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Self-adjustment of excess payment

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II. Tribunal :


11. Self-adjustment of excess payment :



M/s. Narnolia Securities P. Ltd. v. CST, Ranchi, (2008
TIOL 538 CESTAT-Kol.]

â The appellant had
paid service tax on behalf of four other service providers and later came to
know that service providers had also paid taxes separately, adjusted the same
against subsequent payment.


The Revenue contended that Rule 6(3) did not permit this.


It was held the appellant’s contention that they were under
genuine belief that such adjustment was permissible under Rule 6(3) as ST-3
returns filed disclosed such adjustments which confirmed the bona fides
of the appellant. The Tribunal stated that the Department has at no stage
advised the appellant to claim a refund for excess payment, instead of making
adjustments on their own and that such adjustments are not permitted by Rule
6(3). Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, a lenient view was
taken.

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Port Service

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II. Tribunal :


10. Port Service :


Stevedoring whether a port service and transport charge
incurred by CHA — whether taxable ?



Kin-ship Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE–Cochin, [2008
TIOL 584 CESTAT Bang.]

â CHA licensed to
undertake stevedoring activity at Cochin port was asked to pay service tax
considering the activity as Port Service. Relying on the decisions in the cases
of Homa Engineering Works v. CCE Mumbai, 2006 (1) STR 19 (Tri.-Mum),
New Mangalore Port Trust v. CST, Bangalore
, 2006 (4) STR 448 (Trib.-Bang),
Velji P. & Sons (Agencies) P. Ltd. v. CCE, Bhavnagar, 2007 (8) STR 236
(Tri.-Ahmedabad), the issue being no longer res integra was not
considered as Port Service. Secondly, since the said CHA charged transport
charge separately in its bills, the same was treated as reimbursable expense and
demand was set aside.

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Part A — Taxability of sovereign activities

Part A — Summons proceedings

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1. General :

(a) Central
Excise Officers (CEOs) who are empowered by the Central Government, can issue
summons in terms of S. 14(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1994 (CEA). The said
Section has been made applicable for Service Tax. A text of S. 14 of CEA is
reproduced hereafter for reference :


S. 14 — Power to summon persons to give evidence and
produce documents in inquiries under this Act.



(1) Any Central Excise Officer duly empowered by the
Central Government in this behalf, shall have power to summon any person
whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to
produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer is
making for any of the purposes of this Act. A summons to produce documents
or other things may be for the production of certain specified documents or
things or for the production of all documents or things of a certain
description in the possession or under the control of the person summoned.

(2) All persons so summoned shall be bound to attend,
either in person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct; and
all persons so summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject
respecting which they are examined or make statements and to produce such
documents and other things as may be required :

Provided that the exemptions u/s.132 and u/s.133 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall be applicable to
requisitions for attendance under this Section.

(3) Every such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be
a ‘judicial proceeding’ within the meaning of S. 193 and S. 228 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).

 


(b) CEOs of the rank of Superintendent and above are
empowered to issue summons [Notification 9/99 — CE (NT) dated 10-2-1999.] These
powers of ‘summons’ are different than the powers of Courts to issue summons
under the Code of Civil Procedure/Criminal Procedure Code. The power of
‘summons’ to investigating officer only means ‘demand presence of’ or ‘call upon
a person to appear’. The investigation officer cannot administer oath to the
person being interrogated.

 

© CEOs issuing summons have powers to call for attendance,
documents/records and record statements. They have absolutely no powers to
demand any tax.

 

(d) As per S. 174 of the Indian Penal Code, non-attendance in
obedience of an order from public servant, is an offence punishable with
imprisonment up to 6 months and fine up to Rs.1,000. Hence, whenever a summons
is issued to any person, proper attendance should be ensured to avoid penal
consequences.

 

2. Summons/Inquiry proceedings — Few general judicial pronouncements :

(a) Summons and show-cause notices issued during inquiry are
not challengeable when assessee has responded to summons and show-cause notice [L.M.L.
Limited v. AC,
(1997) 90 ELT 43 (All.)]

 

(b) Duties of the interrogating officer and of the party
summoned — The party should make himself available as directed for interrogation
and should answer the questions put to him — But he cannot be asked not to take
recourse to the plea of failure of memory and to give answers which must be
direct and not evasive — He cannot be directed to compulsorily rake up his
memory and give replies only in negatives or affirmatives — The officer
interrogating him should record faithfully in whatever manner or way the party
responds to the questions and can well make his own observations pertaining to
the demeanor of the party — [Ajit Jain v. Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence, New Delhi
, (1998) 102 ELT 521 (SC)]

 

© Inquiry and investigation — Summons not vitiated by
non-mention of nature of investigation therein (since that may alert the persons
concerned to manipulate their records or abscond), nor does non-striking of the
words ‘and/or’ in the summons show lack of application of mind on the part of
the issuing officer, since preliminary inquiry is usually both for purposes of
submission of specified documents and recording of statement of the person
summoned — Authority not required to come to a finding regarding nexus of the
said documents or involvement of any particular person just at the commencement
of inquiry — [TTV Dinakaran v. Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate,
(1995) 80 ELT 745 (Mad.)]

(d) In the absence of any material indicating arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power by authority, it is not within power of Judicial
review to comment on summons issued on the presumption that summons have been
issued for some ulterior purpose —[Annapurna Impex Pvt. Ltd. V. UOI,
(2006) 198 ELT 25 (P& H)]

(e) Writ jurisdiction — Alternative remedy of appeal is not
applicable to the summons issued u/s.14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as they
do not fall in the category of ‘order’ or ‘decision’ — S. 35 of the Central
Excise Act and Article 226 of the Constitution of India — [Hindustan Safety
Glass Works Ltd. V. AC,
(1985) 21 ELT 38 (All.)]

3. Summons for documents :

(a) Summons for producing documents should specify which
documents are required. Authority issuing summons should apply their mind with
regard to necessity to obtain and examine documents mentioned in the order. —
[In Barium Chemicals v. AJ Rana — AIR 1972 SC 591, summons was set aside,
on ground of vagueness.]

(b) A person is bound to produce all useful and relevant
documents asked. [In UOI v. Telco, (1997) 96 ELT 209 (SC), it has been
held that the Assistant Commissioner is entitled to call for and examine
whatever documents he considers relevant. [e.g., records of sale prices
at the regional sales offices while determining factory gate prices].

4. Recording of statements during summons proceedings :

a) Statements can be recorded during enquiry in pursuance of summons. It should be recorded be-fore Gazetted Officer. [Superintendent is the lowest rank of Gazetted Officer in Excise Department. Inspector is not a Gazetted Officer]. Such statements can be used against a person during any legal proceedings.

b) Statements should be in writing and signed by the maker as it safeguards interests of the maker as well as the Department, and eliminates the possibsity of making a complaint subsequently that the statement was not correctly recorded by the authorities. [CO Sampath Kumar v. Enforcement Officer, 96 ELT 511 (SC)]

c) CEO cannot compel a person to give incriminating statement without reasonable, fair and just procedure. Statement should be voluntary and not under threat.

In C. Sampath Kumar v. Enforcement Officer, (1998) ELT 511 (SC), it was held that administration of caution to the person summoned that not making – a truthful statement would be an offence cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as use c pressure to extract the statement. Such a caution has-statutory backing and is in fact in the interest of the person making the statement.

In K. L. Pavunny v. ACCE, (1997) 90 ELT241 (SC) (SC 3-Member Bench), where the accused was informed that law requires him to tell the truth and if he does not tell the truth, he may be prosecuted u/s.193 of IPC for giving false evidence, it was held that the threat comes from the statute and not from the officer.

d) S. 14(2) of CEA specifically provides that all persons summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined and to produce such documents and other things as may be required.

e) U/s.164(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, a caution has to be given to the person making a statement that he is not bound to make the confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against him. However, S. 164 applies to judicial confession before a Magistrate and is not applicable’ to statements before Central Excise Officer as it is not a ‘confession’. [In ACCE v. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd., (2000) 120 ELT 280 (SC), it was held that S. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not applicable to statement recorded by CEO.]

f) A person  whose  statement  is recorded  during the  enquiry has  no  right to have a copy  of his statement on the spot. As per the department instructions also, these need not be given on the spot.

In the case under FERA viz. K. T. Advani v. State, (1987) 30 ELT 390 (Del.), it was held that the person has no right to get copies of his statement at the stage of investigation. However, he can keep a note statement that he makes.

However, he is entitled to get a copy of statement at the time of issue of show-cause notice, or otherwise in cases where the statement is proposed to be used against such person.

If the statements are used and orders are passed, without giving notice to the concerned parties, the same vitiates the proceedings, and cannot be used against the person concerned. [Charan Metal Corporation v. CCE, (1998) 98 ELT 588 (All.)]

In a Customs case, authorities had relied upon the statement made by the appellant at the time of ‘.earch and seizure in order to reject his case, but his request for copy of the statement and inspection of records was not granted. It was held that Customs authorities were not justified to rely upon certain alleged discrepancies in that statement to reject the appellant’s contention. [Ambal Lal v. UOI, (1983) 13 ELT 1321 (sq]

g) In Poolpandi v. Superintendent,  C Ex, 60 ELT 24 (sq (SC 3-Member Bench) it has been held that person being interrogated is not an accused, nor can he plead that there is a possibility of his being made an accused in future. Hence, he has no right to ask for lawyer’s presence during the enquiry / questionitg.

However, the interrogating officer may permit presence of authorised person.

h) As per S. 14(3) of CEA, proceedings after the summons are ‘judicial proceedings’ within the meaning of S. 193 and S. 228 of the Indian Penal Code. As per S. 193 of IPC, giving false evidence is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years 1ind fine. U / s.228 of IPC, intentional insult or causing interruption to any public servant while such servant is at any stage of judicial proceedings shall be punishable with imprisonment up to six months or with fine up to Rs.l,000or both.

i) Even if duty liability is admitted by officers while making a statement, it does not mean a company cannot challenge duty liability. There cannot be estoppel in matters of taxation. [Dodsal P. Ltd. v. CCE, (2006) 193 ELT 518 (CESTAT) – Mumbai]

5. Confessions made in statements, retractions and related matters:

a) When a confession made in a statement is retracted, the burden is on the person making the statement to prove that confession was made under threat and only if the said person is able to prove that it was not voluntary, then the onus shifts on the Revenue to prove that it was voluntary. [ACC v. Govindasamy Ragupathy, (1998) 98 ELT 50 (Mad.)]

b) Burden is on the person making the statement to prove that the statement was obtained by threat, duress, or promise like any other person. [BFlagwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 214.]

c) Any retracted confessional statement is inadmissible in evidence u/ s.24 of the Indian Evidence Act. The relevant text of Section is reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

“24 Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding. A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceeding against him.”

d) The Supreme Court has laid down certain general rules about the nature of corroboration needed before accomplice evidence may be accepted. In this regard, reference can be made to Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1952 SCR 377.

e) It is well-settled law that confessional statement, when retracted at the first available opportunity, leads to the conclusion that it was not true and voluntary. [Shantilal Soni v. CC&CE, (1995) 78 ELT 151 (Delhi – Tribunal)]

f) When a confessional statement was retracted within seven days and the same was the sole basis of the Department’s case, the statement could not be called as having voluntary nature. [Bhagwandas Harjpal v. CC, (1995) 78 ELT 80 (Cal. Trib.)].

g) The fact that retraction was addressed to the same officer who recorded the statement, is no ground to reject the retraction. [Prempreet Textile Industries Ltd. v. CCE, (2001) 47 RLT 746 (T)]

h) The confessional statement retracted the next day cannot be the positive evidence in favour of the Department. [Rahat Hussain v. CC, Prev, (2001) 46 RLT 466 (T)]

i) Retracted confessional statement is not to be relied upon without independent and full corroboration. [State of Maharashtra v. Sayed Mohamed Mashim At Musavi, (1991) 51 ELT 41 (Born.)]

j) Confession is not important if retracted immediately. Retraction affects voluntary nature and truthfulness of confession and is to be considered while deciding a case. [Kali Charan Basant Lal v. CCE, (1989) 41 ELT 162 (Del. – Trib.)]

k) Written statement retraction communicated after five days was held as not very late. [Premier Soaps Detergents v. CCE, (1989) 40 ELT 197 (Del. –  Trib.)]

l) When the statements (which are subsequently retracted) are inconsistent with the documentary evidence, the documentary evidence is to be preferred. [Philip Fernandez v. CC, (2002) 146 ELT 180 (Mum. – Trib.)]

m) In Sevantilat Karsondas Modi v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 109 ELT 41 (SC), the confession consisted of a plea as the result of an assault on him by the Customs Officers, which had been denied by the officers; but because of the circumstances under which the confession was taken, it was held that the confession was hit by S. 24 of the Evidence Act and it was unsafe to treat the confession as voluntary and trustworthy.

6. Precautions required while making a statement:

Statements made before the CEO, in pursuance of summons proceedings, can be used as evidence in subsequent proceedings. Such statements could be valid even if retracted subsequently.

Hence, proper precautions should be taken by person making a statement, as to factual accuracy of information provided and correct legal position on questions asked, which have direct bearing on tax and related liabilities. It would be advisable to seek advice from consultants prior to making such statements by tactfully seeking sufficient time after ascertaining major issues involved in the matter on which specific statement is being sought.

7. Board  instructions on issue  of summons:

Based on practical experience, it is found that sumomons proceedings are often used as a means by the CEOs to cause undue harassment to the assessees. In this regard, the Ministry of Finance has issued important instructions (F No. 137/39 /2007-CX-4 dated 26-2-2007). Relevant text of the instructions is reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

1. It has come to the notice of the Board that on many occasions, merely for obtaining information or documents pertaining to Service Tax cases/matters, officers of field formations or intelligence agencies resort to issuance of sum-mons (U/s.14 of the Central Excise Act, as is made applicable in Service Tax cases u/s.83 of the Finance Act, 1994) to either Service Tax payers or to persons who are not registered with the Department. From the nature of information/ documents called for, it is clear that many times such information/ documents can easily be obtained by making a telephonic request or writing a simple letter to the person concerned. Instead, summons are issued in a routine manner, under the signature of super intendent or the senior intelligence officers (SIOs). The harsh and legal language of the summons not only causes unnecessary mental stress and embarrassment and instills fear ift the minds of the receiver, but may also become a source of harassment or even unethical practices. The Board has taken a serious note of this practice.

2. The undersigned is, therefore, directed to communicate the following directions of the Board for compliance, :

a) For calling for information/documents, normally the mode of communication should be either in the form of a telephone call or by way of sending a simple letter;

b) Issuance of summons should be resorted to, only when the above-mentioned modes of communications are found to be ineffective or are likely to jeopardise Revenue interest or when it is essential to ensure personal presence of the person concerned to tender evidence or record statement in connection with a Service Tax evasion case;

c) In cases mentioned under (b) above, the summons should be issued after obtaining prior written permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner with reasons for issuance of summons to be recorded in writing;

d) In case, for unavoidable operational reasons it is not possible to obtain such prior written permission, oral! telephonic permission from such officer must be obtained and the same should be reduced to writing and intimated to the officer according such permission at the earliest opportunity;

e) In all cases, where summons are issued, the officer who summons must submit a report on proceeding that took place during the presence of the taxpayer/person summoned, and the officer authorising issuance of summons must satisfy himself that no harassment has been caused during the visit of the person summoned to the office.

The above  are self-explanatory.



Part A: Services vis-à-vis Builders and Developers

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Service Tax

Background in brief :


Services in relation to construction activity are covered in
the service tax law under the three main categories of services in the Finance
Act, 1994 (the Act) viz.

Commercial or
industrial construction [S. 65(105)(zzq)]

Construction of
residential complex [S. 65(105)(zzzzh)]

Works contract service [S. 65(105)(zzzza)]

These taxing entries were introduced in the service tax law
at different times during 2004 to 2007.

A tremendous amount of controversy has been generated
recently on account of insertion of the following explanation in the sub-clause
(zzzzh) of S. 65(105) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2010 with effect from
1-7-2010 :

“Explanation — For the purposes of this sub-clause,
construction of a complex which is intended for sale, wholly or partly, by a
builder or any person authorised by the builder before, during or after
construction (except in cases for which no sum is received from or on behalf of
the prospective buyer by the builder or a person authorised by the builder
before the grant of completion certificate by the authority competent to issue
such certificate under any law for the time being in force} shall be deemed to
be service provided by the builder to the buyer.”

(A similar explanation is also inserted in sub-clause (zzq)
of the Act).

Consequent upon the Tribunal decision in the case of Daelim
Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2006 (3) STR 124 (Trib.-Del.) and later
dismissal of Special Leave Petition filed by the department against the above
decision, already a debate was generated as to whether or not construction
services provided under any works contract were at all liable for service tax
prior to 1-6-2007 i.e. at the time of introduction of works contract service in
the service tax law.

To add to this controversy, the Supreme Court’s decision in
the case of K. Raheja Development Corporation v. State of Karnataka, 2006 (3)
STR 337 (SC) and ruling of the Authority for Advance Rulings in Re : Hare
Krishna Developers 2008 (10) STR 341 (AAR) created a controversy as regards
service tax applicability to builder/developer in cases where construction was
undertaken by a builder for a prospective customer under an agreement for sale.
The issue remained contentious on account of various clarifications and judicial
pronouncements although it was almost settled when the Board issued a
clarification vide its Circular No. 108/2/2009-ST dated 29-1-2009 inter alia
that the activity of a builder amounted to ‘self service’ and would not be
subject to service tax.

However, with the insertion of the above explanation in the
two cited sub-sections of the Act, the issue has resurfaced with even greater
force. The Government vide its Circular DOF No. 334/1/2010-TRU dated 26-2-2010
clarified the nature, background and reasons for the imposition of service tax
on the activity of sale of unit of commercial/industrial or residential complex.
An extract from the same is reproduced below :

“8.5 These different patterns of execution, terms of payment
and legal formalities have given rise to confusion, disputes and discrimination
in terms of service tax payment.

8.6 In order to achieve the legislative intent and bring in
parity in tax treatment, an Explanation is being inserted to provide that unless
the entire payment for the property is paid by the prospective buyer or on his
behalf after the completion of construction (including its certification by the
local authorities), the activity of construction would be deemed to be a taxable
service provided by the builder/promoter/developer to the prospective buyer and
the service tax would be charged accordingly. This would only expand the scope
of the existing service, which otherwise remains unchanged”.

The insertion of the explanation in both the categories of
services of construction has given rise to a number of issues as the explanation
seemingly has created a deeming fiction whereby money received by a builder or
developer for units under construction is considered a receipt towards taxable
service of construction even though the money is received towards the sale of
such unit for the reasons stated in the above circular. Assuming for the time
being that builders are liable for service tax unless they have sold the fully
completed residential or commercial unit, some important issues that emerge in
the scenario are discussed below :

It is required to note that the scope of definitions of
taxable services is extended only in respect of commercial or industrial
construction and construction of residential complex and not in the definition
of ‘works contract’ which also specifically includes contracts for construction
of commercial/industrial buildings or civil structure and contracts for
construction of new residential complex. Therefore, the question that arises is
whether intentionally no explanation was inserted under the works contract
service based on the reasoning that contracts entered into by the builders with
flat purchases are not works contracts.

Whether construction service provided for personal use of
buyer is taxable on account of the new explanation ?

The definition of the term ‘residential complex’ in S. 65(91a) of the Act specifically excludes a complex which is constructed by a person directly engaging any other person for designing/planning/ construction and is intended for personal use as residence by such person. The definition further provides that personal use includes permitting use of such property as residence by another person on rent or even without consideration. At this point, it is also relevant to note that applying criterion of personal use, CBEC in a clarification provided in respect of construction contract awarded by Government to NBCC contended to the effect that the Government buying property for its personal use from a builder viz. NBCC, the transaction of sale would not be covered by service tax. If one extends the interpretation to the situation of buying property for one’s personal use from a developer/builder, isn’t it in the fitness of things to contend that every person buying a residential unit for ‘personal use’ in terms of the definition of ‘residential complex’ inherently falls out of the purview of service tax in terms of the definition of ‘residential complex’ itself? A clarification from CBEC would put to rest the uncertainty over the vital and contentious issue at least in the case of builders of residential units to a large extent. The issue however as to the units bought for other than personal use and commercial or industrial properties still would remain open.

On going contracts as on July 01, 2010:

As the deeming provision vide Explanation is effective from 1-7-2010, services provided from this date only would be leviable to service tax. In case of ongoing construction of buildings as on this date, the issue of calculation of service tax liability arises as a number of permutations and combinations of situations are possible; such as construction completed partially, construction completed but completion certificate not received, bookings made and advances received partially and of different amount, in respect of different units etc. Further complications may arise on account of receipt of full amount in case of completed construction in respect of some units and partial receipt in respect of other units in the same building as on 1-7-2010. Further, in the same complex, some units may be only partially completed as on 1-7-2010 and therefore service as well as payment of money would be completed only after 1-7-2010. The builders/developers therefore would require proper accounts and records to facilitate such bifurcation. Typically all civil contractors issue running bills but builders/developers do not issue ‘running bills’ on prospective buyers as they only book units or flats to be sold to prospective purchasers. However, in any scenario, the ‘taxable event’ arising only on provision of service. Therefore, services provided before 1-7-2010 are not liable for service tax in case of liability arising out of deeming provisions. To ascertain the extent and stage of completion, one may have to obtain a certificate from an architect or a chartered engineer. The explanation has referred to ‘authority competent to issue completion certificate’. Vide order No. 1/2010 dated 22-6-2010, the Government has issued Service Tax (Removal of Difficulty) order, 2010 whereby it is provided that besides any Government authority, the following persons are authorised to issue a completion certificate for the purposes of sub-clauses (zzq) and (zzzzh) of S. 65(105) of the Act:

  • Registered architect
  • Chartered engineer
  • Licensed surveyor

Any of the above persons thus may issue a completion certificate in respect of residential or commercial or industrial complex as a pre-condition for its occupation.

Service tax liability on advances:

When any advance is received towards a taxable service, service tax is liable to be paid. Accordingly, in normal course, advance received for services provided post July 01, 2010, the service tax liability would have arisen. However, Notification No. 36/2010 dated 28 -6-2010 has been issued to provide exemption to any amount of advance re-ceived prior to 1-7-2010 for various taxable services provided on or after 1-7-2010. The said Notification inter alia also applies to construction services in respect of residential and commercial/industrial construction services. Therefore, the entire sum of money received as advance from prospective purchasers towards any unit in a building by a builder or a developer prior to 1-7-2010 is not liable for service tax in case of construction services remaining pending to be provided in the period post 1-7-2010.

Valuation of element of ‘service’ for a builder/ developer:

Builders and developers have the options available under the law for determining their service tax liability.

  • Pay service tax at prevailing rate on 25% of the gross value received where the price of the land is included.

  • Pay service tax at prevailing rate on 33% of the gross value where the price of the land is not included.

[Note: In both the above options, while determining the ‘gross value’, value of goods and material supplied, provided or used is required to be added as per the condition laid down in Notification 1/2006-ST. Therefore, if the customer has supplied any material, its value will have to be added to the ‘gross value’ before working out 25% or 33% as the case may be. Further, no CENVAT credit is available, if any of the above options is selected].

  • Pay service tax at prevailing rate taking benefit of Notification 12/2003-ST of 20-6-2003 under which value of the goods sold/transferred would be completely excluded and exempted.

Whether constitutional validity of the provision challengeable?

The above deeming provision applicable to build-ers/developers was challenged by them before various High Courts. The Bombay High Court in the case of Maharashtra Chamber of Housing and Industry v. UOI, (2010 TIOL 526 HC Mum.-ST) granted an interim stay to the petitioners. The Madras High Court also granted an interim stay in the case of A. P. Ravi v. UOI, (2010 TIOL 604 HC Mad.-ST).

However, recently in the case of G. S. Promoters v. UOI, 2011 (21) STR 100, Punjab & Haryana High Court has pronounced its judgment and upheld the validity of the Explanation inserted in S. 65(105) (zzzzh) . In this case, the petitioner sought to declare the Explanation to S. (105)(zzzzh) of the Act and CBEC Circular No. 334/3/2010 -TRU dated 1-7-2010 as unconstitutional. According to the peti-tioner, the Explanation enlarged the scope of the levy beyond the concept of service by including therein sale. It was pleaded that sale and purchase was beyond the legislative competence of the Union legislature. If construction activity is not undertaken by a builder, then the builder cannot be considered to be a service provider in relation to services of construction activities. The petitioner relied upon the stay granted by the Bombay High Court on this issue. They also placed reliance on the decision in the case of Magus Construction P. Ltd. v. UOI, 2008 TIOL 321 HC wherein it was held that if construction activity is not undertaken by a builder, the builder cannot be considered a service provider of construction service.

The High Court did not accept the contentions of the petitioner and made the following observations:

  • Referring to the Supreme Court’s judgment in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners & Others 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC), it was observed that the Supreme Court has upheld the power of the Central Government to levy tax on services under Residuary Entry 92 of the Union List and that legal back-up was further provided by Article 268-A in the constitution vide the 88th Amendment in 2003.

  • On the scope of the legislative entry, it observed that “the entries in the lists being merely topics or fields of legislation, they must receive a liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not in a narrow pedantic sense.

  • The High Court took note of the fact that there was no challenge to the effect that there was any encroachment in the legislative power of the State legislature through the above amendment except the submission that there was element of sale which was sought to be taxed.

  • Relying on the decisions of State of Madras v. Gannon & Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 560, Imagic Creative P. Ltd. v. CCT, 2008 TIOL 04 SC VAT and Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Association v. UOI, 2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC), the High Court observed that service tax is a tax on service and not on a service provider. Quantification of tax should not be confused with the nature of tax and discussed at length on the aspects of ‘nature of tax’ and ‘measure of tax’.

  • The High Court distinguished the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Magus Constructions Pvt. Ltd. 2008 (11) STR 225 (Gauhati) by merely observing that the Circular dated 1-8-2006 issued by CBEC taken note of by the Single Member Bench of the Gauhati High Court would not apply when service recipient is a purchaser of flat. The levy of tax is on service and not on the service provider. Construction services are certainly provided even when a constructed flat is sold. Taxing of such transaction is not outside the purview of the Union legislature when it does not fall in any of the taxing entries of the State List.

In terms of the above observations made by the High Court, it was held that the contention that there is no element of service of construction involved in a builder selling a flat cannot be accepted. Whether there is a service or not has to be obtained not only from builder’s angle but also from the recipient’s angle. Only service in relation to construction is sought to be taxed and it is definitely involved when construction is carried out or before construction and before flat is sold and therefore the levy could not be held unconstitutional.

The judgment being the first final ruling by a High Court on the issue of constitutional validity has generated sharp reactions among legal fraternity on account of various issues in addition to the legal or technical issue of relevance of Article 268A of the Constitution of India and insertion of Entry 92C in the Union List as the Court has referred to it as ‘legal back-up’. Leaving this aspect aside for the time being, the other issues that arise are:

  •  Whether or not, the aspects of ‘nature of tax’ and ‘measure of tax’ while delivering the judgment had relevance as on examining the Explanation inserted in S. 65(105)(zzzzh), the question that arises is whether it merely deals with ‘measures of tax’ and that it maintains a nexus with the essential character of having ‘element of service’ of the levy? Or does it create only a deeming fiction by declaring the construction activity as ‘service’, when a part payment is received by a builder from a prospective buyer when essentially the trans-action is of sale of immovable property.

  •   Further, while distinguishing the case of Magus Construction (supra), only reference to CBEC Circular dated 1-8-2006 is made and the P & H Court has stated that the circular will not apply when service recipient is a purchaser of flat and the levy is on the service and not service provider and construction service is certainly provided. Comparing the facts of both the cases, one may hardly find any difference and therefore the ground on which the distinction is made appears not easily digestible.

Conclusion:

In view of the above, it appears almost certain that the decision would be challenged before the Hon. Supreme Court. Further, there may not be any consequence of the judgment in the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court and the Madras High Court as they have granted the interim stay in the matter. Yet elsewhere uncertain and untoward situation for the builders as well as flat buyers may continue as attempt by the department for the recovery of service tax may be made. The issue being highly complex and contentious, judicial testing seems inevitable.

[Note: Readers may note that the subject being complex, only preliminary issues are discussed above. A few other issues including a vital issue relating to builders involved in redevelopment activity would be discussed in subsequent issue of BCAJ.]

Health check-up and treatment services

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Service TaxRenting of Immovable Property
Retrospective
Validation :

Background :


W.e.f 1-6-2007 the Central Government included within the
definition of taxable service a service provided or to be provided to any
person, by any other person in relation to renting of immovable property for use
in the course or furtherance of business or commerce
. Renting included
letting, leasing, licensing or other similar arrangement. The phrase ‘for use in
the course or furtherance of business or commerce’ was said to include use of
immovable property as factories, office buildings, warehouses, theatres,
exhibition halls and multiple-use building. Some residential and other
properties were excluded from the scope of this service.

The levy of service tax on renting of immovable property was
challenged through writ petitions before High Courts in different parts of the
country. Many property owners began paying self-assessed tax on the rent amount
and passed on the said liability to the tenants. At the same time, many property
owners did not charge service tax pending disposal of writ petitions.

Implications of the levy on renting of immovable property and
issues arising therefrom have been discussed in detail in the August 2007 and
September 2007 issues of BCAJ.

The Delhi High Court in Home Solution Retail India Ltd. v.
Union of India & Others,
(2009) 14 STR 433 (Del.) held that service tax is a
tax on value addition provided by a service provider. It is obvious that it must
have connection with a service and there must be some value addition by that
service. If there is no value addition, then there is no service. Applying the
same to renting of immovable property service, the High Court observed as
under :

“There is no dispute that any service connected with the
renting of such immovable property would fall within the ambit of S.
65(105)(zzzz) and would be exigible to service tax. The question is whether
renting of such immovable property by itself constitutes a service and,
thereby, a taxable service. Service tax is a value added tax. It is a tax
on the value addition provided by some service providers. Insofar as renting
of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or
commerce is concerned, any value addition could not be discerned.
Consequently, the renting of immovable property for use in the course or
furtherance of business or commerce by itself does not entail any value
addition and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a service.

In arriving at the aforesaid finding, the Delhi High Court
relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu (T.N.) Kalyana
Mandapam Association v. UOI,
(2006) 3 STR 260 (SC) which, interestingly was
relied upon both by the appellants who had challenged the legality of the levy,
as well as by the respondents i.e., the Government of India. Based on a
detailed consideration of the aforesaid judgment, the Delhi High Court held that
the decision of the Supreme Court supported the argument of the appellants
before it and not the Government of India. With regard to the nature of the
service tax itself, the High Court held that it is a value added tax on value
addition done by the service provider and it must have a connection with the
service. Consequently, since mere renting of immovable property does not entail
any value addition, it could not be regarded as a service for that reason as
well.

The Delhi High Court observed in para 37 as :

. . . . We have not examined the alternative plea taken
by the petitioners with regard to legislative competence of the Parliament in
the context of Entry 49 of List II of the Constitution of India.



The Govt. filed an SLP against the said ruling which has been
admitted, but no stay has been granted against the Delhi HC Ruling. The same is
pending disposal.

Implications arising from the Delhi High Court Ruling have
been discussed in detail in the July 2009 issue of BCAJ.

Amendment by Finance Act, 2010 (‘Act’) :

Prior to the amendment, S. 65(105)(zzzz) of the Act defined
‘taxable service’ in the context of ‘renting of immovable property’ as under :

“(105) ‘taxable service’ means any service provided or to
be provided :

(a) to (zzzy) . . . . . .

(zzzz) to any person, by any other person in relation to
renting of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business
or commerce.

Explanation 1. . . . . . .

The Finance Act, 2010 has nullified the Delhi High Court
Ruling by redefining ‘taxable service’ with retrospective effect from 1-6-2007
as under :

“(105) ‘taxable service’ means any service provided or to
be provided :

(a) to (zzzy)

(zzzz) to any person, by any other person, by renting of
immovable property or any other service in relation to such renting for use in
the course or furtherance of business or commerce.

Thus, henceforth a service provided by renting of immovable
property or a service ‘in relation to’ such renting of immovable property, is
now covered in the definition of taxable service. TRU Circular No. 334/1/2010 —
TRU (Annexure B), dated 26-2-2-10 clarifies as under :


Para 9.2

“In order to clarify the legislative intent and also bring
in certainty in tax liability the relevant definition of taxable service is
being amended to clarify that the activity of renting of immovable property
per se
would also constitute a taxable service under the relevant clause.
This amendment is being given retrospective effect from 1-6-2007.

Thus, renting of immovable property by itself is now
considered to be a taxable service. In the Finance Act 2010, it has been
declared as under :

No act or omission on the part of any person shall be
punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable had this
amendment not come into force.



Implications of the amendment :

The amendment in the definition of taxable services seeks to bring within the service tax net the activity or renting of immovable property per se nullifying the position held in the Home Solutions case. It further seeks to overturn the said position w.e.f. 1-6-2007. Therefore any levy, demand, recovery or action in relation thereto taken by the authorities will be validated and no action against the same will be maintainable in a Court of law. Further, all refunds made consequent to the Delhi High Court Ruling in Home Solutions case, are liable to be overturned by virtue of this amendment.

Legality and constitutional validity of the amendment:

An important issue that arises for consideration is whether the amendment will withstand the test of constitutionality. Though the answer can only come by way of a final decision by the Courts of law, it becomes important to prima facie examine the same.

In the light of the Delhi High Court ruling in Home Solutions case, the amended provisions will be subject to judicial scrutiny. Questions which arose before the Delhi High Court would once again arise. Is the bare renting of immovable property a taxable service? Is there a continuous flow of service between the property owner and the tenant in such a scenario? Is there any value addition involved?

In addition, constitutional validity was not examined by the Delhi High Court in Home Solutions case. Hence, there would be fresh round of litigations on this ground too.

According to one school of thought, the amended provisions can be challenged for transgression of the constitutional line of control which divides the powers of the Union and the State Governments. In terms of Article 246(3) of the Constitution, the Legislature of any State has the exclusive power to make laws with respect to matters listed in List II to the Seventh Schedule. Taxation on transactions relating to immovable property is not within the legislative competency of the Central Government inasmuch as these matters fall under Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.

S. 66 of the Act, which is the charging section for the purpose of levy of service tax, provides, for the levy of tax on the taxable services covered by S. 65(105) thereof. From a reading of the charging section, it is clear that service tax is a charge of tax on taxable services. The Supreme Court in Laghu Udyog Bharati v. Union of India, (1999) 112 ELT 365 (SC) has also held that service tax is a tax on services and is leviable on the service provider. The levy of service tax on the leasing or letting or rent-ing of immovable property may be illegal and ultra vires Article 246 of the Constitution of India.

According to another school of thought, in terms of the Supreme Court Ruling in TN Kalyana Manda-pam (supra), levy of service tax on renting of immovable property is constitutionally valid.

In the light of the foregoing, a fresh round of litigations is likely as regards legality and Constitutional validity as well of the retrospective amendment made in regard to renting of immovable property.

Some issues:

Implications on property owners:

The retrospective amendment in renting of im-movable property has been challenged through writ petitions in various courts of the country and interim stay has been granted in some cases. The benefit of the same would be available to a property owner who is a petitioner/member of the petitioner association. However, it would be advisable for the petitioners, to make appropriate disclosures before service tax authorities by filing letters/through notes in service tax returns. In cases where, property owners charge service tax but the tenants refuse to pay, the detailed analysis and discussions in July, 2009 of BCAJ can be referred as to the various options that can be exercised by property owners and implications in regard to each option.

Interest implications:

In Pratibha Processors v. UOI, (1996) 88 ELT 12 (SC), it was observed by the Supreme Court as under:
“in fiscal statutes, the import of the words, — ‘tax’, ‘interest’, ‘penalty’, etc. are well known. They are different concepts. Tax is the amount payable as a result of the charging provision. It is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purpose, the payment of which is enforced by law. Penalty is ordinarily levied on an assessee for some contumacious conduct or a deliberate violation of the provisions of the particular statute. Interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable. The levy of interest is geared to actual amount of tax withheld and the extent of delay in paying the tax on due date. Essentially, it is compensatory and different from penalty — which is penal in character.” (p. 20).

Thus, interest is not a penalty, but is essentially compensatory in nature.

In the context of stay matters, it is a reasonably settled position to the effect that if a petitioner loses he would have to pay tax along with interest inasmuch as interest is compensatory as discussed above. However, in the context of retrospective amendment, whether this principle would apply is an issue.

In this connection, attention is invited to the Supreme Court Ruling in Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, (2006) 1 STR 73 (SC), wherein the following was observed in regard to liability to interest in cases of retrospective validation of levy on broadcasting services.

Para 7
“In any event, it is clear from the language of the validation clause, as quoted by us earlier, that the liability was extended not by way of clarification but by way of amendment to the Finance Act with retrospective effect. It is well established that while it is permissible for the Legislature to retrospectively legislate, such retrospective legislation is normally not per-missible to create an offence retrospectively.

There were clearly judgments, decrees or orders of Courts and Tribunals or other authorities, which were required to be neutralized by the validation clause. We can only assume that the judgments, decree or orders, etc. had, in fact, held that persons like the appellants were not liable as service providers. This is also clear from the Explanation to the validation Section, which says that no act or acts on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would have been so punishable if the Section had not come into force.”

On the basis of Star India ruling, a view can be taken to the effect that there may be no interest liability for the past period. However, this view is likely to be disputed by the tax authorities, resulting in litigations.

Penalty implications:

It is a very well-settled position that in cases where matters involved are of controversial nature, no penalty can be imposed. Based on the same, it would appear that there may be no liability to penalties, provided appropriate disclosures are made before service tax authorities.

Vacant land leased for construction of building?: Under the unamended provisions, ‘vacant land’, whether or not having facilities clearly incidental to the use of such vacant land was excluded from the definition of ‘immovable property’. Thus, renting of such vacant land was not liable for service tax.

The Finance Act, 2010 has curtailed the above exclusion by bringing within the ambit of the immovable property ‘vacant land, given on lease or licence for construction of building or temporary structure at a later stage to be used for further-ance of business or commerce’. Thus, renting of vacant land on long-term lease for construction of commercial building or structure thereon in future would be liable for service tax.

Leases executed prior to the amendment:

An important issue that arises for consideration in case of leases executed prior to the amendment (in some cases such leases would have been ex-ecuted before the introduction of service tax).

It is pertinent to note that advances received in respect of all newly inserted taxable services (as well on those services the scope of which has been expanded) in the Finance Act, 2010, have been exempted by virtue of Notification No. 36/2010-ST, dated 28-6-2010. However, services falling under sub-clause (zzc) (Commercial Training or Coaching Service) and (zzzz) (Renting of Im-movable Property Service) of S. 65(105), [which have been given retrospective effect] have been kept out of this Notification.

No such retrospective effect has been given to renting of vacant land (on which some construction is to be made subsequently). Therefore, it would appear that advances received in respect of this renting of vacant land ought to be exempted on the same ground on which exemption to advances in respect of other newly inserted services and amended services has been given. The scope of Notification No. 36/2010-ST, dated 28-6-2010 needs to be clarified accordingly.

The issue involved has ramifications for a large number of assessees most of which are PSUs and local industrial corporations which are renting vacant land on a long-term lease with a explicit condition that the lessee would construct a factory or commercial building on such land.

This can also be seen from a perspective that the moment advance is received and lease agreement is signed, the taxable event of provision of service is completed. Thus, as per settled position, if the taxable event happened at the time when service tax was not leviable on that service, then service tax cannot be demanded later, on a pro rata basis or otherwise even if the service becomes taxable during the tenure of the lease. The Draft Point of Taxation Rules seems to support this position.

From the Service Tax Department’s perspective, they could argue that service is in the nature of continuous service. Hence, service tax needs to be discharged on a pro rata basis for the period post amendment.

In case of long -term leases, whether the same can be covered within the ambit of ‘renting’ at all, may have to be examined vis-à-vis provisions under principal laws governing transfer of property and related regulations.

Editor’s Note:

Recently, Hon. Punjab and Harayana High Court in the case of Shubh Timb Steels Ltd has upheld the consitutional validity of levy of service tax on renting of immovable property as also its retrospective application.

Part A Service tax : Information Technology Software

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Service Tax

1. Introduction :

Service tax has been levied on various services in relation to software by the Finance Act, 2008 with effect from May 16, 2008 by introducing a category under the description ‘Information Technology Software Service’ (ITSS) in Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act).


Many issues and controversies have emerged on account of the manner of drafting of Ss.(zzzze) in S. 65(105) of the Act defining this service especially in the scenario wherein the technology called software is classified as ‘goods’ under various situations for the levy of tax on ‘sale’ (under the VAT laws of the States of India). Further, under the nomenclature ‘Information Technology Software’, a taxing entry No. 8523 also appears in the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1944 (CETA) and the term is defined in almost identical manner as it is defined for the purpose of service tax.

In the scenario, it becomes utmost necessary to primarily study, understand and analyse what software means per se and whether it is possible to identify a particular transaction as one of ‘sale’ or ‘service’ or both simultaneously, given the provisions of law under applicable taxing statues not considering at this moment as to which part of the activity constitutes ‘manufacture’ liable for central excise duty.

2. What is software ?

The meaning of ‘software as examined by the Supreme Court in the following cases is reproduced :

“Software program is essentially a series of commands issued to hardware of the computer that enables a computer to perform in a particular manner.”

[Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2004 (178) ELT 22 (SC)]

“Computer programs are the product of intellectual process, but once implanted in a medium, they are widely distributed to computer owners . . . . Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not a goods, but when transcribed as a book, it becomes goods.

That a computer program may be copyrightable as intellectual property does not alter the fact that once in the form of a floppy disc or other medium, the program is tangible, movable and available in the market place. The fact that some programs may be tailored for specific purposes need not alter their status as goods because the code definition includes “specially manufactured goods”.

[Quote from Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corpn., (925 F 29670 (3rd (i.e. 1991) adopted and agreed upon in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2001 (128) ELT 21 (SC)].

“Computer programs, instructions that make hardware work. Two main types of software (operating systems) which controls the working of computer and applications, such as word processing programs, spread sheets and databases which perform the tasks for which people use computers.”

[CC, Chennai v. Hewlett Packard India, 2007 (215) ELT 484 (SC)]

In terms of the above, software is essentially an intangible asset or a thing that can be used only when it is stored or transferred on a tangible medium like a disc, a CD-ROM or a hard disc, a computer, etc. The application software can further be classified as canned software and customised software. Canned software is one which can be replicated for the use of more than one person with or without modification and is sold ‘off the shelf’ and generally requires routine installation. Thus, substance of a transaction is ‘sale’ of goods when a canned software is sold. This is done either through a tangible medium like a CD or a disc or can also be transmitted electronically. As against a canned or a packaged software, for a customised software, a programme or programmes is/are written or developed for a specific client or a person developing or designing a software writes a programme focussing only on specific requirements of the client. However the set of instructions, which are customised for a client, also needs to be uploaded on a tangible medium of a hard disk of the computer in order that the same could be put to use.

Thus, software is admittedly and undoubtedly an intangible incorporeal intellectual property. However, whether this intangible property is ‘goods’ or ‘service’ was analysed at great length in Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2004

(178) ELT 22 (SC) (TCS). According to the Supreme Court in this case, it would pass its test of being considered ‘goods’, if it has the attributes having regard to :

  • its utility;

  • capable of being bought and sold; and


  • capable of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed, etc. and held : “If a software whether customised or noncustomised satisfies these attributes, the same would be goods”. [Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra)]. It also held “what is essential for an article to become goods is its marketability.”

In Tata Consultancy Services (supra), it was also observed:

“In our view, the term’ goods’ as used in Article 366(12) of the Constitution of India and as defined under the said Act are very wide and include all types of movable properties whether those properties be tangible or intangible ….. The software and media cannot be split up. What the buyer purchases and pays for is not the disc or the CD. As in the case of painting or books or music or films, the buyer is purchasing the intellectual property and not the media i.e., the paper or cassette or disc or CD. Thus, a transaction sale of computer software is clearly a ‘sale of goods’ within the meaning of the term as defined in the said Act: …. “

It also held “we find no error in the High Court holding the branded software as goods. In both cases, the software is capable of being abstracted, consumed and used. In both cases, software can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed, etc. Even unbranded software when marketed/sold may be goods. We however, are not dealing with this aspect and express no opinion thereon because in case of unbranded software other questions like situs of contract of sale and/ or whether the contract is a service contract may arise.”

Thus, the above benchmark decision, which is widely followed, held branded/ canned software as ‘goods’ and the issue regarding unbranded or customised software whether is ‘goods’ or ‘service’ was not concluded and left open.

3.  Software and leviability of VAT:

Following the decision of Tata Consultancy Services (supra), Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT) notified software packages to be under Entry C-39 vide Notification dated 1-6-2005as goods of intangible or incorporeal nature and made liable for VAT @ 4%. Similarly, software is also liable for VAT in the States of Goa, Karnataka, etc.

Since canned software is determined as ‘goods’ and chargeable to VAT, it cannot be held as ‘service’ at the same time in terms of decision of the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. UOI & Ors., 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC). In para 46, the Court observed,

“The test for deciding whether a contract falls into one category or the other is as to what is the “substance of the contract”. We will for want of a better phrase call this the dominant nature test.”

Similarly, in Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC) also, exclusivity of sale and service is established. Also in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. UOI, 2005 (182) ELT 33 (SC), it was held “the mutual exclusivity of taxes which has been reflected in Article 246(1) of the Constitution means that taxing entries must be construed so as to maintain exclusivity.” In principle, service tax has never been intended to be levied on sale of goods by the Union Government having regard to the framework defined by the Constitution i.e., to levy tax on an item covered under Article 246 read with List II – State List to Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. This intention is refleeted in CBEC Circular 96/7 /2007-ST of 23-8-2007 at 36.03/23-8-2007 in the context of services of authorised service station. – “Service tax is not leviable on a transaction treated as sale of goods and subject to levy of sales tax / VAT”. Similarly, the Circular /letter D.O.F. No. 334/1/2008 – TRUE, dated 29-2-2008 in the context of new service category of “transfer of right to use tangible goods” the Board clarified  –    “supply of tangible goods for use and leviable to VAT/ sales tax as deemed sale of goods is not covered under the scope of the proposed service. Whether a transaction involves transfer of possession and control is a question of facts and is to be decided based on the terms of the contract and other material facts. This could be ascertained from the fact whether or not VAT is payable or paid.” (emphasis supplied). Thus, when substance of a transaction is ‘sale’ of a software, it is exigible to VAT and is beyond the scope of service tax.


4.    Software: Scenario hitherto in the service tax law:

Till May 16, 2008, when information technology software service got notified as taxable service, the scenario under the service tax law was as follows:

  • Under the category of business auxiliary service, services in relation to information technology service were specifically excluded. Information technology service in turn was defined to cover services in relation to designing, developing or maintaining of computer software or computerised data processing or system networking or any other service primarily in relation to operation of computer systems. (However, between 2004 and 2006, all aspects other than design and development of software were removed from exclusion and made taxable).

  • Under consulting engineer’s service, software engineering was excluded.

  • Under maintenance or repair service, services in relation to computer, computer systems, etc. were exempted vide Notification No. 20/2003-ST, until it was withdrawn from 9-7-2004. Yet, Circular No. 70/19-ST of 17-12-2003 clarified that maintenance of software was not chargeable to service tax. Later this stand was reversed through other controversial Circulars. Finally, an explanation was inserted with effect from 1-6-2007 that ‘goods’ included ‘computer software’ for this service.

  • Under management or business consultant’s service, procurement and management of information technology resources is taxed.

  • Some of the Information Technology (IT)-enabled services and IT services outsourced got taxed under business support service and when provided on behalf of a client, like call centre is taxed under  business auxiliary  service.

  • Provision and transfer of information and data processing is taxed under banking and other financial services.

5. Scope of information technology software service under service tax:

5.1  Statutory provisions:

S. 65(53a) of the Act:

‘Information technology software’ means any representation of instructions, data, sound or image, including source code and object code, recorded in a machine-readable form, and capable of being manipulated or providing interactivity to a user, by means of a computer or an automatic data processing machine or any other device or equipment.”

S. 65(105)(zzzze)  of the Act:

(zzzze)    “Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to information technology software for use in the course, or furtherance, of business or commerce, including, :

(i)    development of information technology software,

(ii)    study, analysis, design and programming of information technology software,

(iii)    adaptation, upgradation, enhancement, implementation and other similar services related to information technology software,

(iv)    providing advice, consultancy and assistance on matters related to information technology software, including conducting feasibility studies on implementation of a system, specifications for a database design, guidance and assistance during the start-up phase of a new system, specifications to secure a database, advice on proprietary information technology software,

(v)    acquiring the right to use information technology software for commercial exploitation including right to reproduce, distribute and sell information technology software and right to use software components for the creation of and inclusion in other information technology software products,

(vi)    acquiring the right to use information technology software supplied electronically.”

  • Simultaneously with introduction of the above entry, exclusion provided for software engineering in the definition of ‘consulting engineer’ has been deleted.

  • Specific exclusion of information technology service under business auxiliary service is also removed.

  • Under the category of management, maintenance or repair service, the term ‘property’ is defined to include information technology software.

  • Under the category of testing and analysis service, testing of information technology software is included.

  • Certification of IT software is included under technical inspection and certification services.

5.2 The Ministry in its Circular DOF No.334/1/2008-TRU, dated 29-2-2008 clarified as follows:

“4.1.2 Software consists of carrier medium such as CD, floppy and coded data. Softwares are categorised as ‘normal software’ and ‘specific software’. Normalised software is mass market product generally available in packaged form off the shelf in retail outlets. Specific software is tailored to the specific requirement of the customer and is known as customised software.

4.1.3 Packaged software sold off the shelf, being treated as goods, is leviable to excise duty @ 8%. In this budget, it has been increased from 8% to 12% vide Notification No. 12/2008-CE, dated 1-3-2008.

4.1.4 IT software services provided for use in business or commerce are covered under the scope of the proposed service. The said services provided for use, other than in business or commerce, such as services provided to individuals for personal use, continue to be outside the scope of service tax levy. Service tax paid shall be available as input credit under CENVAT Credit Scheme.

4.1.5 Software and upgrades of software are also supplied electronically, known as digital delivery. Taxation is to be neutral and should not depend on forms of delivery. Such supply of IT software electronically shall be covered within the scope of the proposed service.

4.1.6 With the proposed levy on IT software services, information technology-related services will get covered comprehensively.”
 
6. Scope  and  the criteria for taxability  :

6.1 Services provided unless used in the course or furtherance of business or commerce are not covered in the scope of taxable service. Thus, software service provided to an individual for personal use remains outside the purview of the levy.

6.2 It is not difficult to interpret and infer that services of study, analysis, design and programming of software (sub-clause ii) are covered within the scope of the ITSS. Similarly, adaptation, upgradation, enhancement, implementation and other similar services relating to software (sub-clause iii) are also enshrined in the definition. Some of these descriptions seem to overlap with each other. Likewise, some of the services covered under other categories like consulting engineer, management or business consultant and even ‘management, maintenance or repair’ service also find place in this definition. For instance, sub-clause (iv) lists services like advice, consultancy and assistance on matters related to software including feasibility studies on implementation of a system, specifications for a database design, guidance and assistance during start-up, etc. The term ‘study’ can include feasibility study also. Further, when the so-called ‘annual maintenance contracts’ for maintenance of software are entered into, more often than not, providing upgradation or assistance in implementation is included along with the services of troubleshooting, debugging, etc. Implementation services are not very different from guidance and assistance during a start-up phase or advice and/or consultancy services. Various words or terms appear to have been used in order not to – allow any ‘escape’ from the scope. Nevertheless, not much difficulty is felt in interpreting these functions as ‘services’.

6.3.1 The issue is whether sub-clause (i) includes the process of development of information technology software as ‘service’ or it covers as a whole only services in relation to development of software. A view has been formed by some professionals that only the services in relation to development of software are covered under this sub-clause and not the development of software per se. Accordingly, it is contended that services may comprise of writing of codes, providing consultancy, pre-implementation .. study, analysis, etc. The coded software is supplied to the client as ‘goods’ – it is either developed on the system of the client or supplied electronically or on a tangible medium such as a disc. If the software is developed by a person on one’s own and is only replicated for various users, such ‘development’ does not amount to ‘service’ and it is transferred on a tangible medium across the counter as ‘packaged goods’ without much or no involvement of any ‘service’, it is ‘sale’ of ‘goods’ and as such, charge-able to VAT as already analysed in para 3 above, following TCS judgment (supra).

6.3.2 However, when software is developed for and on behalf of and as per specifications provided by the client, the question arises whether the fee received for the development of software is wholly chargeable as ‘service’, considering it as. covered under the sub-clause (i) or should the delivery of duly developed software be considered ‘goods’ liable for VAT,considering the test prescribed in the TCS decision (supra) as to determination of ‘goods’ that when software is capable of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored/possessed, etc. and even when it is customised, it has all the attributes present in it for being considered ‘goods’ and in such eventuality, only the value of services in relation to development of software be considered exigible to service tax. This is an extremely complex issue and only the facts of each case and the terms of agreement between the designer / developer of software and the user would determine as to whether the ‘contract’ relates to sale of ‘goods’ or ‘services’ or whether both the components are present in a contract. Then in such cases, the issue may arise as to whether the contract is indivisible or both the ingredients i.e., ‘sale’ and ‘service’ are defined separately and the consideration is also stated separately and therefore, the parties to the contract intend separate rights, etc. However, on applying ‘dominant nature test’ [as observed in BSNL’s case (supra) discussed in para 3 above], when the parties did not intend separate rights, there is no ‘sale’ even if the contract could be disintegrated, in a contract where dominant objective is provision of service. Therefore, taking an instance of a lump-sum contract which is focussed on development or designing of a software involves preliminary study and analysis of client’s specific organisational requirement. Thereafter, the process of development begins with services of collection of information and data, study, analysis, consultation, advice, designing systems, writing programs before a final product is designed and delivered and which may also include services of post development implementation, training, troubleshooting, etc. Although in the scenario, the final deliverable may be provided, transferred and installed on a tangible medium such as hard disc, it would be reasonable to view the transaction as one of service as services appear dominant in the entire deliverable which is analogical to illustrations of a hospital’s prescription and dispensing of pills, a lawyer’s preparation of a contract as a stamped document discussed in BSNL’s decision (supra) where dominant objective is ‘service’, although deliverable is provided as ‘tangible goods’. Thus, it may prima facie appear that the entire contract of development of software could be considered a service contract exigible to service tax under sub-clause (i) of ITSS. However, the term ‘service’ per se is not defined in the Finance Act, 1994. In the case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. UOI, 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC), the Supreme Court observed that the word ‘service’ should be understood in contradiction to the word ‘goods’. So far as ‘goods’ is concerned, The Supreme Court in TCS’s case has observed that if an article has attributes having regard to (a) its utility (b) capable of being bought and sold and (c) capable of being transferred, delivered, stored and possessed, it should be goods and thus, converse can be inferred that if it cannot be possessed, stored, delivered or transferred and is not capable of being bought and sold, it should be considered ‘service’. In the context of the above instance of client-specific or a customised software, one has to admit that all the above ingredients are present. Further, distinguishing the transaction of development of software from a lawyer’s preparation of document or a doctor’s prescription is that the service once availed is utilised and consumed instantaneously. It is possible that the benefit therefrom can recur later at different events also. However, it gets consumed whereas the customer-specific software, although developed only for the customer, is deliverable, transferable, storable, usable and capable of being possessed. For instance, the client can claim and register proprietary rights over the customised software developed by the provider thereof to the exclusion of the developer of software.

6.3.3 Software: Dutiable  under  excise and customs.

Information technology software (canned as well as customised) is excisable goods under Tariff Entry 8523 8020 (earlier 852 49111, 8524 9112 and 85249113).The rate of duty was 12% with effect from March 01, 2008 (increased from 8% and again it attracts 8%). However, software other than canned software was exempted under Notification No. 6/ 2006-CE of 1-3-2006. When classification exists under the excise law, merely by declaring specific item of ‘goods’ as exempt, does the inherent ‘character’ of these goods got transformed into service or vice versa? If ‘customised software’ per se is not ‘goods’ and is ‘service’ only, can it be considered ‘exempted goods’ for the duty of central excise? (Or is this exemption somewhat analogical to exemption for value of goods or material sold by the service provider to the recipient of service under Notification No. 12/2003-Service Tax dated 20-6-2003 which per se cannot be made exigible to service tax ?). Simi-larly, under the customs law also, it is classified under Entry 8524 4011, but it is exempt. However, since excise duty is levied on canned software, while importing canned software, CVD is payable.

The Supreme Court in Gobindram v. Shamji K. & Co., AIR 1961SC 1285 (1290) held that the word ‘exempt’ shows that a person is not beyond the application of law. Thus, having been classified under the excise and customs law is it to be contended that software both canned and customised should be considered ‘goods’ and therefore development of software per se cannot be a service?

6.3.4 It is relevant to note here, a decision of the Karnataka High Court which in the case of Inventa Software India Pvt. Ltd. v. AC Commercial Taxes, (2008) 17 VST 362, relying on the decision of Tata Consultancy Services (supra) held that development of application software in the areas like financial accounting, inventory control, sales analysis, etc. is ‘works contract’ attracting sales tax under Entry 22 of Sixth Schedule of the KST Act, 1957 under ‘programming and providing computer software’. This has generated further controversy mainly for the fact that a transaction of works contract involves ‘transfer of property’ in goods in execution of works contract. For instance, an ordinary illustration of a painting contract or a contract for construction pre-supposes supply of ‘goods’ in the first instance on which some ‘work’ or ‘labour job’ is carried out in order that a composite job is construed ‘works con-tract’ consisting of transfer of property in goods during its execution. It is doubtful in the case of ‘development of a software’ whether there exists any ‘goods’ prior to the execution or development of software. Even if it is assumed to be a ‘composite contract’, it is well accepted that all composite con-tracts are not works contracts. In case of software development, a series of services are combined and embodied in a ‘deliverable’ product, which is finally delivered on a tangible medium. It is comparable only with a musical or dramatic or such creative work on a tangible medium. The entire creative work, which is intangible and intellectual, is embodied on a tangible medium. Its division into ‘service’ and ‘goods’ does not appear a legally tenable proposal unless a ‘deeming fiction’ is enshrined in the law.

The Government appears to be seized with this issue. In the context of ‘video cassettes supplied for broadcasting on Betachem or a similar format – its instruction Dy No. 167/11/08-CX4, dated March OS, 2008 which  inter alia inquired:

(1)    Whether both service tax and excise duty are payable on the same activity or not?

(2)    Whether for both taxes, the same value is considered or different value is considered?

(3)    Practice of work adopted  by this industry  …  “.

(Note: The above was provided consequent upon representation by Film and Television Producers’ Guild and others).

6.3.5 In summation, the issue is complex. However, although final product passes the test of being a deliverable, transferable, usable, storable, etc., substantial amount of services are embodied in the finally delivered product or it is even appropriate to contend that the product delivered comprises only ‘service’ ingredient. Further, goods like cooked food also gets consumed immediately or has a short shelf life. However, before it is cooked, the raw material exists and service is embodied in the material to produce the cooked food. While developing software, no material is involved in the process of development and it is an intangible intellectual property. Therefore, the issue is arguable from both the sides and accordingly, terms of contract, dominant nature and intention of parties to the contract only may help determine taxability of a transaction. Yet the area being grey, tremendous amount of litigation can be expected if the Government does not act to resolve the matter.

