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Category: Right To Information

PART C: Informati on on & Around

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Information on ethical trails:

The Bhopal hospital has been at the centre of a long standing controversy over carrying out drug trials on poor gas victims but had refused to reveal information claiming confidentiality of the client- the drug companies, the hospital and the patients. The CIC has over-ruled the objections by the hospital and ordered it to reveal all information.

The hospital also contended that the trials were conducted when it was run by a trust – an autonomous body – and was not getting any grants from the Central or the State Government. It noted that the hospital had been taken over by the Government only in July 2010 since when the RTI rules should apply.

The CIC held, “Even if the patients do not agree to disclosure of the requested information, it is still open to this Commission to order disclosure of information in the larger public interest.”

Police Manual:
Maharashtra Chief Information Commissioner, Ratnakar Gaikwad has set at rest the prolonged debate over whether the Police Manual is confidential or otherwise. In a land mark order, Gaikwad held that within the meaning of the Right to Information Act, the Police Manual is not a confidential document and copy of it should be provided to applicant P K Tiwari.

“The police manual does not fall within the category of documents, which have been exempted from disclosure. The applicant should be allowed to inspect the manual and be provided the relevant papers. The director general of police should put up the entire manual on the website of the state police within a month.” Gaikwad said in his two page order.

“Taking into consideration the provisions of Section 8 of the RTI Act, it appears that refusal to provide the police manual is wrong. The view taken by the public information officer is contrary to the spirit of the RTI Act. It is essential for the common man to know the provisions of the police manual. Competent authorities should put up all such information on the website in larger public interest,” Gaikwad observed.

Motor Vehicles Tax:

The activist Sujit Nadkarni stumbled upon the scam under which the dealers of vehicles dupe the Government. The Modus operandi was

• On sale of a car, give customer a tax invoice showing that motor vehicle tax has been paid.

• Make a facsimile of the invoice, watering down the actual cost of the car and tax payable on it.

• Give the first invoice to the customer, and the second to the Government

• Pocket the difference in the amount, duping both customer and state exchequer

It was experienced by Nadkarni that when he purchased a Maruti Swift VDI on 30th March, 2008, he was issued an invoice, which said the car’s actual price was Rs. 4,35,886 and the final amount after taxes Rs. 4,90,349.

Nadkarni, however, noticed that another copy of the invoice was prepared by the car dealer for submission to the road transport authorities. The price of the car in this copy was shown as Rs. 4,21,766, while the final amount was Rs. 4,74,487.

While selling the car to Nadkani, the car dealer prepared two invoices with same number, one for the customer and the other for submission to RTO. The motor vehicle tax of Rs. 1,110 was thus evaded, although the same was collected by the car dealer from Nadkarni.

Nadkarni then conducted a sample survey of tax evasion by fraudulent invoicing. Under the Right to Information Act, he requested the Nashik RTO to furnish copies of all vehicle invoices sold in the area during 2006, 2007 and 2008.

There was, prima facie, a loss to exchequer of Crores of rupees. The transport commissioner is to conduct a detailed inquiry and file a report,” the division bench of justices A. M. Khanwilkar and A. P. Bhangale ordered.

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PART A: Decision of the High Court

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Section 2(h) of the RTI Act: Public Authority:

