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Part B : Some Recent Judgments

I. High Court :

1. CENVAT Credit  :

Non-alcoholic beverage manufacturers of concentrates whether are eligible to avail credit of service tax paid on advertisement, sales promotion, market research and utilise the same against duty liability on the concentrates is the issue involved.

Coca Cola India (P) Ltd. v. CCE, 2009 (22) SIT 130 (Bom.) (HC)

The credit was denied on the ground that advertisements did not relate to concentrates manufactured by the appellant although advertisement expenses formed part of the sale price of the said concentrates manufactured by the appellant. The appellant contended that the advertisement of the brand name with a soft drink had direct relationship with the manufacture of concentrate inasmuch as the demand and consequently, the production of concentrate depended on the consumption of the soft drink and that the advertisement enhanced the market-ability of the concentrate. It was also pleaded by the intervener in the case that service tax like CENVAT was a consumption tax, which had to be borne by the consumer. There was an integral link between the concentrate manufactured by the appellant and the beverage viz. aerated water manufactured by the bottler from it. In this context, the definition of ‘input service’ was analysed in great detail. Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Bombay Tyres International, 1983 (14) ELT 1896 (SC) was discussed at length. In this case, the Supreme Court held that even though the levy was on the manufacturer, the measure could be with reference to the sale price. Accordingly, it was held that the expense for marketability and selling including advertisement and publicity would form part of the value of goods under assessment. It was also contended by the appellant that revenue never disputed that advertisement of aerated water was an activity related to manufacture and sale of concentrate and that cost of advertisement was relatable to aerated water which formed part of the value of concentrate in the hands of its manufacturer and therefore, it was included in the sale price of concentrate charged by the manufacturer. In this background, the terms ‘means’, includes’, ‘such as’ and ‘business’ used in the definition of ‘input service’ were extensively analysed with reference to several Supreme Court and Larger Bench decisions which inter alia included the following:

Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. CCE, 2003 (158) ELT 552 (SC)

Bharat Co-op. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Co-op. Bank Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685

Good Year India Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, 1997 I.(95) ELT 450

Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. UOI, 1988 (36) ELT (SC).

In summation, what followed from the discussion was that credit was availed on the tax paid on the Input service, which was advertisement and not the contents of the advertisement. Thus, it was observed that it was not necessary that the advertisement must relate to the final product manufactured by the person advertising. So long as the manufacturer can prove that the advertisement services used had an impact on the manufacture of the final product, he could avail the credit of the service tax paid by him. The correlation between the soft drink and the concentrate being direct and proportionate, the advertisement indirectly enhanced the marketability of the concentrate. Once the cost incurred for service was added to the cost assessed, the nexus of the cost of the advertisement service was established with the manufacture of the final product. As such, the expression ‘input service’ was capable of covering indirect use in or in relation to the manufacture of the final product and accordingly, CENVAT credit was available to the manufacturer for payment of duty.

2. Import of service:

Unitech Ltd. v. CST, 2009 (15) STR 385 (Delhi)

The High Court agreed with the issue settled by the Bombay High Court in the case of Indian National Shipowners Association v. UOI, 2009 (13) STR 235 (Bom.) and held that the Revenue could collect tax only upon being invested with due legal authority, an event which occurred only on insertion of S. 66A on 18-4-2006 and as such, the demand confirmed by Tribunal from recipient of taxable service of foreign architect for the period 1-1-2005 till 15-6-2005 was held as done without authority of law and accordingly answered the question of law.

3.Penalty: Power of Commissioner (Appeals) to reduce:

CCE v. Madhuri  Travels, 2009 (15) STR 241 (Bom.)

The short question before the Tribunal was, to examine whether minimum penalty prescribed u/ s.76 could be reduced by Commissioner (Appeals). The Court ruled that considering S. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 the authority was vested with the power not to impose penalty or reduce the same and matter being covered in the order of the Court in the case of CCE&C Nashik v. D. R. Gade, 2008 (9) STR 348 (Bom.), revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

II. Tribunal:

4.(a) Appeals: Hearing without pre-deposit when divergent views prevail :

SRC Projects P. Ltd. v. CCE, 2009 (15) STR 463 (Tri.-Chennai)

In the instant case, the appellant adjusted excess service tax paid against later liability. The original authority relied on the Single Member Tribunal’s decision of Nelson Org. Mang. P. Ltd. V. CCE, Delhi 2006 (3) STR 503 (Tri.-Del). However, various other decisions including the one in the case of Nima Architect and Valuers V. CCE, 2006 (1) STR 305 (Tri.-Del) decided that excess payment of service tax could be adjusted against later liability of service tax. The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal as payment of pre-deposit ordered was not complied with. The Tribunal remanded the matter for fresh decision with a direction that the matter be heard without insisting on pre-deposit in the circumstances when divergent views were held in various Tribunal decisions.

b) Pre-deposit not insisted if tax paid with interest:

    K. Fasteners V. Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem 2009 (15) STR 330 (Tri.-Chennai)
 
The appellant assembled items supplied by its principal. Service tax was demanded under ‘business auxiliary service’ and applicable interest and penalties were levied. The appellant contended the activity as manufacturing yet paid service tax with interest before issuance of Show Cause Notice. The appellant’s appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was rejected for non-payment of pre-deposit insisted on penalty amount for considering the appeal. While hearing the stay application, appeal itself was taken up by the Tribunal and the matter was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) directing that the appeal be heard without pre-deposit as usually when tax is paid with interest, pre-deposit should not be insisted upon.

5. CENVAT Credit :

a) Service tax on construction of compound wall – an input service:

In re: Raymond Zambaiti P. Ltd., 2009 (15) STR 596 (Commr. App)

Appellant availed service tax paid on construction service of compound wall of the factory. CENVAT credit was disallowed on the ground that it was neither used directly for ‘manufacture’ of excisable goods nor for any output service. The appellant contended that the compound w311was part of the factory. Reliance was placed on Apex Court’s decision in the case of South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. V. CCE, 2006 (200) ELT 357 (SC) and according to which ‘precinct’ had to be given broader meaning to include the surrounding area. It was further observed that the definition of ‘input service’ included services used in relation to setting up, modernisation, renovation or repairs of factory and no factory could function without a compound wall to take care of security, environmental protection etc., the construction of compound wall would be input service within the meaning of its inclusive definition and as such, CENVAT credit was considered allowable.

b) Security agency service used for factory admissible:
CCE&C Guntur V. Hindustan Coco-Cola Beverages P. Ltd., 2009 (15) STR 248 (Tri. Bang.)

Services of security agency at the depot and services of pest busters were used in the manufacturing activity of food products for human consumption. The former service used to prevent theft and the latter from contamination were found eligible for CENVAT credit by Commissioner (Appeals) after detailed analysis of ‘input service’ and following precedent of DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd., 2006 (4) STR 610 (Comrnr. Appl.) Finding no infirmity in the order, plea of department for stay of order was rejected.

c) Substantive benefit not denied on procedural ground:

C&CCE. Vapi  v.  DNH Spinners, 2009 TIOL  1216 CESTAT-AHM

The assessee received invoices from vendors in the name of head office instead of factory. Based on the decisions in the case of Eveready Industries India Ltd., 2007 (219)ELT 333 and Tisco Ltd., 2008 (228) ELT 224, it was held that when the invoices received by head office/registered office were endorsed by the appellant, substantive benefit could not be denied on procedural ground. Incidentally, the appellant being only manufacturing unit, the head office could not be considered as input service distributor and the denial was dismissed.

6. Import  of Service:

a) Limitation: Plea justified when clarity in law is absent:
Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. CCE&ST, LTU Chennai, 2009 (15) STR 289 (Tri. Chennai)

The appellant paid commission to foreign parties during 2004-05 and 2005-06 till October 30, 2005. This was covered as Business Auxiliary Service. However, service was exempt till 9-7-2004 under Notification No. 8/04-ST until it was restricted to services of commission agents relating to agricul-tural produce. The appellant had a bonafide belief as to non-taxability under reverse charge until the introduction of S. 66A on 18-4-2006. Several deci-sions were cited. which inter alia included ‘ Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (11) STR 375), Lohia Strangler v. CCE, 2008 (10) STR 483 (Tri.-Del), Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd. v. CCE, 2007 (7) STR 443. The Tribunal also took a note of the Larger Bench’s decision in the case of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (11) STR 338 (Tri.-LB) and distinguished Apex Court’s decision in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) v. CCE, 2008 (9) STR 3 (SC) cited by the department. The Tribunal found force in the limitation plea as no clarity existed in law at material time as to the issue of applicability of reverse charge provision. It accepted bonafide belief in non-taxability and provided waiver of pre-deposit as part payment was made by the appellant prior to the issuance of Show cause Notice.
 
(b)(i) Import of service (ii) operational assistance for export considered BSS :

Fifth Avenue  v. CST, 2009 (15) STR (Tri.-Chennai)

Service tax was paid by the appellant for the period April 2006 to September 2006 being receiver of operational assistance for execution of export orders to whom payment was made in foreign exchange. Issue involved was two fold: Appellant pleaded to consider the service of operational assistance for export orders as business support service and not business auxiliary service and secondly application of reverse charge was also contended to be applicable only from 18-4-2006 relying on the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case of Indian National Shipowners Association v. UOI, 2009 (13) STR 235 (Bom). Appellant succeeded on merits on both the pleas and therefore, service tax demand for the period prior to 1-5-2005 was set aside.

c. Bathija International v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem 2009 (15) STR 249 (Tri. Chennai)

Appellant, an exporter, paid commission to agents abroad. Service tax was demanded under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’ and applicable interest and pen-alties were imposed for the period 12-8-2004 to 27-9-2006. Appellant contended that there being no li-ability prior to introduction of S. 66A on 18-4-2006 and the liability for the subsequent period already having been paid by them, plea was made for remand without further pre-deposit. The matter was remanded without pre-deposit.

7. Refund:    Admissible based  on credit notes:

Professional International Couriers Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, 2009 (15) STR 295 (Tri.-Chennai).

Appellant being co-loader for a courier agency was not required to pay service tax as per Board’s Circular, however inadvertently paid service tax after collecting the same from the principal courier agency and claimed refund. The principal agency was returned the so-collected service tax by way of credit note. The principal agency even reversed the credit taken by them for service tax so paid to the appellant. Relying on the ratio of decision in the case of Shiva Analyticals (I) Ltd. v. CST, 2007 (7) STR 35 (Tri.-Bang.), it was held that in the circumstances when service tax erroneously collected was returned to the customer whether by cheque or by issuing credit note and the fact supported by chartered accountant’s certificate, there being no unjust enrichment,  the refund    was  held  as admissible.

8. Valuation:  Benefit of Notification  No. 12/ 2003 to caterer’s  service:

a. Grand Ashok v. CST, 2009 (15) STR 344 (Tri.-Bang.)

The appellant, an in-flight caterer was called upon to pay service tax on the gross amount of their bill, which included supply of goods and beverages on which VAT was paid. Service tax was paid on handling and transportation. Decision of Imagic Creative P. Ltd. v. CCT, 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC) was discussed at length and relied upon. Apex Court’s decision in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. UOI, 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) also was relied upon and it was held that service tax was liable to be paid on outdoor caterer’s service. However on sale of goods, since VAT was paid, service tax could not be levied and the appellant was entitled to benefit under Notification No. 12/2003-ST. Further, appellant being under bonafide belief, longer period of limitation was not invokable.

b. On a similar issue in the case of LSG Sky Chefs (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, 2009 (15) STR 545 (Tri.-Bang.), it was held that sales tax and service tax being mutually exclusive and separate invoices having been issued for supplies of goods, service tax could not be imposed on the portion of the contract on which VAT was paid.

c) Pre-deposit waived: Cost of goods in construction service:

M/s. Sobha Developers Ltd. v. CST, Bangalore 2009 TIOL 1176 CESTAT-Bang.

In case of residential consumption service, the appellant paid service tax on 30% of the contract and VAT was paid on the balance 70% representing value of goods and material. Relying on the same Bench’s final order No. 24/2009 dated 16-1-2009 in case of M/s. LSG Sky Chefs (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and in the case of Wipro GE Medical System Pvt. Ltd., 2008 TIOL 2476 CESTAT-Bang., it was observed that the Board also has issued circular to the effect that the appellant is not liable to pay service tax and the appellant had a strong case of merits based on the fact that where sales tax is paid, service tax would not be demanded and the balance remaining unpaid pre-deposit was waived.

Part B : Some Recent Judgments

I. Supreme Court:

1. Classification:

Marine Logistic Services to Offshore Support Vessels from 1-6-2007 to 15-5-2008 whether could be held as services in relation to mining ?

Union of India v. Indian National Shipowners Association, 2011 (21) STR 3 (SC)

The short question involved in the case relates to the classification i.e., whether the services provided by members of the Association could be covered as services in relation to mining of mineral, oil or gas as provided in section 65(105)(zzzy) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) introduced with effect from 1-6-2007. The Association contended that they were appropriately covered by the provisions of section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Act dealing with supply of tangible goods for hire. This service was introduced from 16-5-2008. The members of the Association provided vessels to ONGC on time-charter basis for the period in question viz. 1-6-2007 to 15-5-2008. The scope of the work in addition also included services such as carrying men and material between base and offshore installation, carrying out routine surveillance in offshore, carrying out rescue operations if and when required and carrying out any other field work which would be within the capability of the chartered vessels. Earlier the High Court held that the nature of work carried out by the members of the respondent could not be said to be the work in relation to mining activity. The Supreme Court also found that none of the activities mentioned in the agreement with ONGC by one of the members could be said to be a service rendered in relation to mining of mineral, oil or gas. Therefore, it affirmed the order of the High Court looking into facts in issues only and left the question of law decided by the High Court, open to be considered at length in appropriate case.

2. Commercial training or coaching services:

Whether computer training institutes were exempt between 10-9-2004 and 15-6-2005?

Commissioner of C.Ex. v. Sunwin Technosolution P. Ltd., 2011 (21) STR 97 (SC)

The Department challenged the judgment of the Jharkhand High Court holding that service tax was not payable by the computer training institutes for the impugned period.

Initially a Notification dated 20th June, 2003 was issued providing exemption to vocational training institutes including computer training institutes. However, the said Notification was effective till 30th June, 2004. Later a new Notification dated 10th September, 2004 was issued, which exempted vocational training institute and recreational training institute from the levy of service tax but did not specifically cover computer training institutes. This Notification, however, was amended by Notification dated 7th June, 2005 (effective from 16th June, 2005), which specifically excluded computer training institutes from the scope of the exemption. Therefore, according to the respondent since the amendment in Notification dated 10th September, 2004 was made effective from June 16, 2005, it implied that computer training institutes stood exempted for the impugned period of 2004-2005 and the liability would arise only from 16th June, 2005.

The Department contended that the Government was fully conscious of the fact that computer training institutes were not to get exemption and the same was clear because these were excluded from the Notification dated 10th September, 2004 and Notification dated 7th June, 2005 was more or less in the nature of clarification. The Apex Court confirmed that since computer training institutes were was out of the scope of exemption from 10-9-2004, the liability existed for the impugned period.

II. High Court:

3. CENVAT credit:

Does Cenvat credit of service tax on input services need to be reversed when inputs are removed?

Commissioner of C.Ex., Chandigarh v. Punjab Steels, 2011 (21) STR 5 (P & H)

The respondent, a manufacturer removed certain inputs from the factory without being used. The respondent did not reverse the CENVAT credit of service tax paid on input service (i.e., Goods Transport Service) so received in relation to purchase of inputs, as no provisions exist in the Rules in this regard. The Tribunal passed an order favouring the respondent. The Revenue filed an appeal raising a question of law whether CENVAT credit availed on input service at the time of receipt of inputs is required to be reversed at the time of clearance of inputs. The Revenue referred to Rule 3(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) which specifies that Cenvat credit taken on inputs or capital goods needs to be reversed when the inputs are removed as such from the factory and contended that the respondent was required to reverse the CENVAT credit even of service tax on input services. Further, the Revenue also relied on Rule 5 of CCR which provides that CENVAT credit on inputs or input services is required to be reversed when the assessee is entitled to refund of tax paid on inputs or input services.

The respondent contended that there exists a material difference in language used in Rule 3 and Rule 5 of CCR. Rule 3 provides for reversal of credit on inputs or capital goods and Rule 5 refers to reversal of credit on inputs or input services. Further, inputs and input service are separately defined under CCR. The Revenue cannot direct respondents to reverse the credit on input service merely on analogy. The Court held that Rule 5 on which reliance was placed by the Revenue, stood on different footing. There being no specific provision for reversal of CENVAT credit on service tax paid on input service, such a proposal was not in accordance with the law. Hence, the appeal by the Department was dismissed holding that there did not exist substantial question of law and tax could not be levied merely by inference.

4. Penalty:

Can penalty u/s.76 of the Finance Act, 1994 be reduced below the minimum prescribed limit?

Commissioner of C.Ex. and Customs v. S. J. Mehta & Co., 2011 (21) STR (Guj.)

The respondents paid service tax along with interest after the due date of payment. They also filed a belated service tax return. Due to the lapses, penalty of Rs.88,800 u/s.76 of the Act was imposed. The respondents in the appeal got the penalty amount reduced to Rs.25,000 on invocation of section 80 of the Act. The Revenue’s appeal was rejected by the Tribunal.

Reliance was placed on a similar case reported at 2010 (19) STR 641 (Guj.) where the High Court quashed the order of the Tribunal. Apart from this, on a conjoint reading of section 76 and section 80 of the Act, the High Court had taken the view that there exists no discretion to the authority for levying a penalty below the minimum prescribed limit. Following this decision, the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the issue was divided to be looked at afresh by the Tribunal.

III. Tribunal :

5. Business Auxiliary Service:

Whether promotion of logo or branding service could be held as ‘Business Auxiliary Service’?

Jetlite (India) Ltd. v. Commr. of C.Ex., New Delhi 2011 (21) STR 119 (Tri.-Delhi)

In the year 2003 to 2007 (hereinafter called as the ‘relevant period’) Sahara Airlines used the logo and advertisement of its group company Sahara India Commercial Corporation Ltd. on its stationary and tickets. The Tax Department claimed that display of information of construction projects of Sahara India Commercial Corporation on boarding passes and baggage tags amounted to advertising and consequently a business auxiliary service and thus demanded a huge sum as liability to tax form Jetlite which had taken over Sahara Airlines.

The contentions of the appellant were as under:

  •     The appellant merely displayed logo of the group companies and were a part of the said group and were not rendering any service to Sahara Corporation. No other activity was carried out by them.

  •     The activities did not relate to any service as such rendered by Sahara Corporation to its customers and hence the appellant could not have been charged of having rendered service in the nature of business auxiliary services.

  •     Services of ‘brand promotion’ and ‘sale of space’ have been introduced in the said Act subsequent to the relevant period and hence the appellants could not be held to have rendered such service.

  •     Activity of the construction and sale of immovable property does not amount to service and promotion of immovable property is not covered within the definition of ‘business auxiliary service’.

  •     Not a single document on record suggested that the appellants had promoted or marketed any service of Sahara Corporation, i.e., the appellants did not carry out advertising activity for the projects of Sahara Corporation.

  •     The sale of immovable property by Sahara Corporation could not be deemed to be service for the relevant period as Sahara Corporation constructed building for themselves and not for others. Further, letter dated 10-9-2004 of the Ministry of Finance, clarified that the builder constructing for himself did not render any service as such.

The submissions of the Department were as under:

  •     Resolution by Sahara Corporation revealed that they had decided to use the services of the appellants for promoting their business and in consideration of which, the appellants were to receive certain amount per passenger.

  •     Merely because end product is transferred by way of sale, that will not wipe out the effect of services rendered by Sahara Corporation.

  •     Subject-matter of sale being that property constructed comprised various services to make the premises ready for sale.

  •     If the interpretation of the appellants was to be accepted, it would defeat the very provision of law.

Rejecting the demand of the Department, the Tribunal held as under:

  •     Mere printing of logo or the promotion of a brand without reference to any particular service provided by the client was not covered under BAS (Business Auxiliary Service).

  •     The service of brand promotion is brought in as a separate taxable service by the Finance Act, 2010 with effect from 1-7-2010 and before this date, brand promotion activity was not taxable under BAS.

  •     Construction of immovable property on its own behalf and its sale does not constitute a service and therefore, even if such activities were promoted, it did not amount to ‘promotion or marketing of service provided by the client’. Furthermore, Memorandum or Articles of Association is not sufficient to establish that there was service for promotion or marketing provided. Similarly, relying on registration certificate, one cannot conclude about the liability to service tax. The Department has to place on record factual matrix which would disclose basic information, which would enlighten as to the activity of the firm.

  •     The adjudication order went beyond the show-cause notice in confirming the demand by referring to various activities that Sahara Group carried on that were not alleged in the show-cause notice.

  •     The onus to establish classification and taxability was on the department was not discharged by the Department.

Hence, the appeal was allowed holding that the appellant’s service could not be taxed as Business Auxiliary Service.

6. CENVAT credit:

a) Whether input service used for outward transportation is eligible for benefit as CENVAT credit?

Somaiya Organo Chemicals v. Commr. of C.Ex. & Cus., Aurangabad 2011 (21) STR 114 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The appellant paid service tax on the insurance policy in respect of goods transported from the factory to the port of export.

In case of export of goods, it has been held that input service includes services rendered for outward transportation upto place of removal of goods and service tax paid to facilitate goods to reach the place of removal has to be eligible for benefit of CENVAT credit. Insurance service was taken by the appellant for transportation of goods from the factory to the port of export. Thus, input service was used for the business activity undertaken up to the place of removal of goods. The Tribunal held that the appellant was entitled to take input service credit.

b) Is Cenvat credit available on air-ticket booking service for paying excise duty on manufacture of final products ?

Somaiya Organo Chemicals v. Commr. of C.Ex. & Cus., Aurangabad 2011 (21) STR 114 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The respondent was engaged in the activity of manufacture. Various air journeys were undertaken by employees for business purpose.

Revenue in appeal claimed that air-ticket booking service was not an input service as there was no nexus between air-ticket booking service and manufacturing activity. The respondent con-tended that ‘the object of CENVAT scheme is to allow credit on inputs used in or in relation to manufacture of final product and to allow credit on input services used in or in relation to manufacture of final product as well as in relation to business of manufacture’. Business activity cannot be restricted to mere manufacturing activity and it covers all activities that are related to business. The term ‘in relation to business’ cannot be given a restricted meaning and expenses incurred as a result of commercial expediency are covered by the said term. The appeal was allowed.

7. Commercial or Industrial Construction service:

Whether laying of pipeline covered as ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction service ?

Dinesh Chandra Agarwal Infracon P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad 2011 (21) STR 41 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellant provided service of laying of long-distance pipelines for the transfer of water in the State of Gujarat under a contract with the Gujarat State’s Sewerage Board, an independent body constituted under an Act of the State Government.

The Tribunal observed that service tax would be payable under the service head, ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ only if the service was provided to any person by a commercial concern and in relation to commercial or industrial construction service.

The appellant did satisfy the first condition mentioned above; however the second condition was not very certain. ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ was chargeable to service tax if it was used for the furtherance of business or commerce. As the canal built by the Government was not falling under commercial activity, service tax was held to be not chargeable.

Water purchased by the Board was distributed to rural and urban areas for the purpose of irrigation and drinking at subsidised rates and the operating cost was also not recovered by them. To set up an establishment for water supply was a part of the duties and functions of the State to provide its citizens with a better living. Accordingly, the services provided were held to be not covered as commercial or industrial construction service and therefore the appeal was allowed.

8. Penalty:

Should penalty be leviable in case service tax is paid along with interest after issuance of show-cause notice?

Rockwool Insulation v. CCE, Rajkot 2011 (21) STR 62 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellant engaged in providing construction services paid service tax after the due date along with interest. However, part payment of service tax was made by the appellant after the issuance of show-cause notice (SCN). Penalty was levied on the appellant for non-payment of service tax along with interest.

Further, the appellant also collected service tax from their customers and admitted that the service tax was not paid because of financial difficulty. Thus, having regard to collection of service tax and non -payment, penalty was considered warranted and the case was remanded for re-determination of penalty imposable.

9. Principles of natural justice:

Show-cause notice issued by the revisionary authority violating the principles of natural justice.

Klockner Desma Machinery Pvt Ltd v. CST, Ahmedabad 2011 (21) STR 37 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

In the present case the demand of service tax raised against the appellant was initially dropped by the Assistant Commissioner and then taken for review by the Commissioner. Show-cause notice was issued by the Commissioner on 13-1-2010 requiring the appellant to file reply within seven days of receipt of notice and appear for personal hearing on 20th, 21st or 22nd January. The appellant applied for an extension of time to reply on 18-1-2010. There was no reference in the impugned order to said reply of the assessee. It was held that a period of seven days granted to the assessee to file a reply and personal hearing on three consecutive days in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The matter was remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for fresh decision observing principles of natural justice.

10. Rebate : Export of services:

Whether non-filing of prior declaration leads to rejection of rebate claim?

Manubhai & Co. v. CST, Ahmedabad 2011 (21) STR 65 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellant claimed refund under Notification No. 12/2005-ST being service tax paid on input services used in services exported by them. The said Notification provides for filing of declaration describing the quantity, value, rate of duty, amount of tax payable on inputs, value and amount of service tax and cess payable on input services prior to the date of export. The Authority was of the opinion that the assessee could not claim refund on the ground that the appellant had not filed of non-filing declaration before export. It was further held that the notification is divided into two parts. The first part gives conditions to be fulfilled for granting of refund and the second part gives the procedures to be followed and that the requirement of a declaration in the Notification cannot be treated as a mere procedural requirement.

The appellant argued that substantive benefit can-not be denied on the ground of procedural lapses. The Tribunal held that failure to file declaration is not sufficient to hold that the assessee did not pay service tax on input services. Non-observance of a procedural condition was of a technical nature and cannot be used to deny the substantive concession.

11. Refund:

Whether refund is allowable when service tax is paid in case when the assessee fails to take benefit of small scale exemption?

Cancio E.P. Mascarenhas v. CCEx., Goa 2011 (21) STR 17 (Tri.-Mumbai)

Notification 6/2005 provided for threshold exemption of service tax on taxable services of the value not exceeding Rs.8 lakh to a service provider in the relevant year. The appellant did not know about this benefit and paid service tax on commission received from his client. On becoming aware, the appellant filed a refund claim of service tax paid by them. However, it was rejected on the ground that the appellant had not exercised the option for claiming the benefit of threshold exemption Notification. Departmental authorities submitted that the appellant paid tax by fulfilling the condition 2(1) of the said Notification which says that a service provider can opt to pay service tax and not avail the benefit of exemption, but the option once exercised shall not be withdrawn during the remaining part of the year. In this regard the assessee contended that the benefit of exemption Notification was available in any financial year subject to fulfilment of conditions specified in the Notification. The assessee could not take the decision in advance as he got registered in November 2007 and could not opt for exemption during the financial year. Hence, condition of 2(1) of the said Notification was not applicable to the appellant. Apart from this, the appellant also did not recover service tax from clients and paid service tax as an honest taxpayer. The appeal was allowed and the refund was allowed.

CENVAT credit

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II. Tribunal :


4. CENVAT credit :



Vodafone Essar Digilink Ltd. v. CCE., Jaipur-I, 2008 (10)
STR 139 (Tri. – Del).

  •  BSNL provided taxable
    service to the appellant and paid service tax on port and space charges. Credit
    was denied for service tax paid, alleging that BSNL was not liable to pay
    service tax in respect of port and space charges.


It was held that since the payment of service tax by BSNL was
not challenged, credit cannot be denied. Pre-deposit of duty and penalty was
waived and stay petition was allowed.

levitra

Some Recent Judgments

I. Supreme Court :


    1. Import of service : Recipient not liable prior to 1-1-2005 :

  •     Department’s appeal against the CESTAT Misc. Order No. ST/85/2008 (PB) dated 27-6-2008 in the case of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2008 (11) STR 338 (Tri.-LB) was dismissed with the comment ‘no merit’. In view of this, the Larger Bench’s decision that recipient of service provided from outside India or by a non-resident having no office in India is not liable to pay service tax prior to 1-1-2005. (Detailed analysis of the decision of the Larger Bench was made in September 2008 issue of BCAJ).

    2. Explanation widening tax net is not retrospective for operation :

    UOI v. Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd., 2009 (14) STR 593

  •     In the definition of business auxiliary service u/s.65(19) of the Finance Act, 1994, an explanation was inserted with effect from 16-5-2008 whereby promotion and marketing of lottery tickets was made exigible to service tax. However, the present appeal arose from a judgment and order dated 18-9-2007 (period prior to insertion of the explanation) passed by the Sikkim High Court in a writ petition filed by the respondent challenging legality wherein the High Court had not upheld the levy under the category of business auxiliary service. Service tax was sought to be recovered from the respondent agent considering the service in relation to promotion/marketing of lotteries as business auxiliary service.

    The core question that the Court had to consider was whether the explanation inserted post-decision of the Sikkim High Court was clarificatory or declaratory so as to be interpreted as having retrospective effect and retroactive operation. Referring to and relying on the decisions of several High Courts and the Supreme Court, the Court ruled that by reason of an explanation, a substantive law may be introduced. The Parliament is entitled to bring new concepts of imposition of tax and also entitled to raise legal fiction. However, when substantive law is introduced, it will have no retrospective effect. For the said purpose, an expression like ‘for the removal of doubt’ is not conclusive. The Court also stated that constitutional validity was not examined by them. However, holding that explanation was not clarificatory/declaratory, the High Court’s decision was upheld opining categorically that service tax, if any, would be payable only and with effect from May 2008, i.e. prospectively on the insertion of explanation.

II. High Court :

    3. Clearing and Forwarding Agent :

    CCE v. Kulcip Medicine Pvt. Ltd., 2009 (14) STR 608 (P & H)

    â In this case of Revenue’s appeal, the short question relates to whether or not both ‘clearing’ and ‘forwarding’ are necessary to be covered within the scope of the definition of clearing and forwarding services as the assessee was engaged in the activity of handling and distribution of products of manufacturer and thus not engaged in clearing activity i.e. he dealt with already cleared goods from the factory. The Court in this case noted and approved the decision in the case of M/s. Mahavir Generics v. CCE, Bangalore 2006 (3) STR 276 (Tri.). According to the Court, the word ‘and’ used after the word ‘clearing’ and before the word ‘forwarding’ in the definition provided in S. 65(105)(j) of the Finance Act, 1994 has to be understood in a conjunctive sense and not disjunctive. According to the Court, if the word ‘and’ was read as ‘or’, then it would amount to doing violence to the simple language used by the legislature which cannot be imputed to ignorance of English language. The Court thus expressed its inability to accept the view taken by the Larger Bench in the case of Medpro Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (3) STR 355 (Tri.-LB) and overruled the same. Further, stressing on the binding nature of the Board circular, the Court observed that they were meant for adoption for the purpose of bringing uniformity and on that count also, the expression ‘clearing and forwarding agent’ was interpreted in the light of the Board Circular dated 20-4-2002 issued in this regard. The Court also observed and the revenue agreed that the department had not appealed against the decision in the case of Mahavir Generics and as such it had attained finality. Thus, considering the dealer not as a clearing and forwarding agent, the revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

    4. Bottling of liquor considered manufacturing and not liable for service tax :

    SOM Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. UOI & Ors., 2009 TIOL 292 HC – MP – ST – LB

  •     Question referred from Divisional Bench, whether bottling of liquor amounts to ‘manufacture’ (as defined by clause (f) of S. 2 of the Central Excise Act, 1944) of liquor or only packaging so as to attract Service Tax u/s.65(76b) of the Finance Act, 1994.

    The Court, overruling the decision of the division bench in M/s. Vindhyanchal Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of M.P. and Anr., (2007) 7 VST 197 (MP) held that packaging and bottling of liquor falls within the ambit of ‘manufacture’ and does not attract service tax u/s.65(76B) of the Finance Act, because:

  •      S. 65(76b) by referral legislation excludes from liability any process amounting to ‘manufacture’ as defined in clause (f) of S. 2 of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

  • The question as to whether exclusion clauses goods/processes would apply to non-excisable goods (as even though they fall within the definition of ‘manufacture’, alcoholic beverages are excluded from excise duty by Entry No. 92C in list 1 of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India) has now been settled by Cir. F.No. 249/1/2006-CX.4, dated 27th October 2008 to conclude that ‘manufacturing process’ is a term which must be understood distinctly and it is not necessary for every process amounting to manufacture to result in the emergence of an excisable good.

  • M/s. Vindhyanchal Distilleries (supra) was incorrectly decided in that the question of whether tax is exigible in respect of a transaction is to be determined on the terms of the contract alone, and not from the invoice issued by the person entitled to receive money under the contract. [Arun Electrics Bombay v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, (1966) 17 STC 576].

  • Further, that the process of bottling can be regarded as independent (as in M/s. Vindhyanchal Distilleries) is not correct, especially in view of the statutory requirement that liquor must be sold in sealed bottles. Therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor is a part of the manufacturing process and because it falls within the ambit of clause (f) of S. 2 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, it is excluded from service tax liability in view of the exclusionary facet of the definition contained in S. 65(76b) of the Finance Act, 1994.

III. Tribunal:
5. CENVAT Credit:

(i) Outward transportation from place of removal is input service — A Larger Bench decision:

M/s. ABB Ltd. & Others v. CCE & ST & Others, 2009 TIOL 830 CESTAT-Bang. (Tri.-LB)

The Larger Bench made a detailed analysis of the definition of ‘input service’ in terms of Rule 2(1). The definition, according to the Tribunal could be conveniently divided into the following 5 categories:

(a) Any service used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly, in or in relation to the manufacture of final products,

(b) Any service used by the manufacturer whether directly or indirectly, in or in relation to clearance of final products from the place of removal,

(c) Services used in relation to setting up, modernisation, renovation or repairs of a factory, or an office relating to such factory,    

d) Services used in relation to advertisement or sales promotion, market research, storage upto the place of removal, procurement of inputs,

e) Services used in relation to activities relating to business and outward transportation upto the place of removal

  • The Tribunal noted that each of the limbs is an independent benefit/ concession and therefore even if an assessee satisfies one of the limbs, the credit is admissible. To illustrate this, it is stated that a service in relation to renovation or repair of factory will be allowed as credit as it is a service in relation to setting up of modernisation even if it is assumed as an activity not relating to business. Various decisions were cited and discussed in support of this contention which inter alia included Share Med.ical Care v. UOI, 2007 (2009 ELT 321 (SC), HCL Ltd. v. Collector, 2001 (130) ELT 405 (SC), Indian Petro Chemicals, 1997 (92) ELT 13 (SC).

  • The Tribunal noted that the definition of ‘input service’ includes the expression ‘activity relating to business’. The term ‘business’ is of wide import and the words ‘in relation to’ further widen the scope. The words are of comprehensiveness, which may have direct, as well as indirect significance. It is equivalent to or synonymous with ‘concerning with’ or ‘pertaining to’ which are expressions of expansion and not of contractions. Further, there is no qualification to the words’ activities relating to business’. The words ‘such as’ in the definition also are purely illustrative.

  • Transportation of goods to customer’s premises is an activity relating to business and an integral part of manufacturing business. The Tribunal further noted that if the activities like advertising and market research are eligible to credit, the service ensuring physical availability of goods i.e. transportation should also be eligible for credit.

  • The Tribunal stated that for admissibility of instant credit, there is no requirement that the cost of freight should enter the transaction value of the manufactured goods. Meaning thereby that credit cannot be automatically disallowed in cases where freight does not form part of the transaction value. Referring to the case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. UOI, 2007 (7) STR 635 (SC), it stated that service tax is a value added tax in the sense that it is on commercial activities and not a charge on the business but a tax on value addition by rendition of service.

  • An additional observation that the Tribunal has made in this case is that the dispute in the case bemg that of admissibility of credit of service tax on GTA service and not one of valuation of excisable goods u/s.4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and therefore, the two issues viz. ‘valuation’ and ‘CENVAT Credit’ are independent and have no relevance with each other. In this frame of reference the relevant guidelines issued by OECD were discussed. Citing the decision of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners (supra), it stated that revenue’s submission that no CENVAT credit is available if the nature of service does not form part of value of goods subject to excise duty, is against the princip,l,e laid down in the said case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners and the OECD guidelines, as service tax and excise duty are consumption taxes to be borne by the consumer. If credit is denied, Ievy T’ of service tax on transportation will become a tax on business  rather  than  on consumption.

  • Lastly, the Tribunal has further made a very important and distinct point that the interpretation of the expression ‘input service’ cannot fluctuate with the change in the definition of value in S. 4 of the Central Excise Act and cannot vary depending on whether the goods are levied to duty u/s.4A of the Excise Act or tariff value u/s.3(2) of the Excise Act. This has been done by the Tribunal while also noting the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. UOI & Others, 2009 (14) STR 3 (P&H) which provided its decision based on and approving the clarification given vide CBEC Circular No. 97/8/2009 dated 23-8-2007 as regards CENVAT credit. Thus, interpreting all the aspects of the definition of ‘input service’ in detail, it was held that GTA service of final products from the place of removal should be treated as input service.

[Note: Readers may note that the last two points make the decision distinct from the decisions provided in the case of CCE Mumbai 5 v. GTC Industries ua., 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri.LB) and the Punjab & Haryana High Court decision in the case of Ambuja Cements Ltd. (supra). The gist of these two decisions was provided in December 2008 and May 2009 BCAJ respectively].

ii) Supplementary invoices and invoice without registration number, whether eligible for credit :

Sanghi Industries Ltd. v. CCE, Rajkot 2009 (14) STR 462 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

  • In this case CENVAT credit was denied on the ground that a supplementary invoice was issued for the amount of service tax as the original invoice omitted to mention the same. In another invoice, registration number of the service provider was not provided. It was held that Rule 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules was not considered by the lower authorities: Substantive compliance being sufficient for granting credit, the matter was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide afresh in the light of the aforesaid observations.

iii) Car repairs, photography, rent-a-cab, etc. used ,for business admissible as credit:

CCE, Jaipur v. J. K. Cement Works, 2009 (14) STR 538 Tri.-Del)

Revenue’s appeal against allowance of CENVAT credit in respect of rent-a-cab service, repairs of motor cars and photography services used for business purposes was dismissed on the following grounds:

(a) The revenue did not controvert use for business.

(b) Tribunal’s decisions in various cases including those in the case of Indian Rayon Industries Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (4) STR 79, Grasim Industries v. CCE, [aipur 2008 (11) STR 168 and CCE, Nasik v. Cable Corporation of India Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 598 were considered wherein allowancy of CENVAT in relation to similar services was upheld as input services for the manufacturer based on the con-tention that ‘in relation to’ in the definition of input service has to be given wider connotation and the illustrative list of the activities is not ex-haustive as the words ‘such as’ follow the words ‘activities relating to business’. Accordingly, denial of credit was not found justified.

(iv) GTA services used for construction of plant admissible as input service:

CCE, Vadodara v. Videocon Industries Ltd., 2009 (14) (STR) 692 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The Revenue’s appeal was rejected as service tax paid on goods transport agency service in respect of steel, cement, etc. used in civil work of new plant/factory was held as covered by the definition of input service.

Some Recent Judgments

I. Supreme Court :

    1. The date of 18-4-2006 for applicability of reverse charge achieves finality :

    UOI & Ors. v. Indian National Ship Owners, 2009 TIOL 129 SC – ST

    Special Leave Petition filed by the Government against the Mumbai High Court’s decision in the case of Indian National Ship Owners’ Association v. UOI, 2009 (18) STT 212 (Bom.) to the effect that prior to the date on which S. 66A was introduced in the Finance Act, 1994 viz. 18-4-2006, services provided outside India would not attract service tax is dismissed by the High Court. As such, the pending cases at various levels for dispute as to the applicable date for levying service tax on services provided outside India would stand settled.


II. High Court :

2. Pre-deposit of Rs.70 crores directed by Tribunal upheld :

    Microsoft Corporation (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, 2009 (16) STR 545 (Del.)

(i) Background :

    The Delhi CESTAT passed a stay order in the case of Microsoft Corporation (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, New Delhi, 2009 (15) STR 680 (Tri. Del.) directing pre-deposit of Rs.70 crores on the grounds that the marketing services covered under business auxiliary service which is a recipient-based service as classified under Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Export of Services Rules 2005) (the export Rules) provided by Microsoft India to its Singapore or US-based entities did not qualify as exports. The denial was on the ground that since services were provided in India and consumed by the customers of the Singapore/US entities in India, the benefits of the services were to the customers in India. The CESTAT interpreted the terms ‘delivered outside India’ and ‘used outside India’ used in the conditions in the Export Rules for treating the services as exports to mean physical performance to take place outside India. The Tribunal heavily relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners & Ors. v. UOI & Ors., 2007 (7) STR 625 wherein it was held that services fall in two categories viz. property-based services and performance-based services and as per prima facie view of the Tribunal, the place of performance of a service is decisive for determining the event of taxability and incidence of tax.

    (ii) The petitioner cited before the Tribunal Circular No. 111/05/2009-ST, dated 24-2-2009 and various decisions wherein it was decided on similar facts that services were exported. This inter alia included decisions in the cases of Blue Star v. CCE, Bangalore 2008 (11) STR 23 and ABS India Ltd. v. CST, Bangalore 2009 (13) STR 65. Further, the petitioner pointed out that in cases viz. M/s. Gap International Sourcing India Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, Delhi 2009 (15) STR 270 (T) and Hitachi Home & Life Solution (I) Ltd. v. CST, Ahmedabad 2009 (16) STR 341 (Tri. Ahd.), unconditional stay was provided on similar facts considering prima facie case in favour of the appellants.

    (iii) As against the above, the Revenue’s case was that the Tribunals or Courts were not bound by the clarificatory Circulars of the Government since the Tribunal had found the Circular No. 111 (supra) to be contrary to the decision in the case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners’ case (supra). The Revenue further contended that the Court should not be influenced by the stay orders granted by the Co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal as the issue involved was plain import of goods, whereas the instant case was radically different as it involved peculiar term of agreement between Microsoft India with its foreign counterparts.

    (iv) The Court, although found contentions of the appellant to be convincing, concluded that only prima facie view has to be considered at the stage of stay and the Tribunal having fully considered all the relevant parameters required to be gone into including the principle that based on prima facie case interim order of protection should not be passed. Therefore, it was not province of the Court to finally pronounce on the aspects of whether or not the services were extinct in India or abroad. The Court took a view that both the sides had arguable case and the final determination was first to be done by the Tribunal. Further the order being equitable was found not fit for interference, the petition was dismissed granting 4 weeks’ time to the petitioner to make compliance with the pre-deposit.

III. Tribunal :

    3. CENVAT Credit :

(a) Repairs & maintenance service — whether an input service ?

    CCE, Vadodara v. Danke Products, 2009 (16) STR 576 (Tri. Ahd.)

    The issue involved related to whether or not service tax paid on the bill of repairing and maintenance raised on the respondent by an outsourced service provider company called DEL was a correctly availed CENVAT credit. Considering that repairs of transformer during warranty period provided by the respondent through outsourced services of DEL could be said to be an activity relating to the business, it stood concluded that the Commissioner (Appeals) had rightly treated the service as input service and held it entitled for CENVAT credit by relying on the Larger Bench’s decision in the case of ABB Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2009 (15) STR 23 (Tri.-LB) wherein it was held that the expression ‘activity relating to business’ was of large import and would take into its ambit all types of activities.

(b) Security in off-factory residential colony — Whether input service ?

    CCE, Nagpur v. UltraTech Cement Ltd., 2009 (16) STR 611 (Tri. Mum.)

The short question for consideration was whether the lower authority rightly allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on security service received at the off-factory residential colony of the assessee. Considering the service to be ‘input service’ for Rule 2(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The respondent’s contention of allowability was based on the fact that the definition of input service included security service in its inclusive part. The Revenue, on the other hand contended relying on the decision in the case of Ponds India Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2008 (227) ELT 497 (SC) that the words ‘means and includes’ used in the definition would afford an exhaustive explanation to the meaning which must invariably be attached to the word or expression. Therefore The Tribunal accordingly observed that services mentioned in the inclusive part of the definition of input service have also to satisfy the parameters laid down in the main part of the definition as the two parts were not independent of each other and as such, the security service used for residential activity was neither a service received prior to the commencement of manufacture, but the value of which got absorbed in the value of goods, nor was it the case of a service received after the clearance of goods where the service is received up to the stage of clearance of goods. It was also not the case of a service like advertising which was not directly related to manufacture but is related to sale of manufactured goods and as such, the credit was ineligible. However, at the end of interpretation in favour of the Revenue, the assessee would not be penalised and penalties would be set aside.

c) Service tax on mobile phones and maintenance of vehicles entitled to the extent of allocated unit :

Force Motors Ltd. v. CCE, Pune-1, 2009 (16) STR 616 (Tri.-Mum)

The appellant in this case had not been able to produce evidence of use of vehicles and mobile phones for business purposes only and there was no check on use for the personal work of employees. Based on the decision in the case of Conzerve Systems (P) Ltd. 2009 (16) STR 195 (Tri.-Mum.) wherein it was held that mobile phones standing in the name of the company and used by the employees in relation to work only and incidentally used for personal work by itself was no ground for denial of credit, the Tribunal allowed the appeal by way of remand to the adjudicating authority to ascertain the quantum of taxable service beyond the allotted limit of use of mobile phones and vehicles and allowed credit availed to the extent of allotted limits and directed to follow the principle of natural justice to pass appropriate order.

d) Garden maintenance service not eligible for CENVAT credit and penalty also sustained. Outdoor catering service to factory workers considered eligible input service :
 

GKN Sinter Metals Ltd. v. CCE, Aurangabad, 2009 (16) STR 615 (Tri. Mum.)

On the issue of allowability of CENVAT credit of service tax paid to outdoor catering service used for the supply of food to factory workers, the Tribunal relying on the Larger Bench’s decision in the case of CCE, Mumbai v. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 (12) STR (Tri.-LB) held that such credit could not be denied to a manufacturer where the cost of such supply of food was reflected on the cost of production of the final product. However, in the case of CENVAT credit of service tax taken by the assessee on garden maintenance service, relying on the decision in the case of Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. v. CCE, 2009 (241) ELT 474, it was held that garden maintenance service had no nexus even remotely to the manufacture or clearance of excisable goods. It further held that the matter being very clear, the assessee could not take undue benefit of pending clarificatory decisions and therefore, penalty maintained was also sustainable.

Some Recent Judgments

I    High Court:

1  CENVAT credit:

Whether outdoor catering service is ‘input service’?


CCE, Nagpur v. Ultratech Cement Ltd., 2010 TIOL 745 HC Mum.-ST

Substantive question of law raised by the Revenue was, whether CESTAT was correct in considering outdoor catering as input service when catering service does not fall under ambit of the definition of input service. Based on Larger Bench’s decision of CESTAT in the case of CCE v. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri.-LB), wherein it was held that cost of food borne by the factory would form part of the cost of product and credit of duty paid thereon was allowable, the appeal was allowed by the Commissioner (A) and upheld by the Tribunal. According to the Revenue, decision of GTC (supra) ought not to have been applied to this case as in that case, duty was paid on assessable value whereas in the instant case, the duty on cement was payable on tonnage basis and therefore, it was distinguishable. Further, the more recent Apex Court’s decision in Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. CCE, 2009 (240) ELT 641 (SC) squarely applied and therefore the Revenue had a case.

Detailed submissions were provided and analysis of wide scope of ‘input service’ and the expression ‘in relation to’ were made by the assessee. Meaning of the words ‘such as’ and which was followed by an illustrative list also was discussed at length citing and relying on various decisions which inter alia included, Federation of Tax Practitioners Association v. Union of India, 2007 (7) SCC 527 and Division Bench judgment in Coca Cola India P. Ltd. v. CCE, 2009 (242) ELT 268 (Bom.).

The Court observed that the Apex Court in Maruti Suzuki’s case (supra) considered the expression ‘used in relation to the manufacture of final product’ in the definition of ‘input’ and held that the ratio laid down by the Apex Court equally applied while interpreting ‘activities relating to business’ in Rule 2(1) of the CENVAT Rules. However, there lay difference as inclusive part of the definition of ‘input’ was restricted to inputs used in or in relation to ‘manufacture of final products’, whereas inclusive part of the definition of ‘input service’ extended to services used prior, during the course of and after the manufacture of final products and that the definition of ‘input service’ was wider than that of ‘input’. However, there was no difficulty found in applying the ratio laid in the said case of Maruti Suzuki (supra) and held that services having integral connection with manufacture as well as business of manufacture of final product would qualify to be ‘input service’.

The Revenue’s contention that not only the ratio but the decision in the case of Maruti Suzuki (supra) must be applied ipso facto to the instant case was not accepted. It was further observed by the Court that the definition of ‘input service’ read as a whole made it clear that it not only covered services used directly/indirectly in relation to manufacture, but also other services integrally connected with the business of manufacturing final product and as such, credit of service tax paid as outdoor catering service would be allowable and the question of law raised was answered in affirmative in favour of the assessee.

2    Mandap keeper’s service:

(i)    Can letting out lawn by a members’ club to its member be taxable under ‘Mandap Keeper Services’?
(ii)    Is ‘member’ a ‘client’ of the club?


Karnavati Club Ltd. v. Union of India, 2010 (20) STR 169 (Guj.)

The appellant is a members’ club registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. It does not have any shareholders. It makes available facilities to its members and their guests and recovers the expenses. Persons are made members against payment of subscription.

The Court observed the following:

To make the activity of the above club taxable under ‘Mandap Keeper Services’, the members of the club should fall within the definition of ‘client’.

After referring to various definitions of ‘client’, the Court inferred that a client is a one who applies for service or advice or who retains a solicitor in the management of his suit. Since the principle of mutuality is squarely applicable in the current case, a member cannot be said to be a ‘client’ of the club.

Held that the activity of the club cannot be taxable under ‘Mandap Keeper Services’.

(P.S.?: The above case pertains to the period prior to 16-5-2008. With effect from 16-5-2008, the word ‘client’ has been replaced with ‘any person’ vide Circular 334/1/2008)

3    Rebate:

Whether a procedural lapse could result denial of rebate claim?


Commissioner of Service Tax v. Convergys India Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 166 (P & H)

The question before the Tribunal was that whether the Department was justified in rejecting the rebate claim for want of declaration prior to making exports as provided in Notification No. 12/2005 ST, dated 19th April 2005. The High Court noticed that delay in filing of declaration, in the present case, was due to the respondents considering many options after introduction of such Notification and also delay in obtaining management’s approval for the same. The Supreme Court in the case of Mangalore Chemicals & Fertilisers v. Deputy Commissioner, [1991 (55) ELT 437] has held that the procedural requirement can be condoned for valid reasons and as such dismissed the appeal of the Revenue.

4    Registration:

  •    Whether centralised registration is deemed to be granted within seven days?
  •     Can the Department grant registration under the category other than what the assessee applied for?
  •     Whether Circulars, which are challenged but the outcome is pending, are binding on the Department?

Karamchand Thapar & Bros. v. Union of India, 2010 (20) STR 3 (Cal.)

The petitioner applied for registration under ‘business auxiliary services’ under which he was covered with effect from 16th June 2005. Further, it also applied for a centralised registration to the Commissioner in November 2005. However, the Department granted centralised registration under the category of ‘clearing and forwarding agent’ on 11th September 2007.

The issues before the High Court were whether registration certificate is deemed to be granted within seven days, whether the Circulars, which were challenged by the Department, were binding on the Department. The High Court observed as follows:

  •     Rule 4(5) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 which portrays such deeming fiction is applicable only to the Superintendent and the same was not applicable to the Commissioners in case of centralised registration under Rule 4(2). Therefore, the centralised registration could not be deemed to be granted within seven days.

  •    Further, there was no such time limit prescribed for the Commissioners to issue centralised registration certificate. However, the registration should be granted within a reasonable time. In the present case, in view of Circulars, seven days was a reasonable time.

  •     The High Court also made a note that although S. 69 requires all registration applications to be submitted to the Superintendent, it does not dilute the authority of the Commissioner to grant such registration under Rule 4.

  •     There are no provisions under the Service Tax Rules to refuse application for registration. Circular No. 72/2/2004 ST, dated 2nd January 2004 provides that the jurisdictional officer cannot question the correctness of declaration made by the applicant.

  •    As held in various judgments, the Circulars are binding on the Department. Though the Supreme Court in the case of CCE, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting and Wire Industries [2008 (12) STR 416] has held that the Circulars can be challenged by the Department, the said judgment did not apply to facts of the case since neither there were contrary decisions nor was the Circular contrary to the statute.

  •     Even when the Circular is challenged, the binding effect continues until the challenge succeeded.

  •     Therefore, the registration should be granted under the category of ‘Business Auxiliary Services’ and the Commissioner did not have power to grant registration on his own without receiving any application for registration under that specific category.

  •     There are no provisions in the service tax laws which lay down the consequences of delay in application for registration. Therefore, though there was a delay in application for registration by the petitioner, the Department could not reject the application, nor could he grant registration under a different category. However, recovery and/or penal proceedings might be initiated for non-payment of service tax.

II.    TRIBUNAL:

5 Applicability of Service Tax:

Whether executory work like false ceiling, partitions, flooring, etc. undertaken without any advice, consultancy or technical assistance be covered as interior decorator services?

Spandrel v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Hyderabad/Kochi, 2010 (20) STR 129 (Tri.-Bang.)

The appellants were engaged in executing interior works such as pest control, demolition and dismantling, masonry work, wall preparation, partition of banks, firms, etc. The said work was intended to be taxed as ‘Interior Decorator Services’ by the Department.

The appellants put forth the claim that interior decorator means any person engaged in the business of providing by way of advice, consultancy and technical assistance. Further, the appellants referred to Circular No. B1/6/2005 TRU, dated 27th July 2005 and contended that execution of the above work falls under the category of ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Services’ introduced from 16th June 2005. The appellants relying on various judgments claimed that these services were notified from 16th June 2005 and therefore, were not taxable earlier.

The Department argued that the scope of interior decorator was not only restricted to advice, consultancy or technical assistance, but also extends to beautification of spaces.

The Tribunal held as follows:

The Department did not have findings that the appellants were engaged in advice, consultancy and technical assistance or planning work and designing. The executory work of the appellants was specifically covered by commercial or industrial construction services and therefore, the same could be held to be covered under any other category prior to introduction of commercial or industrial construction services and allowed the appeal.

6 Appeal:

Whether legal representative can file the appeal on behalf of deceased assessee?

Abhay Intelligence & Security Service v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Vadodara, 2010 (20) STR 204 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellants challenged the levy of penalty on dissolved proprietorship firm after death of the proprietor and relied on various decisions. The Tribunal observed that the ratio laid down in those decisions is that the appeal filed by a legal representative against penalty on deceased is not maintainable. However, the penalty being personal in nature can be recovered only from the person on whom it was imposed and as such it could not be recovered from a legal representative.

7 CENVAT Credit:

7.1 Whether CENVAT credit be allowed on Garden Maintenance Services?

ISMT Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex. & Cus., Aurangabad, 2010 (20) STR 68 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The limited issue before the Tribunal was whether CENVAT credit was allowed on garden maintenance services. The appellants relied on Millipore India Ltd. v. CCE, Bangalore II [2009 (13) STR 616 (Tribunal); 2009 (236) ELT 145 (Tri-Bang.)], which held that modernisation, renovation and repairs, etc. of office premises and landscaping, the surroundings of factory can be considered as input services.

The Department relied on Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd., [2009 (241) ELT 474 (Tribunal)] which held that ‘garden maintenance services’ do not have any nexus with the manufacture or clearance of final product. They also relied on the decision given in Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. CCE, Delhi III [2009 (240) ELT 641] (SC) and stated that ‘input’ and ‘input services’ were identical and therefore, CENVAT credit was not admissible.

The Tribunal observed as follows:

  •     Mumbai High Court in case of Coca Cola [2009 (15) STR 657] has held that input services include services used in relation to business. The Tribunal would look whether garden maintenance was related to business activities. It was also observed in the said case that the term ‘activities relating to business’ used in ‘input services’ widens the scope of such definition and conceptually any input service which forms part of the assessable value of final product should be eligible for CENVAT credit.

  •     Maruti Suzuki case cited by the Department relates to definition of ‘input’. The definitions of ‘input’ and ‘input service’ are not comparable at all. Therefore, ratio of such judgment cannot be considered for the present case. The intention of the Legislature is very clear to have different definitions of ‘input’ and ‘input service’. The words ‘used in or in relation to manufacture of final product’ deployed in ‘input’ are not used in the definition of ‘input service’. Further, the Revenue has relied on the judgment of this Tribunal in the case of Kirloskar Oil Engines (supra) and Vikram Ispat (2009 (16) STR 195), but both these cases did not take a note of Coca Cola case (supra) delivered by the Mumbai High Court.

  •     In Force Motors Ltd. v. CCE, Pune [2010 (18) STR 150], the Tribunal had observed that the definition of ‘input service’ should be considered in two parts, one inclusive and another exclusive part. Further, the activities specified after the phrase ‘such as’ are only illustrations and there fore the activities other than those illustrated may get covered.

  •     A good garden increases the working efficiency and consumer also feels good and therefore, garden maintenance services are in relation to business activity. CENVAT credit was, therefore, allowed.

Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Aurangabad, 2010 (20) STR 30 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The issue before the Tribunal again related to CENVAT credit on garden maintenance services. The Department put forth that there were contrary judgments on the disputed issue and therefore, the same should be referred to the Larger Bench. The Tribunal observed that the contrary judgment was given in case of the appellants itself and such matter was remanded back for fresh adjudication but the law was already settled in Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, [2009 (151) STR 657, 2009 (242) ELT 168]. The Tribunal allowed the CENVAT credit on garden maintenance following the decision given in ISMT Ltd. case discussed above.

7.2 Whether interest is leviable for wrong avail-ment of CENVAT credit?


Commissioner of C. Ex., Pondicherry v. Superfil Products, 2010 (20) STR 279 (Tri.-Chennai)

The manufacturer availed but not utilised CENVAT credit of inputs and capital goods and also availed benefit of exemption Notification No. 30/2004, dated 9th July 2004. However, the CENVAT credit on inputs lying in the factory and inputs in process etc. was not reversed.

The Department claimed that interest was payable even on wrong availment of CENVAT credit in view of Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. However, the respondents alleged that there was sufficient balance in the CENVAT credit account and therefore, it has not got any pecuniary benefit. The respondents also relied on the judgment delivered by P & H High Court in the case of CCE, Delhi-III v. Maruti Udyog Ltd., (2007 (214) ELT 173) which was affirmed by the Apex Court in (2007 (214)    ELT A50) wherein it has been held that in the absence of utilisation of CENVAT credit, interest shall not be leviable.

The Tribunal observed that for interpreting Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the words ‘taken or utilised’ should be construed as ‘taken and utilised’. It was held that in the present case, interest is not justifiable. However, in case when the CENVAT credit balance is less than the credit to be reversed, then the balance should be paid in cash with interest.

7.3 Whether CENVAT Credit is allowed on capital goods received in the factory before the assessee becoming liable to service tax?

ABC Engineering Works v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Guntur, 2010 (20) STR 145 (Tri.-Bang.)

The appellants were engaged in providing site formation and clearance, excavation and earth-moving and demolition services. The appellants took CENVAT credit on excavators during 30th September 2005 and 31st March 2006. However, such excavators were purchased prior to 16th June 2005 i.e., prior to the introduction of the above service in the service tax net.

The appellants submitted that the excavators were purchased after introduction of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and put to use after introduction of service. Such capital goods were not used in providing exempted services and therefore, CENVAT should be allowed. The appellants relied on the Tribunal’s judgment in the case of ACE Timez v. CCE, Bangalore, [2004 (170) ELT 371]. The Tribunal observed and held that in case of Spenta Interna-tional Ltd., [2007 (216) ELT 133], the Larger Bench of Tribunal held that eligibility of CENVAT credit has to be determined based on dutiability of final product on date of receipt of capital goods in the factory, instead of date of utilisation of CENVAT credit. Further ACE Timez case (supra) is based on different facts and ratio thereof cannot be applied to the present case. The assessee therein was availing exemption and therefore, provisions of Rule 6(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 did not apply to the assessee. The ratio laid down by the Board’s Circular No. 137/120/2008-CX-4, dated 24th June, 2008 relied on by the Commissioner provides that the CENVAT credit of CVD paid on the aircrafts before introduction of such services cannot be available to assessee even when the same is included in the definition of capital goods in view of Rule 6(4). Eventually, the Tribunal denied the CENVAT credit on excavators. However, since the question related to interpretation of law, the penalty was waived.

7.4 Whether CENVAT credit is available for input services utilised outside the factory premises?


Atul Auto Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Rajkot, 2010 (20) STR 275 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellants were denied CENVAT credit on erection, installation and commissioning services of wind mills for generation of electricity outside the factory premises.

The?Tribunal?observed?that?the power generated at the wind mills was not directly used by the appellants. It also relied on the decision given in Rajhans Metals (P) Ltd., [2007 (8) STR 498] and held that wind mill firm unit being not a part of the appellant’s factory premises, CENVAT credit cannot be allowed.

7.5 Whether CENVAT credit is allowed on agricultural work, on levelling of children park and tree plantation and construction of toilet in village?


Commissioner of C. Ex., Salem v. ITC Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 141 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The Tribunal held that service tax paid on agricul-tural work is allowed relying on the decision given in the case of Millipore India Ltd. v. CCE, [2009

(13)    STR 616, 2009 (236) ELT 145). However, since levelling of children park and tree plantation and construction of toilet in village are not relating to business of the respondent, CENVAT credit was held to be disallowed.

8  Export of services:

Whether procuring orders for parent company abroad be considered as export of services?

Lenovo (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Bangalore, 2010 (20) STR 66 (Tri.-Bang)

The appellants were procuring orders for their foreign parent company classifiable under ‘Business Auxiliary Services’ and were receiving commission for such services. Rebate was claimed under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 for service tax paid on such commission. The Department rejected the rebate claim on the ground that the appellants promote the product of Singapore-based parent company in India, therefore the said services are rendered in India and they do not qualify to be considered exports. Further, it also claimed that services are rendered to its own concern and the appellant’s office can be considered as office of foreign parent company. Therefore, the recipient of service is not located outside India.

The appellants claimed that they and the parent company were separate entities. Moreover, the recipient was located outside India and parent company does not have an office in India. Therefore, they argued that the services were utilised abroad. The appellants also took support of Blue Star v. CCE, Bangalore, [2008 (11) STR 23] and ABS Ltd. v. CCE, Bangalore, [2009 (13) STR 65] delivered by the Bangalore Tribunal. Since the issue was squarely covered by the said judgments, the ap-peal was allowed.

9 Refund of CENVAT:

9.1 Can Refund of CENVAT credit be denied if it is not filed in the same month?

Can it be disallowed as the invoices were raised on a person acting as Pure Agent and paid by such Agent?

Can credit on input services received for consultancy on acquisition of a business be disallowed because that business is not yet acquired? Whether credit can be disallowed in the absence of specified evidence as to why the credit was not admitted?

Commissioner of Central Excise, Mysore v. Chamundi Textiles (Silk Mills) Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 219 (Tri.-Bang.)

The respondent is a 100% EOU engaged in the business of manufacturing and exporting silk and allied fabrics. They had availed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on services received by them. But the Revenue rejected the claim of refund of the above CENVAT credit on the following grounds:

  •     CENVAT credit was taken on the goods which were not manufactured in the month in which the claim was made.
  •    The invoices were raised on a person acting as a Pure Agent, credit could not be allowed.
  •    The commission received for acquisition of business outside India would not qualify as input service as the business was not acquired till that date.
  •     The assessee failed to prove the nexus of invoices that were addressed to the Head Office but actually related to the Mysore Unit.

The Tribunal’s observations were as follows:

  •     If some credit is admissible in a particular month, it shall be admissible in the succeeding month too. It is natural that there will be a time lag between availment of credit on the goods manufactured and the export of those goods. CBEC has prescribed a time limit of one year for filing the refund claim and the refund should be filed on a quarterly basis. Hence, it is natural that if an exporter is claiming refund after 9 months, it would not be relating to the goods of that month.

Thus, the claim of refund cannot be denied on this ground.

  •     The invoice had been raised on a person acting as Pure Agent on account of the appellant. The Pure Agent had discharged liabilities which would otherwise have been discharged by the appellant.

Thus, the credit cannot be denied on this ground also.

  •     In regard to the Consultancy Service (Commission) received for acquisition of business outside India, it was observed that the company was yet to be acquired and pending such acquisition, it could not be concluded if the consultancy received has been used in the business activity. Hence, CENVAT credit on the said service was not admissible.

  •     The Tribunal also perused the invoices that were raised on the Head Office. It was found that they related to the activities of Mysore Unit. The respondent also submitted that no explanation was given by the Revenue regard-ing the inadmissibility of credit relating to such invoices. The Court thus dismissed the appeal of the Revenue on the grounds that there was no special evidence as to why the credit could not be allowed.

9.2 Whether airfreight services received by appellants till goods are loaded onto aircraft are eligible for CENVAT credit? Whether Department is justified in denying refund in months of no export?

Fine Care Biosystems v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Ahmedabad, 2010 (20) STR 193 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The Department rejected the refund claim for the months where no export took place. Further, it also rejected the refund claim for the CHA and airfreight services.

The Tribunal made the observations that in Delhi Tribunal’s decision in case of Philco Exports v. CCE, New Delhi [2009 (234) ELT 568] it was held that the time lag between the date of receipt of inputs, the date on which they are used and the date of export are not relevant. The issue to be looked into is whether the input services were used in relation to manufacture of export goods. Accordingly, there is no restriction on availment of CENVAT credit for exporters and only when adjustment is not permissible, Rule 5 allows for refund of CENVAT credit. Therefore, for the months where no export sales were made, CENVAT credit cannot be denied. Further, in case of export sales made on FOB or CIF basis, the place of removal has to be the port of export. Therefore, the Com-missioner rightly allowed CENVAT credit on CHA services. Taking the same analogy, CENVAT credit on airfreight services till load port is allowable.

9.3 Whether Department justified in denying claim of refund on the basis of declaration in ARE-1 that the CENVAT credit was not availed by the assessee?

Fine Care Biosystems v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Ahmedabad, 2010 (20) STR 241 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The Department denied refund claim to the ap-pellants, a 100% EOU, on the basis that the appellants had declared in ARE -1 that it has not availed CENVAT credit and such declaration should be treated as final. The Tribunal held that Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 requires that goods should have been exported, the CENVAT credit taken should be eligible CENVAT credit and credit could not have been utilised for payment of duty of finished goods by way of adjustment. Further, there is no requirement under Rule 5 for giving any declaration in ARE-1. The declaration requirements are made to facilitate exporters to have their legitimate export benefit entitlement without delay and the same should not be used to deny the legitimate entitlement.

10 Remand:

Whether Commissioner (Appeals) has power to remand back the service tax cases? Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi v. World Vision, 2010 (20) STR 49 (Tri.-Delhi)

The Tribunal held that the Commissioner (Appeals) can remand the matter u/s.85(4) and the provisions of S. 35, S. 35A and S. 35B of the Central Excise Act were not made applicable to service tax vide S. 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. It also concluded that S. 85(5) related to procedural aspects only and it cannot be interpreted to restrict the powers of the Commissioner (Appeals).

11 Unjust enrichment:

Whether booking of space or time in media are ‘Advertising Agency services’?? Whether unjust enrichment is applicable in case when Department does not have clear finding?

C.S.T., Ahmedabad v. Poornima Advertising & Pro-motion Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 107 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The assessee claimed refund of excess service tax paid without considering discount. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that though the assessee is eligible for refund on merits, refund cannot be allowed in the present case applying doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Tribunal held that refund is eligible on merits on the grounds that:

  •    The Department contended that the scope of ‘Advertising Agency Services’ covers services in connection with advertisement including services connected with display or exhibition of advertisement and the services. However, Master Circular was against such interpretation. Therefore, merely canvassing advertisement for public on commission basis is classifiable under ‘Business Auxiliary Services’ and not under ‘Advertising Agency Services’. In respect of unjust enrichment, the Tribunal observed that the issue of credit note was sufficient to prove repayment of excess service tax and further that the Department did not have clear finding that such amount was not refunded. Thus, the appeal was allowed.

Some Recent Judgments

I. High Court :

    1. Binding nature of law laid down by High Court’s order :

    A.C. Nielsen ORG – MARG Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI 2009 (16) STR 259 (Bom.)

    Order dated : 22-7-2009

    The petitioner in this case was denied waiver of pre-deposit by the Tribunal in the issue of service tax demand as recipient of service for the period prior to 18-4-2006, in spite of relying on the High Court decision in the case of Indian National Shipowners Association v. UOI, 2009 (13) STR 235 (Bom). The High Court ruled that once this Court lays down the law that the recipient of the service was not liable for paying service tax, that law was binding on all Tribunals and authorities functioning within the jurisdiction of this Court and accordingly, directed to proceed with the appeal without any pre-deposit.

2. When appeal relates to rate of duty, Supreme Court is the authority u/s.35L :

    CST v. Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd., 249 (16) STR 129 (Del.)

    In the instant case, the Tribunal had dismissed the appeal made by the Revenue against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) who, relying on the judgments of the Calcutta High Court in the cases of Saturday Club Ltd. v. A.C. Service Tax, 2006 (3) STR 305 (Cal.) and Dalhousie Institute v. AC Service Tax, 2006 (3) STR 311 (Cal.), had held that the service provided by a club to its members did not attract service tax as principle of mutuality prevailed in such cases. The Revenue, challenging the order of the Tribunal filed appeal in the Delhi High Court u/s.35 of the Central Excise Act read with S. 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. In terms of the provisions of S. 35G read with S. 35L of the Central Excise Act against certain orders of the Tribunals, appeal is to be made to the High Court, whereas in respect of certain other orders passed by the Tribunal, a direct appeal to the Supreme Court has to be made. The High Court in this case, accepting the respondent’s contention, held that the appeal would not be maintainable as the question decided by the Tribunal relates to the rate of duty and when the issue relates to the rate of duty or tax or value of goods or assessment, relying on the decision in the case of Navin Chemical Mfg. & Trading Co. Ltd. v. Collector, 1993 (68) ELT 3 (SC), the remedy for the appellant to file appeal u/s.35L was to be to the Supreme Court and therefore, the appeal was held not maintainable on this ground.

II. Tribunal :

3. CENVAT credit :

    CCE & CUS Guntur v. CCL Products (India) Ltd., 2009 (16) STR 305 (Tri.-Bang.)

    Final Order 216-220/2009 & Stay Orders 303-305/2009, all dated 20-3-2009

    The issue involved related to denial of credit availed on service tax paid on insurance premium, repair of vehicles, AMC charges on telecom & courier charges not considering the said services as input services. Considering inclusive part of the definition of ‘input service’ as exhaustive and having a bearing on the main part of the definition and further considering expressions ‘in or in relation to’ expansive, the Commissioner (Appeals) held the services used by the manufacturer as in relation to the manufacture and clearance of final products. Relying on the Larger Bench’s decision in the case of Commissioner v. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri.-LB) and which was followed in 2009 (13) STR 616 (Tri.), the Tribunal rejected the Revenue’s contention that courier services were akin to outward transportation of final goods and therefore they could not be treated as ‘input service’ under Rule 2(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules as per decision in the case of Universal Cables Ltd. v. CCE, 2007 (7) STR 310 (Tri. Del.) and thus maintained the order of lower authority relying on the decision in the case of GTC Industries (supra).

    Wrong classification by service provider cannot make credit ineligible :

    CCE, Chennai v. Carborandum Universal Ltd., 2009 (16) STR 181 (Tri.-Chennai)

    Input credit was considered ineligible on the ground that the service involved was classifiable under manpower recruitment and supply agency, and not business auxiliary service, although the same was claimed on valid documents on which service tax was paid by the respondent. The period in which credit was taken was prior to 16-6-2005, during which time the service of manpower supply was not taxable. Holding that service tax was paid by the provider of service under the business auxiliary service and it was so assessed, credit taken based on valid documents could not be questioned on the basis that the assessment of the service by the department at the end of service provider was incorrect, the appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.

    Rebate under Notification No. 12/2005-ST : Liberal view of procedural lapse for exports :

    CST Delhi v. Convergys India P. Ltd., 2009 (16) STR 198 (Tri.-Del)

The respondent provides customer care services on behalf of foreign clients through telephone, email and web-based interaction. These services being in the nature of exports, claim of rebate was lodged under Notification 12/2005-ST. They used several input services like advertising, courier, leased circuit, rent-a-cab services, security agencies, management consultancy services, air travel agencies, online information services, etc. and inter alia also used management consultancy services from outside India. Rebate claim was rejected on the grounds that declaration being a mandatory requirement was filed late and some of the services were not used for providing output services but used for maintaining capital assets/ goods, etc. and therefore could not be considered input services. Provisions of Notification 12/2005-ST were discussed at length. Late filing of declaration was considered procedural lapse, where by substantive benefit was considered not deniable. Further, rebate was considered admissible also considering that the definition of input service was inclusive and that when cost of the goods and services becomes part of cost of output services, such goods or services in common parlance are inputs and input services in relation to final products are output services. Accordingly, services used in connection with procurement of other input services are also to be treated as input services. Similarly, services used in day-to-day activity like maintenance services, etc. are input services. The eligible criteria under the CENVAT Credit Rules get satisfied if services in part or full are used for taxable services and therefore, the rebate would be admissible. The Tribunal further observed that in respect of exports, a liberal view requires to be taken.

4. Longer period of limitation:

Whether sustainable when disclosure provided in ST-3 Returns:

CCE Kanpur v. Taj Tours & Travels, 2009 (16) STR 273 (Tri.-Del.)

The respondent, a tour operator, provided services of monumental tours, local transportation, rail/ air ticket booking, etc. on behalf of principal agents. The turnover representing purchase of tickets and principal’s services was deducted from the value of taxable services, and accordingly remark was made in the ST-3Returns. Suppression was alleged by the Revenue. Since disclosure was made in the ST-3 Returns, charge of misstatement or suppression was held incorrect and the Commissioner (Appeals)’s ruling based on judgments in the cases of Anand Nishikawa Co. v. CCE, 1995 (75) ELT 721 (SC), etc. that mere failure to give some information did not amount to willful mis-declaration and that there must be a positive act from assessee to final willful suppression was upheld.

When Department has knowledge, whether invokable?

Mahaveer Generics v. CCE, Bangalore 2009 (16) STR 289 (Tri.-Chennai)

Stay Order dated 2-4-2009.

The appellant, a consignment agent of CIPLA, made a stay plea for non-applicability of longer period of limitation as the activity of the firm was known to the Department, as service tax demanded from the firm as clearing and forwarding agency was set aside by the Tribunal rejecting interpretation of the Revenue. Prima facie considering the appellant not guilty of suppression of facts with intent to evade-payment of duty so as to attract longer period of limitation, pre-deposit of service tax and penalty was totally stayed.

When invoked consequent upon audit:

Aditya College of Competitive Exams v. CCE, 2009 (16) STR 154 (Tri.-Bang.)

Appellant is a commercial training and coaching centre. It had collected certain amount towards service to be provided prior to the date on which levy was introduced viz. 1-7-2003. An amendment in S. 67 was made effective 13-5-2005 to levy service tax on advances received for the services to be provided. However, since this amendment was made later i.e., from 13-5-2005, it could not have retrospective effect according to the appellant. Further, the demand was made by the Assistant Commissioner based on audit objection. Relying on the decision in the case of Vikram Ispat v. CCE, Raigad 2007 (8) STR 554 (Tri.-Mum), the demand was held as barred by limitation and therefore penalty, etc. could not be upheld.

5. Penalty:

Deccan Mechanical & Chemical Industry Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Pune 2009 (16) STR 263 (Tri.-Mum.)

Order dated 24-3-2009

The appellant paid service tax with interest before issuance of show-cause notice and pleaded for waiver of penalty levied u/ s.76. The Revenue insisted on pre-deposit on the strength of judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Dharmendra Textile Processor, 2008 (231) ELT 3 (sq. The Tribunal on weighing arguments by both the sides held that prima facie S. 76 was not comparable with penalty imposable u/s.ll AC of the Central Excise Act which provided for penalty on defaults arising on account of fraud, suppression or contravention of law with an intent to evade payment of duty and therefore held that on the strength of such case law, prima facie waiver of pre-deposit could not be resisted upon.

6. Rectification  of mistake  (ROM) :

Ridhi Sidhi Transport v. CCE, 2009 (16) STR 271 (Tri.-Bang.)

Order 25/ /2009, dated 5-5-2009.

In this case, the Tribunal in its order made a mention about contention of the appellant with regard to non-applicability of extended period of limitation. However, no finding on the issue was provided and therefore, ROM application was filed. Despite the Revenue’s view that ROM would mean review by the Tribunal itself, it was held that recalling was necessary in the interest of principles of natural justice and matter was decided to be reheard.

8. Valuation: Whether collection for ‘mess charge’ includible ?

Aditya College of Competitive  Exams v. CCE, 2009 (16) STR 154 (Tri.-Bang.)

In this case, the Revenue demanded service tax by including mess charge collected by the college in the value of taxable service. It was held categorically that there should be nexus between the amount collected and services rendered. Mess charges were collected for availing facility of the mess. It cannot be brought under the category of receipt for commercial training and coaching service and subject it to service tax. There is no provision for inclusion of any amount whatsoever collected by the appellant. Demand was held as unsustainable.

Part B — Some recent landmark judgments

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I. High Court :

1. Whether order liable to be set aside when issued after
a period of more than four months after hearing ?

Shivsagar Veg. Restaurant v. Asstt. Commr. Of Income-tax,
Mumbai,
2009 (13) STR 11 (Bom.)

The appellant was aggrieved by the order of ITAT as the order
was passed after 4 months of hearing, dismissing the appeal without recording
reasons, propositions of the law urged and case laws relied upon by them.

It was contended that Appellate authority could not just stay
away from its duty of assigning reasons as to why it agreed with the reasons and
findings of the lower authority by just stating that findings of CIT(A) are
just, fair and in accordance with the law and inter alia decisions in the
cases of Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh, (1987) 2 SCC 222 and State
of West Bengal v. Atul Krishna Shaw,
AIR 1990 SC 2205 were relied upon.
Various judgments had been considered for prejudice caused to the litigant as
regards delayed delivery and even pronouncement. Relying inter alia on
the case of Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, 2002 (3) BCR (SC) 360, the Court
directed the president of the Appellate Tribunal to issue guidelines to all the
Benches of Tribunal to decide matters heard within three months from the date of
closing of judgment. The Appellate Tribunal directed to rehear the said appeal
and give fresh order with sound reasons.

II. Tribunal :

2.
Coaching services provided online
whether classifiable as online information and data based services ?

Burden of
proof on the Department.

Dewsoft Overseas Pvt. Ltd. V. CST, New Delhi 2008 (12)
STR 730 (Tri.-Del.)

(i) The issue in the case related to whether providing online
computer training is classifiable as online information and data-based access
and retrieval service. As the essential character of the service provided
involved computer education through the medium of Internet, the service was not
restricted to merely providing online access to data or information and
therefore was classifiable as commercial training and coaching service. However,
Notification No. 9/03-ST, dated 20-6-2003 exempted computer training institutes,
the appellant’s activity was held as exempt.

(ii) The appellant provided the said services of computer
training through various franchisees. During the period under dispute, four
conditions were required to be fulfilled cumulatively in order to hold the
arrangement as ‘franchise’. The Tribunal held that the burden of proving that
all the conditions were fulfilled lay on the Revenue. Since the Revenue failed
to do so, the Tribunal held that no service tax was payable as the arrangement
could not be considered as ‘franchise’.

3. CENVAT Credit — whether credit for service tax paid on
cell phones, landline and courier services while providing output services of
maintenance and repairs allowable ?

No penalty where dispute relating to interpretation of
statute.

Wiptech Peripherals Pvt. Ltd. V. CCE, Rajkot 2008 (12)
STR 716 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The Tribunal held that the issue relating to service tax on
cell phones or landlines was no more res integra and stood settled by
various Tribunal decisions. However, since the appellant was unable to establish
that cell phones in the names of individuals were exclusively used in relation
to output services, the matter was remanded to the original authority for
verifying the said facts.

The Tribunal held that no penalty can be levied when the
dispute relates to interpretation of the provisions of law, while setting aside
the penalty.

4. Institutes registered with UGC, whether considered commercial coaching
centre :

ICFAI v. CC & CE, Hyderabad-II, (2008) 17 STT 501
(Bang.-CESTAT)

The appellant, a non-profit society registered under the
State Societies Registration Act imparts education and awards degrees/diplomas
recognised by the law. Service tax was demanded under ‘Commercial Training &
Coaching Service’. The Commissioner held that absence of profit motive was an
immaterial factor and rejected the contention of the appellant. The appellant
contended that the Institutes were societies for educational purposes and their
surplus was pooled back for attainment of their objectives. ICFAI, Dehradun and
ICFAI, Tripura were recognised as universities under the affiliated universities
of Universities Grants Commission and the institutions were exempted from
payment of Income-tax u/s.12A or u/s.10(23C)(vi) of the Act. Circular No.
59/8/2003-ST, dated 20-6-2003 clarified that institutes or establishments which
issued certificate, diploma or degree recognised by law and provided training
for competitive examinations were outside the scope of service tax. The
difference between ‘education’ and ‘coaching or training’ was emphasised and
reliance was placed on Bihar Institute of Mining and Mine Surveying v. CIT,
(1994) 208 ITR 608 (Pat.) for the same. Further, replacement of the word
‘commercial concern’ with ‘any person’ w.e.f. 1-5-2006 had not been effected in
respect of ‘Commercial Training or Coaching Centre’ implied that an activity
could not be commercial in nature but intention to take it up could be, which
was not apparent in the case.

Against this, the Revenue contended that distinction between
‘education’ and ‘training’ was baseless relying on the decision in the case of
JMC Educational and Charitable Trust v. CCE, (2008) 12 STT 308 (Chennai-CESTAT)
where pre-deposit amount was demanded.

It was finally held that the appellant were imparting higher
education and conferred degrees recognised by law and had recognition from
various State Governments and UGC and as such, these services provided by
institutions registered under the Societies Registration Act for educational
purposes were outside the purview of the definition of commercial coaching. The
decision in the case of Great Lakes Institute of Management Ltd. V. CST,
(2008) 12 STT 306 (CESTAT–Chennai) was relied upon. The longer period was not
found invokable as the brochures and information available through website, etc.
Proved that evasion was not the intention.

5. Import of service :

ABS India Ltd. V. Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore,
2008 (13) STR 65 (Tri.-Bang.)

The appellant, an Indian company, booked orders for sale of goods manufactured by its subsidiary situated in Singapore and received certain commission for which they paid service tax initially. The appellant argued that service was deemed to be provided abroad as it could not be considered as delivered in India when the recipient was located abroad. Relying on Blue Star Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2008 (11) STR 23 (Tribunal), it was held that if the recipient is located abroad, the company situated abroad utilised the benefit of the service rendered by the Indian company was exported service and therefore not liable for service tax.

Unitech Ltd. v. CST, Delhi 2008 (12)STR752(Tri.-Del.)

The issue in this case related to:

i) Whether the definition of architect under the Act is capable of covering persons not registered as architects in India?

ii) Whether the assessee is liable to pay service tax as receiver of service?

It was held that definition of architect services under the Act is wide enough to cover commercial concerns engaged in rendering services in the field of architecture and therefore, the recipient received taxable services of architect for the purposes of the Finance Act, 1994.

The Tribunal further held that although comprehensive provisions for taxing import of services came when S. 66A was introduced on 18-4-2006and import rules were notified by Notification No. 11/2006-ST from 18-4-2006,but the taxable services provided in India by a foreigner or a non-resident not having any office or business establishment in India to any person in India are liable for service tax even prior to 18-4-2006 u/s.66 read with S. 65(105) of the Act by virtue of Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 read with Notification No. 36/2004-ST, dated 31-12-2004issued u/s.68(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 as recipient in India was liable for service tax with effect from 1-1-2005.

6. Refund:

K. C. Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara 2009.(13) STR 39 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appeal was filed on the ground that during the period, the appellant had paid service tax for the amount billed for the services rendered rather than the amount actually received. The appellant was required to produce invoicewise details, date of receipt of actual amount along with cheque numbers or mode of payment, instead of merely submitting monthwise details showing amount billed and received. Further, the appellant failed to substantiate its claim by not submitting TR-6 challan with relevant documents and evidences of payment of tax to enable refund sanctioning. The appeal therefore was rejected.

Some Recent Judgments

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Service TaxI. HIGH COURT :

    1. Whether bottling of liquor amounts to packaging service ?

    Maa Sharda Wine Traders v. UOI, 2009 (15) STR 3 (MP)

    In this case, the question arose as to whether bottling of liquor amounted to packaging activity, liable for service tax considering that alcohol is not dutiable under the Central Excise Act (although it is liable under the State Excise Laws). The appellant among various others had filed a writ in the High Court primarily to challenge constitutional validity of the definition of packaging activity [S. 65(76b) of the Finance Act, 1994]. However, it was felt that justice would be done even on adopting apposite interpretative process whereby conclusion could be reached as to whether bottling of liquor could be treated as service liable for service tax or treated as ‘manufacture’ u/s.2(f) of the Central Excise Act and therefore, not liable under the service tax law. After doing a detailed analysis of the terms ‘manufacture’ and ‘excisable goods’ and considering the Department’s clarification vide CBEC Circular No. 249/1/2006-CX-4, dated October 27, 2008 in consonance with the statutory provisions as well as the law laid down by the Apex Court in Sir Shadilal Distillery and Chemical Works v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1998) 8 SCC 428, it was held that bottling of liquor being incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product was ‘manufacture’ for the purpose of S. 2(f) of the Central Excise Act and since this is excluded from the definition of ‘packaging activity’ under the service tax law, it was held as not liable for service tax. Decision in the case of Vindhyachal Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. 2006 (3) STR 723 (LMP) was accordingly overruled.

    Note :

    The case has been reported in the July issue of BCAJ under the citation SOM Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors v. UOI & Ors., 2009 TIOL 292 HC MP ST LB. It may be noted further that to render the decision ineffective prospectively, Budget 2009 has sought to amend the definition of ‘business auxiliary service’ by excluding ‘manufacture of excisable goods’ instead of mere ‘manufacture’ in terms of S. 2(f).

    2. Penalty :

    CCE Jalandhar v. Darmania Enterprises, 2009 (14) STR 741 (P&H)

    The Commissioner in this case enhanced the penalty imposed by the Assistant Commissioner while exercising revisional power u/s.84 of the Act from Rs.1,000 to Rs.31,652. The Commissioner also recorded suppression. However, the Tribunal set aside revision order and restored the original order by observing that leniency considered in view of S. 80 did not suffer any illegality and therefore, could not have been interfered by the revisional authority. The Court observed that since no evidence was produced before the revisional authority to prove fraud, misrepresentation, etc., no jurisdiction was acquired by the authority to impose penalty and dismissed the appeal stating that no question of law arose for determination of the Court.

II. TRIBUNAL :

    3. Binding precedent :

    S. V. Colour Lab v. CCE, 2009 (15) STR 231 (Tri. Bang.)

    The issue of excluding cost of paper, chemicals, etc. being covered by the Tribunal decision in case of Shilpa Colour Lab & Others v. CCE, 2007 (5) STR 423 (Tri.-Bang), the Tribunal held that finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) that the Tribunal decision was distinguishable was wrong and against the judicial discipline and allowed the appeal.

    4. Cargo Handling Service :

    ITW India Ltd. v. CCE, Hyderabad 2009 (14) STR 826 (Tri.-Bang)

    The issue in this case related to whether packaging viz. strapping of steel items, a part of manufacturing process which already suffered excise duty, was chargeable to service tax as cargo handling service. Packaging activity was brought under service tax only from 16-6-2005 and the assessee paid service tax from this date. The decision of the Calcutta Tribunal in the assessee’s own case reported at 2007 (8) STR 490 as well as B. K. Thakkar’s case 2008 (9) STR 542 (Tri.) were distinguished. Relying on the Rajasthan High Court’s decision in the case of S. B. Construction Co. v. UOI, 2006 (4) STR 545 (Raj.), wherein it was held that when goods are packed for transport, it should be followed by transportation of the same in order to be covered by cargo handling service. It was held that later amendment in the definition of cargo handling service also linked service of packaging together with transportation of cargo and therefore, demand of service tax under the category of cargo handling service was not sustainable.

    5. CENVAT Credit : Document for availing credit :

(i) CCE Vapi v. Jindal Photo Ltd., 2009 (14) STR 812 (Tri.-Ahd.)

    Credit was taken based on invoices not containing registration number of Input Service Distributor (ISD) viz. the head office of the appellant. However, the receipt of services was not in dispute. Considering that the omission took place when relevant rules were being implemented, credit was held as admissible in terms of the proviso to Rule 9(2) and Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules.

(ii) Rohit Surfactants P. Ltd. v. CCE, 2009 (15) STR 169 (Tri.-Del)

    Holding that the words ‘directly and indirectly’ used in relation to ‘manufacture’ in the definition of input service had to be given very wide meaning, and relying on the decision in the case of Keltech Energies Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2008 (107) STR 280 (Tri.), it was held that banking & other financial services, general insurance service and courier agency service are to be treated as input service; stay petition was allowed.

6. Chartered Accountant’s Service — whether explanation had retrospective effect ?

    Sridhar & Santhanam v. CCE (ST) Chennai, 2009 (14) STR 756 (Tri.-Chennai)

    Exemption under Notification 59/2002-ST was not extended to a C.A.s’ firm by applying explanation in Notification No. 15/2002-ST re-trospectively. The Notification did not indicate retrospective effect in specific terms, so it was held that the amendment had to be held effective from the date of issue of Notification. Observing that the benefit available on plain reading could not be made retrospective by issuing Notification, the appeal was allowed.

7. Penalty: Levied  u/s.78, whether reducible?

CCE, Mumbai v. Ria Travels & Tours (I) Pvt. Ltd., 2009 (15) STR 124 (Tri.-Mum.)

In this case, the assessee was registered as a travel agent for its multi-locational business. On investigation by DCCEI authority, short payment of service tax was discovered. After upholding the service tax liability as demanded in the SCN, the Divisional Bench was divided on the view of levying penalty u/s.78. The Member Judicial held that in terms of the decision in the case of CCE&E v. Ashish Vasantrao Patil, 2008 (10) STR 5 (Born), the Tribunal has the power to reduce the penalty imposed u/ s.80. The fact that only in one out of twenty branches, the infraction was brought on record, the penalty of Rs.50 lakh in place of Rs.10 cr. would meet the ends of justice. However, the other Member dissented and per majority decision, it was held that mandatory penalty u/s.78, was not reducible as held by the Supreme Court in the case of UOI v. Dharmendra Textile Processors, 2008 (231) ELT 3 (SC) where the suppression was found deliberate. It was further held that the non-obstante S. 80 provided for NIL penalty in case of bonafide belief. The Member Judicial however did not hold that there was bona fide belief. Citing Dharmendra Textile Processor (supra), it was further observed that the Court could interpret the law and not legislate the same and accordingly, the wordings of the statute in S. 78 had to be given full effect by virtue of which the penalty had to be equal the amount of short payment. As such, the penalty of Rs.10 cr. was held as sustained.

8. Valuation:

Sky Gourmet Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, Bangalore 2009 (14) STR 777 (Tri.-Bang.)

The appellant’s services being those of supply of food, beverages, etc. to airlines, were registered as outdoor catering service provider. Supply of food was claimed as exempt under Notification No. 12/ 2003-ST and on which due VAT was paid. Demand was made to receive service tax on gross receipts and agreeing to grant only abatement under Notifications 20/2004-ST and 1/2006-ST but not benefit under Notification No. 12/2003-ST. Invoices evidencing sale were available on records. Considering both the Notifications as mutually exclusive and relying on BSNL v. UOI, 2006 (27) STR 161 (SC), the appellant’s right to avail option of more beneficial Notification was upheld.

Some Recent Judgments

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Service Tax

I. High
Court :


1. Clearing
& Forwarding Agent :



CCE (Bangalore-I) v. Mahavir
Generics,
2010 (17) STR 225 (Kar.) The
Tribunal in this case had held that the assessee could not fall in the category
of C & F agent as their services did not include both clearing and forwarding
operations. The case is reported at Mahavir Generics v. Commissioner,
2006 (3) STR 276 (Tri.-Del.) and it was widely followed by the Tribunals in
various decisions subsequently. Consequently, the Revenue appealed to the High
Court.

The Revenue contended that while
interpreting the meaning the language employed in the statute itself shall
prevail over the dictionary meaning and submitted that in this regard, the
Tribunal ought not to have travelled beyond interpreting the Section and also
relied on Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. & Another v. Ashok
Iron Works Pvt. Ltd.,
(2009 AIR SCW 1502). While the respondent referring to
Prabhat Zarda Factory (India) Ltd. v. CCE, Patna 2006 (2) STR 784
(Tribunal) contended that this decision was overruled by the Larger Bench in the
case of Larsen & Toubro v. CCE, Chennai 2006 (3) STR 321 (Tri.-LB) and affirmed
by the P&H High Court in the case of CCE v. United Plastomers,
2008 (10) STR 229 (P&H), the Tribunal was fully justified in allowing the
appeal.

The agreement of the party with
their principal was discussed in detail. In accordance with the agreement, the
assessee in addition to the other services also provided services of storage and
distribution and also decided the price of the goods on mutual consultation and
could also appoint stockists and dealers for the goods. The Court observed that
the assessee’s contentions were not acceptable mainly on account of the fact
that the assessee was named ‘consignment agent’ in the agreement and therefore
parties were ‘ad-idem’ when the contract was entered into as to what
their status would be and that the assessee was authorised by their principal to
appoint stockists, dealers and agents on their behalf and it was not a case of
mere commission agent but had responsibility of getting the goods stored by
clearing them and forwarding them to stockists, etc. If they were mere
commission agents, these charges would not have found place in the contract.

The Tribunal further observed
that in the case of L&T (supra) only the activity of procuring purchase
orders was involved and such activity was covered under BAS and would not fall
in the category of C & F agents. Similar facts existed even in the case of
United Plastomers.

The High Court also observed
that reliance could not be placed on the decision in the case of CCE,
Jalandhar v. Kulcip Medicines (P) Ltd.
2009 (20) STT 263 (P&H), as while
pronouncing the judgment of the said case reliance was placed on the Tribunal
order of the above case without consideration that the order of the Tribunal in
the above case was not final as the Revenue had preferred an appeal to the High
Court.

As regards the definition of C &
F agent, the Court ruled that even though the definition of Commission Agent is
defined under the Business Auxiliary Services, the interpretation of the clause
tantamount that the definition is also covered under C & F. Further it held that
the definition of C & F was an inclusive one and would cover activities rendered
by the assessee. Hence the appeal was decided in favour of the Revenue.

II. Tribunal :

2.
Auto dealer providing space to finance companies —
whether a BAS ?



M/s. Tribhuvan Motors Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Service Tax, Mangalore, 2010 TIOL 57 CESTAT

(Bang.)

The assessee, an authorised
automobile dealer, was registered under service tax. The Revenue contended that
he was also liable under the category of business auxiliary services (BAS) as he
was promoting the business of the financial institutions situated in his
premises. The assessee contended that no promotion was made by them and they
only gave a table space to the financial institutions and relied on the
decisions in the case of Silcon Honda v. CCE Bangalore, 2007 (7) STR 475
(Tri-Bang.) and CCE v. Chadha Auto Agencies, 2008 (11) STR 643
(Tri-Bang.).

Moreover the Tribunal observed
that there was no dispute with the fact that the assessee only provided table
space and was not promoting the business of the financial institution and
following the ratio in Chadha Auto Agencies (supra) allowed the appeal.



3. CENVAT
Credit :



HPCL v. CCE (Mangalore),
2010 (17) STR 426 (Tri- Bang.)

The assessee, engaged in the
business of refining crude and marketing of petroleum products, sought
registration under the category of storage and warehousing service. In
accordance with S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, oil companies are under
obligation to transport petroleum products in specified manner and area.
Pipelines are considered ideal for transportation of crude oil. The
transportation was done by PMHB, a joint venture company specifically promoted
for rendering services of transportation, which charged service tax to the
assessee. The assessee utilised such CENVAT credit for discharging the output
liability. The transportation for the crude oil was simultaneously done for
three other companies also along with the assessee. CENVAT was disallowed as it
was used for others as well.

The Tribunal held that as explained by the learned advocate, the transportation of the products of all the entities together was so done due to techno-logical necessity. Moreover, the Commissioner also stated that the transportation of goods belonging to the assessee in the pipeline was related to the business of the assessee. As the assessee’s case was strong, full waiver of pre-deposit was granted.

T. G. Kirloskar Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (Bangalore), 2010 (17) STR 359 (Tri-Bang.)

The assessee was denied CENVAT credit of service tax paid on transportation provided to the employ-ees from their place of residence to factory and vice-versa, relying on the decision of M/s. Stanzen Toy-otestsu India Pvt. Ltd.

Accepting the assessee’s contention that the above-mentioned decision was set aside by the Divisional Bench in the case of M/s. Stanzen Toyotestsu India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE as reported in 2009 (14) STR 316 (Tri-Bang.) and relying on CCE v. Cable Corporation of India Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 598 (Tribunal) 2008 (87) RLT 783 (CESTAT-Mum.), the assessee’s case was held covered and the appeal was allowed.

Skyline Builders v. CCE (Calicut), 2010 (17) STR 437 (Tri-Bang.)

The assessee rendered goods transport agency service and claimed the benefit of abatement under Notification No. 1/2006, dated March 1, 2006. The assessee was denied abatement on the ground that they had claimed credit also. It was contended by the assessee that CENVAT credit was later reversed. The Tribunal held that in the given circumstances, the abatement could not be denied and pre-deposit was granted.

CENVAT Credit : Whether any time limit applicable for taking credit ?

Pierlite India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (Ahmedabad), 2010 (17)
STR 237 (Tri-Ahmd.)

The assessee had taken CENVAT credit in November 2006 for the input services paid during the period January 2005 to October 2005 and plead-ed that no time limit has been prescribed for taking the credit and placed reliance on Coromandel Fertilisers Ltd. v. CCE (A), Visakhapatnam, 2009 (239) ELT 99 (Bangalore) and on Para 3.5 of the CBEC manual. Further the assessee at the time of taking the credit gave all the details of the transactions in writing in November 2006. The Revenue admitted that there was no time limit in the law for availment of credit but relied on the M/s. J. V. Strips Ld. v. CCE, Rohtak, 2007 (218) ELT 252 (Tri.-Del.) and CCE (Hyderabad) v. M/s. Mould-tek Technologies Ltd., 2006 (205) ELT 415 (Tri-Bang.) for extension of time limit for issuing the SCN.

The Tribunal held that the decision relied on by the Revenue in the case of J. V. Strips was pronounced by a Single Member, while the decisions relied on by the assessee are of Divisional Benches. Further the decision of Coromandel Fertilisers was pronounced on 26-8-2008, whereas the decision of J. V. Strips on 26-7-2007. It also observed that the decision of Mould-tek could not be followed as the same Bench had rendered the decision in Coromandel Fertilisers at a later date. In view of the above cases and that the assessee had written a letter in November 2006 clearly ruled out the invocation of extended period and allowed the appeal.

 4.   Consulting Engineer : Whether covers execution of processes ?

Ravi Paints & Chemicals v. Commissioner of Service Tax (Chennai), 2010 (17) STR 354 (Tri-Chennai)

The assessee provided the services of processing of raw material, periodical testing of raw materials, finished products, exercising quality control and maintaining machinery used for manufacturing of dry cement paints of M/s. Brilliant Coating Pvt. Ltd.

The Revenue contended that the assessee was covered under the Consulting Engineer’s service as noticing any defects and the requirement of pointing out them that has to be set right would involve advisory/consultancy services and reliance was placed on Nokia (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Delhi (2006 (1) STR 233).

The Tribunal held that the nature of the services did not warrant any consultancy or advisory services. Moreover the Tribunal stated that the decision of Nokia should not be interpreted in narrow sense that in case the engineers are appointed for a certain job it has to be technical consultancy. Hence the assessee was held as not covered under the said service.

 5.   Construction of complex — (a) whether con-struction service or works contract service (b) whether entitled to 100% credit or 20% ?

M/s. Puravankara Projects Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore, 2010 TIOL 28 CESTAT BA

The assessee was engaged in the activity of construction and was registered under the commercial or industrial services and construction of complex services and also registered under Works Contract for the purposes of VAT. The Revenue contended that the assessee should be registered un-der the category of Works Contract for service tax. The Tribunal following the ratio of the decision in the case of Die-bold Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, Chennai 2008 TIOL 489 CESTAT Mad. held that the assessee was already discharging the liability under the existing category for the period prior to 1-6-2007, when the works contract category was introduced, hence was not required to take fresh registration under works contract. Further the Tribunal also ob-served that the main activity of construction of flats and sale by the assessee per se did not involve any taxable service and therefore any ancillary activity forming part of the main activity could not be subjected to tax as works contract service. The various other services rendered by the assessee and the Tri-bunal’s observation on the same were as under :

  1)  Health and Fitness service : The assessee also constructed a gym in the residential complex and had charged the owners of flats. The Revenue contended that such services were covered under the Health & Fitness service and attracted service tax. The Tribunal stated that the facility was owned by the flat-owners and the assessee did not render any health & fitness service. Hence the same could not be considered as liable for service tax.

2)    Real Estate Agent’s service : The assessee had entered into an agreement with the prospective buyers for the flats under construction.
The prospective buyers on their own accord would find other prospective buyers and sell the flat to them. In such a transaction the assessee collected transfer fee from the prospective buyers under the term of the agreement. The Revenue contended that the service pertained to real estate agency. The Tribunal stated that the consideration received as transfer fee could not be considered as real estate agent’s service.

3)    Maintenance of Repair service : The assessee maintained flats constructed till such time they were transferred to the association of owners of the flats. In order to maintain the flats the assessee recovered expenses from the flat owners. Relying on the CBEC Circular that the reimbursable expenditure cannot form part of the value, the Tribunal held that reimbursement of such expenses was not subject to service tax.

The Revenue had also disallowed the input credit on the ground that the assessee should be allowed only 20% credit as the assessee rendered exempt services. The Tribunal held that the consideration received for transfer of right could not be considered exempt services and as such, the assessee could claim 100% CENVAT credit.

In view of the above observations, the Tribunal granted complete waiver and stay.

 6.   Custom House Agent (CHA) : Whether freight forwarding activity a part of CHA service ?

DHL Lemuir Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (Bangalore), 2010 (17) STR 266 (Tri-Bang.)

The assessee registered as CHA according to the Revenue did not pay service tax on certain revenue streams. The assessee contended that he rendered two kinds of services (a) consolidation of cargo activities, and (b) CHA activity. The assessee also submitted a flow chart describing in detail the flow of services rendered by him. The services that were not included were :

a)    Charge collect fees (CCX fees) : The fees pertain to collection and remittance of freight to in-ternational air and water carriers. It was held that the services so rendered are not covered by CHA’s services.

 b)   Break bulk fees : In case when cargo was transported from outside India to India, margin was paid to the assessee and in the case when cargo was transported from India to outside India the assessee would have paid the margin and hence this was not covered as CHA’s service.

c)    Profit share from origin : In case of imports/ exports transactions made through third party as done in break bulk fees, margin was paid. This also was not considered as CHA’s services as break bulk fee itself is not CHA’s service.

d)    Unallocated income : Charges collected for various services are accounted into respective revenue heads on raising of the invoice on the customer. Later in case of any modification, correction, reversal of charges the entries are passed through the unallocated income head. Hence the amounts under this head do not relate to CHA’s services.

 e)   Currency adjustment factor : This is collected as part of freight in order to cover the ex-change rate fluctuations and hence this does not pertain to CHA’s services.

 f)   Air/sea rebate : Air or ship carriers offer bulk space quota and the assessee is booked as the shipper and later the assessee collects the amount from the customers and the difference between the two rates is air/sea rebate. The nature of the amount is not covered as CHA’s services.

  g)  Commission/brokerage : IATA is a worldwide trade association of the international air transporters. The assessee being registered with IATA can sell the air cargo transportation to the passenger and receives commission as a percentage of freight booked. Similarly it renders services for shipping industry and these charges do not relate to CHA’s services.

  h)  Air freight incentive : Air carriers offer incentives in the quantum of cargo booked and hence the services are not related to CHA’s services.

i)   Expenses, reimbursement billing : Charges are collected for expenses such as delivery charges, priority handling charges, courier charges, break bulk fees, statistical charges, etc. In case of such charges if margin is charged they shall be included in CHA’s services.

Hence the order was remanded to the Original Au-thority for determining the liability in the light of observations made by the Tribunal on various services and further directed to obtain CA certificate.

(Note : Readers may note that any kind of commission or brokerage income would be taxable as business auxiliary service while acting on behalf of a client at relevant time).

  7.  Jurisdiction :

CCE (Guntur) v. Integral Construction Company, 2010 (17) STR 380 (Tri-Bang.)

The assessee was providing the services of blast hole drilling, blasting, excavation, loading, transportation, dumping, etc. in the mines in Madhya Pradesh and accordingly, the services were covered under the category of site formation and clearance excavating and earthmoving demolition services. The SCN, however, was issued by CCE, Guntur.

The assessee in this case did not have centralised registration and therefore, technically for his various premises, he required separate registration. In the instant case, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the issue of jurisdiction based on the decision in the case of Ores India Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (9) STR 157 (Tri.-Kol.).

    8. Leasing of stalls : Whether taxable as Business Exhibition service ?

Karnataka Exhibition Authority v. CCE (Bangalore), 2010 (17) STR 296 (Tri-Bang.)

The assessee’s service of leasing of stalls during Dassera festival to the highest bidder was held taxable in revision order. Further, the assessee did not provide any direct service to the lessees of the stalls. The Tribunal held that the leasing of the stalls was not covered as Business Exhibition services and was allowed.

  9.  Management Consultancy : Whether ERP implementations covered ?

M/s. IBM India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore, 2010 TIOL 167 CESTAT Bang.

The assessee provided services in relation to implementation and adoption of ERP software and did not pay service tax thereon. However in respect to their services of planning and advise relating to ERP, they discharged the liability under the category Management Consultancy services and the Revenue also agreed to this. In respect of services relating to implementation and adoption of ERP, according to the assessee they were covered under the Information Technology Software services effective from May 16, 2008 and the Revenue wanted to cover it under the Management Consultancy services. Reliance was placed on BCCI v. CST, [2007 (7) STR 384 (Mumbai-Tribunal)], Glaxo Pharmaceuticals [2005

    ELT 171 CESTAT] and inter alia stating that in case of introduction of a new category, it is implied that the service was not taxable earlier.

The reasons highlighted were that the services were not in connection with the management of the organisation, the services should not be covered in the inclusive definition of management service and moreover the services rendered being of executory were not covered. Reliance was inter alia also placed on CCE, Mumbai-IV v. AISCO Engineering Pvt. Ltd., 2006 (5) STJ 171 (Tri-Mum.). The assessee also contended that prior to September 20, 2004 these services were exempted from service tax and with effect from September 10, 2004 the services were specifically exempted from the definition of consulting engineer’s service and that the exemption was removed only on the introduction of the new ser-vice of information technology from May 16, 2008. Reliance was placed on the case of Federal Bank Limited (2009 TIOL 584 CESTAT Bang.). The Tribunal relying on this decision and other decisions held that the services of implementation and adoption of ERP was not covered under the category of management consultancy services but was squarely covered as IT software service introduced from 16-5-2008.

   10. Business Auxiliary Service : Money Transfer Service : Whether taxable ?

Muthoot Fincorp Ltd. v. CCE (Bangalore), 2010 (17) STR 303 (Tri-Bang.)

The assessee, an NBFC having network in vari-ous states entered into an agreement with Weiz-mann Forex Ltd., Cochin (WFL) which represented Western Union Financial Services Inc. (Western Union). The assessee provided money transfer service. The Revenue held that the service was a Business Auxiliary Service (BAS) and since it was rendered to a party in India there was no ‘export’.

The assessee contended that it was not covered under BAS as it did not promote the services of money transfer, but only displayed the publicity material given to them and it should be covered under the Banking and Financial services which covers transactions of money transfer with effect from May 01, 2006. Hence as the specific service came into force on May 01, 2006, the same could not be taxed from a prior date. Alternatively, if it was covered under the BAS, then Export Rules could exempt the service as one of the conditions stipulated by the Export Rules is that the services should be used outside India. The Tribunal ruled that even if the agreement was between the assessee and WLF, the beneficiary of the transaction was Western Union and the services so rendered by the assessee were utilised by Western Union outside India and hence this condition of the Export Rules was satisfied.

Further as regards the condition of receipt of consolidation in convertible foreign exchange, the Tribunal relied on Nipuna Services Ltd. v. CCE&ST, Hyderabad, 2009 (14) STR 706 (Tri-Bang.) that the condition was only applicable to Rules 3(1) and 3(2) of the Export Rules at given time. In case it was to be made applicable to Rule 3(3), then the Notification would have expressed so, but the Notification only mentioned Rule 3(1) and Rule 3(2) and the ap-peal was allowed accordingly.

   11.  Penalty : Not leviable when bona fide belief of non-taxability exists :

CCE (Ludhiana) v. Instant Credit, 2010 (17) STR 397 (Tri-Bang.)

The assessee acted as a Direct Sales Associate (DSA) and was therefore liable to service tax under the category of Business Auxiliary services and did not obtain registration as it had a belief as to non-taxability. However, on officers visiting the premises and insistence as to liability, the assessee paid service tax when the SCN was issued and pleaded for relief in penalty on bona fide belief. Since the Department did not have evidence of the assessee having intention of suppression, the Tribunal did not interfere with the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that no penalty was leviable.

Vista Infotech v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore, 2010 (17) STR 343 (Tri-Bang.)

The authorities noticed that the assessee, even though collecting service tax, did not deposit the same and pleaded financial hardship on account of non-payment by a major client. The assessee appealed against penalty and not against the confirmation of liability and interest and relied on the Board Circular No. 137/167/2006-cx-4, dated 3-10-2007 and further relied on the Tribunal’s decision in the cases of Essar Steel Ltd. v. CCE&C (Su-rat), 2009 (13) STR 579 (Tri-Ahmd.); Vee Aar Secure v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore, 2009

    STR 50 (Tri-Bang.) and V.S.T. Tillers Tractors v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mysore, 2009 (14) STR 159 (Tri-Bang.).

Observing that the assessee regularly paid the tax for the earlier period and the fact that the liability was discharged before the end of the proceedings, the assessee was held entitled to relief u/s.73(3) and relying on the judgments cited above, no penalty was held leviable.

   12. Refund : Service tax paid on input services for period prior to 18-4-2006 :

Polyspin Ltd. v. CCE (Tirvunelveli), 2010 (17) STR 441 (Tri-Chennai)

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the adjudicating authority for recovery of refund considering it as erroneously granted for input services not liable for service tax. The recovery proceedings were ordered for the refund of tax paid for the period prior to April 18, 2006, the date on which S. 66A came into effect when the assessee was not liable to tax. The Tribunal held that the refund could not be denied on the mere ground that the assessee was not liable to tax and hence the appeal was allowed.

    13. Valuation : Material sold by advertising agency :

CCE (Chennai) v. Elegant Publicities, 2010 (17) STR 263 (Tri-Chennai)

Scanning charges and publicity material charges collected from customers by an advertising agency were contended by the Revenue as part of taxable service.

The assessee contended that they had not done any preparation, visualisation or conceptualisation of the publicity material but only purchased and sold the same to the customer. Since this was not successfully rebutted by the Revenue, it was held that mere sale and of publicity material is not a taxable service and similarly scanning also is not covered under the advertisement services.

Valuation : Material supply :

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax (Bangalore), 2010 (17) STR 249 (Tri-Bang.)

The assessee undertook repair and overhauling of various engines received from the Ministry of Defence and others. The adjudicating authority concluded that the assessee did not discharge the correct service tax liability and the documents did not reflect the payment of sales tax on the value of material. The assessee submitted that in an identical issue in their own case, a final order was passed by the Tribunal in 2010 (17) STR (Tri-Bang.), the only difference being it was in the case of their helicopter division. Further the assessee submitted that they had availed the benefit of Notification 12/2003 and the same could not be denied. The invoices captured the material and labour cost separately and the documentary evidence of payment of sales tax was also provided. The Tribunal after considering the documentary proof of payment of sales tax held that the assessee could not be denied the availment of benefit of Notification 12/2003 and consequential relief was granted.

Part B — Some recent judgments

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Service Tax

An important Larger Bench decision : Services provided by service providers from outside India :



Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. CCE, Jaipur 2008 TIOL 1149 CESTAT
Del. LB [2008 (11) STR 338 (Tri.-LB)]

1. Background :


1.1 The law relating to Service Tax is contained in Chapter V
of the Finance Act, 1994 (The Act) as amended from time to time. Service Tax
Rules, 1944 (The Rules) contain machinery provisions in terms of the Act. S. 68
of the Act deals with payment of Service Tax i.e., who shall pay the tax
and the manner. For easy reference S. 68 is reproduced below :

S. 68 :



“(1) Every person providing taxable service to any
person shall pay Service Tax at the rate specified in S. 66 in such manner and
within such period as may be prescribed.


(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Ss.(1), in
respect of any taxable service notified by the Central Government in the
Official Gazette, the Service Tax thereon shall be paid by such person and in
such manner as may be prescribed at the rate specified in S. 66 and all the
provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such person as if he is the person
liable for paying the Service Tax in relation to such service.”



1.2 Thus the general rule is that person providing taxable
service is the person liable to pay Service Tax. However, U/ss.(2) of S. 68, a
clause is contained which provides that in case of ‘notified’ taxable services,
any other person as may be prescribed is liable to pay Service Tax.

1.3 In the year 2002, a new sub-clause (iv) was inserted in
Rule 2(1)(d) of the Rules with effect from 16-8-2002 (vide Notification
12/2002-ST) which reads as under :


Rule
2(1)





(d) Person liable for paying Service Tax means —


(iv) in relation to any taxable service provided by a
person who is non-resident or is from outside India and does not have any
office in India, the person receiving taxable service in India”
.



1.4 Later i.e., on December 12, 2004, the Government
issued Notification No. 36/2004-ST to come into effect from January 01, 2005
wherein persons other than service providers were specifically notified
u/s.68(2) of the Act. This inter alia also included taxable service
provided by non-resident or person from outside India and who did not have an
office in India.

1.5 Thus, the dispute related to whether the liability to pay
Service Tax could be fastened on the recipient of taxable service from January
01, 2005, the date of issue of Notification No. 36/2005-ST or August 16, 2002,
the date from which Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) was prescribed.

2. In the above background, a single member Bench of Delhi
Tribunal in the case of Aditya Cement v. CCE, 2007 (7) STR 153 in the
context of Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) observed that :

“It is well-settled law that the rules are
subservient to the Sections and if Sections do not provide for discharge of
tax by the recipient of services
from non-resident having no office,
then it would be futile exercise to rely upon the rules to collect the tax
(emphasis supplied). It also stated as follows :

“If the contention of the learned SDR is to be accepted,
then there was no necessity for the Government to issue Notification No.
36/2004-S.T. notifying the service receiver from non-resident having no
office, to pay Service Tax, as receiver. By issuing the said Notification, the
Central Government intended to tax the service receiver from non-resident,
with effect from 1-1-2005, which, in corollary would be that no Service Tax is
payable by this category prior to 1-1-2005.”

The above decision was followed by a Division Bench in case
of Ispat Industries Ltd. v. CCE, 2007 (8) STR 282 (Mum). Doubting the
correctness of these decisions in case of Samcor Glass Ltd. v. CCE, Jaipur-1
Delhi 2007
TIOL 935 CESTAT Del while hearing the stay application the Bench
observed as follows :

“Thus, the person receiving the service from abroad was by
the said clause 2(d)(iv), made liable to pay Service Tax in respect of taxable
services received. This clause is clearly relatable to the provisions of S.
68(2) which contemplates making of such provision under the rules, as is clear
from the word ‘prescribed’ which means ‘prescribed under the rule’. The
statutory effort so created cannot be reduced to a subsequently issued
notification repeating the contents of clause (iv) under sub-heading (B)
.
The learned Single Member has however taken a different view, while the
Division Bench has not taken into consideration the provisions of Rule
2(d)(iv) of the Rules . . . . . . We do not want to pre-empt the course of
referring the matter to the Larger Bench that may be adopted by the Bench
hearing this appeal” (emphasis supplied).

It however further observed :

“The expression ‘taxable service’ occurring in clause (iv)
of Rule 2(d) is to be understood in the concept of taxable service which are
enumerated in S. 65(105) of the Act and therefore, this Rule will apply to all
taxable services. Prima facie, there was no need to make any further
Notification to repeat what was already prescribed by the said Rule.”


3. The Larger Bench, in misc. order No. CT/85/08 analysed S.
68(2) as follows :

3.1 S. 68(2) according to the Larger Bench could be broadly
divided into two parts :

  • The first part envisages specifying ‘services’ in relation to which a person other than service provider is to be made liable. Accordingly, these services have to be identified and specified and this could be done by way of issuing notification.

  • The second part envisages specifying the person liable to pay service on such service notified as per the first part. This is done by the Rules already prescribed.

According to the Bench, it was not an acceptable contention that the manner of collection of tax could be extended to include the person liable to pay the tax. It observed:

“The person liable to pay is an integral component of any tax – as a concept distinct from the mechanism for its collection and recovery.”

3.2 Thus,  combined    reading of Notification 12/2002 notifying  Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) and Notification 36/2004 notifying various persons other than service providers including non-residents or persons from outside India liable for Service Tax, would be necessary as both the notifications complemented or supplemented each other and in the absence of either, Service Tax could not be collected or received in respect of specified services. It is required to note that the levy is on rendering of taxable service and not on a person. No sooner than the taxable event takes place, tax must be collected and therefore provision has to be made to fasten the liability to pay Service Tax.

The Bench stated that the first part of the requirement of S. 68(2) had to be carried out by way of notification and the latter could be implemented by making rules. It also stated:

“It is well known that where the law provides the manner for doing something, it should be done in that manner or not at all”.

3.3 In the context of Rule 2(1)(d), it observed “sub-clause (d) of Rule 2 is the definition clause of the Service Tax Rules. The definition clause cannot be read as a substantive provision creating liability much less in a tax statute.”

Referring to Notification No. 36/2006-ST, it observed, “the service specified in Part B was omni-bus, namely, ‘any taxable service’, meaning thereby all types of taxable services provided by a person who is a non-resident or from outside India and does not have any office in India, the recipient became liable for paying Service Tax.”

The Bench also opined that in case of services provided from abroad, the service provider could not be made liable to pay Service Tax and brought un-der the tax net in absence of apparent mechanism for collection and recovery of tax from them. A different provision had to be made.

3.4 The appellant relying on Laghu Udyog Bharti v. UOI, 1999 (112)ELT 365 (SC) argued that provisions of Rule 2(d)(xii) and (xvii) of the Rules were struck down on the ground that the scheme of the Finance Act created charge on the person collecting service tax, whereas Rule 2(d)(xii) and (xvii) treated customers as the assessees, This clearly was in conflict with S. 65 and S. 66 of the Act. The Revenue on the other hand relied on the decision in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. UOI, 2005 (182) ELT 33 (SC) and argued that amendments made with retrospective effect in this regard were upheld and therefore it could not be relied upon. The Bench observed that the Rule 2(1)(d)(xii) and (xvii) were held illegal in Laghu Udyog Bharti’s case (supra) because of charging provisions provided otherwise. When charging Section itself was amended to make the Act and the Rules compatible, criticism of the earlier law upheld by the Court cannot be availed of and that the Legislature was competent to remove infirmities and validate what was declared invalid. However, there was no question of the Finance Act, 2000 overruling the decision of the Court in Laghu Udyog Bharti as the law itself was amended.

3.5 The Revenue also referred to the explanation inserted at the end of Ss.(105) of S. 65 with effect from 16-6-2005. The Bench stated that explanation was a temporary measure to tax imports of services and was subsequently replaced by S. 66A. However, in the opinion of the Bench, the issue involved in the case had no relevance with the explanation.

There being  no dispute as to the service involved viz. the  consulting engineer’s service as taxable service, any reference  to the erstwhile explanation in S. 65(105) was held  as misplaced by the Bench.

3.6 In summation, it was held that recipient of taxable service could be held as liable for paying Service Tax only from 1-1-2005 and express concurrence to the decisions in the cases of Aditya Cement and Ispat Industries (supra) was also made.

Some Recent Judgments

I. Supreme Court :


    1. Penalty :

    Whether levy of penalty can be considered by Court while considering quantification of penalty under a civil appeal ?

    Commissioner of Central Excise, Haldia v. Exide Industries Ltd., 2010 (19) STR 291 (SC)

    The appellants tried to challenge the levy of penalty in the civil appeal filed for its quantification. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal observing that the Tribunal had rejected the appeal for levy of penalty against which the appellants did not appeal. The Court did not express any opinion on merits.

II. High Court :

2. Penalty :

    Whether penalties u/s.76 and u/s.78 can be imposed simultaneously for the same default ?

    Commissioner of C.Ex. Chandigarh v. City Motors, 2010 (19) STR 486 (P&H)

    The Adjudicating Authority levied penalty on the assessee u/s.76 and u/s.78 for the same default. In the first appeal, penalty u/s.78 was reduced and penalty u/s.76 was set aside and this decision was affirmed by the Tribunal. In the Revenue’s appeal to the High Court, it was held that penalty u/s.78 is sufficient to cover the default and two penalties for the same default cannot be imposed.

3. Import of services :

    Can service tax be levied on firms or body corporate under consulting engineer’s services prior to 1st May, 2006 ?

    Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Araco Corporation, 2010 (19) STR 169 (Kar.)

    The Department, in appeal, claimed that the respondent providing technical assistance and know-how to an Indian company should be liable to service tax under the category of ‘consulting engineer’s services’ for the period from November, 1998 to December, 2000.

    The assessee contended that S. 65(31) dealt with the definition of ‘consulting engineer’ not the taxability thereof and the term ‘body corporate and any other firm’ in the said S. 65(31) was introduced only w.e.f. 1st May, 2006 and therefore, in the period prior to this date, the category applied only to individuals.

    Secondly, the assessee also claimed that S. 65(31) applied only to an Indian service provider and the foreign service provider is liable to service tax only after the introduction of S. 66A w.e.f. 18th April, 2006.

    According to the Court, reference to S. 65(31) being irrelevant was not acceptable and even on assuming its applicability, it applied only to services of Indian consulting engineers.

    Holding that during the disputed period, the definition did not apply to a firm or body corporates and reverse charge also did not apply prior to 18th April, 2006, the Department’s appeal was dismissed.

    [Author’s Note : The term ‘an engineering firm’ was always there in the definition introduced with effect from 7-7-1997. Therefore, the conclusion is based on misquoted legal provision. However, primarily reverse charge did not apply prior to 18-4-2006 and therefore, it would not impact the decision based on misquoted legal provision.]

4. Liability to pay service tax :

    Whether liable when the services are provided by the principal ?

    Commissioner of Central Excise v. P.C. Paulose, 2010 (19) STR 487 (Ker.)

    By an agreement with Calicut Airport Authority Ltd., a right to collect entrance fees from visitors was provided to the assessee and therefore, the service tax was demanded from them. The demand was confirmed in the first appeal. The Tribunal’s order that the Airport Authority was rendering service and not the respondent was challenged by the Department.

    The High Court held that once licence was given by the Airport Authority to the respondent to permit entry and allow enjoyment of services provided to the visitors, the respondent was a service provider though he was acting only as an agent and liable for service tax.

5. Recovery of dues :

    Can the Department directly recover dues from principal employer u/s.87 ?

    ONGC Ltd. v. Dy. Commissioner of Cus., C. Ex. & S.T., Rajahmundry 2010 (19) STR 164 (AP)

    The Department was of the view that even though no assessment order was passed, manpower supply agencies were liable for assessment and since ONGC made substantial payment to them, notice u/s.87 of the Finance Act, 1994 could be issued on principal employer directing it to remit the payment.

    ONGC Ltd. contended that it was not required to pay service tax in respect of payments made to manpower supply agencies and in absence of any assessment order, the question of directing the principal employer to pay service tax liability did not arise. The High Court observed that the authorities have the responsibility of collecting data and pass an assessment order. Only if there’s a failure or default in payment by the assessee, the Department has the option to call the principal employer in terms of S. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994. Without an assessment order in place, service tax was not crystallised and therefore, S. 87 could not be invoked.

6. Search & seizure :

    Whether Revenue could retain the amount collected during search or seizure in absence of liability being crystallised ?

    Naresh Kumar & Company v. Union of India, 2010 (19) STR 161 (Cal.)

    Search was carried out in the petitioners’ premises and various records and documents were seized. The petitioners claimed that they were compelled to handover cheque of Rs 15 lakh to protect against service tax liability.

    The High Court held that the trial judge did not decide the matter in the right direction and the actual issue was whether the Department could re-tain this amount under the provisions of law. While examining communication with the Department, it could be concluded that the payment was not voluntary and no provisions in the service tax law could justify compulsory payment of service tax in advance. Therefore, no amount could be withheld and the Department was bound to return the same with interest @ 9% per annum.

        7. Storage & warehousing:
    Whether service tax is applicable on compensation received from Government for storage of free-sale sugar?

    Commissioner of C. Ex., Chandigarh v. Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd., 2010 (19) STR 166 (P & H)

    A manufacturer of sugar was directed by the Gov-ernment to maintain buffer stock and was also compensated towards storage, interest, insurance charges, etc. by way of subsidy. The Revenue contended that buffer subsidy was taxable under ‘storage and warehousing services’.

    The High Court observed that the respondent stored its own stock in buffer and therefore, there is no service provider and service-recipient relationship emerging as one cannot provide service to his own self. Further, the subsidy was meant as compensation for loss of interest, insurance, etc. and not for rendition of any service. The respondent could not be construed as ‘storage and warehouse keeper’ and Government could not be held as its ‘client’ and accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

    III. Tribunal:

        8. CENVAT credit:
        i)     Whether CENVAT credit is allowable fully to a service provider having a trading activity in view of Rule 6(3) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004?

    Orion Appliances Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad 2010 (19) STR 205 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

    The appellant engaged in providing repairs and maintenance services and commissioning and installation services was taking full CENVAT credit on advertising, security, courier, telephone and banking services. However, these input services were being used for providing repairs and maintenance services and trading activities. The Department contended that the appellant is liable to pay service tax for excess CENVAT credit availed in respect of trading activities in terms of Rule 6(3) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

    The appellant contested that Rule 6, requiring maintenance of separate books of accounts, applies only to an assessee engaged in providing exempted as well as taxable services and trading activities cannot be considered as exempted services and therefore, Rule 6(3) did not apply to him.

    The Tribunal accepted that trading activity was not a service and therefore, Rule 6(3) did not apply. However, full CENVAT credit could not be availed by the appellant as CENVAT credit of input service requires one to one correlation with output services. Therefore, the appellant had to choose and segregate the quantum of input service attributable to trading activity and exclude the same from availment of CENVAT credit. Since the quantum could not be ascertained in advance, the appellant should calculate such amount once in a quarter or every six months. The matter was remanded for quantifying the amount of reversal, if required, after giving an opportunity to appellant.

        ii) CENVAT credit: Outward transportation up to the place of removal when sale is for destination at customer’s premises:

    L. G. Electronics (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Noida 2010 (19) STR 340 (Tri.-Del.)

    The appellant availed CENVAT credit of service tax on GTA service in respect of outward transportation of finished goods from factory gate to the customer’s premises or from factory to depots and from depots to customer’s premises. However, the department contended that the outward transportation from place of removal i.e., factory gate or depot to customer’s premises was not covered within the definition of ‘input service’ under Rule 2(l) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

    The appellant contended that in all the cases, the sales to dealers, whether from factory gate or depots, was on FOR basis. Therefore, the goods were transported at the appellant’s risk and sale took place at customer’s premises and the customer’s price included the transportation cost.

    Since the words ‘place of removal’ are not defined in CENVAT Credit Rules, they must be understood as defined by S. 4 of the Central Excise Act where-under the customer’s premises are considered as the place of removal. The credit in respect of GTA services for transportation from factory gate to depots should not be denied as the sales are held to be made from depots. In terms of Circular No. 97/8/07-ST dated 23-8-2007, CENVAT credit of GTA services up to customer’s premises were available to the appellant. Even if duty was paid on MRP-based valuation, credit of GTA services could be taken in terms of Circular No. 137/3/2006-CX-4, dated 2-2-2006.

    The Department contended that in case of payment u/s.4A, Board’s Circular No. 97/8/07 ST, dated 23rd August, 2007 was irrelevant and CENVAT credit could not be availed by the appellant. U/s.37(2)(xvii) of the Central Excise Act, Central Government is entitled to make rules for credit of service tax as well as excise duty. Since there was no nexus between manufacture and input service, outward transportation from the place of removal could not be regarded as ‘input service’. The scope of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 could not travel beyond the scope of provisions of the Central Excise Act.

    The Tribunal in turn observed that the Department’s contention that input duty credit is available only in respect of services used in or in relation to manufacture in terms of S. 37(2) of the Central Excise Act and that “in case of conflict between provisions of the Act and provisions of Rule, provisions of the Act shall prevail” does not hold good for reasons that in Bombay Tyre International Ltd. 1983, the Supreme Court held that it was not acceptable that because the levy of excise was on manufacture, the value of excisable goods must be limited to manufacturing cost and profit only. Referring to the basic principle of value added tax and valuation aspect, since all expenses up to place of removal were included in assessable value, the Tribunal observed that the whole scheme of Central Excise levy is to be kept in mind rather than interpreting Rule 2(l) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and S. 37(2) of Central Excise Act in isolation. The contention of the Department that the duty was paid u/s.4A was found baseless as availability of credit and valuation for payment of duty were found to be two independent issues as explained vide Circular No. 137/3/2006. Since the matter was decided exparte, the case was remanded back to the Commissioner to examine whether the sale was on FOR destination basis and if this was found to be the fact, direction was provided to allow credit up to customer’s place.

        iii) Outdoor catering service used in the factory not an input service

    Commissioner of C.Ex., Chennai v. Sundaram Brake Linings, [2010 (19) STR 172 Tri-Chennai]

    There were 13 appellant manufacturers to the issue involving availment of CENVAT credit on outdoor catering service disallowed holding that they were not used for manufacturing excisable products. Applying decision of GTC Industries 2008 (12) STR 468, the appellate authority allowed the credit.

    The Department contended before the Tribunal citing the case of CCE, Nagpur v. Manikgarh Cement Works, 2010 (18) STR 275 that in order to fall in the definition of input service, the service must be used in or in relation to manufacture directly or indirectly and outdoor catering service had no nexus with the manufacturing activity.

    The appellants relied on the decision of GTC Industries (supra) and contended that it was rightly followed by the first Appellate Authority and since the value of catering service formed a part of cost of production, the same was to be considered as an input service. The Tribunal stated that the Central Government is empowered to frame rules for grant of credit of duty of service tax and held that outdoor catering service cannot be considered as input service and restored the original order deleting however, penalties imposed by the original authority.

        iv) Whether CENVAT credit allowable on invoices in the name of branch, not registered under service tax?

    Manipal Advertising Services Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Mangalore 2010 (19) STR 506 (Tri-Bang.)

    The appellant provider of advertisement services was disallowed credit on invoices addressed to branch offices both by original and Appellate Authorities.

    The appellant referred to Rule 4(2) of Service Tax Rules, 1994 which provided that in case of centralised billing or centralised accounting system, in respect of any services, the assessee had the op-tion to register the premises or offices from where centralised billing or central accounting system was located. Accordingly, the appellant got registered its premises on the ground that they had centralised billing or central accounting system. Reliance was placed on the case of Stadmed Pvt. Ltd. 1998 ELT 466 wherein credit of duty was allowed on invoices addressed to branch offices. However, according to the Department, in absence of centralised registration, credit in respect of inputs used at branches was not admissible.

    The Tribunal held that since the appellant discharged service tax liability, the benefit of CENVAT credit could not be denied on the ground that invoices were in the name of branch. The appeal was allowed.

        9. Stay of pre-deposit:

    Whether appellant is engaged in providing business auxiliary services?

    Jetlite (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex., New Delhi 2010 (19) STR 209 (Tri.-Del.)

    The appellant took over M/s. Sahara Airlines Ltd. (SAL) and added the category of ‘business auxiliary services’ in March, 2007 in service tax registration. The Department demanded `128 crore of service tax for the period from July, 2003 to January 2007 under the said category and interest and penalty of the same amount.

    The appellant had entered into an agreement with Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited (SICCL) in 1995 to promote business of SICCL of housing and real estate projects through printing it on air tickets. Consideration was paid based on per ticket.

    SAL accounted the money received as ‘operational revenue’. However, SICCL recorded the same as ‘project work in progress’ as it was a capital expenditure.

    The Department contended that SAL being already registered with Service Tax authorities ought to have disclosed material facts in the ST-3 return. However, the appellant had taken opinion on 4th August, 2003 in regard to the present activity and therefore, was under a bona fide belief. Therefore, the appellant relisted invoking of extended period of limitation.

    According to the appellant, they merely used logo of SICCL and as per agreement, no brochures or other arrangements to popularise the business was carried out. The difference between promotion of sale of goods and use of brand was explained and the appellant claimed that the entire consideration was only towards display of logo.

    The Tribunal observed that:
    Levy and collection of tax is regulated by law and not by contract. The term ‘service’ has a variety of meanings, but has to be construed depending on the context in which it is used. An activity provided individually or integrally would not make any difference as to its charge. The character of service does not change with permutation or combination of services and the nature of services does not alter if certain clauses of agreement are not fulfilled. No evidence was led to prove that use of logo was not helpful to promote real estate business of SICCL. The information of SICCL’s projects was supplied purposely to air travel passengers.

    There was no case made out to show that undue hardship would be caused to the appellant if no full waiver was granted. Noting Ravi Gupta’s case 2009, wherein it was held that if prima facie it appears that the demand raised would not stand, the assessee should not be compelled to pay full or substantial part of the demand. The appellant was directed by the Tribunal to make pre -deposit of `100 crore within eight weeks of the date of receipt of the order staying the balance demand.

Some Recent Judgments

I. High Court :

    1. Beauty parlour service :

    Whether carrying out activities of electro homoeo-pathy consultation and certain other related activities, such as hair bonding/hair weaving, sale of wigs, clips etc. were covered under ‘Beauty treatment services’ ?

    Commissioner of Central Excise, Mangalore v. Beau Monde’s Clinic, (2009) 21 STT 326 (Kar.)

    The appellant carried on activities of electro homo-eopathy consultation and had allegedly undertaken certain other related activities, such as hair bonding/hair weaving, sale of wigs, clips, etc. The original authority raised demand under the category of ‘Beauty Parlor Services’ on the contention that these activities would fall within ambit of ‘Beauty Treatment’. The Commissioner (Appeals) ruled in favour of the appellant. However, further appeal was preferred by Revenue in CESTAT. The Tribunal agreed with the detailed reasoning by Commissioner (Appeals) in his order, elaborating reasons why these activities of the assessee would not fall under ‘Beauty Treatment’ and ‘Beauty Parlor Service’. Finding no merit for interference, the appeal was dismissed by the High Court.

    2. Refund :

    Whether refund of Service Tax can be granted when service tax is paid under wrong assumption in spite of not rendering any services and where credit notes have been issued by the assessee ?

    Shiva Analyticals (I) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore, (2009) 21 STT 328 (Kar.)

    The appellant claimed refund of service tax u/s.11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 on contending that service tax was originally paid inadvertently considering that they were liable to pay service tax. Original authority allowed refund on finding that appellant had not rendered any service. The Order was revised by the Commissioner directing to re-credit the refund as the same was erroneously gran-ted. On appeal by the appellant, CESTAT allowed the appeal relying upon the decision in case of Mohd. Ekram Khan & Sons v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, (2004) 6 SCC 1083 and held that since the appellant issued credit notes towards refund of service tax to its clients, refund order passed by the original authority was legal and proper. On appeal by the department calling for interference in the order of CESTAT, the Hon’ble Court held that the order was perfectly legal and valid, and did not call for interference as no questions of law much less the substantial questions framed in the appeal arose for consideration.

II. Tribunal :

    3. CENVAT Credit :

    CENVAT credit reversed on being pointed out non-admissibility.

    3.1 CST Ahmedabad v. Amola Holdings P. Ltd., 2009 (16) STR 46 (Tri.-Ahd.)

    Respondent was providing commercial construction service and as such paid service tax at abated rate under Notification No. 1/2006-ST dated 1-3-2006. He also availed CENVAT credit. However, on being pointed out that benefit of abatement was available only on the condition of non-availment of CENVAT credit, voluntarily reversed credit taken but not utilised and also paid interest. Commissioner (Appeals) relying on Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd., 1996 (81) ELT 3 SC set aside the pe-nalty proposed by the revenue. Revenue challenging this, contended that once credit is availed, they became ineligible for abatement of 67% and subsequent reversal would not help as exemption Notification has to be strictly construed and relied on Supreme Court’s decision in Bombay Dyeing’s case [2007 (215) ELT 3 (SC)]. However, distinguishing the facts of the case of Bombay Dyeing (supra) and relying on the decision in the cases of Precot Mills Ltd. 2006 (201) ELT 356 (Tri.-Chennai) and Hello Minerals Water (P) Ltd. 2004 (174) ELT 422 (All.), it was held that since credit was not utilised and precedent decision holding exemption squarely applied to the respondent, revenue’s appeal was rejected.

    3.2 GHCL Ltd. v. CCE, Bhavnagar 2009 (16) STR 89 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

    Appellant was disallowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on services utilised prior to 10-9-2004 and service tax paid on credit card services, security services, repairs and maintenance services, etc. Factually, security service was used for plant, residential colony and mining and was also evident as per invoice dated 1-11-2004. The contract for repairs and maintenance services pertained to period from 1-9-2004 to 31-8-2005. Since security service was one of the sixteen services covered by Rule 6(5), the credit was considered admissible and proportionate credit in case of repair service after working out was considered admissible for the period 10-9-2004 and 31-8-2005. In case of credit card services, for want of details and the invoice being in the name of individual, credit was disallowed. Appeal accordingly was remanded for limited purpose of working out proportionate admissible credit.

    3.3 Whether debit note is an admissible document for allowance of credit.

    Pharmalab Process Equipments P. Ltd. v. CCE, Ahmedabad 2009 (16) STR 94 (Tri.-Ahd)

    The Tribunal in this case observed that debit notes contained all relevant information required under Rule 9(2) of the CENVAT Credit Rules and therefore, the credit in principle was admissible based on such document which was not named as ‘invoice’. However, the matter was remanded to the original authority as there was no clarity whether the authority had verified the same documents which were presented before the Tribunal. Directions were issued to verify the documents and ensure receipt of service after allowing opportunity to appellant to present the case.

    4. Classification : Exclusion under one entry — Whether could be taxed under another entry ?

    Kiran Motors Ltd. v. CCE, 2009 (16) STR 74 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellant is an authorised service station of Tata Motors. vehicles and receives reimbursements for providing free service to customers during warranty period. Revenue demanded service tax u/ s. 6S(10S)(zzb) treating the service as business auxiliary service. Since the services provided by the appellant   are  in respect  of servicing/repairs    of vehicles  as authorised  service  station  services,  the ‘-   services  are classifiable  u/s.6S(10S)(zo)  as authorised  service  station  service  and  not  under  sub-clause (zzb) as contended  by revenue.  Under  sub-clause  (zo), only motor  cars,  light  motor  vehicles and two wheelers are included and commercial vehicles are not included. The appellant paid service tax in respect of motor cars etc. and the demand of the revenue was only in respect of light commercial vehicles. Relying on the Board’s Circular No. 87/ OS/2006-ST dated 6-11-2006 and Code 36.02 in the Master Circular No. 96/7/07-ST dated 23-8-2007, it was held that transport vehicles were clearly excluded from the category of authorised service station; it could not be brought to tax under another general category of business auxiliary service.

5. Intellectual property service: Services rendered in 1990 – whether payments in installments relevant to hold the service as taxable?

Modi Mundipharma    P. Ltd. v. CCE, Meerut 2009 (15) STR 713 (Tri.-Del.)

Appellant, a manufacturer of medicines under an agreement with a Swiss Company received ‘know-how’ in the form of information, data, drawing, secret formula etc. under its own brand name in India and paid royalty for a period of 10 years or more for the know-how. Service tax was demanded on royalty payment paid as receiver of intellectual property service. After perusing the agreement and Show Cause Notice, the Tribunal accepted the contention of the appellant that there was no finding as to receipt of know-how continuously. Payment whether made lumpsum or on deferred basis for know-how received in 1990 could not determine the liability of service tax as no service was provided during the disputed period and allowed the appeal. Since the appeal was allowed on this short ground, other aspects of the applicable date for ‘reverse charge’ etc. were not gone into.

6. Mandap Keeper’s    service:

When a hotel rented out rooms along with gardens, whether room rentals were liable for service tax under ‘Mandap Keeper Service’ ?

Merwara Estates v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur (2009) 21 SIT 327 (New Delhi CESTAT)

The appellants were running a hotel with gardens adjacent to it. They were renting the gardens for the purpose of various functions and for which they were registered as Mandap Keeper and were paying service tax accordingly. The appellant on few occasions, also rented hotel rooms simultaneously with the garden for the purpose of stay of people arriving for the functions. The appellant’s contention was that service tax was not payable on that portion.of the charges realised which is attributable to renting of hotel rooms. Revenue cited the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Rajmahal Hotel v. CCE, (2006) 3 SIT 75 (New Delhi CESTAT) in support of department’s case.

The Tribunal held that the decision in the case of Rajmahal Hotel (supra) only authorised levy of service tax on renting of halls attached to the hotels but not in respect of renting the hotel rooms. Renting hotel rooms for the purpose of stay was not covered under ‘Mandap Keeper Service’. Hence the view taken by the Tribunal earlier that the appellants were not liable to pay service tax in respect of charges recovered for renting of the hotel rooms was confirmed.

7. Outdoor catering service:

Preparation and serving food in company premises whether can be considered outdoor caterer’s service?

Rajeev Kumar Gupia v. CCE, Jaipur 2009 (16) STR 26 (Tri.-Del. )

Appellant cooked and served food in the canteen of a corporate where place for canteen, kitchen storer, furniture, electricity and even gas stove were provided by the company. The contract also provided for payment for advance to the appellant. It was held to be not liable as outdoor caterer’s service as appellant merely prepared and served food.