Nevertheless, a contract pertaining to services provided in relation to development of software certainly would be covered by sub-clause (i).

6.4 Acquiring the right to use software for com-mercial production or supplied electronically (sub-clauses (v) and (vi).

The reading of these clauses to determine liability of service tax (if any) appears a Herculean task. If sub-clauses (v) and (vi) are read in the manner as the other three preceding clauses i.e., the sub-clause itself as a defined ‘taxable service’, it results in absurdity. Plain reading of these clauses along with the head note would mean as follows :

  • A service provided (including to be provided) to any person in relation to IT software for commercial/business use is taxable under this clause and the coverage also includes descriptions in sub-clauses (i) to (vi). In such a scenario, the question that arises is when aperson acquires a right to use IT software supplied to him electronically, he pays for it being a buyer of the software assumed as ‘goods’. Therefore, to treat buying i.e., acquiring a right as ‘provision of service’ is absurd. Assuming that instead of acquiring, ‘granting’ of a right is meant to be a ‘taxable service’, then on operation of S. 66A of the Act, when a person acquires a right to use software from a person outside India, he would be liable for service tax. Therefore, the’ act of acquiring right’ itself cannot become ‘provision of taxable service’. In the scenario, if there is no drafting error, one has to refer to the governing principle of interpretation, which is as follows:

“Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. The interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual”.

Since service tax law defines ‘taxable service’ u/s. 65(105) of the Act, contextual interpretation that follows is that a service in relation to acquiring of right to use software supplied electronically or to use it for commercial exploitation is sought to be taxed by the inclusion of sub-clauses (v) and (vi). Analysing this from another angle also leads to such contention. Taxing transfer of right to use any goods under Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution vests in the States and accordingly is part of the extended definition of ‘sale’ under VAT laws.

As already discussed above in para 3, at least packaged software per se is held as ‘goods’ under the VATlaws, central excise and the customs laws. Similarly, supply of ‘right’ to use software through what is known in business parlance as ‘paper licence’ (a certificate issued by a copyright owner conveying right to use IT software), wherein delivery may be done on a tangible medium or electronically i.e., sent online, being a ‘deemed sale’ is chargeable to VAT.
 
The question that therefore arises is whether the same can be treated as ‘service’ when a dealer or a distributor acquires right to distribute and sell soft-ware which is a copyrighted product, developed by the developer of the product? Since the transaction is exigible to VAT,it cannot simultaneously attract service tax, as discussed above at para 3 in terms of constitutional limitation decisions of Imagic Creative (P) Ltd. (supra) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (supra) as also Board’s clarifications.

7.    Summing  up :

  • Given the limitation in constitution, the Supreme Court’s judgments and unprecise drafting of taxable service in relation to software, service tax exigibility arises only on services in relation to software. Developer/manufacturer of packaged software sells the right to use software through paper licence which is undoubtedly exigible to VAT.Distributors acquire right to market or sell these paper licences. The packaged software is thus sold electronically or on discs and thus the software is replicated or reproduced for the use of the purchaser. In both the cases, ‘sale’ occurs. There may be element of service on the lines, coffee/tea is sold through vending machines. However, considering ‘dominant nature test’, the transaction is one of sale of goods and therefore exigible to VAT. No service tax simultaneously can be levied.

  • All consultancy contracts, specific contracts for study, implementation, switching of data from old to the new software, audit of systems functioning, troubleshooting and maintenance, up gradation, etc. are services exigible to service tax.

  • However, when services are either provided ‘free’ along with ‘sale’ of software or there is a composite contract, application of ‘dominant nature test’ would be necessitated. Disputes with authorities may arise here.

  • A contract for’ development of customised software’ whether is to be treated only as ‘goods’ or ‘service’ or whether the composite and indivisible contract could be segregated into two may not be concluded without litigation process or through introduction of ‘deeming fiction’ as in the case of TCS (supra), the judgment per J. Variava ended with the words, “… because in case of unbranded  software, other questions like situs of contract of sale and/or whether contract is a service contract  may arise”.

Part A — Classification of services

Software Development vis-à-vis Technical Inspection and Certification

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7. Software Development vis-à-vis Technical
Inspection and Certification :



Development and testing of software admitted in Revenue’s
cross objection as activities which go hand-in-hand for release of software —
Software development not complete without testing — Prima facie computer
software industry exempted from Service Tax — Strong prima facie case
made out on non-applicability of Service Tax provisions to computer software
industry in which inspection and testing is vital activity — Deposit of Rs.4
lakhs already made — Pre-deposit of balance amount waived and recovery thereof
stayed — S. 65(108) of the Act/S. 35F of CEA as applicable to Service Tax vide
S. 83 of the Act.

[Stag Software Pvt. Ltd. V. CST, (2008) 9 STR 476
(Tri — Bang.)]

Technical Testing and Certification as Statutory Functions

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8. Technical Testing and Certification as Statutory
Functions :



  • Liability to Service Tax for statutory functions — Appellant is a State
    Government Department carrying on sovereign activity of inspection and
    certification of electrical installations as per law — Tribunal decisions
    holding sovereign function cannot be subject matter of Service Tax, applicable
    — C.B.E.&C. Circular dated 18-12-2006 clarifying statutory activities of
    sovereign/public authorities not liable to Service Tax, applicable — Bona
    fide
    view on non-liability and demand hit by time bar — S. 65(108), S. 66
    and S. 73 of the Act.



  • Departmental Clarification — Retrospective applicability — CBE&C Circular
    dated 18-12-2006 clarifying statutory activities of sovereign/public
    authorities not liable to Service Tax — Impugned circular being beneficial to
    assessee, applicable retrospectively.


[Electrical Inspectorate, Govt. of Karnataka v. CST, (2008) 9 STR 494
(Tri — Bang.)]


Reimbursements

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6. Reimbursements :



(a) Includibility in taxable value — Appellant rendering
Business Auxiliary Service of promotion of loans of client bank — Service Tax
paid without including reimbursements — Service charges collected from bank as
consideration for Business Auxiliary Service constituting the gross amount
charged by service provider for such service — Impugned amounts being
reimbursement of salaries and infrastructural expenses, held as not to be
termed as amounts charged by service provider – Tribunal decisions and C.B.E.
& C. clarifications on non-taxability of reimbursement of expenses, applicable
— Impugned orders set aside — S. 67 of the Act.

[Malabar Management Services Pvt. Ltd. V. CST,
(2008) 9 STR 483 (Tri — Chennai)]

(b) Service Tax demanded on ‘other income’ and
‘write-backs’ — Impugned order holding that actual expenses reimbursed
eligible for abatement, but the same disallowed citing non-production of
documentary evidences — Expenditure incurred on behalf of client and not
directly relatable to service rendered, not liable to Service Tax —
Information and documents produced not examined in impugned order —
Expenditure details mentioned in books of accounts and charge on suppression
of facts not justified — Impugned order containing certain defects and hence,
set aside — Matter remanded for de novo adjudication — S. 67 and
Provision to S. 73 of the Act.

Reimbursement of expenses — It was held that Service Tax
can be charged on amount received for services rendered — Expenditure incurred
on behalf of client and not directly relatable to service rendered, not liable
to Service Tax — S. 67 of the Act.

[GAC Shipping (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2008) 9 STR 524
(Tri — Bang.)]


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Penalty under Service Tax vis-à-vis Central Excise

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5. Penalty under Service Tax vis-à-vis Central
Excise :


  •  Commission for marketing loans — Service Tax was paid before issue of show-cause
    notice — Applicability of S. 80 of the Act was not considered in impugned order
    — Imposition of penalty of Rs.1000 u/s.78 of the Act not noticed by Commissioner
    (Appeals) while upholding penalty equal to tax u/s.76 of the Act following High
    Court decision in (2006) 4 STR 177 (P & H) — Impugned order set aside and matter
    remanded for fresh consideration — S. 76, S. 78 and S. 80 of the Act — S. 11AC
    of Central Excise Act, 1944 (CEA).


 


  • Tax statutes, penal provisions — Act vis-à-vis CEA Act — Mandatory
    penalty upheld by Com-missioner (Appeals) following High Court decision in
    (2006) 4 STR 177 (P & H) — Impugned order erroneous as provisions of S. 80 of
    the Act, not having any parallel in S. 11AC of CEA — S. 80 of the Act provides
    for non-imposition of penalty if reasonable cause shown for failure — S. 76, S.
    78 and S. 80 of the Act; S. 11AC of CEA.

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Erection, Commissioning, Installation of ATM Machines — Works Contract

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4. Erection, Commissioning, Installation of ATM Machines —
Works Contract :


  • In this case, there was a works contract for supply, erection and commissioning
    of Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) for banks — Impugned order in
    question noted that works contract is indivisible —It was held that Service Tax not leviable on indivisible
    works contract before 1-6-2007 — For period before 1-6-2007, ratio of decision
    in Daelim Industrial case (2006) 3 STR 124 (Tribunal)] as affirmed by Supreme
    Court applicable — Taxable event for levying Service Tax not present during
    impugned period — ATM related services became taxable from 1-5-2006 — Service
    Tax liability absent for material period — S. 65(9b), S. 65(39a) and S.
    65(105)(zzzza) of the Act.

  •  Turnkey project — Liability to Service Tax. Taxing event is execution of turnkey
    project involving sale of ATMs to banks — Installation and commissioning are
    incidental activities — Works contract for supply and commissioning of ATMs not
    taxable before 1-6-2007 in the absence of charging provision — Ambiguity not
    accepted by tax law — Charging
    provision to be found in statute itself, and where there is none in statute,
    they cannot be supplemented by notifications — S. 65(105)(zzzza) of the Act.

  • New services — Effect of introduction — Introduction of new entry presupposes
    non-coverage by pre-existing entries — Addition of an item in list of taxable
    service is just an addition and not subtraction from a pre-existing entry.

[Diebold Systems (P) Ltd. V. CST, (2008) 9 STR 546
(Tri — Chennai)]

 


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Cargo handing

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2. Cargo handing :


  • In this case, transportation activity was carried out, whereby coal was
    transported inside mine/ colliery and there was deployment of machines and
    tipper trucks for transport of coal from quarry beds to surface stocks/railway
    sidings. It was held that Mechanical transfer of coal from coal face to tippers
    and subsequent transportation within mining area not covered under cargo
    handling service. Movement of coal within mine area is dominant activity and
    loading and unloading merely incidental. Hence no Service Tax liability arises —
    Penalty not imposable as suppression or misstatement absent — Impugned order set
    aside — S. 65(23), S. 73 and S. 76 of the Act.
  •  Mechanical transfer of coal from coal face to tippers and subsequent
    transportation within mining area not covered under cargo handling service — S.
    65(23) and S. 65(105)(zr) of the Act.
  • Cargo in commercial parlance means one which is carried as freight in ship,
    plane, rail or truck.

[Sainik Mining & Allied Services Ltd. V. CCE, (2008)
9 STR 531 (Tri — Kolkata)]


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Consulting Engineers Service — Works Contract Service

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1. Consulting Engineers Service — Works Contract Service :


â
This case involved a works contract on turnkey basis, wherein air separation/gas
separation plants were supplied and erection, installation and commissioning of
such plants was undertaken as per impugned contracts — Records indicating major
portion of activity relating to erection of various items of plants — CBE&C
Circular clarifying that erection, installation and commissioning not covered
under Consulting Engineer service — Erection and commissioning services made
taxable from 2003 and not chargeable to Service Tax under Consulting Engineer
during impugned period — Original order dropping demand after relying on
Tribunal decision in Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. (2006) 3 STR 124 (Tri — Del.)
upheld — Impugned revision order set aside — S. 65(31), S. 65(39a), S.
65(105)(g) and S. 84 of the Finance Act, 1994 (Act).


â
It was held that impugned contracts being works contract, came into Service Tax
net from 2007 only — Works contract not covered under Consulting Engineer
service for period prior to 2007 — Main contract for manufacture of plant and
their supply and erection — Drawing and design for manufacture of plant only and
not rendered directly to clients — Ratio of Tribunal decision in Daelim
Industrial Co. Ltd. Rightly followed in original order — Impugned revision order
set aside — S. 65(31), S. 65(105)(zzzza), S. 73 and S. 84 of the Act.


[Air Liquide Engg. India P. Ltd. V. CCE, (2008) 9
STR 486 (Tri — Bang.)]


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Amendments in Port/AIrpor Services

1. Statutory provisions :

[Finance Act, 1994, (as amended from time to time) ‘Act’]

(a) Port Services :

S. 65(82) of the Act :

‘Port Service’ means any service rendered within a port or other port in any manner.

  •  S. 65(105) of the Act :

Taxable services means any service provided or to be provided :

(zn) to any person by any other person in relation to port services in a port in any manner :

Provided that the Provisions of S. 65A shall not apply to any services when the same is rendered wholly within the port :

. . . . . . . . .

(zzl) to any person, by any other person, in relation to port services in other port in any manner :

Provided that the provision of S. 65A shall not apply to any service when the same is rendered wholly within other port :

(b) Airport Services :

  •  S. 65(105) of the Act :

Taxable services mean any service provided or to be provided :

(zzm) to any person, by airports authority or by any other person, in any airport or a civil enclave.

Provided that the provision of S. 65A shall not apply to any service when the same is rendered wholly within the airport or civil enclave.

2. Departmental clarifications :

(a) Extracts from Department Circular DOF No. 334/1/2010-TRU, dated 26-2-2010) —(Annexure B) :

1. Service provided in an airport or port :

    1.1 Two services, namely, Port Services and the Airport Services were introduced in Budget 2001 and 2004, respectively. The services provided by minor ports covered under other port became taxable from 2003. The purpose behind creating these was that since a number of activities are undertaken within the premises of port and airports, it would be easier to consolidate all such services under one head.

    1.2 It was reported that divergent practices are being followed regarding classification of services being performed within port/airport area. In some places all services performed in these areas (even those falling within the definition of other taxable services) are being classified under the port/airport services. Elsewhere, individual services are classified according to their individual description on the ground that the provisions S. 65A of Finance Act, 1994 prescribes adoption of a specific description over a general one.

    1.3 Further both the definitions use the phrase ‘any person authorised by port/airports’. In many ports/airports there is no procedure of specifically authorising a service provider to undertake a particular activity. While there may be restriction on entry into such areas and the authorities often issue entry passes or identity cards, airports/port authorities seldom issue authority permission letter to a service provider authorising him to undertake a particular task. Many taxpayers have claimed waiver of tax under these services on the ground that the port/airport authority has not specifically authorised them to provide a particular service.

    1.4 In order to remove these difficulties, the definition of the relevant taxable services are being amended to clarify that all services provided entirely within the port/airport’s premises would fall under these services. Further specific authorisation from port/air port authority would not be a pre-condition for the levy.

(b) Extracts from Dept. Circular No. 334/03/2010-TRU, dated 1-7-2010 :

    Para 4.1 :

    In the Finance Bill, 2010, with intent to ease the classification disputes, the definitions of port, other port and airport services were amended to comprehensively cover under their ambit, all services provided within an airport or a port or other port, irrespective of whether or not such activities are authorised by the authorities or whether or not they are otherwise classifiable as distinct taxable services. In effect, all services that are wholly rendered within the prescribed area of the port or other port or an airport, are to be classified within the ambit of ‘port services’ or ‘airport services’.

    Para 4.2 :

    During the post-budget interactions with the stakeholders, apprehensions were expressed that the change may have certain unintended effects and certain services (including certain essential services) hitherto exempted, may attract service tax unintentionally. Further, it was also pointed that the abatements and exemptions presently available under individually defined taxable services would get denied when provided within airport or port, merely as they would now be taxable under newly introduced taxable services.

    Para 4.3(v) :

    Currently abatements are available to certain services such as ‘Renting of a cab’, ‘Erection, Commissioning & Installation Service’, ‘Goods Transport Agency service’ and ‘Construction Services’. Similar abatements would be available to such services, when provided wholly within an airport or a port or other port, under the new definition of airport or port or other port services. (Notification No. 40/2010-ST, dated 28th June, 2010 as corrected by corrigendum dated 30th June, 2010 and Notification No. 43/2010-ST, dated 28th June, 2010.)

    Para 4.4 :

    All other services carried out within a port or other port or an airport would be subjected to service tax under the category of port/other port/airport services.

3. Background & Amendment :

        a) Under the existing provisions for a service to be considered as ‘port services,’ two conditions were required to be satisfied?:

        i) the service must be provided by a port or a person authorised by that port, and

        ii) the service must be in relation to vessel or goods

    In Homa Engineering Works v. CCE, (2007) 7 STR 546 (Tri-Mum.), where the appellant provided dry-dock repairs to its client within the port premises, it was held that such services would not be liable to service tax under ‘Port Services’ due to the following reasons?:

        The appellant was not a port or a person specifically authorised by that port under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 (MPTA 63) to provide a particular service on its behalf;

        The service such as dry-dock repairs were not in the nature of ‘Port Services’ since the port itself was not statutorily allowed to undertake such service under the MPTA 63; and

        On an application of S. 65A of the Act, such services were more appropriately classifiable under ‘Maintenance or Repairs’ service.

    This decision of the Tribunal was followed in several cases both in the context of major ports as well as other ports. In CCE v. Kokan Marine Agencies, (2009) 13 STR 79 (KAR) the Karnataka High Court upheld the Tribunal’s view which was based on Homa Engineering (supra) case.

    In order to overcome the judicial pronouncements, definition of ‘Port Services’ is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2010, to the following effect:

  •             Service need not be provided by the port or a person authorised by the port;
  •             Service need not be in relation to vessel or goods, and
  •             Service need not also be one which the port can undertake under the MPTA 63 or the Indian Ports Act, 1908.

    In terms of the amended definition of taxable service, all services rendered wholly within the port would be classified as port services and not under any other category of service, irrespective of the principles of classification laid down u/s.65A of the Act.

        b) Amendments on lines similar to ‘Port Services’ have been made in respect of Airport Services. Under the existing provisions, in order to fall within ‘airport services, the following was essential:

  •             the service should be provided by an ‘airport’ or a ‘person authorised by the airport’; and
  •             the service should be provided in an airport or civil enclave.

    The definition of ‘taxable service’ in the context of airport services is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2010 to the effect that all the services rendered by an airport authority or by ‘any person’ in an airport or civil enclave would be covered under the category of ‘airport services’ and specific authorisation from the airport authority would not be a pre-condition for the levy.

    Further, all services rendered wholly within the airport would be classified as airport services and not under any other category of services, irrespective of the principles of classification laid down u/s.65A of the Act.

        4. Exemptions in regard to amended Port/ Airport Services:
    a) Notification No. 31/10-ST, dated 22-6-2010:

    The following services provided within a port or an airport have been exempted from payment of service tax:
        
    i) repair of ships or boats or vessels belonging to the Government of India including Navy or Coast Guard or Customs, but does not include Government-owned Public Sector Undertakings;

        ii) repair of ships or boats or vessels where such process of repair amounts to ‘manufacture’ and has the meaning assigned to it in clause(f) of S. 2 of the Central Excise Act, 1944;

        iii) supply of water;

        iv) supply of electricity;

        v) treatment of persons by a dispensary, hospital, nursing home or multi-specialty clinic (except cosmetic or plastic surgery service);

        vi) services provided by a school or centre to provide formal education other than those services provided by commercial coaching or training centre;

        vii) services provided by fire service agencies;

        viii) pollution control services.

        b) Notification No. 38/10-ST and Notification No. 42/10-ST, both dated 28-6-2010:
    Commercial or Industrial Construction Services [Clause 65(105)(zzq)] provided wholly within the port/other port for construction, repair, alteration and renovation of wharves, quays, docks, stages, jetties, piers and railways has been exempted from payment of service tax. Similarly, services provided wholly within airport also are exempted.

        c) Notification No. 41/10-ST, dated 28-6-2000:

    The following services provided wholly within the port or other port or airport; have been exempted from payment of service tax:
        i) taxable service provided by a cargo handling agency in relation to agricultural produce or goods intended to be stored in a cold storage;

        ii)taxable service provided by storage or ware-house keeper in relation to storage and warehousing of agricultural produce or any service provided for storage of or any service provided by a cold storage;

        iii) taxable service in relation to transport of export goods in an aircraft by an aircraft operator;

        iv) taxable service of site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition and such other similar activities.

        Notification No. 40/2010-ST, dated 28-6-2010 and Notification No. 43/2010-ST, dated 1-3-2010:
    These Notifications have amended Notification No. 1/2006-ST, dated 1-3- 2006 (read with corrigendum dated 1-3-2010) and Notification No. 13/2008-ST, dated 1-3- 2008, respectively, whereby abatement available under the following existing taxable categories would continue to be available even if these services would now be classified as port services/other port or airport services:

  •         Rent-a-cab service

  •             Commissioning and installation agency
  •             Commercial or industrial construction
  •             Construction of complex
  •             Transportation of goods by rail
  •             Transport of goods by road.


        5.Some issues:

    The basic objective of the amendment, as stated in the Department Circular, is to overcome the judicial view [Homa Engineering case and Konkan Marine Agencies (supra)] whereby the service providers escaped taxation. A close reading of the amended provisions indicates that the amendments in Port/ Airport Services have resulted in large number of issues, legal as well as procedural and administrative. Some of the important issues are discussed hereafter.

    5.1 Whether services rendered wholly within port/ airport would cover service categories which were otherwise not taxable:

    Attention is drawn to Notification No. 31/10-ST dated 20- 6-2010 [Para 4 (a) above], under which specified list of services rendered within port/ airport, have been exempted from payment of service tax. These services include supply of water, supply of electricity and some other services which are not liable to service tax. Does this mean that these services provided within port/airport premises would have been liable to service tax if the exemption Notification had not been issued?? There is no ready answer to this. However it appears that Govt.’s intention is to tax all services rendered wholly within port/airport even if the relevant service does not fall under the taxable service categories specified u/s.65(105) of the Act or is specifically excluded in certain cases.

    This poses a very significant legal issue inasmuch as under the statutory provisions of the Act, the term ‘service’ is not defined. However, taxable services which are liable to service tax have been specified u/s.65(105) of the Act.

    Under Central Excise, it has been held that powers have been granted u/s.5A (1) of Central Excise Act, 1944 to grant exemption. It has been held in Bata India v. ACCE, 2 ELT J211 (PAT) that if a product is not excisable under any Tariff Entry, an exemption Notification issued u/s.5A cannot have the effect of making such a product excisable. The principle laid down is relevant. However, under the law relating to service tax, there is no exhaustive list of taxable services like Central Excise Tariff.

    It would appear that whether a service not otherwise specified u/s.65(105) of the Act, can be taxed under port/airport services, is a highly contentious issue.

    5.2 Services rendered wholly within port/airport —Practical aspects:

    It is pertinent to note that in order to be taxed under the amended port/airport service, it is essential that services are wholly rendered within a port/airport. Hence, if a service is partly rendered outside the port/airport, it would not be taxable under port/airport services but would continue to be taxable under the respective service category.

    This condition it likely to create substantial practical difficulties/hardships. As it is well known, the services are categorised for the purpose of export/ import into 3 categories viz.:

  •             Location of Immovable property

  •             Performance of service

  •             Location of service recipient

    The emphasis in the amendment is on services that can be rendered through physical action/ performance. This may pose substantial practical difficulties. In case of services under criteria of location of service recipient, where a service provider may not necessarily be located at the location of the service recipient.

    It would appear that if it can be established that a service is not wholly rendered within a port/airport, the amended provisions would not apply.

    Let us consider some illustrations.

        a) A practising CA renders consultation services to a client based within port premises. If the services are provided by the CA through physical presence within the port, it would be taxable under port service. However, if the same service is rendered by the CA through a meeting in his office outside port premises, it would be taxable as practising CA service.

    Take the case of auditing services. Audit is conducted by a CA for the above-referred client in his office located within port premises. However, finalising of balance sheet and issue of audit report is done at the CA’s office outside the port premises. In such a scenario, the question arises as to whether such services would be taxable as ‘Port Services’ or Practising CA Services. It is possible to contend that services are not rendered wholly within ‘Port Premises’.

        b) A Goods Transport Agency (GTA) provides services within port/airport as well as outside. If a GTA, provides services wholly within the port/ airport premises, such service would be taxable under port/airport service.

    With regard to GTA services, liability in case of certain specified entities to pay service tax is cast on the persons making the payment to GTA. However, as yet, no consequential amendment has been made in regard to GTA service. Hence, in regard to GTA services wholly rendered within port/airport premises, it appears that GTA would be liable to discharge the service tax liability and not the person making the payment, as was the case before 1-7-2010. Further, a GTA providing services where the freight for a whole consignment does not exceed `1,500 for an individual consignment, the freight does not exceed `750, it is exempt from service tax under Notification No. 34/2004-ST, dated 3-12-2004. Now when a GTA provides transportation service wholly within the port premises and even if each trip is invoiced for less than `1,500, he will be required to register himself under port service and charge service tax to the client, however after availing abatement of 75% thereon.

    5.3 Exemptions issued are ad hoc and inconsistent: A perusal of list of exemptions issued as stated in para 4 above reveals that there are inconsis-tencies and omissions which are likely to cause hardships. To illustrate:

        a) Commercial or industrial construction service rendered wholly within port/airport has been exempted. However, the following have not been exempted:

  •         Works contract services
  •         Residential construction (say, officers/staff quarters)

    The above inconsistencies/omissions need to be speedily addressed.

        b) Cargo handling services in relation to agricultural produce and goods stored in a cold storage have been rightly exempted. However, it needs to be noted that u/s.65(23) of the Act, handling of export cargo is excluded from the purview of Cargo Handling Service liable to service tax. If such services are rendered wholly within a port/ airport it would appear that in the absence of exemption, such services would be taxable under Port/Airport Service.

    5.4 Implications in terms of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004:

    Under Rule 6(5) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 service tax paid on 16 specified services is fully available as CENVAT Credit, unless such services are provided exclusively for exempted service.

    Management, Maintenance or Repairs is one of the specified services under Rule 6(5). If such service is rendered wholly within port/airport premises, the same would be classifiable, w.e.f. 1-7-2010, under port/airport service. The list of specified services under Rule 6(5) does not include port /airport services. Hence, in such a case, benefit hitherto available under Rule 6 (5) would now not be available. This is an unintended consequence of the amendment.

Part A : Health check-up and treatment services

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Service Tax

1. Introduction :


Considering medical or health-related services as essential
services, the Government in the past consciously kept them out of the ambit of
service tax. India being a developing economy, it is hardly able to provide any
social security to its soaring population. A small class of this huge mass is
covered under health insurance schemes floated by various insurance companies.
In the current fiscal, however, the Government decided to levy service tax on
limited health-related preventive care and treatment services provided by
hospitals, nursing homes and multi-speciality clinics under specified conditions
as set out vide the Finance Act, 2010 and notified to come into effect from July
01, 2010.

2. Statutory provisions of health check-up and treatment
services are provided below :


S. 65(105)(zzzzo) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) :

“Taxable service means any service provided or to be
provided by any hospital, nursing home or multi-specialty clinic, —

(i) to an employee of any business entity, in relation to
health check-up or preventive care, where the payment for such check-up or
preventive care is made by such business entity directly to such hospital,
nursing home or multi-specialty clinic; or

(ii) to a person covered by health insurance scheme, for
any health check-up or treatment, where the payment for such health check-up
or treatment is made by the insurance company directly to such hospital,
nursing home or multi-specialty clinic.

3. Scope and coverage :


3.1 Perusal of the above provisions indicates that the
following essential ingredients are required for being covered within the
purview of the above category of service :


  • Who are service providers ?


  • The service should be provided by a hospital, a nursing
    home or a multi-specialty clinic.


  • Who are service receivers ?



  • The service receiver should be; either


    any employee of a business entity; or



    a person covered by a health insurance scheme.




  • What essentially constitutes a service covered under the law ?



  • The service should essentially relate to :

    – 
    Health check-up or preventive care for an employee of a business entity;



    Health check-up or treatment in case of any person covered by a health
    insurance scheme.




    • Under which condition, the service is considered taxable ?



    When the payment is made directly :


    either by a business entity; or



    by an insurance company to the hospital, nursing home or multi-specialty
    clinic, as the case may be, the service is considered taxable.


    3.2 Before analysing further, we consider below the relevant
    extract of Ministry’s Circular letter DOF No. 334/1/2010-TRU (Annexure A), dated


    26-2-2010 issued immediately after presentation of the Finance Bill, 2010.

    “2.2 A large number of health insurance schemes are being
    offered by the insurance companies, under which charges for hospitalisation,
    surgery, post-surgical nursing, etc. are generally paid by the insurance
    company. Such insurance policies, which fall under the category of general
    insurance service, are already taxable. Under general insurance service, an
    insurance company is a service provider to its clients. Under the proposed new
    service, tax is also being imposed on the medical charges paid by the insurance
    companies to the hospitals on behalf of a business entity for its employees. As
    such, the insurance company would be the service receiver and the tax paid by
    the hospital would be available to the insurance companies as credit.

    2.3 The tax on the above-mentioned health



    services would be payable only if and to the extent the payment for such medical
    check-up or treatment, etc. is made directly by the business entity or the
    insurance company to the hospital or medical establishment.
    Any additional
    amount paid by the individual (i.e., the employee or the insured, as the case
    may be) to the hospital would not be subject to service tax. This is to ensure
    that an individual is not required to pay a tax for which he cannot take
    credit.” (emphasis supplied).

    The above clearly indicates that when the payment by a business entity or an insurance company is made directly to any hospital, nursing home or multi-speciality clinic (hereinafter referred to as ‘hospitals’ for all the three) in relation to health check-up or treatment, etc., service tax is attracted. However the words, ‘hospital’, ‘nursing home’ and ‘multi- speciality clinic’ are not defined under the service tax provisions. Therefore, these terms have to be understood as per their common parlance meanings. Hospitals would include all kinds of hospitals whether Central or State Government, private or charitable. Hospitals are generally institutions having a large set-up with many ‘in-house’ curative and diagnostic facilities. Nursing homes as opposed to hospitals are smaller versions of hospitals providing basic and skilled nursing care under doctor’s supervision, but having a limited treatment facility. They are more often than not used for those patients requiring long-term facility where hospitalisation is not required but health care at home is difficult. Multi-speciality clinics are generally those establishments, which are jointly managed by several specialists using common infrastructure facilities.

    3.3 The next important aspect in the statutory provisions is recipients of services. The employees of any business entity are covered. The term ‘business entity’ is defined by S. 65(19b) of the Act as ‘business entity includes an association of persons, body of individuals, company or firm, but does not include an individual’.

    Thus, service tax liability for hospitals arises when the payment is received by them from any business entity directly for its employee/s. Similarly, the service tax is also payable by the hospitals when the payment is made directly by the insurance company to such hospitals for health check-up or medical treatment given to persons covered under the health insurance schemes. These schemes in common parlance are known as mediclaim policies.

    3.4    Health check-up, preventive care and medical treatment services:

    •     Health check-up or preventive care for employees of business entity:


    Health check-up would generally cover periodic or annual physical examination or tests of various organs including diagnostic tests under health check- up schemes. The other term used in sub-clause (i) of the definition is ‘preventive care’. This may also either interchangeably be used for the health check-up or it may mean as little extension of health check-up and would cover measures to prevent a disease from occurring as against curing a disease. Thus preventive care would certainly pre-suppose undergoing physical examination and/ or diagnostic tests and post- diagnostic measures or programmes, but payment made by a business entity for any curative treatment would not be covered for the levy of service tax.

    •     Health check-up or treatment provided to persons covered under health insurance schemes:

    When an insurance company pays directly for a health cover of a policy holder (which in common parlance is known as “cashless policy”) whether for health check-up or for any medical treatment, service tax is payable by the hospitals. Instead, when a person insured at the threshold pays directly to the hospital for the health check-up or medical treatment and subsequently claims reimbursement, no service tax is required to be charged or paid by the hospital. Further, under mediclaim policies of this kind, when various medical treatments also get covered, service tax would be attracted.

        Exemptions:

    No specific exemption is provided to any person or any service as the scope of the category of service itself is limited to certain services and when paid directly by any business entity or insurance company. However, general exemptions applicable to all other taxable services apply to this service as well. These exemptions are services provided to the United Nation or other international organisations under Notification No. 16/2002-ST, dated 2-8-2002, services provided to a developer or unit of Special Economic Zone under Notification No. 9/2009-ST, dated 3-3- 2009 and services provided to foreign diplomatic mission or diplomat agents or career consular officials, etc. under Notifications No. 33/2007 -ST and No. 34/2007-ST, both dated 23-5-2007 as per terms and conditions mentioned under respective notifications.

        Some issues:

    5.1 Company A, a manufacturing company as per its policy provides facility of health check -up as well as various medical/surgical treatments to its employees at empanelled hospitals. The treatments include bypass surgery, hernia, various orthopedic surgeries, angioplasty, ENT surgeries, etc. The Company’s employee, Mr. X was hospitalised and had to undergo a bypass surgery in October 2010. The Company paid directly to the hospital for his hospitalisation, surgery and related other expenses including diagnostic tests. Whether the hospital is obliged to pay service tax on the above and therefore collect it in its invoice on Company A?

    5.1A Vis-à-vis employees of a ‘business entity’, only the services in relation to health check-up or preventive care are specifically covered. When an employee is admitted to a hospital for a bypass surgery, it would mean a medical and surgical treatment to remove and cure blockages in the arteries. This service is not covered in sub-clause of S. 65(105)(zzzzo). The first sub-clause is specific to the employees of a business entity, wherein only services in relation to health check-up or preventive care are covered. Therefore the hospital is not liable to pay service tax in the invoice raised on Company A.

    5.2 Many insurance companies appoint Third Party Administrators (TPAs) for facilitating payment to hospitals on their behalf. Often the hospitals therefore raise bills on such TPAs. Whether service tax is to be levied by the hospitals?

    TPAs act on behalf of the insurance companies. Their services are outsourced by the insurance companies for administration, management and processing of hospital bills. Even if the invoices are issued by hospitals on such TPAs, generally the payment is made by the insurance company as the person is insured by the insurance company. The payment in terms of the legal provisions discussed above would be treated as made by the insurance companies and subject to fulfilment of other requirements discussed above would be liable for service tax. This comment is however subject to specific terms and conditions of the agreement between an insurance company and a TPA.

    5.3 Many corporate entities like airlines, shipping companies or other multinational companies while recruiting new employees require them to undergo medical examination/fitness tests and pay directly to the hospital for the same. Whether this would also attract service tax?

    5.3A Technically, the persons, prior to their being recruited, are not employees of the organisation and therefore they are not covered by the insurance scheme meant for the employees. The definition as discussed above specifically covers employees only and therefore medical examination for persons other than employees would not attract service tax. However, unless the concerned corporate notifies the hospital as to the tests/ examination conducted for non-employees, the hospital would not be able to distinguish since they receive payment directly from corporates against their invoices raised on them; they would assume their service tax liability on such invoices as well.

    5.4 Whether pathology laboratories conducting blood tests would also be considered part of health check-up and therefore liable for service tax?

    5.4A There is a taxing entry ‘technical testing and analysis’ notified in S. 65(106) of the Act. Under this clause, an explanation is provided whereby testing and analysis for determination of nature of diseased condition, identification of disease, prevention of any disease or disorder on human being or animals is specifically excluded. When specific exclusion is provided under one taxing entry, it would not be under another taxing entry. Further, the overall physical check-up undertaken under a mediclaim policy may include pathological tests conducted at a hospital. But the definition above in S. 65(105) (zzzzo) specifically includes only three kinds of service providers viz. hospitals, nursing homes and multi-speciality clinics, but does not include pathological laboratories.

    5.5 In most cases of claims submitted by a person under health insurance/mediclaim policies for medical or surgical treatments, it is observed that substantial amount in a hospital invoice includes cost towards medicines, implants or stent, etc. and other consumables. Whether service tax is chargeable on the entire amount of invoice including the value of supply of goods also?

    5.5A As it is known, Notification No. 12/2003-ST, dated 20-6-2003 in unambiguous terms exempts value of goods and material sold or supplied during the course of providing services. Many rulings have been pronounced by judicial forum, whereby the principle is upheld that supply of goods (which is chargeable to VAT) cannot be subject to service tax, as service tax is levied on the value of taxable services. However, as per requirement of the above Notification, whether value of ‘goods’ supplied is indicated in the invoice or whether any other documentary evidence thereof is available, etc. Therefore, the liability of service tax would have to be determined on a case-to-case basis.

    Legal consultancy services

    1. Introduction :

        Service tax has been introduced on Legal Consultancy Services, through an amendment by Finance Act, 2009. The levy has been notified w.e.f. 1-9-2009. Hence, Service tax would be payable on Services provided on or after 1-9-2009.

    2. Statutory provisions :

        The relevant extracts from the Finance Act; 1994, as amended (‘Act’) are reproduced hereafter for ready reference :

         S. 65(105) (zzzzm) of the Act :

        Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided :

        To a business entity, by any other business entity, in relation to advice, consultancy or assistance in any branch of law, in any manner :

        Provided that any service provided by way of appearance before any court, tribunal or authority shall not amount to taxable service.

        Explanation — For the purposes of this sub-clause, ‘business entity’ includes an association of persons, body of individuals, company or firm, but does not include an individual;

    3. Scope of services :

        (a) The scope of services liable to Service tax, as explained through Dept. Circular [DOF No. 334/B/2009 — TRU dated 6-7-2009], is as under :

        Para 2.3

        As in the case of management consultancy or engineering consultancy service, any consultancy, advice or technical assistance provided in any discipline of law is proposed to be subjected to service tax. However, the tax would be limited to services provided by a business entity to another business entity. It has been defined that a business entity includes firms, associates, enterprises, companies, etc. but does not include an individual. Thus, services provided by an individual advocate either to an individual or even to a business entity would be outside the scope of the taxable service. Similarly, the services provided by a corporate legal firm to an individual would also be outside the purview of taxable service. Any service of appearance before any court of law or any statutory authority would also be kept outside this levy.

        (b) In all Other Taxable Services, even an Individual Service Provider is liable to Service tax. However that is not the case in respect of Legal Consultants.

        (c) For levy of Service tax under the head Legal Consultancy Services, there is no requirement that the ‘legal entity’ should be a member of the Bar Council of the respective state or any such body. Thus even a Sales Tax Practitioner/Income Tax Practitioner rendering services as a ‘business entity’, other than those providing services in their individual capacity, are required to pay Service tax. For that matter even retired officers of the Department providing services in the areas of Central Excise, Customs, Service tax etc. as a group would be covered. Thus, the Scope of Service is very wide so as to include large variety of Consultants including Document Writers, Marriage Counsellors, Passport and Visa Consultants, etc.

    4. Levy is discriminatory :

        In his Budget Speech for the year 2009-10, the Finance Minister explained the scope of the proposed levy in the following manner :

        “As the hon’ble Members are aware, services provided by Chartered Accountants, Cost Accountants and Company Secretaries as well as by engineering and management consultants are presently charged to Service Tax. Although there is a school of thought that legal consultants do not provide any service to their client, I hold my distinguished predecessor in high esteem and disagree ! As such, I propose to extend Service Tax on advice, consultancy or technical assistance provided in the field of law. This tax would not be applicable in case the service provider or the service receiver is an individual.”

        As stated earlier, a very pertinent aspect of the levy of Legal Consultancy Services is that, Service Providers rendering services in their individual capacity are kept out of the levy. There is no convincing reasoning given for the same by the Govt.

        In this regard, it needs to be noted that, various professional service providers (an illustrative list given hereafter) are liable to Service tax irrespective of the status of the Service Provider

    In regard to each of the above Professional Services, there are large number of Service Providers rendering services in their individual capacity, who are presently liable to Service tax. Particularly, in the context of Practising CAs, around 90% of the CAs are practising in their individual capacity.

    It would appear that, exclusion of individuals from the ambit of Legal Consultancy Services liable to Service tax, is discriminatory vis a vis Other Professional Service Providers. The same needs to be speedily addressed by the Govt.

    S. Some issues:

    S.l LAW 1 is a partnership firm of advocates & solicitors practising in the areas of litigations as well as consultations. As at 1-9-2009, LAW1 has out-standing advances to the tune of Rs.S crores which could be for the following services:

        a) Taxable  services

        b) Exempt

        c) Out  of pocket  reimbursements

    Law 1 wants to know its Service tax obligations and time limit within which Service tax liability is to be discharged by them in regard to the advances out-standing as at 1-9-2009.

    5.1A Though service tax payment to government is linked to receipt of consideration for services (either actual or advance), taxable event for levy of Service Tax, is ‘provision of or rendering Service’ and not ‘Receipt of Consideration’. Hence, it would reasonably appear that, LA W1 would be liable to Service Tax on advances received prior to 1-9-2009 for Tax-able Services provided on or after 1-9-2009.

    In this regard, it would become essential for LAW1, to identify outstanding advances vis-a-vis taxable services/exempt services and out of pocket expenses.

    This position is impliedly made clear under Rule 6(1) of Service Tax Rules, relevant extracts of which are reproduced hereafter:

    Rule 6(1) – Payment of Service Tax

    The service tax shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 5th of the month immediately following the calendar month in which the payment are received, towards the value of taxable services :

    Provided that where the assessee is an individual or proprietary firm or partnership firm, the service tax shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 5th of the month immediately following the quarter in which the payments are received, towards the value of taxable services:

    Provided further
    that notwithstanding the time of receipt of payment towards the value of services, no service tax shall be payable for the part or whole of the value of services, which is attributable to services provided during the period when such services were not taxable:

    Provided also that the service tax on the value of taxable service received during the month of March, or the quarter ending in March, as the case may be, shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 31st day of March of the calendar year.

    Explanation – For the removal of doubt it is hereby clarified that in case the value of taxable service is received before providing the said service, service tax shall be paid on the value of service attributable to the relevant month, or quarter, as the case may be.

    It is felt that, if conditions under ten lakh exemption notification are satisfied, the LAWl can avail Exemption upto 10 lakhs for the period 1-9-2009 to 31-3-2010.

    Service Tax liability would have to be discharged by LAWl in regard to Outstanding Advances which are attributable to taxable services by 5th October, 2009.

    5.2 MR SMART is an individual lawyer practising in the Sole Proprietorship firm name of ‘SMART SOLUTIONS’. Due to conflicting views being expressed by professionals, MR SMART is confused as to whether or not he is liable to Service tax under legal consultancy services. Kindly advise MR SMART.

    5.2A The Explanation to S. 65(105)(zzzzm) of the Act reads  as under  :

    For the purpose of this sub-clause, ‘business entity’ includes an association of persons, body of individuals, company or firm, but does not include an individual.

    It is a reasonably settled position that a proprietory concern is only a business name in which a proprietor carries on his business. It has no independent legal status.

    In this regard useful reference can be made to Ashok Transport Agency v. Awadhesh Kumar, (1998) 5 SCC 567 & SK Real Estates v. Ahmed Meeran, (2002) 111 Comp Cases 400 (Mad.).

    Hence, it would appear that, MR SMART would be excluded from the ambit of Legal Consultancy Services introduced w.e.f. 1-9-2009.

    However, it is possible that, service tax authorities could adopt a view that a firm as a business entity would include a proprietary concern. It is felt that, CBEC should issue appropriate clarifications to avoid litigations.

    5.3 The proviso to S. 65(105)(zzzzm) of the Act, reads as under:

    “Service providing by way of appearance before Court, Tribunal or other Authority shall not amount to taxable Service.

    It is very common that several services related to appearances are also provided by lawyers like drafting of replies to notices, drafting of appeals and stay petitions, compilation of submissions, etc.

    Whether services related to appearances would be excluded from the ambit of legal consultancy services liable to service tax.

    5.3A It needs to be expressly noted that the exemption granted in regard to legal consultancy services is differently worded as compared to exemption to practising CA.

    Exemption granted to practising CAs and others in terms of Notification No. 25 /06-ST dated 13-7-2006 reads as under :

    Services provided or to be provided in professional capacity, to a client, relating to representing the client before any statutory authority in the course of proceedings initiated under any law for the time being in force, by way of issue of notice ..

    Further, appearance before the statutory authorities in respect of practising chartered accountants, cost accountants and company secretaries is exempt, but exemption is available only if such appearance is in pursuance to a notice. In the case of legal consultancy services, such services are exempt even if appearance is not in pursuance to a notice.

    On a plain reading of proviso to S. 65(105)(zzzzm) stated above, it appears that, services related to appearances before Court/Tribunal/etc. like drafting, consultations, study & research, etc. may strictly not be regarded as exempt service. The terminology ‘in or in relation to’ extensively employed in the Finance Act, 1994 is not found in the proviso to S. 65(105)(zzzzm) of the Act.

    Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004

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    New Page 1

    4. Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 :


    4.1 Input Service :


    Definition of input service with reference to any service
    used by a manufacturer is amended and thereby restricted to include only those
    services which are directly or indirectly used in relation to the manufacture of
    final products and clearance of final products up to the place of removal
    instead of ‘from the place of removal’.

    Since the integration of credit rules vide CENVAT Credit
    Rules, 2004 to facilitate credit of central excise duty and service tax across
    goods and services, divergent views prevailed to interpret the term ‘input
    service’ and more particularly, in the context of a manufacturer. On one hand,
    services such as those in relation to modernisation, renovation, sales
    promotion, market research and even auditing, credit rating, share registry,
    etc. are specifically termed as input services and on the other hand in the
    context of transportation of goods in a number of disputes, beginning with the
    case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. CCE, Ludhiana 2007 (6) STR 249
    (Tri.-Del.), the meaning of the term ‘input service’ was interpreted narrowly,
    and accordingly, credit of service tax paid on outward transportation of
    manufactured goods in a process of sale was not considered allowable. In a
    number of decisions, this decision was followed. However, in case of India
    Cement & Others v. CCE,
    Tirupati 2007 (8) STR 43 (Tri.-Bang), it was held
    that it is well covered within the main part of the definition and will squarely
    fall within the meaning of the words ‘used in or in relation to the manufacture
    of final products’ to constitute ‘input service.’ Considering diverse opinion on
    interpretation of the term by the two Co-ordinate Benches, the matter has been
    referred to a Larger Bench of the Tribunal of which the decision is still
    awaited. The decision for all practical purposes will impact only cases pending
    once this issue for the period until February, 2008 as post March 01, 2008, the
    amendment in the definition has restricted the coverage. The question that
    arises in any rational mind is that on one hand the Government made a move
    forward in the direction of value added concept by specifically extending credit
    in respect of service tax paid on activities relating to business such as
    coaching and training, computer networking, credit rating, etc. which do not
    have a direct relationship with manufacturing activity and also allowing credit
    on post-manufacturing expenses of advertisement, sales promotion and market
    research. What rationale is applied in narrowing the meaning in another context
    in the same definition by modifying the words ‘from the place’ to ‘up to the
    place’ ? The otherwise liberal and wide purview of the expression ‘whether
    directly or indirectly in or in relation to the manufacture of final products

    appeared harmonious with the inclusive part of the definition prior to the
    amendment and therefore the restriction appears not only inconsistent and
    contradictory within the language of the definition, but also with the spirit of
    extension of CENVAT credit and therefore, can be described as a backward step
    from the movement towards the Goods and Service Tax (GST).

    4.2 Introduction of proportionate CENVAT
    credit :


    Given the complexities in multifarious business enterprises,
    examined below primarily is provision of Rule 6(2) of the CENVAT Credit Rules,
    2004 (CCR) :

    4.2.1 Rule 6(2) of CCR :


    Where a manufacturer or provider of output service avails
    of CENVAT credit in respect of any inputs or input services and manufactures
    such final products or provides such output service which are chargeable to duty
    or tax as well as exempted goods or services, then, the manufacturer or provider
    of output service shall maintain separate accounts for receipt, consumption and
    inventory of input and input service meant for use in the manufacture of
    dutiable final products or in providing output service and the quantity of input
    meant for use in the manufacture of exempted goods or services and take CENVAT
    credit only on that quantity of input or input service which is intended for use
    in the manufacture of dutiable goods or in providing output service on which
    service tax is payable.

    How does one maintain separate accounts for receipt,
    consumption and inventory of input services
    meant for use in output service
    and exempted service ? Unlike goods, quantification of services cannot be done
    precisely and especially in case of services like telephone, security, auditing,
    management consultancy, maintenance or repairs and many others, except
    segregating on proportional basis, no other method is possible to maintain
    separate account of receipt and consumption. In the scenario, condition of
    maintaining separate accounts of receipt and consumption of input services used
    for taxable output services and exempted services appears unrealistic. This is
    besides the fact that the term ‘inventory’ being inapplicable to ‘input
    services’, is faultily used in the context thereof. As a result, until 31st
    March 2008, the only option left was to utilise only twenty percent of CENVAT
    credit in case of all service providers providing both taxable and exempted
    services and this led to huge accumulation of unutilised CENVAT credit balance
    appearing as an asset in books of account.

    4.2.2 New substitution :


    An attempt now is made to overcome this by substituting the
    said Rule 6(3) of the CCR with effect from April 01, 2008 by introducing an
    option for a manufacturer to pay 10% of the value of exempted goods and for
    service provider to pay 8% of the value of exempted services. In the
    alternative, the manufacturer or the output service provider is required to pay
    an amount equal to CENVAT credit attributable to inputs and input services used
    for the manufacture of exempted goods or for providing exempted services, as the
    case may be. The procedure for determining the portion of duty of service tax
    inputs or input services is specified in Rule 6(3A).



    • Whichever option a manufacturer or an output service provider may exercise
      under the sub-rule 6(3), the option is not permitted to be withdrawn during a
      financial year.



    Business Restructuring & CENVAT Credit

    1 Business Restructuring :

        In the fast changing corporate environment, business restructuring has become very common. Some of the more common modes of business restructuring are as under :

    •      Merger/Amalgamation of Companies
    •      Takeover of One Company by Another
    •      De-Merger of Companies
    •      Sale of Business
    •      Transfer of Business to a Joint Venture
    •      Lease of Business to Another Company
    •      Conversion of Partnership into a Company
    •     Restructuring through part IX of the Companies Act, 1956.

        The Finance Act, 1994 and Service Tax Rules, 1994 do not contain specific provisions for implications arising out of different modes of business restructuring. However, CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) contain Rules for transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance under certain circumstances.

    2 General Implications :

        On amalgamation or merger, the running business of amalgamating entity as going concern, vests by virtue of Court Order in the amalgamated entity. The amalgamated entity thus steps into the shoes of the amalgamating entity and takes over all assets and liabilities including rights under contracts/agreements, etc. of amalgamating entity without break in continuity of business.

    3 CENVAT Credit :

        The provisions contained in Rule 10 of CCR are briefly stated as under :

            a) Transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance in CENVAT Credit Account from the Transferor to the Transferee is permitted in case of change in ownership or change in site resulting from the following :

                – Sale

                – Merger

                – Amalgamation

                – Lease or

                – Transfer to a joint venture

            b) The arrangement of transfer should explicitly provide for transfer of liabilities of the old factory/business.

            c) According to Rule 10(3) of CCR, transfer of CENVAT Credit shall be allowed only if the stock of inputs or in process or capital goods are also transferred along with the factory or business premises to the new site or ownership. Further, the same are to be duly accounted to the satisfaction of the Dy Commissioner/Asst Commissioner of Central Excise. (DC / AC).

    4 Some Issues :

    4.1 What is Sale, Merger, Amalgamation, etc. for the purpose of CCR :

    The different modes of business restructing specified under Rule 10(1) of CCR are not defined under CCR. Hence, recourse would have to be made to meanings attributed to the said terms in common parlance/relevant statutes/judicial pronouncements, etc.

    Some of the meanings attributed to the different modes of restructuring under Dictionaries/Judicial Rulings, etc., are given hereafter for ready reference :

    a) Sale :

    According to Section 2(h) of Central Excise Act, 1944

    ‘Sale’ and ‘purchase’ with their grammatical variations and cognate expressions, mean any transfer of the possession of goods by one person to another in the ordinary course of trade or business for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration.

    b) Merger/Amalgamation :

    •  According to HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND : “Neither reconstruction nor ‘amalgamation’ has a precise legal meaning.”

    •  ‘Amalgamation’ is a blending of two or more existing undertakings into one undertaking, the shareholders of each blending company becoming substantially the shareholders in the company which is to carry on the blended undertaking. There may be amalgamation either by transfer of two or more undertakings to a new company or by the transfer of one or more undertakings to an existing company. [Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. VII, para 1539 (Page 855). [See also Baytrust Holdings Ltd. vs. I.R.C. (1971) 3 All ER 76 : (1971) 1 WLR 1333 : Brooklands Selangor Holdings Ltd. vs. Inland Revenue Commissioner, (1970) 2 All ER 76 (Ch D].

    •  The term ‘amalgamation’ contemplates not only a state of things in which two companies are so jointed as to form a new company, but also the absorption and blending of one by the other. [Re. : Walker’s Settlement, (1935) 1 Ch 567 : (1935) 5 Com Cases 412]

    • In a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ‘amalgamation’ is explained as a state of things under which either two companies are so jointed as to form a third entity or one is absorbed into or blended with another. [Cf. S. S. Samayajulu vs. Hope Prudhomme & Co. Ltd., (1963) 2 Comp LJ 61 (AP).]

    c) Transfer :

    The word ‘transfer’ is comprehensive and is regarded generally as comprehending within its scope transfers both voluntary and involuntary. In the absence of distinct genus or category, no presumption can arise that the word ‘transfer’ must be construed in the sense of a voluntary act of transfer since ‘sale’ ‘exchange’ or ‘relinquishment’ are, in the normal acceptation of those terms, voluntary acts. The words (a) sale, (b) exchange, (c) relinquishment, and (d) transfer must, accordingly, be given their plain and natural meaning and there is no justification for restricting the wide comprehension of the last of the four words to voluntary transfers by the application of the ejusdem generis rule. [Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. CIT 113 ITR 655 (SC)]

    d) Joint Venture :

    Joining together of two or more business entities or persons in order to undertake a specific business venture. A joint venture is not a continuing relationship such as a partnership. [Barron’s Dictionary of Accounting Terms]

    e) Lease :

    • An agreement whereby the lessor conveys to the lessee, in return for rent, the right to use an asset for an agreed period of time. [‘Guidance note on accounting for leases’ issued by ICAL]

    • An agreement conveying the right to use property, plant, or equipment (land or  depreciable assets,) usually for specified purposes and for  a stated period of time. [Dictionary for accountants by Kohler.]

    • Legal agreement whereby the lessee uses real or personal property of the lessor for a rental charge. The contract may provide for the time period of lease, designated purposes and restrictions. [Barron’s Dictionary for accounting terms.]

    4.2 Modes of business restructuring not specified under CCR:

    Rule 10 of CCR provides for transfer of Unutilised CENVAT Credit Balance only in 5 specific situations, viz. Sale, Merger, Amalgamation, Lease or Transfer to a Joint Venture. A question could arise as to what would happen in a case not strictly falling under the aforesaid specific situations. Strictly speaking there could be practical difficulties.

    However, as regards situations which are strictly not covered by Rule 10(1) of CCR, it is felt that though the sub-rule does not contain clear-cut provision, since the procedures prescribed under the erstwhile Proforma Credit Scheme would apply mutatis mutandis to the MODV AT [CENVAT] Scheme, a recourse could be made to the procedure laid down in Ministry’s Circular No. 14 / 79, dated 7-4-1979 in terms of erstwhile Rule 56A(6) of erstwhile Central Excise Rules. It would appear that the same would be equally relevant for CCR.

    4.3 Capital Goods:

    Under CCR, in regard to capital goods, only 50% of the Credit can be availed in the year of receipt and balance 50% can be availed only in the subsequent year.

    In this regard, Rule 4(2)(b) of CCR is reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

    “The balance of CENV AT credit may be taken in any financial year subsequent to the financial year in which the capital goods received in the factory of the manufacturer, or in the premises of the provider of output service, if the capital goods other than components, spares and accessories, refractories and refractory materials, moulds and dies and goods falling under [heading 6805, grinding wheels and the like, and parts thereof falling under heading 6804] of the First Schedule to the Excise Tariff Act, are in the possession of the manufacturer of final products, or provider of output service in such subsequent years.

    Hence, in case of business restructuring, if 50%” of credit is availed by a Tranferor company prior to merger, issues could arise as to whether in- such cases balance 50% can be availed by the new Transferee entity after merger.

    In the case of Shri Chamundeshwari Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CCE (2007) 217 ELT 65 (Tri.-Bang) capital goods were leased out with the unit and 50% of duty credit was availed wherein the unit was not in possession of lessee. However, the entry was reversed and Cenvat Credit was never utilised. Under the said circumstances, the Tribunal held that availment of credit was irregular, but in view of reversal, penalty and interest was not imposable.

    It would appear that the matter needs to be addressed through appropriate amendment under CCR.

    4.4 Transfer of all assets & liabilities:

    Rule 10(3) of CCR specifically provides that transfer of business of a service provider, should specifically provide for transfer of liabilities of such business.

    An issue that arises for consideration is, whether in cases where through inadvertence a specific mention is not made in the takeover document for transfer of liabilities, can the Service Tax Authorities deny transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance at the end of transferor?

    In the case of Reliance Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. vs. CC & CE (2007)215 ELT 254 (Tri.-Mum), the takeover document did not specify that the Transferee took over the liabilities also of the Transferor with assets. However, at the time of surrender of registration, the Transferee had by way of letters, undertaken to assume the liabilities of the Transferor arising on and after the date of transfer. In light of the above, the Tribunal held that there was sufficient compliance of Rule 10(2) of CCR.

    Despite the above ruling, it would appear that proper care should be taken while drafting takeover documents.

    4.5 Existence of Stocks at the end of Transferor:

    Rule 10(3) of CCR provides that transfer of CENVAT Credit shall be allowed only if stock of inputs/Capital goods is also transferred alongwith the business premises and inputs/ Capital goods on which Credit has been availed of are duly accounted to the satisfaction of DC/ AC.

    An issue that arises for consideration is, whether physical existence of stocks of inputs/Capital goods is necessary, for transfer of UnutiIised Credit Balance at the end of transferor to the transferee.

    It is a settled principle laid down by the Supreme Court in CCE vs. Dai [chi Karkaria Ltd. (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC) that MODVAT/ CENVAT mechanism does not require one to one correlation between inputs and outputs.

    There has been a consistent attempt by the Central Excise Dept. to deny transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance in cases where there are no physical stocks at the end of the transferor .

    However, the trend of judicial rulings appears to be consistent as well, to the effect that existence of physical stocks is not necessary if other conditions under CCR are complied with. In this regard, reference can be made to the following rulings:

    • Aar Aay Products vs. CCE, (2003)157 ELT 40 (Tri.-Delhi).
    • CCE vs. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., (2005) 191 ELT 660 (Tri.-Chennai)
    • CCE vs. Smithkline Beecham Consumer Health Care Ltd., (2007)209ELT96 (Tri.-Chennai).
    • Shree Ram Multi-Tech Ltd. vs. CCE, (2007) 217 ELT 136 (Tri.-Chennai).
    • Kevin Enterprises  Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, (2007) 219 ELT 181 (Tri.-Mumbai).

    4.6 Transfer of Unutilised CENV AT Credit in proportion to duties paid in stocks at the time of transfer

    Efforts are often being made by the Central Excise Authorities to restrict the transfer of Unutilised CENVAT Credit Balance to the extent of duties paid in stocks at the time of transfer.

