Subscribe to the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal Subscribe Now!

2014 (34) STR 165 (Del.) Frankfinn Aviation Services P. Ltd. vs. Asst. Commr., Designated Authority, VCES, Service Tax

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether pendency of “any issue” or determination before any tax authorities or Tribunal would warrant Designated Authority to reject the declaration of tax dues made pursuant to service tax VCES, Scheme 2013? Held no.

Facts:
Appellant provided vocational training for Air Hostess/ stewards, hospitality and management sector and furnished declaration under the aforesaid scheme for the period from April – December, 2012 for availing immunity from prosecution and penalty. As per the condition of the scheme, no notice or order of determination should have been received previously by a person. Appellant filed an appeal in Tribunal for the notice/order concerning the past six year period between September – February, 2012. The designated authority rejected its declaration on the premise of existence of dispute in the previous periods before the CESTAT .

It was contended that the criteria for debarring the declaration provided in proviso to section 106 had limited application. In that, the ‘issue’ covered should be identical to the subject matter of declaration. It is contended that the subject matter of controversy pending before the Tribunal pertained to its eligibility to avail the exemption notification dated 10-09-2004 meant for vocational training institutes and entirely different from the issue covered by the declaration. More so, CBEC Notification issued dated 27- 02-2010 has laid down the criterion of vocational training institutes covered under service tax net and thereby petitioner was paying service tax for the period till 31-03-2012 but later on could not deposit the tax because of some unavoidable reasons. Petitioner prayed that recourse to the Scheme was available.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed that, as per the principles of interpretation, a proviso prescribes an exception from the operation of the main provision. Thus, “any issue” mentioned must mean that, the issue for service tax liability or quantum of liability itself for a given period must be pending before any tax authority or Tribunal or issue should have been determined. In case of distinct period other than above wherein, the subject matter of declaration is not pending or determined earlier will not be covered by the above exception.

Allowing the petition, it was held that, pendency of distinct issue of Assessee’s liability for the past period could not bar the remedy as per the Scheme.

levitra

2014 (34) STR 35 (Guj) Utkarsh Corporate Services vs. Comm. Ex & ST

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether new/additional legal grounds arising from existing facts on records can be taken first time at the stage of appeal? Held yes.

Facts:
Appellant provided security services and was registered under service tax. In the matter of three show cause notices, short payment of service tax was demanded and interest and penalty u/s. 76 was imposed. Appellant deposited the service tax and preferred appeal for challenging of penalty. Appellant had raised additional legal grounds in the appeal proceedings. The said authority after referring to provisions of Rule 5 of the Central Excise (Appeal) Rules 2001 did not consider these grounds and rejected the appeal. Thereafter Appellant preferred an appeal before Tribunal raising the same contentions. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the first appellate authority and rejected the Appellant’s appeal without considering the additional grounds. Appellant filed miscellaneous application for rectification of mistake before Tribunal. Tribunal rejected the said application for the reason that there was no mistake committed since appeal was dismissed by Tribunal as there were no apparent reasons to interfere with the order-in-original and order in appeal. Appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court challenging the said rejection by Tribunal.

Held:

High Court observed that:

• Appellant had raised new/additional grounds before the first appellate authority which were legal grounds based on the facts on the records which could be raised before an authority at any stage.

• First Appellate Authority has chosen not to adjudicate on any of these grounds raised before it and instead held that satisfactory reasons have not been provided by the Appellant while raising these grounds.

• First Appellate Authority and Tribunal have erred in not considering the additional grounds legal in nature and therefore there was a need to interfere with the orders passed.

• Setting aside both the orders, the First Appellate Authority was directed to examine all the grounds raised before it.

levitra

2014 (34) STR 16 (Bom.) Kandra Rameshbabu Naidu vs. Superintendent (AE) ST, Mumbai-II

fiogf49gjkf0d
For arrest of the assessee for non-deposit of service tax collected exceeding Rs.50 lakh as per amendment to section 89 (1)(d) (ii) w.e.f from 10-05-2013, whether service tax collected till the date of amendment is to be considered OR tax collected from the date of amendment is to be considered?

Facts:
Appellant (Director of two companies) was collecting service tax from its customers and collected Rs. 2.59 crore during the period 2010-11 to 2013-14 but did not deposit it except Rs.15 lakh. Appellant though registered under service tax law, never filed its service tax returns. Appellant was arrested under amended section 89(1)(d)(ii) as the service tax collected amount was exceeding Rs.50 lakh. Appellant filed Criminal Bail application before the Bombay High Court for obtaining bail and pleaded that the amendment in penal provision was not retrospective in nature and the service tax collection from the date of amendment till the initiation of investigation was less than Rs. 50 lakh and therefore section 89(1)(d) (ii) was not applicable to the case.

Held:
High Court observed that non-deposit of service tax collected from customers was a continuing offence and service tax collected till date of amendment exceeded Rs.50 lakh and therefore total arrears accrued as on date of amendment was exceeding Rs. 50 lakh and the investigation was not completed. Court dismissed the Bail application.

levitra

Sale/Exchange/Works Contract

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction
Various types of
transactions take place in a commercial world. A peculiar issue, which
arises is about the status of a transaction where the dealer receives
goods for repair, replaces the same with his own goods and receives his
charges for repair. The old one received from the customer is retained
with him for further replacement after repair. The issue is whether, on
receipt of money from the customer towards the repair charges, the
dealer can be liable to tax under Sales Tax Laws or it can be considered
as transaction of exchange thereby, not liable to Sales Tax or whether
it falls in the category of Works Contract.

Judgment of Hon. M. S. T. Tribunal
The above issue was dealt with by M. S. T. Tribunal in case of Kirloskar Copeland Ltd. (S. A. No. 428 of 2009 dt.18.04.2011).

