S. 69 — Investments not recorded in books of account are covered. 695 (b) S. 28(iv) — Condition that chargeable income should arise from business — Purchase of investment, at lower value not covered

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 Part A — Reported Decisions



47 (2008) 22 SOT 174 (Mum.)

Rupee Finance & Management (P.) Ltd. v.
ACIT

ITA Nos. 3264 (Mum.) of 2006 and

2300 & 2881 (Mum.) of 2007

A.Ys. 2002-03 and 2003-04. Dated 05.02.2007




(a) S. 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — U/s.69, only
such investments are covered, which are not recorded in books of account.


(b) S. 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — The
condition for invoking S. 28(iv) is that the chargeable income should arise
from the business/profession — Purchase, by way of an investment, at a lower
value is not covered.


 


Pursuant to an MOU between the assessee-company and the group
of promoters, shares of two group companies were transferred to the assessee at
cost. The Assessing Officer, applying S. 69, made an addition on account of the
difference between the market value and purchase price of the shares. The CIT(A)
held that the benefits derived by the assessee were clearly chargeable to tax
u/s.28(iv) and, accordingly, upheld the addition.

 

The Tribunal held that addition u/s.69 was not sustainable
and there was no income u/s.28(iv). The Tribunal noted as under :

1. S. 69 :


(a) It was not disputed that the investments purchased were
recorded in the books of account.

(b) U/s.69, only such value of the investments may be
deemed to be the income of the assessee for the financial year, if they are
not recorded in the books of account. Thus, S. 69 was not applicable to the
instant case.

(c) The first Appellate Authority possibly realising this
difficulty had chosen to invoke S. 28(iv) and not to give a decisive finding
as to whether S. 69 was applicable or not.

(d) There was no allegation or evidence from the Revenue
that the apparent consideration was not the real consideration. The only
grouse of the Revenue authorities was that the assessee-company had purchased
the shares at a price which was much lesser that the market price.

(e) On these facts, therefore, no addition would be
sustained u/s.69.

 

2. S. 28(iv) :


(a) The condition for invoking S. 28(iv) is that the
chargeable income of the assessee should arise from the business or in the
exercise of profession. There must be a nexus between the business of the
assessee and the benefit the assessee derived.

(b) In the instant case the assessee purchased certain
shares at a certain price and was required to hold these shares for a period
of three years. It was not in dispute that this was an investment made by the
assessee. Hence, irrespective of the fact as to whether these investments were
made in pursuance of the MOU or not, such investments could not be said to be
a benefit arising out of the business of the assessee.

(c) The effect of this Section has been explained by the
CBDT, from which it is clear that when an assessee purchases goods or assets
at a price lower than the market price, under whatever circumstances, the same
cannot be brought to tax u/s.28(iv).

(d) Only if the seller had incurred an expense or a
liability or had provided a facility to the purchaser, then the value in cash
of such expenses or benefit or perquisite shall be treated as income. In the
instant case, the seller had not incurred any expenses or liability, nor had
provided a facility. It sold its shares at a reduced price.

(e) Therefore, the purchase of shares at a particular price
which was below the market price as an investment was not income by any
stretch of imagination. It could not also be deemed as income u/s.28(iv), as
it was neither benefit or perquisite that had arisen to the assessee from the
business or in the exercise of a profession.


 

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S. 40 (a)(i), read with S. 195, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – In view of Board’s Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000, no income had accrued or arisen in India either u/s.5(2) or u/s.9 in respect of selling commission, brokerage and other related charges paid

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 328 (Gauhati)


Jt. CIT v. George Williamson (Assam) Ltd.

A.Y. : 1995-96. Dated : 31-8-2007

S. 40 (a)(i), read with S. 195, of the Income-tax Act, 1961
– In view of Board’s Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000, no income had accrued
or arisen in India either u/s.5(2) or u/s.9 in respect of selling commission,
brokerage and other related charges paid to non-resident agents in respect of
sale of tea outside India and, therefore, no tax was deductible u/s.195.
Hence, disallowance made by Assessing Officer was liable to be deleted.

During the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
disallowed the expenditure on selling commission, brokerage and other expenses
in relation to overseas sales paid to non-residents without tax deduction
u/s.195. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the additions so made.

On revenue’s appeal : the ITAT held that :

1) S. 195 casts an obligation on an assessee to deduct
tax from the payments made to non-residents which are chargeable to tax
under the Act.

2) In Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000, the Board has
explained the applicability of S. 195, read with S. 40(a)(i), in relation to
commission paid to foreign agents. As per the said Circular, in respect of
commission and brokerage paid to foreign agents on export sales, no income had
accrued or arisen in India either u/s.5(2) or u/s.9 and no tax was, therefore,
deductible u/s.195. Consequently, expenditure on commission and related
charges payable to non-resident agents could not be disallowed u/s.40(a)(i) on
the ground that tax had not been deducted.

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Section 48 — Actual value of sale consideration cannot be substituted by fair market value without any evidence.

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40 (2010) 127 ITD 127 (Delhi)

Moral Trading & Investment Ltd. v. DCIT

A.Y.: 2006-2007. Dated: 30-4-2010

Section 48 — Actual value of sale consideration cannot be
substituted by fair market value without any evidence.

Facts:

The assessee acquired 8,91,181 shares of Hotel HQR in 2002
for a consideration of Rs.12.82 crore (i.e., for Rs.143. 85 per share).
Subsequently, a further subscription of shares was made by the assessee in 2004
and 2005 for Rs.10 per share. All the shares were then transferred to Shri R. P.
Mittal (a majority shareholder in the assessee company) at the rate of Rs.20 per
share. The AO held that transfer of shares was a colourable device to mitigate
tax. He further worked out fair market value of the shares at Rs.185.68 per
share. Capital gains was worked out on the basis of this amount as sale
consideration.

Held:

The hotel was not functional and was under repairs since
quite a long time. As per the valuation done by authorised valuer, the value per
share was coming to Rs.3.19. The Department has not brought any evidence to
rebut the valuation by the authorised valuer. Further, for the shares acquired
in 2004 and 2005 at Rs.10 per share, the assessee had earned profit. Hence, sale
of shares by the assessee to its majority shareholder is not a colourable device
to avoid tax. Hence, the actual value of sale consideration cannot be
substituted by some presumed fair market value.

Note : The other issues, being minor ones, have been ignored
while reporting the above decision.

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Medical reimbursement does not constitute fringe benefit as defined in section 115WB

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39 (2011) 49 DTR (Mum.) (Trib) 202

Godrej Properties Ltd. v. Additional CIT

A.Y. : 2006-2007. Dated : 3-12-2010

Medical reimbursement does not constitute fringe benefit as defined in
section 115WB.

Facts :

The assessee-company filed its return of fringe benefit
declaring the value of fringe benefit at Rs. 14,48,890. The Assessing Officer,
however, assessed the value of fringe benefit by holding that salary paid to
employee in form of medical reimbursement was liable to Fringe Benefit Tax
(FBT). The CIT(A) held the same to be a perquisite liable to FBT on the ground
that in the given case the amounts of expenditure reimbursed to the employee
were not part of salary package and were in the nature of reimbursement.

Held:

The proviso clause (v) of section 17(2) treats expenditure
actually incurred by the employee on medical treatment for himself or his family
and which is paid by the employer in excess of Rs.15,000 as perquisite taxable
as salary. Thus, reimbursement of medical expense is not taxable as perquisite
if amount does not exceed Rs.15,000 per annum. section 115WB(3) explicitly
excludes perquisites in respect of which tax is paid or payable by the employee.
In the Memorandum explaining the Provisions to the Finance bill it was stated
that perquisites directly attributed to the employees will continue to be taxed
in their hands in accordance with provisions of section 17(2). Also, the Budget
Speech (Paragraph 160 — 194 Taxman 1) categorically stated that ‘At present
where the benefits are fully attributable to the employee, they are taxed in the
hands of the employee; that position will continue’.

From the above, it was held that where benefits which are
fully attributable to employee and are taxed in their hands, would be continued
to be taxed u/s.17(2). Only in case where the benefits are enjoyed collectively
by employees and cannot be attributed individually shall be taxed in employers
hands.

In the case on hand, only where bills have been produced by
the employee to the employer it was a case of reimbursement and to the extent of
the benefit given in section 17(2) proviso (v) the employee need not pay tax.
This is not a case where the attribution of personal benefits directly to an
employee poses problem or a case where it is not feasible to tax the benefit in
question in the hands of the employee. It is only a case where a benefit above a
certain specified amount only is liable to be taxed in the hands of employee.
Such case does not constitute fringe benefit as defined in section 115WB of the
Act.

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Exemption u/s.10B — Expenses incurred on on-site development of computer software outside India cannot be excluded from the export turnover for computing deduction u/s.10B — Export proceeds retained abroad in accordance with RBI guidelines is to be includ

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38 (2011) 49 DTR (Chennai) (SB) (Trib.) 1

Zylog Systems Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y.: 2003-2004. Dated: 2-11-2010

 

Exemption u/s.10B — Expenses incurred on on-site development
of computer software outside India cannot be excluded from the export turnover
for computing deduction u/s.10B — Export proceeds retained abroad in accordance
with RBI guidelines is to be included while computing deduction u/s.10B.

Facts:

The assessee was a company engaged in the business of
development of software both by way of on-site development and offshore
development and it has a branch in the USA. It being 100% EOU, had claimed
deduction u/s.10B in respect of the exports of software made. During the
assessment proceedings, the AO had observed that the assessee had total export
turnover of Rs.28.61 crores and out of this amount, the assessee had utilised
the export proceeds to the tune of Rs.15.14 crores in the USA for the purpose of
carrying on export activities. The AO was of the view that since the said amount
had not been received in convertible foreign exchange in India within the
prescribed time u/s.10B(3), the said amount utilised in the USA cannot be
treated as a part of export turnover for computing deduction u/s.10B.

Further, the assessee had incurred expenses of Rs.3.33 crores
in foreign currency on account of payroll, etc., which were claimed to have been
incurred in connection with staff of the foreign branch in foreign country. The
AO also excluded Rs.3.33 crores incurred by the assessee outside India in
foreign exchange considering it as expenses in providing technical services,
while computing deduction u/s.10B. The AO placed reliance on the definition of
‘export turnover’ given in
Explanation 2(iii) to section 10B which excludes expenses incurred in foreign
exchange in providing technical services outside India from export turnover.

The first Appellate Authority allowed the asses-see’s appeal
in respect of inclusion of Rs.15.14 crores in export turnover for computing
deduction u/s.10B, whereas he rejected the claim of the assessee in respect of
inclusion of Rs.3.33 crores incurred by the assessee outside India in providing
technical services.

Held:

The Department had not brought anything on record to show
during the hearing, that the assessee-company was involved in rendering any
managerial consultancy services at foreign country. Also it was not brought on
record that the company was involved in providing the technical services to
other personnel or any outside agency. All the services rendered by the company
were to its staff located at New Jersy for the fulfilment of objects, namely,
development of software. A person cannot provide services to self. Whatever
expenditure has been incurred on foreign soil in a sum of Rs.3.33 crores was
incurred in connection with development of software by the employees of the
assessee-company at foreign branch and nothing has been incurred on managerial
or technical services rendered to outsider in foreign soil and therefore, the
same cannot be excluded from the export turnover.

Regarding the export proceeds of Rs.15.14 crores retained
abroad, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. B. Boda & Co. (P)
Ltd
. 223 ITR 271 would apply to this case also, even though the said
decision was on section 80-O wherein it was held that “two-way traffic of
receiving foreign exchange here and sending it back is a ritual which is
unnecessary”.

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Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Deferred sales tax liability being difference between payment of net present value and future liability credited by assessee to capital reserve account in its books of account would be a capital receipt and cann

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37 (2010) 42 SOT 457 (Mum.) (SB)

Sulzer India Ltd. v. Jt. CIT

ITA Nos. 2944 & 2871 (Mum.) of 2007 &

1317 (Pn.) of 2007

A.Ys.: 2003-2004 & 2004-05. Dated: 10-11-2010

 

Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Deferred sales
tax liability being difference between payment of net present value and future
liability credited by assessee to capital reserve account in its books of
account would be a capital receipt and cannot be termed as remission/cessation
of liability and, consequently, no benefit would arise to assessee in terms of
section 41(1)(a).

The assessee obtained incentive by way of sales tax deferral
scheme under the package scheme of incentive 1983 (the 1983 scheme) and the
package scheme of incentive 1988 (the 1988 scheme) notified by the Government of
Maharashtra. The aggregate deferral amount under 1983 and 1988 schemes was
Rs.752.01 lakh. The total amount of sales tax collected by the assessee for 7
years from 1-11-1989 to 31-10-1996 was to be paid after 12 years in 6 annual
instalments. However, by an amendment to the Bombay Sales Tax Act in 2002, if
the Net Present Value (NPV) of deferred tax as prescribed was paid, then the
deferred tax was deemed, in public interest, to have been fully paid. The
assessee, following the aforesaid amendment, made repayment of Rs.337.13 lakh on
30-12-2002 as per NPV of the deferred tax as prescribed under Circular No. 39T
of 2002 of Trade Circular dated 12-12-2002. The assessee claimed Rs.414.87 lakh,
being the difference between the deferred sales tax Rs.752.01 lakh and its net
present value amounting to Rs.337.13 lakh, as capital receipt and credited it in
the books of account of the assessee to the capital reserve account. However,
the Assessing Officer, keeping in view that the assessee had obtained the
benefit of payment of whole amount of Rs.752.01 lakh as deduction u/s.43B (in
view of CBDT’s Circular No. 496, dated 25-9-1987) brought the difference of
Rs.414.87 lakh to tax u/s.41(1). The CIT(A) upheld the addition made by the
Assessing Officer.

The Special Bench deleted the addition. The Special Bench
noted as under :


    (1) The aggregate deferral amount under 1983 and 1988 schemes of Rs.752.01 lakh was to be paid by the assessee after 12 years in six equal annual instalments.

    (2) As per the amendment of 2002 to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the assessee was allowed to prematurely pay the entire amount of the deferred sales tax at the Net Present Value (NPV) as prescribed and, on making such payment, the deferred tax shall be deemed to have been fully paid.

    (3) The amount paid by the assessee was determined and prescribed by SICOM (which was the implementing agency of the State Government.).

    (4) The amount paid by the assessee represented the NPV of the future sum and there had been no remission or cessation of liability by the State Government.

    (5) Had the State Government accepted a lesser amount after 12 years or reduced the number or amount of the annual instalments, then it could have been a case of remission or cessation.

    (6) Therefore, such payment of net present value of a future liability could not be classified as remission or cessation of the liability so as to attract the provisions of section 41(1)(a) since no benefit arose to the assessee in terms of section 41(1)(a).

Section 234B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Once assessee’s bank account was put under attachment, the amount therein is to be considered to be lying with the Department which would indicate constructive payment of advance tax and, therefore, interest u/s.

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36 (2010) 134 TTJ 457 (Del.)

S. M. Wahi v. Asst. DIT

(International Taxation)

ITA No. 2779 (Delhi) of 2008

A.Y.: 2007-2008. Dated: 30-4-2009

 

Section 234B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Once assessee’s
bank account was put under attachment, the amount therein is to be considered to
be lying with the Department which would indicate constructive payment of
advance tax and, therefore, interest u/s.234B is not chargeable.

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
charged interest u/s.234B. The assessee submitted that a sum of Rs.4 crores was
received by the assessee on 3rd January 2007. His bank account was attached on
12th January 2007. The amount was lying with the Department. In such
circumstances, the assessee cannot make the payment of advance tax and interest
u/s.234B cannot be imposed upon him. He relied upon the judgment of the Delhi
High Court in the case of CIT v. K K Marketing, (2005) 196 CTR (Del.)
611/(2005) 278 ITR 596 (Del). The CIT(A) held that charging of interest u/s.234B
is mandatory. The Assessing Officer has no discretion to charge or not to charge
the interest. He further observed that the assessee did not apply to the
Assessing Officer for permitting him to limited operation of bank account for
payment of advance tax.

The Tribunal, following the Delhi High Court’s decision in
the above-referred case, held that in the present case, for all practical
purposes the amount of Rs.4 crores was considered to be lying with the
Department which would indicate constructive payment of advance tax. Therefore,
interest u/s.234B cannot be imposed.

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Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) would arise only when return of income is scrutinised by the Assessing Officer and he finds some more items of income or additional income over and above what is declared in return.

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35 (2010) 42 SOT 48 (Ahd.)

Dy. CIT v. Dr. Satish B. Gupta

ITA No. 1482 (Ahd.) of 2010

A.Y.: 2006-2007. Dated: 6-8-2010

 

Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) would arise only when return of income is scrutinised by the
Assessing Officer and he finds some more items of income or additional income
over and above what is declared in return.

A survey u/s.133A was carried out at the premises of the
assessee who was a practising doctor. During the course of the search he
declared unaccounted income of Rs.32.84 lakh. Thereafter, he filed a return of
income declaring income of Rs.37.57 lakh wherein, apparently, the assessee
disclosed unaccounted income of Rs.32.84 lakh which was declared by him during
the course of survey. The assessment was finally completed on an income of
Rs.38.12 lakh after making minor additions. The Assessing Officer also levied
penalty u/s.271(1)(c) in respect of the sum of Rs.32.84 lakh declared during the
course of survey. On appeal, the CIT(A) set aside the penalty order.

The Tribunal, following the decision of the Allahabad High
Court in the case of Smt. Govinda Devi v. CIT, (2008) 304 ITR 340/173
Taxman 370, upheld the CIT(A)’s order deleting the penalty. The Tribunal noted
as under:


    (1) As per clause (c) of the Explanation 4 to section 271(1)(c), tax sought to be evaded means the difference between tax on the total income assessed and tax that would have been chargeable on such total income reduced by the amount added.

    (2) Since, in the instant case, the Assessing Officer had not made any addition to the returned income, the question of working out any tax sought to be evaded would not arise.

    (3) In general, where a case does not fall within clause (a) or clause (b) of Explanation 4 to section 271(1)(c) there cannot be any ‘tax sought to be evaded’ if there is no addition to the returned income.

    (4) The assessee would be liable for an action u/s.271(1)(c) in respect of such items only which are discovered by the Assessing Officer on the scrutiny of return of income or after carrying out an investigation and discovering some more items of income not found declared or mentioned in the return of income. Prior to the filing of return of income there is no concept of concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.

    (5) ‘Proceedings’ as used in section 271(1)(c) are statutory proceedings initiated against the assessee either by the issuance of a statutory notice or after filing of return of income. Survey u/s.133A or a search u/s.132 or issuance of a notice u/s.133(6), for example, are only means of collecting evidence against the assessee and are not equivalent to statutory proceedings. Another criterion for finding out whether a particular action is a statutory proceeding or not is to see whether it can be brought to a legal conclusion against the assessee by determining his right to liability.

    (6) Merely carrying out a survey u/s.133A does not create any liability against the assessee which is created only through assessment proceedings or through penalty proceedings. Therefore, the Revenue was not correct in its submission that the survey was a ‘proceeding’ and the Assessing Officer having discovered concealment during survey, the assessee would be liable for penalty u/s.271(1)(c).

    (7) The act of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars should be viewed by the Assessing Officer as done with respect to return of income. The omission or commission or contumacious conduct has to be viewed from the return of income and if certain thing has not been disclosed or has not been furnished therein, only then it can be said that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of his income. Prior to this the assessee cannot be said to have done any contumacious conduct on which penalty could be levied.

    (8) Merely because certain receipts were not recorded in the books of account or receipts were not issued to the patients, but income therefrom was finally declared in the return of income, there would be no contumacious conduct. For not maintaining books of account or not issuing receipts to the patients for the amount received by the assessee, at best, the books can be rejected by invoking provisions of section 145(3) and income can be estimated in accordance with section 144. Where, however, the Assessing Officer had accepted the income declared in the return of income, then the assessee could not be charged for any contumacious conduct.

When neither any deduction is claimed nor any charge is made to the profit and loss account of any tax or duty, there is no question of disallowing the amount u/s 43B.

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60 [2009] 121 ITD 461 (Chennai) (TM)

Dynavision Ltd. vs ACIT, Central Circle – II (1), Chennai

A. Ys.: 1990-91 to 1992-93. Date of order: 26.05.2009

 

When neither any deduction is claimed nor any charge is made
to the profit and loss account of any tax or duty, there is no question of
disallowing the amount u/s 43B.

Facts:


The assessee showed gross receipts of Rs. 46.10 crore in its
profit and loss account. Against this, the
assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 31.30 crore towards raw material consumed. Out
of the total amount of customs duty of Rs. 15.82 crore, Rs. 4.59 crores
represented the provision made for customs duty in respect of goods lying in a
bonded warehouse. This amount was provided to the raw material purchases
account. Since the imported goods were not released from the bonded warehouse,
they were shown as closing stock in hand and the customs duty payable was
included in this closing stock. The AO made addition on the basis that the
customs duty was not paid but was charged to profit and loss account. On appeal
to Tribunal, the Accountant Member upheld the order of AO while the Judicial
Member held otherwise. Hence, the matter was referred to Third Member.


Held:


The Third Member upheld the order of the Judicial Member. It
was held that section 43B can be invoked only when the assessee claims any tax
or duty. There was no dispute regarding accrual of liability. Even the assessee
accepted that the liability to pay customs duty had accrued. However, the fact
that the element of customs duty was made a part of closing stock had to be
considered. Since the customs duty was included in closing stock, it could not
be said that the assessee claimed the deduction of customs duty. Hence,
provisions of section. 43B could not be invoked and no disallowance u/s 43B was
warranted.

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Payments for hiring of trucks does not come within the purview of “works contract”—Hence, provisions of section 194C are not applicable.

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59 (2010) 122 ITD 35 (Asr.)

DCIT, Hoshiarpur Range, Hoshiarpur vs Satish Aggarwal & Co.

A. Y.: 2005-06. Date of order: 28.11. 2008

 

Payments for hiring of trucks does not come within the
purview of “works contract”—Hence, provisions of section 194C are not
applicable.

Facts:

The assessee made payments worth Rs. 17,40,000/- towards
hiring charges of trucks. No tax was
deducted on the said payments. The AO disallowed the expenditure u/s 40(a)(ia)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the tax was deductible u/s 194C,
as the payments were having the character of “work” as defined in Explanation
III to s. 194C. The contention of the assessee was that there was no contract
between the appellant and the truck owners for carrying goods or passengers;
hence tax was not deductible u/s 194C and no disallowance was warranted.

Held:

Following the decision of Poompuhar Shipping Corpn. Ltd., the
Tribunal held that there was no contract between the assessee and the owners of
the trucks for carrying out any work. The assessee simply hired the trucks and
they were utilised in his business of civil construction. For carrying out any
work, manpower is the sine qua non, and without manpower, it cannot be said that
work has been carried out. Merely providing trucks without any manpower cannot
be termed as carrying out work by the truck owners, for which payment was made
by the assessee. Section 194I was also not attracted as its provisions became
applicable on payments made for the use of capital assets with effect from
1.6.2007. Hence, entering into a contract for carrying out work is not
equivalent to contract for hiring trucks. Consequently, there was no need to
deduct tax u/s 194C, and disallowance
u/s 40(a)(ia) was deleted.

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Block of assets, s. 32, 38(2) — Under the scheme of block of assets, (i) Depreciation cannot be disallowed on the ground that some of the assets contained in the block have not been used for the purpose of the business; (ii) the user of an individual asse

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58 2010 TIOL 78 ITAT MUM

Swati Synthetics Ltd. vs ITO

A.Y.: 2001-02. Date of order: 17.12.2009


 



Block of assets, s. 32, 38(2) — Under the scheme of block of
assets, (i) Depreciation cannot be disallowed on the ground that some of the
assets contained in the block have not been used for the purpose of the
business; (ii) the user of an individual asset for the purpose of business needs
to be examined only in the first year when the asset is purchased; (iii)
existence of individual assets in the block itself amounts to use for the
purpose of business. However, proportionate disallowance of depreciation can be
made if an individual asset contained in the block has been used for purposes
other than business
.



Facts:

The assessee was carrying on two businesses with one division
at Dombivli and the other in Surat. Though the Surat division had closed down,
the assessee continued to claim depreciation on its assets. The Assessing
Officer (AO) disallowed the proportionate amount of depreciation attributable to
the assets of the Surat division, on the ground that the assets of the Surat
division were not used for the purpose of business. Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A), who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal discussed in detail the meaning of the term
`depreciation’, considered various statutory provisions which have been amended
consequent to the insertion of the concept of block of assets and also Circular
No. 469, dated 23rd September, 1986 issued by CBDT. It also considered various
judicial pronouncements, examined the principle of commercial expediency and
also examined in detail how the scheme of depreciation on block of assets works,
and held as follows:

(i) Depreciation allowance u/s 32 is a statutory allowance
not confined expressly to diminution in value of the asset by reason of wear
and tear;

(ii) Main objective of introducing the block of assets
concept was only to reduce time and effort spent in detailed record
maintenance;

(iii) If the asset has neither been used for business nor
for non-business purposes, but remained in block of assets, the provisions of
S. 38(2) are not applicable;

(iv) The ratio of the decision of the SB of the Chandigarh
Tribunal in the case of Gulati Saree Centre vs ACIT 71 ITD 73 (Chd)(SB) does
not apply to the present case, since in the case before the SB, the cars owned
by the assessee firm were being used for personal purposes by the partners,
whereas in the present case, assets remained in block of assets and were not
used for non-business purposes like personal use, etc.;

(v) The condition/requirement `used for the purpose of
business’, as provided in s. 32(1) for the concept of depreciation on block of
assets can be summarized as: (a) Use of individual asset for the purpose of
business can be examined only in the first year when the asset is purchased;
(b) In subsequent years, use of block of assets is to be examined. Existence
of individual assets in the block of asset itself amounts to use for the
purpose of business;

(vi) The judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Dineshkumar Gulabchand Agarwal vs CIT & Anr 267 ITR 768 (Bom) is not
applicable to the facts of the present case, since the issue in the case under
consideration is whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the
assessee is entitled to depreciation on the assets of the closed unit. The
decision of the Bombay High Court has been distinguished by the ITAT in the
case of G R Shipping Ltd (ITA No. 822/Mum/05 order, dated
17.7.2008)(2008-TIOL-729-ITAT-Mum) by observing that in that case, the asset
in question was not at all put to use.


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Section 10A — Section 10A grants a deduction and not an exemption, and section 80AB is not applicable to s. 10A—Deduction u/s 10A is to be allowed while computing income under the head `Profits and gains of business or profession’ and not under `Gross tot

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57 2010 TIOL 69 ITAT MAD SB

Scientific Atlanta India Technology Pvt. Ltd. vs ACIT

A.Y.: 2003-04 & 2004-05. Date of order: 05.02.2010

Section 10A — Section 10A grants a deduction and not an
exemption, and section 80AB is not applicable to s. 10A—Deduction u/s 10A is to
be allowed while computing income under the head `Profits and gains of business
or profession’ and not under `Gross total income’. Deduction u/s 10A is to be
computed without setting off the losses of non-eligible units against profits of
an eligible unit.