8. Penalty:

Not leviable  when  bonafide    belief exists.

8.1 Jay Canesh Auto  Centre v. CCE, Rajkot 2009 (15) STR 710 (Tri.-Ahd.)

Appellant, an authorised auto dealer paid service tax with interest before issue of Show Cause Notice and pleaded that on account of confusion as to liability under business auxiliary service on incentive received, did not pay such service tax. However, on receiving clarification from CBEC vide Circular No. 87/05/2006-ST of 6-11-2006, they paid service tax and therefore, penalty u/ s.78 be set aside by extending benefit u/ s.80. Penalty u/ s.78 was set aside.

8.2. Krunal Catering Service v. CCE, Vadodara 2009 (15) STR 716 (Tri:-Ahd.)

Appellant ran a canteen in a factory in the rural area and provided meals to employees. They were ignorant of liability of service tax as outdoor caterer as they merely ran a canteen. On learning about it, they paid service tax with interest. Revenue levied penalty u/ s.78 on the ground that ignorance of law could not be the excuse. According to the Tribunal, section 80 could come into play in the circumstances as the belief as to non-applicability of service tax was bonafide and accordingly, penalty u/ s.78 was set aside.

Some recent judgments

I Supreme Court :

    1. Grant of stay pending disposal of case.

        Ø Ravi Gupta vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi 2009 TIOL 47 SC-CT.

    For want of declaration forms, demand for over 8 crore was made on appellant, a dealer registered under the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975. The appellant prayed for further time to produce declaration forms, which was declined and on failing to get any relief, the appellant moved the Tribunal in six appeals. Along with the appeal, application to dispense with pre-deposit was filed. The Tribunal after hearing rival stands and particularly that declaration will be filed, directed payment of three crore rupees. The appellant filed a writ before the Delhi High Court questioning correctness of the order. The High Court directed the petitioner to produce statutory forms within six weeks and failing to do so, directed to pre-deposit in terms of the order. As the appellant did not produce the records, the Tribunal held that the appellant was required to pre-deposit three crore rupees as directed earlier and as the appellant failed to do both, appeals were held as not entertainable. A writ was again filed questioning correctness of the order, which was dismissed by the order on the ground that earlier order was not complied with. This order was challenged in appeal to the Supreme Court, wherein it was pleaded that the Tribunal and the High Court failed to appreciate that large number of declaration forms were to be collected from various parties and since the situation was beyond the control of the appellant, the forms could not be produced. If the forms are taken into account, the liability would not be more than 15 lakh.

    After examining the relevant provision, the Hon’ble Court observed that though discretion is available, it has to be exercised judiciously. These things are to be considered by the Tribunal while dealing with application for dispensing with the pre-deposit — prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The Court noted, “Merely on establishing a prima facie case, interim order of protection need not be passed. But on a cursory glance, if it appears that the demand has no legs to stand, it would be undesirable to require the assessee to pay full or substantive part and dispose of petition in a routine manner. Merely because the Court has indicated the principles, that does not give a licence to the forum/authority to pass an order which cannot be sustained on touchstone of fairness, legality and public interest. Where denial of interim relief may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injury or shake a citizen’s faith in the impartiality of public administration, interim relief can be given ! !”

    The Tribunal was accordingly directed to hear the appeal on merits without insisting on any pre-deposit. However, no opinion was expressed on the merits of the case and the appeal was disposed of.

II High Court — Important decisions :

2. CENVAT Credit : Credit for service tax paid on outward freight.

Ø Ambuja Cements Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others 2009 TIOL 447 STR 3 (P&H) — order dated February 10, 2009.

    Readers may refer to the decision of Delhi CESTAT reported at 2007 (6) STR 249 (Tri.-Del.) against which instant appeal was filed by the appellant on substantive question of law i.e., whether service of transportation up to the customer’s doorstep in the case of ‘for destination’ sales where the entire freight was paid and borne by the manufacturer would be ‘input service’ for Rule 2(1) of CC Rules and whether interest should have been demanded on the same ?

    The Hon’ble Court examined and relied on these aspects, the definition of ‘place of removal’ as provided in Section 4(3)(c)(iii) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the subsequently issued Board’s Circular No.97/6/2007-ST, dated 23.08.2007 (Master Circular) and the definition of input service as per Section 2(1) of the CC Rules — ‘Place of removal’ means a depot, a premise of consignment agent or any other premises or place where excisable goods are sold after the goods are cleared from the factory. Para 8.2 of the Board’s Circular (supra) contemplates fulfilment of certain conditions; (a) ownership of goods and the property of the goods should remain with the seller till the delivery of goods in acceptable condition at the doorstep of the purchasers, (b) the seller bears the risk of loss or damage in transit to destination, (c) the freight charge should form integral part of the price of goods.

    Binding nature of the Board’s Circular also was recognised by the Court relying on the decision of Paper Products Ltd. vs. CCE, (1999) 7 SCC 84 which in turn had relied inter alia on earlier SC decisions like Usha Martins Industries (1997) 7 SCC 47 and Ranade Micro Nutrients vs. CCE (1996) 10 SCC 387 and that the Revenue precluded from challenging the correction of the Circular even on the ground that is inconsistent with statutory provisions.

    Further, the Hon’ble Court examined that all the requirements of the Circular were fulfilled —the supply of cement was ‘at destination’. Freight and insurance were borne by the appellant. Referring to the reply filed by the appellant to show-cause notice, the Court ruled that the third condition of freight charge forming part of cost of excisable goods stood fulfilled and thus the service of transportation was ‘input service’ for the CC Rules and accordingly, the credit availed was ruled to have been lawfully availed and there being no contravention of law, consequential interest payment did not arise.

3. Broadband connectivity — liable for VAT as sale of light energy although taxable to service tax.

Ø Bharti Airtel Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka & Others 2009 TIOL 99 HC — KAR-VAT

Vide an order dated January 16, 2009 the judgment in this case has given rise to controversy and uncertainty as the broadband connectivity charge recovered by the appellant is held as ‘sale of light energy’ taxable under the Karnataka VAT Act on the entire sale proceeds in spite of being taxed to service tax and principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI, 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) is distinguished. The Assessing Authority in this case issued twelve notices under the Karnataka VAT Act (KVAT) to reassess the turnover of the appellant by adding subscription received towards leasing of broadband by treating the same as ‘transfer of right to use goods’ on the ground that physical lines of optical fibres were goods and rejecting appellant’s contention that leasing of broadband was a service on which service tax was paid. The demand was confirmed through a reassessment order on the new ground that the appellant was selling light energy. The appellant’s writ against the order was allowed by way of remand for fresh disposal. Twelve fresh notices were issued proposing to treat the transaction of providing broadband service as ‘sale of light energy’ and then were reassessed treating the leased service as sale of light energy. The Assessing Authority while deciding the case had also observed that there is no express provision in the service tax law that no VAT could be levied on a transaction on which service tax was levied nor does KVAT law contain a provision as to non-levy of VAT on a transaction on which service tax was levied by the Central Government. The appellant strongly relied on the decision of BSNL (supra), State of U.P. and Another vs. Union of India and Another 2003 TIOL 14 SC-ST, Associated Cement Company Ltd. vs. Asst. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur and Another 1971 (28) STC 629 and a few other decisions and contended that the order of reassessment was opposed to the decision in the case of BSNL (supra) and that the activity of transmission of data from one place to another through optical fibre cables (OFC) did not involve sale of ‘light energy’ to the subscribers of broadband. What is delivered by the broadband users is data or voice information in electronic wave form and the light emitted by the laser device in the transmitter is used only for transmitting the same data at the destination point and that there was no element of ‘sale’ as Artificially Created Light Energy (ACLE) could not be termed as ‘goods’ as defined under Article 366(12) of the Constitution of India, under Section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, Section 2(15) of the KVATAct, 2003, as it does not possess any of the properties of goods. The ACLE which is the electronic magnetic wave of high frequency is not capable of being possessed, stored, delivered and marketed and therefore, it cannot be held as goods was contended relying on the decision in the case of BSNL (supra), wherein it was held that ‘goods’ do not include ‘electro magnate waves’ or radio frequencies for the purpose of Article 366(29A)(a). Per contra on behalf of the Revenue, it was contented that the principle enunciated in BSNL’s case (supra) cannot be applied to this case, as it had not considered ‘artificially created light energy’ and placing strong reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in (1) Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs. CC (2001) 4 SCC 493 (2) Tata Consultancy Services vs. AP (2005) 1 SCC 3208 – 2004 (178) ELT 22 (SC) and (3) State of A.P. vs. NTPC & Others (2002) 5 SCC 203. It was further contended by the Revenue that artificially created light energy is capable of being abstracted, possessed and consumed and as such, it could be held as ‘goods’ for the purposes of Article 3661(12), Section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and Section 2(15) of the KVAT Act, 2003. The definition of ‘goods’ under these laws was examined in detail by the Hon’ble High Court and it observed that in the decisions of TCS (supra) and ACC (supra), the term ‘goods’ as used in Article 366(12) is very wide and includes all types of properties whether tangible or intangible/ any incorporeal property and accordingly it was held that software sale was sale of goods as it was capable of being extracted, consumed and used and it could be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed, etc. The Hon’ble High Court ana lysed observations in the BSNL’s case as regards’ electromagnetic waves’ in detail and distinguished non-extinguishable electromagnetic waves from’ Artificially Created Light Energy: (ACLE)’ and noted that ACLE is made to travel in the confined area in OFC Network and direction of their movement is regulated and that the said light energy gets extinguished and it cannot be reused by the same subscriber for carrying his another data or of any other subscriber. Each specific data is carried by a separate ACLE and it could be safely held that it is being abstracted, possessed, transmitted and delivered during transmission of data to the subscriber  and like, in the case of electricity, the creation, supply, possession, use and transmission (movement) and delivery of ACLE takes place almost simultaneously. Rival submissions including expert opinions were placed on record by the appellant as well as by the Revenue. However, artificially created light energy was held as ‘goods’.

Further questions that were examined were – whether there is a ‘sale’ of ACLE by the appellant to its subscriber so as to attract VAT and whether VAT was leviable even if transmission was chargeable to service tax. The definition of ‘sale’ was considered, analysed and discussed at great length and it was held that the nature of the transaction between the appellant and its subscriber under ‘service line agreement’ though is described as ‘service’, is one of ‘composite transaction’ involving ‘service’ and ‘sale’ elements. With ACLE, the data and information of the subscribers cannot be transmitted by using only OFC network. Similarly, without using OFC network, the data/information cannot be transmitted by using only ACLE.

For composite transactions, again the Supreme Court’s observations in BSNL’s case were examined and an opinion was formed that in the instant composite transaction also, the two elements of service and sale cannot be split. In this frame of reference, relying on the decision in State of UP vs. UOI, 2003 TIOL 14 SC-ST, it was held that the entire proceeds received from the subscriber as ‘service rentals’ would have to be taxed under the KVAT Act treating the transaction of providing broadband connectivity to its subscribers as sale of Artificially Created Light Energy *(ACLE) and that the Government of Karnataka had authority to levy VAT on the entire proceeds collected as ‘lease rentals’, despite it being assessed to ‘service tax’ by the Central Government under the Finance Act, 1994.

[Note:    The above decision would have repercussions of serious nature if finality is reached for taxing a transaction twice].

4. Whether supply of vessels to ONGC amounts to a service in relation to mining?

Indian National Ship Owners’ Association & Others vs. UOI & Others, 2009 TIOL 150 HC Mum-ST.
 
Members of the petitioner provide vessels that include offshore drilling rigs, harbour tugs, construction barges, etc. to exploration and production operators such as ONGC in India and in international waters on time-charter basis to carry out various jobs which inter alia includes anchor handling, towing of vessel, supply to rig or platform, supporting offshore construction, piloting big vessels in and out of harbour, etc. When the taxing entry of service in relation to mining of mineral oil or gas was introduced with effect from 01.06.2007 (entry 65(105)(zzzy), the petitioner’s members on approaching service tax authorities were informed that services of supply of vessels to ONGC or the like companies were liable for service tax under the said taxing entry and actions were initiated for recovery of service tax and an instant writ was filed therefor. In the interim, the Finance Act, 2008 with effect from 16.05.2008 introduced entry (zzzzj) to tax service in relation to supply of tangible goods for use without transferring right of possession and effective control of such goods. Accordingly, the petitioner pleaded that the activity of the members was specifically covered by the new entry and since it did not relate to ‘mining’, it was not covered by the earlier entry and that the new entry was not carved out of the old entry. Reliance was placed on Pappu Sweets & Biscuits & An. vs. CIT, UP, (1998) 7 SCC 228 and Yogendra North Naskar vs. CIT, Calcutta, (1969) 1 SCC 555 and also on Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals, 2005 (188) ELT (TrL), Diebola Systems (P) Ltd. 2008 9 STR 546 (TrL) and a couple of others.

Attention of the Court was drawn to the fact that there existed taxing entries for services of transportation by aircraft, transportation by road and transportation of goods other than water through pipeline or conduit, but no specific entry exists for transportation by sea and, therefore, the activity could not be subjected to service tax.

Provisions of Section 65A, entry (zzzy) and entry (zzzj) along with the respective clarificatory Circulars of the Board were examined. Quoting from the judgment of the Assam Court in the case of Magus Construction P. Ltd. vs. UOI, 2008 TIOL 321 HC GIW-ST, the Court observed that tax on services is a new concept and the Government had adopted selective approach as against comprehensive approach and this distinction needs to be kept in mind as only specified services are taxable under such approach.

The Court further observed that the expressions ‘in relation to’ and ‘in respect of’ are words known as of ‘widest amplitude, but one has to keep in mind the context in which they are used’. The services rendered by a person must have a direct or a proximate relation to the subject matter of the taxing entry. Services having remote connection cannot be included in a taxing entry on the strength of the words ‘in relation to’. Applying this, it was held that entry (zzzzj), was not inserted by amending entry (zzzy) and the former is not the specie of what is covered by (zzzy) and no service tax could be demanded on the activity of supply of vessels under mining service.

5. When does the taxable event take place under the service tax law?

CCE&C Vadodara vs. Schott Glass India P. Ltd., 2009 TIOL 82 HC -AHM-ST 2009 (14) STR 146 (Guj).

The Revenue challenged the order of Ahmedabad CESTA T on the following questions:

o Whether or not in service tax the taxable event is realisation of payment for taxable services rendered and not the time of rendering service?

o Whether or not at the time of realisation of payment for the taxable service provided, the provisions of Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) come into force making the service receiver liable for service tax?

According to the Revenue, in the order in question, the CESTAT had overlooked the fact that service tax burden was shifted to the recipient of service from 16.08.2002 in terms of Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) for services provided by non-residents and the respondent assessee was required to pay service tax on the amount paid in September, 2003. Factually, CESTAT had found that services were rendered prior to March 2002 and at such time, there was no liability cast on the receiver of service. The Court observed that service tax is levied as provided in Section 64(3) of the Act to all taxable services provided or after commencement of Chapter 97 of the Act. Thus, taxable event is providing all taxable services defined by Section 65(105) of the Act. Merely for the fact that invoice was raised later and payment was made subsequently, the liability cannot be fastened. Neither the Section nor did the Rule even suggest that taxable event is raising of the invoice for making the payment. The Tribunal accordingly had decided in accordance with the law based on facts and material on record and there was no legal infirmity in the order.

III Tribunal:

CENV AT Credit  :

6. Service tax on accident policies, etc. allowable as credit?

Milipore India Ltd. vs. CCE, Bangalore, II 2009 TIOL 490 CESTAT-BANG.

The  issue    related to availment of CENV AT credit  of service  tax on the services of medical and personal accident policy,  group  personal accident policy, insurance personal vehicle services, landscaping of factory  and  catering bills. Definition of input  service in Rule 2(i) of CC Rules was examined vis-a-vis CAS-4 standards reproduced in the decision of GTC Industries Ltd. 2008 TIOL 1634 CESTAT-MUM-LB Since CAS-4 considered all the services like medical benefit, subsidised food, education and canteen bill, etc. to form part of the cost of final products, the services received should be treated as received in relation to manufacture. , Further, since modernisation, renovation, repair etc. of the office premises, etc. are also included in the broad definition of input service, even landscaping should be treated as in relation to manufacture of final product and accordingly, the credit on all the above services was allowed.

7. Erection of machinery at buyer’s place by a sub-contractor: Whether allowable?

CCEX Vapi IAlidhara Textool Engineers PI Ltd. vs. Alidhora Textool Engineers Ltd./CCEX Vapi, 2009 TIOL 370 CESTAT-AHM.

A manufacturer supplied, installed and erected machinery in buyer’s premises. An agency was outsourced to instal the machines and took credit of service tax paid on erection and commissioning services provided by the said agency. The question involved was whether installation done at buyer’s premise would be treated as input service for manufacturing as it was a post manufacturing activity. It was contended that commissioning and installation cost was included in the price of machines and duty was paid on the same and that part of the service was provided at buyer’s premises and a part at manufacturer’s. Copy of sample sales contract wherein erection and commissioning cost was included was produced. Commissioning was to be managed by the appellant-manufacturer. Sub-contractor was held to be service provider to manufacturer and it was held that CENV AT Credit Rules do not require that the service should be rendered at factory only for determining eligibility of service tax credit and accordingly, credit was allowed to the appellant.

8. Service provided by one person, tax paid by another – whether entitled for credit?

Federal-Mogul-Goetze (India) Ltd. VS., CCE, Chandigarh, 2009 TIOL 460 CESTAT-DEL.

Credit was taken by a manufacturer on the basis of TR-6 challan showing payment of service tax by the sister concern of the service provider. Service provider was not registered initially when service was provided. Hence, its sister concern which was registered paid service tax charged to the appellant for services provided through its sister concern. This fact was intimated to the Asst. Commissioner. However, no reply was received. Later even the unregistered service provider got registered and paid service tax with interest. It was held that TR-6 was a valid document based on which credit was taken. Since the service tax liability was dis-charged and later even service tax registration was obtained by the actual service provider, it was held that credit could not be denied.

9. Service tax credit on mobile phones or landlines at residence of staff admitted as CENV AT credit.

ITC Ltd. VS. CC&CE, 2009 TIOL 439 CESTAT- MAD
 
Relying on the decision of the High Court in the case of CCE VS. Excel Crop Care Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 436 (Guj.) and also the Tribunal decision in the cases of Indian Rayon & Industries Ltd. VS. CCE Bhavnagar, 2006 (4) STR 79 and Keltech Engineers Ltd. vs. CCE, Mangalore, 2008 (10) STR 280 and the case of CCE (LTU) Chennai VS. Braka India, 2009 (89) RLT 876, it was held to the effect that in the absence of express prohibition under CCR, service tax paid is admissible as the phones were not installed at the factory premises cannot be the ground germane to the provision of rates relevant for the purpose.

10. Whether credit for service tax paid on reimbursable expenses is allowed to be taken?


Chandra Shipping  & Trading Services vs. CCE & C, 2009 (13) STR 655 (Tri.-Bang).

The appellant, a Custom House agent was alleged to have wrongfully availed input credit for over 4 years and an amount of over 52 lakh plus interest and penalty under Sections 76 and 78 were demanded. It was contended that CENVAT credit returns were not verified by the Department. The credit was denied on the grounds that credit was taken on services not used and that no evidence was produced by the appellant that no credit was availed by importers/exporters for whom the services were used. The appellant contended that grounds on which credit was denied were extraneous to the CCR, which have to be interpreted strictly and credit could not be denied based on suspicion. Time bar also was pleaded. Benefit of time bar was granted to the appellant. Since the Revenue had not verified the facts, benefit of doubt was granted to the appellant. It was held that the burden of proof was on the Department to prove the allegations with solid evidence. Since the appellant had filed all its Returns regularly, the demand hit by time bar and the penalties were set aside.

11. Credit taken prior to payment for value of input service.

Gujarat Pipavav Port Ltd. vs. CCE Bhavnagar, 2009 (14) STR 53 (Tri.-AHD).

Service tax credit was availed one month earlier than permissible under Rule 3(1) of the Service Tax Credit Rules, 2002. Credit can be availed only after making payment for value of input service and the service tax shown in the invoice. The appellant pleaded technical lapse. Since in any case credit was available in the next month, interest for one month was required to be paid but penalty imposed was waived.

Part B — Some recent landmark judgments

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New Page 1

1.
Board’s Circulars when in
conflict with SC’s decision : Whether binding ?

Supreme
Court (Constitution Bench) :

CCE v. Bolpur Ratan Melting and Wire Industries, 2008
TIOL 194 SC-CX-CB :

(i) In this case, a Bench of three Judges of the Supreme
Court made a reference to a Larger Bench whereby observations made in the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhiren Chemical Industries, 2002
(2) SCC 127 were referred to be clarified, since the decision in the case of
Dhiren Chemicals (supra) was given by a Bench of five judges, it was
considered appropriate that a Bench of similar strength hands down an
authoritative pronouncement.

 

(ii) Background :

In the case of Dhiren Chemicals (supra), the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Usha Martin Industries 1997 (7) SCC 477 was
overruled based on an interpretation of a particular phrase whereby benefit of
exemption notification was denied, however, as per Board’s clarification,
exemption was granted. However, during the hearing of case of Dhiren Chemicals,
it was pointed out that based on the Board’s Circular, benefit of exemption
notification was granted to many cases. These were likely to be reopened if
interpretation in the case of Dhiren Chemicals was to be followed. Therefore,
para in the judgment of Dhiren Chemicals (para 11 in SCC) included a para as
follows :

 

“We need to
make it clear that regardless of the interpretation that we have placed on the
said phrase, if there are Circulars which have been issued by the Central
Board of Excise and Customs which place a different interpretation upon the
said phrase, that interpretation will be binding upon the Revenue.”

 


This was done to ensure to bind the Department wherever
exemption benefit was granted.

 

(iii) The counsel for the assessee laid stress on the binding
nature of Circulars qua the revenue authorities and argued that even if a
circular ran counter to the decision of Supreme Court, the Revenue was bound by
the circular and it could not take advantage of the Supreme Court’s decision. It
was also contended that once a Circular was brought to the notice of the Court,
the Revenue’s appeal based on the ground contrary to the Circular should be
turned down.

 

(iv) The Apex Court in the instant case observed that while
Circulars issued by the Board are undoubtedly binding on the authorities under
the respective statutes, the law declared by the Supreme Court would be binding
in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution and as such, Circular cannot prevail
once Supreme Court order to deny appeal to the Revenue and lay content with the
Circular would mean that there is no scope for adjudication by the High Court or
Supreme Court and this would be against the concept of majesty of law of the
Supreme Court. The appeal by the Revenue was allowed.

 

2. Penalty u/s.11AC of the Central Excise Act : Whether
mandatory ?

Supreme Court : Larger Bench :

Union of India v. Dharmendra Textile Processors, 2008
(231) 3 ELT (SC)

 

(i) Background :

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court referred the
controversy involved in several appeals to a Larger Bench to examine whether the
view expressed in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint Commissioner of Income-tax,
Mumbai,
2007 (219) ELT 15 (SC) was correct. The issue involved related to
whether mens rea was an essential ingredient for penalty leviable
u/s.11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1994, and whether or not there was a scope
for levying penalty below the prescribed minimum. The Revenue contended that
there was no discretion with the authority in the matter of imposition of
penalty and they were duty bound to impose penalty equal to the duty determined
or payable. The assessee’s contention was that it was open for the authority not
to impose any penalty, as the basic scheme of the said S. 11AC was identical to
one u/s.271(1)© of the Income-tax Act and in the given case, it was open to
the Assessing Officer not to impose penalty. The Division Bench held the view
that correct position in law was laid down in Chairman, SEBI v. Shriram
Mutual Fund & Anr.,
2006 (5) SCC (361). Hence, the matter was referred to a
Larger Bench.

 

(ii) The Division Bench also made reference to Rule 96ZQ and
Rule 96ZO of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. It was noted that in some cases,
the assessee challenged vires of Rule 96ZQ(5) and the Gujarat High Court held
that the said Rule incorporated the requirement of mens rea. The Division
Bench stated that even if Larger Bench took a view that penalty under this
clause was mandatory, it was open for an assessee to challenge vires of Rule
96ZQ(5). Further, it was also agreed that similar issue was involved in Rule
96ZO. However, the Additional Solicitor General submitted that in Rules 96ZQ and
96ZO, there was no reference to any mens rea as in S. 11AC where mens
rea
was prescribed statutorily. This was evident from the fact that extended
period of limitation was permissible u/s.11A of the Act. In essence, it was
contended that penalty was for statutory offence and it was observed that
proviso to S. 11A provided the time for initiation of action, whereas S. 11AC
meant only a mechanism for computation and the quantity of penalty. Thus the
onus lay on the Revenue to establish that extended period is applicable and on
crossing this hurdle, the assessee is exposed to penalty and the quantum is
already fixed. It was also observed that in the statutes where mens rea
exists, if any penalty limit or a maximum penalty, etc. is prescribed, it is to
be levied in accordance with the said limits, but if no variable is provided, no
discretion exists.

iii) On the other hand, on behalf of appellants, reference of SC’s decision in case of State of MP & Ors. v. Bharat Heavy Electricals, 1997 (7)SCC 1 was made to contend that even if the Court held that imposition of penalty was mandatory, yet there was a scope for exercise of discretion. It was further submitted that various degrees of culpability cannot be on the same footing and S. llAC could be con-strued in a manner by reading into it the discretion and that was considered a proper way of giving effect to statutory intention.

iv) Relevant provision of each of S. llAC, Rule 96ZQ, Rule 96Z0 and also of S. 271(1)(c) of the IT Act were gone into. Further, observations made in Chairman SEBI’s case were also gone into at length and it was contended that a specific Section in the SEBIAct viz. S. 24 dealt with criminal offences under the Act and its punishment. Therefore, penalty leviable under Chapter VIA of the said Act was neither criminal nor quasi-criminal, but related to breach of civil obligation i.e., default or failure of statutory obligation and as such, mens rea by the appellant was not required. A catena of decisions were gone into where it was held that mens rea was not an essential foundation for imposing penalty for breach of civil obligations.

v) The Court further observed that the decision of Bharat Heavy Electricals’ case (supra) was not of assistance to the assessee, as the same proceeded on the basis of concessions and even otherwise, it was not open to the Bench to read into a statute which was specific and clear, something which was not specifically provided. The Bench further observed, “The statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent”. The Court cited observations of many decisions on similar issues which inter alia included, “Rules of interpretation do not permit the Courts to do so unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. The Courts are not entitled to read words into the Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn, L’C, in Vickers Sons)”. The Court at the end stated “it is of significance to note that conceptual and contextual difference between S. 271(1)(c) of the IT Act was lost sight of in Dilip Shroff’s case (supra).

vi) The explanations appended in S. 271(1)(c) entirely indicate the element of strict liability on the assessee for concealment or for providing inaccurate particulars while, filing the return. The penalty under that provision is a civil liability. The Section read with the explanations indicates that the said Section has been enacted to provide for a remedy for loss of revenue and willful concealment is not an essential ingredient to attract a civil liability as in the case of prosecution u/ s.276C of the IT Act. Accordingly it was ruled that penalty u/s.llAC of the Act was mandatory.
 

3. CENVAT Credit whether admissible on outdoor caterer’s service in canteen of a manufacturer:

Larger Bench  decision:

CCE Mumbai 5 v. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 (12) STR (Tri.LB)

i) The issue in the instant case relates to whether or not service of an outdoor caterer provided in the canteen of a manufacturer be considered ‘input service’ within the meaning of the definition of input service under Rule 2(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The definition contains two parts – the first being the definition of input service and the second part is an inclusive clause listing various services. The Revenue contended that the inclusive clause is limited only to services enumerated in the said clause and since the disputed service i.e., out-door catering service is not one of them, it will not qualify as an input service.

ii) The appellant’s contention on the other hand was that the term ‘includes’ enhances the scope of the definition and therefore, a restrictive approach cannot be adopted. The appellant also contended that the words in the definition ‘activities relating to business’ were followed by the words ‘such as’ which was further followed by a list of services. Thus, the term ‘such as’ was used to provide only an illustrative list of services and not exhaustive. Any activity that related to business could form part of the expression ‘input service’.

(iii) The appellant also discussed an extract of press note dated August 12, 2004 along with the draft rules issued by the Ministry of Finance prior to introduction of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 which provided indication of the object of the Legislature. The notified rules expanded the scope of the draft rules by including the activities such as coaching and training, computer networking, credit rating, share registry and security, etc. In view of this, the appellant submitted that the argument of the Department that the scope of the definition was restricted to the services specified in the inclusive part of the definition was incorrect inasmuch as the scope of the term ‘activities relating to business’ was expanded and illustrated further when the rules were notified. Thus, the Legislature intended to allow credit on all such services which were activities relating to business. It was also argued that Service Tax being a value added tax and a consumption tax, it essentially formed part of the value of the goods
services, the credit of which  could  not be denied.

iv) In support of the above, para 4.1 of CAS-4 was referred to, which defined ‘cost of production’, and under the head ‘direct wages and salaries’ subsidised food is considered as part of direct wages and salaries being fringe benefits. It was also noted by the Tribunal that it was mandatory on part of the factories to provide canteen facility and failure of which attracts prosecution and penalty u/s.92 of the Factories Act, 1948. Service Tax on outdoor catering service is paid by the manufacturer for running the canteen, irrespective of the fact whether subsidised food is provided or not. Since this cost has bearing on the cost of production, it was held that catering services have to be considered as an input service relating to the business and CENVAT credit in respect thereof would be admissible. The view of the Tribunal expressed in the case of Victor Gaskets India Ltd. & Others, 2008 (10) STR 369 was accordingly approved.




Some Recent Judgments

I.          HIGH
COURT :

 

1.         Applicability
of Service Tax :

 

Whether laying pipes in
wall/roof/floor, etc. or fixing cable trays and digging earth to lay cables,
etc. liable under ‘Erection, Commissioning or Installation service’.

 

Commissioner of C. Ex., Chandigarh v.
Rajeev Electrical Works, 2010 (18) STR (P&H)

 

The appellant, engaged in electrical
fittings obtained registration under ‘Erection, Commissioning or Installation
service’ on 30-11-2004. Since the service was taxable from 1-7-2003, a
show-cause notice was issued for recovery of tax with interest and penalty for
the period 1-7-2003 to 30-11-2004.

 

The appellant contended that they were
engaged in laying pipes in wall/roof/floor for crossing of wires, fixing the
junction box, etc. and were not involved in any services in relation to
installation of plant, commissioning, machinery and equipment for the period
under dispute.

 

In Department’s appeal, the High Court held
that laying pipes in wall/roof/floor for crossing of wires, fixing the junction
box, etc. would not amount to installation of plant, commissioning, machinery
and equipment, and therefore was not liable to service tax. A reference was
made to Circular No. 62/11/2003, dated 21 -8-2003 where it was clarified that
putting up electric wires and fitting in residential premises would not be
covered in the definition of taxable service and thus not liable to service
tax.

 

2.         Applicability
of Service Tax on Rent-a-cab :

 

Whether tourist permit is essential for
levying tax on tour operator under Rent-a-cab service.

 

Commissioner of C. Ex., Chandigarh v.
Kuldeep Singh Gill, 2010 (18) STR 708 (P&H)

 

The respondent was providing transport
service to Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) for which service tax was demanded
under ‘Rent-a-cab’ category.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the levy
of tax and penalty u/s.76.

 

However, the Tribunal held that since the
cabs were not leased to IOC for use of the vehicles at its own discretion,
service tax was not leviable.

 

In Department’s appeal to the High Court,
relying upon the decision in Secretary Federation of Bus Operators v. Union of
India, 2006 (2) STR (Mad.), it was observed that S. 65 of service tax
articulates a tourist vehicle and not holding a permit under the Motor Vehicle
Act as necessity for levy of tax. Just because it is essential to hold a permit
under the Motor Vehicle Act, the same cannot be made squarely applicable to
service tax.

 

Hence, it was held that the respondent
provided transport service and was liable for service tax under Rent-a-cab service.

 

3.         Order
:

 

Whether a letter from Commissioner
can be treated as order.

 

Chief Commissioner, LTU, Bangalore v.
TNT India Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (19) STR 5 (Kar.)

 

The respondent engaged in door-to-door
international courier service, approached the Additional Commissioner
questioning the applicability of service tax on the service provided by them.
The Additional Commissioner confirmed that the service was not taxable vide
order dated 23-12-2004.

 

Subsequently the Revenue realised that the
said order was against the Circular No. 341/43/96 TRU dated 31-10-1996 and
hence the order of Commis-sioner was void-ab-initio. A letter dated 9-1- 2006
was issued in this respect. The respondent filed an appeal before the Tribunal
contending that the letter dated 9-1-2006 was an order and the same was
appealable. The order was passed without providing opportunity of being heard
and hence was bad in law. The Tribunal passed the order in favour of the
respondent.

 

The Revenue then preferred an appeal before
the High Court where the main issues involved were :

 

(a)        Whether
Tribunal was correct in concluding that the letter of Commissioner was an order
appealable u/s.86, even though same was not passed u/s.73, u/s.83A, u/s.84 or
u/s.85 of the Finance Act, 1994 ?

 

(b)        Whether
‘International Flight’ activity was taxable service ?

 

The Revenue asserted that the letter of
Commissioner was only a clarificatory letter and powers conferred u/s.73,
u/s.83A, u/s.84 or u/s.85 of the Finance Act, 1994 were not exercised and
consequently S. 86 for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal could not be made
applicable. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal was not maintainable.

 

The respondent contended that the letter
issued by the Commissioner was a valid order u/s.84 and was passed without
providing opportunity of being heard. Similarly the letter issued to the
respondent was different from the letter issued to the lower authorities. The
letter was incomplete and did not contain footnote, which contained directions
to the lower authorities to issue a show-cause notice for recovery of service
tax and interest thereon.

 

The High Court examined S. 84 pertaining to
revision of orders by the Commissioner and affirmed that any exercise of power
u/s.84 was an order within the meaning of the Finance Act, 1994. The Court
opined that order of the Additional Commissioner was reviewed by the
Commissioner. Therefore, the Commissioner should have provided opportunity of
being heard.

 

Hence, the High Court held that the
Tribunal was correct in concluding that the letter of the Commissioner was an
order, it was appealable and directed the competent authority to pass a valid
order on the issue of taxability after providing opportunity of being heard.

 

 

4.         Powers
of Director General of Service Tax (DGST) :

 

Whether DGST has power to entertain
appeal against order of lower authorities?

 

Aircargo Agents Association of India v.
Union of India, 2010 (18) STR 715 (Bom.)

 

The High Court in its order against writ
petition directed the parties to approach the DGST and the DGST to grant a
hearing before passing an order.

 

 

However, the parties contended that the
DGST had no power to entertain appeal against order of the lower authorities
and pass order.

 

The High Court held that the DGST did not
have power to pass orders.

 

II.        TRIBUNAL
:

 

5.         Applicability
of Service Tax :

 

Whether secondary services provided
towards export of services are exempt ?

 

Ruth Shipping Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v.
Commissioner of C. Ex., Thirunelveli, 2010 (19) STR 39 (Tri-Chennai)

 

The appellant, a CHA received brokerage
from steamer agent for arranging containers on which service tax was demanded
as ‘Business Auxiliary Service’. The appellant contended that the service was
non-taxable and the same was accepted by the Assistant Commissioner. However a review
order was passed by the Commissioner who held that the appellant was liable to
tax.

 

In an appeal preferred to the Tribunal, the
appellant relying on Circular No. 56/5/2003, dated 25-4-2003 contended that
secondary service of arrang-ing a container were primarily used by exporter of
services and they get consumed/merged with exported services, they were not
liable to tax.

 

 

The Tribunal holding that the view of the
appellant was corroborated by Lee & Muirhead Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Service Tax, Bangalore, 2009 (14) STR 348, the demand was set aside.

 

6.         Burden
of proof of suppression :

 

Whether Department owns the burden to
prove suppression of facts by the assessee ?

 

R. A. C. Steels v. Commissioner of
Central Excise, Salem, 2010 (18) STR 775 (Tri-Chennai)

 

The Department levied penalty u/s.76,
u/s.77 and u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994 invoking extended period of
limitation.

 

The appellant pleaded to the Tribunal of
their ignorance. However, their prayer that the burden to prove that there was
suppression of facts by the appellant was not discharged by the Department was
accepted and penalties were set aside.

 

7.         CENVAT
Credit :

 

Whether CENVAT credit on washing
machines used in factory allowable ?

 

Commissioner of C. Ex. & ST, LTU,
Bangalore v. Micro Labs Ltd., 2010 (18) STR 771 (Tri-Bang.)

 

The respondent utilised CENVAT credit on
indus-trial washing machines falling under Chapter 84 of CETA and used for
washing uniforms of employees. The Department denied the credit on the machines
contending that the same are not used in manufacture of final products.

 

The matter was decided in favour of the
respondent by the Deputy Commissioner, LTU as well as the Commissioner
(Appeals).

 

The appellant relied upon India Cements
Ltd. v. CCE, Trichy 2006 (205) ELT 170 (Tri-Chennai) where it was held that any
capital goods which do not take part in the process of manufacture are not
eligible for CENVAT credit.

 

According to the assessee, industrial
washing machines fall within the definition of ‘capital goods’ as defined in
Rule 2(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. Further, the Commissioner (Appeals)
found that requirement of clean clothes is mandatory as per Rule 5.4 of the
Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1945. The assessee also relied upon the case of
Toyota Kirloskar Motor Ltd. v. CCE, Bangalore-III, 2002 (148) ELT 402
(Tri-Bangalore).

 

The Tribunal held that the industrial
washing machines fall within Rule 2(a) and as they are used in factory of
manufacture, credit was admissible.

 

8.         CENVAT
credit on construction :

 

Whether CENVAT credit on construction
of staff quarters allowable?

 

The Laxmi Vilas Bank Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy 2010 (19) STR 40 (Tri-Chennai)

 

CENVAT credit on construction of staff
quarters was disallowed on the ground that the staff residential quarters
located within the bank premises cannot be construed as office relating to bank
premises.

 

The Tribunal held that construction
services used in staff residential quarters located within the bank premises
are covered under the definition of input service as per Rule 2(l) of the
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. So, the CENVAT credit on construction service was
allowed.

 

9.         Penalty
:

 

Whether penalty u/s.76 and u/s.78 is
mutually exclusive ?

 

AR. AS. PV. PV. Motors Erode (P) Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem, 2010 (18) STR 722 (Tri-Chennai)

 

The appellant was ordered to pay penalty
u/s.76 and u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994 where service tax and interest were
already paid prior to com-munication of adjudication order.

 

The appellant contended that the penalty
u/s.76 and u/s.78 was mutually exclusive and since they had paid the penalty
u/s.78 @25%, the penalty imposed u/s.76 was liable to be set aside.

 

The appellant relied upon S. 78(1) of
service tax and the Tribunal’s decision in the case of M/s. Safe Test
Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem and argued that since
service tax and interest had been paid prior to communication of the order,
penalty u/s.78 was liable to be reduced.

 

 

The High Court agreed with both the
contentions and set aside the penalty u/s.76 and reduced penalty u/s.78 to 25%
of service tax demanded.

 

10.       Refund
:

 

Whether refund can be denied on the
grounds beyond the scope of show-cause notice ?

 

Caliber Point Business Solutions Ltd. v.
Commis-sioner of Service Tax, Mumbai, 2010 (18) STR 737 (Tri-Mumbai)

 

The appellant, a BPO service provider filed
refund claim under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules which was rejected on
technical grounds like ab-sence of registration number on input invoices,
non-availability of original invoices and absence of nexus between input and
output services. How-ever, no explanation was provided for absence of nexus.

 

The appellant filed an appeal wherein
rejection was made on the ground of absence of nexus, non-utilisation of CENVAT
credit and difference between ST-3 and refund claim. The later two grounds were
not a part of the original show-cause notice.

 

Relying on Reckitt & Colman of India
Ltd. v. CCE, 1996 (88) ELT 641 (SC), it was held that the Tribunal cannot
travel beyond show-cause notice and favour the Revenue and require the
appellant to meet demands which were never required to be met before the
Revenue.

 

Regarding the absence of nexus in case of
rent-a-cab service, air travel service and BPO service, the appellant relied
upon CST, Delhi v. Conver-gys India Pvt. Ltd., 2009 (16) STR 198 (Tri-Del.)
wherein it was held that without questioning the CENVAT credit, its eligibility
for rebate cannot be questioned.

Further the refund claim was allowed as the
appel-lant proved the nexus between rent-a-cab service, air travel service and
BPO service.

 

 

Refund — GTA service :

 

Whether service tax on transport
service paid by GTA as well as consignor can be refunded to GTA ?

 

Commissioner of C. Ex., Cochin v. Garuda
Transport, 2010 (18) STR 773 (Tri-Bangalore)

 

The respondent filed refund claim of
service tax on transport service paid twice. The tax was paid by him and the
consignor also. The refund claim was rejected by the lower authorities on the
ground of inadequacy of records. An appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) was
filed by the Revenue.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) in his findings
record-ed that the respondent had submitted audited final accounts, freight
bills, challans, CA certificate as to absence of unjust enrichment and
certificate from the sole consignor and accepted double payment of service tax
and held refund claim as valid.

 

The Revenue contended that the Commissioner
(Appeals) did not verify the documents to prove absence of unjust enrichment.
However, the Tribunal held that findings in order of the Commissioner (Appeals)
indicate that he had verified all the relevant documents and hence the refund
claim was accepted.

 

11. Review order : Scope :

 

Whether a review order can be passed
after appeal is filed against the original order ?

 

Avery India Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Service Tax, Delhi, 2010 (18) STR 760 (Tri-Delhi)

 

A refund claim of the appellant was accepted
by the Department but was credited to Consumer Welfare Fund. The Commissioner
(Appeals) how-ever passed the order that refund be credited to the appellant’s
account.

 

On receipt of order from the Commissioner
(Appeals), the Commissioner issued a show-cause notice to review the original
order passed by the lower authorities and later passed an order rejecting the
claim of refund.

 

The appellant contended that the original
order of the lower authority got merged with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).
They also claimed that an appeal was filed by the Revenue against the order of
the Commissioner (Appeals) before the date of review order by the Commissioner
and hence the review order and order of rejection of refund based on review
order were not established.

 

 

The Tribunal observed that revision powers
of the Commissioner u/s.84 of the Finance Act, 1994 are restricted. As per S.
84(4), “no revision order could be passed by the Commissioner if any issue in
the order was pending before the Commissioner (Appeals).” In the instant case,
the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was also appealed before the Tribunal.
Hence, the review order was set aside.

 

12.       Show-cause
notice :

 

Whether an order, which is at
variance with show-cause notice, is sustainable in law

 

Glass Fibres v. Commissioner of Central
Excise, Cochin, 2010 (18) STR 726 (Tri-Bangalore
)

 

The appellant was engaged in the activity
of receipt and stacking operation, loading, packing, repacking, storage, etc.
and was registered as ‘Cargo Handling’ agency. The client of the appellant
refused to pay tax on the activity relating to storage, as it was not covered
as ‘Cargo Handling’ service. The appellant filed a refund claim of
non-reimbursed tax.

 

The original authority rejected the plea on
the ground that it was covered as ‘Cargo Handling’ services. However, the
Commissioner (Appeals) held that the activities related to storage, stacking
and shifting should be more appropriately classifiable under ‘Storage and
warehousing’ services.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
Commissioner (Appeals), the appellant filed an appeal before the Tribunal and
contended as follows :

 

The Commissioner affirmed the order on the
grounds not mentioned in the show-cause notice. The appellant relied on various
case laws for taking such stand and contended that the order should be seen in
the light of show-cause notice and order-in-original and that the order at
variance of show-cause notice is not sustainable in law.

 

The Tribunal held that the judicial
authorities amply support the case of the appellant and in facts of the case,
the appeal was allowed and that the appellant was held not liable for service
tax even though the activity was as such taxable for the reason that the demand
was not conformed to the services alleged in the show-cause notice.

Part B — Some recent judgments

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New Page 1

1. Supreme Court :

Clearing and forwarding service : Consignment
agent :

Super Polyfabriks Ltd. V. CCE, Punjab, 2008 (10) STR
545 (SC)

The appellant under an agreement with Gas Authority of India
is a ‘consignment stockist’. The period in question was from 1-9-1999 to
31-7-2002. Both the Appellate Authority and the Tribunal dismissed respective
appeals. The short question was, whether in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the petitioner was providing services of clearing and forwarding. The
appellant pleaded that lower authorities proceeded only on the premise that the
agent was clearing and forwarding agent relying on the decision in the case of
Prabhat Zarda Factory P. Ltd. V. CCT, Patna 2002 (145) ELT 222 —
which was subsequently overruled by a Larger Bench in the case of Larsen &
Toubro Ltd. V. Commissioner,
2006 (3) STR 321. The Supreme Court relying on
the decision in the case of V. Lakshmanan v. B. R. Mangalagiri & Others,
(1995 Supp 2 SCC 33) opined that for determination of the liability, the
agreement has to be read as a whole. The purport and object in a contract could
be ascertained only from terms and conditions thereof. Neither nomenclature nor
a particular activity would be decisive. Whether in substance and effect the
person was a clearing and forwarding agent must be ascertained from the terms of
the agreement and conclude whether job of clearing and forwarding agent’s
operation was incidental to the main activity of getting the orders and selling
to clients or otherwise. Matter was remitted back to the assessing authority as
the orders were passed ex-parte because the appellant had not appeared
either before the assessing authority or the Appellate Authority.

2. High Court :

2.1 Construction service : Whether value of material
supplied free of charge includible in the value of taxable service ?

Era Infra Engineering Ltd. V. UOI, 2008 (11) STR 3
(Del.) :

The petitioner, engaged in providing commercial or industrial
construction service, received material free of cost from the owner company, was
issued show cause notice proposing to levy Service Tax on such free supply of
material, based on the explanation in Notification No. 1/2006-ST, which provides
for inclusion of value of goods supplied, provided or used by the provider of
construction service. Relying on the provisions of S. 67(3) and interim order in
the case of Larsen & Toubro v. UOI, 2007 (7) STR 123 (Mad.), the High
Court ruled that until conclusion of adjudication proceedings, material value
supplied free of charge would not be added for determining the taxable value and
that explanation in the Notification would not be applied to the detriment of
the petitioner. [CESTAT Delhi in the case of Millennium Constructions Pvt.
Ltd. V. CST, Delhi,
2008 TIOL 838 CESTAT Del. Waived pre-deposit of interest
and penalty levied when Service Tax demanded on addition of cement and steel
value received from recipient of services was already paid by the  appellant.]

2.2 Penalty : Whether reducible below the minimum prescribed limit ?

UOI v. Aakar Advertising, 2008 (11) STR 5 (Raj.)

The Tribunal in the appeals in question :


à
reduced the penalty imposed to 10% of the duty demanded

à
Entertained an appeal on merits when order was passed dismissing the appeal
for non-payment of pre-deposit.


Short questions that arose in the two appeals aggregated
were :


à
Whether the Tribunal could reduce the penalty imposable u/s.76 below the
minimum prescribed limit ?

à
Whether the Tribunal could entertain an appeal on merits when the Commissioner
(appeals) rejected the appeal because of default in making pre-deposit u/s.35F
of the Central Excise Act, 1944 ?


For the question no. 2, it was pleaded that since the
Tribunal already allowed the appeal, the assessee be granted reasonable time to
comply with requirement of pre-deposit even at such stage and set aside the
order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and direct the Commissioner to decide on
merits. The High Court acceded to such request and directed the Commissioner to
decide the appeal on merits on condition of complying with pre-deposit within 4
weeks’ time.

As regards the question no. 1, it was held that if cause of
failure was reasonable, penalty may be set aside. Penalty could be played with
only between minimum and maximum prescribed limits and could not be reduced
below the minimum prescribed limit under the garb of any discretion. Yet it was
not always necessary to impose maximum penalty. The matter was remitted back to
the Commissioner (Appeals) with a direction to decide the penalty afresh
objectively and dispassionately after hearing the parties and in view of the
above observations in the instant order.

3. Tribunal :

3.1 Cargo handling service :

M/s. Jet Airways (India) Ltd. V. CST, Ahmedabad, 2008
TIOL 979 CESTAT Ahm.

The appellant, an airlines that transports passengers and cargo by air, receives booking of cargo to be transported by themselves at the booking office or through lATA agents appointed at various locations all over the country. The Revenue demanded Service Tax considering the appellant as cargo handling agency, although the appellant neither collected cargo from the premises of consignor, nor delivered the same to the consignee. The appellant contende ‘ that the service of transportation of goods by air was ” made taxable w.e.f. 10-9-2004 without disturbing any of the existing entries. Further that, the Board’s Circular F. No. B/11/1/2002, dated 1-8-2002 while detailing cargo handling services cited illustrations of services provided by Airports Authority of India, Inland Container Depot, Container Freight Station, etc. did not refer to any airlines undertaking transportation of goods. Accepting these pleas and relying on the Tribunal decisions inter alia cases of Dr. Lal Nath Lab. (P) Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (4) STR 527 (Tri. Del.) and Glaxo SmithKline v. CCE, 2005 (188) EL 171 (Tri.-Mum.), it was held that when new entry is introduced without disturbing existing entries, it has to be held that the new entry was not covered by any previous entry.

3.2 CENVAT Credit:

Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Meerut, 2008 TIOL 1022 CESTAT Del.

Considering that manpower supply service was not liable for Service Tax prior to 16-6-2005, the credit of Service Tax paid by the contractor of the company was denied. Stay application was allowed on the ground that since the Revenue accepted Service Tax paid by the contractor, applicant had prima facie – strong case.

3.3 Construction Service:

M/s. Greenview Land & Buildcon Ltd. v. CCE Chandigarh, 2008 TIOL 900 CESTAT Del.

The appellant, a developer and a builder, constructed complex himself without engaging a contractor and sold flats. The order of the original authority was based on DGST Circular dated 16-2-2006, which provided that Service Tax was attracted on such construction. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the appeal for non-fulfilment of pre-deposit vide – stay order. The plea of the appellant was that CBCE Circular No. 96/7/2007-ST of 23-8-2007 suppressed the DGST Circular and clarified that when builder did not engage contractor for construction, no service provider-service recipient relationship existed to attract provision of Service Tax. This was accepted by the Tribunal and the matter was remanded for de novo consideration in the light of Circular No. 96/ 7/2007 and without insisting on pre-deposit.

3.4  Export of service:

i) Blue Star Ltd. v. CCE, Bangalore, 2008 (11) STR 23 (Tri.-Bang.)

The appellant booked orders of foreign principals and received commission in convertible foreign exchange and accordingly, contented that such business auxiliary services were provided from India and used outside India fulfilled conditions to construe the services as ‘exports’ in terms of Export of Services Rules, 2005. The Department’s contention was that services were provided in India and refund of Service Tax paid on ‘exported’ services was rejected. The Tribunal held that refund be granted as the conditions of Rule 3(2) were satisfied and the appellant’s services were held as exports. The Tribunal allowed the appeal stating that the Commissioner had not considered the clause in the agreement relating to services rendered by the appellant.

ii) M/s. National Eng. Industries Ltd. v. CCE, [aipur, 2008 TIOL 939 CESTAT Del.

The appellant, an agent of General Motors, USA provided services of sourcing them on contract with Indian Railways. The appellant, although ‘exported’ service, paid Service Tax on the commission received from General Motors through Indian Railways. Refund claim was rejected on the ground that the commission from General Motors was received through Indian Railways in Indian rupees in lieu of foreign exchange and therefore, condition of Rule 3(1)(b) of the Export Rules was violated. According to the appellant, the purchase order of the party provided that agency commission of certain amount of US dollars be paid in equivalent non-convertible Indian rupees at prevailing exchange rate on relevant date and based on this, Indian Railways paid to the foreign party net of the said commission amount.

The Tribunal held that the purpose of Rule 3(2) was to extend benefit of exemption of Service Tax to persons earning convertible foreign exchange and since the equivalent amount payable to the appellant was not released to Indian Railways, the appellant complied with the provision of Rule 3(1)(b). The appeal was allowed while stating that machinery of a statute should be interpreted so as to promote the object and purpose of the scheme and the case should be decided in fulfilment with the legislative intention.
 
3.5  Import of Services: Effective date: Whether 18-4-2006 or 16-8-2002 ?

CCE Raipur  v. Jindal Steel Power Limited,  2008 (11) STR 14 (7)

Contention of the Revenue that services provided by foreign-based commission agent were liable for Service Tax prior to 18-4-2006 under the category of business auxiliary service under Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules was rejected as the issue is considered settled in the case of Foster Wheeler’s [2007 (7) STR 443], wherein it was held that services provided by a service provider not having an office in India is taxable with effect from 18-4-2006 only with the insertion of S. 66A of the Finance Act, 1994.

3.6  Subcontractor’s services:

JAC Air Services Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, New Delhi, 2008 TIOL 839 CESTAT DEL

The appellant provided cargo handling services in terms of agreement with Airports Authority of India for import of cargo. Relying on the Board’s instructions contained in F. No. 43/5/97-TRU of 2-7-1997 as to sub-consultancy, the plea of the appellant that they were subcontractors to Airports Authority of India was considered and waiver of pre-deposit was granted.

3.7 Refund: Under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004:

Caliber Point Business Solutions Ltd. v. CCE, Belapur, 2008 (11) STR 15 (Tri.-Mum.)

The appellant exported taxable services and availed CENVAT credit on input services. Refund claim filed under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 was rejected on the premise of non-application of the said rule to service providers prior to 14-3-2006. Relying on the decision in the case of MNS Global Services (P) Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (10) STR 273 (7), wherein it was held that any claim filed on or after 14-3-2006 even pertaining to the past period satisfying other requirements of the Rule and the Notification cannot be turned down on a ground which was not a condition of the Rule or Notification, it was held that the issue being identical, the ruling was binding on the Bench. The matter was remanded for a limited purpose of verifying other conditions of Notification 5/2006 CE(NT) as earlier rejection was  made only  on the  ground of non-applicability of Rule 5.

Part B — Some recent judgments

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1. High Court :

(i) Service Tax on provision of service and not service provider :

Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. V. Dewanchand Ramsaran,
2008 (11) STR 453 (Bom.)

In this case, the appellant filed appeal against judgment
passed by a single Judge in an arbitration petition. The respondent was
appointed as a handling contractor handling iron & steel for the appellant. In
November 1997, because of creation of reverse charge in case of clearing and
forwarding services, while paying the respondent their handling charge the
appellant deducted 5% Service Tax under the assumption that the respondent was a
clearing and forwarding agent. The deduction was made in spite of objection
raised by the respondent. There being a dispute, the matter was referred to a
sole arbitrator. The arbitrator dismissed the claim and therefore, Dewanchand
Ramsaran filed petition against the award. The Single Judge allowed the petition
and set aside the arbitration award after perusing the agreement between the
parties and finding that the agreement contained no clause or provision fixing
liability of Service Tax on respondent. The payment of tax made by the appellant
to the Government as recipient of service did not imply that it was paid on
behalf of the contractor. The contractor being service provider was not liable
to make payment of Service Tax. The Court considered the arbitration award as
faulty, considering it as opposed to the scheme of Service Tax, which levies tax
on services and not on service provider. The decision in the case of All
India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. UOI,
2007 (7) STR 625 (SC) was
relied upon. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed as dismissal of arbitration
award was upheld.


(ii) Refund :

ICCE Bangalore v. Motorola India P. Ltd., 2008 (11)
STR 555 (Kol).

The assessee in this case paid duty by error in excess of
duty payable and drew attention of authorities who in turn directed to file a
claim of refund. A refund application was subsequently filed by the assessee,
however the same was rejected on the ground of lapse of time and this was also
confirmed by the Appellate Commissioner. On moving the Tribunal, the refund was
allowed. The Court observed that the Tribunal chose to allow the case on the
basis that amount paid by mistake cannot be termed as ‘duty’ and therefore, time
bar did not apply. Since under similar circumstances, the Apex Court in India
Cements Ltd. V. CCE,
1989 (4) ELT 358 had accepted the case of the assessee,
the Court decided not to interfere with the Tribunal’s decision and rejected the
Revenue’s appeal.

2. Tribunal :

(i) Banking and financial services — Machinery given on
lease on monthly user charge basis :

CCE Vadodara I v. M/s. GE India Industries (P) Ltd.,
2008 TIOL 1444 CESTAT-Ahm.

The noticee gave extrusion machinery on lease under an
agreement to a party, which the Revenue held as banking and financial service
and served show-cause notices. The respondent cited the decision in the case of
Thermax Ltd. V. CCE Pune, 2007 (8) STR 487 (Tri. Mum), wherein it was
held that the appellant was not a professional in leasing business, and the
activity was confined to own products and considering ‘interest on loan’ not
forming part of value of taxable service in view of explanation 1 to S. 67 of
the Finance Act, 1994, the demand was held unsustainable. Relevant portion of
the definition of banking and other financial service was analysed and financial
lease covered by the said service as opposed to monthly refutal charge was
discussed. Following the decision in the case of Thermax (supra), the
Revenue’s appeal was rejected.

(ii) Business auxiliary service : Whether
individual/proprietor — a commercial concern ?

(a) Anuradha Jain v. CCE Bhopal, 2008 TIOL 1452 CESTAT-Del.

The appellant pleaded only on the issue that individual or
proprietary concern cannot be treated as commercial concern and Service Tax
applied to only commercial concerns in case of business auxiliary service. The
issue, having been decided in the case of CCE v. R. S. Financial Services,
2008 (9) STR 231, it was no longer ‘res integra’, the service was held as
liable for Service Tax.

(b) CCE Belgaum v. Chadha Auto Agencies, 2008 TIOL
1388 CESTAT-Mad.

The assessee, a dealer in sale and services of two wheelers,
also arranged loan from financial institutions/banks for hire/purchase and thus
promoted/marketed services of banks for which they received commission from such
banks/institutions. The Department proceeded to consider the activity as
business auxiliary service. The Commissioner (Appeals) however held that there
was no evidence to confirm as to whether remuneration was in the nature of rent
or business support service and that assessee provided office space, furniture,
etc. to banks to sell their products and therefore, held it as business support
service, which was challenged by the Revenue. The Bench found that they had
examined similar issue in the case of Silicon Honda v. CCE Bang., 2007
(7) STR 475 (Tri.-Bang). The Bench stated that the assessee did not cause sale
or purchase of services on behalf of another person for a consideration.
Financial institutions paying for occupying table space in the premises of auto
dealer could not be considered business auxiliary service and the Revenue’s
appeal was rejected.

(iii) CENVAT Credit:

(a)    Maersk India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE Raigad, 2008 TIOL 1477 CESTAT-MUM

The appellant, registered under the category of ‘storage & warehousing’ and ‘maintenance and repairs services’, got a part of its empty containers repaired through its subcontractors. The sub-contractors charged Service Tax on their ‘repair charges’ received from the appellant and in turn, the appellant, against his Service Tax liability on output service of ‘maintenance & repairs’, claimed credit of Service Tax paid on input services of subcontractors. CENVAT credit was denied on the ground that sub-contractors did not have Service Tax liability and that there did not exist an agreement between the appellant and the sub-contractor for providing the latter’s services. The Tribunal found that there existed an agreement between the parties, which even the lower Appellate Authority had taken note of and irrespective of the same, it was ruled that once Service Tax has been paid by the supplier, the same cannot be questioned at the receiver’s end and accordingly, credit cannot be denied. Credit for the period prior to 10-9-2004 (the date on which the CENVAT Credit Rules were prescribed) also was held allowable as the ground was the same and in terms of existence of the Service Tax Credit Rules, 2002, credit could not be denied.

(b)    Credit: Whether can be utilised for Service Tax payment on GTA service?

M/s. Sri Sarvana Spg. Mills P. Ltd. v. CCE Madurai, 2008 TIOL 1429 CESTAT-Mad.

The short issue involved in the appeal was whether input duty credit can be utilised for payment of Service Tax on GTA services for the period October 2005 to March 2006. Since by an earlier order the appellant was already given a decision in their favour (covered under MMS Steel Ltd. & Others v. CCE Trichy, 2007 TIOL 1317 CESTAT-Mad.) and identical decision was also given in the case of RRD Tex Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE Salem 2007 TIOL 891 CESTAT-Mad., the order of the lower authority was set aside after condoning the delay in filing the appeal.

(c)    Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. v. CCE Raipur, 2008 TIOL 1450 CESTAT-Del.

The appellant, after taking registration as recipient of consulting engineer’s service and on the sum paid to foreign party, paid Service Tax net of abatement for R & D cess paid by them. The foreign party however had transferred merely the technology. Holding that the appellant was not entitled to utilise CENVAT credit for payment of Service Tax on output services, Service Tax was demanded and penalties were imposed. Since output services were provided much later than the year in which Service Tax was paid as receiver of services i.e., deemed service provider, input services were not considered co-relatable with output services. It was held that the date on which the registration for providing output service was sought was not relevant and that Service Tax paid as deemed output service provider was eligible for taking credit of. Further, Service Tax on transfer of technology under ‘consulting engineering service’ was wrongly paid by the appellant at the instance of the department and therefore also credit could not be denied. The Tribunal also stated that there was no time limit prescribed for utilisation of credit and therefore Service Tax paid on deemed output service was available as credit. The decisions cited by the appellant also supported the case of the appellant (Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (10) STR 18 (Tri.-Kol) and CCE Nagpur v. Visaka Industries Ltd., 2007 (8) STR 231 (Tri. Mum). Accordingly, the credit taken and utilised was held regular.

(iv) Management Consultant’s Service: Services to group companies:

M/s.  RPG Enterprises  Ltd. v. CCE Mumbai-IV, 2008 (11) STR 488 (Tri.-Mum).

The appellant received licence fee from various group companies including CEAT Ltd. under agreement with them, They contended as follows:

  • The client-service provider relationship did not exist between the appellant and its group companies.
  • Recovery  of expenses  was not a service.
  • The recovery was only of costs and it operated on no-profit-no-loss basis.
  • Since only cost was shared by all licensees, principle of mutuality was advanced.
  • In-house organisation cannot contextually be considered impartial adviser meeting the criterion of specified category.

The Tribunal stated that being a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 it was a separate legal entity independent of the entities among which its cost incurred was apportioned and it was essential to look at the very nature of the activities undertaken by M/ s. RPG so as to determine its taxability as management consultant as defined in S. 65(37) of the Finance Act, 1994. As per the Tribunal’s observation of company’s memorandum of association, the company’s objectives included developing and providing part of general economic and industrial intelligence, information in diverse areas of taxation, finance, legal, insurance risk management, data processing, information, systems, marketing, drafting, public relations, etc. to develop cadres of managers, provide infrastructure and administrative set-up for promotion, supervision, monitoring, etc. to the licensees. The Tribunal also found and reproduced extracts from income tax assessment order of CEAT Ltd. stating to the effect that RPG issued guidelines for MIS and possessed expertise in strategic planning, corporate finance, etc. In summation, RPG’s activities were held to be providing services with a view to improve the structure of organisations of licensees and therefore charges recovered by them were held to be leviable to Service Tax in the category of management consultancy.

On the plea of principle of mutuality, the Tribunal stated that the relationship between the two independent legal entities was not that of principal-agent and it did not fulfil the conditions enumerated in the decision of Chemsford Club, 200 (37) SCC 214 as the identity of fund contributors and the recipients of the fund was not the same. The amount paid to RPG by CEAT was shown as expense for the receipt of service in the latter’s balance sheet and therefore it was held that no one acted on behalf of the other in the instant case.

The plea of valuing gross amount charged as inclusive of Service Tax also was not accepted on the ground that explanation 2 to S. 67 of the Financial Act, 1994 was added from 10-9-2004 and was not applicable retrospectively for the period under dispute.

The plea for non-applicability of longer period of limitation based on solicitor’s opinion also was not found convincing on the ground that bona fide belief was not blind belief and the intention to suppress the facts existed and thus rejecting the appeal the demand of Service Tax and penalties was confirmed.

(v) Penalty: Bona fide belief held:

Tidewater Shipping Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, 2008 (11) STR 475 (Tri.-Bang).

In four different appeals, the appellant paid entire Service Tax with interest on being pointed out the lapse and much prior to issuance of show-cause notice. The adjudicating authority did not levy penalty considering the discretion u/ s.80. However, the Commissioner reviewed the orders and imposed penalties u/s.76 and u/s.78. Finally, all the cases were held to be under bona fide belief, appeals were allowed with consequential relief.


(vi)  Penalty u/s.78  :

Industrial Security Agency v. CCE All., 2008 (11) STR 347 (Tri. Del).

In this case, circumstances under which penalty is leviable and provisions of S. 78 have been discussed at length. The Tribunal observed that non-submission of return; result and concomitant of non-registration for which penalty is already imposed. Penalty u/s.78 is not imposable simply because the assessee has not filed the Returns. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside penalty u/ s.78 considering that the facts and circumstances of the case not led by suppression, fraud or even contravention of relevant statutory provisions with an intent to evade Service Tax. Further, according to the Tribunal, if reasonable cause for failure to pay Service Tax is proven, penalty u/s.76 may not be imposed at all. However, the facts of the case were found to be not justifying complete waiver of penalty. Yet, the penalty u/s.76 was reduced.
 

(vii)    Software (Imported) whether goods or service?

Perfect Technologies v. CCE & CS, Siliguri 2008 TIOL 1386 CESTAT-Kol.

The appellants imported software from a foreign company in a digitised form by downloading the same online. The plea was made by the appellant that downloaded software being ‘goods’ was not chargeable to Service Tax. According to the Revenue, it could be treated as online service as it was downloaded online. However, considering the fact that even if it was a service provided online, reverse charge did not apply prior to 18-4-2006 (in terms of S. 66A coming into force) and such view was supported by the decision of Lohia Starlinger v. CCEX Kanpur, 2008 (10) STR 483 (Tri.-Del.) and demand for the subsequent period was not quantified by the Revenue. Further, in the case, there also existed a doubt as to the jurisdiction of the adjudicating Commissioner and therefore it was held fit for waiving pre-deposit.

(viii) Valuation of reimbursements:

Rolex Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner Service Tax, Bangalore, 2008 (11) STR 394 (Tri.-Bang) :

The appellants, registered under ‘management consultancy services’ and ‘maintenance and repair services’, filed their returns and paid Service Tax. On search operation, it was found that no Service Tax was paid on reimbursements shown in the balance sheet and hence, differential Service Tax was demanded in the show-cause notice. The appellant pleaded that rent of godown, salary of employees, etc. were not management consultancy services. The Tribunal observed that order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was non-speaking on various case laws relied upon by the appellant. Further, the facts of appellants’ filing of return and checking and scrutinising of records, etc. by the Department could not be prima facie considered ‘suppression’ in the light of various Supreme Court decisions cited by the appellants, waiver of pre-deposit was granted.

Part B — Some recent judgments

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Service Tax

I. Supreme Court :

Sales tax : Decision of Supreme Court in case of K. Raheja Development
Corporation referred to Larger Bench :

Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka,
2008
(16) STT 286 (SC)


The assessee is engaged in property development involving
construction and building of flats and subsequent sale thereof. Under a
development agreement, it developed a plot owned by an owner and accordingly
tripartite agreement was entered into between the assessee, owner of plot and
prospective buyer. Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in K. Raheja
Development Corporation v. State of Karnataka,
(2005) 2 STT 178 (SC), the
Department alleged that construction of flats was on behalf of purchaser and it
was a works contract and as such, sales tax be levied on works contract. The
question therefore was whether the tripartite agreement was entered into by the
assessee on its own or on behalf of the owner or on behalf of prospective
purchaser of flat.

The appellant did not deem it fit to rely on para 20 of K.
Raheja’s (supra) decision prima facie on the following grounds :



  • The developer–assessee undertook the contract to develop property of the
    owner.



  • The SCN merely proceeded on considering tripartite agreement as works
    contract.



  • There was no allegation in the SCN as to existence of monetary consideration
    in the first contract of development agreement.



  •  Whether the ratio enunciated in para 20 of the K. Raheja’s judgment was
    correct (reproduced below):

“20. Thus the appellants are undertaking to build as
developers for the prospective purchaser. Such construction/development is to
be on payment of a price in various instalments set out in the agreement. As
the appellants are not the owners, they claim a ‘lien’ on the property. Of
course, under clause 7 they have right to terminate the agreement and to
dispose of the unit if a breach is committed by the purchaser. However, merely
having such a clause does not mean that the agreement ceases to be a works
contract within the meaning of the terms in the said Act. All that this means
is that if there is a termination and that particular unit is not resold but
retained by the appellants, there would be no works contract to that extent.
But so long as there is no termination, the construction is for and on behalf
of the purchaser. Therefore, it remains a works contract within the meaning of
the term as defined under the said Act. It must be clarified that if the
agreement is entered into after the flat or unit is already constructed, then
there would be no works contract. But so long as the agreement is entered into
before the construction is complete, it would be a works contract.”


According to the Apex Court, if ratio of K. Raheja (supra)
had to be accepted, there could be no difference between a works contract and a
contract for sale of a chattel as a chattel and further there was a question
whether the petitioner was the contractor for the prospective flat purchaser.
The stand of the Department that not the development agreement but the
tripartite agreement was a works contract was found fallacious by the Court and
the judgment was recommended to be reconsidered by the Larger Bench.

Withdrawal of exemption retrospectively held as not within
the power of State besides being arbitrary.


 MRF Ltd. v. A.C. Sales Tax, 2008 (12) STR 206 (SC)


Kerala State Sales Tax authorities in this case withdrew
retrospectively an exemption granted for a specified period and for a specified
amount under an MOU with the Government granted by the Board of Revenue. The
Court observed that the petitioner made a huge investment in
diversification/expansion of its industrial unit based on the exemption and the
State was benefited through central excise duty, industrial development of the
State and contribution to labour and employment. Therefore denial of right
accruing to the appellant was unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 of the constitution. Further, the Court held that the State did not
have power to withdraw the exemption retrospectively under the provisions of the
Kerala General Sales Tax Act and allowed the appeal.

II. High Court :

Time bar : Whether applies to duty paid mis-takenly ?

CCE, Bangalore v. Motorola India Pvt. Ltd., 2008 (11) STR 555 (Kar.)


An amount was mistakenly debited in excess of duty payable to
the PLA account by the assessee. On noticing the same, the Department was
informed about it. The authorities directed to file refund claim which was
rejected on the ground of lapse of time and it was also confirmed by the
Appellate Commissioner. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s case on the ground
that the amount paid mistakenly did not amount to duty. The High Court relying
on the Apex Court’s decision in the case of India Cements Ltd. v. CCE,
1989 (41) ELT 358 and also noting that the Madras High Court also held the claim
reasonable in view of the Apex Court’s above decision, rejected Revenue’s
appeal.

Karamchand Thaper & Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd. v. UOI, 2008 (11) STR 459
(Cal.)

The petitioner engaged in the business of leasing operation and supervision work for supply of coal to power plants applied for registration under business auxiliary service. The Department did not re-ject the application. There is a provision for deemed registration if not granted within 7 days. After 22 months, the Department on its own registered the firm under clearing ‘and forwarding service. Al-though the rate is the same, liability under the said category would arise from 1999. The case of the petitioner was restricted to the point that without appropriate order of adjudication, the petitioner could not be registered under a different category. Being a factual issue, service tax authorities offered to re-examine the issue. The Court ruled that certificate granted could not remain in operation until the Commissioner, Service Tax, gives reasoned decision after hearing the petitioner and until then, the petitioner would continue to pay service tax under business auxiliary service. However, the Court stated that it had not made any observation on merits which the Commissioner, Service Tax, had to adjudicate.

III. Tribunal:

Business Auxiliary Service – Data processing services whether taxable under this category?

Dataware Computer  v. CCEC & ST (A) Guntur, 2008 (12) STR 121 (Tri.-Bang). Final order dated 25-3-2008.

The appellants under the order provided services of data processing and preparing MIS reports to Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board from July 2003 to April 2004. The contract defined the scope of services which included generation of various MIS reports and development of software for the same. The decision in the case ofBellary Computers v. CCE Mangalore, 2007 (8) STR 470 (Tri.-Bang.) was relied upon. Considering the service of the appellants as ‘Information technology service’, it was held as excluded from the scope of ‘business auxiliary service’.

CENVAT Credit:

Availing CHA services, whether input services for exporter of goods?

(i) CCE Rajkot v. Rolex Rings (P) Ltd., (2008) 16 STT (Ahd.-CESTAT)

While exporting goods, the appellant utilised services of CHA and surveyors. The Revenue treated them as non-eligible being of post-manufacturing activity and post-clearance of goods. Considering the Board’s Circular No. 91/8/2007 and the definition of ‘input services’ (which the Revenue had not considered), if was held that exporter remained owner of the goods until export took place and place of removal is port area. Further, the services are clearly related to business activity and therefore the Revenue’s appeal was rejected.

(ii)    [indal Steel & Power Ltd. v. CCE Raipur, 2008 16 STT (N.D. – CESTAT)

For consulting engineer’s services received from abroad, the assessee got registered  this category and paid service tax from CENVAT account. Later they also registered as output  service provider  of consulting  engineer’s services. However, the  services availed from foreign company  related to transfer of technology. The assessee however, took credit for the service tax paid as receiver. The Revenue denied credit on the ground that considering the relevant period i.e., when credit was taken, the assessee did not provide any output service and therefore, services received were not ‘input services’ for output services provided later. The assessee contended that service tax on transfer of technology was paid only under the direction of the Department. The Tribunal observed that had the service tax been paid by actual service provider, the assessee would have been entitled to credit. Merely because tax was paid as receiver of service, its right as recipient could not be denied. Further, at the relevant time, in terms of Rule 2(p) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, service tax was paid as deemed output service provider. Also, there is no time limit prescribed for utilisation of credit. Therefore, the date on which output service registration was taken is not at all relevant. Utilisation of credit was permissible in view of the extended definition of ‘output services’. Further, case laws cited by the appellant viz. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. v. CCE & ST, (2008) 12 SIT 155 (Kol. – CESTAT) and CCE v. Florescence Microfinish Pumps (P) Ltd., (2008) 12 SIT 423 (Delhi – CESTAT) also supported the view and as such the appeal was allowed.

Subcontractor’s services:

Evergreen Suppliers v. CCE Mangalore, (2008) 16 SIT 122 (Bang. CESTAT) – Final order dated June 23, 2008.

Service tax was demanded from the assessee under cargo handling service and clearing and forwarding service, whereas the assessee contended that it acted as subcontractor and the main contractor had discharged the service tax liability. However, in absence of purportedly sustainable proof, the demand was confirmed. The assessee submitted that in their own case for the earlier period, the Tribunal held that the field officers failed in their duty by not verifying whether principal contractor discharged the tax liability as stated by the assessee and the said failure could not be used against the assessee as in terms of Trade Notice No. 39-CE of 11-06-97, subcontractor was not liable. The Tribunal felt bound by this ruling and held the demand as unsustainable.

CENVAT Credit

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3. CENVAT Credit :



(a) Repair and maintenance services used for residential
colony by appellant-manufacturer — Residential colony necessary as factory
situated in remote area — Presence of workmen on the spot required to maintain
continuity in manufacture — Impugned services relatable to business — Repairs
and maintenance and civil construction for residential colony held as being
input services and, credit thereon held as admissible — Rules 2(l), 3 and 14
of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

[Manikgarh Cement v. CCE, (2008) 9 STR 554 (Tri —
Mumbai)]

(b) Service Tax paid was allowed as CENVAT credit in
impugned order in respect of commission paid to agent. However, Revenue filed
an application for stay of the said order. It was held that Input service
means any service used by manufacturer directly or indirectly in manufacture
of final products and their clearance from place of removal — Input service
includes services used in relation to advertisement and sales promotion — Stay
of impugned order not granted — S. 86 of the Act, Rules 2(l) and 3 of Cenvat
Credit Rules, 2004.

[CCE v. Abhishek Industries Ltd., (2008) 9 STR 562
(Tri — Del.)]

 

Some recent judgments

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Service Tax

1. CENVAT credit:

Whether CENVAT credit is available for air travel for
business?

i) CCE, Ahmedabad vs. Fine Care Biosystems 2009 (16) STR 701
(Tri.-Ahmd.)

Commissioner (Appeals) allowed CENVAT credit of service tax
on outward freight and commission on air tickets. It was held that availability
of CENVAT credit on outward freight is till the place of removal that is the
port from which the goods are loaded for export made on FOB was pronounced in
ABB Ltd vs. Commissioner 2009 (15) S.T.R. 23 (Tribunal-LB) and for CENVAT on air
tickets, it was held that the definition of input service was wide enough to
cover all services used directly or indirectly in the manufacture process, the
CENVAT was admissible. Further, the revenue did not submit any proof that the
travel was for other than business purpose.

Whether credit on mobile
phones is available as they are not installed in the factory premises?



ii) CCE & CUS, Nagpur vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd. 2009 (16) STR 611 (Tri.-Mum)


The company availed CENVAT on the mobile phones provided to
the employees. The adjudicating authority allowed the CENVAT and dropped the
demand. The appeal filed by the Department was also dismissed on merits. Then
the appeal was made to the Tribunal with the contention that mobile phone
service is not cenvatable, as the telephone is not installed in the factory
premises. The Department also referred to the pending appeal filed with the
Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) against the Tribunal Order No. S/263-264/C-IV/SMB/07
dated 01-06-2007 (in the case of Manikgrah Cement).

However, the company citied various decisions holding that
CENVAT on mobile services was available. The list interalia included:

(a) CCE, Chennai vs. Showa Engineering Ltd & Another 2009
(14) S.T.R. 840 (Tri)

(b) ITC Ld vs. Commissioner of Customs & Cen tral Excise,
Salem 2009 (14) S.T.R. 847 (Tri) = 2009-TIOL-439-CESTAT-MAD

(c) Finolex Cables vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai
;I, 2009 (14) S.T.R. 303 (Tri-Mumbai)

(d) Commissioner of Central Excise vs. Excel Corp Care Ltd.
2008 (12) STR 436 (Guj)

(e) Commissioner of Central Excise (LTU), Chennai vs. Brakes
India Ltd., 2009 (13) S.T.R. 684 (Tri-Chennai)



Citing the Gujarat High Court in case of Commissioner vs.
Excel Corp Care (supra), it was held that CENVAT on mobile phones was allowable
and it was observed that the onus to prove that they were directly or indirectly
used in connection with business activity is on the manufacturer.

Is CENVAT credit available
on colony security service, transport for employees and guest house maintenance?



iii) CCE vs Hindustan Zinc Ltd. 2009 (16) STR 704 (Tri.-Bang)


The company was not allowed input credit for colony security
service, transport service for employees and guest house maintenance service.

It was held that for a company, it was the duty to provide
accommodation to the employees and the colony being the property of the company,
it was obligatory for them to provide security also. Hence it was input service,
the definition under 2(1) of CCR being wide to cover such services. In case of
transportation of employees, it was observed that the services were in relation
to the manufacturing of excisable goods and hence it was also an eligible input
service. Similarly, in the case of maintenance of guest house, it was utilized
for the stay of businessmen during their business visit and hence was in
relation to the business activities was considered eligible input service.

Reliance was placed inter alia on:

(i)
Manikgrah Cement vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & Customs, Nagpur (2008) 9 S.T.R.
554 (Tri-Mum) and


(ii) Commissioner of C. Ex., Nashik vs. Cable Corporation of
India Ltd. (2008) 12 S.T.R. 598 (Tri-Mum)


Whether CENVAT credit on specified services mentioned in Rule
6(3) on capital goods are limited to 20%?


iv) Idea Cellular Ltd. vs. CCE, Ahmedabad 2009 (16) STR 712 (Tri.-Del)


The appellant is engaged in providing cellular mobile service
to their Clients and while rendering this service, they rendered services of
interconnectivity and permitted use of infrastructure to other telephone
services. The revenue contended these were not actually rendering such services
but it was cost sharing and the same was not defined under section 65(115) and
hence they were exempted services. The Tribunal observed that the services were
subsumed in the services rendered by the appellant to the client and hence they
were not exempt services.

Further according to revenue, the 17 specific services and
the CENVAT on capital goods is also restricted to 20%. It was held that the
Board Circular No. 137/203/2007-CX-4 dated 01-10-07 clearly stated that the rule
does not restrict either the specified services or the credit on the capital
goods and the Departmental Circular is binding, unless a contrary decision is
pronounced either by the High Court or the Honorable Supreme Court.

Part B — Some recent judgments

fiogf49gjkf0d

Service Tax

I. Supreme Court :


1.1 Burden of proof : ‘reverse burden’ only when one party
to a transaction is a dealer (S. 12 of KGST Act, 1963)



Haleema Zubair v. State of Kerala, 2009 (13) STR 113 (SC)

The appellant a proprietor had two concerns — one having
trading activity and another providing professional services of inspection and
certification of quality. Appeal was filed on being aggrieved with the additions
made by the sales tax assessing authority demanding sales tax on the service.
Income-tax returns, assessment orders and other certificates were produced
before the Appellate authority. The Appellate authority reduced the additional
income from 5% to 2.5%. Appeal was filed with the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal,
where it was contended that as per S. 5(1)(iii) of KGST Act (the Act),
consideration received for transferring right to use any good for any purpose
was liable for tax. The Revenue claimed that the relevant documents were not
produced before the lower authorities and the burden of proof as to taxability
lay on the assessee as per S. 12 of the Act.

The orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court did not
consider distinction between assessment orders under the Income-tax Act and
Sales Tax Act inasmuch as the fact that income tax would be levied on the entire
income, whereas sales tax could be levied only on the ‘sale’ and not the other
income which did not result out of ‘sale of goods’.

The condition precedent to the passing of an order was
assessment of sale. Professional service rendered did not constitute sale, which
attracted service tax. Further, the Supreme Court ruled that in general law, the
burden of proof lay with the State and ‘reverse burden’ must be construed having
regard to the nature of the statute. In the Kerala General Sales Tax Law,
however, S. 12 places the burden on the assessee, provided a transaction of
‘sales’ has taken place and at least one party to it is a dealer. Definition of
‘Dealer’ was analysed and it was concluded that the concern providing services
was not a ‘Dealer’ and professional fees were liable for sales tax. Appeal was
allowed by way of a remand to the adjudicating authority for consideration of
materials placed by the appellant.

Cases relied upon :



(i) BSNL and Another v. Union of India and Others,
2006 (2) STR 161 (SC)

(ii) Girdhari Lal Nannelal v. The Sales Tax
Commissioner,
M.P. 1996 (3) SCC 701



1.2 Violation of
principle of natural justice :



Kothari Filaments v. Commissioner of CVS (Port), Kolkata
2009 (13) STR 225 (SC)

The appellant, an importer of lithosphere, placed order with
a foreign company for import of lithosphere. On physical verification out of
total quantity of 860 bags, only 189 had lithosphere and the rest contained
yellow coloured substance ‘Tetracycline’.

Appellants contended it to be the mistake of exporter and
attached the acceptance of exporters for the same to prevent penal action. The
Commissioner in his order gave directions for confiscation of goods and imposed
penalty before completion of inquiry. Appeal was filed on the grounds of
violation of principles of natural justice.

The respondent contended that acceptance of mistake by
exporter did not facilitate compliance of principles of natural justice and the
indication of outcome of overseas inquiry had been placed in the show-cause
notice. It was the duty of the appellant to prove the mistake of the exporter
and refute the conclusions of inquiry, the authority had no liability to
disclose their materials.

It was held by the Supreme Court that person charged with
misdeclaration had right to know the basis on which he was penalised, to reply
effectively as considered inter alia in the case of Rajesh Kumar
& Ors. v. Dy. CIT & Ors.,
 2007 (2) SCC 181 and thus the principle of natural
justice was held to be violated. Setting aside the order, the matter was
remanded to the Commissioner for consideration afresh.

II. High Court :

Co-operative Society in public service

Green Environment Services Co-Op. Society Ltd. v. Union of
India,
2009 (13) STR 250 (Guj.)

The assessee, a co-operative society, provided treatment of
effluents and managed waste generated by industrial units which were members of
society. They contended that the object of the society was in the nature of
public service i.e., for Prevention & Control of Pollution Provisions of
S. 65(25a) of the Finance Act, 1994 excluded services in the nature of public
services. S. 93 of the Finance Act, 1994 grants power to the Central Government
to grant exemption from payment of service tax by notifying in the Official
Gazette. The facts of the case led to the conclusion that the petitioner-society
had been established with the aid of Central & State Governments for treatment
of industrial effluents and waste materials in public interest. The
representation to the Central Government for exemption would be made within 2
weeks and would be placed by the Central Government within two months from that
day. Interim stay for recovery was granted.

III. Tribunal :


3.1 Air travel agent : Adjustment of tax on cancellation of tickets :



CCE, Jalandhar v. Sharma Travel, 2009 (13) STR 150
(Tri.-Del.)

The respondent, an air travel agent adjusted service tax
amount on cancelled air tickets and paid the differential amount. The adjustment
was disallowed and was upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal
remanded the matter to the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide on merits, evidences
and in consideration of question of limitation.

The Commissioner set aside the demand, but the
Revenue pleaded to invoke doctrine of unjust enrichment. Rejecting the Revenue’s
appeal, the Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

3.2 Registered society and a charitable trust whether
liable under categories club or association service, convention service and
commercial training and coaching ?



M/s. Ahmedabad Management Association v. Commissioner of
Service Tax, Ahmedabad,
2009 TIOL 214 CESTAT-AHM

AMA was a registered society and a charitable trust under Society’s Registration Act and Bombay Public Trusts Act. AMA filed an appeal against the order of the Commissioner for confirmation of demand of service tax on services provided by it. Penalties u/s.7SA, u/s.76, u/s.77 and u/s.78 had been imposed.

The appellant contended that AMA was a non-profit making institution as amounts earned by it were utilised for fulfilment of its objectives and members were liable for liabilities, but had no share in surplus as it was ploughed back. Thus, it was not a commercial concern. The programmes conducted were exempted from year 2003 as vocational training by the government. Therefore, these services cannot be classified as ‘Commercial Training and Coaching Services’. The services of a club or association came under the tax net w.e.f. 16-6-2005. Exclusion clause excluded services provided by associations in nature of public service. AMA did not have any profit motive and provided public services, which were excluded from taxable services. Convention service was liable to tax when provided by a commercial concern. Convention events were not only for members but also for general public. A Circular dated 1-11-2006 clarified that non-commercial concerns would not fall under it.

The respondent considered the definition of commercial training and coaching centre as per the Act and did not consider training programmes conducted at AMA as vocational training programmes, which were exempted.

As regards club or association services, since they were provided to members, they were taxable and were not covered by exclusion clause, according to the Revenue.

As regards convention services, since they were provided to general public not free of cost but for consideration, they could not be excluded from the tax net, as per the Revenue.

It was held by the Tribunal  that:

a) AMA was not a commercial concern in consideration of its objectives, ploughing back of sur-pluses or no profits in the hands of members. The cases on which decision was relied upon were Great Lakes Institute of Management 2008 (10) STR 202 (Tri.-Chennai) and Institute of Chartered Financial Analysis of India 2008

(TIOL 2036 CESTAT-Bang). AMA was not liable to pay service tax on membership fees received from members of the club, as it was not providing any specific services.

b) The programmes conducted were continuing education programmes and not commercial programmes.

c) Since AMA was not a commercial concern, no service tax could be levied on convention services, and therefore the appeal was allowed.

3.3 CENVAT Credit: Transfer on takeover:

CCE, [aipur v. Hindustan  Coca Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd., 2009 (13) STR 222 (Tri.-Del.)

The issue in this case was of transfer of credit from one bottling plant to another plant. The Revenue contended that neither the ownership nor the capital goods were transferred.

The Commissioner (Appeals) in his order stated that one bottling plant was taken up by another as registration certificate of the taken over plant was surrendered and the unutilised credit was transferred to the plant which took over. There was no revenue loss and no contravention of any rule. The credit was allowed.

Whether    construction of jetty,  ‘capital goods’ ?

Penalty:  interpretation of statute:

Mundra Port & Special Economic Zone Ltd. v. C.E., Rajkot, 2009 (13) STR. 178 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellants were providers of port services, storage and warehousing services and cargo handling services liable for service tax.

The major issue was availment of credit on steel and cement used for construction of jetty and port building. Attention was drawn by the appellant to the definition of inputs and emphasised on expression ‘used for providing output services’ and reliance was placed on the case of State of Punjab & Another v. British India Corporation Ltd., (AIR 1963 SC 459). It was contended that the operations of port and management serviees was not possible without such construction and only incidental to the main activity should be excluded from the purview of expression ‘used for’, therefore the credit on such inputs should be allowed.

It was held that the jetty did not fall within the definition of capital goods and was constructed by the contractor. Cement and steel were used by the contractor for construction services and considering them ‘not used’ for providing port service, credit was disallowed.

The credit of service tax on mobile phones, CHA and surveyor charges, rent-a-cab and professional fees was allowed and credit on club house fees was disallowed as it was for recreation of employees, and was not for providing output services.

Credit of duty on air conditioners, being ‘capital goods’ as per the Rules, was allowed.

Penalty was set aside as the issue involved bonafide interpretation of law.

Ruchi  Health Foods Ltd. v. CCE, Chennai, 2009 (13) STR 330 (Tri.-Chennai)

The assessee was in the manufacture of refined oil and vanaspati, used CENVAT credit on capital goods viz. acid oil plant used for refining and processing. Credit availed was disputed as acid oil was manufactured in a separate plant where, according to the Revenue, no dutiable goods emerged. Further, credit of duty paid on computers, paints and welding electrodes was also disallowed.

Refinery was part of the factory and the assessee could take credit of duty paid on capital goods and not on exempted or nilrated goods. The impugned goods produced PFAD also, which was cleared on payment of duty. Acid oil was also cleared on payment of duty. Thus, machinery installed in refinery was not exclusively deployed in producing only non-dutiable products. Declarations as per the rules, records, invoices and returns relating to credit had been furnished to the Dept. indicating that PFAD was also an acid oil which was cleared on payment of duty. Likewise, credit on duty on computers, electrodes in view of decision of Jawahar Mills Ltd. v. CCE, Coimbatore, 1999 (108) ELT 47 (Tri.-LB) were allowed. The order itself was set aside and appeal was allowed.

3.4 Can penalty u1s.76 be reduced?

CCE – Rajkot v. Shri BSGK Shashtry, 2009 TIOL 173 CESTAT-AHM

The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the penalty uj s.76 against which the Revenue filed an appeal and contending that S. 76 was unambiguous and did not provide liberty to reduce penalty and submitted that decision in M/ s. ETA Engineering Ltd. [2006 (3) STR 429 (Tri. LB)] had to be followed.

Various decisions in which authorities used discretion to impose less penalty u/ s.80 of the Finance Act, 1994 submitted by the appellant were considered and rejecting the Revenue’s appeal, extension of S. 80 by the lower authority was upheld.

3.5 Limitation:

Refund: Whether  barred by limitation?

CCE, Pune-III v. M/s. Beharay & Rathi Constructions, 2009 TIOL 178 CESTAT-Mum.

The respondents, being recipient of ‘goods transport agency’ services, thus liable for service tax, availed abatement of 25% instead of 75%, erroneously resulting in excess payment. The refund claim was held to be hit by time bar of S. 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that tax collected by mistake of law, did not attract S. 11B and cited various case laws in support.

The Tribunal held that among various decisions cited, many were of prior period in which amendment dated 19-9-1991 in S. 11B had not been considered. Therefore, the impugned refund claim filed by the respondents was hit by time bar in consideration of S. 11B.Reliance was placed on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1997 (89) ELT 247 (SC) and Commissioner of Customs v. Aman Electrical Manufacturing Co., 1997 (90) ELT 260 (SC).

Kilburn Engg. Ltd. v. CCE, Vadodara-II, 2009 (13) STR 285 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellants engaged in the manufacture of machinery, who installed, erected and commis-sioned it at customer’s premises and raised separate bill for this. The dispute related to supervision of erection, commissioning of machinery to attract service tax liability under consulting engineering services.

The Commissioner (Appeals) observed that supervision of erection and commissioning required professional knowledge and therefore fell within the scope and ambit of ‘consulting engineering service’ and relied on the case M. N. Dastur, 2002 (140) ELT 341 (Cal.).

The Tribunal relied upon case CCE, Cochin v. BPL Telecom Pvt. Ltd., 2007 (5) STR 349 (Tri. Bang.),
 
M/s. Jyoti Ltd. v. CCE, Vadodara, 2008 (9) STR 373 (Tri. Ahmd.) and held that technical assistance provided by manufacturer of goods could not be held as consulting engineering services.

It also considered that first and second show-cause notices for the same period for the same facts being barred by limitation, relief was allowed.

3.6 Jurisdiction:

CCE, Mumbai v. Central Cable Pvt. Ltd., 2009 (13) STR 328 (Tri.-Mumbai)

An appeal was filed against the order passed by CCE (Appeals), for consideration of legal aspects.

The Commissioner (Appeals) in his order observed that the Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to issue show-cause notice.

The Revenue contended that Circulars on which reliance was placed by the Commissioner (Appeals) were not in force when the matter was adjudicated by original authority and he was empowered by a Circular to issue show-cause notices.

The Tribunal remanded the matter back to the Commissioner (Appeals) for reconsideration.

3.7 Reimbursements – whether taxable? (Also limitation) :

Rolex Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, Bangalore, 2009 (13) STR 147 (Tri.-Bang)

The appellant engaged in ‘Management Consultancy Service’ took over operations of two proprietary firms, which were not providing management consultancy services. They were accused of suppression of value of taxable services as regards reimbursements claimed by the firms and evasion of service tax for which demand along with interest and penalty was raised.

The appellant contended that show-cause notice was issued based on the information from balance sheet and other books of accounts and therefore suppression could not be alleged.

The Tribunal observed that service tax liability accounted only towards the amount received and not towards reimbursements.

It was further held that there was no suppression of facts with an intention to evade tax, therefore longer period could not be invoked.

Some of the cases relied upon:
(i) Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick (l) Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, 2007(5) STR 118 (T)
(ii) B.S. Refrigeration Ltd. v. eST, 2006 (4) STR 103(T)
(iii) Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (3) STR 711 (Tribunal)

Some Recent Judgments

fiogf49gjkf0d

Service Tax

Part B : Some Recent Judgments




I.
SUPREME COURT :




1.
Ranking of creditor and tax arrears :


Whether realisation of Central Excise duty has priority over
secured creditors :


Union of India v. SICOM Ltd., 2010 (18) STR 673
(SC) :

The respondents are State Financial Corporation and secured
creditor and the appellant, the Excise Department intended to recover arrears of
excise from the respondents. The matter involved in the case was whether
realisation of Central Excise duty has priority over secured creditors.

The appellants placed reliance on Mascon Marbles Pvt. Ltd. v.
Union of India, 2003 (158) ELT 424 (SC) wherein it was held that arrears of tax
have priority over all the other debts.

The respondents contended that Article 372 of the
Constitution of India on strict interpretation gives priority to arrears of tax
revenue above the unsecured debts only and the secured debts would prevail over
the tax arrears.

The respondents relied on cases like M/s. Builders Supply
Corporation v. Union of India & Others, [AIR 1965 SC 1061] and Bank of Bihar v.
State of Bihar & Others, [AIR 1971 SC 1210], where the Apex Court held that
arrears of tax revenue have priority over other debts but not over secured
debts.

Further reliance was placed on Sitani Textiles & Fabrics (P)
Ltd. v. Asstt. Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Hyderabad-I, [1999
(106) ELT 296 (AP)], where the AP High Court held that right of lien of a
secured creditor being statutory has a higher claim over tax dues even though
the property involved may have been attached or seized under other law.

The Apex Court opined that even recovery of Central Excise
duty is treated at par with recovery of arrears of land revenue. It held that on
perusal of S. 11 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 it appears that dues of Central
Excise can be treated as land revenue only when the dues are not fully recovered
from sale of excisable goods. The land revenues have priority over the dues of
unsecured creditors. However, the dues of secured creditors are in priority when
compared to arrears of land revenue. At length, decision in the case of Dena
Bank v. Bhikabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co., 2000 (5) SCC 694 was discussed and
relied upon by the Court which observed — “It seems a Government debt in India
is not entitled to procedure and a prior security debt.”

Further relying on Periyar & Pareekanni Rubber Ltd. v. State
of Kerala, 2008 (4) SCALE 125, the Court held that non obstante clause under a
State Financial Act being statutory would not only prevail over any of the
signed contract but also over any other laws.

II. HIGH COURT :


2. Adjudication :


Can issue for determination of amount in SCN be considered in
writ proceedings ? :


Creative Infospace Pvt. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner,
Chennai
2010 (18) STR 553 (Mad.) :

The writ petition was filed to quash a show-cause notice
issued by the Revenue as to why service tax and interest could not be demanded.
It was argued on grounds of principles of natural justice and that the authority
had already pre-decided the issue and that the tax was quantified.

The appellant relied on the case of Siemens Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra and Others wherein it was held that writ petition is maintainable
against a show-cause notice if the respondent has already determined the
liability of the assessee.

The High Court held that quantification of tax in the
show-cause notice is a statutory requirement and cannot be stated that the
authority has pre-decided the issue. Therefore the decision cited by the
petitioner is not applicable to the present case. It was further held that the
question invoking extended period of limitation should be left to the
adjudicating authority and it could not be decided by filing a writ petition.
The appeal was dismissed.



3.
Classification :


(i) Whether del credere agent can be classified as
Clearing and Forwarding Agent :



Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Sreenidhi
Polymers (P) Ltd., 2010 (18) STR 385 (Kar.) :


The assessee contented that it was an agent of M/s. IPCL, as
a del credere agent and not C & F agent.

A substantial question of law was raised before the High
Court whether service rendered can be classified as C & F agent.

Del credere agent is a mere surety and is liable to principal
only when purchaser defaults. Service rendered is in nature of indemnifier as
the assessee has to indemnify to the value of goods sold by the principal to its
customers and that the assessee shall ensure proper repayment of value of goods
sold.

Service rendered by del credere agent was included under
‘Business Auxiliary Service’ by way of amendment in the year 2005. By
introducing del credere agent as business auxiliary service provider, it is
implied that prior to amendment Del credere agent was not liable to pay service
tax. Therefore, service rendered by del credere agent cannot fall under
‘Clearing and Forwarding Agent service’.


Bangalore v. Raj Rajeshwari International Polymers (P) Ltd.,
2010 (18) STR 390 (Kar.) :

Following the decision in the above case of Sreenidhi
Polymers (supra), the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed in this case also holding
that Del credere agents were not C & F agents and not liable for service tax
before 16-6-2005.

(ii) If an amount is taxed under one category for an
assessee, can the same be taxed in the hands of another under another category ?


Speed and Safe Courier Service v. Commissioner, 2010 (18) STR
550 (Ker.) :

The assessee is engaged in rendering courier service which involves collection of letters, par-cels, etc. from customers and delivering to the addresses. In order to carry on this business, the assessee appointed several agents named as franchisees. The franchisees collect service charges from customers along with service tax for delivery of parcels, articles, letters, etc. The entire charges collected are passed on to the assessee and the assessee makes payment to franchisees at agreed rates. It implies that courier service operation leads to sharing substantial amount with the franchisee and assessee gets only the balance amount.

The Department assessed the net amount retained by the assessee towards value of taxable service un-der ‘Franchisee service’. In other words, the Depart-ment levied tax twice on the same amount — under courier service and under Franchisee service. The assessee had filed appeal against the Commissioner’s order, which was rejected by the Tribunal, so the assessee preferred an appeal to the High Court.

The High Court held that if a service falls under two heads, there is no provision in the Finance Act, 1994 to tax the same twice under two heads. Having regard to the definition of ‘franchise’ it is clear that under franchise agreement, franchiser gives a right to the franchisee to do business in a representative manner by using its trade mark or trade name. It was further held that agents were doing business on behalf of the assessee and as such, assessee was not rendering any service apart from accepting parcels for courier. The demand under another category being untenable the ap-peal was allowed.

    4. Penalty :

Whether penalty leviable, if amount involved is meager :
Commissioner of C.Ex., Jalandhar v. Ess Ess Kay Engg. Co. Ltd., 2010 (18) STR 393 (P & H) :

Penalty was imposed by the Commissioner for failure to deposit service tax within prescribed time limit. Appeal was filed in this regard by the assessee, which was partly allowed whereby period of payment of interest was modified and penalty order was set aside.

The amount of tax was not more than Rs.30,000. As the amount of penalty was meager, appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.

    5. Service tax applicability :

i) Whether service tax applicable as consulting en-gineer’s services for works contract prior to June 01, 2007 :

Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Turbotech Precision Engineering Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (18) STR 545 (Kar.) :

The assessee was rendering services like design development, design review, installation and commissioning, technology transfer for study and design of oil-free compressor systems.

The Department contended that the above services were covered within ‘Consulting Engineer Services’ as per S. 65(13) of the Finance Act, 1994 and de-manded service tax, interest and penalty thereon and confirmed the same. The Commissioner of Central (Appeals) rejected the plea, but the CESTAT decided the case in favour of the assessee. There-fore, the revenue filed appeal in the High Court.

The High Court observed that prior to amendment in the definition of ‘Consulting Engineer’ by the Finance Act, 2006, the companies were not liable to pay service tax. Therefore, for the period prior to 1-5-2006, the assessee could not be considered as a consulting engineer.

The agreement entered into between the assessee and its employer falls under the definition of works contract. However, since the contract was for the period from 1997 to 2001, and works contract was introduced under service tax net with effect from 1-6-2007, it was held that the assessee cannot be compelled to pay service tax under the category of ‘Works Contract’.

[Note : Readers may note that the finding that the definition of consulting engineer did not cover ‘company’ prior to 1-5-2006 is in deviation from the law laid down by M. N. Dastur & Co. Ltd. v. UOI, 2002 (140) ELT 341 (Cal.) and Tata Consultancy Service v. UOI, 2001 (130) ELT 726 (Kar). The final conclusion that the contract is covered by works contract service and therefore no service tax can be demanded being on a different premise, does not give rise to much issue. However, the conclusion about the company’s exclusion cannot be relied upon, in our opinion.]

    6. Valuation :

i) Whether the value of materials consumed during provision of photography services be exempted under Notification No. 12/2003 :

Commissioner of C.Ex. v. Yahoo Colour Lab, 2010 (18) STR 548 (P&H) :

The assessee was engaged in services of photo-graphy developing and printing. The Revenue contended that the assessee has not sold the material/goods to the recipient of service and therefore, it cannot claim benefit of Notification No. 12/2003–ST, dated 20-6-2003.

The respondent explained that the photography films, printing papers, chemicals, etc. consumed during provision of photography services are the essential ingredients of their developing/printing job and without their use, the photography ser-vices cannot be provided. They further claimed that the material brought and sold was liable to Sales Tax which is a State levy and Central Gov-ernment does not have any power to levy tax on purchase or sale of goods under service tax, unless the same is in the course of inter-State trade.

The Adjudicating Authority relying on clarifica-tion dated 7-4-2004, dropped the proceedings. However, the Revisional Authority reviewed the order and confirmed the demand. However, the Appellate Tribunal restored the original order of the Adjudicating Authority and therefore, the Revenue filed the present appeal.

The High Court relying on the judgment delivered in BSNL v. UOI, 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) held that in case of composite contract where both, service and sales components are discernible, service tax could not be levied on sale portion. Therefore, the impugned order of the Tribunal was maintained and the Revenue’s appeal was rejected.

    III. Tribunal :

    7. Adjudication :

    i) Unjust enrichment — Whether applicable when amount paid did not represent service tax :

Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi v. Avery India Ltd., 2010 (18) STR 428 (Tri-Del.) :

The revenue demanded service tax under ‘Consult-ing Engineer Service’ for receiving services from overseas company and confirmed the same. Com-missioner (Appeals) set aside the order which was upheld by the Tribunal.

The assessee filed claim for refund of service tax and interest paid. The original authority passed an order for refund claim, but ordered to be depos-ited to Consumer Welfare Fund under principles of unjust enrichment. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that unjust enrichment did not apply and or-dered for cash refund. The Department preferred an appeal against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Department argued that the assessee availed credit and service tax factor was added to cost of goods manufactured and thus burden of tax was passed on to the customers.

The assessee contended that he being a recipient of service, paid service tax out of his own pocket and the credit taken was also reversed before is-sue of show-cause notice. It was argued that as a recipient of service, the question of passing the burden of service tax did not arise.

The Commissioner (Appeals) found that the prin-ciple of unjust enrichment and the burden of proving that service tax has not been passed does not arise as the service tax was not payable on technical know-how and the assessee paid service tax out of its own pocket. Further, after taking the credit on payment of tax, the assessee reversed the same, so it can be said that no unjust enrich-ment took place.

The Tribunal held that service tax was not appli-cable, therefore whatever amount was collected did not represent service tax. Therefore, provi-sions relating to refund of service tax, and unjust enrichment could not be made applicable and the refund was held admissible.

    ii) Delay in filing appeal : Whether condonable ?

Indo Colochem Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad, 2010 (18) STR 615 (Tri-Ahmd.) :

The application for condonation for delay of 84 days was filed with the Commissioner (Appeals) was rejected. The application was delayed as the manager of the company was on leave and later he left the organisation, and therefore the appeal was filed by the Director of the company. The as-sessee filed stay application against this order.

The counsel of the assessee submitted that the Commissioner (Appeals) did not pass the order on merit but rejected the appeal as the delay was not condoned.

The Tribunal held that there being genuine reason for the delay, the Commissioner (Appeals) was directed to consider the appeal and stay applica-tion and pass the order on merit.

   iii) Extended period of limitation — Whether invokable in absence of suppression ?

Commissioner of C.Ex., Surat -II v. Haryana Sheet Glass Ltd., 2010 (18) STR 640 (Tri-Ahmd.) :

The assessee paid service tax on outdoor catering service. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee was eligible for credit by relying on the judgment of M/s. GTC Industries 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri-Lb.) and that extended period of limitation was not invokable when there was no suppression of fact with intent to evade payment of duty.

According to the Department, in the case of GTC Industries (supra) it was held that credit of service tax would be admissible if cost of such service is included in assessable value of final product, whereas in the present case there was no evidence to show that value of catering service was included in assessable value of final product.

The assessee submitted chartered accountant’s certificate to prove that the value of cater-ing service was included in assessable value of the final product. The Tribunal agreed with the documents submitted by the assessee that the value of catering service was included in the value of the final product and held that since two views were possible, extended period of limitation could not be invoked.

    8. CENVAT Credit :

    i) Whether credit of additional tax paid by input service provider admissible :

L. G. Balakrishnan & Bros. Ltd. v. Commission-er of Central Excise, Trichy, 2010 (18) STR 432 (Tri- Chennai) :

The assessee took credit of additional tax paid by input service provider and subsequently recovered from the input service provider. Further, the al-legation of suppression of facts was established on input service provider. The credit of tax to the assessee was disallowed under Rule 9(1)(b) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

The Tribunal held that Rule 9(1)(b) which relates to supplementary invoices, there is no mention of additional amount of service tax and there being no provisions to invoke provisions of Rule 9(1)(b), the demand was held unsustainable.

    ii) Whether credit admissible on plant housekeep-ing, factory garden maintenance, insurance and tours and travels expenses :

Balkrishna Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex., Aurangabad, 2010 (18) STR 600 (Tri-Mumbai) :

The assessee filed appeal to the Tribunal on denial of credit by lower authority on factory garden maintenance, plant housekeeping services. As regards insurance and tours and travels credit, it was denied on the grounds of non-availability of records.

The assessee pleaded that the case was covered by the decision of ISMT Ltd. v. CCE & Cus., Aurangabad (Tri-Mum.) with regard to plant house-keeping and garden maintenance service, where it was held that credit of such expenses was admissible. With regard to other two services, copies of invoices and records which were not placed before the lower authority were submitted and plea was made to remand the case to the adjudicating authority.

Based on the case of Chemplast Sanmar Ltd. v. CCE, Salem which stated that the definition of input services which includes activities in relation to business cannot be interpreted to include post-manufacturing activity, it was argued by the Revenue that credit was not admissible.

The Tribunal remanded the case back to adjudicat-ing authority in respect of Insurance service and tours and travels service. With regard to garden maintenance service, it was held that the garden creates better environment which increases work-ing efficiency of the factory and therefore credit is admissible.

    iii) Whether refund admissible when input service provider fails to deposit service tax :

Lason India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai, 2010 (18) STR 626 (Tri-Chennai) :

The assessee availed several input services which remained unutilised as services were exported. The original authority allowed refund of unutilised CEN-VAT credit. However, revision orders were passed disallowing part of the refund on the ground that input service provider did not deposit the amount to the Government. Rule 4(7) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 provides that credit in respect of input services shall be allowed on making payment of value of input service and service tax as indicated in the invoice. Based on Rule 4(7) (supra), it was held that credit was admissible.

    9. Classification :

    i) Whether repairs and maintenance done on job work taxable under ‘Management, maintenance, or repairs’ service :

Crimpson Electronics v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur, 2010 (18) STR 450 (Tri-Del.) :

The assessee registered under the Central Ex-cise Act, 1944 carried on the business as a job worker. The consideration received was towards job work and there were no records to show the consideration was received towards repairs and maintenance. The assessee challenged the order of the first Appellate Authority wherein it was held that assessee was providing service of repairs and maintenance. The Department argued that the activity carried out by the assessee was repairs and maintenance in guise of job work. The Com-missioner (Appeals) held that the activity was job work and not repairs and maintenance. As there was no records to prove the existence of service and in the absence of any contract, it was held that the activity was not liable to service tax.

    ii) Whether freight paid to owners is exigible to service tax under ‘Goods Transport agency service’ :

Bellary Iron & Ores Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex., Belgaum, 2010 (18) STR (Tri-Bang.) :

The assessee incurred freight for transportation of iron ore by trucks in private mines during 1-1-2005 to 31-3 -2006 and did not pay service tax under Goods Transport Agency (GTA) service. The Revenue confirmed the demand attracted in such cases and benefit of 75% abatement.

The assessee contended that the owners of trucks were not GTA and movement of iron ore within the mine during the processing or production or iron ore was not by ‘road’ as was commonly understood and hence the movement was not covered by GTA. Reference was made to CBEC Circular No. 232/02/2006–CX. 4 where it was clari-fied that the activity of handling and transportation of iron ore was liable to service tax under ‘Cargo handling service’ and export cargo was excluded from its definition. The supply of trucks by own-ers without transferring legal right of possession was taxable under ‘supply of tangible goods’. The amount paid was less than Rs.1,500 per trip and hence exemption was available.

The Minister of Finance while presenting the budget speech stated that there was no inten-tion to levy service tax on truck owners or truck operators.

The Commissioner held that the definition of GTA taxes only service provided in relation to transport of goods by road, mere transportation was not a taxable service. The owner of the goods carriage could not be said to be ‘goods transport agent of the owner.

In order to constitute service as GTA, there must be transport of goods by road. Here road is in-terpreted to mean as public road. As there were no roads in mines, provision of GTA service was held as not applicable.

    10. Export of Services :

    i) Whether conditions of Export of Services Rules fulfilled, if benefit accrues outside India :

KSH International Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex., Belapur, 2010 (18) STR 404 (Tri-Mumbai) :

The assessee procured purchase orders in India for suppliers of goods located abroad and transmit-ted the same by courier or electronic means to the said suppliers. Based on the purchase orders, the suppliers exported goods to buyers in India and directly collected payments from them. On receipt of sales proceeds, commission was paid to the assessee in convertible foreign exchange. Service tax was paid by the assessee on commis-sion income. Subsequently, claim for rebate was filed by the assessee under the Export Rules. The service rendered was classified under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’.

The lower authorities refused to accept the con-tention of the assessee that services provided by them to foreign suppliers were delivered outside India. Thus, the claim for rebate was rejected.

It was held that denial of refund of service tax was contrary to the express provisions of law as clarified in CBEC Circular No. 111/5/2009 where the phrase ‘delivery and use outside India’ is in-terpreted to mean that the benefit of the service should accrue outside India. Accordingly, since all the conditions of Export Rules were satisfied, the claim of rebate was held admissible.

    ii) Whether delivery of report outside India can be construed as part performance of service outside India :

Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. B. A Re-search India Ltd., 2010 (18) STR 439 (Tri-Ahmd.)

The assessee was engaged in the business of conducting clinical trial for clients in India and outside India which are classified under ‘Technical Testing and Analysis’. The assessee claimed exemp-tion under Export of Services Rules, 2005 when the report was delivered to the client outside India. The Department raised demand by issuing show-cause notice as the services were wholly performed in India. The assessee preferred an ap-peal with the Commissioner (Appeals) which set aside the demands and penalties imposed.

The Department argued that testing and analysis were performed wholly within India and report sent outside India is secondary aspect. Thus entire services were performed wholly within India and accordingly such services cannot be termed as ‘export outside India’.

On examining Export Rules, it was found that technical testing and analysis service is classified under Category II, wherein in order to constitute export, the service must be necessarily partly or fully performed outside India. The performance of service is not complete unless report is submitted to foreign clients, so it can be construed that service is partly performed outside India. Further, delivery of report is essential part of service and it is not complete unless report is delivered outside India. Accordingly, it was held that such service is not taxable and benefit under Export Rules is available.

    11. Refund :

Whether the Department was right in recovering refund granted erroneously without initiating re-view proceedings or filing an appeal :

Ogilvy & Mather Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore, 2010 (18) STR 502 (Tri-Bang.) :

The appellant paid excess service tax and had issued credit note to clients for extra service tax recovered and then filed a claim for refund. The Assistant Commissioner rejected the claim on the ground of limitation, but held that refund would not entail unjust enrichment. The said order was upheld by the Commissioner (appeals). However, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal by re-manding it back to the adjudicating authority in de novo proceedings. The Assistant Commissioner found that the refund claim was barred by limita-tion, but held that doctrine of unjust enrichment was not applicable.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the refund claim was filed in time. However, to examine the aspect of unjust enrichment the case was directed to the lower authorities who held that there was no unjust enrichment and the refund was granted to the assessee.

Subsequently, the Assistant Commissioner issued a show-cause notice u/s.11A to recover the refund sanctioned erroneously. The said order was confirmed and affirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and therefore, the present appeal by the appellant on the following grounds :

  •     The adjudication order was appealable and legal course open to the Department was to file an appeal.

  •     Since no review was undertaken, the order is illegal.

  •     Since refund claims were sanctioned by the Revenue, reopening of matter by issue of a show-cause notice without filing an appeal is not maintainable.

  •     The Commissioner passed such order relying on cases having dissimilar facts.

  •     The Tribunal in the case of Jindal Aluminium Ltd. [Order-In-Appeal No. 160/2002-CE of Com-missioner (Appeals), Bangalore] had held that refund should be granted if credit note was issued to the clients for excess service tax re-covered. The said decision was not challenged and therefore, the Department cannot take a different stand in the present case.

  •     The refund sanctioned could not be demanded as erroneous refund invoking S. 11A of the Central Excise Act without simultaneously invoking S. 35E of the Act. The quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred by the statute.

  •     A refund made pursuant to an Appellate order could not be said to have been made erroneously.

    

  • The High Court judgment relied by the Department was distinguishable and was not squarely applicable to the present case.

The Department’s grounds were as under :

  •     Reliance was placed on the Tribunal’s decision in CCE v. Addison & Co., 1997 (93) ELT 429(T).

  •     Duty erroneously refunded could be validly recovered u/s.11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 without filing an appeal against such order.

  •     The Apex Court in the case of M/s. Sangam Processors had held that if credit notes issued to customers after collecting excess amounts of duty at the time of clearance of goods, the assessee cannot validly claim refund and doc-trine of unjust enrichment was still attracted.

The Tribunal made the following observations :

  •     S. 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 deals with re-covery of service tax erroneously refunded and S. 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are pari materia and therefore both the parties have relied on cases pertaining to S. 11A.

  •     Relying on the ratio laid by the Supreme Court in Indian Dyestuff Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, recovery of erroneous refund can be made u/s.11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 without firstly filing an appeal against such an order.

  •     Principle of unjust enrichment is fully appli-cable in the present case as once the duty incidence is passed on to the customers at the time of clearance of goods, the assessee would not be entitled for refund.

  •     S. 11A and S. 11B are independent provisions and their effect cannot be taken away by resorting to the provisions of S. 356A or S. 35E.

  •     There being substantive provisions of S. 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the argument that quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order does not merit any stand. It was held that the order being in accordance with law, the appeal was dismissed.

    12. Service tax applicability :

i) Whether manufacture of alcohol-based perfumes and pharmaceutical products liable to service tax :

SPA Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex. & S.T., Aurangabad, 2010 (18) STR 421 (Tri-Mumbai) :

The assessee undertook activity of manufacturing alcohol on job work basis for various input sup-pliers and contended that it was excluded from the purview of ‘business auxiliary service’ as it amounted to manufacture.

The legal position being covered under Circular F. No. 249/1/2006–CX.4, dated 27-10-2008 and also that the issue was decided by the Tribunal in the case of Rubicon Formulations Pvt. Ltd. v. Commis-sioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad Final order No. A/281/2009-WZB/C-II/CSTB of 19/11/2009 wherein it was held that the appellants were not liable to service tax for this activity.

Based on this ratio, it was held that manufactur-ing was excluded from the purview of ‘business auxiliary service’ and as such, demand and penalty were not sustainable.

    ii) Whether Explanation given to a Section to be given retrospective effect :

B. A. Research India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad, 2010 (18) STR 604 (Tri-Ahmd.) :

The assessee was engaged in the activity of clinical research/testing and analysis for various phar-maceutical companies. The category of technical testing and analysis service was made taxable w.e.f. 1-7-2003. Explanation was introduced in the definition on 1-5-2006 by which testing and analysis for the purpose of determination of the nature of diseased condition, identification of disease, prevention of disease or disorder in human beings or animals was included.

    A show-cause notice was issued to the assessee for recovering service tax for the period 1-7-2003 to 1-5-2006. The issue which arose was whether Explanation was to be given retrospective effect. Relying on the case of Sedco Forex International Drill Inc. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 2005 (12) SCC 717 and several other cases, the assessee contended that it could not be retrospective.

Citing the case of Epco India Pvt. Ltd., 2008 (84) RLT 428 (Tri.), the Department argued that since the explanation starts with ‘For removal of doubts’ it had retrospective effect.

The Tribunal held that the Explanation introduced by way of amendment was to make clear that the definition included testing and analysis undertaken for the purpose of clinical testing of drugs and formulations were earlier excluded in the original definition. The amendment expanded the scope of definition and therefore could not be given retrospective effect.

    iii) Whether turnkey contracts can be vivi-sected and service tax be levied on service portion involved in execution of such turnkey contracts :

Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur v. BSBK Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (18) STR 555 (Tri-LB) :

The company entered into one single contract involving handing over of the plant in running condition to the principal, after completing vari-ous works including designing and engineering, civil works, steel structures, erection, testing and commissioning of the plant, etc. They contended that the dominant nature test should be applied for determining type of contract and only divis-ibility of contract cannot be a relevant consid-eration for taxing service tax on service part of such contract.

The Referring Bench had the following views :

  •     Daelim case is not in consonance with the BSNL case delivered by the Supreme Court, wherein it was held that a turnkey contract cannot be vivisected. However, the Revenue had filed appeal in the Supreme Court which was dismissed. However, the Bench observed that summary rejection of the SLP or appeal cannot be construed as affirmation of the judg-ment. It only means that the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the judgment.

  •     By 46th amendment to the Constitution of India, Article 366(29A) was inserted, to con-sider the following three kinds of composite contracts to be ‘deemed sale’ :

    Works contract

    Hire purchase contract and

    Catering contract

Of these three, first and third involve service and sale at the same time and splitting is permitted constitutionally. However, there is no other kinds of contract for which splitting is permitted, say, hospital services.

  •     In the case of ‘turnkey contract’, if sale portion is leviable to sales tax, the remaining portion constituting taxable service cannot go untaxed and the same would be liable to service tax.

  •     The test for composite contracts other than those mentioned in Article 366(29A) continues to be as per the ratio elucidated in Gannon Dunkerley’s case. i.e., to say, did the parties have in mind or intend separate rights arising out of the sale of goods ? If there was no such intention, there is no sale even if the contract could be disintegrated.

  •     It would thus follow that the dominant nature test cannot be applied in the case of works contract falling under clause (b) of Article 366(29-A). If ‘works contract’ can be split into sale contract and service contract, a different treatment may not be given to any works contract simply because the contract is on a turnkey basis.

The arguments put forward by the Revenue were as under :

  •     If taxable services are involved in a composite contract and such element can be discerned, then it is liable to service tax. The reason being service is service whether provided independently or in combination with other activities.

  •     After 46th Constitutional amendment, every con-tract whether indivisible, composite or turnkey involving goods and services are made divisible and would be leviable to sales tax on sale element and service tax on service element.

  •     There are no express provisions of law to exclude turnkey contracts from service tax levy and therefore, service tax should be levied on service element of such contracts.

  •     Daelim’s case had not followed the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in BSNL and 46th amendment to the Constitution of India.

  •     The aspect theory would not apply to enable the value of services to be included in the sale of goods or price of goods in value of the service.

  •     In case of turnkey contracts, irrespective of percentage of service element involved, such element shall be taxable by the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994.

  •     In the judgment of BSNL v. Union of India, 2006 (2) STR-2006 (2) STR 161 (SC), the Supreme Court has held that if there is a composite contract and the transaction in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts and is discernible as such, it has become per-missible to separate agreement to sale from the agreement to render service.

The respondent argued as follows :

  •     Since the original order of the Tribunal was passed ex parte and when the case was referred to Larger Bench, the findings in ex parte order are baseless and the Larger Bench should not rely on the same.

  •     A turnkey contract is a contract which is indivisible and cannot be vivisected to determine the service tax liability due to dominant intention theory.

  •     Works contract is liable to service tax from June 2007 and therefore, prior to that, turnkey contract cannot be divided to determine the value of service if separate consideration is not paid for such service.

  •     The ratio of BSNL case is not practical to severe turnkey contract into supply contract and service contract to levy tax on minor portion of services involved, which is not dominant object.

  •     Fiction of law in Article 366(29-A) of the Constitution is application to only sale of goods and not to service elements involved in such a composite contract.

  •     Execution of turnkey contract is not complete until the assessee carries out its entire obligation imposed upon it under such contract.

  •     Circular No. 334/4/2006-TRU, dated 28-2-2006 has clarified that when a composite service, even if it consists of more than one service, should be treated as a single service based on the main or principal service and accordingly classified. Therefore it is impracticable to classify various services involved in turnkey contract. Accordingly predominant test does not bring services of turnkey contract into tax net.

  •     In case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd., 2006 (4) STR 63 (Tri-Mumbai) it was held that rendering of engineering and designing service in a turnkey contract is not covered under the category of ‘consulting engineering services’.

The observations of the Larger Bench are summarised hereunder :

  •     The validity of levy of service tax constitutionally may be decided only on the basis of laws laid down by the Apex Court in various decisions. Accordingly, it was observed that a new Entry 92C was introduced in the Union List for the levy of service tax.

  •     As held by the Apex Court in All India Federa-tion of Tax Practitioners, there is no difference between production or manufacture of sale-able goods and production of marketable/ saleable services.

  •     According to the aspect theory, there might be overlapping of taxes, but such overlapping must be in law and it is open to a Legislature or more than one Legislature to impose a tax on that particular ‘aspect’ of the transaction which is within its legislative competence.

  •     In case of divisible contract, after 46th amend-ment, it is possible to levy Sales Tax on goods price.

  •     Rule 2A of Service Tax (Determination of Val-ue) Rules, 2006 was introduced w.e.f. 1-6-2007 to precisely value service elements involved in contracts involving goods and services.

  •     For the purpose of interpretation of a taxing statute, principle of purposive construction should be applied to find out object of the Act and to seek reasonable result and it should not to be interpreted in a manner to defeat its spirit.

  •     Severability of composite and turnkey contract permitted by Article 366(29-A)(b) cannot be said to have been for the mere purpose of levy of sales tax.

  •     Turnkey contracts can be vivisected and dis-cernible service elements involved therein can be segregated and classifiable as well as valued for levy service tax under the Finance Act, 1994.

[Note : Since this decision overrules Daelim’s decision 2006 (4) STR 63 (Tribunal), there would be widespread implications on litigation process as Daelim’s decision (supra) has been followed by Tribunals in several cases.]

    iv) Whether once designs and drawings are imported and considered goods for customs purposes, can they be treated as service ? :

Mitsui & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur, 2010 (18) STR 632 (Tri-Kolkata) :

The appellant entered into contract for supply of imported designs and drawings, provision of foreign technician’s services for supervision of detailed engineering in India, manufacture of indigenous equipment, erection, start-up, commissioning, demonstration of performance guarantee tests and training at supplier’s works.

The appellant contended that at the time of im-port, designs and drawings were assessed to the Customs Act as goods and therefore, the value of these cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of service tax. Similarly, the drawings and designs originating in India are also considered as goods under the Central Excise Tariff and with respect to commissioning and erection services, it was introduced under the scope of service tax w.e.f. 1-7-2003. However, the present contract was for the period from April 1999 to November 2001.

The Department contended that supply of designs and drawings was a service liable to service tax under the category of ‘Consulting Engineering Services’ and though erection and commissioning service was made taxable w.e.f. 2004, the same was to be treated as part of consulting engineering service as this service included not only advisory consultative assistance but also implementation of such advice.

Finding that the designs and drawings as services not sustainable, the order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority for de novo adjudication.

    v) Whether service tax could be levied on a works contract after 46th amendment but prior to introduction of ‘works contract’ under service tax net :

Commissioner of Central Excise, Raigad v. Indian Oil Tanking Ltd., 2010 (18) STR 577 (Tri-Mumbai) :

The assessee claimed refund of service tax paid under the category of ‘commissioning and instal-lation’ services for the month of September and October, 2003 on the ground that lump sum turn-key works contract could not be vivisected and part of it subjected to tax, the decision of which was delivered by the Tribunal in Daelim Industrial Company v. CCE, 2006 (3) STR 124 and upheld by the Apex Court and also in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (3) STR 223 (Tri.-Del.).

On scrutiny, it was observed by the Department that the prices were separately quoted on ac-ceptance letter for detailed engineering, supply portion and construction and erection portion. However, the assessee claimed that the separation was made only for breaking up billing schedules and hardly 3% of the total contract value may be considered as price for detailed engineering and the assessee had carried out only certain residual process designs.

The Tribunal observed :

  •     The Daelim’s case held that the contract en-tered was a works contract on turnkey basis and not a consultancy contract and that the works contract could not be vivisected for a part of it to be subjected to service tax.

  •     The Tribunal consistently held as above.

  •     The Daelim’s case is not per incuriam and is binding on the Tribunal as the Apex Court while dismissing the Special Leave Petition (SLP) passed the order that ‘we see no reason to interfere the SLP is dismissed’. This order indicates that the merits of the Tribunal’s judg-ment were examined by the Supreme Court.

  •     In the case of Diebold Systems (P) Ltd., 2008 (9) STR 546 (T), it was held that there was no taxable event defined under the Finance Act, 1994 for levy of service tax in respect of indivisible works contract prior to 1-6-2007. The same was approved by the High Court and therefore, such decision has a binding effect on this Bench of the Tribunal.

  •     The Tribunal’s decision in BSBK Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, 2007 (5) STR 124 has been set aside by the Apex Court on the ground that it was an ex parte order.

  •     The 46th amendment, in respect of Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, is for levy of Sales Tax. However, there was no provision of law during the period in dispute for levy of service tax on deeming fiction since such a provision is introduced only w.e.f. 1-6-2007 under ‘works contract’ service.

  •     The High Court in the case of Indian National Shipowners Association (INSA) has held that the introduction of new Entry and inclusion of certain services in that Entry would pre-suppose that there was no earlier Entry covering the said services.

  •     The Builders’ Association case delivered by the Apex Court has been considered by the Tribunal. However, the same being in the context of sales tax, does not have any effect on the present case.

    

  • The Apex Court in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. CC, 2001 (128) ELT 21 (SC) has held that subsequent to 46th amendment, the State would be empowered to levy sales tax on materials used in a contract of designs, drawings, manuals, etc.

  •     In the case of BSNL v. UOI, 2006 (2) STR 161(SC), it was held that the ratio of decision delivered in Associated Cement would not be applicable in respect of a composite contract and that the 46th amendment was to over-come the earlier decision of the Apex Court for transactions relating to deemed sales only.

  •     The intention of the Legislature was to tax only the labour portion under ‘Works Contract’ Service as envisaged under Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Valuation) Rules, 2006 and therefore, service tax cannot be levied on entire contract value.

  •     The Revenue’s contention that the activities are akin to ‘consulting engineering’ services does not hold good as it was clarified that charges for erection, installation and commissioning are not covered under the category of consulting engineering services and the same would be taxed separately.

It was held that there was no direct decision in favour of the Revenue for levy of service tax on service component of a works contract prior to 1-6-2007. On the contrary, the High Court decision in the case of Indian National Shipowners Associa-tion (supra) is directly against the Revenue and it has a binding effect on the Bench of the Tribunal, therefore, the appeal of the Revenue is rejected.

[Note : This decision and the above-cited reported Larger Bench decision in the case of BSBK at 12(iii) being contradictory would make the litigation process murkier on the subject matter].

    13. Valuation :

Whether value of free supplies is includible ?

Jaihind Projects Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad, 2010 (18) STR 650 (Tri- Ahmd.)

The appellant, engaged in laying of pipelines, is covered by ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ availed abatement of 67% vide Notifica-tion No. 15/2004 and paid service tax on balance amount excluding value of free supplies. The abate-ment was denied on the ground of non-inclusion of value of free supplies of pipes by the service recipient used in construction services. Penalty also was levied u/s.76 and u/s.78. The appellant contested that the value of free supplies is not includible in gross amount charged, as appellants have not charged anything for free supplies.

Based on the decision in the case of Oblum Electri-cal Industries Private Limited v. CC, Bombay, 1997 ELT 449 (SC), the appellant contended that explanation cannot expand the scope of main operative part of Notification. The main operative part of Notification No. 15/2004 provides that tax will be charged on 33% of gross amount charged and its explanation reads ‘gross amount charged shall include the value of goods and services sup-plied or provided or used by the service provider for providing such service’. As such, the words, ‘supplied or provided’ given in the notification are to be read in context with supply of goods by service provider and not the service receiver. They also referred the decision of P. Chandran v. CCE, 2008 (12) STR 33 where CESTAT has held that the word ‘used’ is to be read as supplied and used by service provider and so the value of free supplies is to be excluded from gross amount charged. They also referred to Notification No. 12/2003 stating that it applied to goods sold to service recipient and did not cover free supplies by service recipient.

The CESTAT opined that the case was covered by Rule 3 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value Rules), 2006 providing for valuation of services. The said Rule provides that value of consideration would be the gross amount charged inclusive of monetary and non-monetary consideration and where such valuation is not possible, the gross amount charged would be money equivalent to consider-ation charged and in no case it would be less than the cost of provision of service. It also states that proviso to the Notification only explains when and how the benefit of this Notification can be taken. The explanation in current case is only explaining actual meaning of ‘gross amount charged’ and does not expand the scope of main operative part of Notification. So, the value of free supplies is to be included in the gross amount charged.

The Tribunal held that the case of P. Chandran (referred supra) was only a stay order and the matter would not have been considered in depth. So for the interpretation of word ‘used’, the case cannot be relied upon and the value of all supplies is to be included in the gross amount charged, irrespective of the source of supply if the goods are used in providing the service.

The Tribunal waived the penalty u/s.78 stating that the matter involved was of interpretation of law. However, the matter was remanded back to the adjudicating authority to revise the duty demanded and the penalty u/s.76 was also left to be decided by him.

Part B — Some recent landmark judgments

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New Page 2

I. High Court :

1. Services provided abroad : Used by Indian persons : From when did
service tax apply ? A landmark decision :

Indian National Ship Owners Association v. UOI, 2008
TIOL 633 HC MUM-ST, Writ Petition No. 1449 of 2006 — Judgment dated 11-12-2008.


(i) By way of a writ petition, the petitioner association had
challenged constitutional validity of S. 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 (The Act),
explanation to S. 65(105) of the Act (in force from 16-6-2005 till 17-4-2006)
and Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 (the Rules). However, no
relief was pressed under the said S. 66A. The challenge therefore
was restricted to the demand of service tax made by the Department for the
period from 16-8-2002 to 17-4-2006 (i.e., prior to the enactment of S.
66A) in respect of services by persons from outside India and rendered outside
India to the persons resident in India but who received services outside India.

 

(ii) The Hon. High Court took note of and examined the
following :


  • Board’s Circular No. 36/04/2001, dated 8-10-2001


  • Scope of S. 64 of the Act


  • Notification No. 1/2002-ST, dated 1-3-2004


  • Notification No. 36/2004-ST, dated 31-12-2004 (effective from 1-1-2005)


  • Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Rules along with the amendments from time to time.


  • S. 68(2) of the Act.


  • Explanation below S. 65(105) of the Act (In force from 16-6-2005 till
    17-4-2006)


  • S. 66 of the Act — the charging Section


  • Overall scope of S. 65 including that of S. 65(105).


(iii) The
Court relied on the following decision :

Laghu Udyog
Bharati v. Union of India
, 1999 (112) ELT 365 (SC).

(iv) After
considering submissions made by both the sides, the findings of the Court are
briefly summarised here in below :


  •  Referring to Article 265 of the Constitution, the Court stated that no tax
    shall be levied or collected except under authority of law and therefore,
    examination was necessary as to whether or not there was a valid law between
    1-3-2002 and 12-4-2006 which authorised to levy service tax on services
    rendered outside India.


  •  As regards Notification No. 1/2002-ST, the Court stated that the said
    Notification extended territorial limits of India to the designated areas in
    the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone of India and therefore, this
    Notification did not have effect of levying service tax on the recipients of
    services.


  •  In the context of Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Rules, it was observed that S. 64
    empowered the Central Government to make rules for carrying out provisions of
    Chapter V where a service provider was considered an assessee and services
    provided were taxed. The rules could not be framed to be in conflict with
    provisions of the chapter. If the Act made the person providing the service
    liable, the Rule could not make the recipient liable and thus the provisions
    of Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) were invalid.


  • While examining Notification No. 36/2004-ST (supra) on which reliance
    was placed by the authorities, the Court observed that S. 68(2) authorised the
    Government to notify any taxable service for which rules could be framed. Vide
    Notification No. 36/2004 (supra), any taxable service provided by a
    non-resident or a person from outside India was notified and if rule 2(1)(d)(iv)
    was taken to be the rule pursuant to this provision, then a person receiving
    taxable service in India from a non-resident or from a person outside India
    would become taxable and not services rendered outside India by a non-resident
    or a person from outside India.


  • Vis-a-vis explanation below S. 65(105) from 16-6-2005, the Court found that the explanation did not authorise the Government to levy service tax in relation to services rendered to vessels and ships of the members of association outside India. In this frame of reference, the Court observed and relied on the case of Laghu Udyog Bharati (supra), wherein the Supreme Court by its judgment clearly laid down a law that by making a provision in the Rules, the levy of service tax could not be shifted to recipients of the services. It further noted that this law squarely applied to Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) also. According to the Court, in spite of the explanation, which made services provided outside India taxable, the charge of the tax continued to be on the provider of service as per scheme of the Act.

  • At the end, the Court  ruled that  on amending the Act and inserting S. 66A that the Government got legal authority to levy service tax on recipients of taxable services and before the enactment of S. 66A, no authority was vested by law and therefore, only from 18-4-2006 the recipients could be deemed to be service providers and thus would be liable for service tax in respect of services received from abroad and accordingly, restrained the Government to levy service tax on the members of the petitioner association for the period from 16-8-2002 till 12-7-2006.

(v) Comments:

In the judgment in the case of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. CCE, [aipur, 2008 (11) STR 338 (Tri.-LB) (narrated under this feature at length in September 2008 issue of BCAn, no distinction was made between services provided in India by a person from outside India and services performed outside India. As such, the issue of taxability on services provided outside India remained open for the period from 1-1-2005 to 17-4-2006. Decision in the case of Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd. v. CCE Vadodara Il, 2007 (7) STR 443 (Tri.-Ahd), on the other side provided that prior to insertion of S. 66A i.e., 18-4-2006, the recipient could not be made liable for service tax in respect of offshore services provided by person from outside India. However, the validity or otherwise of Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) was not examined, nor was examined the distinction be-tween scope of provision of Notification No. 36/ 2004-ST and that of S. 66A. Only in the case of Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (11) STR 325 (Tri.-Chennai), the issue as a whOle and distinction between coverage of Notification No. 36/2004 and scope of S. 66A was presented by the appellant. However, it being only a stay application, no finality was reached. Hon. Bombay High Court has dealt with all issues concerning services provided by persons from outside India and the liability of Indian receivers vis-a-vis such services, except examining constitutional validity of the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the levy.

2. Handling of export cargo whether liable to service tax?

CCE, Mangalore v. M/s. Konkan Marine Agencies, [2008 TIOL 601 HC Kar. ST]

The assessee paid service tax under the category of ‘port service’ for the period March 2004 to September 2004 and filed a refund claim of service tax and interest paid, stating that they were handling only export cargo which was outside the purview of service tax under ‘cargo handling service’ and that they had erroneously paid service tax under port services. The claim was rejected considering the services as port services. The Commissioner (appeals) remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority to determine the nature of the service. On examination, it was decided to be ‘cargo handling service’, however the refund was directed to be paid to the Consumer Welfare Fund.

The Commissioner took suo motu revision against the order of the adjudicating authority u/ s.84 and held that the services were port services, therefore, refund stood rejected. The assessee filed an appeal before the CESTAT.After relevant findings, CESTAT held that the assessee was not rendering services on behalf of port, but on its own behalf to customers for loading of export cargo. Accordingly, the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed in limine.

3. Whether reimbursement of expenses part of service rendered ?

Intercontinental Conslt. & Tech. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2008 (12) STR 689 (Del)

The petitioner challenged constitutional validity of Rule 5 of the Valuation Rules, 2006 as it is ultra vires provisions of S. 66, S. 67 and Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 for inclusion of reimbursement of expenses as part of value of services.

The petitioner paid service tax only on services rendered to clients (NHAI) and not on reimbursement of expenses.

The authorities treating reimbursement of expenses as forming part of gross value of taxable services as per S. 67 and Rule 5, issued show-cause notice. The appellant contended that such expenses did not form part of value of services rendered and therefore was not liable u/ s.67 and further that reimbursable expenses were shown separately in the bill issued to clients.

It was held that no coercive steps be taken till an adjudication order was passed, but proceedings for SCN could continue.

II. Tribunal:’
4. Banking and other Financial Services:
CCE, [aipur v. Bank of Rajasthan Ltd., (2008 TIOL 1866 CESTAT Del.)

The Revenue had appealed against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) whereby’ Anywhere Banking Business (ABB) transactions’ were held not liable to service tax. The respondent contended that ABB came under the net of service tax w.e.f. 10-9-2004, therefore, prior to 10-9-2004 this service was not chargeable to service tax. As this service was only for operation of bank account, the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed. No infirmity in the order.

5. Business Auxiliary Service:

APL Logistics India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai, 2008 (12) STR588 (Tri.-Chennai)

The appellant was in the business of collecting export goods from different Indian suppliers for a foreign party under an agreement with the latter. Such goods were consolidated into one cargo and exported for a consideration in Indian rupees. Thus, the appellant was undertaking the activity of handling of export cargo that is excluded from the ambit of cargo handling service. The Revenue contended to tax this activity as ‘Business Auxiliary Service’ as services were provided on behalf of client. The decision of Dr. Lal Path Lab Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE; Ludhiana, 2006 (4) STR 527 (Tribunal) was relied upon and contention was made that handling export could not be brought within the scope of ‘provision of service on behalf of the client’ as well as ‘cargo handling service’. Since the matter involved detailed examination for Revenue’s claim, waiver of pre-deposit was granted.

6. CENVAT Credit :
(i) Whether TR-6 challan a valid document?

M/s. Gaurav Krishna Ispat (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Raipur (2008 TIOL 1979 CESTAT Del.)

The assessee was denied Cenvat credit for the period prior to 16-6-2005 as TR-6 challan was considered as an invalid document for availing the same.

It was held by the Commissioner (Appeals) that it was an inadvertent omission of not including TR-6 challan as a valid document, which was rectified by Notification. The Tribunal’s decision of National Organic Chemicals India Ltd., 2004 (178) ELT 331 (Tribunal) was also relied upon. It was held that CENVAT credit could not be denied and penalty could not be sustained.

(ii) Can CENVAT credit be denied on procedural ground?

M/s. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. CCE, Salem, (2008 TIOL 1989 CESTAT-Mad.)

BSNL divided the country into what they called Secondary Switching Areas (SSAs) and had a Central Stores Dept. (CSD) at Madurai, which catered the SSAs by purchasing and supplying capital goods required for rendering telephone services. The lower authorities denied the credit taken by SSA, Salem on capital goods supplied by CSD covered by copies of manufacturer’s invoice, on the ground that the credit was taken without issuing invoices as registered first stage dealer in accordance with Rule 9.

However, the appellant’s contention that credit could not be denied on technical grounds as the two substantive conditions (a) that the capital goods must be duty paid, and (b) that they should be used in rendering of output service were satisfied.

On finding that CSD was registered at a later date as a first stage dealer, the credit was allowed.

iii) CENVAT credit: Consignment agent’s place – whether place of removal?

CCE, Rajkot v. Rajhans Metals Pvt. Ltd., (2008 TIOL 1871 CESTAT-Ahm.)

The assessee availed Cenvat credit of service tax paid on transportation service availed for movement from factory to consignment agent’s premises. The property of the goods did not transfer to the agent. The Revenue claimed that only depots could claim credit as per Board’s Circular, therefore Commissioner (Appeals)’ s extension of benefit was incorrect. It was contended that the Circular discussed the place of removal, wherein consignment agent’s premises has been defined as place of removal. It was held that the fact that expenses are borne by manufacturer, property of goods does not get transferred and the consignment agent’s premises are defined as the place of removal makes them eligible for Cenvat credit.

iv) CENVAT credit on capital goods when goods received at one place and invoice issued in the name of other:

M/s. BSNL v. CCE, Bhopal (2008 TIOL 1938 CESTAT-Del.)

The Revenue denied the credit on the ground that the credit was availed on the strength of improper document. It stated that the invoices were in the name of Headquarter Bhopal, whereas credit was taken at Jabalpur on the strength of debit notes. However the appellant contented that invoices for capital goods received at Jabalpur were issued in the name of circle Headquarter i.e., Bhopal, and Jabalpur comes under the Bhopal circle. Further, there was no dispute as to payment of duty on those capital goods and they were used for providing output service. Finding merit in the contention, waiver of pre-deposit and penalties was granted.

