Subscribe to the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal Subscribe Now!

LOST IN CREDIT LOSS!

Indirect tax legislations across the globe introduce input credits to eliminate tax cascading in the downstream value chain of goods / services. An idealistic VAT system envisages tax as a ‘pass-through’ so that the tax itself would not be a component of product / service pricing. Yet this idealistic VAT system has been tampered with, time and again, and one is forced to ponder over the robustness of the VAT system. Inefficiencies have crept into this system through the introduction of credit blocks in respect of motor vehicles, construction activity, etc. One such inefficiency is the reversal of input tax credit (ITC) in respect of goods lost, stolen, destroyed, written off or disposed of by way of gift or free samples [section 17(5)(h)]. None of these terms has been defined under the Act and one would have to examine the general and contextual meaning of these terms. This article seeks to articulate the plausible meanings intended by the Legislature and their impact in determining the credit eligibility. The relevant clause(s) under examination has / have been extracted below:

‘16(1). Every registered person shall, subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed and in the manner specified in section 49, be entitled to take credit of input tax charged on any supply of goods or services or both to him which are used or intended to be used in the course of furtherance of his business and the said amount shall be credited to the electronic credit ledger of such person…..
17(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 16 and sub-section (1) of section 18, input tax credit shall not be available in respect of the following, namely: -….
(h) goods lost, stolen, destroyed, written off or disposed of by way of gift or free samples, and; ….’

GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF IMPORTANT TERMS
The key terms under consideration in section 17(5)(h) and their respective meanings from the Law Lexicon (5th Edition) are given below:
Lost – A thing is said to be lost when it cannot be found or when ordinary vigilance will not regain it.
Stolen – ‘To steal’ means to take by theft and ‘Intent to steal’ refers to permanently deprive and defraud another of the use and benefit of property and permanently to appropriate the property to his own use or the use of any person other than the true owner.
Destroyed – ‘Destroyed’ occurring in section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act has a wider connotation than mere physical destruction. It would also cover loss arising on the theft of a vehicle. The term ‘destroyed’ in section 41(2) of the Income-tax Act would not cover items partly destroyed in fire and which have been retained by the assessee. In another context, the term destroyed means to ‘demolish’, i.e., to render a thing useless for the purpose for which it was intended.
Written off – ‘Write down’ means to reduce the book value of. ‘Write off’ means to carry or remove. ‘Write-off’ also means to delete an asset from the accounts because it has been depreciated (or been written-down) so far that it no longer has any book value. It can also mean to charge the whole of the value of an asset to expenses or loss (i.e., assign it zero value on the balance sheet).
Disposed of by way of gift or free sample – Dispose means to transfer to the control or ownership of another; or transfer or alienate. ‘Gift’ means to transfer by one person to another of any existing movable property voluntarily and without consideration in money or money’s worth. ‘Sample’, both in its legal and popular acceptance,  means that which is taken out of a large quantity and is a fair representation of the ‘whole’, a part shown as a specimen. The transfer ought to be by way of gift or free sample. The entire phrase can be interpreted as ‘to transfer the control or ownership over goods either by way of love / affection or by taking out a small quantity from a larger group and such transfer being without consideration’.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The phrase ‘lost’ can be understood in the sense that the taxpayer has lost possession over the goods on account of any external incident. It represents a total annihilation of the goods and does not appear to be encompassing situations where the goods are present but there is a loss (economic and / or physical loss) which is partial in nature. This expression should be understood in contradistinction to the phrase ‘loss’ which would be wider and include partial loss of goods concerned. Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Dluge vs. Robinson1, while considering an issue relating to ‘negotiable instruments destroyed, stolen or otherwise lost’, referred to the definition of the term ‘lost’ in the Black’s Law Dictionary (4th edition) which reads as follows:

‘An article is “lost” when the owner has lost the possession or custody of it, involuntarily and by any means, but more particularly by accident or his own negligence or forgetfulness, and when he is ignorant of its whereabouts or cannot recover it by an ordinarily diligent search.’

In Sialkot Industrial Corporation vs. UOI2 the phrase ‘lost or destroyed’ was examined and it means a complete deprivation of the property involved. This decision is important as it highlights the commonality in the phrases lost, destroyed, disposition as that in which there is loss of possession over the goods:

‘10. According to the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the word “Loss” means, the act or fact of losing, failure to keep possession, deprivation, theft of property. In the same dictionary, the word “lost” is defined as meaning “not made use of, ruined or destroyed physically or morally, parted with, no longer possessed, taken away or beyond reach of attainment”. According to the Law Lexicon, Vol. 2 page 44, the word “loss” has no precise hard and fast meaning. It is a generic and comprehensive term covering different situations. Loss results when a thing is destroyed. But it is also caused when the owner has been made to part with it although the thing remains intact. In this sense, loss means and implies “a deprivation”. It is synonymous with damage resulting either in consequence of destruction, deprivation or even depreciation and when a party is dispossessed of a thing, either when it can never be recovered or when it is withheld from him, he is deemed to suffer the loss.’

The said decision was distinguished in BEML vs. CC Madras3 in the context of the Customs Act which had distinct provisions for goods lost or destroyed and those that are pilfered. In that context the Court held that goods stolen cannot be included in the phrase lost or destroyed. But this distinction does not alter the interpretation in section 17(5)(h) since they are subject to similar implications under the GST law.

In CIT vs. Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. [1978] 112 ITR 776 (SC) the word ‘destroy’ came up for consideration – Destroyed is a word in common usage, with well-defined non-technical meaning. As used in law, it does not in all cases necessarily mean complete annihilation or total destruction. But in the context and under particular circumstances the word many times has been defined as meaning totally obliterated and done away with as also made completely useless for the purpose intended – vide Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 26, page 1246.

‘We are not concerned in this case with a situation where two independent machineries which are separable have to work combined for the purpose of business. We, therefore, need not answer as to what would happen in such a case. We are concerned in this case with the part of the machinery which admittedly was inseparable and had no independent existence as machinery. The context in which the words “sold”, “discarded”, “demolished” or “destroyed” are used and for the purpose for which they are used, to our mind, clearly suggest that it is to the whole machinery that they apply and not to any part of the machinery.’

OTHER LEGAL PROVISIONS
One may recollect the contextual use of the phrase lost and / or destroyed under the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The provision read as follows:

‘21. Remission of duty – (1) Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, as the case may be that goods have been lost or destroyed by natural causes or by unavoidable accident or are claimed by the manufacturer as unfit for consumption or for marketing, at any time before removal, he may remit the duty payable on such goods, subject to such conditions as may be imposed by him by order in writing:’

Similar expressions were used in sections 22 and 23 of the Customs Act in the context of remission of Customs duty prior to clearance of goods for home consumption. The extract reads as follows:

‘SECTION 22. Abatement of duty on damaged or deteriorated goods. – (1) Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs –
(a) that any imported goods had been damaged or had deteriorated at any time before or during the unloading of the goods in India; or
…..
(c) that any warehoused goods had been damaged at any time before clearance for home consumption on account of any accident not due to any wilful act, negligence or default of the owner, his employee or agent,
SECTION 23. Remission of duty on lost, destroyed or abandoned goods. – (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 13, where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs that any imported goods have been lost (otherwise than as a result of pilferage) or destroyed, at any time before clearance for home consumption, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall remit the duty on such goods.’

The specific use of the phrases ‘damage’ / ‘deterioration’ in company with ‘destroyed’ conveys that the Legislature has in the past assigned a distinct connotation to these phrases and the degree of damage or the condition of damage plays an important role in ascertaining whether there is destruction. It appears that only complete damage rendering the goods unusable would be considered as destruction and not otherwise.

RULE OF ‘NOSCITOR A SOCII’
While understanding the above phrase individually, the Noscitor rule of construction ought to be applied. According to the rule, where two or more words which are susceptible to analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. On application of this rule, it would be impermissible to extract a phrase and give it a meaning which is at divergence or wider in amplitude than the other phrases. They are to take colour from each other.

In the present context, the phrases ‘lost’, ‘stolen’, ‘destroyed’, ‘written off’ or ‘disposed of’ appear to have a common thread. The phrase lost and stolen is undoubtedly to be understood as a situation where the owner is deprived of the goods in its entirety. On the other end, the phrases ‘disposed of by gift or free sample’ also represents transfer of goods in its entirety to another person. Accordingly, the intermittent phrases ought to also be understood in the same sense. The phrases ‘destroyed’ and ‘written off’ should also be interpreted in the same sense. Destroyed ought to imply such destruction which completely extinguishes the goods. Partial damage or spoilage of goods which continue to have a physical existence and can be recovered or used partially should not be construed as destroyed. Moreover, write-off of goods represents a permanent write-off of goods which are not having any use to the business enterprise. Partial write-off due to technological obsolescence, etc., cannot be intended to have been included in the said enumeration.

Moreover, these are instances which are unforeseen or non-recurring in nature. If the business practice recognises foreseeable losses (such as evaporation, seasonal damage, etc.), such events may not fall within the strict construction of section 17(5)(h). Losses which arise out of business necessity, conscious efforts, budgeted / identified events, factored into product costs, etc., ought not to be considered as an unforeseen loss. Though there may be involvement of incidents of destruction of the goods, such destruction (being recognised and forecast) would not contextually adhere to the intent of the entire phrase. While one may contend that the phrases ‘disposed of by gift or free sample’ is a voluntary act, the fabric of the phrase evidently necessitates that the events have an unforeseen character inherent in them.

In Symphony Services Corp. India Pvt Ltd. vs. CC Bangalore4 the Court examined a situation where the goods have become entirely useless due to seepage of water, thereby concluding that they were destroyed goods, rejecting the contention of the Department that the said goods were ‘damaged goods’ and not ‘destroyed goods’. This decision is important for the proposition that only complete damage would fall within the expression destruction of goods and the physical condition of the same should be such that it renders them utterly unusable. It is only when such an interpretation is adopted that section 17(5)(h), in its entirety, would one be able to adhere to the Noscitor rule and ensure a consistent understanding of the phrase.

‘In respect of’
Before we move further, it is also important to study the phrase ‘in respect of’ standing at the preamble of section 17(5)(h). One understanding of this phrase is that it has a wide connotation and the Legislature intends to use this phrase in an expansive sense. The popular decision cited in this context is the case of Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. vs. General Electric Co., (1984) 4 SCC 679 where the Courts examined the scope of the arbitration clause in an agreement and held as follows:

‘(2) Expressions such as “arising out of” or “in respect of” or “in connection with” or “in relation to” or “in consequence of” or “concerning” or “relating to” the contract are of the widest amplitude and content and include even questions as to the existence, validity and effect (scope) of the arbitration agreement.’

The said interpretation was followed in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the context of section 8 of the IBC (Macquarie Bank Limited vs. Shilpi Cable Technologies Limited5) which stated that the phrase ‘in relation to’ is of wide import and consequently interpreted in an expansive sense. In Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI (1988) 2 SCC 299, the Court was examining the expression ‘in relation to’ (so also ‘pertaining to’) and held that these expressions are intended to include matters of both direct and indirect significance depending on the context. The Court also stated that the expression ‘relate’ is to be understood as bringing into association or connection with and the said expression is synonymous with ‘concerning to’ and ‘pertaining to’. These are expressions of expansion and not of contraction. Similar views were echoed in other decisions in the context of Central Excise laws6. The above conclusions convey that section 17(5) should be read in its expansive sense with complete play being given to the scope of blocked credits. Accordingly, while interpreting the provisions in respect of goods which are lost, destroyed, etc., they must be applied in an expansive sense rather than a narrow sense.

But a more proximate context was considered in State of Madras vs. Swastik Tobacco Factory7 where the Court was examining the phrase ‘in respect of’ used while granting deduction of excise duty paid in respect of goods sold. While the Revenue argued that ‘in respect of’ here is synonymous with ‘on’ and narrows down the scope of the phrase to only those goods ‘on’ which excise duty was paid, the assessee argued the phrase was wide enough to cover even cases where excise duty paid on raw materials can be attributed to the finished goods. The Court rejected the argument of the assessee and held ‘in respect of’ in the context can only mean goods on which excise duty was paid and not on raw materials which are attributable to the final product. This decision narrowed down the ambit of the phrase and limited the scope of a ‘deduction provision’ to only cases having a direct significance with the subsequent events. Accordingly, the provisions of section 17(5) [more specifically clause (h)] should mandate that the ITC is denied only in respect of those goods which are lost, stolen, destroyed, etc., and not extend itself to goods contained in the finished goods after being put to use.

IDENTITY TEST OF GOODS
The above analysis takes us to the important juncture of whether there has to be a matching of the identity of goods on which credit is taken and the goods on which credit is being denied. In other words, whether a manufactured tyre which is lost, destroyed, stolen can be subjected to reversal ‘in respect of’ the ITC availed on the rubber used as raw material for manufacture of the tyre.

We should reflect back to the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 which contained certain provisions on reversal of ITC on removal, loss, destruction, etc.

Rule

Situation

Reversal

Inference

3(5)

Inputs or capital goods removed as such

Complete

Prior to usage

3(5A)

Capital goods removed after use

Depreciated

Subsequent to usage

3(5B)

Input or capital goods wholly or partially
written off

Complete

Non-usage

3(5C)

Inputs on which excise duty remitted (lost
or destroyed)

Input contained in finished goods

Used and contained in a finished product on
which duty was not collected

The said rules captured the cases where the inputs were not put to the intended use of manufacture of goods. In rule 3(5), removal ‘as such’ was interpreted to apply only to cases where the goods were removed without putting them to any use. There have been multiple decisions on the specific point8 that ‘as such’ implies goods in their original condition without having been put to use. Courts have opined that alteration of the form, usage of goods into production process for a reasonably long period would not amount to removal of goods ‘as such’. This leads to the introduction of Rule 3(5A) which addresses the removal of capital goods after usage on a depreciated value. Such an interpretation appeared to be in harmony with the underlying basis for credit, i.e., use or intended for use. Importantly, the law refrained from introducing any reversal on removal of inputs contained in finished goods after the usage of such inputs. Rule 3(5B) was also introduced to address cases where goods, even though in non-usable condition, were retained in the premises and hence did not trigger removal of goods. The said rule therefore mandated reversal of credit where the write-off in the books of accounts was undertaken as a consequence of non-usage of goods. The proviso in the said rule entitled re-credit of this reversed amount the moment the same were again put back to use by the manufacturer.

Rule 3(5C) was introduced to address cases where goods were used and contained in the finished goods which were either lost or destroyed and the excise duty on the same was remitted under the Central Excise Rules. The crucial point worth noting is that these Rules distinctly provided for cases where goods on which credit was taken were ‘contained’ in the manufactured product. Until this Clause was inserted, courts have taken the view that CENVAT rules did not provide for reversal of goods used in the manufacturing process which were ultimately lost or destroyed and duty was remitted in terms of Rule 219. Even subsequent to the introduction of this Clause, Courts have held that the reversal of credit is not automatic and one has to establish remission of excise duty on such goods for reversal under 3(5C) to be triggered10.

The above interpretation rules out many cases of goods which are lost or destroyed or removed after use in production process. Even in cases where the identity of goods is altered / processed into finished products, the mere fact of inputs being contained in such lost / destroyed finished goods does not warrant a reversal unless there are specific provisions to perform the same. In summary, the identity test definitely played an important role in reversal of CENVAT credit.

In the context of GST law, the conclusion ought to remain constituted in view of legacy understanding of credit provisions and the literal wordings of section 17(5)(h). The preliminary conclusion derived on application of the Noscitor rule is further fortified when one reflects upon the background of legacy provisions.

Therefore, the wide interpretation of ‘in respect of’ may not be palatable to taxpayers and there may be an inclination to highlight the context in which this phrase is to be interpreted. They would claim that the expansive nature of section 16(1) should not be defeated by a wider interpretation of section 17(5). Goods lost, destroyed, etc., should be understood as an exception to the positive intent to allow tax credits in case of business use. Where business use has been met and the taxpayer is able to establish the necessity for use of the product in a particular manner (generally framed as commercial expediency), Revenue ought not to question the business acumen behind the use of such goods. And this is where Courts will have to also take cognizance of the ‘commercial expediency test’ while interpreting the said phrase.

The most profound appreciation of this test was stated in an Income-tax matter in S.A. Builders case11 which was examining a matter of allowability of interest for the purpose of business. The Court stated (in para 23-25 and 31) that expenses incurred out of business expediency do not limit themselves to earning profits or one’s own business. It would also include matters undertaken out of a business necessity or prudence even though it does not appear to render an immediate or a visible benefit to the said business. Most importantly, the A.O. cannot sit in judgement over the commercial expediency of a business decision [Hero Cycles (P) Limited vs. CIT12]. The said test was also expounded in J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Sales Tax Officer in the context of Cenvat / Modvat Credits under the erstwhile laws. The Supreme Court stated that credit ought to be extended to equipment in manufacture of goods if it aids any particular process and the said process is so integrally connected with the manufacturing that its absence would render the same commercially inexpedient.

The applicability of the above analysis under GST is visible with the decision of ARS Steel & Alloy International (P) Ltd. where the Madras High Court while addressing the Revenue’s contention that finished goods contained a substantially lower quantity of inputs in comparison with the raw material consumed, stated that loss of inputs which is inherent to the manufacturing process cannot be denied u/s 17(5)(h). The Court relied on the decision in Rupa & Co. Ltd. vs. CESTAT13 and observed that the phrase ‘Inputs of such finished product’ and ‘contained in finished products’ are distinct phrases and they cannot be viewed theoretically as mere semantics. It must be viewed in the context of the manufacturing process which necessarily entails loss of goods at various stages and such loss cannot be equated to loss of the inputs as such. Therefore, the legacy principle that the identity of the goods and the identity of the credit in respect of the goods for which reversal is being sought on the eventuality of being ‘lost’, ‘destroyed’, etc., u/s 17(5)(h) should be mapped and only on such identification would the reversal be permissible under law.

APPLICATION
The above analysis can now be applied to a set of cases where there has been a constant tug-of-war between the taxpayer and his Officer. The Table below has been divided into distinct instances based on events:

Stage

Event

Analysis for 17(5)(h)

Reasoning

Pre-receipt stage

In-transit normal loss – Foreseeable

Threshold conditions u/s 16(2) need to be satisfied and only
then 17(5) to be applied

Section 16(2) mandates receipt of goods but unavoidable
evaporation loss in transit may not disentitle credit. Receipt here is being
applied as ‘legal receipt’ and not merely physical receipt. Once legal
receipt is satisfied then 17(5)(h) test may not bar credit on normal loss

In-transit abnormal loss (pilferage)

Same as above

Section 16(2) may not place a bar on legal receipt, but
pilferage would be covered by section 17(5)(h) and hence inadmissible

Weighment

Short receipt recorded due to weighing scale calibration
differences

This is more a recognisable financial loss on account of
technical reasons and not in the sense understood by section 17(5)(h) which
are unforeseeable in nature

RM – store / shop floor

Spillages, residues, etc., due to handling

Quantitative loss but not complete loss

Generally attributable to mishandling or loss within tolerable
limits. May not be

(continued)

 

 

 

(continued)

 

‘lost or destroyed’ if an accepted business practice

Natural causes

Arising on account of floods, fire, etc.

Could fall within the scope based on degree – if goods can be
revived even partially may not fall within the phrase

Spoilage / Damage

Weather, season, handling, etc.

May not fall within the scope of destroyed or lost if goods in
usable condition partially

Pilferage

Stolen

Not eligible for credit

In-process

Normal loss – manufacturing activity

Business expediency

Eligible not covered in exigencies of 17(5)

Spillages, etc., physical handling

Part
of manufacturing process

Eligible to the extent of foreseeable or budgeted losses (normal
loss)

In-process damage

Part
of manufacturing process

Eligible to the extent of foreseeable or budgeted losses (normal
loss)

Qualitative Testing (QC)

Part
of manufacturing process

Eligible on account of business expediency

FG/
Captive consumption

Pilferage

Stolen

In view of the phrase ‘in respect of’, the ingredients of the
finished goods may be susceptible to reversal though difference of opinion
would arise

Normal loss

Inherent
nature of product

Eligible based on it being a foreseeable loss

Physical handling damage

Lost
or destroyed

May be considered as ‘lost’ where unforeseeable and complete
loss of goods

CONCLUSION
This is a topic where the Courts may have to draw a balance between the purported widespread application of section 17(5) and the business wisdom of taxpayers to treat their purchases in a particular manner while doing business. In the context of clause (h), one should be cognizant of the fact that the Government’s stake is limited to the tax component on such goods, whereas the taxpayer himself is committed to the base value of goods involved and if the taxpayer has made a decision to treat the goods in a particular way and recover their costs from the value chain, that decision ought to be respected by the Government while granting tax credits. Moreover, in mathematical terms where the taxpayer has factored in and loaded such losses onto the product pricing and the enhanced sale price, the loss is factored therein and tax revenue attributable to such loss has been passed on as a value addition down the value chain. Ultimately, in the legal sense the maxim ‘Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretatio’ is apt here – the best interpretation is made from the context!

CONCEPT OF ‘PERSON’ UNDER GST

GST, as an indirect tax, is collected by a person from another person for onward payment to the Government. Though it is a destination-based consumption tax on businesses, the charge and legal liability to pay tax has to be vested onto a specific person (the subject). In case such subject is missing, the taxing statute would lose its purpose as the implementation of the same would become impossible. The word ‘person’ encompasses within its fold not only natural persons like individuals but also artificial persons like firms, AOPs, trusts, companies, etc.

The term ‘person’ has been defined u/s 2(84) of the Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 as under:

(84) ‘person’ includes —
(a) an individual;
(b) a Hindu Undivided Family;
(c) a company;
(d) a firm;
(e) a Limited Liability Partnership;
(f) an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, in India or outside India;
(g) any corporation established by or under any Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act or a Government company as defined in clause (45) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013);
(h) any body corporate incorporated by or under the laws of a country outside India;
(i) a co-operative society registered under any law relating to co-operative societies;
(j) a local authority;
(k) Central Government or a State Government;
(l) society as defined under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860);
(m) trust; and
(n) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the above.

As can be seen from the above, the term ‘person’ has been very widely defined to cover, apart from individuals, different types of entities / associations / societies, etc., as well as Government at different levels, i.e., Central, State as well as local authorities. However, mere inclusion in the definition of person would not result in liability of GST unless such person gets covered within the charging provision u/s 9 of the CGST Act, 2017.

CHARGING SECTION & LIABILITY TO PAY TAX
Section 9(1) imposes a levy of GST on all intra-state supplies of goods or services, or both. Having so imposed the tax, the said provision also defines that the tax shall be paid by ‘the’ taxable person. The definition of the term taxable person u/s 2(107) read with the provisions of section 22 would suggest that the taxable person shall generally be the supplier. The exceptions to this general rule are provided in subsequent provisions as under:

• Section 9(3) provides that in notified cases, the tax on supply shall be paid on reverse charge basis by the recipient;
• Section 9(4) provides that in notified cases, the tax on supply received from unregistered persons shall be paid by the registered person on reverse charge basis; and
• Section 9(5) provides that in case of notified services, the tax shall be paid by the Electronic Commerce Operator (ECO) through which the said services are supplied, by treating such ECO as the supplier.

Thus, the important terms emanating from the charging section are taxable person, registered person, supplier and recipient, and in order to enforce levy of tax on a person, a person needs to be classified under any of the said baskets. If a person is not a taxable person, or a registered person or a supplier or a recipient, the liability to pay tax cannot be fastened on him. In other words, the person needs to be specified as ‘a person liable to pay tax’ in one of the persons mentioned above for
the liability to be fastened on him. The above position was laid down by the Supreme Court in the context of service tax while dealing with Rule 2(d)(xii) and (xvii) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 which cast responsibility on the service receiver to pay service tax. The levy was struck down in the case of Laghu Udyog Bharati vs. UoI [1999 (112) ELT 356 (SC)] as well as in UoI vs. Indian National Shipowners Association [2010 (017) STR 0J57 (SC)].

In the context of GST also, this aspect has been dealt with by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Mohit Minerals Private Limited vs. UoI [2020 (33) GSTL 321 (Guj)]. The issue before the Court was the validity of Entry 10 of Notification 10/2017-IT (Rate) which casts liability on the importer to pay tax on the freight component of goods imported on CIF basis. The liability to pay tax was cast on a notional value, being 10% of the CIF value of the goods imported. One of the contentions raised before the Court challenging the validity of the rate entry was that the privity of contract was between a foreign shipping line as a supplier and the foreign exporter of goods as a recipient and the Indian importer was not a privy to the transaction. As such, the importer could not be treated as a recipient of service and, therefore, the liability to pay tax u/s 9(3) was not triggered. This was accepted by the Gujarat High Court which held as under:

148. In our opinion, the writ-applicant cannot be made liable to pay tax on some supposed theory that the importer is directly or indirectly recipient of the service. The term ‘recipient’ has to be read in the sense in which it has been defined under the Act. There is no room for any interference or logic in the tax laws.
149. If the definition of the term ‘recipient’ is overlooked or ignored, then the writ-applicant would become the recipient of all the goods which goes into the manufacture / production of goods and all the services which have been availed by the foreign exporter for such purposes. Such reasoning which leads to a harsh and arbitrary result has to be avoided, particularly when the term has been expressly defined by the Legislature. Thus, the writ-applicant cannot be said to be the recipient of the supply of the ocean freight service and no tax can be collected from the writ-applicant.

The principle emanating from the above decision is that a person has to be either a supplier or a recipient in order to be held liable to pay tax. In view of the specific deeming fiction in the law itself treating an E-Commerce Operator as a deemed supplier in some cases, even such ECO may be held liable for payment of tax.

PERSON: CONCEPT OF DISTINCTNESS
GST is a transaction tax driven by contract, whether oral or written. This necessitates that all the elements essential for a valid contract need to be present before the levy can be triggered. Keeping this aspect in mind and to achieve the concept of consumption-based tax, i.e., tax revenue should flow to the State where the consumption takes place, section 25 provides that a person who has obtained / is required to obtain registration in one or more State / Union Territory shall, in respect of each such registration, be treated as a distinct person. Further, Schedule I, Entry 2 deems supply of goods or services between such distinct persons as supply, even if made without consideration.

At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to the service tax provisions wherein establishment of a person in a taxable territory and any of his other establishments in a non-taxable territory were treated as distinct establishments of the same person. The implication of this provision was that the Indian HO and its foreign branch were treated as separate entities, though their accounts were ultimately consolidated and for all legal purposes they were treated as one entity.

The above provision had resulted in certain litigation. In 3I Infotech Limited vs. Commissioner [2017 (51) STR 305 (Tri-Mum)], the issue before the Tribunal was liability to pay tax on expenditure incurred by the foreign branches of an Indian company but disclosed in the financial statements which were prepared on a consolidated basis. In this case, a show cause notice proposed recovery of service tax under reverse charge on expenses of such foreign branches. The Tribunal, however, set aside the demand and held as under:

12. We note that Rule 3(iii) of Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India), Rules, 2006 includes ‘business auxiliary services’ but is restricted to such as are received by a recipient located in India for use in relation to business or commerce. The thrust of the Rules is to identify the manner of receipt of service in India in the three categories, viz., in relation to the object of the service, the place of performance and the location of the recipient. We are concerned with the residuary aspect of location of recipient. The Adjudicating Commissioner has not rendered a finding that the appellant is the recipient of service, indeed, he could have done so only by examining the relationship between the appellant and branch in the context of the payments effected to the foreign service provider which he, probably, did not feel obliged to do in the absence of any allegation to that effect in the show cause notice. Unless the recipient is located in India, section 66A cannot be invoked.

Similarly, in the context of airlines, the Tribunal was seized with the question of determining whether or not service tax was payable under reverse charge on payment made to foreign service providers for the centralised reservation system. The challenge was primarily because the payments were made by the Head Office of the airlines. Therefore, in case of international airlines, the entire payment was made by the airlines from their base country, including for bookings done from India from where the said airlines operated. A show cause notice was issued to the foreign airlines to recover service tax under reverse charge mechanism to the extent payments were made pertaining to India bookings. The matter was ultimately decided by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of British Airways vs. Commissioner [2014 (36) STR 598 (Tri-Del)] wherein the Court set aside the demand and held as under:

46. In view of the foregoing discussions, M/s British Airways, India, has to be treated as a separate person. If that be so, in view of the admitted position that the contract between CRS / GDS companies is not with M/s British Airways, India and is only (sic) that M/s British Airways, UK, the present appellant cannot be held to be the recipient of the services so as to make him liable to pay service tax, on reverse charge basis, in terms of the provisions of section 66A. The said issue stands discussed by the Learned Member (Technical) in his impugned order, by giving an example with which I am in full agreement.

The above decisions indicate that while determining who is the recipient of service the one who is entering into the contract becomes more relevant, even if it is the same legal entity. The challenges would be more especially when this deeming fiction becomes applicable in the context of domestic branches. Let us try to understand the challenges with the help of a few examples:

1. A company incurs marketing expenses for its products which are sold through its regional branches. For accounting and MIS purposes, the company distributes the expenses to the regional branches and the expenses (along with the corresponding ITC) appears in the trial balance of each such branch, though there is only one corresponding invoice. The issue that would arise is who is the recipient of service, who is eligible to claim the input tax credit, and what will be the implications of the Schedule I Entry 2.

2. Similarly, issues may arise in the context of cases where the liability to pay tax is under reverse charge. For instance, a company having a centralised transport department books freight from its Head Office in State A for movement of goods from State B to State C. The company is registered in all the three States. The issue that would remain is whether the RCM liability is to be paid in State A from where the expense has been incurred or State B / C where the services are consumed?

3. The branch office situated in Gujarat has incurred certain expenses towards marketing and promotion. However, the vendor has raised the invoice to the Head Office and disclosed it accordingly in its GST returns, while the expense has been booked by the Gujarat office as it had raised the PO. Who can claim the input tax credit in such cases?

4. Even in case of revenue, while the main revenue would be tagged to the respective locations from where the supply has been made, there can be instances for other income where such identification is not available, or the identification is done erroneously. Let’s take the example of canteen charges which are collected by the company from the employees’ salary on a monthly basis. It is possible that the charges for all employees may be accounted for in one State only. Will there be any implications if the company pays the tax on such recoveries in the State where the recovery is accounted, or the company would be mandatorily required to make payment in the State to which the revenue pertains?

Each of the above situations needs changes at the organisational level, with a need to incorporate branch level accounting, sensitising the personnel with the importance of synchronisation of the invoicing location vis-à-vis the PO location vis-à-vis the accounting location (be it for income / expenditure). A lapse on any one aspect would have substantial impact on the organisation, including financial costs, as claiming of credit in wrong location would not only result in denial of input tax credit at the wrong location and recovery along with interest / penalty, but the correct location may lose out on such credits if not identified within the appropriate timelines. Similarly, even in case of revenue, if the tax is paid from the wrong location, it is likely that the tax authorities might still demand tax from the branch which was actually liable to pay the tax as a supplier of service, resulting in duplicate tax as well as bearing the same, along with interest / penalties as applicable.

Further, the deeming fiction is also inserted to associations where mutuality applies w.r.e.f. 1st July, 2017 wherein activities or transactions between such associations and their members are deemed to be supply. This is to negate the applicability of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Club Ltd. [2019 (29) GSTL 545 (SC)] wherein it was held that in the case of mutual associations, no VAT / Service Tax was leviable. However, the amendment has not been notified till date and in most likelihood will also be subjected to judicial scrutiny from the GST perspective.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN TAXABLE PERSON AND REGISTERED PERSON
The term ‘taxable person’ has been defined u/s 2(107) as under:

(107) ‘taxable person’ means a person who is registered or liable to be registered u/s 22 or u/s 24;

On a plain reading, it is apparent that any person who is liable to be registered or has voluntarily obtained registration is treated as a taxable person. A person is liable to be registered u/s 22 in the following cases:
• Turnover crossing the prescribed limit,
• Liability of successor in case of succession by way of transfer of business, or
• Liability of transferee on transfer of business / part thereof by way of merger, de-merger, etc.

Similarly, section 24 lays down the situation in which a person shall be liable to obtain registration notwithstanding the turnover limit prescribed u/s 22. However, section 22/24 merely determines the point when a person becomes liable to registration and treats such person as a taxable person. Once the registration is obtained by such person, either in view of section 22/24 or voluntarily, such person becomes a registered person. A ‘registered person’ has been defined u/s 2(94) to mean a person registered u/s 25 but does not include a person holding a Unique Identity Number.

The fundamental difference between a taxable person and a registered person forthcoming from the above is that the concept of taxable person is meant to determine a person who is liable to comply with the GST provisions, including obtaining registration, collecting and paying taxes. Such a person, when he complies with the provisions by obtaining registration, becomes a registered person and the procedural aspects of the GST law, such as input tax credit, filing of returns, assessments, etc., become applicable to such registered persons. For instance, the levy provision u/s 9(1) provides that the tax shall be paid by the taxable person. There can be instances where a person liable to obtain registration has failed to do so. Such a person cannot shirk away from his liability to pay tax on supplies made merely because he is not registered, as long as such person continues to be a taxable person, i.e., there is a liability on him to obtain registration. Similarly, liability to pay is cast on a taxable person in the following cases:

• In case of interest u/s 50, for cases where there is a failure to pay, the liability to pay interest is cast on ‘person’, i.e., both, a person already registered, as well as a person liable to registration but not registered.

However, the term ‘registered person’ is referred primarily in provisions relating to claiming of any benefit / procedural aspects. For example, the provisions relating to claim of input tax credit (section 16), exercising option to pay tax under composition scheme (section 10) or filing of returns / refund claims, etc., (Chapter IX) refer to a registered person. This is because the said provisions deal with the procedural aspects which a person cannot comply with unless such person has obtained registration and becomes a registered person.

Therefore, if it is ultimately held that a person was required to obtain registration but failed to do so, he is likely to lose out on claim of input tax credit as section 16(1), the enabling section, entitles only a registered person to take input tax credit. In view of the decision in the case of Spenta International Limited vs. Commissioner [2007 (216) ELT 133 (Tri-LB)], it is a settled position of law that eligibility of credit has to be decided at the time of receipt of inputs.

Therefore, it is apparent that unless a person obtains registration he shall not be entitled to take input tax credit on inward supplies received prior to grant of registration. However, the exception granted u/s 18(1)(a) in case of registration u/s 22/24 and voluntary registration u/s 25(3) will be available, though the same is restricted only to the extent of inputs held in stock. This is a departure from the position under the CENVAT regime where the Karnataka High Court has, in the case of mPortal India Wireless Solutions Private Limited [2012 (27) STR 134 (Kar)] held that registration is not a prerequisite for claim of CENVAT Credit.

LIABILITY TO PAY TAX UNDER ‘REVERSE CHARGE’
While section 9(1), which is the general section, imposes a liability to pay tax on the taxable person supplying the goods, sections 9(3) and 9(4) provide for cases where the liability to pay tax has been shifted to the recipient of the goods or services, or both. However, there is a difference in both the provisions.

Section 9(3) notifies the category of goods or services or both where the tax is payable by the recipient of such goods or services, or both. However, section 9(4) notifies the class of registered persons who shall on receipt of notified supply of goods or services or both, be liable to pay tax under reverse charge. The primary distinction in case of reverse charge u/s 9(3) and 9(4) is that section 9(3) applies to a recipient receiving the notified goods or services or both, as defined u/s 2(93), while section 9(4) applies to notified class of registered person receiving the notified goods or services or both. Therefore, for applicability of reverse charge u/s 9(3), a person needs to be classified as ‘recipient’,” while in the case of the latter, the person needs to be both, recipient as well as registered person.

It therefore becomes essential to analyse who is the recipient in the context of GST. The same is defined u/s 2(93) as under:

(93) ‘recipient’ of supply of goods or services or both, means —
(a) where a consideration is payable for the supply of goods or services or both, the person who is liable to pay that consideration;
(b) where no consideration is payable for the supply of goods, the person to whom the goods are delivered or made available, or to whom possession or use of the goods is given or made available; and
(c) where no consideration is payable for the supply of a service, the person to whom the service is rendered,
and any reference to a person to whom a supply is made shall be construed as a reference to the recipient of the supply and shall include an agent acting as such on behalf of the recipient in relation to the goods or services or both supplied;

It is evident that the definition merely refers to ‘the person’. The person may or may not be a taxable person / registered person. In such a situation, the liability to pay tax in case of supplies notified u/s 9(3) shall be on the recipient. This, coupled with the provisions of section 24(iii) which provides for compulsory registration in case of persons liable to pay tax under reverse charge, would trigger the need for registration even if such person is otherwise not liable to registration.

Therefore, in cases where the supply is notified u/s 9(3), the recipient (if not a registered person) would need to analyse whether or not an exemption has been granted for such supply. For instance, in case of reverse charge on security services / rent-a-cab services, there is no exemption provided under the exemption notification. Therefore, even if there is a single instance of such payments, the liability to obtain registration and pay the tax would get triggered.

This would apply even in cases where there is an exemption from obtaining registration. For instance, a supplier exclusively engaged in making exempt supplies is not required to obtain registration u/s 22(1) even if his aggregate turnover exceeds Rs. 20 lakhs as the same applies only to taxable supplies. However, if such a person receives security services / rent-a-cab services which are notified u/s 9(3), such person would be required to obtain registration in view of section 24(iii) and pay the tax (with no corresponding credits) and comply with the prescribed provisions.

It is also important to note that in quite a few cases exemption has also been granted. For instance, a charitable trust carrying out charitable activities and not liable to pay GST u/s 9(1) would not be liable to obtain registration u/s 22. However, if the same trust purchases software from outside India, the same will be taxable as import of service (which does not require to be in the course or furtherance of business) and in such cases the liability to obtain GST registration and comply with the provisions gets triggered. However, in view of Entry 10 of Notification 9/2017-IT (Rate), such services and certain other cases are exempted from the levy of tax and, therefore, the need to obtain registration does not get triggered in such cases.

However, when it comes to section 9(4), the liability to pay tax triggers only when the person is a registered person, i.e., he has obtained registration u/s 25 and is covered within the class of registered persons notified therein. Currently, the notified class of registered persons liable to pay tax u/s 9(4) on supplies received from unregistered suppliers is a promoter as defined u/s 2(zk) of the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF TAXABLE PERSONS
Under the GST law, a person also has an option to obtain registration as a Casual Taxable Person (‘CTP’) / Non-resident taxable person (’NRTP’). The terms ‘casual taxable person’ and ‘non-resident taxable person’ have been defined u/s 2 as under:

(20) ‘casual taxable person’ means a person who occasionally undertakes transactions involving supply of goods or services or both in the course or furtherance of business, whether as principal, agent or in any other capacity, in a State or a Union Territory where he has no fixed place of business.
(77) ‘non-resident taxable person’ means any person who occasionally undertakes transactions involving supply of goods or services or both whether as principal or agent or in any other capacity, but who has no fixed place of business or residence in India;

As can be seen from the above, registration as NRTP / CTP is applicable in case of a supplier intending to make a taxable supply of goods or services or both from a State / Union Territory where such supplier, being a taxable person, has no permanent fixed place of business in the said State / Union Territory. The only distinction between NRTP and CTP is that while the concept of NRTP applies to a person who has no fixed place of business / residence in India, the concept of CTP applies to a person who has a fixed place of business / residence in India, but not in the State / UT from where such person occasionally makes the taxable supply.

In a recent decision, the Supreme Court in Commercial Tax Officer, Bharatpur vs. Bhagat Singh [2021 (46) GSTL 3 (SC)] held that a person can be treated as casual taxable person even if he carries out a single transaction. There is no need for multiple transactions in order to obtain registration as a Casual Taxable Person.

The need to opt for CTP / NRTP would generally apply in cases where goods are sent for exhibition in a different State and sold at the exhibition itself. Similarly, even Event Management Companies can opt for this concept to optimise credits (especially on inward supplies falling under the property basket). However, in case of handicraft goods, an exemption has been granted from obtaining registration.

It is, however, important to note that CTP / NRTP is compulsorily required to obtain registration u/s 24(ii) and 24(v), respectively. Therefore, a person who has a fixed place of business in Maharashtra and is not liable to be registered u/s 22(1) or 24 and intends to make a taxable supply in Gujarat where he has no fixed place of business, will be required to obtain registration even if his turnover from Gujarat or aggregate turnover is not likely to cross the threshold limit prescribed u/s 22(1). Secondly, the need to register as CTP / NRTP will be triggered only in a case where taxable supply of goods or services or both is intended to be made. This was recently held by the AAR in the case of Ascen Hyveg Pvt. Ltd. [2021 (48) GSTL 386 (AAR–GST–Har)].

E-COMMERCE OPERATOR
In these modern times, online service providers through their online portals have started providing the service of connecting the supplier and the recipient for a charge. The transaction is between the supplier and the recipient but is facilitated by the online portals (such as OLA, Uber, Zomato, etc.). The online portals charge a fee from the supplier or recipient or both. At times, what happens is that both supplier as well as recipient are not registered and, therefore, the transaction escapes the tax net.

Keeping this aspect in mind, the liability to pay tax on such transactions was cast on such online portals, i.e., E-Commerce Operators, through which the services are being supplied. The relevant definitions are:

(45) ‘electronic commerce operator’ means any person who owns, operates or manages digital or electronic facility or platform for electronic commerce;
(44) ‘electronic commerce’ means the supply of goods or services or both, including digital products over digital or electronic network;

Currently, the notified class of services where the liability to pay tax is cast on the ECO are:
• Service by way of transportation of passengers by radio-taxi, motor-cab, maxi-cab and motorcycle;
• Service by way of providing hotel accommodations except where the person actually supplying the service is liable for registration u/s 22(1), i.e., his turnover exceeds the threshold limit;
• Services by way of housekeeping, such as plumbing, carpentering, etc., except where the person actually supplying the service is liable for registration u/s 22(1), i.e., his turnover exceeds the threshold limit;
• Restaurant services supplied through ECO (Swiggy, Zomato, etc.) are also likely to be covered u/s 9(5) w.e.f. 1st January, 2022.

It is imperative to note that in the above cases the liability to pay tax is shifted to the ECO. This is not a case of reverse charge. Therefore, from suppliers’ perspective, especially unregistered suppliers, no tax can be demanded from such suppliers where the ECO has already paid the tax. Further, such unregistered suppliers, supplying exclusively through E-commerce operators are also exempted from obtaining registration if their turnover exceeds Rs. 20 lakhs.

The ECO is also required to collect tax at source @ 1% on the net value of taxable supplies (other than notified supplies) made through it by the registered suppliers.

PERSON – PRINCIPAL – AGENT RELATIONSHIPS UNDER GST
The transactions of principal / agency are governed by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the terms of the arrangement between such parties. Under GST, the supply of goods by a principal to his agent or by an agent to his principal is deemed to be a supply for the purpose of section 7, even if made without a consideration. However, the same does not extend to services. Therefore, any movement of goods by a principal to his agent or otherwise, be it intra-state or interstate, has to be under the cover of a tax invoice.

It is also important to note that the liability of the principal and his agent in respect of goods supplied / received by the agent shall be joint and several, and in case the agent fails to make payment of the due tax, the same can be recovered from the principal.

However, the deeming fiction has not been extended to services. This can lead to certain issues. Let’s take the example of an agent paying the GTA for transport services. The agent is also a registered person and the GTA recognises the agent as the recipient of service. In such cases, the question arises as to who shall pay GST under reverse charge? And if the agent has discharged the liability under reverse charge, can the same be demanded again from the principal?

Even under the pre-GST regime, there have been disputes on taxability in case of P2A transactions. The primary dispute has been determining whether the relationship of principal – agency exists between the two parties or not, be it travel agents, advertising agencies, freight forwarders, etc. For instance, in case of discounts / incentives given by vehicle manufacturers to the dealers where the Department had alleged Business Auxiliary Services, the Tribunal had stuck down the demand, concluding that such discounts were nothing but a reduction in purchase price (Refer Commissioner vs. Sai Service Station Ltd. [2014 (35) STR 625 (Tri-Mum)].

Even in case of freight forwarders, where the freight forwarders traded in cargo space and the Department had demanded service tax on the trading profits, the demand was set aside in the case of Greenwich Meridian Logistics (I) Pvt. Ltd. [2016 (43) STR 215 (Tri-Mum)]. Similarly, in case of advertising agencies, the Tribunal had in the case of Euro RSCG Advertising Ltd. [2007 (7) STR 277 (Tri-Bang)] held that the agency was liable to pay tax only on the amounts collected from the advertiser / client and not the publisher. It is, however, important to note that the basis for this dispute was that the freight charges / print advertising charges were exempt from service tax, which is not so in the context of GST. It is therefore unlikely that the disputes will continue under GST.

As can be seen from the above, even though the tax was discharged on the transaction complying with the principles of destination-based taxation (as the POS was correctly disclosed), the authorities still issued demand notice without appreciating the fact that the tax liability was exhausted. This demonstrates that while dealing with service transactions taxpayers will have to be very careful in taking positions, as any position is likely to be scrutinised by tax authorities and any instances involving non-payment of tax are likely to be looked at adversely.

Of course, on the issue of discharge of liability / person liable to pay tax, in the context of Service Tax, the Tribunal has, in the case of Reliance Securities Ltd. vs. Commissioner [2019 (20) GSTL 265 (Tri-Mum)], held that if the agent has paid the service tax liability, the principal would not be liable to pay tax on the same again on his share. It remains to be seen whether the said principle will be followed in the context of GST also.

PERSONS – WAREHOUSE / GODOWN OWNER / OPERATOR AND TRANSPORTERS
Apart from the above, there are various instances where a person, though not being a taxable person (i.e., registered or not liable to be registered), is required to comply with various requirements under the law. For instance, a warehouse / godown owner / operator and transporter who is not registered is required to maintain records of the consignor, consignee and other relevant details of the goods in the manner prescribed u/r 58. Such person is required to obtain a unique enrolment number by making an application in Form GST ENR-01 / ENR-02, respectively.

In addition, the following details are required to be maintained by such persons:
• In case of warehouse / godown owner / operator, period for which particulars of goods remain in the warehouse along with particulars relating to receipt, dispatch, movement and disposal of such goods;
• In case of transporter, record of goods transported, delivered and stored in transit along with the GSTIN of the consignor and the consignee.

The Proper Officer has the powers to carry out inspection, search and seizure at the premises of the above suppliers, i.e., transporter or warehouse / godown owner / operator u/s 67. Such officer also has powers to issue directions to the custodian of the goods to not remove, part with or deal with such goods without prior approval.

Similarly, when the goods are in movement, it is the responsibility of the transporter to ensure that the prescribed documents are in possession for verification during the movement. If the vehicle is intercepted during movement and the prescribed documents are not available with the transporter in support of the goods being transported, they are liable to confiscation.

PROCEEDINGS A PERSON MAY BE SUBJECTED TO
On the basis of the classification of a person, either as a taxable person, a registered person or otherwise, a distinction exists in the provisions relating to assessment, audit, recovery and penalties. While the concept of self-assessment u/s 59 refers to the registered person requiring such person to self-assess his liability, the option of provisional assessment u/s 60 is made available to a taxable person. Therefore, if a person has doubts over whether he is liable to be registered, he has an option to opt for provisional assessment.

Similarly, separate provisions have been prescribed u/s 63 for a taxable person who fails to obtain registration or has obtained registration but the same has been cancelled u/s 29(2). The reason for the assessment u/s 63 not being applicable to a taxable person registered under GST is that the taxable person who is registered is to be subjected to scrutiny u/s 61, assessment u/s 62 in case of non-filing of returns, audit by tax authorities u/s 65, and special audit u/s 66.

However, in case of recovery proceedings u/s 73 or u/s 74, the provisions refer to ‘the person’, implying that the provisions shall apply to both, a taxable person (thus including a registered person) and a person who is not liable to be registered and opts to be an unregistered person. The appeal provisions have also been similarly drafted.

However, depending on the nature of the contravention, the person on whom penalty can be imposed is based on the nature of contravention. For instance, penalty for specific offences listed u/s 122 is applicable only on a taxable person, while penalty for failure to furnish information return u/s 150 or statistics is leviable on any person. Similarly, the general penalty prescribed u/s 125, which deals with levy of penalty for any offence not covered above, is leviable on any person, irrespective of whether such a person is a registered person or not.

CONCLUSION
The GST law recognises different classes of persons and classification of a person would make such person liable to either pay tax, claim credit or be subject to various proceedings, or even require such person to comply with other provisions of the law. Therefore, it is always important that it is determined which particular provisions are applicable to a person, and whenever any proceedings are being commenced on such a person, it is ensured that such person can be subjected to the said proceedings else the very basis of the proceedings can be challenged before the courts.  

PROPRIETY IN ADJUDICATION

Legacy laws were legislated independently and hence administered by their respective Governments. However, the GST law has been designed on the unique concept of ‘Pooled sovereignty’ between the Centre and the States. This dual nature of GST has made the administration of this novel legislation a critical challenge before the GST Council. Unlike the ‘origin-based’ Central Sales Tax law (also a Central legislation) where the collection and retention of taxes was with the respective State Governments, the GST design faces the peculiarity of implementing a ‘destination consumption law’ with revenue being collected and administered in the State of origin but ultimately accruing to the State of consumption. Moreover, the Central and State administrations are not only implementing their respective laws under which they have been appointed, but are also entrusted with implementing the parallel GST law. Intense discussions have taken place between the Central and State administrations and the final handshake was made as follows:

–    Single administrative interface;
–    Efficient use of respective administrative expertise;
–    Vertical and quantitative division of taxpayer base (except for enforcement and vigilance action); and
–    Cross-empowerment of critical administration functions (except matters involving the place of supply).

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATION OF GST ACT
Sections 3, 4 and 5 provide for the administration of the Act – Section 3 handles appointments at various levels of officers and deemed officers appointed under the erstwhile enactment as GST officers; Section 4 empowers the Board / Commissioner to appoint such other persons as GST officers; Section 5 enables the Board to equip any officer appointed under sections 3 or 4 with functions and duties under the Act. It also enables the Commissioner to delegate his powers to any subordinate officer. Section 6 codifies the cross-empowerment principle as agreed by the GST Council, enabling the appointed GST officers to cross-administer the functions conferred under the correspondent enactments. In this background, three phrases have been adopted for the purpose of assignment of administrative functions, viz., ‘adjudicating authority’, ‘proper officer’ and ‘authorised officer’. This article attempts to decode whether these terms are mutually exclusive or overlapping with each other. It is to be noted that this article only decodes the Central Tax Notifications / Circulars. One may have to examine the flow of the respective State Notifications in order to fix the jurisdiction of said officers.

PROPER OFFICER – DEFINITION AND ROLE
As a starting point, let us look at the respective definitions under the GST Act:

Proper Officer – Section 2(91) defines ‘proper officer’ in relation to any function to be performed under this Act, which means the Commissioner or the Officer of the Central Tax who is assigned that function by the Commissioner in the Board;

Section 2(24): ‘Commissioner’ means the Commissioner of Central Tax and includes the Principal Commissioner of Central Tax appointed u/s 3 and the Commissioner of Integrated Tax appointed under the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act;
Section 2(25) r/w/s 168, ‘Commissioner in the Board’… shall mean a Commissioner or Joint Secretary posted in the Board and such Commissioner or Joint Secretary shall exercise the powers specified in the said sections with the approval of the Board.
(Note – In Central Tax administration, NOT all Commissioners are empowered to perform the function of assignment. It is only that Commissioner who is posted in the Board who is entitled to perform such assignment of functions.)

In order to confer specific jurisdiction to individual officers, the respective Commissioners have, through instructions / Notifications, identified the ‘proper officers’ on the principle of cross-empowerment, functional and geographical division and vested them with the requisite functions. The role of proper officer has been envisaged as follows:

Section

Function

Issue
orders

Chapter VI

Registration / Amendment / Cancellation

Yes, for registration, cancellation,
suspension, revocation

Chapter X

Refunds

Yes, for sanction or rejection

Section 60

Provisional assessment

Yes, for finalisation of provisional
assessment

Section 61

Scrutiny of returns

No

Section 62

Assessment of non-filers

Yes, best judgement order

Section 63

Assessment of unregistered persons

Yes, best judgement order

Section 65

Audit

No

Section 66

Special audits

No

Section 67

Inspection, search and seizure

No

Section 68

Inspection of goods in movement

No

Section 70

Summon attendance

No

Section 71

Access of business premises

No

Section 73/74

Demands of taxes

Yes, for ascertaining raising demands

Section 79

Recovery of taxes

No

ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY – DEFINITION AND ROLE

Adjudicating Authority – Section 2(4) defines ‘adjudicating authority’ which means any authority, appointed or authorised to pass any order or decision under this Act, but does not include the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, the Revisional Authority, the Authority for Advance Ruling, the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, the National Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Tribunal and the Authority referred to in sub-section (2) of section 171.

The term ‘adjudicating authority’ has been used in ‘Chapter XVIII-Appeals & Revisions’. The section provides for the remedy of appeal only against the orders of the ‘adjudicating authority’. The critical point to be noted is that this phrase is being used for the first time under the Chapter of Appeals and is conspicuously absent in the provisions granting powers to issue orders under the Assessment / Adjudication provisions of the enactment. There seems to be a prima facie disconnect in empowerment of execution and decision-making functions under the Act. It appears that certain functions have been distributed to proper officers but the issuance of orders (decision-making) has been conferred on a separate category of officers called ‘adjudicating authority’. One therefore has to look into the enactment to identify whether the said terms are overlapping or mutually exclusive to each other.

Authorised Officer – Role
In several instances, the enactment empowers senior officer(s) to ‘authorise’ a Central Tax Officer with specific functions. Section 67 empowers the Joint Commissioner to authorise officers to inspect the premises of a taxpayer. Section 65 empowers the Joint Commissioner to authorise the audit of a taxpayer by a particular officer including visiting the said premises. Therefore, these are officers who are permitted to perform a specific task under an authorisation having a limited operation over a ‘particular taxpayer for a specific function’.

Identification – ‘Proper Officer’
An officer after having been appointed under the Act, is required to be granted jurisdiction to perform his task under the Act. Proper officers are conferred powers on the following basis: (a) Geography, (b) Cross-empowerment / division, (c) Functions, and (d) Monetary limits (if any).

A) Geographical jurisdiction
Notification 2/2017-CT dated 19th June, 2017
appoints Central Tax Officers for the purpose of section 3 of the CGST Act and assigns geographical jurisdiction to Commissioners (aka Executive Commissionerate), Commissioners (Appeals) and Commissioners (Audit). The said Notification divides the entire Central Administration at State / District levels for the purpose of administration. Each Commissioner has issued public notices assigning jurisdiction to various ranges based on geographical parameters (such as PIN codes, etc.). Correspondingly, State Commissioners are expected to exercise similar powers and assign such jurisdiction to officers in their administration. Similarly, Notification 14/2017-CT dated 1st July, 2017 seeks to appoint officers of the Directorate-General of GST Intelligence / Audit as Central Tax Officers with all-India jurisdiction and confers powers corresponding to the specified level of Central Tax Officers. Section 3 of the GST Act also deems officers appointed under the legacy laws as officers appointed under the said Act.

B) Cross-empowerment jurisdiction
In terms of the 9th GST Council minutes, the Centre and States have mutually agreed to a ‘vertical division’ of the taxpayer base in each State (except for enforcement and vigilance functions). Vertical division of the taxpayer base entails clear demarcation of taxpayers being administered by the Centre and the State at each State’s level. The GST Council vide CBEC Circular No. 1/2017-GST dated 20th September, 2017 provided for such division based on turnover, business and geographical parameters. State-level committees have issued trade notices demarcating the taxpayer base between both the administrations. Having been assigned respective administrative powers for a set of taxpayers, section 6 of the CGST Act empowers the ‘cross-empowered proper officer’ to administer in parallel the corresponding GST law, i.e., the proper officer issuing orders under the CGST Act shall be empowered to issue parallel orders under the SGST Act with due intimation to the jurisdictional officer1. The GST Council has also decided that cases involving ‘place of supply’ would have to be handled by the Central Tax administration even if the taxpayer has been assigned to the State administration.

Notification 39/2017 dated 13th October, 2017 has been issued u/s 6(1) of the CGST Act empowering State officers for the purpose of sanction of refund u/s 54 or 55 except Rule 96 of the CGST Rules, 2017 in respect of registered persons located in the territorial jurisdiction of the said State officers. CBIC letter dated 22nd June, 2020 states that the said Notification has been issued only to place a restriction on State officers from issuing refunds under Rule 96 of the CGST Rules. In the absence of a Notification it should be understood that all powers are cross-empowered to the corresponding administration by virtue of section 6.

C) Functional jurisdiction
CBEC Circular No. 3/3/2017 dated 5th July, 2017 has assigned functions to specified class of officers in exercise of powers u/s 2(91). The summary of the functions assigned to the Central Tax Officers is as follows:

Proper
officer

Powers
& functions

Principal Commissioner / Commissioner of
Central Tax

• Extension of period of seizure of goods
beyond six months

• Extension for payments of demands up to
three months

Additional or Joint Commissioner of Central
Tax

• Authorisation of inspection, search of
premises, seizure of goods, documents, books or things, inventory / disposal
of perishable goods

• Authorisation of access to business
premises for inspection of books of accounts, records, etc.

• Permission for transfer of properties by
defaulter

• Disposal of conveyance in detention
proceedings

Deputy or Assistant Commissioner of Central
Tax

• Processing of refund applications

• Provisional assessment proceedings

• Assessment of unregistered persons

Summary assessments in special cases

• Audit

• Adjudication above a specific limit

• Recovery of excess taxes collected

• Recovery of taxes

• Penalties under various sections

• Detention proceedings

• Confiscation of goods or conveyances

• Transitional provisions

• Re-credit of rejected refunds

• Other specified procedural matters

Superintendent of Central Tax

• Non-accountal of goods

• Scrutiny of returns

• Assessment of non-filers

• General audit / special audit
observations / findings

• Seizure of books of accounts

• Summon for submission of evidences

• Adjudication up to specific limit

• Other specified procedural matters

Inspector of Central Tax

Detention proceedings

(Note – Assignment of powers to a specified officer would include assignment of such powers to the superiors of the specified officers.)

CBEC Circular dated 31st May, 2018-GST, dated 9th February, 2018 has also clarified that Audit Commissionerates and DGGSTI shall exercise powers
of issuance of show cause notices but the adjudication of
the same would be done by the Executive Commissionerates having jurisdiction over the principal place of business.

D) Monetary jurisdiction
The Central Tax administration (vide CBEC Circular dated 31st May, 2018-GST, dated 9th February, 2018) has assigned monetary jurisdiction to Superintendents, Assistant / Deputy Commissioners and Additional / Joint Commissioners for the purpose of adjudication of matters. A significant point is that the said monetary limits would extend only to matters of adjudication and other powers (such as summary assessments, etc.) are not subjected to any monetary limits.

ANALYSIS
The prima facie observation emerging from the above Notifications / Circulars is that though ‘proper officers’ have been conferred certain powers, the phrase ‘adjudicating authority’ u/s 2(4) has not been mentioned anywhere. Generally, one may hasten to conclude that none of the officers have been empowered to adjudicate (i.e., issue orders) in terms of section 2(4) of the GST Act. The adjudication function, being a special and distinct function, has not been conferred on any officer and hence no orders can be issued until the adjudication function is conferred on officers.

The said argument may face stiff resistance when one probes further into the enactment. Chapter II on Administration provides for identification of ‘proper officers’ for various functions of the Act. As tabulated above, various sections under the enactment empower the proper officers to perform certain functions. While some sections specifically empower officers with issuance of orders, others transfer the proceedings to its conclusion. For example, though sections 61, 65 and 66 entrust certain functions / powers, the respective provisions do not empower them to issue orders for the purpose of concluding the proceedings. Section 61 empowers the proper officer to scrutinise the GST returns and seek related clarifications from the taxpayers, but directs that any adverse observation should result in appropriate action such as audit, adjudication, etc. The proper officer does not derive the power of issuance of orders under the said section and the ascertainment of proper officer for issuance of orders would have to be performed under a separate section. Similar implications appear to operate in case of audits conducted u/s 65. The audit function may be entrusted to a specific group of officers but the section does not specifically empower them to adjudicate the matter, and the issue is required to be adjudged only by the proper officer empowered to issue orders in terms of section 73/74 of the GST Act.

The corollary is that all proper officers may not be adjudicating authorities but all adjudicating authorities would necessarily have to be proper officers under the section. The empowerment of a person as a proper officer is delegated to the respective Commissioner but the empowerment of the person as an adjudicating authority emerges from the provisions of the statute and is not the subject matter of delegation.

Another corollary of this approach is that not all actions of proper officers are appealable under the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the GST Act. It is only orders issued by an adjudicating authority which are eligible for a statutory appeal under the Chapter of Appeals / Revisions. For example, section 65(6) requires the proper officer performing the audit to issue his ‘findings’ from the audit. The Act has consciously used the phrase ‘findings’ in contradistinction to ‘orders’. These findings would not be appealable orders for the purpose of XVIII since these are not decisions of adjudicating authorities or arising out of an adjudication proceeding under the Act. However, orders which are issued under sections 62, 63 or 64 in the case of assessment of non-filers, summary assessments or protective assessments, are in the nature of a decision-making function (adjudication function) and hence would be appealable before the respective appellate authority.

To reiterate, assignment of ‘proper officer’ is a consequence of the Commissioner’s order but the assignment of a decision-making function is consequent to the statutory provision itself. Conferment of the status of adjudicating authority stands at a higher pedestal and cannot be altered by any order / Notification. Thus one may conclude that the carving out of a separate category of ‘adjudicating authorities’ is for the purpose of tagging their orders as appealable orders under the Act. Adjudicating authorities are a ‘sub-set’ of proper officers and not a distinct category of officers.

SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT IN THE SAYED ALI & CANNON INDIA CASES
The Supreme Court in Sayed Ali (2011) 265 ELT 17 (SC) examined the aspect of appointment of Customs (Preventive) officers and assignment of functions as proper officers for administration of the Act. The Court observed that appointment of officers of customs for a particular geographical area does not ipso facto confer powers of a ‘proper officer’ and in the absence of specific adjudication functions being assigned, Customs (Preventive) officers were held as incompetent to issue show cause notices.

Applying the Sayed Ali case, the Supreme Court once again in Cannon India [2021 (376) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.)] examined a bill of entry assessed by the Customs Officer (Appraising) and cleared for home consumption. The Director of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) subsequently raised the issue of short assessment of duty in terms of section 28(4) of the Customs Act. Section 28(4) r/w/s 2(34) assigned the function of demands and recovery to ‘the proper officer’. The Court emphasised on the article ‘the’ as conveying that ‘the proper officer’ is the specified officer who has been assigned the function u/s 28(4) and not any other officer. Section 28(4) being a power of re-assessment of the original assessment ought to be conferred only on ‘the officer’ who performed the original assessment and not on any other officer. According to the Court, where the same powers are conferred to different officers on a particular subject matter, then the exercise of powers by one of the officers would be to the exclusion of the other, and hence any subsequent reassessment ought to be made by the original officer who exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter. Moreover, the Court stated that DRI officers were not conferred powers of administration of the Customs Act since the Notification conferring powers did not trace itself back to section 6 of the Customs Act which empowered the Central Government to appoint other Central officers for the purpose of the Customs Act. Accordingly, adjudication proceedings initiated by the DRI officers were quashed in the absence of jurisdiction. The analogy emerging from these decisions is that there has to be a specific conferment of powers for performance of a function under the law and once such power is conferred to a particular officer, it operates to the exclusion of all other officers even though they may exercise jurisdiction over the taxpayer.

The Proper Officer – As adjudicating authority
To understand the interplay between ‘Proper officer’, ‘Authorised officer’ and ‘Adjudicating authority’, one may take the example of audit proceedings. Section 65 specifies that the Commissioner may, by general / special order, authorise any officer to perform an audit of a taxpayer. The provision uses the phrase ‘authorised officer’ in the section, i.e., officer who has been assigned the audit of the taxpayer. However, in section 65(6) the provisions state that on conclusion of the audit, ‘the proper officer’ shall inform the audit findings and their reasons. In section 65(7), it has been stated that where audit results in short payment of taxes, ‘the proper officer’ may initiate action u/s 73/74 which states that the ‘proper officer’ in such cases shall issue a show cause notice directing the taxpayer to pay the said amount. The reference to ‘the proper officer’ continues in the said section and 73(9) enables the said proper officer to issue appropriate orders.

Two questions arise here: (a) Firstly, which Commissioner is authorised to perform the task of assignment of audit cases. While practically the Commissioner (Audit) performs this task, Notification 2/2017-CT does not specify such powers being granted to the Commissioner (Audit). The said Notification merely states that the Commissioner (Audit) would exercise powers over the ‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the corresponding Commissioner(s). The nature of the powers to be exercised has not been specified in the said Notification. Even Board Circular No. 3/3/2017 only appoints the Commissioners with the proper officer functions and does not specifically grant an audit function to the Commissioner (Audit). In contrast, the Central Excise law contained Notification 30/2014-CT dated 14th October, 2014 r/w Notification 47/2016 dated 28th September, 2016 which specifically granted Audit and SCN issuance functions (adjudication powers introduced subsequently) for conferring jurisdiction. The GST provisions appear to have some shortcomings to this extent;

(b) Secondly, who is the ‘proper officer’ for conclusion of audit proceedings and adjudication of the subject matter? It is fairly clear that ‘authorised officers’ u/s 65(1)/(2) are distinct from ‘proper officers’ referred in 65(6)/(7) and 73/74. It also appears that the proper officer referred to in both sections implies ‘the’ proper officer who is assigned the adjudication function. Therefore, ‘the proper officer’ referred to in 65(6)/(7) should be the same officer as is being referred to in 73/74. Notification 2/2017 r/w Circular 3/3/2017 dated 31st May, 2018 implies that the Executive Commissionerate has been vested with both powers, i.e., ‘conclusion of audit proceedings’ [section 65(6)/(7)] as well as ‘adjudication of demands’ (section 73/74). It appears that the function of the Audit Commissionerate / officers terminates with the performance of the audit (i.e., visit, examination, etc.) but reporting of audit findings and adjudication (where required) would need to be performed by the Executive Commissionerate only. Alternatively, it appears that the ‘proper officer’ who is assigned the function of conclusion of audit u/s 65(6)/(7) should be the same officer issuing the show cause notice u/s 73(1), and in view of Circular dated 3rd March, 2017, the proper officer for adjudication u/s 73(9) should be the officer functioning in the Executive Commissionerate. Despite this ambiguity, the conclusion remains that ‘authorised officers’ are distinct from ‘the proper officer’ and those proper officers functioning as decision-making authorities u/s 73/74(9) would function as adjudicating authorities, making their orders amenable to statutory appeal.

State Administration – CGST Act
State administration has been conferred with powers to administer the Central enactment in respect of taxpayers assigned to the State. Section 6(1) of the CGST Act considered ‘officers’ appointed under the SGST Act as being authorised to be ‘proper officers’ for the purpose of the CGST Act. The respective State Commissioners in terms of the powers drawn from section 3 of the respective State enactments have designated proper officers on functional and geographical basis. Though the Commissioner exercising powers from the SGST Act appoints them as proper officers for the purpose of the SGST Act, the said State officers have not been assigned functions for the purpose of the CGST Act. Moreover, section 6(1) does not explicitly confer the rights of assignment of proper officer functions to the Commissioners (State) for the purpose of Central enactment. This probably should continue to be the prerogative of the Commissioner (Central Tax) only. This is because the phrase ‘proper officer’ under the CGST Act is an appointment u/s 2(91) of the CGST Act and the said section only permits the assignment of functions by the ‘Commissioner in the Board’. Commissioner in the Board only refers to Commissioner as designated by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes. State Commissioners would not be the Commissioners as understood in terms of section 2(91) of the CGST Act and hence the assignment of functions to their subordinates for the purpose of the SGST Act does not automatically result in assignment of functions for the purpose of the CGST Act. In simple terms, section 6 enables the Central enactment to authorise the State administration as proper officers (i.e., borrow the man-power) but the power of assignment of functions (supervisory powers) to these sets of officers would continue to vest with the Commissioner in the Board and such power of assignment has not been delegated to the State Commissioner.

State Administration – IGST Act
Section 4 of the IGST Act is pari materia to section 6(1) of the CGST Act. A similar issue would emerge when a State officer administers the IGST Act. This would be so insofar as the State administration is presiding over the state of registration of the taxpayer. But an additional issue that also emerges is where a State administration exercises its powers over a taxpayer who is not registered in their State. For example, any movement of goods from Mumbai to Chennai could entail movement through an intermediate State (say, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, etc.). The ‘place of supply’ of such transaction would be Tamil Nadu and the taxable person would be administered in Maharashtra. Strictly speaking, no revenue accrues (directly or indirectly) from this transaction to the State of Karnataka, though in practice the State administration has exercised its power to intercept goods which originate from Mumbai and are destined for Chennai.

Section 4 of the IGST Act appoints officers of the SGST as proper offices for the IGST Act. SGST has been defined under 2(111) of the CGST Act as ‘respective’ State GST officers. Therefore, section 4 of the IGST Act borrows the State administration from the ‘respective’ State only and so the respective State GST officer should ideally refer to the State administration having jurisdiction over the registration of the taxpayer. Though the State of Karnataka cannot exercise its domain over the said movement by virtue of ‘place of business’ or ‘place of supply’, the practice has been to exercise domain by virtue of the ‘geographical presence’ of the goods under movement. None of the Central Tax notifications confer proper officer functions on the basis of geographical presence of goods. Rather, they appear to have been assigned with reference to the place of business of the taxpayer. On a reading of section 68 r/w/s 129 of the CGST Act, it appears that ‘the proper officer’ referred therein cannot extend to all States’ proper officers and would be limited only to the ‘respective State proper officers’ from the movement that emerges. But the High Court in Advantage India Logistics Private Limited vs. UOI (2018) 19 GSTL 46 (MP) held otherwise. The Court upheld the jurisdiction of an MP State officer to intercept goods moving from Gurgaon (Haryana) to Mumbai (Maharashtra). This results in a very precarious situation and it is important that all stake-holders take cognisance of this issue.

DGGSTI as ‘proper officer’
In this context, the Notifications empowering the Directorate-General GST Intelligence (an arm of DRI) would be worth examining:
– Notification 14/2017-Central Tax invokes its powers from sections 3 and 5 of the CGST Act and appoints the officers of the Director-General of GST Intelligence (erstwhile Director-General of Central Excise Intelligence) as officers with all-India jurisdiction;
– The said Notification invests them with all the powers as have been invested in the corresponding rank of officers under the Central Tax Administration;
– However, the Notification appointing DGGST officers as Central Tax officers has not been issued u/s 4 of the GST Act. The officers of the DGGI, which is a special wing of the DRI, have not been appointed as ‘Central Tax Officers’ in terms of section 4 of the CGST Act.
– Moreover, the Commissioner in the Board has not conferred the ‘proper officer’ function to the officers of the DGGI.
– This gives rise to a similar anomaly as was prevalent under the Customs legislation and under consideration in the Cannon India case.

Thus, DGGSTI being officers appointed directly by the Central Government, are not officers specified in section 3 of the GST Act though a Notification has been issued invoking the said power. Section 4 has not been invoked by the said Notification for appointment of the DGGSTI officer for purposes of the CGST Law. To this extent, Notification 14/2017 carries the similar lacuna as was being considered in the aforesaid case and consequently the said officers cannot be termed as ‘proper officers’ in terms of section 2(34) of the said Act.

COMPTROLLER & AUDITOR-GENERAL OF INDIA (C&AG)
There has been a recent trend where C&AG officers have been seeking information from taxpayers on the Transitional Credit Claim under GST. Neither section 3 nor 4 have appointed the officers of the C&AG as Central Tax Officers under the statute. Accordingly, such officers cannot be categorised as ‘proper officers’ under either the CGST or the SGST Act. Except section 108 of the CGST Act, none of the sections even mentions officers of the C&AG to verify the books of accounts of the taxpayer. It is only section 108 of the CGST Act which makes reference to the objections of the C&AG for the purpose of enabling the revisional authority to revise any orders of proceedings conducted under the GST Act. But this does not enable the C&AG to directly scrutinise, assess or even adjudicate the records of the taxpayers. Thus, the C&AG cannot be permitted to directly seek or audit the records of the taxpayers and form any conclusion on the legality of their tax liability.

CONCLUSION
The onus of proving sufficient jurisdiction is on the officer asserting it. Unless the jurisdiction has been conclusively established, the officer cannot proceed on the subject matter. In conclusion, one may recollect the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukum Chand Shyam Lal (1976 AIR 789) which observed as follows: ‘It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performances are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature and its exercise in a mode other than the one provided will be violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice.’ The complex legal and administrative systems adopted under GST have to be meticulously handled by the Administrators in order to ensure the smooth and efficient function of the administration. Though this has been undertaken to a large extent, certain gaps need to examined and addressed so that there is clarity on the proper officer before whom the taxpayers are answerable.

RESOLVING THE INSOLVENT

Taxation laws have always mingled with other regulatory laws and this interplay has resulted in better application of the tax laws. The intermingling of the GST law with the recently-enacted Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 poses interesting facets of the GST law. Though both laws have a different orientation, they converge on the issue of tax recovery from a defaulter. The said laws also have an interesting commonality, i.e., they are claimed as reformist action carrying the same ‘magnitude of 1991’ (the year when economic reforms were carried out under the duo of PM Narasimha Rao and FM Manmohan Singh).

This article is an attempt to identify the points of convergence of these revolutionary laws in the context of corporate insolvencies.

Generally speaking, a defaulting / sick enterprise will also have statutory defaults (referred to as ‘Crown debts’). Under the erstwhile provisions, Crown debts were given priority over other financial / trade debts. Empirical evidence suggests that sick enterprises burdened with Crown debts impair the productivity of assets and deter the overall recovery of the enterprise. Permitting tax recoveries would defeat the ultimate motive of rejuvenating a sick enterprise and this has been expressed in the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (BLRC) report in 2015:

‘2. Executive Summary
The key economic question in the bankruptcy process…
The Committee believes that there is only one correct forum for evaluating such possibilities and making a decision: a creditors’ committee, where all financial creditors have votes in proportion to the magnitude of debt that they hold. In the past, laws in India have brought arms of the Government (legislature, executive or judiciary) into this question. This has been strictly avoided by the Committee. The appropriate disposition of a defaulting firm is a business decision, and only the creditors should make it.’

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE INSOLVENCY & BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) is the bankruptcy law of India which aims at creating a single law for insolvency and bankruptcy for corporates and non-corporates. It is a comprehensive code for resolving insolvencies which erstwhile laws failed to achieve. Hitherto, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (‘SICA’), the Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (‘RDDBFI’), the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI’) and the Companies Act, 2013 provided for insolvency of companies. The Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 were made applicable to individuals and partnership firms. But the thrust of the IBC law is to identify sickness under a ‘liquidity approach’ rather than a ‘balance sheet approach’ at the earliest point of time, i.e., default in payment of any debt obligation.

At the end of it, the insolvency process results in two eventualities: (a) recovery of the enterprise through a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP); or (b) liquidation of the enterprise and distribution of assets to the stakeholders.

SUPREMACY OF THE CODE OVER ALL LAWS (INCLUDING GST)

The law was given teeth through blanket overriding provisions over all other Central and State laws. This was a learning from the erstwhile laws and the intent of the Legislature was to give corporate revival primacy over liquidation. Section 238 of the Code gives it supremacy over all other laws insofar as an insolvency resolution process is concerned and it cannot be eclipsed by resorting to remedies available under the ordinary law of the land. The IBC law has withstood the constitutional challenge in the famous Swiss Ribbons case (2019) 4 SCC 17 which gave further impetus to this legislation.
Central or State Government as an operational creditor
In terms of section 5(20) r/w/s 5(21) of IBC 2016, an operational creditor has been defined as a person to whom a debt in respect of goods or services is due and includes debt payable under any law to the Central and State Government. Contrary to the erstwhile laws which prioritised Crown debts, this law has relegated Government dues to the class of operational creditors. CBEC Circular 134/04/2020-GST, dated 23rd March, 2020 also clarifies that the GST dues would stand as ‘operational debt’ and no coercive action is permitted to be taken by the proper officer for recovery of debts due prior to the CIRP date. It would be seen under the IBC process that operational creditors have a limited power in revival of the enterprise. Section 30(1) only assures the liquidation value of the Corporate Debtor to operational creditors.

Participation in the insolvency resolution process – operational creditors

The insolvency process commences with an insolvency application filed by a financial creditor, operational creditor or corporate debtor (or its member) himself. Operational creditors are permitted to file for initiation of insolvency in case of default of any debts due to them. The date of admission of the application for insolvency by the NCLT acts as the ‘insolvency commencement date’. On and from this date, a blanket moratorium is announced against the institution and the continuation, execution of any suit or decree under any law against the Corporate Debtor. In addition, a complete bar is placed on transferring, encumbering, alienating, recovering, etc., of any assets or rights of the Corporate Debtor. This date serves as a reference point for ascertainment of debts / claims settled under the insolvency resolution process.

A public announcement is made of the CIRP containing the details of the insolvency and seeking submission of claims against the Corporate Debtor. Operational creditors are required to submit their claims for dues from the Corporate Debtor within the specified time frame. It is based on these claims that the resolution professional (RP) draws up the statement of debts due by the Corporate Debtor and the available assets against such claims. The RP is required to verify the claims, including contingent claims, for arriving at the creditors’ pool of the Corporate Debtor.

________________________________________________________________________

1   For respective GSTIN registration

It is at this juncture that statutory authorities (including Central / State Governments1) have to enter the insolvency process and present their claim of unpaid taxes from the Corporate Debtor. Unless a claim is filed, Governments are not permitted to seek a share in the resolution plan of the creditor. These claims are subject to verification and admission by the IRP / RP. Therefore, if the merits of the claim itself are disputed, the IRP / RP may not consider the same as a valid claim. The Central / State Government being in the status of operational creditors, is not permitted to vote as part of the Committee of Creditors (COC) which is the prerogative of the financial creditors. They are mute spectators to the resolution process and would have to accept the decision of the COC as being in the overall interests of all stakeholders.

AGITATING THE RESOLUTION PLAN

Under the revived insolvency law, the financial creditors that comprise the COC are given supreme powers over the resolution of the Corporate Debtor. The law-makers believe that the financial creditors contributing risk capital stand to lose most in an insolvency and therefore would make all efforts to seek suitors who are willing to revive the company. In case a resolution plan is successfully drawn up and approved by the COC, the same would be approved by the NCLT and given statutory force. In terms of section 31 of the IBC, the approved resolution plan would be binding on all stakeholders, including Central / State Governments.

In all likelihood creditors (including Central / State Governments) would be aggrieved by the reduction in the settlement of dues under the resolution plan. Section 61(3) recognises that all resolution plans would entail some pain to stakeholders, yet the commercial wisdom of COC has been given statutory force. IBC limits the scope of any appeal against the order of NCLT (affirming the COC decisions) only in cases where:

* Approved resolution plan is in contravention of any law for the time being in force
* Material irregularity in exercise of powers by IRP / RP
* Debts owed to operational creditors have not been provided for in the resolution plan
* Insolvency costs are not provided for
* Or any other prescribed criteria.

The Supreme Court, in the case of Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons Private Limited vs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (2021) SCC Online SC 313, has unequivocally stated that the Legislature has consciously precluded any ground to challenge the ‘commercial wisdom’ of the COC before the NCLT and that decision is ‘non-justiciable’. Effectively, on approval of the plan by the NCLT, all operational creditors including the Central / State Governments, lose their right to claim any further dues on the fairness doctrine. Discretion on the rationing of the limited funds of the Corporate Debtors rests in the domain of the financial creditors jointly through the COC.

In the context of GST, though the Centre / State would have ascertained their respective dues, they can at the most stake their claims and it would be for the COC to ascertain the eligible claim and provide for the settlement of the said claim on a liquidation-value basis depending on the availability of assets of the Corporate Debtor and the proposal by the incoming resolution applicant. Despite the Centre / State having a self-assessed GST liability available on record, they are bound by the resolution plan and have to strictly abide by the same. Importantly, paragraph 67 of the above decision also states that debts in respect of the payment of dues arising under any law including the ones owed to Centre / State which do not form part of the resolution plan, stand extinguished. This conclusion seals the fate of all adjudicated / unadjudicated GST dues pertaining to the periods up to the CIRP date and the Centre / States cannot proceed to recover any amounts not provided in the resolution plan. Reference can also be made to the decision in Essar Steel India Ltd. Committee of Creditors vs. Satish Kumar Gupta (2020) 8 SCC 531,

‘107. For the same reason, the impugned NLCAT judgment [Standard Chartered Bank vs. Satish Kumar Gupta, 2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 388] in holding that claims that may exist apart from those decided on merits by the resolution professional and by the Adjudicating Authority / Appellate Tribunal can now be decided by an appropriate forum in terms of section 60(6) of the Code, also militates against the rationale of section 31 of the Code. A successful resolution applicant cannot suddenly be faced with “undecided” claims after the resolution plan submitted by him has been accepted as this would amount to a hydra-head popping up which would throw into uncertainty amounts payable by a prospective resolution applicant who would successfully take over the business of the corporate debtor. All claims must be submitted to and decided by the resolution professional so that a prospective resolution applicant knows exactly what has to be paid in order that it may then take over and run the business of the corporate debtor. This the successful resolution applicant does on a fresh slate, as has been pointed out by us hereinabove. For these reasons, NCLAT judgment must also be set aside on this count.’

ROLE OF INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROFESSIONAL

The CIRP process involves appointment of an IRP / RP for management of the affairs of the Corporate Debtor. The powers of the board of directors stand suspended and vested in the hands of the RP (section 17/25). It provides that the IRP / RP would act and execute in the name and on behalf of the Corporate Debtor and keep the same as a going concern. In terms of section 148 of the CGST / SGST Act r.w. Notification 11/2020-CT dated 21st March, 2020, a special process has been identified for management of the affairs of the Corporate Debtor by the IRP / RP until conclusion of the insolvency resolution process. In terms of the proviso, this Notification would be applicable only to such class of persons who have defaulted in filing the outward supplies statement (GSTR1) or return (GSTR3B) under the GST law.

The IRP / RP would be deemed to be a ‘distinct person’ of the Corporate Debtor and is required to take separate registration numbers in each of the States where the Corporate Debtor was previously registered. In effect, a separate GSTIN (under the PAN of the Corporate Debtor) should be obtained by the IRP / RP and all inward / outward supply transactions from the date of appointment of the IRP / RP would have to be reported under the new GSTIN. This ensures that pre-CIRP dues would be governed by the resolution plan / liquidation order and an IRP / RP being a fiduciary, be responsible for acts done after its appointment under a fresh registration – refer Circular (Supra). Moreover, non-filing of prior period returns would not act as a bar on filing subsequent period returns and the new registration would facilitate regularising the compliance subsequent to the appointment of IRP / RP.

Recognising that the creation of a new registration would cause temporary technical challenges, the said Notification waives the time limit of section 16(4) and GSTR2A reflection under Rule 36(4) of the CGST law. Interestingly, as per the Circular (Supra), this waiver is permitted only for the first return filed by the IRP / RP after seeking the registration u/s 40. The IRP / RP is permitted to account for inward supplies which are received since its appointment and cannot expand the claim of credit to supplies prior to such date.

At the customer’s front, invoices raised by the Corporate Debtor during the interregnum (i.e., from the CIRP commencement date and date of registration by IRP / RP) would be eligible as input tax credit in the hands of the recipient despite the erstwhile GSTIN being reflected in such invoices. Separately, the said Notification also permits the RP to seek refund of the amounts lying in the electronic cash ledger in the erstwhile registration.

STATUS OF THE ERSTWHILE REGISTRATION

In terms of the Circular (Supra), the erstwhile registration is required to be placed under suspension by the proper officer after the CIRP date and cannot be cancelled by the proper officer. In case the registration is already cancelled, the proper officer has been directed to revoke the cancellation and bring the same to suspension status.

It may be noted that the new registration granted to the IRP / RP is for the limited timeframe from the CIRP date up to the approval / rejection of the resolution plan. In the event that the resolution plan of the resolution applicant is approved and the Corporate Debtor continues in the same legal form, the law appears to be silent on the continuation of the new registration or reverting to the erstwhile registration. On the basis that the law is silent and that IRP / RP registration is a temporary measure, it can be concluded that the Corporate Debtor would revert to the original registration and the proper officer would have to revoke the suspension placed on the original registration.

Naturally, section 39(10) and the GSTN portal may pose the technical challenge of prohibiting the Corporate Debtor from filing returns after the resolution date on account of default of prior period returns. Due to this hindrance and given the fact that the IRP / RP has filed the returns for the corresponding period, one may consider availing a third registration after the date of approval of the resolution plan by the NCLT. Of course, where the resolution plan involves an amalgamation or merger, the general GST provisions including transfer of input tax credit, would take over for this purpose.

SCENARIO ON LIQUIDATION

Where the COC fails to draw up a resolution plan within the specified / extended time lines or the resolution plan is rejected or contravened, the NCLT would direct that the company be liquidated and the assets be distributed to the stakeholders under a waterfall mechanism. The liquidation order shall be deemed to be a notice of discharge to the officers, employees and workmen of the Corporate Debtor and the liquidator takes charge of all the matters of the Corporate Debtor. In terms of section 53 of the IBC, the distribution of assets / liquidation value to workmen, secured creditors and unsecured creditors would be made prior to meeting the Crown debts. In all likelihood, a Corporate Debtor would not have sufficient assets and the dues would have to be written off by the Central / State Governments.

Unlike the Notification issued w.r.t. the resolution process, the GST law has not provided for the continuation or creation of a new registration in the eventuality of the company entering into liquidation. A liquidator appointed u/s 34 of the IBC law may inherit a going concern and would have to perform a piecemeal liquidation of the Corporate Debtor. The liquidation process may entail GST implications which the official liquidator may be liable to discharge. The law appears to be silent
on the status of the IRP / RP registration or the erstwhile pre-CIRP registration during such process and the Board should clarify this practical issue faced by liquidators.

SIGNIFICANCE OF DISTINCT PERSON REGISTRATION

Section 168 of the law mandates a fresh registration by the IRP / RP in fiduciary capacity and such registration has been treated as a distinct person. Curiously, this Notification, though procedural in nature, raises concerns on the substantive provisions of section 25 which define distinct person. The assets / inventory which are in possession under the older GSTIN are now to be considered the property of the new IRP / RP GSTIN as being ‘distinct person’ under law. While one may be tempted to invoke Schedule I and deem a notional supply among these GSTINs, we should be conscious of the purpose of the Notification. The said Notification is directed towards procedural aspects and not alteration of substantive rights / liabilities of the taxpayer. The rights and liabilities under law would continue under the supervision of the IBC process and GST should not treat this registration as a distinct person in the strict sense. Under the IBC law, sections 17, 18, 24 and 25 define the role and responsibilities of the IRP / RP as being responsible for the management of affairs and ensuring compliance of legal requirements under the IBC and other laws. The Supreme Court in Arcellor Mittal (India) Ltd. vs. Satish Kumar Gupta (2019) 2 SCC 1, states that the RP is taking over the Corporate Debtor in an ‘administrative capacity’ and not in an adjudicatory capacity. This conclusion should put at rest any doubts on the distinct person concept which has been introduced through section 168 of the law.

INTERESTING FACETS OF INPUT TAX CREDIT AT CUSTOMER’S END

GST dues which are collected and payable by the Corporate Debtor may remain unpaid or would be settled at a reduced value under a resolution / liquidation plan. This may result in violation of section 16(2)(c) of the GST law requiring the recipient to establish that input tax has been paid to the Government. Does the settlement of the resolution plan by the Corporate Debtor have any bearing on the ITC claim of the recipient? One theory would claim that the debt due by the Corporate Debtor (i.e., output tax) itself would stand ‘extinguished’ on approval of the resolution plan and thus the taxes are not ‘unpaid taxes’ to the Government causing invocation of the said provision. Section 16(2) pre-supposes a legally sustainable claim and non-payment of such claim would result in denial of ITC. But where the claim itself has been extinguished one may say that section 16(2) stands complied with. Moreover, Government being a stakeholder of the resolution plan, has accepted the haircut (though by statutory force whose validity has not been challenged at appellate forums), it should be estopped from now staking a new claim at the recipient’s end.

The alternative theory would claim that taxes which are not realised by the Government are not ITC and this makes it justifiable for the Revenue to deny the claim. The fallout of this approach would be that the recipient of input from the Corporate Debtor would be under double jeopardy – having paid the tax portion to the Corporate Debtor it would still be denied the ITC by the Government.

INPUT TAX CREDIT LYING IN BALANCE / REFUNDS DUE AS ON CIRP DATE

The Corporate Debtor may be entitled to the ITC lying unutilised as on the CIRP date [for example, Input – 100; Input as per 2A – 150; Output – 350]. The question for consideration is whether the Government’s claim would be 250 or 350? Government in every likelihood may proceed to confirm its demand (vide an order) for gross amount of 350 and this poses a question on the ‘debt’ which is due to the Government. Claim u/s 2(6) refers to a ‘right to payment’ whether or not such right is disputed / undisputed, etc. Debt has been defined u/s 2(11) as being a ‘liability or obligation’ in respect of a claim which is due from any person. Regulation 9-14 places the responsibility of verification of the claims and ascertainment of the ‘best estimate’ on the IRP / RP.

GST being a VAT model, the references to output tax and input tax are made to ascertain the net value addition. Though they are distinct and independent concepts, the scheme of the legislation is to arrive at the net tax liability after reduction of amounts lying as credit. The scheme of section 49 of the GST law (also refer ‘self-assessed tax’) and returns also depict that the ‘liability or payment’ to the Government would be computed after deduction of the ITC eligible to the Corporate Debtor. But the answer may be different to the extent of input which is eligible but lying unclaimed by the Corporate Debtor (50). This is because the statutory scheme requires that ITC should be claimed for it to be eligible for a deduction against output tax. Where the claim is not made by the Corporate Debtor or its representative (IRP / RP), in all likelihood that amount would stand lapsed and cannot be claimed as a set-off in ascertaining the debt due to the Government.

Where refunds are due by the Government, it may be within its statutory right to internally adjust these amounts. Section 54(10) of the GST law empowers the officer to recover the said amounts. Where such adjustments are made prior to the moratorium, the Government would be within the framework to justify the adjustment. But once a moratorium is declared, section 14(1)(a) bars any transfer, encumbrance, alienation or disposal of the assets of the Corporate Debtor. The Government may be barred from adjusting the refunds due to the Corporate Debtor with outstanding dues. In such scenarios, the IRP / RP would have to pursue the refund claim from the Government and transfer the outstanding dues to the decision of the COC under the resolution plan. But in case of liquidation, Regulation 29 expressly permits mutual credits or set-off prior to ascertainment of the net amount payable by the Corporate Debtor.

FATE OF ALTERNATIVE RECOVERIES – JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS, ETC.

GST law has amply empowered authorities to recover their tax dues from refund adjustments, garnishee proceedings, etc. Whether these provisions which can be invoked in the normal course of business operations have a bearing on the Corporate Debtor? The moment the CIRP process is initiated, the moratorium shields the Corporate Debtor from any further liabilities and also protects all its assets from alienation from the Corporate Debtor. This effectively restricts the taxman from approaching banks / debtors and recovering the taxes forcefully. Under general law, the right of the creditor in invoking the personal guarantees granted by directors was under consideration before the Court in SBI vs. V. Ramakrishnan & Ors. (2018) 17 SCC 394, wherein it was held that the moratorium does not insulate the guarantors of the debt and their independent and co-extensive liability would continue unhindered. On these lines, the liability of directors under GST would also stand on an independent footing.

Section 88 provides for joint and several liabilities over the directors of the company unless they prove that such non-recovery was not on account of any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty in relation to the affairs of the company. While this provision is specific to cases involving liquidation, it does not specifically provide for cases where the Corporate Debtor is taken over by a resolution applicant. Therefore, Centre / State may not be in a position to invoke the said provision in case of reduction of debt due to the respective Governments.

In the alternative, the taxman would like to go after the transferee of business (especially in case of a takeover / merger by resolution applicant) u/s 85 which provides for recovery action against the transferee of the business for recovery of taxes from such transferee. While the said provisions are open-ended, it would be contrary to the IBC provisions which give finality to dues to the resolution applicant and hence any such claims would have to be eclipsed into the resolution plan (refer Arcellor Mittal’s case, Supra). Another viewpoint would be that the resolution plan would have the effect of determination of tax dues and no other forum or civil authority is permitted to alter these dues from the Corporate Debtor.

Implications over criminal or personal penalties against directors, etc.
Parallel proceedings such as prosecution, personal penalties are permitted to be invoked against the directors of Corporate Debtors. The said proceedings would not form part of the insolvency process and would remain unaffected by the resolution plan. The affected persons would have to contest these matters at the appropriate forum on merits and cannot take shelter under the resolution scheme.

CONCLUSION


The taxman should appreciate the macro-economic aspects of introducing this legislation. It is here where the taxman should don the entrepreneur hat and swallow the bitter pill for a better future of the enterprise and of the economy as a whole. It was stated by the Court that ‘What is important is that it is the commercial wisdom of this majority of creditors which is to determine, through negotiation with prospective resolution application, as to how and in what manner the corporate resolution process is to take place’. It is only when such an approach is adopted that the IBC resolution process would yield the desired results.

ACTIONABLE CLAIMS – TAXABILITY UNDER GST

INTRODUCTION
The levy of tax on ‘actionable claims’ has seen substantial litigation under the Sales Tax / VAT regimes. The primary reason for that was that the definition of goods under the Sales Tax / VAT regimes excluded actionable claims. Similarly, under the GST regime, too, actionable claims are generally excluded from the purview of taxability. Therefore, it is important to understand what constitutes an ‘actionable claim’.

The definition of actionable claim is provided u/s 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as under:
‘actionable claim’ means a claim to any debt, other than a debt secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property, or to any beneficial interest in movable property not in the possession, either actual or constructive, of the claimant, which the Civil Courts recognise as affording grounds for relief, whether such debt or beneficial interest be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent;

It is apparent from the above definition that an actionable claim is a claim, or rather a right to claim, either an unsecured debt or any beneficial interest in movable property which is not in the possession of the claimant. So far as the first limb of the definition is concerned, it seems to cover only unsecured debts. Therefore, it should cover cases such as bill discounting where a business sells its receivables to another person, generally a banking and financial institution, and receives the consideration upfront, though a lower amount than what is receivable. The receivable is subsequently realised by the bank and the difference between the amount realised and the amount paid for bill discounting is its margin / profit.

The second limb of the definition has been analysed in detail by the courts. In the context of lottery tickets, the division Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of H. Anraj & Others vs. Government of Tamil Nadu [(1986) AIR 63] had held that lottery tickets were goods and therefore liable to sales tax. However, the said decision was later set aside by the Constitution Bench in the case of Sunrise Associates vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others [(2006) 5 SCC 603-A]. While doing so, the Court had laid down the following principles:

• The fact that the definition of goods under the State laws excluded actionable claims from its purview would demonstrate that actionable claims are indeed goods and but for the exclusion from the definition of ‘goods’, the same would have been liable to sales tax.
• An actionable claim is only a claim which might connote a demand. Every claim is not an actionable claim. A claim should be to a debt or to a beneficial interest in movable property which must not be in the possession of the claimant. In the context of the above definition, it is a right, albeit an incorporeal one. In TCS vs. State of AP [(2005) 1 SCC 308] the Court has already held that goods may be incorporeal or intangible.
• Transferability is not the point of distinction between actionable claims and other goods which can be sold. The distinction lies in the definition of an actionable claim. Therefore, if a claim to the beneficial interest in movable property not in the vendee’s possession is transferred, it is not a sale of goods for the purposes of the sales tax laws.
• Some examples of actionable claims highlighted by the Court include:

  •  Right to recover insurance money,
  •  A partner’s right to sue for an account of a dissolved partnership,
  •  Right to claim the benefit of a contract not coupled with any liability,
  •  A claim for arrears of rent has also been held to be an actionable claim,
  •  Right to the credit in a provident fund account.

• An actionable claim may be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent.
• A lottery ticket can be held to be goods as it evidences transfer of a right. However, it is the right which is transferred that needs to be examined. The right being transferred is claim to a conditional interest in the prize money which is not in the purchasers’ possession and would fall squarely within the definition of an actionable claim and would therefore be excluded from the definition of goods.

In the context of transferrable REP licenses which gave permission to an exporter to take credit of exports made, the Larger Bench in the case of Vikas Sales Corporation vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [2017 (354) E.L.T. 6 (SC)] held that the Exim License / REP Licenses were goods since they were easily marketable and had a value independent of the goods which could be imported using the said licenses, and therefore they could not be treated as actionable claims.

Actionable claims vis-à-vis GST
Section 9 of the CGST Act, 2017, which is the charging section for the levy of GST, provides that the same shall be levied on a supply of goods or services, or both. The terms are defined u/s 2 as under:

(52) ‘goods’ means every kind of movable property other than money and securities but includes actionable claim, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under a contract of supply;
(102) ‘services’ means anything other than goods, money and securities but includes activities relating to the use of money or its conversion by cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or denomination, to another form, currency or denomination for which a separate consideration is charged;

Unlike the Sales Tax / VAT regimes where actionable claims were excluded from the definition of goods, GST law specifically provides that goods shall include actionable claims. Thereafter, Schedule III treats the supply of actionable claims – other than lottery, betting and gambling – as being neither a supply of goods nor a supply of service, thereby excluding the supply of actionable claims from the purview of GST. However, what is the scope of coverage of actionable claims?

Section 2(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 defines actionable claim to have the same meaning as assigned u/s 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The definition under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has been given above.

GST on lottery tickets
The intention of the Legislature to tax lotteries is loud and clear from the fact that Schedule III entry only treats actionable claim – other than lottery, betting and gambling – as neither a supply of goods nor a supply of service. The Rate Notification for goods also specifically provides the rate applicable on lotteries as 28%. Further, Rule 31A of the Valuation Rules also clearly provides a specific method to determine the value of supply in case of lottery tickets.

Despite such clarity, the issue of the validity of the levy of tax on lottery tickets has been raised before several courts. The Calcutta High Court, in the case of Teesta Distributors vs. UoI [2018 (19) GSTL 29 (Cal)] had upheld the levy of GST on lottery tickets and held as under:
• The Centre or the State Government had not exceeded their jurisdiction in promulgating the statutes for the levy of GST on lottery tickets,
• The levy did not violate any constitutional or fundamental rights,
• The differential rate of tax was permissible and it was not discriminatory. Further the Government was within its rights to have the same,
• The definition of goods as per the Constitution of India is an inclusive definition with a very wide sweep to cover both tangible as well as intangible products.

The issue again came up before the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Skill Lotto Solutions India Private Limited vs. UoI [2020 – VIL – 37 – SC]. Dismissing the petition, the Court held as under:
• The definition of goods u/s 2(52) does not violate any constitutional provision nor is it in conflict with the definition of goods given under Article 366(12). Therefore, there is nothing wrong with actionable claims being included within the scope of goods u/s 2(52).
• The decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Sunrise Associates holding lottery as actionable claims was a binding precedent and not obiter dicta.
• Schedule III entry, while treating actionable claims sans lottery, betting and gambling outside the purview of supply of goods or services for the purpose of section 7, was not discriminatory in nature.
• On the issue of the validity of Rule 31A which determined the value of taxable supply based on the price of the ticket without excluding the prize money component thereof, the Court held that the value of taxable supply is a matter of statutory regulation, and when the value is to be transaction value to be determined as per section 15, it is not permissible to compute the value of taxable supply by excluding the prize which has been contemplated in the statutory scheme. Therefore, while determining the value of supply, prize money was not to be excluded.

GST on activities of betting, gambling
The terms ‘betting’ or ‘gambling’ have not been defined under the CGST Act, 2017. But there is a similarity between the two. Both generally refer to setting aside a certain amount in expectation of a much larger amount on the basis of the occurrence or non-occurrence of a particular future event. The person who collects the amount promises to pay the prize money on the occurrence of the said event. However, the distinction between betting and gambling would be that betting would be something which would depend on an event where the activity is done / carried out by a different person altogether, for example, horse racing, sports, etc., while gambling would involve the person himself undertaking the activity.

The fact that Schedule III specifically excludes betting or gambling from the scope of actionable claims would demonstrate that there is not an iota of doubt as to whether or not the activity of betting or gambling is an actionable claim. The only question that would need consideration is whether the specific activities of betting / gambling which require a certain skill set would be liable to tax or not. The reason behind this is because the Supreme Court has, in the case of Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan vs. State of TN [1996 AIR 1153] held as under:

The expression ‘gaming’ in the two Acts has to be interpreted in the light of the law laid down by this Court in the two Chamarbaugwala cases, wherein it has been authoritatively held that a competition which substantially depends on skill is not gambling. Gaming is the act or practice of gambling on a game of chance. It is staking on chance where chance is the controlling factor. ‘Gaming’ in the two Acts would, therefore, mean wagering or betting on games of chance. It would not include games of skill like horse racing. In any case, section 49 of the Police Act and section 11 of the Gaming Act specifically save the games of mere skill from the penal provisions of the two Acts. We, therefore, hold that wagering or betting on horse racing – a game of skill – does not come within the definition of ‘gaming’ under the two Acts.

The above decision clearly lays down that any activity which involves application of skill would not be treated as betting or gambling. In the context of card games such as rummy and bridge, the Bombay High Court has, in the case of Jaywant Sail and Others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others held that the same involves application of skill and the same cannot be treated as betting / gambling.

Whether the above precedents would apply under the GST regime as well and can it be claimed that when the application of a skill set is involved, the same would not classify as betting / gambling? This issue had come up before the Bombay High Court in the case of Gurdeep Singh Sachar vs. UOI [2019 (30) GSTL 441 (Bom)]. In this case, the petitioner had filed a criminal PIL against a gaming platform which allowed participants, upon payment of fees, to create fantasy teams and the performance of each player would be calculated based on the actual performance of the players during a sports event. From the fees collected from the participants, the portal would retain certain amounts for itself as service charges and the balance amount would be used for paying the prize money to participants. The portal was paying GST under Rule 31A(3) only to the extent of the amounts retained by it.

The petition alleged that the portal was violating the provisions of the Public Gaming Act, 1867 as well as the provisions of Rule 31A of the CGST Rules, 2017 which required payment of tax on the entire value and not after reducing the prize money component – which has also been confirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Skill Lotto (Supra). Relying on the decision in the case of Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra), the High Court held that the online game conducted by the portal involved application of skill and, therefore, the same could not be treated as betting / gambling. Since there was an application of skill, the provisions of the Public Gaming Act, 1867 were not applicable in view of the specific provision of section 12 thereof which provided that the Act shall not apply in cases involving the application of skill.

On the GST front, the Court held that the activities carried out by the portal did amount to actionable claims; however, the same could not be treated as lottery, gambling or betting. Therefore, the same would be covered under Entry 3 of Schedule III and hence the said activities were outside the purview of the levy of tax. Since tax itself was not payable, the question of operation of Rule 31A (3) was not applicable.

However, while dealing with the issue of rate of tax, the Court held that the portal was right in discharging tax at 18% on the platform fee, i.e., the amounts retained by it from the escrow account. In a way, the Court held that the platform fee does not partake the character of actionable claim but is in the nature of an independent service rendered by the platform.

So far as taxability on the recipient of the prize money is concerned, the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling has, in the case of Vijay Baburao Shirke [2020 (041) GSTL 0571 (AAAR-MH)] held that the prize money is not a consideration either for supply of goods or supply of service. An interesting observation made by the Authority has held that not every contract becomes taxable under the GST law. The AAAR further held that every supply is a contract but every contract is not a supply.

GST on chit funds
Chit funds are regulated by the Chit Funds Act, 1982. This is a unique financing model. Under this, a person generally known as trustee or foreman, organises the fund. And people participate in it by contributing a fixed amount on a monthly basis. A chit is prepared for each participant and every month one chit is drawn and the participant whose name comes out receives the money. The activity is carried on regularly till the name of each participant is drawn out. In other words, each participant has a right to receive the money. Generally, the trustee or foreman retains his charge for organising the fund.

In the above business model, the issues that would need consideration are:
• Is there an element of actionable claim present in the above model?
The Supreme Court has, in the context of service tax in the case of UoI vs. Margdarshi Chit Funds Private Limited [2017 (3) GSTL 3 (SC)] held that in a chit business, the subscription is tendered in any one of the forms of ‘money’. It would, therefore, be a transaction in money. Once it has been held that chit fund is nothing but a transaction in money, it would be incorrect to treat it as an actionable claim.

However, even if one analyses the definition of actionable claim for academic purposes, it would be difficult to arrive at a conclusion that there is an element of actionable claim present in the said model. In pith and substance, the chit fund is nothing but a financing model where a person periodically invests funds and the same amount is received back by him, albeit after some reduction on account of foreman / trustee charges. The person whose name comes out first is set to gain more as he gets to use the sum for a longer period compared to the person who receives it at the end.

However, the fact is that the participant enjoys the claim to a movable property, i.e., the prize money. And the only issue that remains is what is the legal remedy that a participant whose name has been picked in the lot has in case the foreman fails to pay the prize money. In this respect, reference to section 64 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 is important. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that civil courts shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of any dispute. The issue as to whether Consumer Forums have jurisdiction over chit fund matters is already in dispute with contrary decisions by the Madras High Court in N. Venkatsa Perumal vs. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [2003 CTJ 261 (CP)] and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Margadarsi Chit Fund vs. District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum [2004 CTJ 704 (CP)]. Therefore, it can be said that there is substantial confusion over whether or not civil courts can have jurisdiction over civil matters, specifically in view of the extant provisions of the Chit Fund Act, 1982 and perhaps, the finality of this issue can be a basis to determine whether chit funds can actually be treated as actionable claims.

Whether the foreman / trustee is liable to pay GST on the charges retained by him?
The answer to the above question would depend on the classification which one accords to the chit fund business. If one takes a view that the activity of a chit fund is nothing but a transaction in money, the charges retained by the foreman / trustee would be liable to GST. The Rate Notification prescribes the GST rate at 12% on services provided by the foreman / trustee subject to the condition that input tax credit on inputs used for providing such service has not been claimed by the foreman / trustee. However, there is still no clarity on whether the foreman or trustee shall be liable to pay GST only on the charges retained by him or on the whole amount collected from the participants. Under the Service Tax regime (though the levy was stuck down in the Delhi Chit Funds Association case), an abatement was provided in relation to the service provided by the foreman / trustee. Taking a cue from the same, one may take a position that a foreman / trustee is liable to pay GST only on the commission retained by him and not on the entire amount.

However, if one takes an aggressive view and treats the participation in chit fund as an actionable claim, the question of taxability of the amounts retained by the foreman / trustee should not arise since it would be a consideration for a transaction which is neither a supply of goods nor a supply of service.

In the context of GST on chit funds, an application for a ruling was filed before the AAR seeking clarity on whether or not additional amount collected from participants for delay in paying the monthly amounts were includible in the value of taxable service. The Authority in the case of Usha Bala Chits Private Limited [2020 (39) GSTL 303 (AAR-GST-AP)] held that the additional amount received was classifiable as principal supply of financial and related services and therefore liable to GST @ 12% under Entry 15 of Notification 11/2017-CT Rate dated 28th June, 2017.

GST on assignment of escalation claims
In case of infrastructure companies, substantial amounts are stuck in escalation claims which are subject to conclusion of arbitration proceedings. In order to manage cash flows and monetise the same, such companies at times assign such escalation claims to financing companies. The arrangement is that all the future proceeds of the said escalation claim are assigned to another party which would upfront pay a discounted amount to such infrastructure companies. Once the escalation claim is settled, the entire amount sanctioned would be received by the financing company on which the infrastructure company would have no rights.

It appears that the above transaction would qualify as assignment of actionable claim. The construction company has a right to claim the escalation costs from the clients, which they assign to another company which would squarely fall within the ambit of actionable claim.

The issue, however, would remain with respect to the payment of tax on reaching of finality of such actionable claims. It is important to note that the escalation claim is for receipt of consideration for a supply made by the infrastructure company. Generally, such contracts are in the nature of ‘continuous supply of services’ and therefore the tax on the same is payable at the time when the client accepts the provision of service. The question that would arise is who would be liable to pay the tax on such underlying service in such cases – the contractor / infrastructure company, or the assignee company to which the right has been assigned?

The fact remains that the service has been provided by the infrastructure company and therefore the liability to pay tax thereon shall also be on the infrastructure company. However, one also needs to keep in mind that the journey of an escalation claim reaching finality is generally long. It might happen that the escalation claim approved in 2021 might pertain to a service performed in 2011, i.e., at the time of levy of service tax when the service might have been exempted, while under the GST regime the same becomes taxable. In such a situation, the issue of whether or not the liability to pay tax on such service would arise on account of transition provisions [see section 142(11)] is something which one might need to analyse.

GST on vouchers
Vouchers are pre-paid instruments (PPI) that facilitate purchase of goods and services, including financial services, remittances, funds transfers, etc., against the value stored in / on such instruments. Such PPIs in India are regulated by the Reserve Bank of India which recognises three different kinds of instruments, namely:
• Closed system PPI: Issued by an entity for facilitating the purchase of goods or services from that entity only. For example, vouchers issued by broadcasting companies, telecoms, etc., which can be used against services provided only by such service providers.
• Semi-closed system PPI: Issued by banks as well as non-banks for purchase of goods or services, remittance facilities, etc., for use at a group of clearly identified merchant locations / establishments which have a specific contract with the issuer (or contract through a payment aggregator / payment gateway) to accept the PPIs as payment instruments. Sodexo vouchers is an example of such PPIs.
• Open system PPI: Issued by banks for use at any merchant for purchase of goods and services, including financial services, remittance facilities, etc. Cash withdrawal at ATMs / Points of Sale (PoS) terminals / Business Correspondents (BCs) is also allowed through these PPIs.

The closed system PPIs are not regulated by the RBI. However, the issuance of the same denotes an agreement by the issuer to supply certain goods or services, as the case may be. But the question that would need analysis is whether such vouchers can be constituted as an actionable claim or it is just an instrument to receive consideration for an agreement to supply goods or services? While the former appears to be a more appropriate answer, the fact remains that the PPI is nothing but a means to receive the consideration for supply of goods or service and therefore the same should be liable to GST at the time of issuance.

Therefore, if at the time of issuance all the elements for the levy of tax are known, i.e., recipient, nature of supply, place of supply, tax rate, etc., then GST should be paid at that moment itself by the person who issues the voucher. There would, however, be an issue of the value on which such issuer would be discharging tax. For example, for a voucher of Rs. 100, the company issuing the voucher would be receiving only Rs. 70, the price at which it sells to the distributor. The distributor might sell the voucher to the retailer for Rs. 85 who would further sell it to the consumer for Rs. 100. The question that would remain is whether the issuer would be charged tax on Rs. 100 or on Rs. 70? A more appropriate solution for this would be to look at the nature of the arrangement, i.e., whether the transaction is a P2P arrangement or a P2A arrangement, to determine the correct course of action.

Another issue which might be faced is in case where the goods or service to be supplied is not known. For example, a retailer, say Big Bazaar, issues a voucher of Rs. 1,000 which can be redeemed at any of its outlets for purchase / sale of goods or services or both, which may be taxable or exempt. In such a case, whether the retailer would be required to pay tax at the time of issuance of the voucher or its redemption shall remain open since all the elements for the levy of tax are not known at that time. In such a case, in view of specific provisions contained in sections 12(4) / 13(4), the tax would be payable at the time of redemption of the voucher. This view has been upheld by the AAR in the case of Kalyan Jewellers India Limited [2020 (32) GSTL 689 (AAR-TN)].

However, the above situation would change in case of semi-close and open system PPIs which are regulated by RBI and recognised as a legal means of tender and, therefore, more aptly classified as ‘money’ as defined u/s 2(75) of the CGST Act, 2017. Once the said PPIs are classified as money, the same are excluded from the definition of goods as well as service and therefore the question of payment of GST on the same does not arise. Similarly, once PPIs are classified as money, the need to analyse whether such PPIs would be treatable as actionable claim or not should also not remain.

GST on assignment of debts – secured / unsecured
Assignment or sale of secured / unsecured debts by banks is a common exercise undertaken to reduce their loan book. The debt could be of varied nature, such as loan for properties, business loans, etc., and may be secured or unsecured. However, all debts are not actionable claims which is apparent on a perusal of the definition of actionable claims as per which all debts other than a debt secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property are treated as actionable claims.

So far as the debt which gets classified as ‘actionable claims’ is concerned, there is no doubt regarding its non-taxability in view of the Schedule III entry. However, an issue arises in the context of debt which has been secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property and treated as actionable claim. It is important to note that even the said debt is a property for the bank and has all characteristics to be treated as goods, i.e., utility, capability of being bought and sold and, lastly, capability of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed. Therefore, while such debt does not qualify to be an actionable claim, the question that remains for consideration is whether the same would classify as goods for the purpose of GST. Can a view be taken that such debt is nothing but money receivable by a bank and therefore, even otherwise, it continues to be nothing but a transaction in money and hence cannot be treated either as goods or service?

The Board has attempted to clarify on this issue as under:

Sr.
No. and Question

Answer

40.  Whether
assignment or sale of secured or unsecured debts is liable to GST?

Section 2(52) of the CGST Act, 2017 defines
‘goods’ to mean every kind of movable property other than money and
securities but includes actionable claims. Schedule III of the CGST Act, 2017
lists activities or transactions which shall be treated neither as a supply
of goods nor a supply of services and actionable claims other than lottery,
betting and gambling are included in the said Schedule. Thus, only actionable
claims in respect of lottery, betting and gambling would be taxable under
GST. Further, where sale, transfer or assignment of debt falls within the
purview of actionable claims, the same would not be subject to GST.

Further, any charges collected in the
course of transfer or assignment of a debt would be chargeable to GST, being
in the nature of consideration for supply of services

However, the above clarification seems to have not taken into consideration the fact that the definition of actionable claims covers only debts other than those that have been secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property. Therefore, this is going to be an open issue for the banking sector while dealing with such transactions.

GST on partners’ remuneration
Whether remuneration received by a partner from a partnership firm is liable to GST or not has been a controversy since the introduction of GST. In the case of CIT vs. R.M. Chidambaram Pillai [(1977) 106 ITR 292 (SC)] the Court held that the partners’ remuneration was nothing but a share in profit.

Even the Board has clarified in the FAQ that partners’ salary will not be liable to GST. The AAR in the case of Arun Kumar Agarwal [2020 (36) GSTL 596 (AAR-Kar)] has also held that partners’ salary is not liable to GST in view of Entry 1 of Schedule III which keeps the employer-employee transactions outside the purview of GST. Importantly, while dealing with the issue of share in profits, the AAR has held that the same is mere application of profit and therefore cannot be liable to GST. Perhaps this reasoning can be applied while dealing with the partners’ remuneration since the Supreme Court has already held in the context of Income-tax that partners’ profit is nothing but application of profits.

Other transactions
The Tribunal has, in the case of Amit Metaliks Limited vs. Commissioner [2020 (41) GSTL 325 (Tri-Kol)], held that compensation / liquidated damages payable on cancellation of agreements is nothing but an actionable claim and therefore cannot be treated as consideration. The reasoning accorded by the Tribunal was that the compensation was nothing but debt in present and future and, therefore, was an actionable claim.

In the case of Shriram General Insurance Company vs. Commissioner [2019 (31) GSTL 442 (Tri-Hyd)], the Tribunal held that surrender / discontinuance charges retained by the insurance company on premature termination of a unit-linked insurance policy was not consideration for a taxable service provided, but rather a transaction in an actionable claim which was excluded from the levy of service tax.

The AAR in the case of Venkatasamy Jagannathan [2019 (27) GSTL 32 (AAR-GST)] has held that an agreement to receive a share in profit from shareholders for strategic sale of equity shares over and above the specified sale price per equity share was nothing but an actionable claim and, therefore, could not be treated as supply of goods or services.

In Ascendas Services (India) Private Limited [2020 (40) GSTL 252 (AAAR-Kar)], the Authority held that bus passes were not actionable claims as the same were merely a contract of carriage.

CONCLUSION


What constitutes actionable claim involves substantial application of thought. However, the benefits of a transaction being treated as an actionable claim are many, the primary one being exclusion from the levy of tax itself. Therefore, one needs to be careful while analysing such transactions as the monetary impact might be substantial.  

Additional discount granted by the supplier, reimbursed by the principal company, is additional consideration liable for GST. Further, no credit reversal is required with respect to receipt of commercial credit notes

20. [2019-TIOL-433-AAR-GST] M/s. Santosh Distributors Date of order: 16th September, 2019

Additional discount granted by the supplier, reimbursed by the principal company, is additional consideration liable for GST. Further, no credit reversal is required with respect to receipt of commercial credit notes

FACTS

Prices of the products supplied by the applicant are determined by the supplier / principal company. The applicant is paying GST as per the invoice issued by them and is availing input tax credit on the inward invoice received from the principal company. The ruling is sought to determine whether discount provided by the principal company to their dealers through the applicant attracts any tax under the GST law. Further, whether the amount shown in the commercial credit note issued to the applicant by the principal company attracts proportionate reversal of input tax credit, and is there any tax liability under GST law on the amount received as reimbursement of discount or rebate provided by the principal company as per the written agreement?

HELD

The Authority held that the additional discount given by the supplier through the applicant which is reimbursed as a special reduced price is liable to be added to the consideration payable by the customer to the distributor / applicant to arrive at the value of supply in terms of section 15 of the Act. Further, with respect to commercial credit notes where the supplier is not eligible to reduce its original tax liability, no reversal of credit is required. Lastly, in case of reimbursement of discount, GST is applicable.

A bakery where food items are not prepared and served cannot be considered as a restaurant. The tables in the premise are a mere facility provided to consume the food sold

19. [2019-TIOL-440-AAR-GST] M/s Square One Homemade Treats Date of order: 30th September, 2019

A bakery where food items are not prepared and served cannot be considered as a restaurant. The tables in the premise are a mere facility provided to consume the food sold

FACTS

The applicant company is engaged in sale of food products such as baked items like cakes, cookies, brownies, ready-to-eat homemade packed food, ready-to-eat snacks and hot and cold beverages through dispensing machines. All food items sold are pre-packed and no cooking is done at the premises. There is a table for customers who eat food procured from the counter in the premises. The ruling is sought to know whether resale of food and bakery products falls under restaurant services. Further, whether HSN and tax rates favoured by the applicant would be correct.

RULING

The Authority held that a restaurant is a place of business where food is prepared in the premises and served based on orders received from the customer. Whereas in the present case it is a bakery where food items are sold and the tables in the premise are a mere facility provided to consume the food items in the shop. Accordingly, it was held that the bakery cannot be considered as a restaurant.

The amounts received towards interest-free refundable security deposit do not attract GST unless the same is applied towards ‘consideration’. However, the notional interest / monetary value of the act of providing such deposits will attract GST as it is covered within the definition of ‘consideration’. AAR held that providing pre-decided number of free transactions subject to certain pre-determined maximum amount is in the nature of discount and will not attract GST subject to section 15(3) of CGST Act, 2017

18. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 515 (AAR – Gujarat) Rajkot Nagarik Sahakari Bank Ltd. Date of order: 15th May, 2019

The amounts received towards interest-free refundable security deposit do not attract GST unless the same is applied towards ‘consideration’. However, the notional interest / monetary value of the act of providing such deposits will attract GST as it is covered within the definition of ‘consideration’. AAR held that providing pre-decided number of free transactions subject to certain pre-determined maximum amount is in the nature of discount and will not attract GST subject to section 15(3) of CGST Act, 2017

FACTS

The applicant engaged in providing financial and other services and also provides service for the operation of dematerialised (Demat) accounts to various account holders as well as to persons intending to operate only their Demat accounts. The applicant sought a ruling as to whether (i) amounts received by the applicant as refundable interest-free deposit could be treated as ‘supply’ under GST? (ii) whether the amount of Rs. 2,500 being a refundable interest-free deposit, which allows the depositor some benefits, would attract GST? and

(iii)    whether the first ten free transactions subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 lakhs allowed to the Demat account holder depositing the refundable interest-free deposit would attract GST?

RULING

AAR noted that the deposit is excluded from the definition of the consideration by the proviso to section 2(31) of the CGST Act, 2017. However, the notional interest / monetary value of the act of providing the refundable interest-free deposit will be considered as consideration since it is covered in both the limbs of the definition of consideration given u/s 2(31). Further, AAR noted that the refundable interest-free deposit is in addition to the commercial considerations to cover the risk of the Demat account. The main purpose of the deposits is not only security but also the collection of capital. Therefore, AAR held that the monetary value of the act of providing a refundable interest-free deposit is the consideration for the services provided by the applicant and therefore, the services provided by the applicant can be treated as supply and chargeable to GST in the hands of the applicant.

As regards the refundable interest-free deposit of Rs. 2,500, it was held that such amount will not attract GST unless it is applied towards consideration and the monetary value of the act of providing such deposit will attract GST. Allowing free transactions was looked upon as discount and hence was held as not to attract GST subject to the fulfilment of the conditions u/s 15(3) of the CGST Act, 2017.

When the manufacturer is not obliged to supply tools / moulds in manufacturing parts and they are supplied by the customer free of cost and on a returnable basis, the value of such tools / moulds supplied by the customer not includible in the value of parts to be manufactured by manufacturer-supplier

17. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 107 (AAR – Karnataka) Tool-Comp Systems (P) Ltd. Date of order: 16th July, 2019

When the manufacturer is not obliged to supply tools / moulds in manufacturing parts and they are supplied by the customer free of cost and on a returnable basis, the value of such tools / moulds supplied by the customer not includible in the value of parts to be manufactured by manufacturer-supplier

FACTS

The applicant is a manufacturer and seller of goods. For the production of parts, the tools required are either manufactured by the appellant or supplied by the customers free of cost on a returnable basis. The tools supplied by customers on free of cost basis are classified under capital goods. The tool has a specific life and can produce only a certain volume of total production. Since the customer is supplying the tool on free of cost basis, the applicant is not charging any portion of the cost of the tool to the customer.

The applicant filed the present ruling for seeking clarification regarding the applicability of tool amortisation cost (transaction value) in the GST regime on capital goods received free on returnable basis from the recipients (customer OEM) for parts production and supply.

RULING

AAR noted that as per the contract, the customers are required to supply tools to the applicant free of cost and the applicant is not under any obligation to supply the components by using tools / moulds belonging to him. This is exactly in terms of Circular No. 47/21/2018-GST dated 8th June, 2018 and hence it does not constitute supply. However, if the contractual obligation is cast upon the component manufacturer to provide moulds / dies yet it is provided by the client OEM / FOC, then the amortised cost of the moulds / dies is required to be added to the value of the components supplied. Since this was not the case, it was held that the applicant is not required to add the value of tools supplied by its customers to the value of parts supplied by him.

LATENT ISSUES UNDER GST LAW ON INTERCEPTION, DETENTION, INSPECTION & CONFISCATION OF GOODS IN TRANSIT

It is a settled principle of law that the statutory power to levy tax includes all powers to prevent the evasion of such tax. The power to intercept the goods conveyance in transit and to detain, or seize, or confiscate the goods in the eventuality of evasion of tax, and the power to levy penalty, or fine, or forfeiture of goods, is meant to check tax evasion and is intended to operate as a deterrent against tax evaders and is therefore ancillary or incidental to the power to levy tax. The GST Law is an economic legislation which encompasses the fiscal transactions and activities, therefore it is essential to specifically and explicitly empower through plenary legislation the officers engaged in its administration with certain powers like inspection, search, seizure, confiscation, etc., to protect the interest of the Revenue.

Chapters XIV and XIX of the CGST Act, 2017 enumerate the governing statutory provisions as regards inspection, search, seizure and arrest from section 67 to 72, and offences and penalties from section 122 to 138, respectively. Section 68 of Chapter XIV more particularly provides for the requirement of certain documents including E-way bill to be carried by the person in charge of the conveyance while the goods are in movement. Further, Chapters XVI and XVIII of the CGST Rules, 2017 contain Rules as regards E-way bills from Rule 138 to 138E and Rules as regards demand and recovery from Rule 142 to 161. In addition, in order to regulate the activities related to road checks, interception, inspection, detention, etc., of the goods during their movement and also to keep a watch on the potential tax evasion at a micro level, CBIC has for the very first time exercised its executive powers u/s 168(1) and issued a Circular which could also be termed as Master Circular No. 41/15/2018 dated 13th April, 2018 with subsequent follow-up updates and amendments in Circular 49/23/2018 dated 21st June, 2018, 64/38/2018 dated 14th September, 2018 and 88/07/2019 dated 1st February, 2019. Hence, it can be stated that the entire set of provisions and procedures concerning road checks, inspection, etc., of goods in movement is intertwined and contained in the Act, Rules and Circulars as referred above.

However, it may be noted that the said Master Circular 41/2018 of CBIC issued u/s 168(1) was per se required only for the purpose of providing further clarification and guidance to the department officers as enablers in the implementation of the Act and Rules but it is baffling to note that this Circular actually muscled its way into matters beyond its statutory competence by providing substantive provisions and procedures as regards road checks, detention, inspection, etc., and so it is ‘required’ to be adhered to not only by the tax department but also by taxpayers.

In the context of goods in transit on a conveyance, the powers as regards interception, detention, inspection and confiscation are intrusive and invasive in nature and therefore it is incumbent on the part of officers to wield these powers with extreme care and caution with strict adherence to statutory provisions, rules and internal circulars as the improper exercise of such powers could lead to contravention of provisions of the very statute they are governed by and may also result in the violation of Articles 301 or 265, or 14, or 19(1)(g), as the case may be, of the Constitution of India.

Through this article, the author has endeavoured to decipher some of the latent legal issues in the gamut of provisions of the GST law as relevant in the chain of activities right from the stage of interception of conveyance and ending with the eventual confiscation of the goods / conveyance.

1) POWER OF INTERCEPTION OF CONVEYANCE U/S 68(3)

Although the heading of section 68 of the CGST Act, 2017 suggests that it is in relation to inspection of goods in movement, however, this section as a whole does not substantively deal with all the operating aspects in relation to the entire process which inter alia includes the fixation of powers of interception of the conveyance on the officers and also powers of performing subsequent detention by the officers if the situation so warrants in accordance with the law. The section as it reads provides for the need of carrying of E-way bill subject to threshold and also other documents like tax invoice, bill of supply, delivery challan, etc., along with the goods while they are in movement and also casts a duty on the person in charge of the conveyance to co-operate and produce the prescribed documents before the officer for verification and to allow the officer to inspect the goods. Although the requirement on the part of the person in charge of the conveyance is to stop the conveyance on interception and to co-operate with the officer as has been clearly spelt out in sub-clause 3, it is, however, bereft of any specific and explicit authority or power being conferred on the officer concerned to actually wield this power for interception and subsequently perform detention for the reasons explained below. The following is the extract of this section:

i) 68. Inspection of goods in movement.
(1) The Government may require the person in charge of a conveyance carrying any consignment of goods of value exceeding such amount as may be specified to carry with him such documents and such devices as may be prescribed.
(2) The details of documents required to be carried under sub-section (1) shall be validated in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3) Where any conveyance referred to in sub-section (1) is intercepted by the proper officer at any place, he may require the person in charge of the said conveyance to produce the documents prescribed under the said sub-section and devices for verification and the said person shall be liable to produce the documents and devices and also allow the inspection of goods.

The expression ‘is intercepted by the proper officer’ is used in sub-clause 3 in the past tense which pre-supposes that the proper officer is already in possession of the necessary authority or power to intercept the conveyance and perform inspection. However, it is imperative to note that the statute as it stands today does not in any explicit, clear or specific words confer any such power or authority on the proper officer for interception of conveyance and inspection of goods. The anti-evasion tax provisions of an intrusive character of any fiscal legislation would generally confer express powers in clear and explicit terms on the specific officers to perform specific functions without leaving any room for ambiguity or doubt as regards the jurisdiction of such officers to perform those functions. For instance, section 106 of the Customs Act, 1962, power to stop and search conveyances, where the powers of the proper officer are clearly delineated to stop the conveyance during the movement and perform a search of the same. Also, as per section 67 of the CGST Act, 2017, the power of inspection, search and seizure is clearly and specifically conferred on a proper officer not below the rank of Joint Commissioner either to exercise those powers or to authorise any other officer to exercise those powers. Hence, it may be stated that any action taken or purported to be taken by Revenue under GST Law without proper statutory jurisdiction would fall foul of the GST Law and would not be sustained on challenge in a court of law. The provisions of the tax statutes are subject to strict construction by the courts in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply or presume anything which is not expressed, or it cannot look into the purpose or object of the Legislature while construing the provisions.

One possible argument could be that the proper officer having the power of inspection, search and seizure u/s 67 would also have power of interception u/s 68(3); however, this argument may sound far-fetched as section 67 is qua a specific taxable person or any person on the plank of articulation of reason to believe by the proper officer where no such pre-conditions are required to be fulfilled by the proper officer for interception as per section 68(3). With the evolution of time and with the development of jurisprudence on this law, this haze should also be cleared. Be that as it may, the expression ‘is intercepted by the proper officer’ does not seem to confer or assign any express or specific power of interception on the officer but it only seems to make an assumption or presumption about the currency of such powers. In the absence of any such powers being conferred through any other provisions, applying the strict principle of construction it may be construed that the powers of interception by the officer are completely absent in section 68(3).

In contrast, it is ironic to observe that Rule 138B(1) of the CGST Rules, 2017 by which the Commissioner or an officer empowered by him in this behalf, may delegate the authority of interception and inspection on to other proper officers. As pointed out in the previous paragraph, in the absence of specific and explicit powers having been conferred on the Commissioner or proper officer in the statute to perform the interception, detention, etc., it is difficult to comprehend how through the route of Rule 138B(1) (which is a delegated legislation) one can delegate or assign, and such powers could be delegated by the Commissioner or authorised officer to other subordinate officers. If some rules are to be framed, such rules must necessarily inherit the powers from its plenary legislation; however, this is not true here.

Be that as it may, in order to delegate powers by the Commissioner or other authorised officer, specific statutory provisions are already present u/s 5(2) or u/s 5(3) of the CGST Act, 2017. Where the specific mode of delegation of powers by the Commissioner has been already provided under plenary statutory legislation, there is no reason whatsoever for the Government to also use the route of issuing Rule 138B(1) to perform the very same delegation by the Commissioner which may render the said Rule otiose or infructuous. Further, through Circular No. 3/3/2017-GST issued u/s 2(91) and 5(3) dated 5th July, 2017, the Commissioner has already delegated the said powers of interception and u/s 68(3) to the ‘Inspector of Central Tax’. It is beyond comprehension how the Commissioner could delegate the power of interception when he himself does not possess that power under the statute. As rule 138B(1) is not in congruity with the overall scheme of the GST Law, it should be rendered otiose / meaningless.

2) POWER OF INSPECTION OF GOODS U/S 68(3)

The expression ‘and also allow the inspection of goods’ as used in sub-clause 3 of section 68 (Supra) is to be construed from the perspective of the person in charge of the conveyance who is required to render co-operation and allow the proper officer to perform inspection of the goods after the same are intercepted and detained. However, this provision again does not, in clear, specific and explicit words or expressions empower the proper officer to perform the activity of inspection of goods in transit. In contrast, this sub-clause gives power to the proper officer only to verify the prescribed documents under Rule 138A and the RFID device but does not in any way confer any power on the proper officer to inspect the goods in the conveyance. Again, applying the same analogy from the earlier discussion in the context of interception discussed above, the function of inspection also is of an intrusive nature where the properties of the citizens could be subjected to verification, causing prejudice; therefore, the officer concerned should have specific, explicit, unambiguous and clear power to perform the inspection of the goods in the conveyance. Without specific and explicit powers conferred on the proper officer under the statute for conducting inspection of goods in the conveyance, the delegated legislation has overstretched itself and framed Rule 138B(3) which is pari materia with Rule 138C and purports to provide that the powers of inspection of documents, conveyance and goods are residing with the proper officer and to also follow certain reporting requirements in Form EWB-03 on the GST Portal. Hence, these Rules operate contrary to the provisions of the statute and should be rendered otiose / meaningless.

Apart from the absence of the power of inspection of goods with the proper officer, section 68 is also silent on providing the machinery provisions as regards the time and manner in which the inspection of goods is to be conducted; nor does this section delegate powers to the Government to prescribe necessary enabling rules. In a way, although the Legislature may not have intended so, this provision is seemingly an open-ended ambiguous section without a clear path having been laid down as regards conferment of powers on officers to conduct inspection of goods, not providing for machinery procedures to be followed for inspection and to deal with other related collateral matters. It is imperative for the Legislature to be mindful of the eventuality wherein in the absence of clearly laying down through statute or rules the powers for inspection of goods and concomitant procedures as required to be followed, the mobile squad officers of the Government who are currently in operation may run amok causing unwarranted harassment to genuine taxpayers in the guise of Departmental Circulars, orders or instructions which are anyway not binding on the taxpayers.

Further, after the order of inspection being issued in MOV-02, the time and manner of conducting inspection of the goods in the conveyance is done completely in adherence with the said Circular and where after the completion of the inspection, Form MOV-04 is issued to the taxpayer giving quantitative details of the physical inspection. As there are no Rules prescribed for the inspection of the detained goods, in reality it has been left to the total prerogative and discretion of the Government to define the modus operandi to be followed for physical verification of goods detained via issue of Circulars.

3) VALIDITY OF CIRCULAR 41/2018 AND MOV FORMS
Before adverting to the validity of Circular 41/2018 and MOV Forms covered in the same Circular, it is imperative to read section 168(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 which is as follows:

168. Power to issue instructions or directions.
(1) The Board may, if it considers it necessary or expedient so to do for the purpose of uniformity in the implementation of this Act, issue such orders, instructions or directions to the central tax officers as it may deem fit, and thereupon all such officers and all other persons employed in the implementation of this Act shall observe and follow such orders, instructions or directions.

From the above extract of the provision, two analogies can be drawn:

a) The Circulars are issued by Government only for the purpose of ensuring that there is uniformity of procedure in the implementation of the Act across the country. So the Circulars are a natural concomitant of the existing Act or Rules framed under the Act and therefore the Circulars could not be issued in isolation or independent of the Act or Rules, but they are issued in extension of the existing Act and Rules which are under the domain of control of the Legislature. Further, the Circulars are issued only as supplementary documents and only to provide guidance / aid on the interpretation of certain provisions to be used by the executive wing of the Government responsible for the implementation of provisions of the Act and Rules to avoid the possibility of officers of field formations across the country taking different views on the very same provisions of the statute. Therefore, the Government cannot issue Circulars to prescribe new procedures, processes, methods, forms, applications, etc., not originally envisaged or contemplated in the statute or rules prescribed thereunder which would metaphorically mean ‘placing the cart before the horse’. Even when some provisions are missing in the Act or Rules, maybe for bona fide reasons, the Government even in such situations cannot usurp power u/s 168(1) and seek to fill those identified gaps by issuing Circulars not warranted by powers granted under this section. Wherefore the Government could not perforce enter into the shoes of the Legislature to make the laws through the route of Circulars as has happened in the case of this Circular 41/2018.

b) The officers and all other persons employed in the implementation of the law are required to observe and follow such Circulars, and not the taxpayers. Hence it can be inferred from the text of the provision that these Circulars are only meant to be followed by the internal staff of the tax Department administering the law and are in no way binding on the taxpayers, unless such a Circular has the effect of providing certain benefits or relaxations to the taxpayers. Therefore, the power of issuing Circulars under this section could not have been used by the Government as carte blanche to hold the taxpayers responsible or subject to any obligations under the Circular.

As the GST Law stands today, the Legislature virtually does not exercise any control on procedural matters related to verification of goods in transit which would include powers of officers qua procedures for interception, detention of goods, inspection of goods, post-inspection release of goods, confiscation of goods and adjudication of matters of contravention of provisions of the Act or Rules. The power of laying down the entire gamut of procedures right from the stage of interception of conveyance to eventual confiscation of goods has been completely usurped by the Government and is being controlled through CBIC Circular 41/2018 issued in conjunction with subsequent updated Circulars. Although by enactment of sections 68, 129, 130 and notification of rules 138, 138A, 138B, 138C and 138D the Legislature had retained with itself a few aspects related to these provisions, ironically, a substantial part of the procedures contained in Circular 41/2018 were not contemplated under the provisions of section 168 as explained above. The true fact or practical reality is that all the officers of the tax Department have been following these Circulars in the matter of interception, inspection, etc. That apart, the real tyranny is that even the taxpayers who are not bound by Circulars have been obliged to comply with certain requirements as contained in this Circular, like providing undertakings, signing, etc., in the MOV Forms as specified in the said Circular.

Coming to the various MOV Forms which are as specified in Circular 41/2018, in a metaphorical sense this Circular is the genus and all the MOV Forms coming out from it are its species. As for the justifications as discussed above, if the Circular is held bad in law and it is trumped, as a natural concomitant all the related MOV Forms would also fall. It is through these MOV Forms that the tax Department is bringing accountability and ownership on the part of the taxpayers by furnishing and taking necessary acknowledgements / signatures on these Forms which may become criminating evidence against the taxpayers in any subsequent legal proceedings. It is relevant to advert to section 160(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 where the taxpayer has been disabled or forbidden to assail the validity of the MOV Forms that he has received, or to raise any negative contentions or objections on them, upon which he has subsequently acted and participated in the adjudication process. So it may be imperative for taxpayers to raise objections or raise a dispute on the validity of MOV Forms or claims contained in the said Forms at the earliest opportunity on the ground that these MOV Forms are issued by exercising extra-legislative actions or filing a dispute on the contents of these Forms.

In terms of section 166 of the CGST Act, 2017, every notification, rule, regulation issued or made by the Government is required to be laid on the table of the House for 30 days for the purpose of examination, BUT no such requirement is envisaged for Circulars or Forms issued under Circulars for ensuring accountability as the overarching principle for issuing Circulars is only to regulate and enable the internal administration function of the Government. Specifying these MOV Forms through the route of Circulars can be depicted as an attempt to usurp power by the Government. As long as these MOV Forms do not create any obligation or liability on the persons or taxpayers who are the external parties to the Government, the validity of these forms cannot be called in question, as such forms are issued only to convey certain information without warranting any action from the recipients.

As already indicated earlier, strict interpretation or construction is applied to tax laws and as per the cardinal rule of law that we are governed under, the same level of moral rectitude is sought from the tax Department as it is sought from the taxpayers. The MOV Forms contained in Circular 41/2018, in the author’s view, do not hold any legal ground and are liable to be set aside. Recently, the Sales Tax Bar Association, Delhi has, under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenged before the Delhi High Court the statutory validity of these MOV Forms and prayed that the Court set these aside. It appears as though this is the first time someone has challenged the validity of the MOV Forms. The matter is pending disposal.