Facts :

During the previous year which was relevant to A.Y. 2003-04,
the assessee had two units: one in Chennai and one in Delhi. The unit in Chennai
was engaged in development of software and its profits were eligible for
deduction u/s 10A. The unit in Delhi was engaged in the business of trading.
During the year under consideration, the unit in Delhi had suffered a loss and
the unit in Chennai had earned profits. The assessee claimed deduction u/s 10A
in respect of its entire profits from the unit in Chennai, without setting off
the loss suffered by the unit in Delhi.

The Assessing Officer (AO) did not accept the computation of
the assessee on the ground that after the amendment of s. 10A, w.e.f. 1.4.2001,
a deduction was to be allowed from the “total income”, and consequently, the
loss suffered by the Delhi unit had to be taken into account.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who
upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
A special bench was constituted to dispose of the appeal as well as to
adjudicate upon the following question of law:

“Should the business losses of a non eligible unit, whose
income is not eligible for deduction under section 10A of the Act, have to be
set off against the profits of the undertaking eligible for deduction under
section 10A, for the purposes of determining the allowable deduction under
section 10A of the Act?”

Held:



(i) Even though s. 10A falls under Chapter III, it has been
mentioned in the section itself that what is to be given is only a deduction
and not exemption. A deduction in respect of profits eligible under s. 10A is
required to be made at the stage of computing the income under the head
“Profits and gains of business and profession” and not from the gross total
income;

(ii) Section 80AB applies to deductions mentioned in
Chapter VI-A. Section 10A does not fall in Chapter VI-A, and hence, s. 80AB
cannot be applied to s. 10A;

(iii) It can be noticed from the language of s. 10A (1)
that a deduction of such profits and gains that are derived by “an”
undertaking, qualify u/s 10A for deduction from the total income. In case the
assessee has more than one undertaking, one has to consider the profits and
gains of that “particular undertaking” which qualifies for deduction u/s 10A.
Again,
s. 10A (4) uses the words “profits and gains of the business of the
undertaking” and not total profits of the business of the assessee. The
distinction between the “undertaking” and the “assessee” is well-known and has
also been noted by the CBDT in Circular F. No. 15/563, dated 13.12.1963. The
deduction u/s 10A attaches to the undertaking and not to the assessee;

(iv) The losses of a unit which is not eligible for
deduction u/s 10A cannot be set off against the profits of the unit which is
eligible for deduction u/s 10A. The loss of the non-eligible unit can be set
off against other incomes or may be carried forward;

(v) If there is more than one undertaking which is eligible
for deduction u/s 10A, and if some of the units have profit and other units
have loss, it would be an entirely different case from the present one. The
decision rendered in this case would not be applicable to such cases.

The Special Bench decided the appeal in favour of the
assessee.

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Section 54EC and Circular No. 142/9/2006 TPL, dated 30.6.2006 — Non-availability of bonds qualifying for deduction u/s 54EC is a reasonable cause for not purchasing the bonds within the time specified in s. 54EC—Since the assessee purchased the bonds as s

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56 2010 TIOL 60 ITAT (Mum)

Cello Plast vs DCIT

A. Y.: 2006-07. Date of order: 19.01.2010

 

Section 54EC and Circular No. 142/9/2006 TPL, dated 30.6.2006
— Non-availability of bonds qualifying for deduction u/s 54EC is a reasonable
cause for not purchasing the bonds within the time specified in s. 54EC—Since
the assessee purchased the bonds as soon as the same were available, it was
eligible to claim deduction u/s 54EC.

Facts:

During the year, the assessee sold its factory building which
formed a part of its block of assets. The capital gain of Rs. 49,36,293 arising
from the sale of the factory building was claimed to be deductible u/s 54EC. The
bonds qualifying for deduction u/s 54EC were not available and as a result of
various representations, the CBDT had extended the time period for subscribing
the bonds upto 31.12.2006, vide its Circular No. 142/9/2006 TPL, dated
30.6.2006. Before filing the return of income, the assessee had deposited Rs. 50
lakh through a fixed deposit with the State Bank of India and had in a letter
intimated to the banker that the fixed deposit would be encashed as soon as the
bonds were available. Along with the return of income, the assessee had appended
a note explaining the factual position and stating that it will subscribe to the
bonds as soon as the same were available. The bonds were available on 22.1.2007
and the assessee applied for them on 27.1.2007, whereupon the bonds were
allotted to him on 31.1.2007.

The Assessing Officer held that since the capital asset
transferred formed a part of the block of assets,
s. 50 deems the gain arising on transfer thereof to be a short-term capital gain
arising from the transfer of a short term capital asset. He also held that
though the circular extended the time period up to 31.12.2006, the bonds had
been purchased on 31.1.2007 which was beyond the due date specified. He,
therefore, disallowed the claim of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A),
who held that following the ratio of the decision of the Bombay High Court in
the case of Ace Builders P. Ltd. 281 ITR 210 (Bom), the assessee was entitled to
deduction u/s 54EC, subject to satisfaction of conditions stated therein. Since
the bonds were not subscribed to by the due date extended by the CBDT circular,
the assessee was held not to be entitled to deduction u/s 54EC.

Held :

On the basis of facts, the Tribunal held that it was an
impossible task for the assessee to comply with the time period laid down u/s
54EC. The delay in purchase due to non-availability of the bonds was held to be
a reasonable cause, and the assessee was held to be entitled to exemption u/s
54EC. The Tribunal also noted that in the case of Ram Agarwal 81 ITD 163, on
similar facts, it had been held by the Tribunal that the assessee was entitled
to claim deduction u/s 54EC. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee.

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Section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If an order passed by the Tribunal is not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court or that of the jurisdictional High Court rendered prior to or subsequent to the impugned order, the same constitutes a

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55 (2009) 34 SOT 541 (Mum.)(TM)

Kailashnath Malhotra vs Jt.CIT

Block period 01.04.1987 to 15.12.1997. Date of order:
12.10.2009.

 

Section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If an order passed
by the Tribunal is not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court or
that of the jurisdictional High Court rendered prior to or subsequent to the
impugned order, the same constitutes a mistake as apparent from records and
capable of rectification u/s 254(2).

Certain additions made by the Assessing Officer were
confirmed by the Tribunal. One miscellaneous application filed by the assessee
u/s 254(2), seeking rectification of the Tribunal’s order was dismissed by the
Tribunal. The assessee once again moved another miscellaneous application u/s
254(2) seeking rectification of the Tribunal’s order.

Facts:

The Judicial Member of the Tribunal, in light of the judgment
of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of P.R.Metrani vs CIT [2006] 287 ITR
209 / 157 Taxman 325, recalled the order of the Tribunal on merits. However, the
Accountant Member did not agree with the Judicial Member and dismissed the
miscellaneous application on the ground that successive miscellaneous
applications were not permissible and, further, the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of P.R.Metrani (supra) was not applicable. In view of the
difference of opinion between the members of the Tribunal, the matter was
referred to the Third Member.

Held:


The Third Member held as follows:

1. It is evident that the scope of sub-section (2) is
restricted to rectifying any mistake in the order which is apparent from
records and does not extend to reviewing of the earlier order.

2. It is well-settled that the scope of proceedings u/s
254(2) is confined to rectifying any mistake which is apparent on the very
face of it. If the point needs to be proved on the strength of different
facets of reasoning, the same would become debatable. Once a particular point
falls in the realm of “debatable issue”, it automatically goes out of the
domain of sub-section (2) of section 254.

3. If two views are possible on a particular point and the
Tribunal has preferred one view over the other, no rectification application
lies for impressing upon the Tribunal to choose the other possible view in
preference over the one already adopted by it.

4. If, however, the order passed by the Tribunal is not in
conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court or that of the
jurisdictional High Court, rendered prior to or subsequent to the impugned
order, the same constitutes a mistake apparent from records and capable of
rectification u/s 254(2).

5. Similarly, it will be an error apparent from records, if
the order is not in conformity with the retrospective amendment carried out to
the statutory provision covering the period and point in dispute, subject to
the fulfilment of other conditions prescribed in the Act such as limitation
period, etc.

 


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Section 40(b) — Since section 40(b) uses the term “authorise” and not “quantify”, salary to partners cannot be disallowed merely because amount of salary is not quantified in partnership deed.

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54 (2009) 34 SOT 495 (Pune)

Asst.CIT vs Suman Construction

A.Ys.:1999-2000 and 2000-01.

Date of order: 31.12.2008.

 

Section 40(b) — Since section 40(b) uses the term “authorise”
and not “quantify”, salary to partners cannot be disallowed merely because
amount of salary is not quantified in partnership deed.

Section 119 — CBDT has no jurisdiction to substitute the term
“authorise” occurring in section 40(b) by the term “quantify” in its Circular
No.739, dated 25.03.1996.

Facts:

The salary paid to partners by the assessee firm for A.Ys.
1999-2000 and 2000-2001 was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground
that in the partnership deed filed along with the return of income for
A.Y.1998-99, neither the salary payable to the partners was quantified nor the
manner in which such quantification had to be done was prescribed. By referring
to the CBDT Circular No.739, dated 25.03.1996 [1996] 131 CTR (St.) 53, the
Assessing Officer was of the view that since there was no specified
quantification, the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.40(b) in respect
of the salary.

The CIT(A) held that the assessee was entitled to claim the
deduction for remuneration paid to the partners since the payment of salary to
the four partners was authorised by the partnership deed.

Held:

The Tribunal, upholding the CIT(A)’s order, noted as follows:

1. On reading this section it becomes clear that it does
not make it mandatory to quantify the amount of salary in one of the clauses
of the partnership deed, mainly because of the reason that the monetary limit
or ceiling is otherwise prescribed in the statute itself. The statute has used
the term “authorise” and not the term “quantify”.

 

2. In respect of the CBDT Circular No.739
(supra) relied upon by the Assessing Officer, the Tribunal clarified that the
CBDT cannot issue a circular u/s 119 which tantamounts to detracting from the
provisions of the Act. While interpreting the clause of a statute, there is no
scope for importing into the statute some other words which are not there or
to exclude words which are there.

 

3. It was also not a case that the impugned taxing
provisions were ambiguous and, therefore, capable of more than one
interpretation. Since there was no ambiguity, there was no question of a
beneficial interpretation to either side. Therefore, the words contained in
the provision must be given a natural meaning as commonly understood in the
legal parlance.

 


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S. 271B : If income of a partner, excluding the income from the firm, less than Rs.10 lacs, not liable to audit u/s.44AB — Penalty deleted.

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1) Hitesh D. Gajaria v. ACIT


ITAT ‘K’ Bench, Mumbai

Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and

P. Madhavi Devi (JM)

ITA No. 992/Mum./2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 22-2-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Deepak Shah/

Manvendra Goyal

S. 271B r.w. S. 44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty
for failure to get accounts audited — Assessee, a chartered accountant by
profession, being proprietor and also a partner in a firm — Gross receipts
excluding his share of income from the firm was less than Rs.10 lacs — Penalty
imposed for failure to get the accounts audited — Whether AO justified — Held,
No.

Per P. Madhavi Devi :

Facts :

The assessee was a chartered accountant by profession. He had
a proprietory concern besides being a partner in Bharat S. Raut & Co. During the
year, he received share of profit and remuneration from the said firm, each of
which was more than Rs.10 lacs. However, the gross receipts earned by his
proprietary concern were less than Rs.10 lacs. According to the AO, the
provisions of S. 44AB were applicable. However, the assessee relying on the
opinion of the senior counsel contended that partner’s allocated amounts were
not gross receipts as contemplated in S. 44AB and accordingly, he was not
required to get the accounts audited. However, the AO did not agree and levied a
penalty u/s.271B r.w. S. 274 of the Act. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the
AO’s order.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that assessee’s major income was not from
profession, but from the share of his profit from the professional firm.
According to it, share of profit cannot be equated with income from profession.
Further, it noted that the assessee had relied on the opinion of the senior
counsel, where-in it was opined that it was not necessary to get the accounts
audited. Therefore, relying on the Jodhpur Bench decision in the case of Dr.
Sunderlal Surana, the Tribunal held that the assessee had reasonable cause for
the failure to get his accounts audited as required u/s.44AB of the Act.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the lower authorities was deleted.

Case referred to :


Dr. Sunderlal Surana v. ITO, (2006) 105 TTJ (Jd) 907

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Section 40(a)(i), read with section 2(28A) — Discounting charges paid, cannot be treated as interest in terms of section 2(28A) and, therefore, such amount is not liable for TDS u/s.195.– Also, the same cannot be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i).

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53 (2009) 34 SOT 424 (Delhi)

Asst. CIT vs Cargill Global
Trading (I) (P.) Ltd.

A.Y.: 2004-05. Date of order: 09.10.2009

 

Section 40(a)(i), read with section 2(28A) — Discounting
charges paid, cannot be treated as interest in terms of section 2(28A) and,
therefore, such amount is not liable for TDS u/s.195.– Also, the same cannot be
disallowed u/s 40(a)(i).

Facts:

The assessee company discounted its export sales bills with a
company in Singapore. The discounting charges were disallowed by the Assessing
Officer u/s 40(a)(i) on the ground that the assessee did not deduct tax at
source u/s 195 on the discounting charges which were in the nature of interest
in terms of section 2(28A). The CIT(A) held that the discounting charges paid by
the assessee were not interest, as neither any money was borrowed nor any debt
was incurred. Therefore, no tax was required to be deducted at source from such
payments. He, accordingly, deleted the disallowance.

Held:

The Tribunal, upholding the CIT(A)’s order, noted as
hereunder:

1. As per section 2(28A), interest means sum payable in
respect of any money borrowed or debt incurred. In the instant case, there was
no debt incurred or money borrowed. In fact, it was a case where the assessee
had merely discounted sale consideration receivable on sale of goods.

2. The word `interest’ defined u/s 2(28A) does not include
the discounting charges on discounting of bill of exchange.

3. Though Circular No.65 was issued in relation to
deduction of tax u/s 194A, yet in respect of payment to a resident, the same
would be relevant even for the purpose of considering whether the discount
should be treated as interest or not. The CBDT had opined that where the
supplier of goods makes over the usance bill / hundi to his bank which
discounts the same and credits the net amount to the supplier’s account
straightaway, without waiting for realisation of the bill on due date, the net
payment made by the bank to the supplier is in the nature of price paid for
the bill. Such payment cannot technically be held as including any interest
and, therefore, no tax need be deducted at source from such payment by the
bank.

4. Hence, the assessee was not under obligation to deduct
tax at source u/s 195. Accordingly, the same amount could not be disallowed by
invoking section 40(a)(i).

 


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S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction claimed on the basis of advise of the tax consultant supported by tax audit report — Penalty cannot be levied on the disallowance of the same.

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39 (2010) 38 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 101
Yogesh R. Desai v. ACIT
A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 1-2-2010

 

S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction claimed on the basis of advise of
the tax consultant supported by tax audit report — Penalty cannot be levied on
the disallowance of the same.

Facts :

Deduction u/s.80-O was claimed by the assessee which could
not be justified during the assessment proceedings. Finally, the assessee
accepted before the AO that the deduction was claimed erroneously and
inadvertently, as guided by his tax consultant.

Upon disallowance of the same, the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was
levied by the AO which was confirmed by the CIT(A).

Held :

It is settled law that penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is a civil
liability and the Revenue is not required to prove willful concealment as held
by the Supreme Court in the case of UOI v. Dharamendra Textile Processors &
Ors., 306 ITR 277. However, each and every addition made in the assessment
cannot automatically lead to levy of penalty for concealment of income.

Even if some deduction or benefit is claimed by the assessee
wrongly but bona fidely and no mala fide can be attributed, the penalty would
not be levied. The claim of deduction u/s.80-O was claimed on the basis of
advise of the tax consultant supported by tax audit report. Therefore there is
no concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars on the part of the
assessee and hence the penalty was deleted.

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S. 115JA(3), CBDT Circular No. 763, dated 18-2-1998 — Credit for MAT can be carried forward for a total of six years and not ‘five assessment years’ mentioned in sub-para 2 of para 45.4 of CBDT Circular No.763 — Statutory provisions prevail over a Circula

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  1. 2009 TIOL 404 ITAT (Mad.)


ITO v.
Data Software Research Company (International) Pvt. Ltd.

ITA No. 1602/Mds./2008

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 16-4-2009

 

Facts :

While assessing the total income of the assessee, a private
limited company, u/s.143(3) the AO had allowed credit for Rs.14,69,706 being
MAT paid in A.Y. 1997-98. Subsequently, the AO issued notice proposing to
withdraw MAT credit of Rs.14,69,706 by passing an order u/s.154. In response
to the show-cause notice the assessee contended that u/s.115JAA(3) MAT credit
can be set off for a period of 5 years immediately succeeding the assessment
year in which the credit became available. The AO did not accept this
contention and passed an order u/s.154 of the Act withdrawing tax credit of
A.Y. 1997-98 on the ground that u/s.115JAA the tax credit of A.Y. 1997-98 was
available for set-off only up to A.Y. 2002-03 and after that it cannot be set
off.


The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal.


Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal held that there is no ambiguity in the
language of S. 115JAA(3). The carry forward is available for a total of six
(1+5) years. The Tribunal observed that the confusion has arisen because of
the language used in CBDT Circular No. 763, dated 18-2-1998. The Tribunal held
that the period of ‘five assessment years’ mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) of
paragraph 45.3 of the said Circular contradicts what is stated in Ss.(3) of S.
115JAA. The Tribunal stated that it is trite law that statutory provisions
prevail over a Circular in case of a contradiction between the two. The
Tribunal stated that this position has been reiterated by the Apex Court in
CCE v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries Ltd.,
220 CTR 98 (SC). The Tribunal
upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.


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S. 2(42A), S. 48, S. 49(1)(e), Explanation III to S. 48 — Where assessee transferred the shares held by it to its 100% subsidiary which shares were retransferred by the subsidiary to the assessee and thereafter were sold by the assessee, the assessee was

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  1. 2009 TIOL 383 ITAT (Mum.)


ACIT v.
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

ITA No. 2672/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 2-2-2009

 

Facts :

The assessee company had purchased 2,06,000 equity shares
of M/s. Trumac Engineering Company Ltd. on 7-11-1994. In the financial year
1995-96, the entire lot of 2,06,000 shares were transferred by the assessee to
its 100% wholly-owned subsidiary, M/s. Hamko Financial Services Ltd., (‘the
subsidiary’). In the financial year 1998-99, the subsidiary transferred back
the said shares to the assessee. During the financial year 1999-2000, the
assessee sold 1,56,000 shares out of the said 2,06,000 shares for a
consideration of Rs.70,20,000. The assessee in its return of income for A.Y.
2000-01 claimed loss on sale of these shares at Rs.14,55,72,296 by adopting
the indexation from 1994-95 i.e., the initial date of acquisition by
the assessee. The AO while passing order u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act held
that the assessee was entitled to indexation from the date the shares were
retransferred by the subsidiary to the assessee i.e., financial year
1998-99. Accordingly, the AO computed the indexed cost of acquisition of
shares sold by the assessee to be Rs.11,25,96,594 as against Rs.15,25,92,296
computed by the assessee.


The CIT(A) relying on the decision of the Mumbai Bench of
the Tribunal in the case of DCIT v. Meera Khera in ITA No. 5258/M/1998
of A.Y. 1995-96 and the decision of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in
the case of Mrs. Pushpa Sofat v. ITO, 81 ITD 1 (Chd.) upheld the
contention of the assessee.


Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal after referring to S. 48, S. 49(1)(e),
Explanation to S. 2(42A) and second proviso to S. 48 held that on a conjoint
reading of these provisions it is evident that in calculating long-term
capital gain on sale of shares of Trumac Engineering Company Ltd., the indexed
cost has to be calculated with reference to the cost, holding period and
indexation factor of the first owner i.e., from 1994-95. It held that
the cost has to be indexed from the date the shares were originally acquired
by the assessee company. It stated that the transfer from the assessee to its
subsidiary and retransfer from the said company has got to be ignored, as
provided in the above provisions of the Act. The Tribunal held that there was
no mistake in the capital gain disclosed by the assessee. Accordingly, it held
that the AO was not justified in denying the benefit of indexation from the
initial date of acquisition. It, accordingly, dismissed the appeal of the
Revenue.


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S. 139A, S. 272B — Penalty u/s.272B cannot be levied on the deductor for not quoting PAN of deductee in the quarterly statements filed in Form No. 26Q.

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  1. 2009 TIOL 370 ITAT (Bang.)


D. V. Steel Corporation v.
ITO (TDS)

ITA No. 907/Bang/2008

A.Y. : 2007-08. Date of Order : 27-2-2009

 

Facts :

The assessee firm filed quarterly statement in Form No. 26Q
for the 4th quarter of financial year 2006-07 without quoting therein PAN of
the deductees. The Assessing Officer was of the view that not quoting PAN of
deductees was contrary to the provisions of S. 139A(5B) of the Act. The AO
issued notice to the assessee asking it to show cause why penalty u/s.272B(1)
should not be levied for not quoting the PAN of the deductees in the
statement. The assessee submitted non-availability of the same to be the
reason for non-furnishing of PAN in the quarterly statement. The AO did not
find this to be a reasonable cause. He levied a penalty of Rs.10,000.


The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where it was contended that not quoting the PAN was for a reasonable cause
since the asses-see was being asked to do something which was im-possible; it
had no statutory right or power to compel the deductee to furnish the PAN; not
quoting PAN was for no fault on the part of the assessee.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that there is no mechanism at the end of
the assessee to compel the deductee to give its PAN. The Tribunal was of the
view that the facts of the present case are identical to those before the
Ahmedabad Bench of Tribunal in the case of Financial Co-operative Bank Ltd.
where it has been held that since the rules and the provisions of the Act did
not cast an obligation on the manager of a bank to ensure that Form No. 60
filed by the customer was duly filled in, the failure to comply with the
provisions of S. 139A was on the part of the customer of the bank and not on
the part of the bank. The Tribunal following the reasoning of the said
decision of the Ahmedabad Bench directed the AO to delete the penalty.


          The
appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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S. 201(1A) — When no tax is payable by payee, no interest can be charged from payer

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47
(2008) 304 ITR (AT) 338 (Jodhpur)

ITO v. Emrald Construction Co. P. Ltd.

ITA No. 357 and 370/Jdpr./2002

A.Y. : 1996-97. Dated : 31-8-2007

S. 201(1A) — In case no tax is payable by the payee, no
interest u/s.201(1A) can be charged from the payer.

 

The assessee-company had made payment to three companies in
the nature of interest and contractor’s payment, but without TDS on the same.
The Assessing Officer levied interest u/s.201(1A) till the date of assessment
order. Before the CIT(A), the assessee contested that no tax was payable qua
contract or interest payments (incomes) or qua any other incomes of the
recipients, so the question of loss to the Revenue does not arise. Hence, no
interest was leviable u/s.201(1A). The CIT(A) upheld the levy of interest, but
restricted it till the date of assessment order of the recipients. On cross
appeals by the assessee and the Revenue, the ITAT held that

1. The interest to be charged u/s.201(1A) is not a penalty,
but a compensation of revenue loss for the delay in the payments of tax. The
rigours of S. 201 are flexible and not rigid as would not admit any sort of
explanation with regard to non-deduction at source.

2. The charging of interest u/s.201(1A) is definitely
mandatory, but this ‘mandatory’ nature has to take colour from the main charge
of the deduction of tax at source u/s.201. So to say, when the ‘tax’ which was
to be deducted u/s.201 was not payable at all, it would be unjust to conclude
that, in all eventualities, come what may, interest u/s.201(1A) is to be
charged from the deductor.

3. It is certain that the interest is chargeable from the
date on which the tax is due for deduction. The starting point has been
envisaged in the Act but not the end point. The ‘benchmark’ of the end point
is to be decided after taking into consideration various factors. The question
of charging interest up to framing of assessment orders in the hands of the
recipients would not arise, because ‘no tax dues’ are found against them and
as such there was no loss of revenue. Interest cannot be charged for the sake
of charging of interest only, it has to be charged in accordance with a
provision.

4. The interest is chargeable on the amount of tax to be
deducted. In case the chargeable tax at source increases or decreases, the
interest amount varies accordingly. But, in a case where the tax was not
payable at all, then in that case no interest can be charged. The word
‘compensatory’ clearly suggests this conclusion.

 


Cases relied upon :



(i) Vikrant Tyres Ltd. v. ITO, (1993) 202 ITR 454
(Kar.)

(ii) CIT v. Rishikesh Apartments Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd.,
(2002) 253 ITR 310 (Guj.)

(iii) Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Mrs. V. P. Damle,
(1986) 157 ITR 812 (Bom.)

(iv) Karimtharuvi Tea Estate Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1966) 60 ITR
262 (SC)

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S. 115JA — AO has no power to scrutinise accounts except as per Explanation — No addition can be made due to reduction in value of inventory and obsolescence loss.

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46 (2008) 304 ITR (AT) 123 (Ahmedabad)

Deepak Nitrate v. Dy. CIT

ITA No. 1646 and 1748/Ahd./2004

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 9-4-2007

S. 115JA — Assessing officer has no power to scrutinise the
accounts except as provided in Explanation to S. 115JA and hence no addition can
be made by him on account of reduction in value of inventory and obsolescence
loss for computation of book profit in terms of S. 115JA of the Act.

 

According to the Assessing Officer the two amounts viz.
(i) provision made for obsolescence loss, and (ii) reduction due to change in
method of inventory valuation should be added back in computation of the book
profits as per S. 115JA. He therefore added the said amounts to the income of
the assessee invoking the provisions of S. 154. The CIT(A) upheld the addition
no. (i) and deleted the addition no. (ii).

 

On cross appeals by the assessee and Revenue, the Tribunal
observed as under :

(1) Diminution in value of asset is not a provision for any
liability and consequently it would not be a case of reserve.

(2) As per the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, an
amount set apart to become a provision has to be either (i) provision for
depreciation, renewals, or diminution in value of asset, or (ii) provision for
any known liability of which the amount cannot be determined with substantial
accuracy. However, the Income-tax Act has included only one part of this
definition for increasing the net profit to determine the book profits and
that is provision for meeting liability other than ascertained liability.
Hence provision for diminution in the value of asset cannot be added back
u/s.115JA.

(3) The change in method of valuation of inventory was
adopted by the assessee being more scientific and was consistently followed.
Even otherwise, it would be a diminution in value of inventories and since
these items had not been found to be wrong by any authorities under the
Companies Act, the Assessing Officer did not have the jurisdiction under the
provisions of the Act to add back such items for calculating book profits.

 


Case relied upon :



(i) Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT, (2002) 255 ITR 273
(SC)



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I. By holding shares, assessee entitled to exercise rights of owner of flat — Whether entitled to depreciation — Held, Yes. II. Forfeiture of application money on non-payment of call money on issue of debentures —Held, Capital receipt

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45 (2008) 304 ITR (AT) 167 (Mumbai)

Deepak Fertilizers and Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd.
v.
DCIT

A.Ys. : 1997-98 to 2001-2002. Dated : 21-9-2007



I. By virtue of holding the shares, assessee entitled
to exercise the rights of owner in respect of a flat — Whether entitled to
depreciation on flats — Held, Yes.