In
this case, the appellant M/s. Kirloskar Copeland Ltd. was the
manufacturer and seller of compressors used in air-conditioners. It
accepted defective compressors outside the warranty period with certain
fixed repair charges from the customer and replaced them at the option
of the customer with another repaired compressor off the shelf. The
defective compressor was then sent for repairs. The said repaired
compressor was then available for replacement in lieu of the defective
compressor of another customer. The cycle continues on. The repairs
charges received were mentioned in the books as ‘repair charges.’ This
was treated by the Assessing Officer as ‘sale’ of old repaired
compressors under the BST Act, 1959 and levied tax on the same.

The
Tribunal held that in a transaction of cross transfer of property in
the defective compressor received from customer and giving the repaired
compressor off the shelf, there is no consensual agreement of sale
supported by the price or money consideration. Holding this as not a
‘sale’ transaction, the Tribunal set aside tax. Thus, the situation
developed is that such receipt of money is not liable to tax under the
Sales Tax Laws.

The Madras High Court
The Madras High Court had an occasion to deal with a similar issue in Sriram Refrigeration Industries Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu (53 VST 382)(Mad).

The
assessee received defective compressors in its Tamil Nadu office. The
assessee gave him another repaired compressor and also charged repair
charges. The defective compressor was then transferred to the Hydrabad
workshop to repair and keep it in its rolling stock.

The Tamil
Nadu Sales Tax Authorities levied Sales Tax on the same, considering the
transaction as Works Contract. The Tribunal was of the same view and
the Hon. Madras High Court confirmed the above view of the Tribunal.
Thus, confirmed the levy of tax on above transaction as “Works
Contract”.

Recent judgment of the Hon. Bombay High Court
Kirloskar
Copeland Ltd. (S. A. No. 428 of 2009 dt.18.04.2011) A Reference
application was filed before the Tribunal by the Department to refer the
question of law to the Hon. Bombay High Court. The Hon. Tribunal
rejected the said application on the ground that no question of law
arises as the issue is decided based on precedent. The Department
thereafter filed a Reference Application before the Hon. Bombay High
Court. The said application has now been decided. (Sales Tax application No. 10 of 2012 dated 8th May, 2014). The Hon. Bombay High Court has confirmed the view of the Tribunal that in the given circumstances there is no sale.

The
reasoning of the Hon. Bombay High court is as under: “11. In the
present case, we find that there is no sale at all. As stated earlier, a
defective compressor is brought by the customer of the Respondent to
its Sales and Service Office. Thereafter, the customer is informed about
the normal time of repairs which is approximately 60 days. At that
time, on payment of the repair charges, the customer is given an option
either to wait for 60 days or to take another repaired compressor off
the shelf of the Respondent. If the customer opts for the latter, then a
delivery note cum debit advice as well as a repaired compressor is
handed over to the customer. It is therefore evident that there is no
sale of the repaired compressor. All that is done is that on payment of
repair charges, the customer is given an option not to wait for 60 days
and instead take another second hand repaired compressor immediately in
lieu of the defective compressor.

12. The MSTT, after
considering all the evidence in this regard, came to the conclusion that
in the present case, there was a transaction of cross transfer of
property between the defective compressor and the repaired compressor
and therefore, there was no consensual agreement of sale supported by
price or other monetary consideration. We are in full agreement with the
findings of the MSTT on this aspect. What is paid is only the repair
charges and not the price for purchasing the repaired compressor. This
is clear from the fact that even if the customer opted not to take a
repaired compressor off the shelf of the Respondent, it would still have
to pay the same repair charges for repairing its own compressor and
wait for 60 days to receive the same from the Respondent, after repairs.
This puts it beyond the realm of doubt that what is charged to the
customer by the Respondent is only repair charges and not a price for
the sale of the repaired compressor.

13. Ms. Helekar, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant submitted that repair
charges are fixed and uniform all over India. According to her,
therefore, that was the price at which the repaired compressor was being
sold by the Respondent to the customer.

14. We do not agree. If
the repair charges were really the price of the sale of the repaired
compressor, there would be no question of the customer having to return
his defective compressor and thereafter take the repaired compressor off
the shelf of the Respondent. In the scenario suggested by Ms. Helekar,
all that the customer has to do is simply pay the repair charges and
take the repaired compressor off the shelf of the Respondent. That is
not the case. It is an admitted position that the defective compressor
is handed over to the Respondent along with the repair charges and in
lieu thereof the customer is handed over a repaired compressor. We
therefore find no merit in this contention.”

Thus, the situation
which arises now is that, though in Tamil Nadu, a similar transaction
may be Works Contract in Maharashtra. It will not be liable to tax.

Conclusion
In light of different judgments of two different high courts, the issue will remain debatable.

As
per the reasoning given by the Hon. Bombay High Court, the judgment of
the Tribunal cited above will be correct to the extent that it is not a
‘sale.’ However, the position still remains is that whether it may be
liable to tax as ‘Works Contract’ as per the Madras High Court judgment.
It may be noted that before the Hon. Bombay High Court, the above
Madras High Court judgment was not cited as well as this was not a point
of argument. Therefore, so far as the MVAT Act is concerned, the issue
will still remain open, as Works Contract sale is also covered in the
MVAT Act, 2002.

levitra

Judicial analysis: Taxability of Associations

fiogf49gjkf0d
Synopsis
The article analyses a recent judicial pronouncement and analyses in detail:-
• Whether trade associations are charitable in nature?
• Whether they are covered by the principle of mutuality?
• Whether services rendered by the association to a member or non-member is a taxable service?

In a recent decision FICCI vs. CST, Delhi-2014-TIOL- 701-CESTAT -DEL wherein two separate appeals were filed by Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and by Electronic and Computer Software export Promotion Council (ECSEPC), while considering on the applications for Stay, since substantial issues were heard in both the cases, the appeals were disposed off. In the said appeals the substantial common issues which fell for the Hon. Tribunal’s consideration were:

• Whether FICCI and ECSEPC are engaged in activities having objectives which would amount to public service and of a charitable nature and consequently fall outside the ambit of Club or Association.