The question for consideration in the instant writ petition is whether the petitioner – Chandigarh University is “Public Authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (the “RTI Act”). The State Information Commission, Punjab had, by an Order dated 14.12.2012, answered such question in the affirmative. It is this order dated 14.12.2012, passed by the State Information Commission, Punjab that has been impugned before this Court.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, at the very outset, conceded that the petitioner- University was a creation by law made by the State Legislature i.e. the Punjab University Act, 2012 of the State of Punjab (Act No.7 fo2012). Learned counsel however, strenuously argued that the petitioner would not fall within the definition of ‘public authority’ u/s. 2(h) of the RTI Act. In furtherance of this submission, it was urged that the statements of objects and reasons of the Act have to be read with the provisions contained in the Act itself, while interpreting the provision. Reliance in this regard was placed upon a judgment of the Apex court in Rameshwar Parshad etc. vs. State of U.P. & others, AIR 1983 SC 383. It was argued that the objective of the RTI Act was not to victimise a private body, person or entity under the garb of eliciting information. The second limb of the argument raised by the learned counsel was that the petitioner University was not an authority or body of self-Government. Much emphasis was laid upon the expression “self-Government” to contend that the same would mean the Office of the Government or State itself which by act of law creates the said “public authority” to carry out the acts and deeds of the State as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel while impugning the Order dated 14.12.2012, passed by the State Information Commission, Punjab further argued that the petitioner-University is a privately owned and managed Institution which is not re ceiving financial assistance directly or Indirectly from the State and, accordingly, on this count alone cannot be construed as “public authority” as defined under the RTI Act.

The Court observed that there would be no quarrel as regards the first submission raised by the learned counsel that while interpreting the provision of the statute, due emphasis would have to be given to the statement of objects and reasons of the RTI Act. The statement of objects and reasons of the RTI Act indicate that it has “provisions to ensure maximum disclosure and minimum exemption, consistent with the constitutional provisions and effective mechanism for access to information and disclosures by authorities”. The pre-amble to the RTI Act notes that “democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to governed.”

The Court further observed that it is against such background that the provisions of the RTI Act as also definition of “public authority” under Section 2(h) would require to be interpreted. A wider definition would have to be assigned to the expression “public authority” rather than a restrictive one. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424 noted the importance of the context in which every word is used in the matter of interpretation of statute and held in the following terms:

“Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.”

On a plain reading of the provision, the expression “public authority” would include an authority or a body or an institution of self-government established or constituted by a law made by the State Legislature u/s. 2(h)(c) of the RTI Act. The legislature had made a conscious distinction between “by or under” which used in relation to the Constitution and “by” in relation to a Central or State Legislation. As such, it would not be enough for the body to be established under “a Central or State legislation to become a “public authority”. If this be so, then every Company registered under the Companies Act would be a “public authority”. However, this is not the case here. Admittedly, the petitioner-University is a body established by law made by the State Legislature. Clearly, the petitioner would be covered under the scope and ambit of the definition of “public authority” under Section 2(h)(c) of the RTI Act.

The requirement as regards a body being owned, controlled or substantially financed would only apply to the latter part of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act i.e. body falling within the meaning of Section 2(h)(d)(i) or (ii). Once it is shown that a body has been constituted by an enactment of the State Legislature, then nothing more need be shown to demonstrate that such a body is a “public authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h)(c) of the RTI Act.

The Court held that the submission made by the learned counsel to assert that petitioner- University was not a body of a “self-Government” and thereby would not be covered under the expression “public authority”, was also without merit. Self-Government as sought to be portrayed in the pleadings on record and at the stage of arguments would not be a requirement and essential ingredient for invoking the provisions of RTI Act. It would have been a relevant para-meter to fulfil the requirement under Article12 of the Constitution of India in relation to enforcement of the fundamental rights through Courts. The RTI Act, on the other hand, intends to achieve access to information and to provide an effective frame–work for effecting the right to information recognised under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

For the reasons recorded above, the Court found no infirmity in the impugned Order dated 14.12.2012, passed by the State Information Commission, Punjab holding the petitioner-University was a “public authority” u/s. 2(h) of the RTI Act.

[Chandigarh University vs. State of Punjab & Ors. CWP No. 1509 of 2013 decided on 01.03.2013] [Citation: RTIR I (2013) 353(P&H)]

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PART C: Information & Around

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Public Authority:
Aurangabad Information Commissioner has ruled that Global Towers, a franchisee of the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company (MSEDCL) for Aurangabad city, came within the purview of the Right to Information Act and was bound to provide information to power consumers.