S. 32 — The assessee purchased the shares of YIL on the
basis of which it got an exclusive right to use and occupy certain flats and
claimed depreciation on the same which was disallowed by the Assessing
Officer, but the same was allowed by the CIT(A) relying on the provisions of
S. 2(47)(vi), S. 27(iii), S. 269UA(d)(ii) and also relevant Supreme Court
judgments.

 

The Tribunal observed as under :

1. The articles of association of a company engaged in
the business of real estate may provide that a shareholder of particular
shares would be entitled to exercise the rights of owner in respect of
properties owned by the company. Such mode of transfer is duly recognised by
the Legislature in provisions of S. 2(47)(vi), S. 27(iii), and S.
269UA(d)(ii)


2. The meaning of the term ‘owner’ for the purpose of S.
32 although not defined in the Income-tax Act, a reference to Supreme
Court’s decision in various cases can be construed so as to include a person
who can exercise the rights of the owner not on behalf of the owner but in
his own right. The term ‘owned’ as occurring in S. 32(1) should be assigned
a wider meaning. The provisions of this Section are for the benefit of the
assessee and the intention of the Legislature should be interpreted
accordingly.


 


The Tribunal accordingly allowed the assessee’s claim :

 

Cases relied upon :



(a) CIT v. Podar Cement P. Ltd., (1997) 226 ITR
625 (SC)

(b) Mysore Minerals Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) 239 ITR
775 (SC)

(c) R. B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala (1971) 82 ITR 570 (SC)

 

II. Forfeiture of application money on non-payment of
call money on issue of debentures —Held, Capital receipt.

The assessee issued partly convertible debentures and
received application money. On non-payment of call money, certain amount was
forfeited by the assessee. The assessee claimed it to be capital receipt not
liable to tax, which was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The CIT(A) deleted
the addition made by the Assessing Officer.

 

On Revenue’s appeal, the ITAT held that :

1. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T. V.
Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd., 222 ITR 344 relied upon by the assessee, is
not relevant because the amount received is not a trading receipt of the
assessee.

2. Since the amount received was in respect of debentures
issued, it is a capital receipt not chargeable to rax.

 


Cases relied upon :



(1) CIT v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., (2003) 261
ITR 501 (Bom.)

(2) Prism Cement v. Joint CIT, (2006) 285 ITR (AT)
43 (Mumbai)

 




levitra

Set-up date of business is question of fact and depends upon circumstances involved.

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44 302 ITR (AT) 1 Pune


Styler India Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT 2008

SS ITA 1961 S. 28, S. 37

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 8-4-2008

When business can be said to be set up is a question of fact
and would depend upon the circumstances involved in a particular case.

The assessee-company was set up as a 100% sub-sidiary of S of
Austria with the aim to make available technical expertise to the Indian
industry in three main areas — technical design and con-sultancy services,
systems supplier with respect to vehicle components and parts, sourcing of
vehicle components and parts from India for the global market.

 

The assessee filed a return for the A.Y. 1998-99 showing a
receipt of Rs.3,91,780 as interest on fixed deposit with the banks and claiming
expenses of Rs.49,27,336 as administrative and selling expenses as against the
receipt. The Assessing Officer was of the opinion that expenses of Rs.17,92,600
were capital in nature and that exhibition and launch expenses of Rs.15,65,239
should be disallowed as preliminary expenses.

 

The assessee explained that repairs, improvement and
innovation expenses were incurred for carrying on the business which was done by
obtaining long lease and in regards to exhibition and launch expense of
Rs.15,65,239, these were incurred after the company was formed on September 15,
1997.

 

For substantiating its claim, the assessee stated that it had
attended an exhibition in January 1998 at Expo ’98 at Delhi and it had taken a
stall and participated in the exhibition to promote the business interest of the
company and to increase its visibility in the eyes of Indian automotive
industry. The Assessing Officer held that interest income was liable to be
assessed under the head ‘Other Sources’ and expenses claimed amounting to
Rs.49,27,336 were not admissible and were to be disallowed.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that there was no sufficient
proof to hold that the business had commenced, that all expenses were incurred
by the assessee before setting up of the business and
were not permissible. He upheld assessment of interest income under the head
‘Other Sources’ and did not allow any expenses against the above receipt.

 

On appeal to the Appellate Tribunal :

 

Held :



1. That there were details of various activities handled by
the Managing Director during his stay in India and the corporate offices he
visited to carry on discussion with different persons. Even the names of the
persons he met were given. The assessee had also furnished the detailed
qualification of the general manager, marketing, who had met various
prospective clients and given a summary of various activities carried on by
the employee. The assessee had placed on record correspondence exchanged with
various manufacturers of automobiles.

2. The expenditure clearly showed that the assessee had a
building on which rent of Rs.3,10,400 was incurred. It further carried on an
advertisement related to the business it had set up and other miscellaneous
expenses connected with the consultative services the assessee intended to
provide.

3. The assessee participated and took a stall in ‘Auto
Fair’ held in Delhi with the objective of advancing the assessee’s business of
consultancy. The assessee had a place of business; it had qualified people who
could give advice on automobile industry. There was material to show that the
assessee contacted various clients who entered into agreement with the
assessee in the subsequent years and paid fees for consultation to the
assessee.

4. Merely because actual receipts were not shown, it could
not be said that the assessee did not set up its business. When the assessee
was ready to offer advice on matters and problems indicated in the
correspondence with the clients, it was im-material that no fees for the
consultancy were received in the year under consideration. The assessee had an
office from which advice could be given in the automobile industry. All the
correspondence was addressed to a particular address in Pune. The assessee had
machinery to render advice in the technical field. On the above facts, it
could not be held that the assessee did not set up business in the relevant
period.

 


Cases referred to :



(i) CIT v. Sarabhai Management Corporation Ltd.,
(1991) 192 ITR 151 (SC) (para 84)

(ii) Neil Automation Technology Ltd. v. Deputy CIT,
(2002) 120 Taxman 205 (Mum.) (Tribunal) (paras 4,18, 31, 57, 59, 62)

(iii) Western India Vegetable Products Ltd. v. CIT,
(1954) 26 ITR 151 (Bom.) (paras 4, 10, 13, 17, 29, 35, 52, 59, 60, 61, 75, 77,
81, 85, 92) and many more.

 


S. 10B, as amended w.e.f. 1-4-2001 — Deduction to be computed w.r.t. profits of EOU unit after reducing losses of non-EOU units — Held, No

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43 2009 TIOL 53 ITAT Bang.

DCIT v. M/s Medreich Ltd.

ITA No. 632/Bang./2008

A.Y. : 2004-2005. Dated : 21-11-2008

Whether in view of the provisions of S. 10B, as amended
w.e.f. 1-4-2001, the deduction u/s.10B is to be computed with reference to
profits of EOU unit after reducing the losses of non-EOU units — Held, No.

 

Facts :

The assessee company, a 100% EOU, was engaged in the business
of manufacture of pharmaceutical products. The assessee company claimed
exemption u/s.10B of the Act in respect of export profits in the EOU Unit and
also the domestic profits thereon. The assessee had not claimed set-off of
business losses incurred in other units but carried them forward. The AO while
assessing the total income first set off the loss of non-EOU unit against the
entire profit of the EOU unit (domestic as well as export) and then allowed
deduction u/s.10B on the residue. As a result, the carried forward benefit
claimed by the assessee was not allowed. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the claim of the assessee by relying on the
decision of the Bangalore Tribunal in the case of M/s. Webspectrum Software Pvt.
Ltd. in which the Tribunal held that the deduction u/s.10A is to be allowed
without setting off brought forward and current year loss of non-10A unit.
Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.


 

Held :

The Tribunal did not find any infirmity in the order of the
CIT(A). It dismissed the appeal of the Revenue.


levitra

S. 10A — Assessee owned two STP units — Whether deduction to be computed w.r.t. profits of one unit without setting off loss of other unit — Held, Yes. Whether deduction to be allowed w.r.t. profits and gains derived — Held, Yes. Whether order of CIT u/s.

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42 2009 TIOL 41 ITAT Bang.


Tata Consultancy Service Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 590/Bang./2008

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 14-11-2008

S. 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — A.Y. 2003-04 — Assessee
owned two STP units — During the assessment year STP Unit 1 earned profit and
STP Unit 2 suffered loss — Assessee computed deduction u/s.10A in respect of STP
Unit 1 with reference to its profits and without setting off the loss suffered
by STP Unit 2 — AO accepted the manner of computation adopted by the assessee —
CIT invoked S. 263 and directed AO to compute deduction u/s.10A in respect of
Unit 1 on the profits of Unit 1 after setting off loss of Unit 2 — Whether
deduction u/s.10A is to be computed with reference to profits of an undertaking
without setting off loss incurred by another eligible undertaking — Held, Yes.
Whether deduction u/s.10A is to be allowed with reference to profits and gains
derived by an undertaking — Held, Yes. Whether order of CIT u/s.263 needs to be
set aside — Held, Yes.

Facts :

The assessee company owned two STP units for export of
software. During the A.Y. 2003-04, STP Unit 1 earned profit, whereas STP Unit 2
suffered a loss. The assessee in its return of income claimed deduction u/s.10A
of the Act in respect of Unit 1. This deduction was computed with reference to
profits of Unit 1 without setting off the loss of STP Unit 2. No deduction
u/s.10A was claimed in respect of STP Unit 2.

 

The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income
of the assessee, accepted the manner of computation of deduction u/s.10A.

 

The CIT was of the opinion that deduction allowed u/s.10A in
respect of STP Unit 1 without setting off the loss of STP Unit 2 against income
of STP Unit 1 was not in accordance with law and that the order is prejudicial
to the interest of the Revenue. He accordingly directed the AO to modify the
order and allow deduction u/s.10A after setting off the loss from STP Unit 2
against the profit of STP Unit 1.

 

Aggrieved with the order of CIT u/s.263, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

Held :

The Tribunal after considering various judicial precedents
and also the provisions of S. 10A(1), 10A(4), notes on clauses while introducing
amendment to S. 10A(4) by Finance Bill, 2001 held as under :

(1) In S. 10A(1), the word ‘an’ has been used before the
undertaking. Deduction is to be allowed on such profit and gains as are
derived from the undertaking. Hence, to apply the provisions of S. 10A, one
has to consider the profit and gains as derived by an undertaking. It does not
refer to profits and gains as are derived by the assessee. The assessee may be
having more than one undertaking.

(2) Deduction u/s.10A is to be computed on the basis of
profits and gains derived by an undertaking. In the instant case, STP Unit 2
was having a loss and therefore, its loss cannot be set off while ascertaining
the deduction u/s.10A for STP Unit 1.

(3) When the AO has taken one of the possible views, then
the order of the AO cannot be termed as erroneous and the CIT was having no
power to cancel that order u/s.263 of the Act.

 


The Tribunal cancelled the order passed by the CIT u/s.263 of
the Act. The assessee’s appeal was allowed.

levitra

S. 143(2), S. 158BC, S. 292BB — For period prior to 1-4-2008 where notice not issued, whether block assessment order without jurisdiction — Held, Yes. Whether S. 292BB applicable to A.Y. 2008-09 and subsequent years — Held, Yes

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41 2009 TIOL 38 ITAT Del. SB

Kuber Tobacco Products (P) Ltd. v. DCIT

IT(SS)A No. 261/Del./2001

A.Ys. : 1-4-1988 to 25-1-1999. Dated : 14-1-2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 143(2), S. 158BC, S. 292BB — For a
period prior to 1-4-2008 where a notice u/s.143(2) of the Act is not issued, the
block assessment proceedings and consequential block assessment order can be
said to be without jurisdiction — Held, Yes. Whether S. 292BB is applicable to
A.Y. 2008-09 and subsequent years — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

Search action u/s.132 of the Act was carried out in
the case of the assessee on 21-1-1999. The assessment order dated 29-1-2001
passed u/s.158BC of the Act was silent on the issue of notice u/s.143(2).
Neither before the Assessing Officer, nor before the CIT(A) did the assessee
contend that the assessment framed without issuance of notice u/s.143(2) was
invalid. The assessee in an additional ground before the Tribunal contended that
in the absence of issuance of mandatory legal notice u/s.143(2) of the Act the
block assessment proceedings and consequential block assessment order be held to
be without jurisdiction.

 

The Revenue raised a plea that in view of insertion of S.
292BB which is inserted by Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1-4-2008, the assessee
cannot take the plea that assessment should be held invalid merely for the
reason that no notice u/s.143(2) was issued and the assessee is barred from
taking this plea.

 

In these circumstances, the question referred to the Special
Bench was whether the assessee who has participated in block assessment
proceedings is precluded from taking any objection that notice u/s.143(2) was
not served upon him or was not served upon him in time, in view of the
provisions of S. 292BB inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1-4-2008 and if
so, since when he can be said to be so precluded.


 

Held :

The Special Bench of the Tribunal held as follows :

(1) The scope of S. 292BB is that where any assessee has
appeared in any proceedings or has co-operated in any inquiry relating to
assessment or reassessment, then the consequences ensued will be that it will
be deemed that any notice under any provisions of the Act, which is required
to be served on an assessee has been duly served on him and it will further be
deemed to be served in time and in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
The assessee is debarred from taking the defence or raise any objection in any
proceedings or inquiry that the notice was :


(a) Not served upon him;


(b) Not served upon him in time; and


(c) Served upon him in any improper manner.

 


(2) The assessee has a right of being served with the
notice in case proceedings are taken against him and in case of invalid notice
the whole proceedings taken pursuant to that notice would be void ab initio
(subject to provisions of S. 292B) and will have no legal consequences. To
overcome some of the situations, S. 292BB has been brought on the statute as
explained in the Memorandum explaining the provisions as well as notes on
clauses.


(3) Applicability of S. 292BB is not strictly restricted to
issue of notice u/s.143(2), but it is in respect of other notices relating to
any provisions of the Act, which include notice to initiate re-assessment
proceedings and other proceedings also.


(4) Where the statute u/s.292BB deems service of notice, it
will always include issue of notice as service cannot be effected without
issuance thereof.


(5) Where procedural statute creates a new disability or
obligation and imposes new duties in respect of transactions already
accomplished, then the statute cannot be construed to have retrospective
effect. S. 292BB cannot be construed to have retrospective operation and it
has to be applied prospectively.


(6) S. 292BB is applicable to A.Y. 2008-09 and subsequent
years. The assessee is precluded from taking such objection for and from A.Y.
2008-09. Prior to 1-4-2008 i.e., up to 31-3-2008, as per S. 292BB, the
assessee is not precluded from taking any objection regarding invalidity of
assessment/reassessment on the ground of improper/invalid issuance/service of
a notice.



 



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Whether while computing book profit u/s. 115JB, lower of unabsorbed loss or depreciation as per profit and loss account of amalgamated company can be set off against profits of amalgamating company — Held, Yes.

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40 2009 TIOL 26 ITAT Bang.


VST Tillers & Tractors Ltd.
v. CIT

ITA No. 588/Bang./2008

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 21-11-2008

S. 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — A.Y. 2003-04 — Whether
while computing book profit u/s. 115JB of the Act lower of unabsorbed loss or
depreciation as per profit and loss account of the amalgamated company can be
set off against profits of an amalgamating company — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

During the year ended 31-3-2003, V.S.T. Precision Components
Ltd. (‘VPCL’), a company which was subsidiary of the assessee company was
amalgamated with the assessee company. The amalgamation, approved by the
Karnataka High Court by its order dated 18th July 2003, was to be effective from
1-4-2002. The terms of amalgamation, as mentioned in paragraph 11 of the order
of the Court, inter alia stated that accumulated loss and depreciation of
VPCL shall be deemed to be the loss and depreciation of the assessee company as
provided u/s.72 of the Act.

 

The assessee returned an income of Rs. Nil after setting off
business loss and unabsorbed depreciation of VPCL. The assessee computed book
profit u/s.115JB by reducing from profit as per its profit & loss account the
brought forward loss as per profit & loss account of VPCL.

 

The book profit computed by the assessee was accepted by the
AO in the assessment u/s.143(3).

 

Subsequently, the CIT was of the opinion that since the
unabsorbed loss was not as per the books of account of the assessee company but
of VPCL, the same cannot be permitted to be reduced from the book profit for
purposes of S. 115JB. He, accordingly, directed the AO to modify the assessment
order by re-computing the tax liability u/s.115JB.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the effective date of amalgamation
was 1-4-2002. The Tribunal held that in view of the statutory provisions of S.
72A(1) and also the order of the High Court sanctioning the scheme, the
unabsorbed business loss and also unabsorbed depreciation of VPCL were deemed to
be loss and depreciation of the assessee company. U/s.115JB(2) lower of
unabsorbed loss or unabsorbed depreciation is to be set off against the book
profit. Since the unabsorbed loss of VPCL was lower than unabsorbed
depreciation, the assessee had rightly set off the unabsorbed loss against book
profit. The Tribunal held that the CIT was not correct in directing the AO to
compute book profit without setting off the unabsorbed loss of VPCL. The
Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT passed u/s.263 of the Act.

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Whether grant of excessive credit of TDS amounts to escapement of income — Held, No. Whether it can be construed as grant of excessive relief under sub-clause (iii) of Explanation 2(e) to S. 147 — Held, No

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39 2009 TIOL 01 ITAT Hyd.

GMR Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 1014/Hyd./2007

A.Y. : 2000-2001. Dated : 26-9-2008

S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — A.Y. 2000-01 — Whether
grant of excessive credit of TDS amounts to escapement of income — Held, No.
Whether grant of excessive credit of TDS can be construed as grant of excessive
relief under sub-clause (iii) of clause (c) of Explanation 2 to S. 147 of the
Act — Held, No.

 

Facts :

For A.Y. 2000-01 the assessee company filed its return of
income declaring total income of Rs.11,20,190. During the year under
consideration the assessee had in its profit & loss account admitted receipts of
Rs.3,33,87,112, but had claimed credit for TDS, amounting to Rs.56,30,970, in
respect of entire gross receipts of Rs.25,70,53,996. The Assessing Officer
completed the assessment u/s.143(3) of the Act assessing the total income to be
the same as returned income and granted credit of TDS amounting to Rs.56,27,970.


 


Subsequently, the AO initiated reassessment proceedings since
he was of the view that as per provisions of S. 199 of the Act credit should be
restricted to the extent of income admitted during the year. In the order passed
u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 147 of the Act, the AO restricted credit of TDS to
Rs.7,34,516.


 


In an appeal to the CIT(A) the assessee challenged the
reopening of assessment on the ground that grant of excessive credit of TDS
cannot be construed as escapement of income. The CIT(A) upheld the reopening and
held that grant of excess credit of TDS is a case of income being subjected to
excessive relief.


 



Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal,
wherein it challenged the reopening of the assessment
.

 

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the words ‘income’ and ‘tax’ have
different connotations and are separately defined in the Act. The tax on income
is on the basis of charge prescribed in Chapter II of the Act. It further
observed that what needs to be assessed under the Act is the income earned by
the assessee. Chapter XIV of the Act prescribes the procedure for assessment.
Once the income is earned, returned and assessed, the collection and recovery of
tax start simultaneously at each stage as prescribed in Chapter XVII of the Act.
The Tribunal observed that as per the scheme of the Act, each stage is a
distinct stage, and each stage culminates into the next. In the present case,
the Tribunal noted that it was dealing with assessment stage.

 

The Tribunal observed that S. 147 is contained in Chapter XIV
of the Act and deals with income which has escaped assessment. It stated that
when one says that income has escaped assessment, it only means that such income
has escaped the tax net though it was taxable. According to the Tribunal,
granting of excess credit cannot be equated with income escaping assessment. By
granting excess credit everything revolves around correct collection and
recovery of tax. Nowhere income is in picture and if income is not in picture,
where is the question of its escapement ? The Tribunal held that the AO assumed
the jurisdiction wrongly when no income had escaped assessment.

 

As regards the provision of clause (c)(iii) of Explanation 2
to S. 147 of the Act, the Tribunal noted that the issue is squarely covered in
favour of the assessee by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Bombay Gas Co. Ltd.

 

The Tribunal quashed the order of reassessment.


levitra

(a) Ss.(2) and (3) of S. 14A are procedural in nature and, hence, retrospective. (b) All direct and indirect expenses are disallowable u/s.14A, which have relation with income not chargeable to tax. (c) S. 14A applicable to dividend earned by assessee

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38 (2008) 26 SOT 603 (Mum.) (SB)

ITO v. Daga Capital Management (P.) Ltd.

ITA Nos. 8057 (Mum.) of 2003 and 183, 1372 and 2048 (Mum.)
of 2005

A.Ys. : 2001-02 and 2002-03. Dated : 20-10-2008

S. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 :



(a) Expenses falling under any head or Section which
are otherwise deductible as business expenditure or under other respective
heads, would call for disallowance to the extent to which those expenses
have been incurred in relation to income exempt from tax.


(b) Ss.(2) and (3) of S. 14A are procedural in nature
and, hence, retrospective.


(c) For purpose of S. 14A what is relevant is to work
out expenditure in relation to exempt income and not to examine whether
expenditure incurred by assessee has resulted into exempt income or taxable
income.


(d) All direct and indirect expenses are disallowable
u/s.14A, which have any relation with income not chargeable to tax under the
Act.


(e) S. 14A would be applicable where shares are held
as stock-in-trade.


(f) Provisions of S. 14A would be applicable with
respect to dividend income earned by assessee engaged in business of dealing
in shares and securities on shares held as stock-in-trade when earning of
such dividend income was incidental to trading in shares.


 


The assessee-company was engaged in the business of dealing
in shares. For the relevant assessment year, the assessee had exempt dividend
income and, therefore, the Assessing Officer disallowed certain expenses in
terms of S. 14A. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.

 

The Special Bench also held in favour of the Revenue on all
the matters. The Special Bench observed as under :


1. S. 14A has an overriding effect over all other
Sections allowing deductions :

(a) The residence of this Section in the first
sub-chapter, viz., ‘Heads of income’, clearly demonstrates that it
has been made applicable to all the heads of income. If the intention of the
Legislature had been to restrict its application to the expenditure under
heads other than ‘business income’, then it would have been placed under the
relevant sub-chapter instead of the first sub-chapter, which, in turn,
refers to all the heads of income. Therefore, the expenses deductible under
the head ‘Business income’ are not immune from S. 14A.

(b) S. 14A is a special provision which deals with
disallowances of expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income
which does not form part of the total income under the Act. The expenses
falling under any head or Section which are otherwise deductible as business
expenditure or under other respective heads, would call for disallowance, in
view of the specific provision of S. 14A, to the extent to which those have
been incurred in relation to the income exempt from tax.

 

2. Ss.(2) and (3) of S. 14A are retrospective :

(a) In case of substantive provisions, the general rule
is that a provision is normally prospective in nature, unless it is given
retrospective operation expressly or can be so inferred by necessary
implication.

(b) However, in respect of
clarificatory/explanatory/procedural provisions, the date of insertion loses
its significance.

(c) S. 14A was inserted with a view to clarify the
intention of making disallowance in respect of ‘expenditure incurred by the
assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total income
under this Act’. This Section declared the intention of the Act ‘since
inception’.

(d) When Ss.(1) itself is clarificatory and then
resultantly retrospective, it is beyond comprehension as to how Ss.(2) and
(3), providing the mechanism to do what is provided for in Ss.(1), can be
construed as substantive and, hence, prospective.

(e) A proviso has also been inserted in S. 14A for
reducing its rigor, which stipulates that no reassessment u/s.147 or
rectification u/s.154 shall be carried out by the Assessing Officer so as to
give effect to the newly inserted provision. That has been done so as not to
disturb the proceedings which have already attained finality in the period
prior to this insertion. However, assessments which are pending at any
stage, either before the Assessing Officer or the CIT(A) or the Tribunal or
the Higher Courts, would be governed by the mandate of that Section as it is
retroactive. From the above discussion, it is clear that Ss.(2) and (3) are
procedural in nature and, hence, retrospective.

 

3. Expenditure in relation to exempt income :

(a) The language of Ss.(1) of S. 14A clearly provides
that no deduction shall be allowed ‘in respect of expenditure incurred by
the assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the tot

(a) S. 48 — Option to avail benefit of indexation or not is with assessee. (b) S. 70 — Capital gain computed with indexation can be set off against capital gain computed without indexation.

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New Page 1

37 (2008) 26 SOT 380 (Mum.)

Mohanlal N. Shah HUF v. ACIT

ITA No. 789 (Mum.) of 2004

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 24-9-2008



(a) S. 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Option to avail
or not to avail benefit of indexation is with the assessee.


(b) S. 70 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital loss
computed with indexation can be set off against capital gain computed without
indexation.




During the relevant assessment year, the assessee had sold
shares and units of mutual funds. In respect of shares sold, the assessee did
not claim benefit of indexation, but in respect of units sold of one mutual fund
the assessee opted for indexation. The resultant loss from the units was set off
against the gain from shares.

The Assessing Officer held that though the benefit of
indexation is a privilege allowed to the assessee as S. 48, the same could not
be availed of on a pick-and-choose basis; and that the option to offer capital
gain at the rate of 20% with indexation and at the rate of 10% without
indexation lies with the assessee as S. 112, but before that S. 70 comes into
appraisal and for setting off of any income under the same head it is but
natural that capital gain is to be calculated on the same footing. Therefore, he
disallowed the method adopted by the assessee. The CIT(A) also held against the
assessee.

The Tribunal, following the decision in the case of
Devinder Prakash Kalra v. ACIT,
(2006) 151 Taxman 17 (Delhi), held in favour
of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) The computation of income from capital gains is
governed by S. 48. A plain reading of the said provision reveals that a
capital gain from each asset which is transferred has to be computed.
Indexation is allowable while computing the ‘capital gain’ from the transfer
of each long-term capital asset.


(2) As provided in S. 48, option is with the assessee to or
not to avail of benefit of indexation for computation of capital gains on
transfer of each of long-term capital assets.


(3) It is only after computing the capital gains as per S.
48, can it be aggregated by setting off the loss u/s.70 and it is then that
the rate of tax as provided u/s.112 is to be applied.


(4) The Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of
Devinder Prakash Kalra v. ACIT,
(2006) 151 Taxman 17 (Mag.), has held that
S. 112 is not only a beneficial provision, but is also mandatory provision and
if several transactions have taken place by way of sale of shares, the
assessee can avail of the benefit of indexation in a few transactions and
avail of 10% tax rate in the remaining transactions.



 


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S. 145A — If a change per se is forced upon assessee in valuation of closing stock, corresponding adjustment in opening stock to be carried out for consistency

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36 (2008) 26 SOT 141 (Mum.)

Dy. CIT v. Beck India Ltd.

ITA Nos. 383 and 483 (Mum.) of 2005

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 11-9-2008

S. 145A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If on account of
application of S. 145A, a change per se is forced upon assessee in valuation of
its closing stock, a corresponding adjustment in opening stock has to be carried
out for consistency.

 

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer held
that the assessee was bound to follow the decision of the High Court in
Melmould Corpn. v. CIT,
(1993) 202 ITR 789/71 Taxman 47 (Bom.) and that if a
change in method of accounting results in change in value of closing stock, no
corresponding adjustment would be required in opening stock, since such a change
would have the effect of disturbing the accounts leading to a chain reaction,
and, therefore, he added back MODVAT credit balance to closing stock of the
assessee. The CIT(A) directed the Assessing Officer to make corresponding
adjustments in the opening stock.