7. Commercial Training and Coaching Services:

M/s. Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad v. The CCE, Hyderabad (2008 TIOL 2007 CESTAT-Bang.)

The appellant is a college for practising managers that pioneered post-experience management education in India. The Revenue proceeded on the grounds that they did not pay service tax on services rendered as ‘Commercial Training or Coaching Centre’ and ‘Scientific or Technical Consultancy’. The Revenue contended that any institute satisfying this definition would be liable for service tax, irrespective of whether it was a commercial institute or not and that the college was recognised as a research institute by the Ministry of Science & Technology and as such, they were covered as Scientific and Technical Consultant.

However, it was held that the word ‘commercial’ qualified the commercial coaching or training. It did not qualify coaching or training, but qualified the centre. As long as the institute was registered under the Societies Registration Act and also exempted from income-tax, it cannot be considered as commercial and so no service tax was leviable under Commercial Coaching or Training Service. As regards Scientific and Technical Research, it was held that the appellants carried out research broadly in the field of social sciences, which was not considered ‘Scientific and Technical Consultancy’, and hence no service tax was leviable and the appeal was allowed on both the counts.

8. Import    of services:

Nestle India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, New Delhi, [(2008 (12) STR 570 (Tri.-Del.)]

Service tax was demanded under consulting engineer services for import of services. The appellant received service of consulting engineer from their holding company and the period under dispute was 6-8-2002 to 9-9-2004. The Larger Bench of the Tribunal’s decision in the case of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (11) STR 337 (Tri.-LB) was followed, finding the facts of the case similar and relief was provided for the period prior to 1-1-2005.

9. Revisionary authority – Whether can revise the decision taken u/s.80 ?
M/s.  Solomon Foundry  v. CCE, Tiruchirapalli, (2008 TIOL 1826 CESTAT-Mad.)

The assessee entered into a contract when the service of maintenance and repair was not under the tax net, therefore the contract did not contain any provision to recover the service tax from its clients and hence the tax liability was absorbed and lenient decision was prayed for. The original authority considered that default in payment of service tax was because of bona fide belief as to non-taxability. The amount due was mostly paid before the issue of show-cause notice and the remaining before the decision of adjudicating authority.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal and held that the revisional authority does not have powers to revise a decision of competent authority, which had refrained from imposing penalty on the assessee ul s.80 of the Act.

10. Stevedoring a port service? Homa Engineering decision disregarded with issue referred to Larger Bench:

Western Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai, 2008 (12) STR 739 (Tri.-Chennai)

In this case, the issue relates to whether or not services other than stevedoring activity could be considered as port services. The Tribunal has dif-fered from the decisions taken in the following cases:

  • Homa Engineering Works v. Commissioner, 2007 (7) STR 546 (Tribunal)
  • Kin-Ship Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2008 (10) STR 331 (Tribunal)
  • Konkan Marine Agencies v. Commissioner, 2007 (8) STR 472 (Tribunal)
  • Velji P. and Sons (Agencies) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commis-sioner, 2007 (8) STR 236 (Tribunal)
  • Western (I) Shipyard Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2006 (3) STR 639 (Tribunal)
  • Western India Shipyard Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2008 (15) STT 371 (Mum-CESTAT)

Briefly stated, the Revenue contended that the Apex Court dismissed the Department’s appeal against Tribunal decision in Velji’s case (supra) not on merits but for the reason that no appeal against the Tribunal’s order in Homa Engineering (supra) was filed. However, the appeal in Homa Engineering’s case (supra) has been subsequently filed in the Bombay High Court. Therefore, the Tribunal’s de-cision could not be deemed to have been affirmed on merits in case of Velji’s by the Apex Court. It was also observed by the Tribunal that port services of minor ports were governed by the Indian Ports Act, 1908 and major ports by the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 whereas in Velji’s case, services in question were minor port services and decision was rendered with reference to many provisions of the Major Port Trust Act which did not apply. Further, the Tribunal observed that the view taken to the effect that licence issued by the port was unrecognised as authorisation also seemed incorrect. In the case of Konkan Marine Agencies (supra) it was concluded that stevedoring licence issued by the Mangalore Port Trust permitted them to perform within port premises.

According to the Tribunal, cargo handling services i.e., loading and unloading of cargo when performed within territorial limits of minor and major ports qualify to be ‘port services’. Port service can be performed from premises only if authorised by major port or minor port authorities and therefore stevedoring operations performed from port premises were port services. However, considering the importance of the issue and disagreement made with the decision in the above mentioned cases, the matter was referred to the Larger Bench.

11. Turnkey contracts – Daelim’s decision to be examined by Larger Bench:

CCE, Raipur v. Mls. BSBK Pvt. Ltd., (2008 TIOL 1880 CESTAT-Del.]

The respondent was engaged in the business of execution of turnkey contracts for engineering works at the site of their clients. The authorities ordered the respondents to pay service tax and penalty on these contracts to which the respondents appealed before the Commissioner (A) who set aside this order.

Relying on various decisions which inter alia included the decisions on the cases of Daelim Industrial Co. v. CCE, Vadodara, 2003 and Turbotech Precision Engg. P. Ltd. v. CCE, Bangaiore-III, the respondents claim that a turnkey works contract, could be vivisected as sale contract and service contract, and thus a part of a works contract cannot be subjected to tax.

However, the Revenue stated that the decision in Daelim (supra) was not in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in BSNLv. VOl and was challenged in the Supreme Court. Considering the decision in Daelim’s case (supra) was not in accordance with the law, the case was referred to the Larger Bench to consider the correctness of the decision.

12. Valuation and S. 67:

Shakti Motors v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad, 2008 (12) STR 710 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The assessee, an authorised dealer selling motor bikes and scooters, also provides business auxiliary services to various financial institutions. Servicetax was paid by the appellant before issue of show-cause notice and penalty was levied u/ s.76 and u/ s.77of Finance Act 1994.The appellant contended that the amount received was a cum – tax value, therefore actual demand should be reduced and requested waiver of penalty u/ s.80. It was held that amount received could not be treated as cum- service tax price as no evidence supported it. The benefits of S. 80 were granted considering confusions in budget of 2005.The liabilityof interest could not be set aside.

Transfer of intangible rights: Sale or service?

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In a recently reported
case of Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2016 (44)
STR 161 (Bom) whereunder two writ petitions, one filed by the captioned company
(referred to as the Monsanto) and the other filed by Subway Systems (India)
Pvt. Ltd. (Subway), Hon. Bombay High Court painstakingly examined whether each
of the transactions involved were liable for VAT or service tax.  Although the facts in both the petitions were
totally different, interestingly the petitions were tagged together on finding that
the issue involved was similar.  Facts in
both the cases are briefly summarized below:

Monsanto’s
case:

The petitioner, Monsanto
supplied to third parties certain type of hybrid cotton seed which was infused
with a proprietary technology that protects it against a known menace to cotton
corp.  From these hybrids, these parties
generate large quantities of sowable seeds which are in turn sold to cotton
farmers.  The end product seeds thus have
the benefit of menace protection technology. 
The parties to whom the technology is provided in the form of seeds, (known
as donor seeds) make commercial use of the technology.  In the backdrop of these facts, Monsanto has
claimed that this is a case of offer of technology through container seeds.  The party pays for technology and not
container.  They do not sell any goods to
the end user.  Therefore, there being no “transfer
of right to use”, they should be exigible to service tax.  Central to their claim was
non-exclusivity.  Monsanto licensed to various
third parties the said technology.  Those
developers in turn cannot sub-license the technology.  They use it to produce sowable seeds.  Therefore the recipients of technology obtain
right to use the technology but there is no transfer of that right.  The container seed is the only means by which
technology can be transferred.  Provision
of technology was followed by training for using donor seeds and developing
foundation seeds and training for undergoing regulatory tests before the
licensee could produce foundation seed. For this, a one-time fixed fee plus a
trait fee was received by Monsanto under the agreement with third parties.  Petitioner’s plea was that service tax and
VAT are mutually exclusive and well settled relying inter alia on BSNL 2006 (2) STR
161 (SC)
, Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd.
vs. CTO 2008 (9) STR 337
and Association
of Learning and Finance Companies vs. UOI 2010 (20) STR
417
.  The petitioner’s main
contention was that there did not involve “transfer
of right to use goods”
in the transaction of providing donor seeds.  This was pleaded mainly on the ground that
there is absence of ‘exclusivity’ and inability of the transferor to transfer
the same right to another in terms of twin
tests
comprised in the five attributes required to be satisfied as laid
down in the case of BSNL (supra).  In
this judgment to constitute a transaction as one of “transfer of right to use the goods”, 5 attributes are required to
be satisfied viz. there are goods available for delivery, there is consensus ad
idem as to the identity of the goods, the transferee must have a legal right to
use the goods and the twin tests of temporary ‘exclusion’ of the transferor to
have the said right i.e. during the period the transferee has such right and
incapacity of transferor to again transfer the same rights to others.  According to the petitioner, the said test
applies to tangible and intangible goods equally and therefore the law laid
down in Duke & Sons (1999) 1 Mah LJ
26,
Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra
(2015) 80 VST 173 (Bom)
and Nutrine
Confectionary Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 40 VST 327 (AP)

did not represent correct position in law as certain facts were not made available
to the Court at the time these cases were decided. For instance, when Duke
& Sons’ case (supra) was decided, judgment of Supreme Court interpreting
Article 366 (29A)(d) was not available.  Further,
in Nutrine’s case (supra), BSNL’s test was not correctly applied and it was contrary
to BSNL.  Based on these submissions
among others, it was pleaded that their case is one of permissive use only and
not a sale or deemed sale. Since such transaction of permissive use is covered
under service tax law, it is one of service.

Subway’s
case:

In this case, the
transaction is a franchise agreement. Subway has claimed that franchise
agreement is a pure service.  Its
franchisees in Mumbai have obtained right to display Subway’s trademarks.  The franchisees enjoy no title to these trademarks.  This is therefore neither a sale nor a deemed
sale.  Subway’s business consists of possessing
non-exclusive sub-license from Subway International B.V., a Dutch LLC (which in
turn received in a second layer from an American company owning proprietary
rights) to establish, operate and franchise others to operate SUBWAY branded
restaurants, serving sandwiches and salads under the service mark, SUBWAY in
India.  Under franchise agreements
entered into with third parties, specified services are listed to enable
franchisee to operate sandwich shops in Subway’s name.  The rights are limited and they are non-transferable
or non-assignable.  Further, Subway
reserves the right to compete with its franchisees.  Consideration from the franchisees is received
by way of one-time franchise fee and royalty payable weekly based on weekly turnover.  The petitioner paid service tax since 2003 on
these fees.  The State Government however
contended that since the franchisee has acquired right to use trademarks, there
is a transfer of right to use those trademarks and therefore claimed VAT on
this in 2014 and issued notice to this effect and subsequently several show
cause notices as well as exparte assessment order.  The petitioner pleaded that the franchise
agreement was not one for sale or transfer of right to use but merely
permitting the franchisee to display certain marks and use certain technologies
and methodology to prepare salads and sandwiches for sale and this was a
permissive use.  Subway could enter into
as many / as few agreements with other franchisees even simultaneously and
could compete with its franchisees.  The
license provided thus is limited.  Apart
from this factual aspect, it was also pleaded for Subway that in the light of
several decisions of the Supreme Court on various composite contracts, Article
366(29A) was amended in 1983 whereby only under six specific situations,
transactions could be considered deemed sale and the amendment allowed specific
composite contracts to be divisible and by separating element of ‘sale’ it
could be taxed.  Subway’s agreement could
not be split and sale was not distinctly discernible.  However, the revenue contended that
‘franchise’ and ‘trademarks’ are expressly covered under MVAT Act since 2005 as
‘goods’ and therefore liable for VAT. 
Both revenue and the petitioner relied on Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (2015) 80 VST 173 (Bom). The
petitioner chiefly relied on Asian Oilfield
Services vs. State of Tripura (2015) SCC (online Tai 483
and BSNL (Supra) 
and Imagic Creative (supra).

Findings
of the Court:

The Court on a very
careful consideration in Monsanto’s case found that although ld. Counsel for
the petitioner commended that the transaction of transferring technology was
one of “permissive use”, in view of the Court, the said interpretation was not
supported by law.  The Court observed
that the seeds transferred were fully vested in the transferee.  On the issue of effective control, the Court
observed that effective control over the said seed and therefore that portion
of the technology embedded in the seeds was also transferred to the transferee.  The transferee could do whatever it wished
and Monsanto had no control left after the transfer.  Hence the transfer was to the exclusion of
Monsanto India and this satisfied the twin test laid down in BSNL.  The Court, in this context categorically observed
that BSNL’s judgment noted various factual aspects and the test was therefore
set out in those circumstances. Thus Hon. Supreme Court in that case did not
have occasion to consider its applicability to intangible property like
intellectual property.  The Court thus
also observed that Tata Sons (supra) was interpreted accordingly whereas Kerala
High Court in Malabar Gold (para 35), 2013 (32) STR
3 (Ker) took a contrary view.  It took
BSNL test to be applicable as a general proposition.  The Court expressed that they had serious
reservation about its universal applicability by stating, “we do not think this can ever be a correct reading of BSNL”.  Further that the Bombay High Court in Duke &
Sons (supra) held that test would not be applicable in the case of
trademarks.  According to the Court
therefore the law laid down in Duke & Sons is a good law.  The Court thus considered the instant case to
be the case of a transfer of the right to use goods while inter alia also
referring to various clauses in the agreement pointed out by the revenue in
support thereof.  For instance under a
specific clause 7.1, the sub-licensee could assign the agreement and its rights
and obligations under the agreement to its wholly-owned subsidiaries without
permission of Monsanto.  This according
to the Court would not happen if there was only permissive use as claimed by
the petitioner. Revenue’s reliance on the case of G. S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 43 VST 323
was viewed as well-founded by the Court while observing that in the instant
case, sub-licensing actually amounted to passage of effective control.  The Court also drew analogy in fair detail
with downloading of software by purchasing license.  The Court observed that when a license is
purchased, it is still a sale although what the user has purchased is a right
to use software.  Proprietary rights to
the software do not have to be transferred or sold.  On identical lines in the instant case
identified technology, the one which was infused in seeds were transferred to
use as the transferee wished.  The
intellectual property may continue to be owned by Monsanto.

Finding this case to be diametrically
opposed to model in the case of Subway, the Court observed that primarily
reliance on the case of Asian Oilfield and BSNL by the petitioner was correct
as Subway’s transaction could not be split into two distinct or severable
components.  If State was to be permitted
to tax the whole transaction, it would mean extending upon the power of the
Centre under the Union List.  The Court
noted that agreement between Subway and its franchisee is a bare permission to
use as there is no passage of any kind of control or exclusivity to the
franchisees and for all the reasons in law and fact that licensing of
technology in Monsanto is held to be transfer of right to use, the franchise
agreement in Subway’s case must be held permissible use only. 

The Court however noted
with caution to state that this did not mean that every franchise agreement
will necessarily be outside the purview of amended MVAT Act.  However, merely because of inclusion of
franchisees under MVAT Act would not automatically make all franchise
agreements liable to VAT.  There may be
class of agreements of franchise that would have all incidents of a ‘sale’ or a
“deemed sale” i.e. transfer of the right to use to attract VAT and not
otherwise.  However, limiting its view on
the agreement under the case of Subway, the Court opined that the facts of the
case does not constitute a sale exigible to VAT.  Equally it rejected a proposition that the
transaction which is nothing but a service could be converted as sale merely because
an entry is inserted in the State statute. 
Subway agreements are purely licensing agreements consisting of permissive
right to franchisees to use defined intangible rights, therefore not amenable
to VAT but a service liable for service tax.

Conclusion:

The above decision in
particular in the case of Subway relying on the decision of Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra
(2015) 80 VST 173 (Bom)
based on an altogether different aspect reached a
verdict that the franchise agreement involved is exigible to service tax than
one reached in the  case of Malabar Gold Pvt.
Ltd. (supra).  In Subway’s case above, it
is found that only “permissive use” is granted under the agreement and
therefore it cannot be interpreted as “transfer of right to use goods” whereas
Kerala High Court decided “franchise agreement” as one of service simply based
on interpreting the tests provided in BSNL’s case (supra) as having general
proposition even vis-à-vis intangible goods like intellectual property. It is
important to note that in this case, the Court has categorically made a point
in the context of Monsanto’s case that in the case of BSNL (supra), Hon.
Supreme Court did not have occasion to examine the aspects of transfer of
intangible goods such as intellectual property. Therefore the tests laid down
therein for determining a transaction of “transfer of right to use goods”
should not be followed as having universal application and especially in the
context of transactions involving transfer of use of intangible goods.  A thin line divides a transaction of service
from that of sale.  The controversy soon
is likely to be part of history with the onset of GST regime coming into force
in a short while.  Yet, one cannot ignore
the hardship faced in this regard by a large number of tax compliant entities
which have paid tax under one law and has  to face wrath of the other for want of
appropriate law and mechanism to resolve the manmade issue.

(Readers may read the
above with March, 2016 issue of BCAJ article on transfer of use of intangibles
under service tax feature).

TAXABILITY OF OCEAN FREIGHT UNDER SERVICE TAX

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Introduction:
The Finance Act, 2016 introduced service tax on services of transportation of goods by a vessel from a place outside India upto the customs station of clearance with effect from 01/06/2016. Section 66D introduced from 01/07/2012 in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) comprising of negative list of services i.e. the services which are outside the ambit of service tax also contained entry (p) (ii) which read as follows:

“(p) Services by way of transportation of goods –
(i) ……………
(ii) by an aircraft or a vessel from a place outside India upto the customs station of clearance in India”.

The above entry now stands omitted with effect from June 01, 2016. However, such services by an aircraft continue to be exempt vide insertion of entry 53 In Mega Exemption Notification No.25/2012-ST.

TRU letter DO.F.No.334/8/2016 – TRU dated 29/02/2016 in this regard clarified as follows:

“(C) The entry in the Negative List that covers services by way of transportation of goods by an aircraft or a vessel from a place outside India up to the customs station of clearance [section 66D (p)(ii)] is proposed to be omitted with effect from 1.06.2016. Clause 146 of Finance Bill 2016 may please be seen in this regard. However such services by an aircraft will continue to be exempted by way of exemption notification [Not. No. 25/2012-ST, as amended by notification No. 09/2016-ST dated 1st March, 2016 refers]. The domestic shipping lines registered in India will pay service tax under forward charge while the services availed from foreign shipping line by a business entity located in India will get taxed under reverse charge at the hands of the business entity. The service tax so paid will be available as credit with the Indian manufacturer or service provider availing such services (subject to fulfillment of the other existing conditions). It is clarified that service tax levied on such services shall not be part of value for custom duty purposes. In addition, Cenvat credit of eligible inputs, capital goods and input services is being allowed for providing the service by way of transportation of goods by a vessel from the customs station of clearance in India to a place outside India. Consequential amendments are being made in Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 [Not. No. 23/2004-CE (N.T.), as amended by Sl. Nos. 2(b) and 5(h) of notification No. 13/2016-C.E. (N.T.) dated refers. ]
(Clause 146 of the Bill refers) “

In terms of the above clarification, consequential amendments are made in CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 to allow CENVAT credit of service tax paid on various input services used by domestic shipping companies or other service providers such as freight forwarders against their earnings from export freight, which hitherto was not available to them as ocean freight was not taxable.

Earlier till 30/06/2012 also, the service of transportation of goods by ocean/waterways did not find place in notified services listed in section 65(105) of the Act. The levy thus relates to service of transportation of goods by ocean in the course of import. Transportation of goods by ocean (or even air) in the course of ‘export’ did not attract service tax in the past i.e. pre and post negative list based tax regime and continue to be outside the scope of service tax by means of operation of Place of Provision of Services Rules,2012 (PoP Rules). The relevant Rule 10 of the said PoP Rules reads as follows:

“10. Place of provision of goods transportation services”.- The place of provision of services of transportation of goods, other than by way of mail or courier, shall be the place of destination of goods.

The above rule thus determines that when the goods are transported by vessel/ocean internationally, the destination of goods being beyond territorial jurisdiction to which the Act extends, the place of provision of the said service is outside India and therefore, no service tax is attracted.

Conventionally, when the goods are imported by vessel/ ocean, customs duty in terms of section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 is charged on the cost of transportation from the place of shipment to the port of importation in India. Thus all applicable levies of customs including Counterveiling Duty (CVD), Cess and Special Additional Duty (SAD) are attracted on the ocean freight. Thus, there has been a view among professionals and freight forwarding fraternity that the freight is being taxed twice; viz. under the Customs Act and now also under Service Tax. In this context, it is relevant to note here, a few observations made in decided cases:

Ocean freight & service tax:

In United Shippers Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise 2015 (37) STR 1043-(Tri.-Mumbai) service tax was sought to be levied as cargo handling service wherein on transportation of goods by barges from mother vessel to the jetty onshore in the course of import of goods into India, it was held that the activity is not liable for service tax as the activity is part of import transaction liable for import duty. However, Tribunal – Delhi in Shri Atul Kaushik & others vs. Commissioner of Customs (Export) 2015 (330) ELT 417 (Tri.-Del), a case of import of packaged software held that there is no provision that warrants exclusion from assessable value for customs on the ground that service tax is charged on the license fee paid on such a software imported when such license fee is a part of condition of sale. In this case, relying on the case of Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC) (wherein it was held that service tax and VAT are exclusive), the Appellants had urged that both service tax and customs duty cannot be demanded on the same transaction. The Tribunal in the reference held that decision is an authority for what it decides and mutuality of customs duty and service tax is not deduced from the said Supreme Court decision. Further, no constitution provisions restricting the same was brought to the notice of Tribunal. Since this decision examined includibility of license fee in assessable value for levying customs duty, the question is whether license fee paid should have suffered service tax when the same was includible for the purpose of customs duty by applying the ratio of decision in United Shippers Ltd. (supra).It is another matter though that license fee payable for a copyrighted product like software (wherein copyright remains vested in seller) would be a transaction of “deemed sale” of goods not liable for service tax as what is transferred is a right to use the copyrighted product against payment of license fees as held by Karnataka High Court in Infosys Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Others 2015-TIOL-HC-KAR-VAT.

In a recent ruling provided by Authority for Advance Rulings in the case of Berco Undercarriages (India) Pvt. Ltd. AAR/ST/10/2016, the Applicant intended to import raw material and appoint a foreign C&F agent for all composite services of handling, arranging shipping liners, clearances at point of origin and destination at a composite fee in his respective currency and customs duty would be paid on the said composite fee invoice. The question was raised as to which portion of the same would attract service tax. Discussing both the above decisions of United Shippers Ltd. (supra) and Shri Atul Kaushik (supra), AAR observed that Tribunal was not consistent on chargeability of service tax when customs duty was levied. It was also noted that transportation service by vessel from outside India upto the customs station in India is in the negative list of services and therefore not chargeable to service tax. However, at the instance of revenue’s contention, Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) 2006 (Valuation Rules) was invoked and it was held that excluding the costs incurred by C&F agent as pure agent if conditions listed in the said Rule 5 of Valuation Rules are satisfied, service tax would be payable by the Applicant on the said invoice as recipient of service. It appears prima facie that AAR’s attention was neither drawn to the Delhi High Court having declared the said Rule 5(1) ultra vires service tax in Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. vs. UOI 2012-TIOL-966-HC-DEL-ST and moreover, importantly relevant here is that neither the principles governing bundled service are examined nor relevant PoP Rules apparently seem to have been brought to the notice of AAR to determine place of provision of service of the service provider referred to as C&F agent. For instance, as per Rule 4 of Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (PoP Rules) when a service provider is in nontaxable territory provides performance based services in relation to goods outside India, no service tax is attracted or as per parameters laid in Rule 9 of the said PoP Rules, the services provided by an intermediary outside India, no reverse charge is attracted. Indeed, AAR ruling is binding only on the Applicant. However, it may cause widespread litigation on the issue involved.

Thus, in addition to the levy of duty of customs already levied while the goods are imported, service tax is levied when an Indian shipping line or a freight forwarder handles a cargo and when the freight is payable at the end of consignee. The issue here is assuming there are two separate taxable events, one under the service tax law and also under the Customs Act, whether or not there is a need for cost addition to the goods by way of service tax as in many cases such as traders, passing on of CENVAT credit is not enabled in terms of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and conventionally when freight is being considered part of the cost of imported goods for the levy of customs duty, why should service tax be levied.

Further service tax levied on transportation in the course of import has different implications on different classes of persons. Factually, a large majority of shipments are handled by Foreign Service providers/freight forwarders and the current levy is not affecting them as they are located in non-taxable territory. As against this, an Indian multimodal transport operator or a freight forwarder handling import shipment would be liable for service tax and therefore they would have less competitive service rate with the incidence of service tax @ 4.5 per cent on import freight and such service providers often do not have potential to pass on the credit. The issue therefore arises is whether any level playing field is really provided to Indian shipping lines or other service providers when majority of the cargo in the course of imports to India is handled by foreign flagship vessels or freight forwarders. Lastly, a mention is necessary here as to nationwide litigation initiated by the service tax department wherein service tax is demanded from service providers earning margin on ocean freight as MTO /freight forwarder/Non- Vessel Owning Common Carrier (NVOCC) i.e. carrying out business on their “own account” akin to traders, margin earned on non-taxable ocean or airfreight is alleged as value of service chargeable to service tax. The department is on its way to file an appeal against Mumbai Tribunal’s decision in Greenwich Meridian Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai 2016-TIOL-869-CESTAT -MUM wherein it has been held that the margin on non-taxable ocean freight is not liable for service tax as business auxiliary service. Now the Government’s own action of levying service tax on import freight is inconsistent with their own claim in litigation of treating margin on freight as value of taxable service does not require to be elaborated further.

Conclusion:

As per internationally known practices, the activity of transportation of goods by vessel or air is not chargeable to VAT or GST implemented by several countries across the globe and is considered part of the cost of imported goods for customs duty. When the Government is so keen on implementing GST as soon as practically possible, whether the levy of service tax was necessary is a poser made by many. However, it is hoped that on implementation of GST, the dual levy will be taken care of in line with international practice.

Issue of limitation, an issue of jurisdiction

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In a recent judgment of Calcutta High Court in Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata (2016) 42 STR 634 (Calcutta), the doctrine, the question of limitation is a question of jurisdiction, although an established law has been examined at great length with reference to show cause notices issued for recovery of service tax. Therefore a brief analysis of observations of the Hon. High Court in the said case is provided below:

Petitioner’s case in brief:
The petitioners in the instant case were engaged in civil construction activity. They obtained registration under construction service in October, 2004. Prior to this, the department had initiated inquiry in June 1998 regarding applicability of service tax as consulting engineer. This was replied to by the petitioner promptly stating that they were engaged in civil construction and were not liable to pay service tax as consulting engineer. Since the matter was not pursued further for six years it was understood as concluded by the petitioner. Again in April, 2004, the petitioners on receipt of the inquiry, denied their liability to pay service tax as consulting engineer. Again, there was no communication for 16 months till the department issued summons in September 2005. This was followed by a show cause notice in April, 2006 invoking longer period of limitation alleging suppression and demanding service tax for the period October 2000 to March 2005. The petitioner filed a reply to this show cause notice reiterating that they did not act as consulting engineer etc. Until three years there was complete silence at the end of which another show cause notice was issued in September 2009 involving period of September 2004 to June 15, 2005. The said second show cause notice culminated in an order confirming demand of service tax with interest and imposing equal amount of penalty. Subsequent to this, the petitioner received intimation for hearing for the earlier show cause notice issued in 2006. The petitioner replied to this stating that no hearing could take place 7 years after issuing show cause notice as they did not have record of the same and that under the law, the assessee is required to maintain records for five years only. Further already adjudicated subsequent show cause notice included part of the period covered in the earlier show cause notice. Hence there could not be dual assessment for the same period under the law. Petitioner’s grievance among others was that though there may be no time limit for adjudication of show cause notices by the department, it should be done in a reasonable time frame. For this reliance was placed on Supreme Court’s decisions in State of Punjab vs. Bhatinda District Co-op. Milk P Union Ltd. (2007) 11 SC 363 and in Government of India vs. Citetdal Fine Pharmaceuticals 1989 (42) ELT 515. In both the cases, it was observed by the Apex Court that in absence of any period of limitation, the statutory authority must exercise its power within a reasonable period. Similarly, Bombay High Court in Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Union of India (2012) 22 taxman.com 367(Bom), observed that it is well settled that adjudication proceedings have to be concluded in reasonable time and if not done, they stand vitiated on the said ground. Also in Bhagwandas S. Tolani vs. B C Aggarwal 1983 (12) ELT 44 (Bom), Universal Generics (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India 1993 taxmann.com 30 (Bom) and in Biswanath & Co. V. Union of India 2010 (257) ELT 30 (Cal), the Courts have set aside either the show cause notice or the order, as the case may be. Sum and substance of the petitioner’s pleadings was to hold the hearing notice and the show cause notice as non-est and invalid. Reliance was placed by the petitioner also on the decisions in CCE vs. Mohan Bakers (P) Ltd. 2009 (241) ELT A23 and Giriraj Industries vs. CCE 2009 (242) ELT A84 wherein the Courts held/affirmed respectively that show cause notice issued after two years/15 months from the date of inspection/cause of action, the proceedings initiated were without following the due process of law.

Revenue’s contentions in brief:
On behalf of revenue, relying on the decision in Surya Alloy Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India 2014 (305) ELT 340 (Cal) it was contended that High Court’s interference on classification issues challenged through writs was not maintainable and the petitioners should be directed to agitate their grievance before the revenue authorities. The revenue further pointed out that in Indian Cardboard Industries vs. Collector of Central Excise 1991 taxmann.com 847 (Cal) it was observed that ordinarily, High Court should not embark to decide the factual disputes but relegate the party to submit the reply before authority concerned who is obliged to decide the same. The said rule however is not free from exceptions which are quoted below:

1 When the show cause notice is ex facie or on the basis of admitted facts does not disclose the offence alleged to be committed;

2 When the show cause notice is otherwise without jurisdiction;

3 When the show cause notice suffers from an incurable infirmity;

4 When the show cause notice is contrary to judicial decisions or decisions of the Tribunal;

5 When there is no material justifying the issuance of the show cause notice.

According to revenue, none of the above applied to the petitioner’s case. Reliance by revenue was also placed on the decision of ACST vs. P. Kesavan & Co. 1996 taxmann. com 1512 and it was contended that the rule must apply even to cases where sufficient evidence is placed before the writ Court for an unambiguous conclusion upon technical matters and made reference to Apcotex Industries vs. Union of India 2011 (271) ELT 46. The revenue among others also contended that issuing notice for personal hearing after a delay of seven years did not vitiate the case of the department against the petitioner as the Finance Act, 1994 contains no bar to continue adjudication proceedings and relied on the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of CCE vs. Bhagsons Paints Industries (India) 2003 taxmann. com 315 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Tribunal and allowed adjudication proceedings to be completed nine years after issuance of show cause notice as the statute did not prescribe any time limit. The revenue contended further that show cause notice of 2006 was issued within seven months of the summons dated September 2005 whereas inspection made in 1998 was for the period not covered by the 2006 show cause notice. Only after subsequent inquiries in 2004 and 2005, the impugned show cause notice was issued within seven months.

Court’s view:
The Court’s observations based on rival submissions are summarized as follows:

On the maintainability of the writ petition, it was held that extended period of limitation was wrongly invoked and the logical conclusion would be that the show cause notice was issued without jurisdiction. In such event, the Court is justified in interfering with the show cause notice in exercise of its Writ Jurisdiction. The court observed,

“It is trite law that an authority cannot confer on itself to do a particular thing by wrongly assuming the existence of certain set of facts, existence whereof is a sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction by such authority. An authority cannot assume jurisdiction to do a particular thing by erroneously deciding a point of fact or law.”

“There cannot be dispute that the question of limitation is a question of jurisdiction and the Commissioner has no authority and/or jurisdiction to issue notice after the period of limitation prescribed in the Finance Act, 1994.”

The Court in this frame of reference relied on Raza Textiles Ltd vs,. ITO AIR 1973 SC 1362 and Shrisht Dhawan vs. Shaw Brother (1992) 1 SCC 534 wherein the proposition of Raza Textriles (supra) was reiterated that a Court or a Tribunal cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly. Also citing Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. vs. ITO AIR 1961 SC 372, the Court held that preliminary issue of maintainability of the writ petition is decided in favour of the petitioner and the writ cannot be dismissed in limine as unmaintainable.

On merits, after examining provisions of section 73 of the Finance Act 1994 under which the show cause notice was issued vis-à-vis the facts of the case, it was observed that the show cause notice was issued much beyond 18 months from the date when according to the department service tax was found payable. The Court expressed a clear view that a mere mechanical reproduction of the language of the proviso to section 73(1) of the Act does not per se justify invocation of the extended period of limitation. A mere ipse dixit that the Noticee willfully suppressed the material facts with intent to evade payment of service tax is not sufficient and that the department should be able to substantiate its allegation of suppression even if it is not included in the notice. The Court categorically found that to its mind, the instant case was not of suppression by the petitioner as they had provided copies of balance sheets and specimen contracts in 1996 & were found diligent in their response to all the notices. The impugned show cause notice merely contained a sweeping statement that had investigation not been conducted, material facts would not have been unearthed. There is no whisper as to the fact that was alleged as suppressed. The Court found that once the information called for was supplied and was not questioned, a belated demand has to be held to be barred by limitation.

For this, Punjab Laminates P. Ltd. 2006 (202) ELT 578 and CCE vs. Chennai Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (2007) 8 STT 168 were relied upon among various other such as CCE vs. Bajaj Auto Ltd. (2010) 29 STT 39 and Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd. vs. CCE (2005) 2 STT 226 (SC).

The Court found the show cause notice to be hopelessly barred by limitation and noted that even if the Court was to decide the issue of limitation in favour of the department, there were other grounds on which would be compelled to quash the impugned show cause notice. The Bench in this reference indicated the ‘overlapped’ period and consequent double assessment and observed that such dual assessment is impermissible in law. Reliance was placed in case of Dankan Industries Ltd. vs. CCE 2006 (201) ELT 517 (SC) and found that the demand was rather predetermined. Further citing the case of Siemens Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2007 (207) ELT 168 (SC), it was observed that ordinarily a writ Court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition questioning a Noticee to show cause unless the same inter alia appears to have been issued without jurisdiction, the question has to be considered from a different angle when a notice is issued with pre-meditation.

The Court finally also observed that as pleaded by revenue, the case in no way involved justifiability of classification but of sustainability of a show cause notice and allowed the assessee’s writ quashing the show cause notice of 2006 and dismissed all appeals filed by revenue in this regard.

Conclusion:
When alternate remedy is available and as categorically provided by Hon. High Court in the case of Indian Cardboard Industries (supra), the High Court interferes with the adjudication process in exceptional cases and in particular when there is a clear questionability of jurisdiction involved is proven to the Court. Service tax department in a number of cases may have exceeded its jurisdictional authority. However, considering cost and / or time factor or for want of adequate evidence, not many approach Courts to interfere in the matter. The analysis in the case above serves a good guidance to determine viability depending on facts of each case.

Taxability of Discounts/incentives

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Preliminary

It
is widely known that, post introduction of negative List based taxation of
Services, the ambit of taxation of services has expanded manifold. the  scope of ‘service’ and in particular as to
what constitutes “activity carried out for a consideration” and scope of
“declared services”, has been a subject of extensive deliberations. In this
write up, an attempt is made to discuss this aspect, with a recent ruling of
authority for advance ruling (Central excise, Customs & Service tax) [AAR
(CEST)]

Relevant statutory Provisions

Section
65B  (44) of the Finance act,   1994
as amended (Act):

“Service”
means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and
includes a declared service, but shall not include: –

(a)
An activity which constitutes merely, –

i)   A transfer 
of  title  in 
goods  or  immovable property, by way of sale, gift or
in any other manner; or

ii)  Such transfer, delivery or supply of any
goods which is deemed to be a sale within the meaning of clause (29A) of
article 366 of the Constitution; or

iii)
A transaction in money or actionable claim;

(b)
A provision  of  service 
by  an  employee 
to  the employer in the course of
or in relation to his employment;

(c)
Fees taken in any Court or tribunal 
established under any law for the time being in force.

 Section 66E of the
act – Declared Services:

The
following shall constitute declared services, namely –

(e)
Agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a
situation, or to do an act.

Ruling of AAR (CEST) in AKQA media India (P) ltd. (2016) 55
GST 720 (AAR  – New Delhi) (2016) 69
taxman.com. 390:

Facts in Brief

In
this case, applicant intended to carry out the activity of an advertising
agency (‘AA’), whereby it would provide professional services to its clients
(i.e. advertisers) in relation to placement of advertisements on various media.
Further, the applicant intended to charge commission from such clients as a
consideration for provision  of its
services. While the applicant is to provide services only to advertisers,
depending on the quantum of its advertisements placed by the applicant on
various media, the applicant could be entitled to an incentive / volume
discount from the media owners (MO). The applicants propose to undertake two
business models, which are described hereafter briefly:

Proposed business model 1
– Placement of advertisement in traditional media on behalf of the advertiser
(Steps involved) [“BM 1”]:

Client
Contract

Preparation
of media Plan

Approval
of the media Plan

Issuance
of estimate by advertising agency

Issuance
of release order by advertising agency

Monitoring
of Campaign

Receipt
of invoice from media vendor

Raising
of invoice by advertising agency

Receipt
of volume discount

Proposed business model 2
– Buying and Selling of advertisement Inventory in non – traditional media, on
its own account (steps involved) [“BM 2”]

More
or less on similar lines as BM 1

under
proposed BM 1, while the applicant shall be appointed by its clients (i.e. the
advertiser) to provide services, will incidental receipt of incentives / volume
discounts from MO shall be considered to be providing a service, as defined
under the Act, to the MO and shall the same be liable to Service tax ?

under  proposed 
BM 2,  while  the 
applicant  shall  buy and sell the media inventory on its own
account to the advertiser, will incidental receipt of incentives / volume
discounts from MO shall be considered to be providing a services as defined
under the Act, to the MO and shall the same be liable to service tax?

In
case, it is considered that the applicant is providing any service to the MO,
in the course of providing advertisement placement services to its client, then
on what value should the Service tax be applicable under the Act?

Submissions of Applicants

The
incidental receipt of incentives / volume discounts by the applicant from MO are
gratuitous payment not for providing services. No service tax is payable on
such incentives in as much as the applicant does not enter into any contract
for provision of service with the MO;

The
applicant places the order on behalf of the advertiser and the advertiser is
liable to pay the cost of the advertisement to the MO and the agency commission
to the applicant. The applicant pays service tax on the said agency commission;

No
‘service’ is provided or agreed to be provided by the applicant to the MO and
that the incentives / volume discounts are paid at the sole discretion of the MO
and there is no obligation, either contractual or otherwise, on the MO to pay
incentives / volume discounts to the applicant;

The
concerned issue has been examined by the CEST at in the case of Grey Worldwide
India (P.) Ltd. vs. CST [2015] 52 GST 1020 / (Mum. – CESTAT) wherein it was
held that no service tax is payable on such amount (i.e. incentives / volume
discounts) received by the AA  from the
MO;

In
any event, once MO discharges service tax on the gross amount charged by them
to the advertisers and the applicant having discharged service tax on such
agency  commission  received, 
no  further  service 
tax is  payable  as 
consideration  for  services 
charged  by the MO  and the applicant has already suffered service
tax in full;

In
regard to the proposed BM 2, the applicant would be paying service tax on the
gross amount charged to the advertiser for the media inventory (except non –
taxable media such as print media) and the MO would charge the applicant
service tax on the gross amount charged to the applicant. any incentives /
volume discount received by the applicant from the MO post issuance of the
taxable invoice on the applicant for the gross amount charged to the applicant,
no service tax will be payable on the gross amount charged to the applicant on
the said incentive volume discount, as the service tax, at the first instance
will be paid on the gross amount charged to the applicant. The applicant, in
turn, will pay service tax on the gross amount charged by the applicant to the
advertiser.

Submissions of Revenue

As
far as proposed BM 1 is concerned, the volume discount received by the
applicant for the services provided to the MO is liable to service tax in as
much as the invoices from MO only mentions the name of the applicant, thus
there is contractual relationship for provision of service between the
applicant and mo. the  entire amount
payable to MO in respect of media is to be paid by the applicant and the
applicant is to receive separate amount as consideration for the services
provided to the advertiser.

As
far as BM 2 is concerned, applicant is to sell media inventory on his own
account to the advertiser and in such a case, applicant needs to discharge
service tax liability on the total sale price invoiced to the advertiser. In
this BM 2 also, applicant is required to pay service tax on the amount received
from the MO treating the said amount as consideration for the services
provided.

Observations of AAR (CEST)

As
far as BM 1 is concerned, it is contended by the revenue that, the amount
received by the applicant from the MO is in the nature of consideration
received for the services provided and liable to service tax for following
reasons:

(i)
Invoices pertaining to transaction from MO only mention the name of the
applicant. Consequently, contractual relationship for provision of service
exists only between these two parties.

(ii)
Entire amount payable to MO in respect of space and time for media is payable
by the applicant.

(iii)
Applicant     receives     separate     amount    
as consideration for the service provided to the advertiser.

It  is 
noticed  that  “Step 
7  (receipt  of 
invoice  from media vendor”) of BM
1, clearly mentions that the MO raises its invoices for the cost of the media
inventory sold to the advertiser. Further, invoice will mention the name of
advertiser and also the name of the applicant, besides other details,
therefore,  it is evident that the media
inventory is sold to the advertiser and not to the applicant. Also, Revenue is incorrect in stating that
invoice will only mention the name of the applicant
. The submission of
revenue that the entire amount is payable to MO in respect of space and time
for media by the applicant is also incorrect. In Step 7 of BM 1, it has been
made amply clear that AA makes the payment for the media inventory to the mo,
on behalf of the advertiser after retaining its commission. It is further alleged
by the revenue that applicant receives separate amount as consideration for the
services provided to the advertiser. Step 8 of BM 1 mentions that the amount
received by the applicant from the advertiser is its fees / agency commission
plus service tax. It is to be observed
that the question raised by Revenue relating to BM 1 is based on incorrect
appreciation of facts
.

In
respect of BM 2, it is contended by the revenue that the applicant sells media
inventory on his own account to the advertiser. In such case, applicant needs
to discharge service tax liability on the total sale price invoiced to the
advertiser. Applicant has confirmed that they would be paying service tax (if
any) on the gross amount charged to the advertiser for the media inventory (except
non – taxable media such as print media). Based on the above assumptions which
are factually incorrect, revenue has concluded that applicant is required to
pay service tax on the amount received from MO treating said amount as
consideration for services provided. The
question raised by the Revenue are based on incorrect appreciation of facts,
the subject question does not survive
.

Revenue
further contended that as per section 65B of the act, ‘service’ has following
ingredients;


any activity


by one person for another


for consideration

And
in the present case, all 3 ingredients are satisfied, thus service provided to MO
by the applicant will be liable to service tax. Applicant submitted that they
will not carry out any activity for consideration. It is to be observed that in
the definition of ‘service’, there has to be nexus between activity and
consideration. In case, there is no nexus between the activity and
consideration, such an activity  shall  not 
fall  under  the 
definition  of  “service”, as the concept “activity for
consideration” involves an element of contractual relationship. This
relationship could be express or implied, for which the burden of proof would
be on the revenue. In the subject case,
no iota of the evidence has been produced before us by the Revenue to indicate
that there is an activity undertaken by the applicant, which resulted in MO giving
volume discount to the applicant, especially when  the 
choice  of  selecting 
MO   is  reportedly with the advertiser and not with
the aa (applicant). Therefore, volume discount that could be received from the MO
by the applicant is not in relation to any activity undertaken by the
applicant. Therefore, it is not service.

Revenue
also argued that the applicant provides “declared   service”  
in   terms   of  
section   66E(e)   of the act,

It
is observed that there is no agreement or contractual obligation between the
applicant and the MO to give volume discount to the applicant by the mo. volume
discount is not fixed and is to be given at the discretion of mo. Further,
volume discount is gratuitous. Applicant /AA cannot claim it as a matter of
right. Therefore, applicant is not providing declared services to the MO.

Revenue
has raised another issue that applicant provides promotion or marketing
services to the MO by giving preferential treatment to the them, which provide
volume discounts / incentives. It is noticed that MO are not under any legal
obligation to pay volume discounts and it is purely discretionary on the part
of mo.  Applicant is not carrying out any
activity to promote any mo’s  business.
Further, which MO is to be engaged is the decision of the advertiser and not of
the applicant. Therefore,  applicant
cannot be said to provide promotion or marketing services to MO.

Further,
in Grey Worldwide India (P.) Ltd. vs. CST [Order No. A /1337 – 1338 /
14/CSTB/C-1, dated 30-7-2014], tribunal 
held  that  media 
giving  certain  incentives 
by way of volume discounts cannot be levied to service tax. Relevant extracts
from the Judgment are reproduced hereafter:

“Thereafter,  at the end of the year, depending upon the
volume of business given by the advertising agency, the media gives certain
incentives by way of volume discounts / rate difference. There is no agreement
or understanding or any contract between the advertising agency and the media
for promotion of the media’s business activities. There is also no obligation
on the part of the media to Give these incentives.

These payments are made only as a gratuitous payment   for  
the   advertisements   placed  
on the media. There is no contractual obligation between the advertising
agency and the media for provision of any services. In the absence of such a
contractual obligation, it is difficult to accept the Revenue’s contention that
on the incentives received, the appellant is liable to service tax under
“business  auxiliary  Services”. This was the view taken by this
Tribunal consistently in a series of decisions starting from Euro RSCG
advertising Ltd.”

Ruling:

In
view of the above, AAR (CEST) ruled as under:

In
proposed BM 1, while the applicant shall be appointed by its clients i.e. the
advertiser to provide services, incidental receipt of incentives / volume
discounts from MO shall not be considered to be providing a service, as defined
under the Finance Act, 1994, to the MO and shall not be liable to service tax.

In
proposed BM 2, while the applicant shall buy and sell the media inventory on
its own account to the advertiser, incidental receipt of incentives / volume
discounts from MO shall not be considered to be providing a service, as defined
under the Act, to the MO and shall not be liable to Service tax.

In
view of rulings 1 and 2 above, Question 3 becomes infructuous

Conclusion:

Despite
categorical ruling by AAR (CEST) based on examination of facts placed before
them, it is a common knowledge that at a practical level advertising agencies
are authorized by media owners. Hence, they could be regarded implied agents of
media owners who book advertisements on their behalf.

Further, acting as an agent itself, may
constitute activity for consideration inasmuch as the same could tantamount to
providing representational services. In light of the foregoing, it is felt that
conclusion arrived at by AAR (CEST) may have to be tested before a Court of
law.

Valuation of constructed units given to landowners in lieu of Development Rights – A Burning Issue

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Relevant Statutory Provisions

Section 65B (44) of the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’)

‘Service’ means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include –

a) an activity which constitutes merely, –

i) a transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or

ii) a transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be a sale within the meaning of clause (29A) of article 366 of the Constitution; or
b) a provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;
c) fees taken in any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force.
………………..

Section 66E of the Act – Declared Services

The following shall constitute declared services, namely: – …………

(b) Construction of a complex, building, civil structure or a part thereof, including a complex or building intended for sale to a buyer, wholly or partly, except where the entire consideration is received after issuance of completion certificate by the competent authority.

Explanation. – for the purposes of this clause, –
……………….

(1) The expression ‘construction’ includes additions, alterations, replacements or remodeling of any existing civil structure;
……………..
Service portion in the execution of a works contract.

Section 67 of Act – Valuation of taxable services for charging service tax

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, where service tax is chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value, then such value shall,

i) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration in money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him;

ii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration not wholly or partly consisting of money, be such amount in money as, with the addition of service tax charged, is equivalent to the consideration;

iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable, be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner.


Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 (“Valuation Rules”)

Rule 3 – Manner of determination of value

Subject to the provisions of section 67, the value of taxable service, where such value is not ascertainable, shall be determined by the service provider in the following manner –

a) the value of such taxable service shall be equivalent to the gross amount charged by the service provider to provide similar service to any other person in the ordinary course of trade and the gross amount charged is the sole consideration;

b) where the value cannot be determined in accordance with clause (a), the service provider shall determine the equivalent money value of such consideration which shall, in no case be less than the cost of provision of such taxable service.

Background

In Larsen & Toubro Ltd vs. State of Karnataka [2014] 34 STR 481 (SC) the Supreme Court held that building / construction contract is a ‘works contract as well as transfer of immovable property. In a building / construction contract, goods like cement, concrete, steel, bricks etc. are intended to be incorporated in structure and fact that they lost their identity as goods, does not prevent them from being goods.

However, the activity of construction undertaken by developer would be works contract only from the stage the developer enters into a contract with flat purchaser. If a contract with flat purchaser is entered only after construction is completed, goods used in construction cannot be deemed to have been sold for the fact that it is the building which is intended for sale ultimately.

Taxability of Joint Development Agreements usually involves three parties viz.

Landowner;

Builder and

Buyers of constructed units.

The same has been subject to several interpretations from time to time by CBEC and various High Courts and Tribunals. One of the burning issues in such agreements has been taxability of flats given by a builder to landowner in consideration of the grant of land development rights.

The Burning Issue is whether such flats given to landowner are to be valued:

at the price of land / land development rights given by landowner to the builder / developer or

at the price charged for similar flats from other buyers

To examine this, it is relevant to refer to the following circulars issued by the Government.

Clarification vide CBEC Circular No. 151/2/2012 – ST dated 10/02/2012 (Relevant Extracts)

Para 2.1

In case of Tripartite Business Model, the parties involved are:

i) landowner;

ii) builder or developer; and

iii) contractor who undertakes construction. Here two important transactions are identifiable viz.

Sale of land by the landowner which is not a taxable service; and

Construction service provided by the builder / developer.

The builder / developer receive consideration for the construction service provided by him, from two categories of service receivers:
a) From landowner: in the form of land / development rights; and
b) From other buyers: normally in cash.

For the period prior to 01/07/2010, construction service provided by the builder / development rights of the land was received by the builder / developer will not be taxable in terms of CBEC Circular No. 108/2/2009 – ST dated 21/01/2009.

For the period after 01/07/2010, construction services provided by the builder / developer is taxable in case any part of the payment / development rights of the land was received before the issuance of completion certificate and the service tax would be required to be paid by builder / developers even for the flats given to the landowner.

Value, in the case of flats given to landowner, is determinable in terms of section 67(1) (iii) read with Rule 3(a) of Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, as the consideration for these flats i.e., value of land / development rights in the land may not be ascertainable ordinarily. Accordingly, the value of these flats would be equal to the value of similar flats charged by the builder / developer from the second category of service receivers. In case the prices of flats / houses undergo a change over the period of sale (from the first sale of flat / house in the residential complex to the last sale of the flat / house) the value of similar flats as are sold nearer to the date on which land is being made available for construction should be used for arriving at the value for the purpose of tax. Service tax is liable to be paid by the builder / developer on the “construction service” involved in the flats to be given to the landowner, at the time when the possession or right in the property of the said flats are transferred to the landowner by entering into a conveyance deed or similar instrument (e.g. allotment letter).

Clarification vide Education Guide dated 20/06/2012

Para 6.2.1

In case of flats / houses agreed to be given by builder / developer to the land owner towards the land / development rights and to other buyers, two important transactions are identifiable:

Sale of land by the landowner which is not a taxable service; and

Construction service provided by the builder / developer.

The builder / developer receive consideration for the construction service provided by him from two categories of service receivers: (a) from landowner: in the form of land / development rights; and (b) from other buyers; normally in cash. Construction service provided by the builder / developer is taxable in case any part of the payment / development rights of the land was received by the builder / developer before the issuance of completion certificate and the service tax would be required to be paid by builder / developers even for the flats given to the landowner. ………….

Value, in the case of flats given to first category of service receiver will be the value of the land when the same is transferred and the point of taxation will also be determined accordingly.

Clarification vide CBEC Circular F. No. 354 /311/ 2015 TRU dated 20/01/2016 which supersedes Education Guide dated 20/06/2012 and revives Circular dated 10/02/2012.

Para 4

The Circular dated 10/02/2012 is in accordance with the provisions relating to valuation as laid down in the Finance Act, 1994 and the Service tax (Determination of Value ) Rules, 2006. As regards the Education Guide, it has been clearly stated in the Education Guide, 2012 that it is merely an educational aid based on a broad understanding of a team of officers on the issues. It is neither a “Departmental Circular” nor a manual of instructions issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs. To that extent it does not command the required legal backing to be binding on either side in any manner. The guide was released purely as a measure of facilitation so that all stakeholders could obtain some preliminary understanding of the new issues for smooth transition to the new regime. Hence, Circulars such as the present one would prevail over the Education Guide, 2012. Hence, in valuing the service of construction provided by a builder / developer to a landowner who transfers his land / development rights to builder for getting in return constructed flats / dwellings from builder / developer, the service tax assessing authorities should be guided by the said Board Circular dated 20/02/2012 and not the Education Guide.

Ruling of Madras High Court in Southern Properties & Promoters vs. CCE (2015) 52 GST 413 (MAD)

In this case the appellant was providing taxable service under the category of “Construction of Residential Complex Service”. They entered into a joint venture agreement with a land owner for construction of 72 flats in three blocks, (viz. 24 flats in each block). The appellant, by virtue of the joint venture agreement, owned 48 flats and the land owner owned the remaining 24 flats as his share equivalent to the land. That the appellant paid service tax on the sale of 48 flats to independent third parties after claiming the benefit of abatement. But they failed to pay service tax on the cost of 24 flats alleged to be the share of the land owner and the reason stated by the appellant was that they had not received any amount from the landowner for the construction of the flats allotted to them. Hence, show cause notice was issued demanding service tax. The appellant filed a reply stating that since they did not pay any amount to the land owner towards the land cost, they had not paid service tax for the flats held by the land owner.

The Adjudicating Authority adjudicated the case and came to hold that the classification of the service provided by them was not in dispute. In so holding the Adjudicating Authority further held as under:

“I observe that it is the ‘appellant’ who provided the service of construction of flats by virtue of entering into a ‘JV’. As per section 65 (105)(zzzh) of the Act, taxable service means “any service provided or to be provided to any person in relation to construction of complex”. The phrase “any service” in relation to construction of residential complex service is wide enough to cover all services including construction service.” ………………………

(f) Further, in the Finance Act, 2010 communicated vide Board’s DOF No. 334/1/2010 – TRU, dated 26/02/2010, in order to achieve the legislative intent and bring in parity in tax treatment, an explanation to sub-clause to section 65(105)(zzzh) of the Act had been inserted to provide that unless the entire payment for the property is paid by the prospective buyer or on his behalf after completion of construction (including its certification by local authorities), the activity of construction would be deemed to be a taxable service provided by the builder or promoter or developer to be the prospective buyer and the service tax would be charged accordingly. The above explanation to sub-clause to section 65(105) (zzzh) of the Act has applicability from the date of existence of the section and hence is having retrospective effect from 16/06/2005. Therefore, I observe that all the earlier Board’s Circulars are to be read with the above explanation.”

Accordingly, the Adjudicating Authority confirmed the demand.

The contention of appellant before the Tribunal was that the appellant had not received any consideration in the form of money in respect of 24 flats handed over to the landowner and therefore tax should be demanded on the basis of the cost of land. The plea of the department before the Tribunal was that the value of taxable service should be equivalent to the gross amount charged by the appellant to provide construction of the similar 48 flats. The contention of the department before the Tribunal is reproduced, hereafter:

“3…… He drew the attention of the Bench to Rule 3 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. He submits that the value of such taxable service shall be equivalent to the gross amount charged by the applicant to provide construction of the similar 48 flats. He relied upon the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Prince Foundation Ltd. vs. CST (2014) 33 STR 448 (Tri. – Chen.), where stay was granted partially.”

After hearing both sides, the Tribunal on a consideration of Rule 3 of the Valuation Rules, which provides the manner of determination of value in respect of taxable service, namely the service defined u/s. 65(105)(zzzh) of the Act, came to hold that the value of taxable service should be equivalent to the gross amount charged by the service provider to provide similar service to any other person, that is to say, the value of taxable service rendered in relation to the flats sold to independent persons. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the appellant has failed to make out a prima facie case for waiver of pre-deposit.

Aggrieved by the Tribunal’s order of pre-deposit, the appellant approached the Court. The observations of the High Court are as under:

“From a reading of the above said provisions, it is clear that section 65(105)(zzzh) of the Finance Act, 1994 relates to construction of complex, whereas section 65(105)(zzzza) of the Finance Act, 1994 relates to works contract. It is not in dispute that the appellant is engaged in the promotion and construction of residential complexes and not engaged in works contract. It is relevant to note that the plea now taken by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 29 dated 22nd May, 2007 has not been taken by the appellant either before the Adjudicating Authority or before the Commissioner (Appeals) (Para 18).

Prima facie, we are not inclined to entertain this appeal, in view of the specific admission by the appellant before the Adjudicating Authority that the services rendered by the appellant would fall u/s. 65(105)(zzzh) of the Finance Act, 1994. Even otherwise, the language of section 65(105)(zzzh) and the nature of the services provided by the appellant is for construction of flats provided to the land owner and the transfer of land is only for the purpose of providing such taxable service, we fail to understand as to how the appellant would say that there is no liability to pay service tax in respect of 24 flats handed over to the land owner after rendering taxable service as defined u/s. 65(105)(zzzh) of the Finance Act, 1994. If there is no monetary consideration in the transaction, then section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 provides for various methods for valuation. Hence, it is for the appellant to establish that his plea that the value of the land should be taken into consideration is a matter for the Tribunal to decide on merits at the time of hearing of the appeal (Para 19)..

At the first blush, we are not inclined to accept the plea of the department that the case in respect of valuation, it may fall under Rule 2 or 3 of Valuation Rules and the amendment made in the year 2012. We are not inclined to go into the effect of amendment as pleaded by the standing counsel and we are not inclined to make any observation as that would influence the mind of the Tribunal as to the applicability of such Rule on the merits of the case…… (Para 20).

The Tribunal is justified in ordering pre–deposit of Rs.12 lakh as against demand of Rs. 27 lakh.

Relevant overseas judgment on the Issue

In Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane I upravlenie na izpalnenieto’ – grad Burgas pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite vs. Orfey Balgaria EOOD [2013] 38 STT 289 (ECJ), assessee acquired building right over land owned by various owners and agreed to provide certain portions of constructed property in consideration thereof. Department argued that assessee had agreed to provide construction services and received consideration thereof on date of establishment of building right. It was also argued that value of consideration received by assessee was open market value of construction services provided.

The European Court of Justice ruled that:

When building right was established in favour of assessee as a consideration for construction services agreed to be provided, such establishment of building right amounted to receipt of consideration and such construction services became chargeable on date of establishment of building right.

Such charge will arise only if, at time when right is established, all relevant information concerning that future supply of services is already known and value of that right may be expressed in monetary terms.

Moreover, value of such building right cannot be based on open market value of construction services to be provided; it must be based on value of building rights received.

Mere possibility that building right may get extinguished by assessee not exercising such right does not bar charge of service tax, as on such extinguishment, assessee may seek refund / credit of tax paid earlier.

Conclusion

The ruling of Madras High Court, though in the context of law prevalent prior to 01/07/2012 is relevant despite the fact that the matter has been remanded to Tribunal for final determination of valuation, the Court has observed in para 20 that they are not inclined to accept the plea of the department that the case in respect of valuation may fall under Rule 2 or 3 of the Valuation Rules.

Based on the judgment of ECJ referred in para 7 above and considering the principle of reciprocal consideration, a view could be adopted that the value of construction services by builder to landowner should be based on the value of land development rights received in return from the landowner by the builder. The value of land development rights is clearly discernible in the form of prorata value of land given up by the landowner and such value of land should be determined at the time of entering into the contract.

The value of land is always available at the time of execution of development contract. In the State of Maharashtra, development rights are liable for stamp duty and market value of such rights is prescribed vide the Government Ready Reckoner. Hence, as a reasonable view in terms of provisions of section 67(1)(i) & (ii) of the Act, the prorata value of land rights given up by the landowner can only be taken as basis for determining the value of construction services provided by builder because that is what the builder gets in return. It appears that Education Guide dated 20/06/2012 represents the correct position of law. If the value however, is not ascertainable, only then resort can be made to section 67(1)(iii) of the Act read with Rule 3(a) of Valuation Rules.

However, caution is advised while adopting the view stated in paras (a) to (c) above inasmuch as, more particularly post issue of CBEC circular dated 20/01/2016, the service tax department has issued show cause notices in large number to demand service tax on the basis of market value of similar flats in terms of Rule 3(a) of the Valuation Rules. Hence, this issue is likely to witness an extensive round of litigations and finality thereon could take a very long time. Considering far reaching implications of the matter on the real estate sector, it is suggested that CBEC needs to understand these transactions and then clarify the matter vide a detailed order u/s. 37 B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is also applicable to service tax.

The entire discussion above is however subject to the basic ‘fact’ which requires to be understood by all concerned that when a landowner is given constructed units or flats by the developer, it is part of the ‘cost’ of the developer. The consideration payable to the landowner towards land or purchase of development rights comprises of constructed premises with/without consideration in monetary terms. The consideration for the service that the developer provides both to the landowner and other purchasers of units, comes only from the other purchasers and on which the service tax is already paid / payable. No other consideration for the ‘service’ provided by the developer is received by him. Therefore without the receipt of any additional consideration, fastening liability on the value other than that is attributable to service would be beyond the scope of section 67. Secondly, the market value of the newly constructed units is attributable to the “land value” and not towards construction service. Therefore, the whole exercise initiated by the department is capable of being challenged.

Pre-Deposit At First Stage Appeal – Whether Adjustable At The Second Stage?

BACKGROUND:
As announced by Hon. Finance Minister, Goods and Services Tax is likely to be effective from July 01, 2017. Indirect tax litigation is yet to become a story of the past considering pendency of the matters before various Benches of CESTAT and first appellate authorities, which is further topped up by enthusiasm demonstrated by officers of the department of service tax in particular of initiating proceedings for all and sundry, decided or undecided issues. Since service tax law underwent an ‘overhaul’ on account of introduction of “negative list” based taxation from 01/07/2012, various issues closed under the earlier regime are routinely initiated for the legal testing under the “negative list” based period as well, even though those issues do not remain open on account of the new law having taken care of the shortcomings in interpretation of the earlier provisions of service tax law.

ISSUE OF PRE-DEPOSIT OF DUTY OR TAX IN TWO-STAGE APPEAL
In the scenario, pre-deposit of duty or tax payable while filing appeals is quite a concern of many assessees under service tax considering huge demands initiated and routinely confirmed by adjudicating authorities at all levels and especially in vexatious cases. In a recent decision, Ahmedabad Tribunal in ASR Multimetals Pvt. Ltd. 2017 (345) ELT 294 (Tri.-Ahmd) had an occasion to examine whether pre-deposit made while filing the first appeal can be adjusted against the quantum of deposit required to be made while filing the appeal before the Tribunal.

Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 laying down provisions in this regard (as amended with effect from August 06, 2014) also applicable to service tax vide section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 is reproduced below:

“35F. Deposit of certain percentage of duty demanded or penalty imposed before filing appeal.- The Tribunal or the Commissioner (Appeals), as the case may be shall not entertain any appeal,-
(i)     under sub-section (1) of section 35, unless the appellant has deposited seven and a half per cent of the duty, in case where duty or duty and penalty are in dispute, or penalty where such penalty is in dispute, in pursuance of a decision or an order passed by an officer of Central Excise lower in rank than the Commissioner of Central Excise

(ii)     against the decision or order referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 35B, unless the appellant has deposited seven and a half per cent of the duty, in case where duty or duty and penalty are in dispute, or penalty, where such penalty is in dispute, in pursuance of the decision or order appealed against;

(iii) against the decision or order referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 35B, unless the appellant has deposited ten per cent of the duty, in case where duty or duty and penalty are in dispute, or penalty, where such penalty is in dispute, in pursuance of the decision or order appealed against.

Provided that the amount required to be deposited under this section shall not exceed rupees ten crores.

Provided further that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the stay applications and appeals pending before any appellate authority prior to the commencement of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section “duty demanded” shall include.-

(i)     amount determined under section 11D
(ii)    amount of erroneous CENVAT credit taken;
(iii)    amount payable under Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2001 or the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 or the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.”
[emphasis supplied]

In three cases under appeal before the Tribunal, the Appellants paid 7.5% duty at first appellate stage before Commissioner (Appeals). Against the orders passed by Commissioner (Appeals), when the appeals were filed before the Tribunal, they deposited 2.5% in terms of clause (iii) of the above section 35F / section 129A of the Customs Act, 1962*).

(*Since the provisions of the Customs Act in this regard are identical, they are not reproduced here for the sake of brevity).

They adjusted thus the amount paid at the first appellate stage and considered that the requirement of 10% payment towards pre-deposit thus stood fulfilled. The Revenue objected to this as according to them, such interpretation was incorrect and thus additional 10% was required to be paid in place of 2.5% to comply with the provisions laid down in applicable clause (iii) of the above section 35F for the appeal to be entertained by
the Tribunal.

The Tribunal found that the provisions were in no way ambiguous to interpret that the amount paid under clause (ii) at the time of filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) was adjustable/considered paid for the purpose of clause (iii) as well.

The Tribunal in this context relied on the ratio of decision in the case of Greatship (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-I 2015 (39) STR 754 (Bom) wherein principles of interpretation of taxing statutes were discussed at significant length, at the end of which, the following conclusion was drawn at para 34 relied upon by the Tribunal in the present case.

“34. It would thus appear that it is settled position of law that in taxing statute, the Courts have to adhere to literal interpretation. At first instance, the Court is required to examine the language of the statute and make an attempt to derive its natural meaning. The Court interpreting the statute should not proceed to add the words which are not found in the statute. It is equally settled that if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of law the case might otherwise appear to be. It is further settled that an equitable construction, is not admissible in a taxing statute, where the Courts can simply adhere to the words of the statute. It is equally settled that a taxing statute is required to be strictly construed. Common sense approach, equity, logic, ethics and morality have no role to play while interpreting the taxing statute. It is equally settled that nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied and one is required to look fairly at the language used and nothing more and nothing less. No doubt, there are certain judgments of the Apex Court which also holds that resort to purposive construction would be permissible in certain situation. However, it has been held that the same can be done in the limited type of cases where the Court finds that the language used is so obscure which would give two different meanings, one leading to the workability of the Act and another to absurdity.”
[emphasis supplied].

In view of the above, the Tribunal upheld the Revenue’s contention that the interpretation by the appellants would not be possible without inserting the words not present therein and therefore it was incorrect to interpret that the amount paid at the first stage-appeal could be adjusted. In effect, the pre-deposit amount required for two-stage appeals would be 7.5% in the first instance and 10% of the confirmed duty/tax at the time of filing the Tribunal appeal.

Having had unambiguous decision/interpretation as above, the fact that monetary limits for adjudication of Show Cause Notice have been revised vide Circular No.1049/37/2016-CX dated 29/09/2016, all cases adjudicated after this date where the amount of duty/service tax/penalty confirmed is below two crore rupees involve two-stage appeals and aggregate amount of 17.5% has to be provided towards mandatory pre-deposit. Indeed this was also clear otherwise on reading of the provisions. Further, TRU letter 10th July, 2014 in Annexure-IV also provided clarification on identical lines both in respect of section 129E of the Customs Act and section 35F of the Central Excise Act. Nevertheless, it must be noted here that vide its Circular No.984/08/2014-CX dated 16/09/2014, CBEC has clarified that payment made during investigation or audit, prior to filing the appeal can be considered to the extent of 7.5% or 10% subject to the limit of Rs.10 crore as deposit towards fulfillment of requirement u/s. 35F of Central Excise Act or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962.

Transfer of Cenvat Credit in Merger & Amalgamation – Recent Amendment

Transfer of CENVAT Credit – Existing Provisions under Rule 10
of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (‘CCR’)

If a manufacturer of the final products shifts his factory to
another site or the factory is transferred on account of change in ownership or
on account of sale, merger, amalgamation, lease or transfer of the factory to a
joint venture with the specific provision for transfer of liabilities of such
factory then, the manufacturer shall be allowed to transfer the CENVAT credit
lying unutilised in his account to such transferred, sold, merged, leased or
amalgamated factory.

If a provider of output service shifts or transfers his
business on account of change in ownership or on account of sale, merger,
amalgamation, lease or transfer of the business to a joint venture with the
specific provision for transfer of liabilities of such business then, the
provider of output service shall be allowed to transfer the CENVAT credit lying
unutilised in his account to such transferred, sold, merged, leased or
amalgamated business.

The transfer of the CENVAT credit under sub–rules (1) and (2)
shall be allowed only if the stock of inputs as such or in process, or the
capital goods is also transferred along with the factory or business premises
to the new site or ownership and the inputs, or capital goods, on which credit
has been availed of are duly accounted for to the satisfaction of the Deputy
Commissioner of Central Excise or as the case may be, the Assistant
Commissioner of Central Excise

Amendment in Rule 10 of CCR vide Notification No. 4/2017 –
CE(NT) dated 02/02/2017

In Rule 10 of the said rules, after sub-rule (3), the
following sub-rule shall be inserted, namely :-

(4) “Subject to the provisions contained in sub-rule
(3), the transfer of the CENVAT credit shall be allowed within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of application by the Deputy Commissioner
of Central Excise or Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, as the case may
be:

Provided that the period specified in this sub-rule may, on
sufficient cause being shown and reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended
by the Principal Commissioner of Central Excise or Commissioner of Central
Excise, as the case may be, for a further period not exceeding six months.”

Brief Analysis of the amendment

Rule 10 of CCR contains specific provisions for transfer of
unutilised CENVAT credit, in cases where, a manufacturer or a service provider
shifts his factory/premises to another site or transfers his business, on
account of sale, merger, amalgamation, lease etc. The transfer of credit
in such cases is allowed on the condition that the stocks of inputs and capital
goods are transferred as well. Further, the said inputs or capital goods, on
which credit has been availed, need to be duly accounted for to the
satisfaction of the concerned authorities.

Based on practical experience of central excise and service
tax administration, it is noticed that invariably attempts are made by Central
Excise department to raise frivolous objections and deny transfer of unutilized
CENVAT credit in case of business restructuring generally resulting in hardship
and avoidable litigation.

In particular, provisions under Rule 10 of CCR have led to
several disputes. The departmental authorities insist that prior permission is
required for transfer of unutilised CENVAT credit, while the tax payers take a
position that mere intimation was sufficient to transfer the unutilised credit.

Some relevant judicial considerations are given hereafter for
reference:

In Hewlett Packard (I) Sales vs. CC (2008) 6 STR 155; 211
ELT 263 (CESTAT)
, it has been held that prior permission of AC / DC is not
required for transfer of credit relying on Solaris Biochemicals vs. CCE
(2005) 179 ELT 216 (CESTAT)
– followed in Kiran Pondy Chems vs. CCE
(2009) 239 ELT 192 (CESTAT SMB); Flex Art Foil P Ltd. vs. CCE (2010) 260 ELT
261 (CESTAT)
[view upheld in CC vs. Hewlett Packard India Sales Ltd.
(2012) 279 ELT 203 (Karn HC DB)
.]

In CCE vs. Amar Traders (2008) 222 ELT 400 (CESTAT SMB),
assessee had taken CENVAT credit after intimating about merger and stock
(without seeking any permission). It was held that assessee is eligible for
CENVAT credit of duty paid on stock.

Rulings which have held that permission is not required to
transfer the balance credit – [CCE vs. Tata Auto Components Systems (2011)
33 STT 294; 277 ELT 318 (Karn HC DB); Om Glass Works vs. CCE (2012) 279 ELT 313
(CESTAT SMB).]

In CCE vs. Nagarjuna Agrichem (2008) 222 ELT 232 (CESTAT
SMB)
, it was observed that Rule 10 does not lay down any condition for
seeking permission from authorities.

In most of the judicial cases, relating to transfer of
unutilized CENVAT credit in case of business structuring, the matter has been
decided in favour of tax payers.

Under this backdrop, a new sub-rule 4 has been inserted with
effect from 02/02/2017 in Rule 10 of CCR, to provide that transfer of
unutilised CENVAT credit shall be allowed by the jurisdictional authorities
within 3 months (to be further extended by 6 months on sufficient cause being
shown) from the date of receipt of application by the manufacturer or service
provider.

The wordings of this newly introduced clause, indicates that
the unutilised CENVAT credit cannot be utilised by the new entity/unit unless
express written approval is received from the concerned authorities.

Some Practical Issues from the amendment

a) It is likely to increase the compliance
procedures for tax payers who have multiple premises/factories and consequently
multiple registrations under central excise and service tax. This could also
lead to an overall delay in the entire process, with the various jurisdictional
authorities disposing off applications at different times.

b) Pending
approval from the concerned authorities or in a case where the application is
rejected by the authorities, there could be situations where the new
entity/unit has to discharge the output tax liability of both the current
operations as well as new operations which may have to be paid in cash without
being able to utilise CENVAT credit of the transferor entity/ factory. This
could pose severe working capital constraints.

c) There could be a scenario where the authorities
do not issue the formal approval within the prescribed time. In such a case,
the amendment is silent as to whether or not, transfer of unutilised CENVAT
credit would automatically stand permitted after the expiry of the prescribed
time period.

Conclusion

Mergers and amalgamations are a very common phenomenon in the
fast changing business environment globally as well as in India. Hence, it is
essential that in order to promote the cause of “ease of doing business”, the
relevant tax laws are business friendly so as to encourage smooth & easy
business restructuring. The amendment made in Rule 10 of CCR with effect from
02/02/2017, could result in long drawn litigations and create uncertainty as
regards entitlement to the benefit of unutilised CENVAT credit at the end of
transferor company or entity, by the transferee company or entity. 

In light of the foregoing, the following is recommended:

Appropriate clarifications need to be issued by
CBEC to address practical issues arising from the amendment so as to avoid
hardships to tax payers, in case of business restructuring. In order to encourage
mergers and amalgamations and business restructuring generally and also to
promote the cause of “ease of doing business”, transfer of unutilised CENVAT
credit may be permitted provisionally, pending disposal of application for
transfer of credit based on an undertaking that can be given by the transferor
company or entity to safeguard interest of revenue. While finalising GST
legislation, it should
be ensured that these concerns are appropriately addressed.

CENVAT Credit – Third Party Services

Preliminary

It is very common in business to outsource a wide range of
third party services that are availed for business activities by manufacturers
and service providers. However, the said services may not be received / availed
in the factory / business premises. In such cases, efforts are often made by ST
Department to deny CENVAT credit availed by the manufacturers / service
providers in regard to service tax paid on such services. This aspect has been
recently considered in a Kolkata Tribunal ruling as discussed below:

Ruling in Tata
Motors Ltd. vs. CCE (2017) 50 STR 28 (Tri – Kolkata)

a)  Facts in brief

     In this case, the appellants were engaged
in the manufacture of commercial motor vehicles & chassis and parts thereof
at their factory located at Jamshedpur. The appellants availed CENVAT credit of
duty paid on inputs as well as input services received and used by them in the
manufacture of final products. Appellants did not have facility to manufacture
axles and gear boxes in their factory and accordingly, they supplied raw
materials to job workers to manufacture axles, gear boxes and components
thereof. The inputs procured/ purchased by the appellants were supplied
directly to the job workers and they always belonged to the appellants.

     The appellants had also availed services of
some third party processors, who processed the raw materials / inputs sent to
job workers on behalf of the appellants and send those processed inputs / raw
materials to the said job workers for manufacturing of axles and gear boxes which
are used by the appellants in the manufacture of motor vehicles. The appellants
had paid processing charges to these third party processors along with
applicable service tax under the “Business Auxiliary Services”. Accordingly,
the appellants had taken credit of the service tax paid since the said services
were used in the manufacture of axles and gear boxes, which are used in the
manufacture of final products manufactured by the appellants.

     However, Show Cause Notices were issued and
after due process of law, the demand was confirmed under Rule 14 of CENVAT
Credit Rules, 2004 read with section 11A of Central Excise Act, 1944. The
appellants went in for appeal before the Tribunal against the adjudication
order.

b)  Arguments before the Tribunal in brief.

     The appellant company reiterated the
grounds of appeal and submitted that they were receivers of services rendered
by the job workers and the said services were used directly or indirectly, in
or in relation to the manufacture of final products and accordingly they were
entitled to credit of service tax paid on the input services. It was further
submitted that the ld. commissioner in the impugned order totally ignored the
expression “services used by the manufacturer whether directly or indirectly, in
or in relation to the manufacture of final product”. It is a settled legal
position that the expression “in or in relation to the manufacture of final
product” itself is of wide import. Definition of “input services” not only uses
the expression “in or in relation to the manufacture of final product” but has
also used the expression “whether directly or indirectly, in or in relation to
the manufacture of final products.” Various judicial rulings to support the
stand were relied upon.

     AR reiterated the discussion and findings
of the impugned order.

c)   Findings of the Tribunal

     On this issue paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3 of the
case law Endurance Technologies Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE (2011) 273 ELT 248 (Tri. –
Mumbai)
are relevant and are as follows:

     “Para
7.2
Input services
rendered for manufacture of wind mills for generation of electricity is not in
dispute. The electricity so generated is used in the manufacture of final
product. Therefore, the service falls under the definition of input service. As
regards input service used at a different place it is pertinent that there is
no mandate in law that it should be used in the factory unlike inputs, which is
clear from Rules 4(1) and 4(7) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 reproduced
herein : –

     Rule 4(1).
– The CENVAT credit in respect of inputs may be taken immediately on receipt of
the inputs in the factory of the manufacturer or in the premises of the
provider of output service:

     ……………

     Rule
4(7)
– The CENVAT credit in respect of input service shall be
allowed, on or after the day which payment is made of the value of input
service and the service tax paid or payable as is indicated in invoice, bill
or, as the case may be, challan referred to in Rule 9.”

     Para 7.3

     The Hon’ble High Court in the case of
Ultratech Cement Ltd. has held that the definition of input service read as a
whole makes it clear that the said definition not only covers services, which
are used directly or indirectly in or in relation to the manufacture of final
product, but also includes other services, which have direct nexus or which are
integrally connected with the business of manufacturing the final product. In
the case of CCE & C vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd. – 2010 – TIOL – 1227 – CESTAT
– MUM = 2011 (21) S.T.R. 297 (Tri.-Mum), this Tribunal has held that the denial
of CENVAT Credit on the ground that services were not received by the
respondent in factory premises is not sustainable.”

     In the aforesaid decision, it was held that
services rendered outside the factory when having a nexus with the manufacture
of final product then such services are covered under definition of “input
service” of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. This decision of the Tribunal has
been upheld by the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in CCE&C vs. Endurance
Technology Pvt. Ltd. [2015 – VIL – 221-BOM-ST]
. Similar view has been
expressed by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in Parry Engg. &
Electronics. P. Ltd. vs. C.C.E. & S.T. 
(2015) 40 S.T.R. 243 (Tri – LB
)]. Paragraph No. 7 is relevant and is
reproduced as follows:

     “We find that the Hon’ble Bombay High Court
in the case of Endurance Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held that CENVAT credit
is eligible on maintenance or repair services of windmills, located away from
the factory. It is well-settled that the decision of Hon’ble High Court is
binding on the Tribunal. It was pointed out at the time of hearing that the
definition of “input service” credit was subsequently amended in 2011. We find
that the present appeals are involving for the period 2006-2007. In any event,
this issue is not before the Larger Bench. Hence, the view taken by the
Tribunal in the case of Endurance Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is correct.”

     Respectfully
following the above decision of the Hon’ble High Court and the Coordinate Bench
of the Tribunal, we hold that the appellants are the receiver of the services
rendered by the third party job workers and the said services have been used
directly or indirectly, in or in relation to the manufacture of motor vehicles
chassis. Hence, the appellants are entitled to credit of service tax paid on
the input service. The definition of input services is very clear; that the
receiver of service does not mean receiver of inputs. The CENVAT Credit Rules,
2004 itself recognise the distinction between input and input services
according to which it has been made mandatory to receive inputs in the factory
of production to avail CENVAT credit on inputs. There is no condition to avail
CENVAT credit on input services that services availed should be received by the
service receiver/ manufacturer in the registered premises. In the case on hand,
the goods, on which services were provided, instead of coming to the appellants
factory were dispatched to another job workers of the appellants. As already
emphasised, definition of input services does not specify that the services
should be received in the factory of the manufacturer. The condition to avail
CENVAT credit on input service is that it should be used in or in relation to
the manufacture of final products. In this case, the service was used in the
manufacture of motor vehicle chassis directly or indirectly. It is also a fact
that the service charge paid by the appellants to the job worker is included in
the assessable value of the final products.
 

In view of the above observations, the appeal was allowed
with consequential relief.

Conclusion

It is felt that the ratio of the Kolkata
Tribunal ruling discussed above would be relevant for deciding similar matters
under litigation.

Shared Expenditure: Whether Taxable as Service?

Introduction

Taxability of shared expenditure has been a subject of
extensive litigation under service tax for quite some time. It is a common
business practice to share common facilities or outsourced services by group
companies under a common roof. Typically, one company receives the invoice from
outsourced service provider and then the cost is shared by each participating
entity by way of reimbursements generally in proportion of actual usage.
Similarly, sometimes, common expenses like advertisement expense is incurred by
a manufacturer and shared with its dealers as the benefit is derived by both,
the manufacturer and the dealers. In the case of Union of India vs. Mahindra
and Mahindra Ltd. 1989 (43) ET 611 (Cal)
, the High Court observed that the
manufacturer and distributor had mutual interest in maximising sale of its
products. The contract between them was to further this desire and it no way
affected the real nature of transaction which appeared to be of sale on
principal-to-principal basis. However, in the case of Maruti Suzuki India
Ltd. vs. CCE 2008 (23) ELT 566 (Tri.-Del)
, it was held that when the
contract envisages such expenses to be incurred by the dealer and failure to do
so gives a right to the manufacturer to get advertisement done on their own and
recover such expenses from the dealer, such expense incurred by the dealer
would be payment on behalf of manufacturer and requires to be considered
additional consideration for sale and added to the assessable value.

The Mumbai Tribunal in JM Financial Services Ltd. vs. CST
Mumbai-I 2013-TIOL-757-CESTAT-MUM
held to the effect that whether revenue
such as incentive or processing fee or expense like electricity etc., when
shared by the parties on principal-to-principal basis, no service is said to
have been rendered. Also in Reliance ADA Group Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST Mumbai-IV
2016-TIOL-603-CESTAT-MUM,
it was held that when common services are procured
by one company from service providers, that company acts as a manager/trustee
to incur expenses on behalf of participating group companies and then cost
thereof is shared by all the beneficiaries by making reimbursements.These
reimbursements of the cost incurred cannot be regarded as consideration flowing
for taxable service, but it is rather a receipt towards the reimbursement of
cost/expenses in terms of cost sharing agreement with the participating group
companies.Similarly, in case of CST vs. Arvind Mills Ltd. 2014 (35) STR 496
(Guj),
the High Court of Gujarat held that in case of deputation of
employees to subsidiary company, salary and perquisites reimbursed by group
companies, the assessee could not be said to be engaged in providing specified
services to client. Hence, they were not liable for service tax.Identically,
recently in Franco Indian Pharmaceutical (P) Ltd. (2016) 69 taxmann.com 198
(Mumbai-CESTAT),
it was held that services provided to many employees and
respective share in salaries paid by the employer is not taxable as a service
of manpower supply. It was further observed that the position will remain the
same even if appointment letter is not signed jointly and any one company has
hired employees and employees are lent or deputed to other companies.

Recent decision of Supreme Court

Recently, the matter of Gujarat State Fertilizers and
Chemicals Ltd. vs. CCE 2016 (45) STR 489 (SC)
came up for examination of
Supreme Court wherein GSFC had collected incinerating charge from Gujarat Alkalies
& Chemicals (GACL). The service tax department issued a show cause notice
alleging that the said charges are towards storage and warehousing service
provided by GSFC to GACL. The fact of the matter was that both GSFC and GACL
received Hydro Cynic Acid (HCN) from Reliance Industries Ltd. through a common
pipeline which was used by them for manufacturing of their final product and
used by the two companies in 60:40 ratio. Subsequent to the use, incineration
also was required to be undertaken; the expense on this process was shared by
the two in 50:50 ratio. This arrangement was made in terms of an agreement
between GSFC and GACL. The said facts were adequately explained to the service
tax department. However, the contention of GSFC against service tax liability
was not accepted by the adjudicating authority as well as the first and second
Appellate authorities.

The Appellant, GSFC explained that HCN being one of the main
raw materials was received from RIL, Vadodara directly through a pipeline by
gravity from their plant. As per agreement between GSFC and GACL, sodium
cyanide unit, the quantity received in an intermittent hold tank was consumed
in 60:40 ratio. The hold tank existed for sustaining continuous process of both
the plants facilitating smooth operation of suction pumps and specifically
avoiding starvation of pumps which could disturb the process. If there was any
problem at any of the consumers’ end, the supply from RIL would be stopped and
remaining quantity in the tank would be consumed immediately by either of the
plants. Hence storage of HCN did not happen at all. Moreover, the agreement
between the parties clearly provided that though HCN handling and incineration
facilities were installed in GSFC premises, the expenses thereto were to be borne
by both the parties. For incineration, neither GACL paid nor GSFC received any
fee or a charge but shared cost of incineration as per agreement including
those of repair, maintenance or replacement of spare parts and other overheads.
Thus, both GSFC and GACL were equally responsible for storage and consumption
and no one worked for another and the expense was shared in predetermined
proportion. In facts of the case, GSFC contended that in any case, the
arrangement did not involve storage or warehousing service to GACL and
therefore service tax was not attracted.

The revenue at the other end contended that since HCN was
first kept in holding tank and from this it was distributed in 60:40 ratio, the
holding tank would qualify as storage facility. Further, the fact that GSFC
collected incineration charge from GACL, it was correctly held that GSFC
provided service of storage. According to revenue, since there were questions
of fact based on which concurrent findings were reached by authorities, they
should not be interfered with by the Court as the scope of appeal required the
Court to deal with substantial question of law only. 

Considering all the facts and the terms of agreement between
the parties, the Court observed that there was no dispute that joint investment
was made by the parties for creation of common facility. On accepting this
fact, handling and incineration facilities were in the nature of joint venture
between two of them and they simply agreed to share expenditure. The payment
made by GACL was towards its share of expense. In order to attract service
tax, there has to be element of service provided by one person to the other for
which charges for providing service are collected. When this ingredient is
missing in the facts of the case, the question of service tax does not arise.

Conclusion

When the Apex Court has decided in principle that the element
of service does not exist when common expenses are shared by beneficiaries on
principal-to-principal basis, the long drawn litigation should find a
closement. However, considering approach of the revenue for all practical
purposes, it is less likely that at lower levels, raising dispute would stop.

The question in most of the cases did not per
se
involve “classification issue” although different categories of services
were dealt with which mainly included management consultancy, business
auxiliary/support service and manpower supply. The core issue revolved around
whether there exists an element of service when common services are procured or
when there is a pooling of expenses which is later shared by participating
group companies. Under the negative list based taxation of services from July
01, 2012 also, if there is no element of ‘service’ present, the decision should
continue to apply. However, the authorities now under the guise of ‘testing’
negative list based service taxation vis-a-vis the definition of
‘service’ would continue litigation, considering the scenario in the department
of service tax where a majority of demands made in the show cause notices
issued based on facts or legal grounds are routinely confirmed.

Privatisation Of Airports: Whether A Franchise Service By Airport Authority?

Introduction:

Under selective approach of service tax litigation often
centered around whether a given transaction was one of service apart from the
issue of appropriate classification entry. When the said issue requires
determination based on terms of contract, the importance of reading the terms
of contract as a whole hardly requires any debate. A recent decision covering
this aspect is analysed below:

Facts in brief

In a recently decided set of writ petitions, a division bench
of Hon. Delhi High Court in the case of Delhi International Airport P. Ltd.
vs. UOI 2017 (50) STR 275 (Del)
had to examine whether privatisation of
airports done by Airports Authority of India (AAI) under long term Operations,
Management and Development Agreements (OMDA for short) entered into with
consortium led by GMR group and GVK group for Delhi and Mumbai airports
respectively was an arrangement of franchise service. In this case, the dispute
arose when the revenue claimed that upfront fee and an annual fee received by
AAI from the petitioners, Delhi International Airport P. Ltd. (DIAL) and Mumbai
International Airport P. Ltd. (MIAL) was liable for service tax as franchise
service. Under OMDA, DIAL and MIAL undertook the task to design, construct,
operate, upgrade, modernize, finance, manage and develop the respective
airports and in lieu of which AAI granted them various rights interalia,
long term rights to provide aeronautical and non-aeronautical services to
various consumers for a charge. As per the said OMDA, DIAL and MIAL had to pay
an upfront fee as well as revenue share termed as annual fee to AAI. Consequent
upon OMDA, AAI simultaneously leased out all the land along with buildings,
constructions or immovable assets to the petitioners under separate lease deeds
with each petitioner. AAI informed the petitioners post Finance Act, 2007 that
annual fee payable under OMDA was liable for service tax under the
classification entry renting of immovable property service, the annual fee
being consideration for the leasing of immovable property. However, according
to DIAL and MIAL, they had entered into OMDA primarily for grant of various
rights for better operation and management of airports whereas the lease deeds
were separately entered into and only consequent upon OMDA and therefore no
service tax could be paid by them to AAI over and above the amount paid as annual
fee. AAI therefore instructed escrow bankers of the petitioners to block an
amount equivalent to service tax chargeable on the said annual fee. According
to the petitioners, AAI did not render any service to them and annual fee
payable was under OMDA towards grant of rights to develop, finance, operate,
manage and modernize airports. If at all service tax was chargeable on the
annual fee, it would be the liability of AAI from their own revenue share.
Though no notice was issued to DIAL and MIAL, aggrieved by the order of
adjudication passed against AAI wherein liability of service tax was confirmed
under franchise service, DIAL and MIAL filed writ petitions in the High Court
of Delhi.

Case of petitioners, DIAL and MIAL

As per petitioners, upfront fee and annual fees were paid to
AAI as revenue share and not as consideration for any service. OMDA was not a
franchise agreement but a statutory divestation of right in favour of DIAL and
MIAL respectively to build, operate and maintain the airports. Further, both
DIAL and MIAL are joint venture companies wherein AAI itself holds 26% shares.
Also, since there was complete divestation of rights, it could never be a
considered franchise. Both the petitioner companies had to invest their own
funds to build, operate and maintain the airports and consequently get right to
charge various customers for availability of services liable under service tax
as “airport service” and they paid service tax on this service. They ran their
own operation and did not act as franchisee of AAI. They had to pay AAI
specified percentage of gross revenue termed as “annual fee” in addition to an
upfront fee of Rs.150 crore by each DIAL and MIAL. Thus annual fee was not a
consideration for any service but an appropriation of revenue by AAI before
petitioners received any part of the revenue. In order to be attracted under
service tax, the franchisee should be granted representational right and they
did not perform the activity on behalf of AAI. Alternatively if at all service
tax was payable, it would have to be paid by AAI.

Case of AAI

AAI also contended that there was no franchise agreement in
place and factually DIAL and/or MIAL never claimed that they represented AAI.
The arrangement only allowed private parties to do an activity of profit under
the rights granted by the State. Since the revenue’s case was to bring OMDA
under franchise service, there was no question of examining whether the
arrangement could be construed renting of immovable property as defined u/s.
65(90)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act). In response to petitioner’s
contention that if any service tax liability was to be fastened, it would be
that of AAI, they contended that it was a contractual dispute and writ petition
in respect thereof would not be maintainable and more so when there was an
arbitration clause formed part of the contract.

Case of Revenue

Revenue in turn had a case that writ was primarily not
maintainable since alternate remedy was available by filing an appeal with
CESTAT. Further, on merits OMDA reflected relationship between the parties
which squarely falls within the term ‘franchise’ as used in service tax law and
since the term “representational right“ is not given specific meaning in the
Finance Act, 1994 it should be understood in common parlance meaning. OMDA had
various elements of franchise agreement wherein although responsibility of
operating, maintenance and development was with the petitioners, strict
standards were prescribed for performance and the control was retained by the
franchisor. The functions of AAI are so unique that even without any use of
logo or trademark, the function of airport operation remains identifiable with
AAI. Further, on assuming that the transaction between the parties is of lease
of immovable property for carrying out specific purpose, it actually led to
value addition. In such a case, it would be exigible to service tax. The term
‘service’ therefore must be construed in broad sense. In the case where AAI
entered into a franchise agreement for operation, development and maintenance
of airports, there is a significant amount of value addition to the overall
services offered at the airports. Therefore also service tax was attracted on
the annual fees.

Analysis

The Hon. High Court limited its examination to whether or not
upfront fee and annual fee were exigible to service tax under the
classification of franchise service and not renting of immovable property
service since the revenue so contended. Thus, for OMDA to be construed a
franchise, it would have to satisfy requirement of section 65(47) of the Act as
reproduced below:

“Franchise means an agreement by which the franchisee is
granted representational right to sell or manufacture goods or to provide
service or undertake any process identified with franchisor, whether or not a
trade mark, service mark trade name or logo or any such symbol as the case may
be, is involved.”

The above interalia requires that ‘DIAL’ and ‘MIAL’
should have been granted representational right by AAI. The said right would
envisage the franchisee to represent as franchisor and the franchisee could
lose its individual identify. For this, the Court perused in detail certain
relevant clauses of OMDA to ascertain as to what kind of operational rights
were granted by AAI and whether AAI provided any service to DIAL and MIAL.
Reading OMDA as a whole, the Court essentially found as follows:

At the end of the transition phase, the petitioners had to
operate and maintain airports independently and to employ in a phased manner,
increasing number of senior management personnel during transition period so
that at the end of the said period, no employees would continue at the airport.
Joint Ventures were in fact entered into so that functions of AAI under
Airports Authority of India Act could be effectively carried out with AAI to
have 26% stake in the said joint ventures. Petitioners had to prepare a master
plan of development for over 20 year time frame. Petitioners were also given
right to sub-lease or license any part of the airport site to third parties for
the purpose of fulfillment of their obligation under the OMDA. Petitioners
spent their own money for the design, development, construction and
modernisation etc. of the airports. Operation, maintenance and
development is carried out by them in their own right. They have “exclusive
right and authority”
to undertake various listed functions and to provide
aeronautical and non-aeronautical services at the airports. Thus it is clear
that the petitioners did not undertake any process identified with AAI. The
sole responsibility is theirs and they perform their operation using their own
policies, techniques and processes. Once the functions of AAI are completely
divested and assigned to petitioners, there does not remain any representation
of AAI by the petitioners.
There is no representation right assigned to the
petitioners under OMDA. Annual fee was paid to AAI not because any service was
provided by AAI to petitioners. For the transaction to be taxable there should
be a service provided by AAI to the petitioners. What AAI has done is
entrusting petitioners with some of its functions under the Airports Authority
of India Act. Therefore OMDA does not constitute franchise service.

The Court however left open the issue raised by DIAL and MIAL that
the annual fee was inclusive of service tax or whether the said issue was a
contractual dispute. However, the action of AAI to block the escrow account was
found unsustainable as the categorical stand of revenue was to treat the
transaction as exigible to service tax under franchise service alone.

Conclusion

The
judgment provides guiding principles to interpret a contract for determining
both taxability and classification and when not correctly applied, it indicates
how the revenue missed to collect a large amount of revenue for most of the
relevant period of time.

ONUS OF LIABILITY TO PAY SERVICE TAX

Preliminary

Service providers often face
practical difficulties (due to financial constraints, non-recoveries from
clients etc.) in paying service tax to the Government in time resulting in
interest and other penal consequences. In such situations, issues arise as to
whether service providers can direct service tax authorities to recover tax
dues from their debtors. This aspect and related issues are discussed hereafter
with the help of a Delhi High Court ruling, special leave petition against
which has been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Relevant Extracts from the Finance
Act, 1994 as amended (“Act”)

Section 68 of the Act (payment of service tax)

(1)  Every person providing
taxable service tax to any person shall pay service tax at the rate specified
in section 66B in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed.

(2)  Notwithstanding anything
contained in s/s. (1), in respect of such taxable services as may be notified
by the Central Government in the Official Gazette, the service tax thereon
shall be paid by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed at the
rate specified in section 66B and all the provisions of this Chapter shall
apply to such person as if he is the person liable for paying the service tax
in relation to such service;

Provided that the Central
Government may notify the service and the extent of service tax which shall be
payable by such person and the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such
person to the extent so specified and the remaining part of the service tax
shall be paid by the service provider.

Section 87 of the Act (recovery of any amount due to Central
Government)

Where any amount payable by a
person to the credit of the Central Government under any of the provisions of
this Chapter or of the rules made thereunder is not paid, the Central Excise
Officer shall proceed to recover the amount by one or more of the modes
mentioned below:

(a) the Central Excise Officer
may deduct or may require any other Central Excise Officer or any officer of
customs to deduct the amount so payable from any money owing to such person
which may be under the control of the said Central Excise Officer or any
officer of customs;

(b) (i)   the Central Excise Officer may, by notice in
writing, require any other person from whom money is due or may become due to
such person, or who holds or may subsequently hold money for or on account of
such person, to pay to the credit of the Central Government either forthwith
upon the money becoming due or being held or at or within the time specified in
the notice, not being before the money becomes due or is held, so much of the
money as is sufficient to pay the amount due from such person or the whole of
the money when it is equal to or less than that amount;

     (ii)  every person to whom
a notice is issued under this section shall be bound to comply with such
notice, and in particular, where any such notice is issued to a post office,
banking company or an insurer, it shall not be necessary to produce any pass
book, deposit receipt, policy or any other document for the purpose of any
entry, endorsement or the like being made before payment is made,
notwithstanding any rule, practice or requirement to the contrary;

    (iii) in a case where the
person to whom a notice under this section is sent, fails to make the payment
in pursuance thereof to the Central Government, he shall be deemed to be an
assessee in default in respect of the amount specified in the notice and all
the consequences of this Chapter shall follow;

                        …………….

Delhi High Court Ruling in Delhi
Transport Corporation (DTC) vs. CST (2015) 51 GST 511 (DEL)
(2015-TIOL-961-HC-DEL-57

Facts in Brief

With the objective of augmenting
its revenue, DTC entered into contracts with seven agencies
(contractors/advertisers) providing space to such parties for display of
advertisements on bus queue shelters and time keeping booths. Two of the said
contracts contained similar stipulations including clause No 9 which reads as
under:

“It shall be
responsibility of the contractor/advertiser to pay direct to the authority and
MCD concerned the advertisement tax or any other taxes levy payable or imposed
by any authority and this amount will be in addition to the license fee quoted
above”

According to the Revenue, on the
basis of inputs received from its anti-evasion branch, DTC having engaged
itself in aforementioned contracts had failed to pay tax on services. Hence
show cause notices were issued by the revenue demanding service tax on receipts
by DTC on account of “sale of space or time for advertisement” along with
interest and penalty.

DTC submitted replies to the
effect that it is an autonomous body of government of NCT of Delhi created
under the Road Transport Act and had no intention to violate the provisions of
the taxing statutes. They further submitted that the obligation for
registration under the Service Tax Rules had escaped the notice of its accounts
department and chartered accountant/auditors and thus, the omission was neither
intentional nor deliberate. It was submitted that after the requirement had
come to its notice, DTC had taken requisite steps for registration. It further
stated that since it was obliged to provide transport services to the public at
large at subsidised rates, it was incurring losses and consequently depended on
grants from the government and for this reason it was moving the Central
Government to grant exemption. DTC further stated that in terms of the
contractual arrangement, the liability towards statutory taxes, including
service tax, was to be borne by the contractors engaged by it and that all such
contractors, except the two mentioned above, were paying the service tax
chargeable in their respect pursuant to supplementary bills raised from time to
time and further that all such remittances received were duly deposited with
the service tax department.

DTC resisted the show cause
notices also on the ground that the two contractors  had taken a stand contradictory to the
contractual terms in such regard, failing to abide by their obligation in terms
of clause 9 (as quoted earlier), in spite of directions of this Court on the
petitions u/s. 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. DTC informed the
Revenue that it intended to institute contempt/execution proceedings against
the said contractors for failure to deposit the service tax in spite of
contractual obligation and the directions of the High Court. It added that the
amount of service tax to the extent realized from the contractors was deposited
with the service tax department.

The show cause notices were
confirmed upon adjudication. In reaching at conclusions, the adjudicating
authority repelled the contentions of DTC objecting to the assessment for the
extended period of five years holding that the assessee contravened the
relevant statutory provisions thereby indulging in “suppression of
material facts”. In addition to penalty u/s. 77 of the Act, penalty was
imposed u/s. 78 of the Act, declining benefit of section 80, referring in this
context to the facts that the assessee had neither applied for service tax
registration nor discharged its service tax liability even though it had been
made aware of the obligations.

Appeal before CESTAT

The order of Commissioner
(Adjudication), service tax was challenged before CESTAT. As noted by the
CESTAT in (para 5 of) the impugned order, DTC did not assail the conclusion of
the adjudicating authority as to the classification of the service nor
impeached the quantum of service tax that was confirmed. Its contentions were
restricted to the following (para 11) :

“5. … that since under
agreements with advertisers, the reciprocal obligation of the parties
covenanted that the recipient of the service would be liable for tax, the
appellant was under a bona fide belief that the liability to remit service tax
stood transferred to the recipient qua the agreements; that this was a bona
fide belief which caused the failure to file returns and remit service tax.
Therefore, the extended period of limitation invoked while issuing the first
show cause notice dated 04/01/2008 is unjustified and for the same reasons,
penalty u/s. 78 of the Act should not have been imposed, by exercising
discretion u/s. 80 of the Act.”

The appellant relied on the
Supreme Court Ruling in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited vs. Dewan Chand Ram
Saran (2012) 35 STT 664 (SC)
to urge that having entered into the contracts
in the nature mentioned above, it was a legitimate expectation that the service
tax liability would be borne by the contractors/advertisers and thus, there was
no justification for the appellant being held in default or burdened with the
penalty u/s. 78 of the Act. It was argued that in the wake of orders of this
Court on the applications of the two contractors u/s. 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, fastening the liability of service tax (in the event of it being
imposed) on such contractors, the revenue ought not to insist upon such payment
by DTC. The CESTAT, however, held that such considerations would not transfer
the substantive and legislatively mandated liability to service tax from the
appellant (the service provider) to the advertisers (the service recipients).

The CESTAT rejected the claim of
DTC as to “bona fide belief” by observing in para 13 as under:

“6. A bona fide belief
is a belief entertained by a reasonable person. The appellant is a public
authority and an instrumentality of the State and should have taken care to ascertain whether it was liable to tax in
terms of the provisions of the Act
. There is neither alleged, asserted nor
established that there is any ambiguity in the provisions of the Act, which
might justify a belief that the appellant/service provider, was not liable to
service tax. It is axiomatic that no person can harbour a “bona fide
belief” that a legislated liability could be excluded or transferred by a
contract.
The appellant was clearly and exclusively liable to service tax
on rendition of the taxable service of “sale of space or time for
advertisement”. This liability involved the non-derogable obligation to
obtain registration, file periodical ST-3 returns and remit service tax on the
consideration received during the period covered by such ST-3 returns. These
were the core and essential obligations the appellant should have complied
with. We therefore find no basis for the claim that the appellant harboured a
bona fide belief.”

Accordingly, the appeals of DTC
were dismissed by CESTAT.

OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS OF
THE DELHI HIGH COURT

–   There is no dispute that services provided are taxable within the
meaning of section 65 (105) (zzzn) and that the appellant is liable to pay
service tax thereupon. We, however, do not agree with the views of CESTAT that
the service tax liability could not have been transferred by way of a contract.
The reliance of DTC on the ruling in Rashtriya Ispat case (supra) on
this score was correct and it appears that the same has not been properly
appreciated by CESTAT. Noticeably, the claim of the assessee in that case was
also founded on contractual terms similar to the one relied upon by the
appellant here. [Para 17]

   The service tax liability in Rashtriya Ispat case arose out of
contract given out for transportation of goods. The contractor engaged had
undertaken to “bear and pay all taxes, duties and other liabilities in
connection with discharge of his obligation”. The contractor had invoked
the arbitration clause for raising a dispute as to its liability to pay service
tax. The claim petition was dismissed by the arbitrator which award was
challenged by a petition u/s. 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act before a
Single Judge of Bombay High Court. The learned Judge held that insofar as the
service liability is concerned, the appellant (Rashtriya Ispat which had given
the contract was the assessee and liable to tax. The appeal preferred against
the said order on the petition was dismissed by the division bench of the High
Court. [Para 18]

   Against the backdrop of the above-noted facts in civil appeal
carried to Supreme Court, it was observed
as under:-

     “37. As far as the
submission of shifting of tax liability is concerned, as observed in para 9 of
Laghu Udyog Bharati vs. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 418, service tax is an
indirect tax and it is possible that it may be passed on. Therefore, an
assessee can certainly enter into a contract to shift its liability of service
tax.

 ……………

39. The provisions concerning service tax are relevant only as
between the appellant as an assessee under the statute and the tax authorities.
This statutory provision can be of no relevance to determine the rights and
liabilities between the appellant and the respondent as agreed in the contract
between two of them. There was nothing in law to prevent the appellant from
entering into an agreement with the respondent handling contractor that the
burden of any tax arising out of obligations of the respondent under the
contract would be borne by the respondent.”
[Para 19]

  The above ruling of Supreme Court in the case of Rashtriya Ispat,
however, cannot detract from the fact that in terms of the statutory provisions
it is the appellant which is to discharge the liability towards the Revenue on
account of service tax. Undoubtedly, the service tax burden can be
transferred by contractual arrangement to the other party. But, on account of
such contractual arrangement, the assessee cannot ask the Revenue to recover
the tax dues from a third party or wait for discharge of the liability by the
assessee till it has recovered the amount from its contractors.
[Para 20]

   The
directions of this Court on the two petitions u/s. 9 of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act (instituted by the two contractors) would only govern the
rights and obligations arising out of the contracts entered upon by DTC with
the contractors. It may be that in terms of the said orders, DTC would be in a
position to recover the amount of service tax paid by it to the Revenue
respecting the services in question. The
fastening of liability on such account by such order on the contractors is,
thus, a matter restricted to claims of the appellant against such parties. It
would have no bearing insofar as the claim of the Revenue against the appellant
for recovery of the tax dues is concerned.
[para 21]

   We agree with the observations of CESTAT that the plea of
“bona fide belief” is devoid of substance. The appellant is a public
sector undertaking and should have been more vigilant in compliance with its
statutory obligations. It cannot take cover under the plea that contractors
engaged by it having agreed to bear the burden of taxation, there was no need
for any further action on its part. For purposes of the taxing statute, the
appellant is an assessee, and statutorily bound to not only get itself
registered but also submit the requisite returns as per the prescription of law
and rules framed thereunder. [Para 22]

For the foregoing reasons, it was
held that the imposition of service tax liability and the levy of interest
thereupon cannot be faulted. For the same reasons, the penalties imposed under
sections 76 and 77 of the Act, were upheld. However, penalty u/s. 78 of the
Act  was dropped invoking provisions of
section 80 of the Act.

SLP before the Supreme Court

   SLP against the foresaid ruling of Delhi High Court ruling was
dismissed by the Supreme Court through a short order [Ref (2016) 55 GST 763
(SC)].

Recovery of service tax by the
service providers from the service recipient – Some judicial considerations.

   Since the commercial understanding is between the service provider
and service recipient, if service recipient does not pay taxes to the service
provider, the latter is entitled to file civil suit in terms of applicable
commercial laws and obtain appropriate orders. As far as service tax department
is concerned, it should, ordinarily deal only with person liable to pay service
tax, who is an ‘assessee’ under the Act. In this regard attention is drawn to a
Court ruling in Damodar Valley Corpn. vs. CCE&ST (2014) 41 taxmann.com
58 (JHARKHAND)
, wherein the High Court set aside a direction of the
department to the service recipient to pay Service tax to the service provider,
essentially because no opportunity of hearing was given by department to the
service recipient.

   In Bhagwati Security
Services vs. UOI [2013] 31 STR 537 (All)
, it was held that that, since
service tax is an indirect tax and is a statutory liability, even if agreement
between parties is silent as to levy of service tax, service providers may
bring suit before Courts to seek collection of service tax from the service
recipient, inasmuch as service providers are merely a collecting agency who
collect service tax from recipient and pay it to Government.

   As regards recovery of levy / increase in service tax, useful
reference can be made to the ruling in Satya Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pearey
Lal Bhawan Association (2015) 39 STR 429 (DEL)
and 39 STR J173 (SC). In
the said ruling in particular, it was held that, section 64A of the Sale of
Goods Act, 1930 is also applicable for service tax. However, in a contrary
view, it was held in Multi Engg & Scientic Corp. vs. Bihar State
Electricity Board (2015) 39 STR 414 (PAT)
that liability to pay service tax
is on service provider and in absence of any agreement to the contrary,
reimbursement of service tax cannot be claimed from service recipient. Section
64A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 was held inapplicable to services. 

Summation

In light of foregoing discussions,
it can be reasonably summed up as under :

   Under the service tax law service provider is liable to pay
service tax, excepting in cases notified in terms of section 68 (2) of the Act
read with Notification No. 30/2012 – ST dated 20/06/2012 (as amended), in which
case the persons liable to pay service tax shall be as prescribed in Rule 2(d)
of Service Tax Rules, 1994 (Rules).

   In terms of section 65B (12) of the Act, ‘assessee’ means a person
liable to pay tax and includes his agent. Hence, in appropriate cases, agents
of service providers / persons specified in Rule 2(d) of Rules could be liable
to pay service tax.

   Being an indirect tax, service tax can be recovered by the service
provider from the service receiver, subject to commercial understanding to the
contrary.

   Though service tax burden can be transferred by contractual
agreement by a service provider to the service receiver, such consideration would
not transfer the substantive and legislatively mandated liability to service
tax from a service provider to the service recipients. Further, service
providers cannot ordinarily ask the service tax department to recover tax dues
from a third party or wait for discharge of their liability till it has
recovered the amounts from their clients.

   In appropriate cases, service providers can in terms of applicable
commercial laws seek directions / orders from the Court as regards tax amount
due to them which is not paid by their clients.

   Section 87 of the Act which in particular empowers service tax
department to recover service tax from an assessee’s debtors can be usually
invoked in extreme cases where a service provider fails to pay service tax to
the government. _

WITHDRAWAL OF AN APPEAL

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Right of Appeal

It has been clearly laid down by the Apex Court from time to time that the right of appeal is a matter of substantive right and this right becomes vested in a party when the proceedings are first initiated, even before a decision is given in the matter. Such a right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment.

In this regard, some judicial considerations are as under :

  • In Janaradan Reddy vs. The State, AIR 1951 SC 124 and in Ganpat Rai vs. Agarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd, AIR 1952 SC 409, Supreme Court upheld the principle that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure but it is a matter of substantive right.
  • An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention is clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication [Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others (1983) 13 ELT 1277 (SC)].
  • At various instances different courts including the Apex Court has decided that if the right of appeal is vested and the assessee chooses not to exercise that right and later on files a special leave petition, then in such a case the authority may refuse to undertake the matter and reject the case and instruct the assessee to proceed only through the appeal route [Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. vs. UOI (1998) 97 ELT 28 (SC)]
  • Right of appeal is creature of the statute and can never be termed as an inherent right. Example of inherent right is filing a suit provided the same is not barred by limitation. Appeal right is conferred by the statute but one thing important here is that while conferring the right of appeal, the statute may impose certain restrictions such as limitation or pre – deposit of penalty or limiting the area of appeal to questions of law etc. Such limitations as specified in the statute shall be strictly followed [Raj Kumar Shivhare vs. Asstt. Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2010) 253 ELT 3 (SC)] ? R ight of appeal is a substantive right that is provided by the statute and it automatically vests in the aggrieved party. Therefore all the rights it carries with it that in itself means that such a right cannot be negated or taken away. [CCE & CU vs. Met India Ltd. (2010) 20 STR 560 (GUJ)]
  • Though right of appeal is statutory right under the Central Excise Act 1944 but it is not an absolute right and hence is bound by the provisions of section 35F. [Vibha Fluid Systems Engineering Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI (2013) 287 ELT 29 (GUJ)]

The result of an appeal filed by an aggrieved person can be:

  • Affirmed: where the reviewing court agrees with the result of the lower court’s ruling(s) or
  • Reversed: Where the reviewing court disagrees with the result of the lower court’s rulings(s), and overturns their decision or
  • Remanded: where the reviewing court sends the case back to the lower court.

Can an appeal once filed be withdrawn?

Though, it is generally well settled that right of appeal by an aggrieved person is to be construed liberally, there is very limited clarity on the issue as to whether an appeal once filed by an aggrieved person can be withdrawn.

Neither the Central Excise Act 1944 / Customs Act, 1962 / Finance Act, 1994 nor the Rules made under therespective statutes nor the CEGAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982 contain any specific provision to permit an aggrieved person to withdraw his appeal, either with the permission of the appellate authority or without such permission. This issue becomes very important inasmuch appellate authorities are vested with powers of enhancement of demands and hence usually due caution is exercised by appellate authorities while entertaining such requests, from aggrieved persons.

One would wonder as to why an aggrieved person would want to withdraw an appeal after it is filed. Some examples / situations are given hereafter for ease of understanding:

a) Cases where there are mistakes apparent for record in an order passed by adjudicating authority / appellate authority against which an application for rectification is filed but the same is not disposed off. Hence, an appeal is filed, to protect the interest of the aggrieved person. Subsequent to the filing of appeal, relief is granted in rectification.

b) A services exporter has substantial unutilised CENVAT credit and is uncertain as to its utilisation against service tax payable on taxable services that may be provided in future. Hence, refund for unutilised CENVAT credit is applied for, which is rejected. In order to protect his interest, an appeal is filed. However, subsequent to the filing of appeal, the said services exporter has local transactions where service tax is payable. Issues arise in such cases as to whether an appeal filed can be withdrawn and service tax payable on local transactions be set off against unutilised CENVAT credit.

Some Judicial Considerations under Indirect Taxes

  • When this question came up in Mahindra Mills Ltd. vs. CCE (1987) 31 ELT 295 (Special Bench – New Delhi),] the Tribunal held that while the parties have no absolute right of withdrawal of the appeal, the request therefor was being allowed in the circumstances of that case.
  • When a similar request came from the appellant in another case (after considerable arguments had been heard for the appellant) a majority of the members held in the case of MRF Ltd vs. CCE (1987) 32 ELT 588 (Special Bench – New Delhi) that in the circumstances of that case the request for withdrawal must be declined, while the minority opinion was that it may be granted.
  • In a later decision in Jenson and Nicholson (India) Ltd. vs. CCE (1989) 41 ELT 665 (Special Bench – New Delhi), the Tribunal held that the powers of the Appellate Tribunal are similar to the powers of an Appellate Court in the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence the Tribunal has the right (though under no specified rule) to grant permission to the appellant to withdraw his appeal. [in this regard reliance was placed on Hukumchand Mills vs. IT Commissioner Bombay – AIR 1967 SC 455 and New India Life Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. IT Commissioner, Bombay – AIR 1958 Bombay 143].
  • The facts in Ramakrishnan Steel Industries Ltd. vs. Superintendent – (1993) 66 ELT 563 (MAD) were rather unusual. When the appeal by the department before the Tribunal was pending the department intimated the assessee that it had been decided to withdraw the appeal and directing the assessee to pay in accordance with the order of the Collector (Appeals) against which order the appeal to the Tribunal had been preferred by the department. The assessee duly complied and intimated the Tribunal also of the same and intimated they have no objection to the appeal being allowed to be withdrawn. But somehow the department had failed to intimate the Tribunal of its decision to withdraw the appeal. Hence, the Tribunal decided the appeal on merits by allowing the appeal of the department. The High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal holding that the decision to withdraw the appeal having been taken by the authority who had earlier ordered the filing of the appeal, the department was stopped from going back on the decision to withdraw when the assessee had, in pursuance of the communication, taken the necessary action to comply with the request therein about payment of duty.
  • In Ralson Carbon vs. CCE (1999) 108 ELT 608 (CEGAT – New Delhi) the Tribunal permitted withdrawal on the basis of declaration under Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme (KVSS).

A peculiar situation arose for consideration in Shiv Herbal Research Lab. P. Ltd vs. CCE & CU (2002) 139 ELT 133 (Tri – Mumbai). In that said case the appellant intimated the Tribunal that they had filed a declaration under KVSS and the appeal may be treated as withdrawn. Accordingly the Tribunal permitted withdrawal of the appeal. Evidently the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. Later the appellant applied for restoration of the appeal pointing out that “an order u/s. 90(4) of the Finance Act 1998 for full and final settlement under the KVSS has not been passed”. The Tribunal declined to restore the appeal though the factual situation of certificate u/s. 90(2) not having been issued does not appear to have been controverter or disbelieved.

Judicial Considerations under Income Tax
In respect of proceedings under the Income Tax Act, it was held by the Supreme Court, in CIT vs. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria (1967) 66 ITR 433 (SC) that an appellant having once filed an appeal, cannot withdraw the same. In fact the Calcutta High Court held in Bhartia Steel and Engineering Co. P. Ltd. vs. ITO (1974) 97 ITR 154 (CAL) that even if the Tribunal had dismissed an appeal as withdrawn, the said order would be a nullity as having been passed without jurisdiction and the appeal will have to be treated as pending.

Conclusion

In the absence of specific provisions for withdrawal of an appeal under the Indirect Tax Laws (Service tax, Central Excise & Customs), practical issues / difficulties are faced by aggrieved persons, in particular. This issue needs to be addressed through amendments, in the Indirect Tax statutes / CESTAT (Procedures) Rules, 1982, as considered appropriate.

ADMISSIBILITY OF CENVAT ON TELECOM TOWERS

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Background
The issue as regards whether or not CENVAT credit of excise duty paid on inputs is available to the service providers of active infrastructure under telecommunication service and “passive infrastructure” under business auxiliary service or business support service has been a matter of extensive debate. Earlier, in Bharti Airtel Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune-III 2014 (35) STR 865 (Bom), the Hon. Bombay High Court ruled that towers or prefabricated buildings with antenna, Base Trans receiver Station (BTS) and parts thereof for providing cell phone services are not goods. They are immovable property non-marketable and non-excisable. They do not qualify as inputs and are not used directly for providing output services of telecommunication. Following judicial discipline, this ruling was affirmed by the Bombay High Court in Vodafone India Ltd. 2015 (40) STR 422 (Bom) as well. However, in case of persons providing passive telecom infrastructure to cellular telecom operators and liable for service tax under business auxiliary service, in GTL Infrastructure Ltd. vs. CST Mumbai 2015 (37) STR 577 (Tri.-Mum), the decision of Bharti Airtel (supra) was distinguished. The Tribunal noted that towers/ BTS cabins were undisputedly used for providing services of provision of passive infrastructure and therefore in view of Rule 2(k)(ii) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR), credit cannot be denied. Soon thereafter, in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. vs. CST Mumbai 2015 (38) STR 984 (Tri.-Mum) also CESTAT – Mumbai held that the assessee providing passive telecom infrastructure by way of telecom towers to various cellular telecom operators discharging service tax liability under business support services were entitled to CENVAT credit under Rule 2(a)(A)(i) of CCR of central excise duty paid on inputs such as brackets, mounting pole, cable, prefabricated buildings/shelter/panel used in erection of telecom towers, noting that these goods were procured under central excise invoices and there were no restrictions on coverage of inputs except for oil and petrol in Rule 2(c) (ii) (CCR). It was further observed that merely because the same were assembled together, it was unreasonable to suggest that CENVAT credit was not admissible. In this case also, inter alia, Bharti Airtel (supra) was distinguished and GTL Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) was relied upon.

Tower Vision India P. Ltd,. vs. CCE (Adj) Delhi 2016 (42) STR 249 (Tri.-LB).

In the above background, a Division Bench recorded a difference of opinion in a bunch of 13 appeals in Idea Mobile Communication Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2016 (41) STR J48 (Tri.Del) as to whether post 2006, when assessees paid service tax under business auxiliary service or business support service for providing passive infrastructure services, CENVAT credit on towers, shelters/prefabricated parts etc. should be allowed in the light of decisions in GTL Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) and Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) or they should not be entitled to CENVAT credit on shelters/parts as capital goods wherein the supplier paid excise duty on these items by classifying under chapter 85 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 in the light of decision of Bharti Airtel Ltd. (supra). This was decided to be referred to the Larger Bench of three members. Along with this, on substantially similar issues another set of 8 appeals were directed to be tagged with the said 13 appeals. Hence the Larger Bench, headed by Hon. President CESTAT was constituted. Prior to the formation of the Larger Bench, the division bench had agreed on the view that appellants before them were not eligible for credit of duty on towers and cabins if they are providing telecommunication service as output service following Bharti Airtel Ltd. (supra). However, since the appellants are providing output services of business auxiliary service or business support service to the telecommunication companies, the Member (Judicial) held them as eligible whereas Member (Technical) held it as ineligible in view of the Bombay High Court’s judgment in Bharti Airtel’s case (supra).

Reference Points
Two points provided below were referred to the Larger Bench:

Whether it was correct to hold that post 2006, wherever service providers paid service tax under business auxiliary service or business support service for providing passive infrastructure, they are entitled to take CENVAT credit on towers, prefabricated shelters, parts thereof etc. in view of GTL Infrastructure (supra) and Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) or the appellants-service providers are not entitled to take the said credit in the light of decision in Bharti Airtel Ltd. (supra).

Eligibility of the appellants-service providers to the credit on shelters and parts as capital goods.

Contentions in brief
Contentions made for the appellants are summarised as follows:

Towers/shelters and tower material was part of the Base Transmission System (BTS) classifiable under Tariff Heading 8517 and hence all components, spares and accessories would qualify as capital goods, whether or not such components etc. fall under Chapter 85.

The above credit cannot be denied on the ground of immovability. In terms of Rule 3 of the CCR, credit is admissible on all inputs and capital goods which are received in the premises of the service provider. Later, the fact of embedding them in the earth would not affect their eligibility.

Credit on input services also would not be denied on the ground of immovability.

Prefabricated buildings/shelters classified under Chapter 85 would qualify as capital goods. Since the duty paid documents indicated classification, it cannot be denied at the end of recipients.

As an alternate submission, shelters and towers qualified as ‘inputs’ themselves. There is no bar to indicate that goods which are not considered “capital goods” would also not quality as inputs.

Towers and shelters would qualify as accessories. Without tower, the active infrastructure namely antenna cannot be placed on that altitude to general uninterrupted frequency.

CENVAT chain was not broken. These are installed on foundations by contractors. These contractors issued invoices for payment of service tax. There is no loss of identity of goods during erection process.

On the other hand, the revenue’s contentions are summarised as follows:

The issue relating to eligibility of towers and shelters is settled categorically by the Hon. Bombay High Court in Bharti Airtel Ltd. (supra) and has not been deviated by any other High Court or overruled by Hon. Supreme Court.

The excise duty paid on M.S angles, channels and prefabricated buildings have no direct nexus whether with telecom service or with business support service. It is an immovable tower which is used for providing both the above services and immovable property being neither goods nor a service, no credit can be taken.

Analysis in brief
The Larger Bench analysed rivals contentions keeping following aspects as the focal point.

Towers and shelters claimed as accessories of other capital goods.

The question of immovability of tower and its relevance and the nature of ‘tower’ being goods.

Tower parts (MS channels, angles etc.) as inputs for availing credit.

Nexus and CENVAT credit flow

Applicability of ratio followed for telecom companies to infrastructure companies.

The scope of CENVAT credit scheme and credit on capital goods.

Appellant’s case was strenuously argued, relying on several Court rulings which interalia included:
• Commissioner vs. Solid & Correct Engineering Works 2010 (252) ELT 481 (SC)
• Commissioner vs. Sai Sahmita Storages P. Ltd. 2011 (23) STR 341 (AP)
• Commissioner vs. Hyundai Unitech Electrical Transmission Ltd. 2015 (323) ELT 220 220 (SC)

The Bench observed that a distinction was sought to be made by the Tribunal in GTL Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) that the decision by the Bombay High Court in Bharti Airtel was applicable to active telecom service providers and not to providers of passive infrastructure. On finding that since appellants allowed the operators right to install antenna and BTS equipment and rendered output service under business auxiliary service, they were entitled to credit. According to the Larger Bench, the ratio of the Bombay High Court was not appropriately appreciated by the Tribunal while deciding GTL Infrastructure as the High Court order in Bharti Airtel Ltd, (supra) was not available at such time. Since these items are immovable property, they cannot be considered inputs. The inputs like MS angles and prefabricated shelters which suffered duty were not used for providing output service. It was further noted that in Sai Samhita Storage P. Ltd. (supra) relied upon by the appellant, creation of immovable asset and implication of CENVAT credit flow in such a situation was not examined in detail in the order whereas in Bharti Airtel Ltd. (supra) the same matters covered are discussed elaborately by the Hon. Bombay High Court. The findings therein were further reiterated in Vodafone India Ltd.’s case. In such situation, and in absence of any material to distinguish the said ratio vis-à-vis the facts of the present case, it was found that Bharti Airtel Ltd. supra) and Vodafone India Ltd. (supra) should be followed.

Lastly, as regards eligibility of credit on shelters and parts as capital goods, it was found that a particular classification of duty paid items by itself does not make the items eligible for CENVAT credit. The eligibility is decided as per provisions of CCR. Since the Bombay High Court categorically held that towers and PFB are in the nature of immovable goods, the supplier by classifying the product under Chapter 85 does not make them eligible for credit either as capital goods or as inputs.

All the decisions relied upon were distinguished. It was also contended for the appellant that decisions of the A.P. High Court in BSNL’s case [2012 (25) STR 321] relied upon by the revenue along with the Bombay High Court’s decision in Bharti Airtel Ltd. (supra) and Vodafone India Limited (supra) were incorrectly appreciated and applied the ratio regarding the character of towers and shelters deducible from the judgment in Solid & Correct Engineering Works (supra). The appellant contended, “as in the case of Solid and Correct Engineering Works, there is no permanent affixation of towers and the prefabricated shelters to the earth permanently. These are fixed by nuts and bolts to the foundations not with the intention to permanently attach them to the earth or for the beneficial enjoyment thereof but only since securing these to a foundation is necessary to provide stability and wobble/vibration free operation and to ensure stability…..these continue to be movables and goods and do not normatively undergo transformation as immovable property is the core contention.” (emphasis supplied)

The extract of conclusion drawn by the Larger Bench in para-41 of the judgment are reproduced below:

“In our respectful view however the challenge to the ratio and conclusions of the High Court’s decisions in Bharti Airtel Limited and Vodafone India Limited on the ground that these are predicated on an incorrect and impermissible interpretation of the rationes in Solid & Concrete Engineering Works, must await an appellate consideration, when and if challenged, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is outside the province and jurisdiction of this Tribunal to analyze and record a ruling on a superior Court’s analyses and elucidation of other binding precedents.

If the Hon’ble High Court was not persuaded to reconciler, while adjudicating the lis in Vodafone India Limited, its earlier decision in Bharti Airtel Limited on a premise that its earlier decision might have been incongruous with the ratio of the Apex Court’s decision in Solid & Correct Engineering Works, it is clearly beyond the province of this Tribunal to embark upon such an exercise, on any grounds, including the per incuriam principle.”

Thus, considering the law laid down in Bharti Airtel Limited (supra) and Vodafone India Limited (supra) to be binding law on the constituted Larger Bench, it was held that provision of towers and shelters as infrastructure used in the rendition of an output service is common to both passive and active infrastructure providers, application of the High Court’s rulings would not be different. The Larger Bench thus resolved the issue in favour of revenue and disallowed CENVAT credit.

(Note: Readers may note that the decision in Bharti Airtel’s case is challenged before the Supreme Court. Further, the Supreme Court has ordered that this be tagged with Civil Appeal arising out of SLP in CCE Vishakhapatnam vs. M/s. Sai Samhita Storage P. Ltd.)

Conclusion
An important question that arises is when provision of active or passive infrastructure for use is treated as a taxable service for the purpose of levy of service tax, the means or the medium though which the said service is provided or yet better, without which the service cannot be provided is neither considered ‘input’ nor capital goods in a larger chain of value addition and also considering high cost of infrastructure that has gone into for providing telecommunication services. While many professionals are skeptical about considering the law laid down by Bharti Airtel (supra) to be good law, the finality on the issue is awaited till the Apex Court hears the matter.

30% INTEREST ON DELAYE D PAY MENT OF SERVICE TAX:WHETHER FAIR TO TAX PAYERS

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Background
With effect from 01/10/2014, vide Notification No.12/2014– ST dated 11/07/14 issued u/s. 75 of the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’), the following rates of interest have been prescribed, for delayed payment of service tax:

The intention of the government behind prescribing higher rates of interest for delayed payment service tax, brought out and as stated in the post budget press interview by the then CBEC Chairperson Ms. J. M. Shanti Sundharam, is under:

“Question
The Budget proposed an increase in the rate of interest from 18 % to 30 % on delay in payment of service tax beyond six months.

Reply
This is for service tax which is collected and not paid by a particular date. The person has used this amount. So, interest will act as a deterrent. It is only simple interest.”

However, the law as amended is not indicative of the government’s intention stated above. Hence, it is the understanding of trade & industry and tax payers generally that abnormally high rates of interest would apply to all cases of delayed payments (including tax demands arising out of actions u/s. 73 of the Act)

Concerns
The principal concerns of the trade & industry and tax payers generally are as under:

Service tax department is empowered under law to initiate actions upto 5 years (including 18 month normal period) for demanding & recovering tax with interest and penalty tax. It is common knowledge that tax litigations usually take a long time to settle (invariably litigation upto CESTAT takes around 5 years and could take upto 15 years if the matter goes upto the Supreme Court) for no fault of the tax payer. In that context, rate of interest of 30% is unjustified, unwarranted and totally unfair to tax payers.

The rate of interest is significantly higher if compared to the prevailing market rate of interest.

The rate of interest is abnormal considering the rates of interest prevalent in other Central Tax Laws / State VAT Laws / VAT GST Laws prevalent worldwide. Details are given at the end of this write up for ready reference.

For delayed payment of tax penal provisions are already existing in the Act, (viz. penalty u/s. 76, power to arrest etc.) Hence, in that context prescribing abnormally high rates of interest for delayed payments is unwarranted.

Further, it is pertinent to note that compared to the abnormally high rates of interest for delayed payment of service tax, the rate of interest payable by the government on refunds payable to a tax payer is only 6% pa. The disparity in rate of interest to be paid by a tax payer and tax department is glaring.

Recommendations
In order to avoid adverse consequences on trade & industry and tax payers generally and to promote & encourage fair tax administration practice considering the imminent introduction of GST regime, the following is suggested:

a) The rate of interest for delayed payment of service tax be restored to 18% pa with immediate effect,

b) As a deterrent, a higher rate of interest of 24% pa may be prescribed in cases where tax is collected but not paid to the government,

c) Parity should be brought in rate of interest payable by a tax payer & tax department at the earliest, under all tax laws. This would also help in establishing accountability of tax department.

(Note: Research inputs from Pradeep S. Shah & Udayan D. Choksi are acknowledged)

SERVICES PROVIDED BY A GOVERNMENT OR A LOCAL AUTHORITY TO BUSINESS ENTITIES

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Preliminary
With effect from July 01, 2012, service tax regime has undergone a complete overhaul and most of the services are now covered under the service tax ambit. Earlier, every activity (service), which was liable for service tax was defined by way of specific nomenclature and a definition was provided for each service. However, since the definition of ‘service’ is now introduced, the onus is shifted to the service provider and in some cases to service receiver under Reverse Charge Mechanism (RCM), to ascertain whether a particular activity is a service or not and failure to do so would result into a tax liability or lead to a litigation.

One of the significant amendments made in the negative list based taxation of services governed u/s. 66D (a) (iv) of the Finance Act, 1994 (“Act”) comes into effect from April 01, 2016. For many business enterprises receiving services provided by a government or a local authority, this is very important as it is likely to have far reaching implications. To understand the said amendment in its entirety, one needs to go through section 66D (a) (iv) of the Act before the amendment was made which is reproduced below for easy reference:

Position before the amendment

“Section 66D of the Act (Negative List of Services)

“The Negative list shall comprise of the following services, namely:-

a) Services by Government or local authority excluding the following services to the extent they are not covered elsewhere
i) services by the Department of Posts by way of speed post, express parcel post, life insurance and agency service provided to a person other than Government;

ii) services in relation to an aircraft or a vessel, inside or outside the precincts of a port or an airport;

iii) Transport of goods or passengers; or

iv) Support services, other than services covered under clauses(i) to (iii) above, provided to business entities;”

b) ……….
c) ……….”.
………….

“Support Service” was defined u/s 65B (49) of the Act as under :

“support services” means infrastructural, operational, administrative, logistic, marketing or any other support of any kind comprising functions that entities carry out in ordinary course of operations themselves but may obtain as services by outsourcing from others for any reason whatsoever and shall include advertisement and promotion, construction or works contract, renting of immovable property, security, testing and analysis.”

If above stated support services are provided by the government or a local authority, the liability of discharging service tax is shifted to the services receiver under RCM in terms of Section 68(2) of the Act read with Notification No. 30/ 12 – ST dated 20/6/12 (as amended).

Position after the amendment

Section 66D(a)(iv) of the Act

Vide Clause 107 of the Finance Act, 2015, section 66D (a) (iv) of the Act has been amended, which has been made effective from April 01, 2016 vide Notification No 15/2016 – ST dated March 01/2016. The amended section 66D (a)

(iv) of the Act is reproduced below:

Section 66D (Negative List of Services)

The Negative List shall comprise of the following services, namely:-

“a) Services by government or a Local Authority excluding the following services to the extent they are not covered elsewhere-

i) (unchanged)
ii) “
iii) “
 iv) Any services, other than services covered under clauses i) to iii) above, provided to business entities.”

Also, vide clause 105 (h) of the Finance Act, 2015, the definition of “support service” as defined under section 65B (49) of the Act has been omitted with effect from April 01, 2016.

Notification No. 30/2012 – ST dated 20/6/12 (as amended vide Notification No. 18/2016 – ST dt. 1/3/16 (Relevant Extracts) I The taxable services – ……..

(A) (iv) provided or agreed to be provided by – …….

(C) Government or local authority excluding,-

1) Renting of immovable property, and

2) Services specified in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of the clause (a) of section 66D of the Finance A ct, 1994.

to any business entity located in the taxable territory;

II The extent of service tax payable thereon by the person who provides the service and any other person liable for paying service tax for the taxable services specified in paragraph I shall be as specified in the following Table, namely: –

Brief Analysis of Amendment

Criteria for taxability

A large number of the services provided by the government or a local authority to a business entity may get covered under the service tax net if they satisfy the following criteria for taxability:

Whether any activity carried out or done falls under the definition of ’service’ or not? (‘Service’)

Whether such service is provided or agreed to be provided by the government or a local authority? (‘Government’ / Local Authority)

Whether the recipient of such service is a Business Entity? (“Business Entity”)

Whether there is a consideration paid or payable for such activity/ service? (‘Consideration’)

Whether such activity carried out/ service provided is covered under exemption/ negative list of services or falls under exclusion portion of the definition of service?(Excluded/Exempted)

If the answers to the criteria stated in (a) to (d) above is ‘YES’ and the answer to the last criteria (e) is ‘NO’”, service tax would become payable by the recipient of the service under RCM

Criteria to ascertain whether any activity constitutes ‘service’ u/s. 65B (44) of the Act As mentioned earlier, the major task that would have to be decided is whether a particular activity performed by one person for another is still a service or not. Also, in view of a declared service definition u/s. 66E (e) of the Act [viz. “agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act”,] it is very difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to which activity amounts to service and which does not. To ascertain whether any activity falls under the definition of a service or not, the following criteria need to be applied:

Whether any activity constitutes merely – a transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner?

Whether any activity constitutes- a transaction in money or actionable claim?

Whether any activity constitutes- a provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment?

Whether any activity constitutes – fees taken in any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force?

Whether any activity constitutes – the functions performed by the members of Parliament, members of State Legislative, members of Panchayats, members of Municipalities and members of other local authorities who receive any consideration in performing the functions of that office as such member?

Whether any activity constitutes – the duties performed by any person who holds any post in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution in that capacity?

Whether any activity constitutes – the duties performed by any person as a Chairperson or a Director in a body established by the Central Government or State Government or local authority and who is not deemed as an employee before the commencement of this section?

Whether such activity is covered under exempted list of services/negative list of services?

Determination of Taxability

It is important to note that, after ascertaining whether a particular activity is a service or not per se so as to attract service tax, taxability will be determined on satisfaction of the following two conditions viz.:

Whether such service is provided or agreed to be provided by a ‘person’ for “another person”?

Whether such service is provided for a consideration?

If the answers to the above two conditions is ‘YES’, then service tax becomes payable

For the correct interpretation of the amended section 66D (a) (iv) of the Act, understanding of the following important definitions would be very much essential:

“Business Entity” defined u/s. 65B (17) of the Act is as under:

“business entity” means any person ordinarily carrying out any activity relating to industries, commerce or any other business or profession.

“Government” defined u/s. 65B (26A) of the Act as under:

“Government” means the Departments of the Central Government, a State Government and its Departments and a Union Territory and its Departments, but shall not include any entity, whether created by a statute or otherwise, the accounts of which are not required to be kept in accordance with Article 150 of the Constitution or the rules made thereunder.

“Local Authority” defined u/s. 65B(31) of the Act as under :

“local authority” means –

a) a Panchayat as referred to in cause (d) of article 243 of the Constitution;

b) a Municipality as referred to in clause (e) of article 243P of the Constitution;

c) a Municipal Committee and a District Board, legally entitled to, or entrusted by the government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund;

d) a Cantonment Board as defined in section 3 of the Cantonments Act, 2006 (41 of 2006);

e) a regional council or a district council constituted under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution;

f) a development board constituted under article 371 of the Constitution; or

g) a regional council constituted under article 371A of the Constitution.”;

Taxability Position
With effect from April 01, 2016, a large number of activities /services provided by government/local authority to business entities would come within the ambit of service tax under RCM. Hence, it would be a huge challenge to determine taxability, on the basis of criteria discussed above.

It needs to be expressly noted that, under RCM there is no threshold limit prescribed for payment of service tax. Hence, say when a trader who is not registered with service tax department makes a payment of fees for Rs. 10,000/- to government/local authority which is liable to service tax he would have to register and comply with the service tax law despite very low service tax liability of Rs.1,500/-. This is likely to enhance compliance burden on small and medium businesses, in particular and would be totally contrary to government’s initiative to promote “ease of doing business.”

Taxability Position is discussed hereafter with some illustrations :

Merchant Overtime Charge (MOT)

MOT charge paid for availing services of verification of export goods and sealing thereof by the Department of Excise, Government of India, provided to a business entity would get covered within service tax net under RCM since it fulfills all the conditions/criteria for taxability.

Registration Fees for registering title documents

Since registration fees are collected for providing the service by a state government department for registration of the title documents and preservation thereof in their records to a business entity, service tax under RCM would become payable. However, if the said fees are paid by an individual personally & not as business entity, service tax would not be payable.

Deduction made by government departments for the deposit of Service provider for poor service quality

Since tolerating an act by the government department of poor quality of construction is a service specified under a Declared Service [section 66E (e) of the Act,] and the consideration for such service is the amount so deducted from the deposit, service tax under RCM may become payable by the service provider as a service recipient.

Fees for Filing of Appeals etc paid to CESTAT

Such service falls under the exclusion portion of the definition of ‘Service’ and hence would be not taxable under service tax nor under RCM in terms of Clause (c) of section 65B (44) of the Act.

The above are only a few illustrations. However, facts of every case would have to be examined to determine taxability. Implications of taxability in cases like license fees for 3G/4G, Allocation of coal blocks for mining and related work could have a far reaching implications. The same would require a very detailed study and examination.

Conclusion
Considering far reaching implications of taxability of services provided by government/local authority to business entities with effect from April 01/2016, the following is suggested:

Applicability of RCM needs a serious consideration so as to ease compliance burden, particularly on small and medium business enterprises, who may not be registered with service tax department.

If taxability under RCM is maintained, it is essential that for ease of doing business a transaction threshold (say Rs. 50,000/-) is prescribed.

Detailed guidelines/clarifications need to be issued by CBEC with practical examples to facilitate understanding & avoid litigation.

TRANSFER OF USE OF INTANGIBLES: IS RIGHT TO USE ALWAYS TRANSFERRED?

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Introduction:
Intangible or incorporeal rights such as patents, trademarks, computer software etc. are characterised as goods. It was observed in Vikas Sales vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (1996) 102 STC 106 (SC) that since incorporeal rights are capable of transfer and transmission they are movable property and therefore included in the ambit of goods. In Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Duke & sons Pvt. Ltd. (1999) 112 STC 370 (Bom), upholding applicability of sales tax, the Court held, “the manner of transfer of the right to use the goods to the transferee would depend upon the nature of the goods…… For transferring the right to use the trademark it is not necessary to handover the trademark to the transferee or give control and possession of trademark to him, it can be done merely by authorizing the transferee to use the same in the manner required by the law as has been done in the present case. The right to use the trademark can be transferred simultaneously to any number of persons” Also in SPS Jayam & Co. vs. Registrar, Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal & Others (2004) 137 STC 117, it was held that trademark is intangible goods which is subject matter of transfer. Giving permission to use trademark for a particular period while also retaining this right to use such trademark for self-use or to be able to grant license to some other person simultaneously is only a transfer of right to use and not merely a right to enjoy. It was observed that simply by retaining the right for oneself to use the trademark while granting permission to others to use the trademark, it would not take away the character of the transaction as one of transfer of right to use. This view was also echoed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in G.S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of A.P. 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT that levy of tax under Article 366-(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India is not on the use of goods but on the transfer of right to use goods which accrues only on account of transfer of such right. Transfer of Right is sine qua non for the right to use any goods and such transfer takes place when a contract is executed under which the right is vested in the lessee. G.S. Lamba (supra) however involved providing tangible goods on hire.

