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2012 (27) STR 372 (Tri.-Ahmd) Gujarat NRE Coke Ltd. vs. CCE, Rajkot

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Adjustment of excess payment of service tax – in the absence of centralised registration – Held, it will be highly technical to deny the same.

Facts:
Appellant paid excess service tax in few months and then adjusted the same against the liability arising in the subsequent period. The said adjustment was made taking resort to Rule 6 (4A) of Service Tax Rules, 1994. However, during the extant period adjustment of excess service tax was done by the Appellant under an impression that he had applied for centralised registration, however, the department contended there was no application made for centralised registration. The Department did not permit such adjustment and demanded tax as shortfall along with interest and penalty.

Held:

Having not procured centralised registration is a technical issue. The fact remained that the Appellant paid service tax in excess and this fact is not disputed by the department. Relying interalia on the following judgments, the Tribunal set aside the demand raised:

Cases referred to

? Powercell Battery India Ltd. 19 STR 400 Nirma Architects & Valuers 1 STR 305
? Agrimas Chemicals Ltd. 10 STR 424
? Bharti Cellular Ltd. 1 STR 39
? Bayer Diagnostics India Ltd. 8 STR 367

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2012 (54) VST 202 (Karn) Commissioner of Service Tax, Commissionerate, Bangalore vs. Motor World (& other cases).

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Service Tax: Penalty under sections 76 & 78 mutually exclusive: Discretion regarding quantity of penalty is between minimum and maximum prescribed. Revision to enhance the penalty/to impose the penalty for the first time not permissible.

Facts: Tribunal set aside penalties imposed under sections 76, 77 & 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

The Honourable High Court after hearing both the parties at length, formulated the following questions of law:

? Whether the penalty under the Finance Act, 1994, is automatic?

? Whether sections 76 and 78 of the Act are mutually exclusive?

? Even if the ingredients stipulated in sections 76 and 78 are established but if “reasonable cause” is shown, whether the authorities have power to impose penalties given in the explicit discretion in section 80 of the Act?

? If after holding that all the ingredients under sections 76 and 78 exist and no reasonable cause is made out by the assessee, whether the imposition of penalty as prescribed under these two provisions is automatic or whether any discretion is left in the authority in the matter of imposing penalty?

? If the order passed by the assessing authority is within the four corners of law, i.e. within the parameters prescribed under the aforesaid statutory provisions, whether revisional authority by virtue of power conferred under Section 84 of the Act, can suo motu revise the order of the Assessing authority and enhance the penalty?

? Whether the revisional authority has jurisdiction to impose penalty for the first time when it has not been imposed by the adjudicating authority by invoking section 80?

The Hon. High Court observed that for imposition of penalty, the following is required to be examined:

a. existence of ingredients mentioned in sections 76, 77 and 78.

b. failure of the assessee to comply with the law.

c. Whether there exists “reasonable cause” for failure to comply with the requirement of law.

Reliance was also placed on Woodward Governer India P Ltd vs. Commissioner of Income Tax 2002 (253) ITR 745 (Delhi) which contains a provision conferring discretion on the income-tax authorities not to impose penalties when there is a reasonable cause shown by the assessee. According to the Court, the intention of the Parliament appears clear from the wordings of section 78 by which a discretion “may levy penalty” is conferred on the authority to impose or not to impose penalty. High Court also stated that analogy can be drawn from CCE vs. Sunitha Shetty 2006 (3) STR 404 (Karn) that the minimum penalty under section 76 cannot be read as Rs.100/- per day but read as Rs.100/-. The legislature amended the law w.e.f. April 18, 2006 after the above judicial pronouncement.

Section 78 applies to a case where a person has registered himself under the Act and failed to file prescribed return and in a return filed, he has suppressed or concealed the value of taxable service or has furnished inaccurate value of such taxable service. Therefore, section 78 operates in altogether different field. However, this provision is made subject to section 80. Thus, even if there is a suppression or concealment of the value of taxable service or inaccurate value as mentioned in the returns filed, if that is on account of a bonafide mistake or any cause which constitutes “reasonable cause” no penalty is leviable. Once the ingredients of section 78 are established and there is no reasonable cause for failure, section 80 is not attracted. Then the authority has to impose a minimum penalty of the amount of service tax sought to be evaded and the maximum is double the said amount. Here, no discretion is vested with the authority.

Further, it was concluded that penalty cannot be imposed both under sections 76 and 78 as they are mutually exclusive. It should also be further noted that the Finance Act 2008 also introduced a proviso to section 78 as “provided also that if the penalty is payable under this section, the provision of section 76 shall not apply.”

If there is no reasonable cause shown, the authority has the discretion to quantify the penalty to be imposed. Still, the penalty to be imposed cannot be less than the minimum or more than the maximum prescribed under the statute.

If the penalty imposed is not less than the minimum prescribed under law, the revisional authority has no power to enhance the amount of penalty on the ground that it is less.

When the assessing authority, in its discretion has held that no penalty is leviable, by virtue of section 80 of the Act, the revisional authority cannot invoke its jurisdiction and impose penalty.

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Deduction from Set-off in Respect of Fuel Purchases – When Applicable

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Introduction
Under Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT Act, 2002) the set off scheme is prescribed under the authority of section 48, read with rules. Rules 52 to 55 of MVAT Rules are relevant for deciding the set off quantum. Rule 52 provides that the purchases of capital assets, trading goods, as well as purchases debited to P & L A/c are eligible for set off. The set off availability is subject to retention as per rule 53 or prohibition as per rule 54.

Rule 53
Rule 53 provides for retention from set off, when the goods are used in the prescribed circumstances. In this note, the issue about reduction from set off in respect of purchases which are used as fuel is discussed. The reduction from set off in relation to fuel purchase is provided in Rule 53(1). The said rule is reproduced below for ready reference.

“53. Reduction in set-off. –

(A) The set-off available under any rule shall be reduced and shall accordingly disallowed in part or full in the event of any contingencies specified below and to the extent specified.

(1) If the claimant dealer has used any taxable goods as fuel, then an amount equal to three per cent of the corresponding purchase price shall be reduced from the amount of set-off otherwise available in respect of the said purchase.”

What is fuel?
The reduction is to be made when the item purchased is used as fuel. The term ‘fuel’ is not defined in the MVAT Act/Rules.

In common parlance, fuel means any item which is burnt for producing heat. The dictionary meaning also suggests the same thing. The fuel is defined as under in Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language:

“fuel: 1. combustible matter used to maintain fire, as coal, wood, oil etc. 2. that which gives nourishment or incentive: our discussion provided him with fuel for the debate – v.t.3. to supply with fuel- v.i.4. to obtain or replenish fuel. [ME fule(le), feuel < OF feuaile < LL focalia, neut.pl.of focalis of the hearth, fuel. See focus, – AL]..”

“com.bus.ti.ble 1.capable of catching fire and burning; inflammable; flammable: Gasoline vapor is highly combustible. 2. Easily excited: a high-strung, combustible nature -n.3.a combustible substance: Trucks carrying combustibles will not be allowed to use this tunnel….”

From the above combined meanings of fuel and combustible, it is clear that the item, which burns, to produce heat can be considered as fuel. From the examples given, the position is more clear like, oil, wood etc., which burn, are considered as fuel.

Factual position
On this background, the issue which arises is the use of combustible item. If the item is burnt for producing heat, then it can fall in the category of fuel. There may be circumstances, where the combustible item is used and may also be giving heat. However, simply because some heat is generated, it cannot become fuel and it can be raw material. In other words, whether the item is used as a fuel or a raw material is a matter of factual findings. Some guidelines can be had from the decided judgments.

Recent judgment in case of Gupta Metallics & Power Ltd. (54 VST 292)(Bom).

The dealer was manufacturer of sponge iron. The process of manufacturing of sponge iron involved use of raw material i.e. iron ore, coal and dolomite. The dealer had for the assessment year 1.4.2005 to 31.3.2006 and assessment year 1.4.2006 to 31.3.2007 claimed set-off of 100% in respect of the tax paid on the coal purchased and used in the manufacturing of sponge iron. The dealer before the assessing officer claimed that the said coal was used as raw material for manufacturing sponge iron from iron ore and that is how the respondent claimed 100% set off as per Rule 53 of MVAT Rules, 2005. While passing the assessment order for the aforesaid periods, the assessing authority came to the conclusion that the part of coal used in the manufacture of sponge iron was used as a fuel and part as raw material. The assessing officer permitted the respondent to claim set off to the extent of 50% by treating that 50% of the coal was used as a raw material and 50% of the coal was used a fuel. The reasoning of the assessing authority was that the coal, while reacting with iron in the kiln also generates heat, which is used for the said manufacturing process. Therefore, on the 50% part set off was allowed after reduction of 3% as per above rule 53(1). In the second appeal, Tribunal concurred with the dealer and held that in the given circumstances, coal was used as a raw material. Though, heat is generated and may be useful in the manufacturing process, the coal was not put up in the kiln for the said purpose but basically to act as reductant i.e. raw material. The department filed appeal before Bombay High Court. Hon’ble High Court, after discussing the facts, observed as under;

“It would be proper to deal with the arguments on both the sides on the question whether the coal used in the process by the respondent was used as a raw material or as fuel. In our view, it would be proper to reproduce the report which is contained in letter dated 29.2.2008 to which a reference has been made by all the authorities below. The text of the report is as follows:

“Report:
In the Rotary Kiln Process of manufacturing Sponge Iron, a premixed charge of Iron Ore, Non-Coking Coal and Flux is added inside the Kiln. This charge forms a bed inside the Kiln and slowly moves towards the discharge end. During the transit of the charge, the Iron Ore is slowly converted into Sponge Iron, by the process of reduction. Inside the bed, the carbon of the Non-Coking Coal reduces the Iron Oxide slowly to Iron and the carbon gets converted to Carbon-mono-Oxide gas. Thus, inside the bed the coal plays the role of a reductant. The gas Carbon-mono-oxide rises out of the bed and is now post-combusted to gas carbon-dioxide by carefully admitting air inside the Kiln. This reaction taking place in the area above the bed is a highly exothermic reaction and produces the bulk of the heat required for the process. Thus, the Non-Coking Coal provides the gas Carbon mono-Oxide for satisfying the heat requirements of the process i.e. it indirectly plays the role of a fuel in the Rotary Kiln Process.

It is impossible to quantify the ratio of coal as a reductant vs. fuel in the Rotary Kiln.

10. We have perused the report and we have also considered the submissions advanced by both the sides. A reading of the report clearly indicates that to convert iron ore into sponge iron, the noncoking coal is used. It must be mentioned that the orders passed by the authorities did not use the specific word “Noncoking coal”. The report clearly indicates that the mixture of iron ore and non-coking coal when heated from outside, would ultimately get converted into sponge iron. It is also noticed that on account of the chemical qualities of the non-coking coal, heat is generated. The carbon of non-coking coal reduces the iron oxide slowly to sponge iron and carbon monoxide gas is generated. The report specifically mentions that inside the bed, the Non-Cooking Coal plays the role of a reductant. It further indicates as to how highly exothermic reaction takes place and produces the bulk of the heat required for the process. It also shows that non-coking coal provides the gas carbon mono-oxide for satisfying the heat requirements of the process. On account of this, the author of the report has observed “It indirectly plays a role of fuel in the rotary kiln process”. It is seen that chemical qualities of Noncooking coal to generate heat are used. Merely because heat is generated in the process it cannot be a ground to hold that Noncooking coal so used was used as fuel.

The above observations clearly show that the coal used in the process of manufacturing of sponge iron is used as a raw material and not as a fuel. It is clear that the Assessing Officer as well as the Appellate Authority misread the text of the report dated 29.12.2008. We hold that the tribunal has rightly held that the coal used by the respondent was a raw material and not used as a fuel.”

Thus, simply because heat gets generated, as well as may be useful in the manufacturing process, an item does not become fuel automatically. If the prime object of using the item is as raw material, where without such use, manufacturing may not be feasible then the item is to be considered as a raw material and not a fuel.

Similar is the judgment of Gujarat Tribunal in case of Welspun Steel Ltd. (First Appeal No. 27 of 2010 dated 27.12.2011), wherein also Gujarat Tribunal has considered the use of coal as a raw material and not a fuel.

Conclusion

Set off is the backbone of VAT system. Further, the responsibility of filing correct return is on the dealer. There is no compulsory assessment for each year. Therefore, if set off is due, but not claimed in the returns, then there is no surety that the dealer will get an opportunity to claim the same. If the assessment is initiated then the claim can be lodged. However, if that is not the case, then dealer will lose it. Therefore, it is dealer, who should take care to claim correct set off. Under the above circumstances, it is necessary that the dealer determines the set off quantum correctly. The above issue is one of the issues, where minute study is required to understand the nature of the use of the item.

If it can be proved that the item is used as a raw material for manufacturing or production, then even though it maybe generating heat, it may not be fuel. Similarly, there may be circumstances, where the item is generating heat but as a prime raw material to produce new goods. Normally, when the item is burnt for giving heat to the other item, it will be in the category of fuel. However, if by burning the item, new goods are produced, then a stand can be taken that it is a raw material and not a fuel. In other words, an item can be used as raw material in the heat form. The particular use is to be decided as per facts of each case and no generalisation can be made. The above judgments may be useful for deciding the issue. If the item is coming in the category of fuel, only then reduction will apply otherwise not and the dealer will get full set off.

Hiring of Goods: Declared Service or Deemed Sale?

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Preliminary:

Under the negative list based taxation of services introduced from July 01, 2012, service is defined by section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) to mean an activity carried out by a person for another for consideration and also includes declared services followed by a list of excluded transactions as follows:

? An activity resulting in transfer of title in goods or immovable property by way of sale, gift or in any other manner.

? Deemed sale of goods in terms of Article 366(29A) of the Constitution.

? A transaction only in money (other than activities relating to use of money or conversion of money for which consideration is charged).

? A transaction only in actionable claim.

? Employment contract for service by an employee to an employer.

? Fees payable to a court or tribunal.

In turn, “Declared Service” is defined by section 66E of the Act containing nine activities like renting of immovable property, construction of a complex or a building including one intended for sale to a buyer, temporary transfer of intellectual property rights, design development etc. of information technology software, agreeing to tolerate an act or refraining from an act, transferring goods by hiring without transferring right to use goods, hire purchase transactions, works contract and catering contracts. In this feature, one of the declared services described in subclause (f) of the said section 66E of the Act is discussed below.

Statutory provisions.

Section 66E:

“The following shall constitute declared services: namely:-

(a) ………………;
(b) ………………;

Explanation
(I) ……………….;
(A) …………..;
(B) …………..;
(C) …………..;
(II) ………………;
(c) …………………..;
(d) …………………..;
(e) ………………….;
(f) transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing, licensing or in any manner without transfer of right to use such goods”

Activity of providing goods on hire:

While explaining the scope of this service, the Government in the Education Guide dated 20/06/2012 issued while introducing Negative List based taxation of services has provided as follows “Transfer of right to use goods is a well recognized constitutional and legal concept. Every transfer of goods on lease, licence or hiring basis, does not result in transfer of right to use goods”. In support of the above statement, it has cited Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. 2002 (126) STC 0114 (SC) which ruled in the context of the facts of that case that “Transfer of right of goods involves transfer of possession and effective control over such goods” and “Transfer of custody along with permission to use or enjoy such goods, per se does not lead to transfer of possession and effective control”.

The readers may note that the above ruling was pronounced in a case where the machinery belonging to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (the company) was provided to the contractor for the use in the project work of the company on the site of the company and the contractor merely was responsible for the custody of the same. However, the effective control and possession was not transferred to the contractor. The contractor was not free to make use of the machinery for the work other than that of the company. Therefore, the decision that effective control and possession was not passed on by the company to the contractor, is with reference to the facts of the case that the machinery belonged to the company and the contractor was merely retained to operate the same and responsible for its security as the machinery was placed in his custody only for the project work of the company.

It is, thus, true that transfer of right of goods involves transfer of possession and effective control. However, in the above case of Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (supra) wherein the custody of machinery belonging to the company was merely provided to the contractor for operation of the same. The machinery was not ’hired’ to the contractor. This does not mean that in every transaction where goods belonging to owner or lessor are provided on hire, there does not occur ‘transfer’ of right to use such goods. The issue therefore is, when an equipment is provided on hire or on operating lease or when tangible or intangible goods are licensed to the licensee for the use of the licensee for a specific period whether “transfer of right to use” occurs and therefore the transaction is considered a “deemed sale” in terms of Article 366(29A) of the constitution, exigible to VAT under State laws and therefore specifically excluded from the definition of ‘service’ or whether there is no ‘transfer’ of right to use occurring and the person uses the goods without enjoying the right to use and therefore, the same is to be considered as a “declared service” as defined above and is subjected to service tax. The issue is complex and requires interpretation of the facts of each case. It has been dealt with by Courts time and again. A few such important decisions are discussed below:

Test laid down by the Supreme Court in BSNL:

The test laid down by the Hon. Supreme Court in the benchmark decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) provides direction in the matter. This test is recognised by the Government in the Education Guide for determining whether a transaction involves transfer of right to use goods. It has been followed by the Supreme Court and various High Courts. The test lays down as follows:

? There must be goods available for delivery.

? There must be consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods.

? The transferee should have legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permission or licenses required therefore should be available to the transferee.

? For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion of the transferor. This is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods.

? Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.

The Education Guide also indicates that whether a transaction amounts to transfer of right or not cannot be determined with reference to a particular word or clause in the agreement laying down terms between the parties, but the agreement is required to be read as a whole to determine the nature of transaction.

Further, the Ministry in the Education Guide has also listed certain illustrations as under:

“6.6.2 Whether the transactions listed in column 1 of the table below involve transfer of right to use goods? (Refer Table on the next page)

The Education Guide states that the list in the Table is only illustrative to demonstrate how Courts have interpreted terms and conditions of various types of contracts to see if a transaction involves transfer of right to use goods. The nature of each transaction has to be examined in totality keeping in view all the terms and conditions of an agreement relating to such transaction.

If the above illustrations and the relied on decisions are perused in the light of the test laid down by the BSNL decision (supra), one may find that conclusions drawn by the Government may not satisfy the above test in the cases illustrated.

Admittedly, the issue has been contentious and there may be a thin line of divide between the facts of one case from the other and which may have led to reach different conclusions by Courts at different times. For instance and as against the decisions cited in the above table, viz. International Travel House and Ahuja Goods Agency ( supra), in the case of K. C. Behera vs. State of Orissa (1991) 83 STC 325 (Ori.), buses were hired by State Transport Corporation (STC). The bus was to be run for STC as per the agreement and under directions of an officer. Transaction of hiring was held as ‘sale’ within its extended meaning. Providing driver etc. notwithstanding, there was a transfer of right to use bus for consideration and effective control, general control and possession of the bus vested in STC. As against this, in Laxmi Audio Visual vs. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 2001 (124) STC 426 (Kar), it was held that when there is only hiring of audio visual and multi media equipment, where the equipment is at the risk of the owner and possession and effective control remains with the owner, in such circumstances, it cannot be said that the customer has the right to use the equipment and therefore there was no deemed sale. Similarly, in the background of somewhat different facts, in the case of State of Orissa vs. Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. (2009) 25 VST 522 (Orissa H.C.), the company Dredging Corporation of India engaged its dredgers for dredging the floor of Paradeep Port under the Paradeep Port Trust (PPT) and did not disclose the income from dredging charges as ‘sale’ income. On perusal of the agreement between the parties, the Court held that transfer of right to use any goods is not a bailment, for had it been a bailment, the State would have no power to tax it. It is a sale by a fiction of law engrafted in Article 366(29A)(a) of the Constitution and resultantly in section 2(g)(iv) of the OST Act. So, what is determinative as to whether or not there was a transfer of right to use the chattel (the dredger) is the stipulation in the agreement between the Board and the appellant. The Court also observed:

“The agreement provides as follows:

……….. the Corporation hereby agrees to deploy its Cutter Auction Dredges MOT Dredge-II in the dredging work. There are stipulations to do a work, to dredge the sea-bed with men and machine deployed for the purpose, against a valuable consideration. So find it a works contract without transfer of property in goods in execution of such a contract.” The Court held, “there is nothing in the agreement to prove that there was a transfer of right to use the dredges.”

The readers may consider whether or not in the above case, the contract was that of service of dredging and “hiring of a dredge” was absent?

However, the facts in the case of Deepak Nath vs. ONGC (2010) 31 VST 337 (Gau) may also be examined. In this case, trucks, trailers, tankers and cranes were made available by owner to ONGC under contract in writing for operational charges as agreed to during the contract. It was held by the Division Bench that goods were made available 24 hours a day throughout the contract. Method and manner of using the goods was decided by ONGC, there is a transfer of right to use the goods even though the staff remained under his control.

The case of G.S. Lamba:

The recent decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in G.S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT appears most ex-haustive. It has considered the test laid down by the Apex Court in BSNL, all the significant decisions on the subject matter including those cited in the Education Guide to consider the short point of whether there exists a “transfer of the right to use” in transit mixers to M/s. Grasim Industries Ltd., when Ready Mix Concrete (RMC) manufactured by Grasim was to be transported under a contract by hiring specially designed transit mixers OR as it was pleaded by the petitioner, whether the contract amounted to “transportation service”. Under the contract in the case, the transit mixers are never transferred and effective control over running and using these vehicles as well as disciplinary con-trol over drivers remained with the contractor. The responsibility to obtain route permits, to take the risk or loss of transportation, to decide shifts of driver and vehicles, to maintain and upkeep the vehicles all vests in the contractor. After considering various decisions vis-à-vis facts of each case which interalia included Harbanslal vs. SO Haryana (1993) 88 STC 357 (P&H), 20th Century Finance (2000) 119 STC 182 (SC), IOC vs. Commissioner of Taxes (2009) 22 VST 70 (Gau), R P Kakoty vs. ONGC (2009) 22 VST 136 etc., the Hon. Court in Para 30 observed as under:

“30. From the judicial decisions, the settled essential requirement of a transaction for transfer of the right to use goods are:

(i)    it is not the transfer of the property in goods, but it is the right to use property in goods;

(ii)    Article 366(29A)(d) read with the latter part of the clause (29A) which uses the words, “and such transfer, delivery or supply … ” would show that the tax is not on the delivery of the goods used, but on the transfer of the right to use goods regardless of when or whether the goods are delivered for use subject to the condition that the goods should be in existence for use;

(iii)    in the transaction for the transfer of the right to use goods, delivery of goods is not a condition precedent, but the delivery of goods may be one of the elements of the transaction;

(iv)    the effective or general control does not mean always physical control and, even if the manner, method, modalities and the time of the use of goods is decided by the lessee or the customer, it would be under the effective or general control over the goods; and

(v)    the approvals, concessions, licences and permits in relation to goods would also be available to the user of goods, even if such licences or permits are in the name of owner (transferor) of the goods, and

(vi)    during the period of contract exclusive right to use goods along with permits, licences etc., vests in the lessee.”

Further, the Court followed the principles of interpretation of documents as listed below:

  •     Construe the document as a whole.

  •     To understand the meaning of a document or a part of it from documents itself.

  •     To give literal meaning to the words used in a document.

  •     In the event of intrinsic incongruities and inconsistencies flowing from the words and language used in the document, the intention would prevail over the words used. The intention of the parties has to be determined from the attending circumstances leading to the transaction.

(This principle is an exception to the first three principles. If the language used in the document is very clear, rights and obligation cannot be inferred by resorting to the fourth principle.)

Hon. A. P. High Court inter alia made the following observations while holding that the tax is not on use of goods, but on account of transfer of right to use of goods.

  •    In other words, the right to use goods arises only on the transfer of such right to use goods and that the transfer of right is the sine quo non for the right to use any goods. The contract involved provision of transportation service for shipping RMC by hiring specifically designed transit mixers. The effective control of running the mixers and the disciplinary control remained with the contractor agreeing to provide the above service.

  •     Article 366(29A)(d) would show that the tax is not on the delivery of goods used but on the transfer of the right to use goods regardless of when or whether goods are delivered for use. This is subject to the condition that goods are in existence for use. Delivery of goods is not a condition precedent, but one of the elements of the transaction.

  •     Effective control does not mean always physical control and even if the manner, method modalities and time of the use of goods is decided by the lessee, it would be under the general control over the goods.

  •     During the period of contract, exclusive right to use goods along with permits, licences etc. vests in the lessee. Although the drivers are appointed by the lessor, their roster fixed by them, licences, permits and insurance are taken in their names and they renew them. However, the product is delivered to customers of lessees.

  •     The entire use in the property in goods is to be exclusively utilised for a period under contract by lessee.

  •     The existence of goods is identified and transit mixers operate and are exclusively used for 42 months in the business of the lessee. In putting the property in transit mixers to economic use of the lessee, the lessors figure nowhere. It thus conclusively leads to the conclusion that lessor transferred the right to use the goods to the lessee.

Summing up:

On going through the above, whether a transaction is one of “deemed sale” involving transfer of right to use or is a “declared service” is a question which may not have a definite answer. Professionals may differ from each other. Nevertheless, the test provided in BSNL’s case (supra) appears decisive. Based on it, one may at least be able to answer whether a person can use goods without there being a transfer of ‘right’ to use the same to the exclusion of the lessor or owner on the lines discussed and analysed above in G.S. Lamba & Sons (supra) at least in case of common situations like hiring of vehicles. The Government appears to be tilted towards the view that in an ordinary and common contract of providing a vehicle on hire, the right to use is “not transferred”. In this scenario, it is likely that a law-compliant assessee under service tax law could be visited with recovery action under VAT law of the States and vice-versa. Whether one has to wait till implementation of GST to achieve a finality on the above remains to be seen. In the interim, uncertainty and long drawn litigations appear to be the only visible consequence at this point of time.

(2011) 21 STR 294 (Tri – Chennai) – Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. vs. CCEx., Trichy

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Services of construction of staff quarters whether an input service for providing output service – Reference to division bench considered in view of two different views of co-ordinate benches.

Facts:
Revenue denied CENVAT credit on input services for construction of staff quarters. Appellant contended that if services are used in the ‘premises’ of service provider, CENVAT credit is allowed in view of the definition of “Input Services”. It is not relevant whether this is the ‘premises’ where service is actually provided or “office premises” or “residential premises”. Moreover, the matter is decided by the Tribunal in favour of appellant in appellant’s own case for prior periods.

The revenue contended that the word ‘premises’ should not be considered in isolation. It cannot include every ownership premises of service provider. It should have connection with the activities of providing output services as decided by the Tribunal in case of Manikgarh Cement Works (2010) (18 STR 275).

Held:
Ownership of the premises is not relevant for claim of CENVAT credit. Input services should be used in or in relation to provision of output service so as to be eligible for CENVAT Credit. However, the issue is decided by the Tribunal in appellant’s favour earlier. There being two different decisions of the co-ordinate benches, the matter is placed for considering reference to Division Bench.

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(2011) 21 STR 283 (Tri – Bang) – CCEx., Visakhapatnam vs. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd.

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Definition of “input service” wide enough to cover business related activities like outdoor catering service, group medical insurance etc. If cost of service forms part of assessable value – Decision valid for period prior to 31/03/2011.

Facts:
Revenue denied CENVAT credit on the following input services:

a) Group medical insurance to employees and family members,

b) Insurance of directors and officers when they are on foreign tour,

c) Outdoor catering services i.e. canteen facility provided to employees within factory premises as required under Factories Act, 1948

Held:
The definition of input service is very wide as observed by the Mumbai High Court in case of Coca Cola India (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner (2009) (242 ELT 168). The High Court in this case had provided a test for establishing whether the activity relates to business or not. If the cost of such services forms part of the assessable value on which excise duty is paid, CENVAT credit is allowed. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the original authority with a comment to follow the above judgment. CENVAT credit on outdoor catering services stands allowed since the issue is decided earlier by the Tribunal for respondent itself.

Comment:

The definition of “input service” in the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 has been amended whereby its scope is restricted with effect from 01/04/2011. Therefore, the above interpretation will hold good only till 31/03/2011.

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(2011) 21 STR 421 (Tri – Chennai) – JMC educational Charitable Trust vs. CCEx., Trichy –

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Distant education programme by an institution analogical to a parallel college is not in the nature of commercial coaching or training service.

Facts:
The appellant was conducting classes under the distance education programmes. For these programmes, the students paid separately to university as well as the appellant. Diploma/degree from the university is obtained by the students. The appellant explained that their institution is like a parallel college and students facing troublesome situations can study through these courses. Therefore, the appellant pleaded for exemption as is granted to regular colleges and took support of the Kerala High Court’s verdict in Malappuram Distt. Parallel Colleges Association vs. Union of India (2006) (2 STR 321).

Held:

Since the Kerala High Court had held that provisions of service tax laws for levy of service tax on parallel colleges are ultra virus Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the appeal was allowed.

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(2011) 21 STR 303 (Tri – Bang) SAP India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCEx., Bangalore III

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Services of upgradation of software post implementation of ERP not in the nature of maintenance or repair service. ‘Computers’ do not include software – service liable from 16/05/2008 as information technology software service.

Facts:
i. The Department contended that the services provided by the appellant for the period from July 2004 to January 2006 in relation to maintenance of software should be classified under “management, maintenance or repairs services”. However, the appellant claimed that the said services are classifiable as “information technology software services” which is introduced with effect from 16/05/2008.

ii. Appellant contended that repairs and maintenance of software services are specifically excluded from the definition of business auxiliary services and therefore, are not liable to service tax. They relied on a circular dated 17/12/2003 which clarified that maintenance of software was not chargeable to service tax. However, the Department claimed that circular dated 17/12/2003 was superseded by circular dated 07/10/2005 and therefore, the services of maintenance of software were chargeable to service tax.

iii. Department contended that software is considered as ‘goods’ by various courts and that though Notification No. 20/2003-ST dated 21/08/2003 had exempted maintenance or repairs of computers and its peripherals, Notification No. 7/2004-ST dated 09/07/2004 rescinded the said notification and therefore, such services are chargeable to service tax from 09/07/2004. The appellant argued that computers per se do not include software and therefore, the said notification did not apply to them. The appellant contended that service tax cannot be levied on activities which are specifically kept out of the purview of service tax and they explained that it provides computer software maintenance which can be categorised in following four streams as per the technical literature of special consultants and other sources: Corrective, adaptive, perfective and preventive.

These activities are in the nature of “ERP maintenance and upgradation activities”.

iv. The Department issued show cause notices for various periods including part of the period under dispute under “management consultant’s services”. The appellant challenged the notices on the ground of extended period of limitation as well as on the interpretation issue.

Held:

i. Variety of maintenance services were provided by the appellant post implementation of ERP. These services are mainly in relation to upgrading the software and enhancing ERP’s efficiency. “Maintenance” in relation to computer software is much wider than maintenance of any other goods or of a factual situation

ii. Though ‘software’ is considered as ‘goods’ by various courts, normally maintenance of goods would not result in upgradation of its value or functionality or efficiency to higher levels. Only “corrective maintenance” can be compared with maintenance of tangible goods.

iii. The case laws and circulars placed were in relation to computer software and the new levy with effect from 16/05/2008 is in relation to information technology software. Computer software and information technology software services are treated differently by the legislature which can be understood from section 65(64) of the Finance Act, 1994 which reads as under:

“management, maintenance or repair” means any service provided by —

(i) any person under a contract or an agreement or
(ii) a manufacturer or any person authorised by him, in relation to, —

(a) management of properties, whether immovable or not;
(b) maintenance or repair of properties, whether immovable or not; or
(c) maintenance or repair including reconditioning or restoration, or servicing of any goods, excluding a motor vehicle

Explanation — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes of this clause, —

(a) ‘goods’ includes computer software;
(b) ‘properties’ includes information technology software” Therefore, maintenance of computer software is covered by clause
(c) whereas maintenance of information technology software is covered by clause

(b) above.

(iv) The activities of the appellant being well within the scope of “information technology software services”, appellant was not liable for service for the period under dispute.

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(2011) 21 STR 398 (Tri – Mumbai) – Makjai Laboratories vs. CCEx., Kolhapur

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During the period prior to 01/09/2009, activity amounting to ‘manufacture’ not liable for service tax even if not liable under Central Excise Act but chargeable under Medicinal and Toilet Preparations Act or any other Act.

Facts:
The appellant was manufacturing medicines containing alcohol on job work basis. The said medicines were chargeable to duty under the Medicinal & Toilet Preparations (Excise Duty) Act, 1955. The Department claimed that the exemption from business auxiliary services to job worker is restricted only to excisable goods under section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and since the goods are not excisable under the said section, exemption cannot be granted to appellant.

Held:
The exclusion is applicable to activity of ‘manufacture’ under section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and not restricted to “excisable goods” under the said section. Considering this exemption is available to the activity which is regarded as manufacturing activity whether chargeable to Central Excise Act, 1944 or Medicinal & Toilet Preparations (Excise Duty) Act, 1955 or any other Act and the appeal was allowed.

Comment:
The definition of business auxiliary service has been amended with effect from 01/09/2009 whereby the term ‘manufacture’ relates only to excisable goods under the Central Excise Act. Therefore the above will not hold good for the period after 01/09/2009.

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(2011) 21 STR 241 (Tri – Ahmd.) – Globe Enviro Care Ltd. vs. CCEx., Surat

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Incineration of bio medical waste prima facie not in the nature of processing of goods – not a business auxiliary service – stay granted.

Facts:
Appellant was engaged in processing and treatment of liquid chemical effluents generated at various industries. It was held liable for service tax on the ground that such activities are processing of goods on behalf of client and therefore, the same are ancillary to business auxiliary services. Appellant referred to various judgments to argue that the same is not leviable to service tax at all.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the lower authorities did not consider CBEC Circular issued in this behalf which clarified that incineration/shredding of biomedical waste cannot be considered as processing of goods. Granting unconditional stay, the matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority.

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(2011) 21 STR 224 (Kar) – CCEx., Mangalore vs. K. Vijaya C. Rai

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Non-payment of service tax for 3 years and payment only after receipt of show cause notice indicates malafide intention – penalty levied – cannot get away merely being a lady.

Facts:
The assessee, a lady, did not pay service tax for three years after becoming liable. On being surveyed, obtained the registration, but did not pay any service tax. Subsequent to issuance of show cause notice, paid service tax with interest. The Tribunal set aside the order levying penalty on her.

Held:
The Tribunal was carried away by the fact of assessee being lady and could not notice that people having malafide motives may use names of housewives. The High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and upheld the penalty.

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(2011) 21 STR 210 (P & H) – CCEx. vs. Haryana Industrial Security Services

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Penalty u/s. 78 has to be equal to the amount of service tax demand and the law does not provide discretion to reduce.

Facts:
The assessee a security agency, paid service tax on the service charges received from the customers instead of gross amount charged for the period from 16/10/1998 to 30/09/1999. The assessee did not dispute the revenue’s contention that the minimum penalty prescribed under section 78 is equal to the amount of service tax. Based on other facts, the lower Appellate Authorities held that the assessee had suppressed facts and therefore, liable to penalty. However the Tribunal reduced the penalty amount to 1.5 lakh from 6.5 lakh.

Held:

The penalty equal to the amount of service tax was minimum and Tribunal’s order reducing penalty was set aside.

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CENVAT Credit – Refund of service tax paid on input services – Export of software – Non taxable at the relevant point in time – Exporter entitled to refund of such unutilised CENVAT Credit on furnishing requisite documents – Registration is not a pre-requisite to claim CENVAT Credit in absence of any such statutory provisions.

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3. 2012 (27) STR 134 (Kar) mPortal India Wireless Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, Bangalore
    
CENVAT Credit – Refund of service tax paid on input services – Export of software – Non taxable at the relevant point in time – Exporter entitled to refund of such unutilised CENVAT Credit on furnishing requisite documents – Registration is not a pre-requisite to claim CENVAT Credit in absence of any such statutory provisions.

Facts:

The petitioner was an STPI unit engaged in development and export of software and a 100% export oriented unit. The Assistant Commissioner rejected the refund claim in absence of registration certificate and requisite documents as well as the reason of time bar and the order was upheld by the Commissioner. The Tribunal observed that the petitioner was entitled to the refund of CENVAT credit with respect to input services even when export of softwares was not liable to service tax and that limitation u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act did not apply in this case. However, it upheld that the CENVAT Credit could be claimed only when the assessee was registered.

Held:

Bar of limitation was not the ground for rejection of refund claim of accumulated unutilised CENVAT Credit by an export of services. Further, there is no express provision providing restriction on availment of CENVAT Credit in case of unregistered assessees and therefore, it was held that registration is not a pre-requisite for claiming CENVAT Credit. The matter was remanded for verification of invoice/s/bill/s/challan/s, service tax payment etc.

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[2015-TIOL-1085-CESTAT-MUM] Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-ii vs. Syntel Sterling Bestshores Solutions Pvt. Ltd

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Input services without which the quality and efficiency of output services exported cannot be achieved are eligible for refund.

Facts:
The
Respondent is a BPO rendering services to the clients based abroad. A
refund claim was filed in respect of service tax paid on rent-a-cab
service, telephone service and rent. Adjudicating authority denied the
claim. On appeal, the first appellate authority allowed the refund
claim, aggrieved by which revenue is in appeal.

Held:
The
Tribunal relied upon the CBEC’s Circular No. 120/01/2010-ST dated
19/01/2010 which specifically provides that essential services used by
Call Centres for provision of their output service would qualify as
input services eligible for taking CENVAT credit as well as refund. It
further held that the expression ‘used in’ in the CENVAT Credit Rules
should be interpreted in a harmonious manner and accordingly as the
input services disallowed were essential to provide quality output
services, the refund should be granted.

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Online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company

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Whether online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company liable under reverse charge?

In
a recent decision in relation to reverse charge mechanism in British
Airways vs. Commissioner (ADJN), Central Excise, Delhi
2014-TIOL-979-CESTAT -DEL, the Tribunal by majority set aside the demand
of service tax on British Airways, India (BA India) the branch of
British Airways PLC, U.K. (BA UK) at Gurgaon.

Background in brief
The
Appellant as branch office provides air transportation services for
passengers and cargo and on these services has been paying service tax
under (zzn) and (zzzo) of section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the
Act). BA UK like airlines all over the world have agreements with
Central Computer Reservation System service providing companies such as
Galileo, Amadeus, Abacus, Sabre etc. (CRS companies) all located outside
India. These CRS companies facilitate reservation and ticket
availability position to air travel agents in India and all over the
world through online computer system. None of these service providers
has branch or an establishment in India. Accordingly, they maintain
database of BA UK as regards flight schedule, fares, seat availability
on flight etc. on real time basis and make information available to all
IATA agents across the world. In terms of the agreements with BA UK, CRS
companies provide hardware and connectivity with their network. Based
on the ticket sale by the IATA agents using their database, these
companies receive their fees from BA UK. The IATA agents do not have to
pay any fees. The services provided by CRS companies were considered
“online database access or retrieval service” by the department as
contained in section 65(105)(zh) read with sub-Clause (75) and (36) of
section 65 of the Act and since the services are used by IATA agents of
BA India in India to sell tickets, they were treated as received and
consumed in India by BA India. Hence, service tax was demanded on the
remuneration received by CRS companies from BA UK from the Appellant in
this case BA India, under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66A of the Act
read with Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The
Commissioner confirmed the demand and imposed penalties against which
this appeal was filed.

The dispute in the appeal hinges around
the main issue viz. whether the Appellant BA India, a BA UK branch can
be treated as entity separate from its head office, BA UK in terms of
section 66A(2) and therefore the Indian branch be taxed as recipient of
services of CRS companies. Additional issue involved was whether or not
service provided by CRS companies be considered an online service since
both the members were in agreement with treating the service taxable as
online database access and retrieval service contained in section
65(105)(zh) of the Act read with section 65(75) thereof; not much
discussion is provided herein.

The Appellant contended that
service was provided outside India as the CRS companies and their parent
company were situated outside India. Therefore there cannot be tax
liability for the Appellant, BA India. The Appellant’s view of
non-taxability of service tax was based on the grounds that CRS
companies abroad provided services to their head office in London. CRS
company’s server was connected with the server of the head office of the
Appellant and thus the head office received those services abroad. In
terms of section 66A(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act), the branch
and the head office are to be treated as separate entities. Relying on
Paul Merchants 2012-TIOL-1877-CESTAT – Delhi, the Appellant also
contended that service recipient is the person on whose orders the
service is provided, who is obliged to make payment for the same and
whose need is satisfied by the provision of service. Further, they
advanced the argument that had they paid service tax, it was a revenue
neutral case as they would have got CENVAT credit of the same. They also
contended that longer period of limitation did not apply to them as
they bonafide believed that they had no tax liability.

Revenue
discarded this plea finding that CRS companies even if situated outside
India were providing services to the Appellant having establishment in
India which enabled their appointed IATA agents to use the system for
booking tickets and thus derived benefit therefrom and therefore the
Appellant was ultimate service recipient in India from foreign based CRS
companies of online database access or retrieval services u/s. 66A of
the Act from 18/04/2006. According to revenue, since BA UK was permitted
by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to operate in India, the head office of
the Appellant and the Appellant cannot be two distinct entities under
law. Section 66A(2) of the Act did not apply to them. Existence of
Appellant in India without its head office was impracticable and
existence in India was only to fulfill object of its head office in UK
and act on its behalf in India under limited permissions granted by RBI
which in essence and substance is the same. The establishment in India
was created on temporary basis to carry out business in India. On the
above pleas made by the Appellant and the revenue, the two members of
the Division Bench of the CESTAT , Delhi had different views.
Consequently, the matter was referred to the Third Member. The views of
both the members along with those of the third member are summarised
below:

Conclusion: Member (Judicial):
The learned Member
(Judicial) after considering the case of the adjudicating authority and
examining relevant statutory provisions, examined the letter issued by
RBI to BA UK and the agreement between BA UK & Galileo, the CRS
company. RBI ‘s letter contained permission to carry out air
transportation business in India regulated by FEMA in view of the
foreign currency transactions involved.

• The Bench observed
that BA UK had its place of business in India in terms of section
66A(1)(b) of the Act during the impugned period. As a participant of CRS
agreement, the Appellant at its own cost was required to provide
Galileo complete data, timely and accurate in order that the CRS company
would be able to maintain and operate the system to provide access to
the IATA agents the services of reservation, seat availability etc. on
real time basis for a consideration payable by BA UK. According to the
Member, BA India was in no way different from its head office and
therefore the contention that BA India was not party to the agreement
was not correct.
• Air travel agents appointed by the Appellant
received and used the services of CRS and Appellant having place of
business in India is the recipient of services from foreign based CRS
companies.

• Who makes payment to the service provider is not material and no free service is provided by the service provider.


When the Appellant is covered by section 66A(1)(b) of the Act as
recipient of taxable service u/s. 65(105)(zh) of the Act, their plea
that they are immune from service tax in India is ill-founded as their
existence in India is only under the RBI permission whereas 66A(2) of
the Act recognises only different situs under law, but the said s/s.
does not grant immunity from taxation in India once incidence of tax
arises in India. What is charged by revenue is services received in
India and the Appellant has consumed them in India and not the services
received by its head office outside India.

• Appellant’s plea of
revenue neutrality would not exonerate them from the liability it has
under the law and reliance on Paul Merchants (supra) is misplaced as it
related to export of service.

•    Since the Appellant failed to register and file Returns periodically, they committed breach of law which cannot be eroded by lapse of time. Bonafide should be apparent from conduct and a mere plea does not render the adjudication time-barred and thus extended period could be invoked.

Conclusion: Member (Technical) the   member   (technical)   differing   from   the   above conclusion drawn by the member (judicial) made following observations. He however agreed on the issue of classification that services were classifiable as online/ access/retrieval services:

•    Since the term ‘service’ was not defined during the period under appeal, not only there must be an activity provided by a provider of service to the recipient thereof, but there must also be flow of consideration, cash or other than cash, direct or indirect from recipient to the provider and the provision of services must satisfy some need of the recipient which may be personal or business.

•    Under Rule 3 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005, when a service provider is in india and the recipient thereof are outside india, no service tax is chargeable and when the provider is located abroad being a person having a business or fixed establishment outside India and the recipient is located in india being a person having a place of business, fixed establishment in india, he is a person liable for service tax in terms of section  66A read  with  rule  2(1)(d)(iv)  of  the  service tax rules.

•    U/s. 66A(2), when a person carries out a business through a permanent establishment in india and through another permanent establishment in another country, the two establishments  are  separate  persons  for the purpose of this section. second proviso to section 66a(1) is that when a service provider has his busies establishment in more than any one country, the establishment which is directly concerned with the provision of service will be considered service provider.   This  principle  in  the  hon.  Member’s  view would apply to determine as to who is the service recipient in the instant case when provider of service is located abroad and it will be reasonable to treat the establishment most directly concerned with the use  of the service provided as recipient of such services provided by the person abroad.

•    Unlike the transaction of goods, receipt and consumption of a service goes together, as the provision of a service satisfies the need of recipient, the service stands consumed. Accordingly, if service recipient is located in india, the service is received and hence consumed in india but if the recipient is located abroad, there is no liability for the person in india to pay service tax. This is in accordance with the principle of equivalence mentioned in the apex Court’s judgment in the case of all India Federation of Tax Practitioner 2007-TIOL-149-SC-ST and association of Leasing and Financial service companies 2010 (20) STr 417 (SC).

•    Conceptually, Export of Service Rules, 2005 and taxation   of   service   (provided   from   outside   india and received in india)  rules, 2006 put together are the rules which determine the location of service recipient.  thus, when the provider of service is located in india and the recipient thereof is outside india, in accordance with rule 3(iii) applicable to the services other than these in relation to immovable property and performance based services and when they relate to business or commerce, these will be export services and there would be no taxation in india whereas in  the reverse scenario, there will be import of service   in respect of which the service recipient is located in india. However, if both service provider and receiver  of category (iii) for use in his business are also located outside india, there would be no import and therefore no taxation in india.

•    As regards services of CRS companies located abroad, whether they can be treated as received by the appellant in india is to be determined based on the above legal provisions.

•    As regards letter from RBI, it was observed as follows:

i)    BA UK and Ba india are separate establishments and that the branch was not in the nature of a temporary establishment as contended by the department.
ii)    the   agreement   was   between   BA  UK   and   CRS companies abroad which did not have any branch or establishment in india.
iii)    entire payment to Crs companies was made directly by Ba uK outside india and no part was paid by Ba india.

Thus,  the  services  provided  by  CRS  companies  were received by BA UK as both Ba UK and Ba India are to be treated as separate persons in view of the provisions  of  section  66a(2).  They  would  be  treated as received in india only if it has been received by the recipient located in india for use in relation to business or commerce.

Reasoning why the Branch is not the recipient of service.

According to the hon. Member (technical), the revenue’s view that Ba india was the recipient of the services of CRS companies was incorrect for the following reasons:

•    In a transaction of service, the recipient consumes the service simultaneously with the performance of service. thus recipient of a service is the person who is legally entitled for provision of service.  further, consideration in some cases can be direct or indirect. applying this criteria, Ba india can be treated as recipient only if the service provided by CRS companies is meant for the BA india and if BA UK had acted as only facilitator and there was flow of consideration, direct or indirect from BA india to CRS companies. In the instant case, neither BA India is recipient nor is there a flow of consideration, direct or indirect form Ba India to CRS companies.

•    CRS companies did not provide any branch specific service.   The   job of BA india is only to appoint iata agents, collect sales proceeds of tickets sold by agents, fares and remitting the same to h.o. and nothing showed that key business decisions were taken by them for the entire company. applying the principle of second proviso of section 66A(1) discussed above,    it is BA UK – the H.O. office which is to be treated    as directly concerned with the services provided by CRS companies as it cannot be said that the indian branch was the sole beneficiary or that H.O. acted   as a facilitator to enter into the agreements with CRS companies on behalf of branches for providing services to them. The business needs of H.O. are satisfied and therefore h.o. is the recipient of service.

•    There is no evidence or even allegation that BA India made any payment to CRS companies directly or indirectly and there is an accepted position in the order that payment was made abroad by the h.o. directly   to CRS companies and that the two establishments   of BA india and BA UK their h.o. have to be treated   as separate persons in terms of section 66A(2), the transaction of provision of service has to be treated as  taken  place  outside  india.  therefore,  the  service received by BA UK cannot be treated as service received by Ba india.

•    Merely because IATA agents appointed by BA India used the services of CRS companies from abroad, the appellant does not become the recipient of service.

•    The only situation in respect of which service tax can be levied on the branch of a recipient company in india would be wherein the services provided by a service provider located outside india against an agreement with head office of a company incorporated and located outside India and when the head office has entered into a framework agreement with the service provider by way of centralised sourcing of service, the provision of service at various branches located in different countries and the service is provided at the branch in india and the role of the h.o. is only of facilitator. in the instant case of Ba india, from the agreement, it cannot be inferred that the Crs companies were to provide location specific service to the branches of BA UK all over the world.

•    As regards applicability of longer period of limitation also, it was found not available to the department in view of the fact that intent to contravene the provisions of the act could not be attributed when collection of tax would have been a revenue neutral exercise.

Reference to Third Member:
Briefly stated, the points of difference referred to the Third member were:

•    Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellant permitted by reserve Bank of india to carry out air transport activity in india was a branch in india and was recipient of “online database access or retrieval service” from Crs service providers abroad and liable for service tax in terms of section 65(105) (zh) read with section 65(75) under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66a with effect from 18/04/2006 or exempt in terms of 66a(2) and also whether longer period of limitation was available to the department for recovery of tax.

•    The learned Third Member acknowledged various undisputed facts among others that the Crs companies were located outside india, the agreement was between Ba uK and them and payment for the said service was made by Ba uK and in the light of these facts, what was to be considered was whether Ba india was the extension of Ba uK or they had to  be treated as separate legal entities. She noted the contentions of the revenue that various provisions of the Companies act, 1956 which interalia included that the entire accounts from the indian operations stand debited by the head office along with the expenses incurred by the corporate office in relation to operations in india and which also included the payment of CRS debit for tax sold in indian ticketing.  Further, that there was no legal distinction between foreign companies with its parent office abroad and their local subordinate branch office in India and under these circumstances that Ba uK was given permission to open its branch office in India.

She nevertheless, discussed the provisions of 66A read with explanation to s/s. (2) in her observations and found herself in agreement with the observations and finding of Member (Technical) analysed above that services provided by a foreign based company to a foreign based head office cannot be any liability of the appellant to discharge its service tax in as much as service tax being a destination and consumption based tax cannot be created against the non-consumer of the  services.  Likewise  she  also  concurred  with  non- availability of longer period of limitation for recovery to the department as she found revenue neutral situation and also that the issue involved being complicated issue of legal interpretation which cannot be held to be a settled law also found favour with the appellant’s bonafide belief.

Conclusion:
The above decision allowing appeal by the majority will serve as a guiding decision for disputes relating to cross border transactions and particularly those relating to liability of service tax under reverse charge mechanism. the  decision  however  relates  to  the  period  prior  to introduction of definition of ‘service’ with effect from 01-07-2012 and also place of provision of services

[2015] 55 Taxmann.com 111 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Deshmukh Services vs. CCE & ST.

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Multi-piece packing of soaps on job work basis amounts to deemed manufacture and hence cannot be taxed under Business Auxiliary Services – Matter remitted back to pass a reasoned order and also to consider the effect of Exemption Notification qua intermediate production processes.

Facts:
The appellant undertook job work activities in the nature of mixing of soap bits provided by the supplier company and returning the same in 50 kg. or bigger bags as per company’s instruction and multi-piece packing for which they received consideration. The department contended and confirmed the demand considering the activities as business auxiliary service.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that as per section 2(f)(iii) of the CE Act, 1944 ‘manufacture’ includes any process which in relation to the goods specified in the 3rd Schedule involves packing or re-packing of such goods in a unit container or labeling or re-labeling of containers including the declaration or alteration of retail sale price on it or adoption of any other treatment to the goods to render the products marketable to the consumer and soaps were covered under Serial No. 40 of the said 3rd Schedule. Therefore, multi-piece packaging would fall under the category of “packing or re-packing of goods” and would be an activity of ‘manufacture’. The department’s contention that soap is already in packed condition and hence manufacture is said to be completed was not accepted by the Tribunal on the ground that, multi-piece packaging is done on the soaps already packed and therefore, it would amount to repacking and accordingly the activity would be covered under the definition of ‘manufacture’ u/s. 2(f)(iii). It was further held that if the soap noodles are sold as such after mixing and packing/re-packing, then the activity undertaken by the appellant would amount to ‘manufacture’. On the other hand, if they are not sold as such, but are subject to further processes, since the goods are moved under Rule 4(5)(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 it will be an intermediary process in the course of manufacture of soaps and since such movements are permitted without payment of excise duty, the question of levy of service tax would not arise at all in terms of Notification No.8/2005-ST dated 01/03/2005. However, since there was no finding in the order except that the appellant did not contest the duty, the matter was remitted back to give specific finding as to why the activity of the appellant did not amount to manufacture and if it does not amount to manufacture, why benefit of Notification No. 8/2005-S.T. cannot be extended.

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2014 (35) STR 564 (Tri. – Chennai) Shriram RPC Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

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Is penalty leviable when service tax along with interest is paid before issuance of Show Cause Notice? Held, No.

Facts:
On being pointed out by departmental auditor, service tax along with interest was paid. However, Show Cause Notice was issued imposing penalties. Since tax along with interest was paid before issuance of Show Cause Notice, the appellant claimed entitlement of benefit of 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 and also requested for benefits of section 80. Relying on the decision in case of CCE & STC, Bangalore vs. First Flight Couriers 2007 (8) S.T.R. 225 (Kar.), the revenue denied benefit of section 73(3) considering the case as one of suppression.

Held:
Section 73(3) of Finance Act, 1994 was issued with an intention to encourage immediate realisation of short payment and avoid unnecessary litigations. Karnataka High Court in case of ADECCO Flexione Work Force Solutions Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 3 (kar.), had held that unless there is any active suppression, section 73(3) should be applicable considering First Flight Couriers (supra) on a different footing and not finding even bonafide error or doubt regarding legal provisions, the penalty was set aside.

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2014 (35) STR 397 (Tri.-Del.) Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Comm. of C.Ex., & ST, Allahabad

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Whether denial of CENVAT Credit on the ground that invoice did not contain service tax registration number of service provider is valid? Held, No

Facts:
CENVAT credit was denied on the ground that service tax registration number of service provider was not mentioned on the invoice. Adjudicating authority though observed the fact of deposit of tax by service provider in the ST-3 returns denied CENVAT Credit.

Held:
In view of production of ST-3 returns, the defect in the invoice had become a rectifiable defect and accordingly, Tribunal allowed CENVAT Credit.

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2014 (35) STR 529 (Tri. – Ahmd.) Patel Air Freight vs. Commr. Of C.Ex. & Service Tax, Vadodara

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In case of invoices paid after availing discounts, is CENVAT Credit available in full or proportionately? Held in view of facts, full credit would be available.

Facts:
The appellants had availed full CENVAT Credit on discounted invoices. The Revenue contended that CENVAT credit should be allowed proportionally. The appellants relied on Circular No. 877/15/2008-CX, dated 17th November, 2008 and Circular No. 122/3/2010- ST, dated 30th April, 2010 which clarified that CENVAT Credit will be available for such amount which has been paid as Excise Duty/Service tax whether at full value or proportionate value.

Held:
There was no evidence brought to prove that reduced service tax was paid. Also, CENVAT credit was availed of amount paid as service tax, full credit was held as available in view of the above refered circulars.

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[2014] 48 taxmann.com 232 (Gujarat) – Cema Electric Lighting Products India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise

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Whether assesse is entitled to the CENVAT Credit in respect of catering services received when consideration is recovered from the beneficiaries/assessee’s own employees? Held, No

Facts:
The appellant, a manufacturer availed CENVAT Credit of entire payment made to the canteen contractor even though the amount is recovered from its employees/ beneficiaries of canteen service. The demand was confirmed under Rule 14 of the CCR in respect of the amount recovered. Both Appellate authorities confirmed the demand.

Held:
The appellant is not entitled for CENVAT Credit if the amount is recovered from the beneficiaries/its own employees while running the canteen. Further, it was held that concurrent finding of facts by both the authorities below, that full details were not furnished and entire amount was recovered, justifies the invocation of extended period of limitation

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M/S. Harsh Jewelers vs. Commercial Tax Officer, [2013] 57 VST 538 ( AP)

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VAT- Input Tax Credit- Purchase From Registered Dealer-Selling Dealer Did Not Disclose Sales in His Return- Not a Ground For Denial Of Input Tax Credit, section 13(1) of The Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005

Facts
The petitioner purchased goods from the registered dealer and claimed input tax credit. Subsequently the registration certificate of the selling dealer was cancelled after the date of sale by him to the purchasing dealer but he did not disclose the turnover in his returns. The vat department disallowed the input tax credit claimed by the petitioner on the impugned purchases on the ground that the turnover of sales is not declared by selling dealer in his returns and raised ademand . The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court against the said assessment order.

Held
Section 13(1) of the Act entails input tax credit to the VAT dealer for the tax charged in respect of all purchases of taxable goods, made by that dealer during the tax period. It is not disputed that the registration of the selling dealer was cancelled after the transaction in question occurred. The failure on the part of the selling dealer to file returns or remit the tax component of the sale made to the petitioner dealer cannot per se be a ground for denial of input tax credit. Accordingly, the High Court quashed the order of assessment and it was made open to the vat department to pass revised order if there be material on the basis of which the input tax credit can be denied except on the ground that the selling dealer, despite being a registered dealer on the relevant date, did not remit the tax. The writ petition was allowed by the High Court.

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44. [2015-TIOL-1239-HC-P&H-ST] Ajay Kumar Gupta vs. CESTAT and Another.

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Service Tax deposited on a non-taxable service u/s. 73A(2) of the Finance Act with delay, penalty u/ss. 76 and 78 not leviable.

Facts:
The Appellant collected service tax on a non-taxable service and had deposited the tax with delay without the payment of interest. Show Cause Notice was issued proposing levy of interest and penalty u/ss. 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. The First Appellate Authority held that since the amount collected was not chargeable, penalty u/s. 76 and 78 was set aside. Aggrieved thereby, Revenue appealed before the Tribunal. While allowing the Revenue’s appeal, the Tribunal noted that since the tax was collected and the same was deposited only on the insistence of Revenue, it was a case of willful suppression and interest and penalty u/ss. 75 and 78 was restored leading to the present appeal.

Held:

The Hon’ble High Court noted that service tax was not leviable u/s. 68 of the Finance Act and the liability was only to deposit tax u/s. 73A(2) of the Finance Act which was done after delay. Thus as service was not taxable, penalty u/s. 78 was not invocable.

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[2015] 56 taxmann.com 259 (Karnataka High Court) – Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax vs. Jacobs Engineering UK Ltd.

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A foreign company with no business establishment nor operations in India cannot be held liable to service tax on mere visit of its officers in India for providing service.

Facts:
Assessee company is situated in United Kingdom with no office or branch in India. They provided consulting engineering service to an Indian Fertiliser company for period March 1998 to April 2001. Revenue alleged that since officers of respondent company had visited premises of assessee they are liable to service tax. Both the appellate authorities decided against the Revenue, aggrieved by which appeal is filed before High Court.

Held:
The High Court observed that, the Tribunal dismissed the order relying upon Mumbai Bench judgment of Tribunal in case of Philcorp Pte. Ltd. vs. CCE on the ground that the respondent company did not have any office or operations within the Territory of India. The submission made by the revenue that respondent company’s officers had visited the client’s plant in India and thus liable to tax is not accepted by the Court , in view of the fact that, assessee don’t have branch or office within the taxable territory. Thus, the appeal was dismissed as service provider was located outside India with no business operations or office within territory of India.

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VAT – Works Contract – Goods Involved in Execution of Works Contract – Rate of Tax Applicable to The Goods Deemed to be Sold, section 4(1)(c)of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003

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10. M/S Durga Projects Inc vs. State of Karnataka and Another, [2013] 62 VSTs 482 (Karn)

VAT – Works Contract – Goods Involved in Execution of Works Contract – Rate of Tax Applicable to The Goods Deemed to be Sold, section 4(1)(c)of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003

Facts
The appellant, a partnership firm, engaged in the business of civil works contract, purchased necessary building materials, hardware, etc., the goods falling under Schedule III, certain items of ‘declared goods’ falling u/s. 15 of the CST Act and other non-scheduled goods from within and outside the State as well as from unregistered dealers. The appellant made an application u/s. 60 of the KVAT Act before the Authority for Clarifications and Advance Rulings (ACAR for short) seeking for clarification in respect of: a) A pplicability of the rate of tax on execution of civil works contract under the Act; and b) Whether input tax credit can be availed out of output tax paid by the contractor. The ACAR, after examining the matter in detail, by its order dated 2-8-2006 came to the conclusion that there is no specific entry providing rate of tax on works contract under the KVAT Act, up to 31-3-2006 and therefore, tax should be levied as per the rate applicable on the value of each class of goods involved in the execution of works contract i.e. if the goods involved are taxable at the rate of 4%, then works contract rate would be at 4% and if the rate is 12.5%, the works contract rate would also be at 12.5%. With regard to the clarification of input tax credit is concerned, no finding was given. The appellant subsequently sought for rectification of the order dated 2-8-2006 before the ACAR. The ACAR further clarified on 7-12-2006 stating that iron and steel is one of the commodities specified u/s. 14 of the CST Act 1956, as goods of special importance and therefore, the iron and steel are to be subjected to works contract tax at 4%, when it was used in the same form and if they are used in manufacture or fabrication of product, it would no longer qualify as iron and steel and would have to be subjected to works contract tax at 12.5%.The Commissioner for Commercial Taxes after noticing the clarification order passed by the ACAR found that the order passed by the ACAR is erroneous and prejudice to the interest of the revenue and issued notice u/s. 64(2) of the Act on 25- 8-2010. The Commissioner for Commercial Taxes, after considering the objections filed by the appellant, by its order dated 12-10-2010 set aside the order passed by the ACAR in exercise of its suo-motu revisionary power and held that the goods used in the works contract cannot be treated on par with the normal sale of goods for the purpose of arriving at the rate for the period prior to 1-4- 2006. Further, the iron and steel or any other declared goods used for executing the works contract would be liable to be taxed as per the State Law. The appellant, being aggrieved by the order dated 12-10-2010 passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, filed appeal before the Karnataka High Court.