 

The Tribunal, relying on the decision in the case of CIT
v. Mahavir Aluminium Ltd.,
(2008) 297 ITR 77/ 168 Taxman 27 (Delhi), upheld
the CIT(A)’s order. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. S. 145A mentions ‘inventory’ and limiting it only to
‘closing inventory’, disregarding the opening inventory, would be not in
accordance with the plain meaning of the term ‘inventory’ used in the Section.
Inventory will necessarily include within its fold both opening as well as
closing.

2. In Melmould Corpn.’s case (supra), the assessee
had made a change in the method of valuation, which was not thrust upon the
assessee, but voluntarily selected by it. Such a change suo motu done
would definitely be different from one, which is statutory inflicted, where an
assessee per se is forced to make an adjustment to value of its
inventory.

3. However, when on account of application of S. 145A a
change per se is forced upon the assessee in the valuation of its
closing stock, a corresponding adjustment in opening stock has to be carried
out for consistency.

 


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S. 2(22)(e) — Amount given by company to director to purchase business premises, returned since deal could not materialise — Could not be treated as deemed dividend.

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35 (2008) 26 SOT 95 (Delhi)

Sunil Sethi v. Dy. CIT

ITA No. 2131 (Delhi) of 2007

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 12-9-2008

S. 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — When amount was
given by company to its director for business purposes of company i.e., to
purchase business premises, and said amount was returned since the deal could
not materialise, such amount could not be treated as deemed dividend.

 

During the relevant year, the assessee, who was a director in
a company and was holding 50% of the share capital of the Company, had received
Rs.30 lacs from the Company by way of an imprest to enable him to make the
payment for a proposed office complex and as the deal could not materialise, the
same was returned to the company. The Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) held such
amount as deemed dividend.

 

The Tribunal, following the decision in the case of Dy.
CIT v. Lakra Bros.,
(2007) 162 Taxman 170 (Chd.)(Mag.), held that provisions
of S. 2(22)(e) were not applicable in the assessee’s case. The Tribunal noted as
under :

1. A sum of Rs.30 lacs was given to him for the purpose of
making advance with respect to certain land dealings which were proposed to be
entered into by the company through the assessee. The assessee was a director
in the company and could lawfully execute certain agreements on behalf of the
company. Such payment was made in pursuance of a resolution passed by the
company.


2. It was not the case of the Revenue that such resolution
did not happen or it was an afterthought story. No material had been brought
on record to suggest that what was explained by the assessee was incorrect.
The sum had been treated as deemed dividend simply for the reason that it was
given to the assessee.


3. The transaction was in the ordinary course of the
business of the company, and there was no intention on the part of the company
to give a loan or advance to the assessee for his individual benefit.


4. It had been demonstrated that in the bank account of the
assessee, in which the said amount of Rs.30 lacs was credited, was always
having balance of more than Rs.30 lacs. So even for a short period the
assessee had not derived any benefit or it could not be said that the said
amount was given to the assessee by the company for his individual benefit.
The amount was lying in the bank account of the assessee, which was not
utilised at all for any purpose.


5. The amount was paid for a very short period for a
specific purpose and there was documentary evidence on record to substantiate
the explanation of the assessee that the amount was given for the business
purposes of the company.


 


Thus, the said amount could not be treated as deemed dividend
in the hands of the assessee.

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S. 254(1) — Oral pronouncement during hearing not order; Tribunal has power to refix cases to prevent miscarriage of justice — Only condition is aggrieved party must get opportunity of hearing.

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34 (2008) 119 TTJ 501 (Mumbai)


Mafatlal Securities Ltd. v. Jt. CIT

ITA No. 1127 (Mum.) of 2001

A.Y. : 1996-97. Dated : 10-8-2007

S. 254(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Oral pronouncement
during the course of hearing is not an order at all; even otherwise, Tribunal
has inherent power to refix the cases to prevent miscarriage of justice or to
grant substantial justice, and the only condition which is required to be
satisfied is that the aggrieved party must be given an opportunity of hearing.

 

In the course of original hearing, the learned counsel for
the assessee stated that the facts of this case were identical to the facts of
another case decided by this Tribunal, wherein the Tribunal had decided in
favour of the assessee. Hence, the case was heard mainly as a covered case and
the result was pronounced during the course of the hearing itself.

 

Thereafter, during the course of further study of the files,
the Bench thought that certain observations in the decisions in two cases of
Mumbai Benches were relevant. Hence, the case was released for fresh hearing as
a part heard case so as to confront these two decisions to the assessee. The
learned counsel took a preliminary objection that the Tribunal had pronounced
the order, hence, if any decision was taken contrary to the decision pronounced,
it would amount to review of order and which was beyond its powers. The learned
Departmental Representative supported the approach of the Tribunal where an
adequate opportunity of hearing was given to the assessee before taking any
other view in the matter.

 

The Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of ITAT v. V. K. Agarwal, (1998) 150 CTR 513 (SC)/(1998) 101
Taxman 382 (SC), held that unless the order of the Bench was signed by all the
members of the Bench and was dated, it was not an order of the Tribunal. The
Tribunal noted as under :

1. Legally speaking, oral pronouncement during the course
of hearing is not an order at all. It is only an intimation of likely result
or prima facie conclusion expressed on the basis of the contentions
made by the parties. It is only a procedural aspect and it does not create any
statutory embargo or limitation.

2. No party can proceed further unless it receives an order
in writing and in the case of orders passed by the Tribunal, the limitation
also starts from the date when the order is served. Hence, oral pronouncement
does not give any inherent right or create any limitation with regard to
statutory rights of the parties to the disputes.

3. Even an entry to this effect, in the order sheet signed
by the Members of the Bench would not constitute an order within the meaning
of r. 34 of the ITAT Rules.

4. Even if it is presumed that oral pronouncement during
the course of hearing is an order, then the Tribunal being a Court of plenary
jurisdiction is well within its powers within the meaning of S. 254(1) to
refix it for clarifications before passing an order in writing. The Tribunal
has inherent power to refix the cases in such type of situations to prevent
miscarriage of justice or to grant substantial justice. The only condition
which is required to be satisfied is that the aggrieved party must be given an
opportunity of hearing which has been done in this case.

5. Similarly, the Tribunal before passing a written order
can refix the case suo motu for clarifications so as to appraise the
issue afresh in the light of other facts or material. There is nothing wrong
in it because principles of natural justice are equally applicable to judicial
authorities as these are applicable to the parties to the disputes.

6. Though the Tribunal is not akin to a Court but the
functions discharged by it are similar to a Court, hence, in addition to its
expressed statutory powers, it has got inherent power to pass such orders as
may be necessary for the ends of justice.

 


The following cases were also relied on by the Tribunal :

1. Oriental Building & Furnishing Co. v. CIT, (1952)
21 ITR 105 (Punj.)

2. Singar Singh & Sons v. CIT, (1965) 58 ITR 626
(All.)

3. CIT v. Dr. T. K. Jairaj, (2002) 172 CTR (Ker.)
584; (2002) 256 ITR 252 (Ker.)

4. Khushalchand B. Daga v. T. K. Surendran, ITO
(1972) 85 ITR 48 (Bom.)

 



Note : Similar decision was taken by the Pune Tribunal in
the case of CIT v. Jinendra Smelting & Rolling Mills, Misc. Application
No. 65/Pn/2007 in ITA No. 539 (Pn) 2006 reported in 119 TTJ 519.

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S. 254(1) — If decision not relied upon by parties at hearing and Bench desires to apply ratio of such decision, natural justice demands that Bench should confront parties with decision and should give opportunity to make submissions w.r.t. such decisio

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33 (2008) 119 TTJ 433 (Jab.) (TM)

Vindhya Telelink Ltd. v. Jt. CIT

ITA No. 295 (Jab.) of 2000 and

C.O. No. 19 (Jab.) of 2002

A.Ys. : 1997-98 and 1998-99. Dated : 22-8-2008

S. 254(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If any decision is
not relied upon by the parties at the time of hearing and the Bench desires to
apply the ratio of such decision, natural justice demands that the Bench should
confront the parties with such decision and should give an opportunity to them
so that they can make their submissions with reference to such decision.

 


For the relevant assessment years, the Assessing Officer
disallowed 50% of the expenditure claimed by the assessee assuming that
expenditure towards foreign travel was attributable to the wife of the managing
director, who accompanied him during such visits. The CIT(A) allowed the relief
following the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Appollo Tyres
Ltd. [CIT v. Appollo Tyres Ltd., (1998) 149 CTR 538 (Ker.)/(1999) 237 ITR
706 (Ker.)]. The learned AM upheld the order of the CIT(A) following the same
decision of the Kerala High Court. However, the learned JM reversed the order of
the CIT(A) following various other decisions. It was contended by the assessee’s
learned counsel before the TM that the learned JM has referred to such decisions
which were not relied upon or argued on behalf of the Department.

 


The Third Member noted as under :

1. If any decision is not relied upon by the parties at the
time of hearing and the Bench desires to apply the ratio of such decision,
natural justice demands that the Bench should confront the parties with such
decision and should give an opportunity to them so that they can make their
submissions with reference to such decision. Admittedly, in this case this has
not been done by the Bench.


2. Therefore, since the decisions were not referred to by
any of the parties at the time of hearing, the learned JM was not justified in
relying upon the same while deciding the issue under consideration.

 


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S. 147 — Reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated if time limit for issue of notice u/s.143(2) has not expired.

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

31 (2010) 37 DTR (Chennai) (TM) (Trib) 1
Super Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Addl. CIT
A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 12-3-2010

 

S. 147 — Reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated if time
limit for issue of notice u/s.143(2) has not expired.

Facts :

Notice u/s.148 was issued to the assessee before the expiry
of the time limit for issue of notice u/s.143(2). The assessee preferred an
appeal before the CIT(A) and challenged the validity of reassessment
proceedings. The CIT(A) rejected the plea of the assessee.

Upon further appeal to the Tribunal, the learned Accountant
Member took a view that the decision in the case of Trustees of H.E.H. The
Nizam’s Supplemental Family Trust v. CIT, 242 ITR 381 (SC) pertains to A.Y.
1962-63 which was prior to the amendment to S. 147 w.e.f. 1st April, 1989. Prior
to the amendment of S. 147, there was no provision equivalent to cl. (b) of
Expln. 2 in the amended S. 147. In a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of ACIT v. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P) Ltd., 291 ITR 500 (SC) it
has been held that so long as the ingredients of S. 147 are fulfilled, the AO is
free to initiate proceeding u/s.147 and failure to take steps u/s.143(3) will
not render the AO powerless to initiate reassessment proceedings even when
intimation u/s.143(1) had been issued. Applying the jurisdictional High Court’s
decision in the case of ITO v. K. M. Pachiappan, 311 ITR 31, the validity of
reassessment proceedings was upheld.

The learned Judicial Member distinguished the decision of
Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. on the ground that the notice u/s.148 was
issued after the expiry of the time available for issuing notice u/s.143(2) in
that case. Following the latest decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the
case of CIT v. Qatalys Software Technologies Ltd., 308 ITR 249, the notice
issued by the AO u/s.148 was quashed.

Upon difference of opinion between the members, the matter
was referred to the Third Member.

Held :

The Department wants to interpret the expression ‘no
assessment has been made’ in the clause (b) of Expln. 2 in the amended S. 147 to
mean that it also includes situation where assessment u/s. 143(3) is still
possible but not yet made. If this interpretation is to be accepted, it will set
at naught the fundamental principles underlying S. 147.

As per the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in
several cases :

(a) the proceedings are said to have commenced once the
return is filed, and

(b) the proceedings terminate when,

(i) the return is processed u/s.143(1) and the time to
issue notice u/s.143(2) is over,

(ii) assessment is made u/s.143(3) or,

(iii) assessment is no longer possible u/s. 143(3).

Proceedings u/s.147 can be initiated only after the earlier
proceedings have terminated as mentioned in (b) above.

Observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh
Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. has to be understood in the right perspective. It
is mentioned that failure to take steps u/s.143(3) will not render the AO
powerless to initiate reassessment proceedings even when intimation u/s.143(1)
had been issued. The failure of the AO which the Court is talking about will be
deemed to have occurred only when the hands of the AO are tied down by law and
he is unable to initiate the proceedings u/s.143(3). Hence order passed
u/s.143(3) read with S. 147 was quashed.

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Capital gains vis-à-vis business income — If shares are held for more than a month, they should be treated as investment and profit on the sale should be charged as short-term capital gain — When shares are held for less than a month, gain on them should

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

30 (2010) 37 DTR (Ahd.) (Trib) 345
Sugamchand C. Shah v. ACIT
A.Ys. : 2005-06 & 2006-07. Dated : 29-1-2010

 

Capital gains vis-à-vis business income — If shares are held
for more than a month, they should be treated as investment and profit on the
sale should be charged as short-term capital gain — When shares are held for
less than a month, gain on them should be treated as profit from business.

Facts :

The assessee is engaged in the business of weaving job work
and grey cloth. He declared profits from sale of shares as short-term capital
gains and long-term capital gains. The AO treated the entire sum as business
income on the basis of frequency of transactions and holding periods.

The CIT(A) partly confirmed the order of the AO and
short-term capital gains were treated as business income. However, long-term
capital gains were not allowed to be treated as business income.

Held :

The assessee has shown the transactions in shares as
investment and not as stock-in-trade. It has been shown consistently for several
years in the past and the Department has not challenged the book-keeping or
accounting of shares as investment. No contrary materials or facts have been
pointed out by the Revenue to show that facts in the current year are different
than the facts in earlier years. The entire portfolio has been valued at cost as
at the end of the accounting year. If in the past, the Department has accepted
the sale of shares of holding of more than a year as investment and profits
thereon has been assessed under the head ‘Capital Gains’, then there is no
reason to hold differently this year.

In respect of short-term capital gains, the assessee has
discharged the onus of showing that it is making investment, but the Revenue is
able to show that there are high frequencies and low holdings in many
transactions of shares indicating that the assessee has some intention of
purchasing and selling shares as a trader. Considering the totality and
peculiarity of the facts of the case, it was held that the assessee is neither
fully acting as a trader nor as investor. Therefore, a criterion was fixed for
determining as to when he is acting as trader and when as investor. Accordingly,
if shares are not held even, say, for a month, then the intention is clearly to
reap profit by acting as a trader and he did not intend to hold them in
investment portfolio. If a person intends to hold his purchases of shares as
investment, he would watch the fluctuation of rates in the market for which a
minimum time is necessary, which was estimated at one month. Where shares are
held for more than a month, they should be treated as investment and on their
sale short-term capital gains should be charged. When shares are held for less
than a month, gain on them should be treated as profit from business.

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S. 115JB—provision made for premium payable on mezzanine capital is an ascertained liability.

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

29 Srei International Finance Ltd. v. ACIT
123 ITD 480 (Del. ITAT)
A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 4-4-2008

 

S. 115JB—provision made for premium payable on mezzanine
capital is an ascertained liability.

Facts :

The assessee had debited a sum of Rs.88 lakhs in the profit &
loss account as provision for mezzanine capital. On enquiry, the assessee
provided a detailed explanation of the nature of this provision, that this
provision was made for redemption of unsecured bonds in the nature of mezzanine
capital (Tier II) and was provided over the tenure of bond. The assessee also
submitted that the amount of provision is ascertained at the time of issue of
bonds and therefore the liability is ascertained liability, thus allowable
u/s.115JB. However, the AO disallowed the same holding it as unascertained
liability. The CIT(A) allowed the same on the reasoning that the bonds issued by
the company would earn annual interest for the bond holder. The bond holder was
also required to be paid premium and face value. The premium was to be paid in
equal instalments spread over the tenure of bonds. The provision of Rs.88 lakhs
related to premium payable in respect of previous year under consideration. The
CIT(A) further observed that the face value of the bond is known and amount of
premium and tenure of bond is also fixed. Therefore, it cannot be said the
premium payable on bonds is incapable of being computed in a scientific manner.
Accordingly addition was deleted.

Held :

The Tribunal held that there was a scientific method of
calculation of liability on account of premium on mezzanine capital. Therefore,
it cannot be said that the liability was not an ascertained liability.

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S. 48 r.w. S. 147 — Capital gain to be taxed on basis of provisions of S. 48 and not on basis of fair market value as determined by valuation officer — assessment on the basis of DVO report not permissible.

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 Part A — Reported Decisions



 


46 (2008) 22 SOT 156 (Delhi)

Tej Pratap Singh v. ACIT

ITA No. 4601 (Del.) of 2004

A.Y. 1999-2000. Dated : 31-12-2007

S. 48 read with S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital
gain is to be computed and taxed on the basis of provisions contained u/s.48 and
it cannot be computed on the basis of fair market value of asset as determined
by Valuation Officer. Therefore, assessment cannot be reopened for taxing
capital gain in respect of an asset on basis of market value of asset as
estimated by DVO.

 

The return filed by the assessee was processed u/s.143(1)(a)
by the Assessing Officer. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer reopened the said
assessment of the assessee for the reason that the valuation of the land was
estimated by the DVO at Rs.2,73,281 as against Rs.50,000 shown by the assessee
and, thus, the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for the A.Y.
1999-2000.

 

The Assessing Officer completed the reassessment proceedings
by calculating capital gains based on the fair market value as determined by the
DVO. The CIT(A) confirmed the computation done by the Assessing Officer.

 

The Tribunal ruled in the assessee’s favour. The Tribunal
noted as under :

(a) A perusal of the reasons recorded for the reopening
indicates that the belief of the Assessing Officer regarding escapement of the
income of the assessee is based only on the opinion of
the Valuation Officer. It is also found that before making reference no
material was examined by him. He did not see any other material except the
valuation report. Thus, it is clear that the Assessing Officer has not made
any judicial application of mind for reopening the assessment. He made no
enquiry from the assessee or from any other source, nor examined the books of
account of the assessee before doing so.

(b) In view of the above facts, the reference made to the
Valuation Officer was itself illegal and consequently non est. When the
reference itself is illegal and non est in law, the report submitted in such
reference, consequently, cannot be relied upon to initiate reassessment
proceedings. It was so held by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of
Brig. B. Lall v. ITO,
(1981) 127 ITR 308. In the case of Bhagwandas
Jain v. Dy. CIT,
(2000) 246 ITR 632, the M.P. High Court, after following
the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Brig. B. Lall (supra),
held that reopening of the assessment on the basis of valuation report is not
valid.

(c) On examination of S. 48, it is clear that the capital
gain is to be computed by deducting from the ‘full value’ of the consideration
received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset the cost
of acquisition and expenditure incurred in connection with the transfer. The
expression ‘full value of the consideration’ does not mean ‘market value’ or
‘fair market value’ of the asset transferred. Hence, capital gain tax cannot
be computed and levied with reference to the market value determined on the
basis of valuation report.

(d) The Delhi Bench of the ITAT in the case of Ashok
Soni v. ITO,
(2006) 10 SOT 39 (URO), after following the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the cases of K. P. Verghese v. ITO, (1981) 131 ITR 597
and CIT v. George Henderson & Co. Ltd., (1967) 66 ITR 622 (SC) and
various other authorities, has observed as under :

“In the absence of any material with the Assessing Officer
to show that the assessee has received more amount than the consideration
shown in the concerned document, the action of the Assessing Officer in
substituting the full value of consideration by the fair market value as
stated by the Departmental Valuation Officer in his report for computation of
capital gains was not valid.”

(e) The valuation report is an expert opinion at the most.
In relation to the transaction of transfer such report cannot be treated to be
proof of the fact that there is some underhand dealing and consideration has
passed more than what is disclosed.

 

 

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S. 54 — Where several flats in same building and contiguous with each other, treated as one house for purposes of S. 54.

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 Part A — Reported Decisions



45 (2008) 22 SOT 58 (Hyd.)

Prabhandam Prakash v. ITO

ITA No. 147 (Hyd.) of 2007

A.Y. 2001-02. Dated : 25-1-2008

S. 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Where several flats are
purchased in same building and are contiguous with each other, they would be
treated as one house and not several houses for purposes of S. 54.

 

For the relevant A.Y., the assessee claimed exemption
u/s.54/54F in respect of investment in 3 adjoining flats on the same floor and
one flat on another floor. Two of these flats were occupied by the assessee and
the other two flats were let out.

 

The Assessing Officer denied the exemption on the ground that
all the flats were independent, having separate kitchens and with no
inter-connection. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.

 

The Tribunal allowed the exemption to the assessee in respect
of the 2 flats occupied by him after considering the decisions in the following
cases :

(a) Shiv Narain Chaudhari v. CWT, (1977) 108 ITR 104
(All.)

(b) B. B. Sarkar v. CIT, (1981) 132 ITR 150 (Cal.)/7
Taxman 239

(c) K. G. Vyas v. Seventh ITO, (1986) 16 ITD 195 (Bom.)

(d) CIT v. Kodandas Chanchlomal, (1985) 155 ITR
273/23 Taxman 579

(e) D. Anand Basappa v. ITO, (2004) 91 ITD 53
(Bang.)

(f) Smt. Hansa Bai Sanghi v. ITO, (2004) 89 ITD 239
(Bang.)

 


The Tribunal noted as under :

1. Where several flats are purchased in the same building
and are contiguous to each other, they would be treated as one house and not
as several houses. Whether one or more municipal numbers are given is of no
consequence. The purpose is to see whether the assessee and his family are
using those several dwelling units for their residence or not.

2. However, where the assessee, after acquiring the new
property has not put it to use for his own residence but has let it out, it
means that it was not meant for immediate residence. In the present case, out
of the four flats acquired, two flats on the first floor were occupied by the
assessee and the remaining two were let out. Therefore, respectfully following
the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Kodandas Chanchlomal (supra),
we hold that the assessee be given pro rata exemption in respect of the
two flats occupied by him.


 

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S. 195 — Interest payable for failure to deduct tax at source only on sum not paid and not on sum deductible

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 Part A — Reported Decisions



44 (2008) 300 ITR (AT) 317 (Bang.)

Mrs. Meena S. Patil v. ACIT (Intl. Taxation)

ITA No. 224 (Bang.) of 2006

A.Y. 2002-03. Dated : 29-3-2007

S. 195, S. 201(1A) — Assessee purchased immovable property
from a non-resident — Failure to deduct tax u/s.195 — Sum deductible calculated
at rates in force much higher than tax actually payable by seller according to
assessment order — Interest payable for failure to deduct tax at source only on
sum not paid and not on sum deductible.

 

Facts :

The assessee purchased immovable property in Bangalore,
paying a sum of Rs.25,00,000 on March 05, 2001 and the balance sale
consideration of Rs.75,00,000 at the time of registration of the sale deed,
i.e.,
October 23, 2001, but failed to deduct TDS on such payments made. The
seller paid an advance tax of Rs.4,25,126 and filed a return on July 18, 2002,
in which long-term capital gains of Rs.16,80,782 were disclosed in respect of
the property purchased by the assessee. The seller filed a revised return on
March 23, 2003, declaring an income of Rs.62,28,370 and also paid interest
u/s.234B and u/s.234C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The total amount paid was
Rs.10,30,674. The assessee received an order S. 201(1A), by which liability of
interest of Rs.75,560 was imposed. The assessee filed an appeal and the
Commissioner (Appeals) by order dated March 31, 2004, cancelled the order
u/s.201(1A). The Assessing Officer passed a fresh order u/s.201(1A) on October
20, 2004, by which a demand of Rs.4,78,640 of interest up to October 31, 2004
was raised. The assessee filed an appeal against this order which was dismissed
by the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal to the ITAT, the Tribunal held the following on
various grounds of appeal :

Ground no. 1 :

As per the assessee, the AO was not competent to pass an
order u/s.201(1A) in October, 2004, especially when the earlier order was
cancelled by CIT(A) vide order in March, 2004.

 

While placing reliance on Ashok & Co. v. CIT, (1992)
195 ITR 786 (Karn.) and VLS Finance Ltd. v. CIT, (2007) 289 ITR 286
(Del.), it was held that CIT(A), by order dated 31st March 2004, cancelled the
order as according to him the principles of natural justice were not followed
and it was unnecessary to mention that the order may be remanded. Thus, the AO
was competent to pass a fresh order.

 

Ground no. 2 :

The applicability of S. 195 — Held that the agreement of sale
of the property clearly mentioned that the sellers were non-resident as the
address mentioned in the agreement showed that they were residing abroad. There
was no evidence to suggest that the assessee was in a belief that the sellers
were residents. Hence, the assessee was liable to deduct tax u/s.195.

 

Ground no. 3 :

Period for which interest u/s.201(1A) is to be levied and the
amount on which it has to be levied — Held that interest u/s.201(1A) can be
charged only up to the date of payment of tax by payee. Further, the total tax
payable by seller was Rs.12,74,629 of which Rs.4,25,126 was paid in advance, and
hence the tax payable was only 8,49,503. However, the total tax deductible at
the rates in force was 19,38,000.

 

Held that when the Revenue was not paying any interest to the
deductee on the amount so deductible by charging interest from the deductor,
then it was not justifiable to charge interest from the deductor. Interest was
chargeable on the amount of tax actually paid. The wording in S. 201(1A) is that
interest to be charged on such tax which was not paid. Accordingly interest
u/s.201(1A) was chargeable on the sum of Rs.8,49,503 from the date on which the
tax was deductible.

 

Cases referred to :



(i) CIT v. Adidas India Marketing Pvt. Ltd., (2007)
288 ITR 379 (Delhi) and many others.


 

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II. Travelling expenses incurred by non-employees allowable if for business. 691 IV. Sponsorship, prize money revenue expenditure for business purposes. 691 VI. Repairs of building owned by assessee used by directors for residence, allowable expenditu

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 Part A — Reported Decisions


43 (2008) 112 ITD 57 (Kol.) (SB)

JCIT, Special Range 16 Kolkata v. ITC Ltd.

A.Y. 1997-98. Dated : 7-9-2007

 

In the reported case the Tribunal has considered various
grounds which have been described in the case as fact-I, fact-II and so on. Out
of XI grounds, the following grounds appear to be more relevant and important.

 

Fact-II :

Travelling expenses incurred even by non-employees is
allowable if it is for the business.

 

The assessee-company claimed deduction of Rs.40.91 crores
towards travelling expenditure, out of which Rs.58.30 lakhs was incurred in
connection with travelling of auditors, retainers, consultants, etc. The company
disallowed on its own Rs.8.92 lakhs under Rule 6D. The AO disallowed balance
Rs.49.38 lakhs, as it had not been incurred by the employees or executives of
the company. He further disallowed 1% of the claim of Rs.33.72 lakhs over and
above the said disallowance on account of possibility of personal and pleasure
trips. The CIT(A) deleted the addition. On Revenue’s appeal, the ITAT upheld the
order of CIT(A) on the following grounds :

(1) The assessee had various factories, godowns, stock
points apart from branches and offices at various locations.

(2) The travelling expenditure was very much incurred for
the business.

(3) It is immaterial whether it is incurred by the employee
or non-employee.

(4) The AO had nowhere brought on record that the
expenditure was not incurred for the business.