Nevertheless, considering a significant tax potential in the transactions involving intangible goods, the Central Government incorporated section 66(55b) in the Finance Act, 1994 from September 10, 2004 in terms of which “intellectual property service” was defined as one which means a) transferring whether (permanently or otherwise) amended from 16/06/2005 as temporarily or (b) permitting the use or enjoyment of any intellectual property right”. This category of service in its new version under the negative list based taxation in force from 01/07/2012 appears as declared service in section 66E(c) as “temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of any intellectual property right.”

At this point, it must be noted that mutual exclusivity of VAT and service tax has been envisaged in Imagic Creative P. Ltd. vs. CCE 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC) by the Supreme Court. So also, in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. vs. UOI & Others 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC), it was held that value of service cannot be included in the sale of goods or the price of goods in the value of service. Further, in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (supra), a test was laid down to determine whether a transaction is for transferring right to use goods as provided below:

“Para 97
To constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods the transaction must have the following attributes:

(a) There must be goods available for delivery;

(b) There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

(c) The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefore should be available to the transferee;

(d) For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor – this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statue – viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods;

(e) Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others”. (emphasis supplied)

Thus the test of exclusivity is laid down by the Supreme Court. This criteria is followed in a large number of decisions. However, the Courts have distinguished in a few others leading to a controversy whether the transaction involves transfer of right to use and thus a deemed sale liable for sales tax/VAT tax or a service liable for service tax.

Key Rulings of the Courts: Test of Exclusivity
In the case of Nutrine confectionary Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 21Taxmann.com 555 (Andhra Pradesh), the petitioner allowed the right to use a trademark on non-exclusive basis, against payment of royalty. The dispute related to whether or not there was transfer of right to use goods. Relying on State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (2002) 126 STC 114 (SC) it was observed that ‘assignee’ was free to make use of the trademark and logo and had full control over such use. The petitioner did not in any manner regulate the use of trademark or logo by the assignee and also used trademark for its own use. These facts did not mitigate in favour of the petitioner. Distinguishing the BSNL’s case, the Court observed, “BSNL dealt with a case of mobile connections. It is not a case of transfer of trademark or logo. The contract for providing a mobile connection invariably contains a clause that the licensee shall use a mobile connection exclusively for himself/herself and nobody else would use. In the case of trademark, the same can be used by an assignee without any exclusive right. This itself does not remove the transaction under the agreement outside the purview of section 5E” and therefore liable for sales tax (VAT). (Note: Section 5E of the GST Act overrides all other provisions of the said Act when it is the case of transfer of right to use any goods). Not in line with this, a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer (2013) 35 Taxmann. com 569 (Kerala) while analysing an agreement for franchise followed the dictum of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.’s case (supra) after considering various cases including Rashtriya Ispat Nigam (supra), Duke & Sons Pvt. Ltd. (supra), SPS Jayam & Co. (supra) and even the above Nutrine’s case (supra). In this case, the assesse engaged in the business of marketing, trading etc. of gold and diamond jewelery under the brand “Malabar Gold”, received royalty under a franchise agreement containing various clauses including permitting the use of trademark. The assessee paid service tax on royalty receipts under franchise service. The VAT department considering the use of trademark as transfer of right to use trademark demanded VAT . The clauses in the franchise agreement were examined in detail by the Court. In spite of the revenue’s heavy reliance interalia on the above Nutrine’s case (supra), the facts were distinguished observing that Nutrine’s case was decided because of applicability of section 5E of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act and the Court held that the test laid down in BSNL’s case (supra) squarely applied as there were no deliverables at any stage and the right was not transferred to the exclusion of the franchisor, who could transfer the same right simultaneously to others and thus the test laid down in BSNL judgment was not satisfied. The Court also distinguished two earlier decisions of Kerala High Court itself viz. Jojo Frozen Foods Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2004) 24 VST 327 (Ker) and Kareem Foods Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2009) 24 VST 333(Ker.) on the ground that in these cases, there was no occasion to consider either Entry 97 of LIST-I under the 7th Schedule of the Constitution or the service tax provision u/s. 65(105)(zze) of the Finance Act,1994 in respect of franchise service brought in the law from 2003, as the cases were of pre-2003 period and service tax is correctly paid as the transaction is of franchise service. Yet in another case relating to franchise viz. Vitan Departmental Stores & Industries Ltd. vs. The State of Tamilnadu 2013-TIOL-897-HC-MAD-CT, the agreement related to granting exclusive right to operate departmental store for a specified period. The High Court held that the transaction was not a mere license or mere right to enjoy but a transfer of right to use intangible goods as the right was provided to operate the store on exclusive basis. In a recent decision of Tata Sons Limited & Another vs. The State of Maharashtra 2015-TIOL-345-HC-MUMCT, the decision in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (supra) was distinguished observing that the controversy dealt with in this case related to telephone service and not similar to issue of trademarks and held that in relation to intangibles such as trademarks, the transfer of right to use need not be exclusive and unconditional and such transaction is capable of multiple transfers and transferor continuing to use goods such as trademarks would constitute sale exigible to the State value added tax.

Thus the question that arises is whether the test laid down by the Supreme Court in BSNL’s case (supra) is required to be followed even in the case of intangible goods or whether it applies only to the transfer of right to use tangible goods and distinguishable for determination of transfer of right to use intangible goods. Consequently, the issue is whether it is simply on account of the inherent nature of the intangible goods which allows simultaneous use by multiple persons that a transaction cannot be treated as sale or simply because the service tax law now contains provisions to tax the transaction as ‘service’, the transaction is held as service and not as deemed sale. In this context, it is apposite to discuss one more decision in AGS Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2013 (32) STR 129 (Mad) wherein validity of provisions of section 65(105)(zzzzt) of the Finance Act,1994 (dealing with the service of temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of any copyright) was examined. In this case, a service provided by producer/distributor/exhibitor was challenged on the ground that transfer of right to use the goods amounted to sale and not service. The High Court followed BSNL’s case (supra) to contend that ”the temporary transfer of copyright did not satisfy principles laid down in BSNL’s case (supra) and it is neither a sale nor a deemed sale. Service tax is a levy on “temporary transfer” or “permitting the use or enjoyment” of the copyright as defined under the Copyright Act, 1957. In the case of Sales Tax Act, there would be “transfer of right to use goods” whereas under the Service Tax Act what is levied is temporary transfer/ enjoyment of the goods. The pith and substance of both enactments are totally different. “Temporary Transfer” or “permitting the use or enjoyment of the copyright is not within the State’s exclusive power under Entry 54 of List-II.”

Conclusion:
The issue thus remaining open is whether the test of exclusivity laid down in BSNL’s case is applicable to intangibles or is the decision distinguishable for transfer of right to use intangibles. Also whether there is a difference between granting permission to use and transfer of right to use. If transfer of use necessarily involves transfer of right to use whether the goods are tangible or intangible, the levy of service tax has no place. When any of the matters reaches Supreme Court, it would have to decide these issues among others. In the interim, the Courts would have other cases to decide with new perspective to the controversy when the facts are different and therefore in spite of paying one of the two taxes, the assessee may have to face litigation initiated by the other authority.

SUPREME COURT: NO SERVICE TAX ON WORKS CONTRACT PRIOR TO 01/06/2007

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Background
In the August 2015 issue of BCAJ under the Service
tax feature, both the minority view and the majority view in the
5-member Bench’s decision in Larsen and Toubro Ltd. vs. CST, Delhi 2015
(38) STR 266 (Tri.-LB) were synopsised over the controversy of whether a
works contract was divisible and the service portion involved therein
was liable for service tax prior to June 01, 2007, when service in a
works contract was notified vide introduction of sub-clause (zzzza) in
section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act). The wait and anxiety
has been put to an end by the Hon. Supreme Court’s path breaking
judgment in a bunch of appeals led by CCE & C Kerala vs. Larsen and
Toubro Ltd. 2015-TIOL-187-SCST wherein the Apex Court has allowed
appeals of the assessees by categorically holding that prior to June 01,
2007, the Act did not lay down any charge or machinery to levy and
assess service tax on indivisible composite works contracts.

THE JUDGMENT OF The HON. SUPREME COURT:
In
various revenue appeals, the substance contended was that the 46th
amendment itself divided works contract by Article 366(29A)(6) and what
remained after removing goods element was labour and service and these
were subjected to service tax by various entries in the Finance Act,
1994. Secondly, the Finance Act, 1994 itself contains both charge of
service tax as well as machinery by which only labour and service
element in indivisible contracts is taxable and the statute need not do
what the constitution amendment has already done viz. splitting of
indivisible works contract into a separate contract of transfer of
property in goods involved in execution of works contract taxable by the
States and labour and service element on the other hand is taxable by
the Central Government. As such, defining works contract in 2007 for the
first time would make no difference as the elements of works contracts
were already taxable under the Finance Act, 1994 even prior to the
introduction of the said definition. Lastly, therefore relying on
section 23 of the Contract Act and McDowell & Company Ltd. 1985 (2)
SCC-230, all indivisible contracts were made with a view to avoid/ evade
tax and this being contrary to public policy, invoking principles laid
down in the said McDowell’s case, the socalled indivisible contracts
should be taxed under the Finance Act, 1994.

As against the
above, it was pleaded for various assessees that works contract is a
separate species known to the world of commerce and law and being so, an
indivisible works contract would have to be split into constituent
parts by necessary legislation to contain a charge to service tax
together with requisite machinery provisions. Secondly, there did not
exist such charge and machinery prior to 2007 and what was taxable was
only the pure service in which no goods element was involved and thirdly
in view of this, the Delhi High Court’s judgment in G. D. Builders’
case 2013 (32) STR 673 (Del) was wholly incorrect.

Analysis:
Considering
the above rival contentions, the Hon. Apex Court examined section 64,
relevant clauses in section 65(105), charging section 66 and section 67
of the Act, Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules,
2006 (Valuation Rules) dealing with valuation in depth and also went
into examining in detail second Gannon Dunkerley judgment (1993) 1 SCC
364, heavily relied by the assessee’s counsel and observed at para 15 of
the judgment, that unless splitting of an indivisible works contract is
done, taking into account the eight deductions elaborated in the said
judgment of Gannon Dunkerley (supra) (i.e. deductions for amount paid to
subcontractor for labour and services, planning, designing and
architect’s fees, hire charges for machineries and equipments,
consumables like water, electricity and fuel etc., other charges for
labour and services, cost of transportation to bring goods to the place
of work and cost of establishment and profit of the contractor relatable
to labour/services) the charge would transgress into forbidden
territory i.e. cost, expense and profit attributable to the transfer of
property in goods in such contract. This being the case, the Court
concurred with the case of the assessees that the charging section
itself must specify that service tax can only be on the works contracts
and the measure of tax can only be on the portion of the works contract
representing service element to be derived only by deducting value of
property in goods transferred in execution of the works contract from
the gross value of the works contract. The Court further noted that as
reflected in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. UOI 2006-TIOL-15-
SC-CT-LB, the scheme of taxation under the constitution is such that
powers of the Centre and State are mutually exclusive. Thus, it is
important to segregate the two elements completely and in case of
transgression, the levy would be constitutionally infirm and therefore
exclusivity has to be maintained and thus the Court relying again on
Gannon & Dunkerley (supra), Kone Elevators India P. Ltd. P. Ltd. vs.
State of T. N. 2014-TIOL-57-SC-CT-LB and Larsen & Toubro vs. State
of Karnataka 2013-TIOL- 46-SC-CT-LB endorsed recognition of works
contracts as a separate species of contract and interalia cited Larsen
& Toubro 2013-TIOL-46-SC-CT-LB in approval thereof as follows:

“…..
The term “works contract” in Article 366(29A)(b) is amply wide and
cannot be confined to a particular understanding of the term or to a
particular form. The term encompasses a wide range and many varieties of
contract. The term “works contract” in Article 366(29A)(b) takes within
its fold all genre of works contract and is not restricted to one
specie of contract to provide for labour and service alone”.

The
Court also analysed and accepted the assessee’s next important plea
that there did not exist charge to tax works contract in the Finance
Act, 1994 prior to 01/06/2007 is a correct view. To arrive at the view,
reliance was interalia placed on the following:

Mathuram Agrawal vs. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 667

“The
statute should clearly and unambiguously convey the three components of
the tax law i.e. the subject of the tax, the person who is liable to
pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is to be paid. If there is any
ambiguity regarding any of these ingredients in a taxation statute then
there is no tax in law. Then it is for the legislature to do the
needful in the matter.”

Govind Saran Ganga Saran vs. CST, 1985 Supp SCC 205 = 2002-TIOL-589-SC-CT

“The
components which enter into the concept of a tax are well known. The
first is the character of the imposition known by its nature which
prescribes the taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear
indication of the person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged
to pay the tax, the third is the rate at which the tax is imposed, and
the fourth is the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for
computing the tax liability. If those components are not clearly and
definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in
point of law.”

CIT vs. B. C. Srinivasa Setty (1981) 2 SCC 460

“Thus
the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute
an integrated code. When there is a case to which the computation
provisions cannot apply at all, it is evident that such a case was not
intended to fall within the charging section.”

The Court held that the five taxable services referred to the charging section 65(105) would refer only to service contracts simpliciter and not the composite works contracts which was clear from the very language defining taxable service as “any service provided”. To fortify and advance the above contention further, the Court observed that in contrast to the above, section 67 post amendment in 2006 for the first time prescribed that when the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable to be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner. It is also evident that Rule 2(A) of the Valuation Rules framed pursuant to the power has followed the second Gannon Dunkerley’s case (supra) while segregating the ‘service’ component from the component of ‘goods’. In consonance thereof, the Court also noted that not only the statute was amended and rules framed but a Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007 was also notified for payment of service tax at presumptive rate.

Lastly, the Court examined the Delhi High Court’s judgment in G. D. Builders (supra) holding that levy of service tax in section 65(105) sub-clauses (g), (zzd), (zzh), (zzq) and (zzzh) is good enough to tax indivisible works contract and commented as follows:

  •     Reference was made to various judgments which had no direct bearing on the point at issue and further the second Gannon Dunkerley (supra) was referred to in passing without noticing any of the key paras set out in this judgment.

Mahim Patram Private Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2007

(3)    SCC 668 was completely misread to arrive at the proposition that even when rules are not framed for computation of tax, tax would be leviable. This judgment concerned itself with works contract being taxed under the Central Sales Tax Act. In accordance with sections 9(2) and 13(3) of Central Sales Tax Act, powers are conferred on officers of various States to utilise the machinery provisions of the States sales tax statutes for levy and assessment of Central sales tax under the Central Act, so long as the said rules were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Central Act. Thus, the extracted passage from Mahim Patram’s case (supra) in G. D. Builders’ case (supra) referred to rules not being framed under the Central Act and not to the rules not being framed at all. The conclusion drawn based on such misreading was found wholly incorrect by the Court. The finding in G. D. Builders (supra) was thus contrary to the line of decisions discussed above among various others. In support thereof one such passage from para 17 of Jagannath Baksh Singh vs. State of U.P. [AIR 1962 SC 1563] was extracted from Heinz India (P) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. (2012) 5 SCC 443 which read as:

“An imposition of tax which in the absence of a prescribed machinery and the prescribed procedure would partake of the character of a purely administrative affair can, in a proper sense, be challenged as contravening Article 19(1)(f).” (emphasis supplied).

  •     In addition to the above, the Court also took note of the fact that either machinery provisions were struck down or held inadequate and therefore assessment thereunder was rendered ineffective vide the Patna High Court’s decision (affirmed by Apex Court in State of Jharkhand vs. Voltas Ltd. 2007-TIOL-86-SC-ST, Madras High Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (1993) 88 STC 289 and Orissa High Court in Larsen & Toubro vs. State of Orissa, (2008) 012 VST 0031).

The Court concluded by holding that the Finance Act (prior to 01/06/2007) laid down no charge or machinery to levy and assess service tax on indivisible works contracts. Therefore, the revenue’s apprehension that several exemption notifications have been granted qua service tax levied by the Finance Act, 1994 was also answered emphatically that whichever judgment would be appealed against before the Supreme Apex Court, such notifications would have to be disregarded.

Conclusion:

While it is heartening to note that the controversy which began with the decision in Daelim’s case 2003(155) ELT 457 (T) at the end of over ten years has reached finality for better; nevertheless a large number of assessees who met with an adverse decision in this battle and who did not litigate for want of resources or any other reason would have certainly succumbed to the suffering of financial loss in one or the other way in different proportions for no fault of theirs but only on account of vague and unprecise legislation. The question therefore arises thus, is whether an honest assessee has any recourse under the constitution to question accountability of the law administering machinery which also encompasses drafting of laws? Many open issues of similar nature like dual taxation to the transactions of providing license to software or transfer of intellectual property etc. on a similar uncertainty have made tax payers and stakeholders suffer without having any recourse to even consider questionability. Is it the fruit that we are ‘enjoying’ in a democratic setup?

CONTROVERSY : DIVISIBILITY OF WORKS CONTRACT

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Introduction
There has been long drawn controversy over the issue of taxability of works contract prior to the introduction of works contract service (WCS) in sub-clause (zzzza) in section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) with effect from 01/06/2007. The dispute dates back to the pronouncement of decision in Daelim Industrial Co. vs. CCE 2003 (155) ELT 457 (T). The controversy primarily relates to whether or not works contracts were taxable under the taxable services defined under the service tax law as commercial or industrial construction service (CICS)–with effect from 10/09/2004), construction of complex service (COCS) (w.e.f. 16/06/2005) or erection, commissioning or installation service (ECIS) (w.e.f. 01/07/2003). The decision in Daelim (supra) was doubted and referred to a Three Member Bench which was answered in CCE vs. BSBK Pvt. Ltd. 2010 (18) STR 555 (T) wherein it was ruled that turnkey contracts could be vivisected and service element therein could be subjected to service tax if the service was a taxable service under the Act. A contrary ruling by the Three Member Bench was however pronounced in Jyoti Ltd. vs. CCE 2008 (9) STR 373 and also in CCE vs. Indian Oil Tanking Ltd. 2010 (18) STR 577 (T). The Larger Bench in BSBK (supra) did not analyse or disagree with the operative ratio in the earlier decision of co-ordinate Benches. Therefore, BSBK (supra) could not have overruled or decided contrary to the decision by co-ordinate Benches. In this background, Larsen & Toubro while challenging an adjudication order confirming service tax demand somewhere in 2013 for execution of a turnkey contract prior to 01/06/2007, holding it as commercial or industrial service, also filed an application to refer the matter to Larger Bench in view of the above two conflicting decisions of Larger Benches. In the interim, Hon. Delhi High Court in G. D. Builders vs. Union of India 2013 (32) STR 673 (Del) ruled that after 46th Amendment to the Constitution, service portion of a composite contract could be vivisected for subjecting it to service tax by applying aspect doctrine for bifurcation of a composite contract. However, prior to this in CST vs. Turbotech Precision Engineering Pvt. Ltd. 2010 (18) STR 545 (Kar) and Strategic Engineering Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE 2011 (24) STR 387 (Mad), it was decided that works contracts were not liable for service tax prior to 01/06/2007. Consequent upon CESTAT order referring the matter to Larger Bench, the revenue had appealed to Delhi High Court that since the issue stood resolved and decided in G. D. Builders & Others (supra) vide order dated 24/11/2013, for setting aside the order. The Delhi High Court disposed of the appeal in November, 2014 wherein consensus emerged that Five Member Bench can examine a preliminary issue whether the question raised was covered by the decision in G. D. Builders’ case (supra) and also that appropriate directions/orders could be passed after examining contrary view expressed by the Karnataka High Court and the Madras High Court in Turbotech Precision Engineering (supra) and Strategic Engineering (supra) respectively. Accordingly, the Larger Bench of five members headed by the Hon. President was constituted to look into the above limited angle. Although the reference was made for a limited purpose and applicability is confined to the period between 2004 and 2007, since the controversy over the issue is discussed at great length in approx. 220 pages interim order, the decision has assumed academic value. Various judicial precedents on the subject of works contract, taxability of sale of goods involved therein and adequacy of service tax provisions vis-à-vis works contracts vide a catena of judicial precedents have been analysed from various angles since the decision was reached in terms of majority. Discussed below are some of the key observations and views of both majority and minority members of the Hon. Larger Bench.

 Facts of The Case in Brief:
On behalf of  appellant Company, Larsen & toubro, it was pleaded that  g. d. Builders (supra) was per incuriam as it did not consider and explain several operative, relevant and binding precedents in the area and evolutionary history leading to enactment of distinct category of works contract from 01/06/2007 as several of its seminal reasons were passed sub silentio as the Appellants therein conceded that service component in a composite contract can be taxed but not as works contract per se and such other merits concerning taxability of works contract were not examined. Had the several facts of constitution limits and relevant legislative provisions, the enacting history of sub-clause (zzzza) and binding rationes been brought to the notice of the High Court, the conclusion drawn by the High Court could have been different and therefore G. D. Builders decision was based on concession by petitioners therein and did not have precedential vitality. Also, contrary decisions of Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Turbotech Precision (supra) and Madras High Court in Strategic Engineering (supra) also need to be looked into. Revenue however contended that ruling in G. D. Builders is a binding precedent and not travelling beyond the scope of deliberations fixed by the Delhi High Court vide its order of 11th November, 2014 as contended by the Appellant. In view hereof, the facts and decision of G. D. Builders’ case (supra) as well as those of Turbotech Precision (supra) and Strategic Engineering (supra) were examined in addition to analysing the core issue of taxability of works contract prior to 01/06/2007 in terms of various judicial precedents and all the relevant provisions of service tax

Minority order: Brief Overview:
The minority order contains detailed analysis of scope of charging and valuation provision including the evolutionary history thereof and analysis and examination of a host of judicial precedents which interalia included Gannon Dunkerley & Co. and Others vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (1993) 88 STC 204 (the second Gannon Dunkerley), Larsen & Toubro vs. State of Orissa (2008) 12 VST 0031, Larsen & Toubro vs. State of Karnataka 2014 (34) STR 481 (SC) (a constitution Bench decision), K. Raheja Development Corporation vs. State of Karnataka 2006 (3) STR 337 (SC), Nagarjuna Construction P. Ltd. vs. UOI 2010 (19) STR 321 (AP). Mahim Patram (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India 2007 (7) STR 110 (SC), Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC), Kone Elevators India P. Ltd. 2014 (34) STR 641 (ST) etc. The glimpse of various inferences drawn is provided below:

In addition to examining the definitions CICS, COES and ECIS in section 65(105) and charging section 66, the scope of section 67 dealing with valuation of a service both prior to its amendment on 18/04/2006 and the amended provisions were examined and it was observed that section 67 read with the relevant clauses in section 65(105) and the charging provision leads to infer that “the gross amount charged by the service provider for providing CICS, COCS or ECIS shall be taxable value of such service.” Prior to the amendment of section 67, no exclusion was provided in section 67 on the lines of exclusion provided in Explanation 1 to section 67 that value of goods sold or deemed to have been sold in execution of works contract is excluded from the scope of taxable value referred to in section 67 as provided in clause (vii) to the said explanation for ECIS in respect of CICS or COCS.

  •    Exemption  Notifications  Nos.12/2003-ST,  15/2004-ST and 1/2006-ST attest to the fact that the Central Government was clearly of the view that value of goods sold by a service provider to the recipient thereof is included in the taxable value u/s. 67. It cannot be believed that pure sale transaction simplicitor were sought to be excluded as these were anyway beyond the scope of the Union’s residuary power. Further, these exemption notifications indicate no methodology for valuation of goods sold during execution of works contract. The 2nd Gannon Dunkerley (supra) categorically ordained to exclude value of goods at the time of incorporation, the profit margin on goods, the cost of storage, transportation etc. No Board circular also was issued hinting such exclusion. Actually, Rule 2A inserted in Valuation Rules when works contract service was brought from 01/06/2007 expressly stipulates the value of taxable service to be determined with reference to WCS provided in (zzzza) of section 65(105). Thus, on its terms, Rule 2A has no application to CICS, COCS or ECIS even after 01/06/2007 whereas after 01/06/2007, CICS, COCS and ECIS continue to be taxable services and there is neither repeal nor omission of these services.

  •     The definition of CICS, COCS and ECIS do not signal to cover works contract.

  •     The Hon. Finance Minister in the Budget 2007-08 speech categorically stated that new levy is proposed to impose service tax on works contract.
  •     Works contracts are distinct contractual arrangements and following a series of binding precedents and explicitly provided in Central and State legislations for bringing interalia works contracts within the scope of Union levy by expanding the scope of sale, defining works contracts in the Central Sales Tax Act and incorporating a specific power to make rules for computation/valuation of “deemed sale” in sales tax legislations and also introducing works contract category in the Finance Act, 1994 by expressly defining it together with complementary valuation Rules (Rule 2A) issued u/s. 94 of the Act to ensure proper valuation and confinement of levy strictly to service components also with effect from 01/06/2007. This integrated legislative and statutory landscape of the Act to the extent of works contract service in strict confirmation with constitutional limits on States and the Union taxation in this area as spelt out in second Gannon Dunkerley (supra) and all subsequent rulings including the latest Kone Elevator India Ltd. of 2014 (supra).

  •     In view of the exclusivity and insularity ordained in terms of legislative powers pertaining to taxation, both the federal partners (the Union or the States) are forbidden to trench upon the exclusive domain allocated to each by the constitution. Therefore a vague/overboard definition coupled with ambiguous charging and indeterminate valuation provision could not suffice in terms of First Builders Associations of India (S.C.1989), Second Gannon Dunkerley (supra) and L&T Ltd. (Orissa 2008) (supra). When the charging and/or valuation provisions on a true and fair classification fall short of this specific requirement, collection of sales tax on works contract would fall aside as per the above precedents among various others.

  •     In view thereof, Union’s intention to levy tax only on labour or service element must therefore be categorically expressed in charging provisions read with relevant taxable service and the valuation provisions. Such intention was explicated only by section 65(105)(zzzza) and not collectively through charging section, definition and valuation provisions so far as they related to CICS, COCS and ECIS.

  •     It is an established interpretation principle that where two constructions are fairly possible, the construction sustaining the legislation should be adopted instead of one which renders it invalid.

  •     In terms of revenue contentions, should it mean that insertion of WCS from 01/06/2007 and introduction of Rule 2A in the Valuation Rules were wholly unnecessary amendments in the existing legislative provisions?
  •     Neither the provision of the Act,any rule made there under or exemption notification issued under section 93 indicate how and at what point of time during execution of works contract, the value of goods and material used in execution thereof are to be valued for applying reductions. Although Notification No.12/2003-ST provides deduction towards value of goods sold on furnishing proof of such sales does not provide for computation of profits booked by builders on the goods incorporated in the contract.

  •    There  was  observation  in  Tamil  Nadu  Kalyana Mandapam Association’s case [2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC)] that it is well settled that the measure of taxation cannot affect the nature of taxation and therefore service tax levied as a percentage of the gross charge for catering cannot alter legislative competence of Parliament. This cannot be interpreted as propounding universal norm. This may be appropriate in the facts and circumstances of that case. The nexus and legislative competence tests are established by a long catena of binding authority including Constitution Benches including the second Gannon Dunkerley (supra) and K. Damodarasamy Naidu & Bros. AIR 1999 SC 3909, Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam’s decision (supra) cannot be considered as having dissented or overruled entrenched principles consistently impounded and implicitly followed in a host of decisions including in to another legislation and tax such elements under the pretext of overreaching merely the measure of tax.

  •     Since binding expositions of relevant principles qua binding precedents were not brought to the notice of the Hon. High Court, G. D. Builders (supra) decision is incuriam and sub silentio.

  •     The analysis and the view concluded as: “28.  The decisions of the Karnataka and Madras High Courts, in Turbotech Precision Engineering Pvt. Ltd. and in Strategic Engineering Pvt. Ltd. have clearly concluded that a works contract is not leviable to Service Tax prior to 1-6-2007. Though, with respect there is not discernible a holistic analyses of the relevant statutory framework involved nor of the several precedents which support the conclusion recorded (in Turbotech and Strategic), as is found in the painstaking effort apparent in G.D. Builders, in our respectful view the conclusion that a works contract is defined, charged and is subject to the levy of Service Tax only w.e.f 1-6-2007 (on insertion of sub-clause (zzzza) in Section 65(105) of the Act), is consistent with the overwhelming catena of binding precedents considered and analyzed by us.”
  •    Consequently, the decision in BSBK Ltd. (supra) to the extent it rules that a works contract is a taxable service prior to 01/06/2007 was respectfully an error and stood overruled.
Majority view: Per Shri J. P. R. Chandrasekharan,

Member (T): Brief overview:

Not agreeing with the above, Hon. Member (Technical) proceeded with recording apprehension at the outset over the instant reference in view of the revenue’s pending appeals before the Supreme Court after admission in 2008 and 2010 respectively in Jyoti Ltd. (supra) and Indian Oil Tanking Ltd.’s case (supra) in the same matter. Further, the Delhi High Court having taken a view on this very issue in G. D. Builders’ case (supra) as well as in YFC Projects P. Ltd.’s case (2014) 44 GST 334/43 Taxman.com 219 (Delhi) that works contracts could be vivisected and discernible taxable services could be taxed prior to 01/06/2007 it was noted that the Tribunal being subordinate to High Court and Supreme Court would be bound by these decisions and the matter did not recur post 01/06/2007 as the dispute essentially related to the period 2004 to 2007. Besides this reservation, it was also noted that the ratio of G. D. Builders was consistently followed by the Tribunal in many cases including by Hon. President in CCE vs. Gopal Enterprises 2014 (36) STR 674, Kalpik Interiors vs. CST 2014 (36) STR 1283 and in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. vs. CST 2013 (32) STR783 (Tri.-LB).

    In the said case of G. D. Builders (supra), after examining at great length various decisions which among others included Gannon Dunkerley vs. State of Rajasthan [2002-TIOL-103-SC-CT], K. Raheja [2005-TIOL-77-SC-CT], Larsen & Toubro vs. State of Karnataka 2010 (34) STR 481 (SC)], Nagarjuna Construction Co. Ltd. vs. UOI 2012-TIOL-107-SC-ST, State of Kerala vs. Builders Association of India [2002-TIOL-602-SC-CT, Tamilnadu Kalyana Mandapan Association 2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC) etc. whereby the following issues in brief among others were examined:

a. Service tax is levied on taxable services as defined in section 65(105) read with definition clauses and applicable only on the service element as the Central Government does not have power to impose tax on entries under List-II of Seventh Schedule to the constitution. It cannot levy tax on goods and material used in works contract as central sales tax is levied on material used in “works contract” with effect from 11/05/2002 vide amendment of Central Sales Tax Act.

b. Composite or works contracts are not included in 65(105)(zzq) viz. CICS and (zzzh) viz. COCS as they apply to only service contracts. Therefore, the exemption of 67% under notification cannot be considered a part of main statutory provision as in terms of section 93 of the Finance Act, 1994, the exemption granted cannot relate to works contracts as they are not covered by clauses (zzq) and (zzzh) of section 65(105). Such tax is imposed only from 01/06/2007 under 65(105) (zzzza). There is conflict between these clauses and what is covered by (zzzza) cannot be covered by (zzq) and (zzzh) of section 65(105). The two cannot co-exist. Subsequent legislation shows that the earlier only did not cover composite or works contracts.

c.    Section 66 is charging section and section 67 relates to valuation. Tax can be levied on the value of service and not beyond. There is provision for notional value to substract the value of material or goods.

d.Vagueness or uncertainty makes levy invalid and illegal.

e.    Exemption Notification has to be read while keeping its objective and purpose in forefront. It may provide a convenient formula for computing the value of service in a composite contract. The Notification however is optional and an alternative. It meets the tests laid down u/s. 93 and 94 and it has not been shown that the value prescribed therein is absurd or irrational.

f.    On the strength of factual and legal analysis undertaken, conclusion summarised in para 36 in a nutshell that post 46th Amendment to the Constitution, composite contracts can be bifurcated to compute value of goods sold/ supplied in construction contracts with labour and material and the service portion of the composite contracts can be subjected to service tax by applying aspect doctrine for vivisection of the contract.

  The above decision on an identical issue was followed before another Bench of the Delhi High Court in YFC Projects P. Ltd. vs. UOI (supra). In view of the foregoing, the above decisions are binding on the Tribunal.

    In furtherance of the above and analyzing one of the main points of difference that conflicting decisions of
Karnataka and Madras High Courts as against the Delhi High Court’s decision in G. D. Builders (supra) on the same/similar issue are available, it was observed that facts of these decisions were completely different. In CST vs. Turbotech Precision (supra), the activity of development, design, installation and commissioning and technology transfer was sought to be taxed as consulting engineering service by the department.

Similarly, in Strategic Engineering’s case (supra), the contract involved erection of pipes and also connecting the laid pipes and subjecting them to carry fluids. This activity was sought to be taxed as erection commissioning and installation service wherein the Hon. High Court held that the services provided under works contract were not liable prior to 01/06/2007. However, the question whether works contract could be vivisected and subjected to service tax was not the issue for consideration before the Hon. High Court. Therefore, the said decision has no relevance to the issue considered in G. D. Builders’ case (supra). In support of this contention, the Hon. Member interalia relied upon Alnoori Tobacco Products (2004 170 ELT 135 (S.C.)]. The relevant extract read as follows:

“11. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context.”

  Accordingly, it was concluded that ratio of G. D. Builders stands uncontroverted and thus binding on all subordinate Courts including the Tribunal (irrespective of the strength of the Bench).

    Next examination pertained to the main issue of DIVISIBILITY of works contract prior to 01/06/2007 including analysing section 67 dealing with measure or valuation. The proposition of lack of adequate machinery provision was found without merits on the ground that four important elements of tax law viz. taxable event, the rate of tax, measure of tax and precision liable to tax were found existing in service tax law in section 65(105), sections 66, 67 and 68 of the Act and therefore the challenge was found not sustainable. As regards the primary issue relating to exclusion of value of goods, based on judicial pronouncements including in the case of K. P. Varghese vs. ITO 1981 AIR 1922 (SC), it was found that section 67 of the Act provided measure of the levy adequately and optional exemption notifications 12/2003-ST, 15/2004-

ST and 1/2006-ST as well as CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 provided credit mechanism to capture value of services of goods. Therefore, at practical level of implementation, there is no difficulty to determine value of service rendered.

  At the end, the concept of works contracts was analysed in detail to distinguish it from the contracts for sale. It was observed that the Apex Court in Builders Association of India vs. UOI (supra) held that “by fiction, an indivisible contract has been made a divisible contract and the values of the goods involved in the execution of contract have been subjected to tax”. Further, it is restricted to the value of goods used and not the building as a whole. The law was further elaborated by the constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the second Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (supra). The Bench noted that contract of work is inherently a contract of service. The legal fiction created by Article 366(29A) of the Constitution to hold certain types of works contracts as deemed sale of goods in order that States could levy sales tax on the value of goods supplied as part of the works contract. Similarly, the 92nd amendment to the constitution provided for a specific entry for taxes on services in the Union list under entry 92C. Prior to this, entry 97 covered taxes on services. Thus, the power of Parliament to levy tax on services was never in dispute. Reliance was placed on Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandap Association vs. UOI 2004 (167) ELT 73 (SC) which interalia held as follows:

“45. The concept of catering admittedly includes the concept of rendering service. The fact that tax on the sale of the goods involved in the said service can be levied does not mean that a Service Tax cannot be levied on the service aspect of catering….

46. It is well settled that the measure of taxation cannot affect the nature of taxation and, therefore, the fact that Service Tax is levied as a percentage of the gross charges for catering cannot alter or affect the legislative competence of Parliament in the matter…..

58. A tax on services rendered by mandap-keepers and outdoor caterers is in pith and substance, a tax on services and not a tax on sale of goods or on hire purchase activities.”

Similar reliance was placed on Association of Leasing and Financial Services Companies vs. UOI 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC) which interalia held:

“Merely because for valuation purposes inter alia “finance/interest charges” are taken into account and merely because Service Tax is imposed on financial services with reference to “hiring/interest” charges, the impugned tax does not cease to be Service Tax and nor does it become tax on hire-purchase/leasing transactions under Article 366(29A).”

Based on the above two decisions in respect of two transactions relating to catering services and hire purchase, it was found that since service tax could be levied on these services on the value attributable to the service component of composite transactions, the issue of divisibility of an indivisible contract for the levy of service tax was confirmed. It was observed that many services entail supply of goods and many examples were cited including those of photography services, cleaning services, banking services (entailing supply of cheque books, plastic cards for ATM transactions etc.) sound recording services (entailing supply of recording medium) etc. Further citing a recent decision of Apex Court in State of Karnataka vs. Pro Lab and Others 2015-TIOL-08-SC-LB which considered the issue of levy of sales tax on processing and supply of photographs, it was observed that if by virtue of clause 29A of Article 366 of the Constitution, the State legislature is empowered to segregate goods part of works contract to levy sales tax, the same logic would apply to the Central legislation for imposing service tax and Parliament is empowered to segregate service component of the works contract to levy service tax. Precisely, this was done by the Finance Act, 1994, when service tax was levied vide CICS, COCS and ECIS. It was further observed that statutory provision should be interpreted in the manner not to create discrimination among classes of service providers by taxing supplying services alone and another set providing both supply of goods and service not liable to tax. In effect, it was concluded with, “the issue referred to the Larger Bench is fully and squarely covered by the G. D. Builders case decided by the Hon. Delhi High Court”. Consequently, it has to be held that composite works contract can be vivisected and discernible service element could be subjected to service tax even prior to 01/06/2007.

Majority view: Per R. K. Singh, Member (T): Some key observations:

  •     Concurring with the order of per Hon. Shri P. R. Chandrasekharan, it was observed that the judgments of the Karnataka and Madras High Courts did not infringe upon the ratio of the Delhi High Court in G. D. Builders as regards the subject matter covered by the latter and that the subject matter referred to the Five Member Bench was squarely covered by the decision of the Delhi High Court in G. D. Builders’ case (supra).

  •     Section 67 adequately provided machinery provisions for measure of value of taxable service and which was not arbitrary by any standard whether post its amendment from 18/04/2006 or prior thereto. Since it refers to the value of service would imply that value of goods sold in a composite contract was not to be a part of the value for the purpose of this section.

  •     Notification No.12/2003 needs to be viewed as a measure of abundant caution and care on part of the Government.

Majority view: Per Rakesh Kumar, Member (T): Some key observations:

  •    “47.3 When indivisible works contracts are those contracts involving provision of service, in which there is transfer of property in goods from the service provider to the service receiver through accretion, and this transfer of property in goods is not sale, such contracts have to be treated as service contracts as in such contracts, there is absolutely no intention of transfer of property in and delivery of the possession of, a chattel as a chattel to the service receiver. A service contract will not cease to be a service contract just because the provision of service involves use of goods, the property in which gets transferred to the service recipient through accretion. Even the Law Commission’s Reports (Chapter IA para 7) refers to the works contract as “a contract for work (of service)”.

  •     It is a well settled law that legal fiction has to be given effect to only for a limited purpose for which it was created and therefore Article 366(29A) can be employed only to enable State Governments to levy sales tax on certain contracts including specified contracts. Since works contracts are service contracts, the same would attract service tax even during period prior to 01/06/2007.
  •    Just because State Governments have the power to levy sales tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in execution of works contract by invoking Article 366(29A), the power of Central Government to levy service tax on such works contract does not get restricted so as to confine the levy only to service portion of the works contract excluding the value of goods for providing the service. An inadmissible works contract is one single service contract whose value would include value of all goods and services which contribute to emergence of the service product.

  •   Exemption Notification issued under section 93 of the Act to provide abatement of the taxable value of specified services (including ECIS, COCS and CICS) are sufficient to avoid tax on goods subjected to tax by the State Government and no machinery provision is necessary.
  •     In commercial world, transactions of sale of goods and sale of services are intermixed and therefore some overlap is inevitable which has to be ignored in the interests of smooth functioning of laws governing the levy of tax on sale of goods and service tax.

  •    Separate and specific constitutional provision together with the machinery for determining the measure is required only when State Government wants to tax goods portion in a service transaction or the Central Government wants to tax service portion of a sale transaction. However, for levying service tax on a service transaction including works contract, no machinery for exclusion of value of goods is required and for the lack of the said machinery, the levy cannot be held invalid.

Conclusion:

Since the revenue is already before Supreme Court against the order of Turbotech Precision Engineering (supra) and Strategic Engineering (supra), whether the above intellectual exercise would impact any litigation process is a question which is posed by many. Nevertheless, a threadbare analysis of technical and judicial aspects on the subject of works contract would be a worth read for a large number of professionals and other stakeholders.

RECENT AMENDMENTS: INTEREST ON CENVA T CREDIT WRONGLY TAKEN

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Preliminary
The issue whether interest is leviable at the point of time when CENVAT credit is wrongly taken or at the point of utilization has been a matter of extensive judicial examination. An important amendment was made in Rule 14 of CENVAT Rules through Notification dated 17/03/2012 and further a significant amendment has been made vide Notification dated. 01/3/2015. Hence, the implication of the latest amendment in the backdrop of the earlier judicial controversies, are discussed hereafter.

Background
Relevant Statutory Provisions – [Rule 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (“CCR”)]

“Where CENVAT credit has been taken or utilized wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same along with the interest shall be recovered from the manufacturer or provider of the output service and the provisions of the sections 11A and 11AB of the Excise Act, or sections 73 and 75 of the Finance Act, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries.”

[Note – The words “taken or utilized wrongly” have been substituted by the words “taken and utilized wrongly” vide Notification No. 18/2012 – CE(NT) dated 17/03/2012].

Supreme Court Ruling overruling High Court Ruling

Attention is particularly drawn to the ruling of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Ind – Swift Laboratories Ltd. vs. UOI (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H) (which was subsequently set aside by the Supreme Court), relevant extracts from which, are reproduced hereafter for reference :

Para 9

“The Scheme of the Act and the CENVAT credit Rules framed thereunder permit a manufacturer or producer of final products or a provider of taxable service to take CENVAT credit in respect of duty of excise and such other duties as specified. The conditions for allowing CENVAT credit are contained in Rule 4 of the Credit Rules contemplating that CENVAT credit can be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in the factory of the manufacturer or in the premises of the provider of output service. Such CENVAT credit can be utilized in terms of Rule 3(4) of Credit Rules for payment of any duty of excise on any final product and as contemplated in the aforesaid sub-rule. It, thus, transpires that CENVAT credit is the benefit of duties leviable or paid as specified in Rule 3(1) used in the manufacture of intermediate products etc. In other words, it is a credit of the duties already leviable or paid. Such credit in respect of duties already paid can be adjusted for payment of duties payable under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Under section 11AB of the Act, liability to pay interest arises in respect of any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded from the first day of the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. Interest is leviable if duty of excise has not been levied or paid. Interest can be claimed or levied for the reason that there is delay in the payment of duties. The interest is compensatory in nature as the penalty is chargeable separately.”

Para 10

“In Pratibha Processors vs. Union of India, 1996 (88) ELT 12 (SC) = (1996) 11 SCC 101, it was held that interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable. Similarly, in Commissioner of Customs vs. Jayathi Krishna & Co. – 2000 (119) ELT 4(SC) (2000) 9 SCC 402, it was held that interest on warehoused goods is merely an accessory to the principal and if principal is not payable, so is it for interest on it. In view of the aforesaid principle, we are of the opinion that no liability of payment of any excise duty arises when the petitioner availed CENVAT credit. The liability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilization. Even if CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken, that does not lead to levy of interest as liability of payment of excise duty does not arise with such availment of CENVAT credit by an assessee. Therefore, interest is not payable on the amount of CENVAT credit availed of and not utilized.”

Para 11

“Reliance of respondents on Rule 14 of the Credit Rules that interest under section 11AB of the Act is payable even if CENVAT credit has been taken. In our view, said clause has to be read down to mean that where CENVAT credit taken and utilized wrongly, interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that the CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken as such availment by itself does not create any liability of payment of excise duty. On a conjoint reading of section 11AB of the Act and that of Rules 3 and 4 of the Credit Rules, we hold that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT credit. The interest shall be payable from the date CENVAT credit is wrongly utilized.”

In an important ruling the Supreme Court, in the case of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (2011) 265 ELT 3 (S.C.)], set aside the order passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H)] on the question of charging interest on CENVAT credit wrongly taken but not utilised. By interpreting the expressions and words used in the provisions of Rule 14 of CCR, the Supreme Court concluded that interest is payable on CENVAT credit wrongly taken even if such credit has not been utilised.

The issue for consideration was whether an assessee can be made liable to pay interest for taking wrong credit if such credit has not been utilised in as much as he has not derived any benefit out of his wrong action.

The more important observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

Para 17

“…………….. In our considered opinion, the High Court misread and misinterprets the aforesaid Rule 14 and wrongly read it down without properly appreciating the scope and limitation thereof. A statutory provision is generally read down in order to save the said provision from being declared unconstitutional or illegal. Rule 14 specifically provides that where CENVAT credit has been taken or utilized would be recovered from the manufacturer or the provider of the output service. The issue is as to whether the aforesaid word “OR” appearing in Rule 14, twice, could be read as “AND” by way of reading it down as has been done by the High Court. If the aforesaid provision is read as a whole we find no reason to read the word ‘OR’ in between the expression ‘taken’ or “utilized wrongly” or has been erroneously refunded’ as the word ‘AND’. On the happening of any of the three aforesaid circumstances such credit becomes recoverable along with interest.”

Para 18

“We do not feel that any other harmonious construction is required to be given to the aforesaid expression / provision which is clear and unambiguous as it exists all by itself. So far as section 11AB is concerned, the same becomes relevant and applicable for the purpose of making recovery of the amount due and payable. Therefore, the High Court erroneously held that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT credit and that it should only be payable from the date when CENVAT credit is wrongly utilized. Besides, the rule of reading down is in itself a rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is generally utilized to straighten the crudities or ironing out the creases to make a statue workable. This Court has repeatedly laid down that in the garb of reading down a provision it is not open to read words and expressions not found in the provision statute and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. It is also held by this Court that the Rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute.”

The interpretation made by the Honorable Supreme Court considering the specific circumstances of a case involving evasion of duty, has been a matter of extensive deliberation by experts and rightly so in as much as if the same is applied generally, it would mean unsettling the settled law.

Important Ruling of Karnataka High Court in CCE & ST vs. Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 26 STR 204 (KAR) [Bill Forge Case]

    The observations of the Karnataka High Court in the Bill Forge case are very important, in as much as not only has it distinguished facts of the case of UOI vs. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (2011) 265 ELT 3 (SC) but it has made fine distinction between making an entry in the register and credit being ‘taken’ to drive home the point that interest is payable only from the date when duty is legally payable to the Government and the Government would sustain loss to that extent.

“It is also to be noticed that in the aforesaid Rule, the word ‘avail’ is not used. The words used are ‘taken’ or “utilized wrongly”. Further the said provision makes it clear that the interest shall be recovered in terms of sections 11A and 11B of the Act………”

Para 20

“From the aforesaid discussion what emerges is that the credit of excise duty in the register maintained for the said purpose is only a book entry. It might be utilized later for payment of excise duty on the excisable product………Before utilization of such credit, the entry has been reversed, it amounts to not taking credit.”

Para 22

“Therefore interest is payable from that date though in fact by such entry the Revenue is not put to any loss at all. When once the wrong entry was pointed out, being convinced, the assessee has promptly reversed the entry. In other words, he did not take the advantage of wrong entry. He did not take the CENVAT credit or utilized the CENVAT credit. It is in those circumstances the Tribunal was justified in holding that when the assessee has not taken the benefit of the CENVAT credit, there is no liability to pay interest. Before it can be taken, it had been reversed. In other words, once the entry was reversed, it is as if that the CENVAT credit was not available. Therefore, the said judgment of the Apex Court has no application to the facts of this case. It is only when the assessee had taken the credit, in other words, by taking such credit, if he had not paid the duty which is legally due to the Government, the Government would have sustained loss to that extent. Then the liability to pay interest from the date the amount became due arises under section 11AB, in order to compensate the Government which was deprived of the duty on the date it became due.”

  •     The ruling in Bill Forge case has been followed in a large number of subsequently decided cases. For example:

    CCE vs. Pearl Insulation Ltd. (2012) 27 STR 337 (KAR)

    CCE vs. Gokuldas Images (P) Ltd (2012) 28 STR 214 (KAR)

    CCE vs. Strategic Engineering (P) Ltd (2014) 45 GST 662 (MAD)

    Sharvathy Conductors Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE (2013) 31 STR 47 (Tri – Bang)

    CCE vs. Sharda Energy & Minerals Ltd. (2013) 291 ELT 404 (Tri – Del)

    Gary Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd vs. CCE (2013) 297 ELT 391 (Tri – Del)

    CCE vs. Balrampur Chinni Mills Ltd (2014) 300 ELT 449 (Tri – Del)

    Gurmehar Construction vs. CCE (2014) 36 STR 545 (Tri – Del)

  •     However, in many cases, Bill Forge case has not been followed and instead the position held by the Supreme Court in the Ind Swift case has been followed. For example:

    Dr Reddy Laboratories Ltd vs. CCE (2013) 293 ELT 89 (Tri)

    Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd vs. CC & CCE (2014) 303 ELT 139 (Tri – Bang)

    CCE vs. Sundaram Fasteners Limited (2014) 304 ELT 7 (MAD)

    Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd vs. CCE (2014) 301 ELT 573 (Tri – Mumbai)

Important amendment in Rule 14 of CCR

In a very significant amendment in Rule 14 of CCR, with effect from 17/03/2012, the words CENVAT credit has been “taken or utilized wrongly” have been substituted by the words “taken and utilized wrongly”.

This amendment strongly reinforces the interpretation placed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Maruti Udyog Ind Swift Laboratories and Karnataka High Court in Bill Forge case to the effect that, no interest can be recovered in cases where CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken but not utilized by an assessee.

    Recent Amendment: Analysis

In the recent Budget, Rule 14 of CCR has been amended vide Notification No. 6/2015-Central Excise (NT) dated 01/03/2015. The amended Rule 14 reads as under:

“14. Recovery of CENVAT credit wrongly taken or erroneously refunded. –

“(1) (i) Where the CENVAT credit has been taken wrongly but not utilized, the same shall be recovered from the manufacturer or the provider of output service, as the case may be and the provisions of section 11A of the Excise Act or section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 (32 of 1994), as the case may be, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries;

(ii) Where the CENVAT credit has been taken and utilized wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same shall be recovered along with interest from the manufacturer or the provider of output service, as the case may be and the provisions of sections 11A and 11AA of the Excise Act or sections 73 and 75 of the Finance Act, 1994, as the case may be, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries.

    For the purposes of sub-rule (1), all credits taken during a month shall be deemed to have been taken on the last day of the month and the utilization thereof shall be deemed to have occurred in the following manner, namely: –

    i)the opening balance of the month has been utilized first;
    ii)credit admissible in terms of these rules taken during the month has been utilized next;
    iii)credit inadmissible in terms of these rules taken during the month has been utilized thereafter.”
The amended Rule 14(1) of CCR deals with two distinct situations viz.

  •     one where credit has been wrongly taken but not utilised and
  •     the other where credit has been wrongly taken and also utilised.

Further, to deal with a scenario, where credit has been utilised, a deeming provision has been brought in through new sub-rule 14(2), to lay down the manner in which the utilisation shall be deemed to have occurred.

  •     Prior to the introduction of this sub-rule, the assessee used to avail CENVAT credit even where the eligibility of CENVAT credit was in dispute. As long as the balance of CENVAT credit in the books of the assessee was more than the amount of the disputed CENVAT credit, it was construed that the disputed amount of CENVAT credit availed by the assessee had not been utilised and consequently, the proceedings under Rule 14 of CCR for recovery of credit and interest thereon could not be initiated against it.

However, after the above amendment, the manner prescribed therein will have to be applied to determine the utilisation of ineligible credit or otherwise.

  •     The larger view of trade & industry and tax payers generally is that the amended Rule 14 of CCR continues to be in line with Government’s consistent view to the effect that:

  •     recovery of interest along with CENVAT credit would be applicable only in those situations where the assessee takes credit and also utilises the same; and

  •     in those cases, where the assessee takes CENVAT credit but does not utilise such credit for specified reasons, recovery would be only of credit wrongly taken and the question of any recovery towards interest does not arise at all.

  •     A better view which may be adopted while interpreting Rule 14(2) of CCR is that the opening balance of CENVAT credit should only include the admissible amount of CENVAT credit and the inadmissible amount of CENVAT credit should be recorded separately. In such a case, while computing the amount of CENVAT credit utilized in a particular month, the total admissible amount of CENVAT credit available with the assessee will have to be taken into account first and the inadmissible amount of CENVAT credit will be said to be utilised only after the admissible CENVAT credit is exhausted. In such a case, an assessee will become liable to pay interest only in those cases where the balance of inadmissible CENVAT credit available with it is less than the credit utilised in a month.

This view can be supported by the following reasons :

  •     the earlier rule was silent regarding manner of utilisation, the amendment in the said rule has been made as a matter of trade facilitation exercise.
  •     it is consistent with the leniency shown in the past when the provision of Rule 14 was amended to overcome the adverse impact of Supreme Court decision in case of Ind-Swift.

It is a need of every business and tax payer to keep some amount of CENVAT credit on hold without utilizing the same for excise duty payment or payment of service tax.

Eligibility to CENVAT credit is prone to extensive litigations. Hence, in many cases where credit eligibility is of a doubtful and disputable nature and could often involve substantially high amount, tax payers often opt to avail credits to protect their rights but choose not to utilize the credits pending clarity & judicial evolvement, so as to avoid any interest liability in case the matter is decided adversely.

However, in the amended Rule 14 (2) of CCR, due to employment of the words “For the purposes of sub-rule
(1)”, there is an apprehension that the field formations may erroneously interpret that the deeming provisions laid down in Rule 14(2) would also apply to the cases covered under Rule 14 (1) (i).

Further, to arrive at the due date for interest payable the Rule 14(2) is creating a deeming fiction that all the credits taken during a month shall be deemed to have been taken on the last day of the month and the utilisation thereof shall be deemed to have occurred in the following manner, namely:-

    the opening balance of the month has been utilised first;
    ………………..

    ………………..
It is apprehended by trade and industry that credits kept on hold during any month form part of the opening balance of the next month, the field formations may interpret the same to be deemed utilised and thus liable for interest. This could result in unnecessary litigations and hardships to trade and industry and tax payers generally.

Conclusion:

The amendment in Rule 14 of CCR vide Notification dated 01/03/2015 needs to be understood, in the backdrop of introduction of time limits for availment of credit under CCR, for the first time with effect from 01/09/2014. In cases where availment of CENVAT credits was of a doubtful nature/under litigations, substantial amounts of credits were availed by tax payers prior to 01/09/2014 (but kept unutilised) in order to protect their interest in a scenario where matter gets decided in their favour at a future point of time and at the same time, avoiding any interest liability in case the matter is decided against them.

Further, in the absence of specific provisions under CCR or clarification by CBEC, in practice, no systematic records are maintained by assessees with regard to CENVAT credits utilised but not availed. This would create practical difficulties for the audit team/field formations to ascertain correctness of credit utilisation and interest liability on wrong utilisation. It appears that though legislative intent behind the amendment is laudable, there is a clear disconnect in the fine print that has emerged. This leaves room for doubts and possible hardships to trade and industry and tax payers from the field formations.

Suggestions:

Appropriate amendment should be made in Rule 14(2) of CCR to avoid unnecessary litigations.

Alternatively, CBEC should issue suitable clarifications / instructions to the effect that :

the deeming provisions in Rule 14(2) would apply only in those cases where inadmissible credit has been taken and also utilised; and

On lines with Instructions under erstwhile MODVAT Rules, [Ref – Circular No. 4/91 – Cx 8 dated 14/02/91 (File No. 263/5/91-CX – 8)] lay down detailed procedure to be followed by assessees who desire not to utilise the credit taken by them in order to ensure that they are covered under Rule 14(1)(i) of CCR.

SOME BURNING ISSUES

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I Utilisation of education cess & secondary higher education cess for payment of excise duty & service tax.

Background
Education Cess (EC) was first introduced through the Finance Bill in 2004 as a surcharge with a purpose to fund basic education. Similarly, Secondary Higher Education Cess (SHEC) was introduced through the Finance Bill, 2007 as a surcharge with a purpose to fund secondary and higher education. In terms of sub-clauses (vi) (via) & (x) & (xa) of Rule 3(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR 04) a manufacturer of final products (MFP) or provider of output service (OSP) is allowed to avail CENVAT Credit on EC and SHEC. Further Rule 3(7) of CCR 04 provides that EC/SHEC on excisable goods and services can be utilised either towards payment of EC/SHEC on excisable goods or for payment of EC/ SHEC on taxable services. However, in view of specific restrictions provided under CCR 04, EC and SHEC on goods and services cannot be utilised towards payment of basic excise duty (CENVAT ) or service tax

Exemption from EC & SHEC
In a significant move, the EC levied u/s. 91 read with section 93 of the Finance Act, 2004 on excise duty is fully exempted vide Notification No. 14/2015-CE dated 1st March, 2015. Similarly, SHEC leviable u/s. 136 read with section 138 of the Finance Act, 2007 on excise duty is also fully exempted vide Notification no. 15/2015-CE dated 1st March, 2015.

Consequently, section 91 read with section 95 of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 and section 136 read with section 140 of the Finance Act, 2007 levying EC and SHEC respectively on taxable services have ceased to have effect from June 01, 2015 in terms of the said Notification No.14/2015- Service tax, dated 19th May, 2015.

Notification allowing utilisation of CENVAT credit on EC and SHEC towards payment of basic excise duty

Consequent upon exemption of EC and SHEC on excise duty, the government issued Notification No. 12/2015 – CE (NT) dated 4th April, 2015 allowing utilisation of CENVAT credit on EC / SHEC towards payment of basic excise duty. The Notification is reproduced below for ready reference:

“2. In the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the said rules), in rule 3, in sub-rule (7), in clause (b), after the second proviso, the following shall be substituted, namely:- “Provided also that the credit of EC and SHEC paid on inputs or capital goods received in the factory of manufacture of final product on or after the 1st day of March, 2015 can be utilized for payment of the duty of excise leviable under the First Schedule to the Excise Tariff Act:

Provided also that the credit of balance fifty per cent EC and SHEC paid on capital goods received in the factory of manufacture of final product in the financial year 2014-15 can be utilized for payment of the duty of excise specified in the First Schedule to the Excise Tariff Act:

Provided also that the credit of EC and SHEC paid on input services received by the manufacturer of final product on or after the 1st day of March, 2015 can be utilized for payment of the duty of excise specified in the First Schedule to the Excise Tariff Act.” [emphasis supplied]

Issues not addressed in the Notification
Although the above Notification has addressed some issues of the trade & industry, their primary concern remains unaddressed. Even after the amendment of Rule 3(7)(b) of CCR 04 utilisation of EC & SHEC towards payment of basic excise duty is not possible under various scenarios described below:

Unutilized balance of EC & SHEC of inputs, capital goods and input services as on 28th February, 2015.

EC & SHEC paid on inputs & input services received prior to 1st March, 2015 and CENVAT credit availed after 1st March, 2015.

Availment of first 50% credit of EC & SHEC paid on capital goods received prior to 1st March, 2015 and CENVAT credit availed after this date.

EC & SHEC credit availed on inputs and capital goods reversed prior to 1st March, 2015 in terms of Rule 4(5)(a) of CCR 04 and re-credits taken on or after this date.

EC & SHEC credit on input services reversed prior to March 01, 2015 and re-credit taken in terms of Rule 4(7) of CCR 04 on and after 1st March, 2015.

Re-credit taken of EC & SHEC on or after 1st March, 2015 in pursuance of any order of adjudicating authorities.

No Notification issued so far to allow utilisation of CENVAT credit on EC & SHEC for payment of service tax.

a) Effective 1st June 2015, the levy of EC & SHEC on services has been done away with. Although CBEC has issued Notification providing mechanism for utilisation of EC and SHEC for payment of excise duty on clearance of final products, corresponding provision for service tax on taxable output services is not provided for. Thus, differential treatment is provided to OSP compared to MFP, without any sound reasoning.

b) For the service providers, there could be a scenario wherein a service provider has availed credit on EC & SHEC on goods and services but not started providing any output services before 1st June 2015. Under such circumstances, there will be huge unutilised credit balance of EC & SHEC in the CENVAT credit account which cannot be utilised by such service provider unless the government allows such unutilised credit by issuing necessary clarification/amendment in CCR 04.

c) Since CCR 04 treats MFP & OSP at par for the purpose of utilisation of CENVAT credit, differential treatment will defeat the legislative intent of the government, to provide CENVAT credit benefit to the assessees across goods and services. Hence, an equal benefit needs to be extended also to service providers.

Suggestion
The Union Budget for 2015-16 has focused at making India an easier place to do business and has unveiled a number of facilitation measures to advance the said cause. In line with the said vision, the government should come out with an amendment in CCR 04 to mitigate the hardships faced by the trade & industry, so as to address primary concerns of the MFP & OSP. It is suggested that:

The government should amend sub Rule 7 of Rule 3 of CCR 04, by deleting the restriction imposed with reference to utilisation of CENVAT credit on EC & SHEC.

Further, the proviso recently incorporated under Rule 3(7) of CCR 04 vide Notification No. 12/2015 – CE (NT) dated 30th April, 2015 also requires to be deleted being restrictive in nature for the reasons explained above as it is creating hardship to industry due to large amount of CENVAT credit relating to EC & SHEC remaining unutilised.

II Services provided by agents/distributors of mutual fund or asset management companies.

Background
Prior to 1st April 2015, the following services were exempted from service tax under Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012 – ST dated 20th June, 2013 (as amended) :

Entry No. 29 – Services in relation to Mutual Fund or Asset Management Company by

i) Mutual Fund agent to a Mutual Fund or Assets Management Company

ii) Distributor to a Mutual Fund or Asset Management Company. With effect from 1st April, 2015, these exemptions have been withdrawn and consequent thereto an amendment is made vide Notification No. 7/2015 dated 1st March, 2015 in Reverse Charge Mechanism (RCM) contained in Notification No. 30/2012 – ST dated 20th June, 2012 (as amended), whereby 100% service tax on services provided by a MF Agent / Distributor to a MF/AMC is required to be paid by the recipient of service (viz. MF / AMC) as it used to be under the law prevailing till 30th June, 2012 in case of services of mutual fund agents or distributors.

Issue:

  •     Post 1st April, 2015, it is understood that MF/AMC discharge their service tax obligations and make payment of commission to agents or distributors of MF/ AMC after deducting the service tax paid by them under RCM. However, it is a well-known fact that the chain of MF/AMC intermediaries is not limited to merely agents or distributors but often goes up to three to four layers of sub–agents or sub–distributors.

In the scenario, relevant provision of Rule 2(p) of CCR 04 defining “output service” is examined below :

“Output service” means any service provided by a provider of service located in the taxable territory but shall not include a service –

………..

1    ……..

2    Where the whole of service tax is liable to be paid by the recipient of service”.

  •     Due to the above specific provision, agents and distributors of MF or AMC cannot avail CENVAT credit of service tax that may be paid by sub-agents /distributors in the chain and hence are unable to reimburse service tax to them inasmuch as they have already suffered tax through reduced commission (net of service tax) paid to them by Mutual Funds and/or AMCs.

This is resulting in a severe burden on the large section of MF and AMC intermediaries whereby there is a service tax incidence of 14% at every stage in the chain rendering the business model almost unviable The given scenario also is against the principle of value addition. This needs to be urgently addressed inasmuch as it could result in large number of MF/AMC intermediaries going out of business.

Suggestion

Rule 2(p) of CCR 04 defining output service needs to be amended whereby sub-clause (2) reproduced above is deleted. Alternatively, RCM provisions made applicable to services provided by agents/distributors of MF/AMC be done away with and instead service providers should be made liable to discharge service tax obligations so as to ensure that CENVAT chain is not broken. Another alternative is to provide exemption to sub-distributors/sub-agents under entry 29(a) of Mega Notification No. 25/2012-ST along with the exemption provided to sub-brokers of stockbrokers as sub-brokers of stock brokers and those of mutual funds are at par on this issue.

III    Commission received from overseas principals in convertible foreign exchange by business intermediaries in India

Background

  •     Business establishments in the country includes business intermediaries/agents who act as essential support link to the smooth running of small and medium businesses by ensuring stable supplies and in particular keeping overseas suppliers’ unbroken engagement in Indian markets at reasonable prices through regular marketing and other support services.In addition to providing employment in a sizeable measure, the said business intermediaries earn valuable foreign exchange for the country.

  •     Some recent amendment in service tax law has adversely impacted stated business intermediaries receiving commission from overseas principals in convertible foreign exchange. For the period prior to 1st July, 2012, commission received in convertible foreign exchange for services provided from India by intermediaries/agents (for goods and services) to overseas principals was considered as “exported services” Hence, the said commission was exempted from payment of service tax. However, post 1st July, 2012 a new concept of ‘Intermediaries’ is introduced in Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (POP Rules), whereby intermediaries (for services) providing services from India to overseas principals were made liable to pay service tax despite the fact that commission is received by the said intermediaries in convertible foreign exchange in India.

  •     Further, vide Notification No.14/2014 dated 11th July, 2014 an amendment was made in Rule 9 of POP Rules whereby, even intermediaries/agents for goods have been made liable for service tax with effect from 1st October, 2014, despite the fact that they receive commission from overseas principals in convertible foreign exchange in India.

Issue:

  •     The principal concern of trade & industry is that the stated policy of the government is, “we need to export our goods & services and not our taxes”. Hence, levying service tax on commission received by intermediaries in convertible foreign exchange in India from overseas principals is contrary to this policy and also contrary to taxation practice prevalent in VAT/ GST systems worldwide.

  •     The service tax amendments made with effect from 1st July, 2012 and 1st October, 2014 has resulted in an unprecedented scenario, whereby an intermediary receiving commission in convertible foreign exchange in India is taxed whereas an intermediary based outside India to whom commission is paid from India (other than for exports) in convertible foreign exchange would not be liable for service tax under reverse charge mechanism.

  •    It is impossible for the business intermediaries to pass on service tax of 14% to the overseas suppliers, unlike other service providers. Hence, this has resulted in a huge cost burden for the business intermediaries in India. It is apprehended by the trade & industry that the total tax incidence (Central & States) under GST regime could be as high as 27% based on report presented by a Sub-Committee to the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers. This would be in addition to the peak income tax of 33%(+). The same would have a cumulative impact of rendering the business of intermediaries in India commercially unviable. There is an imminent prospect of thousands of small & medium sized intermediaries existing across the country going out of business resulting in loss of livelihood and creating unemployment as well.

Suggestion

In order to ensure that there is consistency vis-a-vis stated policy of the government for the exports and also adherence to taxation practices followed worldwide with an objective of keeping costs of exports minimal to achieve global competitiveness, due encouragement is required to be provided to businesses carried out by thousands of self-employed individuals or small and medium enterprises and earning foreign exchange. In order that their businesses are not rendered unviable, the following is suggested:

Appropriate amendment be carried out in Rule 9 of POP Rules, whereby concept of ‘Intermediary’ is done away with, in cases where recipient of service is located outside India and commission is received in convertible foreign exchange by Intermediaries (for goods & services) in India. Alternatively, Rule 9 of POP Rules be amended with immediate effect, to restore exemption hitherto available to commission received by intermediaries for goods in India from overseas principals in convertible foreign exchange. If the objective of the government was to provide relief to exporters of goods paying commission to overseas intermediaries, the same can be extended by granting exemption in the same manner as provided prior to 01/07/2012.

MANDATORY PRE-DEPOSIT UNDER SECtION 35F

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Background Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (the Act) was amended by the Finance Act (No.2) 2014 with effect from 6th August, 2014 whereby prior to filing an appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) or Appellate Tribunal, an amount of 7.5% duty or penalty in dispute in case of first appeal and a further amount of 10% of the duty or penalty in dispute is required to be paid by way of mandatory pre-deposit. The amount of pre-deposit is restricted to an upper limit of Rs. 10 crore by way of a proviso in the said section. Further, by way of a second proviso, it is provided that the provision would not apply to pending stay applications and appeals filed before any appellate authority prior to 6th August, 2014. Therefore, post the said date of 6th August, 2014, various appeals filed with different jurisdictional Benches of Appellate Tribunals without payment of pre-deposit amount were either not accepted or rejected. Consequently, writ petitions were filed in various High Courts. As a result thereof, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rama Mohanrao & Co. 2015-TIOL- 511-HC-AP-CX in an interim order and the Kerala High Court in Muthoot Finance Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others 2015-TIOL-632-HC-Kerala-ST and a couple of other cases as well as the Madras High Court in Fifth Avenue Sourcing (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax 2015-TIOL-1592- HC-MAD-ST decided that amended provisions relating to mandatory pre-deposit of 7.5% of duty or penalty was not applicable to the cases wherein the cause of action had already commenced prior to the date of amendment of 6th August, 2014 and that the amendment was prospective and therefore would not affect assessment proceedings initiated prior to the amendment date.

As against these decisions, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court on the very same issue in Ganesh Yadav vs. UOI and Others 2015-TIOL-1490-HC-ALL-ST distinguished the above decision in Muthoot Finance Ltd. (supra) and K. Rama Mohanrao (supra) and dismissing the petitions held that in terms of express language used in the amended provisions of section 35F(1) of the Act, the constitutional challenge was not vested and all appeals filed post the amendment would be governed by the requirement of pre-deposit. Amidst the controversy, recently the Hon. Karnataka High Court also in a learned Single Judge decision has made detailed analysis and observations on the subject matter and dismissed a bunch of petitions. The said decision is summarised below:

Karnataka High Court: 2015-TIOL- 2637-HC-KAR-CX

The Hon. Karnataka High Court in various writ petitions led by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Union of India reported at 2015-TIOL-2637-HC-KAR-CX and others considered mainly the following two issues:

  • Whether section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (the Act) as amended is a piece of substantive or procedural law prescribing mandatory pre-deposit at the time of filing an appeal, is an unreasonable condition?
  • Whether amendment made to section 35F of the Act has a retrospective operation?

The petitioner in this case also on the same issue as involved in various earlier decisions, contended that the requirement of the pre-deposit is violative of Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 265 of the Constitution of India and therefore sought to declare the Circular 984/08/2014-CX and similar Circular F. No.15/ CESTAT /General/2013-14 dated 06/08/2014 issued by the CBEC as ultra vires the constitution and also sought directions to enable petitioners to file their appeals without monetary pre-deposit of 7.5% since lis or the cause of action in the case of petitioner commenced before 06/08/2014, the date of amendment.

Right to Appeal

The Hon. Bench examined section 35 and 35B of the Act providing for Appellate remedy before Commissioner (Appeals) and Appellate Tribunal respectively and also examined section 35F and the amendment made therein effected from 6th August, 2014 as regards mandatory monetary pre-deposit and noted and analysed the concept Right of Appeal as the petitioners claimed that it was adversely affected by the impugned amendment. For this, the Hon. Bench found it expedient to primarily distinguish between substantive law and procedural law and rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard while considering the principles of statutory interpretation. Relying heavily on the ratio of Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others 2002-TIOL-363-SC-CT, the petitioners claimed that the cause of action in their cases commenced prior to the date of amendment viz. 06/08/2014 and therefore their right to be heard before the Tribunal without the mandatory pre-deposit was not destroyed and denial of such right affected their vested right to file appeal. The Revenue contended that all that was done by the amendment was prescribing the conditions of pre-deposit to file the appeal. This had no nexus with the right to file the appeal as a mere condition of mandatory deposit is provided of 7.5% of the duty or penalty levied at the time of filing appeal and only the discretion vested in the Tribunal with regard to pre-deposit was taken away. The Court therefore decided to consider the applicability of the principles stated in Hoosein Kasam Dada (supra) in the present matter, however only after drawing distinction between substantive law and procedural law.

Substantive law and Procedural law

The petitioners contended that the right to appeal is a substantial right which is pre-vested in the parties on the date, the cause of action commenced. Thus, even when the conditions to file an appeal are altered, it would affect their right to file an appeal. The Court therefore examined meanings of these terms as per Black’s Law Dictionary as provided below:

“Substantive law (seb-sten-tiv). (18c) The part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties and powers of parties.

‘So far as the administration of justice is concerned with the application of remedies to violated rights, we may say that the substantive law defines the remedy and the right, while the law of procedure defines the modes and conditions of the application of the one to the other.” John Salmond, Jurisprudence 476 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947)’.

Procedural law:

The rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves.- Also termed adjective law.” Further, on going through the Supreme Court rulings in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra [(1994) 4 SCC 602 and Shyam Sunder vs. Ramkumar [(2001)8 SCC 24, it was noted that if a piece of substantive law is amended, such a law would have prospective operation unless made retrospective operation by necessary intendment whereas in the case of amendment of a procedural law, the amendment is always retrospective in operation unless indicated otherwise. On noting the above, it was observed that the right to file an appeal is required to be distinguished from the procedure necessary to follow while exercising the said right to appeal. Section 35A, 35C and 35D of the Act deal with the procedures to be followed by Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal while considering the appeal filed by an aggrieved party whereas the right to file an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the appellate authority is prescribed in section 35 ad 35B of the Act respectively. Therefore, the conditions to be followed for exercising the substantive right as prescribed in section 35F of the Act prescribing the pre-deposit to be made by the aggrieved party is a piece of procedural law. Further a litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right is available in procedural law. To support these observations, Hon. Court interalia, relied on The Anant Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat & Others 1975 (2) SCC 175, Sheth Nand Lal & Another vs. State of Haryana and Others 1980 (Supp) SCC 574, Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Another vs. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Mumbai 2002-TIOL-427-SC-CUS, Laxmi Rathan Engineering Works Limited vs. CST [AIR 1968 SC 488], Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar [(1974) 2 SCC 393], Narayan Chandra Ghosh vs. UCO Bank and Others [(2011) 4 SCC 548 and concluded that appeal is a creature of statute and there is no reason why the legislature while granting that right cannot impose conditions for exercising that right. Thus, what emerges from dicta in various cited decisions is that requirement regarding deposit of amount as condition precedent to entertainment of appeal is a means of regulating the exercise of the right of appeal and is not in the realm of right to file an appeal and thus not a piece of substantial law. The said requirement is not an onerous condition precedent for the filing of an appeal particularly when there is a cap on the pre-deposit amount where amount exceeds Rs.10 crore. Thus, the first issue is answered that the amended provisions of section 35F of the Act do not adversely affect the right of appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the appellate authority of the aggrieved party.

Whether the Amendment has Retrospective Application

The Finance Act 2014, which amended section 35F of the Act repealed the existing provision by way of substitution and thus when an existing provision is substituted by a fresh enactment, it is a case of express repeal. In this context, interalia relying on the decision was Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana 2004 (8) SCC 1, it was observed: “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations.”

However, in the matters of procedures, the Court cited Maxwell: “Interpretation of Statutes” 11th edition, page 216 that “No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode”.

In the backdrop of these principles, the claim of the petitioners that the amendment to section 35F of the Act was not retrospective was examined and in particular second proviso to the said section 35F was taken note of. The proviso provides that section 35F would not apply to stay applications and appeals pending before the appellate authority filed prior to the commencement of 2014 Act therefrom implying that appeals filed and pending as on 06/08/2014, the earlier provision would apply. While interpreting the said proviso, it was noted that the proviso could not be so construed or interpreted to make it otiose. By virtue of the second proviso, the intendment of the Parliament is clear and therefore to interpret otherwise than the intendment would be to render it redundant. In view thereof but for the circumstances mentioned in the proviso it was held that the main amended provision would apply. The proviso was meant to serve as a saving clause to prevent the pending stay applications from becoming infructuous on account of the amendment. Relying on a number of judicial precedents including in Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula vs. Motibhai Nagjibhai (AIR 1966 SC 459), S. Sundaram Pillai etc. vs. R. Pattabiraman [AIR 1985 SC 582] which in turn among others relied on Govt. of West Bengal vs. Abani Maity [AIR 1979 SC 1029], conclusion was reached that the right to file an appeal granted u/s. 35 and 35B of the Act remained unaltered and therefore available to an aggrieved party even after the amendment to section 35F of the Act. Whereas these sections constitute substantive law not forming the realm of procedure, on the examination of section 35F it was found that this section is procedural in nature and the amendment of the same was found to be having a retrospective operation and particularly the second proviso. Since the real intention of the Parliament is discernible, it was held that the retrospective effect is provided in respect of pending applications before appellate authorities. However, if no appeal was filed prior to 06/08/2014, it was held that the amended section 35F would apply. The amendment thus has no bearing on the date on which the particular lis commenced. It was observed that the lis in each case would have commenced on a different date. In order to ensure the object of certainty and uniformity as to the applicability of the amendment, the Parliament enacted the second proviso. Considering the Hon. Supreme Court’s rulings on the fine distinction between substantive law and procedural law in decisions subsequent to Hoosein Kasam Dada (supra), wherein it was held that amendment made to procedural law can have retrospective operation, the decision in Hoosein Kasam Dada (supra) was distinguished. It was further noted that in the said decision, the fine distinction between substantive and procedural law and that amendment made in the procedural law could have retrospective operation did not come up for consideration in the manner decided in the later decisions and therefore observations made in Hoosein Kasam Dada (supra) were held as not applicable to the present bunch of petitions.

Lastly, the judgments referred above viz. of the Madras High Court in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Tirupur vs. Cameo Experts [(2006)147 STC 218 (Mad)], Fifth Avenue Sourcing (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax Chennai (supra), Kerala High Court in Muthoot Finance Ltd. vs. Union of India (supra) and Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Rama Mohanrao & Co. vs. Union of India (interim order) (supra) were found as not applicable although they are rendered on section 35F or on similar provisions as those judgments followed the reasoning in Hoosein Kasam Dada (supra) which has been distinguished herein and held to be not applicable to the present cases. Writ Petitions were dismissed accordingly.

Conclusion

Although the applicability of the above may be for a limited time frame, it is to be noted that High Courts of the three States viz. Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Madras have decided that the cases wherein the lis commenced prior to 06/08/2014, the amendment was not applicable and the Tribunal was bound to entertain such appeals without mandatory predeposit whereas Allahabad High Court in M/s. Ganesh Yadav (supra) and the present decision of Karnataka High Court have held that pre-deposit requirement cannot be dispensed with except in case of appeals and stay applications already filed prior to 6th August, 2014. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the round of controversy ends with the ruling of Karnataka High Court or litigation continues on the issue before reaching finality.

OVERLAP OF CUSTOMS DUTY AND SERVICE TAX

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Background
In the context of indirect taxation, overlap of taxes is one of the major areas of concern inasmuch as it has a cascading effect and increases the transaction costs. While, overlap of service tax and VAT or service tax and excise duty is a subject of extensive deliberations and judicial considerations, less attention has been given to overlap of customs duty and service tax. However, actually this has a significant implication inasmuch as basic customs duty is not eligible for the benefit of CENVAT credit (only CVD equivalent to excise duty is entitled to CENVAT credit). Hence, the issue is analysed below.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

Service Tax – Reverse Charge Mechanism: effective from July 01, 2012

• Section 68 of the Finance Act, as amended (Act)

“Every person providing taxable service to any person shall pay service tax at the rate specified in section 66B in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed.

Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in respect of such taxable services as may be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette, the service tax thereon shall be paid by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed at the rate specified in section 66B and all the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such person as if he is the person liable for paying the service tax in relation to such service.

Provided that the Central Government may notify the service and the extent of service tax which shall be payable by such person and the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such person to the extent so specified and the remaining part of the service tax shall be paid by the service provider.”

• Notification No. 30/2012-ST dated 20/6/12.

In case of the following services notified as specified services, the service recipient is held as the person liable for payment of service tax to the Government.

“Taxable services provided or agreed to be provided by:

(i) to (x) ……………

(xi) Taxable service provided or agreed to be provided by any person which is located in a non-taxable territory and received by any person located in the taxable territory.”

• Relevant extracts from Customs Valuation (Determination of Price of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 (‘CVR’) issued in terms of Customs Act, 1962 – Rule 10 – Cost and Services

“(1) In determining the transaction value, there shall be added to the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods, —

(a) the following to the extent they are incurred by the buyer but are not included in the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods, namely:-

(i) commissions and brokerage except buying commissions;

(ii) the cost of containers which are treated as being one for customs purposes with the goods in question;

(iii) the cost of packing whether for labour or materials;

(b) The value apportioned as appropriate of the following goods and services where supplied directly or indirectly by the buyer free of charge or at reduced cost for use in connection with the production and sale for export of imported goods, to the extent that such value has not been included in the price actually paid or payable, namely:-

(i) materials, components, parts and similar items incorporated in the imported goods;

(ii) tools, dies, moulds and similar items used in the production of the imported goods;

(iii) materials consumed in the production of the imported goods;

(iv) engineering, development, art work, design work, and plans and sketches undertaken elsewhere than in India and necessary for the production of the imported goods;

(c) royalties and license fees related to the imported goods that the buyer is required to pay, directly or indirectly, as a condition of the sale of the goods being valued to the extent that such royalties and fees are not included in the price actually paid or payable;

(d) the value of any part of the proceeds of any subsequent resale, disposal or use of the imported goods that accrues, directly or indirectly, to the seller;

(e) all other payments actually made or to be made as a condition of sale of the imported goods, by the buyer to the seller or by the buyer to a third party to satisfy an obligation of the seller to the extent that such payments are not included in the price actually paid or payable.

Explanation.- Where the royalty, license fee or any other payment for a process, whether patented or otherwise, is includible referred to in clauses (c) and (e), such charges shall be added to the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods, notwithstanding the fact that such goods may be subjected to the said process after importation of such goods.

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) and these rules, the value of the imported goods shall be the value of such goods, for delivery at the time and place of importation and shall include –

a) The cost of transport of the imported goods to the place of importation;

b) Loading, unloading and handling charges associated with the delivery of the imported goods at the place of importation; and

c) The cost of insurance;

Provided that –

(i) Where the cost of transport referred to in clause (a) is not ascertainable, such cost shall be twenty per cent of the free on board value of the goods;

(ii) The charges referred to in clause (b) shall be one per cent of the free on board value of the goods plus the cost of transport referred to in clause (a) plus the cost of insurance referred to in clause (c);

(iii) Where the cost referred to in clause (c) is not ascertainable, such cost shall be 1.125% of free on board value of the goods;

…………….”

Double taxation of services and intangible rights related payments by importers of goods to foreign entities

As per CVR, the value of services and intangible rights is required to be added to the transaction value of imported goods, for the purpose of levy of customs duty. At the same time such payments (consideration) for services and intangible rights are also liable to service tax under reverse charge. Thus, there is an issue of double taxation.

In particular, as per Rule 10(1)(c) & (e) of CVR, the following is required to be added to the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods while determining the transaction value.

“Royalties and license fees related to the imported goods that the buyer is required to pay, directly or indirectly, as a condition of the sale of the goods being valued, to the extent that such royalties and fees are not included in the price actually paid or payable.

All other payments actually made or to be made as a condition of sale of the imported goods, by the buyer to the seller or by the buyer to a third party to satisfy an obligation of the seller to the extent that such payments are not included in the price actually paid or payable.

Explanation:- Where the royalty, license fee or any other payment for a process, whether patented or otherwise, is includible referred to in clauses (a) and (b), such charges shall be added to the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods, notwithstanding the fact that such goods may be subjected to the said process after importation of such goods.
Issues pertaining to indian companies entering into business arrangements with foreign entities arise for consideration. Such arrangements are mainly done to use brand/reputation, intellectual property rights, product and business expertise etc. of foreign entities and sell products supplied/approved by them in indian market. Such arrangements are made in different legal forms like joint venture, franchise, license, distributor etc. under the said arrangements, indian companies are obliged to maintain prescribed standards of business, pay for value of goods being imported and are also required to make payments to foreign partner for services and intangible rights which are identified by various names like franchise/license fee, marketing/advertising fee, agents fee/commission, renewal fee, reimbursements of travel etc.

While Custom authorities relates all the above direct or indirect payments related to services and intangible rights like royalty, license fee etc. to supply of goods and hold them liable to Customs duty, service tax authorities treat such payments as consideration for services and hold indian companies liable to pay service tax under reverse Charge mechanism.

Thus,  indian  companies  are  exposed  to  the  burden of double taxation of Customs duty as well as service tax.   this   increases   the   transaction   costs   of   indian businesses substantially.

Government has in its wisdom, sought to address this issue in some specific cases. E.g.:

•    When transfer of right to use imported/locally pro- cured packaged software or canned software is passed on to the buyer, Government has exempted CVD/Central excise duty on consideration for such transfer of right to use, provided service tax is paid on the same (Ref: Notification No. 25/2011- Cus. dated 01.03.2011 and 14/2011-Ce dated 24.03.2011). Conversely, service tax was exempt- ed when CVD/Excise duty was paid (Ref: Notifica- tion no. 34/2012 – St, dated 20.06.2012).

•    IPR service providers were exempted from service tax equivalent to amount of cess payable on the transfer of technology under the provisions of the r & d Cess act, 1986 so as to avoid double taxa- tion of both service tax and r & d Cess (ref not no. 17/ 2004-St., dated 10.09.2004).

Mumbai CESTAT Ruling in united shippers lTD vs. csT (2015) 37 STR 1043 (Tri – Mumbai)

Issue before CESTAT

“Whether barge (shipping) charges collected towards transportation of the imported goods from the mother vessel anchored at Bombay floating Lights to dharmatar jetty where the goods were unloaded, which forms part of the transaction value of the imported goods can be once again levied to service tax under the category of cargo handling services?”

Contentions of the Appellants

•    The activity of transshipment of import and export cargo, from the mother vessels to the jetty and vice versa, is carried out by the barges (termed as daughter vessels) on account of the draft not permitting the mother vessels to travel until the jetty at  minor  ports. the  appellant  submitted  that  it  is a settled position in law that such transshipment of cargo from the mother vessel to the jetty is to be treated as a continuation of the journey of the goods in the import stream into india, as upheld in South India Corporation (Agencies) Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs and Ors. (1987) 30 E.L.T. 100 (Cal); Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd. vs. Asstt. Col- lector of Cus. for Exports (II) (1999) 110 E.L.T. 484 Cal.) and Collector of Customs, Ahmedabad vs. Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. (1987) 29 E.L.T. 182 (tribunal).

•    The freight amount charged to the customer for the barge transportation of goods from the mother vessel to the jetty forms a part of the assessable value of the imported goods, for the purpose of computation of Customs duty. the inclusion of the freight amount has been explicitly mandated by the amendments effected to section 14 of the Customs act, 1962 read with CVr these amendments were made in order to overcome the decision in Ispat In- dustries Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs, Mum- bai (2006) [202 E.L.T. 561 (S.C.)] and ensure the position in law which had always been intended by the Legislature, and accordingly the said po- sition would equally apply for the period prior to 2007. therefore, the value of the transportation by transshipment is treated as an intrinsic part of the value of a goods transaction and the said amount therefore, cannot attract the levy of service tax si- multaneously as being in the nature of consideration for provision of services. reference is made to the decision in Escotel Mobile Communications Ltd. vs. Union of India (2004) [177 E.L.T. 99 (Ker.)] wherein it was held that, based on the “aspect theory”, the same transaction could be exigible to different taxes in its different aspects – in that case, the issuance of a Sim card to a subscriber could be equally liable to sales tax and service tax at the same time. this view was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BSNL vs. UOI (2006) [2S.T.R. 161 (SC)] in which the aforesaid finding of the high Court was overruled, and it was categorically held that the aspect theory would not apply to enable the value of the goods to be included in the rendition of services or vice versa. In the present case, the freight charged for the barge transpor- tation of the goods from the mother vessel to the jetty is includible in the assessable value on which customs duties are levied. Applying the rationale laid down in the aforesaid ruling of the Hon’ble Su- preme Court, once the freight has already rightly suffered customs duties as a part of the value of the goods being imported, a dual levy of service tax cannot also be imposed on the same freight amount, and the demand on this basis cannot sustain. Further, it was submitted that this activity of transportation of goods from the mother vessel to the jetty is earned out before the goods crosses the customs frontier of india and consequently, will be construed to be undertaken while the goods are still in the import stream and prior to the successful completion of the process of importation of the goods into india. [Garden Silk Mills vs. Union of India, (1999) 113 E.L.T. 358 (S.C.)] reliance was also placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hotel Ashoka vs. Asst. Commr. of Commercial Taxes (2012) [276 E.L.T. 433 (S.C.)], wherein it held that an activity of sale of items in the duty free zone of an airport will not attract the levy of Vat, even though such sale is actually taking place within the physical territory of india, as such goods had not crossed the customs frontier of india to form a part of the mass of goods meant for consumption in india and had therefore not been imported into india. it was therefore, submitted that taxing the transshipment of the goods in the present case will tantamount to levying service tax on an activity of import of goods, which is impermissible in law.

Contentions of the Revenue

It appears that transport of cargo by barges from the mother vessels had taken place when the mother vessels  were  at  mumbai  floating  Light/inner anchorage  of mumbai Port trust, i.e. when the vessels were already in india. Therefore, there does not appear any legal bar to levy service tax on the services provided in relation to the cargo transported by the barges from the mother vessels to  the jetty.  It  would  also  not  be  correct  to  say  that it would amount to double taxation. The levy of cus- toms duty and service tax are under separate enact- ments. In the case of CST, Bangalore vs. Lincoln He- lios (India) Ltd. (2011) 23 STR 112 (Kar.), the hon’ble high Court has held that excise duty is levied on the aspect of manufacture and service tax is levied on the aspect of services rendered. Therefore, it will not amount to payment of tax twice.

In the said case, the facts were not in dispute. the as- sessee undertook not only manufacture and sale of its products, it also erected and commissioned the finished products.  The  customer  was  charged  for  the  services rendered as well as the value for manufactured products. admittedly, up to 20/06/2003 no service tax was leviable on erection and commission work. It was only subjected to tax from 01/07/2003.

The assessee paid the excise duty on the value of the product notwithstanding the services rendered. it is in that context, they were contending that there cannot be levy of tax under two parliamentary legislations. however, the excise duty was levied on the aspect of manufacture and service tax is levied on the aspect of services rendered. Therefore it will not amount to payment of tax twice. After contesting the matter before the tribunal, the assessee paid the service tax and interest thereon. Moreover, the commissioning installation and erection work was brought to service tax only from 01/07/2003. It was during the transitional period and the benefit of doubt existing in the mind of the assessee was given to him. Since it constitutes a reasonable cause for not paying the service tax in view of Section 80, the Court held that the tribunal was justified in interfering with the levy of penalty and in setting aside the same and there was no infirmity in the order passed by the tribunal.

 Observations of CESTAT
•    As regards the first issue, since the transaction in- volves a customs transaction and a service trans- action, it is necessary to decide where the customs transaction ends and the service transaction begins.  the  issue  as  to  what  constitutes  “imports” has been settled by the hon’ble apex Court in the case of Garden Silk mills Ltd. (supra), wherein the following was observed:

“Truly speaking, the imposition of import duty, by an large, results in a condition which must be ful- filled before the goods can be brought inside the customs barriers, i.e. before they form part of the mass of the goods within the country.

It would appear to us that the import of the goods into india would commence when the same cross into the territorial waters but continues when the goods become part of the mass of goods within the country; the taxable event being reached at the time when the goods reach the customs barriers and the bill of entry for home consumption is filed.”

Thus  when  the  goods  are  being  transported  by the barges from the mother vessel to the jetty on- shore, that activity is part of the import transaction of bringing the goods into india from a place outside india. the question of rendering any service in respect of such goods by way of cargo handling or otherwise can take place only after the customs transaction is completed. therefore, the question of levying to service tax on the transportation by barges from the question of levying to service tax the transportation by barges from the mother vessel to the jetty onshore, would not arise at all since the said activity is part of the import transaction leviable to import duty and we hold accordingly. [para 5.2]

•    This is also evident from the fact that Section 14 of the CVR were amended to specifically include barge charges and handling charges in the trans- action value  of the imported goods vide  finance act, 2007 to overcome the adverse decision in the case of ispat industries (supra). Section 14 was substituted “to specifically provide that transaction value of imported goods shall include, in addition to the price, any amount paid or payable for costs and services, including commissions, … cost of transportation to the place of importation, insurance, unloading and handling charges to the extent and in the manner specified in the rules made in this regard”.

These  amended  provisions  came  into  force  with effect from 10/10/07. CBEC has also clarified vide Circular 34/2009, dated 30-11-2009 that “the issue of ineligibility of barge charges in the value (of imported goods) will be governed by the provisions of Section 14 of the Customs act, 1962 read with CVR for the assessment arising in the period from 10/10/07 onwards.”

Thus  the  question  of  demand  of  service  tax  on barge charges and the handling charges connected therewith would not arise at all with effect from 10-10-2007 as they form an integral part of the transaction value for levy of customs duty. Even fo the period prior 10-10-2007, the same position would apply for the reason that the import trans- action is complete only when the goods reach the customs barriers and the bill of entry for home consumption is field. [Para 5.3]

•    As regards the observations of Karnataka High Court relied by the revenue, it was observed that in the Lincoln helio case, the only question of law considered by the hon’ble high Court was whether setting aside the penalty by the tribunal was correct when the demand of service tax and interest was upheld and the assessee did not contest the levy.  These  are  not  the  issues  before  us  nor  is there any remote connection with the facts of the case before us. It is a settled position in law as held by the hon’ble apex Court in al noori tobacco Products india Ltd. case [2004 (170) eLt 175 (SC)] that the ratio of a decision can be applied only if the facts are identical. A slight or a material change in the facts could lead to an entirely different conclusion. [Para 5.7]

Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, it is very clear that, there is      an exposure to overlap of customs duty & service tax, more particularly, in cases of payments made to foreign entities by indian importers. the mumbai CESTAT ruling discussed earlier does lay down a sound principle in the context of the facts of that case. However, exposure to litigation even in such cases continues. Further, mandatory pre-deposit provisions causes hardship to the assesses in such cases as well. the impact of overlap of customs duty and service tax assumes significance, again in the backdrop of the increased rate of service  tax to 14% (which could go up with 2% Swatch Bharat Cess) and imminent introduction of GST. hence, it is felt that this issue needs to be speedily addressed by the Government so as to ensure that transaction cost of indian importers is not unduly burdened rendering them globally uncompetitive.

Drilling Rigs on Time Charter – A Service of Hiring of Tangible Goods?

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In a recently reported Tribunal decision in the case of Great Ship (India) Ltd. vs. CST, Mumbai 2015 (37) STR 533 (Tri.-Mum), the issue posed before the Hon. Tribunal was to examine primarily whether a contract entered into for charter hire of drilling unit (including carrying out drilling activity), by the appellant therein, an Indian company with ONGC, involved dispute relating to taxability under mining of mineral, oil or gas service as defined in section 65(105)(zzzy) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) or liable as Supply Of Tangible Goods service (SOTG) as defined under sub-clause (zzzzj) of the said section 65(105) of the Act. Considering that along with the drilling rigs brought in by the appellant, their significant number of personnel carried out actual drilling operations, the appellant contended that the contract is one of drilling service liable as mining service as defined under service tax law whereas according to the revenue, the core object of the agreement was to provide equipment (tangible goods) on hire to attract service tax u/s. 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994. According to the appellant, they provided drilling service with the use of the drilling equipment obtained by them on hire from a Singapore company on bareboat charter basis and under the contract with ONGC, they were required to carry out drilling operations after securing permit and licenses for operation of drilling by its own crew of various skills like engineers, technicians etc., totalling to about 45 persons and hence the activity was carried out to produce the output service required by their customer. They also contended that they were fully responsible for the job as a whole and therefore they controlled, directed and supervised drilling operations and did not transfer possession of the equipment so as to merit classification as SOTG. The issue pertained to the period 07-07-2009 to 27-02-2010. Therefore, alternatively and incidentally, it was also contended on behalf of the appellant that prior to the date of 27-02-2010, service tax did not extend to the area in which the drilling services were carried out as India did not include installations, structures and vessels in the Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economy Zones of India. However, for the analysis and discussion herein below, the aspect of territorial jurisdiction is kept aside as the same is not relevant. The appellant also put forth the fact of their paying service tax under mining service for the subsequent period viz. 01-04-2010 onwards and filed ST-3 Returns to such effect and thus contended that their classification was accepted by the department.

As against this claim, the revenue’s submission was that the issue involved was covered by the Hon. Bombay High Court’s decision in Indian National Shipowners Association (INSA) 2009 (14) STR 289 (Bom). The High Court examined the scope of SOTG service in the context of supply of offshore vessels to carry out various jobs like anchor handling, towing of vessels, supply of rigs or platform, diving or safety support, crane support etc., in designated or non-designated areas. The question before the High Court in the case of INSA (supra) was whether various independent services provided by the members of the association were in the nature of mining services defined under entry (zzzy) or the later entry (zzzzj) defining SOTG in section 65(105) of the Act. Since these activities were independently carried out by various and separate vendors, it was held that the services are liable to be classified as SOTG, when the right of possession and effective control of goods was not transferred as they did not carry out mining activity.

Statutory provisions:
For facilitating easy reference, both the relevant definitions of section 65(105) of the Act are reproduced below:

[zzzy]:

“Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to mining of mineral, oil or gas”.

{zzzzj}:

“Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to supply of tangible goods including machinery, equipment and appliances for use, without transferring right of possession and effective control of such machinery, equipment and appliances.”

Scope of the contract:
The Tribunal on detailed examination of the contract between the parties inter alia found that the contract:

Was for a firm period of three years from the commencement date.

The compensation was based on per day of operation and only slightly lower compensation was payable (about 95%) even for a non-operation day. Similarly, even for the day when rigs were moved from one location to another, the lower rate of about 95% of the daily rate was still applicable to non-operation day.
The scope included provision of complete drilling rig and equipment as per technical specification.
Provision of capable and experienced rig crew.
The appellant was fully responsible for mobilisation of personnel, equipment and material and their safety.
Loss or damage to the drilling unit was on account of the appellant.
For undertaking any drilling, the appellant was entitled to additional charges.
Training the crew also was appellant’s responsibility.

The Tribunal on examining the definition of SOTG found that only two conditions were required to be covered by SOTG service viz. there should be supply of tangible goods and there should not be any transfer of right of possession and effective control. Whereas, the appellant’s contention that they did not transfer possession and control to ONGC was not relevant to determine liability under the category of SOTG.

Perusal of the ingredients of the contract in the light of the legal provisions, the Tribunal observed that the equipment and crew were of the appellant and therefore possession and effective control was of the appellant and the consideration was also expressed on per day basis. Thus, all the elements put together showed that there was no transfer of right or possession by the appellant to ONGC and therefore appellant’s contention that they should have transferred possession of goods to come within the scope of the taxing entry of SOTG was not tenable. On examining Bombay High Court’s decision in Indian National Shipowners Association (supra), the Tribunal concluded that the appellant’s service merited classification as SOTG. In support of its decision, the Tribunal also relied on the decisions of:

Atwood Oceanic Pacific Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2013 (32)STR 756 (Tribunal Ahmd)
Shipping Corporation of India 2014 (33 STR 552 (Tri.- Mum)
Srinivasa Transports 2014 (34) STR 765 (Tri.-Bang)

The Tribunal on concluding also noted that even on assuming that service was a composite service consisting of mining service and SOTG, the essential character of the service was SOTG service since 95% of the consideration was attributed for supply of tangible goods.

While analysing the above decision of the hon. tribunal, the fact of the matter to be noted is that the limited issue before the Bench was to examine and classify the activity under one or the other classification as the dispute raised in the show cause notice was in relation to classification. Similarly, when the hon. Bombay  high  Court  examined  the  case of INSA (supra), the trigger point for filing writ petition on behalf of members of the Shipowners’ association was that various offshore support vessels, construction barges, tugs etc., were provided by members for exploration operations on  time  charter  basis. This  summarily  may  be  described as  marine  logistics  services. The  revenue  initiated  action to recover service tax on the said activity under the entry  of mining service under the above sub-clause (zzzy). Vide this entry actually all the activities relating to mining were consolidated  by  the  finance act,  2007.  The  category  of SotG was introduced later from 16th may 2008. Therefore, in the case of INSA (supra) to put an end to dispute relating to taxability under the entry of mining service, the argument was advanced that the later entry of SOTG was the relevant classification. However, the scope of this taxing entry in (zzzzy) or taxability under the entry was per se not examined vis-à-vis a contract for hiring of equipment in detail  as there  did not arise such question before the high Court.   As a matter of fact, the decisions relied upon above by the tribunal in Great Ship (india) Ltd. (supra) viz. Shipping Corporation (supra), atwood oceanic (supra) etc., also, the dispute involved was limited to different classifications vis- à-vis SOTG and/or fact prior to the date of introduction of SOTG the service was not taxable.

Are Most Hiring Contracts Not of “Deemed sale”?:

On closely perusing the scope of the entry of SOTG one may find that only those hiring or leasing contracts would be covered by the scope of this entry whereunder, there is no transfer of right of possession and effective control over the equipment provided on hire. hiring contracts where such right is transferred are liable as “deemed  sale”  under  the  Vat  laws  of  the  States.  To examine whether a contract contains transfer of such right to use the goods or not, a test is laid down in the benchmark decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) which provides direction in the matter and which is also followed by various high Courts as listed below:

?    There must be goods available for delivery.
?    There must be consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods.
?    The transferee should have legal right to use the goods
– consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permission or licenses required therefore should be available to the transferee.
?    For  the  period  during  which  the  transferee  has  such legal right, it has to be the exclusion of the transferor. This is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods.
?    Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.

If all the above ingredients are present, the contract is one of “deemed sale” in terms of article 366(29A) of the Constitution and exigible to Vat and therefore cannot be held as SOTG service. It may be noted at this point that under the negative list based taxation applicable from 01-07-2012, the said service of SOTG is included in the list of “declared Services” in section 66e of the act in clause (F) as “transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing, licensing or in any such manner without transfer of right to use such goods”. While explaining the negative list based provisions, the Government in the education Guide dated 20-06-2012 has referred to the above test and has cited a few illustrations with reference to some judgments to advance its own interpretation. (readers may refer para 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 of the said education Guide). The said test referred above was followed interalia in another important decision of the andhra high Court in G. S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT involving contract of hiring of commercial vehicles and the aspect of transfer of right to use has been exhaustively analysed (refer BCAJ november 2012 issue under hiring of goods: declared Service or deemed Sale). An extract of a few important observations made in the said decision of G. S. Lamba (supra) is provided below:

“The right to use goods arises only on the transfer of such right to use goods and that the transfer of right is the sine quo non for the right to use any goods”.

“Effective control does not mean physical control and even if the manner, method, modalities and time are decided by the lessee, it would be general control over goods”.

“Article 366(29A) would show that the tax (i.e. VAT in the instant case) is not on the delivery of goods used but on the transfer of the right to use goods regardless of when and whether goods are delivered for use. This is subject to the condition that goods are in existence for use.”

“The entire use in the property in goods is to be exclusively utilized for a period under contract by lessee.”

Similar decision has also been pronounced by the Gauhati high Court in Deepaknath vs. ONGC (2010) 31 VST 337 (GAU) and Orissa High Court in K. C. Behra vs. State of Orissa (1991) 83 STC 325 (Orissa). On going through the terms of contract in the instant case of Great Ship (india) Ltd. (supra), one may find that the contract satisfies the test laid down by the Apex Court in BSNL’s case (supra) and conforms with all the observations made by andhra high Court in G. S. Lamba’s case (supra). Yet, paradoxically, the contract is subjected to service tax.

Conclusion:
There may exist several conflicting decisions for a common situation. Similarly, view of professionals also may differ. yet the test laid down by BSNL seems a decisive factor for the  situation  discussed  above.  Following  principles  laid down thereunder, the above contract does not appear to be a contract for service at all. However, since this aspect was  not  presented  before  the  tribunal  for  the  reasons best known to the appellant, the contract seemingly of “deemed sale” is held as service of supply of tangible goods liable for service tax. Entire service sector and professionals eagerly await the arrival of GST legislation in the hope of bringing an end to the battle between the aspect of ‘sale’ and ‘service’ in a transaction.

MANDATORY PRE-DEPOSIT FOR APPEALS

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Background:
Right of appeal is a creation of statute and is
governed by the conditions prescribed under the law. While justice must
be real as well as apparent, justice must be done to both the parties,
(viz. tax department and the tax payer). It has been repeatedly held by
Courts that right of appeal is a substantive right which ought to be
liberally construed generally.

Section 35F of the Central Excise
Act, 1944 (CEA) [corresponding to section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962
(CA’62) and in case of service tax, the said section 35F read with
section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’)] provided for pre-deposit,
pending appeal of duty and interest demanded and penalty levied. It
provided for full pre–deposit of entire demand subject to waiver thereof
by the Appellate Tribunal

The Tribunals were flooded with stay
applications for waiver of pre-deposit and orders for default therein,
appeal restoration applications, orders for rejection of said
applications or allowing these applications and consequent legal
proceedings. The matter used to be first heard for stay purposes (and
for restoration, if any) and thereafter, for final disposal. The stay
orders of the Tribunal got further challenged before the High Courts,
thereby creating multitude of litigations. It consumed substantial time
of Tribunals and tax payers as well.

Based on representations by
various forums to address the issue of stay applications and related
litigation work, the Government has introduced provisions of mandatory
pre deposit with effect from August 06, 2014, as a step towards reducing
time of Tribunals and tax payers. The new provisions introduced under
Central Excise are applicable to service tax and customs as well.

Similar
provisions have been existing under several VAT laws in the country.
Though several attempts have been made to challenge the legal validity
of provisions of mandatory pre-deposit pending appeal, it is understood
that none have succeeded.

Considering the implications of the
new provisions, CBEC has issued detailed clarifications vide Circular
No. 984/08/2014 – CX dated 16/09/2014.

The newly introduced
provisions are analyzed and discussed below with appropriate extracts of
CBEC Circular dated 16th September, 2014C-16/9/14.

Relevant Statutory Provisions
Deposit of certain percentage of duty demanded or penalty imposed before filing appeal – (section 35F of CEA)

The Tribunal or the Commissioner (Appeals), as the case may be, shall not entertain any appeal,

under
sub-section (1) of section 35, unless the appellant has deposited seven
and a half percent of the duty demanded or penalty imposed or both, in
pursuance of a decision or an order passed by an officer of Central
Excise lower in rank than the Commissioner of Central Excise;

against
the decision or order referred to in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
section 35B, unless the appellant has deposited seven and a half per
cent of the duty demanded or penalty imposed or both, in pursuance of
the decision or order appealed against;

against the decision or
order referred to in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 35B,
unless the appellant has deposited ten per cent of the duty demanded or
penalty imposed or both, in pursuance of the decision or order appealed
against:

Provided that the amount required to be deposited under this section shall not exceed rupees ten crores:

Provided
further that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the stay
applications and appeals pending before any appellate authority prior
to the commencement of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014.

Explanation. For the purposes of this section “duty demanded” shall include,—

(i) amount determined u/s. 11D;

(ii) amount of erroneous CENVAT credit taken;

(iii)
amount payable under Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2001 or the
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 or the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Interest on delayed refund of amount deposited under the proviso to section 35F.- (section 35FF of CEA

Where
an amount deposited by the appellant u/s. 35F is required to be
refunded consequent upon the order of the appellate authority, there
shall be paid to the appellant interest at such rate, not below 5 % and
not exceeding 36 % per annum as is for the time being fixed by the
Central Government by notification in the official Gazette, on such
amount from the date of payment of amount till, the date of refund of
such amount.

Provided that the amount deposited u/s. 35F, prior
to the commencement of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014, shall continue to
be governed by the provisions of section 35FF as it stood before the
commencement of the said Act.

Implications of the terminology “shall not entertain appeal” in the amended section 35F of CEA

According
to one school of thought, since the amended section 35F of CEA states
that “Tribunal or Commissioner (Appeals) shall not entertain appeal”,
there is a discretion available with the concerned appellate authority
to admit an appeal without the prescribed mandatory pre-deposit.

In
this regard, attention is invited to a recent Mumbai CESTAT ruling in
M/s. Bhatia Global Trading Ltd. & M/s Asian Natural Resources (I)
Ltd. vs. CC(2014) TIOL – 2637 – CESTAT MUM.

In this case, an
appeal was filed against adjudication orders dated 24/07/2014 and
25/07/2014 after 06/08/2014 without any pre-deposit as required under
the amended section 129 E of the Customs Act, 1962.Reliance was placed
by the appellant on the Supreme Court ruling in CCE vs. A.S. Bava (1978)
2 ELT J333 (SC), wherein it was observed that, right of appeal is a
substantive right and if any pre–deposit is required to be made it would
whittle down the substantive right of appeal. Accordingly, it was
pleaded that the appeal be heard without insisting on any pre-deposit.

The Tribunal held as under :

 A
plain reading of the provisions make it abundantly clear that the
Tribunal or Commissioner (Appeals) shall not entertain any appeal u/s.
128, unless the appellant has made a pre-deposit of 7.5% of the duty in
such cases, where duty and penalty is in dispute and appeal is filed
before Tribunal. Therefore, in terms of amended section 129E with
effect from 06/08/2014, this Tribunal is barred from entertaining any
appeal unless the predeposit as mentioned in section 129E is complied
with. The law is very clear and there is no ambiguity in the matter. In
view of the above, we hold that the appeal is not admissible before this
Tribunal, inasmuch as the appellants have not complied with the
pre-deposit requirements envisaged in section 129E. Accordingly, the
Miscellaneous Applications are dismissed and consequently the appeal
also gets dismissed.

It would appear that post 06/08/2014, payment of mandatory pre-deposit would be necessary for admission of appeal.

Applicability of mandatory pre-deposit provisions to pending matters:

Clarifications issued by CESTAT vide Circular No. 15/CESTAT/General/ 2013-14 dated 14/10/2014 (2014) 308 ELT T 48 & 49.

Relevant extracts of the circular are as under:

“1.
In terms of the amended provisions of the three statutes viz. Customs
Act, 1962, Central Excise Act, 1944 and Finance Act, 1994, the mandatory
deposit of 7.5%/10%, as the case may be, has to be made for filing
appeal before Tribunal. Section 35F of the Central Excise Act reads as:
………
    The above said provisions came into force with effect from 06/08/2014. However, some of the appellants/ consultants/counsels while presenting appeals are expressing reluctance in compliance with the condi-tion of mandatory deposit stipulated under the Act as amended. Some of them have contended that as the Show Cause Notice was issued and demand confirmed earlier to 06/08/2014, the amended provisions are not applicable to their case. Few of them have relied upon judgments of various judicial forums to claim exemption from the mandatory deposit while filing appeal. It is pertinent to mention that no such exemption has been contemplated either in the amended provision of the Act statutes, or even in the clarificatory circular issued by the CBEC on the subject.

    In view of above, DRs/ARs/TOs of all Benches are directed that if no evidence in support of mandatory deposit is produced while filing appeal, such appeals, after providing three opportunities/reminders, be numbered and listed on Fridays before the Court presided by the Senior Member, for appropriate orders.”

    Some Judicial Considerations:

MBG Commodities Pvt. Ltd. vs. CC, CCE & ST (2014)

310 ELT 302 (Tri – Bang)

In this case, adjudication order was passed on 18/03/2014 and First Appeal to the Tribunal was filed on 06/08/2014, after a delay of 42 days. The Tribunal condoned the delay and held as under :

    Pre deposit of 7.5% to be made

    No stay application required

    10 weeks further time given to make pre-deposit since provisions are new.

ITC Infotech Ltd. vs. CC (2014) 310 ELT 304 (Tri – Bang)

The Tribunal held as under

    Post 6/8/14, stay application not required to be filed

    Stay application rejected as in fructuous (Section 35F of CEA.)

Refer para 4 above for recent Mumbai CESTAT ruling

Recovery pending appeal

Relevant extracts from CBEC Circular C- 16/9/14 are as under:

Recovery of the Amounts during the Pendency of Appeal (Para 4)

“Para 4.1

Vide Circular No.967/1/2013 dated 1st January, 2013, Board has issued detailed instructions with regard to recovery of the amount due to the Government during the pendency of stay applications or appeals with the appellate authority. This circular would not apply to cases where appeal is filed after the enactment of the amended section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962.

Para 4.2

No coercive measures for the recovery of balance amount i.e., the amount in excess of 7.5% or 10% depos-ited in terms of section 35F of Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of Customs Act, 1962, shall be taken dur-ing the pendency of appeal where the party / assessee shows to the jurisdictional authorities:

    Proof of payment of stipulated amount as pre-deposit of 7.5% / 10%, subject to a limit of Rs.10 crores, as the case may be; and

    The copy of appeal memo filed with the appellate authority.
Para 4.3

Recovery action if any can be initiated only after the dis-posal of the case by the Commissioner (Appeals) / Tribu-nal in favour of the department. For example, if the Tribu-nal decides a case in favour of the department, recovery action for the amount over and above the amount depos-ited under the provisions of section 35F / 129E may be initiated unless the order of the Tribunal is stayed by the High Court/Supreme Court. The recovery, in such cases, would include the interest, at the specified rate, from the date duty became payable, till the date of payment.”

Refer judicial considerations given above.

Quantum of Pre Deposit

    Department clarifications

Relevant extracts from CBEC Circular C – 16/9/14 are as under:

“2. Quantum of pre-deposit in terms of section 35F of Central Excise Act, 1944 and section 129E of the Cus-toms Act, 1962:

Para 2.1

Doubts have been expressed with regard to the amount to be deposited in terms of the amended provisions while filing appeal against the order of Commissioner (Appeals) before the CESTAT. Sub-section (iii) of section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 stipulate payment of 10% of the duty or penalty payable in pursuance of the decision or order being appealed against i.e. the order of Commissioner (Appeals). It is therefore, clarified that in the event of ap-peal against the order of Commissioner (Appeals) before the Tribunal, 10% is to be paid on the amount of duty demanded or penalty imposed by the Commissioner (Ap-peals). This need not be the same as the amount of duty demanded or penalty imposed in the Order-in-Original in the said case.

Para 2.2

In a case, where penalty alone is in dispute and penalties have been imposed under different provisions of the Act, the pre-deposit would be calculated based on the aggre-gate of all penalties imposed in the order against which appeal is proposed to be filed.

Para 2.3

In case of any short payment or non-payment of the amount stipulated under section 35F of the Central Ex-cise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962, the appeal filed is liable for rejection.”

    Department clarifications (during introduction of Fi-nance Bill, 2014)

Attention is invited to the following clarification issued vide Finance Ministry Circular No. 334/15/2014 – TRU dated 10/07/2014 (Annexure II) :

Legislative Changes

………….

Amendments in the Central Excise Act, 1944

………..

“Para 13

“Section 35F is being substituted with a new section to prescribe a mandatory fixed pre-deposit of 7.5% of the duty demanded or penalty imposed or both for filing appeal with the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Tribunal at the first stage and another 10% of the duty demanded or penalty imposed or both for filing second stage appeal before the Tribunal. The amount of pre-deposit payable would be subject to a ceiling of Rs. 10 crore.”

    2 Stage Appeal – Amount of Pre-deposit

On a perusal of the TRU Clarification dated 10/0720/14 reproduced above and the new provisions as enacted, it appears that in a 2 Stage Appeal, despite detailed clari-fications vide C-16/9/14, lack of clarity continues as to whether an additional pre deposit of 10% is to be made or only the differential pre deposit viz. [10% less 7.5%] is to be made. This needs to be clarified at the earliest to avoid litigations.

    Duty demanded/Interest

 Duty demanded to include “sums collected in name of duty” and CENVAT Credit

For the purposes of new provisions “duty” demanded” shall include, –

    amount determined u/s. 11D
    amount of erroneous CENVAT credit taken

    amount payable under Rule 6 of the CENVAT

Credit Rules, 2001 or the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 or the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

It appears that there is no such expression like “duty demanded” in section 35F of CEA. The expression is “duty
in .. dispute”. Nevertheless, going by the principle of purposive interpretation, the disputed duty shall include the amounts listed in Explanation to section 35F of CEA.

    Pre–deposit of interest

Contrary to provisions which existed prior to 06/08/2014, there is no requirement for mandatory pre-deposit of interest. This is very much welcome.

Payments during investigation

Relevant extracts from CBEC Circular C – 16/9/14 are as under:

“Payment made during investigation (para 3)

Para 3.1

Payment made during the course of investigation or audit, prior to the date on which appeal is filed, to the extent of 7.5% or 10%, subject to the limit of Rs 10 crores, can be considered to be deposit made towards fulfillment of stipulation under section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962. Any shortfall from the amount stipulated under these sections shall have to be paid before filing of appeal before the ap-pellate authority. As a corollary, amounts paid over and above the amounts stipulated under section 35 F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962, shall not be treated as deposit under the said sections.

Para 3.2

Since the amount paid during investigation/audit takes the colour of deposit under section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 only when the appeal is filed, the date of filing of appeal shall be deemed to be the date of deposit made in terms of the said sections.

Para 3.3

In case of any short-payment or non-payment of the amount stipulated under section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962, the appeal filed by the appellant is liable for rejection.”

    Procedure for pre-deposit – Government clarifications

Relevant extracts from CBEC Circular C – 16/09/2014 are as under:

“Procedure and Manner of making the pre-deposits (Para 6.)

Para 6.1

E-payment facility can be made use of by the appellants, wherever possible.

Para 6.2

A self-attested copy of the document showing satisfactory proof of payment shall be submitted before the appellate authority as proof of payment made in terms of section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962.

Para 6.3

Column 7 of EA.1, column 6 of CA.1 and column 6 of ST-4 for filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals), seek details of the duty/penalty deposited. The same may be used for indicating the deposits made under amended section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962.

Para 6.4

The appeal filed before the CESTAT are filed along with the appeal memo in prescribed format (Form EA-3 for Central Excise Appeals and Form CA-3 for the Customs Appeals). Column 14(i) of the said appeal forms seeks information of payment of duty, fine, penalty, interest along with proof of payment (challan). These columns may, therefore, be used for the purpose of indicating the amount of deposit made, which shall be verified by the appellate authority before registering the appeal.
 

Para 6.5

As per existing instructions, a copy of the appeal memo along with proof of deposit made shall be filed with the jurisdictional officers.”

    Refund of Pre–deposit & Interest thereon

    Interest on pre-deposit :

The new section 35FF of CEA provides that where an amount deposited by the appellant u/s. 35F –

    is required to be refunded

    consequent upon the order of the appellate authority, there shall be paid to the appellant –

    interest at the rate of 6% p.a.

    on such amount

    for the date of payment of the amount till the date of refund of such amount

It is further provided that the amount deposited u/s. 35F, prior to 06/08/2014, shall continue to be governed by the provisions of section 35FF as it stood before the com-mencement of the said Act.

    Department clarifications

Relevant extracts from CBEC Circular C – 16/9/14 are as under:

    Refund of pre-deposit para 5) “Para 5.1
Where the appeal is decided in favour of the party / assessee, he shall be entitled to refund of the amount deposited along with the interest at the prescribed rate from the date of making the deposit to the date of re-fund in terms of section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129EE of the Customs Act, 1962.

Para 5.2

Pre-deposit for filing appeal is not payment of duty. Hence, refund of pre-deposit need not be subjected to the process of refund of duty under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962. Therefore, in all cases where the appel-late authority has decided the matter in favour of the appellant, refund with interest should be paid to the appellant within 15 days of the receipt of the letter of the appellant seeking refund, irrespective of whether order of the appellate authority is proposed to be chal-lenged by the department or not.

Para 5. 3

If the Department contemplates appeal against the order of the Commissioner (A) or the order of CES-TAT, which is in favour of the appellant, refund along with interest would still be payable unless such order is stayed by a competent Appellate Authority.

Para 5.4

In the event of a remand, refund of the pre-deposit shall be payable along with interest.

Para 5.5

In case of partial remand where a portion of the duty is confirmed, it may be ensured that the duty due to the Government on the portion of order in favour of the revenue is collected by adjusting the deposited amount along with interest.

Para 5.6

It is reiterated that refund of pre-deposit made should not be withheld on the ground that department is pro-posing to file an appeal or has filed an appeal against the order granting relief to the party. Jurisdictional Commissioner should ensure that refund of deposit made for hearing the appeal should be paid within the stipulated time of 15 days as per para 5.2 supra.”

    Procedure for refund (para 7)

“Para 7.1

A simple letter from the person who has made such de-posit, requesting for return of the said amount, along with a self-attested xerox copy of the order in appeal or the CESTAT order consequent to which the deposit becomes returnable and attested xerox copy of the document evi-dencing payment of such deposit, addressed to Jurisdic-tional Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax or the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Customs, as the case may be, would suffice for refund of the amount deposited along with interest at the rate specified.

Para 7.2

Record of deposits made under section 35F of the Cen-tral Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 should be maintained by the Commissionerate so as to facilitate seamless verification of the deposits at the time of processing the refund claims made in case of fa-vourable order from the Appellate Authority.”

    Applicability of unjust enrichment

Section 11 B of CEA has not been amended to specifically provide that provisions of unjust enrichment will not apply to refund of pre-deposit of duty or penalty made as per the amended section 35Fof CEA. There are judgments which have held that provisions of unjust enrichment will apply even to pre-deposits made u/s. 35F of CEA. E.g.:

    UOI vs. Jain Spinners Ltd. (1992) 61 ELT 321 (SC)

    Sahakari  Khand  Udyog  Mandal  Ltd.  vs.  CCE

(2005) 181 ELT 328 (SC)

At the same time, there are other judgments which have held that provisions of unjust enrichment will not apply to pre-deposits made under section 35F of CEA. For e.g.

    Mahavir Aluminium (1999) 114 ELT 371 (SC)

    Suvidhe Ltd. (1999) 82 ELT 177 (Bom).

In order to avoid disputes, it may be advisable to disclose the amount of pre-deposit under the heading “Advances recoverable in cash or kind” in the balance sheet. It would help to substantiate that the incidence of tax/duty has not been passed on to the customers.

    Some issues and concerns

Introduction of mandatory pre-deposit provisions is a wel-come measure. It would save the time of Tribunals and tax payers that was consumed under the earlier regime of stay Petitions and related matters. However, attention is drawn to some issues & concerns:

    It is often noticed that adjudication orders are passed totally ignoring settled judicial rulings (including rulings of the Supreme Court and jurisdictional Courts). Apparently, there is no remedy provided in law, for such situations. In such cases, though a tax payer can approach Higher Courts, at a practical level in order to get the appeal admitted, appellants often would be con-strained to make the mandatory pre- deposit rather than risking the non-admission of appeal or at times the cost of going to High Court is found prohibitive by small and medium enterprises. Besides this, in many a cases, on account of non-accountability, a huge amount of tax is demanded invoking extended period of limitation for which the basis may or may not be legally sound yet the demand is routinely confirmed in the adjudication order. In such cases, it is noticed that mandatory payment of 7.5% causes serious cash flow crisis and at times even survival of business becomes questionable. For these assessees where the issue is one of interpretation of law alone, the mandatory pre-deposit appears savageous and requires serious reconsideration.

    As discussed earlier, even if an appellant succeeds in appeal, on the basis of judicial rulings, provisions of unjust enrichment are invariably applied and refund denied resulting in further litigation.

It is suggested that, CBEC should issue detailed guide-lines preferably through a Board order, to avoid hard-ships to tax payers

    It is appreciative that, in case of success in appeal, in-terest shall be paid to the appellant from the date of payment of the pre-deposit. However, the interest shall be paid only at the rate of 6% P.A.

As all are aware, w.e.f. 01/10/2014 in case of delayed payment of service tax interest is required to be paid at a rate ranging from 18% p.a. to 30% p.a. (for delay beyond 1 year). The disparity in rate of interest to be paid by a tax payer and tax department is unjustified.

It is suggested that in order to promote and encourage fair tax administration practices, parity should be brought in rate of interest at the earliest under all tax laws. This would also help in establishing accountability of the tax department.

TRANSITIONAL ISSUES: AMENDMENT IN REVERSE CHARGE PROVISIONS

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Amendment effective from April 01, 2015
Notification No.7/2015-ST has amended the reverse charge provisions to come into effect from 1st April, 2015. In case of manpower supply services and security agency services, under specified circumstances [viz. when services are provided by any individual, HUF or partnership firm including an AOP to a business entity registered as body corporate] service tax is payable by the service provider on 25% of taxable value and service recipient on the balance 75% of taxable value. However, as per the amended provisions effective from 01-04-2015, service receiver is required to pay under reverse charge on 100% of the taxable value. In such cases, if payment is made after 3 months and there is a rate change as on the date of payment, the tax payment on the same taxable value could exceed the effective tax rate. This is because rule 7 of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (“POT Rules”) is applicable in cases where a person required to pay tax is recipient of service. In such cases, if invoices are not paid within 3 months from the date of invoice issued by the service provider, the point of taxation is the date immediately following the said period of 3 months.

For example, assuming that the proposed rate of service tax @ 14% is made effective 01-06-2015 and payment is made to the manpower supply/security service providers after 3 months for the invoices raised prior to 01-04-2015, the increase in aggregate effective tax rate at the time of payment will be higher than the prescribed rate of 14% as illustrated below:

The above clearly shows that, due to provisions under POT Rules, transitional issues would arise. It is felt that appropriate amendment needs to be carried out or CBEC needs to issue a clarification to the effect that, in case of invoices raised prior to 31-03-2015 which are governed under dual reverse charge for manpower supply or security services, the service recipient would be required to make payment only for the balance amount of service tax which cumulatively in no case should exceed the proposed increased rate of 14%.

Proposed increase in rate of service tax from 12.36% to 14%.

Presently the rate of service tax is 12.36% consisting of service tax of 12% and education cess of 2% on service tax and secondary and higher education cess of 1% on service tax. The Finance Bill, 2015 (FB 2015) has proposed to abolish both the cesses and increase the service tax rate to 14%. The increased rate of service tax shall be effective from a date to be notified after the enactment of FB 2015 (“notified date”).

Pursuant to the above stated increase, the rate of tax that would be applicable in certain situations, as per the PoT Rules would be as under:-



The following transitional issues merit attention:

In case of situations stated in (c) & (e) above, in accordance with Rule 2A of POT Rules if the payment is not credited in the bank within 4 working days from the notified date, the new rate of 14% would apply.

In case of situations stated in (d) & (f) above, service tax would have already been paid at the old rate (12.36%) when the invoice was issued or payment received before the change of rate of tax applying Rule 3 of POT Rules. However, due to subsequent increase in rate, there would be a short payment which the assessee may have to deposit. However, no interest would apply if the assessee deposits the differential amount within the due date reckoned from the point of taxation [i.e. date of payment in case of (d) and date of issue of invoice in case of (f) above.]

The above anomalies are inherent in the POT Rules which prescribes multiple points of taxation. This poses practical issues more particularly in respect of certain services (for example annual membership fees, annual maintenance contracts, etc.). It is understood that many service providers have already started collecting Service tax at 14% (though not legally correct) to avoid situations of differential payments and recovery issues from customers subsequent to the increased rate becoming effective.

levitra

Supply & Installation of lifts – Sale or Works Contract?

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Introduction
Several controversies have revolved around the issue as to whether a transaction amounts to ‘sale’ or “works contract”. In several judgments, the issue has been dealt with different perspectives. In a very well-known decision in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Kone Elevators – [2005-(181)-ELT-156-(SC)], a Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that a contract of supply and installation of lift was one for sale and not a works contract as (a) the obligation of civil construction and preparatory work is that of purchaser of the lift and not of supplier and therefore (b) skill and labour employed for converting main components into end product was only incidental to components in the contract for sale. Consequent to the said judgment, several show cause notices were issued to the appellant proposing re-opening of assessment, as in a large number of cases in various States, the assessments were done considering the contracts as works contracts. In the State of Maharashtra, prior to the above decision in Kone Elevators’ case, the State treated contracts for sale and installation of lifts as works contracts as per the High Court’s decision in Otis Elevator Company (India) Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra – (1969)-24-STC-525- (Bom). However, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Kone Elevators (Supra) from 01-04-2006, the position was adjusted to the law laid down by the Three Judge Bench of Supreme Court.

In this background, M/s. Kone Elevators India engaged in the manufacture, supply and installation of lifts as well as civil constructions, while undergoing assessment for 1995-1996 in the State of Tamil Nadu, the Sales Tax Tribunal and later the High Court, held that activity of erection and commissioning of lift was works contract and not sale. As against this, in some other States, the assessments closed based on treating the transaction as ‘sale’ were proposed to be re-opened. Driven by the paradox, Kone Elevators India Private Limited filed a writ petition, wherein along with other special leave petitions, it was noted by the Three – Judge Bench that the question raised for consideration is whether the manufacture, supply and installation of lifts is ‘sale’ or “works contract” and that in 2005-(181)-ELT-156-(SC) (supra), the Bench had not noticed the decisions of Supreme Court rendered in State of Rajasthan vs. Man Industrial Corporation Limited – (1969-1-SCC-567, State of Rajasthan & others vs. Nenu Rani – (1970)-26-STC-268-(SC) and Vanguard Rolling Shutters & Steel Works vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax – (1977)-2-SCC-250 and therefore, found it appropriate to refer the controversy to the Larger Bench to resolve the discord and to decide whether contract for manufacture, supply and installation of lifts in a building is a contract for sale of goods, liable for sales tax/VAT under the State legislation or a works contract wherein labour and service components would be excluded from total consideration. Consequently, the Five Judge Bench of the Hon. Supreme Court by majority in Kone Elevator India Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Tamilnadu 2014 (34) STR 641 (SC) overruled the Three Judge Bench decision of 2005 considering it incorrect and held that individually manufactured goods such as lift, car, motors, ropes, rails etc., are components of lift and they are assembled and installed with skill and labour at site to become permanent fixture of building thus satisfying the fundamental characteristics of works contract. The judgment by the majority as well as the contrary view are briefly summarised below:

Some important decisions relied upon in Kone Elevators vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2014 (34) STR 641 (SC).

Before proceeding with the outline of the judgment, a few of the important decisions relied upon by the Larger Bench are briefly described below:

In Patnaik & Co. vs. State of Orissa 1965 (2) SCR 782 the issue involved related to construction of bodies on the chassis supplied to the contractor as bailee. It was held that such a contract being one for work and not a contract for sale, as the parties under the contract did not sell the bus bodies. The Bombay High Court in Otis Elevator Company (India) Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 1969 (24) STC 525 (Bom) held that manufacture, supply and installation of lifts is works contract as per the Bombay Lifts Act, 1939 read with Rules thereunder.

As against the above, in Union of India vs. Central India Machinery Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 847, the Apex Court held that the contract of manufacture and supply of wagon was nothing but a ‘sale’ and not works contract. However, post 46th Constitutional Amendment and insertion of a sub-Article 29A in Article 366 of the Constitution, in Builders’ Association of India and others vs. UOI & others (1989) 2 SCC 645 it was held that the works contract which was an indivisible one is by a legal fiction altered into a contract which is divisible into one for sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services and the property transfers when the goods are supplied in the works and goods involved in the execution of works contract. Therefore, composite contracts for supply and installation, construction of lift or flat are classified as “works contract”.

In case of Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. vs. State of A.P. (2000) 6 SCC 579 (relied on in the case of Kone Elevators 3 Bench Judgment – supra also), the Court held that if the thing to be delivered has individual existence before delivery as the sole property of the party delivering it, then it is a sale. If the bulk of the material used in construction belongs to the manufacturer selling the end product for a price, then it is a stronger pointer that contract in substance is of sale of goods and not one for labour. However, the test is not decisive. The Court finally ruled observed that it is not bulk of the material alone but the relative importance of material qua the work, skill and labour of the payee is also to be seen. If the major component of the end product is material consumed in producing the chattel to be delivered and skill & labour is incidentally used, the end product delivered by the seller to the buyer would constitute sale whereas if the main object of the contract is to avail skill and labour of the seller though same material may be used incidentally by investing skill and labour of the supplier, the transaction would be a contract of work and labour.

In Vanguard Rolling Shutter’s case (1977) 2 SCC 250, the Supreme Court while reversing the decision of the High Court had observed that material as supplied was not supplied by the owner so far as to pass as chattel simplicitor but affixing to one immovable property and after which it became permanent fixture and accretion to the immovable property. Further, the operation to be done at site was not incidental but a fundamental part of the contract and therefore it was a works contract. Similarly, in Man Industrial Corporation Ltd. (supra) also, the Court treated the contract for providing and fixing different windows of certain sizes as per specification, design, drawings etc., as contract for work and labour and a contract for sale for fixing the windows to the building was not incidental/subsidiary to the sale but was essential term of the contract.

In addition to the above, interalia the decisions such as State of Madras vs. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. AIR 1958 SC 560, Associated Hotel’s case (1972) 1 SCC 472, State of Gujarat vs. M/s. Variety Body Builders (1996) 3 SCC 500 etc. were discussed to appreciate the controversy and genesis of law in respect of works contract before dwelling upon the principles in relation to works contract to apply to manufacture, supply and installation of lifts. Nevertheless, it was also observed and noted that there is no standard formula by which a contract of sale could be distinguished from a contract of work as it depended on facts and circumstances of each case. Further, citing landmark judgment of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI

    Others 2006 (2) STR 111 (SC), which dealt with the issue of whether mobile phone connection was a transaction of sale or service or both, the Court observed that after 46th Amendment, the sale elements when covered under Article 366 (29A), the “dominant nature test” was not applicable and this was also reiterated in recent decision of the Apex Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd.’s case 2014 (34) STR 481 (SC) relied upon heavily while deciding the instant case of Kone Elevators.

    Core issue in brief:

The petitioners contended that supply and installation of lift cannot be treated as contract of sale. Each major component of crane has its own identity prior to installation and they are assembled/installed at site to bring ‘lift’ into existence and installation requires great skill and expertise and without installation, adjustment, testing etc. no lift could become operational in a building. Besides discussing various rulings on the subject matter, the petitioner’s counsel referred to Bombay Lifts Act, 1939 and Rules made thereunder to drive home the point that manufacture, supply and installation were controlled by statutory provisions under an enactment of the legislature which reflected that immense skill is required for such installation, as a result of which only lift becomes operational and lift is not sold like goods.

Various States like Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Orissa, Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana etc., have put forward their submissions. Those of which argued against the transaction being treated as a works contract, in substance, contended that even if a high degree of skill went into the installation was an inseggregable facet of the manufacturing process and would not be more than an article for sale on the basis of a special order and erection meant only a functional part of the system to bring the goods to use and hence it was the culmination of the fact of sale. The contract involved goods in any form intended for transfer but the completion of transfer involved certain activities, under any name but the term “deliverable state” as provided in section 21 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 was attracted and therefore the contract was purely of sale of goods. As against this, the States contending the contract as one of works contract, backed the theory that considering multifarious activities involved in the installation, it should be construed as works contract.

    Majority view:

Thoroughly considering Article 366(29A), the Larger Bench interalia importantly referred to three categories of contracts as explained in Hindustan Shipyard (supra) as follows:

“(i) the contract may be for work to be done for remunera-tion and for supply of materials used in the execution of the work for a price;

    it may be a contract for work in which the use of the materials is accessory or incidental to the execution of the work; and

    it may be a contract for supply of goods where some work is required to be done as incidental to the sale.”

Thereafter, it opined that the first contract is a composite contract consisting of two contracts, one of which is for the sale of goods and the other is for work and labour; the second is clearly a contract for work and labour not involving sale of goods; and the third is a contract for sale where the goods are sold as chattels and the work done is merely incidental to the sale.”

Also in detail was considered Larsen and Toubro (su-pra) wherein it was found to have been elucidated that after 46th Amendment, transfer of property in goods whether as goods or in some other form would include goods ceased to be chattels or movables or mer-chandise and become attached or embedded to earth. Thus goods which are incorporated into immovable property are deemed as good/s and therefore the narrow meaning given to the term “works contract” in Gannon Dunkerley-I (supra) no longer survives. Once the characteristics of works contract are satisfied in a contract, irrespective of existence of additional obligation, the contract does not cease to be a works contract because nothing in Article 366(29A)(b) limits the term “works contract”. In view thereof, the Larger Bench among other things reiterated what was stated in Larsen and Toubro (supra) “even if dominant intention of the contract is not to transfer the property in goods and rather it is the rendering of service or the ultimate transaction is transfer of immovable property, then also it is open to the States to levy sales tax on the materials used in such contract if it otherwise has elements of works contract”. The Bench noted that from their detailed analysis, the following 4 concepts emerge:

“(i) the works contract is an indivisible contract but, by le-gal fiction, is divided into two parts, one for sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services;

    The concept of “dominant nature test” or, for that matter, the “degree of intention test” or “overwhelming component test” for treating a contract as works con-tract is not applicable;

    The term “works contract” as used in clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution takes in its sweep all genre of works contract and is not to be narrowly construed to cover one species of contract to provide for labour and service alone; and once the characteristics of works contract are met within a contract entered into between the parties, any additional obligation incorporated in the contract would not change the nature of the contract.”

The Court went through the terms of the agreement in detail and referring to Richardson & Crudass Ltd. (1968) 21 STC 245 (SC), noted that they were also indicative of the fact that the whole contractual obligation was not divisible in parts and was intimately connected with labour and services undertaken by the applicants in erecting and installing the apparatus. Further, for functioning of lift in a huge building to carry persons to several floors calls for considerable technical skill, expertise, experience and precision in execution of work and therefore found it difficult to sever the agreement in two parts, one for sale of goods and another for services as the two are intimately connected. Severance is not possible and in fact it was an indivisible contract. For installation of the elevator, regard must be had to its technical facet, safety devise and actual operation and apart from it, it is an important fact that upon installation, it becomes a permanent fixture in the premises. Therefore, installation of a lift in a building cannot be regarded as transfer of a chattel as goods but a composite contract.

The Bench per majority view thus held that:

    The dominant nature test or overwhelming component fees is not applicable.

    A composite contract is works contract in terms of Article 366(29A)(B) of the Constitution, the incidental part of labour and services pales into total insignificance for determination of nature of contract.

    The conclusions reached in Kone Elevator (supra) were based on bedrock of incidental service for de-livery since the contract itself speaks about obligation to supply lift as well as its installation which conveys performance of labour and service. Hence fundamental characteristic of works contract are satisfied. The decision rendered in Kone Elevators (supra) does not lay down the law correctly and it is accordingly overruled.

    Contrary view:

According to the view expressed at great length by the Hon. Justice F. M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, by calling an activity as “works contract” by itself will not make the activity a works contract unless as explained in the document confirms to that effect. The contract according to the Bench, related only to supply a branded lift in the premises of the purchaser. Major part of the work is carried out by the purchaser in order to enable the petitioner to erect its elevator in the premises. In view of the nature of the prod-uct supplied, it has to necessarily assemble different parts in purchaser’s premises and thereby fulfill the contract of supply of lift in a working condition.

It was also noted emphatically that reference made by petitioner’s counsel to Bombay Lifts Act,1639 did not provide any scope to reach the conclusion that a contract between petitioner and the purchaser was one of works contact and therefore the submissions made in such re-gard were not acceptable. Next aspect dealt with this in contrary view is elaborate analysis of terms and condi-tions of the specimen contract of the petitioner with purchaser of the elevator. The first part of the contract related to preparatory work for the erection of the lift, the whole of which was observed to have been done by the purchaser whereas provision of ladder in the pit or steel fascia at every sill level were found to be only material and part of the lift and hence did not involve any work therein according to the Bench.

Another set of conditions related to prize variation clause captioned as “works contract.” The Bench making a threadbare analysis of conditions laid therein observed that the caption had nothing to do with the contents there-in. Under this very head, it was stipulated by way of pay-ments that claim for manufactured material had to be paid with material invoice and claim for installation relating to labour costs was required to be paid along with their final invoice. This was found to be indicative of contract be-ing divisible in nature and calling it an indivisible one is contrary to its own terms. The most glaring condition that 90% was payable on signing of the contract and 10% on commissioning of lift or in case of delay beyond control of appellant, then within 90 days of the material getting ready for dispatch itself was suggestive of the fact that the contract was separable, one for supply of material and minuscule portion for work involved. It was further found that receiving 90% upfront without having obligation to fulfill or suffer damages read along with other stipulations disclose that it was attributable towards manufacturing cost whereas the balance towards installation service. Therefore, it would have to be the contract of manufac-ture, supply and installation would be one of ‘sale’ alone and therefore could not be called works contract. Once conclusion reached accordingly, then application of Ar-ticle 366(29A)(b) could not be made.

The next in line, was the observation that as a general proposition, it is not appropriate to hold that whenever any element of works is involved, irrespective of its magnitude, all contracts should be held to be works contracts, though the contract may be for supply of goods. Such sweeping interpretations is inappropriate; what is omitted to be considered is whether in the first instance, by the essential ingredients of the contract, the essential ingredi-ents of ‘sale’ as defined in the Sale of Goods Act are present or absent for the purpose of levy of sales tax. If they are present, then going by the ratio of Bharat Sanchar Nigam’s case (supra), application of Article 366(29A) is not available. In the instant case, the essential ingredient of the contract was for sale of the lift and for this purpose, the petitioner also agreed to carry out installation. In Larsen & Toubro’s case (supra), the contract related to development of property which did not pertain to labour and services alone but also to bring into existence some element of works. Such a ratio considering the nature of contract dealt with could not have universal application to every contract. In the case on hand, when the contract itself was for supply of lift, simply because some work element was involved for installation of the lift, it cannot be held that the whole contract is a works contrathe Larsen

    Toubro (supra) at para 76 would apply in the peculiar facts of that case relating to the construction of building between developer and owner on one side and purchaser on the other.

In the instant case, since sale as defined under the Sale of Goods Act occurred when a lift was supplied and there-fore the question of deemed ‘sale’ did not arise. Also going by the dictum in Patnaik and Company (supra), the contract as a whole has to be examined to understand the real intention of the parties. Applying the said principle to the instant contract to ascertain a contract of ‘sale’ and “works contract”, it can be held that what was transferred by petitioner to the purchaser after its installation was lift as a chattel and this contract is nothing but a sale. To conclude, simply because some element of works is involved in a contract, the whole contract would not be-come works contract. Even after the 46th Amendment, if Article 366(29A)(6) is to be invoked, as a necessary con-comitant, it must be shown that terms of contract lead to conclusion that it is works contract. Unless a contract is proved to be a works contract, Article 36B(29A)(b) is not invokable. Alternatively, if the terms of contract lead to a conclusion of sale, it will attract the provisions of relevant sale tax contract. The Bench thus concluded that the instant case was sale of lift and therefore the decision in Kone Elev.ators (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was correct.