• Whether their services to the respective members and the consideration received therefor was liable to tax, in view of the principle of mutuality declared in several judgments including in Ranchi Club Limited vs. Chief Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax 2012 (26) STR 401 (Jhar) and whether service tax was leviable under Club or Association-service, in the light of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. vs. Union of India 2013-TIOL-528-HCAHM- ST.

• Whether services provided by FICCI and ECSEPC to non-members was liable to be classified as Club or Association-service and whether demand of service tax on FICCI for the period subsequent to 01-05-2011 was sustainable.

• Whether ECSEPC is a body constituted by or under any law and therefore falls outside the purview of the definition of Club or Association, in view of clause (i) of section 65(25a) of the Act; and

Thus, the important question that the Tribunal considered was whether both, FICCI and ECSEPC carried out activities having objectives amounting to public service and therefore would be falling in the excluded part of the definition of club or association service in section 65(25aa) of the Finance Act, 1994. Clause (iii) of the said definition excludes from its scope any person or body of persons engaged in activities having objective in the nature of public service and are of charitable, religious or political nature. Referring to Law Lexicon, Income Tax 1961, Charitable Endowment Act and Foreign Trade (Regulations) Rules, 1993, the Tribunal observed that the term “charitable purpose” would include a trust having an object and scope of public utility and advancement of any other object of general public utility and that public service would imply a service performed for the benefit of public and specially by a non-profit organisation. The Hon. Bench also observed that in order to hold an activity as charitable, the other objects of an institution or a body need not necessarily be charitable. If such objects are incidental or ancillary to the dominant purpose of charity, it would not take away the character of the activity being a valid charity as observed by the Supreme Court in CIT Madras vs. Andhra Chamber of Commerce (1965) 55 ITR 733 (SC) and that the said principle was reiterated in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufactures Association, Surat AIR 1980 SC 387. FICCI itself was held as charitable by the Supreme Court in CIT, New Delhi vs. FICCI AIR 1981 SC 1408. In the Andhra Chamber of Commerce (supra), it was explained that promotion of trade, commerce or industry involves an object of general public utility and such activity may lead to economic benefit for the entire society although prosperity would be shared by those in trade, commerce or industry. On this count, it cannot be held otherwise. The Tribunal observed that contours of what attributes to charitable purpose or what object qualify as of general public utility and what constitutes public purpose are considered and explained in several decisions including those by the High Courts. The list, interalia, included South India Hire Purchase Association (1979) 116 ITR 793 (Mad) and Western India Chambers of Commerce and Industry Ltd. (1982) 136 ITR 67 (Bom). The Hon. Bench thus concluded that FICCI and ECSEPC are institutions having public service objectives and of a charitable nature. The Tribunal also noted that the authority holding the FICCI’s activities as covered within the ambit of club or association service omitted to provide reasons for distinguish Supreme Court’s judgment in FICCI’s own case wherein it was treated as a charitable organisation under the provisions of the Income Tax Act which are pari materia the exclusionary provision in section 65(25aa) whereas the authority relied on the Board’s circular dated 28-04-2008 instead. The adjudication order thus suffered from the vice of gross judicial indiscipline. For similar reasons, ECSEPC was also held as engaged in the activities which had objective in the nature of public service and of charitable nature.

Whether principle of mutuality applicable:
The next issue that the Tribunal dealt with was the issue as to whether the services provided by the appellant organisations to their respective members amounted to rendition of taxable service of a club or association in view of the principle of mutuality despite invalidation of the relevant provisions vide the judgments in Ranchi Club Ltd. 2012-TIOL-1031-HC-Jharkhand-ST and Sports’ Club of Gujarat 2013-119L-528-HC-AHM-ST. It was examined by the Hon. Tribunal that based on the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in CIT vs. Ranchi Club Ltd. 1992 (1) PLJR 252 (Pat), in Ranchi Club Ltd. (supra) it was ruled that while sale and service may be two different and distinct transactions, the basic feature common to both the transactions is that they require existence of two parties – for sale, a seller and a buyer and for a service, service provider and service recipient. Similarly, in Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. (supra), the High Court declared the provision to the extent these purport to levy service tax in respect of services provided by a club to its members, as ultra vires. The Tribunal also noted that based on the said decision in Ranchi Club Ltd. (supra), the Tribunal granted full waiver of pre-deposit to appeal preferred by the Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India in Appeal No.57179 of 2013 and in another preferred by Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd. In Appeal No.55225 of 2013 wherein reference was also made to the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. (supra). For the appellants, it was also pleaded that when the relevant provisions were declared ultra vires by the Gujarat High Court and in absence of any contrary decision by any other High Court, it would imply that there is no operative statutory provision in the law to justify levy of service tax on the service of club to its members. Citing interalia Full Bench’s decision in Madura Coats vs. CCE, Bangalore 1996 (82) ELT 512 (Tri.), the Tribunal observed that where adjudication of vires of a provision of a statute or a Notification is outside the province of the Tribunal, the decision of a particular High Court, in absence of a contrary decision by another High Court would have to be followed by the Tribunal as the Tribunal does not enjoy the liberty to disregard the view of the High Court.

Based on the above analysis and on following precedential guidance, the Bench held that on application of principle of mutuality, the services of FICCI/ESCEPC to their members do not qualify to be considered club or association service in absence of operative legislative provisions whereby the levy of service tax could be justified.