 


Cases referred to :



(i) ACIT v. Perfect Project Ltd., (2002) 253 ITR 16
(AT) Calcutta Bench

(ii) Sayaji Iron & Engg. Co. v. CIT, (2002) 253 ITR
749 (Guj.)

(iii) Dinesh Mills Ltd. v. CIT, (2002) 254 ITR 673
and a few more.

 


Fact-IV :

Expenditure for sponsorship, prize money, etc. is revenue
expenditure for the purposes of business.

 

Payments made to clubs by the assessee included expenditure
for sponsorship, prize money, etc. The AO disallowed the same, observing that
the same was not incidental to the business. The CIT(A) deleted the addition by
following the earlier appellate order for A.Y. 1994-95. On Departmental appeal,
the ITAT upheld the order of CIT(A) and allowed the expenditure on the following
grounds :

(1) The assessee submitted proper details in respect of the
expenditure which was incurred by it for sponsorship of events.

(2) Nowadays it is very common to sponsor some sports or
events to advertise the products of the company or for the company’s corporate
image.

(3) The AO has not given any congent reason for disallowing
the expenditure.

(4) The said expenditure is very much revenue expenditure
for the purposes of business.

 


Case referred to :



(i) CIT v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co., (1999)
240 ITR 9 (Delhi).

 


Fact-VI :

Repairs to the building owned by the assessee-company used by
its directors for residence is an allowable expenditure. Secondly, expenditure
on reinstallation of machinery from one factory to another factory is not
capital expenditure.

 


(A) The assessee-company incurred expenditure on repairs to
buildings, which included repairs to company flats. The said flats were
exclusively used by the directors and the higher executives of the company.
The AO disallowed 25% of such claim on the ground that the personal element in
the expenditure could not be ruled out.

(B) The assessee-company also incurred expenditure on
repairs to machinery, which included expenditure on reinstallation of Loga
machine at Bangalore factory. The said machine was brought from company’s
Saharanpur factory. The AO disallowed the same as it was a capital
expenditure. The CIT(A) deleted both the additions. On Revenue’s appeal, the
ITAT upheld the CIT(A)’s order and referred to the following :


(A) (1) The flats were owned by the assessee company
and were utilised by the assessee-company’s directors and executives.

(2) Hence, the expenditure incurred on maintenance
cannot be said to be personal nature just because the flats are occupied
by the directors for their residence.

(3) The expenditure incurred by the company for
personal benefit of directors cannot be considered as personal expenditure
of assessee company, since the assessee and the employees are two
different entities.

 




Regarding the installation expenditure of machinery it held
that :



(B) (1) The machinery from Saharanpur has been shifted
to Bangalore unit for its effective utilisation.

(2) This has not resulted into any addition to the
assets of the assessee-company and hence it cannot be considered as
capital expenditure.

 




Cases referred to :



(i) Sitapur Sugar Works Ltd. v. CIT, (1963) 49 ITR
160

(ii) Otis Elavators Co. (India) Ltd. v. CIT, (1992)
195 ITR 682

 


Fact-IX :

S. 36(1)(iii) – The interest on borrowed funds is an allowable expenditure if the assessee has sufficient own funds to justify interest-free advances to sister concerns.

The assessee borrowed money and claimed deduction of interest paid thereon. The assessee had also made interest-free advances to its subsidiaries. The AO disallowed the interest by calculating notional interest @ 18% p.a. on loans to subsidiaries, observing that interest-free advances were made to subsidiaries out of borrowed funds. The CIT(A) deleted the addition. On Departmental appeal, the ITAT upheld the order of CIT(A) and allowed the interest on the following grounds:

  • The AO has not made a case that these advances were not made in the course of business for commercial expediency and for the purpose of business.
  • The assessee is making such interest-free advances to its sister concerns since long, during the regular course of business.
  • The assessee has shown substantial profit to justify the claim of the assessee to have made advances out of own fund.


Cases referred to:
CIT v. Britannia Industries Ltd., (2006) 280 ITR 525 and a few more.

S. 54EC — Exemption is allowable even though investment of gains in specified bonds is done in joint names

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5 (2008) 300 ITR (AT) 410 (Delhi)


ITO v. Smt. Saraswati Ramanathan

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 19-7-2007

S. 54EC — Exemption is allowable even though investment of
gains in specified bonds is done in joint names.

 

Facts :

The assessee invested proceeds of sale of shares in Rural
Electrification Bonds. The investment was in joint names of herself and her son.
The son did not contribute anything to the investment. The AO denied the
exemption, on the ground that the investment was made in joint names which was
not permitted by the Section. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that there is no such
requirement in the section. Investment in joint names is just a matter of
convenience and hence allowed the exemption. On departmental appeal, the ITAT
dismissed the appeal of the Department and allowed the exemption on the
following grounds :

1. There is no such requirement in the Section that the
investment should be in the name of the assessee.

2. The main object of investment in such corporations is
the development of infrastructure.

3. Once the investment is made in these corporations for
infrastructural development, it would hardly matter whether the investment is
made by the assessee exclusively or in the joint names of the assessee and
somebody else.

4. In the above case, the name of the son was included for
convenience in future since the assessee was 69 years old. Further, the son
also did not contribute anything to the investment.

5. The ITAT also relied on the decision of ITAT, Mumbai
Bench in the case of Joint CIT v. Smt. Armeda K. Bhaya, (2005) 95 ITD
313 wherein the exemption u/s.54 was allowed even though the assessee
purchased the flat in the names of himself, his father and mother.

 


Cases referred to :



(i) CGT v. N. S. Getti Chettiar, (1971) 82 ITR 599
(SC) (para 4)

(ii) CIT (Joint) v. Armeda K. Bhaya (Smt.), (2005)
95 ITD 313 (Mumbai) (para 5)

(iii) R. B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala v. CIT, (1971) 82 ITR 570 (SC) (para
4)

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S. 69 — On-money received on surrender of leasehold rights in agricultural land is capital receipt and cannot be brought to tax u/s.69 as income from undisclosed sources & S. 45 r/w S. 55 — The gain on surrender of tenancy right could not be taxed u/s.45

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 4 (2008) 114 ITD 127 (Ahd.)


ITO v. Heena Agriculture (P) Ltd.

A.Y. 1992-93. Dated : 8-9-2006

S. 69 — On-money received on surrender of leasehold rights in
agricultural land cannot be brought to tax u/s.69 as income from undisclosed
sources —It is a capital receipt.

 

S. 45 r/w S. 55 — The gain on surrender of tenancy right
could not be taxed u/s.45, for the period prior to the amendment brought into
statute with effect from 1-4-1995, in the provisions of S. 55(2).

 

Facts :

The assessee had acquired leasehold rights for a period of 98
years in an agricultural land. In the relevant assessment year, it surrendered
the said rights in favour of the original owner allegedly without any
consideration. However, during the course of search, the director of the
assessee company had given a statement on oath that he had received a sum of
Rs.30 lakhs as on-money on behalf of the assessee on surrendering the leasehold
rights in a land. The sum of Rs.30 lakhs had been brought to tax under these
circumstances, under the provisions of S. 69.

 

On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the addition.

 

On Revenue’s appeal, the Tribunal held the following :

1. The amount had been taxed on the basis of statement of
the director recorded u/s.132(4) and there was no evidence on record to show
that the said amount related to any other source. Therefore, the amount had
been rightly treated by the CIT(A) as being related to the surrender of
leasehold rights of subject agricultural land. Therefore, addition could not
be made u/s.69 because subject sum was not an un explained investment as
rightly held by the CIT(A).

2. There cannot be any dispute on the argument that
leasehold rights constitute capital asset. However, there was no material on
record to suggest that the assessee had incurred any cost for acquiring the
said tenancy right. The contention of the assessee in this regard was that
there being no cost of acquisition of tenancy right, the gain arising
therefrom cannot be taxed as capital gain as per decision of SC in the case of
CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Shetty. Following the said case, the Special
Bench in the case of Cadell Weaving Mill Co. (P) Ltd. has held that the amount
received for surrender of tenancy right is not liable for capital gains tax
prior to the amendment brought into the statute in the provisions of S. 55(2)
w.e.f. 1-4-1995.

3. In view of the said legal and factual aspects, the
Commissioner (Appeals) was right in holding that the amount of Rs.30 lakhs
could not be brought to tax, his order is upheld and the appeal of the
Department is dismissed.

 


Cases referred to :



(i) Cadell Weaving Mill Co. (P.) Ltd v. ACIT, (1955)
55 ITD 137 (Bom.) (SB),

(ii) Rajendra Mining Syndicate v. CIT, (1961) 43 ITR
460 (AP),

(iii) CIT v. Sandu Bros. Chembur (P.) Ltd., (2005)
273 ITR 1,

(iv) CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Shetty, (1981) 128 ITR
294.

 

 

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S. 253 — Faulty internal working in a department not sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing appeal — Department’s contention of communication gap could not be accepted and the appeal being time barred by limitation was to be dismissed

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 3 (2008) 114 ITD 121 (Chd.)


ACIT v. Ranbir Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd.

A.Y. : 1994-95. Dated : 25-2-2007

S. 253 — Faulty internal working in a department cannot be
considered as a sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing appeal — Against
the order of the CIT(A), Revenue filed appeal after 8 years and 47 days, and it
was submitted that the delay was on account of communication gap between the
officers of the Department, and hence should be condoned — Based on the facts,
the Department’s contention could not be accepted and the appeal being time
barred by limitation was to be dismissed in limine.

 

Facts :

For the A.Y. 1994-95, the Commissioner (Appeals) vide an
order dated 8th January 1998, allowed the assessee’s claim for depreciation.
Against this order, the Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal after a
delay of 8 years and 47 days, along with an application for condonation of
delay, on the ground that the instant appeal was not filed in time, possibly due
to communication gap between the office of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the
Assessing Officer.

 

Based on the facts of the case, the Tribunal made the
following observations :

1. No reasonable cause had been explained by the Department
for filing the appeal belatedly. Even when the Commissioner (Appeals) in her
order dated 28th July 1998, and the Tribunal in its order dated 23rd September
2003, for the A.Y. 1995-96 pointed out that no appeal had been filed by the
Department against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) for the A.Y.
1994-95, no action was taken by the Department.

2. It could, therefore, not be believed that there was a
communication gap in the Department which had been claimed as main reason for
filing the appeal belatedly, since the fact was in the notice of the
Department in the year 1998 itself when the order of the Commissioner
(Appeals) was received by the Department. This contention of the Department
could not be accepted and faulty internal working in the Department cannot be
considered to be a sufficient cause for condoning the delay.

3. The appeal was therefore, barred by limitation and
accordingly was to be dismissed in limine.

 


Cases relied on :



(i) J. B Advani & Co. (P.) Ltd. v. R. D. Shah, CIT
(1969) 72 ITR 395 (SC),

(ii) CIT v. Grindlays Bank Ltd., (1994) 208 ITR 700
(Cal.).

(iii) CIT v. Ram Mohan Kabra, (2002) 257 ITR 773
(P&H)

(iv) Soorjamull Nagarmal v. Golden Fibre & Products,
AIR 1969 (Cal.) 381

 

 

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S. 69 — Unexplained investments — Seizure of silver bullion in search explained as inherited by the assessee’s two sons from assessee’s mother — wnership affirmed by the assessee’s sons — Held, the addition in the hands of the assessee was not justified,

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 2 (2008) 114 ITD 1 (Agra) (TM)


Kanhaiyalal Agarwal v. ACIT

A.Y. : Block period 1-4-1996 to 3-11-1996

Dated : 7-11-2007

S. 69 — Unexplained investments — In a search operation
conducted at assessee’s business premises, silver bullion weighing 265.9 kgs was
seized —Assessee explained that 240 kgs of the same was inherited by the
assessee’s two sons from assessee’s mother — Ownership of the bullion was
affirmed by the assessee’s sons — Held, the addition on this account in the
hands of the assessee was not justified, and same had to be considered in the
hands of his sons who were assessees in their own right.


 

Facts :

During the course of a search operation u/s.132(1) conducted
at the business premises of the assessee, silver bullion weighing 265.9 kgs was
seized. The assessee explained that 240 kgs of the silver bullion originally
belonged to his father, who was carrying on silver bullion business, and he gave
the same to his wife prior to his death. The same then continued to remain in
the possession of the assessee’s mother as her property. The silver bullion was
further inherited by the assessee’s sons from their grandmother, and was found
at their residence. The Assistant Commissioner did not accept the explanation
and made the addition as unexplained investment in the hands of the assessee.

 

On assessee’s appeal before the Tribunal, the judicial member
accepted the assessee’s explanation, and deleted the addition. However, the
accountant member opined that the AO was correct in making the addition. Owing
to the difference in opinion, the matter was referred to Third Member.

 

The Third Member observed that :

1. On consideration of the rival submissions made, and the
material brought on record, it was clear that the silver bullion was seized
from the house belonging to the two sons of the assessee, who claimed
ownership of the same. Though there was no direct evidence to prove the factum
of gift of the silver bullion of 240 kgs by the assessee’s mother to her
grandsons, as no Will was executed by her, but that could, however, be the
situation because of the common features prevailing in the Indian families.

2. Based on the circumstantial evidence and material on
record, i.e., the fact that the assessee’s father was carrying on
silver business, and before his death, 240 kgs of silver bullion was handed
over to his wife, the claim of the assessee needs to be accepted.

3. The suspicion entertained by the AO that the assessee’s
mother had handed over the said bullion received from her husband to the
assessee to be distributed equally among his two sons stood explained by the
affidavit stating that she resided with the assessee and his family, who had
taken care of her in old age.

4. The ownership of the bullion was affirmed by the
assessee’s sons. Non-disclosure of the silver bullion by the two sons in their
wealth tax returns was stated to be not liable to tax under the Wealth Tax
Act.

5. On these facts and circumstances, the addition on
account of the silver bullion made in the hands of the assessee to the extent
of 240 kgs of silver might not be justified, and the same had to be considered
in the hands of his sons who were assessees in their own rights.

 


Cases referred to :



(i) CIT v. Smt. Jayalaxmi Devrajan, (2006) 286 ITR
412 (Ker.),

(ii) CIT v. Durga Prasad More, (1971) 82 ITR 540
(SC),

(iii) Mehta Parikh & Co. v. CIT, (1956) 30 ITR 181
(SC).

 

 

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‘Provision for expenses’ on project claimed by estimating liability, substantial part of which incurred within six months from the end of previous year — Balance amount offered for taxation u/s.41(1) — Held, the estimation of liability was reasonable, an

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 1 (2008) 114 ITD 1 (Delhi)


Dy. CIT v. Lurgi India Co. Ltd.

A.Ys. : 2000-01 & 2001-02. Dated : 24-8-2007

Assessee debited certain amount to project expenses as
‘provision for expenses’ and claimed the same u/s.37(1) — Assessing Officer
disallowed the said amount on the grounds that provision was made to meet
certain anticipated expenditure which had not accrued till last date of relevant
previous year. It was found that assessee had estimated its liability in respect
of two projects at certain amount, a substantial part of which was incurred
within six months from the end of previous year — Further the assessee submitted
that the balance amount has been offered for taxation u/s.41(1) — Held, based on
the facts, the estimation of liability by the assessee was a reasonable one, and
the liability was an accrued liability.

 

The assessee had claimed Rs.13,26,724 as ‘provision for
expenses’ in respect of two projects. The Assessing Officer disallowed the
amount, holding that the provision was made to meet certain anticipated
expenditure which had not accrued till the last day of the previous year. Before
the CIT(A), the assessee pointed out that out of the said amount, a sum of
Rs.11,67,210 had actually been utilised or paid before 30-9-2000, and the
balance was offered to tax in the subsequent assessment year. The Commissioner
(Appeals) accepted the above submissions of the assessee, and accordingly
deleted the additions.

 

On Revenue’s appeal, the Tribunal held that :

1. Any liability which is fastened on the assessee in the
case of a completed project, accrues or arises on the date when the project is
completed.

2. It might be difficult at that point to exactly determine
the amount of liability. However, if such amount of liability can be estimated
on a reasonable basis, then such a liability would be an accrued liability and
not a contingent or expected liability. The assessee had estimated its
liability in respect of the two projects at Rs.13,24,724, against which an
expenditure of Rs.11,67,210 had been incurred within six months from the end
of the previous year. Based on the above facts, the estimation of liability by
the assessee could be termed as reasonable, and therefore subject to
verification of the balance amount being offered for taxation, the liability
was an accrued liability.

3. In case the balance amount had been offered for tax in
the subsequent year, then the expenditure represented deductible expenditure.
However, if it was found that the balance amount had not been offered for tax
in the subsequent year, the allowance would be restricted to the expenditure
actually incurred, i.e., Rs.11,67,210.

 


Cases referred to :



(i) Handicrafts & Handloom Exports Corporation of India
v. CIT,
(1983) 140 ITR 532,

(ii) K. L. Agarwal v. CIT, (1991) 190 ITR 303,

(iii) CIT v. Indian Textile Engineers (P.) Ltd.,
(1983) 141 ITR 69,

(iv) CIT v. Girharram Hariram Bhagat, (1985) 154 ITR
10.

 

 

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S. 11 r.w. S. 2(15) and S. 13 — Objects for benefit to a section of public are charitable

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19 (2008) 111 ITD 238 (Rajkot) (SMC)


Rajkot Visha Shrimali Jain Samaj v. ITO

A.Y. 2002-2003. Dated : 1-6-2006

S. 11 r.w. S. 2(15) and S. 13 — In order to serve a
charitable purpose, it is not necessary that the object of the assessee trust
should be to benefit the whole of mankind or all persons in a country. It is
sufficient if the intention is to provide benefit to a section of the public as
distinguished from specified individual.

Facts :

The assessee-trust was incorporated on 11-8-1960. The
charitable nature of the activities of the trust was limited to Vishwa Shrimali
Jains, which was a small community. For A.Y. 2002-03, it claimed deduction of
expenditure incurred by it towards earthquake relief. The AO as well as the
CIT(A) disallowed the claim u/s.13(1)(b) on the ground that :

(1) the assessee’s charitable nature of activities was
limited to the benefit of a small religious community;

(2) the CIT(A) also declined to accept the assessee’s
contention that the trust is incorporated before the commencement of the Act,
on the ground that this was an additional ground and this plea was not before
the AO. It is pertinent to note that the documentary evidence with regard to
incorporation was very much on record. On further appeal, the ITAT allowed the
exemption by referring to the following :

(a) An object which is beneficial to a section of public is
an object of general public utility.

(b) The section of the community sought to be benefited
must be sufficiently definite and/or identifiable by some common quality of
public or impersonal nature.

(c) The additional ground which raises a purely legal plea
and which goes to the very root of the matter, the same deserves to be
admitted.


Cases referred to :



(i) National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1998)
229 ITR 383 (SC)

(ii) CIT v. Maheshwari Agarwal Marwari Panchayat, (1982) 136 ITR 556
10 Taxman 183 (MP)





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S. 115JB — Extra-ordinary items in profit and loss a/c to be deducted for MAT

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18 (2008) 111 ITD 124 (Hyd.)


Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT,

Circle-1(4), Hyderabad

A.Y. 2002-2003. Dated : 21-9-2006

S. 115 JB — Extra-ordinary items appearing in profit and loss
a/c to be deducted in computing MAT liability.

The assessee company returned a loss of Rs.34.27 crores.
Provisions of S. 115JB were attracted. The as-sessee had shown two
extra-ordinary items — credit of write-offs/provisions : Rs.3.06 lacs and debit
of Advisory fee for sale of investments : Rs.109.96 lacs — in the P & L A/c. It
was contended by the Revenue that these items are generally classified as part
of P & L Appropriation A/c and hence should be ignored while computing MAT
liability. The assessee computed MAT liability on Rs.978.55 lacs, whereas the
Revenue contended that it should be on Rs.1085.45 lacs. (Ignoring the two referred above).

The learned CIT(A) confirmed the addition, on the ground that
the above items pertain to previous year. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and
referred to the following :

(a) Part-II and Part-III of Schedule VI does not make any
distinction between P & L A/c and P & L Appropriation A/c. It is a manner of
presentation.

(b) Generally, P & L Appropriation A/c includes items of
extra-ordinary nature, dividend, etc. However, as per schedule VI to Companies
Act, 1956, all these items form part of P & L A/c.

(c) The starting point for computing book profits should be
Profit & Loss A/c carried to balance sheet. From this amount, the various
adjustments (additions and deductions) as stated in S. 115 JB should be made.
Explanation to S. 115 JB does not provide for increase/decrease of
extra-ordinary items.

(d) AS-5 merely states that prior period expenses and
extra-ordinary items should be shown separately to know their impact on
operating results. It does not say that these items do not form part of P & L
A/c.


Cases referred :



(i) Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT, (2002) 255 ITR 273

(ii) Bastar Wood Products Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, (1995) 78
Taxman 126

(iii) NSC Estates (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, (2002) 125
Taxman 220







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S. 37 r.w. S. 43B — Interest on account of default in repaying interest-free sales tax loan is compensatory in nature and allowable — S. 43B are not applicable

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New Page 1

17 (2008) 111 ITD 1 (Hyd.)


Southern Electrodes Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Y. 2002-2003. Dated : 31-8-2006

S. 37 r.w. S. 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Interest
arising on account of default on part of the assessee in repaying interest-free
sales tax loan was compensatory in nature and was to be allowed u/s.37 and also
provisions of S. 43B are not applicable.

Facts :

The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh had given an interest-free sales
tax loan to the assessee company. When the loan was not repaid, interest was
charged to the assessee. The AO as well as the CIT(A) disallowed the said
interest on the following grounds :

(i) The assessee defaulted in repayment of loan and
interest is charged for non-payment of sales tax within the time allowed.

(ii) Interest charged is also in the nature of sales tax;
is penal and covered by S. 43B and hence not allowable.

On further appeal, the ITAT deleted the disallowance
referring to the following :


(a) The charging of interest in case of default is
automatic.

(b) The charging of interest is not within the discretion
of any authority.

(c) Interest payable is not an act of penal nature but it
is only compensatory in nature.



Cases referred to :



(i) Mewar Motors v. CIT, (2003) 260 ITR 218 (Raj.)

(ii) Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1998)
233 ITR 199 (SC)

(iii) Padmavati Raje Cotton Mills Ltd. (1999) 239
ITR 355 (Cal.)

(iv) Western Indian State Motors (1987) 167 ITR
395/31 Taxman 412 (Raj.) CIT v. Pheros & Co. (P.) Ltd., (1989) 178 ITR
472/44 Taxman 43 (Gauhati) and a few more.







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S. 147, S. 148 : (a) Notice not valid if issued on basis of transaction not made by assessee. 144 (b) Notice invalid if issued in status of individual while assessment in status of HUF

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New Page 1

16 (2007) 110 TTJ 834 (Del.) (TM)


Suraj Mal HUF v.
ITO

ITA No.1125 (Del.) of 2005

A.Y. 1996-97. Dated : 17-8-2007

S. 147 & 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —




(a) Notice u/s.148 issued to the assessee on the
basis of a transaction which was made by some other person and not by the
assessee was not valid.


(b) Notice issued to the assessee in the status of
individual while the assessment was eventually made in the status of HUF.
Notice was invalid.


(c) After having issued notice u/s.148 to the
assessee as an individual, ITO had no jurisdiction to assess the HUF of the
assessee, even though the assessee had consented to assessment in the status
of HUF.



For A.Y. 1996-97, a notice u/s.147 was issued to Suraj Mal in
respect of land sold by him, in respect of which income from capital gains had
escaped assessment. The ITO, based on submissions made by Suraj Mal, passed
order u/s.148 in the name of Suraj Mal HUF. Before the CIT(A), the assessee
raised the issue that assessment was bad in law, as notice was issued in the
status of individual, whereas the assessment was made in the status of HUF. The
CIT(A), however, held that the Assessing Officer was fully justified in holding
the status of the assessee as that of HUF as against the claim of the status of
an individual.

The Tribunal held that the assessment was without
jurisdiction and could not be sustained. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in
the following cases :

(a) CIT v. K. Adinarayana Murty, (1967) 65 ITR 607
(SC)

(b) AAC v. Late B. Appaiah Naidu, 1974 CTR 147
(SC)/(1972) 84 ITR 259 (SC)


The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) The Impugned notice suffers from several legal
infirmities. In the first place, the transaction noticed related to sale of
some agricultural land sold to KS Ltd. not by the assessee. This is not the
transaction with which the assessee was connected. So, notice was issued in
respect of some other transaction carried out by some other person. Secondly,
the notice is admittedly issued to the assessee as individual. No notice was
issued to the HUF in which status the assessment was subsequently made. The
assessee has vehemently contended throughout that no notice u/s.148 was served
on the assessee. There is neither any finding, nor is there any material to
refute the claim of the assessee.

(b) Notices were issued without application of mind. It is
a settled law that there must be valid reasons, material and circumstances
leading to the belief that income had escaped assessment. Any good or bad
reason is not sufficient to sustain initiation of proceedings u/s.147/148 as
valid. Therefore, no valid proceedings were initiated u/s.147/148.

(c) The Income-tax Act recognises status of HUF different
from individual status of Karta of the HUF. The two are treated as different
legal entities. Therefore, it is necessary that notice u/s.148 should be sent
in a correct status, because jurisdiction to make assessment is assumed by
issuing valid notice.

(d) It is also settled law that assessment under the
Income-tax Act has to be made in accordance with statutory provisions and not
on agreement or consent of the assessee. Therefore, after having issued notice
u/s.148 to the individual, the ITO had no jurisdiction to assess HUF of the
assessee. He could assume jurisdiction by issuing valid notice u/s.148 after
satisfying conditions laid down u/s.147. This was not done and, therefore,
entire proceedings have to be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction.

(e) The Department cannot be permitted to change the status
from individual to HUF. In the first place, the Assessing Officer had no
jurisdiction to assess HUF, as he did not issue any notice u/s.147/148 in the
case of the HUF. This defect of jurisdiction could not be cured by obtaining
consent from the assessee.







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S. 48 capital gains — Tax on capital gains would arise in respect of only those capital assets in acquisition of which an element of cost is actually present or is capable of being reckoned — Since rulers of yester years did not acquire their kingdoms by

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  1. (2009) 118 ITD 190 (Mum.)

HUF of H.H. late Sir J. M. Scindia v. ACIT

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 22-8-2007

 

The assessee HUF was issued a notice requiring to show
cause as to why for the purpose of computation of capital gains, value for the
purpose of wealth tax was taken as the value of the plot of land, instead of
the value determined by the Government- approved valuer.

The Scindia Family had acquired the land on the occasion of
marriage of one of the forefathers of J. M. Scindia to one ‘Chimanibai’,
daughter of the then ruler of Deccan, i.e., the Peshwa. The said
property was given to Chimanibai as ‘choli bangdi’ according to the
custom prevailing in those days amongst the royal families.

It was further submitted that neither of the then rulers,
the Peshwas, nor the Scindias incurred any cost for acquiring this property.
In view of this, it was evident that the said plot did not have any cost of
acquisition and therefore it fell outside the purview of capital gains. The
claim of the assessee was rejected by the AO who computed the capital gains
taking Rs.1,50,404 as the cost of acquisition of the land. It was also
contended that the said land was recorded in the old Revenue records as ‘Inam’
land.