RTI applicant, Hemant kapadia had made an application to Global Towers (GT) which was rejected by it on the ground that it was a private company and the RTI Act did not apply to it. MSEDCL representatives submitted before the Commission that all applications received from consumers under the RTI Act had been forwarded to Global Towers, but it did not respond and so no information could be given to Kapadia.

All along, Global Towers had taken the view that it would provide information to MSEDCL and that there was nothing wrong in denying information to consumers. In some cases, the firm did provide information, but it was submitted to. MSEDCL and not the consumers.

Information Commission ruled that GT had received substantial assistance form MSEDCL and owing to that assistance view the GT was able to perform and provide service. Accordingly, in the view of the Information Commissioner, GT comes under the purview of the RTI Act and is a Public Authority.

Panchayat head:
Bhadresh Vamja, a 21 year-old law student, who tenaciously used Right to Information (RTI) to fight corruption, has been elected as the sarpanch of Saldi village. He is also one of the youngest sarpanchs in the state of Gujarat.

Vamja is the second RTI activist to be elected to village panchayat for empowering people through RTI. Last year, blind activist Ratna Ala was elected as deputy sarpanch of Rangpar village in Surendranagar.

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PART A: order of high court

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Address in the RTI application, section 6(2) of the RTI Act:

A short judgment of Calcutta High Court-

RTI Activist, Mr. Avishek Goenka approached the Calcutta H.C. in a writ petition and submitted that the authorities should not insist upon the detailed address of the applicant as and when any application is made under the Right to Information Act.

He stated that giving full address would cause a threat to the activist and in fact there had been past incidents of unnatural deaths of activist in the field, presumably by the interested persons having vested interest to conceal the information that is asked for by the activist.

He submitted that the applicant would provide a particular post-box number that would automatically conceal his identity to the public at large.

The Court considered the relevant provisions of the RTI Act and stated: Section 6(2) of the Right to information Act, 2005 would clearly provide, an applicant making request for information shall not be required to give any reason for requesting the information or any other personal details except those that may be necessary for contacting him.

The court further stated:
Looking to the said provision, we find logic in the submission of the petitioner. When the legislature thought it fit, the applicant need not disclose any personal detail, the authority should not insist upon his detailed whereabouts particularly 

when post-box number is provided for that wouldestablish contact with him and the authority.

In case, the authority would find any difficulty with the post-box number, they may insist upon personal details. However, in such case, it would be the solemn duty of the authority to hide such information and particularly from their website so that people at large would not know of the details.

We thus dispose of this writ petition by making the observations as above. The Secretary, Ministry of Personnel should circulate the copy of this order to all concerned so that the authority can take appropriate measure to hide information with regard to personal details of the activist to avoid any harassment by the persons having vested interest.

[Mr. Avishek Goenka: W.P. 33290(W) of 2013 dated on20.11.2013.]

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PART A: CIC Decision

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The Appellant, Shri Shashikant Barve, through his RTI application dated 25.06.2012 sought certain information ( e.g. number and names of study circles in WIRC where the bank account of the study circle is being operated during 2012; payment made by the study circles operating in Pune to any branch of ICAI for holding any joint programmes during the period 01.01.2011 to 31.12.2011; names of currently elected CAs members on WIRC Managing Committee Mumbai or Council at New Delhi; study circle wise data in respect of their members and so on.) in respect of study circles operating in Western India Regional Council (WIRC) of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

The CPIO vide her letter dated 21.08.2012, while inter-alia informing the Appellant that the relationship between ICAI and CPE study circles is only for limited purpose of recognising the CPE hours, denied the information on the ground that the same was not maintained by them.

During the hearing, the Respondents stated that the study circles are voluntary organisations which have been formed for the purpose of carrying out professional learning activities. According to them, the role of ICAI is only for recognising the study activities of these study circles and there is no financial support or funding made by ICAI to these study circles. They, therefore, expressed their inability to provide the information to the Appellant as the same is not held by them.