Services to non-members & levy after 1st May, 2011:

Primarily, it is to be noted here that the scope of Club or association service was expanded to cover facilities or advantages provided by a Club or association to persons other than its members also, provided such facilities or advantages are primarily intended for members. in the scenario, the tribunal observed that the Show Cause notices in both the appeals covered the period prior to the amendment vide the finance act, 2011.  The notices for the period post amendment were issued as periodic notices reiterating allegation in the earlier notices. however, in both the cases since the Show Cause notices failed to indicate the effect of amendment, the tribunal held that services to non-members fell outside the ambit of Club or association service prior to 01-05-2011 and for the subsequent period, it will not attract service tax in absence of specific allegation that services to non-members fell within the expanded scope of the taxable service in terms of amended provisions.

ECSEPC: Whether a body constituted by or under any law:
The Tribunal noted that ECSEPC was constituted qua provisions of Export-Import Policy and its Articles of Association are subject to Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) and while examining this aspect in detail, the tribunal observed that Export Promotion Councils (EPCs) are non-profit organisations which are autonomous and competent to regulate their own affairs but subject to provisions of uniform byelaws to be framed by the Central Government periodically for constitution or business by EPCs and they are required to adopt byelaws that are approved by the Central Government and that ECSEPC is listed and recognised as an EPC in the Appendix to the FTP. To understand and analyse the scope of “body established or constituted by or under a law for the time being in force”, reliance was placed on the observations in the following judgments:

•    Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta vs. W. R. NATHUY AND Ors. AIR 1963 SC 274….Para 22.
•    Finite Infratech Limited vs. IFCI and Ors. [2011] 161 Comp Case 257 (Delhi) … Para 22.
•    R. C. Mitter & Sons vs. CIT air 1959 SC 868 …
Para 22.
•    S. Azeez Basha vs. Union of India air 1968 SC 662 …
Para 22.
•    National Stock Exchange of India Limited vs. Central Information Commission (2010 100 SCl 464 (del) … Para 22.

After a detailed analysis, it was observed that ECSEPC though registered under Societies registration act, 1860 is notified to be an EPC and was chartered to function as EPC authorised to issue Registration cum Membership Certificate (RCMC) and it was concluded that ECSEPC was a body established or constituted under a law for the time being in force viz., foreign trade (development and Regulation) Act, 1992 read with FTP and as such is excluded from the scope of definition of Club or Association qua Clause (1) of section 65 (25a) of the act.

Conclusion:
thus, in conclusion, taxability of service tax on both the counts is decided in negative – the associations are held as charitable organisations and at the same time the concept of mutuality also is held applicable to them. this would apply to all cases for the period till 30-06-2012. Legal testing for the negative list based service tax law yet remains to be done. This decision pronounced by the Principal Bench of the CeStat, assumes particular importance for the fact that CeStat, mumbai in case of Vidarbha Cricket Association vs. CCE, Nagpur 2013-TIOL-1915-CESTAT- mum pronounced a majority decision (the matter was referred to a third member on account of difference in view, reported at 2013-TIOL-1404-CESTAT-MUM) holding that object of the association cannot be considered of charitable nature and that the activity of providing cricket cannot be considered an activity, charitable in nature. in this case, per majority it was also observed, contrary to the observation in fiCCi’s case (supra) above that the provisions of the income tax act, 1961 are not pari materia with Chapter V of the income tax act, 1994 or the said association is a charitable organisation because it is held to be a charitable organisation under the income tax, 1961. While the matter was referred to the third member, the plea was presented by the appellant’s counsel that the decision of Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. vs. UOI (supra) had held the levy of service tax under Club and association service as ultra vires. however, the Bench held the view that the said issue was not raised before the referral Bench. (The decision was reported in July 2013 whereas the matter was heard by the division Bench on 14th June, 2013). The principle of mutuality however was not discussed in the said case of Vidarbha Cricket association (supra). having discussed this and considering that the decision in case of FICCI and ECSEPC above has been pronounced by the Principal Bench containing President CeStat, the pending litigation in similar matters achieves finality in the like manner.

[Note: Readers may note that the concept of mutuality and the decision  of  Jharkhand  high  Court  ranchi  Club  (supra)  were discussed at length earlier under this feature in July, 2012 and december, 2012 of BCaJ).

Allowability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenditure under the Income tax Act

fiogf49gjkf0d
Synopsis
The Companies Act 2013,
mandates incurring of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenditure,
by a certain class of companies. While the accounting and auditing,
issues are significant, the deductibility of the expenditure under the
Income Tax Act is a matter of concern. In this article the author
analyses these aspects in detail.

Introduction of CSR under THE Companies Act, 2013
CSR
is a concept that has been discussed substantially in business and
professional circles. There could be two views on whether an expenditure
of this nature should be voluntary or be mandated by legislation.
However, the discussion would now be academic as provisions in relation
to CSR are now incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013 (‘2013 Act’)
and Rules thereof. The Central Government through Ministry of Corporate
Affairs (‘MCA’) in order to achieve the aforesaid objective has issued
back to back notifications dated 27th February 2014 prescribing
applicability from 1st April 2014 of relevant provisions, schedules and
rules thereof under the 2013 Act concerning CSR.

Section 135,
Schedule VII to the 2013 Act and CSR policy Rules, 2014 (‘CSRP Rules’)
[hereinafter they are together referred to as ‘CSR provisions’] govern,
operate and determine the scope of CSR initiative for the companies.
Before discussing the topic of the article, namely the allowability/
deductibility of CSR expenditure under the Income Tax Act 1961, it would
be appropriate to deal with the guiding principles of CSR, its
applicability, features and scope thereof as enshrined under the 2013
Act and rules thereof.