On appeal, the CIT(A) did not accept the assessee’s
contention and confirmed the action of the AO. On appeal before the Tribunal,
it was held :

(1) The CIT(A) has recorded the fact that the land was
received in gift by the forebears and inherited by their progeny and its
cost was nil. In support of this proposition, the assessee produced old
Revenue records obtained from Government Archives, which showed that the
said plot of land was recorded as ‘Inam’ land. The extracts furnished stated
that ‘Inam’ documents in respect of the said land were not available, and
the assessee’s stand was rejected by the CIT(A) on that count alone.
Further, in absence of any evidence to show that the land was purchased by
paying cash, the assessee’s contention which was based on factual and
historical background was to be accepted.

(2) It is also settled principle that in order to make
this transaction liable for capital gains tax, it is for the Revenue to show
that the assessee had incurred a cost in acquiring the said plot of land.

(3) As per the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in the case of CIT v. H.H. Maharaja Sahib Shri Lokendra Singhji,
(1986) 162 ITR 93, it was clearly held that the liability to pay tax on
capital gains would arise only in case of those capital assets in the
acquisition of which an element of cost is actually present or is capable of
being reckoned and not in case of those assets where the element of cost is
altogether inconceivable.

In the light of the above discussion, the ITAT held that
the capital gain on the transfer of said land was not exigible to tax.


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S. 153C read with S. 153A — Documents found during search at the premises of another person which were in his own handwriting though may refer to the works proposed on behalf of the assessee, the same cannot be considered as ‘documents belonging to the as

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

18 (2010) 36 DTR (Ahd.) (Trib.) 187
Meghmani Organics Ltd. v. DCIT
A.Ys. : 2000-01 to 2004-05. Dated : 16-1-2009

 

S. 153C read with S. 153A — Documents found during search at
the premises of another person which were in his own handwriting though may
refer to the works proposed on behalf of the assessee, the same cannot be
considered as ‘documents belonging to the assessee’ which is a prerequisite for
initiating action u/s.153C — Re-agitating the concluded issues in S. 153C
proceedings without any documents relating thereto belonging to the assessee
cannot be considered in such assessment u/s.153C — In assessments u/s. 153C the
unconnected issue can be considered only if the pending assessment is abated and
not otherwise.

Facts :

Some handwritten documents were found and seized from the
residential premises of other persons. These documents showed estimate for the
purpose of land, building and machinery works for the assessee and statements of
steel and cement issued and deduction thereof for the purpose of computing the
amount payable to the contractor for the work carried out on behalf of the
assessee.

The Assessing Officer noted that although the seized
documents do not reveal any specific undisclosed income on verification, but the
proceedings validly initiated have to be completed in the manner prescribed
u/s.143(2) and u/s.143(3) of the Act. The Assessing Officer completed assessment
whereby the claim of deduction u/s.80HHC and u/s.80-IA of the Act was reduced.
No addition was either proposed or made in respect of so-called papers found
during the course of search and seized from the premises of other persons.

The original assessments were completed prior to initiation
of action u/s.153C of the Act and the issues regarding deductions u/s.80HHC and
u/s.80-IA were subject matter of earlier proceedings in original assessment and
were in further litigation before the CIT(A) and Tribunal.

Held :

Though these documents may refer to the work proposed on
behalf of the assessee, the same cannot be considered as ‘documents belonging to
the assessee’, which is a prerequisite for initiating action u/s.153C. If the
assessee has engaged the services of a professional and if the professional
maintains his own record for the purpose of rendering his services, the
documents cannot be said to be belonging to such assessee. Therefore, the
assessments were set aside.

Further, since the original assessments have been completed
before the initiation of action u/s.153C, these assessments have not abated. The
Assessing Officer was not competent to assume jurisdiction u/s.153C of the Act
(in relation to addition pertaining to deduction u/s.80HHC and u/s.80-IA) since
the original assessments have not abated. What were pending were only the
appeals. Since the appeals do not abate, the original assessments survive and
hence cannot be reopened u/s.153C proceedings. The Assessing Officer is
precluded from re-agitating the assessments that have attained finality in
original assessment proceedings, though pending in for the appeals. So far as
the Assessing Officer is concerned, his jurisdiction is ousted and is a ‘functus
officio’ so far as the original assessments are concerned. Therefore,
re-agitating the concluded issues in S. 153C proceedings without any documents
relating thereto belonging to the assessee cannot be considered in such
assessment u/s.153C of the Act.

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S. 40(a)(ia) — If the assessee has paid the impugned amount and the amount is not payable at the end of the year on the date of balance sheet, then the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) are not applicable.

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

17 (2010) 36 DTR (Hyd.) (Trib.) 220
Teja Constructions v. ACIT
A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 23-11-2009

 

S. 40(a)(ia) — If the assessee has paid the impugned amount
and the amount is not payable at the end of the year on the date of balance
sheet, then the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) are not applicable.

Facts :

Since the assessee was not maintaining proper books of
account and also failed to produce vouchers for verification, the Assessing
Officer rejected the books of account and estimated the income at certain
percentage of the gross receipts. Further, he disallowed certain payments made
to sub-contractors without deducting the TDS by invoking provisions of S.
40(a)(ia) of the Act.

Held :

It was held that the books of account of the assessee were
not relied, they were rejected by the Assessing Officer and the same was
confirmed. Now, based on the reliance on the same books, for the purpose of
invoking the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) is improper. The estimation of income
takes care of the irregularities committed by the assessee. Further addition by
invoking S. 40(a)(ia) amounts to punishing the assessee for a same offence on
double occasions, which is not permitted by law.

Further, it was held that the bare provision of S. 40(a)(ia)
provides for non-deduction of amount which remains payable to a resident in
respect of fees for technical services, etc. It is not applicable where
expenditure is paid. It is applicable only in cases where the payments are due
and outstanding. S. 40(a)(ia) otherwise being a legal fiction needs to be
construed strictly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Mother
India Refrigeration Industries (P) Ltd., (155 ITR 711). If the assessee has paid
the impugned amount and it is not payable at the end of the year on the date of
balance sheet, then the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) are not applicable. It is
only applicable in respect of ‘payable amount’ shown in the balance sheet as
outstanding expenses on which TDS has not been made. There is a difference
between the words ‘paid’ and ‘payable’. The Legislature used the word very
carefully in S. 40(a)(ia) and in all its wisdom. The language used in the S.
40(a)(ia) is very simple, clear and unambiguous. Literal rule of interpretation
has to be applied.

 

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S. 36(1)(iii) — Issue of secured premium notes — Premium payable on the same — Allowable as it was very much in the nature of interest payable on the borrowings made.

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

16 (2010) 123 ITD 1 (Mum.)
JCIT v. Bombay Dyeing Mfg. Co. Ltd.
A.Y. 1998-99. Dated : 16-4-2009

 

S. 36(1)(iii) — Issue of secured premium notes — Premium
payable on the same — Allowable as it was very much in the nature of interest
payable on the borrowings made.

The assessee-company raised funds by issue of Secured Premium
Notes. In respect of the same, it paid certain premium. The entire amount of
premium was payable before the date of final settlement. The premium was claimed
on proportionate basis in the form of provision made in the books of accounts.
Further, the liability to pay the premium arose in the fourth year, though the
assessee had utilised the funds from the first year itself. The deduction in
respect of the premium was claimed by the assessee u/s.36(1)(iii) of the Act.
The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction on the ground that the funds
raised were for the purpose of expansion of business and therefore were capital
in nature.

On appeal to the Tribunal, it was held, that case was covered
in favour of the assessee in its own case for A.Y. 1996-97. In the order passed
earlier, the Tribunal held that the premium payable was nothing but in the
nature of interest for the borrowings made by the assessee. The assessee has
been following mercantile system of accounting and so provision has been made on
accrual basis towards the liability arising. The liability provided by the
assessee was an ascertained liability and not a contingent liability. The
Tribunal also relied on the decision of Madras Industrial Investment Corporation
Ltd. v. CIT, (225 ITR 892) (SC).

Further, it was held that though the liability to pay starts
from the fourth year, this does not mean that the funds for the first three
years were interest free. It was only in view of terms and conditions that
premium was payable from the fourth year. Hence the liability for the premium
was very much eligible for deduction.

 

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S. 41(1) — Loan taken by the assessee from a group company — Waiver of the loan by the group company — Whether the same should be taxable u/s.41(1) — Held, No.

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

15 (2010) 122 ITD 486 (Mum.)
Mindteck (India) Ltd. v. ITO
A.Y. : 1999-2000. Dated : 15-7-2008

 

S. 41(1) — Loan taken by the assessee from a group company —
Waiver of the loan by the group company — Whether the same should be taxable
u/s.41(1) — Held, No.

The assessee-company incurred huge losses and ran into
financial difficulties. It invited a new group to infuse capital into it. As per
the agreement entered into with this group, the assessee has to fulfil certain
conditions. One of these was to fulfil all existing liabilities so as to hand
over a clean balance sheet to the new management. For this, the assesee borrowed
certain amounts of money from a group company for four months. However, this
loan was later on waived off by the group company. The same was so written off
in the books of the assessee also.

The Assessing Officer held that the above loan was taxable
u/s.41(1) of the Act since the amount was received to recoup the losses. These
losses were incurred by the assessee over a period of time. The CIT(A) upheld
the assessment order. He held that even if the amount was a loan, it changes its
character at the time of forfeiture. Hence the same was taxable.

On appeal, the Tribunal held that, in the instant case, the
amount of loan received has no connection with the deduction or allowance
referred to in S. 41(1) of the Act. Although the assessee has received certain
benefits on remission or cessation of liability, the same in no way relates to
any trading liability. The said amount was given by the group company to make
the assessee company fit for the takeover. Provisions of S. 41(1) can be applied
only when a benefit is received in respect of a loss, expenditure or trading
liability, which was allowed as deduction or allowance in earlier years.

Further, it was also observed by the Hon’ble Tribunal that it
is a settled law that ‘a debt waived by the creditor cannot be the income of the
debtor’. [Relying on British Mexican Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Jackson (1932) 16 TC
570 (HL) affirmed in the case of CIT v. P. Ganesa Chettair (1982) 133 ITR 103
(Mad.)]

 

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Block assessment : If in course of search of husband, any material incriminating his wife (assessee) had been found, proper course for AO was to issue notice u/s.158BD — he could not bypass prescribed procedure and issue notice u/s.158BC on assessee who w

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New Page 2

  1. (2009) 118 ITD 133 (Mum.)


Smt. Nasreen Yusuf Dhanani v.
ACIT

A.Y. : 1-4-1986 to 18-12-1996.

Dated : 5-10-2007

 

Search and seizure action u/s.132 was conducted at
residential premises where the assessee was staying with her husband — Search
warrant was issued in the name of the assessee’s husband — consequent to
search action, notice u/s.158BC was issued to the assessee, in response to
which she filed her return of income for block period declaring ‘nil’
undisclosed income — subsequently intimated to the AO that since warrant of
authorisation u/s.132 was not issued and served in her name, special procedure
for assessment of search cases was not applicable to her case — AO without
dealing with the objection, made huge additions of undisclosed income — The
CIT(A) upheld the block assessment.

On appeal before the Tribunal, it was held :

(1) That a reading of S. 132 makes it clear that the
Section is person-specific and not premise-specific as argued by the
Revenue. The primary target for the search action is the person in
possession of any undisclosed income. Thus, the arguments of the Revenue
that the premises where the search action was carried out belonged to the
assessee, and therefore, the block assessment u/s.158BC was validly passed
did not hold good.

(2) Another argument of the Revenue was that in the
course of search action, evidence was found showing undisclosed income in
the name of the assessee and thus, provisions of S. 158BC could be invoked.
In this case, it is provision of S. 158BD which is to be applied in a case
where there is no search warrant and evidence is found showing undisclosed
income in the course of search conducted in respect of any other person. The
proper course of action would therefore be to issue a notice u/s.158BD.

(3) In view of the above factual and legal position, the
entire proceedings undertaken by the AO were bad in law, and hence the
assessment was to be quashed.


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“Recommendation of getting accounts audited u/s.142(2A) should come from AO only — can not be substituted by another officer’s opinion.”

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New Page 2

  1. (2009) 118 ITD 99 (Mum.)


Rajendra C. Singh v.
JCIT

A.Y. : 1-4-1987 to 15-11-1997

Dated : 27-9-2007

 

A search was conducted at the assessee’s premises and after
completion thereof, the AO issued notice u/s.158BC to the assessee. In
response thereto, the assessee filed block return offering undisclosed income.
In the meanwhile, the Assistant Director, in the appraisal report recommended
an audit u/s. 142(2A). The AO requested the Commissioner to approve the said
proposal.

Accordingly, by a letter dated 5-5-1999, the assessee was
directed to get the accounts audited within 60 days from the receipt of the
letter. Before expiry of such period, the assessee applied for extension of
period of audit by two months, which was also granted. On 26-8-1999, the
assessee asked for a further extension of two months which was also granted on
the same date.

During the assessment proceedings, the AO was of the view
that in normal circumstances, the block assessment should have been completed
by 30-11-1999, however, considering the Explanation to S. 158BE, the period
got extended up to 31-5-2000 and hence he passed an assessment order on
31-5-2000.

On appeal before the CIT(A), the assessee argued that
assessment order was barred by time and also contended that the AO had passed
the order only on the basis of the appraisal report of the Assistant Director
and that he had not applied his mind to the proceedings carried out before him
as contemplated in S. 142(2A). It was further submitted that the AO had not
passed an order directing the audit, but merely had endorsed the
recommendation of the Assistant Director, who was not competent authority to
direct the audit.

The CIT(A) rejected the assessee’s claims and upheld the
order of the AO. On appeal before the Tribunal it was held :

(1) Reading of S. 142(2A) makes it clear that the
recommendation should come from the AO. The AO has to form an opinion having
regard to the nature and complexity of the accounts and also keeping in mind
the interests of the Revenue, that a special audit is required. If he forms
such an opinion, he has to seek prior approval of the Chief Commissioner or
the Commissioner to get the accounts audited.

(2) In the instant case, the initiation was done by the
Assistant Director and the AO had only requested the Commissioner to accept
the proposal of the Assistant Director.

(3) Therefore, in the above-mentioned case, since
recourse to S. 142(2A) was not valid, the finding of the Commissioner
(Appeals) that the assessment order was passed within time, is devoid of
merit. The order should have been passed by the AO on or before 30-11-1999,
as he himself had held that in the normal circumstances that was the last
date of passing the order. Therefore, the order of the AO was beyond time
contemplated u/s.158BE and accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was
allowed.



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S. 147 — Differences in account balances of various creditors added to the income of the assessee in re-assessment — Since neither the reassessment order nor the order of CIT(A) gave details of nature of differences in accounts, amount could not be ‘any o

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  1. (2009) 118 ITD 70 (Delhi)


Nuware India Ltd.
v.
DCIT

A.Y. : 1994-95. Dated : 31-1-2008

 

Facts :

The AO had found differences in the account balances of
various creditors on comparison of accounts of the assessee and concerned
creditors. Differences were found in the accounts of 20 parties totalling to
Rs.4,20,949. As these differences were not reconciled, the same was added to
assessee’s income. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the addition. On appeal
before the Tribunal, it was held :

(1) That neither the assessment order, nor the order of
the CIT(A) gave details of the nature of differences in the accounts, so to
say, whether the credit balances were more or less or both in the books of
the assessee when compared with the confirmed accounts received from the
parties.

(2) If it is the case of the AO that these liabilities
ceased to exist, it was for him to prove so by bringing the case within the
four corners of the provisions contained in S. 41(1). Reference was made to
the SC decision in the case of CIT v. Suguali Sugar Works (P) Ltd. in
which it was held that the entries made in the accounts of the debtor,
unilaterally writing off the debt, without any action on the part of the
creditor will not enable the debtor to say that the liability had come to an
end. Therefore, it was held that the amounts written off by the debtor would
not constitute income u/s.41(1).

(3) Thus, as the details of the differences were not
given, as also, it is not shown as to how the sum total of these differences
would be income of the assessee, the impugned amount cannot be said to be
income, and the CIT(A) has erred in upholding the additions.



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S. 44AA : Assessee in contract business : Provision for compulsory maintenance of books of accounts not applicable

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New Page 2

Part A — Reported Decisions



42 (2008) 300 ITR (AT) 310 (Cochin)

C. H. Aboobacker Haji v. ITO

A.Y. 2004-05. Dated : 14-7-2006

S. 44AA, S. 271A —Assessee engaged in contract business —
Provision for compulsory maintenance of books of accounts not applicable —
Survey action after issuing notice — Circumstances that AO unable to compute
income of assessee due to non-maintenance of accounts as required by S. 44AA(2)
does not arise — Held, penalty is not leviable.


Facts :

The assessee, a civil contractor had filed his return of
income for A.Y. 2004-05 showing a turnover of Rs.69,22,579 and he had estimated
the income at the rate of 5% of total contract receipts. For earlier years (A.Y.
2000-01 and 2001-02), the assessee had declared his income at the rate of 8% of
the gross contract receipts. Subsequently, there was a survey action against the
assessee u/s.133A and on finding that the assessee had omitted some contract
receipts, the AO concluded that the assessee had violated the provisions of S.
44AA and issued a notice u/s.274 r.w.s. 271A on 10-1-2005 while the actual
assessment order was passed on 23-6-2006. The assessee challenged the impugned
order of the AO before the CIT (A) but without any success.

On appeal to ITAT, the Tribunal held that the penalty was not
leviable and referred to the following :

(1) On the perusal of the provisions of S. 44AA held that
the assessee’s case was not covered by S. 44AA(1).

(2) At most, S. 44AA(2) may be applicable but for
attracting the said Section the condition that the AO was unable to compute
the income of the assessee was not satisfied, because the AO had passed the
penalty order prior to the completion of the assessment.

(3) It may be worth mentioning that the assessee had
offered Rs.5 lakhs as an additional income from his contract business, which
has been accepted without further comments or observation by the AO.

(4) Further, reliance was also placed on well-settled
principle of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Steel
Ltd. (1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC) that penalty proceedings are quasi-criminal in
nature and it must be brought on record by the AO that the assessee has
deliberately acted in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or
dishonest, but in the reasoning given by the AO in the assessment order,
nothing has been mentioned. Hence, the penalty levied by the AO u/s.271A was
deleted.


Case referred to :

(i) Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC).

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U/s. 80-IB : Profit out of processing, selling and exporting marine products is profit attributable to cold storage and hence entitled to deduction

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Part A — Reported Decisions



41 (2008) 300 ITR (AT) 182 (Mumbai)

Sumaraj Seafoods Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. 2001-02 to 2003-04.

Dated : 26-6-2007

U/s.80-IB — Profit out of processing, selling and exporting
marine products is profit attributable to cold storage and hence entitled to
deduction u/s. 80IB.

The assessee company was engaged in the business of marine
products, storing it in the cold storage and exporting it. The AO denied the
deduction u/s.80-IB on the ground that processing of fish could not be held as
an industrial undertaking. The Appellate Authority denied the deduction on the
ground that separate computation of profit from cold storage was not provided by
the assessee.

On appeal to ITAT, it allowed the deduction u/s.80-IB and
referred to the following :

(1) The only activity conducted by the assessee is to
purchase, process, store (fish and other sea foods) in its cold storage plant
and then export the same.

(2) Thus, the operation of its cold storage plant is a very
essential and critical element in this activity of undertaking.

(3) The operation of a cold storage plant would definitely
result in certain value addition to a product and such value addition should
be considered as profits derived from operation of a cold storage plant.

(4) The profits derived from the industrial undertaking
have a close and proximate nexus with the operation of its cold storage plant.


Cases referred to :



(i) CIT v. Asian Marine Products Pvt. Ltd., (1999)
239 ITR 349 (Mad.)

(ii) CIT v. George Marjo Exports Pvt. Ltd., (2001)
250 ITR 446 (Mad.)

(iii) CIT v. Relish Foods, (1999) 237 ITR 59 (SC)

(iv) CIT v. Sterling Foods, (1999) 237 579 (SC)

(v) National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. v. Addl.
CIT,
(2004) 91 ITD 101 (Delhi)

(vi) Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT, (2003) 262 ITR
278 (SC)



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S. 234B : Advance tax : Interest on shortfall in payment of advance tax — Interest is payable up to the date of regular assessment and not up to the date of AO consequential to the Tribunal order

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Part A — Reported Decisions



40 (2008) 300 ITR (AT) 96 (Delhi)

Freightship Consultants P. Ltd. v. ITO

A.Ys. 1996-97 & 1997-98.

Dated : 25-5-2007

S. 234B — Advance tax — Interest on shortfall in payment
of advance tax — Interest is payable up to the date of regular assessment and
not up to the date of order passed by Assessing Officer in consequence of the
order passed by the Tribunal.


Facts :

The Assessing Officer did not allow the claim of the assessee
u/s.80-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1997-98. On appeal,
CIT(A) allowed it in totality. However, in second appeal before Tribunal filed
by the Revenue, ITAT directed the AO to allow deduction u/s.80-O of the Act on
net income. As per the order of ITAT, the Assessing Officer determined the
income for both the years and issued demand notices and also charged interest
u/s.234B up to the date of assessment orders. The said demands were paid by the
assessee.

The AO subsequently passed order u/s.154 of the Act as he was
of the opinion that interest charged by him u/s.234B up to the date of
assessment was wrong and it should have been charged up to the date of
reassessment framed u/s.254/143(3) of the Act. This order was upheld by the
CIT(A). On appeal to the Tribunal it was held that :

(1) As per Explanation 1 to S. 234B of the Act, ‘assessed
tax’ means the tax on the total income determined u/s.143(1) or on ‘regular
assessment’ as reduced by amount of tax deducted or collected at source in
accordance with provisions of chapter XVII on any income which is subject to
such deduction or collection.

2. The Supreme Court in Modi Industries Ltd. v. CIT,
(1995) 216 ITR 759 laid down that ‘regular assessment’ has been defined in S.
2(40) to mean the assessment made u/s.143 or u/s.144.

3. Hence, it was the duty of the assessing officer to
charge interest u/s.234B of the Act up to the date of passing the assessment
order and not up to the date of order passed by him in consequence of the
order passed by the Tribunal.


Cases referred to :



(i) CIT v. Anjum Ghaswala, (2001) 252 ITR 1 (SC)

(i) Modi Industries Ltd. v. CIT, (1995) 216 ITR 759
(SC)


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S. 80-I/80-IA : Assessee manufacturing gutka and pan masala containing tobacco not entitled to deduction

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Part A — Reported Decisions


39 (2008) 300 ITR (AT) 50 (Pune) (SB)

Dhariwal Industries Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Ys. 1993-94 to 1995-96 and 1997-98 to 2000-01. Dated :
14-8-2007

S. 80I, S. 80IA, S. 143, S. 263, Sch. XI (item 2) —Assessee
manufacturing gutka and pan masala containing tobacco claiming deduction
u/s.80-I and u/s.80-IA — Deduction not allowed stating that the item is covered
under ‘tobacco preparations’, ‘chewing tobacco’ as mentioned in item (2) of Sch.
XI — Held, gutka would fall within the meaning of term ‘tobacco preparations’
and ‘chewing tobacco’.

Facts :

The assessee, a company engaged in the business of
manufacturing gutka and pan masala containing tobacco, had claimed deduction
u/s.80-I/80-IA, which was allowed by the AO. The CIT invoked S. 263 by stating
that gutka manufactured by the assessee is a ‘tobacco preparation’ within the
meaning of item no. 2 in the Sch. XI and thus not eligible for deduction
u/s.80-I/80-IA and the order passed by the AO was erroneous and prejudicial to
the interest of the Revenue.

On appeal to the ITAT, the Special Bench of the Tribunal,
relying on the following grounds, held that the assessee’s business of
manufacturing gutka was not entitled to deduction u/s.80-IB, as the same is
covered by item no. 2 of Sch. XI :

(1) Reliance was placed on the decision of the Allahabad
Tribunal in the case of Kothari Products Ltd., (1991) 37 ITD 285 wherein it
was held that zarda yukt pan masala does not fall under the expression
‘tobacco preparation’. Further, the Allahabad High Court and also the Suprme
Court have declined to interfere with the aforesaid order, thus ruling that
the question under consideration is a question of fact and not a question of
law.

(2) Further, ‘tobacco preparation’ would cover all those
preparations and products which are prepared using tobacco, if the properties
of tobacco are retained in the preparation without undergoing any
metamorphosis as a result of addition of other ingredients. Hence, even 6–7%
content of tobacco in gutka is sufficient to call it ‘tobacco preparation’.

(3) The expression ‘tobacco preparation’ has to be
understood in contradistinction to a ‘tobacco-less preparation’. As a
‘tobacco-less preparation’ cannot become a ‘tobacco preparation’, by the same
logic ‘tobacco preparation’ cannot become ‘tobacco-less preparation’. Hence,
it cannot be said that ‘gutka’ is a ‘tobacco-less preparation’.

(4) Further, the words ‘such as’ used in item 2 of Sch. XI
do not limit the ambit to the specific 7 items in item no. 2. The words ‘such
as’ are illustrative and not exhaustive.

(5) In addition, without prejudice to the above, even if it
is assumed that the words ‘such as’ in item no. 2 of Sch. XI are in the nature
of limitation, gutka and pan masala would fall under ‘chewing tobacco’, an
item mentioned in item no. 2 of Sch. XI.

(6) Further, classification by various provisions of the
Acts dealing with Central Excise and Sales Tax, as relied upon by the
assessee’s authorised representative, is hardly relevant for deciding the
scope of ‘tobacco preparations’ and ‘chewing tobacco’ under the I.T. Act.

(7) Hence, the CIT was correct in invoking the provisions
of S. 263 as the presumptions made by the AO regarding the nature of the
business of the assessee and the profits arising from them were completely
incorrect and the AO had granted deduction without taking note of the most
crucial part of the case i.e., the assessee was manufacturing gutka and
it was held that the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.80-IB.


Cases referred to :




(i) Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT, (1992) 196 ITR 188
(SC);

(ii) Collector of Central Excise v. Parle Exports P.
Ltd.,
(1990) 183 ITR 624 (SC);

(iii) CIT v. Taj Mahal Hotel, (1971) 82 ITR 44 (SC);

(iv) CIT v. Venkateswara Hatcheries (P.), (1999) 237
174 (SC);

(v) Kothari Products Ltd. v. ACIT, (1991) 37 ITD 285
(All.);

(vi) Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (2000) 243
ITR 83 (SC) and many others.



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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 139A(5B) and S. 272B — Whether Press Release dated September 25, 2007 and February 12, 2008 issued by CBDT brings down the rigours of S. 139A(5B) —Held : Yes. Whether penalty u/s. 272B cannot be levied in a case where an ass

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  1. 2009-TIOL-257-ITAT-Bang

Hewlett-Packard Globalsoft Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT.

A.Y. : 2008-2009. Date of Order : 25.3.2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 139A(5B) and S. 272B —
Whether Press Release dated September 25, 2007 and February 12, 2008 issued by
CBDT brings down the rigours of S. 139A(5B) —Held : Yes. Whether penalty u/s.
272B cannot be levied in a case where an assessee has submitted Permanent
Account Number of such number of deductees as satisfies the threshold limit
mentioned in the Press Release issued by CBDT —Held : Yes.