The Appellant, on the other hand, argued that the study circles are nothing but an “extended arm” of the ICAI and that ICAI has full control over them. He, in support, refered to the “Norms for CPE Study Circles” issued by ICAI, copy of which the Respondents has produced before the Commission.

A perusal of the norms issued by ICAI in respect of CPE study circles shows that ICAI does have supervisory control over these study circles. Para of these norms deals with accounts related matters and include provisions like every CPE study circle shall submit an annual statement of receipt and payment, income and expenditure and balance sheet to the Regional Council; Convenors of CPE study circles are authorised to collect a reasonable amount per member as annual membership fee to defray the cost of holding learning activities and other incidental charges; the responsibility for ensuring financial propriety in the financial management of the study circle for production of proper audited accounts, whenever required by the supervising branch/Regional council shall be that of the Convenor and Deputy Convenor etc.

On consideration of the arguments put forth by both the parties and perusal of the records, the Commission is of the view that the information sought by the Appellant here can be accessed by the Respondent from the CPE study circles (through its Convenor or Deputy Convenor) under section 2(f) of the RTI Act, which includes in the definition of information:

“….information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force.” “In view of the above, the CPIO is hereby directed to obtain the information in question from the respective CPE study circles, operating in Western India Regional Council (WIRC) of the ICAI, and provide the same to the Appellant within 4 weeks of receipt of this order”.

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PART A: Decisions of the Supreme Court

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Penalty on Chief State Information Commissioner

One Mr. Anbarasam filed an application u/s. 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (Act) and sought certain documents and information from the Public Information Officer – Deputy Registrar (Establishment) of the High Court of Karnataka (hereinafter referred as Respondent No. 1). His prayer was for the supply of certified copies of some information/documents regarding guidelines and rules pertaining to scrutiny and classification of the writ petitions and the procedure followed by the Karnataka High Court in respect of Writ Petition Nos. 26657 of 2004 and 17935 of 2006. Respondent No. 1 disposed of the application of Mr. Anbarasam vide order dated 3-8-2007 and intimated him that the information sought by him is available in the Karnataka High Court Act and the Rules and he can obtain certified copies of the order sheets of the two writ petitions by filing appropriate application under High Court Rules.

Mr. Anbarasam filed complaint dated 17-1-2008 u/s. 18 of the Act before the Karnataka Information Commission (for short, ‘the Commission’) and made a grievance that the certified copies of the documents had not been made available to him despite payment of the requisite fees. The Commission allowed the complaint of Mr. Anbarasam and directed Respondent No. 1 to furnish the High Court Act, Rules and certified copies of order sheets free of cost.

PIO of the High Court of Karnataka challenged the order of Karnataka Information Commission before the High Court of Karnataka which was decided by a single judge. The Single Judge noted:

“Various information as sought by the respondent are available in Karnataka High Court Act and Rules made there under. The said Act and Rules are available in market. If not available, the respondent has to obtain copies of the same from the publishers. It is not open for the respondent to ask for copies of the same from petitioner. But strangely, the Karnataka Information Commission has directed the petitioner to furnish the copies of the Karnataka High Court Act & Rules free of cost under Right to Information Act. The impugned order in respect of the same is illegal and arbitrary.”

“According to the Rules of the High Court, it is open for the respondent to file an application for certified copies of the order sheet or the relevant documents for obtaining the same. (See Chapter-17of Karnataka High Court Rules, 1959). As it is open for the respondent to obtain certified copies of the order sheet pending as well as the disposed of matters, the State Chief Information Commissioner is not justified in directing the petitioner to furnish copies of the same free of costs. If the order of the State Chief Information Commissioner is to be implemented, then, it will lead to illegal demands. Under the Rules, any person who is party or not a party to the proceedings can obtain the orders of the High Court as per the procedure prescribed in the Rules mentioned supra.”

 “The State Chief Information Commissioner has passed the order without applying his mind to the relevant Rules of the High Court. The State Chief Information Commissioner should have adverted to the High Court Rules before proceeding further. Since the impugned order is illegal and arbitrary, the same is liable to be quashed.”