Guiding Principles of CSR
The
MCA has listed the following guiding principles concerning CSR, which
helps one to understand the intention of the Legislature as regard to
CSR activity:

• CSR is the process by which an organisation
thinks about and evolves its relationships with stakeholders for the
common good, and demonstrates its commitment in this regard by adoption
of appropriate business processes and strategies;

• CSR is not charity or mere donation;

• CSR is way of conducting business, by which corporate entities visibly contribute to the social good;

• CSR should be used to integrate economic, environmental and social objectives with the company’s operations and growth; and


CSR projects/ programmes of a company may also focus on integrating
business models of a company with social and environmental priorities
and processes in order to create shared value

Features and Scope of CSR activities under 2013 Act and rules thereof

• CSR activities does not include the activities undertaken in pursuance of normal course of business of a company;

• CSR activities as undertaken within India by a Company will only qualify as CSR under the 2013 Act and rules thereof;

• CSR activities will have to be undertaken with preference to the local area and areas from where the Company operates;


Projects or programmes of CSR as undertaken by a Company should include
activities and/or subjects as mentioned in Schedule VII to the 2013
Act;

• Only activities which are not exclusively for the benefit
of employees of the Company or their family members shall be considered
as CSR activity;

• The CSR activities can be undertaken by the
company either through itself and/or through a registered trust or a
registered society or a company established under Section 8 of 2013 Act
by itself, its holding or subsidiary company, or otherwise subject to
compliance of conditions mentioned therein and a cap of maximum 5 % of
total CSR expenditure of the Company in one financial year;
• CSR activities can also be undertaken in collaboration with other companies with compliance of conditions mentioned therein;

Contribution of any amount directly or indirectly to any political
party u/s. 182 of the 2013 Act, shall not be considered as CSR activity;
and
• Any surplus arising out of the CSR activity will not be part of the business profits of the Company.

 Applicability of CSR provisions under the 2013 Act and rules thereof

CSR
provisions are not applicable to all persons but are restricted to
companies. The provisions of Section 135 of the 2013 Act further
restrict the said applicability to only selected companies who fulfill
the following conditions:

• A Company having net worth of Rs. 500 crore or more during any financial year; or
• A Company having turnover of Rs. 1,000 crore or more during any financial year; or
• A company having net profit of Rs. 5 crore or more during any financial year;

The
CSRP Rules further provide that the CSR provisions are applicable to
all companies including a holding, subsidiary company and foreign
companies having project office or branch office in India, provided any
of the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled by the said companies. As
regard to applicability to foreign companies, the aforesaid conditions
viz, net worth, turnover and net profit will have to computed and
determined in light of the relevant provisions of 2013 Act.

So,
if a Company satisfies any of the aforesaid conditions in any of the
financial years, then the CSR provisions are applicable to the said
company and will have to be follow them year on year. However, the CSRP
rules relax the rigors of CSR provisions, if a company does not fulfill
any of the said conditions for a continuous period of 3 financial years.
The provisions will then apply once again in the year a company crosses
any one of the above thresholds.

Consequences upon applicability of the CSR provisions


The Board of Directors (‘Board’) of the concerned Company will have to
form from amongst themselves a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee
(‘CSRC’) containing at least 3 directors [including 1 independent
director];

This requirement is relaxed by the CSRP Rules, to
take care of specific situations, namely, non-requirement of independent
directors in regard to particular companies, applicability of
provisions to private company, foreign company, etc

• The CSRC
shall formulate a framework containing Corporate Social Responsibility
Policy (CSRP) of the Company, amount to be spent qua the CSR activities,
monitoring and transparency in implementation of the said activities,
etc; and give recommendations to the Board accordingly;

• The
Board is required to approve the CSRP of the Company alongwith ensuring
that the activities under the CSRP are undertaken accordingly;


In addition, the Board will be required to ensure that at least 2% of
average net profits of the concerned Company during the immediately 3
financial years shall be spent as per the CSRP approved by the Board of
the Company; and

• The Board’ Report should contain disclosure
of composition of the CSRC, details of CSRP [should also be published on
website of the company], alongwith reporting of other details in the
format as prescribed under the CSRP Rules including the amount of money
which was not spent as per the requirements of CSR provisions on CSRP
with reasons thereof.

Schedule VII to the 2013 Act duly amended
prescribes list of 10 specific subjects and/or projects of CSR,
recognised as CSR activities, which a Company needs to consider under
its CSRP. The said CSR activities are explained in detail in the ensuing
paragraphs during the course of discussion of allowability of CSR
expenditure under the Income-tax Act, 1961

Allowability of CSR expenditure under the Income-tax Act, 1961

With aforesaid background in place, it would be appropriate to discuss the allowability of CSr expenditure under the income-tax act, 1961.
The MCA mentions that tax treatment of CSR spends will be in accordance with the income-tax act, 1961 (‘the act’) as may be notified by the Central Board of Direct Taxes [‘CBDT’]. The CBDT till date of writing of this article has not notified any tax treatment as regard to allowability of CSr expenditure under the act. the newspaper articles and reports also are highlighting concerns for allowabil- ity of CSr expenditure under the income-tax act, on the ground that said expenditure may not be allowed to the Companies, since it is not wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the assessee companies.

An issue which then requires to be analysed is, when the MCA requires for specific tax treatment on CSR spends, there seems to be an underlying assumption and/or un- derstanding that the present provisions of the act do not provide for allowability of said CSr expenditure under the act. however, on proper perusal of the provisions of the Act, one may find that CBDT may not be required to notify separate tax treatment for CSR spends, since the present provisions provide for allowability of said spending under various provisions of the act irrespective of whether the said expenditure is incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business of assessee companies.

A chart explaining the specific CSR activities as prescribed under Schedule VII to the 2013 Act and simultaneous provisions of the income-tax act, 1961 which provide for allowability of expenditure qua the specific CSR activities are tabulated below:


Section 372A of the Companies Act, 1956 contained several exemptions which have been done away with by section 186 of the act. the differences in the exemptions are as follows:

Allowability of CSr Expenditure u/s. 35(2AA), 35AC, 35CCA and section 80G of the Act the provisions referred in above are not frequently dis- cussed or applied, while claiming deduction by assessee companies in computation of profits and gains from business or profession. the said provisions allow for deduction of expenditure in computation of profits and gains from business or profession irrespective of whether the expenditure incurred for the activities are related to business of the Company. however, the sine qua non for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s. 35AC is the Company should have income assessable under the head ‘Profit and gains from business or profession’, otherwise the Company shall have to claim deduction u/s. 80GGA of the act. further, there is also scope of claiming deduction u/s. 80G of the Act as regard to certain activities referred in above, however considering the direct coverage of the activities u/s. 35AC, the said provision of section 80G are not referred to. U/s. 35AC, the company can claim full deduction of the expenditure in computation of profit and gains from business of the Company.