 

Facts :

The Assessing Officer (AO) found that the assessee had
filed its quarterly statement in Form No. 24Q for the 3rd quarter of financial
year 2007-08 wherein it had not furnished Permanent Account Number (PAN) of
2154 deductees out of the total of 29,733 deductees. He also found that
details furnished for 38 deductees were not in accordance with the provisions
of S. 139A(5B) of the Act. In response to the show-cause notice issued by the
AO the assessee submitted that the number of deductees whose PAN had been
furnished by the assessee exceeded the threshold limit of 90% stated in the
press release issued by the CBDT and therefore penalty u/s. 272B is not
leviable. However, the AO was of the view that the compliance to the extent of
threshold limit stated in press release issued by the CBDT is only for filing
quarterly TDS statements and that such compliance does not debar an AO from
initiating penal action. He, accordingly, levied penalty u/s. 272B. The CIT(A)
confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal upon going through the Press Release dated
September 25, 2007 and also subsequent Press Release dated February 12, 2008,
held that it is evident from paras 2 and 3 of the Press Release that the CBDT
has prescribed a threshold limit for compliance i.e., to provide
information of PAN data by virtue of S. 139A(5B)(iv) of the Act. It held that
the sole intention of the Press Release is to bring down the rigour of the
provision of S. 139A(5B) and 272B keeping in view the laborious and cumbersome
task of compliance.

Since the assessee had furnished PAN data to the extent of
93% of the total deductees there was compliance in furnishing PAN data in
accordance with the threshold limit of 90% prescribed in press release by the
CBDT, the penal provisions were held to be not attracted. Accordingly, the
Tribunal deleted the penalty levied u/s. 272B of the Act.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 271(1)(c) — Concealment penalty — Impact of the decision of the Apex Court in Dharmendra Textile Processors on the scheme of S. 271(1)(c) — Whether even a civil liability for penalty can be invoked only when the conditions f

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  1. 2009-TIOL-278-ITAT-Pune

Kanbay Software India Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT

A.Y. : 2002-2003. Date of Order : 28.4.2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 271(1)(c) — Concealment
penalty — Impact of the decision of the Apex Court in Dharmendra Textile
Processors on the scheme of S. 271(1)(c) — Whether even a civil liability for
penalty can be invoked only when the conditions for imposition of penalty
under Section are satisfied — Held : Yes. Whether once the mandate of S.
271(1)(c), read with Explanations thereto are satisfied, there is no further
onus on the AO to establish mens rea —Held : Yes. Whether ratio decidendi of
the judgment of Apex Court in Dharmendra Textile Processors and Ors. is
confined to treating the willful concealment as not vital for imposing penalty
u/s. 271(1)(c) and not that in all cases where addition is confirmed, the
penalty shall mechanically follow — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

The assessee company was engaged in the business of
development and export of computer software. The assessee had two units
eligible for deduction u/s. 10A. For assessment year 2002-03, in the first
unit the assessee had made profits, while in the second unit, the assessee
incurred losses. The assessee filed a revised return of income for AY 2002-03,
wherein it claimed carry forward of loss and unabsorbed depreciation of second
unit and claimed a deduction u/s. 10A on the profits of first unit without
setting off loss and depreciation of the second unit. Appropriate disclosure
was made in the return of income. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected this
claim and the assessee accepted the decision of the AO. The AO initiated
proceedings for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income and levied penalty
u/s. 271(1)(c) which action of the AO was confirmed by CIT(A). Aggrieved,
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal deleted the penalty and held as under :

(a) On first principles, penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is not
simply a consequence of an addition being made to the income of the
assessee. Unless it is established that there is concealment of income or
furnishing of inaccurate particulars or it is established that on the facts
of the case, concealment of income can be deemed in accordance with the
provisions of law, the penalty provisions cannot be invoked at all,
irrespective of whether penalty is a civil liability or a criminal
liability.

(b) The judgment of the Supreme Court (SC) in UOI vs.
Dharmendra Textile Processors
(306 ITR 277) has to be understood in the
correct perspective. Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) has been held to be a ‘civil
liability’ in contradistinction to prosecution u/s. 276C. It is wrong to
infer that because the liability is a ‘civil liability’ it ceases to be
penal in character. There is no contradistinction in a liability being a
civil liability and the same liability being a penal liability as well,
though a civil liability cannot certainly be a criminal liability as well.

(c) The only impact of a liability being a civil
liability is that mens rea or the intentions of the assessee need not
be proved. Unless contravention of law takes place and unless the conditions
for imposition of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) are satisfied, even a civil
liability cannot be invoked. The action which triggers the civil liability
is the lapse on the part of the assessee.

(d) An addition made during the course of assessment
proceedings, by itself, cannot be enough to initiate, leave aside conclude,
penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c).

(e) The proposition that mens rea need not be
proved before penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) can be imposed was not laid down by SC
in Dharmendra Textile for the first time. Even in the case of K. P.
Madhusudan (251 ITR 99), a three-judge Bench of SC had so held.

(f) Dharmendra Textiles is not an authority for the
proposition that penalty is an automatic consequence of an addition being
made to the income of the taxpayer for the reason that whether it is a civil
liability or a criminal liability, penalty can only come into play when
conditions are satisfied. All that Explanation 1 to S. 271(1)(c) is to shift
the onus of proof from AO to the assessee; instead of AO being under an
obligation to establish the mala fides of the assessee, the onus is
now on the assessee to establish his innocence and righteous conduct.

(g) The observations in Dharmendra Textile to the effect
that penalty is to provide a remedy for loss of Revenue cannot be construed
to mean that penalty can be imposed as an automatic consequence for addition
to returned income, given the scheme of S. 271(1)(c).

(h) An assessee’s statutory obligation u/s. 139(1) is to
give correct and complete information with the return of income. If this is
complied with, then there is no contravention which can attract even a civil
liability. The fact that additions and disallowances are made by the AO does
not mean that there is a breach of the obligation. The proposition that just
because penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is a civil liability, it must mean that
penalty can automatically be levied on the basis of any addition to income
is not correct.

Section 143 — Notice under Section 143(2) is required to be served on assessee within 12 months from end of month in which return of income has been filed and mere issuance of notice within a period of 12 months is not sufficient —The onus to prove servic

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[2009] 116 ITD 123 (Del.)

BHPE Kinhill Joint Venture


vs. Additional DIT (Delhi).

A.Y. : 2000-01 Dtd. : December 14, 2007

Section 143 — Notice under Section 143(2) is required to be
served on assessee within 12 months from end of month in which return of
income has been filed and mere issuance of notice within a period of 12 months
is not sufficient —The onus to prove service of notice on assessee within
statutory period is upon Assessing Officer.

 


The assessee filed return of income on 22-10-2001. The
Assessing Officer issued notice by way of foreign air registered letter on
31-10-2002. The assessee contended that since the notice under Section 143(2),
dated 31-10-2002 had not been received by it by 31-10-2002, the assessment
proceedings were not valid in law. The Commissioner (Appeals) relying on the
decision of the Apex Court in Prima Realty vs. Union of India [1997]
223 ITR 655, held that the Post Office had acted as an agent of the assessee
and, therefore, the date of service under the provisions of Section 143(2)
would be treated as 31-10-2002, which was within time.

On second appeal by the assessee, the ITAT held that :

1) The onus to prove the service of notice on the
assessee within the statutory period is upon the Assessing Officer and not
upon the assessee.

2) In the instant case, the notice was only issued by the
Assessing Officer on 31-10-2002, but neither the same had been received back
by the Assessing Officer nor the Department was able to prove the service of
notice upon the assessee on 31-10-2002. Therefore, the notice under Section
143(2) was not proved to have been served upon the assessee on or before
31-10-2002 by the Department.

3) In the case of Prima Realty vs. Union of India
[supra] the Apex Court was dealing with the payment made by cheque.
The ratio of that case is that whether the addressee has shown his desire
either expressly or impliedly to send a cheque by post, the property in the
cheque passes to him as soon as it is posted. Therefore, the Post Office
acts as an agent of the person to whom the cheque is sent and so the facts
of that case are clearly distinguishable with the facts of the case of the
assessee.

4) In case the Revenue has failed to establish the
service of the notice upon the assessee under Section 143(2) within the
statutory period of limitation provided under the proviso to Section 143(2)
then the assessment proceedings completed by the Assessing Officer in
violation of statutory provision of Section 143(2) are liable to be
cancelled/quashed.

In support of his contention, the assessee has relied upon
the decision of the ITAT Delhi Bench ‘C’ in the case of Whirlpool India
Holdings Ltd. vs. Dy. DIT
rendered in I.T. Appeal No. 330 (Delhi) of 2004
for the assessment year 2000-01, which has also considered the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Prima Realty (supra). The Tribunal has also
placed reliance on the decision of jurisdictional High Court of Delhi in the
case of CIT vs. Lunar Diamonds Ltd. [2006] 281 ITR 1 (Delhi), wherein
Their Lordships have also discussed the decision of Apex Court delivered in
the case of Prima Realty (supra).

Cases relied upon :



1. Whirlpool India Holdings Ltd. vs. Dy. DIT [IT
Appeal No. 330/Delhi of 2004]

2. Raj Kumar Chawla vs. ITO [2005] 94 ITD 1
(Delhi) (SB).



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S. 50C — Difference between sale consideration of the property shown by assessee and FMV determined by DVO u/s.50C(2) was less than 10% — AO not justified in substituting value determined by DVO for sale consideration disclosed by assessee.

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

28 (2010) 38 DTR (Pune) (Trib) 19
Rahul Constructions v. DCIT
A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 12-1-2010

 

S. 50C — Difference between sale consideration of the
property shown by assessee and FMV determined by DVO u/s.50C(2) was less than
10% — AO not justified in substituting value determined by DVO for sale
consideration disclosed by assessee.

Facts :

The assessee received an amount of Rs.19,00,000 as sale
consideration on account of sale of basement of a building. The stamp valuation
authorities adopted the value of Rs.28,73,000. Since the assessee objected to
valuation of the stamp valuation authorities on various grounds, the AO referred
the matter to the DVO who valued the property at Rs.20,55,000. The AO thereafter
substituted this value for the purpose of calculating the capital gain.

The CIT(A) observed that the assessee has not objected to
this valuation either before the DVO or before the AO or even before him.
Distinguishing the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C. B. Gautam v.
UOI, 199 ITR 530, the CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO.

Held :

As against value of Rs.28,73,000 adopted by stamp valuation
authorities, DVO has determined the FMV on the date of transfer at Rs.20,55,000.
This shows that there is wide variation between the two values. Further, value
adopted by the DVO is also based on some estimate. The difference between sale
consideration shown by the assessee and FMV determined by the DVO is less than
10%. Since such difference is less than 10% and considering that valuation is
always a matter of estimation where some degree of difference is bound to occur,
it was held that FMV determined by the DVO cannot be substituted for the sale
consideration received by the assessee.

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Additions made by AO u/s.40A(2)(b) — Penalty levied — Held : it is not a case of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

27 Jhavar Properties (P.) Ltd.
123 ITD 429 (Mum.)
A.Y. 2001-02. Dated : 10-9-2008

 

Additions made by AO u/s.40A(2)(b) — Penalty levied — Held :
it is not a case of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate
particulars.

The assessee was engaged in business of real estate
development and construction. During assessment, it was found by the AO that the
assessee has claimed a sum of Rs.63 lakhs as payment made to sister concern for
job work. After examination of details, the AO found that the value of job
entrusted to the sister concern was only Rs.32,09,974 for which the appellant
made a payment of Rs.63,00,000. He thus disallowed a sum of Rs.30,82,026
u/s.40A(2)(b). This was confirmed by the CIT(A). The AO initiated penalty
proceedings and levied penalty.

Held :

Since, no specific disclosure is required to be made in
respect of income subject to scrutiny u/s.40A(2)(b) in Act or in Rules or in the
form of return of income, the assessee cannot be held guilty of non-disclosure
of income. It is not a case of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate
particulars. When additions are made on the basis of estimate and not on account
of any concrete evidence of concealment, penalty was not leviable.

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Exemption available under the law should be granted by the Assessing Officer, even if the assessee has not claimed it in its return of income.

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

26 ACWT v. Ku. Ragini Sanghi
123 ITD 384 (Indore)
A.Ys. : 1997-98 and 1998-99
Dated : 25-1-2008

 

Exemption available under the law should be granted by the
Assessing Officer, even if the assessee has not claimed it in its return of
income.

The assessees are beneficiaries of a trust and enjoy 50%
share of interest in the assets of this trust. The trust owned a flat which was
a residential house. As per the assessment order of the trust, the value of
assets owned by it was to be included in the hands of beneficiaries. Since no
interest in the assets of trust was shown in the original return of
beneficiaries, notice u/s.17 was issued to the beneficiaries. The assesses
submitted that the flat was exempt u/s.5(1)(vi) of the Wealth-tax Act since they
had no other residential house in their names. Thus the value of the flat was
shown as NIL. It was contended on behalf of Department that since the assessee
claimed deduction at the assessment stage and not in the return of wealth, it
should not be allowed.

Held :

S. 5(1)(vi) of the Wealth-tax Act clearly provides for the
exemption of one house and as such, the law as it stood should have been applied
by the AO for granting exemption. There is no need for the assessee to seek
exemption as per law. Even when the assessee has not sought exemption expressly,
the AO should apply the statutory provisions and grant exemption.

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S. 80P(2)(a)(i) — Interest on income-tax refund — Assessable under the head ‘Income from other sources’ — Since it is covered within the expression ‘profits and gains attributable to banking business’, deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) is available.

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

25 (2010) 37 DTR (Mumbai) (SB) (Trib) 194
The Maharashtra State Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. ACIT
A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 22-1-2010

 

S. 80P(2)(a)(i) — Interest on income-tax refund — Assessable
under the head ‘Income from other sources’ — Since it is covered within the
expression ‘profits and gains attributable to banking business’, deduction
u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) is available.

Facts :

The assessee received interest u/s.244A of Rs.34.33 crores
which was included in its total income under the head “Income from Business” and
deduction was claimed u/s.80P(2)(a)(i). This interest has arisen upon favourable
order of Tribunal for earlier assessment years and the resultant refund of
assessment dues collected. The AO denied the deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) in
respect of the same.

Upon further appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO
and has held as under :

(i) The interest was assessable under the head ‘Income from
other sources’.

(ii) The interest on income-tax refund was not attributable
to the banking business.

(iii) The favourable decision of the Tribunal in assessee’s
own case for A.Y. 2001-02 was distinguishable, because in that case the issue
was about the interest u/s.244A arising out of excess deduction of tax at
source.

Held :

The principle of consistency qua the judicial forums is not
unexceptionable. If the subsequent Bench finds it difficult to follow the
earlier view due to any convincing reason such as change in the factual or legal
position or non-raising or non-consideration of an important argument by the
earlier Bench having bearing on the issue, then the earlier view cannot be
thrust upon it and in such a case a reference should be made to a larger Bench.
The appeal in the present case needs to be decided on merits rather than
following the earlier view taken by the Tribunal in its own case. Upon merits,
three issues were identified :

(1) Head of income under which interest on income-tax
refund falls :


In order to categorise income under the head ‘Profits and
gains of business of profession’, it is imperative that income should have
arisen from business carried on by the assessee and Business refers to a
systematic, real and organised activity conducted with a view to earn income.
Payment of income-tax is an event which takes place after the determination of
profits of the business for the year. Eventually when the income-tax was
refunded along with interest u/s.244A, that would also, naturally, be an event
after the determination of income on year-to-year basis. Payment of income-tax
cannot be held to be a business activity or a transaction done during carrying
on of the business. There cannot be an intention of the assessee to earn income
by paying income-tax. Interest on refund of income-tax does not and can never
fall under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’, irrespective
of the fact that the assessee is in banking or non-banking business.

(2) Meaning of expression ‘profits and gains’ of
business as used in S. 80P :


The use of the expression ‘profits and gains of business’ in
S. 80P(2) is to be seen in contradiction to the expression ‘income chargeable
under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’. The latter
expression is used in several Sections of the Act including S. 80E, S.
80HHC(baa), etc. The employment of the expression ‘profits and gains’ in S.
80P(2) demonstrates the intention of the Legislature that the benefit of
deduction is not confined to the income arising directly from the banking
business (as covered by ‘profits’), which falls under the head ‘Profits and
gains of business or profession’, but also includes other items of income (as
covered by ‘gains’), which have some relation with the business of banking even
though they do not fall under the head of business income. Since income-tax was
paid in relation to the banking business, the interest on income-tax refund will
be considered as ‘gain’ (not ‘profit’) of banking business covered within the
expression ‘profit and gains’ of banking business.

(3) Scope of phrase ‘attributable to’ eligible business
:


The scope of the phrase ‘attributable to’ is wider than
‘derived from’. Whereas in the case of the latter, the relation of the income
with the source must be direct and that of the first degree, but in the former
even some commercial or casual connection suffices the test. The expression
‘attributable to’ covers ‘receipts from sources other than the actual conduct of
the business’. The income-tax, on which interest was granted, was utilised to
satisfy the demand raised in relation to the banking business. It is for the
banking business that income-tax was originally paid and subsequently the amount
was refunded along with interest. There exists a commercial and causal
connection between the interest on income-tax refund and the banking business
and hence it can be regarded as attributable to the banking business.

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Undisclosed income on the basis of cheques found during the course of search — Cheques received from various parties as security against advances made in cash out of undisclosed income — Amount not recovered by assessee telescoped against undisclosed inco

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Part
A: Reported Decisions

24 (2010) 37 DTR (Chennai) (TM) (Trib) 233
ACIT v. M. N. Rajendhran
A.Y. : 1-4-1995 to 24-1-2002. Dated : 29-1-2010

 

Undisclosed income on the basis of cheques found during the
course of search — Cheques received from various parties as security against
advances made in cash out of undisclosed income — Amount not recovered by
assessee telescoped against undisclosed income assessed on basis of same
cheques.

Facts :

During course of search, certain cheques were found from
premises of the assessee, which were received from various parties as a security
against loans advanced to them by the assessee in cash out of undisclosed
income. Loans were not repaid as confirmed by the parties. Addition was made by
the AO as an undisclosed income.

Upon further appeal to the CIT(A), addition was deleted on
the basis of his own order in the assessee’s brother’s case on the inference
that on the face of evidence, money lent for money-lending business had not been
recovered as per the statements of debtors placed on record.

The decision of CIT(A) in the assessee’s brother’s case was
upheld by the Tribunal. However, the learned Judicial Member set aside the
matter on the ground that the decision of the Tribunal in the case of the
assessee’s brother is entirely on different point. The learned Accountant Member
did not agree and the matter was referred to the Third Member.

Held :

In the assessee’s brother’s case, the Tribunal accepted the
assessee’s plea that no income accrued to the assessee as the cheques remained
unencashed. The amount not recovered by the assessee is telescoped against the
undisclosed income assessed on the basis of same cheques. This ratio is
applicable in the present case also. On the same set of facts, a Co-ordinate
Bench of the Tribunal cannot come to a diametrically opposite conclusion than
arrived at in the earlier case. The names of creditors do not matter. Therefore,
the addition was deleted.

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The AO observed that the assessee has earned an amount of Rs.1,31,39,526 on account of trading in shares and also earned brokerage of Rs.1,49,75,135. He held that according to Explanation to S. 73, the nature of share trading business of the assessee is d

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23 2010 TIOL 232 ITAT (Mum.)
ACIT v. KNP Securities Pvt. Ltd.
A.Y. : 1999-2000. Dated : 26-3-2010
S. 28, S. 43(5) and S. 73 — Explanation 2 to S. 28 does not apply if the
assessee is dealing in delivery-based transactions.

Facts :

The AO observed that the assessee has earned an amount of
Rs.1,31,39,526 on account of trading in shares and also earned brokerage of
Rs.1,49,75,135. He held that according to Explanation to S. 73, the nature of
share trading business of the assessee is deemed to be speculative and as per
Explanation to S. 28, speculation business should be segregated from other
business. Therefore, he allocated the expenditure incurred to speculative
business and other business. He, accordingly, arrived at a speculation loss of
Rs.49,66,658.

The CIT(A) deleted the allocation of expenditure made by the
AO and allowed this ground.

The Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The CIT(A) has correctly held that considering the
transactions as speculative will come only when a particular transaction is
considered as speculative in nature u/s.43(5). So long as the assessee deals in
delivery-based transactions, Explanation to S. 28 does not come into operation
as there are no speculative transactions u/s.43(5). The issue can only be
considered with reference to Explanation to S. 73. That portion of the Section
will come into play after considering the income under the head ‘Income from
Business’ as also income under other heads. The allocation of expenditure and
segregation of business will come into picture only when the assessee indulges
in speculative nature of transactions. The order of the CIT(A) was held to be
correct both on facts as well as on law.

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Explanation 1 to S. 17(2), S. 192 — Assessee employer is not hit by the retrospective insertion of Explanation 1 to S. 17(2) in the absence of any such extension of retrospective effect either in S. 192 or S. 201.

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22 2010 TIOL 231 ITAT (Hyd.)
State Bank of India, IFB Branch, Hyderabad v. DCIT (TDS)
A.Ys. : 2004-2005 to 2007-08.
Dated : 3-12-2009

 

Explanation 1 to S. 17(2), S. 192 — Assessee employer is not
hit by the retrospective insertion of Explanation 1 to S. 17(2) in the absence
of any such extension of retrospective effect either in S. 192 or S. 201.

Facts :

The assessee employer took residential premises on lease and
provided them to its employees. It recovered from its employees standard rent
for the accommodation so provided. Lease rent paid by the assessee was greater
than amount recovered by it from its employees. In accordance with the ratio of
decisions of several High Courts including the jurisdictional High Court, the
difference between the amount of rent paid by the employer and the amount of
standard rent charged from the employee was not regarded as a perquisite.
Subsequently, the Finance Act, 2007 inserted Explanation 1 to S. 17(2)(ii) with
retrospective effect from 1-4-2002. As a result of the retrospective amendment
the employee became chargeable to tax on perquisite value of the accommodation
where the rent paid by the assessee was greater than the rent recovered from the
employee.

The AO held that the assessee has short-deducted income-tax
at source from salaries paid by it to its employees and consequently the AO held
the assessee to be an assessee in default and demanded the amount of income-tax
short-deducted along with interest u/s.201(1A). The CIT(A) upheld the action of
the AO.

The assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that :

(a) at the relevant time, when the TDS was to be effected
by the assessee-bank, there was no such provision on the statute book and the
law was amended at a later date with retrospective effect from 1-4-2002.

(b) the issue under consideration is covered in favour of
the assessee with the decision of the Nagpur Bench of the Tribunal in the
group cases of Canara Bank where it has been held that as far as the
assessee-employer is concerned, it is not hit by the retrospective insertion
of Explanation 1 to S. 17(2) thereof in the absence of any such extension of
retrospective effect either to S. 192 or S. 201.

The Tribunal, agreeing with the ratio of the Nagpur Bench
division decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

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S. 2(15) — Provisions of proviso to S. 2(15) are prospective and not retrospective — not applicable to donations received up to 31-3-2009.

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21 2010 TIOL 226 ITAT (Hyd.)
The Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce and Trade Secunderabad v. DDIT
Dated : 23-12-2009

 

S. 2(15) — Provisions of proviso to S. 2(15) are prospective
and not retrospective — not applicable to donations received up to 31-3-2009.

Facts :

The assessee-was registered under the provisions of Andhra
Pradesh (Telangana Area) Public Societies Registration Act in 1982. It was
established for promotion of trade and commerce and some other charitable
objects. It was granted registration u/s.12A and was also granted recognition
u/s.80G.

It’s application dated 8-3-2008 for renewal of recognition
u/s.80G was rejected by DIT on the ground that the Finance Act, 2008 has w.e.f.
1-4-2009 amended the definition of the term ‘charitable purpose’ by adding a
proviso to S. 2(15), which specifically lays down that advancement of any other
objects of general public utility shall not be ‘charitable purpose’ if it
involves carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or
business for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the
nature of use of application, or retention, of the income from such activity.

The assesee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that :

(a) there was no violation of S. 80G(5) by the assessee;

(b) the decision of the Tribunal, relied upon by the D.R.,
in Andhra Pradesh Federation of Textile Association (ITA No. 88/Hyd./08, dated
30-1-2009) is not applicable to the facts of this case, as in that case, it
was found that the element of charity in the activities of the assessee was
absent, and held that the association could not be considered as a charitable
association within the meaning of S. 2(15) of the Act;

(c) the issue is covered by the decision of the Tribunal in
DDIT v. Indian Electrical and Electronics Manufacturers Association, (2009) 31
SOT 346 (Mum.) where it has been held that the proviso to S. 2(15) is not
clarificatory in nature and would not apply retrospectively;

(d) Legislature has specified the date from which proviso
to S. 2(15) is applicable;

(e) the provisions of S. 80G allowing certain deductions to
the donors apply to specific act of donation made on particular date.

Held that, the provisions of proviso to S. 2(15) shall not
apply to donations received by the assessee up to 31-3-2009. In the absence of
any violation of provisions of S. 80G(5), the assessee is entitled for approval
u/s. 80G in respect of donations received up till 31-3-2009. The Tribunal
directed the DDIT accordingly and allowed the appeal of the assessee.

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S. 194C — Payments made to producers, directors, actors for financing film production are not covered by S. 194C.

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20 2010 TIOL 210 ITAT (Mum.)

Entertainment One Ltd. v. ITO (TDS)
A.Ys. : 2003-2004 to 2006-2007
Dated : 15-6-2009

S. 194C — Payments made to producers, directors, actors for
financing film production are not covered by S. 194C.

Facts :

The objects of the assessee company inter alia included
production of feature films, TV serials, video films and documentary films, etc.
In the course of survey action it was found that assessee had made payments to
various film and T.V. serial producers and directors under different agreements.
The AO, on examining the agreements entered into, came to the conclusion that
the assessee has incurred expenditure for production of films as a whole. After
the film is produced, it acquires the entire right of the film concerned,
including the intellectual property right as well as complete ownership of
distribution and exhibition rights of the film and serial.

He rejected the arguments of the assessee that

(a) it has merely financed the film and has retained
control over negative rights of the completed film as assurance of realisation
of money from the producer;

(b) control over distribution of the film has been taken to
ensure best price available can be recovered from the distribution of the
film;

(c) the producer is in full command of making the film and
not the assessee;

(d) the assessee has neither produced the film, nor has it
got it produced;

(e) the producers/directors with whom agreements are
entered into and to whom advances are made are not
contractors/sub-contractors. For all these reasons the assessee contended that
the provisions of S. 194C are not attracted to the payments made by ic.

The AO held that advances made by the assessee to producers
and directors are covered u/s.194C. He issued notice u/s.201 treating the
assessee as an assessee in default and raised demands for tax and interest
u/s.201(1)/(1A).