    As stated earlier, since no one-to-one correlation is required between inputs and outputs, matching of duties in Stocks and Balancein CENVAT Credit Account would be against the settled principles laid down by the .r Supreme Court.

    In this regard, attention is drawn to a recent Madras High Court ruling in CCE vs. CEST AT (2008)230 ELT 209 (MAD) wherein it has been held that CENVAT Credit Rules do not require transfer of Credit corresponding only to the quantum of inputs transferred.

    Goods Transport Agency — (GTA) Service

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    3. Goods Transport Agency — (GTA) Service :


    Hitherto, recipient of service of a goods transport agency
    paying service tax on 25% of the value of transport freight, faced difficulty in
    claiming abatement of 25% without producing evidence of ful-filment of
    conditions of non-availment of CENVAT credit and/or non-utilisation of benefit
    under Notification No. 12/2003-ST. The evidence was presented by obtaining a
    declaration from each GTA as to fulfilment of the above conditions. Collection
    and maintenance of such declarations and presenting to the Department was found
    to be a difficult exercise. Further, for the field formations also, it was
    cumbersome to verify the required declarations in order to satisfy the
    conditions laid down under the Notification. To free the abatement provision for
    GTA from the conditions laid down under Notification No. 1/2006-ST, a separate
    Notification No. 13/2008-ST has been issued. However, simultaneously, definition
    of the term ‘output service’ is amended in the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR)
    to exclude GTA service therefrom. Thus, no CENVAT credit can be availed by a GTA
    service provider. It may be noted at this point that consequentially, the
    Government has missed omitting sub-clause (zzp) of clause (105) relating to
    goods transport agency from the definition of ‘capital goods’ in Rule 2(a)(B) of
    the CCR. Nevertheless, receiver of service of GTA paying service tax at an
    effective abated rate of 3.09% can claim CENVAT credit of service tax paid on
    GTA service, if the same is ‘input service’ for the purposes of CENVAT Credit
    Rules, 2004 of service tax paid on GTA service.

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    Threshold exemption under Notification No. 6/2005-ST

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    2. Threshold exemption under Notification No. 6/2005-ST :


    The threshold limit for small service providers has been
    increased from 8 lakh rupees to 10 lakh rupees for the Financial Year 2008-2009
    onwards. Consequently, the aggregate value of taxable services provided by a
    service provider during the Financial Year 2007-2008 up to a maximum of 10 lakh
    rupees would be eligible for the increased limit for the financial year
    2008-2009. To state in other words, if a person provided taxable services of
    aggregate value of Rs.8 lakh in the F.Y. 2007-08, he does not pay any service
    tax. However, if his taxable services exceed Rs.8 lakh, but do not exceed Rs.10
    lakh, he is liable to pay service tax @ 12.36% on the value of services by which
    the eight lakh limit is exceeded. For instance, if the aggregate value of
    services provided during F.Y. 2007-2008 is Rs.9.50 lakh, service tax on Rs.1.50
    lakh would be payable. However, since the aggregate value of taxable services
    has not exceeded Rs.10 lakh, no service tax would be required to be paid until
    the aggregate value of taxable services provided exceeds Rs.10 lakh in the F.Y.
    2008-2009. Consequently, upon upward revision of the threshold exemption limit,
    the turnover limit for obtaining registration is also increased from Rs.7 lakh
    to Rs.9 lakh.

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    Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax), Rules, 2007

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    1. Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax), Rules,
    2007 :


    Works contract service was notified with effect from June 01,
    2007. Simultaneously, Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service
    Tax) Rules, 2007 (Composition Scheme) were prescribed. Service providers of
    works contract service in accordance therewith enjoyed an option to pay service
    tax under Composition Scheme @2% of the gross contract value, instead of paying
    12.36% on the service element of the contract value calculated in accordance
    with the method prescribed in Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules.

    After much controversy and following the ratio of decision in
    the case of Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2006 (3) STR 124
    (Trib.-Del) in a catena of Tribunal decisions, it was held that transactions of
    works contract could not be vivisected to levy service tax only on the portion
    of a composite contract. Consequently, works contract service was notified to
    levy service tax on the component other than that chargeable to VAT/sales tax.
    Considering that valuing service component in accordance with the method
    prescribed in Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules is not only lengthy, but also
    questionable at any point of time, exercising option of the Composition Scheme
    was advantageous on all counts including presumptive tax rate of 2%, wherein
    liability would further get reduced as persons paying under the Scheme are
    eligible for CENVAT credit of service tax paid on input services.

    However, the Government vide its Circular No. 98/2007-ST,
    dated 4-1-2008 clarified that works contracts in process as on June 01, 2007
    were not eligible to register under the new category of services, as works
    contracts cannot be vivisected.

    This gave rise to a controversy as to whether the contracts
    in process were liable for service tax at all in terms of decisions in cases of
    Daelim Industrial Company (supra) and Larsen & Toubro, 2006 (3) STR 223
    (Tri.-Del) or they were liable under their respective categories like
    construction services or erection, commissioning and installation services.
    Works contractors who had registered under the relevant category and paid
    service tax after claiming abatement @67% of the gross value charged, faced a
    dilemma unless they decided to terminate the ongoing contract pending
    completion. The Circular issued by the Board being binding on the subordinate
    authorities of the Department, if contractors opted to pay service tax @2% under
    the Composition Scheme after registering under the works contract category,
    litigation would be inevitable. Approach of the Board meant dual standards. When
    a category like commercial construction service or erection, commissioning or
    installation was introduced, the Government did not mean to exclude the ongoing
    contracts from the purview of service tax, and accordingly, value of pending
    contract on the date of introduction of the relevant category was required to be
    offered for taxation. This indeed was independent of the questionability of
    coverage of works contract under the service tax law prior to introduction of
    category of works contract with effect from June 01, 2007.

    Given the above scenario, only the contracts executed post
    June 01, 2007 had the option of the Composition Scheme and the 2% rate of tax. A
    majority of works contracts of construction or commissioning or installation
    would involve a period longer than a year and in a number of cases even over two
    years. Therefore, within a period of nine months, insignificant number of works
    contracts undertaken after June 1, 2007 might have reached completion stage.
    From March 01, 2008, now vide Notification No. 77/2008-ST, the rate is increased
    to 4%.

    The increase in rate adversely affects all contractors who
    opted for the Composition Scheme, as the increase essentially means a dent on
    their margin. There is a view held by some professionals that doctrine of
    promissory estoppel should apply in this case. The poser is, whether legally
    does the increase in rate involve principle of promissory estoppel ? Rule 3(3)
    of the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax) Rules,
    2007 provides that option of paying service tax under these rules once exercised
    is not allowed to be withdrawn until the completion of a contract. Given the law
    that a person is not allowed to withdraw the option until the completion of the
    relevant works contract, how much weightage can be given to the Board’s Circular
    viz. DOF 334/1/2007-TPU of February 28, 2007, which inter alia
    stated :

    Under Composition Scheme, the assessee is required to pay
    2% of the total value of the works contract as service tax
    “. As
    against this, the scheme prescribed payment of “service tax equivalent to 2% on
    the gross amount charged for the works contract”
    . (emphasis supplied). The
    Circular being more of a clarificatory nature, cannot be beyond the scheme of
    the law, it appears doubtful to apply doctrine of promissory estoppel on the
    basis of a decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of CC Calcutta v.
    Indian Oil Corporation,
    2004 3 SCC-488 wherein it was held that departmental
    Circulars or Clarifications issued u/s.37B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 would
    be covered by the doctrine of ‘promissory estoppel’. The above Circular not
    being one u/s.37B, and more in the nature of issue of guidance note on
    introduction of new provision, challengeability of the increased rate on the
    above ground appears doubtful, although it is undoubtedly unfair on the part of
    the Government to double the rate of tax within nine months of its introduction.


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    Tribunal

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    III. Tribunal :


    1. Banking & other financial services : Receipt of payment of bills of
    client :



    Federal Bank Ltd. Ernakulam v. CCE Calicut, [2008 (10)
    STR 320 (Tri.-Bang)].

    Appellant received commission for collecting bills of
    customers of BSNL. The Department held the service as Business Auxiliary Service
    holding it as customer care service on behalf of client in terms of clauses
    (iii) and (vi) of S. 65(19). The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order
    along with penalties u/s.76 and u/s.77. In support of the claim of the Revenue,
    various judgments including the following were cited :



    •  Corporate Debt Management Services (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE-CST, 2007 (8)
      STR 261 (Tri.-Che.)



    • Bridgestone Financial Services v. CST Bangalore, 2007 (8) STR 505
      (Tri.-Bang.)



    The appellants contended that they neither promoted or
    marketed any service, nor were they recovery agents in order that they could be
    covered under Business Auxiliary Service. Therefore, the cited judgments were
    distinguished. They contended that ‘cash management’ was excluded from the
    definition of banking and other financial services in S. 65(12). The appellants
    referred to the judgment in the case of Dr. Lalpath Lab. Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE
    Ludhiana,
    2006 (4) STR 527 (Tri.-Del.), which acted as blood sample
    collection centres. The judgment was discussed at length in the final order and
    it was held by the Tribunal that “once there is a specific entry for item in the
    tax code, it cannot be taken out of that specific entry and taxed under a very
    general entry only because under the specific entry no tax is payable. This
    approach is contrary to the scheme of legislation.” Accordingly, holding ‘cash
    management’ as excluded service from the specific category of banking and other
    financial services, the order was set aside.

    (Note : ‘Cash management’ exclusion in S. 65(12)
    ceased to exist with effect from 1-6-2007).

    2. Business Auxiliary Services : Reduction in price given
    to purchasers of vehicles by DSAs of banks :



    CCE Jaipur v. Kamal Auto Industrial, [2008 TIOL 610
    CESTAT-Del.].

    The Revenue filed appeal against order of the Commissioner
    (Appeals), wherein respondent acted as direct selling and marketing agent
    besides being a vehicle dealer. Since the respondent refused to accept notice of
    the registry, the matter was decided ex-parte. The case of the Revenue
    was that the portion of ‘pay out’ given to purchasers of vehicles out of
    commission amount due to respondent, in respect of which even the TDS deducted
    was subject to Service Tax as commission paid to customers directly or through
    the banks would not change the nature of receipts in their hand. The facts of
    the case were found similar to the case of Chambal Motors (P) Ltd. (2007 TIOL
    1835 CESTAT-Del.) The case was remanded for fresh decision on merit in the light
    of the decision in Chambal Motors’ case.

    3. CENVAT credit : Different address on invoice than on
    Registration Certificate :



    Raaj Khosla & Company v. CCE, New Delhi [2008 TIOL 153
    CESTAT-Del.].

    The appellant was denied CENVAT credit of over Rs.5 lakh, on
    the ground of difference of address on the invoice from the address of the
    registration certificate. Later, all the addresses were registered including one
    on the invoice. Denial of credit was held as not sustainable. However, in
    respect of credit taken for telephone invoices in previous owner’s name although
    service was utilised by the appellant, denial of credit was upheld.

    4. Export of services : Indenting agent booking order for
    foreign suppliers :



    CST New Delhi v. M/s. CANI Merchandising P. Ltd., [2008
    619 CESTAT-Del.].

    The Revenue contended in this case that services
    were provided in India by the assessee and they were not to be treated as
    ‘export’, as the respondents
    situated in India, booked orders for foreign suppliers for supply of goods in
    India. The respondents contended this as exported services and filed a rebate
    claim under Rule 5 of the Export of services Rules, 2005. Since the Revenue’s
    contention of services not delivered outside India and also not used outside
    India was not considered by the adjudicating authority as well as by the
    Commissioner (Appeals), the matter was remanded for de novo adjudication.

    5. Import of services : Commission to overseas agents and
    applicable date :


    (i) CCE – Ludhiana v. Bhandari Hosiery Exports Ltd.,
    [2008 TIOL 604 CESTAT-Del.].

    The Revenue filed appeal against order, whereby demand for
    extended period and penalties were set aside. The assessee filed cross objection
    for the demand confirmed in the order. The assessee being exporter of hosiery
    goods, paid commission to overseas agents. Service Tax was demanded from
    9-7-2004 to February 2006, treating the assessee as receiver of services under
    Rule 2(1)(d)(iv). Following the decision in case of Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd.
    2007 (7) STR 443, it was held that prior to introduction of S. 66A, reverse
    charge did not apply and accordingly the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed and
    cross-objection of the assessee was allowed.

    (ii) Prabhat K. Tyagi v. CCE (appeals) Bangalore,
    [2008 (10) STR 240 (Tri.-Bang)].

    In this case also it was held that offshore services are
    liable to service only after insertion of S. 66A with effect from 18-4-2006
    where Foster Wheeler Eng. Ltd. 2007 (7) STR 443 (Tri.-Ahd.) was referred by the
    appellant and due cognizance was also taken of Circular No. 36/4/2001 of
    8-10-2001.

    6. Show-cause notice and out of pocket expense reimbursement:

    Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. v. CCE & S. Visakhapatnam, [2008 TIOL 679 CESTAT-Bang.].

    The show-cause notice had proposed demand of Service Tax under consulting engineer’s service. The amount represented Service Tax on different services including out of pocket expenses. The appellant relied on the following decisions, wherein it was held that even if services are within the purview of Service Tax, but if they do not conform to the alleged service in the show-cause notice, no Service Tax is payable:

    • Siemens Ltd. v. CST Bangalore, 2007 (8) STR 33 (Tri.-Bang.)

    • Volvo Ltd. v. CST Bangalore, 2007 (7) STR 600 (Tri.-Bang.)

    • Waters India P. Ltd. v. CST Bangalore, 2006 (4) STR 524 (Tri.-Bang.)

    Further, as regards out of pocket expenses on actual basis, Board’s clarification vide Trade Notice 5/98 Service Tax of 14-10-1998 and decision in case of Scott Wilson Kirkpatric (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CST Bangalore, 2007 (5) STR 118 (Tri.-Bang.) were relied upon by the appellant. The Tribunal on both the counts found the Revenue’s demand unsustainable.

    Judicial Rulings under Service Tax

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    7. Judicial Rulings under Service Tax :


    An illustrative list of rulings under Service Tax as regards
    invocation of extended period of 5 years is given hereafter for reference :

    (a) Appellants under bona fide impression that their
    activities would not come within the purview of Service tax under the category
    of Mandap Keeper — Demand restricted to normal period [Secretary, Town Hall
    Committee v.
    (2007) 8 STR 170 (Tri.-Bang.)

    (b) Audit objections stating that impugned services were
    liable to tax — Prima facie, thereafter, Department cannot allege
    suppression of facts and invoke larger period of limitation [Vikram Ispat
    v. Commissioner,
    (2007) 8 STR 559 (Tri.-Mumbai)]

    (c) Appellant supplied labour as per contract for packing,
    loading and unloading of cement. Department accepting coverage under manpower
    recruitment agency and collecting service tax not to argue for coverage under
    cargo handling service for prior period. Labourers rendering limited
    assistance only in entire activities and their role ancillary. Labour supply
    not to be equated with cargo handling involving interpretation of law and
    larger period of limitation not invocable — Demand of Service Tax, interest
    and penalty set aside [K. K. Appachan v. Commissioner, (2007) 7 STR 230
    (Tri.-Bang.).

    (d) Clarification not sought by appellant from Central
    Government as regards exemption —Details not declared u/s.73 of the Act
    extended period of limitation invocable. [Karnataka Govt. Insurance
    Department v. Commissioner,
    (2008) 9 STR 355 (Tri.-Bang.)]

    (e) Confusion on part of officers also as regards correct
    scope of services being provided by appellant — With introduction of new
    service, the activities undertaken by appellant were examined, notices issued
    but not pursued — Short levy, if any, is not on account of mala fide
    intention on part of appellant and no suppression on misstatement with a view
    to evade duty can be attributed to him — Demand barred by limitation [Velji
    P. & Sons (Agencies) P. Ltd. v. Commissioner,
    (2007) 8 STR 236 (Tri.-Ahmd.)]

    (f) Appellant selling aluminium products through
    consignment agents – Service Tax demanded holding consignment agents’ services
    covered under clearing and forwarding agent — Impugned order noting presence
    of conflicting views of Tribunal on taxability of consignment agent under
    clearing and forwarding agent — Extended period not invocable when different
    views prevalent on applicability of tax — Demand hit by time-bar — Appeal
    allowed on limitation — [Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner,
    (2007) 8 STR 27 (Tri.-Del.)]

    (g) Adjustment of excess payment towards payment of tax
    during later period — Return specifically mentioned the adjustment having been
    filed by respondents — Full facts of such adjustment remained disclosed by
    assessee [Demand time-barred [Commissioner v. Hexacom India Ltd.,
    (2006) 1 STR 110 (Tri.-Del).]

    (h) Suppression not alleged and extended time-period not
    invoked in show-cause notice — Reasons for invocation of larger period of
    limitation need to be clearly spelt out in SCN — Mere non–registration not
    sufficient to uphold suppression of facts [Mahakoshal Beverages Pvt. Ltd.
    v. Commissioner,
    (2006) 3 STR 334 (Tri.-Bang.)]

    (i) SCN bereft of any reasons to invoke larger period —
    Revenue to bring out proviso to larger period like suppression of facts,
    willful mis-statement with intent to evade Service tax — Such facts not
    brought out in show-cause notice — Demand for larger period not sustainable —
    [Elite Detectives Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, (2006) 4 STR 583 (Tri.-Bang.)]

    (j) Statements records from proprietor admitting liability
    to tax on 13-12-2000 and SCN issued on 7-12-2001 — No invocation of larger
    period in SCN — Department cannot enforce demand in SCN and due to inordinate
    delay in issuing SCN — Assessee paid Service Tax for initial period and
    thereafter due to loss in business, he failed to pay Service Tax — Demand for
    larger period set aside — [Free Look Outdoor Advertising v. Commissioner,
    (2006) 2 STR 102 (Tri.-Bang.)]

    (k) Suppression of facts and omission to pay Service Tax —
    Communication between appellants and foreign airlines supported by statements
    of their officials in India clearly show that they had knowledge of taxability
    of overriding commission — Appellants willfully not got themselves registered
    with Department under category of business auxiliary services for their
    Service Tax liability. Extended period of limitation invocable as suppression
    of facts and omission to pay Service Tax proved [ETA Travel Agency Pvt.
    Ltd. v. Commissioner,
    (2007) 7 STR 454 (Tri.-Bang.)

    (l) Repeated reminders sent by Department to an entity to
    get itself registered for Service Tax purposes — However, number of CBEC
    Circulars existing, wherein that entity could legitimately entertain bona
    fide
    belief that their activity was not liable to Service Tax — Extended
    period found not invocable especially as Department had knowledge of
    activities of the entity [Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Commissioner, (2006) 4
    STR 349 (Tri.-Mumbai)]

    (m) Returns filed on 22-10-1999, wherein adjustment in
    relation to Service Tax on DOT interconnected bills specifically mentioned —
    Reasons for adjustment being declared, suppression with intent to evade
    Service Tax not to be alleged in respect of SCN dated 20-4-2004 — Extended
    period of limitation not invocable, Demand time-barred [Commissioner v.
    Spiced Communication (P) Ltd.,
    (2006) 4 STR 74 (Tri.-Del.)]

    (n) SCN issued on ground that appellants, who are basically
    commission agents, are liable to pay Service Tax as clearing and forwarding
    agents — Issue involved interpretation of legal provisions — Appellants under
    bona fide belief that they are not covered by definition of clearing
    and forwarding agents, hence not applied for Service Tax registration and not
    followed subsequent procedures — No evidence to show that appellants
    suppressed information with an intention to evade payment of duty – Demand
    barred by limitation [NRC Ltd. v. Commissioner, (2007) 5 STR 308
    (Tri.-Mumbai)]

    o) ST-3 returns filed by appellants, wherein they had given entire particulars of amounts received by them from their clients – Reimburs-able amount received from clients also men-tioned in Annexure to Return – Chartered Accountant’s Certificate also produced – Lower authorities passed their orders without proper scrutiny of information contained is ST-3 returns – Longer period of limitation not invocable [Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick (I) Pvt. Ltd. CST, (2007) 5 STR 118 (Tri.-Bang.)]

    p) Appellants failed in their duty to inform the Department of their activity inviting Service Tax liability – Since intention to evade duty liability is established, benefit of time-bar not applicable [Bridgestone Financial Services v. CST, (2006) 4 STR 279 (Tri.-Bang).]

    q) Appellants sourcing customers for personal loans and housing loans – Promotion of services rendered by client – Activity comes under Business Auxiliary Services – Statement and records given but SCN issued after normal period – Bona fide belief on non-liability as per statement – No finding on willful suppression with intent to evade payment of Service Tax – Demand not sustainable on account of time-bar [Bridgestone Financial Services Commissioner, (2007) 8 STR. 505 (Tri. Bang).]

    r) Details and mode of computation of Service Tax being paid not disclosed in ST-3 form – Plea that there was bona fide belief that service was not taxable rejected and held that there was suppression of material facts – Invocation of extended period upheld [Bharti Cellular Ltd. v. Commissioner, (2006) 3 STR 423 (Tri.-Del.)]

    High Court

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    II. High Court :


    (i) No question of law arising out of Tribunal’s order :
    Clearing & forwarding agent :



    CCE Jalandhar v. United Plastomers, 2008 (10) STR 229
    (P&H).

    Respondent acted as consignment agent of IPCL. The issue
    involved was that of whether or not the service was that of clearing and
    forwarding agent or of commission agent under the Business Auxiliary Service
    category.

    The Tribunal had upheld the assessee’s plea that the services
    did not relate to clearing and forwarding agent’s services and had rejected the
    Department’s plea for enhancement of penalty which was reduced by the
    Commissioner (appeals). The Tribunal had also set aside penalty levied on
    Service Tax for subsequent period on the ground that the same was paid before
    the issue of show-cause notice. The Revenue strongly argued in favour of
    treating the agreement of the assessee with IPCL as Del Credre agent and
    the agreement as distributor to be falling in within the purview of C&F
    operation. They further submitted that the Tribunal had placed reliance on the
    case of Raja Rajeshwari Ind. Polymers Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE Bangalore, 2006
    (3) STR 561(T) itself was appealed against in the Karnataka High Court and also
    that the penalty was wrongly deleted by the Tribunal. The provisions of Business
    Auxiliary Service were discussed in this context by the appellant and they
    relied on Larger Bench’s decision of Larsen & Toubro v. CCE Chennai, 2006
    (37) STR 321 (Trib.-L.B). The Court dismissed the Revenue’s appeal, holding that
    there was no substantial question of law as the Tribunal had already examined
    the expressions ‘directly or indirectly’ and ‘in any manner’ in the definition
    of ‘clearing and forwarding agent’, and the Court held that while interpreting
    these expressions, they cannot be isolated from the activity of clearing and
    forwarding operations and the agent engaged only for processing orders on
    commission basis could not be considered as directly or indirectly engaged in
    clearing and forwarding operations.


    (ii) Import of
    services : Effective date :



    Union of India v. Aditya Cement, 2008 (10) STR 228 (Raj.)

    The Court ruled that order of the Tribunal that recipient was
    liable to Service Tax from 1-1-2005 and in the prior period liability could not
    be fastened on the recipient was found proper on examination of S. 65, S. 66, S.
    66A and S. 68 including Notification issued u/s.68(2). Revenue’s appeal
    accordingly was dismissed.

    (Note : The above refers to the Tribunal decision in
    Aditya Cement v. CCE, 2007 (007) STR 0153 (Tri.-Del.) where it was held
    that since Notification No. 36/2004-ST came into force from 1-1-2005, Service
    Tax paid on engineering services received during October and November 2003 under
    misunderstanding of law should be refunded).

    (iii) Question of law not taken up before lower
    authorities — Whether can be taken up before the High Court ?



    CCE , Jalandhar v. Onkar Travels P. Ltd., 2008 (10) STR
    237 (P&H).

    Show-cause notice was issued u/s.74 of the Act to enhance
    assessment under allegation of short levy on the assessee who was air travel
    agent. Adjudication order confirming the demand and imposing penalty was
    confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal allowed the appeal, on the
    ground that S. 74 dealing with rectification of a mistake is not applicable and
    there was no apparent error in the assessment. The Revenue filed appeal against
    the Tribunal’s order under the plea that mention of S. 74 was inadvertent in
    place of S. 73 and it would not debar Revenue authority from assessing escaped
    taxable service. The respondent contended that the plea of wrong provision of
    Service Tax was taken for the first time and that throughout the course of
    proceedings before the Tribunal and the authorities below, the stand taken by
    the Department that invoking S. 74 and passing the order by the Superintendent
    was perfectly legal and within limitation period of 2 years applicable to S. 74.
    The Court ruled that such question is not permissible to be taken up first time
    in appeal. Only substantial questions of law arising out of the Tribunal’s order
    are to be considered by the Court and in absence of such ground, the appeal
    could not be entertained.

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    Important rulings under Central Excise

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    6. Important rulings under Central Excise :


    An illustrative list of important judicial rulings under
    Central Excise which could be useful for Service Tax, depending upon the facts
    and circumstances of a given case, are set out hereafter :


    (a) No suppression if all facts disclosed :


    (i) If an assessee has disclosed all details in price list,
    it is futile to contend that there was suppression of facts. Extended period
    of limitation held as not available to the Department [CCE v. ITEC (P)
    Ltd.,
    (2002) 145 ELT 280 (SC).]

    (ii) If facts are disclosed in classification list,
    extended period be invoked [Primella Sanitary Products Pvt Ltd. v. CCE,
    (2005) 184 ELT 117 (SC 3-member Bench).

    (b) Mere inaction is not suppression of facts :


    (i) Suppression means not providing information which the
    person is legally required to state, but has intentionally or deliberately not
    stated. The Supreme Court, in CCE v. Chemphar Drugs and Liniments,
    (1989) 40 ELT 276, has held that mere inaction or failure on part of
    manu-facturer will not amount to suppression of facts. Conscious or deliberate
    withholding of information when the manufacturer knew otherwise, is required
    to be established, before saddling the manufacturer with liability for a
    period beyond one year (that time 6 months) [The same view has been held in
    MK Kotecha v. CCE,
    (2005) 179 ELT 261 (SC 3-member Bench).]

    (ii) Extended period of limitation can be invoked only on a
    positive act of fraud, etc. Such a positive act must be in contra distinction
    to mere inaction like non-taking of licence, etc. [ITW Signode India Ltd.
    v. CCE,
    (2004) 158 ELT 403 (SC 3-member Bench).]

    (iii) There can be no suppression of facts if facts which
    are not required to be disclosed are not disclosed [Smt. Shirisht Dhawan v.
    Shaw Brothers,
    AIR 1992 SC 1555; Apex Electricals Pvt Ltd. v. UOI,
    (1992) 61 ELT 413 (Guj HC)]

    (c) Ground for invocation of extended period should be specified in the
    SCN :


    (i) Since the longer period of limitation can be invoked on
    a variety of grounds, the particular ground which is alleged against an
    assessee must be specifically made known to the assessee. There is no scope
    for assuming that the ground is implicit in the issuance of SCN [CCE v. HMM
    Ltd.,
    (1995) 76 ELT 497 (SC); Raj Bahadur Narayan Singh Sugar Mills v.
    UOI,
    (1996) 88 ELT 24 (SC); Kaur & Singh v. CCE, (1997) 94 ELT 289
    (SC)].

    (ii) Extension of the period of limitation entails both
    civil and criminal consequences and therefore must be specifically stated in
    the SCN, in absence whereof the Court would be entitled to raise an inference
    that the case was not one where the extended period of limitation could be
    invoked. [CCE v. M/s. Payal Laminates Pvt. Ltd., (2006) 7 SCC 431;
    Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. CCE,
    (2007) 211 ELT 513 (SC)]

    (d) Omission to provide facts must be deliberate :



    Suppression of facts does not mean any omission and it must
    be deliberate and willful to evade payment of duty. In taxation, it can have
    only one meaning that the correct information was not disclosed deliberately
    to escape payment of duty. Mere failure to declare does not amount to willful
    suppression. There must be some positive act from the side of the assessee to
    make it willful suppression. [Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd., CCE (2005) 188
    ELT 149 (SC); CCE v. Damnet Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., (2007) 216 ELT 3
    (SC)].


    (e) No suppression of facts if an assessee had a bona fide belief :


    (i) If an assessee bona fide believes in a legal
    position (e.g., that no duty is payable or no licence is required in
    his case) and if there is scope for such belief and doubt, provisions of
    proviso to S. 11A will not apply [Padmini Products v. CCE, (1989) 43
    ELT 195 (SC); CCE v. Surat Textile Mills Ltd., (2004) 167 ELT 379 (SC 3
    member bench) Gopal Zarda Udyog v. CCE, (2005) 188 ELT 251 (SC 3-member
    Bench).]

    (ii) If there were conflicting decisions of various High
    Courts and when the assessee was under bona fide belief that he need
    not declare production of an exempted item, extended period is not applicable.
    [Jaiprakash Industries v. CCE, (2002) 146 ELT 481 (SC 3-Member Bench).]

    (iii) If different views were expressed at different stages
    by Tribunal and High Court, extended period of five years is not invocable [Mentha
    & Allied Products Ltd. v. CCE,
    (2004) 167 ELT 494 (SC)]

    (iv) If there was difference of opinion in the Department
    itself and Departmental officials were regularly visiting factory and were in
    knowledge of process of manufacture adopted by the assessee, pleas of the
    assessee of bona fide belief is sustainable and extended period is not
    invocable [Ugam Chand Bhandari v. CCE, (2004) 167 ELT 491 (SC)]

    (v) If there was bona fide dispute whether process
    is ‘manufacture’ or not — extended period is not invocable [Tecumesh
    Products India Ltd. v. CCE,
    (2004) 167 ELT 498 (SC).]

    (f) No suppression if Department aware of facts :


    (i) If the Department had issued SCN earlier and had
    considered the matter earlier, there cannot be any suppression of facts, if at
    a later stage authorities come to a different conclusion [P & B
    Pharmaceuticals v. CCE,
    (2003) 153 ELT 14 (SC)]

    (ii) If the Department had issued SCN earlier and it was
    adjudicated, another SCN in respect of the same subject matter cannot be
    issued invoking extended period of limitation. [Nizam Sugar Factory v. CCE,
    (2006) 197 ELT 465 (SC)]

    Implications under Service Tax

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    5. Implications under Service Tax :


    The extensive judicial precedence (in particular Supreme
    Court Rulings which have laid down principles) under Central Excise, as regards
    invocation of extended period of 5 years, would be available as a good guide for
    the purpose of Service Tax to the extent relevant and applicable.

    In cases where Service Tax has not been paid by an assessee,
    due to bona fide belief as to its liability, which could be due to views
    expressed in judicial rulings, Dept. Clarifications, legal advice, etc., the
    benefit of settled position under Central Excise can be availed for Service Tax
    to challenge invocation of extended period and consequent penalty action,
    depending upon the facts and circumstances of a given case.


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    Settled principles for invocation of extended period under Central Excise

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    4. Settled principles for invocation of extended period
    under Central Excise :


    It is a very clearly laid-down principle that in cases where
    the Central Excise Dept. wishes to invoke the extended time limit of 5 years for
    issuing SCN, it can be done only if an assessee is guilty of willful mis-statement
    or collusion or suppression of facts or contravention of any of the provisions
    of Central Excise Rules, 2002 with the intent to evade payment of duty. The
    elements of wilfulness, collusion and suppression of facts with an intent to
    evade payment of duty, all belong to the domain of criminal jurisprudence having
    an element of mens rea i.e., existence of guilty mind. Therefore, the
    onus is on the Central Excise Dept. to prove that one or the other of these
    elements is present, so as to justify the issue of SCN by availing the extended
    time-limit. This is supported by a number of rulings of the Supreme Court,
    relevant extracts from some of which are given below :



    • In Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. CCE, 74 ELT 9 (SC), in the context of S.
      11A of CEA, it was held that :

    The proviso is in the nature of an exception to the
    principal clause and its exercise is hedged on one side with the existence of
    such situations by using strong expressions as fraud, collusion etc. and on
    the other hand there should be an intention to evade the payment of duty. Both
    must concur to enable the Excise Officer to invoke the exceptional power. The
    initial burden is on the Department to prove that the situations visualised by
    the proviso existed and to bring on record material to show that the appellant
    was guilty of any of the situations visualised by the Section.


    •  In Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company v. CCE, 78 ELT 401 (SC), it was held
      that :

    A perusal of proviso to S. 11A indicates that the
    expression ‘suppression of fact’ has been used in company of such strong words
    as fraud, collusion or wilful default. In fact it is the mildest expression
    used in the proviso. Yet, considering the surroundings in which it has been
    used, it has to be construed strictly. It does not mean any omission. The act
    must be deliberate. In taxation, it can have only one meaning that the correct
    information was not disclosed deliberately to escape from payment of duty,
    where facts are known to both the parties; the omission by one to do what he
    might have done and not that he must have done, does not render it
    suppression.


    •  In Cosmic Dye Chemical v. CCE, 75 ELT 721 (SC), it was held that :

    ‘Intent to evade duty’ must be proved for invoking proviso
    to S. 11A(1) of CEA for extended period of limitation. Intent to evade duty is
    built into the expressions ‘fraud’ and ‘collusion’ but ‘mis-statement’ and
    ‘suppression’ are qualified by immediately preceding words willful
    contravention of any of the provisions.


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    Adjudicating Authorities (AA)

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    2. Adjudicating Authorities (AA) :


    In terms of CBEC Circular No. 80/1/05-ST, dated 10-8-2005 the
    authorities for adjudicating Service Tax cases are under :

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    Time limits for issue of SCN

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    3. Time limits for issue of SCN :


    A major amendment was made under Service Tax, relating to
    recovery of Service Tax not levied or short levied, not paid or short paid or
    erroneously refunded whereby Provisions of S. 11A of Central Excise Act, 1944 (CEA)
    have been incorporated in Service Tax law by amending S. 73 of the Act. The time
    limit for issue of SCN under the amended S. 73(1) of the Act is as under :

    (a) Within one year of the relevant date : Where
    Service Tax has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid
    or erroneously refunded, AA is required to serve a notice on the person
    chargeable with Service Tax which has not been paid or levied or short paid,
    requiring him to show cause as to why he is not liable to pay the amount
    specified in the SCN.

    (b) Within five years of the relevant date : If any
    Service Tax has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid
    or erroneously refunded under specified circumstances.

    The extended period of 5 years can be invoked in terms of
    proviso to S. 73(1) of the Act, if any Service Tax has not been levied or has
    been short levied or short paid by reason of :



    •  fraud or



    • collusion or



    • any wilful mis-statement or



    • suppression of facts


    with an intent to evade payment of tax.

    Hence existence of any of the circumstances specified above
    is absolutely essential and a pre-requisite for invocation of extended period in
    terms of proviso to S. 73(1) of the Act. The reasons for invoking the extended
    period are required to be specified in the SCN.

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    Show-Cause Notice (SCN)

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    1. Show-Cause Notice (SCN) :


    In terms of S. 73 (1) of the Finance Act 1994 (Act), a notice
    is required to be served on the person chargeable with Service Tax which has not
    been paid or has been short paid or to whom any sum has been erroneously
    refunded. SCN requires such person to show cause as to why he should not pay the
    amount specified in the SCN.

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    Renting of immovable property — A dilemma for property owners

    Judicial interpretation of the term ‘Input Service’

    1. Background :

        Since the introduction of tax on services in 1994 and till the prescription of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 — (CCR), service tax on various key services like telephone, insurance, consulting engineers, advertising, manpower recruitment, management consultancy, audit, etc. meant a cost addition initially of 5% and from 2003 of 8% for the entire manufacturing — industrial sector. As a measure of integrating tax on goods and services, extension of intersectoral credit was introduced by prescribing CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 to come into effect on 10th September, 2004 both under the Central Excise Act, as well as under the service tax law which is part of the Finance Act, 1994. Under the premise that credit would be available of service tax paid on input services, the rate of service tax was simultaneously increased from 8% to 10%.

        A Press Note dated August 12, 2004, [Reported at 2004 (17) ELT-T19] highlighted salient features of the proposed CENVAT Credit Rules. The relevant paras (iii) and (iv) are reproduced below :

        (iii) In principle, credit of tax on those taxable services would be allowed that go to form a part of the assessable value on which excise duty is charged. This would include certain services which are received prior to commencement of manufacture but the value of which gets absorbed in the value of goods. As regards services received after the clearance of the goods from the factory, the credit would be extended on services received up to the stage of place of removal (as per S. 4 of Central Excise Act). In addition to this, services like advertising, market research, etc. which are not directly related to manufacture but are related to the sale of manufactured goods would also be permitted for credit.

        (iv) Full credit of service tax on services (such as telephone, security, construction, advertising service, market research, etc.) which are received in relation to the offices pertaining to a manufacturer or service provider would also be allowed.

    2. During the past five years of introduction of CENVAT Credit of service tax on input services, innumerable litigations across the country took place at all levels involving both interpretational as well as procedural issues. However, the most significant among them revolved around interpretation of the definition of ‘input service’ and more so in relation to the manufacturing activity. Consequent upon divergent views and conflicting opinions of various Benches of CESTAT, at least in two important cases the matter was referred to Larger Benches. The decision in both viz. CCE, Mumbai-V v. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri. – LB) and ABB Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. EX. & S.T., Bangalore 2009 (15) STR 23 (Tri. – LB) — (provided in BCAJ in Part-B under Service Tax feature in December 2008 and July 2009 issues, respectively) analysed the term ‘input service’ to reach the conclusion. Soon thereafter, independently i.e., without considering any of the above decisions, the Bombay High Court in the case of Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE-Pune-III, 2009 (15) STR 657 (Bom.) examined and made in-depth analysis of ‘input service’.

    3. What is ‘input service’ :

        The term ‘input service’ in Rule 2(1) in CCR is defined as follows :

        ‘Input service’ means any service, —

        (i) used by a provider of taxable service for providing an output service; or

        (ii) used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly, in or in relation to the manufacture of final products and clearance of final products up to the place of removal, and includes services used in relation to setting up, modernisation, renovation or repairs of a factory, premises of provider of output service or an office relating to such factory or premises, advertisement or sales promotion, market research, storage up to the place of removal, procurement of inputs, activities relating to business, such as accounting, auditing, financing, recruitment and quality control, coaching and training, computer networking, credit rating, share registry, and security, inward transportation of inputs or capital goods and outward transportation up to the place of removal.” (emphasis supplied)

    4. In the case of GTC Industries Ltd. (supra), the Larger Bench of CESTAT, Mumbai examined the above definition in a fairly detailed manner. The definition was analysed in the context of services of outdoor caterer used by the manufacturer in the canteen for workers. Both the appellant and the respondent agreed in principle that the said service of outdoor caterer was to be considered as one relating to business and therefore, would fall under the inclusive part of the definition and not the main definition. Therefore, the analysis of the definition was focussed with special and specific reference to the word ‘includes’ and the term ‘activities relating to business’ used in the definition. The appellant in this case contended that the term ‘includes’ enhances the scope of the definition and therefore it cannot take a restrictive approach. In this regard, inter alia the extract from the Apex Court’s decision in the case of Regional Director v. Highland Coffee Works, 1991 (3) SCC 617 was cited as follows :

    “The word ‘include’ in the statutory definition is generally used to enlarge the meaning of the preceding words and it is by way of extension, and not with restriction. The word ‘include’ is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. [See (i) Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. Vol. 3, p. 1263 and (ii) CIT v. Taj Mahal Hotel 1, (iii) State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha]”

    It was further contended that the term ‘such as’ used in the definition was an adjective indicative of the draftsman’s intention that he is assigning the same meaning or characteristic to the noun as has been previously indicated, but it does not prohibit any other activity which can define noun in a similar way and therefore, the expression only connotes that whatever activities are given are only illustrations that relate to the business. Therefore, any activity relating to business of the assessee would be covered as an input service. Further, stress was laid for this interpretation by stating that the words ‘such as’ used after the expression ‘activity relating to business’ in the inclusive part of the definition further supported the contention that the activities mentioned therein were illustrative and not exhaustive and it could not limit the scope of the definition of the input service once the term was used after the usage of the word ‘includes’ in the said definition. In this context, the reference was also made to the extract of the Press Note of the Draft Rules made at point 1 above. By facilitating comparison between the Draft Credit Rules and the CCR, the scope and application of the term ‘activities relating to business’ was construed wide enough to cover various aspects of the activities relating to business. The submissions of the Revenue with the aid of several Supreme Court decisions however revolved around contending that the list in the inclusive part of the definition is exhaustive. The Larger Bench however concluded with the following remark :

    “We find that it is well settled that every clause of the statute should be construed with reference to the context in which it is issued. A bare mechanical interpretation of words and application of legislative intent is devoid of concept and purpose will reduce most of the remedial and beneficial legislations to futility. To be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss the soul.” . . . . “The context in which and the purpose for which the Credit Rules have been issued are clear from the Press Note dated August 12, 2004 issued by the Ministry of Finance, prior to introduction of the Credit Rules wherein the draft rules were circulated for inviting comments from trade and industries. This Note clearly states that “in principle, credit of tax on those taxable services would be allowed that go to form a part of the assessable value on which excise duty is charged.”

    5. Little different dimension and perspective was provided by the Larger Bench in the case of ABB Ltd. v. CCE & ST, Bangalore (supra). While examining allowability of CENVAT credit service tax paid on outward transportation service for movement of final products from the place of removal till the customer’s place, it was observed that the definition of input service could be conveniently divided into the following five categories vis-à-vis the manufacturers :

    •  Any service used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly, in or in relation to the final products.

    • Any service used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly, in or in relation to clearance of final products from the place of removal.

    •  Services used in relation to setting up, modernisation, renovation or repairs of a factory, or an office relating to such factory.

    • Services used in relation to advertisement or sales promotion, market research, storage up to the place of removal, procurement of inputs.

    •  Services used in relation to activities relating to business and outward transportation up to the place of removal.

    On making the above division, the Larger Bench observed that each of the above was an independent benefit or concession and even if one was satisfied, the credit on input service would be admissible.

    In this case also, the expression ‘activities relating to business’ was analysed in depth by examining the expression ‘in relation to’ as analysed in the case of Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. UOI, (1988) (36) ELT 201 (SC) and also examining the qualification ‘activities’ and the expression ‘such as’.

    In the case of ABB Ltd. (supra), the Bench relying on and discussing the decisions of Kerala State Co-op-erative Marketing Federation Ltd. & Ors. v. CIT, (1998) 5 SCC 48, Share Medical Care v. UOI, 2007 (209) ELT 321 (SC) and HCL Ltd. v. Collector, 2001 (130) ELT 405 (SC) held that when the general expression ‘activities relating to business’ covered transportation up to the customer’s place, credit could not be denied by relying on specific coverage of outward transportation up to the place of removal in the inclusive clause. According to the Bench, the principle laid down in various Supreme Court cases that a specific provision will override a general one did not apply to exemptions. On the basis of this contention, the Bench held that the Revenue’s view was incorrect to contend that “since outward transportation was specifically mentioned in the inclusive clause of the definition, credit for outward transportation could not be allowed with reference to other general limb of the definition. Also, in this decision, there was a categorical observation by the Larger Bench as to the wide import of the word ‘business’ as held in the case of Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. CIT, (AIR 1958 SC 861). The Tribunal reached the conclusion by stating that the use of the expression ‘outward transportation’ in the inclusive clause was by way of abundant caution so as to avoid any dispute being raised on the ‘means’ clause (which refers to clearance from place of removal).
     
    According to the Larger Bench in ABB Ltd.’s case (supra), as opposed to the decision in the case of GTC (supra) discussed above, there was no requirement in law that the cost of freight should have entered transaction value to qualify for admissibility of credit or stated in other words non-inclusion of a particular cost in the transaction value by itself is not a limiting factor for admissibility of credit as the issue did not relate to valuation of excisable goods and the issues of ‘valuation’ and CENVAT credit were independent of each other.

    (Note : Karnataka High Court has stayed the operation of decision in the above ABB Ltd.’s case.)

    It is to be noted here that the Punjab and Haryana High Court, a few months earlier, also reached a similar decision in the case of Ambuja Cement Ltd. v. UOI, 2009 (14) STR 3 (P & H) that outward transportation up to the place of removal was an input service. However, the premise under which this was held was somewhat different. In this case, reliance was placed on the Board’s Circular No. 97/6/2007-ST of 23/08/2007 and the principle that the Revenue was precluded from challenging the correctness of the Circular which provided that when the ownership of the goods remained with the seller of the goods till its delivery, the seller bore the risk of change during transit to destination and when the freight formed part of the price of goods, the credit was admissible. Further, a subtle mention was also made to the definition of ‘input service’ that the definition inter alia includes outward transportation up to the place of removal and since in the instant case, ownership of goods remained with the seller till the doorstep of the buyer, insurance was borne by the seller and also that freight formed part of the value of goods, the conditions of the Circular were satisfied and therefore, the credit was admissible. To sum up, this case did not discuss or analyse the definition of input service to reach the conclusion.

    However, the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, 2009 (15) STR 657 (Bom.) — 22 STT 130 (Bom.) (discussed in BCAJ October 2009 issue) interpreted the definition ‘input service’ at great length discussing the terms used in the definition ‘means’, ‘includes’, ‘such as’, ‘business’ while examining whether or not advertising service used by a concentrate manufacturer was an admissible credit when the soft drinks were bottled and removed for sale by a group company and the advertisement related to the final product as bottled and sold by the latter.

    • In the case of Coca Cola India (supra) while interpreting the definition, relying on the decisions in cases like Regional Director v. Highland Coffee Works, 1991 (3) SCC 617 (reiterated in CIT v. TTK Health Care Ltd., 2007 (11) SCC 796), M/s. Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AR 1989 Supreme Court 335 and Bharat Co-operative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Co-op. Bank Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685, it was held that the expression ‘means and includes’ is exhaustive. By the word ‘includes’ the services which otherwise may not have come within the ambit get included and by the word ‘means’, they are made exhaustive.

    •  After reaching this conclusion, the High Court considered and analysed the meanings of the term ‘such as’ relying on Good Year India Ltd. v. Collector, 1997 (95) ELT 450 and concluded that the words ‘such as’ are illustrative and not exhaustive.

    • Next, it was held that the expression ‘business’ meant a continuous activity, which is not confined to a mere manufacture of the product. Therefore, activities in relation to business could cover all the activities related to the functions of business. Relying on State of Karnataka v. Shreyas Paper Pvt. Ltd., 2006 SCC and Mazagaon Dock (supra), [(also relied on by the Larger Bench in ABB Ltd., (supra),] it was held that the ‘business’ in particular in fiscal statutes is of wide import.

    • Thereafter in paras 26 to 30, the phrase ‘activity relating to business’ was analysed citing extracts from Supreme Court cases viz. Doypack Systems Limited v. UOI, 1988 (36) ELT 261 (SC), CIT v. Chandulal Keshavlal & Co., (1961 38 ITR 61 (SC), Eastern Investments Ltd. v. CIT, 1951 (20) ITR 1 and Allahabad High Court’s decision in Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. Symonds Distributors (P) Ltd., (1977) 108 ITR 947 (All) to conclude that the scope of the said phrase widens the scope of the definition. Among the quotes used in the decision, the following extract from the speech of Lord Hope of Craighead in the context of credit under VAT in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Redrow Group Plc, (1999 Simon Tax cases 161) is both apt and interesting to note :


    “The word services is given such a wide meaning for the purposes of value added tax that it is capable of embracing everything which a taxable person does in the course or furtherance of a business carried on by him which is done for a consideration. The name or description, which one might apply to the service, is immaterial, because the concept does not call for that kind of analysis. The service is that which is done in return for the consideration. As one moves down the chain of supply, each taxable person receives a service when another taxable person does something for him in the course of furtherance of a business carried on by that other person for which he takes a consideration in return. Questions such as who benefits from the service or who is the consumer of it are not helpful. The answers are likely to differ according to the interest, which various people may have in the transaction. The matter has to be looked at from the standpoint of the person who is claiming the deduction by way of input tax. Was something being done for him for which, in the course or furtherance of a business carried on by him, he has had to pay a consideration which has attracted value added tax ? The fact that some-one else, in this case the prospective purchaser, also received a service as part of the same transaction does not deprive the person who instructed the service and who has had to pay for it for the benefit of the deduction.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    •  Like in the case of ABB Ltd., (supra), in the case of Coca Cola India (supra) as well, it was discussed that the definition of ‘input service’ could be effectively divided into five categories vis-à-vis a manufacturer (not reproduced here as it is along the same lines as provided above at para 5).

    7. It is further noteworthy at this point that in all the three cases viz. GTC Industries Ltd. (supra), ABB Ltd. (supra) and Coca Cola India (supra), the definition of ‘input service’ as a whole was examined with reference to Draft CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, Ministry’s Press Note on the subject matter and considering the underlying factor that service tax is a value added tax and therefore the ultimate burden of service tax must be borne by the ultimate consumer and not the intermediary i.e., the manufacturer or the service provider.

    8. With the above important decisions in place, the readers may be shocked to note that in a very recent decision given by the Single Member Bench of the Mumbai CESTAT in the case of CCE, Nagpur v. Manikgarh Cement Works, 2009 TIOL 2059 CESTAT-Mum. wherein primarily the Tribunal examined the allowability of credit on service tax paid on construction service, repairs and maintenance service, manpower recruitment service, etc. used for residential colony outside the assessee’s factory and relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. CCE, Delhi 2009 (240) ELT 641 (SC) (this decision related to examination of the term ‘input’ vis-à-vis use of fuel in the electricity generation, the excess of which was sold to power grid), held as follows :

    “Where an inclusive part of a definition provides a list of items, any such item should also satisfy the quint-essential ingredients of the main part of the definition. In other words, the definition has to be considered in its entirety. The inclusive part is not independent of the main part. It is not a stand-alone provision. This ruling in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. (supra) is applicable to ‘input services’ given the definition of this expression under Rule 2(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules. There is nothing in this definition to indicate that the legislative intent behind it is different from the one underlying the definition of ‘input’.

    Accordingly, I hold that any service which is apparently covered by the parameters of the inclusive part of the definition of ‘input service’ should also satisfy the quintessential requirements of the main part of the definition and, accordingly, any person claiming the benefit of CENVAT credit on input service in terms of the inclusive part of the definition of ‘input service’ should establish that such service was used, directly or indirectly, in or in relation to the manufacture of the final products or the clearance of such products from his factory.”

    The Tribunal went on to further hold that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Maruti Suzuki Ltd. (supra) case implicitly overruled the High Court’s decision in Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and is constitutionally binding on the Tribunal. As a matter of fact, in the earlier case of the same assessee, the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal had held that CENVAT credit was admissible [refer to 2008 (9) STR 554 (Tri.-Mum.)] (the decision is presently under challenge by the Revenue before the High Court).

    Conclusion :

    From the above, it can be observed that in spite of the two Larger Benches of the Tribunal and a High Court doing in-depth analysis of the term ‘input service’, the era of dispute sees no end, given the fact that the issue involved in the decision in the case of ABB Ltd would be examined a fresh by Karnataka High Court. Much remains to be examined yet as to the allowability of credit on service tax paid on various services used for providing output services in spite of the fact that various Tribunals have examined this aspect and rendered decisions using pragmatism. One such instance is the case of Deloitte Tax Service India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Hyderabad-IV, 2008 (11) STR 266 (Tri.-Bang). Nevertheless, seeing conflicting stands followed by various Benches of the Tribunals, both manufacturing and service sector would like to see the issue settled, given the fact that service tax is a value added tax and that interpretation of the term is done with the underlying consideration that intersectoral credit was facilitated with a view to reducing cascading effect of the taxes.

    Unjust Enrichment and Refund of CENVAT Credit to Exporters

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    New Page 2

    1. Background :


    Exporters of services experienced rough times during
    the past four to five years claiming refund or rebate of service tax
    paid on various input services used in exported services and there has
    been tremendous amount of litigation already pending at different
    levels, wherein various issues both legal and procedural have been
    raised by the Department which inter alia include the following :

    • Whether the
      service per se can be considered export in terms of the Export Rules,
      2005.


    • Non-filing of
      declaration form prior to exporting service.


    • Inadequacy of
      documents evidencing export of service.


    • Services on
      which service tax paid is taken as CENVAT credit are not considered
      ‘input services’.


    • Inadequacy of
      documents for CENVAT credit.



    • Non-registration or late registration of the assessee as service
      provider.


    • Refund claims
      filed beyond limitation period u/s.11B of the Central Excise Act.


    • Refund
      relating to export of exempted service.


    • Refund
      inadmissible on account of unjust enrichment.


    Realising difficulties faced by the export-oriented
    units, the Government issued Circular No. 120, dated 19-1-2010 to
    simplify and standardise refund procedure to expedite the process of
    refund applications and grant refunds although the procedure is already
    in place for granting rebate of service tax paid by cash or CENVAT of
    input services or for claiming refund under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit
    Rules, 2004. Question here is whether or not and how the doctrine of
    unjust enrichment should apply to the refund claims filed by exporters
    of services for service tax paid on input services. For this purpose,
    the doctrine of unjust enrichment and provision of S. 11B need
    examination.

    2. Doctrine of unjust enrichment :

    In ordinary course, when any claim of refund is filed
    by an assessee, he is required to file an application of refund in the
    prescribed format under the law along with required documentary
    evidence. On receipt of the application, the Assistant Commissioner of
    Central Excise or Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise after being
    satisfied may himself make an order for the refund of the whole or any
    part of tax. The claimed amount is refunded to the applicant only if the
    incidence of tax has not been passed on by the applicant to any other
    person; or else if the amount considered due to be refunded, is
    transferred to the Consumer Welfare Fund as the claimant is not allowed
    to be unjustly enriched i.e., the claimant cannot get an amount which he
    has not suffered. This law cannot be better understood than by the
    quotes per majority decision in the landmark judgment of Mafatlal
    Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1997 (89) ELT 247 (SC) :

    Á claim for refund, whether made under the
    provisions of the Act as contemplated in Proposition (i) above or in a
    suit or writ petition in the situations contemplated by Proposition
    (ii) above, can succeed only if the petitioner/plaintiff alleges and
    establishes that he has not passed on the burden of duty to another
    person/other persons. His refund claim shall be allowed/decreed only
    when he establishes that he has not passed on the burden of the duty
    or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may be. Whether
    the claim for restitution is treated as a constitutional imperative or
    as a statutory requirement, it is neither an absolute right nor an
    unconditional obligation but is subject to the above requirement, as
    explained in the body of the judgment. Where the burden of the duty
    has been passed on, the claimant cannot say that he has suffered any
    real loss or prejudice. The real loss or prejudice is suffered in such
    a case by the person who has ultimately borne the burden and it is
    only that person who can legitimately claim its refund.”

    Also interesting are the quotes of the Larger Bench
    decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandal
    Ltd. v. CCE&C, 2005 (181) ELT 328 (SC) which have aptly and precisely
    described this doctrine.

    “31. Stated simply, ‘Unjust enrichment’ means reten-tion of a benefit by a person that is unjust or inequi-table. ‘Unjust enrichment’ occurs when a person re-tains money or benefits, which in justice, equity and good conscience, belong to someone else.

    3.2 The doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’, therefore, is that no person can be allowed to enrich inequitably at the expense of another. A right of recovery under the doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’ arises where retention of a benefit is considered contrary to justice or against equity.

    3.3 The juristic basis of the obligation is not founded upon any contract or tort, but upon a third category of law, namely, quasi-contract or the doctrine of restitution.

        From the above discussion, it is clear that the doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’ is based on equity and has been accepted and applied in several cases. In our opinion, therefore, irrespective of applicabili-ty of S. 11B of the Act, the doctrine can be invoked to deny the benefit to which a person is not otherwise entitled. S. 11B of the Act or similar provision merely gives legislative recognition to this doctrine. That, however, does not mean that in absence of statutory provision, a person can claim or retain undue benefit. Before claiming a relief of refund, it is necessary for the petitioner/appellant to show that he has paid the amount for which relief is sought, he has not passed on the burden on consumers and if such relief is not granted, he would suffer loss.”

    Thus, in principle, it is just and fair that this doctrine is followed while granting a refund application. To better understand its applicability, it is necessary to briefly examine the relevant provisions of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, as Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 dealing with the service tax law does not contain specific provisions for claim of refund, but through its S. 83, specific provisions of the Central Excise Act including S. 11B have been made applica-ble to service tax as they apply in relation to excise duty. Accordingly, claim of refund for service tax also is governed by the provisions of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act discussed below.

        3. S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 :

    Claim for refund of duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty

        1) Any person claiming refund of any duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty may make an application for refund of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty to the Assistant Commis-sioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise before the expiry of one year from the relevant date in such form and manner as may be prescribed and the application shall be accom-panied by such documentary or other evidence (in-cluding the documents referred to in S. 12A) as the applicant may furnish to establish that the amount of duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty in relation to which such refund is claimed was collected from, or paid by, him and the incidence of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty had not been passed on by him to any other person :

    Provided that where an application for refund has been made before the commencement of the Cen-tral Excises and Customs Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991, such application shall be deemed to have been made under this sub-section as amended by the said Act and the same shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Ss.(2) substituted by that Act.
    Provided further that the limitation (of one year) shall not apply where any duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty has been paid under protest.

        2) If, on receipt of any such application, the As-sistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Dep-uty Commissioner of Central Excise is satisfied that the whole or any part of the duty of excise and inter-est, if any, paid on such duty paid by the applicant is refundable, he may make an order accordingly and the amount so determined shall be credited to the Fund.

    Provided that the amount of duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty as determined by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise under the foregoing provisions of this sub-section shall, instead of being credited to the Fund, be paid to the applicant, if such amount is relatable to –

        a) rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India or on excisable materials used in the manufacture of goods which are exported out of India;

        b) unspent advance deposits lying in balance in the applicant’s account current maintained with the Commissioner of Central Excise;

        c) refund of credit of duty paid on excisable goods used as inputs in accordance with the rules made, or any notification issued, under this Act;

        d) the duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty paid by the manufacturer, if he had not passed on the incidence of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty to any other person;

        e) the duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty borne by the buyer, if he had not passed on the incidence of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty to any other person;

        f)…………….

    Provided ………..

        Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree, order or direc-tion of the Appellate Tribunal or any Court or in any other provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force, no refund shall be made except as provided in Ss.(2).

    (4) & (5) ……………….

    Explanation — For the purposes of this Section, :

        A) ‘refund’ includes rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India or on excisable materials used in the manufacture of goods which are exported out of India;

        B) ‘relevant date’ means, :

    (a)  to (f)……………………………………

    Perusal of proviso (a) to Ss.(3) indicates that in spe-cific terms, excise duty paid on exported excisable goods or excisable inputs used in the manufacture of such exported goods outside India qualifies to be allowed as rebate or refund. The law has specifically provided for this to be in tune with the broader and outer framework of the fiscal policy of the Govern-ment viz. zero rating of exports, whether of goods or services. An exporter–manufacturer may have paid such duty in cash or from his CENVAT credit account he is entitled to receive refund/rebate, provided he has presented the required documentary evidence and has followed the prescribed proce-dure for claiming refund or rebate, as the case may be. Similarly, with reference to proviso (c) to Ss.2 of S. 11B above, refund of CENVAT credit of duty paid as inputs under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is also available to an exporter. The question arises therefore is whether or not the doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable to refund in case of export of goods as well as of services.