Held

Section 4(1)(c) was inserted by Act No.4 of 2006 w.e.f. 1-4-2006 thereby levying tax on the works contract by specifying the rate of tax under the Sixth Schedule. Prior to the amendment, the tax was being collected on the rate applicable to sale of each class of goods under Section 3(1) of the Act. Section 3(1) of the Act provides for levy of tax on sale of goods. Section 4 prescribes the rate of tax. Neither section 3 nor section 4 of the Act seeks or intend to levy or prescribe different rate of tax for the goods involved in the normal sale and for the goods involved in the deemed sale. Both normal sale as well as the deemed sale should be treated as one and the same with respect to levy of tax on sale of goods. Admittedly, prior to 1-4- 2006 insertion of clause (c) to section 4, the rate of tax was not prescribed in respect of transfer of the property in goods, (whether as goods or in any other form) involved in the execution of works contract. Hence, the tax has to be levied as per section 3(1) of the Act. The sale under the works contract is a deemed sale of transfer of the goods alone and it is not different from the normal sale. Hence, the tax has to be levied on the price of the goods and material used in the works contract as if there was a sale of goods and materials. The property in the goods used in the work contract will be deemed to have been passed over to the buyer as soon as the goods or material used are incorporated to the moveable property by principle of accretion to the moveable property. For the period prior to 1-4-2006, tax has to be levied as per section 3(1) of the Act and for the period subsequent to 1-4-2006, tax has to be levied as per section 4(1)(c) of the Act. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the firm. The order passed by the Commissioner was set aside and the order passed by the ACAR was restored.

[2014] 43 taxmann.com 363 (Madras) CST vs. Sangamitra Services Agency

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Whether, reimbursement of expenses paid by Principal to C&F Agent on actual basis are includible in the value of clearing and forwarding service? Held, no.

Facts:
The issue before the High Court was, whether various charges towards freight, labour, electricity, telephone etc, which were reimbursed by the principal to the C & F Agent on the basis of actuals, were required to be added to the value of the taxable service in relation to the clearing and forwarding services provided by a C&F agent of the Principal.

On behalf of the respondent, nobody represented the matter. The Revenue contended that, in terms of the provisions of Rule 6(8) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, the value of taxable service in relation to the services provided by the Clearing and Forwarding Agent to the client for rendering services of the Clearing and Forwarding operations, in any manner, shall be deemed to be the gross amount of remuneration or commission (by whatever name called) paid to such agent by the client, engaging such agent and considering this, the charges collected towards freight, labour, electricity, telephone etc., in connection with the Clearing and Forwarding Services, would form part of the remuneration/commission.

Held
Rejecting the revenue’s contention, the Hon’ble High Court held that the gross amount referred to in Rule 6(8) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 would apply to receipts of such sum, which would bear the character of remuneration or commission in that. In the absence of any material to show the understanding between the Principal and the Client that the commission payable by the principal was all inclusive, it is difficult to hold that the gross amount of remuneration/commission would nevertheless include expenditure incurred by the assessee providing the services; that all incidental charges for running of the business would also form part of the remuneration or commission (by whatever name called). The phrase “by whatever name called” must necessarily have some link or reference with the nature of the receipt of remuneration or commission. Thus, if a receipt is for reimbursing the expenditure incurred for the purpose per se, would not justify that the same had the character of the remuneration or commission.

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2014 (33) STR 501 (Guj.) Commissioner of C. Ex. & Customs vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd.

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Whether Service Tax paid on insurance of vehicles used for the residents of worker’s residential colony is eligible input service for availment of the CENVAT Credit? Held, no.

Facts:
The respondents, cement manufacturers availed the CENVAT Credit of Service Tax paid on insurance services for the residential colony and of the vehicles specially used for travelling of workers from their colony to the factory. Placing reliance on the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of M/s. Triveni Engg & Industrial Ltd. vs. CCC, Meerut, 2008 (12) S.T.R. 330, the Tribunal had upheld the assessee’s contention that the phrase “activities in relation to business” used in the inclusive part of the definition of input services was wide enough to cover such services.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed the case of Commissioner vs. Gujarat Heavy Chemicals Ltd. 2011 (22) S.T.R. 610 (Guj), wherein the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court had analysed various decisions and had held that if providing residential quarters and security services was voluntary, the activities were not covered within the definition of input services and therefore, the CENVAT Credit was not available. Relying on this, the CENVAT was not allowed as not in relation to business.

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[2015-TIOL-87-CESTAT-AHM] Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Bhavnagar vs. M/s. Madhvi Procon Pvt. Ltd.

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Service tax paid on advance received, ultimately no service was provided. If no service is provided the amount paid has to be considered as a deposit.

Facts:-
The Appellant received mobilisation advance, they paid service tax under works contract composition scheme. However, the contract was terminated and the advance received was recovered by the customer. The refund application filed was rejected on the ground that it had been filed beyond the limitation period u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act. On appeal, the first appellate authority allowed the appeal, aggrieved by which the present appeal is filed.

Held:
Once service is not rendered then no service tax is payable, any duty paid by mistake cannot be termed as ‘duty’. The payment made has to be considered as a ‘deposit’ to which provisions of section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 will not be applicable. Similar view was taken in the case of M/s. Barclays Technology Centre India P. Ltd vs. CCE [2015] – TIOL-82-CESTAT-MUM, where it was decided that refund cannot be denied for procedural infraction when service tax was not required to be paid. On slightly different facts, in the case of Jyotsana D Patel vs. CCE, Nagpur [2014] 52 taxmann.com 255 (Mumbai CESTAT), it was also held on similar lines that when the service tax is not required to be paid, the amount paid cannot constitute service tax and thus the provisions of section 11B are not applicable.

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Exemption from late fee u/s. 20(6) of the MVAT Act Trade Circular 8T of 2014 dated. 11-03-2014.

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By this Circular, the Commissioner has explained different contingencies in which late fee would be exempt.

Notification No. VAT 1513/CR-109/Taxation-1 dated 13-01-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry D-11 has been amended to add more areas.

Notification No. VAT 1514/CR-8/Taxation-1 dated 20-02-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry A-9A: paddy rice, wheat, etc.; A-51: papad, gur, etc.; A-59: raisins and currants, C-108: tea in leaf or powdered form etc., have been amended by extending the period up to 31st March, 2015.

Notification No. VAT 1514/CR-10/Taxation-1 dated 20-02-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry B-1, B-2 has been amended by reducing rate from 1.1% to 1 % again.

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Exemption w.r.t. rice

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Notification No. 04/2014-ST read with Circular No.177/03/2014 – ST dated 17th February, 2014

This Notification has been issued by CBEC for implementing the changes proposed in the Interim Budget presented by the Finance Minister.

The Notification amends Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST to provide that service tax would not be payable on rice from the staple’s loading to the storage stage. It may be noted that rice was originally exempt from service tax. However, later, the Finance Ministry had taken a view that only paddy is an agricultural produce, while rice is a processed item.

This notification also exempts services provided by cord blood banks by way of preservation of stem cells or any other service in relation to such preservation.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 51 (Allahabad) – CCE vs. Juhi Alloys Ltd.

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Rule 9(3) of CCR- What constitutes reasonable steps to ensure the validity of the CENVAT?

Facts:
The Assessee took credit of duty paid on inputs based on invoices issued by the First Stage Dealer (FSD). Inputs were used for the manufacture of final products which were cleared against the payment of duty. The Department sought to deny credit on the ground that original manufacturer of said goods was found to be non-existent.

The Commissioner (Appeals) observed that in terms of Rule 7(4) read with Rule 9(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 (CCR), the assessee submitted Form 31 issued by Trade Tax Department, the ledger account evidencing payments by cheques made to the FSD and Form RG 23-A, Part-II. It was held that the assessee had received goods against the invoices of FSD for which payment was made by cheque and that the manufactured goods were cleared against the payment of central excise duty. He, therefore, allowed the Appeal on the ground that the transaction was bona fide and a buyer can take only those steps which are within his control and would not be expected to verify the records of the supplier to check whether, in fact, he had paid duty on the goods supplied by him. Tribunal also observed that, the fact that FSD is a registered dealer is undisputed and held that, it would be sufficient for the assessee to buy the goods from the FSD whose status he has checked and verified and dismissed the Revenue’s Appeal.

Before the High Court, the Revenue contended that the assessee ought to have made an enquiry which would have indicated that the original manufacturer that had supplied the raw material was a fictitious entity.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court while examining the provisions of Rule 9(3) of CCR held that, the Explanation to Rule 9(3) provides a deeming definition as to when a manufacturer or a purchaser of excisable goods would be deemed to have taken reasonable steps. However, even in a situation where the Explanation to Rule 9(3) is not attracted, it would be open to an assessee to establish independently that he had in fact taken reasonable steps. Whether an assessee has in fact taken reasonable steps, is a question of fact. The High Court observed that both fact finding authorities found that assessee have duly acted with all reasonable diligence in its dealings with the first stage dealer and held that, the assessee has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the inputs for which the CENVAT credit was taken were the goods on which appropriate duty of excise was paid within the meaning of Rule 9(3) of CCR.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 140 (Tri – Mumbai) Hotel Amarjit Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & Service Tax, Nagpur

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Whether supply of food along with provision of Mandap keeper services is liable to service tax under Mandap keeper services?

Facts:
The appellants provided “Mandap Keeper Service” and ‘Catering Services’. Prior to April, 2005, the appellants were charging one lump sum amount and service tax was levied on combined receipt. With effect from April, 2005, the appellants started splitting the bills, one for banquet hall and another for supply of food and discharged service tax only on banquet hall charges considering the same to be Mandap keeper services. Objecting to splitting of bill, the department confirmed demand on food charges collected as well. The appellants contested that food charges were collected separately on which VAT was levied. Since the transaction was of sale of goods, the same was not leviable to service tax. They further contested that Joint Commissioner of Central Excise of their other unit had accepted their contention and service tax was levied only on hall charges. Accordingly, since department had knowledge of the activity undertaken by the appellants, extended period of limitation also was challenged. The appellants further challenged some calculation errors of the department. On the other hand, relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kalyana Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC) and Sayaji Hotels Ltd. 2011 (24) STR 177 (Tri.-Del.), the department contested that catering charges were includible in taxable value of Mandap keeper services and contended that though in another unit, the case was dropped, a wrong decision could be perpetuated.

Held:
Having regard to the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assn. (supra) and Sayaji Hotels Ltd. (supra), the services rendered by Mandap keepers as caterer were also liable to service tax under the category of Mandap keeper services since price charged for food formed part of consideration of Mandap keeper’s services. Service tax demand beyond 5 years was quashed. Since every registered premise is considered as a separate assessee under service tax law, dropping of demand at one unit was of no relevance to decide whether extended period of limitation may be invoked or not. The appellants cannot take plea of bona fide belief as Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held catering services were liable to service tax. Also, according to the Apex Court’s judgement in the case of Fuljit Kaur and Chandigarh Administration 2010 (262) ELT 40 (SC) if a wrong decision has been passed at a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the superior court for repeating the same irregularity. In the present case, the appellants did not disclose consideration received from catering services in bills and ST3 Returns. Hence, it was a case of mis-statement of fact with intent to evade taxes and extended period of time was justified. In light of the above analysis, the matter was remanded back for re-quantification. Penalty u/s. 76 was held imposable for default in payment of service tax since mens rea was not required to be proved to levy such penalty. In view of contravention of provisions in the present case, penalties u/s. 77 were sustainable. Splitting of bills from April, 2005 was a deliberate act to evade Service tax payments and therefore, penalty u/s. 78 was confirmed.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 88 (Tri.-Mumbai) B4U Television Network (I) P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Can excessive service tax paid be adjusted against future service tax liability or the assessee needs to file a refund claim?

Facts:
The appellants adjusted excess service tax paid earlier was objected by service tax department. Relying on various Tribunal decisions, the appellants contested that service tax was not collected by them from their clients and they had complied with Rule 6(3) of Service Tax Rules, 1994 and therefore, such adjustment of excess service tax paid was justified. The Department submitted that the case was not covered by Rule 6(3) and that the appellants should have filed a refund claim for claiming back such excess payment.

Held:
Delhi Tribunal in case of Nirma Architects & Valuers 2006 (1) STR 305 (Tri.) had held that if adjustment of excess Service tax paid would not be allowed against future payments, Rule 6(3) would become redundant. Relying on the said decision, Tribunal allowed such adjustment of undisputed excess Service tax paid.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 220 (Guj.)Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs vs. V.M. Engg. Works

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Whether penalty levied u/s. 76 can be reduced by invoking section 80?

Facts:
Since the respondents delayed the payment of service tax, adjudicating authority levied penalty u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994. Being aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) who reduced the penalty by invoking provisions of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994. The matter was appealed by revenue before the Tribunal, but they did not succeed. According to the revenue, it was mandatory to impose penalty u/s. 76 and discretionary powers to reduce penalty was not vested with the authority and neither the Commissioner (Appeals) nor the Tribunal were justified in reducing the penalty. Further to support its contestation, Revenue placed reliance on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs vs. Port Officer 2010 (19) S.T.R. 641 (Guj.).

Held:
Relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in case of Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs vs. Port Officer (supra) it was held that in case it is proved by the assessee that there was reasonable cause for failure, penalties may not be levied vide section 76 read with section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994. Accordingly, though discretionary powers are granted, the powers are restricted to waive off the total penalty and penalties cannot be reduced below the minimum limit prescribed u/s. 76. Therefore, the appeal was allowed and the Tribunal was directed to decide the matter afresh in light of the said decision after providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 28 (Uttarakhand) Valley Hotel & Resorts vs. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Dehradun

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Whether VAT is leviable on amount, leviable to service tax, on presumptive basis with respect to restaurant services?

Facts:
The revisionist was engaged in the business of hotel providing lodging, boarding and restaurant services. Food served in the restaurant was liable for VAT vide Uttarakhand VAT Act, 2005 which was duly discharged. From 1st July, 2012, Service tax was leviable on 40% of the bill amount vide Rule 2C of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. The revisionist, hence, made an application to VAT authorities requesting not to charge VAT on such 40% of billed amount which would suffer a burden of service tax. However, Commissioner as well as Tribunal of Commercial Tax rejected the application

Held:
Value Added Tax can be imposed on sale of goods and not on service. Union Government, which is the competent authority to impose service tax, has imposed service tax on restaurant services which is not challenged by the State. VAT cannot be imposed on the element of service. Thus, the revision was allowed.

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Operation and Maintenance Service — whether Consulting Engineering Service

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New Page 1

II. Tribunal :


9. Operation and Maintenance Service — whether Consulting Engineering
Service ?



GVK Power & Infrastructure Ltd. v. CC., CE., S.T.
Visakhapatnam,
2008 (10) STR 146 (Tri.-Bang).

â A demand was raised
on the appellant under ‘Consulting Engineer’ service for the activity of
operation and maintenance of power plant. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the
same and remanded the case back to find out value of services relating to
consultancy and recompute the duty liability.

The appellant contended that their contract was not of an
engineering consultancy. They relied upon the decision of M/s. Rolls Royce
Industries Power (I) Ltd. v. CCE,
2006 (3) STR 292, wherein it was held that
it is the responsibility of the operator to operate the plant smoothly and if
any engineering problem arose, it was his responsibility to find out solution
and operate the machine. The operator was not required to render advice or
consultancy, no service tax was payable.

Citing Daelim’s case, the act of the Commissioner (Appeals)
to remand the case for recalculation was not accepted.


GVK Power Infrastructure Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (10) STER 146
(Tri. Bang).

â The service on
providing operation and maintenance (O&M) power plant was treated by the Revenue
as Consulting Engineering Service. The facts of the case were considered
identical to those existed in the case of M/s. Rolls Royce Industries Power
(I) Ltd. v. CCE,
2006 (3) STR 292 (Tri.). Further, the Rolls Royce case was
followed by the Chennai Bench in the case of CMS (I) Operations & Maintenance
Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Pondicherry
2007 (7) STR 369 (Tri.). Relying on the
ratio of these decisions and also considering the Daelim’s case 2006 (3) STR 124
(Trib.) that contract cannot be vivisected to levy tax on a part of the
contract, the appeal was set aside.

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Non payment of tax collected

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New Page 1

II. Tribunal :



8. Non payment of tax collected :



Febin Advertisers v. CCE, Calicut, [2008 (10) STR 50
(Tri.-Bang)]

â Tax was demanded on
collection of rentals for hoardings under Advertising Service. The appel-lant’s
contention that they rented spaces for display of advertisement did not provide
‘Advertising Service’ was upheld. However, for collecting service tax and not
paying to the Government, interest and penalty were levied.

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New evidences produced by authorities relied upon

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New Page 1

II. Tribunal :



7. New evidences produced by authorities relied upon :



Shrinath Tourist Agency v. CCE, Jaipur, [2008 13 STT 176
(New Delhi – CESTAT)].

â Service tax along
with penalty was demanded from the appellant under the category of Tour
Operator. The appellant contended that they were only booking agents of other
tour operators and were not covered as tour operators. Copies of the agents’
licence issued by the RTO, Udaipur were produced in support of contention.

The Revenue challenged this after getting information from
the RTO, Udaipur that the appellant was having 19 all-India tourist permits and
produced copy of letter received from the RTO, Udaipur. Thus, the Revenue
claimed that the appellant had tour permits and was working as tour operator and
therefore liable for service tax as tour operator.

It was held that since the evidence produced by the Revenue
was not available before the lower authority, the case was fit to be remanded to
the adjudicating authority.

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Mining Service — Interpretation issue

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II. Tribunal :


6. Mining Service — Interpretation issue :



National Mining Co. Ltd. v. CCE, Dibrugarh, 2008 (10) STR
136 (Tri. – Kolkata)

â Service tax with
interest and penalty was demanded by the Revenue under the category of ‘Site
Formation & Clearance, Excavation and Earth-moving and Demolition Services’ on
receipts of the appellant in pursuance of contract with M/s. North Eastern Coal
Field, Coal India Ltd., Assam.

The appellant had collected tax amount from the client and
hence did not contest the tax amount in the appeal. They challenged the levy of
interest and penalty, contending that services rendered were in the nature of
mining service which was brought under the tax net w.e.f. 1-6-2007 and therefore
for period prior to 1-6-2007, no service was taxable and liability of interest
and penalty did not arise.

It was held that since liability of tax was not challenged by
the appellant, interest was required to be discharged. However, penalty was set
aside, based on disputed nature of service, interpretation of the scope of
service and the facts of appellant’s discharge of service tax liability.

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Delay in filing appeal

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II. Tribunal :


5. Delay in filing appeal :



Encore Events v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore,
(2008) 13 STT 173 (Bang – CESTAT).

â The Commissioner
(Appeals) dismissed the appeal filed as barred by limitation. The appellant
filed appeal along with an application for condonation of delay, on the ground
that they received the order only on 8-9-2006. After verifying the facts with
the postal authorities it was found that order was dispatched on 2-1-2006 and
received by the appellant on 5-1-2006, the Commissioner (Appeals) for want of
reason in support of delay dismissed the same.

On verifying records and findings of the Commissioner
(Appeals) that postal acknowledgement contained seal and signature of the
appellant confirming the receipt of order on 5-1-2006, dismissed the appeal.

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Chartered Accountant’s Service

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II. Tribunal :


3. Chartered Accountant’s Service :


Sri Mogam Pullaiah v. CCE, Guntur (2008 TIOL 469 CESTAT
BANG).


â The appellant, a
chartered accountant, entered into contract with APCPDCL/AP Transco to carry out
the activity of billing for them. The Revenue demanded service tax under
Chartered Accountancy Service on receipts from such activity.


The appellant contended that billing was only a clerical
activity and such contracts were even granted to non-chartered accountants. The
work was done by staff who were not even SSC. The Tribunal relied on the
decision rendered by the Larger Bench in the case of CCE v. Umakanth & Co.
and allowed the appeal.

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Cargo Handling Service

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II. Tribunal :


2. Cargo Handling Service :



CCE, Jaipur-I v. Laxmi Trading Co. (2008 TIOL 541 CESTAT
DEL)

â The appellant entered
into contract of transportation of limestone from mines. Through the said
contract, it undertook series of services like mining, loading, transporting &
unloading, all incidental to the main contract. The demand was raised alleging
that loading and unloading service was liable for service tax under Cargo
Handling Service specifying that out of total billing, the amount attributable
to loading can be separated and be subjected to tax.

The Tribunal upheld the finding of the Commissioner (Appeals)
that bills have been raised for transportation of limestone and work of
loading/unloading was incidental to the transportation of limestone and
accordingly, not liable for service tax. Further, it was observed that
incidental activities were required to carry out the work of transportation and
therefore, the services rendered by the appellant to himself to execute the
contract cannot be made liable for service tax.

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Construction of Residential Complex Service

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II. Tribunal :


1. Construction of Residential Complex Service :


Findings of adjudicating authority not challenged by the
applicant.


Mokha Builders and Promoters v. CCE, Bhopal (2008 TIOL
547 CESTAT DEL)

â The appellant, a
builder, paid service tax under Construction of Complex Service and filed a
refund application on the ground of non-taxability of service. Refund claim was
rejected by the lower authority as well as by the Appellate authority. Appellant
contended that they being builders were not liable for service tax and unjust
enrichment did not arise as they did not collect service tax. However, they did
not challenge the findings of the adjudicating authority that agreement for sale
of flat was entered into prior to construction of flat and the appellant
constructed the flat. The Tribunal rejected the appeal on the ground that
findings of the adjudicating authority was not challenged by the applicant.


Further, on issue of unjust-enrichment, the appellant’s
contention that service tax was not collected from purchasers of flat was proved
false, as sale deed with customer mentioned that service tax would be paid by
the purchasers of flat.

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Part B — Some Important Decisions

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New Page 1I. Supreme Court :

Port Service :

(CCE, Bhavnagar v. Velji P. & Sons (Agencies) Ltd. [2008
TIOL 68 SC ST]



Background : In the case of Homa Engineering Works v.
CCE, Mumbai
, 2006 (1) STR 18 (Tri.-Mum.), it was held that the activity of
repairing of ships in port area is not covered by services rendered by the port
or any person authorised by the port and therefore, it was not liable to service
tax as ‘Port Service’. This was also followed in the case of Velji P. Sons
(Agencies) Ltd. v. CCE. Bhavnagar
, 2007 (8) STR 236 (Tri. Ahmd).


The appeal was dismissed on the ground that since Homa’s case
was not appealed against by the Department, no appeal on the same issue in
another case would be allowed.

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Part B: Some Recent Judgments

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Service Tax

I.
High Court :


1. Classification :


Whether consignment agent can be classified as Clearing &
Forwarding agent :


ADH Agencies v. CCE, Chandigarh, [2010 (18) STR 259 (P &
H)]

The appellants claimed that they were consignment agents and
not Clearing and Forwarding agents and therefore, not liable to pay service tax
during the relevant period of dispute.

The High Court relied on their own decision in case of
Kulcip Medicines (P) Ltd.
[2009 (14) STR 608 (P & H)] wherein the Court had
accepted the view taken by the Tribunal in Mahavir Generic’s case [2006
(3) STR 276].

The High Court in the case of Kulcip Medicines (supra)
had held that :

  • The activities of
    clearing as well as forwarding both to be undertaken by an agent in order to
    be taxable under the category of ‘Clearing and Forwarding agent services’ and
    that the word ‘and’ after clearing and before forwarding cannot be interpreted
    as ‘or’.


  • The word ‘and’ has to be
    understood in conjunctive sense.


  • Whenever, a person is not
    performing both the functions, that is clearing and forwarding, he cannot be
    made liable to pay service tax under the category of C & F agents.





In the present case, the High Court held that the appellants
are not liable to pay service tax under the category of C & F agent and that the
consignment agents are not covered within the category of C & F agent services.

2. Penalty :


Whether penalty is automatic where extended period is
invoked ?


Commr. of S.T., Bangalore v. Atria Convergence Tech. P. Ltd.,
[2010 (18) STR 265 (Kar.)]

Service tax was demanded by invoking extended period and also
levied penalty u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994. In an appeal filed by the
appellants against penalty, decision was given in favour of the appellants
holding that there was neither suppression, nor deliberate misrepresentation of
facts.

The Tribunal confirmed the order of the CCE
(Appeals). The Department was of the view that with the invoking of extended
period, levy of penalty was automatic and therefore, appealed against Tribunal’s
order before the High Court.

The Court held that the fact of non-suppression has already
been examined by the CCE (Appeals) and the same being confirmed by the Tribunal,
no penalties can be imposed in the instant case u/s. 78.

3. Renting of immovable property service :


Whether Department’s recovery action legal ?


SSIPL Retail Ltd. v. Union of India, [2010 (18) STR 262
(Del.)]

The Delhi High Court in the case of Home Solution Retail
India Ltd. v. UOI,
[2009 (14) STR 433 (Del.)] had held that service tax was
not applicable on renting per se. However, the Revenue filed a special
leave petition before the Supreme Court against this decision and the matter is
pending before the Apex Court. However, the Department started raising the
demands and also threatened the appellants of actions if they stopped paying
service tax.

The High Court observed that the Apex Court has not granted
stay on Home Solution’s ruling (supra) and therefore, the Revenue cannot
resort to other means to protect revenue.

The appellant’s counsel undertook that corrective steps shall
be taken by the Revenue and the officers shall be instructed not to threaten the
assessees of coercive actions in case of non-payment of tax by them.

4. Stockbrokers :



CCE, Chandigarh v. N. K. Chugh & Co., [2010 (18) STR 145
(P&H)]

The respondents were sub-brokers. The question before the
Court was whether services provided by sub-brokers were covered under service
tax and were taxable. For the similar issue, the Tribunal in 2007 (7) STR 518
had held that sub-brokers were not liable to pay tax when the main broker paid
service tax. However, in the similar case, in 2009 the Tribunal in
(13) STR 158 took a view that the words ‘in connection with’ employed in S. 65
(105)(a) had been overlooked in the said earlier decision and that the earlier
decision was incuriam therefore, sub-brokers are liable to pay service tax.

Since there were conflicting decisions by the same Tribunal,
the High Court directed the case to the Larger Bench of the Tribunal.

II. Tribunal :


5. CENVAT Credit :


(a) Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid by a
job-worker (not liable to pay tax by virtue of exemption Notification No. 8/205
ST, dated 1-3-2005) on a taxable service be denied to service receiver.



CCE & C, Aurangabad v. Laxmi Metal Pressing Works Pvt. Ltd.,
[2010 (18) STR 149 (Tri.-Mumbai)]

The job-worker was exempted from payment of service tax under
Notification No. 8/2005 ST. However, he paid service tax and the recipient of
service availed the CENVAT credit of the same.

The appellant raised a legal issue with reference to the
provisions of Rule 3 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The Department was of the
view that under Rule 3 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the CENVAT credit is
allowed in respect of ‘service tax leviable’ u/s.66 of the Finance Act, 1994 and
since job-worker is exempt from payment of service tax, the same cannot be
considered as ‘service tax leviable’ u/s.66. The respondents pointed out that
the exemption Notification was issued u/s.93, which would exempt the service
provider from payment of service tax leviable u/s.66. Therefore, service tax
though leviable to job-worker, is exempted by virtue of Notification and CENVAT
credit would be available under Rule 3. The Rule permits availment of CENVAT
credit of service tax ‘paid’ by service provider and not ‘payable’. The appeal
by the Department was dismissed.

(b) Whether following services, namely; (i) rent-a-cab
service, (ii) outdoor catering service, (iii) air-travel booking, (iv)
telephone/mobile services, and (v) steamer agent service, are eligible ‘input
services’.



Semco Electrical Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Pune, [2010 (18) STR
177 (Tri.-Mumbai)]

The appellant, a 100% Export-Oriented Unit manu-facturing excisable goods viz. electrical wiring, accessories made of aluminium, zinc and copper alloys, exported all goods except for waste and scrap, which was cleared in DTA (on payment of central excise duty). However, the quantum of the sale was small. As a result, credit of service tax on input service remained unutilised. Accord-ingly, the appellant filed periodical refund claims for service tax paid on ‘input service’ used in the manufacture under Notification No. 05/2006-CE, dated 14-3-2006.

Rejection of refund claims was made on the ground that services, namely (i) rent-a-cab service, (ii) outdoor catering service, (iii) air-travel booking, (iv) telephone/mobile services and (v) steamer agent service were not eligible input services as defined in Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

The following were the stands taken by the appellant?:
    i) The definition of ‘input service’ under the CENVAT Credit Rules is wide enough employ-ing words like ‘activities relating to business’, and ‘such as’. Hence, the manifest intention of the Legislature is to allow credit on all such services, which are relating to business.

    ii) The term ‘business’ cannot be given a restricted definition to say that business of a manufacturer is to manufacture final products, in a case like the present, business of the assessee is an integrated activity comprising of manufacture of final products, advertisement of the final products, entering into sale agreements with the foreign purchasers, export of the said goods, etc.

    iii) Expenses incurred on the ground of commercial expediency by the assessee are covered by the term ‘activities relating to business’, even if it benefits somebody else also. Hence, the Department cannot make artificial distinction between activity relating to business and activity relating to manufacturing activity.

    iv) As observed in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India, 2007 (7) SCC 527, service tax is VAT, which in turn is both a general tax as well as destination-based consumption tax. In the present case, service tax paid on expenditure incurred by the assessee on the outdoor catering, telephone, etc. has to be allowed as input stage credit, particularly since the same forms a part of the price of final product of the assessee.
    
v) Each of the limbs of the definition of input service is independent of the other limb. If an assessee can satisfy any one of the limbs, then credit of the input service should be available.
    
vi) While rejecting the appeals, the Commissioner (appeals) relied upon the one and only one decision of Coca Cola India Private Limited v. CCE, 2007 (7) STR 529. However, the said decision has since been reversed by the jurisdictional Bombay High Court vide decision reported at 2009 (15) STR 657 (Bom.). On this sole ground, the case of the Department should fail. The above view is supported by the decision of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ABB Limited v. CCE, 3009 (15) STR 23.

    vii) In the case of CCS v. GTC Industries Limited, 2008 (12) STR 468, the Larger Bench has held ‘outdoor catering service’ received in the canteen of the manufacturer as input service.
    viii)The assessee contended that though the Supreme Court in the case of Maruti Suzuki has held that only the item satisfying all the three parts of the definition under Rule 2(k) would be considered as ‘input’ when it is used within the factory of production, there is no parallel between the inclusive part of the definition of input and input service.
    ix) The assessee pointed out that the Notification No. 41/2007-ST allows refund of service tax paid on ‘service’. The said exemption Notifica-tion does not use the term ‘input service’ and the intention of the Government is to export goods and not taxes.

The Department’s contentions were as follows?:

    i) The decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Maruti Suzuki applies to the present case as far as eligibility of CENVAT credit is concerned. The use of input service in or in relation to the manufacture of the final products is a condition sine qua non for allowing the CENVAT credit thereon. Similar view was expressed by the Apex Court, the High Court of Bombay and the Tribunal in their decisions of Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd., M/s. Cummins Generator Technologies India Ltd., and Mahindra Sona Ltd.

    ii) The decision in GTC Industries by the Larger Bench should not be followed since no. of workers of the assessee in the present case is less than 250 and therefore, there was no statutory requirement of provision of outdoor catering services to workers and therefore, CENVAT credit on the same should not be allowed.
    iii) The view expressed by the Larger Bench in the case of Cummins Generator should be fol-lowed and the test of 250 workers should be applied to each case to decide the eligibility of CENVAT credit.

The Tribunal made the following observations?:

  •     The High Court in the case of Coca Cola has categorised the definition of input services and the present case falls under the 5th category i.e., ‘Services used in relation to activities re-lating to business and outward transportation up to the place of removal.’ And conceptually any input service forming part of value of final product should be eligible for CENVAT credit.

  •     The definitions of ‘input’ and ‘input services’ being not comparable and coverage of ‘input service’ being wider, the case of Maruti Suzuki could not be relied upon. The intention of the Legislature was that the activities relating to the business should be allowed.

  •     It is for Court to examine whether a service could be considered as an activity relating to business.

  •     That the condition of 250 workers was just an additional fact that was examined by the Larger Bench in the case of GTC industries and therefore, it does not mean that a factory having 249 workers would not be entitled for CENVAT credit.

  •     It was held that the appellants were entitled to CENVAT credit availed on the services used in or in relation to the manufacture of final products or used in relation to the business activity and the services under examination being used by the appellants in relation to business activity were entitled for CENVAT credit.

    c) Whether CENVAT credit of input services is allowed to a unit availing value-based exemption.

Vallabh Vidynagar Concrete Factory v. CCE & C, Vadodara, [2010 (18) STR 271 (Tri.-Ahmd.)]

The appellants, being a small-scale manufacturing unit, were availing excise duty exemption under Notification No. 8/2003 C.E., dated 1-3- 2003 and at the same time were availing CENVAT credit of service tax paid on input services. The Department denied CENVAT credit and also levied interest.

The contention of the Department was that as per Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, CENVAT credit could not be taken on the services which have been used exclusively for manufactur-ing products fully exempt or liable to ‘Nil’ rate of duty. The appellants argued that Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules is applicable only to those manufacturers who are manufacturing both dutiable as well as exempt goods and that Notification No. 8/2003 does not restrict availment of credit of service tax/excise duty paid on services as well as capital goods. And, therefore, credit could not be denied. Accepting the said plea, the Tribunal allowed credit of service tax paid on services used for manufacturing products even if no duty was paid as per Notification No. 8/2003.

    6. Classification?:

    a) Handling of export cargo under port premises by custom house agent be classifiable as ‘Port services’ or ‘CHA services’??

    CC & E, Visakhapatnam v. Chowgule Brothers Pvt. Ltd., [2010 (18) STR 164 (Tri.-Bang.)]

The appellants, Custom House Agent (CHA) registered under CHA services were also engaged in cargo handling in the port premises. Cargo handling services includes handling of export cargo. Relying on the Board’s Circular B43/1/1997 -TRU, dated 6-6-1997, the Commissioner found that loading/handling of import or export goods, transferred from the premises of the exporter, etc. were activities relating to CHA services.

It was held that cargo handling in relation to export goods undertaken by the respondent CHA in port premises cannot be subject to tax classifying the same as ‘Port services’. Upholding the CCE (Appeals) order which was in favour of the assessee, the Tribunal observed that the order of the CCE (Appeals) was in conformity with the decision of this Tribunal in case of M/s. Konkan Marine Agencies v. CCE, Mangalore, [2007 (8) STR (Tri.-Bang.)] which has been upheld by the High Court [2009 (13) STR 7 (Kar.)]. Therefore, the Departmental appeal was rejected and stay application was disposed of.

    b) Whether the master biometrics service agreement be considered as manpower supply agency service or information technology software service.

Cognizant Tech. Solutions (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, LTU, Chennai, [2010 (18) STR 326 (Tri.-Chennai)]

The appellant entered into a master biometrics service agreement with Pfizer Pharmaceuticals (India) Pvt. Ltd. The contract was for rendition of the following services?:

  •     Biometric services in the nature of clinical programming and writing (CPW).
  •     Global Clinical Data Services (GCDS).

  •     Data management.

  •     Bio-statistics and reporting

And the same was divided into two phases?:

At the initial stage, the appellants were supposed to retain workforce of full- time equivalent staff providing data management and bio -statistics and reporting services on behalf of Pfizer. In the second phase, the appellants had to provide functional services to Pfizer.

The workforce recruited and retained by the ap-pellants were required to work under a project manager appointed by the appellants, who has to act as single point of contact being responsible for overall management of the project. It is important to note that the recruitment and training precedes provision of specialised services.

The Tribunal held that the nature of service required to be provided was information technology service as it was related to data management, which was out of the purview of service tax net at the relevant point in time.

    7. Mistake apparent from record?:

When binding decision not considered by Tribunal, be considered as mistake apparent from records.

CCE, Trichy v. Maha Sree Aruna Chemicals, [2010 (18) STR 239 (Tri.-Chennai)]
The Department filed an application for rectification of mistake as the Tribunal had not followed binding judgment delivered in case of Gauri Plas-ticulture (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore, 2006 (202) ELT 199 (Tri.-LB), as the same was not brought to notice of the Tribunal by the Revenue.

The Apex Court, in Furest Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., 2001 6 SCC 356, had held that if the Tribunal failed to notice a binding authority, the principle of per incuriam should be applied and as per the decision by the Larger Bench in Hindustan Lever Ltd., binding precedent not considered would constitute an error apparent from record and the same can be reviewed.

It was held that the final order was passed per incuriam the binding authority of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal and the application of rectification of mistake filed by the Revenue was allowed.

    8. Penalty?:

Whether labour contract in present case be considered under manpower recruitment or supply agency service and whether extended period can be invoked.

Jivanbhai Makwana v. CCE, Ahmedabad, [2010 (18) STR 206 (Tri.-Ahmd.)]

The appellant was engaged in supplying man-power and was covered by supply of manpower service brought in the tax net with effect from 16-6-2005. The appellant obtained registration on 7-4-2005 and on 1-6-2005 the appellant surrendered the registration stating that he was not covered by manpower recruitment agency service. The definition employed words ‘.?.?.?.?.?.?supply of manpower.?.?.?.?.?.’ which were not there prior to 16-6-2005. The Department then advised the ap-pellant to obtain registration on 25-1-2007. The Department then demanded service tax with in-terest and imposed penalty for the period from 16-6-2005 to 31-3-2006.

The appellant contended that the contract en-tered into did not mention about the number of labourers to be provided, but the appellant had to ensure?that?the factory premise is kept clean, bathrooms, and toilets are cleaned properly and drinking water and coffee are supplied to staff and loading and unloading is carried out. Therefore, he does not satisfy the definition contained in the Finance Act, 1994.

The Tribunal held that the contract of supply of manpower is covered by the definition of man-power recruitment agency services since certain services like house-keeping, loading and unloading were related to number of labourers supplied and the contract required to provide labourers as per the company’s requirement and the payment to be made by the company was related to number of labourers supplied during a specified period.

With regard to extended period, the appellant argued that he himself had obtained registration and the appellant was genuine and therefore, there was no suppression of facts. However, it was held that the appellant was aware of the amendment in law and therefore, the appellant could not escape from payment of service tax merely because show cause notice was not issued within time limit and therefore, extended period was invokable. It being a bona fide belief of non-liability, penalties u/s. 73, u/s.76 and u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were set aside.

    9. Refund?:

    a) Whether exporter claiming refund can be re-viewed for payment of service tax by service provider.

CCE, Indore v. Anant Commodities Pvt. Ltd., [2010 (18) STR 214 (Tri.-Del.)]

Notification No. 41/2007 ST provides for claim of refund by an exporter who had used certain specified services for export of goods subject to conditions specified in the said Notification. In the present case, the following grounds emerged?:

    i) The Department argued that weighment, sam-pling and analysis services, cargo handling and stevedoring charges were not specified in the said Notification and the same was wrongly allowed by the Appellate Authority. Weigh-ment and sampling services are not treated as taxable service by the Tribunal and therefore, even if service provider had paid service tax, the same should not be refunded. However, the respondents argued that no separate service tax was paid by service provider for such services and service tax was paid under the category of ‘technical testing and analysis services’.

    ii) The Department represented that the Commis-sioner (Appeals) had erred in allowing refund of service tax on account of ‘Agency services’ instead of Custom House Agent (CHA). The re-spondents submitted that they availed services of a CHA for export of goods and the CHA paid service tax. Therefore, while considering refund of respondents, the assessment of service tax of CHA (service provider) should not be re-opened.

    iii) Refund should not be admissible of the tax not payable but paid by service provider and the same should be treated as deposit. The re-spondents urged that the respondent exporter cannot be reviewed for payment of service tax by service provider.

The Tribunal observed that in the present case, it was not the Revenue’s case that service provider who had provided the taxable service, in question, to the respondents, were not of the categories specified in the said Notification. What the Revenue sought to do as to conduct a detailed review of service tax payment by service providers and then disallow certain amounts of service tax refund to the respondents on the ground that those amounts represented tax on amounts charged for services which were not the part of value of such services. The Tribunal in its series of judgments has held that CENVAT credit cannot be denied to receiver of duty paid inputs, by the Central Excise authorities having jurisdiction over the input received, by revising the assessment of duty at the supplier’s end. The same principle was applied by the Tribunal and the Departmental appeal was dismissed.

b) Whether refund could be denied on the ground that all the details and linkage with goods were not mentioned on invoice of service provider.

M. R. Organisation v. CCE, Ahmedabad, [2010 (18) STR 209 (Tri.-Ahmd.)]

According to Notification No. 41/2007 ST, dated 6-10-2007 as amended by Notification No. 3/2008 ST, dated 19-2-2008, for claiming refund, the receipt issued by courier agency should contain details of exporter, IEC No., etc. and also there should be evidence to link the courier service to export goods. The period of such invoices issued was very close to the Notification date and there-fore, on request, the courier company provided all relevant details.

There was no dispute with regard to export of goods and availment of courier services. The only objection by the Revenue was with regard to details on invoice. It was held that there is no bar to provide the details separately in case original receipt did not contain these details. There is no requirement that the invoice should contain link-age. The exporter can produce evidence later. The matter was remanded back to original authority to decide afresh.

c) Whether refund of pre-deposit be made in cash.

Narendra Raja Textiles Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Coimbatore 2010 (18) STR 249 (Tri.-Chennai)

The assessee was sanctioned part of the refund claim and the Dy. Commissioner ordered the same to be credited to RG 23 account. The appellant asked the Dy. Commissioner (Refunds) to sanction refund in cash. The Commissioner (Appeals) observed that the impugned amount was pre-deposited in cash and the appellant was eligible for refund in cash. The refund of such amount was not governed by S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. However, since the appeal against first order was not filed on time, the assessee could not be granted refund.

As per CBEC Circular No. 275/37/2K -CX.8A, dated 2-1-2002, if the appeal is decided in favour of ap-pellant or matter is remanded for fresh decision, the amount of pre-deposit should be refunded. As observed in case of CCE v. Dhiren Chemicals Ltd. delivered by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court, if the Circulars issued by CBEC have placed a different interpretation, then the same would be binding on the Revenue.

It was held that the appellant was eligible for refund in cash suo moto by the Revenue authorities and the appeal was allowed.

d) Whether refund can be granted of input services not consumed for providing output services to be exported.

Kbase Tech Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise/CST, [2010 (Tri.-Bang.)]

The appellant claimed that by virtue of Circular, No. 120/01/2010-ST, dated 19-1-20110 which was issued recently to grant relief to exports in respect of refund claims, the appellant is entitled for refund of unutilised CENVAT credit. The appellant quoted various recent judgments delivered by the Tribunals on the similar issue.

The Department contended that the orders passed by the lower authority are not legal and proper as it does not take into consideration the conditions laid down in Notification No. 5/06-CE(NT), dated 14-3-2006 related to refund of CENVAT credit and that only that part of CENVAT credit which is attributable to the provision of exported output services can be allowed as refund and the Department’s counsel took support of various judgments as well.

The Tribunal observed that?:

  •     The Legislature has empowered, u/s.37(2) of the Central Excise Act and S. 94(2) of the Finance Act, 1994, the Government to make rules for allowing credit of service tax and rebate of service tax on taxable services which are consumed for providing output services for export and therefore, the rule-making power has to be exercised by the Central Government within this mandate of the statute.
  •     The definition of ‘input service’ has been adopted for the purpose of the Export of Service Rules, 2006 which uses expression ‘any service used by a provider of taxable service for providing output service’, which not only differs from the expressions used in the statutes, but certain inclusions of the said definition prima facie go beyond the scope of the rule-making power of the Government as provided in the legislation.

  •     Under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 governing grant of refund, the expressions used are ‘input service used in providing output service’.

  •     The Officer on Special Duty, who has issued the said Circular dated 19-1-2010, is an officer authorised to communicate orders of the Board or not could not be confirmed. Again the Circular does not speak that it is being issued u/s.37B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Therefore, the binding effect of it is in doubt.

  •     It was held that the Board’s Circular No. 120/01/2010-ST, dated 19-1-2010 does not have the effect of amending the statute and cannot be seen as authorising sanction of refund if the credit of service tax does not relate to services consumed for providing the output service in view of express language used in statute.

  •     The amendment proposed in respect of the said Notification No. 5/2006 to replace the words ‘in relation to’ to ‘in connection with’ is immaterial as the statute or rules are not amended.

  •     All the rules relating to procedural aspects should be an aid to justice. Language employed in subordinate legislation alone most often is not decisive, but regard must be had to the extent, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same is in consonance with legislative mandate. It is the duty of the Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered.

  •     The impugned orders were set aside and ap-peals were remanded to the original authority for fresh examination and decision.


    10. Service to own constituent?:

Whether HUF and its constituent separate entities for service tax??

CCE, Hyderabad v. Universal Travels, [2010 (18) STR 157 (Tri.-Bang.)]

The respondents, one of the constituent units of HUF rendered manpower supply services to other constituent units of HUF, sister concerns and group companies.

They did not pay service tax on the ground that different units of HUF are to be treated as one legal entity.

The Department held that all the constituent units of HUF, though termed as group companies, sister concerns were independent concerns/companies registered under relevant law and had independent business activities and hence service tax was payable on the amounts received form HUF constituents. When appealed, the Commissioner (Appeals) relying on a chartered accountant’s certificate, registration certificate for professional tax and copy of letter issued by ACIT, allowed the appeal. Therefore, the Revenue appealed before the Tribunal.

The Department contended that service tax registration was in the name of M/s. Universal Travels clearly indicating the unit as a separate legal entity under service tax laws and it issued debit notes on other units. Therefore, both the statutory requirements for levy of service tax under ‘manpower recruitment or supply agency’ were satisfied. The respondents contend that they were one of the constituents of HUF and different units of the same HUF doing different businesses cannot be treated as separate legal entities.

The Tribunal observed that the adjudicating authority had not shown or proved under which relevant laws the constituent units are registered as separate legal entities for their legal existence as such. However, on the other hand, the respondents had produced chartered accountant’s certificate, registration certificate for professional tax and copy of letter issued by the ACIT. Therefore, it is as good as providing service to self. Relying upon the Tribunal’s decision in Precot Mills Ltd. v. CCE, Tirupati, [2006    STR 495 (Tri.-Bang.)] the Tribunal rejected the Revenue’s appeal.

Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR)

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I. Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) :


Ruling No. AAR 13 (ST)/2008, dated 7-4-2008.

Construction of residential complex : Liability of builders :


In re : Hare Krishna Developers [2008 (10) 341 (AAR)]

(i) The applicant was a partnership firm desirous of setting
up a joint venture with a non-resident to develop residential complex in Gujarat
on the following lines :

Complex of more than 12 residential units on its own land
and expense where booking of units would be done on the receipt of token
amount. In the agreement to be executed, full value of the unit would be
indicated. Possession would be provided on receipt of full amount and
completion of construction. The construction would be carried out under two
scenarios :



  • by employing own labour;



  • by appointing labour contractors.




(ii) The questions for consideration of AAR were :



  • Whether booking of units by the applicant considered taxable service in both
    the scenarios above i.e., under the category of construction of
    residential complex service as per S. 65(105)(zzzh) ?



(iii) The applicant contended that in both the cases,
the construction was their own and so was ownership until handing over
possession and since the development of property was for self, no service
provider-receiver relationship emerged. CBEC Circular No. 96/7/2007-ST of
23-8-2007 in support of such claim was referred to. Further, the Allahabad High
Court’s decision in Assotech Reality’s case [2007 (7) STR 129 was relied upon,
contending that activities in both the cases were not ‘works contract’.

(iv) Contention of the Department as against the above was
that the proposed activity was either taxable as ‘construction of residential
complex’ service or ‘works contract service’. However, the former being more
specific and also that the relevant clause (zzzh) occurred before (zzzza), by
virtue of rules of interpretation laid down in S. 65A, construction service was
the correct classification. Further, that the Board’s circular referred above
did not provide benefit to the activity as it refers to builder/developer
completing construction on his own and then entering into transaction with the
buyer, thus making a sale of the constructed unit. Also that decision of
Assotech Reality (supra) did not fall in line with the law enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Raheja Development Corporation v. State of Karnataka,
2006 (3) STR 337 (SC) and finally whether construction through own labour or
engaging contractors did not alter the position.

(v) AAR examined and discussed the agreement for booking/sale
of units in the self-developed ‘housing project’ in detail and it was noted by
the authority that actual sale of land together with constructed unit would take
place on completion of construction and subject to payment of full
consideration.

The said agreement for sale inter alia contained the
following salient features :



  • Construction would be as per approved plan under control and supervision of
    the developer and right, title and interest in land and construction would
    vest in builder until delivery of possession.



  • Total consideration and timing of installments to be paid by the
    booker/purchaser.



  •  The booker to become member of the society to be set up to provide maintenance
    of the unit and common infrastructure facility against contribution for the
    same on actual basis.



  • Booker could cancel the booking if desired at any stage and would be entitled
    to refund with interest at agreed rate.



  • Builder to be responsible for obtaining requisite permissions for drainage,
    water connection, power, building use, etc. and booker to sign relevant papers
    for the same.



  • Service Tax applicable, if any, would be paid by the booker.



vi) In the above context, Board’s Circular of 23-8-2007 (supra) was distinguished stating that the classification pertained to the case where developer and buyer met only after the construction was completed and therefore, the relationship was purely of seller and buyer, whereas the proposed activity was qualitatively different. AAR contended further that the whole purpose of inserting sub-clause (zzzh) in S. 65(105) appeared to being within its fold the services of builders / developers in connection with construction of complexes. Making construction as per plan, design and specifications, providing amenities and a host of facilities would undoubtedly constitute services to be provided by the applicant. The timing of transferring ownership would  not determine liability to pay tax. Although from one angle, the applicant can be said to be constructing unit on its own and not exactly on behalf of the booker, the fact remains that honouring of commitment to booker is done from where valuable con-sideration is received in instalments. Construction and allied services is referable to the agreement and cannot be viewed in isolation. Possibility of booker terminating is not material for evaluating true nature of transaction. The authority contended that correct classification of the activity was ‘construction of residential complex’ and it was difficult to accept the contention that it was a self-service and there was no recipient of service, as such argument ‘had no basis, whereas the words used in the construction of construction service ‘in relation to’ were of wide import and a greater nexus was established by these words between the construction and services implicit in such construction. Thus, not merely construction was relevant, but correlated and incidental services were all embraced within the scope of (zzzh).

Further, AAR  found force in  contention of the Departmental Representative that the Allahabad High Court in Assotech (supra)’s case making distinction from K. Raheja’s case (supra) was not valid and the ratio of the Supreme Court was not correctly appreciated by the learned Judges. However, it was stated by AAR that this alternative contention of the Revenue need not be gone into.
 
Accordingly, it was ruled that applicant was liable to pay Service Tax for the proposed activity in both the scenarios under the category of ‘construction of residential complex’ service.

Part B : Some recent judgements


I. Supreme Court:

1. Banking and other financial services:

Whether the service tax is leviable on equipment leasing and hire-purchase finance activities?

    Association of Leasing & Financial Service Companies v. Union of India, 2010 (20) STR 417 (SC)

    The issue before the Apex Court was whether hire-purchase and leasing transactions involved any element of service, in order for the service tax to apply, or such transactions were explicitly chargeable to VAT, being a tax in relation to goods.

    The appellants, members are engaged in the business of hire-purchase and leasing. 46th Amendment to the Constitution of India had inserted Article 366(29A) whereby a set of six transactions were enumerated therein to be deemed as sale of goods. These six transactions included the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose as well as hire-purchase transactions. Consequently, the entire amount paid to the hirer/lessor by way of instalments was chargeable to VAT. It was further argued that once the subject matter of hire-purchase and leasing was constitutionally characterised as a ‘deemed sale’, the transaction could not be taxed by the Central Government.

    The Supreme Court took note of this contention and concluded that the taxable service category ‘banking and other financial services’ under service tax, included within it hire-purchase and leasing transactions.

    The appellant’s members are non-banking financial companies (‘NBFC’). Certain NBFCs undertake activities of equipment leasing and hire-purchase financing in addition to giving loans. The concept of ‘banking and other financial services’ has been clarified with relevant explanations:

    (a) Funding or financing the transaction covers two different and distinct transactions i.e., the financing transaction and the equipment leasing/hire-purchase transaction. While the former is exigible to service tax, the latter is exigible to local sales tax/VAT.

    (b) There is a difference between a ‘finance lease’ and an ‘operating lease’. In the case of hire purchase agreement, the periodical payments made by the hirer is made up of (a) consideration for hire and (b) payment on account of purchase.

    (c) The taxable event is the rendition of service. The tax is not on material or sale; it is on activity/service rendered by the service provider to its customer. Therefore, the Centre undoubtedly had legislative competence to charge the tax on the above service.

    The Supreme Court upheld the charge of service tax on hire-purchase and leasing transactions, if forming part of financial leasing services under service tax law, notwithstanding that the same transactions were chargeable to VAT. There was no double taxation of one transaction to two taxes in this instance, as per the Supreme Court, even though both taxes were chargeable on the same base. It also noted that the service tax was, in fact, chargeable only on 10% of the finance or leasing charge.

II. HIGH COURT:

2. Admissibility of CENVAT credit of service tax:

Whether the services of repair, maintenance and civil construction used in residential colony for employees qualifies for input service?

    Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur v. Manikgarh Cement, 2010 (20) STR 456 (Bom.)

    The respondent-assessee engaged in the    manufacture of cement was disallowed the credit of service tax paid on repairs, maintenance and civil construction, etc. as the services were used in their residential colony on the ground that the said services were not covered under the    definition of input service and hence ineligible as input service.

    According to the Revenue, as per decision of the Apex Court in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi, 2009 (240) ELT 641 (SC), it must be held that the CESTAT was wrong in holding that the assessee was entitled to credit of service tax paid on services of repair, maintenance and civil construction used in the residential colony, whereas as per the assessee, establishing a residential colony was indirectly connected with the manufacturing activity in question related to the business and therefore, the Tribunal was justified in holding that they were entitled to the credit.

    The High Court observed that establishing a residential colony for the employees and rendering taxable services in that residential colony may be a welfare activity undertaken while carrying on the business. However, to qualify as an input service, the activity must have nexus with the business of the assessee. The expression ‘relating to business’ in Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 refers to activities which are integral to the business activity and not welfare activities undertaken by them.

    The High Court held that unless the nexus is established between the services rendered and the business carried on by the assessee, the benefit cannot be allowed. In the present case, rendering taxable services at the residential colony established by the assessee for the benefit of the employees is not an activity integrally connected with their business and therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the services such as repairs, maintenance and civil construction rendered at the residential colony constitutes ‘input service’ for claiming credit.

3. Information Technology Service: Service tax:

Should information technology software be considered goods or services?

Infotech Software Dealers Association v. Union of India, 2010 (20) STR 289 (Mad.)

The petitioner, an association of software resellers prayed for a writ to declare S. 65(105)(zzzze) of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 as null and void, ultra vires and unconstitutional of provisions of Article 245, Entries 92C and 97 of List I and Entry 54 of List II and contended as follows:

  •     Softwares are considered as ‘goods’ and are liable to VAT, as the transaction is of sale of goods.
  •     Imposing service tax on canned software would result in increase in cost by 13% and if VAT and service tax both are levied, then the cost may increase up to around 25%.
  •     Software was held to be goods by the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2004 (178) ELT 22). Dominant intention of the transaction should be considered, following the judgment in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of India and Others, (2006 (2) STR 161), to determine whether the transaction would be considered as sale or service. In the present case, the transaction is related to supply of goods on which only VAT should be levied.

  •     When a transaction is covered by VAT under Entry 54 of State List, the Central Government does not have the competence to introduce service tax under Entry 97 of Union List.

The respondents put forth the following claims:

  •     The standardised softwares are not like any other goods and it may not be considered as sale, es-pecially when the software is supplied with End User Licence Agreement. The software requires a key to activate the software. Further, updates are also provided by the original manufacturer to the end user for a definite period. Therefore, original manufacturer only provides the right to use to the end user and it is not provided with a right to tamper, modify or rectify error of such software.

  •     The said transaction involves three activities, namely, right to install such software, right to run such software and receive updates. Therefore, the same may not be considered as absolute sale. The canned software is capable of being sold off the shelf and the same is excisable goods. However, in case of customised software, service element can be segregated clearly. Providing ‘right to use’ constitutes service which is liable to service tax.

Though Entry 92C is inserted, the same is not given effect to and therefore the residual Entry 97 empowers Union to enact the law.

The Court made the following observations:

  •     Article 366(12) of the Constitution of India defines ‘goods’ to include all materials, commodities and articles. Goods as defined are of wide connotation and include everything of use or value which can be the object of trade and commerce.

  •    The Apex Court in Tata Consultancy Services (supra) had held that the test to determine whether the property is goods or not depends on the capability of abstraction, consumption, use and whether the same can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed, etc. Since software program consists of various commands, it becomes goods, once the appellant makes copies of the same. It may be pertinent to note that the buyer is purchasing intellectual property and not the media. Moreover, while concluding on definition of goods by majority in the Apex Court, observed that goods includes tangible as well as intangible ones. Whether an item would be considered as goods, should be decided based on the following attributes, namely, (i) utility, (ii) capable of being bought and sold, (iii) capable of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed.

  •     In case of 20th Century Finance Corporation [2000(6) SCC 12] it was observed that the transfer of right to use goods is the basis to tax and not the delivery of the goods. However, such goods must be available at the time of transfer of right to use such goods as held in BSNL case (supra).

  •     The present case does not deal with branded or unbranded software, therefore, the issue is not discussed at length, however in view of the above-stated judgments software is ‘goods’ for the purpose of Article 366(12).
  •    Software other than packaged one is priced inclusive of cost of initial installation and modi-fications required. However, copyrights of the software are protected with the creator. Sale of such software is with a condition for exclusive use by the customer and the effective possession and control is passed on to the buyer and annual maintenance charges are recovered for certain services which are chargeable to service tax.

  •     Packaged software attracts excise duty, whereas customised software is exempted from excise duty vide Notification No. 6/2006. Further, document to title conveying the right to use such information technology software services is ex-empted from Basic Customs Duty vide Notification No. 21/2002.

  •     Software sold through Internet downloads would not satisfy the test of ‘goods’, since it does not fit within the ambit of ‘IT software on any media’.

  •    In case of exclusive sale, legislative competence of the State Government under Entry 54 of List II should be accepted and in case when service element is involved, Entry 97 has power to impose service tax.
  •     However, the case of software is not of exclusive sale and therefore, introduction of IT software services is constitutionally valid. Moreover, the nature of transaction is of utmost importance. As held by the Supreme Court in Gannon Dunker-ley’s case (IX STC 353), dominant intention of the parties decides the tax route. The Apex Court observed that in the case of composite contracts not covered by Article 366(29A), unless the transaction in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts, States would not have power to levy VAT.

  •     To form a view whether the transfer of software amounts to sale or services in case of software resellers, the following eminent factors can be looked upon:

(a) Through Master End-user Licence Agreement, normally the developer grants right to use and the copyrights of the software are kept with developer in case of all types of software i.e., canned, packaged or customised.
(b) Further, through that Master End-user Licence Agreement, the members of the association enter into an End-user Licence Agreement. ‘End user’ is the one who uses the product/ service but he does not have any contact with the developer.
(c) Therefore, the transaction is not sale of software as such, but is sale of contents of the data stored in the software, which would amount to service. Only when there is a transfer of right to use any ‘goods’, it would be considered deemed sale under Article 366(29A).

  •     In the present case, the appellants’ contention was that software is considered as ‘goods’ and therefore, the transaction should be considered as ‘sale’. However, it was argued that though software is ‘goods’, all transactions need not be in the nature of ‘sale’, it may vary as per the terms of End-user Licence Agreement. As discussed earlier, Parliament has the power to introduce service tax levy on Information Technology Software services under Entry 97 of Union List. However, all transactions have to be perceived from an independent view whether to be considered as sale or service.

  •     Finally, the Court dismissed the writ petition holding that software are ‘goods’ and whether a transaction would amount to sale or service would depend upon the facts of each transaction.


4.    Outdoor catering service — Service tax v. sales tax:

Whether food and beverages supplied to passengers on board trains is leviable to VAT or not?

Indian Railways C. & T. Corp. Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2010 (20) STR 437 (Delhi)

The petitioner, a Government company provided catering services on board trains run by the Indian Railways. The consideration for these services is included in the fare charged by the Indian Railways collected from the passengers, and then paid to the company by Indian Railways. They had paid service tax on 50% of the value, availing abatement provided under the law, however, no VAT was paid thereon by them.

The issue before the Court was whether the petitioner was liable to VAT. The Court observed as follows:

  •     It is open to the States to levy sales tax/Value Added Tax on the whole of the consideration, in transactions of sale of goods, such as sale to a customer in a restaurant, irrespective of the incidental element of service which is necessarily involved in sale of goods of this nature.

  •     In case of composite transactions, there are two distinct contracts, one for sale of goods and the other for providing services. In respect of the present case, it is not permissible to fragment such a composite contract, so as to levy VAT on the component which involves sale of goods.

  •     In the case of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assn. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (2004) 135 STC 480, it was held that services rendered by out-door caterers are clearly distinguishable from the service rendered in a restaurant or hotel. Outdoor catering has an element of personalised service provided to the customer. The customer is at a liberty to choose the time and place where the food is to be served and the service element is more weighty, visible and predominant. However, in case of a restaurant, the customer’s choice of food is limited to the menu card.

  •     In view of the petitioner, providing of food, snacks and water to the passengers on board the trains is altogether different from an outdoor catering service. The passengers travelling in the trains are served food and beverages as per a fixed menu approved by the Railway Board. Neither the petitioner nor the passenger has any choice in respect of articles to be served in the trains or with respect to the quantity each passenger gets.

  •     The transaction of providing meals and snacks to the passengers is not a composite contract.
  •     The element of service by way of heating the food, heating/freezing the beverages and then serving them to the passengers is purely incidental and minimal required for the sale of food and beverage in this transaction.
  •     Once the property in those goods is transferred to Indian Railways, on account of their being loaded on the trains and kept in the gadgets belonging to Indian Railways, those goods become the property of Railways and at the time of service of those goods to the passengers, title in the goods vests in the Railways and not in the petitioner-company. Thus, it can be said that merely by loading, the property got transferred.
  •     In case, if an accident takes place before the food is served to the passengers, nothing prevents the petitioner agreeing to bear the risk, despite property in the goods having already been transferred to the purchaser. However, risk and reward may not be the conclusive criteria to decide the date of transfer of property in goods.

  •     At the time of execution of the contract, as soon as the meals and snacks are cooked and, being in a deliverable state, are appropriated to the contract by loading them on the compartments of Indian Railways and keeping them in the equip-ment belonging to the Railways, the property in the goods passes on to the Indian Railways. Future goods are also chargeable to VAT.
  •     Payment to the petitioner is required to be made by the Indian railways even if the food is not consumed by the passenger.
  •    The constitutional right cannot be denied to the State, to levy such a tax merely because service tax authorities have already collected service tax from the petitioner.