Mr. Anbarasam did not challenge the Order of the Single Judge. However, the Commission filed an appeal along with an application for condonation of 335 days’ delay. The Division Bench dismissed the application for condonation of delay and also held that the Commission cannot be treated as an aggrieved person.

On the said dismal of appeal, the Chief Information Commissioner (instead of the Commission) filed a petition to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted and ruled:

“What has surprised us is that while the writ appeal was filed by the Commission, the special leave petition has been preferred by the Karnataka Information Commissioner. Learned counsel could not explain as to how the petitioner herein, who was not an appellant before the Division Bench of the High Court, can challenge the impugned order. He also could not explain as to what was the locus of the Commission to file appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge whereby its order had been set aside. The entire exercise undertaken by the Commission and the Karnataka Information Commissioner to challenge the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court shows that the concerned officers have wasted public money for satisfying their ego. If Mr. Anbarasam felt aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, nothing prevented him from challenging the same by filing writ appeal. However, the fact of the matter is that he did not question the order of the learned Single Judge. The Commission and the Karnataka Information Commissioner had no legitimate cause to challenge the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. Therefore, the writ appeal filed by the Commission was totally unwarranted and misconceived and the Division Bench of the High Court did not commit any error by dismissing the same.”

“This petition filed by Karnataka Information Commissioner for setting aside order dated 15-6-2012 passed by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No. 3255/2010 (GM-RES) titled Karnataka Information Commission vs. State Public Information Officer and another cannot but be described as frivolous piece of litigation which deserves to be dismissed at threshold with exemplary costs.”

“With the above observations, the special leave petition is dismissed. For filing a frivolous petition, the petitioner is saddled with cost of Rs.1,00,000/. The amount of cost shall be deposited by the petitioner with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within a period of two months from today. If the needful is not done, the Secretary of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee shall recover the amount of cost from the petitioner as arrears of land revenue.”

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PART A: High Court Decisions

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[In the H.C. of Uttarakhand: writ petition No.1814 of 2006 decided on 23-04-2013: Uttaranchal Public Services Commission vs. Chief Information Commissioner & Ors: Citation: RTI III (2013)82]

  •  Section 8(1)(d) & (j) of the RTI Act :

Information sought:

i) To provide the criteria applied in the selection procedure of the candidates to the post of Lecturer-Biology in Inter College.

ii) How many candidates appeared in the written examination for the post of lecturer Biology in Intermediate College and how many candidates were selected and how many candidates have appeared for interview before the Interview Board?

iii) To provide the details of the marks obtained by the selected candidates in the written test along with their marks in the interview and the details of their experience, educational qualification etc. with their preference/marks obtained by them.

iv) To give the details of the marks obtained by Mohd. Asif Tyagi (129639) in written test interview, educational qualification and experience etc. for the post of Lecturer-Biology.

PIO gave information on (i) & (ii) above. As regards information under (iii) & (iv), same were rejected on the ground that the said information cannot be provided in view of the provisions of section 8(1)(d) & 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. FAA dismissed the appeal. Hence, Uttaranchal Public Service Commission (UPSC) filed a writ petition before High Court of Uttarakhand.

The Court stated:
So far as the information on point no.3 is concerned, it is stated in para-10 of the writ petition that the respondent no.2 (Shri Jakir) has sought information with respect to one candidate Mohd. Asif Tyagi under the RTI Act. It is further stated in the writ petition that respondent no. 2 was neither the candidate in the screening examination nor in the interview. Further, as per provisions of section 8(1)(j) of the Act, the information sought by the respondent no.2 with respect to Mohd. Asif Tyagi, comes under the definition of third party as per the provisions of RTI Act and the provisions of sections 8(1)(d) clearly provides that the disclosure of such information would harm the competitive position of third party and the same has been exempted from disclosure under RTI Act.