    A manufacturer exporting excisable goods often does not have potential to use accumulated CENVAT credit on inputs, when he wholly or substantially exports all that he manufactures and eventually, he is necessitated to claim either rebate of duty paid on excisable goods by making a payment of duty from CENVAT account on exports and claiming rebate of CENVAT credit or opting to file a refund claim of CENVAT of duty paid on inputs under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 as the case may be. In the scenario, the Tribunal in CCE, Kolkata-VI v. Black Diamond Beverages Ltd., 2006 (200) ELT 317 relying upon the earlier decision in the case of Dura Syntex Ltd., 2003 (154) ELT 422 (Tri.) held that in case of re-fund related to input credit, the principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable. Recently in Balkrishna Textiles P. Ltd. v. CCE, Ahmedabad-I, 2009 (239) ELT 279 (Tri.-Ahmd.) also, it was held that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is not applicable in respect of exports and S. 11B of the Central Excise Act specifically provides that credit on duty paid can be given as cash refund if admissible and principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable. In case of CC&CE Ahmedabad v. Dura Syntex Ltd. (supra), it was categorically held that principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable in view of the proviso (c) to Ss.(2) of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, which carves out an exception in respect of credit of duty. It is quite interesting to note that despite there being excep-tions in the proviso whereby the question of examining whether duty is passed on to the buyer does not arise as the refund relates to duty paid on Inputs and therefore arising out of input credit, the authorities while issuing show-cause notice repeatedly attempt to shift the onus to the assessee to prove that unjust enrichment has not arisen. In this frame of reference, the Supreme Court’s observation in Rochiram & Sons v. UOI, 2008 (226) ELT 20 (SC) is notable : “It is a cardinal principle of law which has been settled by a Bench of seven Judges of this Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries v. UOI, 1997

        ELT 247 (SC) that refund of a claim made by the assessee can be denied on the principle of undue enrichment if the assessee has passed on the burden to consumers. The principle would be equally applicable to the Revenue as well as it cannot have the double advantage.” The Supreme Court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. v. CIT I, Pune, 2007 (8) STR 193 (SC) held that even if the Revenue has taken an erroneous view of law, that cannot mean that withhold-ing of money is justifiable or not wrongful. Thus, it is imperative that the Government cannot withhold due refund to the claimants.

        4. Exporters of services :

    In the above background and given the fact that there are no separate provisions as regards refund in the service tax law, by merely making provisions of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act applicable to service tax, intangibles like services are placed on par with goods. When services are invoiced to clients, ‘costing’ in most cases is difficult or almost impossible. There can neither be MRP (Maximum Retail Price) concept, nor can there be cost plus profit concept, especially for services provided by all professionals including investment bankers, architects, chartered accountants, legal services, management consultants, consulting engineers, etc. Even in the case of various other services requiring skills, it may or may not be possible to attribute precise ‘cost’ of a service as service is provided based on mental skills. Consequently, when the value of a service is recovered without service tax, yet whether the burden of tax paid on input service is still passed on to the recipient cannot be put to judgment. For argument’s sake, a professional ‘A’ may charge $ 100 for a task and for the same task ‘B’ may charge $ 500 and ‘C’ may charge $ 120. Would it mean that ‘C’ or ‘B’ have included incidence of tax in their price for their service and therefore there is unjust enrichment ? In fact, ‘A’ may charge $ 100 to one person and another $ 75 or $ 125 and yet in no way one can prove that burden of tax is necessarily passed on in one or the other case.

    In a recent decision of the Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. S. Mohanlal Services, 2010 (18) STR 173 (Tri.-Ahmd.) in its second round of litigation, the Tribunal fully endorsed observations of the Commissioner Appeals viz. “the adjudicating authority’s reliance on the judgment in the case of Mafatlal Industries [1997 (89) ELT 247] is misplaced inasmuch as it relates to sale of goods wherein cost of inputs are necessarily incurred, whereas in the present case it is provision of services especially as commission agents wherein mental inputs are incurred which cannot be compared in monetary terms.” The Tribunal further observed, “the refund claim has been made u/s.11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 made applicable for service tax matters. S. 11B provides that where the amount is reliable to rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India, the amount shall be paid to the claimant. This means that provisions relating to unjust enrichment are not applicable in respect of export of services.”

    Although a single Member Bench decision, the intangible characteristic of service being aptly considered, it should serve as a useful guidance for all refund claims made by exporters of services to reduce the amount of litigation.

    Whilst it is in fitness of things to require a claimant to provide chartered accountant’s certificate that tax was not recovered from recipient of services or buyer, it will be equally fair not to stretch application of doctrine of unjust enrichment to exports too far. Non-granting of legitimate refund claim under one or the other pretext is a burning issue that several assessees face from the Department and an early resolution being need of the day, it is high time that the Board does the needful in the matter to remove impediments in genuine claims of exporters.

    Part B : Some Recent Judgments

        I. High Court :

    1.(a) Authorised Service Station : Whether C & F agency ?

    CCE v. Amitdeep Motors, 2010 (17) STR 514 (All)

    The assessee, an authorised dealer of cars was registered under the category of authorised service station. The assessee received commission from the manufacturer for sourcing orders for them from Government agencies, receiving the vehicles from them and delivering the same to the Government agencies. The Revenue sought to tax these servic-es as clearing and forwarding agent’s service. The Tribunal ruled that the services of arrangement of documentary requirements from the customers for principal, liaison with customers for timely delivery, delivery of vehicle to the consignees, sending of provisional receipt and inspection notes from con-signee to the principal and arrangement of way or entry permits required for dispatch of the vehicles, etc. could not be considered clearing and forward-ing services.

    Not finding substantial question of law, the High Court dismissed the appeal.

        b) Whether services to bank for loans exempt under Notification No. 25/2009 ?

    CCE v. Car World Autoline, 2010 (17) STR 449 (Ker.)

    The assessee aided a bank to advance loans to parties and for recovery of the same. The Tribunal in its order stated that the assessee’s services were tax-able as business auxiliary services. It also stated that the assessee discharged its service tax liability under business auxiliary services from September 11, 2004. The Tribunal had allowed the assessee’s exemption claim under clause (e) of Notification No. 25/2004– ST, dated September 10, 2004.

    The Revenue questioned whether the claim of the assessee was justified in light of the facts of the case. The clause (d) of the said Notification awarded exemption to business auxiliary services while the clause (e) awarded exemption to the banking and financial services. The relevant clause (d) and (e) are reproduced for ready reference :

    “(d)    services provided to a client by a commercial concern in relation to the following business auxiliary services, namely :

        i) procurement of goods or services, which are inputs for the client;

        ii) production of goods on behalf of the client;

        iii) provision of service on behalf of the client; or

        iv) a service incidental or auxiliary to any activity specified in (i) to (iii) above;

        e) services provided to a customer by any body corporate or commercial concern, other than a banking company or a financial institution including a non-banking financial company, in relation to banking and other financial services.”

    The Court stated that the assessee did not provide banking and financial services and hence the clause  was not applicable. The clause (d) was applica-ble, hence before declaring the eligibility, the Tribunal was required to consider it with reference to the agreement between the parties, the exact nature of service rendered by the assessee to the bank and whether any of the service so provided was covered under the categories (i) to (iii) and if so, whether any service rendered was incidental to the items of services mentioned in sub-clause (i) to (iii) of (d). Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for reconsideration after hearing both the sides and after calling for relevant records, etc.

        2. Violation of principle of natural justice : Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction :

    Wasp Pump Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2010 (17) STR 613 (Bom.)
    The petitioner manufactured pumps and also the inputs for the pumps. There was no dispute as to exemption for pumps or its classification. Later, the Revenue demanded duty on the CI castings holding that they were marketable goods. The assessee filed an appeal to Commissioner (Appeals), however beyond the time of limitation. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that he had no jurisdiction to condone the delay. Aggrieved by the order, the appeal was filed with the CESTAT and CESTAT confirmed that the Commissioner (Appeals) was right in not con-doning the delay. In view of that, the application for waiver was rejected and the appeal was dismissed.

    Consequently a petition was filed with the High Court. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of U.P. v. Modh Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 which held that the Revenue before quantifying the demand ought to have given a hearing to the assessee and there being a violation of principle of natural justice, the Court could exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction. Plea was also made that the inputs were exempt from tax under relevant Notification. In the rejoinder it was also explained as to why they could not file the appeal in time.

    The Court observed that generally when the alternate remedy sought was exhausted and the Tribunal for some reason declined to entertain the same, the Court normally does not interfere and exercise extra jurisdiction unless the order is a nullity in law. However, the order suffered from violation of principles of natural justice and denial of ‘fair’ hearing and therefore rejecting Revenue’s objection to extraordinary jurisdiction, the Court decided to hear the petition on merits. The Court relied on the Modh Nooh case (supra) and the Notifications cited by the petitioner. The Court also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in W.P.I.L. Ltd. v. CCE, 2005 (181) ELT 359 (SC) wherein pumps as well as parts thereof were held as exempted from excise duty. The case was therefore allowed quashing the order and remitting the matter back to the Tribunal to consider afresh assessment of duty after consid-ering the Notifications issued from time to time.

        II. Tribunal :

        3. Banking and Financial Services : Pre-closure charges :

    Indusind Bank v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai 2010 (17) STR 565 (Tri.-Chennai)
    The assessee did not pay service tax on pre-closure charges treating this as charges for loss of interest.

    As per the Revenue, in a similar case, in appeal No. S/152/08, the Tribunal had ordered pre-deposit of 50% of the tax amount. Relying on the case of GE Money Financial Services Ltd. CST, Chennai 2009 (15) STR 722 (Tribunal), it was held that since the asses-see had not furnished the details pertaining to pre-closure charges to the Department till the assessee was audited by the Department, the invocation of longer period was justified. Also held that the pre-closure charges could not be equated with interest and therefore pre-deposit of 50% of the liability was ordered.

    4.(a) CENVAT Credit : Whether input service is required to be reversed on removal of inputs :

    J. S. Khalsa Steels (P) Ltd. v. CCE, Chandigarh 2010 (17) STR 517 (Tri.-Del.)

    The assessee a manufacturer was also registered under the category of GTA. The assessee claimed CENVAT on the inputs, capital goods and input services. The assessee reversed the CENVAT credit on inputs and capital goods in terms of Rule 3(5) on clearance of the inputs.

    The Revenue issued a SCN for non-reversal of credit on input services. The original authority and the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the demand.

    It was contended by the appellant that Rule 3(5) provides for reversal of credit on capital goods or inputs and not for input services. It was also submit-ted that the Rule 2 defines input, input services and capital goods separately. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Chitrakoot Steel & Power Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Chennai (2008) 10 STR 118.

    The Tribunal concurred with the appellant and set aside the order and held that no provision for rever-sal of input service existed in the law.

        b) Input services : Credit not to be restricted to ‘manufacture’ alone :

    Jaypee Rewa Plant v. CCE, Bhopal 2010 (17) STR 519 (Tri.-Del.)
    The assessee availed CENVAT credit on the invoices issued by the input distributor. The Revenue denied CENVAT credit on the services like rent-a-cab service, courier service, air travel agent service, maintenance and repair service and telephone service on the ground that no evidence was submitted to show that the said services were utilised for the manufacture of the final product. It was alleged in the SCN that the input services have been taken in or in relation to the handling of marketing of goods after the place of removal and hence not admissible.

    Placing reliance on the decisions of the Larger Bench in the case of ABB Ltd. v. CCE & ST, Bangalore 2009 STR 468 (Tri.-LB) and also CCE Mumbai v. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri.-LB) it was held that input service credit cannot be restricted only in relation to the manufacture and their clearance from the place of removal. Hence the matter was remanded to original authority to allow the credit, subject to the input services being used in relation to the business activities and in the light of the Larger Bench decisions.

        c) Documents for claiming credit :

    CCE, Vapi v. ITW India Ltd., 2010 (17) STR 587 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

    The assessee claimed CENVAT credit on input services including CENVAT on mobile bills. The Revenue contended that the invoices which captured the address of the centralised registered office at Silvassa, was improper document for claiming credit. Further the credit was considered not allowable on the mobile phones.

    The Tribunal stated that there was no dispute that the input services received were utilised by the respondent and therefore the benefit could not be denied on the ground that the invoices bear the name and address of the head office or any branch. Reliance was placed on the case of Electro Steel Castings v. CCE, Calcutta 2001 (136) ELT 929 (Tri.-Kolkata).

    As regards the credit on the mobile phones, the Tribunal relied on the judgment pronounced in the case of Indian Rayon Industries Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (4) STR 79 and CCE v. Excel Corp Care Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 436 (Guj.) and confirmed the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order.
        
    5. CHA Services & Port Services :

    Aspinwall & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Cochin 2010 (17) STR 496 (Tri.-Bang.)

    The demand of service tax was confirmed under port services and CHA services. Further, as regards CHA services, the order stated that the assessee was given a contract indicating agency commission separately and hence the assessee would not be entitled to claim the benefit provided by the Board’s Circular No. 843/1/17-TRU; dated 6-6-1997. However, the Tribunal found that the assessee prima facie discharged obligation of tax and the amount other than commission was towards reimbursable expenses and in identical issue of the very assessee, this Bench has granted waiver of pre-deposit of the disputed amounts.

    In the case of port charges, the issue was squarely in favour of the assessee as held in the case of Kinship Services Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Cochin 2008 (10) STR 331 (Tri-Bang) and also in assessee’s own case as decided by the Bench in 2009 (15) STR 466 (Tri.-Bang.).

    Considering that prima facie case in favour of the appellant was made out, waiver was granted.

        6. Pre-deposit dispensed with for case on merits :

    Aster Teleservices Pvt. Ltd. v. Commr. of Cus. & C. Ex., Hyderabad 2010 (17) STR 584 (Tri.-Bang.)

    The assessee was rendering the following services :

        a) Erection of telecommunication tower

        b) Construction of petrol pumps, industrial buildings

        c) Erection and painting of telecommunication towers

        d) Erection and installation of telecom equipments (subcontractor)

        e) Erection of railway signaling system (railways)

    The Revenue demanded service tax on activities mentioned in (a), (d) and (e) under the category of erection and commissioning. According to the Revenue the activities could not be considered as works contract as the entire material was supplied by the principal. Plea was made by the assessee to grant stay till the matter pending before the Larger Bench could be decided. They further submitted that while determining the liability, the adjudicating authority considered the invoiced amount instead of actual receipts.

    The Tribunal observed that the assessee contested the liability on the ground that the activity was works contract. Considering that the decision was pending before the Larger Bench, and further that the assessee had substantiated their claim by producing sales tax returns and they had deposited about 25% of the service tax liability, the deposit was held sufficient and waiver was granted for the balance.

    7.(a) Penalty : U/s.78 : Whether non-filing and non-payment necessarily indicate suppression ?

    Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat v. Star Crane Service, 2010 (17) STR 576 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

    The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the penalty levied u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994. The Appellate Authority stated in its order that neither the show-cause notice made any allegation of existence of any suppressions, mismanagement, etc. with the intention to evade any payment of duty nor did the adjudicating authority recorded any such finding. Further the Commissioner (Appeals) also observed that the quantum of penalty could not exceed the amount of liability.

    The Revenue contended that the assessee failed to apply for registration, pay service tax and failed to file return and this has to be held as suppression on the part of the assessee.

    The Tribunal stated that in a number of cases it is held that non-application for registration does not construe suppression with an intent to evade duty in the light of fast-changing service tax law. The Revenue did not refer to any evidence of non-payment of tax due to any mala fide intention. Hence the order reducing penalty was good in law.

        b) Bona fide reasons : Penalty not leviable :

    Bureau  of  Indian  Standards  v.  Commissioner  of Custom and Central Excise, Nodia 2010 (17) STR 527 (Tri.-Delhi)

    The assessee is a national standard body under the administrative control of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and availing benefit under the Income-tax Act as charitable institution. The assessee’s training programme for development and implementation of quality environment, occupational health and safety, etc. on payment of fees was treated as commercial coaching & training by the Revenue and service tax, interest, penalty, etc. were demanded.

    The assessee took up the issue with its Ministry and was advised to pay service tax with interest.

    The Tribunal held that the facts and circumstances of the case indicated that the cause was reason-able for their failure to pay service tax undertaken by them and in absence of any intention to evade service tax, it is a fit case for invoking the provision of S. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

        c) Bona fide reasons :

    Adani Enterprises Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad 2010 (17) STR 457 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

    Penalty was imposed on the appellant receiving GTA services for several payments made delayedly. The reason for delay was explained as occurred on account of operational difficulty in implementation of new SAP software. The appellant paid interest of its own volition and several times made excess payment rather than short on account of software difficulty. The appellant relied on the decisions of C. Ahead Info. Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (A), Bangalore 2009 (14) STR 803 (Tri.-Bang.) and Santhi Casting Works v. CCE, Coimbatore, 2009 (15) STR 219 (Tri.-Chennai) as well as on the Board Circular No. 341/18/2004-TRU (Pt.), dated Dec 17, 2004 wherein the Department was directed not to impose penalty for procedural lapses in respect of GTA services till 31-12-2005. It also stated that no penalty would be levied unless default was on account of deliberate fraud, collusion, suppression, etc. Further the action of payment of service tax as a service recipient although they were not liable to pay it prior to 18-4-2006 indicated its bona fides. Further, the assessee contended that they were covered u/s.73 and not u/s.76 of the Act.

    The Revenue’s contention was that the delay was very high as compared to the excess payment, as it ranged from 20 days to 166 days which was indicative of other reasons than mere software problem and that the SCN imposed penalty u/s.76 and u/s.73 was not invoked at all.

    The Tribunal set aside the case holding that the assessee’s case was fit for waiver of penalty u/s.80 of the Act.

        d) In absence of suppression, penalty u/s.78 not leviable :

    Sahara Power Products v. CCE, Mangalore 2010 (17) STR 463 (Tri.-Bang.)

    The assessee was rendering repair and maintenance services of faulty distributor transformers of different capacities to Mangalore Electricity Supply. The Revenue issued a SCN as the assessee was not registered and also did not pay service tax. The Revenue demanded service tax from 1-7-2003 to 31-3-2006 invoking longer period of limitation along with interest and penalty u/s.76, u/s. 77 and u/s.78 of the Act. In response to the assessee’s appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) remanded the matter with certain directions. The adjudicating authority in the de novo order confirmed the service tax liability, interest and penalty u/s.76, u/s.77 and u/s.78. In the second round of appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed service tax along with interest and penalty u/s.76, u/s.77 and u/s.78 although in an earlier order, the Commissioner (Appeals) did not confirm any existence of suppression.

    The Tribunal held that for the defaults of non-registration and non-payment of tax, penalty u/s. 76 and u/s.77 is leviable. However, the assessee paid service tax with interest without contesting and the Commissioner (Appeals) in his earlier order levied service tax from 1-6-2005 onwards, thus indicating non-invoking of longer period of limitation and non-existence of fraud or suppression, no penalty was leviable u/s.78 of the Act.

        8. Rebate : Export of Services :

    Dell International Services India P. Ltd. v. CCE, Banga-lore 2010 (17) STR 540 (Tri.-Bang.)

    The assessee, a 100% EOU call centre filed five rebate claims which were rejected primarily on the ground that they did not export taxable service and input services were not used for exported services. In assessee’s own case, earlier the Assistant Commissioner on detailed scrutiny found that services were taxable and this fact was not disputed. Similarly, in another claim of the assessee, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee provided taxable services. In case when an issue is settled between the parties, the same cannot be argued again by the Department. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Suptd. of Central Excise v. D.C.I. Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., 2005 (181) ELT 189 SC.

    In order to determine whether the assessee was rendering business auxiliary services or the services rendered by the assessee were excluded from the definition of business auxiliary services i.e., information technology services, the cases of CCE, Hyderabad–IV v. M/s. Deloitte Tax Service (I) Pvt. Ltd., 2008 STR 266 (Tri.-Bang.) and Circular No. DOF No. 334/1/2008-TRU, dated 29-2-2008 were relied upon.

    To refute the contention of the Department that the services exported were not taxable services but exempt services and hence the rules of export were not applicable, it was submitted that Rule 3 of the Export Rules applied to taxable services. In other words, there was no restriction on the exempted services from being eligible for benefit under the Export of Rules, 2005.

    For the status of services as input services, decision of CCE, Mumbai-V v. M/s. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 STR 468 (Tri-LB) among others was relied upon, which held that CENVAT was allowable on input services utilised for business.

    It was accordingly held that the conditions under the Notification 12/2005 were satisfied and rebate was allowed.

    9.(a) Valuation : Inclusion of amount declared to Income-tax Department :

    CCE, Chandigarh. v. Bindra Tent Service, 2010 (17) STR 470 (Tri.-Del.)

    The assessee, a pandal and shamiana keeper pursuant to an Income-tax Department survey, deposited certain amounts, based on which, the Revenue demanded service tax on the amount deposited contending that the surrender of monies without explaining the source implied that the amounts related to the taxable services and the burden of proof to prove contrary was with the assessee.

    The assessee pleaded that the amount deposited pertained accumulation in the previous six years and not of the particular year in question. In order to compute the undisclosed income only, it was taken as income in that particular year by the IT Department.

    The Commissioner (Appeals) in his order placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Kipps Education Centre, Bhatinda v. CCE, Chandigarh wherein it was held that the income voluntarily disclosed before the Income-tax authorities could not be added to the taxable value merely based on presumption without evidence. The burden to prove evasion lay on the Department. Since no inquiry was conducted by the Department as to the assessee’s claim that monies deposited were of earlier period, no tax could be levied and accordingly, cross objections were disposed of.

        b) Club or Association Service : Membership deposit :

    Adarsh Realty & Hotel Pvt. Ltd. v. Commr. of S. T. Bangalore, 2010 (17) STR 569 (Tri.-Bang.)

    The Revenue demanded service tax under the Club or Association Services. The appellant paid service tax on the annual subscription of the members, health club and spa services, guest charges, banquet halls, laundry service, internet service and travel desk except on membership deposit and service tax was demanded on the entire revenue streams. They also deposited a sum of Rs.12,44,722, pursuant to the order of the Adjudicating Authority pertaining to membership deposit in dispute.

    The Tribunal held that there being no dispute over other revenue streams, whether membership deposit is refundable or not, shall be considered at the time of the final disposal and since the assessee has deposited an amount disputed under the membership services, the pre-deposit of balance amount was waived and recovery was stayed.

        c) Simultaneous availment of CENVAT with abatement :

    CCE, Vadodara v. Ram Krishna Travels Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (17) STR 487 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

    The assessee availed abatement under Notification No. 1/06-S.T. and CENVAT credit simultaneously. The Revenue demanded service tax due to non-availability of benefit of abatement. The assessee subsequently reversed the credit so availed.

    The Commissioner (Appeals) by taking note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrapur Magnet Wires Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, 1996 (81) ELT 422 (All) and the High Court’s order in the case of Hello Minerals Water (P) Ltd. v. UOI, 2004 (174) ELT 422, held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) as the assessee had admittedly reversed the credit.

    Taxation of Software — Recent Developments

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    Service Tax

    Preliminary:


    The Information Technology/Software Industry in India is
    subjected to multiple indirect taxes like Excise Duty (ED)/Countervailing Duty (CVD)
    and Service tax by the Centre and VAT by the States. Apart from incidence of
    multiple taxation, what is affecting the industry most is the uncertainty over
    the correct applicability of a particular tax on its activities and the
    confusion is in the minds of the taxing authorities — both the Central and the
    States. This results in divergent practices being followed and dual taxation as
    a precautionary measure.

    An attempt is made to discuss some important recent
    developments in regard to this complex subject.

    Background:

    Information Technology Software Service (ITSS) was
    comprehensively brought under the levy of service tax through the insertion of
    the sub-clause (zzzze) in clause (105) of section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994
    (FA) w.e.f. 16-5-2008.

    Since March, 2006, ED was already being levied on ‘Packaged
    Software’ manufactured in India and sold off the shelf. Such ‘Packaged Software’
    has been treated as ‘goods’ and classified under Tariff Item 8523 80 20 of the
    Central Excise Tariff. [It needs to be noted that the issue as to whether or not
    the concept of ‘manufacture’ can be applied to ‘software’ or not, is pending
    before a larger Bench of the Supreme Court. However, in the context of income
    tax it has been held in CIT v. Oracle Software India Ltd., (2010) 250 ELT
    161 (SC), that the process of software replication which renders a commodity or
    article fit for use which otherwise is not so, would fall within ‘manufacture’.

    Though basic customs duty is not payable on Imports of IT
    software, CVD under customs became payable on such imports due to levy of ED on
    it.

    W.e.f. 16-5-2008, the ‘Licence to use the IT software’ has
    been subjected to levy of service tax. However, the levy was confined to the
    services in relation to IT software for use for commercial exploitation. It is a
    matter of common knowledge that in case of supply of software, two cost
    components are usually involved viz. :

    •  the
      value of the media and the cost of recording of software thereon; and


    •  the
      value of the licence to use the software representing the consideration towards
      intellectual property.

    On the other hand, based on the ruling of the Supreme Court
    in Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P., (2004) 178 ELT 22 (SC)
    many States have imposed VAT or WCT on software classifying it as ‘goods’ or
    ‘works contract’ under respective VAT legislations. For example, under the
    Maha-rashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT), intangible goods are covered by
    entry C-39 and liable to tax. ‘Software packages’ are notified under entry C-39
    and hence, are liable to VAT.

    Hence, in the context of software taxation, it becomes very
    important to determine whether ‘software’ is sold as ‘goods’, and is liable to
    VAT or provided as ‘service’, so as to attract levy of service tax under the FA.

    Further, pursuant to the 46th Amendment of the Constitution
    of India by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1982, the tax-base underwent a
    sea-change due to the insertion of clause (29A) in Article 366. The States
    acquired the powers to levy sales tax on certain types of ‘deemed sale’. As a
    consequence of this constitutional amendment, all the states have made changes
    in their respective VAT Legislation in this regard. One such ‘deemed sale’ that
    can be subjected to levy of VAT/sales tax is transfer of the right to use any
    goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred
    payment or other valuable consideration. Thus, States have been levying or
    attempting to levy VAT/sales tax on such activity of ‘providing licence to use
    IT software’.

    The IT/Software Industry was slapped with the demands raised
    by the authorities either for customs duties i.e., CVD or for service tax. Even
    though CVD was paid on the licence value, service tax was being demanded thereon
    and vice versa. Even simultaneous demands under customs and service tax have
    been raised in many cases.

    It would appear that it was never the legislative intent that
    the value addition in the form of software licence should be taxed more than
    once. It should either be taxed by way of ED/CVD or by way of service tax.

    Information Technology Software Service (ITSS):

    IT/Software Services were comprehensively brought under the
    service tax ambit w.e.f. 16-5-2008 through introduction of a specific entry viz.
    section 65(105)(zzzze) in the FA.

    Relevant extracts from the Ministry’s Circular/Letter DOF No.
    334/1/2008-TRU, dated 29-2-2008 clarifying the scope of service are as under :

    4.1.1

    Information Technology (IT) software service includes:

    •  Development (study, analysis, design and programming) of software.



    •  Adaptation, upgradation, enhancement, implementation and
      other similar services in relation to IT software.


    •  Provision of advice and assistance on matter related to IT
      software, including :


    •  Conducting feasibility studies on the implementation of a system,


    •  Providing guidance and assistance during the start-up phase of a new system,


    •  Providing specifications to secure a database,


    •  Providing advice on proprietary IT software


    •  Acquiring (substituted by ‘providing’ by the Finance Act, 2009) the right to
      use, :


    •  IT
      software for commercial exploitation including right to reproduce, distribute
      and sell,


    •  Software components for the creation of and inclusion in other IT software
      products,


    •  IT
      software supplied electronically.


    “4.1.2

    Software consists of carrier medium such as CD, floppy and coded data. Softwares are categorised as ‘normal software’ and ‘specific software’. Normalised software is a mass market product generally available in packaged form, off the shelf in retail outlets. Specific software is tailored to the specific requirement of the customer and is known as ‘customised software.’

    “4.1.3

    Packaged software sold off the shelf, being treated as goods, is leviable to excise duty @ 896. In this Budget, it has been increased from 8% to 12% vide Notification No. 12/2008-CE, dated 1-3-2008. Number of IT services and IT-enabled services (ITeS) are already leviable to service tax under various taxable services.”

    “4.1.5

    Software and upgrades of software are also supplied electronically known as digital delivery. Taxation is to be neutral and should not depend on forms of delivery. Such supply of IT software electronically shall be covered within the scope of the proposed service.”

    Software downloaded from Internet:

        a) The Finance Minister in his Budget Speech on 28-2-2006 observed as under:

    “Para 138

    I propose to impose an 8% excise duty on pack-aged software sold over the counter. Customised software and software packages downloaded from the internet will be exempt from this levy.

    In cases where the software is made available only through the medium of the Internet, there is no express, exclusion in Entry 27 stated above. However, the Explanatory Notes, which form part of the Budget papers read as under:

    “Excise duty of 8% is being imposed on packaged software is also known as canned software on electronic media (software downloaded from the internet and customised software will not attract duty). [Serial 27 of Notification No. 6/2006)]”.

        b) The Central Excise Rules, 2002 contemplate payment of excise duty at the time of removal of excisable goods from the factory and at the rates prevalent on the date of removal from the factory. Where a customised software solution is sold to the customer through the medium of Internet, the transaction can be considered as an e-commerce transaction and there is no physical removal of goods in a tangible form from the factory gate, which is the requirement of levy of excise duty. Further, the software is not available in any medium for it to be considered as goods as per the rationale of the Supreme Court in TCS case.

        c) The following judicial rulings need to be noted:

        i) In Digital Equipment (India) Ltd. v. CC, (2001) 135 ELT 962, the Tribunal has held that information transmitted via e-mail cannot be akin to import of record media in 85.23. In an e-mail transfer, no media as a movable article is crossing the international boundaries and there is no movable property movement involved. Therefore, transfer of information or idea or knowledge on e-mail transfer would not be covered within the ambit of goods under the Customs Act. If they are not goods, then they cannot be subject to any duty.

        ii) The Supreme Court in the case of Associated Cement Company v. CC, (2001) 128 ELT 21 had held that where any drawings or designs or technical materials are put in any media or paper, it becomes goods. Hence only if an intellectual property is put in a media, it is to be regarded as an article or goods.

        iii) In Multi Media Frontiers v. CCE, (2003) 156 ELT 272, the Tribunal has observed that a software cannot exist by itself and for it to be put to use it has to necessarily exist on some suitable media such has floppy disc, tape or CD.

        iv) In Pantex Geebee Fluide Power Ltd. v. CC, (2003) 160 ELT 514 (Tri), it has been held that a transfer of intellectual property by intangible means like e-mail would not be liable to customs duty.

        d) The Geneva Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce Document WT/MIN (98) DEC/ 2, dated 25-5-1998 which is a declaration of an intent by members of WTO that they would continue their current practice of not imposing customs duty on electronic declaration.

        e) MVAT does not contain specific provisions to tax supply of software electronically.

        f) Providing the rights to use information technology software supplied electronically is specifically covered under the scope of ITSS[section 65(105) (zzzze)(vi) of FA.]


    Amendments by the Union Budget for 2009-10/Clarification regarding packaged or canned software:

    Relevant Extracts of Ministry’s Circular Letter D.O.F. No. 334/13/2009-TRU, dated 6-7-2009 are as under:

    I.3 — Packaged or canned software:

    Partial exemption from excise duty has been provided to packaged or canned software so that the duty payable on that portion of the value which represents the consideration for the transfer of the right to use such software, is exempted. The benefit of the exemption is available to the manufacturer of such software when he declares to the Central Excise authorities that the right to use is transferred for commercial exploitation and fulfilment of some other conditions. The details are contained in Notification No. 22/2009 — Central Excise, dated 7th July, 2009. On the portion of the value which is exempted from excise duty, service tax will be leviable under the ‘Information Technology Software Service’.

    II.9 — IT Software:

    On packaged or canned software, CVD exemption has been provided on the portion of the value which represents the consideration for transfer of the right to use such software, subject to specified conditions. This portion of the value is leviable to service tax as ‘Information Technology Software Service’. Although, the CVD exemption has not been made conditional upon the payment of service tax, it is requested that a mechanism be put in place to ensure regular exchange of information on details of importers availing of the exemption between the customs and service tax formations so that, where necessary, action for recovery of service tax may be taken.

    Amendments by the Union Budget for 2010-2011:

        a) Realising the difficulties faced by the IT/Software Industry, few steps were taken to address the same, as under:

    •     Vide Notification No. 17/10-CE, dated 27-2-2010, the condition that the transfer of right to use shall be for a commercial exploitation has been removed and Notification No. 22/09-CE has been superseded.

    •     Similarly, the Notification No. 80/09-Cus has been superseded vide Notification. No. 31/10-Cus and the condition relating to ‘commercial exploitation’ has been dispensed with.

    •     Also, vide Notification No. 2/10-ST, dated 27-2-2010, the exemption from payment of whole of the service tax has been granted to ‘packaged or canned software’, intended for single use and packed accordingly subject to fulfilment of the prescribed conditions including the condition that the benefit of Notification 17/10-CE is not availed of.

    •     Exemption from payment of service tax vide Notification Nos. 2/10-ST and 17/10-ST, both dated 27-2-2010 is granted in respect of ‘packaged or canned software’, intended for single use and packed accordingly.

    (b) The following needs to be noted :

    •     The exemption is restricted to shrink-wrapped single-user software licence and does not apply in case in ‘multi-user software licence’.

    •     The issue of liability to pay service tax under ‘reverse charge in terms of section 66A of FA could arise in regard to the remittances towards licence fee made by the licensee based in India to the overseas software company. In such cases, there could be issues as to whether the exemption granted vide the above Notifications would be applicable or not.

    a) Important Ruling of Madras High Court:

        The Madras High Court, in a landmark ruling in Infotech Software Dealers Association v. UOI, (2010) 20 STR 289 (ISODA), has upheld the constitutional validity of section 65(105)(zzzze) of the FA, introduced with effect from 16-5-2008.

        b) The writ petition filed by ISODA had raised the following issues, in particular:

    •     Whether software is ‘goods’ ?

    •     Whether, the transfer/supply of software, in terms of the end-user licence agreements en-tered into by the members of the ISODA would amount to a service, especially in the light of the fact that this transaction is treated as a sale?

    • Whether, the Parliament has the legislative competency to levy service tax u/s.65(105) (zzzze) of the Act?

        c) During the course of hearing, ISODA had submitted that its members are re-selling software products under the three categories, viz.,

    •     shrinkwrapped software,

    •     multiple user software/paper licence and

    •     Internet downloads.

    ISODA also submitted that the transactions entered into by its members are only a sale of software being goods and that no element of service is present and that only the State Governments are empowered to levy tax in terms of Entry 54 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and con-sequently, the Parliament has no legislative compe-tence to levy service tax on the same transaction u/s.65(105)(zzzze) of the FA.

        d) Some of the important contentions of Department were as under:

    •     The amendment would fall under Entry 97 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India and that the challenge to the legislative competency of the Parliament cannot be sustained. Standardised software licence is available across the shelf or is downloaded from Internet, and by itself, it is not a finished product inasmuch as updates are given by the original manufacturer to the end user for an agreed period. At no stage, does an end user who runs the software becomes the absolute owner of the software.

    •     The right to use the software excludes certain rights, particularly the right to modify, right to work on the software and the right to commercially exploit the software and that each transaction should be considered individually to find out whether it is a sale or service. ‘service element’ is clearly discernible in the case of customised software which is liable for service tax.

        e) The Madras High Court made the following important observations:

    •     When the legislative competency of a taxing statute is considered, the nature of transaction and the dominant intention would be relevant.

    •     Goods can be tangible or intangible property and the Indian law does not distinguish between the two.

    •     Software, whether packaged or customised is goods within the meaning of Article 366(12) of the Constitution, in terms of the rulings of the Supreme Court in TCS case, the Karnataka High Court ruling in Antrix Corporation (2010) TIOL 515 HC KAR and the Madras High Court ruling in Infosys (2008) 233 ELT 56 (Mad.). The legal position that software is goods is no longer res integra.

    •     The copyright in a software transaction is protected and always remains the property of the creators/developer and what is sold is the right to use the software. When the sale is with a condition for exclusive use of the software by the customer at the exclusion of others, it gives absolute possession and control to the user of the right to use the software.

    •     When a developer does not sell the software (packaged or customised) as such, the transaction between the resellers and the end users cannot be a sale of software as such but only the contents of the data stored in the software, which would only amount to a service.

    •     If the software is sold through the medium of Internet which is downloadable, it does not fit into the ambit of ‘IT software of any media’ and consequently, it is possible to hold that when an access control is given through an Internet medium with a username and password and when there is no CD or other storage media for the item, it does not satisfy the requirement of being ‘goods’.

        f) The Madras High Court dismissed the writ petition of ISODA and held as under:

    •     Though software is ‘goods’, the transaction may not amount to a sale in all cases and it may vary depending upon the end-user licence agreement. The transaction between the members of ISODA with its customers is not of sale of the software as such, but the contents of data stored in the software would amount to only service.

    •     The Parliament has the legislative competency to enact law to include certain services provided or to be provided in terms of ‘ITSS’, the residuary Entry 97 of List I of Schedule VII. The constitutional validity of the amended provision cannot be questioned so long as the residuary power is available.

    •     The question as to whether a transaction would amount to sale or service depends upon the individual transaction and on that ground, the vires of a provision cannot be questioned.

        g) Some of the important issues arising from the aforesaid landmark ruling of the Madras High Court are as under:

    •     The ruling makes a distinction between ‘soft-ware’ and ‘contents of data stored in the software’.

    •     The ruling has given a new dimension to the taxation of the transfer of right to use goods, by the States. The following observations, in particular, need to be noted:

    Para 31

    “….the dominant intention of the parties would show that the developer or the creator keeps back the copyright of each software, be it canned, packaged or customised, and what is transferred to the network subscriber, namely, the members of the association, is only the right to use with copyright protection. By that agreement, even the developer does not sell the software as such. By that Master End-User Licence Agreement, the members of petitioner — association again enter into an end-user licence agreement for marketing the software as per the conditions stipulated therein. In common parlance, end user is a person who uses a product or utilises the service. An end user of a computer software is one who does not have any significant contact with the developer/ creator/designer of the software. According to Webster’s New World Tele-com dictionary, an end user is “the ultimate user of a product or service, especially of a computer system, application or network.” On a careful reading of the above, we are of the considered view that. “…. when a transaction takes place between the members of ISODA with its customers, it is not the sale of the software as such, but only the contents of the data stored in the software which would amount to only service. To bring the deemed sale under Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India, there must be a transfer of right to use any goods and when the goods as such is not transferred, the question of deeming sale of goods does not arise and in that sense, the transaction would be only a service and not a sale.”

    It is a settled law that for a tax to be levied by the States on the transfer of right to use goods, there is no need for goods, as such, to be transferred. The above observations of the Madras High Court appear to unsettle the settled law.

    •     The decision seems to distinguish between trans-actions entered into by developers of software products and re-sellers of software products. Most domestic software product players directly sell software licences to their customers. While, most re-sellers operate in the area of re-sale of imported software licences, a distinction is sought to be made between selling of a licence by a developer and that by a reseller.

    •     The decision does not seem to distinguish between ordinary re-sellers and value added re-sellers. In a latter case there is possibility of service element.

    •     The Court has also significantly observed that electronic import of software licences is a service, as the software (being goods) is not transferred. This observation could significantly impact the import of software licences by the Indian resellers and large business houses, a major portion of which happens through the electronic mode.

    MRP levy introduced for packaged software — Recent Notifications:

    In an important development, the Government has brought the entire packaged software industry, under the MRP-based excise levy by issuing Notification Nos. 30/10-CE and 53/10-Service Tax, both dated 21-12-2010.

    In terms of the Notification No. 30/10 CE, Notification No. 49/08 CE, dated 24-12-2008 has been amended, providing for an abatement of 15% of what has been given on the MRP of the packaged software based on which the central excise duty will have to be paid by the manufacturer and CVD to be paid by the importer. In terms of Notification No. 53/10-ST, dated 21-12-2010 no service tax shall be payable on the licence value in terms of section 65(105)(zzzze)(v) of FA.

    Some of the more important implications that arise from the Notifications are as under:

        a) MRP-based levy would be applicable only for the physical mode used for licensing of the pack-aged software licences as contrasted to the electronic mode of transfer. Hence electronic transfer of licences for packaged software would continue to be taxed under service tax in terms of specific provisions u/s.65(105)(zzzze) of the FA.

        b) Importers of packaged software licences would have the choice of either importing the licences in the electronic mode, or in the physical mode. Up-till now importers were either paying CVD on the physical imports or service tax on the electronic imports on the transaction values. Now with the MRP-based levy for CVD on physical imports, it is possible that importers could be better off, shifting to the electronic import, as the value-added margins for imports could be much higher.

        c) The local manufacturers may find it better to shift to the electronic mode of transfer of software licences, as paying service tax at 10.3% on the transaction value could be cheaper as compared to paying central excise duty at 10.3% on MRP less 15% abatement.

        d) In terms of Notification No. 49/08-CE, dated 24-12-2008 (as amended) ‘retail sale price’ means the maximum price at which the excisable goods in packaged form may be sold to the ultimate consumer and includes all taxes local or otherwise, freight, transport charges commission payable to dealers, and all charges, towards advertisement, delivery, packing forwarding and the like as the case may be, and the price is the sole consideration for such sale.

    Notifications issued could result in practical difficul-ties for the importers. To illustrate:

        i) In many cases the concept of MRP may not work for imported packaged software products. In such cases, issues would arise as to whether the customs authorities can treat the ultimate selling price charged by the importer, as the MRP where there is no MRP for the software product imported/ or would the authorities go by the retail prices published by the foreign suppliers of software packages which could be substantially higher than the price at which these are sold in India.

        ii) MRP regime may not be practically workable inasmuch as a large number of transactions get conducted through contracts entered into between the parties. A software player holding valid IPR can transfer licences to various customers at varyingprice arising out of customisation etc. In such cases, how can MRP-based duty be computed.

        e) In cases of imports at significantly reduced special price (e.g., non-profit bodies), the same could get covered under the MRP levy, resulting in higher overall costs.

        f) The new MRP-based levy would also affect importers of software licences for their internal purposes at discounted prices. Such importers would have to pay CVD on the MRP less 15% abatement, which could mean increase the overall costs.

        g) By issuing these Notifications, the Government seems to be confirming that packaged software is nothing but goods. However the electronic transfer of software licence would be service in terms of clause (vi) of section 65 (105)(zzzze) of FA. Hence, the same product can be ‘goods’ or ‘service’ depending upon the mode of delivery.

    Part A : INTEREST ON CENVAT CREDIT TAKEN OR UTILISED WRONGLY

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    Service Tax

    1. Relevant statutory provisions :


    (a) Rule 3(1) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR
    04) :


    A manufacturer or producer or provider of taxable
    service shall be allowed to take Credit (hereinafter referred to as CENVAT
    Credit) . . . . . .

    (b) Rule 4(1) of CCR 04 :


    CENVAT credit in respect of inputs may be taken
    immediately on receipt of the inputs in factory of the manufacturer or premises
    of provider of output service . . . . . .

    (c) Rule 4(2)(a) of CCR 04 :


    The CENVAT Credit in respect of Capital goods
    . . . . . . at any point of time in a given financial year shall be taken only
    for an amount not exceeding fifty per cent of duty paid on such Capital goods in
    the same financial year.

    (d) Rule 4(7) of CCR 04 :


    The CENVAT Credit in respect of input service shall
    be allowed, on or after the day on which payment is made of the value of input
    service and service tax paid or payable as indicated in Invoice . . . . . .

    (e) Rule 14 of CCR 04 :


    “Where CENVAT Credit has been taken or utilised
    wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same along with the interest shall
    be recovered from the manufacturer or provider of the output service and the
    provisions of the S. 11A and S. 11AB of the Excise Act, or S. 73 and S. 75 of
    the Finance Act, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such
    recoveries.”

    2. What constitutes CENVAT Credit ‘taken or
    utilised wrongly’ :


    (a) Some of the meanings attributed to the terms
    ‘take’, ‘utilise’ and ‘wrongly’ are as under :

    (i)
    Take


    • Lay
      hold of with one’s hands; reach for and hold

    • To get
      possession of; to gain, to choose; select

    • To gain
      or receive into possession; to seize; to assume ownership

     

    Concise
    Oxford English Dictionary

    Webster’s
    Concise Dictionary


    Black’s Law Dictionary

    (ii)
    Utilise

    • To make
      practical or worthwhile use of

    • Make
      practical and effective use of

    • To make
      use of; turn to use

    • To make
      use of, turn to account, use


     

    New Collins Dictionary

    Concise Oxford English Dictionary

    Concise Dictionary


    COD 6th Ed.

    (iii)
    Wrongly

    • ‘Wrong’
      has various shades of meaning like mistake, not true, in error


    • Wrongful — Characterised by unfairness of injustice, contrary to law

    • Wrong —
      Any damage or injury, contrary to right, violation of right or of law


     

    Concise Oxford Dictionary

     

     

     

     

     

     

    P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s Law Lexicon.

    (b) The following emerges from the foregoing
    analysis :

    • Taking of credit would
      imply an act of availment of credit/benefit under CCR 04. [This could be
      demonstrated by making entry in records, returns, etc.]
      It is possible that an assessee makes entries for ‘CENVAT Credit taken’ in their records but does not actually utilise it. [He may have some doubts about the entitlement of the credit taken or for other reasons like no service tax payable to enable set-off]

      •     Taking or utilising credit wrongly both could be offences. ‘Taking’ can be compared to ‘attempt to commit an offence’ while ‘Utilise’ would mean actually committing of an offence.


      •     The word ‘wrongly’ is stronger than ‘mistakenly’ or ‘erroneously’ and would usually imply an intention to take CENVAT Credit which an assessee was not entitled in terms of CCR 04.


         3.  Reversal of CENVAT Credit before utilisation — Settled position:

          In a landmark ruling in Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (1996) 81 ELT 3 (SC) it has been held by the Supreme Court that when MODVAT Credit taken is reversed, it would mean that MODVAT Credit was not taken at all. This principle is relevant for CENVAT Credit as well. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter?:

      Para 7
      In view of the aforesaid clarification by the Department, we see no reason why the assessee cannot make a debit entry in the credit account before removal of the exempted final product. If this debit entry is permissible to be made, credit entry for the duties paid on the inputs utilised in manufacture of the final exempted product will stand deleted in the accounts of the assessee. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the assessee has taken credit for the duty paid on the inputs utilised in the manufacture of the final exempted product under Rule 57A. In other words, the claim for exemption of duty on the disputed goods cannot be denied on the plea that the assessee has taken credit of the duty paid on the inputs used in manufacture of these goods.

      The above-stated principle laid down by the Su-preme Court has been followed in large number of cases.
          In CCE v. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd., (2007) 215 ELT 3 (SC) also it has been held that reversal of credit before utilisation amounts to not taking credit.

      In view of the Supreme Court ruling in the Bombay Dyeing case, CBEC has in the context of Textiles

      Textile Articles vide its Circular No. 858/16/2007 –CX, dated 8-11-2007, clarified as under?:

      Para 3

      …..it is clarified that para 2 of the said Circular stands amended to the extent that in case, credit taken on inputs used in the manufacture of the said goods cleared under Notification No. 141/2002–C.E. or Notification No. 30/2004–C.E., has been reversed before utilisation, it would amount to credit not having been taken.

      c)    However, it needs to be noted that rulings of the Supreme Court in Chandrapur Magnet & Bombay Dyeing, have been distinguished by the Bombay High Court in CCE v. Nicholas Piramal (India) Ltd., (2009) 244 ELT 321 (Bom.) while interpreting Rule 6 of CCR 04.

      4.    Recent clarification of the Board

      CBEC, vide Circular No. 897/17/2009–CX, dated 3-9-2009 has clarified as under:

      “The Tribunal decision and the High Court judgment referred to above, was delivered in the context of erstwhile Rule 57I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and that the Supreme Court order under reference is only a decision and not a judgment. Since, Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, is clear and unambiguous in the position that interest would be recoverable when CENVAT Credit is taken or utilised wrongly, it is clarified that the interest shall be recoverable when credit has been wrongly taken, even if it has not been utilised, in terms of wordings of the present Rule 14.”

      It may be noted that erstwhile Rule 57I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 did not specifically provide for any interest payment along with reversal of wrongly taken credit while present Rule 14 of CCR 04 provides for payment of interest along with reversal of wrongly taken credit.

         5.  Interest:

      In Pratibha Processors v. UOI, (1996) 88 ELT 12 (SC), it was observed by the Supreme Court as under:

      “In fiscal statutes, the import of the words-, — ‘tax’, ‘interest’, ‘penalty’, etc. are well known. They are different concepts. Tax is the amount payable as a result of the charging provision. It is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purpose, the payment of which is enforced by law. Penalty is ordinarily levied on an assessee for some contumacious conduct or a deliberate violation of the provisions of the particular statute. Interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable. The levy of interest is geared to actual amount of tax withheld and the extent of delay in paying the tax on due date. Essentially, it is compensatory and different from penalty — which is penal in character.” (p. 20).

      Thus, interest is not a penalty but is essentially compensatory in nature. If CENVAT Credit is taken in books but not actually utilised, it would appear that since there is no loss of revenue to the Government, it may not be required to be compensated by a taxpayer.

          6. Interest on credit taken but not utilised — Judicial views:.
          In CCE v. Maruti Udyog Ltd., (2007) 214 ELT 173 (P & H)], the Punjab & Haryana Court agreed with the views of the Hon’ble CESTAT that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as entry in the MODVAT record and was in fact not utilised. SLP filed by the Revenue against this order of the P & H High Court has been dismissed by the Supreme Court (2007) 214 ELT A 50 (SC) on 10-10-2006.

      In the case of Maruti Udyog, the assessee claimed Modvat Credit which was not allowable in absence of requisite certificate under Rule 57E of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, being produced within six months but still the assessee claimed the same and credited the amount in RG – 23A Part II. The authorities disallowed the Modvat Credit relying upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Osram Surya (P) Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore, (2002) 142 ELT 5 (SC).

      The Tribunal, however, had held that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as an entry in the Modvat record and was not in fact utilised. The Tribunal held that in absence of utilisation of credit, the assessee was not liable to pay interest.

      The P&H High Court held as under:
      “Learned counsel for the appellant is unable to show as to how the interest will be required to be paid when in absence of availment of Modvat Credit in fact, the assessee was not liable to pay any duty. The Tribunal has clearly recorded a finding that the assessee did not avail of the Modvat Credit in fact and had only made an entry.

      In view of this factual position, we are unable to hold that any substantial question of law arises.”

         b) Attention is particularly drawn to the ruling of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Ind–Swift Laboratories Ltd. v. UOI, (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H), relevant extracts from which, are reproduced hereafter for reference?:

      Para 9

      The Scheme of the Act and the CENVAT Credit Rules framed thereunder permit a manufacturer or producer of final products or a provider of taxable service to take CENVAT Credit in respect of duty of excise and such other duties as specified. The conditions for allowing CENVAT Credit are contained in Rule 4 of the Credit Rules contemplating that CENVAT Credit can be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in the factory of the manufacturer or in the premises of the provider of output service. Such CENVAT credit can be utilised in terms of Rule 3(4) of Credit Rules for payment of any duty of excise on any final product and as contemplated in the aforesaid sub-rule. It, thus, transpires that CENVAT credit is the benefit of duties leviable or paid as specified in Rule 3(1) used in the manufacture of intermediate products, etc. In other words, it is a credit of the duties already leviable or paid. Such credit in respect of duties already paid can be adjusted for payment of duties payable under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. U/s.11AB of the Act, liability to pay interest arises in respect of any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded from the first day of the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. Interest is leviable if duty of excise has not been levied or paid. Interest can be claimed or levied for the reason that there is delay in the payment of duties. The interest is compensatory in nature as the penalty is chargeable separately.

      Para 10
      In Pratibha Processors v. Union of India, 1996 ELT 12 (SC), (1996) 11 SCC 101, it was held that interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable. The levy of interest is geared to actual amount of tax withheld and the extent of the delay in paying the tax on the due date. It is compensatory and different from penalty which is penal in character. Similarly, in Commissioner of Customs v. Jayathi Krishna & Co., 2000 (119) ELT 4 (SC) (2000) 9 SCC 402, it was held that interest on warehoused goods is merely an accessory to the principal and if principal is not payable, so is it for interest on it. In view of the aforesaid principle, we are of the opinion that no liability of payment of any excise duty arises when the petitioner availed CENVAT Credit. The liability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisation. Even if CENVAT Credit has been wrongly taken, that does not lead to levy of interest as liability of payment of excise duty does not arise with such availment of CENVAT Credit by an assessee. Therefore, interest is not payable on the amount of CENVAT Credit availed of and not utilised.

      Para 11
      Reliance of respondents on Rule 14 of the Credit Rules that interest u/s.11AB of the Act is payable even if CENVAT Credit has been taken. In our view, the said clause has to be read down to mean that where CENVAT Credit taken and utilised wrongly. Interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that the CENVAT Credit has been wrongly taken as such availment by itself does not create any liability of payment of excise duty. On a conjoint reading of S. 11AB of the Act and that of Rules 3 and 4 of the Credit Rules, we hold that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT Credit. The interest shall be payable from the date CENVAT Credit is wrongly utilised.

      Though the above ruling was pronounced on 3-7-2009 (i.e., before the issue of Circular by CBEC on 3-9-2009), it is very relevant for interpretation of Rule 14 of CCR 04.

          Conclusion:
         a) Under the Scheme of CCR 04 there is a clear mismatch as to time of availment of credit and time of utilisation of credit. In case of Service Providers rendering multiple services through loca-tions spread across the country, it becomes very difficult, to ascertain whether credit availed has been actually utilised or not.

      However, the principle laid by the Supreme Court in a landmark ruling CCE v. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd., (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC) that, MODVAT does not envisage one to one correlation between ‘Inputs’ and ‘Outputs’ and credit once availed is indefeasible, is very much relevant in the context of CCR 04 as well.

      Under the scenario of timing mismatch between credit availment and credit utilisation, at a practical level, issues would remain as to how do service tax authorities monitor correctness of CENVAT Credit availed & its subsequent utilisation.

          b) Under CCR 04, the onus for availment of credit is on the person taking credit. Hence, it would appear that a person taking the credit may have to satisfy with reasonable certainty as to the credit entitlement and its subsequent utilisation in terms of conditions stipulated under CCR 04.

      In cases where, there is a very remote possibility of entitlement to credit availment & utilisation of credit [e.g., credit of Input services availed by a retailer] Rule 14 of CCR 04 could be invoked, despite subsequent reversal by such retailer, on the ground that there was no entitlement to credit inasmuch as a retailer is not a beneficiary under CCR 04.

      There could also be cases where there is a genuine error in availing CENVAT Credit (e.g., simultaneous availment of CENVAT benefit on Capital Goods & depreciation under income-tax). However, subsequently on its own but before utilisation of credit, the same is rectified by filing revised return before IT Authorities. This could be a good case for non-recovery of interest.

          c) As regards clarifications issued by CBEC vide Circular dated 3-9-2009, it would appear that interpretation of Rule 14 of CCR 04 by the Punjab & Haryana High Court [discussed in para 6(b) earlier] to the effect that Rule has to be read down to mean ‘credit taken and utilised wrongly’ reflects a correct view. Hence, if bona fides of credit availment can be established, there may not be a case for interest recovery on account of subsequent reversal of credit. However, this would depend on the facts and circumstances, of each case.

      It needs to be expressly noted that though correctness of CBEC Circular dated 3-9-2009 would be judicially tested, the field formations are likely to follow the Circular resulting in extensive litigations.

        d)  To end, since under CCR 04 the onus as to the availment of CENVAT Credit is on the service provider, it is felt that, due diligence need to be exercised at the point of availment of credit through a good system in place.

    Is education taxed as commercial training or coaching service ? – A judicial analysis.

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    Service Tax

    1. ‘Commercial training or coaching’ has been subjected to
    the levy of service tax for the past six years viz. from July 1, 2003.
    Despite the short span, interestingly, the subject matter has been judicially
    tested in many recent cases of educational training institutions wherein
    Tribunals have made in-depth analysis and examination of the levy for the said
    taxing entry. An attempt is made here to bring together this analysis in a
    nutshell for readers. In most of these cases, the issue revolved around, whether
    training or coaching or the centre imparting training or coaching is commercial
    or charitable or vocational etc. or otherwise.

    2. Section 65(26) of the Finance Act,1994 (The Act) has
    defined ‘commercial training or coaching’ as ‘any training or coaching
    provided by a commercial training or coaching centre’.



       In turn, section 65(27) of the Act has defined the service provider which is designated as “commercial training or coaching centre” as follows :

        ” ‘Commercial training or coaching centre’ means any institute or establishment providing commercial training or coaching for imparting skill or knowledge or lessons on any subject or field other than the sports, with or without issuance of a certificate and includes coaching or tutorial classes but does not include preschool coaching and training centre or any institute or establishment which issues any certificate or diploma or degree or any educational qualification recognised by law for the time being in force”.

    3. It is obvious that the legislature has observed some
    difference between the terms ‘training’ and ‘coaching’ and therefore both the
    expressions are used in the definition. The two words are defined in many ways,
    however, major differences can be summarised this way — Training in general is
    imparted by the trainer to a large number of trainees for a shorter duration and
    the flow of imparting skill or knowledge is usually in the direction of trainees
    from the trainer through constant delivery of information whereas coaching is a
    customised and ongoing process, often interactive and through which solution is
    provided for specific needs and challenges. However, the term ‘education’ rests
    much above the concept of training and coaching. Training is an activity whereby
    the trainee exercises to achieve mastery and perfection. Education presupposes
    growth or development of a person. Like being ‘educated’ is much more than being
    ‘literate’ in a specific field, ‘education’ per se is much beyond
    training and coaching. Therefore, in the context of levy of service tax, it is
    required to study and understand the scope of the statutory provisions of the
    category of ‘commercial training or coaching service’. In the case of Malappuram
    District Parallel College Association 2006-TIOL-35-HC-Kerala, the High Court
    noted :


    “Even if the State is not able to finance higher education as required under the Directive Principles of State Policy under article 41 of the Constitution, it should not deny and discourage opportunities for education by adding cost to it in the form of tax on education which will certainly disable the economically weaker sections from pursuing higher studies”. While the revenue argued over the fact that education is carried on as a business activity, the Court further observed as follows :

    ‘This malady has to be corrected only by levying income tax on the institutions and not by licensing the institutions to collect service tax from students. In fact section 10(22) of the Income Tax Act which granted blanket income tax exemption for educational institutions is now deleted and exemption is provided with moderation in section 10(23C) of the said Act. Of course, section 11 of the Income Tax Act which provides cover to large number of tax evaders under the guise of charity will continue to protect educational institutions as charity includes education also. If education is run on business lines, then solution is to amend section 11 and other relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act withdrawing the exemptions to institutions and Government can simultaneously provide financial aid to beneficiaries which will put an end to misuse of Income Tax provisions”.

    The court also observed, “Tax on education, particularly when the incidence of tax is passed on to the beneficiaries, that is, the students, is a regressive legislation and has to be condemned, more so, when large number of poor people seeks salvation through education and employment”.