    Conclusion:

Considering that each of the views above, whether majority or otherwise has its own merits and due consideration of facts involved in the issue, it is hard to infer that sanity is necessarily statistical. Nevertheless, the majority view of the Apex Court is respected as law and a binding precent for all. Yet, it is difficult to conclude that controversy surrounding various composite contracts involving sale and works or services of different proportions would cease to exist, considering the fact that each transaction is unique on its own facts and each emerging issue may be different from the available precedents on the larger issue. However, on having a closer look, it is not an up-hill task to deduce that the chief cause of controversy is nothing but absence of a common legislation to tax sale and service. Non-taxability of one component or difference in rate of taxation under separate legislations and Centr-State tug of war are the main contributories to the litigation relating to composite contracts involving sale and works. When a common tax tool is available to tax both goods and services, irrespective of their proportion in a composite contract, the courts will not be required to hair-split and make microscopic observations to analyses their divisibility or otherwise or the elements of sale or service or interpret whether intangible element is goods or service. Every tax compliant corporate citizen is awaiting a day when one complies with the law under a legislation, the hanging sword of wrath under the other legislation no longer exists.

TIME LIMIT FOR AVAILING CENVAT CREDIT

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Preliminary
For the first time, since the introduction of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR, 2004) with effect from 10-09-2004, time limit has been introduced (with effect from 01-09- 2014) for availing CENVAT Credit on inputs and input services. Similar time limit was introduced under the erstwhile MODVAT Rules in the year 1995. However, the same was withdrawn in the year 2000 when CENVAT Rules were introduced in supersession of MODVAT Rules.

An analysis of implications arising from the newly introduced time limit under CCR 2004 and related larger issues are discussed hereafter.

CENVAT (earlier MODVA T) is a substantive right

Some important observations by the Supreme Court, in the context of erstwhile MODVAT Scheme, are very much relevant for CCR 2004 as well, are as under:

Observations of Supreme Court in Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. UOI (1999) 106 ELT 3 (SC)

In the context of specific provisions that were introduced under the erstwhile MODVAT Rules for lapsing of unutilised credit in specific cases, the following observations were made by the Supreme Court

Para 5
…………

In 1995-96 Budget Modvat Scheme was liberalised/ simplified and the credit earned on any input was allowed to be utilised for payment of duty on any final product manufactured within the same factory irrespective of whether such inputs were used in its manufacture or not.…….. The stand of the assessee is that they have utilised the facility of paying excise duty on the inputs and carried the credit towards excise duty payable on the finished products. For the purpose of utilisation of the credit all vestitive facts or necessary incidents thereto have taken place prior to 16-03-1995 or utilisation of the finished products prior to 16-03-1995. Thus, the assessee became entitled to take the credit of the input instantaneously once the input is received in the factory on the basis of the existing scheme….. the right to the credit has become absolute at any rate when the input is used in the manufacture of the final product. The basic postulate, that the scheme is merely being altered and, therefore, does not have any retrospective or retro-active effect, submitted on behalf of the State, does not appeal to us. As pointed out by us that when on the strength of the rules available certain acts have been done by the parties concerned, incidents following thereto must take place in accordance with the scheme under which the duty had been paid on the manufactured products and if such a situation is sought to be altered, necessarily it follows that right, which had accrued to a party such as availability of a scheme, is affected and, in particular, it loses sight of the fact that provision for facility of credit is as good as tax paid till tax is adjusted on future goods on the basis of the several commitments which would have been made by the assessees concerned. Therefore, the scheme sought to be introduced cannot be made applicable to the goods which had already come into existence in respect of which the earlier scheme was applied under which the assessees had availed of the credit facility for payment of taxes. It is on the basis of the earlier scheme necessarily the taxes have to be adjusted and payment made complete. Any manner or mode of application of the said rule would result in affecting the rights of the assessees.

Para 6

We may look at the matter from another angle. If on the inputs the assessee had already paid the taxes on the basis that when the goods are utilised in the manufacture of further products as inputs thereto then the tax on these goods gets adjusted which are finished subsequently. Thus, a right accrued to the assessee on the date when they paid the tax on the raw materials or the inputs and that right would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed.

(emphasis supplied)

Observations of the Supreme Court in CCE vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC)

Para 17
………..
It is clear from these Rules, as we read them, that a manufacturer obtains credit for the excise duty paid on raw material to be used by him in the production of an excisable product immediately it makes the requisite declaration and obtain an acknowledgement thereof. It is entitled to use the credit at any time thereafter when making payment of excise duty on the excisable product. There is no provision in the Rules which provides for a reversal of the credit by the excise authorities except where it has been illegally or irregularly taken, in which event it stands cancelled or, if utilised, has to be paid for. We are here really concerned with credit that has been validly taken, and its benefit is available to the manufacturer without any limitation in time or otherwise unless the manufacturer itself chooses not to use the raw material in its excisable product. The credit is, therefore, indefeasible. It should also be noted that there is no co–relation of the raw material and the final product; that is to say, it is not as if credit can be taken only on a final product that is manufactured out of the particular raw material to which the credit is related. The credit may be taken against the excise duty on a final product manufactured on the very day that it becomes available.

Para 18

It is therefore, that in the case of Eicher Motors vs. Union of India (1999) 106 ELT 3 this Court said that a credit under the MODVAT Scheme was “as good as tax paid.”

(emphasis supplied)

Observations of judicial forums under erstwhile MODVAT Scheme when no time limit was prescribed

In CCE vs. Mysore Lac & Paint Works Ltd. (1991) 52 ELT 590 (CEGAT), it was held that six months is a reasonable time for taking CENVAT Credit.

In one case, it was held that in the absence of any time limit, CENVAT Credit can be taken any time – even after three or four years. – SAIL vs. CCE (2000) 41 RLT 706 (CEGAT) – followed in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. CCE (2001) 129 ELT 459 (CEGAT).

In Coromandal Fertilizer Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 239 ELT 99 (Tri – Bang), it has been held that, when the law is settled on the issue, there is no justification to deny the credit on the ground that it is availed after three to seven years from the date of receipt of inputs. Further, since the CENVAT Credit Rules do not prescribe any outer limit, the Revenue’s contention that credit should be availed within reasonable period is not acceptable.

Useful reference can also be made to judicial rulings in J. V. Strips Ltd. vs. CCE (2007) 218 ELT 252 (Tri – Del) where credits taken after a considerable delay was denied to the assessee and Essar Steel vs. CCE (2008) 222 ELT 154 (Tri – Ahd).

It is evident from the above that in the absence of specific provisions in regard to time limit for availing credit, judicial authorities did consider time limit for claiming refund under Central Excise (viz., six months at the relevant time) as a reasonable time for taking credits. However, it needs to be noted that, the time limit for claiming refund under Central Excise/Service tax has since been increased from six months to one year.

Observations when time limit was prescribed under erstwhile MODVAT Scheme

Supreme Court Ruling in Osram Surya (P) Ltd. vs. CCE (2012) 142 ELT 5 (SC)

Prior to the introduction of the second proviso to Rule 57G i.e., prior to 29-06-1995, a manufacturer was en- titled to withdraw the said credit at any time without there being a limitation on such withdrawal. On 29-06- 1995, second proviso to Rule 57G was introduced by substituting the then existing proviso and the newly introduced proviso read thus : “Provided further that the manufacturer shall not take credit after six months of the date of issue of any of the documents specified in first proviso to this sub-rule:”

In the said case, the appellants who had received their inputs for the manufacture of their respective products, had taken credit under the Modvat Scheme, admittedly, six months after the date of issue of the documents specified in the said proviso to Rule 57G. Therefore, the said credit was disallowed by the authorities. This action of the authorities was questioned by the appellants before the Tribunal, contending that the benefit of the credit which had accrued to them prior to the introduction of the second proviso to the said Rule, cannot be taken away by introduction of a limitation because it was a vested right accrued to them prior to the coming into force of the said proviso to the Rule. They also contended that, the said proviso is not retrospective in its operation and is only applicable to the inputs received by a manufacturer after the introduction of the said proviso. Further, since the said proviso did not specifically state that it is taking away the vested right of a manufacturer, the proviso should be read to mean that the same is not applicable in regard to the credit accrued to a manufacturer prior to the introduction of the said Rule.

On behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that the language of the newly introduced proviso is very clear and admits no ambiguity, therefore, the question of interpretation of the Rule contrary to the said language does not arise at all and on a plain reading of the Rule, the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that after the in- troduction of the said proviso to the Rule, no manufacturer could avail of credit subsequent to a period of six months, as stipulated in the said proviso.

The observations and findings of the Supreme Court are as under:

Para 6

At the outset, we must note that none of the appellants have challenged the validity of the said proviso, therefore, we will have to proceed on the basis that the proviso in question is a valid one. In that background, the sole question that we will have to consider will be: whether the proviso to the Rule in question is applicable to the cases of manufacturers who had received their inputs prior to the introduction of the said proviso and are seeking to take credit in regard to the said inputs beyond the period of six months.

Para 7

……….by introducing the limitation in the said proviso to the Rule, the statute has not taken away any of the vested rights which had accrued to the manufacturers under the Scheme of Modvat. That vested right continues to be in existence and what is restricted is the time within which the manufacturer has to enforce that right. The appellants, however, contended that imposition of a limitation is as good as taking away the vested right. In support of their argument, they have placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. Union of India [1999] 106 ELT 3 (SC)] wherein this Court had held that a right accrued to an assessee on the date when it paid the tax on the raw-materials or the inputs would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed ……. In the facts of Eicher case (supra) that was a case where- in by introduction of the Rule a credit which was in the account of the manufacturer was held not to be available on the coming into force of that Rule, by that the right to credit itself was taken away, whereas in the instant case by the introduction of the second proviso to Rule 57G, the credit in the account of a manufacturer was not taken away but only the manner and the time within which the said credit was to be taken or utilized alone was stipulated. It is to be noted at this juncture that the substantive right has not been taken away by the introduction of the proviso to the Rule in question but a procedural restriction was introduced which, in our opinion, is permissible in law. Therefore, in our opinion, the law laid down by this Court in Eicher’s case (supra) does not apply to the facts of these cases. This is also the position with regard to the judgment of this Court in Collector of Central Excise, Pune & Ors. vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. & Ors. [1997 (7) SCC 448].

Para 8

It is vehemently argued on behalf of the appellants that in effect by introduction of this Rule, a manufac- turer in whose account certain credit existed, would be denied of the right to take such credit consequently, as in the case of Eicher (supra), a manufacturer’s vested right is taken away, therefore, the Rule in question should be interpreted in such a manner that it did not apply to cases where credit in question had accrued prior to the date of introduction of this proviso. In our opinion, this argument is not available to the appellants because none has questioned the legality or the validity of the Rule in question, therefore, any argument which in effect questions the validity of the Rule, cannot be permitted to be raised. The argument of the appellants that there was no time whatsoever given to some of the manufacturers to avail the credit after the introduction of the Rule also is based on arbitrariness of the Rule, and the same also will have to be rejected on the ground that there is no challenge to the validity of the Rule……………

Para 9

……..in our opinion the language of the proviso con- cerned is unambiguous. It specifically states that a manufacturer cannot take credit after six months from the date of issue of any of the documents specified in the first proviso to the said sub-rule. A plain reading of this sub-rule clearly shows that it applies to those cases where a manufacturer is seeking to take the credit after the introduction of the Rule and to cases where the manu- facturer is seeking to do so after a period of six months from the date when the manufacturer received the inputs. This subrule does not operate retrospectively in the sense it does not cancel the credits nor does it in any manner affect the rights of those persons who have already taken the credit before coming into force of the Rule in question. It operates prospectively in regard to those manufacturers who seek to take credit after the coming into force of this Rule………..

(emphasis supplied)

Gujarat high Court Ruling in Baroda Rayon Corporation Ltd. vs. UOI (2014) 306 ELT 551 (GUJ)

The main challenge in the petition was to the Notification No. 16/94-CE (NT), dated 30-03-1994. By virtue of the said notification, gate pass issued under Rule 52A of the MODVAT Rules as it stood prior to 01-04-1994, has been prescribed as a document for the purpose of Rule 57G of the Rules. However, the notification also provided that the documents should have been issued before 01- 04-1994 and the credit under the said Rule should have been taken on or before 30-06-1994. It is this part of the notification was challenged in the petition.

The Court observed and held as under:

Para 8
………. the right to avail of credit is conferred under Rule 57A of the Rules. Rule 57G only provides the procedure to be observed by the manufacturer. Thus, while exercis- ing powers under Rule 57G of the Rules, the Central Government is not empowered to curtail any right conferred under Rule 57A of the Rules. In the circumstances, the impugned notification issued in exercise of powers under Rule 57G of the Rules insofar as the same prescribes a time-limit for taking of credit, being in excess of the powers conferred under the said rule is ultra vires the same and as such cannot be sustained to that extent.

Para 9

Another aspect of the matter is that by curtailing the time- limit within which the credit taken is to be availed, in effect and substance the said notification provides for lapsing of the credit that has already accrued in favour of the pe- titioner. In this regard it may be noted that the petition pertains to credit taken in the year 1994.    Hence,
the present case would be squarely covered by the deci- sions of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Pune vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd, (supra) and in the case of Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. Union of India, (supra) Court.

Para 11

In view of the above discussion, the petition suc- ceeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned No- tification No. 16/94-C.E. (N.T), dated 30th March, 1994 to the extent it provides that the credit under Rule 57G of the rules has to be taken on or before 30th June, 1994 being in excess of the powers conferred under Rule 57g of the Rules is hereby quashed and set aside.

Illustrative cases where credit was allowed after six months from the date of issue of specified documents

•    Alembic Ltd. vs. CCE (2013) 293 ELT 119 (Tri – Ahd)

•    CCE vs. Ford India Ltd. (2012) 284 ELT 202 (Tri – Chennai)

•    Banner Pharma Caps Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 246 ELT 364 (Tri Ahd)

Illustrative cases where credit was denied when taken after 6 months from the date of issue of the specified documents

•    BHEL vs. CC & CE(A) (2007) 219 ELT 609 (Tri Bang)

•    NVK Mohammed Sultan Rawther & Sons Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 237 ELT 741 (Tri – Chennai)

Validity of time limit introduced under CCR 04 with effect from 01/09/2014.

Vide Notification No. 21/2014 CE (NT) dated 11-07-2014, two new provisos have been inserted in Rule 4(1) & 4(7) of CCR 2004 respectively effective 01-09-2014, providing that a manufacturer/service provider shall not take CEN- VAT credit on inputs/input services after six months from the date of any of the documents specified in Rule 9(1) of CCR 2004. As such, no reasons have been provided by the Government for the sudden introduction of time limit, 10 years subsequent to the introduction of CCR 2004.

It would appear that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Eicher Motors & Dai Ichi discussed above, would be relevant in the context of CCR 2004 as well inasmuch as CENVAT Credit is a substantive right  of a manufacturer/service provider. The applicability of the aforesaid principles is strengthened in the scenario of substantial expansion of erstwhile MODVAT Scheme. The prevalent CCR 2004 covers the manufacturing sector substantially and more importantly services sector post introduction of Negative List based taxation of services with effect from 01-07-2012.

Hence, on the basis of principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Eicher Motors & Dai Ichi, provisos inserted in Rule 4(1) & 4(7) of CCR 2004 with effect from 01/09/2014 providing for time limit for taking CENVAT credit on inputs / input services can be challenged before a Court of law inasmuch as it curtails the substantive rights of manufacturers/service providers. Observations of the Supreme Court in Osram Surya’s case support availability of this option to a manufacturer/ service provider.

Without prejudice to the above, it would also appear that the time limit introduced with effect from 01-09-2014 could be regarded as retrospective to an extent it imposes re- strictions on CENVAT Credit entitlement in regard to duty/tax paid documents issued prior to 01-09-2014. Hence, it does curtail the substantive rights of manufacturers/service providers. Despite, the observations of the Supreme Court in Osram Surya Case, it would appear that, a strong case on this ground also can be made to advance an alternative proposition that time limit introduced with effect from 01-09-2014 should apply only to duty / tax paid documents issued on or after 01-09-2014.

Applicability of time limit to Re – Credits
Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 allows CENVAT redit in respect of input service on or after the day on which the invoice is received by a manufacturer/service provider. However, third proviso to the said Rule 4 (7) reads as under:

“Provided also that in case the payment of the value of input service and the service tax paid or payable as indicated in the invoice, bill or as the case may be, challan referred to in Rule 9, except in respect of input service where the whole of the service tax is liable to be paid by the recipient of service , is not made within three months of the date of the invoice, bill or, as the case may be, challan, the manufacturer or the service provider who has taken credit on such input service, shall pay an amount equal to the CENVAT Credit availed on such input service and in case the said payment is made, the manufacturer or output service provider, as the case may be, shall be entitled to take the credit of the amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier subject to the other provisions of these rules:”

(emphasis supplied)

With effect from 01-09-2014, the sixth proviso has been inserted in Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 which provides as under:

“….the manufacturer or the provider of output ser- vice shall not take CENVAT Credit after six months of the date of issue of any of the documents specified in sub-rule (1) of Rule 9.”

Hence, a very important practical issue arises for consid- eration is as to whether the time limit of six months would apply to cases where initial credit has been properly taken within six months but re-credit in terms of third proviso  to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is taken after a period of six months from the date of issue of the tax paid document.

According to one view, in cases where re–credit taken  by the manufacturer/service provider is after the expiry of six months from the date of invoice upon payment, in light of the sixth proviso inserted with effect from 01-09- 2014 prescribing a six month time limit for availment of credit, the manufacturer/output service provider would not be entitled to take re-credit of the amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier. This view is supported by the terminology “subject to the other provisions of these rules” appearing in the third proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004. Hence, the sixth proviso inserted with effect from 01-09-2014, would apply in full force in such cases.

However, according to a second view, “re-credit” allowed as per the third proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is not taking CENVAT Credit, but it is re-credit of an “amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier” and hence, the sixth proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is not appli- cable to such cases. The time limit of six months applies to taking of CENVAT Credit for the first time and not to subsequent re-credit upon payment. Thus, once credit is validly taken within the permitted time limit of six months, subsequent re–credit upon payment pertains to reversal of amount equivalent to CENVAT Credit reversed and not taking of credit.

This view is supported by judicial rulings referred above in cases of Alembic Ltd. (supra)., Ford India Ltd. (supra) and Banner Pharma Caps Pvt. Ltd. (supra) earlier. Though in a different context, useful reference could also be made to ruling in CCE vs. Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. (2010) 259 ELT 13 (GUJ)

Rightly considering the above uncertainty, the Govern- ment has issued Circular No. 990/14/2014-CX-8 dated 19th November, 2014 whereby it is clarified at para 3 that if credit is taken for the first time within six months of the issue of the document under Rule 9(1) of CCR,2004, the condition of taking credit within six months is fulfilled. The limitation period of six months therefore would not apply for taking re-credit of amount reversed. The said clarification is also provided in respect of two more situations viz.
a)    when the value of input or capital goods on which CENVAT Credit taken is written off or such provision is made in the books of account, the manufac- turer or service provider has to reverse the credit taken (Rule 3(5B) of CCR, 2004)
b)    When inputs sent to job worker are not received back within 180 days, the manufacturer or service provider, in the first instance has to reverse the credit taken.

Thus in all the three situations, while taking re-credit, the limitation of six months would not apply if credit in the first instance is taken within the prescribed time limit of six months of the receipt of eligible document.

Conclusion

According to the Budget Estimates for the year 2014-15, collection from service tax (Rs. 2.16 lakh crore) is likely to exceed Central Excise (Rs. 2.05 lakh crore) for the first time. Further, as per the stated taxation policy of the Government, we are moving towards a GST Regime in due course of time. Hence, in that perspective, it is imperative that we have seamless flow of credits and a robust input tax credit regime in line with GST/VAT Systems prevalent worldwide. To advance this cause, the following is recommended:

a)    The time limit for availment of CENVAT credits should be done away with.

b)    Alternatively, if the time limit is to be continued, it should be increased to one year (so as to be consistent with time limit for claiming refund) and the same should be made applicable to duty/tax paid documents issued after 01-09-2014.

c)    Linkage of CENVAT Credit availment with payment to suppliers was relevant prior to the introduction of POT Rules when service tax was required to be paid to the Government after realisation from the customers. The said linkage is not required subsequent to the introduction of POT Rules. Hence, the same should be done away with.

Controversy: whether renting of vehicle & hiring of vehicle different for service tax?

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The question posed in the caption was answered as
‘yes’ recently by the Uttarakhand High Court in August 2014 whereas
Gujarat High Court in 2013 had ruled that they are not different
concepts. The service of “rent-a-cab” was introduced initially in 1997.
The service providers are more often than not individuals or small time
firms and often found to be from semi organised sector. Rounds of
litigation is not achieving finality for a service that carries 60%
abatement on its value. Prior to the above two decisions, there have
been two to three judgments of different High Courts involving
taxability of transportation service under rent-a-cab scheme and/or tour
operators which also included widely followed decisions in First
Secretary Federation of Bus Operators vs. UOI 2001 (134) ELT 618 (Mad)
and CCE, Chandigarh vs. Kuldeep Singh Gill 2010 (18) STR 708 (P&H).

Decision of The Uttarakhand High Court:
Recently,
the Division Bench of the Uttarakhand High Court, dismissed revenue’s
appeal in 2014-TIOL- 2039-HC-UKAND-ST, Commissioner of Customs &
Central Excise vs. Sachin Malhotra & Others, taking a view that
unless control over vehicle is passed to the hirer under the rent-a-cab
scheme, there cannot be a taxable transaction u/s. 65(105)(o) read with
section 65(91) of the Finance Act,1994 – (The Act).

It is also
observed, “Though both rent and hire may in different context, have the
same connotation, in the context of rent-a-cab scheme and hiring, we are
of the view that they signify two different transactions. What the
lawgiver has chosen fit to tax by way of imposition of service tax is
only transaction relating to business of renting of cabs”. While
deciding as above, the Hon. High Court expressly stated “we are unable
to subscribe to the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
(supra) which is relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant. We
would think that the said Court has not considered the aspects, which we
would think were absolutely relevant in arriving at a conclusion”. The
aspect the Court referred to while concluding as above is section 75 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which contains provisions relating to
empowering Central Government to notify a scheme for renting of motor
cabs. The Rent-A-Cab Scheme,1989 has been formed under these provisions
and which contemplates licensing of the operator under such scheme and
other incidental matters. The counsel for the revenue discussing all
relevant issues and rulings on the subject matter also pleaded to the
Court to ignore the provisions of section 75 of the Motor Vehicles Act
yet, probably did not bring to the attention of the Court that when the
service of rent-a-cab scheme operator was introduced for the first time
in the net of service tax with effect from 16/07/1997 the definition of
rent a cab scheme operator read as:

“Rent-a-cab scheme operator
means a person who is the holder of a license under the Rent-a-Cab
Scheme, 1989 formed by the Central Government under the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988”.

The said definition was substituted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1998 to read as follows:

Section 65(19) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act):
“Rent-a-cab scheme operator means any person engaged in the business of renting of cabs”.

In
turn, taxable service as per section 65(105)(o) of the Act is defined
as “any service provided or to be provided to any person by a rent-a-cab
scheme operator in relation to renting of cab.”

While
considering revenue’s appeal the Hon. High Court in addition to the
P&H High Court’s decision of Kuldeep Singh Gill (supra) also
discussed at length the other two important decisions viz. Secretary
Federation of Bus Operator Association of TN (supra) and L. V.
Sankeshwar Proprietix Vijayanand Travels vs. Superintendent of Central
Excise 2006-TIOL-340-HC-KAR ST in addition to discussing CIT vs. Madan
& Co. (2002) 174 CTR (Madras)-172.

However, according to the
High Court, each one was distinguished or differed with as the facts of
each of them did not help revenue’s case.

In view of this, it is desirable to briefly summarise at least two of these decisions.

In
case of Kuldeep Singh Gill (supra), the assesse provided transport
service to a corporate on contract basis and contended that since they
did not hold any kind of permit including the tourist permit issued
under the Motor Vehicles Act they were not liable for service tax as
rent-a-cab service provider. In addition to this, no other valid ground
was put forth for non-taxability. The court therefore observed that
section 65 of the Finance Act,1994 does not talk of tourist permit
issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, but only talks about user of the
tourist vehicle by tour operator. Merely, because the Motor Vehicles Act
provides for granting tourist permit, it would not automatically mean
that section 65 also contemplates only a tourist permit and not
otherwise. The court observed and followed the judgment in Secretary,
Federation of Bus Operators (supra) “mutatis-mutandis” which clearly
concluded that ‘tourist permit’ is not required to attract provisions of
section 65(52) of the Finance Act”. Therefore, transport service
provided by the Respondent in this case is a taxable service. In turn,
in case of Secretary, Federation of Bus Operators (supra), the Hon.
Madras High Court examined the issue of service tax applicable to tour
operators u/s. 65(52) and rent-a-cab scheme operator u/s. 65(38) of the
Act & dealt with each category separately. As regards, rent-a-cab
service, the court categorically, interalia held as follows:

“We
have already pointed out that the scope of amended provision, which is
as per Section 65(38), has been widened by deleting the requirement of
holding a licence under Rent-a-cab Scheme,1989. Under the amended
provision any person engaged in business of renting of cabs becomes a
rent-a-cab scheme operator.

(53) we have, therefore, no
hesitation in holding that if the petitioners are plying the motor cabs
or maxi cabs and the services are provided by them to any person in
relation to the renting of the cabs, such service becomes a “taxable
service” and therefore, comes within the ambit of Section 66(3) of the
Finance Act.

Decision of the Gujarat High Court:

As opposed to the above, another recently reported de- cision of the Gujarat high Court (although decided on 10/05/2013 as against the above order of 6th august, 2014, of the uttarakhand high Court) in CST vs. Vijay Travels 2014 (36) STR 513 (Guj) again in appeal by the revenue, the hon. Court has held that there is no difference between renting and hiring of vehicle for levy of service tax. In this case, it was contended in assessee’s case that while the assessee provided passenger vehicles like ambassador, Swaraj mazda, 56 Seater luxury buses etc. to a State Government Board on hire and charged for the same on kilometer basis. It was argued that vehicles were not on rent and the activity did not amount to hand- ing over possession of vehicle to a person who wished to rent it and to drive it himself or through his own driver or to keep it at its disposal and regardless the rent would be payable. as against this, in case of hiring, the passengers are carried for a fare and possession of the vehicle remains with the driver and the entire responsibility would be of the car owner. The counsel for assessee also discussed provisions of section 75 of the motor Vehicles act and contended that only licensed persons under the said section are targeted under the tax net whereas transportation service providers were not intended to be taxed by the above provisions. further, distinction was sought to be made by the assessee’s counsel with the madras high Court’s decision in federation of Bus operators (supra) by stressing that the said judgment dealt with the question of tour operators which is a wholly different service from rent-a-cab service and the judgment did not deal with the issue as to what constitutes renting of a motor cab. He further urged that the judgment of the P&h high Court (supra) also did not deal with the said issue and therefore it was not a binding precedent. Summarily, the case of the assessee was that they operated trips to various places where the management continued with themselves and payment was made on kilometer basis and they did not give vehicles to the Board for operating under Board’s management. the ahmedabad tribunal on the basis of these details had held that no service tax was leviable on this. in fact, this very tribunal at a later date also in Shri Gayatri Tourist Bus Service vs. CCE, Vadodara 2013 (29) STR 499 (Tri.-Ahmd) by a majority decision (the matter was  referred  to  the third  member  on  account  of  difference of opinion) has decided in a similar situation that when vehicles are used for transportation of personnel and delegates of client and the assessee is paid on the basis of log book maintained for the purpose, the vehicles are held as not rented to the client.   This is because in case of renting, the driver of property is depossessed and possession passes on to person who has taken it for usage. When the payment is not on a monthly fixed rent but based on usage means that vehicle is not let out on rent and hence service is not taxable as rent-a-cab service. Coming back to the case before the Gujarat high Court, the above factual matrix was examined vis-à-vis the statutory provisions of service tax law including the definition of cab in section 65(20) of the Act which reads as:

“‘Cab’ means –
(i)    motor cab, or
(ii)    a maxi cab, or
(iii)    any motor vehicle constructed or adapted to carry more than twelve passengers excluding the driver for hire or reward”.

Motor cab, maxi cab in turn have been given the mean- ings under the service tax law, as given under the mo- tor Vehicles Act. For the definition of motor vehicle also, the meaning given in the motor Vehicles act was referred to. The issue consequently was therefore to examine who can be said to have been engaged in the business of renting of a cab and whether renting and hiring of vehicle as contended by the assessee is con- templated by the statute to exclude latter category from tax net?

The Court noted that the requirement of having minimum 50 vehicles and a license as required under the rent Cab Scheme 1989 was done away with the substitution of  the definition of rent-a-cab in 1998 and therefore it would amount to artificial requirement of statute if only those persons are taxed who give away their vehicles without retaining  any  control  personally  or  through  driver.  The Court observed that the concept of lease and license was brought about by contending that lease would have insurable interest which is absent in license.

For this  purpose, the Court examined various dictionary meanings of ‘rent’, one of which provides as “A tax or similar charge levied or paid to a person”. Simultaneously, the Court found that the word ‘hire’ means “payment under contract for the use of something” or “a bailment by which the use of thing or the services are contracted for, at a certain price or reward.” On examination, it was observed that both in renting and licensing de facto pos- session of the thing is enjoyed and came to the conclusion “conceptually and essentially if the nature of service provided is the same, natural corollary is that such service is taxed under the taxing statute.” It was also observed that concept of providing transportation service where de jure control remains with the owner of the vehicle and the driver and yet it functions in accordance with the wish and desire of the person hiring it. In the absence of any specific exclusion in the statute of such service from taxing net, a large portion of such services cannot be held to be non-inclusive by any artificial interpretation and therefore escape the liability on the ground that hiring is differ- ent from renting and such distinction does not find favour with the court. This is because there is nothing to read into the taxing statute that only those persons owning the vehicles and providing on rent with exclusive control of the customer only would be charged was held by the hon. high Court while deciding this case, the hon. high Court relied on the P&h high Court decision (supra) as well as heavily relied on the madras high Court decision in Secretary, federation of Bus operators assn. t.n. (supra).

Conclusion:

It is quite evident at this point that the controversy may or may not end soon on the above issue at least for the period prior to the negative list based service taxation. However, yet another significant concept required to b examined is whether or not a contract of renting and/or hiring a motor vehicle for the use of hirer irrespective of duration of usage of the vehicle amount to “transferring of goods by way of hiring, leasing or licensing wherein transfer of right to use such goods occurs and therefore a transaction would be considered one of ‘deemed sale’ under the Vat laws as decided in landmark decision of the andhra Pradesh high Court in M/s. G.S. Lamba & Sons & others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT, [analysed in november 2012 issue of BCAJ]. In this case, the issue before the court was whether hiring of transit mixers was contract of transportation service or transfer of the right to use goods.under the contracts, the transit mixers were never transferred to hirer/user Grasim as the effective control over running & using, disciplinary control over drivers, obtaining route permits, to maintain & upkeep vehicles in good condition responsibility for damage during transportation etc. as well as registration of vehicles remained vested in petitioner, the claimant of transport service provider. After a very detailed examination and analysis of terms of contract vis-à-vis all relevant statutory provisions  of  Vat/Sales  tax,  Sale  of  Goods act,  along  with article 366 (29a)(d) of the Constitution of india etc. and considering law laid down by various relevant judicial pronouncements including landmark decision of BSNL vs. UOI 2006-TIOL-15-SC-CT-LB, it was held that tax is not levied on delivery of goods used but on the transfer of the right to use property in goods. This is for the fact that all the tests laid down in BSnL decision (supra) are satisfied cumulatively viz. goods are available for delivery, there is consensus ad idem as to the identity of goods, the transferee has a legal right to goods including the use of licenses, permissions etc. available, for the period during the use, the transferee has the legal right to the exclusion of the transferor and lastly the owner/transferor does not have the right to transfer the same right to others during the period the transferee having legal rights to use the goods. Further, this is irrespective of the length of the duration. Thus, it was held to be the case of ‘deemed sale’ involving transfer of right to use goods and not one of transportation service. It may sound like the opening of Pandora’s box but do the facts of hiring/renting a cab not appear analogical to the contract of hiring of transit mixers (along with drivers)? at this point, however it is to be noted that education Guide published by the Government at paras 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 while clarifying scope and coverage of the declared service of transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing etc. without transferring the right to use goods, after discussing the test laid down by BSNL (supra) has clarified at illustrations 1 and 4 that when a vehicle is given on hire along with driver where the charge is recovered on mileage basis or when all responsibility is of the owner to abide by the laws, the right to use is not transferred as the car owner retains permissions and licenses relating to cab and therefore effective control and possession is not transferred and thus it is a declared service. Readers may ponder over the same depending however on the relevant facts of each case.

SECONDMENT/DEPUTATION OF EMPLOYEES SERVICE TAX IMPLICATIONS

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Introduction
Secondment/Deputation of
employees within group companies has been a very common feature in
almost all major business houses in India. The globalisation of the
Indian economy has resulted in substantially increased presence of
Multi-National Companies (MNC) in India and Indian companies in the
markets abroad. This gave rise to cross-border secondment/deputation of
employees within a group.

Several issues have arisen as regards
service tax implications on secondment/deputation of employees within a
group (either based in India or abroad) resulting in extensive
litigation. The same is being discussed hereafter.

Relevant Statutory Provisions
a) Provisions Prior to 1/7/12


“manpower recruitment or supply agency” means any person engaged in
providing any service, directly or indirectly, in any manner for
recruitment or supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise, to any
other person.”

Section 65(105)(k) of the Act

“taxable service means any service provided or to be provided –

to
any person, by a manpower recruitment or supply agency in relation to
the recruitment or supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise, in any
manner.

Explanation

For the removal of doubts, it
is hereby declared that for the purposes of this sub-clauses,
recruitment or supply of manpower includes services in relation to
prerecruitment screening, verification of the credentials and
antecedents of the candidate and authenticity of documents submitted by
the candidate.”

b) Provisions with effect from 01/07/2012

Section 65B (44) of the Act


“Service” means any activity carried out by a person for another for
consideration, and include a declared service, but shall not include –

……..
(b) a provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment.”

Rule 2(1) (g) of Service tax rules, 1994 (Rules)


“Supply of manpower” means supply of manpower, temporarily or
otherwise, to another person to work under his superintendence or
Control.”

Relevant Extracts from Draft CBEC Circular No. 354/127/2012 TRU dated 27-07-2012

A. Scope of Manpower Supply

2.
After the negative list coming into force, the erstwhile definition of
the manpower recruitment or supply agency is no more applicable. Thus,
the words manpower supply would have to be given their natural meaning.
The manpower supply is understood to mean when one person provides
another person with the use of one or more individuals who are
contractually employed or otherwise engaged by the first person. The
essence of the employment should be that the individuals should be
employed by the provider of the service and not by the recipient of the
service.

3. There could be certain contracts in which such
manpower is made available to execute another independent contract by
the service provider. For example, a person may agree to carry out
construction or a manufacture for another in which certain manpower may
be engaged. As long as such manpower is not placed operationally
under the superintendence or control of the recipient, it shall not be a
case of manpower supply, though it will continue to be judged
independently whether it comprises any other taxable service.

4. There
are also cases of secondment whereby certain staff belonging to an
organisation is placed at the disposal of a subsidiary company or any
other associate company. Such cases will be covered by the definition of
manpower supply as the contractual employment continues to be with the
parent company.

B. Joint Employment

5. T here
can also be cases where staff is employed by one or more employers who
normally share the cost of such employment. The services provided by
such employee will be covered by the exclusion provided in the
definition of service. However, if the staff has been engaged by one
employer and only made available to other for a consideration, it shall
not be a case of joint employment.

6. Another arrangement could
be where one entity pays the salary and other expenses of the staff on
behalf of other joint employers which are later recouped from the other
employers on an agreed basis on actuals. Such recoveries will not be
liable to service tax as it is merely a case of cost reimbursement.

Service tax implications

As regards the provisions applicable prior to 01-07-2012, most of the
litigation is centered around applicability under the taxable service
[section 65(68) /65(105)(k) of the Act] of “manpower recruitment or
supply agency service”. Under the said provisions the following
conditions had to be fulfilled so as to bring the subject activities
within the scope of taxable service viz.:

The service provider
should have been engaged in providing the service of recruitment or
supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise to any other person; and

the
individuals had to be contractually employed by the manpower supply
agencies and there was no employee – employer relationship between the
individual and the service recipient.

• Under the negative list
regime, introduced with effect from 01-07-2012, service tax is payable
on all activities for consideration carried out by one person or another
for consideration, except those excluded from the definition of
‘service’ or specified in the negative list of services and the
exemption notifications. The services provided by an employee to the
employer, if provided in the course of or in relation to employment,
have been specifically excluded from the definition of ‘service’.

Further,
since the categorisation of taxable services has been done away with,
the condition of a person being engaged in the business of supply of
manpower is no more relevant. However, Rule 2(1)(g) of the Rules,
defines “supply of manpower” for the purpose of reverse change
provisions. .

Considering the specific exclusion from the
definition of service, the aspect of employer-employee relationship
assumes greater significance, insofar as the applicability of service
tax is concerned.

Employer – Employee relationship and Joint Employment
In
case of secondment/deputation of employees of an overseas based company
to an Indian company, the concept of joint employment becomes relevant,
provided the expatriate is also employed by the Indian company, in
terms of the relevant Indian laws are concerned. The issue which is
being deliberated is, whether the concept of joint employment can help
MNCs to arrange their affairs in a lawful manner so as to get the
benefit of exclusion from the definition of service. Hence, it is very
important to analyse and understand the concept of employment and
thereafter the concept of joint employment.

The Honorable
Supreme Court has from time to time expressed a view that the test of
supervision and control is a crucial point for determining the employer –
employee relationship. [Refer Shivanandan Sharma vs. Punjab National
Bank AIR 1955 SC 404]. However, it needs to be noted that the Honorable
Supreme Court has also held that since the nature of supervision and
control varies from business to business, it becomes difficult to
precisely define the degree of such supervision and control & lay
down a single formula or test for the same.

The Gujarat High Court in Satish Plastics vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner – 44 FLR 207 (Guj.) has summarised the tests for ascertaining master-servant relationship as under:

i) Was he doing the work for monetary payment?

ii)    Was the work done by him the work of the establishment or had a nexus with such work?

iii)    Was the payment made as wages, in the sense of being remuneration for the physical or mental effort in connection with such work?

iv)    Was the work such that it had to be done as directed by the establishment or under its supervision and control to the extent that supervision and control are possible having regard to the specialised nature of the work or the skill needed for its performance?

v)    Was the work of such a nature and character that ordinarily a master–  servant  relationship  could  exist and, but for the agreement styling it as a contract, common sense would suggest a master– servant bond?

vi)    Was the relation indicative of master–servant status in substance having regard to the economic realities irrespective of the nomenclature devised by the parties?

vii)    Was he required to do the work personally without the liberty to get it done through someone else?

The above can serve as a useful guide for ascertainment of employer–employee relationship.

In overseas jurisdictions, the test is that of the economic reality rather than various factors discussed above. however, no single or uniform test has been laid down by the Courts to determine the economic reality. Many factors such as the extent of the skill and initiative of an employee being an  integral  part  of  the  employees  business,  the permanency of their relationship, the nature and degree of employer’s control, etc., have been considered by the Courts in the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case.

The absence of defined principles for the application of the test of economic reality has posed challenges before the Courts in determining the existence of employment relationship. Apart from the principle of economic reality, the Courts have also considered the principle of mutuality of obligation for determining the presence of a contract of service.

The  concept  of  joint  employment  has  been  recognized and given effect to in many overseas jurisdictions including US & UK in particular. However, the concept of joint employment and economic reality is comparatively new in india. further, the variety of tests propounded for establishing the employer- employee relationship has brought in more uncertainty. draft CBeC Circular referred above does briefly cover the concept. However, it does not provide any finality as to the Government’s perspective on the concept & service tax implications arising therefrom. the joint employment concern is necessarily an application of the principle of “substance over form”. But how far such relationships can actually sustain in employment laws is a difficult question for which there are no ready answers.

Analysis of some decisions:

•    Ruling in Volkswagen India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. CCE (2014) 34 STR 135 (Tri – Mumbai)

The brief facts of the case were that the appellant was a manufacturer of passenger vehicles and was registered under service tax for various taxable services like, management or business consultant’s service, consulting engineer’s service, etc.

Due to nature of the business, the appellant required people with specialised skill and experience and accordingly, the appellant employed many foreign nationals (called as global employees), who were previously employed with other group entity. there was an “inter Company employment agreement” between the appellant and its holding company namely Volkswagen AG, a company registered in Germany, which facilitatesd employment of personnel from other group companies. The  said  personnel  were  relieved  by  the  other  group company and were put at the disposal of the appellant and they function as whole time employees of the appellant– indian company and worked solely under the control, direction or supervision of the appellant in accordance with its policies, rules and guidelines generally applicable to the employees of the appellant company during the period  of  such  employment.  The  terms,  conditions  and place of employment of such global employee and their designation was in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed between indian company and the respective global employee. In particular, following agreement terms need to be noted:

•    The employment of such global employee shall be in his personal capacity only and not for and on behalf of the foreign company. the appellant also have a right to promote/discipline/suspend/take any action/terminate the services of such global employee at any point of time in accordance with its applicable policies without seeking any permission from the foreign company;

•    The other group company/foreign company will not have any obligation towards the appellant with regard to the performance of the global employee nor the foreign company shall enjoy any right, title to or interest in or be responsible for the work of global employee or assume any risk for the results produced from the work performed by the global employees while under employment with the appellant;

•    During the period of employment with the appellant, the holding company shall not in any way interfere with the working and/or the terms and conditions of such employee nor such employee shall be subject to any instruction or control of the foreign holding company;

•    The salary (including other entitlements) of such global employee shall be the liability of and decided and paid by the indian company i.e. the appellant based on its policies and guidelines and in case of default by the appellant, the foreign/global company will not be liable towards such global employee;

•    If the foreign/global company makes any payment to any third party (salary, etc.) in the home country of the global employee on behalf of the indian company, the foreign company will be entitled to be reimbursed by the indian company to the extent of such payment;

•    The foreign company will not be under any obligation to replace any of the global employees in the event the employment of any of the global employees is terminated by the global employee or the indian company, for any reason, nor the foreign company    is responsible for any loss or damage caused to the appellant or any action of such global employee;

•    The agreement does not create any service provider and client relationship between the foreign company and the appellant nor it would be construed that the foreign company is providing any type of  services with regard to employment of the global employees with the appellant;

•    Clearly provided that there is no direct or indirect consideration/charges (in cash or kind) payable by the indian company to the foreign company or vice-versa in this connection;

•    The remuneration clause provided is as follows:-
Your remuneration will be paid as follows:-
F Part of your net salary will be paid by the company into your valid account in Germany (through the disbursing agent, (VW aG) at the end of each calendar month).

F The  balance  part  of  your  net  salary  as  mutually agreed upon between you and company will be paid by the company into your valid account in india at the end of the calendar month.

Details of your remuneration will be communicated to you separately. your salary to be paid to Germany as above, would be paid subject to approvals as may be required under the indian exchange control regulations. the gross remuneration is subject to statutory withholding/indian income taxes as applicable.

The   company   shall   deduct   the   applicable   individual income-tax payable at source and make payment of the same.  The  company  shall  furnish  you  with  necessary certificates and any other documents evidencing the payment of this tax to the authorities as may be required by law.

…………..

•    The Visa clause of the agreement shows that such global employees are in the control and disposal and also command of the appellant and there is employer– employee relationship between them.

The revenue treated the aforementioned arrangement as “supply of manpower” by the foreign holding company to the appellant and issued show cause notice demanding service tax etc.

For  the  appellants,  it  was  submitted  that  there  was  no supply of labour or manpower, and/or recruitment service provided by the holding company of the appellant. as  per the requirement and request of the appellant, for skilled personnel, the holding company  facilitated  in  the identifying such foreign personnel, who were then employed by the appellant under separate agreement with each employee as aforementioned. Such global employees worked under the control and supervision of the appellant as its employees. Salary for such work done by the global employees was directly paid by the appellant and such income earned by the global employees was taxable as salary under the provisions of the income-tax act, 1961. Further, the appellant deducted income-tax at source from the salary of such global employee of the appellant as per the provisions of the income-tax act. the appellant had also issued necessary TDS certificate in capacity of employer.

Further,  a  part  of  the  salary  of  such  global  employees was remitted abroad in their home country, the same was done using the services of the holding company or other group companies as applicable and such amounts were reimbursed to the other company. It was further contended that apart from the part salary of the global employees (by way of reimbursement), the appellant had not paid any amount to their holding/foreign company. Merely because a part of the salary of such global employee was paid in their home country through the holding/foreign company, it could be said that the foreign/ holding company rendered supply of manpower or labour to  the  appellant. Reliance  was  placed  on  the  decisions in the case of ITC Ltd. vs. (2013) 29 STR 387 (Tribunal) and Paramount Communication Ltd. vs. (2013) 29 STR 317 (Tribunal).

It was further contended that the holding/foreign company was not a “manpower recruitment or supply agency service” as required u/s. 65(105)(k) of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, reliance was placed on C.B.E & C Circular No. 96/7/2007-S.T. dated 23-08-2007, wherein it has been clarified that in the case of supply of manpower, individuals are contractually employed by the manpower recruitment  or  supply  agency.  The  agency  agrees  for use of the services of an individual, employed by him, to another person, for a consideration. Employer–employee relationship in such case exists between the agency and the individual and not between the individual and the person who uses the services of the individual.

On  behalf  of  the  revenue,  it  was  contended  that  the indian entity should have paid full salary directly to the employee of the appellant company and not routed through the foreign/holding company. It is also the contention of the revenue that after a period of 3-4 years such global employees go back to the foreign/holding company and even during the intervening period, during the employment in the appellant company, the social security liability was discharged in their home country. Accordingly, it was submitted that the transaction is one of supply of labour/manpower by the foreign company to the appellant – indian company.

The tribunal held, “in view of the clauses of agreements noticed herein above and other facts, the global employees working under the  appellant  are  working  as their employees and having employee-employer relationship.  Further  there  is  no  supply  of  manpower service rendered to the appellant by the foreign / holding company. the method of disbursement of salary cannot determine the nature of transaction. Further, in view of the rulings relied upon by the appellant as aforementioned, we find that the facts are covered on all four corners and accordingly, the appeals are allowed and orders–in– original are set aside.”

•    Ruling in CST vs. Arvind Mills Ltd (2014) 35 STR 496 (GUJ)

In this case, the issue in brief was whether the respondent is a manpower supply or recruitment agency.

The  brief  facts  were  that  respondent  had  a  composite textile mill and was engaged in manufacturing of fabrics and readymade garments. in order to reduce its cost, the respondent deputed some of its employees to its group company, who were also engaged in similar businesses. Reason for such deputation was also on certain occasions stipulated work arising for a limited period. The tribunal recorded that there was no allegation  of  finding  that the respondent had deputed employees to any other concerns outside its own subsidiary companies and also recorded that undisputedly the employees deputed do not work exclusively under the direction or supervision of the subsidiary company and upon completion of the work they were repatriated to the respondent company. On such basis, the tribunal held that the respondent could be said to be manpower supply recruitment agency and, therefore, not exigible to service tax.

The Revenue contended that the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency was very wide and would include range of activities of supply of manpower either temporarily or permanently and submitted that sizable manpower was required for the respondent from the group companies for deputation of the staff and also drew attention to the amendment of such definition to contend that after the amendment, the definition was widened.

The Court observed that the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency was wide and would cover within its sweep range of activities provided therein. However, in the present case, such definition would not cover the activity of the respondent as rightly held by the tribunal. to  court  observed,  “the  respondent  in  order  to  reduce his cost of manufacturing, deputed some of its staff to its subsidiaries or group companies for stipulated work or limited period. All throughout the control and supervision remained with the respondent. As pointed out by the respondent, company is not in the business of providing recruitment or supply of manpower. Actual cost incurred by the company in terms of salary, remuneration and perquisites is only reimbursed by the group companies.” There was no element of profit or finance benefit. The subsidiary companies could not be said to be their clients. deputation of the employees was only for and in the interest of the company. There was no relation of agency and client. it was pointed out that the employee deputed did not exclusively work under the direction of supervision or control of subsidiary company. All throughout he would be under the continuous control and direction of the company. The court further noted:
“We have to examine the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency in background of such undisputable facts. The definition though provides that manpower recruitment supply agency means any commercial concern engaged in providing any services directly or indirectly  in any manner for recruitment or supply of manpower temporarily or otherwise to a client, in the present case, the respondent cannot be said to be a commercial concern engaged in providing such specified services to a client. It is true that the definition is wide and would include  any such activity where it is carried out either directly or indirectly supplying recruitment or manpower temporarily or otherwise. However, fundamentally recruitment of the agency being a commercial concern engaged in providing any such service to client would have to be satisfied. In the present case, facts are to the contrary.”

In the result, the Court held that no question of law was involved.

Conclusion
•    For the period prior to 01-07-2012, as analyzed and held in judicial rulings, in order to be made liable to service tax, it would be essential to satisfy the test of existence of a manpower supply or recruitment agency as defined under the Act at the relevant time.

•    After introduction of negative list regime with effect from 01-07-2012, since the term ‘service’ has been very widely defined, it would be essential to satisfy  the test of employer – employee relationship so as    to be excluded from the definition of ‘service’. As discussed, the Courts have held that it is very difficult to lay down a single test or formula in this regard. hence, though guidance may be available from Court rulings, existence of employer–employee relationship would have to be determined considering the facts & circumstances of a given case.

•    It is  unfortunate  to  note  that  despite  the  fact  that a draft circular dated 27-07-2012 was issued by CBEC clarifying scope  of  Manpower  Supply  &  Joint Employment, CBEC has not issued a final Circular setting out Government’s perspective, in particular, as regards taxability of secondment/ deputation of employees. It is felt that issue of a CBeC Circular, would provide finality on the issue and avoid extensive litigation.

TAXABILITY OF TAKE AWAYS AND HOME DELIVERIES

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Background
Service tax levy on Air Conditioned Restaurants (with license to serve liquor) [“ACR”) was introduced, w.e.f. 01-05-2011, with an abatement of 70%. The said levy has been continued under negative list based taxation of services introduced w.e.f. 01-07-2012, with few minor changes in the scope and rate of abatement.

However, the scope of ACR Services, was substantially expanded w.e.f. 01-04-2013, whereby the condition of license to serve liquor was done away with. Far reaching implications of the amendment were discussed in April, 2013 issue of BCAJ. In this feature, the contentious of issue of taxability in case of take aways / home deliveries in regard to which inconsistent practices are being followed, is discussed.

Constitutional Validity of the levy
The constitutional validity of service tax levy on ACR was challenged before various Courts in the country. The Kerala High Court in the case of Kerala Classified Hotels and Resorts Association & others (2013) 31 STR 257 (KER) had held the levy constitutionally invalid. However, the Bombay High Court in India Hotels and Restaurant Association & Others vs. UOI (2014 – TIOL – 498 – HC – Mum – ST) and the Chhattisgarh High Court in Hotel East Park & Another vs. UOI (2014 – TIOL – 758 – HC – CHHATTISGRAH – ST) have upheld the constitutional validity of the levy.

Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 65 B (44) of the Finance Act, 1994, as amended (Act)

“Service” means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include –

(a) an activity which constitutes merely, –

i) A transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or

ii) Such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be a sale within the meaning of Clause (29A) of article 366 of the Constitution; or

iii) A transaction in money or actionable claim.

(b) A provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;

(c) Fees taken in any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force.

………………….

Declared Services (section 66E of the Act)

The following shall constitute declared services, namely
…………

(i) Service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as a part of the activity.

Article 366 (29A) (f) of the Constitution of India
Sale includes –

“Supply, by way of or as a part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.”

Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012 – ST dated 20-06-2012 (as amended)

Entry No. 19

Services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having facility of air conditioning or central air heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year.

Relevant Extracts from CBEC – Education Guide dated 20-06-2012

Para 8.4

Valuation of service portion involved in supply of food or any other article of human consumption or any drink in a restaurant or as outdoor catering.

In terms of article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India supply of any goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) in any manner as part of a service for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration is deemed to be a sale of such goods. Such a service therefore cannot be treated as service to the extent of the value of goods so supplied. The remaining portion however constitutes a service. It is a well settled position of law, declared by the Supreme Court in BSNL‘s case [2006(2)STR161(SC)], that such a contract involving service along with supply of such goods can be dissected into a contract of sale of goods and contract of provision of service. Since normally such an activity is in the nature of composite activity, difficulty arises in determining the value of the service portion. In order to ensure transparency and standardization in the manner of determination of the value of such service provided in a restaurant or as outdoor catering a new Rule 2C has been inserted in the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 116 2011, amended by the amendment Rules of 2012. This manner of valuation is explained in the points below.

Para 8.4.1 Are services provided by any kind of restaurant, big or small, covered by the manner of valuation provided in Rule 2C of the Valuation Rules?

Yes. Although services provided by any kind of restaurant would be valued in the manner provided in Rule 2C, it may be borne in mind that the following category of restaurants are exempted –

• Services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year, ……………..

• Below the threshold exemption.

Departmental Clarifications
Circular D.O.F NO. 334/3/2011 – TRU dated 28-02-2011 (Relevant extracts) Para 1.4

The new levy is directed at services provided by highend restaurant that are air-conditioned and have license to serve liquor. Such restaurants provide conditions and ambience in a manner that service provided may assume predominance over the food in many situations. It should not be confused with mere sale of goods at any eating house, where such services are materially absent or so minimal that it will be difficult to establish that any service in any meaningful way is being provided.

Para 1.6

The levy is intended to be confined to the value of services contained in the composite contract and shall not cover either the meal portion in the composite contract or mere sale of food by way of pick-up or home delivery, as also goods sold at MRP…………….

Circular No. 173/8/2013 dated 07-10-2013 (relevant extracts)

Taxability – Supply of food at outlets, take aways, delivery etc.
Various restaurants, hotels or coffee shops sell food items, beverages, ready-to-drink products, including food pre-packaged at their outlets. The arrangement may be sale at outlet for consumption within the premises or sale over the counter or sale of MRP products.

The scope of declared list entry (i) of section 66E of the Act is very wide and covers service portion of an activity of supply of food or any article of human consumption or any drinks in any manner. Hence, service tax will be payable whenever supply of food involves any service element and the transaction is not merely a “transfer of title” in goods. The issue which requires consideration is whether supply of food items and beverages is a transaction of

merely “transfer of title” in goods or involves any service element as part of supply of goods and beverages. As regards the determination of what is ‘sales’ under article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India, various judicial rulings have evolved a law to the following effect:

• the predominant transaction is a ‘sale’ or ‘service’ must be determined from the facts of each case;

• where supply is made in a restaurant and if the customer has the right to take away the food or dispose it off at his discretion, it may qualify as ‘sale’ and providing of services in this situation would be incidental;
•    further, in relation to “over the counter” sales, it may qualify as sale of goods, as the services are not significant.

Though the above evolution of law is before the introduction of negative list based taxation of services, the same would be relevant, to determine what constitutes ‘sale’ as contemplated in the exclusion clause in the definition of ‘service’. [section 65 B(44) of the Act] under the negative list regime.
The CBEC circulars issued at the time of introduction of levy as reproduced earlier, have clarified that mere sale of food by way of pick-up or home delivery as well as goods sold at MRP will not attract service tax. Though these circulars were issued in the context of “ACR Services” the principle contained therein would be relevant under the negative list based regime. Further, as ‘sale’ is covered under the exclusion clause in the definition of ‘service’, there can be no levy of service tax as “Declared Services”.

•    Whether the service tax is attracted even where the air-conditioning facility has operated for a part of the year or in any part of establishment. In particular, cases where A/c is not installed in the restaurant area where food is supplied for consumption by a customer but in Manager’s cabin or a Cold Storage area in a kitchen which is a part of the restaurant establishment.

•    Whether self–service or pick up or home delivery/ supply of food or beverages, ice cream/food served outside the area of restaurant/eating joints or mess having facility or air–conditioning etc. will come under the purview of service tax or not?

In terms of Clause (i) of section 66E of the Act, service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or other articles of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as a part of the activity is a declared service.

Further, Entry No. 19 of the Notification No. 25/2012- S.T. dated 20-06-2012 as amended vide Notification No.3/2013–ST dated 01-03-2013 (w.e.f. 01-04-2013), has exempted services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air–heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year.

?    According to one school of thinking:

•    In light of the Exemption Notification No. 25/2012– S.T. (as amended) the specific exclusion of the premises which have or had air–conditioning facility in any part of the establishment (including Manager’s cabin or Cold Storage area in a restaurant) at any time during the year, it would appear that, exemption may not be available

•    The service tax has been levied on the activity    of supply of goods etc. in any manner and the exemption has been granted to the services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air-heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year. The exemption, is based on the condition of the restaurant, eating joint or the mess as to whether or not they are    or were having air-conditioning or central air– heating facility in any part of their establishment, at any time during the year. It is not based on the manner in which food, etc. is supplied. Therefore, it is appears that service tax could be leviable    on the food etc., supplied by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess if they have or had the facility of air-conditioning or central air-heating in any part of their establishment during any part of the year irrespective of the fact whether the food is served, outside the restaurant premises, delivered or taken away.

?    According to a second school of thinking :

•    Based on settled principles of harmonious & rational interpretation laid down from time to time, in order to attract service tax under ACR Services, it would appear that A/c /air heating facility should exist in the restaurant area where food is supplied.

•    In cases where, food is prepared by an A/c outlet, restaurant etc. and the customers have an option to consume food/beverages etc., within the premises of such A/c outlet, restaurant etc., supply of food may get covered under entry (i) of section 66E of the Act and hence become liable to service tax.

However, in cases where no particular place is provided by the A/c outlet, restaurant etc. where such food/beverage can be consumed, the activities could be considered as being in the nature of sale of goods and hence may not attract service tax.

•    In cases where, A/c outlets, restaurants sell goods  on MRP basis (like coffee packets, cold drinks etc.),  it would be a good case to hold that goods supplied under MRP are mere sale of goods and do not involve any service element so as to attract service tax.

•    In cases where, food items are supplied by A/c Outlets/Restaurants as take aways or home delivery, the activities can be regarded as being in the nature of sale of goods and hence would not attract service tax.

CONCLUSION:
It would reasonably appear that, second set of contentions reflects a better view. CBEC clarifications in the context of ACR services reinforce the same. However, considering the scenario that at a practical level  in  many  cases take aways & home deliveries are being subjected to service tax by owners of A/c outlets, restaurants etc. as a conservative measure to avoid prospect of tax liability at a future date, the matter needs to be appropriately clarified by the CBEC so as to reduce burden at the end Consumer.

Online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company

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Whether online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company liable under reverse charge?

In
a recent decision in relation to reverse charge mechanism in British
Airways vs. Commissioner (ADJN), Central Excise, Delhi
2014-TIOL-979-CESTAT -DEL, the Tribunal by majority set aside the demand
of service tax on British Airways, India (BA India) the branch of
British Airways PLC, U.K. (BA UK) at Gurgaon.

Background in brief
The
Appellant as branch office provides air transportation services for
passengers and cargo and on these services has been paying service tax
under (zzn) and (zzzo) of section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the
Act). BA UK like airlines all over the world have agreements with
Central Computer Reservation System service providing companies such as
Galileo, Amadeus, Abacus, Sabre etc. (CRS companies) all located outside
India. These CRS companies facilitate reservation and ticket
availability position to air travel agents in India and all over the
world through online computer system. None of these service providers
has branch or an establishment in India. Accordingly, they maintain
database of BA UK as regards flight schedule, fares, seat availability
on flight etc. on real time basis and make information available to all
IATA agents across the world. In terms of the agreements with BA UK, CRS
companies provide hardware and connectivity with their network. Based
on the ticket sale by the IATA agents using their database, these
companies receive their fees from BA UK. The IATA agents do not have to
pay any fees. The services provided by CRS companies were considered
“online database access or retrieval service” by the department as
contained in section 65(105)(zh) read with sub-Clause (75) and (36) of
section 65 of the Act and since the services are used by IATA agents of
BA India in India to sell tickets, they were treated as received and
consumed in India by BA India. Hence, service tax was demanded on the
remuneration received by CRS companies from BA UK from the Appellant in
this case BA India, under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66A of the Act
read with Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The
Commissioner confirmed the demand and imposed penalties against which
this appeal was filed.

The dispute in the appeal hinges around
the main issue viz. whether the Appellant BA India, a BA UK branch can
be treated as entity separate from its head office, BA UK in terms of
section 66A(2) and therefore the Indian branch be taxed as recipient of
services of CRS companies. Additional issue involved was whether or not
service provided by CRS companies be considered an online service since
both the members were in agreement with treating the service taxable as
online database access and retrieval service contained in section
65(105)(zh) of the Act read with section 65(75) thereof; not much
discussion is provided herein.

The Appellant contended that
service was provided outside India as the CRS companies and their parent
company were situated outside India. Therefore there cannot be tax
liability for the Appellant, BA India. The Appellant’s view of
non-taxability of service tax was based on the grounds that CRS
companies abroad provided services to their head office in London. CRS
company’s server was connected with the server of the head office of the
Appellant and thus the head office received those services abroad. In
terms of section 66A(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act), the branch
and the head office are to be treated as separate entities. Relying on
Paul Merchants 2012-TIOL-1877-CESTAT – Delhi, the Appellant also
contended that service recipient is the person on whose orders the
service is provided, who is obliged to make payment for the same and
whose need is satisfied by the provision of service. Further, they
advanced the argument that had they paid service tax, it was a revenue
neutral case as they would have got CENVAT credit of the same. They also
contended that longer period of limitation did not apply to them as
they bonafide believed that they had no tax liability.

Revenue
discarded this plea finding that CRS companies even if situated outside
India were providing services to the Appellant having establishment in
India which enabled their appointed IATA agents to use the system for
booking tickets and thus derived benefit therefrom and therefore the
Appellant was ultimate service recipient in India from foreign based CRS
companies of online database access or retrieval services u/s. 66A of
the Act from 18/04/2006. According to revenue, since BA UK was permitted
by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to operate in India, the head office of
the Appellant and the Appellant cannot be two distinct entities under
law. Section 66A(2) of the Act did not apply to them. Existence of
Appellant in India without its head office was impracticable and
existence in India was only to fulfill object of its head office in UK
and act on its behalf in India under limited permissions granted by RBI
which in essence and substance is the same. The establishment in India
was created on temporary basis to carry out business in India. On the
above pleas made by the Appellant and the revenue, the two members of
the Division Bench of the CESTAT , Delhi had different views.
Consequently, the matter was referred to the Third Member. The views of
both the members along with those of the third member are summarised
below:

Conclusion: Member (Judicial):
The learned Member
(Judicial) after considering the case of the adjudicating authority and
examining relevant statutory provisions, examined the letter issued by
RBI to BA UK and the agreement between BA UK & Galileo, the CRS
company. RBI ‘s letter contained permission to carry out air
transportation business in India regulated by FEMA in view of the
foreign currency transactions involved.

• The Bench observed
that BA UK had its place of business in India in terms of section
66A(1)(b) of the Act during the impugned period. As a participant of CRS
agreement, the Appellant at its own cost was required to provide
Galileo complete data, timely and accurate in order that the CRS company
would be able to maintain and operate the system to provide access to
the IATA agents the services of reservation, seat availability etc. on
real time basis for a consideration payable by BA UK. According to the
Member, BA India was in no way different from its head office and
therefore the contention that BA India was not party to the agreement
was not correct.
• Air travel agents appointed by the Appellant
received and used the services of CRS and Appellant having place of
business in India is the recipient of services from foreign based CRS
companies.

• Who makes payment to the service provider is not material and no free service is provided by the service provider.


When the Appellant is covered by section 66A(1)(b) of the Act as
recipient of taxable service u/s. 65(105)(zh) of the Act, their plea
that they are immune from service tax in India is ill-founded as their
existence in India is only under the RBI permission whereas 66A(2) of
the Act recognises only different situs under law, but the said s/s.
does not grant immunity from taxation in India once incidence of tax
arises in India. What is charged by revenue is services received in
India and the Appellant has consumed them in India and not the services
received by its head office outside India.

• Appellant’s plea of
revenue neutrality would not exonerate them from the liability it has
under the law and reliance on Paul Merchants (supra) is misplaced as it
related to export of service.

•    Since the Appellant failed to register and file Returns periodically, they committed breach of law which cannot be eroded by lapse of time. Bonafide should be apparent from conduct and a mere plea does not render the adjudication time-barred and thus extended period could be invoked.

Conclusion: Member (Technical) the   member   (technical)   differing   from   the   above conclusion drawn by the member (judicial) made following observations. He however agreed on the issue of classification that services were classifiable as online/ access/retrieval services:

•    Since the term ‘service’ was not defined during the period under appeal, not only there must be an activity provided by a provider of service to the recipient thereof, but there must also be flow of consideration, cash or other than cash, direct or indirect from recipient to the provider and the provision of services must satisfy some need of the recipient which may be personal or business.

•    Under Rule 3 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005, when a service provider is in india and the recipient thereof are outside india, no service tax is chargeable and when the provider is located abroad being a person having a business or fixed establishment outside India and the recipient is located in india being a person having a place of business, fixed establishment in india, he is a person liable for service tax in terms of section  66A read  with  rule  2(1)(d)(iv)  of  the  service tax rules.

•    U/s. 66A(2), when a person carries out a business through a permanent establishment in india and through another permanent establishment in another country, the two establishments  are  separate  persons  for the purpose of this section. second proviso to section 66a(1) is that when a service provider has his busies establishment in more than any one country, the establishment which is directly concerned with the provision of service will be considered service provider.   This  principle  in  the  hon.  Member’s  view would apply to determine as to who is the service recipient in the instant case when provider of service is located abroad and it will be reasonable to treat the establishment most directly concerned with the use  of the service provided as recipient of such services provided by the person abroad.

•    Unlike the transaction of goods, receipt and consumption of a service goes together, as the provision of a service satisfies the need of recipient, the service stands consumed. Accordingly, if service recipient is located in india, the service is received and hence consumed in india but if the recipient is located abroad, there is no liability for the person in india to pay service tax. This is in accordance with the principle of equivalence mentioned in the apex Court’s judgment in the case of all India Federation of Tax Practitioner 2007-TIOL-149-SC-ST and association of Leasing and Financial service companies 2010 (20) STr 417 (SC).

•    Conceptually, Export of Service Rules, 2005 and taxation   of   service   (provided   from   outside   india and received in india)  rules, 2006 put together are the rules which determine the location of service recipient.  thus, when the provider of service is located in india and the recipient thereof is outside india, in accordance with rule 3(iii) applicable to the services other than these in relation to immovable property and performance based services and when they relate to business or commerce, these will be export services and there would be no taxation in india whereas in  the reverse scenario, there will be import of service   in respect of which the service recipient is located in india. However, if both service provider and receiver  of category (iii) for use in his business are also located outside india, there would be no import and therefore no taxation in india.

•    As regards services of CRS companies located abroad, whether they can be treated as received by the appellant in india is to be determined based on the above legal provisions.

•    As regards letter from RBI, it was observed as follows:

i)    BA UK and Ba india are separate establishments and that the branch was not in the nature of a temporary establishment as contended by the department.
ii)    the   agreement   was   between   BA  UK   and   CRS companies abroad which did not have any branch or establishment in india.
iii)    entire payment to Crs companies was made directly by Ba uK outside india and no part was paid by Ba india.

Thus,  the  services  provided  by  CRS  companies  were received by BA UK as both Ba UK and Ba India are to be treated as separate persons in view of the provisions  of  section  66a(2).  They  would  be  treated as received in india only if it has been received by the recipient located in india for use in relation to business or commerce.

Reasoning why the Branch is not the recipient of service.

According to the hon. Member (technical), the revenue’s view that Ba india was the recipient of the services of CRS companies was incorrect for the following reasons:

•    In a transaction of service, the recipient consumes the service simultaneously with the performance of service. thus recipient of a service is the person who is legally entitled for provision of service.  further, consideration in some cases can be direct or indirect. applying this criteria, Ba india can be treated as recipient only if the service provided by CRS companies is meant for the BA india and if BA UK had acted as only facilitator and there was flow of consideration, direct or indirect from BA india to CRS companies. In the instant case, neither BA India is recipient nor is there a flow of consideration, direct or indirect form Ba India to CRS companies.

•    CRS companies did not provide any branch specific service.   The   job of BA india is only to appoint iata agents, collect sales proceeds of tickets sold by agents, fares and remitting the same to h.o. and nothing showed that key business decisions were taken by them for the entire company. applying the principle of second proviso of section 66A(1) discussed above,    it is BA UK – the H.O. office which is to be treated    as directly concerned with the services provided by CRS companies as it cannot be said that the indian branch was the sole beneficiary or that H.O. acted   as a facilitator to enter into the agreements with CRS companies on behalf of branches for providing services to them. The business needs of H.O. are satisfied and therefore h.o. is the recipient of service.

•    There is no evidence or even allegation that BA India made any payment to CRS companies directly or indirectly and there is an accepted position in the order that payment was made abroad by the h.o. directly   to CRS companies and that the two establishments   of BA india and BA UK their h.o. have to be treated   as separate persons in terms of section 66A(2), the transaction of provision of service has to be treated as  taken  place  outside  india.  therefore,  the  service received by BA UK cannot be treated as service received by Ba india.

•    Merely because IATA agents appointed by BA India used the services of CRS companies from abroad, the appellant does not become the recipient of service.

•    The only situation in respect of which service tax can be levied on the branch of a recipient company in india would be wherein the services provided by a service provider located outside india against an agreement with head office of a company incorporated and located outside India and when the head office has entered into a framework agreement with the service provider by way of centralised sourcing of service, the provision of service at various branches located in different countries and the service is provided at the branch in india and the role of the h.o. is only of facilitator. in the instant case of Ba india, from the agreement, it cannot be inferred that the Crs companies were to provide location specific service to the branches of BA UK all over the world.

•    As regards applicability of longer period of limitation also, it was found not available to the department in view of the fact that intent to contravene the provisions of the act could not be attributed when collection of tax would have been a revenue neutral exercise.

Reference to Third Member:
Briefly stated, the points of difference referred to the Third member were:

•    Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellant permitted by reserve Bank of india to carry out air transport activity in india was a branch in india and was recipient of “online database access or retrieval service” from Crs service providers abroad and liable for service tax in terms of section 65(105) (zh) read with section 65(75) under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66a with effect from 18/04/2006 or exempt in terms of 66a(2) and also whether longer period of limitation was available to the department for recovery of tax.

•    The learned Third Member acknowledged various undisputed facts among others that the Crs companies were located outside india, the agreement was between Ba uK and them and payment for the said service was made by Ba uK and in the light of these facts, what was to be considered was whether Ba india was the extension of Ba uK or they had to  be treated as separate legal entities. She noted the contentions of the revenue that various provisions of the Companies act, 1956 which interalia included that the entire accounts from the indian operations stand debited by the head office along with the expenses incurred by the corporate office in relation to operations in india and which also included the payment of CRS debit for tax sold in indian ticketing.  Further, that there was no legal distinction between foreign companies with its parent office abroad and their local subordinate branch office in India and under these circumstances that Ba uK was given permission to open its branch office in India.

She nevertheless, discussed the provisions of 66A read with explanation to s/s. (2) in her observations and found herself in agreement with the observations and finding of Member (Technical) analysed above that services provided by a foreign based company to a foreign based head office cannot be any liability of the appellant to discharge its service tax in as much as service tax being a destination and consumption based tax cannot be created against the non-consumer of the  services.  Likewise  she  also  concurred  with  non- availability of longer period of limitation for recovery to the department as she found revenue neutral situation and also that the issue involved being complicated issue of legal interpretation which cannot be held to be a settled law also found favour with the appellant’s bonafide belief.

Conclusion:
The above decision allowing appeal by the majority will serve as a guiding decision for disputes relating to cross border transactions and particularly those relating to liability of service tax under reverse charge mechanism. the  decision  however  relates  to  the  period  prior  to introduction of definition of ‘service’ with effect from 01-07-2012 and also place of provision of services

Judicial analysis: Taxability of Associations

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Synopsis
The article analyses a recent judicial pronouncement and analyses in detail:-
• Whether trade associations are charitable in nature?
• Whether they are covered by the principle of mutuality?
• Whether services rendered by the association to a member or non-member is a taxable service?

In a recent decision FICCI vs. CST, Delhi-2014-TIOL- 701-CESTAT -DEL wherein two separate appeals were filed by Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and by Electronic and Computer Software export Promotion Council (ECSEPC), while considering on the applications for Stay, since substantial issues were heard in both the cases, the appeals were disposed off. In the said appeals the substantial common issues which fell for the Hon. Tribunal’s consideration were:

• Whether FICCI and ECSEPC are engaged in activities having objectives which would amount to public service and of a charitable nature and consequently fall outside the ambit of Club or Association.

• Whether their services to the respective members and the consideration received therefor was liable to tax, in view of the principle of mutuality declared in several judgments including in Ranchi Club Limited vs. Chief Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax 2012 (26) STR 401 (Jhar) and whether service tax was leviable under Club or Association-service, in the light of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. vs. Union of India 2013-TIOL-528-HCAHM- ST.

• Whether services provided by FICCI and ECSEPC to non-members was liable to be classified as Club or Association-service and whether demand of service tax on FICCI for the period subsequent to 01-05-2011 was sustainable.

• Whether ECSEPC is a body constituted by or under any law and therefore falls outside the purview of the definition of Club or Association, in view of clause (i) of section 65(25a) of the Act; and

Thus, the important question that the Tribunal considered was whether both, FICCI and ECSEPC carried out activities having objectives amounting to public service and therefore would be falling in the excluded part of the definition of club or association service in section 65(25aa) of the Finance Act, 1994. Clause (iii) of the said definition excludes from its scope any person or body of persons engaged in activities having objective in the nature of public service and are of charitable, religious or political nature. Referring to Law Lexicon, Income Tax 1961, Charitable Endowment Act and Foreign Trade (Regulations) Rules, 1993, the Tribunal observed that the term “charitable purpose” would include a trust having an object and scope of public utility and advancement of any other object of general public utility and that public service would imply a service performed for the benefit of public and specially by a non-profit organisation. The Hon. Bench also observed that in order to hold an activity as charitable, the other objects of an institution or a body need not necessarily be charitable. If such objects are incidental or ancillary to the dominant purpose of charity, it would not take away the character of the activity being a valid charity as observed by the Supreme Court in CIT Madras vs. Andhra Chamber of Commerce (1965) 55 ITR 733 (SC) and that the said principle was reiterated in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufactures Association, Surat AIR 1980 SC 387. FICCI itself was held as charitable by the Supreme Court in CIT, New Delhi vs. FICCI AIR 1981 SC 1408. In the Andhra Chamber of Commerce (supra), it was explained that promotion of trade, commerce or industry involves an object of general public utility and such activity may lead to economic benefit for the entire society although prosperity would be shared by those in trade, commerce or industry. On this count, it cannot be held otherwise. The Tribunal observed that contours of what attributes to charitable purpose or what object qualify as of general public utility and what constitutes public purpose are considered and explained in several decisions including those by the High Courts. The list, interalia, included South India Hire Purchase Association (1979) 116 ITR 793 (Mad) and Western India Chambers of Commerce and Industry Ltd. (1982) 136 ITR 67 (Bom). The Hon. Bench thus concluded that FICCI and ECSEPC are institutions having public service objectives and of a charitable nature. The Tribunal also noted that the authority holding the FICCI’s activities as covered within the ambit of club or association service omitted to provide reasons for distinguish Supreme Court’s judgment in FICCI’s own case wherein it was treated as a charitable organisation under the provisions of the Income Tax Act which are pari materia the exclusionary provision in section 65(25aa) whereas the authority relied on the Board’s circular dated 28-04-2008 instead. The adjudication order thus suffered from the vice of gross judicial indiscipline. For similar reasons, ECSEPC was also held as engaged in the activities which had objective in the nature of public service and of charitable nature.

Whether principle of mutuality applicable:
The next issue that the Tribunal dealt with was the issue as to whether the services provided by the appellant organisations to their respective members amounted to rendition of taxable service of a club or association in view of the principle of mutuality despite invalidation of the relevant provisions vide the judgments in Ranchi Club Ltd. 2012-TIOL-1031-HC-Jharkhand-ST and Sports’ Club of Gujarat 2013-119L-528-HC-AHM-ST. It was examined by the Hon. Tribunal that based on the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in CIT vs. Ranchi Club Ltd. 1992 (1) PLJR 252 (Pat), in Ranchi Club Ltd. (supra) it was ruled that while sale and service may be two different and distinct transactions, the basic feature common to both the transactions is that they require existence of two parties – for sale, a seller and a buyer and for a service, service provider and service recipient. Similarly, in Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. (supra), the High Court declared the provision to the extent these purport to levy service tax in respect of services provided by a club to its members, as ultra vires. The Tribunal also noted that based on the said decision in Ranchi Club Ltd. (supra), the Tribunal granted full waiver of pre-deposit to appeal preferred by the Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India in Appeal No.57179 of 2013 and in another preferred by Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd. In Appeal No.55225 of 2013 wherein reference was also made to the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. (supra). For the appellants, it was also pleaded that when the relevant provisions were declared ultra vires by the Gujarat High Court and in absence of any contrary decision by any other High Court, it would imply that there is no operative statutory provision in the law to justify levy of service tax on the service of club to its members. Citing interalia Full Bench’s decision in Madura Coats vs. CCE, Bangalore 1996 (82) ELT 512 (Tri.), the Tribunal observed that where adjudication of vires of a provision of a statute or a Notification is outside the province of the Tribunal, the decision of a particular High Court, in absence of a contrary decision by another High Court would have to be followed by the Tribunal as the Tribunal does not enjoy the liberty to disregard the view of the High Court.

Based on the above analysis and on following precedential guidance, the Bench held that on application of principle of mutuality, the services of FICCI/ESCEPC to their members do not qualify to be considered club or association service in absence of operative legislative provisions whereby the levy of service tax could be justified.

Services to non-members & levy after 1st May, 2011:

Primarily, it is to be noted here that the scope of Club or association service was expanded to cover facilities or advantages provided by a Club or association to persons other than its members also, provided such facilities or advantages are primarily intended for members. in the scenario, the tribunal observed that the Show Cause notices in both the appeals covered the period prior to the amendment vide the finance act, 2011.  The notices for the period post amendment were issued as periodic notices reiterating allegation in the earlier notices. however, in both the cases since the Show Cause notices failed to indicate the effect of amendment, the tribunal held that services to non-members fell outside the ambit of Club or association service prior to 01-05-2011 and for the subsequent period, it will not attract service tax in absence of specific allegation that services to non-members fell within the expanded scope of the taxable service in terms of amended provisions.

ECSEPC: Whether a body constituted by or under any law:
The Tribunal noted that ECSEPC was constituted qua provisions of Export-Import Policy and its Articles of Association are subject to Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) and while examining this aspect in detail, the tribunal observed that Export Promotion Councils (EPCs) are non-profit organisations which are autonomous and competent to regulate their own affairs but subject to provisions of uniform byelaws to be framed by the Central Government periodically for constitution or business by EPCs and they are required to adopt byelaws that are approved by the Central Government and that ECSEPC is listed and recognised as an EPC in the Appendix to the FTP. To understand and analyse the scope of “body established or constituted by or under a law for the time being in force”, reliance was placed on the observations in the following judgments:

•    Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta vs. W. R. NATHUY AND Ors. AIR 1963 SC 274….Para 22.
•    Finite Infratech Limited vs. IFCI and Ors. [2011] 161 Comp Case 257 (Delhi) … Para 22.
•    R. C. Mitter & Sons vs. CIT air 1959 SC 868 …
Para 22.
•    S. Azeez Basha vs. Union of India air 1968 SC 662 …
Para 22.
•    National Stock Exchange of India Limited vs. Central Information Commission (2010 100 SCl 464 (del) … Para 22.

After a detailed analysis, it was observed that ECSEPC though registered under Societies registration act, 1860 is notified to be an EPC and was chartered to function as EPC authorised to issue Registration cum Membership Certificate (RCMC) and it was concluded that ECSEPC was a body established or constituted under a law for the time being in force viz., foreign trade (development and Regulation) Act, 1992 read with FTP and as such is excluded from the scope of definition of Club or Association qua Clause (1) of section 65 (25a) of the act.

Conclusion:
thus, in conclusion, taxability of service tax on both the counts is decided in negative – the associations are held as charitable organisations and at the same time the concept of mutuality also is held applicable to them. this would apply to all cases for the period till 30-06-2012. Legal testing for the negative list based service tax law yet remains to be done. This decision pronounced by the Principal Bench of the CeStat, assumes particular importance for the fact that CeStat, mumbai in case of Vidarbha Cricket Association vs. CCE, Nagpur 2013-TIOL-1915-CESTAT- mum pronounced a majority decision (the matter was referred to a third member on account of difference in view, reported at 2013-TIOL-1404-CESTAT-MUM) holding that object of the association cannot be considered of charitable nature and that the activity of providing cricket cannot be considered an activity, charitable in nature. in this case, per majority it was also observed, contrary to the observation in fiCCi’s case (supra) above that the provisions of the income tax act, 1961 are not pari materia with Chapter V of the income tax act, 1994 or the said association is a charitable organisation because it is held to be a charitable organisation under the income tax, 1961. While the matter was referred to the third member, the plea was presented by the appellant’s counsel that the decision of Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. vs. UOI (supra) had held the levy of service tax under Club and association service as ultra vires. however, the Bench held the view that the said issue was not raised before the referral Bench. (The decision was reported in July 2013 whereas the matter was heard by the division Bench on 14th June, 2013). The principle of mutuality however was not discussed in the said case of Vidarbha Cricket association (supra). having discussed this and considering that the decision in case of FICCI and ECSEPC above has been pronounced by the Principal Bench containing President CeStat, the pending litigation in similar matters achieves finality in the like manner.

[Note: Readers may note that the concept of mutuality and the decision  of  Jharkhand  high  Court  ranchi  Club  (supra)  were discussed at length earlier under this feature in July, 2012 and december, 2012 of BCaJ).

Controversy: cenvat: Commission Paid to Agents Abroad

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Introduction:
In a landmark decision of Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune-III 2009 (242) ELT 168 (Bom), the Honourable Bombay High Court categorically held that credit was admissible of service tax paid by the concentrate manufacturer on advertising service used for marketing of soft drinks removed by the bottling company. Any activity relating to business could be covered under the definition of input service as per Rule 2(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) provided there is a relation between the manufacturer of concentrate and such activity. Service tax paid on advertisements, sales promotion and market research is admissible as credit for payment of excise duty on concentrate especially when such expense forms part of a price of a final product which suffers excise duty. Within a short time frame of this decision, yet in another landmark case viz. CCE, Nagpur vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 577 (Bom), the Court held that the scope of the definition of input service is very wide and it covers not only the services used directly or indirectly in or in relation to manufacture of final products, but also various services used in relation to the business of manufacturer whether prior to manufacture or post manufacturing activity, whether having a direct nexus or integrally connected with the business of manufacturing the final product. All services in relation to business of manufacture of the final product are covered. When these two well reasoned decisions were pronounced in quick succession, it largely appeared that many disputes relating to the CENVAT credit of service tax paid on various services used for business purposes would be settled based on the observations in the above cases. In many decisions as a matter of fact, the Tribunals have relied upon or followed the above decisions. Nevertheless, litigation for the CENVAT has been continuing for services such as transportation for employees, mobile phones, group insurance health policies, outward freight, outdoor caterer’s services, travel agent’s services etc., used by a manufacturer since these services and many others are not used directly in relation to the activity of manufacture. The nexus theory is often interpreted very narrowly by the revenue authorities both vis-à-vis manufacturers and service providers.

Nevertheless, the activity directly related to sale of a manufactured final product liable for excise duty or in the course of exports appeared less questionable for admissibility of credit particularly considering the definition of input service provided in CCR at least prior to the amendment made with effect from 01-04-2011 read as follows:

“(l) “input service” means any service, –

(i) used by a provider of taxable service for pro viding an output service; or

(ii) used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly in or in relation to the manufacture of final products and clearance of final products, upto the place of removal, and includes services used in relation to setting up, modernisation, renovation or repairs of a factory, premises of provider of output service or an office relating to such factory or premises, advertisement or sales promotion, market research, storage upto the place of removal, procurement of inputs, activities relating to business, such as accounting, auditing, financing, recruitment and quality control, coaching and training, computer networking, credit rating, share registry, and security, inward transportation of inputs or capital goods and outward transportation upto the place of removal.”

[emphasis supplied].

Controversy:
It can be seen that the above definition specifically includes the expression “sales promotion” in addition to advertisement and market research. Prima facie it hardly appears controversial that when a manufacturer of an excisable product pays commission to agents domestically or abroad, whether it has any nexus with the sale of such products as the services of agents are directly used for effecting or augmenting sale. The service of the commission agents is exigible to service tax as business auxiliary service considering it a service in relation to sale or promotion of client’s goods under the erstwhile section 65(19)(i) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) since 09-07-2004. When a manufacturer pays commission to an overseas agent for executing sales abroad, the manufacturer is liable to pay service tax on such commission under reverse charge mechanism applicable u/s. 66A of the Act since 18-04-2006. Since the commission paid directly is related to the sale of the final product, the CENVAT credit of service tax so paid under reverse charge has been available to such exporter-manufacturer.

When the Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana filed an appeal [reported in CCE, Ludhiana vs. Ambika Overseas 2012 (25) STR 348( P&H)] against ruling of the Tribunal that the assessee was entitled to avail credit of service tax paid to the foreign commission agents for services of procuring orders as these services were input services, the Punjab & Haryana High Court found no reason to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal as revenue failed to establish illegality or perversity in the order of the Tribunal. As against this decision, in a detailed order passed in the case of Commissioner of C. Ex. Ahmedabad vs. Cadilla Healthcare Ltd. 2013 (30) STR 3 (Guj), the question that was raised before the Court for consideration that whether the service of a commission agent for promotion of sale of final products of the assessee which is categorised as business auxiliary service (u/s. 65(19)(i) of the Act) would fall within the purview of “input service”. According to the assessee, the commission agents find buyers for the assessee’s goods and thereby they promote sales of the assessee’s goods. The definition of input service specifically includes services in relation to sales promotion whereas according to the revenue, the commission agent is a person directly concerned with the sale and purchase of goods and is not connected with sales promotion. In view hereof, the meaning of the expression “sales promotion” was examined by the Court in detail and at the end of which, a fine distinction was made between services in relation to ‘sales’ and “sales promotion” to hold that the service of commission agent was observed as one in relation with ‘sale’ and therefore not falling within the purview of the main or the inclusive part of the definition of input service in terms of Rule 2(l) of CCR. Arriving at the above conclusion, reliance was placed on the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Mohd. Ishaque Gulam 232 ITR 869 wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court distinguished expenditure made on the sale promotion and commission paid to the agents and held that commission paid to the agents cannot be termed as expenditure on sales promotion. Further, for the contention that in any case, the service provided by the commission agent was in relation to business activity of the assessee and the list of activities in the inclusive part of the definition of input service was illustrative as the words “such as” preceded the said list of services, it was observed that unless the activity was analogous to the business activity, it could not be considered input service. Since the service of the commission agents was found not analogous with accounting, auditing, recruitment, coaching and training, credit rating, quality control, share registry, security services etc., it was held that it did not qualify to be “input service.”

The logical questions to every person studying legal provisions arise are:

• Whether the activity in relation to ‘sale’ is less
akin to being an “input service” in relation to
manufacture than the services of share registry,
security services, credit rating etc.? Is it simply
because such services find specific place in the
definition?

• In the context of definition of input service
whether there exists a material difference between
sales promotion and sale in relation to
manufactured goods? Is sale promotion not
carried out to achieve sale?
• Is the commission agent not helping to execute
sale after identifying the buyers?
• Does the cost of final product sold and subjected
to excise duty not include the cost towards
commission payment and therefore is it not a
cost incurred before the goods are removed
from the place of removal?
Despite knowing the replies to all the above questions,
the decision of the Honourable Gujarat High Court is a reality. However, very importantly, it is
required to note here that the following relevant
facts were not placed before the Honourable Gujarat
High Court in the said case of Cadilla (supra)
while the service of commission agents was not
interpreted as input service.
(a) After the amendment of the definition of “input
service” with effect from 01-04-2011, in response to
some prevailing doubts in the trade, as to availability
of credit in respect of certain items, CBEC
issued Circular No. 943/04/2011 dated 29th April,
2011. In reply to a question that whether the credit
on account of sales commission be disallowed after
the deletion of expression “activities relating to
business”, a clarification was issued at para 5 as,
“the definition of input service allows all credit on
services used for clearance of final products upto
the place of removal. Moreover, activity of sales
promotion is specifically allowed and on many occasions,
the remuneration for the same is linked to
actual sale. Reading the provisions harmoniously it
is clarified that credit is admissible on the services
of sale of dutiable goods on commission basis”.

Thus, it is clear that the credit is available even
in the post-amendment period.
(b) Secondly, in order to provide benefit to exporters
of various goods, the services provided
by commission agents located outside India for
causing sale of goods exported by Indian exporters
are exempted vide Notification No. 42/2012-ST
dated 29-06-2012, of course, subject to fulfillment
of certain conditions laid thereunder. (The said
exemption existed earlier under Notification No.
18/2009-ST dated 07-07-2009. Prior to bringing this
Notification also, vide Notification No. 41/2007-Service
Tax, exemption by way of refund was available
to exporters in respect of this service with
effect from 01-04-2008). Since the commission paid
abroad directly relates to sale of exported goods,
instead of asking assessees to pay service tax and
then allowing the claim of refund, the exemption
is allowed on fulfillment of conditions and following
prescribed procedure. This is clearly indicative of
the fact that the service provided relates to goods
sold in the course of exports and the services are
input services for the said sales.
(c) Thirdly the two benchmark decisions referred
above viz. Coca Cola Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Ultratech
Cement Ltd. (supra) which broadly laid principles
interpreting the scope of input service were not
considered. The instant decision of the Gujarat
High Court now poses a question mark on these
two widely followed decisions of the Honourable
Bombay High Court.

Conclusion:
Consequent upon the above decision of the
Gujarat High Court in case of Cadilla Healthcare
Ltd. (supra), the authorities at various levels of
litigation in the State of Gujarat would be required
to follow the decision in respect of dispute relating
to the CENVAT credit of service tax paid on commission
to agents. However, the credit as per the
Circular No.943 remains available. The benefit of
Notification No. 42/2012-ST also continues in case
of commission paid in respect of export sales. In
the States of Punjab & Haryana, certainly Ambika
Overseas (supra) would be followed and elsewhere
in the country, the authorities follow either of the
two decisions found convenient. The fact however
remains that the service provided by an agent of
procuring sales order was used before executing
the order by the manufacturer and therefore the
cost of which is already factored into the cost
of the final product on which the excise duty is
levied. Hence, the service should qualify to be
an input service and the CENVAT credit therefore
should be available. However, to put an end to
the controversy and frivolous litigation, if the
CBEC considers issuing a further clarification in the
matter, it would mean a proactive step in larger
interests of law-compliant assessees.

Whether Outbound Tours Are Taxable Under Service Tax?

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Synopsis The authors in this feature have highlight the scope of the definition “tour operator” for taxability of outbound tours and evaluated the definition in two parts i.e. operating and arranging tours and planning, scheduling, organizing or arranging such tours. The authors analyse how the principles of apportionment are essential to determine the taxability of several operations in the composite transactions which have some operations in one territory and some in others.

Introduction:

The service of tour operators was introduced as a taxing entry in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) with effect from 01-09-1997. ‘Tour’ in section 65(113) of the Act is defined as:

“A journey from one place to another irrespective of the distance between such places”.

The definition of tour operator however underwent amendment thrice of which the last two definitions are reproduced below:

10-09-2004 to 15-05-2008: 65(115) “ “tour operator” means any person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangements for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport, and includes any person engaged in the business of operating tours in a tourist vehicle covered by a permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 (59 of 1988) or the rules made thereunder.”

16-05-2008 to 30-06-2012:

65(115) “ “tour operator” means any person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangements for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport, and includes any person engaged in the business of operating tours in a tourist vehicle or a contract carriage by whatever name called, covered by a permit, other than a stage carriage permit, granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988) or the rules made thereunder.”

Taxable service in relation to this service as contained in section 65(105(n) reads as follows: “

“taxable service” means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by a tour operator in relation to a tour.”

Typically in travel and tourism industry, a bouquet of services is provided to a variety of customers. There are different taxing entries in relation to these services viz. air travel agent, tour operator service, travel agent, rail travel agent etc. Tours are often provided by way of a package also. These packages can be broadly classified into domestic tours, inbound tours and outbound tours. Whereas the first two categories do not pose much debate as service tax is by and large paid by the tour operators for these kind of tours; it is the third category of outbound tours requires examination of relevant legal provisions and analysis thereof as in this case, the service provider viz. the tour operator organizes tours outside the territory of India for tourists from India. The tour is entirely performed outside India and on account of this, the disputes arise as to their taxability. Therefore the questions that require determination are:

• Considering the scope of the definition of “tour operator”, whether “outbound tours” are outside the purview of the taxable service as described in section 65(105)(h) of the Act?

• Whether the provisions of the Act have an extra territorial jurisdiction?

• Whether outbound tours amount to export of service? If the payment for the service is not received in convertible foreign exchange, whether the service is liable for service tax?

2013-TIOL-1907-CESTAT-DEL

Recently, in a set of five appeals filed with the Principal Bench, Delhi-CESTAT reported at 2013-TIOL-1907-CESTAT-DEL, Cox & Kings India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, New Delhi, the Division Bench comprising of President CESTAT and another technical member had an occasion to analyse the above questions, the discussion of which is summarised below:

In addition to the relevant definitions reproduced above, the Hon. Bench took note of the scope of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 (service tax law or the Act) provided in section 64(1), the charging section 66 and section 66A of the Act and provided due consideration to various circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC or the Board) on outbound tours brought on record by the appellants and/or dealt with in the orders-in-original, enumerated below:

• Madurai Commissionerate issued Trade Notice No.110/97 dated 28-08-1997 based on TRU clarification of 22-08-1997 to the effect that outbound tours would not attract service tax and that in case of composite tours combining tours within India and outside India, service tax will be levied only on services rendered for tours within India provided separate billing in such respect is done. It is to be noted here that the service of tour operator was exempted during 18-07-1998 to 31- 03-2000. So, after its reintroduction, TRU issued Circular No.1/2000 on 27/04/2000 clarifying again that outbound tour would remain outside the ambit of service tax liability.

Note: The original circular of 22-08-1997 was withdrawn vide Circular No.93/04/2007 of 10-05-2007 but Circular No.1/2000 of 27-04-2000 continued to remain.

• Board’s Circular No.36/4/2001-ST clarified that levy of service tax extends to the whole of India except Jammu & Kashmir and that the expression ‘India’ includes territorial waters of India (which would extend upto twelve nautical miles) and that Chapter V has not extended the service tax levy to designated areas in continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of India. Therefore services provided beyond territorial waters of India are not liable for service tax as service tax was not extended to such areas so far.

• Commissioner (Service Tax), CBEC vide his letter dated 12-10-2007 addressed to Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi (in response to the latter’s inquiry) clarified the subject of levy of service tax on outbound tourism that the Board is of the view that tour operator located in India provides services to recipient located in India for planning, scheduling and organizing in relation to outbound tours. Such services would be taxable under the category of tour operator service as both service provider and service receiver are located in India and the service flows within the country. Accordingly, the place of supply of service is India and hence the service is taxable.

• On a somewhat different footing from the above reply dated 12-10-2007, the Board issued Circular No.117/11/2009 in the context of Haj and Umrah on leviability of service tax on tour operator’s service that Haj and Umrah pilgrimage is for service provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia and tour takes place outside India; that as per Rule 3(1)(ii) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005 (Export Rules), tour operator’s services would be treated as performed outside India if they are partly performed outside India and no service tax is chargeable on such tour undertaken outside India considering this as export provided they fulfil other conditions as provided in the said Export Rules.

The adjudicating authority found that in the ordersin- original, the Board’s clarification vide letter of 12-10-2007 (cited above) was not binding. However, the clarification being consistent with the service tax regime, outbound service was taxable from 10-09-2004. Since the service provider and the receiver are located in India, the service is deemed to be delivered to the recipient-tourist in India. Therefore, the condition of Export Rule is factually not fulfilled and thus the tour operator was not entitled to benefit under the Export Rules and consequently invocation of extended period of limitation, penalty, interest etc. also were confirmed.

In the background of the above dispute, the substantive issues that fell for consideration of the Hon. Bench were;

•    The scope of “tour operator” defined in section
65(115) post its amendment from 10-09-2004 and whether the amendment altered the contours of the expression and to what extent.

•    Whether “outbound tours” fall outside the pur-view of taxable service defined in 65(105)(h) of the Act.

The Tribunal’s observations are summarised as follows:

•    Prior to 10-09-2004 and during 01-09-1997 to 31-03-2000 considering the definitions of tour and tour operator (provided above), the taxable activity was a service provided or to be provided to any person by a person who holds a tourist permit granted under the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) for undertaking a journey from one place to another of any distance. During 01-04-2000 and
09-09-2004, the definition of “tour operator” was expanded to mean that operating of tours viz. activities/services of facilitating a journey by any other person from one place to another in a tourist vehicle covered by a permit under the MV Act or rules made thereunder was a taxable service.

•    On further expansion of the definition of tour operator from 10-09-2004, a person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangement for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport is a taxable service. The amended definition also has an inclusive clause whereby a person engaged in the business of operating tours in a vehicle covered by a permit granted under the MV Act would come within the fold of “tour operator”. Thus, the first part of the definition does not include the business of operating tours by any mode/all modes of transport. If it was included, in view of the Bench, there was no necessity to incorporate the specific inclusionary part or it would amount to a surplusage and attribution of surplusage in legislative drafting must be avoided. Consequently, the only possible interpretation of the definition would be that where a person is engaged in a composite activity of operating tours as well as planning, scheduling, organising or arranging such tours by any mode of transport other than a tourist vehicle, such activity falls outside the scope of the definition of “tour operator”. However, the activity of “planning, scheduling, organizing or arranging tours” including operating tour in a tourist vehicle covered by the permit under the MV Act falls within the ambit of tour operator as a consequence of the inclusionary clause.

•    In the case under examination, the concerned assessees are engaged in a composite activity of both “planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours” other than by a tourist vehicle (permitted under the MV Act) and in operating such tours as well. The outbound tours whereby Indian tourists are provided services in relation to tourism outside the Indian territory, no part of the journey would be in a tourist vehicle as defined in the law. The commencement and conclusion of the journey is generally by air-transport and besides scheduling the tour package, operating the tour, fixing probable dates and venues, the itinerary, booking accommodation in hotels abroad, travel arrangements for various destinations, sightseeing, boarding, providing guide, air-ticketing, arranging visa, travel insurance etc. clearly constitute operations of tour in addition to planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours. The nature of the composite services in relation to outbound tours is thus outside the ambit of the definition “tour operator”. The Bench specifically observed that the nature of composite services provided by the concerned assessee in relation to outbound tours fall clearly outside the first facet of the definition; as amended from 10-09-2004.

•    As regards the issue of extra-territorial reach and operation of the Act, the Tribunal’s view point is summarised below:

In All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. UOI 2007 (7) STR (SC), it was clarified interalia that service tax is a value added tax and which is a destination based consumption tax in the sense that it is on the commercial activities and not a charge on business but on the consumer and would logically be leviable only on services provided within the country and that performance based services like tour operators provided services outside India. The Tribunal similarly observed that Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Home Solutions Retails (India) Ltd. vs. Union of India 2011

(24) STR 129 (Del) reiterated the doctrine that service tax is a levy on the event of service. The Tribunal in detail examined the judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay vs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. (1950) SCR-335 as well as the Supreme Court’s observations in Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. vs. Director Of Income Tax, Mumbai 2007 (6) STR 3 (SC) and the judgment in a recent case of G. D. Builders vs. UOI & Others 2013-TIOL-908-HC-DEL. It was observed in each of the judgments viz. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai (supra), Ishikawajima-Harima (supra) that it is essential for determining the taxability of several operations to apply the principle of apportionment to composite transactions which have some operations in one territory and some in others.
To bring home this point, the recent judgment in G. D. Builders vs. UOI & Others (supra) was referred to wherein as a corollary of the said position was followed that a composite contract involving labour and deemed sale of goods could be vivisected to levy service tax on the element of service.

Summarising its conclusion, the Hon. Bench held that qua the text and context of the provisions of the Act, it is clear that service tax is a destination based consumption levy. Taxable event in all events, qua the provisions of the Act and specifically the provisions of section 65 is on the provision of taxable service.  Therefore, when a service is provided and consumed outside the territorial locus of the Act, the consideration thereof would not be exigible to the levy of service tax under the substantive and procedural provisions. The final remarks in para 17(m) are reproduced below:
“(m) On the aforesaid analysis we conclude that the consideration received for operating and arranging outbound tours, even if falling within the scope of the amended definition of “tour operator”; (provided by the assessees and consumed by their tourist customers beyond Indian territory), is not liable to levy and collection of service tax, under provisions of the Act. We hold that provisions of the Act do not have an extra territorial operation. The conclusion and analysis on this issue [Issue No. (b)] is without prejudice to our analysis and conclusion on issue No. (a), that since the assessees had provided a composite service, of operating outbound tours apart from engaging in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging such tours; and by a mode of transport other than in a tourist vehicle, the service falls outside the definitional locus of “tour operator” (vide the analysis on Issue (a), at para 17 supra).” [emphasis supplied].

Nevertheless, the Tribunal noted that whether the outbound tour amounts to export of service and is thus immune to levy service tax under the Export Rules is not decided and is left open or not found necessary in the ruling on the core issue.

Conclusion:

The issue is undoubtedly painstakingly dealt with by the Tribunal. Having allowed the assessee’s appeal, it remains to be seen whether the Revenue accepts the same or further litigates the matter. However, the above would be of little help to tour operators in the scenario post July 01, 2012 i.e. negative list based taxation because under the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (which have been brought in operation in place of Export Rules and Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006), tours performed outside India are considered as provided in taxable territory and therefore liable for service tax.

Controversy: Interest on Cenvat Credit Wrongly Taken and (or) Utilised

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Background

The issue whether interest is leviable at the point of time when the CENVAT Credit is wrongly taken or at the point of utilisation has been a matter of extensive judicial considerations. Further, an important amendment was made in Rule 14 of the CENVAT Rules through Notification dated 17-03-2012. This subject was discussed in the June 2012 issue of the BCAJ in the backdrop of an important ruling of the Karnataka High Court. However, subsequent to the said ruling, divergent views have been expressed by different judicial authorities (in particular recent ruling of CESTAT – Mumbai). Hence, since the issue has become highly controversial, the same is being discussed hereafter in the backdrop of divergent judicial rulings.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

• Rule 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (“CCR”)

” Where the CENVAT Credit has been taken or utilised wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same along with the interest shall be recovered from the manufacturer or provider of the output service and the provisions of the sections 11A and 11AB of the Excise Act, or sections 73 and 75 of the Finance Act, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries.”

[Note – The words “taken or utilised wrongly” have been substituted by the words “taken and utilised wrongly vide Notification No. 18/2012 – CE(NT) dated 17-03-12]

• Rule 4(1) of CCR

“The CENVAT credit in respect of inputs may be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in factory of the manufacturer or premises of provider of output service………..”

• Rule 4(2) (a) of CCR

“The CENVAT Credit in respect of capital goods …….. at any point of time in a given financial year shall be taken only for an amount not exceeding 50 % of duty paid on such capital goods in the same financial year.“

• Rule 4(7) of CCR

“The CENVAT Credit in respect of input service shall be allowed, on or after the day on which payment is made of the value of input service and service tax paid or payable as indicated in Invoice…………”

Analysis of Credit ‘wrongly’ ‘taken’ / ‘utilised’

To understand the difference (if any) between the terms ‘wrongly’ ‘taken’ and ‘utilised’, the meanings attributed to these words used in Rule 14 of CCR is given hereafter for ready reference :

• ‘Taken’ means “to gain or receive into possession, to seize, to assume ownership” (Black’s Law Dictionary).
• ‘To take’, signifies “to lay hold of, grab, or seize it, to assume ownership etc.” (Advance Law Lexicon – 3rd Edition).
• ‘Utilise’ means “to make practical and effective use of” (Compact Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus).
• ‘Utilise’ means “to make use of, turn to use” (The Chambers Dictionary).
• ‘Wrongful’ – “characterised by unfairness of injustice, contrary to law” (Concise Oxford Dictionary)
• ‘Wrong’ – “any damage or injury, contrary to right, violation of right or of law” (P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s Law Lexicon)

Reversal of CENVAT Credit before Utilization – Settled Position

• In a landmark ruling in Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd. vs. CCE (1996) 81 ELT 3 (SC), it has been held by the Supreme Court that, when the MODVAT Credit taken is reversed, it would mean that the MODVAT Credit has not been taken at all. This principle is relevant for the CENVAT Credit as well. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter :

Para 7

In view of the aforesaid clarification by the department, we see no reason why the assessee cannot make a debit entry in the credit account before removal of the exempted final product. If this debit entry is permissible to be made, credit entry for the duties paid on the inputs utilised in manufacture of the final exempted product will stand deleted in the accounts of the assessee. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the assessee has taken credit for the duty paid on the inputs utilised in the manufacture of the final exempted product under Rule 57A. In other words, the claim for exemption of duty on the disputed goods cannot be denied on the plea that the assessee has taken credit of the duty paid on the inputs used in the manufacture of these goods.

The above stated principle laid down by the Supreme Court has been followed in a large number of cases. [For e.g. CCE vs. Ashima Dyecot Ltd. (2008) 232 ELT 580 (GUJ)].

Similarly, the said principle was also asserted by the Hon. Supreme Court in CCE, Mumbai vs. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. 2007 (215) ELT 3 (SC) wherein it was held “whenever duty is paid on the input, the assessee is entitled to credit under CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 however availment of credit takes place later on when the assessee makes adjustments of duty paid on input against duty paid on final product. In the present case, before the account could be debited and before the assessee could avail CENVAT Credit, assessee has reversed CENVAT Credit which would amount to the assessee not taking credit for duty paid on input. Learned counsel submitted that the assessee was free to reverse the credit before utilization of such credit.” This decision was also accepted by the Gujarat High Court in CCE vs. Dynaflex Ltd. 2011 (266) ELT 41 (Guj).

Department clarification

The CBEC had vide Circular No. 897/17/2009 – CX, dated 03-09-2009 has clarified as under:

“The Tribunal decision and the High Court judgment referred to above, was delivered in the context of erstwhile Rule 57 I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and that the Supreme Court order under reference is only a decision and not a judgment. Since, the Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, is clear and unambiguous in the position that interest would be recoverable when CENVAT Credit is taken or utilised wrongly, it is clarified that the interest shall be recoverable when credit has been wrongly taken, even, if it has not been utilised, in terms of wordings of the present Rule 14.”

It may be noted that erstwhile Rule 57 I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 did not specifically provide for any interest payment along with reversal of wrongly taken credit while present Rule 14 of CCR provides for payment of interest along with the reversal of wrongly taken credit.

Interest on Credit taken but not utilized – Judicial Views

• In CCE vs. Maruti Udyog Ltd. (2007) 214 ELT 173 (P & H)], the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana Court agreed with the views of the Hon’ble CESTAT that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as entry in the MODVAT record and was in fact not utilised. The SLP filed by the revenue against this order of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (2007) 214 ELT A 50 (SC) on 10-10-2006.

In the case of Maruti Udyog, the assessee claimed the Modvat credit which was not allowable in the absence of the requisite certificate under Rule 57E of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 being produced within six months but still the assessee claimed the same and credited the amount in RG – 23A Part II. The authorities disallowed the Modvat credit relying upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Osram Surya (P) Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore (2002) 142 ELT 5 (SC).

The Tribunal, however, had held that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as an entry in the Modvat record and was not in fact utilised. The Tribunal held that in absence of utilisation of credit, the assessee was not liable to pay interest.

The P & H High Court held as under :

“Learned Counsel for the appellant is unable to show as to how the  interest  will  be  required to be paid when in absence of availment of Modvat Credit in fact, the assessee was not liable to pay any duty. The Tribunal has clearly recorded a finding that the assessee did not avail of the Modvat Credit in fact and had only made an entry.

In view of this factual position, we are unable to hold that any substantial question of law arises”.

•    Attention is particularly drawn to the ruling of the Punjab & Haryana High  Court  in  the  case of Ind – Swift Laboratories Ltd. vs. UOI (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H), relevant extracts from which, are reproduced hereafter for reference:

Para 9

•    The Scheme of the Act and the CENVAT Credit Rules framed thereunder permit a manufacturer or producer of the final products  or a provider  of taxable service to  take  the  CENVAT  Credit in respect of duty of excise and such other duties as specified. The conditions for allowing the CENVAT Credit are contained in Rule 4 of  the Credit Rules contemplating that the CENVAT Credit can be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in the factory of  the  manufacturer or in the premises of the provider of output service. Such CENVAT Credit can be utilised in terms of Rule 3(4) of Credit Rules  for payment of any duty of excise on any final product  and  as contemplated in the aforesaid sub-rule. It, thus, transpires that the CENVAT credit is the benefit of duties leviable or paid as specified in Rule 3(1) used in the manufacture of intermedi- ate products etc. In other  words,  it  is  a  credit of the duties already leviable or paid. Such credit in respect of duties already paid can be adjusted for payment of duties payable under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. U/s. 11AB of the Act, liability to pay interest arises     in respect of any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded from the first day of the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. Interest is leviable if duty of  excise has not been levied or paid. Interest can be claimed or levied for the reason that there is delay in the payment of duties. The interest is compensatory in nature as the penalty is charge- able separately.

Para 10

•    In Pratibha Processors vs. Union of India, 1996
(88)  ELT  12  (SC)  =  (1996)  11  SCC  101,  it  was  held that  interest  is  compensatory  in  character  and is  imposed  on  an  assessee  who  has  withheld payment  of  any  tax  as  and  when  it  is  due  and payable.  Similarly,  in  Commissioner  of  Customs vs.  Jayathi  Krishna  &  Co.  –  2000  (119)  ELT  4(SC) (2000)  9  SCC  402,  it  was  held  that  interest  on warehoused goods is merely an accessory to the principal  and  if  the  principal  is  not  payable,  so is  it  for  interest  on  it.  In  view  of  the  aforesaid principle,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  no  liability of  payment  of  any  excise  duty  arises  when  the petitioner availed the CENVAT Credit. The liability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisation. Even  if  the  CENVAT  Credit  has  been  wrongly taken, that does not lead to the levy of interest as a liability of payment of excise duty does not arise  with  such  availment  of  the  CENVAT  Credit by an assessee. Therefore, interest is not payable on  the  amount  of  the  CENVAT  credit  availed  of and  not  utilised.

Para 11

•    Reliance of respondents on Rule 14 of the Credit Rules that interest u/s. 11AB of the Act is payable even if the CENVAT Credit has been taken.  In our view, the said Clause  has to be read down  to mean that where the CENVAT Credit taken and utilised wrongly. Interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that the CENVAT  credit has been wrongly taken as such availment by itself does not create any  liability  of  payment of excise duty. On a conjoint reading of section 11AB of the Act and that of Rules  3  and  4  of the Credit Rules, we hold that interest cannot  be claimed from the date of wrong availment   of the CENVAT Credit. The interest shall be pay- able from the date the CENVAT Credit is wrongly utilised.

•    In an important ruling the Supreme Court,  in  the case of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (2011)  265 ELT 3 (S.C.)], set aside the order passed by the  Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court  (2009)  240 ELT  328  (P  &  H)]  on  the  question  of  charging interest  on  the  CENVAT  Credit  wrongly  taken, but  not  utilised.  By  interpreting  the  expressions and  words  used  in  the  provisions  of  Rule  14  of CCR,   the Supreme Court concluded that interest is  payable  on  the  CENVAT  Credit  wrongly  taken even  if  such  Credit  has  not  been  utilised.

The issue for consideration is whether an assessee can be made liable to pay interest for taking wrong credit if such credit has not been utilised inasmuch he has not derived any  benefit  out  of his wrong action.

The more important observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

“17. Xxxxxxxxxx In our considered opinion, the High Court misread and misinterprets the aforesaid Rule 14 and wrongly read it down without properly appreciating the scope and limitation thereof. A statutory provision is generally read down in order to save the said provision from being declared un- constitutional or illegal. Rule 14 specifically provides that where the CENVAT Credit has been taken or utilised would be recovered from the manufacturer or the provider of the output service.  The issue is  as to whether the aforesaid word “OR”  appear- ing in Rule 14, twice,  could  be  read  as  “AND” by way of reading it down as has been done by    the High Court. If the aforesaid provision is read    as a whole we find no reason to read the word “OR” in between the expression ‘taken’ or ‘utilised wrongly’ or has been erroneously refunded’ as the word “AND”. On the happening of any of the three aforesaid circumstances such credit becomes recoverable along with interest.

18. We do not feel that any other harmonious con- struction is required to be given to the aforesaid expression/provision which is clear and unambigu- ous as it exists  all by itself. So far as section  11AB    is concerned, the same becomes relevant and ap- plicable for the purpose of making recovery of the amount due and payable. Therefore, the High Court erroneously held that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of the CENVAT Credit and that it should only be payable from the date when the CENVAT Credit is wrongly utilised. Besides, the rule of reading down is in itself  a Rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is generally utilised to straighten the crudities or ironing out the creases to make a statue workable. This court has repeatedly laid down that in the  garb of reading down a  provision  it  is  not  open to read words and expressions not found in the provision statute and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. It is also held by this Court that the Rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute.

The interpretation made by the Honorable Supreme Court considering the specific circumstances of a case involving evasion of duty,  has been a matter  of extensive deliberation by the experts and rightly so inasmuch as, if the same is applied generally, it would mean unsettling the settled law.

•    Important judgment of Karnataka High Court in CCE & ST vs. Bill Forge  Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 26 STR 204 (KAR) [Bill Forge Case]

?  However, observations of the Karnataka High Court  in  the  Bill  Forge  case  are  very  impor- tant,  inasmuch  not  only  has  it  distinguished facts  of  the  case  of  UOI  vs.  Ind-Swift  Labo- ratories  Ltd.  (2011)  265  ELT  3  (SC)  but  it  has made  a  fine  distinction  between  making  an entry in the register and credit being ‘taken’ to  drive  home  the  point  that  interest  is  pay- able  only  from  the  date  when  duty  is  legally payable  to  the  Government  and  the  Govern- ment  would  sustain  loss  to  that  extent.

? In the Bill Forge case, the High Court referring to the Apex Court’s judgment in case of UOI vs. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. observed as under:

Para 18

“In fact, in the case before the Apex Court, the assessee received inputs and capital goods from various manufacturers/dealers and availed the CENVAT Credit on the duty paid on such  materi- als. The investigations conducted indicated that the assessee had taken the CENVAT Credit on fake invoices. When proceedings were initiated, the assessee filed applications for settlement of proceedings and the entire matter was placed before the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission held that a sum of Rs. 5,71,47,148.00 is the  duty  payable  and  simple  interest  at  10%  on  the CENVAT  Credit  wrongly  availed  from  the  date  the duty became payable as per section 11AB of the Act till  the  date  of  payment.  The  Revenue  calculated the said interest upto the date of the appropriation of  the  deposited  amount  and  not  upto  the  date  of payment.  Therefore,  it  was  contended  that  inter- est  has  to  be  calculated  from  the  date  of  actual utilisation  and  not  from  the  date  of  availment. Therefore,  an  application  was  filed  for  clarification by  the  assessee.  The  said  application  was  rejected upholding  the  earlier  order,  i.e.  interest  is  payable from  the  date  of  duty  becoming  payable  as  per section  11AB.  Therefore,  the  Apex  Court  interfered with the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court  and  rightly  rejected  by  the  Settlement  Com- mission  as  outside  the  scope  and  they  found  fault with  the  interpretation  placed  on  Rule  14.”

“It is also to be noticed that in the aforesaid  Rule, the word ‘avail’ is not used. The words used are ‘taken’ or “utilised wrongly”. Further the said provision makes it clear that the interest shall be recovered in terms of section 11A and 11B of the Act………”

Para 20

From the aforesaid discussion what emerges is that the credit of excise duty in the register maintained for the said purpose is only a book entry.  It might  be utilised later for payment of excise duty on the excisable product……… Before utilisation of such credit, the entry has been reversed, it amounts to not taking credit.”

para 22

“Therefore interest is payable from that date though in fact by such entry the Revenue  is  not put to any loss at all. When once the wrong entry was pointed out, being convinced, the assessee has promptly reversed the entry. In other words,  he did not take the advantage of wrong entry. He did not take the CENVAT Credit or utilised the CENVAT credit. It is in those circumstances that the Tribunal was justified in holding that, when the  assessee has not taken the benefit of the CENVAT Credit, there is no liability to pay  interest.  Before  it  can be taken, it had been reversed. In other words, once the entry was reversed, it is as if that the CENVAT credit was not available. Therefore, the said judgment of the Apex Court* has no application to the facts of this case It is only when the assessee  had taken the credit, in other words by taking such credit, if he had not paid the duty which is legally  due to the Government, the Government would have sustained loss to that extent. Then the liability to pay interest from the date the amount became due arises u/s. 11AB, in order to compensate the Government which was deprived of the duty  on  the date it became due.”

•    The ruling of Karnataka High Court in Bill Forge case, has been followed in large number of subsequent decided cases For e.g.:

?  CCE  vs.  Pearl  Insulation  Ltd.  (2012)  27  STR  337 (KAR)

?  CCE vs. Gokuldas Images (P) Ltd. (2012) 28 STR 214  (KAR)

?  Sharvathy  Conductors  Pvt.  Ltd.  vs.  CCE  (2013) 31  STR  47  (Tri  –  Bang)

?  CCE  vs.  Sharda  Enargy  &  Minerals  Ltd.  (2013) 291  ELT  404  (Tri  –  Del)

?  Gary Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd vs. CCE (2013) 297 ELT  391  (Tri  –  Del)

?  CCE  vs.  Balrampur  Chinni  Mills  Ltd.  (2014)  300 ELT  449  (Tri  –  Del)

However, in many cases, [For e.g., CCE vs. Kay Bouvei Engineering Pvt. Ltd.  (2014)  301  ELT 100  (Tri –  Mum- bai)], the Bill Forge case has not been followed and instead,  the  position  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  in Ind  Swift  case  followed.

Important amendment in Rule 14 of CCR

In  a  very  significant  amendment  in  Rule  14  of  CCR, with  effect  from  17-03-2012,  the  words  CENVAT Credit  has  been  “taken  or  utilised  wrongly”  has been  substituted  by  the  words  “taken  and  utilised wrongly”.

This amendment strongly reinforces the interpreta- tion placed by the  Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court in Maruti Udyog & Ind Swift Laboratories and Karnataka High Court in the Bill Forge case to the effect that, no interest can be recovered in cases where the CENVAT Credit has been wrongly taken but not utilised by an assessee.

Recent  Tribunal  Ruling  in  Balmer  Lawrie  &  Co.  Ltd vs.  CCE  (2014)  301  ELT  573  (Tri  –  Mumbai)

This  ruling  is  very  important  inasmuch  as,  it  not only  distinguishes  the  Karnataka  High  Court  ruling in  the  Bill  Forge  case,  but  it  also  discusses  the applicability  of  the  amendment  in  Rule  14  of  CCR vide  Notification  dated  17-03-2012.

In  this  case,  the  appellant  is  a  manufacturer  of lubricating  oil  availing  the  Cenvat  Credit  on  various inputs  and  capital  goods  as  provided  for  under (CCR).  They  availed  the  Cenvat  Credit  amounting to  Rs.  1,61,04,675/-  of  the  CVD  paid  on  imported base  oil.  The  base  oil  so  obtained  on  which  credit was  taken,  was  returned  by  the  appellant  to  M/s. VCL  and  M/s.  Ultraplus  Lube  Pvt.  Ltd.  and  the  ap- pellant  paid  excise  duty  equivalent  to  the  credit taken  on  such  base  oil  returned.  The  department was  of  the  view  that  the  taking  of  credit  by  the appellant  was  not  permitted  under  law  inasmuch as  the  goods  were  not  intended  for  use  in  the manufacture  of  excisable  goods  and,  therefore, credit  was  not  admissible  under  CCR  ab  initio.  Ac- cordingly,  a  show  cause  notice  dated  02-06-2008 was  issued  to  the  appellant  proposing  to  recover the  credit  taken  along  with  interest  thereon  under the provisions of Rule 14 of the CCR read with Sec- tion  11A(1)  and  section  11AB  of  the  Central  Excise Act,  1944.  It  was  also  proposed  to  impose  penalty on  the  appellant  under  Rule  15  of  the  said  Rules read  with  section  11AC  of  the  said  Central  Excise Act.  The  said  notice  was  adjudicated  and  duty  de- mand was confirmed by denying the Central Excise credit  of  Rs.  1,61,04,675/-  and  interest  on  the  said credit wrongly taken was also confirmed. A penalty of equivalent amount was also imposed on the ap- pellant  under  Rule  15  of  Cenvat  Credit  Rules,  2004 read  with  section  11AC  of  the  said  Act.  In  addition, a  fine  of  Rs.  1  crore  was  imposed  on  the  goods i.e.,  base  oil  on  the  grounds  that  the  same  was liable  to  confiscation  and  hence,  fine  is  imposable u/s.  34  of  the  Central  Excise  Act,  1944.

The Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that inasmuch as the appellant had reversed the credit taken at the time of clearance of the base   oil to M/s. VCL and Ultraplus Lube Pvt. Ltd., the question  of  reversal  of  credit  once  again  does  not arise and, therefore, the demand is not sustainable. It  was  further  pointed  out  that  the  appellant  had reflected  the  taking  of  the  Cenvat  Credit  on  base oil  received  from  VCL  in  their  monthly  ER-1  returns and,  therefore,  the  department  was  aware  of  the fact of taking of Cenvat credit by the appellant and hence  no  suppression  of  facts  on  the  part  of  the appellant could be alleged. It is also argued that the said  credit  was  available  in  the  books  of  accounts of  the  appellant  during  the  entire  period  and  the appellant  had  never  utilised  the  credit.  Therefore, the question of liability to pay any interest thereon would  not  arise  at  all.  Reliance  was  placed  on  the decisions  of  the  Hon’ble  Karnataka  High  Court  in the  case  of  CCE  &  S.T.  vs.  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  (2012) 26  STR  204  (KAR);  CCE  vs.  Gokaldas  Images  (P)  Ltd. (2012)  28  STR  214  (KAR);  &  CCE  vs.  Pearl  Insulation Ltd.  (2012)  27  STR  337  (KAR.)  and  the  decisions  of the  Hon’ble  High  Court  of  Allahabad  in  the  case of  CC  &  Central  Excise,  Meerut  vs.  Rana  Sugar  Ltd. (2010) 253 ELT 366 (ALL). The Learned Counsel has further contended that Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules,  2004,  was  amended  vide  a  Notification  No. 18/2012-C.E.  (N.T.),  dated  17-03-2012  WHEReby  the phrase  “Cenvat  credit  has  been  taken  or  utilised wrongly”  was  substituted  by  the  words  “Cenvat credit  has  been  taken  and  utilized  wrongly”.  Since the  words  have  been  substituted,  the  substitution will have retrospective effect and, therefore, unless the  appellant  utilises  the  credit,  the  question  of recovery of Cenvat credit or interest thereon would not  arise.  Reliance  was  placed  on  the  decisions  of Supreme Court in Indian Tobacco Association (2005) 187 ELT 162  (SC) and W.P.I.L. Ltd. vs. CCE  (2005)  181 ELT  359  (SC)  in  support  of  this  proposition.
 
The  Honorable  Tribunal  held  as  under:  Para  5.2
The  next  issue  for  consideration  is  whether  the appellant  is  liable  to  pay  any  interest  on  the  credit taken.  During  the  period  involved,  Rule  14  of  the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 provided for the recovery of  interest  on  the  Cenvat  Credit  taken  or  utilised wrongly under the provisions of the said Rule read with  section  11AB  of  the  Central  Excise  Act,  1944. The issue also came up for consideration before the Hon’ble  Apex  Court  in  the  case  of  Union  of  India vs.  Ind  –  Swift  Laboratories  Ltd.  (2011)  265  ELT  3 (SC)  (2012)  25  STR  184  (SC).  The  question  before the  Honorable  Apex  Court  was  “when  interest  on irregular credit arises, is it from the date of availing of  such  credit  or  from  the  date  of  utilisation?”  The Hon’ble Apex Court held that Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit  Rules,  2004  specifically  provides  for  interest on  the  Cenvat  Credit  taken  or  utilised  wrongly  or erroneously refunded. Therefore, interest on irregu- lar  credit  arises  from  the  date  of  taking  of  such credit.  Accordingly  it  was  held  that  if  the  Cenvat Credit  taken  is  irregularly,  though  not  utilised,  the liability  to  pay  interest  would  arise  from  the  date of  taking  of  the  credit  till  the  date  of  reversal  of the  credit.  In  view  of  the  above  decision  by  the Hon’ble Apex Court, the ratio of which is applicable to  the  present  case,  it  becomes  evident  that  the appellant  is  liable  to  discharge  interest  liability  on the  Cenvat  Credit  wrongly  taken  from  the  date  of taking  of  the  Cenvat credit  till  the  date  of  reversal. The  reliance  placed  by  the  appellant  on  the  deci- sion  of  the  Hon’ble  Karnataka  High  Court  in  the case  of  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  (supra)  and  the  other decisions  will  not  apply  to  the  facts  of  the  present case.  In  the  case  of  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  (supra)  the appellant  therein  took  the  credit  and  also  reversed the  credit  within  the  same  month,  i.e.,  before  any liability  to  pay  any  duty  arose.  It  was  in  that  con- text  the  Hon’ble  High  Court  held  that  if  a  credit has  been  taken  but  reversed  before  any  liability to  pay  duty  arose  then  no  interest  liability  would accrue.  Those  are  not  the  facts  obtaining  in  the present  case.  It  is  not  the  case  of  the  appellant that  between  the  date  of  taking  the  credit  and the date of reversal when the base oil was cleared, liability  to  pay  duty  did  not  arise  at  all.  In  fact  the clearance has been spread over several months and years.  Therefore,  the  facts  of  the  case  before  us are  clearly  distinguishable  from  the  facts  involved in  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  cited  (supra)  and  hence  ratio of  the  said  decision  would  not  apply.  Since  Pearl Insulation Ltd. (supra) and Gokaldas Images (P) Ltd. (supra)  also  follow  the  ratio  of  the  Bill  Forge  Pvt. Ltd  they  would  also  not  apply  to  the  facts  of  the present  case.  As  regards  the  reliance  placed  in  the case  of  Rana  Sugar  Ltd.  (supra),  it  is  true  that  the Hon’ble  Allahabad  High  Court  had  held  that  if  the reversal  of  credit  has  been  done  before  its  utilisa- tion, demand of interest would not arise. However, the said order was passed much before the decision in Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (supra) by the Hon’ble Apex  Court  was  pronounced.  Therefore,  the  ratio of  Ind-Swift  Laboratories  Ltd.  would  prevail  over all  the  other  decisions  of  various  Courts.

Para  5

As regard the argument advanced by the appellant that  since  the  expression  “Cenvat  Credit  taken  or utilised  wrongly”  had  been  substituted  effective from  17-03-2012  WITH  the  words  “Cenvat  Credit taken  and  utilised  wrongly”,  the  same  would  have retrospective  effect  and,  therefore,  inasmuch  as the  appellant  has  not  utilised  the  credit  there  will not  be  any  liability  to  interest,  this  argument  is misplaced.  Rule  14  of  the  the  Cenvat  Credit  Rules, 2004 was amended by a Notification No. 18/2012-C.E. (N.T.),  dated  17-O3-2012  and  amendment  effected in  Rule  14  of  the  Cenvat  Credit  Rules,  2004  read follows:-

“In Rule 14 of the said Rules, with effect from the 17th  day  of  March,  2012,-

a) For the words “taken or utilised wrongly”, the words “taken and utilised wrongly” shall be substituted;

This  amendment  rule  makes  it  absolute  clear  that the  amendment  is  with  effect  from  17-O3-2012  (in- advertently  mentioned  as  17-03-2004  in  the  ruling) and  not  before.  In  view  of  the  express  provisions in  the  Amendment  Rules,  the  argument  of  the appellant  that  amendment  being  in  the  nature  of substitution would have retrospective effect cannot be  accepted.  It  is  a  trite  law  that  every  statutory provision  is  prospective  only  unless  it  is  explicitly provided  that  it  is  retrospective  in  nature  and  the legislature  provides  for  such  retrospective  operation. In the present case, no such retrospective view has  been  provided  by  the  legislature  in  respect  of Notification  18/2012  –C.E.  (N.T.),  dated  17-03-2012 and, therefore, the argument of the Counsel in this regard  and  the  decisions  relied  upon  in  support  of the  same  cannot  be  accepted.

It appears that, the factual position that appellants claimed credit to which they were not  entitled  at all, could have had a bearing on the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal.

Conclusion

The Honorable Supreme Court in the Ind – Swift case has unsettled the judicially settled principle under the MODVAT (relevant for CENVAT Credit) that no interest is payable in cases where MODVAT Credit is wrongly taken but not utilised. Possibly, the specific circumstances of the case involving evasion of duty, had a bearing on the conclusion arrived at by the Apex Court.

It would appear that,  it  was  correctly  observed  by the Honorable Punjab & Haryana High Court in Ind – Swift case that, interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on nonpayment/delayed payable. No liability of payment of any excise duty arises when the CENVAT Credit is availed. The li- ability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisa- tion. Even if the CENVAT Credit is wrongly taken, that does not lead to levy of interest as liability of payment of excise duty does not arise with such availment of the CENVAT Credit by an assessee. Availment and utilisation of credit cannot be placed at equal footing for the purpose of charging inter- est. Availment of credit is only a book entry and does not result in any gain for the tax payer. The  use of the credit results into benefit and  that  is the time which is relevant for charging interest.

With  due  respect,  the  judgment  of  the  Honorable Supreme  Court  in  the  Ind  –  Swift  case  which  has generated  extensive  judicial  controversy,  needs  a serious reconsideration more particularly to advance the  cause  of  the  CENVAT  Credit  Scheme  which  is essentially  a  beneficial  piece  of  legislation.  Pending judicial resolvement of the controversy, Government could  consider  a  clarificatory  amendment  to  the effect  that  the  amendment  in  Rule  14  of  CCR  vide Notification  No  18/  2012  –  CE  (NT)  dated  17-03-2012 would  have  retrospective  operation.

Remuneration to Partners: Whether Payment to a Different Person is Taxable?

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Synopsis

To consider the applicability of
Service Tax on remuneration paid to partner, the authors have analysed
the definition of ‘Service’ defined in Section 65B (44) of Finance Act
2012 alongwith various provisions of Partnership Law, Income Tax law and
considered the various judicial precedents. The authors have also
referred to the relevant case laws on the subject and concluded that
services provided by partners to the firm and remuneration received
thereof from the firm cannot be subjected to Service Tax.

Preliminary
Partnership
continues to be one of the more prominent forms in which businesses are
carried out in the country. Further, it is a very common practice that,
partners are paid salary (either on a fixed basis monthly/annually or
on a basis which is linked to profits earned by the firm). Further,
under the income tax law, salary paid to partners is allowed as
deduction subject to certain specified limits.

The scope of
service tax has been substantially expanded, post introduction of
Negative List based Taxation of Services with effect from 01-07-2012.
The taxability of salary paid by the firm in the hands of partners under
service tax has been a matter of extensive deliberation since
01-07-2012. An attempt is made hereafter to discuss this issue,
considering the provisions of partnership law & income tax law, in
addition to the provisions of service tax law effective 01-07-2012.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

Extracts from Finance Act, 1994 – as amended (FA 12) effective 01/07/2012.

(A) Section 65 B (44) of FA 12

‘Service’
means any activity carried out by a person for another for
consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include –

(a) an activity which constitutes merely, –

i) A transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or

ii)
Such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be a
sale within the meaning of Clause (29A) of Article 366 of the
Constitution; or

iii) A transaction in money or actionable claim;

(b) A provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;

(c) Fees taken in any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force.

…………………………….

Explanation 2

– For the purpose of this Clause, transaction in money shall not
include any activity relating to the use of money or its conversion by
cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or denomination, to
another form, currency or denomination for which a separate
consideration is charged.

Explanation 3
– for the purposes of this Chapter, –

(a)
an unincorporated association or a body of persons, as the case may be,
and a member thereof shall be treated as distinct persons;

(b)
an establishment of a person in the taxable territory and any of his
other establishment in a non – taxable territory shall be treated as
establishments of distinct persons.


Explanation 4
– A
person carrying on a business through a branch or agency or
representational office in any territory shall be treated as having an
establishment in that territory;

(B) Section 65B (37) of FA 12

“Person includes –
(i) an individual, juridical
(ii) a Hindu undivided family,
(iii) a Company,
(iv) a Society,
(v) a limited liability partnership,
(vi) a firm,
(vii) an association of persons or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not,
(viii)Government,
(ix) a local authority,
(x) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the preceding sub – Clauses

(C) Charge of Service tax – Section 66 B of FA 12

There
shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at
the rate of twelve per cent on the value of all services, other than
those services specified in the negative list, provided or agreed to be
provided in the taxable territory by one person to another and collected
in such manner as may be prescribed.

Relevant extracts from TRU Circular dated 20/6/12 – “Taxation of Services – An Education Guide” issued by CBEC

Guidance Note 2 – What is Service?

‘Service’ has been defined in clause (44) of the new section 65B and means –

• any activity
• for consideration
• carried out by a person for another
• and includes a declared service.

The said definition further provides that ‘service’ does not include –


any activity that constitutes only a transfer in title of (i) goods or
(ii) immovable property by way of sale, gift or in any other manner


(iii) a transfer, delivery or supply of goods which is deemed to be a
sale of goods within the meaning of Clause (29A) of article 366 of the
Constitution

• a transaction only in (iv) money or (v) actionable claim

• a service provided by an employee to an employer in the course of the employment.

• fees payable to a Court or a Tribunal set up under a law for the time being in force
………….

Activity

What does the word ‘activity’ signify?

‘Activity’
is not defined in the Act. In terms of the common understanding of the
word activity would include an act done, a work done, a deed done, an
operation carried out, execution of an act, provision of a facility etc.
It is a term with very wide connotation.

Activity could be
active or passive and would also include forbearance to act. Agreeing to
an obligation to refrain from an act or to tolerate an act or a
situation has been specifically listed as a declared service u/s. 66E of
the Act.

………………….

Activity for a consideration

The
concept ‘activity for a consideration’ involves an element of
contractual relationship wherein the person doing an activity does so at
the desire of the person for whom the activity is done in exchange for a
consideration. An activity done without such a relationship i.e.
without the express or implied contractual reciprocity of a
consideration would not be an “activity for consideration” even though
such an activity may lead to accrual of gains to the person carrying out
the activity.

Thus, an award received in consideration for
contribution over a life time or even a singular achievement carried out
independently or without reciprocity to the amount to be received will
not comprise an activity for consideration.

There can be many
activities without consideration. An artist performing on a street does
an activity without consideration even though passersby may drop some
coins in his bowl kept after feeling either rejoiced or merely out of
compassion. They are, however, under no obligation to pay any amount for
listening to him nor have they engaged him for his services. On the
other hand, if the same person is called to perform on payment of an
amount of money then the performance becomes an activity for a
consideration

Provision of free tourism information, access to
free channels on TV and a large number of governmental activities for
citizens are some of the examples of activities without consideration.

Similarly,
there could be cases of payments without an activity though they cannot
be put in words as being ‘onsideration without an activity’
Consideration itself presupposes a certain level of reciprocity. Thus
grant of pocket money, a gift or reward (which has not been given in
terms of reciprocity), amount paid as alimony for divorce would be
examples in this category.

However, a reward given for an activity performed explicitly on the understanding that the winner will receive the specified amount in reciprocity for a service to be rendered by the winner would be   a consideration for such service. Thus, amount paid in cases where people at large are invited to contribute to open software development (e.g. Linux) and getting an amount if their contribution is finally accepted will be examples of activities for consideration.

By a person for another

What is the significance of the phrase ‘carried out by a person for another’?

The phrase ‘provided by one person to another’ signifies that services provided by a person to self are outside the ambit of taxable service. Example of such service would include a service provided by one branch of a company to another or to its head office or vice-versa.

Are there any exceptions wherein services provided by a person to oneself are taxable?

Yes.  Two  exceptions  have  been  carved  out  to the  general  rule  that  only  services  provided  by a  person  to  another  are  taxable.  These  exceptions,  contained  in  Explanation  3  of  Clause  (44) of  section  65B,  are:

  • an establishment of a person located in taxable territory and another establishment of such person located in non-taxable territory are treated as  establishments  of  distinct  persons.  [Similar provision  exists  presently  in  section  66A  (2)]

  •  an  unincorporated  association  or  body  of  per- sons and members thereof, are also treated as distinct  persons.  [Also  exists  presently  in  part as  explanation  to  section  65].

Implications of these deeming provisions are that inter-se provision of services between such persons, deemed to be separate persons, would be taxable. For example, services provided by a club to its members and services provided by the branch office of a multinational company to the headquarters of the multinational company located outside India would be taxable provided other conditions relating to taxability of service are satisfied.

a)Brief analysis of provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932

Some relevant provisions are as under:

  •  the ‘partnership’ is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of  a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually ‘partners’ and collectively a ‘firm’ and the name under which their business is carried on is called ‘the firm’s name.” [section 4].

  •  a partner is not entitled to receive remuneration for taking part in the conduct of business of the firm subject to a contract between the partners. [section 13(a)]

a partner is the agent of the firm for the purposes of business of the firm. [section 18]

  •  any act of the partner which is done to carry on, in the usual way, business of the kind carried on by the firm, binds the firm. [section  19]

  • every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners  and  also  severally,  for  all  the  acts  of the firm done while he is a partner. [section 25]

b)    Some judicial considerations

  •  under  partnership  law,  a  partnership  firm  is not  a  legal  entity,  but  only  consists  of  the  individual  partners  for  the  time  being.  It  is  not a  distinct  legal  entity  apart  from  the  partners constituting it and equally, in law, the firm, as such,  has  no  separate  rights  of  its  own  in  the partnership assets. When one talks of the firm’s property or the firm’s assets, all that is meant is property or assets in which all partners have a  joint  or  common  interest.  [Malabar  Fisheries Co.  vs.  CIT  [1979]  120  ITR  49   (SC);  in  CIT  vs. Dalmia Magnesite Corpn. [1999] 236 ITR 46 (SC).]

  •  a partnership concern is not a legal entity like a company. It is a group of individual partners [Comptroller  &  Auditor  General  vs.  Kamlesh Vadilal  Mehta  [2003]  126  Taxman  619  (SC   –  3 Member  Bench).]

  •  law has extended only a limited personality to a  partnership  firm.  A  firm  is  not  an  entity  or a  ‘person’  but  is  an  association  of  individuals, and a firm’s name is only a collective name of those  individuals  who  constitute  the  firm.  A partnership  firm  cannot  enter  into  partnership with another partnership firm. HUF or individual [Dulichand Laxminarayan vs. CIT (1936) 29 ITR 535 (SC  –  3  member  Bench); Mahabir Cold Storage vs. CIT  [1991]  188  ITR  91  (SC).]

  •  a partnership is not a legal entity. Partners are the  real  owners  of  assets  of  the  partnership firm. Firm is only a compendious name given to partnership  for  the  sake  of  convenience.  Each partner is owner of assets to the extent of his partnership  [N.  Khadervali  Saheb  vs.  N.  Gudu Sahib  [2003]  129  Taxman  597  (SC  –  3  Member Bench).]

c)    Other important & relevant Judicial Views

  •  The  Honorable  Supreme  Court  in  the  case of  Champaran  Cane  Concern  vs.  State  of  Bihar [1964]  2  SCR  921,  has  pointed  out  that  in  a partnership  each  partner  acts  as  an  agent  of the  other.  The  position  of  a  partner  qua  the firm  is,  thus,  not  that  of  a  master  and  a  servant  or  an  employer  and  an  employee,  which concept  involves  an  element  of  subordination but  that  of  equality.  The  partnership  business belongs to the partners and each one of them is an owner, thereof. In common parlance the status  of  a  partner  qua  the  firm  is,  thus,  different from employees working under the firm. It  may  be  that  a  partner  is  being  paid  some remuneration for any special attention which he gives  but  that  would  not  involve  any  change of  status  and  bring  him  within  the  definition of  an  employee.

  •  The  Honorable  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of CIT vs. R. M. Chidambaram Pillai  [1977]  106  ITR 292  has  held  as  under  :

“Here the first thing that we must grasp is that a firm is not a legal person even though it has some attributes of personality. Partnership is a certain relation between persons, the product of agreement to share the profits of a business. “Firm” is a collective noun, a compendious ex- pression to designate an entity, not a person. In Income-tax law a firm is a unit of assessment, by special provisions, but is not a full person which leads to the next step that since a contract of employment requires two distinct persons, viz. the employer and the employee, there cannot be a contract of service, in strict law, between a firm and one of its partners. So that any agreement for remuneration of a partner for taking part in the conduct of the business must be regarded as portion of the profits being made over as a reward for the human capital brought in. Section 13 of the Partnership Act brings into focus this basis of partnership business.”

“…It is implicit that the share income of the partner takes in his salary. This telling test is that where a firm suffers loss, that salaried partner’s share in it goes to depress his share of income. Surely, therefore, salary is a different label for profits, in the context of a partner’s
remuneration.”

“…The matter may be looked at another way too. In law, a partner cannot be employed by his firm, for a man cannot be his own employer. A contract can only be bilateral and the person cannot be a party on both sides, particularly in a contract of personal employment. A supposition that a partner is employed by the firm would involve that the employee must be looked upon as occupying the position of one of his own employers, which is legally impossible. Consequently, when an arrangement is made by which a partner works and receive sums as wages for services rendered, the agreement should in truth be regarded as a mode  of adjusting the amount that must be taken to have been contributed to the partnership’s assets by a partner who has made what is really a contribution in kind, instead of contribution in money.”

  • The  Honorable  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of Regional  Director,  Employees  State  Insurance Corpn.  vs.  Ramanuja  Match  Industries  [1985]  1 SCC 218 while dealing with the question, wheth- er there could be a relationship of master and servant  between  a  firm  on  the  one  hand  and its partners on the other, indicated that under the  law  of  partnership  there  can  be  no  such relationship as it would lead to the anomalous position  of  the  same  person  being  both,  the master  and  the  servant.