Be that as it may, as regards the Circular 41/2018 the procedures as specified in it have pain areas being encountered on a day-to-day basis by the taxpayers which result in undue harassment to them and loss of intrinsic value of the goods being detained or confiscated for an inordinate time. These are as follows:

a) Although section 68(1) read with Rule 138A requires the person in charge of the conveyance to only carry certain definite documents, in reality the conveyances are intercepted and unwarranted documents are sought to be produced for verification by the mobile squad and also unwarranted objections or infirmities in the documents are raised by the mobile squad.

b) The expression ‘prima facie, no discrepancies are found’ as mentioned in para (b) of Circular 41/2018 is a very broad and latent expression and the same could be subject to different interpretations in identical situations by officers of the Department. The basic purpose of the Circular is to clarify and clear the ambiguities if there are any; however, not expounding such ambiguous expressions quoted above and contained in the same Circular itself, would work contrary to the very purpose of the Circulars issued.

c) The expression ‘or where proper officer intends to undertake an inspection’ as mentioned in para (d) of Circular 41/2018 is again so loosely worded as to give full liberty to the officers concerned to decide whether or not to undertake an inspection. There are no fetters attached or conditions precedent defined for arriving at or having an intention to undertake inspection. The undertaking of inspection is of an intrusive character and the same should be ideally undertaken only based on hard evidence indicating tax evasion and not merely on conjecture, surmises, assumptions and presumptions of the officer concerned.

4) POWER OF DETENTION AND CONFISCATION U/S 129 AND U/S 130:
Just like the issue of officers without statutory powers intercepting and inspecting as discussed above, even the powers for detention and subsequent confiscation if required by officers are not contained in the plenary GST legislation, that is, the CGST Act, 2017. Although sections 129 and 130 do make references to proper officers, but these references are restricted only for the limited purpose of adjudication of the demand by following the principle of natural justice on the proposed action of either detention or confiscation, a decision about which has already been made by the officer concerned based on the per se formation of opinion as per Circular 41/2018. Sections 129 and 130 also serve for the quantification of amounts payable by the taxpayers and to perform other incidental procedures qua the proposed detention or confiscation.

Based on the outcome of physical inspection of the goods by the officers as reported in MOV-04, in case any discrepancy is found or where the proper officer opines that any contravention of the Act or Rules is committed by the taxpayer, then u/s 129 the goods and conveyance are detained or seized by issuing MOV-06 – the order of detention along with MOV-07 – SCN with DRC-01 notified electronically.

Thereafter, the adjudication procedures would follow in accordance with Rule 142 and also in accordance with instructions contained in the Circular 41/2018 along with certain specific MOV Forms in manual mode as specified in the Circular. Therefore, the said Rule 142 on its own does not prescribe the entire adjudication procedure that is required to be followed but the entire process has been unnecessarily parted between Rule 142 and the manual MOV Forms specified in the said Circular which would only increase the compliance burden as well as complexity in compliance by the taxpayers not envisaged by the Central Government.

To issue Form MOV-06 – SCN for detention, or MOV-10 – SCN for confiscation [as per para (l) of Circular 41/2018], very wide carte blanche powers are conferred on the officers to initiate either or both these proceedings. Para (f) of the same Circular empowering the officer to initiate detention proceedings adverts to the expressions ‘Where the proper officer is of the opinion that the goods and conveyance need to be detained under section 129’ or para (l) empowering the officer to initiate confiscation proceedings, adverts to the expressions ‘Where the proper officer is of the opinion that such movement of goods is being effected to evade payment of tax, he may directly invoke Section 130’. In both these cases, the said empowerments are bereft of any guideline or threshold or condition precedent or sine qua non for the formation of such adverse opinion by the officer having the effect of initiating proceedings u/s 129 or 130 for detention or confiscation of goods, respectively. These wide powers qua the formation of opinion by the officers as referred to in the above-referred paras appear to be an attempt of the Government to have a parallel law through administrative Circulars which should go to the root of questioning the sanctity and the very purpose and meaning of the Circulars and why they are issued. This Circular does not seek to instil any checks and balances on the wide discretionary actions of the officers as contemplated in the Circular to hold them accountable, especially where such wide discretionary powers on the opinion formation are likely to trigger proceedings of detention or confiscation of the goods u/s 129 or 130, respectively.

It is pertinent to note that the invocation of detention u/s 129 and confiscation u/s 130 do not happen automatically but are a natural consequence of formation of adverse opinion by the officer under the highlighted paras of the said Circular.

To sum up the issue, Circular 41/2018 ought to have been used only to clarify and help in implementation of substantial or procedural provisions of the Act / Rules, but in actual fact it has taken primacy and it is purportedly operating like a plenary Act in the matter of detention and confiscation of goods, and sections 129 and 130 of the Act are virtually reduced to a machinery provision, or merely as a referencing placeholder for quantification of the amount of tax, penalty, fine, etc.

5) OTHER ISSUES

a) Whether sections 129 and 130 operate coterminous with each other?
Subject to section 118 of the Finance Act, 2021 not yet notified, both the said sections 129 and 130 are mutually exclusive, independent and operate in separate spheres for the simple reason that both start with the non-obstante clause at the beginning with the expression ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act’. The High Court of Gujarat had occasion to deal with several petitions in a group matter in Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat (order dated 23rd December, 2019), where the confiscation proceedings u/s 130 were initiated without concluding the existing on-going adjudication proceedings u/s 129. The Court held that both the sections 129 and 130 are not coterminous with each other, and hence are independent, in the following words:

‘(i) Section 129 of the Act talks about detention, seizure and release of goods and conveyances in transit. On the other hand, section 130 talks about confiscation of goods or conveyance and levy of tax, penalty and fine thereof. Although both the sections start with a non-obstante clause, yet, the harmonious reading of the two sections, keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the enactment thereof, would indicate that they are independent of each other. Section 130 of the Act, which provides for confiscation of the goods or conveyance, is not, in any manner, dependent or subject to section 129 of the Act. Both the sections are mutually exclusive.’

b) Detention on the ground of rate of tax, classification, etc.

An officer intercepting goods in transit cannot go into the unwarranted issues of valuation, classification of goods, rate of tax and so on and cannot high-handedly detain the goods for more than a few hours (up to six hours). However, the officer should collect relevant data during such short detention and transmit the same to the jurisdictional proper officer for initiating necessary assessment proceedings in relation to that supply by the taxpayer. Again, in Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), the Gujarat High Court held as under:

‘160. We are in full agreement with the aforesaid enunciation of law laid down by the Kerala High Court. Thus, in a case of a bona fide dispute with regard to the classification between the transporter of the goods and the Squad Officer, the Squad Officer may intercept the goods, detain them for the purpose of preparing the relevant papers for effective transmission to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. It is not open to the Squad Officer to detain the goods beyond a reasonable period. The process can, at best, take a few hours. It goes without saying that the person, who is in charge of transportation, will have to necessarily co-operate with the Squad Officer for preparing the relevant papers. [See Jeyyam Global Foods (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 64 GSTR 129 (Mad).]

CONCLUSION


In the author’s view, the formation of opinion as contained in Circular 41/2018 which is so critical, foundational and is of a substantive character, has the effect of affecting the rights or liabilities or obligations of the parties qua interception, detention, inspection or confiscation by their very intrusive or invasive nature; though meant to arrest tax evasions, these should never have formed part of the Rules and Circulars. Instead, these provisions which seek to check tax evasion incidents should have ideally been part of the plenary legislation espousing the principles of natural justice, equity, good conscience and fairness, analogous to instances of section 67 in the matter of inspection, search and seizure, or section 69 in the matter of arrest which have been couched in the CGST Act, 2017. However, the present form of operation of the provisions via enforcement of the said Circular seems to suggest that there is a complete abdication of power by the Legislature to the Executive to deal with matters in relation to interception, inspection, detention and confiscation of goods in movement. One hopes this Circular and MOV Forms which are at present in challenge before the Delhi High Court are struck down by the Court and such transgressions of the law by the Executive are discouraged and trumped down to set an example for the future and for assisting the cardinal principle of the rule of law to prevail.

GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure development is one of the stated priorities of the Government. While it is primarily the responsibility of the Government to ensure speedy infrastructure development and provide access to such infrastructure to the citizens at minimal possible cost, over a period of time participation of the private sector has been solicited through the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model.

For example, under the Build Operate & Transfer (BOT) model, the Government or its designated agencies and the successful bidder enter into an agreement termed as ‘Concession Agreement’ wherein the Government / its designated agency agree to grant a concession to private sector infrastructure companies who in legal parlance are known as ‘concessionaires’. The grant of such a concession permits the concessionaire to build the infrastructure (as may be agreed), operate it over a period of time and ultimately transfer it back to the Government. There is a nominal fee which is generally payable by the infrastructure company for such a right granted by the Government / its designated agency. This charging of fee by the Government / its designated agency indicates that the concessionaire is the service recipient in the current case and the Government / its designated agency assumes the role of a service provider.

Under this model, the revenue for the infrastructure company could be in different forms. The most common method of revenue generation for it is the grant of the right to collect usage charges. This right is granted to the infrastructure company for the contract period. The second model which is also very common is the annuity model wherein the Government / its designated agencies agree to make a fixed periodic payment to the concessionaire, while the collection of usage charges is done by the Government / designated agency themselves. There is also a third revenue model, commonly known as the hybrid annuity model, where collection of usage charges for a certain period is with the concessionaire and after that period the Government / designated agencies collect the usage charges themselves and pay a lump sum annuity to the concessionaire.

The above models of infrastructure development are in stark contrast with other traditional models in which the private sector contractor is expected to construct the infrastructure as a contractor and receives a pre-defined consideration.

Such different models result in diverse GST consequences both on the levy of tax on the development efforts as well as the claim of input tax credit (ITC). Further, the receipt of usage charges during the O&M period also has different GST consequences. This article deals with some of the GST issues arising in such infrastructure development projects.

GST IMPLICATIONS ON BOT PROJECTS

While analysing the GST implications on a Government project, the first step is to understand the nature of the project. Let us see this with the help of a standard project under the BOT model where the infrastructure company enters into a ‘concession agreement’ with the Government / designated agency. Generally, the agreements are worded in such a manner as to state that the Government / designated agency has agreed to ‘grant a concession’ to the concessionaire, i.e., the infrastructure company, for which the latter has to pay a nominal consideration (generally, Rs. 1). In such cases, it is apparent that it is the infrastructure company which receives the supply and the Government / designated agency which actually makes the supply. While the tax implications would be immaterial in view of the nominal consideration, the legal issues could be identified as under:

• Whether the supply by Government / designated agency would qualify as supply of goods or services?
While an intangible property is treated as goods, in view of the decision in the case of Tata Consultancy Services vs. State of AP [2004 (178) ELT 22 (SC)], it needs to satisfy the tests of utility, capability of being bought and sold and, lastly, capability of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed, etc. While undoubtedly in the current case the rights would have been granted to the concessionaire, such rights would be lacking the characteristics referred to in the TCS case. In such a situation, it would be more appropriate to treat the rights granted as service rather than goods.

• If supply of services, whether the recipient would be liable to pay GST under RCM?
Once it is concluded that the supply is that of service and the service provider is the Government / designated agency, the provisions of reverse charge would get triggered and there would be a liability to pay GST under reverse charge mechanism. Of course, the recipient can claim exemption if the value of service does not exceed Rs. 5,000 as provided for vide Entry 9 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017.

GST implications on core revenue
Let us now discuss the GST implications on the core revenue, i.e., usage charges collected by the concessionaire. Under the BOT model, there are different ways in which the concessionaire receives the said revenue, namely:
• Standard Model – Collection of usage charges,
• Annuity Model – Periodic payment from the Government / designated agencies,
• Hybrid Model – Collection of usage charges plus periodic annuity payment from the Government / designated agencies.

The tax implication on the first model is very simple as one merely needs to analyse the tax implications on the collection charges, which may vary depending on the nature of the collection charges. For example,
• collection of usage charges in respect of access to road is exempted by Entry 23 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate);
• services provided by way of transportation of passengers through rail (other than first class / an air-conditioned coach), including metro rails, is exempted vide Entry 17;
• services provided by way of transportation of passengers through rail by way of first class / an air-conditioned coach is liable to GST @ 5%;
• services of transportation of goods by rail is liable to GST @ 12% except in case where Indian Railways itself undertakes the transportation, in which case the same is liable to GST @ 5%;
• in case of ports (air / sea), there is no exemption and therefore charges collected from such users are liable to GST @ 18%.

The controversy revolves around the annuity model for roads. An annuity is a periodic payment made by the Government / designated agency to the concessionaire. Under this model, the collection of toll / usage charges is undertaken by the Government / designated agency and the concessionaire has no role to play in the same. There is a controversy around taxability of such annuity payments. This is because in case of such agreements the transaction structure takes a shift and even the concessionaire becomes a service provider, to the extent that he has constructed the infrastructure for which he has received the annuity payments from the Government / designated agencies. In that context, the annuity payments become liable to GST @ 12%. This has also been clarified by the recent CBIC Circular 150/06/2021-GST dated 7th June, 2021 wherein the Board has clarified that the said exemption will not apply to annuity paid for construction of roads. However, the said Circular apparently makes Entry 23A of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate) which exempts service by way of access to a road or a bridge on payment of annuity, irrelevant. The said exemption Entry was introduced after discussions at the GST Council meeting held on 13th October, 2017 which read as under:

‘Agenda item 13(iv): Issue of Annuity being given in Place of Toll Charges to Developers of Public Infrastructure – exemption thereon
61. Introducing this Agenda item, the Joint Secretary (TRU-II), C.B.E. & C. stated that while toll is a payment made by the users of road to concessionaires for usage of roads, annuity is an amount paid by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) to concessionaires for construction of roads in order that the concessionaire did not charge toll for access to a road or a bridge. In other words, annuity is a consideration for the service provided by concessionaires to NHAI. He stated that construction of roads was now subject to tax at the rate of 12% and due to this, there was free flow of input tax credit from EPC (Engineering, Procurement and Construction) contractor to the concessionaires and thereafter to NHAI. He stated that as a result, tax at the rate of 12% leviable on the service of road construction provided by concessionaire to NHAI would be paid partly from the input tax credit available with them. He stated that the Council may take a view for grant of exemption to annuity paid by NHAI / State Highways Construction Authority to concessionaires during construction of roads. He added that access to a road or bridge on payment of toll was already exempt from tax. The Hon’ble Minister from Haryana suggested to also cover under this provision annuity paid by State-owned Corporations. After discussion, the Council decided to treat annuity at par with toll and to exempt from tax, service by way of access to a road or bridge on payment of annuity.’

Interestingly, before the above clarification from the CBIC, the issue was dealt with by the AAAR in the case of Nagaur Mukundgarh Highways Private Limited [2019 (23) GSTL 214 (AAAR-GST)]. In this case, the AAAR held that annuity paid during the construction phase would be liable to GST under SAC 9954, while annuity paid during the O&M phase would be exempted under SAC 9967. However, the said ruling seems to be on a weak footing mainly because there is nothing in the concession agreements which states that the annuity paid post completion of work is towards the O&M phase only and not towards the construction activity. Therefore, appropriating annuity paid during the O&M phase towards the toll charges seems to be improper.

A proper clarification on this issue would certainly be forthcoming since the amounts mentioned in such contracts are generally inclusive of GST and if ultimately it is held that GST is indeed payable on the annuity component, the entire financials for the project would be impacted since it would have a 12% GST impact, of course with corresponding benefit. But it should be kept in mind that in case of long-term projects, if a position has been initially taken that the annuity was not liable for GST, corresponding ITC would not have been taken and the same would now be time-barred. Therefore, the GST credit may be available only prospectively and the benefit may not be substantial to that effect.

INPUT TAX CREDIT IMPLICATIONS
This now takes us to the next aspect of ITC. To understand the ITC-related implications, it may be important to put down the chronology of events:
• The concessionaire receives services from the Government / designated agency;
• The concessionaire undertakes the development of infrastructure activity, which entails paying GST on various inward supplies;
• The revenue is earned by collecting usage charges from the users.

It is imperative to note that in most of the cases, the infrastructure so developed is an immovable property, such as roads, airports, seaports, metro rail, etc. Therefore, the issue remains whether ITC can at all be claimed in view of section 17(5)(c)/(d) of the CGST Act, 2017 which restricts claim of ITC on account of goods or services (including works contract services) received for construction of an immovable property on own account. Of course, the said restriction applies only if the cost incurred towards the same is capitalised in the books of accounts.

This opens up an important dimension from the accounting perspective. It should be noted that the concessionaire is not the owner of the infrastructure project and therefore the amounts are not capitalised in the books of accounts as Fixed Assets, but rather treated as intangible asset / Financial Asset, which is amortised over a period of time as per the guidelines laid down by the relevant Ind AS. If one takes an aggressive view, the restriction u/s 17(5) may be circumvented and make such concessionaire eligible for ITC.

Secondly, in the case of Safari Retreats Private Limited vs. CC of GST [2019 (25) GSTL 341 (Ori)], the provisions of section 17(5)(d) have been ultra vires the provisions of the object of the Act and it has been held that ITC should be allowed on receipt of goods or services used in the construction of an immovable property which is used for providing an output service. However, it needs to be kept in mind that the Revenue appeal against this order is currently pending before the Supreme Court.

The above discussion would be relevant only in case of projects for airport / seaport where the usage charges to be collected from the users are taxable. However, in case of road projects / metro rail projects there is an exemption from tax on collection of charges and, therefore, even otherwise the claim of credit would be hit by section 17(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 and therefore ITC may not be eligible.

GST IMPLICATIONS ON OTHER GOVERNMENT PROJECTS
In case of projects not under the PPP model, where the contract is given to the infrastructure company for a fixed consideration, the GST implications would be of a different level. This is because Entry 3 of Notification No. 11/2017-CT (Rate) prescribes a lower effective GST rate of 5% / 12% on specific services. However, the said concession is subject to satisfaction of conditions such as:

To whom have the services been supplied?
The entries require that the service should be provided either to the Central Government, State Government, Union Territory, Local Authority, Government Authority or Government Entity.

What constitutes Government Authority / Government Entity has been defined in the Notification itself as under:

Government
Authority

Government
Entity

[(ix) ‘Governmental Authority’ means an
authority or a board or any other body, –

 

(i) set up by an Act of Parliament or a
State Legislature; or

 

(ii) established by any Government,

 

with 90% or more participation by way of
equity or control, to carry out any function entrusted to a Municipality
under Article 243W of the Constitution or to a Panchayat under Article 243G
of the Constitution

(x) ‘Government Entity’ means an authority
or a board or any other body including a society, trust, corporation,

 

(i) set up by an Act of Parliament or State
Legislature; or

 

(ii) established by any Government,

 

with 90% or more participation by way of
equity or control, to carry out a function entrusted by the Central
Government, State Government, Union Territory or a Local Authority.]

From the above, it is apparent that the only distinction between Government Authority and Government Entity is that the former carries out functions entrusted to any Municipality under Article 243W or a Panchayat under Article 243G, while the later carries out any function entrusted to it by the Government.

Nature of service
The next aspect that needs to be looked into is the nature of supply being made. Clauses (iii) and (vi) provide that composite supply of works contract supplied to Central Government, State Government, Union Territory, a Local Authority, a Governmental Authority or a Government Entity by way of construction, erection, commissioning, installation, completion, fitting out, repair, maintenance, renovation, or alteration of, should be considered as eligible for the lower tax rate.

The above highlighted portion is relevant. It requires that the supply should be a composite supply of works contract. This indicates that the supply has to be in relation to an immovable property, owing to the fact that the definition of the term ‘works contract’ applies specifically to immovable property under GST. This aspect was recently dealt with by the AAR in the case of Nexustar Lighting Project Private Limited [2021 (47) GSTL 272] wherein the Authority held that a contract for installation of streetlights did not qualify as a works contract and therefore benefit of lower tax rate was not available.

Service in relation to
The next aspect that needs analysis is whether or not the services are provided in relation to the following:

Under Entry 3 (iii)
(a) a historical monument, archaeological site or remains of national importance, archaeological excavation, or antiquity specified under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958);
(b) canal, dam or other irrigation works;
(c) pipeline, conduit or plant for (i) water supply, (ii) water treatment, or (iii) sewerage treatment or disposal.

Under Entry 3 (vi)
(a) a civil structure or any other original works meant predominantly for use other than for commerce, industry, or any other business or profession;
(b) a structure meant predominantly for use as (i) an educational, (ii) a clinical, or (iii) an art or cultural establishment; or
(c) a residential complex predominantly meant for self-use or the use of their employees or other persons specified in paragraph 3 of the Schedule-III of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
[Explanation. – For the purposes of this item, the term ‘business’ shall not include any activity or transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State Government or any Local Authority in which they are engaged as public authorities.]

Under Entry 3 (vii):
Composite supply of works contract involving predominantly earth work, that is constituting 75% of the value of works contract.

Care should be taken specifically while dealing with Entry 3 (vi)(a) where the interpretation of the phrase ‘for use other than for commerce, industry, or any other business or profession’ has created substantial confusion. For example, in the context of works contract services provided in relation to electricity generation plants, the AAR has on multiple occasions held that the activities carried out by electricity generating / distribution companies cannot be treated as ‘for use other than for commerce, industry, or any other business or profession’. One may refer to the recent decisions of the AAAR in the cases of R.S. Development & Constructions Private Limited [2021 (48) GSTL 162 (AAAR – Kar)], Manipal Energy & Infratech Private Limited [2020 (40) GSLT 237 (AAAR – Kar)], etc.

Entry (vii) provides for levy of GST @ 5%. However, the condition is that the service involved should be a composite supply of works contract involving predominantly earth work that is constituting 75% of the value of the works contract. While the term ‘earth work’ has not been defined under the GST law, the same was analysed by the AAAR in the case of Soma Mohite Joint Venture [2020 (041) GSTL 0667 (AAAR – GST – Mah)] wherein the Appellate Authority held that earth work includes both excavation and fortification. Therefore, so long as earth work constitutes more than 75% of the value of a works contract, the benefit of a lower tax rate should be available. However, for such benefit care should be taken to ensure that the contract specifically mentions the consideration for such activity separately. If the break-up is not available, the benefit of the lower rate may be denied.

Common condition
A common condition for Entries (iii) and (vi) when the services are provided to a Government Entity is that the said Government Entity should have procured the said services in relation to a work entrusted to it by the Central Government, State Government, Union Territory or Local Authority, as the case may be.

In Shri Hari Engineers & Contractors [2020 (38) GSTL 396 (AAR – GST – Guj)], the AAR had denied the benefit of lower tax rate for the reason that the Railtel Corporation of India Limited, which had issued the contract, was not entrusted to carry out the said activity by the Central Government / State Government / Union Territory or Local Authority.

Therefore, while concluding classification under Entry 3 (iii) or Entry 3 (vi), fulfilment of this condition should be looked into and documentary evidence to support the same should be obtained.

Extension of benefit to sub-contractors
Vide Entries 3 (ix) and 3 (x), the benefit of lower tax rate is also extended to sub-contractors who make composite supply of works contract to the main contractor. However, it is imperative to note that this benefit applies only for works contract services and not stand-alone services and the same would be liable to GST @ 18%.

Exemption
In addition to lower effective tax rate, certain services supplied to Government have been exempted vide Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate). The same is tabulated in the following Table:

Entry

Nature
of supply

Supply
relating to

Service
provided to

3

Pure services (excluding works contract
services or other composite supplies involving supply of any goods)

Any activity in relation to a function
entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G / to a Municipality under
Article 243W of the Constitution

Central Government, State Government, Union
Territory, Local Authority, a Governmental Authority or a Government Entity

3A

Composite supply of goods or services
(goods not being more than 25% of the value of the composite supply)

Any activity in relation to a function
entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G / to a Municipality under
Article 243W of the Constitution

Central Government, State Government, Union
Territory, Local Authority, a Governmental Authority or a Government Entity

What constitutes ‘pure services’ has not been defined under GST. However, by nomenclature, it seems that supply which does not have any element of supply of goods involved in it would be treated as pure service, for example, consultancy service. This view finds support from the decision of the AAR in the case of R.R. Enterprises [2021 (47) GSTL 309 (AAR – GST – Har)] wherein the Authority held that since only manpower supply services were to be provided by the applicant and since no supply of goods is involved, such services qualify as pure services.

The important aspect which needs to be looked into while dealing with exemption entries is that the services provided should be in relation to a function which has been entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W or Panchayat under Article 243G. However, the service need not be provided directly to the Municipality or Panchayat. It may be provided to the Central Government / State Government / Government Authority / Government Entity.

The only caveat is that the service should be provided in relation to an activity specified in Article 243W / Article 243G. Whether a particular activity is covered under Article 243G / 243W or not has been dealt with by the AAR on multiple occasions.

In the case of Lokenath Builders [2021 (46) GSTL 205 (AAR – GST – WB)], it was held that waste disposal services by engaging garbage-lifting vehicles and other cleaning equipment without any supply of goods would be a pure service and an activity covered under Entry 6 of the 12th Schedule and therefore eligible for exemption.

In MSV International Inc. [2021 (49) GSTL 171 (AAR – GST – Har)], while the Authority held that the services provided in relation to construction of State / district highways was a pure service, the same would still not be eligible for exemption benefit since the construction of State / district highways was not an activity entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W / Panchayat under Article 243G of the Constitution.

Similarly, the exemption benefit was denied by the AAR for services provided to National Institute of Technology, an institute of higher education, which was not covered under Article 243W / 243G of the Constitution. (Refer National Institute of Technology [2021 (47) GSTL 314 (AAR – GST – Har)].

In Janaki Suhshikshit Berojgar Nagrik Seva Sansthan Amravati [2021 (46) GSTL 277 (AAR – GST – MH)], the AAR denied the benefit of exemption to service of supply of manpower to Government Medical College. The conclusion of the Authority was that supply of manpower was not covered under either the 11th or the 12th Schedule.

In the view of the authors, the above ruling does not represent the correct position of law. Entry 6 of the 12th Schedule, public health, is the responsibility of the Municipality and therefore it is bound to make necessary arrangements to deliver the same to the citizens. Any service provided by a vendor towards the said activity can therefore be said to be in relation to a function entrusted to the Municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution and therefore eligible for exemption.

There are some other examples of service which can also be eligible for the exemption, such as:
• advertisements placed in the newspapers creating awareness by the Municipal Corporation would be eligible for exemption since activities in relation to public health awareness are among the activities entrusted to the Municipality under Article 243W;
• services provided in relation to collection of parking charges on behalf of the Municipality are covered under Entry 17 of the 12th Schedule of the Constitution and therefore should be eligible for exemption.

The above discussion clearly brings out the need to analyse the tax position of any project at the tendering stage itself. This is because in case of Government projects usually the contract value is treated as inclusive of GST and the contractor has to bill accordingly. If during the tendering process the company bids assuming eligibility for exemption / lower GST rate and ultimately it turns out that the supply was taxable at the normal rate, the implications would be catastrophic.

ARBITRATION CLAIMS
An important part of Government projects (which is also present in private transactions) are the arbitration clauses in the agreements. At times, due to contractual disputes, the parties to a contract may opt for arbitration and reconciliation and there can be flow of money (both ways) depending on the outcome of the project.

While determining taxability of arbitration claims, a detailed reading of the arbitration award is very relevant. For example, in the case of BOT arrangements discussed above, there is a clause for payment of grant to the concessionaire. If there is a delay in payment of grants, the concessionaire may seek compensation and can go for arbitration on the said issue. If the arbitration award is on account of such a dispute, it may not be taxable since the grant itself was not taxable in the first place.

However, if the arbitration award is for a contractual dispute, for example, the contractor lodges a claim of Rs. 2 crores on the client for work done, while the client approves the claim only to the extent of Rs. 1.75 crores – in such cases, the contractor has an option to resort to arbitration for the disputed amount and if the arbitration is in his favour, he would be entitled to receive the differential amount along with costs as may be granted by the arbitration award. In such a case, a more appropriate position would be to say that the differential amount received is towards a supply and therefore liable to GST.

Arbitration claims – rollover from pre-GST regime
In the case of arbitration awards, it has to be kept in mind that the outcome period of the dispute under arbitration is very long. It is possible that arbitration claims for work done during the pre-GST regime get concluded under the GST regime. This will lead to substantial challenges for the contractors for the following reasons, especially in cases where the dispute is on account of quantification of work done:
• Under the pre-GST regime, services to Government were exempted or were taxable at a substantially lower rate (post abatement). Similarly, even under the VAT regime, the applicable tax rate for works contract was on the lower side, say 5% / 8%.
• The work for the said service would have been completed under the pre-GST regime. However, it is seen that the tax on the said amount is not discharged as the claim is not approved by the client and it has been an industry practice to pay tax on such amounts only when the matter reaches finality.
• The issue that arises is whether the tax on such arbitration awards would be payable under the pre-GST laws, i.e., VAT / Service tax, or as per the provisions of the CGST / SGST Acts? The answer to this question would be relevant since under the pre-GST regime the effective tax rate would have been lower as compared to the effective GST rate which is 12% for supplies to Government.

To deal with the above situation, let us refer to section 142(11) of the CGST Act, 2017 which provides that to the extent tax was leviable under the erstwhile VAT Acts or under Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994, no tax would be leviable under the CGST Act, 2017. It is imperative to note that in case of such roll-over arbitration disputes, the work is already completed before the claim is lodged. It is mere quantification of the work which takes place upon resolution of the dispute and, therefore, it can be said that the tax was actually leviable under the VAT Acts / Finance Act, 1994 itself when the activity was actually carried out and hence a view can be taken that no GST is leviable on such arbitration awards.

Arbitration claims – in the nature of liquidated damages
The next point of discussion would be arbitration claims where the award is in the nature of liquidated damages. Liquidated damages are dealt with under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 within sections 73 and 74. Section 73 states that ‘when a contract has been broken, the aggrieved party is entitled to get compensation or any loss or damages which has been inflicted to him / her naturally during the usual course of breach of contract or about which the parties to the contract had prior knowledge when they entered the contract.’

Similarly, section 74 states that ‘when a contract has been broken, and if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid for such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for’.

Therefore, when an arbitration award is on account of breach of contractual terms, which results in grant of damages to either party, the same would not constitute consideration under the Contract Law and therefore there cannot be any liability towards GST on the same.

TDS DEDUCTION & ASSOCIATED CHALLENGES
Section 51 of the CGST Act, 2017 obligates Government / designated agencies to deduct TDS on payments made for taxable supply of goods or services, or both, received by them.

Unfortunately, as a universal rule TDS is deducted on all payments, including on grants, arbitration awards, etc., without actually analysing whether or not the said payment is towards receipt of taxable supply of goods or services, or both. This results in difficulty for the concessionaire / contractor. This is because if they would have taken a position that they have not made any supply / the supply made by them is exempt, the TDS provisions would not have got triggered. If in such cases also TDS is deducted and if they accept the same, it is likely that the Department may challenge their claim stating that their clients themselves treat the supply as taxable supply, leaving such concessionaires / contractors in a Catch-22 situation.

Of late, it has also been seen that the tax authorities have been issuing notices based on mismatch between the credits reported in GSTR7 by the tax deductors vis-a-vis the liability reported by the contractors. It is imperative to note that there will generally be a time gap between disclosure of liability by the supplier and deduction of tax by the deductor. This is because the supplier would pay the tax when he issues the invoice to the deductor-client. However, such invoice goes through the approval
process which generally consumes time and before the invoice is accounted by the deductor-client and TDS is deducted.

It is therefore advisable that before any TDS credit is claimed, the same be reconciled with the month in which the corresponding liability was discharged and, preferably, if the client has deducted TDS in advance (on provisional basis), such credit should be kept deferred and claimed only when the actual invoice is issued by the contractor and the corresponding liability discharged.

CONCLUSION
The general perception in the industry is that doing business with the Government is a profitable venture. But there are many complications and confusions which make such businesses quite risky. It is always advisable for taxpayers to be very careful while taking a position on a transaction with Government as the tax would generally have to be paid out of one’s own pocket, thus having a severe impact on the overall profitability of the venture.

DEPARTMENT AUDIT

INTRODUCTION
For long taxes in India and the world over have worked on the principle of self-assessment, meaning a registered taxpayer (RTP) would himself assess his liability and discharge the same as per the provisions applicable under the respective statute by filing the prescribed returns. Once the self-assessment process is concluded, the tax authorities initiate the process of verifying the correctness of the taxes paid by the RTP under the self-assessment scheme which involved interaction with the RTPs / their consultants.

Under the pre-GST regime, with the presence of multiple taxes, there were multiple assessments in different forms that an RTP had to undergo. The VAT law provided for a concept of assessment which was done on a year-on-year basis requiring the RTP to visit the tax department with box-loads of files to demonstrate various claims and positions taken by him, while the Central Excise / Service tax followed a detailed Audit structure, which was commonly known as EA-2000 Audit, and in respect of which a detailed manual for the tax officials on how an Audit on taxpayer records should be carried out was also issued.

Apart from these, there were provisions for investigation, special audits, etc., under the respective statutes which empowered the tax authorities to undertake further verification. The same practice has also been followed under the GST regime with the law providing for different methods of assessment such as Provisional Assessment (section 60), Scrutiny in different scenarios (sections 61 to 64), Audit by Tax Authorities (section 65), Special Audit (section 66) and investigation (section 66).

ASSESSMENT VS. SCRUTINY VS. AUDIT VS. INVESTIGATION

The term assessment has been defined u/s 2(11) to mean determination of tax liability under this Act and includes self-assessment, re-assessment, provisional assessment, summary assessment and best judgment assessment. The above definition demonstrates that while there can be different forms of assessments, their purpose is to determine the tax liability of a person, whether or not such person is registered.

But while the term ‘scrutiny’ has not been specifically defined, the way the provisions u/s 61 have been worded indicate that scrutiny is to be seen vis-à-vis the correctness of the particulars furnished in the returns. Therefore, the scope of scrutiny would generally cover cases where there is a mismatch between GSTR1 and GSTR3B or non-disclosure of certain information in the returns, etc. In other words, the basis for scrutiny proceedings should only be the returns filed and nothing else. In that sense, this is similar to intimation issued u/s 143 (1) of the Income-tax Act.

The term ‘audit’, on the other hand, has been defined u/s 2(13) to mean the examination of records, returns and other documents maintained or furnished by the registered person under this Act or the rules made thereunder or under any other law for the time being in force to verify the correctness of turnover declared, taxes paid, refund claimed and input tax credit availed, and to assess his compliance with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder.

Lastly, the term investigation, which generally encompasses ‘inspection, search, seizure and arrest’, is undertaken by the tax authorities when they have reason to suspect suppression by an RTP whether of liability on supply of goods / services or claim of input tax credit. Any proceedings under this category can be initiated only after approval by the competent authority and empowers the tax authorities to confiscate the records of the RTP.

A plain reading of the above clearly indicates the distinction in the concept behind each of the steps and the very distinction needs to be respected. The same can be summarised as under:

•    Assessment – determination of tax liability,
•    Scrutiny – to verify the correctness of the returns filed,
•    Audit – to verify the overall compliance with the provisions of GST, including returns filed, credits / refunds claimed, etc.,
•    Investigation – to undertake verification based on specific information received relating to suppression by an RTP– either in respect of liability or input tax credit.
A primary question which generally arises and is also experienced in daily proceedings is whether there can be parallel proceedings. For example, can scrutiny of an RTP be undertaken when the audit for the same period is already going on? Or can an RTP be subjected to parallel proceedings – audit by one wing and investigation by another? In a recent decision in the case of Suresh Kumar PP vs. Dy. DGGI, Thiruvananthapuram [2020 (41) GSTL 308 (Ker.)], the single-member Bench had refused to intervene when parallel proceedings, audit u/s 65 and investigation were initiated. In fact, the HC held that interferences in process issued for auditing of books as well as order of seizure of the documents would help the Department in correlating the entries in document and at the time of auditing of the account.

When appealed before the Division Bench [reported in 2020 (41) GSTL 17 (Ker.)], while the High Court held that there was no infirmity in the audit and investigation proceedings being continued simultaneously, the Revenue itself submitted that once the investigation proceedings are initiated, the audit proceedings shall stand vacated. This is an important takeaway from this judgment (although in favour of Revenue) for RTPs who are facing parallel proceedings at the same time for the same period. The RTP can always contend that since the Department has taken a stand in one case that once investigation commences audit proceedings shall be discontinued, the same should be followed in other cases as well. However, it remains to be seen whether or not the Revenue follows this stand in all the cases.

In this background, we shall now discuss the provisions relating to audit u/s 65 for which many RTPs have already started receiving notices and some important aspects which revolve around the same.

SCOPE OF AUDIT

The term ‘audit’ has been defined u/s 2(13) and reproduced above. On going through the same, it is apparent that the scope of audit is to be restricted to ‘examination of records, returns and other documents maintained or furnished by the registered person’.

While the term ‘record’ has not been defined, the term ‘document’ has been defined u/s 2(41) to include written or printed record of any sort and electronic record as defined in clause (t) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000). Section 145 further provides that any document, which is maintained in a microfilm or reproduced as image embodied in a microfilm or a facsimile copy of a document or statement contained in a document and included in printed material produced by a computer or any information stored electronically in any device or media including hard copies made of such information, shall be deemed to be a document for the purposes of this Act. It is, therefore apparent that all documents which are stored in a scanned copy should be sufficient during the audit purpose. This should apply also for copies of purchase invoices, sales invoices, etc., which, during the audit, tax authorities generally insist upon for physical verification.

The second important takeaway from the definition of ‘audit’ which to some extent also defines the scope of ‘audit’, is that the examination is to be of the documents maintained or furnished by the registered person, i.e., things which are within the reach of the RTP being audited. Therefore, what can be the subject matter of audit is only such documents / records which are maintained / furnished by the RTP and are within his control. Therefore, the audit team cannot insist on a reconciliation based on figures appearing in form 26AS and demand tax on the mismatch since the form 26AS is not maintained / furnished by the RTP, but prepared by the Government based on disclosures made by the RTPs’ clients / suppliers. This view finds support from the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Sharma Fabricators & Erectors Private Limited vs. CCE, Allahabad [2017 (5) GSTL 96 (Tri. All.)] where the Tribunal had set aside the demand raised based on TDS certificates issued by the clients and not the books of accounts of the RTP.

A similar issue is likely to arise in case of mismatch between GSTR3B and GSTR2A. GSTR3B is the monthly return wherein an RTP also lodges a claim for input tax credit while GSTR2A is the document wherein the supplies disclosed by the supplier in GSTR1 are disclosed and auto-populated and made available to the recipient. A strong view can be taken that GSTR3B and GSTR2A are not comparable documents as GSTR2A is not maintained / furnished by the recipient. However, such a stand may not be accepted by the Department after the introduction of Rule 36(4) as the scope of audit is to look at the overall correctness of the returns furnished by the RTP and compliance with the various provisions of the Act and Rules framed therein.

In fact, on the issue of whether an audit can be conducted when there is apprehension that certain amounts were kept outside of the accounts, the Supreme Court has, while admitting the appeal in the case of Commissioner vs. Ranka Wires Private Limited [2006 (197) ELT A83 (SC)], sought an affidavit from the Revenue as to why the audit was conducted when the show cause notice alleged that certain amounts were kept out of the accounts. This indicates that even the Supreme Court is of the view that in a case where the dispute revolves around transactions outside the books of accounts of the RTP, the same is a fit case for investigation and not audit.

LEGAL VALIDITY

Under the Service Tax regime, the power to conduct audit was derived from Rule 5A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. However, there were no enabling powers under the Finance Act, 1994 empowering the Central Government to frame rules relating to Department Audit. For this reason, the Delhi High Court has, in the case of Mega Cabs Private Limited vs. UoI [2016 (43) STR 67 (Del. HC)] held Rule 5A as ultra vires the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994. This dispute continued even after the introduction of GST where the notice for conducting audits was challenged on the grounds that the savings clause under the CGST Act, 2017 did not save the right of the Revenue to conduct audit u/r 5A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. There have been conflicting decisions of the High Courts in this regard and therefore the dispute will reach finality only with a judgment of the Apex Court.

However, the above decision may not continue to apply under GST. The basis for the conclusion in the case of Mega Cabs (Supra) was that there was no enabling provision under the Finance Act, 1994 which empowered the Central Government to make Rules relating to audit. However, under the GST regime there are specific provisions which empower the Government to undertake Department Audit and frame rules in regard to the same.

AUDIT U/S 65 – PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
The detailed procedure to be followed while conducting audit has been provided for u/s 65 of the CGST Act, 2017. In addition, the CBIC has also issued a detailed Manual for steps to be followed before, during and after the audit.

Selection of registered person for audit

This is the first step of the audit process. This requires following of the risk-assessment method for selection of the RTP who shall undergo audit. The entire process would be facilitated based on the available registered person-wise data, the availability of which would be ensured by the Audit Commissionerate. Based on the process of risk assessment undertaken, the list of RTPs selected for the audit would be shared with the Audit Commissionerate, along with the risk indicators, i.e., area of focus for the Audit Team. The Audit Commissionerate would also be at liberty to select RTPs at random for undertaking of audit based on local risk perception in each category of small, medium and large units as well as those registered u/s 51 and 52 to verify compliance thereof.

The Manual also speaks of accrediting such RTPs, who have a proven track record of compliance with tax laws, though the procedure for such accreditation is yet to be provided. RTPs who have received accreditation shall not be subjected to audit up to three years after the date of the last audit.

Authorisation for conducting audit

The first formal step after selection of the RTP liable to be audited is authorisation u/s 65(1) to conduct the said audit, either by the Commissioner or any officer authorised by a general or specific order. U/r 101 it has been provided that the period of audit shall be a financial year or part thereof, or multiples thereof. This is the enabling provision for initiating the audit process and unless a valid authorisation has been obtained, the entire proceedings would be treated as null and void.

One may refer to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Devilog Systems India vs. Collector of Customs, Bangalore [1995 (76) ELT 520 (Kar.)] where a notice not issued by a ‘proper officer’ was held to be invalid. On the other hand, recently the Delhi High Court has, in the case of RCI Industries & Technologies Limited vs. Commissioner, DGST [2021-VIL-31-Del.], held that if an officer of the Central GST initiates intelligence-based enforcement action against an RTP administratively assigned to a State GST, the officers of the former would not transfer the said case to their counterparts in the latter Department and they would themselves take the case to its logical conclusion.

A question might arise as to whether or not the auditee should be given an opportunity of being heard before his name is selected for the purpose of conducting audit u/s 65(1). This aspect has been dealt with by the High Court in the case of Paharpur Cooling Towers Limited vs. Senior Joint Commissioner [2017 (7) GSTL 282 (Cal.)] wherein, in the context of VAT, the Court held that subjecting an assessee to audit does not result in adverse civil consequence and therefore the question of giving a hearing before selection does not arise.

However, while selecting an RTP for special audit, the Delhi High Court has held in the case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. [2017 (52) STR 116 (Del.)] that since an order for special audit is likely to cause prejudice, hardship and displacement to the assessee, the requirement of issuance of a show cause notice ought to be read into section 58A of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 so as to grant reasonable opportunity for representation.

Pre-Audit preparation

This is where the actual audit process concerning an RTP commences. The first step is to prepare the Registered Person Master Profile (RPMF) which contains details that can be extracted from the Registration Certificate, such as application for registration, registration documents and returns filed by the registered person as well as from his annual return, E-way Bills, reports / returns submitted to regulatory authorities or other agencies, Income-tax returns, contracts with his clients, audit reports of earlier periods as well as audits conducted by other agencies, like office of the C&AG, etc., most of which will be available in the GSTN.

The Manual speaks about a utility ‘RTPs at a Glance’ made available to the Audit Team which would contain a comprehensive data base about an RTP. It appears primarily to be a facility exclusively for the Audit Team and not for the auditee. The Manual also requires that before the start of each audit the RPMF should be updated based on the details available or sourced from the auditee and the same should be updated periodically after completion of audit. Various documents gathered during the audit, such as audit working papers, audit report duly approved during Monitoring Meeting, etc., along with the latest documents should also form part of the RPMF.

AUTHORS’ VIEWS

The Audit Manual speaks about RPMF which needs to be collated and updated by the Jurisdictional Audit Commissionerate. This is a novel concept aimed at improving the quality of the process and would also help the Audit Team become aware about the auditee. However, maintenance of records in the specified format prescribed in the Audit Manual is not something new but one that was also used during the EA 2000 Audit. Past experience indicates that the Audit Teams generally shift the onus to compile and collect the basic details which is cast on them on to the auditees and such an exercise is started only when the audit nears completion and the file is to be put before the monitoring committee for review.

In fact, in the notices currently received it is seen that even the RPMF is being sent to the auditee for submission along with intimation in Form GST ADT 01 and the list of documents required for the audit. Therefore, perhaps to this extent, the process laid down by the Manual appears to have failed to achieve the stated objective. This is because only after the profiling activity is undertaken is the audit allocated to the audit parties.

Audit intimation

The next step, after undertaking profiling of the RTP / auditee, is to allocate the audit to the audit parties. The audit parties are expected to issue intimation in Form GST ADT 01 giving the auditee at least 15 days to provide the details required for the audit as provided for u/s 65(3). An indicative list of information to be requisitioned by the audit party has been provided in Annexure III of the Audit Manual.

Section 65 clearly requires that a general / specific order be issued by the Commissioner / an officer authorised by him stating that the RTP has been selected for Department Audit for the period specified therein. Such a list has already been released by the Maharashtra State authorities where the audit will be conducted by the respective State Audit Team. Any RTP receiving intimation for audit should check:

•    Whether the notice has been received from his jurisdiction, i.e., an RTP allotted to State cannot be audited by Central authorities and vice versa;
•    The second point to check is whether the general order specifically mentions the RTP. If not, a request for a specific order should be made in writing to the Audit Team as absence of the same would render the entire proceedings being without the authority of law and any proceedings emanating from such an exercise might not survive the test of law.

Vide Explanation to section 65, it has been clarified that the term ‘commencement of audit’ shall be the date on which the records and other documents called for by the tax authorities are made available by the registered person, or the actual institution of audit at the place of business, whichever is later. This is important because section 65 provides that once the audit process commences, the same must be concluded within three months which period can be extended by the Commissioner for a further period of up to six months for reasons to be recorded in writing.

It is therefore of utmost importance that the RTP under audit maintain proper communication regarding submission of documents and once all the documents sought by the Audit Team are submitted, a formal letter intimating them about the same should be filed. This is important because under the service tax regime, while dealing with the issue of what constitutes commencement of audit, the Tribunal has in the case of Surya Enterprises vs. CCE & ST, Chennai II [2020 (37) GSTL 320 (Tri. Che.)] held that mere issuance of a letter requesting for submission of documents could not be considered as initiation of audit. The Department had to demonstrate that the audit was commenced by producing its register of audit visit.

Desk Review

On the basis of the response of the auditee, the Audit Party is expected to undertake a Desk Review to understand the operations, business practice and identify potential audit issues. The Desk Review proposed in the Manual is an exhaustive process to be undertaken by the Audit Party for the preparation of the audit plan, which includes:
•    Referring to RPMF which would throw up various points meriting inclusion in the audit plan;
•    Analysis of exports turnover, turnover of non-taxable / exempted goods and service to obtain a clear picture of the transactions not considered for tax payment and arrive at a prima facie opinion on the correctness of such claims;
•    Determine the various mismatches, such as GSTR1 vs. GSTR3B, credits as per 3B vs. 2A, etc., which should be discussed in the Audit Plan for verification at the time of audit;
•    Undertake ratio analysis, trend analysis and revenue risk analysis based on the documents obtained up to that stage and reconciling the same with the Third Party Information, such as Form 26AS, ITR, etc., and analysing the variances;
•    Prepare a checklist (different checklists have been prescribed for traders and composite dealers)

Audit plan

The next activity is to prepare the audit plan based on the above activities undertaken by the Audit Team. The Manual specifically highlights the importance of the Audit Plan and the steps preceding its preparation. It also specifies the preferable format in which the Audit Plan is to be prepared and requires that the same should be discussed with the Assistant / Deputy Commissioner and finalised after approval of the Commissioner / Joint or Additional / Deputy or Assistant, as the case may be.

Audit verification

The next step is to undertake audit verification. Section 65(2) provides that the audit ‘may’ be conducted at the POB of the RTP or in their office. The purpose of audit verification, as per the Manual, is to perform verification activities and obtain audit evidence by undertaking verification of data / documents submitted at the time of desk review and verification of points mentioned in the Audit Plan.

The primary activity to be carried out during Audit Verification is evaluation of internal controls which has been dealt with extensively in the Manual as it lays down different techniques to be followed for this process, including walk-through, ABC analysis, etc., and requires the various findings to be recorded in the working papers, the formats of which have also been specified in Annexure VIII of the Manual.

Additionally, the auditor is also required to undertake verification of all the points mentioned in the Audit Plan. The primary point to verify is whether any weakness in internal control of the auditee has resulted in loss of revenue to the Government. The Audit Team is also expected to verify various documents submitted to Government Departments which can be used for cross-verification of information filed for the assessment of GST.

Audit observations
The next step as per the Manual is to communicate the various audit observations to the auditee and obtain his feedback on the same. The Manual categorically states that an audit observation is not a show cause notice but only an exercise for understanding the perspective of the auditee on a particular issue and clearly states that wherever a suitable reply is provided by the auditee, the same may be removed from the findings and excluded from the draft audit report after approval of the seniors.

However, the Manual further states that where the response of the auditee is not forthcoming, the observation should be included in the draft audit para specifically stating the non-submission of response by the auditee.

This is an important step in the Manual. Even under the EA 2000 Audit it has been seen that whenever an observation letter is shared with the auditee, it is more in the nature of a show cause notice, rather than seeking the viewpoint of the auditee on a particular issue and in the observation para itself there is a statement saying that the payment of the tax amount, along with interest and penalty, be made and compliance be reported to the Audit Team. This contrasts with the purpose of the concept of communication of observation as it takes the shape of a recovery notice rather than a routine communication.

Unless the Audit Team is sensitised about this aspect, the Audit Manual will lose its purpose as it is unlikely the approach of the Audit Team would change even after issuance of this Manual. It has also been seen that the Team expects a reply to the observation para, at times in one to two days. The Audit Team needs to be sensitised to the fact that the auditee resources must also carry out their regular activity and they can, at no point of time, be fully dedicated only to the Department Audit process. Even otherwise, certain observation paras may involve legal issues that may need more time, including the auditee obtaining legal advice for drafting a reply to the same in which case a reply at such a short notice may not be feasible. Therefore, it is essential that a standardised format for sharing of audit observation and sufficient time to the auditee for replying to the same be prescribed.

Preparation of audit report

Once the above exercise is concluded, the Audit Team is expected to prepare a draft audit report for onward submission to senior officers and should be placed before the Monitoring Cell Meeting (MCM) for discussion on various points raised therein. It is during the MCM that the decisions of issuing notices, including invocation of extended period of limitations, are taken or issuance of a show cause notice can be waived.

Based on the decisions taken during the MCM, a Final Audit Report (FAR) has to be prepared which will also be conveyed to the auditee. Section 65(6) provides that on conclusion the ‘Proper Officer’ shall within 30 days inform the auditee about the findings, the reasons for such findings and his rights and obligations. The same shall be intimated in form GST ADT 02 as notified vide Rule 101(5). It is only after the issuance of the final audit report u/s 65(6) that recovery proceedings u/s 73 or 74 can be initiated.

It is imperative to note that generally the recovery proceedings are initiated before the issuance of the FAR. At the time of receipt of a show cause notice, the auditee needs to ensure whether the same is received prior to the issuance and receipt of the FAR or afterwards. It is imperative to note that even under the pre-GST regime, (recently) in Sheelpa Enterprises Private Limited vs. Union of India [2019 (367) ELT A17 (Guj.)] the High Court has admitted a writ petition challenging the validity of a show cause notice issued prior to the issuance of the FAR.

The Final Audit Report shall comprise of the decision taken on the audit paras, including cases where the show cause notice is issued / to be issued and cases where a decision to not initiate proceedings has been taken.

Respecting timelines

Section 65, Rule 101 of the CGST Rules, 2017 and the Audit Manual issued by the CBIC strongly reiterate the importance of adhering to timelines, both for initiation of audit as well as conclusion. The fact that this aspect has been specifically included in the statute demonstrates the intention of the Legislature to ensure timely compliance of the proceedings. This is a positive aspect because under the EA 2000 there were no strict timelines prescribed, but rather only guidelines which meant that the EA 2000 audit in many cases kept going on for a long stretch of time.

While this is a positive move on the part of the Legislature to include the timelines in the statute itself, it will also cast an onerous responsibility on the auditees to ensure that they have submitted all the information sought by the Audit Team within the prescribed time. Besides, proper documentation and acknowledgement of submission of documents would also be important since it is possible that the Audit Team might dispute the date of ‘commencement of audit’ itself citing receipt of incomplete data. It is therefore advisable that the fact of non-availability of certain details (for instance, state-wise trial balance) be intimated to the Audit Team at the initial stage itself.

The RTP should also note that in case of delay in submission, there might be adverse action taken on account of non-submission. For example, if an RTP has claimed certain exemption and the supporting documents for which are not submitted within the timelines prescribed by the Audit Team, it is possible that they may end up with an observation letter which would result in unnecessary initiation of a protracted litigation since the experience suggests that an observation para generally culminates in issuance of a show cause notice.

Therefore it is imperative that an RTP who has already received audit notice or is likely to receive one, prepares basic documentation which can be shared immediately with the Audit Team as and when asked, such as state-wise trial balances, details of exports along with FIRC details, basis for claim of exemption, reconciliation of earnings / expenditure in foreign currency with GST filings, etc. Perhaps a lot of the information sought by the Audit Team is generally required during the audit u/s 35. It would therefore be prudent that the RTP / consultants prepare the supporting file during the audit u/s 35 itself so that not only is there no duplication of work, but they also become aware of any specific issues.

An assessee, who was also registered under service tax, will agree that a lot of litigations under that tax were on account of non-submission of the above information. Of course, the Courts have time and again held that demand cannot be based merely on account of a difference in two figures and should be supported with proper evidence. One may refer to the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Go Bindas Entertainment Private Limited vs. CST, Noida [2019 (27) GSTL 397 (Tri. All.)].

Other points to note

An audit process involves substantial human element and therefore needs to be handled carefully on all fronts, be it sharing of information or interacting with the Audit Team owing to the subjectiveness of the auditor. The auditee / their consultants must bear this aspect in mind while interacting. It is important that at no point of time should they antagonise the Audit Team. This is important because if such a situation arises, it is likely that the Audit Team might raise meritless observations which would culminate in the issuance of show cause notices and the initiation of unnecessary protracted litigations.

One important aspect which needs to be noted by the readers, although out of context but arising from the Department Audit process, is that whenever a notice is issued by the Audit Team it is generally issued invoking the extended period of limitation alleging fraud, wilful misstatement, etc., with the intention to evade payment of tax. Such audit notices generally allege that ‘had the audit not been conducted, the fact of the said contravention, which can be either non-payment of tax / excess claim of input tax credit and so on, would have gone unnoticed’. It is imperative to note that merely making such a statement is not sufficient for invocation of extended period of limitation. There must be some demonstration that there prevailed an intention to evade payment of tax and the allegation of fraud, wilful misstatement, etc., should be demonstrated with supporting documentation by the Audit Team. The Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal has, in the case of Popular Caterers vs. Commissioner, CGST, Mumbai West [2019 (27) GSTL 545 (Tri. Mum.)], held that suppression can’t be alleged merely because the Audit Team found certain credits inadmissible.

The High Court has, in the case of Haiko Logistics Private Limited vs. UoI [2017 (6) GSTL 235 (Del.)] raised serious questions on the act of seizure of documents undertaken during the audit process.

Similarly, no summons can be issued in pursuance of the audit process. The Tribunal in the case of Manak Textiles vs. Collector of Central Excise [1989 (42) ELT 593 (Tri. Del.)] held that a statement made to an audit party is not valid as the Audit Party has no authority to record any statement. This principle should apply under GST also as audit is conducted u/s 65 while powers to record statements are governed u/s 70.

CONCLUSION

While the Audit Manual indicates the intention of the CBIC to make the entire process smooth and systematic, it remains to be seen how the same is implemented. Past experience shows that the Department Audit is generally an exhausting process resulting in unwarranted litigation, which in India is protracted and costly. It is therefore important that the RTP prepare for audit on an annual basis, irrespective of whether a notice for the same is received or not, and keep the documentation ready to the extent possible.  

TRANSITIONAL CREDIT TUSSLE

India’s
policy-makers introduced the GST law with the objective of removing the
cascading effect of taxes and replacing it with a single value-added tax across
the country. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Constitutional (One
Hundred and Twenty Second Amendment) Bill, 2014 and the memorandum introducing
the GST Bill(s) had as their objective a seamless transfer of Input Tax Credit
along the value chain of a product and consequently to reduce the cost of
production and inflation in the economy.

 

Effective
1st July, 2017, the key compliance for a taxpayer was to prepare and
file his Transition Forms (in Form Tran-1 and / or Tran-2).The transition
credit became a critical entry step for taxpayers to avail the benefit of GST
and commence their journey into an idealistic value-added tax system. Many
large enterprises had blocked their working capital in such taxes and were
seeking early utilisation of their credit against their output taxes. Despite
the lack of robust legal and technical support from the regulatory authorities,
most business houses succeeded with the advice of tax practitioners, but there
was a set of businesses (a small percentage of the total GST registrations) who
struggled to perform their transition obligations. The eligibility or
ineligibility of transition credit is not the subject of discussion of this
article – and nobody denies a rightful claimant this transition credit; what is
under debate is the strict time limit imposed by the Revenue authorities in
complying with the transition credit formalities.

 

A
significant number of taxpayers failed to exercise their transitional credit
rights. The reasons were varied and we may categorise the taxpayers into broad
categories of those (a) unaware of the entitlement of transition credit (MSMEs,
rural and semi-urban entities, etc.); (b) aware but clueless about filling up
the transition forms due to lack of appropriate advisers and regulatory
support; (c) facing technical challenges (at their end or at the GSTN portal
end); and (d) those who genuinely missed the bus due to multiple extensions,
the peculiar due date of 27th December, 2017 and so on.

 

Thus,
taxpayers are in a tussle before the Courts to resolve this deadlock where they
are pleading for condonation but the Revenue is contending that 180 days was
sufficient time and no leniency is to be given to taxpayers on this subject.
Revenue also claims that the plea of technical difficulties is a mere alibi and
the sole proof of a genuine attempt to file a transition is the GSTN system log
and nothing else.

 

BACKGROUND TO TRANSITION COMPLIANCE

Section
140 provided for the claim of transition credit under multiple scenarios.
Unlike the time limits prescribed for availing GST Input Tax Credit (ITC) u/s
16, there was a clear absence of any time limit under the primary enactment.
Rule 117 of the CGST Rules notified that the declaration ought to be filed
electronically within 90 days from the appointed date. The
proviso provided for an extension by the
Commissioner by another 90 days based on the recommendations of the GST
Council. Accordingly, the initial time limit stood at 28th September,
2017 which was subsequently extended by Order Nos. 3/2017, 7/2017 and 9/2017 to
31st October, 30th November and finally to 27th
December, 2017. In fact, 27th December, 2017 was the last
permissible date for extension of filing Tran-1 under Rule 117 of the CGST
Rules. The said orders were issued by the Commissioner of GST in terms of
powers exercised under Rule 117 read with section 168 of the CGST Act. The
transition forms were disabled on the GSTN portal immediately after (on 28th
December, 2017) and hence taxpayers who could not file their returns were
not permitted to make any electronic submission of their transition data.

 

Apart from
the taxpayers in general, to give effect to Court directions (discussed later),
Rule 117(1A) was introduced which provided case-specific extensions to taxpayers
who proved their
bona fides of facing
technical difficulties. The overall time limit of Rule 117(1A) was frequently
extended until 31st March, 2020 and effectively stood extended up to
31st August, 2020 (under the general Covid Notifications).

 

BONE OF CONTENTION

The
primary grievance of taxpayers on the legal front was that the time limit
specified in Rule 117 was beyond the powers delegated to the Central Government
u/s 140 of the CGST Act. The section provided for prescription of rules for the
limited purpose of defining the manner or form in which the declaration u/s 140
was to be made by the taxpayers. The section did not delegate the powers of
fixing or extending time limits for filing the Transition declaration. Revenue,
on the other hand, considered section 164 as empowering them to make rules for
any purpose of the Act. The matter was challenged in multiple High Courts and
contrary rulings have been delivered (discussed later). Revenue authorities
quickly recognised the deficiency in the provisions of section 140 and
introduced a retrospective amendment
vide
Finance Act, 2020 empowering the Central Government to validate the time limits
specified in Rule 117. Interestingly, the amendment was brought in to validate
a time limit which had already expired / lost its utility and is certainly
questionable before the Courts.

 

The other
grievance of taxpayers was that the multiple extensions were on account of a
lack of readiness of the GST portal and sufficient time was not provided for
filing the Transition returns. Those taxpayers who had the available data were
facing technical difficulties either with the web portal or the Transition
form. Revenue acknowledged that taxpayers faced technical difficulties and
quickly formed an IT Grievance Redressal Committee (ITGRC) on the directions of
the High Courts of Allahabad and Bombay.

 

Revenue
issued Circular No. 39/13/2018-GST dated 3rd April, 2018 setting up
a committee on the basis of the approval granted by the GST Council
vide its 26th  meeting held on 10th March,
2018. The Circular defined a very narrow entry point to approach the ITGRC,
i.e.,

  •    Where
    the taxpayer has made a
    bona fide
    attempt to file the Tran return and recorded by the system logs maintained by
    GSTN;
  •    No
    amendment is permissible to the data already available in the GSTN servers and
    ITGRC cannot be used as a forum to revise Transition claim data;
  •    Field
    formations were directed to verify the data and collection of information at
    the time of seeking special permission to open the GSTN portal;
  •    ITGRC
    would approve the opening of the GST portal for the specified taxpayers who met
    the criteria set forth by the ITGRC and established technical difficulties
    conclusively.

 

Seeing
this ray of hope, many taxpayers approached the ITGRC with their grievances and
sought filing of the Tran returns. But much to their disappointed, many
taxpayers failed to meet the stringent criteria set forth by the ITGRC and once
again knocked at the door of the Courts for justice. The following applications
were rejected by the ITGRC:

  •    Lack
    of digital evidence like screenshots, help-desk correspondence, etc.;
  •    Unawareness
    about the due date;
  •    Lack
    of knowledge of computer systems;
  •    Mistakes
    committed while filing online; and
  •    Ignorance
    with the hope that the due date would be extended,
    etc.

 

The tussle
regarding Transition credit is now before several Courts and case-specific
decisions are being delivered on this front to resolve the issue. The decisions
would be clubbed based on the similarities of the issues and the decision
rendered.

 

DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE COURT

Type 1
decisions:
Recognised that transition credit is a
vested right and procedural lapses cannot submerge this right.

In Siddharth Enterprises (2019) (9) TMI 319,
the Gujarat High Court was examining a matter where the taxpayer did not file
the transition return due to technical challenges and challenged the time limit
provisions under Rule 117 as being
ultra vires
the statute. The taxpayer argued that the intention of the Government is not to
collect tax twice on the same goods; section 140(3) grants a substantive right
which cannot be curtailed by procedural lapses; right accrued / vested under
the existing law and is saved under GST; right of credit is a constitutional
right; doctrine of legitimate expectation is applicable to such credit. The
Court laid down a very elaborate order and affirmed that credit is due to the
taxpayer in terms of section 140. The key findings of the Court were as
follows:

  •    Credit
    legally accrued under the erstwhile laws is a vested right and cannot be taken
    away by virtue of Rule 117 with retrospective effect on failure to file the
    Transition form. The provision of credit is as good as tax paid and such right
    cannot be offended on failure to file the form;
  •    The
    denial of transition credit is against the policy of avoiding the cascading
    effect of taxes which has been explicitly set out in the Statement of Objects
    and Reasons of the Constitutional Amendment bill;
  •    Section
    16 grants time until September, 2018 to claim the ITC while the transition
    credit has been limited until 27th December, 2017 which is
    discriminatory and without any rationale;
  •    The
    doctrine of legitimate expectation mandates that a person would have a
    legitimate expectation to be treated by any administrative authority in a
    particular manner based on the representations or promises made by such
    authority. The vested right of ITC cannot be withdrawn after compliance of
    conditions under the erstwhile laws;
  •    Input
    Tax Credit is a property right in terms of Article 300A and cannot be denied on
    procedural lapses.

 

These
views were subsequently adopted in
Heritage
Lifestyles & Developers Private Limited (2020) (11) TMI 236
wherein
the coordinate bench of the Bombay High Court observed the divergent decision
of
NELCO (discussed below) and yet held
that the substantive right of credit cannot be denied on procedural grounds and
technicalities cannot hinder substantial justice.

 

Type 2
decisions:
Input Tax Credit is a concession and not
a right and hence prescription under rule 117 is valid law which mandates
strict compliance.

In NELCO Ltd. (2020) (3) TMI 1087, the
Bombay High Court examined the challenge to the time limit under Rule 117. The
taxpayer had attempted filing the Transition return, submitted their browsing
history and communicated their grievance via email multiple times but failed to
receive a suitable response. The line of argument adopted in this case was more
on the
vires of Rule 117 and the phrase
‘technical difficulties’ in 117(1A). The taxpayer contended that the said
phrase would refer to difficulties both at the taxpayer’s end as well as the
GSTN end. Revenue contended that presumption of legality of law and subordinate
legislation cannot be negated until it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Section
164(2) has granted a general rule-making authority to the Government for the
implementation of the Act which includes, amongst others, the right to specify
the time limit for filing of transition declarations. The Court finally upheld
Revenue’s contentions as follows:

 

  •    Section
    164 grants rule-making powers of the widest amplitude and is sufficient to
    validate Rule 117. It does not rule contrary to the parent enactment. Once the
    rule is held to be valid, the time limit prescribed therein
    operates strictly;
  •    Rule
    117(1A) has been inserted to address genuine technical difficulties and
    provides for a uniform and technically capable criterion for ascertaining the
    claim and the taxpayer should follow this process;
  •    Input
    Tax Credit being a concession should be utilised in a time-bound manner;
  •    ‘Technical
    difficulty’ should be understood as those at the GSTN server-end and not
    elsewhere. When multiple taxpayers succeeded in filing the form, there was no
    reason for citing technical reasons for non-filing. The system log is an
    unquestionable criterion for ascertaining the genuineness of the claim of
    technical difficulty and the absence of such a criterion may make the
    examination subjective.

 

These
views were subsequently followed in
P.R.
Mani Electronics (2020) (7) TMI 443.

 

Type 3
decisions:
Recognised technical glitches at the
taxpayer’s end and granted a time limit of three years from introduction of GST
to claim the transition credit.

In Brand Equity (2020) (7) TMI 443 which
included many other matters as a batch, the claim of transition credit could
not be complied with due to various reasons (such as a genuine lapse, system
error, preoccupation, etc.). In such cases, taxpayers admittedly did not have
any evidence of a GSTN error and Courts were examining the cases on meritorious
grounds rather than technical grounds. Taxpayers argued that GST being a new
levy suffering from technical glitches, the procedures should be applied
liberally. The Courts observed as follows:

 

  •    Evidently,
    the GSTN portal was riddled with shortcomings and inadequacies. The online
    portal should be able to perform all functions of the law with all
    flexibilities / options. The Government cannot be insensitive to the
    difficulties faced by trade;
  •    Credit
    duly accumulated under the erstwhile laws are vested rights and in the absence
    of a mechanism to claim refund under the said laws, taxpayers rightly entitled
    to migrate this credit into GST;
  •    There
    is nothing sacrosanct in the time limit of 90 days since it has been extended
    multiple times on account of an inefficient network. The Act does not specify a
    strict time limit for claiming the transition credit;
  •    The
    classification of extending the time limit to specified taxpayers faced
    challenges at the GSTN and not extending to taxpayers in general is arbitrary
    without reasonable basis;
  •    Government
    cannot adopt different standards for itself and for the taxpayers when both
    were facing technical issues at their respective ends;
  •    Taxpayers
    cannot be robbed of their vested rights within 90 days when civil laws grant
    the right for three years;
  •  Rule 117 is directory and cannot
    take away a substantive right. The phrase ‘in the manner prescribed’ can be
    prescription of the form and the content but not the time limit;
  •    But
    it is also not permissible to claim this transition credit as being a perpetual
    right and as a guiding principle subject to the civil law limitation of three
    years. Accordingly, all transition credit claims until June, 2020 would be
    valid in law. Government has been directed to open the portal in order to
    implement this decision.

 

The said
decision was a breakthrough for the taxpayers struggling to seek admittance of
their transition credit claims. The decision cut across all arguments of
technicalities, etc., and addresses the root point that vested rights ought to
be granted and time limit cannot be a garb for denial of such rights.

 

Type 4
decisions:
Recognised that GSTN
had technical difficulties and taxpayers ought to be granted an opportunity to
file the transition returns.

In Tara Exports (2020) (7) TMI 443, the
taxpayer pleaded that there was an attempt to file the Tran-1 online but faced
technical difficulties due to which a manual Tran-1 was filed within one month
of the expiry of the due date. It was contended that GST is in a ‘trial and
error phase’ and inefficiencies of the system cannot debar the claim of credit.
Other arguments on vested right and procedural lapses were also adopted. The
Court recognised that GST was a progressive levy with several technical
glitches in the early stages. Credit which was legitimately accrued to the
taxpayers ought not to be denied on such grounds. Filing of transition return
was procedural in nature and the substantive right of credit should prevail
over procedural lapses. The Court held that since genuine efforts were made by
the taxpayer and evident from records, Revenue was directed to allow the
transition credit. These views were echoed in multiple decisions that followed.

Type 5
decisions:
Recognised that GSTN
was underprepared and taxpayers need not submit proof of technical
difficulties.

In Garuda Packaging Pvt. Ltd. (2019) (10) TMI 556 and Kun United Motors Pvt. Ltd. (2020) (9) TMI 251,
the taxpayers made an attempt to file the return online but faced portal
challenges. The taxpayers filed a letter one year later about their inability
to file Tran-1 but the application was rejected by the ITGRC on the ground that
no such record was available. The taxpayers submitted letters of the details of
eligible credit since they were unable to file the transition form and made
multiple personal visits to the range offices. The High Court held that
non-filing of screenshots cannot be a ground to reject the plea of technical
difficulties. The GST system being still in a trial and error phase, it will be
too much of a burden to expect the taxpayer to comply with the requirements of
the law where they are unable to even connect to the system on account of
network failures or other failures. The Court finally directed the Revenue to
re-open the portal and enable filing of the Tran-1 return. These views were
relied upon in several decisions which followed later.

 

POSITION OF THE TAXPAYER

The taxpayer is now in a slightly tricky position with divergent views
from multiple High Courts across the nation. The Bombay High Court in
NELCO applies the time limitation very strictly and denies credit to
non-vigilant taxpayers but also agrees that taxpayers who have evidence to
substantiate the technical difficulties at the GSTN portal end are permitted to
apply to the ITGRC for re-opening of the portal for claim of credit. The vast
majority of Courts have taken a liberal view on account of the early stage of
the GST law and permitted the transition credit as a substantive right of the
taxpayers. Of course the above decisions would be subject to challenge from
either side before the Supreme Court and the last word on this is awaited. The
taxpayers until then would have to await the outcome and make suitable
provisions / contingencies in the financial statements in case of any
unforeseen decision. The following Table can be a guiding factor for
ascertaining the contingency levels:

 

 

Type of
assesse

Grounds
for claim

Unaware
of entitlement as on 27th December, 2017

Substantive
right and plead condonation of compliance

Attempted
logging onto system but lack proof and made alternative claims within 27th
December, 2017

Substantive
right claimed within time and plead procedural deviation of filing on common
portal

Attempted
logging / filing onto system but lack proof and made alternative claims after
27th December, 2017 – no evidence in form of screenshots

Substantive
right claimed within time and plead genuine attempt but admit lack of proof.
Rely on High Court decisions as above

Attempted
filing onto system but lack proof and made alternative claims after 27th
December, 2017 – possess evidence in form of screenshots

Same
as above but strong case despite NELCO

Successfully
filed but short claimed transition credit in the form

Same
as above

Reported
the data but in wrong data field

Same
as above

 

 

The objective behind the
GST revolution was certainly commendable and generated euphoria in the country.
There was high expectation from the regulatory authorities of a smooth
transition and handholding of the business enterprises into this tectonic
change in the indirect taxation systems in India. Naturally, the size and
complexity of the Indian economy placed a challenge before the regulatory
authorities to educate and empower small, medium and large business houses.
Help desks / grievance centres were expected to be well in place before the
opening bell – but unfortunately it was the litigation floodgates that were
opened.

 

This
tussle is far from closure and the divergent views of Courts are certainly
subject to the decision of the Supreme Court. It is hoped that the Apex Court
views the spirit of the law and also appreciates the genuine difficulties
prevailing at the time of introduction of GST on the technical front. Apart
from pure interpretation of law, it would also be important to appreciate the
economics of the subsumation of erstwhile laws and transition into a single
consolidated value-added tax regime. If the new law is not implemented in the
spirit of the VAT system, a critical objective of this change would be diluted.
One may view this tussle as prolonged but it also reminds taxpayers to be
vigilant and cautious in complying with the law promptly.

REFUND OF TAX ON INPUT SERVICES UNDER INVERTED DUTY STRUCTURE – WHETHER ELIGIBLE?

INTRODUCTION

Goods & Services Tax, often touted as ‘One Nation, One Tax’, in
practice consists of many State-specific contradictions due to conflicting
advance rulings. Further, in the case of writ matters we are witnessing
conflicting High Court rulings as well. One such controversy that has come to
the fore pertains to refund of unutilised input tax credit (ITC) under inverted
duty structure in view of two conflicting decisions:

i)   VKC
Footsteps India Private Limited vs. Union of India & others –
2020-VIL-340-Guj.

ii) Transtonnelstroy
Afcons JV vs. Union of India & others – 2020-VIL-459-Mad.

 

In this article, we have analysed the relevant provisions under the
Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 and rules framed thereunder on this
particular topic, the interpretation giving rise to the current issue and the
judicial perspective on it. Of course, the matter will reach finality only
after a Supreme Court decision on the issue.

 

BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS

Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017 deals with the provisions relating to
refunds. While section 54(3) provides for refund of any unutilised input tax
credit (ITC), the first proviso thereof restricts the right to claim
such refund only in the case of zero-rated supplies made without payment of
tax, or where the accumulation of credit is on account of the rate of tax on
inputs being higher than the rate of tax on output supplies (other than
nil-rated or fully exempt supplies). The relevant provisions are reproduced for
reference:

 

(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (10), a registered person
may claim refund of any unutilised input tax credit at the end of any tax
period:

Provided that no refund of unutilised input tax credit shall be allowed
in cases other than —

(i) zero
rated supplies made without payment of tax;

(ii)        where
the credit has accumulated on account of rate of tax on inputs being higher
than the rate of tax on output supplies (other than nil rated or fully exempt
supplies), except supplies of goods or services or both as may be notified by
the Government on the recommendations of the Council.

 

The procedure for determining the refund due in case of Inverted Duty
Structure is provided for u/r 89(5) of the CGST Rules, 2017 which provides that
the amount of refund shall be granted as per the following formula:

 

Turnover of Inverted Duty Structure
of goods and services                                 * 
Net ITC
________________________

Adjusted
Total Turnover                     

The term ‘Net ITC’ referred to in the above formula is defined to mean
ITC availed on inputs during the relevant period other than ITC availed for
which refund is claimed u/r 89(4A) or 89(4B) or both. The same is an amended
definition notified vide Notification No. 21/2018 – CT dated 18th
April, 2018 and given retrospective effect from 1st July, 2017 vide
Notification No. 26/2018 – CT dated 13th June, 2018. The pre-amended
definition of ‘Net ITC’ gave the meaning assigned to it in Rule 89(4) which
covered ITC availed on inputs and input services during the relevant period
other than the ITC availed for which refund is claimed under sub-rules (4A) or
(4B) or both.

 

UNDERSTANDING THE DISPUTE

GST works on the principle of value addition, i.e., tax paid on ‘inputs’
is available as credit to be used to discharge the tax payable on ‘output’. In
other words, what goes IN, goes OUT. On a plain reading, this principle also
appears to be applicable for application of section 54(3) (first proviso
referred above) as well as Rule 89(5). This is because though the proviso
uses the term ‘inputs’, it finds in its company the term ‘output supplies’. The
proviso does not restrict the output supply to be only that of goods. In
other words, if output supply, liable to tax at a lower rate, can be of either
goods or services, the same principle should be applied in the context of
inward supplies also, i.e., it can be both goods as well as services. If this
is not done, the very purpose of the provision becomes redundant.

 

Let us understand this with the help of a live example. Diamonds are
taxed at a lower rate under GST, generally 0.25% or 3% depending on their
characteristics. On the other hand, the expenses to be incurred by a person
engaged in the supply of diamonds are all taxable at 18%. For example, rental
services, grading services, security services, etc., all attract tax at 18%.
Unless the above interpretation is applied, all suppliers engaged in supply of
diamonds would never get covered under the scope of ‘inverted duty structure’
and would therefore always end up with an unutilised ITC which would never get
utilised since the tax on output supplies would perennially be lower and there
would be ITC on account of purchase of diamonds itself which would be sufficient
for utilisation against the tax payable on output supplies.

 

Therefore, while interpreting the proviso to section 54(3), the
following questions need consideration:

(i) Whether the term ‘inputs’
referred to in the proviso has to be interpreted as defined u/s 2(59) of
the CGST Act, 2017 which would render the provision non-workable, or should it
be read in context?

(ii)        Does the principle of Noscitur
a Sociis
apply to this matter and can section 54(3) be liberally
interpreted?

 

Here are a few judicial precedents relevant to the current dispute and
also to the above questions:

 

(a) CIT vs. Bharti Cellular Limited [(2009) 319 ITR 319 (Del.)]

This decision was in the context of what constitutes technical services
for the purpose of section 194J. In this case, the Court, relying on the
decision of Stonecraft Enterprises vs. CIT [(1999) 3 SCC 343] held
as under:

 

19. From this decision, it is apparent that the Supreme Court employed
the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis and held that the word minerals took colour from
the words mineral oil which preceded it and the word ores which succeeded it. A
somewhat similar situation has arisen in the present appeals where the word
technical is preceded by the word managerial and succeeded by the word
consultancy. Therefore, the word technical has to take colour from the word
managerial and consultancy and the three words taken together are intended to
apply to those services which involve a human element.

 

This concludes our discussion on the applicability of the principle of noscitur
a sociis
.

 

(b) Southern Motors vs. State of Karnataka [2017 (368) ELT 3 (SC)]

34.       As
would be overwhelmingly pellucid (clear) from the hereinabove, though words in
a statute must, to start with, be extended their ordinary meanings, but if the
literal construction thereof results in an anomaly or absurdity, the courts
must seek to find out the underlying intention of the Legislature and, in the
said pursuit, can within permissible limits strain the language so as to avoid
such unintended mischief.

 

(c)        Commissioner of
Customs (Import), Mumbai vs. Dilip Kumar & Co. [2018 (361) ELT 577 (SC)]

Regard must be had to the clear meaning of
words and matter should be governed wholly by the language of the notification,
equity or intendment having no place in interpretation of a tax statute – if
words are ambiguous in a taxing statute (not exemption clause) and open to two
interpretations, benefit of interpretation is given to the subject.

 

The above discussion indicates that the term ‘inputs’ referred to in
clause (ii) to the first proviso of section 54(3) is to be given a wider
import and not to be restricted to the definition of inputs provided u/s 2(59)
of the CGST Act, 2017. Therefore, the important question that arises is what is
the cause for the current litigation? The dispute stems from Rule 89(5)
prescribed to lay down the methodology to determine the amount eligible for
refund claim under the 2nd clause of the 1st proviso
of section 54(3) and the manner in which the term ‘Net ITC’ has been defined
therein to mean ITC availed on inputs during
the relevant period other than ITC availed for which refund is claimed u/r
89(4A) or 89(4B) or both.

 

By interpreting clause (ii) of the first proviso to section 54(3)
r/w/r 89(5) literally, the Revenue authorities have been denying the refund of
unutilised ITC due to inverted duty structure to the extent the accumulation is
on account of input services. In fact, in a few such cases, the taxpayers had
opted for advance ruling on the subject and the Authority for Advance Ruling
has also agreed with the Revenue’s view. Some relevant rulings include the
ruling by the Maharashtra Authority in the case of Daewoo TPL JV [2019
(27) GSTL 446 (AAR – GST)]
and Commissioner (Appeals) in
Sanganeriya Spinning Mills Limited [2020 (40) GSTL 358 (Comm. Appeals – GST –
Raj)].

 

VKC FOOTSTEPS: BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

In the case of VKC Footsteps, they were faced with a similar challenge
where their refund claim was rejected to the extent it pertained to input
services and therefore they had challenged the validity of Rule 89(5)
restricting the claim of ITC only to the extent it pertained to inputs and not
input services / capital goods.

 

VKC Footsteps made their case before the Gujarat High Court on the
following grounds:

i)   GST is a value-added tax where
the tax is borne by the end customer and businesses do not have to bear the
burden of the said tax as they are eligible to claim credit of taxes paid by
them on their inward supplies.

ii)  That even before the
introduction of GST, the Government was aware of a situation where there could
have prevailed an inverted duty structure and the associated problem of credit
accumulation thereon and to overcome this particular anomaly clause (ii) to the
first proviso of section 54(3) was included in the statute.

iii) Section 54(3) specifically
provided for refund of unutilised ITC. There is no restriction u/s 54(3)
restricting the claim of refund to inputs only.

iv) Rule 89(5) has restricted the scope
of operation of the clause by excluding the credit of taxes paid on input
services from the scope of ‘Net ITC’ for determining the amount eligible for
refund and, in fact, deprived the taxpayer of his crystallised and vested right
of refund. For these reasons, it was argued that Rule 89(5) was ultra vires
of the provision of the Act and therefore liable to be set aside.

v)  The petitioners had also placed
reliance on the decisions in the cases of Shri Balaganesan Metals vs.
M.N. Shanmugham Shetty [(1987) 2 SCC 707]; Lucknow Development Authority vs.
M.K. Gupta [(1994) 1 SCC 243];
and Lohara Steel Industries
Limited vs. State of AP [(1997) 2 SCC 37].

 

The Revenue countered the above with a single argument that Rule 89(5)
was notified within the domain of powers vested with the Central Government by
virtue of section 164. It was argued that this section empowered the Centre in
the widest possible manner to make rules on the recommendations of the GST
Council for carrying out the provisions of the Act. Rule 89(5) was notified in
exercise of these powers and therefore cannot be held ultra vires as it
only provides the method of calculating the refund on account of inverted duty
structure. Revenue relied on the decision in the case of Willow-wood
Chemicals Private Limited vs. UoI [2018 (19) GSTL 228 (Guj.)].

 

After hearing both the parties, the Gujarat High Court held that Rule
89(5) was ultra vires the provisions of section 54(3) of the CGST Act,
2017 based on the following conclusions:

(A) Rule 89(5) excluding credit of
input services from the scope of ‘Net ITC’ to determine the amount of eligible
refund is contrary to the provisions of section 54(3) which provides for refund
of claim of ‘any unutilised input tax credit’. The Court further held that
clause (ii) of the first proviso to section 54(3) refers to both supply
of goods or services, and not only supply of goods as per amended Rule 89(5).

(B) Rule 89(5) does not demonstrate
the intention of the statute. Therefore, the interpretation in Circular
79/53/2018 – GST dated 31st December, 2018 was incorrect.

 

TRANSTONNELSTROY AFCONS JV: THE SAGA
CONTINUES

Around the same time, the Madras High Court also had occasion to examine
the same issue. The detailed decision in the case of Transtonnelstroy
Afcons JV
reignited the controversy. The judgment records a series of
arguments put forth by the petitioner, countered by the respondents and
rejoinder submissions by both sets of parties rebutting the opposite parties’
submissions. We have attempted to summarise (pointwise) the submissions of the
parties.

 

Vires of Rule 89(5) vis-à-vis
sections 164 and 54(3) of the CGST Act, 2017

The petitioners, placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Sales Tax Officer vs. K.T. Abraham [AIR 1967 SCC 1823]
contended that clauses which empower framing of rules only in respect of form
and manner of application are limited in scope. They further contended that a
general rule-making power cannot be resorted to to create disabilities not
contemplated under the CGST Act, 2017 – Kunj Behari Lal Butail vs. State
of HP [(2000) 3 SCC 40].

 

The petitioners further relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court
in the case of VKC Footsteps wherein it has held that Rule 89(5)
as amended is contrary to the provision of section 54(3).

 

In response, the respondent (Revenue) contended that wide Parliamentary
latitude is recognised and affirmed while construing tax and other economic
legislations and that Courts should adopt a hands-free approach qua economic
legislation – Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India
vs. UoI [(1989) 3 SCC 634]
and Swiss Ribbons Private Limited vs.
UoI [(2019) 4 SCC 17].

 

The respondent further contended that no restriction can be read into
the rule-making power of the Government. Section 164 is couched in extremely
wide language and the only limitation therein is that the Rules should be
applied only for fulfilling the purpose of the CGST Act – K. Damodarasamy
Naidu vs. State of TN [2000 (1) SCC 521)]
wherein the Court held that
the distinction between goods and services was valid in case of composite
contracts.

 

Entitlement to claim refund stems from
section 54 – operative part and not
proviso

On their part, the petitioners contended that the general rule for
entitlement of refund of unutilised ITC is contained in section 54(3), while
the principle merely sets out the eligible class of taxpayers who can claim the
refund. Since the entry barrier is satisfied, i.e., they are covered under the
inverted duty structure, the primary condition that the credit accumulation is
due to inverted duty structure is satisfied. The proviso does not
curtail the entitlement to refund of the entire unutilised ITC and merely sets
out the eligibility conditions for claiming such refund. This was also
reiterated during the rejoinder submissions.

 

The petitioners also stated that the use of the phrase ‘in the cases’
indicates that the proviso is intended to specify the classes of
registered persons who would be entitled to refund of unutilised ITC and not to
curtail the quantum or type of unutilised ITC in respect of which refund may be
claimed.

 

Scope of clause (ii) of first proviso
to section 54(3)

The petitioners further argued that section
54(3) is drafted in a manner to entitle a claimant for refund of full
unutilised ITC. Therefore, the provisions should be interpreted by keeping the
context in mind. The intention of Parliament was to deploy the words ‘inputs’
and ‘output supplies’ as per their meaning in common parlance. Therefore, the
definition of input u/s 2(59) should not apply since that definition applies
only when the context does not require otherwise. They further relied on the
decision in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1]; M. Jamal & Co. vs. UoI [(1985) 21 ELT 369];
and
Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of TN [(2002) 3 SCC 554].

In response to the above, the respondent referred to the Explanation to
section 54 wherein it has been clarified that refund shall include tax paid on
inputs / input services. On the basis of this, Revenue contended that the terms
‘inputs’ or ‘input services’ were consciously used in section 54 – CIT,
New Delhi vs. East West Import and Export (P) Limited [(1989) 1 SCC 760]
and
CST vs. Union Medical Agency [(1981) 1 SCC 51].
The Revenue further
argued that this classification of inputs, input services and capital goods is
continuing since the CENVAT regime and, therefore, even in trade parlance the
same meaning which was applied under the CENVAT regime should continue to apply
under GST.

 

The respondents further argued that if a term is defined in the statute,
the Court should first consider and apply such a definition and only in the
absence of a statutory definition can the Court consider the definition under
common parlance meaning of the term – Bakelite Hylam Limited vs. CCE,
Hyderabad [(1998) 5 SCC 621].

 

Manner of interpretation of tax statute –
Strict vs. liberal

The petitioners contended that strict interpretation of a taxing statute
applies only when interpreting a charging provision / exemption notification – Gursahai
Sehgal vs. CIT [AIR 1963 SC 1062]
and ITC Limited vs. CCE [(2004)
7 SCC 591].
The petitioners further contended that if section 54(3) is
not interpreted in this manner, the same would be violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution as it would amount to discrimination between similarly placed
persons. They placed reliance on the decision in the case of Government
of Andhra Pradesh vs. Lakshmi Devi [(2008) 4 SCC 720]
.

 

In response to the above contentions, the respondents argued that if it
is held that section 54(3)(ii) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution,
the correct approach would have been to strike down the provisions and not to
expand it to include the person discriminated – Jain Exports Private
Limited vs. UoI [1996 (86) ELT 478 (SC)].
The respondents further
argued that a refund provision should be treated at par with an exemption
provision and should therefore be construed strictly and any ambiguity should
be resolved in favour of the Revenue as held by the Supreme Court in the case
of Dilip Kumar & Co. The Revenue also relied on the decision
in the case of Ramnath vs. CTO [(2020) 108 CCH 0020]. And on
decisions wherein ITC has been equated with a concession and therefore the
terms and conditions associated with it should be strictly complied with – Jayam
& Co. vs. AC(CT) [(2016) 15 SCC 125]
and ALD Automotive
Private Limited vs. AC(CT) [2018-VIL-28-SC].

 

Vide their rejoinder
submission, the petitioners argued that a tax statute should not always be
construed strictly, which can be defined either as literal interpretation,
narrow interpretation, etc. Further, the decision in the case of Dilip
Kumar & Co.
was distinguishable as it dealt with interpretation of
an exemption notification which is not similar to refund. Reference was made to
the decision in the case of Ramnath equating exemptions,
incentives, rebates and other things as similar. However, refund of unutilised
ITC is not similar to exemptions, incentives or rebates.

 

The respondents vide a sur-rejoinder contended that refund
is akin to an exemption / rebate / incentive. Refund is at best a statutory
right and not a vested right and therefore can be exercised only if the statute
grants such right. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Satnam
Overseas Export vs. State of Haryana [(2003) 1 SCC 561].

 

Reading down of the provisions was required

The petitioners further contended that the validity of the provisions
could be upheld only by resorting to reading down the said provisions – Delhi
Transport Corporation vs. Mazdoor Congress & Others [1991 (Supplement) 1
SCC 600]
and Spences Hotel Private Limited vs. State of WB &
Others [(1991) 2 SCC 154].

 

In response, the respondents contended that reading down is intended to
provide a restricted or narrow interpretation and not for the purpose of
providing an expansive or wide interpretation. Words cannot be added to the
statute for the purpose of reading down the statute. The Revenue further
referred to decisions where it has been held that Courts cannot remake the
statute – Delhi Transport Co. (Supra) and UoI vs. Star
Television News Limited [(2015) 12 SCC 665].
The respondents further
argued that a proviso performs various functions such as curtailing,
excluding, exempting or qualifying the enacted clause and may even take the
shape of a substantive provision – S. Sundaram Pillai vs. V.R.
Pattabiraman [(1985) 1 SCC 591]
and Laxminarayan R. Bhattad vs.
State of Maharashtra [(2003) 5 SCC 413].

 

During the rejoinder submission, the petitioners submitted that the
words ‘on inputs’ in Rule 89(5) should be deleted to ensure that the Rule is
not ultra vires to section 54(3). To support the contention of reading
down, the petitioners relied on the decision in the case of Lohara Steel
Industries
and D.S. Nakara vs. UoI [(1983) 1 SCC 37].
They further contended that the purpose of a proviso is to exempt,
exclude or curtail and not to expand the scope of the main provision – ICFAI
vs. Council of Chartered Accountants of India [(2007) 12 SCC 210 (ICFAI)].

 

During the sur-rejoinder submission, the respondents contended
that reading up is not permitted when resorting to the principle of reading
down – B.R. Kapur vs. State of TN [(2001) 7 SCC 231].

 

Inequalities should be mitigated – Article 38
of the Constitution

The petitioners further argued, referring to Article 38, that the
legislation should be interpreted in such a manner as to ensure that
inequalities are mitigated – Sri Srinivasa Theatre vs. Government of
Tamil Nadu [(1992) 2 SCC 643]; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of Jammu and
Kashmir [(1980) 4 SCC 1];
and UoI vs. N.S. Rathnam [(2015) 10 SCC
681].

 

The respondents contended that the classification of a registered person
into who is entitled to claim and who is not entitled to claim the refund by
differentiating based on those who procure input goods vs. those who procure
input goods and input services was legitimate. The respondents further argued
that the distinction between treatment of goods and services emanated from the
Constitution wherein goods were defined in Article 366(12) while services were
defined under Article 366(26)(A). More importantly, equity was not an issue in
the current case since there was no restriction from the claim of ITC. The
restriction applied only on claim of refund, to the extent that ITC was on
account of input service, the same continued to be a part of the taxpayers’ credit
ledger.

 

The petitioners vide a rejoinder submission contended that the
validity or invalidity of classification would depend on the frame of
reference. They further contended that there is no material difference in the
treatment of goods and services under GST law. Goods and services are treated
similarly when dealing with the four basic elements of the GST law, i.e.,
taxable event, taxable person, rate of tax and measure of tax. The only
distinction is in relation to provisions relating to determination of place of
supply, time of supply, etc. They further contended that GST was a paradigm
shift and therefore the historical segregation between goods and services
cannot be relied upon to contend that unequal treatment of goods and services
is valid. In fact, the purpose of introducing GST is to consolidate goods and
services and treat them similarly by keeping in mind that taxes are imposed on
consumption, irrespective of whether goods or services are consumed.

 

In the sur-rejoinder submission by the respondents, they
contended that the distinction between goods and services continues to apply
under GST also since the nature and characteristics of goods and services are
coherently different – Superintendent and Rememberancer of Legal Affairs,
West Bengal vs. Girish Kumar Navalakha [(1975) 4 SCC 754]; State of Gujarat vs.
Ambika Mills [(1975) 4 SCC 656];
and R.K. Garg vs. UoI [(1981) 4
SCC 675].

 

CONCLUSION OF THE COURT

After hearing both the parties exhaustively, the Court proceeded with an
analysis of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of VKC
Footsteps
and prima facie opined that the decision did not seem
to have considered the proviso to section 54(3) and, more significantly,
its import and implications and therefore proceeded on an independent analysis
of the relevant provisions. The Court referred to various decisions revolving
around the scope and function of a proviso relied upon by both the
parties, arrived at a conclusion that the proviso in the case of section
54(3) performed the larger function of limiting the entitlement of refund to
credit that accumulates as a result of the rate of tax on input goods being
higher than the rate of tax on output supplies. On this basis, the Court
proceeded to conclude that Rule 89(5) was intra vires. It opined that
the Gujarat High Court in VKC Footsteps had failed to take into
consideration the scope, function and impact of the proviso to section
54(3).

 

The Court also dealt with the argument on the manner of interpreting the
term ‘inputs’ used in the proviso. It concluded that the statutory
definition as well as context point in the same direction, that the word
‘inputs’ encompasses all input goods other than capital goods and excludes
input services. This conclusion was arrived at based on the following
reasoning:

  •         The definition of inputs u/s 2 excludes capital goods. If the
    common parlance meaning was applied, it would result in a conclusion that would
    be antithetical to the text.
  •         Section 54 itself refers to inputs as well as input services
    on multiple occasions. Therefore, merely because the undefined word ‘output
    supplies’ is used in the proviso, one cannot read the word ‘inputs’
    preceding it to include input service also.

 

Dealing with the issue of strict vs. liberal interpretation, the Court
concluded that the refund claims should be strictly interpreted since it was a
benefit / concession.

 

The Court also held that the classification, by virtue of which the
right to claim refund of unutilised ITC on account of input services was
curtailed, was not in violation of Article 14. Though it held that the object
of GST was to treat goods and services similarly, this is an evolutionary
process. There are various instances where goods and services are treated
differently, be it the rate of tax or provision for determination of place of
supply. However, the Court abstained from dealing with the arguments relating
to reading down since it had already held that section 54(3)(ii) was not in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

 

AUTHORS’ VIEWS

Both the decisions referred to above deal with a similar fact matrix,
are detailed and reasoned orders but bear diverse outcomes. However, there are
some aspects which still remain unaddressed and could have been considered in
the current dispute:

 

1. The Madras High Court
decisions, while concluding that section 54(3)(ii) covers only input goods and
not input services, appears to have not dealt with the key issue raised by the
petitioners, i.e., the intention of the Legislature based on which substantial
arguments were advanced by the petitioners. Even when dealing with the
arguments of applying contextual definition / understanding of the terms, the
Court has held that in interpreting a tax statute the requirement to stay true
to the statutory definition is more compelling. However, while concluding so,
the Court has not considered its own decision in the case of Firm
Foundation & Housing Private Limited vs. Principal CST, Chennai [2018 (16)
GSTL 209 (Mad.)]
wherein it has been held that there is enough
precedent available to support the view that Courts will interfere where the
basis of the impugned order is palpably erroneous and contrary to law.

 

2. The decision in the case of TCS
vs. UoI [2016 (44) STR 33 (Kar.)]
is also relevant in the current case.
This involved determination of whether or not a company would be liable to pay
tax under the category of ‘consulting engineer’ services? In this case, the
Court held that when the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and
grammatical construction leads to manifest contradiction of its apparent
purpose or to inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, construction
may be put upon that which emphasises the meaning of the words and even the
structure of the sentence.

 

3. The
Madras High Court concluded that if the interpretation of the petitioners was
accepted that the term ‘inputs’ used in section 54(3)(ii) was to be interpreted
in context with the words accompanying it, it would lead to an interpretation
that even unutilised ITC on account of capital goods would have been eligible
for refund. However, it appears that the Court has not considered the fact that
the Explanation to section 54 specifically provides that refund of unutilised
ITC shall be permitted only to the extent that it pertains to inputs / input
services.

 

4. As for the question whether
refund when provided in the legislation itself can be treated as a concession,
or it is a right which cannot be curtailed, one needs to keep in mind that
although section 17(5)(h) of the CGST Act, 2017 specifically stated that
certain ITC would be treated as blocked credits, the Orissa High Court in the
case of Safari Retreats Private Limited vs. Chief Commissioner of GST
[2019 (25) GSTL 341 (Ori.)]
held the same ultra vires. Of
course, this matter is also currently pending before the Supreme Court, but the
bearing of the outcome of the same on the current dispute cannot be ruled out.

 

We now stand at a
juncture wherein two Hon’ble High Courts have given detailed and well-reasoned
judgments but diverse decisions on the issue of whether refund of unutilised
input tax credit, on account of input services, would be eligible or not? As a
natural corollary, the aggrieved parties will approach the Supreme Court to
settle the controversy and also lay down the principles of interpretation under
GST. The final decision of the Supreme Court in this matter will either blur
the lines of distinction between goods and services, or underline them in bold.

 

 

AGENCY IN GST

The concept of Agency has been engrafted in
the GST law on multiple fronts. Common law attributes representative powers to
the concept of agency but this traditional essence of agency has been altered
under GST. With the deviation from common law concepts of agency, we would have
to examine the contextual understanding of agency and test the fitment in
various practice areas of GST.

 

AGENCY UNDER CONTRACT ACT

Agency is a
special contract recognised under the Contract law. Section 182 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 defines an ‘agent’ as a person employed to do any act for
another, or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for
whom such act is done or who is so represented is called the ‘principal’.
Agency can be established either by an express oral / written agreement or even
from surrounding circumstances (section 187).

 

Thus, the test
of establishment of a contract of agency is a mixed question of law and facts.
An express contract is not an essential ingredient of agency but, on the other
hand, agency should not be concluded by the mere use of a terminology in an
arrangement. It is more behavioural rather than contractual in the sense that
mere terms do not automatically form the basis of agency. The Supreme Court in Assam
Small Scale Ind. Dev. Corp. vs. JD Pharmaceuticals 2005 (10) TMI 494

observed:

 

‘The
expressions “principal” and “agent” used in a document are not decisive. The
nature of transaction is required to be determined on the basis of the
substance there and not by the nomenclature used. Documents are to be construed
having regard to the contexts thereof wherefor “labels” may not be of much
relevance.’

 

The principles
of agency are to be examined with reference to the authorities exercised by a
person while engaging with a third party. An agent functioning within the
authority granted to it would be in a position to bind its principal by its
acts as against a third party (section 226). This forms the core of an agency
relationship under general law. To the extent that an agent surpasses its
authority, the third party would have to exercise its right against the agent,
in its personal capacity, without any recourse to the principal (section 227).
In fact, if the excessive authority is not separable from the original
authority, the whole contract can be repudiated by the principal (section 228)
and the remedy available to the third party is limited only against the agent.

 

A principal can
disown any acts beyond the agent’s authority in which case all implications
would fall upon the agent in its personal capacity (section 196).
Alternatively, the principal with knowledge of material facts can either
expressly or impliedly ratify the acts of the agent and all consequences of
agency would follow on such ratification (section 199). These are the critical
provisions which govern principal-agent contracts in general.

 

AGENCY UNDER SALE OF GOODS ACT

The Sale of Goods Act governs the principal-agency relationship on
matters involving sale or purchase of goods. The Act defines a ‘mercantile
agent’ as having in the customary course of business such authority either to
sell goods, or to consign goods for the purpose of sale, or to buy goods, or to
raise money on the security of goods. In contradistinction to the Contract Act,
the Sale of Goods Act narrowed down the authority under the agency
transactions, for its purpose, as those which have a reference to sale or
purchase of goods. A mercantile agent under the Sale of Goods Act is one who
has control and / or possession over the goods and the authority from the
owner-principal to pass the property in goods to a third party.

 

Section 27 of
the Sale of Goods Act acknowledges transfer of valid title on sales performed
by a mercantile agent even though such agent may not himself possess the title
over the goods. This comes with the obvious rider that such agent should act
within its authority and the buyer of such goods acquires the title in good
faith with knowledge about this authority. Section 45 grants rights to the
agent to step into the shoes of its principal as an unpaid seller and enforce
such rights as against the buyer for recovery of the price of the goods due to
it and accountable to its principal.

 

AGENCY ERSTWHILE VAT / CST LAW

Sale under the
VAT / CST laws was nomen juris, i.e. understood as per the prevailing
Sale of Goods Act, 1932 – involving transfer of title in goods. Accordingly,
transfer of goods by the principal to its agent was normally considered as a
delivery / stock transfer and not a transaction of sale. The Supreme Court in Sri
Tirumala Venkateswara Timber and Bamboo Firm vs. Commercial Tax Officer,
Rajahmundry [(1968) 2 SCR 476]
explained the distinction between a
contract of sale and agency as follows:

 

‘As a matter of
law there is a distinction between a contract of sale and a contract of agency
by which the agent is authorised to sell or buy on behalf of the principal and
make over either the sale proceeds or the goods to the principal. The essence
of a contract of sale is the transfer of title to the goods for a price paid or
promised to be paid. The transferee in such a case is liable to the transferor
as a debtor for the price to be paid and not as agent for the proceeds of the
sale. The essence of agency to sell is the
delivery of the goods to a person who is to sell them,
not as his own
property but as the property of the principal who continues to be the owner of
the goods and will therefore be liable to account for the sale proceeds. The
true relationship of the parties in each case has to be gathered from the
nature of the contract, its terms and conditions, and the terminology used by
the parties is not decisive of the legal relationship.’

 

Under Sales
Tax, the transaction through the medium of agents takes into account two
phases, (a) that which takes place between the agent and principal on one part,
and (b) that which takes place between the agent (on behalf of the principal)
on one part and the third person (a seller or purchaser) on the other part.
Therefore, the true test of whether two persons were under a
principal-to-principal relationship or under a principal-agent relationship was
to ascertain whether there was any inter se transfer of property in
goods between such persons. If after the transfer the risks of loss or injury
over goods would be that of the buyer to the exclusion of the seller, such
relationships would not be a principal-agency relationship.

 

Yet, in VAT
laws the definition of ‘sale’ included transfer of goods by the principal to
its selling agent or by the purchasing agent to its principal in cases of (a)
difference in the sale price being accounted back to the principal; (b)
non-accountal of all collections to its principal; (c) acting on behalf of
fictitious or non-existent principal. This was perhaps only done to address the
cases of tax frauds or sham transactions where terms of agency were used to
camouflage the transaction of sale.

 

Sales tax laws
also made reference to the relationship of agency while setting the scope of
the phrase ‘dealer’. This was done in order to acquire powers to make
assessments over mercantile agents dealing in respect of non-resident dealers
and enforce joint or several liability over transactions of the agent on behalf
of its principal.

 

AGENCY UNDER ERSTWHILE SERVICE TAX

The Service Tax
law had adopted a different understanding of agency. Until the negative list
regime, agency was identified as a service to its principal, say advertising
agent, insurance agent, air travel agent, custom house agent, real estate
agent, etc. The objective was to tax the inter se services rendered by
the agent (on its own account) to its principal. The general law prevailed on
services rendered by the principal through its agent and all consequences of
agent’s action would flow back to the principal in entirety without any
fictional element.

 

Even after the
introduction of the negative list scheme, the definition of ‘assessee’ included
an agent. With this as the basis, taxes discharged by agencies were considered
as sufficient compliance in the hands of the principal [Zaheer R. Khan
vs. CST 2014 33 STR 75 (Tri-Mum) and Reliance Securities Ltd. vs. CST 2018 (4)
TMI 1335 (Tri-Mum)].
The Tribunal also held that once the entire value
in a transaction chain has been taxed, additional tax on the principal would
amount to double taxation of the same amount which is impermissible.

 

AGENCY UNDER THE GST LAW

Schedule 1 to
section 7 of the GST law deems a supply of goods by a principal to its agent
for subsequent sale and a purchase of goods by an agent to its principal even
though without consideration, as a supply liable to tax. Effectively, Schedule
I treats the principal and agent as different persons for the purposes of the
Act. It treats a mere movement by the principal to its agent or vice versa
as a supply – equivalent to a buy-sell transaction. It is in this context that
section 2(5) defines an agent as follows:

 

‘(5) “agent”
means a person, including a factor, broker, commission agent,
arhatia, del credere agent, an auctioneer or any other mercantile
agent, by whatever name called, who carries on the business of supply or
receipt of goods or services or both on
behalf of another;’

 

The definition
u/s 2(5) triggered off a controversy initially over the inclusion of factors,
brokers, commission agents, etc., which are specifically mentioned in the
definition of agent but do not have authoritative scope on representing and
concluding contracts on behalf of their principals. For example, a broker is
one who has limited authority to identify buyers / sellers of goods and a
commission agent is one whose only interest is to receive a commission for
fixing a supply contract between its principal and a third party; both these
persons would not possess the authority of concluding supply contracts with a
third party and binding the principal with their actions.

 

On a careful
reading of the definition one would observe that the necessary ingredient of
agency under GST is the authority to effect
a supply / receipt on behalf
of its principal. This is because under
general law the scope of functions of the agent could take various forms such
as logistics, liaising, negotiations, etc., but the GST law has narrowed the
scope of agency u/s 2(5) to only functions w.r.t. effecting a supply or receipt
of goods on behalf of the principal. Section 2(5) also uses the phrase ‘or any
other mercantile agent’, implying that the preceding categories of agent are of
the type who have satisfied the condition of being a mercantile agent (as
understood under the Sale of Goods Act) though they are called by different
names. The phrase ‘whatever name called’ only reinforces the accepted practice
of looking into the substance of the relationship and not just the form.
Therefore, a person may be termed as a ‘factor’ or ‘a commission agent’ in
trade / general law parlance but would acquire agency u/s 2(5) only if he
possesses the power to enter into binding supply arrangements on behalf of his
principal. It is also possible to interpret that only those cases of agency
would be applicable to Schedule I which involve a delivery of goods to / from
the selling / buying agent and such agent possesses the authority to effect the
supply on behalf of its principal.

 

This
interpretation was also acknowledged by the CBEC Circular No. 57/31/2018-GST
which read as follows:

 

‘7. It may be
noted that the crucial factor is how to determine whether the agent is wearing
the representative hat and is supplying or receiving goods on behalf of the
principal. Since in the commercial world, there are various factors that might
influence this relationship, it would be more prudent that an objective
criteria
(sic) is used to determine whether a particular
principal-agent relationship falls within the ambit of the said entry or not.
Thus, the key ingredient for determining relationship under GST would be
whether the invoice for the further supply of goods on behalf of the principal
is being issued by the agent or not. Where the invoice for further supply is
being issued by the agent in his name then, any provision of goods from the
principal to the agent would fall within the fold of the said entry. However,
it may be noted that in cases where the invoice is issued by the agent to the
customer in the name of the principal, such agent shall not fall within the
ambit of Schedule I of the CGST Act. Similarly, where the goods being procured
by the agent on behalf of the principal are invoiced in the name of the agent
then further provision of the said goods by the agent to the principal would be
covered by the said entry. In other words, the crucial point is whether or not
the agent has the authority to pass or receive the title of the goods on behalf
of the principal.’

 

Though the
aspect of representative authority has been affirmed by the CBEC, it has
questionably used the manner of raising the invoice as the ‘objective criteria’
for ascertaining the representative authority. From the perspective of substance
over form, a mere mention of a name in the invoice cannot decide the presence
or absence of agency. Nevertheless, this appears to have been done from a
practical standpoint to overcome possible procedural challenges with place of
supply, credit flow and inter-government settlements.

 

While this is
the contextual understanding of agency under Schedule I, there is another type
of agency which has been subtly recognised under the GST law. The phrase
‘agent’ has also been used in the definition of supplier, principal, place of
business, output tax, etc. The consequence of this is that all activities of an
agent would merge into the assessment of the principal and treated as being
concluded by the principal for the purposes of GST. For example, output tax and
supplier have been defined as follows:

 

‘(82) “output
tax” in relation to a taxable person, means the tax chargeable under this Act
on taxable supply of goods or services or both made by him or by his agent but
excludes tax payable by him on reverse charge basis’.

 

‘(105)
“supplier” in relation to any goods or services or both, shall mean the person
supplying the said goods or services or both and shall include an agent acting
as such on behalf of such supplier in relation to the goods or services or both
supplied;’

 

The above
definition implies all taxes charged in agency capacity would be included in
the assessment of the principal. Moreover, a person would be considered to be a
supplier even though the goods are in fact being supplied by its agent.

 

This leads to a
head-on collision with the Schedule I situation discussed above. Ordinarily
speaking, after applying Schedule I and treating the principal and agent as
different persons under the law, one would have expected that all supplies of
the agent would be delinked from the principal’s activities for all purposes of
the Act. One would have expected that the deemed supply by the principal to the
agent would terminate all responsibilities of the principal over the subject
goods for the limited purpose under GST. All assessments of tax would be
conducted in the hands of the agent in its fictional capacity of a buyer of
goods. The inclusion of the agent’s turnover in the hands of the principal u/s
2(82) / 2(105) apparently conflicts with the consequence of agency under
Schedule 1. It would result in a turnover being taxed twice, (a) once in the
hands of the agent (by virtue of Schedule I), and (b) again in the hands of the
principal (by virtue of the definitions such as output tax, supplier, etc.).

 

This deadlock can be resolved through two theories: (A) The phrase ‘on
behalf of’ has been commonly used only in section 2(5) and Schedule I.
Moreover, Schedule I is only limited to supply of goods and not services.
Therefore, one could view section 2(5) as directly applicable to Schedule I
transactions and not beyond. All other references to agent in the Act are only
for supply of services and not for supply of goods, in which case their
turnover would continue to still be included in the hands of the principal.
This school of thought suffers from a very critical deficiency that the
definition of agency has been used with reference to goods and / or services
and it would not be correct to ignore the specific mention of services while
interpreting the definitions in the context of the agent’s activities; (B) An
agent could acquire representative capacity for various purposes such as making
/ receiving supply, making / receiving payments, etc. Of the various
authorities which an agent can acquire from its principal, section 2(5) read
with Schedule I is limited to agency exercising the authority to effect supplies on behalf of the principal w.r.t. supply
of goods.
Where the agent has other representative authorities (such as
carrying, forwarding, consignment agents, ancillary activities to enable a
supply of goods, etc.), the activities would be considered to have been made by
the principal itself and all consequences would follow therefrom. For services,
in the absence of a parallel Schedule I situation, all agents’ actions would be
assessed in the hands of the principal directly.

 

The consequence
of the latter interpretation may be as follows: For example, Steel Authority of
India appoints an agent for receiving supplies, storing them, procuring orders
and selling these goods to third parties, giving the principal a true account
of the sale proceeds for a commission. Here, the agent has the authority to
negotiate the price, bind SAIL with the price negotiated (of course within
authority) and effect the sale on behalf of SAIL. SAIL would be considered to
have made a Schedule I supply to its agent at the time of dispatch of the goods
and the agent will be considered to have received the goods and making a
subsequent supply to third parties. In effect, there are two supplies in this
arrangement and the agent, though only a medium, will be treated as a buyer for
all purposes of the Act. In such a scenario, the consequence of pricing,
assessment, input tax credit at the principal and agent’s end would have to be
viewed independently.

 

In contrast to
this, another case could be of Indian Oil Corporation appointing ‘carrying and
forwarding agents’ for receiving, storing and dispatching the goods on behalf of
IOCL. Here the carrying and forwarding agent would not have the authority to
negotiate and / or conclude contracts on behalf of IOCL. The instruction for
movement is also given by IOCL and the agent merely arranges for logistics and
ancillary functions associated with the main supply. In such a scenario, the
law states that even if the tax invoice is raised in the name of the agent on
behalf of IOCL, the supply having taken place by IOCL, the output tax,
turnover, etc., would have to be included in the assessment of IOCL. In such a
scenario there is only one supply, i.e., by the C&F agent under the IOCL’s
authority to the third party which would be assessed in the hands of IOCL
directly. The crucial difference is that the SAIL agent has the authority to bind
its principal under general law with the transactions of supply, while the IOCL
agent was not granted the authority to bind IOCL with its sale transaction and
had limited authority of possession and / or dispatch of the goods.

 

While these are
simplistic models, real-life transactions pose considerable challenges. One
would have to appreciate the true purport of commonly-used terms such as
factor, del credere agent, commission agent, consignment agent, etc.

 

(a)        Commission agent – is a mercantile agent who sells or disposes goods by exercising
authority to conclude contracts on behalf of its principal.

(b)        Factor – is generally
a mercantile agent who sells or disposes goods by taking possession or control
over the goods which are entrusted to him by the principal.

(c)        Del credere agent / Pukka arhatia – is one who guarantees that the price of the goods sold would be
recovered and indemnifies against any loss caused on account of non-recovery of
sale price.

(d)        Broker / Kutcha arhatia – is one who mediates a transaction between two principals but does not
acquire or transfer any title over the goods on anyone’s behalf. The broker
acts as a negotiator for each end of the transaction but cannot bind anyone to
the transaction. It is famously stated that all agents are brokers but all
brokers may not be agents.

(e)        Auctioneer – is one who
exercises authority to conclude the price of the goods under sale on the drop
of the hammer.

 

One may refer
to the principle outlined by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales
Tax vs. Bishamber Singh Layaq Ram [1981] 47 STC 80
while
differentiating an authoritative agent and a general agent as follows:

 

‘The crucial
test is whether the agent has any personal interest of his own when he enters
into the transaction or whether that interest is limited to his commission
agency charges and certain out of pocket expenses, and in the event of any loss
his right to be indemnified by the principal. This principle was applied in the
case of pakki arhat by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J., in
Bhagwandas Narottamdas vs. Kanji Deoji [1906] ILR 30 Bom. 205 and approved of by the Judicial Committee in Bhagwandas Parasram vs. Burjorji Ruttonji Bomanji (1917-18) LR 45 IA 29 and by this Court in Shivnarayan Kabra vs. State
of Madras [1967] 1 SCR 138.’

 

The other
relevant decision is the case of Kalyanji Kuwarji vs. Tirkaram Sheolal
AIR 1938 Nag. 254
:

 

‘The test to my
mind is this: does the commission agent when he sells have authority to sell in
his own name? Has he authority in his own right to pass a valid title? If he
has then he is acting as a principal
vis-a-vis
the purchasers and not merely as an agent and therefore from that point on he
is a debtor of his erstwhile principal and not merely an agent. Whether this is
so or not must of course depend upon the facts in each particular case.’

 

The above
variants of mercantile agents u/s 2(5) of the GST law should be contextually
understood as those which have the authority to conclude the supply on behalf
of the principal supplier. Any other arrangement which as termed in the manner
specified above would not be considered as agency under GST law, and the latter
school of thought would accordingly apply.

 

CHALLENGES UNDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIP

Whether secretly
accounted profits / collections liable to GST as an independent activity?

A critical
dimension to the aspect of agency is that the agent is obligated to account for
all the collections to the principal. The agent is permitted to retain the
commissions, expenses and service fee due to it under the agency contract but
cannot secretly profit from the agency. The secreted profits of agency are held
without the knowledge of both the third party as well as the principal. Going
by the previous discussion, agency would take two forms under GST – (a)
Schedule I scenario where agents are treated on par with a principal, (b) the
other scenario where the agent’s functions are assessed in the hands of the
principal in entirety without any fiction.

 

In the former
scenario, if an agent procures the product at a deemed value of Rs. 85 and
supplies the product at a final price of Rs. 100 and accounts only Rs. 95 as
the collection to the principal, the secreted profit of Rs. 5 may not be a
discernible supply to anyone. It is a profit which has been retained by the
agent from its gross collections and not as a consideration for the agency
services. While the agent may have committed a breach under general law (which
is subject to ratification by the principal himself), tax laws would have to
implement this in its narrow sense. The secreted profit cannot be termed as a
consideration for any identifiable supply and hence may not be taxed at all.
Viewed from another angle, when the entire Rs. 100 has already been taxed as a
consideration of the sale price of goods to the third party, there is nothing
left to tax and Revenue cannot contend that Rs. 5 has escaped the tax net
altogether.

 

In the latter
scenario, where assessments are made in the hands of the principal, the secreted
profit of Rs. 5 would not be disclosed to the principal, resulting in short
reporting of the tax liability in the hands of the principal to this extent.
But even in such a scenario, the Rs. 5 cannot be taxed in the hands of the
agent as an identifiable supply activity. In contrast to the former scenario,
though there is a net shortfall in payment, the shortfall in payment cannot be
fixed as the liability of the agent for its agency function. At the principal’s
end, the said amount does not accrue to the principal, cannot be termed as a
consideration due to the principal and hence may not form part of the taxable
value of the supply.

 

The important
principle emerging from this example is that any surplus does not automatically
acquire the character of a supply unless there is a consensus over the activity
between both parties and such parties identify the consideration for such
consensual activity.

 

Whether
e-commerce activity makes the market place website ‘an agent’?

E-commerce
market place models have multiple variants. In today’s e-commerce business
models where a substantial part of the transaction is concluded by the
e-commerce company on behalf of the seller, there is a challenge in identifying
the relevant basket of agency, i.e. mere C&F agent or a mercantile agent.
Websites such as Amazon, Flipkart, etc., provide multiple facilities to sellers
such as (a) product hosting services, (b) fulfilment centres offering
warehousing, logistics, packing, etc., (c) direction over promotional schemes
for products, (d) incentives and price support to portal sellers, and (e)
collection of payments, etc. The web portal clearly depicts the name of the
seller and the prices offered by the seller which are accepted by the buyer at
the click of a button on the portal. The final invoice is raised in the name of
the seller of goods with the branding, logo and packaging of the web portal but
the payments are made to the web portal. The portal also hosts product
descriptions, customer reviews, seller rating, etc., of the product.

 

One may contend
that the web portal has portrayed itself as an agent of the seller and the
seller having accepted such a portrayal has impliedly accepted this
principal-agency relationship. By such implicit actions, the marketplace web
portal may be treated as an agent of the principal and effecting supplies on
their behalf. Hence, the transaction would be covered under Schedule I. The
other view may be that these are a host of services provided by a marketplace
web portal and the web portal does not hold out to make warranties /
representations over the product pricing, quality, description, etc. Moreover,
the GST law has imposed TCS provisions for e-commerce operators and treating
them as a separate class of persons who effect collections on behalf of
sellers. Hence, the web portals are not agents as defined in section 2(5) read
with Schedule I. At the most they may be termed as brokers who merely connect
the buyer and the supplier over an e-commerce platform but are not effecting a supply on behalf of the
seller. The issue is wide open and one would have to await clarity on this
front in the years to come.

 

Intermediary
services under place of supply for goods / services

Agency has also
been used in a different form in the IGST Act. Section 2(13) defines
‘intermediary’ to mean a broker, an agent or any other person, by whatever name
called, who arranges or facilitates the supply of goods or services or both, or
securities, between two or more persons, but does not include a person who
supplies such goods or services or both or securities on his own account. This
phrase is a legacy from the service tax era and has been used in the context of
determining the interstate character of supplies in overseas trade or commerce.

 

The said
definition includes similar terms such as broker, agent, etc. The important
distinctions between the definition of agent and intermediary are as follows:

1.         Intermediary definition is applicable
for the limited context of ascertaining the place of supply of services being
rendered by the intermediary as a principal and not for;

2.         Agent u/s 2(5) enlists categories of
‘mercantile agents’ while intermediary u/s 2(13) enlists categories of ‘agents’
in general. This is critical as one can contend that where one acquires the
status of a mercantile agent the element of intermediary does not arise in view
of the deeming fiction in Schedule I.

3.         The definition of intermediary excludes
supply of goods / services ‘on own account’. This probably implies that goods
which are supplied on own accounts, including those deemed as a supply by the
agent under Schedule I, would stand excluded from the scope of this definition.

4.         Therefore, the concept of intermediary
has to be distinguished from the concept of agency u/s 2(5) and the obscure
line of difference is the extent of authority granted to the person concerned.

 

As it appears, the principles of agency under GST
are multi-faceted with the same term having contextual meanings. This makes the
job of tax advisers a precarious walk over a tight rope. Apart from the concept
of agency, one may also need to address certain other relationships (such as
master-servant, bailee-bailor, brokers, consignment agents, etc.) which fall on
the peripheries of an agency relationship and draw a line of distinction while
interpreting these terms. This can be taken up in a separate article.

 

Part A Service Tax

I. HIGH COURT

 

25. [2020-TIOL-1285-HC-AHM-ST] M/s. Linde Engineering India Pvt. Ltd. vs.
Union of India Date of order: 16th January, 2020

 

Services rendered by a
company located in India to its holding company outside India not being
establishments of distinct persons, are considered as export of service

 

FACTS

 

The petitioner is engaged
in providing services in India and outside India. Service is provided to their
holding company located outside India. A show cause notice was issued alleging
that the services provided to the holding company being merely an establishment
of a distinct person, cannot be considered as export of service and would fall
within the definition of exempted service, and therefore Rule 6(3) of the
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is applicable and hence a demand is raised for
reversal of credit.

 

HELD

 

The Court noted that the
demand is raised on mere misinterpretation of the provisions of the law. The
petitioner and its parent company can by no stretch of the imagination be
considered as the same entity. The petitioner is an establishment in India
which is a taxable territory and its 100% holding company, which is the other
company in the non-taxable territory, cannot be considered as establishment so
as to treat them as distinct persons for the purpose of rendering services.
Thus, services provided to its holding company are considered as export of
service as per Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

 

II. TRIBUNAL

           

26. [2020-TIOL-1178-CESTAT-ALL] M/s Encardio-Rite Electronics Pvt. Ltd. vs.
Commissioner of Appeals, Central Excise and Service Tax
Date of order: 25th November, 2019

 

Even though the
sub-contractor and the main contractor are located in the taxable territory,
since the service is consumed in the state of Jammu and Kashmir the service is
not taxable

 

FACTS

 

The appellants are sub-contractors
engaged in laying of tracks for the Indian Railways and work associated with the construction of dams. The entire activity is performed in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir. The Revenue argues that since both the sub-contractor and
the main contractor are located in the taxable territory in view of Rule 6 of
the Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside and Received in India) Rules
2006 as well as Rule 8 of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012, the service is taxable and therefore tax is leviable.

 

 

 

HELD

 

The Tribunal primarily
noted that the services were provided and consumed in the state of Jammu and
Kashmir. It was held that the provisions of the rule cannot override provisions
of the sections provided in the Act. Section 64 clearly lays down that provisions
of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 which deals with service tax are not
applicable in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Accordingly, since the service is
consumed in a non-taxable territory, the demand of service tax is not
sustainable.

 

27. [2020-TIOL-1167-CESTAT-CHD] State Bank of India vs. Commissioner
(Appeals) of CGST, Ludhiana Date of order: 27th February, 2019

 

Refund cannot be rejected
on technical grounds that the payment of tax sought to be refunded was made in
a wrong service code

 

FACTS


The appellant is a banking
company providing banking and financial services. They received services from a
contractor and discharged service tax under reverse charge on works contract
service. However, while making the payment the same was made under the category
of banking and financial services. Since they were not required to pay service
tax under reverse charge, they filed a refund claim. The claim was rejected on
the ground that they have failed to show that the payment was made under works contract
service.

 

HELD


The Tribunal noted that
whatever service tax was payable by the appellant has been paid under banking
and financial services. They have also produced a certificate issued by the
chartered accountant showing that the service tax of which the refund claim is
filed is none other than the works contract service. The Tribunal accordingly
held that the refund claim cannot be rejected on technical grounds and the
appeal was allowed.

 

28. [2020-TIOL-1166-CESTAT-CHD] M/s Hitachi Metals India Pvt. Ltd. vs.
Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax Date of order: 3rd April, 2019

 

The provisions of section
11B are not applicable when tax is not required to be paid

 

FACTS


The appellant entered into
an agreement with a foreign company for promotion of products in India by way
of customer identification and contact, communication to or from, inquiries
relating to business, co-operate with and represent companies in its
promotional efforts, etc. Due to confusion and lack of clarity, the appellant
paid service tax during the period from April, 2006 to February, 2008 for the
services provided to their foreign-based service recipient for the payment
received against the services in convertible foreign exchange. A refund claim
was filed which was rejected on the ground that the same is filed beyond the
time limit prescribed u/s 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Accordingly, the
present appeal is filed.

 

HELD


The
Tribunal relying on the decision in the case of National Institute of
Public Finance and Policy vs. Commissioner of Service Tax
[2018-TIOL-1746-HC-DEL-ST]
held that since the appellant was not liable
to pay service tax, the time limit prescribed u/s 11B of the Central Excise
Act, 1944 for filing of refund claim is not applicable.

 

 

INTERMINGLING OF INCOME TAX AND GST

Tax laws are not made in a vacuum.
They are expected to be legislated keeping in mind the prevailing social,
economic and legal structure of a State. Yet, once legislated, taxing statutes
are to be implemented strictly and literally without consequences under other
tax laws. It is for the limited purposes of resolving any ambiguity over
undefined terms and / or unclear obligations of transaction where the Courts
have resorted to ancillary tax laws. It becomes imperative for tax subjects to
reconcile multiple laws prior to concluding transactions. This approach
involves a conceptual study and a cautious application of the respective laws
and their precedence.

 

Enactment of the Goods and Services
Tax laws in India would certainly have parallel implications under the existing
Income tax enactment. The business practices and accounting methodology under
the pre-existing enactments would need to be examined under the GST lens. We
are aware that gross income / receipts / turnover in the Profit and Loss
account of an Income tax return does not equate to aggregate turnover of a GSTR
annual return. Why is this so? Fundamentally, supply represents rendering of
service / sale of goods (outward obligation), while income is the consequence
flowing back from such supply (also called consideration); in other words,
supply of goods is the outward flow of a benefit and the consideration emerging
from such supply is termed as income.

 

 

Therefore, supply and income are two
facets of the same coin (one being the source and the other being the
consequence) and are to be viewed differently. They meet only when both
parameters, i.e., outward benefit and corresponding consideration are present
in a transaction; the absence of one any of these elements causes a divergence
in treatment under the respective laws. The other fundamental difference is the
geographical spread of the legislation – Income tax is a pan-India legislation
and GST is a hybrid of both national and State-level legislations.

 

An attempt has been made in this
article to identify variances and consistencies between both the tax enactments
from a conceptual perspective under four broad baskets: Charge, Collection,
Deductions / Benefits and Procedures.

 

A)  CHARGE OF TAX

Income
perspective

Income tax is a direct tax on the
income from a transaction (see pictorial representation). The tax can be said
to be outcome-based since it is imposed on the end result, i.e., net business
profit, net capital gains, net rental income, etc. The basis of charge of
Income tax is ‘accrual’ or ‘receipt’ of ‘income’ depending on the accounting
methodology or specific provisions. Income is a term of wide import and has
been defined in section 2(24) in a very wide manner. Its normal connotation
indicates a periodical money return with some sort of expected regularity from
a definite source. It implies the net take-away from a transaction or series of
transactions. Yet, this definition has been the subject matter of scrutiny at
all levels in judicial fora. Every passing Finance Act has only widened the
scope of this term to include artificial items which do not fall in the normal
connotation of income. Certain extensions to this definition overcome general
understanding such as capital receipts, chance-based (lotteries, etc.)
receipts, absence of consideration, etc. For instance, courts have held that
capital receipts do not fall within the natural scope of the definition of
income. As a consequence, compensation on destruction of capital assets was
held to be capital in nature and included in Income tax only by artificial
extension. Capital receipts are thus an extended feature of income, and
therefore any capital receipt not specified in the enactment is outside the net
of Income tax.

 

GST, on the other hand, is a
transaction-based indirect tax. Transaction of ‘supply’ forms the basis of
charge. However, the term supply appears to be widely defined; it is fenced
with the requirement of being in the nature of sale, lease, exchange, barter,
license, etc. in the course or furtherance of business. Business has been
extended to include occasional, set-up related and closure-related
transactions. The transaction of supply is not significantly influenced by the
intention behind holding the asset. The behavioural aspect may be with
reference to the contractual terms but not behind the ownership of the asset.
For instance, GST may not concern itself with the intention behind holding the
asset but would lay higher emphasis on whether, in fact, the asset was sold or
not. To elaborate this with an example, a manufacturer temporarily leasing an
asset during its construction phase prior to its set-up may not be considered
as generating an income from business but reducing its capital expenditure (a
capital receipt), though such transaction would still be liable to GST. GST
does not treat capital and revenue transactions too differently; sale of
capital assets (or even salvage value), though capital in nature, would be
taxable under the said law.

 

On the other hand, Income tax
permits deduction of bad debts since it follows the ‘income’ approach. As a
corollary, the write-back of a revenue liability is also income. Since the
charging event of GST ends with the completion of supply, recovery of the
consideration, though relevant for Income tax, may be inconsequential for GST.
On the other hand, there may be certain transactions which are supply but may
not result in any income to the supplier. Recovery of costs may not necessarily
impact the income computation as they are generally netted off, but the very
same transaction could have implications under GST (say, freight costs).

 

Schedule I transactions certainly
pose a challenge when juxtaposed between Income tax and GST. Take the example
of the movement of goods between principal and agents. While for Income tax
this movement would not have any implications in either hand, under GST this
would be treated as an outward supply from the principal to its agent and a
corresponding inward supply to the agent, akin to a sale and purchase between
these parties. This would be the case even for a transaction between principal
and job-worker crossing the statutory threshold. The principal would have to
forcefully record this as an outward supply but would not give any
corresponding effect in its Income tax records. Therefore, while all GST
consequences would follow, Income tax would refrain from recognising these
transactions, leading to permanent variance between two values for the
taxpayer; for example, Income tax books would report this as stock held with
the job-worker, while the goods would strictly not form part of inventory of
the principal for GST purposes.

 

Apart from such variances, the
general phenomena of income and supply would more or less reconcile with each
other. The net consequence of the above-cited difference is that a
comprehensive coverage of either Income tax or GST cannot be made only by
reviewing the Profit and Loss account or Income tax computation of the
taxpayer. Transactions beyond Income tax records would need to be examined from
a GST perspective as well.

 

Characterisation
perspective

The other linkage is the
characterisation of transactions under both laws. Income tax u/s 14 provides
for five broad heads of income: (a) salary, (b) income from house property, (c)
business or profession, (d) capital gains and (e) other sources. The Supreme
Court in the famous case of East Housing & Land Development Trust
Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (1961) 42 ITR 49(SC)
held that:

 

‘The classification of income
under distinct heads of income is made having regard to the sources from which
the income is derived. Moreover, Income tax is levied on total taxable income
of the taxpayer and the tax levied is a single tax on aggregate tax receipts
from all sources. It is not a collection of taxes separately levied under
distinct heads but a single tax’.

 

The distinct heads are for the
purpose of differential computation methodologies of income depending on the
source of income. Income tax would treat computation of gains on sale from
capital assets differently from that of gains on sale of a stock. In fact, any
conversion of capital assets into stock in trade or vice versa would
have Income tax implications but no GST implications. A trader reclassifying an
asset from one balance head to another would not have any GST implications. The
reason for this difference is probably that GST does not look through the
intention of supply; it rather looks at the fact of a supply taking place for
taxation.

 

Income resulting from an
employer-employee / master-servant relationship is separately taxable under the
head ‘Salaries’ under Income tax. The litmus test of master-servant
relationship would be the extent of supervisory control of the master over the
individual while rendering the said service – independence in functioning would
provide the extent of control exercised by the master [Ram Prashad vs.
CIT (1972) 86 ITR 122 (SC)].
Under Income tax, the definition of salary
includes wages, allowances, accretion to recognised provident funds, etc.
Though the definition of salary u/s 17(1) does not include ‘perquisites’ within
its fold, it is nevertheless taxable under the head ‘Income from salary’ u/s
17(2). The Supreme Court in Karamchari Union vs. Union of India (2000)
243 ITR 143 (SC)
stated that the definition of salary itself includes
any allowance, perquisite, advantage received by an individual by reason of his
employment. The perquisites are valued based on the net benefit being provided
to the employee (i.e., gross value of benefit minus the recoveries, if any).

 

The above analogy could be extended
to GST in matters involving examination of services rendered between the
employer and the employee in the course of employment. From an employee’s
perspective, the commissions, bonuses, monetary / non-monetary benefits arising
on account of employment even received after termination would be excluded from
the net of GST. But one should be cautious to ascertain the capacity under
which the individual is rendering these services. A director, for instance, can
hold two capacities – as an employee and as a director (agent of the company).
Services rendered as an agent of the company would not fall within the
exclusion but those rendered out of a master-servant relationship would stand
excluded.

 

Under the GST law both employer and
employee are treated as related persons in terms of the explanation to section
15. Schedule I deems certain services between related persons as taxable even
in the absence of a consideration. Therefore, from an employer’s perspective,
in cases where he is providing services for a subsidised charge to an employee
on duty (say subsidised rent accommodation, transport facility, etc.), there
appears to be some ambiguity whether such transaction entails GST. This is
because Schedule III excludes services by an employee to an employer in the
course of, or in relation to, employment, but not the reverse.

 

Certain services by an employer to
his employee arise on account of the obligations he takes over as part of the
employment agreement (such as providing rented accommodation, transport,
medical facilities, etc.). In the view of the authors, such activity is in the
nature of a ‘self-service’ and the recovery if any is towards the costs of such
activity rather than an independent supply, or an outward flow of benefit to
the employee. We can view this as follows:

 

 

The employer provides such benefits
as a condition (express or implied) of the employment. Some activities may also
be gratuitous / implied in nature, such as serving tea during official hours.
Some activity may be either provided free of cost or chargeable at a subsidised
cost (factory lunch). The benefits which are made available to the individual
have emerged from the status of a master-servant relationship. These benefits
are provided by the employer as a means for improving efficiency, productivity,
retention, etc. for his business. Though these actions provide some benefit to
the employee, such benefits are not solely for exclusive personal consumption.
In such cases it can be stated that there is no independent supply from the
employer to the employee, rather, a non-monetary benefit provided to the
individual. Even in case an amount is charged (either at cost or subsidised
rate), it represents a cost recovery / reduction in the quantum of non-monetary
benefit, but not a supply.

 

Such a view resonates from the fact
that while computing the value of perquisites in the hands of the employee, any
costs recovered by the employer towards the provision of such non-monetary
benefit is reduced from the valuation of salary. Such costs are not treated as
an expense of the employee, rather, they are reduced from the gross value of
monetary benefit received during the course of employment. The employer also
does not treat this transaction as part of his income generation activity but
considers this a reduction of his salary costs.

 

We should distinguish the above
scenario from a case where an employer provides benefits beyond the contract of
employment, or renders exclusive benefits to individuals in their personal
capacity. 

 

Situs
perspective

Income tax is imposed on income
which accrues or arises or is received in India, or deemed to accrue or arise,
or received in India. The situs of accrual and receipt of such income
plays an important role in deciding the tax incidence under the Act. Indian
Income tax follows a hybrid of residence and source-based taxation and where
multiple sources exist, the principle of apportionment comes to the fore for
taxation. The Supreme Court in Ahmedbhai Umerbhai [1950] 18 ITR 472 (SC)
held that the place of accrual need not necessarily be the place where the sale
is consummated (i.e., the transfer of property in goods takes place) and income
can be attributed between different places depending on the acts committed at
these places.

 

Income tax has a recognised
principle of profit attribution where cross-border transactions are attributed
to each nation based on Transfer Pricing principles (involving functions
performed, assets employed and risks assumed). In Anglo-French Textile
Company Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax [1954] 25 ITR 27 (SC)
, the
Court stated that sale is merely a culmination of all acts to realise the
profit earned therefrom. The terms accrue and arise themselves have an inherent
principle of apportionment within them and in the absence of a specific
statutory provision (as it was then), general principles of apportionments
would be applicable; of course, subject to application of international treaty
covenants.

 

GST, on the other hand, taxes all
supplies in their entirety even if such supply takes place partly in India
(section 5-14 of the IGST Act). Being a transaction-based levy, the trigger of
supply takes place in terms of the place of supply provisions. Unlike the
Income tax law, the place of supply would be the particular place as stated in
the statute (rather than a spread) which would closely replicate the place of
probable consumption of the goods or services. Place of supply cannot be spread
across geographies and subjected to apportionment principles. For example, the
Indian branch of a foreign bank may be contracting for banking and financial services
with a multinational group directly but with active assistance from its
headquarters outside India. Income tax would require the profit from this
activity to be attributed to all the relevant jurisdictions based on a
functional analysis, but GST would treat this contractual consideration as
taxable entirely in India. It’s a different matter that the headquarters may
separately raise a GST invoice on the branch office to recover its costs.

 

IGST law has specific provisions for
identifying the location of supplier or recipient based on the business
establishments across jurisdictions. The term ‘business establishment’ is
defined to involve people, places and permanence and it forms the basis to
decide the location of supplier or recipient (usually residence-driven). The
terms ‘business establishment’ and ‘permanent establishment’ (business
connection) are on similar platforms to some extent. ‘Permanent establishment’
also uses these three parameters (such as a Fixed Place PE, Service PE,
Equipment PE, etc.) to decide the extent of income attributable to a
jurisdiction. The variance is because (a) Income tax has already experienced
significant evolution with changing business dynamics due to which the
permanent establishment concept is quite enlarged to agency functions, etc.;
(b) Income tax does not treat the condition of permanence, place or people as
cumulative and has, over the years, diluted this to significant economic
presence (say, presence of internet users). It may not be totally incorrect to
say that ‘business establishment’ under GST would necessarily entail a
permanent establishment for the overseas enterprise under Income tax, but the
reverse may not always be true.

 

B)  COLLECTION OF TAX

Income tax is an annual tax. It is
imposed for each year called the assessment year based on the income which is
accrued or received in the preceding year (called previous year). Section 4 of
Income tax prescribes a unique methodology of taxing income of a particular
year (previous year) in the subsequent assessment year. Taxes paid during the
previous year take the form of advance tax and the tax paid during the
assessment year is termed as final self-assessed tax. The liability to charge
arises not later than the close of the previous year but the liability to pay
tax is postponed based on the rates fixed by the yearly Finance Act after the
close of the previous year.