    4. In the background of the above thin yet fundamental
    difference between education on one hand and coaching and training on the other,
    examined below are observation of Tribunals in various cases :


    4.1 Service tax of about 1.5 crores and huge penalties, interest, etc. were demanded from Great Lakes Institute of Management Ltd., which conducts post graduate programme in management and which has academic and research collaborations with renowned international universities [Great Lakes Institute of Management Ltd.- (GUM) vs. CST Chennai-2008-TIOL-134-CESTAT-Mad.]. Summary of the Tribunal’s observations was that GUM was a section 25 company and as such, most of its surplus earned was transferred to campus infrastructure project fund and that GUM aims to mould itself into a center of excellence in consonance with its avowed objective. The provision of education by an institution is a commercial concern run with the sole objective of making profit whereas in GUM’s case, no individual gained any profit by its operations and the Tribunal ruled, “the test which has therefore now to be applied is whether the predominant object of the activity involved in carrying out the object of general public utility is to sub-serve the charitable purpose or to earn profit: where profit making is predominant object of the activity, the purpose though an object of general public utility would cease to be a charitable purpose. But where the predominant object of the activity is to carry out charitable purpose and not to earn profit, it would not lose the character of charitable purpose merely because some profit arises in the activity. The exclusionary clause does not require that the activity must be carried on in such a manner that it does not result in any profit”. The Tribunal further observed, “Healthcare and education are social services essential to provide minimum quality of life to the people of a country. As the demand for these services cannot be met by the public sector alone, private sector fills the gap. For most of them in the private sector, health and education are lucrative business”. “Primary object of GUM is to impart education, profit making is not its motive. The refrain of the several judicial authorities cited is that profit motive characterises a commercial concern as against general public utility in the case of a charitable organisation “.

    4.2. In another case, viz. M/ s. Magnus Society vs. CCE-Hyderabad 2008- TIOL-1812-CESTAT-Bang. wherein the society registered under Chhattisgarh Societies Registration Act,1973, having an objective to provide instructions, teaching and training various career oriented programmes at bachelor, post-graduation and  doctorate level provides education through centres across the country induding through distance learning courses. The Tribunal went into details of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entered into by the society with various UGC recognised universities and concluded that “so long as the instructions impart education, the same cannot be considered as ‘commercial training or coaching’; moreover, the appellants are registered under Societies Registration Act. The Income Tax Authorities have also issued certificates for exemption from Income Tax. All these prove that profit motive is not there in these institutions”. The Tribunal also stated that decision in the case of Great Lakes Institution-[GUM] (supra) squarely applied to this case. The Tribunal also observed, “education has a large scope. Education may include coaching or training and not vice-versa. Coaching or training is a very narrow activity imparting skill in a particular discipline. But education is a broader term which is a process of personality of body, mind and intellect … “. Education develops several skills whereas what is meant by commercial training or coaching, in the definition given by the Finance Act has a very narrow meaning and it is not broad enough to contain in its hold institutions imparting higher learning like MBA or Management in Computer Science or any other discipline. They would not be called as ‘commercial training or coaching centres’.

    4.3 Interestingly in the case of Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad vs. CCE-Hyderabad-2008- TIOL-2007-CESTA T-Bang, wherein the institution, again a registered society, is engaged in providing an extension of practical training to those who already hold positions of responsibility and enable its members to share their own experience profitably with others having different but comparable experience. In this case notably, distinguishing commercial training and coaching from mere training or coaching, the Tribunal observed, in para 12 of the judgment as follows:

    “We are not inclined to hold that the activities rendered by them would fall within the ambit of coaching or training. In our view, the fact that Income Tax Department has given them exemption is very very relevant. We do not agree with the department that the point is not at all relevant. In that case, legislature could have taxed all training and coaching. They need not have used the word ‘commercial’. The very fact the word commercial has been used indicates that the word ‘commercial’ qualifies the commercial coaching or training centre. It doesn’t qualify coaching or training. It qualifies the centre. As long as the institution is registered under the Societies Registration Act and also exempted from Income Tax, it cannot be considered as a commercial centre. Therefore, no service tax is leviable under the category of commercial coaching or training.”

    4.4 Vocational  Training:
     
        Another Bench of the Bangalore Tribunal examined the case of an institute viz. M/ s. Pasha Educational Training Institute, Hyderabad 2009 TIOL 288 CESTAT-BANG engaged in providing training in various fields in the name of different institutes i.e. insurance agents sponsored by various insurance companies, health care institute providing training for nursing exam, institute of media studies providing training in TV and Journalism, institute for performing arts provides training in music through classes, etc. The institute indeed is a case of a registered Trust under section 12A of the Income Tax Act as charitable institution and also is recognised and licensed by IRDA under IRDA Act, 1999 to conduct classes for students who appear for IRDA examination. After making detailed examination of syllabus, etc. it ruled as follows:

    “On going through the nature of training, it is clear that the said training can be considered as ‘Commercial Training or Coaching’ because the Institute imparts skill or knowledge on the subject of insurance. However, the second point to be noted is whether the said training can be considered as a vocational training. Vocational training means training that imparts skills to enable the trainee to seek employment or undertake self-employment directly after such training or coaching. This definition should not be interpreted in a very narrow sense as done by the Commissioner (Appeals). The argument of the Commissioner (Appeals) is that even after the training, the trainee should again write examination conducted by IRDA to qualify to work as Insurance Agent under the Insurance Act, 1938. We should not forget that the comprehensive training given by the appellant enables the trainees to appear for the examination conducted by IRDA. Moreover, the appellant institute is also recognised for imparting training by the IRDA. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the training imparted is not a vocational training.”

    4.5 In another case the Institute of CFA, Hyderabad etc. vs. CCE-Hyderabad viz. 2008-TIOL-2036-CESTAT-Bangalore, the following aspects were discussed in great detail:

    •     Relevant provision of Universities Grants Commission Act.

    •     Difference between ‘education’and ,coaching and training’.

     

    •     Objectives of the institute as set out in its Memorandum of Association.

    •     Judgment of the Kerala High Court in the case of Malappuram District Parallel Colleges Association (supra), Pasha Educational Training Institute (supra) etc. & GUM’s case (supra)

    •     Board’s Circular No.59/08/2003 dated 20-06-2003, wherein scope of the taxing entry is provided.

    •     Substitution of the phrase ‘any person’ for the phrase ‘commercial concern’ in section 65 with effect from 01-05-2006and that such deletion was not made in the definition of commercial coaching and training or commercial training and coaching centre.

    In addition to the above, a point was made out tha t even if the courses are not recognised by the law, still they qualify as education, even if non-formal in nature ..Merely due to lack of recognition, the process of education will not cease to be education and it will definitely not become commercial training or coaching and there could not be an absurd conclusion that all schools in the country which do not confer degree or diploma certificate recognised by law are commercial training or coaching centre and subject to service tax. The fact of imparting  education and recognition by various bodies should clearly be visible in order to get out of the purview of the definition of commercial training or coaching centre was the summary of observations. Further, the term ‘commercial’ was considered significant in interpreting the provision of law.

    4.6 Another important case uiz, Ahmedabad Management Association (AMA) vs. CST- Ahmedabad-2009- TIOL-214-CESTAT-Ahm, which followed the decisions of GUM (supra) ICFAI (supra) also took the view that since the profit earned by the association cannot be distributed among the members and in case of dissolution any surplus would have to be given away to another society or charitable trust engaged in similar activities, the AMA was held as not a commercial concern. Further, while analysing the training programmes conducted by them, it was observed that they did not lead to conferring any degree. In this background, the decision of GUM (supra) and ICFAI (supra) were gone into detail and conclusion was reached that programmes conducted by AMA were in the nature of providing continuing education to candidates participating in the programme and/ or creating an awareness of the latest developments etc. but not to prepare the candidates for a particular job or for a particular examination. The Tribunal observed that training programmes conducted by AMA could not be called commercial training or coaching for the following reasons:

    (i) AMA is not a commercial concern,

    (ii) The purpose of the training is not commercial,

    (iii) The objective of the AMA in conducting the programme is not commercial and whatever extra income is earned, it is ploughed back into the association and is used for public purpose,

    (iv) The programmes conducted by the AMA can be considered as continuing education programmes and not as commercial training or coaching,

    (v) No specific skills which prepare candidates for a particular job or an examination are imparted,

    (vi) The diploma programmes/courses conducted by AMA amount to education or continuing education and no commercial training or coaching.

    5. To summa rise, the crux of various pronouncements discussed above is that if the objective of an educational institution in entirety is education and the institution itself does not carry out the said educational activity solely with profit motive, even if the activity results in surplus which is deployed for the activity of education, the activity of education would not be interpreted as commercial training or coaching. Significance of the term ‘commercial’ has been recognised in all the above decisions. Although the status of an institution as charitable body under the Income Tax Act, or the registration under the Societies Registration Act or holding registration as section 25 company, etc. may not by itself directly determine the taxability under the service tax law, they certainly have pursuasive value to help determine non-taxability under the said category of service.

    Sale of flats not being a ‘service’, builders not liable for registration and payment of Service Tax

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    Sale of flats not being a ‘service’, builders not liable for
    registration and payment of Service Tax :



    Magus Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2008
    TIOL 321 HC GUW ST)

    1. The petitioner, a builder, promoter and developer engaged
    in the business of development and sale of immovable property received a notice
    from the Superintendent to register as service provider of commercial and
    residential construction services. Challenging the authority to issue such
    notice, the present writ petition was filed.

    2. The petitioner constructs buildings and sells
    premises/flats in such buildings. The petitioner pleaded that the transaction
    between the petitioner and a flat purchaser is a transaction for sale of
    premises and cannot be treated as contract for rendering service. The
    consideration for the sale of premises is often paid in instalments though the
    terms correlate more or less with the stage of development of construction. The
    agreement for sale of such flats is stamped as ‘sale of flats’ for the entire
    consideration. The agreement for sale is registered by the petitioner. The
    agreement contains several details including price, area of the unit, price for
    common areas, other facilities concerning the flat, etc.

    3. The petitioner engages various reputed contractors for
    various construction-related services, yet the construction activity is carried
    out for their own purposes and not for anyone else. In some cases where land is
    owned by a different person and not the petitioner, an agreement is entered into
    with the land owner and this in common parlance is known as development
    agreement. After acquiring all the rights of development and raising
    construction thereon, constructional or developmental activity is carried out by
    the petitioner for its own benefit and not for any other person. The flats are
    sold in the same manner as in the case when the land is owned by the petitioner.

    4. According to the Department’s affidavit, the activity
    undertaken by the builders is for and on behalf of prospective buyers for
    consideration of cash or deferred payment and is covered under ‘works contract’
    and not ‘sale’. The Department argued that the builder has to enter into
    agreement for sale before accepting money as advance/deposit when building/flat
    is found only in specifications of the agreements. The saleable products not
    being existent at the time of making agreement, construction is the essential
    obligation of the petitioner and therefore the petitioner is to be treated as
    service provider of construction of complex to the parties in compliance with
    the agreements against the advance received according to the statutory
    provisions provided in S. 65(105)(zzzh) of the Finance Act, 1994, which are wide
    enough to include estate builders such as the petitioner. Since the agreement is
    executed prior to the completion of work of construction, it is nothing else but
    ‘works contract’ and as such, the petitioner is liable to pay Service Tax and
    the advance received makes the petitioner work for and on behalf of prospective
    buyer.

    5. The Court noted that the moot question in the petition
    related to whether the petitioner worked as a service provider for prospective
    buyers with whom the agreements were entered into OR the petitioner constructs
    flats for the purpose of sale to those with whom the agreements are entered into
    and proceeded to scrutinise the relevant clauses of the said agreements which
    mainly contained details of instalments, the obligation of prospective buyer to
    pay stamp duty and registration fee as per applicable laws, etc., the probable
    time of handing over possession and the condition that possession would be
    provided only after full payment of the sale price and that after payment of all
    dues, a sale deed would be registered in favour of the prospective buyer as per
    prevailing Stamp Act, Registration Act, Property Transfer Act, etc.

    6. The Court observed that the combined reading of various
    clauses of the agreement for sale made it clear that the transaction relates to
    purchase and sale of premises and not for carrying out any constructional
    activity on behalf of the latter. The flat purchasers are entitled for specific
    performance of the contract and non-performance may lead to refund of advance
    with interest by the petitioner. They also have an obligation to register the
    agreement. Further, the registering authority also treats these documents as
    agreement for sale/purchase of premises and not relating to construction
    activity and as such, stamp duty is levied on the sale consideration.

    7. The ‘selective approach’ for taxing services under Service
    Tax provisions and the relevant enabling provisions of the Indian Constitution
    were discussed at length by the Court. Similarly, the provisions of the Finance
    Act, 1994 relating to charge of Service Tax, payment of Service Tax,
    registration, relevant provisions of ‘taxable service’ and in particular S.
    65(30a), S. 65(25b), S. 65(91a), S. 65(105)(zzq) and 65(105(zzzh) were
    discussed. The Court further noted that the term ‘service’ is not defined by the
    Finance Act, 1994 by way of any explanation or otherwise or by the rules framed
    thereunder. The Court therefore examined the definition of service under the
    Income-tax Act, 1961, under the MRPT Act, 1969 as well as under the Consumer
    Protection Act and under the FEMA and concluded that one can safely define
    ‘service’ as an act of helpful activity, an act of doing something useful,
    rendering assistance or help, service does not involve supply of goods;
    ‘service’ rather connotes transformation of goods/user of goods as a result of
    voluntary intervention of ‘service provider’ and is an intangible commodity in
    the form of human effort. To have service, there must be a ‘service provider’
    rendering services to some other person(s), who shall be recipient of such
    ‘service’.

    8. Under the Finance Act, 1994,Service Tax is levied on taxable service only and not on service provider. According to the Court, the relevant legal provisions of Service Tax did not support the view that the petitioner provided any service to anyone and that the activity carried out by a person for his own benefit cannot be termed as service rendered. The Court took note of Circular No. 80/10/2004, dated September 17, 2004, which clarified that estate builders constructing buildings/premises for themselves were not covered within the ambit of construction service. Further, the decision in the case of K. Raheja Development Corporation v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 5 SCC 162 was discussed and was distinguished by noting that this decision was rendered on the facts of its own case. The Court emphatically stated that until the time the sale deed is executed, the title and interest, including the ownership and possession in the construction made remained with the petitioner company. The fact of payment of advance and instalments does not lead to the inference that petitioner company is making construction for and on behalf of the probable allottees. The Court also stated that the decision of the Apex Court in K. Raheja’s case (supra) considered the issue relating to Sales Tax and not relating to Service Tax. According to the Court, as distinguished from the facts of K. Raheja (supra) in the present case, there was no material to show that the petitioner company constructed the premises on behalf of the prospective allottees and also stated that similar view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Assotech Realty Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2007) 8 VST 738.

    9. Further, importantly reliance was made on Circular No. 332/35/2006-TRU, dated August 01, 2006 which clarified that the builder/promoter/developer undertaking construction activity on one’s own account did not have relationship of service provider and service recipient with anyone and therefore the question of providing taxable service did not arise. Citing extracts from CIT v. Aspinwall & Co. Ltd., (1993) 204 ITR 225, Keshavji Raoji & Co. v. CIT, (1990) 183 ITR 1 and a catena of other decisions, the binding nature of the circular was affirmed by the Court and it finally contended that the aforementioned Circular dated August 01, 2006was binding on the Department which in more than abundant terms made it clear that a builder /promoter / developer undertaking construction activity for its ownself did not provide any taxable service. The material placed by the petitioner clearly showed that the activity undertaken by them is their own work and they only sold the completed construction work to the buyers. Any advance/deposit received was against consideration of sale of the flat/premises and not for obtaining service from the petitioner.

    Note: The above decision is in complete contrast to the Authority for Advance Ruling’s (AAR) decision in case of Hare Krishna Developers 2008 (10) STR 341 (AAR) reported in June 2008 issue under this feature on almost identical facts and clauses of the agreements under both the cases. The ruling of the AAR being binding only on the applicant, the decision of the High Court assumes significant importance. Major contrasting features of the two decisions pronounced by the two separate judicial authorities are provided below:

    1. In both the cases, the agreement with the prospective buyer relates to SALE OF UNITS. However, in Hare Krishna’s case (supra), it is contended by the authority that the point of time at which the ownership gets transferred will not be determinative of applicant’s liability to pay Service Tax. The words ‘in relation to’ used in the context of ‘construction of the complex’ are of widest import and are capable of encompassing builders/developers. AAR noted that “package of services is necessarily involved in the activity viewed as a whole”. Not merely construction part of the activity that matters, the co-related and incidental services are all embraced within the scope of the definition and the builder / developer does everything to honour its commitment to the customer (booker) from whom it receives valuable consideration in instalments. As against this, in case of Magus narrated above, distinguishing features are as follows:

    • Sale of units/premises to be subject matter of the transaction between the builder and prospective buyer.

    • Advance and instalment received are looked upon as a convenient method of payment. The judgment further brought out the contention that until the execution of sale deed, the title, interest and ownership and possession of construction remains with the builder and therefore, no construction is done on behalf of probable allottees.

    • A good amount of stress is laid on registration by registering authorities as agreement of sale/purchase of flats and the relevant stamp duty levied thereon. (In Hare Krishna’s case, this aspect is not touched upon).

    •  An overall inference of ‘sale’ aspect is drawn rather than laying stress on details of facilities mentioned in various clauses while interpreting ‘sale of flat’ from combined reading of the clauses of the agreement and concluding that no construction activity is carried out for buyers.

    • A lot of effort is put in to distinguish ‘service’ from ‘service provider’ vis-a-vis statutory provisions to contend that there being no ‘service’ in the transaction of sale of flats, the builder is not a service provider for his own business activity where there is no recipient of service present.

    2. In case of Hare Krishna, the Department’s reliance on Raheja’s case [2006 (3) STR 337 (SC)], as alternative contention was not discussed or considered while delivering for judgment, as chief reliance was placed on the fact that transaction was regarded as that of construction services in terms of clause (zzzh) and in terms of Classification Rules, ‘construction service’ was the correct classification entry even if the service could be classified as works contract service as per K.Raheja’s case (supra) and therefore, alternative contention was not gone into. As against this, Gauhati High Court distinguished K. Raheja’s decision on two counts: Firstly, the judgment was given on its own facts and secondly, that it related to SalesTaxand not ServiceTaxand therefore was not considered relevant.

    3. In Hare Krishna’s case, the Board’s Circular dated August 23, 2007only was considered. Further, the said Circular was interpreted to be distinguishing the applicant’s case from the person/builder who sells flat after completing the entire construction on his own and then selling the same. Whereas in Magus’s case, the Circular No. 80/110/2004 of September 17,2004as well as the Circular of August 01, 2006 were discussed and the latter Circular was heavily analysed and relied upon. These Circulars were not referred to in the former’s case.

    Compounding/settlement mechanism

    The prescribed procedure

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    3. The prescribed procedure :



    • The declaration in respect of Service Tax/interest/penalty and the amount
      payable is required to be made in a prescribed form viz. Form 1, to be
      furnished in duplicate and to be signed by the declarant or his authorised
      representative and to be submitted to the designated officer (an officer not
      below the rank of Assistant Commissioner) notified by the jurisdictional
      Commissioner for the purpose of the scheme, between July 01, 2008 and
      September 30, 2008.



    •  The designated officer is required to verify the submitted declaration and
      upon such verification, is required to issue an order in specified format
      within 15 days of the date of receipt of the declaration. The order would
      indicate the amount to be paid by the declarant for resolution of dispute
      under the scheme.



    •  The declarant is required to pay the sum determined by the designated
      authority vide the order described above within 30 days and intimate such
      payment along with the proof of payment. The declarant is also required to
      produce evidence of withdrawal of petition pending before any High Court or
      the Supreme Court, if any.



    •  The payment under this scheme is to be made in cash only.


    à
    On receipt of the proof of payment determined in accordance with the order and
    the proof of withdrawal of petition, if any, to any Court, the designated
    authority would be required to issue a certificate in a prescribed form
    viz.
    Form 2 certifying full and final settlement of the amount in dispute.

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    The Scheme

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    2. The Scheme :




    •  The scheme comes into force on July 01, 2008 and will close on September 30,
      2008, meaning thereby that immunity under the scheme would be available only
      to those cases in respect of which declaration is made under the scheme
      between the stated period.



    • The scheme is open to persons in dispute for Service Tax, interest or penalty
      leviable under the Finance Act, 1994, but not paid prior to March 01, 2008 and
      where a show-cause notice has been issued on or before March 01, 2008 or an
      order has been issued.



    • The scheme is open to cases where service tax in dispute does not exceed
      Rs.25,000. The scheme is not open to cases where service tax is not paid after
      collecting the same from the recipient of service for which a notice u/s.73A
      of the Finance Act, 1994 has been issued.

    [It may be noted that no limit is prescribed for the amount
    of interest or penalty in dispute].


    • The order passed under the scheme would be final and non-appealable. Any
      pending appeal shall stand withdrawn by virtue of the said order. In case of a
      writ petition pending before any High Court or the Supreme Court, the person
      opting for the scheme is required to withdraw such petition.



    •  The amount paid under the scheme is non-refundable under any circumstances.



    • The Central Government is empowered to remove difficulties for implementation
      of the scheme.



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    Background

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    1. Background :


    The much publicised and hyped Dispute Resolution Scheme 2008
    was notified vide Chapter VI of the Finance Act, 1994. The Government has now
    issued Notification No. 28/2008-ST, dated June 04, 2008 whereby the rules called
    the Dispute Resolution Scheme Rules 2008 have been prescribed. Further,
    guidelines in respect of the scheme have been provided vide Circular No.
    102/5/2008-ST, dated June 04, 2008. The operation of the scheme, the procedure
    to be followed and settlement mechanism is provided below :

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    Larger Bench Ruling on Valuation: Material Supplied by Receiver of Service, Whether Includible in Taxable Value

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    Introduction:
    In commercial or residential construction activity, it is commonly found that a developer or owner, appointing a contractor to construct a building or a structure, purchases important building material like cement and steel on its own account and supplies the same to the contractor for the use in the building construction contracted to the contractor. Since the contractor carries out the construction activity with its labour, various equipments and other material such as bricks, sand etc., the material bought by oneself and used for one’s own construction is commonly referred to as free supply of material to the contractor. However, the fact of the matter is that the material belongs to the contractee and it is not given free to the contractor as gift or donation. The contractor receives the material for use in the contractee’s project. The discussion herein relates to controversy over the issue whether such material forms part of the value of contractor’s services for determination of service tax liability thereon.

    Relevant statutory provisions:
    • Section 66 – Charging section

    “There shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at the rate of twelve per cent of the value of taxable services referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (zzzzw) of clause (105) of section 65 and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.” [emphasis supplied]

    • Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) deals with valuation of a taxable service for the charge of service tax. This section with effect from 18-04-2006 was substituted whereby its scope was expanded. Nevertheless, the basic mode and characteristic of valuation of a taxable service remained unaltered.

    Prior to 18-04-2006, the said section 67 read as follows:

    “For the purpose of this chapter, the value of any taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him.

    [emphasis supplied]

    Explanation 1 ………… Explanation 2 ……….. Explanation 3 ………..”

    (There were certain inclusions and exclusions provided in the above explanations which are not produced for the sake of brevity).

    The substituted section 67 with effect from 18-04- 2006 reads as under:

    “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, where service tax is chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value, then such value shall, —

    (i) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration in money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him;

    (ii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration not wholly or partly consisting of money, be such amount in money as, with the addition of service tax charged, is equivalent to the consideration;

    (iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable, be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner.

    (2) Where the gross amount charged by a service provider, for the service provided or to be provided is inclusive of service tax payable, the value of such taxable service shall be such amount as, with the addition of tax payable, is equal to the gross amount charged.

    (3) the gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include any amount received towards the taxable service before, during or after provision of such service.

    (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the value shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed.

    Explanation. — For the purposes of this section, —

    (a) “consideration” includes any amount that is payable for the taxable services provided or to be provided;

    (b) ………..

    (c) “gross amount charged” includes payment by cheque, credit card, deduction from account …………………..” [emphasis supplied]

    Commercial construction service was introduced in the service tax law with effect from 10th September, 2004 whereas residential construction service became taxable from 16th June, 2005. A variety of construction agreements are entered into by developers or builders with their contractors. Some contracts involve construction services with all the material to be supplied by their contractor/s and in some others, the owner/developer purchases critical materials like cement and steel on his own account. In order that the material supplied by a contractor in a composite contract would not have to suffer service tax, the Government issued Notification No.15/2004-ST and subsequently Notification No.18/2005-ST as regards residential construction on identical lines.

    Notification No. 15/2004-Service Tax read as follows:

    “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 93 of the Finance Act, 1994 (32 of 1994), the Central Government, being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts the taxable service provided by a commercial concern to any person, in relation to construction service, from so much of the service tax leviable thereon under section 66 of the said Act, as is in excess of the service tax calculated on a value which is equivalent to thirty-three per cent of the gross amount charged from any person by such commercial concern for providing the said taxable service:

    Provided that this exemption shall not apply in such cases where –

    (i) the credit of duty paid on inputs or capital goods has been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; or (

    ii) the commercial concern has availed the benefit under the notification of the Government of India, in the Ministry of Finance, (Department of Revenue) No. 12/2003-Service Tax, dated the 20th June, 2003 [G.S.R. 503 (E), dated the 20th June, 2003.”

    [emphasis supplied]

    Consequent upon the introduction of the above service, Central Board of Excise & Customs (the Board) issued Circular No.80 dated 17-09-2004 wherein, inter alia, the reason for issue of Exemption Notification No.15/2004-ST was contained in para 13.5 as extracted below:

    “13.5. The gross value charged by the building contractors include the material cost, namely, the cost of cement, steel, fittings and fixtures, tiles etc. Under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the service provider can take credit of excise duty paid on such inputs. However, it has been pointed out that these materials are normally procured from the market and are not covered under the duty paying documents. Further, a general exemption is available to goods sold during the course of providing service (Notification No. 12/2003-ST) but the exemption is subject to the condition of availability of documentary proof specially indicating the value of the goods sold. In case of a composite contract, bifurcation of value of goods sold is often difficult. Considering these facts, an abatement of 67% has been provided in case of composite contracts where the gross amount charged includes the value of material cost. (refer notification No.15/04-ST, dated 10-09-2004) This would, however, be optional subject to the condition that no credit of input goods, capital goods and no benefit (under notification no. 12/2003-ST) of exemption towards cost of goods are availed.”

    With effect from 01-03-2005, vide Notification No.4/2005-ST, an explanation was inserted in the above Notification viz. “For the purpose of the Notification, the gross amount charged shall include the value of goods and materials supplied or provided or used for providing the said taxable service provided by the said service provider.

    In terms of this explanation, the revenue contended that when cement or steel is supplied by the builder/developer/owner, the same should form part of the value for determining 67% abatement. Widespread litigation occurred on this issue across the country. The Madras High Court provided an interim relief in a writ filed by Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 2007 (7) STR 123 (Mad) holding that:

    “On a reading of the explanation, this court is prima facie of the view that such an insistence is not in accordance with the explanation. To that extent there will be an interim order as prayed for.”

    Based on the above interim order, the Delhi High Court in Era Infra Engineering Ltd. 2008 (11) STR 3 (Del) also provided interim relief to the appellant.

    Conflicting decisions by two co-ordinate Benches of Tribunal:

    Subsequently, the Bangalore Tribunal in Cemex Engineers vs. CST Cochin 2010 (17) STR 534, relying on the observation of the Madras High Court in Larsen & Toubro (supra), held that the value of goods supplied and provided by the client cannot be included for calculating service tax and that such inclusion would be contrary to the provisions of section 67 of the Act which specifies that the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service. As against this, in Jaihind Projects Ltd. vs. CST, Ahmedabad 2010 (18) 650 (Tri.-Ahmd), the Appellant engaged in laying pipelines provided commercial or industrial construction service to companies such as ONGC, GAIL, Essar Projects Ltd. etc. In all cases, pipes were supplied by the receiver of service to the Appellant. The department raised a dispute contending that the value of pipes supplied by receiver ought to have been included in the value for determining taxable value of 33% while availing the benefit of Notification No.15/2004-ST. The Tribunal held that even under section 67 of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, the pipes being essential component of providing pipeline service, it must be treated as consideration other than money and therefore the value of such pipes must be included in the gross value to be offered for service tax payment. As regards Explanation to Notification No.15/2004-ST, the Tribunal held that the ‘Explanation’ has explained the meaning of “gross amount charged” and since the assessee has opted to avail the abatement under the Notification, he must include the value of goods supplied for the purpose of determining taxable value. The Tribunal further noted that if the value of the pipes used is not included, the Appellant would not be eligible to claim abatement under Notification No.15/04-ST as amended. The Tribunal also recorded that discriminatory results would ensue between two pipeline service providers if one uses pipes provided by him and the other uses one provided by the receiver client. Therefore, when the receiver supplies the material, the expression ‘used’ in the Explanation comes into play as the objective of the Explanation and the proviso is to ensure uniformity in different situations. Further, reliance on Circular No.80/10/2004-ST dated 17-09-2004 by the Appellant was negated by holding that the Explanation brought about from 01-03-2005 did not exist at the time of issue of the circular.

    The above conflicting decisions led the Division Bench of the Delhi Tribunal to make a reference to the Larger Bench wherein 23 appeals got bunched together. The decision dated 6th September, 2013 is discussed below:

    M/s. Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd. & 22 Others 2013-TIOL-1331-CESTAT-DEL-LB:

    The question before the Larger Bench (the Bench or LB) was whether the value of the material supplied by the recipient of the taxable service free of cost to the provider of service should also be included for availing tax benefit under Notification No.15/2004-ST dated 10-09-2004 as amended by Notification No.4/2005-ST dated 01-03-2005. The above Notification as well as Notification 18/2005-ST issued in respect of residential construction service along with all other abatement Notifications later got merged into a single one viz. Notification No.1/2006 -ST dated 01-03- 2006 without any change in the notification per se. Although the issue relates to the construction industry and a vast number of contractors providing construction services, the decision assumes greater importance as the scope of provision of valuation contained in section 67 of the Act is examined and dealt with at a great length.

    Revenue’s contention in brief:

    The Revenue discussed various alternative schemes available under the service tax provisions for valu-ation of construction service as follows:

    •    CENVAT credit of material including cement and TMT bars used while providing construction service and remitting full value of the service.

    •    Benefit under Notification 12/2003-ST of exemp-tion to the extent of value of goods sold during the course of providing service.

    •    Benefit under Notification 15/2004-ST wherein a generic abatement of 67% of the “gross amount charged” in case of composite contracts when the gross amount charged includes value of material used upon condition of non-availment of credit on inputs and capital goods and the benefit under the above referred Notification
    12/2003-ST.

    •    In case of works contracts under a scheme, service tax at a very low rate on the gross amount wherein value of goods or abatement is not deducted.

    In the above background, it was contended that Explanation to Notification 15/2004-ST as amended provided that where an assessee opts for the benefit of abatement of 67%, the value of all the goods must be included for determining the value of the contract without availing CENVAT credit of inputs or capital goods or the benefit of exclusion of goods sold under Notification No.12/2003-ST.

    The word ‘used’ in the explanation clearly means irrespective of the source of supplies. If the material/ goods were used in the construction service, the value of such goods ought to be included to avail abatement of 67%. Further, even u/s. 67 of the Act, the value of goods whether supplied by the provider or the receiver, if used for providing taxable service, constitute the “gross amount charged” for providing taxable service and lastly, in terms of the contract between the parties, free supplies constitute the consideration by the receiver to the provider of construction service and this value is accordingly taxable u/s. 67 and therefore, it must be declared and offered for tax if 67% abatement benefit is availed. The Revenue interalia relied on N M Goel & Co. vs. Sales Tax Officer (1989) 1 SCC 335 wherein steel and cement supplied by PWD to the assessee were to be deducted from the bills payable by PWD and thus PWD sold these goods to the assessee, though the goods were used for construction for the benefit of PWD. The Bench, in this frame of reference, observed that as against the above case of N. M. Goel & Co. (supra), in the instant case of free supply by the receiver, the agreements between the parties do not provide for recovery of cost of free materials by the recipient from the service provider and the case does not help achieve resolution of the referred issue. The Bench further observed that it did not dispute the fact of integral nexus between free supplies with the construction activity. However, essentially whether such free supplies by the recipient would constitute consideration accruing to the service provider so as to be includible in the “gross amount charged” for the purpose of computation of the taxable value u/s. 67 or to be included in the “gross amount charged” for availing benefit under the abatement Notification as comprehended within the meaning of the word ‘used’ in the Explanation.

    Discussion & Analysis contained in the Decision:

    Contentions presented by the Appellants were referred to the order of the Hon‘ble Bench in the analysis that follows:

    •    Section 67 deals with valuation of taxable services and intends to define what constitutes the value received by the service provider as consideration from the recipient for the service provided. Implicitly, the consideration— monetary or otherwise—must flow from the receiver to the provider of service and should accrue to the benefit of the latter. For interpreting the term ‘consideration’, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Ku. Sonia Bhatia vs. State of UP & Others AIR 1981 SC 1274 wherein it was held that “consider-ation means a reasonable equivalent for other valuable benefits passed on by the promisor to the promisee or by the transferor to the transferee.” The Bench, thus observed that even on an extravagant inference, free supply of cement and steel would not constitute a non-monetary consideration by the recipient to the provider particularly because material supplied is retained by the service recipient (misprinted as provider in the order). The Bench also relied on the recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2013 (29) STR-DEL and observed that the High Court considered the challenge of constitutionality of Rule 5 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 to the extent it includes reimbursement of expenses in the value of taxable service and also that the said Rule is ultra vires sections 66 and 67 of the Act. The High Court held that section 66, the charging section, levies tax only on the taxable services and this inbuilt mechanism ensures that only taxable services shall be evaluated u/s. 67. On construing provision of section 66 and section 67(1)(i) together and harmoniously, the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider and nothing more and nothing less than consideration paid as quid pro quo for the service can be brought to charge. The Bench thus observed that the legislative text of sections 66 and 67 being clear and unambiguous and in the light of the judgment in Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. (supra) “the conclusion is compelling and inviolable that value of free supplies by a construction service recipient would not constitute non- monetary consideration to the service provider nor form part of the gross amount charged for the service provided” and consequently could not constitute value of tax-able service. As per this analysis, the Bench held that the conclusions in Jaihind Projects Ltd. proceeded on a flawed interpretation of section 67. Further, on bringing uniformity of incidence as discussed in this decision, the Bench relying on Union of India & Others vs. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. & Others 1983 (14) ELT 198 (6) (SC) and UOI vs. Nitdip Textile Processors P. Ltd. 2011 (273) ELT 321 (SC) observed that advantages or disadvantages to individual assessees are accidental, inevitable and inherent in every taxing statute. Further, referring and relying on Moriroku UT India (P) Ltd. vs. State Of U.P. 2008 (224) ELT 365 (SC), the Bench observed as follows:

    “Sales-tax or trade-tax under the 1948 Act is leviable on sale, whether actual or deemed, and for every sale there has to be a consideration. On the other hand, excise duty is a levy on a taxable event of ‘manufacture’ and it is calculated on the ‘value’ of manufactured goods. Excise duty is not concerned with ownership or sale. The liability under the excise law is event-based and irrespective of whether the goods are sold or captively consumed. Under the excise law, the liability is there even when the manufacturer is not the owner of raw material or finished goods (as in the case of job workers). For sales-tax purposes, what has to be taken into account is the consideration for transfer of property in goods from the seller to the buyer. For this purpose, tax is to be levied on the agreed consideration for transfer of property in the goods and in such a case cost of manufacture is irrelevant. The provisions relating to measure (section 4 of 1944 Act read with Excise Valuation Rules, 2000) aim at taking into consideration all items of costs of manufacture and all expenses which lead to value addition to be taken into account and for that purpose Rule 6 makes a deeming provision by providing for notional additions. Such deeming fictions and notional additions in excise law are totally irrelevant for sales-tax purposes.” [emphasis supplied].

    Based on the observations in Moriroku UT India (P)    Ltd. (supra), the Bench concluded that a clear principle emerged therefrom that consideration for the transfer of property in goods from the seller to the buyer is only to be held as consideration for the levy of tax unlike event-based excise duty and this principle would equally apply to the levy of service tax and particularly in the context of specific language of section 67 of the Act.

    •    For the next issue of the Explanation inserted in Notification No.15/2004, the Bench observed that the Explanation purports to define “gross amount charged” and the abatement of 67% is in respect of the “gross amount charged” by the service provider to the recipient, the identical expression employed in section 67(1)(i). The question, therefore, requiring examination is whether the Notification No. 04/2005-ST amending Notification No. 15/2004-ST enlarged the contents of the said expression. The Bench while considering various contentions advanced for the Appellants observed that the nuance of the substantial contention of the Appellants was that goods used by the provider of the construction service for providing such service in the Explanation to the Notification No.15/2004-ST must connote those goods as are charged to the service recipient. However, the revenue contested that the literal meaning of the word ‘used’ be given its full effect and ought not to be restricted to the other two expressions ‘supplied’ and ‘provided’ with reference only to the “gross amount charged”. On behalf of the assessees, contention was made to employ interpretative principle of “Noscitur A Sociis” or the analogy of the “ejusdem generis” to hold that goods and material used for providing the construction service, the value of which is charged to the service recipient. Considering the term ‘used’ problematic, examination and analysing of the said principle of noscitur was found imperative and a number of judgments and quotes on the subject matter were referred to in aid thereof which inter alia included;

    •    Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise AIR 1991 SC 151

    •    Paradeep Agarbatti, Ludhiana vs. State of Punjab AIR 1998 SC 171

    •    Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla and Another vs. A. D. Divelkar and Others 2002-TIOL-447-SC-MISC-CB

    The Bench finally concurred with the contention advanced on behalf of the Appellants while elaborating on the noscitur a sociis principle that when the Notification exempts service tax to the extent of 67% of the “gross amount charged” in relation to construction service, section 67 enacts that the value of taxable service shall be the “gross amount charged” which would not include the value of free supplies, as any value to constitute consideration, monetary or otherwise should flow from a recipient to the provider of service and this being the pre-condition u/s. 67, the expression “gross amount charged” in the Explanation could not be construed as expanding the scope of the said expression. Likewise, the reliance placed by the Appellants inter alia on CIT, Bangalore vs. B. C. Srinivasa Setty (1981) 2 SCC 460 was noted and the Bench observed the principle laid therein to the effect that when four important components of concept of a tax system (viz. the nature of the imposition of a tax which prescribes the taxable event, the person on whom the levy is imposed, the rate of tax and the measure or value to which the rate is applied), are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law and any uncertainty and vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity. Considering this principle analogous to the principle that liability to tax could not be inferred on a doubtful or ambiguous provision and the benefit of ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the assessee, the Hon‘ble Bench concluded that the expression ‘used’ in the Explanation to Notification No.15/2004-ST is inherently ambiguous and more so in the context of other expressions therein i.e., supplied or provided, the noscitur principle must be applied to conclude that only such goods/materials which are ‘supplied’ by the service provider or ‘provided’ by the service provider or ‘used’ when supplied or provided by the service provider i.e. goods and material whether supplied, provided or used in the construction and charged on the service recipient and value where-of is received by the service provider towards a consideration that accrues to the provider’s benefit would alone comprise the “gross value charged” by the construction service provider within the meaning of section 67 and for availing benefit of Notification 15/2004- ST. Alternatively, it can also be stated that since the free supplies i.e. incapable of computation provision of section 67(1)(iii) would not apply as free supply would not fall within section 67, the computation provisions fail and consequently restriction on availability of benefit of exemption would be nugatory. Based on the above, the reference was answered in the following words in para 16 of the order:

    “Para 16:

    “(a) The value of goods and materials supplied free of cost by a service recipient to the provider of the taxable construction service, being neither monetary or non- monetary consideration paid by or flowing from the service recipient, accruing to the benefit of service provider, would be outside the taxable value or the gross amount charged, within the meaning of the later expression in section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994; and

    (b)    Value of free supplies by service recipient do not comprise the gross amount charged under Notification No. 15/2004-ST, including the Explanation thereto as introduced by Notification No. 4/2005-ST.”

    Conclusion:

    Despite the above, the observation of the Bench concluded in para 15 is important. “This is not to say that an exemption Notification cannot enjoin a condition that the value of free supplies must also go into the gross amount charged for valuation of the taxable service. If such intention is to be effected, the phraseology must be specific and denuded of ambiguity.” The question now arises is whether the effect of above ruling would be extended to the composition scheme under the works contract service or the works contracts under the negative list based taxation.

    Under the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007, service tax @2% or 4% during application period was payable on the gross amount charged. An Explanation was inserted with effect from 07 -07 -2009 to include “the value of all goods used in or in relation to the execution of the works contract, whether supplied under any other contract for a consideration or otherwise.”

    Further, the above Rule 3(1) contained “notwith-standing anything contained in section 67 of the Act and Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006………”, means a non-obstante provision. However, determination of value of services involved in the execution of works contract under Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 (Valuation Rules) was subject to the provisions of section 67.

    Similarly, in the post-negative list period, service tax is to be paid on a specific percentage of the total amount charged for the works contract in accordance with the substituted Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules. The term “total amount” is defined to include the fair market value of all goods and services supplied in or in relation to the execution of the works contract. As per the substituted Rule 2A also, the value of service portion in the execution of a works contract is to be determined subject to provisions of section 67.

    Thus, in both the cases, the question remains as to whether the Explanation and its phraseology is unambiguous enough to expand the scope of the term “gross amount charged” to include the value of free supplies is again a matter of interpretation. However, the treatise of the above landmark decision would serve as a guidance to resolve many vexed issues on the subject of valuation. However, the finality on this issue of valuation is unlikely in the near future.

    Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme 2013.

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    Introduction:

    In the past, in 2004 and in 2008, the Government made not so successful attempts, to provide amnesty to service tax defaulters. Once more, the amnesty scheme termed as the Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme, 2013 is introduced under the service tax law (‘VCES’ or “the Scheme” for short) and has come into force from 10th May, 2013 vide the Finance Act, 2013 (FA 2013). The 2004 scheme was known as Extraordinary Tax Payer Friendly Scheme for instant registration of service providers, (2004 Scheme) and the other one (towards reducing litigation) was named as Service Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme 2008 (2008 Scheme). While presenting the Budget for fiscal 2013-14, the Finance Minister stated that out of 17 lakh registered assessees, only seven lakh tax payers file their periodic returns. Thus in effect, only 41% of the registered tax payers comply with the law and hence the scheme is for such defaulters with expectation to collect a reasonable sum of money for the exchequer. The VCES is contained in sections 104 to 114 of the Finance Act, 2013. Simultaneously, with the enactment of the Budget proposals, by exercising power u/s. 114 of the Finance Act, 2013, the Government has also notified Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Rules, 2013 (VCES Rules for short) vide Notification No.10/2013-ST dated 13th May, 2013 and has also issued Circular No.169/4/2013-ST on 13th May, 2013. For all practical purposes, the scheme is one of amnesty only.

    Features of VCES:
    • Any person who was required to pay service tax and for any reason missed or failed paying such tax and such tax dues remained pending as on 01-03-2013, is permitted to pay service tax under VCES for the period from 1st October, 2007 till 31st December, 2012.
    • Who is eligible to declare and pay tax under VCES?

    The scheme is available only to those persons who have not filed any return or stopped filing their returns for any reason and also to those persons who filed their returns in the past but did not disclose their true liability in respect of which no notice or any order for determination under sections 72, 73 or 73A of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) is issued on or before 28th February, 2013 i.e. the date of introduction of the Budget 2013. However, the list of disqualifications or ineligibility is more important to note, as the Scheme is not open in respect of ST-3 Returns filed declaring true liability but service tax wholly or partly was not paid or in cases where any dispute is pending or where any inquiry or investigation is being made against any person for non-payment or short payment of service tax in the form of:

    – A summons issued u/s. 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (as applicable vide section 83 of the Act). – Search of the premises is made.

    – Communication requiring production of accounts, documents or other evidence under the law.

    – An audit is initiated by the department. If any such inquiry, investigation or audit is pending on 1st March, 2013, then in such cases, the designated officer (as will be notified by the Commissioner of Central Excise for the purpose) is required to reject the declaration made by such a person by issuing an order in writing containing reasons for such rejection. The question therefore arises for a person desiring to avail amnesty under the VCES is when any communication is received from the department asking to provide any information, whether the same would render him ineligible to declare taxable service under VCES. The Government in the above referred CircularNo.169 has clarified that besides summons issued u/s. 14 of the Central Excise Act, unless an inquiry/investigation is conducted u/s. 72 of the Act or Rule 5A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and unless such inquiry is pending on 01-03-2013, no other communication would disqualify a person from making a declaration of taxable service under VCES.

    • Service tax dues may be paid not only on provision of taxable services but also on receipt of taxable services. Therefore, if any tax liability is not discharged by a person under reverse charge and if no disclosure thereof is made in any ST-3 Return and no inquiry/investigation is pending, such person also may make declaration under VCES and pay service tax towards liability under reverse charge mechanism for any period covered by the period of October, 2007 to December, 2012.

    • What is the immunity under the Scheme?

    In terms of the Scheme, when a person eligible for making a declaration under VCES makes a declaration and also makes service tax payment in accordance with the Scheme, he would be entitled to get immunity from interest leviable u/s. 75 or u/s. 73B as the case may be, waiver of penalties leviable and prosecution under the law. Generally penalties are imposed u/s. 76, 77 and 78 of the Act and/or similar other provisions. For instance, when a person who was liable for obtaining registration earlier did not register at all and now seeks registration for the first time under VCES would get immunity from penalty for non-registration also. This is also clarified in the above referred Circular No.169 of 13th May, 2013. The distinct feature of VCES is that waiver of interest is provided. The current rate of interest @ 18% is an extremely heavy burden on any assessee. For those who did not have the intention of evasion but did not pay either on account of genuine error or were uncertain about taxability, have a good opportunity to put an end to the liability in case of disputable area of taxability as outcome of litigation is uncertain and long-drawn litigation process may result into manifold liability in case of adverse outcome after a long wait.

    • What is the time limit for filing declaration and in what manner is it to be made? VCES requires an eligible person desiring to declare any taxable service to file such declaration in a prescribed format viz. Form VCES-1 on or before 31st December, 2013. The said form prescribed under VCES Rules is to be submitted to the designated authority (Assistant/Deputy Commissioner or any officer above him prescribed for the purpose). The said designated authority would issue an acknowledgement within 7 working days of the receipt of declaration in Form VCES-2 prescribed for the purpose.

    Important points while making declaration:

    — The declaration should be truthful leaving no scope for the Commissioner of Central Excise to issue Show Cause Notice for false declaration resulting in short payment or nonpayment of tax dues.

    — At the time of filing the declaration and before the due date of 31-12-2013, declarant has to ascertain, declare and calculate the exact sum of tax dues he is going to pay and therefore a separate calculation sheet is required to be attached with the declaration in Form VCES- 1 showing separately computation for each category of service if service tax dues relate to more than one service for the period under declaration.

     — Calculation of the dues should be furnished in the manner prescribed at Sr.No. 3F(1) of the old form of ST-3 Return or Part B of the new form of ST-3 Return as the case may be, as existing during the relevant period. The said calculation must be submitted per Return period i.e. half yearly period of April- September and/or October-March of the respective financial year depending upon the period for which the declaration is made.

    • Payment of service tax under VCES:

    A minimum of 50% of service tax due on the value of declared taxable service has to be paid on or before 31st December, 2013 and the balance is required to be paid on or before 30th June, 2014. If any amount remains unpaid as on 1st July 2014, it would be payable before 31st December, 2014 along with interest for the delayed period beginning from 1st July, 2014 till the date of payment. However this would in any case be prior to 31st December, 2014. The applicable rate of interest would be in accordance with section 75 (currently prescribed at 18%) or section 73B of the Act, as the case may be. On making the payment of service tax dues, the declarant is required to furnish full details of payment and interest if any payable for any delayed payment. Service tax is to be paid in the same manner as ordinarily paid through GAR-7 challan as prescribed under the Service Tax Rules. However, two important points should be noted here:

    (i)    No payment is permissible to be made through CENVAT credit as per Rule 6(2) of the VCES Rules.

    (ii)    Amount once paid in pursuance of declaration will not be refunded by the Government under any circumstances as provided in section 109 of the FA 2013.

    •    When does the declaration become conclusive?

    When the declarant has truthfully made a declaration by the due date of 31st December, 2013 and has made the payment of service tax dues by the due dates discussed above and has also paid interest in accordance with the law if the payment is made after 30th June, 2014 but before 31st December, 2014 and the details of the payment are furnished to the designated authority as and when the payment of tax is made along with the copy of acknowledgement i.e. Form VCES-2, the designated authority will issue an acknowledgement of discharge in the prescribed Form VCES-3. On receipt of the acknowledgement of discharge in VCES-3, the declaration made under the scheme stands concluded according to section 108 of the FA 2013.

    •    What is the consequence if declaration is not true?

    No case would be reopened for the period covered under the declaration, unless the Commissioner of Central Excise finds that the declaration made is substantially false. In such cases, after recording reasons in writing, the Commissioner may issue a Show Cause Notice. Such Show Cause Notice would be considered as issued u/s. 73 or 73A of the Act as if issued under the law in ordinary course. However, no action is permissible to be initiated beyond a period of one year from the date of declaration. This provision of the scheme is likely to prove to be a deterrent for many persons coming forward to declare. Further, the use of the term “substantially false” is extremely subjective and therefore it could be hard to interpret as to what constitutes “substantially false” declaration. Skepticism prevails on account of such vague term and consequently the area would remain vulnerable to litigation.

    Other Provisions:

    •    Service tax obligations in respect of period from 1st January, 2013 are to be complied with in the normal course and therefore immunity from interest and other consequences will not be available.

    •    Declarants who fail to pay at least 50% of their tax dues as declared on or before 31st December, 2013 would not remain eligible for the Scheme. Similarly, those who fail to declare by 31st December, 2013 also will be disqualified to avail benefit under VCES.

    •    Declarants who pay 50% of their tax dues after making declaration before 31st December, 2013 but fail to pay the balance amount or interest before 31st December, 2014 would be visited with provisions of section 87 of the Act whereunder the liability can be recovered by attaching movable or immovable property of the declarant and all other consequences under the law would follow.

    –    Is the Scheme fair to honest taxpayers?

    Interest is essentially compensatory in nature. Total waiver of interest for five years and thereafter for a further period of 01-0102013 to 30-06-2014 is most unprecedented and totally unfair vis-à-vis honest taxpaying fraternity. In no tax amnesty scheme announced by the government, interest was totally waived. In this context, the question may arise as to what would happen to assessees who availed penalty waiver facility announced in the Finance Act, 2012 and paid tax on renting of immoveable property with interest? Are they entitled to claim refund of interest? Thus the Scheme is certainly discriminatory against all regular taxpayers.

    Legal Validity of the scheme:

    There are two landmark Supreme Court judgments on amnesty schemes:

    •    R. K. Garg vs. UOI (1982) 133 ITR 239 (SC) (Bearer Bond Scheme).

    In this case, the constitutional validity of special bearer bonds was challenged mainly on the grounds of inequality under Article 14 of the Constitution. Although as per the majority view of the 5 member bench, the PILs filed were dismissed rejecting the challenge, the extract from the observation made by the dissenting Judge Justice Gupta in the context of bearer bonds in E P Ruyappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr, is worth looking at. He observed “In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14.”

    •    AIFTP vs. UOI (1998) 231 ITR 24 (SC) 98 Taxmann 446 (SC) (97 Amnesty)

    In AIFTP (supra) Honourable Supreme Court had insisted on an affidavit from the Finance Minister that in future there will be no amnesty schemes. The immunity of interest and penalty granted being against the principles of natural justice and discriminatory against regular tax payers, (who are not eligible under the scheme) and in terms of the observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court in AIFTP (supra), it is possible that Courts could strike down the Scheme, if challenged.

    Some other issues and shortcomings of VCES:

    •    The VCES Rule 6(2) does not allow CENVAT credit utilisation. This appears unfair, as under the Excise law, even in cases of clandestine clearances of excisable goods when duty liability is accepted and paid, CENVAT credit is allowed.

    •    As regards CENVAT credit, it is also a matter of concern, whether receiver of the services provided by the declarant would be entitled and allowed to take credit of service tax paid by the persons under VCES by application or otherwise of Rule 9 of CCR. Similarly, when a person has paid service tax under reverse charge u/s. 66A and if such service is otherwise “input service” as per Rule 2(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, whether a provider of service or a manufacturer declaring under VCES would be allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid under VCES or would it be disputed by the department. This requires clarity from the Government.

    •    The most unfair and unfortunate point as regards the Scheme is that it is not open to the persons having pending disputes with the department at different levels. There is a kind of discrimination against such persons who could be visited with consequences of interest, penalty etc. Similarly even when inquiry or investigation is initiated, one fails to appreciate the decision of the Government not to allow such persons the benefit of VCES and select only a class of persons which has not been accessed by the department for the interest free amnesty scheme. One fails to understand how such persons are on a better footing than those who are registered and also tax payers but have disputes on account of interpretation of issues or any other genuine reason. During the entire period of 18 years of existence of service tax, the net of tax gradually included different taxing entries on selective basis and disputes based on interpretation issue were quite incidental to the selective approach of taxation of services and therefore propriety of such discriminatory approach undoubtedly remains questionable.

    •    Further, when the Scheme has become operational on 10th May, 2013, the first half-year period viz. 1st October, 2007 to 31st March, 2008 has already become time-barred. Therefore, why would a person who has not received any notice or inquiry etc. declare value of taxable service for the period October, 2007 – March, 2008 under limitation period, no demand would sustain for the said period.

    Similarly, if a person has not been visited with any inquiry/investigation etc. till 1st March, 2013, he is eligible per se to opt for VCES for his defaults. Since he is required to file declaration and pay 50% tax dues on or before 31st December, 2013 and if he files declaration on say 10th November, well before the last date, even the period April, 2008 – September, 2008 gets time barred. It appears therefore that the scheme could rather cover the period at least till 31st March, 2013 instead of 31st December, 2012.

    •    No provision in VCES relates to maintaining confidentiality of information furnished by a person under VCES. Thus risk of misuse/use by other tax authorities appears to exist. To encourage persons to come forward to declare, it is desired that the scheme is modified whereby assurance is provided to accept declaration as voluntarily done by the declarant or else the persons otherwise wanting to declare may be reluctant to do so as the risk of getting and/or receiving Show Cause Notice would persist in terms of specific provisions in this regard.

    •    There is a large number of pending cases wherein penalties are proposed although the entire amount of service tax is paid, however either NIL returns were filed or no returns were filed at all. At least such cases ought to have been covered under the scheme.

    Caution Note:

    Considering the intricate terms and conditions relating to eligibility & otherwise under the Scheme, professional fraternity is advised to exercise caution and appropriate due diligence before advising on matters relating to the scheme.

    Penalties, Prosecution, Power to Arrest – Recent Amendments

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    Introduction:

    Significant amendments have been made by the Finance Act, 2013 through introduction of provisions for imposing penalties on directors/ managers/etc. of a company and making certain offences cognisable thereby empowering tax authorities to arrest a person without warrant. These amendments which have far reaching implications, are discussed hereafter.

    Penalty for failure to register:

    Presently, u/s. 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’), penalty for failure to register within the due date, is the higher of the following:

    ? Rs. 10,000/- or

    ? Rs. 200/- per day during which the default continues.

    Section 77 of the Act is amended with effect from 10-05-2013, to restrict the maximum amount of penalty for failure to register to Rs. 10,000/-. Though the penalty is still on the higher side, the amendment is a welcome one.

    Penalty on directors, managers, secretary or other officers for certain contraventions by a company:

    The Finance Act, 2011, with effect from 08-04-2011, made section 9AA of the Central Excise Act 1944 (‘CEA’) applicable to service tax. This section provides that if an offence is committed by a company (which includes a firm), the persons liable to be proceeded against and punished are:

    • the company;

    • every person, who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business except where he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence; and

    • any director (who in relation to a firm means a partner), manager, secretary or other officer of the company with whose consent or connivance or because of neglect attributable to whom the offence has been committed.

    In addition to the above, a new section 78A is introduced with effect from 10-05-2013, for imposing a financial penalty upto Rs. 1,00,000/- on directors, managers, secretary or other officers in charge of the company for specified contraventions committed by a company namely :

    • evasion of service tax; or

    • issuance of invoice, bill or challan without provision of taxable services contravening the provisions of the Rules prescribed under the Act;

    • availment and utilisation of credit of taxes/ duty without actual receipt of taxable service or excisable goods either fully or partially in violation of the Credit Rules;

    • failure to pay to the Government any amount collected as service tax beyond a period of six months from the date on which such payment became due.

    The aforesaid persons would be liable to penalty only if:

    • at the time of such contravention they were in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business; and

    • they were knowingly concerned with such contravention.

    The terminology “in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company” has been a subject of interpretation by the Supreme Court as well as High Courts from time to time. Some judicial considerations are given hereafter:

    In Girdhari Lal Gupta vs. D N Menta, Collector of Customs (1971) 3 SCR 748, it was held that, the words “in charge of” must mean in overall control of the day to day business of the company or the firm;

    In State of Karnataka vs. Pratap Chand 1981 (1) FAC 374, it was observed that, a partner who was not in overall control of the day to day business of the firm could not be proceeded against merely because he had a right to participate in the business of the partnership firm under the terms of the partnership deed.

    In light of the foregoing, it would appear that, whether or not a director/manager/etc. of a company was “in charge/responsible”, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Hence, it would be very difficult to lay down specific parameters as to the precise situations under which penalty would be imposable.

    In this regard, it may be noted that for the contraventions mentioned in case of evasion, issuance of bogus invoices and non-payment amount collected as service tax, such persons may also be liable to be prosecuted in terms of section 89 of the Act read with section 9AA of CEA in addition to suffering a financial penalty u/s. 78A of the Act.

    Further, in the absence of a corresponding amendment in section 80 of the Act, the defense of “reasonable cause” available under the said section would not be available against imposition of penalty u/s. 78A of the Act.

    Failure to pay tax collected beyond 6 months – maximum imprisonment increased from 3 years to 7 years:

    Presently, failure to pay to the Government any amount collected as service tax beyond a period of six months from the date on which such payment became due is a punishable offence. The quantum of punishment for this offence is increased with effect from 10-05-2013. Section 89 of the Act, as amended, prescribes the quantum of punishment separately in respect of first offence and second offence and also in cases where amount exceeds Rs. 50 lakh and other cases. The quantum of punishment for various offences as applicable from 10-05-2013 is summarised in the Table at the end:

    Cognizance of offences and power to arrest:


     Amendments in brief:

    Significant amendments are made with effect from 10-05-2013 by introducing provisions relating to arrest of persons for offences under the Act. These provisions are summarised hereafter :

    Offences are divided into two categories viz:

    • Cognisable offences i.e. where the person can be arrested without ‘warrant’; and

    • Non-cognisable offences [i.e. offences other than the above].

    Failure to pay tax collected beyond 6 months from the due date where the ‘amount’ exceeds Rs. 50 lakh is the only cognisable offence. All other punishable offences (viz. knowingly evading service tax, availing bogus credits, supplying false information, etc.) are non-cognisable offences.

    If the Commissioner of Central Excise (‘CCE’) has reason to believe that any person has committed an offence u/s. 89 of the Act where the ‘amount’ exceeds Rs. 50 lakh he may by general or special order authorise any officer of Central Excise not below the rank of Superintendent of Central Excise to arrest such person.