Brief analysis of provisions under income tax law

Under the Income-tax Act, 1961, some relevant provisions which need to be noted, are as under:

  •  A partnership firm (registered or unregistered) is taxed as a separate entity. Share of income of the partner in income of the firm is not included in computing total income of the partner (as it has already been taxed in the hands of partnership firm).

  • In addition to share of income of the firm, working partners can draw salary commission or remuneration from the partnership firm as per provisions of section 184, read with section 40(b). This is allowed as deduction from income of the firm (subject to certain limits) and is treated as an income of the partner for income-tax purposes.

  • According to section 2(23), a firm, partner and partnership  have  the  same  meaning  as  in  the Partnership  Act,  1932.

  •  Explanation   2   to   section   15   specifically states  that  any  salary,  bonus,  commission  or remuneration,  by  whatever  name  called,  due to or received by a partner of a firm from the firm  shall  not  be  regarded  as  ‘salary’.

  • Section 28(V) specifically states that any interest, salary, bonus, commission or remuneration, by  whatever  name  called,  due  to  or  received by a partner of a firm from such firm shall be treated as income chargeable to tax under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession.’

  • Provisions  of  TDS  (Section  192)  are  not  applicable to salary paid by the firm to its partners.

Partnership is a “person” by legal fiction for taxation

Though  partnership  is  not  a  legal  person,  yet  a firm  has  been  defined  as  a  ‘person’  u/s.  2(31) of  the  Income-tax  Act,  1961  and  section  65B(37) of  FA  12  effective  01-07-2012,  by  creating  a  legal fiction.  Hence,  once  a  legal  fiction  is  created  by law,  it  has  to  be  taken  to  its  logical  end.  Accordingly, partnership firm and the partners have to  be  ‘deemed’  as  two  different  persons  and  a partner should be deemed to be employee of the partnership  firm.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the following proposi- tions emerge :

  • there is a specific exclusion in the definition of ‘service’ for services provided by an employee to an employer in course of or in relation to his employment. However, there is no relationship of an employee and an employer between the partners and the partnership firm;

  • any agreement for remuneration of a partner for taking part in the conduct of the business is nothing but an additional share of profit remuneration is a different label for profits, in the context of a partner’s remuneration paid by firm to its partners. For services rendered by the partners, to the firm, would have oth- erwise got additional share of profit instead of remuneration.

  •  the partners act as agents of their firm and render the services to themselves,

  • the partnership business belongs to the partners and each of them is an owner thereof, and, hence, the services are rendered by partners to themselves.

Based on the above, it can be reasonably concluded that, since the services are rendered by the partners to themselves and not by one person to another and since services provided by partners to the firm is not covered by the two specific exceptions  in  Explanation  3  to  section  65  B(44)  of  FA 12,  services  provided  by  the  partners  to  the  firm would not constitute “any activity carried out by a person for another” in terms of the definition of ‘service’ u/s. 65B(44) of FA 12, Hence, service tax would not be applicable to remuneration received by  a  partner  from  the  partnership  firm.  Alterna- tively, by deeming fiction if a partner is treated as a different ‘person’ under tax laws overriding the provisions of the partnership law, then a partner would be deemed to be an employee of the firm. If that be the case, services provided by partners to  the  Partnership  firm  would  be  excluded  from the  definition  of  ‘service’  in  terms  of  clause  (b) of section 65 B(44) of FA 12. Hence, the question of  any  liability  to  service  tax,  on  remuneration received  by  partners  from  the  partnership  firm, would  not  survive.

SERVICES OF AIR-CONDITIONED RESTAURANTS

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Introduction and background Service tax is introduced on services provided by air-conditioned restaurants having a licence to serve liquor with effect from 1st May, 2011. The restaurants predominately serve food and as such, the dominant nature of the transaction is that of sale and the service is built-in or an integral part thereof and it is already subject to the levy of VAT. Whether a transaction is a sale or a service is determined with reference to facts of each case. At times, there may be a composite transaction consisting of both sale and service. The debate over this issue is ongoing and often a transaction is looked upon as ‘sale’ as well as ‘service’ under different statutes in India. There has been ongoing debate in relation to taxation of software, intellectual property rights or goods of incorporeal nature, telecommunication service, etc. as to whether these should be taxed as goods or services. Mutual exclusivity of service tax and VAT was recognised and a composite contract was distinguished from an indivisible contract in the case of Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd., 2008 (9) STR 337 by the Supreme Court and accordingly held to the effect that the element of sale would attract VAT and element of service would attract service tax. In the context of provision of broadband connectivity, in the case of Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 2009 TIOL 99 HC Kar-VAT, the High Court upheld the order of the Assessing Authority that activity of providing connectivity to the subscribers amounted to sale of light energy and taxable under the Karnataka VAT Act, whereas the company had paid due service tax. On filing SLP however, the Supreme Court set aside the order and directed the company to file statutory appeal and further passed an order to dispose of the appeal on merits. The controversy thus is not closed. It is however relevant to note that in the context of supply of food and beverages on board trains in the case of Indian Railways C&T Corporation Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2010 (20) STR 437 (Del.), the Delhi High Court held that the said transaction did not amount to service of outdoor catering as passengers have no choice of articles served or time and place of service of food. The element of service is incidental and bare minimum of heating food and serving it. The state was empowered to levy VAT on the transaction and incidental element of service was not relevant and the petitioner was at liberty to challenge the levy of service tax. Further citing the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., 2006 (2) STR 161 (80), it was observed that in respect of composite transactions other than those covered by Article 366(29A) of the Constitution, if no intention is found to segregate the element involving sale of goods from the element involving providing of service or if the transaction does not involve two distinct contracts, one for sale of goods and the other for providing of service, it is not permissible to disintegrate such composite contract so as to levy VAT/sales tax and service tax. In the context of outdoor catering service, distinguishing it from food served in a restaurant, the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandap Assn. v. UOI, 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC) noted, “In the case of an outdoor caterer, the customer negotiates each element of catering service including the price to be paid to the caterer. Outdoor catering has an element of personalised service provided to a customer. Clearly the service element is more weighty, visible and predominant in the case of outdoor catering, it cannot be considered a case of sale of food and drink as in restaurant”. Amidst the controversy as to whether food served in a restaurant is an indivisible contract where dominant objective is sale of food or a composite contract of sale of food and providing services of ambience of air-conditioning, furniture, etc. and other personalised services, service tax is introduced on the service provided by restaurants.

Services provided by restaurants Statutory provisions in relation to the new levy, as contained in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) are reproduced below: Section 65(105)(zzzzv) of the Act “ ‘Taxable service’ means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by a restaurant, by whatever name called, having the facility of air-conditioning in any part of the establishment, at any time during the financial year, which has licence to serve alcoholic beverages, in relation to serving of food or beverage, including alcoholic beverages or both, in its premises.”

Criteria for taxability The definition in relation to a restaurant indicates the following criteria for taxability:

  •  Services provided by a restaurant or any establishment providing such services and known by any name such as a fast-food centre, a lunch home, a dhaba, a coffee-shop, a club, etc. The term ‘restaurant’ is not defined in the Act, therefore only the common parlance meaning of the term is to be applied. Any establishment or an eating house serving food and/or beverages whether in a hotel or otherwise to public or a class of public for consumption on the premises is known as a restaurant and is covered in the scope.

  •  Air-conditioning facility may be available for the whole or partial premises of the restaurant or the establishment and at any time during a financial year.

  •  The other concurrent requirement is having a licence to serve alcoholic beverages. However, there is no requirement as to the actual servicing of alcohol using the said licence. The existence of licence to serve is the requirement and any kind of alcoholic beverage such as beer, rum, gin, vodka, whisky, wine, etc. if licensed to serve is covered in the scope.

  •  Service is to be provided to any person in relation to food or beverages including any alcoholic beverages.

  •  The food and/or beverages are served on the premises of the restaurant.

The Government Instruction vide DOF No. 334/3/2011-TRU, dated 28-2-2011 has clarified as follows:

“1. Services provided by a restaurant 1.1 Restaurants provide a number of services normally in combination with the meal and/ or beverage for a consolidated charge. These services relate to the use of restaurant space and furniture, air-conditioning, well-trained waiters, linen, cutlery and crockery, music, live or otherwise, or a dance floor. The customer also has the benefit of personalised service by indicating his preference for certain ingredients, e.g., salt, chilies, onion, garlic or oil. The extent and quality of services available in a restaurant is directly reflected in the margin charged over the direct costs. It is thus not uncommon to notice even packaged products being sold at prices far in excess of the MRP. 1.2 In certain restaurants the owners get into revenue-sharing arrangements with another person who takes the responsibility of preparation of food, with his own materials and ingredients, while the owner takes responsibility for making the space available, its decoration, furniture, cutlery, crockery and music, etc. The total bill, which is composite, is shared between the two parties in terms of the contract. Here the consideration for services provided by the restaurants is more clearly demarcated.

1.3 Another arrangement is whereby the restaurant separates a certain portion of the bill as service charge. This amount is meant to be shared amongst the staff who attend the customers. Though this amount is exclusively for the services, it does not represent the full value of all services rendered by the restaurants.

1.4    The new levy is directed at services provided by high-end restaurants that are air-conditioned and have licence to serve liquor. Such restaurants provide conditions and ambience in a manner that service provided may assume predominance over the food in many situations. It should not be confused with mere sale of food at any eating house, where such services are materially absent or so minimal that it will be difficult to establish that any service in any meaningful way is being provided.

1.5    It is not necessary that the facility of air-conditioning is available round the year. If the facility is available at any time during the financial year, the conditions for the levy shall be met.

1.6    The levy is intended to be confined to the value of services contained in the composite contract and shall not cover either the meal portion in the composite contract or mere sale of food by way of pick -up or home delivery, as also goods sold at MRP. The Finance Minister has announced in his budget speech 70% abatement on this service, which is, inter alia, meant to separate such portion of the bill as relates to the deemed sale of meals and beverages. The relevant Notification will be issued when the levy is operationalised after the enactment of the Finance Bill.”

Further to the above, the Circular No. 139/8/2011-TRU, dated 10-5-2011, clarified the following issues as summarised below:

  •     When there are more than one restaurant belonging to a common entity in a complex and if they are demarcated by separate names, service tax would be levied on the restaurant which is air-conditioned in any part of the establishment and has a licence to serve alcohol and as such, satisfies both the conditions for its coverage.

  •    Taxable services provided by a restaurant in other parts of the hotel such as swimming pool or an open area attached to the restaurant also attract service tax as they are extension of the restaurant.

  •     When food is served as a part of ‘room service’ of a hotel, no service tax is leviable as service is not provided in the premises of air-conditioned restaurant with a licence to serve liquor. It is not chargeable even under short-term accommodation service if the bill for the food is raised separately and does not form part of the declared tariff.

  •     For the levy of service tax, State Value Added Tax (VAT) charged in the invoice would be excluded from the taxable value.

Food picked up at counter or delivered at home

Many a time, food is picked up at the counter of the restaurant and not consumed while sitting in the restaurant or is delivered at home as most food chain outlets or even speciality restaurants provide home delivery service. In these situations, only food is sold and the facility of restaurant not enjoyed. DOF letter dated 28-2-2011 reproduced above has clarified this point.

Valuation of restaurant service

In the context of catering service provided by outdoor caterers and/or mandap-keepers, the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Association (supra) observed “it is well settled that the measure of taxation cannot affect the nature of taxation and therefore the fact that service tax is levied as a percentage of gross charges for catering cannot alter or affect the legislative competence of the Parliament in the matter”. In the said backdrop, exemption Notification No. 34/2011-ST of 25-4-2011 has amended Notification 1/2006-ST and granted abatement of 70% on the gross value of taxable service provided by a restaurant. The Ministry vide its Circular dated 25-4-2011 has also clarified that the exemption is available on the gross price charged by the restaurant for the taxable service including any portion shown separately, for instance some restaurants recover service charge separately. This would also form part of the value for determining service tax. However, any amount paid ex-gratia e.g., tip to any staff does not amount to consideration paid for the service of the restaurant and therefore would not be included in the value.

Some issues

(i)    A non-air-conditioned restaurant having a licence to sell alcoholic beverage is partly being made air-conditioned and will be functional from 1st January, 2012. Whether and when would service tax be attracted? Whether the entire sale i.e., even the non-air-conditioned part sale would attract tax liability?

Ans. (i) Service tax would be attracted from 1st January, 2012 and on the entire value of billing including billing for serving meals and/or drinks in the non-a/c part of the restaurant. The use of the words ‘at any time during the financial year’ makes it clear. However, prior to 1st January, 2011, the food was served without the facility of air-conditioning, therefore service tax would not be attracted. It may also be noted that service tax is introduced for the first time on the restaurant service from 1st May, 2011 and therefore threshold exemption would be available to the restaurant, subject to other conditions of threshold exemption of rupees ten lakh under Notification 6/2005-ST, dated 1-4-2005.

(ii)    Mr. A went to Restaurant M, a state-of-the art air-conditioned restaurant which would also service alcoholic beverages, but Mr. A does not have alcohol. Whether Mr. A can insist on not charging service tax in the invoice as he did not consume alcohol?

Ans. (ii) Consumption of alcohol is not envisaged in the definition of restaurant service. So long as the restaurant is air-conditioned and has a licence to servce alcoholic beverages, the restaurant is liable to pay service tax.

(iii)    Whether air-conditioned liquor shops having a licence to sell alcohol would be covered by the above provisions?

Ans. (iii) Liquor shops are not restaurants. They sell alcohol but do not serve the same in their premises. It is the service of restaurant facility i.e., having tables, chairs and other furniture along with a bar and/or waiters, etc. along with food and/or beverages including non-alcoholic beverages or both, is covered by the service tax provisions and not the shops selling alcohol.

(iv)    Are coffee-shop chain of restaurants with state-of-the art ambience in air-conditioned halls liable for service tax?

Ans. (iv) If the coffee-shop does not have licence to serve alcoholic beverages, it is not covered by the service tax provisions.

(v)    Whether a restaurant having a mere beer bar where only that part is air-conditioned would be liable for service tax?

Ans. (v) The part of the restaurant is air-conditioned and beer is an alcoholic beverage. Therefore, the value of the food and all beverages served in any part of the restaurant is liable for service tax.

(vi)    An air-conditioned restaurant in Mahabaleshwar uses air-conditioning facility only during the months of March – May. Rest of the year being very cool, air-conditioning is not operated. If the restaurant’s value of taxable sale during May, 2011 was well below the threshold limit of 10 lakh, would it be out of the scope of the levy till March 2012 or so.

Ans. (vi) No. The restaurant would be liable for service tax when it crosses the limit of Rs.10 lakh, even if it does not operate air-conditioning as it has used it for some part of the year. The condition is to have a facility of air-conditioning at anytime during the financial year is satisfied.

CONTROVERSY: WHETHER RENTING OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY A SERVICE?

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Issue for consideration:

Section 65(105)(zzzz) read with section 65(90a) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act or the service tax law) contains provisions relating to taxable service of renting of immovable property for use in the course of or for furtherance of, business or commerce. The service was introduced with effect from 1-6-2007 in the service tax law. The activity of renting an immovable property per se was not perceived as a transaction of service. When airport services were introduced, the Government vide its Circular No. 80/10/2004-ST, dated 17-9-2004 (para 5) also clarified to such effect:

“However, in case a part of airport/civil enclave premises is rented/leased out, the rental/lease charges would not be subjected to service tax, as the activity of letting out premises is not rendering a service.”

The introduction of the category gave rise to resistance to pay service tax chiefly by various retail outlets selling goods and occupying licensed/ leased premises and some other licensees/lessees, engaged in business activity as they do not have the potential to claim CENVAT credit of service tax on licence fees payable for the use of commercial premises. Consequently, writ petitions were filed in various High Courts across the country challenging the levy and constitutional validity thereof. The Delhi High Court first took a position in the case of Home Solution Retail India Ltd. v. Union of India, 2009 (14) STR 433 (Del.) and held a view that in terms of section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act), renting out of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce would not constitute a taxable service and as a result, the Notification dated 22-5-2007 and Circular dated 4-1-2008 were held ultra vires the Act.

In service tax law, the term ‘service’ is not defined but every taxable service introduced in the tax net is separately defined. Therefore, the issue has been that while an immovable property is rented or licensed or leased, whether there is any value addition or whether there exists any element of service?

Background of Home Solutions’ writ petition:
In this writ, the petitioner challenged the legality, validity and vires of Notification No. 24/2007, dated 22-5-2007 and Circular No. 98/1/2008-ST, dated 4-1- 2008 issued by the Government.

It was further alleged that because of the incorrect interpretation of law by the said Notification and the Circular, service tax was sought to be levied on renting of immovable property as opposed to service tax on a service provided in relation to the renting of immovable property.

The petitioners also took an alternative plea that in case it is held that such a tax is envisaged, then the provisions of section 65(90a), section 65(105) (zzzz) and section 66 insofar as they relate to the levy of service tax on renting of immovable property would amount to a tax on land and would therefore fall outside the legislative competence of the Parliament as the subject was covered under Entry 49 of List II of the Constitution of India and would fall within the exclusive domain of the State Legislatures and therefore the same be declared unconstitutional.

It was, inter alia, submitted that the impugned Notification and the Circular which proceeded on the assumption that the renting of immovable property was itself a service, were contrary to and inconsistent with the charging provision and therefore ultra vires the Act. Since service tax is a value-added tax and can only be levied on the value addition, the words ‘in relation to’ in section 65(105)(zzzz) of the said Act are of great significance. The value addition of service in the present context could be an improvement or the betterment of the property provided by the owner to the lessee or licensee. It is that betterment alone which could qualify as a service. The act of renting of the immovable property by itself does not provide any value addition to any person and therefore cannot be treated as a service. To support this contention reference was made to the various entries falling within the scope of ‘taxable service’, which would reveal that it is only the value addition which is taxable.

The Court held that in terms of section 65(105) (zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994, renting out of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce would not constitute a taxable service and as a result, Notification dated 22-5-2007 and Circular dated 4-1-2008 were ultra vires the Act. The Court distinguished the observations made by the SC in the case of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam’s case [2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC)], on which the respondent had placed reliance to the effect that “making available a premises for a period of a few hours for the specific purpose of being utilised as a mandap whether with or without other services would itself be a service and cannot be classified as any other kind of legal concept”. The Court also referred to the observations made by the SC in the case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners [2007 (7) STR 625 (SC)] wherein the SC, inter alia, had observed that “service tax is a value added tax and that just as excise duty is a tax on value addition on goods, services tax is on value addition by rendition of services. A distinction was also sought to be made between property-based services and performance-based services. The property-based services cover service providers, such as architects, interior designers, real estate agents, construction services, mandap keepers, etc. Whereas the performance-based services are those provided by persons, such as stock-brokers, practising chartered accountants, practising cost accountants, security agencies, tour operators, event managers, travel agents, etc.” Applying the same to renting of immovable property service, the High Court observed “There is no dispute that any service connected with the renting of such immovable property would fall within the ambit of section 65(105)(zzzz) and would be exigible to service tax. The question is whether renting of such immovable property by itself constitutes a service and, thereby, a taxable service. Service tax is a value added tax. It is a tax on the value addition provided by some service providers. Insofar as renting of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce is concerned, any value addition could not be discerned. Consequently, the renting of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or commerce by itself does not entail any value addition and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a service.” (emphasis supplied). The Delhi High Court however did not examine alternative plea of constitutional validity. The Government filed an SLP against the said ruling which is admitted, but no stay has been granted against the Delhi HC Ruling. The same is pending for disposal.

The amendment by the Finance Act, 2010:
To overcome the above ruling, the Finance Act, 2010 redefined ‘taxable service’ with retrospective effect from 1-6-2007 as under :

“(105) ‘taxable service’ means any service provided or to be provided –

(zzzz) to any person, by any other person, (*by renting of immovable property or any other service in relation to such renting) for use in the course of or, for furtherance of business or commerce.”

* Words substituted for (in relation to renting of immovable property).

As a result, a service provided by renting of immovable property or a service ‘in relation to’ such renting of immovable property, is brought within the tax net. TRU, Circular No. 334/1/2010 — TRU dated 26-2-2010 clarified the amendment as under:

Para 9.2:

“In order to clarify the legislative intent and also bring in certainty in tax liability the relevant definition of taxable service is being amended to clarify that the activity of renting of immovable property per se would also constitute a taxable service under the relevant clause. This amendment is being given retrospective effect from 1-6-2007.”

Thus, renting of immovable property by itself is considered to be a taxable service. In the Finance Act 2010, it has been declared:
“No act or omission on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable had this amendment not come into force.”

Recently, the Bombay High Court and Gujarat High Court have delivered their judgments on this burning issue and have decided the scope of powers of the Parliament to enact the activity of renting of premises for the use of or for furtherance of business or commerce, as service. Earlier, during F.Y. 2010-11 the other High Courts viz. Orissa High Court, in Utkal Builders Limited v. UOI, [2011 (22) STR 257 (Ori)] and P&H High Court in Shubh Timb Steels Ltd. v. UOI, [2010 (20) STR 737 (P&H)] have also held to the effect that renting of property for commercial purpose was certainly a service and had a value for the service receiver. While the Bombay High Court has extended the interim order to remain in force till September 30, 2011 and some of the petitioners have decided to knock the door of the Supreme Court, hopes of getting a decision in favour of retailers in the special leave petition filed before the Supreme Court against UOI v. Home Solutions Retail India Ltd., [2009 (15) STR J23 (SC)] appears to have dimmed. Both the decisions are briefly analysed below:

Retailers Association of India & Other v. UOI’s case, 2011 (23) STR 561 (Bom.):

The petitioners had in their petition, inter alia, challenged the legislative competence of the Parliament in the context of Entry 49 of List II of the Constitution of India. The constitutional challenge to the legislative competence of the Parliament was premised on the submission that:

  •     The tax which has been imposed on a taxable service which is defined to mean renting of immovable property is a tax on lands and buildings within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

  •    All four judgments of the Supreme Court, referred to later herein, did not deal with a situation where the legislation would fall within the purview of a specific entry in List II.

  •     Article 246 of the Constitution empowers the State Legislature to make laws “with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II”.

  •     In consequence, the power of the State Legislature is not only to make laws imposing taxes on lands and buildings, but to enact legislation with respect to taxes on lands and buildings;

  •     Entry 49 of List II must receive the broadest possible interpretation and amplitude.

  •     Especially when read in the context of Entry 97 of List I, the width and ambit of Entry 49 of List II cannot be curtailed with reference to the residuary power of the Parliament; and

  •     A tax whether levied on the basis of rent, annual value, or capital value would constitute a tax on lands having regard to the ambit of Entry 49 of List II. A tax based on leasing of a land and computed by rental value cannot be rested on Entry 97 of List I, because it is in substance, a tax on a transaction of letting of land and Entry 49 of List II would preclude a levy by the Parliament of a service tax on letting.

Relevant legal provisions:

Article 246 of the Constitution of India:

“246. Subject-matter of laws made by the Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.

(1)    Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Union List).

(2)    Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), the Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Concurrent List).

(3)    Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the ‘State List’).

(4)    The Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included (in a State) notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.”


Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India:

List I — Union List — Entry 97 — Residuary power:

97.    Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.

List II — State List — Entry 49:

49.    Taxes on lands and buildings.

In order to address the constitutional challenge in the above petitions, the Court briefly traced the evolution of judicial thought on the issue of imposition of service tax (paras 5 to 10) by referring to the following four Supreme Court decisions in which the controversy was analysed:

(i)    Tamil Nadu Kalayana Mandapam Association v. UOI, 2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC)

(ii)    Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. UOI, 2005 (182) ELT 33 (SC)

(iii)    All India Federation of Tax Practitioners Associa-tion v. UOI, 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC) and

(iv)    Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies v. UOI, 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC).

The Court, based on the analysis of the legislative provisions contained in (i) Article 246 of the Constitution of India read with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II read with Entry 49, and (ii) residuary powers under Entry 97 of List I, noted that “If the subject on which the Parliament has enacted legislation is found, upon determining its true nature and character not to fall within the purview of a field reserved to the States, the Parliament would have legislative competence in any event under Entry 97 of List I read with Article 248. The essential question that falls for determination in the present case is whether the levy of a service tax on a taxable
service which the Parliament defined to be the renting of immovable property falls within the exclusive province of the State Legislatures under Entry 49 of List II.”

The Court referred to the following judgments of the Supreme Court where the scope and ambit of Entry 49 of List II has been interpreted:

  •    Ralla Ram — AIR 1949 FC 81:

In this case, the Federal Court held that merely because the Income- tax Act adopted annual value as the standard for determining income, it would not necessarily follow that if the same standard were to be employed as a measure for any other tax (in the given case — an annual tax on buildings and lands situated in the rating areas as stipulated in the Schedule at a particular rate), that tax also became a tax on income. The Court distinguished between the nature of tax and nature of machinery quantifying the tax and the Bombay High Court averred that Ralla Ram’s case is an authority for the proposition that it is the essential nature of the tax and not the nature of the machinery, which must be looked at in determining the validity of the impost.

  •    Sudhir Chandra v. Wealth Tax Officer

— AIR 1969 SC 59:

This case dealt with a challenge to the constitutional validity of the Wealth Tax Act of 1957 on the ground that it transgressed upon a field reserved to the State Legislature under Entry 49 of List II. The Bombay High Court noted that while explaining the scope of Entry 49, the Supreme Court held:

“But the legislative authority of the Parliament is not determined by visualising the possibility of exceptional cases of taxes under two different heads operating similarly on taxpayers. Again Entry 49, List II of the Seventh Schedule con-templates the levy of tax on lands and buildings or both as units. It is normally not concerned with the division of interest or ownership in the units of lands or buildings which are brought to tax. Tax on lands and buildings is directly imposed on lands and buildings, and bears a definite relation to it. Tax on the capital value of assets bears no definable relation to lands and buildings which may form a component of the total assets of the assessee.”
(emphasis supplied).

  •     Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D. H. Hazareth — AIR 1970 SC 999:

In this case, the constitutional validity of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 was considered. The Court ruled that however wide a taxing entry in the State List may be, it would still not authorise a tax which is not expressly mentioned. If the pith and substance of the law did not fall within the purview of Entry 49 of the State List, the Parliament, it was held, would undoubtedly possess that power under Article 248 and Entry 97 of the Union List. While holding that the Gift Tax Act, 1958 was not a tax on lands and buildings, the Constitution Bench came to the conclusion that Entry 49 postulates a tax resting upon the general ownership of lands and buildings and a tax which is imposed directly upon lands and buildings.

  •    D. G. Gose & Co. v. State of Kerala — 1980 2 SCC 410:

The Bombay High Court noted that in this case the above principle was reiterated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court holding that a tax on buildings is “a direct tax on the assessee’s buildings as such, and is not a personal tax without reference to any particular property”.

  •     India Cement Ltd. — AIR 1990 SC 85:

Referring to the observation by the Supreme Court in this case to the effect that “there is a clear distinction between tax directly on land and tax on income arising from land” and held that the tax levied under the Income-tax Act, 1961 on income “though computed in an artificial way from house property” was levied on the income and not house property and therefore, did not fall within the purview of Entry 49 of List II. The Bombay High Court also noted that a principle was enunciated (in a judgment of two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union of India) that a tax on lands and buildings would not comprehend within its purview a tax on income arising from land or building.

The Bombay High Court observed that the above judgments of the Supreme Court clearly indicate that the settled principle of law is that a tax on lands and buildings is a tax on the general ownership of lands and buildings. In order that a tax must fall under Entry 49 of List II, the tax must be one directly on lands and buildings. A tax which is levied on the income which is received from lands or buildings is not a tax on lands or buildings.

The petitioners’ submission was that a tax on land within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II can take into account the use to which the land is put. The service tax imposed by the Parliament on renting of immovable property takes account of the user of the land or building and, hence, the service tax on renting of immovable property is a tax which the State Legislatures could conceivably impose under Entry 49 of List II. In support of the contention, it was urged that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee v. Local Board of Barpeta, (AIR 1965 SC 1561) is an authority for the proposition that in order to be a tax on land, the charge under the legislation must be on the land as a unit. In that case, a tax was imposed u/s.62 of the Assam Local Self Government Act, 1953. Section 62(1) stipulated that the local Board may order that no land shall be used as a market otherwise than under a licence to be granted by the Board. U/ss.(2) which was the charging provision, it was stipulated that on the issue of an order u/ss.(1), the Board may grant a licence for the use of any land as a market and impose an annual tax thereon. While upholding the validity of the tax, the Supreme Court noted that the tax was, in substance, a tax on the land but the charge only arises on land which was used for a market.

Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Goodricke Group Ltd. v. State of W.B., [1995 Supp (1) SCC 707] which dealt with a challenge to the validity of a cess imposed under the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976. The levy was challenged in Goodricke on the ground that it was not a tax on lands and buildings. The Supreme Court held that the subject -matter of the tax and the levy was land on the premise that the entire land covered in the tea estate was treated as a separate category of land as a unit for the purposes of the levy of tax. Merely because a tax on lands or buildings is imposed with reference to the income or yield of lands or buildings, it would not cease to be a tax on lands or buildings.


Residuary power of the Parliament to legislate:
Referring to observations made by the SC in the cases of:

  •     UoI v. H. S. Dhillon — AIR 1972 SC 106,
  •     Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax — AIR 1970 SC 169,
  •     Sat Pal & Co. — AIR 1979 SC 1550,
  •     International Tourist Corp. — 1981 2 SCC 318, and few of the above-referred judgments, the Bombay High Court noted that “while the Court must give a broad and liberal interpretation to Entry 49 of List II, the interpretation to be placed on that entry must nevertheless be meaningful. In each case, the Court must have regard to the true nature and character of the levy in determining as to whether in pith and substance, the tax is a tax on land and buildings. If the essential nature of the levy is the imposition of a tax on land and buildings, it would fall within Entry 49 of List II. If on the other hand, the essential nature and character of the levy is not a tax on land and buildings, then the exercise of interpretation would not bring within its purview a tax which is not one on land and buildings.”

To determine the character of the levy under challenge, analysis of section 66 (charging section), section 65(105)(zzzz), section 65(90a) and section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 was made and it was held that:

(a)    The charge of tax is not on lands or buildings.
(b)    The charge of tax is on a taxable service.
(c)    The measure of tax is the gross amount charged by the service provider.
(d)    The charge of tax is not on lands or buildings as a unit nor is the tax on lands or buildings.
(e)    To be a tax on lands and buildings under Entry 49 of List II, the tax must be directly a tax on lands and buildings. That is not the true character of an impost on taxable services.

On behalf of the petitioners reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Limited, [(2004) 10 SCC 201] in support of the submission that the law in the present case is a law which imposes a tax on land and buildings. It was urged that in paragraph 129 of the judgment the Supreme Court, inter alia, has laid down the following principles regarding:

“(6) ‘Land’, the term as occurring in Entry 49 of List II, has a wide, connotation. Land remains land though it may be subjected to different user. The nature of user of the land would not enable a piece of land being taken out of the meaning of land itself. Different uses to which the land is subjected or is capable of being subjected provide the basis for classifying land into different identifiable groups for the purpose of taxation. The nature of user of one piece of land would enable that piece of land being classified separately from another piece of land which is being subjected to another kind of user, though the two pieces of land are identically situated except for the difference in nature of user. The tax would remain a tax on land and would not become a tax on the nature of its user.

(7)    To be a tax on land, the levy must have some direct and definite relationship with the land. So long as the tax is a tax on land by bearing such relationship with the land, it is open for the Legislature for the purpose of levying tax to adopt any one of the well-known modes of determining the value of the land such as annual or capital value of the land or its productivity. The methodology adopted, having an indirect relationship with the land, would not alter the nature of the tax as being one on land.”

In this frame of reference, the Bombay High Court noted that though as per this decision the expression ‘land’ in Entry 49 of List II has a wide connotation, the judgment in Kesoram Industries (supra) does not mark a departure from the ambit and content of Entry 49 of List II which has been laid down in the previous decisions of the Court including the judgments of the Constitution Bench in Nawn’s case and in Hazareth’s case (supra) or for that matter the decision of the Bench of seven learned Judges in Dhillon’s case (supra) and held that service tax that has been legislated upon by the Parliament is not a tax on land. The true nature and character of the levy is not a tax on land or buildings. The charge of tax is a taxable service which the Parliament regards as being rendered. The renting of immovable property is an activity which in the legislative wisdom of the Parliament involves a conferment of service and it is in that legislative exercise that the Parliament has proceeded to impose a levy of service tax. The measure of tax u/s.67 is the gross amount charged by the service provider for the service which is provided or which is to be provided by him. In the case of renting of immovable property, the measure is the rental. The measure of the tax does by no means indicate that the tax is a tax imposed on land or buildings.

The Bombay High Court noted that the decision in Godfrey Philips [(2005) 2 SCC 515] is not a decision which elucidates the scope of Entry 49 of List II to the Seventh Schedule. Whereas, the ambit of Entry 49 has been explained in several judgments of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court as well as in the judgment of the Bench consisting of seven Judges in Dhillon (supra).

The Bombay High Court reiterated that since properly construed a tax which has been imposed by the Parliament is not in essence and in its true character a tax on land and buildings, the tax cannot nonetheless be held as a tax within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II in spite of the true nature and character of the levy. The essential nature and character of the levy is one which is referable to the residuary power of the Parliament under Article 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97. The Parliament, it may be noted, introduced Entry 92C into List I by the Constitution (Eighty Eighth Amendment) Act, 2003 to specifically deal with taxes on services. That provision has still not been enforced. In the circumstances, the true nature and character of the levy of service tax in the present case is a levy under the residuary power which has been conferred upon the Parliament.

Whether renting of immovable property has an element of ‘service’?

The Court did not accept the submission of the petitioners that there is no service involved in letting out of the immovable property and, there-fore, it was not open to the Parliament to impose service tax on the supposition that taxable service is involved on the premise that “The submission cannot be accepted for more than one reason. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Parliament when it legislates upon a matter is entitled to make an assessment of fact on the basis of which the legislation is designed and drafted. An underlying assessment of fact by the Parliament on the basis of which a law has been enacted cannot be amenable to judicial review absent a case of manifest arbitrariness. That apart, it is equally well settled that the Legislature in enacting a law is entitled to provide for a deeming fiction …….. The fact that the service which is provided may not, to the petitioners, accord with what is commonly regarded as a service would not militate against the validity of the legislation…….. In the affidavit in reply that has been filed in these proceedings it has been stated that renting of property is considered to add value to the activity of the person who has rented the property. When a person has a property at a particular location, he is able to charge a higher sum for the merchandise sold therefrom than he would be able to charge if he were to sell the same merchandise from a place which does not have the same locational advantage. Renting of a property, it has been submitted, adds value to the activities of a person renting the property.” The Court also referred to the judgment of the SC in the case of Navnitlal C. Jhaveri v. K. K. Sen, Assistant Comm. of I. Tax AIR 1965 SC 1375. [refer paras 28 to 31].

The Court finally decided “Therefore in our view, looked at from either standpoint, the legislative basis that has been adopted by the Parliament in subjecting taxable services involved in the renting of property to the charge of service tax cannot be questioned. The assumption by a legislative body that an element of service is involved in the renting of immovable property is certainly not an assumption which can be regarded by the Court as being so manifestly absurd or perverse as to lead to an inference that the Parliament had treated as a service, an item which in no rational sense could be regarded as involving service. But more significantly, even if the Court were to proceed on the basis, suggested by the petitioners that no element of service is involved, that would not make the legislation beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament. So long as the legislation does not trench upon a field which has been reserved to the State Legislatures, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the law must be treated as valid and within the purview of the field set apart for the Parliament. There is, it must be emphasised, no violation set up of any provision in Part III of the Constitution, (save and except on the issue of retrospectivity which would be considered subsequently).”

Retrospectivity:

The Court did not accept the challenge to the legislation on the ground that it is retrospective is lacking in substance by referring to (i) the plenary power of the Parliament to enact legislation, (ii) the Delhi High Court’s judgment in the case of Home Solutions and further observing that: “The provision was given retrospective effect so as to cure the deficiency which was found upon interpretation by the Delhi High Court”, (iii) the affidavit in reply by the UOI, (iv) the SC’s judgment in the case of Bakhtawar Trust v. M. D. Narayan, 2003 5 SCC 298, and (v) to the judgments in the cases of Shubh Timb Steels Limited v. Union of India, 2010 (20) STR 737 (P&H) and Utkal Builders Limited v. Union of India, 2011 (22) STR 257 (Ori.) wherein the constitutional validity of the provision has been upheld.

Cinemax India Limited’s case
— 2010 TIOL 535 HC AHM-ST:

Petitioners in these petitions challenged the levy of service tax on renting of immovable property on the grounds that:

(i)    The amendment is unconstitutional being beyond legislative competence of the Parliament.
(ii)    The Delhi High Court having held that renting of immovable property is not a service in absence of any value addition, the Union of India can never change the nature of tax by changing the event of transaction.
(iii)    The amendment not being clarificatory cannot be retrospectively enforced.

The Union of India, on the other hand took the ground that renting of immovable property is taxable service if such renting is for use in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce.

The petitioners inter alia contended that renting of immovable property does not amount to service as it is a transaction whereby rights in or in relation to immovable property is transferred for a certain period for consideration based on market value of the property. It is not an activity involving performance, skill or knowledge on behalf of petitioners, it was also contented that end- use i.e., the use which the licensee/lessee puts the property to cannot be determinative of the nature of transaction or can create a taxable event. At the most, it can bring about valid classification for taxation. The act of the consumer is not value addition for considering an activity a ‘service’. The value addition must be done by the service provider and in this context reliance was placed on All India Federation of Tax Practitioners & Others v. UOI & Others, 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC) and Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies v. UOI, 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC). Further, with reference to an example it was discussed that when a landlord/licensor has property capable of being used both for residence and/or for commercial purpose, it is an irrational proposal to contend that if it is licensed for commercial use, there is value addition and therefore taxable ‘event’ occurs and no taxable event occurs when provided for residential use. There is no difference per se in the activity.

Whereas, the Revenue inter alia contended that the Legislature defined immovable property for the purpose of taxing event and only when it is used for furtherance of business or commerce, it is taxed and thus it made a class different from what is defined under other enactment like Transfer of Property Act. There is always a value addition when an immovable property is provided for furtherance of business and commerce to the recipient of service. Relying on Tamil Nadu Kalyan Mandap Association v. UOI, 2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC), it was contended that definition of taxable service includes renting in the course of furtherance of business. Like in the case of catering contracts, for the fact that tax on sale of goods is involved does not mean that service tax cannot be levied on the aspect of catering which is a service. The event of making available business premises is rendition of service though it may be an event of leasing or licensing under the Transfer of Property Act and/or Easement Act. Reliance was placed on the case of Shubh Timb Steels Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 737 (P&H). For the purpose of validation of the Act for retrospective amendment relying on Gujarat Ambuja Cement v. UOI, 2005 TIOL 53 SC-ST, it was contended that the amendment cured defect and which was within legislative competence. Relying on All India Federation of Tax Practitioners, 2007

(7)    STR 625 (SC), it was contended that service tax is on value addition by rendition of services. Relying on similar view expressed in Moti Laminates P. Ltd. v. CCE, 1995 (76) ELT 241 (SC) wherein it was held that there is no difference between production and manufacture of saleable goods and production of marketable/saleable services in the form of an activity undertaken by the service provider for consideration.

The Gujarat High Court observed that in normal course of renting of immovable property, service tax is not attracted in absence of any activity in-volving performance, skill, expertise or knowledge. Renting of immovable property for use in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce is an activity which amounts to rendition of service in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce. Relying on the decisions of Association of Leasing and Financial Services v. UOI (supra), the Court observed that service tax is a tax on activity, whereas sales tax is a tax on sale of thing or goods. Taxable event under the service tax is each exercise/activity undertaken by the service provider and it is imposed every time service is rendered to customer/client, it is a value added tax. Citing Tamil Nadu Kalyan Mandapam (supra)’s case, it was held that service could not be struck down on the ground that it does not conform to a common understanding of the word, ‘service’ so long as it does not transgress any specific restriction contained in the constitution.

Thus, when a service recipient uses an immovable property in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce, it can safely be stated that the service provider has rendered service enabling the service recipient in value addition. Meaning thereby that such activity undertaken by service provider for value addition in the course of or for furtherance of business or commerce i.e., to carry on the activity or business or commerce of the service recipient amounts to rendition of service and will fall within the meaning of the definition of ‘service tax’ and there was no case made out to declare section 65(105)(zzzz) as unconstitutional or ultra-vires any provision of the constitution.

Conclusion:

In summation, various petitions before both the Courts viz. the Bombay High Court and the Gujarat High Court, respectively, have been dismissed upholding the activity of renting/leasing/licensing of immovable property for use in the course of or for furtherance of business as service. In addition thereto, the constitution validity is also upheld as service tax on the activity of renting is not considered a tax on land or buildings. Also the Courts have concluded to the effect that there exists value addition for the recipient or consumer of service when premises are provided for the use of business. The grounds of rejection of petitions by the P&H High Court in Shubh Timb (supra) and the Orissa High Court in Utkal Builders (supra) are not discussed hereinabove. While the Orissa High Court has not dealt with whether or not value addition exists in renting of immovable property or whether it is a necessary ingredient for a transaction to be held as ‘taxable service’, the P&H High Court has observed that even if there is no value addition, the impugned provision cannot be held void. Whereas, all the four High Courts have upheld legislative competence of the Parliament and retrospectivity with a focus on different aspects, it appears that litigation at the level of the Apex Court may mainly revolve around the aspect of value addition and whether or not the tax levied as service tax could be considered a tax on land and buildings.

SERVICES OF SHORT-TERM ACCOMMODATION

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Introduction

Service tax has been introduced on services provided by hotels and other similar establishments providing short-term accommodation for less than three months’ time with effect from 1-5-2011. Amidst the controversy, as discussed in August, 2011 issue of BCAJ, as to whether food served in a restaurant is an indivisible contract where dominant objective is sale of food or a composite contract of sale of food and providing services of ambience of airconditioning, furniture, etc. and other personalised services, Service tax has been introduced on the service provided by restaurants and so also the service provided by hotels, club, inns, etc. for providing short-term accommodation. Renting of immovable property is already taxed since 1-6-2007. However, the scope of the said service does not include residential accommodation, whereas short-term accommodation which is already subject to luxury tax by the States is brought in the net of Service tax. Implications of the new levy vis-à-vis renting of immovable property and Luxury tax imposed by States are discussed separately.

Statutory provisions contained in the Finance Act, 1994 (Act)

Section 65(105)(zzzzw) of the Act:

‘Taxable service’ means ‘any service provided or to be provided to any person by a hotel, inn, guest house, club or campsite, by whatever name called for providing of accommodation for a continuous period of less than three months.’

Scope of Service

On an analysis of the definition of providing shortterm accommodation reproduced above, the following emerges in regard to scope of service liable to Service tax:

  •  The subject-matter of this service is provision of accommodation. The term ‘accommodation’ is not defined in the Act. However, applying the principle of ‘ejusdem generis’ it can be observed that all the terms used viz. inn, guest house, club or campsite along with the term ‘hotel’ in generic terms indicate lodging facility or stay.
Such an accommodation should be provided by any hotel, club, inn, guest house or a campsite by whatever name called. Thus the accommodation provided by establishments also known as resort, service apartment, motel, sanatorium, dharamshala, accommodation attached to any temple, gymkhana, etc., would be covered subject to satisfying other conditions.
It is pertinent to note that the scope of taxable service does not provide for exclusion in regard to similar services that may be provided by Govt.-owned establishments (e.g., hotels owned by ITDC, MTDC, etc.)

  •  The period of stay should not continuously be more than three months. Thus the stay could vary from one day to 89 days (assuming 30 days in a month).

  •  The accommodation can be provided to any person and service must relate to accommodation of persons.

  •  The declared tariff of such accommodation should be Rs.1,000 or more per day. CBEC’s Circular DOF No. 334/3/2011-TRU, dated 28-2-2011 clarifies as under:

“Actual levy will be restricted to accommodation with declared tariff of Rs.1,000 per day or higher by an exemption Notification. Once this requirement is met, tax will be chargeable irrespective of the fact that actually the amount charged from a particular customer is less than Rs.1,000 The tax will also be charged on the gross amount paid or payable for the value of the service.”

Further to the above, the following clarification was issued vide Circular DOF 334/3/2011-ST, dated 25-4-2011:

“3. In accordance with the budget announcement, the levy will be applicable on short-term accommodation with a declared tariff of Rs. 1000 per day or above. A suitable exemption has been given below this amount vide Notification No. 31/2011-ST, dated 25th April, 2011. Declared tariff has been defined within the Notification as charges for all amenities provided in the unit of accommodation. Thus it will include cost of all electronic gadgets installed in the room and any other facility normally provided by a hotel as part of the stay. Cost of extra bed will not form a part of the declared tariff. No further exclusions are provided from the declared tariff e.g., on account of breakfast or any other meal whose cost is included in the declared tariff including any discount given to the customer.”

The explanation in Notification No. 31/2011-ST of 25-4-2011 defines ‘declared tariff’ as under:

“For the purpose of this Notification, ‘declared tariff’ include charges for all amenities provided in the unit of accommodation like furniture, air-conditioner, refrigerators, etc. but does not include any discount offered on the published charges for such unit.”
Further, the Circular No. 139/8/2011-TRU, dated 10- 5-2011 clarifies to the following effect:

  •  The relevance of ‘declared tariff’ is in determining the liability to pay Service tax as far as shortterm accommodation is concerned. However, the actual amount charged e.g., if declared tariff is Rs.1,100 but actual room rent charged is Rs.800, tax would be paid @5% on Rs.800.

  •   It is possible to levy separate tariff for the same accommodation in respect of a class of customers which can be recognised as distinct class on an intelligible criterion. However, it would apply to the class of customers and not a single or a few corporate entities only. For instance, there could be corporate customers or privileged customers and walk-in customers, special tariffs can be offered to corporate and/or privileged customers.
  •  When the declared tariff is revised as per the tourist season, the liability of Service tax would be on the declared tariff where the published/ printed tariff is above Rs.1,000. However, the revision should be uniformly applicable to all customers and such off-season rate charges should be declared.

Valuation aspects

  •  Luxury tax is imposed by the States on the accommodations provided by hotels and similar establishments. The value of service in this case would be the gross amount charged for the service. Through CBEC Circular No. 139, dated 10-5-2011, it has been clarified that the luxury tax is not to be included in the taxable value for determining Service tax liability.
  •  Further, the said Circular No. 139, dated 10-5-2011 has also clarified that where the declared tariff includes the cost of food or beverages, Service tax would be charged on the total value of declared tariff. This is evident in the definition of ‘declared tariff’ of the Notification cited above. However, if separate charge is recovered for food or beverages in the bill, such amount is not considered part of declared tariff.

  •  Similarly, DOF letter No. 334/3/2011-TRU, dated 25-4-2011 has clarified that amount charged towards extra bed will not be included in the value of declared tariff.

  •  In terms of Notification No. 34/2011-Service tax dated 25-4-2011, Notification No. 1/2006-ST of 1-3-2000 is amended to provide abatement of 50% on the short-term accommodation service and accordingly effective rate of Service tax for this service is 5% of the gross value of service. This is subject to the conditions that no CENVAT credit of excise duty on inputs, capital goods or Service tax on input service is taken or that the benefit of Notification No. 12/2003 has not been availed.
Short-term accommodation vis-à-vis Renting of immovable property
It is pertinent to note that Renting of Immovable Property was brought under the Service tax net w.e.f. 1-6-2007 and the validity of the said levy has been recently confirmed by the Bombay High Court. There appears to be a overlap of this levy vis-à-vis the new levy of short-term accommodation. The relevant provisions of the Act relating to renting of immovable properly are as under:
  •     Section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Act

Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any person, by renting of immovable property or any other service in relation to such renting, for use in the course of or for the furtherance of business or commerce.

Explanation 1 — For the purpose of this sub- Clause, ‘immovable property’ includes —

………….

But does not include —

………….

(d)    buildings used for the purposes of accommodation, including hotels, hostels, boarding houses, holiday accommodation, tents, camping facilities.

It is interesting to note that short-term accommodation service has been introduced w.e.f. 1 -5-2011, without effecting any amendment in the exclusion clause stated above which is existing w.e.f. 1-6-2007. This is likely to result in number of issues as to services classification and applicability of short-term accommodation Service.

In this regard, attention is drawn to an important Delhi-CESTAT ruling in Dr. Lal Path Lab Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE , (2006) 4 STR 527, wherein it has been held that if a service is specifically excluded from a Service category it cannot be taxed under another category. In this case, services of blood sample collection which was specifically excluded under ‘Technical testing & analysis service’ was sought to be taxed under ‘Business auxiliary service’. The principle laid down in the ruling is very important for determination of Services Classification and the same has been followed in a large number of subsequently decided cases.

Issues could arise as to, whether the scope of short-term accommodation service, is restricted only to non-commercial accommodation services. The definition reproduced above is not indicative of the same.

In view of the foregoing, whether hotels falling within the scope of short-term accommodation service can contend that the correct services classification for accommodation services provided by them is renting of immovable property wherein the service is specifically excluded and hence there can be no liability to Service tax under the newly introduced category is matter for a larger professional debate.

Luxury tax vis-à-vis Short-term accommodation service

The relevant extracts from the Maharashtra Tax on Luxuries Act, 1987 (MLTA) are as under:

Section 2

(b)    ‘business’ includes
(i)    The activity of providing residential accommodation and any other service in connection with or incidental or ancillary to, such activity of providing residential accommodation, by a hotelier for monetary consideration

……..

(e)    ‘hotel’ includes
(i)    a residential accommodation, a club, a lodg-ing house, an inn, a public house or a building or part of a building, where a residential ac-commodation is provided by way of business; and

……..

(f)    ‘hotelier’ means the owner of the hotel and includes the person who for the time being is in charge of the management of the hotel:

(g)    ‘Luxury provided in a hotel’ means —
(i)    accommodation and other services provided in a hotel, the rate or charges for which including the charges for air -conditioning, telephone, television, radio, music, entertainment, extra beds and the like, exceeds rupees two hundred or more per residential accommodation per day; and

……..

The following needs to be noted:

  •     The charge under MLTA is on the hotelier and tax is to be computed as a percent of turnover of receipts. The rate of tax varies vis-à-vis charge per day/per residential accommodation.

  •     In order to be liable to luxury tax, accommodation need to be provided by way of business.
  •     The scope includes providing of facilities/amenities relating and incidental to accommodation
  •     In order to be liable to luxury tax, accommodation services need to be provided for a monetary consideration.

It would appear that there is a very clear over-lap of Service tax on short-term accommodation vis-à-vis Luxury tax under MLTA. On lines with some other services like intellectual property rights, franchise, etc. this levy is also likely to be challenged in Courts on the ground of dual taxation. In this regard, the exclusion under renting of immovable property discussed above assumes increased significance inasmuch as the same was possibly done taking into account the fact that Luxury tax is being imposed on hotel accommodation by the States.

Some issues

(i)    A small hotel in Bhavnagar has a tariff card for single occupancy for a small room is Rs.950. The hotel also provided airport pick-up facility to its customer for a charge of Rs.100. Would the transaction be liable for Service tax?

Ans. (i) The additional facility of pick-up from airport is charged separately. Therefore the declared tariff would not cover the additional service charge and it being less than Rs.1,000 would not attract Service tax.

(ii)    A hotel has declared tariff of Rs.1,200 for a class of rooms in regular season. However, during off-season of monsoon for four months, the tariff is declared @ Rs.900. In terms of the instructions provided in the Government Circulars above, although Service tax is payable when tariff is Rs.1,200, whether no Service tax is payable during off-season?

Ans. (ii) Yes. If the declared tariff is less than Rs.1,000, no Service tax is payable in terms of the Board’s Circular.

(iii)    A company X is constructing a factory premises and erecting a plant near a small village in a district in Maharashtra. Since there is ongoing construction/erection, the company X has made a special arrangement with a small hotel in the village and booked two rooms in the said hotel for a continuous period of six months at tariff of Rs.1,500 per room for its regularly visiting engineers, executives, etc. Whether Service tax is attracted on this transaction?

Ans. (iii) If the same room is in occupation continuously for three months or more, Service tax would not be attracted as the short-term accommodation is defined as a period of less than three months. However, if the hotel has promised any two rooms as and when required and a specific room is occupied for less than a period of three months, it appears that Service tax would be attracted.

(iv)    A retired executive from a MNC owns several flats in Mumbai. In order to generate revenue some flats are rented out to corporates under contracts for use by their visiting guests. The said flats have usual accommodation facilities. Such contracts could be monthly/quarterly/ yearly depending upon the requirement of a corporate. The charge of accommodation under the contract is periodic (Monthly/Quarterly/ Yearly) irrespective of the actual occupation. In all cases, per day/per room charge would work out in excess of exceed Rs.1000/per room/per day. Would the provision of short-term accommodation service be applicable to the retired executive?

Ans. (iv) It would appear that residential accommodation services provided in the given case are contractual (for a flat for a specified period), as distinct from accommodation services provided by hotels and similar establishments which essentially provide accommodation to walk-in-customers for a declared tariff which is usually displayed. Such establishments also do enter into period contracts with companies. Considering the scope of short-term accommodation services as discussed in Para 3 earlier, it appears that the accommodation services provided by the retired executive would not get covered under short-term accommodation service.

(v)    All India Chartered Accountants Society (AICAS) is a reputed body of CAs and regularly holds conferences for the benefit of its members AICAS is planning to host a three day conference on ‘DTC & GST’ in a seven star hotel in Mumbai wherein expert faculty from abroad and India would be invited. As a good gesture, the said hotel has agreed to offer complimentary accommodation to the visiting faculties, subject to a condition that Service tax (if applicable) would have to be borne by AICAS. Whether complimentary accommodation provided to visiting faculty of AICAS by the hotel would attract Service tax.

Ans. (v) It appears to be reasonably established that complimentary accommodation to visiting faculty of AICAS has been offered, considering the fact the hosting of three day conference would result in substantial business for the hotel and promotion of its facilities to the delegates as well.

Considering the provisions of the following, in particular:

  •     Section 67 of the Act,
  •   Service tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006,
  •     Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 and
  •     Consequent amendments in Service tax Rules, 1994

it would reasonably appear that complimentary accommodation provided to the visiting faculty of AICAS by the seven star hotel may attract Service tax under short-term accommodation service.

CONTROVERSY: WHETHER GOODS USED IN A PHOTOGRAPHY SERVICE NOT EXCLUDIBLE FROM THE VALUE LIABLE FOR SERVICE TAX?

Dilemma: Sale and/or service?

Given the fact, that in India we have a separate legislation each for taxing a ‘sale’ by the States and taxing a ‘service’ under the Union law, tug of war between the two taxing laws victimises many law-compliant business outfits for many complex transactions or even apparently simple transactions like purchase or sale of software, providing telecommunication services, serving food or processing and developing photographs. Despite paying tax on the whole of the transaction under one or both the tax legislations, considering it either sale or service or a composite transaction having both the elements, a business entity is forced into litigation process under one or both the tax legislations on account of conflicting or different views of administrators of different tax legislations. For a simpliciter transaction of a pure sale like a retailer/ wholesaler selling simple goods across the counter or a stand-alone service transaction like a chartered accountant providing tax advisory or a stock-broker buying or selling securities for its client and charging brokerage does not generally cause any issue in determining applicable tax law. However, a very large number of transactions are more complex than this where constantly issues occur over the parentage of the tax law for the transaction and whether or not the transaction can be split into two and have refuge under both taxing statutes. If at all there appears apparent finality on any issue, it is only subjective. The underlying cause of this controversy is separate taxing statute and separate taxing authorities for sale of goods and services and the two administrating bodies never seem to have a meeting point and therefore the least important factor is the assessee in the scenario, who suffers uncertainty and cost of long-drawn litigation.

In the State of Uttar Pradesh v. UOI, 2004 (170) ELT 385 (SC), the Supreme Court observed:

“By calling sale as service or vice versa, the substance of the transaction will not get altered. This has to be determined by discerning the substance of the transaction in the context of the contract between the parties or in a case of statutory contract in the light of relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. If an activity or activities are comprehensively termed as ‘service’, but they answer the description of ‘sale’ within the meaning of statute, they can nonetheless be regarded as sale for the purpose of that statute. In other words, it is possible that an activity may be service for the purpose of one Act and sale for the purpose of another Act. It may also be that in a given case, on the facts of that case, a particular activity can be treated as ‘service’, but in a different fact situation the same could be ‘sale’ under the same statute”.

The above decision however was overruled by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. UOI & Ors., 2006 (2) STR-161 (SC) and in respect to a specific question formulated by the Court that “would the aspect theory be applicable to the transaction enabling the States to levy sales tax on the same transaction in respect of which the Union Government levies service tax?” The Court held that “the aspect theory would not apply to enable the value of the services to be included in the sale of goods or price of goods in the value of service”. The law enunciated by BSNL (supra) is a settled position. Whereas in the case of Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd. v. COL, 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC), the Supreme Court held “the payment of service tax as also the VAT are mutually exclusive. Therefore, they should be held to be applicable having regard to the respective parameters of service tax and the sales tax as envisaged in a composite contract as contradistinguished from an indivisible contract.

It may consist of different elements providing for attracting different nature of levy. It is therefore difficult to hold that in a case of this nature, sales tax would be payable on the value of the entire contract, irrespective of the element of service provided” (emphasis supplied). Does the problem get solved at this point or does it give rise to another issue viz. which contracts are composite contracts and which are indivisible? Or, the seemingly composite contract is held a contract of pure sale or of pure service! The overlap if any in a transaction is not always visible and it can be interpreted as either or both by different administrations giving rise to litigation.

In a few recent decisions, it is noticed that apparently settled position is unsettled. Keeping aside the question of correctness of the same for the time being, the controversy is discussed with reference to photography service.

Issue for consideration

Photography service was introduced in the service tax net with effect from July 16, 2001. Clauses (78) and (79) of section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) r.w.s. 65(105)(zb) of the Act contain the provisions relating to this service. The scope of the service also includes jobs carried out by processing laboratories. This position as of date is not controversial. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in a writ filed by Colourway Photo Lab v. UOI, 2009 (15) STR 17 (MP) held that “colour laboratories would be a part of photography studio or agency involved in providing the service to the consumer and are amenable to service tax”. The controversial issue relates to whether or not paper, chemicals and other consumables used in the creation of photographs is excludible from the value of service chargeable to service tax in terms of Notification No. 12/2003-ST of 20-6-2003, whereby the value of goods sold during provision of service is excluded, provided no CENVAT credit of duty paid on such goods is claimed by the service provider. Before discussing this aspect, it may be noted that Explanation 1(iii) to section 67 as it stood till 17-4-2006 provided that the cost of unexposed photography film if sold to the receiver of service during the course of providing photography service will not be included in the value of service. Section 67 with effect from 18-4-2006 was amended. Rule 6 of the Valuation Rule does not contain any express provision in this regard. However, for the separate supply of unexposed film, the exclusion under Notification 12/2003-ST is not an issue. The issue only centres around excludability of value of paper chemicals and other consumable under the same Notification.

Rainbow Colour Lab’s case
[2001 (134) ELT 332 (SC)]

This case came up before the Supreme Court as the Madhya Pradesh High Court decided in favour of levying sales tax on business turnover of photographs considering jobs rendered by photographer in taking photographs, developing and printing films amounted to works contract and exigible to sales tax. The Supreme Court categorically distinguished the decision in Builders’ Association of India v. UOI, 1989 (73) STC 370 relied upon by Madhya Pradesh High Court while holding that to the extent of the photo-paper used in the printing of positive prints, there is a transfer of property in goods and therefore the job done becomes a ‘works contract’ as contemplated under the Article 366(2A)(b) of the Constitution. However, this reliance was expressly referred to as ‘misplaced’ and relying inter alia on Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 1984 (55) STC 314 and Everest Copiers v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1996 (103) STC 360, the Supreme Court held that mere passing of property in an article or commodity during the course of performance of the transaction in question does not render the transaction to be one of sale. In every case, one is necessitated to find out the primary object of the transaction. The Court further held that “unless there is a sale and purchase of goods either in fact or deemed and which sale is primarily intended and not incidental to the contract, the State cannot impose sales tax on a works contract simplicita in the guise of expanded definition of Article read with the relevant provisions in the State Act,” and quoted observation in Builders’ Association’s case (supra) which read, “as the Constitution exists today, the power of the States to levy taxes on sales and purchases of goods including ‘deemed’ ‘sales’ and purchases of goods under clause 29(A) of Article 366 is to be found only in entry 54 and not outside it.” The Court held that the work done by the photographer is only in the nature of a service contract not involving any sale of goods. The contract is for use of skill and labour by the photographer to bring about a desired result. The occupation of photographer, except insofar as he sells the goods purchased by him is essentially one of skill and labour.

[Note: It is interesting to note that in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd., 2001 (128) ELT 21 (SC), the Larger Bench of three Judges pointed out that the principle laid down in Rainbow Colour Lab (supra) runs counter to the express provision contained in Article 366(29A), since after the 46th Amendment to the Constitution, the States now would be empowered to levy sale tax on material used in a works contract. It also pointed out that the principle in Rainbow Colour Lab (supra) runs counter to the decision of the constitutional Bench in Builders’ Association’s case (supra) and thus doubted the judgment.]


C. K. Jidheesh v. Union of India’s case [2006 (1) STR 3 (SC)]

In this case, the Supreme Court distinguished Associated Cement’s case (supra) when it was pointed out by the appellant that correctness of decision in Rainbow Colour Lab’s case (supra) was doubted by the Bench of three judges in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. (supra) and thus stood overruled. The Court observed that in Associated Cement Companies Ltd.’s case (supra) the question was whether or not customs duty could be levied on drawings, designs, diskettes, manuals, etc. as they were contended to be intangible properties and not goods as defined in section 2(22) of the Customs Act and the question of levy of service tax did not arise there. The Court further observed that the observations relied upon were mere passing observations and did not overrule Rainbow Colour Lab’s case (supra). While examining the plea of the petitioner for bifurcation of gross receipts of processing of photographs into the portion attributable to goods and that attributable to services, and tax only the portion attributable to services followed the decision in Rainbow Colour Lab’s case and held that “contracts of photography are service contracts pure and simple. In such contracts there is no element of sale of goods and in view of Rainbow Colour Lab’s judgment, the question of directing the respondent to bifurcate the receipts into an element of goods and the element of service cannot and does not arise.”

During about past five years however, several decisions were given by the Tribunals on this issue. Beginning with the decision in the case of Adlabs v. Commissioner, 2006 (2) STR 121, the Tribunal relied on the Board’s letter dated 7-4-2004 to Punjab Colour Association (later superseded by Circular dated 3-3-2006) clarifying that exemption under Notification No. 12/2003-ST for excluding input material consumed/sold was available. Based on the letter, the Tribunal held that the appellant was eligible for the benefit of deduction of cost of material used during provision of service. This stand was dissented to by the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Laxmi Colour Pvt. Ltd., 2006 (3) STR 363 (Tri.-Del.) which followed the Supreme Court’s decision of C. K. Jidheesh (supra). Between then and now, Tribu-nals in Agarwal Colour Lab v. CCE, Raipur 2006 (1) STR 41 (Tri.-Del.) and Panchsheel Colour Lab v. CCE, Raipur 2006 (4) STR 320 (Del.) decided in favour of the Revenue i.e., not allowing exclusion of inputs in photography service whereas in umpteen number of cases, the decision was against the Revenue. C. K. Jidheesh (supra) was considered overruled in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.’s case (supra) and cited by the Tribunal in the case of Shilpa Colour Lab v. CCE, Calicut 2007 (5) STR 423 (Tri.-Bang.) and it followed the decision in the case of Adlabs (supra). The list of decisions against the Revenue included Delux Colour Lab & Others, 2009 (13) STR 605 (Tri.), Technical Colour Lab v. CCE, 2009 (13) STR 589 (Tri.-Del.), Jyoti Art Studio v. CCE, 2008 (10) STR 158 (Tri.-Bang.), M/s. Edman Imaging v. CCE, 2008 (9) STR 91 (Tri.-Bang.), Roopchhaya Colour Studio v. CCE, 2008 (11) STR 125 (Tri.-Bang.), Digi Photo Laser Imaging P. Ltd. v. CCE, 2007 TIOL 1169 (CESTAT-Bang.), Ajanta Colour Lab (2009) 20 STT 395 (New Delhi CESTAT). Savitri Digital Lab v. CCE, (2009) 23 STT 82 (Chennai-CESTAT) and a few others as well. Further, following the views of the Delhi CESTAT in Sood Studios v. CCE, (2009) 19 STT 453 (New Delhi), the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CCE v. Vahoo Colour Lab, 2010 (18) STR 548 (P&H) following BSNL (supra) held that “the components of sale of photography, developing and printing, etc. are clearly distinct and discernible than that of photography service. Therefore as the photography is in the nature of works contract and it involves the elements of both sale and service, the service tax is not leviable on the sale portion in obtaining circumstances of the case”. We summarise below the case of Shilpa Colour Lab (supra) as it contained a number of appellants and it has also been relied upon in a number of later decisions holding that value of goods and consumables was excludible under Notification No. 12/2003-ST while providing photography service.

Shilpa Colour Lab v. CCE, Calicut’s case 2007 (5) STR 423 (Tri.-Bang.)

In this case, a bunch of appeals related to the issue of levying service tax on the amount charged in the case of printing photograph for other than service component. This case had followed earlier decision of the same Bench in the case of Adlabs v. Commissioner, 2006 (2) STR 121 (Tri.). The Tribunal in this case observed that goods sold while providing service are not liable to service tax as that would amount to sales tax which constitutionally is State subject and not that of Union. Decisions in Rainbow Colour Lab (supra) and C. K. Jidheesh (supra) were examined. It was pointed out by the appellants that the Apex Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) had overruled the decisions in the cases of C. K. Jidheesh and Rainbow Colour Lab. Para 47 of the BSNL decision (supra) was specifically cited to read as follows. “47. We agree. After the 46th Amendment, the sale element of those contracts which are covered by the six sub-clauses of Clause (29A) of Article 366 are separable and may be subjected to sales tax by the States under Entry 54 of List II and there is no question of the dominant nature test applying. Therefore when in 2005, C. K. Jidheesh v. Union of India, (2005) 8 SCALE 784 held that the aforesaid observations in Associated Cement (supra) were merely obiter and that Rainbow Colour Lab (supra) was still good law, it was not correct. It is necessary to note that Associated Cement did not say that in all cases of composite transactions the 46th Amendment would apply.”

Based on this, the Tribunal held that the Apex Court had overruled the decisions in Rainbow Colour Lab and C. K. Jidheesh in BSNL’s (supra) case and further observing BSNL’s ruling that “aspect theory would not apply to enable the value of services to be included in the sale of goods the price of goods in the value of service”, the Tribunal held that the implication of BSNL’s case is that in photography service, if value of goods and material are consumed, then such value cannot be included in the value of service for the levy of service tax.

[Note — The Supreme Court dismissed the Departmental appeal filed against this decision].

In the midst of the above, the case of Agarwal Colour Advance photo System v. CCE, Bhopal reported at 2010 (19) STR 181 (Tri.-Del.) came up before the Delhi CESTAT wherein detailed analysis of the various decisions including the above deci-sions (both for and against the Revenue) and the decisions referred to in these decisions viz. BSNL (supra ), Imagic Creative (supra), Associated Cements (supra), Rainbow Colour Lab (supra), Everest Photocopier (1996) 163 STC 360 (SC) inter alia were discussed alongside the discussion on sale, deemed sale, etc. On account of there being several judgments against the Revenue and a number of them in its favour, to maintain judicial propriety wherever the Bench differs with the decision of a co-ordinate Bench, the matter was referred to the Larger Bench of the Delhi Tribunal.

The recently reported Aggarwal Colour Advance Photo System’s case
[2011 (23) STR 608 (Tri.-LB)]

In an attempt to end the controversy and conflicting decisions in Aggarwal Colour Advance Photo System, 2011 (23) STR 608 (Tri.-LB), only two questions were decided (agreed by both the parties) to be dealt with by the Larger Bench in the appeal out of 5 questions of law referred to it [as reported in 2010 (19) STR 181 (Tri.-Del.)] are as follows :

  •     Whether for the purpose of section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 the gross amount chargeable for photography service should include the cost of material and goods used/consumed and deduct the cost of unexposed films?

  •     Whether the term ‘sale’ appearing in Notification No. 12/103-ST of 20-6-2003 is to be given the same meaning as given by section 2(h) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with section 65(121) of the Finance Act, 1994 or this term would also include deemed sale as defined by Article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution?

Answering the first question cited above, the Bench expressed its view that in case of services in relation to photography, service tax has to be levied on the gross amount charged for providing such service which would include value of all material or goods used/consumed or becoming medium, it being inseparable and integrally connected and enabling performance of service. The only permissible deduction will be for the value of unexposed film, if any sold. This view was expressed by following C. K. Jidheesh (supra), a direct judgment of the Supreme Court on the valuation of photography service. According to the Bench, decisions of the Tribunal in cases of Shilpa Colour Lab (supra), Adlab v. CCE (supra) and Delux Colour Lab & Others v. CCE, Jaipur (supra) were impediments and appeared contrary to law laid down by C. K. Jidheesh (supra).

The appellant’s key contention inter alia on merits was that on the basis of the settled law, various Benches of Tribunal rightly excluded the value of goods used in providing photography service to determine assessable value of such service. The Finance Act, 1994 could not attempt to tax goods as there did not exist provision in that law to do so and that benefit of excluding sale of goods under Notification 12/2003-ST was not deniable. Among others, and relying on the decision of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in the case of Vahoo Colour Lab, 2010 (18) STR 548 (P&H), it was contended that processing of photography being a works contract involved both sale and service and therefore service tax was not leviable on the sale portion. Whereas the Revenue contended that providing photography is a pure and simple service contract and there is no contract for sale of goods unless a distinct sale is available, the consideration received for photography service becomes measure of value of taxation. The Revenue inter alia further contended that the word ‘sale’ in Notification 12/2003-ST has to be interpreted on the basis of its meaning as per section 2(h) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as applicable to service tax by virtue of section 65(121) of the Act. When there is no primary intention of the parties to sell paper or consumables in providing photography service, there is no room for applicability of ‘deemed sale’ concept in absence of any such sale of commodities as goods.

Valuation of taxable service

The Larger Bench of the Tribunal observed that service tax is leviable on the gross value of taxable service and this being a measure of tax, determination thereof was crucial. Service tax being destination-based consumption tax, all cost additions till the service reaches consumer form part of the value of the service. Citing the judgment of Association of Leasing & Financial Service Companies v. UOI, 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC), it was opined by the Bench that the principle of equivalence was applicable and there was a thin line of divide between sale and service and such principle was in-built into the concept of the Finance Act, 1994. It is a value added tax and the value addition is on account of the activity which provides value addition.


Notification No. 12/2003, dated 20-6-2003 granting exemption to value of goods sold to the recipient of service

While answering the second question, the Bench observed that to satisfy the said condition of the Notification and claim the part of value as exempt, the assessee was to discharge the burden to show the value of goods and material actually sold. The term ‘sold’ cannot include ‘deemed sale’ of goods and material consumed by the service provider while generating and providing service. Whether any goods or material are sold while providing photography service, there should be documentary proof specifically indicating the value of goods and material in question sold while providing service and this is further subject to condition of non-availment of credit of duty on such goods. Granting an exemption always depends on factual evidence and differs from case to case depending on facts and circumstances of each case which is left to the domain of the Tax Administration for determining whether such burden was discharged by the assessee.

The Bench noted that there was no doubt that papers, consumables and chemicals are used and consumed to bring photographs into existence and it is also true that no person goes to buy paper and chemicals from the photography service provider. Service recipient expects delivery of photograph. Consumables and chemicals disappear when the photograph emerges. Relying on C. K. Jidheesh (supra), it was observed that photography contract was not a composite contract of sale of goods and service. It was also noted by the Bench that since the Supreme Court rendered decision of Surabhi Colour Lab (supra) by remanding the matter to verify whether the assessee maintained records of inputs used in photography and no report was produced as to how the matter was concluded, it could not be relied upon. Further, the decision in Technical Colour Lab (supra) was rendered purely by following Surabhi’s case (supra), they were bound to follow the ratio of C. K. Jidheesh (supra). While accepting the Revenue’s contention, the Bench observed that in terms of the rulings of several High Courts (included inter alia V. V. Jha v. State of Meghalaya, Gauhati High Court etc.), there was ‘no sale’ or ‘deemed sale’ of goods and material in photography service. The obiter reference in the case of BSNL (supra) being a different question of law and fact. (In the case of BSNL, the Supreme Court had to examine whether any right to use any goods involved in telephone connection provided by BSNL to its subscribers could be subject to sales tax), it did not stand to overrule either C. K. Jidheesh (supra) or Rainbow Colour Lab (supra). The Bench accordingly answered the questions as follows:

  •     For the purpose of section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, the value of service of photography would be the gross amount charged including cost of goods and material used and consumed during provision of service. The cost of unexposed films, etc. would stand excluded in terms of Explanation to section 67 if sold to the client.

  •     The value of goods and material if sold separately would be excluded under Notification 12/2003-ST and the term ‘sold’ appearing thereunder has to be interpreted using the definition of ‘sale’ in the Central Excise Act, 1944 and not as per the meaning of deemed sale under Article 366(29A) (b) of the Constitution. The Court further ob-served that based on the above, it can be said that value would be determined based on facts and circumstances of each case as the Finance Act, 1944 does not intend taxation of goods and material sold in the course of providing all taxable services.


Conclusion

From the aforesaid discussion, it appears that generally if the cost of paper and other material appears separately in an invoice during the course of providing service, the issue prima facie of non-allowance of benefit under Exemption Notification 12/2003-ST may not arise. However, appreciating that this practice more often than not, is not followed and also considering the recent controversial decision in the case of Sayaji Hotels Ltd. v. UOI, (24)    STR 177 (Del.-Trib.) (Refer Recent Decisions – Indirect Taxes, Part A of this issue) if the facts of a specific case demand examination of applicable provisions of law, the following questions whether can be answered with finality or the controversy may continue on account of conflicting views and interpretations, time alone would decide it:

  •     Whether contract of photography is indivisible or a composite contract of sale and service or a standalone contract of service?
  •     If the contract is composite or an indivisible one, whether the value of ‘sale’ is discernible?
  •     If the value is discernible, whether it amounts to ‘sale’ as defined in 2(h) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or whether fiction of ‘deemed sale’ under Article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution would be available considering the contract a works contract?
  •     As a matter of fact, whether there exists an intention of ‘sale’ in the contract of photography or put in other words, whether there are two distinct or subtle contracts, one of ‘sale’ and another of ‘service’ present?
  •     Given the fact that paper used for photograph can be bought and sold and the photograph itself can be utilised, stored, possessed, transferred, transmitted and delivered, [and thus the necessary ingredients of existence of ‘goods’ and their delivery are satisfied in terms of the view adopted in Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2004 (178) ELT 22 (SC)] should the benefit under Notification 12/2003-ST be not available without examining the intention to purchase and/or sale?
  •     In a simple contract of providing five copies of passport-sized photograph of an individual, Rs.150 is charged and for providing ten copies, Rs.175 is charged. Isn’t the value addition only on account of ‘value’ of goods? Is ‘deemed sale’ still not applicable?

TAXATION OF SERVICES BASED ON A NEGATIVE LIST

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Background
Service tax was first introduced through the Union Budget for the year 1994-95. With a modest beginning, the scope and coverage has been substantially expanded and presently around 120 services are covered within the ambit of service tax, covering most of the important services which are taxed internationally.

While presenting the Union Budget for 2011-12, the Finance Minister proposed as under:

“Many experts have argued that it will be desirable to tax services based on a small negative list, so that many untapped sectors are brought into the tax net. Such an approach will be very conducive for a nationwide GST. I propose to initiate an informed public debate on the subject to help us finalise the approach to GST.”

Pursuant to the aforesaid announcement, a public debate on widening the tax base by introducing a negative list of services has been initiated by the Government, through the release of a draft concept paper inviting comments/suggestions from the affected parties.

Revenue implications

Relevant extracts from the draft concept paper are set out below for ready reference:

Para 9.1

It is well known that nearly 57% of India GDP comes from services. After including construction, the contribution from services will come to about 63%. At current prices the contribution from services during 2010-11 comes to about Rs.50 lakh crore.

Para 9.2

The national income statistics do not capture the break-up of the service sector in the manner it is being taxed or sought to be taxed. However some broad indications are available of the contribution of services from certain sectors. Based on these indications contribution from services that are proposed to be kept in the negative list e.g., trading of goods, transportation of passengers, education and health sectors as also portions of construction, real estate and financial sectors can be estimated. In addition to exclusions by way of negative list, export of services valued at about nearly US$ 130 billion at present will also remain exempt. The import of services meant for direct consumptions by individuals are at present not largely subjected to tax. Remaining services from abroad may not make any major net contribution to tax being available for credit set-off.

Para 9.3

On a rough estimate nearly 40% of the total services will come into the tax net as a result of the proposed negative list. However, a large part of the informal sector would also remain outside the tax net due to the threshold exemption. This would leave only about 60% of the sector not covered by negative list actually available for tax payment. Thus the potential for effective taxation of services may be confined to about 20-25% of the service sector contribution. This is still a sizable number and will add significant numbers to the revenue, though it may not sound astounding as some sections believe it to be.

Shortcomings in the present service tax law

Despite the fact that service tax fetches a revenue in excess of Rs.70,000 crore to the Central Government, service tax law suffers from significant shortcomings, more important of which are as under:

Unlike Central Excise law which clearly defines the basic concept of ‘manufacture’, there is no definition of ‘service’ under the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’). Each of the 120 services which are liable to service tax are specified and defined u/s.65(105) of the Act. Taxable services are defined employing a very wide terminology. In the absence of a detailed Tariff (like Central Excise/ Customs) with Interpretative Notes, a large number of interpretation issues have arisen as to the coverage of services liable to service tax, resulting in extensive litigations.

The definitions in regard to each taxable service u/s.65(105) of the Act have been introduced at different points of time. Further, amendments have been made in the scope of definition within a service category from time to time. This has resulted in classification issues as regards date of applicability of levy and coverage under specific exemption Notifications;

A large number of exemption Notifications have been issued over the years, resulting in interpretation issues and disputes between the Department and the taxpayers; and

Issues of overlapping vis-à-vis other indirect taxes like State VAT, Central Excise, etc. resulting in double taxation and consequent increased burden to the end consumer.

The above shortcomings need to be satisfactorily addressed in the proposed service tax policy framework.

Case being made against Negative List approach:

The draft concept paper in paras 2, 3 and 4 highlights in detail the issues surrounding the positive and negative lists. While it does accept that the currently existing positive list has certain advantages in terms of definitiveness, it seeks to justify the introduction of the negative list by citing certain limitations of the current mechanism of positive list. According to one school of thinking most of the said limitations can be either removed even in positive list approach or are so inherent that they would continue even in the negative list approach. The same is explained in Table 1

Selective Approach vis- à-vis Comprehensive Approach (Positive List v. Negative List)
The Govind Rao Committee, which was appointed by the Government to deliberate in detail on taxation of services, has observed as under:
The tax which has been imposed on a taxable service which is defined to mean renting of immovable property is a tax on lands and buildings within the meaning of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

Para 2.6
“The limited experience gained in taxing the services on a selective basis has raised some important issues. The most important of them relates to the basic approach to taxing services. The selective approach to taxation, which has been followed till now, has given rise to many administrative problems arising from selectivity including inadequate coverage and increased litigation, Further, in accordance with the medium-term policy objective of the Government of evolving a manufacturing stage value added tax in respect of goods and services at central level, it is neces-sary to adopt a more general approach.”

Considering the serious shortcomings in the presently adopted selective approach (Positive List) to tax services and the prevailing international practices as regards taxation of services, according to a second school of thinking which is being supported by trade bodies/professional bodies across the country comprehensive approach (Negative List) to tax services may be desirable, more particularly in order to avoid breaking of chain and also to ensure wider coverage from the perspective of proposed GST regime.

However, a serious note of caution is advised while moving towards comprehensive approach (Negative List), keeping in mind that a substantial portion of our economy exists in the form of a large unorganised sector scattered in the different parts of the country and the possible adverse impact on the aam aadmi. Hence, it is essential that the likely con-sequences of adopting a comprehensive approach (Negative List) to tax services are appropriately dealt with.

Introduction of Comprehensive Approach (Negative List)
Introduction should be only with GST to avoid overlaps with State levies

Considering the substantive nature of the proposed legislative amendment which spells out a significant policy perspective of the Government and which is likely to have far-reaching implications, comprehensive approach (Negative List) to tax services should be introduced only as a part of GST Regime, which is being looked upon as the biggest indirect taxation reform in our country post independence.

While mutual overlaps between central levies have been resolved to a large extent, several overlaps remain due to the lack of coordination and uniformity in the approach to indirect taxation by the Centre and the States. GST, in creating a dual but uniform levy on goods and services simultaneously by the Centre and States is expected to resolve many of these issues. The definition of the term ‘service’ has been set out in such broad terms in the draft concept paper that the potential for overlap with the existing State levies (and certain central levies) is very high. Hence, until the State levies are synchronised with the Central levies (which will only happen upon the transition to GST) the introduction of a negative list may be a step in the wrong direction.

In case of introduction of Negative List prior to GST, public debate on amendments in affected legislations necessary
Alternatively, if the comprehensive approach (Negative List) to tax service is to be put in place prior to the introduction of GST Regime, a Comprehensive Concept Paper along with drafts of amended legislations likely to be impacted should also be placed for public debate and response by the affected parties so as to fully understand the implications in totality.

An illustrative list of rules/regulations which could be impacted are as under:

  •     Service Tax Rules, 1994
  •     CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004
  •     Criteria-based Export of Services Rules, 2005
  •     Criteria-based Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006
  •     Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006
  •     Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007

    Point of Taxation Rules, 2011

  •     Service-specific exemption Notifications issued from time to time granting exemptions/abatements either fully or partially

In relation to the aforesaid, it should be ensured that the existing substantive and established principles are continued upon in the negative list approach as well.

Time for preparation
Introduction of a comprehensive approach (Negative List) of taxing services with several consequential amendments in existing rules & regulations will undoubtedly require businesses to make innumerable changes in their current IT systems, processes, documentation, record management, etc. Therefore, businesses should be given a minimum of 6 months’ time after all the legislative amendments (including the Rules referred to above) are announced, but before they are made effective.

Important issues requiring consideration before adopting comprehensive approach (Negative List) to tax services
While moving towards comprehensive approach (Negative List) to tax services, the important and significant aspects which need to be considered are set out below.

Definition of ‘Service’
The term ‘service’ needs to be appropriately defined whereby the shortcomings of the present service tax law are taken care of and at the same time unintended transactions do not get taxed by ensuring the following, in particular:

  •     The terminology in definition employing words such as ‘anything’ should be done away with so as to minimise interpretation issues.

  •     In line with prevalent international practices, the scope of ‘service’ should explicitly cover only those transactions which are carried out with a commercial/economic objective & intent.

  •     In the absence of harmonious approach be-tween the Centre and States at present, there are already instances of various transactions like supply of software, enjoyment of IPR, franchise, recharge vouchers for telecommunication services and DTH services, etc. which are currently treated by the Centre as services liable to service tax and by States as sale of ‘goods’/ ‘deemed sale of goods’ liable to VAT. Once the term ‘service’ is defined for the purpose of taxing services based on a negative list and if there is no consensus between the Centre and States on such definition, instances of dual taxation of various transactions, both by Centre and States, will only increase. Therefore, approval of all the States governments should also be taken on the definition of the term ‘service’ to be adopted by the Centre. In order that the end beneficiary (aam aadmi) is not burdened by cascading effect of dual taxation, it should be ensured that services which are liable to service tax by the Centre do not also suffer VAT under the State VAT Laws.

  •     Transactions which are in the nature of ‘self-supply’ within a legal entity are excluded.

  •     Transactions which are per se not in the nature of ‘service’ (e.g., donations/voluntary contributions, gifts, subsidies/grants, security deposits, damages and compensations, etc.) should be kept out of service tax.

  •     Transactions arising from shifting or transfer of factory/premises on account of change in ownership or on account of sale, merger, de-merger, amalgamation, lease, conversion to LLP, transfer to joint venture or any other mode of business reorganisation with specific provision for transfer of liabilities of such factory/premises/business to the transferee should be excluded from the purview of ‘service’.

l Exclude activities that are specifically notified from time to time for exemption/exclusion from the levy of service tax.

Threshold exemption

Under the comprehensive approach (Negative List) to tax services, a large section of the country’s unorganised economy is likely to get covered under the service tax, which could have adverse impact on the aam aadmi. In order to ensure that a large number of small taxpayers are kept out and administration efforts of the Government are focussed on large taxpayers the following is suggested:

  •     A high threshold limit in the range of Rs.50 lakh (on an optional basis) should be prescribed.

  •     Alternatively, a simple composition scheme of taxation (with no CENVAT benefit), may be prescribed for small taxpayers where taxable value of services exceeds a specified amount during a financial year.

Input services eligible for CENVAT credit
It is an established cardinal principle of any VAT/ GST system prevalent worldwide that taxes paid on all services availed for the purpose of business are eligible for input tax credit. If services are to be taxed comprehensively, there cannot be any justification for breaking the input tax credit chain. Hence, simultaneously with introduction of negative list of services, definition of ‘input service’ under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 must be amended, whereby all services availed for the purpose of business qualify as input services eligible for CENVAT credit.

Zero-rated services

  •     There are certain key sectors (Refer to Table 2) of our economy, which need to be specified as ‘Zero-rated Services’ (i.e., while there would be no output tax payable, benefit of input tax credit would be available, through a refund mechanism).

  •     In order to avoid issues and disputes as to classification and consequential eligibility to benefit, coverage of services should be clearly defined with detailed Interpretative Notes on lines with Central Excise/Customs Tariff.

Negative List of services

  •     The Government has identified certain services (Refer Table 3 below) to be kept out of the service tax. In case of such services, benefit of CENVAT credit would not be available to the service provider. The following services should be considered for inclusion/wider coverage in the negative list.

  •     In order to avoid issues and disputes as to classification and consequential eligibility to benefit, coverage of services should be clearly defined with detailed interpretative notes on lines with Central Excise/Customs Tariff.

POINT OF TAXATION RULES, 2011

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1. Background:

1.1 Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POT Rules) were notified vide Notification No. 18/2011-ST, dated 1-3-2011 and were amended before they came into force vide Notification No. 25/2011-ST, dated 31-3-2011. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, only the amended rules are analysed and discussed. In all, there is a set of nine rules. While introducing the POT Rules, the Ministry of Finance, in its Instruction D.O.F. No. 334/3/2011-TRU, dated 28-2-2011 stated as under:

“These rules determine the point in time when the services shall be deemed to be provided.

The general rule will be that the time of provision of service will be the earliest of the following dates:

  • Date on which service is provided or to be provided
  • Date of invoice
  • Date of payment.”

The Service Tax Rules, 1994 (ST Rules) are also correspondingly amended consequent upon introduction of POT Rules to align the provisions and to alter the payment from receipt to the point when services are deemed to be provided.

1.2 Hitherto, Service tax was payable into the Government treasury only at the point of time and to the extent of actual receipt towards value of taxable service. There is a paradigm shift in this well-settled modus operandi of collection of the levy vide the introduction of the POT Rules and accrual is expected to be the new order of the levy with the exception of tax payable on advances also. At the outset, it may be noted that although POT Rules came into force from 1-4-2011, an option is provided in Rule 9 of POT Rules to pay Service tax on receipt basis till 30-6-2011. Essentially, the introduction of POT Rules is claimed as a transitionary action to align the system of payment of taxes on goods and services in the forthcoming GST Regime.

2. Whether POT Rules determine ‘taxable event’ or point of time for manner of collection?

2.1 Prelude to the POT Rules provides that the said rules have been made for the purpose of collection of Service tax and determination of rate of Service tax. However, Rule 2 defining a few terms, its clause (e) defines point of taxation as; “ ‘Point of taxation’ means the point in time when a service shall be deemed to have been provided”. Thus a deeming fiction is created and different times have been laid down when a service shall be deemed to be provided. Does this mean that this set of rules determines the ‘taxable event’? In any law, the charging section determines the taxable event. Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (Act) reads as under:

“there shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as Service tax) at the rate of . . . percent of the value of taxable services referred to in section 65(105) . . . and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.”

2.2 The Supreme Court in the case of Association of Leasing and Financial Services Companies v. UOI, (2010) 20 STR 417 (SC) observed that the taxable event is the rendition of service. The Gujarat High Court in the case of CCE&C v. Reliance Industries Ltd., (2010) 19 STR 807 (Guj.) held that “in our view, substantive provision of the Act would clearly indicate the relevant date is the date of entry in service and not the date of billing.” The Tribunal in the case of CCE v. Krishna Coaching Institute, (2009) 14 STR 18 (Tri.-Del.) held that even though value has been received prior to the date of levy of Service tax, Service tax shall be leviable once the service has been rendered after the date of levy of Service tax. Similarly, in the case of Hindustan Colas Ltd. v. CCE, (2010) 19 STR 845 (Tri.-Mum.) it was held that levy of Service tax is with reference to taxable event and if that has taken place prior to the introduction of levy of a particular service, Service tax cannot be levied on the amount/consideration received for the said service. In the context of excise law in the case of Wallace Flour Mills Company Ltd. v. CCE, (1989) 44 ELT 598 (SC), the goods were exempted from duty at the time of manufacture. However, at the time of clearance after the budget, the duty was levied. The Court held that although when taxable event of manufacture occurred, the goods were exempt, the duty is collected at a later date for administrative convenience. The authorities were competent to collect the duty at the rate applicable at the time of clearance on the goods excisable at Nil rate at the time of taxable event of manufacture. Later in the case of CCE, v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd., (1996) 83 ELT 3 (SC), the Court held that once the levy is not there at the time of manufacture, it cannot be levied at the time of removal of goods. Thus the law laid down through the above cases is that under the central excise law, the taxable event is manufacture or production of goods and collection of duty is at the point of removal and exempted goods under a notification are excisable goods. However, when they are outside the purview of the excise law at the time of manufacture, no duty can be levied at the time of clearance on the goods manufactured before the introduction of levy and removed after the imposition of levy.

2.3 Thus the charging section levies a tax at prescribed rate on the value of taxable service and specifies that the manner of collection shall be as prescribed. Accordingly, the amended Rule 6 of the ST Rules prescribes that Service tax is to be paid by 6th/5th of the month as the case may be immediately following the calendar month in which the service is deemed to be provided as per POT Rules. In other words, ST Rules read with POT Rules determine the manner of collection of Service tax. Therefore POT Rules do not determine the ‘taxable event’ viz. the provision of service, on the happening of which, the levy of Service tax is triggered. In the backdrop of this analysis, a question arises as to whether Rule 2(e) of the POT Rules defining point of taxation as point in time when service is deemed to be provided is appropriate? The object and purpose laid down while introducing POT Rules indicate that POT Rules are prescribed to provide a deeming fiction for the point in time to determine the manner of collection of Service tax and not taxable event of provision of service. In effect, Rule 6 of the Rules read with POT Rules determines the manner of collection of Service tax. Amidst this legal controversy, the provisions of POT Rules, are discussed hereafter.

3. Determination of point of taxation:

Rule 3 to Rule 8 deal with different situations for determining point of taxation.

3.1 General Rule (Rule 3):
The basic rule set out in Rule 3 is that earlier of the following three events is the point at which Service tax is required to be paid:

  • The date on which an invoice is issued for a service provided or to be provided.
  • If no invoice is issued within 14 days of completion of service, the date on which provision of a service is completed.
  • The date on which any advance by whatever name known is received.

The Government’s letter F. No. 341/34/2010-TRU, dated 31-3-2011 in para 2 has provided a following illustrative table:

The above indicates that point of taxation is hybrid or multiple with a condition of whichever is earlier. If the stated objective is mere alignment with GST, then whether resorting to multiple points was required is a question. Further, and as it also exists since 2005, if advance payment is also a point of taxation under deeming fiction, there is another question arising as to whether or not uniformity will be achieved in the indirect tax system. Under the excise law, the time of manufacture is the taxable event, but the duty is levied at the point of clearance and thus there is a single taxation point. Under the VAT laws, the tax is payable when sale is made.

3.2    When effective rate of Service tax is changed (Rule 4):

Notwithstanding anything in Rule 3 of POT Rules as discussed in para 3.1 above when the effective rate of Service tax changes, provision of this Rule 4 relating to change in effective rate of Service tax is applicable. The rate of Service tax for this purpose also includes abated rate under any exemption or a specific rate under any rule. For instance, there is a lower effective rate of tax by virtue of exemption of 75% in value in case of service of transportation of goods by road, exempted value on various services vide Notification No. 1/06-ST, dated 1-3-2006 or there is a composition rate prescribed in case of works contract service or options available of specific rates for services of air travel agents, life insurance business, purchase or sale of foreign currency including money changing, etc. under Rule 6(7), (7A) and (7B), respectively of ST Rules. Determination of point of taxation under the said Rule 4 for services provided before the change in rate and after the said change is provided as follows:

(a)    When taxable service is provided before the change in effective rate of tax:

  •  If both, issuing invoice and receipt of payment are after the date of change of effective rate of tax, whichever accrues earlier is the point of taxation. The changed rate would apply here.

  •     However, when the invoice is issued prior to the change in effective rate of tax, but the payment is received after the said change, the date of invoice is the point at which tax is payable and accordingly the old rate would apply.
  •     As against the above, when the payment is received prior to the change in effective rate of tax, but the invoice is issued after the date of change of the rate, the date of payment is the point of taxation. As such, in this case also the old rate of tax would be applicable.

(b)    When a taxable service is provided after the change in effective rate of Service tax:

  •  If the invoice is issued prior to the change in the effective rate of tax, but the payment is received after the said change, the date of receipt of payment is the point of taxation and despite the issue of invoice earlier, in deviation from the general rule, the changed rate would be applicable.

  •  However, when both, issuing invoice and receipt of payment have occurred prior to the change in the effective rate of tax, the earlier event out of the two occurrences is the point of taxation. The old rate would be applicable in this situation.

  •  When the payment is received prior to the change in the effective rate of Service tax, but the invoice is issued after the said change, the date of invoice is the point of taxation. The changed rate would be applicable here again in deviation from the general rule.

The broad principle in the above six situations is that the tax rate is determined based on when two events have occurred at a point of time i.e., either provision of service and issue of invoice or provision of service and payment.

3.3    When a new service is introduced in the law:
(Rule 5):

3.3.1 When any service (other than a service which is considered in continuous supply and accordingly covered by Rule 6) which was not taxable earlier and for the first time it is made taxable from a specific date, Service tax is not payable:

(a)    when the invoice is issued and payment is received for such service before such service became taxable;
(b)    when the payment is received prior to the service becoming taxable, but the invoice is issued after the service becoming taxable, if the invoice is issued within fourteen days from the date of completion of service as laid down in Rule 4A of the ST Rules.

3.3.2 This rule appears to defy the basic legality that when there is no ‘taxable event’ under the law, there cannot be levied Service tax as emerging from the provision of section 66 of the Act as well as various rulings, some of which are cited in para 2 earlier. From the conditions laid in (a) above, it appears that in a case when both, issue of invoice and payment have occurred prior to the date of introduction of the levy, but if a service as a matter of fact is provided after the introduction of levy, no Service tax is payable. Conversely, in terms of (b) above, if the service is provided prior to the effective date of the new levy, payment also is received prior to such date, but if no invoice is issued within 14 days, Service tax liability would arise. The question arises is whether the condition of issuing invoice within 14 days in terms of Rule 4A of the ST Rules can be applied to the period prior to the effective date of the levy? Does such rule get authority of law? It appears that if the Rule is not amended, considerable litigation may surface on this issue in addition to the hardship expected to be faced by a large number of service providers.

3.4 Continuous supply of service: (Rule 6):
3.4.1 Continuous supply of service as defined by Rule 2(c) of POT Rules means any service provided or to be provided continuously under a contract for a period exceeding three months or where the Central Government notifies a particular service to be a continuous supply of service with or without any condition.

The Government in accordance with the provisions of the said Rule 2(c) of POT Rules vide Notification 28/11-ST, dated 1-4-2011 notified the following services to be constituted in the nature of continuous supply, notwithstanding the period for which they are provided or agreed to be provided:

  •     Telecommunication service [65(105)(zzzx)]
  •     Commercial or industrial construction [65(105)(zzq)]
  •     Construction of residential complex [65(105)(zzzh)]
  •     Internet telecommunication service [65(105)(zzzu)]
  •    Works contract service [65(105)(zzzza)]

3.4.2 The conditions mentioned in sub-clauses (a) and(b) of Rule 6 are aligned with Rule 3, viz. the general rule discussed in para 3.1 earlier. Nevertheless, Rule 6 for services held to be in continuous supply is in primacy over Rules 3 and 4 discussed in paras 3.1 and 3.2 earlier and Rule 8 discussed in 3.9 hereafter. The earlier event of the date of invoice or the date of receipt of advance is the point of taxation. Like the general rule, in case of continuous supply of service also, if the invoice is issued within 14 days of completion of service, the date of completion of service would be the point of taxation. However, in case where the terms of the contract for the service provided that on the completion of a specific event or a milestone, certain payment is required to be made by the recipient of the service to the provider thereof, the date of completion of each such event or milestone as provided in the contract would be deemed to be completion of part or whole of such service, as the case may be. In this context, the following clarification of the Finance Ministry made vide para 5 of letter F. No. 341/34/2011-TRU of 31-3-2011 is relevant:

“5. Rule 6 relating to continuous supply of service has been aligned with the revised Rule 3 and the date of completion of continuous service has been defined within the rule. This date shall be the date of completion of the specified event stated in the contract which obligates payment in part or whole for the contract. For example, in the case of construction services if the payments are linked to stage-by-stage completion of construction, the provision of service shall be deemed to be completed in part when each such stage of construction is completed. Moreover, it has been provided that this rule will have primacy over Rules 3, 4 and 8.”

3.4.3 Briefly stated, so far as this Rule 6 is concerned, ordinarily, once a service is determined as one in continuous supply, the date of the completion of the event stated in the contract is the point of taxation. However, if an invoice is raised or payment is received before this date, point of taxation shifts accordingly.

3.5 When services are exported: Rule 7(a):

When the services are held as exported in terms of the Export of Services Rules, 2005, there does not arise a liability to pay Service tax. However, technically until the payment for the service is received in convertible foreign exchange, the service would not constitute export, because the condition of receipt in foreign exchange does not stand fulfilled. Rule 7(a) and the proviso in this regard provide that if payment for exported service is made within the period specified by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) which is usually 12 months (except in certain cases, a longer period is allowable), the date of payment is considered the point of taxation. However, if it is not received within the period specified by RBI, the point of taxation would be determined as if this rule is absent and therefore in accordance with Rules 4, 5 or 6 discussed above or Rule 8 discussed hereafter in para 3.9, as the case may be. To summarise, if the payment for the exported service is not made within the time prescribed by RBI, the Service tax liability would emerge and the liability would arise from the point of taxation as determinable under the rules without having benefit of considering the date of receipt and therefore the interest for delayed payment also would arise as the point of taxation would shift to a much earlier date like the date of invoice or the date of completion of service, or as the case may be. The clarification of the Finance Ministry in para 9 of the letter F. No. 341/34/11-TRU of 31-3-2011 is reproduced below:

“9. Export of services is exempt subject, inter alia, to the condition that the payment should be received in convertible foreign exchange. Until the payment is received, the provision of service, even if all other conditions are met, would not constitute export. In order to remove the hard-ship that will be caused due to accrual method, the point of taxation has been changed to the date of payment. However, if the payment is not received within the period prescribed by RBI, the point of taxation shall be determined in the absence of this rule.”

3.6    When Service tax is payable under reverse charge mechanism: Rule 7(b):

In case of services like insurance agents and mutual fund agents, goods transport agencies or when taxable services are provided from outside India, the liability of Service tax is on recipient of the services u/s.68(2) of the Act. In such cases, like in case of exported services, the Rule 7(b) provides for point of taxation on the date of actual payment to the service provider. However, this is subject to the condition that the payment is made within six months of the date of the invoice. If the payment is not made within 6 months of the date of invoice, point of taxation is determined in the absence of this rule i.e., in accordance with the applicable rule, be it Rule 3, 4, 5, 6 or 8, as the case may be. Like in the case of export of services discussed in 3.5 earlier, interest for the delayed payment would arise as the point of taxation would shift to the date of invoice or the date of completion of service, etc. The clarification of the Finance Ministry vide para 10 of the letter dated 31-3-2011 is as follows:

“10. In case of services where the recipient is obligated to pay Service tax under Rule 2 (1)(d) of the Service Tax Rules i.e., on reverse charge basis, the point of taxation shall be the date of making the payment. However, if the payment is not made within six months of the date of invoice, the point of taxation shall be determined as if this rule does not exist. Moreover, in case of associated enterprises, when the service provider is outside India, the point of taxation will be the earlier of the date of credit in the books of account of the service receiver or the date of making the payment.”

3.7    Certain professionals to continue to pay Service tax on receipt basis: Rule 7(c):

Rule 7(c) has carved out an exception for the following professional service providers when services are provided as individuals, proprietary firms or partnership firms and provided for the date on which payment for a service is received or made as the point of taxation and accordingly has maintained a status quo for these assessees. The list is as follows:

  •     Architect [Section 65(105) (p)]
  •    Chartered Accountant [Section 65(105) (s)]
  •     Cost Accountant [Section 65(105) (t)]
  •     Company Secretary [Section 65(105) (u)]
  •     Interior Decorator [Section 65(105) (q)
  •     Legal Consultant [Section 65(105) (zzzzm)]
  •     Scientific and Technical Consultant [Section 65 (105) (za)]

Thus, the above categories of persons continue to pay Service tax on receipt basis even after 1-7-2011. In this list, professions of consulting engineers and management consultants are conspicuously missing. In this context, the clarification vide para 8(iii) of the Finance Ministry letter of 31-3-2011 is relevant to note:

“8(iii) Individuals, proprietorships and partnership firms providing specified services (Chartered Accountant, Cost Accountant, Company Secretary, Architect, Interior Decorator, Legal, Scientific and Technical consultancy services). The benefit shall not be available in case of any other service also supplied by the person concerned along with the specified services.” (emphasis supplied)

It is required to note here that the above rider is not mentioned in the applicable rule, but finds place in the Government clarification in the above words.

3.8 Associated enterprises:

In case of associated enterprises, when the service provider is outside India and the Service tax is pay-able in respect thereof under reverse charge, the earlier of the date of credit in the books of account of the receiver of service or the date of payment is considered the point of taxation. When any associated enterprise is situated in India, no provision is made for it in POT Rules. The earlier proviso in this regard in Rule 6 of the ST Rules is also omitted with effect from 1-4-2011. The clarification in para 7 of the Finance Ministry letter of 31-3-2011 explains this point as follows:

“7. Rule 7 relating to associated enterprises has been deleted. Now that the date of completion of the provision of service is an important criterion in the determination of point of taxation, it shall take care of most of the dealings between the associated enterprises. Thus in case of failure to issue the invoice within the prescribed period, the date of completion of provision of service shall come into effect even if payment is not made.”

3.9    Royalty payments: Intellectual property rights:
(Rule 8):

It is provided that in respect of royalties and payments towards copyrights, trademarks, designs or patents, when the whole amount of consideration is not ascertainable at the time of provision of service, the service shall be deemed to have been provided each time the payment in respect of the use or the benefit is received by the provider of trademark, copyright, patent, etc. or at the time the invoice is issued by the service provider, whichever is earlier.

4.    Services completed or invoice issued before POT Rules became effective:

Transitional provision is made in the POT Rules whereby for the service provision completed prior to 30-6-2011 or invoices issued till 30-6-2011, an assessee at his option can pay Service tax at the point when payment is received or made, as the case may be. In short, an assessee can continue to pay service tax on receipt basis for the invoices issued till 30-6-2011 or he may pay on accrual if so opts from 1-4-2011.

5.    When invoice is not paid partly or wholly by the recipient of service:

Most assessees under the Service tax law, except the seven categories of professionals as discussed in para 3.7 earlier, face the challenge of payment of service tax based on the invoice in the post — July 01, 2011 scenario and not receiving full/part payment towards the service, leave aside non-receipt of amount of service tax charged in the said invoice. Therefore, non-payment or short payment may occur on account of various reasons such as dispute as to delayed service, quality of deliverables, cash-flow difficulty of the recipient of service, breach of terms of service, etc. With the onset of POT Rules, corresponding changes are made in the ST Rules. The amended Rule 6(3) of the ST Rules provides that:

  •     If the service is wholly or partly not provided for any reason; or

  •     Where the amount of invoice is renegotiated due to inadequate or poor quality of service, the service provider or the assessee can refund the amount to the receiver of service with Service tax or issue a credit note suitably.

After such refund of amount or issue of credit note, the assessee may himself adjust the excess payment of Service tax against his Service tax li-ability for the subsequent period. However, when no invoice is paid for at all by the service receiver and if the assessee does not issue a credit note, no provision is made in the POT Rules or ST Rules for adjustment of bad debts. Refer to para 11(ii) of the Finance Ministry letter of 31-3-2011 explaining the position as follows:

“11(ii) If the amount of invoice is renegotiated due to deficient provision or in any other way changed in terms of conditions of the contract (e.g., con-tingent on the happening or non-happening of a future event), the tax will be payable on the revised amount provided the excess amount is either refunded or a suitable credit note is issued to the service receiver. However, concession is not available for bad debts.”

6.    CENVAT credit available on receipt of invoice:

Rule 4(7) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is simultaneously amended to align with POT Rules to provide that CENVAT credit of Service tax is available immediately on receipt of invoice issued on or after 1-4-2011, except when service tax is payable under reverse charge mechanism. However, if the invoice is not paid within three months of the date of invoice, the credit is required to be reversed. The credit can be taken again after the invoice is paid. (Readers may refer to Service tax feature in May 2011 Issue of BCAJ for detailed analysis of this at para 5 under ‘Significant Amendments in CENVAT Credit’).

7.    Some issues:

7.1 Mr. A, an assessee under the Service tax law received advance payment on 25th February for his services agreed to be provided 1st June onwards. The rate of Service tax was revised from 10.3% to 12.36% from May 2011. Considering the POT Rules in operation, on the receipt of advance payment, Service tax @10.3% was paid by Mr. A on 5th March i.e., in the following month of the receipt on the receipt of advance is the earliest event. Whether Mr. A would be required to pay service tax at higher rate of tax on the amount of advance received on 25th February, if:

(a)    he issues an invoice on March 10 for the said advance

(b)    he issues an invoice on June 01 when service commences

(c)    he issues an invoice on 31st March.

Mr. A seeks advice.

7.1    (a) When the rate of Service tax changes, ordi-narily one is governed by the provisions of Rule 4 of POT Rules. Accordingly, when services are provided after the change in the rate, but if advance is received prior to such change and if the invoice is also issued prior to such change, the point of taxation is earlier event of the two occurrences, therefore payment on 5th March @10.3% is in order as the invoice is also issued prior to the date of change in the rate.

(b)    If the invoice is not issued by Mr. A till June 01, he will be required to pay service tax @12.36% as his point of taxation would be June 01 in this case and the liability to pay Service tax arises on 5th July. (Here the default under Rule 4A of STR is also made as no invoice is issued within 14 days of the receipt of the advance.)

(c)    In this situation also, the point of taxation would be 25th February and therefore the payment of tax on 5th March @10.3% was proper notwith-standing the default in issuing of invoice later than 14 days of the receipt of the advance.

Mr. A is advised to issue the invoice within 14 days of the receipt of advance as in (a) above in order to avoid a controversy.

7.2 Mr. X provides a service which was hitherto not taxable. However, the service is introduced in the law from a prospective date for the first time, say, from July 01. For certain services provided till 30th June, Mr. X had already issued two invoices, however no payment was received by Mr. X till 30th June. Whether Service tax would be payable in any case by Mr. X if he receives the payment for both the two invoices in August and December, respectively.

7.2    Rule 5 of POT Rules provides for point of taxation when a new service is introduced in the law for the first time. However, the above situation is not envisaged by the said rule. Therefore Rule 3(a) being a general rule would be applicable. Accordingly, no Service tax would be payable as the date of invoice is the point of taxation and at such time the service was not taxable. Further, in principle, in the absence of or prior to the introduction of POT Rules when the provisions of service occurred, the service was not taxable and therefore no Service tax would have to be paid. Taxable event under the service tax law is rendering of taxable service as discussed and decided in cases cited in para 2 earlier and also by the Gujarat High Court in CCE&C v. Schott Glass India (P) Ltd., (2009) 14 STR 146 (Guj) held that taxable event in relation to Service tax is admittedly the rendering of taxable service. Many disputes have arisen on the issue of whether Service tax is payable in respect of services provided prior to the introduction of levy on it and payment for which is received later. In the case of Lumax Samlip Industries

v.    CST, (2007) 6 STR 417 (Tri.-Chennai) it was held that for determination of Service tax liability, the relevant date is the date on which the service was received by the appellant. If the service was received before the applicability of Service tax on that service, Service tax cannot be levied.

7.3 ABC & Co is a partnership firm of CAs which is registered with the Service Tax Dept. under the following service categories:

  •     Chartered Accountant
  •     Management or Business Consultant
  •     Business Support

They are in the process of converting into LLP in due course of time. ABC & Co seeks advice as to implications of POT Rules before/after conversion into LLP.

7.3A    According to the provisions of Rule 7(b) of POT Rules, relaxation is applicable only in the following circumstances/situations:

  • Service provider is an individual, proprietary firm or partnership firm
  • Specified service is provided by a service provider.

Hence, the following position emerges:

(a)    Prior to LLP conversion, relaxation under POT Rules, would be available only in regard to taxable Services provided under ‘Chartered Ac-countant’ category [Section 65(105) (s)]

(b)    Post LLP conversion, relaxation under Rule 7(b) of POT Rules, would not be available to ABC & Co.

PROSECUTION UNDER SERVICE TAX

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Preliminary

Sections 88 to 92 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) provided for prosecution for certain offences, such as failure to furnish prescribed returns, false statement in verification, abetment of false return, etc. These provisions were omitted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 w.e.f. 16-10-1998. However, through the Finance Act, 2011, amendments have been made to introduce prosecution provisions by enacting a new section 89 under FA. Further, sections 9A, 9AA, 9B, 9E and 34A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (‘CEA’) have been made applicable to Service tax. These provisions together constitute the provisions relating to prosecution under Service tax, which are discussed hereafter.

Prosecution provisions Offences punishable

The punishable offences specified in section 89(1) of the Act are as under:

(a) Provision of taxable services or receipt of any taxable services where the recipient is liable to pay Service tax, without an invoice issued in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the Rules made hereunder;

(b) availment and utilisation of credit without actual receipt of taxable service or excisable goods either fully or partially in violation of the Act or Credit Rules;

(c) maintenance of false books of account;

(d) failure to supply information or supply of false information;

(e) failure to pay to the Government any amount collected as Service tax beyond a period of six months from the date on which such payment became due.

2.2 Quantum of punishment

In absence of ‘special and adequate reasons’ to be recorded in the judgment of the Court the punishment mentioned in Sr. Nos. 1 and 3 above, cannot be reduced below six months. The following grounds would not be considered ‘special and adequate reasons’ in terms of section 89(3) of the Act:

(a) conviction of the accused for the first time for an offence under the Act;

(b) payment of penalty or any other action taken for the same act which constitutes the offence

(c) the fact that the accused was not the principal offender and was acting merely as a secondary party in the commission of the offence.

(d) The age of the accused.

Sanction

Prosecution can be initiated only with prior approval of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise (CCCE).

Central Excise Sections provisions made applicable to Service tax

The provisions of sections 9A 9AA, 9B, 9E and 34A of CEA which have been made applicable to Service tax are briefly explained as under:

(a) The offences would be ‘non-cognisable’ i.e., an offence in which a police officer has no authority to arrest without a warrant. Further the CCCE is also empowered to compound the offences on payment of the compounding amount as may be prescribed (section 9A of CEA).

(b) If an offence is committed by a company (which includes a firm), the persons liable to be proceeded against and punished are:

(i) the company;
(ii) every person, who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business, except where he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence; and
(iii) any director (who in relation to a firm means a partner), manager, secretary or other officer of the company with whose consent or connivance or because of neglect attributable to whom the offence has been committed. (section 9AA of CEA)

(c) The Court is empowered to publish the name, place of business, etc. of person convicted under the Act (section 9B of CEA)

(d) In case of a person who is less than 18 years of age, the Court, under certain circumstances, is empowered to release the accused on probation of good conduct u.s 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or to release the offenders on probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. (section 9B of CEA)

(e) The imposition of penalty would not prevent infliction of other punishment on the offender. (section 34A of CEA)

Dept. clarifications vide Circular No. 140/9/2011-TRU, dated 12-5-2011

Relevant extracts from the Dept. Circular are given hereafter for reference:

Para 2
Prosecution provision was introduced this year, in Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994, as part of a compliance philosophy involving rationalisation of penal provisions. Encouraging voluntary compliance and introduction of penalties based on the gravity of offences are some important principles which guide the changes made this year in the penal provisions governing Service tax. While minor technical omissions or commissions have been made punishable with simple penal measures, prosecution is meant to contain and tackle certain specified serious violations. Accordingly, it is imperative for the field formations, in particular the sanctioning authority, to implement the prosecution provision keeping in view the overall compliance philosophy. Since the objective of the prosecution provision is mainly to develop a holistic compliance culture among the taxpayers, it is expected that the instructions will be followed in letter and spirit.

Para 4
Clause (a) of section 89(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is meant to apply, inter alia, where services have been provided without issuance of invoice in accordance with the prescribed provisions. In terms of Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, invoice is required to be issued inter alia within 14 days from the date of completion of the taxable service. Here, it should be noted that the emphasis in the prosecution provision is on the non-issuance of invoice within the prescribed period, rather than non-mention of the technical details in the invoice that have no bearing on the determination of tax liability.

Para 5
In the case of services where the recipient is liable to pay tax on reverse-charge basis, similar obligation has been cast on the service recipient, though the invoices are issued by the service provider. It is clarified that the date of provision of service shall be determined in terms of the Point of Taxation Rules, 2011. In the case of persons liable to pay tax on reverse-charge basis, the date of provision of service shall be the date of payment, except in the case of associated enterprises receiving services from abroad where the date shall be earlier of the date of credit in the books of accounts or the date of payment. It is at this stage that the transaction must be accounted for. Thus the service receiver, liable to pay tax on reverse-charge basis is required to ensure that the invoice is available at the time the payment is made or at least received within 14 days thereafter and in the case of associated enterprises, invoice should be available with the service receiver at the time of credit in the books of accounts or the date of payment towards the service received.

Para 7
Clause (b) of section 89(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 refers to the availment and utilisation of the credit of taxes paid without actual receipt of taxable service or excisable goods. It may be noted that in order to constitute an offence under this clause the taxpayer must both avail as well as utilise the credit without having actually received the goods or the service. The clause is not meant to apply to situations where an invoice has been issued for a service yet to be provided on which due tax has been paid. It is only meant for such invoices that are typically known as ‘fake’ where the tax has not been paid at the so-called service provider’s end or where the provider stated in the invoice is non-existent. It will also cover situations where the value of the service stated in the invoice and/or tax thereon have been altered with a view to avail Cenvat credit in excess of the amount originally stated. While calculating the monetary limit for the purpose of launching prosecution, the value shall be the amount availed as credit in excess of the amount originally stated in the invoice.

Para 8

Clause (c) of section 89(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is based on similar provision in the Central Excise law. It should be noted that the offence in relation to maintenance of false books of accounts or failure to supply the required information or supplying of false information, should in material particulars have a bearing on the tax liability. Mere expression of opinions shall not be covered by the said clause. Supplying false information, in response to summons, will also be covered under this provision.

Para 9


Clause (d) of section 89(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 will apply only when the amount has been collected as Service tax. It is not meant to apply to mere non-payment of Service tax when due.
This provision would be attracted when the amount was reflected in the invoices as Service tax, service receiver has already made the payment and the period of six months has elapsed from the date on which the service provider was required to pay the tax to the Central Government. Where the service receiver has made part payment, the service provider will be punishable to the extent he has failed to deposit the tax due to the Government.

Para 11

Section 9C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which is made applicable to the Finance Act, 1994, provides that in any prosecution for an offence, existence of culpable mental state shall be presumed by the Court. Therefore each offence described in section 89(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, has an inherent mens rea. Delinquency by the defaulter of Service tax itself establishes his ‘guilt’. If the accused claims that he did not have guilty mind, it is for him to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt. Thus “burden of proof regarding non-existence of ‘mens rea’ is on the accused.

Para 13

Sanction for prosecution has to be accorded by the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise in terms of the section 89(4) of the Finance Act, 1994. In accordance with Notification 3/2004 -ST dated 11th March 2004, the Director General of Central Excise Intelligence (DGCEI) can exercise the power of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, throughout India.

Para 14

The Board has decided that monetary limit for prosecution will be Rupees Ten Lakh in the case of offences specified in section 89(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 to ensure better utilisation of manpower, time and resources of the field formations. Therefore, where an offence specified in section 89(1) involves an amount of less than Rupees Ten Lakh, such case need not be considered for launching prosecution. However the monetary limit will not apply in the case of repeat offence.

Para 15

Provisions relating to prosecution are to be exercised with due diligence, caution and responsibility after carefully weighing all the facts on record. Prosecution should not be launched merely on matters of technicalities. Evidence regarding the specified offence should be beyond reasonable doubt, to obtain conviction. The sanctioning authority should record detailed reasons for its decision to sanction or not to sanction prosecution, on file.

Para 16

Prosecution proceedings in a Court of law are to be generally initiated after departmental adjudication of an offence has been completed, although there is no legal bar against launch of prosecution before adjudication. Generally, the adjudicator should indicate whether a case is fit for prosecution, though this is not a necessary pre-condition. To launch prosecution against top management of the company, sufficient and clear evidence to show their direct involvement in the offence is required. Once prosecution is sanctioned, complaint should be filed in the appropriate court immediately. If the complaint could not be filed for any reason, the matter should be immediately reported to the authority that sanctioned the prosecution.

Para 17

Instructions and guidelines issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) from time to time, regarding prosecution under Central Excise law, will also be applicable to Service tax, to the extent they are harmonious with the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 and instructions contained in this Circular for carrying out prosecution under Service tax law.

4.    Guidelines for launching prosecution issued by CBEC under Central Excise (Circular No. 33/80 CX 6. Dated 26-7-1980 read with CBEC Circular No. 15/90 – CX 6, dated 9-8-1990.)

(i)    Prosecution should be launched with the final approval of the Principal Collector after the case has been carefully examined by the Collector in the light of the guidelines.

(ii)    Prosecution should not be launched in cases of technical nature, or where in the additional claim of duty is based totally on a difference of interpretation of law. Before launching any prosecution, it is necessary that the Department should have evidence to prove that the person, company or individual had guilty knowledge of the offence, or had fraudulent intention to commit the offence, or in any manner possessed mens rea (mental element) which would indicate his guilt. It follows, therefore, that in the case of public limited companies, prosecution should not be launched indiscriminately against all the Directors of the company but it should be restricted to only against such of the Directors like the Managing Director, Director in charge of Marketing and Sales, Director (Finance) and other executives who are in charge of day-to-day operation of the factory. The intention should be to restrict the prosecution only to those who have taken active part in commit-ting the duty evasion or connived at it. For this purpose, the Collectors should go through the case file and satisfy themselves that only those Chairman/Managing Directors/Directors/Partners/ Executives/Officials against whom reasonable evidence exists of their involvement in duty evasion, should be proceeded against while launching the prosecution. For example, Nominee Directors of financial institutions, who are not concerned with day-to-day matters, should not be prosecuted unless there is very definite evidence to the contrary. Prosecution should be launched only against those Directors/Officials, etc., who are found to have guilty knowledge, fraudulent intention, or mens rea necessary to bind them to criminal liability.

(iii)    In order to avoid prosecution in minor cases, a monetary limit of Rs. 10,000 was prescribed in the instructions contained in Board’s letter F. No. 208/6/M-77-CX 6, dated 26-7-1980. Based on experience, and in order not to fritter away the limited man-power and time of the Department on too many petty cases, it has now been decided to enhance this limit to Rs.1 lakh. (See Note Below) But in the case of habitual offenders, the total amount of duty involved in various offences may be taken into account while deciding whether prosecution is called for. Moreover, if there is evidence to show that the person or the company has been systematically engaged in evasion over a period of time and evidence to prove mala fides is available, prosecution should be considered irrespective of the monetary limit.

(iv)    One of the important considerations for deciding whether prosecution should launched is the availability of adequate evidence. Prosecution should be launched against top management when there is adequate evidence/ material to show their involvement in the offence.

(v)    Persons liable to prosecution should not normally be arrested unless their immediate arest is necessary. Arrest should be made with the approval of the Assistant Collector or the senior-most officer available. Cases of arrest should be reported at the earliest opportunity to the Collector, who will consider whether the case is a fit one for prosecution.

(vi)    Decision on prosecution should be taken immediately on completion of the adjudication proceedings.

(vii)    Prosecution should normally be launched immediately after adjudication has been completed. However, if the party deliberately de-lays completion of adjudication proceedings, prosecution may be launched even during the pendency of the adjudication proceedings if it is apprehended that undue delay would weaken the Department’s case.

(viii)    Prosecution should not be kept in abeyance on the ground that the party has gone in appeal/revision. However, in order to ensure that the proceedings in appeal/revision are not unduly delayed because the case records are required for purposes of prosecution, a parallel file containing copies of the essential documents relating to adjudication should be maintained. It is necessary to reiterate that in order to avoid delays, the Collector should indicate at the time of passing the adjudication order itself whether he considers the case is fit for prosecution so that it should be further processed for being sent to the Principal Collector for sanction.

Applicability of prosecution provisions
Section 89 of the Act has become operative upon enactment of the Finance Act, 2011 on 8-4-2011. Hence, it would appear that prosecution provisions would apply to offences committed on or after 8-4-2011.

In this regard, useful reference can be made to precedents under income tax. In the context of section 276C which was inserted w.e.f. 1-10-1975, it has been held in a number of cases that the said section would not apply to an offence committed prior to that date.

Time limit for launching prosecution
The Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act provides that there is no time limit for launching prosecution in case of offences under some specified Acts. Further, limitation bar contained in Criminal Procedure Code, is not applicable to offences under Central Excise, Service Tax and Customs Law.

It would appear that there is no time limit for launching prosecution under Service tax.

Note: The monetary limit has been enhanced to Rs.25 lakh vide CBEC Circular dated 12-12-1997.

Few judicial considerations are as under:

?    In Devchand Kalyan Tandel v. State of Gujarat, 89 ELT 433 (SC) it was held that in case of economic offences, the Courts should not take lenient view, as stringent measures are necessary in case of economic offences. (In this case, there was lapse of 13 years between the occurrence and the date of judgment.)

?    In V. K. Agarwal v. Vasantraj, (1988) 3 SCC 467 and A. A. Mulla v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 AIR SCW 63, the Supreme Court declined to stop further proceedings on the matter though the matters had become very old. (In this case, the case was already filed long ago i.e., in 1969).

Procedures relating to prosecution

The CBE&C has clarified that prosecution can be approved only by the CCCE in terms of section 89(4) of CEA throughout India.

Some judicial and other considerations are as under:

?    Appeal against sanction of prosecution cannot be filed with CEGAT — [Jagatjit Industrial Ltd. v. CCE, (1993) 67 ELT 878 (CEGAT)]

?    Decision to grant sanction for prosecution is merely an administrative act. No hearing is necessary. Prima facie, authority sanctioning prosecution should be satisfied that an offence is committed. Even exoneration by disciplinary authority (in excise and customs matters, it means departmental adjudication) is also not relevant [Supdt. of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary, (1995) 6 SCC 225, the same view in State of Maharashtra v. Ishmal Piraji Kalpatri, AIR 1996 SC 722.]

?    Opportunity of personal hearing is not required to be given before grant of sanction of the Commissioner to file criminal prosecution — [Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles, (2003) 157 ELT 369 (SC 3-member Bench).]

?    Decision to prosecute does not involve ex-ercise of any quasi-judicial power, [Praveen Kumar R. Jain v. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul, 1995 (79) ELT 353 (Mad. HC).]

?    Specific approval for launching prosecution is required. Mere signing on file by the Chief Commissioner would not mean that he has applied his mind and granted approval. If prior approval of the Chief Commissioner is not obtained, prosecution cannot continue and accused has to be acquitted. – [UOI v. Greaves Ltd., (2002) 139 ELT 34 (CEGAT)].

?    In CIT v. Camco Colour Co., (2002) 254 ITR 565 (Bom. HC), it was held that monetary limit prescribed is a policy decision with a view to reduce litigation and the same is binding on the Revenue.

?    The CBE&C has clarified that when action is launched under the Central Excise Act, action under Indian Penal Code, 1860 should also be launched, wherever found feasible — [CBE&C Circular No. 178/12/1996, dated 28-2-1996.]

Compounding of offences
Section 9A(2) of CEA, provides that any offence under CEA can be compounded by the CCCE. Such compounding can be done either before or after the institution of prosecution. Procedure for compounding has been prescribed in the Central Excise (Compounding of Offences) Rules, 2005 and Guidelines for Compounding have been issued vide MF (DR) Circular No. 54/2005-Cus, dated 30-12-2005. Since, section 9A of CEA has been made applicable to Service tax, the Rules/Guidelines and precedents under Central Excise would be relevant for Service tax.

Some judicial considerations are as under:

?    In Vinod Kumar Agarwal v. UOI, (2008) 223 ELT 19 (Bom HC DB), it was held that compound-ing under the Customs Act cannot result in discharge of offences under other Acts like IPC.

?    In Maharashtra Power Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Dabhol Power Company, (2004) 52 SCL 224 (Bom HC DB), it was held that if the offence is compounded, it is as if no offence had even been committed in the first place.

?    In P. P. Varkey v. STO, (1999) 114 STC 251 (Ker. HC), it was held that once the offence is compounded, penalty or prosecution proceedings cannot be taken for the same offence.

?    In S. Viswanathan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 113 STC 182 (Ker HC DB), it was held that once the matter is compounded, neither the Department nor the assessee can challenge the compounding order.

?    A person having agreed to the composition of offence is not entitled to challenge the said proceedings by filing appeal. [S. V. Bagi v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 87 STC 138 (Karn HC FB) — followed in Sakharia Bandhu v. ADCCT (1999) 112 STC 449 (Karn HC DB).]

9.    Conclusion

Service tax law has evolved as a law based on voluntary compliance. In this backdrop, re-introduction of prosecution provisions is a retrograde step. One does understand that there may have been many cases of tax evasion detected by the Tax Dept. However, the same is no justification for re-introduction of prosecution provisions, inasmuch as there are wide powers for the tax administration under the existing tax structure and other laws to deal with such cases and impose stiff penalties.

Overall, the provisions are too harsh, and are likely to be misused by the authorities causing severe harassment to taxpayers. In particular, non-issue of tax invoice by a service provider being specified as an offence, is totally unjustified. Further, non-issue of tax invoice as per the Service Tax Rules by a service provider based outside and its non-issue to be treated as an offence at the end of service recipient in India, is unprecedented and needs to be done away with.

It is suggested that a monetary limit of tax evaded amount of Rs. 1 crore need to be prescribed for a judicious implementation of prosecution provisions and minimise hardships to small and medium taxpayers.

TDS UNDER SERVICE TAX?

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A proposal of the Government:

A Study Group was appointed by the Government to examine the feasibility of introducing TDS provisions under service tax law. Comments were invited on the following aspects from the affected parties:
  • The feasibility of the introduction of TDS as a method of tax collection in service tax.
  • Whether this method should be applied uniformly to all taxable services or to certain specific/sensitive taxable services, and if only selectively, then to which categories of service providers/services receivers.
  • The extent to which service tax collections would be augmented by adopting the TDS method of tax collection.
  • The modalities of implementation of TDS method of tax collection.
  • The changes necessary in the present legal and administrative framework, to adopt the TDS method of service tax collection.
Government’s rationale behind the proposal:
Some of the reasons, for the introduction of TDS under service tax cited by the Government are as under:
  • Despite the fact that there are 14 lakh registered service providers, only 6 lakh service providers are paying tax.
  • According to a study carried out by the Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence, there is a 70% increase in the service tax evasion in the last two years; and
  • TDS system followed under Income tax is found to be a very efficient way of collecting tax. Hence, the same needs to be replicated for service tax to achieve efficient tax collections.

TDS provisions under service tax neither desirable nor administratively feasible:
It would neither be desirable to introduce TDS provisions under the service tax law, nor would it be administratively feasible to do so for various reasons set out hereafter.
No justification for introducing TDS provisions after introduction of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POT Rules):
Hitherto, service providers had to deposit the service tax only after receipt of payment from the service receiver. As a result, the payment of service tax to the Government was postponed until and contingent upon the actual receipt of payment from the service receiver. However, after the introduction of POT Rules, the trigger for payment of service tax has shifted to the point of taxation as specified in the POT Rules, irrespective of realisation from clients. Thus, once an invoice is issued, the service provider has to deposit the tax with the Government by the 5th day of the following month/quarter, whether he receives the payment from the service receiver or not.
It is pertinent to note that despite the introduction of POT Rules, unlike income tax, there are no provisions under the service tax law permitting adjustments in case of bad debts (either fully or partly). This has an adverse impact on the service providers who have to bear the burden of tax in addition to the loss caused due to non-realisation.
Further, in cases where advances are received by a service provider, service tax is to be collected at the point of receipt of advance. This position continues even after introduction of POT Rules.
Therefore, there is no postponement in payment of tax to the Government in the existing structure. However, this appears to be one of the principal objectives behind the proposal.
As a matter of fact, the proposed introduction of TDS provisions would only bring about unnecessary complications and hardships for service providers as well as service receivers without any corresponding increase in Government collections.
Adequate powers under the service tax law to enforce recovery:
Under the present service tax law, there are stringent provisions to penalise tax evasions, delay in payment of tax to Government by a service provider and recovery of tax. Some of the more important provisions are as under:

Provision under service tax law

Section

 

of
the Finance

 

Act,
1994

 

 

Recovery of service tax not levied/

 

paid or short-levied/short-paid

 

or erroneously refunded.

73

 

 

Service tax collected
from any

 

person required to be deposited

 

with the Government.

73A

 

 

Interest on amount collected

 

in excess.

73B

 

 

Provisional
attachment to protect

 

revenue in certain cases.

73C

 

 

Interest on delayed
payment of

 

service tax to Government

 

at 18% p.a.

75

 

 

Penalty for failure to pay service

 

tax.

76

Penalty for suppressing value of

 

taxable services.

78

 

 

Power to search premises.

82

 

 

Recovery of any
amount due to

 

Government.

87

 

 

Prosecution provisions.

89

 

 

Further, the service tax registration (which is PAN-based) and filing of returns in all cases is now required to be carried out electronically. This is introduced essentially to bring efficiency in tax administration under service tax.

In light of the foregoing, there is no justification whatsoever for introduction of TDS provisions under service tax, on the ground that there is a widespread evasion. Instead, efforts ought to be made by the Government to bring efficiency in tax administration and strengthen intelligence machinery.

TDS provisions have no place in the context of a Value Added Tax (VAT) such as service tax:

Service tax, like VAT levied on the sale of goods, is an indirect tax, meaning that the ultimate burden of the tax is to be borne by the consumer, i.e., the service receiver. This fact marks a crucial distinction between the service tax and income tax, which is the only tax under which TDS provisions are applicable. In the case of other indirect taxes such as Central Excise, VAT, etc., TDS provisions are not generally prevalent.

However, under some of the State VAT laws in India, there are TDS provisions in regard to payments made to contractors for works contracts. These provisions are essentially made, considering the fact that under the peculiar nature of the business, sub-contractors are existing in large numbers in the unorganised sector and are scattered and widespread across the country.

In the context of service tax, it has been clarified by the Government and it is reasonably settled that sub-contracted service providers are to be treated as independent service providers and their taxability determined accordingly. Further, with CENVAT credit mechanism in place, service tax charged by a sub -contractor can be availed as credit by the main contractor subject to satisfaction of conditions. Hence, large section of sub-contractors are now charging service tax to avoid possibilities of demands in future with interest and penalties.

Since service tax is an indirect tax, the ultimate burden is borne by the service receiver. If the liability of depositing the same is also imposed on service receivers, there will be a dual burden of compliance on trade and industry, in that both service receivers and service providers will have to face the burden of procedural formalities in relation to service tax simultaneously for the same transactions.

Especially in those cases in which the price is cum duty, service receivers will also be hard put to arrive at the stand -alone value of the services for the purposes of complying with TDS provisions, which will result in additional administrative difficulties.

Furthermore, since service tax is leviable at each level of value addition, this will result in a duplication of work for the Government and the assessees.

International practices:
The VAT/GST regimes in most progressive countries worldwide do not contain TDS provisions. Given that the transition to GST is in the offing, the Indian indirect tax regime should be aligned as far as possible with international practices which have been developed over decades of experience. On this ground, introduction of TDS provisions under service tax does not appear to be meaningful.

CENVAT Scheme is a self-policing mechanism:
In the context of service tax, it is wholly unnecessary to introduce TDS, considering that in view of the CENVAT credit mechanism in place, the payment of service tax has a self-policing mechanism. There is a clear and established paper trail required to be maintained for each and every transaction and it is already in the interest of service providers as well as service receivers to charge the service tax as applicable and have it paid to the Govern-ment so that credit can be availed.

There are stringent provisions of interest, penalties and prosecution for wrong availment/utilisation of CENVAT credit. Further there is regular scrutiny/ audits by the Service Tax Department as well. Hence, mechanism itself ensures that onus is clearly on the persons availing credits to establish entitlement/correctness should the need arise.

Under this backdrop, introduction of TDS system under service tax is totally unjustified and unwarranted.

TDS provisions with a CENVAT credit mechanism will result in huge accumulations of credit:

As TDS will be calculated on gross turnover, this will create an additional pool of tax credit for service providers. As the actual tax payable by a service provider is to the extent of value addition made by him which is ensured by the CENVAT credit mechanism, which permits a service provider to avail credit on his input side and utilise the credit to pay tax on his output liability.

TDS provisions will result in accumulation of huge credits and consequent blockage of funds. This will increase costs of businesses and hence, have adverse impact on the trade and industry generally.

Refunds:
Presently, there is a threshold limit of 10 lakh under service tax. This is basically done to ensure that efforts of tax administration are focussed on high tax potential taxpayers. If TDS provisions are introduced, service providers availing threshold exemption would get covered in the tax net. They would have to get registered to claim refunds. This would adversely impact small-scale services sector.

TDS system would result in a service provider availing credit of taxes paid on inputs/input services as well as TDS credits. In cases where the value addition is low, depending on the TDS rate, it would result in large refund claims by service providers.

After the introduction of POT Rules as stated earlier, since the entire tax would have already been paid before the TDS is made, the same would lead to anomalous situations and service providers will have to seek for refunds in large number of cases.

As seen in the case of income tax, claiming refunds from the Tax Department invariably creates hardships/difficulties to taxpayers. If TDS provisions are introduced under service tax, service providers will have to face severe hardships in getting their refunds, which involves cumbersome procedural compliances. This would again result in blockage of funds and increase business costs.

Administrative difficulties, procedural compliances and increase in transaction costs:

Many service recipients are individuals/households/ small businesses who are not conversant with tax compliance. Introduction of TDS provisions will result in unnecessary administrative difficulties, especially for such service recipients, without any increase in revenue to the Government.

As seen in the case of income tax, assessees are required to file TDS returns, thereby requiring each business to make the deductions and deposit the tax, as well as complete other related formalities. Even thereafter, assessees often face difficulties in terms of objections raised for technical infractions. If TDS provisions are introduced under service tax law, all these issues would come into play for service receivers as well.

Hence, TDS provisions would substantially increase additional compliances for all the three parties i.e., service providers, service recipients and the tax authorities without any benefit as is being perceived by the Government.

Further, introduction of TDS provisions under service tax would increase transaction costs of conducting business.

Potential for tax evasion:

Given the extent of paperwork that would be generated due to the introduction of TDS, administrative difficulties may pose a risk to the revenue, as there is possibility of evasion of service tax through false TDS credits being claimed. These risks could substantially outweigh the benefits of speedy tax recovery as perceived by the Government.

Additional litigations:

If TDS provisions are introduced, both service providers and service recipients will be required to analyse whether the service rendered is a taxable service, classification thereof, etc. This will result in multiple litigations which will increase costs for businesses and for the Revenue.

Reverse-charge mechanism:

There are provisions under the present service tax law, wherein the service recipient/person making the payment is made liable to comply service tax provisions instead of the service provider. The aforesaid provisions are existing in the following cases:

  •     All instances of services provided from outside India.
  •    Commission payments to agents by insurance companies.
  •    Specified persons making payment to a Goods Transport Agency (GTA).
  •    Mutual fund or asset management company making payments to mutual fund distributors or agent.
  •     Payments made by body corporate of firms availing sponsorship service.

These provisions were specifically introduced for GTA, keeping in mind the high potential of tax evasion, inasmuch as the said services providers exist in large numbers in the unorganised sector across the country.

Compared to TDS system, reverse-charge mechanism is an easier system to administer inasmuch as under reverse charge only the service receiver is liable for tax compliances, whereas under TDS system both the service providers as well as service receivers would be saddled with compliances and paperwork associated therewith.

Since, reverse charge mechanism is already in place under the present service tax law, instead of introducing TDS provisions, it may be desirable to consider expansion in the scope of this mechanism in regard to services where tax evasion is apprehended by the Government.

Conclusion:

If TDS provisions are introduced under service tax, it would substantially increase compliance burdens at the end of service providers/service recipients, increase transactions costs, result in blockage of funds and generally have adverse impact on trade and industry without any benefit as perceived by the Government.

All trade and professional bodies need to collectively voice their protest, in case the Government decides to go ahead with the introduction of TDS provisions under service tax, either fully or partially.

CONCEPT OF MUTUALITY

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Relevance under Service tax

Though
the concept of ‘mutuality’ has been a subject-matter of extensive
judicial considerations under the Income tax Act and Sales tax laws, it
has been tested judicially to a very limited extent under Service tax.

However,
it assumed significance in the context of Club or Association Service,
the category introduced w.e.f. June 16, 2005, more particularly in the
context of co-operative societies, trade associations and clubs.

The
following Explanation was inserted at the end of section 65(105) of the
Finance Act, 1994 (Act) w.e.f. May 01, 2006: “For the purpose of this
section, taxable service includes any taxable service provided or to be
provided by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a
member thereof, for cash, deferred payment or any other valuable
consideration.” Attention is particularly invited to the following
Explanation inserted to newly introduced section 65B(44) of the Act
which now defines ‘service’ effective from July 01, 2012: “
…………………….

Explanation 2 — For the purpose of
this Chapter, — (a) An unincorporated association or a body of persons,
as the case may be, and a member thereof shall be treated as distinct
persons. ……………”

General concept

It is
widely known that no person can make a profit out of himself. The old
adage that a penny saved is a penny earned may be a lesson in household
economics, but not for tax purposes, since money saved cannot be treated
as taxable income. It is this principle, which is extended to a group
of persons in respect of dealings among themselves. This was set out by
the House of Lords in Styles v. New York Life Insurance Co., (1889) 2 TC
460 (HL). It was clarified by the Privy Council in English and Scottish
Joint Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Agricultural Income-tax, (1948) 16 ITR 270 (PC), that mutuality
principle will have application only if there is identity of interest as
between contributors and beneficiaries. It was the lack of such a
substantial identity between the participants, with depositor
shareholders forming a class distinct from the borrowing beneficiaries,
that the principle of mutuality was not accepted for tax purposes for a
Nidhi Company (a mutual benefit society recognised u/s.620A of the
Companies Act, 1956) in CIT v. Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd.,
(1964) 53 ITR 241 (SC).

Distinction between Members’ Club/Association and Proprietary Club/Association

(i)
The concept of mutuality and distinction between ‘Members’ Clubs’ and
‘Proprietary Clubs’ has been discussed in detail in a 6-Member Supreme
Court Ruling viz. Joint CTO v. Young Men’s Indian Association, (1970) 26
STC 241 (SC). (‘YMIA’) The relevant extract of discussion is set out
hereafter for reference.

If a members’ club, even though a
distinct legal entity, acts only as an agent for its members in the
matter of supply of various preparations and articles to them, no sale
would be involved as the element of transfer would be completely absent.
Members are joint owners of all the club properties. Proprietary clubs
stand on a different footing. The members are not owners of or
interested in the property of the club. To show the difference of
characteristics between Members’ Club and Proprietary Club, the Supreme
Court held that where every member is a shareholder and every
shareholder is a member, then the same would be called a Members’ Club.

In
a Members’ Club what is essential is that the holding of the property
by the agent or trustee must be holding for and on behalf of and not a
holding antagonistic to the members of the club. (ii) In CIT v. Bankipur
Club Ltd., (1997) 226 ITR 97 (SC), it was held by the Supreme Court
that there must be complete identity between contributors and
participators. If this requirement is fulfilled, it is immaterial, what
particular form the association takes. Trading between persons
associating together in this way does not give rise to profits which are
chargeable to tax. Facilities were offered only as a matter of
convenience for the use of the members. (iii) It was further held in
Chelmsford Club v. CIT, (2000) 243 ITR 89 (SC) that the surplus from the
activities of a club is excluded from the levy of the income-tax.

Applicability to a co-operative society

Where
a co-operative society deals solely with its members, right to
recognition for exemption on grounds of mutuality has been recognised
under income-tax in the following High Court rulings:

  • CIT v. Apsara Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., (1993) 204 ITR 662 (Cal.);
  •  CIT v. Adarsh Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., (1995) 213 ITR 677 (Guj.) and;
  • Director of Income-Tax v. All India Oriental Bank of Commerce and Welfare Society, (2003) 130 Taxman 575 (Del.).