 

The Supreme Court in CIT vs.
Shoorji Vallabhdas & Co. [1962] 46 ITR 144 (SC)
held:

 

‘Income-tax is a levy on income. No
doubt, the Income-tax Act takes into account two points of time at which the
liability to tax is attracted, viz., the accrual of the income or its receipt;
but the substance of the matter is the income. If income does not result at
all, there cannot be a tax, even though in book-keeping an entry is made about
a “hypothetical income” which does not materialise. Where income has, in fact,
been received and is subsequently given up in such circumstances that it
remains the income of the recipient, even though given up, the tax may be payable.
Where, however, the income can be said not to have resulted at all, there is
obviously neither accrual nor receipt of income, even though an entry to that
effect might, in certain circumstances, have been made in the books of
account.’

 

Similarly in CIT vs. Excel
Industries 2013 38 taxmann.com 100 (SC)
and Morvi Industries Ltd.
vs. CIT (Central), [1971] 82 ITR 835 (SC)
the Court considered the
dictionary meaning of the word ‘accrue’ and held that income can be said to
accrue when it becomes due. It was then observed that: ‘……. the date of
payment ……. does not affect the accrual of income. The moment the income
accrues, the assessee gets vested with the right to claim that amount even
though it may not be immediately’.

 

GST is a transaction-based tax with
reporting and tax payments being made on a monthly basis. Time of supply
provisions (sections 12 and 13) fix the relevant month in which taxes are
payable. The leviability of GST is on supply of goods / services and charge of
tax is applicable even on an agreement of supply (section 7). In view of this,
goods sold but rejected on quality parameters prior to its acceptance itself,
may be a supply in terms of section 7 but would certainly not be an income to
the taxpayer. For example, the taxpayer has removed goods on 31st January
for sale which are subject to quality approval at the customer’s end for
payment; this would be a supply for the taxpayer for the month of January but
would be income for the very same taxpayer only when the goods are accepted by
the customer and the right to receive the consideration comes into existence in
favour of the supplier. It would be a different case that in case of rejection
the taxpayer can seek a refund of the GST already paid, but one would
appreciate that the GST law is distinct insofar as it imposes taxes and then,
subsequently, grants refund, while Income tax would refrain from imposing tax
itself.

 

Under Income tax the year of accrual
(other than specified exceptions) determines the relevant assessment year.
Importantly, each assessment year is a water-tight compartment and accruals
pertaining to a particular assessment year have to be considered in the
computation of Income tax for that year only and cannot be adopted in any other
assessment year. This is because Income tax is a single tax (refer preceding
discussion) of an assessment year and can be determined only when all incomes
are reporting in tandem. But GST is a transaction tax and reporting of each
transaction is independent of the other. GST, hence, has this peculiar feature
of permitting transactions of a tax period to cross over to other tax periods
and even financial years. Reporting of transactions in subsequent periods is
not fatal to taxation as each transaction is independent and does not impact
the overall taxability.

 

C)  DEDUCTIONS / BENEFITS

Income tax law is required to grant
deduction of expenses or costs as a matter of statutory limits and
Constitutional mandate. This is because the entry for taxation in terms of
Entry 82 is with reference to income and not receipts (for example, income by
way of diversion of overriding title would not be income in its true sense
though it may be received by the taxpayer). Section 28 levies a tax on the
‘profit and gains’ from business, section 45 taxes capital ‘gains’, etc.; no
doubt, the Legislature exercised its liberty in denying certain deductions
(penal expenses) and limiting the quantum of deductions (30% deduction in case
of house property income), but the law is drafted to ascertain the income and
not the gross receipts of a taxpayer. As a consequence, it may not be illegal
for assessing officers to grant deduction of expenses from the records
available even if the same were not availed by the taxpayer.

 

GST also grants a deduction in the
form of input tax credit – this benefit does not emerge from the Constitution
but from the underlying principle of value-added taxation and statutory
provisions made therefrom. The Legislature has a wider latitude insofar as
barring input tax credit on certain inputs (such as motor vehicle, building /
civil structures, etc.) as part of Legislative liberty and one cannot question
this discretion. A theoretical understanding of the statute may also suggest
that the Legislature may have the discretion to deny all input tax credit if it
decides to do so as a matter of policy. Given this, it may not be imperative
for the assessing authority to grant input tax credit if such a claim has not
been put forward. The statute believes that unavailed input tax credit
represents a tax burden passed on to the next person in the value-chain and
hence there is no obligation to grant input tax credit suo motu while
performing an assessment.

 

As regards the scope of deductions,
both these laws seem to have reconciled on the principle of business purpose.
Income tax permits deductions of business expenses while calculating profits
and gains from business or profession. Apart from specific deductions, there is
also a residuary category for claiming deduction of business expenses u/s 37. GST
has also followed a similar path and granted benefit of input tax credit on
most business inputs / expenses. Both the Income tax deduction and GST credit
are fettered with respective ancillary conditions, but these laws seem to have
aligned themselves as a matter of principle. Therefore, a disallowance u/s 37
on personal expenses may also result in a corresponding disallowance of input
tax credit and vice versa. On the capital assets front, while Income tax
grants depreciation on ownership and use of assets, GST does not concern itself
with ownership of assets and mere business use would be sufficient for claim of
input tax credit.

 

D)  PROCEDURES

Under Income tax the law prevailing
as on the first day of an assessment year would be the relevant law for taxability,
but in the case of GST the law prevailing as on the date of the transaction
would be the basis of chargeability.

 

Income tax has adopted a concept of
self-assessment on an annual basis. Being a Central legislation, state-level
reporting is not relevant and entity-level compliance has to be performed. GST
has adopted a monthly assessment methodology with registration-level compliance
for each State, respectively. This makes GST data much more granular in
comparison to the Income tax data collation.

 

On the assessment front, Income tax
has a tested system of summary assessment, scrutiny assessment, best judgement
assessment, reassessment, review, etc. A taxpayer can be assessed multiple
times for the same assessment year. GST has adopted a hybrid system of
adjudication and assessment (borrowed partially from Excise and VAT laws).
Unlike Income tax where the assessment involves both fact-finding and
adjudication of law, GST has kept the fact-finding exercise under audit
procedures which is independent of legal adjudication (show cause proceedings)
and probably performed by different officers.

 

CONCLUSION

Income and GST certainly meet and part at
multiple points. This diversity would cause variance in differential tax
treatments and hence need careful examination. Supply may or may not be backed
by an income and similarly an income may or may not arise from a supply. With
increasing interchange of information of GSTR9/9C and Income tax return
(comprising the P&L and balance sheet) between Government departments, it
is expected that taxpayers should reconcile these variances as a matter of
preparedness before assessing authorities under both laws. It is suggested that
Government implement exchange programmes among tax departments for field
formations in order to effectively administer these tax laws.

INTERLINKING BETWEEN GST AND CUSTOMS

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK – GST  VIS-À-VIS CUSTOMS

The levy of GST finds its genesis under
Articles 246A and 269A of the Constitution of India. Article 246A confers
powers on both Parliament and the State Legislature to make laws with respect
to goods and services tax imposed by the Union or such State. Two points to be
noted here are:

 

(a) Vide the proviso to
Article 246A, Parliament has been given the exclusive power to make laws with
respect to goods and services tax where the supply of goods or services or both
is in the course of interstate trade or commerce. The mechanism for levy,
collection and sharing of tax on such supplies is provided under Article 269A.
Explanation 1 to Article 269A further provides that the supply of goods or
services in the course of import into the territory of India shall be deemed to
be a supply in the course of interstate trade or commerce.

(b) Article 286 restricts the states from
levying tax on sale or purchase of goods or services or both if such supply
takes place outside the state or in the course of import into or export out of
the territory of India.

 

It is by virtue of the above framework that
Parliament has enacted the Integrated Goods & Services Tax (IGST) Act, 2017
and the Central Goods & Services Tax (CGST) Act, 2017 for levy and
collection of tax on interstate supplies and intrastate supplies, respectively.
Similarly, the states have enacted the State Goods & Services Tax (SGST)
Act, 2017 for levying tax on intrastate supplies. The determination whether or
not a supply is in the course of interstate trade or commerce is dealt with
under sections 7 and 8 of the IGST Act, 2017. Section 7 thereof provides that
supply of goods imported into the territory of India till they cross the
customs frontiers of India shall be treated as supply of goods in the course of
interstate trade or commerce.

 

There is an apparent dual levy on import of
goods under the Constitution in view of Article 269A treating import of goods
as interstate supply of goods or commerce and Article 246 empowering the levy
of customs duties. It is for this reason that the charging section for levy of
IGST u/s 5 specifically excludes the levy and collection of integrated tax on
goods imported into India from its purview and provides that the same shall be
levied and collected in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the CTA,
1975 on the value determined under the said Act at the point when the duty of
customs is levied on the said goods u/s 12 of the Customs Act, 1962.

 

Therefore, when dealing with a cross-border
transaction involving goods, there is a close interplay between the provisions
of GST and Customs requiring determination of the statute under which the duty
/ tax has to be discharged. It therefore becomes important to understand the
meaning of the terms ‘imported goods’, ‘importer’ and the process to be
followed in the case of importation of goods.

 

‘IMPORTED GOODS’ AND ‘IMPORTER’

‘Imported goods’ is defined u/s 2(25) of the
Customs Act, 1962 to mean any goods brought into India from a place outside
India but does not include goods which have been cleared for home consumption.
Similarly,
section 2(26) defines the term ‘importer’ in relation to any goods at any
time between their importation and the time when they are cleared for home
consumption, includes [any owner, beneficial owner] or any person holding
himself out to be the importer.

 

When goods are imported into India, there
are generally two sets of transactions which are undertaken, one being the
filing of Bill of Entry for Home Consumption, in which case the importer has to
pay duty as applicable on the said goods and get the goods cleared from the
Customs Authorities. Once this is done, the goods are no longer imported goods
and therefore, on all subsequent transfers the tax will be levied and collected
under the GST mechanism by classifying the transaction either as intrastate or
interstate. The second option is to file Bill of Entry for Warehousing, in
which case the goods shall be stored either at a public or a private warehouse
by executing a bond. In the second option, the goods continue to be classified
as imported goods and the payment of duty on such goods gets deferred till the
time the goods are kept in the bonded warehouse and the same shall be assessed
to tax when a bill of entry for home consumption in respect of such warehoused
goods is presented.

 

In other words, till the time the goods are
cleared for home consumption, i.e., an order permitting clearance of such goods
for home consumption is passed, the goods would be treated as imported goods
and will be subjected to levy and collection of tax u/s 12 of the Customs Act,
1962.

 

TAX
TREATMENT OF HIGH SEAS SALES

In the case of high seas sales, the sale
takes place before the goods are cleared for home consumption, i.e., a bill of
entry for home consumption is filed and an order permitting the clearance of
such goods is issued by the proper officer. This position has also been
accepted by the Board vide Circular 33/2017 – Customs dated 1st
August, 2017 wherein they have clarified that in case of high seas sales
transactions (single or multiple), IGST shall be levied and collected only at
the time of importation, i.e., when declarations are filed before the Customs
Authorities for clearance purposes after considering the value addition on
account of such high seas transactions. Even the Authority for Advance Ruling
has held so in BASF India Private Limited [2018 (14) GSTL 396 (AAR –
GST)]
.

 

Further, Schedule III has been amended
w.e.f. 1st February, 2019 vide the insertion of Entry 8(b) to
provide that supply of goods by the consignee to any other person, by
endorsement of documents of title to the goods, after the goods have been
dispatched from the port of origin located outside India but before clearance for
home consumption, shall be treated as neither being supply of goods nor supply
of services.

 

TAX
TREATMENT OF WAREHOUSED GOODS

A similar treatment will be accorded to
goods where a bill of entry for warehousing is filed, i.e., goods are kept at a
bonded warehouse which falls within the purview of customs area defined u/s
2(11) of the Customs Act, 1962 as any area of a customs station or a warehouse.
This is because when a bill of entry is filed for warehousing, the goods are
not cleared for home consumption and therefore such goods continue to be
classified as imported goods and subject to levy and collection of tax under
the Customs Act, 1962. This view has been followed by the AAR in Sadesa
Commercial Offshore De Macau Ltd. [2019 (21) GSTL 265 (AAR – GST)]
and Bank
of Nova Scotia [2019 (21) GSTL 238 (AAR – GST)]
. In fact, in Sadesa
Commercial
the AAR has also held that if they are engaged exclusively
in undertaking such supplies, i.e., sale of warehoused goods, they would not be
liable to obtain registration under GST.

 

Prior to the amendment referred to above,
the Board had issued Circular 46/2017-Cus. dated 24th November, 2017
wherein it was clarified that tax will be levied on multiple occasions, one at
the time when the warehoused goods are sold before clearance for home
consumption, and secondly when the bill of entry for home consumption of such
warehoused goods is presented for clearance. However, vide a later
Circular 3/1/2018 dated 25th May, 2018, it was clarified that
integrated tax shall be levied and collected at the time of final clearance of
the warehoused goods for home consumption only.

 

In addition, Circular 46/2017-Cus. was
withdrawn to align with the amendment to Schedule III of the CGST Act, 2017
which deemed supply of warehoused goods to any person before clearance for home
consumption as neither a supply of goods nor supply of services w.e.f. 1st
April, 2018.

 

IMPORTS BY
SEZ DEVELOPERS / UNITS

A similar analogy will apply for the purpose
of goods imported into a Special Economic Zone as well. Section 53(1) of the
SEZ Act, 2005 provides that SEZs shall be deemed to be a territory outside the
Customs territory of India for undertaking the authorised operations. However,
this does not imply that the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 shall not
apply to SEZs as held by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Diamond
& Gem Development Corporation vs. Union of India [2011 (268) ELT 3 (Guj.)]
.
It is for this reason that when goods are imported into an SEZ, a bill of entry
for re-warehousing has to be filed. Of course, in view of section 26 of the SEZ
Act, 2005 which provides exemption from duties of customs on goods imported
into India to carry on the authorised operations, no duty of customs –
including IGST – is leviable on such imports.

 

However, a challenge arises when the said
goods are cleared for use in DTA. The goods imported into an SEZ are under a
Bill of Entry for re-warehousing. However, since an SEZ is deemed to be outside
the customs territory of India, section 30 of the SEZ Act, 2005 provides that
any goods removed from an SEZ to the DTA shall be chargeable to duties of
customs, including anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard duties under the
CTA, 1975 (51 of 1975), where applicable, as leviable on such goods when
imported. In other words, if goods imported into an SEZ are cleared into DTA, a
fresh Bill of Entry for Home Consumption would have to be filed in view of the
fact that the same would be treated as import of goods from a territory outside
India. The Bill of Entry can be filed either by the SEZ unit or by the buyer of
the goods.

 

TAX TREATMENT OF DUTY FREE SHOPS

The levy of tax on goods sold by Duty Free
Shops (DFS) has always been a subject matter of scrutiny, first under the
pre-GST regime and now under the GST regime. DFS are shops which are set up at
airports / sea ports within the customs territory, i.e., after a person goes
through customs formality if he is commencing an international travel, or
before a person goes through customs formality if he is returning from an
international travel.

 

The DFS are treated as warehouses licensed
u/s 58A of the Customs Act, 1962. Once the goods reach the DFS, there are two
possibilities –the goods may be bought by an outbound passenger or the goods
may be bought by an inbound passenger. But the fact remains that the goods have
been sold by the DFS before a Bill of Entry for home consumption was filed.
Thus the question that remains is whether or not such sales would be liable to
GST, irrespective of whether the same is from the departure area or the arrival
area. In this context, it would be imperative to refer to the following
decisions of the Supreme Court:

 

(A) In the case of J.V. Gokal &
Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Assistant Collector of Sales Tax [1990 (110) ELT 106 (SC)]
,
the Court explained the phrase ‘in the course of import of goods into the
territory of India’ to mean

(1) The course of import of goods starts at
a point when the goods cross the customs barrier of the foreign country and
ends at a point in the importing country after the goods cross the customs
barrier,

(2) The sale which occasions the import is a
sale in the course of import,

(3) A purchase by an importer of goods when
they are on the high seas by payment against shipping documents of title (Bill
of Lading) is also a purchase in the course of import, and

(4) A sale by an importer of goods, after
the property in the goods passed to him either after the receipt of the
documents of title against payment or otherwise, to a third party by a similar
process is also a sale in the course of import.

 

(B) In the case of Hotel Ashoka vs.
Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [2012 (276) ELT 433 (SC)]
,
specifically in the context of DFS, the Court had held that the sale of goods
from DFS was from outside India and therefore, they were not liable to sales
tax. The Court further held that the sale of goods was before they were cleared
for home consumption, i.e., it was a sale of goods in the course of import into
India and for this reason the state did not have the power to levy tax on such
transactions.

 

Even in the context of GST, reference to the
decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sandip Patil vs. Union
of India [2019 (31) GSTL 398 (Bom.)]
is important. In this case, not
only did the Court agree with the above contention, it also held that supply of
goods to outbound passengers would be treated as export of goods and in case of
supply of goods to inbound passengers such inbound passengers would be treated
as importers and they would also not be liable to pay any duty in view of
Notification 43/2017-Cus. dated 30th June, 2017 and 2/2017-IT (Rate)
dated 28th June, 2017 r.w. duty-free allowance under the Baggage
Rules. The High Court further held that the DFS would be entitled to claim
refund of accumulated ITC on account of export of goods u/r 89 of the CGST
Rules, 2017. A similar view has also been taken in the case of A1
Hospitality Services Private Limited vs. Union of India [2019 (22) GSTL 326
(Bom.)]
as well as Atin Krishna vs. Union of India [2019 (25)
GSTL 0390 (All.)].

 

One should, however, note that the AAR has,
in the case of Rod Retail Private Limited [2018 (12) GSTL 206 (AAR –
GST)]
on the contrary held that the supply of goods from DFS would be
liable to GST. However, this AAR, while referring to the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Ashoka Hotel referred above, has
held it to be not applicable since ‘under GST law, scenario has changed and
therefore decision of Apex Court not applicable
’. Instead, it refers to the
decision in the case of Collector vs. Sun Industries [1988 (35) ELT 241
(SC)]
which was completely on a different footing. It is imperative to
note that the High Court had in the case of Sandeep Patil
distinguished this ruling on the grounds that the facts in the case of Rod
Retail
were different since the same was a ‘Duty Paid Shop’ and not a
‘Duty free shop’ as clarified by the Board vide Circular dated 29th
May, 2018 and therefore the dispensation allowed to DFS would not be affected
in any manner.

 

Reference is also invited to the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nirmal Kumar Parsan vs.
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [SCA No. 7863 of 2009]
wherein in the
case of warehoused goods the Court upheld the liability to pay VAT on goods
sold as stores to foreign-going vessels. However, in this case, the Court made
a peculiar observation that the appellant had not shown anything to demonstrate
that the subject bonded warehouse came within the customs port / customs land
station area and, more so, the state sales occasioned the import of goods
within the territory of India.

 

INPUT TAX CREDIT IMPLICATIONS

In view of the amendment to section 17(3),
it is further provided that the supply of goods covered under Schedule III
would not be treated as exempted supply and therefore there is no requirement
to reverse Input Tax Credit on account of the same.

 

RCM ON OCEAN FREIGHT

Generally, when a contract for sale of goods
is executed, the parties need to agree when the risk and rewards associated
with the goods would get transferred. There are two commonly used terms,
namely, CIF – i.e., cost, insurance and freight included; and FOB – i.e., Free
on Board, meaning once the goods reach the port at the foreign country, the
risks and rewards associated with such goods are transferred to the buyer in
which case he shall make arrangements to bring the goods from the foreign port
to a port in India by entering into a separate contract for such services.

 

For customs, depending on the agreed terms,
the assessable value is generally adjusted, either for actual freight incurred
or on notional basis. For example, if freight cost is not available, the same
is assumed at 20% of the FOB value and the same is added to the transaction
value for determining the assessable value. [Refer Rule 10 of the Customs
Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007]. This implies
that the customs duty along with IGST is paid not only on the transaction value
but also on the actual various or notional value of expenses incurred during
the import of such goods. This would also mean that tax is charged indirectly
on the transportation cost in the CIF contracts as well, though the service
provider (shipping line) and the service receiver (foreign seller) may not be
in India.

 

Despite the transaction being indirectly
taxed, Entry 10 of Notification 10/2017-IT (Rate) dated 28th June,
2017 imposes a liability on the importer, as defined in section 2(26) to pay
tax on ‘services supplied by a person located in non-taxable territory by
way of transportation of goods by a vessel from a place outside India up to the
customs station of clearance in India
’. The Notification further provides
that where the value of taxable service provided by a person located in
non-taxable territory to a person located in non-taxable territory by way of
transportation of goods by a vessel from a place outside India up to the
customs station of clearance in India is not available with the person liable
for paying integrated tax, the same shall be deemed to be 10% of the CIF value
(sum of cost, insurance, and freight) of imported goods.

 

Therefore, it is apparent that there is a
dual taxation of the freight component, once at the time of clearance of goods
with the customs authorities where the value of freight is included in the
assessable value, and secondly, the tax liability created through the
Notification 10/2017-IT (Rate). Similar provisions existed under the Service
Tax Regime as well where the Gujarat High Court had struck down the entry
imposing liability to pay tax under reverse charge in the case of Sal
Steel Limited vs. Union of India [R/SCA No. 20785 of 2018]
. The levy
was struck down primarily because section 94 did not permit the Central
Government to make rules for recovering service tax from a third party who is
neither the service provider nor the service receiver. The Court further held
that there was no machinery provision to demand the tax from the importer.

 

Under GST, the AAR has on multiple occasions
such as India Potash Limited [2020 (32) GSTL 53 [AAR – AP)]; M.K.
Agrotech Limited [2020 (32) GSTL 148 (AAR – KA)]; E-DP Marketing Private
Limited [2019 (26) GSTL 436 (AAR – MP)]
held that there is a liability
to pay GST under RCM on such transactions. However, the Gujarat High Court has
in the case of Mohit Minerals Private Limited vs. UoI
[2020-TIOL-164-HC-AHM-GST]
struck down Entry 10 as ultra vires
for the following reasons:

(a) The importer is not the service
recipient since the GST law defines the service recipient as the person liable
to pay consideration,

(b) The place of supply provisions apply
only in case where either the location of supplier or the recipient of services
is outside India. In this case, both the location of supplier as well as
recipient are outside India,

(c) The point of taxation would never get
triggered since neither the payment to the supplier would be reflected in the
books of accounts of the importer, nor the invoice of the shipping line would
be in the name of the importer.

 

While the levy has been struck down, one
should note that the Revenue is likely to file an appeal before the Supreme
Court and therefore reliance on this decision should be placed keeping in mind
other aspects as well. For instance, in case the decision is overturned by the
Court and the liability to pay tax is confirmed, the same would be along with
consequential interest and probably no Input Tax Credits. Penalty can be
contested on bona fide belief, but it would be a long way away,
especially considering the fact that the payment of tax might in many cases be
a revenue-neutral exercise.

 

INTERNATIONAL JOB WORK

Section 2(68) of the CGST Act, 2017 defines
the term ‘job work’ as ‘any treatment or process undertaken by a person on
goods belonging to another person
’. This activity is deemed to be a supply
of service under GST in view of Entry 3 of Schedule II of the CGST Act, 2017.

 

The modus operandi in this kind of
transaction is that the owner of goods (generally known as principal) desirous
of getting some work done on his goods, sends the said goods to his job-worker
without any consideration. The said job-worker shall work on the said goods and
return the goods to the principal and recover the charges for carrying out the
said activities from the principal.

 

Therefore, there are three different events
involved in a transaction of job work, namely, receipt of goods, working on the
said goods (treatment / process) and lastly, return of the said goods. When
both the parties, i.e., principal and job-worker are in the same territory,
there are no tax implications at the time of receipt of goods and sending back
the goods. However, when in the same transaction one of the parties is outside
India, customs duty comes into the picture because there is either an import of
goods, i.e., goods coming into India from a territory outside India in case of
inbound job work or export of goods, i.e., goods being taken out of India in
case of outbound job work.

 

Under the Customs Act, 1962 the import of
goods for job work is dealt with by Notification 32/1997-Cus. dated 1st
April, 1997. This Notification exempts goods imported for jobbing from payment
of customs duty leviable under the First Schedule and additional duty leviable
u/s 3 of the CTA, 1975 subject to satisfaction of the condition prescribed.
However, it is imperative to note that vide Notification 26/2017-Cus.
dated 29th June, 2017 in the context of additional duties u/s 3 of
the CTA, 1975, the exemption is restricted only to the extent of additional
duties leviable under sub-sections (1), (3) and (5) thereof. This would imply
that the integrated tax on import of goods, which is leviable u/s 3(7) of the
CTA, 1975 would be liable to IGST in case of goods imported for job work
purposes, though no consideration is payable by the importer job worker on such
import of goods. The same applies in case of outbound job work, where goods are
re-imported. Notification 45/2017-Cus. dated 30th June, 2017 exempts
additional duties leviable u/s 3 in the case of re-import.

 

The first question that would need
consideration is whether the job-worker importing the goods would be liable to
claim credit of integrated tax paid on such imports? For the same, one would
need to refer to section 16 of the CGST Act, 2017 to ensure that the conditions
prescribed therein are satisfied or not. The primary conditions to be satisfied
in this set of transactions are that the goods should have been received in the
course or furtherance of business, the recipient should be in possession of
such tax-paying document as may be prescribed, the recipient should have actually
received the goods, and lastly, he should have furnished the return u/s 39. It
is beyond doubt that the above conditions are getting satisfied and therefore,
the claim of integrated tax paid on receipt of goods for job work by the
job-worker as importer should be allowed. This view has also been accepted by
the AAR in Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. [2019 (27) GSTL 405 (AAR)].

 

The next question that would need
consideration is in two parts, taxability of services provided by the job
worker, and secondly whether sending back of goods would amount to exports or
not? As discussed above, the commercial transaction in the current case is
undertaking activity on goods owned by the principal for which the job worker
recovers charges from the said principal. Since this is deemed to be a supply
of service, section 13 of the IGST Act, 2017 shall come into play which deals
with determination of place of supply in case where either the location of the
supplier of service or the location of the recipient of service is outside India,
which applies to the current transaction. Accordingly, one needs to refer to
the various scenarios laid down u/s 13 thereof to identify the applicable rule
for determining the place of supply.

 

The most directly concerned rule for this
kind of service appears to be section 13(3)(a) which provides that the place of
supply of service in case where the services supplied in respect of goods which
are required to be made physically available by the recipient of services to
the supplier of services, or to a person acting on behalf of the supplier of
services in order to provide the services, shall be the location where such
services are actually performed. In this sense, it would have implied that the
goods on which job work services are being performed being located in India,
the place of supply u/s 13(3) shall be India and accordingly the same would be
liable to tax and not treated as export of services. Similarly, in case of an
outbound job work transaction, the situation would be reverse and job work charges
paid to the foreign job worker would not be liable to GST under import of
services since place of supply would be outside India.

 

This situation would apply till 31st
January, 2019 post which the proviso to section 13(3) has come into
force. The proviso provides that section 13(3)(a) shall not apply to
cases where goods are temporarily imported into India for repairs or for any
other treatment or process and are exported after such repairs or treatment or
process without being put to any use in India, other than that which is
required for such repairs or treatment or process. Therefore, w.e.f. 1st
February, 2019, in case of inbound job works, the place of supply shall be the
location of the recipient of service, i.e., outside India and subject to the
satisfaction of conditions u/s 2(6) of the IGST Act, 2017 shall be treated as
export of service. That being the case, such job-worker may be entitled to
claim refund of accumulated ITC or tax paid on supply of such Zero-Rated
Services. However, in case of an outbound job work transaction, the Indian
principal would now be liable to pay tax under import of services.

 

It is important to note that this proviso
does not impose any time limit within which the goods have to be exported after
the repairs / process and therefore, no such time limit can be enforced for
return of such goods. One may refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court
in Bombay Machinery Works [2020–VIL16–SC] which was on a similar
aspect, though in the context of section 6(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act,
1956.

 

Notification 32/1997-Cus. dated 1st
April, 1997 requires that the goods should be re-exported within six months
from the date of clearance of such goods or within such extended time period as
the Assistant Commissioner of Customs may allow. It may be noted that the
definition of exports, under GST as well as Customs, is similar and means taking
out of India to a place outside India
. Therefore, the sending back of goods
would qualify as export for the purpose of Customs as well as GST.

One important issue which was taken up in
the AAR case of Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. was that of
eligibility of refund claim. In the said case, the applicant was engaged in
undertaking job work on iron ore which attracts nil rate of duty. In this case,
the AAR held that since the goods being exported are liable for export duty,
the refund of accumulated ITC would not be available in view of the second proviso
to section 54. However, this appears to be on a wrong footing because the
supply undertaken by the applicant was that of supply of services to which the
restriction does not apply.

 

TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES

Section 2(22) of the Customs Act, 1962
defines the term ‘goods’ to include, among other things, any other kind of
movable property. The Supreme Court has, in the case of TCS vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh [2004 (178) ELT 2 (SC)]
dealt with what shall constitute
goods. While dealing with this subject, the Constitution Bench held that goods
may be tangible or intangible property. A property becomes goods provided it
has the attributes having regard to utility, capability of being bought and
sold and capability of being transferred, transmitted, delivered, stored and
possessed.

 

There can be
different types of intangibles, such as patents, designs, copyrights,
trademarks, etc. Each of these is governed by specific statutes. Such rights
can be transferred either by way of license or assignment. License is a
temporary transfer of rights without any change in the ownership, which would
amount to rendition of service in view of Entry 5(c) of Schedule II of the CGST
Act, 2017, while assignment would mean a change in ownership of the rights and
therefore would be treated as supply of goods in view of Entry 1(a) of Schedule
II. This distinction has been explained in the case of CST vs. Dukes
& Sons Private Limited [1988 (SCC) Online Bom 448].

 

However, an issue that arises is with
respect to the situs in case of assignment of intangibles. What shall be
the situs of such transfer, i.e., whether the location where the
intangible is registered shall be the situs, or the location of the
owner of such intangible shall be considered the situs? In this regard,
one may refer to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mahyco
Monsanto Biotech India Private Limited vs. Union of India [2016 (44) STR 161
(Bom).]
where the Court has followed the principle of mobilia
sequuntur personam
, i.e., location of owner of intangible asset would be
closest approximation of situs of his intangible asset and the location
where agreement is entered would not be relevant.

Given this background, it may be argued that
in case the rights owned by a person outside India are assigned, the same would
be treated as import of goods and therefore no tax can be levied on the same
u/s 5 of the IGST Act, 2017. However, the bigger issue would be whether or not
such imports would be liable to tax u/s 12 of the Customs Act, 1962, especially
when the document of title evidencing assignment of rights is received
electronically? In case the document of title is brought into India, either as
a courier or baggage, there may be customs duty implications on such imports,
but on what value would the same be payable would be a subject matter of
dispute.

 

A similar challenge would be seen in case of
export transactions, i.e., assignment of rights from India to a person outside
India. Whether such person would be liable to treat such assignment as export
of goods without there being a corresponding shipping bill and, accordingly,
the consequential impact on adjudication of refund claims?

 

IMPORTS VIS-À-VIS TRANSFER OF RIGHT TO USE
GOODS

Another aspect to be noted is that of cases
where there is a transfer of right to use goods and in pursuance of which goods
are imported into India. Entry 5(f) of Schedule II of the CGST Act, 2017 treats
activities of transfer of right to use goods for any purpose as supply of
services. Therefore, when such service of transfer of right to use such goods
is provided by a foreign party, which would trigger bringing goods from outside
India to India, there will be a dual challenge, one being the levy of IGST on
the rental payments under import of service, and the second being the levy of
IGST u/s 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 which would be on the value of goods and
therefore highly disproportionate to the transaction being undertaken.

 

To avoid this dual levy of tax, Notification
72/2017-Cus. dated 16th August, 2017 provides exemption from the
levy of basic customs duty and integrated tax. While 100% exemption is not
provided for under basic customs duty, integrated tax u/s 3(7) of CTA, 1975 is
granted, provided the importer gives an undertaking that he shall discharge the
tax on the said services as import of services.

 

GOODS SENT FOR EXHIBITIONS

Various exhibitions are held all over India
where people participate and display their goods. There can be a scenario where
an exhibition is being held in India and a person from outside India showcases
his product, in which case he shall bring the goods from outside India to
India; and secondly, a case where a person in India intends to showcase his
products at an exhibition being held outside India.

 

The procedure for import of goods for
exhibition purposes is dealt with under Notification 8/2016-Cus. dated 5th
February, 2016. The said Notification provides for exemption from payment of
customs duty and additional customs duty subject to conditions, such as
execution of bond, re-export of goods within the prescribed period of six
months, etc. At times it so happens that the goods are sold at such exhibitions
and therefore, instead of re-exporting the said goods, the same have to be
cleared for home consumption by paying the appropriate customs duty.

 

However, in such cases such person will have
to apply for registration as a non-resident taxable person and discharge the
applicable tax on the sale value after claiming Input Tax Credit only of the
tax paid on goods imported by him u/s 16. Such non-resident taxable person
shall not be allowed credit of any other inward supplies, except for tax paid
on goods imported by him. Similarly, in case of goods sent for exhibition
abroad, Notification 45/2017-Cus. dated 30th June, 2017 provides
that no tax shall be payable on re-importation of such goods. This has also
been clarified by the Board Circular 21/2019-Cus. dated 24th July,
2019.

 

BRANCH TRANSFER

Branch transfer is a common terminology used
when a branch sends goods to another branch. Under GST, Entry 2 of Schedule I
of the CGST Act, 2017 deems supply of goods or services or both between related
persons or between distinct persons as specified in section 25 when made in the
course or furtherance of business as supply, even though made without
consideration which would require the transaction to be valued at arm’s length
and tax discharged.

 

The application of this entry in the context
of international branch transfer needs to be analysed. The term ‘distinct
persons’ is dealt with u/s 25(4) which provides that a person who has
obtained or is required to obtain more than one registration, whether in one
State or Union territory or more than one State or Union territory shall, in
respect of each such registration, be treated as distinct persons for the
purposes of this Act.

 

In other words, it is only the domestic
branches of an entity which come within the purview of distinct persons.
Similarly, a domestic H.O. and foreign branch, or vice versa would not
come within the purview of related persons, since the same would have entailed
existence of more than one person, which is not so in the case of branch transfers.
It is for this reason that in case of domestic transactions the concept of
‘distinct person’ has been introduced.

 

In this background, one would need to
analyse the tax implications when international branch transfer is undertaken,
i.e., goods are sent to foreign branch / H.O. or vice versa, goods are
received from foreign branch / H.O.

 

In an outward branch transfer case, it would
be a transaction of export of goods – both under customs as well as GST since
goods are actually going out of India. The supplying branch would have an
option to export the goods under LUT / Bond or on payment of duty.

 

However, in case of inward branch transfer,
the importer would be required to pay the applicable duty – customs as well as
integrated tax on such imports, subject to specific exemptions or cases where
the import of goods fall under specific scenarios.

 

CONCLUSION

While both the
Customs and the GST laws operate in different domains with different objectives
in mind, in view of the disconnect in certain cases, one finds instances of
overlap and interplay between these two laws.

 

FIRST SIGNS OF EVOLUTION

We are experiencing
the first signs of evolution of the GST law and who would have imagined that
the beginning would be from a property dispute matter! A recent decision of a
single-member bench of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Bai Mamubai Trust
vs. Suchitra 2019 (31) GSTL 193
has set the tone for the upcoming years
of GST. This article is an attempt to decode the decision and examine its
application.

 

ISSUE AT HAND

The Bombay High
Court was hearing a suit between a landlord (plaintiff) and a tenant (defendant)
under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 regarding adverse possession of a
commercial property. In view of the strong prima facie case of the
landlord to obtain possession of the property, the Court granted interim
protection by placing a condition of payment of an ad hoc royalty by the
defendant to be deposited with the Court Receiver under an agency agreement.
The Court Receiver was directed to invest the royalty received as a fixed
deposit with a nationalised bank. This direction raised three questions for the
plaintiff and the Court Receiver:

(a) Whether the royalty paid by the defendant was
liable to GST during the period of dispute?

(b) If yes, who was liable to collect the GST from
the tenant and pay the same to the Government – whether the Court Receiver or
the landlord?

(c) Whether the Court Receiver is separately
taxable for the agency services being rendered under this arrangement?

 

The primary issue
before the Court was the applicability of GST on the royalty payment by the
defendant to the Court Receiver during the pendency of the dispute. This
required examination of the following entries:

* Provisions of
section 7 defining the scope of supply for the purpose of GST;

* Schedule III –
Entry 2: Services by any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the
time being in force; and

* Applicability of
reverse charge provisions on receipt of services from the Central Government in
terms of Notification 13/2017-CGST(Rate).

 

Submissions
of
amicus curiae:
The Court appointed an amicus curiae to assist it in
resolving the issue on legal principles. The submissions made by him were as
follows:

(i)   Any amount paid under a Court’s order / decree
or an out-of-Court settlement is taxable only if it is towards an underlying
taxable supply; where the payment is towards restitution of a loss or damage,
i.e. compensatory in nature, such payment would lack the tenets of supply, i.e.
enforceable reciprocity in actions.

(ii)   The method adopted for quantifying the
damages, i.e. equating to the commercial rental value should not be confused
with the underlying purport of the payment {Citing Senairam Doongarmall
vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [(1962) SCR 1 257]
}.

(iii) Services provided by the Court Receiver were to
be treated as ‘Services by any Court or Tribunal established under any law for
the time being in force’ within the meaning of paragraph 2 of schedule III to
the CGST Act and is, accordingly, not within the ambit of GST.

(iv) Section 92 of the CGST Act provides for
collection and discharge of tax liability by a Court Receiver from the estate
in its control. The Court Receiver would be a convenient point for the Revenue
to collect its tax being the person who is in direct receipt of the
consideration / royalty, where such payment itself is liable to be taxed under
the provisions of the CGST Act. The Court Receiver can discharge the liability
as an agent of the supplier in terms of section 2(105) of the said Act.

 

Court
Receiver’s submissions:
The Court Receiver also
made its submission on the specific question on taxability of the royalty as
follows:

(1) There is a distinction between fees or
remuneration of the Court Receiver under Rule 591 of the Bombay High Court
(Original Side) Rules, 1980 and the moneys paid by a litigant towards the matter
under litigation.

(2) The Court Receiver is an adjunct of the Court
and a permanent department of the Court and its role is to implement interim
protection to litigants. Therefore, the former is clearly covered under
schedule III and not taxable.

(3) Monies paid in the Court of litigation as part
of interim protection are to be examined based on the underlying relationship
between the litigating parties – taxable event of supply cannot be applied on a
notional contract between either of the parties and the Court Receiver.

(4) For example, during the tenure of permissive
use of a property, what is paid by the occupier to the right owner is the
contractual consideration. If such permissive use or occupation is terminated
or comes to an end and the occupation becomes unlawful, the nature of payment
to be paid to the right owner changes from contractual consideration to
damages or
mesne profits for unauthorised use and occupation of the
property.
GST is payable on the former contractual consideration, but
not on damages payable for unauthorised use and occupation of the property. The
fact that the measure of damages is to be based on market rent should not
influence the nature of the payment being made, i.e. a payment to compensate
the right owner for violation of his legal right. Royalty is towards
compensation and not a contractual consideration.

(5) The Court Receiver may discharge the GST by
including this obligation in the agency agreement. This may obviate the
requirement of the Court Receiver from having to obtain separate CGST
registration for each matter or transaction in respect of which it is appointed
to act by the Court; (though) it is preferable from an audit and administrative
perspective to obtain separate GST registration for each matter, where the same
is paid for by the Court Receiver.

 

Submissions
of State Government / Union of India

(I) GST may be
recovered from the Court Receiver u/s 92 only if it is conducting a business of
a taxable person. A binding contract has come into existence under the
directions of the Court (i.e. the defendant has to either accept the offer to
retain possession and pay royalty, or vacate the premises).There is an offer,
its acceptance and consideration for forming a valid contract.

(II) The order
permitting the defendant to remain in possession of the suit premises is
essentially a contract and payment of royalty is ‘consideration’ for this
‘supply’ of premises to the defendant pursuant to an order of
the Court. GST will be liable to be paid under the MGST Act. The Learned
Advocate-General relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Assistant
Commissioner, Ernakulam vs. Hindustan Urban Infrastructure Ltd. [(2015) 3 SCC
745]
(which considers Rule 54 of the Kerala Sales Tax Rules which is in
pari materia
with section 92 of the MGST Act) to contend that akin to an
official liquidator who was termed to be a dealer of company assets even though
the express consent of the Company in Liquidation was not present, the Court
Receiver represents the plaintiff and is a supplier of services.

(III) As per the
decision of the Supreme Court in Humayun Dhanrajgir vs. Ezra Aboody
(2008) Bom C.R. 862
, royalty is a compensation payable by the occupier
to the right owner in the property towards the use of his rights in his
property. There is a clear supply of service of providing premises (subject, of
course, to the final determination of the rights of the parties to the suit).
Such letting or providing of premises is clearly covered in the scope of
‘supply’ u/s 7 of the CGST Act as also under the definition of ‘services’ u/s
2(102) of the CGST Act.

(IV) The Court
Receiver wears two hats, one as an agent of the Court and another as an agent
of the plaintiff on whose application he is appointed. Tax is only levied
on the services rendered by the Court Receiver as an agent / on behalf of the
plaintiff u/s 92 of the CGST Act.

 

The findings of the
Court can be segregated into the following sub-headings:

(A) Status of
the Court Receiver and its Court fee:
The
Court cited the decision of Shakti International Private Limited vs.
Excel Metal Processors Private Limited 2018 (4) Arb LR 17 (Bom.)
which,
in turn, relied on certain Supreme Court decisions and effectively approved the
submission of the amicus curiae that the Court Receiver is a permanent
department of the Court, implements orders of the Court and functions under the
supervision and direction of the Court, hence to be concluded as a ‘Court’1.
Accordingly, the fee of the Court Receiver is clearly excludible in terms of
Entry 2 to Schedule III of the GST enactments.

(B) GST
liability on income from estate under control of Court Receiver:
The Court held that ‘supply’ being an essential ingredient of
taxability, has to be identified for each case; the present case being royalty
payments for use of commercial premises.

 

On the aspect
of supply:
The royalty payment was held as not
being towards a taxable supply for the following reasons:

 

(a) It was being paid towards damages or compensation
or towards securing any future determination of compensation or damages for a violation
of the legal rights
of the landlord (plaintiff) in the tenanted
premises;

(b) The basis of payment is illegal
possession or trespass and hence lacked necessary reciprocity to make it a
supply;

(c) The plaintiff is not in agreement with
continuing possession and hence seeking damages for loss and such loss closely
resembles in monetary terms the rental value of the property;

(d) In contrast, had there been a money suit for
recovery of unpaid rent, certainly the tax is liable on the unpaid
consideration as it represented an agreed reciprocal obligation where one of
the litigating parties was seeking relief of its rights in the contract;

(e) Damages represent an award in money for a civil
wrong which is in contrast to ‘consideration’. While damages are towards
restitution for loss caused on account of violation, consideration is towards
an identifiable supply;

(f)   The law of damages is not restricted to only
unpaid consideration, i.e. what ought to have been paid, but also expands to
compensating the loss to a party which may not even be privy to the agreement
(e.g. in torts);

(g) The decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan
Urban Infrastructure (Supra)
is distinguishable as the said decision
pertained to an official liquidator being termed as a dealer of goods of the
company it represents in the course of liquidation;

(h) Royalty for the demise of a property itself has
many colours and the true character is to be determined from specific facts –
the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Humayun
Dhanrajgir vs. Ezra Aboody (2008) Bom C.R. 862
clearly distinguishes
the rent paid for a tenancy as being in the nature of (a) consideration during
the tenure of the tenant; (b) compensatory after the tenure as a disputed
occupant; and (c) mesne profits as being towards the occupancy in spite
of being declared as illegal by a Court;

(i)   The Court also accepted the submission that
the measure for computation cannot be the litmus test for ascertaining the
character of a supply;

(j)   Contractual obligations would dominate over
consideration while deciding the character of a supply. Even though business
and supply definitions are inclusive, a positive act of supply is a necessary
concomitant of a supply transaction;

(k) The Court cited an example of a Court Receiver
being deputed to make an inventory of goods, collect rents with respect to
immovable property in dispute, or where the property has to be sealed, or the Receiver
is appointed to call bids for letting out the premises on leave and license,
the fees or charges of the Court Receiver are exempt. In providing these
services, the office of the Court Receiver is acting as a department of the
Court and therefore no GST is payable.

 

Interestingly, as
an obiter, the Court specifies some instances where GST may be
applicable – it may be observed that each of them has a positive act with
reciprocity and hence includible as supply:

(i)   Where the Court Receiver is appointed to run
the business of a partnership firm in dissolution, the business of the firm
under the control of receivership may generate taxable revenues.

(ii)   Where the Court authorises the Court Receiver
to let out the suit property on leave and license, the license fees paid may
attract GST.

(iii) Where the Court Receiver collects rents or
profits from occupants of properties under receivership, the same will be
liable to payment of GST.

(iv) Consideration received for assignment, license
or permitted use of intellectual property.

 

On the aspect
of representative capacity of Court Receiver:

Curiously, having
decided that the said royalty is not towards a supply, the Court need not have
examined the provisions designating the Court Receiver as a representative
assessee. Yet, the Court specifically stated that section 92 would be
applicable where the Court Receiver was in control of the business of the
taxable person, a taxable event of supply takes place with respect to such
business on account of which the estate of the taxable person would be liable
to tax, interest or penalty under the CGST Act. Therefore, in the event the
supply is taxable, the Court Receiver would have to take registration and
discharge the tax liability as an agent of the supplier [Court directed that a
clause in the standard form of the agency agreement to the effect may be
included] – the agent appointed by the Court Receiver must obtain registration
and make such payment on behalf of the Receiver and indemnify the Receiver for any
liability that may fall upon the Receiver u/s 92 of the GST Act concerned.

 

Ratio Decidendi

The following are
the key takeaways from this decision:

(1) Reciprocal obligations arising from positive
actions are necessary for an arrangement to be a supply;

(2) Consideration should be examined as a
reciprocal of a positive act and distinguished from compensations for
restituting a loss;

(3) Measure cannot fix the character of the
payment, it has to be ascertained from contractual obligations and substance of
the agreement;

(4) Schedule II was not invoked as a starting point
for deciding supply, and naturally so in view of the retrospective amendment
setting the role of schedule II as being classificatory and not directory, in
deciding the scope of supply u/s 7 of the GST enactment;

(5) In case of representative persons, distinguish
the receipt while acting as a representative and those on its own account. In
the present facts, the Court Receiver acted as a representative while
collecting royalty payments but acted on its own account in respect of the fee
as a Court Receiver. The former was not taxable on account of not falling
within the scope of supply u/s 7 itself, while the latter was held as being
exempt on account of schedule III of the GST law.

 

CAUTION OVER APPLICATION

However, the
following should not be immediately concluded from this decision:

(I)   All court-directed payments are not
compensatory and damages are to be identified in their true sense based on
facts of the case;

(II)   Scope of the term ‘business’ and whether Court
Receiver is in ‘business’ – the Court directly invoked schedule III to hold
that it was exempt under GST and has not examined section 7 on this aspect;

(III) GST implications if the Court in this civil
suit ultimately holds that tenant has rightful possession under the tenancy and
the royalty previously deposited as a fixed deposit (even partially) is
appropriated towards the rent to the landlord;

(IV) Whether or not
there is a supply inter se between the Court Receiver and the principal
in case of supply of goods, especially in the context of schedule I entry 3
which deems transactions between principal and agent as supplies even in the
absence of consideration.

 

The Hon’ble High Court has delivered a
well-reasoned order and even if the same is to be challenged before higher
forums, the principles set out in this decision seem to be on a solid
foundation. The Court has certainly placed some boundaries over the seemingly
unfenced scope of supply u/s 7. This decision would have implications on
matters involving liquidated damages, demurrage / detention charges, notice pay
recovery, etc. and the underlying character of the obligation would have to be
minutely studied prior to taking support of this decision.  

GST ON PAYMENTS MADE TO DIRECTORS – SOME CLARITY

In my article ‘GST
on payments made to Directors
’ published on Page 24 of the BCAJ
issue of June, 2020, I had discussed in detail the various types of payments
made to Directors (whether Whole-Time Directors or Independent Directors) and
the GST implications of the same. That was on the basis of some judicial
precedents and a few contradictory Advance Rulings.

 

The inconsistent
Advance Rulings and the representations made by the trade and industry seeking
finality in the matter may have prompted the GST Policy Wing of the Central
Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (the Board) to issue a clarification and to
avoid unnecessary confusion and costly litigation. The clarification was issued
vide Circular No. 140/10/2020-GST dated 10th June, 2020.

 

The clarification
has categorised the payments made to Directors under two scenarios – the applicability
of GST on remuneration paid by companies to:

(a) Independent Directors or those Directors who
are not employees of the company
; and

(b) Whole-Time Directors, including Managing
Director, who are employees of the company.

 

The clarification
has laid emphasis on the relation of the Director with the company to decide
the leviability of GST and relied on the definition of Independent Directors
and Whole-Time Directors from the Companies Act, 2013. The same is summarised
hereunder.

 

Independent
Directors or those Directors who are not employees of the company

As per section
149(6) of the Companies Act, 2013, read with Rule 12 of the Companies (Share
Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014, ‘independent directors’ are such Directors
who have not been an employee or proprietor or a partner of the said
company in any of the three financial years immediately preceding the financial
year in which he is proposed to be appointed in the said company.

 

And a ‘whole
time-director’ is defined u/s 2(94) of the Companies Act, 2013 in an inclusive
manner, to include a person who may not be an employee of the company.

 

In both the cases
mentioned above, where the Directors are not employees of the company, the
amounts paid to them for the services provided to the company would be outside
the scope of Schedule III of the CGST Act and would thus become taxable under
GST. As mentioned in the article earlier, such services would get covered under
Entry 6 of Notification No. 13/2017-CT (Rates) and No. 10/2017-IT (Rates), both
dated 28th June, 2017, effective from 1st July, 2017,
issued under the CGST Act (‘Reverse Charge Notification’) and, consequently,
GST shall become payable under Reverse Charge Mechanism by the company being
recipient of the services.

 

Whole-Time Directors, including Managing Director, who are employees
of the  company

The clarification
provides that if a Director has been considered to be an employee of the
company, it would be pertinent to examine whether the activities performed by
the Director are in the course of an employer-employee relation. The
clarification emphasises that the services provided should be ascertained to be
under a ‘contract of service’ or ‘contract for service’ since the remuneration
under the latter would become taxable under GST.

 

To classify the
service being provided under the above categories, the Board has taken
cognisance of the treatment given to the remuneration under the Income-tax Act,
1961 (‘IT Act’) wherein the salaries are subjected to Tax Deducted at Source
(‘TDS’) u/s 192 of the Act and fees other than salaries, is liable for TDS u/s
194J.

 

Accordingly,
remuneration which is subjected to TDS u/s 192 shall be treated as
consideration for ‘services by an employee to the employer in the course of or
in relation to his employment’ and would get covered under Schedule III of the
CGST Act, 2017.

 

It has also been
clarified that if an amount paid to the Director is declared as Fees for
Professional or Technical Services and subjected to TDS u/s 194J, it shall be
treated as consideration for providing services and become taxable under GST.
In such cases, the liability shall be of the recipient of services, i.e., the
company, under the Reverse Charge Notification.

Provided
below is a comparative table for a quick reference on the applicability of GST
/ RCM on payments to Directors:

 

Payments
to Directors

Employer–Employee
Relationship

TDS
u/s

Applicability
of GST

Applicability
of RCM

Remark

Salary

Yes

192

No

No

Entry I of Schedule III of
CGST Act, 2017

Commission, Professional Fees,
Sitting Fees

Yes

192(2B)

No

No

Commission

No

194-H

Yes

Yes

Entry 6 of Reverse Charge
Notification

Contract Payment

No

194-C

Yes

Yes

Professional Fees, Sitting
Fees

No

194-J

Yes

Yes

Rent

No

194-IB

Yes

Yes

 

 

GST IMPLICATIONS ON BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING

INTRODUCTION

In changing
business dynamics, business restructuring has become a norm whereby businesses
undertake activities of merger – wherein two or more entities come together to
form a new entity, resulting in the old entities ceasing to exist; or
amalgamation – wherein one or more entities are subsumed into an existing
entity such that the subsumed entities cease to exist. The next mode of
business restructuring is de-merger, where only specific business divisions are
transferred to a new entity, or are sold to an existing entity. When the above
activities are undertaken as a corporate, the same are governed by the
provisions under the Companies Act, 1956 (now 2013). In the non-corporate
sector, the restructuring transactions are generally undertaken by way of business
transfer arrangements, lease, leave and license and so on, which may not be
governed under any other statute.

 

Generally, a
business transaction is structured in such a manner that there is transfer of
assets and liabilities as per the terms of the transfer of the business or part
thereof which is being transferred to the transferee. However, this transaction
has its own set of challenges under GST, ranging from whether the transaction
would be liable to GST u/s 9, liability of transferor and transferee in case of
such transfers, input tax credit implications, registration implications, etc.

 

In this article, we
will try to decode the above aspects and the issues which revolve around
business restructuring.

 

TAXABILITY
OF CONSIDERATION RECEIVED FOR BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING TRANSACTIONS

An important aspect
which needs to be looked into while dealing with business restructuring
transactions under GST is whether or not the consideration received for the
said transaction attracts levy of GST u/s 9. This is very important since the
consideration involved is substantial and the applicability of GST on such
transactions may be a game-breaker. To analyse the same, one needs to analyse
from two different perspectives, one being whether transfer of business can be treated
as supply of goods, or supply of services or not, and the second being whether
or not the same can be treated as being in the course or furtherance of
business?

 

Let us first
discuss whether the activity of sale of business, as part of business restructuring,
can be treated as sale of goods, or sale of services, or none of the two. For
this let us refer to the definition of goods as defined u/s 2(52) of the CGST
Act which is reproduced below for ready reference:

 

‘goods’ means
every kind of movable property other than money and securities but includes
actionable claim, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part
of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under a contract of
supply;

 

On going through
the above definition of goods, it is evident that for any item to be classified
as goods it has to be movable property. Therefore, the question that needs to
be analysed is whether or not a business unit is a movable property. While the
term ‘movable property’ has not been defined under the GST law, one can refer
to the decisions under the pre-GST regime which specifically dealt with this
issue. In this context, reference may be made to the decision in the case of Shri
Ram Sahai vs. CST [1963 (14) STC 275 (Allahabad HC)]
wherein the
Hon’ble High Court held that ‘business’ is not a movable property and therefore
it is not covered within the meaning of ‘goods’.

 

Similarly, in a
recent decision the Hon’ble Andhra High Court in the case of Paradise
Food Court vs. State of Telangana [Writ Petition No. 2167 of 2017]
had
held as under:

‘16. Two
important things are to be noted from the definition part of the Statute. (i)
The first is that the sale of a business as such is not covered either by the
charging Section, viz., Section 4(1) or by the definition of the expression
goods. While the sale of a business may
necessarily include a sale of the assets (as well as liabilities) of the
business, the expression business is not included in the definition of the
expression goods under Section 2(16).’

 

While the above
decisions were in the context of the sales tax / VAT regime, it is important to
note that the definition of goods was similarly worded and, therefore, the
principles laid down by the above judgments should continue to apply even under
GST. For these reasons, it can be concluded that the activity of business
restructuring, by way of amalgamation, merger, de-merger or transfer of
business unit, cannot be treated as supply of goods for the purpose of GST.

 

We shall now
proceed to analyse whether sale of business, as a part of business
restructuring, can be treated as supply of services. For this, let us refer to
the definition of service as provided u/s 2(102) of the CGST Act, 2017 which is
reproduced below for ready reference:

‘services’ means
anything other than goods, money and
securities but includes activities relating to the use of money or its
conversion by cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or
denomination, to another form, currency or denomination for which a separate
consideration is charged;

 

On going through the above, it is evident that service has been very
loosely defined under GST. A literal reading of the definition indicates that
anything which is not classifiable as goods would be service. However, the
question that needs to be analysed is whether such literal interpretation of
the definition of supply can be done or not, or whether one needs to refer to
purposive interpretation. It would be relevant to refer to two decisions of the
Supreme Court to understand when purposive interpretation can be resorted to:

 

(i)    Periyar & Pareekanni Rubbers
Limited vs. State of Kerala [2008 (13) VST 538 (SC)]

28. Tax
liability of the business concern is not in dispute. Correctness of the orders
of assessment is also not under challenge. The Tribunal or for that matter the
High Court were, therefore, not concerned with the liability fastened upon the
dealer. The only question was as to what extent the appellant was liable
therefor. It is impossible for the legislature to envisage all situations. Recourse to statutory interpretations therefore
should be done in such a manner so as to give effect to the object and purport
thereof. The doctrine of purposive construction should, for the said purpose,
be taken recourse to.

 

(ii)   Tata Consultancy Services Limited vs.
State of Andhra Pradesh [2004 (178) ELT (022) SC]

68. It is now
well settled that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the
Court would attempt to resolve that ambiguity in a manner consistent with the
purpose of the provisions and with regard to consequences of the alternative
constructions.

See Clark
&Tokeley Ltd. (t/a Spellbrook) vs. Oakes [1998 (4) All ER 353].

69. In Inland
Revenue Commissioners vs. Trustees of Sir John Aird’s Settlement [1984] Ch. 382
,
it is stated:

Two methods of
statutory interpretation have at times been adopted by the court. One,
sometimes called literalist, is to make a meticulous examination of the precise
words used. The other, sometimes called purposive, is to consider the object of
the relevant provision in the light of the other provisions of the Act – the
general intendment of the provisions. They are not mutually exclusive and both
have their part to play even in the interpretation of a taxing statute.

70. Although
normally a taxing statute is to be strictly construed, but when the statutory
provision is reasonable akin to only one meaning, the principles of strict
construction may not be adhered to.

[See Commnr.
of Central Excise, Pondicherry vs. M/s Acer India Ltd., 2004 (8) SCALE 169
].

 

As can be seen from
the above, the need to resort to purposive interpretation arises only when the
literal interpretation results in ambiguity. It would therefore need to be
analysed as to whether according a transaction of business restructuring by way
of amalgamation, merger, de-merger or transfer of business assets as supply of
service would lead to absurdity? In general, depending on the terms of each
agreement, a transaction for business restructuring by any of the means referred
above would generally include transfer of assets, liabilities, employees, etc.
It would be difficult to perceive as to how a transaction, which involves
transfer of assets, liabilities, human resources, etc., would constitute
service, especially when there are identified elements of goods, transactions
in money, etc., involved. In other words, merely because all the above items
are sold as a bundle making the transaction take the character of a business
unit and going by the literal interpretation, since the transfer of business
unit is not classifiable as goods, it should be classified as service. This is
where the ambiguity / absurdity comes into the picture. Schedule II only deems
transactions of temporary transfer of right to use goods as service. This is
because in case of temporary transfer, the goods revert back to the owners. But
it is not the case here as the items being transferred would not revert back to
the owners. It is for this reason that such business restructuring activity
cannot be classified as service as well.

 

It may also be
relevant to note that notification 12/2017 – CT (Rate) exempts services by way
of transfer of a going concern, as a whole or an independent part thereof, from
levy of GST. However, merely because there is an entry in exemption
notification would not mean that the transaction was upfront liable to levy of
tax. However, if the entry is treated as valid, it would mean that the
transferor has made an exempt supply and, therefore, trigger the applicability
of the provisions of section 17(2) r/w/rule 42 / 43 of the CGST Rules.

 

Liability of
transferor
vis-à-vis transferee – in case of
transfer of business by sale, gift, lease, leave and license, hire or in any
other manner whatsoever

 

In case of business
restructuring transactions, there is also a change of ownership. Section 85(1)
deals with liability to pay tax in such cases where the business restructuring
results in transfer of business by sale, gift, lease, leave and license, hire
or in any other manner whatsoever. The section provides that in case of
transfer of business, there shall be joint and several liability of the
transferor as well as the transferee to pay tax up to the time of such
transfer, whether determined prior to or subsequent to the said transfer.

 

Therefore, what needs to be analysed first is what is meant by the term
‘transfer of business’. This has been analysed by the Supreme Court in the case
of State of Karnataka vs. Shreyas Papers Private Limited [Civil Appeal
3170-3173 of 2000]
while dealing with the scope of section 15(1) of the
Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. In this case, the Court held that business is an
activity directed with a certain purpose, more often towards promoting income
or profit. Mere transfer of one or more species of assets does not bring about
the transfer of ownership of the business, which requires that the business be
sold as a going concern. The above view has been followed in multiple instances
wherein the Court has held that transfer of specific business assets cannot be
treated as transfer of business in itself. One may refer to the decisions in
the cases of Rana Girders Limited vs. UOI [2013 (295) ELT 12 (SC)],
Lamifab Industries vs. UOI [2015 (326) ELT 674 (Guj.)], Chandra Dyeing &
Printing Mills Private Limited vs. UOI [2018 (361) ELT 254 (Guj.)], Krishna
Lifestyle Technologies Limited vs. Union of India [2009 (16) STR 669 (Bom.)].

 

When comparing with
the provision under the Central Excise Act, 1944 (section 11), one important
distinction which comes to mind is that the proviso of section 11
required that the transferee should have succeeded in the business of the
transferor. This aspect was dealt with by the High Court in the case of Krishna
Lifestyle Technologies (Supra)
where the Court held as follows:

 

‘16. Succession
therefore has a recognised connotation. The tests of change of ownership,
integrity, identity and continuity of a business have to be satisfied before it
can be said that a person succeeded to the business. The business carried on by
the transferee must be the same business and further it must be continuation of
the original business either wholly or in part. It would thus be clear from the
above that these tests will have to be met before it can be said that a person
has succeeded to a business. This would require the facts to be investigated as
to whether there has been transfer of the whole of the business or part of the
business and succession to the original business by the transferee.’

 

While the
provisions under GST do not require succession in interest by the transferee,
it remains to be seen whether the condition shall still be continued to be
applicable under GST, considering the decision in the case of Shreyas
Papers (Supra)
wherein the Supreme Court has brought in the concept of
transfer of business as a going concern though no specific provisions were
contained in the Karnataka Sales Tax Act.

 

It would also be
relevant to note that there are instances where the business is transferred by
State Financial Corporations after taking over control of defaulting borrowers.
The statute under which the State Financial Corporations were incorporated
provided that in case of sale of such assets, though the sale would have been
executed by the State Financial Corporation, it would have been deemed that the
sale was being done by the defaulting borrowers and, therefore, the liability
to pay tax up to the date of transfer shall be on the transferee (refer Macson
Marbles Private Limited vs. UOI [2003 (158) ELT 424 (SC)].

 

Treatment of
Input Tax Credit in case of transfer of business, amalgamation, merger,
de-merger, etc.

Another GST aspect which revolves around the above set of transactions,
apart from the attached transfer of liability to the transferee, is the
permission to transfer the balance lying in the electronic credit ledger of the
transferor. Section 18(3) provides that in case of change in constitution of a
registered person on account of sale, merger, de-merger, amalgamation, lease or
transfer of business with specific provision for transfer of liabilities, the
taxable person shall be allowed to transfer the input tax credit which remains
unutilised in his credit ledger in such manner as may be prescribed. The manner
has been prescribed u/r 41 of the CGST Rules. While the provisions are silent
w.r.t. the manner of determining the credit appropriable to the transferee, it
provides that in the case of de-merger the input tax credit shall be
appropriated in the ratio of value of assets of new units as specified in the
de-merger scheme. However, in all other cases there is no method prescribed for
appropriating input tax credit. The only requirements prescribed for the
transfer of balance lying in electronic credit ledger are:

 

(1)   A copy of the chartered accountant’s
certificate certifying that the sale, merger, de-merger, amalgamation, lease or
transfer of business has been done with a specific provision for transfer of
liabilities;

(2)   Furnishing of Form GST ITC-02 by the
transferor which shall be accepted by the transferee on the common portal; and

(3)   Accounting for the inputs and capital goods so
transferred by the transferee in his books of accounts.

 

REGISTRATION
IMPLICATIONS IN CASE OF BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING

In case of
transactions of amalgamation or merger, one needs to take note of the fact that
there are two different dates, namely, the effective date from which the scheme
would be given effect (which has to be indicated while filing the application
for the amalgamation or merger) and, second, the date of order, when the scheme
is approved by the Court or Tribunal. Generally, the effective date precedes
the order date and under the Income-tax Act, while till the time the order is
received both companies continue to have separate existence, the receipt of the
order requires them to re-file their tax returns as the company which has
merged or amalgamated into the other company has ceased to exist.

 

However, it is not
so under the GST regime. Section 87(2) specifically provides that the companies
party to a scheme shall continue to be treated as distinct companies till the
date of receipt of the order, and the registration certificate of the
amalgamated or merged company shall be cancelled only with effect from the date
of the order approving the scheme. This specific provision will help in dealing
with the following situations:

(A) Supply of goods or services, or both, between
the companies which are part of the scheme, and

(B) Supply of goods or services, or both, by the
said companies to other persons who are not part of the scheme.

 

This would imply
that till the date of the order approving the scheme is received, each of the
companies party to the scheme shall continue to comply with the various
provisions of the law, including filing of periodic tax returns, annual returns
and reconciliation statements prescribed u/s 35.

 

Similarly, section
22(4) provides that any new company which comes into existence in pursuance of
an order of a Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, shall be liable to get
registered with effect from the date on which the Registrar of Companies issues
a certificate of incorporation giving effect to such order.

 

Therefore, in case of amalgamation /
merger, one needs to take the registration aspect very seriously, to the extent
that upon receipt of approval of the scheme, the application for cancellation
of certificate of registration of the company which ceases to exist in view of
the order, and the application for fresh registration of the company which
comes into existence, is done within the prescribed time limits, and all future
supplies are made / received under the registration certificate of the
continuing company / new company and the use of the GSTIN of the company which
ceases to exist is discontinued with immediate effect.


INTERPLAY OF FIXED ESTABLISHMENT WITH PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

Business enterprises with
presence in multiple geographical locations either set up an independent legal
entity (recognised under the host state laws) or operate through extended
establishments such as branch offices, installation / project sites, personnel,
etc. (referred to as multi-location entity – MLE). Such MLEs give rise to
critical tax consequences in both the host state and the parent states. While
the general economic principle in framing fiscal laws for such presence is to
ensure avoidance of double taxation and non-taxation, due to a lack of
consensus on international transactions on the VAT / GST front this objective
is far from being achieved. The issue of taxation is relatively simpler when
the business enterprises set up an independent subsidiary and remunerate them
at arm’s length for all their activities. The complexity arises with presence
through extended establishments as the arrangements between the head office and
these establishments are not clearly discernible or documented for comparison
with external world transactions.

 

VAT laws globally have termed these extensions as
‘fixed establishment’ – this has been used as a tool to assist them in
identifying the end destination of the service or intangibles. The OECD VAT /
GST guidelines have suggested three approaches in taxation of MLEs for services
and intangibles and to reach the end consumption of the service: (i) Direct use
approach where the focus is on the establishment that uses the services; (ii) Direct delivery approach where the focus
is on the establishment to which the services are delivered (with a presumption that delivery is a good reference
point of use); and (iii) Recharge approach which factors the inefficiencies in
both approaches and requires the MLE to recharge the externally procured costs
to the establishment which ultimately uses the services in order to ensure that
the VAT chain continues to the state of consumption1.

1   It
is probable that the recharge approach has weighed heavily while drafting
Schedule 1 of the CGST Act


The Income Tax law (along with tax treaties) has
recognised the presence of foreign enterprises in India through business
connections / permanent establishments (PE) for the purpose of taxation. The
term ‘permanent establishment’ has been used with a dual purpose – (a) fixing
the taxing rights over the source of income pertaining to the extended presence
in India; and (b) application of Transfer Pricing Regulations for ascertainment
of arm’s length profits of permanent establishments through a process of profit
attribution. Being a nation-wide law, domestic branches really do not alter the
revenue situation from an income tax perspective and have no significance in
this respect.

 

Under the Indian GST law, not only do we have to
resolve transactions spanning across national borders, we also have to deal
with transactions over state borders. Article 286 of the Indian Constitution
empowered Parliament to play the role of a mediator for inter-state transactions.
Article 286 articulates the location of the supply and also defines the state
which would have exclusive jurisdiction to tax the supply transactions. To give
effect to this geographical jurisdiction, the IGST law, in addition to other
principles, included the concept of ‘fixed establishment’. The objective of
this term is to identify the taxable person, the source and destination of a
supply and the appropriate jurisdiction for taxing the transaction.

 

Before venturing into a comparative analysis of
fixed establishment (FE) with permanent establishment (PE), it is imperative
that the underlying objectives of both laws are understood clearly. The VAT /
GST laws have introduced the said concept in order to give effect to the
destination principle, i.e., taxation revenues ultimately accrue to the state
in which the services are consumed and the neutrality principle, i.e.,
non-resident and residents are treated in the same manner, while the Income Tax
laws introduced the concept of permanent establishments in line with the
‘source principle’ of taxation, i.e., the country from which the income has
been generated should have the right to tax the said income. This fundamental
divergence would act as a natural impediment to automatic application of the PE
definition to the FE definition.

 

FIXED ESTABLISHMENT UNDER GST
– CONCEPT

In general, the GST law defines the term FE in
contra-distinction with the term ‘place of business’. The phrase place of
business (PoB) refers to a place from where business is ordinarily carried out
and includes a warehouse, godown or any other place where the supplies are made
or received. FE has been defined to mean a place (other than the registered
place of business) which is characterised with a sufficient degree of permanence
in terms of human and technical resources in order to supply or receive and use
services for its own needs.
The terms PoB and FE are relevant to decide the
‘from’ location and the ‘to’ location of the service activity and consequently
the right location of supplier and recipient of service.

 

The PoB / FE concept also has some background in
the Service Tax enactment and the Place of Provision of Services Rules. With
similarly worded terms, the education guide on service tax explained the
objective behind the concept of fixed establishment as follows. It was stated
in paragraph 5.2.3 that the term ‘location’ was significant from the
perspective of service provider and recipient in order to ascertain the source
or rendition of a particular service. The paragraph also stressed that the
location also assists in identifying the jurisdiction of the field formation
(under Service Tax being a Central enactment) which would have domain to assess
the transaction. This can probably also support the point that the fixed
establishment concept would play a pivotal role in identifying the appropriate
state to which the taxing domain lies.

 

FIXED ESTABLISHMENT UNDER
EU-VAT – CONCEPT

The Indian GST definition of fixed establishment
has been influenced by the EU-VAT law. The EU Sixth VAT Directive (Article 43)
adopted the term ‘fixed establishment’ for ascertaining the place of supply of
services. The term was objectively expanded in 2011 by virtue of Articles 11(1)
and 11(2) of the implementing regulations (a procedural law). Prior to this
expansion, certain decisions analysed the definition of fixed establishment,
i.e., the Berkholz2 and ARO Lease3 cases. The Berkholz
case involved gaming machines installed by the taxpayer on on-going sea vessels
with intermittent presence of personnel for maintenance of the machines. The
ECJ on consideration of the cumulative requirement of permanence of human
and technical resources
held that the FE was not established. Similarly, in
the ARO Lease case a company was engaged in leasing of cars to its customers in
Belgium (these cars were purchased by ARO, Netherlands from Belgian dealers and
delivered to the customers directly in Belgium); it was held by the ECJ that
neither the presence of cars of ARO in Belgium nor the self-employed intermediaries
(Belgium dealers) created a sufficient permanent human and technical presence
to constitute an FE.

 

With Articles 11(1) and (2) of the EU implementing
regulations, the EU-VAT law has categorised fixed establishment into ‘passive’
and ‘active’ fixed establishments4. The IGST law has adopted both in
one definition with the use of the disjunctive phrase ‘or’ in the last few
words of the definition (discussed in detail later). This may be considered as
essential because the concept of fixed establishment has been used to ascertain
both the location of cases where services are either received or provided from
the said fixed establishment.

 

After the introduction of the implementing
regulation, the Welmory case5 examined a situation where a Cyprian
company had appointed a Polish company to maintain and operate a website for
online auction. The entire process of auction was functioning through the
website maintained by the Polish company. The ECJ stated that the economic
activities of the Polish company and Polish customers does not by itself
constitute a fixed establishment and the services of the Polish company should
be viewed distinctly from that of the Cyprian company to the Polish customers.

 

PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT UNDER
INCOME TAX – CONCEPT

In Income Tax, the domestic legislation used the
phrase ‘business connection’ which is of very wide amplitude, but taxpayers use
the benefit of a narrower term PE6 which is used in most tax
treaties (OECD, US or UN model). The term PE has been defined as a fixed place
of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly
carried out and includes the following: (a) place of management; (b) branch,
office, factory, workshop, warehouse, etc., (c) building, construction or
installation site; (d) provision of services through presence of personnel; and
(e) dependent agency. In case a foreign enterprise constitutes a PE in a host
state, the PE is to be granted a separate entity status and business profits
attributable to the PE at arms’ length are to be taxed in the state in which
the PE is constituted.

 

Having understood the broad concept of FE and PE in
GST / EU and Income Tax law, we now proceed to identify the points at which the
said terms would converge / diverge through the assistance of illustrations and
then tabulate the same for future reference.

 

2   ECJ
EC 4th July, 1985, 168/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:299 (Günter Berkholz),
European Court Reports, 1985

3   ECJ
EC 17th July, 1997, C-190/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:374 (ARO Lease),
European Court Reports, 1997

4   Passive
FEs being those which only receive / procure inputs / services (cost centres)
and Active FEs which also provide services (profit centres)

5   ECJ
EU 15th October, 2014, C-605/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2298 (Welmory),
Official Journal 2014, C 462

6   OECD
Model Convention on Tax Treaties as an example

 

CONSTITUTION OF A PE / FE –
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

(A) Fixed place PE (basic rule): Stability,
productivity and dependence

Article 5 of Income Tax treaties defines a fixed
place PE as ‘fixed place of business’ through which the business of an
enterprise is wholly or partly carried out. The fixed place PE rests on three
primary tests: (a) place of business; (b) location test; and (c) permanence
test. Article 5(2), in fact, enumerates instances such as branch, office,
factory, workshop, warehouse, etc., which by default satisfy the above tests,
especially the place of business test.

 

The place of business test
postulates that some portion of the business activity of the MLE enterprise is
conducted through the physical office in India. The extent of business activity
conducted in India is ascertained through a FAR analysis (Functions performed,
Assets employed and Risks assumed) of the PE’s operations in India. But there
is one critical exclusion in terms of conduct of preparatory or auxiliary
activities – in effect, where a part of the business activity is conducted in a
territory and such part is preparatory or auxiliary in nature, the MLE is not
considered to have a permanent establishment in the said territory. In the
context of this Basic Rule PE, the Supreme Court in DIT vs. Morgan
Stanley [2007 (7) TMI 201]
was examining whether back-office operations
of a subsidiary constitute a place of business of the parent company. The Court
held that the support function performed would not constitute an extension
of the business activity of the parent.
Similarly, the mere fact that the
business of the parent company is outsourced or support functions are performed
by the Indian subsidiary, was considered as irrelevant for the purpose of concluding that the parent company is having
an establishment in India [ADIT vs. E Funds IT Solutions Inc. 2017 (10)
TMI 1011].
These decisions imply that the business activity should be
understood as an extension of the set-up already in place in the parent company
rather than an independent entity.

 

The location test requires that there has to be a
physical presence of the business in a specific place (though the place may be
mobile within the defined territory). This test warrants that the business
activity should be capable of being tagged to the physical territory either as
equipment, branch or any such physical infrastructure.

 

As for the permanence test,
the OECD commentary states that the term ‘fixed’ itself warrants a certain
degree of permanence at the location in which the physical infrastructure is
placed in the taxable territory. The phrase ‘fixed’, as an adjective, also
attaches a certain degree of permanence to the place of business which is a
prerequisite under this Article (also stated in the OECD commentary)7.
In the absence of a defined time period under the treaties, there is some
relativity in the way jurisprudence has developed to identify the degree of
permanence of an activity. While each case produced different results, a recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Formula One World Championship Ltd. vs.
CIT, Delhi [2017] 80 taxmann.com 347 (SC)
examined a Formula One race
arrangement which lasted for approximately three weeks and held that such an
arrangement constituted a fixed place PE. The background to the case involved a
Formula One race conducted by FOWC which involved placement of the entire racing
infrastructure / equipment on Budd International Circuit and FOWC had complete
control over the schedule, equipment and personnel at the location. The Supreme
Court stressed on the disposal test (i.e., FOWC having exclusive and complete
control over the racing circuit) rather than the duration test for testing the
permanence of an activity. In other words, ‘fixed’ was interpreted by the
Supreme Court with reference to the exclusivity and control over the place
rather than the duration of usage (which is relative for each business
activity).

 

In comparison, the FE definition in IGST law also
relies on a ‘sufficient degree of permanence’. The legislature has used a very
subjective term probably keeping in view varied industry practices. For
example, the Formula One race arrangements which last only for three weeks in a
calendar year at a particular location, was considered as a sufficient degree
of permanence by the Court given the peculiarity of the sporting event.
Moreover, the Court stressed on the adequacy of control over the three-week
period rather than the duration of three weeks. Though speculative, it is
probable that the Court might not have reached the same result in case the
facts were for a long duration project (e.g., oil exploration activities,
etc.). Probably, this test would also be applicable for understanding the FE
definition. Whether the phrase ‘sufficient degree of permanence’ has to be
assessed keeping the disposal test or the duration test in mind, is a question
open for debate.

7   CIT
vs. Visakhapatnam Port Trust 1983 (6) TMI 31

Further, the disposal test
should also be addressed factoring in the nature of supply which is under
consideration, for example, presence of a few weeks would be sufficient for
rendering legal advisory services on a particular issue but a presence of even
a few months would not be sufficient while rendering the very same advisory
services for construction of a building. The service tax education guide states
that the relevant factor is the ‘adequacy’ of the human and technical resources
to render the ‘service’ for deciding whether there is sufficient permanence in
the activity. In the absence of detailed jurisprudence on this subject, one may
imbibe the settled principle under Income Tax while interpreting the FE
definition.

 

 

(B) Service PE (Extended PE): Physical presence of
employees

The OECD Model Convention
provides for a service PE if the aggregate presence of the personnel in the
taxable territory is beyond 183 days in a 12-month period8. The
nature of services that are rendered by the personnel could be wide in range.
Physical presence of personnel in the taxable territory rendering a service,
irrespective of the type of service, would be prominent in deciding the
constitution of a service PE. But the Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley
(Supra)
differentiated the services rendered through own employees of
MS USA and deputed employees of MS USA. The Court held that in the case of own
employees performing supervisory / stewardship activities, there is no service being rendered by the presence
of employees in India to the Indian subsidiary, rather the presence of
personnel is for the sole benefit of the parent company in order to ensure
quality control, confidentiality, etc. On the other hand, the employees of MS
India deputed for assisting the operations of MS India were considered as an identifiable service activity to the
Indian subsidiary, hence a service PE was held to be constituted.

8   UN
Model narrows the test to a 6-month period

Under GST, the reference to
personnel is made in the definition of fixed establishment by use of the phrase
‘human resources’. But this aspect is not a stand-alone requirement for
constitution of a fixed establishment. The human capital is required to be
equipped with a degree of permanence and technical resources (depending on the
nature of work) in order to constitute a fixed establishment. The permanence
test applicable to Fixed Place PE may be adopted while examining the FE arising
out of service personnel. It is also important that the human capital should be
‘capable of availing and rendering the service activity’ to the third party
while being present in the taxable territory.

 

We may recall that the EU-VAT in Berkholz’s case
held that the presence of personnel to maintain the gaming equipment on an
intermittent basis did not constitute a fixed establishment in the foreign
territory. Probably, the IGST law may also have to follow suit and despite a
service PE being constituted under Income Tax, if the human capital is using
technical resources of the end customer there may be a ground to contend that a
fixed establishment is not constituted. From a practical standpoint, many MNCs
appoint personnel for maintenance and on-site repair of machinery. Where repair
and maintenance is partially conducted from the Indian territory with a
significant portion being conducted remotely, one may view the same as not
constituting an FE in India, but where the said personnel (with their
equipment) are capable of rendering the service exhaustively, the said
personnel can be said to have constituted a PE in India.

 

(C) Agency PE (non-obstante rule):
Dependence (DAPE)

The concept of agency PE was introduced to address quasi-presence
of foreign enterprises through dependent representatives in the taxable
territory. Notwithstanding the requirements of a basic rule PE, Article 5
provides for formation of a dependent agency PE where, (a) the person
habitually concludes contracts or even possesses the authority to conclude
contracts; (b) maintains inventory of goods on behalf of its principal; or (c)
habitually secures orders wholly or primarily for its principal in India. The
primary requirement is that a principal-agency relationship is visible and such
agent, if at all, should be one who is NOT operating in his independent
capacity in his ordinary course of business. Evidently, a principal-agent
relationship would be established if the agent acts in a representative
capacity with an ability to bind its principal to its actions.

 

The Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Taj TV
Limited [2020 (3) TMI 500]
examined whether revenues under the
exclusive distribution agreement by Taj TV Limited involving fees from cable
operators and granting them viewing and relay rights, were under an agency
relationship. Under the distribution agreement, Taj TV was given independent
rights to market and promote the TV channels and negotiate and conclude
contracts with sub-distributors. In this decision, the Court observed that Taj
TV under sub-distributor agreement and the cable-operator agreement, acted in
its own capacity and the foreign enterprise did not have any privity in
deciding the pricing of the rights. Hence it was concluded that there was a
principal-to-principal relationship. In contrast, the very same Bombay High
Court in DIT Mumbai vs. B4U International Holdings Limited 2015 (5) TMI
277
on those specific facts held that the Indian entity did not have
any authority to conclude contracts on its own and was under the direction and
control of its principal and hence constituted a DAPE in India.

 

The secondary requirement of constitution of a DAPE
is that the agent should not be of independent status. ‘Legal and economic
independence’ are the two tests which are usually applied for this clause.
International commentaries suggest that if the agent is responsible for its own
actions, takes risks and has its own special skill and knowledge to render the
agency service, such agent would be termed as an independent agent. In certain
AAR rulings9 under Income Tax, the dependency agency test was
applied and held not to be fulfilled on the ground that similar services were
being provided to multiple FIIs and not just one principal. Moreover, the
treaties itself provides for an exclusion where the agent renders its services
to multiple principals, evidencing that it has risk abilities, own skill and
knowledge, etc. to act independently.

 

As regards the authority to conclude contracts,
paragraph 33 of the OECD commentary states that a person who is authorised to
negotiate all elements of a contract in a binding way on the enterprise can be
said to have the authority to conclude contracts and the mere fact that the
person has attended and participated in negotiations is not sufficient
authority under this PE rule10.

 

9   XYZ/ABC Equity Fund vs. CIT (2001) 116 Taxman
719 (AAR); Fidelity Services Series VIII in (2004) 271 ITR 1 (AAR)

10  India
has expressed its reservations to the OECD commentary on this aspect and
submitted that mere participation in negotiations is also evidence of authority
to conclude contracts

In contrast, the IGST law does not have a specific
case of agency for the purpose of fixed establishment for a supplier or its
recipient. It would be interesting to note that section 2(105) of the CGST Act
has extended the definition of a supplier to include its agent as well who is
engaged as supplier of services. By virtue of this inclusion, the location of
the supplier would have to be adjudged after taking cognisance of the presence
of an agent in India. As an illustration, if Taj TV was appointed as an agent
of Taj Mauritius for distribution of channels, the location of the supplier for
the services rendered by Taj Mauritius (i.e., channel access fee) would be
liable to be attributed to the Taj TV (as an agent) of Taj Mauritius resulting
in Taj Mauritius being considered as present in India through the FE-agency
relationship. Unlike Income Tax, the agency relationship need not always be one
who is dependent on the principal. The place of business of the agent would be
considered as the place of business of the principal (to the extent of the
agency relationship) and fixed as the location of supplier of such services. Of
course, the basic FE rule under GST such as permanence, human and technical
resources would still have to be satisfied by the agent in order to qualify as
an FE in India.

 

The location of supplier and
recipient definitions has been limited only for the service activity and not
transactions of supply of goods. One of the reasons may be that the agency FE may
not be applicable to selling / purchasing agents of goods. This is because
agency transactions in respect of supply of goods are covered under Schedule I
of the CGST Act which deems the principal and agent as separate beings. Once
the agent is equated to a purchaser of goods, by way of a deeming fiction, the
agent would be considered as a quasi-supplier for other purposes of the
Act and not as a representative of its principal. Hence, an agency PE under
Income Tax for supply of goods would not translate into an FE for the very same
principal under GST.

 

(D) Construction / Installation PE

Tax treaties recognises any construction,
installation, project site, etc., including supervisory activities11
of a foreign enterprise as being construction / installation PEs. The treaties
(OECD – 12 months; UN – 6 months) specify the period beyond which the PE is
said to be constituted. All planning and designing activity prior to physical
visit to the site would be included in the PE (UN Model). The Tribunal in SAIL
vs. ACIT (2007) 105 ITD 679
held that supervisory services provided by
a company even though it was itself not engaged in installation activity would
be sufficient to constitute an installation PE.

 

The IGST law has not carved out a specific instance
of a construction / installation FE. The fixed establishment definition itself
encompasses any presence of human and technical resources as sufficient grounds
to constitute an FE. Moreover, construction activities generally entail direct
procurement and supply of services and hence all the ingredients of
constituting an FE stand established. Unlike the situation in SAIL’s case above
which involved mere provision of supervisory services, such activities may not
constitute an FE in GST law.

11  Only in UN model treaties

 

(E) Significant Economic Presence (SEP): Digital
footprint

With increasing digital presence globally, BEPS
Action Plan 1 identified the problems of taxation due to advancement of digital
economy. The concept of significant economic presence (SEP), which could be
represented by the digital footprint of an enterprise, was given legal sanctity
in the Income Tax law. The law has prescribed minimum thresholds on the basis
of digital footprint for constituting significant economic presence in the
country – the thresholds could take the form of number of digital users,
revenue per user, etc. The BEPS Action Plan as well as the memorandum
suggesting this amendment stated that the traditional concept of permanent
establishment requiring physical presence in the taxable territory cannot be
possibly applied to digital transactions and hence alternative criteria such as
the above are necessary for viewing significant economic presence.

 

The Indian GST law has not considered
this aspect for the purpose of defining fixed establishment. The law has
defined a term ‘Online Database and Information Access or retrieval service
activity’
to tax all digital economy transactions. In fact, this law has
alternatively chosen to place a tax liability by adopting a different approach
and treating this transaction as an import of service into India and taxing the
same in the hands of the business user. In case of B2C transactions, the GST
law has placed the obligation on the foreign company to identify a
representative in India for discharging the tax burden on such transaction.

 

In summary, the GST FE concept and the Income Tax PE concept converge and
diverge at multiple points which can be tabulated as follows (see Table 1):

 

ATTRIBUTION / RECHARGE
APPROACH

Income Tax attributes income /
profit to the PE based on the FAR approach. This would involve estimations and
approximations; profitability is not traceable to the transaction level.

Table 1

Aspect

Convergence

Limited Divergence

Complete Divergence

Fixed
PE

Degree
of permanence

Disposal
test which does not seem to be a clear prerequisite in FE; no exclusion for
preparatory / auxiliary activity in FE

Capability
of receipt and / or supply of services is not required in PE

Service
PE

Rendition
of services

Duration
test for PE and FE may be differently viewed

Presence
of technical resources are essential for FE

Agency
PE

Agent
constituting PE / FE

Agency
in respect of goods not part of FE test due to deeming fiction in Schedule I

Dependency
not an FE test ~ multi service agents constituting FE

Construction
PE

Construction
site being place of business

Ancillary
activities may form a Construction PE but not an FE

No
time limit specified for FE and relative to nature of work

SEP

NIL

NIL

Treated
as OIDAR and liable for RCM / FCM as the case may be

 

 

In GST, India has adopted the
recharge approach in cases of service transactions. For example, with respect
to services directly connected to an FE, the requirement under GST law is to
‘bill from’ the FE / ‘bill to’ the FE which is most directly concerned with the
supply. The FE would then have to recharge the relevant establishment in the
organisation which has consumed the service even partially. In such a manner,
the tax revenues would follow the contractual obligations (with the presumption
that economics would assist in reaching the point of consumption) and hence the
importance of identification of the relevant FE would assume high significance.

 

However, in cases of agency of supply of goods, the
requirement of the law is to deem them as distinct entities at the outset
itself and equate them to a seller or purchaser of goods. By this approach, the
VAT chain passes through the agent and attempts to reach the end consumption of
goods. This activity takes place at the transaction level rather than
the entity level which is the case in Income Tax. The global apportionment
approach / FAR analysis adopted for attribution of profits to the PE would not
serve any purpose for GST.

 

In summary, it is observed that though both the concepts are
interconnected at multiple points, there are bound to be divergent answers in
view of the basic structure of both the Income Tax and the GST laws being
different. This concept would be relevant for outbound as well as inbound
presence and hence a balanced interpretation of this concept is essential from
the perspective of all stakeholders. In any case, the attempt should be to
identify the last point in the value chain where the consumption actually takes
place. This destination principle, though unwritten in the law, is the core of
the GST system in place and violation of this principle at the cost of legal
interpretation may cause chaos in the economic distribution of the wealth of
the nation.

 

INTERPLAY OF GST & EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS

INTRODUCTION
– SERVICE BY EMPLOYEES EXCLUDED FROM GST

GST is a tax on all supplies of
goods or services, or both, made in the course or furtherance of business.
However, Schedule III, Entry 1 treats services by an employee to the employer
in the course of or in relation to his employment as neither a supply of goods
nor a supply of services, effectively resulting in the situation that such
services are excluded from the purview of GST.

 

HOW TO
DETERMINE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

It,
therefore, becomes important to analyse the scope of the abovementioned entry.
Since the exact tests of determination of employment contract are not
specifically listed in the GST law, it will be important to understand the said
tests from legal precedents under the general law including various labour
legislations. To begin this journey it may be worthwhile to refer to the
decision of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Balwant
Rai Saluja & others vs. Air India Limited & others [Civil Appeal No.
10264-10266 of 2013].
In this case, the Court laid down the following
tests which are required to be satisfied to demonstrate the existence of an
employer-employee relationship:

 

(i)   Who appoints the workers?

(ii)   Who pays the salary / remuneration?

(iii) Who has the authority to dismiss?

(iv) Who can take disciplinary action?

(v) Whether there is continuity of service?

(vi) What is the extent of control and supervision?

 

Various legislations have been
enacted to safeguard the interest of employees employed by employers. Some of
the key legislations are the Factories Act, 1948, the Industrial Employment
Act, 1946, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Contract Labour Regulation
Act, 1970, the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, and so on. Each of these
legislations has defined the term employee, identified as worker, workmen, etc.
However, it is important to note that the definition of employee referred
to in one legislation is restricted only to that legislation and merely because
a person is an employee under one legislation he does not become an employee in
general of the employer.
The Supreme Court in the above decision has
held that for matters which are not related to the specific legislations, one
needs to satisfy the above test to establish the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.

 

WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE ENTRY?

The next point that needs to be
analysed is what all will be included within the scope of the consideration /
remuneration paid to an employee. Generally, the consideration paid to an
employee carries two components, one being the monetary component which would
cover payouts like salary, wages, allowances, etc., and the other being
non-monetary components such as perquisites, rent-free accommodation, etc.,
which are made available to employees under the terms of the employment
contract. Some components may be mandated by the legislature and some may be
part of the employment policy of the employer.

 

The legislations referred to
above also deal with the meaning of ‘consideration’. For example, section 2
(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines the term ‘wages’ to mean all
the remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money and payable to a
workman in respect of his employment or work done in such employment, and also
includes (a) allowances that the workman is entitled to, (b) the value of the
house accommodation or of the supply of light, water, medical attendance or
other amenities, or of any service, or of any concessional supply of food
grains or other articles, (c) any travelling concession, and (d) any commission
payable on the promotion of sales or business, or both. However, it also
excludes certain items such as (i) any bonus, (ii) any contribution paid /
payable by the employer to any pension fund / provident fund / for the benefit
of the workman under any law for the time being in force, and (iii) any
gratuity payable on the termination of service.

Similarly, section 2(v) of the
Payment of Wages Act, 1932 defines the term ‘wages’ as all the remuneration
(whether by way of salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of
money, or capable of being so expressed, which would be payable to a person
employed in respect of his employment, or of work done in such employment and
includes (a) any remuneration payable under any award or settlement between the
parties or order of a Court, (b) overtime remuneration, (c) additional
remuneration payable under the terms of employment, (d) any amount due on
termination of employment, and (e) any sum which the employee is entitled to
under any scheme framed under any law for the time being in force, excluding
any bonus, value of benefits, such as house accommodation, electricity or water
supply, medical attendance or other amenity, or of any service excluded from
the computation of wages by a general or special order of the appropriate
government, any contribution paid by the employer to any pension or provident
fund and the interest accrued thereon, any travelling allowance or the value of
any travelling concession and any sum paid to the employed person to defray
special expenses entitled to him by the nature of work.

 

The above two definitions in the
context of specific legislations clearly point towards what shall constitute
‘consideration’ and it generally intends to include within its scope all
payments made to the employees, except for specific items which are also
excluded only for the purpose of the specific legislations. But the general
principle laid down in the said legislations indicates that all payments made
or facilities extended to the employees as a part of employment contracts would
be treated as a part of the consideration to the employee. This principle was
laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gestetner Duplicators
(Private) Limited vs. CIT [1979 AIR 607 = 1979 SCR (2) 788]
wherein the
Court held as under:

 

It is thus clear that if under
the terms of the contract of employment, remuneration or recompense for the
services rendered by the employee is determined at a fixed percentage of
turnover achieved by him, then such remuneration or recompense will partake of
the character of salary, the percentage basis being the measure of the salary
and therefore such remuneration or recompense must fall within the expression
‘salary’ as defined in Rule 2(h) of Part A of the Fourth Schedule to the Act.
In the instant case before us, admittedly, under their contracts of employment
the assessee has been paying and did pay during the previous years relevant to
the three assessment years to its salesmen, in addition to the fixed monthly
salary, commission at a fixed percentage of the turnover achieved by each
salesman, the rate of percentage varying according to the class of article sold
and the category to which each salesman belonged. The instant case is,
therefore, an instance where the remuneration so recompense payable for the
services rendered by the salesmen is determined partly by reference to the time
spent in the service and partly by reference to the volume of work done. But it
is clear that the entire remuneration so determined on both the basis clearly
partakes of the character of salary.

 

In fact, while determining what
shall and what shall not constitute consideration, one should refer to the
principle of dominant intention theory, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. UoI [2006 (2) STR 161 (SC)].
The Court in the
said decision held that one needs to look into the substance of the transaction
in order to determine how the same would get covered. Once it is established
that any payment made to an employee or any benefit / facility made available
to him is in the course of an employment contract, irrespective of whether the
same is a mandatory requirement or not, it gets covered within the purview of
that contract and cannot be distinguished from it.

 

Employer and employees are
related persons – Does this impact the tax treatment of the facilities /
benefits provided to employees?

 

Section 15 provides that an
employer and his employee shall be deemed to be related persons. Further, Entry
2 of Schedule I deems certain activities to be supplies even if the same are
without consideration. The entry reads as under:

 

Supply of goods or services or
both between related persons or between distinct persons as specified in
section 25, when made in the course or furtherance of business:

 

Provided that gifts not exceeding
fifty thousand rupees in value in a financial year by an employer to an
employee shall not be treated as supply of goods or services or both.

 

In the normal course, various
facilities / benefits are provided by the employer to his employees. Let us
first analyse whether or not the same constitute a supply under GST (without
considering the scope of entries under Schedule I and Schedule III). It is
imperative to note that generally when an employer makes available any
facilities / benefits to the employee, it is not mandatory in nature. For
example, commutation facility extended by the employer may not be availed of by
employees who prefer to travel on their own. It is upon the employee to decide
whether he intends to avail of the facility. Similarly, it is not necessary
that all employees might avail the canteen facility. Rather, they might want to
make arrangements on their own. It is only as a part of the employer’s HR
policy / statutory requirement that the employer makes available the facilities
/ benefits.

 

However, once it becomes part of
the employment policy, which the employee would have accepted, it becomes part
of the employment contract, i.e., the employer has made available the
facilities / benefits in pursuance to the services supplied by the employee to
the employer. However, there is no contrary service supplied by the employer.
The employer has merely undertaken the activity of incurring the cost to make
available the benefits / facilities to its employees. However, merely because a
cost is incurred does not necessarily mean that the employer has supplied the
service. In Kumar Beheray Rathi vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune
[2014 (34) STR 139],
the Tribunal held that the assessee was acting
merely as a trustee or a pure agent as it was not engaged in providing any
service but only paying on behalf of various flat-buyers to various service
providers. In this particular case, even though there was recovery of cost, the
Tribunal has held that there was no provision of service. The argument would therefore
get stronger in a case where consideration is not involved. Similarly, in the
case of Reliance ADAG Private Limited vs. CST, Mumbai [2016 (43) STR 372
(Tri.)(Mum.)],
the Tribunal has held that merely incurring expenses on
behalf of group companies and recovering them would not amount to provision of
service. The principles laid down in the said case should also apply to the
current case.

 

Another aspect to be noted is
that in certain cases, such as telephone facilities / insurance services, there
is a legal impediment to the employer providing such service since they are
regulated services and only those people who are authorised by the Department
of Telecommunication (DOT) or the Insurance Regulatory Development Authority of
India (IRDAI) can provide such a service. Therefore, this is one more basis to
say that by merely making available the facilities / benefits the employer has
not made a supply to his employees, but rather it is a cost incurred by him in
the course of receiving services from his employee and, therefore, is nothing
but just an employment cost for him. This aspect has also been discussed in our
previous article ‘Decoding GST: Inter-Mingling of Income tax and GST’ (BCAJ,
April, 2020).

 

Therefore, once a view is taken
that making available benefits / facilities does not constitute supply, Entry 2
of Schedule I which deems an activity of supply of goods or services between a
distinct person / related person as supply, even if made without consideration,
would not be applicable. This would be because Entry 2 pre-necessitates that
the activity has to be treated as supply u/s 7.

 

Another point to be noted is that
if a view is taken that by incurring the above expenses / making available the
benefits to the employees, there is a supply made by the employer, it could
result in additional unwarranted compliances on the part of the employer. Let’s
take an example of insurance facilities / benefits extended to the employee. If
a view is taken that the employer has indeed provided these services, then they
would be in violation of the IRDAI guidelines since they would be engaged in
providing insurance services without necessary approvals. Similar would be the
situation in case of telecommunication facilities made available to the
employees where one needs to obtain approval from DOT, or in the canteen
facilities from FSSAI. Further, in some cases such an interpretation would
result in an absurd application from other aspects also. For example, in case
of rent-free accommodation provided by the employer to the employee, if a view
is taken that the same is a supply of service in view of Entry 2 of Schedule I,
while there would be no tax liability on the outward side since the services of
renting of residential accommodation is exempted from tax, correspondingly, the
Department might take a view that the employer is engaged in providing exempt
services, thus triggering the applicability of the provisions of sections 17(2)
and 17(3) of the Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 requiring
compliances under Rules 42 and 43 of the Central Goods & Service Tax Rules,
2017.

 

Therefore,
it is apparent that whether or not any amount is recovered from the employee
for any facilities / benefits made available to him, it would be wrong to treat
the same as a supply itself under GST. In fact, the next proposition would be
important, which is to say that the facilities / benefits which are made
available to the employees is nothing but a part of the employee cost incurred
in the course of receiving the services of the employee in pursuance of the
employment contract. This view finds support from the decision of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in the case of Bhimas Hotels Private Limited vs. Union
of India [2017 (3) GSTL 30 (AP)]
wherein, in the context of canteen
recoveries, the Court held that such recoveries have to be seen as part of any
pay package that workers have negotiated with employers and therefore cannot be
construed as service falling within the definition of ‘service’ u/s 65B(44) of
the Finance Act, 1994. The logic behind the above conclusion was that under
service tax the definition of service excluded any service provided by the
employee to the employer in the course of employment from its purview. Since
the recoveries were made in pursuance of the employment contract, they were
excluded from the scope of the definition of service. It is imperative to note
that even under GST, Entry 1 of Schedule III provides that services provided by
an employee to the employer in the course of the employment contract shall be
treated neither as supply of goods nor as supply of services. Therefore, it can
be said that under GST,

 

(a) Any facilities / benefits made available to the employees would not
be liable to GST as they do not amount to supply of service itself

(b) The facilities / benefits made available to the employees even if
not a statutory requirement but part of the employment policy, should be
treated as covered under Entry 1 of Schedule III and therefore excluded from the
scope of supply itself

(c) Even if any amounts are recovered from the employees, the same would
also be covered under Entry 1 of Schedule III in view of the decision in the
Bhimas Hotels case (Supra)
and should be treated as nothing short of
reduction in the employee cost.

 

Readers might also take note of
the contrary AARs under GST on this subject. In the case of Caltech
Polymers Private Limited [2018 (18) GSTL 350 (AAR)]
and upheld by the
Appellate Authority in [2018 (18) GSTL 373 (AAR)], the Authority
has held that the employer is liable to pay GST on amounts recovered from
employees for the canteen facilities extended to them. However, in the context
of recovery of insurance premia from employees, the authority has held that as
the same do not constitute an activity incidental or ancillary to their
business activity, they cannot be treated as supply of service. One may refer
to the ruling in the case of Jotun India Private Limited 2019 (29) GSTL
778 (AAR).

 

Eligibility
of Input Tax Credit on employee-related costs

 

There are
specific provisions which restrict claim of Input Tax Credit u/s 17(5) as
under:

(b) the following supply of goods or services or
both:

(i) food
and beverages, outdoor catering, beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic
and plastic surgery, leasing, renting or hiring of motor vehicles, vessels or
aircraft referred to in clause (a) or clause (aa), except when used for the
purposes specified therein, life insurance and health insurance:

Provided
that the input tax credit in respect of such goods or services or both shall be
available where an inward supply of such goods or services or both is used by a
registered person for making an outward taxable supply of the same category of
goods or services or both or as an element of a taxable composite or mixed
supply;

(ii) membership of a club, health and fitness
centre; and

(iii) travel benefits extended to employees on
vacation such as leave or home travel concession:

Provided
that the input tax credit in respect of such goods or services or both shall be
available, where it is obligatory for an employer to provide the same to its
employees under any law for the time being in force.

(g) goods
or services or both used for personal consumption;

 

Building on
the above discussion, it is important to note that while making available the
various benefits / facilities to their employees, the employers incur various
costs on which GST would have been charged by their suppliers. Therefore, the
question that needs consideration is whether or not credit shall be available
on such expenses incurred.

 

The
specific reason for this query is that section 17(5) lists items on which
credit shall not be allowed. These are termed as blocked credits. For various
expenses while there is a restriction on claim of credit, an exception has been
provided when the expense is incurred as a statutory requirement. For example,
while in general ITC on food and beverages is not allowed, however, vide
an exception it has been provided that if it is a statutory requirement to
provide such facilities, Input Tax Credit shall be available. For instance,
under the Factory Act, 1948 every factory employing more than 250 employees is
required to maintain a canteen for them. As discussed earlier, for the purpose
of this Act the employees also include those who are not on the payroll of the
employer, i.e., while in general, an employer-employee relationship does not
exist, for the purposes of the Factory Act, 1948 they are treated as employees
and therefore the question that needs consideration is whether the eligibility
to claim credit will apply for such an outsourced workforce also. This would be
specifically important in cases such as construction contracts where generally
the labour is outsourced.

The same
applies to rent-a-cab services, insurance services, etc., as well. However, at
times there are inward supplies received which facilitate the making available
of benefits / facilities to employees. For example, equipment / crockery
purchased for a canteen. There is no specific restriction on the claim of
credit on such items. The restriction applies only to food and beverages and
these do not constitute food and beverages. Therefore, credit on such items
could be claimed.

 

Another
area that would need deliberation is clause (g) of section 17(5) which
restricts claim of credit on goods or services or both used for personal
consumption. The scope of this entry has seen substantial confusion as to
whether it would apply to goods or services used for employee consumption. For instance,
the company organises a picnic for its staff. Will this get covered under this
entry or not? To understand this, one needs to analyse the scope of the term
‘personal consumption’. However, before proceeding further it would be relevant
to refer to the similar entry in CENVAT Credit wherein Rule 2 (l) states that
specific services which were meant for ‘personal consumption of any employee’
shall not constitute input service. It is imperative to note that while the CCR
specified whose personal consumption, the same is apparently silent under GST.
This would indicate that in the absence of a specification, a view can be taken
that the term ‘personal consumption’ is to be seen in the context of the
taxable person and not the employees and, therefore, subject to other clauses
of section 17(5), credit would be available even if they were meant for
consumption of the employees.

 

However,
the answers would change in the above case where the cost of making available
the benefits / facilities, whether wholly or partly, is recovered from the
employees. In such a case, it would result in a reduction of cost for the
employer and therefore, to that extent, the employer would not be entitled to
claim credit. However, there are instances where employers take a view that in
a case where credit is allowable and the corresponding costs are recovered from
the employees, GST should be paid on the recovery amount to avoid complicating
ITC calculations. However, one should take a view that paying GST on the
recovery would mean that the employer has accepted liability under Entry 2 of
Schedule I and there might be challenges on the valuation of the supply claimed
to be made by the employer to his employees because section 15 of the Central
Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 requires such a transaction to be valued as
per the Valuation Rules.

 

Applicability of GST on payments made to
directors of a company

 

Entry 6 of
Notification 13/2017 – CGST Rate requires that the GST in case of service
supplied by a director of a company or a body corporate to the said company /
body corporate shall be paid by the service receiver, i.e., the company in case
the service provider is a director / body corporate. However, this particular
aspect of the GST law has seen its share of controversy, with conflicting
decisions under the Service Tax regime as well as a ruling issued by the
Authority for Advance Ruling.

 

However, before proceeding further, it would be
necessary to go through the background of the concept of directors. Directors
are individuals who are appointed on the Board of a company to protect the
interests of the shareholders and manage the affairs of the company. Generally,
there are two types of directors: executive directors who are involved in the
day-to-day activities of the business, and non-executive directors, also known
as independent directors, whose role is mainly to ensure that the interest of
the shareholders and other stakeholders is largely protected. The maximum
remuneration that can be paid to each class of directors is also regulated.
However, when determining whether the directors satisfy the test of an
employer-employee relationship, there would be a different outcome which is
evident from the following:

Condition

Executive Director

Non-Executive / Independent Director

Who appoints the workers?

Shareholders, on the recommendation of Board, or Board, to be
subsequently ratified by the shareholders

Who pays the salary / remuneration?

Company

Company

Who has the authority to dismiss?

Shareholders

Who can take disciplinary action?

Shareholders

Whether there is continuity of service?

Generally, appointed till end of next general meeting

What is the extent of control and supervision?

Full control and supervision by shareholders

No control / supervision

As is apparent from the above, in
the case of Executive Directors, the test of employer-employee relationship
laid down by the Supreme Court in Balwant Rai Saluja (Supra) is
satisfied. However, it is not so in the case of Independent directors as the
key element of existence and control and supervision is missing. It is
therefore sufficient to say that while Executive Directors satisfy the test of
the employer-employee relationship, the same is not so in the case of
Non-executive / Independent directors. Therefore, in case of directors, while
admittedly notification 13/2017 – CT (Rate) imposes a liability on the company
to pay tax on reverse charge, the issue that remains is whether the payment
made to directors who are in an employer-employee relationship will get covered
within this entry or will it be excluded from the purview of Entry 1 of
Schedule III.

 

Therefore,
since Schedule III itself excludes transactions where an employer-employee
relationship exists from the purview of supply itself, notification 13/2017 –
CT (Rate) imposing the liability to pay tax on the service recipient is ultra
vires
of the provisions of the Act and, therefore, not maintainable. This
aspect has already been considered by the Gujarat High Court in the recent
decision in
Mohit Minerals Private Limited vs. UoI & others [2020 VIL 36
Guj.].

 

In fact, it
is imperative to note that a similar entry requiring payment of tax under RCM
was applicable even under the Service Tax regime where there were two
conflicting decisions. The Division Bench of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of
Allied Blenders & Distillers Private Limited vs. CCE & ST,
Aurangabad [2019 (24) GSTL 207 (Tri.)(Mum.)]
held that directors’
salary would be excluded from the purview of service tax and therefore no tax
would be liable to be paid under Reverse Charge. However, the Kolkata Tribunal
(SMB) has, in the case of Brahm Alloy Limited vs. Commissioner [2019 (24)
GSTL 616 (Tri.)(Kol.)]
held otherwise and confirmed the liability to
pay tax on directors’ remuneration, described as salary by concluding that an
employer-employee relationship didn’t exist on account of two reasons; firstly,
the resolution of the company confirming the appointment of the directors did
not cover the terms of appointment / hiring of services and also the action to
be taken for non-performance of specified duties without which it cannot be
construed as to whether an individual was appointed as Promoter-Director or an
employee director; and secondly, payments made in a quarterly and not monthly
manner. It is apparent that the decision in the case of Brahm Alloy
Limited
is contrary to the established principles and might not survive
if appealed before a higher authority.

 

It is also
important to note that under the GST regime, the AAR has, in the case of Clay
Craft India Private Limited [Raj/AAR/2019-20/33]
also held to the
contrary, that tax is payable under Reverse Charge. The Authority has concluded
that the services rendered by the director to the company are not covered under
Entry 1 of Schedule III as the directors are not employees of the company.

 

The next
issue relating to directors is the applicability of reverse charge in case of
directors deputed on behalf of investing companies, in which case the
remuneration is paid to the company and not to the representative directors.
The issue revolves around whether such transactions would be covered under
notification 13/2017 – CT (Rate) or not? It is imperative to note that in this
transaction structure, the transaction is between two different companies /
body corporates wherein one body corporate has deputed a person as a director
on the Board of the other company. In other words, both the supplier and the
recipient of service are a body corporate / company. The notification requires
that the service provider must be an individual, being a director of the
company. However, that is not so in the case of the current set of
transactions. In other words, Entry 6 does not get triggered at all and,
therefore, no reverse charge would be applicable on such transactions.

 

Is GST applicable on notice period
recoveries / claw-back of payments to employees?

 

Before
looking into the tax implications of notice period recovery / claw-back, let us
understand the background of these transactions.

 

Notice
period recovery: Generally, the employment contracts have a clause that if an
employee intends to leave the organisation or an employer intends to
discontinue the services of an employee, each party will be required to give a
notice to the other of their intention to do so, and once the notice is served,
the party giving the notice will be required to serve a notice period, i.e., if
the employee is serving notice, he will be required to continue in employment
for a pre-decided period to enable the employer to make alternate arrangements.
Similarly, if the employer has served notice to the employee, he will have to
allow the employee to continue in employment for a pre-decided period to enable
the employee to find new employment, or prepare for transition. This is
generally treated as serving notice period. However, there are times when the
party giving the notice does not intend to honour the commitment in which case
they are required to compensate the other person monetarily. In case the
employee refuses to serve the notice period, he would be required to pay
compensation to the employer, which would be either adjusted from his full and
final settlement or recovered from him, and vice versa; if the employer
abstains from honouring the notice period clause, he would monetarily reimburse
the employee.

 

Similarly,
claw-back refers to recovering the amounts already paid to the employees. In
case of senior management employees, there are generally clauses in the
agreement which provide that in case of non-satisfaction of certain conditions
of the employment contract, the payments made to the employees shall be
recovered back from them. For example, if a top level employee is joining a
company from another company, in order to lure him to accept the employment he
is offered ‘joining bonus / incentive’ with the condition that if he does not
continue the employment for a specified period, the same would be liable to be
recovered from him. Similarly, even in case of incentives / bonus, there are
clauses for claw-back of the bonus if there is some action on the part of the
employee which is detrimental to the employer.

 

The issue
that needs consideration is whether recoveries such as the above would
constitute a supply and therefore liable for GST? It is imperative for the
readers to note that the applicability of GST on notice period recoveries has
been a burning issue right from the service tax regime wherein the following
service was declared to be a deemed service u/s 66E: agreeing to the
obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to
do an act;…

 

A similar
entry has continued even under the GST regime with Entry 5(e) of Schedule II of
the Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 which declares the above to be
treated as supply of service under the GST regime as well, thus keeping the
issue alive. Let us analyse the same.

 

Whether such recoveries would be covered under Entry 1 of Schedule III?

However,
what needs to be noted is that the above recoveries emanate from a contract of
employment which is covered under Schedule III as neither being supply of goods
nor supply of services. A contract is the logical starting point for any
transaction. In any contractual obligation, the contracting parties are under
an onus to perform the contract. The contracting terms determine the
responsibility and enforce the performance on each contracting party. In case
of non-performance by any party, resort has to be taken to the contractual
relationship to determine the scope of recovery, if any. Hence, the contract is
in toto the binding force in any relationship.

A Latin
maxim, Nemo aliquam partem recte intelligere potest antequam totum perlegit,
says that no one can properly understand a part until he has read the whole.
Hence, it is important to analyse the entire transaction matrix, the
contractual relationship between the employer and the employee, the relevant
contracts / documents before diving into a discussion on the applicability of
service tax. An employment contract is a written legal document that lays out
binding terms and conditions of an employment relationship between an employee
and an employer. An employment contract generally covers an overview of job
responsibilities, reporting relationships, salary, benefits, paid holidays,
leave encashment benefits, details of employment termination and also provides
that in case an employee wants to quit, the employee should provide one month’s
notice before resigning or compensation in lieu of notice period.

 

The
employment contracts are long-term contracts with the employees. The
understanding and expectations from the employer are that the employee should
provide his services on a continuous basis. The employees are working on
important client projects or certain functions important for the operation of
the business; if any employee resigns in between, that impacts the progression
of the project adversely. To avoid such a situation and give sufficient time to
the employer to make alternative arrangements, the mandatory notice period is
prescribed under the employment contract. However, if the employee wishes to
leave without serving the notice period, the contract provides for recovery of
a certain amount which is generally deducted from the amounts due to the
leaving employee earned in the course of employment.

 

The ‘notice
period recovery’ is a provision for an eventuality that may arise as per
mutually-agreed terms of the employment contract. Notice period recovery is a
condition of the employment contract agreed mutually and hence is intricately
linked with the employer-employee relationship and arises out of an employment
contract only.

 

In the case
of Lakshmi Devi Mills Limited vs. UP Government [AIR 1954 All. 705, 714]
it has been held that ‘terms and conditions of service’ not only include the
recruitment or appointment but also all aspects like disciplinary matters,
removal from service, dismissal, etc. Therefore, termination or quitting the
organisation on notice or notice period recovery in lieu thereof is an
integral part of the employment contract. Thus, notice period recovery is just
another condition of the contractual relationship of an employer and employee
just like other terms of the same employment agreement. Hence, the notice
period recovery in lieu of not adhering to the notice period emanating
from the employment contract should get covered under Entry 1 of Schedule III
and therefore excluded from the scope of supply itself.

 

Is there
any service provided by the employer?

Another
point to be noted is that merely because there is recovery would not convert
the same into consideration. In permitting the employee to leave the
organisation, there is nothing that the employer has done to qualify as
service. For treating something as service, there has to be an activity which
requires doing something for another person. In case of notice period
recoveries, there is no rendition of service from the employer in the case of
permitting the employee to leave the organisation before the completion of the
notice period. The events which precede the employee leaving the organisation
are:

 

(a) The decision to leave is that of the
employee

(b) The request for termination is made by
the employee

(c) The employer has no choice to retain the
employee if he really wants to leave

(d) If the employer decides not to insist on
the notice period, even then he cannot insist on the recovery of the notice pay
if the employee wants to serve the notice period; he will be required to
continue the employment till that period

(e) Therefore, the employer has no choice to
decide on whether the employee should stay back for the notice period or
whether he should leave early against recovery of notice pay. This choice is
also made by the employee.

 

From the
above it is evident that all the activities and decisions are actually carried
out by the employee. And the employer does nothing. He neither decides nor is
in a position to decide. Hence, there is no provision of service by the
employer. Merely because the employee is permitted to leave by the employer
does not by any stretch of the imagination get covered by ‘activity performed
for the employee’.

 

Would mere recovery of amounts characterise it as consideration?

Another
aspect which would need deliberation is whether or not the amounts recovered on
account of notice period recovery / claw-back clauses can be treated as
consideration? Merely because money is received would not give it the
characteristic of consideration. In the case of Cricket Club of India vs.
Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai [2015 (40) STR 973]
it was held
that mere money flow from one person to another cannot be considered as
consideration for a service. The relevant observations of the Tribunal in this
regard are extracted below:

 

‘11.
…Consideration is, undoubtedly, an essential ingredient of all economic
transactions and it is certainly consideration that forms the basis for
computation of service tax. However, existence of consideration cannot be
presumed in every money flow. The factual matrix of the existence of a monetary
flow combined with convergence of two entities for such flow cannot be moulded
by tax authorities into a taxable event without identifying the specific
activity that links the provider to the recipient.

12. …Unless
the existence of provision of a service can be established, the question of
taxing an attendant monetary transaction will not arise.’

 

Even in the celebrated case of UoI
vs. Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt. Limited
[2018-TIOL-76-SC-ST],
the Apex Court upheld the decision of the Delhi
High Court that observed that ‘…and the valuation of tax service cannot be
anything more or less than the consideration paid as quid pro quo for
rendering such a service’.

 

In the case of HCL Learning
Limited vs. Commissioner of CGST, Noida [2019-TIOL-3545-CESTAT-All.],

the Hon’ble Tribunal of Allahabad has categorically held as under:

 

‘1… From
the record, we note that the term of contract between the appellant and his
employee are that employee shall be paid salary and the term of employment is a
fixed term and if the employee leaves the job before the term is over then
certain amount already paid as salary is recovered by the appellant from his
employee. This part of the recovery is treated by Revenue as consideration for
charging service tax… terms of contract between the appellant and his
employee are that employee shall be paid salary and the term of employment is a
fixed term and if the employee leaves the job before the term is over then
certain amount already paid as salary is recovered by the appellant from his
employee. This part of the recovery is treated by Revenue as consideration for
charging service tax.

 

2. We hold
that the said recovery is out of the salary already paid and we also note that
salary is not covered by the provisions of service tax. Therefore, we set aside
the impugned order and allow the appeal.’

Therefore,
whether recovery is from salary due / retained or salary already paid, the fact
remains that salary is excluded from service tax and such recovery cannot be
termed as consideration.

 

Will notice period recovery be covered under Entry 5(e) of Schedule II
to treat the same as supply of service?

The
decision to quit the organisation by the employee is a unilateral decision. The
same is forced upon the employer and he has to accept it. The employer cannot
make any employee work without his consent. Article 23(1) of the Indian
Constitution prohibits forced labour in any form. In other words, statutorily
no employee can be forced to work against his wish. In case the employee wishes
not to serve the notice period and opt to leave the organisation before
completion of the notice period, in such a situation the employer can only
recover the notice period dues.

 

Further,
the employer would not be tolerating any act in such a case. If the employer
has the option to tolerate or not to tolerate, then it can be said to be a
conscious decision. In such cases, in view of the above discussion, the decision
to quit is thrust upon the employer without any option. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the employer has agreed to tolerate the said act of the employee.

 

A breach of
contract cannot be said to be ‘tolerated’ and that is why an amount is imposed
to deter breach in contracts. The contract of employment is for receipt of
services from the employee and not for the breach. The Court of Appeal (UK) in
the case of Vehicle Control Services Limited [(2013) EWCA Civ 186],
has noted that payment in the form of damages / penalty for parking in wrong
places / wrong manner is not a consideration for service as the same arises out
of breach of contract with the parking manager.

          

The Madras
HC has critically analysed the levy of service tax on notice period recoveries
in the case of GE T&D India Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner of
Central Excise, Large Tax Payer Unit, Chennai [2020-VIL-39-Mad-ST]
wherein
the OIO had confirmed the demand treating the recoveries as consideration for
providing declared service u/s 66E. In this case, the Court held as under:

 

‘11. The
definition in clause (e) of section 66E as extracted above is not attracted to
the scenario before me as, in my considered view, the employer has not “tolerated”
any act of the employee but has permitted a sudden exit upon being compensated
by the employee in this regard.

12. Though
normally a contract of employment
qua an employer and employee has to be read as a whole, there are
situations within a contract that constitute rendition of service such as
breach of a stipulation of non-compete. Notice pay,
in lieu of sudden termination, however, does not give rise to the
rendition of service either by the employer or the employee.’

 

The above
judgment clearly lays down the principle that notice period recovery cannot be
treated as ‘service’ by an employer, more so a ‘declared service’. Some
monetary recovery by an employer from an employee on account of breach of
contract cannot be said to be consideration for any different service. Breach
of contract leading to recovery does not lead to the creation of a new contract
of tolerating any act of the employee. The notice period recovery, at best,
represents nothing but reduction in salary payable which is due to the employee
which emanates only from the employment agreement. To draw an analogy, for
breach of contracts, certain companies recover liquidated damages from the
amounts due to the opposite party who fails to execute his duties as stipulated
under the contract. In case of notice period recoveries, the employer recovers
notice period recovery from the employee for breach of contract conditions as
stipulated in the employment agreement. The Tribunal has in the case of Reliance
Life Insurance Company Limited [2018-TIOL-1308-CESTAT-Mumbai = 2018 (19) GSTL
J66 (Tri.)(Bom.)]
held that the surrender / discontinuance charges
represent penalty or liquidated damages and cannot be considered as a
consideration for any services. On a similar footing, in another case of Gondwana
Club vs. Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Nagpur
[2016-TIOL-661-CESTAT-Mum.]
the club had recovered certain charges from
the employees for the accommodation provided to them. In this case also, the
Tribunal held as under:

 

‘7… The
contractual privileges of an employer-employee relationship are outside the
purview of service tax and this activity of the appellant does not come within
the definition of the taxable service of “renting of immovable property” sought
to be saddled on the appellant in the impugned order. Accordingly, the demand
under the head “renting of immovable property service” does not sustain.’

 

In a very
recent decision, the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay had the opportunity to
analyse the concept of ‘supply’ in relation to violation of legal right and
claim of compensation / damages in the context of the Central Goods &
Services Tax Act, 2017. The Hon’ble High Court in the case of Bai Mamubai
Trust & Ors vs. Suchitra Wd/O. Sadhu Koraga Shetty & Ors
[2019-VIL-454-Bom.]
observed as under:

 

56. I am in
agreement with the submissions of the Learned
Amicus Curiae that where a dispute concerns price / payment for a
taxable supply, any amount paid under a court’s order / decree is taxable if,
and to the extent that, it is consideration for the said supply or a payment
that partakes that character. In such cases, the happening of the taxable event
of ‘supply’ is not disputed, but the dispute may be in regard to payment for
supplies already made. This could be, for example, where the defendant denies
the liability to pay the price forming consideration for the supply. The order
/ decree of the court links the payment to the taxable supply and the requisite
element of reciprocity between supply and consideration is present.

 

57.
However, where no reciprocal relationship exists, and the plaintiff alleges
violation of a legal right and seeks damages or compensation from a Court to
make good the said violation (in closest possible monetary terms), it cannot be
said that a ‘supply’ has taken place.

 

58. The
Learned
Amicus Curiae correctly submits that
enforceable reciprocal obligations are essential to a supply. The supply
doctrine does not contemplate or encompass a wrongful unilateral act or any
resulting payment of damages. For example, in a money suit where the plaintiff
seeks a money decree for unpaid consideration for letting out the premises to
the defendant, the reciprocity of the enforceable obligations is present. The
plaintiff in such a situation has permitted the defendant to occupy the premises
for consideration which is not paid. The monies are payable as consideration
towards an earlier taxable supply. However, in a suit, where the cause of
action involves illegal occupation of immovable property or trespass (either by
a party who was never authorised to occupy the premises or by a party whose
authorisation to occupy the premises is determined) the plaintiff’s claim is
one in damages.

 

The above
judgment of the Hon’ble High Court clearly explains that a contractual
obligation forced out of a contract for legal violation cannot be said to be an
activity on which tax is applicable. Although the context is under the Goods
& Services Tax law, but the same can be very well correlated with the
Service Tax laws. Violation of contractual terms by way of monetary
compensation does not result into a ‘contract’ between the parties on which tax
is payable. Reciprocal relationship is a must, which is missing in the case of
notice period recovery as succinctly explained in the grounds above.

 

Based on the
above judgments, analogies and justification as to why notice period recovery
cannot be said to be a ‘declared service’, it is apparent that the recoveries
made from employees on account of non-serving of notice period / claw-back
clauses should not be liable to GST.

 

INTERPLAY WITH PROFESSION TAX ACT

Each
business having a presence in a particular state and employing a specified
number of employees is required to deduct Profession Tax from the salary
payable to the employees and deposit it with the respective State Profession
Tax Authorities of the branch where the employees are based.

 

In the
pre-GST regime, entities engaged in providing services in multiple states had
an option to take single registration and, therefore, had limited exposure to
the state authorities. In many cases, it was observed that the Profession Tax
deducted from employee’s salary was deposited in only one state though the
employee was based in a branch in a different state. While under the pre-GST
regime the state had no overview over such cases, with the introduction of GST
such entities are under the radar of the authorities of multiple states and
issues such as non-registration under Profession Tax, non-payment of profession
tax in the correct state and so on might start coming to the fore. In case of
non-compliance, there might be repercussions which might need to be taken care
of.

 

CONCLUSION

In view of the specific exclusion for services
rendered by employees to employers, it may be important to ensure that the said
exclusion is interpreted in the context of the precedents set under other
legislations
.

OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK ON GST

India has been in lockdown mode
in response to the coronavirus pandemic since 24th March, 2020. It
all started on 30th January when Kerala confirmed the first case of
the disease. In most of the states a semi-lockdown situation started on 12th
March with the closure of schools, colleges and cinema halls, malls, night
clubs, marriages and conferences as a precautionary measure. In Maharashtra,
the provisions of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 were invoked on 13th March.
The impact on business houses started when the State Government ordered private
offices to operate with less than 50% of total attendance and allow the rest to
work from home. The orders were given on 17th March and the
restrictions further tightened on 20th with the announcement of the
closure of all workplaces excluding essential services.

 

And on the 24th of
March, 2020, the Government of India issued a nationwide lockdown order for
containment of the Covid-19 epidemic to be effective for 21 days from the 25th
of March. This lockdown was further extended up to 3rd May. It is
thus seen that the lockdown started affecting trade and business operations in
most of the states from 15th March, a period which coincided with
the compliance period (GST payments and filing of returns) under GST for the
month of February, 2020.

 

It will not be incorrect to state
that in a country like India, considering the present tax rate structure, tax
collection is one of the indicators of the economic growth of trade and
commerce. The indirect tax, which is a tax imposed on consumption, reflects
directly on the economic health of trade and commerce. With the introduction of
the Goods and Services Tax from July, 2017, the tax rate structures of various
commodities and services have been rationalised multiple times to ensure steady
growth in revenue collection. Over the past few months, the GST has been
contributing over Rs. 1 lakh crores in the indirect tax receipts of the Centre
and the states. However, in March, 2020 the GST collections slipped below the
said psychological mark – a fall that may partially be attributable to the
Covid-19 situation (the government announcement extending the due dates for
making payment of GST for the said month came very late). It is, however,
important to note that the GST collections for March, 2020 are at Rs. 97,597
crores and are still higher as compared to the numbers for September and
October of 2019. Considering the economic lockdown in the entire month of
April, 2020, the collection for this month is certainly going to be a
challenge.

 

The Hon’ble Finance Minister has
announced various tax compliance-related reliefs / measures for the next few months
to enable the trade and businesses to effectively address this unprecedented
situation while managing their tax compliances and cash flow. Some of the
important relaxations made are given below:

 

(i) Extension of time limit for filing of GSTR3B for the months of
February, March and April to 30th June, 2020 for assessees having a
turnover of less than Rs. 5 crores.

(ii) For assesses with a turnover more than Rs. 5 crores (large
assessees), the rate of interest for delayed payment of tax has been conditionally
reduced from 18% to 9% p.a. from 15 days after the due date. However, there is
no extension of the due date. No late fee / penalty shall be charged for delay
relating to this period.

(iii) Time limits for notices, notifications, approval orders, sanction
orders, filing of appeals, furnishing applications, reporting any other
document, etc., or for any other compliance (barring a few exceptions) expiring
between 20th March and 29th June are extended to 30th
June, 2020.

(iv) 24/7 clearance at all customs stations till 30th
June, 2020 to address any congestion, delay or surge on account of the
prevailing conditions.

(v) RBI extended the time period for realisation and repatriation of
export proceeds for export of goods or software made up to or on 31st
July to 15 months (from the existing nine months) from the date of export.

(vi) (For a detailed note on GST amendments refer to Recent
Developments in GST
in the BCAJ issue dated April, 2020).

 

The extension in payment of GST
for the months of February to April, 2020 is certainly a big relief to the
taxpayers. However, it is strongly felt that it would have been more
appropriate for the government to completely waive off the interest for those
making the payments for the months of February to May on or before 31st
July, 2020. As per the said extension, for assessees having a turnover of more
than Rs. 5 crores no interest will be charged if they make the payment on or
before 4th May. Considering that the lockdown has been extended from
the earlier 14th April to 3rd May, a further 15 days’
extension in the said date is the least that trade and commerce can expect.

 

The lockdown was implemented
without any advance announcement, as a result of which a lot of practical
problems have arisen.

 

(a) The problem of Invoice / E-way bill
generation and printing:
As we all know, under GST the movement of goods is
allowed only with proper supporting documents such as Invoice / E-way bills,
etc. Any goods not accompanied by proper documentation are liable to be seized
and attract a heavy penalty. During the lockdown period and the related mandate
to work from home, many have experienced difficulties in printing invoices /
generating E-way bills due to the lack of a printing set-up at home. In a few
cases, as a temporary measure the transportation was done without adequate
documentation based only on oral information about Invoice No. and E-way bill
Nos. provided by the supplier to the transporter.

 

(b) Possibility of clandestine movement of goods: There is
a high risk of clandestine movement of goods by certain anti-social tax evaders
during the lockdown period, especially since the tax authorities may not be in
a position to keep a check on in-transit movements of goods due to scaling down
in the mobile squad staff during this period. The government, perhaps in
anticipation of this issue, has not relaxed the requirement of generating E-way
bills and issuing invoices.

 

(c) Preparation of manual invoices: Many organisations did not
have sufficient IT infrastructure in place to enable access to their accounting
/ invoicing software from home. Therefore, in many cases invoices were prepared
manually (i.e., outside the regular systems), resulting in various control
lapses such as no consecutive system-generated invoice number, the challenge as
to the proper accounting thereof, etc. Further, it’s not unlikely that instead
of paying interest, the large assessees may consider filing of GSTR3B on an ad
hoc
basis and prefer to reconcile the amounts later whenever the GSTR1
returns are filed, increasing the compliance burden due to added
reconciliation.

 

(d) Digital signature: Use of digital signature is a
must for carrying out many important compliances under GST, for example, filing
of GST Returns, making payment of GST using DRC-03, refund applications, etc.
As the duration of the lockdown period and gravity of the situation were
unknown, many employees / consultants working with the GST compliance team did
not carry the digital signature home with them which added to their compliance
hindrances during the lockdown period. To address this issue, as a temporary
measure the GSTIN has permitted filing of returns without digital signature and
only on the basis of EVC code.

 

(e) Transitional consignments: Many consignments were in
transit during the lockdown period. Since many states sealed their borders from
12th March onwards, a huge volume of consignments was immobilised.
The problem relating to the expiry of the E-way bill was partially addressed by
the subsequent relief measures extending the validity of the E-way bills
expiring between 20th March and 15th April up to 30th
April, 2020. However, most of the consignments, perishable in nature, resulted
in spoilage of goods. The GST law requires a reversal of Input Tax Credit on
goods lost due to damage / spoilage etc. Unfortunately, no relief has so far
been given in respect thereof. Besides, delays in delivery resulted in many
such orders being cancelled, the tax on which was already paid, adding to the
working capital woes of the trade. In cases involving stock transfers between
different registered units of the same entity, the supplying unit ended up
paying taxes, whereas the receiving unit could not avail the ITC due to
non-receipt of goods.

 

(f) Cancellation of services: The hospitality, tourism and
airline industries suffered a major setback due to the cancellation of their
services during the lockdown. In many cases, the advance was refunded with some
cancellation charges. The issue as to the applicability of the rate of
cancellation charges is still unsettled and hence is likely to remain in focus
during assessments dealing with the said period.

 

(g) Delays in processing refunds: Since the
tax department is functioning with limited staff during the lockdown period,
various refund applications are pending processing, thus adding to the
cash-flow problems of the assessees. This has also impacted various other
administrative processes, such as matters dealing with the restoration of GST
registrations, the release of bank account attachment / blockage of electronic
credit ledger, etc.

(h) Goods supplied free under CSR initiative: During
the lockdown period many entities have been involved in CSR initiatives by
donating masks, gloves, sanitizers, food packets, etc. The eligibility of ITC
on such donations is also doubtful in the light of the provisions of section
17(5)(h) of the CGST Act and no tax incentive has been provided for the same.

 

As part of an administrative
relief package, the time limits for notices, notifications, approval orders,
sanction orders, filing of appeals, furnishing applications, reporting any
other document, etc., as also the time limit for any other compliance expiring
between 20th March and 29th June is extended to 30th
June, 2020. However, certain provisions have been excluded from the purview of
such relaxations. For example, no relaxation was given for time limit stated in
section 31 for issue of invoices. Hence, in cases involving continuous supply
of services, if the event obligating the payment falls during the lockdown
period, then the issue of invoice is mandatory and shifting of liability is not
permissible.

 

Similarly, if during the lockdown
period the turnover of any person exceeds the threshold limit provided for
obtaining GST registration, then such person shall be required to obtain the
registration within 30 days thereof as no relaxation from the same has been
provided. And in cases where the assessee could not make the previous
compliances before the due dates on account of various reasons and the default
continued owing to inability to take any corrective action during the lockdown
period, the imposition of late fees and interest for the lockdown period will
continue. In this background, it would be interesting to see whether an
assessee can exclude the lockdown period from the limitation period citing force
majeure
or impossibility of performance?

 

Unfortunately, in many states
such notifications were not issued by the State VAT / Commercial Tax Departments
as regards pre-GST matters. In an attempt to prevent the spread of coronavirus,
the Maharashtra State Goods and Services Tax Department issued detailed
guidelines to its officers and staff discouraging personal appearances of
assessees / their representatives and completing the time-barring assessments
by obtaining the details through emails and to pass manual orders. However, no
extension of the time limit was given for cases that were getting time-barred
in March, 2020. This may have far-reaching implications, especially where the
orders are passed ex parte and because the Maharashtra VAT Act contains
no provision for cancellation of assessment order and an appeal is not admitted
without depositing 10% of the disputed tax liability by way of pre-deposit.

 

It also appears that the decision
of the department in not extending the statutory due date is in direct
contravention of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the suo motu
WP (Civil) No. 3/2020 vide order dated 23rd March, 2020,
wherein the Apex Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 141 of the
Constitution (binding on all Courts / Tribunals and authorities), has ordered
that the period of limitation in all proceedings, irrespective of the
limitation prescribed under the general law or special law whether condonable
or not, shall be extended with effect from 15th March, 2020 till
further orders. The service tax audits / inquiries under the pre-GST laws also
continued during the lockdown period (admittedly not on a full scale)
increasing the risk of best-judgment SCNs due to the inability of the assessee
to produce proper data during the said period. In some cases, the authorities
issued notices for conducting personal hearing through video conferencing.

 

The
economic impact of coronavirus on GST is directly linked to the economic health
of trade, commerce and industry during the said period and will become clearer
in the days to come and could even become permanent. However, the operational
impact and practical difficulties explained above are temporary in nature and
are expected to have a short life. Hopefully, with the re-opening of the
economy these things will come back on track and certain cases of fait
acompli
experienced during the said period will be addressed wherever
possible by appropriate administrative orders. The whispers seeking more relief
are getting louder and there is a possibility that the government is likely to
announce further relaxations if the lockdown period is further extended. One only
hopes that this happens sooner rather than later.

MANDATORY PAYMENT FOR FILING APPEAL AND ESCAPE THEREFROM

INTRODUCTION

Laws are being so drafted nowadays that even for
preferring an appeal against an order passed by Revenue authorities the
aggrieved assessee has to shell out a minimum 10% or maybe even a higher
proportion of the dues.

 

In other words, the law makes it compulsory that
for filing / entertaining an appeal, the appellant must pay a minimum amount
upfront.

 

For example, under the MVAT Act payment of 10% of
tax dues has been made compulsory from 15th April, 2017. Although
litigation on the said issue is on before the Hon. Bombay High Court, but as of
today no appeal is being admitted without payment of minimum 10% of tax dues.

 

Recently, the above issue has been dealt with by
the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of
Punjab (67 GSTR 193)(SC).

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case arose from an order and judgment of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court. Under the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (PVAT
Act), payment of 25% of additional demand was mandatory for entertaining an
appeal. This was challenged before the High Court.

 

The following questions arose before the Hon.
Punjab & Haryana High Court while deciding the case of Punjab State
Power Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Punjab (90 VST 66)(P&H):

 

‘(a) Whether the State is empowered to enact
section 62(5) of the PVAT Act?

(b) Whether the condition of 25% pre-deposit for
hearing first appeal is onerous, harsh, unreasonable and, therefore, violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India?

(c) Whether the first appellate authority in its
right to hear appeal has inherent powers to grant interim protection against
imposition of such a condition for hearing of appeals on merits?’

 

The Court decided the first two issues in favour of
the State, i.e., the State is empowered to make the provision as it has done
and that the provision is not in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

 

However, regarding the third issue, i.e., whether
the appellate authority is empowered to use its discretion for a lower amount,
the Hon. Punjab & Haryana High Court held in the affirmative, observing as
under:

 

‘It is, thus, concluded that even when no express
power has been conferred on the first appellate authority to pass an order of
interim injunction / protection, in our opinion, by necessary implication and
intendment in view of various pronouncements and legal proposition expounded
above, and in the interest of justice, it would essentially be held that the
power to grant interim injunction / protection is embedded in section 62(5) of
the PVAT Act. Instead of rushing to the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the grievance can be remedied at the stage of first
appellate authority. As a sequel, it would follow that the provisions of
section 62(5) of the PVAT Act are directory in nature, meaning thereby that the
first appellate authority is empowered to partially or completely waive the
condition of pre-deposit contained therein in the given facts and
circumstances. It is not to be exercised in a routine way or as a matter of
course in view of the special nature of taxation and revenue laws. Only when a
strong prima facie case is made out will the first appellate authority
consider whether to grant interim protection / injunction or not. Partial or
complete waiver will be granted only in deserving and appropriate cases where
the first appellate authority is satisfied that the entire purpose of the
appeal will be frustrated or rendered nugatory by allowing the condition of
pre-deposit to continue as a condition precedent to the hearing of the appeal
before it.

 

Therefore, the power to grant interim protection /
injunction by the first appellate authority in appropriate cases in case of
undue hardship is legal and valid. As a result, question (c) posed is answered
accordingly.’

 

The above judgment was challenged by the State on
the issue of the answer to question (c) and by the assessee in respect of the
answers to the first two questions.