    Where a person is arrested for any cognisable offence, every officer authorised to arrest a person shall inform such person of the grounds of arrest and produce him before a magistrate within 24 hours.

    • In the case of a non-cognisable and bailable offence, the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner, shall for the purpose of releasing an arrested person on bail or otherwise have the same powers and be subject to the same provisions as an officer in charge of a police station has, and is subject to u/s. 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC”).

    • All arrests shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC.

    Some considerations under Central Excise:

    Provisions relating to power to arrest have been existing under Central Excise/Customs laws. Some considerations under the said laws are set out hereafter. The same could serve as a useful guide for the purpose of the service tax.

    Powers to arrest:

    U/s. 13 of CEA, an Excise Officer (EO) not below the rank of Inspector, is empowered to arrest a person whom they have “reason to believe” to be liable to be punished under provisions of CEA. Such arrest can be only with prior approval of the Commissioner.

    EO can arrest and inform the concerned person as to the ground of arrest. The person arrested has to be forwarded to the Magistrate and must be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours. The Magistrate may grant the bail on bond or refuse the bail and remand him to custody. Bail is at the total discretion of Court.

    As per Section 50 of CrPC, a person arrested should be informed full particulars of the offence and his rights about the bail.

    In Sunil Gupta vs. UOI (2000) 118 ELT8 (P&H), it was held that, even if offences under Central Excise are not cognisable, EO duly empowered u/s. 13 of CEA can arrest a person without a warrant.

    In Rajni vs. UOI (2003) 156 ELT 28 (All), it was observed that, powers and duties of EO are not parallel to power of Station House Officer of the police station. As per section 155 of CrPC, investigation can be made only with order of Magistrate. EO has to follow provisions of CrPC as well as regards the arrest, or filing of complaint.
     
    As per section 155 of CrPC, a police officer cannot investigate a non – cognisable case without the order of a Magistrate, A police officer cannot arrest a person who has committed a non-cognisable offence, without a warrant, as per section 2(1) of CrPC.

    However, these restrictions are only to police officers. Section 13 of CEA confers substantive powers of arrest. These powers can be exercised by a duly authorised EO without a warrant of arrest. [Refer Sunil Gupta vs. UOI (2000) 118 ELT 8 (P&H)].

    Arrest can be made only as per the provisions of section 46 of CrPC. Under this section, the person making arrest shall actually touch or confine the body of person to be arrested, unless the persons submit to the custody. If he resists the arrest, all necessary means may be applied to effect the arrest. However, this does not give right to cause death of a person, unless the accused of the offence is punishable to death or with imprisonment for life.

    Arresting authority should make all efforts to keep a lady constable present. But in circumstances if a lady constable is not available or delay in ar-rest would impede the course of investigation, arresting officer, for reasons to be recorded in writing, can arrest a lady for lawful reasons at any time of day or night, even in absence of a lady constable [State of Maharashtra vs. Christian Community Welfare Council 2003 AIR SCW 5524.]

    EO can make enquiry even after the arrest. In Badaku Joti Savani vs. State of Mysore – AIR 1966 SC 1746, it has been held by the Supreme Court that, though EO has the powers of a police officer, he is not a “police officer” unless he has powers to lodge a report u/s. 173 of CrPC. Statements made before EO even after arrest are not hit by section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and these statements can be used as evidence against the accused.

    Procedure after arrest:

    The person arrested has to be forwarded to the EO who is empowered to send the arrested per-son to a Magistrate. If such empowered EO is not available within reasonable distance, the person may be sent to officer-in-charge of the nearest police station. Superintendent of CE has been empowered for this purpose. [Section 19 of CEA].

    EO of the rank of Superintendent or above will make enquiry into the charges against the person arrested. While making enquiry, he has the same powers as an officer–in–charge of a police station [Section 21(1)(b) of CEA]. If he is of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion against the accused person, he can forward the person to Magistrate for bail or custody, [Proviso (a) to Section 21(2) of CEA].

    EO making arrest has powers to release a person on executing a bond with or without sureties, and make a report to his superior officer. He can do so if it appears to him that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of sus-picion against the accused person [Proviso (b) to section 21(2) of CEA]. Superintendent of CE and officers above him have been empowered for this purpose vide Notification No. 9/99-CE(NT) dated 10-02- 1999. However, if he is of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion, he shall either admit him to bail to appear before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case or forward him in the custody of such Magistrate [Proviso (a) to section 21(2) of CEA].

    Section 20 of CEA prescribes that the police officer shall either admit him to bail to appear before a Magistrate having jurisdiction, or in default of bail, forward him in the custody of such Magistrate. The arrested person must be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest.

    Granting ‘Bail’:

    ‘Bail’ means a “security for prisoner’s appearance, on giving which he is released pending trial”. If offence is ‘bailable’, grant of bail is automatic and can be given by a police officer in charge of a police station or by a Court, on bond or with-out bond. Court has no discretion in the matter. In case of non–bailable offence, accused can be released on bail, unless the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life, Court has discretion whether to release on bail or not in respect of non–bailable offences.

    The considerations which normally weigh with the Court in granting bail in non–bailable offences are basically – (a) nature and seriousness of offence (b) character of the evidence (c) circumstances which are peculiar to the accused (d) a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured in the trial (e) reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with (f) larger interest of public or State and (g) other similar factors which may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case [Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal vs. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2005 SC 716 (SC 3 Member Bench)].

    The basic rule is in favour of granting a bail ex-cept where the course of justice being affected, gravity or heinous nature of the crime, risk of non appearance at the trial, influencing or intimidation of witnesses and similar other possibilities exist [State of Rajasthan vs. Balchand AIR 1977 SC 2447].

    In Chaman Lal vs. State of UP 2004 AIR SCW 4705, it was considered that Court dealing with the bail application should be satisfied as to whether there is a prima facie case, but exhaustive exploration of the merits of case is not necessary. It is necessary for the Court dealing with application for bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors before granting bail – (a) Nature of accusation and severity of punishment in case of conviction and nature of supporting evidence (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge.

    Since the words used in section 20 of CEA are “shall admit the arrested person to bail”, it was argued that the Magistrate must release the person on bail. He has no power to keep the person in judicial custody, if he gives necessary bail bond. There were divergent opinions about whether Magistrate can detain him or he must release the arrested person on bail. Finally, in Director of Enforcement vs. Deepak Mahajan (1994) 70 ELT 12 (SC) Supreme Court has held that the Magistrate has jurisdiction u/s. 167(2) of CrPC to authorise detention of a person arrested under Customs Act etc. as provisions are identical. Thus the Magistrate may grant the bail on bond or refuse the bail and remand him to custody. Bail is at the total discretion of the Court.

    In Sankarlal Saraf vs. State of West Bengal (1993) 67 ELT 477 (Cal), a division bench has held that power to grant bail, by necessary implication, includes power to refuse bail, Thus, Magistrate can refuse bail and order custody, police, jail or otherwise.

    As per section 167 (2) of CrPC, a person can be kept in judicial custody for 60 days. If investigations are not completed within 60 days, the person arrested should be released on bail. The period is 90 days when offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment of 10 years or more.

    Section 438 of CrPC makes provision for “anticipatory bail”. Court should grant or refuse bail after exercising its judicial discretion wisely [Director of Enforcement vs. PV Prabhakar Rao (1997) AIR 1997 SC 3868 (3 Member Bench) – quoting Gurbaksh Singh vs. State of Punjab (1980) AIR 1980 SC 1632 (SC Constitution Bench).]

    Conclusion

    The amendments relating to penalties, prosecution & powers of arrest discussed above have been a subject of widespread expression of concerns by the trade & industry and the tax paying fraternity inasmuch as the provisions could be misused to cause undue harassment by the tax authorities.

    In para 3 of TRU Circular No DOF No. 334/3/2013 TRU dated 28 -02-2013, it is clarified that policy wing of CBEC will issue detailed instructions in due course of time. It is felt that CBEC should issue a draft circular and seek views of trade & industry and all affected persons before finalising such instructions.
     

    Table —Summary of Punishment for various offences

       

    Implications: Amendments in Exemptions

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    The Finance Bill, 2013, unlike in the past few years, had a few proposals to amend the service tax law that underwent a major metamorphosis in this Budget in the last fiscal. However, seemingly small proposals made, could have large implications. Further, by issuing some notifications, amendments are made in some exemptions and abatements in case of construction services of builders or developers. Most of these amendments are effective from 1st April, 2013 and one relating to builders is effective from 1st March, 2013. These are discussed below.

    • Air-conditioned Restaurants:

    Background:

    Whether a transaction for supply of food and/or beverages in a restaurant or a hotel is a contract for sale of food or a composite contract for sale and services was a subject of controversy vis-à-vis leviability of Sales Tax (now VAT) under the sales tax law in the states for many years. The Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1978) 42 STC 386 (SC) held that service of meals whether in a hotel or restaurant does not constitute a sale of food for the purpose of levy of sales tax but must be regarded as the rendering of a service in the satisfaction of a human need or ministering to the bodily want of human beings. It would not make any difference whether the visitor to the restaurant is charged for the meal as a whole or according to each dish separately.

    This led to the amendment in article 366(29A) of the Constitution, whereby the 46th amendment included within its scope “the supply, by way of or as part of any service, of food or any drink for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration” as a deemed sale. Subsequent to the constitutional amendment, VAT is being paid on the sale of food in hotels. However, the question that arose was on what value of the consideration should VAT be paid.

    The five member Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Damodarasamy Naidu & Sons Ltd. vs. State of TN (2000) 117 STC 1 (SC) interestingly held that the entire value should be deemed to be the consideration towards the sale. While delivering its judgment, the Honourable Supreme Court observed as under:

    “In our view, therefore the price that the customer pays for the supply of goods in a restaurant cannot be split up as suggested by learned counsel. The supply of food by the restaurant owner to the customer though it may be a part of service that he renders by providing good furniture, furnishing and fixtures, linen, crockery and cutlery, music, a dance floor, and a floor show, is what is the subject of levy. The patron of a fancy restaurant who orders a plate of cheese sandwiches whose price is shown to be Rs. 50/- on the bill of fare knows very well that the innate cost of the bread, butter, mustard and cheese in the plate is very much less, but he orders it all the same. He pays Rs. 50/- for its supply and it is on Rs. 50/- that the restaurant owner must be taxed.”

    In East India Hotels Ltd. & Another vs. UOI & Another (2001) 121 STC 46 (SC), it was held that “when all movable properties, materials, articles or commodities are goods, food in a restaurant has necessarily to be regarded as goods. …………. The moment the dish is supplied and the sale price paid, it would amount to sale”. It is also interesting to note that the Supreme Court in Tamilnadu Kalyan Mandapam Assn. vs. UOI 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC) observed, “In case of catering contracts, service element is more weighty; visible and predominant and it cannot be considered as a case of sale of food and drink in a restaurant”. Admittedly, there was no question before the Hon. Supreme Court in this case, to examine whether sale of food in a restaurant was a service or otherwise. Nevertheless, service tax on the service in relation to serving of food or beverage including alcoholic beverage was introduced with effect from 01-05-2011. However, this remained restricted to air-conditioned restaurants which also had a license to serve alcoholic beverages. To justify the levy in this regard, the TRU in its letter dated 28-02-2011, clarified that the tax is levied on the service element and it should not be confused with the sale of food. The levy is intended to be confined to the value of services contained in the composite contract and shall not cover either the meal portion in the composite contract or mere sale of food by way of pick up or home delivery as also goods sold at MRP. Subsequently, on the onset of negative list based taxation of services with effect from 01-07-2012, the list of declared services in section 66E of the Finance Act, 1994 in sub-clause (i) included, the service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as a part of the activity. However, the restaurants other than fully or partially air-conditioned/centrally heated and not having license to serve alcoholic beverages remained exempted as the mega exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012 provided for the same at entry 19.

    In many cases under the Service category of “Outdoor catering”, it has been held that it is possible to take deduction of material component in terms of Notification 12/2003. However, the Delhi CESTAT in the case of Sayaji Hotels (2011) 24 STR 177 has held that, in case of a composite contract of a “Mandap keeper” the hotel cannot artificially divide the contract and levy Service tax merely on the value of services so identified. In essence, the Delhi CESTAT rejected the theory of splitting between the value of services and goods and held that the only option the appellant had was to pay tax on the abated value as provided for in Notification 1/2006 dated 01-03-2006.

    It would appear that after the rescinding of Notification 12/2003 w.e.f. 01-07-2012, the Service tax in relation to food contracts may have to be paid on the abated value as provided for or on the entire value of the contract inasmuch the new scheme of Valuation under Rule 2C does not provide for an option for claiming deduction of goods as it is provided for “Works Contract” under Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules. However, the larger issue is whether or not tax the taxing entry (i) u/s. 66E (Declared Services) which specifies service portion in an activity, can include value of goods supplied at all this is a matter that is being extensively debated. It needs to be noted that Rule 2C refers only to a “Restaurant” and does not Specify “eating joint or mess”. This appears to be inadvertent.

    In addition, other valuation issues like charge of VAT on Service tax component (and vice versa), charge on other service charges (due to introduction of definition of service w.e.f. 1st July 2012) etc., are likely to be faced, which would ultimately increase the final cost to the consumer substantially.

    Implication of amendment with effect from 01-04-2013:

    Now, vide the Notification No. 3/2013-ST, the said entry no.19 in the Notification No. 25/2012 is amended to delete the condition for the restaurant to have a license to serve alcoholic beverages. Consequently, the amendment will have a tremendous impact, as a large number of eating places including fast food chains, coffee shops, pizza places, ice-cream parlours, cafeteria in hospitals, educational institutions or corporate offices, airports, multiplex cinema houses, book shops, auditoria, canteens in factories, food courts in shopping malls, clubs etc. are covered.

    The entry 19 in the Notification No. 25/2012-ST describes a restaurant or eating joint other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year. This will consequentially include all the above stated illustrations including simple cafes or restaurants having a small portion or a mezzanine portion air-conditioned and will come under the service tax net. Further, even non air-conditioned portion of the café serving food would be subject to the levy. If a small ice-cream/yoghurt parlour has an air-conditioner in any part of their premises, it would be subjected to the levy. In large departmental/chain stores or book shops, small kiosks/bakeries/prepared food corners are often provided with a few tables and chairs. Since the book shop, the store or the mall has common area air-conditioned and even if the food or snacks, beverages or ice-cream are provided through “self-service” counters/desks in a tray and without the use of crockery, the exemption under entry 19 will not be available as some part of the establishment is air-conditioned. Many or most of these contracts of providing food are predominantly ‘sale’ contracts as ‘service’ element is present in a negligible proportion. In India, we have the system of ‘thali’, places serving only meals in thalis. They are known as Bhojanalayas and only lunch or dinner is served very quickly. These servings have a very little ‘service’ element. Yet, all and sundry would be subject to service tax once the turnover crosses the threshold limit of ten lakh rupees. The value of service however, in accordance with Rule 2C of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 is to be taken at 40% or in other words, after considering 60% presumptive abatement. This value is effective from 01-07-2013, as earlier 70% abatement was provided.

    When the food is not consumed in the restaurant premises but packed or parcelled from the counter, there is no setup of the eating house enjoyed or used by the person collecting cooked food/meal. As referred above, the TRU circular dated 28-02-2011 clarified that on mere sale of food by way of pick-up or home delivery, no service tax would be attracted. However, there are cafes/restaurants which charge “delivery charges” for small orders or all orders as the case may be. The question therefore arises as to whether or not such “delivery charge” is a part of “sale contract” or in the negative list based taxation, it amounts to consideration for a service of providing food at the doorstep. This is because the food is supplied at home by a delivery boy which itself is a service and a separate charge is recovered for the same. It would mean a composite yet divisible contract of sale of food and service of providing home delivery of such food and thus the service components would be exigible to service tax. So far as cafeteria/canteens in corporate offices or factories are concerned, it is relevant to note the views expressed in the Draft Circular dated 25-07-2012 vide F. No. 354/127/2012-TRU issued by Tariff Research Unit of Ministry of Finance. Paras 8, 9 and 10 of the said circular read as follows:

    “8.    A number of activities are carried out by the employers for the employees for a consideration. Such activities fall within the definition of “service” and are liable to be taxed unless specified in the Negative List or otherwise exempted.


    9.    One of the ingredients for the taxation is that such activity should be provided for consideration. Where the employees pay for such services or where the amount is deducted from the salary, there does not seem to be any doubt. However, in certain situations, such services may be provided against a portion of the salary foregone by the employee. Such activities will also be considered as having been made for a consideration and thus liable to tax. CENVAT credit for inputs and input services used to provide such services will be eligible under extant rules. The said goods or services would now not be construed to be for personal use or consumption of an employee per se and rather shall be a constituent to the taxable service provided to an employee. The status of the employee would be as a service recipient rather than as a mere employee when consuming such output service. The valuation of the service so provided by the employer to the employee shall be determined as per the extant rules in this regard.


    10.    However, any activity available to all the employees free of charge without any reduction from the emoluments shall not be considered as an activity for consideration and will thus remain outside the purview of the service tax liability (facilities like crèche, gymnasium or a health club which all employees may use without any charge or reduction from the salary will be outside the tax net). However the CENVAT credit for such inputs and input services will be guided by the extant rules.”

    The above comments are a part of the Draft Circular which is yet not finalised. However, in the context of a canteen facility extended by an employer and in a case when consideration for the food served in the canteen is recovered by the employer and if the canteen is in the establishment, any part of which is air-conditioned, may need to examine service tax liability depending on the facts of each case.

    Considering a mushroom growth of cafeteria, food courts, coffee shops, fast food chains and ice-cream parlours in all large and medium sized cities and towns of India, the number is alarmingly high and therefore, there would be widespread implications of the amendment, considering that eating out is a part of daily routine or a necessity of the young and middle-aged working population of the country.


    •    Service of construction of complex:


    Background

    Service of construction of a complex, building or civil structure or any part thereof provided by a builder or a developer was notified as taxable service with effect from 01-07-2010. Although this generated tremendous controversy, the Honourable Bombay High Court in case of MCHI vs. UOI 2012 (25) STR 305 (Bom) rejected the challenge on the ground of constitution validity. Similarly, earlier the P&H High Court also dismissed the petition in GS Promoters vs. UOI 2011 (21) STR 100 (P&H) wherein the plea was made to declare the levy of service tax on builders as unconstitutional. This category, like the service portion of activity of supplying food, is included as declared service in section 66E, unless the entire consideration for the constructed unit is received post issuance of completion certificate. Vide Notification No. 26/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012 at serial no.12, the abatement of 75% subject to prescribed conditions continued.

    Implication: Amendment with effect from 01-03-2013:

    Alongside the budget proposals, amendment in the rate of abatement from 75% to 70% in certain cases vide Notification No. 2/2013-ST is already effective from 1st March, 2013 and plain reading of the substituted entry no. 12 in the said Notification No. 26/2012-ST reads as shown in the Table:

    Table: Substituted entry no.12 in Notification No. 26/2012-ST


    Reading of the aforesaid entry no. 12 indicates as follows:

    a)    75% abatement subject to fulfillment of conditions will continue in two cases, viz.,

    •    Construction of residential unit having car-pet area upto 2000 square feet or less OR

    •    Construction of residential unit where the amount charged is less than Rs. 1 crore.

    Meaning thereby that for a flat of 2500 sq. feet, if the amount charged is Rs. 80 lakh, it is entitled for abatement @ 75%. Conversely, even for a flat of 800 sq. feet, if the amount charged is Rs. 3 crore, the abatement is available @ 75%. In ef-fect, only one of the conditions mentioned above is required to be fulfilled — either the area of the residential unit is less than 2000 sq. feet or the amount charged is less than Rs. 1 crore.

    b)    The abatement of 75% will no longer be available to a complex, building, civil structure or part thereof not covered by the above two categories. As such, a distinction is now made for commercial and residential construction and abatement of only 70% is available for commercial constructions irrespective of the amount charged or the area. Even if the amount charged is less than Rs. 1 crore or the area is less than 2000 sq. feet, the abatement available is 70% and the effective rate of service tax is thus 3.708% in place of 3.09%.

    In this context, the words used by the Finance Minister while announcing his proposals in his Budget speech are worth taking note of:

    “182. Homes and flats with a carpet area of 2,000 sq.ft. or more or of a value of `1 Crore or more are high-end constructions where the component of ‘service’ is greater. Hence, I propose to reduce the rate of abatement for this class of buildings from 75 percent to 70 percent. Existing exemptions from service tax for low cost housing and single residential units will continue.”

    The above extract from the speech of the Finance Minister indicated that the reduction in abatement was to be restricted to certain residential premises. However, the language of the notification does not support that and conveys clearly that the abatement of 75% will not be available except in two cases referred above.

    •    Copyright for cinematographic films:

    In Notification No.25/2012-ST, entry no.15 exempted “Temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of a copyright covered under clauses (a) or (b) of s/s. (1) of section 13 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957 relating to original literary, dramatic, musical, artistic works or cinematograph films” with effect from 01-07-2012. It is relevant to note in this context that actors, directors and various other technicians are brought under the net of service tax vide the new definition of service and the negative list based service tax regime from 1st July, 2012. Accordingly, a film producer is required to pay various actors, technicians and/ or other professionals their charges along with service tax and thus there is a cost addition of 12.36% to the producers. However, such producer of the film, the owner of copyrights of his film was not liable to pay service tax on his services of transferring or permitting use of such copyright in favour of distributors and/or theatre owners on account of the entry prior to amendment.

    Implication of amendment with effect from 01-04-2013:

    •    Now, this entry of exemption is restricted to “cinematograph films for exhibition in a cinema hall or cinema theatre”.

    Thus, the exemption in respect of original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is retained without any change. However, grant of copyright is restricted only to transfers or permissions for the use of exhibition in a cinema hall or a cinema theatre.

    •    The intention for the amendment is explained in CBEC letter dated 28-02-2013 as follows:

    “The benefit of exemption u/s. No. 15 of the notification in relation to copyrights for cinematograph films will now be available only to films exhibited in a cinema hall or theatre. This will allow service providers to pass on input tax credits to taxable end-users”.

    Now, when a film producer grants copyrights or temporarily transfers these to distributors for exhibition of the film in theatres, the producer is still not liable for service tax. However, when rights are granted for direct to home (DTH) exhibition or to broadcasting agencies viz. TV channels, satellites etc., the film producer is liable to service tax and in turn broadcasting TV channels already being under the tax net would be eligible to CENVAT credit of the service tax paid for temporary transfer of copyrights in their favour. However, film producers paying service tax to actors, technicians etc. would be eligible for only proportionate credit as they would be providing taxable service in respect of DTH or broadcasting rights whereas services of transfer of rights for exhibition in cinema continue to be exempt. The CBEC letter therefore appears to be only partially correct considering the above discussion.

    •    Renting of immovable property and auxiliary education services provided by specified educational institutions:

    Background:

    Entry No. 9 in the Notification 25/2012-ST exempted service to or by an educational institution in re-spect of education exempted from service tax by way of renting of immovable property or education auxiliary service. The term “auxiliary educational service” is defined in the said Notification 25/12-ST itself as follows:

    “(f) “auxiliary educational services” means any services relating to imparting any skill, knowledge, education or development of course content or any other knowledge – enhancement activity, whether for the students or the faculty, or any other services which educational institutions ordinarily carry out themselves but may obtain as outsourced services from any other person, including services relating to admission to such institution, conduct of examination, catering for the students under any mid-day meals scheme sponsored by Government, or transportation of students, faculty or staff of such institution”

    Education which is not taxable under the negative list in section 66D appears at entry (1) and reads as follows:

    “(l) services by way of-

    (i)    pre-school education and education up to higher secondary school or equivalent;
    (ii)    education as a part of a curriculum for obtaining a qualification recognized by any law for the time being in force;
    (iii)    education as a part of an approved vocational education course”

    Implication of amendment with effect from 01-04-2013:

    Exemption will not continue for services provided by such institutes to other persons for the said services. However, such other persons providing auxiliary educational services or renting of immovable property services to the educational institutes would continue to be exempt. Educational institutions imparting education recognised by law such as university-affiliated colleges or any higher secondary school often provides its premises like halls, auditoria or ground on hire for any official, social, cultural or political functions. Prior to the introduction of the negative list from 01-07-2012, this service was covered under the category of mandap keeper. In the negative list taxable categories have ceased to exist and entry no.9 exempted renting of immovable property. Therefore letting off of institution’s immovable property was declared exempt. Now again, this becomes taxable. Even when the schools provide small counters/ place to banks in their premises for facilitating students/parents to pay school fees, this was taxable prior to 01-07-2012 and is noe taxable again. The definition of auxiliary educational services is such that generally services provided by others or those outsourced by the specified educational institutes would get covered. For instance, admission process outsourced by a university or the services of bus contractor etc. Nevertheless, if a school owns its transport vehicles and recovers charges from students for these facilities, it now will attract service tax. Similarly, if a place for canteen is let out to a contractor, it will attract service tax. If a training programme is conducted by a school for persons other than to specified education institutions, it will also become taxable as the scope of entry 9 is substantially narrowed. Further, educational institutions conduct a large number of extra-curricular courses (in addition to basic education) which are usually charged sepa-rately. These could get hit unless they fall under Entry No. 8 of Notification 25/2012- ST i.e., recreational activities in relation to arts, sports, etc.

    •    Charitable activity of advancement of object of general public utility:

    Background:

    The Notification 25/2012 at entry 4 exempts services by an entity registered u/s. 12AA of the Income -tax Act, 1961 by way of charitable activities and in turn the said notification contains definition of “charitable activities” at 2(k) as follows:

    “(k) “charitable activities” means activities relating to –

    (i)    public health by way of –

    (a)    care or counseling of (i) terminally ill persons or persons with severe physical or mental disability, (ii) persons afflicted with HIV or AIDS, or (iii) persons addicted to a dependence-forming substance such as narcotics drugs or alcohol; or

    (b)    public awareness of preventive health, family planning or prevention of HIV infection;

    (ii)    advancement of religion or spirituality;

    (iii)    advancement of educational programmes or skill development relating to,

    (a)    abandoned, orphaned or homeless children;
    (b)    physically or mentally abused and traumatised persons;
    (c)    prisoners; or
    (d)    persons over the age of 65 years residing in a rural area;

    (iv)    preservation of environment including watershed, forests and wildlife; or

    (v)    advancement of any other object of general public utility up to a value of,

    (a)    Rs. 18,75,000 for the year 2012-13 subject to the condition that total value of such activities had not exceeded Rs. 25,00,000 during
    2011-12;

    (b)    Rs. 25,00,000 in any other financial year subject to the condition that total value of such activities had not exceeded Rs. 25,00,000 during the preceding financial year;

    Implication of amendment from 01-04-2013:

    Now, the last sub-clause (v) is omitted. As it is, the term charitable activity is defined in a restrictive manner to include only a few specific activities. Some other activities of general nature like public awareness programmes etc., conducted by any 12AA registered organisation would not qualify to be exempt anymore.

    •    Others:

    •     Transportation of goods by rail and transportation of goods by road.

    Exemption in respect of transportation of goods by rail and vessel is contained at entry 20 and transportation of goods by road at entry 21 of the Notification 25/2012-ST. Amendments are made in both these entries to bring exemption in respect of all the modes of transport at par. Transportation of petroleum or petroleum products, postal mail or mail bags and household effects by rail or vessel was exempted at entry 20. This is now withdrawn. Therefore, transportation of petroleum/ petroleum products, postal mail or household effects by any mode of transport is now liable for service tax. Under entry 21 for goods transportation by road, transportation of fruits, vegetable, eggs, milk, food grain and pulses only was exempt. Now, in its place and like in the case of rail or vessel transportation, the exemption is redefined and scope is expanded to include the following products:

    •    Agricultural produce

    •    Foodstuff including flours, tea, coffee, jaggery, sugar, milk products, salt and edible oil, excluding alcoholic beverages

    •    Chemical fertilisers and oilcakes

    •    Registered newspapers or magazines, relief material for victims of natural or man-made disasters

    •    Defence equipments.

    The existing exemption in respect of consignment of single goods carriage for Rs. 1,500/- or less and consignment for a single consignee for Rs. 750/- or less continues to remain exempt.

    •    Exemption provided at entry no.24 in Notification 25/2012-ST for vehicle parking services to general public stands withdrawn from 01-04-2013 and therefore parking charge recovered from general public now is liable for service tax.

    Important High Court Ruling: Recovery Proceedings Pending Stay Application

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    Background

    The Central Board of Excise and Customs (“CBEC”) in supersession of seven previous circulars on the same subject issued Circular No. 967/01/2013 CX on 1st January, 2013, directing the departmental officers to initiate recovery actions in cases where 30 days have expired after the filing of appeal by an assessee before an appellate authority. This action by CBEC is most unprecedented and totally unjust and unfair inasmuch as it has resulted in penal consequences for reasons beyond the control of an assessee and has rendered the statutory right of appeal nugatory. The said CBEC Circular is unjust and unfair for various reasons and in particular due to the fact that in large number of cases, stay applications are not disposed of due to inaction at the end of the concerned appellate authority and for no fault of the assessee.

    In this regard, significant observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court of India (reproduced hereafter) in Commissioner of Cus & CE vs. Kumar Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. (2005) 180 ELT 434 (SC), have been totally ignored by CBEC:

    “Para 6

    The sub-section which was introduced in terrorem cannot be construed as punishing the assessees for matters which may be completely beyond their control For example, many of the Tribunals are not constituted and it is not possible for such Tribunals to dispose of matters. Occasionally by reason of other administrative exigencies for which the assessee cannot be held liable, the stay applications are not disposed within the time specified. ….”

    Bombay High Court Ruling in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs. UOI (2013) 288 ELT 481 (Bom) – Automatic Stay of recovery after filing of Stay Application – No coercive actions unless assessee resorts to dilatory tactics.

    A Writ Petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the CBEC Circular dated 1-1-2013. The Petitioners pleaded that when the stay application remains to be disposed of due to inability of the appellate authority to take up the application for hearing and disposal without any default on the part of the assessee, it would be arbitrary to penalise the assessee by enforcing the recovery, despite the pendency of the application for stay. The Honourable High Court noted the ruling in Collector vs. Krishna Sales (P) Ltd. (1994) 73 ELT 519 (SC) and relied on the rulings in CCE vs. Kumar Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. (2005) 180 ELT 434 (SC); Mark Auto Industries Ltd. vs. UOI (1998) 102 ELT 542 (DEL) and Nedumparambil P George vs. UOI (2009) 242 ELT 523 (BOM), while making important observations set out hereafter. As regards CBEC’s directive that even though stay application was filed before Commissioner (Appeals)/CESTAT which is pending, recovery could be initiated upon completion of 30 days after filing of appeal if no stay is granted, the following was observed:

     • If on failure of Appellate Authority to dispose of appeal or stay is not due to default of assessee or their dilatory tactics, to initiate recovery by coercive measures in the meantime, is unjustified, arbitrary, travesty of justice and violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India.

    • It is unjust to penalise the assessee for inability of judicial/quasi judicial authority to dispose stay application within thirty days. The fact that a period of thirty days is allowed to lapse after filing of appeal is immaterial as Commissioner (Appeals)/CESTAT may not have heard the stay application within these thirty days.

    • Lack of adequate infrastructure, unavailability of officer before whom stay application had been filed, absence of bench of CESTAT or sheer volume of work, are some causes due to which applications for stay remain pending, which are beyond control of assessee.

    • Protection of revenue has to be balanced with fairness to assessee. That is why even though Section 35C(2A) of Central Excise Act, 1944 prescribes that stay order stands vacated where appeal before Tribunal is not disposed of within 180 days, it is not applicable where appeal remains pending for reasons not attributable to assessee. In such a scenario, Revenue’s plea that when there is no stay and thus there is no prohibition of recovery of confirmed demand immediately, and it is a matter of government policy to how long it should wait before initiating recovery is rejected.

    • The fact that Revenue officers initiating recovery are independent of adjudicating/appellate forum, and have no means of verifying status of stay application and it is for assessee to inform them when recovery action is initiated, is not a valid justification for penalising assessee whose conduct is otherwise free from blame with modern technology, this can be overcome. However, if a stay application remains pending for more than reasonable period, due to default/improper conduct of assessee, recovery proceedings can be initiated. As regards CBEC’s directive that in cases where Commissioner (Appeals)/CESTAT or the High Court confirms the demand, recovery has to be initiated immediately, the Court observed as under:

    • This directive ‘deprives’ the assessee even a reasonable time to exercise the remedy provided to them under the law of filing an appeal with CESTAT, High Court or Supreme Court as the case may be along with an application of stay.

    • Further, there is no justification to commence recovery immediately following the order–in– appeal where period of limitation has been laid down for challenging it under the law. As regards adoption of modern information technology in regard to appeal and adjudication processes, the following important observations, were made by the Court at Para 16:

    • Union Ministry of Finance should take steps to ensure that proceedings before the adjudicating authorities as well as the Appellate Authorities including the Commissioner (Appeals) and the CESTAT are recorded in the electronic form.

    • Once an appeal is filed before the Commissioner (Appeals), the filing of the appeal must be recorded through an entry made in the electronic form. Every appellant, including the assessee, must indicate, when an appeal is filed, an email ID for service of summons and intimation of dates of hearing.

    • The Commissioner (Appeals) must schedule the hearing of stay applications and provide dates for the hearing of those applications which must be published in the electronic form on the website. The order sheets or roznamas of every case must be duly uploaded on the website to enable both the officers of the Revenue and assessees to have access to the orders that have been passed and to the scheduled dates of hearing.

    • We would also recommend to the Union Ministry of Finance the urgent need to introduce electronic software that would ensure that the orders and proceedings of the CESTAT are duly compiled, collated and published in the electronic form.

    • Matters involving Revenue have large financial implications for the Union Government. The incorporation of electronic technology in the functioning of judicial and quasi-judicial authorities constituted under the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Customs Act, 1962 and cognate legislation would provide a measure of transparency and accountability in the functioning of the adjudicating officers, the appellate Commissioners as well as the Tribunal. But equally significant is the need to protect the interest of the Revenue which the adoption of electronic technology would also achieve.

    •    The fact that an application for stay may be kept pending for an indefinitely long period of time at the behest of an unscrupulous assessee and a willing administrative or quasi judicial authority. This would be obviated by incorporating the requirement of disseminating and uploading the proceedings of judicial and quasi-judicial authorities under the Central Excise Act 1944 as well as the Customs Act 1962 in an electronic form. This would ensure that a measure of administrative control can be retained with a view to safeguarding the position of the Revenue as well as in ensuring fairness to the assessees.

    The Court finally at Para 17 held as follows:

    “For these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the provisions contained in the impugned circular dated 1st January, 2013 mandating the initiation of recovery proceedings thirty days after the filing of an appeal, if no stay is granted, cannot be applied to an assessee who has filed an application for stay, which has remained pending for reasons beyond the control of the assessee. Where however, an application for stay has remained pending for more than a reasonable period, for reasons having a bearing on the default or the improper conduct of an assessee, recovery proceedings can well be initiated as explained in the earlier part of the judgment”

    Stay by other Courts

    In addition to Bombay High Court, interim stay has been granted against operation of CBEC Circular dated 1-1-2013 by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Karnataka and Rajasthan. [Reference can be made to Bharat Hotels Ltd. vs. UOI (2013) 288 ELT 509 (DEL); Texonic Instruments vs. UOI (2013) 288 ELT 510 (KAR) and R.S.W. M Ltd vs. UOI (2013) 288 ELT 511 (RAJ)

    Directions given by the Bombay High Court in Patel Engineering Limited 2013-TIOL-150-HC -MUM-ST The assessee had filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court against the Circular dated 1-0-2013. The assessee’s facts are similar to those of Larsen & Toubro case (supra). The Honourable High Court after considering the decision in Larsen & Toubro (supra ) held that recovery proceedings be stalled and further issued directions for the authorities to issue a circular to follow the directions as stated in the Larsen & Toubro case (supra) before initiating recovery proceedings. Further, the Honourable High Court also held that the law laid by the Court is applicable to all the authorities under the jurisdiction of this Court.

    Conclusion

    The above assumes greater importance for the simple reason that despite the Court Rulings of Larsen & Toubro (supra), it is understood that at practical level, field formations are initiating recovery actions based on CBEC Circular insisting that Court Ruling is applicable to the concerned petitioner only. It is high time that the Supreme Court intervenes in the matter and issues appropriate directions or alternatively, the Union Ministry of Finance urgently acts upon the directions given by the Honourable High Court and move towards establishing accountability and reforming tax administration in the country.

    Franchise: ‘Service’ or “Deemed Sale” of Transfer of Right to Use Trademark?

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    Background: Transfer of right to use goods – a deemed sale.

    Long before intellectual property service was introduced on the statute of service tax in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) with effect from 10th September, 2004, intellectual property right including trademark has been considered intangible goods. As such, its assignment or transfer has been exigible to sales tax. The issue for discussion however relates not to transfer or assignment of trademark but transfer of right to use trademark. In Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Duke & Sons Pvt. Ltd. 1999 (112) STC 371 (Bom), Hon. Bombay High Court observed, “For transferring the right to use the trademark, it is not necessary to handover the trademark to the transferee or give control or possession of trademark to him. It can be done merely by authorizing the transferee to use the same in the manner required by the law as has been done in the present case. The right to use the trademark can be transferred simultaneously to any number of persons.” It is further observed, “In the instant case, there is no dispute about the fact that trademark is specifically included in the schedule of goods to the 1985 Act in entry no.7, the amount received by the assessee on the transfer of the right to use the same is therefore liable to be taxed under the said Act.” In Vikas Sales vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (1996) 102 STC 106, the Supreme Court held that, even incorporeal rights like trademarks, copyrights, patent and right in persona capable of transfer or transmission such as debts are also included in the ambit of the term ‘goods’. The Court further held that patents, copyrights and other rights which are not rights over land related matters are included within the ambit of movable property. In another case, viz. SPS Jayam & Co. vs. Registrar Tamilnadu Taxation Special Tribunal and Others (2004) 137 STC 117 (MAD), it was held that trademark is intangible good which is subject matter of transfer and was further observed that simply because the assessee retained the right for himself to use the trademark and reserved the right to grant permission to others to use the trademark, it would not take away the character of the transaction as one of transfer of a right to use.

    It is a known fact that vide 46th Constitutional Amendment in 1982 in the Article 366, a new clause (29A) was inserted. The said Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India in sub-clause (d) reads as follows:

    “ “tax on the sale or purchase of goods” includes:

    (d) a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.”

    In this frame of reference, it is also interesting to note that in case of 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2000 (119) STC 182, it was held, “the States in exercise of power under entry 54 of List II read with Article 366(29A)(d) are not competent to levy sales tax on the transfer of right to use goods, which is a deemed sale, if such sale takes place outside the state or is a sale in the course of inter-state trade or commerce or is a sale in the course of import or export.” Consequently, the Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 11-05-2002 amended the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 whereby the definition of sales was enlarged by incorporating transactions included in clause (29A) of Article 366 for the purpose of levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods which take place in the course of inter-state trade or commerce. Thus, for the purpose of sale, deemed sale under Article 366(29A) is included and in turn, intangible property includes a trademark and thus is always treated as ‘goods’. The Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy Service vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 178 ELT 22 (SC) held that intangibility is not something which should determine whether a property is goods for the purpose of sales tax. The test is whether the property is capable of abstraction, consumption and use and whether the same can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. The transfer of the right to use goods is distinct from mere transfer of goods but also an activity considered as liable for tax as sale of goods. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in G.S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of A.P. 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT held “The levy of tax under Article 366(29A)(d) is not on the use of goods. It is on the transfer of the right to use goods which occurs only on account of the transfer of the right.” [emphasis supplied].

    Sale vs. Service:

    In terms of the judicial pronouncements cited above, it can be inferred that there is a marked distinction between transfer of right to use a trademark or a similar intellectual property and assignment of trademark. By way of assignment, the owner of the trademark/intellectual property divests his right, title or interest but while transferring the right to use the same, he does not give up his right, title or interest. However, sale or deemed sale both are exigible to VAT. Having so determined, the fact is that the transaction other than those of mere sale or transfer of intellectual property i.e. temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of any intellectual property is declared as ‘service’ u/s. 66E of the Act with effect from 01-07-2012 and under the earlier dispensation of service tax law as well, intellectual property service was defined in section 65(55b) as ““intellectual property service” means, — (a) transferring, temporarily; or (b) permitting the use or enjoyment of, any intellectual property right” and was considered “taxable service” with effect from 10th September, 2004 as stated hereinabove.

    While the intent of legislation in principle is to exclude both ‘sale’ and “deemed sale” from the purview of service tax is clear in many forms, the implementation has not matched the intention always. To illustrate, the definition of ‘service’ as introduced in section 65B(44) with effect from 01- 07-2012 specifically excludes transfer, delivery and supply of goods which is deemed to be sale for the purpose of Article 366(29A) of the Constitution. However, there is a contradiction made in the law itself by defining temporary transfer or permitting the use of enjoyment of any intellectual property as declared service as stated above. Earlier, judiciary also made pronouncement on this subject matter when in Imagic Creative (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Others 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC) wherein it was held by the Supreme Court that VAT and service tax are mutually exclusive. Thus, even though there is a settled law that a transaction cannot be simultaneously ‘sale’ and ‘service’ and therefore not exigible to both VAT and service tax, it is quite a matter of challenge to correctly determine the nature of a transaction whether of sale of goods or provision of service and consequently, should be exigible to only one of the levies. Like the declared services of development of information technology software and transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing or licensing etc. (discussed in May, 2013 and November, 2012 issues of BCAJ respectively under this column), this is one more controversial declared service which is extremely prone to litigation on account of overlap of VAT and service tax. The law in this regard is still under evolution and hence there is no finality.

    In a landmark decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC), the Supreme Court observed, “……. If there is an instrument of contract which may be composite in form in any case other than the exceptions in Article 366(29A), (Note: The reference here was to works contract and catering contract) unless the transaction in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts and is discernible as such, then the State would not have the power to separate the agreement to sell from the agreement to render service and impose tax on sale. The test therefore for composite contracts other than those mentioned in Article 366(29A) continues to be – did the parties have in mind or intend separate rights arising out of the sale of goods. If there was no such intention, there is no sale even if the contract could be disintegrated. The test for deciding whether a contract falls into one category or the other is to as what is the substance of the contract. We will, for the want of a better phrase, call this the “dominant nature test”. In para 97, the Court dealt with the question as to what would constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods exigible to VAT and held that such transactions must have the following attributes:

    a. There must be goods available for delivery;

    b.    There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

    c.    The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefor should be available to the transferee;

    d.    For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute – viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods;

    e.    Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.

    [emphasis supplied].

    All the aforesaid attributes vis-à-vis “transfer of right to use goods” certainly would hold good in case of tangible goods. This aspect was also observed in G.S. Lamba & Sons (supra). However, transfer of right to use incorporeal property such as trademark would not be able to fulfill the last two tests out of the above 5 tests viz.

    •    The transferee cannot use the right to use the goods to the exclusion to the transferor as the transferor of the right to use intangible can himself continue to use the said intangible goods as physical transfer is not required for intangibles.

    •    Right to use intellectual property can be transferred to others simultaneously.

    [This characteristic was observed in the decisions of Duke & Sons P. Ltd. (supra) and SPS Jayam & Co. (supra)].

    Both the above tests are not fulfilled because of the inherent characteristic of “intangible goods” being intangible in nature as physical dispossession or transfer does not happen in this case. Heavily relying on the above, the Kerala High Court reversed its own ruling of the earlier cases in a recent judgment analyzed below:

    Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer 2013-TIOL-512-HC-Kerala-ST.

    In this recent decision, the Division Bench of Kerala High Court was approached challenging the levy of VAT under KVAT Act on royalty received from franchisee companies. The petitioner company engaged in marketing/trading export and import of jewellery under the name “Malabar Gold” paid VAT on the sale of jewellery without any dispute. However, the appellant had entered into franchise agreements with various franchisees which sold the jewellery under the name “Malabar Gold” and interalia displayed such board with design approved by the Appellant and paid royalty to the Appellant under the franchise agreement. Admittedly, franchise service is a notified category of service taxable under the service tax law vide section 65(105)(zze) read with section 65(47) & (48) of the Finance Act, 1994 from 1st July, 2003 and the company paid service tax on royalty received in terms of the franchise agreement. The Commercial Tax Officer initiated proceedings for recovery of VAT contending that royalty received by the Appellant from its franchisees for the use of trademark was exigible to VAT as transfer of right to use any of the goods would be taxable. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in BSNL (supra) and Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (supra), the petitioner’s stand was that the transaction being of franchise service attracted service tax alone which they had already paid. In turn, the VAT authority interalia relied on Tata Consultancy Service (supra) and Division Bench decision of Kerala High Court in Mechanical Assembly Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala 2006 (144) STC 546.

    Earlier, the single Judge in this case rejected the Appellant’s appeal reported at 2012-TIOL-1032-HC. Kerala- VAT wherein it was held that royalty received by the dealer was exigible to KVAT Act. Hence this writ petition was filed. It was pleaded for the appellant that royalty fee was paid under the franchise agreement. The concept of franchise agreement was explained and as ruled in Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (supra) by the Supreme Court, once the transaction was clearly covered under the relevant provisions for payment of service tax, then it was not liable for VAT simultaneously. As regards “right to use”, it was pleaded that in Tata Consultancy Service’s case (supra), it was clearly laid down that the item concerned should be capable of abstraction, consumption and use which can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. and referring to various paras from the decision in BSNL (supra), it was contended that considering the peculiarities of the franchise arrangement and the concept of “right to use the goods”, the test laid down in BSNL’s case was not satisfied as the franchise was not provided to the exclusion of the franchisor. It was also submitted interalia that assuming there was a conflict between the entries in Lists I & II under the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Finance Act, 1994 would prevail.

    Next in line, the facts in the case of Mechanical Assembly Systems P. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (supra) were distinguishable as in that case, transfer of know- how on permanent basis was involved and it was totally different from the franchise arrangement. It was further submitted that the subsequent decisions of the Kerala High Court in Jojo Frozen Foods P. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2009) 24 VST 327 and Kreem Foods P. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2009) 24 VST 333 on the identical issue even though considered liable for sales tax, they were under the GST Act and in all the 3 decisions of the same Kerala High Court, the period prior to 2003 was involved i.e. prior to introduction of franchise service from 01/07/2003 in the service tax law and the Division Bench had no occasion to examine the effect of the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994. Further that in those cases, transfer from one dealer to another was involved whereas in the instant case license alone is involved and that the findings of those cases could not be supported in the light of pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court in BSNL’s case (supra). It was strongly pleaded that the learned Single Judge did not go into the question whether service tax alone is payable by the Appellant and did not consider the other related legal issues. Discussing the decision of the Bombay High Court in Duke and Sons Pvt. Ltd. (supra) relied upon in Jojo Foods (P) Ltd.’s case (supra) also, it was submitted that this decision based on special facts was distinguishable.

    The VAT authority on the contrary contended that the 3 decisions of the Kerala High Court (referred above) would show that transactions by way of transfer of know-how as well as right to use the trademark were found covered by KVAT Act. The instant case not being different from those 3 cases, Article 366(29A)(d) would have relevance.

    Considering the contentious issue, the Court ex-amined in detail provisions of franchise service in the Finance Act, 1994 and also those in relation to intellectual property service viz. section 65(55a) and 65(55b) alongside the provisions of KVAT Act as regards definition of ‘sale’ and relevant Explanation (v) thereof dealing with “transfer of right to use any goods for any purpose” and section 6 providing for levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods. All the important terms of model franchise agreement entered into by the Appellant with its franchisees were considered to examine the crux of the arrangement. In a nutshell, the franchisee was granted license to pursue retailing of gold and diamond ornaments, watches etc. at the showroom authorized by the Appellant under their trade name and logo Malabar Gold. At its own discretion, Malabar Gold provided support right from project plan to selection of product mix, implementation of system, raising of funds, specification & guidance on showroom operations etc. Franchisees were not allowed to use the showroom for any other products in their name. The relationship was defined as that of products in their name. The relationship was defined as that of principal to principal and franchisee was allowed not to act as their agent and all other responsibilities and compliances had to be solely of franchisee. Lastly on termination, interalia included non-compete clause for a 2 year period. It was noted by the Court that franchise service was introduced with effect from 01-07-2003 and KVAT was introduced from 01-04-2005. In the light of the said franchise arrangement, principles stated by the very Court in Mechanical Assembly System’s case (supra), Jojo Frozen Foods (supra) and Kreem Foods (supra) were discussed. The case of Mechanical Assembly System was distinguishable as although consideration was termed as ‘royalty’, in that case, there was an outright transfer of know-how involved and not a case of transfer of use of know-how. Therefore, question was whether dictum in the other two cases whether was distinguishable in the light of peculiar facts of the franchise arrangement in the appellant’s case and the question that whether the principles laid down in BSNL’s case would support the appellant’s case.

    The  Court  noticed  that  both  appellant  and revenue relied upon relevant principles explaining the meaning of ‘goods’ in case of Tata Consultancy’s case (supra). On examining the said judgment, the Court formed the view that ‘goods’ used in Article 366(12) of the Constitution and as defined in the KVAT Act is very wide and includes all types of movable properties, tangible or intangible. Then, in juxtaposition, BSNL’s judgment was examined. On analysing relevant paras viz. 50, 56 & 57, 73, 75 of BSNL’s case (supra) as regards ‘goods’ in a sales transaction and delivery thereof, the Court observed that in the light of principles stated therein, actual delivery of the goods is not necessary for effecting transfer of right to use the goods but the goods must be deliverable and delivered at some stage and if what is claimed as goods are not deliverable at all, the question of right to use those goods would not arise. Thus if there is no deliverable, there is no transfer of user and this is true for both tangible and intangible goods. Finally the Court noted the 5 attributes contained in para 97 of BSNL’s case (supra) to constitute a transaction for transfer of the right to use the goods (provided above under sale vs. service). In terms of this test, the appellant’s case involved only a license to use trademark. The transfer of its use was not to the exclusion of the transferor i.e. the appellant retained the right to transfer it to others also. The Court also noted that BSNL’s case (supra) was also considered in Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (supra) while examining a case of composite contract. Further, referring to interalia the decision of the Bombay High Court in Rolta Computer & Industries P. Ltd. (2009) 25 VST 322 it was observed that the Bombay High Court followed the above dictum laid down in BSNL’s case (supra). In this case, an amount was paid on hourly basis for the use of CPU to process accounting applications. The sales tax authorities held that as soon as the terminal was allowed to be used, transfer of right to use took place and therefore sales tax was attracted. Following the above dictum of BSNL’s case (supra), it was held in this case that the possession of computers & terminals was never parted with. Merely when a person agrees to provide a particular customer the service during a particular period to the exclusion of other customers, it would not mean goods are delivered to the exclusion of owner himself. It was nothing more than a service contract and no sales tax was attracted.

    The Court found that this judgment supported the appellant’s case besides the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam (2002) 3 SCC 314 (SC) wherein the crucial relevant factor was that there was no transfer of right to use machinery in favour of contractors to the exclusion of owner was made. The contractor was appointed to only operate the machinery for owner’s own project work in owner’s premises and therefore the effective control and possession over the machinery other than for owner’s use was never transferred to the contractor to attract sales tax. In the light of this, through appellant’s franchise agreement, franchisee did not get effective control of the trademark but got only limited rights and even during subsistence of the agreement, the appellant could use the trademark for itself and for other parties, the dictum laid down in BSNL’s case (supra) was found applicable and the Court found the transaction to be not of “deemed sale” but of “franchise service” in terms of section 65(105) (zze) read with 65(47) & 65(48) of the Finance Act, 1994 although it was strongly pleaded on behalf of the respondent that no service was referred to in the model agreement. The Court accordingly stated that Jojo Frozen Foods Ltd.’s case (supra) and Kreem Foods Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra) had no occasion to consider entry 97 and provisions of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, the Court found that the definitions of ‘franchise’ & ‘franchisor’ were important to consider, as in terms of these definitions, granting of representational right to sell or manufacture goods or to provide service or undertake any process identified with the franchisor was covered whether or not any trademark, service mark, trade name or logo or symbol was involved. Based on this, these judgments were found distinguishable. Accordingly, the single judge’s decision that the transaction was of “deemed sale” as defined in KVAT Act was not agreed upon as in the instant case, the Court did not have to deal with a case involving transfer of intellectual property right like trademark but the matter involved was of franchise agreement and accordingly the judgment was reversed by concluding that it did not attract the provisions of KVAT Act.

    Conclusion:

    The above case is of a typical franchise arrangement and based on this specific arrangement, the Division Bench reached the decision as above reversing the stand taken in the two earlier cases on identical issue. However, many situations or transactions of supply of tangible goods for hire, transfer of right to use intellectual property, electronic transfer/downloads of standard software, transactions involving providing customised software etc. suffer a hanging sword of the other levy even if in good faith one of the taxes is paid with bonafide intentions. An honest tax payer is pushed to the wall to undergo strenuous, lengthy and expensive litigation deterring him to under-take business venture in India on account of the existing complex legal system. Trial and error in judiciary for interpretation of different provisions contained in both the legislations is done at the cost of an assessee – business enterprise whose interests and conveniences are considered of least importance in the gamut of tax collection and administration. Is the issue of interpretation on account of overlap between the two legislations and tug of war between the two administrations on account of revenue a simple affair for us to wrap up as professional opportunity or does it require a serious consideration for drawing attention of lawmakers to address the issue irrespective of implementation of GST?

    Valuation of Taxable Services – Rule for Taxing Reimbursements Held ultra vires

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    Preliminary:

    Subsequent to the introduction of Negative List based Taxation of Services wef 1/7/12, no amendments were made in Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 (Act) and Rule 5 of Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 [Valuation Rules] framed thereunder relating to the taxability of reimbursements. However, significant amendments were made, in regard to valuation relating to Works Contract Services (Rule 2A) and Valuation relating to Supply of Food/Outdoor Catering Services (Rule 2C).

    In the meantime, in a significant recent judicial development, Rule 5 of Valuation Rules has been held to be ultra vires. Hence, considering its significant repercussions, the same is analysed and discussed in detail here. Provisions of Rules 2A and 2C of the Valuation Rules will be discussed in this feature in due course.

    Delhi high court ruling in Inter Continental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt Ltd. (2012 TIOL – 966 HC – Del – ST)

    In this case, the Delhi High Court was concerned with the question of law wherein it was decisively ruled that Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rules providing inclusion of the expenditure or costs incurred by the service provider during the course of providing taxable service, to be part of the value for the purpose of charging Service tax is ultra vires Sections 66 and 67 of the Act, as the said rule travels beyond the scope and mandate of the said section 67.

    Background:

    In the case of Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt. Ltd. (2012-TIOL-966-HC-DEL-ST), writ petition was filed. The petitioner company was providing consulting engineering services to National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) and charged service tax thereon and paid the same. However, during the course of providing the said service, the petitioner had incurred certain out of pocket expense like traveling, boarding and lodging, office rent, office supplies and utilities testing charges etc. These expenses were separately indicated in the invoice for recovering the same. This according to the revenue were essential expenses for providing taxable services of consulting engineers and therefore they directed the company to pay service tax on the same. While proposing the demand of service tax, the Show Cause Notice made Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rules as its basis. Challenging the Show Cause Notice and the said Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rules, the petitioner filed writ petition in 2008 with three prayers viz.

    • quashing Rule 5 of Valuation Rules to the extent that it included reimbursable expenses in the taxable value for charging service tax;

    • declaring the said rule to be unconstitutional and ultra vires section 66 and 67 of the Act;

    • quashing the Show cause Notice holding it illegal, without jurisdiction and unconstitutional. In the interim order, the High Court had directed not to take coercive steps against the petitioner [reported at 2008 (12) STR 689 (Del)]. The final order dated 30th November, 2012 is reported at the above citation.

    Discussion: Provisions of law:

    Section 94 of the Act empowers the Central Government to make rules by issuing notifications. The rules are framed to carry out the provisions of Chapter V of the Act providing for the levy and collection of service tax. Valuation Rules were accordingly notified to come into effect from 19th April, 2006. Almost simultaneously, i.e. w.e.f. 18th April, 2006 section 67 dealing with ‘valuation’ of any taxable service also was amended to read as follows:

    Section 67 (as introduced from 18/04/2006):

    1. Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, where service tax is chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value, then such value shall, –

    (i) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration in money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him;
    (ii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration not wholly or partly consisting of money, be such amount in money, with the addition of service tax charged, is equivalent to the consideration;
    (iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable, be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner.

    2 Where the gross amount charged by a service provider, for the service provided or to be provided is inclusive of service tax payable, the value of such taxable service shall be such amount as, with the addition of tax payable, is equal to the gross amount charged.

    3 The gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include any amount received towards the taxable service before, during or after provision of such service.

    4 Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the value shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed.

    Explanation – For the purposes of this section, –
    (a) “consideration” includes any amount that is payable for the taxable services provided or to be provided;
    (b) “money” includes any currency, cheque, promissory note, letter of credit, draft, pay order, travelers cheque, money order, postal remittance and other similar instruments but does not include currency that is held for its numismatic value;
    (c) gross amount charged” includes payment by cheque, credit card, deduction from account and any form of payment by issue of credit notes or debit notes and book adjustment.

    It is interesting to note that the above section 67 as amended and as it stood prior to 18/04/2006 authorised determination of the value of taxable service as, the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him in a case where the consideration is in money. The highlighted words, “for such service” are key words in the above section read with the charging section 66 which reads as “there shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) @ 12% of the value of taxable services referred to in sub-clauses …………. of section 65 and collected in such manner as may be prescribed”. Thus, the charge of the service tax as per section 66 is on the value of taxable services. In turn, the taxable services are listed in section 65(105) and the relevant sub-clause under which the consulting engineering service is covered is sub-clause (g). Therefore, the only value which can be subjected to service tax is the value of the service provided by the petitioner to NHAI which is that of consulting engineer and nothing more. In other words, the quantified value can never exceed the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided by him. The petitioner thus contended that though section 94 of the Act enables the Central Government to prescribe rules, such rules can only be made to carry out the provisions of Chapter V of the Act. The power conferred cannot exceed or go beyond the section providing for them the charge or collection of the levy.

    In the scenario, it is necessary to understand the subject matter of the controversy i.e. what does the said Rule 5 intend to include in the value of any taxable service. Rule 5 of the Valuation Rules reads as follows:

    “(1) Where any expenditure or costs are incurred by the service provider in the course of providing taxable service, all such expenditure or costs shall be treated as consideration for the taxable service provided or to be provided and shall be included in the value for the purpose of charging service tax on the said service.”

    Sub-clause (2) of the said section contains an exception to the above rule, that the expenditure or costs incurred shall be excluded from the value of taxable value when the service provider acts as a pure agent of the recipient of service subject to the conditions contained in the said sub-section. These conditions are required to be satisfied cumulatively and it is extremely hard to do so.

    Further, Explanation 2 to the said Rule 5 reads as follows, followed by four illustrations:

    “Explanation 2. – For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that the value of the taxable service is the total amount of consideration consisting of all components of the taxable service and it is immaterial that the details of individual components of the total consideration is indicated separately in the invoice.