It was held that the transaction between the petitioner and the Indian Railways does not amount to a contract of providing outdoor catering service but is a transaction of sale of food and beverages by the petitioner-company to the Indian Railways.

5.    Recovery of dues:

Are directors personally liable for arrears of State and Central Sales Tax dues from the Company?? Om Prakash Walecha v. State of Haryana, 2010 (20) STR 384 (P & H)

The question before the High Court was whether the directors can be made personally liable to pay arrears of Central and State Sales Tax dues of a company. The Department contended that u/s.18 of the Central Sales Tax Act 1956, if the Company is wound up then the arrears of State and Central Sales Tax can be recovered from any person who was director for the period when the tax became due. However, in the present case, the company was not wound up or formally liquidated and other judgments on the subject-matter were not disputed by the Department. Therefore, the High Court allowed the writ petition.

III.    TRIBUNAL:

6.    Appeal:

Whether Committee of Commissioners can review the order already reviewed by the previous Committee of Commissioners?
Commissioner of C. Ex., Surat-II v. Gujarat Borosil Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 377 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The Committee of Commissioners reviewed the order passed in favour of the respondents and found the same in accordance with the law and decided not to file appeal against it. The respondents applied for refund as a consequential relief and the same was rejected by the Department.

Thereafter, the Committee of Commissioners again reviewed the earlier order and filed an appeal with application for condonation of delay of 440 days. The Department contended that the length of delay was not relevant and what really matters is ‘sufficient cause’ for delay and that the Tribunal should liberally construe the phrase ‘sufficient cause’. The order was passed without considering the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of CCE, Allahabad v. Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd., (2005 (181) ELT 178).

The assessee contended that the Committee of Commissioners did not have power to review earlier order of the Committee of Commissioners and the case relied upon by the Department was not applicable to the fact of their case.

The Tribunal observed that the Committee had taken a conscious decision of not filing the appeal. Moreover, the said decision of Hindustan Safety Glass Works was available at the time of passing the order and also at the time of review. Therefore, it could not be considered as ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay. Further, subsequent Committee of Commissioners cannot again review the order passed by the precedent Committee of Commissioners, since the matter had attained finality. The appeal was thus dismissed.

7.    CENVAT credit:

(i)    Whether service tax paid on C & F services is allowed as CENVAT credit to a 100% EOU?

Adani Pharmachem (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Rajkot, 2010 (20) STR 386 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The Department contended that the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) was based on the Tribunal’s decision in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. v. CCE, Ludhiana 2007 (212) ELT 410 wherein it was held that the appellants were not eligible for CENVAT credit. However, the appellants relied on the Departmental Circular and the Tribunal’s decision in case of CCE, Rajkot v. 6 respondents including appellants.

The Tribunal allowed the CENVAT credit of service tax?paid?on C&F services to the appellants who are 100% EOU for the reason that the place of removal in case of C&F or FOB exports is load port.

(ii)    Whether various services used by the appellants qualify to be input services in terms of Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004?

Commissioner of Cus. & C. Ex., Raipur v. H. E. G. Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 312 (Tri.-Del.)

  •     Services utilised in relation to generation of steam and electricity towards maintenance of the plant:

Since the steam and electricity generated was not liable to excise duty and therefore, service utilised in relation thereto was not available as CENVAT credit in Department’s view. However, since the issue was decided in favour of the assessee in case of Sanghi Industries Ltd. v. CCE, Rajkot (2009(13)    STR 167) and the services were used within the factory premises, CENVAT credit was held as allowed.

  •     Car insurance:

The Department contended that excise duty paid on cars was not allowed as CENVAT credit and therefore, car insurance was also not allowed. However, the respondents submitted that repairs and maintenance of car was allowed as credit in case of CCE, Jaipur-II v. J. K. Cement Works, (2009(14)STR 538). The Tribunal allowed credit treating insurance as maintenance activity.

  •     Maintenance of air cooler, pay loader, dumper repairing and changing of damaged asbestos sheet of canteen building within factory:

The Department contended that this was not used in or in relation to manufacture of final product. However, the activity was undertaken within the factory premises and it had nexus with the business activity and therefore was allowed.

  •     Security services at a place other than factory premises:

Since the direct nexus with activities relating to manufacture was not established, the Tribunal remanded back the matter to the original authority.

  •     Rent-a-cab services:

The services were utilised by executives in relation to procurement of raw material, sale of finished goods and therefore, the same was held as connected to the business activity and was allowed. Reliance was placed on Ace Glass Containers Ltd. v. CCE, Meerut-II, [2010 (250) ELT 110].

  •     Commission on sales:

Commission paid in relation to procurement of orders and consequently for business activity was held as allowable.

  •    Mobile phone services:

Following the Gujarat High Court’s decision in the case of CCE v. Excel Crop Care Ltd., [2008 (12) STR 436], this was allowed.

(iii)    Does the activity of commission agent for sales promotion fall under the definition of
‘input service’?

Commissioner of C.Ex., Jallandhar v. Ambika Over-seas, 2010 (20) STR 514 (Tri.-Delhi)

A manufacturer-exporter of tools appointed an overseas commission agent for sales promotion activities in the overseas market. They paid service tax along with interest on the commission as recipients and took eligible credit of the same, treating the services of agents as ‘input service’. This was challenged by the Department holding that services rendered by them cannot be held to be utilised in the manufacture of final products and therefore, cannot be treated as inputs services. The activity of a commission agent was considered a post removal activity.

Since the definition of ‘inputs services’ included any services used in relation to ‘sales promotion’, the activities of overseas commission agents were clearly part of sales promotion activities, the case was decided in favour of the respondents.

(iv)    In case of closure of factory, can cash refund of CENVAT credit be claimed?

Commissioner of C. Ex., Ludhiana v. Manish Spinning Mills (P) Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 540 (Tri.-Delhi)
The assessee’s finished goods were destroyed in a fire. They applied for remission to the Commissioner. The Assistant Commissioner granted refund in the form of CENVAT credit. The Commissioner (Appeals) had accepted the plea of the assessee for cash refund. Relying on the case of Slovak India Trading Co. P. Ltd. v. CCE, Bangalore, 2006 (205) ELT 956 (Tri.-Bang.) upheld by the Karnataka High Court in 2006 (201) ELT 559 (Kar.) wherein it was held that Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 did not expressly prohibit cash refund of unutilised credit, the Tribunal held that the ratio of the decision was applicable to the present case and therefore Revenue’s appeal against cash refund was rejected.

8.    Manufacturer: Service tax under commis-sioning and installation service:

Whether service tax is leviable on erection, commissioning and installation services rendered by a manufacturer on which excise duty is already paid by including the same in the assessable value?

Alidhara Texspin Engineers v. Commissioner of C. Ex. & Customs, Vapi, 2010 (20) STR 315 (Tri.-Ahmd.)
The appellants were engaged in the manufacturing of textile machineries. The appellants were entering into a composite contract for sale and supply of such machineries in fully installed, commissioned and in operational condition. Moreover, gross amount charged was inclusive of installation and commissioning charges and excise duty was levied on the same. Further, such work was sub-contracted and the sub-contractor was paying service tax on the same. The Department held that the appellants were engaged in providing erection, installation and commissioning services u/s.65(39a) of the Finance Act, 1994 and it levied service tax on the whole gross amount charged in absence of segregation of quantum of such service charged received by the appellants. It was held that S. 65(39a) of the Finance Act, 1994 covered commissioning and installation agencies, whereas the appellants were a manufacturing unit and had paid excise duty on the same treating the process as incidental to comple-tion of manufactured product. Relying on various judgments, the appeal was allowed.

9.    Stock broker’s service:
Whether the sub-broker is liable to pay service tax when the stock broker has paid service tax on the same transaction?

Vijay Sharma & Co. v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Chandigarh, 2010 (20) STR 309 (Tri.-LB)

The Revenue submitted that the sub-brokers reg-istered with SEBI or made application for registration under SEBI Act, 1992, were covered within the definition of stock broker u/s.65(101) of the Finance Act, 1994 with effect from September 10, 2004. Further, the services provided by sub-brokers or stock -brokers in relation to sale or purchase of listed securities are taxable services and sub-brokers were liable for service tax. The appellants contended that they paid service tax to the main broker who ultimately has discharged the same on behalf of the sub-broker. A sub-broker provides services to a stock-broker who in turn provides services to its clients. Therefore, sub-brokers are not liable to service tax since sub-brokers and stock- brokers are agent and principal and this would amount to double taxation.

There being conflicting judgments of the Tribunal for the issue, the High Court referred the matter to the Larger Bench for deciding the same afresh in view of the amendment in the law.

The Larger Bench observed that sub-brokers were covered in the definition of stock-broker with effect from September 10, 2004. However, service being event of levy of tax, same service cannot be taxed twice. Therefore, the sub-brokers and the stock-brokers being agent and principal, the same transaction shall not be liable to double taxation. In the present case, the matters were remanded back for verification of payment of service tax by stock brokers. ?If?found that the stock-broker had paid service tax on behalf of the sub-broker, then the Department was directed to reduce the sub-broker’s demand.

10. Waiver of penalty:

Whether delay in obtaining registration and pay-ment of service tax amounts to evasion?
Star Energy Systems v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad, 2010 (20) STR 479 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellant is a proprietor providing erection, commissioning and installation services. The category came into effect on 1-7-2003, however the appellant got itself registered on 26-10-2004 and voluntarily paid service tax with interest for the period 1-7-2003 to 26-10-2004 and on filing the returns, the Department began proceedings. Thereafter, with the introduction of Notification No. 18/2003-ST exemption benefit was claimed by the appellant whereby individuals providing commissioning and installation services were provided exemption. The appellant did not challenge the liability of service tax or seek refund of the same, but requested for waiver of penalties. It was held that an individual to be treated as a commercial concern cannot be accepted. In spite of the fact that the appellant could have challenged the liability, he did not even seek refund of voluntarily paid service tax and interest. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was an intention to evade tax and the appeal was allowed.

Part B: Some recent judgements

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Service Tax

I. High Court :



Renting of Immovable property service :

Constitutional validity of levy of service tax on commercial
renting and retrospective amendment, w.e.f., 1-6-2007.


Shubh Timb Steels
Limited v. Union of India,
2010 (20) STR 737 (P & H)

The petitioner, owner of commercial immovable property, let
it out to business entities on rental basis. The petitioner challenged the levy
of service tax on renting of immovable property covered u/s.65(90a) and S.
(65)(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994 and its retrospective amendment under
the said category as ultra vires the legislative competence of the Parliament.
The gist of contentions of the petitioner was that the matter of levy of service
tax on providing service of renting of immovable property was covered by Entry
49 of List II and not by Entry 92C or 97 of List I, and retrospective levy was
beyond legislative competence. Further, the transfer of property without any
value addition by way of service could not be covered by the levy of service tax
as renting of a building was a transaction of land & building covered by Entries
18, 45 and 49 of List II in respect of which exclusive jurisdiction to legislate
under Article 246(3) was vested in the State Legislature. Leasing was a transfer
of rights and not a service and was, therefore, not covered by Entry 92C of List
I. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of
Home Solution Retail India Limited v. Union of India and Others, 2009 (14) STR
433 (Del.), wherein it was held that service was to be provided in relation to
the renting of property and the property by itself could not be regarded as
service as it did not involve any value addition. As against this, the Revenue
contended that under Article 246(1), the Parliament had exclusive power to make
laws in respect of matters covered under List I including residue entry and that
the amendment with retrospective effect was only clarificatory in nature, such
levy was already provided under unamended provisions. The scope of Entry 49 List
II was limited to direct tax on property and not on activity in relation to
property. In any case, Entry 49 List II had to be read subject to Entries 92C
and 97 of List I. It was further argued that the judgment of the Delhi High
Court [Home Solution Retail India Ltd. v. Union of India and Others (supra)] did
not involve the issue of validity of the levy but involved question of validity
of the Notification and the Circular to recover service tax from the lessors of
property on the proceeds of renting out of property. The retrospective amendment
made the renting of immovable property itself a service covered by the
definition of taxable service.

The Court held as follows:

  •      Service tax is a destination-based consumption tax being not a charge on business but on consumer and is leviable on service provided, hence, is a value added tax. Such service can be property-based or performance-based.

  •      In case of overlapping, the doctrine of pith and substance is to be applied and the Court has to look at the substance of the matter. List I has priority over List II, though predominance of List I does not prevent the State Legislature from dealing matters under List II.

  •      Considering various judgments it was observed that Entry 49 of List II relates only to tax on land and buildings and not any activity relating thereto. It cannot be held that renting of property did not involve any service as service could only be in relation to property and not by renting of property.

  •      The aspect of service element in renting transaction is an independent aspect covered under Entry 92C read with Entry 97 of List I. The subject-matter of impugned levy being outside the scope of Entry 49 of List II, power of the Union Legislature is undoubted.

  •      As regards the retrospective amendment, the High Court observed that the object of validating law is to rectify the defect in phraseology or lacuna and to effectuate and to carry out the object for which the earlier law was enacted.

Based on the above, the petition was dismissed holding that renting of immovable property for commercial purposes is a service having a value for the service receiver and therefore, service tax is leviable on the renting of immovable property as being covered under Entry 92C read with Entry 97 of List I on the value of taxable services referred to in S. 65(105)(zzzz) read with S. 65(90a) of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, the retrospective amendment retrospectively with effect from 1-6-2007 was also upheld.

II. Tribunal:

2. CENVAT credit:

    (a) Can CENVAT credit be availed on the strength of debit notes?

    Godrej Consumer Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex., Indore, 2010 (20) STR 609 (Tri.-Delhi)

    The appellants took CENVAT credit of Rs.7,327 based on debit notes and the credit was denied. Penalty of Rs.20,000 was imposed on the appellants for wrong availment of credit.

    Rule 9(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 mentions the documents on the basis of which CENVAT credit can be availed. Such documents are invoice, challans, supplementary invoice and bills of entry. Therefore credit was denied by the departmental authorities considering debit notes as ineligible document for availing CENVAT credit. Rule 15 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 prescribes penalty for wrong availment of CENVAT credit at Rs.2,000 or amount of service tax, whichever is higher, at the discretion of the authority. The appellant was levied penalty of Rs.20,000 and no finding was given for levying such penalty. Considering the amount of penalty arbitrary, it was reduced to Rs.2,000 and as such the appeal was partially allowed.

    (b) Can CENVAT credit be taken on service tax paid on repair and maintenance service for residential staff colony?

Commissioner of C. Ex., Trichy v. Madras Cements Ltd., 2010 (20) STR 672 (Tri.-Chennai)

The respondents paid service tax on repair and maintenance service for residential staff colony of workers. It was held that nexus is required between the services and the manufacture or clearance of excisable goods before the benefit of CENVAT credit could be taken in respect of such services. The assessees failed to establish any such nexus between the services which were considered by them to be input services and therefore, benefit of CENVAT credit was not allowed.

(c)    Whether CENVAT credit of telephone installed in residential premises of chief executive and CHA service for clearance of import and export goods is allowable?


Mileen Engineers v. Commissioner of C. Ex., Mumbai-III, 2010 (20) STR 668 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The appellants availed the facility of CENVAT credit of duty paid on the inputs as well as service tax paid on the services of CHA and the telephone installed in the residential premises of the Chief Executive. The same was denied by the lower authorities as per the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The Tribunal allowed CENVAT credit on CHA service but denied in case of telephone installed in the residential premises and held that credit is admissible only in case of exclusive use of telephone for business purpose.

3.    Export of service:

Whether services for procuring purchase orders in India for foreign suppliers satisfy conditions under Export of Services Rules, 2005?

Em Jay Engineers v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai, 2010 (20) STR 821 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The appellant filed a refund claim of Rs.6,71,439 on the ground that their activities are considered as export of service and exempted from payment of service tax. After scrutiny of the claim, a show-cause notice was issued and the Adjudicating Authority sanctioned the refund claim partially rejecting an amount of Rs.1,40,268 on the ground that the claim was not admissible as per Notification 2/2007-ST.

This Notification provided that the two conditions needed to be fulfilled for considering any taxable service as export of service, viz.: service is provided from India and used outside India, and payment for such service provided outside India is received by the service provider in convertible foreign exchange. The appellant received commission from their foreign principal in foreign currency for introducing the Indian clients to the foreign suppliers. The foreign principal used these services outside India and exported those goods to the buyers in India and directly collected payments from the buyers. The appellants were not required to pay service tax and were entitled for refund. The appellant claimed rebate of service tax under Rule 5 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005. It was held that refund was allowable.

4.    Input service:

In respect of overseas commission paid, whether input service has connection with manufacture or sale?

Commissioner of C. Ex., Jalandhar v. Ambika Forgings, 2010 (20) STR 662 (Tri.-Delhi)

A manufacturer sold the goods to foreign buyers and paid commission to overseas parties. This commission was considered by the assessee as ‘input service’. The question that arose is whether the commission had nexus with manufacture or sale. Credit was denied relying on the meaning of ‘promotion’ as in the dictionary. As per Rule 2(l)(ii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, broad activities which are having nexus to business and are integrally connected to business fall under the definition of ‘input service’. It was observed that once legislative mandate is apparent, no technical meaning need to be assigned to deny credit. As per common business parlance, business promotion adds to revenue of the seller/manufacturer. If business promotion adds to the revenue, it would have nexus with the sale activities. Therefore, the respondent would take credit of input service on overseas commission paid and excise duty payable on manufacturing activity. The case of the Department was thus dismissed and the manufacturer was allowed credit.

5.    Principle of natural justice:

Is it justified to deny CENVAT credit to the assessee when documents relied upon while denying the credit were not made available to the assessee by the Authority?

Idea Mobile Communication Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex., Meerut-I, 2010 (20) STR 775 (Tri.-Delhi)

Rule 9(2) of the ‘CCR’, provides discretion to the adjudication authority to give concession to the assessee in relation to procedural irregularity regarding maintenance of documents, on the basis of which CENVAT credit can be availed. In the instant case even before ascertaining the liability of the assessee and applying its mind, the authority arrived at final conclusion and passed the order denying credit. The matter was remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for fresh decision. The assessee produced all original invoices for verification before the Authority. However, the Revenue failed to take notice of the same and no reply was issued to the letter addressed to the Superintendent. The Adjudicating Authority relied on certain documents which the assessee was not aware of. It was held that the principle of natural justice was denied to the assessee as the document on which the order relied upon were not disclosed to the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and remanded the case back to the lower authority for fresh adjudication.

6.    Penalty:

(a)    Whether penalty can be imposed in case there is ignorance for payment of tax

Sri Krishna Smelters Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem, 2010 (20) STR 780 (Tri.-Chennai)

The assessee was held for non-payment of service tax and penalty was imposed u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994 and contended that the assessee cannot be held responsible for non -payment of service tax as there was no intention to evade payment of tax, as the entire amount of tax was available by way of credit. It was further held that S. 78 was invoked on the ground that the assessee failed to file the returns. The Tribunal held that failure to file returns was not sufficient to hold the assessee guilty of suppression and considering that the entire amount of tax was available as credit, there was no intention to evade payment of tax. Hence, the penalty imposed u/s.78 was set aside.

(b)    Whether penalty can be imposed u/s.76 and u/s.78 if service tax has been paid along with interest willingly?

Idial Security Organisation v. Commissioner of S.T., Ahmedabad, 2010 (20) STR 787 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The appellant was providing security agency services. Penalties under various Sections of the Finance Act, 1994 were also imposed. On coming to know of the liability, immediately full amount of service tax along with interest was deposited. The appellant did not pay the service tax only because he was not aware of the law. It was a one -man show and he had not collected service tax from the customers. Even though it can be said that ignorance of law cannot be an excuse, it is one of the factors while considering imposition of penalty. Considering this a fit case for waiver of penalty, S. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 was extended and the appeal was allowed.

(c)    Whether penalty is imposable in case of ad-justment of excess tax of a particular month in subsequent months?

Chettinad Cement Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy, 2010 (20) STR 815 (Tri.-Chennai)

The appellant intended to adjust excess service tax paid for the month of March towards subsequent month’s liability. This not being a case of delayed payment of service tax or failure to pay service tax and in way it could be said to be tax paid in advance, it was held that the assessee could not be penalised u/s.76 of the Finance Act, 1994 which is applicable in case of failure to pay tax. However, u/s.77, penalty of Rs.1000 was imposed and the appeal was allowed.

7.    Valuation : Sales tax paid on materials:

A. N. Palaniappan v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy, 2010 (20) STR 781 (Tri.-Chennai)

Materials consumed during the course of carrying out the activity of retreading of tyres under the service head ‘Maintenance and Repair Services’ could take benefit of Notification No. 12/2003-ST, dated 20 -6-2003. As per this Notification, so much of the value of taxable services, which is equal to the value of goods and materials sold by the service provider to the service recipient, is exempted from payment of service tax. In the instant case, the assessee was paying sales tax on the materials consumed and hence, the order levying service tax on such material component was set aside.

Cosmetic and Plastic Surgery

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Service Tax

1. Introduction


Cosmetic and plastic surgeries
impact public perception in as much as our society places high value on physical
appearances of people they interact/deal with at a personal or business level.
Personal aspects such as appearance and presentability have gained increased
importance in the era of globalisation and in the general outlook of our society
at large. People, who are born with visible deformities or have been deformed
subsequent to accidents, diseases, etc., are often perceived to face social
difficulties and generally develop reduced confidence levels. For others, who
work in glamorous fields like films, TV, media, fashion, modelling, beauty care,
product marketing, airlines, etc., physical appearance is of prime importance.
And surgeries are often resorted to in order to help them in keeping their
appearance youthful or beautiful so as to enable them to conduct their
respective business/ profession with higher confidence levels and aggression in
a highly competitive business environment.

When beauty treatment services
provided by ‘beauty parlours’ were brought under the tax net, the board, vide
Para 3 of its Circular No. B11/1/2002 TRU, dated 1.8.02 clarified that beauty
treatment services do not include plastic surgery/cosmetic surgery which help
improve one’s appearance, as they are not the kind of services provided by
beauty parlours. These are more appropriately classifiable as medical services.

In this regard, it is worthwhile
to note that in CCE vs New Look Cosmetic Laser Centre (2009) 18 STT 555 (Ahd –
CESTAT), it was held that laser treatment given either by doctors or under a
doctor’s supervision and guidance for curing physical disorders and deformities
and for removal of facial and body hair, have to be held as “Cosmetic Surgical
Service” and will not be taxable under “Beauty Treatment Services”.

Increased prominence of cosmetic
and plastic surgery under the modern business and social scenario and judicial
views cited above, could have prompted the government to tax the said service
specifically.

A Cosmetic and Plastic Surgery
Services category has now been accordingly introduced and made effective from
1.9.2009. Hence, one can say, a beginning has been made to tax medical services
in a restricted manner.

2
Relevant Statutory
Provisions






  • Section 65(105) (zzzzk) of the Finance Act, 1994
    (as amended) [Act]


Taxable Service provided or to
be provided, means and applies

“to any person, in relation to
cosmetic surgery or plastic surgery, but does not include any surgery undertaken
to restore or reconstruct anatomy or functions of body affected due to
congenital defects, developmental abnormalities, degenerative diseases, injury
or trauma”

3
Scope of Services


a) The terms “Cosmetic Surgery”
and “Plastic Surgery” are not specifically defined under the Act.

The understanding of the said
terms in common parlance is as under:


  • ‘Cosmetic
    Surgery’ usually involves techniques intended for the betterment and
    enhancement of physical appearance through surgical and medical techniques,
    and is specifically concerned with maintaining normal appearance, restoring
    it, or enhancing it beyond the usual level towards some aesthetic objective
    employing modern technological advancement.


  • ‘Plastic Surgery’
    is usually understood as the functional and structural removal of all types of
    defects/deformities of the human body (for example, skin transplant of a
    person who has met with a fire accident). Modern plastic surgery has evolved
    along two broad areas, viz. reconstruction of anatomic defects and aesthetic
    betterment of usual form.


Although both surgeries have
identical techniques and approaches, there are differences. Plastic surgery is
usually performed to treat birth and other subsequent defects, and to remove
skin blemishes such as, acne scars, or birthmarks. Cosmetic Surgery, on the
other hand, is usually performed to make a client look younger, better and more
beautiful than earlier or to enhance his/her appearance in other ways.

b) As regards the Scope of
Cosmetic and Plastic Surgery Services, the Department vide its Circular Letter
D.O.F. No. 334/13/2009 – TRU, dated 6.7.09, has clarified as under:



Para 2.4.1

“Beauty treatment services
provided by saloons, beauty parlours and beauticians are taxable since 2002. The
services now proposed to be taxed are cosmetic surgery and plastic surgery which
are undertaken to preserve or enhance physical appearance or beauty. As per the
common definition, surgery is a medical technology consisting of a physical
intervention on tissues. As a general rule, a procedure is considered surgical
when it involves cutting of a patient’s tissues or closure of a previously
sustained wound. Commonly, surgery is performed in a sterile environment with
anaesthesia and antiseptic conditions using surgical instruments. It also
includes non-invasive surgery.”

c) The Department, in the above
cited circular has in Para 2.4.2 specified that some of the commonly known
aesthetic/cosmetic surgeries are as under :

  • Abdominoplasty
    (tummy tuck)

  • Bletharoplasty
    (eyelid surgery)

  • Mammoplasty

  •  Buttock augmentation and lift

    •     Rhinoplasty (reshaping of nose)

    •     Otoplasty (ear surgery)

    •     Rhytidectomy (face lift)

    •     Liposuction (removal of fat from the body)

    •     Brow lift

     

    •     Cheek augmentation

    •     Facial implants

    •     Lip augmentation

    •     Forehead lift

    •     Cosmetic dental surgery

    •     Orthodontics

    •     Aesthetic dentistry

    •     Laser skin surfacing, etc.

        4. Specific Exclusion of Certain Surgeries

    Any reconstructive surgery carried out as a part of the treatment of a disease is excluded from the ambit of service tax. The Department, in its “Circular Letter” dated 6.7.2009, has clarified as under:

    Para 2.4.3

    “Any reconstructive surgery undertaken to restore one’s appearance, anatomy or bodily functions affected due to congenital defects, developmental abnormalities, degenerative diseases, injury or trauma would be outside the scope of this service. These processes could be undertaken to correct im-pairment caused by burns, fractures or congenital abnormalities like cleft lip, etc.”

    A few examples of degenerative diseases are:

        Parkinson’s Disease

        Cancer

        Diabetes

        Heart Ailments

        Prostatitis

        Arthritis

        5. Clarification Required on Scope of Services

    Considering the technicalities of the matter, issues are likely to arise as to what can be included or not included within the scope of “Cosmetic & Plastic Surgery” liable to service tax.

    Hence, in order to avoid litigations, it is felt that detailed clarifications explaining the scope of surgeries liable to service tax may be issued by CBEC after seeking detailed inputs from the Indian Medical Association or any other reputed body having expertise on the subject matter.

        6. Essential Criteria for Taxability

    The essential criteria for taxability can be sum-marised as under:

        a) Services can be provided to any person, by any other person

        b) Services should be provided in relation to cosmetic surgery or plastic surgery

        c) Any surgery undertaken to restore or recon-struct the anatomy or the functions of body affected due to

    •     Congenital defects

    •     Developmental abnormalities

    •     Degenerative diseases

    •     Injury or

    •     Trauma

    are specifically excluded from the scope of taxable service.

        7. Some Issues

    X is a science graduate and has done specialized courses which enable him to advise/carry out cosmetic surgery for the betterment and beautification of the appearance of his clients. Would X be liable to service tax under “Cosmetic & Plastic Surgery Services”?

    7.1A Unlike some taxable services (like architect, practising CA, etc), the statutory definition of taxable service U/s 65 (105)(zzzzk) of the Act, does not specify any particular qualification which a person providing the ‘cosmetic and plastic surgery service’ should possess. Therefore, services rendered by any person whether he is a qualified doctor or otherwise which constitutes Cosmetic of Plastic Surgery Services, would become taxable.

    In this regard, attention is drawn to the ruling in the case of Parasmal Bam v. CCE [2007] 3 STR 73 (Delhi- CESTAT), wherein it was held that “management consultancy services’ rendered by any person would be taxable inasmuch as the definition of management consultant services does not prescribe any specific qualification; and, therefore, even if the person acquires the consultancy skill by way of experience, the services rendered by him would be taxable.

    Hence, X would be liable to service tax, subject to available exemptions (like Ten Lakhs Threshold Exemption).

    A reputed hospital in Mumbai, equipped with the latest and technologically advanced infrastructure, has a division which conducts cosmetic and plastic surgeries. The surgeons who actually carry out the surgery are not employed by the hospital but are engaged on a professional basis. They are paid per surgery.

    As per the policy of the hospital, a person intend-ing to undergo surgery has to avail presurgery/ post-surgery services provided at the hospital. Ac-cordingly, the hospital bill raised for surgery usually includes the following charges:

        a) Indoor Hospitalisation

        b) Pre-operation Care

        c) Clinical/Pathological Tests

        d) Charges of Anaesthesiologist

        e) Surgery Charges

        f) Operation Theatre Charges

        g) Room Charges

        h) Cost of Medicines

        i) Post-surgery Care

    Who would be liable to service tax under “Cosmetic & Plastic Surgery Services” and on what amount?

    7.2A Cosmetic and plastic surgery services are rendered by the hospital to a patient. In order to provide the said service, the hospital avails services of surgeons on a professional basis. Hence surgeons are sub-contracted services providers. According to clarifications issued by CBEC through its Master Circular dt. 23.8.07, it would appear that exemption to sub-contracted service providers may not be available as per the government’s line of thinking. Hence, if the amounts charged by a surgeon for cosmetic and plastic surgery exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs during the period 1.9.2009 to 31.3.2010, service tax could become payable on amounts exceeding Rs. 10 lakhs.

    Since the ultimate service provider to a patient is the hospital, there would be a liability of service tax under cosmetic and plastic surgery services on the hospital.

    As regards the value on which service tax would become payable, under Section 67 of the Act, Value of taxable services is the gross amount charged for providing such taxable service. Hence, it would appear that the amount received by a service provider must have nexus to the taxable services rendered by him in order to constitute that amount as value of taxable service.

    CBEC had, vide its erstwhile Circular No. 65/14/2003, dated 5.11.2003, clarified as under:

    “In this regard it may be noted that Rule 6 only prescribes the procedure of payment of tax. The liability to tax is created by Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 as amended from time to time. The liability to pay tax is fastened on the service provider by Section 68 of the said Act. These two sections read together imply that service tax is pay-able by the service provider on the value of taxable services. Thus if a service provided is taxable, tax has to be paid on its value. Section 67 also clarifies value of service as the amount charged for the tax-able service when it has a nexus with the service provided. That is the reason why the expression used in Rule 6 is “value of taxable services” and not amount. The implication is that the tax has to be paid on the value of taxable services attribut-able to the service provided in a month / quarter as and when it is received. Thus Rule 6(1) cannot be read in isolation”.

    In this regard, it may be noted that in a case under Central Excise [viz Acer India Ltd., (2004) 172 ELT 289 (SC)], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the value of manufactured goods cannot be deter-mined by over-riding the provisions of the charging section. The amount received by the manufacturer must have nexus to the goods manufactured by him. [In this case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the issue of inclusion of value of software in the value of computer.]

    In light of the foregoing, a reasonable view is possible that service tax is payable only on the surgery charges identified and included in the bill raised by the hospital on a patient.

    However, it needs to be expressly noted that Section 65(105) (zzzzk) of the Act which defines the taxable service, employs the terminology “in relation to Cosmetic Surgery or Plastic Surgery”. The term “in relation to” has a very wide connotation as interpreted by the Supreme Court from time to time. Hence, service tax authorities could take a view that service tax is payable on the total amount of the bill, on the ground that all charges (other than surgery charges) are levied in or in relation to providing cosmetic and plastic surgery services.

    In either scenario, in cases where a surgeon charges service tax on a bill raised on a hospital, the hospital would be in a position to avail the benefit of CENVAT Credit.

Part A — Supply of tangible goods for use

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New Page 1

1. Introduction :

In most of the States, VAT (commonly known as Lease Tax) is
charged on the amount received by the supplier, permitting right to use the
goods where the possession and control is transferred to the user. However in
many cases, more particularly where machinery or equipment is of a highly
technical nature and operation of the same requires special skills and
experience, possession and effective control of such machinery or equipment is
not transferred to the user. Such transactions do not attract sales tax/VAT.


Under service tax, generally transactions of hire/lease of
moveable assets hitherto did not constitute taxable service under the Finance
Act, 1994 (Act). (However, transactions in the nature of financial lease, were
being taxed under Banking & Other Finance Services category.)

Hence, transactions of hire/lease of movables, wherein
effective control and possession of such goods is not transferred by the
supplier to the user, there was no liability to VAT as well as service tax.

2. Position under VAT/Sales Tax :

Before analysing the newly introduced services category of
“supply of tangible goods for use”, it is felt that, understanding of the
conceptual aspects as to the existing levy of lease tax under sales tax/VAT is
essential. The same are explained hereafter briefly.

(a) Transfer of Right to Use :

As per Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India,
‘sale’ includes a transfer of right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or
not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable
consideration.

Definition on similar lines has been adopted in S. 2(g)(iv)
of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and many State VAT legislations.

(b) ‘Transfer’ implies exclusive possession to transferee :

In a Supreme Court ruling having far-reaching implications
viz.
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. V. UOI, (2006) 146 STC 91 (SC 3-Member
Bench), the following important observations have been made by the Apex Court :

Para 97 :

“To constitute
a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods, the transaction
must have the following attributes :

(a) there
must be goods available for delivery;

(b) there
must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of goods

© the
transferee should have a legal right to use the goods — consequently all legal
consequences of such use including any permissions or licences required
therefor should be available to transferee

(d) for the
period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be to the
exclusion to the transferor — this is the necessary concomitant of the plain
language of the statute viz. a ‘transfer of the right to use’ and not
merely a licence to use the goods.

(e) having
transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same right to others.”

Relying on the
BSNL case stated above, the Gauhati High Court in the case of HLS Asia Ltd.
V. State of Assam,
(2007) 8 VST 314 has held that the delivery of physical
possession of goods is not essential precondition for levy of sales tax. The
relevant observations in paras 26 and 27 are as under :

“The
equipment, plants and machinery were available and identified by the parties.
Under the contract, OIL derived the legal right to use the goods having hired
the same on payment of charges. Customs duty had also been paid by it on the
equipment imported by the contractor for executing the works. Under the
stringent contractual terms, the contractor was bound to keep the equipment
engaged exclusively for the works. The fact that the same had been operated by
its technically qualified personnel does not militate against the element of
exclusiveness in the use thereof for the services and benefit of OIL. During
the subsistence of the contract, the appellant-company was neither authorised
nor permitted to transfer the equipment or detain the same for others. The
parties consciously limited the tax liability to the rental component only.

The
provisions of the contract understandably have to be construed in the context
of the service accorded to be rendered. The transfer of right to use the
equipments has to be perceived in the context of the nature, manner and extent
of engagement thereof. The retention of physical possession thereof by the
appellant company cannot be decisive. The parties entered into the contract
understanding the implications of each and every provision thereof, which
according to us, demonstrate an obvious dominion and control of OIL over the
equipment used by the appellant for the execution of the works during the
period of the contract. We, thus, have no hesitation to hold that the
transaction in question involved transfer of right to use the equipment,
plants and machinery under the lease within the meaning of S. 2(33)(iv) of the
Act.”

©
‘Transfer’ is different from ‘allowed to use’ or ‘permitted to use’ :

‘Transfer’ in
the context of Lease Tax implies exclusiveness to the user. For example, if a
passenger boards a bus, can it be said that the bus owner has ‘transferred’
right to use the bus to the passenger ? Obviously the answer is No. The bus
owner has only ‘allowed’ or ‘permitted’ the use of the bus to the passenger on a
non-exclusive basis.

(d) Lease tax is attracted only on ‘goods’ and not on
immovable property :

Lease is taxable only if it is in respect of goods (viz. movable property). Tax cannot be levied if plant and machinery fixed in building is leased, as it is immovable property and not ‘goods’ – Reference can be made to Karthik Engineering Works v. State of Kamataka, (2000) 119 STC 88 (Karn HC DB) – same view in CTO v. Sadulshshar Krai Vikrai Sahakari Samiti, (2004) 135 STC 90 (Raj HC).

In CST v. Bombay Sound Service, (1999) 112 STC 290 (Born HC DB), it was held that hire of recording studio with instruments embedded to earth is not transfer of right to use ‘goods’ as it is not movable property. Similarly in CST v. Pralhad Industries, (1999) 112 STC 548 (All HC), it was held that lease of factory along with plant and machinery fastened to earth is not transfer of ‘goods’, as plant and machinery is immovable property. Reference can also be made to DCST v. Bobby Rubber Industries, (1998) 108 STC 410 (Ker HC DB).

However, in such cases, there could be liability to service tax under ‘Renting of Immovable Property’ services category, subject to satisfaction of taxability criteria specified therein.

e) When is hire of goods taxable under sales tax/ VAT? :

It is commonly found that goods (e.g., furniture, utensils, machinery, equipments, etc.) are given on hire. These are returned after prescribed period and hire charges are paid by the user. This is ‘transfer of right to use for consideration’ and can be treated as ‘sale’ within extended definition of ‘sale’.

In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam v. CTO, (1990) 77 STC 182 (AP HC DB), [confirmed by the Supreme Court in 126 STC 114 (SC)], it was held that hire charges are taxable only when full possession and control is given to the hirer. If the owner (person giving equipment) retains effective control over the equipment, it is not ‘transfer of right to use’. In this case, the assessee had given sophisticated machinery to the contractors for execution of work entrusted to them. However, the machinery continued to be in possession of assessee. The contractor was not free to use the machinery for other work, and hence there is no ‘transfer of right to use’.

The principle enunciated above is popularly referred to as ‘concept of effective control and ownership’.

Some judicial rulings are given hereafter for reference:

  • In New Central Group Engg. v. ACCT, (2001) 124 STC 637 (WBTT), a dealer provided machines (dumpers, loaders and cranes) with his men and machines to carry out specified work. It was held that it is not a ‘transfer of right to use goods’ [same view in case of excavators given on hire in Alpha Clays v. State of Kerala, (2004)135 STC 107 (Ker HC DB)].

  • In Great Eastern Shipping v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 136 STC 519 (Karn HC DB), a dealer supplied tug (towing vessel) on hire to port trust under Charter Party Agreement. Agreement provided for handing over possession and control in all respect of the tug to the port trust. It was held that this is agreement to transfer right to use the tug. It was also held that since the tugs were within territorial waters, it is a sale within the State, as powers of the State Government extend to the territorial waters adjacent to the State.

  • In Lakshmi Audio Visual Inc. v. ACCT, (2001) 124 STC 426 (Kar HC), the petitioner was providing audio visual and multimedia equipment to customers for specified period and collecting hire charges. He was taking equipment to site, installing, operating, dismantling and bringing it back. Possession and effective control always remained with petitioner. It was held that it is not ‘deemed sale’ as customer never got right to use the equipment.


3. Effective  date  of levy :

The new levy of ‘Supply of Tangible Goods for Use’ has been notified w.e.f. 16-5-2008 and hence would apply to transactions for the period on or after 16-5-2008.

4.  Scope  of the levy :

The scope of the new levy has been explained vide Ministry’s Circular D.O.F. No. 334/1/2008 – TRU, dated 29-2-2008, as under:

4.4 Supply  of tangible goods  for use:

4.4.1 Transfer of the right to use any goods is leviable to sales tax/VAT as deemed sale of goods [Article 66(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India]. Transfer of right to use involves transfer of both possession and control of the goods to the user of the goods.

4.4.2 Excavators, wheel loaders, dump trucks, crawler carriers, compaction equipment, cranes, etc., off-shore construction vessels & barges, geo-technical vessels, tug and barge flotillas, rigs and high-value machineries are supplied for use, with no legal right of possession and effective control. Transaction of allowing another person to use the goods, without giving legal right of possession and effective control, not being treated as sale of goods, is treated as service.

4.4.3 Proposal is to levy service tax on such services provided in relation to supply of tangible goods, including machinery, equipment and appliances, for use, with no legal right of possession or effective control. Supply of tangible goods for use and leviable to VAT/ sales tax as deemed sale of goods, is not covered under the scope of the proposed service. Whether a transaction involves transfer of possession and control is a question of fact and is to be decided based on the terms of the contract and other material facts. This could be ascertainable from the fact whether or not VAT payable or paid.”

5. Essential  criteria  for taxability:

S. 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Act defines taxable service as under:

Any service provided or to be provided to any person –

by any other person in relation to supply of tangible goods including machinery, equipment and appliances for use, without transferring right of possession and effective control of such machinery, equipment and appliances.

The essential criteria for taxability can be summarised as under:

  • The service provider can be any person
  • The service  receiver  can be any other person
  • The service must be in relation to supply of goods
  • The goods so supplied  must be tangible goods
  • The supply  of tangible  goods must be for use
  • The supply of tangible goods must be without transferring right of possession and effective control of those goods.


6. Specific tax exemption for goods carriage to Goods Transport Agency (GTA) :

Representations were made to the Govt. by the All India Confederation of Goods Vehicle Owners’ Association and also the All India Motor Transport Congress requesting to provide relief on account of levy of service tax on supply of goods carriage to GTA for use in transport of goods. It stated that GTAs often provide services in relation to transportation of goods by road using the goods carriage obtained on rent or hire basis. The relief was sought on various grounds inter alia that the service tax paid on renting/hiring of goods carriage, without right of possession and effective control, could not be taken as input credit for payment of service tax towards GTA service.

Service tax for the GTA service provided is payable only on 25% of the amount charged for providing the GTA service tax. In view of this provision, GTAs are not entitled to take input credit under Cenvat Credit Scheme on goods and services used for GTA service. Moreover service tax for GTA services provided in seven specified cases is not required to be paid by the GTA service provider but by the person making payment towards the freight. Services provided in relation to supply of tangible goods for use, without transfer of possession and effective control, has been made as separate taxable service w.e.f. 16-5-2008. Consequently, supply of goods carriage to the GTA, without transfer of possession and effective control, for using the said goods carriage for transport of goods by road had become leviable to service tax.

The Central Government has issued Notification No. 29/08 ST, dated 26-6-2008 to exempt fully from levy of service tax the supply of transport vehicles (goods carriage) to GTA to be used for transport of goods by road.

The exemption granted is in line with the intention of the Govt. as stated in the Union Finance Minister’s Budget Speech on 8-7-2004 while introducing service tax on GTA, that truck owners would not be subjected to service tax.

7. Some  issues:

7.1 X is engaged in the business of giving equipments on hire for a specific period of time, wherein the said goods would effectively remain in the custody and control of the user. X has not been registered under VAT and accordingly is not charging VAT.X has now registered himself with Service Tax Dept. under the new category ‘Supply of Tangible Goods for Use’. Can the sales tax authorities demand and recover VAT from X ?

7.1A Comments:

The intention of the Govt. behind introduction of the new levy has been. very clear to tax those cases of hire/lease, which were escaping sales tax/VAT liability. Under the facts of X, it appears that since effective control and possession of equipments is transferred to the users, it would be liable to sales tax/VAT and not service tax. The mere fact that X has decided to pay service tax, though there was no liability for the same, cannot absolve X from discharging liability to sales tax/VAT. Hence Sales Tax authorities can demand sales tax/VAT from X for the past period as well as for the period during which X has paid service tax.

7.2 Y, a partnership company, is engaged in the business of giving cranes on hire to foreign companies, whereby effective control and possession re-mains with Y through their technical and operating staff. Hence there was no sales tax/VAT liability on hire transactions. Y has entered into an annual contract in March 2008 with a foreign company for hire of cranes during the period 1-4-2008 to 31-3-2009. The entire annual hire of Rs.90 lakh has been received by Y before 31-3-2008. Whether Y would be liable to service tax for the period 16-5-2008 to 31-3-2009. If yes, whether Rs.10-lakh exemption can be availed of by them and what would be the time within which service tax liability is to be discharged by Y?

7.2A Comments:

Though service tax payment to the Government is linked to receipt of consideration for services (either actual or advance), taxable event for levy of service tax, is ‘provision of service’ and not receipt of consideration’. Hence, it would reasonably appear that, Y would be liable to service tax on hire charges attributable to the period 16-5-2008 to 31-3-2009.

This position is impliedly made clear under Rule 6(1) of Service Tax Rules, relevant extract of which is reproduced hereafter:

Rule  6(1) – Payment of Service Tax

The service tax shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 5th of the month immediately following the calendar month in which the payment is received, towards the value of taxable services :

Provided that where the assessee is an individual or proprietary firm or partnership firm, the service tax shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 5th of the month immediately following the quarter in which the payments are received, towards the value of taxable services:

Provided further that notwithstanding the time of receipt of payment towards the value of services, no service tax shall be payable for the part or whole of the value of services, which is attributable to services provided during the period when such services were not taxable:

Provided also that the service tax on the value of taxable service received during the month of March, or the quarter ending in March, as the case may be, shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 31st day of March of the calendar year.

Explanation – For the removal of doubt it is hereby clarified that in case the value of taxable service is received before providing the said service, service tax shall be paid on the value of service attributable to the relevant month, or quarter, as the case may be.

It is felt that if conditions under ten-lakh Exemption Notification are satisfied, one can avail exemption up to ten lakh for the period 16-5-2008to 31-3-2009.

Service tax liability for the entire period (16-5-2008 to 31-3-2009) would have to be discharged by 5th July 2008.

7.3 Z is in the business of giving specialised machines on hire, wherein effective control and possession remains with Z. During the year ended 31-3-2008, Z has purchased 5 new machines on which substantial amount of Excise Duty has been paid. Can Z avail Cenvat Credit of Excise Duty paid on the said machines and set off the same against service tax to be paid on hire charges on or after 16-5-2008 ?

7.3A Comments:

a) In this connection, attention is invited to CBEC Clarification vide letter F No. 137/120/2008 – Cx 4, dated 24-6-2008,extracts of which, are reproduced hereafter:

1. “M/ s. Hindustan Construction Company (HCCL) imported an aircraft last year, which was cleared on payment of appropriate customs duty (i.e., CVD). After its import, the aircraft was being let out by HCCL on hire basis without transferring right of possession and effective control. From 16-5-2008, ‘supply of tangible goods for use, without transferring right of possession and effective control’ is brought under taxable service. After 16-5-2008, such activity attracts service tax on the hire charges received by HCCL. In this regard, it has been requested that HCCL should be allowed to take credit of the CVD paid on the aircraft and utilise it for paying service tax. The modality suggested is to amend the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 so as to specifically include aircraft within the definition of capital goods, as has been done in case of motor vehicles for providing specified services.

The matter has been examined. It is noticed that in this specific case, the aircraft was imported last year and till 15-5-2008,the service provided by HCCL was outside the scope of the S. 66 of the Finance Act and thus was covered under the definition of the term ‘exempted services’ under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. As per Rule 6(4),no Cenvat Credit can be taken on capital goods, which are used in providing only exempted services. Therefore, ab initio, HCCL was not eligible to take credit of CVD. Such being the case, the credit which was ab initio ineligible, does not become eligible after the service tax is imposed on the service at a later date. It is therefore clarified that no Cenvat credit of the CVD paid on the said aircraft should be taken, even if it is specifically included within the definition of ‘capital goods’.”

The above is self-explanatory.

b) In this regard, attention is also drawn to a Larger Bench ruling in the case of Spenta International Ltd. v. CCE, (2007) 216 ELT 133 (Tri – LB, WZB), wherein it has been held that eligibility to credit is to be determined with reference to the dutiability of the final product as on the date of receipt of capital goods. The ratio of the said ruling would be relevant for service tax as well.

c) In light of (a) and (b) above, it would appear that, if Cenvat Credit is availed by Z upon compliance of stipulated conditions (non-claiming of depreciation, etc.), the same would be disputed by service tax authorities.

Interpretation issue : Excluded services under commercial construction services

1. Preamble :

    Recently on July 27, 2009, the Government issued Notification No. 24/2009-ST, whereby services provided in relation to management, maintenance or repairs of roads is notified as exempt from the whole of the levy of service tax. This prima facie appears to have been done to put an end to the controversy over the issue of taxability of these services. However, the question arises here is, can the Government exempt a service which was always outside the purview of the levy ? The issue of the Notification does not end the controversy over taxability of the services for the period prior to July 27, 2009, as it would mean that the services covered under the Notification were taxable till such date. Whether the services at least of repairs of roads were excluded from the purview of service tax or otherwise is discussed and analysed below.

2. Background :

    2.1 Construction service was introduced w.e.f. September 10, 2004 in clause (30a) of S. 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 (The Act). The definition inter alia excluded construction of road, dams, tunnels, etc. CBEC vide its Circular F.No.B2/8/2004-TRU dated 10-9-2004 explained the scope of this service. Subsequently, with effect from 16-6-2005 this service was renamed as ‘commercial or industrial construction service’ under clause (25b) of S. 65 and the erstwhile clause (30a) defined taxable service called ‘construction of complex’. The new clause (25b) also excluded services provided in respect of roads, tunnels and dams along with construction services in respect of airports, railways, transport terminals and bridges. Further, when execution of works contract service was introduced vide clause (zzzza) in S. 65(105) of the Act from 1-6-2007, this category also excluded works contract in respect of the same items. The relevant definitions are reproduced here :

    S. 65(25b) :

    ‘Commercial or industrial construction service’ means —

        (a) construction of a new building or a civil structure or a part thereof; or

        (b)

        (c)

        (d) repair, alteration, renovation or restoration of, or similar services in relation to, building or civil structure, pipeline or conduit,

which is —

        (i) used, or to be used, primarily for; or

        (ii) occupied, or to be occupied, primarily with; or

        (iii) engaged, or to be engaged, primarily in, commerce or industry, or work intended for commerce or industry, but does not include such services provided in respect of roads, airports, railways, transport terminals, bridges, tunnels and dams”. (emphasis supplied)

S. 65(105)(zzzza) :

‘Taxable service’ means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to the execution of a works contract, excluding works contract in respect of roads, airports, railways, transport terminals, bridges, tunnels and dams.

Explanation — For the purposes of this sub-clause, ‘works contract’ means a contract wherein, —

        (i)

        (ii) such contract is for the purposes of carrying out, —

(a)

(b) construction of a new building or a civil structure or a part thereof, or of a pipeline or conduit, primarily for the purposes of commerce or industry; or

(c) ……………

(d) completion and finishing services, repair, alteration, renovation or restoration of, or similar services, in relation to (b) and (c); or

(e) (emphasis supplied)

    The above definitions clearly indicate inclusion of repair, alteration, renovation or restoration or similar services in relation to commercial building or civil structure, pipeline or conduit in sub-clause (d) alongside construction services in sub-clause (a) and (ii)(b), respectively in the above definitions.

    2.2 Under another category of service viz. ‘management, maintenance or repair’ in S. 65(64) of the Act, maintenance or repair of properties whether immovable or not has been made taxable w.e.f. May 01, 2006. The definition is reproduced here :

“65(64) ‘management, maintenance or repair’ means any service provided by :

(i)

(ii)

(a) ;

(b) maintenance or repair of properties, whether immovable or not; or

(c)

Explanation — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes of this clause, —

(a)

(b) ‘properties’ includes information technology software”. (emphasis supplied)

    2.3 Thus, there has been an overlap of repair services in relation to immovable properties under both the above taxing entries. This gave rise to dispute with the authorities for the assessees particularly in relation to (b) different construction services in relation to road and other areas (a) repairs or restoration services in relation to roads.

3. Repair services in respect of roads :

    3.1 Different kinds of services are provided by construction service providers in cases of both public and private roads. For instance, widening of existing roads, resurfacing, relaying, concretisation, etc. Since commercial or industrial construction service as well as execution of works contract service clearly include services in relation to repairs, alteration, renovation or restoration of any building or civil structure and exclude such services in relation to roads, the issue arose as to whether repair, renovation, etc. of road is classifiable under commercial or industrial construction service, or works contract service, as the case may be, on one side or under management, maintenance or repair service under the other. Service tax authorities at various places adopted divergent practices. On referring the matter to the Board by the Department, Circular No. 110/4/2009-ST, dated 23-2-2009 was issued providing the following clarification :

“2. Commercial or industrial construction service [S.65(105) (zzq) specifically excludes construction or repairs of roads. However, management, maintenance or repair provided under a contract or an agreement in relation to properties, whether immovable or not, is leviable to service tax u/s. 65(105) (zzg) of the Finance Act, 1994. There is no specific exemption under this service for maintenance or repair of roads, etc. Reading the definitions of these two taxable services in tandem leads to the conclusion that while construction of road is not a taxable service, management, maintenance or repair of roads are in the nature  of taxable services,  attracting  service tax.

The next issue requiring resolution is the types of activities that can be called as ‘construction of road’ as against the activities which should fall under the category of maintenance or repair of roads. In this regard the technical literature on the subject indicate that the activities can be categorised as follows, :

A) Maintenance  or repair  activities:

I. Resurfacing

II. Renovation

III.  Strengthening

IV. Relaying

V. Filling of potholes

B) Construction  activities:

I. Laying  of a new  road

II. Widening of narrow road to broader road (such as conversion of a two-lane road to a four-lane road)

III. Changing road surface (gravelled road to metalled road/metalled road to black-topped/blacktopped to concrete, etc.)

4. The cases may be decided/revenue should be protected based on the above classification. Suitable trade and public notices may be issued for information of the trade and field formations.”

3.2 The above Circular appears to be not in harmony with the rules for classification of services required to be followed when a taxable service is prima facie classifiable under two or more taxing entries. S. 65A of the Act contains these rules. According to the first rule, specific description is always preferred over general description. Accordingly, if roads are specifically excluded from commercial or industrial construction service, as well as execution of works contract service and as both these categories specifically include repairs, renovation, restoration, etc. of buildings or civil structures as construction services, the sub-clause in management, maintenance or repair service of maintenance or repair of immovable ‘properties’ appears generic in nature for services in relation to roads. The Tribunal in the case of Dr. Lal Path Lab. Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Ludhiana 2006 (4) STR 527 (Tri.-Del.) held “What is specifically kept out of a levy by the Legislature cannot be subjected to tax by the Revenue administration under another entry”. “In the present case, Revenue is seeking to discard the specific entry and to bring the appellant’s services under a very general entry only because under the specific entry, no tax is payable. This approach is contrary to the scheme of legislation.” Also, under the excise law, similar view was held inter alia in the cases of Tata Tea Ltd. v. CCE, 2004 (164) ELT 0315 and TTK Healthcare Ltd. v. CCE, 2008 (231) ELT 0273. In the case of CCE v. Konkan Marine Agencies, 2009 (13) STR 7 (Kar.), it was held to the effect that once the definition of the taxing entry excluded a specific aspect, service tax could not be levied. It appears therefore a reasonable view that the above Circular restricts the scope of the taxing entries viz. commercial or industrial construction service and execution of works contract service. “Circulars contrary to the correct legal interpretation are not binding on judicial authorities” was held in the case of Videocon International Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2004 (167) ELT 33 (Tri.-Mum). Similarly, it was held in the case of Mahakaushal Builders Welfare Association v. Supdt., 2006 (3) STR 721 (MP) that Circular does not create liability for payment of service tax if assessee not liable to pay tax under law relating to service tax. In the case of Pahwa Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2005 (181) ELT 339 (SC), it was held that the Board can issue directions only for purpose and in furtherance of and not contrary and derogation to provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

3.3 Construction services per se cover repairs, renovation or restoration services as these services also involve’ construction’ and / or reconstruction in part. Roads are per se civil structures. When an existing road is redone completely, it can be called restoration. Clause (d) in the relevant definition cannot be rendered redundant by issuing a Circular. Further, there is a thin line of distinction between the terms ‘relaying’ and ‘laying of a new road’. Can ‘relaying’ not be covered by the terms ‘renovation’ or ‘alteration’ ? A further question arises as to whether the word ‘renovation’ used in the Circular directing that it is a maintenance service liable for service tax and the same word used in clauses (25b) or (zzzza) mean different? It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of taxing status that interpretation leading to absurdity cannot be accepted. By the parameter adopted by the Circular, even repair services in respect of a dam, bridge or any airport also would be considered taxable under clause (64) of S. 65 as all such services are also provided under a contract. Admittedly, revenue consideration of the authorities is on a higher footing than any other parameter like natural or grammatical meaning, principle of harmonious construction in a statute or principle of legality.

3.4 In effect, the Board’s Circular interprets the definition of commercial or industrial construction service in a restrictive manner merely to suit the Revenue needs. If sub-clause (a) under commercial or industrial construction service and sub-clause (ii)(b) under execution of works contract service, which provide for construction of a new building or a civil structure or a part thereof apply to the respective exclusionary part of the definition, why would sub-clause (d) under both the definitions providing for repair, alteration, renovation or restoration or similar services in relation to building or civil structure, etc., cannot apply to the exclusionary clause? If the scope of the definition is comprehensive enough to extend coverage to various services in relation to construction including those of repair, restoration aspects, the same ‘expansive’ scope applies to the exclusionary clause of the definition containing such services provided in respect of roads, airports, tunnels, dams, etc.” Such clarification being binding on the lower authorities would certainly create litigation than relief for the period prior to July 27,2009 when Notification No. 24/2009-ST was issued.

4. Services of construction of dam, tunnel and road:

4.1 The above Circular in no ambiguous terms clarifies that construction of road is not a taxable

The project was completed in February 2007. The tax demanded for the period April 2005 to March 2008 was  made  in the following manner:

  • Tax was computed on the entire amount received from WBSEB without granting abatement of 67%.

  • Computation of liability was made on the gross value even though service tax was not collected.

  • Invoked extended period of limitation on the charge of mis-representation and mala fide intention of evasion.

4.2 The Noticee’s case contained chiefly the following grounds :

  • Scope of the service included civil works structures of dams, tunnels and roads and did not include designing of power generation system or providing electrical and mechanical works for the plant.

  • The service was covered more appropriately under execution of works contract service introduced from 1-6-2007, whereas the project was completed in February 2007.

  • Filing of return or taking registration under wrong category could not be the basis for the levy.

  • Declaration of the entire value of the contractual service and claiming exemption on the proach or a voyage of discovery of the authorities ground  of exclusion  of dams, tunnels  and roads in the definition of commercial or industrial construction service in various returns from time to time and providing copy of the agreement in October 2005 to the Department evidenced against the charge of suppression or evasion.

  • Wide range of activities described in the scope of work in the contract under different nomen-clature related only to construction of dams, tunneling and roads.

  • Each activity described in the agreement was clarified to prove construction/civil works related to dams, roads and tunnels.

4.3 Order in a nutshell contained the following observations:

  • Based on examination of definition of ‘dam’ cited in Encyclopedia Britannica and the reading of the agreement clauses concluded that construction of dam involves several auxiliary works. Exclusion of dam in the purview of the definition would mean exclusion of all auxiliary works and that there was no scope to view the exclusion provision in narrow meaning.

  • No distinction could be made between construction of ordinary dams, tunnels and roads and tunnels, dams and roads as an integral part of the hydroelectric power project as the statute does not provide for it and therefore the statute cannot permit such distinction. Moreover, the dams are generally used for generating hydroelectric power.

  • There is no scope for segregating the agreement for considering any part of the work as taxable service.

  • Allegation of suppression also being unmeritous, the case failed both on the question of merit and the question of limitation.

5. In conclusion, to issue a half-baked Circular which generates controversy rather than settling it and then to combat it, issue a Notification or another Circular which also would not end the existing controversy is peculiar to the administration of the levy of service tax. The analysis and discussion above amply demonstrate the state of administration of the levy which otherwise contains several ambiguities and limiting factors leading to litigation due to dichotomy in interpretation. In most cases, it appears frivolous and a result of innovative approach or a voyage of discovery of the authorities at the peril of assessees at large.

Part A — Provisional Attachment of Property under Service Tax

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Service Tax

1. Introduction :


Notification 30/2008 — Service Tax was issued on July 01,
2008, whereby Service Tax (Provisional Attachment of Property) Rules, 2008 have
been notified under Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 (The Act) to protect the
interests of revenue in certain cases in terms of power given u/s.94(1) and (2)
read with S. 73 C of the Act.

2. Statutory provisions :


2.1 Provisions of S. 73C :


S. 73C was introduced with effect from April 18, 2006 vide
the Finance Act, 2006. However, for the past two years no rules were prescribed
in this respect and therefore, the provisions appearing draconian in nature
remained on hold. With the prescription of the rules, the issue involving
provisional attachment of property assumes great significance. Where any
proceeding u/s.73 or u/s.73 A is pending and a notice is served on a person
u/s.73(1) or u/s.73A(3) and the Central Excise Officer forms an opinion that to
protect the interests of the Revenue, it is necessary to provisionally attach
any property belonging to such person, he may do so in the manner prescribed in
the rules notified now.

2.2 Provisions of S. 73(1) and S. 73A(3):




  • S. 73(1) provides that where any Service Tax has not been levied or paid or
    has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded, the Central
    Excise Officer is empowered to
    issue a show-cause notice on the person charge-able with Service Tax which has
    not been levied/paid or which has been short-levied/short-paid or a refund is
    erroneously issued under ordinary circumstances within 1 year and in case of
    fraud/collusion/willful misstatement, suppression/evasion within 5 years.



  • U/s.73A(3), a show-cause notice can be served when a person liable to pay
    Service Tax has collected an amount representing Service Tax from the
    recipient of service either in excess of the amount determined to be payable
    or has collected which is not required to be collected and has not paid to the
    credit of the Central Government.



3. Position under Central Excise and Customs :



With effect from July 13, 2006, S. 11DDA and S. 28BA were
introduced in the Central Excise Act, 1944 (the excise law) and Customs Act,
1962 (the customs law), respectively, to provide for provisional attachment of
property of a person to whom show-cause notice has been served u/s.11A or
u/s.11D of the excise law or S. 28 or S. 28B of the customs law as the case may
be. These provisions are similar to the provisions of S. 73C narrated above.
However, the discussion here is restricted to the attachment under the Service
Tax law.

4. Prescribed procedure contained in the Rules :


  • Obtaining previous approval of the Commissioner of Central Excise by an order in
    writing.

If the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise is
satisfied that to protect the interest of revenue during the pendency of
proceeding u/s.73 or u/s.73A of the Act, it is necessary to provisionally attach
any property of a person, he may send proposal to do so to the Commissioner of
Central Excise after verifying facts and circumstances of the case in the
prescribed format. The Commissioner of Central Excise in turn is required to
satisfy himself that facts and circumstances justify such an action and then
only proceed to send a notice to the person whose property is considered for
provisional attachment.