The Court held:
By a perusal of the information sought by respondent no.2, it reveals that the information sought is of a general nature and the marks obtained in a competitive examination cannot be held to be an intellectual property of an individual. The petitioner cannot deny the information as to how many marks have been obtained by Asif Tyagi and the other selected candidates and their educational qualification and experience. In my opinion, this information is not covered u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act and the learned Chief Information Commissioner has rightly directed the petitioner to give information on point nos.3 and 4.

For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly.

[Decision of High Court of Madras in the Registrar general, High Court of Madras, Chennai vs. K.Elango & Anr: W.P.No.20485 of 2012 And M.P.No.1 of 2012 decided on 17-04-2013 Citation: RTIR III (2013) 103 (Madras)]

• In this case The Tamil Nadu Information Commission passed an order by not accepting the argument “unwarranted invasion of privacy of individuals” and allowed the appeal by directing the Registrar General, High Court of Madras to furnish the details sought for by K. Elango.

To start with the High Court of Madras noted:

It is to be borne in mind that under the Right to Information Act, 2005 an authority has a rudimentary function to perform either to furnish the information or deny the information. As a matter of fact, there is no specific Article in the Constitution of India which provides for the citizens right to know. However, Article 19(1)(a) provides for freedom of thought and expression which indirectly includes right to obtain information. Further, Article 21 guarantees right to life and personal liberty to citizens. Undoubtedly, Right to Life is incomplete if basic human right viz., ‘Right to Know’ is not included within its umbrage.

K. Elango had sought from PIO of the High Court, Madras following information:

1. How may Subordinate Judges are there in service in the state of Tamil Nadu? The district-wise list may be furnished to me as per the hierarchy.

2. How many employees are serving in the judicial department in the whole of Tamil Nadu (including the Government servants on deputation)?

3. How many judicial officers, police officers and staffs are working in the Vigilance Department of the registry of Madras High Court?

4. Does your vigilance department have any branches in the district so as to receive the complaint from the general public against the judicial officer and court staffs?

5. Does your registry have any tie-up or coordination with the office of Vigilance and Anticorruption, Rajaannamalai Puram, Chennai 28 to trap the judicial officers or court staffs on the basis of the complaints from the affected persons?

6. Does your registry have a special team for trapping the corrupt judicial officers and court staffs?

7. Between 2001 to 2010, how many complaints have been received by your Registry and Vigilance Department, kindly give complaint-wise break-up figure (that is how many complaints against DJ, ADDLJ, SJ, DMC, FTC Judges, Magistrates and Court staffs)?

8. How many complaints ended in dismissal, suspension, issuance of memo and dropping of the case and conviction between the said 2001 to 2010?

9. Between 2001 to 2010 how many complaints against High Court staffs have been received relating to bribe and the fate of those complaints?

Both the sides in this case made elaborate submission and also cited number of courts’ decisions. The Court also cited number of courts’ decisions and further stated:

• In the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta and others vs. President of India and others, [AIR 1982 Supreme Court 149], it is held that ‘the Right to know has been given a constitutional status by treating it as a part of speech and expression and thereby bringing this right within Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.’
• It will be quite in the fitness of things to recall the Golden words of Thomas Jefferson, who rightly said that ‘Information is the Currency of Democracy’.
• In the words of Amartya Sen, ‘the Right to Information Act, 2005 is a momentous engagement with the possibilities of freedom.’ [vide Lawz January 2008 at page 40 special page 41]
• Befittingly, we recall the observation of Lord Goff in the decision Attorney General vs. Guardian Newspapers Limited and others(No 2) 1990 1 A.P. at page 109 which runs as follows:

“Although the basis of Law’s protection of confidence is that there is a Law, nevertheless the public interest may be outweighed by some other countervailing public interest which favours disclosure.”

• It is to be pointed out that the personal information and the information between persons in fiduciary relationship are exempted from disclosure under the Right to Information Act. Also, ‘Confidence’ may be outweighed by public interest in the matter of such disclosure.