    Illustration 1. – X contracts with Y, a real estate agent to sell his house and thereupon Y gives an advertisement in television. Y billed X including charges for Television advertisement and paid service tax on the total consideration billed. In such a case, consideration for the service provided is what X pays to Y. Y does not act as an agent on behalf of X when obtaining the television advertisement, even if the cost of television advertisement is mentioned separately in the invoice issued by X. Advertising service is an input service for the estate agent in order to enable or facilitate him to perform his services as an estate agent.

    Illustration 2. – In the course of providing a taxable service, a service provider incurs costs such as traveling expenses, postage, telephone, etc., and may indicate these items separately on the invoice issued to the recipient of service. In such a case, the service provider is not acting as an agent of the recipient of service, but procures such inputs or input service on his own account for providing the taxable service. Such expenses do not become reimbursable expenditure merely because they are indicated separately in the invoice issued by the service provider to the recipient of service.

    Illustration 3. –
    A contracts with B, an architect for building a house. During the course of providing the taxable service, B incurs expenses such as telephone charges, air travel tickets, hotel accommodation, etc., to enable him to effectively perform the provision of services to A. In such a case, in whatever form B recovers such expenditure from A, whether as a separately itemised expense or as part of an inclusive overall fee, service tax is payable on the total amount charged by B. Value of the taxable service for charging service tax is what A pays to B.

    Illustration 4. – Company X provides a taxable service of rent-a-cab by providing chauffeur-driven cars for overseas visitors. The chauffeur is given a lump sum amount to cover his food and overnight accommodation and any other incidental expenses such as park-ing fees by the Company X during the tour. At the end of the tour, the chauffeur returns the balance of the amount with a statement of his expenses and the relevant bills. Company X charges these amounts from the recipients of service. The cost incurred by the chauffeur and billed to the recipient of service constitutes part of gross amount charged for the provision of services by the Company X.”

    Perusing the above, the Court observed that the above illustration 3 amplifies what is meant by sub-rule
    (1). In the illustration given, the architect who renders the service incurs expenses such as telephone charges, air travel tickets, hotel accommodation etc. to enable him to effectively perform his services. Through the illustration, the Rule clearly breaches the boundaries of section 67. In addition to traveling beyond the mandate and the scope of the section, it may also result in double taxation. For instance, air travel attracts service tax and by including it in the value of the invoice and to charge service tax thereon would be certainly paying tax twice. In this frame of reference, the Court recognised that there could be double taxation provided it is clearly intended and cannot be enforced by implication. Citing Supreme Court in Jain Brothers vs. UOI (1970) 77 ITR 107, a part of the extract of the Court’s observation reads as follows:

    “It is not disputed that there can be double taxation if the legislature has distinctly enacted it. It is only when there are general words of taxation and they have to be interpreted, they cannot be so interpreted as to tax the subject twice over to the same tax (vide Channell J. in Stevens v. Durban-Roodepoort Gold Mining Co. Ltd.). The Constitution does not contain any prohibition against double taxation even if it be assumed that such a taxation is involved in the case of a firm and its partners after the amendment of section 23(5) by the Act of 1956. Nor is there any other enactment which interdicts such taxation. If any double taxation is involved the legislature itself has, in express words, sanctioned it. It is not open to any one thereafter to invoke the general principles that the subject cannot be taxed twice over.”

    While the Hon. Court found adequate authority for the contention that the rules cannot overreach the provisions of the main enactment, it cited the following:

    “In Central Bank of India vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12 the observation was, “We do not say that a statutory rule can enlarge the meaning of Section 10; if a rule goes beyond what the Section contemplates, the rule must yield to the statute. We have, however, pointed out earlier that Section 10 itself uses the word “remuneration” in the widest sense, and R.5 and Form-I are to that extent in consonance with the Section.”

    Similarly, In Babaji Kondaji Garad vs. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 50, the Supreme Court observed “Now if there is any conflict between a statute and the subordinate legislation, it does not require elaborate reasoning to firmly state that the statute prevails over subordinate legislation and the bye-law, if not in conformity with the statute in order to give effect to the statutory provision, the Rule or bye-law has to be ignored. The statutory provision has precedence and must be complied with.”

    In the light of the above observations, the Court found that the expressions “consideration in money” or “the gross amount charged” used in section 67 in widest sense are not suggestive of including the amount collected for travel, hotel stay, transportation and other out of pocket expenses, but these words are defined in the Explanation below the section. Significantly, out of pocket expenses such as travel, hotel stay, transportation etc. are not included in those expressions.

    The Court also relied on the observation in Devi Datt vs. Union of India, AIR 1985 Delhi 195 “but obviously the said rule has to be construed in the light of the parent section and it cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of Section 19 itself. It is a well settled canon of construction that the Rules made under a statute must be treated exactly as if they were in the Act and are of the same effect as if contained in the Act. There is another principle equally fundamental to the rules of construction, namely, that the Rules shall be consistent with the provisions of the Act. Hence, Rule 102 has to be construed in conformity with the scope and ambit of Section 19 and it must be ignored to the extent it appears to be inconsistent with provisions of Section 19”. Similarly in CIT vs. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, (1969) 74 ITR 41 it was held that “if a rule clearly comes into conflict with the main enactment or if there is any repugnancy between the substantive provisions of the Act and the Rules made therein, it is the rule which must give way to the provisions of the Act.” Also in Bimal Chandra Banerjee vs. State of M.P. and Ors. (1971) 81 ITR 105, the Court observed:

    “No tax can be imposed by any bye-law or rule or regulation unless the statute under which the sub-ordinate legislation is made specially authorises the imposition even if it is assumed that the power to tax can be delegated to the executive. The basis of the statutory power conferred by the statute cannot be transgressed by the rule making authority. A rule making authority has no plenary power. It has to act within the limits of the power granted to it”.

    The Court further relied on CIT, Andhra Pradesh vs. Taj Mahal Hotel, (1971) 82 ITR 44 and Commissioners of Customs and Excise vs. Cure and Deeley Ltd., (1961) 3 WLR 788 (QB) and made similar observation as to the canon that a rule has to be framed remaining within the scope and ambit of the Act.

    For the case under examination, the Court observed that reading section 66 and section 67(I)(i) of the Act together and harmoniously, it seems clear that while valuing a taxable service, nothing more and nothing less than the consideration paid as quid pro quo for the service can be brought to charge. Sub-section (4) of the said section 67 enabling the determination of value of taxable service “in such manner as may be prescribed” is expressly made subject to the provisions of sub-section (1). The Court decisively ruled that sections 66, 67 and 94, which empower the Central Government to prescribe rules to carry out the provisions of Chapter V of the Act mean that only the service actually provided by the service provider can be valued and assessed to service tax and Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rules runs counter and is repugnant to sections 66 and 67 of the Act and to that extent it is ultra vires. By including the expenditure and costs, it goes far beyond the charging provisions and cannot be upheld. Citing Hukam Chand vs. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 2427, the Court concluded that simply because every rule framed by the Central Government is laid before both the Houses of the Parliament, does not confer validity on a rule if it is not made in conformity with the Act as it is a specie of a subordinate legislation.

    Whether all reimbursable expenses would not attract service tax any more?

    While the ruling of the Delhi High Court indeed is extremely welcome, little can be commented about its finality at this stage. A lot will depend whether the revenue chooses to file appeal against the above ruling in the Supreme Court and this is most likely to happen. The possibility of the Government bringing about retrospective amendment in section 67 itself cannot also be ruled out, considering the fact that a large number of assessees have already paid service tax on the reimbursable expenses and again a large number of them may have paid after recovering the same and of which, CENVAT credit is availed by the recipients of such services. Precedents of retrospective amendment have already been experienced in the service tax administration itself in case of renting of immovable property service and broadcasting service, besides the fact that Supreme Court struck down provisions relating to reverse charge made via subordinate legislation as ultra vires vis-à-vis services of clearing and forwarding agents and goods transport agencies. (Refer Laghu Udyog Bharti Anr. vs. UOI 1999 (112) ELT 365 (SC) and subsequent retrospective amendment made in section 68 of the Act by the Central Government to overcome the directives of the Court in the said case). Therefore, the relief or even the sense of ‘fairness’ felt on account of the above judgment may remain short-lived and plan of action on the basis of the above ruling may not be an act of prudence, as felt by many at this point in time. However, and not withstanding the outcome or the finality in the above context, it is relevant to analyse the rationale laid down by the Larger Bench of the Bangalore Tribunal in Shri Bhagawathy Traders vs. CCE, Cochin 2011 (24) STR 290 (Tri.-LB) which dealt with the issue of taxability of reimbursable expenses under the service tax law in the scenario when Rule 5(1) did not exist. In this case, issues relating to reimbursement of various expenses incurred by C. & F. Agents were discussed in detail, by the Larger Bench including various conflicting judicial views in the matter. Relevant extracts of the observations made by the Larger Bench are under.

    Having analysed the various decisions cited on behalf of the assessee and on behalf of the department, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of the term “reimbursements” in the context of money realised by a service provider. ……The concept of reimbursement will arise only when the person actually paying was under no obligation to pay the amount and he pays the amount on behalf of the buyer of the goods and recovers the said amount from the buyer of the goods.

    Similar is the situation in the transaction between a service provider and the service recipient. Only when the service recipient has an obligation, legal or contractual, to pay certain amount to any third party and the said amount is paid by the service provider on behalf of the service recipient, the question of reimbursing the expenses incurred on behalf of the recipient shall arise. For example, when rent for premises is sought to be claimed as reimbursement, it has to be seen whether there is an agreement between the landlord of the premises and the service recipient and, therefore, the service recipient is under obligation for paying the rent to the landlord and that the service provider has paid the said amount on behalf of the recipient. The claim for reimbursement of salary to staff, similarly has to be considered as to whether the staff were actually employed by the service recipient at agreed wages and the service recipient was under obligation to pay the salary and it was out of expediency, the provider paid the same and sought reimbursement from the service recipient.

    Various Circulars of the Board relied upon by the Learned Advocate for the assessee clearly referred to amounts payable on behalf of the service recipient. For example, the Customs House Agent (CHA) paying the Customs duty to the Customs Department, paying the charges levied by the Port Trust to the Port Trust, paying the fee for testing to the Testing Organisation are clearly on behalf of the importer/exporter and the same are recoverable by the CHA as reimbursement, that too on actual basis. These Circulars cannot be held to be in support of the claim of the assessee that they can split part of the amount as reimbursable expenses and the rest as towards service charges.

    The claim for reimbursement towards rent for premises, telephone charges, stationery charges, etc. amounts to a claim by the service provider that they can render such services in vacuum. What are costs for inputs services and inputs used in rendering services cannot be treated as reimbursable costs. There is no justification or legal authority to artificially split the cost towards providing services partly as cost of services and the rest as reimbursable expenses.

    Keeping in view this rationale, if a simple example of architect, consulting engineer or a chartered accountant is examined wherein when an architect visits site of the client outside his home city/town and so do the engineers of a consulting engineering firm or audit team of a CA firm, the travel expenses, lodging and boarding expenses incurred and reimbursed cannot certainly form part of the ‘value’ of taxable service as the service provider has incurred such expenses only to carry out the assignment of the recipient of service and such cost does not represent its own “professional fee” that is charged for using its proficiency expertise and/or knowledge of the subject. Yet in some cases for the sake of simplicity, sometimes allowances are fixed on a daily basis for employees to avoid cumbersome paper work or to overcome practical difficulties and this many a times acts as a deterrent to prove that the ‘reimbursement’ of the expense incurred is on “actual basis” in terms of the controversial Rule 5(2) of the Valuation Rules which provides that cost incurred as “pure agent” can be excluded from the value of taxable service, subject to satisfaction of all the conditions laid down in this respect. Taking another example of a CHA or a logistics service provider, it is found that when an expense like courier charge is specifically incurred for and on behalf of the recipient and under his specific instructions or a place is acquired on rental basis on behalf of client and is client-specific and for their limited purpose, it may not form part of the cost of providing such service and therefore, service tax may not be attracted in such cases. Nevertheless, the issue is subjective as observed by the Larger Bench in Shri Bhagawathy Traders (supra) wherein admittedly the subject is dealt with a well-balanced approach. The issue therefore may be debatable and therefore litigative in many complex situations as precise parameters are not available in law for the same otherwise than Rule 5 of the Valuation Rules.

    Conclusion:

    Nevertheless, the draconian Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rules and the concept of “pure agent” as enshrined in the Rule sub-clause (2) of the said Rule 5 with rigidity certainly do not deserve to exist on the statute.

    In the current scenario, when all services are brought within the sweep of the service tax except the Negative List and certain exempt services, if pragmatism is applied by the Government and Rule 5 is allowed to remain struck down, to a large extent dual taxation would be avoided and guidelines by revenue may be provided on the lines ruled by the Larger Bench in the case of Shri Bhagawathy Traders (supra). Service tax administration then would not be lopsided in favour of revenue on this aspect and may extend fairness to assessees at large on the issue of levying service tax on reimbursable costs and this may also possibly cover genuine concern of many business enterprises on the open issue of leviability or otherwise of service tax on shared costs among associate/group concerns.

    Software: Taxable as Service or Goods or Both?

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    Introduction:
    The term ‘software’ is not defined in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act). However, in Commissioner of Customs vs. Hewlett Packard India Sales Pvt. Ltd. 2007 (215) ELT 484, the Supreme Court referred to the meaning of software as given in Computer Dictionary by Microsoft 5th Edition:

    “Software—Computer programs; instructions that make hardware work. Two main types of software are system software (operating systems), which controls the workings of the computer, and applications, such as word processing programs, spreadsheets, and databases, which perform the tasks for which people use computers. Two additional categories, which are neither system nor application software but contain elements of both, are network software, which enables groups of computers to communicate, and language software, which provides programmers with the tools they need to write programs. In addition to these task-based categories, several types of software are described based on their method of distribution. These include packaged software (canned programs), sold primarily through retail outlets; freeware and public domain software, which are distributed free of charge; shareware, which is also distributed free of charge; although users are requested to pay a small registration fee for continued use of the program; and vaporware, software that is announced by a company or individuals but either never makes it to market or is very late. See also application, canned software, freeware, network software, operating system, shareware, system software, vaporware, Compare firmware, hardware, liveware.”

    Software under the description Information Technology Software (IT Software) was brought into the net of service tax with effect from 16th May, 2008 by defining the term “Information Technology Software” and introducing clause (zzzze) in section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) wherein various items were listed as taxable services in relation to IT software. From 1st July, 2012, under the new regime of negative list based taxation of services, “Development, design programming, customization, adaptation, upgradation, enhancement, implementation of information technology software” is specified in section 66E of the Act as one of the 9 declared services. In turn, the definition of ‘service’ includes a declared service in its purview. Service tax levied on IT software has been a matter of debate as it has been subject to multiple taxes. Under the VAT laws of the States, all types of software are treated as goods. This is because in a landmark ruling of the Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy Services vs. State of Andhra Pradesh’ (2004) 178 ELT 22 (SC) [TCS] where the question before the Court was whether Packaged Software was goods, the proposition argued before the Court was that software was intangible, and therefore not goods. The Court held as under :

    “A software programme may consist of various commands which enable the computer to perform a designated task. The copyright in that programme may remain with the originator of the programme. But the moment copies are made and marketed, it becomes goods, which are susceptible to sales tax. Sale is not just of the media which by itself has very little value. The software and the media cannot be split up. Thus, a transaction of sale of computer software is clearly a sale of “goods” within the meaning of the term as defined in the said Act. The term “all materials, articles and commodities” includes both tangible and intangible/incorporeal property which is capable of abstraction, consumption and use and which can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. The software programmes have all these attributes.”

    The Central Government under the service tax law treats software as service except packaged or canned software. Section 65B(28) of the Act defines IT software as under:

    “information technology software” means any representation of instructions, data, sound or image, including source code and object code, recorded in a machine readable form, and capable of being manipulated or providing interactivity to a user, by means of a computer or an automatic data processing machine or any other device or equipment”.

    Chargeability to Central Excise Duty
    Introduction of levy on Packaged Software

    • Extracts from Finance Minister’s Budget Speech on 28.2.2006 :

    Para 138 “I propose to impose an 8 per cent excise duty on packaged software sold over the counter. Customized software and software packages downloaded from the internet will be exempt from this levy”.

    • Entry 27 – General Exemption Notification 6/06 – CE

    “Any customised software (that is to say any custom designed software developed for a specific user or client) other than packaged software or canned software.”

    Explanation: For the purpose of this entry packaged software or canned software means software developed to meet the needs of variety of users and it is intended for sale or capable of being sold off the shelf.”

    In the TCS case, the Supreme Court has observed as under:

    Para 26

    “…….. We are in agreement with Mr. Sorabjee when he contends that there is no distinction between branded and unbranded software. However, we find no error in the High Court holding that branded software is goods. In both cases, the software is capable of being abstracted consumed and use. In both cases the software can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. Thus even unbranded software, when it is marketed/sold, may be goods. We, however, are not dealing with this aspect and express no opinion thereon because in case of unbranded software other questions like situs of contract of sale and/or whether the contract is a service contract may arise”

    For the purpose of Central excise, so long as software does not fit within the ambit of Packaged Software, which is capable of being sold off the shelf, there would be no question of excise duty.

    Can the Concept of “manufacture” apply to Software at all?

    Interestingly, even assuming software is considered as goods and packaged software is considered as excisable goods, excise duty can be imposed only if there is an “activity of manufacture” in terms of Section 2(f) of CEA.

    The Supreme Court in the case of Seelan Raj and Other vs. Presiding Officer, First Additional Labour Court, Chennai – 2001 AIR SC 1127 was considering the issue under the Industrial Disputes Act. It was the contention of company that it was rendering computer services and developing customised soft-ware application. Dispute arose which was referred to the Labour Court and it was contended by the Company that it was a manufacturer of software and therefore it is not an establishment under the Industrial Disputes Act and much less a factory under the Factories Act and therefore the dispute should not be referred to Labour Court as it is not an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court overruled the objection and held that legislation covers the establishment of the company and directed the reinstatement of the workmen back with wages. It was also held that the company was factory and had to comply with the Industrial Disputes Act. After various rounds of litigation, the matter landed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that there is a distinction between packaged software and custom-built software. Standard Packaged Software is marketed as a standard product, to meet the requirements of a large number of users whereas customised software is meant to meet the particular requirement of the user. The hybrid form of software also exists whereby the standard package is altered so that it fits the customised needs more clearly adopting a basis of customisation. The Supreme Court, taking into account the debate on various aspects and the questions with reference to software, referred the dispute to the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court.

    In the case of CCE vs. Acer India Ltd. (2004) 172 ELT 289 (SC) the following was observed by the Supreme Court:

    “Para 81


    We, however, place on record that we have not applied our mind as regards the larger question as to whether the information contained in a software would be a tangible personal property or whether preparation of such software would amount to manufacture under different statutes.”

    CETA is aligned to the Customs Tariff and software is identically classified under entry 8523 80 20 as (Information Technology Software) under Chapter Heading 8523. Again, the CETA is only set out for tangible goods, and the software and the media cannot be split. Attention is drawn to Chapter Note 10 to Chapter 85 of CETA which states as under:

    “For the purposes of heading 8523 ‘recording’ of sound or other phenomena shall amount to manufacture”.

    In other words, the recording of software on a medium could be an activity of manufacture which would attract a charge of Central Excise duty.

    CETA Classification for “Software” is entry 8523 80 20 (Information Technology Software). Information Technology software is then carved up into customised software (defined as custom designed software developed for a specific user or client) and packaged or canned software (defined as software designed to meet the need of variety of users and is intended for sale or capable of being sold off the shelf), and separate notifications set out the effec-tive rates of duty in respect of these two.

    By Notification No. 6/2006-CE dated 1.3.2006, the effective rate for Customised Software is nil. Ac-cordingly, CVD on imports of Customised Software is also nil.

    In this regard, attention is invited to the decision in Steag Encotec India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs (2010) 250 ELT 287 (Tri – Mumbai). In the facts of the case, the software, which was imported for use in coal based plants, required to be modified according to the needs to each of the plants on the basis of design and operating conditions which varied from one plant to another. The question before the CESTAT was whether such modification of the software would suffice to give it the character of customised software so as to qualify it for the aforesaid exemption. The CESTAT held that the exemption notification would not apply, as only software which “has to be developed from the basic building blocks, whereby a new software product should emerge as per the specific requirement of the client” would qualify as CS, and that software which has just been modified from PS would not.

    Chargeability to Customs Duties

    Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 [‘CA ’62] provides that customs duty shall be levied on goods imported into India. Section 2(22) of ‘CA ’62 defines goods to include “(a) vessels, aircrafts and vehicles; (b) stores, (c) baggage; (d) currency and negotiable instruments; (e) any other kind of movable property”. Therefore, for customs duties to apply on an import of software, it must answer to this definition of goods.

    In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs (2001) 128 ELT 21 (SC), the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the scope of this definition. In the context of import of designs and drawings on paper, it was contended before the Court that the transactions were for a transfer of technology which was intangible, and that the medium was only a vehicle of transmission and incidental to the main transaction. It was accordingly contended that even though the technology was put onto a medium, it would not get converted from an intangible to a tangible thing which could be subject to customs duties. The Court did not accept these contentions, and held that all tangible movable articles would fall within the ambit of the definition of goods u/s. 2(22) (e) of CA ‘62, and that it was immaterial as to what types of goods were imported or what is contained in them or recorded thereon. In other words, if there was an import of tangible movable articles, there would be a levy of customs duty on these articles without any exclusion for an intangible contained in the articles. The Court went on to say, on the related subject of valuation of the imported goods, that once the intellectual property had been incorporated on the medium, the value of the medium would get enhanced, and customs duties would apply on this enhanced value. In the words of the Court:

    “It is misconception to contend that what is being taxed is intellectual input. What is being taxed under the Customs Act read with Customs Tariff Act and the Customs Valuation Rules is not the input alone but goods whose value has been enhanced by the said inputs. There is no scope for splitting the engineering drawing or the encyclopedia into intellectual input on the one hand and the paper on which it is scribed on the other.”

    The Supreme Court ruling in ACC’s Case seem to imply that, though the definition of “goods” in CA ‘62 is set out in the same terms as the Constitution and various Sales tax/VAT provisions, the goods must be tangible for a levy of customs duty to apply. Such a position appears to be inconsistent with the view taken in TCS and BSNL that the ambit of the term “goods” extends to intangibles. Then, a question arises as to why, the import of intangibles does not attract a levy of customs duty.

    A possible answer could be that though intangibles are goods, as the taxable event of import, i.e. crossing the customs barrier, cannot arise (given the intangible nature of the goods), there cannot be a charge to customs duty. This would be in line with the Geneva Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce, 1998 WT/MIN (98)/ DEC/2, according to which member countries are to “continue their current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmission”.

    What follows from above is that only software recorded on a tangible medium is liable to customs duty. In this connection, it is relevant to note that software is classified under Tariff Entry 8523 80 20 (Information Technology software) under chapter heading 8523 (Discs, tapes, solid-state non–volatile storage devices, “smart cards” and other media for the recording of sound or of other phenomena, whether or not recorded, including matrices and masters for the production of discs, but excluding products of Chapter 37) of the Customs Tariff. This classification accords with the position set out in TCS that the software and medium cannot be split up, and the implication that follows in respect of valuation of the medium. The classification also provides yet another answer as to why intangibles (like software), though constituting goods, are not liable to customs duty, i.e. the fact that the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (“CTA”) is only set out for tangible goods. The Customs Tariff rate for entry 8523 80 20 (IT Software) is “Free”

    This means that a packaged or a canned software is goods and when it is capable of being used by a large number of users, it also amounts to manufacturing of goods whereas customised software is fully exempt goods. Board’s Instruction F, no.354/189/2009-TRU dated 04-11-2009 also clarified in this regard that so far as excise duty/CVD is concerned, packaged software attracts duty @ 8% while customised software is fully exempted.

    The question therefore arises is that if both packaged or canned software and customised software are ‘goods’ for the purpose of CEA, CA, 62, one dutiable and the other ‘exempt’, whether customised software can simultaneously be considered service for the purpose of service tax law?

    Packaged/canned software vs. customised software:

    So far as packaged or canned software is concerned, time and again, CBEC provided indication that it is considered goods and not exigible to service tax. Education Guide dated 20-06-2012 released along with the introduction of negative list based tax on services at Guidance Note No.6.4.1 & 6.4.4 has referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy Services vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2004 (178) ELT 22 (SC) and stated that sale of pre-packaged or canned software is in the nature of sale of goods and is not covered by the entry for declared service of development, design etc. of IT software. The Education Guide also states that the judgment of Tata Consultancy Services (supra) is applicable in case the pre-packaged software is put on a media before sale. “In such a case, the transaction will go out of the ambit of the definition of service as it would be an activity involving only a transfer of title in goods.” It is thus not a matter of doubt or debate that packaged or canned software is ‘goods’ both for the purpose of VAT laws of the States and the Central Excise law at least when canned/packaged software is made available on any tangible medium. The question however remains open in regard to customised software. In the Tata Consultancy’s case (supra) the Honourable Supreme Court did not decide as to whether unbranded software is considered ‘goods’ or not. This is mainly because whether uncanned software (unbranded software) were goods or not was not at all an issue before the Supreme Court in that case. However, the Court was in agreement with the submission made by the petitioner in the case that there was no distinction between branded and unbranded software. The majority opinion in the said judgment held that as they did not deal with the unbranded software when it is marketed or sold as goods and therefore did not express opinion on the same. In this regard however, the Supreme Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Another vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) at Para 56 and 57 upheld that software whether customised or non-customised would become goods provided it satisfies the attributes of goods, namely (a) its utility (b) its capability of being bought and sold and (c) capability of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored or possessed.

    Considering all the above, the issue that arises is:

    When an item is specifically exempted under an exemption notification of the Central Excise Tariff Act, could it not mean that it is primarily ‘goods’ though exempted. Without having characteristic of goods, why would it find place as exempted item under the Central Excise law? Viewing this from another angle, we find similar inconsistencies in the service tax law also. For instance, process amounting to manufacture and trading in goods are listed along with other non-taxable services in section 66D when the activities per se do not have characteristic of a ‘service’, whether they can find place in the “negative list” of services. Under the earlier dispensation of law, notifying the value of goods and material sold by the service provider to the recipient of service as exempt under Notifica-tion No.12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 was also along the same lines. Nevertheless, this does not whittle down the fact that even customised software is more akin to being goods than a service as it can be utilised, transmitted, transferred, delivered and stored and possessed. As a matter of fact, it can be used only when it is stored on a tangible medium of the hardware. The Madras High Court in the case of Infosys Technologies Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 2009 (233) ELT 56 (Mad) relying on the decision in the case of TCS (supra) held that unbranded/customised software developed and sold by the petitioner, with or without obligation for system upgradation, repairs and maintenance or employee training, satisfies the Rules as ‘goods’, it will also be ‘goods’ for the purpose of sales tax. However amidst controversy, service tax is levied on customised software considering it as ‘service’.

    Software: Can it be goods as well as service at the same time?

    The question therefore arises is whether an activity or a transaction can be considered ‘goods’ as well as ‘service’ under different statutes and therefore exigible to tax more than once. Since the Central Excise law and Service Tax law are under a com-mon administration, dual levy generally here would not be attracted, yet by interpreting a transaction to be either ‘service’ or ‘goods’ and offering tax accordingly, one may have to face litigation from the administration of the other levy. In Yokogowa India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore 2008 (226) ELT 474 (Tri.-Bang), the Indian company imported a software and claimed that it was a customised software, unique to only their usage and claimed exemption under Notification No. 6/2006-CE (referred above) for countervailing duty. The appellant in this case made a number of submissions in support of its claims that the software that it imported was not capable of being bought off the shelf and that this software was designed on the basis of their unique requirement. However, it was held that the software imported by the as-sessee consisted of several standard packages and only after further modification, it would acquire characteristic of custom designed software. What was imported was packaged software and therefore benefit of Notification No. 6/2006-CE was not available.

    Later, however the Government issued Notification No. 53/2010-ST dated 21/12/2010 whereby packaged/ canned software was exempted subject to the condition that the value of such packaged/canned software had suffered excise duty when domestically produced or additional customs duty along with appropriate customs duty in case of imported packaged/canned and that the service provider made a declaration on the invoice that no amount in ex-cess of retail sale price declared on the said goods (packaged/canned software) is recovered from the customer. Similarly, the tug of war between the State law relating to VAT and service tax law of the Central Government being more intense, it makes tax compliant software businesses go through a rough bet of interpretation as to whether the transaction is of sale or of a service and have to bear consequent litigation cost for no fault of theirs. In the case of Sasken Communication Technologies Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Bangalore (2011) 16 taxmann.com 7 (Kar.), VAT was demanded from the assessee who entered into an agreement for development of software for a client as per client’s specification & expressly agreed that software when brought into existence would be absolute property of the client. The Court observed that the assessee gave up their rights before software was developed. The agreement did not have any indication for purchase of software. It was provided in the agreement that all ideas, inventions, patentable or otherwise, as a result of programming or other services would be exclusive property of the client as it would be considered as work made on hire. The deliverable was entirely related to development. In short, software prior to being embedded on a material object, belonged to the client and the entire work was done through capable employees of the assessee & no indication existed in the agreement as to purchase of software even from the market and improvement thereon by the assessee. The court, therefore, held that the contract was for a service simplicitor.

    The principle that a transaction cannot simultaneously be both for goods and services is recognised at various levels. The Supreme Court in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC) observed that the word ‘goods’ has to be understood in contradistinction to the word ‘services’. In BSNL’s case (supra) it was categorically held that a transaction cannot be both for goods and services. Nevertheless, there being a thin line of divide between the two or both intertwined in many situations, there lacks clarity on the subject until a common code by way of Goods and Services Tax (GST) is implemented.

    Software downloaded electronically:

    The following is extracted from the Finance Minister’s Budget Speech on 28-02-06:

    “Para 138

    I propose to impose an 8% excise duty on packaged software sold over the counter. Customised Software and Software Packages downloaded from the internet will be exempt from this levy.”

    In cases where the software is made available only through the medium of internet there is no express exclusion in Entry 27 stated above. However, the Explanatory Notes, which forms part of the Budget Papers read as under:

    “Excise duty of 8% is being imposed on packaged software, is also known canned software on electronic media (software downloaded from the internet and customised software will not attract duty). [Serial 27 of Notification No. 6/2006)”]

    The Central Excise Rules, 2002 contemplate payment of excise duty at the time of removal of excisable goods from the factory and at the rates prevalent on the date of removal from the factory. Where a customised software solution is sold to the customer through the medium of internet, the transaction can be considered as an e-commerce transaction and there is no physical removal of goods in a tangible form from the factory gate which is the requirement of levy of excise duty. Further, the software is not available in any medium for it to be considered as goods as per the rationale of the Supreme Court in TCS case.

    The following judicial considerations need to be noted:

    The Supreme Court in the case of Associated Cement Company vs. CC (2001) 128 ELT 21 held that where any drawings or designs or technical materials are put in any media or paper, it becomes goods. Hence, only if an intellectual property is put in a media, it is to be regarded as an article or goods.

    In Digital Equipment (India) Ltd. vs. CC (2001) 135 ELT 962 Tribunal held that information transmitted via e-mail cannot be akin to import of record media in 85.23. In an e-mail transfer, no media as a movable article is crossing the international boundaries and there is no movable property movement involved. Therefore, transfer of information or idea or knowledge on e-mail transfer would not be covered within the ambit of goods under the Customs Act. If they are not goods, then they cannot be subject to any duty.

    In Multi Media Frontiers vs. CCE (2003) 156 ELT 272 the Tribunal has observed that a software cannot exist by itself and for it to be put to use it has to necessarily exist on some suitable media such has floppy disc, tape or CD.

    In Pantex Geebee Fluid Power Ltd vs. CC (2003) 160 ELT 514 (Tri), it was held that, a transfer of intellectual property by intangible means like email would not be liable to customs duty.

    The Geneva Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce Document WT/MIN (98) DEC/2 dated 25-05-1998 which is a declaration of an intent by members of WTO that they would continue their current practice of not imposing customs duty on electronic declaration.

    Annual maintenance contract for electronically downloaded software:

    When a software is bought and sold, annual or ongoing maintenance service is important for the user. Generally, under an Annual Maintenance Contract (AMC), upgradation or updation is done by way of installation of upgraded version of the software already sold or available with the user. It is common to provide license to such versions electronically vide internet or through paper licenses. Since this is part of the obligation of the AMC along with other maintenance services like debugging, troubleshooting etc. agreed to be provided during the currency of the AMC, the value of the licensed updation is also contained in the AMC and because it is difficult to determine the said value at the time of signing of AMC, it remains inseparable. Therefore, liability under both the laws is attracted, viz., VAT law of the State and the Service Tax law’], as the sale of license to use software is goods under deemed sale concept and providing upgradation, enhancement etc. is a ‘service’ with effect from 16-05-2008 as well as “declared service” with effect from 01-07-2012. In this context, Education Guide comments at para 6.4.4 are extracted for easy reference:

    “6.4.4 Would providing a license to use pre-packaged software be a taxable service?

    •    ‘Transfer of right to use goods’ is deemed to be a sale under Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India and transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing, licensing or any such manner without transfer of right to use such goods is a declared service under clause (f) of section 66E.

    •    A license to use software which does not involve the transfer of ‘right to use’ would neither be a transfer of title in goods nor a deemed sale of goods. Such an activity would fall in the ambit of definition of ‘service’ and also in the declared service category specified in clause (f) of section 66E.

    •    Whether the license to use software is in the pa-per form or in electronic form makes no material difference to the transaction.

    •    However, the manner in which software is transferred makes material difference to the nature of transaction. If the software is put on the media like computer disks or even embedded on a computer before the sale the same would be treated as goods. If software or any programme contained is delivered online or is down loaded on the internet the same would not be treated as goods as software as the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy Service case is applicable only in case the pre-packaged software is put on a media before sale.

    •    Delivery of content online would also not amount to a transaction in goods as the content has not been put on a media before sale. Delivery of content online for consideration would, therefore, amount to provision of service.” [emphasis supplied].

    It is noted here that although in the Education Guide the Ministry of Finance has placed reliance on the TCS decision (supra), it has made it applicable in the manner it suits its own interpretation that mode of delivery of the software would determine whether it is ‘goods’ or the ‘service’. Thus, service tax is certainly made applicable as the license to use software is considered service. The ‘rationale’ as explained by the Education Guide that the manner of delivery of a software or a programme determines the character of the transaction is hard to digest.

    Whether intangible nature of the ‘goods’ capable of being bought and sold, utilised, transmitted & transferred (electronically) and stored and possessed by the user ultimately loses its characteristic of being ‘goods’ and becomes ‘services’? The issue is certainly disputable. In practice, it can be observed that most of the AMCs entered into by IT sector carry both VAT and service tax at applicable rates.

    Further, introduction of repairs and maintenance contracts in the execution of works contract vide Notification No. 24/2012-ST has added further confusion. Most contractors of AMCs treat AMCs as works contracts, given the fact that value of license or goods which is deemed sale as per VAT laws is inseparable. Accordingly, in many cases it is observed that persons entering into AMC charge and recover VAT at applicable rate (depending on whichever option under the VAT law is exercised) and service tax of 12.36% is charged and recovered on 70% value (effective rate of 8.652%) in terms of Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 introduced with effect from 1st July, 2012. Whether this practice is correct in terms of discussion here is an issue by itself as the service tax administration considers license to use software acquired electronically as pure service. In this sce-nario, would service tax be not demanded on full value of AMC considering it a service contract?

    Applicability of VAT indeed would not be influenced by this interpretation as it independently treats the subject matter as sale of goods and therefore VAT is attracted at applicable rate. Thus, uncertainty and diverse practices would continue to persist till the issue is settled judicially as tremendous litigation would be generated on account of overlap. One such attempt made in Infotech Software Dealers Association vs. UOI 2010 (20) STR 289 (Mad) hardly provided any definite direction. In this case, the petitioner challenged legislative competency of the Parliament to levy service tax under the relevant clause section 65(105)(zzzze). The High Court in this case considered the incidental question that the transaction of the software in all cases amounted to sale or in some transactions, it could be considered ‘service’. The member of the Association in this case, supplied software to their customers pursuant to end user license agreements. To this, the High Court held that it is not sale of software but only the contents of the data stored in the software were provided and this amounted to service. It was further observed that to bring the “deemed sale” concept, there must be transfer of right to use any goods and when the goods as such is not transferred, the question of deeming sale does not arise and in that sense, transaction would be of service and not a sale.

    The High Court further observed that the challenge to the amended provisions was only on the ground that software is goods and all transactions would amount to sale whereas the transactions may not amount to sale in all cases and it may vary depending upon the end user license agreement Therefore, competence of Parliament to levy service tax cannot be challenged so long as the residuary power is available under Entry 97 of the List-I and finally held “the question as to whether a transaction would amount to sale or service depends upon the individual transaction and on that ground, the vires of provision cannot be questioned”. The issue therefore remains open for interpretation when a dealer in software merely passes on license to the end user without any value addition to the license, whether it would still be treated as service.

    Paradoxically, in spite of the fact that software sold electronically is notified as service, in case of Microworld Software Services P. Ltd. vs. CCE, MUM-I 2012-TIOL-1044-CESTAT-MUM, the company engaged into manufacturing software cleared packaged soft-ware on payment of appropriate duty. They also effected sale of software through internet. Central Excise authorities demanded and confirmed the duty and imposed penalties. At the lower appellate stage, 25% pre-deposit on duty and penalty was directed to be paid to hear the appeal. The pre-deposit of duty was paid and for the pre-deposit on the penalty portion, modification application was filed. Both modification application and appeal were dismissed for non-compliance of the order.

    Appellant’s plea to CESTAT was that from F. Y. 2008-09, they had started paying service tax considering software cleared in tangible form attracted excise duty whereas Board’s Circular dated 29- 02-2008 clarified that service tax was payable on electronically supplied software. Further, they had informed revenue that they claimed exemption under Notification No. 6/06-CE for electronic supply of software. The revenue argued that Tariff heading 8524 covers software on floppy, disc/media/ CD Rom and also covers software on other media and the term “other media” covers electronically supplied internet. Based on the above submissions of the Appellant and considering their service tax payment and letter informing revenue about claim of the exemption under Notification No. 06/2006, the Bench found 25% pre-deposit of duty amount sufficient to hear the appeal and also found the case arguable and directed the Commissioner (Appeals) to hear the appeal on merits as the same was dismissed for non-compliance of section 35F without going into merits.

    Considering the above process undergone by the Appellant, the following extract of TRU letter F. No. 334/1/2008 dated 29-02-2008 may be noted:

    “4.1.3 Packaged software sold off the shelf, being treated as goods, is leviable to excise duty @ 8%. In this budget, it has been increased from 8% to 12% vide notification No. 12/2008-CE dated 01-03 -2008. Number of IT services and IT enabled services (ITES) are already leviable to service tax under various taxable services.

    4.1.5 Software and upgrades of software are also supplied electronically, known as digital delivery. Taxation is to be neutral and should not depend on forms of delivery. Such supply of IT software electronically shall be covered within the scope of the proposed service.”

    Relying on the above and taking action thereon and given the fact that both excise duty and service tax are administered by CBEC, it can be observed that litigation cannot be avoided by law-compliant assesses as well.

    Conclusion:

    Given various contradictions in interpretations by different agencies of the Government machineryas regards software, IT sector as a whole and consequently the economy is imparted by not only multiplicity of taxation but also by increasing frivolous and lengthy litigation process. This could be minimised if single Government agency deals with the concept of deemed sale, intangible goods and services for implementing fair tax system in the matter at different levels and avoid hardship of the tax payers considering that the tax payer is an important part of the system of revenue collection.

    Services by Directors

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    Services by Directors

    ‘Service’ means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include –

    (a) an activity which constitutes merely, –
    i) A transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or
    ii) Such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be a sale within the meaning of clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution; or
    iii) A transaction in money or actionable claim;

    (b) A provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;

    (c) Fees taken in any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force.

    Explanation 1 – for the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this clause shall apply to, –

    (A) the functions performed by the Members of Parliament, Members of State Legislative, Members of Panchayats, Members of Municipalities and Members of other local authorities who receive any consideration in performing the functions of that office as such member; or
    (B) the duties performed by any person who holds any post in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution in that capacity; or
    (C) the duties performed by any person as a Chairperson or a Member or a Director in a body established by the Central Government or State Government or State Governments or local authority and who is not deemed as an employee before the commencement of this section. ……………

    Services provided by Director to a Company – Taxability under Reverse Charge

    • Vide Notification No.45/2012–ST dated 07-08- 2012, an amendment is made in the notification No.30/2012–ST dated 20-06-2012 by including the services provided or agreed to be provided by a director of a company to the said company, as a service taxable under reverse charge mechanism. Further, the extent of service tax payable on the same by the service provider and the service recipient is also stipulated as under:-

    • Vide Notification No.46/2012–ST dated 07-08- 2012 the Rule 2(1)(d) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, (ST Rules) which defines “person liable for paying service tax” is amended to insert a new item (EE) after item E as under : – “(EE) in relation to service provided or agreed to be provided by a director of a company to the said company, the recipient of such service”.

    Payments to Directors – Service tax implications
    i) Remuneration to Executive Directors

    Sections 198 and 309 of the Companies Act, 1956 (“CA 56”) supplemented by Schedule XII, deal with remuneration of directors (including managing director and whole-time director) of a public company or a private company which is a subsidiary of a public company.

    Section 309 of CA 56 lays down the ceilings on the remuneration payable to managing and whole-time employment of the company or a managing director may be paid remuneration either by way of a monthly payment or at a specified percentage of the net profits of the company or partly by one way and partly by the other.

    The term ‘remuneration” is inclusively defined in the Explanation appended to section 198 of CA 56. This definition is relevant for the purposes of all the provisions of CA 56 which deals with director’s remuneration. The definition of ‘remuneration’, indicates that any payment by whatever name called and whether in cash, kind or money’s worth, or by way of perquisite, amenity or benefit, or by discharging an obligation amounts to ‘remuneration’, and such payment would attract the provisions of CA 56 regarding remuneration to directors

    Section 309(2) of CA 56 contemplates payment to a director of remuneration by way of a fee for attending meetings of the board of directors or committees constituted by the board.

    In case of managing director and whole time director, the payment of sitting fees forms part of managerial remuneration and if amounts are payable in accordance with Schedule XIII, no such sitting fees is payable to them; Department letter No. 3/1/90 CL – V, dated 18/07/1990, makes it very clear that, sitting fee may be paid only to a director who is not a whole time director or a managing director.

    (ii) Remuneration to Non-Executive Directors

    According to section 309 of CA 56, a public company can pay its non-executive director (meaning a director who is not a managing or a whole time director) remuneration in the form of fees for attending board meetings at the rate prescribed under CA 56, which are to be excluded for the purpose of the percentage limits on directors’ remuneration as specified in section 198 and 309 of CA 56.

    In addition to sitting fees, a company’s nonexecutive director can be paid commission on net profits for a financial year. The total remuneration to all directors (executive and non–executive) excluding the fees for attending meetings, should not exceed the percentage limits laid down in section 198.

    Section 309(4) permits payment of remuneration to the non–executive directors in two alternative ways:
    • by way of monthly, quarterly or annual payment; or
    • by way of commission.

    (iii) Whether all Directors are employees of a Company

    In terms of the provisions of CA 56 Act managing and whole time directors are executive directors and those who are not managing and whole time directors are non – executive directors. They are called “managerial personnel” and their appointment and remuneration are governed by the provisions of CA 56. Even when an executive director is designated as “executive chairman” or “executive vice chairman” or any other designation, such executive director is either a managing director or a whole–time director under CA 56 depending upon the nature and extent of powers of management because CA 56 does not recognise any other designation although it does not prohibit it. Therefore, a company has to treat its executive director either as managing director or whole–time director but both are equal so far as the provisions of the CA 56 regarding appointment and remuneration are concerned, all the provisions equally apply to both.

    An important issue for consideration is, whether employer–employee relationship exists between the company and the executive directors.

    It is a well–settled principle in company law that a director of a company as such is not a servant of the company and that the fees he receives are in recognition of services, but the same does not prevent a director or a managing director from, entering into a contractual relationship with the company, so that, quite apart from his office of director he becomes entitled to remuneration as an employee of the company. Further that relationship may be created either by a service agreement or by the articles themselves. [Refer CIT vs. Armstrong Smith (1946) 14 ITR 606 (Bom); (1946) 16 Comp as 172 (Bom)]

    However, a managing director has a dual capacity. He may both be a director as well as an employee. It is, therefore, evident that, in his capacity as a managing director, he may be regarded as having not only the capacity as persona of a director but also the persona of an employee, or an agent depending upon the nature of his work and the terms of his employment. Where he is so employed, the relationship between him as the managing director and the company may be similar to a person who is employed as a servant or as an agent, for the term ‘employee’ can cover any of these relationships. The nature of his employment may be determined by the Articles of Association of the company and/or the agreement, if any, under which a contractual relationship between the director and the company has been brought about, under which the director is constituted as an employee of the company. The control which the company exercises over the managing director need not necessarily be one which tells him what to do from day-to-day. That would be too narrow a view of the test to determine the character of the employment. Nor does supervision imply that it should be a continuous exercise of the power to oversee or supervise the work to be done. The control and supervision is exercised and is exercisable in terms of the Articles of Association by the board of directors and the company in its general meeting.

    It has been held in an English case that as directors they are not employees, but it cannot be doubted that a managing director may for many purposes properly be regarded as an employee. [Refer Boulting vs. Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (1963) 33 Comp. Cases 475 (CA)]

    In one case, the question was whether the managing director was ‘employed’ by the company in any capacity. The managing director had claimed that he was not employed by the company, but that his position was an office or function of a director, i.e. he was an ordinary director entrusted with some special powers. However, this argument was rejected, and it was held that the proposition that a director can be regarded as having not only the persona of director but also the persona of employee was plain from the case of Beeton and Co. In re [1913] 2 Ch 279. Lord Normand summarised the position as follows :

    “In my opinion, therefore, the managing direc-tor has two functions and two capacities. Qua managing director he is a party to a contract with the company, and this contract is a contract of employment; more specifically I am of opinion that it is a contract of service and not a contract for services. There is nothing anomalous in this; indeed it is a common place of law that the same individual may have two or more capacities, each including special rights and duties in relation to the same thing or matter or in relation to the same persons.”

    Useful reference can also be made to Fowler vs. Commercial Timber Co. Ltd. [1930] 2 KBI (CA)

    There are several cases under the Income Tax Act which dealt with this issue and the consensus appears to be that regardless of whether there is an agreement of service between the assessee company and the managing director the relationship between the company and the managing director is that of employer and employee. In some cases a provision or a term as to the removal or termination of the managing director has been considered to be one of the factors determining the relationship of employer and employee. [Refer Travancore Chemical Manufacturing Co (1982) 133 ITR 818 (KER) affirmed by SC – (1982) 137 ITR (St) 13]

    The various provisions of CA 56 Act relating to managing director also indicate that a managing director has a role of an employee. For instance, the use of the term ‘agreement’ (section 2(26); use of the term “appoint or employ” (sections 316, 317); the expression “occupying the position of a managing director by whatever name called” (section 2(26); use of the expressions “appointment or employment” (section 267), the various kinds of remuneration enumerated in Schedule XIII, etc., go to indicate that a managing director is a director in the garb of an employee. Moreover, the Schedule also allows certain perquisites to the managing director and some of them (e.g. LTC) are to be given “in accordance with the rules of the company”. Section 17(2) of the Income Tax Act defines the term ‘perquisite’ the purport of which is that it is an amenity or a benefit granted by an employer to an employee. In fact, clause (iii)(a) of the said section specifically covers as perquisite the value of any benefit or amenity granted or provided free of cost or at concessional rate by a company to an employee who is a director thereof.

    The nature of extent of control which is requisite to establish the relationship of employer and employee must necessarily vary from business to business and is by its very nature incapable for precise definition. It is not neces-sary for holding that a person is an employee, that the employer should be proved to have exercised control over his work. The test of control is not one of universal application and that there are many contracts in which the master could not control the manner in which the work was done.

    There may be a formal contract between a managing director and the company evidencing the contractual relationship between the two. However, in the absence of a formal agreement the relationship may be established by an implied contract. Where a managing director is appointed, and acts as such, in accordance with the company’s articles, and no separate formal contract is entered into, the existence of an implied contract may be inferred, although the articles do not constitute a contract between the company and the managing director qua managing director.

    Summation

    In light of discussion above, it would reasonably appear that, a managing director is an employee of the company. This principle equally applies to any whole–time director or any other director (by whatever name called) who has executive powers relating to the management of the affairs of a company and responsibility to look after the day-to-day affairs of the company (fully or partly) under a service contract which is either express or implied and evidenced by the board/shareholders resolution appointing him and additionally, a formal agreement between him and the company.

    Taxability of Services provided by Directors

    According to one school of thinking, since a company is a legal entity, it has no option but to operate through the medium of directors. Therefore, services provided by directors to a company (excepting those on a contractual or professional basis), are essentially in a fiduciary capacity. Hence, such services would not fall within the ambit of ‘service’ as defined u/s. 65B(44) of the Act so as to be liable to service tax. However, this is a very extreme view, which is likely to be disputed by the service tax authorities.

    Subject to such extreme view, it would reasonably appear that, with effect from 01-07-2012 services provided by directors to companies would be taxable except in the following cases:

    •    Services provided by a director to a company in the course of or in relation to his employment as discussed in detail above.

    •    Services provided by a director in a non– taxable territory to a company located in a non–taxable territory.

    •    Services provided by a director to a company without consideration (for example in case of nominee directors where no sitting fee is paid).

    •    According to Point of Taxation Rules, 2011, the point of taxation of services provided by a director to a company, would be either the time when invoice is issued for service provided or to be provided. If invoice is not issued within 30 days, point of taxation will be the date of completion of service. For sitting fees, date of completion of services, would generally be the date of meeting or the time when the payment/advance is received to the extent of such payment.

    •    In case of reverse charge payments, point of taxation is reckoned from the date of payment by the company to the director.

    Subject to the above discussion, the taxability for the period 01-07-2012 to 06 -08 -2012 (the period till amendment was brought in vide Notifications 45/2012 and 46/2012 provided above) and 07-08-2012 onwards and taxability of reimbursements is discussed hereafter.

    Taxability of services provided by directors during the period 01-07-2012 to 06-08-2012.

    Liability at the end of Directors

    •    During this period, the director’s services were not covered under reverse charge, the directors would be liable to pay service tax and also comply with the requirements under the service tax law. The said position is confirmed by draft CBEC Circular F.No.354/127/2012–TRU dated 27-07-2012, which states that when a director receives payment in his personal ca-pacity, the same is liable to be taxed in the hands of the director. However, the concerned director would be entitled to the threshold exemption of Rs. 10 lakh, subject to compliance of stipulated conditions.

    •    However, in the following cases, service tax would not be payable by the directors:

    As per draft CBEC circular dated 27-07-2012, a director may also be appointed to represent an entity including Government who has either invested in the company or is otherwise authorized to nominate a director. Where the fee is charged by the entity appointing the director and is paid to such entity, the services shall be deemed to be provided by such entity and not by the individual director. Accordingly, in such cases, the service tax would be payable not by the director but by such entity appoint-ing the director. Nevertheless, in the case of Government nominee directors where the fee is charged by the Government appointing the director and is paid to the Government, the services may be deemed to be provided by the Government and may be liable to be taxed under the exclusion sub-(iv) of clause (a) of section 66D of the Act viz. support services by Government to a business entity. Such services are liable to be taxed on reverse charge basis from 01-07-2012 and therefore, tax is to be paid by the service recipient i.e. the company. Secondly, if the director is located in a non-taxable territory i.e. the State of Jammu & Kashmir or outside India, then service tax is not payable by such director. In this case, if the company is located in a taxable territory, the transaction would be covered under reverse charge from 01-07-2012 and tax is payable by the company.


    Implications at the end of Company receiving the service

    •    No service tax would be payable in respect of fees paid to directors located in taxable territory. However, in case of any payment towards taxable service to a director, located outside India or in the State of Jammu and Kashmir or in case of payment to Government against consideration of Government nominee director as discussed above, the company receiving the service is required to pay service tax under reverse charge as per Rule 2(1)(d) of ST Rules read with Notification No. 30/2012–ST dated 20-06-2012. Further, in case of reverse charge the threshold exemption of Rs. 10 lakh is not applicable.

    •    Vide Circular No.24/2012, dated 09-08-2012 of Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, it is clarified that any increase in remuneration of non–whole time director(s) of a company solely on account of payment of service tax on commission payable to them by the company shall not require approval of Central Government u/s. 309 and 310 of the CA 56 even if it exceeds the limit of 1% or 3% of the profit [u/s. 309(4)] of the company, as the case may be in the financial year 2012-13.

    Taxability of services provided by directors from 07-08-2012 onwards

    Implications at the end of directors

    For the period 07-08-2012 onwards, since the services by directors are covered under reverse charge, the directors are not liable to pay service tax. Even the entities receiving fee in respect of directors nominated by them are not required to pay service tax on the same.

    Implications at the end of the Company receiving the service

    The companies other than those located in a non taxable territory, would be required to pay service tax under reverse charge basis in respect of taxable services received from the directors for a consideration, irrespective of fact whether they are located within or outside the taxable territory or are nominee directors of Government/ other entitles. Further, as discussed earlier, the threshold exemption of Rs. 10 lakh is not applicable when the liability is fastened under reverse charge mechanism.

    Further as stated above, the Circular No.24/2012-ST of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs is equally relevant here as well.

    Taxability of reimbursements/out of pocket expenses

    From 19- 04-2006, stringent provisions were introduced under the service tax law in regard to taxability of reimbursements. The Constitutional Validity of Rule 5 of the said Valuation Rules has been challenged before the Delhi High Court in International Consult & Tech (P) Ltd vs. UOI (2009) 19 STT 320 (DELHI), in particular on the ground being ultra vires the provisions of section 66 and 67 of the Act. The Delhi High Court has recently ruled in 2012 TIOL 66 DEL HC that Rule 5(1) of Valuation Rules is ultra vires of sections 66 & 67 of the Act. Implications of the said ruling in particular the continued relevance of principles laid down in Larger Bench ruling in Shri Bhagawathy Traders vs. CCE, Cochin 2011 (24) STR 290 (Tri.-LB) is discussed in detail in the January, 2013 issue of BCAJ. Hence the same are not repeated here.

    Subject to the above, the following needs to be noted in particular, while determining taxability of expenses reimbursed to directors since the liability vests in the company under reverse charge:

    •    According to Rule 5(1) of Valuation Rules, where any expenditure or costs are incurred by the service provider in the course of providing any taxable services, all such expenditure or costs shall be treated as consideration for the taxable services provided or to be provided and shall be included in the ‘value’ for purpose of charging of service tax on the said services. Expenditure or costs incurred by a service provider as “pure agent” of the recipient of service shall be excluded from the value of taxable service if all the conditions specified in Rule 5(2) of valuation Rules are satisfied.

    •    For the purpose of Rule 5(2) of Valuation Rules, a pure agent is defined to mean a person who receives only the actual amount incurred to procure such goods or services.

    •    According to the department clarification dated 19-04-2006, “value for the purpose of charging service tax is the gross amount received as consideration for provision of service. All expenditure or costs incurred by the service provider in the course of providing a taxable service forms integral part of the taxable value and are includible in the value. It is not relevant that various expenditure or costs are separately indicated in the invoice or bill issued by the service provider to his client”.

    REFUND OF CENVAT CREDIT: OTHER THAN ON EXPORTS

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    Statutory provisions [Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (‘CCR’)]

    “Where any input or input service is used in the manufacture of final product which is cleared for export under bond or letter of undertaking, as the case may be, or used in the intermediate product cleared for export, or used in providing output service which is exported, the CENVAT credit in respect of the input or input service so used shall be allowed to be utilised by the manufacturer or provider of output service towards payment of,

    • duty of excise on any final product cleared for home consumption or for export on payment of duty; or
    • service tax on output service,

    and where for any reason such adjustment is not possible, the manufacturer or the provider of output service shall be allowed refund of such amount subject to such safeguards, conditions and limitations, as may be specified, by the Central Government, by Notification.

    Provided that no refund of credit shall be allowed if the manufacturer or provider of output service avails of drawback allowed under the Customs and Central Excise Duties Drawback Rules, 1995, or claims rebate of duty under the Central Excise Rules, 2002, in respect of such duty; or claims rebate of service tax under the Export of Services Rules, 2005 in respect of such tax:

    Provided further that no credit of the additional duty leviable u/ss.(5) of section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act shall be utilised for payment of service tax on any output service.

     Explanation — For the purposes of this rule, the words ‘output service which is exported, means the output service exported in accordance with the Export of Services Rules, 2005.”

    Refunds in situations other than export — A contentious issue

    Rule 5 under CCR is the only provision which permits refund of CENVAT credit, essentially in case of exports. Refunds of unutilised CENVAT credit are often claimed in situations, other than export. For example, discontinuance of business, payments in case of disputes made in cash due to insistence by the Department instead of debit to CENVAT credit, Pre Deposits pending appeal made in cash instead of debit to CENVAT credit, etc.

    Interpretation of the words ‘where for any reason such adjustment is not possible . . . .’ in Rule 5 has resulted in extensive litigations between the tax Department and the taxpayers.

    Entitlement to refund in situations other than exports has been a very contentious issue and divergent judicial views have been expressed. There are very limited cases directly relating to service tax. However, there are extensive judicial precedents under Central Excise, principles in regard to which are relevant for service tax and which serve as a useful guide while dealing with issues of refunds relating to service providers.

    The same are analysed hereafter along with the latest Larger Bench Ruling.

    Mumbai Tribunal ruling holding that refund is inadmissible in situations other than exports

    In the case of National Leather Cloth Mfg. Co. v. CCE, (2006) 198 ELT 400 (Tri-Mumbai) followed the ratio of the judgment in case of CCE, v. Rajashree Cements, (2001) 132 ELT 724 (Tri-Chennai) and denied the refund of MODVAT credit observing as under:

    “The decision in the cases of Bombay Burmah, Arcoy Industries and Omkar Textile have been rendered contrary to the earlier decision of the Tribunal in the case of Rajashree Cements, which was delivered at an earlier point of time on 9-9- 2001. Moreover, Rajashree Cements also correctly notices the provisions of law which allow cash refund only in the case of unutilised credit in respect of export of final products. Hence, the decision in the said case is binding and the same requires to be followed until reversed by either Larger Bench or by any superior court”.

    In the case of Rajashree Cements referred above, the Tribunal had held as under:

    Para 5

    “Accordingly, we hold that payment of duty through RG23A Part II account is a payment of duty and the refund of the same has to be given, if otherwise admissible and principle of unjust enrichment does not apply. However, the refund amount is to be given in RG23A Part II accounts if the same is in operation.”

    In the case of National Leather, though it was an admitted fact that the appellants were not in a position to utilise the credit as they have closed down, legitimate refund was denied.

    The three decisions of the Tribunal cited by the appellants and not followed in the above case of National Leather (supra) as the same were considered contrary to the decision in the case of Rajashree Cements are given below.