  • The notice to be served must contain :


(a) the reasons for initiating action of provisional
attachment;

(b) details of property to be attached provisionally.



  • The Commissioner of Central Excise is also required to give opportunity to
    such person to make submissions within 15 days of service of such notice.



  • After duly considering the submissions provided by such person in writing or
    in person or both, the Commissioner may pass an order in writing to
    provisionally attach the property of such person.



5. Which property could be attached ?



  • The rules specifically provide that the order of the Commissioner would not
    attach any personal property of proprietor or partners or directors, as the
    case may be.



  • The provisional attachment of the property shall be to the extent required to
    protect the interests of the Revenue meaning that value of the property
    attached shall be of the value which would be nearly equivalent to that of the
    amount of pending revenue against such person.



  • Any movable property of such person could be attached only if the immovable
    property available for attachment is not sufficient to protect the interests
    of revenue.



6. Period of provisional attachment :

  • Provisional attachment will be rendered ineffective on expiry of six months of serving of the order for attachment.

  • Only when the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise considers it necessary to extend this period, he would do so only after recording the reasons in writing. However, the total extension would not exceed two years in any case.

7. For any reason, if a person pays pending revenue amount with interest, the provisional attachment would cease to exist.

8. The person whose property is provisionally attached is obliged not to mortgage, lease, transfer or deliver the attached property in any manner except with the previous approval of the Commissioner of Central excise.

9. Some issues:

In the above background, the following questions may arise in the minds of assessees under the Service Tax law :

9.1 Whether the Department can attach bank accounts of a service provider ?

9.1A Any bank account whether current or overdraft account or even a fixed deposit is a movable property. If value of the immovable property proposed to be attached is insufficient to cover the amount of the show-cause notice, the bank account of a service provider could be attached.

9.2 It is experienced and observed by many that in case of some show-cause notices, even after filing replies for over one year or more, the Department has not adjudicated the SCN. Can the Department take recourse to provisional attachment in such cases?

9.2A Service Tax law has not prescribed any time limit for disposal of a show-cause notice. Therefore, it is true that many show-cause notices remain unadjudicated after receiving replies thereto and in some cases even after hearing the noticee in person, no order is passed for months and years. Nevertheless, the Central Excise Officer proposing provisional attachment of property of a person is required to record reasons in writing and the same is required to meet with the approval of the Commissioner of Central Excise. This approval and reasoning are however discretionary and unless is exercised in a judicious manner, can cause harm to service providing fraternity. Further, ‘protection of interests of the Revenue’ being a highly relative term, misuse of the powers by some officers cannot be ruled out. Evaluation of facts and circumstances of a case is a matter of personal judgment when no parameters for determination of the same are prescribed. Service Tax legislation is only fourteen years old. Further, drafting of the provisions lack precision and this has given rise to numerous genuine interpretation issues. The law is slowly evolving only through judicial decisions. Amidst umpteen controversies over interpretational issues, empowering bureaucracy to provisionally attach property based only on show-cause notices does not appear sound at this juncture. Professionals come across several SCNs issued frivolously or without application of mind merely in a routine manner on interpretational issues. In many cases, such notices contain no discussion whatsoever as to why and in what manner a particular taxing entry is applicable to the noticee but may contain a huge demand of Service Tax and consequential interest and penalty and such demands are considered by the Department as disputed recoveries. The demand of these huge amounts is more often than not unrealistic. For instance, in the case of Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd. v. UOI, 2007 *8)STR 561 (Sikkim), demand was shown as over rupees 2,000 crores. In the scenario, prescription of rules for provisional attachment appears premature for the fact that technically, pending adjudication attachment on provisional basis is possible. Therefore, apprehension of misuse is not out of place.

9.3 Whether property of a service provider can be provisionally attached when an adverse order is issued by the adjudicating authority and appeal is admitted by the Appellate Authority?
 
9.3A The rules for provisional attachment can be invoked only if proceedings are pending u/ s. 73 of the Act. S. 73 does not apply once appeal is admitted and therefore, proceeding for provisional attachment cannot be initiated for adjudicated orders pending in appeal. However, if property is already attached provisionally prior to adjudication, the appeal admitted subsequent to such attachment would not necessitate the Department to release the property attached. However, the provisions of over-all time limit as discussed above would indeed apply.

Part A — Service Tax Refund for exporters of goods

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New Page 2

1. Background :

Financial crisis led by US subprime mortgage debacle has
already slowed down Indian exports. In the scenario, exporters struggling hard
to survive are anxious to get refund of service tax paid on input services used
for exports. In the January 2008 issue of BCAJ, a write-up on the subject was
provided. However, considering the expanded scope of Notification 41/2007-ST,
dated 6-10-2007 by various subsequent amendments, a need was felt to provide an
updated account of the issue for guidance of many readers.

 

2. Scope and coverage :

Notification No. 41/2007 (supra), which was amended
vide Notifications No. 42/2007-ST, dated 29/11/2007-ST and 43/2007-ST, dated
29-11-2007 was further amended by Notifications No. 3/2008-ST, dated 19-2-2008,
17/2008-ST, dated 1-4-2008, 24/2008-ST, dated 10-5-2008, 32/2008-ST, dated
18-11-2008 and 33/2008-ST, dated 7-12-2008. Vide the entire amendments, 19
taxable categories of services have been notified, in respect of which exemption
by way of remission mechanism for filing a claim of refund is prescribed.

 

A list containing specified services, the date of their
notification and specific compliance/requirement as to documentation is
tabulated at the end of the write-up.

 

3. General conditions for claiming refund :

  • An exporter is eligible to claim refund only when service tax is actually paid
    on specified services.
  • No CENVAT credit of service tax paid on the services should have been availed
    for which refund is claimed.
  • Refund of service tax paid on the specified services should not be made in any
    manner otherwise than under this Notification viz. No. 41/2007-ST.
  • Export should be made without availing drawback of service tax paid on the
    specified services under Customs, Central Excise Duties and Service Tax Drawback
    Rules, 1995. It may be noted that this condition is omitted recently with effect
    from December 07, 2008 (refer Notification No. 33/2008-ST).

 


(Note : Specific conditions for each specified
service category are provided in the table at the end of this write-up)

 


4. Exemption to exporter
when he is also a person liable for payment of service tax under reverse charge
mechanism :

When an exporter is liable to pay service tax being an
availer/user of any of the above specified services, he is exempt from payment
of service tax on such services. For instance, if an exporter has used goods
transport agency’s service for movement of goods from ICD to port and thereby he
is liable to pay service tax under the reverse charge mechanism, he is eligible
to claim exemption from service tax under this Notification as he is otherwise
also eligible for the refund of the service tax paid on such services used for
the exported goods.

 

5. Procedure for claiming refund :

5.1 Is there a prescribed format for lodging a claim of
refund ?

No specific form is prescribed in Notification No. 41/2007-ST
for claiming refund on the lines of Form R prescribed by the Government u/s.11B
of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or Form A under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit
Rules, 2004 (CCR). In the scenario, an exporter may follow the format of Form A
for submission of the claim of refund, as the details under the said format
would serve the purpose of the claim of refund to be made under this
Notification also.

 

5.2 Where to submit the application of refund ?

à
A manufacturer exporter is required to submit the application with the
Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise having jurisdiction over the
factory where the goods are manufactured.

à
A merchant exporter is required to submit the application with the Assistant
Deputy Commissioner who has jurisdiction over the registered office of the
merchant exporter.

 

5.3 What procedure is prescribed to be followed when an
exporter is not registered ?

à
The exporter, whether a merchant or a manufacturer who is not registered under
Central Excise or Service Tax authority is required to file a declaration in the
prescribed form (provided in the Notification) with the respective
jurisdictional Assistant/Deputy Commissioner prior to filing a claim for refund
of service tax under this Notification and obtain a Service Tax Code — (STC)
number which would be granted within seven days from the date of submission of
the said Declaration Form.

 

5.4 Is there a time limit for filing a claim of
refund ?

5.4.1 The refund claim is required to be filed on quarterly basis within 6 months from the end of the relevant calendar quarter during which the goods are exported. The earlier time limit was 60 days. However, from 18-11-2008 the time limit is amended to 6 months vide Notification No. 32/2008-ST.

5.4.2 Although the Notification does not clarify or provide definition of ‘quarter’, the Service Tax Rules, 1994 provide for quarter as a calendar quarter, like January to March, July to September, etc.

5.4.3 The exports will be regarded to have been made on the date on which the Customs appraising officer has permitted clearance and loading of the goods in accordance with S. 51 of the Customs Act, 1962. The officer issues an order known as ‘let export order ‘.

(Note: One should not consider the actual date of export or the date of sailing of vessel as the ‘date of export’. The date of ‘let export order’ is the date of export. Therefore, while claiming refund, the relevant quarter may be decided considering the date of the ‘let export order’.
 
6. Documents required to be enclosed with the claim of refund:

6.1 Documents substantiating export of goods and other relevant details:

Documents such as ARE-1 duly endorsed by the Customs authorities, copy of shipping bill, non-negotiable copy of bill of lading along with the copy of the export invoice, invoice of the provider of service, etc. should be submitted.

For each specified service, specific documentation is prescribed by the Government. Table at the end may be referred to for the same.

6.2 Documents evidencing payment of service tax to input service providers:

Invoice copies of service providers of specified services, along with proof of payment of the amount mentioned in invoices such as copies of bank statements or copy of challan in GAR-7 and/or receipt of the service provider, etc. should be enclosed with the claim of the refund.

  • In practice, it is observed that exports are effected through availing the services of custom house agents or freight forwarders – intermediaries. Therefore the specified service providers are paid by these agents or intermediaries. CHAs/intermediaries should be instructed to provide certificate of payment to specified service providers. Further, it should be ensured to follow practice of providing reference of shipping bill number on the invoice issued by service providers. In case of port services and transportation services of rail and road, the notification does not provide requirement of bills to be in the name of exporters. However, the proof of specified service used for export goods would have to be provided. Therefore photo-copies of invoices of specified service providers bearing shipping bill reference should be obtained to the extent possible in order to avoid rejection of the claim for want of proof.

  • Copy of agreement entered into by the exporter with the buyer wherever applicable i.e., in cases when refund is conditional upon mention of requirement of the specified service in the written agreement.


6.3 Category of service of the service provider:

Since refund is eligible only  in case of specified services, the exporter may ensure to obtain invoice with category of service written on it or obtain proof of payment like copy of GAR-7 challan or copy of registration certificate of the service provider.

7. Recoverability of Refund:

If the exporter has not been able to realise sale proceeds for exported goods within stipulated period under FEMA 1999 including any extension of the period, service tax refunded shall be recoverable, treating the recovery as service tax erroneously refunded. Under FEMA (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations 2000, export sale proceeds have to be realised within six months from the date of exports. However, in case of certified status holder exporters, 100% EOUs, and units under STPs BTP schemes, etc. realisation and repatriation is permissible up to twelve months. Under certain circumstances this limit is further extended by RBI.Therefore, if proceeds are not realised within this time limit, then only recovery provisions would be invoked.

8. Some issues:

8.1 X, a merchant exporter has not filed claim of refund for the quarter ended December 2008. The stipulated time limit under Notification No. 41/ 2008-SThas been amended vide Notification No. 32/2008-ST from 60 days to six months. If X files his refund claim by the end of January 2009,he would be within the time limit of 6 months. However, if the Department contends that the amendment is prospective and corresponding to quarter ended September 2008,the time limit of 60 days under earlier dispensation of Notification only would apply. What remedy is left for X under the law?

8.1A The time limit of 60 days was revised to 6 months from 60 days vide Notification 32/2008-ST, dated 18-11-2008.The amendment was made prior to the expiry of 60 days from the end of September 2008 i.e., before November 30, 2008. Therefore, the case can be argued both ways. If the claim is rejected by the Department, the case of the exporter is fairly arguable on the following grounds:

  • The time limit has been revised, considering genuine hardship faced by the exporters as regards non-receipt of documents before 60 days, pendency remaining for payment of invoicing of input service provider on account of dispute, cash flow problem, etc. The beneficial amendment therefore may be interpreted liberally and not strictly.

  • Procedural lapses are often condoned if substantive compliance is made. Reliance can be made in the case of IN RE Barot Exports, 2006 (2003)ELT 321 (GOI), where it was held that substantive benefit be given by condoning non mandatory procedural provisions. Similarly,in the case of Cotfab Exports, 2006 (20S)ELT107 (GOI), it was held that procedural infractions of Notification/Circulars be condoned if exports have taken place.

8.2 ABC Exports Ltd. filed its refund claim within the prescribed time limit of 60 days for Y.E. September 30, 2008.However, the documents enclosedwith the claim evidencing export of goods and payment of service tax were found inadequate by the Department. Whether the Department can rejectthe refund claim on the ground of inadequate evidence?

8.2A The Department generally would issue a show-cause notice and point out deficiencies in the claim lodged therein. Following the principle of natural justice, the Department is required to issue a show-cause notice and provide opportunity to the claimant to present his reasons for not attaching the required documents with the claim. If other compliances are found bona fide, the claim could be entertained with/without modifications in the amount claimed if deficiency is made good by filing documents not attached with the claim. If no opportunity is granted, the claimant has a remedy under the law to file an appeal.

To overcome this difficulty of not being able to provide all relevant enclosures within 60 days, the time limit has been extended to six months, which is reasonable for any exporter to make available the required documents. However, the point is that if the entire claim of refund and export is genuine, depending on the facts of each case, the refund claim if rejected could be fought out.

8.3 Classification of service:

AB Exporters Ltd. filed a claim of refund under Notification No. 41/2007-ST for its exported goods in respect of service tax paid on port services, trans-port of goods by rail, etc. However, the steamer agent of the shipping line and/or freight forwarders have charged service tax under the nomenclature of Terminal Handling Charges (THC). Their service providers have paid service tax for this service under ‘business support service’ which is not specified in Notification No. 41/2007-ST. Is there a solution for this difficulty?

8.3A This is the difficulty faced by the entire fraternity of exporters, as most of the exporters ship their goods through a freight forwarder or a custom house agent acting as a freight forwarder who books cargo space for the shipper. Although THC consists of port levies, CONCOR charges and laC road transportation service, the services are obtained through intermediaries. Therefore, the intermediary’s service cannot be classified under the respective taxing entry specified in the Notification. The exporter i.e., user of the service on its own accord cannot change the classification. This principle was followed in the case of CCE v. Courtlaulds Packaging (I) Ltd., 2007) 217 ELT 399 (Tri.-Mum). However, the difficulty faced by AB Exporters Ltd. does not appear to get addressed for now, as in practice, most of the goods are exported through intermediaries and therefore the benefit intended to be provided may remain on paper only.

An insight into Draft Point of Taxation Rules

1.
Introduction :

Given the fact
that frequent change in the rate of tax on services over a period of time has
caused confusion and uncertainty both among tax officers and assessees as to
the criteria based on which the tax may be levied, the Government has decided
to provide framework to determine point of taxation in different situations by
publishing Draft Point of Taxation (for Services Provided or Received in India)
Rules, 2010 (the POT Rules). The said POT Rules are also accompanied by a
preamble letter and Explanatory Notes on the POT Rules. The Government has
clearly expressed that the proposed rules are meant to provide the regulatory
framework and clarity to determine point of taxation whenever there is a change
in the rate of service tax. Similar difficulty is faced in determining point of
tax in the cases of continuous services. The taxable event under the law takes
place on provision of service. However, the liability to pay service tax
currently arises only on the receipt of the payment. In the POT Rules, there is
a shift proposed by providing a link to the payment of tax with raising of
invoice or payment for service provided or to be provided or provision of
service, whichever is occurring earlier. According to the Government, the
current rule allowing payment of tax on receipt basis does not fall in line
with the Central Excise law and the VAT laws of the states of India. In both
these cases, the payment is required to be made on accrual basis i.e., on the
event of clearance of goods in the case of former and issue of invoice in the
case of latter and that Goods and Service Tax (GST) which is in the offing is
likely to follow this practice. Thus, the proposed POT Rules appear to be a
precursor to GST, which is likely to be implemented in April, 2011.

2. Taxable
event and point of taxation :

In any fiscal
legislation, specific provisions exist for charge of tax and collection of tax.
Under the service tax law, the charge of tax is created by S. 66 of the Finance
Act, 1994 (the Act) on prescribed taxable services. ‘Taxable Service’ is
defined as a service provided or to be provided. Therefore when a service is
provided or agreed to be provided, there takes place the taxable event. As
against this, the POT Rules seek to define ‘taxable event’ as the event which
causes the tax liability to arise, namely, the provision of service, issuance
of invoice or the receipt of payment. The events of issuance of invoice and
receipt of payment are deemed as provision of service under a fiction proposed
to be created under the law. When an invoice is issued or payment is received
prior to providing the service by a service provider, the service would be
deemed to be provided at the time the invoice was issued or the payment was
received, whichever occurred earlier and the liability to pay tax would arise
at this point. Referring now to the collection of service tax, currently Rule
6(1) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 provides that service tax liability arises
when payment for taxable services Is received. In the POT Rules however, ‘Point
of Taxation’ is defined to mean the point of time when the tax becomes payable
to the Government. Thus, the POT Rules have proposed to shift the point of
taxation away from the receipt of payment for the service to either at the time
of provision of service or the issuance of invoice for the service or the receipt
of payment, based on various situations as envisaged in the Rules, but
essentially on the concept of accrual rather than solely on the receipt of
payment.

3. Key
features :

3.1 The POT
Rules essentially provide framework to determine the point of taxation mainly
under the following situations :

à When any advance payment is received towards any
taxable service.

à When there is a change in the rate of tax with regard
to existing taxable service whether exempt or otherwise and there is a
difference in date and timing of provision of
service, raising of invoice and date of receipt of payment.

à When there is a change in the rate of tax with regard
to service which is taxed for the first time.

à When there is a continuous supply of a service or a
service provided on a long-term basis.

à When there is a transaction between associated
enterprises.

à In case of royalty and similar payments.

3.2 Advances
towards taxable services :

Under Rule 4,
the point of tax for advances is dealt with. It provides that service tax is to
be paid on the date of receipt of the advance towards provision of a taxable
service and the rate applicable would be the rate prevailing at the time of
receipt of such advance. Thus, the tax payment under this rule falls in line
with the basic principle underlying the provisions in the POT Rules that the
tax payment is linked to the issuance of invoice or receipt of payment,
whichever is earlier. The Government in its explanatory note in this regard has
clarified that once the tax is charged on the payment, the determination of tax
would be final. Further, it is expressly provided in the rule that no tax is to
be paid on interest-free refundable deposits.

3.3 Change in
rate of tax – Existing services :

Rule 5 seeks to
determine the point of taxation where there is a change in the rate of tax as
regards existing taxable services whether exempt or otherwise and there is a
difference of time between provision of service, raising of invoice and the
time of receipt of payment of taxable service. Table 1 sets out the
determination of point of taxation under the said rule.

 The principle followed in the above rule is that when two points of taxation have occurred, the ear-lier of the two would be the point of taxation.

3.4 Introduction of new services in the tax net :

Table
2

Sr.

Provision

Issue of

Receipt of

Point of

No.

of service

invoice

payment

taxation

 

 

 

for service

 

 

 

 

 

 

(i)

Before the

Irrelevant

Irrelevant

No tax

 

date of

 

 

 

 

new levy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(ii)

Irrelevant

Before

Before

No tax

 

when

the date

the date

 

 

provided

of new

of new

 

 

 

levy

levy

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iii)

After the

After the

Before

No tax

 

date of

date of

the date

 

 

new levy

levy but

of new

 

 

 

within 14

levy

 

 

 

days of

 

 

 

 

receipt of

 

 

 

 

payment

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rule 6 provides for determination of point of taxation when a service is brought in the tax net for the first time. Refer Table 2. This rule however does not apply to services provided on a continuous or long-term basis. (Rule 7 deals with services supplied continuously or for a long duration of time.)

3.5 Continuous supply of services :

Sr.

Provision of service

Issue of invoice

Receipt of payment

Point of taxation

No.

 

 

for service

 

 

 

 

 

 

(i)

Before change

After change

After change

Date of invoice or payment,

 

in rate

in rate

in rate

whichever is earlier

 

 

 

 

 

(ii)

Before change

Before change

Within 30 days of

Date of invoice*

 

in rate

in rate

invoice date

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iii)

After change

Before change

After change

Date of payment

 

in rate

in rate

in rate

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iv)

After change

Before change

Before change

Date of payment or invoice,

 

in rate

in rate

in rate

whichever is earlier

 

 

 

 

 

Continuous supply of services is defined to mean services supplied under a contract for a period exceeding six months or services as specified by the Government to be in continuous supply. The proposed Rule 7 provides that the rate of tax would be the rate applicable on the date of payment becoming due in terms of the contract irrespective of whether or not payment is received or invoice is raised. If the payment becomes due on completion of any milestone in terms of the contract, the date of completion of such milestone is the point of taxation. If the contract does not contain any clause for date of payment or mile-stone, the service tax is required to be paid on raising of invoice or receipt of payment, which occurs earlier.

It is further provided that when the service supplied continuously is covered under this rule is introduced for the first time in law, no service tax is required to be paid on payments received prior to service becoming taxable, even if the service is provided subsequently. The Government has clarified that in case of ongoing contracts of construction, the tax is liable to be paid on the basis of raising of invoice or the date provided for payment in the contract or the actual date of payment, as the case may be. When payment for construction is received prior to applicability of service tax and commencement of construction occurs after the levy coming into force, no service tax would be levied on such payments made prior to the applicable date.

3.6 Services provided to associated enterprises:

In case of transactions with associated enterprises, Rule 8 has provided that the relevant date is the date of debit or credit in the books of account or issuance of debit or credit note or the date of payment, which is earlier.

3.7  Royalty and similar payments:

As regards royalties and similar payments where the whole amount of consideration for service is not ascertainable at the time of performance of service and subsequently the use or the benefit of these services by a person other than the supplier gives rise to any payment of consideration, Rule 9 has provided that the service would be deemed to be provided at the time of each payment is made or invoice is raised, which is earlier.

    At the end:

While the attempt of the Government to introduce framework of POT Rules should be regarded as a welcome step since it is done with the basic objective of addressing some of the prevailing certainty and open issues under the current dispensations of law, there exists certain aspects which appear to add to complexity and difficulty of implementation. For instance :

    As aforesaid, currently the charging S. 66 of the Act determines the taxable event and which is ‘provision of a service’. To redefine this rudimentary aspect of the fiscal statute under the rules proposed to be issued in exercise of the powers conferred u/s.94(2) of the Act seem to be going beyond the Finance Act, 1994 and to this extent, re-consideration of this very fundamental aspect appears necessary.

    The objective of the Government as indicated in the preamble letter and Explanatory Notes is to specify point of taxation as the date of raising of invoice, provision of service or receipt of payment, whichever is earlier, whereas the POT Rules have dealt with only specific conflicting situations and not the remaining or residuary situation/s. If the point at which the service provider should pay tax is changed, it is not indicated whether the existing Rule 6(1) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 would be amended consequent upon the proposed POT Rules coming into force. Or else, is it to be contended that the point of taxation except in the case of specified situations, would be still the time of receipt of payment? In any case, the proposed rules should be consistent with the provisions of the Service Tax Rules 1994, existing or suitably amended.

    Provision of multiple parameters under different situations if introduced without modification, is likely to pose a serious challenge in implementation as Rules 5, 6 and 7 are complex and keeping a track of all the three events viz. provisions of service, raising of invoice and receipt of payment under any of these rules is a huge task for businesses after understanding and interpreting the said rules.

    The POT Rules have not dealt with a situation when services are provided from outside India i.e., when reverse charge mechanism operates u/s.66A of the Act. Specific consideration for this also appears necessary.

    Rule 4 provides that interest-free refundable deposit would not attract service tax. Does this mean that when interest is payable on a refundable deposit, the tax is payable? If intention is not so, suitable change is required on this issue.

    The class of service providers in India is not analogical to that of manufacturing units or VAT dealers. There could be tremendous cash flow issue for a number of service providers when one is required to pay at the point of raising of invoice or provision of service which may result in delay in compliance of law followed by penal action and litigation. Further, the POT Rules as proposed are silent over the treatment of non-payment for services or bad debts, cancellation of invoice, discounts, etc. Similarly, in the current scenario also, there already exists the issue of availability of CENVAT credit (in terms of existing CENVAT Credit Rules) when service tax is paid on advances. If multiple taxable events as proposed are introduced, well-thought out consequential amendments in CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 also would be required. Further, one could envisage a chaotic condition while taking CENVAT credit as complexity in record maintenance would also arise again resulting in litigation.

Since the Government has invited public comments on the Draft POT Rules before September 01, 2010, it can be hoped that major creases would be ironed out if the Government is keen on notifying the Rules. As a matter of fact, since GST is soon likely to be a reality, it would be a better proposition to implement broad-based rules along with GST rather than half-baked rules as precursor to GST, which may only worsen the already uncertain scenario.

Part B : Some Recent Judgments

    High Court :

1. Penalty :

Whether penalty u/s.76 can be reduced below the limit prescribed.

Commissioner of C.Ex. & Customs v. Port Officer, 2010 (19) STR 641 (Guj.)

The short issue before the High Court was whether penalty u/s.76 could be reduced below the mini-mum limit.

The High Court observed as follows :

    a. As per S. 76, a person who failed to pay tax, shall in addition to tax and interest, pay penalty for such failure. The penalty shall not be less than Rs.100 per day to Rs.200 per day during which failure continues, but the penalty shall not exceed the service tax not paid.
There is no provision in the Section to provide the authority with any discretion to reduce the penalty below the limit prescribed.

    b. S. 80 overrides provisions of S. 76, S. 77, S. 78, and S. 79, which state that if the assessee proves that there is reasonable cause for failure, no penalty can be imposed. The provision does not state that even upon establishment of reasonable cause, reduced quantum of penalty is imposable.

On combined reading of S. 76 and S. 80, it appears that the penalty cannot be reduced below the limit prescribed.

    2. Classification of service:

Whether services provided by a consignment agent can be taxed as Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s service?

Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Sangam Investments, 2010 (19) STR 650 (Kar.)

The Tribunal passed an order that services provided as a consignment agent were not covered under the category of C & F service based on Tribunal’s decision in Mahavir Generics case 2006 (3) STR 276 (Tri. -Del) which ultimately got reversed vide 2010 (17) STR 225 (Kar). In the Rev-enue’s appeal, the Court held that the definition of C & F agent includes consignment agent and therefore the assessee is liable for tax.

    3. Constitutional validity : Renting of immoveable property:

Whether service tax can be recovered in respect of renting of immovaeble property when the Constitutional validity is challenged in the High Court.

Infiniti Retail Ltd. v. Union of India, 2010 (19) STR 801 (Bom.)

The constitutional validity of levy of service tax on renting of immoveable property was stayed by the High Court. In this regard the Court held that the Department shall not take coercive steps for recovery of service tax in respect of renting of immovaeble property. However, since the constitutional validity of levying service tax on ‘any other service in relation to such renting’ was not challenged, the High Court held that the Department could recover service tax from the service provider.

    4. Import of service:

Whether foreign service provider liable to tax before introduction of Import Rules.

Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Toyoda Iron Works Co. Ltd., 2010 (19) STR 802 (Kar.)

The respondent, a foreign company, entered into agreement with an Indian company for providing consultancy/technical assistance and transfer of technical know -how relating to the manufacture of automobile components to the Indian company. The Revenue taxed such services under the category of ‘Consulting Engineer Service’. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the respondent was not liable to service tax. CESTAT dismissed the Departmental appeal.

The High Court held that the definition of ‘Consulting Engineer Service’ was amended w.e.f. 1-5-2006 and charge of service tax on service received from outside India (S. 66A) was amended w.e.f. 18-4-2006. Therefore, only from the date of aforesaid amendments, service receiver would be liable for tax and the foreign company being a service provider was not liable for service tax prior to the amendment i.e., for the period in question, 1-4-1999 till 31-3-2001.

    5. Relevant date for applying rate of tax:

Whether applicable rate will be the rate prevailing on the date of provision of service or one prevailing at the time of billing and/or receipt of payment?

Commissioner of C.Ex. & Cus. v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2010 (19) STR 807 (Guj.)

The Tribunal had held that service tax shall be payable at the rate prevailing on the date of provision of service and not at the rate prevailing at the time of billing and receipt of payment. The Revenue challenged this order before the High Court. The Court held that the relevant date is the date of provision of service and not the date of billing. The appeal accordingly was dismissed.

    II. Tribunal:

    6. Construction Service:

Whether construction of road liable for service tax as commercial or industrial construction service?

Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. Shilpa Constructions Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (19) STR 830 (Tri. Ahmd.)

The respondent filed a refund claim with regard to service tax wrongly paid for the construction of road which was not included in the definition of ‘Commercial and Industrial Construction’. However, the Department rejected the refund claim which was allowed in the appeal. Therefore, the Department preferred an appeal before the CESTAT.

The respondent contended that the term ‘drive-way work’ used in the agreement was in relation to road work and the respondent was not en-gaged in any other work. In respect of construction of road, service tax is required to be paid only if it is covered under a single contract of construction of commercial complex in terms of Circular No. B1/6/2005-TRU, dated July 27, 2005. Since the respondent did not collect such service tax from client, the doctrine of unjust enrichment did not apply to it. Invoices and chartered accountant’s certificate were produced as proof.

According to the Department, the exclusion of roads from the definition of ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ was to facilitate general public in the public interest and ‘driveway work’ could not be equated with road and therefore the stated Circular was not applicable. The Tribunal held that road constructed for public utility or not, was not the determining factor and held that construction of ‘driveway work’ amounted to construction of road and therefore, not liable for service tax.

    7. CENVAT credit:

Whether CENVAT credit can be availed on garden maintenance service and repairs of deep freezer installed in canteen.

Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex., Pune-III 2010 (19) STR 823 (Tri.-Mumbai)

The appellants cited certain cases wherein it was held that the service provider is entitled to CENVAT credit on garden maintenance service which is used in or in relation to the manufacture of the final products or used in the business activity. In the present case, the appellants have used the garden maintenance service in relation to business activity.

The Revenue presented some contrary decisions and requested for referring the matter to a larger bench. The Tribunal observed that the cases referred by the Department were either not similar to the present case or were remanded back to the Tribunal by the High Court and therefore did not find it necessary to refer the matter to a larger bench. Following the Semco Electricals decision 2010 (18) STR 177 and I.S.M.T. Ltd.’s decision 2010 TIOL 27 CESTAT-MUM, the appeal was allowed.

    8. Penalty:

Whether penalty could be imposed in case there is ignorance for payment of tax.

J. K. Industries v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad 2010 (19) STR 653 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The facts of the case were:

The appellant, a consignment agent obtained service tax registration in the year 1999 and did not pay service tax till March, 2004 as they could not collect it from the recipient. The premises of the appellant were searched and liability was envisaged. The appellant demanded the amount of service tax from the recipient, which they agreed to pay only after 4-1-2005 and not for earlier period.

The appellant paid service tax from its own pocket before passing of order of adjudication.

The Tribunal held that correspondence between the appellant and the principal supports the case that there was no intention to evade payment of tax. Moreover, the appellant paid tax before any order was passed by the authority. Therefore, the Tribunal ordered for waiver of penalty.

    9. Non-registration-Penalty:
Whether not taking registration amounts to suppression of facts attracting levying penalty.

Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. Pankaj Tyre Retreads, 2010 (19) STR 829 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

The respondent was in the business of tyre retreading which was considered by them as ‘Maintenance or Repair Services’ by reason of amendment with effect from June 16, 2005 and they held a bona fide belief that the threshold limit of Rs.4,00,000 was applicable only in relation to service element and the turnover of material used or sold while providing service was not required to be included for calculating such limit. The Department contended that the respondent did not take registration w.e.f. June 16, 2005 and the registration was taken only after search of premises by the Department and it amounted to suppression of facts attracting penalty. The Tribunal held that mere non- registration could not amount to suppression of facts and that there was a reasonable cause as depicted in S. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 and accordingly the appeal was allowed.

Share Transfer Agency Service

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II. Tribunal :




12. Share Transfer Agency Service :



Karvy Consultants Ltd. v. CCE, Hyderabad, 2008 (10) STR
166 (Trib.-Bang)

â Service tax was
demanded on the activity of the appellant of Registrar and Share Transfer Agency
treating the same as Business Auxiliary Service. Relying on the ratio of
decision in the case of Sathguru Management Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. CCE, Hyderabad
2007 (7) STR 654, which in turn had relied on the decision in the case of CCE
v. Ankit Consultancy Ltd.,
2007 (6) STR 101 (Trib. Del) wherein it was held
that Share Transfer Agency and Registrar Services were not covered as Business
Auxiliary Services prior to 1-5-2006 (when a separate category for Share
Transfer Agency was notified), the appeal was allowed.

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Self-adjustment of excess payment

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II. Tribunal :


11. Self-adjustment of excess payment :



M/s. Narnolia Securities P. Ltd. v. CST, Ranchi, (2008
TIOL 538 CESTAT-Kol.]

â The appellant had
paid service tax on behalf of four other service providers and later came to
know that service providers had also paid taxes separately, adjusted the same
against subsequent payment.


The Revenue contended that Rule 6(3) did not permit this.


It was held the appellant’s contention that they were under
genuine belief that such adjustment was permissible under Rule 6(3) as ST-3
returns filed disclosed such adjustments which confirmed the bona fides
of the appellant. The Tribunal stated that the Department has at no stage
advised the appellant to claim a refund for excess payment, instead of making
adjustments on their own and that such adjustments are not permitted by Rule
6(3). Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, a lenient view was
taken.

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Port Service

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II. Tribunal :


10. Port Service :


Stevedoring whether a port service and transport charge
incurred by CHA — whether taxable ?



Kin-ship Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE–Cochin, [2008
TIOL 584 CESTAT Bang.]

â CHA licensed to
undertake stevedoring activity at Cochin port was asked to pay service tax
considering the activity as Port Service. Relying on the decisions in the cases
of Homa Engineering Works v. CCE Mumbai, 2006 (1) STR 19 (Tri.-Mum),
New Mangalore Port Trust v. CST, Bangalore
, 2006 (4) STR 448 (Trib.-Bang),
Velji P. & Sons (Agencies) P. Ltd. v. CCE, Bhavnagar, 2007 (8) STR 236
(Tri.-Ahmedabad), the issue being no longer res integra was not
considered as Port Service. Secondly, since the said CHA charged transport
charge separately in its bills, the same was treated as reimbursable expense and
demand was set aside.

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Part A — Taxability of sovereign activities

Part A — Summons proceedings

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1. General :

(a) Central
Excise Officers (CEOs) who are empowered by the Central Government, can issue
summons in terms of S. 14(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1994 (CEA). The said
Section has been made applicable for Service Tax. A text of S. 14 of CEA is
reproduced hereafter for reference :


S. 14 — Power to summon persons to give evidence and
produce documents in inquiries under this Act.



(1) Any Central Excise Officer duly empowered by the
Central Government in this behalf, shall have power to summon any person
whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to
produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer is
making for any of the purposes of this Act. A summons to produce documents
or other things may be for the production of certain specified documents or
things or for the production of all documents or things of a certain
description in the possession or under the control of the person summoned.

(2) All persons so summoned shall be bound to attend,
either in person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct; and
all persons so summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject
respecting which they are examined or make statements and to produce such
documents and other things as may be required :

Provided that the exemptions u/s.132 and u/s.133 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall be applicable to
requisitions for attendance under this Section.

(3) Every such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be
a ‘judicial proceeding’ within the meaning of S. 193 and S. 228 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).

 


(b) CEOs of the rank of Superintendent and above are
empowered to issue summons [Notification 9/99 — CE (NT) dated 10-2-1999.] These
powers of ‘summons’ are different than the powers of Courts to issue summons
under the Code of Civil Procedure/Criminal Procedure Code. The power of
‘summons’ to investigating officer only means ‘demand presence of’ or ‘call upon
a person to appear’. The investigation officer cannot administer oath to the
person being interrogated.

 

© CEOs issuing summons have powers to call for attendance,
documents/records and record statements. They have absolutely no powers to
demand any tax.

 

(d) As per S. 174 of the Indian Penal Code, non-attendance in
obedience of an order from public servant, is an offence punishable with
imprisonment up to 6 months and fine up to Rs.1,000. Hence, whenever a summons
is issued to any person, proper attendance should be ensured to avoid penal
consequences.

 

2. Summons/Inquiry proceedings — Few general judicial pronouncements :

(a) Summons and show-cause notices issued during inquiry are
not challengeable when assessee has responded to summons and show-cause notice [L.M.L.
Limited v. AC,
(1997) 90 ELT 43 (All.)]

 

(b) Duties of the interrogating officer and of the party
summoned — The party should make himself available as directed for interrogation
and should answer the questions put to him — But he cannot be asked not to take
recourse to the plea of failure of memory and to give answers which must be
direct and not evasive — He cannot be directed to compulsorily rake up his
memory and give replies only in negatives or affirmatives — The officer
interrogating him should record faithfully in whatever manner or way the party
responds to the questions and can well make his own observations pertaining to
the demeanor of the party — [Ajit Jain v. Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence, New Delhi
, (1998) 102 ELT 521 (SC)]

 

© Inquiry and investigation — Summons not vitiated by
non-mention of nature of investigation therein (since that may alert the persons
concerned to manipulate their records or abscond), nor does non-striking of the
words ‘and/or’ in the summons show lack of application of mind on the part of
the issuing officer, since preliminary inquiry is usually both for purposes of
submission of specified documents and recording of statement of the person
summoned — Authority not required to come to a finding regarding nexus of the
said documents or involvement of any particular person just at the commencement
of inquiry — [TTV Dinakaran v. Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate,
(1995) 80 ELT 745 (Mad.)]

(d) In the absence of any material indicating arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power by authority, it is not within power of Judicial
review to comment on summons issued on the presumption that summons have been
issued for some ulterior purpose —[Annapurna Impex Pvt. Ltd. V. UOI,
(2006) 198 ELT 25 (P& H)]

(e) Writ jurisdiction — Alternative remedy of appeal is not
applicable to the summons issued u/s.14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as they
do not fall in the category of ‘order’ or ‘decision’ — S. 35 of the Central
Excise Act and Article 226 of the Constitution of India — [Hindustan Safety
Glass Works Ltd. V. AC,
(1985) 21 ELT 38 (All.)]

3. Summons for documents :

(a) Summons for producing documents should specify which
documents are required. Authority issuing summons should apply their mind with
regard to necessity to obtain and examine documents mentioned in the order. —
[In Barium Chemicals v. AJ Rana — AIR 1972 SC 591, summons was set aside,
on ground of vagueness.]

(b) A person is bound to produce all useful and relevant
documents asked. [In UOI v. Telco, (1997) 96 ELT 209 (SC), it has been
held that the Assistant Commissioner is entitled to call for and examine
whatever documents he considers relevant. [e.g., records of sale prices
at the regional sales offices while determining factory gate prices].

4. Recording of statements during summons proceedings :

a) Statements can be recorded during enquiry in pursuance of summons. It should be recorded be-fore Gazetted Officer. [Superintendent is the lowest rank of Gazetted Officer in Excise Department. Inspector is not a Gazetted Officer]. Such statements can be used against a person during any legal proceedings.

b) Statements should be in writing and signed by the maker as it safeguards interests of the maker as well as the Department, and eliminates the possibsity of making a complaint subsequently that the statement was not correctly recorded by the authorities. [CO Sampath Kumar v. Enforcement Officer, 96 ELT 511 (SC)]

c) CEO cannot compel a person to give incriminating statement without reasonable, fair and just procedure. Statement should be voluntary and not under threat.

In C. Sampath Kumar v. Enforcement Officer, (1998) ELT 511 (SC), it was held that administration of caution to the person summoned that not making – a truthful statement would be an offence cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as use c pressure to extract the statement. Such a caution has-statutory backing and is in fact in the interest of the person making the statement.

In K. L. Pavunny v. ACCE, (1997) 90 ELT241 (SC) (SC 3-Member Bench), where the accused was informed that law requires him to tell the truth and if he does not tell the truth, he may be prosecuted u/s.193 of IPC for giving false evidence, it was held that the threat comes from the statute and not from the officer.

d) S. 14(2) of CEA specifically provides that all persons summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined and to produce such documents and other things as may be required.

e) U/s.164(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, a caution has to be given to the person making a statement that he is not bound to make the confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against him. However, S. 164 applies to judicial confession before a Magistrate and is not applicable’ to statements before Central Excise Officer as it is not a ‘confession’. [In ACCE v. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd., (2000) 120 ELT 280 (SC), it was held that S. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not applicable to statement recorded by CEO.]

f) A person  whose  statement  is recorded  during the  enquiry has  no  right to have a copy  of his statement on the spot. As per the department instructions also, these need not be given on the spot.

In the case under FERA viz. K. T. Advani v. State, (1987) 30 ELT 390 (Del.), it was held that the person has no right to get copies of his statement at the stage of investigation. However, he can keep a note statement that he makes.

However, he is entitled to get a copy of statement at the time of issue of show-cause notice, or otherwise in cases where the statement is proposed to be used against such person.

If the statements are used and orders are passed, without giving notice to the concerned parties, the same vitiates the proceedings, and cannot be used against the person concerned. [Charan Metal Corporation v. CCE, (1998) 98 ELT 588 (All.)]

In a Customs case, authorities had relied upon the statement made by the appellant at the time of ‘.earch and seizure in order to reject his case, but his request for copy of the statement and inspection of records was not granted. It was held that Customs authorities were not justified to rely upon certain alleged discrepancies in that statement to reject the appellant’s contention. [Ambal Lal v. UOI, (1983) 13 ELT 1321 (sq]

g) In Poolpandi v. Superintendent,  C Ex, 60 ELT 24 (sq (SC 3-Member Bench) it has been held that person being interrogated is not an accused, nor can he plead that there is a possibility of his being made an accused in future. Hence, he has no right to ask for lawyer’s presence during the enquiry / questionitg.

However, the interrogating officer may permit presence of authorised person.

h) As per S. 14(3) of CEA, proceedings after the summons are ‘judicial proceedings’ within the meaning of S. 193 and S. 228 of the Indian Penal Code. As per S. 193 of IPC, giving false evidence is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years 1ind fine. U / s.228 of IPC, intentional insult or causing interruption to any public servant while such servant is at any stage of judicial proceedings shall be punishable with imprisonment up to six months or with fine up to Rs.l,000or both.

i) Even if duty liability is admitted by officers while making a statement, it does not mean a company cannot challenge duty liability. There cannot be estoppel in matters of taxation. [Dodsal P. Ltd. v. CCE, (2006) 193 ELT 518 (CESTAT) – Mumbai]

5. Confessions made in statements, retractions and related matters:

a) When a confession made in a statement is retracted, the burden is on the person making the statement to prove that confession was made under threat and only if the said person is able to prove that it was not voluntary, then the onus shifts on the Revenue to prove that it was voluntary. [ACC v. Govindasamy Ragupathy, (1998) 98 ELT 50 (Mad.)]

b) Burden is on the person making the statement to prove that the statement was obtained by threat, duress, or promise like any other person. [BFlagwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 214.]

c) Any retracted confessional statement is inadmissible in evidence u/ s.24 of the Indian Evidence Act. The relevant text of Section is reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

“24 Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding. A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceeding against him.”

d) The Supreme Court has laid down certain general rules about the nature of corroboration needed before accomplice evidence may be accepted. In this regard, reference can be made to Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1952 SCR 377.

e) It is well-settled law that confessional statement, when retracted at the first available opportunity, leads to the conclusion that it was not true and voluntary. [Shantilal Soni v. CC&CE, (1995) 78 ELT 151 (Delhi – Tribunal)]

f) When a confessional statement was retracted within seven days and the same was the sole basis of the Department’s case, the statement could not be called as having voluntary nature. [Bhagwandas Harjpal v. CC, (1995) 78 ELT 80 (Cal. Trib.)].

g) The fact that retraction was addressed to the same officer who recorded the statement, is no ground to reject the retraction. [Prempreet Textile Industries Ltd. v. CCE, (2001) 47 RLT 746 (T)]

h) The confessional statement retracted the next day cannot be the positive evidence in favour of the Department. [Rahat Hussain v. CC, Prev, (2001) 46 RLT 466 (T)]

i) Retracted confessional statement is not to be relied upon without independent and full corroboration. [State of Maharashtra v. Sayed Mohamed Mashim At Musavi, (1991) 51 ELT 41 (Born.)]

j) Confession is not important if retracted immediately. Retraction affects voluntary nature and truthfulness of confession and is to be considered while deciding a case. [Kali Charan Basant Lal v. CCE, (1989) 41 ELT 162 (Del. – Trib.)]

k) Written statement retraction communicated after five days was held as not very late. [Premier Soaps Detergents v. CCE, (1989) 40 ELT 197 (Del. –  Trib.)]

l) When the statements (which are subsequently retracted) are inconsistent with the documentary evidence, the documentary evidence is to be preferred. [Philip Fernandez v. CC, (2002) 146 ELT 180 (Mum. – Trib.)]

m) In Sevantilat Karsondas Modi v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 109 ELT 41 (SC), the confession consisted of a plea as the result of an assault on him by the Customs Officers, which had been denied by the officers; but because of the circumstances under which the confession was taken, it was held that the confession was hit by S. 24 of the Evidence Act and it was unsafe to treat the confession as voluntary and trustworthy.

6. Precautions required while making a statement:

Statements made before the CEO, in pursuance of summons proceedings, can be used as evidence in subsequent proceedings. Such statements could be valid even if retracted subsequently.

Hence, proper precautions should be taken by person making a statement, as to factual accuracy of information provided and correct legal position on questions asked, which have direct bearing on tax and related liabilities. It would be advisable to seek advice from consultants prior to making such statements by tactfully seeking sufficient time after ascertaining major issues involved in the matter on which specific statement is being sought.

7. Board  instructions on issue  of summons:

Based on practical experience, it is found that sumomons proceedings are often used as a means by the CEOs to cause undue harassment to the assessees. In this regard, the Ministry of Finance has issued important instructions (F No. 137/39 /2007-CX-4 dated 26-2-2007). Relevant text of the instructions is reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

1. It has come to the notice of the Board that on many occasions, merely for obtaining information or documents pertaining to Service Tax cases/matters, officers of field formations or intelligence agencies resort to issuance of sum-mons (U/s.14 of the Central Excise Act, as is made applicable in Service Tax cases u/s.83 of the Finance Act, 1994) to either Service Tax payers or to persons who are not registered with the Department. From the nature of information/ documents called for, it is clear that many times such information/ documents can easily be obtained by making a telephonic request or writing a simple letter to the person concerned. Instead, summons are issued in a routine manner, under the signature of super intendent or the senior intelligence officers (SIOs). The harsh and legal language of the summons not only causes unnecessary mental stress and embarrassment and instills fear ift the minds of the receiver, but may also become a source of harassment or even unethical practices. The Board has taken a serious note of this practice.

2. The undersigned is, therefore, directed to communicate the following directions of the Board for compliance, :

a) For calling for information/documents, normally the mode of communication should be either in the form of a telephone call or by way of sending a simple letter;

b) Issuance of summons should be resorted to, only when the above-mentioned modes of communications are found to be ineffective or are likely to jeopardise Revenue interest or when it is essential to ensure personal presence of the person concerned to tender evidence or record statement in connection with a Service Tax evasion case;

c) In cases mentioned under (b) above, the summons should be issued after obtaining prior written permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner with reasons for issuance of summons to be recorded in writing;

d) In case, for unavoidable operational reasons it is not possible to obtain such prior written permission, oral! telephonic permission from such officer must be obtained and the same should be reduced to writing and intimated to the officer according such permission at the earliest opportunity;

e) In all cases, where summons are issued, the officer who summons must submit a report on proceeding that took place during the presence of the taxpayer/person summoned, and the officer authorising issuance of summons must satisfy himself that no harassment has been caused during the visit of the person summoned to the office.

The above  are self-explanatory.



Part A: Services vis-à-vis Builders and Developers

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Service Tax

Background in brief :


Services in relation to construction activity are covered in
the service tax law under the three main categories of services in the Finance
Act, 1994 (the Act) viz.

Commercial or
industrial construction [S. 65(105)(zzq)]

Construction of
residential complex [S. 65(105)(zzzzh)]

Works contract service [S. 65(105)(zzzza)]

These taxing entries were introduced in the service tax law
at different times during 2004 to 2007.

A tremendous amount of controversy has been generated
recently on account of insertion of the following explanation in the sub-clause
(zzzzh) of S. 65(105) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2010 with effect from
1-7-2010 :

“Explanation — For the purposes of this sub-clause,
construction of a complex which is intended for sale, wholly or partly, by a
builder or any person authorised by the builder before, during or after
construction (except in cases for which no sum is received from or on behalf of
the prospective buyer by the builder or a person authorised by the builder
before the grant of completion certificate by the authority competent to issue
such certificate under any law for the time being in force} shall be deemed to
be service provided by the builder to the buyer.”

(A similar explanation is also inserted in sub-clause (zzq)
of the Act).

Consequent upon the Tribunal decision in the case of Daelim
Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2006 (3) STR 124 (Trib.-Del.) and later
dismissal of Special Leave Petition filed by the department against the above
decision, already a debate was generated as to whether or not construction
services provided under any works contract were at all liable for service tax
prior to 1-6-2007 i.e. at the time of introduction of works contract service in
the service tax law.

To add to this controversy, the Supreme Court’s decision in
the case of K. Raheja Development Corporation v. State of Karnataka, 2006 (3)
STR 337 (SC) and ruling of the Authority for Advance Rulings in Re : Hare
Krishna Developers 2008 (10) STR 341 (AAR) created a controversy as regards
service tax applicability to builder/developer in cases where construction was
undertaken by a builder for a prospective customer under an agreement for sale.
The issue remained contentious on account of various clarifications and judicial
pronouncements although it was almost settled when the Board issued a
clarification vide its Circular No. 108/2/2009-ST dated 29-1-2009 inter alia
that the activity of a builder amounted to ‘self service’ and would not be
subject to service tax.

However, with the insertion of the above explanation in the
two cited sub-sections of the Act, the issue has resurfaced with even greater
force. The Government vide its Circular DOF No. 334/1/2010-TRU dated 26-2-2010
clarified the nature, background and reasons for the imposition of service tax
on the activity of sale of unit of commercial/industrial or residential complex.
An extract from the same is reproduced below :

“8.5 These different patterns of execution, terms of payment
and legal formalities have given rise to confusion, disputes and discrimination
in terms of service tax payment.

8.6 In order to achieve the legislative intent and bring in
parity in tax treatment, an Explanation is being inserted to provide that unless
the entire payment for the property is paid by the prospective buyer or on his
behalf after the completion of construction (including its certification by the
local authorities), the activity of construction would be deemed to be a taxable
service provided by the builder/promoter/developer to the prospective buyer and
the service tax would be charged accordingly. This would only expand the scope
of the existing service, which otherwise remains unchanged”.

The insertion of the explanation in both the categories of
services of construction has given rise to a number of issues as the explanation
seemingly has created a deeming fiction whereby money received by a builder or
developer for units under construction is considered a receipt towards taxable
service of construction even though the money is received towards the sale of
such unit for the reasons stated in the above circular. Assuming for the time
being that builders are liable for service tax unless they have sold the fully
completed residential or commercial unit, some important issues that emerge in
the scenario are discussed below :

It is required to note that the scope of definitions of
taxable services is extended only in respect of commercial or industrial
construction and construction of residential complex and not in the definition
of ‘works contract’ which also specifically includes contracts for construction
of commercial/industrial buildings or civil structure and contracts for
construction of new residential complex. Therefore, the question that arises is
whether intentionally no explanation was inserted under the works contract
service based on the reasoning that contracts entered into by the builders with
flat purchases are not works contracts.

Whether construction service provided for personal use of
buyer is taxable on account of the new explanation ?

The definition of the term ‘residential complex’ in S. 65(91a) of the Act specifically excludes a complex which is constructed by a person directly engaging any other person for designing/planning/ construction and is intended for personal use as residence by such person. The definition further provides that personal use includes permitting use of such property as residence by another person on rent or even without consideration. At this point, it is also relevant to note that applying criterion of personal use, CBEC in a clarification provided in respect of construction contract awarded by Government to NBCC contended to the effect that the Government buying property for its personal use from a builder viz. NBCC, the transaction of sale would not be covered by service tax. If one extends the interpretation to the situation of buying property for one’s personal use from a developer/builder, isn’t it in the fitness of things to contend that every person buying a residential unit for ‘personal use’ in terms of the definition of ‘residential complex’ inherently falls out of the purview of service tax in terms of the definition of ‘residential complex’ itself? A clarification from CBEC would put to rest the uncertainty over the vital and contentious issue at least in the case of builders of residential units to a large extent. The issue however as to the units bought for other than personal use and commercial or industrial properties still would remain open.

On going contracts as on July 01, 2010:

As the deeming provision vide Explanation is effective from 1-7-2010, services provided from this date only would be leviable to service tax. In case of ongoing construction of buildings as on this date, the issue of calculation of service tax liability arises as a number of permutations and combinations of situations are possible; such as construction completed partially, construction completed but completion certificate not received, bookings made and advances received partially and of different amount, in respect of different units etc. Further complications may arise on account of receipt of full amount in case of completed construction in respect of some units and partial receipt in respect of other units in the same building as on 1-7-2010. Further, in the same complex, some units may be only partially completed as on 1-7-2010 and therefore service as well as payment of money would be completed only after 1-7-2010. The builders/developers therefore would require proper accounts and records to facilitate such bifurcation. Typically all civil contractors issue running bills but builders/developers do not issue ‘running bills’ on prospective buyers as they only book units or flats to be sold to prospective purchasers. However, in any scenario, the ‘taxable event’ arising only on provision of service. Therefore, services provided before 1-7-2010 are not liable for service tax in case of liability arising out of deeming provisions. To ascertain the extent and stage of completion, one may have to obtain a certificate from an architect or a chartered engineer. The explanation has referred to ‘authority competent to issue completion certificate’. Vide order No. 1/2010 dated 22-6-2010, the Government has issued Service Tax (Removal of Difficulty) order, 2010 whereby it is provided that besides any Government authority, the following persons are authorised to issue a completion certificate for the purposes of sub-clauses (zzq) and (zzzzh) of S. 65(105) of the Act:

  • Registered architect
  • Chartered engineer
  • Licensed surveyor

Any of the above persons thus may issue a completion certificate in respect of residential or commercial or industrial complex as a pre-condition for its occupation.

Service tax liability on advances:

When any advance is received towards a taxable service, service tax is liable to be paid. Accordingly, in normal course, advance received for services provided post July 01, 2010, the service tax liability would have arisen. However, Notification No. 36/2010 dated 28 -6-2010 has been issued to provide exemption to any amount of advance re-ceived prior to 1-7-2010 for various taxable services provided on or after 1-7-2010. The said Notification inter alia also applies to construction services in respect of residential and commercial/industrial construction services. Therefore, the entire sum of money received as advance from prospective purchasers towards any unit in a building by a builder or a developer prior to 1-7-2010 is not liable for service tax in case of construction services remaining pending to be provided in the period post 1-7-2010.

Valuation of element of ‘service’ for a builder/ developer:

Builders and developers have the options available under the law for determining their service tax liability.

  • Pay service tax at prevailing rate on 25% of the gross value received where the price of the land is included.

  • Pay service tax at prevailing rate on 33% of the gross value where the price of the land is not included.

[Note: In both the above options, while determining the ‘gross value’, value of goods and material supplied, provided or used is required to be added as per the condition laid down in Notification 1/2006-ST. Therefore, if the customer has supplied any material, its value will have to be added to the ‘gross value’ before working out 25% or 33% as the case may be. Further, no CENVAT credit is available, if any of the above options is selected].

  • Pay service tax at prevailing rate taking benefit of Notification 12/2003-ST of 20-6-2003 under which value of the goods sold/transferred would be completely excluded and exempted.

Whether constitutional validity of the provision challengeable?

The above deeming provision applicable to build-ers/developers was challenged by them before various High Courts. The Bombay High Court in the case of Maharashtra Chamber of Housing and Industry v. UOI, (2010 TIOL 526 HC Mum.-ST) granted an interim stay to the petitioners. The Madras High Court also granted an interim stay in the case of A. P. Ravi v. UOI, (2010 TIOL 604 HC Mad.-ST).

However, recently in the case of G. S. Promoters v. UOI, 2011 (21) STR 100, Punjab & Haryana High Court has pronounced its judgment and upheld the validity of the Explanation inserted in S. 65(105) (zzzzh) . In this case, the petitioner sought to declare the Explanation to S. (105)(zzzzh) of the Act and CBEC Circular No. 334/3/2010 -TRU dated 1-7-2010 as unconstitutional. According to the peti-tioner, the Explanation enlarged the scope of the levy beyond the concept of service by including therein sale. It was pleaded that sale and purchase was beyond the legislative competence of the Union legislature. If construction activity is not undertaken by a builder, then the builder cannot be considered to be a service provider in relation to services of construction activities. The petitioner relied upon the stay granted by the Bombay High Court on this issue. They also placed reliance on the decision in the case of Magus Construction P. Ltd. v. UOI, 2008 TIOL 321 HC wherein it was held that if construction activity is not undertaken by a builder, the builder cannot be considered a service provider of construction service.

The High Court did not accept the contentions of the petitioner and made the following observations:

  • Referring to the Supreme Court’s judgment in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners & Others 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC), it was observed that the Supreme Court has upheld the power of the Central Government to levy tax on services under Residuary Entry 92 of the Union List and that legal back-up was further provided by Article 268-A in the constitution vide the 88th Amendment in 2003.

  • On the scope of the legislative entry, it observed that “the entries in the lists being merely topics or fields of legislation, they must receive a liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not in a narrow pedantic sense.

  • The High Court took note of the fact that there was no challenge to the effect that there was any encroachment in the legislative power of the State legislature through the above amendment except the submission that there was element of sale which was sought to be taxed.

  • Relying on the decisions of State of Madras v. Gannon & Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 560, Imagic Creative P. Ltd. v. CCT, 2008 TIOL 04 SC VAT and Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Association v. UOI, 2004 (167) ELT 3 (SC), the High Court observed that service tax is a tax on service and not on a service provider. Quantification of tax should not be confused with the nature of tax and discussed at length on the aspects of ‘nature of tax’ and ‘measure of tax’.

  • The High Court distinguished the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Magus Constructions Pvt. Ltd. 2008 (11) STR 225 (Gauhati) by merely observing that the Circular dated 1-8-2006 issued by CBEC taken note of by the Single Member Bench of the Gauhati High Court would not apply when service recipient is a purchaser of flat. The levy of tax is on service and not on the service provider. Construction services are certainly provided even when a constructed flat is sold. Taxing of such transaction is not outside the purview of the Union legislature when it does not fall in any of the taxing entries of the State List.

In terms of the above observations made by the High Court, it was held that the contention that there is no element of service of construction involved in a builder selling a flat cannot be accepted. Whether there is a service or not has to be obtained not only from builder’s angle but also from the recipient’s angle. Only service in relation to construction is sought to be taxed and it is definitely involved when construction is carried out or before construction and before flat is sold and therefore the levy could not be held unconstitutional.

The judgment being the first final ruling by a High Court on the issue of constitutional validity has generated sharp reactions among legal fraternity on account of various issues in addition to the legal or technical issue of relevance of Article 268A of the Constitution of India and insertion of Entry 92C in the Union List as the Court has referred to it as ‘legal back-up’. Leaving this aspect aside for the time being, the other issues that arise are:

  •  Whether or not, the aspects of ‘nature of tax’ and ‘measure of tax’ while delivering the judgment had relevance as on examining the Explanation inserted in S. 65(105)(zzzzh), the question that arises is whether it merely deals with ‘measures of tax’ and that it maintains a nexus with the essential character of having ‘element of service’ of the levy? Or does it create only a deeming fiction by declaring the construction activity as ‘service’, when a part payment is received by a builder from a prospective buyer when essentially the trans-action is of sale of immovable property.

  •   Further, while distinguishing the case of Magus Construction (supra), only reference to CBEC Circular dated 1-8-2006 is made and the P & H Court has stated that the circular will not apply when service recipient is a purchaser of flat and the levy is on the service and not service provider and construction service is certainly provided. Comparing the facts of both the cases, one may hardly find any difference and therefore the ground on which the distinction is made appears not easily digestible.

Conclusion:

In view of the above, it appears almost certain that the decision would be challenged before the Hon. Supreme Court. Further, there may not be any consequence of the judgment in the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court and the Madras High Court as they have granted the interim stay in the matter. Yet elsewhere uncertain and untoward situation for the builders as well as flat buyers may continue as attempt by the department for the recovery of service tax may be made. The issue being highly complex and contentious, judicial testing seems inevitable.

[Note: Readers may note that the subject being complex, only preliminary issues are discussed above. A few other issues including a vital issue relating to builders involved in redevelopment activity would be discussed in subsequent issue of BCAJ.]

Health check-up and treatment services

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Service TaxRenting of Immovable Property
Retrospective
Validation :

Background :


W.e.f 1-6-2007 the Central Government included within the
definition of taxable service a service provided or to be provided to any
person, by any other person in relation to renting of immovable property for use
in the course or furtherance of business or commerce
. Renting included
letting, leasing, licensing or other similar arrangement. The phrase ‘for use in
the course or furtherance of business or commerce’ was said to include use of
immovable property as factories, office buildings, warehouses, theatres,
exhibition halls and multiple-use building. Some residential and other
properties were excluded from the scope of this service.

The levy of service tax on renting of immovable property was
challenged through writ petitions before High Courts in different parts of the
country. Many property owners began paying self-assessed tax on the rent amount
and passed on the said liability to the tenants. At the same time, many property
owners did not charge service tax pending disposal of writ petitions.

Implications of the levy on renting of immovable property and
issues arising therefrom have been discussed in detail in the August 2007 and
September 2007 issues of BCAJ.

The Delhi High Court in Home Solution Retail India Ltd. v.
Union of India & Others,
(2009) 14 STR 433 (Del.) held that service tax is a
tax on value addition provided by a service provider. It is obvious that it must
have connection with a service and there must be some value addition by that
service. If there is no value addition, then there is no service. Applying the
same to renting of immovable property service, the High Court observed as
under :

“There is no dispute that any service connected with the
renting of such immovable property would fall within the ambit of S.
65(105)(zzzz) and would be exigible to service tax. The question is whether
renting of such immovable property by itself constitutes a service and,
thereby, a taxable service. Service tax is a value added tax. It is a tax
on the value addition provided by some service providers. Insofar as renting
of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business or
commerce is concerned, any value addition could not be discerned.
Consequently, the renting of immovable property for use in the course or
furtherance of business or commerce by itself does not entail any value
addition and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a service.