 

The Hon. Supreme Court decided the issue under Tecnimont
Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Punjab (67 GSTR 193)(SC).

 

CONSIDERATION BY SUPREME COURT

In its judgment, the Supreme Court referred to
various precedents on the issue. The indicative observations of the Supreme
Court can be noted as under:

 

‘15. In Har Devi Asnani 11 the
validity of proviso to section 65(1) of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998
came up for consideration in terms of which no revision application could be
entertained unless it was accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of
50% of the recoverable amount. Relying on the earlier decisions of this Court
including in Smt. P. Laxmi Devi the challenge was rejected and
the thought expressed in P. Laxmi Devi 10 was repeated in Har
Devi Asnani 11
as under:

 

“27. In Govt. of A.P. vs. P. Laxmi Devi 10 this
Court, while upholding the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 47-A of the Stamp Act introduced by the Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 8
of 1998, observed (SCC p. 737, para 29):

 

29. In our opinion in this situation it is always
open to a party to file a writ petition challenging the exorbitant demand made
by the registering officer under the proviso to section 47-A alleging
that the determination made is arbitrary and / or based on extraneous
considerations, and in that case it is always open to the High Court, if it is
satisfied that the allegation is correct, to set aside such exorbitant demand
under the proviso to section 47-A of the Stamp Act by declaring the
demand arbitrary. It is well settled that arbitrariness violates Article 14 of
the Constitution (vide Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India 17). Hence,
the party is not remediless in this situation.

 

28. In our view, therefore, the Learned Single
Judge should have examined the facts of the present case to find out whether
the determination of the value of the property purchased by the appellant and
the demand of additional stamp duty made from the appellant by the Additional
Collector were exorbitant so as to call for interference under Article 226 of
the Constitution.”

 

16. These decisions show that the following
statements of law in The Anant Mills Co. Ltd. have guided
subsequent decisions of this Court:

 

The right of appeal is the creature of a statute.
Without a statutory provision creating such a right the person aggrieved is not
entitled to file an appeal… It is permissible to enact a law that no appeal
shall lie against an order relating to an assessment of tax unless the tax had
been paid. It is open to the Legislature to impose an accompanying liability
upon a party upon whom legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for
the exercise of the right. Any requirement for the discharge of that liability
or the fulfilment of that condition in case the party concerned seeks to avail
of the said right is a valid piece of legislation…’

 

Observing as above, the Hon. Supreme Court upheld
the validity of two provisions.

 

In respect of question (c), that is, in spite of
such provisions, whether the appellate authority has discretion, the Hon.
Supreme Court observed as under:

 

‘18. It is true that in cases falling in second
category as set out in paragraph 11 hereinabove, where no discretion was
conferred by the Statute upon the appellate authority to grant relief against
requirement of pre-deposit, the challenge to the validity of the concerned
provision in each of those cases was rejected.

 

But the decision of the Constitution Bench of this
Court in Seth Nand Lal was in the backdrop of what this Court
considered to be meagre rate of the annual land tax payable. The decision in Shyam
Kishore
attempted to find a solution and provide some succour in cases
involving extreme hardship but was well aware of the limitation. Same awareness
was expressed in P. Laxmi Devi and in Har
Devi Asnani
and it was stated that in cases of extreme hardship a writ
petition could be an appropriate remedy. But in the present case the High Court
has gone a step further and found that the appellate authority would have
implied power to grant such solace, and for arriving at such conclusion,
reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Kunhi 1.

 

19. Kunhi 1 undoubtedly laid down
that an express grant of statutory power carries with it, by necessary
implication, the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant
effective. But can such incidental or implied power be drawn and invoked to
grant relief against requirement of pre-deposit when the statute in clear
mandate says no appeal be entertained unless 25% of the amount in question is
deposited? Would not any such exercise make the mandate of the provision of
pre-deposit nugatory and meaningless?

 

20. While dealing with the scope and width of
implied powers, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Matajog Dubey vs.
H.C. Bhari
also touched upon the issue whether exercise of such power
can permit going against the express statutory provision inhibiting the
exercise of such power. The discussion was as under:

 

“Where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by
statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the
exercise of the power or the performance of the duty by any limitations or
restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of
doing all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for
such execution. If in the exercise of the power or the performance of the
official duty, improper or unlawful obstruction or resistance is encountered,
there must be the right to use reasonable means to remove the obstruction or
overcome the resistance. This accords with common sense and does not seem
contrary to any principle of law. The true position is neatly stated thus in Broom’s
Legal Maxims, 10th Ed.,
at page 312: It is a rule that when the law
commands a thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be
necessary for executing its command.

 

(Emphasis added)”’

 

Relying upon the above precedents, the Hon. Supreme
Court held that once there is a specific provision, the appellate authority
cannot have discretion and cannot forgo such condition nor lower the amount.

 

AN ALTERNATIVE

The Hon. Supreme Court, while deciding the issue,
has also given a solution about cases where such condition cannot be complied
with. The said observations are available at many places and in precedents
reproduced by the Hon. Supreme Court.

 

In the paragraph reproduced above from the judgment
of Har Devi Asnani it can be seen that in case of exorbitant
demand, or in case of demand based on extraneous considerations, it is open to
approach the High Court under its inherent powers for deletion of such demand
as violative of Article 14.

 

The High Court can consider such a plea. Even in
the present case, the Hon. Supreme Court concluded as under:

 

‘25. As stated in P. Laxmi Devi and
Har Devi Asnani, in genuine cases of hardship recourse would
still be open to the concerned person. However, it would be a completely
different thing to say that the appellate authority itself can grant such
relief. As stated in Shyam Kishore, any such exercise would make
the provision itself unworkable and render the statutory intendment nugatory.’

 

Thus, an inference can be drawn that in case of
arbitrary demand one can approach the High Court by writ petition. It can also
be stated that in case of inability to pay the minimum amount, supported by
necessary documents and reasons, one can approach the High Court by writ
petition to waive the condition.

 

CONCLUSION

The law is now becoming very clear. Once there is a
condition of minimum payment, the appellate authority has no discretion in
spite of great prejudice to the assessee. However, if the circumstances exist,
the assessee can approach the High Court by way of writ petition to waive the
condition or set aside the demand itself.

 

As of today, the laws are
becoming mechanical and discretions are being done away with. The only hope for
justice will be from the Hon. High Courts in deserving cases.


 

GST ON PAYMENTS MADE TO DIRECTORS

This article
analyses the GST implications of different payments made by companies to their
Directors. Such payments can be broadly categorised into:

(1)    Remuneration to Whole-Time Directors

(2)    Remuneration to Independent Directors

(3)    Payment towards expenses as lump sum or as
reimbursement.

Each of the above
is discussed below.

 

REMUNERATION TO WHOLE-TIME DIRECTORS

Whole-Time
Directors (who can be professionals or from the promoter group) (‘WTD’) are
those persons who are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the company
and are entitled to a remuneration. The terms of appointment for such WTDs
(including the remuneration and perquisites) are as per the limits laid down by
Schedule V to the Companies Act, 2013. The remuneration can be a fixed minimum
amount per month or a combination of fixed amount plus a commission based on a
percentage of the profits. The said terms are laid down in an agreement
approved by the Board of Directors.

 

In terms of the agreement between the company and the WTD/s, the WTD is
regarded as having a persona of not only a Director but also an employee
depending upon the nature of his work and the terms of his employment.
Moreover, in all such cases the company makes necessary deductions on account
of provident fund, profession tax and deduction of tax at source under
Income-tax law, treats these Directors as employees of the company in filings
before all statutory authorities and considers the remuneration paid to them as
a salary. Thus, the relationship of the Director vis-à-vis the company would be
that of an employer-employee.

 

If the same is
analysed from the GST point of view, Schedule III of the Central Goods and
Services Tax Act, 2017 (‘CGST Act’) provides for supplies which are to be
treated neither as a supply of goods nor a supply of services. Entry (1) of the
said Schedule reads as follows, ‘Services by an employee to the employer in
the course of or in relation to his employment’.
From this it can be
inferred that the services supplied by an employee to the employer is not a
service liable to GST.


REMUNERATION TO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

Independent Directors (‘IDs’), on the other
hand, are not WTDs but are recommended by the Board of Directors and appointed
by the shareholders. They are normally separate and independent of the company
management. These IDs provide overall guidance and do not work under the
control and supervision of the company management and therefore, by inference,
they are not employees of the company. IDs attend the meetings of the Board or
its committees for which they are paid fees, usually referred to as sitting
fees / directors’ fees. In many cases, the Directors are also paid a percentage
of profits as commission.

Analysing these
payments to IDs from the GST perspective, Entry 6 of Notification No.
13/2017-CT (Rates) and No. 10/2017-IT (Rates) both dated 28th June,
2017, effective from 1st July, 2017 issued under the CGST Act (‘Reverse
Charge Notification’
) provides that the ‘GST on services supplied by
a director of a company or a body corporate to the said company or the body
corporate located in taxable territory shall be paid under reverse charge
mechanism by the recipient of services’.

 

Thus, in case of
payments to IDs (whether they are located in India or domiciled outside India),
the company will have to pay GST under Reverse Charge Mechanism (‘RCM’),
albeit appropriate credit of such GST paid shall be available to the
company, subject to fulfilment of other terms and conditions of availment of
ITC.

 

PAYMENT TOWARDS EXPENSES AS LUMP SUM OR AS REIMBURSEMENT

In many companies,
Directors (whether WTDs or IDs) are also paid a lump sum amount towards
expenses, or reimbursed the actual expenses incurred by them in performing
their duties as directors, e.g. travel expenses, accommodation expenses, etc.
The same is as per the terms of appointment for WTDs or the Directors’ Expense
Reimbursement Policy of the company.

 

Regarding the
applicability of GST on such payments, the Authority on Advance Rulings (‘AAR’)
in the case of M/s Alcon Consulting Engineers (India) Private Limited,
Bengaluru (AR No. Kar ADRG 83/2019) dated 25th September, 2019
,
while responding to the query, whether expenses incurred by employees and later
reimbursed by the company are liable to GST, ruled in the negative and observed
that the expenses incurred by the employees are expenses of the applicant and
therefore this amount reimbursed by the applicant to the employee later on
would not amount to consideration for the supplies received, as the services of
the employee to his employer in the course of his employment is not a supply of
goods or supply of services and hence the same is not liable to tax.

 

Therefore, any
expense reimbursement to a WTD who is treated as an employee would not be
liable to GST. However, if the reimbursement of expenses is made to an ID, who
also receives sitting fees, the same shall be treated as part of the
consideration and would be liable to GST under the RCM.

 

Analysis of
the AAR decision in Clay Craft India Private Limited

Whilst the above provisions of the GST law regarding the taxability of
payments made to the Directors were fairly settled, a recent Advance Ruling
issued by the AAR, Rajasthan in the case of Clay Craft India Private
Limited (AR No. Raj/AAR/2019-20/33) dated 20th February, 2020
held
that consideration paid to Directors by the company will attract GST on Reverse
Charge basis as it is covered under Entry 6 of the Reverse Charge Notification
issued under the CGST Act. Entry 6 of the said Notification provides that the
GST on services supplied by a Director of a company or a body corporate to the
said company or the body corporate located in the taxable territory shall be
paid under RCM by the recipient of services.

 

SERVICE SUPPLIED BY AN
EMPLOYEE

The applicant in
the above Advance Ruling had sought clarity on ‘whether payment made for
services availed from a Director, in their capacity as an employee, is also
liable to be taxed under GST on RCM basis’
. The clarification was sought
keeping in mind Entry (1) of Schedule III of the CGST Act on the basis of which
the ‘Services by an employee to the employer in the course of or in
relation to his employment’
is treated neither as a supply of goods nor
a supply of services. Thus, the service supplied by an employee to the employer
is not a supply for GST purposes.

The aforesaid query
was raised by the applicant pursuant to a decision passed by the AAR, Karnataka
in the case of M/s Alcon Consulting Engineers (Supra) wherein the
Authority provided that the services provided by the Director to the company
are not covered under Schedule III Entry (1) of the CGST Act as the Director is
not an employee of the company and hence the payment made to him is liable to
GST.

 

In both the
aforesaid rulings, there is no segregation of payments / consideration paid to
the Directors for the services provided by such Directors in their capacity as
an employee or as an agent or as a Director.

 

EPF DEDUCTED FROM
DIRECTORS

It would be pertinent to note that the applicant in the Clay Craft
case (Supra)
was already paying GST under RCM on any commission paid to
its Directors, who were providing services to the company in the capacity of
Director. However, payments for the services received from its Whole-Time
Directors / Managing Directors, who were supplying services in their capacity
as employees of the company, were made in the form of salary and the same were
also offered by the Directors in their personal income tax returns under
‘Income from Salary’. The company was also deducting EPF from their salaries
and all other benefits given to them were as per the policy decided by the
company for its employees.

 

However, the AAR
did not consider the above and only took note of the RCM entry under GST and
denied treating Directors as employees of the company.

 

Analysis of
the AAR decision in Anil Kumar Agrawal

In yet another
recent Advance Ruling by the AAR, Karnataka in the case of M/s Anil Kumar
Agrawal (AR No. Kar ADRG 30/2020) dated 4th May, 2020
, the
Authority analysed incomes derived from various sources so as to examine
whether such income in relation to any transaction amounts to supply or not.
One such source of income examined was ‘Salary received as Director from
a Private Limited Company’
.

 

The AAR, Karnataka
at paragraph 7.8 of the ruling explicitly observed that:

‘The applicant
is in receipt of certain amount termed as salary as Director of a private
limited company. Two possibilities may arise with regard to the instant issue
of amount received by the applicant. The first possibility that the applicant
is the employee of the said company (Executive Director), in which case the
services of the applicant as an employee to the employer are neither treated as
supply of goods nor as supply of services, in terms of Schedule III of CGST Act
2017.

The second
possibility that the applicant is the nominated Director (non-Executive
Director) of the company and provides the services to the said company. In this
case the remuneration paid by the company is exigible to GST in the hands of
the company under reverse charge mechanism under section 9(3) of the CGST Act
2017, in the hands of the company, under Entry No. 6 of Notification No.
13/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017.

…….

…….

In view of the
above, the remuneration received by the applicant as Executive Director is not
includable in the aggregate turnover, as it is the value of the services
supplied by the applicant being an employee.’

 

OBSERVATIONS

Keeping in view
these contradictory rulings, it would be pertinent to have a look at some of
the observations made in the following judgments / circulars / notifications of
various authorities. Though the judgments are in respect of the erstwhile
Service Tax law, the provisions being identical can also be applied to GST.

 

(i)     Remuneration paid to the Managing Director
is to be considered as salary. A Managing Director may be regarded as having a
persona of not only a Director but also an employee or agent, depending upon
the nature of his work and the terms of the employment1.

(ii)    If an amount paid to an individual was
treated as salary by the Income-tax Department, it could not be held by the
Service Tax Department as amount paid for consultancy charges and to demand
service tax on the same2.

(iii)   If a Director is performing duties and is
working for the company, he will come within the purview of an employee3.

(iv)   Remuneration paid to four Whole-Time Directors
for managing the day-to-day affairs of the company and where the company made
necessary deductions on account of provident fund, professional tax and TDS as
applicable and declared these Directors to all statutory authorities as
employees of the company, remuneration paid to Directors was nothing but salary
and the company was not required to discharge service tax on remuneration paid
to Directors4.

(v)    The Managing Director of a company may be
executive or non-executive. A Managing Director of a company may or may not be
an ‘employee’ of the company. It was rightly held that for the purpose of ESIC
the company is the owner. The Managing Director is not the ‘owner’. Even if the
Managing Director is declared as ‘Principal Employer’ to ESIC, he can still be
an employee5.

(vi)   Payments made by a company to the Managing
Director / Directors (Whole-Time or Independent) even if termed as commission,
is not ‘commission’ that is within the scope of business auxiliary service and,
hence, service tax would not be leviable on such amount6.

(vii) The Managing Director / Directors (Whole-Time or
Independent) being part of the Board of Directors, perform management functions
and they do not perform consultancy or advisory functions…In view of the above,
it is clarified that the remunerations paid to the Managing Director /
Directors of companies whether Whole-Time or Independent when being compensated
for their performance as Managing Director / Directors, would not be liable to
service tax7.

(viii) The service tax (now GST) paid by the company
will be treated as part of remuneration to non-Whole-Time Directors and if it
exceeds the ceiling of 1% / 3%, the approval of the Central Government would be
required – Circular No. 24/2012 dated 9th August, 2012 of the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs. This entire circular is on the basis that GST is
payable on payments made to non-Whole-Time Directors only. And, as a corollary,
it can be inferred that service tax (now GST) shall not be payable on payments
made to Whole-Time Directors.

 

1 In Ram Prasad vs. CIT (1972) 2 SCC 696 dated
24
th
August,
1972
bound to
cause uncertainty and unnecessary litigation.

2 In Rentworks India P Ltd. vs. CCE (2016) 43
STR 634 (Mum. – Trib.)

3 In Monitron Securities vs. Mukundlal
Khushalchand 2001 LLR 339 (Guj. HC)

4 In Allied Blenders and Distillers P Ltd. vs.
CCE & ST [2019] 101 taxmann.com
462 (Mum. –CESTAT)

5 In ESIC vs. Apex Engineering Ltd. 1997 LLR 1097

6 CBE&C Circular No. 115/09/2009-ST dated 31st July, 2009

7 CBE&C Circular No. 115/09/2009-ST dated 31st July, 2009

MAY LEAD TO NEEDLESS
LITIGATION

From the above it
can be further deduced that a Director may provide services to a company in the
capacity of a Director or agent or employee and may receive consideration /
payments in the form of sitting fees or commission or salary, depending on the
arrangement he / she has with the company. Consequently, tax would be payable
in accordance with the nature of the consideration derived by a company’s
Director providing services in his / her capacity as a Director or agent or
employee. Under such circumstances, considering all payments to Directors under
one category and imposing GST on the same is against the established principles
of law and bound to cause uncertainty and unnecessary litigation.

 

 

The AAR seems to have erred in delivering the rulings under the Clay
Craft
and the M/s Alcon Consulting Engineers cases (Supra)
and by obvious inadvertence or oversight failed to reconcile the aforesaid
issue with that of some previously pronounced judgments of co-equal or higher
authorities. It also appears that the AAR wanted to differ from the precedents;
however, it was not open to the AAR to completely ignore the previous decisions
on illogical and unintelligible grounds. Regrettably, the ruling delivered by
the AAR without referring to the aforesaid precedents and without consciously
apprising itself of the context of such judgments on similar issues, is per
incuriam
, meaning a judgment given through inadvertence or want of
care, and therefore requires reconsideration. Per incuriam judgments are
not binding judgments. Needless to say, the AAR is only binding on the
applicant but carries some reference and, therefore, nuisance value and should
be appealed before the higher forum.

 

CONCLUSION

While the AARs are not binding on anyone other than the applicants, the
companies may revisit their payments to Directors on which GST is not being
currently paid by them under RCM. Such payments should be analysed on the basis
of the contract / agreement with the Directors and the payment / non-payment of
GST under RCM against such payments to Directors be decided and documented.

 

There is also an
immediate need for a Central Appellate Authority for Advance Rulings since
contradictory rulings given by different state authorities, and sometimes even
by the same state authority as in the case discussed above (by the AAR,
Karnataka) can result in unnecessary confusion and avoidable litigation.

 

SPECIFIC TRANSACTIONS IN INCOME TAX & GST

In continuation of the article
published in the April, 2020 issue of this Journal, we have detailed certain
other areas of comparison between the Income tax and the GST laws

 

REVISION IN
PRICE OF SUPPLY – ACCRUAL OF INCOME VS. SUPPLY OF SERVICE

The time of supply
and the accrual of income are generally synchronous with one another. The
earlier article discussed that the supply aspect of a contract generally
precedes the claim of consideration from the contract. In most contracts, the
right to receive consideration starts immediately on completion of supply
resulting in co-existence of supply and income in a reporting period. Yet, in
certain cases the occurrence of supply and the consequential income therefrom
may spread over different tax periods. This concept of timing can be understood
from the perspective of tax treatments over retrospective enhancement of price
/ income. Income tax awaits the right to receive the enhanced income but excise
retraces any additional consideration back to the date of removal and is not
guided by the timing of its accrual.

 

Under the Excise law, there was
considerable debate on the imposition of interest on account of revision of the
transaction value subsequent to removal of excisable goods. The Supreme Court
through a three-judge Bench in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. CCE,
Raipur (CA 2150, 2562 of 2012 & 599, 600 & 1522-23 of 2013)
was
deciding a reference in the light of decisions in CCE vs. SKF India Ltd.
[2009] 21 STT 429 (SC)
and CCE vs. International Auto Ltd. [2010]
24 STT 586 (SC)
wherein the question for consideration was the due date
of payment of the excise duty component on subsequent enhancement of a
tentative price. In other words, whether the date of removal of goods would be
relevant in case of a subsequent enhancement of price with retrospective
effect. The Court, after analysing the provisions of sections 11A, 11AB, etc.
held that the date of removal was the only relevant date for collection of tax
and the transaction value would be the value on the date of removal. Even
though the price of the transaction was not fixed on the date of removal,
subsequent fixation of price would relate back to the date of removal and
interest would be applicable on the additional price collected despite the
event taking place after the removal.

 

In service tax, the taxable event was
the rendition of service [Association of Leasing & Financial Service
Companies vs. UOI; 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC)]
. Rule 6 of the Service Tax
Rules r/w the Point of Taxation Rules provides for payment of service tax based
on the invoice raised for rendition of service. In case of regular services,
the invoice was considered as a sufficient trigger for taxation, while in the case
of continuous services the right to claim consideration was considered as the
appropriate point of time when tax would be applicable. The said rules seem to
be the source of the provisions contained in the GST law, especially for
services. Where provision of service is the point of taxation, the principles
as made applicable to removal under the Excise law would also be applicable to
service tax laws.

 

In sales tax law, the term turnover
(and sales price) was defined on the basis of amounts receivable by the dealer
towards sale of goods. The Supreme Court in Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing
Co. Ltd. [1971] 82 ITR 363 (SC)
stated that the liability to pay sales
tax would arise the moment the sale was effected. In the case of EID
Parry vs. Asst. CCT (2005) 141 STC 12 (SC)
, the Court was examining
whether interest was payable on short payment of purchase tax on account of
enhanced purchase consideration payable after fixation of the statutory minimum
price of sugar under the Government Order. The Supreme Court held that no
interest was payable on such enhanced consideration and any tax paid earlier
was a tax paid in advance. In fact, the Court went a step further stating that
the amount paid towards the provisional price fixed by the government is not
the price until finalised by the government for the transaction of sale.

 

Now under the GST law, tax on supply of
goods / services is payable on the invoice for the supply, i.e. typically on or
before the removal of goods or the provision of service. From the perspective
of supply of goods, the collection of taxes under GST has blended the sales tax
concept (relying on invoice) and the excise concept (relying on removal).
However, there is a clear absence of a condition of ‘right to receive’
the consideration from the recipient while assessing the supply of goods.

 

One probable reason would be that the
legislature has presumed an invoice as evidence of the supplier completing its
obligation under the contract, resulting in a right to receive the
consideration. The other reason could be that the legislature is fixing its tax
at the earliest point in time (which it is entitled to do), i.e. when the
outward aspect of a contractual obligation takes place and is not really
concerned with the timing of its realisation. Both reach the same conclusion,
that while income tax stresses on ‘right to receive’,
GST latches onto the transaction immediately on ‘completion of obligation to
supply
’ and does not await realisation
of consideration to establish taxing rights. In effect, the time of supply for
GST may in many cases be triggered even before the income accrues to the
taxpayer and as a consequence creating a timing difference between both laws.
Therefore, even if prices are tentative, it may be quite possible to tax the
transaction and subsequent fixation of prices of supply of goods or services
would not assist the taxpayer in claiming that the point of tax liability is
the point of fixation of the price.

 

One caveat would be that in case of services
the law does not have any tangible substance to trace its origin and
completion, and hence as a subordinate test adopts receipt of consideration as
the basis of the supply (of service) having been complete (both in the case of
regular and continuous supply of service). But this is a matter of legislative
convenience of collection rather than a conceptual point for analysis.

 

DEPRECIATION
COMPONENT ON CAPITAL ASSETS

The GST law prohibits the claim of
Input Tax Credit (ITC) if such component has been capitalised in the written
down value (WDV) of the block of assets under the Income-tax Act [section 16(4)
of CGST]. This is introduced to prohibit persons from availing a dual benefit:
(1) a deduction from taxable profits under income tax; and (2) a deduction from
output taxes. Taxpayers generally opt to avail ITC and refrain from taking
depreciation on such tax components. In case a taxpayer (erroneously or
consciously) avails depreciation on the ITC component of capital goods without
claiming the credit under GST, does the window to relinquish its claim of
depreciation and re-avail ITC continue to remain open?

 

We can take the case of motor vehicles
which was originally considered as ineligible for ITC becoming eligible for the
same if the taxable person decides to sell the asset during the course of
business. The answer could be a ‘possible’ yes (of course, with some practical
challenges). Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act permits an assessee to offer
any benefit arising from a previously claimed allowance / deduction as income
in the year of its credit. Through this provision the assessee may be in a
position to reverse the depreciation effect and state that there is no
depreciation claim on the ITC component of the asset. We may recall that the
Supreme Court in Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd. vs. CCE 1996 (81) ELT 3
SC
had in the context of MODVAT stated that if the assessee reverses a
wrongly-claimed credit, it would be treated as not having availed credit. This
analogy can serve well in this case, too, on the principle of revenue
neutrality. But the contention of revenue neutrality becomes questionable where
there is any change in law, in tax rates, etc.

 

However, the
reverse scenario, i.e. giving up the ITC claim and availing depreciation, may
not be as smooth. While there may not be an issue under the GST law, the
Income-tax Act follows a strict ‘block of assets method’ and alterations to
such blocks, except through enabling provisions, are not permissible. The block
of assets method only permits alterations to the block in case of acquisition,
sale, destruction, etc. of assets and does not provide for retrospective change
in the actual cost of the asset. The only alternative is to file a revised
return before the close of the assessment year in which the acquisition takes
place by enhancing the actual cost, or file a revised block of assets during
the course of assessment proceedings.

 

ASSESSMENT VS.
ADJUDICATION OR BOTH

The Privy Council in Badridas
Daga vs. CIT (17 ITR 209)
stated that the words ‘assess’ and
‘assessment’ refer to the procedure adopted to compute taxes and ‘assessee’
refers primarily to the person on whom such computation would be performed
(also held in Central Excise vs., National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. 1972
AIR 2563)
. While adjudication and assessment are both comprised in the
wider subject to ‘assessment’, the procedure for assessment under income tax is
distinct from the assessment systems under the Excise / GST laws.

Income tax follows the concept of
previous year and assessment year, i.e. incomes which are earned in a financial
year (previous year) are assessed to tax in the immediately succeeding year
(assessment year). Consequently, income tax liability arises at the end of the
previous year and is liable for payment during the assessment year. The
taxpayer is required to compute the net income arising during the previous year
and discharge its liability after the close of the previous year as part the
self-assessment scheme. The unit of assessment is a year comprising of twelve
months. On the other hand, the liability towards GST is fixed the moment the
transaction of supply takes place with the collection being deferred to a later
date through a self-assessment mechanism, i.e. the 20th of the
subsequent calendar month (tax period).

 

The assessment of income under income
tax takes place in multiple stages. The return filed u/s 139 is examined
through a process popularly called summary assessment, the scope of which involves
examination of mathematical accuracy, apparent errors (such as conflicting or
deficient data in the return), incorrect claims based on external data sources
with Income tax authorities (such as TDS, TCS, Annual Information Reports,
etc.) [section 143(1)]. Based on a Computer-Aided Selection System, a return
may be selected for detailed scrutiny assessment on the legal and factual
aspects involving information gathering, examination, application and final
conclusion through an assessment order [sections 143(2) and (3)]. One
assessment year is subjected to a single scrutiny assessment. Once this takes
place, such an assessment cannot be altered other than by a re-assessment. The
re-assessment provisions u/s 147 provide for assessment of escaped income (either
arising after self-assessment or scrutiny assessment) which can be initiated
within a stipulated time frame in cases of escaped incomes. Income tax has
defined time limits for initiation and completion of such scrutiny and
re-assessments.

 

The Excise and service tax laws follow
a system of adjudication rather than a scheme of assessment. This probably is
on account of the physical administration system adopted by Excise authorities
during the 1900s. The Excise law has bifurcated the administrative function
into two stages, (a) audit / verification function (information collation), and
(b) adjudication function (legal application). These functions are not
necessarily performed by the same authority. The audit function was not
codified in law but guided by administrative instructions. It involved
site-cum-desk activity wherein the authorities performed the information
collection and issued an exception-based report on the identified issues. After
this, the adjudicating authority prepares a tax proposal, referred to as a show
cause notice, giving its interpretation over a subject with the evidence
collected for this purpose. The adjudicating authority would complete the
adjudication after due opportunities and confirm / drop the proposal by
issuance of an adjudication order. The Excise law provided for time limits on
issuance of the show cause notice but did not provide an outer limit to its
completion.

 

The critical difference between the two
systems can be examined from these parameters:

(1)        Source
and scope
– Scrutiny assessments are currently selected through a computer-aided
selection process. Though administrative instructions limited the assessments
to identified issues, the officer had the liberty to expand the scope in cases
where under-reporting of taxes is identified. The statute does not limit the
scope of the scrutiny proceedings. Adjudication commences after internal audit
/ verification / inspection reports but not through any random sampling
methodology. The scope of the adjudication is clearly defined and the entire
proceeding only hovers around the issue which is defined in the notice.

 

(2)        Methodology – Income tax
assessments involve both fact-finding and legal application. The onus is on the
officer to seek the facts required and arrive at a legal conclusion, but the
stress is initially on the facts of the case. The diameter of an ideal
adjudication process is driven by application of law and the presumption is
that the adjudicating officer has concluded the fact-finding exercise thoroughly;
however, in practice any deficiency in facts can be made good by seeking an
internal verification report or submission from the taxpayer. In adjudication,
the fact-finding authority and the decision-making authority may not
necessarily be the same, unlike in income tax assessments.

 

(3)        Adversarial
character
– Adjudication is slightly adversarial in nature, in the sense that the
notice commences with a proposal of tax demand leaving the taxpayer to provide
all the legal and factual contentions against the proposal. Revenue and
taxpayers are considered as opposing parties to the issue identified.
Assessments do not acquire an adversarial character until the Revenue officer
reaches a conclusion that there is under-payment of taxes.

 

(4)        Multiplicity
and parallel proceedings
– Scrutiny proceedings are undertaken only once for a particular
assessment year. Multiple scrutiny proceedings are not permissible for the same
assessment year even on matters escaping attention during the scrutiny
proceedings. Multiple adjudications by different authorities (in ranking /
function) are permissible for a particular tax period, though the issues may
not necessarily overlap with each other. As regards periodicity, there would be
one income tax assessment in force for a particular assessment year but there
can be multiple adjudication orders in force for the tax period. The period
under adjudication is not limited by tax periods or financial years, except for
the overall time limit of adjudication.

 

(5)        Revenue’s
remedy
– In income tax, Revenue does not have the right to appeal against the
assessment order of the A.O. Where orders are ‘erroneous’, the Commissioner can
exercise his revisionary powers. Adjudications being adversarial in nature are
orders against which both the taxpayer and the Revenue have the right of
appeal. Revision proceedings are limited in scope in comparison to appellate
proceedings where Revenue is under appeal – for example, revision proceedings
cannot be initiated where the A.O. adopts one of the two possible views (order
would not be erroneous) but the appellate proceedings would be permissible even
in cases where the Commissioner differs from the view adopted by the
subordinate. At the first appellate forum, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)
[CIT(A)] is permitted to wear the A.O.’s hat and enhance the assessment during
the course of the proceedings. Under Excise, the Commissioner of Central Excise
(Appeals) [CCE(A)] proposing enhancement of tax would have to necessarily
operate as an adjudicating officer assuming original jurisdiction and following
the time limits and restrictions as applicable to the original adjudication
proceedings – for example, the CIT(A) can enhance the assessment of an order
under appeal even if the time limit for assessment has expired, but a CCE(A)
would not be permitted to issue a show cause notice for enhancement after the
time permissible to issue a show cause notice.

 

(6)        Demands
and refunds
– Income tax assessments could result in a positive demand or a refund
to the taxpayer. The net result of the computation of income would have to be
acted upon by the A.O. without any further proceeding. Excise adjudications,
being issue-specific, can only result in tax demand or dropping of the
proceedings – but cannot result in refunds. The taxpayer is required to
initiate the refund process through independent proceedings. Consequently,
excess tax paid in respect of capital gains income can be adjusted with short
tax paid on business income. On the other hand, excess tax paid on a
manufactured product cannot be adjusted with short tax paid on any other
product – both these aspects are to be independently adjudicated and the
process of adjustment can only take place through a specific right of
adjustment under recovery procedures.

 

(7)        Time
limits
– Income tax has defined the time limits for initiation and completion
of proceedings, including re-assessment, etc. Excise laws are not time-bound on
the completion of the adjudication, though Courts have directed that the validity
of a notice can be questioned where there is unreasonable delay in completion
of the adjudication.

 

(8)        Finality – Assessment orders
under income tax are final for the assessment year under consideration and no
issue for that assessment year can be re-opened or revised except by statutory
provisions under law. Adjudication orders are final only with respect to the
issue under consideration and Excise authorities are permitted to adjudicate other
issues within the statutory time limit. Therefore, multiple adjudication orders
for one tax period are permissible under the Excise law.

 

(9)        Effect
orders
– Appellate proceedings are with reference to specific issues and on
the completion of such proceedings the income tax authority is required to
modify the assessment order after taking into consideration the conclusion over
the disputed matter. An adjudication proceeding is itself issue-driven and
hence the appellate orders generally do not require any further implementation
by the adjudication officer unless directed by the appellate authority.

 

The GST law has adopted a hybrid system
of adjudication and assessment – adjudication seems to be inherited largely
from the Excise law and the assessment scheme has been borrowed from the Sales
Tax law. While sections 59-66 represent the assessment function, section 73/74
performs the adjudication over the issues gathered through assessment activity.
The consequence of having this dual functionality would be:

 

(a)        All
assessments resulting in demand of taxes would necessarily have to culminate in
adjudication without which the demand would not be enforceable under law, even
though it may be liable. Where the assessment results in a refund of taxes, the
Revenue may not proceed further and would leave it to the assessee to claim a
refund under separate provisions, i.e. section 54. This is quite unlike in
income tax where refunds computed under the Act are necessarily required to be
paid and need not be sought by the assessee through a refund application.

 

(b)        Under
sales tax, self-assessment was considered as a deemed assessment in the sense
that the return filed was considered as accepted unless reopened by Revenue
authorities. The assessment order modifies the self-assessment (i.e. return)
and no further adjudication is required to complete the assessment. GST also
treats the return filed as a self-assessment of income. In some cases where
assessments are to be made (best judgement assessment, scrutiny assessment,
etc.), the assessments are interim until final adjudication of the demand
arising therefrom. Though adjudication necessarily succeeds assessments (to
enforce demands), assessment need not necessarily precede adjudication.

 

(c)        Revenue
authorities now have appellate and revision remedies for assessing escaped
taxes. Appellate rights have been granted to both the assessee and to Revenue
against the orders passed under sections 73 / 74 and revision rights have been
granted to the Commissioner to revise the said adjudication order (sections 107
and 108). In effect, Revenue has the option to either appeal or revise the
adjudication order (though in limited cases). This seems to be a concern given
the fact that adjudicating officers are expected to be independent authorities.
With multiple review powers by senior administrative offices on a suo motu
basis, any possibility of reopening of adjudication orders may impair the
quality and fairness of adjudication.

 

(d)        GST
has for the first time introduced an overall time limit for completion of
adjudication and, in effect, capped the time limit for its commencement (three
months from the statutory time limit of completion). This is unlike the Excise
law where time limits of adjudication proceedings are not capped. The enactment
has also rectified an anomaly in the income tax law by stating that notices for
adjudication should be issued at least three months prior to the expiry of the
time limit for adjudication.

 

To sum up, the GST law seems to have a
blend of both, resulting in wide latitude of powers to the tax authorities and
one should tread cautiously while representing before the tax authorities by
ensuring robust documentation.

 

UNEXPLAINED
CREDITS – UNACCOUNTED SALES / CLANDESTINE REMOVALS

Income tax contains specific provisions
deeming unexplained credits / moneys or expenditure (assets or income which
cannot be identified to a source). In income tax the said credits are deemed as
income and aggregated to the total income without the need to examine the head
under which they are taxable. Unlike income tax where tax is imposed on a
single figure, i.e. the total income of the assessee for the assessment year,
GST is applicable on individual transactions and identification of the
transaction is of critical importance.

 

In the recent past there have been
circumstances where inspection proceedings have resulted in detection of
unaccounted assets (such as cash). The practice of the Revenue has been to
allege that unaccounted assets are an outcome of the supply of particular
product / service and liable to tax under GST. This is being done even in the
absence of a parallel provision under GST to deem unaccounted assets as a
supply from a taxable activity. This approach suffers some deficiencies on
account of various reasons: (a) deeming fiction over incomes cannot be directly
attributable to a taxable supply; (b) the levy is dependent on certain factors
such as exemptions, classification, rates, etc. and such facts cannot be left
to best judgement; (c) a defendant cannot be asked to prove the negative (i.e.
prove that he / she has NOT generated the asset from a supply); (d)
presumptions of the existence of a transaction cannot be made without having
reasonable evidence on time, value and place of supply. The provisions of best
judgement u/s 62, too, do not provide wide latitude in powers and are
restricted to cases of non-filers of returns. In the absence of a document
trail or factual evidence, it would be inappropriate for the Revenue to allege
suppression of turnover and impose GST on such deemed incomes under income tax.

 

In the context of Excise, demands based
on income tax reports have all along been struck down on the ground that such
reports are merely presumptions and cannot by themselves substitute evidence of
manufacture and removal. In Commissioner vs. Patran Pipes (P) Ltd. – 2013
(290) ELT A88 (P&H)
it was held that cash seized by income tax
authorities cannot form cogent evidence showing manufacture and clandestine
removal of such goods. The larger Bench in SRJ Peety Steel Pvt. Ltd. vs.
CCE 2015 (327) E.L.T. 737 (Tri.–Mum.)
held that the charge of
clandestine removal cannot sustain merely on electricity calculations. In
service tax, too, in CCE vs. Bindra Tent Service (17) S.T.R. 470 (Tri .-
Del.)
and CCE vs. Mayfair Resorts (22) S.T.R. 263 (P & H)
2010
it was held by the Courts that surrender of income before income
tax authorities would not be considered as an admission under the Service Tax
law. These precedents are likely to apply to the GST enactment as well, and
unless thorough investigation of these unexplained incomes is performed, tax
liability cannot be affixed to unexplained credits.

 

TAX AVOIDANCE
PROVISION SECTION 271AAD OF INCOME TAX ACT

By the recent Finance Act, 2020 the
Central Government has introduced a specific penal provision in the Income-tax
Act in terms of section 271AAD. The said section has been introduced to address
the racket of fake invoices – the income tax law has been empowered to impose a
penalty to the extent of the ‘value’ of the fake invoice. The
section is applicable (a) where there is a false entry in the books generally
represented through a fake input invoice (being a case where the supplier is a
bogus dealer, there is no supply of goods / services at all, invoice is fake /
forged); or (b) where a person has participated in such falsification – such as
supplier, agent, etc.

 

The GST law also contains provisions
u/s 122 to impose a penalty on the supplier to the extent of tax evaded in case
of bogus supplies. A recipient of such supplies is also liable for penalty to
the same extent. Therefore, apart from the basic payment of tax and interest, a
recipient and / or supplier would be liable to an aggregate penalty under both
laws which would exceed the value of the fake invoice, including the GST
component. This is apart from other penalties and consequences of prosecution
and de-registration. The presence of such stringent provisions would pave the
way to both income tax and GST authorities to jointly clean up the system of
this menace and share such information with each other for effective
enforcement. This provision is another step in integration of income tax and
GST laws.

 

The above instances (which are selected as examples) clearly convey the
need for industry to view any transaction from both perspectives at a
conceptual and reporting level. With the advent of GST, additional
responsibilities would be placed on taxpayers to provide suitable
reconciliation between GST and income tax laws. GST authorities would be
interested in identifying those incomes that were not offered to tax and income
tax authorities would be interested in identifying those supplies which have
not been reported as income. The taxpayer has to survive this tussle and stamp
his claim to the respective authorities.

 

RETURNS UNDER GST – A NEW LOOK !!

INTRODUCTION


1.  When GST was introduced in July,
2017, a lot of noise was created around the proposed elaborate return filing
systems which provided for online uploading of invoices issued by the supplier
systems, monthly reconciliation of transaction between registered persons,
amendment of transaction in case of mis-matches and subsequently filing of the
final return on a monthly basis to be followed by an annual return at the end
of the financial year and audit for suppliers where the aggregate turnover
exceeded the prescribed limit of Rs. 2 crore.

2.  However, the system remained in
papers only as implementation was hit with multiple issues, ranging from
non-functional government portal, lack of preparedness amongst all the
stakeholders, confusion relating to the law, and so on. Therefore, dropping the
above proposed structure, the elaborate return filing mechanism was kept on
hold and compliance was restricted to filing of GSTR 1, i.e., details of
outward supplies on either monthly or quarterly basis depending upon prescribed
turnover and GSTR 3B, a summary statement of outward supplies made during the
period and input tax credit availed on inward supplies on a monthly basis.

3.  However, the makeshift
arrangement did not serve the purpose of Government to allow credits based on
transaction level matching, identifying defaulting taxpayers at an earlier
stage, etc. Therefore, a new return filing mechanism has been proposed to
re-introduce the concept of uploading of all details relating to outward and
inward supplies and matching of transactions. In this article, we shall deal
with the proposed return forms and various intricate issues revolving around
the same. The entire discussion is based on the proposed return formats made
available on the public platform. The proposed return filing mechanism is
expected to be made applicable w.e.f July, 2019. The enabling provisions w.r.t
the same are contained in section 43A of the CGST Act, 2017.

 

BROAD FRAMEWORK

4.  The proposed framework
bifurcates tax payers into two categories, based on their aggregate turnover
as:

Tax payers having annualised aggregate turnover during FY 2017-18
not exceeding Rs. 5 crore
. Such tax payers have been given an option to
file returns quarterly or monthly. Further, there are three different options
of returns which can be filed by such tax payers, which are Sahaj, Sugam and
Normal returns. However, if opting for quarterly returns, the tax payers would
be required to make payment of taxes on monthly basis only, which would be
considered while filing of quarterly returns. Further, in case of fresh
registration, the turnover of the previous financial year shall be considered
as zero and therefore such taxpayers shall have an option of filing the returns
either monthly or quarterly.

Tax payers having annualised aggregate turnover during FY 2017-18
exceeding Rs. 5 crore.
Such tax payers have to compulsorily file returns on
monthly basis.

5.  The following chart explains
the proposed scheme:

 

6.  The option of whether return
has to be filed monthly or quarterly has to be selected at the start of the
financial year. It is important to note that once a periodicity is selected,
the same can be changed only during the start of next financial year. It is
also important to note that in case there is a change in status during the next
Financial Year, it will be the responsibility of the tax payer to opt for the
change. In case no option is selected, the option selected in the previous year
shall continue to be applied for the next Financial Year as well.

7.  Once a tax payer opts to file
quarterly returns, the next step that he needs to take is decide the type of
return that he has to file. For such tax payers there are three different
options of return filing available based on the type of transactions carried
out. For instance, Sahaj scheme is feasible for such tax payers who exclusively
provide service to unregistered persons while Sugam is suitable for those class
of tax payers who are providing service to both, registered as well as
unregistered persons but do not make other supplies, such as exempt, non-GST,
zero rated, etc. For the balance tax payers, i.e., who have all kinds of
transactions, the normal option has to be chosen.

8.  In case Sahaj option has been
selected, the tax payer can switch to Sugam but not vice-versa. Similarly, in
case a tax payer selects the normal scheme, he can switch to Sahaj / Sugam
scheme. However, the switch can be done only once, at the start of the
financial year. Further, option for switching from Sugam to Sahaj is not
available, except at the start of the financial year.

 

FLOW OF EVENTS


9.  The flow of events preceding
the filing of the above returns, be it Sahaj / Sugam / Normal return is

-Filing of ANX – 1 – this contains details of outward supplies made
during the tax period and details of inward supplies liable to RCM.

-Filing of ANX – 2 – based on details auto-populated from the suppliers
ANX – 1, the recipient shall file details of inward supplies are following the
steps discussed in the subsequent paras.

-Filing of RET – 1/2/3 – basis the details furnished in ANX – 1 and ANX
– 2, the tax payer will be required to file his applicable return and discharge
the applicable taxes, interest, fees, etc.,

-Interestingly, the formats are silent w.r.t the due dates for filing
the Annexures. Only in the context of ANX – 2, it has been stated that the same
shall be deemed to be filed after the return for the relevant period (month /
quarter) has been filed.

10. While the return in case of
Sahaj and Sugam has to be filed quarterly, the tax payer will have to make
payment on monthly basis in PMT-08 on provisional basis, after disclosing the
liability as well as the ITC availed provisionally, which will be available for
offset while filing the quarterly return. However, in all other cases,
compliances will have to be done on a monthly basis.

11. In this article, we shall
discuss in detail the various intricate aspects revolving around the filing of
ANX – 1 , ANX – 2 and RET – 1 along with the amendments through ANX – 1A and
RET – 1A.

 

ANX – 1 – details of outward supplies and inward
supplies liable to RCM

12. The new mechanism provides the
tax payer an option to upload ANX – 1 during the course of tax period itself
and not after the end of tax period. Further, the details will also be updated
on real time basis and would be made available to the recipient in his ANX – 2
by way of auto-population.

13. It is imperative to note that
the information to be provided in ANX – 1 is segregated into two parts, one
relating to outward supplies and second relating to inward supplies liable to
RCM. However, on going through the proposed formats, one can note that the
details relating to inward supplies required to be reported not only covers
transactions where tax is payable on RCM, but also all other cases where tax is
applicable but not charged by vendors. For instance, import of goods from
outside India / SEZ / SEZ developer and documents on which credit has been
claimed but not disclosed by the supplier in his RET – 1 for more than two tax
periods, if the tax payer files return monthly and one tax period if the tax
payer files return quarterly.

14. The following table lists down
the key information relating to a transaction that would be required to be
reported in ANX – 1:

 

GSTIN / UIN

      The requirement to file this information
is available in the current scheme as well.

Place of Supply
(Name of State/ UT)

Document Details

      Type

      No.

      Date

      Value

 

      Under the
current scheme of things, each document type had to be reported separately.
For instance, under the current regime, invoices and credit notes were
reported in separate tables. This is sought to be changed with all document
types, have to be reported under the same head.

HSN Code

      While the
current formats prescribed the  need to
disclose the HSN code of goods / SAC of service being supplied to be
disclosed in the GSTR 1, the said functionality was never enabled on the
portal. The same is sought to be reintroduced.

      Under the
proposed scheme, the reporting is mandated as under:

 

 

      Interestingly, the need to report HSN
wise summary, containing quantitative details has been done away with.

 

Tax rate (%)

This is standard
information which is required to be disclosed even under the existing scheme.

Taxable value

Tax amount
(I/C/S/Cess)

      Under the proposed scheme, the tax
amount will be auto calculated and not editable, except by way of issue of
debit notes / credit notes. Cess will have to be inputted manually.

Shipping Bill/ Bill
of Export details (No. & Date)

      If at the time of filing ANX – 1, these
details are not available, an option to update the same at a later date will
also be provided.

 

15. Once the above set of details
w.r.t each transaction has been collated, the tax payers will need to
segregate, depending on its’ nature, each transaction into:

 

Segregation into
the basket of

Comments

3A. Supplies made to consumers and unregistered persons
(Net of debit notes/ credit notes)

3A is common across all the three return schemes while
3B is common for Sugam and the normal scheme.

      HSN wise
details need not be reported for 3A, though required for 3B.

      It is
however important to note that disclosure relating to outward supplies liable
for tax under reverse charge need not be reported here.

3B. Supplies made to registered persons (Other than
those attracting reverse charge mechanism) – including edit / amendment

3C. Exports with payment of tax

      The
information sought in this section is similar to what is being required to be
provided in the current scheme as well.

      However, it
is provided that in case of export of goods, details of shipping bill / bill
of export may be provided at a later date also. 

3D. Exports w/o
payment of tax

3E. Supplies to SEZ units/ developers with payment of
tax – including edit / amendment

      The
information sought in this section is similar to what is being required to be
provided in the current scheme as well.

      However,
one important aspect that needs to be noted in the context of 3E is that the
supplier will have an option to select whether he / the SEZ Unit / Developer
would claim refund on such supplies or not? The SEZ Developer / unit will be
entitled to avail such credits and claim consequential claim refund of such
tax only if the supplier is not claiming refunds.

      Similarly,
even in the context of 3G, it has been provided that supplier shall declare
who will claim the refund, the supplier or recipient. If supplier is claiming
refund, the recipient shall not be entitled to avail the corresponding
credits.

3F. Supplies to SEZ units/ developers without payment
of tax – including edit / amendment

3G. Deemed exports
– including edit / amendment

3H. Inward supplies attracting reverse charge

      The notes
to the return provides that the details of inward supplies attracting RCM
need to be provided GSTIN wise and not invoice wise. In case of unregistered
suppliers, it has been provided that the PAN wise details may be disclosed.

      Furthermore,
it has been also clarified that the details of advances / debit notes /
credit notes relating to such inward supplies have also to be included in the
summary referred. Interestingly, the notes further provide that in case of
advance payment, the tax credit needs to be reversed in the Return form and
the same has to be claimed only after the said service has been received.

3I. Import of Services (Net of DN/ CN and advances
paid, if any)

3J. Import of goods

      The note
provides that the details of tax paid on import of goods from outside India /
SEZ Units / developers shall be reported here.

      It further
clarifies that this information shall be required to be provided till the
data starts flowing from the ICEGATE (Customs) portal.

 

3K. Import of goods from SEZ units/developers on a Bill
of Entry

3L. Missing documents on which credit has been claimed
in T-2 / T-1 (for quarter) tax period and supplier has not reported the same
till the filing of the return for current tax period

      This refers
to cases where credit was claimed though not appearing in ANX – 2 but even
after the expiry of two months/1 quarter from the availment of credit, the
same has not been uploaded by the supplier, thus triggering a reversal u/s.
42 (5) of CGST Act, 2017.

 

16. The above classification at
various junctures mentions “including edit / amendment”. The background to the
same is that the proposed scheme is also expected to work on a concept of
matching of transactions. It has been provided that once a transaction has been
uploaded on the portal, the facility to edit/amend the same shall depend on the
status of the transaction, i.e., whether it has been accepted or not? If not
accepted, the same can be amended upto 10th of the following month.
However, if accepted, the same can be amended upto 10th of the
following month, provided the same has been reset/unlocked by the recipient.
However, this restriction of editing/amending a transaction will not apply to
cases where the same pertains to a transaction of supply to a person not filing
returns in RET – 1/2/3, for example supplies made to composition dealers, ISD
or UIN holders and so on). Further, a facility of shifting the documents is
also proposed to be provided for transactions rejected by recipients on account
of wrong tagging. For instance, transaction wrongly tagged as SEZ supply on
payment of tax while the same relates to SEZ supply without payment of tax.

17. In addition to the above, all
tax payers who make supplies through e-commerce operators shall also be
required to disclose the details of turnover made through E-commerce operator
in table 4. However, it is important to note that the details to be disclosed
in table 4 should already be disclosed in table 3 and this is merely for
statistical purpose and would not have any impact on the output liability of
the tax payer.

 

TRANSITION FROM EXISTING SYSTEM


18. One important question that
arises is how to deal with cases where invoices were issued prior to the
introduction of the proposed scheme. For such cases, there can be three
probable scenarios, as tabulated below:

 

Scenario

Probable actions

Not reported, either in R1/ 3B

Upload the document in ANX – 1 and discharge tax along
with interest in RET – 1

Reported in 3B, but not reported in R1

Document should be uploaded, but in case of invoice,
since the tax liability would already have been discharged, the same would
have to be disclosed at 3C (5) of RET – 1 as reduction in liability.

However, while dealing with CNs, since the reduction
has already been claimed in the earlier scheme, reporting of CN would require
increase in liability to be reported at 3A (8) of RET – 1.

Reported in R1, but not reported in 3B

This would refer to cases where the tax effect of an
invoice/CN has not be considered while filing 3B. For such cases, w.r.t
invoices, the tax amount should be disclosed at 3A (8) in RET – 1 to increase
the liability and in case of credit notes, the tax amount should be disclosed
at 3C (5) to reduce the liability.

 

ANX – 2 ANNEXURE OF INWARD SUPPLIES AND MATCHING CONCEPT


19. This annexure primarily deals
with the concept of matching of transactions wherein the transactions reported
by suppliers would be auto-populated on real time basis in this annexure and
the recipient is required to mark each such transaction as either accepted,
rejected or pending.

20. The act of accepting a document
would mean that the recipient has accepted the transaction in all aspects. Acceptance
of a transaction would make it not eligible for edit / amendment by supplier,
unless unlocked.

21. Upon acceptance, if the
supplier has disclosed the transaction in ANX – 1 by 10th of the
next month, credit of the same can be claimed by the recipient in the month to
which the transaction pertains. However, for transactions disclosed after 10th
of the next month, credit would get deferred. Let us understand this with an
example. A supplier has issued an invoice on 15th July, 2019 and
disclosed the same in ANX – 1 on 5th August, 2019, the recipient can
claim credit of this invoice while filing the return for the month of July,
2019 itself. However, in case the supplier reports this transaction only on 15th
August, 2019, then the credit will have to be claimed in the next month.

22. The need to reject a
transaction shall arise, as per the instructions to filing ANX – 2, when
recipient does not agree with details disclosed such as the HSN Code, tax rate,
value etc., which cannot be corrected through a credit/debit note or the GSTIN
of the recipient itself is erroneous and therefore the transaction appears to a
person who is not concerned with the same. The notice of rejection of a
transaction would be sent to the supplier only after filing of return by the
recipient and the same would enable the supplier to edit / amend the
transactions in ANX – 1.

23. The third action, i.e., mark
the transaction as pending means that the recipient is either unsure of the
transaction appearing in ANX – 2 or he is yet to receive the invoice for such
transaction or the corresponding supplies would not have been received by them.
Such transactions which are marked as pending would be rolled over to the ANX –
2 for the next period. However, the same would not be available to the
supplier for editing / amendment unless the recipient rejects them.

24. However, if any transaction is
not marked as accepted/ rejected / pending and the return in RET – 1 / 2 / 3 is
filed, the same shall be deemed to be accepted and corresponding ITC shall be
made available for such recipient. Therefore, it would be very important for
the recipient to ensure that all transactions are marked as either accepted,
rejected or pending as failure to do so might result in claim of credit in case
of transactions which were ultimately meant to be rejected or dealt with
ineligible credits.

25. In addition to the above, there
can be instances wherein a recipient has received invoice from a supplier and
accounted the same in his books of accounts. However, such invoice is not
reported by the supplier in his ANX – 1 or has been reported wrongly (say
classified as B2C or tagged to wrong GSTIN and so on). For such transactions,
the recipient of supply shall be required to self-claim credit for such
transactions in the return form. However, such recipient shall be required to
disclose transactions of self – claim of credit in ANX – 1 if the supplier has
failed to report the transaction in his ANX – 1, in the following manner:

-If the supplier failed to report supplies after lapse of two tax
periods in case of monthly return and one tax period in case of quarterly
return being filed by the recipient.

-The details of such transactions
wherein the suppliers have still not filed their returns, but credit has been
claimed by therecipient shall be made available to the recipient through ANX –
2.



RET – 1 – MONTHLY OR QUARTERLY RETURNS UNDER THE NORMAL SCHEME


26. This is the return which each
tax payer is required to file w.r.t his outward and inward supplies. As of now,
the formats suggest that substantial information would be auto-populated from
disclosures made in ANX – 1 and actions taken on various transactions appearing
in ANX – 2 of the tax payer.

27. However, there would be certain
information which would be required to be filled by the tax payer. The same in
the context of outward supplies would be:

 

3.A.8. Liabilities relating to period prior to the
introduction of current return filing system and any other liability to be
paid

Refer discussion at para 19

3.C.3. Advances received (net of refund vouchers and
including adjustments on account of wrong reporting of advances earlier)

In the current scheme, this information needs to be
furnished in GSTR 1 along with POS wise, rate wise summary.

3.C.4. Advances adjusted

3.C.5. Reduction in output tax liability on account of
transition from composition levy to normal levy, if any or any other
reduction in liability

Refer discussion at para 19

3.D. (1-5) Details of supplies having no liability
[Exempt and nil rated supplies, non-GST supplies (including no
supply/Schedule III supplies), outward supplies attracting reverse charge and
supply of goods by a SEZ unit/ developer to DTA on a bill of entry]

This clause proposes to cover transactions of outward
supplies on which no GST is applicable, such as exempt supplies, non-GST
supplies and so on.

 

28. Similarly in the context of
inward supplies and input tax credit, the tax payer would require to input
following details which would increase the claim of input tax credit:

 

4.A.4. Eligible credit (after 1st July,
2017) not availed prior to the introduction of this return but admissible as
per Law (transition to new return system)

This clause will cover disclosure of  credit claim relating to invoices issued
under the GST Regime but prior to the introduction of the new scheme of
returns filing.

4.A.10. Provisional input tax credit on documents not
uploaded by the supplier (net of ineligible credit)

This clause will cover self – claimed credits where
transactions are not appearing in ANX – 2 but claimed by the tax payer on the
strength of the documents available on record.

4.A.11. Upward adjustments to input tax credits due to
receipt of credit notes and all other adjustments and reclaims

In case of credit notes reported by a supplier in ANX –
1 and accepted by the recipient in his ANX – 2, there will be automatic
reversal of input tax credit. However, there can be cases where the recipient
would not have claimed credit in the original invoice itself, thus resulting
in double reversal of credit for the recipient. For such cases, the amount of
tax associated with each credit notes will have to be added back to the ITC
claim of the recipient.



Any other adjustments shall also be reported here.

 

29. Further following details which
would decrease the claim of input tax credit will also have to be manually
added to the return by the tax payer:

 

4.B.2. Supplies not eligible for credit (including ISD
credit)

[out of net credit available in table 4A above]

This would cover cases relating to claim of input tax
credit which are covered by section 17 (5) or other cases wherein the claim
of credit is not eligible.

4.B.3. Reversal of credit in respect of supplies on
which provisional credit has already been claimed in the previous tax periods
but documents have been uploaded by the supplier in the current tax period

This clause covers credits which were self-claimed in
the earlier period, and the corresponding transaction has been uploaded by
the supplier and accepted by the tax payer during the current tax period and
therefore in order to avoid double claim, to the extent credit was claimed
provisionally to be reversed.

4.B.4. Reversal of input tax credit as per law (Rule
37, 39, 42 and 43)

This would include adjustments on account of the
specific provisions in the Act

4.B.5. Other reversals, including downward adjustments
to input tax credits on account of transition from composition to normal
levy, if any

This would include all other reversals to input tax
credit on account of reasons, other than the above.

30.In addition to the above, as statistical
information, the tax payer would need to identify the amount of credit which
pertains to capital goods and input services out of ITC available net of
reversals determined in the return. The logic behind this segregation is to
determine the amount of ITC in case the tax payer claims refund of accumulated
ITC on account of zero rated supplies/inverted rate structure. However, this
would pose a substantial challenge since various adjustments to the ITC
reported in the return, such as relating to Rule 43 are at aggregate level and
cannot be identified easily at transaction level and therefore the submission
of information to this extent might pose difficulty.

31. The next field that is relevant relates to
calculation of interest and late fee details at table 6. The liability on
account of interest and late fee due to late filing of returns would be
auto-computed by the system. Interestingly, this would also cover following:

liability on
account of late reporting of tax invoices, for instance, invoice of July
reported in August.

liability on
account of rejection of accepted documents.

32. In addition to the above, the tax payer will be
also required to self-calculate interest liability on account of following:

reversal of input
tax credit on account of various reasons, such as Rule 37, 42, 43, etc., as
well as interest

interest liability on account of delayed reporting of transactions
attracting reverse charge. The time of supply in case of reverse charge
transactions is attracted within 60 days from the date of invoice or date of
payment to the vendor, whichever is earlier. However, in case of supply of
services by Associated Enterprises located outside India, the time of supply is
triggered on the date when the entry is made in the books of accounts or the
date of payment, whichever is earlier. In all such cases where the time of
supply is determined late, the same would result in a liability to pay interest
which would have to be reported here.

    Any other interest liability

33. Once the above action is taken, the tax payer
will have to discharge the liability, either by utilising the balance lying in
electronic cash ledger or electronic credit ledger as per the applicable
provisions and file the return.

 

ANX – 1A AMENDMENTS TO ANX – 1

34. Under the proposed scheme, it is provided that
a tax payer can amend the details furnished in ANX – 1 and RET – 1 by amending
the return filed for the tax period in which the transaction was reported.
However, such amendment can be done only for transactions wherein GSTIN level
details were not submitted. In other words, B2B, SEZ and Deemed export
transactions cannot be amended. The same will have to be processed through the
“edit/amendment” route only as discussed above.

35. For other cases wherein amendment is required,
the amendment will have to be given effect for the period to which the
transaction pertains. For instance, a sales invoice was reported in July, 2019
as local sale. In September, 2019, it came to the tax payers’ attention that
the transaction was wrongly reported as local sale though it was an interstate
sale as per invoice. Accordingly, for such transaction, the tax payer will be
required to file ANX – 1A of July, 2019 and then proceed to file RET – 1A to
amend the RET – 1 of that period.

36. The above concept will be applicable in case of
amendment of transaction reported late in ANX – 1 also. For instance, an
invoice dated July, 2019 has been reported in ANX – 1 of September, 2019 and
liability discharged while filing the return for September, 2019. However, if
for such transaction any amendment is required to be done, the same will have
to be done in the month of July, 2019 as the transaction pertains to that
month, though disclosed in September, 2019.

37. An amendment can be done in ANX – 1A only w.r.t
transactions which have been reported in ANX – 1. For instance in the above
example, if an invoice dated July, 2019 was not reported in ANX – 1 of July,
2019, the same cannot be then reported in July, 2019 through ANX – 1A. Such
transactions can be reported only through ANX – 1.

38. The ANX – 1A shall be deemed to be filed only
after the RET – 1A has been filed.

 

RET – 1A – AMENDMENT TO RET – 1

39. Based on the details amended in ANX – 1A,
amendment to details already disclosed in RET – 1 on account of the ANX – 1A
will have to be done. For instance, in ANX – 1A, the liability under reverse
charge has been increased. The impact of this amendment will be auto-populated
in RET – 1A and the tax payer will have to make disclosures w.r.t the said
amendment as to whether any supplies are not eligible for credits and so on.
Only the impact of amendments will be considered in RET – 1A and not all the
transactions reported in the original return.

40. Basis the amendments disclosed in the RET – 1A,
the net tax payable/refundable will be determined. In case a liability is
determined, the same will have to be paid before the filing of RET – 1A.
However, in case the amendment results in excess payment, or negative liability
as referred in the instructions, the same will be made available to the
taxpayer in the next RET – 1 to be filed after filing of RET – 1A. 

 

CONCLUSION:

41. The proposed scheme of returns, undoubtedly
appear more in the nature of old wine in new bottle, with the scope of details
to be disclosed remaining more or less the same. However, there are certain
substantial changes, such as option to amend the returns itself.

42.  In
addition to the above, it will also be important for tax payers to shore up
their IT systems to facilitate the above process through automation rather than
manual intervention to avoid possibility of errors.

RULE 36(4) – MATCHING UNDER ITC

INTRODUCTION

When GST was introduced in July, 2017, heavy
emphasis was placed on the matching process under GST which required a transaction-level
matching of B2B transactions and claim of credit being dependent on the
matching activity in the form of GSTR2. However, due to systems constraints,
GSTR2 as well as GSTR3 were kept in abeyance and the truncated process of
return filing was introduced requiring the taxable persons to file only GSTR1
and a new statement in Form GSTR3B in place of GSTR3 was introduced.

 

Due to the suspension of GSTR2 and GSTR3
returns, the process of matching of transactions and credits and filing of
returns based on the same could not be implemented. Due to fall in revenue
collections, the Government suspects that the lack of matching could result in
large-scale evasion and false input tax credit (ITC) claims filed by assessees
facing liquidity crunch.

 

Based on the limited information available,
various Department authorities did issue letters or notices to the assessees
highlighting an aggregate-level mismatch in the input tax credit claims and the
credits reflecting in GSTR2A. However, the authorities could not enforce the
matching process since they lack legislative mandate in view of the suspension
of the process of filing of GSTR2 and GSTR3 returns. It may be noted that the
provisions of sections 42 and 43 requiring payment of tax on account of provisional
mismatch not being rectified in two months is dependent upon sections 37 and 38
for claim of credit through the process of matching, reversal, reclaim and
reduction.

 

In pursuance of various recommendations, the
Government proposed to introduce new returns where the flow of information is
unidirectional from the supplier to the recipient. The new returns process also
requires a matching of credit and permits self claim of provisional unmatched
credit for a period of two months to the extent of 20% of eligible matched
credit. To enable the new return-filing process, the CGST Amendment Act, 2018
inserted section 43A. Section 43A(4) thereof deals with prescription of
procedure for availing input tax credit in respect of outward supplies not
furnished and specifically provides for prescription of maximum ITC which can
be availed, not exceeding 20% of the ITC available on the basis of details
furnished by the suppliers and appearing in GSTR2A. However, since the
implementation of the new returns has been postponed, the provisions of section
43A have not been made effective till date.

 

The procedure as referred to in section
43A(4) has now been prescribed vide an amendment to the CGST Rules, 2017 by
Notification 49/2019–CT dated 9th October, 2019. Vide the said amendment,
Rule 36(4) has been inserted which provides as under:

 

(4) Input tax credit to be availed by a
registered person in respect of invoices or debit notes, the details of which
have not been uploaded by the suppliers under sub-section (1) of section 37,
shall not exceed 20 per cent of the eligible credit available in respect of
invoices or debit notes the details of which have been uploaded by the
suppliers under sub-section (1) of section 37

           

On a first reading of the above provisions,
the issues that crop up could be listed as under:

  •    Legality of the above
    amendment;
  • Applicability on credit
    availed in earlier period returns (3B);
  •     Applicability on credits of
    earlier period invoices availed before and after 9th October, 2019;
  •     Whether Rule 36(4) would be
    applicable at the time of filing GSTR3B for September, 2019 (the due date of
    which was 20th October, 2019)?
  •     Whether the matching has to
    be done at invoice level or consolidated level?
  •     Which GSTR2A to be
    considered for doing the matching process?
  •     Implications when the
    supplier is required to furnish the details on quarterly basis;
  •     Accounting and disclosure
    implications;
  •     Flood of mismatch notices
    expected after the amendment.

 

Considering the above, the CBIC has also
issued clarifications on various points vide Circular 123/42/2019 dated 11th
November, 2019. However, there are certain open-ended issues which would need
further clarification. We have attempted to analyse the same in this article.

 

Issue
1: Scope of applicability of the provisions

This can be examined from two different
perspectives, one being the date of invoice and the second being the date of
filing of return. It is relevant to note that under GST, availment of credit
takes place only upon filing of returns under GSTR3B. The various aspects which
would need consideration are:

(a)        If the return for period on or before
September, 2019 is not filed and filed after 9th October, 2019, will
the RTP be required to comply with the provisions?

(b)        Will the provisions apply to invoices
dated prior to 9th October, 2019 but credit availed after 9th
October, 2019?

 

With respect to (a) above, the CBIC has
clarified that Rule 36(4) would apply only on invoices / DNs on which credit
note is availed after 9th October, 2019. Therefore, in cases where
the returns were filed before 9th October, 2019, the amended
provisions should not apply. This is because filing of returns would mark the
availment of returns. Therefore, since at the time of filing the return the
provision was not in place and, more importantly, it has not been given
retrospective effect, Rule 36(4) cannot apply to such cases.

 

However, there can be instances where the
returns for earlier period, say, August, 2019 and prior are filed after 9th
October, 2019 or credit relating to invoices dated prior to 9th
October, 2019 is availed after that date. For such cases, as per the
clarification issued by CBIC, and even otherwise, on a plain reading of Rule
36(4) it would be apparent that the provisions of Rule 36(4) would apply to
such cases. This view also finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Osram Surya (P) Limited vs. CCE, Indore [2002 (142) ELT
0005 SC].
In the said case, Rule 57G of the Central Excise Rules, 1944
was amended to prescribe a time limit for availing credit within six months
from the date of issue of the document. In this case, the Supreme Court held
that credit could not be claimed. However, it is imperative to note that in the
said case the validity of the said Rule was not looked into since the same was
not challenged before the Court.

This aspect was
also noted by the Gujarat High Court in Baroda Rayon Corporation Limited
vs. Union of India [2014 (306) ELT 551 (Guj)]
wherein the Court held
that the condition resulted in lapsing of credit which had already accrued in
favour of manufacturer and therefore the rule was violative of Article 226 of
the Constitution. However, it is imperative to note that even the Gujarat High
Court has allowed the credit only on the premise that the Rule was ultra
vires
of the Act since the Act did not empower the Government to make rules
to impose conditions for lapsing of credit.

 

It is imperative
to note that in the current case, section 43A does empower the Central
Government to prescribe rules for imposing restrictions on availing of input
tax credit. For this instance, reliance on the decision of Baroda Rayon
Corporation (Supra)
may not be of assistance.

 

It is, however,
important to take note of the decision of CESTAT in the case of Voss
Exotech Automotive Private Limited vs. CCE, Pune I [2018 (363) ELT 1141
(Mumbai)].
In the said case, the issue was in the context of proviso
to rule 4(7) which introduced time limit for availing credit w.e.f. 1st
October, 2014. In the said case, the Tribunal held that the amendment did not
apply to invoices issued prior to 11th July, 2014 (the date of
notification by which the amendment was introduced) for the reason that the
notification was not applicable to invoices issued prior to the date of
notification and, therefore, restriction could not be applied to invoices
issued prior to the said date. However, it is imperative to note that the said
decision referred to the ruling of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. CCE, Bhopal [2016 (332) ELT 411
(MP)]
which also relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of Baroda Rayon Corporation.

 

In view of the
above, it would be difficult to argue that the provisions of Rule 36(4) do not
apply to invoices dated prior to 9th October, 2019 on which credit
is availed after that date. However, it can be said with certainty that the
same would not apply to cases where credits were availed before 9th
October, 2019.

 

It may also be
important to note that the validity of Rule 36(4) has been challenged before
the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in SCA 19529 of 2019 and the
matter is currently pending. The challenge is on the ground that since the
provision of section 43A has not been notified till date, insertion of Rule
36(4) is not maintainable. It therefore remains to be seen whether the Court
accepts
the argument
and strikes down the provision or it treats Rule 36(4) as being prescribed
under the general powers granted u/s 16(1) of CGST Act, 2017 which empowers the
Government to frame conditions for availment of credit.

 

Issue 2: Which GSTR2A to be considered for the
matching process?

Assuming that
Rule 36(4) does survive the test of validity, the next question that remains is
with respect to its implementation. This is important because while the
availment of credit takes place at the time of filing of return, it is possible
that credits of invoices issued by suppliers for multiple periods would be
claimed in a tax period. For instance, while filing the GSTR3B for September,
2019, it is possible that the invoices issued by suppliers between April, 2019
and August, 2019 as well as invoices of the previous financial year would be
claimed. In such a case, it is likely that the credit that would be claimed in
GSTR3B would be higher as compared to credits appearing in GSTR2A for
September, 2019. This will open a barrage of notices of GSTR2A vs. GSTR3B
mismatch for different tax periods, though on a cumulative basis there may not
be a mismatch.

 

To deal with
this particular situation, for credit availed in each month, the data will have
to be analysed vis-à-vis the month to which the invoice pertains and
corresponding comparison with GSTR2A of the respective tax period will be
required. For this reason, the Board has also clarified that the matching will
be done on consolidated basis (after reducing ineligible credits appearing in
2A) and not supplier basis. However, in case credits of the previous financial
year are claimed, it will always be an open issue and care will have to be
taken to ensure that the figures match with the figures reported at Table 8C of
GSTR9.

 

Another aspect
to be noted is that GSTR2A is a volatile figure, i.e., even after the due date
of filing GSTR1 of a particular month, there is no restriction on filing of
GSTR1 and therefore GSTR2A downloaded on 11th October, 2019 and 20th
October, 2019 would represent completely different pictures. While the Board
Circular clarifies that the GSTR2A as on due date of filing of form GSTR1 u/s
37 (1) is to be considered, the 2A downloaded from the portal does not provide
the date on which the supplier has filed the GSTR1. It would therefore mean
that the clarification provided by the Board is not possible to comply with in
the first place itself. More importantly, Rule 36(4) also does not include any
such restriction.

 

A specific issue arises in cases where the
supplier has opted to furnish GSTR1 on quarterly basis, in which case there
will also be a time gap between the claims of credit by the recipient (which is
on monthly basis) vs. furnishing of information on quarterly basis by the
supplier. For such instances also, the circular clarifies that the credit
should be claimed only after the transaction appears in 2A. This, however,
appears to be harsh considering the fact that even under the earlier mechanism
of GSTR1 -2 -3, the law provided for the concept of self claim of credits up to
two months to enable the suppliers to file their GSTR1 and match the
transaction. Non-extension of the said benefit would appear to be contradictory
to the principles of matching laid down under the Act itself.

 

Another important aspect is that the
Circular clarifies that maximum ITC to be claimed shall be 20% of the eligible
ITC appearing in 2A. Even this clarification may present practical challenges
to the RTP since it may not be possible to identify the eligibility of credits
appearing in 2A merely based on the name of the vendor. While there may be
specific vendors who are identified as making supplies not eligible for ITC, in
other cases it may not be possible to easily comply with the said requirement.

 

Issue 3: Accounting and disclosure
implications

The next issue
that needs consideration is the manner in which the disclosure of credit needs
to be done in view of Rule 36(4). There are two different methods which can be
considered for disclosure in 3B, one being to avail and reverse credit in the
same month in 3B, and the other being to avail credit only when the credit
appears in the 2A.

 

The first method is preferable. Let us
understand this with the help of an example. ARTP receives an invoice from his
vendor dated 1st September, 2019. However, the said invoice is not
appearing in his 2A. Therefore, in the month of filing GSTR3B, he claims the
credit and reverses the same in view of the provisions of Rule 36(4). This
credit does not appear in his 2A till the time of GSTR3B for September, 2020.
However, on downloading fresh GSTR2A of 2019-20 on 21st October,
2020, the invoice appears in GSTR2A. In this case a view can be taken that
since the RTP had availed and reversed the credit in compliance with Rule
36(4), once the invoice appears in his GSTR2A in future, he can reclaim the
same and the time limit imposed u/s 16(4) for
availing the credit would not apply since this would be in the nature of
re-claim.

 

However, this
can also be subject to dispute by the authorities on the ground that the
restriction u/r 36(4) is r.w.s. 16(1). Therefore credit was not available at
the first point and therefore, the action and availment of reversal of credit
is futile and the credit appearing in GSTR2A after the expiry of statutory time
limit would not be eligible by treating the same as re-credits.

 

Issue 4: Applicability of Rule 36(4) to Input
Service Distributor (ISD)

The next issue
that needs consideration is whether or not Rule 36(4) will be applicable to
ISD? This is because ISD itself per se does not avail credit, the
availment of credit takes place at the receiving unit. This is also evident on
perusal of the definition of ISD u/s 2 which provides that ISD shall mean an
office of the supplier of goods
or services, or both, which receives the tax invoice issued u/s 31 towards the
receipt of input services and issues a prescribed document for the purpose of distributing the credit.

 

In other words,
ISD does not avail the credit and therefore a view is possible that rule 36(4)
may not be applicable to ISD.

 

Issue 5: Maintaining details for reconciliation
purposes and responding to mismatch notices

Even before the
insertion of Rule 36(4), assessees have been receiving notices from the
Department for mismatch in credits appearing in GSTR3B vs. GSTR2A. Attempting
to respond to this notice is turning out to be extremely difficult for the
assessees primarily because figures of credit availed in GSTR3B / GSTR2A do not
match with GSTR3B actually filed or GSTR2A downloaded from the portal. This in
itself makes it difficult for an assessee to prepare the necessary
reconciliations. Also to be considered is the time factor playing a part in the
mismatch as discussed earlier.

 

Therefore, it
would be advisable that for credits claimed in each month, as stated in the
earlier paragraph also, the details should be segregated vis-à-vis the month of
invoice and cumulative data for invoice month-wise credit claimed in a
financial year should be prepared which should be compared with invoice date-wise
credit appearing in GSTR2A. One should also take note of the fact that GSTR2A
of the entire financial year should be downloaded each month since there is no
concept of locking of GSTR1 and therefore the GSTR2A of earlier periods can
keep on fluctuating.

 

CONCLUSION

The amendment by
way of insertion of Rule 36(4) is going to have its set of ramifications, with
impact on small suppliers opting for furnishing of GSTR1 on quarterly basis to
all taxpayers having to delay their claim of credit on account of non-compliance
by errant suppliers. This will also launch a flood of notices to taxpayers for
mismatch in figures reported in GSTR3B and GSTR2A.

 

Taxpayers will
have to be very careful in responding to the notices electronically, wherever
they appear on the portal, and manually if notices are not sent through the
GSTN portal. Failure to do so may also have its own set of ramifications,
ranging from ex parte orders to ad hoc confirmation of demands.
Perhaps, this will be a testing time for all, taxpayers as well as their
consultants to step up to the changing scenarios.

 

PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF DIRECTORS UNDER VAT / GST

INTRODUCTION

As per normal
understanding, the directors are not liable for any dues of the company.
Limited companies are basically formed to limit the financial liabilities to
the extent of the assets of the company. However, in spite of such a legal
position, an attempt is made by the authorities to cast liability on the
directors. Normally, directors of a public limited company are not covered for
personal recovery even by any specific provision. However, there may be
specific provisions for casting liability on the directors of a private limited
company. For example, under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, section
44(6) provides for personal liability of directors of a private limited
company. The said section is reproduced below for ready reference:

 

‘(6) Subject
to the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013), where any tax or
other amount is recoverable under this Act from a private company, whether
existing or wound up or under liquidation, for any period, (but) cannot be
recoverable, for any reason whatsoever, then, every person who was a director
of the private company during such period shall be jointly and severally liable
for the payment of such tax or other amount unless he proves that the
non-recovery cannot be attributed to any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach
of duty on his part in relation to affairs of the said company.’

 

It can be seen
that the liability of the directors is not blanket but subject to conditions.
In other words, if the director proves that there was no gross negligence,
misfeasance or breach of any duty, then no liability can be attracted. However,
there is also a possibility that the Revenue may try to initiate recovery from
a director in spite of there being no such negligence, etc. on the part of the
director.

 

DECIDED CASES

There are a
number of judgements wherein the Hon’ble Courts have held that the corporate
veil cannot be lifted for recovery of tax dues unless there are specific
provisions. Reference can be made to the judgement of the Uttarakhand High
Court in the case of Jagteshwar Prasad Bansal & others vs. State of
Uttarakhand
& others (59 GSTR 491) (Uttarakhand). In
this case, the sales tax department tried to recover dues from the directors of
the company, although in the relevant Uttarakhand Value Added Tax Act there was
no specific provision for recovery from a director. However, the department
wanted to lift the corporate veil. The High Court rejected the action of the
sales tax authorities. It held that unless there is any fraud or he / she is
guilty of misrepresentation, the corporate veil cannot be lifted. In the above
judgement, the Court has referred to an earlier judgement in the case of Meekin
Transmission Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (58 VST 201) (All.) and
reproduced the following observations of the Allahabad High Court:

 

‘The legal
position as discerned from the above is that in a case where the corporate
personality has been obtained by certain individuals as a cloak or a mask to
prevent tax liability or to divert the public funds or to defraud public at
large or for some illegal purposes, etc., to find out as to who are those
beneficiaries who have proceeded to prevent such liability or to achieve an
impermissible objective by taking recourse to corporate personality, the veil
of the corporate personality shall be lifted so that those persons who are so
identified are made responsible. However, this doctrine is not to be applied as
a matter of course, in a routine manner and as a day-to-day affair so as to
recover the dues of a company, whenever and for whatever reason they are
unrecoverable, from the personal assets of the directors. If such a course is
permitted, it would lead to not only disastrous results but would also destroy
completely the concept of juristic personality conferred by various statutes
like the Act in the present case and would make several enactments and their
effect to be redundant and illusory.

 

Moreover, the
shallowness of arguments in favour of making directors personally responsible
can be considered from another angle. In every case the director may not be a
shareholder of the company. He may have been appointed as director for taking
advantage of his expertise in his field of vocation or profession, and for
achieving goals for which the company is incorporated. Such director is paid
remuneration, if any, for the services he rendered. Otherwise he is not at all
a beneficiary of the business or trade, etc., as the case may be, in which the
company is engaged. Such benefit would be available only to the shareholders as
they would only be entitled to share the profits earned by the company in the
form of dividends as decided by the Board of Directors. In such case such
director, though an agent of the company, he is more in the nature of an
officer of the company and not in the capacity of limited ownership by way of
shareholding. Such a director, in our view, unless guilty of misfeasance, fraud
or acting
ultra vires, we are not able to understand
as to how he can be made responsible personally for the dues of the company even
if we apply the doctrine of piercing the veil.

 

If in such a
case the veil is to be lifted, the persons behind the veil, at the best, would
be the promoters of the company or those who have sought to obtain corporate
personality as a sham or bogus transaction. Similarly, in some of the companies
the financial institutions, who advance funds as loan, etc., nominate their
director/s to keep some kind of monitoring over the functions of the company so
that it may not go in liquidation on account of negligent and careless function
of the Board of Directors. Such directors also, in our view, cannot be included
in the category of the persons who would be responsible personally for the dues
of
the company.

 

In order to
find out as to who are the persons responsible personally when the veil is
lifted it would be wholly irrelevant as to whether such person is a director or
a promoter shareholder or otherwise of the company since the purpose of lifting
the veil is to find out the person/s who is operating behind the corporate
personality for his personal gain. Such person may be an individual or group of
persons belonging to a family or relatives or otherwise a small group collected
with a common objective of achieving some illegal, immoral or improper purpose,
etc. So long as no investigation is made into various aspects, we are not able
to understand as to how and in what manner a director of a company can
straightway be proceeded (against) personally for recovering dues of a company
unless it is so provided by some provision of the statute.’

 

The
observations clearly show that unless there is fraud or deliberate misrepresentation,
the corporate veil cannot be lifted to make the directors personally liable.

 

In the above
judgement, there was no specific provision about recovery from the director of
a Pvt. Ltd. Co. However, even where there is specific provision about recovery
from a director of a Pvt. Ltd. Co., like section 44(6) of the MVAT Act
reproduced above, still recovery is subject to proving negligence, etc. In
other words, the said provision is also in the nature of lifting the corporate
veil. The observations made above will equally apply in case of a specific
provision also.

 

In view of the
above legal position it can be inferred that whether there is specific
provision or not about recovery from directors, the recovery is subject to
positive involvement for dues by the director, like fraud, etc.

 

POSITION UNDER GST

Though the
above position is decided in light of the provisions under the VAT regime, the
ratio will equally apply under GST, too. Under GST, there is specific provision
for recovery from directors like section 89 that provides for liability of a
director. The section reads as under:

 

‘89. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act,
2013, where any tax, interest or penalty due from a private company in respect
of any supply of goods or services or both for any period cannot be recovered,
then, every person who was a director of the private company during such period
shall, jointly and severally, be liable for the payment of such tax, interest
or penalty unless he proves that the non-recovery cannot be attributed to any
gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on his part in relation to the
affairs of the company.’

 

Thus, the
provision is similar to section 44(6) of the MVAT Act. The issue of negligence,
etc. is also applicable under GST. The guidelines and observations mentioned in
earlier judgements will be useful for deciding cases under GST also.

 

CONCLUSION

Normally, limited companies are formed to restrict
personal liability. However, the laws are now being made to make the directors
personally liable. Though the said provisions are for safeguarding the revenue
in case directors play a fraud, the Revenue authorities try to apply them
summarily in all cases. It is expected that such specific provisions should be
applied only in specific cases, that also after observing principles of natural
justice and complying with requirements of the relevant section. 

REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT – A ‘REAL’ CONUNDRUM

GST law has recently overhauled the entire taxation scheme of
real estate development activities. Amidst discussions over inclusion of real
estate in the GST fold, the 33rd GST Council made the following broad
announcements on real estate development activities:

 

a)   GST to be levied at 5% on regular and 1% on
affordable housing (‘final taxes’), without any input tax credit (ITC).
Apartments up to 90 / 60 square metres in non-metro / metro cities having gross
sale value below Rs. 45,00,000 are considered as ‘affordable residential apartments’;

b)   Tax on
development rights / TDR / JDA, lease premium, FSI (‘intermediate taxes’) are
to be exempted for apartments sold pre-completion, and taxable where apartments
are sold after completion, in other words, intermediate taxes would be payable
if final taxes are not applicable.

 

The
philosophy behind the recommendations was stated as follows:

 

“i. The
buyer of house gets a fair price and affordable housing gets very attractive
with GST @ 1%;

ii. Interest of the buyer / consumer gets
protected; ITC benefits not being passed to them shall become a non-issue;

iii.
Cash flow problem for the sector is addressed by exemption of GST on
development rights, long-term lease (premium), FSI, etc.;

iv.
Unutilised ITC, which used to become cost at the end of the project, gets
removed and should lead to better pricing;

v. Tax
structure and tax compliance becomes simpler for builders.”

 

In view of limitations in bringing
the said amendments through primary enactments, the 34th GST Council
adopted the route of issuing notifications to give effect to the said
decisions. The modalities of the scheme were carried out by rate notifications
and other procedural amendments. The rate notifications are the subject matter
of discussion in this article:

Notification 3/2019 – CT(R): Beneficial rates for pure
and mixed residential real estate

CGST sections invoked – 9(1), 9(3), 9(4), 11(1), 15(5),
16(1), 148

Clause

Service description

Effective
tax rate1

Conditions

3(i)

Affordable residential apartment in RREP2  in new / ongoing projects3

1%

NOTE 1

3(ia)

Regular residential apartment in RREP in new projects /
ongoing projects

5%

3(ib)

Commercial apartments in RREP in new projects / ongoing
projects

5%

3(ic)

Affordable residential apartment in REP in new projects /
ongoing projects

1%

3(id)

Regular residential apartment in REP in new projects /
ongoing projects

5%

3(ie)

Affordable residential housing under ongoing projects of
Govt.-specified housing schemes (such as JNNURM, PMAY, etc.) where higher
rate option exercised

8%

NOTE 2

3(if)

All other construction services including commercial
apartments in REP; residential apartments for ongoing projects where option
to continue in old scheme is exercised

12%

3(va)

Works contract service for affordable residential apartments
of new / ongoing projects

12%

NOTE 3

____________________________________________________

1    These rates are aggregate GST rates after
considering the ad hoc land deduction of 33.33%

2    RREP represents a real estate project where
carpet area of commercial apartment is not more than 15%. An REP represents all
the other real estate projects as covered by the RERA law

3    Ongoing projects
represent those cases where commencement certificate has been issued prior to
01-04-2019, actual construction has commenced, the project has not received its
completion / occupancy certificate and at least one apartment has been booked
in such a project. New projects are those which commence after 01-04-2019

 

Note 1: Cumulative
conditions for the beneficial rate of 1% / 5%

i.    The
taxes should only be paid in cash and not by ITC;

ii.    ITC on goods and services has not been
availed except to the extent of the completed construction activity / supply as
specified in Annexure I / II of the notification. Adverse variance between
computed and availed ITC should be paid either by credit / cash. Favourable
variance permits the developer to take additional ITC to meet the shortfall;

iii.   Landowner’s
area share4 – Developer to pay the tax on constructed area and the
landowner would be entitled to ITC only against taxable supplies (i.e.,
pre-completion supplies);

___________________________________________________

4    Landowner
promoter is the person who transfers land / development rights / FSI to a
developer promoter against area share in the project

 

iv.   80/20
rule – 80% of input / input services (other than grant of development rights /
lease premium, FSI, etc., electricity, diesel / petrol, etc.) are from
registered persons. Shortfall is liable to tax @ 18% on reverse charge basis
(RCM). In case of cement, it is expected that the entire material is purchased
from registered persons and any shortfall on this front would be liable to tax
@ 28%. The tax liability on account of the shortfall of RCM would have to be
paid by the end of the quarter following the financial year. In case of cement,
the tax would have to be paid in the same month itself;

v.   Project-wise
computations and accounts to be maintained to justify compliance of above
conditions. ITC not availed is required to be reported in the specified column
of GSTR-3B as being ineligible ITC.

 

Note 2: Conditions
for continuing with the regular rate of 8% / 12% for ongoing projects

i.    It
is mandatory to exercise the option of continuing in old scheme within the
specified time limit of 10th May, 2019 (extended up to 20th
May, 2019). Where the option is not exercised, the new rates / conditions would
automatically be considered as applicable.

 

Note 3: Conditions
to be satisfied by works contractor

i.    Aggregate
carpet area of affordable residential apartments is more than 50% of the total
carpet area of all apartments.

ii.    In
cases where the above threshold drops below 50%, the beneficial rate would be
denied and developer would have to repay the differential tax on reverse charge
basis

Notifications
4/2019 –CT(R): Exemption to intermediate taxes subject to RCM

CGST sections invoked – 9(1), 9(3), 9(4), 11(1), 15(5),
16(1), 148

Description of services

Amount

Conditions

Services by way of transfer of development rights / FSI on or
after 01-04-2019 for construction of residential apartments intended for sale
prior to completion of the project

Proportionate

Note 4

Upfront lease premium in respect of long-term lease of 30
years or more after 01-4-2019 for construction of residential apartments
intended for sale prior to completion of the project

Proportionate

 

     

Note 4: Cumulative
Conditions for the exemption

i.    Exemption
would be limited to the proportionate residential carpet area of the project;

ii.    Developer
would be liable to repay the tax under reverse charge on the proportionate
value of flats remaining unbooked as on date of issuance of completion
certificate. The tax payable is limited to 1% of value of unbooked affordable
and 5% of booked regular residential apartments, i.e., extent of final taxes
otherwise applicable prior to completion;

iii.   The
above liability would be payable on the date of completion / first occupation
of the project, whichever
is earlier;

iv.   Value
of the above services would be the fair market value of residential /
commercial area allotted to the transferor of development rights / FSI nearest
to date of allotment.

 

Notifications
5/2019 – CT(R): RCM of
intermediate taxes

CGST sections invoked – 9(3)

Description of services

Service provider (e.g.)

Service recipient

Services by way of transfer of development rights / FSI, etc.

Landowner

Developer

Upfront lease premium in respect of long-term lease or
periodic rent for construction

Development authority

Developer

 

 

Notifications 6/2019 – CT(R):
Special procedures for developers (Section 148):
Developers receiving
development rights / long-term lease of land on or after 1st April,
2019 would be granted ‘deferment’ of payment of RCM taxes up to issuance of
completion certificate or first occupation, whichever is earlier.

 

Notifications 7/2019 and 8/2019 –
CT(R) (Section 9(4), 15(5)):
Enabling notifications for payment of RCM on
procurements from unregistered persons beyond the 80/20 rule. The notifications
also provide for RCM on procurement of all capital goods from unregistered
persons and such goods do not form part of the
80/20 rule.

 

KEY CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES UNDER NEW SCHEME

Without going into the
constitutionality and / or the vires of the statute to tax real estate
transactions, including development rights / TDRs, FSI, lease premium, etc.,
the key conceptual issues under the new scheme have been discussed herein:

 

Issue 1 – Whether the real
estate notification(s) is a rate notification / exemption notification? If it
is a rate notification, is it permissible to place conditions in rate
notifications?

Unlike VAT / Excise / Service tax
laws where the base rates are statutorily fixed with exemption powers being
delegated to the Government, the GST law has delegated both the rate fixation
(u/s 9[1]) and exemption powers (u/s 11[1]) to the Government(s) which gives
rise to the confusion over the powers which are being invoked while prescribing
tax rates.

 

Rate fixation (commonly termed as
tariff / scheduled rate) is an absolute power u/s 9(1). The section requires
the Government to notify tax rates on all supplies with a cap of 40%. Once the
tariff rates are fixed, tax payers are bound by it with absolutely no
flexibility. Section 11(1) then permits the Government to grant exemptions (a)
wholly or partly; (b) in public interest; and (c) with or without conditions.
An exemption always presupposes a fixed base rate. Notifications under both
these sections have to be backed by recommendations from the GST Council.

 

In this context, the Supreme Court in
Associated Cement Company vs. State of India & others (2004) 7 SCC
642
had stated as follows:

 

The question of exemption arises
only when there is a liability. Exigibility to tax is not the same as liability
to pay tax. The former depends on charge created by the Statute and latter on
computation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute and rules framed
thereunder if any. It is to be noted that liability to pay tax chargeable under
Section 3 of the Act is different from quantification of tax payable on
assessment. Liability to pay tax and actual payment of tax are conceptually
different. But for the exemption the dealer would be required to pay tax in
terms of Section 3. In other words, exemption presupposes a liability. Unless
there is liability question of exemption does not arise. Liability arises in
terms of Section 3 and tax becomes payable at the rate as provided in Section
12. Section 11 deals with the point of levy and rate and concessional rate.

 

This decision implies that the
Governments ought to fix the base rate liability for the public at large and
then proceed to grant exemptions in specific circumstances. In GST, the rate
fixation powers are absolute powers with an upper cap of 40%. It appears that
the Governments have thoroughly mixed both these distinct and independent
powers and notifications are issued for effective rates without any base rate
fixation. If one were to examine the GST Council discussions until 1st
July, 2017, the agenda of rate fixation culminated into the said rate slabs –
5%(necessities), 12% (processed commodities), 18% (standard commodities and
services), 28% (luxury products) and NIL rate. The entire exercise of rate
fixation by the fitment committee after the 14th Council meeting
also categorised the rates into the above five rates only. In respect of
services, rates were fixed for taxable services keeping in mind the erstwhile
service tax rates and with majority of the service tax exemptions being
adopted. Therefore, the consensus over services was to tax them at a base rate
of 18% with concessions being given for specific categories.

 

Let’s take a look at the
notifications issued at the inception of GST which define the rate / exemption
structure:
N– 01/2017 fixed rates for goods u/s 9(1) – this contained a basket of four
rates, i.e., 5% / 12% / 18% and 28%;
N–02/2017 exempted goods u/s 11(1) containing all the NIL rated goods; N–11/2017
was issued u/s 9(1) and 11(1) providing service tax rates between 5%-28% – each
four-digit SAC classification (adopted from the internationally-accepted
standards) was assigned a single rate and in case there were multiple rates
under a single four-digit SAC, the SAC generally contained a residual category
with 18% rate; and N–12/2017 was issued u/s 11(1) exempting services with or
without conditions. The above actions of the GST Council and Governments convey
that services generally had a base rate of 18% and goods had a base rate under
five categories as proposed by the fitment committee.

 

However, the legal process adopted by
the Governments over rate fixation poses a serious question over all
notifications and in particular the subject real estate notifications which
have prescribed rates and corresponding conditions. The real estate
notification contains various conditions w.r.t. input tax credit, RCM payment,
landowner terms, etc. Placing conditions in rate notifications is clearly not
permissible u/s 9(1). Though the notification also spells out section 11(1) as
its source of power, the above verdict of the Supreme Court presupposing a base
rate liability would come into play. Consequently, ‘conditions’ under the real
estate notifications may be read down as beyond statutory powers.

 

The alternative view would be that
the Government(s) being the custodian of both powers can choose to combine the
powers and notify the effective tax rates rather than duplicating the process.
While this is certainly alien to indirect tax legislation, it is a possible
view that can be adopted to validate the actions of the Council /
Government(s). In such a scenario, the residuary entry specifying the peak rate
under each service heading could be termed as a base rate, i.e., cases where
the conditions of the specific entry are violated, one may be relegated to the
residuary entry.

 

Issue 2 – Whether the new real
estate scheme is optional / mandatory?

The new scheme with drastic reduction
in tax rates appears to be highly beneficial from a customer’s standpoint but
raises cost arithmetic of the developer (due to ITC restrictions) requiring a
change in the base price to consumers. This mathematical problem poses a
question whether this new scheme is mandatory at all.

 

The GST Council and press releases
suggest that the new scheme is mandatory for all new projects and ongoing
projects where the option to continue under the old scheme is not exercised.
The original entry has been completely substituted with this new entry and the
residuary entry specifically excludes services specified in the table from its
ambit.

 

The issue is also inter-linked with
the fundamental issue of whether N–03/2019 is a ‘rate notification’ or an
‘exemption notification’. It is settled law by the Supreme Court that rate
specifications are mandatory and conditional exemptions are optional.

 

A cursory view of N–03/2019 clearly
depicts that the notification emerges from ‘public interest’ (refer press
release), contains conditions for availment and has limited its applicability
based on certain parameters (such as flat area, REP conditions, project start
date, etc.). Though both section 9(1) and 11(1) have been invoked, Governments
would certainly be placed in a tricky situation while defending the real estate
rates as being a compulsory levy (as a tariff) or an optional levy (as an
exemption). Where it is contended that the levy is compulsory, all conditions
(such as ITC, RCM, etc.) then stand as a violation of section 9(1) and where it
is contended that the said notification is an exemption with prescriptive
conditions, the notification would be treated as optional.

 

The implication of treating the entry
as being an exemption also raises a parallel question over the base rate. The
answer to this may probably lie in the residual entry (clause xii) which taxes
services at 18% if not classified elsewhere (though the explanation bars
classification for all the aforesaid real estate entries).

 

Issue 3 – Can a notification
take away validly availed ITC on transition?

N–03/2019-CT(R) requires the
developer to re-state the ITC balance as on 1st April, 2019 for new
and on-going projects under the beneficial rate scheme based on futuristic
arithmetical formulation. Annexure I and II of the said notification specify
the ITC to be retained / repaid based on an extrapolatory formula once the
beneficial rates are availed. The intent is to deny dual benefit of low tax
rate and ITC during the transitory phase, especially where percentage of
construction and percentage billing are at variance.

 

In
simple terminology, the formula attempts to extrapolate the actual ITC availed
on inputs or input services (whether utilised or not) up to 31st
March, 2019 to a statistical number until project completion. This is then
proportionately reduced for residential or commercial apartments booked prior
to 1st April, 2019 to the extent of instalments collected from such
apartment buyers. For example, Rs. 10 ITC on a project which is 10% complete is
extrapolated to 100 and then attributed to the value of advances for booked
apartments until 1st April, 2019 for which tax would have been
payable at the original rates. Assuming 20% flats are booked as on 1st April,
2019 and 25% of the advance has been collected, the restated ITC would be Rs. 5
(100*20%*25%). Since the developer has already availed Rs. 10, the balance Rs.
5 becomes repayable as excess ITC availed. If there is a shortfall, the
developer becomes entitled to take additional ITC to the extent of the
shortfall. In effect, ITC would be available only to the extent of value of
supply taxed at rate 8% / 12%.

The said formulation is based on
multiple statistical assumptions:

a)   Uniformity in ITC availment during the tenure
of the project;

b)   Similarity in the schedule of advance
payments from customers;

c)   Consistency on the pattern of construction by developer;

d)   Correlating percentage of invoicing with
percentage of construction completion;

e)   Accuracy of total project costs, etc.

 

In a transaction-based levy, has the
Government been empowered to restrict ITC based on statistical results? Is it
also empowered to retroactively reverse ITC rightfully availed and / or
utilised? The answer may probably be NO. The Supreme Court in various instances
has held that ITC rightly availed in compliance with statutory provisions on
the date of availment is as good as ‘tax paid’. It is an absolute right which
cannot be withdrawn, more so by delegated legislations. The Supreme Court has
also stated that ITC is a benefit / concession and hence statutory conditions
need to be strictly complied with.

 

The notifications have been issued
drawing powers from section 11(1) which permits prescription of certain
conditions for complete or partial exemptions. Explanation 4(iv) to the
notification requires that ITC is reversed as a condition to the availment of
the exemption. This seems to be the apparent source of power for the
Government.

 

But, section 17(1) and (2) specify
reversal of ITC only in cases of wholly exempt supplies and does not extend to
partially exempt supplies. The section also does not envisage any delegation of
powers for restricting ITC. Section 16-18 permits reversals of validly availed
ITC to the electronic credit ledger only through statutory provisions. However,
the notification requires reversal of ITC of both availed and utilised ITC. The
notification fails to appreciate that attribution of an input invoice
(especially services) to a taxable / exempt activity can be performed only at
the time of its availment and once the credit is rightfully availed, it loses
its original identity. Therefore any attempt to trace a credit after availment
/ utilisation to a taxable / exempt activity for purpose of reversal in
computations would be a futile and inaccurate exercise.

 

Another issue in this condition is
whether this reversal is ‘person specific’, ‘project specific’ and / or ‘period
specific’. While the notification says that the accounts are to be maintained
project-wise, the computation mechanism gives mixed views – for example, where
a project is taken over by a new developer, would the incoming developer have
access to this 80/20 criterion from project inception or from its take-over?
The formula certainly does not capture this scenario. What happens where there
is a shortfall in the 80/20 rule in initial years (due to sand / jelly
purchase) and sufficiently complied when viewed from a project level at its
finishing stages? The notification suggests that each year is independent on
this front. The press release states that the calculation has to be performed
project-wise and year-wise.

 

On the other hand, there is an
attempt (through amendments in Rule 42) to reverse credit based on ‘carpet
area’, a clear departure from the requirement of section 17 which specifies
‘value’-based computations. Rule 42 goes on to require reversal right from the
commencement of the project without considering the year of availment of the
credit. This clearly disturbs the uniform law that ITC is final by the end of
the September returns following the financial year closure. Real estate
projects which face delays crossing more than five years would be saddled with
the task of going back to the origin of the project. Thus, one school of
thought clearly raises red flags over the vires of the notification to
prescribe reversal of ITC from multiple fronts.

 

The other conservative school of
thought would be that real estate notifications are more akin to exemption
notifications and the powers of conditional exemptions are wide enough to
provide substantive and procedural conditions, and this would cover ITC
restrictions in any form even though not empowered under the ITC provisions.
Being an optional notification and having opted for the exemption, one may have
to strictly abide by the conditions of exemption or otherwise continue paying
tax at the higher rate.

 

Issue 4 – Whether imposition of
RCM under 80/20 procurement rules, booked / unbooked apartment ratio rule,
i.e., on future contingencies, is a sustainable legal condition?

80/20
procurement rule

N–07/2019 imposes RCM on the
developer where the procurements of the project from registered persons fall below
80%. Tax is to be paid at 18% on the shortfall on reverse charge basis except
for cement which is taxable at 28%. There is a requirement of apportionment of
credit exclusively to commercial segment at standard rate, commercial segment
at beneficial rate, residential segment at beneficial rate, common credits and
then test the same at the project level. This condition has certain
shortcomings:

 

a.   This
condition is based on an outcome which may be known only at the end of the
financial year;

b.   In
a transaction levy regime where ‘supply’ has to be identified, it appears to
defeat the basic cannon of taxation of identifying the subject of levy;

c.   The
notification imposes a tax on an ad hoc figure @ 18% which clearly runs
contrary to the requirements of section 9(3)/9(4). These sections envisage only
a ‘supply / transaction’-based RCM levy and not a result-based RCM levy;

d.   One
would not be in a position to raise the self-invoice on RCM transactions of
9(4) under 80/20 rule.

 

Unbooked
apartment RCM rule

N–04 and 05/2019 impose RCM on
intermediate transactions to the extent of unbooked residential apartments at
the end of the project. This is on the premise that unbooked completed
apartments are outside the ambit of GST. The tax payable is determined based on
carpet area ratios of booked / unbooked apartments, a ratio completely foreign
to GST law. Such ratios also deviate from the economic value-add of a service
and result in disparity in the cost burden to end-customers on the basis of
carpet area ignoring commercial value. Moreover, it appears to be a back-door
entry to tax completed apartments also evident from the cap fixed to that of
underconstruction apartments.

 

The
fundamental rule of taxation is that there should be certainty on the subject,
time and measure of levy. The Supreme Court in Govind Saran Ganga Saran
vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax and Ors (1985 AIR 1041)
held that the
components which enter into the concept of a tax are well known. The first is
the character of the imposition known by its nature which prescribes the
taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear indication of the
person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged to pay the tax, the third
is the rate at which the tax is imposed, and the fourth is the measure or value
to which the rate will be applied for computing the tax liability. If these
components are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say
that the levy exists in point of law. Any uncertainty or vagueness in the
legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal
to its validity. These futuristic conditions appear to make the levy uncertain
and vulnerable to challenge.

Issue 5 – Notification grants
benefit to ‘A’ by fulfilment of conditions by ‘B’?

The notification distinctly has
scenarios where benefit to one is subject to the actions of another. This is
absurd

 

Instance 1: N–03/2019 grants
beneficial works contract rate for affordable housing projects to contractors
subject to fulfilment of the minimum 50% carpet area by the developer. The
exemption is topped with a condition that any shortfall in area would result in
withdrawal of exemption by way of an RCM payment by the developer. Moreover,
the notification 7/8-2019 does not back this levy with an amendment in the RCM
table u/s 9(3).

 

Instance 2: N–03/2019 grants
beneficial rates to developer provided landowner discharges all the taxes on
his share of apartments sold prior to completion and reversal of ITC on
unbooked apartments. Non-fulfilment of conditions by the landowner on his share
may adversely affect the availment of beneficial rate.

 

The above conditions of the
notification would necessarily have to be whittled down suitably for its
sustenance.

 

Issue 6 – Whether condition of
prohibiting tax payment through credit is within the
vires of tax
discharge?

N–03/2019 mandatorily directs the
developer to discharge all beneficial rate taxes only through cash. This rule
emerged from discussions in the GST Council that developers are discharging
only 1-5% of their output through cash ledgers. With this assumption, the
Council decided that the new scheme debarring availing of input tax credit
should not result in any credit balance and hence payments should be directed
to be made through cash ledgers only. This runs contrary to the mandate of
section 49(4) which permits rightful electronic credit ledger balance to be
used for payment of any output taxes. Input tax credit is as good as tax paid
and differential treatment to this would defeat this value-added tax scheme.
Developers having input tax credit balance would be left with a dead number if
it is not permitted to be utilised against output taxes. For a developer
engaged only in construction activity, this condition effectively lapses the
input tax credit balance accumulated over the years of operation of the
company.

 

Issue 7 – What would be the
implication in case of change in any variable of the real estate project (such
as cancellation of flat, valuation of affordable flat, change in project
composition, cancellation of project, etc.)?

The
real estate notification has set up a complex matrix based on project variables
such as apartment dimensions, residential to commercial composition, pre- and
post-1st April, 2019 flat inventory, etc. For example, a new
commercial plan may emerge in the third year of the project reclassifying the
project from an RREP to an REP. This changes the entire dynamics of rate
structure and transitional ITC working right from 1st April, 2019.
Another example could be a flat previously treated as booked and WIP as on 1st
April, 2019 is subsequently cancelled. Clause 22 of the real estate FAQ
provides some guidance on this matter but this has multi-faceted implications
on RCM, ITC, etc. The notification does not provide for any claw back of
previous workings. The developer would fall into a situation where the entire
cost structure is impacted and the burden of additional taxes cannot be
recovered from any one. Once again, the Supreme Court’s verdict in Govind
Saran Ganga Saran (supra)
may come to the rescue of the tax payers.

 

The above complexities are just the
tip of the iceberg. The real estate notifications have been intermingled with
the RERA law which is itself in an adolescent stage – any ambiguity will have
repercussions on tax computations, making it difficult for managements to take
decisions. The functioning of this entire scheme through exemption
notifications makes matters very complex. A tax payer who is denied exemption
on certain facts on a future date would be placed in severe hardship as there
is no mechanism to undo all compliances ancillary to the exemption and
reinstate it to the base rate scenario. A fundamental question also lingers
whether this is interfering with fundamental rights in taking business
decisions?

 

The real estate sector needs to be boosted and
this can take place only with simple laws and tighter monitoring. The
philosophy of the GST Council to simplify real estate tax structure has
evidently taken a back seat. This would be an opportune moment to remember what
Sir Winston Churchill had said: ‘We contend that for a nation to try to tax
itself into prosperity is like a man standing in a bucket and trying to lift
himself up by the handle.

WORKS CONTRACT VIS-A-VIS VALUE OF TAXABLE TURNOVER

INTRODUCTION

The taxation of a works
contract under sales tax has been the subject of much debate in the pre-GST
era. The issues arising therefrom are manifold. One such issue is the valuation
of taxable turnover under a works contract.

 

A ‘Works Contract’ is a
composite contract involving both goods and labour. As per the statutory
provisions only value relating to goods can be taxed under sales tax laws. But
determining the value of goods has remained mired in controversy.

 

GOODS USED BUT NOT
GETTING TRANSFERRED

This is one of the issues
being hotly discussed. The case of Commissioner of Sales Tax vs.
Matushree Textiles Limited (132 STC 539)(Bom)
is, amongst others, one
of the earliest judgements, laying down that even if goods are not getting
transferred physically but their effect gets transferred, it will be considered
a works contract.

 

In this case, dyes and
chemicals were used for dyeing of cloth. And one of the arguments was that
since the dyes /chemicals are washed away there is no transfer of property in
goods for it to become a part of a works contract.

 

But the Bombay High Court
turned down this argument, holding that even passing on of colour, in the form
of a colour shade on cloth, is transfer of property in goods, and thus it comes
under a works contract. However, valuation was not discussed in this judgement.

 

A case where the issue of valuation arose was that of Enviro
Chemicals vs. State of Kerala (39 VST 434)(Ker)
. The activity
involved here was the treatment of effluent water. The dealer used chemicals to
purify water and such purified water was then allowed to flow into a river. The
argument was that since there is no transfer of property to the employer in any
form, there is no taxable value as the use of materials is only as consumables.

 

The High Court, by a
majority, rejected the argument and held that the value of goods used, though
not actually transferred to the employer, is taxable.

 

In the recent case of A.P.
Processors vs. State of Haryana (57 GSTR 491)(P&H)
, the
facts relevant to the judgement are noted as under by the High Court:

 

“3. A few facts relevant
for the decision of the controversy involved as narrated in VATAP No. 32 of
2017 may be noticed. The appellant-assessee is a dealer duly registered under
the provisions of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (HVAT Act) and the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (the CST Act). The assessee is a textile processor
and is engaged in the execution of job works. The grey fabric comes to the
processors and after due processing/manufacturing, the finished product is sent
back, raising an invoice on which Basic Excise Duty (BED) and Additional Excise
Duty (AED) is also leviable, although the rate of duty is nil, and as per the
valuation prescribed in the relevant Act considering the cost of grey fabric,
processing charges and other incidental charges, etc.

 

The assessing authority
concluded the assessment on the basis of observations and findings that all the
dyes and chemicals used in the execution of the job work of bleaching and
dyeing are transferred in physical form or as their inherent properties. Therefore,
the property in goods passed on in the process of execution of the job work
should be taxed; the assessing officer raised a tax demand of Rs. 5,34,516 vide
order dated 20.3.2007 (Annexure A.1). Reliance was placed on the decision of
the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Matushree Textiles
Limited, (2003) 132 STC 539
.

 

Still not satisfied, the
assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal, inter alia canvassing that
tax on value of chemicals consumed during the process of dyeing and job work
was not to be included for the purpose of levy of VAT under the HVAT Act/CST
Act. It was also argued that even the dye used in the process would not be
entirely taxable because a substantial portion of the same is not transferred
to the principal eventually. The assessee also submitted a book containing the
reports and technical certificates issued by various competent authorities
justifying the stand of the assessee that chemicals are wasted during the
process of dyeing of textiles and that only a part of the colour is made part
of the final product sent to the principal. Vide impugned order dated 17.3.2017
(Annexure A.5), the Tribunal dismissed the appeal upholding the levy of tax on
the entire value of the chemicals and dyes used in the process irrespective of
the fact whether property in goods had been transferred or not. Hence the
instant appeal by the appellant-assessee.”

 

The Hon’ble High Court
thereafter examined the process in detail. The processes like washing,
watering, dyeing and softening, etc. are carried out. After examining the scope
of such processes and the technical reports submitted on behalf of the
assessee, the Hon. High Court held as under:

 

“21. In other words, the
bleaching and dyeing is a multi-level process in which chemicals are used
initially and are mandatorily washed out before the cloth becomes conducive for
the process of dyeing. After undertaking dyeing, the fabric is sent to the
principal. Initially, the fabric indicates washing with the help of caustic
soda, desizer, soda ash, hydrogen peroxide, HCL, potassium permanganate, oxalic
acid, sodium sulphate and acetic acid. The said process would be akin to
washing clothes at home with the help of washing powder. The effect of washing
is to ensure that the portion of elements and dirt attached to the cloth is
removed before any further process is carried out. It was also claimed that in
this process, the weight of the cloth is reduced which shows that no chemical
gets stuck to the cloth. The property of such chemicals, if held to be absorbed
in the fabric and transferred, (is that) the fabric would not remain fit for
wearing. The dyeing work undertaken by the appellant on cotton fabrics
manufactured by them is the final act, but prior to this act of dyeing various
processes are undertaken for making the fabric fit for dyeing. The processes
normally undertaken are as follows: (1) desizing, (2) scouring, (3) bleaching,
(4) mercerizing and (5) dyeing and finishing.

 

While the textile
undergoes the aforesaid treatment, certain chemicals are used which are
consumables and which do not hold on to the cotton fabrics. After completion of
the aforesaid processes, dyeing is undertaken which holds on to the cotton
fabric giving a lasting impression and ultimately converts the grey fabric into
printed fabric, which is then marketed. In the act of dyeing, as also in
printing, certain amount of chemicals, dyes and colours are washed out and they
do not remain embedded on the textile or fabric. Thus, the benefit of
chemicals, dyes and colours which get washed out to this extent would be
extended to the assessee-appellant. In Gannon Dunkerley & Co. [AIR
1954 Mad 1130]
it has been specifically laid down that while permitting
deductions, the consumables are required to be deducted from the total gross
turnover of an assessee for arriving at actual taxable turnover and the dyes
and chemicals in the present case, a certain percentage thereof being
consumables, are required to be excluded.

 

22. Thus, it would be
pertinent to observe that what is taxable under the HVAT and CST Act is the
value of the goods which get transferred to the customer in the execution of
the works contract either as goods or in any other form and not the value of
goods used or consumed in the execution of the works contract, if such user or
consumption does not result in transfer of property in those goods in any form
to the customer. The tax on the entire value of chemicals consumed during the
process of dyeing and job work are not to be included for the purpose of levy
of VAT as substantial portion of the same is not transferred to the principal
eventually.”

 

Thus, the Hon’ble High
court has arrived at the scope of consumables in relation to a works contract.
The judgement is laying down a sound principle though there are also some
contrary judgements. The actual extent of transfer of property depends upon the
facts of each case.

 

CONCLUSION

The judgement will be
useful for guiding the assessee /authorities in deciding the controversial
issue of valuation of goods for the purpose of levy of tax in works contracts.
The judgement will also apply to many such day-to-day transactions like laundry
activities or only cleaning activity, etc. It is expected that the assessee
will give technical / relevant data to determine the value and the authorities will
look at it in a fair and businesslike manner to avoid further disputes in all
such contracts executed up to 30th June, 2017.

 

It may be noted that under
GST laws, w.e.f. 1st July, 2017, such contracts are to be treated as
labour contracts. Thus, the entire value of transaction (including value of
material as well as services) shall be liable to tax as ‘service contract’ and
tax thereon shall be levied accordingly.

AN ASSESSMENT OF ASSESSMENT PROVISIONS


Tax
laws are structured on three key pillars – levy, assessment and collection.
Assessment is the link between levy and collection of taxes. Assessment
provisions under indirect tax laws, especially excise law, have evolved from
the era of officer control and assessment to self-assessment.

 

With
its introduction in 2017, GST law is now about to change gears and enter the
phase of ‘Assessments’. This phase operates as a litmus test over the extent of
percolation of the law into the system both at the Government’s and the tax
payer’s end. Tax payers are about to experience challenges on the front of
assessments, audits and adjudications and this article examines some of the
issues involved.

 

ASSESSMENT – AUDIT – ADJUDICATION

Though
the above terms are used inter-changeably, they represent distinct activities
in any legal enforcement. The GST law has made specific provisions towards each
of these aspects under its machinery provisions, i.e., Chapter XII –
Assessment; Chapter XIII – Audit; and Chapter XV – Demands & Recovery.

 

Assessment
has been defined u/s. 2(11) as any ‘determination of tax liability’. Advanced
Law lexicon explains assessment as ‘determination of rate or amount of
something such as tax, damages, imposition of something such as tax or fine
according to an established rate’.

 

Audit
u/s. 2(13) involves an elaborate exercise of examination of records, returns
and other documents maintained to verify correctness of taxes paid / refunded
and assess compliance under the Act.

 

Adjudication
has not been defined but the term ‘Adjudication authority’ has been defined as
an authority that ‘passes any order or decision under the Act’. Advanced
Law lexicon explains adjudication as the process of ‘trying and determining
a case judicially’.

Assessment
essentially means computation of the taxes under the law. Audit, on the other
hand, is a special procedure involving desk and / or on-site review of records.
Adjudication involves a judicious process of deciding the questions of law
which emerge from the assessment and audit processes. Assessment and audit are
the processes which lead to the adjudication function and these three functions
come under the overall umbrella of ‘Assessment’ in a tax law.

 

ASSESSMENT SCHEME

Chapter
XII of the GST law provides for specific instances where an assessment would be
performed:

Type (Section)

Scenarios

Outer
time-limit

Self-assessment (59)

Assessment of the tax dues by the
assessee himself through returns in GSTR-3B & 1

Due dates of filing return

Provisional assessment (60)

Assessment by the officer on specific
request by the assessee in cases of difficulty in ascertainment of the tax
liability

Six months (extendable to 4 years) from application

Scrutiny assessment (61)

Scrutiny of the data reported in returns
on a frequent basis for any visible discrepancies culminating into a demand
u/s. 73 or 74

Within 3 / 5 years from due date of annual return

Assessment of non-filers (62)

Best judgement assessment in case of
non-filing of returns within prescribed time limits

5 years from due date of annual return

Assessment of unregistered persons (63)

Best judgement assessment in case of
unregistered persons which are required to be registered

5 years from due date of annual return

Summary assessment (64)

Assessment in order to protect interest
of Revenue and culminating into a demand u/s. 73 or 74

Within 3 / 5 years from due date of annual return

 

 

Any
assessment initiated under these sections would have to meet the prerequisites
of the section and the authority would have to operate within the confines of
these sections while exercising its powers. For example, scrutiny assessment of
the returns u/s. 61 can be initiated only to verify the correctness of the
returns filed and examine the discrepancies noticed therein. The assessing
authority is under an obligation to provide the reasons for invoking section 61
and such reasons should emerge from the returns filed for the period under
consideration. It cannot be initiated for conducting a detailed audit of the
books of accounts of the assessee. Such powers rest within the domain of
sections 65 and 66 only. Similarly, an assessing authority can invoke section
62 only for the months for which the returns are not filed and cannot spread
the assessment for other periods.

 

Further,
the provisions only provide the circumstances under which assessments can be
initiated. The provisions are not a complete code for enforcement of the demand
and its recovery. Once the assessments are duly initiated and the examination
of records report a discrepancy, the officer would have to enter adjudication
provisions u/s. 73 / 74 for the recovery of tax dues. Where the officer
concludes that the taxes are duly reported and paid, adjudication need not be
invoked and an assessment order confirming the conclusions would be sufficient.

 

AUDIT SCHEME

Chapter
XIII provides for conducting a regular audit (65) or a special audit (66).
Going by earlier experience where audit provisions in the rules were
challenged, the legislature has introduced these powers in the main enactment
itself allaying any doubts over the jurisdiction to conduct audits. There is no
time limit to conduct an audit of an assessee. However, any demands arising
from these audits would have to follow the process u/s. 73 and 74 which have an
outer time limit of 3 and 5 years, respectively. The key features of regular
and special audit are as follows:

Regular Audit (65)

Special Audit (66)

Performed by authorised officers either on periodical or
selection basis

Performed by appointed chartered accountants / cost
accountants at the specific instance of the Revenue officer on selection
basis only

Audit can be a desk review or an on-site review

Audit would generally be performed on-site

Audit report would record the findings of any tax short
payment / non-payment

Audit report would address specific points defined in the
scope of the audit for further action by the Revenue officers

Proceedings u/s. 73 / 74 would be initiated in case of any
demand

Proceedings u/s. 73 / 74 would be initiated in case of any
demand

Initiated before any adjudication proceeding

Can be initiated during adjudication proceedings

 

While
powers of audit are much wider in scope in comparison with assessment
provisions, they, too, are not unfettered powers. Audit officers cannot, in the
garb of audit, perform an inspection of the assessee’s premises. The audit
officers would have to restrict themselves to the transactions recorded in the
books of accounts and their conformity with the returns filed. For example, an
audit officer visiting the premises cannot perform a physical verification of
the stocks and its comparison with books of accounts; an officer cannot perform
seizure of stocks, records, etc., and does not possess powers equivalent to the
Cr.P.C., 1973 which are conferred upon inspecting officers. Where such
discrepancies are identified, the audit officer can at the most report the same
internally for necessary action by the empowered officers. Like assessment
provisions, where the audit officers conclude that demand of taxes has arisen,
it would have to initiate proceedings u/s. 73 or 74 as appropriate.

 

ADJUDICATION SCHEME

It
is evident that any assessment / audit (except section 62 / 63) involving a
demand would culminate into an adjudication proceeding u/s. 73 or 74. The said
sections provide for issuance of a show cause notice proposing a demand and are
followed by an adjudication proceeding over the issue involved. The section can
be invoked under the following instances as tabulated below:

Instances

Explanation

Examples

Tax not paid or short paid

Output taxes which are legally payable are not paid wholly or
partly

Sale of fixed asset not offered to output tax, etc.

Tax erroneously refunded

Refund sanctioned but on incorrect grounds u/s. 54

Refund in excess of the prescribed formula, etc.

Input tax credit wrongly availed

Credit availed on inputs / input services or capital goods
which are specifically blocked or not available u/s. 16-18

Credit on motor vehicles, rent a cab, etc.

Input tax credit wrongly utilised

Credit rightly availed but utilised incorrectly against
output taxes in terms of section 49

CGST credit utilised for SGST output, etc.

 

 

The
key features of sections 73 and 74 are as follows:

  • While section 73 covers cases where the
    reasons for non-payment are bona fide, section 74 can be invoked where
    the reasons are on account of fraud, wilful misstatement, and / or suppression
    of facts to evade tax payment (fraud cases).
  • The person from whom such amounts appear to
    be recoverable should be put to notice (popularly called show cause notice) as
    to why said amounts are not recoverable from him along with interest or
    penalty. The adjudication officer has to make out a case in the SCN and offer
    the assessee the opportunity to defend itself against the facts and law laid
    down before it.
  • Once the proceedings are initiated, they are
    subjected to an outer time limit of 5 years (extended period in fraud cases)
    and 3 years (normal period in bona fide cases) for its completion. The
    proper officer should initiate the proceedings at least 3 months (6 months in
    fraud cases) prior to the time limit for completion of adjudication. The said
    time limit is to be calculated from the due date of filing annual return or
    date of erroneous refund.
  • As a dispute resolution measure, the
    assessee is provided an option to pay the complete tax and interest (penalty of
    15% in fraud cases) before the issuance of the SCN on the basis of its own
    ascertainment or the ascertainment of the proper officer. As a second level of
    dispute resolution, the assessee is also provided the option to pay the
    complete tax and interest (penalty of 25% in fraud cases) within 30 days of the
    issuance of the SCN.
  • Once an SCN is issued for an initial period,
    a detailed SCN for a subsequent period need not be issued. A statement
    computing taxes payable would be deemed to be an SCN, provided the grounds are
    identical to the initial period. Section 74(3) provides that the allegation of
    fraud cannot be made in periodical SCNs for subsequent periods.
  • The proper officer would determine the tax,
    interest and penalty (10% in bona fide cases, 100% in fraud cases) by
    way of an adjudication order. Where the assessee waives its right of appeal and
    pays the tax, interest and penalty (of 50%), the proceedings are deemed to be
    concluded.

 

The above scheme is substantially
similar to section 11A of the Central Excise Act and section 73 of the Finance
Act. The critical difference is with respect to time limitation. While the
erstwhile laws provided for a time limit of initiation of adjudication
proceedings and no outer time limit for its completion, the GST law provides
for the time limit over the conclusion of the said proceedings. The
adjudication proceedings are deemed to be concluded where the order is not
issued within 3 / 5 years.

 

The
other critical difference is with respect to recovery of erroneous input tax
credit which was contained in rule 14 of the erstwhile rules. Consequent to
inclusion of input tax credit provisions in the Act itself, sections 73 / 74
provide for recovery of input tax credits wrongly availed / utilised. Input tax
credit which has been wrongly availed and not utilised is also recoverable from
the assessee. Whether interest is applicable on such recovery is a different
aspect and needs to be viewed u/s. 50.

 

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS ADJUDICATION PROVISIONS (SECTION 75)

The
law-makers have scripted many settled legislative principles in this provision.
Most of the provisions have their roots in settled principles of natural
justice, fairness, double jeopardy, speaking orders, etc.

 

  • The computation of limitation of 3 / 5 years
    is subject to any stay over proceedings by any Court / Tribunal and the period
    of stay would stand excluded for such computation. A new provision has been
    inserted which extends the period for subsequent years where the Revenue is
    under appeal on a similar issue before an appellate forum. The purpose of this
    insertion was to enable the tax authority to transfer matters to a ‘call book’
    maintained as a practice in the erstwhile regime and keep them pending until
    disposal of the appeal. It is unclear whether the specific issue would be kept
    pending or all proceedings, including other issues which are not under appeal,
    would be subjected to this extension. Cross objections filed by the Revenue are
    equivalent to cross appeals and hence can extend the period of limitation.
  • In cases where the appellate authority or
    Tribunal or Court concludes that the grounds on fraud are not sustainable, the
    proceedings would continue to be valid for the normal period (of 3 years)
    despite such conclusion. Demand for the normal period would have to be adjudged
    on its merits in spite of the SCN being set aside for the extended period.
  • The decision of the adjudicating authority
    should confine itself to the grounds specified in the SCN and should not be in
    excess of the amounts specified in the notice. The officer is required to pass
    a speaking order detailing the facts and provisions leading to the conclusion.
  • Personal hearing is required to be granted
    in case it is specifically requested or the decision contemplated is adverse.
    Adjournments are allowed to be granted up to a maximum of three hearings.
    Courts have frowned upon the practice of officers providing three alternative
    dates for personal hearing in the same notice.
  • Taxes self-assessed and reported in the
    returns remaining unpaid would be recovered without issuance of any SCN in
    terms of section 79.
  • Interest on tax short paid or not paid would
    be payable irrespective of whether the same is specified in the adjudication
    order.
  • In cases where penalty is imposed u/s. 73 /
    74, no other penalty can be imposed on the same assessee under any other
    provision.
  • In case of any remand or direction by
    appellate forums to issue an order, such orders are required to be issued
    within 2 years from the communication of such direction.

 

PRINCIPLES ON ISSUANCE OF SCN

An
SCN is the first step taken by the Revenue to recover any tax demands. It is
the basic and most crucial document in the entire adjudication process. Certain
settled principles of adjudication under the Excise and Service Tax law would
have applicability even under the GST regime:

 

  • Issue of a show cause notice is condition
    precedent to a demand proceeding. The Supreme Court in various instances held
    that any demand can be confirmed only by way of an issuance of a show cause
    notice [Gokak Patel Volkart Limited vs. CCE 1987 28 ELT 53 (SC)].
    This principle would continue to hold good even under the GST scheme as the
    assessment and audit provisions direct that any demand should be recovered
    through the mechanism u/s. 73 / 74.
  • A mere letter of communication cannot be
    equated to a show cause notice. The show cause notice should specify the
    allegations and the basis for it to be sustainable under law [Metal
    Forgings vs. UOI 2002 146 ELT 241 (SC)
    ].
    Prejudged SCNs have been
    struck down by the Courts as being tainted with bias.
  • An SCN must contain all the essential
    details and relied-upon documents. A show cause is the foundation of the entire
    proceeding and the allegations should be clear and supported legally [CCE
    vs. Brindavan Beverages (P) Ltd. 2007 213 ELT 487 (SC)
    ].
  • SCNs on assumptions / presumptions, without
    any material evidence and based only on inferences, are not valid in law [Oudh
    Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. UOI 1978 2 ELT J172 (SC)
    ].
  • Show cause notices issued under a wrong
    section cannot be invalidated as long as the powers of the SCN are traceable to
    the statute [BSE Brokers Forum vs. SEBI 2001 AIR SCW 628 (SC)].
  • Corrigenda issued to the SCN are valid as long
    as they rectify apparent mistakes in the notice and do not enlarge its scope [CCE
    vs. SAIL 2008 225 ELT A130 (SC)
    ].
    However, the corrigenda can be issued
    any time before completion of the adjudication proceeding and may not be bound
    by the time limit.

 

PRINCIPLES FOR DIFFERENTIATING FRAUD AND NON-FRAUD CASES

Wilful
Misstatement, Suppression and Fraud

These
terms have been a matter of considerable litigation since failure of the
Revenue to meet the situations contemplated under these terms invalidated the
entire proceedings irrespective of the merits of the case. While Revenue has
applied these terms mechanically, the assessee has banked upon these terms to
defendits case.

 

In
Cosmic Dye Chemicals vs. CCE (1995) 75 ELT 721 (SC), the
Supreme Court explained these terms as follows:

 

Fraud
and collusion – as far as fraud or collusion are concerned, it is evident that
intent to evade duty is built into these very words.

 

Misstatement
or suppression – so far as misstatement or suppression of facts are concerned,
they are clearly qualified by the word wilful, preceding the words misstatement
or suppression of facts, which mean intent to evade duty.

 

The
Supreme Court in CCE vs. Chemphar Drugs & Liniments 1989 (40) ELT 276
(SC)
observed that fraud, etc., is essentially a question of fact
emerging from a positive act. Non-declaration of any information in the returns
without any deliberate intention does not amount to suppression. Similarly, the
Supreme Court in Padmini Products vs. CCE 1989 (43) ELT 795 (SC)
held that mere inaction or non-reporting does not amount to suppression of
facts.

 

Suppression
has now been defined in Explanation 2 to section 74 which states that any
failure to report facts or information required to be disclosed in returns,
statements or reports would amount to suppression of facts. This definition has
implicitly removed the requirement that suppression should be wilful and
consequently any failure to report required information would amount to
suppression. However, if one observes section 74, suppression should be
accompanied with intention to evade payment of tax and it appears that despite
its open-ended definition, Revenue has to still establish tax evasion in cases
of suppression.

 

In
Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. CCE 1991 (74) ELT 9 (SC), the
Court stated that an intention to evade would be present only in cases where
the assessee has deliberately avoided the tax payment. Cases involving
ambiguity in law or multiple interpretations in laws were not cases of tax
evasion.

 

The
burden of proof that circumstances of the case warrant invocation of extended
period of limitation is on the Revenue and these circumstances should be
discernible from the records of proceedings against the assessee.

 

PRINCIPLES IN ADJUDICATION

Adjudicating
officers are quasi judicial officers and have to follow settled legal
disciplines in the process of adjudication. Some of the principles to be
followed are:

 

  • Res judicata – the Latin term res
    judicata
    means a thing which is already adjudged, has attained finality and
    cannot be reconsidered. Since each tax period is different, the said principle
    does not apply directly across tax periods unless underlying assumptions like
    law and facts remain the same.
  • Adjudicating authorities are creatures of
    statute and hence vires of a section or entire Act itself cannot be put
    to question before such authority. These questions can only be placed before
    the High Court under its Writ jurisdiction.
  • Adjudicating authorities would have to act
    on fairness and such proceedings cannot be impaired by instructions, directions
    or clarifications from senior officers.
  • The authorities are bound by the principle
    of judicial discipline and should either follow or clearly distinguish
    decisions of higher appellate forums while adjudging a matter.
  • The officer who has heard the assessee
    should only pass the order. An incoming officer would have to conduct fresh
    hearings prior to passing any order.
  • Questions on jurisdiction to issue the
    notice, order or communication should be made at the first available instance.
    In terms of section 160(1) no person can question the proceedings at a later
    stage if he / she has acted upon such notice, order or communication.

 

FIXATION OF MONETARY LIMITS FOR ADJUDICATION

CBEC
in its Circular No. 31/05/2018-GST dated 09.02.2018 has prescribed monetary
limits for optimal distribution of work relating to issuance of SCNs.  The following table provides the monetary
limits for adjudication:

Sl. No.

Officer of Central Tax

CGST Limit

IGST Limit

1

Superintendent

Up to Rs. 10 lakhs

Rs. 20 lakhs

2

Dy / Asst. Commissioner

Rs. 10 lakhs –
Rs. 1 crore

Rs. 20 lakhs –
Rs. 2 crores

3

Addln / Jt Commissioner

Above Rs. 1 crore

Above Rs. 2 crores

 

The
Supreme Court in Pahwa Chemicals (P) Ltd. vs. CCE – 2005 (181) ELT 339
(SC)
, held that administrative directions of the board
allocating different works to various classes of officers cannot cut down the
jurisdiction vested in them by statute and may be followed by them at best as a
matter of propriety. Issuance of SCN or adjudication contrary to such
directions cannot be set aside for want of jurisdiction, especially as no
prejudice is caused thereby to assessee.

 

CRITICAL MATTERS IN ADJUDICATION (SECTIONS 73 AND 74)

A)  Whether reversal of input tax credit is
recoverable u/s. 73 and 74?

As
the recovery provisions are limited to four scenarios, any recovery outside the
scope of the above terms is without any authority. The Supreme Court in CCE
vs. Raghuvar (India) Ltd. 2000 (118) E.L.T. 311 (S.C.)
held that
section 11A is not an omnibus provision to cover any and every action to be
taken under the Act. The said section will apply only when the circumstances
specified therein are triggered.

 

A
typical example would be the case of reversal of common input tax credit
required in terms of section 17(1)/(2). Strictly speaking, provisions of
section 17(1)/(2) do not place a bar on availing input tax credit. Instead,
these provisions provide for a reversal of input tax credit in excess of what
is attributable to taxable supplies. Non-reversal does not amount to input tax
credits ‘wrongly availed’ or ‘wrongly utilised’. Hence there could be a
challenge on whether the Revenue has powers to invoke sections 73 / 74 to
recover input tax credit reversals under the said provisions. In the context of
Rule 57CC (parallel to Rule 6 of Cenvat Credit Rules and Rule 42 / 43 of GST
rules) which governed common inputs, the Tribunal in Pushpaman Forgings
vs. CCE Mumbai 2002 (149) E.L.T. 490 (Tri.-Mumbai)1
  held that payment of an amount is NOT ‘duty
or credit’ and in the absence of a specific provision to recover the same, the
proceedings are invalid.

 

B)  Whether reversal of transition credit is
recoverable u/s. 73 and 74?

The primary challenge for invoking
sections 73 and 74 for recovery of transition credit arises on account of the
definition of input tax credit u/s. 2(62) r/w 2(63) of the CGST Act. Recovery
of transitional credit could be on account of two reasons, (a) not meeting
erstwhile law conditions (e.g. not an input service, input or capital goods in
terms of Cenvat Rules, etc); and / or (b) not meeting transitional conditions
(e.g. not eligible duties defined under GST, first time credits to traders,
etc). There should be no doubt on the recovery of the former as the
non-compliance emerges under the Cenvat Rules and hence is governed by recovery
provisions of the said rules which are saved under the GST law. Once the said
amount is regularised under the erstwhile law, the transition claim stays
intact in terms of section 142. The latter, however, poses some challenge on
the recovery front.

 

Sections
73 / 74 can be invoked only for recovery of wrongfully availing / utilisation
of ‘input tax credit’. Input tax credit, by definition, is limited to the taxes
which are charged and paid under the IGST / CGST Acts only. The transition
provisions are a separate code by itself under Chapter XX and cannot be equated
to the input tax credit provisions under Chapter V. Transition credit is
directly credited to the electronic credit ledger and available towards discharge
of tax liabilities unlike input tax credits which have to pass the tests
prescribed in sections 17 and 18 of the GST law.

 

Now
Rule 121 of the transition provisions provides for recovery of such credit in
terms of sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act. The parent provisions u/s. 140
delegate its powers to rules only for the limited purpose of prescribing the
manner of availing. The parent provisions do not authorise the Government to
prescribe the recovery provisions. Unlike the Cenvat Rules where availing of
input tax credit was itself in a delegated legislation, transitional credit is
contained in the enactment and cannot be recovered through a subordinate
legislation.

 

CBEC
Circular No. 42/16/2018-GST dated 13.04.2018
provides that Cenvat credit and erstwhile recovery of arrears of taxes
are recoverable as Central taxes in terms of section 142 of the CGST law. In
one case the Circular prescribes that one may invoke section 79 (such as
garnishee orders, etc.) for recovery, clearly bypassing the step of adjudication.
Circular 58/32/2018-GST dated 04.09.2018 has gone a step further and
stated that the same may be reversed as input tax credit while filing GSTR-3B.
The genesis of these conclusions appears to be hazy and the backdoor entry of
Rule 121 is open for challenge in the Courts.

 

C)  Whether an SCN can be issued where taxes are
fully paid prior to its issuance?

Sections
73 / 74 state that an SCN would be issued where taxes are ‘not paid’ or ‘short
paid’. While section 73 provides for waiver of the penalty, there is no such
waiver in cases covered u/s. 74. In many cases, the assessee discharges the
taxes prior to issuance of the SCN and the taxes are completely paid on the
date of issuance of the SCN. We also observe from the said section that the
notice should specify why the amount specified is not ‘payable’. Section 73(7)
also specifies that in case of any short payment, the SCN should be issued only
to the extent of the short payment. All these provisions indicate that an SCN
cannot be issued where taxes are fully paid prior to its issuance.

 

Historically,
the Revenue officers would raise the SCN proposing a demand and provide for an
appropriation of the tax already paid by the assessee against the proposed
demand. This practice would keep the demand outstanding until the appropriation
at the time of conclusion of the adjudication proceedings. Whether a similar
practice can be continued given that the provisions are borrowed from the
Central Excise law is a matter of detailed examination.

 

D)  Whether an SCN can be issued only towards
interest or penalty?

In
many cases, the assessee deposits the taxes but fails to compute the interest
on account of delayed payment of taxes. It has been held by various Courts that
interest is an automatic levy and does not require specific notice for its
recovery. Section 75(12) provides that in case of self-assessed tax, the amount
of interest remaining unpaid would be recoverable directly in terms of section
79 without issuance of a show cause notice. Therefore, there is no requirement
of any SCN proceeding to recover interest.