 Judicial considerations under Service tax

The
Service tax authorities had issued show-cause notices to various clubs
demanding Service tax under the service category ‘Mandap Keeper’ on the
ground that the clubs have allowed the members to hold parties for
social functions. Two of such clubs disputed the levy before the
Calcutta High Court viz.:

  • Dalhousie Institute v. AC, (2005) 180 ELT 18 (Cal.).
  •  Saturday
    Club Ltd. v. AC, (2005) 180 ELT 437 (Cal.). In Saturday Club’s case, a
    members’ club permitted occupation of club space by any member or his
    family members or his guest for a function by constructing a mandap.

On the principle of mutuality, there cannot be

(a) any sale to oneself,
(b) any service to oneself or
(c) any profit out of oneself.

Therefore,
the Calcutta High Court held that the same principle of mutuality would
apply to income-tax, Sales tax and Service tax in the following words:
“Income tax is applicable if there is an income. Sales tax is applicable
if there is a sale. Service tax is applicable if there is a service.
All three will be applicable in a case of transaction between two
parties.

Therefore, principally there should be existence of two
sides/entities for having transaction as against consideration. In a
members’ club there is no question of two sides. ‘members’ and ‘club’
both are the same entity. One may be called as principal while the other
may be called as agent, therefore, such transaction in between
themselves cannot be recorded as income, sale or service as per
applicability of the revenue tax of the country. Hence, I do not find it
is prudent to say that members’ club is liable to pay service tax in
allowing its members to use its space as ‘mandap’.”

While
quashing the proceedings, the High Court referred to the decisions in
the case of Chelmsford Club v. CIT, (2000) 243 ITR 89 (SC) & CIT v.
Bankipur Club Ltd., (1997) 226 ITR 97 (SC)

Principles laid down by the Calcutta High Court under Service tax

(a)
The principles laid down by the Calcutta High Court in Saturday Club
& Dalhousie Institute discussed above have been followed in a large
number of subsequently decided cases. Some of these are:

  • Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. v. UOI, (2010) 20 STR 17 (Guj.)
  • Karnavati Club Ltd. v. UOI, (2010) 20 STR 169 (Guj.)
  •  CST v. Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd., (2009) 18 STT 227 (CESTAT-New Delhi)
  •  Ahmedabad Management Association v. CST, (2009) 14 STR 171 (Tri.-Ahd.) and
  •  India International Centre v. CST, (2007) 7 STR 235 (Tri.-Delhi)
(b)In CST v. Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd., (2009) 18 STT 227 (New Delhi-CESTAT) the Tribunal observed:

“using of facilities of club, cannot be said to be acting as its clients and hence, in respect of services provided to its members, a club would not be liable to pay Service tax in the category of club or association service.”

The Revenue’s appeal against the above ruling was dismissed by the Delhi High Court on technical grounds. It needs to be noted that, Explanation inserted at the end of section 65(105) of the Act w.e.f. May 01, 2006, has not been discussed in the aforesaid ruling.

Recent judgment in Ranchi Club Ltd. v. CCE & ST, (2012) 26 STR 401 (JHAR)

Background

A writ petition was preferred by Ranchi Club Limited for declaration that the Club was not covered under the Act and, therefore, was not liable to pay Service tax under ‘Mandap Keeper Service’ or under the ‘Club or Association Service’ categories and prayed for order of prohibition against Central Excise Division, Ranchi from enforcing any of the provisions of the Act.

Contention of the petitioner

Petitioner is a club which is a registered company under the Companies Act, 1956 and is giving service to its members but the club is formed on the principle of mutuality and, therefore, any transaction by the club with its member is not a transaction between two parties. When the club is dealing with its member, it is not a separate and distinct individual. It was submitted that in identical facts and circumstances, however, in the matter of imposition of sales tax, when the club was expressly included in the statutory definition of ‘dealer’ under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, so as to bring the club within the purview of taxing statute of the Madras Sales Tax, the Supreme Court, in YMIA case, considered the definition of the ‘dealer’ by which the club was declared as a ‘dealer’. The Court considered the definition of ‘sale’ as given in the Act of 1959 and Explanation-I appended to section 2(n), specifically declaring ‘sale’ or ‘supply or distribution of goods by a club’ to its members whether or not in the course of business to be a ‘deemed sale’ for the purpose of the said Act. In that situation, the Supreme Court considered the issue that when the club is rendering service or selling any commodity to its members for a consideration, whether that amounts to sale or not. The Supreme Court held that it is a mutuality which constitutes the club and, therefore, sale by a club to its members and its services rendered to the members, is not a sale by the club to its members. In sum and substance, the ratio is that for a transaction of sale, there must be two persons in view of this judgment as well as in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court delivered in the petitioner’s own case i.e., Tax v. Ranchi Club Limited, (1992) 1 PLJR 252 (PAT) (FB) (‘Ranchi Club’). The Full Bench considering the identical issue in the matter of imposition of income-tax observed that no one can earn profit out of himself on the basis of principle of mutuality and held that income-tax cannot be imposed on the transaction of the club with its members.

With the help of these two judgments, it was submitted that the petitioner was a club and was rendering services to its members and the same principle of mutuality applied to the facts of the case in view of the reason that the language in the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 and the provisions under the Income-tax Act are pari materia with the provisions which are sought to be applied against the writ petitioner for levy of Service tax.

Contentions of the Department

The Department submitted that the sale has its own meaning and the service is entirely different transaction which cannot be equated with the sale in any manner. They relied upon the book ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ by G. P. Singh, the then Chief Justice, M.P. High Court (3rd edition), wherein there is reference to a case wherein Bhagwati J observed that, for construction of fiscal statute and determination of liability of the subject to tax, one must refer to the strict letters of law. It was submitted that the statutory provisions are very clear which are sections 65(25a), 65(105)(zzze) as well as Explanation appended to section 65. It was also submitted that when the language of section is absolutely clear, then the meaning of the statute in fiscal matter should be given according to the language and words used in the section and cannot be interpreted on the basis of some ideology or some impressions or with the help of some other enactments. Each of the taxing statute may have its own definition and meaning and they are required to be given effect to, irrespective of the fact that meaning of the same word in different statute has been given differently. It was further submitted that the Supreme Court in the situation of imposition of Sales tax may have held that there cannot be sale by oneself to oneself and himself to himself, but the club can certainly render the service to its members and tax is on the service and the members are paying for the service to the club and, therefore, it is a service for consideration rendered by the club and is liable for tax.


Observations of the High Court

The question which was considered by the Supreme Court in YMIA case was that whether the supply of various preparations by each club to its members involves a transaction of sale within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. In para 15 of the judgement, the High Court quoted the Supreme Court as under:

“Thus in spite of the definition contained in section 2(n) read with Explanation 1 of the Act, if there is no transfer of property from one to another there is no sale which would be exigible to tax. If the club even though a distinct legal entity is only acting as an agent for its members in matter of supply of various preparations to them, no sale would be involved as the element of transfer would be completely absent. This position has been rightly accepted even in the previous decision of this Court”.

The Supreme Court held so after considering the English Law also and observed that the law in England has always been that members’ clubs to which category the clubs in the present case belong cannot be made subject to the provisions of the Licensing Acts concerning sale because the members are joint owners of all the club property including the excisable liquor. The supply of liquor to a member at a fixed price by the club cannot be regarded to be a sale. With regard to incorporated clubs a distinction has been drawn. Where such a club has all the characteristics of a members’ club consistent with its incorporation, that is to say, where every member is a shareholder and every shareholder is a member, no licence need to be taken if liquor is supplied only to the members. If some of the shareholders are not members or some of the members are not shareholders that would be the case of a Proprietary Club and would involve sale. Proprietary clubs stand on a different footing. The members are not owners of or interested in the property of the club. The Supreme Court observed that the above view was accepted by various High Courts in India. The Supreme Court, relying upon other judgments held that members’ club is only structurally a company and it did not carry on trade or business so as to attract the corporation profit tax. Therefore, in spite of specific inclusion of the club in the definition of the dealer in the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, the Supreme Court categorically held that , there cannot be transaction of transfer of property.

The Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of the petitioner itself (Ranchi Club case) after finding that the club was a limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, considered various clauses of the main objects of the club and relying upon various judgments, observed as under:

    Therefore, by applying the principle of mutuality, members’ clubs always claim exemption in respect of surplus accruing to them out of the contributions received by the clubs from their members. But this principle cannot have any application in respect of surplus received from non-members. It is not difficult to conceive in case where one and the same concern may indulge in activities which are partly mutual and non-mutual. True, keeping in view the principle of mutuality, the surplus accruing to a members’ Club from the subscription charges received from its members cannot be said to be income within the meaning of the Act. But, if such receipts are from sources other than the members, then can it still be said that such receipts are not taxable in the hands of the club? The answer is obvious. No exemption can be claimed in respect of such receipts on the plea of mutuality. To illustrate, a members’ club may have income by way of interest, security, house property, capital gains and income from other sources. But such income cannot be said to be arising out of the surplus of the receipts from the members of the club. “

Conclusion by the High Court

“It is true that sale and service are two different and distinct transactions. The sale entails transfer of property, whereas in service, there is no transfer of property. However, the basic feature common in both transactions requires existence of the two parties; in the matter of sale, the seller and buyer, and in the matter of service, service provider and service receiver. Since the issue whether there are two persons or two legal entities in the activities of the Members’ Club has been already considered and decided by the Supreme Court as well as by the Full Bench of this Court in the cases referred above, therefore, this issue is no more res integra and issue is to be answered in favour of the writ petitioner and it can be held that in view of the mutuality and in view of the activities of the club, if club provides any service to its members, may be in any form including as mandap keeper, then it is not a service by one to another in the light of the decisions referred above as foundational facts of existence of two legal entities in such transaction is missing.” (para 18)

Taxability of mutual concerns (up to 30-6-2012)

    a) According to one school of thought, the scheme of Service tax envisages a contractual relationship between the service provider and service receiver. Under a service contract, money flows from the service receiver and service is rendered by the service provider. The Courts have held that relationship between a mutual association and its members is governed by the principle of mutuality and is not one between two different entities. When a facility or amenity is provided to the members, it is so done by the members to themselves through the medium of their agent, the association. There cannot be an independent commercial transaction between a principal and his agent. Therefore, the very scheme of service tax is not applicable to the relationship between the members’ association and its members. Hence, the club or association service category (introduced w.e.f. June 16, 2005) would not apply to mutual concerns.

The ruling of the Jharkhand High Court in Ranchi Club discussed above strongly supports this view and more importantly it has considered the Explanation inserted at the end of section 65(105) of the Act w.e.f. May 01, 2006 to nullify the Calcutta High Court rulings of Saturday Club (supra) and Dalhousie Institute (supra).

    b) According to another school of thought, the Calcutta High Court ruling in Saturday Club & Dalhousie Institute case discussed earlier was in the context of Mandap Keeper Services wherein the relevant taxable service definition u/s. 65(105) of the Act, the service recipient was specified as ‘Client’. However, under the club or association service category, the relevant taxable service definition u/s.65(105)(zzze) of the Act, the service recipient is specified as ‘members’.

The distinction made by the Government is reinforced, if one closely examines, the taxable services definitions of all the newly introduced taxable services through the Finance Act, 2005 which clearly demonstrates that in the context of club or association services ‘members’ have been specified as service recipients liable to tax. Hence the ratio of Saturday Club’s case would not apply in the context of mutual concerns like club, associations, etc. The aforesaid view is reinforced by the insertion of Explanation at the end of section 65 of the Act w.e.f. May 01, 2006.

    c) Though principle of mutuality is relevant, it would appear that taxability of mutual concerns under Service tax remains a highly contentious and litigative issue.

Taxability of mutual concerns under the ‘negative list’ based taxation of services (w.e.f. July 01, 2012)

The terminology employed in Explanation 2 inserted in section 65B(44) of the Act which defines ‘Service’ is identical to that employed in Explanation to section 65(105) of the Act (up to June 30, 2012). Hence, it would appear that, principles of mutuality upheld by the Calcutta High Court in Saturday Club and Dalhousie Institute and the Jharkhand High Court in Ranchi Club, would continue to be relevant.

Further, under Sales tax a constitutional amendment was carried out, to enable States to levy sales tax on sale of goods by a club or association to its members. The same has not been carried out for Service tax.

However, it needs to be expressly noted that the is-sue is likely to be subject of extensive litigations.

Are Builders/Developers Construction Service Providers

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Background:

Service tax on commercial or industrial service was introduced in 2004 and that on residential complex was introduced in 2005 in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act). Later in the year 2007, under the entry of `Execution of works contract service’, specifically construction contracts of new commercial or industrial buildings and new residential complex during the execution of works contract chargeable as sale of goods were made liable for service tax. The scope of these entries covered contractors providing construction services.

The Finance Act, 2010 with effect from July 01, 2010 inserted explanation in clause (zzq) and in clause (zzzh) of section 65(105) of the Act dealing with these construction services. By these explanations, a legal fiction is created and a builder is deemed to be a service provider of construction service to the prospective buyer of the immovable property or a unit thereof and thus liable for service tax. The explanation to become applicable has two pre-requisites:

  • Construction of a new building or a complex must be intended for sale wholly or partly by a builder or his authorised person either before, during or after construction; and

  • A sum must be received from or on behalf of prospective buyer by the builder before the grant of completion certificate by a competent authority under the applicable law.

Challenging the service tax imposed on the builders on the ground that between the builder and a buyer there is no provision of service, writ petition filed in the Bombay High Court by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry (MCHI) & Others (Writ Petition No.1456 of 2010) and similar petitions filed by various builders were dismissed.

Brief analysis of the decision:
The petitioners urged that title to the building under construction vests in the builder. On completion of construction, a final transfer of title takes place, there is no event of provision of service. Thus, the tax is directly on the transfer of land and buildings, which falls within the legislative power of the States under Entry 49 of List II to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The builders also challenged the levy made under the new entry in section 65(105) (zzzzu) of the Act dealing with preferential location of the property or an extra advantage accorded on a payment over and above the basic sale price of the property sold. This was also challenged on the ground that it is a tax on land per se, because it is a tax on location and there is no voluntary act of rendering service.

The Revenue urged that the explanation does not tax transfer of property at all. The tax is on construction service, but it is triggered when there is intent to sell and some payment is received. These are incidents but do not form the subject-matter of the tax. Further, there is no tax imposed when the duly constructed property is sold after receiving completion certificate.

The Hon. High Court observed that it had the task to examine the object of taxation or the taxable event to determine whether the tax in its true nature is a tax on land and buildings. Incidence of the tax is not relevant to construing the subject-matter of tax and it is distinct from the taxable event; it identifies, as it were, the person on whom the burden of tax would fall. As regards the explanation, it observed that intent to sell whether before, during or after construction is the touchstone of the deeming definition of the service of the builder to the buyer. The explanation expanded the scope materially to include deemed service provided by builders to buyers. According to the Court, an explanation could be of different genres and the Legislature is not prevented to enact an explanation which is not clarificatory but expansive. In this frame of reference, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decisions, Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1977 SC 915) and an earlier decision in Hira Ratan Lal v. The Sales Tax Officer (AIR 1973 SC 1034).

To address the issue of challenge of legislative competence of the levy, the Court in its order has discussed inter alia the following decisions of the Supreme Court almost on identical lines as it discussed the issue of legislative competence in relation to renting of immovable property service in Retailers Association of India v. Union of India (Writ Petition 2238 of 2010 & connected petition decided on 21/08/2011 – Refer BCAJ – October 2011 Issue – Service Tax feature):

  • Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. Wealth Tax Officer – AIR 1969 SC 59

  • Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D.H. Nazareth – AIR 1970-SC 999

  • Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon AIR 1972 SC 1061

  • India Cement Limited v. State of Tamilnadu AIR 1990 SC 85

  • State of Bihar v. Indian Aluminium Company AIR 1997 SC 3592

The Court stated that principles emerging from the Supreme Court decisions were that in order to be a tax on land and buildings, it must be directly imposed on land and buildings as units, whereas one imposed on a particular use of land or building or an activity in connection therewith or arrangement in relation therewith or a tax on income arising therefrom or a tax on transaction of a transmission of title to or a transfer of land and building is not a tax on land and buildings. In the instant case, the charge of tax is on rendering of taxable services. The taxable event is rendering of a service which falls within the description set out in sub-clauses (zzq), (zzzh) and (zzzzu) of the Act. The Legislature has imposed levy on the activity involving provision of service by a builder to the buyer in the course of the execution of a contract involving intended sale of immovable property. The charge is not on land and buildings as a unit and it is not on general ownership of land. The activity rendered on land does not make the tax a tax on land. A service rendered in relation to land does not alter the character of the levy.

The explanation bringing in two fictions of a deemed service and deemed service provider is not ultra vires the provisions of sections 67 and 68 of the Finance Act, 1994. Such submission by the petitioners lacked substance. Further, builders following the practice of levying charges under diverse heading including preferred location involved value addition and a service before obtaining a completion certificate. If no charge is levied for a preferential location or development, no service tax is attracted. Therefore there is no vagueness and uncertainty and there is no excessive delegation. Accordingly, finding no merits and no other submission other than the recorded being urged, the petitions were dismissed.

The question therefore arises is whether the observation made in Magus Construction P. Ltd. v. UOI in 2008 (11) STR 225 (Gau) stands completely negated by the deeming fiction? The Guwahati High Court in this case held that when a builder or a promoter undertakes construction activity for its own self, in the absence of relationship of “service provider”, and “service recipient” the question of providing taxable service to any person does not arise at all. Advance made by a prospective buyer is against consideration of sale of flat or building and not for the purpose of obtaining any service. Now in the scenario, it remains to be seen whether filing an appeal to the Supreme Court would bring a change in the situation or the above decision has decided the fate of the builders.

levitra

Self Supply of Services

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Preliminary:

Taxability of self supply of services (i.e. transactions between mutual concerns and its members/transactions between various units a single legal entity) has been a contentious issue prior to 1/7/12, more particularly in the context of cross border transactions due to deeming provisions in section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 (Act) as existed prior to 1/7/12.

An attempt is made to discuss the tax implications of self supply of services under the Negative List based Taxation regime introduced w.e.f. 1/7/12, more particularly in regard to cross border transactions.

Relevant Statutory Provisions (w.e.f. 1/7/12)

Section 65 B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended)

“Service” means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include –

a) An activity which constitutes merely, –
I) A transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or

II) Such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be a sale within the meaning of clause (29A) of article 366 of the Constitution; or III) A transaction in money or actionable claim;

b) a provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;

c) fees taken in any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force.

Explanation 1. – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this clause shall apply to, –

(A) the functions performed by the Members of Parliament, Members of State Legislative, Members of Panchayats, Members of Municipalities and members of other local authorities who receive any consideration in performing the functions of that office as such member; or

(B) the duties performed by any person who holds any post in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution in that capacity; or

(C) the duties performed by any person as a Chairperson or a Member or a Director in a body established by the Central Government or State Government or local authority and who is not deemed as an employee before the commencement of this section.

Explanation 2. – for the purposes of this clause, transaction in money shall not include any activity relating to the use of money or its conversion by cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or denomination, to another form, currency or denomination for which a separate consideration is charged.

Explanation 3. – For the purposes of this Chapter, –

a) an unincorporated association or a body of persons, as the case may be, and a member thereof shall be treated as distinct persons;

b) an establishment of a person in the taxable territory and any of his other establishment in a non – taxable territory shall be treated as having an establishment of distinct persons.

Explanation 4. – A person carrying on a business through a branch or agency or representational office in any territory shall be treated as having an establishment in that territory.

Service Tax Rules, 1994 as amended (ST Rules)

Rule 6A – (Export of Services)

The provision of any service provided or agreed to be provided shall be treated as export of service when –

a) The provider of service is located in the taxable territory,

b) The recipient of service is located outside India,

c) The service is not a service specified in section 66D of the Act,

d) The place of provision of the service is outside India,

e) The payment for such service has been received by the provider of service in convertible foreign exchange, and

f) The provider of service and recipient of service are not merely establishments of a distinct person in accordance with item (b) of Explanation 2 of clause (44) of Section 65B of the Act.

Where any service is exported, the Central Government may, by notification, grant rebate of service tax or duty paid on input services or inputs, as the case may be used in providing such service and the rebate shall be allowed subject to such safeguards, conditions and limitations, as may be specified by the Central Government, by notification.

Relevant Departmental Clarifications

Extracts from departmental clarifications titled “Education Guide” dated 20/6/12 issued in the context of Negative List based taxation of services introduced w.e.f. 1/7/12, are as under :

Para 2.4.1


What is the significance of the phrase “carried out by a person for another”?

The phrase “provided by one person to another” signifies that services provided by a person to self are outside the ambit of taxable service. Example of such service would include a service provided by one branch of a company to another or to its head office or vice versa.

Para 2.4.2

Are there any exceptions wherein services provided by a person to oneself are taxable?

Yes, Two exceptions have been carved out to the general rule that only services provided by a person to another are taxable. These exceptions, contained in Explanation 2 of clause (44) of section 65B, are:

  •  An establishment of a person located in taxable territory and another establishment of such person located in non-taxable territory are treated as establishments of distinct persons. [Similar provision exists presently in section 66A(2)].

  •  An unincorporated association or body of persons and members thereof are also treated as distinct persons. [Also exists presently in part as explanation to section 65].

Para 10.2.2

Can there be an export between an establishment of a person in taxable territory and another establishment of same person in a non – taxable territory?

No. Even though such persons have been specified as distinct persons under the Explanation to clause (44) of section 65B, the transaction between such establishments have not been recognised as exports under the above stated rule.

Mutuality Concept

Relevance under Service tax

Though the concept of “mutuality” has been a subject matter of extensive judicial consideration under Income tax & Sales tax, under Service tax, it has been tested judicially to a very limited extent. However, it assumed significance in the context of Club or Association Services Category introduced w.e.f 16/6/05, more particularly in the context of co-operative societies, trade associations & clubs.

The following Explanation was inserted at the Section 65 (105) of the Act w.e.f. 1/5/06:

“For the purpose of this section, taxable service includes any taxable service provided or to be provided by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof, for cash, deferred payment or any other valuable consideration.”

Attention is particularly invited to the following Explanation inserted to newly introduced section 65B(44) which defines ‘Service’:

Explanation 2 – For the purpose of this Chapter, –

a) An unincorporated association or a body of persons, as the case may be, and a member thereof shall be treated as distinct persons.

General Concept

It is widely known that no man can make a profit out of himself. The old adage that a penny saved is a penny earned may be a lesson in household economics, but not for tax purposes, since money saved cannot be treated as taxable income. It is this principle, which is extended to a group of persons in respect of dealings among themselves. This was set out by the House of Lords in Styles vs. New York Life Insurance Co.. (1889) 2 TC 460 (HL). It was clarified by the Privy Council in English and Scottish Joint Co -operative Wholesale Society Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax (1948) 16 ITR 270 (PC), that mutuality principle will have application only if there is identity of interest as between contributors and beneficiaries.

It was the lack of such a substantial identity between the participants, with depositor shareholders forming a class distinct from the borrowing beneficiaries, that the principle of mutuality was not accepted for tax purposes for a Nidhi Company (a mutual benefit society recognised under section 620A of the Companies Act, 1956) in CIT vs. Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd. (1964) 53 ITR 241 (SC).

Judicial Considerations under Service tax

The service tax authorities had issued show cause notices to various clubs demanding service tax under the Category of “Mandap Keeper” on the ground that the Clubs have allowed the members to hold parties for social functions. Two of such clubs disputed the levy before the Calcutta High Court viz:

  •     Dalhousie Institute v. AC (2005) 180 ELT 18 (CAL)

  •     Saturday Club Ltd. v. AC (2005) 180 ELT 437 (CAL)

In Saturday Club’s case, a members Club, permitted occupation of club space by any member or his family members or his guest for a function by constructing a mandap. On the principle of mutuality, there cannot be (a) any sale to oneself, (b) any service to oneself or (c) any profit out of oneself. Therefore, the Calcutta High Court, held that the same principle of mutuality would apply to Income tax, sales tax and service tax in the following words:

“……….. Income tax is applicable if there is an income. Sales tax is applicable if there is a sale. Service tax is applicable if there is a service. All three will be applicable in a case of transaction between two parties. Therefore, principally there should be existence of two sides/entities for having transaction as against consideration. In a members’ club there is no question of two sides. ‘Members’ and ‘club’ both are same entity. One may be called as principal when the other may be called as agent, therefore, such transaction in between themselves cannot be recorded as income, sale or service as per applicability of the revenue tax of the country. Hence, I do not find it is prudent to say that members’ club is liable to pay service tax in allowing its members to use its space as ‘mandap’.

……………

Therefore, the entire proceedings as against the club about the applicability of service tax stands quashed……”.

[Chelmsford Club    vs. CIT (2000) 243 ITR 89 (SC) & CIT vs. Bankipur Club Ltd. (1997) 226 ITR 97 (SC) were referred]

Principles laid down by the Calcutta High Court under Service tax

The principles laid down by the Calcutta High Court in Saturday Club & Dalhousie Institute discussed earlier, have been followed in a large number of subsequently decided cases. To illustrate:

  •     Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd vs. UOI (2010) 20 STR 17 (GUJ)

  •     Karnavati Club Ltd vs. UOI (2010) 20 STR 169 (GUJ)

  •     CST vs. Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd (2009) 18 STT 227 (CESTAT – New Delhi)

  •     Ahmedabad Management Association vs. CST (2009) 14 STR 171 (Tri – Ahd) and

  •     India International Centre vs. CST (2007) 7 STR 235 (Tri – Delhi)

In CST vs. Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd. (2009) 18 STT 227 (New Delhi – CESTAT) the Tribunal observed:

“using of facilities of club, cannot be said to be acting as its clients and hence, in respect of services provided to its members, a club would not be liable to pay service tax in the category of club or association service”.

Revenue appeal against the above ruling has been dismissed by the Delhi High Court on technical grounds. It needs to be noted that, Explanation inserted at the end of section 65 (105) of the Act w.e.f. 1/5/06, has not been discussed in the aforesaid ruling.

Recent Judgement in Ranchi Club Ltd v CCE & ST (2012) 26 STR 401 (JHAR)

The said ruling has been analysed and discussed in detail in the July, 2012 issue of BCAJ. In this ruling, the High Court observed as under:

“It is true that sale and service are two different and distinct transactions. The sale entails transfer of property whereas in service, there is no transfer of property. However, the basic feature common in both transaction requires existence of the two parties; in the matter of sale, the seller and buyer, and in the matter of service, service provider and service receiver. Since the issue whether there are two persons or two legal entity in the activities of the members’ club has been already considered and decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by the Full Bench of this Court in the cases referred above, therefore, this issue is no more res integra and issue is to be answered in favour of the writ petitioner and it can be held that in view of the mutuality and in view of the activities of the club, if club provides any service to its members may be in any form including as mandap keeper, then it is not a service by one to another in the light of the decisions referred above as foundational facts of existence of two legal entities in such transaction is missing. [Para 18]”

Self Supply of Services – Judicial & Other Considerations under Service tax

Some judicial considerations under service tax are as under:

Under Central Excise, the concept of captive consumption has been in force, for many years. However under the service tax law ,there is as such no concept of captive consumption of services whereby services provided by one division of a company to another division are liable to service tax. As such, service provider–customer/client relationship is necessary for being liable for service tax.

In this connection, attention is drawn to the Ban-galore tribunal ruling in the case of Precot Mills Ltd. vs. CCE (2006) 2 STR 495 (Tri – Bang) wherein it was held as under :

“Technical Guidance provided by applicant to its own constituent (a Sister Concern), cannot be brought with the ambit of Management Services and Service Tax in the absence of Consultant – Client relationship between the two”.

Attention is drawn to the following observations of Tribunal in Rolls Royce Industrial Power (I) Ltd v Commissioner (2006) 3 STR 292 (Tribunal):

“…………Thus, there are no two parties, one giving advise and the other accepting it. Service tax is attracted only in a case involving rendering of service, in this case, engineering consultancy. That situation does not take place in the present case. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the duty demand raised is not sustainable………..”

Magus Construction Pvt. Ltd. Vs. UOI (2008) 11 STR 225 (GAU)

In the said ruling, the Honourable Gauhati High Court observed:

“In the light of the various statutory definitions of “service”, one can safely define “service” as an act of helpful activity, an act of doing something useful, rendering assistance or help. Service does not involve supply of goods; “service” rather connotes transformation of use/user of goods as a result of voluntary intervention of “service provider” and is an intangible commodity in the form of human effort. To have “service”, there must be a “service provider” rendering services to some other person(s), who shall be recipient of such “service”. (Para 29)

In the context of construction services, it has been repeatedly clarified that, in case of self supply of services there can be no liability to service tax. In this regard, useful reference can be made to the department circular dated 17/9/04 on estate builders, Master Circular dated 23/8/07 in regard to applicability of service tax to real estate builders/developers and department Circular dated 29/1/09 regarding imposition of service tax on builders.

In the context of cross border transactions, a deeming fiction was introduced in section 66A of the Act w.e.f. 18/4/06 (relevant upto 30/6/12), whereby reverse charge liability was triggered in cases of payments made by an establishment based in India to an establishment based outside India, despite the fact that the said establishments are part of one legal entity.

In this regard, attention is drawn to the para 4.2.5 from department circular dated 19.4.06:

“Provision of service by a permanent establishment outside India to another permanent establishment of the same person in India is treated, for the purpose of charging service tax, as provision of service by one person to another person. In other words, permanent establishment in India and the permanent establishment outside India are treated as two separate legal persons for taxation purposes.”

It is pertinent to note that, there was no deeming fiction on similar lines, under the Export of Services Rules, 2005 (ESR) which were in force upto 30/6/12.

Taxability of transactions between mutual concerns and their members

The terminology employed in Explanation 3 [Para (a)] inserted in section 65B (44) of FA 12 which defines ‘Service’, w.e.f. 1/7/12, is identical to that employed in Explanation to section 65 (105) of the Act which was in force upto 30/6/12. Hence, it would appear that, principles of mutuality upheld by the Calcutta High Court in Saturday Club and Dalhousie Institute and Jharkhand High Court in Ranchi Club would continue to be relevant.

Further, under sales tax law, a constitutional amendment was carried out to enable States to levy sales tax on sale of goods by a club or association to its members. No such amendment is carried out for service tax.

However, it needs to be expressly noted that the issue is likely to be a subject of extensive litigation.

Taxability in case of self supply of services within India

As discussed above, upto 30-06-2012 it is a reasonably settled position to the effect that, in the absence of a service provider – client relationship transactions between divisions/units within a legal entity would not result in any service tax liability.

In the context of Negative List based taxation of services introduced w.e.f. 01-07-2012, it would appear that, the above stated position would continue. However, in regard to transactions between units located in India and J & K, the implications discussed below would be relevant to note.

Taxability in case of self supply of services in cross border transactions

As regards the position upto 30-06-2012 as discussed above, deeming fiction enacted in section 66A of the Act would be triggered, resulting in service tax liability under reverse charge in case of payments made by an establishment based in India to an establishment based outside India despite the fact that two establishments are a part of one legal entity.

However, in the absence of deeming fiction under ESR, if the cross border transactions between two establishments of one legal entity satisfy the conditions of ‘export’ under ESR, there may not be any liability to service tax.

To conclude, it would appear that, whether cross border transactions in the nature of self supply of services can be made liable to service tax at all, needs to be judicially tested inasmuch principles of taxability of self supply of services discussed above would be relevant.

As regards position w.e.f. 1/7/12, vide Explanation 3 [Para (b)] to section 65B (44), a legal fiction has been created whereby two establishments of a person, one located in the taxable and other in non–taxable territory are to be treated as two separate persons. The obvious intention of the deeming fiction is to tax the transactions between two branches or between head office and branch office, where one is located in the non–taxable territory and other is located in the taxable territory.

For example, in a case of a head office in India remitting salaries for its staff employed at branches in 50 different countries world wide, section 65B (44) of FA 12 specifically excludes services provided by employees from the definition of ‘service’. However, an issue could arise, as to whether deeming fiction created in Explanation 3 [Para (b) ] to section 65B (44) can be triggered and a view adopted that transactions between two separate entities cannot be regarded as “salary”, but on an application of deeming fiction transactions are in the nature of supply of services between two persons liable to service tax. This would be an extreme and highly controversial view which could result in extensive litigation.

There could be similar issues in case of several other transactions between head office and overseas branches. For example, disbursements by head office to sales offices for meeting establishment ex-penses and funding of losses in the initial set up period. By invoking the deeming fiction stated earlier, reverse charge provisions could be triggered, if the transactions are not excluded in terms of 66B (44)/ Negative List/Exempted List of Services.

Let us now discuss the implications in case of cross borders transactions between head office/branches which result in inward remittances in India in convertible foreign exchange. These transactions could be either genuine ‘export’ transactions or could be for salary disbursements, establishment disburse    ments etc. to branches/sales offices set up in India by an overseas company based outside India.

In this context, it is very important to note that para 1(f) of Rule 6A of ST Rules which defines “Export of Services” specifically excludes transactions between two establishments within one legal entity. Hence, even if all the other conditions for ‘export’ specified under Rule 6A of ST Rules are satisfied, the benefit of export would be denied, resulting in a possible service tax liability.

It has been a stated policy of the Government to the effect that, we should export our goods & services and not taxes. However, it seems provisions of Rule 6A of ST Rules would result in export of taxes, which is clearly contrary to the policy of the Government. This needs to be addressed immediately.

To conclude, it would appear that, deeming fiction created through Explanation 3 [Para (b)] to Section 65B (44) of FA 12 read with Para 1(f) of Rule 6A of ST Rules, is likely to have far reaching implications on cross border transactions under Negative List based taxation regime and is likely to increase costs of international transactions. This needs to be appropriately addressed to encourage cross border business and avoid litigations as well.

However, though deeming fictions are to be construed strictly, whether cross borders transactions between two units of one legal entity in the nature of self supply of services can be taxed at all in the absence of service provider client relationship, needs to be judicially tested.

Interest on Cenvat Credit Wrongly Taken And (Or) Utilised

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Issue for consideration:

The issue whether interest is leviable at the point in time when CENVAT credit is wrongly taken or at the point of time of utilisation has been a matter of debate for over many years and hence judicially dealt with at great length and breadth. In a welcome move to close the issue to the relevant rule viz. Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) is amended (w.e.f. 17th March, 2012) to read as follows:

Rule 14 of CCR 04:

 “Where CENVAT Credit has been taken and* utilised wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same along with the interest shall be recovered from the manufacturer or provider of the output service and the provisions of the sections 11A and 11AB of the Excise Act, or sections 73 and 75 of the Finance Act, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries.”

The amendment in the rule undoubtedly not only ends the undesirable litigation but is also indicative of intent of the legislation. The issue was discussed at length under this column in June 2010. However, considering judicial developments occurring in recent times, pending litigation on the issue and litigation that may come for the period till March 16, 2012, need is felt to revisit the issue.

When can a manufacturer or service provider ‘take’ credit?

For this, relevant statutory provisions are reproduced below:

Rule 4(1) of CCR 04:

“CENVAT credit in respect of inputs may be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in factory of the manufacturer or premises of provider of output service . . . . . . . .” Rule 4(2)(a) of CCR 04: “The CENVAT Credit in respect of Capital goods . . . . at any point of time in a given financial year shall be taken only for an amount not exceeding 50% of duty paid on such Capital goods in the same financial year.”

Rule 4(7) of CCR 04:

“The CENVAT Credit in respect of input service shall be allowed, on or after the day on which payment is made of the value of input service and service tax paid or payable as indicated in Invoice . . . . . . . .”

To understand the difference, if any, between the terms, ‘taken’ and ‘utilised’, we examine below the dictionary meanings of these words used in Rule 14 ibid. ‘Taken’ means ‘to gain or receive into possession, to seize, to assume ownership’ (Black’s Law Dictionary).

To take, signifies to lay hold of, grab, or seize it, to assume ownership, etc. (Advance Law Lexicon — 3rd Edition).

‘Utilise’ means ‘to make practical and effective use of’ (Compact Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus). Utilise means to make use of, turn to use (The Chambers Dictionary).

In the context of CENVAT credit, generally it may mean that taking a CENVAT credit means committing an act of making an entry in the CENVAT credit register and/or return, etc. However, there is a fresh thought on the subject wherein a question arises as to whether merely making an entry in the register really means that credit is taken? This is because until credit is used for making a payment towards duty or tax, can it be said credit has been taken is an issue that requires thought-process. Whether the two terms — ‘taken’ and ‘utilised’ are interchangeable or almost similar or they are different is the issue discussed here in terms of judicial analysis.

At the outset, we peruse below the landmark rulings on the subject matter:
Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (1996) 81 ELT (SC). The Supreme Court observed in para 7:

“We see no reason why the assessee cannot make a debit entry in the credit account before removal of the exempted final product. If the debit entry is permissible to be made, credit entry for the duties paid on the inputs utilised in manufacture of the final exempted product will stand deleted in the accounts of the assessee.”

In CCE v. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd., (2007) 215 ELT 3 (SC) it was held that reversal of credit before utilisation amounts to not taking credit.

In CCE v. Maruti Udyog, (2007) 214 ELT 173 (P&H), agreeing with the Tribunal’s decision, observed as follows:

“Learned Counsel for the appellant is unable to show as to how the interest will be required to be paid when in absence of availment of Modvat credit in fact, the assessee was not liable to pay any duty. The Tribunal has clearly recorded a finding that the assessee did not avail of the Modvat Credit in fact and had only made an entry.”

Little after the above ruling again the P&H High Court in the case of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. v. UOI, (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P&H) held as follows:

“CENVAT credit is the benefit of duties leviable or paid as specified in Rule 3(1) used in the manufacture of intermediate products, etc. In other words, it is a credit of the duties already leviable or paid. Such credit in respect of duties already paid can be adjusted for payment of duties payable under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Under section 11AB of the Act, liability to pay interest arises in respect of any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded from the first day of the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. Interest is leviable if duty of excise has not been levied or paid. Interest can be claimed or levied for the reason that there is delay in the payment of duties. The interest is compensatory in nature as the penalty is chargeable separately.” (emphasis supplied)

The High Court further observed and opined:

“We are of the opinion that no liability of payment of any excise duty arises when the petitioner availed CENVAT credit. The liability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisation. Even if CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken, that does not lead to levy of interest as liability of payment of excise duty does not arise with such availment of CENVAT credit by an assessee. Therefore, interest is not payable on the amount of CENVAT credit availed of and not utilised.”

The High Court concluded in the following words:

“In our view, the said clause has to be read down to mean that where CENVAT credit taken and utilised wrongly, interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that the CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken as such availment by itself does not create any liability of payment of excise duty. On a conjoint reading of section 11AB of the Act and that of Rules 3 and 4 of the Credit Rules, we hold that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT credit. The interest shall be payable from the date CENVAT credit is wrongly utilised.”

However, the above ruling was unsettled by the Supreme Court in UOI v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd., (2011) 265 ELT 3 (SC). The important observations made by the Supreme Court in para 17 read as follows:

“17. . . . . In our considered opinion, the High Court misread and misinterpreted the aforesaid Rule 14 and wrongly read it down without properly appreciating the scope and limitation thereof. A statutory provision is generally read down in order to save the said provision from being declared unconstitutional or illegal. Rule 14 specifically provides that where CENVAT credit has been taken or utilised or has been erroneously refunded, the same alongwith interest would be recovered from the manufacturer or the provider of the output service.  The issue is as to whether the aforesaid word ‘OR’ appearing in Rule 14, twice, could be read as ‘AND’ by way of reading it down as has been done by the High Court. If the aforesaid provision is read as a whole we find no reason to read the word ‘OR’ in between the expression ‘taken’ or ‘utilised wrongly’ or has been erroneously refunded as the word ‘AND’. On the happening of any of the three aforesaid circumstances such credit becomes recoverable along with interest.”
The Supreme Court also noted:

“Besides, the rule of reading down is in itself a rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is generally utilised to straighten the crudities or ironing out the creases to make a statue workable. This Court has repeatedly laid down that in the garb of reading down a provision it is not open to read words and expressions not found in the provision/statute and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. It is also held by this Court that the Rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute.”

On reading the above judgment, a question may arise whether ‘or’ can be interpreted as ‘and’. As a matter of fact, there was no finding as to why the word OR used between ‘taken’ and ‘utilised’ could not be interpreted to mean ‘AND’ as in some situations, the Courts have found it necessary or desirable to do so. For instance, the expression ‘established or incorporated’ used in sections 2(f), 22 and 23 of the University Grants Commission Act was read as ‘established and incorporated’ having regard to the constitutional scheme and in order to ensure that the Act was able to achieve its objective and the UGC was able to perform its duties and responsibilities. [Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chattisgarh, AIR 2005 SC 2026 (para 40)]. However, in the context of Rule 14 ibid, as per the Supreme Court, recovery with interest is required to be made under three circumstances viz. on wrongfully taking credit, on wrongfully utilising it and on erroneously refunding CENVAT credit. Whether the judgment given by the Supreme Court in the case of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (supra) required reconsideration as some felt or whether the facts of the case (in this case, the credit was claimed based on fake invoices and application was filed with Settlement Commission) necessitated the decision in the manner it is pronounced, is a matter of opinion.

A recent decision:

However, observation of the Karnataka High Court in a very recently reported case of CCE & ST LTU, Bangalore v. Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd., 2012 (279) ELT 209 (Kar.)/2012 (26) STR 204 (Kar.) is important to discuss here mainly on account of the fact that not only has it distinguished facts of the case of UOI v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd., 2011 (265) ELT 3 (SC) but it has made a fine distinction between making an entry in the register and credit being ‘taken’ to drive home the point that interest is payable only from the date when duty is legally payable to the Government and the Government would sustain loss to that extent. This judgment has placed reliance and discussed at a fair length the following decisions

  •     Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd. v. Collector, (1996) 81 ELT 3 (SC)

  •     Collector v. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd., (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC)

  •     Commissioner v. Ashima Dyecot Ltd., (2008) 232 ELT 580 (Guj.)

  •     Commissioner v. Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd., (2007) 215 ELT 3 (SC)

  •     Pratibha Processors v. Union of India, (1996) 88 ELT 12 (SC)

In para 18 of the said judgment (supra), the High Court referring to the Apex Court’s judgment in case of UOI v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd., (supra) observed:

“In fact, in the case before the Apex Court, the assessee received inputs and capital goods from various manufacturers/dealers and availed CENVAT credit on the duty paid on such materials. The investigations conducted indicated that the assessee had taken CENVAT credit on fake invoices. When proceedings were initiated, the assessee filed applications for settlement of proceedings and the entire matter was placed before the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission held that a sum of Rs.5,71,47,148.00 is the duty payable and simple interest at 10% on CENVAT credit wrongly availed from the date the duty became payable as per section 11AB of the Act till the date of payment. The Revenue calculated the said interest up to the date of the appropriation of the deposited amount and not up to the date of payment. Therefore, it was contended that interest has to be calculated from the date of actual utilisation and not from the date of availment. Therefore, an application was filed for clarification by the assessee. The said application was rejected upholding the earlier order, i.e., interest is payable from the date of duty becoming payable as per section 11AB. Therefore, the Apex Court inter-fered with the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and rightly rejected by the Settlement Commission as outside the scope and they found fault with the interpretation placed on Rule 14.”

The High Court of Karnataka further observed:

“It is also to be noticed that in the aforesaid Rule, the word ‘avail’ is not used. The words used are ‘taken’ or ‘utilised wrongly’. Further the said provision makes it clear that the interest shall be recovered in terms of section 11A and 11B of the Act……….”

“20……… From the aforesaid discussion what emerges is that the credit of excise duty in the register maintained for the said purpose is only a book entry. It might be utilised later for payment of excise duty on the excisable product…..Before utilisation of such credit, the entry has been reversed, it amounts to not taking credit.”

The judgment concluded in the following words:

Extracts from para 22:

“Therefore interest is payable from that date though in fact by such entry the Revenue is not put to any loss at all. When once the wrong entry was pointed out, being convinced, the assessee has promptly reversed the entry. In other words, he did not take the advantage of wrong entry. He did not take the CENVAT credit or utilised the CENVAT credit. It is in those circumstances the Tribunal was justified in holding that when the assessee has not taken the benefit of the CENVAT credit, there is no liability to pay interest. Before it can be taken, it had been reversed. In other words, once the entry was reversed, it is as if that the CENVAT credit was not available. Therefore, the said judgment of the Apex Court* has no application to the facts of this case. It is only when the assessee had taken the credit, in other words by taking such credit, if he had not paid the duty which is legally due to the Government, the Government would have sustained loss to that extent. Then the liability to pay interest from the date the amount became due arises under section 11AB, in order to compensate the Government which was deprived of the duty on the date it became due.”

Conclusion:

Despite the amendment in Rule 14 of CCR, the above judgment of the Karnataka High Court would be of great use to all those manufacturers and service provider organisations which are facing litigation for the period prior to the date of amendment of March 17, 2012 on account of making book entries of credit in the CENVAT register and keeping utilisation consciously pending on account of uncertainty of eligibility of credit. However, the facts of each case and time would determine its persuasive value.

SOME IMPORTANT AMENDMENTS IN SERVICE TAX

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Introduction:
A conceptual change taking place in taxation of services. The Finance Bill, 2012 has introduced negative list of services which will not be taxed. In addition, a list of exempt services is notified. Certain activities are defined as ‘declared as services’. However, these provisions are yet to be enacted with or without modifications and the effective date of their coming into force would be notified thereafter. Therefore, they are not discussed here. However, alongside the increase in the general rate of service tax from 10% to 12% and increasing the rate of service tax levied on services of life insurance, exchange of foreign currency, distribution or selling of lotteries, works contract service, composition scheme and transportation of passengers by air to come into effect from 1st April, 2012, there are a few other significant amendments coming into force from 1st April, 2012 or from 17th March, 2012 as the case may be. Some important amendments are discussed below:

Benefit to pay service tax on receipt basis restricted:

Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POT Rules) were introduced with effect from 01/04/2011. In terms of Rule 7(C) of the POT Rules (before their amendment by notification No.4/2012), various professional service providers viz. architects, interior decorators, practising chartered accountants, practising cost accountants, practising company secretaries, scientific or technical consultants, legal consultants and consulting engineers paid service tax on receipt basis if such services were provided in capacity as individuals, proprietors or partnership firm.

The POT Rules have been amended vide Notification No.4/2012-Service tax and the amended Rules come into effect from 1st April, 2012. The amendment has substituted Rule 7 and the new Rule 7 does not have provisions contained in the above Rule 7(C). This provision permitting payment of service tax on receipt basis now finds a place in Rule 6 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 (Service Tax Rules) by way of a proviso in a modified form. The benefit of payment of service tax on the basis of payment towards the value of taxable service is now extended to all the service providers rendering service in capacity as individuals and partnership firms instead of the above eight stated categories of service providers. However the benefit is restricted only to those cases where the value of taxable services provided from one or more premises in aggregate did not exceed Rs. 50 lac in the previous financial year. In effect, all individuals and partnership firms whose gross receipts exceeded Rs. 50 lac in the Financial Year 2011-12 would now be required to pay service tax in accordance with the point of taxation as determined under the amended POT Rules i.e., earlier of the three events i.e., date of provision of service, date on which invoice is issued or the date of payment. In terms of the amended Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, the invoice is required to be issued within 30 days instead of 14 days. (In case of banking and financial services, the time limit to issue the invoice is extended to 45 days).

As a matter of fact, professionals like chartered accountants, legal practitioners etc. account their professional receipts on “cash basis” and this is accepted under section 145 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Payment towards professional fees in many cases is made after a delay. Moreover, for a portion of fees of interior decorators or architects is customarily ‘retained’ by the clients until completion of long-drawn projects. Thus, the very basic purpose of permitting under the Income Tax Act, 1961 for maintenance of accounts on “cash basis” is not only defeated or contradicted by the above provisions becoming effective on 1st April, 2012 but it also appears unfair vis-à-vis all individuals or partnership firms maintaining their books of account on “cash basis”. In any case, as service tax is required to be paid on advances received for services to be provided. Therefore, if the amended rule are implemented without considering the difficulty and avoidable paper work, it is likely to cause hardship to all professionals.

CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004:
Capital goods:

The definition of ‘capital goods’ as provided in Rule 2(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) has undergone some noteworthy amendments coming into force from April 1, 2012. Motor vehicle used for transportation of passengers or goods covered by Tariff Headings 8702, 8703, 8704 and 8711 are not considered as ‘capital goods’ and therefore the duty paid on such vehicles used for business purposes including trucks/lorries used for transportation of goods except in the case of *seven specified categories of service providers is not available as CENVAT credit. However, in the financial year 2012- 13, excise duty paid on tractors and special purpose motor vehicles such as breakdown lorries, crane lorries, fire-fighting vehicles, concrete mixer lorries, mobile radiological units and trailers covered by Chapter Entry 8716, etc. and their chassis would be available as CENVAT credit as these vehicles now form part of the definition of capital goods. Thus to a limited extent when these assets are required for a business activity, excise duty paid would be eligible for claiming credit against duty liability or service tax liability. However, service providers other than goods transport agencies such as logistics service providers, freight forwarders, clearing and forwarding agents, construction contractors, etc. purchase transport vehicles including refrigerated vans, etc. only for providing logistics services. The duty payable on such vehicles forms part of the cost to the service provider, as no CENVAT credit is available as they are not treated as capital goods and for these service providers, CENVAT credit will continue to be unavailable. However, authorised service stations possess special purpose motor vehicles fitted with equipments to provide emergency repair services ‘on-road’ when vehicles on road face breakdown. These vehicles are not used for transportation of goods or passengers. Since special purpose vehicles now qualify as capital goods, the motor vehicles specifically designed to provide specific services should qualify to be considered ‘capital goods’.

Input service: The Finance Act, 2011 significantly restricted the scope of the definition of ‘input service’ provided in Rule 2(1) of CCR by specifically providing artificial exclusions. A small relaxation is now made by amending the definition of input service.

With effect from 1-4-2011 till 31-3-2012, except in case of *seven specified services, credit was not available for service tax paid on insurance and repairs or maintenance of motor vehicles. Now, credit in respect of service tax on insurance services and of repair or maintenance services will be available to manufacturers of motor vehicles for vehicles manufactured by them and to insurance service providers for the motor vehicles insured or reinsured by them. The insurance service however will be restricted to reinsurance and third-party insurance for insurance companies and in-transit insurance for the vehicle manufacturers according to the Government-Tax Research Unit’s letter dated 16-3-2012.

In case of hiring of a motor car or any other tangible goods for use, the credit of service tax paid was restricted from 1-4-2011 till 31-3-2012 to only *seven categories of service providers. In case of hiring of vehicles or any other goods, credit for service tax paid will be available to the extent such vehicles or goods hired are considered ‘capital goods’ for an assessee as a manufacturer or as a service provider.

As discussed above, the motor vehicles used for transportation of passengers and goods, covered by tariff headings 8702, 8703, 8704 and 8711 and their chassis are not considered ‘capital goods’ except for *seven categories of service providers. Implications of the above is that e.g., if a machinery or any other equipment which qualifies to be ‘capital goods’ for a manufacturer or a service provider, service tax paid on hiring of such machinery will now be available. By excluding this service in entirety, except to the specified seven categories from 1-4-2011 to 31-3-2012, the service used for bona fide business use was not treated as input service as it was specifically excluded. With the amendment, credit of service tax paid on such services will be available.

Removal/disposal of capital goods after use:

  •     In Rule 3(5) of CCR, in its third proviso it was provided that when capital goods on which CENVAT credit has been taken are removed after they are used i.e., as second-hand capital goods, the manufacturer or service provider was required to pay an amount equal to CENVAT credit taken on such capital goods, as reduced by 2.5% for each quarter of a year or part thereof from the date of taking CENVAT credit in case of capital goods other than computers and computer peripherals. In case of computers and its peripherals, considering that they become obsolete fast, accelerated reduction or depreciation is allowed whereby at the end of fifth year, the value becomes Nil [i.e., 10% of every quarter of the first year (40% in the first year)] in the first year, 8% of every quarter of the second year (32% in the second year), 5% of every quarter of the third year (20% in the third year) and 1% for each quarter of fourth and fifth year (8% in aggregate in fourth and fifth year).

  •    In a separate sub-clause viz. in sub-clause (5A) of the said Rule 3 of CCR, it was provided that when any capital goods are cleared as scrap and waste, the manufacturer was required to pay an amount equal to the duty leviable on the transaction value of the sale of such capital goods as scrap. This was applicable only to those capital goods on which CENVAT credit was taken. When such capital goods were sold as waste and scrap, the service provider was not required to pay any amount.

  •     Now, with effect from 17th March, 2012, both the above provisions are aligned in a common rule viz. the substituted sub-rule (5A) in place of the third proviso in sub-rule (5) and the erstwhile sub-rule (5A) as discussed above. The implications of the substituted sub-rule (5A) of Rule 5 is that 17th March 2012 onwards, whether capital goods are disposed of as second-hand goods or waste and scrap and whether by a manufacturer or a service provider and if CEN-VAT credit was taken on such capital goods, the assessee would pay amount equal to CENVAT credit taken as reduced at the same rates (as applicable prior to the amendment provided above) in case of computers and other capital goods as the case may be. However, if the amount so calculated is less than the duty levi-able on the actual transaction value of the sale of such used capital asset, then the amount equal to the duty leviable would be required to be paid by the assessee.

Thus, service providers are now required to pay an amount equal to the duty on sale of any capital goods, whether as scrap or otherwise. For instance, if a computer was sold after 5 years of its date of receipt, no amount equal to the duty on its sale was required to be paid. However, now with effect from 17-3-2012, on sale of second-hand capital goods or scrap value of any capital goods whether a manufacturer or a service provider as the case may be will be required to pay an amount equal to the duty payable on its transaction value or an amount equal to CENVAT credit as reduced by permissible deprecation, whichever is higher. Further, hardship is expected to be faced for sale of very old assets as scrap or the transfer of various capital goods occurring in slump sale, mergers and acquisitions, etc. as the assessee may find it hard to prove whether CENVAT credit was at all taken. At times, even when records are available, the unit of measurement for virgin capital goods may be different from the unit of measurement for scrap. Scrap may be sold based on say kilogram, whereas at the time of purchase per unit price or per meter price may have been applied. Therefore, removal of scrap ideally should have been subjected only to transaction value for reversal of credit as in the past.

Conditions for allowing credit:

Rule 4 of CCR provides conditions for allowing CENVAT credit. Sub-rules (1) and (2) of the said Rule 4 provides for condition vis-à-vis output service provider that inputs and capital goods, respectively, are eligible for CENVAT credit when they are received in the premises of output service provider. With effect from 1-4-2012, a proviso is inserted under both the sub-sections to provide that the CENVAT credit in respect of inputs as well as capital goods may be taken when inputs or capital goods are delivered to the provider of service, subject to documentary evidence of delivery and location of inputs or capital goods as the case may be. Thus the condition of receipt of inputs or capital goods in the premises of the output service provider is deemed to be fulfilled by a mere documentary evidence of delivery of capital goods or inputs. For instance, if a person providing site formation and clearance services purchases a dumper, such ‘capital goods’ cannot be practically received in the premises of the service provider. Therefore, the proviso would dispel practical difficulty in implementation of the condition of the receipt of inputs or capital goods in the premises of the output service provider.


Distribution of credit by Input Service Distributor:

Rule 7 dealing with distribution of CENVAT credit by input service distributor is replaced as a whole with effect from 1st April, 2012. Input service distributor means an office of a manufacturer or producer of final products or output service provider which receives invoices towards purchase of input services and which in turn would issue invoice or challan for distribution of credit of service tax paid on such services to its units located elsewhere. Hitherto, there were only two simple conditions underlying distribution of credit viz.:

  •     Credit distributed against the invoice or challan would not exceed the amount of service tax actually paid.

  •     Credit of service tax attributable to service used in a unit exclusively engaged in manufacture of exempted goods or providing exempted services would not qualify to be distributed.

Now, retaining the above two conditions, further two conditions are laid down, thus implying restrictions on the distribution of eligible credit. These conditions are:

  •     Credit of service tax attributable to service used wholly by a unit would be distributed only to such unit; and

  •     Credit of service attributable to service used for more than one unit such as common services like audit services would be distributed pro rata on the basis of the turnover of the concerned unit to the sum total of the turnover of all the units to which the service relates. For the purpose of this condition, the unit would include premises of output service provider and premises of a manufacturer including the factory whether registered or not and the term ‘turnover’ is required to be determined as it is required to be determined under Rule 5 of CCR for the purposes of refund. In effect, these conditions would increase substantial paper-work for the input service distributor.

Interest: Recovery of CENVAT credit wrongly taken:

Rule 14 of CCR deals with situations when CENVAT credit is taken or utilised wrongly or is erroneously refunded, and the same is payable by a manufac-turer or provider of output service with interest. Since Rule 14 provides for interest liability on CEN-VAT credit ‘taken or utilised wrongly’, there were numerable disputes occurring between the revenue and assessees as to whether interest is leviable on the amount of credit was ‘taken’ by the assessee in the CENVAT credit account, but not ‘utilised’ against any liability of excise duty or service tax. The appeal by the revenue in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. reported in (2007) 214 ELT 173 (P&H) was dismissed by the Supreme Court wherein the P&H High Court had upheld the Tribunal’s decision that no interest was payable when CENVAT credit was taken but not utilised. However, the Supreme Court in the case of UOI v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd., (2011) TIOL 21 SC-CX held that the High Court erroneously held that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT credit. It had further held that provisions are to be read as a whole. We find no reason to read the word ‘or’ as the word ‘and’ which appears between the expression ‘taken’ or ‘utilised wrongly’ or ‘has been’ erroneously refunded. In (2011) 266 ELT 41 (Guj.) CCE v. Dynaflex P. Ltd., it was held that when a wrong entry was reversed voluntarily before utilisation, no interest was payable. The amendment made in the Rule 14 now by using the words ‘taken and utilised wrongly’ in place of ‘taken or utilised wrongly’ is well intended to extend fairness and to put an end to the controversy over payment of interest from the date of availment of wrong credit instead of its utilisation, if any.

REVERSE CHARGE MECHANISM UNDER SERVICE TAX

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Amidst tremendous resistance from the business community as well as professionals, the Government has expanded the scope of reverse charge mechanism to a significant extent and thereby fastened the onus of paying service tax on the recipients of various services especially by the corporate sector irrespective of whether the service provider is covered by the threshold exemption limit of Rs 10 lakh or he is already discharging the obligation of service tax fully.

History and background:
Reverse charge was first attempted to be introduced in the service tax law as early as in 1997, on the services of clearing and forwarding agents and those of goods transport operators. This was introduced vide section 68(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) read with Rule 2(1)(d) of the Service Tax Rules (the Rules). When every person engaging a clearing and forwarding agent and every person paying or liable to pay freight either himself or through his agent for transportation of goods by road in a goods carriage respectively, was responsible for getting registered, discharging the obligation of payment of service tax. However, since the liability on recipients of these two services was fixed merely by introducing the machinery provisions in Rule 2(1)(d) of the Rules, it was challenged. The Readers may recall that the Supreme Court in Laghu Udyog Bharati & Anr. v. UOI & Others 1999 (112) ELT 365 (SC)/2006 (2) STR 276 (SC) ruled that provisions of Service Tax Rules, 1994 viz. Rule 2(d)(xii) and (xvii) of the Rules (as it prevailed then) in so far as it makes the persons other than the clearing and forwarding agents or goods transport operators responsible for collecting service tax were ultra vires the Finance Act, 1994 itself and such sub-rules were accordingly struck down. Later indeed, to overcome the implications of this decision wherein tax collected was ordered to be refunded, the Finance Act, 2000 retrospectively amended these provisions to validate collection of service tax made from recipients of these services. Further, the services of goods transport operators were exempted from 02/06/1998 and later only from 01/01/2005, the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 reintroduced the services of goods transport agency (GTA). It is to be noted here that enabling provisions under section 68(2) were incorporated with effect from 16/10/1998 vide Finance (No.2) Act, 1998. However, Notification No.36/2004-ST was issued only on 31/12/2004 which notified certain services whereby recipients of notified services were made liable for payment of service tax. In the year 2005, in addition to the recipients of GTA, the liability to register and pay service tax was also fixed on mutual funds for distribution fee paid to mutual fund distributors, insurance companies in respect of commission paid to insurance agents and later on, sponsoring body corporates or firms located in India.

Service tax liability of recipients of services provided from outside India:

In terms of the provisions of Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Rules r.w.s. 68(2) of the Act, the liability of service tax was attempted to be fastened also on the recipient of taxable services provided from a person from a country other than India, with effect from 16/08/2002. In the absence of requisite provision in the Act, the levy on such services was disputed. Even after notifying such services in the Notification No.36/2004-ST referred above, the controversy continued. However, with effect from 18/04/2006 when section 66A was introduced in the Act, creating a charge of service tax on a person receiving taxable services in India provided by a person from a country other than India, the person receiving such services has been liable for service tax. For determining the liability in respect of various taxable services, the Government also prescribed the Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006 (Import Rules for short) to come into effect from 19/04/2006. These rules along with section 66A have been in force till 30/06/2012 i.e. till the onset of the newly introduced negative list based taxation of services. A tremendous amount of controversy and consequential litigation occurred for the application of reverse charge on taxable services provided from outside India to a person in India between the period 16/08/2002 and 18/04/2006, i.e. the date on which section 66A was introduced. The controversy however, achieved finality with the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case of Indian National Shipowners’ Association vs. UOI 2009 (13) STR 235 (Bom) and upheld by the Supreme Court in 2010 (17) STR OJ57 (SC). The Court held that only from the date of the introduction of section 66A, service tax liability could be fastened on the recipients located in India, for the services received from outside India.

Reverse Charge: Under the new “negative list” based taxation effective from 1st July, 2012:

Reverse charge as it existed under the erstwhile selective levy of services till 30.06.2012 continues under the new system of taxation also both in case of specified services provided in India and in case of services provided from outside India. As discussed above, section 68(2) of the Act is the applicable provision whereby reverse charge i.e. liability to pay service tax is fastened on the recipient of a service. Section 68 is reproduced below:

“68 (1) Every person providing taxable service to any person shall pay service tax at the rate specified in section 66B in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in respect of such taxable services as may be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette, the service tax thereon shall be paid by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed at the rate specified in section 66B and all the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such person, as if he is the person liable for paying the service tax in relation to such service.

Provided that the Central Government may notify the service and the extent of service tax which shall be payable by such person and the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such person to the extent so specified and the remaining part of the service tax shall be paid by the service provider.”

In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 68, the Government earlier notified some services vide Notification No.36/2004-ST dated 31/12/2004 (as already discussed above) which now with effect from 01/07/2012 is superseded by a new Notification No.30/2012-ST dated 20/06/2012 whereby in addition to the taxable services provided from outside India and services of insurance agents, goods transport agencies, sponsorship services, leasing services of mutual fund distributors, a few other services are also notified for which recipients are made liable for service tax and in some cases, partial reverse charge is introduced, whereby both service provider and service recipient are jointly responsible for tax payment for the proportion respectively specified for each of them in the said Notification No.30/2012-ST as discussed below:

In case of the following services notified as specified services, the service recipient is held as the person liable for payment of service tax to the Government.

Taxable services provided or agreed to be provided by:

i) An insurance agent to a person carrying on insurance business.
ii) A goods transport agency for transportation of goods by road, where freight is paid by:

(a) a factory registered or governed by the Factories Act;
(b) a registered society;
(c) any co-operative society established by or under any law;
(d) a registered excise dealer;
(e) anybody corporate established by or under any law; or
(f)    any registered/unregistered partnership firm including association of persons.

  •    Services provided by a GTA for transportation of vegetables, eggs, milk, food grains or pulses is exempted vide entry 21(a) and goods where the gross amount charged on a consignment in a single goods carriage does not exceed Rs. 1,500/- or goods for a single consignee does not exceed Rs. 750/-are exempted vide entry 21(b) in Notification No.25/2012-ST dated 20/06/2012.

  •    It may further be noted that service tax is payable on 25% of freight amount and person paying freight or liable for paying for services of GTA would be treated as the receiver of service for the purpose of reverse charge.

iii)    By way of sponsorship to any body corporate or partnership firm located in taxable territory.

Note: The following new services are now added in the said Notification No.30/2012-ST:

iv)    Arbitral Tribunal to any business entity located in taxable territory.

  •    “Business entity” as per section 65B(17) means “any person ordinarily carrying out any activity relating to industry, commerce or any other business or profession”.

v)    An advocate whether as individual or a firm of advocates providing legal services to any business entity located in the taxable territory.

  •    “Legal service” as per Rule 2(cca) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 (The Rules for short) means “any service provided in relation to advice, consultancy or assistance in any branch of law, in any manner and includes representational services before any Court, Tribunal or authority.”

  •     Services by arbitral tribunal or by individual advocate or a firm of advocates to any person other than a business entity or business entity with a turnover not exceeding rupees ten lakh are exempted vide entry 6(a) and (b) of Notification No.25/2012-ST.

vi)    Government or local authority by way of support services to any business entity located in the taxable territory except in the cases of:
(a)    Renting of immovable property by the Government
(b)    Speed post expenses, parcel post, life insurance and agency services provided to a person other than Government.
(c)    Port and airport in relation to vessel or an aircraft inside/outside the precincts of a port or an airport
(d) Transport of goods or passengers.

  •     Renting of immovable property for the above purpose as per Rule 2(f) of the Rules means “any service provided or agreed to be provided by renting of immovable property or any other service in relation to such renting.”
  •     “Support services” as per section 65B(49) means “infrastructural, operational, administrative, logistic, marketing or any other support of any kind comprising functions that entities carry out in ordinary course of operations themselves but may obtain as services by outsourcing from others for any reason whatsoever and shall include advertisement and promotion, construction or works contract, renting of immovable property, security, testing and analysis”.

  •     It is clarified in the “education guide” issued by the Government that ‘Government’ includes both Central and State Governments. A statutory body, corporation or an authority created by the Parliament or a State Legislature is neither Government nor a local authority.

  •    “Local authority” as per section 65B(31) means-

(a)    a Panchayat as referred to in clause
(d)    of article 243 of the Constitution;
(b)    a Municipality as referred to in clause
(e)    of article 243P of the Constitution;
(c)    a Municipal Committee and a District Board, legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund;
(d)    a Cantonment Board as defined in section 3 of the Cantonment Act, 2006 (41 of 2006);
(e)    a regional council or a district council constituted under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution;
(f)    a development board constituted under article 371 of the Constitution; or
(g) a regional council constituted under article 371A of the Constitution.”

(vii)    a director of a company to the said company. (see note)
(viii)    Hiring of a motor vehicle designed to carry passengers to any person who is not in similar line of business.
(ix)    Supply of manpower for any purpose or security services. (see note)

  •     Supply of manpower as per Rule 2(g) of the Rules means supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise to another person to work under his superintendence or control.

  •    Security for the above purpose as per Rule 2(fa) of the Rules means services relating to the security of any property whether movable or immovable or of any person, in any manner and includes the services of investigation, detection or verification, of any fact or activity.

(x)    Service portion in execution of works contract:

  •     Works contract as per section 65B(54) means “a contract wherein transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of such contract is leviable to tax as sale of goods and such contract is for the purpose of carrying out construction, erection, commissioning, installation, completion, fitting out, repair, maintenance, renovation, alteration of any movable or immovable property or for carrying out any other similar activity or a part thereof in relation to such property.”

  •     In this case, it may also be noted that Notification No.24/2012-ST dated 06/06/2012 has provided for alternate method of valuation by providing presumptive rate by introducing Rule 2A in the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 from 01/07/2012.

Note-1: In case of the three services listed at (viii),
(ix)    and (x), the liability to pay service tax is fastened only when the services are provided by any individual, HUF or partnership firm registered or not including association of persons located in a taxable territory to a business entity registered as body corporate located in the taxable territory.

Note-2: Services of director and the words “or security services” along with manpower supply have been inserted only with effect from 07/08/2012 vide Notification No.45/2012-ST.

(xi)    Taxable service provided or agreed to be provided by any person who is located in a non-taxable territory and received by any person located in the taxable territory.

  •    As discussed above, reverse charge mechanism, earlier in terms of the erstwhile section 66A, applied to the services provided or to be provided by a person outside India and received by a person in India. Now with effect from 01/07/2012, to determine the liability of the recipient vis-à-vis various types of services, the Government has prescribed Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (POP Rules for short) in place of Import Rules (as well as Export Rules).

  •    “Taxable territory” as per section 65B(52) means “the territory to which the provisions of this Chapter apply.”

  •    Non-taxable territory as per section 65B(35) means “the territory which is outside the taxable territory.”

  •     ‘India’ as per section 65B(27) means –

(a)    the territory of the Union as referred to in clauses (2) and (3) of article 1 of the Constitution;
(b)    its territorial waters, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone or any other maritime zone as defined in the Territorial Waters,
Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (80 of 1976);
(c)    the seabed and the subsoil underlying the territorial waters;
(d)    the air space above its territory and territorial waters; and
(e)    the installations, structures and vessels located in the continental shelf of In dia and the exclusive economic zone of

India, for the purposes of prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oil and natural gas and supply thereof.”

  •     As under the earlier system prevailing till 30/06/2012, an individual recipient receiving any service in relation to any purpose other than commerce or any other business or profession, would not be covered by liability under reverse charge as the same is exempted by entry 34 of the exempted Notification No.25/2012-ST. By this entry, even the Government, a local authority, a Government authority and an entity registered under section 12AA of the Income Tax Act for the purpose of providing charitable activities (as defined in the said Notification 25/2012-ST) also are declared exempt.

Partial Reverse Charge for 3 services only:

Except for the services listed above at (viii), (ix) and (x) viz. services of renting of motor vehicle, supply of manpower or security service and service in execution of works contract, the entire or 100% amount of service tax payment liability vests in the recipient of services. Partial reverse charge i.e. both the service provider and the recipient of services having liability for service tax exists only for 3 services in the following proportion as notified:

An explanation in Notification No.30/2012-ST is provided to clarify that in case of Works Contract services, where both service provider and recipient thereof are the persons liable to pay tax, the service recipient has the option of choosing the valuation method as per choice, independent of valuation method adopted by the provider of service.

Some Issues:
1.    Is reverse charge applicable to invoices raised by the vendors in July 2012 or later for the services completed in June, 2012 or when the payment for the invoice is made post 1st July, 2012?

For any service, where point of taxation is determined and liability is fastened prior to 01/07/2012 in terms of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POT Rules for short), the new provisions of reverse charge do not apply. For instance, if service was completed prior to 30th June, 2012 and invoice also was raised before such date, the point of taxation is determined to be the date of the invoice, if the invoice was raised within the stipulated time limit of 30 days in terms of Rule 4A of the Rules. In the scenario, even if the payment is made post 30th June, 2012, reverse charge would not apply to the receiver for such payment.

2.    Whether in the following situations, the liability under reverse charge would arise for the recipient?

  •     When a partnership firm provides works contract services to another partnership firm.

  •     When manpower supply services are provided by a private limited company to another private limited company.

  •     A firm of solicitors provides service to a proprietary business concern.

In the first two situations, recipient does not have liability under reverse charge. In the first situation, it is so because except for body corporates, liability is not cast on any other person in case of works contract services. In the second situation, there is no liability because the service provider is a company, the receiving corporate body does not have the liability. In this case, the provider would have to charge service tax and the receiver would pay him as per the invoiced amount unless the provider is covered by threshold exemption under Notification No.33/2012-ST. In the third situation, the liability to pay tax would vest in the recipient as the recipient is a business entity if his turnover is more than Rs.10 lakh i.e. when he is not covered by the threshold exemption limit and provider is a solicitor firm (solicitors are necessarily advocates). However, it may be noted that under Notification No.25/2012-ST, services by Arbitral Tribunal or individual advocate or a firm of advocates provided to any person other than business entity or a business entity with a turnover upto Rs. 10 lakh in the preceding financial year are exempted at entry no.6(b) as discussed above. Therefore, if the proprietary business concern is within the threshold turnover limit, no service tax is payable by such proprietor under reverse charge. The definition of business entity is provided above.

3.    When does the liability to pay service tax under partial reverse charge arise both for the provider of service as well as for the receiver?

This is governed by POT Rules. Service provider would have to pay service tax either depending on the date of invoice or the date of receipt of consideration for service whichever is earlier. The recipient as per the said rules would pay, considering the date of payment made for the service. However, if no payment for the invoice is made within six months, point of taxation would be the date of invoice in accordance with Rule 7 of the said POT Rules.

4.    Whether the service tax liability under reverse charge, partial or full, can be discharged by the recipient of services using balance in the CENVAT credit account?

No. CENVAT credit balance cannot be used for discharging the liability under reverse charge in terms of Rule 3(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR). CENVAT credit in terms of this rule can be utilised for payment of excise duty or amount payable on removal of inputs or capital goods or amount payable under Rule 16(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 and for payment of service tax on any output service. When a person pays service tax as a receiver of service, it is neither towards output service nor for any excise duty payment or an amount payable as stated above. Further, with effect from 01/07/2012, an express provision vide insertion of an explanation is also made below the said Rule 3(4), providing that CENVAT credit cannot be used for payment of service tax in respect of services where the person liable to pay tax is a service recipient. Also Rule 2(p) of CCR specifically excludes the service where the whole of service tax is liable to be paid by the recipient of service from the definition of output service.

5.    When a service provider is located in Jammu and Kashmir and provides taxable service to a receiver located in taxable territory, whether the recipient is liable for service tax?

This is to be determined in terms of the provisions contained in section 66C of the Act read with the rules prescribed in this regard viz. Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (POP Rules, for short) as notified vide Notification No.28/2012-ST dated 20/06/2012. For instance, if the service provided by J&K service provider in the above question is of architect’s service in relation to immovable property situated in Chandigarh, the recipient located anywhere in the taxable territory would be liable to pay service tax under reverse charge as Rule 5 of the said POP Rules provides that place of provision of service is the place where the immovable property is located. Thus, depending on the type of service, the applicable POP Rule would determine the place of provision to determine whether service tax is payable by the recipient located in taxable territory from a person located in non-taxable territory including services received from outside India.

6. (a) When a small service provider is availing benefit of Rs. 10 lakh exemption under Notification No.33/2012-ST dated 20/06/2012 from service tax leviable under section 66B of the Act and has provided services to a body corporate, whether the receiver is liable for service tax?

(b)    What would be the answer in case of services for which partial reverse charge is prescribed?

For this purpose, we may refer the Notification No.33/2012-ST. It contains a non-obstante clause which reads as:

“Nothing contained in this Notification shall apply to:
(i)    ……………..
(ii)    Such value of taxable services in respect of which service tax shall be paid by such person and in such manner as specified under sub-section (2) of section 68 of the said Finance Act read with the Service tax Rules, 1994.”

Section 68(2) referred to in the above clause including proviso therein is reproduced above. Both the provisions read together indicates that the threshold limit does not apply to the service receiver liable for service tax in terms of section 68(2) read with Notification No.30/2012-ST and Rule 2(1)(d) of the Service Tax Rules.

The Government also has clarified in the Guidance Note as follows:

“Liability of the service provider and the service recipient are different and independent of each other. Thus, in case the service provider is availing exemption owing to turnover being less than Rs.10 lakh, he shall not be obliged to pay any tax. However, the service recipient shall have to pay service tax which he is obliged to pay under the partial reverse charge mechanism”

Thus, the clarification answers that in both the situations, whether having full or partial liability, service tax is payable by the recipient irrespective of the threshold exemption availment by the provider. The recipient would discharge the liability of his part.

7.    Whether the credit of service tax paid under reverse charge is available to the service recipient? If the recipient is not able to utilise the credit, would the amount paid be refunded?

The availability of credit is subject to provisions of CCR. If the service on which service tax is paid under reverse charge satisfies the definition of “input service” as provided in Rule 2(l) of the CCR and based on GAR-7 challan evidencing payment of service tax, credit can be availed. Rule 5B is introduced in CCR for granting refund to service provider providing services are notified under section 68(2) of the Act and the service provider unable to utilise CENVAT credit availed on inputs and input services for service tax payment on output services subject to procedure, conditions and safeguards to be prescribed.

Comment: In the matter of refund, the above Rule 5B of CCR indicates that the refund would be available to service providers of services notified in section 68(2) and not to recipients liable under reverse charge. Hence, if the recipient corporate body of, say, works contract services and manpower supply services is engaged in pure “trading activity” which is not liable for service tax, such trader cannot claim refund and so would be the manufacturing body corporate manufacturing products which are exempt or have Nil rate of duty. [The newly intro-duced Rule 5A in CCR refers to refund for manufacturers only on inputs].

8.    (a) In case of services provided by a director of the company to the company, now that Notification No.45/2012-ST has introduced reverse charge with effect from August 07, 2012, if a director receives sitting fees from more than one company, whether all the companies where a person provides service as a director would separately pay service tax on his sitting fees?

(b)    How about remuneration to managing director, whole-time directors or executive directors?

In principle, all the companies in which a person is a director would independently pay service tax as a recipient, in respect of services received from all its directors. As regards the payment made to the managing director, whole-time director or executive director, the liability under reverse charge would be determined, based on facts of each case. If there is an employment contract with such a director and the amount paid is as ‘salary’, there will not be any service tax liability since employment contracts or an employee providing services to an employer are specifically excluded from the definition of ‘service’ in section 65B(44) of the Act. Manner of tax deduction at source under the Income Tax Act i.e. whether deduction is made u/s 192 or section 194J may also help indicate (although not conclusive) whether the amount paid is in the nature of salary or remuneration. If a director is paid some fixed amount as salary and other or additional amount as remuneration and if this is not part of the employment contract with the director, reverse charge would apply to such amount paid additionally and not forming part of the employment contract. However, independent directors on the Board act in a fiduciary capacity and therefore the consideration for the service rendered by the director to the company would be liable for reverse charge.

9.    In case of works contract service, in terms of Notification No.24/2012-ST depending on the nature of works contract, different valuation rate viz. 40%, 70% or 60% is applicable. How would the recipient body corporate know whether the provider has applied/paid service tax at the correct rate?

In terms of Explanation II to Notification No.30/2012-ST, the service recipient has the option of choosing the valuation method, independent of the valuation method adopted by the provider of service. Consider an instance, when a provider has charged and paid 50% of the service tax on 40% of the value of an invoice, considering the works contract as one of “original works” whereas if the recipient holds a view that the contract/transaction is not covered by the definition of “original works” and therefore, service tax would be attracted on 60% value. In such a case, whether the recipient is “mandatorily required” to independently determine the substance of the contract by virtue of the above explanation or not, is not clear. The explanation refers only to having an option in reflecting “valuation method”. Therefore, it appears that the recipient along with the provider runs a risk of dispute over ‘valuation’ option if a lower rate in place of a higher one is selected.

Conclusion:

The intention of the Government in introducing the above complicated procedure of reverse charge and especially partial reverse charge for various services provided predominantly in semi-organized sector, can be understood and appreciated as the compliance is poor and undue advantage of threshold exemption also may have been taken by some. However, certain fall-outs of the clumsy system cannot be ignored when it is introduced at the cost of hardship that would be faced by small entities including trading outfits and even the law firms as enumerated below:

  •    Large law firms would not be able to avail any CENVAT credit of service tax paid on various taxable services used by them, as they are not required to collect and pay service tax for their services. This indeed means a substantial cost addition for them.

  •     In case of partial reverse charge, a number of compliance issues are likely to emerge. For instance, if a manpower supply agency has already discharged service tax obligation, as in the past, of 100% liability, and if no service tax is paid by the recipient to the Government, as he has inadvertently paid 100% service tax to the provider.

  •     Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid to the vendor would be allowed?

  •     Whether or not service tax demand would be raised against the receiver and consequently whether excess service tax paid as the provider would be refunded to the provider?

There are no definite answers to the above issues without going through the litigating process. However, it may be noted here that in the past, considering the basic cannons of taxation that no transaction can be taxed twice, in Invincible Security Services vs. CCE (2009) 13 STR 185 (Tri.-Del) and in Navyug Alloys (P) Ltd. vs. CCE&C (2008) 17 STT 362 (Ahd-CESTAT), liberal view was taken by the Tribunals and even on receiving service tax without authority of law, it was held that it was not open to the department to confirm the same again in respect of the same service and the appeals were allowed.

Since the above illustrations are only a small part of various issues and difficulties that are likely to be faced on account of partial reverse charge, it is recommended that the same should be done away with at the earliest and instead the Government may consider introduction of transaction threshold. A private limited company paying barely Rs.1,500/-as sitting fees to each director for every meeting also is required to register and pay service tax of an insignificant amount. Transaction threshold can relieve such hardships as well as administration costs of the corporate sector as well as that of the department. A pragmatic approach is required on the part of the Government in this matter.

EXPORTED SERVICES

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Preliminary

Under the Export of Services Rules, 2005 (ESR) which were in force prior to 01/07/2012, it was provided in Rule 4 that, any service which is taxable under clause (105) of section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’), may be exported without payment of service tax. Further clarifications were issued in the context of proportionate credit rules under CENVAT Credit as to the treatment to be given to “exported services”.

W.e.f. 01/07/2012, ESR have ceased to exist, and Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (POP Rules) have been introduced. Importantly, for the first time, the concept of “exported services” has been specifically introduced under Service Tax Rules, 1994 (ST Rules).

This feature discusses the concept of “exported service” and consequent implications in terms of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CENVAT Rules) and Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POT Rules) in regard to “exported services” However, it needs to be expressly noted that, for determination as to whether a service constitutes “export” or not, provisions under ST Rules should be read with the provisions under POP Rules.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

ST Rules Rule 6A – (Export of Services)

“(1) The provision of any service provided or agreed to be provided shall be treated as export of service when –

a) The provider of service is located in the taxable territory,

b) The recipient of service is located outside India,

c) The service is not a service specified in section 66D of the Act,

 d) The place of provision of the service is outside India,

 e) The payment for such service has been received by the provider of service in convertible foreign exchange, and

f) The provider of service and recipient of service are not merely establishments of a distinct person in accordance with item (b) of Explanation 2 of clause (44) of Section 65B of the Act.

(2) Where any service is exported, the Central Government may, by notification, grant rebate of service tax or duty paid on input services or inputs, as the case may be used in providing such service and the rebate shall be allowed subject to such safeguards, conditions and limitations, as may be specified, by the Central Government, by notification.”

CENVAT Rules
Rule 2(e) “exempted service” means a –

 (1) Taxable service which is exempt from the whole of the service tax leviable thereon; or

 (2) Service, on which no service tax is leviable under section 66B of the Finance Act; or

(3) Taxable service whose part of value is exempted on the condition that no credit of inputs and input services, used for providing such taxable service, shall be taken; but shall not include a service which is exported in terms of rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994”.

Rule 5: Refund of CENVAT Credit

 “(1) A manufacturer who clears a final product or an intermediate product for export without payment of duty under bond or letter of undertaking, or a service provider who provides an output service which is exported without payment of service tax, shall be allowed refund of CENVAT Credit……… Explanation 1 – For the purpose of this rule – (1) “export service” means a service which is provided as per Rule 6A of the Service tax Rules, 1994.”

Rule 6 – Obligation of a manufacturer or producer of final products and a provider of output service “………..

(7) The provisions of sub-rules (1), (2), (3) and (4) shall not be applicable in case the taxable services are provided, without payment of service tax, to a unit in a Special Economic Zone or to a developer of a Special Economic Zone for their authorized operations or when a service is exported.

(8) For the purpose of this rule, a service provided or agreed to be provided shall not be an exempted service when –

(a) the service satisfies the conditions specified under rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and the payment for the service is to be received in convertible foreign currency; and

(b) Such payment has *not been received for a period of six months or such extended period as may be allowed from time-totime by the Reserve Bank of India, from the date of provision.” [*Note: The use of the word ‘not’ appears erroneous].

Exported Service – Whether “taxable service” or “exempted service”

Under Central Excise, it has been a settled position that, exported goods are in the nature of taxable goods and not exempted goods. However under service tax, there was no clarity and issues continued to be raised. In the context of CENVAT Credit, vide Circular No. 868/6/2008 – CX dt. 9/5/08 it was clarified, as under: ……………

6 Whether export of service without payment of service tax under Export of Service Rules shall be treated as exempted service for the purpose of rule 6(3)?

No, export of services without payment of service tax are not to be treated as exempted services. W.e.f. 01/07/2012, Rule 2(e) of CENVAT Rules which defines “exempted services”, clearly provides that, services exported in terms of Rule 6A of ST Rules, would not be “exempted services”.

However, it needs to be expressly noted that, this is for the purpose of CENVAT Rules only.

 Brief Analysis of Rule 6A of ST Rules – “export of service”

 Each of the specified conditions is discussed hereafter.

 a) Service provider should be located in the taxable territory. This is in line with the concept of export which presupposes that service is usually provided from taxable territory to non– taxable territory. In this regard, the following definitions under the Finance Act, 1994 as amended (FA12) need to be noted.

Section 64 of FA 12

“(1) This Chapter extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” ……… Section 65(27) of FA 12 “ ‘India’ means, –

 (i) the territory of the Union as referred to in clauses (2) and (3) of article 1 of the Constitution;

(ii) its territorial waters, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone or any other maritime zone as defined in the Territorial Waters. Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (80 of 1976);

(iii) the seabed and the subsoil underlying the territorial waters;

(iv) the air space above its territory and territorial waters and (v) the installations, structures and vessels located in the continental shelf of India and the exclusive economic zone of India, for the purposes of prospecting or extraction or production of mineral oil and natural gas and supply thereof;” Section 65 (52) of FA 12 “ “Taxable territory” means the territory to which the provisions of this Chapter apply.” Thus, simply stated, service provider should be located in India except in the State of Jammu & Kashmir.

b) Service recipient should be located outside India. Here also, it is to be understood that Jammu & Kashmir is otherwise a non-taxable territory. However, if recipient is located in Jammu & Kashmir, the condition of location outside India is not satisfied. This is also in line with the general concept of ‘export’.

 c) Service should not be a service specified in the Negative List of Services under section 66D of FA 12. This is very important inasmuch it spells out an important legislative intent that services which are specified in the Negative List are totally excluded from the service tax ambit. Hence, the question of the same being regarded as ‘export’, does not arise at all.

d)    The place of provision of service is outside India. This does raise many questions inasmuch as POP Rules contemplate that services could be provided by a service provider based in the taxable territory to a service recipient based in a non–taxable territory.

For instance, if the services are physically provided/performed outside India, the same would be completely out of the service tax ambit and hence, the question of the same being considered as ‘export’ would not arise at all. This anomaly also existed under ESR which was in force prior to 01/07/2012.

In this regard, attention is drawn to the following clarifications by the department in the context of some specific services:

CBEC Circular No. B-11/3/98-TRU dt. 7/10/98 – Market Research Agencies

Para 6.3

“An issue has been raised whether service tax is payable in respect of services rendered to foreign clients in India, and in respect of such services rendered abroad. It is clarified that service tax is payable on all taxable services rendered in India whether to an Indian or foreign client. However, services rendered abroad shall not attract service tax levy as service tax extends only to services provided within India.”

Dept Trade Notice No 1/2000 dt. 27/4/2000, Pune I – Tour Operator Services

Para 6.7

“Service tax on services rendered by tour opera-tors is only on services rendered in India in respect of a tour within Indian Territory. Services rendered by tour operators in respect of out-bound tourism i.e. for tours abroad, do not attract service tax. In case of a composite tour which combines tours within India and also outside India, service tax will be leviable only on services rendered for tours within India provided separate billing has been done by the tour operators for services provided in respect of tours within India.”

This remains an unresolved issue. Possibly the only logical reason appears to be treatment for determination of availability of CENVAT Credit.

e)    Realisation of consideration in convertible foreign exchange by a service provider. Compliance of this condition has assumed increased significance.

It needs to be expressly noted that, w.e.f. 01/07/2011, POT Rules have been introduced, whereby there is a liability to pay service tax on the service provider irrespective of realisation from the service recipient. Hence, in cases where consideration is not received (either fully or partly) by a service provider from the service recipient within the time limit permitted by RBI, the benefit of export would be denied subject to discussion in paras hereafter and service tax liability may be triggered from the date of completion of service in terms of POT Rules with applicable interest.

In cases where payments are not received by an exporter service provider within the time permitted by RBI, it would be advisable that appropriate procedure under RBI Regulations (like seeking an extension of time for unrealised proceeds) are complied with by service providers.

(f)    Service provider and service recipient should not be merely establishments of a distinct person in terms of Explanation 2(b) (should be read as 3) to section 65B(44) of the Act which defines ‘Service’. The said explanation reads as follows:

“(b) an establishment of a person in the taxable territory and any of his other establishment in a non-taxable territory shall be treated as establishments of distinct persons”.

At this point, it is required to note the relevant extracts from Department clarifications titled “Education Guide” dated 20/06/2012 issued in the context of Negative List based taxation of services introduced w.e.f. 01/07/2012 reproduced below:

Para 10.2.2

“Can there be an export between an establishment of a person in taxable territory and another establishment of same person in a non–taxable territory?

No. Even though such persons have been specified as distinct persons under the Explanation to clause (44)    of section 65B, the transaction between such establishments have not been recognized as exports under the above stated rule.”

Para 2.4.1

“What is the significance of the phrase “carried out by a person for another”?

The phrase “provided by one person to another” signifies that services provided by a person to self are outside the ambit of taxable service. Example of such service would include a service provided by one branch of a company to another or to its head office or vice versa.”

Para 2.4.2

“Are there any exceptions wherein services provided by a person to oneself are taxable?

Yes, two exceptions have been carved out to the general rule that only services provided by a person to another are taxable. These exceptions, contained in Explanation 2 (read as ‘3’) of clause (44) of section 65B, are :

  •     “An establishment of a person located in tax-able territory and another establishment of such person located in non-taxable territory are treated as establishments of distinct persons.” [Similar provision exists in section 66A(2). The said section is effective till 30/06/2012].

  •    “An unincorporated association or body of persons and members thereof are also treated as distinct persons.” [Also exists presently in part as explanation to section 65].

Implications of these classificatory remarks are that inter se provision of services between such per-sons, deemed to be separate persons, are likely to be taxed by the department. For example, services provided by a club to its members and services provided by the branch office of a multinational company to the headquarters of the multinational company located outside India would be treated as taxable provided other conditions relating to taxability of service are satisfied.

The term ‘establishment’ has not been defined under FA12/POP Rules/ST Rules. However, in this regard useful reference can be made to, “Education Guide” dated 20/06/2012 available on www. cbec.gov.in

In the line with the legislative intent, whereby services availed from an establishment based outside India by another establishment of the same legal entity in India are deemed to be taxed under reverse charge (as per Education Guide at least), it is being provided that in a reverse case scenario the benefit of export would be denied in such cases even if all the other conditions of Rule 6A of ST Rules are satisfied.

Despite the deeming fiction, which was introduced u/s 66A of the Act (in force upto 30/06/2012) and has been continued w.e.f. 01/07/2012 [section 65B(44) – Explanation 2], whether transactions between two establishments within one legal entity can be taxed at all under service tax, remains an unresolved legal issue which would have to be judicially tested.

Implications in case of delays in realisation of export proceeds

An important practical issue that would arise in such cases is, what would happen in cases where there is a delay in realisation of proceeds for “exported services” and application for extension has been made before RBI, and the case comes up for scrutiny/inquiry by the service tax authorities?

Similar issues did arise under income tax, wherein there was a procedure which prescribed for an application to be made to the Commissioner for seeking extension of time in cases of delays in realization of export proceeds. It was commonly found that applications were not disposed off/ nor proceeds realised till the time of completion of assessment. In many cases, assessing officers disallowed deduction claimed u/s 80HHC (subject to rectification) and raised demands which had to be appealed against.

It is felt that, similar situations may arise under service tax as well, whereby subject to discussions in paras hereafter, service tax authorities may raise protective demands with interest which would have to be contested by service providers. It would be advisable for the service providers to make appropriate disclosures in service tax returns.

Implications in cases where proceeds for exported services are not realised either fully or partially.

As stated earlier, non–realisation of proceeds for exported services, may trigger liability to service tax with interest from the point of completion of service in terms of POT Rules.

Further, it needs to be expressly also noted that, POT Rules do not have any provisions for abatements of service tax in case of bad debts (either fully or partially). Hence, this could cast an additional burden on the “exported services” provider, in addition to the loss on account of bad debt.

Implications under CENVAT Rules/ST Rules in cases of non–realisation of proceeds for exported services

a)    It has been a settled position in the context of duty drawback under the Customs law, that in case of non–realisation of export proceeds, drawback benefits received by an exporter are required to be paid back to the Government with appropriate interest.

b)    On the lines of duty draw back rules, it would appear that, refunds availed by an “exported services” provider under Rule 5 of CENVAT Rules/Notifications issued in terms of Rule 6A of ST Rules would have to be paid back to the Government with appropriate interest.

c)    On a combined reading of Rule 2(e) & Rule 6(8) of CENVAT Rules, it prima facie appears that, in cases where proceeds are not realised for “exported services”, the said services could be treated as “exempted services” with consequent implications.

This appears to be inconsistent considering the fact that, in cases where proceeds for exported services are not realised as prescribed in Rule 6A of ST Rules, export benefit would be denied and service tax liability may arise. Hence, if appropriate service tax liability has been discharged by an “exported services” provider, there should not be any adverse implications in terms of CENVAT Rules.

POP Rules v. ST Rules:

POP Rules were introduced w.e.f. 01/07/2012 in terms of the powers granted u/s 66C of FA 12 to determine the place where services are provided/ agreed to be provided or deemed to have been provided/agreed to be provided. This is essentially done to determine the taxability of cross border transactions. In addition to the said POP Rules, Rule 6A as discussed above in detail is introduced under ST Rules w.e.f. 01/07/2012, specifying conditions for determination of ‘export’ service. The said Rule 6A has not been made subject to POP Rules. Further, the clarification of the Government dated 20/06/2012 (para10.21 of Education Guide), clearly states that all the conditions under the said Rule 6A should be satisfied for a service to be treated as ‘exported’ service. On this backdrop, an important issue that arises for consideration is what would happen in cases where all the conditions specified in Rule 6A are not satisfied (for example, realisation in convertible foreign exchange) but the transaction is outside the taxable territory as per POP Rules.

According to one school of thought, such transaction would be regarded as non-taxable and therefore for the purpose of CENVAT Rules, the same would be treated as “exempted service” and hence the benefit of credits/refunds would be denied. The amendments in CENVAT Rules w.e.f. 01/07/2012 seem to support this line of thinking. According to an alternative school of thought, non-compliance of any of the conditions specified in Rule 6A of ST Rules could trigger service tax liability from the date of completion of service as per POP Rules with interest. This would result in apparent inconsistency vis-à-vis amendments in CENVAT Rules w.e.f. 01/07/2012.

To conclude, it appears that it is a contentious issue which needs to be speedily addressed/clarified to avoid litigation in this regard.

Redevelopment of properties (commercial/ residential):

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Redevelopment of properties (commercial/ residential):

Background:
During the past decade, redevelopment of society/ properties has tremendously increased mainly in metropolitan cities like Mumbai. Increased redevelopment activities have inter alia attracted attention of the Preventive/Anti-Evasion Wing of the Service Tax Dept. and inquiry is initiated or show-cause notice is issued in this regard. Some of the significant implications impacting redevelopment activity are discussed hereafter.

Common features in redevelopment:

Some of the commonly found features redevelopment arrangements are listed below:

(i) Societies usually own buildings and are often lessees of the land owned by MHADA/other bodies on which the building is built;

(ii) These societies are entitled to additional FSI under relevant regulations or statute, which can be used for development upon payment of appropriate premium;

(iii) Such societies grant development right to the builders/developers to demolish existing building and construct new buildings. Builders/ developers pay the appropriate premium for additional FSI entitled to the society and utilise the same for additional construction and/or development;

(iv) Each existing occupant in the building of the society, is given a flat/office in the newly constructed building of a bigger area than the existing area free of cost or without any additional consideration;

(v) The entire cost of new building and other related cost is fully borne by the builders or developers;

(vi) Builder or the developer is fully entitled to the proceeds from sale of remaining flats/ shops/ commercial premises to be constructed by him on the society’s properties through sale in the open market; and

(vii) Existing occupants also receive a specified monetary compensation and reimbursement towards rentals for alternate accommodation during the period of demolition of old building and construction of new building.

Any redevelopment arrangement between a builder or a developer and the society is mutually beneficial to all the affected parties or can be described as a barter deal inasmuch as:

(i) In addition to monetary compensation and reimbursement of rentals, existing occupants get a flat/office of a higher area in a newly constructed building at no extra cost;

(ii) The society would get newly constructed property with enhanced area and improved or better facilities;

(iii) Builders/developers gain through realisation of sale/proceeds of additional flats/commercial premises at market price which far outweighs the cost of obtaining additional FSI, construction cost of the new building and payment of rentals to existing occupants, all put together.

Redevelopment: Whether a service by a builder or developer?

Service tax authorities have issued show-cause notices contending that the builders/developers do not own the property undertaken for redevelopment and ‘service’ is therefore provided by the builder/developer to the society. The issue therefore needs to be analysed in detail.

In order to be liable to service tax, it is essential that, ‘service’ is provided by a service provider. The term ‘service’ is not defined under the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’). However, some meanings attributed to ‘Service’ are as follows:

(i) ‘Service’ — Black’s Law Dictionary:

The act of doing something useful for a person or company for a fee.

A person or company whose business is to do useful things for others, a linen service.

An intangible commodity in the form of human effort, such as labour, skill, or advice, contract for services.

(ii) ‘Service’ — Magus Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI, (2008) 11 STR 225 (Gau.)

In the said ruling, the following was observed by the Gauhati High Court:

Para 29 “In the light of the various statutory definitions of ‘service’, one can safely define ‘service’ as an act of helpful activity, an act of doing something useful, rendering assistance or help. Service does not involve supply of goods; ‘service’ rather connotes transformation of use/user of goods as a result of voluntary intervention of ‘service provider’ and is an intangible commodity in the form of human effort. To have ‘service’, there must be a ‘service provider’ rendering services to some other person(s), who shall be recipient of such ‘service’.”

(iii) Service — Jetilite (India) Ltd. v. CCE, (2011) 30 STT 324 (New Delhi — CESTAT)

An extract from the Tribunal’s observation is provided below:

Para 65 “Being so, taking into consideration the common understanding of the definition of the term ‘service’ as well as the definition of the term ‘taxable service’ under the said Act, it is evident that the service contemplated under section 65(19) is the one which relates to service rendered by the service recipient. It may be taxable service or may not be so. However, the situation invariably contemplates existence of two entities in order to bring the case within the scope of definition of business auxiliary service. One entity which provides service to others is called a service recipient. Another entity is one which provides service to the service recipient in relation to the service rendered by such service recipient to others, and such entity is called the service provider.”

Considering the fact that different types of redevelopment agreements are entered into between the societies and the builders/developers, it would be impossible to lay down any general proposition as to whether a redevelopment arrangement results in a service provided by a builder/developer to a society or not.

A redevelopment arrangement is usually for the mutual benefit of the affected parties to the contract. Though not described, it appears to be in the nature of a joint venture arrangement, wherein role of each party is specified and contracted for. Hence, there is a possibility of a view depending on the terms of an agreement that redevelopment arrangement does not result in any ‘service’ provided by builders/developers to the societies. At the most, services performed in pursuance of redevelopment arrangement by builders/developers, amount only to self-service which cannot be subjected to service tax.

In this regard the following observation of the Tribunal in Rolls Royce Industrial Power (I) Ltd. v. Commissioner, (2006) 3 STR 292 (Tribunal) may be noted:

“……………….. The terms of the contract do not envisage or involve providing any consulting or engineering help to the owner. The operator is fully autonomous and responsible for the performance of operation and maintenance. Whatever engineering issues are involved, it is for the operator to find solutions for, and attend to in the course of operation and maintenance. He is not required to render any advice or to take any orders from the owner. He cannot pass on the responsibility for operating the plant in any manner to the owner. Thus, there are no two parties, one giving advice and the other accepting it. Service tax is attracted only in a case involving rendering of service, in this case, engineering consultancy. That situation does not take place in the present case. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the duty demand raised is not sustainable”

Attention is also drawn to the following observation of the Bangalore Tribunal in Precot Mills Ltd. v. CCE, (2006) 5 STT 35 (Bang.-CESTAT)

“………………

M/s. Precot Mills Ltd. is a corporate entity. It has got various units which function as separate profit centres. When service is rendered by one unit to the other, debit note is raised for the value of service in order to evaluate the perfor-mance of a particular unit. Ultimately there is only one balance sheet for the legal entity for M/s. Precot Mills Ltd. and not for the separate unit. In other words, the appellants, M/s. Precot Mills Ltd. do not receive any valuable consider-ation for service rendered by one unit of the appellant to the other unit, in view of the fact that each unit is part of the same legal entity which is the appellant. To put it differently, when one renders service to oneself, as in the present case, there is no question of leviability of service tax.”

Although the facts in both the above cases are dissimilar, the ratio of the rulings is relevant to the issue of redevelopment arrangement.

Further, as regards the contention that there is no liability to service tax in case of self-supply of service, further support can be found from the following:

    Gauhati High Court Ruling in Magus Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI, (2008) 11 STR 225 (Gau.)

    Dept. Circular dated 17-9-2004 on Estate Build-ers in regard to Construction Services

    Master Circular dated 23-8-2007 in regard to applicability of service tax on real estate builders

    Dept. Circular dated 29-1-2009 regarding im-position of service tax on builders

Nevertheless, it needs to be expressly noted that whether a particular redevelopment arrangement results in any service provided by a builder/devel-oper to a society or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances and in particular terms and structure of a redevelopment arrangement. Further, it is a highly contentious issue. If a view is adopted that there is no service provided by a builder/developer to a society, the same would have to satisfy the judicial test.

Applicable Service categories:
Service tax provisions do not contain any spe-cific category for redevelopment. Hence taxability would have to be determined on the basis of service categories relevant to construction activi-ties viz.:

    i) Commercial or industrial construction [section 65(25b)/65(105)(zzq) of the Act]

    ii) Construction of Complex [section 65(30a)/65(91a)/65(105)(zzzh) of the Act]

    iii) Works Contract [section 65(105)(zzzza) of the Act]

A substantial part of construction carried out in terms of a redevelopment arrangement would have to satisfy the essential taxability criteria specified in the definitions stated above in order to be made liable to service tax.

The scope of construction of complex/commercial or industrial construction liable to service tax has been expanded w.e.f. 1-7-2010 to tax advances received by builders/developers from prospective buyers for flats/offices which are under construction. The relevant extracts from Dept. Clarification clarifying the scope of expanded service in the Ministry’s Circular Letter D.O.F. No. 334/1/2010-TRU (Annexure B), dated 26-2-2010 was reproduced in February 2011 issue of BCAJ and therefore is not repeated here (refer para 2 on page 57)

In this context and as analysed in February Issue of BCAJ, Notification No. 36/2010-ST, dated 28-6-2010 provides that advances received by the builders/developers from prospective buyers prior to 1-7-2010 for flats/offices under construction have been exempted from the purview of expanded scope of construction of complex/commercial or industrial construction service. This exemption is extremely relevant inasmuch as, in many show-cause notices issued by the service tax authorities in the issue of redevelopment, the advances received by builders/developers from prospective buyers for the subsequent period is treated as value of taxable service, provided by a builder/developer to a society.


Redevelopment of flats/offices of existing occupants made prior to 18-4-2006 without any monetary consideration — Free of cost:

It is now a settled position that taxability to service tax is to be determined at the time when service is provided. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the Gujarat High Court ruling in Reliance Industries Ltd. v. CCE, (2010) 19 STR 807 (Guj.) and other rulings as well. Hence, in the context of construction services, taxability is to be determined based on the date on which relevant construction is completed.

Section 67 of the Act relating to valuation of a taxable service was significantly amended w.e.f. 18-4-2006. One of the more significant amendment relates to enactment of specific provisions for valu-ation of taxable services in cases where service is rendered for a consideration not determined in monetary terms (either fully or partly). This is discussed in para 1.6 below.

In terms of these provisions read with Rule 6 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 as existed prior to 18-4-2006, no service tax is payable if services were rendered free or without any monetary consideration.

Vide, CBEC Circular No. 62/11/2003-ST, dated 21-8-2003, it was clarified that, even if a service is taxable, there will be no service tax if service is provided free, as value of service tax will be zero.

In the light of the foregoing, it would appear that in cases where flats/offices are allotted to existing occupants of a society in the new building (constructed prior to 18-4-2006) free of cost in pursuance of redevelopment agreement between a society and the builders/developers, there would be no liability to service tax in terms of the valuation provisions as they existed prior to 18-4-2006.

Redevelopment made for existing occupants after 18-4-2006:


Service tax is demanded in regard to flats/offices built and allotted to existing occupants free of cost by treating the entire sale proceeds of additional flats/commercial premises received by the builders/developers in the subsequent years as the value of taxable services. Hence this aspect needs a detailed discussion, more particularly after the introduction of the Valuation Rules w.e.f. 18-4-2006. The amended section 67 of the Act effective from 18-4-2006 has conceptually changed the provisions relating to valuation of service for the levy of service tax. In addition, Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 (Valuation Rules) have been notified to come into force from 19-4-2006.

Prior to its substitution, section 67 of the Act read as “For the purpose of this Chapter, the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him”. The newly introduced section 67 provides for ‘cost of service in the hands of recipient of service’ and ‘value of similar service’ as the basis for valuation, which is in complete departure from the earlier position in law which restricted itself to ‘gross amount charged’ by a service provider. Thus in the light of amended section 67 read with the Valuation Rules, the following is analysed.

Value of ‘similar’ service:

According to Rule 3(a) of the Valuation Rules, in case of a taxable service where consideration received does not consist wholly of money, then value is required to be determined, based on the gross amount charged by a service provider for similar service provided to any other person in ordinary course of trade.

Brief analysis of ‘similar’ — Some of the meanings attributed to ‘Similar’ are as under:

  •     ‘Similar’ means resembling or similar; having the same or some of the same characteristics— (Webster’s Online Dictionary)

  •     ‘Similar’ means ‘having a marked resemblance of likeness; of a like nature of kind — (Oxford English Dictionary)

On the basis of the foregoing, it would appear that the word ‘similar’, does not mean identical but there should be resemblance between two services in order to constitute the services as similar services. Various factors would have to be considered in order to determine whether two services are similar or not.

In the context of Central Excise, the Supreme Court has observed with reference to ‘electrical appliances normally used in the household and similar appliances used in hotels’ etc., that “the statute does not contemplate that goods classed under the words of ‘similar description’ shall be in all respects the same. If it did, these words would be unnecessary. These were intended to embrance goods not identical with those goods.” [Nat Steel Equipment v. Collector, (1998) 34 ELT 8 (SC) quoted and followed in CCE v. Wood Craft Products Ltd., (1995) 77 ELT 23 (SC)]

Valuation on the basis of equivalent money value of consideration:

Rule 3(b) of the Valuation Rules provides that where the value cannot be determined in accordance with clause (a) [i.e., Rule 3(a) on basis of value of similar service], the service provider shall determine the equivalent money value of such consideration which shall, in no case be less than the cost of provision of such taxable service.

Thus, if the value of similar services cannot be ascertained, the ‘value’ will be ‘equivalent value of consideration’. Such ‘equivalent value’, to be determined by service provider himself, shall not be less that cost of provision of such service.

It is pertinent to note that Valuation Rules make no provision for method of calculation of ‘cost’ of the taxable services. No guidelines have been issued by CBEC prescribing methodology to be adopted for the purposes of valuation.

Implications in the context of redevelopment:

Under a redevelopment arrangement, flat/office is provided to an existing occupant free of cost, in pursuance of an agreement between a society and the builder/developer. Hence, immediate beneficiary of redevelopment is the flat/office occupant, whereas society would be a remote beneficiary of redevelopment in the existing sense that there would be enhancement of property value and increased/better facilities that would be available.

Whether or not there is a flow of consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a builder/developer to a society in terms of amended section 67 of the Act, is a highly complex and contentious issue for which there is no ready answer.

Assuming, there is flow of ‘consideration’ arising from the redevelopment arrangement between builders/developers to a society, the taxable value of service in terms of Valuation Rules would be determined as under:

    i) Option 1 — Amount equivalent to the gross amount charged by a builder/developer to any new buyer of flat/office for similar service provided in the ordinary course of trade and gross amount charged is the sole consideration.

This would have to be determined based on an examination of the facts of a given case duly supported by independent documentary evidences.

    ii) Option 2 — In case, value cannot be determined in accordance with Option 1 above, builder/developer would have to determine equivalent money value of such consideration, which shall not be less than the cost of provision of taxable service factoring mainly cost incurred for obtaining FSI, the en-tire cost of construction, rentals paid for the period during demolition and construction period, etc. This will differ depending on the facts of each case.

As yet, no methodology is prescribed by CBEC to determine equivalent monetary value of consideration in terms of the Valuation Rules. However, in this regard, recourse may be made to Guidelines issued by CBEC under Central Excise for computing cost of captive consumption liable to excise duty, on the basis of Cost Accounting Standard (CAS 4) issued by The Institute of Cost & Works Accountants of India. This basis has been approved by the Supreme Court in CCE v. Cadbury India Ltd., (2006) 200 ELT 353 (SC).

In case there is any liability to service tax on the builder/developer, it would appear that the same would be subject to various benefits available under the applicable exemption/abatement notifications granting full or partial exemption from payment of service tax.

Alternatively, benefits may also be available under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 subject to compliance of stipulated conditions.

Conclusion:
Redevelopment of properties is a very complex subject and issues relating to service tax under re-development are equally complex. Issues involved are likely to be litigated extensively in due course of time. Till the time, there is a reasonable level of clarity on the complex subject, it would be in the interest of concerned builders/developers to factor service tax while finalising redevelopment arrangements.

SIGNIFICANT AMENDMENTS IN CENVAT CREDIT

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1. Scope and background:

1.1 Scope of ‘Inputs’/Input Services — Subject of extensive litigations:

The scope of ‘inputs’ and ‘input services’ eligible to CENVAT credit under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) has been subject of extensive judicial controversy having significant implications.

The Supreme Court had interpreted the scope of ‘inputs’ narrowly in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. CCE, (2009) 240 ELT 41 (SC).

In Chemplast Ltd. v. CCE, (2010) 17 STR 253, it was held that ‘input services’ definition including activities relating to business cannot be interpreted to include post-manufacturing activities. In Kbace Tech Pvt. Ltd. (2010) 18 STR 281, a narrow interpretation of ‘input service’ was made on the basis of Supreme Court ruling in Maruti Suzuki (supra).

In the mean time, the Bombay High Court in a landmark ruling in Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, (2009) 15 STR 657 (Bom.) held that scope of ‘input services’ is very wide to cover all business related services.

However, in CCE v. Manikgarh Cements Works, (2010) 18 STR 275 (Tri.-Mumbai), the Tribunal, held that the Bombay High Court ruling in Coca Cola case has been impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court ruling in Maruti Suzuki in regard to inputs, and a narrow interpretation was given to the scope of ‘input service’. This ruling was confirmed by the Bombay High Court in CCE v. Manikgarh Cement, (2010) 20 STR 456 (Bom.).

In a subsequent ruling by the Bombay High Court in CCE v. Ultratech Cement Ltd., (2010) 20 STR 577 (Bom.), after considering the Supreme Court ruling in Maruti Suzuki and the Bombay High Court ruling in Coca Cola, a wide interpretation has been given to the scope of ‘input services’ eligible to CENVAT credit.

Amidst all this, in a subsequent ruling, the Supreme Court in Ramala Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. (2010) 260 ELT 321 (SC) doubted the Supreme Court ruling in Maruti Suzuki and has referred the matter to a larger Bench.

On this backdrop, significant and far-reaching changes have been made in CCR w.e.f. 1-4-2011, in particular relating to scope of ‘inputs’/ ‘input services’ eligible to credit rule providing for proportionate credit rules, point of credit availment, etc.

The more important amendments, essentially from a service provider’s perspective are discussed hereafter.

1.2 Government clarification:

Relevant extract from the Department clarification dated 28-2-2011 explaining the amendments is as under:

Para 1.1

The changes in the Cenvat Credit Rules are guided inter alia by the following considerations:

(a) Describe the scope of eligible inputs and input services more clearly so as to minimise disputes in their interpretation;

(b) Eliminate distortions and areas of tax avoidance arising from differential treatment of goods and services used for similar purposes;

(c) Provide a practical scheme for the segregation of Cenvat credits used in respect of final products and output services where they are partially exempted with condition that no such credits shall be taken;

(d) Liberalise the provisions in certain areas to meet the legitimate demands of business;

Overall comments:
An overall study of the amendments in CCR in totality clearly indicates that the CENVAT credit benefit of service tax paid on input services, would be substantially curtailed with effect from 1-4-2011.

The rate of service tax was increased from 5% to 10% during a short period of about 15 months. At that time, questions were posed before the Government, as to how would the business and end consumers absorb the 100% increase in a short time. At that time, Government had explained to the effect that impact of increase in the rate of service tax would be substantially neutralised by introduction of CENVAT credit mechanism across goods and services. The amendments are clearly against the stated position of the Government.

Further, it is the cardinal principle of VAT/GST tax system prevalent in over 100 countries that taxes paid on expenditure incurred for the purpose of business can be set off against VAT/GST payable at the output stage. Amendments in CENVAT credit denying credit of service tax paid on business expenses, is against the principles of VAT/ GST system prevalent world-wide.

Further, amendments do not appear to be trade/ taxpayer-friendly in the backdrop of imminent introduction of GST regime.

2. Exempted services:
Definition of ‘exempted services’ in Rule 2(e) of CCR has been amended to include taxable service, which is partially exempted, on the condition that no credit of inputs/input services used for taxable service shall be taken.

An Explanation has been added to clarify that ‘exempted services’ includes trading.

Comments:
(a) It is commonly found that a person is often engaged in trading activity (buying and selling of goods/services). The same could exist in one or more of the following combinations:

  • Only trading
  • Manufacturing and trading
  • Services and trading
  • Manufacturing, services and trading

As regards pure trading activity, it was very clear that benefit of CENVAT credit (viz. Service Tax paid on input services and excise duty paid on inputs/capital goods) would not be available to such dealer.

In Metro Shoes Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, (2008) 10 STR 382 (Tri.-Mumbai) it was observed as under:

“. . . . . . Credit availed on the services which are directly/wholly attributable to the trading activity is ineligible to be availed as input service credit.”

In regard to persons engaged in trading activities along with manufacturing/services/or both, there was no clarity as regards availment of CENVAT credit on common input services.

In the case of Orion Appliances Ltd. v. CST, (2010) 19 STR 205 (Tri.-Ahd.) where the assessee, providing taxable services and engaged in trading activity, availed CENVAT credit on iput services used for taxable services as well as trading activity, the Tribunal held as under:

Trading activity is nothing but purchase and sales and cannot be called a service and therefore it cannot be considered as exempted service.

Rules 6(2) and 6(3) of CCR only deal with a situation where service provider is providing taxable and exempted services. Therefore, since trading activity is not an exempted service, Rule 6 cannot be applied to such a situation.

(b) On this backdrop, the burning issue of common input services in regard to trading activity is sought to be addressed by treating ‘trading’ as ‘exempted service’ through insertion of an Explanation in Rule 2(e) of CCR which defines ‘exempted services’.

This is a significant amendment, spelling out an important policy perspective, which is likely to result in curtailment on CENVAT credit available to service providers involved in trading business. It is felt that a clarification need to be issued to the effect that the amendment would be effective 1-4-201

Further, one can understand ‘trading activities’ being treated on similar lines as ‘exempted services’ for the limited purpose of determination of proportionate credit under Rule 6 of CCR. However, amendment made in section 2(e) of CCR, is likely to result in larger legal issues as to whether ‘trading activity’ can be regarded as ‘service’ at all so as to be regarded as ‘exempted services’.

(c) It seems that all services in respect of which, abatement is claimed (in terms of Notification No. 1/2006-ST) would now get treated as ‘exempted services’. Thus services like mandap keeper construction of complex commercial or industrial construction, catering, etc. where abatement is allowed subject to the condition that CENVAT credit is not availed, would all be now treated as ‘exempt servi

Hiring of Goods: Declared Service or Deemed Sale?

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Preliminary:

Under the negative list based taxation of services introduced from July 01, 2012, service is defined by section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) to mean an activity carried out by a person for another for consideration and also includes declared services followed by a list of excluded transactions as follows:

? An activity resulting in transfer of title in goods or immovable property by way of sale, gift or in any other manner.

? Deemed sale of goods in terms of Article 366(29A) of the Constitution.

? A transaction only in money (other than activities relating to use of money or conversion of money for which consideration is charged).

? A transaction only in actionable claim.

? Employment contract for service by an employee to an employer.

? Fees payable to a court or tribunal.

In turn, “Declared Service” is defined by section 66E of the Act containing nine activities like renting of immovable property, construction of a complex or a building including one intended for sale to a buyer, temporary transfer of intellectual property rights, design development etc. of information technology software, agreeing to tolerate an act or refraining from an act, transferring goods by hiring without transferring right to use goods, hire purchase transactions, works contract and catering contracts. In this feature, one of the declared services described in subclause (f) of the said section 66E of the Act is discussed below.

Statutory provisions.

Section 66E:

“The following shall constitute declared services: namely:-

(a) ………………;
(b) ………………;

Explanation
(I) ……………….;
(A) …………..;
(B) …………..;
(C) …………..;
(II) ………………;
(c) …………………..;
(d) …………………..;
(e) ………………….;
(f) transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing, licensing or in any manner without transfer of right to use such goods”

Activity of providing goods on hire:

While explaining the scope of this service, the Government in the Education Guide dated 20/06/2012 issued while introducing Negative List based taxation of services has provided as follows “Transfer of right to use goods is a well recognized constitutional and legal concept. Every transfer of goods on lease, licence or hiring basis, does not result in transfer of right to use goods”. In support of the above statement, it has cited Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. 2002 (126) STC 0114 (SC) which ruled in the context of the facts of that case that “Transfer of right of goods involves transfer of possession and effective control over such goods” and “Transfer of custody along with permission to use or enjoy such goods, per se does not lead to transfer of possession and effective control”.

The readers may note that the above ruling was pronounced in a case where the machinery belonging to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (the company) was provided to the contractor for the use in the project work of the company on the site of the company and the contractor merely was responsible for the custody of the same. However, the effective control and possession was not transferred to the contractor. The contractor was not free to make use of the machinery for the work other than that of the company. Therefore, the decision that effective control and possession was not passed on by the company to the contractor, is with reference to the facts of the case that the machinery belonged to the company and the contractor was merely retained to operate the same and responsible for its security as the machinery was placed in his custody only for the project work of the company.

It is, thus, true that transfer of right of goods involves transfer of possession and effective control. However, in the above case of Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (supra) wherein the custody of machinery belonging to the company was merely provided to the contractor for operation of the same. The machinery was not ’hired’ to the contractor. This does not mean that in every transaction where goods belonging to owner or lessor are provided on hire, there does not occur ‘transfer’ of right to use such goods. The issue therefore is, when an equipment is provided on hire or on operating lease or when tangible or intangible goods are licensed to the licensee for the use of the licensee for a specific period whether “transfer of right to use” occurs and therefore the transaction is considered a “deemed sale” in terms of Article 366(29A) of the constitution, exigible to VAT under State laws and therefore specifically excluded from the definition of ‘service’ or whether there is no ‘transfer’ of right to use occurring and the person uses the goods without enjoying the right to use and therefore, the same is to be considered as a “declared service” as defined above and is subjected to service tax. The issue is complex and requires interpretation of the facts of each case. It has been dealt with by Courts time and again. A few such important decisions are discussed below:

Test laid down by the Supreme Court in BSNL:

The test laid down by the Hon. Supreme Court in the benchmark decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) provides direction in the matter. This test is recognised by the Government in the Education Guide for determining whether a transaction involves transfer of right to use goods. It has been followed by the Supreme Court and various High Courts. The test lays down as follows:

? There must be goods available for delivery.

? There must be consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods.

? The transferee should have legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permission or licenses required therefore should be available to the transferee.

? For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion of the transferor. This is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods.

? Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.

The Education Guide also indicates that whether a transaction amounts to transfer of right or not cannot be determined with reference to a particular word or clause in the agreement laying down terms between the parties, but the agreement is required to be read as a whole to determine the nature of transaction.

Further, the Ministry in the Education Guide has also listed certain illustrations as under:

“6.6.2 Whether the transactions listed in column 1 of the table below involve transfer of right to use goods? (Refer Table on the next page)

The Education Guide states that the list in the Table is only illustrative to demonstrate how Courts have interpreted terms and conditions of various types of contracts to see if a transaction involves transfer of right to use goods. The nature of each transaction has to be examined in totality keeping in view all the terms and conditions of an agreement relating to such transaction.

If the above illustrations and the relied on decisions are perused in the light of the test laid down by the BSNL decision (supra), one may find that conclusions drawn by the Government may not satisfy the above test in the cases illustrated.

Admittedly, the issue has been contentious and there may be a thin line of divide between the facts of one case from the other and which may have led to reach different conclusions by Courts at different times. For instance and as against the decisions cited in the above table, viz. International Travel House and Ahuja Goods Agency ( supra), in the case of K. C. Behera vs. State of Orissa (1991) 83 STC 325 (Ori.), buses were hired by State Transport Corporation (STC). The bus was to be run for STC as per the agreement and under directions of an officer. Transaction of hiring was held as ‘sale’ within its extended meaning. Providing driver etc. notwithstanding, there was a transfer of right to use bus for consideration and effective control, general control and possession of the bus vested in STC. As against this, in Laxmi Audio Visual vs. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 2001 (124) STC 426 (Kar), it was held that when there is only hiring of audio visual and multi media equipment, where the equipment is at the risk of the owner and possession and effective control remains with the owner, in such circumstances, it cannot be said that the customer has the right to use the equipment and therefore there was no deemed sale. Similarly, in the background of somewhat different facts, in the case of State of Orissa vs. Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. (2009) 25 VST 522 (Orissa H.C.), the company Dredging Corporation of India engaged its dredgers for dredging the floor of Paradeep Port under the Paradeep Port Trust (PPT) and did not disclose the income from dredging charges as ‘sale’ income. On perusal of the agreement between the parties, the Court held that transfer of right to use any goods is not a bailment, for had it been a bailment, the State would have no power to tax it. It is a sale by a fiction of law engrafted in Article 366(29A)(a) of the Constitution and resultantly in section 2(g)(iv) of the OST Act. So, what is determinative as to whether or not there was a transfer of right to use the chattel (the dredger) is the stipulation in the agreement between the Board and the appellant. The Court also observed:

“The agreement provides as follows:

……….. the Corporation hereby agrees to deploy its Cutter Auction Dredges MOT Dredge-II in the dredging work. There are stipulations to do a work, to dredge the sea-bed with men and machine deployed for the purpose, against a valuable consideration. So find it a works contract without transfer of property in goods in execution of such a contract.” The Court held, “there is nothing in the agreement to prove that there was a transfer of right to use the dredges.”

The readers may consider whether or not in the above case, the contract was that of service of dredging and “hiring of a dredge” was absent?

However, the facts in the case of Deepak Nath vs. ONGC (2010) 31 VST 337 (Gau) may also be examined. In this case, trucks, trailers, tankers and cranes were made available by owner to ONGC under contract in writing for operational charges as agreed to during the contract. It was held by the Division Bench that goods were made available 24 hours a day throughout the contract. Method and manner of using the goods was decided by ONGC, there is a transfer of right to use the goods even though the staff remained under his control.

The case of G.S. Lamba:

The recent decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in G.S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT appears most ex-haustive. It has considered the test laid down by the Apex Court in BSNL, all the significant decisions on the subject matter including those cited in the Education Guide to consider the short point of whether there exists a “transfer of the right to use” in transit mixers to M/s. Grasim Industries Ltd., when Ready Mix Concrete (RMC) manufactured by Grasim was to be transported under a contract by hiring specially designed transit mixers OR as it was pleaded by the petitioner, whether the contract amounted to “transportation service”. Under the contract in the case, the transit mixers are never transferred and effective control over running and using these vehicles as well as disciplinary con-trol over drivers remained with the contractor. The responsibility to obtain route permits, to take the risk or loss of transportation, to decide shifts of driver and vehicles, to maintain and upkeep the vehicles all vests in the contractor. After considering various decisions vis-à-vis facts of each case which interalia included Harbanslal vs. SO Haryana (1993) 88 STC 357 (P&H), 20th Century Finance (2000) 119 STC 182 (SC), IOC vs. Commissioner of Taxes (2009) 22 VST 70 (Gau), R P Kakoty vs. ONGC (2009) 22 VST 136 etc., the Hon. Court in Para 30 observed as under:

“30. From the judicial decisions, the settled essential requirement of a transaction for transfer of the right to use goods are:

(i)    it is not the transfer of the property in goods, but it is the right to use property in goods;

(ii)    Article 366(29A)(d) read with the latter part of the clause (29A) which uses the words, “and such transfer, delivery or supply … ” would show that the tax is not on the delivery of the goods used, but on the transfer of the right to use goods regardless of when or whether the goods are delivered for use subject to the condition that the goods should be in existence for use;

(iii)    in the transaction for the transfer of the right to use goods, delivery of goods is not a condition precedent, but the delivery of goods may be one of the elements of the transaction;

(iv)    the effective or general control does not mean always physical control and, even if the manner, method, modalities and the time of the use of goods is decided by the lessee or the customer, it would be under the effective or general control over the goods; and

(v)    the approvals, concessions, licences and permits in relation to goods would also be available to the user of goods, even if such licences or permits are in the name of owner (transferor) of the goods, and

(vi)    during the period of contract exclusive right to use goods along with permits, licences etc., vests in the lessee.”

Further, the Court followed the principles of interpretation of documents as listed below:

  •     Construe the document as a whole.

  •     To understand the meaning of a document or a part of it from documents itself.

  •     To give literal meaning to the words used in a document.

  •     In the event of intrinsic incongruities and inconsistencies flowing from the words and language used in the document, the intention would prevail over the words used. The intention of the parties has to be determined from the attending circumstances leading to the transaction.

(This principle is an exception to the first three principles. If the language used in the document is very clear, rights and obligation cannot be inferred by resorting to the fourth principle.)

Hon. A. P. High Court inter alia made the following observations while holding that the tax is not on use of goods, but on account of transfer of right to use of goods.

  •    In other words, the right to use goods arises only on the transfer of such right to use goods and that the transfer of right is the sine quo non for the right to use any goods. The contract involved provision of transportation service for shipping RMC by hiring specifically designed transit mixers. The effective control of running the mixers and the disciplinary control remained with the contractor agreeing to provide the above service.

  •     Article 366(29A)(d) would show that the tax is not on the delivery of goods used but on the transfer of the right to use goods regardless of when or whether goods are delivered for use. This is subject to the condition that goods are in existence for use. Delivery of goods is not a condition precedent, but one of the elements of the transaction.

  •     Effective control does not mean always physical control and even if the manner, method modalities and time of the use of goods is decided by the lessee, it would be under the general control over the goods.

  •     During the period of contract, exclusive right to use goods along with permits, licences etc. vests in the lessee. Although the drivers are appointed by the lessor, their roster fixed by them, licences, permits and insurance are taken in their names and they renew them. However, the product is delivered to customers of lessees.

  •     The entire use in the property in goods is to be exclusively utilised for a period under contract by lessee.

  •     The existence of goods is identified and transit mixers operate and are exclusively used for 42 months in the business of the lessee. In putting the property in transit mixers to economic use of the lessee, the lessors figure nowhere. It thus conclusively leads to the conclusion that lessor transferred the right to use the goods to the lessee.

Summing up:

On going through the above, whether a transaction is one of “deemed sale” involving transfer of right to use or is a “declared service” is a question which may not have a definite answer. Professionals may differ from each other. Nevertheless, the test provided in BSNL’s case (supra) appears decisive. Based on it, one may at least be able to answer whether a person can use goods without there being a transfer of ‘right’ to use the same to the exclusion of the lessor or owner on the lines discussed and analysed above in G.S. Lamba & Sons (supra) at least in case of common situations like hiring of vehicles. The Government appears to be tilted towards the view that in an ordinary and common contract of providing a vehicle on hire, the right to use is “not transferred”. In this scenario, it is likely that a law-compliant assessee under service tax law could be visited with recovery action under VAT law of the States and vice-versa. Whether one has to wait till implementation of GST to achieve a finality on the above remains to be seen. In the interim, uncertainty and long drawn litigations appear to be the only visible consequence at this point of time.

Online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company

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Whether online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company liable under reverse charge?

In
a recent decision in relation to reverse charge mechanism in British
Airways vs. Commissioner (ADJN), Central Excise, Delhi
2014-TIOL-979-CESTAT -DEL, the Tribunal by majority set aside the demand
of service tax on British Airways, India (BA India) the branch of
British Airways PLC, U.K. (BA UK) at Gurgaon.

Background in brief
The
Appellant as branch office provides air transportation services for
passengers and cargo and on these services has been paying service tax
under (zzn) and (zzzo) of section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the
Act). BA UK like airlines all over the world have agreements with
Central Computer Reservation System service providing companies such as
Galileo, Amadeus, Abacus, Sabre etc. (CRS companies) all located outside
India. These CRS companies facilitate reservation and ticket
availability position to air travel agents in India and all over the
world through online computer system. None of these service providers
has branch or an establishment in India. Accordingly, they maintain
database of BA UK as regards flight schedule, fares, seat availability
on flight etc. on real time basis and make information available to all
IATA agents across the world. In terms of the agreements with BA UK, CRS
companies provide hardware and connectivity with their network. Based
on the ticket sale by the IATA agents using their database, these
companies receive their fees from BA UK. The IATA agents do not have to
pay any fees. The services provided by CRS companies were considered
“online database access or retrieval service” by the department as
contained in section 65(105)(zh) read with sub-Clause (75) and (36) of
section 65 of the Act and since the services are used by IATA agents of
BA India in India to sell tickets, they were treated as received and
consumed in India by BA India. Hence, service tax was demanded on the
remuneration received by CRS companies from BA UK from the Appellant in
this case BA India, under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66A of the Act
read with Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The
Commissioner confirmed the demand and imposed penalties against which
this appeal was filed.

The dispute in the appeal hinges around
the main issue viz. whether the Appellant BA India, a BA UK branch can
be treated as entity separate from its head office, BA UK in terms of
section 66A(2) and therefore the Indian branch be taxed as recipient of
services of CRS companies. Additional issue involved was whether or not
service provided by CRS companies be considered an online service since
both the members were in agreement with treating the service taxable as
online database access and retrieval service contained in section
65(105)(zh) of the Act read with section 65(75) thereof; not much
discussion is provided herein.

The Appellant contended that
service was provided outside India as the CRS companies and their parent
company were situated outside India. Therefore there cannot be tax
liability for the Appellant, BA India. The Appellant’s view of
non-taxability of service tax was based on the grounds that CRS
companies abroad provided services to their head office in London. CRS
company’s server was connected with the server of the head office of the
Appellant and thus the head office received those services abroad. In
terms of section 66A(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act), the branch
and the head office are to be treated as separate entities. Relying on
Paul Merchants 2012-TIOL-1877-CESTAT – Delhi, the Appellant also
contended that service recipient is the person on whose orders the
service is provided, who is obliged to make payment for the same and
whose need is satisfied by the provision of service. Further, they
advanced the argument that had they paid service tax, it was a revenue
neutral case as they would have got CENVAT credit of the same. They also
contended that longer period of limitation did not apply to them as
they bonafide believed that they had no tax liability.

Revenue
discarded this plea finding that CRS companies even if situated outside
India were providing services to the Appellant having establishment in
India which enabled their appointed IATA agents to use the system for
booking tickets and thus derived benefit therefrom and therefore the
Appellant was ultimate service recipient in India from foreign based CRS
companies of online database access or retrieval services u/s. 66A of
the Act from 18/04/2006. According to revenue, since BA UK was permitted
by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to operate in India, the head office of
the Appellant and the Appellant cannot be two distinct entities under
law. Section 66A(2) of the Act did not apply to them. Existence of
Appellant in India without its head office was impracticable and
existence in India was only to fulfill object of its head office in UK
and act on its behalf in India under limited permissions granted by RBI
which in essence and substance is the same. The establishment in India
was created on temporary basis to carry out business in India. On the
above pleas made by the Appellant and the revenue, the two members of
the Division Bench of the CESTAT , Delhi had different views.
Consequently, the matter was referred to the Third Member. The views of
both the members along with those of the third member are summarised
below:

Conclusion: Member (Judicial):
The learned Member
(Judicial) after considering the case of the adjudicating authority and
examining relevant statutory provisions, examined the letter issued by
RBI to BA UK and the agreement between BA UK & Galileo, the CRS
company. RBI ‘s letter contained permission to carry out air
transportation business in India regulated by FEMA in view of the
foreign currency transactions involved.

• The Bench observed
that BA UK had its place of business in India in terms of section
66A(1)(b) of the Act during the impugned period. As a participant of CRS
agreement, the Appellant at its own cost was required to provide
Galileo complete data, timely and accurate in order that the CRS company
would be able to maintain and operate the system to provide access to
the IATA agents the services of reservation, seat availability etc. on
real time basis for a consideration payable by BA UK. According to the
Member, BA India was in no way different from its head office and
therefore the contention that BA India was not party to the agreement
was not correct.
• Air travel agents appointed by the Appellant
received and used the services of CRS and Appellant having place of
business in India is the recipient of services from foreign based CRS
companies.

• Who makes payment to the service provider is not material and no free service is provided by the service provider.


When the Appellant is covered by section 66A(1)(b) of the Act as
recipient of taxable service u/s. 65(105)(zh) of the Act, their plea
that they are immune from service tax in India is ill-founded as their
existence in India is only under the RBI permission whereas 66A(2) of
the Act recognises only different situs under law, but the said s/s.
does not grant immunity from taxation in India once incidence of tax
arises in India. What is charged by revenue is services received in
India and the Appellant has consumed them in India and not the services
received by its head office outside India.

• Appellant’s plea of
revenue neutrality would not exonerate them from the liability it has
under the law and reliance on Paul Merchants (supra) is misplaced as it
related to export of service.

•    Since the Appellant failed to register and file Returns periodically, they committed breach of law which cannot be eroded by lapse of time. Bonafide should be apparent from conduct and a mere plea does not render the adjudication time-barred and thus extended period could be invoked.

Conclusion: Member (Technical) the   member   (technical)   differing   from   the   above conclusion drawn by the member (judicial) made following observations. He however agreed on the issue of classification that services were classifiable as online/ access/retrieval services:

•    Since the term ‘service’ was not defined during the period under appeal, not only there must be an activity provided by a provider of service to the recipient thereof, but there must also be flow of consideration, cash or other than cash, direct or indirect from recipient to the provider and the provision of services must satisfy some need of the recipient which may be personal or business.

•    Under Rule 3 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005, when a service provider is in india and the recipient thereof are outside india, no service tax is chargeable and when the provider is located abroad being a person having a business or fixed establishment outside India and the recipient is located in india being a person having a place of business, fixed establishment in india, he is a person liable for service tax in terms of section  66A read  with  rule  2(1)(d)(iv)  of  the  service tax rules.

•    U/s. 66A(2), when a person carries out a business through a permanent establishment in india and through another permanent establishment in another country, the two establishments  are  separate  persons  for the purpose of this section. second proviso to section 66a(1) is that when a service provider has his busies establishment in more than any one country, the establishment which is directly concerned with the provision of service will be considered service provider.   This  principle  in  the  hon.  Member’s  view would apply to determine as to who is the service recipient in the instant case when provider of service is located abroad and it will be reasonable to treat the establishment most directly concerned with the use  of the service provided as recipient of such services provided by the person abroad.

•    Unlike the transaction of goods, receipt and consumption of a service goes together, as the provision of a service satisfies the need of recipient, the service stands consumed. Accordingly, if service recipient is located in india, the service is received and hence consumed in india but if the recipient is located abroad, there is no liability for the person in india to pay service tax. This is in accordance with the principle of equivalence mentioned in the apex Court’s judgment in the case of all India Federation of Tax Practitioner 2007-TIOL-149-SC-ST and association of Leasing and Financial service companies 2010 (20) STr 417 (SC).

•    Conceptually, Export of Service Rules, 2005 and taxation   of   service   (provided   from   outside   india and received in india)  rules, 2006 put together are the rules which determine the location of service recipient.  thus, when the provider of service is located in india and the recipient thereof is outside india, in accordance with rule 3(iii) applicable to the services other than these in relation to immovable property and performance based services and when they relate to business or commerce, these will be export services and there would be no taxation in india whereas in  the reverse scenario, there will be import of service   in respect of which the service recipient is located in india. However, if both service provider and receiver  of category (iii) for use in his business are also located outside india, there would be no import and therefore no taxation in india.

•    As regards services of CRS companies located abroad, whether they can be treated as received by the appellant in india is to be determined based on the above legal provisions.

•    As regards letter from RBI, it was observed as follows:

i)    BA UK and Ba india are separate establishments and that the branch was not in the nature of a temporary establishment as contended by the department.
ii)    the   agreement   was   between   BA  UK   and   CRS companies abroad which did not have any branch or establishment in india.
iii)    entire payment to Crs companies was made directly by Ba uK outside india and no part was paid by Ba india.

Thus,  the  services  provided  by  CRS  companies  were received by BA UK as both Ba UK and Ba India are to be treated as separate persons in view of the provisions  of  section  66a(2).  They  would  be  treated as received in india only if it has been received by the recipient located in india for use in relation to business or commerce.

Reasoning why the Branch is not the recipient of service.

According to the hon. Member (technical), the revenue’s view that Ba india was the recipient of the services of CRS companies was incorrect for the following reasons:

•    In a transaction of service, the recipient consumes the service simultaneously with the performance of service. thus recipient of a service is the person who is legally entitled for provision of service.  further, consideration in some cases can be direct or indirect. applying this criteria, Ba india can be treated as recipient only if the service provided by CRS companies is meant for the BA india and if BA UK had acted as only facilitator and there was flow of consideration, direct or indirect from BA india to CRS companies. In the instant case, neither BA India is recipient nor is there a flow of consideration, direct or indirect form Ba India to CRS companies.

•    CRS companies did not provide any branch specific service.   The   job of BA india is only to appoint iata agents, collect sales proceeds of tickets sold by agents, fares and remitting the same to h.o. and nothing showed that key business decisions were taken by them for the entire company. applying the principle of second proviso of section 66A(1) discussed above,    it is BA UK – the H.O. office which is to be treated    as directly concerned with the services provided by CRS companies as it cannot be said that the indian branch was the sole beneficiary or that H.O. acted   as a facilitator to enter into the agreements with CRS companies on behalf of branches for providing services to them. The business needs of H.O. are satisfied and therefore h.o. is the recipient of service.

•    There is no evidence or even allegation that BA India made any payment to CRS companies directly or indirectly and there is an accepted position in the order that payment was made abroad by the h.o. directly   to CRS companies and that the two establishments   of BA india and BA UK their h.o. have to be treated   as separate persons in terms of section 66A(2), the transaction of provision of service has to be treated as  taken  place  outside  india.  therefore,  the  service received by BA UK cannot be treated as service received by Ba india.

•    Merely because IATA agents appointed by BA India used the services of CRS companies from abroad, the appellant does not become the recipient of service.

•    The only situation in respect of which service tax can be levied on the branch of a recipient company in india would be wherein the services provided by a service provider located outside india against an agreement with head office of a company incorporated and located outside India and when the head office has entered into a framework agreement with the service provider by way of centralised sourcing of service, the provision of service at various branches located in different countries and the service is provided at the branch in india and the role of the h.o. is only of facilitator. in the instant case of Ba india, from the agreement, it cannot be inferred that the Crs companies were to provide location specific service to the branches of BA UK all over the world.

•    As regards applicability of longer period of limitation also, it was found not available to the department in view of the fact that intent to contravene the provisions of the act could not be attributed when collection of tax would have been a revenue neutral exercise.

Reference to Third Member:
Briefly stated, the points of difference referred to the Third member were:

•    Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellant permitted by reserve Bank of india to carry out air transport activity in india was a branch in india and was recipient of “online database access or retrieval service” from Crs service providers abroad and liable for service tax in terms of section 65(105) (zh) read with section 65(75) under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66a with effect from 18/04/2006 or exempt in terms of 66a(2) and also whether longer period of limitation was available to the department for recovery of tax.

•    The learned Third Member acknowledged various undisputed facts among others that the Crs companies were located outside india, the agreement was between Ba uK and them and payment for the said service was made by Ba uK and in the light of these facts, what was to be considered was whether Ba india was the extension of Ba uK or they had to  be treated as separate legal entities. She noted the contentions of the revenue that various provisions of the Companies act, 1956 which interalia included that the entire accounts from the indian operations stand debited by the head office along with the expenses incurred by the corporate office in relation to operations in india and which also included the payment of CRS debit for tax sold in indian ticketing.  Further, that there was no legal distinction between foreign companies with its parent office abroad and their local subordinate branch office in India and under these circumstances that Ba uK was given permission to open its branch office in India.

She nevertheless, discussed the provisions of 66A read with explanation to s/s. (2) in her observations and found herself in agreement with the observations and finding of Member (Technical) analysed above that services provided by a foreign based company to a foreign based head office cannot be any liability of the appellant to discharge its service tax in as much as service tax being a destination and consumption based tax cannot be created against the non-consumer of the  services.  Likewise  she  also  concurred  with  non- availability of longer period of limitation for recovery to the department as she found revenue neutral situation and also that the issue involved being complicated issue of legal interpretation which cannot be held to be a settled law also found favour with the appellant’s bonafide belief.

Conclusion:
The above decision allowing appeal by the majority will serve as a guiding decision for disputes relating to cross border transactions and particularly those relating to liability of service tax under reverse charge mechanism. the  decision  however  relates  to  the  period  prior  to introduction of definition of ‘service’ with effect from 01-07-2012 and also place of provision of services

Operation and Maintenance Service — whether Consulting Engineering Service

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II. Tribunal :


9. Operation and Maintenance Service — whether Consulting Engineering
Service ?



GVK Power & Infrastructure Ltd. v. CC., CE., S.T.
Visakhapatnam,
2008 (10) STR 146 (Tri.-Bang).

â A demand was raised
on the appellant under ‘Consulting Engineer’ service for the activity of
operation and maintenance of power plant. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the
same and remanded the case back to find out value of services relating to
consultancy and recompute the duty liability.

The appellant contended that their contract was not of an
engineering consultancy. They relied upon the decision of M/s. Rolls Royce
Industries Power (I) Ltd. v. CCE,
2006 (3) STR 292, wherein it was held that
it is the responsibility of the operator to operate the plant smoothly and if
any engineering problem arose, it was his responsibility to find out solution
and operate the machine. The operator was not required to render advice or
consultancy, no service tax was payable.