    • Assessee’s factory closing before allowance of Modvat credit by the Tribunal and utilisation of credit was prevented due to initiation of proceedings by the Department. It was held that the assessee was entitled to cash refund. [CCE v. Omkar Textile, (2002) 148 ELT 461 (Tri-Mum.)]
    • Amount originally paid by the assessee by debiting RG23A. Part II. The assessee moved out of Modvat credit scheme when dispute finally settled — It was held that the assessee is not able to utilise credit, the very basis of refund is defeated, in which case amount is to be given in cash. [CCE v. Arcoy Industries, (2004) 170 ELT 507 (Tri-Mum.)]
    • Section 11B contains no bar against payment of refund by cheque/cash in cases where original payment of duty was from Modvat/Cenvat account. Moreover, the assessee ceased to exist as a manufacturing unit and has no Cenvat account into which refund can be credited. [CCE v. Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn., (2005) 190 ELT 40 (Tri-Del.)]

    Larger Bench Ruling in Gauri Plasticulture (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (2006) 202 ELT 199 (Tri-Mumbai) (LB)

    In this case duty debit was made in CENVAT (MODVAT) account. However, the appellants could not utilise the credit due to departmental objections and insistence of payment from PLA Account. Thereafter the appellants surrendered their licence due to discontinuance on business and applied for refund of unutilised CENVAT credit.

    The Larger Bench, under the peculiar facts of the case held that credit can be given in MODVAT Account, but if an assessee is not able to utilise, cash refund can be granted. The important observations made by the Larger Bench are as under:

    Para 8

    “Detailed reading of the above judgments, leads into the fact that wherever the assessee was unable to utilise the credit on account of objection raised by the Department or actions taken by them by way of initiation of proceedings or paid duty out of Modvat account at the Department’s insistence, and for that reason, he had to pay duty in cash or out of the PLA, they would be entitled to refund of that credit in cash, on the dispute being ultimately settled in their favour. In the decisions holding that such refund in cash is not possible, it has been observed that there is no provision allowing refund of such credit in cash. However, we are not in agreement with the above proposition for the simple reason that there is also express no bar in the Modvat Rules to that extent. We have to keep in mind that it is not the refund of unutilised credit, but the credit which has been used for payment of duty at the insistence of the Revenue or has been reversed because the Department was of the view that the same is not available for utilisation. This is a simple and basic principle of equity, justice and goods conscience. Had the Department not prevented the assessee from utilising the credit otherwise available to him, they would have been in a position to use the same towards payment of duty on their final product, which obligation they had to discharge from their PLA account. As such, on the success of their claim subsequently, if the assessee is maintaining Modvat credit and is in a position to use the same for future clearances, it should normally be credited back in the same account from where it was debited i.e., RG23A Part account. However, if an assessee is not able to use the credit on account of any reasons, whatsoever (which may be closure of his factory or final products being exempted, etc.) the refund becomes admissible in cash or by way of credit entry in PLA to the extent duty paid in cash or out of PLA during the relevant period.

    Para 9

    On the same basic principles of equity, justice and good conscience, if such refund in cash makes the assessee enrich because during the period when the dispute was pending, they had not paid any duty in cash and as such, the debit entry in Mod-vat account would have made no difference, as the credit would have been lying unutilised only in the account, such credit, cannot be refunded in cash.”

    Karnataka High Court ruling in UOI v. Slovak India Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd., (2006) 201 ELT 559 (Kar.) [Confirmed by the Supreme Court (2008) 223 ELT A 170

    In this case, the assessee was engaged in manufacture of shoes for M/s. Bata India Ltd. and was registered under the Central Excise. They surrendered their registration and a refund application was made on 14-5-2003 claiming a refund of Rs.4,15,057. During the Internal Audit, it was noticed that the assessee had availed CENVAT credit of the materials received by them during the past and had availed the credit to the tune of Rs.3,09,390. On scrutiny, it was noticed that there was neither production, nor clearance of finished goods. CENVAT credit availed by the assessee was irregular. A show-cause notice was issued in the matter with regard to irregular availment and also with regard to rejection of refund claim. Thereafter, an order was passed ordering allowance of CENVAT credit of Rs.3,72,405 availed. Refund claim was rejected in terms of section 11B of the Act. It was stated that there is no provision in Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 with regard to refund. An unsuccessful appeal was filed by the assessee. Thereafter, the Tribunal was moved and the Tribunal allowed the appeal in terms of the impugned order.

    The High Court held that Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 does not expressly prohibit refund of unutilised credit where there was no manufacture in light of the closure of factory. Further, since the assessee has come out of the MODVAT Scheme, refund of unutilised credit has to be granted.

    The Department’s appeal against the afore-said Court ruling was rejected by the Supreme Court.

    Recent Larger Bench Ruling in the case of Steel Strips v. CCE, (2011) 269 ELT 257 (Tri.-LB)

    The following question was referred to the Larger Bench regarding refund of unutilised amount of MODVAT credit in cash for the period from December, 1997 to September, 1999:

    “Whether in cases where either on account of coercion by the Department or otherwise, the assessee pays the duty through PLA account, in spite of having sufficient balance in the MODVAT/CENVAT credit, on the factory or unit becoming inoperative and there being no likelihood of restarting the production, can such assessee be entitled for refund of the credit amount under the provisions of law in force?

    Though, the Larger Bench ruling is with reference to section 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944, the observations are very relevant in the context of Rule 5 of CCR.

    The Larger Bench distinguished the rulings of Larger Bench in Gauri Plasticulture (P) Ltd., Karnataka High Court in Slovak India as well as other rulings and held that refund of unutilised credit is only permissible in case of exports and for no other reason whatsoever that may be.

    The Larger Bench made the following important observations while passing the order:

    Para 5.7

    “A distinction between provisions of the statute which are of substantive character and are built in with certain specific objectives of policy on the one hand, and those which are merely procedural and technical in their nature on the other hand, must be kept clearly distinguished. An eligibility criteria to get refund calls for a strict construction, although construction of a condition thereof may be given a liberal meaning if the same is directory in nature. The doctrine of substantial compliance is a judicial invention, equitable in nature, designed to avoid hardship in cases where a party does all that can be reasonably expected of it, but fails in or faults in some minor or inconsequent aspects which cannot be described as the ‘essence’ or the ‘substance’ of the requirement. Like the concept of ‘reasonableness’, the acceptance or otherwise of a plea of ‘substantial compliance’ depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the purpose and object to be achieved and the context of the prerequisites which are essential to achieve the object and purpose of the rule or the regulation. Such a defence cannot be pleaded if a clear statutory prerequisite which effectuates the object and the purpose of the statute has not been met. Certainly, it means that the Court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently, so as to carry out the intent for which the statute was enacted and not a mirror image type of strict compliance. Substantial compliance means ‘actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute’ and the Court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent of the statute and to accomplish the reasonable objectives for which it was passed.

    Para 5.8

    Fiscal statute generally seeks to preserve the need to comply strictly with regulatory requirements that are important, especially when a party seeks the benefits of an exemption clause, substantial compliance of an enactment is insisted upon, where mandatory and directory requirements are lumped together, for in such a case if mandatory requirements are complied with, it will be proper to say that the enactment has been substantially complied with notwithstanding the non-compliance of directory requirements. In cases where substantial compliance has been found, there has been actual compliance with the statute, albeit procedurally faulty. The doctrine of substantial compliance seeks to preserve the need to comply strictly with the conditions or requirements that are important to invoke a tax or duty exemption and to forgive non-compliance for either unimportant and tangential requirements or requirements that are so confusingly or incorrectly written that an earnest effort at compliance should be accepted.

    Para 5.9

    The test for determining the applicability of the substantial compliance doctrine has been the subject of a myriad of cases. Quite often, the critical question to be examined is whether the requirements relate to the ‘substance’ or ‘essence’ of the statute; if so, strict adherence to those requirements is a precondition to give effect to that doctrine. On the other hand, if the requirements are procedural or directory, in that they are not of the essence of the thing to be done, but are given with a view for the orderly conduct of business, they may be fulfilled by substantial, if not strict compliance. In other words, a mere attempt at compliance may not be sufficient, but actual compliance of those factors which are considered as essential. In the cases of refund substantial compliance with the law granting refund is sine qua non.

    Para 5.11

    No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner laid down by law. He has no right other than to proceed according to the mandate of the statute governing the subject. Claim of refund is not a matter of right unless vested by law. That would depend upon the object of the statute and eligibility. The purpose for which law has been made and its nature, the intention of the Legislature in making the provision, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the subject including the language of the provision are considerable factors in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular claim is in accordance with law. No injustice or hardship plea can be raised to claim refund in the absence of statutory mandate in that behalf and no equity or good conscience can influence fiscal courts without the same being embedded in the statutory provisions.

    Para 5.13

    It is well-settled principles of law that what cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly. On surrendering of their licence, the appellants were not allowed to claim the refund of the unutilised credit in the Modvat account, and the same would have lapsed. As such, utilisation of the same towards payment of disputed demand of duty, after surrendering of their registration, had not led to a situation where the assessee was compelled not to use the

    credit for regular clearances and had to make payment through PLA accounts. As such, in the instant refund in cash was not to be allowed.

    Para 5.16

    Modvat law has codified the procedure for adjustment of the duty liability against the Modvat account. That is required to be carried out in accordance with law and unadjusted amount is not expressly permitted to be refunded. In the absence of express provision to grant refund, that is difficult to entertain except in the case of export. There cannot be presumption that in the absence of debarment to make refund in other cases that is permissible. Refund results in outflow from treasury, which needs sanction of law and an order of refund for such purpose is sine qua non. Law has only recognised the event of export of goods for refund of the Modvat credit as has been rightly pleaded by the Revenue and instant reference was neither the case of ‘otherwise due’ of the refund, nor the case of exported goods. Similarly, absence of express grant in statute does not imply ipso facto entitlement to refund. So also absence of express grant is an implied bar for refund. When right to refund does not accrue under law, claim thereof is inconceivable. Refund of unutilised credit is only permissible in case of export of goods and for no other reason, whatsoever that may be. Thus, where the assessee pays duty through the PLA account, in spite of having sufficient balance in the Modvat/Cenvat credit account on the factory or unit becoming inoperative and there being no likelihood of re-starting the production, such an assessee cannot be entitled to refund of the credit amount under the provisions of law in force.”

    Conclusion

    The Department authorities are following the aforesaid Larger Bench ruling and denying refunds, though in many cases, the reasons could be genuine.

    With due respects to the Larger Bench, it would appear that refund provisions being in the nature of beneficial provisions ought to be construed liberally rather than strictly in accordance with the settled principles laid down by the Supreme Court from time to time.

    It is suggested that appropriate amendment need to be made in Rule 5 of CCR, whereby powers may be granted to CBEC to prescribe circumstances under which refunds may be permitted subject to appropriate revenue safeguards.

    Education: A Taxable Commercial Training Service?

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    Introduction:

    Commercial training or coaching service was introduced in the service tax law from 1st July, 2003 by defining the expression, “commercial training or coaching” and “commercial training or coaching centre” in sections 65(26) and 65(27) respectively of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) as reproduced below:

    Section 65(26):

    ““Commercial training or coaching” means any training or coaching provided by a commercial training or coaching centre”.

    Section 65(27):

    ““Commercial training or coaching centre” means any institute or establishment providing commercial training or coaching for imparting skill or knowledge or lessons on any subject or field other than the sports, with or without issuance of a certificate and includes coaching or tutorial classes but does not include preschool coaching and training centre or any institute or establishment which issues any certificate or diploma or degree or any educational qualification recognized by law for time being in force.”

    Consequently, taxable service in relation to this service was defined in section 65(105)(zzc) of the Act. Within a span of 4 to 5 years of the introduction of the service, in a significant number of cases, the co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal at Bangalore and Chennai pronounced various decisions wherein various large and well-known institutions were held to be not liable under this taxing entry mainly on account of their status as non-profit making or charitable institutions. Understandably, as a consequence thereof, the Government appended an explanation to the definition to section 65(105)(zzc) of the Act vide the Finance Act, 2010 to come into effect retrospectively from 01-07-2003. Thus, the relevant provisions read as follows:

    Section 65(105)(zzc):

    ““Taxable service” means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by a commercial training or coaching centre in relation to commercial training or coaching.

    Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression “commercial training or coaching centre” occurring in this sub-clause and in clauses (26), (27) and (90a) shall include any centre or institute, by whatever name called, where training or coaching is imparted for consideration, whether or not such centre or institute is registered as a trust or a society or similar other organization under any law for the time being in force and carrying on its activity with or without profit motive and the expression “commercial training or coaching” shall be construed accordingly.”

    It is also relevant to note here that the Finance Act, 2011 with effect from 01-05-2011 amended the definition of commercial training or coaching centre in section 65(27) whereby exclusionary part of the definition was omitted and instead the said exclusion part was simultaneously declared exempt vide Notification 33/2011-ST from 01-05-2011.

    Primarily, in terms of the above explanation, the scope of the service was expanded to exclude profit motive element. When the decision of the Madras Tribunal in Great Lake Institute of Management Ltd. (GLIM) vs. CST Chennai 2008 (10) STR 202 (Tri.-Chennai) was challenged by the Revenue in the Supreme Court, on noticing the above explanation the Apex Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and remanded the case for denovo consideration in the light of the said Explanation [2010 (19) STR 481 (SC)].

    Larger Bench direction vide Interim Order No.ST/443/2013 in Great Lake Institute of Management Ltd. vs. CST Chennai & 5 others: [2013-TIOL- 1480-CESTAT-DEL-LB]

    Recently, in a bunch of appeals filed before the Tribunal, a Division Bench prima facie doubted the reasons recorded in one of the decisions viz., Magnus Society vs. CC&CE, Hyderabad 2009 (13) STR 509 (Tri.-Bang). In this decision, a distinction was made between higher learning through a proper format of education imparted by institutions on one hand and those which are characterised as commercial training or coaching centres preparing students for entrance examinations to universities or the like. The matter therefore was referred to the Larger Bench of CESTAT (LB or the Bench). The limited reference however was made to examine whether the provisions relating to commercial coaching or training service as defined in sections 65(26), 65(27) and 65(105)(zzc) of the Act accommodate a distinction between imparting of specific skill by an institution such as in computer literacy, computer operations, spoken English or accountancy at one end and a broader format of education imparted by an institution of higher learning providing a course of instructions in MBA, management, computer science or similar disciplines. The Bench headed by Hon. President, CESTAT examined the said relevant statutory provisions in relation to commercial training or coaching services specifically considering the scope of the service in the light of the above explanation inserted with retrospective effect and also analysed various precedents including Magnus Society (supra), GLIM (supra) and a few others as summarised below.

    On making primary examination of the statutory provisions, the Bench held a view that for an institution or establishment to claim immunity from the liability of service tax, it must establish any one of the following exclusionary parameters:

    • The institute/establishment is not imparting skill, knowledge or lessons on any subject or field except sports.
    • If the establishment is a pre-school coaching or a training centre.
    • Institute/establishment which issues any certificate, diploma, degree or an educational qualification recognised by the extant law.

    Thus, as per the preliminary remark of the LB, if any institute fails to fulfill any of the listed parameters, it would be considered a commercial training or coaching centre and consequently be liable for service tax.

    Gist of analysis of various precedents:

    In case of GLIM vs. CST, Chennai 2008 (10) STR 202 (Chennai), the appeal was allowed by holding that it being a recognised charitable organisation under the Income- tax Act, 1961 and engaged in public utility areas, profit motive was absent although it may have earned surplus. Since the decision was pronounced prior to incorporation of the Explanation and profit motive was excluded by virtue of the Explanation, the Supreme Court in Revenue’s appeal remanded the matter (2010 (19) STR 481 (SC) for denovo consideration in the light of the Explanation. Another pre- amendment decision in the case of Administrative Staff College of India vs. CC&CE, Hyderabad 2009 (14) STR 341 (Tri.- Bang), the Tribunal concluded that although profit might have been earned, the laudable objectives of the institution registered as a society could not be equated with those of a tutorial college and that the expression ‘commercial’ in the definition indicates that it qualifies coaching or training centre and not coaching or training. Further, that the registered society also exempted from income tax as charitable organisation cannot be considered a commercial centre. Revenue’s appeal to Supreme Court in this case was dismissed without recording any reasons—reported in 2010 (20) STR J117 (SC). In another decision in Magnus Society vs. CC&CE, Hyderabad (supra) following the decision in GLIM (supra), the appeal was allowed. In this case, in addition to the reason of absence of profit motive involved in services of the institution, Hon. Tribunal carved out distinction for the term ‘education’ as against coaching or training by observing that ‘education’ was a much broader term of which coaching and training was only a part and the breadth of the term education could not be encompassed in the definition containing narrow meaning. Institutes offering degrees recognised by law could not be covered within the ambit of the defined category of the service. This view was also reiterated in Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India vs. CE&CE, Hyderabad 2009 (14) STR 220 (Tri. -Bang) while noting that the states Governments have recognised ICFAI University by notifications and there also existed UGC recognition. Further, considering the exempt nature of the income, the activity being non-commercial was held as not liable for service tax. This deci-sion also was pronounced prior to incorporation of the explanation.

    The stated provisions were also considered by the Kerala High Court in Malappuram District—Parallel College Assn. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 321 (Ker) wherein challenge was made on several grounds interalia including the grounds of discrimination and violation of Article14 of the Constitution. The pleas regarding education being non-taxable under the Constitution and coverage of parallel colleges by exclusionary clause were repelled. The Hon. Court however ruled that the impugned levy was discriminative since the burden of the levy ultimately fell on students and there was no ap-parent distinction between the students pursuing education in regular colleges or in parallel colleges. The case of Indian Institute of Aircraft Engineering vs. UOI & Ors 2013-TIOL -430-HC-DEL-ST also was discussed by the Bench with reference to what constituted approved institution regulated by law. In this case, the High Court had concluded that the institution in question provides education resulting in degree/diploma/qualifications recognised by law and therefore was covered by the exclusionary clause and consequently not subject to service tax. In addition to various decisions by CESTAT, decisions involving issue of entitlement to exemption from income tax on the ground of educational purpose, under the Income-tax Act also were discussed. The Bench however, noted that neither the precedents nor the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act assisted them significantly to interpret the scope of the expression “commercial training or coaching” or “commercial training or coaching centre” which was for their limited consideration.

    Training & Education: Whether literal meaning relevant?

    In addition to discussing various precedent decisions on behalf of the appellants, reference was made to various textual authorities to analyse contours of relevant terms such as teach, education, training, coach etc. to elucidate what the words meant and consequently to draw distinction between the concept of ‘training’ and ‘education’ or to examine whether they overlap. However, it was noted that when legislatively mandated definition was available, it is impermissible to look to extra textual guidance. “A good faith interpretation of section 65(27) requires that whatever skills/ knowledge/lessons are imparted on any subject or field, the activity must be considered to be training or coaching.”

    Conclusion:

    The Bench finally concluded that the retrospectively introduced Explanation in section 65(105) (zzc) of the Act redefined the scope of the expres-sion “commercial training or coaching” in section 65(26) by virtue of which a commercial element or profit motive became an irrelevant ingredient to bring an institute or establishment within the fold of “commercial training or coaching centre” nor would any organisational structure of registration of the entity as a trust or society would determine taxability. On analysing the other facet of the definition of “commercial training or coaching centre” in section 65(27), it was held that the training or coaching for imparting skill, knowledge or lessons on any subject or field constitutes commercial training or coaching and the scope of “training or coaching” could not be restricted by super-adding any conditions by parameters of course content, syllabus, duration, etc. The Bench declined to agree with the restricted interpretation pleaded or as was made in the precedent decisions and held that in the definition contained in section 65(27), there would be no rationale for engrafting an exclusionary clause broadly formulated other than what is specifically excluded viz., an institute or establishment which issues any certificate, diploma, degree or any educational qualification recognised by law. The Bench further held that since Parliament introduced the ‘Explanation’ retrospectively to clarify ambiguities to ascertain the expression ‘commercial’, recourse to guidance from precedents was not warranted. The reference to the Larger Bench was accordingly answered holding that the activities of imparting skill, knowledge, lessons on any subject or field or when imparted by an entity, institution or establishment which is excluded by a specific and legislated exclusionary clause would alone be outside the fold of the taxable territory. Considering the scope of the reference, the Bench declined to consider whether any of the appellants were taxable or otherwise in terms of the exclusionary clause in section 65(27) as it stood prior to its amendment with effect from 01-05-2011 and therefore the appeals stood remitted to the respective Bench to decide based on principles discussed above.

    The direction provided by the Larger Bench is likely to have far-reaching implications on various institutions offering higher studies especially in absence of appropriate regulatory authority in this regard as the exclusion in terms of the direction of the Larger Bench is meant only for the degree, diploma, a certificate or any qualification recognised by the law for the time being in force. It appears therefore that the litigation hereafter would hinge mainly around whether a degree/ diploma certificate issued by an institution can be construed as one recognised under the law in force. It may be noted that in the new era of negative list based taxation effective from 1st July, 2012, what is specifically non-taxable is by way of entry in the “negative list” of services contained in section 66D of the Act is “education as a part of a curriculum for obtaining a qualification recognised by any law for the time being in force.” In addition to preschool education, higher secondary education and approved vocational courses. Thus, a course or education recognised by law is the sole criterion for non-taxability

    Levy on Restaurants & Hotels Held Unconstitutional

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    Background

    Service tax levy was introduced on Restaurants & Hotels as under:

    • Services provided by air-conditioned restaurants with license to serve liquor, with effect from 01-05-2011, with an abatement of 70%.

    • Short Term Accommodation Services provided by hotels, with effect from 01-05-2011, with an abatement of 50%.

    The above services have been discussed earlier in this column in the August, 2011 and September, 2011 issues respectively of BCAJ and in particular, the dual taxation issues arising therefrom. The same are not repeated for the sake of brevity.

    The above stated levies continued under negative list based taxation of services introduced with effect from 01-07-2012 also, with a few minor changes in the scope and rate of abatement. However, the scope of air-conditioned restaurant service was substantially expanded with effect from 01-04- 2013, withdrawing the condition of having license to serve liquor. Far reaching implications of this amendment also were discussed in the April, 2013 issue of BCAJ. With these facts in the background, discussed below is the recent Kerala High Court’s ruling wherein levy of service tax on restaurants and hotels has been held beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament. Considering that levy of tax on supply of food or drink whether by way of or as a part of service is a State subject, the levy by the Centre is held unconstitutional in a Single Member Bench’s decision.

    Kerala High Court Ruling in Kerala Classified Hotels & Resorts Association & Others (2013) 31 STR 257 (KER)

    The Petitioners through writ petitions challenged the validity of sub-clause (zzzzv) and (zzzzw) of clause 105 of section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 (Act) and section 66 of the Act, as amended by the Finance Act 2011 relating to levy of service tax on taxable services referred there and for consequential reliefs. The relevant portion reads as under:

    “(zzzzv) Services provided or to be provided to any person, by a restaurant, by whatever name called, having the facility of air-conditioning in any part of the establishment, at any time during the financial year, which has license to serve alcoholic beverages, in relation to serving of food or beverage, including alcoholic beverages or both, in its premises;

    (zzzzw) Services provided or to be provided to any person, by a hotel, inn, guest house, club or camp-site, by whatever name called, for providing of accommodation for a continuous period of less than three months;”

    Contentions of the Petitioner

    The main contention urged by the petitioners was that the imposition of service tax in relation to serving of food or beverage including alcoholic beverages represents only sale of goods which transaction squarely falls under Entry 54 of List II (State List) of the 7th schedule to the Constitution of India and therefore within the exclusive competence of the State legislature. The service tax was originally introduced by Parliament in exercise of the residuary power under Entry 97 of List I. Though Entry 92 C has been introduced to List I of the 7th schedule which enables the Union to levy “taxes on services”, the said entry had not come into effect as it was not notified by the Government. Similarly the State legislature had enacted Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, by which tax is levied for accommodation. By introducing service tax on the basis of sub-clauses (zzzzv) and (zzzzw) to clause 105 of section 65, the Parliament has encroached upon the legislative powers of the State under Entry 54 and 62 of List II.

    Hence, the main contention of the petitioners was with reference to the legislative competence of Parliament to impose a tax on sale of goods/ luxuries which is absolutely the domain of the State legislation.

    Contention of the Revenue

    The respondents contended that the legislation has been brought in terms of Article 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97 of List I of the 7th schedule. Therefore according to the respondent, on a perusal of judgments cited by them it is all the more clear that service tax can be imposed on the service involved during the sale of a product and so long as the Statute does not transgress upon any restriction contained in the Constitution, contentions regarding lack of legislative power cannot be sustained. It is further contended that the Sales Tax Act and the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act are framed by the State Government. Service tax levied by the Government of India is not for serving alcoholic beverages and it is a tax on the services provided by restaurants and hotels. In that view of the matter, according to them, the challenge to the provisions aforesaid is absolutely baseless and seeks for dismissal of the writ petitions.

    Questions for Consideration before the Court

    The following questions arose for consideration by the Court:

    Whether “taxes on the sale and purchase of goods” in Entry 54 of List II of the seventh schedule covers service in the light of the definition of “tax on sale and purchase of goods” under Article 366 (29A)(f) of the Constitution of India.

    Whether the service provided in a hotel, inn, guest house, club etc. imposed with luxury tax under the State Act in terms of Entry 62 of List II can be separately assessed and imposed by the Union with service tax, invoking the residuary powers at Entry 97 of List I of the Constitution.

    Judgment relied upon by the Revenue for Consideration of Constitutionality of a statute

    The judgment in State of M.P. vs. Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312) = (2012-TIOL-44-SC-MISC) was relied upon by the respondent to highlight the principles to be kept in mind by courts while considering constitutionality of a statute and the Supreme Court held as under:

    “32. While dealing with constitutional validity of a taxation law enacted by Parliament or State Legislature, the Court must have regard to the following principles:

    (i) there is always presumption in favour of constitutionality of a law made by Parliament or a State Legislature,

    (ii) no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable or irrational but some constitutional infirmity has to be found,

    (iii) the Court is not concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom, the justice or injustice of the law as Parliament and State Legislatures are supposed to be alive to the needs of the people whom they represent and they are the best judge of the community by whose suffrage they come into existence,

    (iv) hardship is not relevant in pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a fiscal statute or economic law, and

    (v) in the field of taxation, the legislature enjoys greater latitude for classification.”

    Similar views were expressed by the Supreme Court in Karnataka Bank Ltd. vs. State of A.P. [(2008) 2 SCC 254], Govt. of A.P. vs. P. Laxmi Devi [(2008) 4 SCC 720] and Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. vs. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd. (2007) 6 SCC 236). There is no dispute regarding the proposition as held in the above judgments and hence the only enquiry is to find out whether the impugned legislation has trenched upon the legislative powers of the State Government, keeping in mind the limitations as held in the aforesaid judgments.

    • Important and Relevant Judgments for consideration by the Court

    •  In Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. vs. State of U.P., (2005) 2 SCC 515) = (2005-TIOL-10-SC-LT-CB) the Supreme Court held as under:

    “83. Hence on an application of general principles of interpretation, we would hold that the word “luxuries” in Entry 62 of List II    means the activity of enjoyment of or indulgence in that which is costly or which is generally recognised as being beyond the necessary requirements of an average member of society and not articles of luxury.”

    “93. Given the language of Entry 62 and the legislative history we hold that Entry 62 of List II does not permit the levy of tax on goods or articles. In our judgment, the word “luxuries” in the entry refers to activities of indulgence, enjoyment or pleasure. Inasmuch as none of the impugned statutes seek to tax any activity and admittedly seek to tax goods described as luxury goods, they must be and are declared to be legislatively incompetent. However, following the principles in Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. while striking down the impugned Acts we do not think it appropriate to allow any refund of taxes already paid under the impugned Acts. Bank guarantees if any furnished by the assessees will stand discharged.”

    In T.N. Kalyana Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 632) = (2004-TIOL-36-SC-ST) the Supreme Court was considering whether the imposition of service tax on the services rendered by the mandap-keepers was intra vires the Constitution, and held as under:

    “44. In regard to the submission made on Article 366(29-A)(f), we are of the view that it does not provide to the contrary. It only permits the State to impose a tax on the supply of food and drink by whatever mode it may be made. It does not conceptually or otherwise include the supply of services within the definition of sale and purchase of goods. This is particularly apparent from the following phrase contained in the said sub-article “such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods”. In other words, the operative words of the said sub-article are supply of goods and it is only supply of food and drinks and other articles for human consumption that is deemed to be a sale or purchase of goods.”

    In K. Damodarasamy Naidu & Bros. vs. State of T.N., (2000) 1 SCC 521) = (2002-TIOL-884-SC-CT-CB) while considering the entitlement of the States to levy tax on the sale of food and drink a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court held as under:

    “9. The provisions of sub-clause (f) of clause (29-A) of Article 366 need to be analysed. Sub-clause (f) permits the States to impose a tax on the supply of food and drink. The supply can be by way of a service or as part of a service or it can be in any other manner whatsoever. The supply or service can be for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration. The words of sub-clause (f)    have found place in the Sales Tax Acts of most States and, as we have seen, they have been used in the said Tamil Nadu Act. The tax, therefore, is on the supply of food or drink and it is not of relevance that the supply is by way of a service or as part of a service. In our view, therefore, the price that the customer pays for the supply of food in a restaurant cannot be split up as suggested by learned counsel. The supply of food by the restaurant-owner to the customer though it may be a part of the service that he renders by providing good furniture, furnishing and fixtures, linen, crockery and cutlery, music, a dance floor and a floor show, is what is the subject of the levy. The patron of a fancy restaurant who orders a plate of cheese sandwiches whose price is shown to be Rs.50 on the bill of fare knows very well that the innate cost of the bread, butter, mustard and cheese in the plate is very much less, but he orders it all the same. He pays Rs. 50 for its supply and it is on Rs. 50 that the restaurant-owner must be taxed.”

    Other judgments considered by the Court were as follows:

    •     Assn. of Leasing & Financial Services Companies vs. UOI (2011) [2 SCC 352 = 2010–TIOL–87–SC–ST– LB.]

    •     All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. UOI (2007) [TIOL–149 –SC– ST]

    •     BSNL vs. UOI (2006) [TIOL–15–SC–CT–LB]

    •     Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Assn of India vs. UOI (2002) [TIOL- 699 –SC–MISC]

    •    Observations & Findings of the Court

    On a consideration of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, I am of the view that:

    Para 18

    “There are two judgments which throw light on the subject matter in issue. Those are K. Damoda-rasamy Naidu (Supra) and T.N. Kalyana Mandapam Assn. (Supra). In fact, the effect of Article 366(29-A)(f) has been considered by the Supreme Court in Assn. of Leasing & Financial Service Companies (Supra) and other judgments referred above includ-ing BSNL (Supra) . But the factual situation with reference to the case on hand is available only in the cases referred above. But it could be seen that in T.N. Kalyana Mandapam Assn. (Supra) the question was with reference to services rendered by mandap-keepers which is not the situation here. Here the factual situation is almost similar to the statement of law as held by the Supreme Court in K. Damodarasamy Naidu (Supra).”

    Para 19

    Now, coming to Article 366(29-A)(f) of the Constitution of India one could see that a deeming provision has been incorporated by way of 46th amendment to the Constitution of India and the history of such a legislation has been clearly dealt with in the judgments cited above. The very purpose of incorporating the definition of tax on sale or purchase of goods in Article 366 was to empower the State Governments to impose tax on the supply, whether it is by way of or as a part of any service of goods either being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink either intoxicating or not intoxicating whether such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration. The words “and such transfer delivery or supply of goods” is deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer. Therefore the incidence of tax is on the supply of any goods by way of or as part of any service. When food is supplied or alcoholic beverages are supplied as part of any service, such transfer is deemed to be a sale. Apparently, the transfer is during the course of a service and when the deeming provision permits the State Government to impose a tax on such transfer, there cannot be a different component of service which could be imposed with any service tax in exercise of the residuary power of the Central Government under Entry 97 of List I of the Constitution of India.

    Para 20

    Therefore, it can be seen from Article 366(29-A)(f) that service is also included in the sale of goods. If the constitution permits sale of goods during service as taxable, necessarily Entry 54 has to be read giving the meaning of sale of goods as stated in the Constitution. If read in that fashion, necessarily service forms part of sale of goods and State Government alone will have the legislative competence to enact the law imposing a tax on the service element forming part of sale of goods as well, which they have apparently imposed. I am supported to take this view in the light of the Constitution Bench judgment in K. Damodarasamy Naidu (Supra).

    Para 21

    Coming to the next question regarding the imposition of service tax in respect of hotel, inn, guest house, club or camp site etc., the contention of the petitioners is based on Entry 62 of List II. What exactly is the meaning of the expression ‘luxuries’ in Entry 62 of List II has been held by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (Supra), wherein it is held that luxuries is an activity of enjoyment or indulgence which is costly or which is generally recognised as being beyond the necessary requirements of an average member of society. While giving the said meaning to Entry 62 and if we look at the sub-clause (zzzzw), the service tax is imposed on services provided in a hotel and other similar establishments when State Legislature had enacted the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act by exercising their legislative power under Entry 62 of List II. When applying the dictum laid down in Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (supra) which gives an extended meaning to the word ‘luxuries’, I am of the view that the amendment now made to the service tax trenches upon the legislative function of the State under Entry 62 of List II.

    Having come to the aforesaid findings, these writ petitions are allowed as follows:

    •    It is declared that sub-clauses (zzzzv) and (zzzzw) to clause 105 of section 65 of the Finance Act 1994 as amended by the Finance Act 2011 is beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament as the sub-clauses are covered by Entry 54 and Entry 62 respectively of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

    •    That if any payments have been made by the petitioners on the basis of the impugned clauses, they are entitled to seek refund of the same.

    Impact of Kerala High Court Ruling

    •    As per the Court order, the petitioners are entitled to seek refund of service tax. However, it may not be easy and feasible inasmuch as the restaurants merely collect service tax from the customers and pay to the Government. Hence, if the service tax collected (rightly or wrongly) is duly deposited with the Government, onus stands discharged under the law. Alternatively, the prospect of each customer filing for refund of tax is highly unlikely.

    •    Since the ruling is a consequence of a Writ Petition and there being presently no other conflicting High Court ruling, a view could be adopted (although debatable) to the effect that this ruling is applicable to restaurants across the country. However, the Government would without any doubt file an appeal before the Supreme Court against the High Court Order. Hence, it would appear that there is no finality on the issue.

    •    Whether the Kerala High Court ruling would apply under the negative list based taxation regime introduced with effect from 01-07-2012, is a matter which is being intensely debated.

    It is interesting to note the following clarification issued in the context of Negative List regime of service tax:

    •    Extracts from Education Guide (TRU Circular dt. 20/6/12)

    Para 6.9

    Service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as part of the activity. [Section 66E (i) of the Act]

    Para 6.9.1

    What are the activities covered in this declared list entry?

    The following activities are illustration of activities covered in this entry –

    •    Supply of food or drinks in a restaurant;

    •    Supply of food and drinks by an outdoor caterer.

    In terms of Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India, supply of any goods being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) in any manner as part of a service for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration is deemed to be a sale of such goods. Such a service therefore cannot be treated as service to the extent of the value of goods so supplied. The remaining portion however constitutes a service. It is a well settled position of law, declared by the Supreme Court in BSNL’s case [2006 (2) STR 161 (SC)], that such a contract involving service along with supply of such goods can be dissected into a contract of sale of goods and contract of provision of service. This declared list entry has been incorporated to capture this position of law in simple terms.

    Based on the above, the Government could contend that what is being taxed is only the service component without encroaching upon the powers of the State Government under the Constitution. This aspect would have to be judicially tested.

    The 46th amendment to the Constitution which introduced clause 29A to the Article 366 contained six transactions which were deemed to be a transaction of sale or purchase of goods. For example, tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract is one of the deemed sales transportation under this amendment.

    After the judgment by the Kerala High Court, an old debate is likely to be revived. The question arises is that whether on similar grounds, the levy of service tax on a transaction of works contract where the buyer only intends to buy, say for example a constructed building and pay consideration on per square foot of constructed building could also be challenged? The buyer of the building has no interest in the services that the builder has used in construction of such building. Therefore, can the Central Government tax the services that are provided in a works contract when these transactions are deemed sales under the Constitution?

    The clause 29A was introduced in Article 366 of the Constitution, as it was felt necessary to declare those transactions as deemed sale of goods which could otherwise lead to a dilemma in classification between sale of goods and/or services.

    •    Yet another question arising out of this situation is, shouldn’t there be a similar provision in the Constitution to declare the other portion of such transactions as the deemed/declared services as is done for sales tax/VAT, before the same could be brought under the tax net by the Centre?

    There are no ready answers to the above posers. However, it appears that, there could to be a fresh round of litigations and resultant uncertainties.

    Conclusion

    To conclude, it would appear that the Kerala High Court does not resolve the larger burning issue of dual taxation of transactions by the Centre and the States whereby the increased burden is being felt by the end user/consumer. To put it in simple terms, an ideal scenario would be that in case of composite transactions, one component is taxed by the States and the other by the Centre in terms of clear statutory provisions. However, presently despite the fact that service tax is being levied on the service component (40%), the States continue to charge VAT on the 100% amount, resulting in dual taxation and increased burden on the end user/consumer.

    It is expected that the GST regime would address this burning issue impacting businesses and end users. However, it is felt that the Government needs to urgently address this issue without waiting for the introduction of GST Regime whereby Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers can have a dialogue with the Centre and States and arrive at an agreement for a consistent abatement regime across the country which can be adopted by the Centre as well as the States.

    Taxability of Sub-Contracted Services

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    Preliminary

    Sub–contracting is a significant mode of business operations in the country (both in the manufacturing sector as well as the service sector).

    In order to deal with the issue of multiple taxation, Central Excise exemptions have been granted by issuing Job work Notifications, which have the force of law. Under service tax, there are no statutory provisions which specifically deal with taxability of sub-contracted services. However, clarifications have been issued by the service tax authorities in the matter from time to time, while taxability of sub–contracted services remains a highly contentious issue.

    With effect from 1-7-2012, taxability of sub-contracted services has assumed increased significance with the introduction of Negative List based taxation of services, more particularly in view of the fact that, despite substantially widening the taxation base, the threshold exemption continues to be 10 lakh. Hence, the same is discussed hereafter, separately for position prior to 1-7-2012 and after 1-7-2012.

    Position prior to 1-7-2012:

    • Department clarifications on or after 23/08/2007.

    A Master Circular No.96/8/2007-ST dated 23-8- 2007 was issued by the Government whereby all the earlier circulars, clarifications etc. from time to time till the date of the said circular were superseded. An extract from the said circular is provided in Table 1:


       
    • Circular No. 138/07/2011, May 2011
    “Subject: Representation by Jaiprakash Associates Limited, Noida, in terms of Judgement dated 14-2-2011 in W.P. No. 7705 of 2008 – regarding

    1. The Works Contract Service (WCS) in respect of construction of dams, tunnels, road, bridges etc. is exempt from service tax. WCS providers engage sub-contractors who provide services such as Architect’s Service, Consulting Engineer’s Service, Construction of Complex Service, Design Services, Erection Commissioning or Installation Service, Management, Maintenance or Repair Service etc. The representation by Jaiprakash Associates Limited seeks to extend the benefit of such exemption to the sub-contractors providing various services to the WCS provider by arguing that the service provided by the sub-contractors are “in relation to” the exempted works contract service and hence they deserve classification under WCS itself.

    2. The matter has been examined.

    (i) Section 65A of the Finance Act, 1994 provides for classification of taxable services, which mentions that classification of taxable services shall be determined according to the terms of the sub-clauses (105) of section 65. When for any reason, a taxable service is prima facie, classifiable under two or more sub-clauses of clause (105) of section 65, classification shall be effected under the sub-clause which provides the most specific description and not the sub-clauses that provide a more general description.

    (ii) In this case, the service provider is providing WCS and he in turn is receiving various services like Architect service, Consulting Engineer service, Construction of complex, Design service, Erection Commissioning or installation, Management, Maintenance or Repair etc., which are used by him in providing output service. The services received by the WCS provider from its sub-contractors are distinctly classifiable under the respective sub-clauses of section 65(105) of the Finance Act by their description. When a descriptive sub-clause is available for classification, the service cannot be classified under another sub-clause which is generic in nature. As such, the services that are being provided by the sub-contractors of WCS providers are classifiable under the respective heads and not under WCS.” …………………..

    3. “Therefore, it is clarified that the services provided by the subcontractors/consultants and other service providers are classifiable as per section 65A of the Finance Act, 1994 under respective sub-clauses (105) of section 65 of the Finance Act, 1944 and chargeable to service tax accordingly.”

     • CBEC Circular No. 147/16/2011-ST dated 21-10-2011 “

    1. Reference is invited to the Circular No.138/07/2011– Service Tax dated 06.05.2011 wherein it was clarified that the services provided by the sub-contractors/consultants and other service providers to the Works Contract Service (WCS) provider in respect of construction of dams, tunnels, road, bridges etc. are classifiable as per section 65A of the Finance Act, 1994 under respective sub-clause (105) of section 65 of the Finance Act and are chargeable to service tax accordingly. Clarification has been requested as to whether the exemption available to the Works Contract Service providers in respect of projects involving construction of roads, airports, railways, transport terminals, bridges, tunnels, dams etc., is also available to the subcontractors who provide Works Contract Service to these main contractors in relation to those very projects.

    2. It is thus apparent that just because the main contractor is providing the WCS service in respect of projects involving construction of road, airports, railways, transport terminals, bridges, tunnels, dams etc. it would not automatically lead to the classification of services being provided by the sub-contractor to the contractor as WCS. Rather, the classification would have to be independently done as per the rules and the taxability would get decided accordingly.

    3. However, it is also apparent that in case the services provided by the sub-contractors to the main contractor are independently classifiable under WCS, then they too will get the benefit of exemption, so long as they are in relation to the infrastructure project mentioned above. Thus it may happen that the main infrastructure projects of execution of works contract in respect of roads, airports, railways, transport terminals, bridges, tunnels and dams, is sub-divided into several sub-projects and each such sub-project is assigned by the main contractor to the various sub-contractors. In such cases, if the sub-contractors are providing works contract service to the main contractor for completion of the main contract, then service tax is obviously not leviable on the works contract service provided by such sub-contractor.”

    • Taxability of sub-contractors under VAT – Important Judicial Principles

    In the case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2006) 146 STC 610 (AP), there were three parties, viz.:
    Contractee – One who awarded the contract

    Contractor – One who took the whole con-tract

    Sub–Contractors – To whom main contractor gave the contract.

    Petitioner filed a writ petition praying for a declaration that section 4(7), Explanation VI to section 2(28) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, Rule 17(1)(a) and 17(1)(c), read with Rule 17(1)(e) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 are against Article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution of India and the scheme of levy and recovery of taxes both at the hands of the nominated sub-contractors and the main contractor is beyond the legislative competence of the state legislature. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held as under:

    •    “Sub–contractor is an agent of the contractor –
    Though there are two agreements in the transaction of execution of works contract by a contractor through sub-contracts, satisfying the definition of “works contract” under the APVAT Act, it must be noticed that there is no agreement between the contractee and the sub -contractor and, consequently, there is no legal relationship creating either rights or obligations between them under an agreement. In between the contractee and the sub -contractor, the relationship is simply that the sub-contractor is an agent of the contractor.

    •    Property in goods passes directly from the sub-contractor to the contractee – In a works contract, the property in goods passes directly to the contractee by the theory of accretion. In the event of a contractor awarding the contract to a sub-contractor, the property in goods does not pass to the contractor at any point of time. The sub-contractor is only an agent of the contractor and the property in goods passes directly from the sub-contractor to the contractee and, therefore, there can be only one sale recognised by the legal fiction created under Article 366(29A).”

    •    Taxing both contractor and sub-contractor would be double taxation – That to hold that there are two taxable events in such a transaction, enabling the State to levy and collect tax both from the sub-contractor and the contractor, would be violative of Article 14 also for the reason that wherever a contractor executes a works contract himself without employing the sub-contractor, the deemed sale of goods involved in such execution of works contract would attract the tax only once and whenever the contractor employs a sub-contractor, the transfer of property in the same goods involved in the execution of such works contract attracts the tax twice, which is plainly irrational and violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India.

    •    Finally, the Andhra Pradesh High Court concluded that it is open for the State to frame appropriate rules to collect the same either from the sub-contractor or from the contractor, we emphasise, not from both. That means that tax can be collected from sub-contractor or from the contractor, but not from both.

    The Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. [2008] 17 VST 1 (SC) affirmed the above decision of AP High Court.

    The Supreme Court explained that by virtue of Article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution of India, once the work was assigned by the contractor the only transfer of property in goods would be by the sub-contractor, who was registered dealer, and who claimed to have paid the taxes under the Act on the goods involved in the execution of works.

    Once the work was assigned by the assessee to the sub-contractor, the assessee ceased to execute the works contract in the sense contemplated by Article 366(29A)(b) because the property passed by accretion and there was no property in the goods with the contractor which was capable of re-transfer, whether as goods or in some other form. Thus, in such a case, the work executed by the sub-contractor resulted only in a single transaction and not multiple transactions.

    The position emerging from the ruling of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. by the Andhra Pradesh High Court (affirmed by the Supreme Court) can be summed up as under:

    •    Sub-contractor is an agent of main contractor and has no privity of contract with contractee.

    •    Property in goods in a sub-contract works contract passes directly from the sub-contractor to the contractee and there can be only one sale recognised by legal fiction created under Article 366 (29A) of the Con-stitution of India.

    •    Taxation of contractor and sub-contractor on the same works contract (or a part thereof) would mean double taxation.

    The above important principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the context of VAT, could be relevant for service tax, in appropriate cases.

    •    Taxability of sub-Contracted services under service tax – judicial considerations

    •    In regard to position for the period prior to 23.08.2007, based on relaxations granted through departmental clarifications, the matter stands settled by various judicial rulings viz.

    •    Urvi Construction vs. CST, (2010) 17 STR 302 (Tri.-Ahmd)

    •    CCE vs. Shivhare Roadlines (2009) 16 STR 335 (Tri.–Del)

    •    Harshal & Company vs. CCE (2008) 12 STR 574 (Tri.– Ahmd)

    •    Semac Pvt Limited vs. CCE (2006) 4 STR 475 (Tri.–Bang)

    •    Shiva Industrial Security Agency vs. CCE (2008) 12 STR 496 (Tri.– Ahmd)

    •    Synergy Audio Visual Workshop P. Ltd. vs. CST (2008) 10 STR 578 (Tri.– Bang)

    •    OIKOS vs. CCE, (2007) 5 STR 229 (Tri.–Bang)

    •    Viral Builders vs. CCE (2011) 21 STR 457 (Tri.– Ahd)

    to the effect that there cannot be double taxation in cases where services are rendered by a person through another person to the ultimate consumer, as long as the main contractor who has the privity of contract with the final cus-tomer has paid service tax on the gross amount.

    •    Some of the important observations by judicial authorities as regards taxation of sub–contracted services are as under:

    Vijay Sharma & Co. vs. CCE (2010) 20 STR 309 (Tri.–ND) (LB)

    Para 9

    It is true that there is no provision under Finance Act, 1994 for double taxation. The scheme of service tax law suggest that it is a single point tax law without being a multiple taxation legislation. In absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, providing of service being event of levy, self same service provided shall not be doubly taxable.

    CCE vs. Areva T&D India Ltd (2011) 23 STR 33 (Tri – Chennai)

    Para 6

    ……………..

    The dispute relates to services rendered by the respondents to their customers utilising engineering firms as sub-contractors. The original authority held that the respondents have not rendered any “Repair Service”. It is not being disputed that the respondents are having contract for rendering services with the ultimate customers and they receive payment from them and ensure the quality of services rendered to them. Mere engagement of sub-contractors for some of the activities does not take away the role of respondents as service provider to their ultimate clients. The reasoning adopted by the original authority may lead to the conclusion that the respondents are not liable to pay any service tax at all in respect of activities undertaken through sub-contractors. Apparently, the implications are not being understood or appreciated by the original authority. From the facts of the case, it emerges that the respondents are rendering services to their ultimate customers and while rendering the said service, they are receiving services from the engineering firms appointed by them. They receive payment of service charges from the ultimate customers and part of it is paid to the sub-contractors for the services rendered by them and naturally the respondents are making some profits…………..

    National Building Construction Corp Ltd vs. CCE & ST (2011) 23 STR 593 (Tri.–Kolkata)

    In this case, NTPC awarded contract to NBCC who entrusted work for site formation and clearance to two sub-contractors and Demand raised against sub-contractors for providing service to NTPC on behalf of NBCC. The Tribunal observed as under:

    Services were rendered by sub–contractor to main contractor who are answerable to NTPC, and no service was rendered by sub-contractors to NTPC on behalf of NBCC main contractor. Hence, no tax was demandable as a case of revenue neutrality &    NBCC having paid tax on the entire amount received from NTPC.

    •     Taxability position of sub-contracted services

    •    For the period prior to 23-8-2007, it would appear that there was reasonable clarity based on department clarifications and judicial rulings to the effect that in case of sub-contracting of services, where the main contractor has discharged the service tax liability on the gross amount, there would be no liability to service tax at the end of the sub-contractor.

    •    For the period on or after 23-8-2007, based on department clarifications dated 23-8-2007, 6-5-2011 and 21-10-2011 stated above and subject to observations in paras (c) & (d) hereafter, it would appear that a better view would be that sub–contracted service provider (SCSP) is to be treated as an independent service provider and taxability needs to be determined based on appropriate service classification, applying the principles for classification of services contained in section 65A of the Act.

    •    In the context of works contract services, based on Supreme Court ruling in the L&T case discussed above, it can be contended that in case of sub-contracting, tax can be collected either from the sub-contractor or the main contractor, but not from both.

    •    In the absence of statutory provisions under service tax law as regards taxability of sub-contracted services, larger issue as to whether there can be liability at the end of sub-contractor at all, in cases where main contractor has discharged the service tax liability on the gross amount, remains judicially unresolved for the period on or after 23-8-2007.

    •    Taxability of sub-contracted services provided to SEZ Units are discussed separately.

    Position on or after 01/07/2012

    •     Provisions u/s. 66F of the Finance Act, 1994 (Act)

    Section 66F of the Act (principles of interpretation of specified description of services or bundled services) provides as under:

    “(1) Unless otherwise specified, reference to a service (hereinafter referred to as main service) shall not include reference to a service which is used for providing main service.”

    ……………..

    Para 9.1-1 of Guidance Note 9 of Education Guide issued by CBEC dated 20/06/2012 provides the following illustrations to explain this first rule of interpretation contained u/s. 66F of the Act:

    “Provision of access to any road or bridge on payment of toll is a specific entry in the negative list in section 66D of the Act. Any service provided in relation to collection of tolls or for security of a toll road would be in the nature of service used for providing such specified service and will not be entitled to the benefit of the negative list entry.

    Transportation of goods on an inland water-way is a specific entry in the negative list in section 66D of the Act. Services provided by an agent to book such transportation of goods on inland waterways or to facilitate such transportation would not be entitled to the benefits of the negative list entry.”

    From the above illustrations, it is clear that, as per section 66F(1), services procured for providing a service (main service) are not automatically classifiable under the same category as the main service. The above provision seems to confirm the position clarified by CBEC in May, 2011 and October, 2011 (referred earlier)

    •     Mega Exemption Notification No.25/2012 – ST dated 20/6/12 (Mega N 25)

    Despite the fact that excepting provisions u/ s. 66F(1), no specific provisions have been made under service tax law in regard to taxability of sub-contracted services, significant exemptions have been granted to specific sections of sub–contracted services under Mega N25. The relevant entry is reproduced hereafter:

    •    Entry No. 29

    “Services by the following persons in respective capacities –

    (a)    sub-broker or an authorised person to a stock broker;
    (b)    authorised person to a member of a commodity exchange;
    (c)    mutual fund agent to a mutual fund or asset management company;
    (d)    distributor to a mutual fund or asset management company;
    (e)    selling or marketing agent of lottery tick ets to a distributor or a selling agent;
    (f)    selling agent or a distributor of SIM cards or recharge coupon vouchers;
    (g)    business facilitator or a business corre spondent to a banking company or an insurance company, in a rural area; or
    (h)    sub-contractor providing services by way of works contract to another contractor providing works contract services which are exempt.”

    •    In addition to (a) above, sub-contracted services could be exempted from service tax, if they fulfill the criteria for entitlement to specific exemption under a notification (other than 10 lakh exemption). To illustrate:

    Mega N25 (Entry No. 13)

    “Services provided by way of construction, erection, commissioning, installation, completion, fitting out, repair, maintenance, renovation, or alteration of –

    (a)    a road, bridge, tunnel, or terminal for road transportation for use by general public;

    (b)    a civil structure or any other original works pertaining to a scheme under Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission or Rajiv Awaas Yojana;

    (c)    a building owned by an entity registered u/s. 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961(43 of 1961) and meant predominantly for religious use by general public;

    (d)    a pollution control or effluent treatment plant, except when located as a part of a factory; or a structure meant for funeral, burial or cremation of deceased;”

    Mega N25 (Entry No. 14)

    “Services by way of construction, erection, commissioning, or installation of original works pertaining to,-

    (a)    an airport, port or railways, including monorail or metro;

    (b)    a single residential unit otherwise than as a part of a residential complex;

    (c)    low-cost houses up to a carpet area of 60 square meters per house in a housing project approved by competent authority empowered under the “Scheme of Affordable Housing in Partnership” framed by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India;

    (d)    post-harvest storage infrastructure for agricultural produce including a cold storages for such purposes; or

    (e)    mechanised food grain handling system, machinery or equipment for units processing agricultural produce as food stuff excluding alcoholic beverages;”

    •     Taxability position of sub-contracted services

    •    Subject to observations in paras hereafter, it would appear that, a better view would be that SCSP is to be treated as an independent service provider and taxability needs to be determined based on appropriate service & classification applying the principles contained in section 66F of the Act.

    •    In the context of works contract services, based on Supreme Court ruling in L&T case discussed earlier, it can be contended that in case of sub-contracting, tax can be collected either from the SCSP or the main service provider (MSP), but not from both.

    •    Despite the fact that specific exemptions have been granted to a large section of sub-contracted services, it is a well settled principle laid down by the Supreme Court to the effect that, an exemption cannot necessarily imply liability to tax/duty. Hence, the larger issue as to whether there can be liability at the end of SCSP at all in cases where MSP has discharged the service tax liability on the gross amount, needs to be tested judicially.

    •    Another point required to be noted is that all SCSPs do not necessarily enjoy the exemption that is available to MSP under Mega N25. For instance, certain services provided to the Government, local authority etc. are exempt under “entry No. 25” of the said Mega N25. However, when a sub-contractor is retained by MSP providing services to the Government, technically services provided by SCSP to MSP are not provided to the Government, Therefore unless SCSP enjoys exemption independently under any other entry, he would be liable for service tax in spite of the fact that his services are merged into the services of MSP who ultimately provides services to the Government.

    •    Taxability of sub-contracted services provided to SEZ units are discussed herein below:

    Taxability of sub–contracted services provided to SEZ Units

    The relevant extracts from Notification No. 40/2012–ST dated 20-6-2012 (“N40”) are as under:

    “The exemption contained in this notification shall be subject to the following conditions, namely:-

    (a)the exemption shall be provided by way of refund of service tax paid on the specified services received by a unit located in a SEZ or the developer of SEZ and used for the authorised operations:

    Provided that where the specified services received in SEZ and used for the authorised operations are wholly consumed within the SEZ, the person liable to pay service tax has the option not to pay the service tax ab initio, instead of the SEZ unit or the developer claiming exemption by way of refund in terms of this notification.

    Explanation – For the purposes of this notification, the expression “wholly consumed” refers to such specified services received by the unit of a SEZ or the developer and used for the authorised operations, where the place of provision determinable in accordance with the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (hereinafter referred as the POP Rules) is as under:-

    (i)    in respect of services specified in Rule 4 of the POP Rules, the place where the services are actually performed is within the SEZ ; or

    (ii)    in respect of services specified in Rule 5 of the POP Rules, the place where the property is located or intended to be located is within the SEZ; or

    (iii)    in respect of services other than those falling under clauses (i) and (ii), the recipient does not own or carry on any business other than the operations in SEZ;

    …………………”

    The substantive position of exemption in regard to services provided to SEZ units prior to 1-7-2012 continues with effect from 1-7-2012 as well, excepting consequential changes due to introduction of POP Rules in lieu of Rules for Export of Services/lImport of Services which were in force upto 30-6-2012.

    According to one school of thinking, benefit of exemption under N 40 would not be available in regard to services availed by a MSP from a SCSP in regard to services provided by them for SEZ projects. This is supported by one or more of the following reasons:

    •    SCSP has privity of contract with MSP and has no independent legal relationship with SEZ clients of MSP. Hence, MSP is the recipient of Services provided by SCSP and not SEZ clients of MSP.

    •    According to department clarifications dated 23-8-2007, 6-5-2011 and 21-10-2011 and provisions of section 66F(1) of the Act, SCSP is to be treated as an independent service provider and taxability determined accordingly.

    •    Though according to Rule 10 of SEZ (Amendment) Rules, 2009 benefit of exemptions & concessions available to a Contractor shall also be available to sub-contractors read with section 51 of SEZ Act, it has been judicially held that, provisions of SEZ Act/Rules do not necessarily override the provisions of the relevant statute. [Reference can be made to UOI v. Essar Steel Ltd. (2010) 249 ELT 3 (GUJ) affirmed by Supreme Court – (2010) 255 ELT A 115]

    According to an alternative school of thinking, benefit of exemption under N 40 would be available in regard to services availed by MSP from SCSP in regard to services provided by them for SEZ projects. This is supported by one or more of the following/reasons:

    •    SCSP has provided services on behalf of MSP to their SEZ clients. Hence, though privity of contract is between MSP and their SEZ clients, there is a constructive receipt of service by units located in SEZ from SCSP. Hence, benefit of N 40 would be available.

    •    Views expressed through department clarifications that, a SCSP is an independent service provider, has no statutory force. Hence, taxation at the end of SCSP results in multiple taxation which is not contemplated under the scheme of service tax law generally.

    •    Section 51 of SEZ Act read with Rule 10 of SEZ (Amendment) Rules, 2009 supports the contention that benefits available to a MSP should also be available to a SCSP.

    Based on the above, it would appear that entitlement to the benefit of N 40 by a SCSP continues to be a contentious issue.

    CENVAT credit on service tax paid on input services availed in connection with services provided by MSP to units in SEZ/developers of SEZ.

    For availment of CENVAT credit under CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) on input services availed for “exported services”, it has been a settled position that, “exported services” are to be treated in the nature of “taxable services” and not “exempted services”. Hence, restrictions on availment of CENVAT credit under Rule 6 of CCR, would not apply and benefit of CENVAT credit of service tax paid on input services is available. However, whether services provided to a unit in SEZ/developer of SEZ, are to be treated as being in the nature of “exported services” or “exempted services” has also been a very contentious issue.

    With effect from 1-3-2011, however, a new sub–rule (6A) has been inserted in Rule 6 of CCR to the effect that provisions of sub–rules (1), (2), (3) & (4) of Rule 6 of CCR shall not apply in cases when taxable services are provided, without payment of service tax to a unit in SEZ/developer of a SEZ for their authorised operations. Hence, with effect from 01/03/2011, benefit of CENVAT credit would be available on service tax paid on input services availed in connection with services provided to a unit in SEZ/developer of SEZ. This amendment has been given a retrospective effect, by the Finance Act, 2012. Hence, MSP can avail benefit of CENVAT Credit in cases where service tax is paid on services availed from SCSP for SEZ Projects on which Service tax has been paid by a MSP, subject to conditions stipulated under CCR.