 

In
cases of fraud where taxes have been completely paid, the Revenue may invoke
adjudication proceedings u/s. 74 for recovery of penalty. As discussed above,
the said section provides only for four instances where the proceedings can be
initiated. It is only when the above conditions are satisfied that penalty can
be proposed against the assessee. Where taxes have been completely paid, none
of the four instances applies and there is a possibility to take a view that an
SCN cannot be issued merely for recovery of penalty. Whether the officer can
then directly invoke section 122(1) may be a matter of examination.

 

E)  What happens where multiple issues are
involved and some issues fall in the fraudulent basket while others fall in the
non-fraudulent basket?

The
examination of a case falling u/s. 73 / 74 has to be performed for each issue
on hand and not in its entirety. There could occur circumstances where some
issues genuinely arise on account of interpretation of law and some issues on
account of evasive acts. The time limitation of 3 / 5 years would have to be
examined for each issue on hand depending on which basket they fall into. The
officer cannot paint all issues with one brush and apply the time limit of 5
years for the proceedings as a whole. Once the issues are segregated, the
proceedings would be governed by the respective sections.

 

F)  Can parallel proceedings be conducted by two
officers either by Central / State workforce?

Section
6(2) of the GST law provides that any proceeding issued on a subject matter by
any officer would not be duplicated with another proceeding of an officer of
parallel rank. This provision is specific to the issue under examination. The
parallel administration can certainly raise other issues provided they have
jurisdiction to assess these in terms of the work allocation between the Centre
and the State administrations.

 

G)  Whether disclosure to Central officer still
results in suppression before the State officer and vice versa?

In
case prior disclosure of information is made to a Central authority, an issue
arises whether the State authorities can allege suppression of information. The
terms are merely an expression of the state of mind of the tax payer. Where the
tax payer has established bona fide in reporting the issue to the
jurisdictional officer, it can certainly pray that the case does not involve a
fraudulent act. Unless the assessee has specifically withheld information being
sought from a particular officer, it can claim itself to be excluded from the
above terms. In fact, it may be interesting for one to even examine whether
reporting of information in one State would amount to sufficient bona fide
in assessments of other States. These are issues which would emerge on account
of State-wise assessments and cross empowerment of administration under the
law.

 

H)  Tax experts are requested for their opinion on
the status of litigation as on balance sheet date in the context of
provisioning in terms of GAAP?

Departmental
audits / assessments are only inquiry proceedings over the tax dues reported by
the assessee and until a specific issue is red-flagged, such proceedings may
not fall within the domain of provisioning / contingency. But where the issue
is ascertained and adjudication proceedings are initiated by way of an SCN, the
tests of provisioning (enlisted below) would have to be performed for the
company:

 

  • An entity has
    a present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of past events;
  • It is probable
    that the obligation may entail an economic outflow; and
  • A reliable
    estimate can be made of such outflow.

 

The
term present obligation has been defined as an obligation whose existence as on
the balance sheet date is probable. Though an SCN is a mere
proposal, the term present obligation requires one to test the probability of
the demand in view of the SCN as on balance sheet date. An SCN is an indication
of a potential demand and the tax expert would have to weigh the issue for its
merits and judicial precedents for concluding on the probable exposure to the
company.

 

Going by the overall
architecture of the GST law and the work allocation, it appears that audit
would be conducted based on statistical sampling of the assessee, assessments
would be performed on case-specific non-compliance reports and both these
functions would then channel into adjudication proceedings for recovery of tax
dues from the assessee. The GST topography poses multiple hurdles in assessment
of tax payers. Cross empowerment and maintenance of uniformity in State level
assessments would be a game changer. Being a new turf, tax payers and Revenue
would have to traverse the path of assessments cautiously.

IS GSTR3B A RETURN?

INTRODUCTION


Recently, the Gujarat High Court had occasion
to examine an interesting issue of whether GSTR3B is a return as envisaged u/s
16(4) of the CGST Act, 2017. In a detailed judgement, the Court held that the
press release dated 18th October, 2018 could be said to be illegal
to the extent that it clarifies that the last date for availing input tax
credit relating to the invoices issued during the period from July, 2017 to
March, 2018 is the last date for the filing of returns in Form GSTR3B for the
month of September, 2018. The decision brings to the fore the risks of changing
tax compliance processes without supporting amendments in the legislative
framework.

 

GUJARAT HIGH COURT DECISION


The pivot of the entire debate revolved
around the time limit for claiming input tax credit as prescribed u/s 16(4) of
the Act. The said provision is reproduced below for ready reference:

 

A registered person
shall not be entitled to take input tax credit in respect of any invoice or
debit note for supply of goods or services or both after the due date of
furnishing of the return under section 39 for the month of September following
the end of financial year to which such invoice or invoice relating to such
debit note pertains or furnishing of the relevant annual return, whichever is
earlier,

 

1Provided that the registered person shall be
entitled to take input tax credit after the due date of furnishing of the
return under section 39 for the month of September, 2018 till the due  date of furnishing of the return under the
said section for the month of March, 2019 in respect of any invoice or invoice
relating to such debit note for supply of goods or services or both made during
the financial year 2017-18, the details of which have been uploaded by the supplier
under sub-section (1) of section 37 till the due date for furnishing the
details under sub-section (1) of said section for the month of March, 2019.

 

Since section 16(4) of the Act refers to a
return to be filed u/s 39, the Court directed itself to the provisions of
section 39(1) of the CGST Act which reads as under:

 

Every registered
person, other than an Input Service Distributor or a non-resident taxable
person or a person paying tax under the provisions of section 10 or section 51
or section 52 shall, for every calendar month or part thereof, furnish, in such
form and manner as may be prescribed, a return, electronically, of inward and
outward supplies of goods or services or both, input tax credit availed, tax
paid and such other particulars as may be prescribed, on or before the
twentieth day of the month succeeding such calendar month or part thereof.

 

The search for the correct return format then
led towards Rule 61(1) which prescribes GSTR-3 to be the form in which the
monthly return specified u/s 39(1) should be filed. The said Rule reads as
under:

 

Every registered
person other than a person referred to in section 14 of the Integrated Goods
and Services Tax Act, 2017 or an Input Service Distributor or a non-resident
taxable person or a person paying tax under section 10 or section 51 or, as the
case may be, under section 52, shall furnish a return specified under
sub-section (1) of section 39 in Form GSTR-3, electronically, through the
common portal either directly or through a facilitation centre notified by the
Commissioner.

 

The provisions of section 16(4), section
39(1), Rule 61(1) and many other provisions were drafted considering the
original workflow of a two-way transaction level matching through the processes
of filing GSTR-1 followed by auto population of credit in GSTR2A and matching
and self-claim in GSTR-2, resulting in the return in form GSTR-3. However, due
to various reasons, the compliance process was sought to be simplified through
the introduction of form GSTR3B. The same was done not though any amendment in
the Act, but through the introduction of Rule 61(5). The initial verbiage of
Rule 61(5) was as under:

 

Where the time limit
for furnishing of details in FORM GSTR-1 under section 37 and in form GSTR-2
under section 38 has been extended and the circumstances so warrant, return in
form GSTR3B,
in lieu of form
GSTR-3, may be furnished in such manner and subject to such conditions as may
be notified by the Commissioner.

 

The said verbiage suggested that form GSTR3B
was a substitute for the filing of return in GSTR-3. However, the said verbiage
was substituted with retrospective effect with the following words:

 

Where the time limit
for furnishing of details in form GSTR-1 under section 37 and in form GSTR-2
under section 38 has been extended and the circumstances so warrant, the
Commissioner may, by notification, specify that return shall be furnished in
form GSTR3B electronically through the common portal, either directly or
through a facilitation centre notified by the Commissioner.

 

Based on the above, the Gujarat High Court
observed that the Notification No. 10/2017 Central Tax dated 28th
June, 2017 which introduced mandatory filing of the return in form GSTR3B
stated that it is a return in lieu of form GSTR-3. However, the Government, on
realising its mistake that the return in form GSTR3B is not intended to be in
lieu of
form GSTR-3, rectified its mistake retrospectively vide
Notification No. 17/2017 Central Tax dated 27th July, 2017 and
omitted the reference to return in form GSTR3B being return in lieu of Form
GSTR-3.

 

The observations of the Gujarat High Court
treating GSTR3B not as a substitute of GSTR-3 but merely as an additional
compliance requirement have widespread ramifications and some of those aspects
are discussed in this article.

 

IS THERE A DUE DATE FOR CLAIMING INPUT TAX
CREDIT?


While the Gujarat High Court does lay down
that the press release clarifying that the due date of filing the GSTR3B for
the month of September, 2018 to be the due date for claiming input tax credit
is illegal, it does not define any specific date by which the input tax credit
has to be claimed. With the understanding that the return referred to in
section 16(4) is GSTR-3 and not GSTR3B, it may be relevant to once again read
the provisions of section 16(4) to decipher the due date.

A registered person
shall not be entitled to take input tax credit in respect of any invoice or
debit note for supply of goods or services or both after the due date of
furnishing of the return under section 39 for the month of September following
the end of financial year to which such invoice or invoice relating to such
debit note pertains or furnishing of the relevant annual return, whichever is
earlier.

 

It is evident that the provision prescribes
the earlier of two events as the last date for claiming input tax credit:

(i) Due date of furnishing GSTR-3 for
September, 2018 – which has been extended ad infinitum;

(ii) Due date of furnishing the relevant
annual return – to be filed in GSTR-9 as per the provisions of section 44 read
with Rule 80.

 

Therefore, in general cases, the input tax
credit has to be claimed before the due date of furnishing the annual return in
GSTR-9. However, it may be important to note that fresh input tax credit cannot
be claimed in annual return but has to be claimed in GSTR3B (in interim) and
the GSTR-2 (in finality, as and when it is operationalised). Therefore, it will
be important to claim the input tax credit in any GSTR3B filed before the due
date of the filing of the GSTR-9.

 

WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF ROD ORDER EXTENDING THE
TIME UP TO MARCH?


Through CGST (Second Removal of Difficulties)
Order, 2018, the Government inserted a proviso to section 16(4) and purportedly
sought to extend the September deadline to March. However, the decision of the
Gujarat High Court and the verbiage of the said proviso suggests a different
interpretation. Let us look at the proviso once again:

 

Provided that the
registered person shall be entitled to take input tax credit after the due date
of furnishing of the return under section 39 for the month of September, 2018
till the due date of furnishing of the return under the said section for the
month of March, 2019 in respect of any invoice or invoice relating to such
debit note for supply of goods or services or both made during the financial
year 2017-18, the details of which have been uploaded by the supplier under
sub-section (1) of section 37 till the due date for furnishing the details
under sub-section (1) of said section for the month of March, 2019.

 

On a fresh reading of the said proviso, one
would notice that the reference to annual return is missing in the proviso. It
merely refers to the return in section 39 (which as per the Gujarat High Court
decision is GSTR-3 and not GSTR3B) and specifies that the credit can be claimed
till the due date of furnishing the return in GSTR-3 of March, 2019. This
absence of any reference to annual return in this proviso effectively means
that the input tax credit can be claimed at any point of time till the
Government notifies the due date for GSTR-3. However, it may be noted that the
proviso is restrictive in nature and covers only cases where the invoices have
been uploaded by the supplier in form GSTR-1 by the due date of filing GSTR-1
for March, 2019.

 

AMENDMENTS TO GSTR-1


Section 37(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 permits
rectification of any error or omission of the details furnished in GSTR-1. However,
such rectifications are not permitted after the date of furnishing the return
u/s 39 (GSTR-3, as per the High Court interpretation) for the month of
September or furnishing of the annual return, whichever is earlier.

 

Applying the above observations relating to
input tax credit, the date of furnishing the annual return would be the outer
date before which the amendments to GSTR-1 can be carried out. It may be noted
that unlike section 16(4) which uses the phrase ‘due date’ of return, section
37(3) uses the phrase ‘date’ of furnishing the return.

 

WHAT IS THE DUE DATE OF PAYMENT OF TAX?


Section 39(7) prescribes the due date for
payment of tax. The said due date of payment of tax is linked to the date of
filing the return (GSTR-3, as per the decision of the High Court). Due to the
introduction of an interim return in GSTR3B, a proviso was inserted in section
39(7) to provide as under:

 

Provided  that the Government may, on the
recommendations of the Council, notify certain classes of registered persons
who shall pay to the Government the tax due or part thereof as per the return
on or before the last date on which he is required to furnish such return,
subject to such conditions and safeguards as may be specified therein.

 

Apart from this, Rule 61(6) was inserted in
the CGST Rules, 2017 to provide as under:

 

Where a return in
form GSTR3B has been furnished, after the due date for furnishing of details in
form GSTR-2,

(a) Part  A of the return in form GSTR-3 shall be
electronically generated on the basis of information furnished through form
GSTR-1, form GSTR-2 and based on other liabilities of preceding tax periods and
Part B of the said return shall be electronically generated on the basis of the
return in form GSTR3B furnished in respect of the tax period;

(b) the registered
person shall modify Part B of the return in form GSTR-3 based on the
discrepancies, if any, between the return in form GSTR3B and the return in form
GSTR-3 and discharge his tax and other liabilities, if any;

(c) where the amount
of input tax credit in form GSTR-3 exceeds the amount of input tax credit in
terms of form GSTR3B, the additional amount shall be credited to the electronic
credit ledger of the registered person.

 

The above provisions have to be read along
with Notification 23/2017 prescribing return in form GSTR3B. Para 2 of the said
Notification lays down the condition requiring the discharge of the tax payable
under the Act. The phrase ‘tax payable under the Act’ is defined under clause
(ii) of the Explanation to mean the difference between the tax payable as
detailed in the return furnished in form GSTR3B and the amount of input tax
credit entitled to for the month.

 

Having reconciled to the position that GSTR3B
is an additional compliance return and not a substitute for GSTR-3, the
following propositions emerge:

(1) GSTR3B is an additional ad hoc
compliance requirement (akin to advance tax requirement under income tax);

(2) As and when the process of GSTR-2 and
GSTR-3 is operationalised, the difference between the tax payable as per GSTR3B
and GSTR-3 shall be payable under Rule 61(6)(b). There is no reference to any
interest payable on such difference and since the due date of the said payment
is not notified, it is not evident whether there is a delay in the said
payment;

(3) Similarly, Rule 61(6)(c) would also
permit the differential input tax credit to be credited to the electronic
credit ledger at that point of time.

 

THE WAY FORWARD


The Gujarat High Court decision clearly
demonstrates the perils of administering the law through notifications and
bringing about fundamental amendments to processes and compliances without
corresponding legislative amendments. It is important for the Government to
look at this decision as a wake-up call and review comprehensively all such
disconnects in law and practice and propose suitable amendments in the
legislative framework so that the law is aligned to the practices expected of
the taxpayers.

 

 

COMPOSITION SCHEME – A PUZZLE UNDER GST

INTRODUCTION

Indirect tax is generally perceived as a
transaction level tax, i.e., each transaction is taxed and assessed separately.
It is possible that a person may be liable to pay tax on certain transactions,
while other transactions may be exempted from tax or excluded from the levy
itself. Therefore, in order to ensure that the taxes are discharged properly,
the businessman needs to review each transaction and check for taxability
thereof. Once the taxability is looked into, the next step is reporting the
transaction, claiming input tax credits, making payment of taxes, etc.

 

The above process in the context of the Goods
and Services Tax (GST) has been perceived in the form of filing GSTR 1 (details
of outward supplies), GSTR 2 (details of inward supplies), GSTR 3 (monthly
return and payment of taxes) and GSTR3B (which was introduced as a stop-gap
measure in place of GSTR 2 and 3 but is a statement for claiming input tax
credit and making payment of taxes for a particular month).

 

Even without going into the specifics of the
above process, it is apparent that the same is rigorous and exhaustive in
nature and, most importantly, unyielding for a small businessman having small
value transactions in huge volume (typically the unorganised sector).

 

Considering the time and resources involved in
the above process, GST has been perceived as a hindrance to ease of doing
business because at times it is possible that the time spent on complying with
the law is more than the time spent on doing business itself, which would
perhaps render the entire activity redundant.

 

It is for this reason that like the VAT regime,
even the GST law provides an option to small taxpayers to opt for the
composition scheme and pay a lump sum tax on supplies made based on turnover
without claiming input tax credit and minimum compliances. In this article, we
shall discuss the salient features of the composition scheme and the various
amendments since the introduction of the law. Before proceeding further,
readers may note that the provisions relating to taxation under the composition
scheme have undergone multiple amendments and we have tried to cover the same
in this article.

 

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1.         The
levy of GST is u/s 9 of the CGST Act, 2017 which applies to all suppliers
making taxable supplies. However, an exception is carved out for specific cases
u/s 10 which provides that any registered person, whose aggregate turnover in
the preceding financial year did not exceed Rs. 50 lakhs (which can be
increased up to Rs. 1.50 crores vide notification) may, instead of paying tax
u/s 9, i.e., under the normal scheme, opt to pay tax at such rate as may be
prescribed.

 

2.         The
turnover limit for opting for composition scheme, as notified from time to
time, is tabulated below for reference:

 

Notification
No.

Turnover
limit for
non-specified states

Turnover
limit for specified states

08/2017
– CT dated 27.06.2017

Rs.
75 lakhs

Rs.
50 lakhs

46/2017
– CT dated 13.10.2017

Rs.
1 crore

Rs.
75 lakhs

14/2019
– CT dated 07.03.2019

Rs.
1.5 crores

Rs.
75 lakhs

 

 

However, if multiple registrations are obtained
for a single PAN, the option to pay tax u/s 10 will have to be exercised for
all such registrations. It cannot be exercised only for selective
registrations. Further, the following class of registered persons are not
eligible to opt for paying tax u/s 10:

 

(i) A registered person engaged in the supply of
services other than those referred to in entry 6(b) of Schedule II, i.e.,
supply by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever of
goods being food or any other article for human consumption;

(ii) The registered person should not be engaged
in making supply of goods which are not liable to tax under this Act;

(iii) The registered person should not be
engaged in making inter-state supply of goods or services;

(iv)       The
registered person should not be engaged in supplying goods through e-commerce
operators required to collect tax at source u/s 54;

(v)        The
registered person should not be a manufacturer of notified goods;

(vi)       The
registered person should not be a casual taxable person or a non-resident
taxable person (condition inserted by Finance Act, 2019).

 

From the above it is apparent that the
composition option was introduced only for a supplier of goods. However, this
resulted in specific difficulties where a supplier was pre-dominantly engaged
in supply of goods, but occasionally undertook supply of services as well. For
instance, a trader in goods received commission for a one-off transaction.
Under the above conditions, since this would result in the registered person being
engaged in supply of services, he would become ineligible to continue under the
composition scheme requiring him to withdraw and pay tax under the normal
scheme. To overcome such difficulties, a second proviso to section 10(1) was
inserted w.e.f. 1st February, 2019. The proviso provided that a
supplier of goods, opting for the composition scheme, may supply services
provided that the value of supply of service does not exceed 10% of turnover in
a state / UT in the preceding financial year, or Rs. 5 lakhs, whichever is
higher.

 

Further, vide Finance Act, 1994, the option to
pay tax under composition has been extended to suppliers of services vide
insertion of sub-section (2A). The said section provides an option to
suppliers, whose aggregate turnover was less than Rs. 50 lakhs in the preceding
financial year to pay tax under composition, provided they satisfy the
conditions prescribed therein. The conditions are similar to (b) to (f) as
stated above, with the only change being that the conditions apply for services
also.

 

The scope of ‘aggregate turnover’ referred to in
section 10 is to be derived from its definition u/s 2(6) which is defined to
mean aggregate value of all taxable supplies, exempt supplies, export of goods
or services or both, and inter-state supplies of a person having the same PAN
to be computed on an all-India basis, but excluding GST and cess. This resulted
in a lot of confusion because all small businesses which had opted for the
composition scheme would have interest income, which is treated as exempt
service under GST in view of entry 27 of notification 12/2017 – CT (rate) dated
28th June, 2017, resulting in apparent non-satisfaction of the
condition prescribed u/s 10. To resolve this conflict, CBIC clarified vide
Removal of Difficulty Order No. 01/2017 – CT dated 13th October,
2017 that while determining aggregate turnover, the value of supplies shall not
include exempt supply of services provided by way of extending deposits, loans
or advances insofar as the consideration is represented by way of interest /
discount. Further, the Finance Act, 2019 also amended section 10 by inserting
an Explanation to that effect.

 

The rates notified u/s 10 since the introduction
of GST are tabulated for reference:

 

Activity
of Supplier

Not.
8/2017 – CT dated 27.06.2017

Not.
1/2018 – CT dated 01.01.2018

Not.
3/2019 – CT dated 01.02.2019

In
the case of manufacturer

2%
of turnover in a state

1%
of turnover in a state

1%
of turnover in a state

In
the case of a supplier, making supply by way of or as part of any service or
in any other manner whatsoever of goods being food or any other article for
human consumption

5%
of turnover in a state

5%
of turnover in a state

5%
of turnover in a state

In
case of other suppliers

1%
of turnover in a state

1%
of turnover of taxable supplies of goods in a state

1%
of turnover of taxable supplies of goods and services in a state

 

It is not mandatory for a registered person
satisfying the above conditions to pay tax under composition. For this reason,
it has been provided that any person, including a registered person opting to
pay tax u/s 10, shall need to give intimation in the prescribed format
regarding the exercise of the said option. The same is tabulated as follows:

 

 

A person opting to pay tax under the composition scheme in form GST
CMP-01 shall also be required to declare the stock on the date of opting for
composition levy in form GST CMP-03, while a person opting to pay tax in form
GST CMP-02 shall make a declaration in form ITC-03 within 180 days from the
date on which such person commences to pay tax u/s 10.

 

The purpose behind GST CMP-03 as well as GST ITC-03 is to ensure that a
person opting to pay tax u/s 10 of this Act should not have claimed the benefit
of taxes paid on inputs / capital goods lying in stock on the date of opting
for the composition scheme, and for this reason such person is required under
the Act to pay back the benefit taken under the earlier regime / existing
regime either from the balance in the credit ledger or by making a deposit in
the cash ledger. It is also provided u/s 18 that the balance lying in the
credit ledger after making the above reversal shall lapse. Further, Rule 5 also
imposes additional conditions, namely:

 

(a) In case of registered person opting to pay tax u/r 10(3), the goods
held in stock on the appointed day should not have been purchased in the course
of inter-state trade or commerce / imported / received from branch outside the
state or from an agent / principal outside the state;

(b) The goods held in stock should not have been purchased from
unregistered persons, and if purchased from unregistered persons, the
applicable tax u/s 9(4) should have been paid;

(c) The person opting to pay tax u/s 10 shall have to comply with the
provisions of section 9(3) and 9(4), i.e., the provisions relating to payment
of tax under reverse charge shall continue to apply on them;

(d) He should not have been engaged in the manufacture of notified goods
during the preceding financial year;

(e) He shall mention the words ‘composition taxable person, not eligible
to collect tax on supplies’ at the top of the bill of supply issued by him;

(f) He shall mention the words ‘composition taxable person’ on every
notice / signboard displayed at a prominent place at his principal place of
business and every additional place or places of business.

 

Once the option to pay tax u/s 10 has been
exercised, the same shall remain valid as long as the registered person
satisfies all the conditions mentioned in section 10 and the corresponding
Rules. Similarly, once the option is exercised, the registered person shall
continue to pay the tax under this scheme and there shall be no need to file
fresh intimation every financial year.

The important conditions to be satisfied are
that a person opting to pay tax u/s 10 cannot collect tax from the customer and
cannot claim input tax credit, including credit of tax paid u/s 9(3) and 9(4),
i.e., RCM. Further, for all supplies made by a person paying tax u/s 10, a bill
of supply needs to be issued containing the particulars prescribed in Rule 49
of the CGST Rules, 2017.

 

However, once the registered person ceases to
satisfy the conditions prescribed in section 10, he shall start discharging tax
u/s 9 from the day he ceases to satisfy the condition and issues tax invoices
for all supplies made after that
day. In addition, he shall also give intimation in GST CMP-04 for withdrawal
from the scheme within seven days. A person paying tax u/s 10 also has an
option to voluntarily withdraw from the composition scheme even if all the
conditions continue to be satisfied by giving prior intimation in GST CMP-04.

 

Similarly, even the Proper Officer can deny the
option to pay tax u/s 10 if he has reasons to believe that the registered
person is not eligible to opt for the scheme. However, before denying the
benefit, a notice has to be issued in GST CMP-05 asking such taxable person to
show cause within 15 days as to why the option should not be denied. In such
cases, the registered person shall be required to reply in GST CMP-06, post
which the Proper Officer shall issue an order in GST CMP-07 within a period of
30 days of receipt of such reply, either accepting or denying the option to pay
tax u/s 10 from the date of option or from date of occurrence of event of
contravention, as the case may be.

 

Any person who opts out of the composition
scheme, either voluntarily or on account of order passed in GST CMP-07, shall
file a declaration in GST ITC-01 to claim the benefit of tax paid on inputs and
capital goods held on the date when such person switched out of the composition
scheme. However, credit of such inputs / capital goods shall not be eligible
after the expiry of one year from the date of issue of tax invoice relating to
such supply. Further, in case of credit in respect of capital goods, the same
shall be allowed after reducing the tax paid by 5% per quarter of a year or
part thereof from the date of invoice / such other documents on which the
capital goods were received by the taxable person. The declaration in GST
ITC-01 has to be filed within 30 days from the date of cessation of payment of
tax u/s 10.

 

COMPLIANCES

At the time of introduction of GST, a person
paying tax u/s 10 was required to file quarterly returns in GSTR 4 which
contained the details of inward and outward supplies received by such
composition dealers. However, w.e.f. 23rd April, 2019 a person
paying tax u/s 10 is required to file two returns:

(I)        Quarterly
statement in GST CMP-08 containing details of payment of self-assessment tax by
the 18th day of the month succeeding such quarter; and

(II)       Return
for financial year in GSTR-4 by the 30th day of April following the
end of such financial year.

 

A person paying tax u/s 10 has to compulsorily
discharge his tax by debiting balance from cash ledger only.

 

FAQs

Is a taxable person opting to pay tax u/s 10
required to discharge tax under any one of the three options or all the three
options can be opted for simultaneously?

There are different rates prescribed for payment
of tax by a person opting for composition on the basis of whether the supplier
is a manufacturer, or supplier of service covered under schedule II, entry
6(b), or any other supplier. The issue remains that there can be instances
where a supplier eligible and exercising the option to opt for composition is
getting covered under multiple rate entries. The question therefore arises
whether the person will have to opt for residuary entry or opt for specific
entry for each transaction.

 

One possible view is to say that GST, being a
transaction tax, each transaction needs to be analysed separately and tax has
to be paid depending on the nature of the transaction. Therefore, for a
supplier who is engaged in trading as well as manufacturing activity, for
supplies made as manufacturer he should pay tax at the rate prescribed for
manufacturer, and for other supplies (pure trading) he should pay tax under the
residuary entry.

 

Are there notified goods for which option to pay
tax u/s 10 is not available?

The option to pay tax u/s 10 is not applicable
for the  manufacturer of specified
products, such as ice-cream and other edible ice whether or not containing
cocoa falling under entry 2105 00 00, pan masala falling under entry
2106 90 20 and tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes falling under
chapter 24.

 

What will be the implications if a person,
though not eligible to pay tax u/s 10, does so?

There can be instances where a person not
eligible to opt for payment of tax u/s 10 opts to do so. For such cases it has
been provided that in case a person wrongly opts to pay tax u/s 10, the amount
of tax which would have been payable u/s 9 would be liable to be recovered from
such person notwithstanding the fact that the tax has already been paid u/s 10.
In addition, such person shall be also liable for penalty and the provisions of
sections 73 and
74 shall apply mutatis mutandis for determination of tax and penalty.

 

 

DUPLICATE PART OF C FORM, WHETHER VALID

Introduction


Under CST
Act, the vendor can sell the goods against C form to the buyer. The vendor is
depending upon buyer for getting the C form. As per Rules, there are three
identical parts in C form. The buyer retains counterpart with him. The two
parts marked as original and duplicate are given to vendor. The vendor is
required to produce the above two parts before his assessing authority for getting
the claim of sale against C form allowed.

 

India Agencies case


There the
controversy is about which part to be produced before the assessing authority.
The party, India Agencies, produced duplicate parts of C forms in its
assessment and they were disallowed on the ground that original parts are
required to be produced. The matter went to the Hon. Supreme Court which is
reported in case of India Agencies (139 STC 329)(SC). In this case,
Kerala (CST) Rules provided for production of original parts and on
non-production the claim was disallowed which was contested before the Hon.
Supreme Court. In above judgment the Hon. Supreme Court has rejected the claim
observing, amongst others, as under:- 

 

“25. The
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that there is no suggestion
anywhere that there is anything wrong with the genuineness of the transaction
or any doubts as to the possession by the purchasing dealer on a certificate
enabling the sellers to obtain the concessional rate of tax under section 8 of
the Act.

 

Under such
circumstances, the authorities should not have taken the strict view in
rejecting the claim of the concessional rate of tax. At first sight, the
argument of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be genuine and
acceptable but considering the mandatory nature of the provisions of the Act
and Rules, this Court is called upon to decide the questions involved in this
case. The provisions being mandatory they should have been complied with. The
appellant made no attempt to comply with rule 12(3) till after his claim was
rejected by the assessing authority. Having made no attempt to comply with the
mandatory provisions, he disentitled himself from getting the concessional
rate. Even otherwise, in our view, it is a pure question of law as to the
proper interpretation of the provisions of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax
Act and the provisions of rule 12 of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and
Turnover) Rules, 1957 and rule 6(b)(ii) of the Central Sales Tax (Karnataka) Rules,
1957. In view of the decision of this Court in the case of Kedarnath Jute
Manufacturing Co.* [1965] 3 SCR 626 and of the decision in Delhi Automobiles
(P) Ltd.† (1997) 10 SCC 486, it is clear that these provisions have to be
strictly construed and that unless there is strict compliance with the
provisions of the statute, the assessee was not entitled to the concessional
rate of tax.”

 

Based on
above judgment there are a number of Tribunal judgments in Maharashtra where
the claims are disallowed for non-production of original parts.

 

Recent judgment of the Hon. Madras High
Court in case The State of Tamil Nadu vs. TVL India Rosin Industries [Tax Case
(Revision) No.66 of 2017 dt.13.12.2017]

The Hon.
Madras High Court had an occasion to deal with similar issue. The facts in this
case are that the original parts were misplaced and in appeal, the claim was
allowed based on duplicate parts. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the first
appellate authority. Therefore, the State Government has filed revision before
the Hon. Madras High Court. Following questions were referred for the opinion
of the High Court.

 

“9. Being
aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal in S.T.A.No.86 of 2011, dated 25/10/2013,
on the file of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench),
Chennai, instant Tax Case Revision Petition is filed, on the following
substantial questions of law:-

 

1. Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in
law in holding that duplicate Form F is sufficient for availing concessional
rate of tax?

2. Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in
law in holding that though the decision reported in 83 STC 116 is related to C
Form, F Form also comes under CST Act?

3. Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in
not considering the Rule 10 (2) of the CST Rule which prescribed, under which
circumstances duplicate forms can be accepted?

4. Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in
not considering Rule 12 (2) and 12 (3) of the CST Rule which deals with the
procedure to be followed for obtaining duplicate forms in lieu of the original
declaration forms lost?

5. Whether
the Tribunal was right in ignoring the fact that the dealer while replying to
the pre-revision notice issued by the Assessing Officer, promised to file the
original form and requested extension of time for filing the same?” 

The Hon.
Madras High Court referred to the arguments of the State Government i.e.
revisionist and also referred to various provisions applicable on above subject
under CST Act and Local Act.

In
particular arguments on behalf of State Government are noted as under:-

“17.
Though Ms. Narmadha Sampath, learned Special Government Pleader contended that
one of the conditions required to be satisfied by the purchasing dealer is that
the Forms should have been lost and that the purchasing dealer, ought to have
submitted an indemnity bond, in Form G to the notified authority, from whom the
said Form was obtained, for such sum and only in the event of satisfying the
above said requirement, the Assessing Authority can decide, as to whether such
duplicate/certificate, can be accepted or not, and further submitted that in
the case on hand, when purchasing dealer had failed to discharge the statutory
obligation, refusal to accept the duplicate forms, cannot be said to be
erroneous, we are not inclined to accept the said contention, for the simple
reason that the Assistant Commissioner (CT) Harbour 2, Assessment Circle, has
not passed orders, with the above said reasons.”

 

The Hon.
Madras High Court further observed as under while rejecting the revision filed
by the State Government.

“20.
Having regard to the Forms (Original, duplicate or counter foil) and placing
reliance on the decision rendered in Manganese Ore (India) Ltd Vs. Commissioner
of Sales, Tax, Madhya Pradesh, reported in {1991 (83) STC 116}, the Appellate
Deputy Commissioner (CT)-I, has passed the orders, stating that, there is
nothing wrong in filing duplicate forms, for availing concessional rate. The
Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench), Chennai, has
referred to the Rules and accordingly, concurred with the views of the
appellate Authority.

21. Though
before the appellate Authority, contention has been made that submission of
original portion of Form, is mandatory for claiming concessional rate and that
there is every possibility of misuse of original Form, in some other
transaction, the said contention has been rejected. Form C (Rule 12 (1), is
issued by the State authority of the State. It also contains and name of the
person signing the declaration. Genuineness of the duplicate forms issued by
the authority of the other state to the purchaser-dealer is not disputed.
Revenue has not disputed that there was a inter-state sale and that a
certificate has been issued by the competent authority. Both the appellate
Deputy Commissioner (CT), Chennai, as well as the Tribunal had the opportunity
of perusing the duplicate forms. Assessee has relied on Manganese Ore Ltd’s
case and revenue has not placed any contra decision. On the facts and
circumstances of the instant case, the said judgment has persuasive value and
rightly applied.”

 

Thus, the
Hon. Madras High Court has taken a view, which will certainly give relief to
the litigants. It is nightmare to get the original of duplicate C forms from
the buyers. Under such circumstances, in genuine cases, the claim should remain
allowable against duplicate part of C form.

Although,
in this case the judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in case of India Agencies
is not referred. But still the above judgment of the Hon. Madras High Court
based on provisions of CST Act will be helpful to the litigants. 

 

Conclusion

The above judgment is really very useful and it is a judgment
contemplating good relief in case of loss of original parts of C forms. Since
it is judgment under CST Act, it should remain applicable in all States unless
there is contrary judgment of any jurisdictional High Court. It should also
remain applicable in Maharashtra. A line of clarification and confirmation
about acceptance of above judgment by the concerned authority of Maharashtra
State will be much useful to avoid unnecessary litigations.
 

 

INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS IN VAT/GST

This  article 
introduces case laws  on  VAT  /  GST developing  in various parts of the world.  After each decision,  the 
compiler  has given  in 
a  note  stating ‘Principles applicable to Indian  law’. 
This note draws attention  to  specific 
propositions  and  contextualises the decision in the Indian  scenario. It goes without saying that the
legal provisions in India and abroad may not be identical  and 
therefore the decisions should  be
read accordingly. These determinations intend 
to give a perspective on global 
developments, reading  them  in 
juxtaposition  with  the 
Indian  GST law would add value to
local reader.

 

I.
EU VAT/UK VAT

 

1   Nexus – Inputs and output
supply – Whether University carrying on ‘economic activity’?

 

Revenue and
Customs Commissioners vs. The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the
University of Cambridge [Judgement dated 3rd July, 2019 in case
C-316/18]

 

EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE

The University of
Cambridge is a not-for-profit educational institution which provides
principally education (not taxable) as also taxable supplies like commercial
research, sale of publications, consultancy services, catering, accommodation
and the hiring of facilities and equipment. The activities are financed in part
through donations and endowments, which are placed into an investment fund for
producing income for the University. That fund is managed by a third party to
whom certain management fees are paid. The question is whether the tax charged
on management fees can be taken as input tax credit against the taxable
supplies.

 

HELD

The Court has held
that the activity of collecting donations and endowments is not ‘for
consideration’ and is in the nature of charitable activities and not an
‘economic activity’ as is required under EU VAT law. Furthermore, the act of
investing these donations and endowments is a mere extension of the activity of
collecting and the University acts much like a private individual who invests
his surplus wealth. All these activities are not taxable. The management fee is
incurred in relation to this investment and generation of income by the
University, and hence cannot be taken as input tax credit. Even the cost of the
management of fund is not really included in the price of the output supplies.
There is no direct and immediate link in the present case either between the
management fee and a particular output transaction or between the management
fee and the activities of the University of Cambridge as a whole. No input tax
credit is therefore available.

 

Principles applicable to Indian law:

The European
concept of ‘economic activity’ is similar to, though not identical to, our
concept of ‘business’ in section 7 of the Indian GST Act. This judgement turns
partly on the University being a charitable institution and thus not carrying
on ‘business’. In our law, an activity is considered a business even without
‘profit motive’. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained in CST
vs. Sai Publication Fund (2002) 126 STC 288 (SC)
that even if profit
motive is irrelevant under the statute, the activity must still have an
underlying commercial nature. The Supreme Court has explained that even after
the ouster of the profit motive by statute, universities and educational
institutions continue to be outside the ‘business’ definition and has held that
the judgements of University of Delhi vs. Ram Nath AIR 1963 SC 1873 and
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur vs. State of UP (1976) 38 STC 428 (All)

continue to be good law despite amendment in the definition of ‘business’ in
sales tax law making the profit motive irrelevant.

 

The European judgement also says that collecting donations and
endowments is not an ‘economic activity’ since it is not ‘for consideration’.
The better analysis, suited for our GST law (which would not lead to a change
in the ultimate conclusion) would be that the collections of donations and
endowments are gifts of money and charity and not ‘consideration’ for any
supply made by the University. As such, that activity falls outside the remit
of our GST law.

 

The second prong of
the judgement, that of investment of fund created by the University being
comparable to investment activity of private individuals, is again an activity
which would otherwise fall outside the definition of ‘business’ under the
Indian law [Bengal and Assam Investors Ltd. vs. CIT (1966) 59 ITR 547
(SC)].

 

2   Whether a Diary is a ‘Book’?

 

Gardasson (t/a
Action Day aIslandi) vs. RCC [2019] UKFTT 0441

 

UK FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL

A diary which was
styled in such a manner as to teach time management to its buyers is a ‘book’
within the zero-rating provisions of the UK VAT Act. The fact that there is a
writing space and that the main function of a diary is not reading, does not
affect the conclusion, since writing spaces are provided even in students’
working books.

 

Principles applicable to Indian law:

This decision is
instructive about the rules of classification followed by other countries.

 

3   Whether a default on a loan changes the
character of the original supply? Whether litigation fees paid in connection
with such default can be claimed as input tax credit?

 

Newmafruit Farms Ltd. vs. RCC [2019] UKFTT 0440 (TC)

 

UK FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL

A loan of money
remains a loan even if there is a subsequent default in repayment. As such, the
exempt character of the original loan under the UK VAT Act does not change
merely because there is no repayment.

 

A loan of money being
exempt from UK VAT, any litigation fees paid in connection with the default of
such a loan is directly and immediately linked to the exempt supply of loan and
not eligible for input tax credit. Simply because the business of the appellant
is to give such loans does not mean that the input tax credit must be given in
respect of such transactions. Furthermore, even though there is a substantial
time gap between the making of the loan and the litigation fee, the direct and
immediate link is not affected by such passage of time. Such fees are also
indirectly factored into the cost of making the loan and thus the direct and
immediate link exists.

 

Principles applicable to Indian law:

Direct and
immediate link is a test evolved by European Courts to determine whether an
input supply has sufficient nexus with output supply. It is useful in the
Indian context where, though nexus is generally not required, it is still
needed where an output supply is ineligible for credit u/s 17 of the CGST Act.

 

4   Overpaid parking fees – Whether consideration
for ‘supply’?

 

National Car
Parks vs. HMRC [2019] EWCA Civ 854

 

UK COURT OF APPEAL

The appellant
operates, among others, ‘pay and display’ car parks in which there are ticket
machines which take cash. A board or boards will specify the amounts that must
be paid to park for different lengths of time. Someone wishing to leave his car
for a particular period has to insert coins to the value of at least the figure
given for that period in order to obtain a ticket which must be placed in his
vehicle’s windscreen. Once the requisite coins have been accepted by the
machine, the customer will be able to obtain his ticket by pressing a button.
Each machine indicates that no change is given and that ‘overpayments’ are
accepted.

 

The issue involved
in this appeal is whether such overpayments are subject to taxation under the
UK VAT Act.

 

HELD

Article 73 of
Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value-added tax (‘the
Principal VAT Directive’) reads as follows: ‘The taxable amount shall include
everything which constitutes consideration obtained or to be obtained by the
supplier, in return for the supply, from the customer or a third party…’

 

In the present
case, a contract between the appellant and the customer will have been
concluded no later than the point at which the customer chose to press the
green button to receive her ticket. The customer could have paid the exact
price, but chose to pay more. There was an explicit warning that no change
would be given and the tariff board indicated that ‘overpayments’ were
accepted.

 

Taken together, the
tariff board and the statement that overpayments were accepted and no change
given, indicated, looking at matters objectively, that the appellant could be
said to have set a minimum price for which the parking would be provided;
however, more was always welcome if the customer chose not to pay the exact
minimum price. The contract price in such case will always include the
overpayment.

 

Principles applicable to Indian law:

Under the Indian
GST law, every ‘supply’ must be made for a ‘consideration’. The definition of
‘consideration’ in section 2(31)(a) covers ‘any payment made… in respect of, in
response to, or for the inducement of’ a supply. This decision shows how an
overpayment which is made by the recipient despite due notice that it will be
appropriated by the supplier towards the contract, can be treated as
consideration under the UK VAT law. The same principle will apply in India.

 

5   Deceiving or cheating a person is not a supply
of ‘service’

 

Owen Francis
Saunders vs. HMRC [2019] TC 9922

 

UK FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL
(TAX)

The Appellant had
recovered excess consideration from his customers by way of deceit / fraud.
This excess consideration was confiscated by the Crown Court in the UK under
the Trading Standards law.

 

The appellant was
assessed to tax taking all the payments received from his customers into
account for calculating registration threshold, including the excess
consideration which was received by way of fraud and deception and which was
subsequently confiscated by the Court.

 

HELD

There was no
underlying ‘supply’ against which the excess consideration could be said to be
‘consideration’ under the Act. To deceive or to cheat is not a ‘service’ and
any amount received by deception or cheating cannot therefore be consideration
for any ‘supply’. The Tribunal considered that otherwise every fraudster and
scamster would become liable for UK VAT.        

 

Principles applicable to Indian law:

Section 7 of the
CGST Act taxes not only a completed supply, but also a ‘supply… agreed to be
made’. Similarly, the definition of ‘consideration’ in section 2(31) does not
only take the consideration actually paid or given, but also a ‘payment… to be
made’. Even otherwise, the term ‘consideration’ in the Indian contract law is
understood as including not just a payment actually made, but also a promise to
pay in future.

Under the contract
law, consideration procured by fraud is void. Though the GST law does not
include all the legal principles relating to a contract, this UK judgement
throws light on how the general principles of contract can sometimes aid
in understanding the concept of ‘consideration’ in the GST / VAT law, for just
like the Indian definition, the UK definition does not expressly exclude
payments made under deception and it is only on general contract principles
that the UK Court has arrived at this view. Though this judgement takes a
reasonable view, readers must not derive a general principle that the entire
body of contract law principles applies to the GST concept of ‘supply for
consideration’.

 

6   Whether construction of one building and
furbishing of another in the same project amounts to a single supply?

 

Glasgow School
of Art vs. HMRC [2019] UKUT 0173

 

UK UPPER TRIBUNAL

The appellant is a
Higher Education Institution Art School. It carried out a redevelopment project
which consisted of the demolition of two buildings, the partial demolition,
reconstruction and refurbishment of a building known as the assembly building
and the construction of a new building called the Reid Building. The assembly
building was then let out to the student union for low rent.

 

Due to ITC
attribution rules between taxable and exempted supplies, the question which
arose was whether the construction works, etc. relating to the assembly
building can be treated as a separate supply from the other work and whether
the assembly building was used for taxable supply to the student union?

 

HELD

There was a single
supply in this case. The economic and commercial reality of the construction
contract was a single development of the site as a whole. There was a single
delivery strategy. Funding was required and obtained for the project as a
whole. The decision not to demolish the assembly building altogether, but rather
to retain its facades and roof, was taken for reasons of value for money.
Partial demolition and refurbishment of the building on its own was never
contemplated. Additional features supporting the single supply characterisation
are the fact that there was a single contract with payment being made during
the construction phase in accordance with invoices issued for the whole
project. While no particular weight can be attached to the existence per se
of a connecting doorway, the reason for its existence, i.e., that it was
considered necessary in order to meet the environmental assessment requirement
for external funding, reinforces the view that the project should be regarded
as a single supply from an economic point of view and that a split between the
two buildings would
be artificial.

 

Although the
appellant wanted and obtained two separate premises with different functions,
that cannot lead to an inference that there were two separate supplies. It was
always the appellant’s intention that the project should consist of both.

 

Principles applicable to Indian law:

The Indian law on
composite supplies is contained in section 2(30) of the CGST Act. This decision
is instructive of the principles which can be followed in India while
determining whether a supply is composite or not.

 

7 ‘Direct and
immediate link’ – Nexus between input / input services and output supplies for
purposes of ITC attribution

 

Royal Opera
House vs. HMRC [2019] TC 7157

 

UK FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL

The appellant is an
internationally-renowned producer of operas. Under the UK VAT law, admission to
opera or ballet is an exempt supply. However, the appellant also makes certain
supplies which are taxable and the question involved in this appeal was whether
there was a sufficient nexus, formulated as a ‘direct and immediate link’ test
by EU and UK Courts, between the production costs and these supplies for ITC
attribution mechanism under that law. These taxable supplies are:

 

(1) Catering income
(bars and restaurants);

(2) Shop income;

(3) Commercial
venue hire;

(4) Production work
for other companies; and

(5) Ice cream
sales.

 

HELD

Catering income
(bars and restaurants)

It is the opera or
ballet that is central to everything that the Opera House (the appellant) does.
It is these performances that bring the restaurants and bars of the Opera House
their clientele. Taking an economically realistic view, the performances at the
Opera House, and therefore the production costs, are essential for the
appellant to make its catering supplies. It therefore follows that the purpose
of the production costs, objectively ascertained, is not solely for the
productions of opera and ballet at the Opera House but also to enable the Opera
House to attract clientele to the restaurants and bars and to maintain its catering
income. Therefore, the production costs do have a direct and immediate link
with the catering supplies in the bars and restaurants of the Opera House.

 

Shop income

The shop in the
Opera House, at its premises and online, and the sale of tickets for performances
at the Opera House are ‘separate and “freestanding” supplies.’ It was not
disputed that the production costs do have a direct and immediate link to the
sale of recordings, both audio and visual, of the Opera House productions.

 

However, with respect
to the remaining supplies that the shop makes, which although there is a
connection to the repertoire of the Opera House and therefore the production
costs, there is no direct and immediate link.

 

Commercial venue
hire

There is a direct
and immediate link between the production costs and production-specific events,
such as a gala dinner in support of a production by a sponsor. However, that
cannot be the case for other commercial events which are unconnected with the
productions themselves.

 

Production work
for other companies

The reputation of
the Opera House and its productions play a significant part in it receiving
orders from other opera and ballet companies to construct scenery and make
costumes. However, this is not sufficient to enable a finding that a direct and
immediate link with the production costs exists. This is because this work is
undertaken by the Opera House at a fixed price, which includes material and
labour, and as such the production costs cannot be a cost component of these
supplies.

 

Ice cream sales

As with catering,
the Opera House productions, with their associated costs, are essential for the
sale of ice creams. Accordingly, the production costs do have a direct and
immediate link to the sale of ice creams.

 

Principles applicable to Indian law:

Direct and immediate link is a test evolved by European Courts to
determine whether an input supply has sufficient nexus with output supply. It
is useful in the Indian context where, though nexus is not required generally,
it is still required where an output supply is ineligible for credit u/s 17.

II. NEW ZEALAND GST

8 Provident
Insurance Corporation Ltd. vs. CIR [2019] NZHC 995

 

NEW ZEALAND HIGH
COURT

The overarching
purpose of GST is to tax consumption expenditure and to tax the widest range of
goods and services with as few exceptions as possible. An exemption in GST law
must therefore be strictly construed.

 

Principles applicable to Indian law:

This dicta appears in a case relating to interpretation of exemptions,
the factual details of which are not necessary for the present purposes.

 

The normal rule of taxation is that exemptions should be strictly
construed against the taxpayer on the basis of the theory that the charging
provisions in taxing laws should be strictly construed, and therefore any
exemption from the taxing law should also be strictly construed.

 

The New Zealand
High Court has, in this case, given an additional and novel justification for
strict interpretation of exemptions in GST law.
 

 

INTRA-COMPANY TRANSACTIONS UNDER GST

INTRODUCTION

The charging
section for the levy of GST is under section 9 of the CGST Act, 2017 and the
taxable event, which triggers the levy, is supply, the scope of which is
defined u/s. 7. Section 7(1)(a) thereof defines the normal scope of supply to
include transactions which are generally carried out in the normal course of
business. Section 7(1)(b) includes import of services for a consideration
within the scope. Section 7(1)(c) then refers to schedule I of the Act, wherein
the activities listed are deemed to be included in the scope of supply, even if
made or agreed to be made without a consideration.

 

Schedule I lists
four specific activities which shall be treated as supply even if made without
a consideration. In this article, we shall discuss entry 2, which reads as
under:

 

“2. Supply of goods or services or both between
related persons or between distinct persons as specified in section 25, when
made in the course or furtherance of business”.

 

The scope of the
above deeming fiction is, inter alia, to treat transactions between related
persons or distinct persons as supply, making it liable to tax in the state
from where the supply originates with a corresponding credit, subject to
provisions of section 17 in the state where the supply culminates.

 

Therefore, what
needs to be analysed to interpret the scope of the above entry is:

  •     What is meant by related person?
  •     What is meant by distinct person, as
    specified in section 25?
  •     When can it be said that a supply of goods
    or services has taken place between distinct persons?

 

RELATED PERSON – SCOPE

Vide explanation to
section 15 of the CGST Act, it has been provided that persons shall be deemed
to be related persons, if:

(i)  such persons
are officers or directors of one another’s businesses;

(ii) such persons
are legally recognised partners in business;

(iii) such
persons are employer and employee;

(iv) any person
directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds 25% or more of the outstanding
voting stock or shares of both of them;

(v)        one of
them directly or indirectly controls the other;

(vi) both of them
are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person;

(vii)       together, they directly
or indirectly control a third person; or;

(viii) they are members of the same family.

 

DISTINCT PERSON – SCOPE

Section 22(1) read
with section 25(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 provides that every supplier is
required to obtain registration in every such state from where he makes a
taxable supply of goods or services or both. Therefore, every taxable person
supplying goods or services or both from multiple states shall be required to
obtain registration in all such states.

 

Sections 25(4) and
25(5) of the CGST Act deems such separate places from where supplies are made,
whether registration has been obtained or not, to be distinct persons for the
purposes of the Act. In other words, all the locations of a taxable person,
within India but in different states, are treated as distinct persons for the
purpose of GST law.

 

IDENTIFYING SUPPLIES BETWEEN DISTINCT PERSONS

The important
question that needs consideration while analysing whether entry 2 is triggered
or not, is determining when a supply of goods or services has taken place
between distinct persons. While determining the same in the context of goods
may not be a challenge, owing to the tangibility factor, there will be a
challenge from the perspective of identifying the existence of a service. This
is because when it comes to services, there appears to be confusion on the
scope of the above deeming fiction. Let us try to understand the same with the
help of the following examples of various activities which take place within a
legal entity:

 

a.  A multi-locational entity having a centralised
accounting department for all India operations, which includes a centralised
tax compliance department, too;

b.  The head office of a multi-locational entity
receiving auditing services for multiple locations across the country,
including the foreign branches;

c.  The senior management, responsible for the
overall operations of the legal entity, operating from the head office which
results in various supplies being made by the multiple locations;

d.  An employee from one branch is asked to
support the other branch for a particular project;

e.  Multiple branches work on a project, for which
the front-ending to the client is done by a particular branch / head office.

 

In the above, it is also important to note that at times, the companies
might be accounting the costs / revenue identifying the location to which it
pertains, in which case there will be always a revenue mismatch as costs will
be accumulated in one location while revenue will be lying in another location,
resulting in revenue-cost mismatch and credit accumulation in cost-incurring
locations and liability payout in cash in revenue-generating locations.

 

A view is therefore
being proposed that in cases where the costs and the corresponding revenues are
booked in distinct jurisdictions, there should be a cross charge of the costs
from the expense-incurring jurisdiction to the income-bearing jurisdiction. Such
cross charge would constitute a consideration for the rendition of ‘service’ by
the expense-incurring jurisdiction to the income-earning jurisdiction and such
deemed / inferred service would be liable for payment of GST due to the
provisions of schedule I entry 2 referred to above. In case the costs are
common costs incurred for multiple revenue-earning jurisdictions, there should
be some reasonable basis of apportionment of costs with similar consequences as
stated above. This view is further corroborated by the ruling of the Authority
for Advance Ruling in the case of Columbia Asia Hospitals Private Limited
[2018 (15) GSTL 722 (AAR – GST)]
which was confirmed by the Appellate
Authority as well. The matter is currently pending before the Karnataka High Court.

Though the
objective of schedule I entry 2 and the view expressed above may be to ensure a
smooth flow of credits across multiple jurisdictions, the essential legal
position is that the entry deems certain activities / supplies to be taxable
and therefore imposes a tax in one of the jurisdictions. Therefore, the
question that needs consideration is to what extent can the deeming fiction be
extended to deem an activity carried out by a taxable person as supply of
service?

 

It is now a settled
proposition of law that a provision imposing a tax has to be strictly
interpreted and cannot be inferred. In fact, the Supreme Court has time and
again held that before a tax can be imposed, the levy has to be certain. To
define this certainty of levy, it is understood that the following constitute
the key corner-stones of the levy:

 

  •  Certainty of the taxable
    event;
  •  Certainty of the person on
    whom the levy is cast;
  •  Certainty about the
    recipient of service;
  •  Certainty in the rate of
    tax;
  •  Certainty in the value on
    which the tax has to be charged; and
  •  Certainty as regards the
    time at which the tax has to be discharged.

 

The proposition of
requirement of cross charge canvassed above may not be a correct legal
proposition since there is technically no service rendered by the head office
to the branches and therefore, the deeming fiction needs to be restricted to
the fiction created by the said provision and there are significant
uncertainties in the implementation of the cross charge proposition, resulting
in the probability of the alleged levy itself getting struck down. In
subsequent paragraphs, an attempt is made to understand the answers to the
above issues.

 

Whether there is certainty of the taxable
event?

The taxable event
under GST is the supply of goods or services or both. It may be important to
note the legislative background of GST. While a plethora of indirect tax
legislations pertaining to various goods and services have been subsumed under
the GST legislation, it is evident that the fundamental distinction between
goods and services is still relevant. It is still not a very comprehensive tax
on all supplies but rather a tax on goods or services or both. This is the
reason why both these terms are defined separately and there are provisions to
determine the nature of supply as either being that of goods or services, or
neither. Further, many provisions like time of supply, rate of tax and place of
supply are distinct for goods and for services.

 

The term service is
defined u/s. 2(102) as anything other than goods, money and securities.
However, this definition appears to be sketchy and does not in any way define
the essence of what constitutes service and what does not. It is, therefore,
felt necessary that before one embarks to understand the scope of the deeming
fiction referred to above, it may be important to determine the essence of what
constitutes goods and what constitutes services and the essential differences
between the two.

 

Prior to the
introduction of GST, it was always felt that the fundamental attributes of
goods would be utility, possession, transferability and storage value.
Similarly, the fundamental attributes of service were understood to be an
activity carried out by a person for another for a consideration under an
enforceable contract. It is evident that the concept of ‘goods’ is distinct
from the concept of transaction in ‘goods’ like sale of goods. For example, a
person may possess ‘goods’ and such goods will have utility and value (some
inherent value) and such possession may have no linkage with consideration or
any contract or another person. In distinction to goods, by their very nature
services cannot be viewed in isolation of their rendition or provision. It is
felt that this very essence of goods or services does not change due to the
introduction of GST. The definitions have to be read in this context.

 

On a co-joint
reading of the definitions under various legislations and the judicial
interpretation, it can be argued that an enforceable contract between two
parties and consideration are essential elements for something to be defined as
a service in general. For example, a musician singing on the road cannot be
treated as providing services to passersby since there is no enforceable
contract between the two. Similarly, acquiring knowledge by reading books
cannot be considered as a service even if the said knowledge is for furtherance
of the business in the future. Most businesses receive free advice from
consultants – all and sundry. The businesses may not even perceive a value in
such advises.

 

One would generally
consider that an actor provides a service to a film producer. This is because
generally, the producer approaches the actor and pays him a fee for acting in
the movie. However, if a struggling newcomer approaches a producer and offers
to pay him a fee and also act in the movie, one would say that the producer has
provided a service to the actor since the flow of consideration is from the
actor to the producer. Further, it would not be correct to even say that the
actor provided a free service in this case since neither the producer nor the
trade nor the actor himself perceives a value for the ‘acting’ carried out by
him. In that sense, the acting is carried by the actor for himself and not for
the producer.

 

It is, therefore,
felt that despite a wide residuary definition of service, the essential
attributes of service would be:

 

  •  An enforceable contract between
    two persons;
  •  A consideration flowing from
    one person to another;
  •  A defined activity set carried
    out by one person for another under specific instructions of another
    person.

 

The issue to be
examined here is whether and to what extent do the above essential elements of
service get diluted due to the deeming fiction prescribed under schedule I
entry 2.

 

Clearly, the cost
and revenue mismatches across jurisdictions are on account of imbalances in the
underlying activities carried out at the different jurisdictions. For example,
a litigation pertaining to Chennai may land up in Delhi in the Supreme Court
and may be supported by the in-house legal counsel from Mumbai. Would these
activities fall within the mischief of the above deeming fiction?

 

Admittedly, the
various locations where a taxable person may be registered are deemed to be
distinct persons for the purposes of the GST law since they bear separate GST
registrations. However, does the deeming fiction restrict itself merely to the
distinctness of a person (i.e., entity) or does it create a distinctness
amongst all its relationships with business, employees, clients, assets,
suppliers, government authorities, judiciary, etc.? In order to fit within the
deeming fiction entry mentioned earlier, a series of deeming fictions will have
to be created. This will have its own set of challenges. For example,

 

  •  The different locations for
    which registration would have been obtained would be treated as distinct
    persons. This has been provided in section 25. However, nowhere is it stated
    that due to such distinctness of establishments, the legal existence of the
    taxable person is to be totally ignored;
  •  In the above example, the
    in-house counsel will have to be treated as an employee of the legal entity.
    This is a deeming fiction, but this is nowhere provided under the law. Further,
    the reason for treating him as an employee of Maharashtra registration is
    merely because he generally sits in the Maharashtra office. This is again a
    deeming fiction since the person who is the employer cannot be determined by
    the location where the employee usually sits. Similarly, the payment of the
    salary to the in-house counsel may be accounted in the books in Maharashtra. In
    most of the cases, the entity maintains common books of accounts. Further,
    accounting principles cannot determine the tax implications;
  •     Most
    of the other regulations, employment contract, the expectations of the
    stakeholders and the conduct of the employee, would not in any way suggest that
    the counsel is an employee of a particular registration. Even the GST law may
    not restrict the interpretation of the person being an employee of a particular
    registration and not the legal entity as a whole. If such an interpretation is
    taken by the GST authorities, under which authority could such in-house counsel
    located in Mumbai be summoned? Similarly, section 137 of the GST law provides
    for liability of officers responsible for the conduct of the business as being
    guilty of the offence.

 

Similarly, can one
really say that the litigation is that of legal entity or will it be said to be
that of registration (and what would be the principles which will determine
this aspect)? Will the artificial distinctness then imply that one office
(registered) has rendered a service to another office (whether or not
registered) by providing the in-house legal counsel requiring a value to be
assigned to such alleged service with a corresponding tax liability in Mumbai
and credit in Chennai? What would be the scenario of hotel booking carried out
by the Delhi office for the in-house counsel? Will the concept of business also
be considered distinctly and, therefore, can it be argued by the Delhi officer
that the stay in the hotel is not for the furtherance of business of the Delhi
branch and therefore input tax credit should not be allowed?

 

Therefore, the
deeming fiction provided under schedule I entry 2 has to be restricted to the
fiction that it creates. In the absence of a clear intention to extend the
deeming fiction not only to the distinctness of the person but also to all
consequential relationships, it would not be correct to create layers of such
deeming fiction and thereby infer the existence of a service which does not
exist at all and then operationalise the deeming fiction.

 

Another way to deal
with the cost-revenue mismatch is to suggest that there can be a difference
between a receipt of a supply and the receipt of the benefit of the supply. The
distinction between a recipient of a supply and the beneficiary of the supply
is very well understood in the judicial context. Just because the benefit of a
supply is derived by an artificially dissected distinct person, can it be said
that the original recipient of the supply is a further supplier of service?

 

The GST law itself
considers the possibility of the recipient of service being distinct from the
beneficiary of service. In this context, the definition of recipient of service
provided under section 2(93) clearly demonstrates that the person liable to pay
the consideration is the recipient of the supply. Further, the definition of
location of recipient of service u/s. 2(70) envisages a joint receipt of
service by more than one establishment and suggests a tie-breaker test to
determine the establishment most directly connected with the supply. The
provision stops at that and does not further provide a deeming fiction to
further suggest that there is a secondary supply by the most directly connected
establishment to the less directly connected establishment.

 

If the above
proposition is taken as a legal requirement, one may even find the provisions
of input service distributor totally redundant.

 

In view of the
above discussions, it is felt that there is no element of service rendered by
the corporate office to the branches when there is a cost-revenue mismatch and
certain support functions are performed by the corporate office which may be
intended for the benefit of the branches.

 

Whether there is certainty about the
person who is liable to discharge the tax liability?

Another important
aspect is the determination of the person who is the service provider and
therefore liable to discharge the GST liability on the so-inferred deemed
supply. It is felt that this aspect itself can be a subject matter of severe
uncertainty.

 

Let us take an
example of two branches of a taxable person, say Maharashtra and Gujarat
jointly rendering a service to a client. Section 2(15) of the IGST Act will
define either one of the two branches as the establishment most directly
connected with the supply. The issue to be examined is whether there is any
service provided between the two branches? If yes, who renders service to whom?
This question cannot be answered in isolation at all. If at all a conservative
view has to be taken, an additional piece of information will be required as to
which of the two establishments is the establishment most directly concerned
with the supply and then only one can perhaps argue that the less directly
connected establishment is providing service to the most directly connected
establishment. It may be noted that there is no specific deeming fiction to
this effect.

 

Let us extend the
above example slightly and say that the two branches are jointly rendering free
service to the client. How would one now conservatively operationalise the
deeming fiction?

 

Therefore, it is
evident that it is difficult to examine who is the service provider with
certainty.

 

Whether there is certainty about the
person who is the service recipient?

Let us extend the
example provided above to the case of a disaster recovery centre which is
located in Andhra Pradesh. If due to cost-revenue mismatch it is inferred that
there is a requirement to deem a service flow, the question which arises is
whether the Andhra Pradesh unit is rendering services to the corporate office
in Maharashtra or to all the units located across the country? Who is the
recipient of the deemed service alleged to have been provided by the Andhra
Pradesh unit?

 

Even if a
proportionate cost allocation is carried out across the country, the same may
not be really representative of the receipt of service by the constituent units.
This is because in many cases there may not be a clear period-specific matching
of costs and revenues. To continue the example of VAT litigation, it may be
possible that when the litigation comes up before the Supreme Court, the unit
in Tamil Nadu may have already shut down and therefore there may not be any
distinct person in Tamil Nadu. In such a case, how would one define the
activity to be that of a rendition of service to Tamil Nadu when there is no
such unit? If the cost is cross-charged on proportionate basis to all other
states, the same may be incorrect since they have not received any service at
all.

 

Whether there is certainty on the nature
of supply and the rate of tax?

The next issue
which arises is the identification of the exact nature of the service rendered.
Each scenario may be different. In the above example, is it the case of legal
services rendered by the Maharashtra office to the Chennai office or is it a
sort of residuary service? The service cannot be described as a legal service
due to various reasons including the regulatory framework in the country. Even
if it is to be treated as a residuary service, the same should be capable of
some description. What is that description? A very common-place answer is that
the same constitutes business support services. This again appears to be a very
circuitous answer because in the normal course the in-house legal counsel would
be expected as a part of his employment contract to perform the said activity.
Notionally attributing a totally different name to the said activity may be
inappropriate.

 

Similarly, when the
logistics team of the company arranges for the transportation of the products
of the company, does it provide a ‘goods transport agency service’ and
therefore be liable for tax @ 5% or does it provide a business support service?
Does the F&B team provide ‘restaurant services’ or does it provide business
support services? There can be many more examples.

 

The answers are
obvious. There is really a significant uncertainty in defining the nature of
the supply and the consequent tax rate on such presumed supply.

 

Whether there is certainty in the value on
which the tax has to be charged?

It is also felt
that if a view is taken that there is a supply between distinct persons under
the above case, the provisions of the law have to provide with certainty the
value of the said supply on which the tax has to be discharged.

 

Section 15(1) of
the CGST Act, 2017 which deals with the provisions relating to value of taxable
supply, provides as under:

 

(1) The value of
a supply of goods or services or both shall be the transaction value, which is
the price actually paid or payable for the said supply of goods or services or
both where the supplier and the recipient of the supply are not related and the
price is the sole consideration for the supply.

 

In the instant
case, there is no transaction value, or the price actually paid by the branches
to the head office. Since there would be one single legal entity, there is no
occasion to maintain state-specific bank accounts and periodic settlements
through receipts or payments from such bank accounts. In some cases, there may
be an internal accounting entry to define location-specific profitability for
MIS purposes. However, this concept of accounting entry is notional and it
deals with location-specific entries and not ‘distinct person’ specific
entries. Further, in many cases there may not be an internal accounting entry
since there may not be any legal requirement to provide for the same.

 

In the absence of
the transaction value or price, one can say that the value of taxable supply is
NIL with a consequent NIL liability. However, a counter argument could be that
the transaction value is acceptable only if the supplier and the recipient are
not related persons.

 

The scope of
related persons has already been dealt with in the earlier paragraph. Further,
section 15(4), which is applicable in cases where valuation as per sub-section
(1) is not possible, provides as under:

 

(4) Where the
value of the supply of goods or services or both cannot be determined under
sub-section (1), the same shall be determined in such manner as may be
prescribed.

 

From the above, it
appears that reference to section 15(4) is required only when the provisions of
section 15(1) are not applicable, i.e., price is not the sole consideration and
parties are not related. Therefore, the issue is whether the supply made by the
head office to its distinct persons will be classifiable for valuation u/s.
15(1) of the CGST Act or not? This query arises because distinct persons are
not treated as related persons for the purpose of GST, as is evident from the
definition referred earlier.

 

It can be argued
that the definition of related person deals with legally distinct entities and
not with distinct persons as defined under the GST law. Therefore, the
transaction value of NIL u/s. 15(1) should not be disturbed.

 

Even if a view is taken
that the distinct persons as defined u/s. 25 fall within the definition of
related persons under explanation to section 15, the question which arises is
how the same will be valued keeping in view the provisions of valuation
prescribed under the CGST Rules. Chapter V of the CGST Rules contain the rules
for determination of value of supply in following specific cases:

 

  • Rule 27 – Value of supply of
    goods or services where the consideration is not wholly in money;
  • Rule 28 – Value of supply of
    goods or services or both between distinct or related persons, other than
    through an agent;
  • Rule 29 – Value of supply of
    goods made or received through an agent;
  • Rule 30 – Value of supply of
    goods or services or both based on cost;
  • Rule 31 – Residual method for
    determination of value of supply of goods or services or both.

 

Rule 28 of the CGST
Rules, 2017 prescribes for situations of defining a value of supply of services
between distinct persons. Rule 28(a) provides that the open market value of the
supply will be considered for the purposes of valuation. This provision itself
implies marketability of the support functions provided by the corporate
office. Most of the activities carried out by the employees at the corporate
office may be such that they may not be amenable to outsourcing or any element
of marketability. For example, it would not be correct to define the activities
carried out by a director for the company as services which are freely
marketable. Such activities are carried out only due to the specific
relationship as a director of the company. The activity and the relationship is
so closely knit with each other that the activity cannot be looked upon de
hors
the relationship. In such cases, it may be incorrect to attribute
marketability and consequently open market value to such supply.

 

Similarly, the
activities carried out by the employees may be so unique that it may not be
possible to define a value of a service of like kind and quality and therefore
Rule 28(b) would also fail.

 

Rule 30 provides
for a mechanism to determine the value on the basis of the cost of provision of
service. However, the cost incurred on the activities may also not be easily
determinable. For example, if the in-house counsel appears for the matter in
the Supreme Court, will the salary cost be considered as the cost of provision
of service or will the company cost attributable to retirement benefits also be
added into the calculation? Will the notional cost of his cabin be added? Will
the electricity cost be added? How does one determine with precision the cost
of provision of service and attribute fixed overheads when the so-called
service itself is not clear and there is no identification of the unit of
measurement? Therefore, Rule 30 fails to provide a definitive answer to the
calculation of value of the presumed service.

 

The second proviso to Rule 28 specifies that the value declared in the
invoice shall be deemed to be the open market value of the goods or services in
cases where the recipient is eligible for full input credit. It is felt that
the condition mentioned in Rule 28 will have to be read down by the courts as
leading to artificial discrimination and also leading to a scenario where the
supplier is expected to demonstrate something which is impossible. Once the
condition is read down or read in context, it can lead to the conclusion that
the transaction value should be accepted.

 

Whether there is certainty as regards the
time at which the tax has to be discharged?

The next issue to
examine is whether there is any certainty as regards the time at which the tax
has to be discharged. Section 13(2) of the CGST Act prescribes the time of
supply of services to be the earliest of the following dates, namely,

 

(a) the date of
issue of invoice by the supplier, if the invoice is issued within the period
prescribed under sub-section (2) of section 31, or the date of receipt of
payment, whichever is earlier; or

(b) the date of
provision of service, if the invoice is not issued within the period prescribed
under sub-section (2) of section 31, or the date of receipt of payment,
whichever is earlier; or

(c) the date on
which the recipient shows the receipt of services in his books of account, in a
case where the provisions of clause (a) or clause (b) do not apply.

 

Essentially, if the
invoice is issued within the prescribed time, the date of issue of invoice or
the date of receipt, whichever is earlier becomes the time of supply. In the
instant case, there is no question of any amount exchanging hands and therefore
there is no date of receipt. One will therefore have to refer to the provisions
of the invoicing rules. Section 31(2) read with section 31(5) prescribes the
outer time limit within which the invoice has to be issued in the case of
continuous supply of services. Accordingly, it is mentioned that the invoice
shall be issued as under:

 

(i) where the
due date of payment is ascertainable from the contract, the invoice shall be
issued on or before the due date of payment;

(ii) where the
due date of payment is not ascertainable from the contract, the invoice shall
be issued before or at the time when the supplier of service receives the
payment;

(iii) where the
payment is linked to the completion of an event, the invoice shall be issued on
or before the date of completion of that event.

 

It is more than
evident that the above scenarios are not applicable in the instant case and
therefore the provisions relating to the time of supply cannot be implemented
with reasonable certainty.

 

To summarise, it is
felt that significant uncertainty exists over various elements towards the
implementation of the proposition to consider the impact of cost-revenue
mismatch as a deemed service by the cost-incurring state to the revenue-earning
state, and such uncertainties vitiate the charge sought to be created by
schedule I entry 2, especially vis-à-vis the supply of services between
distinct persons of the same legal entity.

 

In view of the above discussion, a view
that the common expenditure incurred by the head office, the benefits of which
are claimed by the various other branches, cannot be construed as supply by the
head office to branches is possible. Therefore, a cross charge may not be
required by the head office to the respective branches.

RECOVERING THE UNRECOVERABLE

Recovery
proceedings are initiated to realise the taxes dues. The proceedings are a
final step towards the realisation of any tax or amount which has been
confirmed as payable after following the due process of adjudication and has
remained unpaid beyond the statutory time limit. Government has set in place
three broad routes for collection of taxes – (a) self-assessment; (b)
adjudication; and (c) tax deduction at source / tax collection at source. Under
Article 265 of the Indian Constitution, not only should the levy of tax be
under authority of law, its collection should also be backed by a clear
authority of law. Recovery is the end stage of collection and any action beyond
statutory boundaries would be unconstitutional and rendered void. This article
aims at discussing the various circumstances under which recovery could be
initiated and their respective modes.

 

CIRCUMSTANCES
WARRANTING RECOVERY

Self-assessed
/ admitted taxes

The self-assessment
scheme requires taxpayers to compute the taxes and discharge the dues by
reporting in tax returns u/s 39 of the CGST / SGST Act. Self-assessed taxes are
considered as admitted taxes (though there is no estoppel in tax law)
and are recoverable without any adjudication u/s 73/74 (sec. 75[12]).
Self-assessed taxes are payable on or before the due date of filing the returns
and are to be discharged on FIFO basis (section 49[8]), i.e., any payment would
be first adjusted towards previous period tax liabilities and then towards
current period tax dues. The common portal maintains an indelible trail of tax
liabilities and its eventual adjustment.

 

Primary issues
arising here are: (a) GSTR3B does not appear to be a ‘return’ u/s 39 (refer
our previous article in BCAJ September, 2019)
and one may contend
that tax liabilities reported in 3B are not covered by the said section; (b)
GSTR-9 (annual return) may also involve admission of tax liabilities, but this
is a return u/s 44 and not u/s 39; (c) GSTR3B online module does not permit the
taxpayer to file its return without payment of the reported tax liabilities,
and hence reported tax cannot remain unpaid if returns are filed; and (d)
reporting of outward supplies in GSTR-1 statement u/s 37 does not constitute
filing of return u/s 39. In effect, though the taxes are ‘self-assessed’
(liability is determined by the taxpayer), such self-assessment is not through
the return specified u/s 39. Consequently, section 75(12) does not seem to
apply under the current return filing scheme. The Revenue may still want to
invoke recovery provisions on the ground that they are admitted taxes even
though the admission is not by way of a return u/s 39. A better alternative for
the Revenue would be to conduct full-fledged assessment proceedings and then
proceed for any recovery.

 

Taxes arising
from adjudication / assessments

Taxes assessed by
way of an order of adjudication u/s 73/74 are recoverable after three months
from the date of service of the order. Three months’ time enables the taxpayer
to prefer any appeal before the appellate forum on any aggrieved point of
assessment. Once an appeal is preferred, the tax demand continues unless it is
stayed by a higher forum (say, a High Court, etc.). Section 107(7) provides for
an automatic stay over recovery of demands on payment of 10% of the disputed
tax dues under first appeal (20% in case of second appeal u/s 112[8]). In cases
of multiple issues involved, taxes due on issues not disputed would be payable
on expiry of three months from service of order. The proper officer in such
cases is required to issue a demand notice in DRC-07 and proceed towards
recovery on its expiry. The proper officer can also seek special permission for
recovery in a shorter period in case he believes that the action of the
taxpayer (such as fleeing the country, disposal of assets, etc.) in the interim
may jeopardise the recovery.

 

Taxes
collected and unpaid

Taxpayers are
required to remit any amount collected as taxes forthwith to the government.
The taxpayer is not allowed to hold on to taxes which are collected,
irrespective of whether such amounts are duly collectible under law. This is
based on the fundamental tenet of indirect
taxation wherein taxpayers are made ‘agents’ of the government and such agents
are not permitted to engage in profiteering from taxes. A classic case would be
where taxable person collects taxes from the recipient prior to its time of
supply (such as advance, including taxes collected prior to sale of goods).
Such amounts are payable forthwith (implying on the immediate due date) and the
taxable person cannot claim that the time of supply of provisions is yet to be
triggered. The section provides for an issuance of a show cause notice and its
conclusion prior to proceeding on the recovery (one-year time limit). Where the
amount is held to be wrongly collected by the taxpayer, the section also
provides for a claim of refund by the person who has ‘borne’ the incidence of
taxes, failing which the same would be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund.

 

Recovery of legacy tax liabilities

Section 174(2) saves the rights, obligations or liabilities in respect
of anything done prior to the repeal of earlier laws. Under this provision, tax
demands pertaining to pre-GST periods can be enforced against the defaulter and
recovered under the respective laws. The erstwhile Central excise, VAT laws
contained similar provisions for recovery of tax dues. Simultaneously, section
142(8) of GST law also enables recovery of tax dues which are unrecovered under
the earlier tax laws.

 

While the recovery proceedings initiated prior to 30th June,
2017 are saved by the said provisions, a question arises whether Revenue should
initiate recovery (such as garnishee proceedings, etc.) after 30th
June, 2017 under the erstwhile law or u/s 142(8) of the GST law. One view would
be that section 174(2)(d) r/w/s 174(2)(e) permits any legal proceeding to be
instituted, continued or enforced in respect of tax dues of the earlier laws
despite their repeal w.e.f. 30th June, 2017. Such legal proceeding
(including recovery proceedings) can be instituted even after the repeal as
long as it pertains to tax dues pertaining to the period prior to the repeal.
The provisions of section 142(8) are in addition to the erstwhile recovery
provisions and the recovery officer can opt for either of these provisions.

 

The alternative view would be that section 174(2) in its entirety only
permits institution of proceedings qua the tax defaulter. A garnishee
proceeding, which is an independent proceeding, cannot be instituted after 30th
June, 2017 as there is no pre-existing liability on the defaulter’s debtor to
the government as on the said date. One of the arguments being canvassed in Sulabh
International Social Service Organization vs. UOI 2019 (4) TMI 523 (JH)

is that the term ‘instituted’ refers to proceedings already instituted before
30th June, 2017. It is on account of this deficiency in the repeals
/ saving provision that section 142(8) comes into operation for recovery
actions instituted after 30th June, 2017. Therefore, any recovery
proceeding should necessarily be initiated under the GST law. Rule 142A
provides for issuance of DRC-07A for creation and recovery of the legacy tax
liabilities on the GST portal.

 

Recovery of transitional credit

The transition scheme has been codified for enabling tax credits on
introduction of GST. Recovery of incorrect transition credit falls under two
variants: (a) recovery due to non-conformity with erstwhile provisions, say
Cenvat, availed on input services ineligible under Cenvat Rules. The recoveries
would be either covered under the repeals and savings provisions or u/s 142(8) (alternative
view discussed above)
; and (b) recovery due to non-conformity with GST
provisions, say ineligible cess carried forward or ineligible credits of stocks
u/s 140(3), etc. These recoveries arise due to violation of GST law and would
be recoverable through specific provisions under GST law rather than any
erstwhile law. However, GST law lacks a specific recovery provision for transitional
items such as these.

 

Overlooking the literal interpretation and giving a wide meaning to
‘input tax credit’1  u/s
73/74, transitional credit could at the most be recoverable under the said
sections, in which case it would form part of GST liabilities and hence covered
under the previous heading – Taxes arising from adjudication /
assessments.
The scope of section 73/74 in this context has been
discussed in an earlier article.

 

Recovery in case of clandestine removal /
non-accounted goods

Goods without appropriate documentation are considered as tax-evaded
goods and such goods are liable for seizure. Such evasive acts may be
identified as a result of inspection, search or interception. In case of
hazardous, perishable goods or any other relevant consideration, the proper
officer would dispose of the goods by following the process through DRC-16.
However, the said recovery is subject to the final outcome of the assessment
following the inspection, search or interception.

 

MODES OF RECOVERY

Recovery by
deduction / adjustments

The section
empowers the proper officer to adjust amounts held by the government (e.g.,
refunds) and due to the taxpayer against any dues to the government. Refund may
be either held by the proper officer himself or by any specified officer.
Amounts lying under the electronic cash ledger balance would also be subject to
such adjustments as being amounts held by the government. The proper officer
would issue DRC-09 intimating the specified officer to adjust the tax dues from
the amounts due to the taxable person. Rule 143 includes, amongst others,
officers of public sector undertakings / State-operated undertakings within its
coverage, implying that the proper officer can directly approach such creditors
for recovery.

 

Recovery by
detention and sale of goods

The proper officer
or any other specified officer/s is empowered to detain goods belonging to the
defaulter and under the control of the proper officer. The process of acquiring
control over goods has not been specified under the section. One would view
this section as being limited only to goods which are already under control of
the proper officer (say, confiscation of goods u/s 130 or seizure u/s 67). Rule
144 requires the officer to issue a notice in DRC-10 for public auction of
goods under its control and conclude the recovery through DRC-11 and DRC-12. An
issue would arise as to ascertainment of goods which are ‘belonging’ to the
taxpayer. The answer possibly lies in the underlying principle followed by all
the modes of recovery, i.e., recover amounts over which the taxpayer has
financial claim and not just possession / legal title.

 

Recovery by
garnishee

The proper officer
is empowered to issue a garnishee to a third-party debtor who holds sums to the
account of the taxpayer. A garnishee is an instruction to the third-party
debtor to pay the required sum forthwith or within the time specified, or pay
it on becoming due to the proper officer instead of the tax defaulter. The
proper officer would have to issue the notice in DRC-13 which would have
overriding claim against any other claims of the tax defaulter. The payment by
the third party to the government would constitute sufficient discharge of the
debt due to the tax defaulter (issued in DRC-14). Failure on the part of the
third party to comply with the notice would result in its treatment as a
defaulter under law and initiation of an independent recovery process on such
person. Recovery can also take place where any amounts are due under an
execution decree to the taxable person and the proper officer can request the
court to execute the decree in its favour for settlement of tax dues (DRC-15
and process of Civil Procedure Code, 1908).

 

Recovery by
distraint (seizure)

The proper officer
can also seize any movable / immovable property belonging to or under the
control of the taxable person and detain the same until the amount is paid.
Unlike detention, this provision extends to all property (such as fixed assets,
land, building, etc.) for recovery proceedings. If the said amount is not paid
within 30 days, the proper officer is empowered to sell the property for
realisation of the amounts due after deduction of the expenses of sale.

 

Recovery as
land revenue

Amounts due to the
government can be recovered as arrears of land revenue by applying to the
District Collector. The proper officer would issue a certificate to the
District Collector for recovery of the tax dues under the respective Revenue
Recovery Act under which all rents, incomes arising from the land would accrue to
the government account.

 

Government has
various options for recovery and though not explicit, the general practice has
been to recover amounts based on their ease of recovery without any specific
sequence. It is discretionary for the officer concerned that he may recover the
amount by attachment and if, in the opinion of the officer concerned, the goods
are of such nature that they are not saleable or would not fetch any price he
may not recover the amount by attachment and sale of such goods. The use of the
methods as provided is discretionary and even if the approach was slightly
indirect it need not be interfered with by the court (Prem Chandra Satish
Chandra vs. CCE (1980 6] E.L.T. 714 [All.]).

 

PROPER ADMINISTRATION AND OFFICER FOR
RECOVERY

Recovery
proceedings are to be conducted only by the ‘proper officer’ who may or may not
be the adjudicating officer. Section 2(91) of the CGST Act grants the Board the
power to assign the recovery functions to specified officers under its
administration. In view of the cross empowerment provisions, the challenge
would arise on the front of deciding the ‘proper officer’ for recovery
provisions. Does adjudication performed by the Centre permit the state tax
officer to proceed on recovery? The 16th Council meeting has provided exclusive
administrative powers to the state / Central administration based on the
allocation agreed between the governments. Moreover, section 6(2) provides that
where the proper officer has initiated a proceeding on a subject matter under
the CGST Act, the corresponding proper officer under the SGST Act is prohibited
from initiating any proceeding and vice versa. Recovery proceedings
would have to be initiated only by the proper officer from the administration
assigned for the taxpayer.

 

In the case of the
SGST Act, the Commissioner of the state would be empowered to perform the
assignment. Under the CGST law, the delegation is as follows:

 

Principal /
Commissioner

Reduce the 3-month
moratorium for recovery (proviso to s. 78)

Addl. / Joint
Commissioner

Permission for
transfer of property in case of pending tax dues

Asst. / Dy.
Commissioner

All other powers

Superintendent /
Inspector

Nil

 

 

State Commissioners
have also issued necessary instructions delegating their powers to Assistant
Commissioners for performing the recovery functions. Recently, the High Court
in Valerius Industries vs. UOI 2019 (9) TMI 618 (Guj.) held that
the State Commissioner being a delgatee himself, cannot further delegate the
recovery powers conferred by the State to its junior officers. The provision of
attachment of property on this ground was struck down by the court.

 

PROCEDURE FOR RECOVERY

The basic
requirement of recovery is that there should be a tax due either through self /
revenue assessment. Rule 142 prescribes the forms and the demand notice to be
issued along with the order of assessment directing the taxable person for
payment of tax dues. The notice is required to quantify the tax, interest and
penalty payable on account of assessment. This demand notice should be arrived
at after adjustments of amounts already paid to the government. Once the
pre-conditions for recovery are satisfied, the recipients to whom the
directions are being served would have to be issued a notice instructing them
to either exercise distraint or appropriate the amounts held with them to the
government. Revenue has in multiple cases attempted to recover taxes pending
adjudication or without any adjudication. This action has been clearly struck
down by courts from time to time and as recently as in Mono Steel India
Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat (2019-TIOL-422-HC-AHM-GST)
where bank
attachment immediately on issuance of a show cause notice was set aside.

 

PECULIARITIES UNDER GST

Though there is
standardisation of the legal framework, the current GST structure (CGST / IGST
and 29 states and 7 UTs; pre- 6th August, 2019) is still fettered
with tax segmentation and multiple state administrations. This poses definite
challenges over acquisition of jurisdiction for proceeding with recovery.
Section 25 has fragmented a single unified legal entity, based on its presence
across the states, into ‘distinct persons’ for purposes of implementation of the
Act, implying that each state registration is ring-fenced from the rest of the
entity. While the Act has placed this fiction from a legal perspective, most
organisations are unified from an operational perspective. The challenges are
explained by way of examples:

 

Q1 – ‘A’ a multi-locational entity having registration in all states
would still operate on a single bank account, unified debtor / creditor
relationships and directors / workforce. The proper officer in Maharashtra
having jurisdiction over AMH would like to proceed with a garnishee
order to a bank or a debtor of ADEL.

A1 – Explanation to section 79 prescribes that person would include
‘distinct persons’. The officer is within his powers to issue garnishee notice
to any bank / debtor and recover the sums due from the distinct person. In the
context of recovery, one may have to view the entire entity as one person even
though there is a bifurcation for the purpose of levy and collection of taxes.
Of course, this is an issue that would be subject to judicial scrutiny.

 

Q2 – Extending this example further to a scenario where distinct bank
accounts / debtor lists are maintained based on registrations… does the
officer have jurisdiction to recover sums due from a debtor of another distinct
person of the entity?

A2 – The proper officer can issue a garnishee to any debtor it chooses
to and is not limited by the geographical limits of the state. The proper
officer can issue a garnishee to all bank accounts / creditors for the purpose
of recovery.

 

Q3 – ADEL, a distinct person, has been sanctioned a
CGST/SGST/IGST amount. Would the proper officer of AMH be entitled
to adjust demands with the refunds sanctioned to ADEL?

A3 – Specified officer has been defined to include any officer of the
Central / state government. The proper officer may direct the officer of ADEL
to appropriate the refunds to the outstanding demands in Maharashtra.

 

SPECIAL PROVISIONS IN RECOVERY

Section 80 – Recovery in instalments: A Commissioner is empowered to permit payments of tax dues in
instalments subject to the condition that any default therefrom  would make the entire balance outstanding
without any further recovery notice. The officer in such cases directly
proceeds for recovery of the balance amount after the act of default.

 

Section 81 – Transfer of property void in certain cases: This
section repudiates any transfer of property by sale, mortgage, exchange, etc.,
which is in the possession of a taxpayer if such transfer has been conducted
with an intention to defraud the government. The proper officer in such cases
is permitted to recover its tax dues from the property notwithstanding the fact
that the property has been transferred by the taxable person. The proviso to
the said section carves out an exception for cases where the transfer is made
for adequate consideration in good faith, or with the prior permission of the
proper officer.

 

Section 82 – Tax to be first charge on property: This section overrides all laws, except the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, to state that any amount payable as taxes under the GST
law would be a first charge over the property. In Central Bank of India
vs. State Of Kerala [2009] 21 VST 505 (SC),
the three-judge Bench held
that in case of specific provisions in the statute, the sovereign State would
have primacy over secured debt for realisation of sovereign dues and
distinguished the decision in Union of India vs. SICOM Limited [2009] 2
SCC 121
, delivered in the context of Central excise, held the converse
in the absence of a specific provision in the statute.

 

Section 83 – Provisional attachment of property: This section empowers the proper officer to obtain the permission
of the Commissioner seeking provisional attachment of property during the
pendency of any proceeding in order to protect the interest of the Revenue.
Such provisional attachment is valid for a period of one year from the date of
attachment.

 

Section 84 – Continuation and validation of recovery proceedings: Where the demand notice is subject to appeal, revision, etc., any
subsequent enhancement at a higher forum would need to be followed up with an
additional demand notice. The recovery proceedings in respect of the original
demand can be continued without a fresh notice from the stage at which such
proceedings stood immediately before the disposal of such proceedings. For
example, in case a garnishee order has been issued to a debtor and the same has
been stayed by a court, the proper officer need not issue a fresh garnishee
notice after the passing of the order and can proceed for recovery to the
extent the original demand is confirmed. In case of any enhancement, a fresh
demand notice recovery process would have to be initiated.

 

LIABILITY IN SPECIAL CASES

The GST law
prescribes cases where the recovery provisions can extend beyond the taxable
person. The cases have been tabulated below:

 

Scenario

Relationship: Taxable person & other
person

Type of liability of the said person

Transfer of business by sale, gift,
lease, license, etc.

Transferee – Transferor

Joint and several liability on tax dues
up to date of transfer

Principal agency transactions

Agent – Principal

Joint and several liability of principal
on goods sold by agent

Amalgamation / merger

Amalgamating and amalgamated company

Tax dues would be assessed separately in
respective companies’ hands from appointed date to effective date of order

Directorship

Private company – Director

Joint and several liability on directors
who are responsible for gross neglect, misfeasance, etc.

Partnership / HUF

Firm – Partners / HUF – Member

Joint and several liability on partners
up to date of retirement (subject to intimation of retirement) or partition

Guardian / Trustee, court of wards, etc.

Minor – guardian / Trustee, etc.

Recovery from the guardian, etc., in the
same manner as recoverable from minor

Death of individual

Deceased – Legal representative

Legal representative liable entirely,
except where the business is discontinued, in which case the liability is
limited to the estates of the deceased

Dissolution

Firm – Partner

Joint and several liability on partners
up to dissolution

Discontinuation of business

Firm / AOP / HUF – Partner / Member

Joint and several liability on partner /
member

 

One must note that
there is no outer time limit for recovery of tax dues once the adjudication has
been completed within the specified time frame. Generally, one should expect
that the Revenue would proceed on recovery at the earliest for recovering its
arrears.

 

Recovery is a necessary tool for the
government to realise its taxes. Yet, this tool should be used cautiously and
wisely for effecting its end purpose rather than mere display of authority over
the taxpayer. The erstwhile law as well as GST Law has already experienced
hasty use of these provisions and leading to the closure of the enterprise
itself. The heads of administration should issue circulars limiting the
instances where such provisions should be invoked, in a way ensuring efficient
recovery of taxes rather than killing the golden goose itself.  

ADDITIONAL GROUND IN APPEAL: WHEN PERMISSIBLE?

INTRODUCTION

Under tax
laws, remedies are provided against orders passed by lower authorities.
Normally, the remedy is either rectification or appeal. While rectification has
a limited scope because it is restricted to correction of apparent mistakes,
appeal has a very wide scope and is a useful right with the assessee. An
aggrieved assessee can file an appeal to the designated higher authority
against unfavourable order/s. Normally, there is also a scheme for filing a
second appeal before the Tribunal or such higher authorities as may be
prescribed.

 

However,
it may be noted that the rights to appeal are subject to certain conditions.
Generally, there are appeal forms which are to be filled up and in the same the
grounds about the issues raised in appeal are required to be mentioned. It is
expected that the assessee will take proper care while raising the grounds of
appeal. Under fiscal laws, the grounds can be amended or new grounds can be
added in the course of an appeal. If the matter is in first appeal, then the modification
/ addition of the grounds is normally not objected to. However, if the appeal
is before the Tribunal and if any new ground is to be raised, then the issue is
not that simple. The power of the Tribunal to allow the additional ground is
discretionary and it may allow it subject to its satisfaction.

 

RECENT CASE LAW

Recently, the Hon. Bombay High Court had occasion to deal with such an
issue in the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. the
Commissioner of Sales Tax (68 GSTR 58) (Bom.)
under the BST Act. The
factual position involved is narrated by the High Court in the following words:

 

…..

‘7.   When all the aforementioned four second
appeals were fixed for hearing, the applicant sought permission to raise an
additional ground relating to levy of sales tax on the surrender of Exim
Scrips. This additional ground was with reference to the second appeals that
were filed pertaining to the F.Y. 1995-96. The additional ground sought to be
raised was thus:

 

“That the
lower authorities have erred in levying sales tax on surrender of Exim Scrip
and therefore such levy be set aside in view of the judgement of the Hon’ble
Tribunal in the case of M/s Agra Engineering Works (Second Appeal No. 185
of 1997, dated 30/4/2002).

 

8.    It was submitted on behalf of the applicant
that since this is a pure question of law, it could be raised at any time in
the appeal proceedings and therefore the said additional ground be allowed to
be raised before the MSTT.

 

9.    This was however vehemently opposed by the Revenue.
It was pointed out that this ground was never taken up either in the first
appellate proceedings or even in the grounds before the MSTT.

 

According
to the Revenue, the adjudication on this ground involved verification of the
relevant documents and therefore the said ground could not be allowed at such a
late stage of the proceedings.

 

10. Hearing the parties on this preliminary issue,
the MSTT opined that the applicant had not given any details of the particular
transactions, the levy in respect of which was now disputed through the
additional ground. It recorded that the assessment order for the period 1995-96
was also silent as regards whether any such transactions had been assessed to
tax. It was also not clear as to whether the transaction, if any, in respect of
the Exim Scrips constituted any surrender or sale. Having regard to these
facts, the MSTT agreed with the Revenue that adjudication in the context of
this ground would involve verification of relevant evidence so as to ascertain
the true nature of the transactions and therefore there was no case made out to
allow this additional ground to be raised at such a late stage. The MSTT
therefore declined to entertain the additional ground. Question (I) reproduced
by us earlier arises from this additional ground.’

…..

 

The above
matter came before the High Court by way of Sales Tax Reference. Long-drawn
arguments were made before the Court from both the sides. So far as the
assessee was concerned, it was submitted that the Tribunal is the last fact-finding
authority, and therefore it should have allowed the additional ground. It was
further submitted that the appellate powers under the BST Act are wide enough
to allow additional ground and even if additional evidence was required, still,
it could have been allowed.

 

Per contra,
on behalf of Revenue it was submitted that the additional ground sought to be
raised was not purely a question of law but was a mixed question of fact and
law and accordingly it was submitted that the rejection is justified.

 

The High
Court thereafter referred to the discussion by the Tribunal on the above ground
and came to a conclusion as follows:

 

…..

‘19.       As
can be seen from the aforesaid paragraphs, the MSTT (third Bench) on a
consideration of all the relevant facts had taken a conscious decision not to
entertain the additional ground relating to levy of tax on the transactions of
Exim Scrips. Thereafter, the fourth Bench of the MSTT itself examined the files
for the relevant financial years. It perused the files submitted by the
applicant in the assessment proceedings which contain statements of sales /
purchase, declarations and other relevant documents like transport receipts,
sales bills, etc. On going through all these files, the fourth Bench of the
MSTT opined that they did not contain any documents to conclusively show that
the Exim Scrips were surrendered to the Government of India or the designated
bank. On the contrary, in the statements of sales, the said transactions of
Exim Scrips have been specifically shown to be “Exim Scrips sold.”

 

Even in
the assessment order, the transactions were categorically mentioned to be
“sale” of Exim Scrips. After examining all this material, the MSTT opined (in
the referral order) that it was beyond any doubt that the assessment records
did not contain any document to conclusively show that the impugned
transactions constituted surrender of Exim Scrips and which was the additional
ground that was sought to be raised by the applicant. In this view of the
matter, it was absolutely clear that the adjudication on the said point before
the MSTT would have certainly involved perusal, verification and appreciation
of additional evidence and that is why the MSTT declined to adjudicate the said
issue. This was for the simple reason that no material on this additional
ground was ever produced. Over and above this, the MSTT in paragraph 21
(reproduced above) also examined certain documents which the applicant had
claimed to have submitted in the assessment proceedings. On examining the documents
mentioned in paragraph 21, the MSTT found that, in fact, at least part of the
Exim Scrips were admittedly sold by the applicant to one M/s Agrawal Traders of
Bombay.

 

As far as
the contention of the applicant regarding surrender of Exim Scrips is concerned,
the MSTT opined that the documents submitted by the applicant in relation to
certain cheque receipt entries in support of the receipt of cheques from the
Joint DGFT, the MSTT was of the opinion that merely on the basis of these
documents, the claim of the applicant that the Exim Scrips were surrendered to
the Government could not have been legally allowable unless the other
supporting documents relating to the particular transactions were produced,
verified and appreciated. To put it in a nutshell, the MSTT was of the view
that the relevant documents available on record were not sufficient for
adjudication of the additional ground that was sought to be canvassed by the
applicant. It would have certainly required leading of additional evidence.

 

20. We find that the applicant never made any
application for leading any additional evidence to substantiate its claim that
the Exim Scrips were in fact surrendered to the Government and were not sold.
In fact, in the order of MSTT dated 8th December, 2006 it was
specifically contended by the applicant that since the additional ground is a
pure question of law it could be raised at any time in the appeal proceedings
and therefore the MSTT ought to have entertained the additional ground. Having
found that the additional ground was not a pure question of law but required
additional documents and evidence which needed to be verified, produced and
appreciated, we do not think that the MSTT was unjustified in not entertaining
the additional ground regarding surrender of Exim Scrips. If the applicant did
not bring any material before the MSTT to substantiate its claim that it had
surrendered the Exim Scrips to the Government and therefore was not exigible to
tax, the MSTT necessarily could not have entertained the aforesaid ground as
there was no material brought on record to render a finding thereon.

 

In these
circumstances and peculiar to the facts of this case, we find that the MSTT was
legally justified in not adjudicating on the point regarding levy of tax on Exim
Scrips. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in answering Question (I)
in the affirmative and against the applicant and in favour of the Revenue.’

…..

 

Thus, the rejection is justified by the High Court. From the above
observation it can be seen that if the additional ground is about a law point,
then allowability of the same is normal. However, if the issue involves factual
position, then it becomes discretionary and may require more persuasion.

 

CONCLUSION

Though the
above judgement is under the BST Act, the ratio will apply to other fiscal laws
also where the assessee wants to raise additional grounds before the appellate
authority. Amongst others, while trying to raise additional grounds it is
expected that the assessee will give all relevant material that is ready to
convince the appellate authority to allow the additional ground. Normally, care
should be taken to take the grounds with the appeal itself, but if at all a
situation arises for raising additional ground, then the assessee should take
more care to submit the relevant supporting ground along with the application.
The above judgement will be a useful guidance for future.
 

PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE VIS-À-VIS ASSESSMENT UNDER MVAT/CST ACTS

INTRODUCTION

Assessment under taxation laws is considered to be
a quasi-judicial process. The Department authorities are expected to act in a
just and fair manner, including compliance with the principles of natural
justice.

 

Not calling records lying with department

There are a number of instances where the
investigation authorities may visit the place of business of an assessee.
Through such a visit, the Department may acquire possession of full / part
records of the assessee. The assessing authorities subsequently initiate
assessment proceedings. And the burden is on the assessee to produce records.
But strangely, no action is taken to call for the records lying with the
investigation authorities!

 

Often, adverse orders are passed based on reports
received from investigation authorities, or based on (their) own assumptions
without going into the actual records with the authorities.

 

Judgement of the Bombay High Court in the case of Insta Exhibitions Pvt. Ltd. (Writ Petition No. 6751
of 2019 dated 8th August, 2019)

One such case came before the Hon’ble Bombay High
Court recently. The facts narrated by the Court are as under:

 

‘3. The
grievance of the Petitioner is that both the impugned orders dated 14th
March, 2019 have been passed in breach of principles of natural justice
inasmuch as no sufficient opportunity to present their case was given to the
Petitioner. In particular, it is pointed out that the Petitioner had received a
notice for personal hearing from the Assessing Officer for the hearing
scheduled on 11th March, 2019. On that date, i.e. 11th
March, 2019, the Petitioner’s representative attended the office of the
Assessing Officer and filed a letter seeking an adjournment of eight days and
the respondents were requested to make available to the Petitioner its own
documents relevant for the assessment relating to financial year 2014-2015,
which were with the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Investigation Branch,
Bhayander (evidence in the form of receipt was also enclosed with the
Petitioner’s letter dated 11th March, 2019). The impugned orders do
record that the Petitioner’s representative was present at the hearing and the
filing of letter dated 11th March, 2019. It is submitted that the
assessment were (sic) finalised without giving the Petitioner the
documents in the possession of the Revenue. Thus, the Petitioner did not have
an opportunity to establish its case before the authority.’

 

The respondents opposed the writ petition on
grounds of alternative remedy and also on the ground that the submission of the
assessee is otherwise considered.

 

However, the Bombay High Court did not approve of
the action of the Department authorities and observed as under:

 

‘5. It is an undisputed position that the
Petitioner’s documents relating to the period 2014-2015 and necessary for the
Petitioner’s assessment, in particular to support its claim for branch transfer
and exhibition activity, were in the possession of the Department with effect
from 18th April, 2017. In spite of the Petitioner’s seeking copies
of the same, the same were not granted by the Assessing Officer as he did not
call for the necessary proceedings and papers from the Assistant Commissioner
of Sales Tax, Investigation Branch, Bhayander, who was in possession of the
papers relating to the assessment year 2014-15. In these circumstances, it was
impossible for the Petitioner to establish its claim for branch transfer as
also the exhibition activity as the documents relevant, according to the
Petitioner, in support of its aforesaid two claims, were amongst the documents
which were in the possession of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax,
Investigation Branch, Bhayander. This non-giving of documents certainly
handicapped the Petitioner in the assessment proceedings. This certainly
amounts to a breach of principles of natural justice.

 

6. In the above view, there
is a flaw in the decision-making process which goes to the root of the matter.
Therefore, we set aside the impugned orders dated 14th March, 2019
passed under the MVAT Act and the CST Act. We restore the Petitioner’s
assessment proceedings to respondent No. 3 – Deputy Commissioner of State Tax –
for fresh consideration of the assessment for the period 2014-15 after
furnishing to the Petitioner all the documents relating to the assessment year
2014-15 which are in possession of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax,
Investigation Branch, Bhayander, since 18th April, 2017.’

 

Thus, the Hon’ble High Court has remanded the
assessment for fresh orders after providing a proper opportunity to the
petitioner.

 

CONCLUSION

Compliance with the principles of natural justice
is a very important part of assessment. Non-compliance results in invalid
orders. However, the assessee is also required to be alert about his rights. It
is necessary that the issue about the requirement of following the principles
of natural justice is raised in due course. If not, then non-compliance will be
fatal to the validity of the orders passed. The above judgement will be useful
for reference in future proceedings.
 

 

 

CALCUTTA CLUB CASE: PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY AND ITS RELEVANCE UNDER GST REGIME

INTRODUCTION

‘No man, in my
opinion, can trade with himself; he cannot, in my opinion, make, in what is its
true sense or meaning, taxable profit by dealing with himself
’.1

 

The principle of
mutuality is a concept borrowed from the ‘English decisions’ and has been adopted
and refined over a long period of time by the courts in India. The principle of
mutuality has been mainly held to be applicable in the context of levy of
income tax as well as the erstwhile sales tax regimes.

 

In a landmark
decision by the larger bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of
West Bengal & Ors. vs. Calcutta Club Limited, Civil Appeal No. 4184 of 2009
[reported in 2019-TIOL-449-SC-ST-LB],
it was held that the supply /
sale of goods or rendering of services by incorporated / unincorporated
associations or clubs to their members are not liable to sales tax / service
tax by application of the principle of mutuality even after the 46th
Amendment to the Constitution. Further, the Supreme Court also held that the
judgement in C.T.O. vs. Young Men’s Indian Association (1970) 1 SCC 462
which applied the doctrine of mutuality continues to hold the field even after
the 46th Amendment.

 

BACKGROUND: West Bengal & Ors. vs. Calcutta Club Limited (Supra)

The Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes issued a notice to the
respondent club (assessee) proposing to demand sales tax on the sale of food
and drinks to the permanent members during the quarter ending 30th June,
2002. The demand was contested on the ground of principles of mutuality. The matter
was carried to the Tribunal which held that there is no supply or sale of goods
by the club to its members as members and the club are the same persons and
there is no exchange of consideration. The issue was contested before the High
Court by the Revenue. The High Court held that no sales tax could be imposed on
the supplies by clubs to their members.

 

On appeal, the
Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the State of West Bengal vs.
Calcutta Club Ltd. (2017) 5 SCC 356, considering the decision in C.T.O. vs.
Young Men’s Indian Association (1970) 1 SCC 462 and Fateh Maidan Club vs. CTO
(2017) 5 SCC 638
and Article 366(29A) of the Constitution, referred the
matter to a larger bench with the following questions:

 

(i)   Whether the doctrine of mutuality is still
applicable to incorporated clubs or any club after the 46th
amendment to Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India?

(ii)   Whether the judgement of this Court in
Young Men’s Indian Association (Supra)
still holds the field even after
the 46th Amendment; and whether the decisions in Cosmopolitan
Club (Supra)
and Fateh Maidan Club (Supra) which remitted
the matter applying the doctrine of mutuality after the Constitutional
amendment can be treated to be stating the correct principle of law?

(iii) Whether the 46th Amendment by
deeming fiction provides that provision of food and beverages by incorporated
clubs to their permanent members constitutes sale, thereby holding the same to
be liable to sales tax?

 

Levy of
service tax on clubs or associations

In the meanwhile,
the High Court of Jharkhand in Ranchi Club Ltd. vs. Chief
Commissioner of Central Excise & ST, Ranchi Zone [2012 (26) STR 401
(Jhar.)]
and the High Court of Gujarat in Sports Club of Gujarat
Ltd. vs. Union of India [2013 (31) STR 645 (Guj.)]
held that no service
tax could be demanded on the services provided by clubs or associations to
their members by applying the doctrine of mutuality and by relying upon the
decision of the Supreme Court in Young Men’s Indian
Association (Supra).

 

Consequently,
departmental appeals were filed before the Supreme Court against the aforesaid
High Court decisions. In the light of reference to the larger bench of the
Supreme Court in State of West Bengal vs. Calcutta Club Ltd. (Supra),
the service tax matters were also placed before this bench.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE
PARTIES

The submissions
before the larger bench of the Supreme Court by the Revenue and the assessees
could be summarised as below:

 

Revenue:

(a) After the 46th amendment to the
Constitution which inserted Article 366(29A), more specifically clause (e), the
earlier decision holding that there cannot be levy of sales tax on supply of
goods by clubs or associations to their members would no more be applicable;

(b) The supply of food or drink by the clubs or
associations to their members could either be taxed under clause (e) of Article
366(9A) or under clause (f) thereof;

(c) The decisions of the Constitution Bench in the
case of Young Men’s Indian Association (Supra) is prior to the
amendment of the Constitution referred above and the amendment is to do away
the effect of the said decision;

(d) The phrase ‘unincorporated association or body
of persons’ in sub-clause (e) must be read disjunctively, and so read would
include incorporated persons such as companies, co-operative societies, etc.;

(e) The doctrine of mutuality has no application
when a members’ club is in the corporate form. Reliance was placed on the
decision in the case of Bacha F. Guzdar vs. Commissioner of Income Tax,
Bombay (1955)
1 SCR 876,
wherein it was held that a shareholder is not the owner of
the assets of a company and, therefore, the aforesaid principle cannot possibly
apply to members’ clubs in corporate form.

 

Assessees:

(1) The 46th Amendment, which inserted
clause (29-A) into Article 366 of the Constitution, has not done away with the Young
Men’s Indian Association (Supra)
as there cannot possibly be a supply
of goods by a person to himself; and that, therefore, the doctrine of agency /
trust / mutuality continues as before;

(2) Referring to the definition of consideration,
it was contended that the consideration should move from one person to another
and as there are no two persons involved in a transaction between a club and
its members, no consideration is involved and hence no sale is involved;

(3) Clauses (e) and (f) of Article 366(29A) are for
different purposes and the clause (f) cannot be used to tax the supply of food
or drink by the clubs or associations to their members;

(4) On the issue of levy of service tax on clubs or
associations it was submitted that:

(i)   The concept of mutuality as applicable to
supply of goods would equally be applicable to the provision of service by a
club to its members;

(ii)   The definition under ‘club and association
services’ specifically excludes incorporated entities;

(iii)  Similar to Article 366(29A)(e) of the
Constitution, there is no deeming fiction to treat services by clubs to their
members as service liable to tax; deemed fiction in respect of goods cannot be
applied to services, and reliance is placed on the decision in the case of Geo
Miller & Co. vs. State of M.P., (2004) 5 SCC 209;

(iv)  Where supply of food or drinks by clubs or
associations falls under clause (e) of Article 366(29A) in its entirety, there
cannot be any levy of service tax on such transactions as the Supreme Court in
the BSNL case (2006) 3 SCC 1 held that in Article
366(29A) only clause (b) relating to works contract and clause (f) relating to
catering contract can be vivisected into services
and goods;

(v)  Even if it is assumed that the decision of the
Supreme Court in Joint Commercial Tax Officer vs. The Young Men’s Indian
Association (Regd.), Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 462
has been overcome, that
would relate only to sale or purchase of goods and not to services. Therefore,
there is no deeming provision in the Constitution relating to entry 97 of List
I, where a deeming clause is present in respect of service.

 

ANALYSIS OF DECISION

Levy of sales
tax on the goods supplied by clubs or associations to members

The larger bench of
the Supreme Court on the issue of sale of goods by an incorporated or
unincorporated club or association to its members held as under:

 

  •   The doctrine of
    mutuality continues to be applicable to incorporated and unincorporated
    members’ clubs after the 46th Amendment adding Article 366(29A) to
    the Constitution of India;
  •   Young Men’s Indian
    Association
    and other judgements which applied this doctrine continue to
    hold the field even after the 46th Amendment;
  •    Sub-clause (f) of
    Article 366(29-A) has no application to members’ clubs.

 

The reasoning for
the above view is summarised below:

(A) The 61st Law Commission Report,
which recommended the 46th Constitutional Amendment, was of the view
that the Constitution ought not to be amended so as to bring within the tax net
members’ clubs for the following reasons:

(1) The number of
such clubs and associations would not be very large;

(2) Taxation of
such transactions might discourage the co-operative movement;

(3) No serious
question of evasion of tax arises as a member of such clubs really takes his
own goods.

 

(B) Article 366(29A) was introduced by way of the
46th Amendment with a view to expand the scope of tax on sale in
respect of certain specified activities involving supply of goods or supply of
goods and services, which hitherto was held by the Supreme Court in various
decisions as not amounting to sale of goods. However, as regards clause (e) of Article
366(29A), relating to supply of goods by unincorporated associations to their
members, the Court ruled that the 46th Amendment did not overcome
the decision in the Young Men’s Indian Association case and the
doctrine of mutuality remains applicable even after the amendment.

 

It is interesting
to note that the Supreme Court placed reliance mainly on the decision in the
case of C.T.O. vs. Young Men’s Indian Association (1970) 1 SCC 462,
wherein the Association which is a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 and the issue was whether supply of refreshments by the
society to its members would attract levy of sales tax. It should be noted that
in the said decision, members’ clubs were also a party. The Constitution Bench
of the Supreme Court in this connection, referring to the decisions of English
judgements in the cases Graff vs. Evans (1882) 8 Q.B. 373 and Trebanog
Working Men’s Club and Institute Ltd. vs. MacDonald (1940) 1 K.B. 576,

held that there cannot be sale between a club or association and its members
when refreshments are supplied. The Court further observed that the club, even
though a distinct entity, is acting as an agent in supplying various
preparations and the concept of transfer is completely absent.

 

Further, the Court
followed the principle laid out in Young Men’s Indian Association, in
Fateh Maidan Club [Fateh Maidan Club vs. CTO, (2008) 12 VST 598 (SC)]
and
Cosmopolitan Club [Cosmopolitan Club vs. State of T.N., (2009) 19 VST 456
(SC)].

 

(C) The Supreme Court observed that the Statement
of Objects and Reasons for the 46th Amendment states that while sale
by a registered club or other association of persons (the club or association
of persons having corporate status) to its members is taxable, sales by an
unincorporated club or association of persons to its members is not taxable as
such club or association, in law, has no separate existence from that of the
members.

(D) The Supreme Court held that the Statement of
Objects and Reasons did not properly understand the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Young Men’s Indian Association and assumed
that sale of goods by members’ clubs in the corporate form were taxable. The
Court observed that in the Young Men’s Indian Association case,
it had held that sale of goods by an incorporated entity to its members is sale
to self and hence, does not amount to sale of goods for levy of sales tax. The
Court clearly stated that the Constitution Bench in Young Men’s Indian
Association
placed reliance on two English decisions (Graff vs.
Evans & Trebanog Working Men’s Club and Institute Ltd. vs. MacDonald)
which
pertained to incorporated clubs and hence the concept of mutuality would be
applicable to incorporated clubs or associations also.

 

(E) The Supreme Court further held that even in
case of sale / supply of goods by unincorporated associations or body of
persons to members, the requirement of consideration is not fulfilled since in
case of sale of goods to self, there exists no consideration as per the
provisions of the Contract Act, 1872.

 

(F) The Supreme Court also ruled out the contention
of the Revenue that the supply of food by clubs would fall under clause (f) of
Article 366(29A), if not under clause (e), and observed that clause (f) was
specifically brought in to tax supply of food by restaurants and that the
subject matter of sub-clause (f) is entirely different and distinct from that
of sub-clause (e) and it cannot be made applicable to members’ clubs.

 

(G) Unlike the specific provisions under the
Income-tax Act, 1961 such as section 2(24)(vii) or section 45, the absence of
such language in clause (e) to Article 366(29A) is also a pointer to the fact
that the doctrine of mutuality cannot be said to have been done away with by
the 46th Amendment.

 

Levy of service
tax on clubs or associations

The Supreme Court
held that the judgements of the Jharkhand High Court in Ranchi Club Ltd.
(Supra)
and the Gujarat High Court in Sports Club of Gujarat
(Supra)
are correct in their view of the law in Young Men’s
Indian Association (Supra).
It was also held that with effect from 2005
no service tax could be levied on the services by clubs or associations to
their members in the incorporated form. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held
that show-cause notices, demand notices and other action taken to levy and
collect service tax from incorporated members’ clubs are declared to be void
and of no effect in law.

 

The judgement of
the Supreme Court is analysed as under:

(i)   The Court held that for the period prior to 1st
July, 2012, i.e.,  before the Negative
List regime, the definition of club or association as per section 65(2a)
of the Finance Act, 1994 specifically excluded incorporated entities. Thus, the
Court held that incorporated entities providing services to their members would
be outside the service tax net prior to 1st July, 2012.

 

(ii)   The Supreme Court held that companies and
co-operative societies registered under the respective Acts can certainly be
said to be constituted under those Acts.

 

(iii) For the period post-1st July, 2012, the Court,
referring to the definition of ‘services’ as per section 65B(44) of the Finance
Act, 1994 observed that to qualify as service the definition requires the
existence of two persons and the doctrine of mutuality, the doctrine of agency,
trust, as applicable to sales tax cases, would equally be applicable to the
definition of services. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that services by an
incorporated club / association to its members would amount to service to self
and hence would not qualify as service as defined above. [Note: However, the
Supreme Court has not dealt with exclusion of deemed sale under Article
366(29A) from the definition of ‘service’ in section 65B(44) of the Finance
Act, 1994.]

 

(iv)  As regards the Explanation 3 to section
65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, the Court held that the said explanation
deeming associations and their members as distinct persons would not be
applicable to incorporated associations or clubs. Relying on the decision in the
case of I.C.T., Bombay North, Kutch and Saurashtra, Ahmedabad vs. Indira
Balkrishna (1960) 3 SCR 513
, the Court further observed that the
expression ‘unincorporated associations’ would include persons who join
together in some common purpose or common action.

 

SUMMARY AND COMMENTS

In summary, the
supply of goods or services by incorporated / unincorporated clubs or
associations to their members would not be exigible to sales tax or service tax
on the basis of principles of mutuality. The larger bench of the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgement of Young Men’s Indian Association (Supra)
as regards the applicability of the doctrine of mutuality and held that it
continues to apply even after the 46th Amendment.

 

As regards the levy
of service tax on the services provided by the club to its members, the Supreme
Court held that the judgements of the Jharkhand High Court in Ranchi Club
Ltd. (Supra)
and the High Court of Gujarat in Sports Club of
Gujarat (Supra)
are correct.

 

Additional
points to be noted

In the context of
service tax levy on the services provided by clubs to their members, the larger
bench of the Supreme Court did not consider its categorical decision in Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC)
wherein it was held
that the 46th Amendment chose three specific situations: a works
contract, a hire- purchase contract and a catering contract, to bring the
services within the fiction of a deemed sale. Of these three, the first and the
third involve a kind of service and sale at the same time, hence apart from
these two cases where splitting of the service and supply has been
constitutionally permitted in clauses (b) and (f) of clause 29A of Article 366,
there is no other service which has been permitted to be so split.

 

Accordingly, under Article
366(29A) only ‘works contract’ in clause (b) and ‘catering contract’ in clause
(f) are divisible and split between services and goods and, therefore, there is
no question of splitting the deemed sale entry relating to sale or services
provided by the club to its members under clause (e) of Article 366(29A). This
aspect would have categorically ruled out any service tax levy for the period
up to 30th June, 2017. Even Explanation 3 found in the definition of
services u/s 65B(44) would have been restricted only to declared services u/s
66E(h) and (i) corresponding to clauses (b) and (f) of Article 366(29A) of the
Constitution as only those can be vivisected, and as clubs fall under Article
366(29A)(e), the said explanation would not apply as the transaction cannot be
vivisected.

 

Another aspect
which is to be noted from the above decision is that the concept of mutuality
would not be applicable to proprietary clubs. The Supreme Court in the case of Cosmopolitan
Club vs. State of T.N. (2009) 19 VST 456 (SC)
, referring to the English
decisions, brought in the distinction between members’ clubs and the
proprietary clubs as below:

 

7. The law in
England has always been that members’ clubs to which category the clubs in the
present case belong cannot be made subject to the provisions of the Licensing
Acts concerning sale because the members are joint owners of all the club
property including the excisable liquor. The supply of liquor to a member at a
fixed price by the club cannot be regarded to be a sale. If, however, liquor is
supplied to and paid for by a person who is not a
bona
fide member of the club or his duly authorised agent, there would be a sale.
With regard to incorporated clubs a distinction has been drawn. Where such a
club has all the characteristics of a members’ club consistent with its
incorporation, that is to say, where every member is a shareholder and every
shareholder is a member, no licence need be taken out if liquor is supplied
only to the members. If some of the shareholders are not members or some of the
members are not shareholders that would be the case of a proprietary club and
would involve sale. Proprietary clubs stand on a different footing. The members
are not owners of or interested in the property of the club. The supply to them
of food or liquor though at a fixed tariff is a sale.

 

Therefore, in case
of proprietary clubs, the doctrine of mutuality would not be applicable
inasmuch as some of the shareholders may not be members of the club and vice
versa
and outsiders could well use the club. In other words, the clear
mandate would be that the persons participating and persons enjoying should be
the same. If not, mutuality does not exist.

 

One other aspect to
be remembered is that although in the end portion of the judgement relating to
service tax the judgement seems to be confined to incorporated members’ club,
in our opinion it would apply to unincorporated members’ club also for three
specific reasons:

 

(1) The portion of
the judgement which answers the sales tax questions raised clearly covers both
type of members’ clubs and the Supreme Court refers to it when it discusses
service tax;

(2) If incorporated
members’ clubs or associations, where identity can be distinct, can still come
within the mutuality clause, there is no reason why unincorporated clubs or
associations cannot;

(3) Our observations relating to the BSNL case as to why the
transactions of clubs cannot be vivisected would rule out service tax
applicability. Further, the definition of services post-1st July,
2012 specifically excluded these transactions.

 

Whether above
decision is applicable in GST regime

With effect from 1st
July, 2012, GST is levied on the supply of goods or services or both in
terms of section 9 of the CGST Act, 2017. The term ‘supply’ is defined
elaborately in section 7 of the Act to include all forms of supply of goods or
services or both, such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental,
lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a
person
in the course or furtherance of business.

 

 

It shall be noted
that the term ‘business’ that has been defined in section 2(17) of the CGST
Act, 2017 inter alia includes ‘provision by a club, association,
society, or any such body (for a subscription or any other consideration) of
the facilities or benefits to its members’.

 

Further, entry 7 of
Schedule II to CGST Act, 2017 reads as below:

 

‘7. Supply of
Goods

The following
shall be treated as supply of goods, namely:

 

Supply of goods
by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof for
cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.’

As per serial No. 7 of Schedule II, the supply of goods by any
unincorporated association or body of persons to its members shall be deemed to
be supply of goods. However, there is no such deeming fiction for ‘supply of
services’.

 

In terms of the
above referred provisions under the GST law, we are of the view that the
decision of the larger bench of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Club
(Supra)
is applicable even under the GST regime for members’ clubs on
the basis of the following points:

 

(a) The doctrine of mutuality continues to apply
under GST law. In terms of section 7, the term ‘supply’ includes sale or
transfer or barter, etc., which requires two persons; further, the said supply
must be for consideration which necessarily involves two or more persons. As
there are no two persons involved in the provision of supply of goods or
services by the club or association to its members, there cannot be any
‘supply’ of goods or services. This is specifically so for members’ clubs.

 

(b) Though the definition of the term ‘business’
includes the provision of facilities or benefits by the club or association to
its members, there is no deeming fiction under the provisions of section 7
which defines the term ‘supply’ to include such transactions. As the supply of
goods or services by the club or association does not get covered under the
definition of supply u/s 7, there is no question of levying GST by referring to
the clause (e) of definition of ‘business’.

 

(c) In terms of section 7(1A) of the CGST Act, 2017
entries in schedule II are only for the purposes of classification and cannot
be read independently. Therefore, no tax could be levied on supply of goods or
services by incorporated or unincorporated associations to their members as the
main section does not cover it.

 

(d) Alternatively, as per serial No. 7 of Schedule
II, the supply of goods by an unincorporated association or body of persons
could be termed as ‘supply of goods’, hence incorporated clubs or associations
cannot be brought under this entry. Further, serial No. 7 of Schedule II only
covers ‘supply of goods’, hence the provision of service by the club or
association to its members remains outside the purview of GST.

 

(e) The ratio of the decision laid out in Young
Men’s Association (Supra)
continues to hold the field that in a
members’ club, the club acts as merely an agent for the principal and would be
covered by the principle of mutuality.

 

In view of the above, the authors are sure
that the dispute would continue under the GST regime but are of the view that
the decision of the larger bench would apply to the GST regime also so as to
exclude members’ clubs from the purview of taxation.

THE ART OF UNDERSTANDING & MANAGING STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS – AN INTERNAL AUDITOR’S PERSPECTIVE

Internal Audit (IA) must recognise that it
exists to serve the needs of diverse stakeholder groups, that their
expectations are constantly evolving and may not be necessarily aligned.
Internal auditors, whether in-house or outsourced – irrespective of the size of
the organisation – who invest in managing the expectations of their various
stakeholders are more likely to create an IA function that remains successful
and relevant in the long term. Those who lose sight of this are at greater risk
of long-term failure.

 

THE STAKEHOLDERS

For IA, the stakeholders comprise:

(i)     The Audit Committee (AC) and the Board of
Directors (Board), to whom IA is supposed to report directly and functionally;

(ii)     The CEO (or head of the enterprise), to
whom IA usually reports administratively;

(iii)    The CFO, who is primarily responsible for the
internal control environment and who, therefore, may be IA’s perpetual ally;

(iv)    Other business heads of the organisation
(auditees);

(v)    Internal audit team (whether forming part of
the in-house team or members of professional services firms engaged on a
co-sourced basis);

(vi)    Statutory auditors and regulators;

(vii)   Other board committees and heads of support
functions, especially administration and HR; and

(viii) Professional network.

 

In well-established organisations, there
will also be potential collaborators such as the CIO (Chief Information
Officer), the CRO (Chief Risk Officer) and the Compliance Head who can jointly
drive the common governance agenda with the AC / Board and within the
organisation. Incidentally, the CIO can be the best catalyst and support for IA
as technology initiatives gain momentum to increase the effectiveness of IA.

 

IA needs to identify the key stakeholders
and categorise them in terms of influence and needs, craft engagement
strategies for each and build and maintain an effective working relationship
with them.

 

UNDERSTANDING STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS

IA provides value to the organisation and
its stakeholders when it delivers objective and relevant assurance, and
contributes to the effectiveness and efficiency of governance, risk management
and control processes. To achieve this, the IA plan should reflect the issues
that are important to the stakeholders; it should address the challenges and
risks that stand in the way of the strategic and other key objectives of the
organisation. IA must invest sufficient time in talking to stakeholders to
identify and assess priorities. It should involve them in drafting the IA plan
and solicit inputs. Knowing what’s important to stakeholders is the
cornerstone of managing their expectations.

 

Keep your ear to the ground to ensure that
IA is in tune with current concerns and has a flexible plan. If need be, it
should review and update the plan at the half-year point or even quarterly if
circumstances so dictate. Design a process that brings information together;
share it within the IA team to ensure that the team is aware of the main
business drivers
and risks; analyse it and make planning decisions
based on key risks and issues.

 

One of the most important aspects to think
about is the approach, frequency and content of communications for each
stakeholder so that it is easy and encourages them to get involved. Besides,
consider the balance and benefits of formal and informal protocol. Ensure that
the stakeholders understand your needs, relevance and the value of IA to the
organisation.

 

There are several key areas of IA work that
require good stakeholder understanding:

(a) The IA Charter, which defines its mission, role
and scope, should be a living document that helps to sustain IA’s value to the
organisation. The Charter must be up to date, clear, easily understood and
reflect the focus of IA. Stakeholders need to be aware of it and it could, for
example, be a key document on the IA intranet.

(b)        More and more internal auditors are
providing ratings at an engagement and overall level. IA should work with the
AC Chair and senior managers to devise a way of expressing ratings that help
them to understand where the business stands in relation to achieving its
objectives. Some ACs prefer narrative statements, others ‘traffic light’
systems or gradings. There is no right or wrong way of doing this. It does mean
talking through options, agreeing to a suitable format and applying it on a
consistent basis.

(c) Stakeholder feedback on individual engagements
and at the overall service level are important components to continuously
assessing the effectiveness of the service and how well it is providing value
to the organisation.

 

MANAGING STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS – OVERVIEW

Having understood
the stakeholder expectations:

1.   Assess key stakeholder expectations, identify
gaps and implement a comprehensive strategy for improvement;

2.   Deploy quality resources for planning and
execution;

3.   Leverage technology to the full;

4.   Deploy a strategy for business knowledge
acquisition;

5.   Streamline IA processes and operations to
enhance value;

6.   Coordinate and collaborate with other risk,
control and compliance functions. In many organisations, some of these roles
are with IA or there may be an overlap. It is not unusual to find board members
looking at IA when issues of risk, control and compliance come up for review.

 

KEYS TO SUCCESS – HIGH-LEVEL INTER-PERSONAL SKILLS

Good oral, written
communications and presentation skills topped with soft skills will hold you
and your team in good stead.

 

Strong
collaboration with stakeholders calls for highly capable communicators who are
good not only at oral and written communications, but also good listeners who
are highly perceptive of body language and unspoken words. My experience over
the years is that there is scope for improvement for IA in effective
communication with stakeholders.

 

IA needs to
remember to communicate what is and what is not being audited and why. ACs need
clarity on this point. Further, the rule of sequence of observation, root
cause, risk and suggested mitigation presented objectively and with clarity
will reinforce your effectiveness.

 

And if you see a problem beyond your scope, either do something to fix
it, or bring it to the attention of those who can fix it. You will then be
perceived as a valuable partner to your stakeholders. Do not hesitate to
solicit feedback from stakeholders; ask them to identify areas for you to
improve.

 

To stay
relevant, always

*    Know your stakeholders’ expectations;

*    Set the right tone and culture for your team
– never stop short of demanding quality, agility and integrity;

*    Build
exceptional teams that deliver high-value assurance and advisory services to
the organisation / client.

 

STRIKING A BALANCE

To achieve the
right balance, IA may employ some of these approaches:

(i)   Engage stakeholders as a business leader, not
a technical auditor –

Assess the IA
team’s level of business acumen and, if necessary, develop a plan to spend time
and effort with those in the organisation who can help you think more like a
business leader and understand the risks related to its strategies and
businesses and the internal and external inter-dependencies. And align these
with functional knowledge of IA.

(ii) Coordinate with the second line of defence –

Understand clearly
the work done by functions in the second line of defence. Collaborate as much
as possible with these functions, work towards common views of risks and
compliance where possible. Once the rigour of their work is tested, IA may rely
on assurance work done by these functions.

(iii)        Balance competing demands –

Develop strong
relationships with stakeholders, including auditees at all levels. However,
stay grounded in your professional obligations and be firm when the situation
demands.

 

IA may also involve
itself in conducting proactive fraud audits to identify potentially fraudulent
acts; participating in fraud investigations under the direction of fraud
investigation professionals; and conducting post-investigation fraud audits to
identify control breakdowns and establish financial loss. Above all, just
watch for complacency!

    

Recent stakeholder
surveys suggest that whilst IA is keeping up with changes in business and is
communicating well with management and the Board by focussing on critical
areas, IA needs to demonstrate its capability for value-add. This is
best done by moving beyond its comfort zone to help organisations bring an IA
perspective to strategic initiatives and changes – digitalisation,
cyber-security, Internet-of-things and more. It needs to proactively flag
the new and emerging risks
that organisations need to understand and
manage.

    

To successfully
manage auditees’ expectations, IA should become familiar with the most common
issues relating to their expectations. To understand them, find some time to
have one-on-one casual and unscripted conversations as often as possible. You
need to realise that stakeholders are not IA subject matter experts. They may
not understand the IA jargon or theory as well as you do. Take some time to
understand them and educate them when you know for sure that there are gaps in
their knowledge that should be filled. Keep it simple when communicating
with auditee stakeholders; in fact, use their language in your conversations
and you will instantly strike a chord!

    

Working with
stakeholders is a two-way process. Talking to and working with them is
fundamental to IA. It enables internal auditors to explain the value of IA
while getting to know stakeholder expectations. Regular face-to-face
meetings enable internal auditors to highlight the function’s role in good
governance and explain the value of the independent and objective assurance.

Stakeholders, on the other hand, have an opportunity to talk about IA
performance and flag risks or issues they would like to see in the IA plan.

 

Regular contact is
therefore beneficial to everyone, but it can be difficult to organise. Plan
ahead, especially as other assurance providers may be competing for your
stakeholders’ attention.

 

MANAGING STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS

Let us now look at
how IA can manage its key stakeholders:

 

AC / Board,
CEO

  •     With the AC Chair as well
    as with the CEO, agree on the audit plan after presenting your draft and
    soliciting guidance to modify the same. That establishes your agreement that
    captures the stakeholder expectations. Thereafter, remain proactive; seek
    periodic meetings when you can share progress as also any challenges that could
    impede audit execution. Avoid surprises with all stakeholders, especially the
    AC Chair and the CEO. Reset expectations if necessary or seek support that may
    mitigate challenges.
  •     Talk to your stakeholders, particularly your
    AC Chair and CEO, perhaps also the CFO, and find out what they expect from IA.
    This not only includes the focus of the IA plan but also IA processes, such as
    expressing opinions, reporting styles, performance monitoring and quality
    assessment.
  •     Set up separate ‘audit
    planning days’ with the AC Chair / members outside the formal meeting schedule.
    Prepare monthly / quarterly activity reports or regular briefings for AC
    members requesting feedback. This might include a balanced scorecard or
    dashboard to show progress on a number of important activities. Meet informally
    or call your AC Chair between meetings. Meet the AC Chair before each meeting.
  •     AC Chair and CEOs often use
    IA as an informal sounding board with whom they can discuss risks and explore
    practical responses.

    

Auditees

  •     Organise formal, one-to-one
    internal audit planning discussions with business heads and heads of support
    functions.
  •     Find time for follow-up
    reviews with managers to understand changing risk profiles.
  •     Schedule informal, short
    ‘catch-up’ meetings or phone calls with managers to keep up with changes and
    developments in the organisation.

 

Your
collaborators

  •     Establish regular meetings
    with the CFO and risk management teams to maintain awareness of risk events and
    issues.
  •     Keep in touch with other
    assurance providers to share information.
  •     Collaborate with the
    compliance head and the IT head – both of them can be valuable supporters in
    your initiatives. IA can also work on creating a common resource pool with this
    set of collaborators.

 

Your team

  •     Arrange monthly team
    meetings for sharing experience during execution.
  •     Organise training for
    functional and soft skills. Hold ‘audit workshops’, for example, where the CEO,
    CFO or a business head may meet with a section of the audit team to discuss
    significant risks and issues.
  •     Recognise good performers.
    Ensure variety for team and focus on their development and rotation.
    Demonstrate how IA can be a pipeline for talent that is already groomed in
    process discipline.
  •     An annual two-day offsite for
    the IA team is ideal for brainstorming, introspection, assimilation of feedback
    and team-building. Try and get an external expert to address the team. The IA
    team is more often in the field and less often in office – life can be tough,
    so be sensitive to their hectic schedules and extend support to them.

 

External
stakeholders

  •     Schedule planning and
    update meetings with external stakeholders, e.g., external audit. It is
    necessary to share the audit plan and solicit inputs from the statutory
    auditors. Have at least quarterly meetings to exchange notes with them.
  •     Periodically engage with a
    professional network, which is a good source for sharing new initiatives,
    knowledge-sharing and also trying joint initiatives.
  •     Be a part of professional
    networking groups and occasionally host such meetings in your office. That also
    helps your team to get external exposure.

 

Over the years,
there is a reluctant acceptance that IA does not enjoy as much influence as it
could have enjoyed. There is a feeling that IA is not positioned properly
within the organisation to have the maximum possible impact. And often, IA is
reduced to a compliance function, unable to focus on the opportunities and
risks.

 

Often, IA teams do not have the right skills and capabilities to
undertake the kinds of activities to be relevant and impactful within the
organisation. In response to this challenge, more CAEs plan to use alternative
resourcing models in the coming three to five years to gain the kinds of skills
they need. Co-sourcing, for instance, is a popular option that helps access
specialised skills. Additional alternative resourcing models such as guest
auditor programmes and rotation programmes are also gaining acceptance.

 

Though many IA
teams are embracing analytics to drive deeper insight and provide greater
foresight, others are barely scratching the surface. CAEs are now attempting to
deploy advanced analytics and predictive tools that leading internal audit departments
are using to provide greater value, to provide deeper insight, and to provide
foresight to their stakeholders. Use of workflow-based audit planning and
execution software is helping IA in enhanced delivery.

 

STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
PLAN

Here are some
simple ideas that might form part of a Stakeholder Engagement Plan or a
component part of IA strategy:

(a) Develop an induction programme for new AC
members and business leaders / senior managers.

(b)        Organise separate management meetings and
earmark sessions during AC meetings to provide updates and relevant
information. This could include changes in legislation, regulation, risk
management and IA profession and how this might impact the organisation and
audit execution.

(c) Develop an intranet site that contains useful
and relevant information and ensure that it is kept up to date.

(d)        Prepare and circulate a brief note
containing information about IA activities. Use this channel to introduce your
team to a larger audience. Update this periodically to include highlights of
the achievements of IA during the year.

(e) Prepare short guides relating to the IA
process, IA involvement in projects such as systems implementation or new
business set-up, IA role with regard to risk management, etc. Auditees love to
see documented audit processes and terms of engagement with IA, including
service level agreements for flow of information, responses and action-taken
reports.

(f) Schedule periodic meetings with key
stakeholders, even when there is no direct engagement activity in their area,
to stay alive to business changes and the potential for new and emerging risks
that might call for a revision of the engagement plan.

(g)        Offer to second team
members for support or, better still, introduce the concept of guest auditor
for operational audits.

 

With support from
management, IA must help the organisation realise that there is one goal with
one common interest and that there is one team, not two, and each performs its
role in a different way – that would contribute significantly to harmonising
the work performance, increase effectiveness of IA and achieve stakeholders’
satisfaction.

 

DO STAKEHOLDERS MEET THE EXPECTATIONS OF INTERNAL AUDIT?

The question, how
IA can meet the expectations of stakeholders has often been discussed and
debated. Various questionnaires are used to measure the satisfaction of
stakeholders with the performance of IA and its role in achieving the
objectives of the organisation, improving its operations and enhancing the
control and risk management practices.

 

There is also a
need to address the subject from the other party’s perspective with the same
degree of interest – how can stakeholders meet the expectations of IA and be
supportive of IA? While it is the responsibility of the management to ensure
that IA is well accepted in the organisation, IA is well advised to take a
proactive approach and build bridges with various stakeholders through fair and
effective communication and finding opportunities to demonstrate the
contribution of IA on a regular, ongoing basis.

 

CONCLUSION

The frequent discussions about how IA meets the expectations of
stakeholders may perhaps give a wrong impression about internal audit in
comparison with other functions within the organisation. In some organisations,
IA is criticised for impacting the morale of business teams by raising
objections and concerns. In others, particularly those experiencing
cost-control measures, IA is often called upon to justify the reasons for its
existence and the importance of its work. These misconceptions can best be
erased by sustained investment in managing stakeholder expectations and
focusing on value-addition across the various areas addressed by Internal Auditors.

 

Though IA may not
be the most glamorous corporate activity, without it, many organisations would
fall foul of their numerous regulatory and compliance obligations. Indeed, IA
helps companies to establish and maintain solid cultures of compliance up and
down the corporate structure. Historically, IA has focused primarily on just
financial and compliance areas. More and more organisations are beginning to
see the strategic and operational benefits of utilising IA from an enterprise
risk angle. Compliance with ever-increasing regulations obviously remains a
core focus for IA teams; however, increases in social media usage as well as
the recent explosion in cybercrime and developments in the technological space
are posing more issues for internal auditors to address.

 

As IA encapsulates
a variety of business areas, boards, senior executives and auditors are
becoming increasingly aware of how companies can leverage IA as a strategic
business adviser, but it is up to companies to find the right balance. Happy
stakeholders will support IA adequately to ensure that the right resources are
available and influence the organisation culture to look at IA as a
collaborator.