In arriving at the aforesaid finding, the Delhi High Court
relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu (T.N.) Kalyana
Mandapam Association v. UOI,
(2006) 3 STR 260 (SC) which, interestingly was
relied upon both by the appellants who had challenged the legality of the levy,
as well as by the respondents i.e., the Government of India. Based on a
detailed consideration of the aforesaid judgment, the Delhi High Court held that
the decision of the Supreme Court supported the argument of the appellants
before it and not the Government of India. With regard to the nature of the
service tax itself, the High Court held that it is a value added tax on value
addition done by the service provider and it must have a connection with the
service. Consequently, since mere renting of immovable property does not entail
any value addition, it could not be regarded as a service for that reason as
well.

The Delhi High Court observed in para 37 as :

. . . . We have not examined the alternative plea taken
by the petitioners with regard to legislative competence of the Parliament in
the context of Entry 49 of List II of the Constitution of India.



The Govt. filed an SLP against the said ruling which has been
admitted, but no stay has been granted against the Delhi HC Ruling. The same is
pending disposal.

Implications arising from the Delhi High Court Ruling have
been discussed in detail in the July 2009 issue of BCAJ.

Amendment by Finance Act, 2010 (‘Act’) :

Prior to the amendment, S. 65(105)(zzzz) of the Act defined
‘taxable service’ in the context of ‘renting of immovable property’ as under :

“(105) ‘taxable service’ means any service provided or to
be provided :

(a) to (zzzy) . . . . . .

(zzzz) to any person, by any other person in relation to
renting of immovable property for use in the course or furtherance of business
or commerce.

Explanation 1. . . . . . .

The Finance Act, 2010 has nullified the Delhi High Court
Ruling by redefining ‘taxable service’ with retrospective effect from 1-6-2007
as under :

“(105) ‘taxable service’ means any service provided or to
be provided :

(a) to (zzzy)

(zzzz) to any person, by any other person, by renting of
immovable property or any other service in relation to such renting for use in
the course or furtherance of business or commerce.

Thus, henceforth a service provided by renting of immovable
property or a service ‘in relation to’ such renting of immovable property, is
now covered in the definition of taxable service. TRU Circular No. 334/1/2010 —
TRU (Annexure B), dated 26-2-2-10 clarifies as under :


Para 9.2

“In order to clarify the legislative intent and also bring
in certainty in tax liability the relevant definition of taxable service is
being amended to clarify that the activity of renting of immovable property
per se
would also constitute a taxable service under the relevant clause.
This amendment is being given retrospective effect from 1-6-2007.

Thus, renting of immovable property by itself is now
considered to be a taxable service. In the Finance Act 2010, it has been
declared as under :

No act or omission on the part of any person shall be
punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable had this
amendment not come into force.



Implications of the amendment :

The amendment in the definition of taxable services seeks to bring within the service tax net the activity or renting of immovable property per se nullifying the position held in the Home Solutions case. It further seeks to overturn the said position w.e.f. 1-6-2007. Therefore any levy, demand, recovery or action in relation thereto taken by the authorities will be validated and no action against the same will be maintainable in a Court of law. Further, all refunds made consequent to the Delhi High Court Ruling in Home Solutions case, are liable to be overturned by virtue of this amendment.

Legality and constitutional validity of the amendment:

An important issue that arises for consideration is whether the amendment will withstand the test of constitutionality. Though the answer can only come by way of a final decision by the Courts of law, it becomes important to prima facie examine the same.

In the light of the Delhi High Court ruling in Home Solutions case, the amended provisions will be subject to judicial scrutiny. Questions which arose before the Delhi High Court would once again arise. Is the bare renting of immovable property a taxable service? Is there a continuous flow of service between the property owner and the tenant in such a scenario? Is there any value addition involved?

In addition, constitutional validity was not examined by the Delhi High Court in Home Solutions case. Hence, there would be fresh round of litigations on this ground too.

According to one school of thought, the amended provisions can be challenged for transgression of the constitutional line of control which divides the powers of the Union and the State Governments. In terms of Article 246(3) of the Constitution, the Legislature of any State has the exclusive power to make laws with respect to matters listed in List II to the Seventh Schedule. Taxation on transactions relating to immovable property is not within the legislative competency of the Central Government inasmuch as these matters fall under Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.

S. 66 of the Act, which is the charging section for the purpose of levy of service tax, provides, for the levy of tax on the taxable services covered by S. 65(105) thereof. From a reading of the charging section, it is clear that service tax is a charge of tax on taxable services. The Supreme Court in Laghu Udyog Bharati v. Union of India, (1999) 112 ELT 365 (SC) has also held that service tax is a tax on services and is leviable on the service provider. The levy of service tax on the leasing or letting or rent-ing of immovable property may be illegal and ultra vires Article 246 of the Constitution of India.

According to another school of thought, in terms of the Supreme Court Ruling in TN Kalyana Manda-pam (supra), levy of service tax on renting of immovable property is constitutionally valid.

In the light of the foregoing, a fresh round of litigations is likely as regards legality and Constitutional validity as well of the retrospective amendment made in regard to renting of immovable property.

Some issues:

Implications on property owners:

The retrospective amendment in renting of im-movable property has been challenged through writ petitions in various courts of the country and interim stay has been granted in some cases. The benefit of the same would be available to a property owner who is a petitioner/member of the petitioner association. However, it would be advisable for the petitioners, to make appropriate disclosures before service tax authorities by filing letters/through notes in service tax returns. In cases where, property owners charge service tax but the tenants refuse to pay, the detailed analysis and discussions in July, 2009 of BCAJ can be referred as to the various options that can be exercised by property owners and implications in regard to each option.

Interest implications:

In Pratibha Processors v. UOI, (1996) 88 ELT 12 (SC), it was observed by the Supreme Court as under:
“in fiscal statutes, the import of the words, — ‘tax’, ‘interest’, ‘penalty’, etc. are well known. They are different concepts. Tax is the amount payable as a result of the charging provision. It is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purpose, the payment of which is enforced by law. Penalty is ordinarily levied on an assessee for some contumacious conduct or a deliberate violation of the provisions of the particular statute. Interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable. The levy of interest is geared to actual amount of tax withheld and the extent of delay in paying the tax on due date. Essentially, it is compensatory and different from penalty — which is penal in character.” (p. 20).

Thus, interest is not a penalty, but is essentially compensatory in nature.

In the context of stay matters, it is a reasonably settled position to the effect that if a petitioner loses he would have to pay tax along with interest inasmuch as interest is compensatory as discussed above. However, in the context of retrospective amendment, whether this principle would apply is an issue.

In this connection, attention is invited to the Supreme Court Ruling in Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, (2006) 1 STR 73 (SC), wherein the following was observed in regard to liability to interest in cases of retrospective validation of levy on broadcasting services.

Para 7
“In any event, it is clear from the language of the validation clause, as quoted by us earlier, that the liability was extended not by way of clarification but by way of amendment to the Finance Act with retrospective effect. It is well established that while it is permissible for the Legislature to retrospectively legislate, such retrospective legislation is normally not per-missible to create an offence retrospectively.

There were clearly judgments, decrees or orders of Courts and Tribunals or other authorities, which were required to be neutralized by the validation clause. We can only assume that the judgments, decree or orders, etc. had, in fact, held that persons like the appellants were not liable as service providers. This is also clear from the Explanation to the validation Section, which says that no act or acts on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would have been so punishable if the Section had not come into force.”

On the basis of Star India ruling, a view can be taken to the effect that there may be no interest liability for the past period. However, this view is likely to be disputed by the tax authorities, resulting in litigations.

Penalty implications:

It is a very well-settled position that in cases where matters involved are of controversial nature, no penalty can be imposed. Based on the same, it would appear that there may be no liability to penalties, provided appropriate disclosures are made before service tax authorities.

Vacant land leased for construction of building?: Under the unamended provisions, ‘vacant land’, whether or not having facilities clearly incidental to the use of such vacant land was excluded from the definition of ‘immovable property’. Thus, renting of such vacant land was not liable for service tax.

The Finance Act, 2010 has curtailed the above exclusion by bringing within the ambit of the immovable property ‘vacant land, given on lease or licence for construction of building or temporary structure at a later stage to be used for further-ance of business or commerce’. Thus, renting of vacant land on long-term lease for construction of commercial building or structure thereon in future would be liable for service tax.

Leases executed prior to the amendment:

An important issue that arises for consideration in case of leases executed prior to the amendment (in some cases such leases would have been ex-ecuted before the introduction of service tax).

It is pertinent to note that advances received in respect of all newly inserted taxable services (as well on those services the scope of which has been expanded) in the Finance Act, 2010, have been exempted by virtue of Notification No. 36/2010-ST, dated 28-6-2010. However, services falling under sub-clause (zzc) (Commercial Training or Coaching Service) and (zzzz) (Renting of Im-movable Property Service) of S. 65(105), [which have been given retrospective effect] have been kept out of this Notification.

No such retrospective effect has been given to renting of vacant land (on which some construction is to be made subsequently). Therefore, it would appear that advances received in respect of this renting of vacant land ought to be exempted on the same ground on which exemption to advances in respect of other newly inserted services and amended services has been given. The scope of Notification No. 36/2010-ST, dated 28-6-2010 needs to be clarified accordingly.

The issue involved has ramifications for a large number of assessees most of which are PSUs and local industrial corporations which are renting vacant land on a long-term lease with a explicit condition that the lessee would construct a factory or commercial building on such land.

This can also be seen from a perspective that the moment advance is received and lease agreement is signed, the taxable event of provision of service is completed. Thus, as per settled position, if the taxable event happened at the time when service tax was not leviable on that service, then service tax cannot be demanded later, on a pro rata basis or otherwise even if the service becomes taxable during the tenure of the lease. The Draft Point of Taxation Rules seems to support this position.

From the Service Tax Department’s perspective, they could argue that service is in the nature of continuous service. Hence, service tax needs to be discharged on a pro rata basis for the period post amendment.

In case of long -term leases, whether the same can be covered within the ambit of ‘renting’ at all, may have to be examined vis-à-vis provisions under principal laws governing transfer of property and related regulations.

Editor’s Note:

Recently, Hon. Punjab and Harayana High Court in the case of Shubh Timb Steels Ltd has upheld the consitutional validity of levy of service tax on renting of immovable property as also its retrospective application.

Part A Service tax : Information Technology Software

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Service Tax

1. Introduction :

Service tax has been levied on various services in relation to software by the Finance Act, 2008 with effect from May 16, 2008 by introducing a category under the description ‘Information Technology Software Service’ (ITSS) in Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act).


Many issues and controversies have emerged on account of the manner of drafting of Ss.(zzzze) in S. 65(105) of the Act defining this service especially in the scenario wherein the technology called software is classified as ‘goods’ under various situations for the levy of tax on ‘sale’ (under the VAT laws of the States of India). Further, under the nomenclature ‘Information Technology Software’, a taxing entry No. 8523 also appears in the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1944 (CETA) and the term is defined in almost identical manner as it is defined for the purpose of service tax.

In the scenario, it becomes utmost necessary to primarily study, understand and analyse what software means per se and whether it is possible to identify a particular transaction as one of ‘sale’ or ‘service’ or both simultaneously, given the provisions of law under applicable taxing statues not considering at this moment as to which part of the activity constitutes ‘manufacture’ liable for central excise duty.

2. What is software ?

The meaning of ‘software as examined by the Supreme Court in the following cases is reproduced :

“Software program is essentially a series of commands issued to hardware of the computer that enables a computer to perform in a particular manner.”

[Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2004 (178) ELT 22 (SC)]

“Computer programs are the product of intellectual process, but once implanted in a medium, they are widely distributed to computer owners . . . . Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not a goods, but when transcribed as a book, it becomes goods.

That a computer program may be copyrightable as intellectual property does not alter the fact that once in the form of a floppy disc or other medium, the program is tangible, movable and available in the market place. The fact that some programs may be tailored for specific purposes need not alter their status as goods because the code definition includes “specially manufactured goods”.

[Quote from Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corpn., (925 F 29670 (3rd (i.e. 1991) adopted and agreed upon in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2001 (128) ELT 21 (SC)].

“Computer programs, instructions that make hardware work. Two main types of software (operating systems) which controls the working of computer and applications, such as word processing programs, spread sheets and databases which perform the tasks for which people use computers.”

[CC, Chennai v. Hewlett Packard India, 2007 (215) ELT 484 (SC)]

In terms of the above, software is essentially an intangible asset or a thing that can be used only when it is stored or transferred on a tangible medium like a disc, a CD-ROM or a hard disc, a computer, etc. The application software can further be classified as canned software and customised software. Canned software is one which can be replicated for the use of more than one person with or without modification and is sold ‘off the shelf’ and generally requires routine installation. Thus, substance of a transaction is ‘sale’ of goods when a canned software is sold. This is done either through a tangible medium like a CD or a disc or can also be transmitted electronically. As against a canned or a packaged software, for a customised software, a programme or programmes is/are written or developed for a specific client or a person developing or designing a software writes a programme focussing only on specific requirements of the client. However the set of instructions, which are customised for a client, also needs to be uploaded on a tangible medium of a hard disk of the computer in order that the same could be put to use.

Thus, software is admittedly and undoubtedly an intangible incorporeal intellectual property. However, whether this intangible property is ‘goods’ or ‘service’ was analysed at great length in Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2004

(178) ELT 22 (SC) (TCS). According to the Supreme Court in this case, it would pass its test of being considered ‘goods’, if it has the attributes having regard to :

  • its utility;

  • capable of being bought and sold; and


  • capable of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed, etc. and held : “If a software whether customised or noncustomised satisfies these attributes, the same would be goods”. [Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra)]. It also held “what is essential for an article to become goods is its marketability.”

In Tata Consultancy Services (supra), it was also observed:

“In our view, the term’ goods’ as used in Article 366(12) of the Constitution of India and as defined under the said Act are very wide and include all types of movable properties whether those properties be tangible or intangible ….. The software and media cannot be split up. What the buyer purchases and pays for is not the disc or the CD. As in the case of painting or books or music or films, the buyer is purchasing the intellectual property and not the media i.e., the paper or cassette or disc or CD. Thus, a transaction sale of computer software is clearly a ‘sale of goods’ within the meaning of the term as defined in the said Act: …. “

It also held “we find no error in the High Court holding the branded software as goods. In both cases, the software is capable of being abstracted, consumed and used. In both cases, software can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed, etc. Even unbranded software when marketed/sold may be goods. We however, are not dealing with this aspect and express no opinion thereon because in case of unbranded software other questions like situs of contract of sale and/ or whether the contract is a service contract may arise.”

Thus, the above benchmark decision, which is widely followed, held branded/ canned software as ‘goods’ and the issue regarding unbranded or customised software whether is ‘goods’ or ‘service’ was not concluded and left open.

3.  Software and leviability of VAT:

Following the decision of Tata Consultancy Services (supra), Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT) notified software packages to be under Entry C-39 vide Notification dated 1-6-2005as goods of intangible or incorporeal nature and made liable for VAT @ 4%. Similarly, software is also liable for VAT in the States of Goa, Karnataka, etc.

Since canned software is determined as ‘goods’ and chargeable to VAT, it cannot be held as ‘service’ at the same time in terms of decision of the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. UOI & Ors., 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC). In para 46, the Court observed,

“The test for deciding whether a contract falls into one category or the other is as to what is the “substance of the contract”. We will for want of a better phrase call this the dominant nature test.”

Similarly, in Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC) also, exclusivity of sale and service is established. Also in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. UOI, 2005 (182) ELT 33 (SC), it was held “the mutual exclusivity of taxes which has been reflected in Article 246(1) of the Constitution means that taxing entries must be construed so as to maintain exclusivity.” In principle, service tax has never been intended to be levied on sale of goods by the Union Government having regard to the framework defined by the Constitution i.e., to levy tax on an item covered under Article 246 read with List II – State List to Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. This intention is refleeted in CBEC Circular 96/7 /2007-ST of 23-8-2007 at 36.03/23-8-2007 in the context of services of authorised service station. – “Service tax is not leviable on a transaction treated as sale of goods and subject to levy of sales tax / VAT”. Similarly, the Circular /letter D.O.F. No. 334/1/2008 – TRUE, dated 29-2-2008 in the context of new service category of “transfer of right to use tangible goods” the Board clarified  –    “supply of tangible goods for use and leviable to VAT/ sales tax as deemed sale of goods is not covered under the scope of the proposed service. Whether a transaction involves transfer of possession and control is a question of facts and is to be decided based on the terms of the contract and other material facts. This could be ascertained from the fact whether or not VAT is payable or paid.” (emphasis supplied). Thus, when substance of a transaction is ‘sale’ of a software, it is exigible to VAT and is beyond the scope of service tax.


4.    Software: Scenario hitherto in the service tax law:

Till May 16, 2008, when information technology software service got notified as taxable service, the scenario under the service tax law was as follows:

  • Under the category of business auxiliary service, services in relation to information technology service were specifically excluded. Information technology service in turn was defined to cover services in relation to designing, developing or maintaining of computer software or computerised data processing or system networking or any other service primarily in relation to operation of computer systems. (However, between 2004 and 2006, all aspects other than design and development of software were removed from exclusion and made taxable).

  • Under consulting engineer’s service, software engineering was excluded.

  • Under maintenance or repair service, services in relation to computer, computer systems, etc. were exempted vide Notification No. 20/2003-ST, until it was withdrawn from 9-7-2004. Yet, Circular No. 70/19-ST of 17-12-2003 clarified that maintenance of software was not chargeable to service tax. Later this stand was reversed through other controversial Circulars. Finally, an explanation was inserted with effect from 1-6-2007 that ‘goods’ included ‘computer software’ for this service.

  • Under management or business consultant’s service, procurement and management of information technology resources is taxed.

  • Some of the Information Technology (IT)-enabled services and IT services outsourced got taxed under business support service and when provided on behalf of a client, like call centre is taxed under  business auxiliary  service.

  • Provision and transfer of information and data processing is taxed under banking and other financial services.

5. Scope of information technology software service under service tax:

5.1  Statutory provisions:

S. 65(53a) of the Act:

‘Information technology software’ means any representation of instructions, data, sound or image, including source code and object code, recorded in a machine-readable form, and capable of being manipulated or providing interactivity to a user, by means of a computer or an automatic data processing machine or any other device or equipment.”

S. 65(105)(zzzze)  of the Act:

(zzzze)    “Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to information technology software for use in the course, or furtherance, of business or commerce, including, :

(i)    development of information technology software,

(ii)    study, analysis, design and programming of information technology software,

(iii)    adaptation, upgradation, enhancement, implementation and other similar services related to information technology software,

(iv)    providing advice, consultancy and assistance on matters related to information technology software, including conducting feasibility studies on implementation of a system, specifications for a database design, guidance and assistance during the start-up phase of a new system, specifications to secure a database, advice on proprietary information technology software,

(v)    acquiring the right to use information technology software for commercial exploitation including right to reproduce, distribute and sell information technology software and right to use software components for the creation of and inclusion in other information technology software products,

(vi)    acquiring the right to use information technology software supplied electronically.”

  • Simultaneously with introduction of the above entry, exclusion provided for software engineering in the definition of ‘consulting engineer’ has been deleted.

  • Specific exclusion of information technology service under business auxiliary service is also removed.

  • Under the category of management, maintenance or repair service, the term ‘property’ is defined to include information technology software.

  • Under the category of testing and analysis service, testing of information technology software is included.

  • Certification of IT software is included under technical inspection and certification services.

5.2 The Ministry in its Circular DOF No.334/1/2008-TRU, dated 29-2-2008 clarified as follows:

“4.1.2 Software consists of carrier medium such as CD, floppy and coded data. Softwares are categorised as ‘normal software’ and ‘specific software’. Normalised software is mass market product generally available in packaged form off the shelf in retail outlets. Specific software is tailored to the specific requirement of the customer and is known as customised software.

4.1.3 Packaged software sold off the shelf, being treated as goods, is leviable to excise duty @ 8%. In this budget, it has been increased from 8% to 12% vide Notification No. 12/2008-CE, dated 1-3-2008.

4.1.4 IT software services provided for use in business or commerce are covered under the scope of the proposed service. The said services provided for use, other than in business or commerce, such as services provided to individuals for personal use, continue to be outside the scope of service tax levy. Service tax paid shall be available as input credit under CENVAT Credit Scheme.

4.1.5 Software and upgrades of software are also supplied electronically, known as digital delivery. Taxation is to be neutral and should not depend on forms of delivery. Such supply of IT software electronically shall be covered within the scope of the proposed service.

4.1.6 With the proposed levy on IT software services, information technology-related services will get covered comprehensively.”
 
6. Scope  and  the criteria for taxability  :

6.1 Services provided unless used in the course or furtherance of business or commerce are not covered in the scope of taxable service. Thus, software service provided to an individual for personal use remains outside the purview of the levy.

6.2 It is not difficult to interpret and infer that services of study, analysis, design and programming of software (sub-clause ii) are covered within the scope of the ITSS. Similarly, adaptation, upgradation, enhancement, implementation and other similar services relating to software (sub-clause iii) are also enshrined in the definition. Some of these descriptions seem to overlap with each other. Likewise, some of the services covered under other categories like consulting engineer, management or business consultant and even ‘management, maintenance or repair’ service also find place in this definition. For instance, sub-clause (iv) lists services like advice, consultancy and assistance on matters related to software including feasibility studies on implementation of a system, specifications for a database design, guidance and assistance during start-up, etc. The term ‘study’ can include feasibility study also. Further, when the so-called ‘annual maintenance contracts’ for maintenance of software are entered into, more often than not, providing upgradation or assistance in implementation is included along with the services of troubleshooting, debugging, etc. Implementation services are not very different from guidance and assistance during a start-up phase or advice and/or consultancy services. Various words or terms appear to have been used in order not to – allow any ‘escape’ from the scope. Nevertheless, not much difficulty is felt in interpreting these functions as ‘services’.

6.3.1 The issue is whether sub-clause (i) includes the process of development of information technology software as ‘service’ or it covers as a whole only services in relation to development of software. A view has been formed by some professionals that only the services in relation to development of software are covered under this sub-clause and not the development of software per se. Accordingly, it is contended that services may comprise of writing of codes, providing consultancy, pre-implementation .. study, analysis, etc. The coded software is supplied to the client as ‘goods’ – it is either developed on the system of the client or supplied electronically or on a tangible medium such as a disc. If the software is developed by a person on one’s own and is only replicated for various users, such ‘development’ does not amount to ‘service’ and it is transferred on a tangible medium across the counter as ‘packaged goods’ without much or no involvement of any ‘service’, it is ‘sale’ of ‘goods’ and as such, charge-able to VAT as already analysed in para 3 above, following TCS judgment (supra).

6.3.2 However, when software is developed for and on behalf of and as per specifications provided by the client, the question arises whether the fee received for the development of software is wholly chargeable as ‘service’, considering it as. covered under the sub-clause (i) or should the delivery of duly developed software be considered ‘goods’ liable for VAT,considering the test prescribed in the TCS decision (supra) as to determination of ‘goods’ that when software is capable of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored/possessed, etc. and even when it is customised, it has all the attributes present in it for being considered ‘goods’ and in such eventuality, only the value of services in relation to development of software be considered exigible to service tax. This is an extremely complex issue and only the facts of each case and the terms of agreement between the designer / developer of software and the user would determine as to whether the ‘contract’ relates to sale of ‘goods’ or ‘services’ or whether both the components are present in a contract. Then in such cases, the issue may arise as to whether the contract is indivisible or both the ingredients i.e., ‘sale’ and ‘service’ are defined separately and the consideration is also stated separately and therefore, the parties to the contract intend separate rights, etc. However, on applying ‘dominant nature test’ [as observed in BSNL’s case (supra) discussed in para 3 above], when the parties did not intend separate rights, there is no ‘sale’ even if the contract could be disintegrated, in a contract where dominant objective is provision of service. Therefore, taking an instance of a lump-sum contract which is focussed on development or designing of a software involves preliminary study and analysis of client’s specific organisational requirement. Thereafter, the process of development begins with services of collection of information and data, study, analysis, consultation, advice, designing systems, writing programs before a final product is designed and delivered and which may also include services of post development implementation, training, troubleshooting, etc. Although in the scenario, the final deliverable may be provided, transferred and installed on a tangible medium such as hard disc, it would be reasonable to view the transaction as one of service as services appear dominant in the entire deliverable which is analogical to illustrations of a hospital’s prescription and dispensing of pills, a lawyer’s preparation of a contract as a stamped document discussed in BSNL’s decision (supra) where dominant objective is ‘service’, although deliverable is provided as ‘tangible goods’. Thus, it may prima facie appear that the entire contract of development of software could be considered a service contract exigible to service tax under sub-clause (i) of ITSS. However, the term ‘service’ per se is not defined in the Finance Act, 1994. In the case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. UOI, 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC), the Supreme Court observed that the word ‘service’ should be understood in contradiction to the word ‘goods’. So far as ‘goods’ is concerned, The Supreme Court in TCS’s case has observed that if an article has attributes having regard to (a) its utility (b) capable of being bought and sold and (c) capable of being transferred, delivered, stored and possessed, it should be goods and thus, converse can be inferred that if it cannot be possessed, stored, delivered or transferred and is not capable of being bought and sold, it should be considered ‘service’. In the context of the above instance of client-specific or a customised software, one has to admit that all the above ingredients are present. Further, distinguishing the transaction of development of software from a lawyer’s preparation of document or a doctor’s prescription is that the service once availed is utilised and consumed instantaneously. It is possible that the benefit therefrom can recur later at different events also. However, it gets consumed whereas the customer-specific software, although developed only for the customer, is deliverable, transferable, storable, usable and capable of being possessed. For instance, the client can claim and register proprietary rights over the customised software developed by the provider thereof to the exclusion of the developer of software.

6.3.3 Software: Dutiable  under  excise and customs.

Information technology software (canned as well as customised) is excisable goods under Tariff Entry 8523 8020 (earlier 852 49111, 8524 9112 and 85249113).The rate of duty was 12% with effect from March 01, 2008 (increased from 8% and again it attracts 8%). However, software other than canned software was exempted under Notification No. 6/ 2006-CE of 1-3-2006. When classification exists under the excise law, merely by declaring specific item of ‘goods’ as exempt, does the inherent ‘character’ of these goods got transformed into service or vice versa? If ‘customised software’ per se is not ‘goods’ and is ‘service’ only, can it be considered ‘exempted goods’ for the duty of central excise? (Or is this exemption somewhat analogical to exemption for value of goods or material sold by the service provider to the recipient of service under Notification No. 12/2003-Service Tax dated 20-6-2003 which per se cannot be made exigible to service tax ?). Simi-larly, under the customs law also, it is classified under Entry 8524 4011, but it is exempt. However, since excise duty is levied on canned software, while importing canned software, CVD is payable.

The Supreme Court in Gobindram v. Shamji K. & Co., AIR 1961SC 1285 (1290) held that the word ‘exempt’ shows that a person is not beyond the application of law. Thus, having been classified under the excise and customs law is it to be contended that software both canned and customised should be considered ‘goods’ and therefore development of software per se cannot be a service?

6.3.4 It is relevant to note here, a decision of the Karnataka High Court which in the case of Inventa Software India Pvt. Ltd. v. AC Commercial Taxes, (2008) 17 VST 362, relying on the decision of Tata Consultancy Services (supra) held that development of application software in the areas like financial accounting, inventory control, sales analysis, etc. is ‘works contract’ attracting sales tax under Entry 22 of Sixth Schedule of the KST Act, 1957 under ‘programming and providing computer software’. This has generated further controversy mainly for the fact that a transaction of works contract involves ‘transfer of property’ in goods in execution of works contract. For instance, an ordinary illustration of a painting contract or a contract for construction pre-supposes supply of ‘goods’ in the first instance on which some ‘work’ or ‘labour job’ is carried out in order that a composite job is construed ‘works con-tract’ consisting of transfer of property in goods during its execution. It is doubtful in the case of ‘development of a software’ whether there exists any ‘goods’ prior to the execution or development of software. Even if it is assumed to be a ‘composite contract’, it is well accepted that all composite con-tracts are not works contracts. In case of software development, a series of services are combined and embodied in a ‘deliverable’ product, which is finally delivered on a tangible medium. It is comparable only with a musical or dramatic or such creative work on a tangible medium. The entire creative work, which is intangible and intellectual, is embodied on a tangible medium. Its division into ‘service’ and ‘goods’ does not appear a legally tenable proposal unless a ‘deeming fiction’ is enshrined in the law.

The Government appears to be seized with this issue. In the context of ‘video cassettes supplied for broadcasting on Betachem or a similar format – its instruction Dy No. 167/11/08-CX4, dated March OS, 2008 which  inter alia inquired:

(1)    Whether both service tax and excise duty are payable on the same activity or not?

(2)    Whether for both taxes, the same value is considered or different value is considered?

(3)    Practice of work adopted  by this industry  …  “.

(Note: The above was provided consequent upon representation by Film and Television Producers’ Guild and others).

6.3.5 In summation, the issue is complex. However, although final product passes the test of being a deliverable, transferable, usable, storable, etc., substantial amount of services are embodied in the finally delivered product or it is even appropriate to contend that the product delivered comprises only ‘service’ ingredient. Further, goods like cooked food also gets consumed immediately or has a short shelf life. However, before it is cooked, the raw material exists and service is embodied in the material to produce the cooked food. While developing software, no material is involved in the process of development and it is an intangible intellectual property. Therefore, the issue is arguable from both the sides and accordingly, terms of contract, dominant nature and intention of parties to the contract only may help determine taxability of a transaction. Yet the area being grey, tremendous amount of litigation can be expected if the Government does not act to resolve the matter.

Nevertheless, a contract pertaining to services provided in relation to development of software certainly would be covered by sub-clause (i).

6.4 Acquiring the right to use software for com-mercial production or supplied electronically (sub-clauses (v) and (vi).

The reading of these clauses to determine liability of service tax (if any) appears a Herculean task. If sub-clauses (v) and (vi) are read in the manner as the other three preceding clauses i.e., the sub-clause itself as a defined ‘taxable service’, it results in absurdity. Plain reading of these clauses along with the head note would mean as follows :

  • A service provided (including to be provided) to any person in relation to IT software for commercial/business use is taxable under this clause and the coverage also includes descriptions in sub-clauses (i) to (vi). In such a scenario, the question that arises is when aperson acquires a right to use IT software supplied to him electronically, he pays for it being a buyer of the software assumed as ‘goods’. Therefore, to treat buying i.e., acquiring a right as ‘provision of service’ is absurd. Assuming that instead of acquiring, ‘granting’ of a right is meant to be a ‘taxable service’, then on operation of S. 66A of the Act, when a person acquires a right to use software from a person outside India, he would be liable for service tax. Therefore, the’ act of acquiring right’ itself cannot become ‘provision of taxable service’. In the scenario, if there is no drafting error, one has to refer to the governing principle of interpretation, which is as follows:

“Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. The interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual”.

Since service tax law defines ‘taxable service’ u/s. 65(105) of the Act, contextual interpretation that follows is that a service in relation to acquiring of right to use software supplied electronically or to use it for commercial exploitation is sought to be taxed by the inclusion of sub-clauses (v) and (vi). Analysing this from another angle also leads to such contention. Taxing transfer of right to use any goods under Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution vests in the States and accordingly is part of the extended definition of ‘sale’ under VAT laws.

As already discussed above in para 3, at least packaged software per se is held as ‘goods’ under the VATlaws, central excise and the customs laws. Similarly, supply of ‘right’ to use software through what is known in business parlance as ‘paper licence’ (a certificate issued by a copyright owner conveying right to use IT software), wherein delivery may be done on a tangible medium or electronically i.e., sent online, being a ‘deemed sale’ is chargeable to VAT.
 
The question that therefore arises is whether the same can be treated as ‘service’ when a dealer or a distributor acquires right to distribute and sell soft-ware which is a copyrighted product, developed by the developer of the product? Since the transaction is exigible to VAT,it cannot simultaneously attract service tax, as discussed above at para 3 in terms of constitutional limitation decisions of Imagic Creative (P) Ltd. (supra) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (supra) as also Board’s clarifications.

7.    Summing  up :

  • Given the limitation in constitution, the Supreme Court’s judgments and unprecise drafting of taxable service in relation to software, service tax exigibility arises only on services in relation to software. Developer/manufacturer of packaged software sells the right to use software through paper licence which is undoubtedly exigible to VAT.Distributors acquire right to market or sell these paper licences. The packaged software is thus sold electronically or on discs and thus the software is replicated or reproduced for the use of the purchaser. In both the cases, ‘sale’ occurs. There may be element of service on the lines, coffee/tea is sold through vending machines. However, considering ‘dominant nature test’, the transaction is one of sale of goods and therefore exigible to VAT. No service tax simultaneously can be levied.

  • All consultancy contracts, specific contracts for study, implementation, switching of data from old to the new software, audit of systems functioning, troubleshooting and maintenance, up gradation, etc. are services exigible to service tax.

  • However, when services are either provided ‘free’ along with ‘sale’ of software or there is a composite contract, application of ‘dominant nature test’ would be necessitated. Disputes with authorities may arise here.

  • A contract for’ development of customised software’ whether is to be treated only as ‘goods’ or ‘service’ or whether the composite and indivisible contract could be segregated into two may not be concluded without litigation process or through introduction of ‘deeming fiction’ as in the case of TCS (supra), the judgment per J. Variava ended with the words, “… because in case of unbranded  software, other questions like situs of contract of sale and/or whether contract is a service contract  may arise”.

Part A — Classification of services

Software Development vis-à-vis Technical Inspection and Certification

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7. Software Development vis-à-vis Technical
Inspection and Certification :



Development and testing of software admitted in Revenue’s
cross objection as activities which go hand-in-hand for release of software —
Software development not complete without testing — Prima facie computer
software industry exempted from Service Tax — Strong prima facie case
made out on non-applicability of Service Tax provisions to computer software
industry in which inspection and testing is vital activity — Deposit of Rs.4
lakhs already made — Pre-deposit of balance amount waived and recovery thereof
stayed — S. 65(108) of the Act/S. 35F of CEA as applicable to Service Tax vide
S. 83 of the Act.

[Stag Software Pvt. Ltd. V. CST, (2008) 9 STR 476
(Tri — Bang.)]

Technical Testing and Certification as Statutory Functions

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8. Technical Testing and Certification as Statutory
Functions :



  • Liability to Service Tax for statutory functions — Appellant is a State
    Government Department carrying on sovereign activity of inspection and
    certification of electrical installations as per law — Tribunal decisions
    holding sovereign function cannot be subject matter of Service Tax, applicable
    — C.B.E.&C. Circular dated 18-12-2006 clarifying statutory activities of
    sovereign/public authorities not liable to Service Tax, applicable — Bona
    fide
    view on non-liability and demand hit by time bar — S. 65(108), S. 66
    and S. 73 of the Act.



  • Departmental Clarification — Retrospective applicability — CBE&C Circular
    dated 18-12-2006 clarifying statutory activities of sovereign/public
    authorities not liable to Service Tax — Impugned circular being beneficial to
    assessee, applicable retrospectively.


[Electrical Inspectorate, Govt. of Karnataka v. CST, (2008) 9 STR 494
(Tri — Bang.)]


Reimbursements

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6. Reimbursements :



(a) Includibility in taxable value — Appellant rendering
Business Auxiliary Service of promotion of loans of client bank — Service Tax
paid without including reimbursements — Service charges collected from bank as
consideration for Business Auxiliary Service constituting the gross amount
charged by service provider for such service — Impugned amounts being
reimbursement of salaries and infrastructural expenses, held as not to be
termed as amounts charged by service provider – Tribunal decisions and C.B.E.
& C. clarifications on non-taxability of reimbursement of expenses, applicable
— Impugned orders set aside — S. 67 of the Act.

[Malabar Management Services Pvt. Ltd. V. CST,
(2008) 9 STR 483 (Tri — Chennai)]

(b) Service Tax demanded on ‘other income’ and
‘write-backs’ — Impugned order holding that actual expenses reimbursed
eligible for abatement, but the same disallowed citing non-production of
documentary evidences — Expenditure incurred on behalf of client and not
directly relatable to service rendered, not liable to Service Tax —
Information and documents produced not examined in impugned order —
Expenditure details mentioned in books of accounts and charge on suppression
of facts not justified — Impugned order containing certain defects and hence,
set aside — Matter remanded for de novo adjudication — S. 67 and
Provision to S. 73 of the Act.

Reimbursement of expenses — It was held that Service Tax
can be charged on amount received for services rendered — Expenditure incurred
on behalf of client and not directly relatable to service rendered, not liable
to Service Tax — S. 67 of the Act.

[GAC Shipping (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2008) 9 STR 524
(Tri — Bang.)]


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Penalty under Service Tax vis-à-vis Central Excise

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5. Penalty under Service Tax vis-à-vis Central
Excise :


  •  Commission for marketing loans — Service Tax was paid before issue of show-cause
    notice — Applicability of S. 80 of the Act was not considered in impugned order
    — Imposition of penalty of Rs.1000 u/s.78 of the Act not noticed by Commissioner
    (Appeals) while upholding penalty equal to tax u/s.76 of the Act following High
    Court decision in (2006) 4 STR 177 (P & H) — Impugned order set aside and matter
    remanded for fresh consideration — S. 76, S. 78 and S. 80 of the Act — S. 11AC
    of Central Excise Act, 1944 (CEA).


 


  • Tax statutes, penal provisions — Act vis-à-vis CEA Act — Mandatory
    penalty upheld by Com-missioner (Appeals) following High Court decision in
    (2006) 4 STR 177 (P & H) — Impugned order erroneous as provisions of S. 80 of
    the Act, not having any parallel in S. 11AC of CEA — S. 80 of the Act provides
    for non-imposition of penalty if reasonable cause shown for failure — S. 76, S.
    78 and S. 80 of the Act; S. 11AC of CEA.

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Erection, Commissioning, Installation of ATM Machines — Works Contract

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4. Erection, Commissioning, Installation of ATM Machines —
Works Contract :


  • In this case, there was a works contract for supply, erection and commissioning
    of Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) for banks — Impugned order in
    question noted that works contract is indivisible —It was held that Service Tax not leviable on indivisible
    works contract before 1-6-2007 — For period before 1-6-2007, ratio of decision
    in Daelim Industrial case (2006) 3 STR 124 (Tribunal)] as affirmed by Supreme
    Court applicable — Taxable event for levying Service Tax not present during
    impugned period — ATM related services became taxable from 1-5-2006 — Service
    Tax liability absent for material period — S. 65(9b), S. 65(39a) and S.
    65(105)(zzzza) of the Act.

  •  Turnkey project — Liability to Service Tax. Taxing event is execution of turnkey
    project involving sale of ATMs to banks — Installation and commissioning are
    incidental activities — Works contract for supply and commissioning of ATMs not
    taxable before 1-6-2007 in the absence of charging provision — Ambiguity not
    accepted by tax law — Charging
    provision to be found in statute itself, and where there is none in statute,
    they cannot be supplemented by notifications — S. 65(105)(zzzza) of the Act.

  • New services — Effect of introduction — Introduction of new entry presupposes
    non-coverage by pre-existing entries — Addition of an item in list of taxable
    service is just an addition and not subtraction from a pre-existing entry.

[Diebold Systems (P) Ltd. V. CST, (2008) 9 STR 546
(Tri — Chennai)]

 


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Cargo handing

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2. Cargo handing :


  • In this case, transportation activity was carried out, whereby coal was
    transported inside mine/ colliery and there was deployment of machines and
    tipper trucks for transport of coal from quarry beds to surface stocks/railway
    sidings. It was held that Mechanical transfer of coal from coal face to tippers
    and subsequent transportation within mining area not covered under cargo
    handling service. Movement of coal within mine area is dominant activity and
    loading and unloading merely incidental. Hence no Service Tax liability arises —
    Penalty not imposable as suppression or misstatement absent — Impugned order set
    aside — S. 65(23), S. 73 and S. 76 of the Act.
  •  Mechanical transfer of coal from coal face to tippers and subsequent
    transportation within mining area not covered under cargo handling service — S.
    65(23) and S. 65(105)(zr) of the Act.
  • Cargo in commercial parlance means one which is carried as freight in ship,
    plane, rail or truck.

[Sainik Mining & Allied Services Ltd. V. CCE, (2008)
9 STR 531 (Tri — Kolkata)]


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Consulting Engineers Service — Works Contract Service

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1. Consulting Engineers Service — Works Contract Service :


â
This case involved a works contract on turnkey basis, wherein air separation/gas
separation plants were supplied and erection, installation and commissioning of
such plants was undertaken as per impugned contracts — Records indicating major
portion of activity relating to erection of various items of plants — CBE&C
Circular clarifying that erection, installation and commissioning not covered
under Consulting Engineer service — Erection and commissioning services made
taxable from 2003 and not chargeable to Service Tax under Consulting Engineer
during impugned period — Original order dropping demand after relying on
Tribunal decision in Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. (2006) 3 STR 124 (Tri — Del.)
upheld — Impugned revision order set aside — S. 65(31), S. 65(39a), S.
65(105)(g) and S. 84 of the Finance Act, 1994 (Act).


â
It was held that impugned contracts being works contract, came into Service Tax
net from 2007 only — Works contract not covered under Consulting Engineer
service for period prior to 2007 — Main contract for manufacture of plant and
their supply and erection — Drawing and design for manufacture of plant only and
not rendered directly to clients — Ratio of Tribunal decision in Daelim
Industrial Co. Ltd. Rightly followed in original order — Impugned revision order
set aside — S. 65(31), S. 65(105)(zzzza), S. 73 and S. 84 of the Act.


[Air Liquide Engg. India P. Ltd. V. CCE, (2008) 9
STR 486 (Tri — Bang.)]


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Amendments in Port/AIrpor Services

1. Statutory provisions :

[Finance Act, 1994, (as amended from time to time) ‘Act’]

(a) Port Services :

S. 65(82) of the Act :

‘Port Service’ means any service rendered within a port or other port in any manner.

  •  S. 65(105) of the Act :

Taxable services means any service provided or to be provided :

(zn) to any person by any other person in relation to port services in a port in any manner :

Provided that the Provisions of S. 65A shall not apply to any services when the same is rendered wholly within the port :

. . . . . . . . .

(zzl) to any person, by any other person, in relation to port services in other port in any manner :

Provided that the provision of S. 65A shall not apply to any service when the same is rendered wholly within other port :

(b) Airport Services :

  •  S. 65(105) of the Act :

Taxable services mean any service provided or to be provided :

(zzm) to any person, by airports authority or by any other person, in any airport or a civil enclave.

Provided that the provision of S. 65A shall not apply to any service when the same is rendered wholly within the airport or civil enclave.

2. Departmental clarifications :

(a) Extracts from Department Circular DOF No. 334/1/2010-TRU, dated 26-2-2010) —(Annexure B) :

1. Service provided in an airport or port :

    1.1 Two services, namely, Port Services and the Airport Services were introduced in Budget 2001 and 2004, respectively. The services provided by minor ports covered under other port became taxable from 2003. The purpose behind creating these was that since a number of activities are undertaken within the premises of port and airports, it would be easier to consolidate all such services under one head.

    1.2 It was reported that divergent practices are being followed regarding classification of services being performed within port/airport area. In some places all services performed in these areas (even those falling within the definition of other taxable services) are being classified under the port/airport services. Elsewhere, individual services are classified according to their individual description on the ground that the provisions S. 65A of Finance Act, 1994 prescribes adoption of a specific description over a general one.

    1.3 Further both the definitions use the phrase ‘any person authorised by port/airports’. In many ports/airports there is no procedure of specifically authorising a service provider to undertake a particular activity. While there may be restriction on entry into such areas and the authorities often issue entry passes or identity cards, airports/port authorities seldom issue authority permission letter to a service provider authorising him to undertake a particular task. Many taxpayers have claimed waiver of tax under these services on the ground that the port/airport authority has not specifically authorised them to provide a particular service.

    1.4 In order to remove these difficulties, the definition of the relevant taxable services are being amended to clarify that all services provided entirely within the port/airport’s premises would fall under these services. Further specific authorisation from port/air port authority would not be a pre-condition for the levy.

(b) Extracts from Dept. Circular No. 334/03/2010-TRU, dated 1-7-2010 :

    Para 4.1 :

    In the Finance Bill, 2010, with intent to ease the classification disputes, the definitions of port, other port and airport services were amended to comprehensively cover under their ambit, all services provided within an airport or a port or other port, irrespective of whether or not such activities are authorised by the authorities or whether or not they are otherwise classifiable as distinct taxable services. In effect, all services that are wholly rendered within the prescribed area of the port or other port or an airport, are to be classified within the ambit of ‘port services’ or ‘airport services’.

    Para 4.2 :

    During the post-budget interactions with the stakeholders, apprehensions were expressed that the change may have certain unintended effects and certain services (including certain essential services) hitherto exempted, may attract service tax unintentionally. Further, it was also pointed that the abatements and exemptions presently available under individually defined taxable services would get denied when provided within airport or port, merely as they would now be taxable under newly introduced taxable services.

    Para 4.3(v) :

    Currently abatements are available to certain services such as ‘Renting of a cab’, ‘Erection, Commissioning & Installation Service’, ‘Goods Transport Agency service’ and ‘Construction Services’. Similar abatements would be available to such services, when provided wholly within an airport or a port or other port, under the new definition of airport or port or other port services. (Notification No. 40/2010-ST, dated 28th June, 2010 as corrected by corrigendum dated 30th June, 2010 and Notification No. 43/2010-ST, dated 28th June, 2010.)

    Para 4.4 :

    All other services carried out within a port or other port or an airport would be subjected to service tax under the category of port/other port/airport services.

3. Background & Amendment :

        a) Under the existing provisions for a service to be considered as ‘port services,’ two conditions were required to be satisfied?:

        i) the service must be provided by a port or a person authorised by that port, and

        ii) the service must be in relation to vessel or goods

    In Homa Engineering Works v. CCE, (2007) 7 STR 546 (Tri-Mum.), where the appellant provided dry-dock repairs to its client within the port premises, it was held that such services would not be liable to service tax under ‘Port Services’ due to the following reasons?:

        The appellant was not a port or a person specifically authorised by that port under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 (MPTA 63) to provide a particular service on its behalf;

        The service such as dry-dock repairs were not in the nature of ‘Port Services’ since the port itself was not statutorily allowed to undertake such service under the MPTA 63; and

        On an application of S. 65A of the Act, such services were more appropriately classifiable under ‘Maintenance or Repairs’ service.

    This decision of the Tribunal was followed in several cases both in the context of major ports as well as other ports. In CCE v. Kokan Marine Agencies, (2009) 13 STR 79 (KAR) the Karnataka High Court upheld the Tribunal’s view which was based on Homa Engineering (supra) case.

    In order to overcome the judicial pronouncements, definition of ‘Port Services’ is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2010, to the following effect:

  •             Service need not be provided by the port or a person authorised by the port;
  •             Service need not be in relation to vessel or goods, and
  •             Service need not also be one which the port can undertake under the MPTA 63 or the Indian Ports Act, 1908.

    In terms of the amended definition of taxable service, all services rendered wholly within the port would be classified as port services and not under any other category of service, irrespective of the principles of classification laid down u/s.65A of the Act.

        b) Amendments on lines similar to ‘Port Services’ have been made in respect of Airport Services. Under the existing provisions, in order to fall within ‘airport services, the following was essential:

  •             the service should be provided by an ‘airport’ or a ‘person authorised by the airport’; and
  •             the service should be provided in an airport or civil enclave.

    The definition of ‘taxable service’ in the context of airport services is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2010 to the effect that all the services rendered by an airport authority or by ‘any person’ in an airport or civil enclave would be covered under the category of ‘airport services’ and specific authorisation from the airport authority would not be a pre-condition for the levy.

    Further, all services rendered wholly within the airport would be classified as airport services and not under any other category of services, irrespective of the principles of classification laid down u/s.65A of the Act.

        4. Exemptions in regard to amended Port/ Airport Services:
    a) Notification No. 31/10-ST, dated 22-6-2010:

    The following services provided within a port or an airport have been exempted from payment of service tax:
        
    i) repair of ships or boats or vessels belonging to the Government of India including Navy or Coast Guard or Customs, but does not include Government-owned Public Sector Undertakings;

        ii) repair of ships or boats or vessels where such process of repair amounts to ‘manufacture’ and has the meaning assigned to it in clause(f) of S. 2 of the Central Excise Act, 1944;

        iii) supply of water;

        iv) supply of electricity;

        v) treatment of persons by a dispensary, hospital, nursing home or multi-specialty clinic (except cosmetic or plastic surgery service);

        vi) services provided by a school or centre to provide formal education other than those services provided by commercial coaching or training centre;

        vii) services provided by fire service agencies;

        viii) pollution control services.

        b) Notification No. 38/10-ST and Notification No. 42/10-ST, both dated 28-6-2010:
    Commercial or Industrial Construction Services [Clause 65(105)(zzq)] provided wholly within the port/other port for construction, repair, alteration and renovation of wharves, quays, docks, stages, jetties, piers and railways has been exempted from payment of service tax. Similarly, services provided wholly within airport also are exempted.

        c) Notification No. 41/10-ST, dated 28-6-2000:

    The following services provided wholly within the port or other port or airport; have been exempted from payment of service tax:
        i) taxable service provided by a cargo handling agency in relation to agricultural produce or goods intended to be stored in a cold storage;

        ii)taxable service provided by storage or ware-house keeper in relation to storage and warehousing of agricultural produce or any service provided for storage of or any service provided by a cold storage;

        iii) taxable service in relation to transport of export goods in an aircraft by an aircraft operator;

        iv) taxable service of site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition and such other similar activities.

        Notification No. 40/2010-ST, dated 28-6-2010 and Notification No. 43/2010-ST, dated 1-3-2010:
    These Notifications have amended Notification No. 1/2006-ST, dated 1-3- 2006 (read with corrigendum dated 1-3-2010) and Notification No. 13/2008-ST, dated 1-3- 2008, respectively, whereby abatement available under the following existing taxable categories would continue to be available even if these services would now be classified as port services/other port or airport services:

  •         Rent-a-cab service

  •             Commissioning and installation agency
  •             Commercial or industrial construction
  •             Construction of complex
  •             Transportation of goods by rail
  •             Transport of goods by road.


        5.Some issues:

    The basic objective of the amendment, as stated in the Department Circular, is to overcome the judicial view [Homa Engineering case and Konkan Marine Agencies (supra)] whereby the service providers escaped taxation. A close reading of the amended provisions indicates that the amendments in Port/ Airport Services have resulted in large number of issues, legal as well as procedural and administrative. Some of the important issues are discussed hereafter.

    5.1 Whether services rendered wholly within port/ airport would cover service categories which were otherwise not taxable:

    Attention is drawn to Notification No. 31/10-ST dated 20- 6-2010 [Para 4 (a) above], under which specified list of services rendered within port/ airport, have been exempted from payment of service tax. These services include supply of water, supply of electricity and some other services which are not liable to service tax. Does this mean that these services provided within port/airport premises would have been liable to service tax if the exemption Notification had not been issued?? There is no ready answer to this. However it appears that Govt.’s intention is to tax all services rendered wholly within port/airport even if the relevant service does not fall under the taxable service categories specified u/s.65(105) of the Act or is specifically excluded in certain cases.

    This poses a very significant legal issue inasmuch as under the statutory provisions of the Act, the term ‘service’ is not defined. However, taxable services which are liable to service tax have been specified u/s.65(105) of the Act.

    Under Central Excise, it has been held that powers have been granted u/s.5A (1) of Central Excise Act, 1944 to grant exemption. It has been held in Bata India v. ACCE, 2 ELT J211 (PAT) that if a product is not excisable under any Tariff Entry, an exemption Notification issued u/s.5A cannot have the effect of making such a product excisable. The principle laid down is relevant. However, under the law relating to service tax, there is no exhaustive list of taxable services like Central Excise Tariff.

    It would appear that whether a service not otherwise specified u/s.65(105) of the Act, can be taxed under port/airport services, is a highly contentious issue.

    5.2 Services rendered wholly within port/airport —Practical aspects:

    It is pertinent to note that in order to be taxed under the amended port/airport service, it is essential that services are wholly rendered within a port/airport. Hence, if a service is partly rendered outside the port/airport, it would not be taxable under port/airport services but would continue to be taxable under the respective service category.

    This condition it likely to create substantial practical difficulties/hardships. As it is well known, the services are categorised for the purpose of export/ import into 3 categories viz.:

  •             Location of Immovable property

  •             Performance of service

  •             Location of service recipient

    The emphasis in the amendment is on services that can be rendered through physical action/ performance. This may pose substantial practical difficulties. In case of services under criteria of location of service recipient, where a service provider may not necessarily be located at the location of the service recipient.

    It would appear that if it can be established that a service is not wholly rendered within a port/airport, the amended provisions would not apply.

    Let us consider some illustrations.

        a) A practising CA renders consultation services to a client based within port premises. If the services are provided by the CA through physical presence within the port, it would be taxable under port service. However, if the same service is rendered by the CA through a meeting in his office outside port premises, it would be taxable as practising CA service.

    Take the case of auditing services. Audit is conducted by a CA for the above-referred client in his office located within port premises. However, finalising of balance sheet and issue of audit report is done at the CA’s office outside the port premises. In such a scenario, the question arises as to whether such services would be taxable as ‘Port Services’ or Practising CA Services. It is possible to contend that services are not rendered wholly within ‘Port Premises’.

        b) A Goods Transport Agency (GTA) provides services within port/airport as well as outside. If a GTA, provides services wholly within the port/ airport premises, such service would be taxable under port/airport service.

    With regard to GTA services, liability in case of certain specified entities to pay service tax is cast on the persons making the payment to GTA. However, as yet, no consequential amendment has been made in regard to GTA service. Hence, in regard to GTA services wholly rendered within port/airport premises, it appears that GTA would be liable to discharge the service tax liability and not the person making the payment, as was the case before 1-7-2010. Further, a GTA providing services where the freight for a whole consignment does not exceed `1,500 for an individual consignment, the freight does not exceed `750, it is exempt from service tax under Notification No. 34/2004-ST, dated 3-12-2004. Now when a GTA provides transportation service wholly within the port premises and even if each trip is invoiced for less than `1,500, he will be required to register himself under port service and charge service tax to the client, however after availing abatement of 75% thereon.

    5.3 Exemptions issued are ad hoc and inconsistent: A perusal of list of exemptions issued as stated in para 4 above reveals that there are inconsis-tencies and omissions which are likely to cause hardships. To illustrate:

        a) Commercial or industrial construction service rendered wholly within port/airport has been exempted. However, the following have not been exempted:

  •         Works contract services
  •         Residential construction (say, officers/staff quarters)

    The above inconsistencies/omissions need to be speedily addressed.

        b) Cargo handling services in relation to agricultural produce and goods stored in a cold storage have been rightly exempted. However, it needs to be noted that u/s.65(23) of the Act, handling of export cargo is excluded from the purview of Cargo Handling Service liable to service tax. If such services are rendered wholly within a port/ airport it would appear that in the absence of exemption, such services would be taxable under Port/Airport Service.

    5.4 Implications in terms of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004:

    Under Rule 6(5) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 service tax paid on 16 specified services is fully available as CENVAT Credit, unless such services are provided exclusively for exempted service.

    Management, Maintenance or Repairs is one of the specified services under Rule 6(5). If such service is rendered wholly within port/airport premises, the same would be classifiable, w.e.f. 1-7-2010, under port/airport service. The list of specified services under Rule 6(5) does not include port /airport services. Hence, in such a case, benefit hitherto available under Rule 6 (5) would now not be available. This is an unintended consequence of the amendment.

Part A : Health check-up and treatment services

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Service Tax

1. Introduction :


Considering medical or health-related services as essential
services, the Government in the past consciously kept them out of the ambit of
service tax. India being a developing economy, it is hardly able to provide any
social security to its soaring population. A small class of this huge mass is
covered under health insurance schemes floated by various insurance companies.
In the current fiscal, however, the Government decided to levy service tax on
limited health-related preventive care and treatment services provided by
hospitals, nursing homes and multi-speciality clinics under specified conditions
as set out vide the Finance Act, 2010 and notified to come into effect from July
01, 2010.

2. Statutory provisions of health check-up and treatment
services are provided below :


S. 65(105)(zzzzo) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) :

“Taxable service means any service provided or to be
provided by any hospital, nursing home or multi-specialty clinic, —

(i) to an employee of any business entity, in relation to
health check-up or preventive care, where the payment for such check-up or
preventive care is made by such business entity directly to such hospital,
nursing home or multi-specialty clinic; or

(ii) to a person covered by health insurance scheme, for
any health check-up or treatment, where the payment for such health check-up
or treatment is made by the insurance company directly to such hospital,
nursing home or multi-specialty clinic.

3. Scope and coverage :


3.1 Perusal of the above provisions indicates that the
following essential ingredients are required for being covered within the
purview of the above category of service :


  • Who are service providers ?


  • The service should be provided by a hospital, a nursing
    home or a multi-specialty clinic.


  • Who are service receivers ?



  • The service receiver should be; either


    any employee of a business entity; or



    a person covered by a health insurance scheme.




  • What essentially constitutes a service covered under the law ?



  • The service should essentially relate to :

    – 
    Health check-up or preventive care for an employee of a business entity;



    Health check-up or treatment in case of any person covered by a health
    insurance scheme.




    • Under which condition, the service is considered taxable ?



    When the payment is made directly :


    either by a business entity; or



    by an insurance company to the hospital, nursing home or multi-specialty
    clinic, as the case may be, the service is considered taxable.


    3.2 Before analysing further, we consider below the relevant
    extract of Ministry’s Circular letter DOF No. 334/1/2010-TRU (Annexure A), dated


    26-2-2010 issued immediately after presentation of the Finance Bill, 2010.

    “2.2 A large number of health insurance schemes are being
    offered by the insurance companies, under which charges for hospitalisation,
    surgery, post-surgical nursing, etc. are generally paid by the insurance
    company. Such insurance policies, which fall under the category of general
    insurance service, are already taxable. Under general insurance service, an
    insurance company is a service provider to its clients. Under the proposed new
    service, tax is also being imposed on the medical charges paid by the insurance
    companies to the hospitals on behalf of a business entity for its employees. As
    such, the insurance company would be the service receiver and the tax paid by
    the hospital would be available to the insurance companies as credit.

    2.3 The tax on the above-mentioned health



    services would be payable only if and to the extent the payment for such medical
    check-up or treatment, etc. is made directly by the business entity or the
    insurance company to the hospital or medical establishment.
    Any additional
    amount paid by the individual (i.e., the employee or the insured, as the case
    may be) to the hospital would not be subject to service tax. This is to ensure
    that an individual is not required to pay a tax for which he cannot take
    credit.” (emphasis supplied).

    The above clearly indicates that when the payment by a business entity or an insurance company is made directly to any hospital, nursing home or multi-speciality clinic (hereinafter referred to as ‘hospitals’ for all the three) in relation to health check-up or treatment, etc., service tax is attracted. However the words, ‘hospital’, ‘nursing home’ and ‘multi- speciality clinic’ are not defined under the service tax provisions. Therefore, these terms have to be understood as per their common parlance meanings. Hospitals would include all kinds of hospitals whether Central or State Government, private or charitable. Hospitals are generally institutions having a large set-up with many ‘in-house’ curative and diagnostic facilities. Nursing homes as opposed to hospitals are smaller versions of hospitals providing basic and skilled nursing care under doctor’s supervision, but having a limited treatment facility. They are more often than not used for those patients requiring long-term facility where hospitalisation is not required but health care at home is difficult. Multi-speciality clinics are generally those establishments, which are jointly managed by several specialists using common infrastructure facilities.

    3.3 The next important aspect in the statutory provisions is recipients of services. The employees of any business entity are covered. The term ‘business entity’ is defined by S. 65(19b) of the Act as ‘business entity includes an association of persons, body of individuals, company or firm, but does not include an individual’.

    Thus, service tax liability for hospitals arises when the payment is received by them from any business entity directly for its employee/s. Similarly, the service tax is also payable by the hospitals when the payment is made directly by the insurance company to such hospitals for health check-up or medical treatment given to persons covered under the health insurance schemes. These schemes in common parlance are known as mediclaim policies.

    3.4    Health check-up, preventive care and medical treatment services:

    •     Health check-up or preventive care for employees of business entity:


    Health check-up would generally cover periodic or annual physical examination or tests of various organs including diagnostic tests under health check- up schemes. The other term used in sub-clause (i) of the definition is ‘preventive care’. This may also either interchangeably be used for the health check-up or it may mean as little extension of health check-up and would cover measures to prevent a disease from occurring as against curing a disease. Thus preventive care would certainly pre-suppose undergoing physical examination and/ or diagnostic tests and post- diagnostic measures or programmes, but payment made by a business entity for any curative treatment would not be covered for the levy of service tax.

    •     Health check-up or treatment provided to persons covered under health insurance schemes:

    When an insurance company pays directly for a health cover of a policy holder (which in common parlance is known as “cashless policy”) whether for health check-up or for any medical treatment, service tax is payable by the hospitals. Instead, when a person insured at the threshold pays directly to the hospital for the health check-up or medical treatment and subsequently claims reimbursement, no service tax is required to be charged or paid by the hospital. Further, under mediclaim policies of this kind, when various medical treatments also get covered, service tax would be attracted.

        Exemptions:

    No specific exemption is provided to any person or any service as the scope of the category of service itself is limited to certain services and when paid directly by any business entity or insurance company. However, general exemptions applicable to all other taxable services apply to this service as well. These exemptions are services provided to the United Nation or other international organisations under Notification No. 16/2002-ST, dated 2-8-2002, services provided to a developer or unit of Special Economic Zone under Notification No. 9/2009-ST, dated 3-3- 2009 and services provided to foreign diplomatic mission or diplomat agents or career consular officials, etc. under Notifications No. 33/2007 -ST and No. 34/2007-ST, both dated 23-5-2007 as per terms and conditions mentioned under respective notifications.

        Some issues:

    5.1 Company A, a manufacturing company as per its policy provides facility of health check -up as well as various medical/surgical treatments to its employees at empanelled hospitals. The treatments include bypass surgery, hernia, various orthopedic surgeries, angioplasty, ENT surgeries, etc. The Company’s employee, Mr. X was hospitalised and had to undergo a bypass surgery in October 2010. The Company paid directly to the hospital for his hospitalisation, surgery and related other expenses including diagnostic tests. Whether the hospital is obliged to pay service tax on the above and therefore collect it in its invoice on Company A?