In appeal, the CIT(A) gave partial relief to the assessee.
The assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal observed that :

(a) in majority of the agreements film-makers and producers
have right to participate in the surplus after repayment of the principal
amount and these terms support the case of the assessee that status of the
film-makers/ producers is also like principal, as in normal commercial
practice, once the contract is executed, the contractor is out of the project
and the entire surplus is enjoyed by the principal;

(b) while the relationships of the principal and contractor
can be determined on the basis of the terms of the agreement or contract, at
the same time, industry and trade practices and conventions are also to be
taken judicial note of, and considered before arriving at final conclusions,
in respect of the relationships created. In film industry, it is not uncommon
that the entire film project is financed by a third party, who otherwise is
not involved in the execution of a film project;

(c) the AO had admitted that the assessee has not hired the
services of the producer and director. This itself takes the
producers/directors out of the term “contractors” and hence, the first mandate
of S. 194C is not fulfilled;

(d) production of the film goes through many stages and it
is nowhere the case of the Revenue that the assessee has any active role in
the production of the film;

(e) Censor Board certificates in respect of the films which
the assessee has financed were all in the name of the producers. If the
assessee’s role was as a producer, then the Censor Board Certificates being
very important legal documents, would have shown the assessee as a producer.

On examining the agreements, the Tribunal concluded that no
relationship of ‘principal’ and ‘contractor’ was created between the assessee
and film-producers/directors, but all agreements were finance agreements with
unique features
to participate in the surplus by taking the risk of losses also.

The Tribunal held that the payments made by the assessee to
producers and directors of the film/TV serials cannot be said to be covered by
S. 194C. It held that the assessee is not a deemed defaulter u/s.201(1) and
there is no question of levy of interest u/s.201(1A).

The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee.

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S. 35DDA — Claim for deduction of 1/5th of the expenditure incurred on VRS cannot be denied merely on the ground that there was no manufacturing activity during the year, particularly when similar expenses are allowed in the previous year.

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19 2010 TIOL 205 ITAT (Mum.)

Apte Amalgamations Ltd. v. DCIT
A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 9-3-2010

S. 35DDA — Claim for deduction of 1/5th of the expenditure
incurred on VRS cannot be denied merely on the ground that there was no
manufacturing activity during the year, particularly when similar expenses are
allowed in the previous year.

Facts :

The assessee-company had in its return of income claimed a
deduction of Rs.19,18,441 being 1/5th of the total expenditure incurred on VRS.
The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed this on the ground that the expenditure
was incurred subsequent to closure of the business and hence VRS expenditure was
not wholly and exclusively incurred for the purpose of business.

In appeal to the CIT(A) observed that during the current year
there was no manufacturing activity, hence, the question of allowability of
expenses relating to manufacturing business did not arise. He confirmed the
disallowance on further appeal by the assessee:

Held :

The Tribunal noted that :

(a) the AO observed that “the assessee-company is engaged
in the business of manufacturing chemicals and trading of scientific
instruments”;

(b) the CIT(A) while considering the assessee’s claim of
depreciation has observed that during the year the assessee had not undertaken
any manufacturing activity and that the business income was by way of trading,
service charges and commission. He upheld the disallowance of depreciation on
plant and machinery, but allowed depreciation on non-manufacturing items
(computer, furniture and motor cars) as the assessee was having some business
activity during the year, and

(c) in the A.Y. 2001-02 similar disallowance made by the AO
on the ground that expenditure has been incurred subsequent to closure of
business was deleted by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal had, on an appeal by the
Revenue, upheld the action of the CIT(A),

Following the order of the Tribunal for the earlier year and
also keeping in view that merely because the assessee has closed its
manufacturing activity did not mean that the assessee has not carried out its
business activities, the claim of the assessee was held allowable.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 6(1)(c) and Explanation to S. 6(1) — In the case of an assessee who is sent on deputation by his Indian employer to a company outside India and his salary is borne and paid by the foreign company, can it be said that the ass

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  1. 2009-TIOL-261-ITAT-Mad.

DCIT vs. Ashok Kumar

A.Y. : 2004-2005. Date of Order : 6.3.2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 6(1)(c) and Explanation to
S. 6(1) — In the case of an assessee who is sent on deputation by his Indian
employer to a company outside India and his salary is borne and paid by the
foreign company, can it be said that the assessee has left India for the
purpose of employment and therefore his case is covered by clause (a) of
Explanation to S. 6(1) — Held : Yes.

 

Facts :

The assessee was an employee of ONGC. During the previous
year relevant to assessment year 2004-05, he was seconded to ONGC Nile Ganga
BV, a Dutch company. During the year under consideration his stay in India was
for 98 days. The AO held that in view of S. 6(1)(c) of the Act the assessee
became resident and accordingly he charged to tax salary received by the
assessee from ONGC Nile Ganga in Sudan. The AO held that the assessee did not
leave India for employment outside India but was sent for work of ONGC out of
India and, therefore, his income was chargeable to tax.

The CIT(A) held the assessee to be a non-resident and
directed the AO to exclude salary received by the assessee from ONGC Nile
Ganga by treating the assessee as a non-resident.

The Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that during the period when the assessee
was deputed to ONGC Nile Ganga no salary was paid by ONGC. It held that since
ONGC Nile Ganga B.V. is a foreign company, a separate entity, the assessee can
be said to have left India but joined employment in a foreign country and,
therefore, the condition for treating him as resident would be for 180 days (sic
182 days) as against 60 days provided in the Explanation. Accordingly, it
held that the assessee was a non-resident and therefore, income received by
him from ONGC Nile Ganga in Sudan would not be taxable. It noted that this
view was also supported by the decision of AAR in the case of British Gas
India P. Ltd. (285 ITR 218). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Revenue.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Sections 40(a)(i) and S. 195 — Whether provisions of S. 195 apply only to income chargeable to tax in India — Held : Yes. Whether in a case where amount paid to non-resident is not chargeable to tax in India and therefore provisions

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  1. 2009-TIOL-241-ITAT-Mad.

DCIT vs. Venkat Shoes Pvt. Ltd.

A.Y. : 2004-2005. Date of Order : 6.3.2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Sections 40(a)(i) and S. 195 —
Whether provisions of S. 195 apply only to income chargeable to tax in India —
Held : Yes. Whether in a case where amount paid to non-resident is not
chargeable to tax in India and therefore provisions of Chapter XVII-B are not
applicable, can such an amount be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i) — Held : No.

 

Facts :

The assessee paid a sum of Rs.23,57,715 as commission to a
non-resident. The commission was paid for services rendered by the agent
outside India. The assessee did not deduct tax at source on the ground that
the services have been rendered outside India. The AO held that in view of the
ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission
Corporation of India the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source. The AO
disallowed this sum u/s. 40(a)(i) since according to the him tax was
deductible on this sum and the assessee had failed in its duty of deducting
tax as per S. 195.

The CIT(A) held that (a) the commission paid by the
assessee was not chargeable to tax in India as per Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act; (b)
the case of the assessee was supported by CBDT Circular No. 786, dated
7.2.2000. Accordingly, he held that the provisions of S. 195 and S. 40(a)(i)
were not applicable. He also accepted the assessee’s contention that the Apex
Court decision in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd. and Another
mandated deduction of tax at source only when the same is chargeable to tax in
India. Accordingly, he allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that as the non-resident rendered
services outside India, the amount under consideration could not be said to
have been deemed to accrue or arise in India and also the payment was remitted
abroad and therefore the amount was not exigible to tax in India. The Tribunal
held that since the payment was not chargeable to tax in India, the provisions
of S. 195(2) are not applicable.

The Tribunal also found the case of the assessee to be
fully meeting the criteria laid down by the CBDT in its Circular No. 786,
dated 7th February, 2000 and Circular No. 23, dated 23rd July, 1969 according
to which, no tax is deductible u/s. 195. The Tribunal noted that in view of
the decision of the Apex Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan the circulars of CBDT
are binding on the Revenue authorities.

The Tribunal held that it cannot be said that the decision
of the Apex Court in Transmission Corporation mandates deduction of tax at
source, if non-resident renders service outside India which is not chargeable
to tax. The Hon’ble Court’s exposition in that case was on the premise that at
least some part of the receipt may be chargeable to tax. The Apex Court has
clearly upheld that the obligation of the assessee to deduct tax at source is
limited to the appropriate portion of income chargeable under the Act. So when
there is no income chargeable to tax, the question of deduction at source does
not arise.


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Section 37(1)- Amount paid towards discharge of corporate guarantee obligation, which guarantee was issued for its subsidiary company and was in the interest of the assessee’s business, is allowable as a deduction while computing `Business Income’.

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45 2009-TIOL- 783-ITAT- MAD

ACIT vs. W S Industries (India)
Ltd.

ITA No. 1373/Mds/2008

Assessment Year: 2004-05.
Date of Order: 21.8.2009

Section 37(1)- Amount paid
towards discharge of corporate guarantee obligation, which guarantee was issued
for its subsidiary company and was in the interest of the assessee’s business,
is allowable as a deduction while computing `Business Income’.

Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing
electro porcelain products. W. S. Telesystems (WSTL), a subsidiary of the
assessee, was supplying to the assessee the material required by the assessee
for executing its contracts. For this purpose, the assessee used to make
advances to WSTL from time to time. Over a period of time, amounts aggregating
to Rs 6.11 crores were advanced by the assessee in excess of the amounts billed.
The assessee had issued corporate guarantees in respect of borrowings of WSTL
from ICICI, Central Bank of India and Kirloskar Finance Ltd. Upon WSTL becoming
sick and being under the threat of invocation of guarantees, the assessee
entered into a onetime settlement with the lenders of WSTL, whom the assessee
had given corporate guarantees and paid amounts aggregating to Rs 13.07 crores
in consideration of discharge of corporate guarantees. Thus, a total Rs 19.18
crores was shown as receivable from WSTL. Upon closure of the WSTL factory and
WSTL becoming sick, the assessee, with the approval of the High Court of Madras,
u/s 391 of the Companies Act, 1956, debited the sum of Rs 19.18 crores to share
premium account in the books of the company, but claimed it as a deduction in
the course of assessment. The Assessing Officer (AO) allowed the deduction of Rs
6.11 crores, but did not allow the deduction of Rs 13.07 crores.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
allowed the deduction of Rs 13.07 crores towards discharge of corporate
guarantee obligation.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

Giving corporate guarantee was one of the objects under the
Memorandum of Association; and also since the subsidiary company was supplying
materials which were important for the assessee’s business, the action of giving
corporate guarantee as well as advances was held to be incidental to the
assessee’s business, and a commercially expedient decision. The Tribunal
observed that when the writing off of advances has been allowed as a deduction,
there is no reason why the amount paid towards discharge of corporate guarantee
should be treated any differently. Incurrence of expenditure was incidental to
the interest of the business of the assessee.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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Section 45(3)- Provisions of S. 45(3) are attracted even when an asset held as stock-in-trade is introduced by an assessee into a partnership firm as its capital contribution.

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44 2010-TIOL-16-ITAT-D-L-SB
DLF Universal Ltd vs DCIT

ITA No. 3622/Del/1995

Assessment Year: 1992-93.
Date of Order – 4.1.2010

Section 45(3)- Provisions of S.
45(3) are attracted even when an asset held as stock-in-trade is introduced by
an assessee into a partnership firm as its capital contribution.

Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of real estate
development. The assessee held land costing Rs 4.40 crores as its
stock-in-trade. Vide a Memorandum of Partnership executed on 23rd March, 1992,
the assessee entered into a partnership with four of its subsidiaries and one
individual. The assessee contributed all its rights in the five plots of land to
the newly constituted partnership firm in which the assessee became a partner
with 76% share. The rights of the assessee in the land so contributed became the
property of the firm from 16th March, 1992. A sum of Rs 11.50 crores,
representing the market value of the land, was credited by the partnership firm
to the capital account of the assessee. The assessee credited its ‘profit and
loss’ account with Rs 6.01 crores, the sum being the difference between market
value of the land introduced into the firm and its book value. However, in the
return of income filed by the assessee, this sum of Rs 6.01 crores was claimed
to be not taxable on the ground that the introduction of an asset into a
partnership firm does not constitute sale. In support of its contention, the
assessee placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Hind
Construction Ltd. (83 ITR 211)(SC). The AO and the CIT (A), relying on the ratio
of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sunil Siddharthbhai, taxed this
amount.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

The Special Bench of the Tribunal, by the majority, held as
follows:

Held:



(i) The Apex Court has in the case of Sunil Siddharthbhai
held that when a partner introduces his asset into a firm as capital
contribution, there is a `transfer’, though the gains are not chargeable to
tax, as the consideration is not determinable. The Apex Court has clarified
that this principle does not apply if the partnership was non-genuine or a
sham or where the transaction of transferring personal assets to the
partnership firm was a device or ruse to convert personal assets into money
while evading tax on capital gains.

(ii) The bench, upon having noted that the assessee had
encashed its stock-in-trade and had derived gains, held that going by facts —
though there was no material to hold that the partnership was non-genuine or
sham — the assessee had adopted a calculated device of converting land into
money by withdrawing substantial sums from the firm and debiting the same to
its current account. Accordingly, the contribution by the assessee of its
personal land to the capital of the firm was a device or ruse for converting
land into money for its benefit. Thus, the entry of Rs 11.50 crores being the
value of land credited in the assessee’s capital account was not imaginary or
notional. The surplus was chargeable to tax.

(iii) S. 45(3) applies when a capital asset is introduced
into a firm as capital contribution. S. 45(3) applies also when stock-in-trade
is introduced into a firm. The transaction of introducing stock-in-trade into
a firm is on capital account. At the point of time of introduction, the
stock-in-trade does not retain its character as stock-in-trade. This is also
shown by the fact that the assessee revalued the stock-in-trade to its market
value prior to introduction into the firm. Consequently, the gains on such
transfer are taxable u/s 45(3);

(iv) As regards the contention whether the AO, after having
assessed the gain as business profits, is entitled to urge before the Tribunal
that the gains should be assessed as capital gains u/s 45(3), it held in the
affirmative for the reason that this is merely an alternative argument on the
same set of facts and not making out of a new case against the assessee. The
bench noted that in Sumit Bhattacharya 112 ITD 1 (Mum)(SB), it was held that
the Tribunal was competent to change the head of income even at the instance
of the respondent.

(v) The surplus to the assessee from the contribution of
land to the firm as capital was held to be assessable u/s 45(3). Even
otherwise, the surplus was taxable as the transaction was a colorable device.
Without prejudice, if it was held that the land should be treated as
stock-in-trade, the surplus is assessable as business income.

 


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S. 2(22)(e) — Whether deemed dividend can be assessed in hands of person other than a shareholder of lender — Held, No — Whether words ‘such shareholder’ in S. 2(22)(e) refer to shareholder who is both registered and also beneficial — Held, Yes.

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32 2008 TIOL 641 ITAT Mum-SB


ACIT v. Bhaumik Colour Pvt. Ltd.

ITA No. 5030/Mum./2004

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 19-11-2008

S. 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Assessee received
interest-bearing loan of Rs.9 lakhs from Umesh Pencils Pvt. Ltd. (UPPL) —
Narmadaben Nandlal Trust (NMT), a shareholder holding 20% shares in assessee
company held 10% shares in UPPL — Trustees of NMT were the registered
shareholders in both the companies, but the beneficiaries of NMT were different
from the trustees – Assessing Officer taxed the amount of loan received by
assessee as deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e) — Whether deemed dividend can be
assessed in the hands of a person other than a shareholder of the lender — Held,
No — Whether the words ‘such shareholder’ in S. 2(22)(e) of the Act refer to a
shareholder who is both the registered shareholder and also the beneficial
shareholder — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

Bhaumik Colour Pvt. Ltd. (BCPL), the assessee, was a company
engaged in the business of manufacture of pencil-paints. The assessee took an
interest-bearing loan of Rs.9 lakhs from UPPL. The AO found that though the
assessee was not a shareholder of UPPL, both the companies had one common
shareholder i.e., NNT. The said trust was holding 20% shares in
assessee-company i.e., holding substantial interest and 10% shares in
UPPL. The shares were held by the trust in the name of three trustees for and on
behalf of the trust and the beneficiaries of the trust were five in number and
none of the trustees was the beneficiary of the trust. The AO was of the view
that this transaction was covered by the second limb of provisions of S.
2(22)(e) of the Act. The AO taxed the sum of Rs.9 lakhs in the hands of the
assessee. The CIT(A) deleted the addition made by the AO for the reason that NNT
was not beneficial shareholder of shares in BCPL or UPPL and therefore the
second limb of the provisions of S. 2(22)(e) could not be applied vis-à-vis
the assessee. Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the Revenue preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal. The Division Bench noted that there was a direct
conflict between the decisions in Nikko Technologies (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Seamist
Properties (P) Ltd., and was, therefore, of the opinion that the matter should
be heard by a Special Bench on the following questions :

(a) Whether deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e) of the Act, can be
assessed in the hands of a person other than a shareholder of the lendor ?

(b) Whether the words ‘such shareholder’ occurring in S.
2(22)(e) refer to a shareholder who is both the ‘registered’ shareholder and
also the ‘beneficial’ shareholder ?

The Special Bench held as under :

(1) The provisions of S. 2(22)(e) of the Act, and the
provisions of S. 2(6A)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 were considered. The
Bench analysed the amendments made in S. 2(22)(e) from time to time and
observed that under the 1922 Act, two categories of payment were considered as
dividend viz. (a) any payment by way of advances or loan to a
shareholder was considered as dividend paid to the shareholder, or (b) any
payment by any such company on behalf of or for the individual benefit of a
shareholder was considered as dividend. In the 1961 Act, the very same two
categories of payment were considered as dividend but an additional condition
that payment should be to a shareholder being a person who is the beneficial
owner of shares and who has a substantial interest in the company viz.,
share-holding which carries not less than twenty percent of the voting power,
was introduced.

(2) The Apex Court has in the case of C. P. Sarathy
Mudaliar (83 ITR 170), while dealing with provisions of S. 2(6A)(e),
(synonymous to the provisions of S. 2(22)(e) of the 1961 Act,) held that when
the Act speaks of shareholder, it refers to the registered shareholder. This
decision was followed by the Apex Court in Rameshwarlal Sanwarmal (122 ITR 1).
It is clear from these pronouncements that to attract the first limb of S.
2(22)(e), the payment must be to a person who is a registered holder of
shares.

(3) The word ‘shareholder’ is followed by the words ‘being
a person who is the beneficial owner of shares’. These provisions do not
substitute the aforesaid requirement to a requirement of merely holding a
beneficial interest in the shares without being a registered holder of shares.
Thus the expression ‘shareholder being a person who is the beneficial owner of
shares’ referred first time in S. 2(22)(e) means both a registered shareholder
and beneficial shareholder. If a person is a registered shareholder but not
the beneficial shareholder or vice versa, then the provisions of S.
2(22)(e) will not apply.

(4) There are divergent views on this issue of the person
in whose hands dividend is to be taxed viz. the ‘concern’ or the
‘shareholder’. The Rajasthan High Court in the case of Hotel Hilltop (217 CTR
527), held that the liability of tax, as deemed dividend, could be attracted
in the hands of the ‘shareholder’ and not the ‘concern’.

(5) The provisions of S. 2(22)(e) do not spell out as to
whether the income has to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder or the
concern. Since the provisions are ambiguous, the intention behind enacting the
provisions of S. 2(22)(e) should be examined. The intention of the Legislature
is to tax dividend only in the hands of the shareholder and not in the hands
of the concern.

(6) The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kantilal
Manilal (41 ITR 275), explained the basic characteristic of dividend.
Provisions of S. 206 of the Companies Act prohibits payment of dividend to
persons other than shareholders and in the case of Nalin Beharilal (74 ITR
849), the Apex Court considered what can come within the artificial definition
of dividend u/s.2(22).

S. 36(1)(va), S. 43B, S. 37(1) — Delayed payment of employees contribution to PF/ESIC beyond the grace period but before due date of filing return of income is allowable. Unrecoverable advances made for purchase of capital asset are allowable as revenue e

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(Full texts
of the following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on
written request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to them,
Rs.30 per decision will be charged for photocopying and postage.)

 




3. Pik Pen Private Ltd. v. ITO


ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai

Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and

R. S. Padvekar (JM)

ITA No. 6847/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on : 28-1-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue : K. Shivaram/ Chandra
Ramakrishnan

S. 36(1)(va), S. 43B, S. 37(1) — Delayed payment of employees
contribution to PF/ESIC beyond the grace period but before due date of filing
return of income is allowable. Unrecoverable advances made for purchase of
capital asset are allowable as revenue expenditure u/s.37(1).

Per R. S. Padvekar :

Facts I :

The assessee made payment of employees contribution to PF/ESIC
for the month of February, beyond the grace period but before due date of filing
return of income. The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the payment of Rs.43,721
u/s.36(1)(va) as he was of the opinion that the employees’ contribution to PF/ESIC
even if made before filing of the return of income is not covered u/s.43B of the
Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
confirmed the action of the AO.

Facts II :

The assessee had debited a sum of Rs.2,96,135 which
represented advances made for purchase of machinery, but since the machinery was
not supplied the unrecovered amount of advances was written off and treated as
revenue expenditure allowable u/s. 37(1) of the Act. The Assessing Officer (AO)
was of the view that since the advances were made for purchase of capital asset,
un-recovered amount of advances represented a capital loss and was not
allowable. He disallowed the sum of Rs.2,96,135.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held I :

In the case of Alom Extrusion Ltd. 319 ITR 306 (SC) it has
been held that the omission of the second proviso to S. 43B of the Act by the
Finance Act, 2003 operated retrospectively w.e.f. 1-4-1988. In the said case
also, the issue was concerning the contribution payable by the employer to the
PF/Superannuation Fund or any other fund for the welfare of the employees. The
Court held that the contribution paid before due date of filing return of income
is allowable. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the issue is covered in
favour of the assessee and the deduction is allowable.

Held II :

The Tribunal following the principles laid down by the
Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT v. Anjanikumar Co. Ltd., (259 ITR 114)
decided the issue in favour of the assessee and deleted the addition by treating
the write-off as revenue expenditure u/s.37(1) of the Act, as admittedly, no
capital asset came into existence. This ground was decided in favour of the
assessee.

 

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S. 40(b) — Remuneration to working partner as per the partnership deed — Partnership deed gave power to modify the terms of remuneration — Whether the existence of such term would render remuneration not qualified for deduction — Held, No.

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New Page 2

(Full texts
of the following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on
written request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to them,
Rs.30 per decision will be charged for photocopying and postage.)

 



2. Shabro International v. Addl. CIT


ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. S. Sayal (AM) and

V. Durga Rao (JM)

ITA No. 6629/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on : 20-3-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Pradip Kapasi/ A. K. Kadam

S. 40(b) — Remuneration to working partner as per the
partnership deed — Partnership deed gave power to modify the terms of
remuneration — Whether the existence of such term would render remuneration not
qualified for deduction — Held, No.

Per R. S. Sayal :

Facts :

The assessee, a firm, executed a supplementary partnership
deed on 20-6-2004 to provide for the payment of interest and remuneration to the
working partners. As per the deed, the remuneration was to be calculated as a
percentage of the profit as per S. 40(b) of the Act. One of the clauses in the
deed further provided that the partners may decide to pay remuneration at a
lower amount or not to pay remuneration or to pay remuneration on any other
criteria or ratio. According to the AO, as explained in Circular No. 739, dated
25-3-1996, since the partnership deed did not contain a specific provision for
calculating the amount of remuneration, no remuneration was allowable. He
further held that in any case, the remuneration for the period till 20-6-2004,
since it pertained to the period prior to the date of the execution of the deed,
cannot be allowed. The CIT(A) on appeal upheld the order of the AO.

Held :

According to the Tribunal, the Board Circular referred to by
the Tribunal required that either the remuneration payable to each of the
working partners is laid down in the deed or the deed must lay down the manner
of ascertaining such remuneration. Referring to the supplementary deed, the
Tribunal noted that the deed did provide the manner of quantifying the
remuneration to the partners. According to the Tribunal, the presence of clause
3(d) which empowered the partners to lower the remuneration or to not pay the
remuneration, did not erase the other clauses which clearly laid down the amount
of remuneration payable. It further observed that even in the absence of the
said clause 3(d), the partners had the power to alter the remuneration payable.
Accordingly, the orders of the lower authorities were modified to the said
extent.

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S. 41(1) — Remission or cessation of liability — Receipt of advance money against order remaining unclaimed — Creditor under liquidation — Whether AO justified in treating the unclaimed sum as income — Held, No.

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New Page 2

(Full texts
of the following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on
written request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to them,
Rs.30 per decision will be charged for photocopying and postage.)

 

1. Nash Machines & Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v.
Jt. CIT

ITAT ’A’ Bench, Pune

Before Mukul Shrawat (JM) and

D. Karunakara Rao (AM)

ITA Nos. 163/PN/2008

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 30-11-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : C. N. Vaze/

Amrinder Kumar

S. 41(1) — Remission or cessation of liability — Receipt of
advance money against order remaining unclaimed — Creditor under liquidation —
Whether AO justified in treating the unclaimed sum as income — Held, No.

Per Mukul Shrawat :

Facts :

The assessee had received the sum of Rs.36.33 lacs in the F.Y.
1996-97 from a party called PMA Ltd. as advance against sales. Before the
assessee could supply the material, PMA went into liquidation. The last
correspondence with the party was in February 1999 when a liquidator informed
the assessee about the fact of liquidation.

Applying the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of T. V. Sundaram Iyenger & Sons Ltd., of the Chennai High Court in the
case of Aries Advertising Pvt. Ltd. and of the Delhi High Court in the case of
State Corporation of India Ltd., the AO treated the said unclaimed amount as the
income of the assessee. On appeal the CIT(A) agreed with the order of the AO and
noted that since the amount remained unpaid for a long period, it assumed the
character of trade receipt taxable u/s.41(1) of the Act. He also relied on the
decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Mysore Thermo Electric Pvt.
Ltd.

Held :

According to the Tribunal, the provisions of S. 41 would
apply where an allowance or deduction had been made of loss or expenditure in
the assessment of earlier year and in any subsequent years the assessee availed
the benefit by way of remission or cessation of such trading liability. In the
case of the assessee, the impugned amount was not of the character of ‘trading
liability’ for which the assessee had ever obtained any benefit or deduction or
allowance in any of the past years. Further, there was no evidence or any
specific communication to indicate the remission or waiver of debt by the
creditor. Hence, according to the Tribunal, the provisions of S. 41(1) were not
applicable. For the purpose it also relied on the decisions of the Calcutta High
Court in the case of S. K. Bhagat & Co. and of the Rajasthan High Court in the
case of Shree Pipes Ltd. According to it, all the decisions relied on by the
lower authorities were distinguishable on facts and hence, not applicable to the
case of the assessee.

Cases referred to :


1. S. K. Bhagat & Co. v. CIT, 275 ITR 464 (Cal.);

2. CIT v. Shree Pipes Ltd., 301 ITR 240 (Raj.);

3. U. B. Engineering Ltd., ITA No. 1368/PN/06 dated
31-8-2009;

4. T. V. Sundaram Iyenger & Sons Ltd., 222 ITR 344 (SC);

5. CIT v. Aries Advertising Pvt. Ltd., 255 ITR 510 (Mad.);

6. CIT v. State Corporation of India Ltd., 247 ITR 114
(Del.);

7. Mysore Thermo Electric Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, 221 ITR
504 (Kar.)




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