 

Good business leaders should anticipate what their customers will
want in the days to come. Good IAs need to be alert to what their stakeholders
will expect from them, especially when there is so much turbulence in the
corporate world. Are you ready? 

 

RECORDS AND THEIR MAINTENANCE

Indirect tax being a transaction-based impost, it relies heavily on
transaction-level documentation for its implementation. The new millennium has
already completed a ‘graduation’ in statutory record maintenance – from preset
formats to content-based requirements. GST is a step in the same direction with
the added advantage of digitisation. This article lists some of the
documentation requirements under GST.

 

Persons liable to maintain records:

(a)        A person who is
registered (or liable to register) is required to maintain books of accounts
and records; distinct persons (such as branches, regional offices, etc.) of
such registered entities are required to maintain separate books of accounts
pertaining to their operations;

(b)        Certain designated
persons seeking registration for specific transactions (such as a deductor of
tax u/s 51; an e-commerce operator operating as a collector u/s 52; an input
service distributor) are required to maintain records for the purposes for
which they are designated;

(c)        The owner of a place of
storage of goods (such as a warehouse, godown, etc.) and transporters / C&F
agents are also required to maintain records of consignor, consignee and
specified details of goods. This requirement is placed even though the person
concerned does not have any ownership over the goods and their movement.
Independent enrolment forms have been prescribed (in Form ENR-01/02) for this
purpose. It is perceived that this provision is applicable only to person/s who
have possessory rights over the goods and should not be made applicable in
cases where the owner of the place of storage has merely leased out the
premises for storage without any control over the storage of goods.

(d)        Casual taxable person /
non-resident taxable person doing business temporarily in a state / country is
required to maintain books of accounts for its operational period in that state
/ country;

(e)        Agent (typically,
representative agent) is required to maintain accounts in respect of the
movement, inventory and tax paid on goods of each principal with the statement
of accounts of the principal;

(f) Reporting agencies (such as
state governments, registrars / sub-registrars, stock exchanges, the Goods and
Services Tax Network, electricity boards, etc.) are required to maintain and
report details of information specifically required to be reported in the
information return under GST;

(g)        A GST practitioner is
required to maintain records of the statements / returns being filed on behalf
of the registered persons.

 

List of records (section 35):

Section 35 of the CGST / SGST Acts provides for the maintenance of the
following records by registered persons at each place of business, e.g. each
stockyard would need to maintain a separate stock account of goods:

(i)     Production or manufacture
of goods,

(ii)    Inward and outward supply
of goods / services,

(iii)   Stock of goods,

(iv)   Input tax credit availed,

(v)    Output tax payable and paid,

(vi)   Any other requirement
specified.

 

In special circumstances, the Commissioner may on application prescribe
waiver over maintenance of specific documents, where the trade practice
warrants such waiver on account of difficulty in maintenance. Since this is a
discretionary power, the Commissioner can prescribe a conditional waiver (such
as subject to alternative document, etc.), too. Such records are required to be
audited by a chartered / cost accountant and submitted with the annual return
for the relevant year.

 

Specified Contents (Rule 56):

In addition to the above, the rules prescribe maintenance of the
following details:

 

(1) Stock registers should contain
quantitative details of:

(a) raw
material consumption,

(b)   details
of goods imported and exported,

(c)    production,
scrap / wastage, generation of by-products, loss / pilferage, gift / samples,
etc.

     Costing
records with standard conversion ratios can be maintained, especially in case
of standardised goods;

(2)  Transactions attracting
reverse charge with details of the inward supplies;

(3)  Register of prescribed
documents, i.e., tax invoice, debit / credit notes, receipts / payment / refund
vouchers, bills of supply and delivery challans;

(4)  Details of advance receipts,
payments and their adjustments.

 

Statutorily prescribed documents:

Tax invoices / debit notes / credit notes / e-way bills / receipt
vouchers etc. have been prescribed with their contents. These documents are not
permitted to be revised except where specified in the statute (such as issuance
of a revised invoice with attestation of the GSTIN number for a new registrant).

 

Tax invoices – These are required to be issued for
any taxable supply in accordance with the timings specified in section 31. It
not only proves supply of goods or services, but is also an essential document
for the recipient to avail Input Tax Credit. There are approximately 17
requirements and the said document is required to be issued in triplicate for
supply of goods and in duplicate for supply of services. Banking and insurance
companies have special instructions / waivers. An invoice document can be
signed with a digital signature of the supplier or its authorised
representative. An electronic invoice issued in terms of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 does not require a signature or digital signature. Persons
with a turnover above Rs. 1.5 crores and up to Rs. 5 crores and those above Rs.
5 crores should quote four-digit HSNs as against the eight-digit HSN in the
customs tariff.

 

Receipt / refund vouchers and payment
vouchers
– These
documents are issued when there is flow of funds between the contracting
parties. This is a new prescription in comparison to the erstwhile laws and
aimed at documenting events occurring before the time of supply. Receipt
voucher is issued for any advance, refund vouchers are issued on refund of any
advance prior to issuance of tax invoice. Payment vouchers are issued by
recipients of supplies who are liable to tax under reverse charge provisions
signifying the date of payment and an affirmation to the supplier that he / she
would be making the payment under reverse charge provisions.

 

Debit / credit notes – Any upward / downward adjustment in
valuation after issuance of tax invoices can be undertaken only through debit /
credit notes. In the context of GST, these can only be issued in specific cases
u/s 34. But the section does not preclude any entity to issue debit / credit
notes in other circumstances in order to settle or adjust inter-party accounts.
In addition to the details specified in the tax invoice, the debit note and
credit note will also contain reference to the original invoice against which
it is being issued.

 

Bill of supply – This document is issued in case of an
exempt supply. In case where a taxpayer is making taxable and exempted supplies
(such as retailers), an invoice-cum-bill of supply can be issued containing the
required details.

 

Delivery challan – This document is required where
movement of goods takes place other than by way of supply, for job work, the
supply of liquid gas and other prescribed scenarios. It is also issued in case
of supply where the movement of goods takes place under completely /
semi-knocked-down condition in batches or lots. This should also be issued in
triplicate with the original document moving along with the goods in movement.

 

Business specific requirements:

(a)        Works contractors are
required to maintain details of receipt of goods / services and their
utilisation in respect of each works contract separately along with the other
details specified above. With effect from 1st April, 2019,
developers are required to maintain project-wise details of inputs, RCM and
books of accounts under the recently-issued real estate scheme;

(b)        While the principal is
principally liable to maintain records of its goods at job worker location, the
job worker is also required to maintain specific records in respect of each
principal’s goods, their consumption / output and their inward / outward
movement; and

(c)        Persons under the
composition scheme are required to maintain books of accounts and records with
specific waivers on the input tax credit front.

 

Electronic records – Rule 57:

Section 4 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 states that
maintenance of records in electronic form would meet statutory requirements
provided that the records should not be capable of being erased, effaced or
over-written and equipped with an audit trail, i.e., any amendment or deletion
of an incorrect entry should be under due authorisation and traceable with a
log of details. The electronic records [section 2(t) states that any data,
record or image or sound stored, received or sent in electronic form is an
electronic record] should be authenticated by means of digital signatures by
authorised agents of the registered person. The GST law also contains
provisions to this effect. Many accounting packages may not meet the
requirement of having an audit trail of data captured in the software and may
be staring at an unintended violation. Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 prescribed that an electronic record duly authenticated as per the IT Act
would serve as a documentary evidence in any proceeding and shall be admissible
in any proceedings without any further proof or production of the original
document.

 

Not only should the registered person maintain records of the respective
principal place and additional places, but should also take necessary steps for
recovery in case of data corruption or disaster recovery by maintaining
suitable back-ups of such records. In view of this specific prescription,
officers may be empowered to perform best judgement assessments even in cases
where records are irretrievable due to natural causes / accidents, etc., on
ground of non-maintenance of appropriate data recovery mechanisms.

 

Rule 56(15) requires electronic records to be authenticated with an
electronic signature. Interestingly, the IT Act considers an ‘electronic
signature’ secure and reliable only if the signature was created under the
exclusive control of the signatory and no other person. MSME managements
habitually handing over signatures to others for operational convenience are
finding this requirement to be an uphill task and an unknown risk.

 

Location / accessibility:

Records are required to be maintained at the principal place of business
specified for each state in which the registered person operates. In case of
additional places of business, location-specific records are required to be
maintained at the respective locations. In peculiar cases of un-manned
structures such as IT infrastructure, windmills, etc., constituting the place
of business, identification / sufficiency and accessibility of records would
become challenging. The documents should be readily accessible to the proper
officer and the taxpayer is duty-bound to assist the officer with all the
security systems in order to facilitate their verification.

 

Sufficiency in documentation:

GST places the onus on the taxpayer / Revenue to establish the presence
of a fact while invoking the provisions. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 lays
down principles when evidence is sufficient to prove a fact, its probable
existence or non-existence. Under the Act, documentary evidences are segregated
into primary and secondary evidences and their implications as evidence have
been set out. In tax laws, the first resort to establish a fact is usually the
documentation maintained by the person. Normal accounting set-ups do not meet
all requirements prescribed in GST and information has to be sourced from the
operational set-up of the organisation. Some instances in the context of GST
are explained below:

 

(i) Time of
supply / raising tax invoice
– One of the parameters used to ascertain the time of supply of
services is provision / completion of the service. Services are intangible in
nature and contracting parties usually do not document their start and end
point. An assessee operating under long-duration / phased contracts should
document milestones either with counter party (such as service completion
certificate, warranty certificates, etc.) or external certificates. This would
also assist the taxpayer to claim refund in case of excess payment arising on
cessation of contracts. The tax invoice should, apart from the mere description
of the service, also report the start and end date of the assignment with the
end deliverable in this time frame.

 

(ii) Input
tax credit claim

Section 16(1)/(2) requires that the taxpayer establish use / intent to use and
receipt of services for establishing its right of input tax. The primary onus
is on the taxpayer for establishing this fact and once this is established it
would be the Revenue’s turn to establish this fact from records. Rule 57(13)
requires even service providers to establish utilisation of input services.
This becomes challenging and the authors’ view is that mere payment or debit in
the accounts of the assessee may not be sufficient to discharge the primary
onus. While there is no prescriptive list and it is highly fact-specific, the
taxpayer would have to establish the delivery of a service by the service
provider and its acceptance by the recipient, e.g. a company can furnish the
copy of the signed auditor’s report as proof of receipt of an audit service, an
IT company can furnish the repair and service report, etc. The recipient should
stamp the vendor tax invoice (electronic / physical) and map the same with
service completion report of the vendor’s counter signature to establish this
fact at a later date.

 

(iii) Possession of invoice vs. GTR-2A matching – Input tax credits are permissible on
the basis of invoices of the supplier. Vendors are also mandated to upload the
details of the invoices on the GST portal which can be matched by the recipient
at his / her end. Can this facility in the portal which has been designed to
act as a self-policing system for the Revenue also assist the taxpayer to
contend that the presence of the details on the portal is itself a recognised
invoice and a sufficient substitute to the requirement of possessing of the
original invoices? While one may argue that 2A reports do not capture all
details of an invoice (for testing eligibility, etc.), this is certainly a
plausible defence which taxpayers can resort to. Taxpayers can certainly
establish receipt of service by other collateral documents (such as contracts,
email trails, etc.) and these should ideally meet the requirements of officers
insisting on production of original invoices. The CBEC circular in the context
of refund has waived the requirement of submission of input invoices for
invoices appearing in the GTR-2A statement on the portal (No. 59/33/2018-GST,
dated 4th September, 2018).

 

(iv) Inventory in manufacturing and service
set-ups

Manufacturers and service providers are required to maintain the stock of
consumption of goods. While the prescription is to maintain details of
consumption, it is advisable to map this with the costing records (standard
consumption ratios, etc.), bill of materials, shop floor registers, etc., in
order to produce the same before authorities in case of any allegation of
excessive wastage / clandestine removal, etc. The factory records should
contain the entire trail of consumption of raw materials right from the store
inwards up to the finished goods section. Batch records of inputs and their
journey to the particular batch of final products would be essential where raw
materials and finished goods do not have stable pricing. This also assists in computation
of any input tax reversal in case of ascertaining the input tax credit
component on destruction of goods such as by fire, etc. Service sector (without
a strong ERP) would face the challenge of establishing the consumption of
goods, especially where the unit of measurement of billing is different from
the UOM of the materials indented into the stock. In ‘Bill to Ship to
Movement’, the intermediate supplier should prove that the goods have been
received by the ‘end buyer’ in the transaction chain.

 

(v)        Valuation
under prescriptive rules, i.e., fair market value, rejection, cost plus, etc.
– Valuation rules require to first
ascertain fair market value / open market value, non-monetary components, etc.
in case of fixing the taxable value. These values can be documented from market
databases, stock exchange details, regulatory publications, etc. Pricing of
like comparable transactions can be sought from third-party quotations;
purchase orders may be obtained and documented as a justification of the
valuation. In case cost-plus pricing is sought to be resorted to, documentation
of the rejections of other methodology and computation of costs through costing
records becomes essential.

 

(vi) Identification of inputs / input services /
capital and their usage in exclusive / common category
– Rules 42/43 require tax credits to be
categorised in three baskets. The classification is driven by the end use of
the particular input. While the inventory records may record the issuance of
inputs to the particular goods / services, the end use of input services and
their exclusiveness to a particular class of supply (taxable, exempt,
zero-rated) should be documented through cost centres, project costing
documentations, etc.

 

(vii) Proving against unjust enrichment /
profiteering
– Section
49(9) presumes that taxes paid by a person have been passed on to the recipient
of goods / services. Any claim of refund by such person would have to overcome
this burden of proof. As per the learning from erstwhile laws, one should
maintain affidavits, declarations from counter parties, price comparisons for
pre- and post the change in tax rates, costing / accounting records,
identification of end consumer, certifications, etc. for establishing against
unjust enrichment / profiteering.

 

(viii) Change in rate of goods / services and
cut-off date records: exemption to taxable vice-versa
– In case of change in tax status for
goods / services, documentation over the criteria of supply of goods /
services, payment and invoicing should be maintained for all open transactions
on the said cut-off date. Apart from this, input tax credits of inputs in stock
or contained in unfinished / finished goods for availment / reversal should
also be maintained.

 

(ix) Maintenance of pre-GST documentation – Transitional provisions specify
certain conditions to be prevalent on 1st July, 2017 for availing benefits under the GST law. Moreover,
the status of certain unfinished transactions on this date (incomplete
services, partially billed services, advances, etc.) should have been
documented. For example, a dealer availing transition credit of stock available
from purchase prior to 1st July, 2017 should be in a position to map
the stock in hand to the invoice which should be within one year from the date
of introduction of GST.

 

(x)        Presence
/ absence of an intra-branch / registration activates
– This is certainly a problem whose
solution is ‘elusive’ for all taxpayers having multi-locational presence. No
one, including the government administration, has a clue about this Pandora’s
Box. In a de-clustered environment, companies have started documenting internal
roles and responsibilities of offices and sharing of resources through
time-sheets and building invisible walls within the organisations. These are
passed at board meetings and maintained as per company records for future
production before officers. In clustered environments where the entire set-up
works so cohesively and partitions are impossible to be even envisioned and
documented, companies need to take a conservative approach and discharge the
taxes to protect themselves against any future cash loss.

 

(xi) Refund provisions require specific details – Refund procedures require certain
endorsements and proofs such as FIRCs / BIRCs for meeting the sanction
conditions. Currently, banks have refused to issue FIRCs on receipt of foreign
inward remittances citing a FEDAI circular. Some banks are issuing the same
only if a specific application has been made by the account holder. Being a
statutory requirement, as a last resort one should pursue this matter with the
banker and obtain alternative declarations which contain all the requirements
of the FIRC and make necessary submissions.

 

Other regulatory laws:

The Companies Act,
the Income-tax Act, banking / insurance regulation laws, etc. are also
governing organisations in record maintenance and GST requirements can be met
with the assistance of reports under other laws. Entities would of course have
to apply the more stringent provision in order to harmonise requirements across
laws. For example, the Companies Act requires that the books of accounts of the
company should be kept at the registered office except where the Board of
Directors adopts an alternative location with due information to the Registrar
of Companies. This conflict between GST and the Companies Act can be resolved
by the Board adopting a resolution to maintain accounts at distinct locations
to comply with GST laws. In any case, mere access to electronic records at a
particular location is also sufficient compliance with GST requirements in
terms of section 35 of the Act. The Companies Act also requires reporting the
Internet Service Provider credentials where details are maintained on a cloud
platform. The Income-tax Act requires maintenance of transfer pricing
documentation and this could serve as a ground for corroborating the valuation
approach of the taxpayer. Labour laws may require an establishment level
reporting of employees which may serve as deciding the salary costs of a
distinct person under GST. One would have to approach documentation with an
open mind to extract as much information as possible from available statutory reports rather than reinventing the
wheel and duplication of records.

 

Time limit for retention of records (section 36):

The prescribed records are required to be maintained for a minimum
period of six years from the due date of furnishing the annual return for the
relevant year. In case of any pending legal proceedings as at the end of six
years, the relevant documents pertaining to the subject-matter of dispute are
to be maintained for one year after the final disposal of the proceedings. With
the annual return due dates being extended to 31st December, 2019,
the due date of assessments and retention of records are also being extended
for the taxpayers concerned.

 

Implications for non-maintenance of records:

Non-maintenance of
records invites penalty u/s 122 to the extent of Rs. 10,000 or 100% of the tax
evasion, apart from the penalty imposable for non-payment of tax dues. Such
failure would invite best judgement assessment based on other data such as
electricity records, 2A reports, e-way bills, paper slips, past history, etc.
For the first time, the statute has introduced a fiction that non-accountal of
goods or services from records (shortage of goods on physical verification,
numerical variances, storage at unregistered places [rule 56(60)] etc.), would
invite show cause proceedings for recovery of tax on such goods. However, this
presumption is rebuttable with credible evidence, including the fact of
destruction, loss or otherwise of goods.

 

As one implements the
requirements, the trichotomy of materiality, practicality and technicality
would stare the taxpayer in the face. The dividing line of segregating
documents which are mandatory and those which are ancillary is very thin and
difficult for a taxpayer to decide upon. Law has prescribed the minimum
criteria and it is in the taxpayer’s own interest to implement the law and
maintain additional documents to substantiate his claims under the Act. It
takes less time to do things right than explain why you did it wrong – Henry
Wadsworth.

 

With
increased self-reporting over digital formats, there is also a high expectation
for the government to gear up its Information Technology capabilities. In a
bi-polar administration, it is very essential that the administration
streamline its documentation demands by avoiding parallel requests consuming
unnecessary time and economic resources. Governments should appreciate that
‘Compliance’ is just a subset of ‘Governance’ and not the other way round.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY UNDER GST

INTRODUCTION


1.  It’s a trite law that for a tax
law to survive there needs to be a levy provision which determines when
the levy of tax would be triggered, i.e., when the taxable event takes place;
and a collection provision which determines when the levy of tax
triggered can be collected by the Department. The levy provision precedes the
collection provision and in the event the levy is not triggered, the collection
provision also does not get triggered. In other words, without levy getting
triggered, the collection mechanism fails. This distinction between the levy
and collection provisions has been dealt with by the Supreme Court on multiple
occasions.

 

2.  In this article, we shall
discuss in detail the provisions relating to collection of tax dealt with in
Chapter IV of the CGST Act, 2017.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – CASES UNDER FORWARD CHARGE
(OTHER THAN CONTINUOUS SUPPLY)


3.  Section 9, which is the charging
section for the levy of GST, provides that the tax shall be collected in such
manner as may be prescribed. The manner has been prescribed u/s. 12 to 14 of
the CGST Act, 2017. Sections 12 and 13 thereof deal with time of supply of
goods and services, respectively, while section 14 deals with instances when
there is a change in the rate of goods / services supplied.

 

4.  Sections 12 (1) and 13 (1)
thereof provide that the liability to pay tax on supply of goods and / or
services shall arise at the time of supply of the said goods and / or services
and then proceeds to list down events when the time of supply shall be
triggered in the context of goods and services, respectively. The provisions
relating to time of supply, in cases where the tax is liable under forward
charge, is tabulated alongside:

Time of supply in
the case of supply of goods

Time of supply in
the case of supply of services

Section 12 (2):

The time of supply shall be earliest of:

  •  Date
    of issue of invoice by supplier or the last date on which the invoice is
    required to be issued u/s. 31 (1) with respect to the supply [Clause (a)]
  •  Date on which the supplier receives the payment for
    such supply [Clause (b)]

Section 13 (2):

The time of supply
shall be earliest of:

  •     If
    the invoice is issued within the time prescribed u/s. 31 (2) – date of issue
    of invoice OR the date of receipt of payment, whichever is earlier [Clause
    (a)]
  •     If
    the invoice is not issued within the time prescribed u/s. 31 (2) – the date
    of provision of service OR the date of receipt of payment, whichever is
    earlier [Clause (b)]
  •     If
    the above does not apply – date on which the recipient shows the receipt of
    service in his books of accounts [Clause (c)]

 

 

5.  As can be seen from the above,
sections 12 (2) and 13 (2) provide that in normal cases, the time of supply
shall be determined based on the issuance of invoice within the timeline
prescribed u/s. 31. The time limit for issuing invoice u/s. 31 is as under:

 

In case of supply of
goods

In case of supply of
services

Section 31 (1):

Invoice shall be
required to be issued before or at the time of

  •     Removal
    of goods for supply to recipient, where supply involves movement of goods
  •     Delivery
    of goods or making available thereof to the recipient in any other case

Section 31 (2):

Invoice shall be required to be issued before or after
the provision of service
, but within prescribed time limit of issue of
the invoice, which has been prescribed as 30 days u/r. 47 of CGST Rules, 2017

 

6.  From the above, it is evident
that in case of goods, the time of supply is determined based on the nature of
goods. For tangible goods, there are two scenarios envisaged, namely:

 

  •    Where there is movement of goods involved –
    this would cover both, ex-works as well as CIF contracts. Before the movement
    of goods is initiated, the supplier will have to issue the invoice,
    irrespective of whether the risk and rewards associated with the goods have
    been transferred or not;
  •    Where there is no movement of goods – this
    would cover situations where the supply of goods takes place only by way of
    transfer of title. For instance, transactions in a commodity exchange, where
    the sale has culminated and ownership changed hands, but the movement of goods
    does not take place. Instead there is merely an endorsement on the warehouse
    receipts. In such cases, the invoice will have to be issued before the
    endorsement takes place. Further, there are transactions wherein a supplier is
    required to keep a bare minimum stock of goods for a particular customer and
    the said stock cannot be sold to a third party. In such cases also, when the
    goods are appropriated for a particular customer, though the delivery is not
    taken by the customer, the time of supply shall get triggered at the moment
    when the appropriation towards a particular customer takes place.

7.  However, in case of intangible
goods, since the question of movement does not arise, in such cases the time of
supply shall be the date when the transfer takes place. For instance, in a
transaction involving permanent transfer of copyrights, time of supply shall be
the date when the transfer is executed, i.e., when the ownership of the rights
is transferred as per the provisions of the Copyright Act.

 

PROVISION OF SERVICE – ISSUES


8.  However,
the issue arises in the case of services since the triggering of time of supply
is predominantly based on completion of provision of service. However, what is
meant by completion of provision of service is a subjective issue and has its
own set of implications as discussed below:



  •    Method of accounting – it is possible that
    the supplier of service would be required to recognise revenue on accrual
    basis; however, the provision of service may not have been completed. It is
    possible that the Department may treat that the accrual is on account of
    completion of service, without appreciating the fact that the service provision
    might not have been completed in toto and, therefore, the supplier is
    not in a position to issue invoice for claiming the amount from the recipient,
    though he may have been required to accrue the invoice as per the accounting
    standards.

  •    Client
    approval of work proof of completion of service – There are instances when the
    actual execution of service might have been completed, but the confirmation of
    the same by the client might be pending. For instance, in case of contractors
    there is an industry practice of lodging a claim with their principal by
    raising a Running Account Bill which contains the detail of work done by the
    contractors, which would be then certified by the principal for its correctness
    and based on the certification alone would payment be made to the contractor.
    In such cases (assuming this is not classifiable as continuous supply of
    services), the question that arises is whether the completion of service shall
    be on raising the RA bill or when the same is approved by the client? The
    answer to this question can be derived from the CBEC Circular 144 of 2011 dated
    18.07.2011 which was issued in the context of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011
    under the erstwhile service tax regime and clarified as under:




2. These representations have been examined. The
Service Tax Rules, 1994 require that invoice should be issued within a period
of 14 days from the completion of the taxable service. The invoice needs to
indicate inter alia the value of service so completed. Thus it is important
to identify the service so completed. This would include not only the physical
part of providing the service but also the completion of all other auxiliary
activities that enable the service provider to be in a position to issue the
invoice. Such auxiliary activities could include activities like measurement, quality
testing, etc., which may be essential prerequisites for identification of
completion of service. The test for the determination whether a service has
been completed would be the completion of all the related activities that place
the service provider in a situation to be able to issue an invoice.

However, such activities do not include flimsy or irrelevant grounds for delay
in issuance of invoice.

 

CASES WHERE INVOICE HAS NOT BEEN ISSUED BUT
RECEIPT OF SERVICE ACCOUNTED BY RECIPIENT


9.  A specific anomaly lies in
section 13 (2). Clauses (a) and (b) thereof provide for determination of time
of supply of service where the invoice has been issued within the prescribed
time limit or not issued within the prescribed time limit. In other words,
these two scenarios can be there in any supply. However, clause (c) further
introduces a new scenario where neither clause (a) nor (b) applies. Clause (c)
deals with a situation wherein the recipient has accounted for receipt of
service. The question that therefore arises is whether the recipient accounting
for receipt of service can be a basis to say that the provision of service has
been completed? There can be cases where the recipient has merely provided for
expenses on accrual basis, though the service provision may not be completed.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – CONTINUOUS SUPPLY


10. However, the above general rule
for cases covered under forward charge mechanism will not be applicable in
cases where the supply is classifiable as continuous supply of goods / services
as defined u/s. 2. and reproduced below for ready reference:

 

Continuous supply of goods

Continuous supply of services

(32) “continuous supply of goods” means a supply of
goods which is provided, or agreed to be provided, continuously or on
recurrent basis, under a contract, whether or not by means of a wire, cable,
pipeline or other conduit, and for which the supplier invoices the recipient
on a regular or periodic basis and includes supply of such goods as the
government may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, by
notification specify;

(33) “continuous supply of services” means a supply of
services which is provided, or agreed to be provided, continuously or on
recurrent basis, under a contract, for a period exceeding three months with
periodic payment obligations and includes supply of such services as the
government may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, by
notification specify;

 

 

11. The question that therefore
arises from the above, is what shall be covered within the purview of
continuous supply? In the view of the authors, what would classify as
continuous supply would be instances where the supply of goods / service is
continuous in the sense that whenever the recipient, say, starts his stove, the
goods are available. Similarly, renting of immovable property service would
also qualify as continuous supply since the service is continuous in nature.

 

12. On the other hand, recurrent
supply would mean a supply which is provided in the same form over and over
again, but not on a continuous basis. For instance, a GST consultant has agreed
to file the returns of his client on a monthly basis. This would classify as
recurrent service which the consultant keeps on providing over a period of time
and therefore classified as being in the nature of continuous supply.
Similarly, even in the context of goods, there can be examples of recurrent
supply. A mineral water supplier supplying two bottles of water on a daily
basis is an example of recurrent supply. All such supplies shall qualify as
continuous supply and accordingly the time limit for issuance of invoice shall
be as follows:

In case of
continuous supply of goods

In case of
continuous supply of services

Section 31 (4):

Where successive statements of accounts or successive
payments are involved, the invoice shall be issued before or at the time when
such successive statements are issued or each such payment is received.

Section 31 (5):

Invoice shall be
issued:

  •    Where
    due date of payment is ascertainable from the contract – on or before the due
    date of payment.
  •    Where
    due date of payment is not ascertainable from the contract – before or at the
    time when the supplier receives the payment.
  •    Where
    payment is linked to completion of an event – on or before the date of
    completion of event.

 

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – REVERSE CHARGE CASES


13. Sections 12 (3) and 13 (3) deal
with the provisions relating to time of supply in cases where reverse charge
mechanism is applicable. The relevant provisions are tabulated below for ready
reference:

 

Time of supply in
case of supply of goods

Time of supply in
case of supply of services

Section 12 (3):

The time of supply shall be earliest of:

  •     Date of receipt
    of goods.
  •     Date of payment
    as entered in the books of accounts of the recipient or the date on which the
    payment is debited in the books of account.
  •     Date
    immediately following 30 days from the date of issue of invoice or any other
    document by the supplier.

 

If time of supply cannot be determined as per the above,
the same shall be the date of entry in the books of accounts of the recipient
of supply.

Section 13 (3):

The time of supply shall be earliest of:

  •     Date of payment
    as entered in the books of accounts of the recipient or the date on which the
    payment is debited in the books of account.
  •     Date
    immediately following 60 days from the date of issue of invoice or any other
    document by the supplier.

 

If time of supply cannot be determined as per the above,
the same shall be the date of entry in the books of accounts of the recipient
of supply or date of payment, whichever is earlier.

 

Further in case of supply by associated enterprises
located outside India, the time of supply shall be the date of entry in the
books of accounts of recipient / date of payment, whichever is earlier.

 

 

CASES WHERE THERE IS A DELAY IN ACCOUNTING
THE INVOICE


14. At times, it so happens that the
recipient receives the invoice after the lapse of the prescribed time limit,
thus resulting in delay in accounting such invoices as well as discharge of
liability. In such cases, the question that arises is whether there is a delay
in accounting the invoice on account of factors beyond the control of the
recipient; for instance, in non-receipt of invoice within the prescribed time
limit, can interest liability be triggered for late payment of tax? In this
regard it is important to note that the provisions of section 12 (3) as well as
section 13 (3) clearly provide for triggering of liability upon completion of
the event, without any scope of exception.

 

Therefore, on a literal reading of the provisions, it is evident that interest
would be payable in such instances.

15. However, a contrary view can be
taken that the provision imposes a condition on the recipient which cannot be
fulfilled. It can be argued that the principle of lex non cogitadimpossibilia
is triggered, i.e., an agreement to do an impossible act is void and is not
enforceable by law. This principle has been accepted in the context of indirect
taxes as well1. Based on the same, it can be argued that since on
the date of expiry of 30 / 60 days period the invoice itself was not available
with the recipient, it was not possible for him to discharge the tax liability
and therefore it cannot be said that the recipient has failed to make payment
of tax and is therefore liable to pay interest.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY IN CASE OF VOUCHERS


16. The term voucher has been
defined u/s. 2 (118) to mean

“an instrument where there is an obligation to
accept it as consideration or part consideration for a supply of goods or
services or both and where the goods or services or both to be supplied or the
identities of their potential suppliers are either indicated on the instrument
itself or in related documentation, including the terms and conditions of use
of such instrument”.

 

17. Vouchers are generally
classified as Prepaid Instruments and are governed by the Payment &
Settlement Systems Act, 2007 read with RBI Circular DPSS/2017-18/58 dated
11.10.2017 wherein it has been provided that there can be two type of vouchers,
namely:

 

  •    Closed System PPI – wherein the voucher is
    issued directly by the supplier (for example, recharge coupons issued by
    telecoms, DTHs, etc.) for facilitating the supply of their own goods /
    services. In fact, closed system PPI can be used for specific purposes only.
    For instance, hotel vouchers issued by various hotel brands can be used for
    availing specific service that would be mentioned on the voucher only;
  •    Semi-closed System PPI – wherein the voucher
    is issued by a system provider which can be used by the voucher holder to
    purchase goods / services from suppliers who are registered as system
    participant (for example, Sodexo, Ticket Restaurant® Meal Card, etc.). Such
    semi-closed system PPI can be used for procuring any supplies that the system
    participant would be making. For example, Sodexo voucher can be used for buying
    food-grains as well as vegetables from the system participant.

18. In view of this distinct nature
of the vouchers, depending on the nature of voucher and the underlying
deliverable from the voucher, the time of supply provisions have been prescribed
as under:

 

In case the voucher
is consumed / to be consumed towards procuring goods

In case the voucher
is consumed / to be consumed towards procuring services

The time of supply,
if voucher used / to be used for supply of goods shall be:

  •     If
    underlying supply is identifiable at the time of supply of voucher, the date
    of issue of voucher.
  •     In
    other cases, the date of redemption of voucher.

The time of supply,
if voucher used / to be used for supply of service shall be:

  •     If
    underlying supply is identifiable at the time of supply of voucher, the date
    of issue of voucher.
  •     In
    other cases, the date of redemption of voucher.

 

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – RESIDUARY PROVISIONS


19.     Further,
sections 12 (5) and 13 (5) provide that in case the time of supply of goods /
services is not determinable under any of the above sections, the same shall be
determined as under:

  •    If periodical return is to be filed, the date
    on which such return is to be filed.
  •    Else, the date on which tax is paid.

20. In addition, sections 12 (6) and
13 (6) provides that the time of supply in case of addition in value of supply
on account of interest, late fee or penalty for delayed payment of
consideration received from customer, shall be at the time of receipt of such
amount and not at the time of claiming the same from the customer.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – TAX ON ADVANCES


21. Sections 12 (2) as well as 13
(2) provide that in case the earliest event is the date of receipt of payment,
in such a scenario tax shall be payable at the time of receipt of such advance
consideration. However, it has to be noted that such advance payment has to
pass the test of consideration, as per the definition provided u/s. 2 (31)
which is reproduced below for ready reference:

 

(31) “consideration” in relation to the supply of goods or services
or both includes —

 

(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in
money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of,
the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any
other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central government
or a State government;

(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance,
in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or
services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not
include any subsidy given by the Central government or a State government:

 

Provided that a deposit given in respect of the
supply of goods or services or both shall not be considered as payment made for
such supply unless the supplier applies such deposit as consideration for the
said supply.

 

22. From the above, it is more than
evident that for any payment received to be considered as supply, it has to be
in relation to the supply of goods or service. If such relation cannot be
established, the payment would not partake the character of consideration and
therefore tax would not be payable on the same. In fact, in the context of
service tax, the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Thermax
Instrumentation Limited vs. CCE [2017 (51) STR 263]
held as under:



8. In the present case the advance is like earnest
money for which a bank guarantee is given by the appellant. It is a fact that
the customer can invoke the bank guarantee at any time and take back the
advance. Hence the appellant does not show the advance as an income, not
having complete dominion over the amount, and therefore, the same cannot be
treated as a consideration for any service provided.
Therefore, the
findings lack appreciation of the complete facts and evidences (only relevant
extracts).

 

23. It is also pertinent to note
that proviso to sections 12 (2) as well as 13 (2) provide that if a supplier
receives an excess payment up to Rs. 1,000 in excess of the amount indicated in
the tax invoice, the time of supply of such excess payment shall be the date of
issue of invoice in respect of such excess payment, at the option of the
supplier.

24. However, it is important to note
that the tax payable on receipt of advance for supply of goods has been
exempted vide notification 40/2017 – CT dated 13.10.2017 for taxable person having
aggregate turnover not exceeding Rs. 1.5 crore. The same has been further
extended to all taxable persons vide notification 66/2017 – CT dated
15.11.2017.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – IN CASE OF CHANGE IN RATE OF
TAX


25. Section 14 deals with the
provisions relating to determination of time of supply in cases where there is
a change in the rate of tax in respect of goods / services / both based on the
following:

 

Provision of Service

Issuance of Invoice

Receipt of Payment

Effective tax rate
as applicable on

Before change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

The date of invoice
or payment, whichever is earlier

Before change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

The date of invoice

Before change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

The date of receipt
of payment

After change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

The date of receipt
of payment

After change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

The date of invoice
or payment, whichever is earlier

After change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

The date of invoice

 

 

26. However, it is important to note
that the above table will apply only in case where there is a change in rate of
tax or a supply which was earlier exempted becomes taxable and  vice versa. This position has been
settled under the pre-GST regime in the case of Wallace Flour Mills Company
Limited vs. CCE [1989 (44) ELT 598 (SC)]
wherein the Court held that if at
the time of manufacturing, goods were exempted but the same was withdrawn
during removal, they would be liable to duty on the date of their removal.

27. However, the above cannot be
applied in case an activity which was not classifiable as supply is made liable
to tax in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector
of Central Excise vs. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Limited [1996 (83) ELT 3
(SC)]
wherein the Court held that once the levy is not there at the time
when the goods are manufactured or produced in India, it cannot be levied at
the stage of removal of the said goods.

 

CONCLUSION


28. Under the pre-GST regime, the
tax payers were saddled with multiple provisions relating to levy and
collection. The same situation continues even under the GST regime, with levy
being consolidated into a single event of supply and the collection provisions
continue to be complicated with distinct provisions prescribed for goods as
well as services.

29.          Failure to comply with the collection
provisions may not only expose the taxable person to interest u/s. 51 in case
of self-determination of such non-compliance, but may also expose them to
recovery actions u/s. 73 if action is initiated by the tax authorities.
Therefore, all taxable persons will have to be careful while dealing with the
provisions relating to time of supply of goods and / or services to avoid such
consequences.

GST @ 2 – A SHORT WISH LIST

The Editor of BCAJ assigned me the responsibility of writing an
article with the above title. What a thoughtful title this is! GST was launched
two years ago with much fanfare and celebrations on 1st July, 2017
and has substantially lived up to the expectations. The fireworks are now over.
The benefits of GST are there for the country to see. However, as it completes
two years of existence, the million-dollar question is “What next?” The
question begs attention also in the context of the results of the Lok Sabha
elections and the re-institution of the NDA government in its second term. With
the government looking towards a “New India” and simplified taxation under the
leadership of a new Finance Minister, it is now time to look at new ideas and
present a wish list which could capitalise on the journey traversed so far and
take India to the next trajectory in terms of consolidation, improving “Ease of
Doing Business” and putting the country on the path towards achieving a $5
trillion economy. So here we go:

 

1. EXPAND THE COVERAGE OF PRODUCTS AND
SERVICES UNDER GST


The success of GST is there for all to see. If, as legislators, we
believe that GST has been a path-breaking reform towards simplification of
indirect taxes, what forces us to exclude certain pockets of industry from reaping
the benefits of this simplification? The unanimity of numerous decisions taken
in the GST Council over the last couple of years has shown that the dynamics of
conflicting Centre-State interests no longer takes precedence over national
interest and that where there is a will, there is a way. If that be so, it’s
time to step away from the easy approach of providing excuses and postponing
the inevitable – and to take that bold step to include petroleum, real estate
and electricity into the GST Net.

 

Despite all noble intentions, exemptions from payment of tax are provided
under the legislation. At first brush, the industry welcomes such exemptions
and resists the withdrawal of such exemptions. However, as reality sinks in,
the industry realises that each exemption results in additional costs in terms
of denial of credits. Also, the innovative minds of the tax administrators can
result in a treatise of narrow interpretation of exemption entries resulting in
virtual uncertainty and rude shocks – a recent advance ruling denying the
benefit of exemption to skill development courses on a hyper-technical
distinction between the words ‘course’ and ‘programme’ being a case in point.
It is, therefore, time to relook at the list of exemptions and specifically identify
those that primarily pertain to the B2B sector. It may make sense to engage
with the impacted stakeholders and build a consensus towards moving from
exemption to a preferential rate of tax with seamless credits.

 

2. DO NOT DEVIATE – COME BACK TO THE CENTRAL
THEME OF SEAMLESS CREDITS


That brings us to the unique selling proposition (USP) of GST –
availability of seamless credits reducing the cascading impact of taxes across
the supply chain. This has been talked about so often that it has perhaps lost
its context. How else does one explain the deviations from this concept of
seamless credits in the case of restaurants and real estate developers? Let’s
look at the background of the changes in this regard. The GST rate of 12% and
18% on restaurants started impacting the consumer prices of food. The
government wants to control inflation and therefore decides to reduce the rate
to 5% – so far so good. But the government has revenue considerations as well
and finds it easy to deny input tax credit in such cases.

 

While trying to balance the interests of all stakeholders, we now end up
in a situation of damaging the core of the GST legislation, i.e., seamless
credits. And knowingly or unknowingly, we cooked up a recipe for endless
litigation – a series of advance rulings where the authorities need to
interpret the distinction between a restaurant and a shop are clearly
necessitated by such differential tax treatments for similar products. A
similar initiative to reduce the rate of tax on under-construction units coupled
with denial of credit to the real estate developer is another example, but
let’s leave the analysis thereof for some other time.

 

The impact is loud and clear – a lower output tax rate with denial of
input tax credit effectively means taking money out of businesses and putting
it in the hands of the consumer. While this objective sounds laudable, we need
to understand the economics of the free market which effectively nullifies this
objective in the shortest possible timeframe as businesses will increase the
base price to absorb the loss of input tax credit. An even louder and clearer
message – there should be no case of absolute denial of input tax credit. A
lower rate of output tax neither justifies nor empowers the government to
deviate from the core of GST, i.e., seamless credits.

 

Let’s also remember that we actually started with some deviation in the
form of ‘blocked credits’ right from 1st July, 2017. While the
hangover of the earlier tax regimes resulted in that deviation to start with,
there is no reason to continue with that deviation forever. Don’t we all
(including the government) believe and agree that the earlier tax regimes were
archaic and unjust? If that is the collective consensus, what makes us
collectively reconcile ourselves to some traces of such archaic laws with a
myopic vision? The wish list therefore is to eliminate altogether or at
least prune the list of goods and services which form a part of blocked
credits.

 

One more deviation from the core of GST is the concept of ‘reverse charge
mechanism’. While a cross-border reverse charge mechanism is understandable, a
domestic reverse charge mechanism is perhaps unique to India. To what extent is
it logical to shift the burden of levy from the supplier to the recipient? How
far is it correct to expect the recipient to not only pay the tax but also
maintain extensive documentation in the form of payment vouchers and ‘self
invoices’ – a term invented specifically for this context? And while expecting
the honest tax payer to do all this, we must not lose track of the fact that
all of this dilutes and interferes with the fundamental principles of GST like
credits, exemptions and the like.

 

Well, it’s time to accept that you cannot travel long distances in a
vehicle that’s in reverse gear – an accident is in the making. Can we not
eliminate all cases of domestic reverse charge mechanism? Remember, excise law
never had the reverse charge mechanism and many VAT laws had, out of
experience, dumped the obnoxious purchase tax (a simpler cousin of the reverse
charge mechanism) and the administrators were able to administer the law
without these crutches.

 

3. RESPECT LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES


Legislatures in India have been known to possess wide powers of
delegation. However, the legislature cannot delegate, in the words of the
Supreme Court, “unchannelised and uncontrolled power”. Thanks to the long-drawn
process of bringing about an amendment, the last two years witnessed only one
legislative amendment. However, what is important and bewildering is the countless
changes brought about through amendments in rules, removal of “difficulty”
orders, notifications and the like (averaging at more than one a day – see the
next point for statistics). Whether it be suspension of tax on advances for
goods, or the composition option provided to service providers, the
substitution of the return filing process, or a fundamentally new scheme of
apportionment of credit based on carpet area for real estate developers, all of
these conveniently found place through such non-legislative processes.

 

History is full of situations where courts have interfered and placed a
very low priority on such provisions not contained in the Act but in the rules
and notifications. It’s time to learn from such experiences and not place the cart
before the horse. It really is time to comprehensively review the legislation
and bring about amendments in the law to simplify processes, realign to ground
level realities and synchronise the government intent with that prescribed in
the law. At the end of the day, the law is the best reflection of government
intent.

 

4. CONSOLIDATE THE JOURNEY SO FAR


The journey of two years resulted in the issuance inter alia of
179 Central tax notifications, 87 Central tax rate notifications, 19 integrated
tax notifications, 90 integrated tax rate notifications, 101 Central tax
circulars, four integrated tax circulars, 17 Central tax orders and ten removal
of difficulty orders. Coupled with UT tax notifications and circulars, ignoring
state tax notifications and circulars to avoid duplication, we still end up
with a total count of 773 documents at an average of more than one per day!

 

We are yet to factor in the sector-specific booklets, FAQs, press
releases, Twitter responses, flyers and what not! Time and again, governments
have realised that such overdose has resulted in chaos rather than clarity. The
concept of master circulars and notifications is not alien to our legislators.
Before things really go out of control, it is time to have one master
notification covering all exemptions and concessions and one master
clarification (like an education guide) replacing all existing circulars and
clarifications.

 

5. LOOK AT THE BIGGER PICTURE


Along with the comprehensive review of the legislations and the
amendments, it is also time to have a relook at the policy. As accountants, we
understand the concept of materiality. In management parlance, we say “look at
the big picture”. If there are hardly any exemptions or exclusions, does it
make sense to have a complicated mechanism to determine the proportion of
ineligible credits? How does one reconcile to the requirement of reverse
credits on account of transactions in securities? What is the revenue generated
by the government and whether the time and efforts of millions of tax payers,
their accountants and consultants is justified in generating this revenue? Can
we not liberate ourselves from these shackles? What is the rationale of
demanding interest on gross tax before utilisation of credit? Why can’t the
processes for export refunds be simplified? Why is such an elaborate definition
of “business” required?

 

At one point of time, we had wealth tax and it was observed that the cost
of collecting wealth tax was more than the revenue it generated. Naturally,
wiser counsel prevailed and we scrapped the tax itself. While there is no case
for scrapping GST, it’s definitely time to carry out an analysis of each of the
provisions of the law and review the revenue generated vis-à-vis the time and
efforts involved in compliance with every specific provision. The data will
speak for itself and guide us on the way forward for substantial simplification
in the law and processes.

 

6. IN AN OCEAN, EACH DROP COUNTS


Having highlighted the need to not miss the woods for the trees, it is
also important to count the trees. After all, in an ocean each drop counts.
Many associations and chambers including ICAI and BCAS have time and again sent
representations to highlight the difficulties in the existing legislation. This
article is not one where the entire laundry list can be reproduced or
discussed. But an indicative sample will definitely not be out of place:

 

a.  Delete definitions which are
obsolete and realign conflicting definitions. The legislature is not expected
to miss words or to add superfluous words in the statute. Let’s align the GST
legislation with this time-tested expectation. For example, how does one
justify the simultaneous existence of the definition of ‘associated
enterprises’ and ‘related person’?

b.  While it is notable that levy of
GST is restricted to supplies made in the course or furtherance of business,
the very wide definition of business, and even wider interpretation canvassed
by a few advance rulings, virtually make the definition redundant. It’s time to
realign the definition to what it could logically mean.

c.  The term ‘service’ is defined to
mean anything other than goods. While the definition is picked up from
international experiences, the framework is not comparable. In the absence of a
full-fledged GST, such a wide definition of service results in indirectly
taxing subjects which are outside the purview of GST (for example, development
rights in land). A more specific definition like the one under the erstwhile
service tax legislation may be a good reference point.

d.  The benefit of refunds on
account of inverted rate structure needs to be extended to services as well.

e.  The advance ruling authority
should also consist of judicial members. Similarly, the appellate Tribunal
should have more or at least equal numbers of judicial and non-judicial
members.

 

7. SIMPLIFY PROCESSES

It is often said that a bad law which is administered well is better than
a good law which is not administered well. Tax collection and administration
processes should be such that they are simple, stable and fair. While use of
technology for tax collection and administration cannot be disputed, the
processes will have to consider situations where the technology or systems
fail. A human touch may then be required. Having said that, the element of subjectivity
needs to be kept at the bare minimum in such face-to-face interactions. Again,
a lot has been said and written about the desired process improvements, but let
me just take the case of returns. There is really no reason not to permit the
revision of returns filed. After all, we know that to err is human. And if so,
an opportunity to revise the return has to be provided.

 

8. DON’T OVERSTRETCH INTERPRETATIONS

Taxation of
services always flummoxed the administrators. Fearing the risk of ridicule and
censure from the CAG, it was not uncommon for the superintendents to
overstretch the interpretations to factual situations. When an employee resigns
from the company and the company recovers notice period pay from his full and
final settlement, a view is canvassed that the company renders a service to the
employee – the service of tolerating the act of the employee prematurely
terminating his employment! Is this not an overstretched interpretation?

 

Again, when a
cost-benefit analysis is undertaken, where do we see the data point in terms of
cost of compliance and revenue generated? When the CFO of a company
headquartered in Maharashtra attends a tax hearing in Delhi, does the
Maharashtra branch render services to the Delhi branch? If yes, we enter the fragile
territory of interpretations – one could even contend that the Delhi branch
rendered services to the Mumbai branch by facilitating the CFO to attend the
hearing. We may even end up with a maze of dotted lines with absolute zero
clarity on the head or the tail of each arrow. It’s time to live naturally and
not overstretch and draw unnecessary dotted lines.

 

9.    SWIM
WITH THE TIDE

It is generally understood that tax is a sub-set of business. It is
expected to facilitate business and not conflict with the natural flow of
business. Let’s take the case of the supply chain of pharmaceuticals. Due to
the peculiar nature of the products, there is reverse logistics in the form of
rejections and sales returns. Necessarily, such rejections and sales returns go
on to reduce the sales of the organisation and are supported by credit notes.
But a clarification in GST law permits the buyer to issue a tax invoice for
such rejections. Is this not swimming against the tide? Could this have
implications in terms of accounting and legal relationships? Let’s not create
conflicting sets of documentation and then aim for reconciliations between
them.

 

10.     BURY
THE PAST

In one of the earlier wish lists, the problem of overstretched
interpretation was highlighted. The earlier tax regimes generated sufficient
baggage of litigation which still exists in the pipeline. Showing their wisdom,
many state governments announced amnesty schemes to reduce litigation under the
VAT regimes. It is time for the Central government to take a cue from this and
announce an amnesty scheme for pending litigation under the service tax, excise
duty and customs duty laws. This will help bury the past.

 

CONCLUSION

I can go on and on. However, the Editor has cautioned me to restrict
myself to around 2,500 words. I am sure that there are many more items which
could enter this wish list but I have chosen to limit myself to ten important
wishes at a macro level. This article is not a balance sheet of the GST law but
only suggests a few critical action points for the way forward!

 

Over to you,
Madam Finance Minister.

INTERCEPTION, INSPECTION, DETENTION OR SEIZURE, CONFISCATION

 

GST law had
promised to usher in a host of reforms on hastle free movement goods across the
country. Some of the promising features of GST involved abolition of
check-posts, common way bill management systems, uniformity in law enforcement
across the country thus boosting business efficiency in logistics. This has certainly
freed business enterprises from shackles of traditional law enforcement and is
on course to digitization of enforcement to improve the administrative
effectiveness and minimise hurdles to trade and commerce.

 

In-transit
inspection plays a critical role in law enforcement. Interception, detention
and seizure provisions of the GST law perform the function of administrating
law on a real-time basis to check tax evasion during movement of goods. Section
68 of Chapter XIV contains enforcement provisions and grants wide powers to the
tax administration. Active tax enforcement not only detects tax evasion but
also acts as a deterrent. This article is an attempt to elaborate provisions in
detail and identify the critical areas one needs to address in such matters.

 

GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF INTERCEPTION, DETENTION & SEIZURE


‘Interception’ is generally understood as the act of preventing someone or
something from continuing to a destination. Black’s Law dictionary states: “the
term usually refers to covert reception by a law enforcement agency” and P
Ramanatha Iyer’s Law Lexicon states interception as “seize, catch or
stop (letter etc.) in transmit”.

 

‘Detention’ is understood as the act of taking custody over someone or
something. Black’s law dictionary states “the act or an instance of holding a
person in custody; confinement or compulsory delay”; Law Lexicon states
“the action of detaining, the keeping in confinement or custody, a keeping from
going on or proceeding”.

 

‘Seizure’ is understood as the act of capturing or confiscating something by
force (i.e. against the will of the person having possession). Black’s Law
states “the act or an instance of taking possession of a person or property by
legal right or process, esp, in constitutional law, a confiscation or arrest
that may interfere with a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy; Law
Lexicon
explains seizure as taking possession of property by an officer
under legal process.

 

‘Confiscation’ means permanent deprivation of property by order of a court of
competent authority (Law Lexicon). Black’s Law states “seizure of
property for the public treasury”.

 

One would observe
from the ensuing paragraphs, that each term represents a different stage in a
proceeding and the rigours increase as the stage progresses. For eg.
Interception requires a simple reporting and release of goods but as soon the
goods are proposed for detention and seizure, the intensity of the powers of
the officer increasing. Same goes with once the goods enter confiscation
proceedings, the power of the officers over the goods are more stringent than
in cases of detention. Rights and obligations of the officer and the tax payer
are different at each level of the proceeding and hence one needs to be mindful
of the stage of the proceedings while addressing the questions of the officer.

 

IN-TRANSIT DOCUMENTATION U/S. 68(1) R/W RULE 138A


Section 68 provides
for carrying specified documents/ devices along with the conveyance of
consignment during the transportation of goods. The section empowers the
‘proper officer’ to intercept the conveyance at any place and require
the ‘person in charge’ of the conveyance to produce the prescribed
documents/devices for verification and allow inspection of goods. The term
proper officer has been defined to mean the officer who has been assigned the
powers of interception by the respective Commissioners of the CGST/SGST. While
determining the proper officer care should be taken that the said officer has
territorial and functional jurisdiction at the point of interception. ‘Person
in charge’ of conveyance has not been defined and should be understood as
referring to the transporter and driver of the conveyance performing the
movement of goods.

 

Rule 138A (inserted
w.e.f. 30-08-2017) provides for the requirement of carrying a tax invoice, bill
of supply, bill of entry or delivery challan and e-way bill (as applicable). In
terms of section 138A(5), the Commissioner in special cases is permitted to
waive the requirement of e-way bill. The contents of a tax invoice, bill of
supply, delivery challan and e-way bill are prescribed in Rule 46, 46A and 49.
In addition to the said manual documents, e-way bill requirements as generated
from the common portal were mandated vide Notification 27/2017-CT dt.
30.08.2017 w.e.f. from 01/02/2018 but ultimately implemented from 01-04-2018.
Certain States (like Karnataka) implemented these provisions even prior to the
Centre invoking the E-way bill provisions for intra-state transactions.

 

INTERCEPTING POWERS U/S. 68(2) R/W RULE 138 B


Section 68(2) r/w
Rule 138B grants the powers to the Commissioner or proper officer to intercept
any conveyance for verification of the e-way bill for all inter-state and
intra-state movement. Physical verification of the intercepted vehicle should
be carried out only by empowered officers. In terms of CBIC Circular
3/3/2017-GST dt. 05.07.2017, the Inspector of Central Tax and his superiors
have been granted powers of interception. The proviso of the said rule states
that in case of receipt of any specific information of tax evasion, physical
verification of the conveyance can be carried out by any other officer after
obtaining necessary approval from the Commissioner.

 

INSPECTING POWERS U/S. 68(2) R/W RILE 138 C


Section 68(2) r/w
Rule 138C requires that every inspection of goods in transit would have to be
recorded online by the proper officer within 24 hours of inspection and the
final report recorded within 3 days of inspection (in Form EWB-03). Sub rule
(2) states that where any physical verification of goods has been performed
during transit in one State or in any other State, no further physical
verification of the said conveyance should be carried out again in the State
unless specific information of evasion is available with the officer
subsequently. Rule 138D specifies that the detention of the vehicle for the
purpose of inspection should not exceed 30 minutes and the transporter can
upload the details in cases where the detention is beyond 30 minutes.

 

DETENTION & SEIZURE POWERS U/S.129


The proper officer
is empowered to detain the conveyance and the goods during its transit in case
of any contravention of the provisions of the Act (report of detention in Form
EWB-04). The detention proceedings require issuance of a notice, seeking a
reply and concluding the proceeding by way of a detention/seizure order. In
terms of the CBIC Circular dt 05.07.2017 (supra) detention powers can be
exercised only by the Asst/Dy. Commissioner of Central Tax. The goods would be
released by the proper officer only on payment of the applicable tax and
penalty or submission of a security in prescribed form.

 

The said section
also prescribes the procedure to be adopted on detention of the goods in
transit. In this regard, CBIC has issued circulars (Circular 41/15/2018-GST dt.
13-04-2018; No 49/23/2018-GST dt. 21-06-2018 and No 64/38/2018-GST dt.
14-09-2018) which specify the detailed procedure and forms to the followed
(MOV-01 to MOV-11) by the Central Tax officers in matters of interception,
inspection and detention. Key points emerging from the Circular are as follows:

 

  •     The jurisdictional
    Commissioner or the designated proper officer is permitted to conduct
    interception and inspection of conveyances within the jurisdictional area
    specified by the Commissioner. One should verify whether the locational
    Commissionerate of the region has issued any such trade notice assigning
    functional/ geographical jurisdiction.
  •     The proper officer believes
    that the movement of goods is with an intention of evading tax, he may directly
    invoke section 130 where a fine in lieu of compensation may be imposed.
  •     Where an order is passed
    under the CGST Act, a corresponding order shall also be passed under the
    respective State laws as well.
  •     Demand of the tax, penalty,
    fine or other charges would be uploaded on the electronic liability register
    and in case of unregistered persons a temporary ID would be created for
    discharge of the liability posted on the common portal.
  •     In cases of multiple
    consignments, only goods or conveyance in respect of which there is violation
    of the provisions of the Act should be detained while the rest of the
    consignment should be permitted to be released by the proper officer.
  •     Consignment of goods should
    not be detained where there are clerical errors such as spelling mistakes in
    name of consignor/ee, PIN code, locality, document number of e-way bill,
    vehicle number, etc. in cases of clerical errors, a maximum penalty of Rs. 500
    each under respective law could be imposed.
  •     Section 129 does not
    mandate payment of tax in all cases and the owner of goods scan exercise the
    option of furnishing a security (in prescribed form and a bond supported by a
    bank guarantee equal to amount payable).

 

CONFISCATION POWERS U/S.130


In cases where the
proper officer has formed the view that any of the five circumstances exists,
the goods are liable for confiscation – where any person:

 

i.    Supplies or receives goods in contravention
of the provisions of Act/ rules with intention of tax evasion

ii.   Does not account for goods liable for paying
tax

iii.   Supplies goods without obtaining a
registration number

iv.  Contravenes any provision of the Act with
intention of tax evasion

v.   Uses any conveyance as means of transport for
tax evasion unless the owner of the conveyance has no knowledge of this action

 

The fine legal
difference between detention and confiscation is that detention is invoked only
on suspicion over tax evasion whereas confiscation require reasons beyond doubt
that the goods are a result of tax evasion [Kerala High Court in Indus
Towers vs. Asst. State Tax officer 2018 (1) TMI 1313
]

 

In terms of the
CBIC Circular dt 05.07.2017 (supra) confiscation powers can be exercised only
by the Asst/Dy Commissioner of Central Tax. In cases of confiscation, the title
over the goods shall vest upon the Government and the owner of the goods cannot
exercise any rights over the goods. Whenever any confiscation of goods is
ordered, the owner of the goods has the option to pay a fine in lieu of
confiscation which shall not exceed the market value of goods confiscated less
the tax chargeable thereon, and shall in no case be less than the amount
specified u/s. 129. In cases of confiscation of the conveyance itself, the fine
shall not exceed the tax payable on the goods under conveyance.

 

APPROPRIATE TAX ADMINISTRATION


Though GST has been
built on a national platform, legislative powers under IGST, CGST and SGST Act
have certain inherent geographical limitations. In addition to that, the Centre
and State have notified the respective workforce for administration. It would
be thus important to identify the ‘proper officer’ having geographical
jurisdiction over goods under transit.

 

We can take an
example of a case where goods under inter-state movement from Kerala (KL) to
Delhi (DL) are intercepted by a State officer in Maharashtra (MH) and detained
for lack of proper documentation. Whether the intercepting officer in MH could
be considered as the ‘proper officer’ for interception, detention, seizure,
inspection and adjudication of the goods under movement which is an inter-state
supply from KL to DL? The practical experience thus far is that the State
officers detain the goods and direct the assessee to open a temporary ID in
their State and discharge the taxes as if it is an intra-state sale within MH.

 

Primarily, three
theories can exist (A) Only Origin State authorities have jurisdiction over
interception; or (B) All state authorities (including origin and destination
state) have jurisdiction over the goods under transit as long as the goods are
physically present in their state boundaries during exercise of powers or (C)
While state authorities have powers of interception, the final assessment of
the tax involved would be made by the officer in the State of origin based on
the detention report.

 

A) Geographical
jurisdiction

Article 246A(1)
empower both the Centre and State to make laws pertaining to goods and service
tax imposed by the Union or State. 246A(2) grants exclusive powers to Centre to
legislate on matters of inter-state trade of commerce. Article 286 places a
clear embargo on the State to impose a tax on supply of goods or services ‘outside
a State
’ and or ‘in course of import or export of goods or services’.
Article 258 provides for the Union to confer powers to the State or its
officers either conditionally or unconditionally, with consent of the President
of India and the Governor of the respective State, in relation to any matter to
which the Executive of the Union extends. Where such powers have been conferred
by the Union to the State, administration costs attributable to the staff
empowered would be payable by the Centre to State. The IGST has not invoked
Article 258 but empowered the State workforce through statutory provisions.

 

In terms of Article
286(2), the Centre has been placed with the responsibility to formulate the
principles of determining where the supply takes place. It is in exercise of
these powers that the IGST Act has formulated provisions for ascertaining the
character of supply (i.e. intra-state vs. inter-state) based on the place of
supply of such services: Chapter IV and V of the IGST Act read together answer
(a) the characterisation of the supply (inter-state or intra-state); and (b)
where locus of the supply. This is broadly akin to the provisions of section 3,
4 and 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CST law).

 

In the context of
administration, the GST council has decided that Centre & State’s
administration would be a unified force. Discussions on cross empowerment in
GST council involved five options which were discussed at length and the fifth
option attained consensus only in the 9th GST Council meeting (para
28 of minutes of meeting). The key thrust of the decisions where (a) Unified
tax payer and administration interface;(b) Allocation of tax payer base between
the Centre and State based on statistical data for administering the CGST/SGST
Acts (b) Concurrent enforcement powers to Centre & State on entire value
chain based on intelligence inputs of respective field formations; (c) Powers
under IGST law to be cross empowered on the same basis as that of CGST/ SGST
Act. However, Centre has exclusive powers to administer issues around ‘place of
supply’, ‘export’, ‘imports’ etc. These decisions were translated into the CGST
and SGST Act as follows:

 

  •     Section 6 of CGST/ SGST
    cross empowers the corresponding officer as per the allocation criteria agreed
    at the GST Council (stated above). Further, it has been agreed that where an officer
    has initiated any proceeding on a subject matter under an Act, no proceeding
    shall be initiated by the officer of the corresponding administration on the
    same subject. This ensured that unified interface was maintained.
  •     In respect of the IGST Act,
    section 20 does not borrow the cross-empowerment provisions of the CGST Act.
    The IGST Act has a different mechanism of empowerment of both Central/ State
    officers. Section 3 grants powers to central tax officers for exercise of all
    powers of the Act. The CBIC has issued Circulars No. 3/3/2017dt 05.07.2017
    assigning powers to the Central Tax Officers. Section 4 also authorises
    officers appointed under the State GST Acts as proper officers under the IGST
    Act subject to exceptions and conditions of the GST Council.
  •     The Commissioner of the
    State would have thus issued appropriate notifications under their respective
    State laws assigning the jurisdiction of enforcement action to the officers and
    by virtue of the said notification, they would acquire enforcement jurisdiction
    even under the IGST Act. Therefore State officers who are empowered under the
    State GST to perform enforcement activity would also be empowered to perform
    the enforcement function under the IGST Act.

 

We may recollect
that CST law empowered the ‘appropriate state’ from where the movement of goods
commenced to collect and enforce payment of tax through their general sales tax
law (Section 9). This enabled the origin state to acquire jurisdiction on
inter-state sale movement and enforcement action. Transit states acquired
enforcement jurisdiction over such inter-state movement through transit pass
and way bill provisions which setup a presumption that the goods have been sold
within the State on failure to produce such documentation. The IGST Act is on a
different footing. Firstly, States do not have the same autonomous powers akin
to section 9(2) of CST Act in matters of collection and enforcement provisions.
The IGST Act is a self-sufficient Act containing its own collection and enforcement
provisions. Secondly, IGST Act has limited itself to appointing the State
officers as proper officers for the purpose the IGST Act (section 4) rather
adopting the provisions of the respective State law. Thirdly, IGST does not
provide for any presumption as to the sale of goods within a state in the
absence of any prescriptive documentation. In other words, the character of the
transaction being an inter-state transaction does not get altered during the
process of detention and/or seizure and tax due on such transaction should be
assessed from the Origin State. Even in case there is a dispute on the
inter-state character, the Centre has exclusive domain over examining its
nature in view of Article 286(2) and the decision of the 9th GST Council meeting.

 

The following
overall inferences can be formed from above analysis:

 

  •     Power of legislation is
    distinct from the power of administration and it is not necessary that the
    power of legislation and enforcement are with the same authority (eg. CST Act).
    The administrative provisions of IGST act are self-contained in the said
    enactment itself.
  •     IGST Act only borrows the
    work force of the State for implementing the Act. State work force is required
    to follow the Circulars, Notifications of the CBIC / Central Tax office while
    exercising their powers under the IGST Act. The statutory powers are not
    sourced from the State legislation independently like section 9(2) of the CST
    law (refer discussion below).
  •     There is no specific
    notification or circular issued under the IGST Act assigning the functions and
    territorial limits to the State workforce. In the absence of a specific
    notification or circular one may view that (a) each state workforce would
    operate within the respective State boundaries and the role assigned by the
    State Commissioner (enforcement, vigilance, audit, range, etc) in that boundary
    would operate equally for the IGST Act or (b) the State workforce would have
    pan India powers on inter-state transactions and would exercise these powers
    under IGST law in the absence of any geographical limits over the officers
    under the IGST law. The former seems to be a more plausible approach to
    resolving the issue on jurisdiction.

 

  •     The power of collection on
    inter-state supplies from State X lies with the Centre. However, State X in
    terms of Article 286 is precluded over imposing tax on supplies occurring in
    all other States or in import/ export transactions. Therefore intercepting
    officers in State X should refrain imposing any tax on inter-state
    movement u/s. 129.

 

Coming to the issue
taken up earlier, MH State should not be considered as the ‘proper officer’ for
the inter-state movement from KL to DL as the jurisdiction of administration is
between the Centre/ State workforce operating from the State of Kerala. An
alternative view would be that the IGST Act being a pan Indian enactment has
borrowed the State officers across India for the purpose of enforcement in
their respective geographical area. MH State may not have administrative power
over the ‘transaction of supply’ but it could have powers over the ‘goods under
movement’ for the limited purpose of interception, inspection, detention and
seizure.



Though the above
powers of interception, detention and release would be exercised by the MH
officer under the IGST Act, the final assessment of the liability on the goods
will have to take place at the Origin State (KL) either by the Central/ State
administration depending on the allocation.

 

FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION


Section 2(91) defines the proper officer to mean the person who has been
assigned the function by the Commissioner. CBEC has in its Circular No.
3/3/2017-GST dt. 05-07-2017 designated the Inspector of Central Tax with powers
of interception and the Asst./Dy. Commissioner of Central Tax with the powers
of adjudication over the matter of release of goods u/s. 129. These powers
would be exercised by the respective officers within the confines of the
geography assigned to the said officers. It is expected that similar
Circulars/notifications are issued by the respective State Commissioners
assigning the functional jurisdiction to their officers. Therefore, one would
have to carefully peruse the relevant notification/ circulars under the States
for consideration to establish the function and geographical jurisdiction over
a particular transaction/goods.

 

OVERALL SCHEME OF SECTION 129


Some important
questions arise on the overall scheme of section 129:

 

Whether
proceedings u/s. 129 is interim in nature and subject to the final assessment
in the hands of
the supplier?

 

Section 129
provides for detention, seizure and release of goods by following a prescribed
procedure of issuance of a notice, seeking a reply and furnishing a release
order. A key feature is that it permits release of the goods on furnishing a
security in the prescribed form, indicating that the goods are being released
on a provisional basis and the assessment would be finalised subsequently. But
the provision subsequently goes on to state that on payment of the amount, all
proceedings in respect of the notice would deemed to the concluded. There seems
to be a divergence in the way the provisions are drafted. One theory suggests
that the proceedings are interim in nature and subject to its finalisation
before the assessing authority who would take cognizance of the entire
proceeding u/s. 64, 73, 74 and complete the assessment of the supplier taking
into account the report of the inspecting authority. This was the manner in
which the VAT law was also being enforced across States. The other theory
suggests that the proceedings are conclusive and no further action needs to be
taken at the assessing officer’s end on the subject matter. Now there could be
instances where the supplier would have already reported the transaction in its
GSTR-3B/GSTR-1 and discharged the applicable taxes. If the goods in transit are
subjected to the said provisions and cleared on payment of applicable tax and
penalty, it would result in a double taxation of the very same goods which
clearly does not seem to be the intent of law. It appears to the author that
the scope of section 68 r/w 129 is to examine the completeness of documents and
provide information to the assessing authority, which could be obtained only
from real time enforcement, for finalisation of the assessment and not just to
conclude the entire proceeding at the place of interception. The term
‘contravention’ in section 129 should be understood contextually on with
reference to the compliance of documentation during the movement of goods and
not beyond that. The author believes that all these proceedings would finally
culminate by way of an assessment u/s. 64, 73 or 74.

 

How do we
harmoniously apply the penalty imposable u/s. 129 vs. 122(1) (i), (ii), (xiv),
(xv), (xviii) vs. 122(2) : specific vs. general : lower vs. higher penalty?

 

Both section 129
and 122 are penal provisions imposing penalty for offences under the Act. There
is an overlap of the scope of the said sections resulting in ambiguity. The
said sections are briefly extracted below

 

Section 129

Section 122(1) (i), (ii), (xiv), (xv),
(xviii)

Section 122(2)

Penalty for contravention of goods in
transit

Specific Penalties for movement of goods
without invoice/ documents, evasion of tax, goods liable for confiscation,
etc

Penalty where tax has not been paid or
short paid

100% of tax payable (in case of exempted
goods – 2% of value of goods) (OR)

50% of value of goods less tax paid (5%
in case of exempted goods)

Penalty of 10,000 or 100% of tax evaded
w.e.h.

Penalty of Rs. 10,000 or 10% of the tax
due w.e.h.

 

 

The field
formations are consistently applying the provisions which results in a higher
collection without assessing the applicable section under which penalty are
imposable. While certainly section 129 is specific to cases where goods are in
transit, section 122 also provides for cases of imposition of penalty where
goods are transported without cover of documents. One possible resolution to
this conflict may be as follows:

  •     Section 129 is specific to
    cases of non-compliance identified during transit and section 122(1)
    applies only to cases where the transportation has completed and the
    non-compliance is identified after the goods have reached their
    destination (say the registered premises)

 

  •     Section 122(1) is narrower
    in its scope in so far as it requires tax to be evaded for its application.
    There could be cases where goods have reached the destination without
    appropriate documents but duly accounted for in the books of accounts. In such
    cases, section 129 cannot be imposed and section 122(1) would apply to cases
    involving tax evasion.
  •     Section 122(2) on the other
    hand being a general provision for penalty should not apply since section
    122(1) and 129 are more specific contenders on this subject matter

 

PRACTICAL ISSUES ON INTERCEPTION / INSPECTION / DETENTION & SEIZURE

Apart from the
legal analysis, the trade and community are facing multiple challenges at the
ground level on matters of such matters. The issues are tabulated below for
easy reference:

 

S No

Issue

Possible resolution

1

E-way bill not containing key particulars such as
Invoice No., Taxable value, Tax , etc OR E-way bill not generated

Supreme Court in Guljag Industries (below) has
stated that mens-rea need not be examined in cases of statutory offences.
Therefore, tax & penalty can be imposed u/s 129 equivalent to the tax in
cases of such violations. Recent decision of MP High Court in Gati
Kintetsu Express Pvt ltd vs. CCT 2018 (15) GSTL 310
affirmed penalty in
case of violation and distinguished Allahabad High Court’s decision in VSL
Alloys (India) Pvt Ltd vs. State of UP 2018 (5) TMI 455.

2

E-way bill & Invoice is valid and containing
accurate particulars but quantity reported is higher than the physical
quantity in the conveyance (due to evaporation, wastage, water content, etc)

Taxable quantity/value being higher than the physical
quantity, there is no short payment of tax and hence detention would be
incorrect. At the most in case where there is an error, general penalty of
Rs. 25,000/- may be imposed for discrepancies.

3

E-way bill is valid and generated but invoice/ delivery
challan is not carried along with consignment – all particulars in e-way bill
match with consignment

Rule 138A and CBEC Circular require both the
self-generated document (invoice/delivery challan) and e-way bill to be
carried. E-way bill is a system generated document containing all particulars
of the invoice and a verifiable/non-destructible document and hence superior
in status vis-à-vis the invoice. Ideally no penalty should be imposed in such
scenarios.

4

E-way bill not reconciling with the some valuation
particulars of Invoice – such as Taxable Value, Tax etc but matching with
other particulars

Officers may disregard the e–way bill entirely and
state that conveyance is without e-way bill in which case the entire penalty
would be imposable. Alternatively, if it is established that e-way bill
relates to the very same consignment, then possibly e-way bill would be
considered for examination, ignoring the invoice and the physical
verification would be performed accordingly. Any excess stock/ value above
the e-way bill may be subject to penalty.

 

 

 

5 & 6

Delivery challan & e-way bill issued and officer contesting
that Invoice should be issued (OR) Wrong Tax Type recorded in the E-way bill
& Invoice i.e. IGST instead of CGST/SGST

Intercepting officer is only required to assess with
the prescribed documents are being carried and they reconcile with the physical
movment of goods. Any dispute on the type of documentation, etc., is not with
the domain of intercepting officer and is for the assesing authority to
examine and take a legal position on that front.

7

Goods sent on approval and at particular location for
sale within the six months time limit but e-way has expired

This is a tricky issue. Whether goods sent on approval
and retained by the recipient for approval for six months are required to be
under a live e-way bill. While one may say that this is incorrect another
argument would be that goods should be either under a live e-way bill or at
the registered presmises of the supplier and hence registration should be
obtained for places where goods are temporarily stored.

8

Alternative/ Wrong route adopted by the transporter but
e-way bill valid

Not a contravention of any provision and section 129
cannot be invoked unless the officer is establish tax evasion.

9

Difference between invoice date : e-way bill date
(could range from few months to year) especially in case of goods consigned
after auction

Inspecting officers are intercepting goods where
invoice is significantly prior to e-way bill. Section 31 permits invoice to
be raised on or before removal of goods. A tax invoice is a permanent
document & does not have any expiry date unlike e-way bill which has is a
temporary document. Therefore, such action is incorrect in law.

10

Owner of goods – Ex-works/ FOB contracts, etc.

Section 129 requires the owner to come forward for the
entire proceedings. There have been cases where the officer has rejected the
purchaser from hearing the matter. There have been cases where the officer
has called upon the purchaser rather than the seller since the purchaser
resides in the same State. This is a challenge since ownership is differently
understood from the term supplier and recipient.

11

Whether inspecting officer can question the veracity of
the delivery address (eg. Delivery at a fourth location not belonging to the
customer)

Section 129 is invoked only where there is a
contravention of provisions during movement of goods. Being tax paid goods,
there is nothing which is further payable irrespective of the destination of
goods. Unless there is specific information of tax evasion, the officer
cannot question the veracity of the delivery address.

12

Multiple consignment – detain only goods in respect of
violation : multiple invoice vs. multiple quantity

CBIC circular (supra) states that in case of multiple
consignments, detention proceedings should be applied only on the consignment
under which there is a violation. In certain cases where an invoice has
multiple line items and the discrepancy is only with respect to one line
item, equity demands that detention proceedings should be restricted only to
the said line item in respect of which there is a violation and the rest of
the consignment should be related without any delay.

13

Officers not accepting the security for release of
goods u/s. 129

This is clearly violation of statutory mandate by the
Officers.

 

 

SOME LEGAL PRECEDENTS


Some judicial
precedents on this subject are as follows:

  •     Failure to report material
    particulars on the statutory documents under movement is a statutory offence.
    Penalty is for this statutory offence and there is no question of proving of
    intention or of mens-rea as the same is excluded from the category of essential
    element for imposing penalty. Guljag Industries vs. CTO [2007] 9 VST 1 (SC).
  •     Declaration uploaded on the
    website after the detention of goods does not absolve the penalty of the
    assessee. The time of declaration is critical. Asst. State Tax officer vs.
    Indus Towers Ltd 2018 (7) TMI 1181
    (Ker-HC)
  •     Squad / enforcement
    officers cannot detain goods over dispute on HSN/ classification. This is under
    the domain of the assessing authority. At the most, the squad officer could
    report this discrepancy to the assessing authority for further action at their
    end. Jeyyam Global Foods (P) Ltd., vs. UOI 2019 (2) TMI 124 (Mad-HC)
  •     Supreme Court CST vs. PT
    Enterprises (2000) 117 STC 315 (SC)
    – The inspecting authority has the
    powers to question the valuation of the goods under the Madhya Pradesh Sales
    Tax Act. This decision was rendered in view of the specific requirement that
    inspecting authority could detain goods in case of evasion on the value
    of goods.

 

CONCLUSION


Provisions of
interception, detention and seizure are open ended giving wide powers to the
officer. This could result in dual taxation of the very same goods without any
input tax credit in the hands of the recipient. Moreover, diverse practices are
being followed among the field formations across the country leading to
inequities in application of law. Certain legal provisions are overlapping
giving choices to the administration over the subject goods and the inclination
of the administration is to choose a stricter provision thereby making the other
provision practically redundant.  There
are multiple challenges on the front of administration, appeal, etc., which
needs to be addressed both at the macro and micro level by the GST council.
Therefore, it is imperative that the GST council and the Government take
proactive steps in cleansing the entire scheme in order to bring uniformity in
implementation of law across the country.

 

JOB WORK : OLD WINE IN BETTER BOTTLE? (PART 2)

In the previous article, we
concluded that the GST law has widened the scope of job work from its
predecessor law by considering ‘any’ treatment or process undertaken on goods
belonging to another registered person as a ‘job work’. Job work under GST law
could be viewed from two vintage points – (a) job worker’s view point with
respect of determination of his output tax liability; and (b) recipient/
principals’ view point with respect to movement of goods and retention of input
tax credit. The said article aims at discussing Job Work under various sub
topics from these viewpoints.

 

A) Supply – whether deemed Supply between distinct persons?

Movement of goods for job work
reduces the cash flow cost (to the extent of tax component) of an organisation.
GST law has innovated with the concept of distinct persons wherein distinct
registration numbers having the same PAN is deemed as independent persons (even
though they may be in the same state). Does this fiction extend even to job
work arrangements? Whether factory A can operate as a job worker for factory B
as distinct persons even-though they are holding the same PAN?

 

Section 25(4) of the CGST Act
states that a person having registration in multiple states would be treated as
distinct persons in each of the State for the purpose of the CGST/IGST/SGST
Act. This deeming fiction seemingly applies to all provisions of the GST law.
Schedule I deems transactions without consideration between distinct persons as
taxable only when there is a ‘identified supply’ between such distinct persons.
Since job work arrangements do not entail a supply (in the nature of sale,
barter, exchange, etc) between factory A to B, it would be permissible to move
goods between states without any GST implications. The goods can undergo
processing and cleared therefrom on payment of GST. While there may be
practically challenges to prove the aspect of a principal-job worker
relationship without a written contract between factory A to B, the self
generated delivery challan and ITC-04 should ideally serve as an expression of
the job work arrangement.

 

B) Classification – Supply of Goods/ Services

Job work as a Supply of Service – Job work
transactions have been deemed to be a ‘supply of service’ under Entry 3 of
Schedule II. The scope of the entry is wider in comparison to the definition of
job work in as much as it does not require the owner of the goods to be a
registered person. This entry would certainly put to rest any litigation over
the classification of such transactions on the grounds of percentage of
material involved, dominant intention, end deliverable, etc. In its Circular
No. 52/26/2018-GST, CBEC has stated that body building activity involving
supply of the entire body over the chassis owned by the principal is taxable as
supply of services @ 18% and not at the rate applicable to the goods (28%).
Therefore, in job work arrangements one would necessarily have to examine the
tax rate and exemption as applicable to services irrespective of the rate
applicable to the goods involved in such contract. The modelling of contracts
as job work or sale and purchase would become significant where the applicable
tax rate for the goods is substantially lower say exempt/ 5-12% in comparison
to the standard job work rate of 18%.

 

Job work vs.Works contract – Is there
an overlap between job work (section 2(68)) and works contract (section 2(119))
where an immovable property is involved in the arrangement? For eg. fabrication
services at site during construction of building/ storage tank for the
principal/ contractee could have two aspects:

 

  •    Process of fabrication as
    a treatment / process on goods. SAC classification under job work (99887)
    states that such fabrication manufacturing services of metal structures, steam
    generators, etc., is classifiable as job work and taxable at 18%.
  •    Process also involves
    erection of movable property as an immovable property. SAC classification (99544)
    covers assembly and erection of prefabricated constructions under the works
    contract / construction service category and taxable at 18%.

 

Explanatory notes to the SAC
classification codes provide that specific description would prevail over
general description. Going by this principle, it appears that classification as
a works contract prevails over job work (on the basis of the specific
definition of work contract w.r.t. immovable properties) and the tax rates as
applicable to work contract would apply. The end deliverable under the
contractual arrangement is the erection of the civil structure and job work
should be considered as only the means and not the end.

 

The important
point to note here is that the classification of service under Schedule II is
relevant only with reference to the job worker’s view point (i.e. his output
tax liability). This classification at the job worker’s end should not bar the
principal from availing the benefits of job work procedures. The principal
should still be permitted to send the goods to the job workers premises for any
specific activity (such as twisting, bending, etc.) under job work procedure
even-though the job worker may ultimately raise a works contract invoice on its
output activity. While this view is subject to debate, the author believes that
understanding of job work from the principal’s perspective does not necessarily
have to translate into the classification as a job work on the job worker’s
output invoice.

 

Job work vs. Manpower Supply
Contracts
– Job work has been specifically defined unlike manpower service
contracts. In certain instances where a person outsources specific processing
functions of a product to third party either on man-day/man-hour basis, the
dividing line between it being classified as a job work contract or a manpower
contract is blurred. In cases where the supplier takes responsibility over the
assignment of personnel to a particular entity for a specified job but does not
undertake the obligation over the quantum / quality of output from such
assigned personnel, the contracts would typically be in the nature of manpower
supply contracts (SAC 998513/4). Where the supplier takes over the obligation
of ensuring the quality / quantum of the product processed by the personnel so
assigned under its supervision and direction, the supplier would be
classifiable as a job worker. Decisions under both excise/ service on whether a
person is a ‘manufacturer/ service provider’ or mere supplier of hired labour
would provide some guidance on this aspect.

 

C)     Place of
Supply – Inter-State / Intra-State

Job work transactions being
classified as ‘supply of service’ would be governed by the place of supply
provisions as applicable to services u/s. 12/ 13 of the IGST Act. Some unique
instances have been provided below:

 

Job work for SEZ units/ developers – Supply of
job work service would be an inter-state supply, irrespective of the location
of the supplier of service or the place of supply u/s. 12 of the IGST Act, as
long as they are carried out for authorised operations of the SEZ unit/
developer. For the SEZ unit/ developers where physical movement of goods takes
place across the SEZ area, one will have to follow procedures of procurement of
‘goods’ under the SEZ rules (Rule 41/ 50 of SEZ rules which are discussed
later) even though the transaction may be classified as a supply of ‘service’
under the GST law. The deeming fiction of treating job work as a service
transaction under Entry 3 of Schedule II has limited operation under the GST
law and does not extend to the SEZ law.

 

Export of goods outside India for
Job Work
– Export of goods under job work arrangements outside India would
be governed by section 13 of the IGST Act. Section 13(3) read as follows:

 

“(3) The place of supply of the
following services shall be the location where the services are actually
performed, namely :-

 

(a)    Services
supplied in respect of goods which are required to be made physically available
by the recipient of services to the supplier of services, or to a person acting
on behalf of the supplier of service in order to provide the services:… ”

 

Generally, job work would be
regarded as performing a treatment/ process on goods under physical possession
(as a bailee). The definition of job work indicates the activity would be
clearly governed by section 13(3) – performance based activity and the place of
supply in case of exported goods would be location where the services are
actually performed i.e. outside India. Since the place of supply is outside
India, the transaction would not be taxable in the hands of the job worker
supplier.

 

The transaction would also not
qualify as an import of service in terms of section 2(11) of the IGST Act.
Though the RCM notification issued u/s. 5(3) of the IGST seeks to impose tax on
reverse charge basis on the basis of location of the recipient and not on the
basis of place of supply rules, in view of the author, this is a transaction
outside India and not taxable under the provisions of section 5(1) of the IGST
Act itself. No RCM liability can be attached on a non-taxable transaction.

 

From a customs perspective, export
movement is generally duty free except for some export duty goods. For Import
movement Notification 45/2017-Cus dt. 30-06-2017 grants customs duty exemption
(incl. IGST) to goods originally exported, at the time of reimport within 3
years, provided the goods are ‘same’ as those exported. Explanation to the
notification states that the goods would not be same if they are subjected to
re-manufacturing, reprocessing through melting, recycling or recasting abroad.
In such arrangements, challenge would arise on whether the job worked goods
constitute ‘same’ goods. In case the goods do not get the customs duty
exemption, it would be regarded as a fresh import and subjected to customs duty
incl. IGST on the enhanced value of the product.

 

 



Be that as it may, one can
certainly take a view based on the celebrated decision of Hyderabad
Industries vs. UOI 1999 (108) E.L.T. 321 (S.C.)
that IGST component u/s.
3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act is counter-veiling in nature and hence cannot be
imposed on imports under job work in the absence of a transaction of ‘supply’
between the parties involved1. The transaction is deemed to be a
supply only in limited cases when the conditions of job work are breached by
the principal and not otherwise.

___________________________________

1 There is a slight variation in the way section 3(1), (3) and
(5) are worded in comparison to 3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

 

Import of goods into India for Job
work
– Goods are imported into India for job work. While the job work
is performed in India, the location of the recipient of such job work (i.e.
principal) is outside India. Strictly speaking this arrangement does not fall
within the ambit of the definition of job work since the owner of the goods is
not a ‘registered person’. Nevertheless we will analyse this job work
transaction as understood in commercial sense.

 

Under the GST law, by application
of section 13(3), the place of supply would be held to be in India. By way of a
proviso2 to section 13(3) (extracted below), the place of supply in
such transactions has been fixed to the location of the recipient of job work
services rather than the place of performance of the job work.

 

“Provided further that nothing
contained in this clause shall apply in the case of services supplied in
respect of goods which are temporarily imported into India for repairs or for
any other treatment or process and are exported after such repairs or treatment
or process without being put to any use in India, other than that which is
required for such repairs or treatment or process;”

 

In view of this proviso, the
transaction would be considered as an export of service and zero-rated in terms
of section 16 of the IGST Act. The Customs law vide Notification 32/1997 dt.
1-4-1997 permits temporary imports into India for the purpose of job work,
etc., subject to certain conditions over time limit, use etc. Therefore, import
of goods for job work should not have any implications in India.

 

Inter-state job work – Job work
transactions would be inter-state or intra-state and largely dependent on the
location of the supplier and recipient of the service in terms of section 12(1)
of the IGST Act. Where the location of the supplier and recipient is in the
same state, it would be an intra-state transaction and vice-versa. Except in
cases involving an immovable property, the location of supplier of service and
recipient of service would be the only determinants in deciding the inter-state
character of the transaction. Provisions of CGST Act would apply to inter-state
transactions as well (section 20 of IGST Act) and hence all benefits extended
to intra-state arrangements would equally apply even to inter-state movements.

 

From a principals perspective for
intra-state job work movement, further supply of goods after job work either
from the principal location or job workers location would not pose any
particular challenge since the registered location of the supplier and the
physical location of the goods is in the same state. The further supply would
be treated as inter-state or intra-state depending on the movement of the
goods.

 

In certain inter-state job work
movement where the principal does not receive the goods back but decides to
supply the processed/ job worked goods directly from the job worker’s location
to its customer, there is a challenge in deciding the location of the supplier.
This is primarily because the registered location of the supplier is different
from the physical location of goods. It is depicted below:

________________________________________________

2   Broadened
by the IGST amendment Act, 2018 and yet to be notified.

 

 

 

 

 

 

In such transactions, the initial
movement of goods takes place from KA-MH under a delivery challan for the
purpose of job work. The supplier may or may not have a confirmed order for
supply of the said goods to a customer in MH. Assuming there is no confirmed
order, after job work, the principal supplies the goods directly to its
customer in MH. A question arises on the type of tax to be charged on the sale
invoice (i.e. IGST/ CGST+SGST).

 

The IGST Act states that where the
supply involves movement of goods within a state, the transaction would be
intra-state, else it would be classified as an inter-state transaction. In this
case, the first movement of goods by the supplier is under an arrangement of
job work and not under a binding contract of supply with the customer. It is
only when the order is received from the customer in MH that the second
movement commences, which then terminates in MH. Going by the fabric of the
entire GST law and also the fact that job work is merely facilitation provision
and does not materially alter other obligations under GST, one can take a stand
that this is an inter-state transaction despite the fact that the movement
commences and terminates in the same state3. This reconciles with
the overall scheme of source and consumption principle of value-added scheme of
taxation.

_________________________________________________

3   It
must be noted that this is not a Bill to Ship to case as is envisaged in
section 10(1)(b) but a case where the billing location and dispatch location
are in different states.

 

D)     Valuation
under job work

Job work transactions are liable to
tax on its transaction value i.e. price paid or payable by the principal to the
job worker for the job work service. There is a clear departure from the excise
principle of notionally re-valuing the goods after job work and subjecting the
same to excise duty. Under job work, valuation is only restricted to the
service rendered by the job worker. The price charged for the job work service
would then be subject to all the additions/ exclusions as provided u/s. 15(2)
and (3) of the Act. Certain important points have been stated below:

 

Recoveries on disposal of
scrap/ waste from Job Work

The erstwhile Cenvat rules was
silent on the treatment of waste and scrap arising during the course of
manufacturing final products at the premises of job worker. This resulted in
litigation on the person liable to excise duty on such waste/ scrap. Section
143(5) of the GST law now provides that the waste and scrap generated during
the job work may be supplied by the registered job worker directly from
his place of business or by the principal in case the job worker is not
registered. A question arises on whether the liability of recoveries on waste/
scrap generated from job work arises on the job worker in all cases?

 

In this context, job work contracts
can be classified into two categories: (a) Contracts where the responsibility
of utilisation and/ or disposals of scraps or waste emerging from the goods is
on the job worker. In such cases by virtue of the contract, the scraps and
waste are to the account of the job work and any recoveries from waste/ scraps
would be retained by the job worker. Accordingly, such recoveries should be
taxable in the hands of the job worker and not the principal.  (b) In other contracts waste and scraps are
to the account of the principal and the job worker has to report the generation
of such items to the principal. The principal may either receive the goods back
or direct the job worker to dispose them under its authorisation to a third
party. Generally, two sub-scenarios arise in this category (b-i) principal
sells the goods under its invoice and directs the job worker to collect the net
proceeds (as a collection agent). The principal should report this turnover and
discharge the tax liability on such transaction; (b-ii) job worker sells the
goods in its possession under its own invoice effectively operating as a
‘selling agent’ of goods belonging to the principal – in such case the
recoveries would be taxed in the hands of the principal (as a deemed supply
between principal and agent under Schedule I) as well as in the hands of the
job worker (as a selling agent).

 

Is there a conflict that may
possibly arise by virtue of a contract and the statute? In view of the author,
the provisions of section 143(5) should not be given a strict application in
all cases in view of the use of the term ‘may’. The contract should be given
prominence before determining the person liable to pay tax on such recoveries.
Section 143(5) should be understood as giving an option to the principal to
decide the more economical and viable options viz., to bring back the wastes
and scraps or to clear the same from job worker premises on payment of taxes by
himself or by the job worker, as the case may be.

 

The following judgements General
Engineering Works vs. CCE 2007 (212) ELT 295 (SC)
clearly explains the
position of earlier law and the importance of contractual terms in order to
ascertain the appropriate value:

 

“4. It is an admitted position that
to manufacture 100 Kgs. of points and crossings, 105 Kgs. of raw material has
to be used. Therefore, in working out the value of points and crossings the
cost of 105 Kgs. of raw material would have to be taken into account.
Undoubtedly, when points and crossings are manufactured a small quantity of raw
material become scrap/waste. But that does not detract from fact that to
manufacture 100 kg. of points and crossings 105 kg. of raw material has to be
used. This element i.e. the cost of raw material would remain the same
irrespective of whether scrap/waste is returned to the Railways or kept by the
Appellants. The Appellants charge what are known as conversion charges. This
includes their labour charges. Such conversion charges would have to be added
to the cost of raw material. To this would have to be added profits, if any,
earned by the processor (Appellant). Thus suppose the conversion charges are
Rs. 450/-, the cost of 105 Kgs. of raw material is Rs. 1,000/-, and Rs. 50/- is
earned from sale of scrap the value of the points and crossings would be Rs.
1,500/-

5. It must be clarified that the value of scrap would be included in the value
of the points and crossings only in case where it is shown that the conversion
charges get depressed by the fact that the processor is allowed to keep and
sell the scrap. Thus in the example given above, it would have to be shown that
the conversion charges are Rs. 450/- because Rs. 50/- is earned from the sale
of scrap. If the conversion charges are not depressed or if the scrap/waste is
returned then, their value will not get added.

 

6. The burden of proving that the
price is so depressed would be on the Revenue. But one of the methods of
proving it would be through the contract between the parties itself. In this
case the contract is on record. The contract provides as follows : –

 

“The prices quoted are based on the
free supply of Rails by you at our works, Bharatpur, Western Railway,
Rajasthan. The tonnage for Rails will be 5% more than the net requirement of
Rails required for different items of Switches, 5% being the manufacturing
wastage…………

The total requirement of Rails for
different items would be forwarded to you within ten days of receipt of your
formal order. Manufacturing wastage of 5% has been considered and therefore
this wastage will not be separately accounted for and shall not be returned. Any
surplus materials received from you against the contract, will be returned to
you and dispatched to the destination as advised by you, F.O.R.”

 

7. Thus, the contract clearly
indicates that the price (conversion charges) have been worked out on the basis
that 5% wastage would be available to the Appellants. This indicates that the
price has been affected by the sale of scrap. In this view, we are in agreement
with the view of the Tribunal that in computing the value of points and
crossings the value of scrap sold has to be taken into account.”

 

Includibility of Value of FOC items
(such as inputs, moulds, dies, etc.)

 

Job workers in many instances are
supplied with moulds, dies, etc., for rendering the service. The Central excise
and GST law both use the phrase that ‘price should be sole consideration’.
Under excise provisions, explanation to Rule 6 of the Central Excise
(Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 required the
manufacturer to include the amortised value of moulds, etc., in the value the
final product manufactured by the job worker. This practice under excise law
would certainly pose challenges during the GST period. The issue is whether a
notional value is to be attributed to the value of job work service on account
of (a) price not being the sole consideration in view of the FOC item; or (b)
in view of section 15(2)(b) of the GST law requiring the supplier to notionally
add value of all expenses incurred by the principal. Both are in some sense
correlated and section 15(2)(b) is an elaboration of the adjustment where price
is not the sole consideration.

 

Section 15(2)(b) has the following
cumulative conditions:

 

  •    Supplier (job worker) is
    making a supply (job work service) to its recipient (principal), typically
    under a contract;
  •    An amount is liable to
    be paid
    by the supplier (job worker);
  •    Such amount has been incurred
    by the recipient (principal)
  •    And accordingly this is
    not included in the price payable for supply (job work service)

 

In job work arrangements, the
moulds are purchased by the principal for multiple commercial reasons such as
high costs, IPR protection, etc. This is done in its own interest. One of the
primary conditions of section 15(2)(b) is that there has to be a primary
liability on the job worker to incur an expense, either under a contract or as
part the scope of work assigned to the job worker, which is subsequently taken
up by the principal, thereby reducing the net price as originally agreed in the
contract, for eg. a textile manufacturer agrees to outsource the dyeing of x
mtrs of textile with dyes/inks/ impressions as part of the responsibility on
the job worker and fixes a price of y/mtr. Subsequently, the manufacturer
procures the ink of specified type and supplies the same to the job worker and
reduces the price payable to y-1/mtr. In such cases, the dye could be
notionally added onto the value of supply in the hands of the job worker. In a
contrasting case, if the price was originally agreed at y 1/mtr with the supply
of dye being part of responsibility of principal, there is no liability on the
job worker to use his own dye for the process. The important driver for trigger
of this provision is that the liability of job worker should precede
the act of incurring the expense by the recipient. Fulfilment of one’s own
obligation is distinct from fulfilment of another person’s obligation and
15(2)(b) is addressing only the later obligation. In a transaction based law,
price agreed for a set of obligations (as a counter promise) should be the only
basis for valuation under GST.

 

E)     Compliance of Job work
provisions

Outsourcing
by job worker himself
– The law permits the principal to send the goods for job work to
multiple job workers. Outsourcing by job workers as a principal himself may be
permitted contractually but the law does not contain specific provisions for
job workers to send the goods at their own behest (in capacity of a principal).
One may view this from two perspectives.

 

The definition
of job work suggests that the law does not mandate that the goods should belong
to the principal i.e. the goods can be belong to any registered person. The
term principal is understood only u/s. 143 as being the person who ‘sends’ the
goods for job work.  Therefore, this
suggests that the job worker can function as a principal while sending the
goods for a second level job work. All provisions of the law as applicable to
principals would equally apply to the job worker when operating as a principal.

 

The other aspect is from the point
of view of section 143(2) which states that the accountability of the goods
under job work always lies with the principal. The accountability on the
principal u/s. 143(2) has been placed as a consequence of the fact that he has
availed input tax credit on such goods. This responsibility over the goods
under law cannot be shifted from the primary principal to the job worker.  Even if there is a clandestine removal of
goods without authorisation/ knowledge of the principal at any point of time,
the recovery of the tax on such goods would only be made by the person availing
the benefit of input tax credit i.e. principal. Since the job worker has not
availed the benefit of input tax credit on such goods, the onus is always on
the principal who has availed this facility to ensure that the goods are within
its supervision until all the conditions of job work are satisfied. While
outsourcing by a job worker to a sub-job worker is not barred, the
accountability over the goods under law still rests on the primary principal
only.

 

In-house job
work activity
– There are instances where a job worker performs the job work
activity in the premises of the principal for commercial reasons. In such
cases, the place of supply provisions would operate on similar lines and the
location of the principal and the job worker would decide the inter-state
character of the transaction (unless the job worker constitutes a fixed
establishment in the premises of the principal). Under these arrangements, the job
worker may have to move certain tools, equipments etc to the principal’s
premises and return those back to the original location. Section 19 and 143 is
applicable only cases where principal moves goods to the job worker’s premises
and not the other way round. However, in cases of in-house job work activity,
the principal does not need the facility of these sections since the entire
activity is occurring in-house. The job worker on the other hand is moving the
goods without an intent of supply but self-use. In view of the author, in the
absence of a transaction of supply between the job worker and the principal,
the job worker can still move the goods to the principal’s location and retain
the input tax credit by use of a delivery challan.

 

Possible consequence of violation
of Job work provisions

Violation of job work provisions
can be clubbed under two baskets (a) violation of substantial requirements
(such as arrangement not falling under the scope of job work, non-return of
goods within prescribed time etc) (b) violation of procedural requirements
(such as non-filing of ITC-04, etc).

 

(a)    Violation
of substantial provisions:
Conceptually any violation should be rectified
by restoring the benefit originally granted to the tax payer. In a job work transaction,
the principal avails the benefit of input tax credit on inputs/ capital goods
(i.e. skips the stage of reversal and reclaim) even-though the goods are not in
its possession. Section 143(3) & (4) deems the inputs/ capital goods as
being supplied by the principal to the job worker if they are not returned
within the time limit. Valuation rules do not provide any mechanism for
valuation of goods violating the job work provisions. In the absence of a
contractual consideration for the deemed supply of goods, does this mean that
the principal would have to pay tax on a notional value in terms of open market
value of the goods under job work? In the view of the author this may not be
so. The deeming fiction is to be understood in the context of the original
benefit extended to the supplier which is limited to recover the input tax
credit availed on the goods which have violated the job work provisions. It
would be legally in appropriate to assume this transaction as an independent
supply and subject it to tax in the hands of the principal at a notional value.

(b)    Violation
of procedural provisions:
Any procedural violation which is curable and
condonable should not have any adverse implication. Where the principal has
failed to make the necessary intimations of goods sent for job work, it can be
cured by producing books of accounts/ records evidencing the outward and inward
movement which conclusively establish the use of the goods under job work. In
cases where goods are duly accounted, it would be incorrect to saddle the
principal with an additional tax liability by invoking provisions of section
143(3) / (4). The penal provisions for non-filing of the relevant forms would
continue to apply.

 

F)     Procedural matters

Documentation requirements

Movement of goods between the
principal and job work is required to be covered under a delivery challan (DC)
in terms of Rule 45 r/w 55(1)(b) of CGST/ SGST Rules. This is also required to
be accompanied by a e-way bill in terms of Rule 138(1)(ii) of the said Rules.
Certain specific provisions have been provided under the e-way bill rules for
job work arrangements (CBEC Circular No. 38/12/2018):

 

  •    Where goods are sent by
    principal to only one job worker: The principal shall prepare a DC for sending
    the goods to a job worker. Two copies of the DC may be sent to the job worker
    along with the goods. The job worker should send one copy of the said challan
    along with the goods, while returning them to the principal. The FORM GST
    ITC-04 will serve as the intimation as envisaged u/s. 143 of the CGST Act,
    2017.
  •    Where goods are sent from
    one job worker to another job worker: In such cases, the goods may move under a
    DC issued either by the principal or the job worker. In the alternative, the DC
    issued by the principal may be endorsed by the job worker sending the goods to
    another job worker, indicating therein the quantity and description of goods
    being sent. The same process may be repeated for subsequent movement of the
    goods to other job workers.
  •    Where the goods are
    returned to the principal by the job worker: The job worker should send one
    copy of the DC received by him from the principal while returning the goods to
    the principal after carrying out the job work.
  •    Where the goods are sent
    directly by the supplier to the job worker: In this case, the goods may move
    from the place of business of the supplier to the place of business/premises of
    the job worker with a copy of the invoice issued by the supplier in the name of
    the buyer (i.e. the principal) wherein the job worker’s name and address should
    also be mentioned as the consignee, in terms of Rule 46(o) of the CGST Rules.
    The buyer (i.e., the principal) shall issue the challan under Rule 45 of the
    CGST Rules and send the same to the job worker directly in terms of para (i)
    above. In case of import of goods by the principal which are then supplied
    directly from the customs station of import, the goods may move from the
    customs station of import to the place of business/premises of the job worker
    with a copy of the Bill of Entry and the principal shall issue the challan
    under Rule 45 of the CGST Rules and send the same to the job worker directly.
  •    Where goods are returned
    in piecemeal by the job worker: In case the goods after carrying out the job
    work, are sent in piecemeal quantities by a job worker to another job worker or
    to the principal, the challan issued originally by the principal cannot be
    endorsed and a fresh challan is required to be issued by the job worker.

 

E-way Bill requirements

  •    E-way bill is required to
    be issued for movement of goods under a DC. The e-way bill is generally
    required to be generated by the person causing movement of goods. In case of
    job work, the provisions permit the either the principal or the job worker to
    raise the e-way bill for movement.

 

Quarterly
reporting of movement in Form ITC-04

  •    Rule 45(3) of the CGST
    Rules provides that the principal is required to furnish the details of DCs in
    respect of goods sent to a job worker or received from a job worker or sent
    from one job worker to another job worker during a quarter in FORM GST ITC-04
    by the 25th day of the month succeeding the quarter or within such period as
    may be extended by the Commissioner. FORM GST ITC-04 will serve as the
    intimation as envisaged u/s. 143 of the CGST Act.

 

G)     Challenges in
Compliance

Difference in unit of measurement
(UOM)/ quantity

Many a times, difference arises in
the UOM between goods sent and received under job work. Form ITC-04 originally
required that goods sent and received should be strictly correlated in terms of
the original UOM. The law also required the original delivery challan should be
enclosed with the delivery challan raised on return of goods. While in practice
there many reasons due which it is impossible to make a one-to-one correlation with
each outward and inward movement (eg. raw materials sent in batches, raw
materials losing their original identified, etc). The form has now been
recently rationalised wherein one-to-one correlation between outward challan
and inward challan is not mandatory if it is impossible for the principal to
ascertain. Therefore, as long as the principal can establish the conversion
ratio and account of the goods under job work, it may not be mandatory for the
principal to report each outward movement with the inward movement.
Whether job work provisions are applicable where raw material is exempt and
job worked product is taxable?

Section 143/ 19 are applicable only
on inputs/ capital goods i.e. goods used in business and on which tax is
leviable under the GST law. In cases where the raw material is exempt (such as
sugar to sugar cane), one may take a stand that since input tax credit has not
be availed on such goods, job work provisions need not be strictly followed.

 

Whether procedural provisions (such
as e-way bill) applicable when raw material is taxable and job worked product
is exempt?

Job work provisions are applicable
when the inputs under consideration are tax suffered goods and irrespective of
the taxability of goods on their return after job work provisions. Reporting
such movement is mandatory in ITC-04. However, e-way bill requirements are
waived for exempted goods. Therefore such goods may be returned under the cover
of a delivery challan and need not be accompanied with an e-way bill.

 

What is the value to be declared by
the job worker in the e-way bill on its return?

Certain challenges have been raised
on the value to be declared on the delivery challan on outward and inward
movement of goods under job work. One view suggests that the approx. market
value at the time the movement of goods should be adopted i.e. the return of
goods should be enhanced by the job work charges.  The other view may be to adopt the value of
cost of the input/ capital goods under job work for both outward and inward
movement. A third view may be to adopt the value on which input tax credit has
been availed on such inputs/ capital goods for both outward and inward
movement. The author is inclined to believe that the third view conceptually
aligns with the objective of the job work provisions under GST.


Special provisions for SEZ unit/ developer.

A
SEZ unit/ developer is permitted to sub-contract a portion of their processing
activity to other SEZ / EOU or DTA units (in terms of Rule 41 of SEZ Rules).
SEZ unit are also permitted to temporarily remove their capital goods/ inputs
to DTA without payment of duty for job work, testing, repair, refining,
calibration and return thereof (in terms of Rule 50 of SEZ Rules). Rule 40/51
both provide for strict procedures to be followed for outsourced processing
activities to a DTA including the time limit for return, account  of the goods cleared, wastage, quantum of
outsourcing, return of moulds, jigs, tools, etc. There could be variances
between the GST law and the SEZ requirements and the SEZ unit as a principal of
the transaction would have to necessarily comply with the more stringent
requirement in order to retain its SEZ benefits.

 

H)     Conclusion

Job work provisions should be
understood as a provision of convenience. Accordingly any misuse/
non-compliance should be viewed as a recovery of the benefit granted and not
beyond that.
 

Set Off vis-a-vis Gross Receipts for Rule 53(6)(B) of The MVAT Rules

Introduction

The grant of set off is
prerogative of the legislature. In other words, set off is not right of the
dealers. The set off is to be given as per Scheme, Rules and conditions
attached therewith.

 

Under MVAT Act, there is
broad scheme of granting set off including almost on all goods like Capital
goods, trading goods and expenses are eligible for set off. However, there are
certain conditions where set off can be reduced or it can be denied.

 

There is Rule 53(6)(b)
which has attracted long litigation. The rule is reproduced below for ready
reference.

 

53. Reduction in
set-off

 

The set-off available under
any rule shall be reduced and shall accordingly be disallowed in part or full
in the event of any of the contingencies specified below and to the extent specified.

 

(6) If out of the gross
receipts of a dealer in any year, receipts on account of sale are less than
fifty per cent. of the total receipts, –

 

(b) in so far as the dealer
is not hotel or restaurant, the dealer shall be entitled to claim set-off only
on those purchases effected in that year where the corresponding goods are sold
or resold within six months of the date of purchase or are consigned within the
said period, not by way of sale to another State, to oneself or one’s agent or
purchases of packing materials used for packing of such goods sold, resold or
consigned:

 

Provided that for the
purposes of clause (b), the dealer who is a manufacturer of goods not being a
dealer principally engaged in doing job work or labour work shall be entitled
to claim set-off on his purchases of plant and machinery which are treated as
capital assets and purchases of parts, components and accessories of the said
capital assets, and on purchases of consumables, stores and packing materials
in respect of a period of three years from the date of effect of the
certificate of registration.

 

Explanation.-For the
purposes of this sub-rule, the “receipts” means the receipts pertaining to all
activities including business activities carried out in the State but does not
include the amount representing the value of the goods consigned not by way of
sales to another State to oneself or one’s agent.”

 

It can be seen that if the
receipts from sale are less than 50% of gross receipts, than set off is restricted
to the purchases which are sold within six months. If such condition is
applicable, then the dealer has to give the data about purchase and sale of
corresponding goods and then claim set off.

 

The major issue arises
about interpretation of “gross receipts”. One of the issues is what is the
scope of gross receipts?

 

Case of Mutual Funds

In case of Mutual Funds,
they run various different schemes. Separate accounts are kept for each scheme.
If receipts of all the schemes are considered then the mutual funds attract
above rule. However, if the scheme relating to particular commodity like gold
is considered separately then the above rule may not apply.  

 

There was controversy about
the scope of gross receipt in relation to mutual fund i.e. whether to take
receipts from all the schemes to compute the gross receipts or to take only
receipts of each scheme. The matter has reached to Hon. Bombay High Court in
case of Axis Mutual Fund (WP No. 710 of 2018 dt.6.8.2018).

 

The brief facts narrated by
Hon. Bombay High Court are reproduced below.

           

“3.  By the Deed of Trust dated 27.06.2009 made by
and between Axis Bank Limited, a settlor, and Axis Mutual Fund Trustee Company
Limited, trustee, an irrevocable trust/trusts called Axis Mutual Fund was
created.

 

4.  Axis Mutual Fund Trustee Company Limited
(“Trustee Company”), incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act,
1956, was approved by Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) to act as
a Trustee of the various scheme(s) of the Axis Mutual Fund.

 

5. Axis Asset Management
Company Limited (“Axis AMC”), incorporated under the provisions of the
Companies Act, 1956, was approved by SEBI to act as the Asset Management
Company for the scheme(s) of the Axis Mutual Fund.

 

6.  By the Deed of Trust dated 27th
June, 2009, the settlor, inter-alia, declared and agreed that the Trustee
Company shall manage the mutual fund in accordance with the  applicable regulations. Further, as per para
6.1.1 of the Deed of Trust dated 27th June, 2009, the Trustee
Company is allowed to float one or more schemes for the issue of units to be
subscribed by the public.

 

7.  The responsibility for the daily operations
of the scheme(s) of Axis Mutual Fund has been delegated to the Axis AMC through
an investment Management Agreement dated 27th June, 2009 executed
between the Trustee Company and Axis AMC. As enumerated in Clause 3 of this
Agreement dated 27th June, 2009, the delegated responsibilities,
inter alia, include the maintenance of accounts and records, evaluation of investment
operations, carrying out credit assessments in relation to proposes
investments.

 

8.  It is the contention of the Petitioner that
by the Deed of Trust dated 27th June, 2009, multiple trust(s), i.e. scheme(s), were created as and when floated. The various clauses of the
Deed of Trust indicating independent existence of each scheme is provided in
the table below:-

 

Para

Text

4.3.1

Entrustment
of property

 

The
liabilities of a particular Scheme shall be met out of assets of the same
scheme and shall in no way attach to or become a liability of any other
scheme.

4.3.2

Entrustment
of property

 

The
Trustee Company shall ensure that proper and separate accounting records are
maintained for each scheme.

6.1.14

Functions
of Trustee Company

 

Distribute
dividend and income of the relevant Scheme, as and when the same may become
due and payable.”

 

 

The contention of the
dealer was that though there is one trust deed, there are actually multiple trusts
as per the schemes. It was submission that a trust is an obligation annexed to
the ownership of property. It was also submitted that as clearly evident from
Deed of Trust, such obligations are towards the beneficiaries of each scheme
and not towards the beneficiaries of all the schemes put together. Accordingly,
it was argued that the receipts of each scheme to be seen separately. If it so
seen then for Axis Gold ETF Scheme, the condition of 50% of sale of the gross
receipts gets fulfilled and Rule 53(6)(b) will not apply. The reliance was
placed on the judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in case of Commissioner
of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh and Anr. vs. Trustees of H. E. H. the Nizam’s
Family Trust (1986) 4 SCC 352.
 

 

On behalf of revenue the
above submission was opposed on the ground that trust is registered as dealer
and hence it is one dealer and the rejection of set off applying Rule 53(6)(b)
is correct.

 

The Hon. High Court
discussed various aspects including the judgment cited in case of Nizam’s
Family Trust. However, under the scheme of the Rule 53(6)(b), the Hon. High
Court upheld the action of the revenue.

The observations of the
Hon. High Court are as under;

 

“46. Such is not the case
before us. There is a single Deed of Trust. There may be separate schemes, but
there was never any intent as is now sought to be culled out and to create
separate Trust. This is not a case where separate Trusts were created and
hence, the principle relied upon by Mr. Sridharan from several works on Law of
Trust and to the effect that receipts from Axis Mutual Fund ETF alone have to
be considered for there is formation of more than one trust by the Deed of
Trust and that is permissible, has no application. This has no application here
because the earlier principle and based on the case of Commissioner of Income
Tax, Bombay City 1, Bombay vs. Manilal Dhanji, Bombay 3 is inapplicable. This
is not a case where the settlor has created more trusts under a single Trust
Deed. This is a clear case where the Deed of Trust permits floating one or more
schemes. That is not equivalent to creation of separate Trusts. It is in these
circumstances that the assessing officer, the first appellate authority and the
Tribunal all rightly concluded that the set-off available under Rule 53 has to
be reduced. It shall be accordingly in part or full in the event of any of the
contingencies specified and to the extent specified in sub-rule (6) of Rule 53.
Pertinently, the set-off has not been disallowed in full. It is hold that in
the case clearly specified of gross receipts of a dealer in any year and if
from that, receipts on account of sale are less than 50% of the total receipts,
then, insofar as the dealer, who is not a hotel or restaurant, the set-off is
permissible only on those purchases effected in that year where the
corresponding goods are sold or resold within six months from the date of
purchase. There is no creation of separate Trusts, but separate schemes under a
single Trust Deed are floated.”

Thus, the application of
Rule 53(6)(b) was justified.

                       

Conclusion

The above judgment will be
guiding judgment to interpret the scope of Rule 53(6)(b). However, leaving
aside the legality, the effect is that there will be double taxation in as much
as the set off is denied though on the sale of same goods, tax is collected. It
is for the policy makers to reconsider the issue and to give necessary relief
considering the scheme and object of the VAT system.
 

 

 

Job-Work : Old Wine In Better Bottle? (Part-1)

Job Workers are generally understood as
persons who perform a part of a manufacturing process on goods belonging to another.
Traditionally, job workers performed outsourced manufacturing/ processing
activities by receiving goods belonging to their principal and returning the
same after due processing. The arrangements are usually made for certain
commercial reasons, such as:

 

1.   Work requires special skilled labour

 

2.   Work can performed only with specialised
machinery

 

3.   Infrequent requirement not requiring a
full-fledged set-up

 

4.   Job worker can perform same/ similar tasks at
lower operating costs

 

5.   Paucity of space for job work activity

 

The objective of this article is to discuss
the concept of job work from the perspective of its scope and the general
procedures involved in a job work arrangement.

 

Job Work – A specie of a Contract

Job work contracts are usually a combination
of a service contract coupled with bailment. The owner of the goods delivers or
transfers possession over his goods to another person with a condition of
returning the goods or disposing them under the directions of the owner. The
essentials of a contract of job work would be as follows:

 

1.   The objective of the contract is to perform a
process/ treatment over the goods

 

2.   For the purpose of its fulfilment, the owner
of goods (generally called the principal) delivers/ transfers the possession of
goods with a specific mandate to the transferee (called the job worker) under a
contract of bailment

 

3.   Ownership continues to rest with the
principal awarding the job work

 

4.   The job worker performs his process on the
goods received and on completion delivers the goods back to the principal or
any other place as designated by the principal

 

5.   Job worker would have to account for the
consumption of goods/ scrap and wastage

 

6.   Job worker would ensure that the goods are
not merged / mixed with own goods or any other principals’ goods

 

7.   Job worker is required to take reasonable
steps for the safety of the goods in capacity as a bailee of these goods

 

Job Work – Its relevance and history

The concept of Job work was originally
contained in the Excise law. Excise law was an activity driven law in the sense
that the manufacturing process in a factory formed the basis of imposition of
duty. The ownership over goods was not relevant for deciding the taxable person
(1988 (38) E.L.T. 535 (S.C.) Ujagar Prints, etc. vs. UOI). It laid
emphasis on the physical location, movement and identity over the goods and
considered the terms of contract between the parties as an inessential element.
Therefore, every removal of goods, whether in processed or unprocessed form,
whether under a contract of sale, bailment or otherwise, had excise
implications either as duty payment or Cenvat Credit reversal. In order to
overcome the procedural difficulties of an intermittent duty payment or credit
reversal, the Government extended certain benefits to job workers and reduced
multiplicity of tax implications and compliance under job work transactions.
The benefits can be put into two baskets:

 

i.    Notification 214/86-CE dated 25-03-1986
granted duty exemption in case a job worker was engaged in manufacturing
activity as long as the principal undertook to discharge the applicable duty on
the finished goods.  Notification
83/94-CE and 84/94-CE exempted job worker manufacturer and supplier
manufacturer under the SSI scheme from payment of duty.

 

ii.    Rule 4(5) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004
allowed the manufacturer/ service provider to retain the Cenvat Credit availed
on inputs/ capital goods where such goods were sent for the purpose of job work
and returned within the prescribed time limit.

 

The important point that needs to be
observed is that both these benefits operated under different domains. The
former granted a duty benefit which was otherwise applicable in case of a
manufacturing activity undertaken by a job worker and the latter granted the
benefit of retaining Cenvat Credit inspite of goods being physically removed
for a specific purpose. Yet, the common intent behind this was to relax the
complexities in view of physical movement of goods and ensuring that the goods
are duly accounted at the original location after the job work.

 

On the other hand, the Sales tax / VAT law
did not contain specific provisions in respect of job work. Infact, one may say
that this was not essential because the levy was a transaction based levy with
the sole emphasis on the ‘transfer of ownership’ over the goods. As long as the
principal retained its ownership over the goods, any manufacturing activity on
such goods did not lead to tax implications. Pure job work being a contract for
service and bailment did not fall within the ambit of VAT (except for some
stray works contract cases). The movement of goods (inter-state or intra-state)
for job work coupled with transport documents did not generally have any
sales/VAT tax implications. At most, the law prescribed certain documentation
for movement of goods in order to protect the interest of revenue and tap any
diversion of goods.

 

One may say that excise is a ‘boundary’
based law whereas sales tax is a ‘transaction’ based law. Therefore, concept of
job work had prominence under the excise law rather than the sales tax
law. 

 

Concept of Job work under GST

The GST law is considered a pseudo-sales tax
law with its peripheries made from the excise law. Two important facets of the
law are (a) it’s a contract based transaction law; and (b) it’s a multi-point
levy on both goods and services. Every form of value addition, whether on goods
or of service is taxed under the GST law at the transaction level and not at
the unit level. Job work itself being a value-added activity is a ‘taxable
service’ and did not require any special treatment.

 

Yet, the GST law has introduced the concept
of job work.  The only possible reason
attributable to such a move could be that job work arrangements would involve
significant to and fro movement of goods between the principal and the job
worker. Hence from a revenue perspective it was important to ensure that the
inventory of goods (esp. tax credited goods) are duly accounted for by the
principal after completion of job work. Reporting of outward and inward
movement of goods for job work enables the revenue to ascertain the end-use of
the goods.

 

Framework of Job work under GST

Job work provisions are contained u/s. 19
and 143 with certain transitional provisions u/s. 141. Job work has been
defined u/s. 2(68) to mean any treatment or process undertaken by a person on
goods belonging to another registered person and the term job worker should be
construed accordingly. Section 19 is titled ‘Taking input tax credit in respect
of inputs and capital goods sent for job work’ and placed under the Input tax
Credit chapter (Chapter V). Section 16, 143, 141 use terms such as ‘inputs’ and
‘capital goods’ rather than ‘goods’ in general implying that the job work
provisions should be understood to extend only to those goods which are
availing the benefit of ITC. This indicates that job work provision were
intended to operate in the lines of Rule 4(5) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and
not as an exemption from payment of tax.

 

An examination of the general provisions and
the waiver conditions in section 19 and 143 further substantiate this
conclusion. Section 19 provides a relaxation to one of the primary conditions
of availing input tax credit i.e. the receipt of goods u/s. 16(2)(b). The
section state the following:

 

    Credit on Inputs / capital
goods is permitted even in cases where such goods are directly sent to the
job-workers premises for job work without first being brought to the premises
of the principal provided they are returned in the specified period;

 

   the goods are returned to
the principal within a period of one year or three years; and

 

   in case of any violation,
the inputs/ capital goods originally sent out would deemed to be supplied by
the principal to the job worker on the day they were originally removed

 

Section 143 under Chapter XXI –
Miscellaneous contains procedural provisions to be followed in job work
transactions which state the following:

 

     The principal is permitted
to send inputs/ capital goods to a job worker without payment of tax provided
they are returned within the prescribed period of one/ three years

 

    It is permitted to supply
these goods directly from the job workers premises without bringing the same
back to the principal’s place of business if the job worker is registered or
the job workers place of business is included in the certificate of
registration of the principal

 

     The principal is
accountable for the goods sent on job work

 

     Waste and scrap generated
during job work is permitted to be supplied by a job worker directly from his
place of business on payment of tax

 

     An extended meaning to the
term input has been provided which states that intermediate goods would also be
termed inputs – implying that intermediate goods would be permitted to remove
without payment of tax to a job worker.

 

Section 19 and 143 contain similar
provisions i.e. permitting zero-tax movement of goods back and forth between
the principal and job worker. The content of both the sections overlap each
other except on three points (a) treatment of scrap/ wastage; (b) inclusion of
intermediate goods for job work activity and (c) permitting clearance of goods
from job worker premises. Yet, one noticeable difference between section 19 and
143 is that while section 19 talks about ‘retention of the input tax credit
in the hands of the principal, section 143 grants the benefit of removal of
goods to a job worker ‘without payment of tax’.

 

Rate of Tax/
Classification under GST

Job work activity has been deemed as a
supply of services under Schedule II of the GST Act (Entry 3). Notification
11-2017- Central Tax (Rate) (as amended) has provided the rates of tax for job
work activities. The said activity has been classified under HSN 9988 &
9989. Explanatory note to HSN 9988 states that it covers services performed on
physical inputs owned by others and are generally characterised as outsourced
manufacturing units, etc. The value of the service is based on the service fee
and not the value of goods manufacturer. HSN 9989 provides for classification
of other manufacturing services and cases which involve intangible inputs and
not necessarily physical inputs. The service rate schedule prescribes the
following rates for job work activities:

 

HSN/SAC

Scope of activity

Rate of Tax

9988

Printing of news-papers, book, etc;
Textile processing activities; job work for jewellery; food processing
activities; tanning and leather processing activities

5%

 

Manufacturing of clay bricks, handicraft
goods, etc

5%

 

Manufacturing of umbrella and Printing
of paper products attracting 12% tax

12%

 

Other Manufacturing services

18%

9989

Printing of all paper products (under
Chapter 48 or 49) where only content is supplied by the publisher and the
paper belongs to the printer

12%

 

Other manufacturing services including
publishing, printing, reproduction material recovery activities

18%

 

 

Issues under the GST law

A) 
What is the scope of the term ‘job work’?

The fundamental question arising under job
work is the extent of value addition that is permissible under a job work
arrangement. Is there any outer limit on the value addition (say the entire/
substantial part of the manufacturing activity)? Can a job worker be the owner
of the principal raw material itself while performing job work? These questions
are to be viewed independently – the former question is on substantial value
addition on account of the ‘processes’ performed by the job work and the latter
question is on value addition on account of the ‘type of inputs’ used by
the job worker?

 

Addressing the first aspect, it may be
relevant to examine the issue based on a controversy raised by a recent advance
ruling. The Maharashtra Advance Ruling Authority in re: JSW Energy Limited
(GST-ARA-05/2017/B-04)
had the occasion to examine whether coal converted
into electrical energy on job work basis would fall within the definition of
job work. The Advance Ruling authority held that the job work was not on
coal rather the coal was consumed in the process of generation of
electricity resulting in a manufacturing activity and hence beyond the scope of
the term job work. The Advance Ruling authority suggested that job work and
manufacturing activity are mutually exclusive and the presence of the term
manufacture limits the scope of the term job work. On appeal, the appellate
advance ruling authority (MAH/AAAR/SS-RJ/01/2018-19) held that the
definition does not permit complete transformation of tangible inputs into intangible
inputs – only minor additions are permitted in a job work arrangement (relying
on Prestige Engineering case discussed below). The AAAR stated that
though processing of inputs resulting in manufacture is permitted under job
work arrangements, the section requires the principal to bring back the inputs
and in the absence of a one-to-one correlation between the inputs and the
processed output, the activity is not within the scope of job work.

 

We need to analyse the definition of job
work a little more intricately. The term job work is defined to mean a
treatment or process undertaken on goods belonging to another registered
person. The emphasis of the definition is on two things (a) ownership of
goods
and (b) treatment/ process being performed on those goods. The
term treatment and process are very generic terms without any limits. In this
context, the term treatment generally means giving some properties (either
chemical, physical or biological) to another item. The term process has been
very widely understood by the Supreme Court in the past. In CCE vs.
Rajasthan State Chemical Works 1991 (55) E.L.T. 444 (SC)
it was held that
the natural meaning of process would refer to any treatment of certain
materials in order to produce a good result, a species of activity performed on
the subject-matter in order to transform or reduce it to a certain
stage.  The definition of job work reads
as follows:

 

2(68) “job work” means any treatment or
process undertaken by a person on
goods belonging to another registered person and the expression “job worker”
shall be construed accordingly

 

In comparison, job work was defined in the
CE notification 214/86 as follows:

 

“Explanation I. – For the purposes of
this notification, the expression “job work” means processing or
working upon of raw materials or
semi-finished goods supplied to the job worker/ so as to complete a part or
whole of the process resulting in the manufacture or finishing of an article or
any operation which is essential for the aforesaid process”

 

The AAR held that the treatment or process
should be performed upon the goods
for it to be termed as job work. Grammatically speaking, the term ‘on’ is used
as preposition1 to establish a relationship between a pronoun and
the rest of a sentence. Preposition generally have an object for which it
establishes a relationship. The legislature have used to term ‘on’ in order to
make goods as the object of the entire
statement. The said preposition is establishing a relationship between the
person and the goods and does not establish a relationship between the
process and the goods
. It proves that the term process in the definition is
unqualified and should be understood in its natural and complete sense. Unlike
the central excise definition which requires working upon raw materials,
current definition in GST is limited to performing the treatment on goods.
Since the definition is completely silent on the result of the treatment or
process, the definition should be widely construed.

 

Now referring to section 19 and 143, we can
infer that both sections require the principal to bring back the inputs and
capital goods within a specific time frame. The AAAR & AAR have commented
that the meaning of job work should also be gathered from section 19 and 143.
Since the provision require the principal to bring back the inputs, the term
job work should be understood as only limited to cases where the identity of
the goods is retained and as such returned to the principal. The AAAR failed to
appreciate that section 143 also permits the principal to ‘supply or export’
such inputs with or without payment of tax from the job-workers premises. Any
interpretation should be made based on contemporaneous circumstances. If such
narrow interpretation is made, principal manufacturers would also be barred
from sending raw materials to job work and clearing the finished products after
the manufacturing activity to end customers. Where the provision itself permits
onward clearance of finished products subsequent to a manufacturing activity,
the requirement of retention of the original identity of goods is an apparent
conflict with the term manufacture. The entire provision would become
unworkable with this absurd interpretation of the AAAR.

_____________________________________________________________

1     The term preposition is a word governing, and
usually preceding, a noun or pronoun and expressing a relation to another word
or element in the clause. 

 

 

Moreover, when 143(5) itself speaks about
generation of scrap and wastage and use of intermediate goods ‘arising’ from
inputs, it is necessarily referring to a manufacturing activity. This conveys
the intention that job workers are permitted to carry out manufacturing
activity including the fact that the existence of the original input is not
visible in the final product.  The AAR
failed to understand that the section does not contemplate that the inputs or
capital goods should be brought back in its original condition – such an
interpretation would defeat the concept of job work itself. It should be
interpreted to mean that inputs should either be contained in final products
after job work in some form or the other or the inputs should cause the further
generation of the new product emerging from the job work process. The important
aspect is that the original input should identifiable (either by its cause,
content, character) with job work process and the final product. The Supreme
Court in Prestige Engineering (India) Ltd. vs. CCE Meerut Samples – 1994
(73) E.L.T. 497 (S.C.)
while explaining the scope of the definition of job
work under an exemption notification stated that job work should not be
narrowly understood as requiring the job worker to return the goods in the same
form, this would render the notification itself redundant (since the definition
specifically contemplated ‘a manufacturing process’) but it also cannot be so
widely interpreted to allow an arrangement where the process involves
substantial value addition. 

 

The AAAR commented that coal converted into
electrical energy has not been brought back. The condition of bringing back
should be understood from the original intent under Rule 4(5) of Cenvat Credit
Rules i.e. ensuring tax credited inputs do not escape the taxation net while
the goods leave the premises of the taxable person. As long as they have been
used for a value added activity for the taxable person, the condition should be
understood as satisfied and the benefit should be granted. The narrow
interpretation adopted in the AAR only stifles the intent of the law.

 

One may also observe that the original
ITC-04 tool on the GSTN portal (form for reporting outward and inward movement
of goods under job work activity) required that quantity code of the original
inputs match with the quantity code of the processed item after job work. This
was a challenge as in many cases manufacturers would receive the processed item
in a different form/ quantity. After representations the revised ITC-04
(amended vide Notification 39/2018 dt. 04-09-2018) has suggested that the
original challan date and number need not be given if one-to-one correspondence
between the original goods send for job work and the returned goods is not
possible. This adds credence to the above conclusion that establishing identity
or existence of the original product is clearly not a requirement of the law
and the term job work should not be narrowed down by the requirement of
bringing back the inputs. This leads to an inescapable conclusion that a job
worker can perform any value added activity on the goods.

 

B) Are the terms manufacture and job work
mutually exclusive?

The AAR concluded that manufacture is
excluded from the definition of job work in view of a separate definition. This
was part of the ruling modified by the AAAR on appeal by stating that job work
activity may or may not result in manufacture. The term manufacture refers to
processing of raw materials or inputs resulting in emergence of a new products
having a distinct name, character and use. On scanning the entire law, the term
manufacture has been used with limited reference: composition scheme, transitional
credit, deemed export.  The term
manufacture is used in completely independent context and does not even
remotely narrow down the scope of the term job work.

 

In other words, the job work is understood
from a contractual sense while manufacture was understood from the physical
properties of the product. In terms of a contract, if a bailor-baliee
relationship is established between the contracting parties with specific
directions for performing a treatment/ process, it would necessarily be a job
work activity. There could be cases which are job work but do not result in a
manufacturing process and there could also be cases were a manufacturing
activity is not a job work transaction in a contractual sense. It is in view of
this independent concepts that under excise, job worker declaration was
required only where the job worker performed a manufacturing activity. Where
the job worker performed limited testing activities, it was not essential for
the job worker to comply with the exemption conditions of Notification 214/86.

 

The CBEC in its flyer have stated as
follows:

 

“Job work sector constitutes a
significant industry in Indian economy. It includes outsourced activities that
may or may not culminate into manufacture. The term Job work itself explains the
meaning. It is processing of goods supplied by the principal. The concept of
job work already exists in Central Excise, wherein a principal manufacturer can
send inputs or semi-finished goods to a job worker for further processing. Many
facilities, procedural concessions have been given to the job workers as well
as the principal supplier who sends goods for job work. The whole idea is to
make the principal responsible for meeting compliances on behalf of the job
worker on the goods processes by him (job worker), considering the fact that
typically the job workers are small persons who are unable to comply with the
discrete provisions of the law.”

 

The flyer clearly states that job work
activity may or may not result in manufacture. The idea behind the concept of
job work is to facilitate the tax free movement of goods and making the
principal responsible for goods under job work. The explanatory notes to the
HSN/SAC chapter headings also provide explain job work as involving an
outsourced manufacturing activity. Further, the notification prescribing the
rates also specify both manufacturing and processing activities to be included
under the SAC for job work. All these clearly indicate that the concept of job
work overlaps with the concept of manufacture and both need not be considered
as mutually exclusive concepts.

 

C) Whether
job worker can introduce substantial raw materials in its job work process?

A parallel question is whether the
definition prohibits a job worker from introducing substantial/ critical raw
materials in relative comparison to that received from the principal
manufacturer. A plain reading of the section certainly does not bar this
activity. The definition is open ended and left these matters to the mutual
contractual terms between the principal and job worker. Prima-facie, is
appears that law does not prohibit the introduction of substantial / high value
inputs or critical inputs being used by the job worker during the entire
processing. As an example there is no restriction for a goldsmith to use its
own gold where the solitaire diamond is being supplied by the principal
manufacturer. 

 

However, the Supreme Court in Prestige
Engineering (supra)
does not permit an open-ended definition of the term
job work. It stated that the definition should not be widely understood to
permit the job worker from performing substantial value added activity. This
understanding of the law was made while interpreting an exemption notification.
As discussed, the concept of job work is being introduced as a facility for
retaining the Cenvat credit rather than as an exemption provision. The
interpretation should be such that the facility made available is effective
rather than a dead letter. The Madras High Court in 2015 (316) E.L.T. 209
(Mad.) CCE vs. Whirlpool of India ltd
held that the definition of Prestige
engineering case is limited to that notification and does not extended over the
Cenvat Credit Rules. Therefore, one can certainly take a stand that the excise
understanding of value added activity should not narrow down the scope of the
prevailing definition.

 

The CBEC Circular No. 38/12/2018, dated
26-3-2018 has clearly permitted the job worker to use his own goods apart from
the goods received from the principal and has not restricted the type/ nature
of goods to be used by the job worker:

 

“5. Scope/ambit of job work : Doubts have
been raised on the scope of job work and whether any inputs, other than the
goods provided by the principal, can be used by the job worker for providing
the services of job work. It may be noted that the definition of job work, as
contained in clause (68) of section 2 of the CGST Act, entails that the job
work is a treatment or process undertaken by a person on goods belonging to
another registered person. Thus, the job worker is expected to work on the
goods sent by the principal and whether the activity is covered within the
scope of job work or not would have to be determined on the basis of facts and
circumstances of each case. Further, it is clarified that the job worker, in addition
to the goods received from the principal, can use his own goods for providing
the services of job work.”

 

Moreover, from
an economics perspective, one would be neutral to the fact that critical inputs
being used by the job worker. Being a value added tax law with job work
services also being taxed under its ambit, it is really immaterial on who
introduces the raw material since commercial terms would automatically
determine the transaction value of the each leg of the supply (incl. job work)
and taxes would be appropriately recovered. From a revenue administration
perspective, the benefit of job work was to tide over the compliance of input
tax credit reversal and availment during the intermediary phase. Revenue would
monitor the job work movement primarily to ensure that the input tax credit
availed on such goods is used for the intended objects only. Where substantial
value / critical raw materials are purchased by the job worker itself, the risk
exposure of granting the benefit u/s. 19 is correspondingly reduced. The input
tax credit on the bullion purchased has been now been availed by the goldsmith
and section 19 operates only the domain of inputs sent by the principal to the
job worker and not on the self-purchased inputs.

 

Rationally, this credit of bullion does not
jeopardise the input tax credit claim on the diamond purchase and sent by the
principal. Hence revenue authorities should not question the quantum / nature
of inputs being used by the job worker as it not result in any additional revenue.

 

The above conceptual understanding of job
work can be tabulated with some practical examples:

 

Sl No

Type of Work

Ownership of Raw material

Job work Process

Whether Job work?

1

Forging
of metal blocks into specific castings

Metal
Blocks supplied by principal

Foundry
activities

Yes
even though there is a manufacturing activity

2

Supply
of Coal which is used in power plant for generation of electricity

Coal
owned by principal

Power
generation, conversion of coal into steam is also a process

Yes,
even though tangible inputs convert into intangible output

3

Supply
of Customised Printed Paper

Paper
and Ink owned by printer

Printing/
publishing activity

May
not be classifiable as job work but as supply of goods but HSN 9989 and
notification permits such activity as job work

4

Retreading
of Tyres

Old
tyres supplied by the Principal and the retreading material owned by job
worker

Retreading

Yes
– CBEC Circular No. 34/8/2018-GST, dated 1-3-2018 gives a view that where
supplier of retreated tyres own the old tyres, it is a supply of goods

5

Manufacturing
of bearings with own raw material but based on moulds, dies, etc received
from principal

Ownership
of raw material with job worker and ownership of dies with principal

Manufacturing
activity

Yes
to extent of moulds, dies, etc even though no process or treatment of moulds
since there exists a bailor-bailee relationship over the moulds/ dies, etc

6

Bus-Body
Building Activity

Chassis
owned by principal

Body
built on chassis

Yes
as per Circular No. 52/26/2018-GST, dated 9-8-2018

7

Bottling
plants receiving concentrate for processing

Concentrates
usually purchased by bottlers

Contract
manufacturer

No
May not be a job work if there is a principal-principal relationship

8

Brand
owners merely lending brand for manufacturing activity: Pharma/ FMCG industry

Intangibles
owned by brand owner but all raw materials owned by manufacturer

Licensed
manufacturing / loan licensee

May
not be a job work activity but stated in HSN9989 as any manufacturing
activity involving supply if intangible inputs

9

Printing
of Paper/ Photographs based on intangible material (such as designs) supplied
by Customer on tangible material

Intangible
materials owned by principal

Printing
activity

May
not be a job work but included in HSN9989 as outsourced manufacturing
activity

10

Extraction
of paraffin from crude material

Crude
material owned by principal

Extraction/
purification

Yes,
treatment includes extraction

11

Repairing
a transport passenger vehicle

Vehicle
owned by manufacturer

Repairing/
painting, etc

No
compliance of job work provisions required if not an ITC eligible item

 

In summary, the concept of job work has not
undergone a substantial change from its parent law. There is no reason to limit
its scope with reference to some terminologies as is being attempted by the
AAR. In fact, the concept of job work has widened in relative comparison to
from its excise origin. Its full effect should be given especially in a value
added system. The AAAR have deviated from the essence of job work and this
needs to be examined by a higher forum. The other procedural issues on job work
can be undertaken in a subsequent article. 
 