    5.1A Vis-à-vis employees of a ‘business entity’, only the services in relation to health check-up or preventive care are specifically covered. When an employee is admitted to a hospital for a bypass surgery, it would mean a medical and surgical treatment to remove and cure blockages in the arteries. This service is not covered in sub-clause of S. 65(105)(zzzzo). The first sub-clause is specific to the employees of a business entity, wherein only services in relation to health check-up or preventive care are covered. Therefore the hospital is not liable to pay service tax in the invoice raised on Company A.

    5.2 Many insurance companies appoint Third Party Administrators (TPAs) for facilitating payment to hospitals on their behalf. Often the hospitals therefore raise bills on such TPAs. Whether service tax is to be levied by the hospitals?

    TPAs act on behalf of the insurance companies. Their services are outsourced by the insurance companies for administration, management and processing of hospital bills. Even if the invoices are issued by hospitals on such TPAs, generally the payment is made by the insurance company as the person is insured by the insurance company. The payment in terms of the legal provisions discussed above would be treated as made by the insurance companies and subject to fulfilment of other requirements discussed above would be liable for service tax. This comment is however subject to specific terms and conditions of the agreement between an insurance company and a TPA.

    5.3 Many corporate entities like airlines, shipping companies or other multinational companies while recruiting new employees require them to undergo medical examination/fitness tests and pay directly to the hospital for the same. Whether this would also attract service tax?

    5.3A Technically, the persons, prior to their being recruited, are not employees of the organisation and therefore they are not covered by the insurance scheme meant for the employees. The definition as discussed above specifically covers employees only and therefore medical examination for persons other than employees would not attract service tax. However, unless the concerned corporate notifies the hospital as to the tests/ examination conducted for non-employees, the hospital would not be able to distinguish since they receive payment directly from corporates against their invoices raised on them; they would assume their service tax liability on such invoices as well.

    5.4 Whether pathology laboratories conducting blood tests would also be considered part of health check-up and therefore liable for service tax?

    5.4A There is a taxing entry ‘technical testing and analysis’ notified in S. 65(106) of the Act. Under this clause, an explanation is provided whereby testing and analysis for determination of nature of diseased condition, identification of disease, prevention of any disease or disorder on human being or animals is specifically excluded. When specific exclusion is provided under one taxing entry, it would not be under another taxing entry. Further, the overall physical check-up undertaken under a mediclaim policy may include pathological tests conducted at a hospital. But the definition above in S. 65(105) (zzzzo) specifically includes only three kinds of service providers viz. hospitals, nursing homes and multi-speciality clinics, but does not include pathological laboratories.

    5.5 In most cases of claims submitted by a person under health insurance/mediclaim policies for medical or surgical treatments, it is observed that substantial amount in a hospital invoice includes cost towards medicines, implants or stent, etc. and other consumables. Whether service tax is chargeable on the entire amount of invoice including the value of supply of goods also?

    5.5A As it is known, Notification No. 12/2003-ST, dated 20-6-2003 in unambiguous terms exempts value of goods and material sold or supplied during the course of providing services. Many rulings have been pronounced by judicial forum, whereby the principle is upheld that supply of goods (which is chargeable to VAT) cannot be subject to service tax, as service tax is levied on the value of taxable services. However, as per requirement of the above Notification, whether value of ‘goods’ supplied is indicated in the invoice or whether any other documentary evidence thereof is available, etc. Therefore, the liability of service tax would have to be determined on a case-to-case basis.

    Legal consultancy services

    1. Introduction :

        Service tax has been introduced on Legal Consultancy Services, through an amendment by Finance Act, 2009. The levy has been notified w.e.f. 1-9-2009. Hence, Service tax would be payable on Services provided on or after 1-9-2009.

    2. Statutory provisions :

        The relevant extracts from the Finance Act; 1994, as amended (‘Act’) are reproduced hereafter for ready reference :

         S. 65(105) (zzzzm) of the Act :

        Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided :

        To a business entity, by any other business entity, in relation to advice, consultancy or assistance in any branch of law, in any manner :

        Provided that any service provided by way of appearance before any court, tribunal or authority shall not amount to taxable service.

        Explanation — For the purposes of this sub-clause, ‘business entity’ includes an association of persons, body of individuals, company or firm, but does not include an individual;

    3. Scope of services :

        (a) The scope of services liable to Service tax, as explained through Dept. Circular [DOF No. 334/B/2009 — TRU dated 6-7-2009], is as under :

        Para 2.3

        As in the case of management consultancy or engineering consultancy service, any consultancy, advice or technical assistance provided in any discipline of law is proposed to be subjected to service tax. However, the tax would be limited to services provided by a business entity to another business entity. It has been defined that a business entity includes firms, associates, enterprises, companies, etc. but does not include an individual. Thus, services provided by an individual advocate either to an individual or even to a business entity would be outside the scope of the taxable service. Similarly, the services provided by a corporate legal firm to an individual would also be outside the purview of taxable service. Any service of appearance before any court of law or any statutory authority would also be kept outside this levy.

        (b) In all Other Taxable Services, even an Individual Service Provider is liable to Service tax. However that is not the case in respect of Legal Consultants.

        (c) For levy of Service tax under the head Legal Consultancy Services, there is no requirement that the ‘legal entity’ should be a member of the Bar Council of the respective state or any such body. Thus even a Sales Tax Practitioner/Income Tax Practitioner rendering services as a ‘business entity’, other than those providing services in their individual capacity, are required to pay Service tax. For that matter even retired officers of the Department providing services in the areas of Central Excise, Customs, Service tax etc. as a group would be covered. Thus, the Scope of Service is very wide so as to include large variety of Consultants including Document Writers, Marriage Counsellors, Passport and Visa Consultants, etc.

    4. Levy is discriminatory :

        In his Budget Speech for the year 2009-10, the Finance Minister explained the scope of the proposed levy in the following manner :

        “As the hon’ble Members are aware, services provided by Chartered Accountants, Cost Accountants and Company Secretaries as well as by engineering and management consultants are presently charged to Service Tax. Although there is a school of thought that legal consultants do not provide any service to their client, I hold my distinguished predecessor in high esteem and disagree ! As such, I propose to extend Service Tax on advice, consultancy or technical assistance provided in the field of law. This tax would not be applicable in case the service provider or the service receiver is an individual.”

        As stated earlier, a very pertinent aspect of the levy of Legal Consultancy Services is that, Service Providers rendering services in their individual capacity are kept out of the levy. There is no convincing reasoning given for the same by the Govt.

        In this regard, it needs to be noted that, various professional service providers (an illustrative list given hereafter) are liable to Service tax irrespective of the status of the Service Provider

    In regard to each of the above Professional Services, there are large number of Service Providers rendering services in their individual capacity, who are presently liable to Service tax. Particularly, in the context of Practising CAs, around 90% of the CAs are practising in their individual capacity.

    It would appear that, exclusion of individuals from the ambit of Legal Consultancy Services liable to Service tax, is discriminatory vis a vis Other Professional Service Providers. The same needs to be speedily addressed by the Govt.

    S. Some issues:

    S.l LAW 1 is a partnership firm of advocates & solicitors practising in the areas of litigations as well as consultations. As at 1-9-2009, LAW1 has out-standing advances to the tune of Rs.S crores which could be for the following services:

        a) Taxable  services

        b) Exempt

        c) Out  of pocket  reimbursements

    Law 1 wants to know its Service tax obligations and time limit within which Service tax liability is to be discharged by them in regard to the advances out-standing as at 1-9-2009.

    5.1A Though service tax payment to government is linked to receipt of consideration for services (either actual or advance), taxable event for levy of Service Tax, is ‘provision of or rendering Service’ and not ‘Receipt of Consideration’. Hence, it would reasonably appear that, LA W1 would be liable to Service Tax on advances received prior to 1-9-2009 for Tax-able Services provided on or after 1-9-2009.

    In this regard, it would become essential for LAW1, to identify outstanding advances vis-a-vis taxable services/exempt services and out of pocket expenses.

    This position is impliedly made clear under Rule 6(1) of Service Tax Rules, relevant extracts of which are reproduced hereafter:

    Rule 6(1) – Payment of Service Tax

    The service tax shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 5th of the month immediately following the calendar month in which the payment are received, towards the value of taxable services :

    Provided that where the assessee is an individual or proprietary firm or partnership firm, the service tax shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 5th of the month immediately following the quarter in which the payments are received, towards the value of taxable services:

    Provided further
    that notwithstanding the time of receipt of payment towards the value of services, no service tax shall be payable for the part or whole of the value of services, which is attributable to services provided during the period when such services were not taxable:

    Provided also that the service tax on the value of taxable service received during the month of March, or the quarter ending in March, as the case may be, shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government by the 31st day of March of the calendar year.

    Explanation – For the removal of doubt it is hereby clarified that in case the value of taxable service is received before providing the said service, service tax shall be paid on the value of service attributable to the relevant month, or quarter, as the case may be.

    It is felt that, if conditions under ten lakh exemption notification are satisfied, the LAWl can avail Exemption upto 10 lakhs for the period 1-9-2009 to 31-3-2010.

    Service Tax liability would have to be discharged by LAWl in regard to Outstanding Advances which are attributable to taxable services by 5th October, 2009.

    5.2 MR SMART is an individual lawyer practising in the Sole Proprietorship firm name of ‘SMART SOLUTIONS’. Due to conflicting views being expressed by professionals, MR SMART is confused as to whether or not he is liable to Service tax under legal consultancy services. Kindly advise MR SMART.

    5.2A The Explanation to S. 65(105)(zzzzm) of the Act reads  as under  :

    For the purpose of this sub-clause, ‘business entity’ includes an association of persons, body of individuals, company or firm, but does not include an individual.

    It is a reasonably settled position that a proprietory concern is only a business name in which a proprietor carries on his business. It has no independent legal status.

    In this regard useful reference can be made to Ashok Transport Agency v. Awadhesh Kumar, (1998) 5 SCC 567 & SK Real Estates v. Ahmed Meeran, (2002) 111 Comp Cases 400 (Mad.).

    Hence, it would appear that, MR SMART would be excluded from the ambit of Legal Consultancy Services introduced w.e.f. 1-9-2009.

    However, it is possible that, service tax authorities could adopt a view that a firm as a business entity would include a proprietary concern. It is felt that, CBEC should issue appropriate clarifications to avoid litigations.

    5.3 The proviso to S. 65(105)(zzzzm) of the Act, reads as under:

    “Service providing by way of appearance before Court, Tribunal or other Authority shall not amount to taxable Service.

    It is very common that several services related to appearances are also provided by lawyers like drafting of replies to notices, drafting of appeals and stay petitions, compilation of submissions, etc.

    Whether services related to appearances would be excluded from the ambit of legal consultancy services liable to service tax.

    5.3A It needs to be expressly noted that the exemption granted in regard to legal consultancy services is differently worded as compared to exemption to practising CA.

    Exemption granted to practising CAs and others in terms of Notification No. 25 /06-ST dated 13-7-2006 reads as under :

    Services provided or to be provided in professional capacity, to a client, relating to representing the client before any statutory authority in the course of proceedings initiated under any law for the time being in force, by way of issue of notice ..

    Further, appearance before the statutory authorities in respect of practising chartered accountants, cost accountants and company secretaries is exempt, but exemption is available only if such appearance is in pursuance to a notice. In the case of legal consultancy services, such services are exempt even if appearance is not in pursuance to a notice.

    On a plain reading of proviso to S. 65(105)(zzzzm) stated above, it appears that, services related to appearances before Court/Tribunal/etc. like drafting, consultations, study & research, etc. may strictly not be regarded as exempt service. The terminology ‘in or in relation to’ extensively employed in the Finance Act, 1994 is not found in the proviso to S. 65(105)(zzzzm) of the Act.

    Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004

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    4. Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 :


    4.1 Input Service :


    Definition of input service with reference to any service
    used by a manufacturer is amended and thereby restricted to include only those
    services which are directly or indirectly used in relation to the manufacture of
    final products and clearance of final products up to the place of removal
    instead of ‘from the place of removal’.

    Since the integration of credit rules vide CENVAT Credit
    Rules, 2004 to facilitate credit of central excise duty and service tax across
    goods and services, divergent views prevailed to interpret the term ‘input
    service’ and more particularly, in the context of a manufacturer. On one hand,
    services such as those in relation to modernisation, renovation, sales
    promotion, market research and even auditing, credit rating, share registry,
    etc. are specifically termed as input services and on the other hand in the
    context of transportation of goods in a number of disputes, beginning with the
    case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. CCE, Ludhiana 2007 (6) STR 249
    (Tri.-Del.), the meaning of the term ‘input service’ was interpreted narrowly,
    and accordingly, credit of service tax paid on outward transportation of
    manufactured goods in a process of sale was not considered allowable. In a
    number of decisions, this decision was followed. However, in case of India
    Cement & Others v. CCE,
    Tirupati 2007 (8) STR 43 (Tri.-Bang), it was held
    that it is well covered within the main part of the definition and will squarely
    fall within the meaning of the words ‘used in or in relation to the manufacture
    of final products’ to constitute ‘input service.’ Considering diverse opinion on
    interpretation of the term by the two Co-ordinate Benches, the matter has been
    referred to a Larger Bench of the Tribunal of which the decision is still
    awaited. The decision for all practical purposes will impact only cases pending
    once this issue for the period until February, 2008 as post March 01, 2008, the
    amendment in the definition has restricted the coverage. The question that
    arises in any rational mind is that on one hand the Government made a move
    forward in the direction of value added concept by specifically extending credit
    in respect of service tax paid on activities relating to business such as
    coaching and training, computer networking, credit rating, etc. which do not
    have a direct relationship with manufacturing activity and also allowing credit
    on post-manufacturing expenses of advertisement, sales promotion and market
    research. What rationale is applied in narrowing the meaning in another context
    in the same definition by modifying the words ‘from the place’ to ‘up to the
    place’ ? The otherwise liberal and wide purview of the expression ‘whether
    directly or indirectly in or in relation to the manufacture of final products

    appeared harmonious with the inclusive part of the definition prior to the
    amendment and therefore the restriction appears not only inconsistent and
    contradictory within the language of the definition, but also with the spirit of
    extension of CENVAT credit and therefore, can be described as a backward step
    from the movement towards the Goods and Service Tax (GST).

    4.2 Introduction of proportionate CENVAT
    credit :


    Given the complexities in multifarious business enterprises,
    examined below primarily is provision of Rule 6(2) of the CENVAT Credit Rules,
    2004 (CCR) :

    4.2.1 Rule 6(2) of CCR :


    Where a manufacturer or provider of output service avails
    of CENVAT credit in respect of any inputs or input services and manufactures
    such final products or provides such output service which are chargeable to duty
    or tax as well as exempted goods or services, then, the manufacturer or provider
    of output service shall maintain separate accounts for receipt, consumption and
    inventory of input and input service meant for use in the manufacture of
    dutiable final products or in providing output service and the quantity of input
    meant for use in the manufacture of exempted goods or services and take CENVAT
    credit only on that quantity of input or input service which is intended for use
    in the manufacture of dutiable goods or in providing output service on which
    service tax is payable.

    How does one maintain separate accounts for receipt,
    consumption and inventory of input services
    meant for use in output service
    and exempted service ? Unlike goods, quantification of services cannot be done
    precisely and especially in case of services like telephone, security, auditing,
    management consultancy, maintenance or repairs and many others, except
    segregating on proportional basis, no other method is possible to maintain
    separate account of receipt and consumption. In the scenario, condition of
    maintaining separate accounts of receipt and consumption of input services used
    for taxable output services and exempted services appears unrealistic. This is
    besides the fact that the term ‘inventory’ being inapplicable to ‘input
    services’, is faultily used in the context thereof. As a result, until 31st
    March 2008, the only option left was to utilise only twenty percent of CENVAT
    credit in case of all service providers providing both taxable and exempted
    services and this led to huge accumulation of unutilised CENVAT credit balance
    appearing as an asset in books of account.

    4.2.2 New substitution :


    An attempt now is made to overcome this by substituting the
    said Rule 6(3) of the CCR with effect from April 01, 2008 by introducing an
    option for a manufacturer to pay 10% of the value of exempted goods and for
    service provider to pay 8% of the value of exempted services. In the
    alternative, the manufacturer or the output service provider is required to pay
    an amount equal to CENVAT credit attributable to inputs and input services used
    for the manufacture of exempted goods or for providing exempted services, as the
    case may be. The procedure for determining the portion of duty of service tax
    inputs or input services is specified in Rule 6(3A).



    • Whichever option a manufacturer or an output service provider may exercise
      under the sub-rule 6(3), the option is not permitted to be withdrawn during a
      financial year.



    Business Restructuring & CENVAT Credit

    1 Business Restructuring :

        In the fast changing corporate environment, business restructuring has become very common. Some of the more common modes of business restructuring are as under :

    •      Merger/Amalgamation of Companies
    •      Takeover of One Company by Another
    •      De-Merger of Companies
    •      Sale of Business
    •      Transfer of Business to a Joint Venture
    •      Lease of Business to Another Company
    •      Conversion of Partnership into a Company
    •     Restructuring through part IX of the Companies Act, 1956.

        The Finance Act, 1994 and Service Tax Rules, 1994 do not contain specific provisions for implications arising out of different modes of business restructuring. However, CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) contain Rules for transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance under certain circumstances.

    2 General Implications :

        On amalgamation or merger, the running business of amalgamating entity as going concern, vests by virtue of Court Order in the amalgamated entity. The amalgamated entity thus steps into the shoes of the amalgamating entity and takes over all assets and liabilities including rights under contracts/agreements, etc. of amalgamating entity without break in continuity of business.

    3 CENVAT Credit :

        The provisions contained in Rule 10 of CCR are briefly stated as under :

            a) Transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance in CENVAT Credit Account from the Transferor to the Transferee is permitted in case of change in ownership or change in site resulting from the following :

                – Sale

                – Merger

                – Amalgamation

                – Lease or

                – Transfer to a joint venture

            b) The arrangement of transfer should explicitly provide for transfer of liabilities of the old factory/business.

            c) According to Rule 10(3) of CCR, transfer of CENVAT Credit shall be allowed only if the stock of inputs or in process or capital goods are also transferred along with the factory or business premises to the new site or ownership. Further, the same are to be duly accounted to the satisfaction of the Dy Commissioner/Asst Commissioner of Central Excise. (DC / AC).

    4 Some Issues :

    4.1 What is Sale, Merger, Amalgamation, etc. for the purpose of CCR :

    The different modes of business restructing specified under Rule 10(1) of CCR are not defined under CCR. Hence, recourse would have to be made to meanings attributed to the said terms in common parlance/relevant statutes/judicial pronouncements, etc.

    Some of the meanings attributed to the different modes of restructuring under Dictionaries/Judicial Rulings, etc., are given hereafter for ready reference :

    a) Sale :

    According to Section 2(h) of Central Excise Act, 1944

    ‘Sale’ and ‘purchase’ with their grammatical variations and cognate expressions, mean any transfer of the possession of goods by one person to another in the ordinary course of trade or business for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration.

    b) Merger/Amalgamation :

    •  According to HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND : “Neither reconstruction nor ‘amalgamation’ has a precise legal meaning.”

    •  ‘Amalgamation’ is a blending of two or more existing undertakings into one undertaking, the shareholders of each blending company becoming substantially the shareholders in the company which is to carry on the blended undertaking. There may be amalgamation either by transfer of two or more undertakings to a new company or by the transfer of one or more undertakings to an existing company. [Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. VII, para 1539 (Page 855). [See also Baytrust Holdings Ltd. vs. I.R.C. (1971) 3 All ER 76 : (1971) 1 WLR 1333 : Brooklands Selangor Holdings Ltd. vs. Inland Revenue Commissioner, (1970) 2 All ER 76 (Ch D].

    •  The term ‘amalgamation’ contemplates not only a state of things in which two companies are so jointed as to form a new company, but also the absorption and blending of one by the other. [Re. : Walker’s Settlement, (1935) 1 Ch 567 : (1935) 5 Com Cases 412]

    • In a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ‘amalgamation’ is explained as a state of things under which either two companies are so jointed as to form a third entity or one is absorbed into or blended with another. [Cf. S. S. Samayajulu vs. Hope Prudhomme & Co. Ltd., (1963) 2 Comp LJ 61 (AP).]

    c) Transfer :

    The word ‘transfer’ is comprehensive and is regarded generally as comprehending within its scope transfers both voluntary and involuntary. In the absence of distinct genus or category, no presumption can arise that the word ‘transfer’ must be construed in the sense of a voluntary act of transfer since ‘sale’ ‘exchange’ or ‘relinquishment’ are, in the normal acceptation of those terms, voluntary acts. The words (a) sale, (b) exchange, (c) relinquishment, and (d) transfer must, accordingly, be given their plain and natural meaning and there is no justification for restricting the wide comprehension of the last of the four words to voluntary transfers by the application of the ejusdem generis rule. [Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. CIT 113 ITR 655 (SC)]

    d) Joint Venture :

    Joining together of two or more business entities or persons in order to undertake a specific business venture. A joint venture is not a continuing relationship such as a partnership. [Barron’s Dictionary of Accounting Terms]

    e) Lease :

    • An agreement whereby the lessor conveys to the lessee, in return for rent, the right to use an asset for an agreed period of time. [‘Guidance note on accounting for leases’ issued by ICAL]

    • An agreement conveying the right to use property, plant, or equipment (land or  depreciable assets,) usually for specified purposes and for  a stated period of time. [Dictionary for accountants by Kohler.]

    • Legal agreement whereby the lessee uses real or personal property of the lessor for a rental charge. The contract may provide for the time period of lease, designated purposes and restrictions. [Barron’s Dictionary for accounting terms.]

    4.2 Modes of business restructuring not specified under CCR:

    Rule 10 of CCR provides for transfer of Unutilised CENVAT Credit Balance only in 5 specific situations, viz. Sale, Merger, Amalgamation, Lease or Transfer to a Joint Venture. A question could arise as to what would happen in a case not strictly falling under the aforesaid specific situations. Strictly speaking there could be practical difficulties.

    However, as regards situations which are strictly not covered by Rule 10(1) of CCR, it is felt that though the sub-rule does not contain clear-cut provision, since the procedures prescribed under the erstwhile Proforma Credit Scheme would apply mutatis mutandis to the MODV AT [CENVAT] Scheme, a recourse could be made to the procedure laid down in Ministry’s Circular No. 14 / 79, dated 7-4-1979 in terms of erstwhile Rule 56A(6) of erstwhile Central Excise Rules. It would appear that the same would be equally relevant for CCR.

    4.3 Capital Goods:

    Under CCR, in regard to capital goods, only 50% of the Credit can be availed in the year of receipt and balance 50% can be availed only in the subsequent year.

    In this regard, Rule 4(2)(b) of CCR is reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

    “The balance of CENV AT credit may be taken in any financial year subsequent to the financial year in which the capital goods received in the factory of the manufacturer, or in the premises of the provider of output service, if the capital goods other than components, spares and accessories, refractories and refractory materials, moulds and dies and goods falling under [heading 6805, grinding wheels and the like, and parts thereof falling under heading 6804] of the First Schedule to the Excise Tariff Act, are in the possession of the manufacturer of final products, or provider of output service in such subsequent years.

    Hence, in case of business restructuring, if 50%” of credit is availed by a Tranferor company prior to merger, issues could arise as to whether in- such cases balance 50% can be availed by the new Transferee entity after merger.

    In the case of Shri Chamundeshwari Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CCE (2007) 217 ELT 65 (Tri.-Bang) capital goods were leased out with the unit and 50% of duty credit was availed wherein the unit was not in possession of lessee. However, the entry was reversed and Cenvat Credit was never utilised. Under the said circumstances, the Tribunal held that availment of credit was irregular, but in view of reversal, penalty and interest was not imposable.

    It would appear that the matter needs to be addressed through appropriate amendment under CCR.

    4.4 Transfer of all assets & liabilities:

    Rule 10(3) of CCR specifically provides that transfer of business of a service provider, should specifically provide for transfer of liabilities of such business.

    An issue that arises for consideration is, whether in cases where through inadvertence a specific mention is not made in the takeover document for transfer of liabilities, can the Service Tax Authorities deny transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance at the end of transferor?

    In the case of Reliance Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. vs. CC & CE (2007)215 ELT 254 (Tri.-Mum), the takeover document did not specify that the Transferee took over the liabilities also of the Transferor with assets. However, at the time of surrender of registration, the Transferee had by way of letters, undertaken to assume the liabilities of the Transferor arising on and after the date of transfer. In light of the above, the Tribunal held that there was sufficient compliance of Rule 10(2) of CCR.

    Despite the above ruling, it would appear that proper care should be taken while drafting takeover documents.

    4.5 Existence of Stocks at the end of Transferor:

    Rule 10(3) of CCR provides that transfer of CENVAT Credit shall be allowed only if stock of inputs/Capital goods is also transferred alongwith the business premises and inputs/ Capital goods on which Credit has been availed of are duly accounted to the satisfaction of DC/ AC.

    An issue that arises for consideration is, whether physical existence of stocks of inputs/Capital goods is necessary, for transfer of UnutiIised Credit Balance at the end of transferor to the transferee.

    It is a settled principle laid down by the Supreme Court in CCE vs. Dai [chi Karkaria Ltd. (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC) that MODVAT/ CENVAT mechanism does not require one to one correlation between inputs and outputs.

    There has been a consistent attempt by the Central Excise Dept. to deny transfer of Unutilised Credit Balance in cases where there are no physical stocks at the end of the transferor .

    However, the trend of judicial rulings appears to be consistent as well, to the effect that existence of physical stocks is not necessary if other conditions under CCR are complied with. In this regard, reference can be made to the following rulings:

    • Aar Aay Products vs. CCE, (2003)157 ELT 40 (Tri.-Delhi).
    • CCE vs. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., (2005) 191 ELT 660 (Tri.-Chennai)
    • CCE vs. Smithkline Beecham Consumer Health Care Ltd., (2007)209ELT96 (Tri.-Chennai).
    • Shree Ram Multi-Tech Ltd. vs. CCE, (2007) 217 ELT 136 (Tri.-Chennai).
    • Kevin Enterprises  Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, (2007) 219 ELT 181 (Tri.-Mumbai).

    4.6 Transfer of Unutilised CENV AT Credit in proportion to duties paid in stocks at the time of transfer

    Efforts are often being made by the Central Excise Authorities to restrict the transfer of Unutilised CENVAT Credit Balance to the extent of duties paid in stocks at the time of transfer.

    As stated earlier, since no one-to-one correlation is required between inputs and outputs, matching of duties in Stocks and Balancein CENVAT Credit Account would be against the settled principles laid down by the .r Supreme Court.

    In this regard, attention is drawn to a recent Madras High Court ruling in CCE vs. CEST AT (2008)230 ELT 209 (MAD) wherein it has been held that CENVAT Credit Rules do not require transfer of Credit corresponding only to the quantum of inputs transferred.

    Goods Transport Agency — (GTA) Service

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    3. Goods Transport Agency — (GTA) Service :


    Hitherto, recipient of service of a goods transport agency
    paying service tax on 25% of the value of transport freight, faced difficulty in
    claiming abatement of 25% without producing evidence of ful-filment of
    conditions of non-availment of CENVAT credit and/or non-utilisation of benefit
    under Notification No. 12/2003-ST. The evidence was presented by obtaining a
    declaration from each GTA as to fulfilment of the above conditions. Collection
    and maintenance of such declarations and presenting to the Department was found
    to be a difficult exercise. Further, for the field formations also, it was
    cumbersome to verify the required declarations in order to satisfy the
    conditions laid down under the Notification. To free the abatement provision for
    GTA from the conditions laid down under Notification No. 1/2006-ST, a separate
    Notification No. 13/2008-ST has been issued. However, simultaneously, definition
    of the term ‘output service’ is amended in the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR)
    to exclude GTA service therefrom. Thus, no CENVAT credit can be availed by a GTA
    service provider. It may be noted at this point that consequentially, the
    Government has missed omitting sub-clause (zzp) of clause (105) relating to
    goods transport agency from the definition of ‘capital goods’ in Rule 2(a)(B) of
    the CCR. Nevertheless, receiver of service of GTA paying service tax at an
    effective abated rate of 3.09% can claim CENVAT credit of service tax paid on
    GTA service, if the same is ‘input service’ for the purposes of CENVAT Credit
    Rules, 2004 of service tax paid on GTA service.

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    Threshold exemption under Notification No. 6/2005-ST

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    2. Threshold exemption under Notification No. 6/2005-ST :


    The threshold limit for small service providers has been
    increased from 8 lakh rupees to 10 lakh rupees for the Financial Year 2008-2009
    onwards. Consequently, the aggregate value of taxable services provided by a
    service provider during the Financial Year 2007-2008 up to a maximum of 10 lakh
    rupees would be eligible for the increased limit for the financial year
    2008-2009. To state in other words, if a person provided taxable services of
    aggregate value of Rs.8 lakh in the F.Y. 2007-08, he does not pay any service
    tax. However, if his taxable services exceed Rs.8 lakh, but do not exceed Rs.10
    lakh, he is liable to pay service tax @ 12.36% on the value of services by which
    the eight lakh limit is exceeded. For instance, if the aggregate value of
    services provided during F.Y. 2007-2008 is Rs.9.50 lakh, service tax on Rs.1.50
    lakh would be payable. However, since the aggregate value of taxable services
    has not exceeded Rs.10 lakh, no service tax would be required to be paid until
    the aggregate value of taxable services provided exceeds Rs.10 lakh in the F.Y.
    2008-2009. Consequently, upon upward revision of the threshold exemption limit,
    the turnover limit for obtaining registration is also increased from Rs.7 lakh
    to Rs.9 lakh.

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    Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax), Rules, 2007

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    1. Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax), Rules,
    2007 :


    Works contract service was notified with effect from June 01,
    2007. Simultaneously, Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service
    Tax) Rules, 2007 (Composition Scheme) were prescribed. Service providers of
    works contract service in accordance therewith enjoyed an option to pay service
    tax under Composition Scheme @2% of the gross contract value, instead of paying
    12.36% on the service element of the contract value calculated in accordance
    with the method prescribed in Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules.

    After much controversy and following the ratio of decision in
    the case of Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2006 (3) STR 124
    (Trib.-Del) in a catena of Tribunal decisions, it was held that transactions of
    works contract could not be vivisected to levy service tax only on the portion
    of a composite contract. Consequently, works contract service was notified to
    levy service tax on the component other than that chargeable to VAT/sales tax.
    Considering that valuing service component in accordance with the method
    prescribed in Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules is not only lengthy, but also
    questionable at any point of time, exercising option of the Composition Scheme
    was advantageous on all counts including presumptive tax rate of 2%, wherein
    liability would further get reduced as persons paying under the Scheme are
    eligible for CENVAT credit of service tax paid on input services.

    However, the Government vide its Circular No. 98/2007-ST,
    dated 4-1-2008 clarified that works contracts in process as on June 01, 2007
    were not eligible to register under the new category of services, as works
    contracts cannot be vivisected.

    This gave rise to a controversy as to whether the contracts
    in process were liable for service tax at all in terms of decisions in cases of
    Daelim Industrial Company (supra) and Larsen & Toubro, 2006 (3) STR 223
    (Tri.-Del) or they were liable under their respective categories like
    construction services or erection, commissioning and installation services.
    Works contractors who had registered under the relevant category and paid
    service tax after claiming abatement @67% of the gross value charged, faced a
    dilemma unless they decided to terminate the ongoing contract pending
    completion. The Circular issued by the Board being binding on the subordinate
    authorities of the Department, if contractors opted to pay service tax @2% under
    the Composition Scheme after registering under the works contract category,
    litigation would be inevitable. Approach of the Board meant dual standards. When
    a category like commercial construction service or erection, commissioning or
    installation was introduced, the Government did not mean to exclude the ongoing
    contracts from the purview of service tax, and accordingly, value of pending
    contract on the date of introduction of the relevant category was required to be
    offered for taxation. This indeed was independent of the questionability of
    coverage of works contract under the service tax law prior to introduction of
    category of works contract with effect from June 01, 2007.

    Given the above scenario, only the contracts executed post
    June 01, 2007 had the option of the Composition Scheme and the 2% rate of tax. A
    majority of works contracts of construction or commissioning or installation
    would involve a period longer than a year and in a number of cases even over two
    years. Therefore, within a period of nine months, insignificant number of works
    contracts undertaken after June 1, 2007 might have reached completion stage.
    From March 01, 2008, now vide Notification No. 77/2008-ST, the rate is increased
    to 4%.

    The increase in rate adversely affects all contractors who
    opted for the Composition Scheme, as the increase essentially means a dent on
    their margin. There is a view held by some professionals that doctrine of
    promissory estoppel should apply in this case. The poser is, whether legally
    does the increase in rate involve principle of promissory estoppel ? Rule 3(3)
    of the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax) Rules,
    2007 provides that option of paying service tax under these rules once exercised
    is not allowed to be withdrawn until the completion of a contract. Given the law
    that a person is not allowed to withdraw the option until the completion of the
    relevant works contract, how much weightage can be given to the Board’s Circular
    viz. DOF 334/1/2007-TPU of February 28, 2007, which inter alia
    stated :

    Under Composition Scheme, the assessee is required to pay
    2% of the total value of the works contract as service tax
    “. As
    against this, the scheme prescribed payment of “service tax equivalent to 2% on
    the gross amount charged for the works contract”
    . (emphasis supplied). The
    Circular being more of a clarificatory nature, cannot be beyond the scheme of
    the law, it appears doubtful to apply doctrine of promissory estoppel on the
    basis of a decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of CC Calcutta v.
    Indian Oil Corporation,
    2004 3 SCC-488 wherein it was held that departmental
    Circulars or Clarifications issued u/s.37B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 would
    be covered by the doctrine of ‘promissory estoppel’. The above Circular not
    being one u/s.37B, and more in the nature of issue of guidance note on
    introduction of new provision, challengeability of the increased rate on the
    above ground appears doubtful, although it is undoubtedly unfair on the part of
    the Government to double the rate of tax within nine months of its introduction.


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    Tribunal

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    III. Tribunal :


    1. Banking & other financial services : Receipt of payment of bills of
    client :



    Federal Bank Ltd. Ernakulam v. CCE Calicut, [2008 (10)
    STR 320 (Tri.-Bang)].

    Appellant received commission for collecting bills of
    customers of BSNL. The Department held the service as Business Auxiliary Service
    holding it as customer care service on behalf of client in terms of clauses
    (iii) and (vi) of S. 65(19). The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order
    along with penalties u/s.76 and u/s.77. In support of the claim of the Revenue,
    various judgments including the following were cited :



    •  Corporate Debt Management Services (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE-CST, 2007 (8)
      STR 261 (Tri.-Che.)



    • Bridgestone Financial Services v. CST Bangalore, 2007 (8) STR 505
      (Tri.-Bang.)



    The appellants contended that they neither promoted or
    marketed any service, nor were they recovery agents in order that they could be
    covered under Business Auxiliary Service. Therefore, the cited judgments were
    distinguished. They contended that ‘cash management’ was excluded from the
    definition of banking and other financial services in S. 65(12). The appellants
    referred to the judgment in the case of Dr. Lalpath Lab. Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE
    Ludhiana,
    2006 (4) STR 527 (Tri.-Del.), which acted as blood sample
    collection centres. The judgment was discussed at length in the final order and
    it was held by the Tribunal that “once there is a specific entry for item in the
    tax code, it cannot be taken out of that specific entry and taxed under a very
    general entry only because under the specific entry no tax is payable. This
    approach is contrary to the scheme of legislation.” Accordingly, holding ‘cash
    management’ as excluded service from the specific category of banking and other
    financial services, the order was set aside.

    (Note : ‘Cash management’ exclusion in S. 65(12)
    ceased to exist with effect from 1-6-2007).

    2. Business Auxiliary Services : Reduction in price given
    to purchasers of vehicles by DSAs of banks :



    CCE Jaipur v. Kamal Auto Industrial, [2008 TIOL 610
    CESTAT-Del.].

    The Revenue filed appeal against order of the Commissioner
    (Appeals), wherein respondent acted as direct selling and marketing agent
    besides being a vehicle dealer. Since the respondent refused to accept notice of
    the registry, the matter was decided ex-parte. The case of the Revenue
    was that the portion of ‘pay out’ given to purchasers of vehicles out of
    commission amount due to respondent, in respect of which even the TDS deducted
    was subject to Service Tax as commission paid to customers directly or through
    the banks would not change the nature of receipts in their hand. The facts of
    the case were found similar to the case of Chambal Motors (P) Ltd. (2007 TIOL
    1835 CESTAT-Del.) The case was remanded for fresh decision on merit in the light
    of the decision in Chambal Motors’ case.

    3. CENVAT credit : Different address on invoice than on
    Registration Certificate :



    Raaj Khosla & Company v. CCE, New Delhi [2008 TIOL 153
    CESTAT-Del.].

    The appellant was denied CENVAT credit of over Rs.5 lakh, on
    the ground of difference of address on the invoice from the address of the
    registration certificate. Later, all the addresses were registered including one
    on the invoice. Denial of credit was held as not sustainable. However, in
    respect of credit taken for telephone invoices in previous owner’s name although
    service was utilised by the appellant, denial of credit was upheld.

    4. Export of services : Indenting agent booking order for
    foreign suppliers :



    CST New Delhi v. M/s. CANI Merchandising P. Ltd., [2008
    619 CESTAT-Del.].

    The Revenue contended in this case that services
    were provided in India by the assessee and they were not to be treated as
    ‘export’, as the respondents
    situated in India, booked orders for foreign suppliers for supply of goods in
    India. The respondents contended this as exported services and filed a rebate
    claim under Rule 5 of the Export of services Rules, 2005. Since the Revenue’s
    contention of services not delivered outside India and also not used outside
    India was not considered by the adjudicating authority as well as by the
    Commissioner (Appeals), the matter was remanded for de novo adjudication.

    5. Import of services : Commission to overseas agents and
    applicable date :


    (i) CCE – Ludhiana v. Bhandari Hosiery Exports Ltd.,
    [2008 TIOL 604 CESTAT-Del.].

    The Revenue filed appeal against order, whereby demand for
    extended period and penalties were set aside. The assessee filed cross objection
    for the demand confirmed in the order. The assessee being exporter of hosiery
    goods, paid commission to overseas agents. Service Tax was demanded from
    9-7-2004 to February 2006, treating the assessee as receiver of services under
    Rule 2(1)(d)(iv). Following the decision in case of Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd.
    2007 (7) STR 443, it was held that prior to introduction of S. 66A, reverse
    charge did not apply and accordingly the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed and
    cross-objection of the assessee was allowed.

    (ii) Prabhat K. Tyagi v. CCE (appeals) Bangalore,
    [2008 (10) STR 240 (Tri.-Bang)].

    In this case also it was held that offshore services are
    liable to service only after insertion of S. 66A with effect from 18-4-2006
    where Foster Wheeler Eng. Ltd. 2007 (7) STR 443 (Tri.-Ahd.) was referred by the
    appellant and due cognizance was also taken of Circular No. 36/4/2001 of
    8-10-2001.

    6. Show-cause notice and out of pocket expense reimbursement:

    Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. v. CCE & S. Visakhapatnam, [2008 TIOL 679 CESTAT-Bang.].

    The show-cause notice had proposed demand of Service Tax under consulting engineer’s service. The amount represented Service Tax on different services including out of pocket expenses. The appellant relied on the following decisions, wherein it was held that even if services are within the purview of Service Tax, but if they do not conform to the alleged service in the show-cause notice, no Service Tax is payable:

    • Siemens Ltd. v. CST Bangalore, 2007 (8) STR 33 (Tri.-Bang.)

    • Volvo Ltd. v. CST Bangalore, 2007 (7) STR 600 (Tri.-Bang.)

    • Waters India P. Ltd. v. CST Bangalore, 2006 (4) STR 524 (Tri.-Bang.)

    Further, as regards out of pocket expenses on actual basis, Board’s clarification vide Trade Notice 5/98 Service Tax of 14-10-1998 and decision in case of Scott Wilson Kirkpatric (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CST Bangalore, 2007 (5) STR 118 (Tri.-Bang.) were relied upon by the appellant. The Tribunal on both the counts found the Revenue’s demand unsustainable.

    Judicial Rulings under Service Tax

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    7. Judicial Rulings under Service Tax :


    An illustrative list of rulings under Service Tax as regards
    invocation of extended period of 5 years is given hereafter for reference :

    (a) Appellants under bona fide impression that their
    activities would not come within the purview of Service tax under the category
    of Mandap Keeper — Demand restricted to normal period [Secretary, Town Hall
    Committee v.
    (2007) 8 STR 170 (Tri.-Bang.)

    (b) Audit objections stating that impugned services were
    liable to tax — Prima facie, thereafter, Department cannot allege
    suppression of facts and invoke larger period of limitation [Vikram Ispat
    v. Commissioner,
    (2007) 8 STR 559 (Tri.-Mumbai)]

    (c) Appellant supplied labour as per contract for packing,
    loading and unloading of cement. Department accepting coverage under manpower
    recruitment agency and collecting service tax not to argue for coverage under
    cargo handling service for prior period. Labourers rendering limited
    assistance only in entire activities and their role ancillary. Labour supply
    not to be equated with cargo handling involving interpretation of law and
    larger period of limitation not invocable — Demand of Service Tax, interest
    and penalty set aside [K. K. Appachan v. Commissioner, (2007) 7 STR 230
    (Tri.-Bang.).

    (d) Clarification not sought by appellant from Central
    Government as regards exemption —Details not declared u/s.73 of the Act
    extended period of limitation invocable. [Karnataka Govt. Insurance
    Department v. Commissioner,
    (2008) 9 STR 355 (Tri.-Bang.)]

    (e) Confusion on part of officers also as regards correct
    scope of services being provided by appellant — With introduction of new
    service, the activities undertaken by appellant were examined, notices issued
    but not pursued — Short levy, if any, is not on account of mala fide
    intention on part of appellant and no suppression on misstatement with a view
    to evade duty can be attributed to him — Demand barred by limitation [Velji
    P. & Sons (Agencies) P. Ltd. v. Commissioner,
    (2007) 8 STR 236 (Tri.-Ahmd.)]

    (f) Appellant selling aluminium products through
    consignment agents – Service Tax demanded holding consignment agents’ services
    covered under clearing and forwarding agent — Impugned order noting presence
    of conflicting views of Tribunal on taxability of consignment agent under
    clearing and forwarding agent — Extended period not invocable when different
    views prevalent on applicability of tax — Demand hit by time-bar — Appeal
    allowed on limitation — [Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner,
    (2007) 8 STR 27 (Tri.-Del.)]

    (g) Adjustment of excess payment towards payment of tax
    during later period — Return specifically mentioned the adjustment having been
    filed by respondents — Full facts of such adjustment remained disclosed by
    assessee [Demand time-barred [Commissioner v. Hexacom India Ltd.,
    (2006) 1 STR 110 (Tri.-Del).]

    (h) Suppression not alleged and extended time-period not
    invoked in show-cause notice — Reasons for invocation of larger period of
    limitation need to be clearly spelt out in SCN — Mere non–registration not
    sufficient to uphold suppression of facts [Mahakoshal Beverages Pvt. Ltd.
    v. Commissioner,
    (2006) 3 STR 334 (Tri.-Bang.)]

    (i) SCN bereft of any reasons to invoke larger period —
    Revenue to bring out proviso to larger period like suppression of facts,
    willful mis-statement with intent to evade Service tax — Such facts not
    brought out in show-cause notice — Demand for larger period not sustainable —
    [Elite Detectives Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, (2006) 4 STR 583 (Tri.-Bang.)]

    (j) Statements records from proprietor admitting liability
    to tax on 13-12-2000 and SCN issued on 7-12-2001 — No invocation of larger
    period in SCN — Department cannot enforce demand in SCN and due to inordinate
    delay in issuing SCN — Assessee paid Service Tax for initial period and
    thereafter due to loss in business, he failed to pay Service Tax — Demand for
    larger period set aside — [Free Look Outdoor Advertising v. Commissioner,
    (2006) 2 STR 102 (Tri.-Bang.)]

    (k) Suppression of facts and omission to pay Service Tax —
    Communication between appellants and foreign airlines supported by statements
    of their officials in India clearly show that they had knowledge of taxability
    of overriding commission — Appellants willfully not got themselves registered
    with Department under category of business auxiliary services for their
    Service Tax liability. Extended period of limitation invocable as suppression
    of facts and omission to pay Service Tax proved [ETA Travel Agency Pvt.
    Ltd. v. Commissioner,
    (2007) 7 STR 454 (Tri.-Bang.)

    (l) Repeated reminders sent by Department to an entity to
    get itself registered for Service Tax purposes — However, number of CBEC
    Circulars existing, wherein that entity could legitimately entertain bona
    fide
    belief that their activity was not liable to Service Tax — Extended
    period found not invocable especially as Department had knowledge of
    activities of the entity [Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Commissioner, (2006) 4
    STR 349 (Tri.-Mumbai)]

    (m) Returns filed on 22-10-1999, wherein adjustment in
    relation to Service Tax on DOT interconnected bills specifically mentioned —
    Reasons for adjustment being declared, suppression with intent to evade
    Service Tax not to be alleged in respect of SCN dated 20-4-2004 — Extended
    period of limitation not invocable, Demand time-barred [Commissioner v.
    Spiced Communication (P) Ltd.,
    (2006) 4 STR 74 (Tri.-Del.)]

    (n) SCN issued on ground that appellants, who are basically
    commission agents, are liable to pay Service Tax as clearing and forwarding
    agents — Issue involved interpretation of legal provisions — Appellants under
    bona fide belief that they are not covered by definition of clearing
    and forwarding agents, hence not applied for Service Tax registration and not
    followed subsequent procedures — No evidence to show that appellants
    suppressed information with an intention to evade payment of duty – Demand
    barred by limitation [NRC Ltd. v. Commissioner, (2007) 5 STR 308
    (Tri.-Mumbai)]

    o) ST-3 returns filed by appellants, wherein they had given entire particulars of amounts received by them from their clients – Reimburs-able amount received from clients also men-tioned in Annexure to Return – Chartered Accountant’s Certificate also produced – Lower authorities passed their orders without proper scrutiny of information contained is ST-3 returns – Longer period of limitation not invocable [Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick (I) Pvt. Ltd. CST, (2007) 5 STR 118 (Tri.-Bang.)]

    p) Appellants failed in their duty to inform the Department of their activity inviting Service Tax liability – Since intention to evade duty liability is established, benefit of time-bar not applicable [Bridgestone Financial Services v. CST, (2006) 4 STR 279 (Tri.-Bang).]

    q) Appellants sourcing customers for personal loans and housing loans – Promotion of services rendered by client – Activity comes under Business Auxiliary Services – Statement and records given but SCN issued after normal period – Bona fide belief on non-liability as per statement – No finding on willful suppression with intent to evade payment of Service Tax – Demand not sustainable on account of time-bar [Bridgestone Financial Services Commissioner, (2007) 8 STR. 505 (Tri. Bang).]

    r) Details and mode of computation of Service Tax being paid not disclosed in ST-3 form – Plea that there was bona fide belief that service was not taxable rejected and held that there was suppression of material facts – Invocation of extended period upheld [Bharti Cellular Ltd. v. Commissioner, (2006) 3 STR 423 (Tri.-Del.)]

    High Court

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    II. High Court :


    (i) No question of law arising out of Tribunal’s order :
    Clearing & forwarding agent :



    CCE Jalandhar v. United Plastomers, 2008 (10) STR 229
    (P&H).

    Respondent acted as consignment agent of IPCL. The issue
    involved was that of whether or not the service was that of clearing and
    forwarding agent or of commission agent under the Business Auxiliary Service
    category.

    The Tribunal had upheld the assessee’s plea that the services
    did not relate to clearing and forwarding agent’s services and had rejected the
    Department’s plea for enhancement of penalty which was reduced by the
    Commissioner (appeals). The Tribunal had also set aside penalty levied on
    Service Tax for subsequent period on the ground that the same was paid before
    the issue of show-cause notice. The Revenue strongly argued in favour of
    treating the agreement of the assessee with IPCL as Del Credre agent and
    the agreement as distributor to be falling in within the purview of C&F
    operation. They further submitted that the Tribunal had placed reliance on the
    case of Raja Rajeshwari Ind. Polymers Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE Bangalore, 2006
    (3) STR 561(T) itself was appealed against in the Karnataka High Court and also
    that the penalty was wrongly deleted by the Tribunal. The provisions of Business
    Auxiliary Service were discussed in this context by the appellant and they
    relied on Larger Bench’s decision of Larsen & Toubro v. CCE Chennai, 2006
    (37) STR 321 (Trib.-L.B). The Court dismissed the Revenue’s appeal, holding that
    there was no substantial question of law as the Tribunal had already examined
    the expressions ‘directly or indirectly’ and ‘in any manner’ in the definition
    of ‘clearing and forwarding agent’, and the Court held that while interpreting
    these expressions, they cannot be isolated from the activity of clearing and
    forwarding operations and the agent engaged only for processing orders on
    commission basis could not be considered as directly or indirectly engaged in
    clearing and forwarding operations.


    (ii) Import of
    services : Effective date :



    Union of India v. Aditya Cement, 2008 (10) STR 228 (Raj.)

    The Court ruled that order of the Tribunal that recipient was
    liable to Service Tax from 1-1-2005 and in the prior period liability could not
    be fastened on the recipient was found proper on examination of S. 65, S. 66, S.
    66A and S. 68 including Notification issued u/s.68(2). Revenue’s appeal
    accordingly was dismissed.

    (Note : The above refers to the Tribunal decision in
    Aditya Cement v. CCE, 2007 (007) STR 0153 (Tri.-Del.) where it was held
    that since Notification No. 36/2004-ST came into force from 1-1-2005, Service
    Tax paid on engineering services received during October and November 2003 under
    misunderstanding of law should be refunded).

    (iii) Question of law not taken up before lower
    authorities — Whether can be taken up before the High Court ?



    CCE , Jalandhar v. Onkar Travels P. Ltd., 2008 (10) STR
    237 (P&H).

    Show-cause notice was issued u/s.74 of the Act to enhance
    assessment under allegation of short levy on the assessee who was air travel
    agent. Adjudication order confirming the demand and imposing penalty was
    confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal allowed the appeal, on the
    ground that S. 74 dealing with rectification of a mistake is not applicable and
    there was no apparent error in the assessment. The Revenue filed appeal against
    the Tribunal’s order under the plea that mention of S. 74 was inadvertent in
    place of S. 73 and it would not debar Revenue authority from assessing escaped
    taxable service. The respondent contended that the plea of wrong provision of
    Service Tax was taken for the first time and that throughout the course of
    proceedings before the Tribunal and the authorities below, the stand taken by
    the Department that invoking S. 74 and passing the order by the Superintendent
    was perfectly legal and within limitation period of 2 years applicable to S. 74.
    The Court ruled that such question is not permissible to be taken up first time
    in appeal. Only substantial questions of law arising out of the Tribunal’s order
    are to be considered by the Court and in absence of such ground, the appeal
    could not be entertained.

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    Important rulings under Central Excise

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    6. Important rulings under Central Excise :


    An illustrative list of important judicial rulings under
    Central Excise which could be useful for Service Tax, depending upon the facts
    and circumstances of a given case, are set out hereafter :


    (a) No suppression if all facts disclosed :


    (i) If an assessee has disclosed all details in price list,
    it is futile to contend that there was suppression of facts. Extended period
    of limitation held as not available to the Department [CCE v. ITEC (P)
    Ltd.,
    (2002) 145 ELT 280 (SC).]

    (ii) If facts are disclosed in classification list,
    extended period be invoked [Primella Sanitary Products Pvt Ltd. v. CCE,
    (2005) 184 ELT 117 (SC 3-member Bench).

    (b) Mere inaction is not suppression of facts :


    (i) Suppression means not providing information which the
    person is legally required to state, but has intentionally or deliberately not
    stated. The Supreme Court, in CCE v. Chemphar Drugs and Liniments,
    (1989) 40 ELT 276, has held that mere inaction or failure on part of
    manu-facturer will not amount to suppression of facts. Conscious or deliberate
    withholding of information when the manufacturer knew otherwise, is required
    to be established, before saddling the manufacturer with liability for a
    period beyond one year (that time 6 months) [The same view has been held in
    MK Kotecha v. CCE,
    (2005) 179 ELT 261 (SC 3-member Bench).]

    (ii) Extended period of limitation can be invoked only on a
    positive act of fraud, etc. Such a positive act must be in contra distinction
    to mere inaction like non-taking of licence, etc. [ITW Signode India Ltd.
    v. CCE,
    (2004) 158 ELT 403 (SC 3-member Bench).]

    (iii) There can be no suppression of facts if facts which
    are not required to be disclosed are not disclosed [Smt. Shirisht Dhawan v.
    Shaw Brothers,
    AIR 1992 SC 1555; Apex Electricals Pvt Ltd. v. UOI,
    (1992) 61 ELT 413 (Guj HC)]

    (c) Ground for invocation of extended period should be specified in the
    SCN :


    (i) Since the longer period of limitation can be invoked on
    a variety of grounds, the particular ground which is alleged against an
    assessee must be specifically made known to the assessee. There is no scope
    for assuming that the ground is implicit in the issuance of SCN [CCE v. HMM
    Ltd.,
    (1995) 76 ELT 497 (SC); Raj Bahadur Narayan Singh Sugar Mills v.
    UOI,
    (1996) 88 ELT 24 (SC); Kaur & Singh v. CCE, (1997) 94 ELT 289
    (SC)].

    (ii) Extension of the period of limitation entails both
    civil and criminal consequences and therefore must be specifically stated in
    the SCN, in absence whereof the Court would be entitled to raise an inference
    that the case was not one where the extended period of limitation could be
    invoked. [CCE v. M/s. Payal Laminates Pvt. Ltd., (2006) 7 SCC 431;
    Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. CCE,
    (2007) 211 ELT 513 (SC)]

    (d) Omission to provide facts must be deliberate :



    Suppression of facts does not mean any omission and it must
    be deliberate and willful to evade payment of duty. In taxation, it can have
    only one meaning that the correct information was not disclosed deliberately
    to escape payment of duty. Mere failure to declare does not amount to willful
    suppression. There must be some positive act from the side of the assessee to
    make it willful suppression. [Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd., CCE (2005) 188
    ELT 149 (SC); CCE v. Damnet Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., (2007) 216 ELT 3
    (SC)].


    (e) No suppression of facts if an assessee had a bona fide belief :


    (i) If an assessee bona fide believes in a legal
    position (e.g., that no duty is payable or no licence is required in
    his case) and if there is scope for such belief and doubt, provisions of
    proviso to S. 11A will not apply [Padmini Products v. CCE, (1989) 43
    ELT 195 (SC); CCE v. Surat Textile Mills Ltd., (2004) 167 ELT 379 (SC 3
    member bench) Gopal Zarda Udyog v. CCE, (2005) 188 ELT 251 (SC 3-member
    Bench).]

    (ii) If there were conflicting decisions of various High
    Courts and when the assessee was under bona fide belief that he need
    not declare production of an exempted item, extended period is not applicable.
    [Jaiprakash Industries v. CCE, (2002) 146 ELT 481 (SC 3-Member Bench).]

    (iii) If different views were expressed at different stages
    by Tribunal and High Court, extended period of five years is not invocable [Mentha
    & Allied Products Ltd. v. CCE,
    (2004) 167 ELT 494 (SC)]

    (iv) If there was difference of opinion in the Department
    itself and Departmental officials were regularly visiting factory and were in
    knowledge of process of manufacture adopted by the assessee, pleas of the
    assessee of bona fide belief is sustainable and extended period is not
    invocable [Ugam Chand Bhandari v. CCE, (2004) 167 ELT 491 (SC)]

    (v) If there was bona fide dispute whether process
    is ‘manufacture’ or not — extended period is not invocable [Tecumesh
    Products India Ltd. v. CCE,
    (2004) 167 ELT 498 (SC).]

    (f) No suppression if Department aware of facts :


    (i) If the Department had issued SCN earlier and had
    considered the matter earlier, there cannot be any suppression of facts, if at
    a later stage authorities come to a different conclusion [P & B
    Pharmaceuticals v. CCE,
    (2003) 153 ELT 14 (SC)]

    (ii) If the Department had issued SCN earlier and it was
    adjudicated, another SCN in respect of the same subject matter cannot be
    issued invoking extended period of limitation. [Nizam Sugar Factory v. CCE,
    (2006) 197 ELT 465 (SC)]

    Implications under Service Tax

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    5. Implications under Service Tax :


    The extensive judicial precedence (in particular Supreme
    Court Rulings which have laid down principles) under Central Excise, as regards
    invocation of extended period of 5 years, would be available as a good guide for
    the purpose of Service Tax to the extent relevant and applicable.

    In cases where Service Tax has not been paid by an assessee,
    due to bona fide belief as to its liability, which could be due to views
    expressed in judicial rulings, Dept. Clarifications, legal advice, etc., the
    benefit of settled position under Central Excise can be availed for Service Tax
    to challenge invocation of extended period and consequent penalty action,
    depending upon the facts and circumstances of a given case.


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    Settled principles for invocation of extended period under Central Excise

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    4. Settled principles for invocation of extended period
    under Central Excise :


    It is a very clearly laid-down principle that in cases where
    the Central Excise Dept. wishes to invoke the extended time limit of 5 years for
    issuing SCN, it can be done only if an assessee is guilty of willful mis-statement
    or collusion or suppression of facts or contravention of any of the provisions
    of Central Excise Rules, 2002 with the intent to evade payment of duty. The
    elements of wilfulness, collusion and suppression of facts with an intent to
    evade payment of duty, all belong to the domain of criminal jurisprudence having
    an element of mens rea i.e., existence of guilty mind. Therefore, the
    onus is on the Central Excise Dept. to prove that one or the other of these
    elements is present, so as to justify the issue of SCN by availing the extended
    time-limit. This is supported by a number of rulings of the Supreme Court,
    relevant extracts from some of which are given below :



    • In Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. CCE, 74 ELT 9 (SC), in the context of S.
      11A of CEA, it was held that :

    The proviso is in the nature of an exception to the
    principal clause and its exercise is hedged on one side with the existence of
    such situations by using strong expressions as fraud, collusion etc. and on
    the other hand there should be an intention to evade the payment of duty. Both
    must concur to enable the Excise Officer to invoke the exceptional power. The
    initial burden is on the Department to prove that the situations visualised by
    the proviso existed and to bring on record material to show that the appellant
    was guilty of any of the situations visualised by the Section.


    •  In Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company v. CCE, 78 ELT 401 (SC), it was held
      that :

    A perusal of proviso to S. 11A indicates that the
    expression ‘suppression of fact’ has been used in company of such strong words
    as fraud, collusion or wilful default. In fact it is the mildest expression
    used in the proviso. Yet, considering the surroundings in which it has been
    used, it has to be construed strictly. It does not mean any omission. The act
    must be deliberate. In taxation, it can have only one meaning that the correct
    information was not disclosed deliberately to escape from payment of duty,
    where facts are known to both the parties; the omission by one to do what he
    might have done and not that he must have done, does not render it
    suppression.


    •  In Cosmic Dye Chemical v. CCE, 75 ELT 721 (SC), it was held that :

    ‘Intent to evade duty’ must be proved for invoking proviso
    to S. 11A(1) of CEA for extended period of limitation. Intent to evade duty is
    built into the expressions ‘fraud’ and ‘collusion’ but ‘mis-statement’ and
    ‘suppression’ are qualified by immediately preceding words willful
    contravention of any of the provisions.


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    Adjudicating Authorities (AA)

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    2. Adjudicating Authorities (AA) :


    In terms of CBEC Circular No. 80/1/05-ST, dated 10-8-2005 the
    authorities for adjudicating Service Tax cases are under :

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    Time limits for issue of SCN

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    3. Time limits for issue of SCN :


    A major amendment was made under Service Tax, relating to
    recovery of Service Tax not levied or short levied, not paid or short paid or
    erroneously refunded whereby Provisions of S. 11A of Central Excise Act, 1944 (CEA)
    have been incorporated in Service Tax law by amending S. 73 of the Act. The time
    limit for issue of SCN under the amended S. 73(1) of the Act is as under :

    (a) Within one year of the relevant date : Where
    Service Tax has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid
    or erroneously refunded, AA is required to serve a notice on the person
    chargeable with Service Tax which has not been paid or levied or short paid,
    requiring him to show cause as to why he is not liable to pay the amount
    specified in the SCN.

    (b) Within five years of the relevant date : If any
    Service Tax has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid
    or erroneously refunded under specified circumstances.

    The extended period of 5 years can be invoked in terms of
    proviso to S. 73(1) of the Act, if any Service Tax has not been levied or has
    been short levied or short paid by reason of :



    •  fraud or



    • collusion or



    • any wilful mis-statement or



    • suppression of facts


    with an intent to evade payment of tax.

    Hence existence of any of the circumstances specified above
    is absolutely essential and a pre-requisite for invocation of extended period in
    terms of proviso to S. 73(1) of the Act. The reasons for invoking the extended
    period are required to be specified in the SCN.

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    Show-Cause Notice (SCN)

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    1. Show-Cause Notice (SCN) :


    In terms of S. 73 (1) of the Finance Act 1994 (Act), a notice
    is required to be served on the person chargeable with Service Tax which has not
    been paid or has been short paid or to whom any sum has been erroneously
    refunded. SCN requires such person to show cause as to why he should not pay the
    amount specified in the SCN.

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    Renting of immovable property — A dilemma for property owners

    Judicial interpretation of the term ‘Input Service’

    1. Background :

        Since the introduction of tax on services in 1994 and till the prescription of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 — (CCR), service tax on various key services like telephone, insurance, consulting engineers, advertising, manpower recruitment, management consultancy, audit, etc. meant a cost addition initially of 5% and from 2003 of 8% for the entire manufacturing — industrial sector. As a measure of integrating tax on goods and services, extension of intersectoral credit was introduced by prescribing CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 to come into effect on 10th September, 2004 both under the Central Excise Act, as well as under the service tax law which is part of the Finance Act, 1994. Under the premise that credit would be available of service tax paid on input services, the rate of service tax was simultaneously increased from 8% to 10%.

        A Press Note dated August 12, 2004, [Reported at 2004 (17) ELT-T19] highlighted salient features of the proposed CENVAT Credit Rules. The relevant paras (iii) and (iv) are reproduced below :

        (iii) In principle, credit of tax on those taxable services would be allowed that go to form a part of the assessable value on which excise duty is charged. This would include certain services which are received prior to commencement of manufacture but the value of which gets absorbed in the value of goods. As regards services received after the clearance of the goods from the factory, the credit would be extended on services received up to the stage of place of removal (as per S. 4 of Central Excise Act). In addition to this, services like advertising, market research, etc. which are not directly related to manufacture but are related to the sale of manufactured goods would also be permitted for credit.