With the onset of the CSR provisions under the 2013 Act, the aforesaid provision now will have greater applicability in computation of profits and gains from business of the assessee companies under the provisions of the act, unless otherwise prescribed by CBdt.

A brief overview of the aforesaid provisions of the act alongwith relevant rules under the 1962 rules are dis- cussed herein below:

Section 35AC of the Act provides for deduction of expenditure incurred by way of payment by an assessee of any sum to a public sector company or a local authority or   to an association or institution approved by the national Committee for carrying out any eligible project or scheme. the said provision further provides that the assessee may either make payment aforesaid to the entities referred in above or either directly make payment of any sum to the eligible project or schemes. in other words, the provisions of section 35AC recognise the features of CSR provisions i.e., of allowing the Company to either make contribution to the eligible organisations/entities that undertake eligible projects or schemes and/or incur expenditure directly by itself on eligible projects or schemes. the eligible projects or schemes as referred in section 35AC are recommended under Rule 11K of the 1962 Rules. On perusal of Rule 11K, one may find that the significant guidelines of activities as recommended are in consonance to the subjects as prescribed under Schedule VII to the 2013 Act. the aforesaid chart tabulating the activities as prescribed under Schedule VII to the 2013 Act and the allowability of expenditure incurred on the said activities under the act confirms the said understanding.

The national Committee as referred in above is the nodal agency to provide approval to the organisation/entities who undertake eligible projects or schemes and/or to the eligible projects or schemes. the complete procedure as regard to composition of national Committee, its place of operation, functions of the said committee, guidelines for approval of organisation/entities and/or eligible project or schemes, application forms, audit reports for verification and procedure to be followed by the national Committee in granting approvals are documented in rule 11f to rule 11o of the 1962 rules and forms prescribed thereof. One may want to refer the said provisions and rules thereof for better understanding of the subject.

Similarly, the provisions of section 35(2AA), section 35CCA and section 80G alongwith relevant rules pre- scribed thereof may be looked into for further and better understanding of the subject.

In light of above, one may find that provisions of the Act have  long  recognised  the  CSR  initiative  and  provided benefits accordingly by allowing expenditure in computa- tion of income from business of the assessees or deduction otherwise. however, considering the said initiative was not mandatory in nature until CSR provisions under the 2013 Act, therefore, one may not have had contribu- tions made by the corporate sector to the subject.

Allowability of CSr Expenditure u/s. 37(1) of the Act

A question which requires further consideration, is in case if the specific CSR activities as covered under Schedule VII to the 2013 Act are not allowable under the provisions of the act as referred in above, then can the said CSR expenditure could be allowed u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

On perusal of features of CSr provisions as reproduced in earlier paragraphs, one may find that the said provisions allow for activities to be undertaken  which are in furtherance of business activities of the assessee company, however with limitations that said activity should neither be undertaken in normal course of business of the Company nor exclusively for employees of the Company and their family members. the said CSr provisions also mention that such expenditure should not be a charity and/or donation.

Recently, the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT and Anr. vs. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2014)(360 ITR 714), has opined that CSr expenditure which facilitates the business of the assessee is allowable u/s. 37(1) of the act. the relevant facts of the said decision are as under:

infosys technologies ltd (‘infosys’) has an establishment in Bannerghata Circle in Karnataka, where nearly 500 em- ployees are working. There was severe traffic congestion near the said establishment and therefore, the employees including the general public had to wait for a long time. the  said  congestion  seriously  affected  the  free  movement of public including employees of infosys. infosys as  a  Corporate  Social  responsibility  initiative  installed traffic signal near the establishment which otherwise was responsibility of the State. a question arose as regard to allowability of said expenditure u/s. 37(1) of the Act. The high Court held that the said CSr expenditure incurred by infosys could be said to be laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the business u/s. 37(1) of the Act and therefore, is allowable, for want of following reasons:

•    The said expenditure facilitates the employees of Infosys for free movement and allows them to reach the office in time, which otherwise was affecting the business of Infosys on account of delay in reaching office and thereby resulting in delay in completing projects; and

•    The Court further noted that just because the general public other than Infosys was also benefited by the said expenditure shall not come in way of deduction of said expenditure u/s. 37(1).

In view of the above decision, one may find that the if the CSr activity is undertaken in advancement of business of the assessee, then the said expenditure could be allowed u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

in addition to above, reliance could be placed on the fol- lowing decisions, wherein Courts have time and again held that contribution made by the assessee company in public welfare funds which are directly connected or related with the carrying on the business or which results in benefit to the business has to be regarded as allowable deduction u/s. 37(1) of the Act:

•    Sri Venkata Satyanarayna Rice Mills Contractors Co. vs. CIT (223 ITR 101) (SC);

•    Addl. CIT vs. Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Ltd.
(274 ITR 463)(Raj);

•    Mehsana District Co-operative Milk Producer’s Union Ltd. (203 ITR 601)(Guj);

•    CIT vs. Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. (247 ITR 314)(Guj.);

•    Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd vs. CIT (229 itr 577); and

•    Surat Electricity Co. Ltd. vs. ACIT (125 itd 227)(ahd) in the same vein and for the sake of completeness,    it would also be necessary to mention that in the following decisions, the Courts have either held against and/or remanded the matter on expenditure similar to CSR activity claimed for deduction u/s. 37(1) of the Act:

•    CIT vs. Madras Refineries Ltd. (313 ITR 334)(SC) – The Supreme Court was hearing a plea for allowability of ex- penditure u/s. 37(1) of the Act on the CSR activity of providing drinking water and sanitation to residents in the vicinity of factory of the Company. the apex Court remanded the matter to the tribunal for denovo consideration as it was found that neither the madras high Court nor the Tribunal concerned had given specific finding to the effect that said CSr expenditure is allowable as business expenditure.