The Court then concluded:

•    On a careful consideration of respective contentions and on going through the contents of the application dated 01-11-2010 filed by the 1st Respondent/Applicant this Court is of the considered view that the information sought for by him in Serial Nos. 1 to 9 pertaining to the internal delicate functioning/administration of the High Court besides the same relate to invasion of privacy of respective individuals if the information so asked for is furnished and more so, the information sought for has no relationship to any public activity or interest. Moreover, the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is not to a fuller extent open to public domain. It added further, if the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is divulged, then, it will open the floodgates/Pandora’s Box compelling the Petitioner/High Court to supply the information sought for by the concerned Requisitionists as a matter of routine, without any rhyme or reason/restrictions as the case may be. Therefore, some self restrictions are to be imposed in regards to the supply of information in this regards. As a matter of fact, the Notings, Jottings, Administrative Letters, Intricate Internal Discussions, Deliberations etc. of the Petitioners/High Court cannot be brought u/s. 2(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, in considered opinion of this Court. Also that, if the information relating to Serial Nos.1 to 9 mentioned in the application of the 1st Respondent/Applicant dated 01-11-2010 is directed to be furnished or supplied with, then, certainly, it will impede and hinder the regular, smooth and proper functioning of the Institution viz. High Court (an independent authority under the Constitution of India, free from Executive or Legislature). As such, a Saner Counsel/Balancing Act is to be adopted in matters relating to the application under the Right to Information Act, 2005, so that an adequate freedom and inbuilt safeguards can be provided to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court [competent authority and public authority as per section 2(e)(iii) and 2(h)(a) of the Act 22 of 2005] in exercising his discretionary powers either to supply the information or to deny the information, as prayed for by the Applicants/Requisitionists concerned.”

•    “Apart from the above, if the information requested by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, based on his letter dated 01-11- 2010, is supplied with, then, it will have an adverse impact on the regular and normal, serene functioning of the High Court’s Office on the impact on the Administrative side. Therefore, we come to an irresistible conclusion that the 1st Respondent/Applicant is not entitled to be supplied with the information/details sought for him, in his Application dated 01-11-2010 addressed to the Public Information Officer of the High Court, Madras under the provision of the Right to Information Act. Even on the ground of (i) maintaining confidentiality; (ii) based on the reason that the private or personal information is exempted from disclosure u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act,2005; and (iii) also u/s. 8(1)(e) of the Act in lieu of fiduciary relationship maintained by the High Court, the request of the 1st Respondent/Applicant, cannot be acceded to by this Court. Also, we opine that the 1st Respondent/Applicant’s requests, suffer from want of bona fides (notwithstanding the candid fact that Section 6 of the Right to Information Act does not either overtly or covertly refers to the ‘concept of Locus’)”

•    To put it differently, if the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is divulged or furnished by the Office of the High Court (on administrative side), then, the secrecy and privacy of the internal working process may get jeopardised, besides the furnishing of said information would result in invasion of unwarranted and uncalled for privacy of individuals concerned. Even the disclosure of information pertaining to departmental enquiries in respect of Disciplinary Actions initiated against the Judicial Officers/Officials of the Subordinate Court or the High Court will affect the facile, smooth and independent running of the administration of the High Court, under the Constitution of India. Moreover, as per section 2(e) read with section 28 of the Right to Information Act, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of this Court is empowered to frame rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. In this regards, we point out that the ‘Madras High Court Right to Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules, 2007’ have been framed and as amended in regard to the Name and Designation of the Officers mentioned therein, the same has come into force from 18-11-2008.

•    In the upshot of quantitative and qualitative discussions mentioned supra, Information Commission, Chennai, to prevent an aberration of Justice and to promote substantial cause of Justice, this Court interferes with the order dated 10-01-2012 in Case No.10447/ Enquirt/A/11 passed by the 2nd Respondent/ Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai and sets aside the same, to secure the ends of Justice Resultantly, the Writ Petition is allowed. No. costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition Is closed.