        (iv) Full credit of service tax on services (such as telephone, security, construction, advertising service, market research, etc.) which are received in relation to the offices pertaining to a manufacturer or service provider would also be allowed.

    2. During the past five years of introduction of CENVAT Credit of service tax on input services, innumerable litigations across the country took place at all levels involving both interpretational as well as procedural issues. However, the most significant among them revolved around interpretation of the definition of ‘input service’ and more so in relation to the manufacturing activity. Consequent upon divergent views and conflicting opinions of various Benches of CESTAT, at least in two important cases the matter was referred to Larger Benches. The decision in both viz. CCE, Mumbai-V v. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri. – LB) and ABB Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. EX. & S.T., Bangalore 2009 (15) STR 23 (Tri. – LB) — (provided in BCAJ in Part-B under Service Tax feature in December 2008 and July 2009 issues, respectively) analysed the term ‘input service’ to reach the conclusion. Soon thereafter, independently i.e., without considering any of the above decisions, the Bombay High Court in the case of Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE-Pune-III, 2009 (15) STR 657 (Bom.) examined and made in-depth analysis of ‘input service’.

    3. What is ‘input service’ :

        The term ‘input service’ in Rule 2(1) in CCR is defined as follows :

        ‘Input service’ means any service, —

        (i) used by a provider of taxable service for providing an output service; or

        (ii) used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly, in or in relation to the manufacture of final products and clearance of final products up to the place of removal, and includes services used in relation to setting up, modernisation, renovation or repairs of a factory, premises of provider of output service or an office relating to such factory or premises, advertisement or sales promotion, market research, storage up to the place of removal, procurement of inputs, activities relating to business, such as accounting, auditing, financing, recruitment and quality control, coaching and training, computer networking, credit rating, share registry, and security, inward transportation of inputs or capital goods and outward transportation up to the place of removal.” (emphasis supplied)

    4. In the case of GTC Industries Ltd. (supra), the Larger Bench of CESTAT, Mumbai examined the above definition in a fairly detailed manner. The definition was analysed in the context of services of outdoor caterer used by the manufacturer in the canteen for workers. Both the appellant and the respondent agreed in principle that the said service of outdoor caterer was to be considered as one relating to business and therefore, would fall under the inclusive part of the definition and not the main definition. Therefore, the analysis of the definition was focussed with special and specific reference to the word ‘includes’ and the term ‘activities relating to business’ used in the definition. The appellant in this case contended that the term ‘includes’ enhances the scope of the definition and therefore it cannot take a restrictive approach. In this regard, inter alia the extract from the Apex Court’s decision in the case of Regional Director v. Highland Coffee Works, 1991 (3) SCC 617 was cited as follows :

    “The word ‘include’ in the statutory definition is generally used to enlarge the meaning of the preceding words and it is by way of extension, and not with restriction. The word ‘include’ is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. [See (i) Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. Vol. 3, p. 1263 and (ii) CIT v. Taj Mahal Hotel 1, (iii) State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha]”

    It was further contended that the term ‘such as’ used in the definition was an adjective indicative of the draftsman’s intention that he is assigning the same meaning or characteristic to the noun as has been previously indicated, but it does not prohibit any other activity which can define noun in a similar way and therefore, the expression only connotes that whatever activities are given are only illustrations that relate to the business. Therefore, any activity relating to business of the assessee would be covered as an input service. Further, stress was laid for this interpretation by stating that the words ‘such as’ used after the expression ‘activity relating to business’ in the inclusive part of the definition further supported the contention that the activities mentioned therein were illustrative and not exhaustive and it could not limit the scope of the definition of the input service once the term was used after the usage of the word ‘includes’ in the said definition. In this context, the reference was also made to the extract of the Press Note of the Draft Rules made at point 1 above. By facilitating comparison between the Draft Credit Rules and the CCR, the scope and application of the term ‘activities relating to business’ was construed wide enough to cover various aspects of the activities relating to business. The submissions of the Revenue with the aid of several Supreme Court decisions however revolved around contending that the list in the inclusive part of the definition is exhaustive. The Larger Bench however concluded with the following remark :

    “We find that it is well settled that every clause of the statute should be construed with reference to the context in which it is issued. A bare mechanical interpretation of words and application of legislative intent is devoid of concept and purpose will reduce most of the remedial and beneficial legislations to futility. To be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss the soul.” . . . . “The context in which and the purpose for which the Credit Rules have been issued are clear from the Press Note dated August 12, 2004 issued by the Ministry of Finance, prior to introduction of the Credit Rules wherein the draft rules were circulated for inviting comments from trade and industries. This Note clearly states that “in principle, credit of tax on those taxable services would be allowed that go to form a part of the assessable value on which excise duty is charged.”

    5. Little different dimension and perspective was provided by the Larger Bench in the case of ABB Ltd. v. CCE & ST, Bangalore (supra). While examining allowability of CENVAT credit service tax paid on outward transportation service for movement of final products from the place of removal till the customer’s place, it was observed that the definition of input service could be conveniently divided into the following five categories vis-à-vis the manufacturers :

    •  Any service used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly, in or in relation to the final products.

    • Any service used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly, in or in relation to clearance of final products from the place of removal.

    •  Services used in relation to setting up, modernisation, renovation or repairs of a factory, or an office relating to such factory.

    • Services used in relation to advertisement or sales promotion, market research, storage up to the place of removal, procurement of inputs.

    •  Services used in relation to activities relating to business and outward transportation up to the place of removal.

    On making the above division, the Larger Bench observed that each of the above was an independent benefit or concession and even if one was satisfied, the credit on input service would be admissible.

    In this case also, the expression ‘activities relating to business’ was analysed in depth by examining the expression ‘in relation to’ as analysed in the case of Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. UOI, (1988) (36) ELT 201 (SC) and also examining the qualification ‘activities’ and the expression ‘such as’.

    In the case of ABB Ltd. (supra), the Bench relying on and discussing the decisions of Kerala State Co-op-erative Marketing Federation Ltd. & Ors. v. CIT, (1998) 5 SCC 48, Share Medical Care v. UOI, 2007 (209) ELT 321 (SC) and HCL Ltd. v. Collector, 2001 (130) ELT 405 (SC) held that when the general expression ‘activities relating to business’ covered transportation up to the customer’s place, credit could not be denied by relying on specific coverage of outward transportation up to the place of removal in the inclusive clause. According to the Bench, the principle laid down in various Supreme Court cases that a specific provision will override a general one did not apply to exemptions. On the basis of this contention, the Bench held that the Revenue’s view was incorrect to contend that “since outward transportation was specifically mentioned in the inclusive clause of the definition, credit for outward transportation could not be allowed with reference to other general limb of the definition. Also, in this decision, there was a categorical observation by the Larger Bench as to the wide import of the word ‘business’ as held in the case of Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. CIT, (AIR 1958 SC 861). The Tribunal reached the conclusion by stating that the use of the expression ‘outward transportation’ in the inclusive clause was by way of abundant caution so as to avoid any dispute being raised on the ‘means’ clause (which refers to clearance from place of removal).
     
    According to the Larger Bench in ABB Ltd.’s case (supra), as opposed to the decision in the case of GTC (supra) discussed above, there was no requirement in law that the cost of freight should have entered transaction value to qualify for admissibility of credit or stated in other words non-inclusion of a particular cost in the transaction value by itself is not a limiting factor for admissibility of credit as the issue did not relate to valuation of excisable goods and the issues of ‘valuation’ and CENVAT credit were independent of each other.

    (Note : Karnataka High Court has stayed the operation of decision in the above ABB Ltd.’s case.)

    It is to be noted here that the Punjab and Haryana High Court, a few months earlier, also reached a similar decision in the case of Ambuja Cement Ltd. v. UOI, 2009 (14) STR 3 (P & H) that outward transportation up to the place of removal was an input service. However, the premise under which this was held was somewhat different. In this case, reliance was placed on the Board’s Circular No. 97/6/2007-ST of 23/08/2007 and the principle that the Revenue was precluded from challenging the correctness of the Circular which provided that when the ownership of the goods remained with the seller of the goods till its delivery, the seller bore the risk of change during transit to destination and when the freight formed part of the price of goods, the credit was admissible. Further, a subtle mention was also made to the definition of ‘input service’ that the definition inter alia includes outward transportation up to the place of removal and since in the instant case, ownership of goods remained with the seller till the doorstep of the buyer, insurance was borne by the seller and also that freight formed part of the value of goods, the conditions of the Circular were satisfied and therefore, the credit was admissible. To sum up, this case did not discuss or analyse the definition of input service to reach the conclusion.

    However, the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, 2009 (15) STR 657 (Bom.) — 22 STT 130 (Bom.) (discussed in BCAJ October 2009 issue) interpreted the definition ‘input service’ at great length discussing the terms used in the definition ‘means’, ‘includes’, ‘such as’, ‘business’ while examining whether or not advertising service used by a concentrate manufacturer was an admissible credit when the soft drinks were bottled and removed for sale by a group company and the advertisement related to the final product as bottled and sold by the latter.

    • In the case of Coca Cola India (supra) while interpreting the definition, relying on the decisions in cases like Regional Director v. Highland Coffee Works, 1991 (3) SCC 617 (reiterated in CIT v. TTK Health Care Ltd., 2007 (11) SCC 796), M/s. Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AR 1989 Supreme Court 335 and Bharat Co-operative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Co-op. Bank Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685, it was held that the expression ‘means and includes’ is exhaustive. By the word ‘includes’ the services which otherwise may not have come within the ambit get included and by the word ‘means’, they are made exhaustive.

    •  After reaching this conclusion, the High Court considered and analysed the meanings of the term ‘such as’ relying on Good Year India Ltd. v. Collector, 1997 (95) ELT 450 and concluded that the words ‘such as’ are illustrative and not exhaustive.

    • Next, it was held that the expression ‘business’ meant a continuous activity, which is not confined to a mere manufacture of the product. Therefore, activities in relation to business could cover all the activities related to the functions of business. Relying on State of Karnataka v. Shreyas Paper Pvt. Ltd., 2006 SCC and Mazagaon Dock (supra), [(also relied on by the Larger Bench in ABB Ltd., (supra),] it was held that the ‘business’ in particular in fiscal statutes is of wide import.

    • Thereafter in paras 26 to 30, the phrase ‘activity relating to business’ was analysed citing extracts from Supreme Court cases viz. Doypack Systems Limited v. UOI, 1988 (36) ELT 261 (SC), CIT v. Chandulal Keshavlal & Co., (1961 38 ITR 61 (SC), Eastern Investments Ltd. v. CIT, 1951 (20) ITR 1 and Allahabad High Court’s decision in Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. Symonds Distributors (P) Ltd., (1977) 108 ITR 947 (All) to conclude that the scope of the said phrase widens the scope of the definition. Among the quotes used in the decision, the following extract from the speech of Lord Hope of Craighead in the context of credit under VAT in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Redrow Group Plc, (1999 Simon Tax cases 161) is both apt and interesting to note :


    “The word services is given such a wide meaning for the purposes of value added tax that it is capable of embracing everything which a taxable person does in the course or furtherance of a business carried on by him which is done for a consideration. The name or description, which one might apply to the service, is immaterial, because the concept does not call for that kind of analysis. The service is that which is done in return for the consideration. As one moves down the chain of supply, each taxable person receives a service when another taxable person does something for him in the course of furtherance of a business carried on by that other person for which he takes a consideration in return. Questions such as who benefits from the service or who is the consumer of it are not helpful. The answers are likely to differ according to the interest, which various people may have in the transaction. The matter has to be looked at from the standpoint of the person who is claiming the deduction by way of input tax. Was something being done for him for which, in the course or furtherance of a business carried on by him, he has had to pay a consideration which has attracted value added tax ? The fact that some-one else, in this case the prospective purchaser, also received a service as part of the same transaction does not deprive the person who instructed the service and who has had to pay for it for the benefit of the deduction.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    •  Like in the case of ABB Ltd., (supra), in the case of Coca Cola India (supra) as well, it was discussed that the definition of ‘input service’ could be effectively divided into five categories vis-à-vis a manufacturer (not reproduced here as it is along the same lines as provided above at para 5).

    7. It is further noteworthy at this point that in all the three cases viz. GTC Industries Ltd. (supra), ABB Ltd. (supra) and Coca Cola India (supra), the definition of ‘input service’ as a whole was examined with reference to Draft CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, Ministry’s Press Note on the subject matter and considering the underlying factor that service tax is a value added tax and therefore the ultimate burden of service tax must be borne by the ultimate consumer and not the intermediary i.e., the manufacturer or the service provider.

    8. With the above important decisions in place, the readers may be shocked to note that in a very recent decision given by the Single Member Bench of the Mumbai CESTAT in the case of CCE, Nagpur v. Manikgarh Cement Works, 2009 TIOL 2059 CESTAT-Mum. wherein primarily the Tribunal examined the allowability of credit on service tax paid on construction service, repairs and maintenance service, manpower recruitment service, etc. used for residential colony outside the assessee’s factory and relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. CCE, Delhi 2009 (240) ELT 641 (SC) (this decision related to examination of the term ‘input’ vis-à-vis use of fuel in the electricity generation, the excess of which was sold to power grid), held as follows :

    “Where an inclusive part of a definition provides a list of items, any such item should also satisfy the quint-essential ingredients of the main part of the definition. In other words, the definition has to be considered in its entirety. The inclusive part is not independent of the main part. It is not a stand-alone provision. This ruling in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd. (supra) is applicable to ‘input services’ given the definition of this expression under Rule 2(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules. There is nothing in this definition to indicate that the legislative intent behind it is different from the one underlying the definition of ‘input’.

    Accordingly, I hold that any service which is apparently covered by the parameters of the inclusive part of the definition of ‘input service’ should also satisfy the quintessential requirements of the main part of the definition and, accordingly, any person claiming the benefit of CENVAT credit on input service in terms of the inclusive part of the definition of ‘input service’ should establish that such service was used, directly or indirectly, in or in relation to the manufacture of the final products or the clearance of such products from his factory.”

    The Tribunal went on to further hold that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Maruti Suzuki Ltd. (supra) case implicitly overruled the High Court’s decision in Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and is constitutionally binding on the Tribunal. As a matter of fact, in the earlier case of the same assessee, the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal had held that CENVAT credit was admissible [refer to 2008 (9) STR 554 (Tri.-Mum.)] (the decision is presently under challenge by the Revenue before the High Court).

    Conclusion :

    From the above, it can be observed that in spite of the two Larger Benches of the Tribunal and a High Court doing in-depth analysis of the term ‘input service’, the era of dispute sees no end, given the fact that the issue involved in the decision in the case of ABB Ltd would be examined a fresh by Karnataka High Court. Much remains to be examined yet as to the allowability of credit on service tax paid on various services used for providing output services in spite of the fact that various Tribunals have examined this aspect and rendered decisions using pragmatism. One such instance is the case of Deloitte Tax Service India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Hyderabad-IV, 2008 (11) STR 266 (Tri.-Bang). Nevertheless, seeing conflicting stands followed by various Benches of the Tribunals, both manufacturing and service sector would like to see the issue settled, given the fact that service tax is a value added tax and that interpretation of the term is done with the underlying consideration that intersectoral credit was facilitated with a view to reducing cascading effect of the taxes.

    Unjust Enrichment and Refund of CENVAT Credit to Exporters

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    1. Background :


    Exporters of services experienced rough times during
    the past four to five years claiming refund or rebate of service tax
    paid on various input services used in exported services and there has
    been tremendous amount of litigation already pending at different
    levels, wherein various issues both legal and procedural have been
    raised by the Department which inter alia include the following :

    • Whether the
      service per se can be considered export in terms of the Export Rules,
      2005.


    • Non-filing of
      declaration form prior to exporting service.


    • Inadequacy of
      documents evidencing export of service.


    • Services on
      which service tax paid is taken as CENVAT credit are not considered
      ‘input services’.


    • Inadequacy of
      documents for CENVAT credit.



    • Non-registration or late registration of the assessee as service
      provider.


    • Refund claims
      filed beyond limitation period u/s.11B of the Central Excise Act.


    • Refund
      relating to export of exempted service.


    • Refund
      inadmissible on account of unjust enrichment.


    Realising difficulties faced by the export-oriented
    units, the Government issued Circular No. 120, dated 19-1-2010 to
    simplify and standardise refund procedure to expedite the process of
    refund applications and grant refunds although the procedure is already
    in place for granting rebate of service tax paid by cash or CENVAT of
    input services or for claiming refund under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit
    Rules, 2004. Question here is whether or not and how the doctrine of
    unjust enrichment should apply to the refund claims filed by exporters
    of services for service tax paid on input services. For this purpose,
    the doctrine of unjust enrichment and provision of S. 11B need
    examination.

    2. Doctrine of unjust enrichment :

    In ordinary course, when any claim of refund is filed
    by an assessee, he is required to file an application of refund in the
    prescribed format under the law along with required documentary
    evidence. On receipt of the application, the Assistant Commissioner of
    Central Excise or Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise after being
    satisfied may himself make an order for the refund of the whole or any
    part of tax. The claimed amount is refunded to the applicant only if the
    incidence of tax has not been passed on by the applicant to any other
    person; or else if the amount considered due to be refunded, is
    transferred to the Consumer Welfare Fund as the claimant is not allowed
    to be unjustly enriched i.e., the claimant cannot get an amount which he
    has not suffered. This law cannot be better understood than by the
    quotes per majority decision in the landmark judgment of Mafatlal
    Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1997 (89) ELT 247 (SC) :

    Á claim for refund, whether made under the
    provisions of the Act as contemplated in Proposition (i) above or in a
    suit or writ petition in the situations contemplated by Proposition
    (ii) above, can succeed only if the petitioner/plaintiff alleges and
    establishes that he has not passed on the burden of duty to another
    person/other persons. His refund claim shall be allowed/decreed only
    when he establishes that he has not passed on the burden of the duty
    or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may be. Whether
    the claim for restitution is treated as a constitutional imperative or
    as a statutory requirement, it is neither an absolute right nor an
    unconditional obligation but is subject to the above requirement, as
    explained in the body of the judgment. Where the burden of the duty
    has been passed on, the claimant cannot say that he has suffered any
    real loss or prejudice. The real loss or prejudice is suffered in such
    a case by the person who has ultimately borne the burden and it is
    only that person who can legitimately claim its refund.”

    Also interesting are the quotes of the Larger Bench
    decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandal
    Ltd. v. CCE&C, 2005 (181) ELT 328 (SC) which have aptly and precisely
    described this doctrine.

    “31. Stated simply, ‘Unjust enrichment’ means reten-tion of a benefit by a person that is unjust or inequi-table. ‘Unjust enrichment’ occurs when a person re-tains money or benefits, which in justice, equity and good conscience, belong to someone else.

    3.2 The doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’, therefore, is that no person can be allowed to enrich inequitably at the expense of another. A right of recovery under the doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’ arises where retention of a benefit is considered contrary to justice or against equity.

    3.3 The juristic basis of the obligation is not founded upon any contract or tort, but upon a third category of law, namely, quasi-contract or the doctrine of restitution.

        From the above discussion, it is clear that the doctrine of ‘unjust enrichment’ is based on equity and has been accepted and applied in several cases. In our opinion, therefore, irrespective of applicabili-ty of S. 11B of the Act, the doctrine can be invoked to deny the benefit to which a person is not otherwise entitled. S. 11B of the Act or similar provision merely gives legislative recognition to this doctrine. That, however, does not mean that in absence of statutory provision, a person can claim or retain undue benefit. Before claiming a relief of refund, it is necessary for the petitioner/appellant to show that he has paid the amount for which relief is sought, he has not passed on the burden on consumers and if such relief is not granted, he would suffer loss.”

    Thus, in principle, it is just and fair that this doctrine is followed while granting a refund application. To better understand its applicability, it is necessary to briefly examine the relevant provisions of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, as Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 dealing with the service tax law does not contain specific provisions for claim of refund, but through its S. 83, specific provisions of the Central Excise Act including S. 11B have been made applica-ble to service tax as they apply in relation to excise duty. Accordingly, claim of refund for service tax also is governed by the provisions of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act discussed below.

        3. S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 :

    Claim for refund of duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty

        1) Any person claiming refund of any duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty may make an application for refund of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty to the Assistant Commis-sioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise before the expiry of one year from the relevant date in such form and manner as may be prescribed and the application shall be accom-panied by such documentary or other evidence (in-cluding the documents referred to in S. 12A) as the applicant may furnish to establish that the amount of duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty in relation to which such refund is claimed was collected from, or paid by, him and the incidence of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty had not been passed on by him to any other person :

    Provided that where an application for refund has been made before the commencement of the Cen-tral Excises and Customs Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991, such application shall be deemed to have been made under this sub-section as amended by the said Act and the same shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Ss.(2) substituted by that Act.
    Provided further that the limitation (of one year) shall not apply where any duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty has been paid under protest.

        2) If, on receipt of any such application, the As-sistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Dep-uty Commissioner of Central Excise is satisfied that the whole or any part of the duty of excise and inter-est, if any, paid on such duty paid by the applicant is refundable, he may make an order accordingly and the amount so determined shall be credited to the Fund.

    Provided that the amount of duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty as determined by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise under the foregoing provisions of this sub-section shall, instead of being credited to the Fund, be paid to the applicant, if such amount is relatable to –

        a) rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India or on excisable materials used in the manufacture of goods which are exported out of India;

        b) unspent advance deposits lying in balance in the applicant’s account current maintained with the Commissioner of Central Excise;

        c) refund of credit of duty paid on excisable goods used as inputs in accordance with the rules made, or any notification issued, under this Act;

        d) the duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty paid by the manufacturer, if he had not passed on the incidence of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty to any other person;

        e) the duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty borne by the buyer, if he had not passed on the incidence of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty to any other person;

        f)…………….

    Provided ………..

        Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree, order or direc-tion of the Appellate Tribunal or any Court or in any other provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force, no refund shall be made except as provided in Ss.(2).

    (4) & (5) ……………….

    Explanation — For the purposes of this Section, :

        A) ‘refund’ includes rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India or on excisable materials used in the manufacture of goods which are exported out of India;

        B) ‘relevant date’ means, :

    (a)  to (f)……………………………………

    Perusal of proviso (a) to Ss.(3) indicates that in spe-cific terms, excise duty paid on exported excisable goods or excisable inputs used in the manufacture of such exported goods outside India qualifies to be allowed as rebate or refund. The law has specifically provided for this to be in tune with the broader and outer framework of the fiscal policy of the Govern-ment viz. zero rating of exports, whether of goods or services. An exporter–manufacturer may have paid such duty in cash or from his CENVAT credit account he is entitled to receive refund/rebate, provided he has presented the required documentary evidence and has followed the prescribed proce-dure for claiming refund or rebate, as the case may be. Similarly, with reference to proviso (c) to Ss.2 of S. 11B above, refund of CENVAT credit of duty paid as inputs under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is also available to an exporter. The question arises therefore is whether or not the doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable to refund in case of export of goods as well as of services.

    A manufacturer exporting excisable goods often does not have potential to use accumulated CENVAT credit on inputs, when he wholly or substantially exports all that he manufactures and eventually, he is necessitated to claim either rebate of duty paid on excisable goods by making a payment of duty from CENVAT account on exports and claiming rebate of CENVAT credit or opting to file a refund claim of CENVAT of duty paid on inputs under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 as the case may be. In the scenario, the Tribunal in CCE, Kolkata-VI v. Black Diamond Beverages Ltd., 2006 (200) ELT 317 relying upon the earlier decision in the case of Dura Syntex Ltd., 2003 (154) ELT 422 (Tri.) held that in case of re-fund related to input credit, the principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable. Recently in Balkrishna Textiles P. Ltd. v. CCE, Ahmedabad-I, 2009 (239) ELT 279 (Tri.-Ahmd.) also, it was held that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is not applicable in respect of exports and S. 11B of the Central Excise Act specifically provides that credit on duty paid can be given as cash refund if admissible and principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable. In case of CC&CE Ahmedabad v. Dura Syntex Ltd. (supra), it was categorically held that principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable in view of the proviso (c) to Ss.(2) of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act, which carves out an exception in respect of credit of duty. It is quite interesting to note that despite there being excep-tions in the proviso whereby the question of examining whether duty is passed on to the buyer does not arise as the refund relates to duty paid on Inputs and therefore arising out of input credit, the authorities while issuing show-cause notice repeatedly attempt to shift the onus to the assessee to prove that unjust enrichment has not arisen. In this frame of reference, the Supreme Court’s observation in Rochiram & Sons v. UOI, 2008 (226) ELT 20 (SC) is notable : “It is a cardinal principle of law which has been settled by a Bench of seven Judges of this Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries v. UOI, 1997

        ELT 247 (SC) that refund of a claim made by the assessee can be denied on the principle of undue enrichment if the assessee has passed on the burden to consumers. The principle would be equally applicable to the Revenue as well as it cannot have the double advantage.” The Supreme Court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. v. CIT I, Pune, 2007 (8) STR 193 (SC) held that even if the Revenue has taken an erroneous view of law, that cannot mean that withhold-ing of money is justifiable or not wrongful. Thus, it is imperative that the Government cannot withhold due refund to the claimants.

        4. Exporters of services :

    In the above background and given the fact that there are no separate provisions as regards refund in the service tax law, by merely making provisions of S. 11B of the Central Excise Act applicable to service tax, intangibles like services are placed on par with goods. When services are invoiced to clients, ‘costing’ in most cases is difficult or almost impossible. There can neither be MRP (Maximum Retail Price) concept, nor can there be cost plus profit concept, especially for services provided by all professionals including investment bankers, architects, chartered accountants, legal services, management consultants, consulting engineers, etc. Even in the case of various other services requiring skills, it may or may not be possible to attribute precise ‘cost’ of a service as service is provided based on mental skills. Consequently, when the value of a service is recovered without service tax, yet whether the burden of tax paid on input service is still passed on to the recipient cannot be put to judgment. For argument’s sake, a professional ‘A’ may charge $ 100 for a task and for the same task ‘B’ may charge $ 500 and ‘C’ may charge $ 120. Would it mean that ‘C’ or ‘B’ have included incidence of tax in their price for their service and therefore there is unjust enrichment ? In fact, ‘A’ may charge $ 100 to one person and another $ 75 or $ 125 and yet in no way one can prove that burden of tax is necessarily passed on in one or the other case.

    In a recent decision of the Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. S. Mohanlal Services, 2010 (18) STR 173 (Tri.-Ahmd.) in its second round of litigation, the Tribunal fully endorsed observations of the Commissioner Appeals viz. “the adjudicating authority’s reliance on the judgment in the case of Mafatlal Industries [1997 (89) ELT 247] is misplaced inasmuch as it relates to sale of goods wherein cost of inputs are necessarily incurred, whereas in the present case it is provision of services especially as commission agents wherein mental inputs are incurred which cannot be compared in monetary terms.” The Tribunal further observed, “the refund claim has been made u/s.11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 made applicable for service tax matters. S. 11B provides that where the amount is reliable to rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India, the amount shall be paid to the claimant. This means that provisions relating to unjust enrichment are not applicable in respect of export of services.”

    Although a single Member Bench decision, the intangible characteristic of service being aptly considered, it should serve as a useful guidance for all refund claims made by exporters of services to reduce the amount of litigation.

    Whilst it is in fitness of things to require a claimant to provide chartered accountant’s certificate that tax was not recovered from recipient of services or buyer, it will be equally fair not to stretch application of doctrine of unjust enrichment to exports too far. Non-granting of legitimate refund claim under one or the other pretext is a burning issue that several assessees face from the Department and an early resolution being need of the day, it is high time that the Board does the needful in the matter to remove impediments in genuine claims of exporters.

    Part B : Some Recent Judgments

        I. High Court :

    1.(a) Authorised Service Station : Whether C & F agency ?

    CCE v. Amitdeep Motors, 2010 (17) STR 514 (All)

    The assessee, an authorised dealer of cars was registered under the category of authorised service station. The assessee received commission from the manufacturer for sourcing orders for them from Government agencies, receiving the vehicles from them and delivering the same to the Government agencies. The Revenue sought to tax these servic-es as clearing and forwarding agent’s service. The Tribunal ruled that the services of arrangement of documentary requirements from the customers for principal, liaison with customers for timely delivery, delivery of vehicle to the consignees, sending of provisional receipt and inspection notes from con-signee to the principal and arrangement of way or entry permits required for dispatch of the vehicles, etc. could not be considered clearing and forward-ing services.

    Not finding substantial question of law, the High Court dismissed the appeal.

        b) Whether services to bank for loans exempt under Notification No. 25/2009 ?

    CCE v. Car World Autoline, 2010 (17) STR 449 (Ker.)

    The assessee aided a bank to advance loans to parties and for recovery of the same. The Tribunal in its order stated that the assessee’s services were tax-able as business auxiliary services. It also stated that the assessee discharged its service tax liability under business auxiliary services from September 11, 2004. The Tribunal had allowed the assessee’s exemption claim under clause (e) of Notification No. 25/2004– ST, dated September 10, 2004.

    The Revenue questioned whether the claim of the assessee was justified in light of the facts of the case. The clause (d) of the said Notification awarded exemption to business auxiliary services while the clause (e) awarded exemption to the banking and financial services. The relevant clause (d) and (e) are reproduced for ready reference :

    “(d)    services provided to a client by a commercial concern in relation to the following business auxiliary services, namely :

        i) procurement of goods or services, which are inputs for the client;

        ii) production of goods on behalf of the client;

        iii) provision of service on behalf of the client; or

        iv) a service incidental or auxiliary to any activity specified in (i) to (iii) above;

        e) services provided to a customer by any body corporate or commercial concern, other than a banking company or a financial institution including a non-banking financial company, in relation to banking and other financial services.”

    The Court stated that the assessee did not provide banking and financial services and hence the clause  was not applicable. The clause (d) was applica-ble, hence before declaring the eligibility, the Tribunal was required to consider it with reference to the agreement between the parties, the exact nature of service rendered by the assessee to the bank and whether any of the service so provided was covered under the categories (i) to (iii) and if so, whether any service rendered was incidental to the items of services mentioned in sub-clause (i) to (iii) of (d). Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for reconsideration after hearing both the sides and after calling for relevant records, etc.

        2. Violation of principle of natural justice : Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction :

    Wasp Pump Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2010 (17) STR 613 (Bom.)
    The petitioner manufactured pumps and also the inputs for the pumps. There was no dispute as to exemption for pumps or its classification. Later, the Revenue demanded duty on the CI castings holding that they were marketable goods. The assessee filed an appeal to Commissioner (Appeals), however beyond the time of limitation. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that he had no jurisdiction to condone the delay. Aggrieved by the order, the appeal was filed with the CESTAT and CESTAT confirmed that the Commissioner (Appeals) was right in not con-doning the delay. In view of that, the application for waiver was rejected and the appeal was dismissed.

    Consequently a petition was filed with the High Court. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of U.P. v. Modh Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 which held that the Revenue before quantifying the demand ought to have given a hearing to the assessee and there being a violation of principle of natural justice, the Court could exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction. Plea was also made that the inputs were exempt from tax under relevant Notification. In the rejoinder it was also explained as to why they could not file the appeal in time.

    The Court observed that generally when the alternate remedy sought was exhausted and the Tribunal for some reason declined to entertain the same, the Court normally does not interfere and exercise extra jurisdiction unless the order is a nullity in law. However, the order suffered from violation of principles of natural justice and denial of ‘fair’ hearing and therefore rejecting Revenue’s objection to extraordinary jurisdiction, the Court decided to hear the petition on merits. The Court relied on the Modh Nooh case (supra) and the Notifications cited by the petitioner. The Court also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in W.P.I.L. Ltd. v. CCE, 2005 (181) ELT 359 (SC) wherein pumps as well as parts thereof were held as exempted from excise duty. The case was therefore allowed quashing the order and remitting the matter back to the Tribunal to consider afresh assessment of duty after consid-ering the Notifications issued from time to time.

        II. Tribunal :

        3. Banking and Financial Services : Pre-closure charges :

    Indusind Bank v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai 2010 (17) STR 565 (Tri.-Chennai)
    The assessee did not pay service tax on pre-closure charges treating this as charges for loss of interest.

    As per the Revenue, in a similar case, in appeal No. S/152/08, the Tribunal had ordered pre-deposit of 50% of the tax amount. Relying on the case of GE Money Financial Services Ltd. CST, Chennai 2009 (15) STR 722 (Tribunal), it was held that since the asses-see had not furnished the details pertaining to pre-closure charges to the Department till the assessee was audited by the Department, the invocation of longer period was justified. Also held that the pre-closure charges could not be equated with interest and therefore pre-deposit of 50% of the liability was ordered.

    4.(a) CENVAT Credit : Whether input service is required to be reversed on removal of inputs :

    J. S. Khalsa Steels (P) Ltd. v. CCE, Chandigarh 2010 (17) STR 517 (Tri.-Del.)

    The assessee a manufacturer was also registered under the category of GTA. The assessee claimed CENVAT on the inputs, capital goods and input services. The assessee reversed the CENVAT credit on inputs and capital goods in terms of Rule 3(5) on clearance of the inputs.

    The Revenue issued a SCN for non-reversal of credit on input services. The original authority and the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the demand.

    It was contended by the appellant that Rule 3(5) provides for reversal of credit on capital goods or inputs and not for input services. It was also submit-ted that the Rule 2 defines input, input services and capital goods separately. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Chitrakoot Steel & Power Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Chennai (2008) 10 STR 118.

    The Tribunal concurred with the appellant and set aside the order and held that no provision for rever-sal of input service existed in the law.

        b) Input services : Credit not to be restricted to ‘manufacture’ alone :

    Jaypee Rewa Plant v. CCE, Bhopal 2010 (17) STR 519 (Tri.-Del.)
    The assessee availed CENVAT credit on the invoices issued by the input distributor. The Revenue denied CENVAT credit on the services like rent-a-cab service, courier service, air travel agent service, maintenance and repair service and telephone service on the ground that no evidence was submitted to show that the said services were utilised for the manufacture of the final product. It was alleged in the SCN that the input services have been taken in or in relation to the handling of marketing of goods after the place of removal and hence not admissible.

    Placing reliance on the decisions of the Larger Bench in the case of ABB Ltd. v. CCE & ST, Bangalore 2009 STR 468 (Tri.-LB) and also CCE Mumbai v. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 468 (Tri.-LB) it was held that input service credit cannot be restricted only in relation to the manufacture and their clearance from the place of removal. Hence the matter was remanded to original authority to allow the credit, subject to the input services being used in relation to the business activities and in the light of the Larger Bench decisions.

        c) Documents for claiming credit :

    CCE, Vapi v. ITW India Ltd., 2010 (17) STR 587 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

    The assessee claimed CENVAT credit on input services including CENVAT on mobile bills. The Revenue contended that the invoices which captured the address of the centralised registered office at Silvassa, was improper document for claiming credit. Further the credit was considered not allowable on the mobile phones.

    The Tribunal stated that there was no dispute that the input services received were utilised by the respondent and therefore the benefit could not be denied on the ground that the invoices bear the name and address of the head office or any branch. Reliance was placed on the case of Electro Steel Castings v. CCE, Calcutta 2001 (136) ELT 929 (Tri.-Kolkata).

    As regards the credit on the mobile phones, the Tribunal relied on the judgment pronounced in the case of Indian Rayon Industries Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (4) STR 79 and CCE v. Excel Corp Care Ltd., 2008 (12) STR 436 (Guj.) and confirmed the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order.
        
    5. CHA Services & Port Services :

    Aspinwall & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Cochin 2010 (17) STR 496 (Tri.-Bang.)

    The demand of service tax was confirmed under port services and CHA services. Further, as regards CHA services, the order stated that the assessee was given a contract indicating agency commission separately and hence the assessee would not be entitled to claim the benefit provided by the Board’s Circular No. 843/1/17-TRU; dated 6-6-1997. However, the Tribunal found that the assessee prima facie discharged obligation of tax and the amount other than commission was towards reimbursable expenses and in identical issue of the very assessee, this Bench has granted waiver of pre-deposit of the disputed amounts.

    In the case of port charges, the issue was squarely in favour of the assessee as held in the case of Kinship Services Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Cochin 2008 (10) STR 331 (Tri-Bang) and also in assessee’s own case as decided by the Bench in 2009 (15) STR 466 (Tri.-Bang.).

    Considering that prima facie case in favour of the appellant was made out, waiver was granted.

        6. Pre-deposit dispensed with for case on merits :

    Aster Teleservices Pvt. Ltd. v. Commr. of Cus. & C. Ex., Hyderabad 2010 (17) STR 584 (Tri.-Bang.)

    The assessee was rendering the following services :

        a) Erection of telecommunication tower

        b) Construction of petrol pumps, industrial buildings

        c) Erection and painting of telecommunication towers

        d) Erection and installation of telecom equipments (subcontractor)

        e) Erection of railway signaling system (railways)

    The Revenue demanded service tax on activities mentioned in (a), (d) and (e) under the category of erection and commissioning. According to the Revenue the activities could not be considered as works contract as the entire material was supplied by the principal. Plea was made by the assessee to grant stay till the matter pending before the Larger Bench could be decided. They further submitted that while determining the liability, the adjudicating authority considered the invoiced amount instead of actual receipts.

    The Tribunal observed that the assessee contested the liability on the ground that the activity was works contract. Considering that the decision was pending before the Larger Bench, and further that the assessee had substantiated their claim by producing sales tax returns and they had deposited about 25% of the service tax liability, the deposit was held sufficient and waiver was granted for the balance.

    7.(a) Penalty : U/s.78 : Whether non-filing and non-payment necessarily indicate suppression ?

    Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat v. Star Crane Service, 2010 (17) STR 576 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

    The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the penalty levied u/s.78 of the Finance Act, 1994. The Appellate Authority stated in its order that neither the show-cause notice made any allegation of existence of any suppressions, mismanagement, etc. with the intention to evade any payment of duty nor did the adjudicating authority recorded any such finding. Further the Commissioner (Appeals) also observed that the quantum of penalty could not exceed the amount of liability.

    The Revenue contended that the assessee failed to apply for registration, pay service tax and failed to file return and this has to be held as suppression on the part of the assessee.

    The Tribunal stated that in a number of cases it is held that non-application for registration does not construe suppression with an intent to evade duty in the light of fast-changing service tax law. The Revenue did not refer to any evidence of non-payment of tax due to any mala fide intention. Hence the order reducing penalty was good in law.

        b) Bona fide reasons : Penalty not leviable :

    Bureau  of  Indian  Standards  v.  Commissioner  of Custom and Central Excise, Nodia 2010 (17) STR 527 (Tri.-Delhi)

    The assessee is a national standard body under the administrative control of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and availing benefit under the Income-tax Act as charitable institution. The assessee’s training programme for development and implementation of quality environment, occupational health and safety, etc. on payment of fees was treated as commercial coaching & training by the Revenue and service tax, interest, penalty, etc. were demanded.

    The assessee took up the issue with its Ministry and was advised to pay service tax with interest.

    The Tribunal held that the facts and circumstances of the case indicated that the cause was reason-able for their failure to pay service tax undertaken by them and in absence of any intention to evade service tax, it is a fit case for invoking the provision of S. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

        c) Bona fide reasons :

    Adani Enterprises Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad 2010 (17) STR 457 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

    Penalty was imposed on the appellant receiving GTA services for several payments made delayedly. The reason for delay was explained as occurred on account of operational difficulty in implementation of new SAP software. The appellant paid interest of its own volition and several times made excess payment rather than short on account of software difficulty. The appellant relied on the decisions of C. Ahead Info. Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (A), Bangalore 2009 (14) STR 803 (Tri.-Bang.) and Santhi Casting Works v. CCE, Coimbatore, 2009 (15) STR 219 (Tri.-Chennai) as well as on the Board Circular No. 341/18/2004-TRU (Pt.), dated Dec 17, 2004 wherein the Department was directed not to impose penalty for procedural lapses in respect of GTA services till 31-12-2005. It also stated that no penalty would be levied unless default was on account of deliberate fraud, collusion, suppression, etc. Further the action of payment of service tax as a service recipient although they were not liable to pay it prior to 18-4-2006 indicated its bona fides. Further, the assessee contended that they were covered u/s.73 and not u/s.76 of the Act.

    The Revenue’s contention was that the delay was very high as compared to the excess payment, as it ranged from 20 days to 166 days which was indicative of other reasons than mere software problem and that the SCN imposed penalty u/s.76 and u/s.73 was not invoked at all.

    The Tribunal set aside the case holding that the assessee’s case was fit for waiver of penalty u/s.80 of the Act.

        d) In absence of suppression, penalty u/s.78 not leviable :

    Sahara Power Products v. CCE, Mangalore 2010 (17) STR 463 (Tri.-Bang.)

    The assessee was rendering repair and maintenance services of faulty distributor transformers of different capacities to Mangalore Electricity Supply. The Revenue issued a SCN as the assessee was not registered and also did not pay service tax. The Revenue demanded service tax from 1-7-2003 to 31-3-2006 invoking longer period of limitation along with interest and penalty u/s.76, u/s. 77 and u/s.78 of the Act. In response to the assessee’s appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) remanded the matter with certain directions. The adjudicating authority in the de novo order confirmed the service tax liability, interest and penalty u/s.76, u/s.77 and u/s.78. In the second round of appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed service tax along with interest and penalty u/s.76, u/s.77 and u/s.78 although in an earlier order, the Commissioner (Appeals) did not confirm any existence of suppression.

    The Tribunal held that for the defaults of non-registration and non-payment of tax, penalty u/s. 76 and u/s.77 is leviable. However, the assessee paid service tax with interest without contesting and the Commissioner (Appeals) in his earlier order levied service tax from 1-6-2005 onwards, thus indicating non-invoking of longer period of limitation and non-existence of fraud or suppression, no penalty was leviable u/s.78 of the Act.

        8. Rebate : Export of Services :

    Dell International Services India P. Ltd. v. CCE, Banga-lore 2010 (17) STR 540 (Tri.-Bang.)

    The assessee, a 100% EOU call centre filed five rebate claims which were rejected primarily on the ground that they did not export taxable service and input services were not used for exported services. In assessee’s own case, earlier the Assistant Commissioner on detailed scrutiny found that services were taxable and this fact was not disputed. Similarly, in another claim of the assessee, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee provided taxable services. In case when an issue is settled between the parties, the same cannot be argued again by the Department. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Suptd. of Central Excise v. D.C.I. Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., 2005 (181) ELT 189 SC.

    In order to determine whether the assessee was rendering business auxiliary services or the services rendered by the assessee were excluded from the definition of business auxiliary services i.e., information technology services, the cases of CCE, Hyderabad–IV v. M/s. Deloitte Tax Service (I) Pvt. Ltd., 2008 STR 266 (Tri.-Bang.) and Circular No. DOF No. 334/1/2008-TRU, dated 29-2-2008 were relied upon.

    To refute the contention of the Department that the services exported were not taxable services but exempt services and hence the rules of export were not applicable, it was submitted that Rule 3 of the Export Rules applied to taxable services. In other words, there was no restriction on the exempted services from being eligible for benefit under the Export of Rules, 2005.

    For the status of services as input services, decision of CCE, Mumbai-V v. M/s. GTC Industries Ltd., 2008 STR 468 (Tri-LB) among others was relied upon, which held that CENVAT was allowable on input services utilised for business.

    It was accordingly held that the conditions under the Notification 12/2005 were satisfied and rebate was allowed.

    9.(a) Valuation : Inclusion of amount declared to Income-tax Department :

    CCE, Chandigarh. v. Bindra Tent Service, 2010 (17) STR 470 (Tri.-Del.)

    The assessee, a pandal and shamiana keeper pursuant to an Income-tax Department survey, deposited certain amounts, based on which, the Revenue demanded service tax on the amount deposited contending that the surrender of monies without explaining the source implied that the amounts related to the taxable services and the burden of proof to prove contrary was with the assessee.

    The assessee pleaded that the amount deposited pertained accumulation in the previous six years and not of the particular year in question. In order to compute the undisclosed income only, it was taken as income in that particular year by the IT Department.

    The Commissioner (Appeals) in his order placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Kipps Education Centre, Bhatinda v. CCE, Chandigarh wherein it was held that the income voluntarily disclosed before the Income-tax authorities could not be added to the taxable value merely based on presumption without evidence. The burden to prove evasion lay on the Department. Since no inquiry was conducted by the Department as to the assessee’s claim that monies deposited were of earlier period, no tax could be levied and accordingly, cross objections were disposed of.

        b) Club or Association Service : Membership deposit :

    Adarsh Realty & Hotel Pvt. Ltd. v. Commr. of S. T. Bangalore, 2010 (17) STR 569 (Tri.-Bang.)

    The Revenue demanded service tax under the Club or Association Services. The appellant paid service tax on the annual subscription of the members, health club and spa services, guest charges, banquet halls, laundry service, internet service and travel desk except on membership deposit and service tax was demanded on the entire revenue streams. They also deposited a sum of Rs.12,44,722, pursuant to the order of the Adjudicating Authority pertaining to membership deposit in dispute.

    The Tribunal held that there being no dispute over other revenue streams, whether membership deposit is refundable or not, shall be considered at the time of the final disposal and since the assessee has deposited an amount disputed under the membership services, the pre-deposit of balance amount was waived and recovery was stayed.

        c) Simultaneous availment of CENVAT with abatement :

    CCE, Vadodara v. Ram Krishna Travels Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (17) STR 487 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

    The assessee availed abatement under Notification No. 1/06-S.T. and CENVAT credit simultaneously. The Revenue demanded service tax due to non-availability of benefit of abatement. The assessee subsequently reversed the credit so availed.

    The Commissioner (Appeals) by taking note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrapur Magnet Wires Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, 1996 (81) ELT 422 (All) and the High Court’s order in the case of Hello Minerals Water (P) Ltd. v. UOI, 2004 (174) ELT 422, held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) as the assessee had admittedly reversed the credit.

    Taxation of Software — Recent Developments

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    Service Tax

    Preliminary:


    The Information Technology/Software Industry in India is
    subjected to multiple indirect taxes like Excise Duty (ED)/Countervailing Duty (CVD)
    and Service tax by the Centre and VAT by the States. Apart from incidence of
    multiple taxation, what is affecting the industry most is the uncertainty over
    the correct applicability of a particular tax on its activities and the
    confusion is in the minds of the taxing authorities — both the Central and the
    States. This results in divergent practices being followed and dual taxation as
    a precautionary measure.

    An attempt is made to discuss some important recent
    developments in regard to this complex subject.

    Background:

    Information Technology Software Service (ITSS) was
    comprehensively brought under the levy of service tax through the insertion of
    the sub-clause (zzzze) in clause (105) of section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994
    (FA) w.e.f. 16-5-2008.

    Since March, 2006, ED was already being levied on ‘Packaged
    Software’ manufactured in India and sold off the shelf. Such ‘Packaged Software’
    has been treated as ‘goods’ and classified under Tariff Item 8523 80 20 of the
    Central Excise Tariff. [It needs to be noted that the issue as to whether or not
    the concept of ‘manufacture’ can be applied to ‘software’ or not, is pending
    before a larger Bench of the Supreme Court. However, in the context of income
    tax it has been held in CIT v. Oracle Software India Ltd., (2010) 250 ELT
    161 (SC), that the process of software replication which renders a commodity or
    article fit for use which otherwise is not so, would fall within ‘manufacture’.

    Though basic customs duty is not payable on Imports of IT
    software, CVD under customs became payable on such imports due to levy of ED on
    it.

    W.e.f. 16-5-2008, the ‘Licence to use the IT software’ has
    been subjected to levy of service tax. However, the levy was confined to the
    services in relation to IT software for use for commercial exploitation. It is a
    matter of common knowledge that in case of supply of software, two cost
    components are usually involved viz. :

    •  the
      value of the media and the cost of recording of software thereon; and


    •  the
      value of the licence to use the software representing the consideration towards
      intellectual property.

    On the other hand, based on the ruling of the Supreme Court
    in Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P., (2004) 178 ELT 22 (SC)
    many States have imposed VAT or WCT on software classifying it as ‘goods’ or
    ‘works contract’ under respective VAT legislations. For example, under the
    Maha-rashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT), intangible goods are covered by
    entry C-39 and liable to tax. ‘Software packages’ are notified under entry C-39
    and hence, are liable to VAT.

    Hence, in the context of software taxation, it becomes very
    important to determine whether ‘software’ is sold as ‘goods’, and is liable to
    VAT or provided as ‘service’, so as to attract levy of service tax under the FA.

    Further, pursuant to the 46th Amendment of the Constitution
    of India by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1982, the tax-base underwent a
    sea-change due to the insertion of clause (29A) in Article 366. The States
    acquired the powers to levy sales tax on certain types of ‘deemed sale’. As a
    consequence of this constitutional amendment, all the states have made changes
    in their respective VAT Legislation in this regard. One such ‘deemed sale’ that
    can be subjected to levy of VAT/sales tax is transfer of the right to use any
    goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred
    payment or other valuable consideration. Thus, States have been levying or
    attempting to levy VAT/sales tax on such activity of ‘providing licence to use
    IT software’.

    The IT/Software Industry was slapped with the demands raised
    by the authorities either for customs duties i.e., CVD or for service tax. Even
    though CVD was paid on the licence value, service tax was being demanded thereon
    and vice versa. Even simultaneous demands under customs and service tax have
    been raised in many cases.

    It would appear that it was never the legislative intent that
    the value addition in the form of software licence should be taxed more than
    once. It should either be taxed by way of ED/CVD or by way of service tax.

    Information Technology Software Service (ITSS):

    IT/Software Services were comprehensively brought under the
    service tax ambit w.e.f. 16-5-2008 through introduction of a specific entry viz.
    section 65(105)(zzzze) in the FA.

    Relevant extracts from the Ministry’s Circular/Letter DOF No.
    334/1/2008-TRU, dated 29-2-2008 clarifying the scope of service are as under :

    4.1.1

    Information Technology (IT) software service includes:

    •  Development (study, analysis, design and programming) of software.



    •  Adaptation, upgradation, enhancement, implementation and
      other similar services in relation to IT software.


    •  Provision of advice and assistance on matter related to IT
      software, including :


    •  Conducting feasibility studies on the implementation of a system,


    •  Providing guidance and assistance during the start-up phase of a new system,


    •  Providing specifications to secure a database,


    •  Providing advice on proprietary IT software


    •  Acquiring (substituted by ‘providing’ by the Finance Act, 2009) the right to
      use, :


    •  IT
      software for commercial exploitation including right to reproduce, distribute
      and sell,


    •  Software components for the creation of and inclusion in other IT software
      products,


    •  IT
      software supplied electronically.


    “4.1.2

    Software consists of carrier medium such as CD, floppy and coded data. Softwares are categorised as ‘normal software’ and ‘specific software’. Normalised software is a mass market product generally available in packaged form, off the shelf in retail outlets. Specific software is tailored to the specific requirement of the customer and is known as ‘customised software.’

    “4.1.3

    Packaged software sold off the shelf, being treated as goods, is leviable to excise duty @ 896. In this Budget, it has been increased from 8% to 12% vide Notification No. 12/2008-CE, dated 1-3-2008. Number of IT services and IT-enabled services (ITeS) are already leviable to service tax under various taxable services.”

    “4.1.5

    Software and upgrades of software are also supplied electronically known as digital delivery. Taxation is to be neutral and should not depend on forms of delivery. Such supply of IT software electronically shall be covered within the scope of the proposed service.”

    Software downloaded from Internet:

        a) The Finance Minister in his Budget Speech on 28-2-2006 observed as under:

    “Para 138

    I propose to impose an 8% excise duty on pack-aged software sold over the counter. Customised software and software packages downloaded from the internet will be exempt from this levy.

    In cases where the software is made available only through the medium of the Internet, there is no express, exclusion in Entry 27 stated above. However, the Explanatory Notes, which form part of the Budget papers read as under:

    “Excise duty of 8% is being imposed on packaged software is also known as canned software on electronic media (software downloaded from the internet and customised software will not attract duty). [Serial 27 of Notification No. 6/2006)]”.

        b) The Central Excise Rules, 2002 contemplate payment of excise duty at the time of removal of excisable goods from the factory and at the rates prevalent on the date of removal from the factory. Where a customised software solution is sold to the customer through the medium of Internet, the transaction can be considered as an e-commerce transaction and there is no physical removal of goods in a tangible form from the factory gate, which is the requirement of levy of excise duty. Further, the software is not available in any medium for it to be considered as goods as per the rationale of the Supreme Court in TCS case.

        c) The following judicial rulings need to be noted:

        i) In Digital Equipment (India) Ltd. v. CC, (2001) 135 ELT 962, the Tribunal has held that information transmitted via e-mail cannot be akin to import of record media in 85.23. In an e-mail transfer, no media as a movable article is crossing the international boundaries and there is no movable property movement involved. Therefore, transfer of information or idea or knowledge on e-mail transfer would not be covered within the ambit of goods under the Customs Act. If they are not goods, then they cannot be subject to any duty.

        ii) The Supreme Court in the case of Associated Cement Company v. CC, (2001) 128 ELT 21 had held that where any drawings or designs or technical materials are put in any media or paper, it becomes goods. Hence only if an intellectual property is put in a media, it is to be regarded as an article or goods.

        iii) In Multi Media Frontiers v. CCE, (2003) 156 ELT 272, the Tribunal has observed that a software cannot exist by itself and for it to be put to use it has to necessarily exist on some suitable media such has floppy disc, tape or CD.

        iv) In Pantex Geebee Fluide Power Ltd. v. CC, (2003) 160 ELT 514 (Tri), it has been held that a transfer of intellectual property by intangible means like e-mail would not be liable to customs duty.

        d) The Geneva Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce Document WT/MIN (98) DEC/ 2, dated 25-5-1998 which is a declaration of an intent by members of WTO that they would continue their current practice of not imposing customs duty on electronic declaration.

        e) MVAT does not contain specific provisions to tax supply of software electronically.

        f) Providing the rights to use information technology software supplied electronically is specifically covered under the scope of ITSS[section 65(105) (zzzze)(vi) of FA.]


    Amendments by the Union Budget for 2009-10/Clarification regarding packaged or canned software:

    Relevant Extracts of Ministry’s Circular Letter D.O.F. No. 334/13/2009-TRU, dated 6-7-2009 are as under:

    I.3 — Packaged or canned software:

    Partial exemption from excise duty has been provided to packaged or canned software so that the duty payable on that portion of the value which represents the consideration for the transfer of the right to use such software, is exempted. The benefit of the exemption is available to the manufacturer of such software when he declares to the Central Excise authorities that the right to use is transferred for commercial exploitation and fulfilment of some other conditions. The details are contained in Notification No. 22/2009 — Central Excise, dated 7th July, 2009. On the portion of the value which is exempted from excise duty, service tax will be leviable under the ‘Information Technology Software Service’.

    II.9 — IT Software:

    On packaged or canned software, CVD exemption has been provided on the portion of the value which represents the consideration for transfer of the right to use such software, subject to specified conditions. This portion of the value is leviable to service tax as ‘Information Technology Software Service’. Although, the CVD exemption has not been made conditional upon the payment of service tax, it is requested that a mechanism be put in place to ensure regular exchange of information on details of importers availing of the exemption between the customs and service tax formations so that, where necessary, action for recovery of service tax may be taken.

    Amendments by the Union Budget for 2010-2011:

        a) Realising the difficulties faced by the IT/Software Industry, few steps were taken to address the same, as under:

    •     Vide Notification No. 17/10-CE, dated 27-2-2010, the condition that the transfer of right to use shall be for a commercial exploitation has been removed and Notification No. 22/09-CE has been superseded.

    •     Similarly, the Notification No. 80/09-Cus has been superseded vide Notification. No. 31/10-Cus and the condition relating to ‘commercial exploitation’ has been dispensed with.

    •     Also, vide Notification No. 2/10-ST, dated 27-2-2010, the exemption from payment of whole of the service tax has been granted to ‘packaged or canned software’, intended for single use and packed accordingly subject to fulfilment of the prescribed conditions including the condition that the benefit of Notification 17/10-CE is not availed of.

    •     Exemption from payment of service tax vide Notification Nos. 2/10-ST and 17/10-ST, both dated 27-2-2010 is granted in respect of ‘packaged or canned software’, intended for single use and packed accordingly.

    (b) The following needs to be noted :

    •     The exemption is restricted to shrink-wrapped single-user software licence and does not apply in case in ‘multi-user software licence’.

    •     The issue of liability to pay service tax under ‘reverse charge in terms of section 66A of FA could arise in regard to the remittances towards licence fee made by the licensee based in India to the overseas software company. In such cases, there could be issues as to whether the exemption granted vide the above Notifications would be applicable or not.

    a) Important Ruling of Madras High Court:

        The Madras High Court, in a landmark ruling in Infotech Software Dealers Association v. UOI, (2010) 20 STR 289 (ISODA), has upheld the constitutional validity of section 65(105)(zzzze) of the FA, introduced with effect from 16-5-2008.

        b) The writ petition filed by ISODA had raised the following issues, in particular:

    •     Whether software is ‘goods’ ?

    •     Whether, the transfer/supply of software, in terms of the end-user licence agreements en-tered into by the members of the ISODA would amount to a service, especially in the light of the fact that this transaction is treated as a sale?

    • Whether, the Parliament has the legislative competency to levy service tax u/s.65(105) (zzzze) of the Act?

        c) During the course of hearing, ISODA had submitted that its members are re-selling software products under the three categories, viz.,

    •     shrinkwrapped software,

    •     multiple user software/paper licence and

    •     Internet downloads.

    ISODA also submitted that the transactions entered into by its members are only a sale of software being goods and that no element of service is present and that only the State Governments are empowered to levy tax in terms of Entry 54 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and con-sequently, the Parliament has no legislative compe-tence to levy service tax on the same transaction u/s.65(105)(zzzze) of the FA.

        d) Some of the important contentions of Department were as under:

    •     The amendment would fall under Entry 97 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India and that the challenge to the legislative competency of the Parliament cannot be sustained. Standardised software licence is available across the shelf or is downloaded from Internet, and by itself, it is not a finished product inasmuch as updates are given by the original manufacturer to the end user for an agreed period. At no stage, does an end user who runs the software becomes the absolute owner of the software.

    •     The right to use the software excludes certain rights, particularly the right to modify, right to work on the software and the right to commercially exploit the software and that each transaction should be considered individually to find out whether it is a sale or service. ‘service element’ is clearly discernible in the case of customised software which is liable for service tax.

        e) The Madras High Court made the following important observations:

    •     When the legislative competency of a taxing statute is considered, the nature of transaction and the dominant intention would be relevant.

    •     Goods can be tangible or intangible property and the Indian law does not distinguish between the two.

    •     Software, whether packaged or customised is goods within the meaning of Article 366(12) of the Constitution, in terms of the rulings of the Supreme Court in TCS case, the Karnataka High Court ruling in Antrix Corporation (2010) TIOL 515 HC KAR and the Madras High Court ruling in Infosys (2008) 233 ELT 56 (Mad.). The legal position that software is goods is no longer res integra.

    •     The copyright in a software transaction is protected and always remains the property of the creators/developer and what is sold is the right to use the software. When the sale is with a condition for exclusive use of the software by the customer at the exclusion of others, it gives absolute possession and control to the user of the right to use the software.

    •     When a developer does not sell the software (packaged or customised) as such, the transaction between the resellers and the end users cannot be a sale of software as such but only the contents of the data stored in the software, which would only amount to a service.

    •     If the software is sold through the medium of Internet which is downloadable, it does not fit into the ambit of ‘IT software of any media’ and consequently, it is possible to hold that when an access control is given through an Internet medium with a username and password and when there is no CD or other storage media for the item, it does not satisfy the requirement of being ‘goods’.

        f) The Madras High Court dismissed the writ petition of ISODA and held as under:

    •     Though software is ‘goods’, the transaction may not amount to a sale in all cases and it may vary depending upon the end-user licence agreement. The transaction between the members of ISODA with its customers is not of sale of the software as such, but the contents of data stored in the software would amount to only service.

    •     The Parliament has the legislative competency to enact law to include certain services provided or to be provided in terms of ‘ITSS’, the residuary Entry 97 of List I of Schedule VII. The constitutional validity of the amended provision cannot be questioned so long as the residuary power is available.

    •     The question as to whether a transaction would amount to sale or service depends upon the individual transaction and on that ground, the vires of a provision cannot be questioned.

        g) Some of the important issues arising from the aforesaid landmark ruling of the Madras High Court are as under:

    •     The ruling makes a distinction between ‘soft-ware’ and ‘contents of data stored in the software’.

    •     The ruling has given a new dimension to the taxation of the transfer of right to use goods, by the States. The following observations, in particular, need to be noted:

    Para 31

    “….the dominant intention of the parties would show that the developer or the creator keeps back the copyright of each software, be it canned, packaged or customised, and what is transferred to the network subscriber, namely, the members of the association, is only the right to use with copyright protection. By that agreement, even the developer does not sell the software as such. By that Master End-User Licence Agreement, the members of petitioner — association again enter into an end-user licence agreement for marketing the software as per the conditions stipulated therein. In common parlance, end user is a person who uses a product or utilises the service. An end user of a computer software is one who does not have any significant contact with the developer/ creator/designer of the software. According to Webster’s New World Tele-com dictionary, an end user is “the ultimate user of a product or service, especially of a computer system, application or network.” On a careful reading of the above, we are of the considered view that. “…. when a transaction takes place between the members of ISODA with its customers, it is not the sale of the software as such, but only the contents of the data stored in the software which would amount to only service. To bring the deemed sale under Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India, there must be a transfer of right to use any goods and when the goods as such is not transferred, the question of deeming sale of goods does not arise and in that sense, the transaction would be only a service and not a sale.”

    It is a settled law that for a tax to be levied by the States on the transfer of right to use goods, there is no need for goods, as such, to be transferred. The above observations of the Madras High Court appear to unsettle the settled law.

    •     The decision seems to distinguish between trans-actions entered into by developers of software products and re-sellers of software products. Most domestic software product players directly sell software licences to their customers. While, most re-sellers operate in the area of re-sale of imported software licences, a distinction is sought to be made between selling of a licence by a developer and that by a reseller.

    •     The decision does not seem to distinguish between ordinary re-sellers and value added re-sellers. In a latter case there is possibility of service element.

    •     The Court has also significantly observed that electronic import of software licences is a service, as the software (being goods) is not transferred. This observation could significantly impact the import of software licences by the Indian resellers and large business houses, a major portion of which happens through the electronic mode.