 

SCOPE OF GST AUDIT

Audit is the
flavour of the season and finance/ accounting professionals are busy addressing
this statutory requirement under various laws. The GST council and the
Government of India have recently notified the GST Annual Return (in Form 9)
and the GST Annual Certification (in Form 9C) for tax payers in respect of
transactions pertaining to the financial year 2017-18. This is an annual
consolidation exercise of all monthly reports of GST. We have detailed our
thoughts on the scoping of GST Annual certification/ audit under the GST laws.
One should reserve their conclusion on whether Form 9C is an ‘audit report’ or
‘certificate’ until the end of this article.


GOVERNMENT’S THOUGHT PROCESS


The Indian economy
has progressively evolved from an appraisal system to a self-assessment system.
Business houses are required to self-assess the correct taxes due to the
Government exchequer and report the same in statutory returns on a periodical
basis. The parallel to this liberalisation was the requirement of maintenance
of comprehensive, robust and reliable records for verification and examination
by the tax administration at a later stage. The Government(s) approached
independent statutory bodies having professional expertise on the subject
matter to assist them in verification of the accounting records of the
taxpayers. It is this thought process that lead to the emergence of statutorily
prescribed audits with specific reporting requirements giving the Government
assurance over the accounting records for them to effectively discharge their
administrative duties.


AUDIT VS. CERTIFICATION


While audit report
and certificates are part of attest functions of an auditor, there is a
conceptual difference between an ‘audit’ and ‘a certificate’. As per ‘Guidance
Note on Audit Report and Certificates for special purposes’ issued by ICAI, the
difference between a certificate and report has been provided as under:

  • “A Certificate is a
    written confirmation of the accuracy of facts stated there in and does not
    involve any estimate or the opinion”;
  • “A Report, on the other
    hand, is a formal statement usually made after an enquiry, examination or
    review of specified matters under report and includes the reporting auditor’s
    opinion thereon”.


The reader of a
certificate believes that the document gives him/ her reasonable assurance over
the accuracy of specific facts stated therein. A certificate is normally
expected to entail a higher level of assurance compared to an opinion or report
– a true and correct view. An audit report is more generic and gives an overall
opinion
that the reported statements are true and fair (in some cases true
and correct). It must be noted that due to inherent limitation of audit
procedures, an absolute assurance is impossible to provide and in spite of the
words report and certificates being used interchangeably, a professional should
clarify to the users of his services that only a reasonable assurance or
limited assurance can be provided by him.


RECORD MAINTENANCE UNDER GST LAW


Section 35 places a
requirement of maintaining accounts, documents and records. The law places an
obligation on every registered person to maintain separate accounts for each
registration despite the person maintaining accounts at an India level. At
every registration level, the tax payer should maintain a true and correct
account of specified particulars such as production or manufacture of goods;
inward and outward supply of goods or services or both; stock of goods; input
tax credit availed; output tax payable and paid; and other additional documents
mentioned in the rules. Rule 56(1) prescribes maintenance of goods imported/
exported, supplies attracting reverse charge liability and other statutory
documents (such as tax invoices, bill of supply, delivery challans, credit
notes, debit notes, receipt vouchers, payment vouchers and refund vouchers).
Succeeding clauses place requirements on the taxpayer (including service
providers) to maintain inventory records at a quantitative level; account of
advances received, paid and adjustments made thereto; output/ input tax,
details of suppliers and registered and/or large unregistered customers, etc.


Strictly
speaking, section 35 does not require the assessee to maintain independent
state level accounting ledgers/ GLs.
The section
limits its scope only to maintenance of specified records (which need not be an
accounting ledger) giving the required details enlisted therein at the
registration level in electronic or in physical form. The taxpayer should be in
a position to provide the details as envisioned in section 35 and its
sub-ordinate rule. This could be understood by a simple example of a company
maintaining a bank ledger for pan India operations. Section 35 does not expect
the taxpayer to maintain a separate bank ledger for each registration, but it
certainly expects that the taxpayer to be in a position to derive the state
level advances/ vendor payments from this consolidated bank ledger when
required. Section 35 is not a prescription of list of ledgers for each registered
person, but a specific list of records relevant for the law.
 


GST REPORTING REQUIREMENTS


Section 35(5) read
with section 44(2) of the CGST Act and the corresponding Rule 80(3) of the CGST
Rules relates to audit. Section 35(5) places three reporting requirements:

  • Submission of copy of
    audited accounts;
  • Submit a reconciliation
    statement in terms of section 44(2); and
  • Submit any other prescribed
    document


Section 44(2)
requires the taxpayer to submit an annual return (in Form 9), audited annual
accounts and a reconciliation statement. Rule 80(3) prescribes the turnover
threshold (currently 2 crore) beyond which tax payers are required to get their
accounts audited in terms of section 35(5) and furnish a copy thereof along
with a reconciliation statement ‘duly certified’.


An important link
between section 35(1) and 35(5) to be noted here is that though section 35(5)
prescribes audit of the accounts of the assessee, section 35(1) does not specify
the accounting parameters under which this exercise is to be conducted. As
stated in the earlier paragraph, section 35 does not provide for maintaining
accounting ledgers at the state level and hence consciously refrained from
providing the accounting parameters (unlike the Income tax law). The law has
limited itself to specific details for its information requirement. Thus, audit
under any governing statute, or in its absence, an audit based on generally
accepted accounting principles, is considered acceptable under the said
section. The law has thus prescribed mere filing of copy of audited annual
accounts as a requirement u/s. 35(5).


Section 35(5) and
44(2) give rise to two scenarios – first being cases where accounts are not
audited under any other law in which case an audit is required to be conducted
under GAAP; and second being cases where accounts are audited under other
statutes and such accounts would be acceptable under GST. A separate obligation
of maintaining GST specific books of accounts has not been prescribed. In both
scenarios, the audited accounts should be accompanied with the reconciliation
statement duly certified u/s. 44(2).


APPLICABILITY OF GST AUDIT AND ANNUAL RETURN


Annual Return: Every registered person irrespective of the turnover threshold
would be required to file an annual return. The said return in Form 9
consolidates the category wise turnovers, tax liabilities and input tax credit
availment/ reversal as reported in the relevant GST returns. It also captures
transactions/amendments, which spill across financial years. A recent document
issued by GSTN convey that Form 9 would be pre-filled by GSTN in an editable
format. The taxpayer would have to review the data and file the same. Aggregate
of the turnover; output tax and input tax credit details as declared in the GST
returns and consolidated in Form 9 would flow into Form 9C for the purpose of
reconciliation by the auditor.


GST
Certification:
Every registered person whose
turnover exceeds the prescribed limit is required to file annual audited
accounts and reconciliation statement. An entity having registration in more
than one State / UT is considered as a distinct persons in every State in terms
of section 25 of the CGST/SGST Act. Distinct persons are required to maintain
separate records and get their records audited under the GST Laws. There seems
to be no ambiguity that Form 9 and 9C need to be filed and reported at the
registration level.


However, there
exists some confusion on whether the turnover limit needs to be tested
independently at each GSTIN level or at the entity level. This confusion arises
primarily on account of the wordings adopted in section 35(5) vis-à-vis Rule
80(3). While section 35(5) uses the term ‘turnover’, Rule 80(3) uses the phrase
‘aggregate turnover’. Aggregate turnover is defined to include the PAN based
turnover and the term turnover is not defined. The closest meaning of turnover
would be expressed by the definition of ‘turnover in a state’ which restricts
itself only to the turnover at a particular GSTIN. Thus on one hand, the section
refers to turnover in a state and Rule 80(3) refers to aggregate turnover i.e.
entity level turnover. A simple resolution of this conflict would be to place
larger emphasis on Rule 80(3) as the powers of prescription have been delegated
and one would have to view the prescription only as per the delegate
legislation. Section 35(5) does not in anyway narrow down the scope of Rule
80(3) by using the phrase ‘turnover’. It merely directs one to refer to the
expression of turnover as laid down by the delegated legislation for the
purpose of deciding applicability. There are several viewpoints that affirm
this stand and it would be fairly reasonable to take the view that audit at
each location should be performed irrespective of the state level turnover as
long as the aggregate limits have been crossed.


While the above
explanation conveys that thresholds are to be tested at the entity level and
applied to all registrations under an umbrella, it would be interesting to
examine the other side of the argument for a better debate:

  • Registered persons u/s. 25
    also includes distinct persons and the provisions should apply independently to
    each distinct person. If the law expects a separate audit report for each
    GSTIN, it seems unnatural that this one turnover parameter is singled out to be
    tested at the entity level.
  • Deeming fiction of distinct
    persons under GST law should be given its full effect unless the law conveys a
    contrary meaning and the law has not specifically conveyed any contrary
    meaning. Since the deeming fiction has stretched itself to treat a branch as
    distinct from its head office, the turnover of the head office cannot be then
    included for the purpose of assessing the branch compliance.
  • Though CGST Act is a
    national legislation, it has state specific coverage like its better half (i.e.
    SGST Act) and should be understood qua the specific registration and not qua
    the legal entity as a whole. Hence turnover in section 44(2) should be
    understood as per the of definition ‘turnover in a state’, else turnover would
    be left undefined/ unexplained in law. The term ‘aggregate turnover’ in Rule
    80(3) being a sub-ordinate legislation should be understood within the confines
    of section 44(2) to mean aggregation of all supplies under a particular GSTIN
    and not at the entity level.


The author believes
that former view is a more sustainable view and the latter view is only a
possible defence plea in any penal proceeding.


SCOPE OF GST AUDIT


Section 35(5) does
not lay down the parameters of its audit requirement. Though the statute
defines ‘audit’ u/s. 2(13), it appears the definition is a misfit for 35(5).
The said definition seems relevant only for the purpose of special audits
required and directed by the Commissioner u/s. 66. The definition reads as
follows:


‘audit means
examination of records, returns and other documents maintained or furnished by
the registered person under this Act or rules made thereunder or under any
other law for the time being in force to verify the correctness of the
turnover declared, taxes paid, refund claimed and input tax credit availed, and
to assess his compliance
with the provisions of this Act or rules made
thereunder’


The above
underlined portion of the definition places a stringent task over the auditor
to verify correctness of all declarations of the taxpayer and make a
comprehensive assessment of compliance of the GST law. The requirement is so
elaborate that the auditor would be required to apply all provisions (including
rules, notifications, etc) to every transaction of the taxpayer, take a view in
areas of ambiguity and provide a report on the compliance/ non-compliance of
the provisions of the Act. Section 35(5) seems to be on a different footing
altogether. It refers to performance of audit of accounts (NOT records, returns
or statutory documents) and submission of the copy of the same, which is
completely different from the definition u/s. 2(13). It therefore seems that
the said definition has limited relevance. It applies to cases where a special
audit is directed by the Commissioner on the ground that the books of accounts
and records warrant an examination by a professional.


If one also reads
9C (discussed in detail later), it does not incorporate any section level
report or overall compliance of provisions of the Act. In fact there is a clear
absence of a section reference or the term ‘compliance’ in the entire form.
This leads to the only inference that audit should be understood in general
parlance and not in terms of section 2(13). As a consequence, one can conclude
that the scope of the audit is undefined and respective governing statutes
would be the basis of any audit of accounts u/s. 35(5). This seems logical
since section 35(1) itself stays away from prescribing maintenance of general
books of accounts. In cases where audit is not governed under any statute,
section 35(5) merely directs conduct of audit of accounts as per generally
accepted accounting principles and standards on auditing. An auditor should
apply the procedures given in the Standards on Auditing, specifically obtaining
representation and clarify the terms of engagement in writing with the auditee.


SCOPE OF GST RECONCILIATION STATEMENT


The scope of
reconciliation statement and its certification are not very well defined under
the GST law. Section 44(2) does give some limited indication on the scope of
the reconciliation statement, which reads as under:


‘a
reconciliation statement, reconciling the value of supplies declared in the
return furnished for the financial year with the audited annual financial
statement,
and such other particulars as may prescribed’


The above extract
of section 44(2) conveys that the reconciliation statement is a number
crunching document aimed to bridge the gap between the accounts and returns.
Revenue figures as per accounts are present on one end (‘accounting end’) and
the GST return figures are present on the other (‘return end’). The statement
requires the assessee to provide an explanation to timing/ permanent variances
between these two ends. The framework of Form 9C also echoes of it being a
reconciliation and not an ‘opinion statement’ of the auditor and depends on the
reliance upon the data provided by the client that forms the basis of such
reconciliation. 


OVERALL STRUCTURE OF FORM 9C


Let’s reverse
engineer Form 9C to affirm this understanding !!!. Form 9C contains two parts:
Part A contains details of reconciliation between accounting figures with the
Annual return figures. Part B provides the format and content of the
certificate to be obtained by assessee.


The salient
features of Part A of 9C can be categorised under four broad heads as follows
(clause wise analysis may be discussed in a separate article):


Table 5 – 8 –
Outward Supply (Turnover Reconciliation):
The
net of taxation of GST extends beyond the operating income of a taxpayer. The
objective of this section is to reconcile the operating revenue as reported in
the profit and loss account with the total turnover leviable to GST and
reported in GST returns. The said section then provides a drill down of this
total turnover to the taxable turnover. Any unreconciled difference arising due
to inability to reconcile or other reasons would be reported here.


Table 9 &
11 Output Tax Liability (Tax Reconciliation):

Output tax liability of a taxpayer is calculated on the taxable turnover of the
assesse. However, there could be inconsistencies between the tax payable and
the tax reported in accounts due to either excess collection or otherwise. This
section requires reporting of differences between Tax GLs in accounts vs. the
numbers reported in the electronic liability ledger. The instructions do not
place an obligation on the auditor to verify legality of the rates applied.


Table 12–16
Net Input Tax Credit (Credit Reconciliation):
This
section reconciles net ITC availed as per accounts with that reported in
GSTR-3B. ITC under GST is permitted to spill over FYs and the reconciliation
table bridges this timing gap between accounts and GST returns. There could be
certain unreconciled differences such as:- ITC availed in A/C but not availed
in GST returns, lapsed credits, ineligible credits in A/C but claimed in GSTR 9
etc. The table expects the auditor to report the flow of numbers starting from
the accounts to the GST returns. This part also contains an expense head wise
classification based on accounting heads for statistical and analytical
purposes by the tax administration.


Auditors
Recommendation Of Liability Due To Non-Reconciliation


This section
provides the auditors recommendations of tax liability due to
non-reconciliation. The recommendation is limited only to items arising out of
“non” reconciliation and not on account of legal view points. The auditor can
rely on the tax positions taken by the assessee and need not report the same if
the auditee has a contrary view to the same. Difference in view points would
not be points of qualification in the Auditor’s concluding statement.


Part-A seems to limit itself to a reconciliation exercise at various
levels with the audited accounts. There is no provision which requires the
auditor to provide his/her opinion on the compliance with the sections of the
laws (e.g job work, time or place of supply, etc).


Part B of Form
9C
is the Certification statement which has been
divided into two parts:-


(I) Where reconciliation
statement is certified by the person who has audited the accounts-
As the title suggests, auditors takes twin responsibilities of
statutory audit (either under the Income tax law, sector specific laws or the
GST law1) and GST reconciliation statement and would furnish its
report in Part-I. In this report, the auditor reports on three aspects:


(a) that statutory
records under GST Act are maintained;


(b) that financial
statements are in agreement with accounts maintained; and


(c) that particulars
mentioned in 9C are true and correct.


It must be noted
that Part I is not an audit report even-though it is issued by the same
auditor. The auditor performing the audit would still have to issue a separate
audit report as per relevant professional guidelines certifying that the
financial statements/ accounts are in accordance with GAAP and giving a true
and fair view. In this part, the auditor reaffirms that audit has been
conducted by him and the audit provides assurance that the audited books of accounts
agree with the financial statements.


In cases where the
Mr A (Partner of ABC firm) audits under the Companies Act, 2013, Mr X (Partner
of the same firm) performs audit under the Income tax Act, 1961), and Mr Z
(Partner of the same firm) performs certification under the GST law, Mr A may
have to follow Part-I of the certification statement as it is part of the firm
which conducted the statutory audit.


(II) Where
accounts are already audited under any law (Such as Companies Act 2013, Income
Tax Act 1961, Banking Regulation Act 1949, Insurance Act 1938, Electricity Act
2003)
. This part applies in cases where a
person places reliance on the work of another auditor who has conducted audit
under another statute. The professional believes that statutory audit conducted
under the respective statutes gives him/ her reasonable assurance that the
figures reported in the financial statements are correct. Therefore, the
auditor only reports on two aspects


(a) that statutory
records under GST Act are maintained;


(b) that
particulars mentioned in 9C are true and correct.

_____________________________________________

1   For eg. An individual earning commercial
rental in excess of 2 crore and reporting the same under ‘income from house
property’ would not be subject to maintenance of books of accounts / tax audit
under the income tax.  Such individual
would have to get his accounts audited in view of section 35(5) and then
proceed to obtaining the certification over the reconciliation statement.


It appears that
Part B of Form 9C has used audited accounts as the starting point and sought a
certification from the auditor on the particulars mentioned in the
reconciliation statement to reach the numbers at the return end. When the
starting point is unaudited, section 35(5) places an onus on the assessee to
get the accounts audited (based on generally accepted accounting principles)
and perform the reconciliation pursuant to the audit exercise. The audit
process has limited significance only to give assurance to the user of the
reconciliation statement that the accounting end of the reconciliation
statement is also reliable.


To reiterate, the
pressing conclusion is that the focus of Form 9C is to certify the particulars
required to bridge the mathematical gap between accounting revenue vs. GST
outward turnover, input credit as per accounts vs. input credit as per GST
returns and tax liability as per accounts vs. tax liability as reported in GST
returns. This objective becomes effective only when:


a)  The accounts are reliable and are consolidated
into the financial statements.


b)  This accounting number is bridged with the GST
number in the return.


The first objective
is fulfilled by placing reliance on the audit report issued by the statutory
auditor that financial statements are a true and fair representation of the
books of accounts maintained by the assessee. The second objective is met by a
reporting certain particulars in Part I of 9C. To summarise 9C Part II is a
limited purpose certificate reporting the correctness of the particulars
contained in 9C only.


COMPARATIVE WITH INCOME TAX REQUIREMENTS


Audit reports/
certificates are not germane to tax laws. Income tax has also traditionally
required an income tax audit u/s. 44AB and also chartered accountant
certificates under various sections (such as 115JB, 88HHE, etc). Section 44AB
permitted assessee to have its accounts audited under the Income tax law or any
other law applicable to the assessee and in addition furnish a report in the
prescribed form (in Form 3CD) verifying the particulars mentioned therein. The
audit report in Form 3CD presently contains 44 clauses placing onus on the
auditor to verify compliance of specific sections and reporting particulars
relevant to each section under the respective clause. Each clause requires the
auditor to apply legal provisions/ tax positions, circulars, etc and give an
accurate report of the eligibility and quantum of deduction claimed by the tax
payer (such as whether assessee has claimed any capital expenditure, compliance
of TDS compliance, claim of specific deductions, etc). Yet, it is also settled
that the auditor’s view on a particular section is not binding on the tax payer
and the tax payer was free to take a contrary stand in its income tax return.
One the other hand, section 115JB required a certificate from the chartered
accountant reporting compliance of computation of book profits under the said
section in terms of the list of clauses u/s. 115JB (in Form 29B).


It appears that
Form 9C is not an audit activity rather a certification of accuracy of
particulars. If a comparative is drawn with Form 3CB/3CD and certification
exercise u/s. 115JB, Form 9C appears to be number oriented certification
exercise rather than compliance oriented exercise such as Form 3CD/29B.
Therefore it would be incorrect to term Form 9C as an ‘audit’ exercise and
rather appropriate to term it as a ‘certification’.
 

 

 

 

 

PENALTY- CONCEALMENT-INTERPRETATION

Introduction

Under any fiscal law, there are
provisions for levy of penalty. Penalties are normally related to tax quantum
found payable at the end of the proceeding. Normally, these provisions are made
to tackle deliberate attempts of the assessee to avoid tax payment. One of the
events to attract penalty is concealment by the concerned assessee. However,
such penalty is not expected to be levied when the dues arise under bona
fide
belief and action. For example, there may be case where assessee shows
the transactions in his accounts and returns but claims the same as exempt on
its bona fide interpretation of provisions of law. Subsequently, such
interpretation may not be acceptable to the revenue department and dues may
arise. In such cases, levy of penalty cannot be justified. However, the issue
remains that, how to decide about bona fide mistake on part of the
assessee. There may be cases where the department will impose penalty inspite
of plea of bona fide mistake on part of assessee.

 

Recent
judgment

Recently, Hon’ble Rajasthan High
Court had an occasion to deal with such a situation in case of Commercial
Taxes Officer, Anti Evasion, Rajasthan, Circle-III, Jaipur. vs. I.C.I.C.I Bank
Ltd. (2018) 54 GSTR 389 (Raj)
.
      

 

The facts, as
narrated by Hon’ble High court, are as under:-

 

“The brief facts noticed are that
the claim of the assessee is that the assessee is engaged in providing finance
to the prospective buyers of vehicle and if buyers after certain time fail to
pay the regular installment (EMI) as per agreement arrived at by and between
the assesse and the buyer (assessee) gets the right to repossess the vehicle
and get it transferred in its own name and thereafter either directly or
through agent, can dispose/auction the vehicle whether such transaction is
eligible to tax under Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act (RVAT) or not. It is
undisputed fact that all the three authorities, namely assessing officer,
Deputy Commissioner (A) as well as the Tax Board have upheld that the
transaction is eligible to tax under the RVAT Act, following the judgment of
the apex court in the case of Federal Bank Ltd vs. State of Kerala(2007) 6
VST 736 (SC)
. However, in so far as penalty u/s. 61 of the Act is concerned,
while the assessing officer imposed penalty which was upheld by the Deputy
Commissioner (A) but the Tax Board in the impugned order has held that there is
no case of imposition of penalty u/s. 61 of the Act and accordingly, deleted
the penalty in all the assessment years.”  

 

The argument of the revenue
department was that when the law was already laid by Supreme Court in case of Federal
Bank Ltd vs. State of Kerala(2007) 6 VST 736 (SC)
, there is no
justification for non-levy of penalty. In other words it was submitted that
after above judgment there is no debatable position and what was done by the
assessee bank is deliberate and therefore, the penalty required to be restored.

 

Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court
observed that the Tax Board has come to correct finding. Since all the
transactions were duly disclosed and it is the matter of interpretation,
whether VAT is leviable or not, the issue cannot be covered under penalty
clause. In this respect, Hon’ble High Court has relied upon the Supreme Court
judgment in case of Sree Krishna Electricals vs. State of Tamil Nadu
(2009) 23 VST 249 (SC)
.

 

In above judgment regarding similar
clause of penalty under Tamil Nadu Sales Tax law, Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed as under:

“So far as the question of penalty
is concerned the items which were not included in the turnover were found
incorporated in the appellant’s accounts books. Where certain items which are
not included in the turnover are disclosed in the dealer’s own account books
and the assessing authorities includes these items in the dealers’ turnover,
disallowing the exemption. penalty cannot be imposed. The penalty levied stands
set aside.”  

                                                     

Accordingly, following above ratio
of Supreme Court judgment, Hon’ble Rajasthan High court has justified removal
of penalty by Tax Board.

 

In relation to penalty matters, the
basic principle laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the land mark judgment in
case of Hindustan Steel Limited, (25 STC 211), is also required
to be kept in mind. The relevant observations are as under:

 

“Under the Act penalty may be
imposed for failure to register as a dealer: section 9(1) r/w section 25(1)(a)
of the Act. But the liability to pay penalty does not arise merely upon proof
of default in registering as a dealer. An order imposing penalty for failure to
carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding,
and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted
deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or
dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not
also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether penalty should be
imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion
of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the
relevant circumstances. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority
competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose
penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the
Act or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the offender
is not liable to the act in the manner prescribed by the statute. Those in
charge of the affairs of the company in failing to register the company as a
dealer acted in the honest and genuine belief that the company was not a
dealer. Granting that they erred, no case for imposing penalty was made out.”

 

Conclusion

The
penalty is discretionary and can be justified only where there is deliberate
and conscious disregard of the law. When the disregard is due to technical
reasons, no penalty can be justified. From the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court’s
judgment, as above, it is also clear that in spite of judgment of courts on the
issue covered, the assessee can still take different view and litigate the
matter. If the transactions are otherwise recorded in the books levy of penalty
cannot be justified. It is expected that the above principles will be followed
by the revenue department in true spirit. 

GST ON CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETIES

Introduction

A co-operative housing
society is a mutual association wherein the membership is restricted to the
buyers of the flats situated in the said building. The society is managed by a
Managing Committee elected by the Members at the General Body Meeting of the
Society from amongst its members only. The primary role of the Managing
Committee is to manage, maintain and administer the property of the society.
This would include making payments to the municipal / local authorities for the
property tax, water charges, etc., arranging for various facility for the
members, such as security, lift (operation and maintenance), maintaining the
common area and facilities of the society (gymnasium, swimming pool, play or
garden area, etc.). For undertaking the above activities, the society needs
funds, which are collected from its members periodically in the form of
maintenance charges. We shall discuss in this article the levy of GST on such
maintenance charges.

 

At the outset, it is
important to note that the levy of taxes on the co-operative housing societies,
both under the income tax as well as the service tax regime has seen its fair
share of litigation and therefore, taking precedents from the said laws, we
shall discuss the alternate interpretations for different issues.

 

GST – Levy provisions

In order to determine
whether GST is leviable or not, reference to the charging section (section 9 of
the CGST Act, 2017) becomes necessary which provides that the tax shall be
levied on all supplies (intrastate or interstate) of goods or services
on the value to be determined u/s. 15 of the CGST Act, 2017 and the said
tax shall be paid by the taxable person.

 

From the above, it is
evident that the primary requirement for the levy of tax to succeed under GST
is that there should be a supply. While the term “supply” has not been defined
under the GST law, its scope has been explained u/s. 7. Clause (a) of section 7
(1) thereof is relevant which provides that the expression

 

“supply” includes —

 

(a) all forms of supply
of goods or services or both such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence,
rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a
person in the course or furtherance of business;

 

Therefore, to treat a
transaction as supply the following three parameters are important:

 

    Supply of goods or supply of services

    Supply in the course or furtherance of business

    Supply for a consideration

 

Can a Co-operative housing
society be said to be engaged in supplying services?

While the activities
undertaken by a co-operative housing society for its members cannot be treated
as supply of goods, the question that needs consideration is whether the same
can be considered as supply of service or not? The term service has been defined
u/s. 2 of the Act to primarily mean anything other than goods and therefore, a
simple answer to this would be that the activities undertaken by a co-operative
housing society is a supply of service to its members.

 

However, an alternate view
is also possible. It would be important to note that the activities undertaken
by the society for its members come within the ambit of principle of mutuality
which says that a person cannot earn out of himself and a person cannot supply
to one self. Infact, applying the said principle, in the context of Income Tax,
receipts by a co-operative housing society from its members have been held as
not being income. Some of the important decisions in this regard are:

 

    Chelmsford Club vs. Commissioner of
Income Tax — 2000 (243) ITR 89 (SC)

    Commissioner of Income Tax vs. National
Sports Club of India — 1998 (230) ITR 373 (Del)

    Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bankipur
Club Ltd — 1997 (22G) HR 97 (SC)

    Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Delhi
Gymkhana Club Ltd. — 1905 (155) ITR 373 (Del)

    Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Merchant
Navy Club — 1974 (96) ITR 2GI (AP)

    Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Smt.
Godavaridevi Saraf — 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J624) (Bom.)

 

In fact, relying on the
above set of decisions, in the context of service tax, it has been held on
multiple occasions that services provided by a co-operative housing society /
club to its members come within the purview of principle of mutuality and
hence, not liable to service tax. Notable decision in this regard is in the case
of Ranchi Club Ltd. vs. Chief Commissioner [2012 (26) S.T.R. 401 (Jhar.)] wherein
it was held as under:

 

18. However, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that sale and service are different. It is true that sale and service
are two different and distinct transaction. The sale entails transfer of
property whereas in service, there is no transfer of property. However, the
basic feature common in both transaction requires existence of the two parties;
in the matter of sale, the seller and buyer, and in the matter of service,
service provider and service receiver. Since the issue whether there are two
persons or two legal entity in the activities of the members’ club has been
already considered and decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by the Full
Bench of this Court in the cases referred above, therefore, this issue is no
more res integra and issue is to be answered in favour of the writ petitioner
and
it can be held that in view of the mutuality and in view of the
activities of the club, if club provides any service to its members may be in
any form including as mandap keeper, then it is not a service by one to another
in the light of the decisions referred above as foundational facts of existence
of two legal entities in such transaction is missing.
However, so
far as services by the club to other than members, learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that they are paying the tax
.

 

Similar view has been held
in other cases as well.

    Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. vs. Union of
India [2013 (31) S.T.R. 645 (Guj.)]

    Karnavati Club Limited vs. Union of India
[2010 (20) STR 169 (Guj.)]

    Breach Candy Swimming Bath Trust vs. CCE,
Mumbai [2007 (5) STR 146 (Mumbai Tribunal)]

    Matunga Gymkhana vs. CST, Mumbai [2015
(38) STR 407 (Mumbai Tribunal)]

    Cricket Club of India Limited vs. CST,
Mumbai [2015 (40) STR 973 (Mumbai Tribunal)]

 

To summarise, in view of
the above judicial precedents, an important proposition that emerges is that
vis-à-vis the supplies to the members, the principle of mutuality continues to
apply even under the GST regime and therefore, any collection from members
continue to be outside the ambit of levy of tax. Therefore, GST shall apply
only in case of services provided to non-members.

 

However, all the above
decisions are contested by the Department and the matter is pending before the
Supreme Court.

 

Further aspect to be
examined is whether the said decisions rendered in the context of service tax
would have relevance under the GST Regime. It is felt that the concept of
mutuality not only continues under GST Regime but becomes even more fortified
due to the following reasons:

 

1.  Under the service tax regime, Explanation 3 to
section 65B(44) provided a deeming fiction treating an unincorporated
association and the members thereof as distinct persons. While it was possible
to argue that a co-operative society is an incorporated association and hence
the said deeming fiction is not applicable, the said Explanation did somewhere
indicate the intention of the Legislature. In contradistinction, the GST Law
nowhere has such a deeming fiction. It may also be important to note that such
deeming fiction is created in case of establishments in distinct States or
countries.

 

2.  Entry 7 of Schedule II treats supply of goods
by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof as a
supply of goods but does not specifically cover services under the ambit
thereof.

 

Can a co-operative housing
society be said to be providing services in the course or furtherance of
business?

The second aspect that
needs consideration is whether a co-operative housing society is carrying out
its activities in the course or furtherance of business or not? This becomes
essential since in the absence of the same, the service may not get
classifiable u/s. 7 to be covered within the scope of supply itself and hence,
may not attract GST at all (irrespective of position taken in the first case).

 

In order to determine
whether a co-operative housing society carries out its activities in the course
or furtherance of business or not, it becomes essential to refer to the
definition of business as provided for u/s. 2 (17) of the CGST Act, 2017, which
is reproduced below for ready reference:

 

(17) “business” includes —

 

(a) any
trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any
other similar activity, whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit;

 

(b) any
activity or transaction in connection with or incidental or ancillary to
sub-clause (a);

 

(c) any
activity or transaction in the nature of sub-clause (a), whether or not there
is volume, frequency, continuity or regularity of such transaction;

 

(d) supply
or acquisition of goods including capital goods and services in connection with
commencement or closure of business;

 

(e) provision
by a club, association, society, or any such body (for a subscription or any
other consideration) of the facilities or benefits to its members;

 

(f) admission,
for a consideration, of persons to any premises;

 

(g) services
supplied by a person as the holder of an office which has been accepted by him
in the course or furtherance of his trade, profession or vocation;

(h) services
provided by a race club by way of totalisator or a licence to book maker in
such club; and

 

(i) any
activity or transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State
Government or any local authority in which they are engaged as public
authorities;

 

At this juncture, it is
relevant to note that the above definition is similar to the definition
applicable under the CST Act, 1956 (prior to amendment doing away with the
for-profit clause). In the context of the said definition, the Supreme Court
had in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Abdul Bakhi & Bros
[(1964) 15 STC 644 (SC)]
held that the expression “business” though
extensively used as a word of indefinite import, in taxing statutes it is used
in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention
and labor of a person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an
activity as business there must be a course of dealings, either actually
continued or contemplated to be continued with a profit motive, and not for
sport or pleasure. Keeping the said principles in mind (except for the clause
relating to pecuniary benefit), let us analyse as to whether the activities of
a co-operative housing society can be classified as trade, commerce,
manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any other similar
activity or not?

 

To do so, let us first
understand the activities of a co-operative housing society. As discussed
earlier, the main object of incorporating a co-operative housing society is to
manage, maintain and administer the property of the society and thus protecting
the rights of the members of the society thereof. There is no apparent
intention to carry out any of the activities specified in clause (a) which a
co-operative housing society carries out. That being the case, the question of
activities of the co-operative housing society being classifiable as business
under clauses (a) to (c) of the above definition does not arise at all.

 

The only other clause,
which appears remotely relevant to the current topic of discussion is clause
(e) which is reproduced below

 

(e) provision by a
club, association, society, or any such body (for a subscription or any other
consideration) of the facilities or benefits to its members.

 

Let us first understand
the concept of how the co-operative housing society model functions. A builder
develops land by constructing the building and other amenities, sells it to
potential buyers who after the completion of construction and handover of
possession, form a society to manage, maintain and administer the property. The
society incurs expense of two kind, one being directly incurred for the member
(such as property tax, water bill, etc.) and second being common expenses for
all the members (such as lighting of common area, lift operation and
maintenance, security, etc.) which are recovered from the members. However,
what is of utmost importance is that a member does not come to society for
enjoying the said facilities, but to stay there, which continues to be his
right by way of ownership which cannot be denied to him. Even if there is a
case where a member stops contributing to the expenses, other members of the
society cannot deny the access to the member to his unit, though the facilities
extended may be discontinued.

 

However, it is not so in
the case of a club or association. A person becomes a member only to enjoy the
facilities that the said club or association has to offer. If that be the case,
it can be argued the term “society” used in clause (e) of section 2 (17) is to be
read in context of the surrounding words like club or association and hence,
has to be restricted only to such societies where the purpose of obtaining
membership is to receive benefits/ facilities.

 

If a conservative view is
taken that the activities undertaken by a co-operative housing society is
classifiable as supply of services in the course or furtherance of business, is
the supply for a consideration?

Section 9 of the CGST Act,
2017 provides that tax shall be levied on the value of supply, as determined
u/s 15 of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 15 (1) provides that where the supplier
and recipient are related and price is the sole consideration for the supply,
the value of supply shall be the transaction value, i.e., the price actually
paid or payable for the said supply of goods or services or both.

 

Therefore, following
points need analysis, namely:

    Whether the society and member can be
treated as related person or not?

    Is the price sole consideration for the
supply?

To
answer the first question, i.e., whether the society and member are related
person or not, it becomes necessary to refer to understand the scope of
“related person”. Explanation 1 to section 15 provides that

(a) persons
shall be deemed to be “related persons” if —

(i)     such persons are officers or directors of
one another’s businesses;

(ii) such
persons are legally recognised partners in business;

(iii) such
persons are employer and employee;

(iv) any
person directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds twenty-five per cent. or
more of the outstanding voting stock or shares of both of them;

(v)    one of them directly or indirectly controls
the other;

(vi)   both of them are directly or indirectly
controlled by a third person;

(vii)  together they directly or indirectly control a
third person; or;

(viii) they are members of the same family;

 

From the above, it is more
that evident that society and members cannot be classified as related persons
since it is not classifiable under either of the above entries.

 

Regarding the second point
also, it is more than evident that price is the sole consideration of the
supply. This is because the society does not recover anything over and above
the amounts charged for undertaking the maintenance activity.

 

That being the case, the
value of supply will have to be determined as per section 15 (1) of the CGST
Act, 2017, i.e., GST shall be attracted on the transaction value.

 

Charges not to be included
in the taxable value

A co-operative housing
society recovers various charges from its members, such as property tax, water
tax, water charges, NA Tax, electricity charges, contribution to sinking fund
and repairs and maintenance fund, car parking charges, non-occupancy charges,
interest on late payment, etc.

 

A detailed clarification
on the taxability of the above charges has been issued and the same is
tabulated below for ready reference, along with remarks wherever applicable:

 

Nature of Receipt

Clarification

Property
Tax

Not
Taxable

Water
Tax*

Not
Taxable

Electricity
charges**

Not
Taxable if collected under Statute

NA
Tax

Not
Taxable

Maintenance
& Society charges

Taxable

Parking
Charges

Taxable

Non-Occupancy
Charges

Taxable

Sinking
/ Repair Fund***

Taxable

Share
Transfer Fee****

Taxable

 

 

*The clarification
talks about only water tax. However, most of the local authority do not charge
tax but charge a fee based on usage by the member. However, this aspect may
also not have any impact on the taxability since the water charges are levied
basis the consumption per flat and hence, even if the society recovers the said
expense from members, the same will have to be excluded from the value of
taxable service in view of Rule 33 of the CGST Rules, 2017.

 

** In most of the
cases, electricity charges are not recovered by the municipal / local authority
but by the private players like Reliance Energy, Tata Power, BEST, etc. To the
extent the electricity charges pertain to the members’ flat, the same is
recovered directly by the service provider from the member. The society may
recover only the electricity charges relating to common area, on which the
claim of non-taxability may not be possible.

 

*** While the
Government clarification states that tax is applicable on such recoveries, it
can be claimed that the contribution to the said funds is not liable to GST for
the following reasons:

 

1.  Both the funds are statutory requirement under
the bye-laws of the society

 

2.  These funds are meant for specific use which
might happen in distinct future

 

3.  This are in the nature of deposits given by
members to safeguard future expenditure. Deposits by themselves are not liable
for GST.

 

Basis these three
propositions, a view can be taken that collection of sinking fund / repair
funds are not taxable, irrespective of the clarification issued.

 

****Share transfer fees
is the fees collected from an incoming member for transfer of ownership from
old member to new member. The issue that arises is that the definition of
business u/s. 2 (17) provides that provision of facilities / benefits by a
society to its’ members shall be treated as business. However, at the time when
the share transfer fees are collected from the incoming member, he is not
actually a member of the society. Only upon completion of the share transfer process
does a person become member of the society. Therefore, share transfer fees
recovered from such incoming members cannot be considered as business under
clause (e) of section 2 (17). In view of the earlier discussion, since the
activities of a co-operative housing society are not covered under any of the
other clauses of section 2 (17), collection of share transfer fees may not be
classifiable as being in the course or furtherance of business and hence, a
view can be taken that the share transfer fees are not liable to tax,
irrespective of the clarification issued.

 

Exemption for Co-operative Housing Societies

Notification 12 / 2017 –
Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 provides an exemption for services by an
unincorporated body or a non-profit entity registered under any law for the
time being in force, to its own members by way of reimbursement of charges or
share of contribution up to an amount of Rs. 7500[1]  per month per member for sourcing of goods or
services from a third person for the common use of its members in a housing
society or a residential complex.

 

Important observations
from the above exemption entries are:

 

– The monetary limit will
not include the amounts recovered which are not taxable in view of the society.

 

– The exemption will have
to be decided qua the member.

 

For instance, if a society
has houses of different sizes and the maintenance charges are decided based on
the house size, there can be an instance where maintenance for certain houses
is below the specified limit and for certain houses is above the specified
limits. In such cases, the exemption will be available for smaller houses with
maintenance lower than the specified limit and no exemption will be available
for houses having maintenance higher than the specified limit.

 

Registration Related Provisions

Section 22 (1) requires
that every supplier, having aggregate turnover exceeding Rs. 20 lakh in
previous financial year shall be required to obtain registration. The term
“aggregate turnover” has been defined u/s. 2 (6) to mean aggregate value of all
taxable supplies, exempt supplies, exports of goods or services to be computed
on all India basis but shall exclude GST thereof.

 

It may be noted that the
amounts recovered on account of property tax, water tax, etc., will have to be
excluded while computing the aggregate turnover. This is because they are not
treated as being a consideration received for making a supply (exempt or
taxable).

 

However, maintenance
charges recoveries which are exempted under Notification 12/2017 would have to
be considered while calculating the turnover of Rs. 20 lakh. Further, the
threshold limit will not apply in case a society is already registered. In that
sense, the threshold limit is a mere misnomer in the context of co-operative
housing society.

 

Conclusion

While the legal principle
of mutuality appears to be reasonably strong in view of consistent decisions of
the High Court, the matter has still not reached finality since the same is
pending in Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Government notifications and
clarifications suggest that GST is applicable to co-operative societies. In
this background, a decision from the Supreme Court is eagerly awaited to settle
the controversy to its fullest.


[1] Earlier the limit was Rs. 5000 per
month upto 25.01.2018

Goods Vis-À-Vis Intellectual Service

Introduction

Under
Sales Tax Laws tax could be levied on sale/purchase of goods. The term ‘goods’
is defined in the Constitution and it is also normally defined in the State
Sales Tax Laws. For example, the definition of ‘goods’ under MVAT Act is as
under in section 2(12):

 

“(12)
“goods” means every kind of movable property not being newspapers, actionable
claims, money, stocks, shares, securities or lottery tickets and includes live
stocks, growing crop, grass and trees and plants including the produce thereof
including property in such goods attached to or forming part of the land which
are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale;”

 

This
term is also discussed and interpreted in various judgements. The landmark
judgement is in case of Tata Consultancy Service (137 STC 620)(SC).
Regarding ‘goods’, Hon. Supreme Court has observed as under:

 

“17.
Thus this Court has held that the term ‘goods’, for the purposes of sales tax,
cannot be given a narrow meaning. It has been held that properties which are
capable of being abstracted, consumed and used and/ or transmitted,
transferred, delivered, stored or possessed etc. are ‘goods’ for the purposes
of sale tax. The submission of Mr. Sorabjee that this authority is not of any
assistance as a software is different from electricity and that software is
intellectual incorporeal property whereas electricity is not, cannot be
accepted. In India the test, to determine whether a property is ‘goods’, for
purposes of sales tax, is not whether the property is tangible or intangible or
incorporeal. The test is whether the concerned, item is capable of abstraction,
consumption and use and whether it can be transmitted, transferred, delivered,
stored, possessed etc. Admittedly in the case of software, both canned
and un-canned, all of these are possible.”

Inspite
of Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term ‘goods’ still the controversies
keep up coming from time to time.

 

Judgement of Tribunal in case of Sungrace Engineering Projects Pvt. Ltd.
(Second Appeal No.198 of 2015 dt.2.9.2016). 

 

Hon.
Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal had an occasion to deal with similar issue in
above judgment. 

 

Facts

The
facts are narrated by Tribunal as under:

 

“Appellant
is a Private Limited Company carrying on the business of sale of software,
conducting surveys, preparing reports and consultancy in various fields.
Appellant is duly registered under B.S.T. Act. Company is assessed under
Section 33 for the period 01/04/1999 to 31/03/2000 on 07/08/2002. Assessment
had resulted in Nil tax demand. Later on, the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax
(Adm.) M-61, Pune Division, Pune (in brief, “The Revision Authority”) took
this case for revision u/s. 57 of BST Act after noticing that, professional
receipts shown in the balance-sheet worth Rs.1,13,23,186/- are received on
account of sale of technical know-how i.e. preparing lay outs, surveys and
submitting report to the customers, Government which according to Revisional Authority
is one of the types of transfer of knowledge or transfer of technology; that
falls within the purview of Schedule entry C-I-26 (7) of the B.S.T. Act.
Technical know-how is taxable @ 4%. Assessing Authority failed to levy tax on
Rs.1,13,23,186/-.”

 

In
course of argument, appellant further elaborated the facts as under:

 

“4. On
merits of the case, Mr. Gandhi, Ld. Chartered Accountant further, explained
that appellant has collected amount of Rs.1,13,23,186/- stated above from
different Government Authorities and Private Agencies. The nature of services
rendered is mainly preparation of designs, drawings of all components of dam
under Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation in brief, ”MKVDC “) of
irrigation projects, consultancy services for survey of pipe lines alignments,
soil investigation, consultancy services for survey preparing financial
estimates, preparing reports including detail designs and drawings as mutually
agreed between the parties. Major work is done as a contractor client to the
Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department of Government of Maharashtra, and
there are some sub-contracts regarding government works but done on behalf of
other private parties. He further, explained that by no stretch of imagination,
the nature of work conducted by the appellant can be termed “sale of technical
know-how,” as prescribed in entry C-I-26(7) of the B.S.T. Act. He further,
explained that running bills clearly explains what was the nature of work done.
According to him, the Revision Authority and the First Appellate Authority have
wrongly held that the transactions were in the nature of sale of technical
know-how by applying one or two criteria without confirming that the
transactions confirm all necessary ingredients is illegal or cannot be sustained.
The said condition is as below:-

 

“All
the studies layouts, drawings, design notes which have been submitted to the
Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation shall become the absolute
property of MKVDC under the Copyright Act and the consultant shall not use the
same in whole or part thereof elsewhere for any purpose without explicit
written permission from MKVDC.”

 

The
department reiterated the contentions as per revision order and further relied
upon the judgement of Tribunal in case of I. W. Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
vs. The State of Maharashtra
(SA No.429 of 2004, decided on 22/10/2008).

 

Hon.
Tribunal considered the arguments of both the sides and also referred to entry
C-I-26 of the BST Act and held
as under:

 

“9.  Heading of the said entry itself clearly
states that the goods are incorporeal or intangible characters are covered
under this entry, then question before us is whether the services rendered by
appellant are goods of intangible nature. We have to see the authorities referred
from both sides. M/s I.W. Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (cited supra).
The dealer was carrying on the business of selling water purification systems
and components and parts thereof. It used to undertake engineering and
consultancy services. It undertook work from M/s. Sudarshan Chemical Industries
Ltd. for upgrading their Effluent Water Treatment Plant at Roha. M/s. Sudarshan
Chemical Industries Ltd. carried out the work with their contractor as per
models, designs, drawings, specifications of civil works, electrical works
under the guidance and technical knowledge of M/s I.W. Technologies Ltd.
Therefore, it was held that there was sale of technical know-how. But in the
present case, surveys and reports, designs, drawings of the dam and the
irrigation projects are prepared as per specifications provided by the
employer. Appellant prepared reports, drawings, designs, etc., with the
help of their technical expertise in the field.

 

10.  The tender condition mentioned above, and
relying on the same departmental authorities levied tax as property is covered
under Copyright Act, there is sale of “Copy right .”

 

11.  Provision under Copyright Act, in section
17(d) it is prescribed that-

 

Section
17. “Subject to provisions of this Act the author of work shall be the first
owner of the Copyright therein provided that

 

(a) to
(c) not relevant

 

(d) in
the case of Government work, Government shall in the absence of contract to the
contrary be the first owner of the Copyright therein.”

 

In
view of this provision it is clear that whatever work, done by the appellant,
was owned by the Government and therefore there was no question of sale of
technical know-how.

 

Observing
as above Hon. Tribunal held that the levy of tax is not sustainable as it is
not sale of goods but rendering of services. Tribunal set aside the revision
order.

 

Conclusion     

The
judgement throws light on the nature of “goods”. Normally, the goods are first
produced and then delivered. However, when the transaction is for intellectual
service which is also not transferable to other parties, it will amount to
service and not goods. The judgement will be useful for making distinction
between goods and intellectual service.
 

 

Refunds Under GST

Introduction

 

1.  Since GST works on the
principle of value addition, it is generally expected that on a net basis, the
tax payer will end up paying differential tax (excess of output tax over the
input tax credit) and there would be very few instances of refunds. However, in
certain scenarios, there could be a possibility of there being no differential
tax liability and in fact, there could be refund. Such refunds can be on
account of multiple reasons, such as:

 

    Tax on inputs is higher than the tax on
output

 

   Zero rated supplies, i.e., exports and SEZ supplies where there is no
tax on output while tax has to be paid on inputs

 

   Excess payment of tax, either on account of
mistake, interpretation issue, dispute, pre-deposit in appeal, etc.

 

    Excess tax payment resulting on account of
loss making business or discontinuance of business.

 

2.  Under the earlier tax regime,
in all the above scenarios, the above excess payment (irrespective of nature,
i.e., payment of tax or unutilised input tax credit) had to be dealt with under
the provisions of the respective laws, which had different principles and
timelines. For instance, under the VAT regime (in the context of Maharashtra
VAT), there was no restriction on claim of refund of such excess tax except for
the limitation period, which was 18 months from the end of the financial year.
However, under the Central Excise / Service Tax regime, the refund claim was
divided into two parts, namely refund of excess balance of credit and refund of
excess tax payment. The provision relating to refund of excess balance of
credit was primarily governed u/r 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 which granted
refund of accumulated credit to exporters of goods / services. Similarly, the
provisions relating to refund of excess tax payments were governed u/s. 11B of
Central Excise Act, 1944. In both the scenarios, general limitation period for
claim of the said refund permitted the claim of refund only within a period of
one year from the relevant date. The entire process of claiming refund had seen
its fair share of litigation under the earlier tax regime with various landmark
decisions in the context of each legislation laying down various important
principles which shall be discussed at appropriate places in this article.

 

3.  We shall now analyse whether
the provisions relating to refund under GST regime, pursuant to the amalgam of
the above taxes, have succeeded in removing various difficulties faced under
the earlier regimes or not. We shall primarily cover the following topics
relating to refunds under GST, namely:

 

   General provisions

 

   Form & manner of application

 

   Documentary evidence to be submitted along
with application

 

    Various Issues relating to refund.

 

General
Provisions relating to refund under GST

 

4.  Section 54 of the CGST Act,
2017 read with Chapter X of the CGST Rules, 2017 deals with the provisions
relating to grant of refunds under GST. Refund of Integrated tax paid on zero
rated supplies is dealt with u/s. 16 of the IGST Act, 2017 but the same is also
governed by Chapter X of the CGST Rules, 2017. The general provisions relating
to refund under GST are covered u/s. 54 of the Act.

5.  Section 54 (1) provides that any person claiming refund of any tax & interest, if paid before the
expiry of two years from the relevant date, may make an application in such form & manner as may be prescribed.
This would encompass the claim of refund of balances appearing in electronic
cash ledger and electronic credit ledger as well as refund of any tax or
interest paid, but not appearing in the respective ledgers for any reason. The
general provisions relating to such refund claims can be listed as under:

 

    Refund of balance in electronic cash ledger
– Vide proviso to section 54 (1), it has been clarified that the refund of
balances appearing in electronic cash ledger shall be claimed in the return to
be furnished u/s. 39

 

    Refund of balance in electronic credit
ledger – There can be different reasons for balance in electronic credit
ledger. Section 54 (3) deals with the provisions relating to refund of
unutilised input tax credit and provides for claim of refund by a registered
person of unutilised input tax credit in following cases:

 

    Zero rated supplies made
without payment of tax

    Accumulation of credit on
account of rate of tax on inputs being higher than the rate of tax on output

    Refunds due, but not reflected
in either of the ledgers – This would refer to situations such as:

    Cases where zero rated
supplies have been made on payment of integrated tax and the liability has been
discharged using balance in credit / cash ledger, thus reducing the respective
balances

    Cases where liability had been
disclosed & discharged wrongly in the returns

 

Form &
manner of application

 

6. Section 54 (1) provides that the application for refund shall be made
in the prescribed form & manner, which as per rule 89 is tabulated below:

 

Refund on account of

Prescribed form / manner

Balance in electronic cash ledger

In the return to be filed u/s. 39

Integrated tax paid on export of goods out of India

Automated refund subject to matching of information in
shipping bill with disclosures in GSTR 1 (Rule 96)

Unutilised input tax credit on account of zero rated supplies
other than export of goods out of India on payment of integrated tax

In Form RFD-01

Unutilized input tax credit on account of Deemed Exports
(either by recipient / supplier)

In Form RFD-01

On account of Order passed by Appellate Authority / Tribunal
/ Court

In Form RFD-01

Excess payment of tax, if any

In Form RFD-01

Any other

In Form RFD-01

 

7.  However, as of now, the
facility to file refund claim has been enabled only in case of refund on
account of zero rated supplies/ deemed exports.

 

Refund of
unutilised input tax credit:

 

8.  In order to determine the
amount eligible for refund out of unutilised input tax credit, Rule 89 (4)
prescribes elaborate formula to determine the amount eligible for refund from
the balance lying in the electronic credit ledger in case of zero rated
supplies made without payment of tax. The said Rule provides that the Refund
amount shall be derived by applying the following formula,

 

  
Turnover of Zero-rated supply of Goods +

Turnover of
Zero – rated supply of Services    
*?Net
ITC

                     Adjusted Total Turnover

 

9.  Each of the terms used in the
above formula has been defined in the rules. For instance, Net ITC has been
defined to mean input tax credit availed on inputs & input services during
the relevant period other than input tax credit availed for which refund is
claimed u/r (4A) or (4B) for specified notifications

 

10. Turnover
of Zero rated supply of goods / services – has been defined to mean the value
of zero rated supply of goods / services made during the relevant period
without payment of tax under bond / letter of undertaking, other than turnover
for which refund is claimed u/r (4A) or (4B) or both. Further, zero rated
supply of services has been defined to include following payments in the
context of zero rated supplies:

Nature of Payments

Action

Aggregate of payments received during
relevant period for such supplies

Include

Advance received in earlier period for
zero rated supplies, where service provision has been completed during the
relevant period

Include

Advance received during the relevant period for zero rated
supplies, where service provision has not been completed during the relevant
period

Exclude

 

 

11. Adjusted Total Turnover has
been defined to mean the turnover in a State / Union Territory as defined u/s.
2 (112), i.e., aggregate value of all taxable supplies & exempt supplies
made including export of goods or services or both but excluding the value of
exempt supplies and the value on which refund has been claimed u/r (4A) or (4B)
during the relevant period.

 

12. Similarly, relevant period has
been defined to mean the period for which the refund claim has been filed.

 

13. Just like Rule 89 (4) deals
with determination of refund amount in case of zero rated supplies made, Rule
89 (5) deals with determination of refund amount in case of inverted rate
structure. For this situation, it has been provided that the maximum refund
amount shall be determined by applying the following formula:

 

Turnover of
Inverted rated supply of
                 Goods &
Services                          
* Net ITC

           Adjusted Total Turnover

 

14. The definition of adjusted
total turnover as provided u/r 89 (4) has been borrowed for the purpose of Rule
89 (5) as well while Net ITC has been defined to mean input tax credit availed
on inputs during the relevant period other than input tax credit availed where
refund is claimed u/r (4A) and (4B).

 

Documentary
Evidences to accompany with refund application

 

15. Further, Section 54 (4)
provides that refund application shall be accompanied by prescribed documentary
evidences which demonstrate that

 

   the amount of refund is due to the taxable
person; and

   the incidence of the same has not been
passed on to any other person, later being required only in cases where the
amount of refund claim exceeds Rs. 2 lakhs.

 

16. In addition to the above, each
refund application needs to be supported with documentary evidence prescribed
u/r 89 (2) as under:

Clause

Reason for Refund

Supporting documentary evidence

(a)

Order of a Proper Officer / Appellate Authority / Appellate
Tribunal / Court

 

Refund of pre-deposit made at the time of appeal file before
the Appellate Authority / Appellate Tribunal

Reference number of the Order & copy of the Order passed

 

Reference number of payment of said amount

(b)

Export of goods – without payment of integrated tax

Statement containing the number & date of shipping bills
/ bill of export and the date of relevant export invoices

(c)

Export of Services – with or without payment of integrated
tax

Statement containing the number and date of invoices
containing the relevant BRC/ FIRC

(d)

Supply of goods to SEZ Unit / Developer

Statement containing number and date of invoices as provided
in rule 46 along with evidence in the form of endorsement on the invoice by
the specified officer of the Zone that the goods have been admitted in full
in the SEZ Unit / Developer

(e)

Supply of services to
SEZ Unit / Developer

Statement containing the number and date of invoices along
with evidence in the form of endorsement on the invoice by the specified
officer of the Zone that the services have been received for authorized
operations of the Unit / Developer

(f)

Supply of goods / services to SEZ Unit / Developer on payment
of integrated tax

A declaration from the Unit / Developer that they have not
availed the input tax credit of the tax paid by the supplier

(g)

Deemed Exports

Statement containing number and date of invoices

(h)

Inverted rate structure

Statement containing the number and date of invoices received
& issued during a tax period

(i)

Finalisation of provisional assessment

Reference number and copy of final assessment order

(j)

Reclassification of outward supply from intra-state to
inter-state supply

Statement showing details of such transactions

(k)

Excess payment of tax

Statement showing details of such payment

(l)

On account of (e), (g), (h), (i) or (j)

Declaration that the incidence of tax, interest or any other
amount has not been passed on to any other person where the amount exceeds
Rs. 2 lakhs

(m)

On account of (e), (g), (h), (i) or (j)

Certificate from a Chartered Accountant / Cost Accountant
confirming the declaration in clause (l)

 

 

Grant of Refund

 

17. On verification of the above,
if the Proper Officer is satisfied that the amount of claim is refundable, he
may make an Order accordingly and the refundable amount shall be credited to
the Consumer Welfare Fund, except in following cases (Section 54 (8)):

 

   Refund is relatable to tax paid on
zero-rated supplies of goods or services or both or on inputs or input services
used in making such zero-rated supplies

 

  Refund relates to unutilised input tax
credit as referred to in section 54 (3)

 

    Refund relates to tax paid on supply, which
is not provided either wholly or partially and for which invoice has not been
issued or where refund voucher has been issued

 

   Refund of tax in pursuance of section 77

 

    Refund of tax & interest or any other
amount paid by the Applicant, if he has not
passed on the incidence of such tax & interest to any other person

 

    Any tax or interest borne by such other
class of applicants as the Government may notify (Rule 89 (4A) & (4B) have
been inserted to grant refund in case of deemed exports to supplier/ recipient
subject to certain conditions).

 

Concept of
relevant date

 

18. The concept of “relevant date”
in the context of refund is important as it forms the basis for determining the
eligibility of the refund claim from the view point of limitation. The said
term is defined through Explanation 2 to Section 54 as under:

 

Reasons for Refund

Remarks

Relevant Date

Tax paid on Export of goods

By Sea or Air

Date on which the aircraft/ ship leaves India

 

By Land

Date on which goods pass the frontier

 

By Post

Date of dispatch of goods by Post Office concerned o/s India

 

Deemed export of goods

Date on which return relating to such deemed exports is
furnished

Tax paid on Export of Services

Supply completed prior to receipt of payment

Receipt of payment in convertible exchange

 

Advance received for supply prior to issuance of invoice

Issuance of invoice

Refund of Unutilised input tax credit

As per proviso to section 54 (3)

End of the financial year

Refund on account of

Finalisation of provisional assessment order

Date of adjustment of tax after finalization of assessment
order

 

Judgment/ decree/ order / direction of Appellate Authority /
Tribunal/ Court

Date of communication

Refund claimed by person other than supplier

 

Date of receipt of goods or services

Refund in any other case

 

Date of Payment

 

 

19. Having discussed the basic provisions relating to refund, we shall
now discuss on specific issues relating to claim of refund under the GST
regime.

 

Does the time
limit of 2 years apply in case of refund of balance in Electronic Cash Ledger?

 

20. A possible reason for balance in electronic cash ledger would be
instances of payment of tax under the wrong head / excess payment of tax. To
deal with such situations, section 54 (1) provides that any person claiming
refund of any tax & interest, if paid may make an application in such form
& manner as may be prescribed, before the expiry of two years from the
relevant date. Further, proviso to section 54 (1) provides that the refund of
any balance in electronic cash ledger has to be claimed in accordance with
provisions of section 49 (6) in the return furnished u/s .39 in such manner as
may be prescribed.

 

21. One important distinction in the above provisions is that while the
operative part of section 54 (1) specifically deals with refund of tax &
interest paid, the proviso deals with refund of balance in electronic cash
ledger. This distinction is important because it helps us in dealing with the
question of whether the two-year limit applies to claim refund of balance in
electronic cash ledger or not?

 

22. To answer this question, we will need to refer to the concept of PLA
under Central Excise wherein amounts deposited in PLA were treated as mere
deposits and not actual discharge of tax. In this context, reference to the
decision in the case of Jayshree Tea & Industries Limited vs. CCE,
Kolkata [2005 (190) ELT 106 (Kolkata)]
may be relevant wherein the Tribunal
has dealt with the distinction between the amount appropriated towards duty and
amount deposited for payment of duty. The Tribunal held that in the first case,
duty which has been paid to the PLA and appropriated towards liability becomes
property of Government and no person would be entitled to get it back unless
there is provision of law to enable that person to get the duty already
appropriated back. However, for the second case, i.e., amount deposited for
appropriation towards future liability but not appropriated, the said amount
does not become property of Government unless goods are cleared and duty is
levied and therefore, the law of limitation does not apply to such refund
claims.

 

23. Similarly, in the context of GST, making payment in to electronic
cash ledger under GST is also treated as a “deposit” which is evident on a
reading of section 49 (1), which reads as “Every deposit made towards, tax, interest, penalty, fee or any
other amount by a person … …. … shall be credited to the electronic cash ledger
of such person … … …”

 

24. Therefore, a view can be taken that the limitation period may not
apply to balance lying in electronic cash ledger since the same is a deposit
and not in the nature of tax, interest, penalty, etc.

 

Will the above principles be applicable for
refund of pre-deposits made while filing appeal before Appellate Authority /
Tribunals?

25. Sections 107 & 112, which deal with the provisions relating to
Appeal to be filed before Appellate Authority or Appellate Tribunal provide for
pre-deposit of 10% / 20% of the disputed demand before filing of appeal under
the respective sections. The issue that needs consideration is whether the
time-barring principle will apply for such kind of payments, if in future the
matter is decided in favor of the taxable person making the pre-deposit?

 

26. To answer this question, foremost one needs to determine the manner
in which the pre-deposit compliance has been done by the taxable person, i.e.,
whether by debit in the electronic cash ledger / electronic credit ledger? This
is because once the Order from the Appellate Authority / Tribunal is received
and the Order Giving Effect to the same is given, the amounts will be
recredited to the respective cash / credit ledgers from where they were
initially debited.

 

27. Once the said amount forms part of cash ledger, the same shall
partake the character of deposit and hence, the above principles of applicability
of time-barring provisions shall continue to apply. In this regard, one can
also refer to the decision of Bombay HC while dealing with a similar issue in CCE,
Pune I vs. Sandvik Asia Limited [2017 (52) STR 112 (Bombay)]
wherein it has
been held that the principles of unjust enrichment and Section 11B do not apply
to refund of amounts deposited in compliance with interim order. Similar view
has been held in the case of CCE, Coimbatore vs. Pricol Limited [2015 (39)
STR 190 Madras
]

 

28. However, in cases where the pre-deposit is made through debit in
credit ledger, on receipt of the favorable Order, the pre-deposit amount would
be re-credited to the credit ledger and hence, the above principles shall not
be applicable for such re-credits.

 

What are the
specific issues in the context of filing of refund claim for unutilised input
tax credit balances appearing in electronic credit ledger?

 

29. As discussed earlier, section 54(1) provides for refund of any tax
& interest paid. One subset of the same would be balance lying in
electronic credit ledger, i.e., unutilised input tax credit which is dealt with
in section 54 (3). In the context of such balances, there is a specific
restriction on claim of refund except where the balance has arisen on account of:

  Zero rated supplies made without payment of
tax

 

Inverted rate structure, i.e., where the tax
rate applicable on outward supplies is lower than the tax rate applicable on
inward supplies.

 

30. Elaborate process has been prescribed u/r 89 to determine the form
& manner of making application and the amount of refund eligible, which has
been discussed earlier as well. For instance, Rule 89 (4) defines the formula
to be applied for determining the refund amount for zero rated supplies. The
said formula deals with certain terms, which have been defined in the Rules.
The definition has led to various issues which are discussed below.

 

Timing Issues

 

31. The core issue with the formula is the aspect of relevant period.
This is because all the terms, namely Net ITC as well as Turnover figures (both
turnover of zero rated supplies as well as adjusted total turnover) are defined
in the context of refund claim for the relevant period, i.e., the period for
which refund claim has been filed.

 

32. Many a times, there can be a scenario wherein the inward supplies
are received during one particular period prior to the relevant period during
which the outward supplies towards which the refund claim is being filed is
made. Due to this, there is a timing mis-match. Let us try to understand this
issue with the help of following example:

 

Example: ABC Limited is a manufacturer, predominantly exporting its’
manufactured products. They manufacture based on Orders received from
customers. During the period from January to March 2018, they received an
Export Order for INR 100000. They procured the materials for the same in
January for Rs. 60,000 on which GST @ 18% was charged (i.e., Rs. 10,800) and
claimed as credit. The manufacturing process completed in March 2018 and the
goods were exported in the same month. Applying the formula for refund of the
said tax in the month of March 2018, the same shall be determined as:

 

Turnover of Zero-rated
supply, i.e., Rs. 100000  
* Net ITC (0) = 0

      
Adjusted Total Turnover, i.e., Rs. 100000
                                      

 

33. Similar issue would arise in case refund is filed in January when
the turnover would be zero and hence again, refund amount would continue to be
zero only.

34. In view of the formula mismatch, unless the taxpayer has continuous
exports, there is a possibility of the refund amount reducing on account of
such timing mismatch.

 

35. While the method for calculating the amount of refund eligible is
similar to the method prescribed u/r 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the key
difference is in the determination of the denominator, i.e., Adjusted Total
turnover. While the Turnover of zero rated supply of services is determined on
the basis of the payments realised, adjusted total turnover merely refers to
the turnover of export of service, which would primarily cover the value of
services exported, whether or not payments realised. This is in contrast to the
method adopted u/r 5 of CCR, 2004 wherein it was specifically provided that the
value of export of services, for the purpose of total turnover also shall be
determined based on the payment realisation only.

 

Relevant period

 

36. Another departure from Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is
in the context of relevant period, or the period for which the refund claim is
being filed. While u/r 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the refund claim was
to be filed on a quarterly basis, irrespective of the periodicity for filing
returns, under GST, the term “relevant period” has been defined to mean the
period for which the refund claim has been filed. While the term “period” has
not been defined under the GST law, the term ‘tax period’ has been defined to
mean the period for which return is required to be furnished. Therefore, for
taxable persons whose turnover exceeds Rs. 2 crores, refund claim will have to
be filed on a monthly basis while in case of others, depending on the option of
return filing exercised (monthly vs. quarterly), the periodicity of filing
refund claims should be required to be determined. However, on the portal, even
for taxable persons exercising the option to file quarterly returns, the refund
claims are required to be filed on monthly basis only.

 

Is it mandatory to file a refund claim in
case of refund of advances received for provision of services on which tax was
discharged or self-adjustment in returns is permissible?

 

37. Section 31 (3) (d) requires a taxable person to issue a receipt
voucher or any other document as may be prescribed at the time of receipt of
advance payment with respect to supply of goods or services or both. There can
be two outcomes against this advance, namely:

 

   Supply is made & invoice is issued
against the advance received

 

   Supply is not made & invoice is not
issued, the advance is refunded for which refund voucher shall be issued as
envisaged in Section 31 (3) (e)

 

38. The issue that arises is how to treat the adjustment of tax paid on
advances and subsequently refunded to the client. This is because Table 11 of
GSTR 1 provides for disclosure of only advances received & advances
adjusted during the tax period. While what is meant by advances adjusted has
not been dealt with specifically, notes to the format of GSTR 1 provides that
Table 11B shall include information for adjustment of tax paid on advances
received and reported in earlier tax period against invoices issued in the
current tax period. However, there is no specific mention of how the instances
covered u/s 31 (3) (e), i.e., refund of advances received before provision of
supply & issuance of invoice will be dealt with. 

 

39. While section 54 (8) (c) provides for refund of tax paid on such
supplies, it is important to note that the process for filing such refund
claims has not been enabled as on date and hence, if the view that
self-adjustment is not permissible for instances where tax was paid on advance
receipt and subsequently refunded, the same will result in blockage of funds in
the absence of proper mechanism with respect to the same.

 

Will refund on account of inverted rate structure be eligible if the
rate of inward input services is higher as compared to the rate on outward
supplies?

40. Proviso to section 54 (3) provides that refund of unutilised input
tax credit where the credit has accumulated on account of an inverted rate
structure, i.e., the rate of tax on inputs being higher that the rate of tax on
output supplies. Rule 89 (5) prescribes the method which shall determine the
refund amount in such cases. The formula prescribed for determining the refund
amount states that net ITC shall mean the credit availed on inputs during the
relevant period. The issue that arises is whether the term “input” used in
section 54 (3) refers the term “input” as defined u/s. 2 (59) or it has to be
read as “input supplies” in the context of “output supplies”?

 

41. This is essential because the formula for output supply covers
outward supplies of both, goods as well as services. Therefore, there is no
apparent logic for considering only the credit claimed on input goods for the
purpose of Net ITC and not input services also.

 

42. A logical argument is that the input referred to in the proviso has
to be read to be in correlation to the output supply. This is because the term
“output supply” has not been defined in the GST law. What is defined is outward
supply. Had it been a case that the proviso used the term “outward supply” and
not “output supply”, a strong ground to say that Net ITC should include inputs
as defined u/s 2 (59) would have been possible.

 

However, with use of words input & output supply, in our view, will
have to be read vis-à-vis each other, i.e., Net ITC should include the
credit availed on both inputs, as well as input services.

 

What will be the
scope of applicability of doctrine of unjustenrichment under GST?

 

43. One important aspect that needs to be analyzed while dealing with
the subject of refund is that the incidence of tax, interest or any other
amount that is being claimed as refund should not be passed on to another
person. This is known as the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The doctrine states
that if a person pays the tax to the Government and passes it on to his
customer by including it in the sales price, he effectively loses nothing. If
this tax is to be later on refunded to him on the ground that it was not
payable itself at first instance, the refund would be an undeserving benefit. This
principle has been exhaustively dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in many
cases, the landmark being Mafatlal Industries vs. Union of India [1997 (089)
ELT 0247 SC]
.

 

44. The circumstances under which refund shall be granted under GST, as
governed u/s. 54 (8) of the Act are similar to the provisions prescribed u/s.
11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Therefore, the principles of doctrine of
unjust enrichment, as applicable in the context of section 11B of Central
Excise Act, 1944 should continue to apply in the context of GST as well.
Therefore, unless specifically mentioned, the principles of doctrine of unjust
enrichment should not apply in the context of GST as well. 
 

ENTRY TAX ON GOODS IMPORTED FROM OUT OF INDIA

Introduction


A burning issue prevailed
about levy of Entry tax on goods imported from out of India.


The State tax on Entry of
Goods into Local Areas is levied by State Governments by enacting respective
State Acts. The Act is enabled by Entry 52 of List II of Schedule VII of
Constitution of India.


Different State Governments
have enacted such Acts including Maharashtra. The Act generally provides for
levy of entry tax on goods, which entered into the State from outside the State
for consumption, use or sale therein. The question for consideration herein is
what is the meaning of words ‘from outside the State’?    


Controversy


There were contradictory
judgments about scope of ‘outside the State’.


In case of Fr.
William Fernandez vs. State of Kerala (115 STC 591) (Ker)
, the Hon.
Kerala High Court held that the scope of entry of goods from outside the State
will be restricted to goods brought from outside State but from place within
India. In other words, when the goods are imported from out of India there is
no intention to levy Entry Tax by State Act. The judgment was based on overall
scheme of Constitution that imported goods are immune from levy of State tax
and that the State Governments are intending to tax goods coming from other
States and not from out of India.


There are contrary
judgments from other High Courts also like in Reliance Industries Ltd.
vs. State of Orissa (16 VST 85) (Ori)
, the Orissa High Court justified
levy of Entry Tax even on goods imported from out of India.


The above controversy
ultimately came before the Hon. Supreme Court.


The
Supreme Court has given its judgment in case of State of Kerala vs. Fr.
William Fernandez (54 GSTR 21)(SC)
.


The main issues raised for
non-levy of goods imported from outside India are rejected by the Hon. Supreme
Court. The main principles observed by the Hon. Supreme Court can be noted as
under: –


(i) The law provides for
entry into local area from “any place” outside State “Any Place” has wide
extent and need not be restricted to place within India.


(ii) Entry 52 permits tax
on entry of goods into local area for consumption, use or sale and has nothing
to do with origin of goods.      


(iii)
When the charging section is clear, provisions cannot be read narrowly to mean
that the imported goods coming from outside country are excluded from charge of
entry tax.


(iv) Even in some State
Entry Tax Acts, specific words are used to include goods imported from outside
the country, and that is by abandon caution thus cannot affect scope in other
State Acts.


(v) The entries in Schedule
VII are regarding field of legislation and not only power of legislation.


(vi) There is no over
powering between State and Union in respect of entries in the field of
Legislation.


(vii) There cannot be said
any intrude of State power into Union power, by levying entry tax on goods
imported from outside India.


(viii) Restriction by
Article 286 on levy of tax on sale/purchase covered by section 5 of CST Act as
sale in course of import/export cannot be brought in, while interpreting Entry
52 in List II.


(ix) The custom duty provisions
also do not hit levy of entry tax as entry tax is levied after import is over.
Import continues till goods are cleared for home consumption. Once so cleared,
they are part of common mass and hence eligible to tax by States.


(x) Though in the concept of
valuation, custom duty is not included in State Entry Tax Act, it is
inconsequential for deciding validity of law.


(xi) Even if, name suggests
levy by local authorities, State is empowered to levy such tax.


(xii)  Other grounds about validity like user of tax
collection etc., were rejected, as they have nothing to do with validity of
levy.


Thus, holding as above the
Hon. Supreme Court upheld entry tax on goods imported from outside India.
 


Some relevant observations
of the Hon. Supreme Court are as under:
 


“58. The plain and literal construction when
put to section 3 read with section 2(d) clearly means that goods entering into
local area from any place outside the State are to be charged with entry tax.
Foreign territory would be a place which is not only outside the local area but
also outside the State. The writ petitions are trying to introduce words of
limitation in the definition clause. The interpretation which is sought to be
put up is that both the phrases be read as:


(1)  “from any place outside that local area but
within that State”;


(2)  any place outside the State but within
India.


59. It is well known rule of statutory
interpretation that be process of interpretation the provision cannot be
rewritten nor any word can be introduced. The expression ‘any place’ the words
‘outside the State’ is also indicative of wide extent. The words ‘any place’
cannot be limited to a place within the territory of India when no such
indication is discernible from the provisions of the Act.

 

60. The entry tax legislations are referable to
entry 52 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Entry 52 also
provided a legislative field, namely, ‘taxes on the entries of goods into a
local area for consumption, use or sale therein’. Legislation is thus concerned
only with entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale. The
origin of goods has no relevance with regard to chargeability of entry tax…”


Further:


“75. The distribution of power between Union and
States is done in a mutually exclusive manner as is reflected by precise and
clear field of legislation as allocated under different list under the Seventh
Schedule. No assumption of any overlapping between a subject allocated to Union
and State arises. When the field of legislation falls in one or other in Union
or State Lists, the legislation falling under the State entry has always been
upheld.”


The Hon.
Supreme Court also observed as under: –


“83. As
noted above, although, Nine Judges Constitution Bench had left the question
open of validity of entry tax on goods imported from countries outside the
territories of India, the two Hon’ble Judges, i.e. Justice R. Banumathi and
Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud while delivering separate judgment have considered
the leviability of entry tax on imported goods in detail. Both Hon’ble Judges
have held that there is no clash/overlap between entry levied by the State
under Entry 52 of List II and the custom duty levied by the Union under Entry
83 List I. We have also arrived at the same conclusion in view of the foregoing
discussions. We thus hold that entry tax legislations do not intrude in the
legislative field reserved for Parliament under Entry 41 and under Entry 83 of
List I.


The State Legislature is fully competent to impose tax on the entry of
goods into a local area for consumption, sale and use. We thus repel the
submission of petitioner that entry tax legislation of the State encroaches in
the Parliament’s field.”


Conclusion


The law
about levy of Entry tax has now become clear. The interpretation on many
Legislative aspects by
the Hon. Supreme Court will be useful for guidance in future.

 

PACKAGE SCHEME OF INCENTIVES – PROPORTIONATE INCENTIVES VIS-À-VIS RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT TO SECTION 93 OF THE MVAT ACT

This feature started as Sales Tax corner
in 1995-96. The first contributors to write it were Govind G Goyal and C B
Thakar. The feature was started with the intention to spread awareness about
Indirect Taxes, and more particularly sales tax as excise duty was covered by
another column titled Excise Duty Spectrum. Sales tax was replaced by VAT in
2005 and so the feature explained the new law initially. Later it was renamed
as VAT.

The
feature covers contemporary issues under VAT. It is an analytical feature where
a topic or an issue under it is selected and discussed in light of available
decisions from the highest court to the tribunals. Authors give a conclusion at
the end and offer their views. When we asked them what keeps them going they
said: “As we travel for speaking engagements across the country, we receive
positive feedback and that has been the major source of motivation for us”.
Talking about BCAJ@50, Govind Goyal said, “Its journey must continue with same
zeal, with same enthusiasm in pursuit of such a noble cause of sharing &
spreading knowledge.”

 

Package Scheme of Incentives –
Proportionate
Incentives vis-à-vis retrospective effect to section 93 of the MVAT Act

 

Introduction


Under MVAT era there were
incentive schemes, for backward area units, 
announced by the State Government from time to time, which were also
known as Package Scheme of Incentives (PSI). The incentives used to be given to
new units as well as for the expansion of the existing unit. The unit enjoying
original benefits under the PSI may have carried out expansion and therefore
may also become eligible for further PSI benefits by separate certificate for
expansion.

 

Under the 1993 PSI, the
units, who got the Entitlement Certificate for expansion, took benefit on the
whole production of the unit. While the Government was contemplating only
proportionate exemption i.e. in the ratio of production from exempted unit as
compared to total production.

 

However, the Hon. Bombay
High Court in case of Pee Vee Textile Ltd. (26 VST 281)(Bom)
ruled that once the unit holds Entitlement certificate even only for Expansion,
till the unit is entitled to take the benefit for total production and no pro
rata
working is applicable.

 

Amendment in MVAT Act


Having above back ground,
Government of Maharashtra amended the MVAT Act, 2002 and inserted section 93
and 93A in the MVAT Act in 2009 with retrospective effect from 1st
April 2005.

 

By the
above amendment, the Government prescribed the Scheme for pro rata
benefit in relation to Expansion. This amendment was retrospective and hence it
was challenged before the Bombay High Court. The Hon. Bombay High Court
delivered judgment in case of Jindal Poly Films Ltd. (63 VST 67)(Bom)
in which it was held that legislature has power to amend the position
retrospectively and hence the retrospective amendment was upheld. In view of
above it was general feeling that there are no chances to avoid pro rata
working of benefits from 1.4.2005.

 

However, recently there is
a judgment from the Hon. Bombay High Court in relation to above issue wherein
in spite of above position laid down earlier Hon. High Court has given
favorable judgment. The reference is to the judgment in case of Finolex
Industries Ltd. (MVAT A.No.61 of 2017 dt.29.10.2018)
.

 

Facts in above case


The facts, narrated by the
Hon. High Court in the judgment, may we read as follows:-

 

“3. The Appellant Company,
in the year 1994, has made a fixed capital investment of Rs.329.5 crore,
thereby creating a new manufacturing factory in Ratnagiri (hereinafter referred
to as “Ratnagiri Factory”) for manufacturing of PVC Resins and also PVC Pipes.
The said factory claimed the benefits of the Package Scheme of Incentives which
was prevailing at the relevant time, known as PSI 1988 and an eligibility
certificate under Part I of the 1988 Scheme was granted to the appellant by
SICOM qua its Ratnagiri unit. By virtue of the said eligibility
certificate, the appellant was held eligible for maximum entitlement of sales
tax incentives of Rs. 313,03,07,000/- by way of exemption. The said eligibility
certificate was valid for a period of 10 years from 4th April 1994
to 30th April 2004. On the basis of the said eligibility
certificate, the Sales Tax Department also issued an entitlement certificate on
25th April 1994 to the appellant and both the certificates mentioned
the production capacity as 1,30,000 metric tonnes. The said eligibility
certificate expressly described the unit of the appellant as “Pioneer Unit”. In
the year 1993, a new Package Scheme of Incentives substituted the existing
Package Scheme of Incentives. The appellant made a further investment in its
Ratnagiri unit to the tune of Rs.208.89 crore in August 2002 and accordingly,
the existing capacity of PVC Resins and extruded products like pipes, flared up
from 1,30,000 metric tonnes to 2 lakh metric tonnes per annum. The appellant,
accordingly, made an application for availment of necessary incentives in terms
of 1993 Package Scheme of Incentives vide application dated 8th
October 2002. Accordingly, on 10th February 2003, a fresh
eligibility certificate was issued to the appellant in the capacity as Pioneer
Unit by SICOM. The said certificate issued on 11th February 2003 was
valid for 106 months i.e. from 1st August 2002 to 31st
May 2011 and the eligibility certificate issued in favour of the appellant for
additional fixed capital investment of Rs. 20889.76 lakhs for village Ranpar,
District Ratnagiri was made subject to review/ monitoring every year. Certain
conditions were stipulated in the said eligibility certificate which included
the condition of automatic curtailment of the eligibility certificate from the point
of time when the total sales tax incentives admissible under the Scheme are
availed of, or exceed the limits as specific in the 1993 Package Scheme of
Incentives i.e. on attaining 69.93% of the gross value of Fixed Capital
Investment actually made subject to a ceiling of Rs. 20889.70 lakh i.e.
Rs.14,608.17 lakh or from the date from which the certificate of entitlement is
either cancelled or revoked, whichever event occurred earlier.

 

4. The certificate of
Entitlement issued in favour of the appellant on 21st October 2002
by SICOM did not incorporate any condition whatsoever that availment of
incentives should be on proportionate basis of increase in production capacity
to the additional investment. The consequential certificate of entitlement
dated 10th February 2003 issued by the Sales Tax Department,
according to the appellant, also does not in any condition stipulating that the
appellant should avail the incentives on a proportionate basis of increase in
production capacity of additional investment. It is the specific case of the
appellant that for the Financial Years 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09
and in particular, for the Financial Year 2005-06 in respect of which the
present Appeal is filed, the appellant relied upon the eligibility certificate
and the Entitlement certificate issued in its favour and claimed complete
exemption from taxes for the entire turnover of sales made by it from Ratnagiri
unit. It is the case of the appellant that it fully satisfied all the
conditions of exemption imposed under the notification dated 1st
April 2005 issued under the MVAT Act 2002 and necessary declarations were also
duly made on the invoice as required in the notification. As such, the
appellant exhausted the eligible quantum of benefit under the entitlement
certificate in the month of March 2009 itself. The appellant also claimed a
refund of tax paid on purchases in terms of Rule 78 of the MVAT Rules 2005 for
the period from 4th February 2006 to 1st March 2006 and
accordingly, the respondent granted provisional refund to the appellant
amounting to Rs. 5,65,39,588/.

 

Perusal of the chronology
of events would further reveal that on 22nd February 2013, an
assessment order was passed by the Assessing Authority for the disputed period
2005-06.

 

In the assessment order,
the Assessing Authority applied the provisions of section 93 of the MVAT 2002
as retrospectively substituted by Maharashtra Act No.XXII of 2009 and only
allowed the exemption to the extent of prorate turnover of 35%. The assessing
authority rejected the claim of 100% exemption without applying prorate factor
on the ground that the dealer has not produced any books of accounts and has
not identified the goods manufactured by old and new units and there was no
identification of goods. Resultantly, the appellant was assessed to VAT Tax at
Rs. 6,07,82,694/- and the claim was verified and finally allowed at
Rs.10,30,85,904/and it was held that the assessment had resulted in excess
amount which was refunded to the dealer. For the remaining amount, a demand
notice was served on
the appellant.”

 

The
argument of the appellant was that since the benefits are already exhausted and
it has started paying tax subsequent to exhaustion and that there is no
periodicity available for taking benefit of modified working, the retrospective
amendment should not be made applicable to it.

 

On the part of Government
the argument was that the law should be applied as already upheld by the Hon.
Bombay High Court and only pro rata benefit should be granted,
irrespective of the consequences.

The Hon. Bombay High Court
has held that in the above specific circumstances the position should not be
disturbed. Hon. High Court concluded the position in following words.

 

“26.       The findings recorded by the First
Appellate Authority as well as the Tribunal is amiss the legal position laid
down by the Hon’ble High Court in ACC Ltd Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra),
wherein it was categorically held that the expansion made by the existing
pioneer unit which specified conditions under para 3.12(b) will not be hit by
expansion under para 8.1(i)(c). The amendments made by Maharashtra Act No. XXII
of 2009 will not apply to units whose Cumulative Quantum of Benefits have been
fully utilized before expiry of the eligibility period even if the incentive is
computed in terms of amended Section 93 of the MVAT Act, 2002.

 

The amendment inserted by
Act No. XXII of 2009 would only govern those units where the Cumulative Quantum
of Benefits has not yet lapsed without full utilization and is in the process
of being availed. The eligibility availed under Section 93(1) is computed for a
particular year and if there is excess availment, then, the benefits can be
withdrawn. The challenge to the constitutional validity of Act No. XXII of 2009
was rejected by a Division Bench of this court in case of Jindal Poly Films
(supra) which is upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court and thus, upholding the
retrospectively of the said amending enactment. The amendment of Section 93(1)
being retrospective in the sense would make the provision applicable to the
unit set up before the date of the said amendment, but in respect of sales
which are made by such unit on or after 27th August 2009. Since the
appellant has already exhausted the benefits of exemption before 27th
August 2009, the appellant cannot be deprived of the said benefits in light of
Section 93A which was inserted with effect from 27th April 2009. The
amendment, thus would not apply to the sales already made between 1st
April 2005 and 28th August 2009. A retrospectively of a statute has
to be tested in the backdrop of its nature. A statute is not said to be
retrospective in operation merely because a part of the requisite for its
operation is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. A situation which
takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under the existing law or which
creates a new obligation or imposes a new liability will be treated as
retrospective. If the amendment which is made on 27th August 2009
applied to a unit to deprive it of all the exemptions of sale after 27th August
2009, then, the amendment would affect such vested right and not merely a
future or contingent right and it would be retrospective in operation. The
industrial unit like the appellant which has been set up before 27th
August 2009 and fulfilled all the requirements of the scheme, which was
prevailing, relating to enjoyment of certain sales tax benefits and if it had
fulfilled all the requirements of the scheme, then, a vested right is created
in favour of the unit to avail the exemption for a specified period and if on
the basis of an amendment which deprives the unit of all such benefits, it
would be retrospective in operation and would be against the spirit of a taxing
statute.”

 

Thus, favorable position is
available inspite of retrospective amendment. 

 

Conclusion


The judgment gives much
required relief to the backward area units. In fact many units have suffered
financially due to retrospective amendment. This judgment will save many of
such units and they will not be affected by the retrospective amendment. This is
good judgment considering the basic intention of the Scheme. This judgment will
also be guiding judgment in relation to retrospective amendments, where
applicable and where not applicable.
 

 

DECODING GST – CLAUSE BY CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF GST FORM 9C

This article is oriented towards performing a clause by clause analysis
of GST Form-9C. GSTR-9C has been titled as a reconciliation statement driven
towards reconciliation of data as per books of accounts with the data reported
in the GSTR 9. Therefore, preparation of GSTR-9 has to be treated as being a
pre-cursor to the reconciliation statement to be prepared for GSTR-9C.

 

Foreword

 

We have all experienced multiple course corrections in the country-wide
GST implementation including the course correction in reporting front. For
instance, in April 2017, the ambitious plan of item level reporting (at output/
input level) in the form of GSTR-1/2/3 with GSTR-1A/2A was introduced. However,
in July 2017 GSTR-1/2/3 and its compliments have been suspended and replaced
with a surrogate return in the form of GSTR-3B condensed the information
requirement. The said form was meant to collect taxes and tide over the IT
preparedness in implementing this nation-wide law. There was a temporary shift
from item level reporting to aggregated level reporting in the returns.
Entities hence prepared internal workings (at item level) and only reported the
aggregate number in GSTR-3B. Then came October 2017 wherein the requirement to
file GSTR 1 was introduced.

 

The flip-flop in reporting formats and ambiguity in
law could have given scope for errors creeping into reporting or taxability.
The law permitted tax payers to rectify both these errors during the course of
the tax period with additional time granted until September 2018. Yet there
could be instances where errors remain unrectified. For such instances, GSTR-9
and 9C assume a higher significance for FY 2017-18. The Auditee should view the
exercise of GSTR 9 as an opportunity to review and rectify the ‘errors in
reporting’ and GSTR-9C as an opportunity to get an external view to taxability
and rectify ‘errors in taxability’.

 

Structure of Form 9C

 

Traditionally, scope of taxation under VAT/ Service tax/ Excise was
limited to business turnover. With advent of GST the gamut of taxation has
widened unimaginably – from financial / recorded transactions to
non-financial/unrecorded activities; from contractual events (written/ oral) to
non-contractual activities; from external transactions to internal events; from
revenue to capital / non-recurring items. The law has encompassed almost
everything one can imagine. We have in some sense transgressed from a
‘transaction based law’ to an ‘event based law’. The law drills deep into the
information mine of an organisation touching internal actions, behaviors and
movements. It is for this reason that 9C attempts to capture whole lot of
information which is beyond the trial balance/ balance sheet of an
organisation. The form has been structured as follows:

 

 

Part-I contains the basic details of registration. Part II, III, IV and
V are the reconciliation tables which are discussed below. It is pertinent to
note that any reconciliation is an examination of the presence/ absence of a
particular number in two comparatives. Therefore, prior to performing any
reconciliation, one needs to be clearly conscious of the composition of
starting point since all adjustments to be made to reach the other end are
based on the presence/ absence of that particular figure in the starting point.
All the clauses of Form-9C should be understood on the basis of this comparative.

 

Part II: Point No. 5: Reconciliation of turnover declared in audited
annual financial statements with turnover declared in Annual Return (GSTR-9)

 

This part reconciles the turnover level differences between audited data
and returned data. Conceptually, audited turnover would vary from returned
turnover on account of certain variances. While this part performs a two-way
reconciliation between audited accounts and GSTR-9, one would also have to
factor the background workings of GSTR-3B and make this a triangular
reconciliation to conclude on the tax level differences. The picture below
depicts the journey from BOA to GSTR-9 to GSTR-3B and back to BOA:

 

 

 

i.      Timing variance
(TV):
GST follows a monthly tax period and permits transactions to spill
over multiple months/ financial years but audited accounts freeze numbers
between two dates i.e. 01/04/XX to 31/03/XX. This spill-over effect creates
temporary differences in Y1 and reversing difference in a subsequent year (say
Y2). There could also be cases where the revenue recognition policy uses
different parameters in comparison to the GST time of supply provisions (eg. a
developer following percentage completion method of revenue recognition whereas
GST follows invoice/ receipt basis). Similarly, GST law requires the taxable
person to pay tax on advances received during the year though not recognised as
revenue, thus resulting in a timing difference between the BOA and returns.

 

ii.  Accounting variance (Permanent variance) (AV): As mentioned
earlier, GST encompasses events which may not be reflected in the entity level
books of accounts (say internal stock transfers, internal cross charges, etc)
and thus creates a permanent variance between two numbers.

 

iii.  Value variance
(Permanent variance) (VV): This represents variances arising on account
of difference in commercial value and GST value (section 15).

 

PART 5 & 6 – RECONCILIATION OF GROSS TURNOVER

 

This part reconciles the accounting turnover with the turnover reported
in GSTR-9. The GST turnover would be mapped from GSTR-9 (compilation of all
GSTR-1 returns) with subsequent year adjustments during the period April 2018
to September 2018 (such as rectification in errors in the amendment table,
etc.)

 

Clause Description

Intricacies

Auditor responsibility/ working Papers

Adjustments/ Illustrations

5A. Turnover as per audited financial statements
for the State/UT (for multi-GSTIN units under same PAN the turnover shall be
derived from the audited financial statement) – Starting Point

Report the revenue from operations of the entity
in the P&L for the financial year April 2017 to March 2018 (incl. the
non-GST period)

  •  Financial year 2017-18 numbers are to be
    adopted.  For entities having multiple
    registrations, the instruction of the form suggests that a GSTIN level
    turnover should be extracted from the audited turnover at entity level.
  •  Auditor should obtain the signed financial
    statements.  In case of multiple
    registrations, auditor should obtain GSTIN level data which aggregates to the
    audited figure under a representation letter.

Revenue excluding GST component should be adopted
from financial statements

 

No adjustment should be made to the financial
number and it should be directly planted into this clause. Any adjustments to
this number should be made only via form 9C.

 

  • This clause does not require a ‘State level
    Trial Balance’ and the auditor can rely on any suitable methodology in the
    company which extracts the registration level turnover from the revenue GL
    (such as cost centre, location codes, etc).
  •  Other income streams in separate schedules
    should not be included here. Only those having GST implications should be
    added as a separate line item.
  •   All
    subsequent clauses should also be applied at the GSTIN level only.
  •  The auditor should check if the audit
    adjustments on account of transfer pricing / IND-AS / provisions, etc., are
    accounted for in the books at registration level / consolidated level and
    accordingly, the registration level revenue should be arrived at.
  •  Auditor may consider documenting/ reporting the
    broad composition of the starting point as an observation in Part-B since all
    subsequent adjustments are dependent on this composition. 

 

5B. Unbilled revenue (UBR) at the beginning of the financial year(+)

5H. UBR at the end of the financial year (-)

UBR as reported in the Asset GL as on
01-04-2017and 31-03-2018 (+/-) to be taken at state level

  •  The objective of this clause is to adjust
    opening UBR which is billed during the GST period and eliminate fresh
    recognition of UBR by reducing it from the audited revenue
  •  It may be advisable to map the opening
    composition of UBR with billing under Service tax/ GST period
  • Auditor to document the revenue recognition
    policy and management’s view for its variance with the Time of Supply
    provisions
  • Delay in billing beyond the contractual due
    date may need to be analysed considering the provision of Time of Supply
    under GST.
  •  A MRL may be obtained with regards to details
    of Unbilled Revenue provision of earlier period reversed during the period
    under audit and fresh unbilled revenue provision created during the period of
    audit
  • Some entities have taken a conservative stand
    and considered UBR as their taxable turnover under Service tax (especially
    export entities).  In such case, a note
    that UBR has not been reported since there is no timing variance between
    revenue recognition and time of supply provisions could be provided.

5C. Unadjusted advances (UADV) at the beginning of the financial year
(-)

5I. UADV at the end of the financial year (+)

Report the UADV as on 31-03-2018 and 01-04-2017
as per BS/ location level accounts

  • Only taxable advances need to be included in
    the opening/ closing values i.e. advances on which tax has been paid
  • In case of decentralised billing/ accounting
    practiced during the service tax regime, it would be easy for the assessee to
    ascertain the state level opening UADV
  •  In case of service entities having centralised
    registration under service tax, the adjustments towards opening UADV and the
    service tax turnover may be recorded only in the Form 9C of the centralised
    office of the tax payer
  • Verify opening UADV with the state level
    billing in subsequent period to ensure accuracy of the data provided by the
    assessee and ensure there is no cross adjustments between branches
  •  If assessee has not offered advances to
    taxation during the service tax/ GST period, this clause would become
    redundant and an observation should be made in the certificate
  • Auditor to verify that tax has been paid and
    turnover has been reported in GSTR-9 at the time of receipt of advances which
    are comprised in the year end UADV
  •  In certain cases tax payers have paid the tax
    on advances based on an incorrect place of supply (i.e. IGST instead of
    CGST+SGST), necessary adjustments may need to be made at the tax level if not
    already adjusted in the returns. Refund of the incorrect tax may be sought by
    the assessee through a separate process (refer tax level reconciliation)

5D. Deemed Supply under Schedule I

Transactions without considerations are to be
captured here such as Branch transfers/ intra-entity cross-charges; principal
agent supplies, etc

  • This should include activities which are deemed
    to be supply under the GST law, i.e., covered under schedule I of the CGST
    Act but not included in the financial statements/ state level turnover.
  • Auditor should identify all such cases which
    might be covered under Schedule I of the CGST Act.
  •  Auditor may consider reconciling the delivery
    challans/ e-way bills generation data for completeness of the reporting.

 

 

  •  Some entities have practiced departmental
    accounting for state level registration and made consolidation adjustments at
    the time of preparation of financial statements.  One may verify whether the turnover in 5A
    already includes this figure
  • In case where state level data has been
    extracted from cost centres/ location codes, adjustments to the accounting
    turnover becomes necessary.
  • Fixed asset and other inventory registers may
    be examined to ascertain whether there are disposals/ write-off of business
    assets on which input tax credit has been availed
  •  For instance, branch transfer of goods can be
    identified based on the examination of the inventory registers for
    identification of inter-state stock movements and its reporting in GSTR-3B/1.
    Similarly, deemed supply of service between distinct persons can be
    identified by doing a revenue cost analysis for each registration and reviewing
    the documented policy in this regard.
  • Auditor should conduct a review of all assets
    and seek representation on the physical location/ presence within the
    respective States to determine whether there is any permanent transfer/
    disposal of assets
  • Auditors may consider caveating their report to
    the extent that auditing methodologies only facilitate review of identified
    branch transfers and that the certificate should not be construed as a
    comprehensive identification of all such deemed supplies
  • In case of supply of goods, tax payers have
    been exempted from payment of taxes at the time of receipt of advances.  In such cases, closing unadjusted advances
    for supply of goods would only comprise of receipts during July 2017 to Nov
    2017.

5E. Credit notes issued after the end of the financial year but
reflected in the annual return (+) : apparent error in signage

Credit notes u/s. 35 are issued for cases
involving change in taxable value or on account of goods return or deficient
supplies

  • Credit notes raised by an entity could be those
    which have a GST impact, i.e., satisfy the conditions prescribed u/s. 35 and
    those which do not have a GST impact (for example, account settlement credit
    notes or bad debts and so on).  This
    clause is meant to captures the former and that also only to the extent such
    credit notes are issued during the subsequent financial year in relation to
    supply made during the period under audit are reflected in the Annual return
    filed for the period under audit
  • The auditor will have to review the GSTR 1
    filed for the period from April to September of the next financial year and
    determine credit notes which are issued in relation to supply made during the
    period under audit and further analyse whether the same have been disclosed
    in the Annual return or not.
  • There is lack of clarity on this clause and we
    have to await an amendment to this clause.
    Credit notes raised during 18-19 are logically not required to be
    reported as part of the 17-18 reconciliation.
    It is highly probable that this clause might be amended

5J. Credit Notes accounted for in the audited
financial statement but are not permissible under GST (-): apparent error in
signage

Credit notes u/s. 35 are issued for reduction of
taxable turnover (such as price re-negotiation, short shipment, incorrect tax
rate, etc)

  • This clause would capture all such credit
    notes, where reduction in GST is not allowed u/s. 35 as discussed for the
    earlier clause.
  •  Identification of credit notes and reasons for
    reduction sought in the taxable turnover should be documented as working
    papers
  • Management may seek confirmations on reversal
    of credit on the recipient end

5F. Trade Discounts accounted for in the audited
financial statements but not permissible under GST

Trade discounts u/s. 15(3) could be those granted
at the time of supply or post supply

  • Trade discount here should be understood to
    include cash discounts, target discounts, incentives, etc. which do not
    satisfy the conditions prescribed u/s. 15(3) for non-inclusion in the value
    of taxable supply.
  • Auditor may consider conducting a sample
    analysis of major contracts to identify whether discounts given during the
    year on which section 15 (3) benefit has been claimed satisfy the parameters
    prescribed therein

Gratuitous discount given by a company on 100th
year celebration to its all India distributors may not be permissible under
this clause

5G. Turnover during April 2017-June 2017 (-)

Audited financial turnover at the location level
for the said period is to be reduced

  • The accounting turnover (net of all credit
    notes/ debit notes and accounting adjustments) which was used to arrive at
    the opening figure should be reduced to nullify the effect of pre-GST period
    revenue during the FY.

  • Turnover in excise/ service tax/ VAT returns are irrelevant for reporting
    here.
  •  Auditor would need to understand the process of
    ascertaining locational level turnover for April-June’17 especially under
    service tax regime since many assessee might have opted for centralised
    registration under service tax and would not have identified a turnover to a
    specific location
  •  A view with adequate disclosure may be given
    that consolidated turnover for April-June’17 is to be tagged to the state
    where service tax jurisdiction applies and the disclosure is not having any
    adverse tax consequences

5K. Adjustments on account of supply of goods by
SEZ units to DTA units (-)

Report DTA sales by SEZ unit

  •  ‘Removals’ from SEZ units are liable to custom
    duties as any other imported stock in the hands of the person who declares
    himself as an importer on record (generally the DTA buyer).  Since buyer discharges the customs duties
    on the basis of bill of entry for home consumption, it is not considered as a
    taxable supply by the SEZ unit even-though it is a turnover in the accounts
  •  Where the SEZ unit declares itself as an importer on record, pays
    the custom duties and also charges IGST on the stock transfer invoice to the
    DTA unit, this would form part of the turnover of the SEZ unit and no
    adjustments are required in this clause
  •  The auditor may obtain a list of all DTA sales by the SEZ unit and
    also obtain a copy of Bill of Entry filed by the customer as importer to
    satisfy that the onus of discharging tax was not on the SEZ unit but on the
    DTA unit buying the goods

 

  •  DTA clearances of capital goods by SEZ
    developers are not covered in this clause though principally similar implications
    would apply  (Section 30 of the SEZ Act
    operates only for SEZ Unit)

5L. Turnover for the period under Composition (-)

Accounting turnover during the period under
Composition Scheme to be excluded

  •  GSTR-4 data to be reconciled with accounting
    turnover under the composition schemeand then excluded under this clause.
  •  NIL
  •  NIL

5M. Adjustments in turnover u/s. 15 and rules
made thereunder  (+/-)

Variances in commercial value and GST value to be
aggregated and reported here

  • Section 15 and rules may require upward/
    downward adjustment to taxable value (such as air travel agent invoices/
    money-changer transactions, trading of used goods, admitted undervaluation in
    related party transactions, admitted Free-of cost supplies with external
    parties, etc)
  •  Auditor can ascertain this figure by a invoice-wise comparison of
    revenue GL and GST register (value column)
  • Auditor may study the upward/downward variance at a conceptual
    level and aggregate the same but is not required to attest the said
    quantification

 

  •  Certain value exemption notifications (such as
    sale of flats, sale of second hand pre-GST motor vehicles , etc) may also be
    included here eventhough they are not part of section 15

5N. Adjustments in turnover due to foreign
exchange fluctuations (+/-)

Difference in valuation due to forex rates
adopted for revenue recognition / GST valuation

  •  In respect of export of goods, the law requires
    the customs notified rates to be adopted but commercially agreed currency/
    forex rates may vary. Therefore, there will always be a difference in the
    value of export of goods reported in the Annual Return vis-à-vis books of
    accounts which will have to be reported here.
  • Auditor to examine the internal accounting policy in respect of
    adoption of foreign exchange rates. 
  • In addition, the auditors should obtain a statement of export of
    goods during the year with both, the figures as per books of accounts as well
    as the shipping bill plotted for verification and record purposes.
  • Certain accounting practices for companies who have hedged their
    foreign exchange exposures on export revenue may be examined

 

  •  Any variance in turnover due to difference in
    foreign exchange rates at the time of receipt of advance and time of its
    adjustments may need some reporting

5O. Adjustments in turnover due to reasons not
listed above (+/-)

Residual entry for all other adjustments

  •  All case-specific adjustments may be carried
    out here.  If the web-portal does not
    permit multiple sub-items, it may be advisable to maintain a internal working
    and upload a scanned copy if permitted by the web-portal

 Auditor to seek representation on this residual
adjustments and maintain working papers on the reasons for the adjustments
and its impact at the tax level. Missed reporting of outward supply should
not be reported here but reported as unreconciled difference

 Expense recoveries which are debited to the
profit and loss account

  •  High-sea sales/ drop shipments which are
    excluded from GST
  • Sale of fixed assets, residual value of
    destroyed goods, etc.

 

5R = 5Q-5P : Unreconciled difference between the Accounting
turnover (with adjustments) and the GSTR-9 turnover

Reasons for non-reconciliation to be provided
here

• It is absolutely essential to reconcile the two
turnovers to the last rupee to eliminate the possibility of compensating
reconciling items

  • Auditor cannot adopt a materiality test for this
    unreconciled difference (eg. a Re 10 +ve and Re 9 –ve may result in Re 1
    +ve).  Auditor to identify every
    difference
  •  It is also essential to comment whether tax is
    due on this difference and if yes, whether tax has been discharged and the
    relevant tax period. If tax has not been discharged, auditor may consider
    reporting the same as additional liability

 

 

PART 7& 8 – RECONCILIATION OF TAXABLE TURNOVER

 

This part aims at moving
from the reconciled total turnover as per accounts to the taxable turnover as
reported in GSTR-9.  By this stage, the
accounting turnover has been brought to the level of total turnover as per
GSTR-9. Any difference arising in this reconciliation table would primarily
be on account of: (a) short-reporting of non-taxable turnover in GSTR-1 (say
interest income); or (b) short reporting of taxable turnover; (c) incorrect
reporting head.  In the author’s view,
it may be advisable to rectify any short reporting of non-taxable turnover
and reporting errors of GSTR-1 in GSTR-9 itself so one is left only with
items having a final impact on the tax liability.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Clause Description

Intricacies

Auditor responsibility/ working Papers

Adjustments/ Illustrations

7A. Annual Turnover after (+/-) adjustments above

Turnover as per accounts with the +/- adjustments

  •  This is an auto-filled data field

NIL

NIL

7B. Value of Exempted, Nil rates, Non-GST
supplies, No-Supply turnover (-)

Non taxable items comprised in GSTR-9 are
reported there

  •  Exempted refers to supplies arising from
    Notifications (Goods/ Services) u/s. 11 of the respective acts i.e. N-02/2017
    and 12/2017
  •  Documentation of the list of exemptions availed
    and compliance of exemption conditions may be examined on sample basis

This turnover should be reported net of debit
notes/ credit notes as available from the books of accounts

 

  • Turnover having partial exemption such as rate
    reduction of 18% to 5% or 0.1% or value reduction (in case of
    developers)  would not be reported here
  •  Non-GST supplies imply supply of Non-GST
    products (such as petroleum)
  •  No-Supply implies turnover covered under
    Schedule III i.e. sale of land, etc
  •   Documentation
    of the reasons provided by the assessee for treating the turnover as Non-GST/
    No-Supply, etc.

 

7C. Zero-rated supplies without payment of tax
(-)

Export Supplies and Supplies to SEZ units/
developers

  •  Export supplies of goods and services including
    to SEZ units / developers from accounts is to be extracted and reported here

 

  •  Auditor needs to maintain the LUT as part of
    its working papers and broad parameters on which the assessee has treat the
    transaction as export – a sampling may be undertaken for verification

Same as above

 

  • Tax type would be IGST even for same state SEZs
  • Sample verification of SEZ status of customers
    may be carried out on the GSTN portal

 

7D. Supplies on which tax is to be paid on
reverse charge basis (-)

Turnover of suppliers under RCM

  •  Supplies where the supplier records the
    turnover but does not pay the tax  are
    to be reported here
  •  Auditor needs to maintain the notification
    under which the assessee has taken the stand that RCM is being discharged by
    recipient
  •  Sample invoices for RCM declaration may be
    examined
  •  Same as above

7G = 7F – 7E : Taxable turnover as computed above
and compared with the Turnover as per GSTR-9

There could be +ve/ -ve result

  •  If everything has been captured above, 7G
    should ideally be NIL
  •  +ve implies GSTR-9 taxable turnover is greater
    than accounting taxable turnover indicating tax refund
  •  -ve implies GSTR-9 taxable turnover is lesser
    than accounting taxable turnover resulting in indicating tax payable
  •  Credible explanation should be provided at item
    level for the difference
  •  Auditor needs to ascertain all those cases
    where there is admittedly a tax liability which is payable but the same has
    not been considered by the assessee in its GST workings
  •  Where the tax payer represents to have
    discharged the tax liability in subsequent year GSTR-3B, a categorical
    representation is important on this point.

There should not be any un-explainable difference
at this stage.

 

 

PART 9, 10 & 11 – RECONCILIATION OF RATE WISE LIABILITY AND AMOUNT
PAYABLE THEREON

This part aims at
reconciling the above adjusted taxable turnover at the rate level (as per
accounts) with the tax liability reported in GSTR-3B.  Since the accounting turnover has undergone
changes prior to this level, one would have to perform a rate classification
(exempt, 6%, 12%, etc) even for the adjustments made until this point.  Therefore, workings for the adjustments
should be maintained at an item level.
This part is also important to examine whether there is any excess
collection of taxes by the tax payer.
The tax GL of the tax payer is the primary source of data for this
clause.

 

Clause Description

Intricacies

Auditor responsibility/ working Papers

Adjustments/ Illustrations

9. Reconciliation of rate wise liability and amount payable thereon

Rate wise liability as per accounts to be
reported here

  •  Account extracts computing the rate
    wise liability at the CGST/SGST and IGST level would have to be aggregated
    and reported here (Tax GL)
  •  This should also include rate wise RCM
    liability on inwards supplies of goods/ services
  •  Back-up workings of GSTR-3B would have
    to be examined with GSTR-9 to ascertain the differences at the tax level
  •  Errors due to using incorrect rates
    from HSN schedule could be reported here
  •  Auditor to maintain working papers of
    rate wise liability as per accounts vs. rate wise liability as per GSTR-9
  •  To the extent the variance is because
    of turnover level un-reconciled differences, as a consequence they may form
    part of the un-reconciled tax amounts
  •  Auditor can recommend any additional
    liability under this clause

 

GSTR-3B is primary document for discharge
of tax liability and the back-up workings would provide insights into the
tax level differences beyond those arising due to turnover level

 

 PART 12 & 13 – INPUT TAX CREDIT RECONCILIATION

This part performs an
analysis of the input tax credit availed as per accounts and that reported in
GSTR-3B.  The tax administration
expects that accounts are the sole basis for credit availment and hence
difference in accounting and receipt of goods/ services could be the primary
reason for any variance in credits. Practically, multiple errors have been
performed during the GST implementation.
This exercise is a good opportunity to rectify clerical errors (such
as claiming excess credit in a particular head) as well as eligibility errors
(such as blocked credits, year-end mandatory credit reversals, etc).  Importantly, this form should not be viewed
as a document to avail/ reclaim any missed credit or even adjust the same
with any output liability.

 

12A. ITC availed as per
audited financial statements for the state at GSTIN level

ITC ledger extracts for each GSTIN to be reported
here

  •  Account extracts computing the aggregate of ITC as recorded in
    accounts would be reported here. This figure should be net of any reversals
    made in accounts on the input tax credit front.
  •  Internal working should be made at the tax type level (CGST/ SGST or
    IGST) though the reporting is required to be done at the aggregate level.
  • GSTR-2A reconciliation summary of the tax payer could be examined for
    completeness.

 

  •  Working papers of rate wise input tax credit as per accounts vs.
    rate wise input tax credit used for GSTR-3B workings to be maintained.
  •  Auditor to ascertain if input tax credit availed in a particular
    state is mapped to another state in accounting systems.

 

ITC availed in accounts but not claimed in any of the transition/GST
returns may be written off/ ignored.

 

ISD credit availed in GSTR-3B but availed at a different location in
accounts may come up here.

 

 

12B. ITC booked in the earlier financial years
and claimed in current financial year (+)

Transition Credit of earlier financial years to
be reported here

  •   Transition return workings
    and the accounting treatment would have to be examined and reported here.
  •  Cases of capital goods claiming credit in accounts during FY16-17
    but reported in transition returns would also be covered.

 

  •  Auditor to document basis of claim of
    transition credit and the eligible duties/ taxes claimed u/s. 140.

Centralised Cenvat credit which is distributed
during transition may be adjusted appropriately.

12C. ITC booked in current financial year and
claimed in subsequent financial year (-)

ITC booked in accounts but availed in subsequent
financial year in returns

  •  GSTR-3B workings and the ITC register as per accounts may be
    reconciled on a line-item basis and the difference may be reported here.
  •  This ITC register data may also be compared with
    the ITC reported in GSTR-2A (Table 9 of GSTR-9).
  • Auditor need not propose any disallowance of
    input tax credit availed in GSTR-3B merely on the ground of non-reporting of
    invoice in GSTR-2A.

  • Auditor need not particularly verify conditions of section 16(2) for
    reporting this figure.

All figures reported here should be net of any
reversals or vendor credit notes.

14. Reconciliation of ITC at description level

Ledger level break-up of ITC credit

  •  This table appears to be a ledger-wise breakup
    of the expenses and the corresponding ITC reported in 12A/12B/12C.
  •  Auditor would need to obtain ledger level data
    and extract the expenses under each ledger on which ITC has been availed.

Column 4 : Amount of eligible ITC availed represents
the actual ITC availed in accounts net of the adjustments in 12B/C at the
ledger level.

 

  •  ITC from internal stock transfers which do not
    appear at a GL level may also be reported as a separate line item
  •  Prima facie examination of ledger
    nomenclature / narrations may be adopted for checking eligibility

 

13 & 15. Reconciliation of ITC at ledger
level

Reasons for non-reconciliation to be provided
here

  •  It is absolutely essential to reconcile the two
    turnovers to the last rupee to eliminate the possibility of compensating
    reconciling items
  •  Auditor cannot adopt a materiality test for
    this unreconciled difference (eg. a Re 10 +ve and Re 9 –ve may result in Re 1
    +ve).  Auditor to identify every
    difference

Eg. Admitted reversals of input tax credit not
reversed in GSTR-3B; availment of credit without receipt/ accounting of
goods/ services; credit availed at the wrong GSTIN location

 

 

 

Reporting horizon of GSTR-9C

Books of accounts have an annual time horizon and the GST-1/3B work on
monthly periodicity with hard close only in September following the respective
financial year.  This variance in period
poses a peculiar problem because of a lack of a revision option in GSTR-1/3B
and GSTN storing data based on reporting period rather than the document
date.  Let’s take similar yet
contradictory examples (i) debit note raised in FY17-18 delayed reporting in GSTR-3B/1
of 18-19 (ii) debit notes raised in FY17-18 and delayed reporting only in
GSTR-1 in 18-19 (iii) debit notes raised in FY18-19 for enhancement of a price
agreed in FY 17-18 and reported in GSTR-3B/1 if 18-19?  Let’s compare these example based on following
parameters

 

Parameter

Case – 1 : Delayed
reporting in 3B  & 1

Case – 2 : Delay in
reporting only in 1

Case – 3 : delay in
recognition

Original Invoice date

01-01-2018

01-01-2018

01-01-2018

Accrual of liability

January 2018

January 2018

January 2018 (*)

Debit note date/
Accounting entry

31-03-2018

31-03-2018

30-09-2018

Date of Reporting
additional turnover  in GSTR-9

Clause 10 certainly
capture this amendment

Clause 10 would capture
this amendment only at turnover level

Clause 10 would not
capture this and treated as 18-19 transaction

Date of Reporting
additional turnover  in GSTR-1

This would be a
reconciliation item at turnover and tax level for both 17-18 & 18-19

This will be a
reconciliation item only at turnover level for both 17-18 and 18-19

Transaction of purely
18-19 though accrual of liability in 17-18

 

 

Whether reporting in 9C is anchored to tax liability accrued in FY 17-18
or anchored to accounting and/or reporting the base document?  Section 9 r/w 12/13  provide the time of supply for the
‘transaction value’.  Legally speaking,
all liabilities accrued in 17-18 (either through current year/ subsequent year
adjustments) should be reported as part of Form-9C irrespective of the date of
accounting and reporting in GSTR-3B/1.
Procedurally, section 35(4) and rule 59 require reporting based on date
of issuance of base document.  Going by
this analogy, transactions accounted in 17-18 would form the basis and those
accounted subsequently (for any reasons) should not form part of 17-18.  The author believes that this second approach
should be adopted keeping in mind the true spirit of reconciliation i.e.
balance two values based on its composition.

 

Part – B : General points for Audit observations/
Comments

Part-B is the Auditor’s report over the correctness of contents of the
reconciliation statement.  The report
places an onus that the reconciling items are accurate having credible
reasoning.  This said report could have
two forms – (a) where the certification is by the person who has also conducted
the statutory audit; and (b) where the certification is placing reliance on the
audited books of accounts examined by another statutory auditor.  The prescribed format provides certain areas
where observations/ comment may be provided by the person certifying the
report.  Other general points for
consideration during this exercise are:

  •  GSTR-9 is a management document and auditor is not certifying the
    contents of GSTR-9.  Effectively implying
    that auditor is not expected to certify the legal aspects such as
    classification, place of supply, time of supply, eligibility of exemption/
    zero-rated conditions, valuation. etc.
  •           Compensating tax
    adjustments cannot be netted off.  Excess
    payment can only be refunded by way of a refund application.
  •           Observations should
    emphasise that audit methodologies are expected to give a reasonable and NOT an
    absolute assurance over the correctness of books of accounts and data reported
    in the form.
  •           Auditor’s recommendation
    of the liability would generally be resorted for admitted tax liabilities,
    numerical errors in reporting/ accounting, patent errors in taxability.   In matters having multiple view points,
    auditor may consider the management’s view under a representation.

 

Conclusion

From tax administration perspective, GSTR-9C is like an ‘appetizer’ in a
full course meal of assessments.  In
other words, it addresses the limited question prior to any assessment ie. are
reported values are correct when compared to the accounting records.  It gives a headstart of items included/
excluded from the returns and hence enables the officer to perform a Top-Down
analysis of the records of the entity.
Once this picture is laid out, the officer is equipped in examining the
nuts and bolts of each transaction (such as time of supply, place of supply,
valuation, rate of tax, eligibility/ ineligibility of credits, etc).   Auditor is merely a facilitator and is not
expected to be a judge over the auditee’s decision.
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PENALTIES : TO ERR IS HUMAN – IS GST HUMAN?

Payment of taxes is considered a
civil obligation and breach of such obligation results in penal
consequences.  The nuances of a duly
enacted statute provide the contours under which the taxes need to be
discharged and penal provisions accompany such legislations for its effective
enforcement.  Yet, it is well known that
no statute is enacted with an object to impose penalties. Rather, they are
intended to operate as a deterrent to violating of any provision. Courts have
frequently held that penalty is imposed only in cases of contumacious conduct
by the tax payer. The GST enactment is no different and this resonates from the
Statement of objects and reasons placed before the Parliament while introducing
the Central Goods & Services Tax Bill, 2017:

 

“…. (i) To make provision for
penalties for contravention of the provisions of the proposed legislation … ”

 

Practical experiences depict a
contrasting picture. One would have experienced tax administrators (both Centre
and the State) applying the penal provisions mechanically without appreciating
the purpose and instances for which penal provisions are enacted. The following
statements are a common feature in show cause notices and adjudication orders:

 

“Assessee has intentionally
contravened the provisions of the Act and hence liable for penalty …;
suppressed this information from the revenue with an intention to evade tax
payment….; deliberately avoided the payment of taxes knowing fully well that
the transaction is taxable;….”

 

Not a single order goes without
imposition of penalty even in cases where the tax demand is under debate at
higher forums. All the tax payers are painted by a single brush leading to
undesirable litigation. Sometimes, administrative authorities do not even
consider it necessary to state that penalty is being imposed and one is
enlightened about the imposition only from the demand notice or computation at
the end of the order. There is a tendency to invoke and adjudicate the penalty
merely by a stroke of a pen, leaving the battle to be fought by the assessee.
Though, Courts have time and again held that penalty is not an ‘additional tax’
rather ‘an addition to the taxes collected’, this starking difference has been
ignored by tax administrators. With this foreward, we have examined the penal
provisions under the CGST law in the subsequent paragraphs:

 

General Principles of Penalty

 

Certain principles set down by Courts
while dealing with matters on penalty have been enlisted below:

 

    Penal
provisions should be strictly construed without much play. Yet, one should
ensure that the constructions fall within the contours of its Statute.

 

    There
has been considerable debate on whether mensrea is an essential
requirement for imposition of penalty towards civil offences. While it is
certainly clear that mensrea need not always be proved for
penalty, the statutory provisions should be examined to reconcile this debate:
(a) examine the statutory provisions for any express or implied requirement of
a guilty mind (such as use of the phrases like suppression, concealment, etc.
have an inbuilt requirement of mens-rea to be established); (b) identify
if the penalty has been intended to be a civil offence or a criminal offence
since the requirement of mens rea in civil offences is comparatively
lower than in criminal offences; and (c) once the requirements of the
provisions have been met, there is no discretion with the officer over the
quantum of penalty for such offence or referring back to the presence or
absence of mens-rea

    The
road to all assessments need not necessarily end with penalty. Though every tax
evasion arises out of non-payment, every non-payment should not be equated with
tax evasion. It has been famously cited that penalty should not be imposed
merely because one has been empowered to do so.

 

    The
onus is on Revenue to establish that the circumstances warrant imposition of
penalty. Only when this onus is effectively discharged that the tax payer is
required to defend his/her bonafide. Mere suspicion / surmises cannot form the
ground for penalty. Evidences and actions should be placed on record.

 

    Penalty
should be invoked under a specific clause/ provision and expressly stated out
in the notice/ order. The tax payer cannot be left to search for the provision
under which he/she has been penalised (Amrit Foods vs. CCE, UP 2005 190 ELT
433 (SC)
).

 

    Penalty
invoked under clause (a) cannot be upheld under clause (b). The grounds of
invoking penalty and upholding the same would have to be reconcilable.

 

    Penalty
should be commensurate with the tax involved. 

 

    Unequals
should not be treated as equals. A mala-fide tax payer and bonafide tax payer
cannot be saddled with same quantum of penalty merely on the ground of non-payment.

 

    Penalty
cannot be imposed for a future action on the theory of possibilities.

 

    One
cannot be penalised retrospectively, even in retrospective legislations. Penal
provisions prevailing on the date of offence should be applied.

 

    If
two reasonable views are possible or in cases of ambiguity, the lineal
construction should be adopted.

 

Statutorily recognised principles
of penalty (section 126)

 

The CGST / SGST law for the first
time has penned down certain disciplines for imposition of penalty. These are
principles from settled judicial decisions in the context of penalty:

 

   Minor
breaches (Tax effect < Rs. 5000) or omission in documentation without
fraudulent intent should not be subjected to penalty.

 

   Penalty
should be commensurate with the degree and severity of breach.

 

   Prior
notice and personal hearing should be granted prior to imposing penalty.

 

   Order
imposing penalty should be speaking about the nature of breach and the
applicable provision under which the penalty is being imposed.

 

   Voluntary
disclosure prior to discovery of breach of law should be dealt with leniency.

 

However, this section has given
limited applicability only to penal provisions where a fixed quantum or fixed
percentage has not been prescribed i.e. cases where discretion has been
bestowed upon the officer over the quantum of penalty.

 

Examination of legal provisions –
Scheme of Penalty under the GST law

 

The GST Law has elaborately spread
the provisions for penalty across various Chapters. Principally, penalties can
be classified into those which are imposed based on findings on the merits of
the issue in the course of adjudication proceedings (sections 73 and 74) and
those penalties which can be imposed by the proper officer independent of the
adjudication proceedings (broadly similar to that followed in Income tax) by
issuing a separate order i.e. once the ingredients of the respective penal
provisions are satisfied (section 127). There is also a third set of penalties
imposable in cases of goods in transit or evasive acts where goods are liable
for confiscation. On a reading of the entire set of penal provisions, there
appears to be a significant amount of overlap between provisions leading to
multiple touch points for an officer to invoke for imposing penalty.

 

The overall scheme of penalty has
been depicted in the following chart. In simplistic terms, section 127 r/w
section 73, 74 and 129/130 has carved out three broad pillars on the basis of
which penalty can be imposed.


 

General understanding of key
terminologies

 

Prior to examining the above scheme in detail, it is important to
examine the meaning of some terms used in these sections, to be applied
contextually under respective facts and circumstances only:

 

Term

Understanding
as per Black’s law dictionary and other sources

Offence

A violation of the law; a
crime, often a minor one.

Non-compliance

Failure or refusal to
comply.

Opposite – Compliance- The acting in accordance with a
desire, condition etc.

Contravention

An act of violating a legal
condition or obligation

Fraudulent/ Fraud

Fraud- A known misrepresentation or concealment of a
material fact made to induce another to act to his or her detriment

 

Fraudulent- Conduct involving bad faith, dishonesty, a lack
of integrity, or moral turpitude

 

Other legal sources

 

Mere omission to give
correct information is not suppression of facts unless it was deliberate to
stop the payment of duty. Suppression means failure to disclose full information
with the intent to evade payment of duty. When the facts are known to both
the parties, omission by one party to do what he might have done would not
render it suppression

Suppression

GST law – Explanation 2 to
section 74 defines suppression as ‘non-declaration of facts or information
which a taxable person is required to declare in the return, statement,
report or any other document furnished under the Act or failure to furnish
any information asked by the proper officer

False/Falsifying document

False – Untrue, Deceitful; lying. Not genuine,
inauthentic

 

Falsifying a record – The crime of making false entries or otherwise
tampering with a public record with the intent to deceive or injure, or to
conceal wrong doing

 

Other Sources:

 

“Erroneous, untrue, the
opposite of correct, or true. The term does not necessarily involve turpitude
of mind. In the more important uses in jurisprudence the word implies
something more than a mere untruth; it is an untruth coupled with a lying
intent, or an intent to deceive or to perpetrate some treachery or fraud.

 

 

“In law, this word usually
means something more than untrue; it means something designedly untrue and
deceitful, and implies an intention to perpetrate some treachery or fraud”

Tampering/ destroying

Tampering– The act of altering a thing; esp., the act of
illegally altering a document or product, such as written evidence or a
consumer good.

 

Destroying– To damage something so thoroughly as to make
unusable, unrepairable or non-existent; to ruin.

Tax evaded

The willful attempt to
defeat or circumvent the tax law in order to illegally reduce one’s tax
liability.

Detention

The act or an instance of
holding a person in custody; confinement or compulsory delay.

 

Not allowing temporary
access to the owner of the goods by a legal order/notice is called detention.
However the ownership of goods still lies with the owner. It is issued when
it is suspected that the goods are liable to confiscation.

Seizure

Seizure is taking over of
actual possession of goods with right of disposal for recovery of dues by the
department in case of perishable / highly depreciable goods. Seizure can be
made only after inquiry/investigation that the goods contravened provisions
of the Act. Title continues with the supplier-owner.

Confiscation

Confiscation of the goods is
the ultimate act after proper adjudication. Once confiscation takes place,
the ownership as well as the possession forcefully goes out of the hands of
the original owner and into the hands of the Government Authority.

 

 

A)      Adjudication related
penalties (section 73 and 74)

 

Under the erstwhile scheme, penalty
(u/s 11AC of the Central Excise Act and 78 of the Finance Act) and extended
period of limitation emanated from a common trigger point i.e. fraud,
suppression, etc (prior to amendment by Finance Act, 2015). In cases where
extended period of limitation was dropped, penalty could not be imposed even in
respect of the normal period. In a particular case penalty was dropped even
though extended period of limitation was invoked against the assessee[1]. This
position was altered by Finance Act, 2015 where penalty was imposed even in
respect of cases not involving fraud, suppression, etc albeit at lower scale.
The amendment prescribed various scales of penalty for short payment depending
on the reasons for such non-payment. The GST law has toed the line prevalent
after the 2015 amendment and delinked both the concepts resulting in penalty
being imposable even for bonafide acts.

 

Section 73 (normal period
assessments) and 74 (extended period assessments) are parallel to the
adjudication provisions of section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 and section 11A
of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The said provisions empower the proper officer
to initiate adjudication proceedings in cases of short payment/ non-payment,
irregular input tax credit and erroneous refund. During the course of such
proceedings, the proper officer would have an opportunity conclude on the
reasons for non-compliance by the tax payer and classify the cases on the basis
of intent.

 

The penalty would be imposed in the
order issued under the said section depending on the stage at which the tax
payer makes the payment of the taxes demanded. The important take aways from a
reading of the said provisions are:

 

1)  Penalties
provided under the said section are absolute without much discretion being
granted to the proper officer on the quantum of penalty.

 

2)  There
is no provision parallel to the erstwhile section 80 of the Finance act, 1994
wherein officers were granted powers to waive the penalty if ‘reasonable cause’
is shown by the tax payer.

 

3)  Penalties
are directly linked to the alleged revenue loss to the respective Government.

 

4)  Imposition
of penalties under these section are subject to an outer time limit of 3-5
years from the relevant date (due date of filing the annual return).

 

B)  Non-adjudication related
penalties (section 122 to section 128)

 

Chapter XIX of the CGST/ SGST law –
‘Offences and penalties’ is a code for imposition of penalties in specific
cases. The said penal provisions u/s. 122 to 128 have been structured to lay
down the triggers for penalty in enlisted cases including detention and
confiscations. Under section 127, these penal provisions would apply only where
the proceedings of sections 62, 63, 64, 73, 74, 129 and 130 do not impose
penalty. The said provisions are as follows:

Section 122(1) – Specific Penalties

This section provides for 21
instances when penalty can be imposed on the tax payer. On a reading of certain
clauses, it appears that the law makers have targeted the issues at a micro
level in many cases.  The section 122(1)
can be divided into two sub-parts for a better understanding:

 

   Part A : Enlists the
triggers for penalty; and

   Part B : Prescribes the
penalty for the enlisted circumstances as follows:

 

Ad-hoc penalty : 10,000 being the
bare minimum penalty;

(OR)

Proportionate penalty : 100%
penalty to tax evaded; tax not deducted/ collected; short-collected
or not paid
; input tax credit availed or passed on or distributed
irregularly or refund claimed fraudulently whichever is higher.

 

A clause by clause analysis of
section 122(1) has been tabulated below. In the table the author has
categorised the possible reasons underlying a non-compliance into – (a)
clerical errors generally considered as bonafide; (b) interpretative in view of
ambiguity in law and deemed as bonafide; and (c) evasive where it is
intentional.

 

Clause

Trigger
of penalty

Some
examples

Attributable  reasons

Possible
Quantum

(i)

Supply without invoice or
incorrect or false invoice

Clandestine removal

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

 

 

Human error of not raising
valid invoice

Clerical

10000

 

 

Ambiguity in continuous
supply of services/ goods

Interpretative

10000

(ii)

Invoice issued without
supply of goods/ services

Bill Trading

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

 

 

Invoice issued but goods not
removed

Clerical

10000

(iii)

Collected any tax but fails
to pay within 3 months[2]

Collected and failed to pay

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

 

 

Failed to include in
GST-3B/1 due to mistake though accounted liability in books of accounts

Clerical

10000

(iv)

Collection in contravention
of the law coupled with failure to pay within 3 months

Tax collected on exempted
goods and not recorded in accounts

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(v) & (vi)

Fails to deduct or collect
tax or after such deduction or collection failed to pay this entire amount

Tax collected on exempted
goods and not recorded

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(vii)

Takes or utilises input tax
credit without actual receipt of goods/ services

Accommodation bills

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(viii)

Fraudulently obtains refund

Falsifying ITC claims

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(ix)

Takes or distributed input
tax credit incorrectly

Falsifying ITC claims

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

 

Incorrect distribution
formula applied

Interpretative

10000

 

Formula error

Clerical

10000

(x)

Falsifies or substitutes
financial records with intent to evade taxes

Forgery

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(xi)

Fails to obtain registration

Clandestine supplies

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

 

 

Incorrectly ascertains the
location of supplier

Interpretative

10000

(xii)

Furnishes false information
in respect of registration

Fictitious address

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(xiii)

Obstructs or prevents any
officer

Fails to unlock a godown on
demand

Considered evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(xiv)

Transports without
appropriate documentation

E-way bill not raised

Clerical

10000

 

 

Clandestine supply

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(xv)

Suppresses turnover

Clandestine supply

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(xvi) & (xvii)

Fails to maintain
appropriate records/ information or furnishes false information

Non-submission of inventory
records

Clerical

10000

Non-maintenance

Clerical

10000

False data

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(xviii)

Supplies, transports or
stores any goods liable for confiscation

Clandestine goods

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(xix)

Issues invoice by using
another registered person’s number

Fraud

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

 

 

Wrong GSTIN of same entity
used

Clerical

10000

(xx)

Tamper material evidence

Fraud

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

(xxi)

Tampers with goods under detention

Fraud

Evasive

10000 or 100% penalty

 

 

The following observations emerge
from the above tabulation of examples:

 

1)  Prima-facie,
the clauses seem to address all types of non-compliance and not just tax
evasion

 

2)  Evasive
action is omnipresent in every clause, either impliedly or expressly

 

3)  Interpretative
or clerical non-compliance seems to be missing in cases where phrases such as
fraudulent, tampering, falsification, etc are present

 

4)  The
chapter title and section title use the phrase ‘Penalty for certain offences’
indicating that the section is addressing unacceptable defaults or defaults
having the ingredient of a gross violation which is non-curable resulting in
revenue law

 

5)  In
certain cases, proportionate penalty on the basis of ‘tax evaded’ would not be
ascertainable resulting in a situation where there is no comparative to the
adhoc penalty of Rs. 10,000. This throws up two alternative theories:

 

(a) Section
122 only addresses actions involving tax evasion and not every non payment
(such interpretative / clerical cases); or

 

(b) Section
122 addresses both cases, but in cases where there is no evasive action, the
penalty imposable for any default is limited to Rs. 10,000

 

The questions emerging from the
above table are:

 

Q1 – Whether 21 clauses are
mutually exclusive to each other?

 

Section 122(1) contains cases which
could fall under more than one clause eg. supply without invoice (clause (i))
and suppression of turnover (clause (xv)). An assessee could be penalised under
either of the clauses – for example transport of goods without invoice would
trigger both clause (i) and (xiv). Though clauses are overlapping, the tax
payer can be imposed with penalty only under one of the clauses for the same offence.

 

Q2 – Does the prescription of
adhoc and proportionate penalty apply to each of the clauses or only to
specific clauses? In other words, does penalty proportionate to tax evasion, etc. apply to all cases of tax evasion
(express or implied) or only to cases where the clauses specifically use the
phrase ‘tax evaded’.

 

The provisions of section 122(1)
targets actions which are evasive impliedly and expressly. One argument could
be that the proportionate penalty applies only to cases where tax evasion is
specifically expressed in the clause (such as (x), (xv), etc.). Similar
phrases accompanying the proportionate penalty such as tax short deduction/
collection, input tax credit irregularly availed, refund fraudulently availed
are directly relatable to specific clauses. Since accompanying phrases are
directly relatable to a specific clause(s), the prescription of proportionate
penalty on tax evasion should also apply to specific clauses only.

 

However, the other argument would
be that once tax evasion has been established, proportionate penalty can be
imposed on the tax evaded irrespective of there being an express prescription
of tax evasion in the clause. Tax evasion is inbuilt in the manner in which the
clauses are worded (such as (i)). The above table depicts that every clause
seems to capture an evasive act even though the term tax evaded has not been
expressly spelt out. The intent of this provision is to address cases of tax
evasion with rigorous penalty equalling the amount of tax evaded. This is the
only way full force may be given to
section 122(1), else the said provision may become a toothless tiger. 

 

Q3 – If the ingredients of tax
evasion have limited applicability, what would be the comparative figure to Rs.
10,000 in cases where the 100% penalty does not apply ?

 

For eg, if a tax payer issues an
incorrect invoice of Rs. 100,000 taxable @ 18% citing a wrong place of supply,
would one have to compare Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 18,000 for imposition of penalty
or one can claim that there being no tax evasion, penalty of only Rs. 10,000/-
can be imposed? The answer to this question is dependent on the tax position
adopted on the scope of section 122(1). In cases where the scope of section
122(1) is considered as only addressing ‘offences’ and not all tax
non-compliance, no penalty can be imposed for clerical/ interpretative reasons
as cited in the above case. But where a stand is taken the section 122(1)
extends beyond cases of tax evasion, then a purposive effect to this stand can
be given as follows:

 


 

This chart implies that in non-tax
evasion cases, in the absence of a comparative figure, one should consider the
same as zero and then make a comparison leading to the inevitable conclusion
that Rs. 10,000/- would be the applicable penalty. Therefore, in case of a
wrong place of supply, the tax payer may be subjected to a maximum penalty of
only Rs. 10,000/-.  This is the only
possible interpretation where penalty for substantive and procedural defaults
can be given effect to.

 

In summary, the reasonable
interpretation of section 122(1) would be it primarily addresses cases of tax
evasion / tax non-deduction etc. and every clause addresses cases of tax
evasion either expressly or impliedly. Hence, equal penalty can be imposed on
the tax payer irrespective of which clause the case falls under. Section 122(1)
does not have any applicability over procedural/ non-evasive defaults. But if
one were to still extend this provision to procedural defaults, the penalty
imposable would only be Rs. 10,000/-.

 

Section 122(2) – Tax liability/ refund related penalties

 

Section 122(2) – This section
provides for two levels of penalty depending on the reasons for non-payment.
The said section has recognised that mens-rea/ state of mind would
establish the gravity of the offence and hence the quantum of penalty. Unlike
section 122(1), the law makers have targeted the non-payment at a macro level
purely on the test of whether there is a short payment of tax to the exchequer
and have not listed down actions resulting in such short payment:

 

Any reason other than fraud

10,000 or 10% of the tax due whichever is higher

The clause specifically uses
the phrase tax due rather than tax evaded

Fraudulent reason

10,000 or 100% of the tax evaded
whichever is higher

 

 

Section 122(2) provides some
inferences as to interpretation of section 122(1) as well as 122(2):

 

1)  Section
122(2) captures all cases of non-payment of tax and imposes a basic penalty of
10% of tax due which can jump to 100% in fraud cases.

 

2)  Though
section 122(2) does not use the term ‘intent to evade’, it is implied by use of
the phrases – fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression, etc.: tax evasion
is always malafide and one cannot evade taxes without having the
intention to do so.

 

3)  Use
of the expression ‘tax due’ in section 122(2) and tax evaded in section 122(1)
clearly establish the distinct domains that each of the clauses address.

 

4)  Section
122(2) is general in its scope and presence of specific clauses in section
122(1) may exclude them outside the scope of section 122(2).

5)  Proportionate
penalty u/s. 122(1) is at the same scale as that applicable to fraudulent
actions specified u/s. 122(2)(b). By this interpretation, the first theory over
section 122(1) is strengthened. The legislature would not have in its wisdom
treated non payment for clerical errors at par with those due to evasive acts
u/s. 122(1). It has therefore provided a reduced penalty of 10% or Rs. 10000
only to cases where the penalty is not on account of fraud, etc. and
section 122(1) does not extend its scope over clerical / interpretative
defaults.

 

Reconciling section 73/74 and
section 122(2)

 

Section 122(2) seems to be a close
replica of the penal provisions contained in section 73 and 74. Legal
provisions should not be out rightly held to be surplusage. The possible
reconciliation of this overlapping could be:

 

a.  Section
122(2) provides an outer boundary / parameters under which penalty can be
imposed and section 73/74 operate within this confine.

 

b. Section
73(1) states that penalty would be imposed ‘under the provisions of this Act’,
possibly hinting at section 122(2). Section 73 and 74 grant concessions in
cases of early tax payment along with interest and penalty promoting dispute
resolutions and amicable settlement between the tax payer and the Government.

 

c.  Section
127 which seems to be creating two separate branches is only a surrogate
section. Its role seems to empower the officer to play catch-up by imposing
penalty even if the same has not been imposed under adjudication proceedings;
this section by itself does not make section 122(2) mutually exclusive to
section 73/74.