Citing Daelim’s case, the act of the Commissioner (Appeals)
to remand the case for recalculation was not accepted.


GVK Power Infrastructure Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (10) STER 146
(Tri. Bang).

â The service on
providing operation and maintenance (O&M) power plant was treated by the Revenue
as Consulting Engineering Service. The facts of the case were considered
identical to those existed in the case of M/s. Rolls Royce Industries Power
(I) Ltd. v. CCE,
2006 (3) STR 292 (Tri.). Further, the Rolls Royce case was
followed by the Chennai Bench in the case of CMS (I) Operations & Maintenance
Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Pondicherry
2007 (7) STR 369 (Tri.). Relying on the
ratio of these decisions and also considering the Daelim’s case 2006 (3) STR 124
(Trib.) that contract cannot be vivisected to levy tax on a part of the
contract, the appeal was set aside.

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Non payment of tax collected

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II. Tribunal :



8. Non payment of tax collected :



Febin Advertisers v. CCE, Calicut, [2008 (10) STR 50
(Tri.-Bang)]

â Tax was demanded on
collection of rentals for hoardings under Advertising Service. The appel-lant’s
contention that they rented spaces for display of advertisement did not provide
‘Advertising Service’ was upheld. However, for collecting service tax and not
paying to the Government, interest and penalty were levied.

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New evidences produced by authorities relied upon

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II. Tribunal :



7. New evidences produced by authorities relied upon :



Shrinath Tourist Agency v. CCE, Jaipur, [2008 13 STT 176
(New Delhi – CESTAT)].

â Service tax along
with penalty was demanded from the appellant under the category of Tour
Operator. The appellant contended that they were only booking agents of other
tour operators and were not covered as tour operators. Copies of the agents’
licence issued by the RTO, Udaipur were produced in support of contention.

The Revenue challenged this after getting information from
the RTO, Udaipur that the appellant was having 19 all-India tourist permits and
produced copy of letter received from the RTO, Udaipur. Thus, the Revenue
claimed that the appellant had tour permits and was working as tour operator and
therefore liable for service tax as tour operator.

It was held that since the evidence produced by the Revenue
was not available before the lower authority, the case was fit to be remanded to
the adjudicating authority.

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Mining Service — Interpretation issue

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II. Tribunal :


6. Mining Service — Interpretation issue :



National Mining Co. Ltd. v. CCE, Dibrugarh, 2008 (10) STR
136 (Tri. – Kolkata)

â Service tax with
interest and penalty was demanded by the Revenue under the category of ‘Site
Formation & Clearance, Excavation and Earth-moving and Demolition Services’ on
receipts of the appellant in pursuance of contract with M/s. North Eastern Coal
Field, Coal India Ltd., Assam.

The appellant had collected tax amount from the client and
hence did not contest the tax amount in the appeal. They challenged the levy of
interest and penalty, contending that services rendered were in the nature of
mining service which was brought under the tax net w.e.f. 1-6-2007 and therefore
for period prior to 1-6-2007, no service was taxable and liability of interest
and penalty did not arise.

It was held that since liability of tax was not challenged by
the appellant, interest was required to be discharged. However, penalty was set
aside, based on disputed nature of service, interpretation of the scope of
service and the facts of appellant’s discharge of service tax liability.

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Delay in filing appeal

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II. Tribunal :


5. Delay in filing appeal :



Encore Events v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore,
(2008) 13 STT 173 (Bang – CESTAT).

â The Commissioner
(Appeals) dismissed the appeal filed as barred by limitation. The appellant
filed appeal along with an application for condonation of delay, on the ground
that they received the order only on 8-9-2006. After verifying the facts with
the postal authorities it was found that order was dispatched on 2-1-2006 and
received by the appellant on 5-1-2006, the Commissioner (Appeals) for want of
reason in support of delay dismissed the same.

On verifying records and findings of the Commissioner
(Appeals) that postal acknowledgement contained seal and signature of the
appellant confirming the receipt of order on 5-1-2006, dismissed the appeal.

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Chartered Accountant’s Service

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II. Tribunal :


3. Chartered Accountant’s Service :


Sri Mogam Pullaiah v. CCE, Guntur (2008 TIOL 469 CESTAT
BANG).


â The appellant, a
chartered accountant, entered into contract with APCPDCL/AP Transco to carry out
the activity of billing for them. The Revenue demanded service tax under
Chartered Accountancy Service on receipts from such activity.


The appellant contended that billing was only a clerical
activity and such contracts were even granted to non-chartered accountants. The
work was done by staff who were not even SSC. The Tribunal relied on the
decision rendered by the Larger Bench in the case of CCE v. Umakanth & Co.
and allowed the appeal.

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Cargo Handling Service

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II. Tribunal :


2. Cargo Handling Service :



CCE, Jaipur-I v. Laxmi Trading Co. (2008 TIOL 541 CESTAT
DEL)

â The appellant entered
into contract of transportation of limestone from mines. Through the said
contract, it undertook series of services like mining, loading, transporting &
unloading, all incidental to the main contract. The demand was raised alleging
that loading and unloading service was liable for service tax under Cargo
Handling Service specifying that out of total billing, the amount attributable
to loading can be separated and be subjected to tax.

The Tribunal upheld the finding of the Commissioner (Appeals)
that bills have been raised for transportation of limestone and work of
loading/unloading was incidental to the transportation of limestone and
accordingly, not liable for service tax. Further, it was observed that
incidental activities were required to carry out the work of transportation and
therefore, the services rendered by the appellant to himself to execute the
contract cannot be made liable for service tax.

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Construction of Residential Complex Service

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II. Tribunal :


1. Construction of Residential Complex Service :


Findings of adjudicating authority not challenged by the
applicant.


Mokha Builders and Promoters v. CCE, Bhopal (2008 TIOL
547 CESTAT DEL)

â The appellant, a
builder, paid service tax under Construction of Complex Service and filed a
refund application on the ground of non-taxability of service. Refund claim was
rejected by the lower authority as well as by the Appellate authority. Appellant
contended that they being builders were not liable for service tax and unjust
enrichment did not arise as they did not collect service tax. However, they did
not challenge the findings of the adjudicating authority that agreement for sale
of flat was entered into prior to construction of flat and the appellant
constructed the flat. The Tribunal rejected the appeal on the ground that
findings of the adjudicating authority was not challenged by the applicant.


Further, on issue of unjust-enrichment, the appellant’s
contention that service tax was not collected from purchasers of flat was proved
false, as sale deed with customer mentioned that service tax would be paid by
the purchasers of flat.

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Part B — Some Important Decisions

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New Page 1I. Supreme Court :

Port Service :

(CCE, Bhavnagar v. Velji P. & Sons (Agencies) Ltd. [2008
TIOL 68 SC ST]



Background : In the case of Homa Engineering Works v.
CCE, Mumbai
, 2006 (1) STR 18 (Tri.-Mum.), it was held that the activity of
repairing of ships in port area is not covered by services rendered by the port
or any person authorised by the port and therefore, it was not liable to service
tax as ‘Port Service’. This was also followed in the case of Velji P. Sons
(Agencies) Ltd. v. CCE. Bhavnagar
, 2007 (8) STR 236 (Tri. Ahmd).


The appeal was dismissed on the ground that since Homa’s case
was not appealed against by the Department, no appeal on the same issue in
another case would be allowed.

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Part B: Some Recent Judgments

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Service Tax

I.
High Court :


1. Classification :


Whether consignment agent can be classified as Clearing &
Forwarding agent :


ADH Agencies v. CCE, Chandigarh, [2010 (18) STR 259 (P &
H)]

The appellants claimed that they were consignment agents and
not Clearing and Forwarding agents and therefore, not liable to pay service tax
during the relevant period of dispute.

The High Court relied on their own decision in case of
Kulcip Medicines (P) Ltd.
[2009 (14) STR 608 (P & H)] wherein the Court had
accepted the view taken by the Tribunal in Mahavir Generic’s case [2006
(3) STR 276].

The High Court in the case of Kulcip Medicines (supra)
had held that :

  • The activities of
    clearing as well as forwarding both to be undertaken by an agent in order to
    be taxable under the category of ‘Clearing and Forwarding agent services’ and
    that the word ‘and’ after clearing and before forwarding cannot be interpreted
    as ‘or’.


  • The word ‘and’ has to be
    understood in conjunctive sense.


  • Whenever, a person is not
    performing both the functions, that is clearing and forwarding, he cannot be
    made liable to pay service tax under the category of C & F agents.





In the present case, the High Court held that the appellants
are not liable to pay service tax under the category of C & F agent and that the
consignment agents are not covered within the category of C & F agent services.

2. Penalty :


Whether penalty is automatic where extended period is
invoked ?


Commr. of S.T., Bangalore v. Atria Convergence Tech. P. Ltd.,
[2010 (18) STR 265 (Kar.)]

Service tax was demanded by invoking extended period and also
levied penalty u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994. In an appeal filed by the
appellants against penalty, decision was given in favour of the appellants
holding that there was neither suppression, nor deliberate misrepresentation of
facts.

The Tribunal confirmed the order of the CCE
(Appeals). The Department was of the view that with the invoking of extended
period, levy of penalty was automatic and therefore, appealed against Tribunal’s
order before the High Court.

The Court held that the fact of non-suppression has already
been examined by the CCE (Appeals) and the same being confirmed by the Tribunal,
no penalties can be imposed in the instant case u/s. 78.

3. Renting of immovable property service :


Whether Department’s recovery action legal ?


SSIPL Retail Ltd. v. Union of India, [2010 (18) STR 262
(Del.)]

The Delhi High Court in the case of Home Solution Retail
India Ltd. v. UOI,
[2009 (14) STR 433 (Del.)] had held that service tax was
not applicable on renting per se. However, the Revenue filed a special
leave petition before the Supreme Court against this decision and the matter is
pending before the Apex Court. However, the Department started raising the
demands and also threatened the appellants of actions if they stopped paying
service tax.

The High Court observed that the Apex Court has not granted
stay on Home Solution’s ruling (supra) and therefore, the Revenue cannot
resort to other means to protect revenue.

The appellant’s counsel undertook that corrective steps shall
be taken by the Revenue and the officers shall be instructed not to threaten the
assessees of coercive actions in case of non-payment of tax by them.

4. Stockbrokers :



CCE, Chandigarh v. N. K. Chugh & Co., [2010 (18) STR 145
(P&H)]

The respondents were sub-brokers. The question before the
Court was whether services provided by sub-brokers were covered under service
tax and were taxable. For the similar issue, the Tribunal in 2007 (7) STR 518
had held that sub-brokers were not liable to pay tax when the main broker paid
service tax. However, in the similar case, in 2009 the Tribunal in
(13) STR 158 took a view that the words ‘in connection with’ employed in S. 65
(105)(a) had been overlooked in the said earlier decision and that the earlier
decision was incuriam therefore, sub-brokers are liable to pay service tax.

Since there were conflicting decisions by the same Tribunal,
the High Court directed the case to the Larger Bench of the Tribunal.

II. Tribunal :


5. CENVAT Credit :


(a) Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid by a
job-worker (not liable to pay tax by virtue of exemption Notification No. 8/205
ST, dated 1-3-2005) on a taxable service be denied to service receiver.



CCE & C, Aurangabad v. Laxmi Metal Pressing Works Pvt. Ltd.,
[2010 (18) STR 149 (Tri.-Mumbai)]

The job-worker was exempted from payment of service tax under
Notification No. 8/2005 ST. However, he paid service tax and the recipient of
service availed the CENVAT credit of the same.

The appellant raised a legal issue with reference to the
provisions of Rule 3 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The Department was of the
view that under Rule 3 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the CENVAT credit is
allowed in respect of ‘service tax leviable’ u/s.66 of the Finance Act, 1994 and
since job-worker is exempt from payment of service tax, the same cannot be
considered as ‘service tax leviable’ u/s.66. The respondents pointed out that
the exemption Notification was issued u/s.93, which would exempt the service
provider from payment of service tax leviable u/s.66. Therefore, service tax
though leviable to job-worker, is exempted by virtue of Notification and CENVAT
credit would be available under Rule 3. The Rule permits availment of CENVAT
credit of service tax ‘paid’ by service provider and not ‘payable’. The appeal
by the Department was dismissed.

(b) Whether following services, namely; (i) rent-a-cab
service, (ii) outdoor catering service, (iii) air-travel booking, (iv)
telephone/mobile services, and (v) steamer agent service, are eligible ‘input
services’.



Semco Electrical Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Pune, [2010 (18) STR
177 (Tri.-Mumbai)]

The appellant, a 100% Export-Oriented Unit manu-facturing excisable goods viz. electrical wiring, accessories made of aluminium, zinc and copper alloys, exported all goods except for waste and scrap, which was cleared in DTA (on payment of central excise duty). However, the quantum of the sale was small. As a result, credit of service tax on input service remained unutilised. Accord-ingly, the appellant filed periodical refund claims for service tax paid on ‘input service’ used in the manufacture under Notification No. 05/2006-CE, dated 14-3-2006.

Rejection of refund claims was made on the ground that services, namely (i) rent-a-cab service, (ii) outdoor catering service, (iii) air-travel booking, (iv) telephone/mobile services and (v) steamer agent service were not eligible input services as defined in Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

The following were the stands taken by the appellant?:
    i) The definition of ‘input service’ under the CENVAT Credit Rules is wide enough employ-ing words like ‘activities relating to business’, and ‘such as’. Hence, the manifest intention of the Legislature is to allow credit on all such services, which are relating to business.

    ii) The term ‘business’ cannot be given a restricted definition to say that business of a manufacturer is to manufacture final products, in a case like the present, business of the assessee is an integrated activity comprising of manufacture of final products, advertisement of the final products, entering into sale agreements with the foreign purchasers, export of the said goods, etc.

    iii) Expenses incurred on the ground of commercial expediency by the assessee are covered by the term ‘activities relating to business’, even if it benefits somebody else also. Hence, the Department cannot make artificial distinction between activity relating to business and activity relating to manufacturing activity.

    iv) As observed in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India, 2007 (7) SCC 527, service tax is VAT, which in turn is both a general tax as well as destination-based consumption tax. In the present case, service tax paid on expenditure incurred by the assessee on the outdoor catering, telephone, etc. has to be allowed as input stage credit, particularly since the same forms a part of the price of final product of the assessee.
    
v) Each of the limbs of the definition of input service is independent of the other limb. If an assessee can satisfy any one of the limbs, then credit of the input service should be available.
    
vi) While rejecting the appeals, the Commissioner (appeals) relied upon the one and only one decision of Coca Cola India Private Limited v. CCE, 2007 (7) STR 529. However, the said decision has since been reversed by the jurisdictional Bombay High Court vide decision reported at 2009 (15) STR 657 (Bom.). On this sole ground, the case of the Department should fail. The above view is supported by the decision of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ABB Limited v. CCE, 3009 (15) STR 23.

    vii) In the case of CCS v. GTC Industries Limited, 2008 (12) STR 468, the Larger Bench has held ‘outdoor catering service’ received in the canteen of the manufacturer as input service.
    viii)The assessee contended that though the Supreme Court in the case of Maruti Suzuki has held that only the item satisfying all the three parts of the definition under Rule 2(k) would be considered as ‘input’ when it is used within the factory of production, there is no parallel between the inclusive part of the definition of input and input service.
    ix) The assessee pointed out that the Notification No. 41/2007-ST allows refund of service tax paid on ‘service’. The said exemption Notifica-tion does not use the term ‘input service’ and the intention of the Government is to export goods and not taxes.

The Department’s contentions were as follows?:

    i) The decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Maruti Suzuki applies to the present case as far as eligibility of CENVAT credit is concerned. The use of input service in or in relation to the manufacture of the final products is a condition sine qua non for allowing the CENVAT credit thereon. Similar view was expressed by the Apex Court, the High Court of Bombay and the Tribunal in their decisions of Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd., M/s. Cummins Generator Technologies India Ltd., and Mahindra Sona Ltd.

    ii) The decision in GTC Industries by the Larger Bench should not be followed since no. of workers of the assessee in the present case is less than 250 and therefore, there was no statutory requirement of provision of outdoor catering services to workers and therefore, CENVAT credit on the same should not be allowed.
    iii) The view expressed by the Larger Bench in the case of Cummins Generator should be fol-lowed and the test of 250 workers should be applied to each case to decide the eligibility of CENVAT credit.

The Tribunal made the following observations?:

  •     The High Court in the case of Coca Cola has categorised the definition of input services and the present case falls under the 5th category i.e., ‘Services used in relation to activities re-lating to business and outward transportation up to the place of removal.’ And conceptually any input service forming part of value of final product should be eligible for CENVAT credit.

  •     The definitions of ‘input’ and ‘input services’ being not comparable and coverage of ‘input service’ being wider, the case of Maruti Suzuki could not be relied upon. The intention of the Legislature was that the activities relating to the business should be allowed.

  •     It is for Court to examine whether a service could be considered as an activity relating to business.

  •     That the condition of 250 workers was just an additional fact that was examined by the Larger Bench in the case of GTC industries and therefore, it does not mean that a factory having 249 workers would not be entitled for CENVAT credit.

  •     It was held that the appellants were entitled to CENVAT credit availed on the services used in or in relation to the manufacture of final products or used in relation to the business activity and the services under examination being used by the appellants in relation to business activity were entitled for CENVAT credit.

    c) Whether CENVAT credit of input services is allowed to a unit availing value-based exemption.

Vallabh Vidynagar Concrete Factory v. CCE & C, Vadodara, [2010 (18) STR 271 (Tri.-Ahmd.)]

The appellants, being a small-scale manufacturing unit, were availing excise duty exemption under Notification No. 8/2003 C.E., dated 1-3- 2003 and at the same time were availing CENVAT credit of service tax paid on input services. The Department denied CENVAT credit and also levied interest.

The contention of the Department was that as per Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, CENVAT credit could not be taken on the services which have been used exclusively for manufactur-ing products fully exempt or liable to ‘Nil’ rate of duty. The appellants argued that Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules is applicable only to those manufacturers who are manufacturing both dutiable as well as exempt goods and that Notification No. 8/2003 does not restrict availment of credit of service tax/excise duty paid on services as well as capital goods. And, therefore, credit could not be denied. Accepting the said plea, the Tribunal allowed credit of service tax paid on services used for manufacturing products even if no duty was paid as per Notification No. 8/2003.

    6. Classification?:

    a) Handling of export cargo under port premises by custom house agent be classifiable as ‘Port services’ or ‘CHA services’??

    CC & E, Visakhapatnam v. Chowgule Brothers Pvt. Ltd., [2010 (18) STR 164 (Tri.-Bang.)]

The appellants, Custom House Agent (CHA) registered under CHA services were also engaged in cargo handling in the port premises. Cargo handling services includes handling of export cargo. Relying on the Board’s Circular B43/1/1997 -TRU, dated 6-6-1997, the Commissioner found that loading/handling of import or export goods, transferred from the premises of the exporter, etc. were activities relating to CHA services.

It was held that cargo handling in relation to export goods undertaken by the respondent CHA in port premises cannot be subject to tax classifying the same as ‘Port services’. Upholding the CCE (Appeals) order which was in favour of the assessee, the Tribunal observed that the order of the CCE (Appeals) was in conformity with the decision of this Tribunal in case of M/s. Konkan Marine Agencies v. CCE, Mangalore, [2007 (8) STR (Tri.-Bang.)] which has been upheld by the High Court [2009 (13) STR 7 (Kar.)]. Therefore, the Departmental appeal was rejected and stay application was disposed of.

    b) Whether the master biometrics service agreement be considered as manpower supply agency service or information technology software service.

Cognizant Tech. Solutions (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, LTU, Chennai, [2010 (18) STR 326 (Tri.-Chennai)]

The appellant entered into a master biometrics service agreement with Pfizer Pharmaceuticals (India) Pvt. Ltd. The contract was for rendition of the following services?:

  •     Biometric services in the nature of clinical programming and writing (CPW).
  •     Global Clinical Data Services (GCDS).

  •     Data management.

  •     Bio-statistics and reporting

And the same was divided into two phases?:

At the initial stage, the appellants were supposed to retain workforce of full- time equivalent staff providing data management and bio -statistics and reporting services on behalf of Pfizer. In the second phase, the appellants had to provide functional services to Pfizer.

The workforce recruited and retained by the ap-pellants were required to work under a project manager appointed by the appellants, who has to act as single point of contact being responsible for overall management of the project. It is important to note that the recruitment and training precedes provision of specialised services.

The Tribunal held that the nature of service required to be provided was information technology service as it was related to data management, which was out of the purview of service tax net at the relevant point in time.

    7. Mistake apparent from record?:

When binding decision not considered by Tribunal, be considered as mistake apparent from records.

CCE, Trichy v. Maha Sree Aruna Chemicals, [2010 (18) STR 239 (Tri.-Chennai)]
The Department filed an application for rectification of mistake as the Tribunal had not followed binding judgment delivered in case of Gauri Plas-ticulture (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore, 2006 (202) ELT 199 (Tri.-LB), as the same was not brought to notice of the Tribunal by the Revenue.

The Apex Court, in Furest Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., 2001 6 SCC 356, had held that if the Tribunal failed to notice a binding authority, the principle of per incuriam should be applied and as per the decision by the Larger Bench in Hindustan Lever Ltd., binding precedent not considered would constitute an error apparent from record and the same can be reviewed.

It was held that the final order was passed per incuriam the binding authority of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal and the application of rectification of mistake filed by the Revenue was allowed.

    8. Penalty?:

Whether labour contract in present case be considered under manpower recruitment or supply agency service and whether extended period can be invoked.

Jivanbhai Makwana v. CCE, Ahmedabad, [2010 (18) STR 206 (Tri.-Ahmd.)]

The appellant was engaged in supplying man-power and was covered by supply of manpower service brought in the tax net with effect from 16-6-2005. The appellant obtained registration on 7-4-2005 and on 1-6-2005 the appellant surrendered the registration stating that he was not covered by manpower recruitment agency service. The definition employed words ‘.?.?.?.?.?.?supply of manpower.?.?.?.?.?.’ which were not there prior to 16-6-2005. The Department then advised the ap-pellant to obtain registration on 25-1-2007. The Department then demanded service tax with in-terest and imposed penalty for the period from 16-6-2005 to 31-3-2006.

The appellant contended that the contract en-tered into did not mention about the number of labourers to be provided, but the appellant had to ensure?that?the factory premise is kept clean, bathrooms, and toilets are cleaned properly and drinking water and coffee are supplied to staff and loading and unloading is carried out. Therefore, he does not satisfy the definition contained in the Finance Act, 1994.

The Tribunal held that the contract of supply of manpower is covered by the definition of man-power recruitment agency services since certain services like house-keeping, loading and unloading were related to number of labourers supplied and the contract required to provide labourers as per the company’s requirement and the payment to be made by the company was related to number of labourers supplied during a specified period.

With regard to extended period, the appellant argued that he himself had obtained registration and the appellant was genuine and therefore, there was no suppression of facts. However, it was held that the appellant was aware of the amendment in law and therefore, the appellant could not escape from payment of service tax merely because show cause notice was not issued within time limit and therefore, extended period was invokable. It being a bona fide belief of non-liability, penalties u/s. 73, u/s.76 and u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were set aside.

    9. Refund?:

    a) Whether exporter claiming refund can be re-viewed for payment of service tax by service provider.

CCE, Indore v. Anant Commodities Pvt. Ltd., [2010 (18) STR 214 (Tri.-Del.)]

Notification No. 41/2007 ST provides for claim of refund by an exporter who had used certain specified services for export of goods subject to conditions specified in the said Notification. In the present case, the following grounds emerged?:

    i) The Department argued that weighment, sam-pling and analysis services, cargo handling and stevedoring charges were not specified in the said Notification and the same was wrongly allowed by the Appellate Authority. Weigh-ment and sampling services are not treated as taxable service by the Tribunal and therefore, even if service provider had paid service tax, the same should not be refunded. However, the respondents argued that no separate service tax was paid by service provider for such services and service tax was paid under the category of ‘technical testing and analysis services’.

    ii) The Department represented that the Commis-sioner (Appeals) had erred in allowing refund of service tax on account of ‘Agency services’ instead of Custom House Agent (CHA). The re-spondents submitted that they availed services of a CHA for export of goods and the CHA paid service tax. Therefore, while considering refund of respondents, the assessment of service tax of CHA (service provider) should not be re-opened.

    iii) Refund should not be admissible of the tax not payable but paid by service provider and the same should be treated as deposit. The re-spondents urged that the respondent exporter cannot be reviewed for payment of service tax by service provider.

The Tribunal observed that in the present case, it was not the Revenue’s case that service provider who had provided the taxable service, in question, to the respondents, were not of the categories specified in the said Notification. What the Revenue sought to do as to conduct a detailed review of service tax payment by service providers and then disallow certain amounts of service tax refund to the respondents on the ground that those amounts represented tax on amounts charged for services which were not the part of value of such services. The Tribunal in its series of judgments has held that CENVAT credit cannot be denied to receiver of duty paid inputs, by the Central Excise authorities having jurisdiction over the input received, by revising the assessment of duty at the supplier’s end. The same principle was applied by the Tribunal and the Departmental appeal was dismissed.

b) Whether refund could be denied on the ground that all the details and linkage with goods were not mentioned on invoice of service provider.

M. R. Organisation v. CCE, Ahmedabad, [2010 (18) STR 209 (Tri.-Ahmd.)]

According to Notification No. 41/2007 ST, dated 6-10-2007 as amended by Notification No. 3/2008 ST, dated 19-2-2008, for claiming refund, the receipt issued by courier agency should contain details of exporter, IEC No., etc. and also there should be evidence to link the courier service to export goods. The period of such invoices issued was very close to the Notification date and there-fore, on request, the courier company provided all relevant details.

There was no dispute with regard to export of goods and availment of courier services. The only objection by the Revenue was with regard to details on invoice. It was held that there is no bar to provide the details separately in case original receipt did not contain these details. There is no requirement that the invoice should contain link-age. The exporter can produce evidence later. The matter was remanded back to original authority to decide afresh.

c) Whether refund of pre-deposit be made in cash.

Narendra Raja Textiles Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Coimbatore 2010 (18) STR 249 (Tri.-Chennai)

The assessee was sanctioned part of the refund claim and the Dy. Commissioner ordered the same to be credited to RG 23 account. The appellant asked the Dy. Commissioner (Refunds) to sanction refund in cash. The Commissioner (Appeals) observed that the impugned amount was pre-deposited in cash and the appellant was eligible for refund in cash. The refund of such amount was not governed by S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. However, since the appeal against first order was not filed on time, the assessee could not be granted refund.

As per CBEC Circular No. 275/37/2K -CX.8A, dated 2-1-2002, if the appeal is decided in favour of ap-pellant or matter is remanded for fresh decision, the amount of pre-deposit should be refunded. As observed in case of CCE v. Dhiren Chemicals Ltd. delivered by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court, if the Circulars issued by CBEC have placed a different interpretation, then the same would be binding on the Revenue.

It was held that the appellant was eligible for refund in cash suo moto by the Revenue authorities and the appeal was allowed.

d) Whether refund can be granted of input services not consumed for providing output services to be exported.

Kbase Tech Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise/CST, [2010 (Tri.-Bang.)]

The appellant claimed that by virtue of Circular, No. 120/01/2010-ST, dated 19-1-20110 which was issued recently to grant relief to exports in respect of refund claims, the appellant is entitled for refund of unutilised CENVAT credit. The appellant quoted various recent judgments delivered by the Tribunals on the similar issue.

The Department contended that the orders passed by the lower authority are not legal and proper as it does not take into consideration the conditions laid down in Notification No. 5/06-CE(NT), dated 14-3-2006 related to refund of CENVAT credit and that only that part of CENVAT credit which is attributable to the provision of exported output services can be allowed as refund and the Department’s counsel took support of various judgments as well.

The Tribunal observed that?:

  •     The Legislature has empowered, u/s.37(2) of the Central Excise Act and S. 94(2) of the Finance Act, 1994, the Government to make rules for allowing credit of service tax and rebate of service tax on taxable services which are consumed for providing output services for export and therefore, the rule-making power has to be exercised by the Central Government within this mandate of the statute.
  •     The definition of ‘input service’ has been adopted for the purpose of the Export of Service Rules, 2006 which uses expression ‘any service used by a provider of taxable service for providing output service’, which not only differs from the expressions used in the statutes, but certain inclusions of the said definition prima facie go beyond the scope of the rule-making power of the Government as provided in the legislation.

  •     Under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 governing grant of refund, the expressions used are ‘input service used in providing output service’.

  •     The Officer on Special Duty, who has issued the said Circular dated 19-1-2010, is an officer authorised to communicate orders of the Board or not could not be confirmed. Again the Circular does not speak that it is being issued u/s.37B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Therefore, the binding effect of it is in doubt.

  •     It was held that the Board’s Circular No. 120/01/2010-ST, dated 19-1-2010 does not have the effect of amending the statute and cannot be seen as authorising sanction of refund if the credit of service tax does not relate to services consumed for providing the output service in view of express language used in statute.

  •     The amendment proposed in respect of the said Notification No. 5/2006 to replace the words ‘in relation to’ to ‘in connection with’ is immaterial as the statute or rules are not amended.

  •     All the rules relating to procedural aspects should be an aid to justice. Language employed in subordinate legislation alone most often is not decisive, but regard must be had to the extent, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same is in consonance with legislative mandate. It is the duty of the Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered.

  •     The impugned orders were set aside and ap-peals were remanded to the original authority for fresh examination and decision.


    10. Service to own constituent?:

Whether HUF and its constituent separate entities for service tax??

CCE, Hyderabad v. Universal Travels, [2010 (18) STR 157 (Tri.-Bang.)]

The respondents, one of the constituent units of HUF rendered manpower supply services to other constituent units of HUF, sister concerns and group companies.

They did not pay service tax on the ground that different units of HUF are to be treated as one legal entity.

The Department held that all the constituent units of HUF, though termed as group companies, sister concerns were independent concerns/companies registered under relevant law and had independent business activities and hence service tax was payable on the amounts received form HUF constituents. When appealed, the Commissioner (Appeals) relying on a chartered accountant’s certificate, registration certificate for professional tax and copy of letter issued by ACIT, allowed the appeal. Therefore, the Revenue appealed before the Tribunal.

The Department contended that service tax registration was in the name of M/s. Universal Travels clearly indicating the unit as a separate legal entity under service tax laws and it issued debit notes on other units. Therefore, both the statutory requirements for levy of service tax under ‘manpower recruitment or supply agency’ were satisfied. The respondents contend that they were one of the constituents of HUF and different units of the same HUF doing different businesses cannot be treated as separate legal entities.

The Tribunal observed that the adjudicating authority had not shown or proved under which relevant laws the constituent units are registered as separate legal entities for their legal existence as such. However, on the other hand, the respondents had produced chartered accountant’s certificate, registration certificate for professional tax and copy of letter issued by the ACIT. Therefore, it is as good as providing service to self. Relying upon the Tribunal’s decision in Precot Mills Ltd. v. CCE, Tirupati, [2006    STR 495 (Tri.-Bang.)] the Tribunal rejected the Revenue’s appeal.

Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR)

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New Page 1

I. Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) :


Ruling No. AAR 13 (ST)/2008, dated 7-4-2008.

Construction of residential complex : Liability of builders :


In re : Hare Krishna Developers [2008 (10) 341 (AAR)]

(i) The applicant was a partnership firm desirous of setting
up a joint venture with a non-resident to develop residential complex in Gujarat
on the following lines :

Complex of more than 12 residential units on its own land
and expense where booking of units would be done on the receipt of token
amount. In the agreement to be executed, full value of the unit would be
indicated. Possession would be provided on receipt of full amount and
completion of construction. The construction would be carried out under two
scenarios :



  • by employing own labour;



  • by appointing labour contractors.




(ii) The questions for consideration of AAR were :



  • Whether booking of units by the applicant considered taxable service in both
    the scenarios above i.e., under the category of construction of
    residential complex service as per S. 65(105)(zzzh) ?



(iii) The applicant contended that in both the cases,
the construction was their own and so was ownership until handing over
possession and since the development of property was for self, no service
provider-receiver relationship emerged. CBEC Circular No. 96/7/2007-ST of
23-8-2007 in support of such claim was referred to. Further, the Allahabad High
Court’s decision in Assotech Reality’s case [2007 (7) STR 129 was relied upon,
contending that activities in both the cases were not ‘works contract’.

(iv) Contention of the Department as against the above was
that the proposed activity was either taxable as ‘construction of residential
complex’ service or ‘works contract service’. However, the former being more
specific and also that the relevant clause (zzzh) occurred before (zzzza), by
virtue of rules of interpretation laid down in S. 65A, construction service was
the correct classification. Further, that the Board’s circular referred above
did not provide benefit to the activity as it refers to builder/developer
completing construction on his own and then entering into transaction with the
buyer, thus making a sale of the constructed unit. Also that decision of
Assotech Reality (supra) did not fall in line with the law enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Raheja Development Corporation v. State of Karnataka,
2006 (3) STR 337 (SC) and finally whether construction through own labour or
engaging contractors did not alter the position.

(v) AAR examined and discussed the agreement for booking/sale
of units in the self-developed ‘housing project’ in detail and it was noted by
the authority that actual sale of land together with constructed unit would take
place on completion of construction and subject to payment of full
consideration.

The said agreement for sale inter alia contained the
following salient features :



  • Construction would be as per approved plan under control and supervision of
    the developer and right, title and interest in land and construction would
    vest in builder until delivery of possession.



  • Total consideration and timing of installments to be paid by the
    booker/purchaser.



  •  The booker to become member of the society to be set up to provide maintenance
    of the unit and common infrastructure facility against contribution for the
    same on actual basis.



  • Booker could cancel the booking if desired at any stage and would be entitled
    to refund with interest at agreed rate.



  • Builder to be responsible for obtaining requisite permissions for drainage,
    water connection, power, building use, etc. and booker to sign relevant papers
    for the same.



  • Service Tax applicable, if any, would be paid by the booker.



vi) In the above context, Board’s Circular of 23-8-2007 (supra) was distinguished stating that the classification pertained to the case where developer and buyer met only after the construction was completed and therefore, the relationship was purely of seller and buyer, whereas the proposed activity was qualitatively different. AAR contended further that the whole purpose of inserting sub-clause (zzzh) in S. 65(105) appeared to being within its fold the services of builders / developers in connection with construction of complexes. Making construction as per plan, design and specifications, providing amenities and a host of facilities would undoubtedly constitute services to be provided by the applicant. The timing of transferring ownership would  not determine liability to pay tax. Although from one angle, the applicant can be said to be constructing unit on its own and not exactly on behalf of the booker, the fact remains that honouring of commitment to booker is done from where valuable con-sideration is received in instalments. Construction and allied services is referable to the agreement and cannot be viewed in isolation. Possibility of booker terminating is not material for evaluating true nature of transaction. The authority contended that correct classification of the activity was ‘construction of residential complex’ and it was difficult to accept the contention that it was a self-service and there was no recipient of service, as such argument ‘had no basis, whereas the words used in the construction of construction service ‘in relation to’ were of wide import and a greater nexus was established by these words between the construction and services implicit in such construction. Thus, not merely construction was relevant, but correlated and incidental services were all embraced within the scope of (zzzh).

Further, AAR  found force in  contention of the Departmental Representative that the Allahabad High Court in Assotech (supra)’s case making distinction from K. Raheja’s case (supra) was not valid and the ratio of the Supreme Court was not correctly appreciated by the learned Judges. However, it was stated by AAR that this alternative contention of the Revenue need not be gone into.
 
Accordingly, it was ruled that applicant was liable to pay Service Tax for the proposed activity in both the scenarios under the category of ‘construction of residential complex’ service.

Part B : Some recent judgements


I. Supreme Court:

1. Banking and other financial services:

Whether the service tax is leviable on equipment leasing and hire-purchase finance activities?

    Association of Leasing & Financial Service Companies v. Union of India, 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC)

    The issue before the Apex Court was whether hire-purchase and leasing transactions involved any element of service, in order for the service tax to apply, or such transactions were explicitly chargeable to VAT, being a tax in relation to goods.

    The appellants, members are engaged in the business of hire-purchase and leasing. 46th Amendment to the Constitution of India had inserted Article 366(29A) whereby a set of six transactions were enumerated therein to be deemed as sale of goods. These six transactions included the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose as well as hire-purchase transactions. Consequently, the entire amount paid to the hirer/lessor by way of instalments was chargeable to VAT. It was further argued that once the subject matter of hire-purchase and leasing was constitutionally characterised as a ‘deemed sale’, the transaction could not be taxed by the Central Government.

    The Supreme Court took note of this contention and concluded that the taxable service category ‘banking and other financial services’ under service tax, included within it hire-purchase and leasing transactions.

    The appellant’s members are non-banking financial companies (‘NBFC’). Certain NBFCs undertake activities of equipment leasing and hire-purchase financing in addition to giving loans. The concept of ‘banking and other financial services’ has been clarified with relevant explanations:

    (a) Funding or financing the transaction covers two different and distinct transactions i.e., the financing transaction and the equipment leasing/hire-purchase transaction. While the former is exigible to service tax, the latter is exigible to local sales tax/VAT.

    (b) There is a difference between a ‘finance lease’ and an ‘operating lease’. In the case of hire purchase agreement, the periodical payments made by the hirer is made up of (a) consideration for hire and (b) payment on account of purchase.

    (c) The taxable event is the rendition of service. The tax is not on material or sale; it is on activity/service rendered by the service provider to its customer. Therefore, the Centre undoubtedly had legislative competence to charge the tax on the above service.

    The Supreme Court upheld the charge of service tax on hire-purchase and leasing transactions, if forming part of financial leasing services under service tax law, notwithstanding that the same transactions were chargeable to VAT. There was no double taxation of one transaction to two taxes in this instance, as per the Supreme Court, even though both taxes were chargeable on the same base. It also noted that the service tax was, in fact, chargeable only on 10% of the finance or leasing charge.

II. HIGH COURT:

2. Admissibility of CENVAT credit of service tax:

Whether the services of repair, maintenance and civil construction used in residential colony for employees qualifies for input service?

    Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur v. Manikgarh Cement, 2010 (20) STR 456 (Bom.)

    The respondent-assessee engaged in the    manufacture of cement was disallowed the credit of service tax paid on repairs, maintenance and civil construction, etc. as the services were used in their residential colony on the ground that the said services were not covered under the    definition of input service and hence ineligible as input service.

    According to the Revenue, as per decision of the Apex Court in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi, 2009 (240) ELT 641 (SC), it must be held that the CESTAT was wrong in holding that the assessee was entitled to credit of service tax paid on services of repair, maintenance and civil construction used in the residential colony, whereas as per the assessee, establishing a residential colony was indirectly connected with the manufacturing activity in question related to the business and therefore, the Tribunal was justified in holding that they were entitled to the credit.

    The High Court observed that establishing a residential colony for the employees and rendering taxable services in that residential colony may be a welfare activity undertaken while carrying on the business. However, to qualify as an input service, the activity must have nexus with the business of the assessee. The expression ‘relating to business’ in Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 refers to activities which are integral to the business activity and not welfare activities undertaken by them.

    The High Court held that unless the nexus is established between the services rendered and the business carried on by the assessee, the benefit cannot be allowed. In the present case, rendering taxable services at the residential colony established by the assessee for the benefit of the employees is not an activity integrally connected with their business and therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the services such as repairs, maintenance and civil construction rendered at the residential colony constitutes ‘input service’ for claiming credit.

3. Information Technology Service: Service tax:

Should information technology software be considered goods or services?

Infotech Software Dealers Association v. Union of India, 2010 (20) STR 289 (Mad.)

The petitioner, an association of software resellers prayed for a writ to declare S. 65(105)(zzzze) of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 as null and void, ultra vires and unconstitutional of provisions of Article 245, Entries 92C and 97 of List I and Entry 54 of List II and contended as follows:

  •     Softwares are considered as ‘goods’ and are liable to VAT, as the transaction is of sale of goods.
  •     Imposing service tax on canned software would result in increase in cost by 13% and if VAT and service tax both are levied, then the cost may increase up to around 25%.
  •     Software was held to be goods by the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2004 (178) ELT 22). Dominant intention of the transaction should be considered, following the judgment in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of India and Others, (2006 (2) STR 161), to determine whether the transaction would be considered as sale or service. In the present case, the transaction is related to supply of goods on which only VAT should be levied.

  •     When a transaction is covered by VAT under Entry 54 of State List, the Central Government does not have the competence to introduce service tax under Entry 97 of Union List.

The respondents put forth the following claims:

  •     The standardised softwares are not like any other goods and it may not be considered as sale, es-pecially when the software is supplied with End User Licence Agreement. The software requires a key to activate the software. Further, updates are also provided by the original manufacturer to the end user for a definite period. Therefore, original manufacturer only provides the right to use to the end user and it is not provided with a right to tamper, modify or rectify error of such software.

  •     The said transaction involves three activities, namely, right to install such software, right to run such software and receive updates. Therefore, the same may not be considered as absolute sale. The canned software is capable of being sold off the shelf and the same is excisable goods. However, in case of customised software, service element can be segregated clearly. Providing ‘right to use’ constitutes service which is liable to service tax.

Though Entry 92C is inserted, the same is not given effect to and therefore the residual Entry 97 empowers Union to enact the law.

The Court made the following observations:

  •     Article 366(12) of the Constitution of India defines ‘goods’ to include all materials, commodities and articles. Goods as defined are of wide connotation and include everything of use or value which can be the object of trade and commerce.

  •    The Apex Court in Tata Consultancy Services (supra) had held that the test to determine whether the property is goods or not depends on the capability of abstraction, consumption, use and whether the same can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed, etc. Since software program consists of various commands, it becomes goods, once the appellant makes copies of the same. It may be pertinent to note that the buyer is purchasing intellectual property and not the media. Moreover, while concluding on definition of goods by majority in the Apex Court, observed that goods includes tangible as well as intangible ones. Whether an item would be considered as goods, should be decided based on the following attributes, namely, (i) utility, (ii) capable of being bought and sold, (iii) capable of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed.

  •     In case of 20th Century Finance Corporation [2000(6) SCC 12] it was observed that the transfer of right to use goods is the basis to tax and not the delivery of the goods. However, such goods must be available at the time of transfer of right to use such goods as held in BSNL case (supra).

  •     The present case does not deal with branded or unbranded software, therefore, the issue is not discussed at length, however in view of the above-stated judgments software is ‘goods’ for the purpose of Article 366(12).
  •    Software other than packaged one is priced inclusive of cost of initial installation and modi-fications required. However, copyrights of the software are protected with the creator. Sale of such software is with a condition for exclusive use by the customer and the effective possession and control is passed on to the buyer and annual maintenance charges are recovered for certain services which are chargeable to service tax.

  •     Packaged software attracts excise duty, whereas customised software is exempted from excise duty vide Notification No. 6/2006. Further, document to title conveying the right to use such information technology software services is ex-empted from Basic Customs Duty vide Notification No. 21/2002.

  •     Software sold through Internet downloads would not satisfy the test of ‘goods’, since it does not fit within the ambit of ‘IT software on any media’.

  •    In case of exclusive sale, legislative competence of the State Government under Entry 54 of List II should be accepted and in case when service element is involved, Entry 97 has power to impose service tax.
  •     However, the case of software is not of exclusive sale and therefore, introduction of IT software services is constitutionally valid. Moreover, the nature of transaction is of utmost importance. As held by the Supreme Court in Gannon Dunker-ley’s case (IX STC 353), dominant intention of the parties decides the tax route. The Apex Court observed that in the case of composite contracts not covered by Article 366(29A), unless the transaction in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts, States would not have power to levy VAT.

  •     To form a view whether the transfer of software amounts to sale or services in case of software resellers, the following eminent factors can be looked upon:

(a) Through Master End-user Licence Agreement, normally the developer grants right to use and the copyrights of the software are kept with developer in case of all types of software i.e., canned, packaged or customised.
(b) Further, through that Master End-user Licence Agreement, the members of the association enter into an End-user Licence Agreement. ‘End user’ is the one who uses the product/ service but he does not have any contact with the developer.
(c) Therefore, the transaction is not sale of software as such, but is sale of contents of the data stored in the software, which would amount to service. Only when there is a transfer of right to use any ‘goods’, it would be considered deemed sale under Article 366(29A).

  •     In the present case, the appellants’ contention was that software is considered as ‘goods’ and therefore, the transaction should be considered as ‘sale’. However, it was argued that though software is ‘goods’, all transactions need not be in the nature of ‘sale’, it may vary as per the terms of End-user Licence Agreement. As discussed earlier, Parliament has the power to introduce service tax levy on Information Technology Software services under Entry 97 of Union List. However, all transactions have to be perceived from an independent view whether to be considered as sale or service.

  •     Finally, the Court dismissed the writ petition holding that software are ‘goods’ and whether a transaction would amount to sale or service would depend upon the facts of each transaction.


4.    Outdoor catering service — Service tax v. sales tax:

Whether food and beverages supplied to passengers on board trains is leviable to VAT or not?

Indian Railways C. & T. Corp. Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2010 (20) STR 437 (Delhi)

The petitioner, a Government company provided catering services on board trains run by the Indian Railways. The consideration for these services is included in the fare charged by the Indian Railways collected from the passengers, and then paid to the company by Indian Railways. They had paid service tax on 50% of the value, availing abatement provided under the law, however, no VAT was paid thereon by them.

The issue before the Court was whether the petitioner was liable to VAT. The Court observed as follows:

  •     It is open to the States to levy sales tax/Value Added Tax on the whole of the consideration, in transactions of sale of goods, such as sale to a customer in a restaurant, irrespective of the incidental element of service which is necessarily involved in sale of goods of this nature.

  •     In case of composite transactions, there are two distinct contracts, one for sale of goods and the other for providing services. In respect of the present case, it is not permissible to fragment such a composite contract, so as to levy VAT on the component which involves sale of goods.

  •     In the case of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assn. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (2004) 135 STC 480, it was held that services rendered by out-door caterers are clearly distinguishable from the service rendered in a restaurant or hotel. Outdoor catering has an element of personalised service provided to the customer. The customer is at a liberty to choose the time and place where the food is to be served and the service element is more weighty, visible and predominant. However, in case of a restaurant, the customer’s choice of food is limited to the menu card.

  •     In view of the petitioner, providing of food, snacks and water to the passengers on board the trains is altogether different from an outdoor catering service. The passengers travelling in the trains are served food and beverages as per a fixed menu approved by the Railway Board. Neither the petitioner nor the passenger has any choice in respect of articles to be served in the trains or with respect to the quantity each passenger gets.

  •     The transaction of providing meals and snacks to the passengers is not a composite contract.
  •     The element of service by way of heating the food, heating/freezing the beverages and then serving them to the passengers is purely incidental and minimal required for the sale of food and beverage in this transaction.
  •     Once the property in those goods is transferred to Indian Railways, on account of their being loaded on the trains and kept in the gadgets belonging to Indian Railways, those goods become the property of Railways and at the time of service of those goods to the passengers, title in the goods vests in the Railways and not in the petitioner-company. Thus, it can be said that merely by loading, the property got transferred.
  •     In case, if an accident takes place before the food is served to the passengers, nothing prevents the petitioner agreeing to bear the risk, despite property in the goods having already been transferred to the purchaser. However, risk and reward may not be the conclusive criteria to decide the date of transfer of property in goods.

  •     At the time of execution of the contract, as soon as the meals and snacks are cooked and, being in a deliverable state, are appropriated to the contract by loading them on the compartments of Indian Railways and keeping them in the equip-ment belonging to the Railways, the property in the goods passes on to the Indian Railways. Future goods are also chargeable to VAT.
  •     Payment to the petitioner is required to be made by the Indian railways even if the food is not consumed by the passenger.
  •    The constitutional right cannot be denied to the State, to levy such a tax merely because service tax authorities have already collected service tax from the petitioner.

It was held that the transaction between the petitioner and the Indian Railways does not amount to a contract of providing outdoor catering service but is a transaction of sale of food and beverages by the petitioner-company to the Indian Railways.

5.    Recovery of dues:

Are directors personally liable for arrears of State and Central Sales Tax dues from the Company?? Om Prakash Walecha v. State of Haryana, 2010 (20) STR 384 (P & H)

The question before the High Court was whether the directors can be made personally liable to pay arrears of Central and State Sales Tax dues of a company. The Department contended that u/s.18 of the Central Sales Tax Act 1956, if the Company is wound up then the arrears of State and Central Sales Tax can be recovered from any person who was director for the period when the tax became due. However, in the present case, the company was not wound up or formally liquidated and other judgments on the subject-matter were not disputed by the Department. Therefore, the High Court allowed the writ petition.

III.    TRIBUNAL:

6.    Appeal:

Whether Committee of Commissioners can review the order already reviewed by the previous Committee of Commissioners?
Commissioner of C. Ex., Surat-II v. Gujarat Borosil Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 377 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The Committee of Commissioners reviewed the order passed in favour of the respondents and found the same in accordance with the law and decided not to file appeal against it. The respondents applied for refund as a consequential relief and the same was rejected by the Department.

Thereafter, the Committee of Commissioners again reviewed the earlier order and filed an appeal with application for condonation of delay of 440 days. The Department contended that the length of delay was not relevant and what really matters is ‘sufficient cause’ for delay and that the Tribunal should liberally construe the phrase ‘sufficient cause’. The order was passed without considering the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of CCE, Allahabad v. Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd., (2005 (181) ELT 178).

The assessee contended that the Committee of Commissioners did not have power to review earlier order of the Committee of Commissioners and the case relied upon by the Department was not applicable to the fact of their case.

The Tribunal observed that the Committee had taken a conscious decision of not filing the appeal. Moreover, the said decision of Hindustan Safety Glass Works was available at the time of passing the order and also at the time of review. Therefore, it could not be considered as ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay. Further, subsequent Committee of Commissioners cannot again review the order passed by the precedent Committee of Commissioners, since the matter had attained finality. The appeal was thus dismissed.

7.    CENVAT credit:

(i)    Whether service tax paid on C & F services is allowed as CENVAT credit to a 100% EOU?

Adani Pharmachem (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Rajkot, 2010 (20) STR 386 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The Department contended that the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) was based on the Tribunal’s decision in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. v. CCE, Ludhiana 2007 (212) ELT 410 wherein it was held that the appellants were not eligible for CENVAT credit. However, the appellants relied on the Departmental Circular and the Tribunal’s decision in case of CCE, Rajkot v. 6 respondents including appellants.

The Tribunal allowed the CENVAT credit of service tax?paid?on C&F services to the appellants who are 100% EOU for the reason that the place of removal in case of C&F or FOB exports is load port.

(ii)    Whether various services used by the appellants qualify to be input services in terms of Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004?

Commissioner of Cus. & C. Ex., Raipur v. H. E. G. Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 312 (Tri.-Del.)

  •     Services utilised in relation to generation of steam and electricity towards maintenance of the plant:

Since the steam and electricity generated was not liable to excise duty and therefore, service utilised in relation thereto was not available as CENVAT credit in Department’s view. However, since the issue was decided in favour of the assessee in case of Sanghi Industries Ltd. v. CCE, Rajkot (2009(13)    STR 167) and the services were used within the factory premises, CENVAT credit was held as allowed.

  •     Car insurance:

The Department contended that excise duty paid on cars was not allowed as CENVAT credit and therefore, car insurance was also not allowed. However, the respondents submitted that repairs and maintenance of car was allowed as credit in case of CCE, Jaipur-II v. J. K. Cement Works, (2009(14)STR 538). The Tribunal allowed credit treating insurance as maintenance activity.

  •     Maintenance of air cooler, pay loader, dumper repairing and changing of damaged asbestos sheet of canteen building within factory:

The Department contended that this was not used in or in relation to manufacture of final product. However, the activity was undertaken within the factory premises and it had nexus with the business activity and therefore was allowed.

  •     Security services at a place other than factory premises:

Since the direct nexus with activities relating to manufacture was not established, the Tribunal remanded back the matter to the original authority.

  •     Rent-a-cab services:

The services were utilised by executives in relation to procurement of raw material, sale of finished goods and therefore, the same was held as connected to the business activity and was allowed. Reliance was placed on Ace Glass Containers Ltd. v. CCE, Meerut-II, [2010 (250) ELT 110].

  •     Commission on sales:

Commission paid in relation to procurement of orders and consequently for business activity was held as allowable.

  •    Mobile phone services:

Following the Gujarat High Court’s decision in the case of CCE v. Excel Crop Care Ltd., [2008 (12) STR 436], this was allowed.

(iii)    Does the activity of commission agent for sales promotion fall under the definition of
‘input service’?

Commissioner of C.Ex., Jallandhar v. Ambika Over-seas, 2010 (20) STR 514 (Tri.-Delhi)

A manufacturer-exporter of tools appointed an overseas commission agent for sales promotion activities in the overseas market. They paid service tax along with interest on the commission as recipients and took eligible credit of the same, treating the services of agents as ‘input service’. This was challenged by the Department holding that services rendered by them cannot be held to be utilised in the manufacture of final products and therefore, cannot be treated as inputs services. The activity of a commission agent was considered a post removal activity.

Since the definition of ‘inputs services’ included any services used in relation to ‘sales promotion’, the activities of overseas commission agents were clearly part of sales promotion activities, the case was decided in favour of the respondents.

(iv)    In case of closure of factory, can cash refund of CENVAT credit be claimed?

Commissioner of C. Ex., Ludhiana v. Manish Spinning Mills (P) Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 540 (Tri.-Delhi)
The assessee’s finished goods were destroyed in a fire. They applied for remission to the Commissioner. The Assistant Commissioner granted refund in the form of CENVAT credit. The Commissioner (Appeals) had accepted the plea of the assessee for cash refund. Relying on the case of Slovak India Trading Co. P. Ltd. v. CCE, Bangalore, 2006 (205) ELT 956 (Tri.-Bang.) upheld by the Karnataka High Court in 2006 (201) ELT 559 (Kar.) wherein it was held that Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 did not expressly prohibit cash refund of unutilised credit, the Tribunal held that the ratio of the decision was applicable to the present case and therefore Revenue’s appeal against cash refund was rejected.

8.    Manufacturer: Service tax under commis-sioning and installation service:

Whether service tax is leviable on erection, commissioning and installation services rendered by a manufacturer on which excise duty is already paid by including the same in the assessable value?

Alidhara Texspin Engineers v. Commissioner of C. Ex. & Customs, Vapi, 2010 (20) STR 315 (Tri.-Ahmd.)
The appellants were engaged in the manufacturing of textile machineries. The appellants were entering into a composite contract for sale and supply of such machineries in fully installed, commissioned and in operational condition. Moreover, gross amount charged was inclusive of installation and commissioning charges and excise duty was levied on the same. Further, such work was sub-contracted and the sub-contractor was paying service tax on the same. The Department held that the appellants were engaged in providing erection, installation and commissioning services u/s.65(39a) of the Finance Act, 1994 and it levied service tax on the whole gross amount charged in absence of segregation of quantum of such service charged received by the appellants. It was held that S. 65(39a) of the Finance Act, 1994 covered commissioning and installation agencies, whereas the appellants were a manufacturing unit and had paid excise duty on the same treating the process as incidental to comple-tion of manufactured product. Relying on various judgments, the appeal was allowed.

9.    Stock broker’s service:
Whether the sub-broker is liable to pay service tax when the stock broker has paid service tax on the same transaction?

Vijay Sharma & Co. v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Chandigarh, 2010 (20) STR 309 (Tri.-LB)

The Revenue submitted that the sub-brokers reg-istered with SEBI or made application for registration under SEBI Act, 1992, were covered within the definition of stock broker u/s.65(101) of the Finance Act, 1994 with effect from September 10, 2004. Further, the services provided by sub-brokers or stock -brokers in relation to sale or purchase of listed securities are taxable services and sub-brokers were liable for service tax. The appellants contended that they paid service tax to the main broker who ultimately has discharged the same on behalf of the sub-broker. A sub-broker provides services to a stock-broker who in turn provides services to its clients. Therefore, sub-brokers are not liable to service tax since sub-brokers and stock- brokers are agent and principal and this would amount to double taxation.

There being conflicting judgments of the Tribunal for the issue, the High Court referred the matter to the Larger Bench for deciding the same afresh in view of the amendment in the law.

The Larger Bench observed that sub-brokers were covered in the definition of stock-broker with effect from September 10, 2004. However, service being event of levy of tax, same service cannot be taxed twice. Therefore, the sub-brokers and the stock-brokers being agent and principal, the same transaction shall not be liable to double taxation. In the present case, the matters were remanded back for verification of payment of service tax by stock brokers. ?If?found that the stock-broker had paid service tax on behalf of the sub-broker, then the Department was directed to reduce the sub-broker’s demand.

10. Waiver of penalty:

Whether delay in obtaining registration and pay-ment of service tax amounts to evasion?
Star Energy Systems v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad, 2010 (20) STR 479 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellant is a proprietor providing erection, commissioning and installation services. The category came into effect on 1-7-2003, however the appellant got itself registered on 26-10-2004 and voluntarily paid service tax with interest for the period 1-7-2003 to 26-10-2004 and on filing the returns, the Department began proceedings. Thereafter, with the introduction of Notification No. 18/2003-ST exemption benefit was claimed by the appellant whereby individuals providing commissioning and installation services were provided exemption. The appellant did not challenge the liability of service tax or seek refund of the same, but requested for waiver of penalties. It was held that an individual to be treated as a commercial concern cannot be accepted. In spite of the fact that the appellant could have challenged the liability, he did not even seek refund of voluntarily paid service tax and interest. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was an intention to evade tax and the appeal was allowed.

Part B: Some recent judgements

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Service Tax

I. High Court :



Renting of Immovable property service :

Constitutional validity of levy of service tax on commercial
renting and retrospective amendment, w.e.f., 1-6-2007.


Shubh Timb Steels
Limited v. Union of India,
2010 (20) STR 737 (P & H)

The petitioner, owner of commercial immovable property, let
it out to business entities on rental basis. The petitioner challenged the levy
of service tax on renting of immovable property covered u/s.65(90a) and S.
(65)(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994 and its retrospective amendment under
the said category as ultra vires the legislative competence of the Parliament.
The gist of contentions of the petitioner was that the matter of levy of service
tax on providing service of renting of immovable property was covered by Entry
49 of List II and not by Entry 92C or 97 of List I, and retrospective levy was
beyond legislative competence. Further, the transfer of property without any
value addition by way of service could not be covered by the levy of service tax
as renting of a building was a transaction of land & building covered by Entries
18, 45 and 49 of List II in respect of which exclusive jurisdiction to legislate
under Article 246(3) was vested in the State Legislature. Leasing was a transfer
of rights and not a service and was, therefore, not covered by Entry 92C of List
I. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of
Home Solution Retail India Limited v. Union of India and Others, 2009 (14) STR
433 (Del.), wherein it was held that service was to be provided in relation to
the renting of property and the property by itself could not be regarded as
service as it did not involve any value addition. As against this, the Revenue
contended that under Article 246(1), the Parliament had exclusive power to make
laws in respect of matters covered under List I including residue entry and that
the amendment with retrospective effect was only clarificatory in nature, such
levy was already provided under unamended provisions. The scope of Entry 49 List
II was limited to direct tax on property and not on activity in relation to
property. In any case, Entry 49 List II had to be read subject to Entries 92C
and 97 of List I. It was further argued that the judgment of the Delhi High
Court [Home Solution Retail India Ltd. v. Union of India and Others (supra)] did
not involve the issue of validity of the levy but involved question of validity
of the Notification and the Circular to recover service tax from the lessors of
property on the proceeds of renting out of property. The retrospective amendment
made the renting of immovable property itself a service covered by the
definition of taxable service.

The Court held as follows:

  •      Service tax is a destination-based consumption tax being not a charge on business but on consumer and is leviable on service provided, hence, is a value added tax. Such service can be property-based or performance-based.

  •      In case of overlapping, the doctrine of pith and substance is to be applied and the Court has to look at the substance of the matter. List I has priority over List II, though predominance of List I does not prevent the State Legislature from dealing matters under List II.

  •      Considering various judgments it was observed that Entry 49 of List II relates only to tax on land and buildings and not any activity relating thereto. It cannot be held that renting of property did not involve any service as service could only be in relation to property and not by renting of property.

  •      The aspect of service element in renting transaction is an independent aspect covered under Entry 92C read with Entry 97 of List I. The subject-matter of impugned levy being outside the scope of Entry 49 of List II, power of the Union Legislature is undoubted.

  •      As regards the retrospective amendment, the High Court observed that the object of validating law is to rectify the defect in phraseology or lacuna and to effectuate and to carry out the object for which the earlier law was enacted.

Based on the above, the petition was dismissed holding that renting of immovable property for commercial purposes is a service having a value for the service receiver and therefore, service tax is leviable on the renting of immovable property as being covered under Entry 92C read with Entry 97 of List I on the value of taxable services referred to in S. 65(105)(zzzz) read with S. 65(90a) of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, the retrospective amendment retrospectively with effect from 1-6-2007 was also upheld.

II. Tribunal:

2. CENVAT credit:

    (a) Can CENVAT credit be availed on the strength of debit notes?

    Godrej Consumer Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex., Indore, 2010 (20) STR 609 (Tri.-Delhi)

    The appellants took CENVAT credit of Rs.7,327 based on debit notes and the credit was denied. Penalty of Rs.20,000 was imposed on the appellants for wrong availment of credit.

    Rule 9(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 mentions the documents on the basis of which CENVAT credit can be availed. Such documents are invoice, challans, supplementary invoice and bills of entry. Therefore credit was denied by the departmental authorities considering debit notes as ineligible document for availing CENVAT credit. Rule 15 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 prescribes penalty for wrong availment of CENVAT credit at Rs.2,000 or amount of service tax, whichever is higher, at the discretion of the authority. The appellant was levied penalty of Rs.20,000 and no finding was given for levying such penalty. Considering the amount of penalty arbitrary, it was reduced to Rs.2,000 and as such the appeal was partially allowed.

    (b) Can CENVAT credit be taken on service tax paid on repair and maintenance service for residential staff colony?

Commissioner of C. Ex., Trichy v. Madras Cements Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 672 (Tri.-Chennai)

The respondents paid service tax on repair and maintenance service for residential staff colony of workers. It was held that nexus is required between the services and the manufacture or clearance of excisable goods before the benefit of CENVAT credit could be taken in respect of such services. The assessees failed to establish any such nexus between the services which were considered by them to be input services and therefore, benefit of CENVAT credit was not allowed.

(c)    Whether CENVAT credit of telephone installed in residential premises of chief executive and CHA service for clearance of import and export goods is allowable?


Mileen Engineers v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Mumbai-III, 2010 (20) STR 668 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The appellants availed the facility of CENVAT credit of duty paid on the inputs as well as service tax paid on the services of CHA and the telephone installed in the residential premises of the Chief Executive. The same was denied by the lower authorities as per the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The Tribunal allowed CENVAT credit on CHA service but denied in case of telephone installed in the residential premises and held that credit is admissible only in case of exclusive use of telephone for business purpose.

3.    Export of service:

Whether services for procuring purchase orders in India for foreign suppliers satisfy conditions under Export of Services Rules, 2005?

Em Jay Engineers v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai, 2010 (20) STR 821 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The appellant filed a refund claim of Rs.6,71,439 on the ground that their activities are considered as export of service and exempted from payment of service tax. After scrutiny of the claim, a show-cause notice was issued and the Adjudicating Authority sanctioned the refund claim partially rejecting an amount of Rs.1,40,268 on the ground that the claim was not admissible as per Notification 2/2007-ST.

This Notification provided that the two conditions needed to be fulfilled for considering any taxable service as export of service, viz.: service is provided from India and used outside India, and payment for such service provided outside India is received by the service provider in convertible foreign exchange. The appellant received commission from their foreign principal in foreign currency for introducing the Indian clients to the foreign suppliers. The foreign principal used these services outside India and exported those goods to the buyers in India and directly collected payments from the buyers. The appellants were not required to pay service tax and were entitled for refund. The appellant claimed rebate of service tax under Rule 5 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005. It was held that refund was allowable.

4.    Input service:

In respect of overseas commission paid, whether input service has connection with manufacture or sale?

Commissioner of C. Ex., Jalandhar v. Ambika Forgings, 2010 (20) STR 662 (Tri.-Delhi)

A manufacturer sold the goods to foreign buyers and paid commission to overseas parties. This commission was considered by the assessee as ‘input service’. The question that arose is whether the commission had nexus with manufacture or sale. Credit was denied relying on the meaning of ‘promotion’ as in the dictionary. As per Rule 2(l)(ii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, broad activities which are having nexus to business and are integrally connected to business fall under the definition of ‘input service’. It was observed that once legislative mandate is apparent, no technical meaning need to be assigned to deny credit. As per common business parlance, business promotion adds to revenue of the seller/manufacturer. If business promotion adds to the revenue, it would have nexus with the sale activities. Therefore, the respondent would take credit of input service on overseas commission paid and excise duty payable on manufacturing activity. The case of the Department was thus dismissed and the manufacturer was allowed credit.

5.    Principle of natural justice:

Is it justified to deny CENVAT credit to the assessee when documents relied upon while denying the credit were not made available to the assessee by the Authority?

Idea Mobile Communication Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex., Meerut-I, 2010 (20) STR 775 (Tri.-Delhi)

Rule 9(2) of the ‘CCR’, provides discretion to the adjudication authority to give concession to the assessee in relation to procedural irregularity regarding maintenance of documents, on the basis of which CENVAT credit can be availed. In the instant case even before ascertaining the liability of the assessee and applying its mind, the authority arrived at final conclusion and passed the order denying credit. The matter was remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for fresh decision. The assessee produced all original invoices for verification before the Authority. However, the Revenue failed to take notice of the same and no reply was issued to the letter addressed to the Superintendent. The Adjudicating Authority relied on certain documents which the assessee was not aware of. It was held that the principle of natural justice was denied to the assessee as the document on which the order relied upon were not disclosed to the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and remanded the case back to the lower authority for fresh adjudication.

6.    Penalty:

(a)    Whether penalty can be imposed in case there is ignorance for payment of tax

Sri Krishna Smelters Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem, 2010 (20) STR 780 (Tri.-Chennai)

The assessee was held for non-payment of service tax and penalty was imposed u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994 and contended that the assessee cannot be held responsible for non -payment of service tax as there was no intention to evade payment of tax, as the entire amount of tax was available by way of credit. It was further held that S. 78 was invoked on the ground that the assessee failed to file the returns. The Tribunal held that failure to file returns was not sufficient to hold the assessee guilty of suppression and considering that the entire amount of tax was available as credit, there was no intention to evade payment of tax. Hence, the penalty imposed u/s.78 was set aside.

(b)    Whether penalty can be imposed u/s.76 and u/s.78 if service tax has been paid along with interest willingly?

Idial Security Organisation v. Commissioner of S.T., Ahmedabad, 2010 (20) STR 787 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellant was providing security agency services. Penalties under various Sections of the Finance Act, 1994 were also imposed. On coming to know of the liability, immediately full amount of service tax along with interest was deposited. The appellant did not pay the service tax only because he was not aware of the law. It was a one -man show and he had not collected service tax from the customers. Even though it can be said that ignorance of law cannot be an excuse, it is one of the factors while considering imposition of penalty. Considering this a fit case for waiver of penalty, S. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 was extended and the appeal was allowed.

(c)    Whether penalty is imposable in case of ad-justment of excess tax of a particular month in subsequent months?

Chettinad Cement Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy, 2010 (20) STR 815 (Tri.-Chennai)

The appellant intended to adjust excess service tax paid for the month of March towards subsequent month’s liability. This not being a case of delayed payment of service tax or failure to pay service tax and in way it could be said to be tax paid in advance, it was held that the assessee could not be penalised u/s.76 of the Finance Act, 1994 which is applicable in case of failure to pay tax. However, u/s.77, penalty of Rs.1000 was imposed and the appeal was allowed.

7.    Valuation : Sales tax paid on materials:

A. N. Palaniappan v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy, 2010 (20) STR 781 (Tri.-Chennai)

Materials consumed during the course of carrying out the activity of retreading of tyres under the service head ‘Maintenance and Repair Services’ could take benefit of Notification No. 12/2003-ST, dated 20 -6-2003. As per this Notification, so much of the value of taxable services, which is equal to the value of goods and materials sold by the service provider to the service recipient, is exempted from payment of service tax. In the instant case, the assessee was paying sales tax on the materials consumed and hence, the order levying service tax on such material component was set aside.

Cosmetic and Plastic Surgery

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Service Tax

1. Introduction


Cosmetic and plastic surgeries
impact public perception in as much as our society places high value on physical
appearances of people they interact/deal with at a personal or business level.
Personal aspects such as appearance and presentability have gained increased
importance in the era of globalisation and in the general outlook of our society
at large. People, who are born with visible deformities or have been deformed
subsequent to accidents, diseases, etc., are often perceived to face social
difficulties and generally develop reduced confidence levels. For others, who
work in glamorous fields like films, TV, media, fashion, modelling, beauty care,
product marketing, airlines, etc., physical appearance is of prime importance.
And surgeries are often resorted to in order to help them in keeping their
appearance youthful or beautiful so as to enable them to conduct their
respective business/ profession with higher confidence levels and aggression in
a highly competitive business environment.

When beauty treatment services
provided by ‘beauty parlours’ were brought under the tax net, the board, vide
Para 3 of its Circular No. B11/1/2002 TRU, dated 1.8.02 clarified that beauty
treatment services do not include plastic surgery/cosmetic surgery which help
improve one’s appearance, as they are not the kind of services provided by
beauty parlours. These are more appropriately classifiable as medical services.

In this regard, it is worthwhile
to note that in CCE vs New Look Cosmetic Laser Centre (2009) 18 STT 555 (Ahd –
CESTAT), it was held that laser treatment given either by doctors or under a
doctor’s supervision and guidance for curing physical disorders and deformities
and for removal of facial and body hair, have to be held as “Cosmetic Surgical
Service” and will not be taxable under “Beauty Treatment Services”.

Increased prominence of cosmetic
and plastic surgery under the modern business and social scenario and judicial
views cited above, could have prompted the government to tax the said service
specifically.

A Cosmetic and Plastic Surgery
Services category has now been accordingly introduced and made effective from
1.9.2009. Hence, one can say, a beginning has been made to tax medical services
in a restricted manner.

2
Relevant Statutory
Provisions






  • Section 65(105) (zzzzk) of the Finance Act, 1994
    (as amended) [Act]


Taxable Service provided or to
be provided, means and applies

“to any person, in relation to
cosmetic surgery or plastic surgery, but does not include any surgery undertaken
to restore or reconstruct anatomy or functions of body affected due to
congenital defects, developmental abnormalities, degenerative diseases, injury
or trauma”

3
Scope of Services


a) The terms “Cosmetic Surgery”
and “Plastic Surgery” are not specifically defined under the Act.

The understanding of the said
terms in common parlance is as under:


  • ‘Cosmetic
    Surgery’ usually involves techniques intended for the betterment and
    enhancement of physical appearance through surgical and medical techniques,
    and is specifically concerned with maintaining normal appearance, restoring
    it, or enhancing it beyond the usual level towards some aesthetic objective
    employing modern technological advancement.


  • ‘Plastic Surgery’
    is usually understood as the functional and structural removal of all types of
    defects/deformities of the human body (for example, skin transplant of a
    person who has met with a fire accident). Modern plastic surgery has evolved
    along two broad areas, viz. reconstruction of anatomic defects and aesthetic
    betterment of usual form.


Although both surgeries have
identical techniques and approaches, there are differences. Plastic surgery is
usually performed to treat birth and other subsequent defects, and to remove
skin blemishes such as, acne scars, or birthmarks. Cosmetic Surgery, on the
other hand, is usually performed to make a client look younger, better and more
beautiful than earlier or to enhance his/her appearance in other ways.

b) As regards the Scope of
Cosmetic and Plastic Surgery Services, the Department vide its Circular Letter
D.O.F. No. 334/13/2009 – TRU, dated 6.7.09, has clarified as under:



Para 2.4.1

“Beauty treatment services
provided by saloons, beauty parlours and beauticians are taxable since 2002. The
services now proposed to be taxed are cosmetic surgery and plastic surgery which
are undertaken to preserve or enhance physical appearance or beauty. As per the
common definition, surgery is a medical technology consisting of a physical
intervention on tissues. As a general rule, a procedure is considered surgical
when it involves cutting of a patient’s tissues or closure of a previously
sustained wound. Commonly, surgery is performed in a sterile environment with
anaesthesia and antiseptic conditions using surgical instruments. It also
includes non-invasive surgery.”

c) The Department, in the above
cited circular has in Para 2.4.2 specified that some of the commonly known
aesthetic/cosmetic surgeries are as under :

  • Abdominoplasty
    (tummy tuck)

  • Bletharoplasty
    (eyelid surgery)

  • Mammoplasty

  •  Buttock augmentation and lift

    •     Rhinoplasty (reshaping of nose)

    •     Otoplasty (ear surgery)

    •     Rhytidectomy (face lift)

    •     Liposuction (removal of fat from the body)

    •     Brow lift

     

    •     Cheek augmentation

    •     Facial implants

    •     Lip augmentation

    •     Forehead lift

    •     Cosmetic dental surgery

    •     Orthodontics

    •     Aesthetic dentistry

    •     Laser skin surfacing, etc.

        4. Specific Exclusion of Certain Surgeries

    Any reconstructive surgery carried out as a part of the treatment of a disease is excluded from the ambit of service tax. The Department, in its “Circular Letter” dated 6.7.2009, has clarified as under:

    Para 2.4.3

    “Any reconstructive surgery undertaken to restore one’s appearance, anatomy or bodily functions affected due to congenital defects, developmental abnormalities, degenerative diseases, injury or trauma would be outside the scope of this service. These processes could be undertaken to correct im-pairment caused by burns, fractures or congenital abnormalities like cleft lip, etc.”

    A few examples of degenerative diseases are:

        Parkinson’s Disease

        Cancer

        Diabetes

        Heart Ailments

        Prostatitis

        Arthritis

        5. Clarification Required on Scope of Services

    Considering the technicalities of the matter, issues are likely to arise as to what can be included or not included within the scope of “Cosmetic & Plastic Surgery” liable to service tax.

    Hence, in order to avoid litigations, it is felt that detailed clarifications explaining the scope of surgeries liable to service tax may be issued by CBEC after seeking detailed inputs from the Indian Medical Association or any other reputed body having expertise on the subject matter.

        6. Essential Criteria for Taxability

    The essential criteria for taxability can be sum-marised as under:

        a) Services can be provided to any person, by any other person

        b) Services should be provided in relation to cosmetic surgery or plastic surgery

        c) Any surgery undertaken to restore or recon-struct the anatomy or the functions of body affected due to

    •     Congenital defects

    •     Developmental abnormalities

    •     Degenerative diseases

    •     Injury or

    •     Trauma

    are specifically excluded from the scope of taxable service.

        7. Some Issues

    X is a science graduate and has done specialized courses which enable him to advise/carry out cosmetic surgery for the betterment and beautification of the appearance of his clients. Would X be liable to service tax under “Cosmetic & Plastic Surgery Services”?

    7.1A Unlike some taxable services (like architect, practising CA, etc), the statutory definition of taxable service U/s 65 (105)(zzzzk) of the Act, does not specify any particular qualification which a person providing the ‘cosmetic and plastic surgery service’ should possess. Therefore, services rendered by any person whether he is a qualified doctor or otherwise which constitutes Cosmetic of Plastic Surgery Services, would become taxable.

    In this regard, attention is drawn to the ruling in the case of Parasmal Bam v. CCE [2007] 3 STR 73 (Delhi- CESTAT), wherein it was held that “management consultancy services’ rendered by any person would be taxable inasmuch as the definition of management consultant services does not prescribe any specific qualification; and, therefore, even if the person acquires the consultancy skill by way of experience, the services rendered by him would be taxable.

    Hence, X would be liable to service tax, subject to available exemptions (like Ten Lakhs Threshold Exemption).

    A reputed hospital in Mumbai, equipped with the latest and technologically advanced infrastructure, has a division which conducts cosmetic and plastic surgeries. The surgeons who actually carry out the surgery are not employed by the hospital but are engaged on a professional basis. They are paid per surgery.

    As per the policy of the hospital, a person intend-ing to undergo surgery has to avail presurgery/ post-surgery services provided at the hospital. Ac-cordingly, the hospital bill raised for surgery usually includes the following charges:

        a) Indoor Hospitalisation

        b) Pre-operation Care

        c) Clinical/Pathological Tests

        d) Charges of Anaesthesiologist

        e) Surgery Charges

        f) Operation Theatre Charges

        g) Room Charges

        h) Cost of Medicines

        i) Post-surgery Care

    Who would be liable to service tax under “Cosmetic & Plastic Surgery Services” and on what amount?

    7.2A Cosmetic and plastic surgery services are rendered by the hospital to a patient. In order to provide the said service, the hospital avails services of surgeons on a professional basis. Hence surgeons are sub-contracted services providers. According to clarifications issued by CBEC through its Master Circular dt. 23.8.07, it would appear that exemption to sub-contracted service providers may not be available as per the government’s line of thinking. Hence, if the amounts charged by a surgeon for cosmetic and plastic surgery exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs during the period 1.9.2009 to 31.3.2010, service tax could become payable on amounts exceeding Rs. 10 lakhs.

    Since the ultimate service provider to a patient is the hospital, there would be a liability of service tax under cosmetic and plastic surgery services on the hospital.

    As regards the value on which service tax would become payable, under Section 67 of the Act, Value of taxable services is the gross amount charged for providing such taxable service. Hence, it would appear that the amount received by a service provider must have nexus to the taxable services rendered by him in order to constitute that amount as value of taxable service.

    CBEC had, vide its erstwhile Circular No. 65/14/2003, dated 5.11.2003, clarified as under:

    “In this regard it may be noted that Rule 6 only prescribes the procedure of payment of tax. The liability to tax is created by Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 as amended from time to time. The liability to pay tax is fastened on the service provider by Section 68 of the said Act. These two sections read together imply that service tax is pay-able by the service provider on the value of taxable services. Thus if a service provided is taxable, tax has to be paid on its value. Section 67 also clarifies value of service as the amount charged for the tax-able service when it has a nexus with the service provided. That is the reason why the expression used in Rule 6 is “value of taxable services” and not amount. The implication is that the tax has to be paid on the value of taxable services attribut-able to the service provided in a month / quarter as and when it is received. Thus Rule 6(1) cannot be read in isolation”.

    In this regard, it may be noted that in a case under Central Excise [viz Acer India Ltd., (2004) 172 ELT 289 (SC)], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the value of manufactured goods cannot be deter-mined by over-riding the provisions of the charging section. The amount received by the manufacturer must have nexus to the goods manufactured by him. [In this case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the issue of inclusion of value of software in the value of computer.]

    In light of the foregoing, a reasonable view is possible that service tax is payable only on the surgery charges identified and included in the bill raised by the hospital on a patient.

    However, it needs to be expressly noted that Section 65(105) (zzzzk) of the Act which defines the taxable service, employs the terminology “in relation to Cosmetic Surgery or Plastic Surgery”. The term “in relation to” has a very wide connotation as interpreted by the Supreme Court from time to time. Hence, service tax authorities could take a view that service tax is payable on the total amount of the bill, on the ground that all charges (other than surgery charges) are levied in or in relation to providing cosmetic and plastic surgery services.

    In either scenario, in cases where a surgeon charges service tax on a bill raised on a hospital, the hospital would be in a position to avail the benefit of CENVAT Credit.

Part A — Supply of tangible goods for use

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New Page 1

1. Introduction :

In most of the States, VAT (commonly known as Lease Tax) is
charged on the amount received by the supplier, permitting right to use the
goods where the possession and control is transferred to the user. However in
many cases, more particularly where machinery or equipment is of a highly
technical nature and operation of the same requires special skills and
experience, possession and effective control of such machinery or equipment is
not transferred to the user. Such transactions do not attract sales tax/VAT.


Under service tax, generally transactions of hire/lease of
moveable assets hitherto did not constitute taxable service under the Finance
Act, 1994 (Act). (However, transactions in the nature of financial lease, were
being taxed under Banking & Other Finance Services category.)

Hence, transactions of hire/lease of movables, wherein
effective control and possession of such goods is not transferred by the
supplier to the user, there was no liability to VAT as well as service tax.

2. Position under VAT/Sales Tax :

Before analysing the newly introduced services category of
“supply of tangible goods for use”, it is felt that, understanding of the
conceptual aspects as to the existing levy of lease tax under sales tax/VAT is
essential. The same are explained hereafter briefly.

(a) Transfer of Right to Use :

As per Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India,
‘sale’ includes a transfer of right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or
not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable
consideration.

Definition on similar lines has been adopted in S. 2(g)(iv)
of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and many State VAT legislations.

(b) ‘Transfer’ implies exclusive possession to transferee :

In a Supreme Court ruling having far-reaching implications
viz.
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. V. UOI, (2006) 146 STC 91 (SC 3-Member
Bench), the following important observations have been made by the Apex Court :

Para 97 :

“To constitute
a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods, the transaction
must have the following attributes :

(a) there
must be goods available for delivery;

(b) there
must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of goods

© the
transferee should have a legal right to use the goods — consequently all legal
consequences of such use including any permissions or licences required
therefor should be available to transferee

(d) for the
period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be to the
exclusion to the transferor — this is the necessary concomitant of the plain
language of the statute viz. a ‘transfer of the right to use’ and not
merely a licence to use the goods.

(e) having
transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same right to others.”

Relying on the
BSNL case stated above, the Gauhati High Court in the case of HLS Asia Ltd.
V. State of Assam,
(2007) 8 VST 314 has held that the delivery of physical
possession of goods is not essential precondition for levy of sales tax. The
relevant observations in paras 26 and 27 are as under :

“The
equipment, plants and machinery were available and identified by the parties.
Under the contract, OIL derived the legal right to use the goods having hired
the same on payment of charges. Customs duty had also been paid by it on the
equipment imported by the contractor for executing the works. Under the
stringent contractual terms, the contractor was bound to keep the equipment
engaged exclusively for the works. The fact that the same had been operated by
its technically qualified personnel does not militate against the element of
exclusiveness in the use thereof for the services and benefit of OIL. During
the subsistence of the contract, the appellant-company was neither authorised
nor permitted to transfer the equipment or detain the same for others. The
parties consciously limited the tax liability to the rental component only.

The
provisions of the contract understandably have to be construed in the context
of the service accorded to be rendered. The transfer of right to use the
equipments has to be perceived in the context of the nature, manner and extent
of engagement thereof. The retention of physical possession thereof by the
appellant company cannot be decisive. The parties entered into the contract
understanding the implications of each and every provision thereof, which
according to us, demonstrate an obvious dominion and control of OIL over the
equipment used by the appellant for the execution of the works during the
period of the contract. We, thus, have no hesitation to hold that the
transaction in question involved transfer of right to use the equipment,
plants and machinery under the lease within the meaning of S. 2(33)(iv) of the
Act.”

©
‘Transfer’ is different from ‘allowed to use’ or ‘permitted to use’ :

‘Transfer’ in
the context of Lease Tax implies exclusiveness to the user. For example, if a
passenger boards a bus, can it be said that the bus owner has ‘transferred’
right to use the bus to the passenger ? Obviously the answer is No. The bus
owner has only ‘allowed’ or ‘permitted’ the use of the bus to the passenger on a
non-exclusive basis.

(d) Lease tax is attracted only on ‘goods’ and not on
immovable property :

Lease is taxable only if it is in respect of goods (viz. movable property). Tax cannot be levied if plant and machinery fixed in building is leased, as it is immovable property and not ‘goods’ – Reference can be made to Karthik Engineering Works v. State of Kamataka, (2000) 119 STC 88 (Karn HC DB) – same view in CTO v. Sadulshshar Krai Vikrai Sahakari Samiti, (2004) 135 STC 90 (Raj HC).

In CST v. Bombay Sound Service, (1999) 112 STC 290 (Born HC DB), it was held that hire of recording studio with instruments embedded to earth is not transfer of right to use ‘goods’ as it is not movable property. Similarly in CST v. Pralhad Industries, (1999) 112 STC 548 (All HC), it was held that lease of factory along with plant and machinery fastened to earth is not transfer of ‘goods’, as plant and machinery is immovable property. Reference can also be made to DCST v. Bobby Rubber Industries, (1998) 108 STC 410 (Ker HC DB).

However, in such cases, there could be liability to service tax under ‘Renting of Immovable Property’ services category, subject to satisfaction of taxability criteria specified therein.

e) When is hire of goods taxable under sales tax/ VAT? :

It is commonly found that goods (e.g., furniture, utensils, machinery, equipments, etc.) are given on hire. These are returned after prescribed period and hire charges are paid by the user. This is ‘transfer of right to use for consideration’ and can be treated as ‘sale’ within extended definition of ‘sale’.

In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam v. CTO, (1990) 77 STC 182 (AP HC DB), [confirmed by the Supreme Court in 126 STC 114 (SC)], it was held that hire charges are taxable only when full possession and control is given to the hirer. If the owner (person giving equipment) retains effective control over the equipment, it is not ‘transfer of right to use’. In this case, the assessee had given sophisticated machinery to the contractors for execution of work entrusted to them. However, the machinery continued to be in possession of assessee. The contractor was not free to use the machinery for other work, and hence there is no ‘transfer of right to use’.

The principle enunciated above is popularly referred to as ‘concept of effective control and ownership’.

Some judicial rulings are given hereafter for reference:

  • In New Central Group Engg. v. ACCT, (2001) 124 STC 637 (WBTT), a dealer provided machines (dumpers, loaders and cranes) with his men and machines to carry out specified work. It was held that it is not a ‘transfer of right to use goods’ [same view in case of excavators given on hire in Alpha Clays v. State of Kerala, (2004)135 STC 107 (Ker HC DB)].

  • In Great Eastern Shipping v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 136 STC 519 (Karn HC DB), a dealer supplied tug (towing vessel) on hire to port trust under Charter Party Agreement. Agreement provided for handing over possession and control in all respect of the tug to the port trust. It was held that this is agreement to transfer right to use the tug. It was also held that since the tugs were within territorial waters, it is a sale within the State, as powers of the State Government extend to the territorial waters adjacent to the State.

  • In Lakshmi Audio Visual Inc. v. ACCT, (2001) 124 STC 426 (Kar HC), the petitioner was providing audio visual and multimedia equipment to customers for specified period and collecting hire charges. He was taking equipment to site, installing, operating, dismantling and bringing it back. Possession and effective control always remained with petitioner. It was held that it is not ‘deemed sale’ as customer never got right to use the equipment.


3. Effective  date  of levy :

The new levy of ‘Supply of Tangible Goods for Use’ has been notified w.e.f. 16-5-2008 and hence would apply to transactions for the period on or after 16-5-2008.

4.  Scope  of the levy :

The scope of the new levy has been explained vide Ministry’s Circular D.O.F. No. 334/1/2008 – TRU, dated 29-2-2008, as under:

4.4 Supply  of tangible goods  for use:

4.4.1 Transfer of the right to use any goods is leviable to sales tax/VAT as deemed sale of goods [Article 66(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India]. Transfer of right to use involves transfer of both possession and control of the goods to the user of the goods.

4.4.2 Excavators, wheel loaders, dump trucks, crawler carriers, compaction equipment, cranes, etc., off-shore construction vessels & barges, geo-technical vessels, tug and barge flotillas, rigs and high-value machineries are supplied for use, with no legal right of possession and effective control. Transaction of allowing another person to use the goods, without giving legal right of possession and effective control, not being treated as sale of goods, is treated as service.

4.4.3 Proposal is to levy service tax on such services provided in relation to supply of tangible goods, including machinery, equipment and appliances, for use, with no legal right of possession or effective control. Supply of tangible goods for use and leviable to VAT/ sales tax as deemed sale of goods, is not covered under the scope of the proposed service. Whether a transaction involves transfer of possession and control is a question of fact and is to be decided based on the terms of the contract and other material facts. This could be ascertainable from the fact whether or not VAT payable or paid.”

5. Essential  criteria  for taxability:

S. 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Act defines taxable service as under:

Any service provided or to be provided to any person –

by any other person in relation to supply of tangible goods including machinery, equipment and appliances for use, without transferring right of possession and effective control of such machinery, equipment and appliances.

The essential criteria for taxability can be summarised as under:

  • The service provider can be any person
  • The service  receiver  can be any other person
  • The service must be in relation to supply of goods
  • The goods so supplied  must be tangible goods
  • The supply  of tangible  goods must be for use
  • The supply of tangible goods must be without transferring right of possession and effective control of those goods.


6. Specific tax exemption for goods carriage to Goods Transport Agency (GTA) :

Representations were made to the Govt. by the All India Confederation of Goods Vehicle Owners’ Association and also the All India Motor Transport Congress requesting to provide relief on account of levy of service tax on supply of goods carriage to GTA for use in transport of goods. It stated that GTAs often provide services in relation to transportation of goods by road using the goods carriage obtained on rent or hire basis. The relief was sought on various grounds inter alia that the service tax paid on renting/hiring of goods carriage, without right of possession and effective control, could not be taken as input credit for payment of service tax towards GTA service.

Service tax for the GTA service provided is payable only on 25% of the amount charged for providing the GTA service tax. In view of this provision, GTAs are not entitled to take input credit under Cenvat Credit Scheme on goods and services used for GTA service. Moreover service tax for GTA services provided in seven specified cases is not required to be paid by the GTA service provider but by the person making payment towards the freight. Services provided in relation to supply of tangible goods for use, without transfer of possession and effective control, has been made as separate taxable service w.e.f. 16-5-2008. Consequently, supply of goods carriage to the GTA, without transfer of possession and effective control, for using the said goods carriage for transport of goods by road had become leviable to service tax.

The Central Government has issued Notification No. 29/08 ST, dated 26-6-2008 to exempt fully from levy of service tax the supply of transport vehicles (goods carriage) to GTA to be used for transport of goods by road.

The exemption granted is in line with the intention of the Govt. as stated in the Union Finance Minister’s Budget Speech on 8-7-2004 while introducing service tax on GTA, that truck owners would not be subjected to service tax.

7. Some  issues:

7.1 X is engaged in the business of giving equipments on hire for a specific period of time, wherein the said goods would effectively remain in the custody and control of the user. X has not been registered under VAT and accordingly is not charging VAT.X has now registered himself with Service Tax Dept. under the new category ‘Supply of Tangible Goods for Use’. Can the sales tax authorities demand and recover VAT from X ?

7.1A Comments:

The intention of the Govt. behind introduction of the new levy has been. very clear to tax those cases of hire/lease, which were escaping sales tax/VAT liability. Under the facts of X, it appears that since effective control and possession of equipments is transferred to the users, it would be liable to sales tax/VAT and not service tax. The mere fact that X has decided to pay service tax, though there was no liability for the same, cannot absolve X from discharging liability to sales tax/VAT. Hence Sales Tax authorities can demand sales tax/VAT from X for the past period as well as for the period during which X has paid service tax.

7.2 Y, a partnership company, is engaged in the business of giving cranes on hire to foreign companies, whereby effective control and possession re-mains with Y through their technical and operating staff. Hence there was no sales tax/VAT liability on hire transactions. Y has entered into an annual contract in March 2008 with a foreign company for hire of cranes during the period 1-4-2008 to 31-3-2009. The entire annual hire of Rs.90 lakh has been received by Y before 31-3-2008. Whether Y would be liable to service tax for the period 16-5-2008 to 31-3-2009. If yes, whether Rs.10-lakh exemption can be availed of by them and what would be the time within which service tax liability is to be discharged by Y?

7.2A Comments:

Though service tax payment to the Government is linked to receipt of consideration for services (either actual or advance), taxable event for levy of service tax, is ‘provision of service’ and not receipt of consideration’. Hence, it would reasonably appear that, Y would be liable to service tax on hire charges attributable to the period 16-5-2008 to 31-3-2009.

This position is impliedly made clear under Rule 6(1) of Service Tax Rules, relevant extract of which is reproduced hereafter:

Rule  6(1) – Payment of Service Tax

The service tax shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 5th of the month immediately following the calendar month in which the payment is received, towards the value of taxable services :

Provided that where the assessee is an individual or proprietary firm or partnership firm, the service tax shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 5th of the month immediately following the quarter in which the payments are received, towards the value of taxable services:

Provided further that notwithstanding the time of receipt of payment towards the value of services, no service tax shall be payable for the part or whole of the value of services, which is attributable to services provided during the period when such services were not taxable:

Provided also that the service tax on the value of taxable service received during the month of March, or the quarter ending in March, as the case may be, shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 31st day of March of the calendar year.

Explanation – For the removal of doubt it is hereby clarified that in case the value of taxable service is received before providing the said service, service tax shall be paid on the value of service attributable to the relevant month, or quarter, as the case may be.

It is felt that if conditions under ten-lakh Exemption Notification are satisfied, one can avail exemption up to ten lakh for the period 16-5-2008to 31-3-2009.

Service tax liability for the entire period (16-5-2008 to 31-3-2009) would have to be discharged by 5th July 2008.

7.3 Z is in the business of giving specialised machines on hire, wherein effective control and possession remains with Z. During the year ended 31-3-2008, Z has purchased 5 new machines on which substantial amount of Excise Duty has been paid. Can Z avail Cenvat Credit of Excise Duty paid on the said machines and set off the same against service tax to be paid on hire charges on or after 16-5-2008 ?

7.3A Comments:

a) In this connection, attention is invited to CBEC Clarification vide letter F No. 137/120/2008 – Cx 4, dated 24-6-2008,extracts of which, are reproduced hereafter:

1. “M/ s. Hindustan Construction Company (HCCL) imported an aircraft last year, which was cleared on payment of appropriate customs duty (i.e., CVD). After its import, the aircraft was being let out by HCCL on hire basis without transferring right of possession and effective control. From 16-5-2008, ‘supply of tangible goods for use, without transferring right of possession and effective control’ is brought under taxable service. After 16-5-2008, such activity attracts service tax on the hire charges received by HCCL. In this regard, it has been requested that HCCL should be allowed to take credit of the CVD paid on the aircraft and utilise it for paying service tax. The modality suggested is to amend the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 so as to specifically include aircraft within the definition of capital goods, as has been done in case of motor vehicles for providing specified services.

The matter has been examined. It is noticed that in this specific case, the aircraft was imported last year and till 15-5-2008,the service provided by HCCL was outside the scope of the S. 66 of the Finance Act and thus was covered under the definition of the term ‘exempted services’ under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. As per Rule 6(4),no Cenvat Credit can be taken on capital goods, which are used in providing only exempted services. Therefore, ab initio, HCCL was not eligible to take credit of CVD. Such being the case, the credit which was ab initio ineligible, does not become eligible after the service tax is imposed on the service at a later date. It is therefore clarified that no Cenvat credit of the CVD paid on the said aircraft should be taken, even if it is specifically included within the definition of ‘capital goods’.”

The above is self-explanatory.

b) In this regard, attention is also drawn to a Larger Bench ruling in the case of Spenta International Ltd. v. CCE, (2007) 216 ELT 133 (Tri – LB, WZB), wherein it has been held that eligibility to credit is to be determined with reference to the dutiability of the final product as on the date of receipt of capital goods. The ratio of the said ruling would be relevant for service tax as well.

c) In light of (a) and (b) above, it would appear that, if Cenvat Credit is availed by Z upon compliance of stipulated conditions (non-claiming of depreciation, etc.), the same would be disputed by service tax authorities.

Interpretation issue : Excluded services under commercial construction services

1. Preamble :

    Recently on July 27, 2009, the Government issued Notification No. 24/2009-ST, whereby services provided in relation to management, maintenance or repairs of roads is notified as exempt from the whole of the levy of service tax. This prima facie appears to have been done to put an end to the controversy over the issue of taxability of these services. However, the question arises here is, can the Government exempt a service which was always outside the purview of the levy ? The issue of the Notification does not end the controversy over taxability of the services for the period prior to July 27, 2009, as it would mean that the services covered under the Notification were taxable till such date. Whether the services at least of repairs of roads were excluded from the purview of service tax or otherwise is discussed and analysed below.

2. Background :

    2.1 Construction service was introduced w.e.f. September 10, 2004 in clause (30a) of S. 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 (The Act). The definition inter alia excluded construction of road, dams, tunnels, etc. CBEC vide its Circular F.No.B2/8/2004-TRU dated 10-9-2004 explained the scope of this service. Subsequently, with effect from 16-6-2005 this service was renamed as ‘commercial or industrial construction service’ under clause (25b) of S. 65 and the erstwhile clause (30a) defined taxable service called ‘construction of complex’. The new clause (25b) also excluded services provided in respect of roads, tunnels and dams along with construction services in respect of airports, railways, transport terminals and bridges. Further, when execution of works contract service was introduced vide clause (zzzza) in S. 65(105) of the Act from 1-6-2007, this category also excluded works contract in respect of the same items. The relevant definitions are reproduced here :

    S. 65(25b) :

    ‘Commercial or industrial construction service’ means —

        (a) construction of a new building or a civil structure or a part thereof; or

        (b)

        (c)

        (d) repair, alteration, renovation or restoration of, or similar services in relation to, building or civil structure, pipeline or conduit,

which is —

        (i) used, or to be used, primarily for; or

        (ii) occupied, or to be occupied, primarily with; or

        (iii) engaged, or to be engaged, primarily in, commerce or industry, or work intended for commerce or industry, but does not include such services provided in respect of roads, airports, railways, transport terminals, bridges, tunnels and dams”. (emphasis supplied)

S. 65(105)(zzzza) :

‘Taxable service’ means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to the execution of a works contract, excluding works contract in respect of roads, airports, railways, transport terminals, bridges, tunnels and dams.

Explanation — For the purposes of this sub-clause, ‘works contract’ means a contract wherein, —

        (i)

        (ii) such contract is for the purposes of carrying out, —

(a)

(b) construction of a new building or a civil structure or a part thereof, or of a pipeline or conduit, primarily for the purposes of commerce or industry; or

(c) ……………

(d) completion and finishing services, repair, alteration, renovation or restoration of, or similar services, in relation to (b) and (c); or

(e) (emphasis supplied)

    The above definitions clearly indicate inclusion of repair, alteration, renovation or restoration or similar services in relation to commercial building or civil structure, pipeline or conduit in sub-clause (d) alongside construction services in sub-clause (a) and (ii)(b), respectively in the above definitions.

    2.2 Under another category of service viz. ‘management, maintenance or repair’ in S. 65(64) of the Act, maintenance or repair of properties whether immovable or not has been made taxable w.e.f. May 01, 2006. The definition is reproduced here :

“65(64) ‘management, maintenance or repair’ means any service provided by :

(i)

(ii)

(a) ;

(b) maintenance or repair of properties, whether immovable or not; or

(c)

Explanation — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes of this clause, —

(a)

(b) ‘properties’ includes information technology software”. (emphasis supplied)

    2.3 Thus, there has been an overlap of repair services in relation to immovable properties under both the above taxing entries. This gave rise to dispute with the authorities for the assessees particularly in relation to (b) different construction services in relation to road and other areas (a) repairs or restoration services in relation to roads.

3. Repair services in respect of roads :

    3.1 Different kinds of services are provided by construction service providers in cases of both public and private roads. For instance, widening of existing roads, resurfacing, relaying, concretisation, etc. Since commercial or industrial construction service as well as execution of works contract service clearly include services in relation to repairs, alteration, renovation or restoration of any building or civil structure and exclude such services in relation to roads, the issue arose as to whether repair, renovation, etc. of road is classifiable under commercial or industrial construction service, or works contract service, as the case may be, on one side or under management, maintenance or repair service under the other. Service tax authorities at various places adopted divergent practices. On referring the matter to the Board by the Department, Circular No. 110/4/2009-ST, dated 23-2-2009 was issued providing the following clarification :

“2. Commercial or industrial construction service [S.65(105) (zzq) specifically excludes construction or repairs of roads. However, management, maintenance or repair provided under a contract or an agreement in relation to properties, whether immovable or not, is leviable to service tax u/s. 65(105) (zzg) of the Finance Act, 1994. There is no specific exemption under this service for maintenance or repair of roads, etc. Reading the definitions of these two taxable services in tandem leads to the conclusion that while construction of road is not a taxable service, management, maintenance or repair of roads are in the nature  of taxable services,  attracting  service tax.

The next issue requiring resolution is the types of activities that can be called as ‘construction of road’ as against the activities which should fall under the category of maintenance or repair of roads. In this regard the technical literature on the subject indicate that the activities can be categorised as follows, :

A) Maintenance  or repair  activities:

I. Resurfacing

II. Renovation

III.  Strengthening

IV. Relaying

V. Filling of potholes

B) Construction  activities:

I. Laying  of a new  road

II. Widening of narrow road to broader road (such as conversion of a two-lane road to a four-lane road)

III. Changing road surface (gravelled road to metalled road/metalled road to black-topped/blacktopped to concrete, etc.)

4. The cases may be decided/revenue should be protected based on the above classification. Suitable trade and public notices may be issued for information of the trade and field formations.”

3.2 The above Circular appears to be not in harmony with the rules for classification of services required to be followed when a taxable service is prima facie classifiable under two or more taxing entries. S. 65A of the Act contains these rules. According to the first rule, specific description is always preferred over general description. Accordingly, if roads are specifically excluded from commercial or industrial construction service, as well as execution of works contract service and as both these categories specifically include repairs, renovation, restoration, etc. of buildings or civil structures as construction services, the sub-clause in management, maintenance or repair service of maintenance or repair of immovable ‘properties’ appears generic in nature for services in relation to roads. The Tribunal in the case of Dr. Lal Path Lab. Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Ludhiana 2006 (4) STR 527 (Tri.-Del.) held “What is specifically kept out of a levy by the Legislature cannot be subjected to tax by the Revenue administration under another entry”. “In the present case, Revenue is seeking to discard the specific entry and to bring the appellant’s services under a very general entry only because under the specific entry, no tax is payable. This approach is contrary to the scheme of legislation.” Also, under the excise law, similar view was held inter alia in the cases of Tata Tea Ltd. v. CCE, 2004 (164) ELT 0315 and TTK Healthcare Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (231) ELT 0273. In the case of CCE v. Konkan Marine Agencies, 2009 (13) STR 7 (Kar.), it was held to the effect that once the definition of the taxing entry excluded a specific aspect, service tax could not be levied. It appears therefore a reasonable view that the above Circular restricts the scope of the taxing entries viz. commercial or industrial construction service and execution of works contract service. “Circulars contrary to the correct legal interpretation are not binding on judicial authorities” was held in the case of Videocon International Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2004 (167) ELT 33 (Tri.-Mum). Similarly, it was held in the case of Mahakaushal Builders Welfare Association v. Supdt., 2006 (3) STR 721 (MP) that Circular does not create liability for payment of service tax if assessee not liable to pay tax under law relating to service tax. In the case of Pahwa Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2005 (181) ELT 339 (SC), it was held that the Board can issue directions only for purpose and in furtherance of and not contrary and derogation to provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

3.3 Construction services per se cover repairs, renovation or restoration services as these services also involve’ construction’ and / or reconstruction in part. Roads are per se civil structures. When an existing road is redone completely, it can be called restoration. Clause (d) in the relevant definition cannot be rendered redundant by issuing a Circular. Further, there is a thin line of distinction between the terms ‘relaying’ and ‘laying of a new road’. Can ‘relaying’ not be covered by the terms ‘renovation’ or ‘alteration’ ? A further question arises as to whether the word ‘renovation’ used in the Circular directing that it is a maintenance service liable for service tax and the same word used in clauses (25b) or (zzzza) mean different? It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of taxing status that interpretation leading to absurdity cannot be accepted. By the parameter adopted by the Circular, even repair services in respect of a dam, bridge or any airport also would be considered taxable under clause (64) of S. 65 as all such services are also provided under a contract. Admittedly, revenue consideration of the authorities is on a higher footing than any other parameter like natural or grammatical meaning, principle of harmonious construction in a statute or principle of legality.

3.4 In effect, the Board’s Circular interprets the definition of commercial or industrial construction service in a restrictive manner merely to suit the Revenue needs. If sub-clause (a) under commercial or industrial construction service and sub-clause (ii)(b) under execution of works contract service, which provide for construction of a new building or a civil structure or a part thereof apply to the respective exclusionary part of the definition, why would sub-clause (d) under both the definitions providing for repair, alteration, renovation or restoration or similar services in relation to building or civil structure, etc., cannot apply to the exclusionary clause? If the scope of the definition is comprehensive enough to extend coverage to various services in relation to construction including those of repair, restoration aspects, the same ‘expansive’ scope applies to the exclusionary clause of the definition containing such services provided in respect of roads, airports, tunnels, dams, etc.” Such clarification being binding on the lower authorities would certainly create litigation than relief for the period prior to July 27,2009 when Notification No. 24/2009-ST was issued.

4. Services of construction of dam, tunnel and road:

4.1 The above Circular in no ambiguous terms clarifies that construction of road is not a taxable

The project was completed in February 2007. The tax demanded for the period April 2005 to March 2008 was  made  in the following manner:

  • Tax was computed on the entire amount received from WBSEB without granting abatement of 67%.

  • Computation of liability was made on the gross value even though service tax was not collected.

  • Invoked extended period of limitation on the charge of mis-representation and mala fide intention of evasion.

4.2 The Noticee’s case contained chiefly the following grounds :

  • Scope of the service included civil works structures of dams, tunnels and roads and did not include designing of power generation system or providing electrical and mechanical works for the plant.

  • The service was covered more appropriately under execution of works contract service introduced from 1-6-2007, whereas the project was completed in February 2007.

  • Filing of return or taking registration under wrong category could not be the basis for the levy.

  • Declaration of the entire value of the contractual service and claiming exemption on the proach or a voyage of discovery of the authorities ground  of exclusion  of dams, tunnels  and roads in the definition of commercial or industrial construction service in various returns from time to time and providing copy of the agreement in October 2005 to the Department evidenced against the charge of suppression or evasion.

  • Wide range of activities described in the scope of work in the contract under different nomen-clature related only to construction of dams, tunneling and roads.

  • Each activity described in the agreement was clarified to prove construction/civil works related to dams, roads and tunnels.

4.3 Order in a nutshell contained the following observations:

  • Based on examination of definition of ‘dam’ cited in Encyclopedia Britannica and the reading of the agreement clauses concluded that construction of dam involves several auxiliary works. Exclusion of dam in the purview of the definition would mean exclusion of all auxiliary works and that there was no scope to view the exclusion provision in narrow meaning.

  • No distinction could be made between construction of ordinary dams, tunnels and roads and tunnels, dams and roads as an integral part of the hydroelectric power project as the statute does not provide for it and therefore the statute cannot permit such distinction. Moreover, the dams are generally used for generating hydroelectric power.

  • There is no scope for segregating the agreement for considering any part of the work as taxable service.

  • Allegation of suppression also being unmeritous, the case failed both on the question of merit and the question of limitation.

5. In conclusion, to issue a half-baked Circular which generates controversy rather than settling it and then to combat it, issue a Notification or another Circular which also would not end the existing controversy is peculiar to the administration of the levy of service tax. The analysis and discussion above amply demonstrate the state of administration of the levy which otherwise contains several ambiguities and limiting factors leading to litigation due to dichotomy in interpretation. In most cases, it appears frivolous and a result of innovative approach or a voyage of discovery of the authorities at the peril of assessees at large.

Part A — Provisional Attachment of Property under Service Tax

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Service Tax

1. Introduction :


Notification 30/2008 — Service Tax was issued on July 01,
2008, whereby Service Tax (Provisional Attachment of Property) Rules, 2008 have
been notified under Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 (The Act) to protect the
interests of revenue in certain cases in terms of power given u/s.94(1) and (2)
read with S. 73 C of the Act.

2. Statutory provisions :


2.1 Provisions of S. 73C :


S. 73C was introduced with effect from April 18, 2006 vide
the Finance Act, 2006. However, for the past two years no rules were prescribed
in this respect and therefore, the provisions appearing draconian in nature
remained on hold. With the prescription of the rules, the issue involving
provisional attachment of property assumes great significance. Where any
proceeding u/s.73 or u/s.73 A is pending and a notice is served on a person
u/s.73(1) or u/s.73A(3) and the Central Excise Officer forms an opinion that to
protect the interests of the Revenue, it is necessary to provisionally attach
any property belonging to such person, he may do so in the manner prescribed in
the rules notified now.

2.2 Provisions of S. 73(1) and S. 73A(3):




  • S. 73(1) provides that where any Service Tax has not been levied or paid or
    has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded, the Central
    Excise Officer is empowered to
    issue a show-cause notice on the person charge-able with Service Tax which has
    not been levied/paid or which has been short-levied/short-paid or a refund is
    erroneously issued under ordinary circumstances within 1 year and in case of
    fraud/collusion/willful misstatement, suppression/evasion within 5 years.



  • U/s.73A(3), a show-cause notice can be served when a person liable to pay
    Service Tax has collected an amount representing Service Tax from the
    recipient of service either in excess of the amount determined to be payable
    or has collected which is not required to be collected and has not paid to the
    credit of the Central Government.



3. Position under Central Excise and Customs :



With effect from July 13, 2006, S. 11DDA and S. 28BA were
introduced in the Central Excise Act, 1944 (the excise law) and Customs Act,
1962 (the customs law), respectively, to provide for provisional attachment of
property of a person to whom show-cause notice has been served u/s.11A or
u/s.11D of the excise law or S. 28 or S. 28B of the customs law as the case may
be. These provisions are similar to the provisions of S. 73C narrated above.
However, the discussion here is restricted to the attachment under the Service
Tax law.

4. Prescribed procedure contained in the Rules :


  • Obtaining previous approval of the Commissioner of Central Excise by an order in
    writing.

If the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise is
satisfied that to protect the interest of revenue during the pendency of
proceeding u/s.73 or u/s.73A of the Act, it is necessary to provisionally attach
any property of a person, he may send proposal to do so to the Commissioner of
Central Excise after verifying facts and circumstances of the case in the
prescribed format. The Commissioner of Central Excise in turn is required to
satisfy himself that facts and circumstances justify such an action and then
only proceed to send a notice to the person whose property is considered for
provisional attachment.


  • The notice to be served must contain :


(a) the reasons for initiating action of provisional
attachment;

(b) details of property to be attached provisionally.



  • The Commissioner of Central Excise is also required to give opportunity to
    such person to make submissions within 15 days of service of such notice.



  • After duly considering the submissions provided by such person in writing or
    in person or both, the Commissioner may pass an order in writing to
    provisionally attach the property of such person.



5. Which property could be attached ?



  • The rules specifically provide that the order of the Commissioner would not
    attach any personal property of proprietor or partners or directors, as the
    case may be.



  • The provisional attachment of the property shall be to the extent required to
    protect the interests of the Revenue meaning that value of the property
    attached shall be of the value which would be nearly equivalent to that of the
    amount of pending revenue against such person.



  • Any movable property of such person could be attached only if the immovable
    property available for attachment is not sufficient to protect the interests
    of revenue.



6. Period of provisional attachment :

  • Provisional attachment will be rendered ineffective on expiry of six months of serving of the order for attachment.

  • Only when the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise considers it necessary to extend this period, he would do so only after recording the reasons in writing. However, the total extension would not exceed two years in any case.

7. For any reason, if a person pays pending revenue amount with interest, the provisional attachment would cease to exist.

8. The person whose property is provisionally attached is obliged not to mortgage, lease, transfer or deliver the attached property in any manner except with the previous approval of the Commissioner of Central excise.

9. Some issues:

In the above background, the following questions may arise in the minds of assessees under the Service Tax law :

9.1 Whether the Department can attach bank accounts of a service provider ?

9.1A Any bank account whether current or overdraft account or even a fixed deposit is a movable property. If value of the immovable property proposed to be attached is insufficient to cover the amount of the show-cause notice, the bank account of a service provider could be attached.

9.2 It is experienced and observed by many that in case of some show-cause notices, even after filing replies for over one year or more, the Department has not adjudicated the SCN. Can the Department take recourse to provisional attachment in such cases?

9.2A Service Tax law has not prescribed any time limit for disposal of a show-cause notice. Therefore, it is true that many show-cause notices remain unadjudicated after receiving replies thereto and in some cases even after hearing the noticee in person, no order is passed for months and years. Nevertheless, the Central Excise Officer proposing provisional attachment of property of a person is required to record reasons in writing and the same is required to meet with the approval of the Commissioner of Central Excise. This approval and reasoning are however discretionary and unless is exercised in a judicious manner, can cause harm to service providing fraternity. Further, ‘protection of interests of the Revenue’ being a highly relative term, misuse of the powers by some officers cannot be ruled out. Evaluation of facts and circumstances of a case is a matter of personal judgment when no parameters for determination of the same are prescribed. Service Tax legislation is only fourteen years old. Further, drafting of the provisions lack precision and this has given rise to numerous genuine interpretation issues. The law is slowly evolving only through judicial decisions. Amidst umpteen controversies over interpretational issues, empowering bureaucracy to provisionally attach property based only on show-cause notices does not appear sound at this juncture. Professionals come across several SCNs issued frivolously or without application of mind merely in a routine manner on interpretational issues. In many cases, such notices contain no discussion whatsoever as to why and in what manner a particular taxing entry is applicable to the noticee but may contain a huge demand of Service Tax and consequential interest and penalty and such demands are considered by the Department as disputed recoveries. The demand of these huge amounts is more often than not unrealistic. For instance, in the case of Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd. v. UOI, 2007 *8)STR 561 (Sikkim), demand was shown as over rupees 2,000 crores. In the scenario, prescription of rules for provisional attachment appears premature for the fact that technically, pending adjudication attachment on provisional basis is possible. Therefore, apprehension of misuse is not out of place.

9.3 Whether property of a service provider can be provisionally attached when an adverse order is issued by the adjudicating authority and appeal is admitted by the Appellate Authority?
 
9.3A The rules for provisional attachment can be invoked only if proceedings are pending u/ s. 73 of the Act. S. 73 does not apply once appeal is admitted and therefore, proceeding for provisional attachment cannot be initiated for adjudicated orders pending in appeal. However, if property is already attached provisionally prior to adjudication, the appeal admitted subsequent to such attachment would not necessitate the Department to release the property attached. However, the provisions of over-all time limit as discussed above would indeed apply.

Part A — Service Tax Refund for exporters of goods

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New Page 2

1. Background :

Financial crisis led by US subprime mortgage debacle has
already slowed down Indian exports. In the scenario, exporters struggling hard
to survive are anxious to get refund of service tax paid on input services used
for exports. In the January 2008 issue of BCAJ, a write-up on the subject was
provided. However, considering the expanded scope of Notification 41/2007-ST,
dated 6-10-2007 by various subsequent amendments, a need was felt to provide an
updated account of the issue for guidance of many readers.

 

2. Scope and coverage :

Notification No. 41/2007 (supra), which was amended
vide Notifications No. 42/2007-ST, dated 29/11/2007-ST and 43/2007-ST, dated
29-11-2007 was further amended by Notifications No. 3/2008-ST, dated 19-2-2008,
17/2008-ST, dated 1-4-2008, 24/2008-ST, dated 10-5-2008, 32/2008-ST, dated
18-11-2008 and 33/2008-ST, dated 7-12-2008. Vide the entire amendments, 19
taxable categories of services have been notified, in respect of which exemption
by way of remission mechanism for filing a claim of refund is prescribed.

 

A list containing specified services, the date of their
notification and specific compliance/requirement as to documentation is
tabulated at the end of the write-up.

 

3. General conditions for claiming refund :

  • An exporter is eligible to claim refund only when service tax is actually paid
    on specified services.
  • No CENVAT credit of service tax paid on the services should have been availed
    for which refund is claimed.
  • Refund of service tax paid on the specified services should not be made in any
    manner otherwise than under this Notification viz. No. 41/2007-ST.
  • Export should be made without availing drawback of service tax paid on the
    specified services under Customs, Central Excise Duties and Service Tax Drawback
    Rules, 1995. It may be noted that this condition is omitted recently with effect
    from December 07, 2008 (refer Notification No. 33/2008-ST).

 


(Note : Specific conditions for each specified
service category are provided in the table at the end of this write-up)

 


4. Exemption to exporter
when he is also a person liable for payment of service tax under reverse charge
mechanism :

When an exporter is liable to pay service tax being an
availer/user of any of the above specified services, he is exempt from payment
of service tax on such services. For instance, if an exporter has used goods
transport agency’s service for movement of goods from ICD to port and thereby he
is liable to pay service tax under the reverse charge mechanism, he is eligible
to claim exemption from service tax under this Notification as he is otherwise
also eligible for the refund of the service tax paid on such services used for
the exported goods.

 

5. Procedure for claiming refund :

5.1 Is there a prescribed format for lodging a claim of
refund ?

No specific form is prescribed in Notification No. 41/2007-ST
for claiming refund on the lines of Form R prescribed by the Government u/s.11B
of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or Form A under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit
Rules, 2004 (CCR). In the scenario, an exporter may follow the format of Form A
for submission of the claim of refund, as the details under the said format
would serve the purpose of the claim of refund to be made under this
Notification also.

 

5.2 Where to submit the application of refund ?

à
A manufacturer exporter is required to submit the application with the
Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise having jurisdiction over the
factory where the goods are manufactured.

à
A merchant exporter is required to submit the application with the Assistant
Deputy Commissioner who has jurisdiction over the registered office of the
merchant exporter.

 

5.3 What procedure is prescribed to be followed when an
exporter is not registered ?

à
The exporter, whether a merchant or a manufacturer who is not registered under
Central Excise or Service Tax authority is required to file a declaration in the
prescribed form (provided in the Notification) with the respective
jurisdictional Assistant/Deputy Commissioner prior to filing a claim for refund
of service tax under this Notification and obtain a Service Tax Code — (STC)
number which would be granted within seven days from the date of submission of
the said Declaration Form.

 

5.4 Is there a time limit for filing a claim of
refund ?

5.4.1 The refund claim is required to be filed on quarterly basis within 6 months from the end of the relevant calendar quarter during which the goods are exported. The earlier time limit was 60 days. However, from 18-11-2008 the time limit is amended to 6 months vide Notification No. 32/2008-ST.

5.4.2 Although the Notification does not clarify or provide definition of ‘quarter’, the Service Tax Rules, 1994 provide for quarter as a calendar quarter, like January to March, July to September, etc.

5.4.3 The exports will be regarded to have been made on the date on which the Customs appraising officer has permitted clearance and loading of the goods in accordance with S. 51 of the Customs Act, 1962. The officer issues an order known as ‘let export order ‘.

(Note: One should not consider the actual date of export or the date of sailing of vessel as the ‘date of export’. The date of ‘let export order’ is the date of export. Therefore, while claiming refund, the relevant quarter may be decided considering the date of the ‘let export order’.
 
6. Documents required to be enclosed with the claim of refund:

6.1 Documents substantiating export of goods and other relevant details:

Documents such as ARE-1 duly endorsed by the Customs authorities, copy of shipping bill, non-negotiable copy of bill of lading along with the copy of the export invoice, invoice of the provider of service, etc. should be submitted.

For each specified service, specific documentation is prescribed by the Government. Table at the end may be referred to for the same.

6.2 Documents evidencing payment of service tax to input service providers:

Invoice copies of service providers of specified services, along with proof of payment of the amount mentioned in invoices such as copies of bank statements or copy of challan in GAR-7 and/or receipt of the service provider, etc. should be enclosed with the claim of the refund.

  • In practice, it is observed that exports are effected through availing the services of custom house agents or freight forwarders – intermediaries. Therefore the specified service providers are paid by these agents or intermediaries. CHAs/intermediaries should be instructed to provide certificate of payment to specified service providers. Further, it should be ensured to follow practice of providing reference of shipping bill number on the invoice issued by service providers. In case of port services and transportation services of rail and road, the notification does not provide requirement of bills to be in the name of exporters. However, the proof of specified service used for export goods would have to be provided. Therefore photo-copies of invoices of specified service providers bearing shipping bill reference should be obtained to the extent possible in order to avoid rejection of the claim for want of proof.

  • Copy of agreement entered into by the exporter with the buyer wherever applicable i.e., in cases when refund is conditional upon mention of requirement of the specified service in the written agreement.


6.3 Category of service of the service provider:

Since refund is eligible only  in case of specified services, the exporter may ensure to obtain invoice with category of service written on it or obtain proof of payment like copy of GAR-7 challan or copy of registration certificate of the service provider.

7. Recoverability of Refund:

If the exporter has not been able to realise sale proceeds for exported goods within stipulated period under FEMA 1999 including any extension of the period, service tax refunded shall be recoverable, treating the recovery as service tax erroneously refunded. Under FEMA (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations 2000, export sale proceeds have to be realised within six months from the date of exports. However, in case of certified status holder exporters, 100% EOUs, and units under STPs BTP schemes, etc. realisation and repatriation is permissible up to twelve months. Under certain circumstances this limit is further extended by RBI.Therefore, if proceeds are not realised within this time limit, then only recovery provisions would be invoked.

8. Some issues:

8.1 X, a merchant exporter has not filed claim of refund for the quarter ended December 2008. The stipulated time limit under Notification No. 41/ 2008-SThas been amended vide Notification No. 32/2008-ST from 60 days to six months. If X files his refund claim by the end of January 2009,he would be within the time limit of 6 months. However, if the Department contends that the amendment is prospective and corresponding to quarter ended September 2008,the time limit of 60 days under earlier dispensation of Notification only would apply. What remedy is left for X under the law?

8.1A The time limit of 60 days was revised to 6 months from 60 days vide Notification 32/2008-ST, dated 18-11-2008.The amendment was made prior to the expiry of 60 days from the end of September 2008 i.e., before November 30, 2008. Therefore, the case can be argued both ways. If the claim is rejected by the Department, the case of the exporter is fairly arguable on the following grounds:

  • The time limit has been revised, considering genuine hardship faced by the exporters as regards non-receipt of documents before 60 days, pendency remaining for payment of invoicing of input service provider on account of dispute, cash flow problem, etc. The beneficial amendment therefore may be interpreted liberally and not strictly.

  • Procedural lapses are often condoned if substantive compliance is made. Reliance can be made in the case of IN RE Barot Exports, 2006 (2003)ELT 321 (GOI), where it was held that substantive benefit be given by condoning non mandatory procedural provisions. Similarly,in the case of Cotfab Exports, 2006 (20S)ELT107 (GOI), it was held that procedural infractions of Notification/Circulars be condoned if exports have taken place.

8.2 ABC Exports Ltd. filed its refund claim within the prescribed time limit of 60 days for Y.E. September 30, 2008.However, the documents enclosedwith the claim evidencing export of goods and payment of service tax were found inadequate by the Department. Whether the Department can rejectthe refund claim on the ground of inadequate evidence?

8.2A The Department generally would issue a show-cause notice and point out deficiencies in the claim lodged therein. Following the principle of natural justice, the Department is required to issue a show-cause notice and provide opportunity to the claimant to present his reasons for not attaching the required documents with the claim. If other compliances are found bona fide, the claim could be entertained with/without modifications in the amount claimed if deficiency is made good by filing documents not attached with the claim. If no opportunity is granted, the claimant has a remedy under the law to file an appeal.

To overcome this difficulty of not being able to provide all relevant enclosures within 60 days, the time limit has been extended to six months, which is reasonable for any exporter to make available the required documents. However, the point is that if the entire claim of refund and export is genuine, depending on the facts of each case, the refund claim if rejected could be fought out.

8.3 Classification of service:

AB Exporters Ltd. filed a claim of refund under Notification No. 41/2007-ST for its exported goods in respect of service tax paid on port services, trans-port of goods by rail, etc. However, the steamer agent of the shipping line and/or freight forwarders have charged service tax under the nomenclature of Terminal Handling Charges (THC). Their service providers have paid service tax for this service under ‘business support service’ which is not specified in Notification No. 41/2007-ST. Is there a solution for this difficulty?

8.3A This is the difficulty faced by the entire fraternity of exporters, as most of the exporters ship their goods through a freight forwarder or a custom house agent acting as a freight forwarder who books cargo space for the shipper. Although THC consists of port levies, CONCOR charges and laC road transportation service, the services are obtained through intermediaries. Therefore, the intermediary’s service cannot be classified under the respective taxing entry specified in the Notification. The exporter i.e., user of the service on its own accord cannot change the classification. This principle was followed in the case of CCE v. Courtlaulds Packaging (I) Ltd., 2007) 217 ELT 399 (Tri.-Mum). However, the difficulty faced by AB Exporters Ltd. does not appear to get addressed for now, as in practice, most of the goods are exported through intermediaries and therefore the benefit intended to be provided may remain on paper only.

An insight into Draft Point of Taxation Rules

1.
Introduction :

Given the fact
that frequent change in the rate of tax on services over a period of time has
caused confusion and uncertainty both among tax officers and assessees as to
the criteria based on which the tax may be levied, the Government has decided
to provide framework to determine point of taxation in different situations by
publishing Draft Point of Taxation (for Services Provided or Received in India)
Rules, 2010 (the POT Rules). The said POT Rules are also accompanied by a
preamble letter and Explanatory Notes on the POT Rules. The Government has
clearly expressed that the proposed rules are meant to provide the regulatory
framework and clarity to determine point of taxation whenever there is a change
in the rate of service tax. Similar difficulty is faced in determining point of
tax in the cases of continuous services. The taxable event under the law takes
place on provision of service. However, the liability to pay service tax
currently arises only on the receipt of the payment. In the POT Rules, there is
a shift proposed by providing a link to the payment of tax with raising of
invoice or payment for service provided or to be provided or provision of
service, whichever is occurring earlier. According to the Government, the
current rule allowing payment of tax on receipt basis does not fall in line
with the Central Excise law and the VAT laws of the states of India. In both
these cases, the payment is required to be made on accrual basis i.e., on the
event of clearance of goods in the case of former and issue of invoice in the
case of latter and that Goods and Service Tax (GST) which is in the offing is
likely to follow this practice. Thus, the proposed POT Rules appear to be a
precursor to GST, which is likely to be implemented in April, 2011.

2. Taxable
event and point of taxation :

In any fiscal
legislation, specific provisions exist for charge of tax and collection of tax.
Under the service tax law, the charge of tax is created by S. 66 of the Finance
Act, 1994 (the Act) on prescribed taxable services. ‘Taxable Service’ is
defined as a service provided or to be provided. Therefore when a service is
provided or agreed to be provided, there takes place the taxable event. As
against this, the POT Rules seek to define ‘taxable event’ as the event which
causes the tax liability to arise, namely, the provision of service, issuance
of invoice or the receipt of payment. The events of issuance of invoice and
receipt of payment are deemed as provision of service under a fiction proposed
to be created under the law. When an invoice is issued or payment is received
prior to providing the service by a service provider, the service would be
deemed to be provided at the time the invoice was issued or the payment was
received, whichever occurred earlier and the liability to pay tax would arise
at this point. Referring now to the collection of service tax, currently Rule
6(1) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 provides that service tax liability arises
when payment for taxable services Is received. In the POT Rules however, ‘Point
of Taxation’ is defined to mean the point of time when the tax becomes payable
to the Government. Thus, the POT Rules have proposed to shift the point of
taxation away from the receipt of payment for the service to either at the time
of provision of service or the issuance of invoice for the service or the receipt
of payment, based on various situations as envisaged in the Rules, but
essentially on the concept of accrual rather than solely on the receipt of
payment.

3. Key
features :

3.1 The POT
Rules essentially provide framework to determine the point of taxation mainly
under the following situations :

à When any advance payment is received towards any
taxable service.

à When there is a change in the rate of tax with regard
to existing taxable service whether exempt or otherwise and there is a
difference in date and timing of provision of
service, raising of invoice and date of receipt of payment.

à When there is a change in the rate of tax with regard
to service which is taxed for the first time.

à When there is a continuous supply of a service or a
service provided on a long-term basis.

à When there is a transaction between associated
enterprises.

à In case of royalty and similar payments.

3.2 Advances
towards taxable services :

Under Rule 4,
the point of tax for advances is dealt with. It provides that service tax is to
be paid on the date of receipt of the advance towards provision of a taxable
service and the rate applicable would be the rate prevailing at the time of
receipt of such advance. Thus, the tax payment under this rule falls in line
with the basic principle underlying the provisions in the POT Rules that the
tax payment is linked to the issuance of invoice or receipt of payment,
whichever is earlier. The Government in its explanatory note in this regard has
clarified that once the tax is charged on the payment, the determination of tax
would be final. Further, it is expressly provided in the rule that no tax is to
be paid on interest-free refundable deposits.

3.3 Change in
rate of tax – Existing services :

Rule 5 seeks to
determine the point of taxation where there is a change in the rate of tax as
regards existing taxable services whether exempt or otherwise and there is a
difference of time between provision of service, raising of invoice and the
time of receipt of payment of taxable service. Table 1 sets out the
determination of point of taxation under the said rule.

 The principle followed in the above rule is that when two points of taxation have occurred, the ear-lier of the two would be the point of taxation.

3.4 Introduction of new services in the tax net :

Table
2

Sr.

Provision

Issue of

Receipt of

Point of

No.

of service

invoice

payment

taxation

 

 

 

for service

 

 

 

 

 

 

(i)

Before the

Irrelevant

Irrelevant

No tax

 

date of

 

 

 

 

new levy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(ii)

Irrelevant

Before

Before

No tax

 

when

the date

the date

 

 

provided

of new

of new

 

 

 

levy

levy

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iii)

After the

After the

Before

No tax

 

date of

date of

the date

 

 

new levy

levy but

of new

 

 

 

within 14

levy

 

 

 

days of

 

 

 

 

receipt of

 

 

 

 

payment

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rule 6 provides for determination of point of taxation when a service is brought in the tax net for the first time. Refer Table 2. This rule however does not apply to services provided on a continuous or long-term basis. (Rule 7 deals with services supplied continuously or for a long duration of time.)

3.5 Continuous supply of services :

Sr.

Provision of service

Issue of invoice

Receipt of payment

Point of taxation

No.

 

 

for service

 

 

 

 

 

 

(i)

Before change

After change

After change

Date of invoice or payment,

 

in rate

in rate

in rate

whichever is earlier

 

 

 

 

 

(ii)

Before change

Before change

Within 30 days of

Date of invoice*

 

in rate

in rate

invoice date

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iii)

After change

Before change

After change

Date of payment

 

in rate

in rate

in rate

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iv)

After change

Before change

Before change

Date of payment or invoice,

 

in rate

in rate

in rate

whichever is earlier

 

 

 

 

 

Continuous supply of services is defined to mean services supplied under a contract for a period exceeding six months or services as specified by the Government to be in continuous supply. The proposed Rule 7 provides that the rate of tax would be the rate applicable on the date of payment becoming due in terms of the contract irrespective of whether or not payment is received or invoice is raised. If the payment becomes due on completion of any milestone in terms of the contract, the date of completion of such milestone is the point of taxation. If the contract does not contain any clause for date of payment or mile-stone, the service tax is required to be paid on raising of invoice or receipt of payment, which occurs earlier.

It is further provided that when the service supplied continuously is covered under this rule is introduced for the first time in law, no service tax is required to be paid on payments received prior to service becoming taxable, even if the service is provided subsequently. The Government has clarified that in case of ongoing contracts of construction, the tax is liable to be paid on the basis of raising of invoice or the date provided for payment in the contract or the actual date of payment, as the case may be. When payment for construction is received prior to applicability of service tax and commencement of construction occurs after the levy coming into force, no service tax would be levied on such payments made prior to the applicable date.

3.6 Services provided to associated enterprises:

In case of transactions with associated enterprises, Rule 8 has provided that the relevant date is the date of debit or credit in the books of account or issuance of debit or credit note or the date of payment, which is earlier.

3.7  Royalty and similar payments:

As regards royalties and similar payments where the whole amount of consideration for service is not ascertainable at the time of performance of service and subsequently the use or the benefit of these services by a person other than the supplier gives rise to any payment of consideration, Rule 9 has provided that the service would be deemed to be provided at the time of each payment is made or invoice is raised, which is earlier.

    At the end:

While the attempt of the Government to introduce framework of POT Rules should be regarded as a welcome step since it is done with the basic objective of addressing some of the prevailing certainty and open issues under the current dispensations of law, there exists certain aspects which appear to add to complexity and difficulty of implementation. For instance :

    As aforesaid, currently the charging S. 66 of the Act determines the taxable event and which is ‘provision of a service’. To redefine this rudimentary aspect of the fiscal statute under the rules proposed to be issued in exercise of the powers conferred u/s.94(2) of the Act seem to be going beyond the Finance Act, 1994 and to this extent, re-consideration of this very fundamental aspect appears necessary.

    The objective of the Government as indicated in the preamble letter and Explanatory Notes is to specify point of taxation as the date of raising of invoice, provision of service or receipt of payment, whichever is earlier, whereas the POT Rules have dealt with only specific conflicting situations and not the remaining or residuary situation/s. If the point at which the service provider should pay tax is changed, it is not indicated whether the existing Rule 6(1) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 would be amended consequent upon the proposed POT Rules coming into force. Or else, is it to be contended that the point of taxation except in the case of specified situations, would be still the time of receipt of payment? In any case, the proposed rules should be consistent with the provisions of the Service Tax Rules 1994, existing or suitably amended.

    Provision of multiple parameters under different situations if introduced without modification, is likely to pose a serious challenge in implementation as Rules 5, 6 and 7 are complex and keeping a track of all the three events viz. provisions of service, raising of invoice and receipt of payment under any of these rules is a huge task for businesses after understanding and interpreting the said rules.

    The POT Rules have not dealt with a situation when services are provided from outside India i.e., when reverse charge mechanism operates u/s.66A of the Act. Specific consideration for this also appears necessary.

    Rule 4 provides that interest-free refundable deposit would not attract service tax. Does this mean that when interest is payable on a refundable deposit, the tax is payable? If intention is not so, suitable change is required on this issue.

    The class of service providers in India is not analogical to that of manufacturing units or VAT dealers. There could be tremendous cash flow issue for a number of service providers when one is required to pay at the point of raising of invoice or provision of service which may result in delay in compliance of law followed by penal action and litigation. Further, the POT Rules as proposed are silent over the treatment of non-payment for services or bad debts, cancellation of invoice, discounts, etc. Similarly, in the current scenario also, there already exists the issue of availability of CENVAT credit (in terms of existing CENVAT Credit Rules) when service tax is paid on advances. If multiple taxable events as proposed are introduced, well-thought out consequential amendments in CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 also would be required. Further, one could envisage a chaotic condition while taking CENVAT credit as complexity in record maintenance would also arise again resulting in litigation.

Since the Government has invited public comments on the Draft POT Rules before September 01, 2010, it can be hoped that major creases would be ironed out if the Government is keen on notifying the Rules. As a matter of fact, since GST is soon likely to be a reality, it would be a better proposition to implement broad-based rules along with GST rather than half-baked rules as precursor to GST, which may only worsen the already uncertain scenario.

Part B : Some Recent Judgments

    High Court :

1. Penalty :

Whether penalty u/s.76 can be reduced below the limit prescribed.

Commissioner of C.Ex. & Customs v. Port Officer, 2010 (19) STR 641 (Guj.)

The short issue before the High Court was whether penalty u/s.76 could be reduced below the mini-mum limit.

The High Court observed as follows :

    a. As per S. 76, a person who failed to pay tax, shall in addition to tax and interest, pay penalty for such failure. The penalty shall not be less than Rs.100 per day to Rs.200 per day during which failure continues, but the penalty shall not exceed the service tax not paid.
There is no provision in the Section to provide the authority with any discretion to reduce the penalty below the limit prescribed.

    b. S. 80 overrides provisions of S. 76, S. 77, S. 78, and S. 79, which state that if the assessee proves that there is reasonable cause for failure, no penalty can be imposed. The provision does not state that even upon establishment of reasonable cause, reduced quantum of penalty is imposable.

On combined reading of S. 76 and S. 80, it appears that the penalty cannot be reduced below the limit prescribed.

    2. Classification of service:

Whether services provided by a consignment agent can be taxed as Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s service?

Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Sangam Investments, 2010 (19) STR 650 (Kar.)

The Tribunal passed an order that services provided as a consignment agent were not covered under the category of C & F service based on Tribunal’s decision in Mahavir Generics case 2006 (3) STR 276 (Tri. -Del) which ultimately got reversed vide 2010 (17) STR 225 (Kar). In the Rev-enue’s appeal, the Court held that the definition of C & F agent includes consignment agent and therefore the assessee is liable for tax.

    3. Constitutional validity : Renting of immoveable property:

Whether service tax can be recovered in respect of renting of immovaeble property when the Constitutional validity is challenged in the High Court.

Infiniti Retail Ltd. v. Union of India, 2010 (19) STR 801 (Bom.)

The constitutional validity of levy of service tax on renting of immoveable property was stayed by the High Court. In this regard the Court held that the Department shall not take coercive steps for recovery of service tax in respect of renting of immovaeble property. However, since the constitutional validity of levying service tax on ‘any other service in relation to such renting’ was not challenged, the High Court held that the Department could recover service tax from the service provider.

    4. Import of service:

Whether foreign service provider liable to tax before introduction of Import Rules.

Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Toyoda Iron Works Co. Ltd., 2010 (19) STR 802 (Kar.)

The respondent, a foreign company, entered into agreement with an Indian company for providing consultancy/technical assistance and transfer of technical know -how relating to the manufacture of automobile components to the Indian company. The Revenue taxed such services under the category of ‘Consulting Engineer Service’. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the respondent was not liable to service tax. CESTAT dismissed the Departmental appeal.

The High Court held that the definition of ‘Consulting Engineer Service’ was amended w.e.f. 1-5-2006 and charge of service tax on service received from outside India (S. 66A) was amended w.e.f. 18-4-2006. Therefore, only from the date of aforesaid amendments, service receiver would be liable for tax and the foreign company being a service provider was not liable for service tax prior to the amendment i.e., for the period in question, 1-4-1999 till 31-3-2001.

    5. Relevant date for applying rate of tax:

Whether applicable rate will be the rate prevailing on the date of provision of service or one prevailing at the time of billing and/or receipt of payment?

Commissioner of C.Ex. & Cus. v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2010 (19) STR 807 (Guj.)

The Tribunal had held that service tax shall be payable at the rate prevailing on the date of provision of service and not at the rate prevailing at the time of billing and receipt of payment. The Revenue challenged this order before the High Court. The Court held that the relevant date is the date of provision of service and not the date of billing. The appeal accordingly was dismissed.

    II. Tribunal:

    6. Construction Service:

Whether construction of road liable for service tax as commercial or industrial construction service?

Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. Shilpa Constructions Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (19) STR 830 (Tri. Ahmd.)

The respondent filed a refund claim with regard to service tax wrongly paid for the construction of road which was not included in the definition of ‘Commercial and Industrial Construction’. However, the Department rejected the refund claim which was allowed in the appeal. Therefore, the Department preferred an appeal before the CESTAT.

The respondent contended that the term ‘drive-way work’ used in the agreement was in relation to road work and the respondent was not en-gaged in any other work. In respect of construction of road, service tax is required to be paid only if it is covered under a single contract of construction of commercial complex in terms of Circular No. B1/6/2005-TRU, dated July 27, 2005. Since the respondent did not collect such service tax from client, the doctrine of unjust enrichment did not apply to it. Invoices and chartered accountant’s certificate were produced as proof.

According to the Department, the exclusion of roads from the definition of ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ was to facilitate general public in the public interest and ‘driveway work’ could not be equated with road and therefore the stated Circular was not applicable. The Tribunal held that road constructed for public utility or not, was not the determining factor and held that construction of ‘driveway work’ amounted to construction of road and therefore, not liable for service tax.

    7. CENVAT credit:

Whether CENVAT credit can be availed on garden maintenance service and repairs of deep freezer installed in canteen.

Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex., Pune-III 2010 (19) STR 823 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The appellants cited certain cases wherein it was held that the service provider is entitled to CENVAT credit on garden maintenance service which is used in or in relation to the manufacture of the final products or used in the business activity. In the present case, the appellants have used the garden maintenance service in relation to business activity.

The Revenue presented some contrary decisions and requested for referring the matter to a larger bench. The Tribunal observed that the cases referred by the Department were either not similar to the present case or were remanded back to the Tribunal by the High Court and therefore did not find it necessary to refer the matter to a larger bench. Following the Semco Electricals decision 2010 (18) STR 177 and I.S.M.T. Ltd.’s decision 2010 TIOL 27 CESTAT-MUM, the appeal was allowed.

    8. Penalty:

Whether penalty could be imposed in case there is ignorance for payment of tax.

J. K. Industries v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad 2010 (19) STR 653 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The facts of the case were:

The appellant, a consignment agent obtained service tax registration in the year 1999 and did not pay service tax till March, 2004 as they could not collect it from the recipient. The premises of the appellant were searched and liability was envisaged. The appellant demanded the amount of service tax from the recipient, which they agreed to pay only after 4-1-2005 and not for earlier period.

The appellant paid service tax from its own pocket before passing of order of adjudication.

The Tribunal held that correspondence between the appellant and the principal supports the case that there was no intention to evade payment of tax. Moreover, the appellant paid tax before any order was passed by the authority. Therefore, the Tribunal ordered for waiver of penalty.

    9. Non-registration-Penalty:
Whether not taking registration amounts to suppression of facts attracting levying penalty.

Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. Pankaj Tyre Retreads, 2010 (19) STR 829 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The respondent was in the business of tyre retreading which was considered by them as ‘Maintenance or Repair Services’ by reason of amendment with effect from June 16, 2005 and they held a bona fide belief that the threshold limit of Rs.4,00,000 was applicable only in relation to service element and the turnover of material used or sold while providing service was not required to be included for calculating such limit. The Department contended that the respondent did not take registration w.e.f. June 16, 2005 and the registration was taken only after search of premises by the Department and it amounted to suppression of facts attracting penalty. The Tribunal held that mere non- registration could not amount to suppression of facts and that there was a reasonable cause as depicted in S. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 and accordingly the appeal was allowed.

Share Transfer Agency Service

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New Page 1

II. Tribunal :




12. Share Transfer Agency Service :



Karvy Consultants Ltd. v. CCE, Hyderabad, 2008 (10) STR
166 (Trib.-Bang)

â Service tax was
demanded on the activity of the appellant of Registrar and Share Transfer Agency
treating the same as Business Auxiliary Service. Relying on the ratio of
decision in the case of Sathguru Management Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. CCE, Hyderabad
2007 (7) STR 654, which in turn had relied on the decision in the case of CCE
v. Ankit Consultancy Ltd.,
2007 (6) STR 101 (Trib. Del) wherein it was held
that Share Transfer Agency and Registrar Services were not covered as Business
Auxiliary Services prior to 1-5-2006 (when a separate category for Share
Transfer Agency was notified), the appeal was allowed.

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