The madras high Court had earlier allowed for deduction of aforesaid CSr expenditure with the following relevant findings:

“The concept of business was not static. It has evolved over a period of time to include within  its fold the concrete expression of care and concern for the society at large and the people   of the locality in which the business is located,  in particular. Being known as a good corporate citizen brings goodwill of the local community,   as also with the regulatory agencies and the society at large, thereby creating an atmosphere in which the business can succeed in a greater measurewith the aid of such goodwill.”

•    CIT and Anr. vs. Wipro Ltd. (360 ITR 658)(Kar) – Wipro ltd (‘Wipro’) had incurred expenditure on community development near its factory which was located in backward area and claimed as business expenditure. The Court specifically found that Wipro was not able to provide any supporting documents to substantiate its claim for community development which was claimed to be in the nature of religious funds, charitable institutions, social clubs or charity, etc. the Court held that for want of limitation of documents, the expenditure on community do not stand to test of commercial expedi- ency and therefore, said expenditure will not be allow- able u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

The relevance of documentation in allowability of expen- diture u/s. 37(1) of the Act was succinctly brought in the decision of apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (74 itr 17). the Supreme Court held that burden of proving that particular expenditure has been laid out or incurred wholly and exclusively for purpose of business is entirely on assessee.

Based on the above decisions, one may find that it is too early to carve out specific rules determining allowability of CSR expenditure u/s. 37(1) of the Act and the facts and circumstances of the respective cases shall determine the deductibility of said expenditure.

Lastly, it would also necessary to highlight that on perus- al of the CSR provisions of the 2013 Act, one also finds that during the course of implementation one may find that there are still some bottlenecks in its implementation with following questions remaining unanswered and/or no clarifications provided by the MCA on the said issues, which are as under:

•    Whether, contribution of at least 2% of average net profit as prescribed under CSR provisions, is mandatory? the CSr provisions do not provide any advisory to that effect except for requiring a mere disclosure alongwith  reasons  thereof  for  non-spending  of  CSr expenditure in the Board’s report;

•    Further, the definition of ‘average net profit’ is referred to in 2013 Act, whereas the CSRP Rules prescribes definition of ‘net profit’, which is not in consonance with the definition as referred in 2013 Act. One may recon- cile the said differences in definition with interpreting the ‘net profit’ definition only relevant to determine the applicability of CSr provisions, whereas ‘average net profit’ definition is relevant to determine the amount of CSR expenditure by a Company;

•    In addition, the guiding principles to CSR provide for not  considering  the  CSR  expenditure  as  donation  or charity, whereas Schedule VII to the 2013 Act itself provides for activities viz, contribution to PM National relief fund, contribution to technology incubators, etc, which supports the concept of donations given to said institutions; etc

It appears that it is possible to take view that the expenditure incurred on CSR activities as prescribed under the 2013 Act and Rules thereof may be allowed under the present provisions of the act and the CBDT may not be required to prescribe any separate tax treatment.

Maharashtra Ordinance No. VII OF 2014 dated 03-03-2014

fiogf49gjkf0d
The Government of Maharashtra has promulgated this Ordinance whereby in case of builders and developers the limitation for making an order of assessment for any of the periods which expires on 31-03-2014 has been extended up to 30-09-2015.

levitra

Supreme Court Judgment in the case of Bansal Wire Industries

fiogf49gjkf0d
Trade Circular 11T of 2014 dated 04-04-2014

As per the Supreme Court judgment ‘Stainless Steel Wire’ is not declared goods taxable @5%, but it is taxable as the residual entry.

levitra

Extension of date for filing Audit Report in Form 704 for 2012-13 by developers

fiogf49gjkf0d
Trade Circular 9T of 2014 dated 29-03-2014 In case of developers (other than those opting for composition scheme), if Mvat audit report for the period 2012-13 is filed by 10th May, 2014, it is decided administratively not to levy penalty u/s. 61(2) of the MVAT Act.

levitra

Submission of Annexures with/as part of returns for the periods starting from 1st April 2014

fiogf49gjkf0d
Trade Circular 9T of 2014 dated 25-03-2014

From 01-04-2014 onwards with every MVAT return, whether monthly, quarterly or half yearly, Annexure J1 & J2, that is buyer-wise sales and supplier-wise purchase will have to be filed.

For a composition dealer required to file Annexure J2 –supplier wise purchase, this requirement is over and above annual Annexure J1 & J2 and Form 704

levitra

State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/S. Mahaveer Chemical Industries, [2012] 49 VST 200 (Mad)

fiogf49gjkf0d
Central Sales Tax – Subsequent Sale By Transfer of Document of Title To Goods – Transporters Giving Delivery of Goods To Buyers As Per Instruction of Dealer – Not a Continuation of Inter-State Sale–S/s. 3(b) and 6(2) Of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS
The assessee, a dealer in chemicals having office at Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, had purchased liquid/gaseous chemicals from M/s. Cochin Refineries Limited Ernakulum, Kerala. The said goods were further sold to the dealers either in Coimbatore or to the dealers out side the state of Tamil Nadu and claimed exemption from payment of tax u/s. 6(2) of the CST Act, 1956 by producing the required E-1 and Form C. The assessing authority rejected the claim after noticing the fact that after taking delivery from the transporters, the assessee had issued from XX delivery notes to transport chemicals in same tankers to the end users within and outside the state of Tamil Nadu. The Tribunal allowed the claim and the department filed revision petition before the Madras High Court.