    MRP levy introduced for packaged software — Recent Notifications:

    In an important development, the Government has brought the entire packaged software industry, under the MRP-based excise levy by issuing Notification Nos. 30/10-CE and 53/10-Service Tax, both dated 21-12-2010.

    In terms of the Notification No. 30/10 CE, Notification No. 49/08 CE, dated 24-12-2008 has been amended, providing for an abatement of 15% of what has been given on the MRP of the packaged software based on which the central excise duty will have to be paid by the manufacturer and CVD to be paid by the importer. In terms of Notification No. 53/10-ST, dated 21-12-2010 no service tax shall be payable on the licence value in terms of section 65(105)(zzzze)(v) of FA.

    Some of the more important implications that arise from the Notifications are as under:

        a) MRP-based levy would be applicable only for the physical mode used for licensing of the pack-aged software licences as contrasted to the electronic mode of transfer. Hence electronic transfer of licences for packaged software would continue to be taxed under service tax in terms of specific provisions u/s.65(105)(zzzze) of the FA.

        b) Importers of packaged software licences would have the choice of either importing the licences in the electronic mode, or in the physical mode. Up-till now importers were either paying CVD on the physical imports or service tax on the electronic imports on the transaction values. Now with the MRP-based levy for CVD on physical imports, it is possible that importers could be better off, shifting to the electronic import, as the value-added margins for imports could be much higher.

        c) The local manufacturers may find it better to shift to the electronic mode of transfer of software licences, as paying service tax at 10.3% on the transaction value could be cheaper as compared to paying central excise duty at 10.3% on MRP less 15% abatement.

        d) In terms of Notification No. 49/08-CE, dated 24-12-2008 (as amended) ‘retail sale price’ means the maximum price at which the excisable goods in packaged form may be sold to the ultimate consumer and includes all taxes local or otherwise, freight, transport charges commission payable to dealers, and all charges, towards advertisement, delivery, packing forwarding and the like as the case may be, and the price is the sole consideration for such sale.

    Notifications issued could result in practical difficul-ties for the importers. To illustrate:

        i) In many cases the concept of MRP may not work for imported packaged software products. In such cases, issues would arise as to whether the customs authorities can treat the ultimate selling price charged by the importer, as the MRP where there is no MRP for the software product imported/ or would the authorities go by the retail prices published by the foreign suppliers of software packages which could be substantially higher than the price at which these are sold in India.

        ii) MRP regime may not be practically workable inasmuch as a large number of transactions get conducted through contracts entered into between the parties. A software player holding valid IPR can transfer licences to various customers at varyingprice arising out of customisation etc. In such cases, how can MRP-based duty be computed.

        e) In cases of imports at significantly reduced special price (e.g., non-profit bodies), the same could get covered under the MRP levy, resulting in higher overall costs.

        f) The new MRP-based levy would also affect importers of software licences for their internal purposes at discounted prices. Such importers would have to pay CVD on the MRP less 15% abatement, which could mean increase the overall costs.

        g) By issuing these Notifications, the Government seems to be confirming that packaged software is nothing but goods. However the electronic transfer of software licence would be service in terms of clause (vi) of section 65 (105)(zzzze) of FA. Hence, the same product can be ‘goods’ or ‘service’ depending upon the mode of delivery.

    Part A : INTEREST ON CENVAT CREDIT TAKEN OR UTILISED WRONGLY

    fiogf49gjkf0d

    Service Tax

    1. Relevant statutory provisions :


    (a) Rule 3(1) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR
    04) :


    A manufacturer or producer or provider of taxable
    service shall be allowed to take Credit (hereinafter referred to as CENVAT
    Credit) . . . . . .

    (b) Rule 4(1) of CCR 04 :


    CENVAT credit in respect of inputs may be taken
    immediately on receipt of the inputs in factory of the manufacturer or premises
    of provider of output service . . . . . .

    (c) Rule 4(2)(a) of CCR 04 :


    The CENVAT Credit in respect of Capital goods
    . . . . . . at any point of time in a given financial year shall be taken only
    for an amount not exceeding fifty per cent of duty paid on such Capital goods in
    the same financial year.

    (d) Rule 4(7) of CCR 04 :


    The CENVAT Credit in respect of input service shall
    be allowed, on or after the day on which payment is made of the value of input
    service and service tax paid or payable as indicated in Invoice . . . . . .

    (e) Rule 14 of CCR 04 :


    “Where CENVAT Credit has been taken or utilised
    wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same along with the interest shall
    be recovered from the manufacturer or provider of the output service and the
    provisions of the S. 11A and S. 11AB of the Excise Act, or S. 73 and S. 75 of
    the Finance Act, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such
    recoveries.”

    2. What constitutes CENVAT Credit ‘taken or
    utilised wrongly’ :


    (a) Some of the meanings attributed to the terms
    ‘take’, ‘utilise’ and ‘wrongly’ are as under :

    (i)
    Take


    • Lay
      hold of with one’s hands; reach for and hold

    • To get
      possession of; to gain, to choose; select

    • To gain
      or receive into possession; to seize; to assume ownership

     

    Concise
    Oxford English Dictionary

    Webster’s
    Concise Dictionary


    Black’s Law Dictionary

    (ii)
    Utilise

    • To make
      practical or worthwhile use of

    • Make
      practical and effective use of

    • To make
      use of; turn to use

    • To make
      use of, turn to account, use


     

    New Collins Dictionary

    Concise Oxford English Dictionary

    Concise Dictionary


    COD 6th Ed.

    (iii)
    Wrongly

    • ‘Wrong’
      has various shades of meaning like mistake, not true, in error


    • Wrongful — Characterised by unfairness of injustice, contrary to law

    • Wrong —
      Any damage or injury, contrary to right, violation of right or of law


     

    Concise Oxford Dictionary

     

     

     

     

     

     

    P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s Law Lexicon.

    (b) The following emerges from the foregoing
    analysis :

    • Taking of credit would
      imply an act of availment of credit/benefit under CCR 04. [This could be
      demonstrated by making entry in records, returns, etc.]
      It is possible that an assessee makes entries for ‘CENVAT Credit taken’ in their records but does not actually utilise it. [He may have some doubts about the entitlement of the credit taken or for other reasons like no service tax payable to enable set-off]

      •     Taking or utilising credit wrongly both could be offences. ‘Taking’ can be compared to ‘attempt to commit an offence’ while ‘Utilise’ would mean actually committing of an offence.


      •     The word ‘wrongly’ is stronger than ‘mistakenly’ or ‘erroneously’ and would usually imply an intention to take CENVAT Credit which an assessee was not entitled in terms of CCR 04.


         3.  Reversal of CENVAT Credit before utilisation — Settled position:

          In a landmark ruling in Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (1996) 81 ELT 3 (SC) it has been held by the Supreme Court that when MODVAT Credit taken is reversed, it would mean that MODVAT Credit was not taken at all. This principle is relevant for CENVAT Credit as well. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter?:

      Para 7
      In view of the aforesaid clarification by the Department, we see no reason why the assessee cannot make a debit entry in the credit account before removal of the exempted final product. If this debit entry is permissible to be made, credit entry for the duties paid on the inputs utilised in manufacture of the final exempted product will stand deleted in the accounts of the assessee. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the assessee has taken credit for the duty paid on the inputs utilised in the manufacture of the final exempted product under Rule 57A. In other words, the claim for exemption of duty on the disputed goods cannot be denied on the plea that the assessee has taken credit of the duty paid on the inputs used in manufacture of these goods.

      The above-stated principle laid down by the Su-preme Court has been followed in large number of cases.
          In CCE v. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd., (2007) 215 ELT 3 (SC) also it has been held that reversal of credit before utilisation amounts to not taking credit.

      In view of the Supreme Court ruling in the Bombay Dyeing case, CBEC has in the context of Textiles

      Textile Articles vide its Circular No. 858/16/2007 –CX, dated 8-11-2007, clarified as under?:

      Para 3

      …..it is clarified that para 2 of the said Circular stands amended to the extent that in case, credit taken on inputs used in the manufacture of the said goods cleared under Notification No. 141/2002–C.E. or Notification No. 30/2004–C.E., has been reversed before utilisation, it would amount to credit not having been taken.

      c)    However, it needs to be noted that rulings of the Supreme Court in Chandrapur Magnet & Bombay Dyeing, have been distinguished by the Bombay High Court in CCE v. Nicholas Piramal (India) Ltd., (2009) 244 ELT 321 (Bom.) while interpreting Rule 6 of CCR 04.

      4.    Recent clarification of the Board

      CBEC, vide Circular No. 897/17/2009–CX, dated 3-9-2009 has clarified as under:

      “The Tribunal decision and the High Court judgment referred to above, was delivered in the context of erstwhile Rule 57I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and that the Supreme Court order under reference is only a decision and not a judgment. Since, Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, is clear and unambiguous in the position that interest would be recoverable when CENVAT Credit is taken or utilised wrongly, it is clarified that the interest shall be recoverable when credit has been wrongly taken, even if it has not been utilised, in terms of wordings of the present Rule 14.”

      It may be noted that erstwhile Rule 57I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 did not specifically provide for any interest payment along with reversal of wrongly taken credit while present Rule 14 of CCR 04 provides for payment of interest along with reversal of wrongly taken credit.

         5.  Interest:

      In Pratibha Processors v. UOI, (1996) 88 ELT 12 (SC), it was observed by the Supreme Court as under:

      “In fiscal statutes, the import of the words-, — ‘tax’, ‘interest’, ‘penalty’, etc. are well known. They are different concepts. Tax is the amount payable as a result of the charging provision. It is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purpose, the payment of which is enforced by law. Penalty is ordinarily levied on an assessee for some contumacious conduct or a deliberate violation of the provisions of the particular statute. Interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable. The levy of interest is geared to actual amount of tax withheld and the extent of delay in paying the tax on due date. Essentially, it is compensatory and different from penalty — which is penal in character.” (p. 20).

      Thus, interest is not a penalty but is essentially compensatory in nature. If CENVAT Credit is taken in books but not actually utilised, it would appear that since there is no loss of revenue to the Government, it may not be required to be compensated by a taxpayer.

          6. Interest on credit taken but not utilised — Judicial views:.
          In CCE v. Maruti Udyog Ltd., (2007) 214 ELT 173 (P & H)], the Punjab & Haryana Court agreed with the views of the Hon’ble CESTAT that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as entry in the MODVAT record and was in fact not utilised. SLP filed by the Revenue against this order of the P & H High Court has been dismissed by the Supreme Court (2007) 214 ELT A 50 (SC) on 10-10-2006.

      In the case of Maruti Udyog, the assessee claimed Modvat Credit which was not allowable in absence of requisite certificate under Rule 57E of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, being produced within six months but still the assessee claimed the same and credited the amount in RG – 23A Part II. The authorities disallowed the Modvat Credit relying upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Osram Surya (P) Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore, (2002) 142 ELT 5 (SC).

      The Tribunal, however, had held that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as an entry in the Modvat record and was not in fact utilised. The Tribunal held that in absence of utilisation of credit, the assessee was not liable to pay interest.

      The P&H High Court held as under:
      “Learned counsel for the appellant is unable to show as to how the interest will be required to be paid when in absence of availment of Modvat Credit in fact, the assessee was not liable to pay any duty. The Tribunal has clearly recorded a finding that the assessee did not avail of the Modvat Credit in fact and had only made an entry.

      In view of this factual position, we are unable to hold that any substantial question of law arises.”

         b) Attention is particularly drawn to the ruling of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Ind–Swift Laboratories Ltd. v. UOI, (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H), relevant extracts from which, are reproduced hereafter for reference?:

      Para 9

      The Scheme of the Act and the CENVAT Credit Rules framed thereunder permit a manufacturer or producer of final products or a provider of taxable service to take CENVAT Credit in respect of duty of excise and such other duties as specified. The conditions for allowing CENVAT Credit are contained in Rule 4 of the Credit Rules contemplating that CENVAT Credit can be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in the factory of the manufacturer or in the premises of the provider of output service. Such CENVAT credit can be utilised in terms of Rule 3(4) of Credit Rules for payment of any duty of excise on any final product and as contemplated in the aforesaid sub-rule. It, thus, transpires that CENVAT credit is the benefit of duties leviable or paid as specified in Rule 3(1) used in the manufacture of intermediate products, etc. In other words, it is a credit of the duties already leviable or paid. Such credit in respect of duties already paid can be adjusted for payment of duties payable under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. U/s.11AB of the Act, liability to pay interest arises in respect of any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded from the first day of the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. Interest is leviable if duty of excise has not been levied or paid. Interest can be claimed or levied for the reason that there is delay in the payment of duties. The interest is compensatory in nature as the penalty is chargeable separately.

      Para 10
      In Pratibha Processors v. Union of India, 1996 ELT 12 (SC), (1996) 11 SCC 101, it was held that interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable. The levy of interest is geared to actual amount of tax withheld and the extent of the delay in paying the tax on the due date. It is compensatory and different from penalty which is penal in character. Similarly, in Commissioner of Customs v. Jayathi Krishna & Co., 2000 (119) ELT 4 (SC) (2000) 9 SCC 402, it was held that interest on warehoused goods is merely an accessory to the principal and if principal is not payable, so is it for interest on it. In view of the aforesaid principle, we are of the opinion that no liability of payment of any excise duty arises when the petitioner availed CENVAT Credit. The liability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisation. Even if CENVAT Credit has been wrongly taken, that does not lead to levy of interest as liability of payment of excise duty does not arise with such availment of CENVAT Credit by an assessee. Therefore, interest is not payable on the amount of CENVAT Credit availed of and not utilised.

      Para 11
      Reliance of respondents on Rule 14 of the Credit Rules that interest u/s.11AB of the Act is payable even if CENVAT Credit has been taken. In our view, the said clause has to be read down to mean that where CENVAT Credit taken and utilised wrongly. Interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that the CENVAT Credit has been wrongly taken as such availment by itself does not create any liability of payment of excise duty. On a conjoint reading of S. 11AB of the Act and that of Rules 3 and 4 of the Credit Rules, we hold that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of CENVAT Credit. The interest shall be payable from the date CENVAT Credit is wrongly utilised.

      Though the above ruling was pronounced on 3-7-2009 (i.e., before the issue of Circular by CBEC on 3-9-2009), it is very relevant for interpretation of Rule 14 of CCR 04.

          Conclusion:
         a) Under the Scheme of CCR 04 there is a clear mismatch as to time of availment of credit and time of utilisation of credit. In case of Service Providers rendering multiple services through loca-tions spread across the country, it becomes very difficult, to ascertain whether credit availed has been actually utilised or not.

      However, the principle laid by the Supreme Court in a landmark ruling CCE v. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd., (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC) that, MODVAT does not envisage one to one correlation between ‘Inputs’ and ‘Outputs’ and credit once availed is indefeasible, is very much relevant in the context of CCR 04 as well.

      Under the scenario of timing mismatch between credit availment and credit utilisation, at a practical level, issues would remain as to how do service tax authorities monitor correctness of CENVAT Credit availed & its subsequent utilisation.

          b) Under CCR 04, the onus for availment of credit is on the person taking credit. Hence, it would appear that a person taking the credit may have to satisfy with reasonable certainty as to the credit entitlement and its subsequent utilisation in terms of conditions stipulated under CCR 04.

      In cases where, there is a very remote possibility of entitlement to credit availment & utilisation of credit [e.g., credit of Input services availed by a retailer] Rule 14 of CCR 04 could be invoked, despite subsequent reversal by such retailer, on the ground that there was no entitlement to credit inasmuch as a retailer is not a beneficiary under CCR 04.

      There could also be cases where there is a genuine error in availing CENVAT Credit (e.g., simultaneous availment of CENVAT benefit on Capital Goods & depreciation under income-tax). However, subsequently on its own but before utilisation of credit, the same is rectified by filing revised return before IT Authorities. This could be a good case for non-recovery of interest.

          c) As regards clarifications issued by CBEC vide Circular dated 3-9-2009, it would appear that interpretation of Rule 14 of CCR 04 by the Punjab & Haryana High Court [discussed in para 6(b) earlier] to the effect that Rule has to be read down to mean ‘credit taken and utilised wrongly’ reflects a correct view. Hence, if bona fides of credit availment can be established, there may not be a case for interest recovery on account of subsequent reversal of credit. However, this would depend on the facts and circumstances, of each case.

      It needs to be expressly noted that though correctness of CBEC Circular dated 3-9-2009 would be judicially tested, the field formations are likely to follow the Circular resulting in extensive litigations.

        d)  To end, since under CCR 04 the onus as to the availment of CENVAT Credit is on the service provider, it is felt that, due diligence need to be exercised at the point of availment of credit through a good system in place.

    Is education taxed as commercial training or coaching service ? – A judicial analysis.

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    Service Tax

    1. ‘Commercial training or coaching’ has been subjected to
    the levy of service tax for the past six years viz. from July 1, 2003.
    Despite the short span, interestingly, the subject matter has been judicially
    tested in many recent cases of educational training institutions wherein
    Tribunals have made in-depth analysis and examination of the levy for the said
    taxing entry. An attempt is made here to bring together this analysis in a
    nutshell for readers. In most of these cases, the issue revolved around, whether
    training or coaching or the centre imparting training or coaching is commercial
    or charitable or vocational etc. or otherwise.

    2. Section 65(26) of the Finance Act,1994 (The Act) has
    defined ‘commercial training or coaching’ as ‘any training or coaching
    provided by a commercial training or coaching centre’.



       In turn, section 65(27) of the Act has defined the service provider which is designated as “commercial training or coaching centre” as follows :

        ” ‘Commercial training or coaching centre’ means any institute or establishment providing commercial training or coaching for imparting skill or knowledge or lessons on any subject or field other than the sports, with or without issuance of a certificate and includes coaching or tutorial classes but does not include preschool coaching and training centre or any institute or establishment which issues any certificate or diploma or degree or any educational qualification recognised by law for the time being in force”.

    3. It is obvious that the legislature has observed some
    difference between the terms ‘training’ and ‘coaching’ and therefore both the
    expressions are used in the definition. The two words are defined in many ways,
    however, major differences can be summarised this way — Training in general is
    imparted by the trainer to a large number of trainees for a shorter duration and
    the flow of imparting skill or knowledge is usually in the direction of trainees
    from the trainer through constant delivery of information whereas coaching is a
    customised and ongoing process, often interactive and through which solution is
    provided for specific needs and challenges. However, the term ‘education’ rests
    much above the concept of training and coaching. Training is an activity whereby
    the trainee exercises to achieve mastery and perfection. Education presupposes
    growth or development of a person. Like being ‘educated’ is much more than being
    ‘literate’ in a specific field, ‘education’ per se is much beyond
    training and coaching. Therefore, in the context of levy of service tax, it is
    required to study and understand the scope of the statutory provisions of the
    category of ‘commercial training or coaching service’. In the case of Malappuram
    District Parallel College Association 2006-TIOL-35-HC-Kerala, the High Court
    noted :


    “Even if the State is not able to finance higher education as required under the Directive Principles of State Policy under article 41 of the Constitution, it should not deny and discourage opportunities for education by adding cost to it in the form of tax on education which will certainly disable the economically weaker sections from pursuing higher studies”. While the revenue argued over the fact that education is carried on as a business activity, the Court further observed as follows :

    ‘This malady has to be corrected only by levying income tax on the institutions and not by licensing the institutions to collect service tax from students. In fact section 10(22) of the Income Tax Act which granted blanket income tax exemption for educational institutions is now deleted and exemption is provided with moderation in section 10(23C) of the said Act. Of course, section 11 of the Income Tax Act which provides cover to large number of tax evaders under the guise of charity will continue to protect educational institutions as charity includes education also. If education is run on business lines, then solution is to amend section 11 and other relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act withdrawing the exemptions to institutions and Government can simultaneously provide financial aid to beneficiaries which will put an end to misuse of Income Tax provisions”.

    The court also observed, “Tax on education, particularly when the incidence of tax is passed on to the beneficiaries, that is, the students, is a regressive legislation and has to be condemned, more so, when large number of poor people seeks salvation through education and employment”.

    4. In the background of the above thin yet fundamental
    difference between education on one hand and coaching and training on the other,
    examined below are observation of Tribunals in various cases :


    4.1 Service tax of about 1.5 crores and huge penalties, interest, etc. were demanded from Great Lakes Institute of Management Ltd., which conducts post graduate programme in management and which has academic and research collaborations with renowned international universities [Great Lakes Institute of Management Ltd.- (GUM) vs. CST Chennai-2008-TIOL-134-CESTAT-Mad.]. Summary of the Tribunal’s observations was that GUM was a section 25 company and as such, most of its surplus earned was transferred to campus infrastructure project fund and that GUM aims to mould itself into a center of excellence in consonance with its avowed objective. The provision of education by an institution is a commercial concern run with the sole objective of making profit whereas in GUM’s case, no individual gained any profit by its operations and the Tribunal ruled, “the test which has therefore now to be applied is whether the predominant object of the activity involved in carrying out the object of general public utility is to sub-serve the charitable purpose or to earn profit: where profit making is predominant object of the activity, the purpose though an object of general public utility would cease to be a charitable purpose. But where the predominant object of the activity is to carry out charitable purpose and not to earn profit, it would not lose the character of charitable purpose merely because some profit arises in the activity. The exclusionary clause does not require that the activity must be carried on in such a manner that it does not result in any profit”. The Tribunal further observed, “Healthcare and education are social services essential to provide minimum quality of life to the people of a country. As the demand for these services cannot be met by the public sector alone, private sector fills the gap. For most of them in the private sector, health and education are lucrative business”. “Primary object of GUM is to impart education, profit making is not its motive. The refrain of the several judicial authorities cited is that profit motive characterises a commercial concern as against general public utility in the case of a charitable organisation “.

    4.2. In another case, viz. M/ s. Magnus Society vs. CCE-Hyderabad 2008- TIOL-1812-CESTAT-Bang. wherein the society registered under Chhattisgarh Societies Registration Act,1973, having an objective to provide instructions, teaching and training various career oriented programmes at bachelor, post-graduation and  doctorate level provides education through centres across the country induding through distance learning courses. The Tribunal went into details of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entered into by the society with various UGC recognised universities and concluded that “so long as the instructions impart education, the same cannot be considered as ‘commercial training or coaching’; moreover, the appellants are registered under Societies Registration Act. The Income Tax Authorities have also issued certificates for exemption from Income Tax. All these prove that profit motive is not there in these institutions”. The Tribunal also stated that decision in the case of Great Lakes Institution-[GUM] (supra) squarely applied to this case. The Tribunal also observed, “education has a large scope. Education may include coaching or training and not vice-versa. Coaching or training is a very narrow activity imparting skill in a particular discipline. But education is a broader term which is a process of personality of body, mind and intellect … “. Education develops several skills whereas what is meant by commercial training or coaching, in the definition given by the Finance Act has a very narrow meaning and it is not broad enough to contain in its hold institutions imparting higher learning like MBA or Management in Computer Science or any other discipline. They would not be called as ‘commercial training or coaching centres’.

    4.3 Interestingly in the case of Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad vs. CCE-Hyderabad-2008- TIOL-2007-CESTA T-Bang, wherein the institution, again a registered society, is engaged in providing an extension of practical training to those who already hold positions of responsibility and enable its members to share their own experience profitably with others having different but comparable experience. In this case notably, distinguishing commercial training and coaching from mere training or coaching, the Tribunal observed, in para 12 of the judgment as follows:

    “We are not inclined to hold that the activities rendered by them would fall within the ambit of coaching or training. In our view, the fact that Income Tax Department has given them exemption is very very relevant. We do not agree with the department that the point is not at all relevant. In that case, legislature could have taxed all training and coaching. They need not have used the word ‘commercial’. The very fact the word commercial has been used indicates that the word ‘commercial’ qualifies the commercial coaching or training centre. It doesn’t qualify coaching or training. It qualifies the centre. As long as the institution is registered under the Societies Registration Act and also exempted from Income Tax, it cannot be considered as a commercial centre. Therefore, no service tax is leviable under the category of commercial coaching or training.”

    4.4 Vocational  Training:
     
        Another Bench of the Bangalore Tribunal examined the case of an institute viz. M/ s. Pasha Educational Training Institute, Hyderabad 2009 TIOL 288 CESTAT-BANG engaged in providing training in various fields in the name of different institutes i.e. insurance agents sponsored by various insurance companies, health care institute providing training for nursing exam, institute of media studies providing training in TV and Journalism, institute for performing arts provides training in music through classes, etc. The institute indeed is a case of a registered Trust under section 12A of the Income Tax Act as charitable institution and also is recognised and licensed by IRDA under IRDA Act, 1999 to conduct classes for students who appear for IRDA examination. After making detailed examination of syllabus, etc. it ruled as follows:

    “On going through the nature of training, it is clear that the said training can be considered as ‘Commercial Training or Coaching’ because the Institute imparts skill or knowledge on the subject of insurance. However, the second point to be noted is whether the said training can be considered as a vocational training. Vocational training means training that imparts skills to enable the trainee to seek employment or undertake self-employment directly after such training or coaching. This definition should not be interpreted in a very narrow sense as done by the Commissioner (Appeals). The argument of the Commissioner (Appeals) is that even after the training, the trainee should again write examination conducted by IRDA to qualify to work as Insurance Agent under the Insurance Act, 1938. We should not forget that the comprehensive training given by the appellant enables the trainees to appear for the examination conducted by IRDA. Moreover, the appellant institute is also recognised for imparting training by the IRDA. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the training imparted is not a vocational training.”

    4.5 In another case the Institute of CFA, Hyderabad etc. vs. CCE-Hyderabad viz. 2008-TIOL-2036-CESTAT-Bangalore, the following aspects were discussed in great detail:

    •     Relevant provision of Universities Grants Commission Act.

    •     Difference between ‘education’and ,coaching and training’.

     

    •     Objectives of the institute as set out in its Memorandum of Association.

    •     Judgment of the Kerala High Court in the case of Malappuram District Parallel Colleges Association (supra), Pasha Educational Training Institute (supra) etc. & GUM’s case (supra)

    •     Board’s Circular No.59/08/2003 dated 20-06-2003, wherein scope of the taxing entry is provided.

    •     Substitution of the phrase ‘any person’ for the phrase ‘commercial concern’ in section 65 with effect from 01-05-2006and that such deletion was not made in the definition of commercial coaching and training or commercial training and coaching centre.

    In addition to the above, a point was made out tha t even if the courses are not recognised by the law, still they qualify as education, even if non-formal in nature ..Merely due to lack of recognition, the process of education will not cease to be education and it will definitely not become commercial training or coaching and there could not be an absurd conclusion that all schools in the country which do not confer degree or diploma certificate recognised by law are commercial training or coaching centre and subject to service tax. The fact of imparting  education and recognition by various bodies should clearly be visible in order to get out of the purview of the definition of commercial training or coaching centre was the summary of observations. Further, the term ‘commercial’ was considered significant in interpreting the provision of law.

    4.6 Another important case uiz, Ahmedabad Management Association (AMA) vs. CST- Ahmedabad-2009- TIOL-214-CESTAT-Ahm, which followed the decisions of GUM (supra) ICFAI (supra) also took the view that since the profit earned by the association cannot be distributed among the members and in case of dissolution any surplus would have to be given away to another society or charitable trust engaged in similar activities, the AMA was held as not a commercial concern. Further, while analysing the training programmes conducted by them, it was observed that they did not lead to conferring any degree. In this background, the decision of GUM (supra) and ICFAI (supra) were gone into detail and conclusion was reached that programmes conducted by AMA were in the nature of providing continuing education to candidates participating in the programme and/ or creating an awareness of the latest developments etc. but not to prepare the candidates for a particular job or for a particular examination. The Tribunal observed that training programmes conducted by AMA could not be called commercial training or coaching for the following reasons:

    (i) AMA is not a commercial concern,

    (ii) The purpose of the training is not commercial,

    (iii) The objective of the AMA in conducting the programme is not commercial and whatever extra income is earned, it is ploughed back into the association and is used for public purpose,

    (iv) The programmes conducted by the AMA can be considered as continuing education programmes and not as commercial training or coaching,

    (v) No specific skills which prepare candidates for a particular job or an examination are imparted,

    (vi) The diploma programmes/courses conducted by AMA amount to education or continuing education and no commercial training or coaching.

    5. To summa rise, the crux of various pronouncements discussed above is that if the objective of an educational institution in entirety is education and the institution itself does not carry out the said educational activity solely with profit motive, even if the activity results in surplus which is deployed for the activity of education, the activity of education would not be interpreted as commercial training or coaching. Significance of the term ‘commercial’ has been recognised in all the above decisions. Although the status of an institution as charitable body under the Income Tax Act, or the registration under the Societies Registration Act or holding registration as section 25 company, etc. may not by itself directly determine the taxability under the service tax law, they certainly have pursuasive value to help determine non-taxability under the said category of service.

    Sale of flats not being a ‘service’, builders not liable for registration and payment of Service Tax

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    Sale of flats not being a ‘service’, builders not liable for
    registration and payment of Service Tax :



    Magus Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2008
    TIOL 321 HC GUW ST)

    1. The petitioner, a builder, promoter and developer engaged
    in the business of development and sale of immovable property received a notice
    from the Superintendent to register as service provider of commercial and
    residential construction services. Challenging the authority to issue such
    notice, the present writ petition was filed.

    2. The petitioner constructs buildings and sells
    premises/flats in such buildings. The petitioner pleaded that the transaction
    between the petitioner and a flat purchaser is a transaction for sale of
    premises and cannot be treated as contract for rendering service. The
    consideration for the sale of premises is often paid in instalments though the
    terms correlate more or less with the stage of development of construction. The
    agreement for sale of such flats is stamped as ‘sale of flats’ for the entire
    consideration. The agreement for sale is registered by the petitioner. The
    agreement contains several details including price, area of the unit, price for
    common areas, other facilities concerning the flat, etc.

    3. The petitioner engages various reputed contractors for
    various construction-related services, yet the construction activity is carried
    out for their own purposes and not for anyone else. In some cases where land is
    owned by a different person and not the petitioner, an agreement is entered into
    with the land owner and this in common parlance is known as development
    agreement. After acquiring all the rights of development and raising
    construction thereon, constructional or developmental activity is carried out by
    the petitioner for its own benefit and not for any other person. The flats are
    sold in the same manner as in the case when the land is owned by the petitioner.

    4. According to the Department’s affidavit, the activity
    undertaken by the builders is for and on behalf of prospective buyers for
    consideration of cash or deferred payment and is covered under ‘works contract’
    and not ‘sale’. The Department argued that the builder has to enter into
    agreement for sale before accepting money as advance/deposit when building/flat
    is found only in specifications of the agreements. The saleable products not
    being existent at the time of making agreement, construction is the essential
    obligation of the petitioner and therefore the petitioner is to be treated as
    service provider of construction of complex to the parties in compliance with
    the agreements against the advance received according to the statutory
    provisions provided in S. 65(105)(zzzh) of the Finance Act, 1994, which are wide
    enough to include estate builders such as the petitioner. Since the agreement is
    executed prior to the completion of work of construction, it is nothing else but
    ‘works contract’ and as such, the petitioner is liable to pay Service Tax and
    the advance received makes the petitioner work for and on behalf of prospective
    buyer.

    5. The Court noted that the moot question in the petition
    related to whether the petitioner worked as a service provider for prospective
    buyers with whom the agreements were entered into OR the petitioner constructs
    flats for the purpose of sale to those with whom the agreements are entered into
    and proceeded to scrutinise the relevant clauses of the said agreements which
    mainly contained details of instalments, the obligation of prospective buyer to
    pay stamp duty and registration fee as per applicable laws, etc., the probable
    time of handing over possession and the condition that possession would be
    provided only after full payment of the sale price and that after payment of all
    dues, a sale deed would be registered in favour of the prospective buyer as per
    prevailing Stamp Act, Registration Act, Property Transfer Act, etc.

    6. The Court observed that the combined reading of various
    clauses of the agreement for sale made it clear that the transaction relates to
    purchase and sale of premises and not for carrying out any constructional
    activity on behalf of the latter. The flat purchasers are entitled for specific
    performance of the contract and non-performance may lead to refund of advance
    with interest by the petitioner. They also have an obligation to register the
    agreement. Further, the registering authority also treats these documents as
    agreement for sale/purchase of premises and not relating to construction
    activity and as such, stamp duty is levied on the sale consideration.

    7. The ‘selective approach’ for taxing services under Service
    Tax provisions and the relevant enabling provisions of the Indian Constitution
    were discussed at length by the Court. Similarly, the provisions of the Finance
    Act, 1994 relating to charge of Service Tax, payment of Service Tax,
    registration, relevant provisions of ‘taxable service’ and in particular S.
    65(30a), S. 65(25b), S. 65(91a), S. 65(105)(zzq) and 65(105(zzzh) were
    discussed. The Court further noted that the term ‘service’ is not defined by the
    Finance Act, 1994 by way of any explanation or otherwise or by the rules framed
    thereunder. The Court therefore examined the definition of service under the
    Income-tax Act, 1961, under the MRPT Act, 1969 as well as under the Consumer
    Protection Act and under the FEMA and concluded that one can safely define
    ‘service’ as an act of helpful activity, an act of doing something useful,
    rendering assistance or help, service does not involve supply of goods;
    ‘service’ rather connotes transformation of goods/user of goods as a result of
    voluntary intervention of ‘service provider’ and is an intangible commodity in
    the form of human effort. To have service, there must be a ‘service provider’
    rendering services to some other person(s), who shall be recipient of such
    ‘service’.

    8. Under the Finance Act, 1994,Service Tax is levied on taxable service only and not on service provider. According to the Court, the relevant legal provisions of Service Tax did not support the view that the petitioner provided any service to anyone and that the activity carried out by a person for his own benefit cannot be termed as service rendered. The Court took note of Circular No. 80/10/2004, dated September 17, 2004, which clarified that estate builders constructing buildings/premises for themselves were not covered within the ambit of construction service. Further, the decision in the case of K. Raheja Development Corporation v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 5 SCC 162 was discussed and was distinguished by noting that this decision was rendered on the facts of its own case. The Court emphatically stated that until the time the sale deed is executed, the title and interest, including the ownership and possession in the construction made remained with the petitioner company. The fact of payment of advance and instalments does not lead to the inference that petitioner company is making construction for and on behalf of the probable allottees. The Court also stated that the decision of the Apex Court in K. Raheja’s case (supra) considered the issue relating to Sales Tax and not relating to Service Tax. According to the Court, as distinguished from the facts of K. Raheja (supra) in the present case, there was no material to show that the petitioner company constructed the premises on behalf of the prospective allottees and also stated that similar view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Assotech Realty Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2007) 8 VST 738.

    9. Further, importantly reliance was made on Circular No. 332/35/2006-TRU, dated August 01, 2006 which clarified that the builder/promoter/developer undertaking construction activity on one’s own account did not have relationship of service provider and service recipient with anyone and therefore the question of providing taxable service did not arise. Citing extracts from CIT v. Aspinwall & Co. Ltd., (1993) 204 ITR 225, Keshavji Raoji & Co. v. CIT, (1990) 183 ITR 1 and a catena of other decisions, the binding nature of the circular was affirmed by the Court and it finally contended that the aforementioned Circular dated August 01, 2006was binding on the Department which in more than abundant terms made it clear that a builder /promoter / developer undertaking construction activity for its ownself did not provide any taxable service. The material placed by the petitioner clearly showed that the activity undertaken by them is their own work and they only sold the completed construction work to the buyers. Any advance/deposit received was against consideration of sale of the flat/premises and not for obtaining service from the petitioner.

    Note: The above decision is in complete contrast to the Authority for Advance Ruling’s (AAR) decision in case of Hare Krishna Developers 2008 (10) STR 341 (AAR) reported in June 2008 issue under this feature on almost identical facts and clauses of the agreements under both the cases. The ruling of the AAR being binding only on the applicant, the decision of the High Court assumes significant importance. Major contrasting features of the two decisions pronounced by the two separate judicial authorities are provided below:

    1. In both the cases, the agreement with the prospective buyer relates to SALE OF UNITS. However, in Hare Krishna’s case (supra), it is contended by the authority that the point of time at which the ownership gets transferred will not be determinative of applicant’s liability to pay Service Tax. The words ‘in relation to’ used in the context of ‘construction of the complex’ are of widest import and are capable of encompassing builders/developers. AAR noted that “package of services is necessarily involved in the activity viewed as a whole”. Not merely construction part of the activity that matters, the co-related and incidental services are all embraced within the scope of the definition and the builder / developer does everything to honour its commitment to the customer (booker) from whom it receives valuable consideration in instalments. As against this, in case of Magus narrated above, distinguishing features are as follows:

    • Sale of units/premises to be subject matter of the transaction between the builder and prospective buyer.

    • Advance and instalment received are looked upon as a convenient method of payment. The judgment further brought out the contention that until the execution of sale deed, the title, interest and ownership and possession of construction remains with the builder and therefore, no construction is done on behalf of probable allottees.

    • A good amount of stress is laid on registration by registering authorities as agreement of sale/purchase of flats and the relevant stamp duty levied thereon. (In Hare Krishna’s case, this aspect is not touched upon).

    •  An overall inference of ‘sale’ aspect is drawn rather than laying stress on details of facilities mentioned in various clauses while interpreting ‘sale of flat’ from combined reading of the clauses of the agreement and concluding that no construction activity is carried out for buyers.

    • A lot of effort is put in to distinguish ‘service’ from ‘service provider’ vis-a-vis statutory provisions to contend that there being no ‘service’ in the transaction of sale of flats, the builder is not a service provider for his own business activity where there is no recipient of service present.

    2. In case of Hare Krishna, the Department’s reliance on Raheja’s case [2006 (3) STR 337 (SC)], as alternative contention was not discussed or considered while delivering for judgment, as chief reliance was placed on the fact that transaction was regarded as that of construction services in terms of clause (zzzh) and in terms of Classification Rules, ‘construction service’ was the correct classification entry even if the service could be classified as works contract service as per K.Raheja’s case (supra) and therefore, alternative contention was not gone into. As against this, Gauhati High Court distinguished K. Raheja’s decision on two counts: Firstly, the judgment was given on its own facts and secondly, that it related to SalesTaxand not ServiceTaxand therefore was not considered relevant.

    3. In Hare Krishna’s case, the Board’s Circular dated August 23, 2007only was considered. Further, the said Circular was interpreted to be distinguishing the applicant’s case from the person/builder who sells flat after completing the entire construction on his own and then selling the same. Whereas in Magus’s case, the Circular No. 80/110/2004 of September 17,2004as well as the Circular of August 01, 2006 were discussed and the latter Circular was heavily analysed and relied upon. These Circulars were not referred to in the former’s case.

    Compounding/settlement mechanism

    The prescribed procedure

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    3. The prescribed procedure :



    • The declaration in respect of Service Tax/interest/penalty and the amount
      payable is required to be made in a prescribed form viz. Form 1, to be
      furnished in duplicate and to be signed by the declarant or his authorised
      representative and to be submitted to the designated officer (an officer not
      below the rank of Assistant Commissioner) notified by the jurisdictional
      Commissioner for the purpose of the scheme, between July 01, 2008 and
      September 30, 2008.



    •  The designated officer is required to verify the submitted declaration and
      upon such verification, is required to issue an order in specified format
      within 15 days of the date of receipt of the declaration. The order would
      indicate the amount to be paid by the declarant for resolution of dispute
      under the scheme.



    •  The declarant is required to pay the sum determined by the designated
      authority vide the order described above within 30 days and intimate such
      payment along with the proof of payment. The declarant is also required to
      produce evidence of withdrawal of petition pending before any High Court or
      the Supreme Court, if any.



    •  The payment under this scheme is to be made in cash only.


    à
    On receipt of the proof of payment determined in accordance with the order and
    the proof of withdrawal of petition, if any, to any Court, the designated
    authority would be required to issue a certificate in a prescribed form
    viz.
    Form 2 certifying full and final settlement of the amount in dispute.

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    The Scheme

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    New Page 2

    2. The Scheme :




    •  The scheme comes into force on July 01, 2008 and will close on September 30,
      2008, meaning thereby that immunity under the scheme would be available only
      to those cases in respect of which declaration is made under the scheme
      between the stated period.



    • The scheme is open to persons in dispute for Service Tax, interest or penalty
      leviable under the Finance Act, 1994, but not paid prior to March 01, 2008 and
      where a show-cause notice has been issued on or before March 01, 2008 or an
      order has been issued.



    • The scheme is open to cases where service tax in dispute does not exceed
      Rs.25,000. The scheme is not open to cases where service tax is not paid after
      collecting the same from the recipient of service for which a notice u/s.73A
      of the Finance Act, 1994 has been issued.

    [It may be noted that no limit is prescribed for the amount
    of interest or penalty in dispute].


    • The order passed under the scheme would be final and non-appealable. Any
      pending appeal shall stand withdrawn by virtue of the said order. In case of a
      writ petition pending before any High Court or the Supreme Court, the person
      opting for the scheme is required to withdraw such petition.



    •  The amount paid under the scheme is non-refundable under any circumstances.



    • The Central Government is empowered to remove difficulties for implementation
      of the scheme.



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    Background

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    New Page 2

    1. Background :


    The much publicised and hyped Dispute Resolution Scheme 2008
    was notified vide Chapter VI of the Finance Act, 1994. The Government has now
    issued Notification No. 28/2008-ST, dated June 04, 2008 whereby the rules called
    the Dispute Resolution Scheme Rules 2008 have been prescribed. Further,
    guidelines in respect of the scheme have been provided vide Circular No.
    102/5/2008-ST, dated June 04, 2008. The operation of the scheme, the procedure
    to be followed and settlement mechanism is provided below :

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    2013 (30) S.T.R. 475 (Tri-Bang.) Mangalore Refinery & Petrochemicals vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mangalore.

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    Without ISD registration, CENVAT credit cannot be transferred.
    Facts:

    The appellant had a registered office at Mumbai which transferred the input credit to its manufacturing unit at Mangalore sans registration as an Input Service Distributor (ISD) and department denied the same as Mumbai office was not registered as ISD. The Appellant submitted that this was a minor defect and as such, the substantive benefit of CENVAT should be allowed.

    Held:

    The Tribunal observed that since there was a specific provision to take ISD registration for the purpose of distributing CENVAT credit on any input service received by a manufacturing unit or an output service providing unit under cover of invoice/bills/challans issued by the input service provider, to its own manufacturing unit or output service providing unit, it was not permissible to distribute CENVAT credit by the Mumbai office to its Mangalore unit without obtaining ISD registration and issuing invoices in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.
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    Larger Bench Ruling on Valuation: Material Supplied by Receiver of Service, Whether Includible in Taxable Value

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    Introduction:
    In commercial or residential construction activity, it is commonly found that a developer or owner, appointing a contractor to construct a building or a structure, purchases important building material like cement and steel on its own account and supplies the same to the contractor for the use in the building construction contracted to the contractor. Since the contractor carries out the construction activity with its labour, various equipments and other material such as bricks, sand etc., the material bought by oneself and used for one’s own construction is commonly referred to as free supply of material to the contractor. However, the fact of the matter is that the material belongs to the contractee and it is not given free to the contractor as gift or donation. The contractor receives the material for use in the contractee’s project. The discussion herein relates to controversy over the issue whether such material forms part of the value of contractor’s services for determination of service tax liability thereon.

    Relevant statutory provisions:
    • Section 66 – Charging section

    “There shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at the rate of twelve per cent of the value of taxable services referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (zzzzw) of clause (105) of section 65 and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.” [emphasis supplied]

    • Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) deals with valuation of a taxable service for the charge of service tax. This section with effect from 18-04-2006 was substituted whereby its scope was expanded. Nevertheless, the basic mode and characteristic of valuation of a taxable service remained unaltered.

    Prior to 18-04-2006, the said section 67 read as follows:

    “For the purpose of this chapter, the value of any taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him.

    [emphasis supplied]

    Explanation 1 ………… Explanation 2 ……….. Explanation 3 ………..”

    (There were certain inclusions and exclusions provided in the above explanations which are not produced for the sake of brevity).

    The substituted section 67 with effect from 18-04- 2006 reads as under:

    “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, where service tax is chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value, then such value shall, —

    (i) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration in money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him;

    (ii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration not wholly or partly consisting of money, be such amount in money as, with the addition of service tax charged, is equivalent to the consideration;

    (iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable, be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner.

    (2) Where the gross amount charged by a service provider, for the service provided or to be provided is inclusive of service tax payable, the value of such taxable service shall be such amount as, with the addition of tax payable, is equal to the gross amount charged.

    (3) the gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include any amount received towards the taxable service before, during or after provision of such service.

    (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the value shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed.

    Explanation. — For the purposes of this section, —

    (a) “consideration” includes any amount that is payable for the taxable services provided or to be provided;

    (b) ………..

    (c) “gross amount charged” includes payment by cheque, credit card, deduction from account …………………..” [emphasis supplied]

    Commercial construction service was introduced in the service tax law with effect from 10th September, 2004 whereas residential construction service became taxable from 16th June, 2005. A variety of construction agreements are entered into by developers or builders with their contractors. Some contracts involve construction services with all the material to be supplied by their contractor/s and in some others, the owner/developer purchases critical materials like cement and steel on his own account. In order that the material supplied by a contractor in a composite contract would not have to suffer service tax, the Government issued Notification No.15/2004-ST and subsequently Notification No.18/2005-ST as regards residential construction on identical lines.

    Notification No. 15/2004-Service Tax read as follows:

    “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 93 of the Finance Act, 1994 (32 of 1994), the Central Government, being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts the taxable service provided by a commercial concern to any person, in relation to construction service, from so much of the service tax leviable thereon under section 66 of the said Act, as is in excess of the service tax calculated on a value which is equivalent to thirty-three per cent of the gross amount charged from any person by such commercial concern for providing the said taxable service:

    Provided that this exemption shall not apply in such cases where –

    (i) the credit of duty paid on inputs or capital goods has been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; or (

    ii) the commercial concern has availed the benefit under the notification of the Government of India, in the Ministry of Finance, (Department of Revenue) No. 12/2003-Service Tax, dated the 20th June, 2003 [G.S.R. 503 (E), dated the 20th June, 2003.”

    [emphasis supplied]

    Consequent upon the introduction of the above service, Central Board of Excise & Customs (the Board) issued Circular No.80 dated 17-09-2004 wherein, inter alia, the reason for issue of Exemption Notification No.15/2004-ST was contained in para 13.5 as extracted below:

    “13.5. The gross value charged by the building contractors include the material cost, namely, the cost of cement, steel, fittings and fixtures, tiles etc. Under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the service provider can take credit of excise duty paid on such inputs. However, it has been pointed out that these materials are normally procured from the market and are not covered under the duty paying documents. Further, a general exemption is available to goods sold during the course of providing service (Notification No. 12/2003-ST) but the exemption is subject to the condition of availability of documentary proof specially indicating the value of the goods sold. In case of a composite contract, bifurcation of value of goods sold is often difficult. Considering these facts, an abatement of 67% has been provided in case of composite contracts where the gross amount charged includes the value of material cost. (refer notification No.15/04-ST, dated 10-09-2004) This would, however, be optional subject to the condition that no credit of input goods, capital goods and no benefit (under notification no. 12/2003-ST) of exemption towards cost of goods are availed.”

    With effect from 01-03-2005, vide Notification No.4/2005-ST, an explanation was inserted in the above Notification viz. “For the purpose of the Notification, the gross amount charged shall include the value of goods and materials supplied or provided or used for providing the said taxable service provided by the said service provider.

    In terms of this explanation, the revenue contended that when cement or steel is supplied by the builder/developer/owner, the same should form part of the value for determining 67% abatement. Widespread litigation occurred on this issue across the country. The Madras High Court provided an interim relief in a writ filed by Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 2007 (7) STR 123 (Mad) holding that:

    “On a reading of the explanation, this court is prima facie of the view that such an insistence is not in accordance with the explanation. To that extent there will be an interim order as prayed for.”

    Based on the above interim order, the Delhi High Court in Era Infra Engineering Ltd. 2008 (11) STR 3 (Del) also provided interim relief to the appellant.

    Conflicting decisions by two co-ordinate Benches of Tribunal:

    Subsequently, the Bangalore Tribunal in Cemex Engineers vs. CST Cochin 2010 (17) STR 534, relying on the observation of the Madras High Court in Larsen & Toubro (supra), held that the value of goods supplied and provided by the client cannot be included for calculating service tax and that such inclusion would be contrary to the provisions of section 67 of the Act which specifies that the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service. As against this, in Jaihind Projects Ltd. vs. CST, Ahmedabad 2010 (18) 650 (Tri.-Ahmd), the Appellant engaged in laying pipelines provided commercial or industrial construction service to companies such as ONGC, GAIL, Essar Projects Ltd. etc. In all cases, pipes were supplied by the receiver of service to the Appellant. The department raised a dispute contending that the value of pipes supplied by receiver ought to have been included in the value for determining taxable value of 33% while availing the benefit of Notification No.15/2004-ST. The Tribunal held that even under section 67 of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, the pipes being essential component of providing pipeline service, it must be treated as consideration other than money and therefore the value of such pipes must be included in the gross value to be offered for service tax payment. As regards Explanation to Notification No.15/2004-ST, the Tribunal held that the ‘Explanation’ has explained the meaning of “gross amount charged” and since the assessee has opted to avail the abatement under the Notification, he must include the value of goods supplied for the purpose of determining taxable value. The Tribunal further noted that if the value of the pipes used is not included, the Appellant would not be eligible to claim abatement under Notification No.15/04-ST as amended. The Tribunal also recorded that discriminatory results would ensue between two pipeline service providers if one uses pipes provided by him and the other uses one provided by the receiver client. Therefore, when the receiver supplies the material, the expression ‘used’ in the Explanation comes into play as the objective of the Explanation and the proviso is to ensure uniformity in different situations. Further, reliance on Circular No.80/10/2004-ST dated 17-09-2004 by the Appellant was negated by holding that the Explanation brought about from 01-03-2005 did not exist at the time of issue of the circular.

    The above conflicting decisions led the Division Bench of the Delhi Tribunal to make a reference to the Larger Bench wherein 23 appeals got bunched together. The decision dated 6th September, 2013 is discussed below:

    M/s. Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd. & 22 Others 2013-TIOL-1331-CESTAT-DEL-LB:

    The question before the Larger Bench (the Bench or LB) was whether the value of the material supplied by the recipient of the taxable service free of cost to the provider of service should also be included for availing tax benefit under Notification No.15/2004-ST dated 10-09-2004 as amended by Notification No.4/2005-ST dated 01-03-2005. The above Notification as well as Notification 18/2005-ST issued in respect of residential construction service along with all other abatement Notifications later got merged into a single one viz. Notification No.1/2006 -ST dated 01-03- 2006 without any change in the notification per se. Although the issue relates to the construction industry and a vast number of contractors providing construction services, the decision assumes greater importance as the scope of provision of valuation contained in section 67 of the Act is examined and dealt with at a great length.

    Revenue’s contention in brief:

    The Revenue discussed various alternative schemes available under the service tax provisions for valu-ation of construction service as follows:

    •    CENVAT credit of material including cement and TMT bars used while providing construction service and remitting full value of the service.

    •    Benefit under Notification 12/2003-ST of exemp-tion to the extent of value of goods sold during the course of providing service.

    •    Benefit under Notification 15/2004-ST wherein a generic abatement of 67% of the “gross amount charged” in case of composite contracts when the gross amount charged includes value of material used upon condition of non-availment of credit on inputs and capital goods and the benefit under the above referred Notification
    12/2003-ST.

    •    In case of works contracts under a scheme, service tax at a very low rate on the gross amount wherein value of goods or abatement is not deducted.

    In the above background, it was contended that Explanation to Notification 15/2004-ST as amended provided that where an assessee opts for the benefit of abatement of 67%, the value of all the goods must be included for determining the value of the contract without availing CENVAT credit of inputs or capital goods or the benefit of exclusion of goods sold under Notification No.12/2003-ST.

    The word ‘used’ in the explanation clearly means irrespective of the source of supplies. If the material/ goods were used in the construction service, the value of such goods ought to be included to avail abatement of 67%. Further, even u/s. 67 of the Act, the value of goods whether supplied by the provider or the receiver, if used for providing taxable service, constitute the “gross amount charged” for providing taxable service and lastly, in terms of the contract between the parties, free supplies constitute the consideration by the receiver to the provider of construction service and this value is accordingly taxable u/s. 67 and therefore, it must be declared and offered for tax if 67% abatement benefit is availed. The Revenue interalia relied on N M Goel & Co. vs. Sales Tax Officer (1989) 1 SCC 335 wherein steel and cement supplied by PWD to the assessee were to be deducted from the bills payable by PWD and thus PWD sold these goods to the assessee, though the goods were used for construction for the benefit of PWD. The Bench, in this frame of reference, observed that as against the above case of N. M. Goel & Co. (supra), in the instant case of free supply by the receiver, the agreements between the parties do not provide for recovery of cost of free materials by the recipient from the service provider and the case does not help achieve resolution of the referred issue. The Bench further observed that it did not dispute the fact of integral nexus between free supplies with the construction activity. However, essentially whether such free supplies by the recipient would constitute consideration accruing to the service provider so as to be includible in the “gross amount charged” for the purpose of computation of the taxable value u/s. 67 or to be included in the “gross amount charged” for availing benefit under the abatement Notification as comprehended within the meaning of the word ‘used’ in the Explanation.

    Discussion & Analysis contained in the Decision:

    Contentions presented by the Appellants were referred to the order of the Hon‘ble Bench in the analysis that follows:

    •    Section 67 deals with valuation of taxable services and intends to define what constitutes the value received by the service provider as consideration from the recipient for the service provided. Implicitly, the consideration— monetary or otherwise—must flow from the receiver to the provider of service and should accrue to the benefit of the latter. For interpreting the term ‘consideration’, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Ku. Sonia Bhatia vs. State of UP & Others AIR 1981 SC 1274 wherein it was held that “consider-ation means a reasonable equivalent for other valuable benefits passed on by the promisor to the promisee or by the transferor to the transferee.” The Bench, thus observed that even on an extravagant inference, free supply of cement and steel would not constitute a non-monetary consideration by the recipient to the provider particularly because material supplied is retained by the service recipient (misprinted as provider in the order). The Bench also relied on the recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. vs. Union of India 2013 (29) STR-DEL and observed that the High Court considered the challenge of constitutionality of Rule 5 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 to the extent it includes reimbursement of expenses in the value of taxable service and also that the said Rule is ultra vires sections 66 and 67 of the Act. The High Court held that section 66, the charging section, levies tax only on the taxable services and this inbuilt mechanism ensures that only taxable services shall be evaluated u/s. 67. On construing provision of section 66 and section 67(1)(i) together and harmoniously, the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider and nothing more and nothing less than consideration paid as quid pro quo for the service can be brought to charge. The Bench thus observed that the legislative text of sections 66 and 67 being clear and unambiguous and in the light of the judgment in Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. (supra) “the conclusion is compelling and inviolable that value of free supplies by a construction service recipient would not constitute non- monetary consideration to the service provider nor form part of the gross amount charged for the service provided” and consequently could not constitute value of tax-able service. As per this analysis, the Bench held that the conclusions in Jaihind Projects Ltd. proceeded on a flawed interpretation of section 67. Further, on bringing uniformity of incidence as discussed in this decision, the Bench relying on Union of India & Others vs. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. & Others 1983 (14) ELT 198 (6) (SC) and UOI vs. Nitdip Textile Processors P. Ltd. 2011 (273) ELT 321 (SC) observed that advantages or disadvantages to individual assessees are accidental, inevitable and inherent in every taxing statute. Further, referring and relying on Moriroku UT India (P) Ltd. vs. State Of U.P. 2008 (224) ELT 365 (SC), the Bench observed as follows:

    “Sales-tax or trade-tax under the 1948 Act is leviable on sale, whether actual or deemed, and for every sale there has to be a consideration. On the other hand, excise duty is a levy on a taxable event of ‘manufacture’ and it is calculated on the ‘value’ of manufactured goods. Excise duty is not concerned with ownership or sale. The liability under the excise law is event-based and irrespective of whether the goods are sold or captively consumed. Under the excise law, the liability is there even when the manufacturer is not the owner of raw material or finished goods (as in the case of job workers). For sales-tax purposes, what has to be taken into account is the consideration for transfer of property in goods from the seller to the buyer. For this purpose, tax is to be levied on the agreed consideration for transfer of property in the goods and in such a case cost of manufacture is irrelevant. The provisions relating to measure (section 4 of 1944 Act read with Excise Valuation Rules, 2000) aim at taking into consideration all items of costs of manufacture and all expenses which lead to value addition to be taken into account and for that purpose Rule 6 makes a deeming provision by providing for notional additions. Such deeming fictions and notional additions in excise law are totally irrelevant for sales-tax purposes.” [emphasis supplied].

    Based on the observations in Moriroku UT India (P)    Ltd. (supra), the Bench concluded that a clear principle emerged therefrom that consideration for the transfer of property in goods from the seller to the buyer is only to be held as consideration for the levy of tax unlike event-based excise duty and this principle would equally apply to the levy of service tax and particularly in the context of specific language of section 67 of the Act.

    •    For the next issue of the Explanation inserted in Notification No.15/2004, the Bench observed that the Explanation purports to define “gross amount charged” and the abatement of 67% is in respect of the “gross amount charged” by the service provider to the recipient, the identical expression employed in section 67(1)(i). The question, therefore, requiring examination is whether the Notification No. 04/2005-ST amending Notification No. 15/2004-ST enlarged the contents of the said expression. The Bench while considering various contentions advanced for the Appellants observed that the nuance of the substantial contention of the Appellants was that goods used by the provider of the construction service for providing such service in the Explanation to the Notification No.15/2004-ST must connote those goods as are charged to the service recipient. However, the revenue contested that the literal meaning of the word ‘used’ be given its full effect and ought not to be restricted to the other two expressions ‘supplied’ and ‘provided’ with reference only to the “gross amount charged”. On behalf of the assessees, contention was made to employ interpretative principle of “Noscitur A Sociis” or the analogy of the “ejusdem generis” to hold that goods and material used for providing the construction service, the value of which is charged to the service recipient. Considering the term ‘used’ problematic, examination and analysing of the said principle of noscitur was found imperative and a number of judgments and quotes on the subject matter were referred to in aid thereof which inter alia included;

    •    Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise AIR 1991 SC 151

    •    Paradeep Agarbatti, Ludhiana vs. State of Punjab AIR 1998 SC 171

    •    Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla and Another vs. A. D. Divelkar and Others 2002-TIOL-447-SC-MISC-CB

    The Bench finally concurred with the contention advanced on behalf of the Appellants while elaborating on the noscitur a sociis principle that when the Notification exempts service tax to the extent of 67% of the “gross amount charged” in relation to construction service, section 67 enacts that the value of taxable service shall be the “gross amount charged” which would not include the value of free supplies, as any value to constitute consideration, monetary or otherwise should flow from a recipient to the provider of service and this being the pre-condition u/s. 67, the expression “gross amount charged” in the Explanation could not be construed as expanding the scope of the said expression. Likewise, the reliance placed by the Appellants inter alia on CIT, Bangalore vs. B. C. Srinivasa Setty (1981) 2 SCC 460 was noted and the Bench observed the principle laid therein to the effect that when four important components of concept of a tax system (viz. the nature of the imposition of a tax which prescribes the taxable event, the person on whom the levy is imposed, the rate of tax and the measure or value to which the rate is applied), are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law and any uncertainty and vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity. Considering this principle analogous to the principle that liability to tax could not be inferred on a doubtful or ambiguous provision and the benefit of ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the assessee, the Hon‘ble Bench concluded that the expression ‘used’ in the Explanation to Notification No.15/2004-ST is inherently ambiguous and more so in the context of other expressions therein i.e., supplied or provided, the noscitur principle must be applied to conclude that only such goods/materials which are ‘supplied’ by the service provider or ‘provided’ by the service provider or ‘used’ when supplied or provided by the service provider i.e. goods and material whether supplied, provided or used in the construction and charged on the service recipient and value where-of is received by the service provider towards a consideration that accrues to the provider’s benefit would alone comprise the “gross value charged” by the construction service provider within the meaning of section 67 and for availing benefit of Notification 15/2004- ST. Alternatively, it can also be stated that since the free supplies i.e. incapable of computation provision of section 67(1)(iii) would not apply as free supply would not fall within section 67, the computation provisions fail and consequently restriction on availability of benefit of exemption would be nugatory. Based on the above, the reference was answered in the following words in para 16 of the order:

    “Para 16:

    “(a) The value of goods and materials supplied free of cost by a service recipient to the provider of the taxable construction service, being neither monetary or non- monetary consideration paid by or flowing from the service recipient, accruing to the benefit of service provider, would be outside the taxable value or the gross amount charged, within the meaning of the later expression in section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994; and

    (b)    Value of free supplies by service recipient do not comprise the gross amount charged under Notification No. 15/2004-ST, including the Explanation thereto as introduced by Notification No. 4/2005-ST.”

    Conclusion:

    Despite the above, the observation of the Bench concluded in para 15 is important. “This is not to say that an exemption Notification cannot enjoin a condition that the value of free supplies must also go into the gross amount charged for valuation of the taxable service. If such intention is to be effected, the phraseology must be specific and denuded of ambiguity.” The question now arises is whether the effect of above ruling would be extended to the composition scheme under the works contract service or the works contracts under the negative list based taxation.

    Under the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007, service tax @2% or 4% during application period was payable on the gross amount charged. An Explanation was inserted with effect from 07 -07 -2009 to include “the value of all goods used in or in relation to the execution of the works contract, whether supplied under any other contract for a consideration or otherwise.”

    Further, the above Rule 3(1) contained “notwith-standing anything contained in section 67 of the Act and Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006………”, means a non-obstante provision. However, determination of value of services involved in the execution of works contract under Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 (Valuation Rules) was subject to the provisions of section 67.

    Similarly, in the post-negative list period, service tax is to be paid on a specific percentage of the total amount charged for the works contract in accordance with the substituted Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules. The term “total amount” is defined to include the fair market value of all goods and services supplied in or in relation to the execution of the works contract. As per the substituted Rule 2A also, the value of service portion in the execution of a works contract is to be determined subject to provisions of section 67.

    Thus, in both the cases, the question remains as to whether the Explanation and its phraseology is unambiguous enough to expand the scope of the term “gross amount charged” to include the value of free supplies is again a matter of interpretation. However, the treatise of the above landmark decision would serve as a guidance to resolve many vexed issues on the subject of valuation. However, the finality on this issue of valuation is unlikely in the near future.