 

Section 122(3) – Other Penalties

Section 122(3), provides for
ancillary circumstances or connected persons where penalty of Rs. 25,000 can be
imposed:

    Transporters,
employees, tax professionals, chartered accountants, purchaser of goods, tax
officials, etc. accompanying the assessee, who aid or abet an offence
could also be saddled with a penalty.

    Any
person who acquires or receives goods or services with knowledge that such
receipt is in contravention of provisions of the Act (for eg. procuring a
taxable services/ goods from an unregistered person for more than 20 lakhs in
aggregate in a financial year).

    Failure
to appear or issue invoice or account such invoice in book of accounts.

 

Section 122(3) also validates the
position that clerical actions which results in tax dues cannot be covered in
section 122(1) since clerical defaults have a fixed penalty of Rs. 25,000 only.

 

Section 125 – Miscellaneous penalty not specific elsewhere

 

Penalty of Rs. 25,000 in cases
where no penalty has been prescribed for a contravention of the act or the
rules.

 

Section 129 – Penalties in case of detention, seizure of goods in
transit

 

The GST law provides for imposition
of penalties for movement of goods which are in contravention of the statutory
provisions. The said provisions are non-obstante in nature. Two levels
of penalties are prescribed herein:

 

(a) Owner
comes forward for payment of tax and penalty: Penalty of 100% of the tax
payable or 2% of value of exempted goods or Rs. 25,000 whichever is less.

 

(b)        Owner
does not come forward for payment of tax and penalty : Penalty of 50% of
taxable value of goods or
5% of value of exempted goods or Rs. 25,000 whichever is less.

 

Two primary ingredients are
required for invoking penalty under this section –(a) the goods should in
transit and are intercepted by the proper officer u/s. 68; and (b) the proper
officer should come to a conclusion that the movement of goods is in
contravention of the provisions of the Act.

 

It may be important to note that
this section is qua the goods under question and not the transaction
i.e. this section applies equally to transactions having the character of
‘supply of goods’ or ‘supply of services’ in terms of Schedule II to the law as
long as there are goods in movement, for eg. a works contractor engaged in
supply of services (exempted/ taxable) attempting movement of goods would still
fall under this section for production of delivery challan and e-way bills. The
possible areas of contravention could be:

 

 

Examples of cases involving
evasion

Examples of cases not
involving evasion

  Presence / validity e-way bill accompanying
the consignment

  Non-accompanying invoice/ delivery challan

  Variance in the physical and invoiced
quantity

  Prima-facie variance in description of physical goods and
that stated on invoice

  Clear diversion of goods to unreported
locations

  Non-reporting all details in e-way bill/
invoice/ delivery challan

  Failure to seek extension of e-way bill on
expiry

 Incorrect reporting of details in e-way bill
eg.
prima-facie
place of supply being in direct contradiction with address

  Supply of goods reported as supply of
services

 

 

 

Generally, the term ‘contravention’
is used in cases where severity of non-compliance is relatively high compared
to a procedural non compliance. For example, a person raising the e-way bill
fails to update the correct vehicle number on account of clerical reasons and a
person consciously conceals revealing details of the vehicle number ensure
multiple trucks use the same e-way bill. While both have failed to comply with
the law in letter, rationally the degree of the offence and the penalty should
be higher in the case of the latter rather than the former. The law cannot
treat unequals as equals. Given the quantum of penalty, it appears that this
section is only towards addressing revenue loss and not procedural/ clerical
defaults. Applying this intent, a person complying with the law but erring in
reporting the vehicle number should not be saddled with penalties of the
magnitude as prescribed in the section. 

 

Further, the terms ‘detention’ or
‘seizure’ when used on conjunction imply severe cases of non-compliance. As
tabulated earlier, detention followed by seizure forcefully restricts the right
of possession of goods from its original owner. It breaches the right in rem
over the goods of its owner. In a welfare state, this is usually done where the
gravity of the offence is high and not otherwise. One can take a stand that
this section can be applied only to substantive offences where the owner of the
goods has escaped payment of taxes.

 

However, very recently, the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Gati Kintetsu Express Pvt Ltd vs. CCT of MP
(2018-TIOL-68-HC-MP-GST)
held that Part B of e-way bill is mandatory
and non-compliance of this requirement is amenable to penalty u/s. 129 of the
CGST/ SGST law. The court incorrectly distinguished an earlier favourable order
in VSL Alloys (India) Pvt Ltd vs. State of UP (2018) 67 NTN DX 1
which held that penalty cannot be imposed in case where Part-B of the eway bill
was
not completed.

 

This section also imposes penalties
on exempted goods with reference to its value upto a maximum of Rs. 25,000.
Impliedly, it equates the offence with a procedural violation since they do not
have any tax revenue impact. But ‘exempted goods’ should not be equated with
exempted supplies. The term exempted goods should be understood on a standalone
basis de-hors whether the transaction under question is enjoying any
benefit under Notification 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). 

 

Section 130 – Confiscation of goods/ conveyance

 

Section 130 are penal provisions
invoked as a consequence of either an inspection or interception activitiy. The
instances where this section can be invoked are enlisted below:

 

1) Undertakes
supply or receipt of goods in contravention of any legal provision with
malafide intent to evade tax – for eg. clandestine removal of goods from
premises or even receipt of goods by the fraudulent buyer.

2) Fails
to account for the goods which are liable for tax – unaccounted sales.

3) Supplies
goods without having any registration or even applying for the same.

4) Contravention
of any provision with intent of evasion of payment of tax.

5) Conveyances
used for illegal activities with connivance of the owner of such conveyance.

 

The provisions impose penalty or
fine (also called redemption fine) in lieu of confiscation (i.e. for release of
goods). However, in no case will the aggregate of penalty and fine be less than
the market value of goods. In case of confiscation of conveyance along with the
goods, the quantum of fine in respect of the conveyance would be equal to the
tax payable on the goods under transportation. This section applies without
prejudice to the imposition of tax, interest and penalties.

 

In summary, the possible comparatives between the three pillars
can be tabulated below:

Parameter

Section
73/74

Section
122-128

Section
129 & 130

Type

Transactional penalties

Behavioural penalties

Behavioural but specific to
goods

Source

Books of accounts/ audit, etc.

External information

Interception/ Inspection

Timing of the proceeding

Post-mortem analysis

No specific timing

Real time while in
possession of goods

Time Bar

3/5 years

No specific time bar

Until goods in transit/
possession

Waiver/ Discretion over
quantum

No discretion once
ingredients satisfied

No discretion once
ingredients satisfied

Discretion over imposition
but not quantum except in section 130 where there is a discretion on quantum

Exempted Transactions

NIL

Upto Rs. 10,000/- or
25,000/-

Rs. 10,000/-

Procedure

Part of adjudication
proceedings

Independent of adjudication

Part of enforcement/
vigilance activities

Strength of Evidence

Medium

High

High

Onus

Revenue

Revenue

Revenue

Penalty type – Specific over
general

Specific

Relatively general

Highly Specific

Independent appeal/ linked
to adjudication

Part of adjudication

Independent

Independent

Impost on

Tax payer

Tax payer and accompanying
persons

Owner/ Transporter

 

 

In a self-assessment scheme, the
onus of accurate tax computations, reporting and payments lie on the tax payer.
In an era where disclosures are of paramount importance, the tax payer is
expected to disclose as much detail as possible to its officers and establish
its bona fide before courts in subsequent proceedings. Ideally, disclosure to
the officer exercising administrative jurisdiction over the tax payer would be
regarded as sufficient proof of bona fide.

 

On the other side, tax
administrators should appreciate that unlike taxes, penalty provisions should
be studied on a factual basis rather by a strait jacket formula. Any
subjectivity would deliver adversarial results and everyone expects that the
current order undergoes a shift under the GST law.
 

 



[1] Sree Rayalaseema Hi-Strength Hypo
Ltd vs. CC Ex, Tirupathi, 2012 (278) ELT AP 167

[2] Twin condition of collection and 3
months from due date of payment should be compulsorily satisfied for this
clause to apply

GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES UNDER GST

INTRODUCTION & POSITION UNDER PRE – GST REGIME


1.    In
India, administration is divided into three tiers, namely Central Government,
State Government & Municipality/Local Authority. Each tier is entrusted
with specific powers & responsibility to carry out the various activities
and functions. In the said course, the said authority receives various
goods/services and at times, might even supply goods/services. Article 285
& 289 of the Constitution stipulates that the property of Union/ States is
exempted from taxes levied by the States/Union respectively. However, the same
does not apply to Indirect Taxes. The Supreme Court has held1 that
indirect taxes levied by the Union/State shall be borne by the recipient
State/Union since the same would not be governed by immunity provided by the
Constitution vide Articles 285 & 289 respectively.

2.    Therefore,
considering the above constitutional background, not only the Union/States were
liable to bear the indirect taxes levied, viz., VAT, Central Excise &
Service Tax, there was also a liability fastened to discharge service tax on
sale of goods/services provided by the Union/State. For instance, in the
context of sale of goods, under the VAT regime, certain class of person were
deemed to be a dealer with specific intention to tax specific sales, such as
sale of essential commodities at subsidised rates, auctions undertaken by the
Authorities, scrap, etc., carried out by such Government/Local Authority. This
included Customs Department, Department of Union Government/ any State
Government, Local Authorities, Port Trust, Public Charitable Trusts, Railways,
etc.

3.    However,
in the context of services tax, the levy had to be analysed for two different
regimes, one being pre-negative list regime and second being the negative list
regime. Under the positive list regime, only selective services were being
taxed. Further, vide Circular No. 89/7/2006 – ST dated 18.12.2006, CBEC had
clarified that performance of statutory function could not be considered as
rendition of service. However, it was further clarified that “if such authority
performs a service which is not in the nature of statutory activity and the
same is undertaken for a consideration not in the nature of statutory fee/levy,
service tax would be leviable in such cases if the activity undertaken was
classifiable within the ambit of a taxable service”. In other words, the said
Circular prescribed tests to determine the applicability of service tax
vis-à-vis the nature of activity involved.

___________________________________________

1   Sea
Customs Act [AIR 1963 (SC)], Karya Palak Engineer, CPWD vs.
Rajasthan Taxation Board, Ajmer [2004 (171) ELT 3 (SC)]

 

4.    However,
under the negative list regime, the definition of person specifically included
“Government” and provided that all services provided by the Government would be
covered under the negative list, except for following:

(a)   Services
by Department of Posts by way of speed post, express parcel post, life
insurance and agency services provided to a person other than Government

(b)   Services
in relation to an aircraft or a vessel, inside or outside the precincts of a
port or an airport

(c)   Transport
of goods or passengers

(d)   Any2
services other than services covered above provided to business entities.

5.    While
(a) to (c) above were covered under forward charge, i.e., the Government/Local
Authority providing the service would be required to collect and discharge
service tax, service under (d) were covered under reverse charge, i.e., the
business entity receiving the service would be required to discharge tax.
However, upto 31.03.2016, clause (d) covered only support services which was
defined to mean infrastructural, operational, administrative, logistic,
marketing or any other support of any kind comprising functions that entities
carry out in ordinary course of operations themselves but may obtain as
services by outsourcing from others for any reason whatsoever and shall include
advertisement and promotion, construction or works contract, renting of
immovable property, security, testing and analysis.

_____________________________________

2   Substituted
for “Support services” w.e.f 01.04.2016

 

6.    Further,
the Education Guide had also clarified that services which are provided by
government in terms of their sovereign right to business entities, and which
are not substitutable in any manner by any private entity, are not support
services e.g. grant of mining or licensing rights or audit of government
entities established by a special law, which are required to be audited by CAG
u/s. 18 of the Comptroller and Auditor-General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions
of Service) Act, 1971 (such services are performed by CAG under the statue and
cannot be performed by the business entity themselves and thus do not
constitute support services.)

7.    The
above position was amended w.e.f 01.04.2016 to provide that any service
provided by Government to business entities would be excluded from the scope of
negative list. Further, CBEC vide Circular 192/02/2016 dated 13.04.2016
clarified that whether or not any activity is carried out as statutory function,
the same would be liable to service tax (subject to specific exemptions) so
long as payment is being made for getting a service in return. However, it was
clarified that fines and penalty chargeable by Authority were not leviable to
service tax.

 

LEGAL POSITION UNDER THE GST REGIME


8.    The
charging section for levy of GST provides for levy of tax on all supplies of
goods, except alcoholic liquor for human consumption on the value determined
u/s. 15 and at such rates as may be notified and collected in such manner as
may be prescribed and paid by the taxable person

9.    The
term “taxable person” has been defined u/s 2 (107) to mean a person
who is registered or liable to be registered u/s. 22 or 24. Section 2
(84) defines the term “person” to include, among others a local authority;
Central Government or a State Government. Section 22 provides that every
supplier shall be liable to be registered in the state from where he makes
taxable supplies. Therefore, the issue that would need consideration is whether
the Government (Central/State) or Local Authority can be said to be engaged in
making taxable supplies, either of goods or services? To answer the said
question, one needs to determine whether the activities undertaken by the
Government or Local Authority can be classifiable as supply or not. For the
same, reference to section 7 becomes necessary. Section 7 (1) which defines the
scope of supply to include all forms of supply of goods or services or both
such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, license, rental, lease or disposal
made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course or
furtherance of business.

10.   Section
2 (17), which defines the term business provides that business shall include any
activity or transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State
Government or any local authority in which they are engaged as public
authorities.
In other words, the activities or transactions undertaken by
the Government or Local Authority are deemed to be business and therefore as
long as there is supply of goods/service by such Government/ Local Authority,
they would be classifiable as supply.

 

TAXABILITY UNDER GST REGIME


11.   Therefore,
the question that would need consideration is whether all activities/functions
undertaken by Government/Local Authority has to be treated as supply of goods
or services or not? This question may not be relevant in the context of goods;
however, it would be very relevant in the context of services. This is because
though service has been defined in a very wide manner to mean anything other
than goods, section 7 (1), which defines supply, pre-necessitates the existence
of a contract for treating an activity/transaction as supply. The same is
evident from the fact that section 7 (1) uses the phrase made or agreed to
be made
. This would necessarily require the presence of quid pro quo
for any activity undertaken by the Government/ Local Authority, i.e., the
person making the payment should receive something in return. Some instances
where quid pro quo exists in the activities undertaken by Government/
Local Authority include:

  •    companies
    engaged in telecommunication sector have to pay license fee to the Department
    of Telecommunication for spectrum allocation

  •    builders
    are required to pay various charges to the Local Authority in the form of
    permission charges, lease premium, staircase allowance, etc., for undertaking
    construction activities. Such transactions may amount
    to service
  •    companies
    making payment to ROC in the form of filing fees, fees for increasing
    authorised share capital, etc., thus enabling them to comply with the
    provisions of the law

12.   However,
there can be instances where the element of quid pro quo may not exist.
For instance, in Gupta Modern Breweries vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir
[(2007) 6 SCC 317]
, the Court was required to decide whether the fees
recovered for audit conducted by Excise Authorities on the records of assessee
were in the nature of a fee or tax? In the said case, the Court held that there
was no quid pro quo between the taxpayer and the Government/Authority
and therefore the amounts were in the nature of tax and not fee. Therefore, if
such amounts recovered by the Government are treated as tax and not fees, the
same would not amount to a service to the licensee by the Government. That
being the case, such payments to the Government may not attract GST.

13.   With
regard to taxes levied by Government/Local Authorities under other statutes,
such as property tax, stamp duty, etc., they cannot be treated as being consideration
for any service provided. This view was also expressed by the CBEC in its’
Circular 192/02/2016. One important fact to support this view is perhaps that
tax is a compulsory exaction of funds, not involving any quid pro quo
and no specific performance can be enforced upon payment of the same from the
Government or Local Authority.

14.   Similarly,
penalties or fines levied for violation of any statute, bye-laws, rules or
regulations will also not amount to a service. This would be for the reason that
the penalty or fine would not be paid by the recipient for receiving any
specific service, but are infact in the nature of compulsory payments imposed
on him. For instance, car towing charges collected by the State Government for
a car parked in No-Parking Zone. Even if the owner of car would be paying for
the said charges, yet, the same should not be treated as service supplied by
Government since there was no agreement to receive the said service.

15.   To
support the above view, one may refer to the Judgment by the New Zealand
Tribunal in Case S65 (1996) 17 NZTC 7408 wherein a taxpayer, who was a
solicitor, was the subject of a disciplinary hearing by the New Zealand Law
Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. The taxpayer argued that the costs he was
ordered to pay were a supply of goods or services to him by the Law Societies.

 

In the said case, it was held that
costs imposed by a disciplinary tribunal were not subject to GST because there
was no “supply”. The costs of prosecuting an allegedly defaulting solicitor
could not be described as the supply of a service; and in the context of the
Goods and Services Tax Act, “services” are generally considered to be some
activity which helps or benefits the recipient. In other words, penalties,
fines, etc., imposed by the Government/ Local Authorities cannot be treated as
consideration for service provided and hence should not attract GST.

 

LIABILITY TO PAY GST


16.   In
a manner similar to the service tax regime, substantial services provided by
the Government/Local Authority to business entities have been covered under
reverse charge mechanism, except for following specific services where the
respective Government/Local Authority is liable to collect and discharge the
tax liability:

  •    Renting of
    immovable property services3
  •    Services
    by the Department of Posts by way of speed post, express parcel post, life
    insurance, and agency services provided to a person other than the Central
    Government, State Government, Union territory
  •    Services
    in relation to an aircraft or a vessel, inside or outside the precincts of a
    port or an airport;
  •    Transport
    of goods or passengers

17.   In
all other cases of services provided by Government to business entities, the
liability to pay service tax has been fastened on the recipient of service.
While the term business entity has not been defined under GST law, the same
will have to be understood as a person carrying on any business, whether or not
liable to pay GST. For instance, a person dealing in non-GST goods, say
alcohol, is required to obtain liquor licenses for dealing in license. Since
such a person would be a business entity, even though there is no GST
applicable on his outward supplies, he would be required to obtain registration
under GST and discharge the applicable tax thereon. This would also require
such a person to comply with the various provisions of the GST law as well.

18.   In
addition to the above, notification 12/ 2017 Central Tax (Rate) also provides
exemption for various other services provided to/by Government/Local
Authorities. Some of the relevant exemptions for services provided by
Government/Local Authorities are listed below:

(a)   Services
by Central Government, State Government, Union territory, local authority or
governmental authority by way of any activity in relation to any function
entrusted to a municipality under Article 243 W of the Constitution
[Entry 4]

(b)   Services
by a governmental authority by way of any activity in relation to any function
entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G of the Constitution [Entry 5]

(c)   Services
by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local authority
excluding the following services—

(i) services by the Department of Posts
by way of speed post, express parcel post, life insurance, and agency services
provided to a person other than the Central Government, State Government, Union
territory;

(ii) services in relation to an
aircraft or a vessel, inside or outside the precincts of a port or an airport;

(iii) transport of goods or passengers;
or

(iv) any service, other than services
covered under entries (a) to (c) above, provided to business entities [Entry 6]

(d)   Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority to a business entity with an aggregate turnover of up to twenty lakh
rupees (ten lakh rupees in case of a special category state) in the preceding financial
year. However, the same is not applicable to services covered under (i) to
(iii) in (d) above as well as in case of renting of immovable property services
[Entry 7]

(e)   Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority to a business entity where consideration does not exceed Rs. 5000.
However, this exemption is not available in case of services covered under (i)
to (iii) above and in case the services are in the nature of continuous supply
of services and the total consideration payable for the supply during the year
exceeds Rs. 5000. [Entry 9]

(f)    Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of allowing a business entity to operate as a telecom service
provider or use radio frequency spectrum during the period prior to the 1st
April, 2016, on payment of license fee or spectrum user charges, as the case
may be. [Entry 42]

(g)   Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of-

(i) registration required under any law
for the time being
in force;

 

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

3     Vide notification 3/2018 dated 25.01.2018, services
of renting of immovable property supplied by Central Government, State
Government, Union territory or local authority to a person registered under the
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 have been brought within the purview
of reverse charge.

 

(ii) testing, calibration, safety check
or certification relating to protection or safety of workers, consumers or
public at large, including fire license, required under any law for the time
being in force [Entry 47]

(h)   Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of issuance of passport, visa, driving license, birth
certificate or death certificate [Entry 61]

(i)    Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of tolerating non-performance of a contract for which
consideration in the form of fines or liquidated damages is payable to the
Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local authority under
such contract.
[Entry 62]

(j)    Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of assignment of right to use natural resources to an
individual farmer for cultivation of plants and rearing of all life forms of
animals, except the rearing of horses, for food, fibre, fuel, raw material or
other similar products. [Entry 63]

(k)   Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of assignment of right to use any natural resource where such
right to use was assigned by the Central Government, State Government, Union
territory or local authority before the 1st April, 2016. [Entry 64]

(l)    Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory by way of
deputing officers after office hours or on holidays for inspection or container
stuffing or such other duties in relation to import export cargo on payment of
Merchant Overtime charges
[Entry 65]

(m)  Services
supplied by a State Government to Excess Royalty Collection Contractor (ERCC)
by way of assigning the right to collect royalty on behalf of the State
Government on the mineral dispatched by the mining lease holders.

19.   Similarly,
following services provided to Government/ Local Authority have been exempted:

(a)   Pure
services (excluding works contract service or other composite supplies
involving supply of any goods) provided to the Central Government, State
Government or Union territory or local authority or a Governmental authority by
way of any activity in relation to any function entrusted to a Panchayat under
Article 243G of the Constitution or in relation to any function entrusted to a
Municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution [Entry 3]

(b)   Composite
supply of goods and services in which the value of supply of goods constitutes
not more than 25 % of the value of the said composite supply provided to the
Central Government, State Government or Union territory or local authority or a
Governmental authority or a Government Entity by way of any activity in
relation to any function entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G of the
Constitution or in relation to any function entrusted to a Municipality under
Article 243W of the Constitution
 [Entry 3A]

(c)   Supply
of service by a Government Entity to Central Government, State Government,
Union territory, local authority or any person specified by Central Government,
State Government, Union territory or local authority against consideration
received from Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority, in the form of grants. [Entry 9C]

(d)   Services
by an old age home run by Central Government, State Government or by an entity
registered u/s. 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) to its residents
(aged 60 years or more) against consideration upto twenty five thousand rupees
per month per member, provided that the consideration charged is inclusive of
charges for boarding, lodging and maintenance [Entry 9D]

(e)   Service
provided by Fair Price Shops to Central Government by way of sale of wheat,
rice and coarse grains under Public Distribution System (PDS) and to State
Governments or Union territories by way of sale of kerosene, sugar, edible oil,
etc., under Public Distribution System (PDS) against consideration in the form
of commission or margin [Entry 11A/ 11B]

(f)    Services
provided to the Central Government, State Government, Union territory
administration under any training programme for which total expenditure is
borne by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory
administration [Entry 72]

 

CERTAIN ISSUES & RULINGS

20.   What
will be the scope of functions entrusted to a municipality under Article 243W?

  •    One
    particular function performed by the Municipality is to provide permission to
    various utility service providers (electricity, gas, etc.,) to carryout
    excavation work to laydown underground wire, pipe-lines, etc., for which
    charges in the form of access charges & reinstatement charges are levied by
    the Municipality.
  •    An
    application for Advance Ruling was made before the Authority in Maharashtra by
    Reliance Infrastructure Limited [2018 (013) GSTL 0449 (AAR)] as to
    whether the above charges would be covered under functions entrusted to a
    Municipality under Article 243W or not? The Authority in the said case held as
    under:

This restoration work would not result
in performing of the sovereign function. The sovereign function has already
been performed by constructing the road or undertaking maintenance works of the
roads. The restoration work can be equated neither to construction work nor to
maintenance work as suo motu undertaken by the Municipal Authorities. The
restoration charges are also not in the nature that the Municipal Authorities
are performing any job of construction for the applicant. The street or pavement
or road that is dug up is a general road. In view of all above, we are of the
firm view that it should not be disputed that the recovering of charges for
restoring the patches which have been dug up by business entities of the nature
as the applicant cannot be equated to performing a sovereign function as
envisaged under Article 243W of the Constitution.

  •    However,
    the Authority in the above case has while appreciating the fact that the
    function of construction and maintenance of road is entrusted to the
    Municipality under Article 243W, erred in not appreciating the fact that the
    reinstatement charges recovered from the utility service providers is merely to
    meet the cost incurred for undertaking the functions entrusted to it under
    Article 243W, i.e., to maintain the roads. This is done by the Municipality by
    appointing contractors, who undertake the activity and charge the Municipality
    for the same. The role of Municipality is to ensure that the said function
    relating to construction and maintenance of road is properly performed, which
    is performed by collecting the said charges from such public utility companies.
    In fact, one can say that in case of access & reinstatement charges
    collected by the Municipality, it is infact a case of service to self rather
    than service to public utility companies as it helps the Municipality to
    perform the function entrusted to it under Article 243W.
  •    Interesting
    aspect to note in the above case is that there were two different charges
    collected by the Municipality, namely reinstatement charges and access charges.
    In the case of access charges, the Authority has arrived at a prima facie
    conclusion that tax would be payable. However, it has failed to appreciate the
    fact that in case of access charges, the Municipality has recovered GST from
    the Applicant. The question that therefore would need analysis is whether there
    would be double taxation, i.e., the supplier of service also charges GST and
    the recipient also discharges GST on the same under reverse charge?
  •    Further,
    in another Ruling in the case of VPSSR Facilities [2018 (013) GSTL 0116
    (AAR)]
    , the Authority held that cleaning services provided to the Northern
    Railways, classifiable as Central Government would not be eligible for
    exemption under Entry 3 since the Railways do not carry out any function
    entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W. The Authority further held that
    the Municipality was entrusted with functions only in relation to urban areas
    and not in relation to railway properties. If this view is accepted, exemption
    will not be available in case of services provided by Central/State Government
    in relation to carrying out any function entrusted to a Municipality under
    Article 243W.

21.    Whether
exemption under Entry 6 will extend to other services provided by Department of
Posts?

  •    On going
    through the website of Department of Posts, there are three different
    categories of service provided, as under:

 

Premium

Domestic

International

Speed Post

Letter

Letter

Express Parcel

Book Packet

EMS Speed Post

Business Parcel

Registered Newspaper

Air Parcel

Logistics Post

Parcel

International Tracked Packets

 

  •      The
    services relating to speed post & express parcel post are explicitly
    covered under forward charge. However, other services provided to business
    entities by Department of Posts will be covered under clause (d) of Entry 6 of
    notification 12/ 2017 and therefore be liable to tax under reverse charge
    mechanism.
  •      This
    would be important in the case of business delivering goods through posts,
    companies mailing annual reports/notices under normal post, magazines posted on
    license to post without pre-payment, etc., Off-course, one can claim the exemption
    of Rs. 5000 but the same would need to be analysed on a case to case basis.

22.   In
case of exemption under Entry 72, can exemption be denied on the grounds that
only cost is borne by the Government and no service is received by the
Government?

  •      Entry 72
    provides for exemption to services provided to Government under any training
    programme for which total expenditure is borne by them. In such cases, there
    are programmes where the service provider is required to identify candidates
    for providing training and upon completion of training or as per agreed terms,
    the Government makes the payment for such training to the service provider,
    i.e., the service is not provided to the Government but only the cost is borne
    by the Government.
  •      In such
    a case, can the exemption be denied on the grounds that since service is not
    provided to Government but the candidate, the exemption is not available.
  •      The
    answer to the same would be in negative in view of the fact that the definition
    of recipient of service u/s. 2 (93) provides that recipient of supply in case
    where consideration is payable for supply shall be the person liable to pay the
    service and not the person consuming the service. Therefore, since the claim
    for payment for the service is to be made before the Government conducting the
    programme, the payment can be enforced only from the Government and therefore,
    in view of section 2 (93), it is the Government who is the recipient of
    service.

 

TAX DEDUCTED AT SOURCE

23.   Vide
notification  50/2018 – CT (Rate) dated
13.09.2018, in addition to specified class of people referred to in clause (a)
to (c) of section 51, i.e., Department/Establishment of Central Government or
State Government, local authority or Government agencies, following class of
people have been made liable to deduct tax at source on payments to be made on
various supplies received by them:

 

(a)   an
authority or a board or any other body, –

(i)    set
up by an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature; or

(ii)    established
by any Government,

with 51 % or more participation by way
of equity or control, to carry out any function;

(b)   Society
established by the Central Government or the State Government or a Local
Authority under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860);

(c)   public
sector undertakings (not applicable in case of supplies received from another
PSU)

24.   The rate of TDS
applicable on such payments would be 2%, being 1% CGST and 1% SGST/UTGST in
case of intrastate supplies and 2% IGST in case of interstate supplies.

 

CONCLUSION

25.   To
summarise, under the GST regime, while making payment for any activity or
function undertaken by Government or Local Authority, one will need to analyse
the GST implications on multiple fronts, such as :

  •      whether
    the activity undertaken by the Government or Local Authority partakes the
    character of a service or not?
  •      Whether
    the activity is classifiable under the exemption list or not?

26.   The
above exercise will need to be followed rigorously by a business not entitled
for full credit as payment of tax under reverse charge, even on a conservative
basis will have to be taken as cost, which may not be necessary. Off course, a
business eligible to claim full input tax credit might take a conservative view
and not go in to the above hassles by discharging tax on all payments since
there may not be any cash flow issues or unnecessary tax costs.

27.          More care needs to be exercised in
case of services provided to Government/Local Authority in view of the fact
that claiming a wrong exemption can have significant repercussions involving
payment of tax out of pocket saddled with consequential interest and penalties.
One further needs to ensure that in each case, the exemption be analysed on
their own rather than depending on the recipients’ claim of exemption, since
the same may not be always correct.

MVAT updates

Extension  of  due  date 
for  filling  of 
refund application for F.Y. 2014-15

Trade Circular 30T of 2016 dated 1.10.2016

Due  to technical problem in the system of MSTD,
due date of filing refund application in Form 501 for the financial year
2014-15  is extended for 7 days that is
from 30.9.2016 to 8.10.2016.

Extension of time limit under
Settlement act, 2016 and clarification on certain issues Trade Circular 31T of
2016 dated 1.10.2016

By this Circular, time limit in
maharashtra Settlement of arrears in dispute act, 2016 is extended from
30-9-2016 to 15-11-2016 and some issues have been clarified..

First Phase Go Live of e-payment under SAP – TRM new automation process

Trade Circular 32T of 2016 dated 27.10.2016

Many tax payers are having their
accounts in private banks and co op banks and as such they are unable to make
tax payments through e banking. Therefore, 
department has developed and expanded facility so that tax payments can
be done through more number of banks. System has been explained in this
Circular.

e-Returns w.r.t.Maharashtra Tax on the Entry of Goods into Local Areas
Act, 2002

Trade Circular 33T of 2016 dated 27.10.2016

e Service facility to file
electronic returns to the importers registered under the maharashtra tax on the
entry of Goods into local  area act.2002
has started and step by step procedure is explained in this Circular.

Service Tax updates

Exemption on payment to State Government Industrial    Development    Undertakings    reg.
lease of plots

Notification No.41/2016-ST dated 22. 09. 2016

Central Government has exempted
Service tax on one time upfront amount paid to State Government industrial
development Corporations/ undertakings for granting of long term lease of industrial
plots to industrial units.

Exemption to advancement of Yoga

Notification No. 42/2016-ST dated 26. 09. 2016

CBEC through this notification
exempts the Service Tax on the services by way of advancement of yoga provided
by an entity registered under section 12AA of the income tax act
retrospectively to services rendered during the period 01.07.2012 to
20.10.2015.

Return Form ST 3 amended

Notification No. 43/2016-ST dated
28. 09. 2016

The CBEC has amended half
yearly Service Tax Return Form ST 3 by issuing notification namely ‘Service Tax
(Third   amendment)  rules, 2016’ to  facilitate 
changes in tables relating to the details of CENVAT, payment and
liability of Krishi Kalyan Cess & detailed disclosure of reversal under CENVAT
Credit Rule 6(3A) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. this amended ST-3 form shall be
applicable from the date of publication of this notification in the official
gazette.

Issue of Notice by Department- revision of monetary limits

Notification No. 44/2016-ST dated 28. 09. 2016

Central Government has, vide this
notification, amended the adjudication powers of the officers.

Under the revised limits, the
Superintendent can issue notice provided that for the amount of service tax or CENVAT
credit specified in the notice should not exceed Rs. 10 lakhs (excluding the
cases relating to taxability of services or valuation of services and cases
involving extended period of limitation). Similarly in case of notice by
assistant Commissioner or deputy Commissioner such amount should not exceed Rs.
50 lakhs (except cases where Superintendents are empowered to adjudicate). For
the joint  Commissioner or additional
Commissioner such amount is Rs. 50 lakhs and above but not exceeding Rs. 2
crores. While for the Commissioner there is no such monetary limit.

Exemption on transportation to Educational Institutions

Notification No. 45/2016-ST dated 30. 09. 2016

By this notification, Government
has exempted Service tax on transportation facility by educational institutions
to students, faculty and staff for the period commencing on and from the first
day of April, 2013 and ending with the tenth day of July, 2014 which was not
being collected by the educational institutions in view of the generally
prevalent practice.

M/S. J. K. Lakshmi Cement Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Civil Appeal No.102 of 2010, 16th Sep- tember, 2016 , SC.

Central Sales Tax – Exemption From Payment of Tax Or Concessional Rate
of Tax – Notification u/S. 8(5) – under Two Separate Notifications – Not
allowed, Section 8(5) of The Central Sales tax, act, 1956.

Facts

The   appellant, 
a  Public  limited  
Company  incorporated under the
Companies act, 1956, is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
Grey Portland Cement. in exercise of powers conferred by section 8(5) of the
Central Sales tax act, 1956 (for short, “CST act”), the Government of Rajasthan
had issued a Notification No. F4(72)FD/Gr. IV/81- 18 dated 06.05.1986 allowing
partial exemptions from the sales tax payable in respect of inter-state sales
in the manner and subject to the conditions mentioned therein. Partial
exemption was granted under the said notification at the rate of 50%/75% on the
basis of increase in the percentage of the entire inter-state sales and
decrease in percentage of stock transfers but the benefit under the said
notification was not available on levy cement. from the assessment year 1989-90
to 1997-98 the appellant had been granted benefit of partial exemption under
the notification dated 06.05.1986 except for the assessment year 1995-96 and
1996-97 as no claims were made by the appellants being not eligible. By
Notification no. 97-122 dated 12.03.1997 issued u/s. 8(5) of the CST act, the
State Government rescinded the Notification No. 94-70 dated 07.03.1994 and
directed that CST  on inter-State sales
of cement shall be calculated at the rate of 4%, inter alia, subject to
fulfillment of the condition that the dealer making inter-State sales under
this notification shall not be eligible to claim benefit provided by partial
exemption notification dated 06.05.1986. further, in exercise of power u/s.
8(5) of the CST act, the State Government vide Notification No. 97-266 dated 21.1.2000
directed that tax payable under sub-sections (1) and (2) of the said Section on
the inter-state sales of cement shall be calculated at the rate of 6%, inter
alia, subject to the condition that the dealer making inter-state sales under
this notification shall not be eligible to claim benefit provided under partial
exemption notification dated 06.05.1986. After a lapse of seven years from the
previous circular dated 15.04.1994, the CCT issued another Circular no.
94-95/119 dated 16.04.2001 purporting to clarify the applicability of partial
exemption notification  dated  06.05.1986  vis-a-vis 
notification  dated 07.03.1994 and
subsequent notifications dated 12.03.1997 and 21.01.2000. By the said circular,
the competent authority purported to state that the dealer can avail the
benefit of either of these two notifications in any financial year meaning
thereby that if he opts for the benefit under notification dated 06.05.1986 for
the year 2000-2001, he would not be entitled to claim simultaneous benefit in
respect of the same year under the notification dated 21.01.2000. The
Department Held that as per circular dated 16.04.2001 the benefit could not be
claimed under notification dated 06.05.1986 if the unit had made sales under
notification dated 21.01.2000. It was Held that benefit of both the
notifications could not be availed of in the same financial year.

The High Court in appeal, filed
by the appellant, confirmed the order of Rajasthan Board allowing the appeal
filed by the Department. The appellant company filed appeal before the SC.

Held

The circular dated 15.04.1994,
when in force, had referred to the notifications dated 07.03.1994 as well as
06.05.1986. Under the notification dated 07.03.1994, the rate of central sales
tax on inter-State sale of cement was unconditionally fixed at 4%, even when
there was no declaration in form  C and
form  d. The notification dated
06.05.1986 relating to inter-State sale required Form C and Form D, for
availing the benefit. The circular did not in clear and categorical terms lay
down that dual or multiple benefits under the two notifications could be
availed of by the same dealer. it, however, appears that both the assessee as
well as the revenue had understood the circular dated 15.04.1994 to mean that
inter-state transactions would qualify and would be entitled to partial
exemption under the notification dated 06.05.1986, when accompanied with
form  C and d and for inter-state sale
transactions without Form C and D, benefit of notification dated 07.03.1994
would apply. The understanding by the assessee and the revenue, in obtaining
factual matrix, has its own limitation. it is because the principle of res-
judicata would have no application in spite of the understanding by the
assessee and the revenue, for the circular dated 15.04.1994, is not to the specific
effect as suggested and, further notification dated 07.03.1994 was valid
between 1st  april, 1994 up to 31st  march, 1997 (upto 31st march, 1997 vide
notification dated 12.03.1997) and not thereafter. The Commercial tax
department, by a circular, could have extended the benefit under a notification
and, therefore, principle of estoppel would apply, though there are authorities
which opine that a circular could not have altered and restricted the
notification to the detriment of the assessee. Circulars issued under tax
enactments can tone down the rigour of law, for an authority which wields power
for its own advantage is given right to forego advantage when required and
considered necessary. This power to issue circulars is for just, proper and
efficient management of the work and in public interest. It is a beneficial
power for proper administration of fiscal law, so that undue hardship may not
be caused. Circulars are binding on the authorities administering the enactment
but cannot alter the provision of the enactment, etc. to the detriment of the
assessee.

The controversy herein centres
round the period from 1st april, 2001 to 31st 
march, 2002. The period in question is mostly post the circular dated
16.04.2001. The appellant­ assessee has pleaded to take benefit of the circular
dated 15.04.1994, which stands withdrawn and was only applicable to the
notification dated 07.03.1994. It was not specifically applicable to the
notification dated 21.01.2000. The fact that the third paragraph of the notification
dated 21.01.2000 is identically worded to the third paragraph of the
notification dated 07.03.1994 but that would not by itself justify the
applicability of circular dated 15.04.1994.

Accordingly, the SC dismissed the
appeal, filed by the appellant, and Held that due to language of notifications
the appellant cannot take benefit of concession under both notifications in
same financial year.

M/S. Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. State of Karna- taka, Civil Appeal No. 4003 of 2007, dated 2nd September, 2016, SC.

Entry Tax – Exemption – Packing material is used For Packing of Tea
-Not Raw material – Not Exempt When Only Raw material is Exempt – Section 11a
of The Karnataka Tax on Entry of goods act, 1979.

Facts

The appellant is a public limited
company, having a tea manufacturing unit at dharwad (Karnataka) and various
other units which also manufacture tea. The tea manufactured by the appellant
is of three types, namely, packet tea, tea in tea bags, and quick brewing black
tea. The appellant claimed that its dharwad unit, as opposed to the other units
manufacturing tea, is a new unit and is, therefore, exempt altogether from
payment of entry tax on packing material of tea under a notification dated
31.3.1993 issued u/s. 11A of the Karnataka tax on entry of Goods act, 1979. Insofar
as the other units are concerned, it is the case of the appellant they are
covered by Explanation II to a Notification dated 23.9.1998 issued u/s.3 of the
said act, and “packing material” being covered by the said explanation would
entitle them to pay entry tax at the rate of 1% and not 2%. all the authorities
under the entry tax act i.e. the assessing authority, the first appellate
authority and the Karnataka appellate tribunal have Held that packing material
cannot be regarded as raw material, component parts or inputs used in the
manufacture of finished goods and, therefore, in the context of the Entry tax
act, read with Schedule i, such packing material is neither exempt nor
chargeable at the rate of 1% on a true construction of the notifications of
1993 and 1998. The High Court in turn also dismissed the revision petitions
filed under the statute by the assessee. the question that arises for decision
in appeal before SC was whether “packing materials” which enter the local, area
for consumption therein, that is for packing tea that is manufactured by the appellant,
can be said to be raw material, components, or inputs used in the manufacture
of tea for the purpose of either of exemption or liable to lower rate of tax of
1% instead of 2%.

Held

In the context of the entry tax
act, the difference between “goods” used in the manufacture of goods and
“packing material” is also brought out by Schedule i. Packing materials are
separately defined in Entry 66. On the other hand, raw material, component
parts and inputs, which are used in the 
manufacture  of  an 
intermediate  or  finished 
product, are separately and distinctively given in entry 80 thereof. The
context of the entry tax act therefore is clear. When raw material, component
parts and inputs are spoken of, obviously they refer to material, components
and things which go into the finished product, namely, tea in the present case,
and cannot be extended to cover packing material of the said tea which is
separately provided for by the aforesaid entry 66. The notification dated
23.9.1998 issued u/s. 3 uses identical language as that contained in entries 66
and 80 of Schedule I to the Entry Tax Act. Equally, notification dated
31.3.1993 is an exemption notification issued u/s. 11A which also uses the
identical language of Entry 8 of Schedule I. Thus, notification cannot be read
to include “packing material” as “raw material, component parts  or 
inputs  used in the manufacture”
of tea. Accordingly, the SC dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant and
judgment of High Court was affirmed.

2016 (44) STR 258 (Tri-Ahmd.) Newlight Hotels 25 & Resorts Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Vadodara

Classification of service cannot be changed at service recipient’s end.

Facts

The appellant received management
consultancy services. However, department intended to classify it as Business
auxiliary Services. Relying on numerous judicial pronouncements, it was
contested that classification by service provider cannot be changed at
recipient’s end. It was argued that service provider had paid service tax under
management consultancy category at the behest of revenue and therefore,
classification cannot be altered.

Held

Relying on CCE Pondicherry vs.
Mohan Breweries & Distilleries Limited 2010 (259) ELT 176 (Mad.) and also
on Sarvesh Refractories Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE & C 2007 (218) ELT 488 (SC), it
was Held that classification cannot be changed at service recipient’s end.
Credit of service tax paid cannot be denied or reduced on the grounds that
classification was wrongly done by service provider. Accordingly, appeal was
allowed.

2016 (44) STR 97 (Tri-All.) LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C.Ex. &S.T., Noida

Whether CENVAT credit on employees shifting expenses are admissible.
(Period of dispute – prior to 2011)

Facts

The appellant had incurred
expenses including freight charges on shifting and relocation of its employees
in accordance with transfer policy of its business and availed CENVAT credit of
service tax paid on the said services. The said credit was disallowed on the
contention that the said services have no nexus with the business, shifting of
employee was not an activity of the business.

Held

Relying on ruling, in the case of
“CCE vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd. – 2010 (20) S.T.R. 577 (Bom.), where the hon’ble
High Court Held that the definition of “input service” is not restricted to
services used in or in relation to the business of manufacturing the final
product, input service is defined illustratively and not
restrictively/exhaustively. And restriction if any is imposed post year 2011,
only if such travel expenses are of primarily of personal use and consumption.
Prior to 2011, such expenses are allowable if the same are provided to
employees in general expenditure in relation to the business of the assesse.

Appeal was allowed with
consequential relief to appellant.

2016 (44) STR 65 (Tri-Mumbai) Kolland Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C.Ex., Nagpur

Whether refund claim of SEZ developer can be rejected on the ground
that input services on which refund sought were not pre-approved from approval
Committee before its availment?

Facts

The Appellant was a developer of
SEZ and had filed a refund claim in respect of input services availed in terms
of the notification 12/2013-S.T. dated 01/07/2013. The refund claim was
rejected by the lower authorities on the ground that the specified input
services were not approved at the time of its availment.

Before the tribunal, the
appellant, relying on the decision of 
“mahindra  engineering  Services 
ltd –  2015  (38) S.t.r. 841 (tri.-mum)”, argued that
erstwhile exemption notification (09/2009-ST) did not mandate pre-approval of
services before its availment.

Held

The tribunal observed that, in
case of “Mahindra Engineering Services Ltd.”, the said notification was an
exemption notification and at the time of availment, the conditions of
exemption have to be fulfilled. However, the Notification No. 12/2013 (which is
under dispute) provides for refund of tax paid on specified input services
which are approved by approval committee and to avail the exemption the
assessee must fulfill the conditions of the said notifications at the time of
availing the services. Accordingly, appeal was dismissed and refund claim
rejection was Held to be appropriate.

[2016] 72 taxmann.com 4 (Hyderabad-CESTAT) – Spandana Spoorthy Financial Ltd. vs. Com- missioner, Hyderabad

fiogf49gjkf0d

Tribunal affirmed appellant’s entitlement to CENVAT credit for period
prior to registration and utilisation thereof for discharging service tax
demanded for such period.

Facts

The appellant, engaged in micro
finance  Business, was not registered
with service tax department from April 2004 till june  2009. In June 
2009, when statutory auditors pointed 
out  this  fact, appellant obtained  opinion 
from their consultants and applied for service tax registration. Part of
the liability for the period prior to June 
2009 was discharged by adjustment of CENVAT credit pertaining to that
period and balance liability was paid in cash along with interest. on scrutiny
of records in august 2009, department issued SCN to appellant by invoking
extended period of limitation by alleging suppression of Facts by appellant
with intention to evade service tax liability and also proposed to deny
availment of CENVAT credit on the ground that rule 3(4) of CCR, 2004 permits
utilisation of CENVAT credit only to the extent such credit is available on the
last day of the month or quarter for which tax liability is being discharged. The
appellant challenged invocation of extended period and also submitted that the
case is covered by provision of section 73(3) of the finance  act, 1994 as entire liability was discharged
prior to scrutiny by department.

Held

As regards eligibility for CENVAT
credit, the hon’ble CeStat opined that if and when the department demands
service tax liability for taxable services rendered during a particular period,
a corresponding right shall accrue to the assessee entitling him to avail of CENVAT
credit on CENVATable documents evidencing inputs or capital goods or input
services received by such assessee during the same period, subject to the
conditionalities envisaged in CCr, 2004. as regards rule 3(4) of CCr, 2004 the
tribunal  Held that it merely puts cap on
the credit that can be ‘utilised’ for payment of duty or tax and not on the
quantum that be ‘availed’. The tribunal relied upon decisions in cases of
mPortal India Wireless Solutions (P.) Ltd vs. CST [2011] 16 taxmann.com 353
(Kar.), Nitesh residency Hotels (P.) Ltd. vs. CST [Misc. Order No. 27030/2013,
dated 27-8-2013], Amar Remedies vs. CCE 2010 (257) ELT 552 (Tri-Ahd.) and C.
Metric Solution (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE [2013] 31 taxmann.com 344,to hold that
appellant was entitled to availment and utilisation of CENVAT credit on the
basis of documentary evidences for the period prior to obtaining registration.

As regards applicability of
proviso to section 73(3) the hon’ble tribunal Held that since major part of
duty which was adjusted by CENVAT credit was in dispute, issuance of SCn is
legal and the said proviso is not applicable.

As regards invocation of extended
period, the tribunal affirmed allegations of suppression on the ground that
appellant neither filed returns nor approached department for clarifying
taxability of services rendered by them. however, penalties imposed u/s. 78
were dropped on the basis of finding that as appellant was not aware of tax
liability ab initio, non-payment thereof cannot be said to be done knowingly
and even adjudicating authority took note of the fact that appellant become
aware of its liability only after obtaining opinion from consultants.

{Note: readers may note that, although the tribunal  on one hand has Held that invocation of
extended period is justified and on other hand has deleted the penalty u/s. 78,
hon’ble Bombay high  Court in the case of
Saswad Mali Sugar Factory Ltd vs. CCE, Pune [2014] 44 taxmann.com 149 has Held
that conditions for invocation of extended period of limitation u/s. 73(1) and
the conditions for imposing penalty u/s. 78 are identical. therefore both the
provisions go hand-in-hand, and if one did not survive, the other also cannot
be invoked.}

[2016] 72 taxmann.com 5 (Mumbai-CESTAT) – Dhanshree Ispat vs. Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Aurangabad

fiogf49gjkf0d

If, commission agent, who arranges for transportation of goods, pays
tax on gTa services and claims reimbursement thereof from its customer, input
tax credit of tax paid on gTa services is not allowable in terms of CCR, 2004.

Facts

The appellant, a commission agent,
handled receipt of goods from principal and transportation to the buyers. The
appellant discharged service tax liability as a provider of “goods transport
agency” and also recovered the said tax paid towards Gta services from the
buyers of goods who were contractually required to reimburse freight charges
along with taxes paid thereon to the appellant. While discharging service tax
liability on his commission income, the appellant claimed CENVAT credit of tax
paid on Gta services. Revenue denied availment of CENVAT credit on the ground
that for Gta services, the appellant was acting only as agent of the buyers and
hence, he cannot be said to be discharging tax on Gta services on its own
account and accordingly, is not eligible for CENVAT claim.

Held

The Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal
affirmed the denial of CENVAT credit by holding that the activity of
“transportation of goods” as undertaken by the appellant is same as other
agency functions rendered by the appellant on reimbursement basis and hence, it
does not constitute performance of taxable service by appellant, so as to
entitle the appellant to claim CENVAT credit thereof.

As regards imposition of penalty
u/s. 78 of the finance act, 1994 for period covered by second show cause
notice, the hon’ble tribunal Held that when second show cause notice (SCN) is
issued within few months after first SCN is issued, it is not open for revenue
to contend suppression of Facts and resultantly, in absence of clear evidence
of suppression with intention to evade service tax payment, levy of penalty
u/s.78 in relation to second period of demand is not proper.

[2016-TIOL-2576-CESTAT-DEL] M/s. Marud- han Motors vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Jaipur-II

fiogf49gjkf0d

Trading cannot be considered as an exempted service prior to April 2011

Facts

The   appellant, 
a  service  provider, 
was  also  engaged in trading activities. CENVAT credit
on common input services was disallowed under rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit
rules, 2004 on the ground that trading activity should be considered as
exempted service in terms of rule 2(e) of the said rules. Since separate
accounts were not maintained, reversal was demanded in accordance with  rule 6(3a) 
of  the  said 
rules  and  the 
demand was confirmed.

 Held

The  tribunal noted that the term exempted service
is defined in Rule 2(e) of the said rules during the relevant period  as 
taxable  services  which 
are  exempt  from the whole of the service tax leviable
thereon. The said definition was amended vide notification 3/2011-CE(NT) dated
01/03/2011 and an explanation was added clarifying that exempted service
includes trading. On perusal of both un-amended and amended provisions of
exempted service, it reveals that the activity of trading was not included
within the ambit of the definition prior to 01/04/2011. Since the period in the
present case is prior to April 2011, the amended definition would not be
applicable and thus rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit rules 2004 does not have any
application and therefore credit is allowable.

{Note: readers may note a similar decision in the case of Kundan
Cars Pvt. ltd.  [2016 (43) STR 630
(tri.-mumbai)] wherein the tribunal relying on the decision of Shariff motors
[2010] 18 Str 64(tr.-Bang)  upheld by the
andhra Pradesh high Court [2015 (38) St j53(a.P)] and Badrika motors [2014 (34)
STR349] Held that reversal of CENVAT credit attributable to trading activity is
not required.}

[2016-TIOL-2520-CESTAT-DEL] Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur vs. M/s Hira Ferro Alloys Ltd, Unit-II

fiogf49gjkf0d

Allegation of suppression is not sustainable when the information is
declared in balance sheet which is publicly available documents.

Facts

The appellant acted as an
intermediary between two companies 
and  received  brokerage 
for  such  services on which no service tax was
discharged. The lower authorities confirmed the demand under business auxiliary
service and the Commissioner (appeals) set aside the demands as being
timebarred, considering the fact that the departmental authorities were in
knowledge of the activity undertaken at the time of their departmental audit in
the earlier years. Accordingly, the revenue was in appeal.

Held

The tribunal noted that the
appellant acted as a commission  
agent   and   therefore  
service   tax   was payable under the category of business
auxiliary service. However, it was observed that the same issue of non­ payment
was not raised earlier during the departmental audit. Moreover, it was not in
dispute that receipt of brokerage was declared in the published balance sheet
of the company. Thus,  once the information
was declared in balance sheets which are publicly available documents, the
allegation of suppression is not sustainable and accordingly, the revenue’s
appeal was dismissed.

[2016-TIOL-2571-CESTAT-CHD] M/s Fermanta Biotech Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh

fiogf49gjkf0d

Suppression  cannot  be alleged when there is a failure to pay
service tax under reverse charge mechanism as there is a scope of
interpretation in such cases.

Facts

The appellant received services
from foreign based commission agents and failed to pay service tax under
reverse charge mechanism. on this being pointed out by the audit team, service
tax liability was discharged and a show cause notice was issued demanding equal
penalty u/s. 78 of the finance  act,
1994. The lower authorities confirmed the demand.

Held

The tribunal  noted that in this case, the services were
received from outside india and the tax was payable under reverse charge
mechanism. It was not a case where the services were provided and the service
tax is payable thereon. Accordingly, the benefit of doubt goes in favor of the
appellant and therefore the charges of suppression cannot be alleged. Thus
provisions of section 73(3) of the finance 
act are attracted and therefore, no show cause notice was required to be
issued and accordingly the penalty was set aside.

2016-TIOL-709-CESTAT-MUM] Milind Kul- karni vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-I

fiogf49gjkf0d

ii.   Tribunal

Reimbursements made to Overseas Branch Office by head Office in india
are not liable to service tax.

Facts

The appellant viz. the Head
Office had established network of branches at different locations outside the
country. The branches acted as salary disbursers of the staff deputed from
india to client locations and carried out other assigned activities. The
salaries and other expenses of running the branch are borne by the head office.
Payments made by the customers are also received in the branches and
transmitted to the head office after netting the expenses incurred by the
branch. Show Cause notice was issued demanding service tax under reverse charge
mechanism on the payments made to the branches considering it business
auxiliary services rendered by them to their head office along with interest
and penalties thereon. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand
primarily on the basis that head office and its branches were different
persons. Accordingly, the present appeal was filed.

Held

The tribunal noted that there was no dispute
that the appellant   had   entered  
into   contractual   agreements with overseas customers for
supply of services which also involved onsite activity undertaken by deputing
employees at the site. Section 66a(2)  of
the finance act, 1994 provided that “a person carrying on a business through a
permanent establishment in India and through another permanent establishment in
a country other than India, such permanent establishments shall be treated as
separate persons for the purpose of this section”. The explanation 1 in s/s.(2)
has designated branches as business establishment overseas. It was observed
that the section is not elastic enough to govern the corporate intercourse and
commercial indivisibility of headquarters and its branches. Accordingly,  any service rendered to the other contracting
party by the branch as branch of the service provider would not be within the
scope of section 66A. Such a legal fiction in relation to overseas activities
is undertaken to prevent escapement from tax by resort to branches to take
advantage of principles of mutuality. A branch by its very nature cannot
survive without resources assigned by the head office. Its employees are the
employees of the organisation itself. There was no independent existence of the
overseas branch as a business. The transfer of funds by gross outflow or by netted
flow is, therefore, nothing but reimbursements and taxing of such reimbursement
would amount to taxing of transfer of funds which was not contemplated by the
act whether before 2012 or after. Accordingly the appeals were allowed.

2016 (44) STR 236 (Mad.) Sree Daksha Property 16 Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Coimbatore

fiogf49gjkf0d

Non-consideration of submissions made by assessee while
passing adjudication order, is an error apparent from record.

Facts

During
adjudication, petitioner asked for deduction of land value for determining
value of services and provided relevant information for calculation.
Adjudication got completed without considering such information and it was
stated that no corroborating and convincing evidences were produced.
Consequently, application for rectification of mistake apparent from record was
filed. The same was rejected by the department on the ground that this was not
an error apparent from record and it was Held that there cannot be a long drawn
process of reasoning on points if there are two opinions, relying on the
hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Sant
Lal Gupta vs. Modern Co-op. Group Housing Society 2010 (262) ELT 6 (SC).

Held

It
was Held that the power to rectify a mistake u/s. 74 of Finance  Act, 1994 cannot be put under a straight
jacket formula and each case has to be tested on its own Facts. Adjudication
order did not discuss the relevance or irrelevance of records produced by
petitioner and did not examine records. This was undoubtedly an error apparent
from records. Further,  opportunity of
being heard was not granted to the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition
was allowed.

2016 (44) STR 207 (M.P.) Indore Municipal 15 corporation vs. CCE (A), Indore (MP)

fiogf49gjkf0d

No  time  limit  is 
prescribed  under  Central Excise act, 1944 for filing
cross-objection
.

Facts

Department filed an appeal and sent
relevant documents to  the  appellants 
with  directions  to 
file  memorandum of cross
objections within 45 days. Due to non-receipt of order, one week’s time was
requested to file cross objections during personal hearing. Cross objections
and one appeal was filed thereafter. However, the same were rejected as
time-barred since department had dispatched the orders through speed post. However,
despite follow up with speed post department, the appellants could not gather
information as to whether the orders were delivered to them. Revenue argued
that in view of section 37C of Central excise act, 1944 read with section 27 of
General Clauses act, 1897, the burden of proof was on assessee to rebut the
presumption of service of speed post.

Held

The hon’ble high Court observed
that section 27 of General Clauses act, 1897 provides presumption for
registered post. However, having regard to section 114 of evidence act, burden
of proof was on assessee to prove that speed post was not delivered. In the
absence of any evidences, the issue was decided against the appellants.

Cross objections should be filed
within 30 days from receipt of notice of appeal vide order  41, rule 22 of CPC. Though direction was made
to file cross objection within 45 days, no time limit is prescribed under Central
Excise Act, 1944. Accordingly, cross objection filed within extended time
period allowed by the appellate authority and taken on record cannot be said to
be time-barred.

2016 (44) STR 31 (Mad.) Hitech Manpower 14 Consultant Pvt. Ltd. vs. CESTAT Chennai

fiogf49gjkf0d

Is condonation of a delay in filing an appeal beyond statutory
prescribed period possible?

Facts

An appeal was filed by Appellant
before the Tribunal after a lapse of statutory period of filing of appeal along
with application for condonation of delay. Appellant prayed that delay occurred
due to misplacement of order by security guard who received the order on
account of closure of company for the last four years. The tribunal dismissed
the appeal on the ground that the reason stated for the delay was not
acceptable.

Held:

On appeal before the high  Court, the Court observed that normally, fault
of employees cannot be a reason for condoning delay. But, considering the fact
of closure of company in this case, the Court agreed to condone the delay and
accordingly, set aside the order of the tribunal rejecting the appeal and
directed the tribunal to take up the appeal for hearing.

Transfer of intangible rights: Sale or service?

fiogf49gjkf0d

In a recently reported
case of Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2016 (44)
STR 161 (Bom) whereunder two writ petitions, one filed by the captioned company
(referred to as the Monsanto) and the other filed by Subway Systems (India)
Pvt. Ltd. (Subway), Hon. Bombay High Court painstakingly examined whether each
of the transactions involved were liable for VAT or service tax.  Although the facts in both the petitions were
totally different, interestingly the petitions were tagged together on finding that
the issue involved was similar.  Facts in
both the cases are briefly summarized below:

Monsanto’s
case:

The petitioner, Monsanto
supplied to third parties certain type of hybrid cotton seed which was infused
with a proprietary technology that protects it against a known menace to cotton
corp.  From these hybrids, these parties
generate large quantities of sowable seeds which are in turn sold to cotton
farmers.  The end product seeds thus have
the benefit of menace protection technology. 
The parties to whom the technology is provided in the form of seeds, (known
as donor seeds) make commercial use of the technology.  In the backdrop of these facts, Monsanto has
claimed that this is a case of offer of technology through container seeds.  The party pays for technology and not
container.  They do not sell any goods to
the end user.  Therefore, there being no “transfer
of right to use”, they should be exigible to service tax.  Central to their claim was
non-exclusivity.  Monsanto licensed to various
third parties the said technology.  Those
developers in turn cannot sub-license the technology.  They use it to produce sowable seeds.  Therefore the recipients of technology obtain
right to use the technology but there is no transfer of that right.  The container seed is the only means by which
technology can be transferred.  Provision
of technology was followed by training for using donor seeds and developing
foundation seeds and training for undergoing regulatory tests before the
licensee could produce foundation seed. For this, a one-time fixed fee plus a
trait fee was received by Monsanto under the agreement with third parties.  Petitioner’s plea was that service tax and
VAT are mutually exclusive and well settled relying inter alia on BSNL 2006 (2) STR
161 (SC)
, Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd.
vs. CTO 2008 (9) STR 337
and Association
of Learning and Finance Companies vs. UOI 2010 (20) STR
417
.  The petitioner’s main
contention was that there did not involve “transfer
of right to use goods”
in the transaction of providing donor seeds.  This was pleaded mainly on the ground that
there is absence of ‘exclusivity’ and inability of the transferor to transfer
the same right to another in terms of twin
tests
comprised in the five attributes required to be satisfied as laid
down in the case of BSNL (supra).  In
this judgment to constitute a transaction as one of “transfer of right to use the goods”, 5 attributes are required to
be satisfied viz. there are goods available for delivery, there is consensus ad
idem as to the identity of the goods, the transferee must have a legal right to
use the goods and the twin tests of temporary ‘exclusion’ of the transferor to
have the said right i.e. during the period the transferee has such right and
incapacity of transferor to again transfer the same rights to others.  According to the petitioner, the said test
applies to tangible and intangible goods equally and therefore the law laid
down in Duke & Sons (1999) 1 Mah LJ
26,
Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra
(2015) 80 VST 173 (Bom)
and Nutrine
Confectionary Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 40 VST 327 (AP)

did not represent correct position in law as certain facts were not made available
to the Court at the time these cases were decided. For instance, when Duke
& Sons’ case (supra) was decided, judgment of Supreme Court interpreting
Article 366 (29A)(d) was not available.  Further,
in Nutrine’s case (supra), BSNL’s test was not correctly applied and it was contrary
to BSNL.  Based on these submissions
among others, it was pleaded that their case is one of permissive use only and
not a sale or deemed sale. Since such transaction of permissive use is covered
under service tax law, it is one of service.

Subway’s
case:

In this case, the
transaction is a franchise agreement. Subway has claimed that franchise
agreement is a pure service.  Its
franchisees in Mumbai have obtained right to display Subway’s trademarks.  The franchisees enjoy no title to these trademarks.  This is therefore neither a sale nor a deemed
sale.  Subway’s business consists of possessing
non-exclusive sub-license from Subway International B.V., a Dutch LLC (which in
turn received in a second layer from an American company owning proprietary
rights) to establish, operate and franchise others to operate SUBWAY branded
restaurants, serving sandwiches and salads under the service mark, SUBWAY in
India.  Under franchise agreements
entered into with third parties, specified services are listed to enable
franchisee to operate sandwich shops in Subway’s name.  The rights are limited and they are non-transferable
or non-assignable.  Further, Subway
reserves the right to compete with its franchisees.  Consideration from the franchisees is received
by way of one-time franchise fee and royalty payable weekly based on weekly turnover.  The petitioner paid service tax since 2003 on
these fees.  The State Government however
contended that since the franchisee has acquired right to use trademarks, there
is a transfer of right to use those trademarks and therefore claimed VAT on
this in 2014 and issued notice to this effect and subsequently several show
cause notices as well as exparte assessment order.  The petitioner pleaded that the franchise
agreement was not one for sale or transfer of right to use but merely
permitting the franchisee to display certain marks and use certain technologies
and methodology to prepare salads and sandwiches for sale and this was a
permissive use.  Subway could enter into
as many / as few agreements with other franchisees even simultaneously and
could compete with its franchisees.  The
license provided thus is limited.  Apart
from this factual aspect, it was also pleaded for Subway that in the light of
several decisions of the Supreme Court on various composite contracts, Article
366(29A) was amended in 1983 whereby only under six specific situations,
transactions could be considered deemed sale and the amendment allowed specific
composite contracts to be divisible and by separating element of ‘sale’ it
could be taxed.  Subway’s agreement could
not be split and sale was not distinctly discernible.  However, the revenue contended that
‘franchise’ and ‘trademarks’ are expressly covered under MVAT Act since 2005 as
‘goods’ and therefore liable for VAT. 
Both revenue and the petitioner relied on Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (2015) 80 VST 173 (Bom). The
petitioner chiefly relied on Asian Oilfield
Services vs. State of Tripura (2015) SCC (online Tai 483
and BSNL (Supra) 
and Imagic Creative (supra).

Findings
of the Court:

The Court on a very
careful consideration in Monsanto’s case found that although ld. Counsel for
the petitioner commended that the transaction of transferring technology was
one of “permissive use”, in view of the Court, the said interpretation was not
supported by law.  The Court observed
that the seeds transferred were fully vested in the transferee.  On the issue of effective control, the Court
observed that effective control over the said seed and therefore that portion
of the technology embedded in the seeds was also transferred to the transferee.  The transferee could do whatever it wished
and Monsanto had no control left after the transfer.  Hence the transfer was to the exclusion of
Monsanto India and this satisfied the twin test laid down in BSNL.  The Court, in this context categorically observed
that BSNL’s judgment noted various factual aspects and the test was therefore
set out in those circumstances. Thus Hon. Supreme Court in that case did not
have occasion to consider its applicability to intangible property like
intellectual property.  The Court thus
also observed that Tata Sons (supra) was interpreted accordingly whereas Kerala
High Court in Malabar Gold (para 35), 2013 (32) STR
3 (Ker) took a contrary view.  It took
BSNL test to be applicable as a general proposition.  The Court expressed that they had serious
reservation about its universal applicability by stating, “we do not think this can ever be a correct reading of BSNL”.  Further that the Bombay High Court in Duke &
Sons (supra) held that test would not be applicable in the case of
trademarks.  According to the Court
therefore the law laid down in Duke & Sons is a good law.  The Court thus considered the instant case to
be the case of a transfer of the right to use goods while inter alia also
referring to various clauses in the agreement pointed out by the revenue in
support thereof.  For instance under a
specific clause 7.1, the sub-licensee could assign the agreement and its rights
and obligations under the agreement to its wholly-owned subsidiaries without
permission of Monsanto.  This according
to the Court would not happen if there was only permissive use as claimed by
the petitioner. Revenue’s reliance on the case of G. S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 43 VST 323
was viewed as well-founded by the Court while observing that in the instant
case, sub-licensing actually amounted to passage of effective control.  The Court also drew analogy in fair detail
with downloading of software by purchasing license.  The Court observed that when a license is
purchased, it is still a sale although what the user has purchased is a right
to use software.  Proprietary rights to
the software do not have to be transferred or sold.  On identical lines in the instant case
identified technology, the one which was infused in seeds were transferred to
use as the transferee wished.  The
intellectual property may continue to be owned by Monsanto.

Finding this case to be diametrically
opposed to model in the case of Subway, the Court observed that primarily
reliance on the case of Asian Oilfield and BSNL by the petitioner was correct
as Subway’s transaction could not be split into two distinct or severable
components.  If State was to be permitted
to tax the whole transaction, it would mean extending upon the power of the
Centre under the Union List.  The Court
noted that agreement between Subway and its franchisee is a bare permission to
use as there is no passage of any kind of control or exclusivity to the
franchisees and for all the reasons in law and fact that licensing of
technology in Monsanto is held to be transfer of right to use, the franchise
agreement in Subway’s case must be held permissible use only. 

The Court however noted
with caution to state that this did not mean that every franchise agreement
will necessarily be outside the purview of amended MVAT Act.  However, merely because of inclusion of
franchisees under MVAT Act would not automatically make all franchise
agreements liable to VAT.  There may be
class of agreements of franchise that would have all incidents of a ‘sale’ or a
“deemed sale” i.e. transfer of the right to use to attract VAT and not
otherwise.  However, limiting its view on
the agreement under the case of Subway, the Court opined that the facts of the
case does not constitute a sale exigible to VAT.  Equally it rejected a proposition that the
transaction which is nothing but a service could be converted as sale merely because
an entry is inserted in the State statute. 
Subway agreements are purely licensing agreements consisting of permissive
right to franchisees to use defined intangible rights, therefore not amenable
to VAT but a service liable for service tax.

Conclusion:

The above decision in
particular in the case of Subway relying on the decision of Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra
(2015) 80 VST 173 (Bom)
based on an altogether different aspect reached a
verdict that the franchise agreement involved is exigible to service tax than
one reached in the  case of Malabar Gold Pvt.
Ltd. (supra).  In Subway’s case above, it
is found that only “permissive use” is granted under the agreement and
therefore it cannot be interpreted as “transfer of right to use goods” whereas
Kerala High Court decided “franchise agreement” as one of service simply based
on interpreting the tests provided in BSNL’s case (supra) as having general
proposition even vis-à-vis intangible goods like intellectual property. It is
important to note that in this case, the Court has categorically made a point
in the context of Monsanto’s case that in the case of BSNL (supra), Hon.
Supreme Court did not have occasion to examine the aspects of transfer of
intangible goods such as intellectual property. Therefore the tests laid down
therein for determining a transaction of “transfer of right to use goods”
should not be followed as having universal application and especially in the
context of transactions involving transfer of use of intangible goods.  A thin line divides a transaction of service
from that of sale.  The controversy soon
is likely to be part of history with the onset of GST regime coming into force
in a short while.  Yet, one cannot ignore
the hardship faced in this regard by a large number of tax compliant entities
which have paid tax under one law and has  to face wrath of the other for want of
appropriate law and mechanism to resolve the manmade issue.

(Readers may read the
above with March, 2016 issue of BCAJ article on transfer of use of intangibles
under service tax feature).

[2016-TIOL-1851-CESTAT-MUM] Bny Mellon International Operations India P. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

fiogf49gjkf0d
When premium on group insurance does not vary with the number of family members covered, entire service tax charged on such premium is available as CENVAT credit.

Facts
The Appellant an exporter of services filed a refund claim of the accumulated CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. CENVAT credit of service tax paid on premium charged on group insurance scheme was disallowed on the ground that the said insurance also covered the family members of the employee which is not related to the output service.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the premium charged does not vary with the number of dependents who are additionally covered by the same insurance scheme. Accordingly even if none of the dependents were within the coverage, the premium amount would not alter or vary. Thus no part of premium is attributable to the extension of coverage to family members. Appeal is allowed and refund granted.

[2016-TIOL-1299-CESTAT-MUM] Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad vs. Ratnaprabha Motors

fiogf49gjkf0d
Services provided by automobile dealers to financial institutions was decided only upon issuance of Circular No. 87/06/2006-ST dated 06/11/2006. Therefore demands prior to the said date cannot be confirmed.

Facts

The Assessee receives commission from various financial institutions for introducing customers seeking loans/finances to such banks/NBFCs. The First Appellate Authority confirmed the demand only from 06/11/2006. Further the demand pertaining to sharing of profit was also set aside as such an arrangement was not liable to service tax. The Revenue appealed only against the demands set aside for the period prior to 06/11/2006.

Held
The Tribunal noted the observations of the First Appellate Authority wherein it has been provided that the classification of service was finally decided by the Board vide Circular dated 06/11/2006 as Business Auxiliary Service. Therefore extended period and penalties under section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 are liable to be set aside. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Jaiprakash Ind. Ltd. [2002-TIOL- 633-SC-CX] and Suchitra Components [2008 (11) STR 430 SC] to hold that extended period is not invokable.

[2016-TIOL-1408-CESTAT-MAD] GRR Logistics P. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

fiogf49gjkf0d
Penalty u/s. 78 cannot be imposed when there is no discussion on the allegation of fraud, collusion, willful misstatement or suppression of facts in the Show Cause Notice.

Facts
During the course of audit it was observed by the departmental officers that there was a short payment of service tax. On being pointed out the Appellant paid up the entire demand along with interest. Thereafter a Show Cause Notice was issued proposing appropriation of amounts already paid and imposing penalty u/s. 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. It was argued that the entire demand along with interest was paid and there was no non-payment and therefore the SCN cannot survive u/s. 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the SCN is silent on the ingredients of suppression. The only allegation is that the “fact of nonpayment came to the notice of the department on account of audit” which is not sufficient for invocation of penalty u/s. 78. Penalty can be imposed only under the circumstances mentioned in section 78 which is not alleged in the SCN. Thus what is not alleged cannot be traversed at a later point of time in any proceedings. Therefore the penalty is unsustainable.

Note: Readers may note a similar decision in the case of Ishvarya Publicities P. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax [2016-TIOL-1409-CESTAT -MAD] and the decision of S. K. Poly Formulations P. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-II [2016-TIOL-1407-CESTAT -MAD] where penalty imposed u/s. 76 was accordingly set aside.

2016 (42) STR 752 (Tri.-Mum.) JDSU India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Pune.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Classification of input services cannot be changed by service recipient for availing CENVAT credit on input services. Further, works contract for repairs, renovation and modernization of the premises are not eligible for CENVAT credit.

Facts
Appellant availed CENVAT credit on services of repairs, renovation and modernization of the premises classified as “works contract service” by service provider. Works contract services are specifically excluded from the definition of “input services”. The Appellant challenged denial of CENVAT credit on the grounds that the services for renovation and modernization of the premises were specifically covered in the inclusion clause of the definition of “input services”.

Held
There cannot be different yardstick for the purpose of classification of service at the service provider’s and service recipient’s end. In other words, classification of service cannot be disputed at service recipient’s end. Works contract service is not one service but a bunch of various activities like renovation, repairs, construction, erection, installation where the material is also involved during the course of provision of service. If renovation and modernization services are provided and classified individually, they shall be eligible for credit. However, if these services are provided as bunch under works contract, they shall not be considered as input services. If CENVAT credit is allowed on the basis of nature of service by claiming that services were for renovation and modernization of premises, it would make exclusion clause of input service redundant. Accordingly, CENVAT credit was denied.

2016 (42) STR 329 (Tri.-Bang.) AMR India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex, Cus. and S.T., Hyderabad-II.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Free supply of items by service recipient cannot be added to the value of service.

Bonus or incentive given for good performance to service provider after the completion of service cannot be assumed to be the value of services as it was not known at the time of provision of services.

Facts

Appellants were engaged in providing site formation, clearance and excavation services and service tax was discharged on consideration for such service. As per the terms of agreement, their clients were providing specific quantities of diesel and explosives with the condition of incentives/penalties for short/excess usage of free supplies. Revenue contended that cost of free supplies and amount of incentive should be added to value of services. Commissioner did not follow the decision of Larger Bench in case of Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd vs. CST, Delhi 2013 (32) STR 49 (Tri.-LB) on the basis that the said decision was in the context of construction services in general and on the meaning of the term “gross amount charged” provided in specific notification. Further, various judgements were relied observing that bonus/incentive given to service provider for appreciating services which were not known at the time of providing services were never a ‘consideration’ received by the assessee.

Held

Following various decisions, it was held that the value of diesel and explosives supplied free of cost shall not be included in the value of services. Further, bonus/ incentives calculated after the provision of services were in the nature of prize money for good performance and cannot be linked to the value of services.

2016 (42) STR 686 (Tri.- Ahmd.) Paul Mason Consulting India (P.) Ltd. vs. C.C.E. & S.T., Vadodara.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Relevant date for calculation of time limit of 1 year for CENVAT credit refund shall be the date of export invoice.

Facts
The Appellant filed claim for refund of accumulated CENVAT credit on account of export of services. Department rejected the claim as time barred under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (CEA). The Appellant contended that section 11B is applicable only to the refund of duty and interest whereas refund of CENVAT credit is governed by Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules which does not prescribe any such time limit. Furthermore, it was contended that they have filed the refund claims within one year of the quarter-ending, pertaining to the quarter for which refund claims were made and also claimed that relevant date shall be the date of export invoice. Respondent contested that procedure for refund of CENVAT credit has been prescribed vide notification no. 27/2012-CE(NT) dated 18/06/2012, issued under Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 wherein time limit as per section 11B is made applicable for refund of CENVAT credit.

Held
Time limit of one year is applicable to refund of CENVAT credit. Analysis of decision on the subject matter revealed that CENVAT credit though not a duty but has been equated with duty since section 11B is made applicable to refund of CENVAT credit. The relevant date for filing of refund claim would be the date of export invoice, being the date when cause for refund has arose and time limit of one year shall be reckoned from the said date.

2016 (42) STR 527 (Tri-Delhi) Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & ST. Delhi –III.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether proportionate service tax paid on services used for generation of electricity at factory needs to be reversed in case of partial sale of electricity?

Facts
The appellant was engaged in manufacture of motor vehicles and parts thereof which were liable to excise duty. They have a captive power plant inside their factory. Some portion of the power generated was sold to other units for a consideration. CENVAT was availed on transportation of gas services used for manufacture of power. Adjudicating authority passed an order for reversal of CENVAT credit attributable for electricity sold outside. It was contested that ‘nexus’ test is applicable only in case of inputs and not input services. In case of input services, it should be used directly or indirectly, in or in relation to the manufacture of final products. Hence, as long as input service was used by the manufacturer, no portion of credit pertaining to such service can be reversed.

Held

The admitted fact is that electricity which is sold by the appellant is not used in or in relation to manufacture of dutiable final products. Consequently, inputs and input services which are used in production of such electricity sold outside will not be eligible for credit as they are outside the ambit of definition of input and input service as defined in CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. Hence, demand for reversal of proportionate CENVAT credit is sustainable. It was also observed that since demand was issued on the basis of audit para, it was held that extended period was not invocable and considering repeated amendments in the Cenvat Credit Rules resulting in huge amount of litigation, it was held that no penalty shall be imposed.

2016 (42) STR 450 (Tri-Mum.) Commr. Of Ex., Goa vs. Kamat Constructions & Resorts Pvt. Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
III. Tribunal

CENVAT credit on capital goods is allowed when the assessee was registered as a service receiver (person liable to take registration under reverse charge) only which was subsequently amended as a service provider. Further full CENVAT credit of capital goods is allowed in the second or the third year when no CENVAT is taken in the first year.

Facts
The Appellants had bought duty paid capital goods and subsequently availed CENVAT credit for the same. However, it was registered as service receiver when the capital goods were bought. Therefore, the adjudicating authority disallowed the CENVAT with respect to the same. Subsequently the Appellants amended its registration as Service provider on a later date. With respect to some capital goods procured by the assessee, the assessee had not taken any CENVAT credit in its first year and had taken full CENVAT credit in the second/subsequent years. The adjudicating authorities levied interest and penalties stating that CENVAT credit was taken wrongly.

Held
It was observed that in various judgments, Tribunals have allowed CENVAT credit for those assessees who were not registered with the service tax department at all. However, in the present case, the Appellants were at least registered as a service recipient. Therefore, there is no reason why credit in the present case be not allowed. Further, it was observed that with respect to CENVAT credit of capital goods, provision of Rule 4(2) of CCR allows an assessee to avail 50% of CENVAT in the first year and balance CENVAT in the subsequent years. Hence, if no credit has been taken in the first year at all, the assessee can avail 100% CENVAT in subsequent years. Therefore appeal was allowed.

2016 (42) STR 668 (Mad.) Classic Builders (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. vs. CESTAT, Chennai.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Tribunal has power and jurisdiction to restore the appeal on belated payment of pre-deposit on the basis of merits of the case.

Facts
The Appellant’s application for pre-deposit in installments was rejected by the Tribunal and the appeal was dismissed for non-compliance. Furthermore, restoration of appeal consequent to belated pre-deposit was also dismissed. Revenue contended that Tribunal had become “functus officio” on account of dismissal of appeal and it had no power to restore the appeal, once it is dismissed. Appellant contended that they had a very good case on merits which needs to be considered while deciding restoration of appeal.

Held
Right to appeal is a statutory right and pre-deposit requirement is procedural. Therefore, delay in making pre-deposit cannot hamper the primary right of appeal.

2016 (42) STR 425( Ori.) Maa Engineering vs. Registrar, CESTAT, Kolkata.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Court can reduce the amount of pre-deposit as directed by the Tribunal on the grounds of financial difficulties of the assessee and direct them to pay pre-deposit equal to mandatory percentage as prescribed in section 35F of Central Excise Act, 1944 even for appeals filed during the year 2012

Facts
The petitioner had filed appeals before the CESTAT in the year 2012 wherein pre-deposit of 25% of tax amount was ordered. Due to financial hardship they were unable to comply with the directions and hence challenged the predeposit order before the High Court.

Held

Although the amended provisions of section 35F of Central Excise Act, 1944 are not retrospective yet the High Court exercised its writ jurisdiction and considering the financial difficulties of Appellant to obtain statutory remedy, directed to make pre-deposit of 7.5% of the duty amount and passed the stay order till disposal.

2016 (42) STR 420 (Del) CHL Limited vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Department cannot refuse application for adjournment on medical grounds of Chartered Accountant and pass ex-parte order when case was pending with department over six years.

Facts
A Show Cause Notice was pending since more than 6 years wherein only one hearing was held. An application for adjournment was filed before adjudicating authority accompanied by a Medical Certificate for the representative CA. However, the Adjudicating Authority passed an ex-parte order on the last date of his service period by refusing the adjournment request. Appellant filed writ before High Court challenging the ex-parte order.

Held

Reasonable request of adjournment was unjustifiably refused and the Petitioner was deprived of the opportunity of effectively participating in the adjudication proceedings which appears to be a case of violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore the High Court held that writ is maintainable in spite of availability of alternative remedy. It was observed that it would not have caused any serious prejudice to the department if the request for adjournment was accepted. It appears that the Adjudicating Authority was in a hurry to conclude the proceedings as he did not want to show the notice as pending for over six years and therefore, passed the order on the last date before his retirement. Therefore, the order was set aside with a direction to resume adjudication proceedings.

[2016] 69 taxmann.com 97 (Calcutta HC) – Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata

fiogf49gjkf0d
When Show Cause Notice is issued on the basis of allegation of “suppression of facts”, department must specify particulars of allegedly suppressed facts, otherwise such SCN issued by invoking extended period of limitation is bad in law.

Facts
Department initiated an enquiry in the year 1998 for levy of service tax under consulting engineer service. The petitioner clearly replied that they were engaged in civil engineering construction and therefore were not consulting engineers. An enquiry was again initiated in the year 2004 which was duly attended to. Thereafter summons were issued after almost 16 months which was also duly replied to. Finally, without making any reference to the previous notices, department issued a show cause notice in the year 2006 for the period October 2000 to March 2005 by invoking extended period of limitation on the ground of suppression of facts with an intention to evade service tax. A reply was filed to the said notice. Another show cause notice was issued in the year 2009 for the period September 2004 to June 2005. This notice culminated in an order in February, 2012. Thereafter in 2013 a personal hearing notice was received for the notice pertaining to 2006. The said notice invoking extended period by alleging suppression of facts which were actually known to the department since 1998 as well as the notice of hearing which was issued after almost 7 years is challenged in the present writ.

Held

The High Court firstly noted that the question of limitation is a question of jurisdiction and therefore the writ is maintainable. As regards allegations of suppression of facts, it was noted that all the enquiries raised by the department were diligently replied and the scope of business was also explained. Further the notice itself provided that the same was issued on basis of records submitted. In the notice there is no allegation of any conscious act constituting fraud, collusion or suppression of facts but a sweeping statement is made that had investigation not been conducted material facts would not have been unearthed. Relying upon various judicial precedents, i.e. CCE vs. Chennai Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. [2007] 8 STT 168, CCE vs. Chemphar Drugs and Liniments 1989 taxmann.com 612 (SC), Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd. vs. CCE [2005] 2 STT 226 (SC), it was held that it is well known preposition that mere failure to disclose a transaction and pay tax thereon or mere misstatement or contravention of provisions of law is not sufficient for invocation of extended period of limitation. There has to be a positive, conscious and deliberate action, viz. a deliberate misstatement/suppression, in order to evade payment of tax. Once the information is supplied to the revenue authority and the same is not questioned, a belated demand has to be held as barred by limitation [CCE vs. Punjab Laminates (P.) Ltd. 2006 (202) ELT 578 (SC) replied upon]. Further while quashing the notice, the court also held that two show cause notices cannot be issued for the same period and further the notice issued with a pre-determined mind at the instance of a CERA Audit is also not sustainable. It was also held that a quasijudicial authority must act independently and not at the dictates of some other authority. Further on merits also it was held that Civil Engineering Construction carried on by the petitioner being a composite works contract cannot be vivisected to segregate the service element as held by the Supreme Court in the case of C,CE&C vs. Larsen & Toubro Ltd [2016] 60 taxmann.com 354. Thus the writ was allowed.

Note:
Readers may note that, the case involves a principle which could be of use in matters involving extended period of limitation. Recently, Hon’ble Bombay High Court, in the case of Excel Production Audio Visuals (P.) Ltd vs UOI, [2016] 69 taxmann.com 94 (Bombay), quashed the adjudication order which was passed almost 16 months after the date of hearing and directed re-adjudication.

[2016-TIOL-1077-HC-DEL-ST] Suresh Kumar Bansal vs. Union of India & ORS

fiogf49gjkf0d
II. High Court

In absence of machinery provisions to exclude non-service elements from a composite contract of construction of residential complex service, no service tax can be levied.

Facts
The petitioner entered into an agreement with a builder to buy flats in a housing project developed by the builder. It is contended that the agreement with the builder is a composite contract for purchase of immovable property and therefore in absence of a specific provision for ascertaining the service component of the said agreement, the levy would be beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament. Thus the question before the Court is whether consideration paid by flat buyers to builder/developer for acquiring a flat in a complex which is under construction is leviable to service tax. Reliance was placed on Circular No. 108/02/2009-ST dated 29/01/2009 wherein it was provided that the initial agreement between the promoters/builders/developers and the ultimate owner is in the nature of agreement to sell and the property remains under the ownership of the seller. Therefore, any service provided by such seller in connection with the construction of residential complex till the execution of such sale deed would be in the nature of “self-service” and consequently would not attract service tax. Further levy of service tax on preferential location charges was also challenged

Held

The High Court observed that the explanation to section 65(105)(zzzh) inserted by the Finance Act, 2010 created a legal fiction, whereby a set of activities carried on by a builder for himself are deemed to be that on behalf of the buyer and the Parliament is also competent to create such a deeming fiction. Moreover it cannot be disputed that the buyer acquires an economic stake in the project and the services subsumed in construction service in relation to a construction of a complex are rendered for the benefit of the buyer. Therefore it was held that the element of service involved cannot be disputed. However it was noted that it is essential to examine the measure of tax used for the levy as it is impermissible to tax the nonservice elements involved in the transaction viz. goods and immovable property. In the present case section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 do not provide for any machinery for ascertaining the value of services involved in relation to construction of a complex. Rule 2A of the said rules does not cater to determination of value of service which involves sale of land. Thus neither the Act nor the Rules provide the required machinery. The abatement to the extent of 75% by a notification or a circular cannot substitute the lack of statutory machinery provisions to ascertain the value of services involved in a composite contract. Thus it was held that in absence of a measure of tax, the levy fails. Further the levy of service tax on service of preferential location was upheld as it represented an additional value that a customer would derive by obtaining a particular unit as per its preference and therefore involved an element of service.

Note: Readers may note a contrary decision of the Madras High Court in the case of N. Bala Baskar vs. Union of India & others [2016-TIOL-824-HC-MAD-ST] digest provided in BCAJ June 2016 wherein the Court primarily held that the writ was not maintainable as it is not open for a recipient to challenge the levy. However it is important to note that decision dealt with the case of joint development agreement and the Court merely held that such agreement for development is a service exigible to service tax without commenting on its valuation aspect.

2016 (42) STR 401 (S.C) Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai vs. Lark Chemicals P. Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d

I. Supreme Court

Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 envisages a complete waiver of penalty once reasonable cause of failure is established and the same cannot be applied to reduce partially minimum penalties prescribed u/s. 76 and 78 of Finance Act, 1994

Held
On following the judgement of Union of India and Others vs. Dharamendra Textile Processors and Others’ 2008 (231) ELT 3 (SC), it has been held that penalties imposed under section 76 and section 78 cannot be reduced u/s. 80 of Finance Act, 1994.

(Note: section 80 has been omitted with effect from 14/05/2015. The judgment may be relevant to the period prior to deletion of section 80).

‘Sale’ vis-à-vis exchange/barter

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction
Under Sales Tax Laws, the transactions of ‘sale’ are liable to tax. The transaction of ‘sale’ is to be understood as per Sale of Goods Act, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Gannon Dunkerly & Co. (9 STC 353)(SC). In this case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has interpreted the term ‘sale’ and has held that the transaction to be a sale, it should fulfill the minimum criteria as laid down in Sale of Goods Act. In fact, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under in relation to transaction of sale:-

“Thus, according to the law both of England and of India, in order to constitute a sale it is necessary that there should be an agreement between the parties for the purpose of transferring title to goods, which of course presupposes capacity to contract, that it must be supported by money consideration, and that as a result of the transaction property must actually pass in the goods ……”

From above passage it is clear that to be a ‘sale’ following criteria should be fulfilled.

(i) There should be two parties to contract i.e. seller/ purchaser,
(ii) The subject matter of sale is moveable goods,
(iii) There must be money consideration and
(iv) Transfer of property i.e. transfer of ownership from seller to purchaser.

Deemed sale by way of works contract

By 46th Amendment to the constitution, the concept of deemed sales was introduced which can be taxed under sales tax laws. One of the deemed sales is ‘works contract’ which has been introduced by Article 366 (29A)(b) in the Constitution of India.

A question arose as to whether the whole works contract price is liable to tax or only value relating to the goods. While analyzing the taxability of above deemed sale category of works contract, Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Builders Association of India (73 STC 370)(SC) stated as under:

“Hence, a transfer of property in goods under sub-clause (b) of clause (29-A) is deemed to be a sale of the goods involved in the execution of a works contract by the person making the transfer and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer is made. The object of the new definition introduced in clause (29-A) of article 366 of the Constitution is, therefore, to enlarge the scope of “tax on the sale or purchase of goods” wherever it occurs in the Constitution so that it may include within its scope the transfer, delivery or supply of goods that may take place under any of the transactions referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (f) thereof wherever such transfer, delivery or supply becomes subject to levy of sales tax. So construed the expression “tax on the sale or purchase of goods” in entry 54 of the State List, therefore, includes a tax on the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract also. The tax leviable by virtue of sub-clause (b) of clause (29-A) of article 366 of the Constitution thus becomes subject to the same discipline to which any levy under entry 54 of the State List is made subject to under the Constitution..”

It can be seen that works contract is nothing but composite transaction for supply of goods and for supply of services. By the constitution amendment the composite transaction is notionally divided between goods and services.

It is also clear that to the extent of supply of goods the nature and character of supply is at par with normal sale of goods. In other words, all the criteria as applicable to normal sale i.e. as discussed above in Gannon Dunkerly & Co. (73 STC 370)(SC) are equally applicable to this deemed sale under works contract.

Therefore, even under works contract, the transaction should be against money consideration and if it is against any other consideration in form of goods or property etc., it cannot be a taxable transaction under sales tax laws, as it will not fall in the category of ‘sale’ but in the category of ‘barter’ or ‘exchange’.

Definition of ‘sale’ under MVAT Act, 2002
The definition of ‘sale’ in section 2(24) of MVAT Act, 2002 is as under;

“(24) “sale” means a sale of goods made within the State for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge; and the words “sell”, “buy” and “purchase”, with all their grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall be construed accordingly;

Explanation,-—For the purposes of this clause,—
(a) a sale within the State includes a sale determined to be inside the State in accordance with the principles formulated in section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956;
(b) (i) the transfer of property in any goods, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;
(ii) the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of’ a works contract including , an agreement for carrying out for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, the building, construction, manufacture, processing, fabrication, erection, installation, fitting out, improvement, modification, repair or commissioning of any movable or immovable property….”
(emphasis supplied)

It can be seen that even under MVAT Act, 2002, the works contract transaction should be against cash/deferred payment or other valuable consideration.

‘Other valuable consideration’
The term ‘other valuable consideration’, in relation to sales tax laws, is also well understood by judicial pronouncements. Reference can be made to the judgment of Kerala High Court in case of M. Jaihind vs. State of Kerala (111 STC 374)(Ker).

“The essence of a sale lies in the transfer of property “for cash or for deferred payment or for other valuable consideration”. The definition of “sale” contained in the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 cannot be construed to include within its ambit those transactions which do not fall within the definition of “sale” as contained in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and the definition in the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, must therefore be construed accordingly. Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act defines “sale” as a transaction whereby there is transfer of property in goods to the buyer for a price. Section 2(10) of the Sale of Goods Act defines “price as money consideration for ‘sale of goods’”. Thus, in order that a transaction may amount to a sale in accordance with the Sale of Goods Act, the consideration has to be money. The expression “cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration” used in the definition of “sale” in section 2(xxi) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act has to be construed to mean cash or some other monetary payment. The words “other valuable consideration”, which occur in section 2(xxi) of the Act can be interpreted by rules of ejusdem generis, as the payment by cheque, bills of exchange or other negotiable instruments. The words “deferred payment or other valuable consideration” used in section 2(xxi) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act merely enlarge the ambit of the consideration beyond cash, but do not carry it outside the scope of the term “money”. If, the consideration is not money, but for other valuable consideration, it cannot then be a sale.”

Thus, the ‘other valuable consideration’ should also be in money terms like Bill of Exchange or Cheque etc..

Recent judgment of MST Tribunal in relation to SRA Project Hon’ble MST Tribunal had an occasion to decide one of the important issues in relation to alleged works contract transaction. The judgment is in the case of M/s Sumer Corporation (VAT SA No. 335 of 2015 dtd 3.5.2016).

In this case, the facts noted by the Tribunal are as under; “2. Appellant contends that he is engaged in the business of construction of buildings and tenements for Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA). He was assessed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, (INV- 7), Investigation-A, Mumbai for the period 2006-07 under MVAT Act vide order dated 12/05/2014. It is alleged that in the said assessment, assessing authority levied tax on a transaction which is not a sale within the meaning of MVAT Act.

Appellant states that he has constructed buildings for SRA for which he did not receive any money consideration. No contract value in terms of money was fixed. According to him, as per agreement, he has received TDR (Transferable Development Rights), which he has sold and realised money out of that. He claims that the transaction was barter and cannot be taxed under MVAT Act.

He states that assessing authority assessed him as unregistered dealer (URD). He contends that the assessing authority has committed illegality by holding the sale value of TDR and proposed value of TDR as turnover and tax is calculated on the same. He states that TDR itself is not taxable under the MVAT Act. Hence, he contended that appeal be allowed.”

Appellant had submitted that the transfer of property in the given transaction was against allotment of TDR which itself was immovable property or goods but not money consideration. Therefore, it is barter or exchange and not a sale by works contract. The department had considered the money received by sale of TDR as receipt from SRA and levied tax on the same. This was objected to on the ground that sale of TDR is separate transaction and cannot be directly linked as money consideration from SRA.

It was also submitted that if at all the TDR is to be considered as consideration, there was no mechanism given in the law to convert the same in money consideration on which tax could be levied. Relevant judgments were cited.

Hon’ble Tribunal came to the conclusion as under:
“19. Taking into consideration the definition of sale under the MVAT Act as defined in section 2(24) the word ‘other valuable consideration’ would include anything that would directly or indirectly fetch some element of money or any other consideration. In the present case, TDR which is mentioned as Transfer Development Rights can be converted into money and in the present case already appellant has en-cashed some TDR and obtained considerable amount therein and, therefore, TDR would be a valuable consideration. Under these circumstances, the contention of the appellant that the transaction is barter or free of cost or without consideration cannot be accepted.”

Thus Tribunal has departed from settled position that there should be consideration in money terms from the buyer itself. Hon. Tribunal has expanded the meaning of ‘other valuable consideration’ in relation to contracts observing that the earlier judgments are now not relevant after 46th Amendment.

Hon’ble Tribunal has also not appreciated that there is no procedure laid down for conversion of TDR in to money term to compute tax. Hon’ble Tribunal has applied its own theory and held that the monetary value can be ascertained as market value by reference to ready reckoner for stamp duty at the relevant time of agreement. Thus the Tribunal held that transaction is taxable but changed the mode of computation. Lower authorities have levied tax on amount received against sale of TDR, whereas Tribunal has shifted it to market value on the date of agreement. The tax computation is left to the lower authorities.

Conclusion

Though works contract transactions are made taxable, it is equally important that all the criteria, as required to make a transaction a sale transaction, are also applicable to works contract. Further, assuming that consideration in form of other property is also valid than there should be a procedure, prescribed by law, to convert the value of such consideration in money terms. Like, under Service Tax, there are provisions to arrive at monetary value for levy of service tax when the consideration is other than money. Unless such provisions are available under MVAT Act itself, no tax can be attracted on barter transactions. Therefore, the judgment of Hon. Tribunal cannot be said to be final. A decision by higher judicial forums will lay down the correct position.

TAXABILITY OF OCEAN FREIGHT UNDER SERVICE TAX

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction:
The Finance Act, 2016 introduced service tax on services of transportation of goods by a vessel from a place outside India upto the customs station of clearance with effect from 01/06/2016. Section 66D introduced from 01/07/2012 in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) comprising of negative list of services i.e. the services which are outside the ambit of service tax also contained entry (p) (ii) which read as follows:

“(p) Services by way of transportation of goods –
(i) ……………
(ii) by an aircraft or a vessel from a place outside India upto the customs station of clearance in India”.

The above entry now stands omitted with effect from June 01, 2016. However, such services by an aircraft continue to be exempt vide insertion of entry 53 In Mega Exemption Notification No.25/2012-ST.

TRU letter DO.F.No.334/8/2016 – TRU dated 29/02/2016 in this regard clarified as follows:

“(C) The entry in the Negative List that covers services by way of transportation of goods by an aircraft or a vessel from a place outside India up to the customs station of clearance [section 66D (p)(ii)] is proposed to be omitted with effect from 1.06.2016. Clause 146 of Finance Bill 2016 may please be seen in this regard. However such services by an aircraft will continue to be exempted by way of exemption notification [Not. No. 25/2012-ST, as amended by notification No. 09/2016-ST dated 1st March, 2016 refers]. The domestic shipping lines registered in India will pay service tax under forward charge while the services availed from foreign shipping line by a business entity located in India will get taxed under reverse charge at the hands of the business entity. The service tax so paid will be available as credit with the Indian manufacturer or service provider availing such services (subject to fulfillment of the other existing conditions). It is clarified that service tax levied on such services shall not be part of value for custom duty purposes. In addition, Cenvat credit of eligible inputs, capital goods and input services is being allowed for providing the service by way of transportation of goods by a vessel from the customs station of clearance in India to a place outside India. Consequential amendments are being made in Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 [Not. No. 23/2004-CE (N.T.), as amended by Sl. Nos. 2(b) and 5(h) of notification No. 13/2016-C.E. (N.T.) dated refers. ]
(Clause 146 of the Bill refers) “

In terms of the above clarification, consequential amendments are made in CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 to allow CENVAT credit of service tax paid on various input services used by domestic shipping companies or other service providers such as freight forwarders against their earnings from export freight, which hitherto was not available to them as ocean freight was not taxable.

Earlier till 30/06/2012 also, the service of transportation of goods by ocean/waterways did not find place in notified services listed in section 65(105) of the Act. The levy thus relates to service of transportation of goods by ocean in the course of import. Transportation of goods by ocean (or even air) in the course of ‘export’ did not attract service tax in the past i.e. pre and post negative list based tax regime and continue to be outside the scope of service tax by means of operation of Place of Provision of Services Rules,2012 (PoP Rules). The relevant Rule 10 of the said PoP Rules reads as follows:

“10. Place of provision of goods transportation services”.- The place of provision of services of transportation of goods, other than by way of mail or courier, shall be the place of destination of goods.

The above rule thus determines that when the goods are transported by vessel/ocean internationally, the destination of goods being beyond territorial jurisdiction to which the Act extends, the place of provision of the said service is outside India and therefore, no service tax is attracted.

Conventionally, when the goods are imported by vessel/ ocean, customs duty in terms of section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 is charged on the cost of transportation from the place of shipment to the port of importation in India. Thus all applicable levies of customs including Counterveiling Duty (CVD), Cess and Special Additional Duty (SAD) are attracted on the ocean freight. Thus, there has been a view among professionals and freight forwarding fraternity that the freight is being taxed twice; viz. under the Customs Act and now also under Service Tax. In this context, it is relevant to note here, a few observations made in decided cases:

Ocean freight & service tax:

In United Shippers Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise 2015 (37) STR 1043-(Tri.-Mumbai) service tax was sought to be levied as cargo handling service wherein on transportation of goods by barges from mother vessel to the jetty onshore in the course of import of goods into India, it was held that the activity is not liable for service tax as the activity is part of import transaction liable for import duty. However, Tribunal – Delhi in Shri Atul Kaushik & others vs. Commissioner of Customs (Export) 2015 (330) ELT 417 (Tri.-Del), a case of import of packaged software held that there is no provision that warrants exclusion from assessable value for customs on the ground that service tax is charged on the license fee paid on such a software imported when such license fee is a part of condition of sale. In this case, relying on the case of Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC) (wherein it was held that service tax and VAT are exclusive), the Appellants had urged that both service tax and customs duty cannot be demanded on the same transaction. The Tribunal in the reference held that decision is an authority for what it decides and mutuality of customs duty and service tax is not deduced from the said Supreme Court decision. Further, no constitution provisions restricting the same was brought to the notice of Tribunal. Since this decision examined includibility of license fee in assessable value for levying customs duty, the question is whether license fee paid should have suffered service tax when the same was includible for the purpose of customs duty by applying the ratio of decision in United Shippers Ltd. (supra).It is another matter though that license fee payable for a copyrighted product like software (wherein copyright remains vested in seller) would be a transaction of “deemed sale” of goods not liable for service tax as what is transferred is a right to use the copyrighted product against payment of license fees as held by Karnataka High Court in Infosys Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Others 2015-TIOL-HC-KAR-VAT.

In a recent ruling provided by Authority for Advance Rulings in the case of Berco Undercarriages (India) Pvt. Ltd. AAR/ST/10/2016, the Applicant intended to import raw material and appoint a foreign C&F agent for all composite services of handling, arranging shipping liners, clearances at point of origin and destination at a composite fee in his respective currency and customs duty would be paid on the said composite fee invoice. The question was raised as to which portion of the same would attract service tax. Discussing both the above decisions of United Shippers Ltd. (supra) and Shri Atul Kaushik (supra), AAR observed that Tribunal was not consistent on chargeability of service tax when customs duty was levied. It was also noted that transportation service by vessel from outside India upto the customs station in India is in the negative list of services and therefore not chargeable to service tax. However, at the instance of revenue’s contention, Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) 2006 (Valuation Rules) was invoked and it was held that excluding the costs incurred by C&F agent as pure agent if conditions listed in the said Rule 5 of Valuation Rules are satisfied, service tax would be payable by the Applicant on the said invoice as recipient of service. It appears prima facie that AAR’s attention was neither drawn to the Delhi High Court having declared the said Rule 5(1) ultra vires service tax in Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. vs. UOI 2012-TIOL-966-HC-DEL-ST and moreover, importantly relevant here is that neither the principles governing bundled service are examined nor relevant PoP Rules apparently seem to have been brought to the notice of AAR to determine place of provision of service of the service provider referred to as C&F agent. For instance, as per Rule 4 of Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (PoP Rules) when a service provider is in nontaxable territory provides performance based services in relation to goods outside India, no service tax is attracted or as per parameters laid in Rule 9 of the said PoP Rules, the services provided by an intermediary outside India, no reverse charge is attracted. Indeed, AAR ruling is binding only on the Applicant. However, it may cause widespread litigation on the issue involved.

Thus, in addition to the levy of duty of customs already levied while the goods are imported, service tax is levied when an Indian shipping line or a freight forwarder handles a cargo and when the freight is payable at the end of consignee. The issue here is assuming there are two separate taxable events, one under the service tax law and also under the Customs Act, whether or not there is a need for cost addition to the goods by way of service tax as in many cases such as traders, passing on of CENVAT credit is not enabled in terms of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and conventionally when freight is being considered part of the cost of imported goods for the levy of customs duty, why should service tax be levied.

Further service tax levied on transportation in the course of import has different implications on different classes of persons. Factually, a large majority of shipments are handled by Foreign Service providers/freight forwarders and the current levy is not affecting them as they are located in non-taxable territory. As against this, an Indian multimodal transport operator or a freight forwarder handling import shipment would be liable for service tax and therefore they would have less competitive service rate with the incidence of service tax @ 4.5 per cent on import freight and such service providers often do not have potential to pass on the credit. The issue therefore arises is whether any level playing field is really provided to Indian shipping lines or other service providers when majority of the cargo in the course of imports to India is handled by foreign flagship vessels or freight forwarders. Lastly, a mention is necessary here as to nationwide litigation initiated by the service tax department wherein service tax is demanded from service providers earning margin on ocean freight as MTO /freight forwarder/Non- Vessel Owning Common Carrier (NVOCC) i.e. carrying out business on their “own account” akin to traders, margin earned on non-taxable ocean or airfreight is alleged as value of service chargeable to service tax. The department is on its way to file an appeal against Mumbai Tribunal’s decision in Greenwich Meridian Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai 2016-TIOL-869-CESTAT -MUM wherein it has been held that the margin on non-taxable ocean freight is not liable for service tax as business auxiliary service. Now the Government’s own action of levying service tax on import freight is inconsistent with their own claim in litigation of treating margin on freight as value of taxable service does not require to be elaborated further.

Conclusion:

As per internationally known practices, the activity of transportation of goods by vessel or air is not chargeable to VAT or GST implemented by several countries across the globe and is considered part of the cost of imported goods for customs duty. When the Government is so keen on implementing GST as soon as practically possible, whether the levy of service tax was necessary is a poser made by many. However, it is hoped that on implementation of GST, the dual levy will be taken care of in line with international practice.

Welcome GST – VA T (GST) in Canada

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction
This story on the salient features of Canada’s GST continues BCAS’s ongoing series discussing GST concepts, and global perspectives and practices on some of the key elements. The Canada example is especially interesting because of Canada’s system of dual taxation at the Federal and Provincial levels (like our proposed dual GST design which will allow for concurrent taxing powers to the Centre and States on all taxable transactions), and because, as we will see, the Canadian GST model incorporates certain concepts that we are familiar with in the context of income tax.

Taxing powers, GST design and levy

Like India, Canada levies indirect taxes at two levels – there is a federal GST charged by the Federal Government, and retail sales taxes are imposed at the provincial level. In the early 1990s, there was a move by the Federal Government to replace the dual imposition of taxes with a single national levy called the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST). However, not all provinces are participating in the HST system, and some provinces have retained their sales tax regimes instead of switching over to the revenue- sharing model under the HST. Fortunately, in the latest Constitutional Amendment Bill that is with the Rajya Sabha, the possibility of us having two parallel systems operating has been foreclosed.

GST is imposed on the taxable supply of goods and services made in Canada, and is collected as a transaction tax at each stage of the production and distribution value chain. GST also applies to goods imported into Canada, and to certain services and intangibles acquired from outside of Canada, known as ‘imported taxable supplies’.

In Canada, the GST is administered by the Canada Revenue Authority (CRA) which also collects all other taxes imposed by the Federal Government including income tax. GST on imported goods is administered by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). Provincial sales tax regimes are administered locally.

Taxable events
(i) Supply of goods / property

Interestingly, the GST Act does not generally use the term ‘goods’ and instead uses the term ‘property’ which is defined to mean any property whether real or personal, movable or immoveable, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal and to include a right, share and chose in action, but not to include money. As we will see later in this discussion, in the Canadian GST context, ‘property’ may be subdivided into real property, goods and intangibles.

A supply of goods is made when goods are provided to another person in any manner, including sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental, lease, gift or disposition. It is to be noted that a supply takes place regardless of receipt of monetary consideration, and transfers for no consideration are also supplies of goods. Canada also cognizes the concept of deemed supplies of goods (somewhat similar to our “deemed sales” under article 366(29A)) for the compulsory transfer of property, hire purchase transactions etc.

Under the Canadian GST treatment of commissionaire arrangements, an agent is generally not considered the supplier of goods for GST purposes except where the principal is not required to collect GST and the supply is made through a taxable person acting in the course of a taxable activity, in which case the agent is deemed to have supplied goods. In such cases, the agent is deemed not to have supplied agency services to the principal.

Certain transactions that do not attract VAT under the present scheme of taxation in India are treated as taxable under Canadian GST. These include the withdrawal of business goods for personal use where the business is deemed to have made a supply of goods for consideration i.e. a “self-supply”, free-of-charge supplies of goods to third parties (here no GST is payable on the supply in the absence of consideration, yet the supplier can claim input tax credit if the supply is for the purpose of business promotion), situations of change of use of capital goods from taxable to non-taxable activities, cessation of the carrying on of taxable activity, and, importantly, the bringing of goods from one province to another – here, GST may be payable to the extent of the difference in rates between the provinces.

Intangible rights such as the right to use intellectual property, and memberships in clubs and organisations are treated as supply of property and not services.

Special provisions exist in the GST Act for taxing the transaction of a transfer of a business. In an acquisition of all or substantially all of the property necessary for carrying on a business or part of a business, GST does not apply on the consideration attributable to goodwill, and the transfer of each property (and the provision of each service) is deemed to be a separate supply, the tax status of which is required to be determined. However, an option is available whereby the recipient is relieved of the obligation of paying GST where the tax payable on the purchased assets would be fully recoverable through the credit provisions. There are additional relieving rules specific to M&A transactions wherein transfers of property on amalgamation or winding up do not result in a supply of property for GST purposes.

(ii) Supply of services

The term ‘service’ is defined to mean anything other than property, money or the services of an employee. Per this definition, some of the declared services under the Indian service tax law such as non-compete agreements also fall within the aforesaid definition. As mentioned earlier, leases and rentals are not services for GST purposes, as these constitute supplies of goods or real property. A selfsupply of services is generally not subject to GST.

Characterisation of supplies

Under Canadian GST, whether a supply is to be characterised as one of goods or services is to be determined on the basis of general legal principles. Transactions involving a combination of elements (across goods and services) are characterised on the basis of specific provisions and tests developed by case law per which, generally, multiple elements will be considered as a single supply if each of the elements is an integral part of the overall supply. Similarly, supplies of property or services that are incidental to another (principal) supply of property or services are treated as part of the principal supply, if all the properties and services are supplied for a single consideration. Also, a supply of property or services tagged to financial services for a single consideration are deemed to be supplies of financial services, if, among other conditions, the value of the financial services accounts for more than 50% of the consideration. In other words, property can be treated as services (and vice versa) depending upon which is the dominant principal supply. The aforesaid characterisation logic and methodology is in interesting contrast to the tax treatment accorded under the present indirect tax system in India, where we continue to grapple with the challenges of parallel taxation of transactions as sales / deemed sales as well as services.

(iii) Import of goods

Goods imported into Canada are subject to Canadian GST on importation. Complications in tax collection arise on account of the differences in tax rates from one province to another under the HST system, and where there is a separate provincial tax component. In some cases, the CBSA collects the federal and provincial components whereas in others, only the federal component is collected. It is important to note that no tax is payable when a commercial importer imports goods exclusively for use in taxable activities – this idea that that tax need not be paid when credit thereof is available is an important simplification that Canada has applied.

(iv) Imported taxable supply

GST also applies to certain personal property and services acquired from outside of Canada in certain situations, if the recipient in Canada receives the supply otherwise than for use in an exclusively taxable activity (for the reason that credit would not be available).

Place of supply

As stated above, GST is imposed on taxable supplies made in Canada. Like in the Indian scheme of indirect taxation, the taxing jurisdiction covers Canada’s landmass, internal waters, territorial sea the airspace above these, and extends to the EEZ. The rules to determine the place of supply vary according to whether the supply involves property (real property, goods and intangibles) or services.

Supply of real property

 In case of supply related to real property, the place of supply shall be deemed to be the place where such property is located. Therefore, the property must be situated in Canada for the place of supply to be in Canada.

Supply of goods

In determining the place of supply vis-à-vis supply of goods, a distinction has been made between supplies made by way of sale and otherwise. Where goods are supplied by way of sale, the place of supply is deemed to be in Canada if the goods are delivered or made available in Canada to the recipient of the supply – this is generally the place where possession is transferred to the buyer. In case of a supply otherwise than by way of sale (e.g. by way of rental), the place of supply shall be the place where possession or use of the property is given or made available to the recipient of the supply.

Supply of intangibles

A supply of intangible property is deemed to be in Canada if the property may be used in Canada or the property relates to real property or goods situated in Canada or to a service performed in Canada.

Supply of services

The general rule is that a supply of service is deemed to be Canada if the service is wholly or partly performed in Canada. Therefore, services will be deemed to be supplied outside Canada if they are performed wholly outside Canada. As an exception, the place of supply of a service in relation to real property depends upon where the property is situated. Telecommunication services have a separate rule under which the service is considered to be supplied in Canada if 2 out of the following 3 tests are met, viz. (1) the telecommunication is emitted from Canada, (2) the telecommunication is received in Canada, (3) the billing location is in Canada. It is important to note that, therefore, unlike in our service tax legislation, the place of establishment of the service provider or service recipient are not relevant.

In case of goods, intangibles, and services (except admissions to places, activities, and events), the aforesaid rules to determine place of supply are subject to an overriding provision per which despite the supply being determined to having been made in Canada thereunder, by a specific carve out, these supplies are deemed to be made outside Canada if the supplier is not resident in Canada, not registered for GST purposes, and the supply is not made in the course of business carried on in Canada. These transactions may nonetheless be liable to Canadian GST, as imported taxable supplies.

As stated above, GST also applies to goods imported into Canada.

Additional rules apply to determine whether a supply is made in or outside of a particular province. Apart from the aspect of taxing jurisdiction, this is important given that the rates of tax are not the same across the provinces.

It is important to understand the connection between place of supply and taxability in the light of the incidence of GST and the person liable for the payment of tax, which is discussed below.

Taxable person and liability to pay tax
GST applies to businesses operating in Canada. Supplies of goods and services are considered taxable only when made in the course of commercial activity, including isolated or infrequent commercial activity. For individuals, partnerships, and personal trusts, taxability requires reasonable expectation of profit. Real property transactions are deemed to be in the course of taxable activity unless specifically exempted.

Whereas small businesses may choose not to register for GST, charities, non-profit organisations and public bodies are subject to GST like all other persons. For some of these, dispensations in the form of different threshold levels and rebates are available.

The liability to remit GST generally attaches to the supplier, other than in cases where the reverse charge mechanism applies. The reverse charge is restricted to situations of commercial real estate sales, and imported taxable supplies which, as discussed earlier, pertain to supplies made by non-residents.

It is to be noted that the test to determine residential status for the purposes of GST is based on the concept of ‘permanent establishment’, similar to the DTAA concept. Accordingly, a place of management, branch, office, factory, workshop, place of extraction of natural resources, etc., from which supplies are made or head trigger resident status for Canadian GST in respect of activities carried out through the permanent establishment. It may also be noted that under some business models, non-residents making sales to customers in Canada are deemed to carry on business in Canada and are required to register for GST – otherwise, registrations by non-residents are optional.

Canadian GST law contains provisions enabling “group treatment” under which related corporations and partnerships who are resident in Canada and registered for GST can elect to deem intra-group transactions to be made for no consideration, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions.

Time of supply

According to the time of supply provisions, generally, the GST becomes due on the earlier of the following two dates, viz. (1) the date on which consideration is paid, and (2) the date on which the consideration becomes due. Other than in case of property lease or licence transactions where consideration becomes due as per the terms of agreement, as a general rule, consideration becomes due on the earliest of the following three dates, viz. (1) the date on which supplier issues an invoice for taxable supply, (2) the date on which supplier ought to have issued an invoice (in case of delay in issuing invoice), and (3) the date on which recipient is required to make payment of consideration for taxable supply. Per the above, advance payments are liable to tax. However, deposits are not treated as consideration unless so applied by the supplier.

The aforesaid general rule is subject to certain overriding exceptions, among others, such as where in case of conditional sale or hire purchase transactions where the full GST becomes due though payments are spread over a period, and contracts for construction, renovation, etc. to real property and ships where tax cannot be deferred past the month of substantial completion of work. Where consideration is not completely ascertainable on the date GST is payable, the tax becomes payable to the extent that it is ascertainable, and the balance GST is due when only the date that the value is ascertainable.

Unlike the Indian service tax legislation, which provides for payment of taxes on receipt of consideration for certain small businesses, GST in Canada is to be deposited in accordance with the provisions of time of taxation relating thereto.

Valuation for GST

GST is payable ad valorem, and is therefore calculated on the value of consideration paid for a taxable supply. Where the consideration is not expressed in money terms, the fair market value of the consideration forms the tax base. Where there is no actual transaction, e.g. in a situation of a self- supply, the consideration is the base value of the property at the time it was originally acquired, and the tax is the amount that would have been recorded as a tax credit. In transactions between related parties which are not at arm’s length, the supply is deemed to take place at a value equal to the fair market value of the supply – however, this provision is not applied where the customer is engaged in exclusively taxable activity and is therefore eligible to claim all the tax on the transaction as tax credit.

Adjustment of the amount of tax collected (where excess tax is charged) is permitted subject to conditions including a time limit for such adjustment.

Whereas GST is payable on taxable transactions at the appropriate consideration value, where a supplier writes off all or a portion of the consideration and the tax charged, he may claim bad debt relief. There is a 4-year time limit for making such adjustment.

For import transactions, the basis of valuation is as provided for in the customs law. The inclusions and exclusions provided for are similar to the adjustments required under India’s customs valuation provisions which follow from our WTO commitments.

Tax rates, exemptions and zerorating

The tax rates range from 5% to 15%, depending upon the province in which the supply is deemed to have been made. The standard rate of the federal GST is 5% for all taxable supplies made in Canada other than those that are zero-rated, and the balance pertains to the provincial tax component where HST applies.

Export transactions and transactions concluded in Canada which pertain to export transactions are zero-rated. This tax treatment is conditional and also requires fulfilment of certain documentation criteria. It may be noted that there is no GST refund or rebate to travellers who export taxpaid goods out of Canada in their luggage.

In addition to exports, certain supplies under the following categories are also accorded the zero-rate, viz. (1) prescription drugs, (2) medical devices, (3) basic groceries, (4) agriculture and fishing, (5) travel, (6) transportation services, (7) supplies to international organisations, (8) financial services.

Like in the case of zero-rated transactions, no GST is also due on exempted transactions – in case of the latter, the supplier cannot claim input tax credits. Exempted transactions include (1) financial services, (2) healthcare services, (3) welfare and socials security services, and (4) education.

Certain transactions of imports of goods into Canada are exempt from the import GST. These include import of (1) crude oil for use in manufacture of exported refined products, (2) precious metals, and (3) imports for repairs.

Input tax credit, and rebates

One of the inherent benefits of a GST system is the noncascading of taxes in the value chain. Following this principle, Canada’s GST provides that a registrant who acquires or imports a property or a service, may claim an input tax credit for the GST paid thereon as a deduction in the calculation of the tax payable on supplies made by him. As follows, if the amount of input tax credit exceeds the GST payable on the supplies made, the registrant is entitled to a refund.

Sufficient documentation is required to be maintained in order to claim input tax credit as stipulated in the regulations formed for this purpose. However, interestingly, the issuance of an invoice is not mandatory and alternatives for evidencing the tax amount are acceptable.

Under the GST Act, a registered person can generally claim input tax credits within 4 years from the reporting in which such person was entitled to claim credit, but in certain circumstances a shorter time period applies.

As stated above, suppliers of exempted supplies are not eligible to take input tax credit of GST paid by them. Even where tax credits are available, the Canadian GST law proscribes full utilisation of input tax in respect of certain transactions. These include the application of property or services for personal use by employees. A “reasonableness” test applies to limit the amount of credit benefit available. Also, similar to our CENVAT credit provisions, there is a separate methodology for credits pertaining to capital goods.

Rebates of GST are granted to various organizations carrying out operations in the interest of the public, such as hospitals, charities, schools, municipalities etc. The rebate ranges from 50% to 100% of the tax borne by such entities.

Special scheme for small businesses
Small businesses have the option to account for GST on a simplified basis, wherein under a “Quick Method”, they can pay GST at a lower rate (ranging between 0% and 12%) without availing input tax credit. There is another option of a “Simplified Method” to calculate input tax credits under which credit may be determined on the basis of a calculation, as opposed to the tracking the GST paid on each purchase invoice. Similar schemes are also available to charities and public bodies.

Anti-avoidance measures and supplies within group entities

Another income tax concept that the Canadian GST law contains is that of GAAR provisions. The most commonly applied provision pertains to supplies being made at prices not at arm’s length. Under the GAAR provision, the fair market value of the transaction is to be applied, unless the receiver is entitled to full input tax credit. There are two defences against the invocation of GAAR – these are showing that the transaction was undertaken primarily for a purpose other than reduction of the amount of tax due, and demonstrating that it may be reasonable considered that the transaction would not result in misuse or abuse.

Concluding thoughts

The foregoing paragraphs provide just a brief overview of the Canadian GST provisions. As may be evident therefrom, there is significant detailing for specific situations, which is oriented toward effective and efficient tax collection. There are also several provisions that ease assessee compliance and assist in cash flow conservation. These are important ideas for us to keep in mind in the drafting of Indian GST law.

[2016-TIOL-1974-CESTAT-MUM] Raymond Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Nashik

fiogf49gjkf0d
Section 11BB of Central Excise Act, 1944 is intended to ensure accountability on the part of revenue officials and therefore withholding of interest will only serve to encourage irresponsibility and non-responsiveness on part of tax authorities.

Facts
The Appellant paid service tax following a show cause notice issued. The adjudicating authority dropped the demand and after protracted recourse to appeal and review, the Tribunal also accorded finality to non-taxability. The refund claim filed was allowed but the amount sanctioned was transferred to the fund on the ground of “unjust enrichment”. On appeal the first appellate authority allowed the refund to be paid but claim for interest was rejected. Accordingly the present appeal is filed.

Held
The Tribunal noted that section 11BB of Central Excise Act, 1944 is unambiguously clear that non-sanction of refund within three months of filing of claim will set the “interest clock” ticking. Mere pendency of any appellate/ revisionary proceedings cannot justify non-sanction of such refunds. The law does not acknowledge recoveries to any such excuse or loopholes. Section 11BB is intended to ensure accountability on the part of revenue officials and if interest legally provided for in the law is not granted, it tantamounts to defying legislative intent. It was observed that wrongful collection of tax was known since the date of adjudication order and therefore there is no justification to hold back the wrongly credited amount. Accordingly appeal was allowed with a direction to immediately release the interest due on receipt of the order.

Note: Readers may also the note the decision in the case of CCE & ST vs. Ghatge Patil Industries Ltd [2016-TIOL-1970- CESTAT-MUM] holding that even though the amount became refundable after Tribunal order, the interest shall be payable for the period from three months of the date of application till the date of sanction of refund. Reference can also be made to a similar decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Tahnee Heights Co-op Housing Society Ltd vs. The Union of India & ORS [2015-TIOL-1828-HC-MUM-ST] digest reported in the October 2015 issue of BCAJ.

2016 (43) STR 166 (Guj.) New Asian Engineers & Amp. vs. Union of India

fiogf49gjkf0d
Application for condonation of delay shall be decided liberally.

Facts
Petitioner prayed for condonation of delay of 300 days on the ground of financial distress, his daughter’s suicide, scarcity of staff and unfamiliarity with legal procedures. CESTAT rejected the application since the grounds were related to the earlier period and not to the period of delay.

Held
Substantial justice shall be preferred as against technical requirements. Unless delay is inordinate or not explained at all or is due to mala fide intentions or neglect and lethargy, condonation shall be granted liberally. Having regard to the facts of the case, delay was condoned subject to payment of cost.

[2016-TIOL-2072-CESTAT-MUM] Jet Airways India Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

fiogf49gjkf0d
II. Tribunal

Tax paid under reverse charge mechanism which is available as CENVAT credit results in a revenue neutral situation and is a good ground to set aside demands, interest and penalties.

Facts
The Appellant is engaged in running airlines all over India as well as outside India. They have entered into agreements with the providers of computer reservation system (CRS) services outside India to display real time availability of flights, reservation of flights etc. on the basis of data collected from the main server of the Appellant for a consideration to be paid on the basis of each ticket issued by the travel agent.

A show cause notice was issued demanding service tax, interest and penalties on such payments made outside India u/s. 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 under reverse charge mechanism falling under “online information and database access or retrieval service”. It was argued that to be covered under the said service category, the person who renders that service should be the owner or should have exclusive right over the relevant information/data so as to put him in a position to charge the recipient for access/retrieval of that data/information.

However in the present case the data/information was owned by the Appellant itself. Further revenue neutrality was claimed to set aside the demands.

Held
The Tribunal relying on the decision of British Airways [2014-TIOL-979-CESTAT-DEL] held that the classification of the activity is correctly determined by the revenue and therefore the demand stands correct. However, it was noted that the tax paid under reverse charge mechanism would be available as CENVAT credit against the output service tax liability of “transport by air and other services” resulting in a revenue neutral situation. It was held that it is trite law that question of revenue neutrality is a good ground, more so when the tax liability is being discharged under reverse charge mechanism and therefore demands, interest and penalties imposed are set aside.

2016 (43) STR 57(Kar.) Commr. of ST, Bangalore vs. Tavant Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Refund of unutilised CENVAT credit be claimed without even having any service tax registration.

Facts
The respondent was engaged in export of services and is not registered under the Service Tax Law. However a refund claim of unutilised CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 was filed. In absence of registration, the claim was rejected. Tribunal relied on the decision of M/s. mPortal India Wireless Solutions Private Limited 2011 (16) taxmann.com 353 (Kar) of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court and held that there is no such precondition under the CENVAT Credit Rules for the assessee to take any registration. Also, one to one co-relation with respect to the input services used for providing output services was established and accordingly refund was allowed. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, department has filed an appeal.

Held

The High Court dismissed the appeal due to absence of substantial question of law.

[2016-TIOL-1730-HC-Del-ST] Federation of Hotels and Restaurants Association of India and ORS vs. Union of India and ORS

fiogf49gjkf0d
I. High Court

Constitutional validity of restaurant service along with Rule 2(C) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 is upheld and entry 65(105)(zzzzw) pertaining to levy of service tax on short term accommodation is held unconstitutional and invalid.

Facts:
The petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of section 65(105)(zzzzv) viz. restaurant service and section 66E(i) of the Finance Act, 1994 seeking to constitute service portion in an activity of supply of food as a declared service. Further it is claimed that Rule 2C of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 arbitrarily determining 40% as the value of service is invalid. Further the constitutional validity of section 65(105)(zzzzw) viz. Hotel, Inn, Club and Guest House service is also challenged. It was stated that with the insertion of clause 29(f) in Article 366 of the constitution, the state legislatures have the exclusive competence to legislate in respect of levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods and no part of the transaction of supply of food in a restaurant is amenable to service tax. Further in respect of hotel accommodation it was submitted that Entry 62 of the State List imposes tax on entertainment, amusement, betting and gambling and moreover state legislatures have enacted statutes for levy of luxury tax on hotel accommodation and therefore levy of service tax lacks legislative competence.

Held:
The High Court relied on the decision of Larsen and Toubro [2015-TIOL-187-SC-ST] and BSNL vs. Union of India [2006-TIOL-15-SC-CT-LB] wherein it has been observed that the taxation powers of the Centre and States are mutually exclusive under the constitution and therefore the moment a levy enters into a prohibited exclusive field it is liable to be struck down. Accordingly Parliament can only tax the service element and the states can only tax the transfer of property in goods. Therefore the Court noted that in the present writ it is essential to examine whether the composite catering contract is capable of being segregated into a portion pertaining to supply of goods and that pertaining to services provided. Relying on the decision of Larsen and Toubro vs. State of Karnataka [2013-TIOL-46-SC-CT-LB] it was held that even if some part of the composite transaction involves rendering of service, there should be no difficulty in recognizing the power of the Union to bring to tax that portion. Since the Parliament has made the legal position explicit by taxing the service portion of a composite contract of supply of food and drinks the same has sound constitutional basis and therefore section 65(105)(zzzzv) and section 66E(i) are constitutionally valid. In the matter of Rule 2C the Court relying on the decision of Association of Leasing and Financial Services Companies vs. Union of India [2010-TIOL-87-SC-ST-LB] observed that the grant of abatement has the approval by the Supreme Court more so when the assessee does not maintain accounts to determine the service portion. However it was pointed out that if an assessee is able to demonstrate on the basis of accounts and records that the value of service is different than that provided in the Rule, the assessing authority is obliged to consider such submission and give a decision thereto. In respect of Hotel accommodation, however the Court noted that the “Delhi Tax on Luxuries Act, 1996” which provides for levy of luxury tax on provision of service of hotel accommodation is traceable to entry 62 of the State list and therefore the State is competent to levy tax on such taxable event. Thus, this is a case of encroachment by the Union in the domain of the State and therefore the Court strikes down section 65(105)(zzzzw) of the Finance Act 1994 pertaining to levy of service tax on provision of short-term accommodation.

“Transfer of right to use” vis-à-vis “Permissible Use”

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction
The controversy about nature of a transaction as to whether it is ‘transfer of right to use’ or nothas been debated for long.. Intermittently there are judgments from different forums giving different views and at times conflicting views. Asituation has also arisen that both VAT and Service Tax are being levied on same amount. It was long felt that the issue, whether service tax is attracted or VAT is attracted, should be decided by the Hon. High Court by making both authorities VAT and Service tax authorities parties to the dispute. Mahayco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. (W.P. No.9175 of 2015) & Subway Systems India Pvt. Ltd. (W.P.No.497 of 2015) dated 11.8.2016.

Recently Hon. Bombay High Court had an occasion to deal with the above delicate issue once more in above matters. The important aspect of the Writ Petitions is that along with VAT department of State Government, Service Tax Department of Central Government was also made party to the Writ Petition. Both writ petitions are decided by common judgment. However, facts in both cases are different.

It will be useful to refer to judgment in each case separately.

Mahayco Monsanto Biotech (India) Pvt. Ltd. (W.P. No.9175 of 2015 dated 11.8.2016).

The facts as noted by Hon. High Court in above case are as under:

“11. The Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9175 of 2015, Monsanto India, is a joint venture company of Monsanto Investment India Private Limited (“MIIPL”) and the Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Monsanto India develops and commercializes insect-resistant hybrid cottonseeds using a proprietary “Bollgard technology”, one that is licensed to Monsanto India by Monsanto USA through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Monsanto Holdings Private Limited (“MHPL”). This technology is further sublicensed by Monsanto India to various seed companies on a non-exclusive and nontransferable basis to use, test, produce and sell genetically modified hybrid cotton planting seeds. In return for this technology, Monsanto India receives trait fees based on the number of packets of seeds sold by the sub-licensees. These sub-licensing agreements, with almost 40 seed companies, are the transactions in question. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the Monsanto Writ Petition are the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra respectively. Respondent No.3 is the Principal Commissioner of Service Tax. Respondent No. 4 is the Commissioner of Sales Tax.”

The arguments were from various angles including the argument that the allowance touse is non exclusive and not covered by ‘transfer of right to use’ category in view of judgment in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.(145 STC 91)(SC). Payment of service tax on same amount was also pointed out in the arguments made. Judgment in case of Tata Sons Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (80 VST 173)(Bom) of Hon. Bombay High Court was argued to be distinguishable as well as otherwise argued to be per incurium. It was urged that no distinction can be made between tangible and intangible goods and therefore, the law laid down in BSNL equally applies to intangible goods also.

However, Hon. High Court did not concur with above submission and justified levy of VAT . Hon. High Court concluded as under:

“37. We have considered most carefully this submission. It is indeed sophisticated in its construction, and, at first blush, appears most appealing. On reflection and a closer examination, we find ourselves unable to subscribe to the interpretation Mr. Venkatraman so eloquently commends, viz., that his transaction is one of a merely permissive use. We find this interpretation not to be supported by law, and we have the most serious reservations about the universal applicability of his propositions, which seem to us to be overbroad and to cast the net too widely. The first question is whether there is a ‘transfer’ within the meaning of Article 366(29A)(d). We believe there is. It is true that the essence of a ‘transfer’ is the divesting of a right or goods from transferor and the investing of the same in the transferee, and this is what Salmond on Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum both say. In our opinion, the seeds embedded with the technology are, in fact, transferred. Monsanto India is divested of that portion of the technology embedded in these fifty seeds and these are fully vested in the sub-licensee. Mr. Venkatraman is not correct when he says that the effective control of the ‘goods’ is with Monsanto India. In RINL, the Supreme Court concluded that the contractor (transferee) did not have effective control over the machinery, despite the fact that he was using it, since he could not make such use of it as he liked. He could not use the machinery for any project other than that of the transferor’s, nor could he move it out during the period of the project. We do not see how we can draw a parallel from that case to the one at hand. The effective control over the seeds, and, therefore that portion of the technology that is embedded in the seeds, is entirely with the sub-licensee. That sub licensee is not bound to use the seeds (and the embedded technology) in accordance with Monsanto India’s wishes. Monsanto India cannot further dictate to the sub-licensee what he or it may do with these technology-infused seeds. The sub-licensee can do as it wishes with them. It may not use them at all. It may even destroy the seeds. Once the transaction is complete, i.e., once possession of the technology-imbued seeds is effected, and those seeds are delivered, Monsanto India has nothing at all to do with the technology embedded in those fifty seeds given to the sub-licensee.

At no point does Monsanto India have access to this portion of the technology. In other words, the transfer is to the exclusion of Monsanto India. This clearly satisfies the so-called BSNL “twin test” that Mr. Venkatraman is at pains to propound. Mr. Venkatraman’s argument that the seeds are “merely the media” and therefore irrelevant is, in our opinion, erroneous. They are relevant for the simple reason that the technology could not have been given to the sub-licensee without them; and there is no other method demonstrated anywhere of effecting any such transfer.”

Thus, Hon. High Court rejected all arguments about transfer of technology within scope of permissible use but held it as complete transfer of right, to constitute deemed sale liable under VAT . Hon. High Court has also cited various examples about what constitutes goods in relation to intangible goods.

The alternative argument that it is sale of seeds, hence exempt under Schedule Entry A-41 of MVAT Act was also rejected.

The other main argument about non attraction of VAT as Service Tax is paid did not impress the court. The further plea to direct transfer of service tax paid to VAT department was also not considered by Hon. Court by observing as under:

“53. Mr. Venkatraman makes one more, without prejudice argument, in case neither of his previous arguments succeeds. He submits that even if the agreement in question is held to be a transfer of the right to use (deemed sale) and that it does not fall under the exemption for seeds in the MVAT Act, then the levy and collection of Service Tax by the Union of India would be without the authority of law since VAT can only be levied and collected by the States. As argued earlier, the same transaction cannot be taxed as both a sale and a service. Monsanto India has already paid service tax for the entire period at a rate significantly higher than what is provided under the MVAT Act and therefore he says that it is not liable to pay further tax. For the period between May 2007 and February 2009, it has paid service tax at a rate of 12.36%, for March 2009 to March 2012 at a rate of 10.3%, for April 2012 to May 2015 at 12.36%, and for the period beginning June 2015 at a rate of 14%.

Under Entry 39 of Schedule C of the MVAT Act, the applicable rate of sales tax is only 5% since April 2010, prior to which it was 4%. He therefore seeks a Writ of Mandamus directing Union of India to transfer the amount paid as service tax from the Consolidated Fund of India to the Consolidated Fund of State of Maharashtra. He argues that such a transfer would not amount to unjust enrichment. We decline to enter into this debate. We leave it to Monsanto India to adopt suitable proceedings in this behalf, and leave their contentions open to the necessary extent.”

There will thus be a looming question of double tax payment.

Subway Systems India Pvt. Ltd. (W.P.No.497 of 2015 dated 11.8.2016)

The facts in this case are noted by High Court as under:

“55. A brief description of Subway’s business is this. Subway was granted a non-exclusive sub-license by Subway International B.V. (“SIBV”), a Dutch limited liability corporation to establish, operate and franchise others to operate SUBWAY -branded restaurants in India. This non-exclusive license was granted to SIBV itself by Subway Systems International Ansalt, which in turn was granted such a license by Doctor’s Associates Inc., an entity that owns the proprietary system for setting up and operating these restaurants.

These restaurants serve sandwiches and salads under the service mark SUBWAY. The agreement includes not only the trade mark SUBWAY , but also associated confidential information and goodwill, such as policies, forms, recipes, trade secrets and the like.

Typically, Subway enters into franchise agreements with third parties, under which it provides specified services to the franchisee. In return, the franchisee undertakes to carry on the business of operating sandwich shops in Subway’s name. The agreement only provides for a very limited representational or display right, and the franchisee cannot transfer or assign these exclusive rights to any third person. Subway also reserves the right to compete with these franchisees in the agreement. Under this agreement, Subway receives two kinds of consideration, one being a one-time franchisee fee which is paid when the agreement is signed; and the second is a royalty fee paid weekly by the franchisee on the basis of its weekly turnover. A sample franchise agreement is annexed. Under these agreements, the franchisees have no more than a right to display Subway’s intellectual property in the form of marks and logos, and a mere right to use such confidential information as Subway discloses and as prescribed by the franchise agreement.”

Based on above facts, the issue was examined by the Court. In this case also the ratio of BSNL relied upon. Hon. High Court ultimately held as under:

“69. We believe that Mr. Shroff is correct when he says that the agreement between Subway and its franchisees is not a sale, but is in fact a bare permission to use. It is, therefore, subject only to service tax. In our opinion, the fact that the agreement between Subway and its franchisee is limited to the precise period of time stipulated in the agreement is vital to Subway’s case. At the end of the period of the agreement, or before in case there was any breach of its terms, the right of the franchisee to display the mark ‘Subway’ and its trade dress, and all other permissions would also end. This is what sets this agreement apart from the case of Monsanto and its sublicensee. There, the seed companies could do as they pleased with the seeds; they could alienate or even destroy them. In Subway’s case, there are set terms provided by the agreement which have to be followed. A breach of these would result in termination of the agreement.

We believe that there is no passage of any kind of control or exclusivity to the franchisees. In fact, this agreement is a classic example of permissive use. It can be nothing else. For all the reasons in law and fact that the sub-licensing of technology in Monsanto is held to be a transfer of right to use, this franchising agreement must be held to be permissive use.”

Thus on ground that the agreement is for permissible use, it is held that it is not a sale by transfer of right to use but a ‘service agreement’.

One more issue dealt with by Hon. High Court is that for situs of sale by transfer of right to use, the place of agreement, as decided by Supreme Court in case of 20th Century Finance Corp. Ltd. ( 119 STC 182)(SC), is relevant.

In this case, the agreement was signed in Delhi and hence High Court held that otherwise also the transaction cannot be taxed in Maharashtra, inspite that the users are in Maharashtra.

Conclusion
The issue about sale by transfer of right to use or service transaction has become vexed and requires decision on facts of each case. Even in above judgment, Hon High Court has observed that each agreement, whether titled as franchise or something else, will be required to be decided on the basis of actual terms and scope of agreement. The dealers will thus be under threat of uncertainity taxation and most probably by both departments, till the issue gets resolved at a higher forum. Some undisputable criteria for deciding nature of transaction is required to be specified to avoid such uncertain situation.