HELD
As per section 3(b) of the CST Act, 1956 all subsequent inter-State sales effeted by transfer of document of title to the goods also qualified to be inter-state sales. However, when there is a break in the movement and it comes to an end, the exemption u/s. 6(2) of the Act is no longer available to claim benefit of second inter-state sale. Such subsequent inter-state sale could be made between two dealers residing in the same street provided that there is a sale by transfer of document of title to the goods while they are in transit from one state to another. The burden of proof is on the assessee. The Court further held that in the present case, the journey of goods started from Cochin to Coimbatore and there was no obligation on the part of carrier to transport the goods further to any place beyond Coimbatore. Thus, the subsequent arrangement that the assessee had with the transporter to carry the goods to another place for a different person however did not make the movement a continuation of the original inter-state sale. Once the movement of goods terminated at Coimbatore, on the doctrine of constructive delivery, the authorities rightly rejected the assessee’s claim of exemption u/s. 6(2) of the CST Act. Accordingly, the High Court allowed revision petition filed by the department and set aside the judgment of the Tribunal.

levitra

M/S.Shree Shyam Enterprises vs. Joint Commissioner, Sales Tax, Bally Circle And Others, [2012] 49 VST 177 (WBTT)

fiogf49gjkf0d
Value Added Tax – Input Tax Credit – Tax Invoice Purchase of Goods Under Auction – Sale Release Order Issued By Vendor Containing Prescribed Particulars – Disallowance of Claim For Want of Tax Invoice – Not Correct, Section 21 of The West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003 and R. 91 (7) Of The West Bengal Value Added Tax Rules, 2005

FACTS
The assessee dealer purchased goods from M/s. South Eastern Railway on auction after paying due tax to it. The vendor issued sale release order containing particulars, i.e., date of sale, sale order number and date, name and address of selling dealer, full description of goods sold, quantity or number of goods sold, value of the goods sold, rate and amount of tax charged. The dealer claimed input tax credit in returns. The department rejected the claim for want of proper tax invoice and did not consider the sale release order as tax invoice. The dealer filed application u/s. 8 of The West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 against the rejection of claim of input tax credit.

HELD
The vendor issued sale release order containing all the particulars required under sub-Rule (7) of Rule 91. The documents having contained all the particulars, as required in sub-rule (7) of rule 91 of the VAT Rules, 2005, the Sale Release Order ought to have been equated with and treated at par with the Tax Invoice. The appeal was allowed and assessing authority was directed to allow the claim on verification of documents, treating the sale release order as tax invoice.

levitra

M/S. IFB Industries Ltd. vs. State of Kerala, [2012] 49 VST SC 1.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Sales Tax – Turnover of Sales – Trade Discount – Given Subsequently – By Credit Notes – Deductible, Section 2 (xxvii) of The Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 and R 9(a) of The Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963.

FACTS
The appellant Company is a manufacturer of home appliances. The company as a part of Sales Promotion Scheme allowed discount to its dealers on achieving pre-set sale targets subsequent to issue of sales invoices by way of credit notes. The Company claimed deduction of such trade discount from turnover of sales. The assessing authority principally accepted the claim but there was a dispute in the computation thereof. The matter was disputed up to the High Court. The Kerala High Court held that discount in question was not a trade discount at all and it was not eligible for deduction in terms of Rule 9(a) of the Rules. The appellant company filed appeal before the SC.

HELD
The definition of the term “turnover” contained in section 2(xxvii) read with Explanation (2)(ii) to it recognises discounts other than cash discounts and provides that those other discounts like the cash discount shall not be included in the turnover. Further, Rule 9(a) stipulates that the accounts should show that the purchaser has paid only the sum originally charged less discount. There is nothing in Rule 9(a) to read it in a restrictive manner to mean that a discount in order to qualify for exemption under its provisions must be shown in the invoice itself. Accordingly, the SC allowed the appeal and remanded the matter back to the assessing authority to pass fresh orders in light of the judgment of the SC.

levitra

[2014] 43 taxmann.com 172 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Hiranandani Constructions (P.) Ltd vs. CCE

fiogf49gjkf0d
Stay – Whether charges collected by the Promoter developer from flat buyers in terms of provisions of Section 5 of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation) Act, 1963 are liable to service tax under ‘Management, maintenance and repair services’ – Held, prima facie – No.

The appellant was engaged in the construction of residential complex and collected certain amounts as the development and maintenance fees from the flat buyers before handing over to them possession of the flats. Such sum was collected by it as a promoter to discharge payments towards outgoing expenses including any municipal local taxes, property tax, water charges, electric charges, revenue assessment or interest or any mandatory charges under the provisions of section 5 of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation) Act, 1963. The Appellant was under obligation to return the balance amount, if any, after debiting the expenses, while handing over the possession. The department considered the a ctivity as taxable under the category of “management, maintenance and repair services”. The Tribunal after perusing the provisions of section 5 of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation) Act, 1963, held that the Appellant has made out a strong case in their favour and accordingly unconditional waiver and stay for recovery was granted.

levitra

[2014] 43 taxmann.com 41 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Maharashtra State Co-op. Bank Ltd vs. CCE

fiogf49gjkf0d
Pre-deposit waiver – Whether lease rental received from letting of property acquired from defaulting borrower under the provisions of SARFAESI Act is liable to service tax as renting of immovable property service or is regarded as recovery of outstanding loan? Held, since the appellent is the lessor, it is liable to Service Tax.

Facts:
The appellant is a co-operative bank rendering banking and financial services. It took possession of the Borrower’s factories’ plant and machinery in terms of section 13(4)(a) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, for the default in repayment of loan. Thereafter, the bank leased out the factory and received lease rent from lessee which it adjusted against the loan amount. As per the terms of the lease agreement, the lessee was required to maintain the plant and machinery in good condition at the lessee’s own cost and accordingly the lessee incurred certain expenditure. The department was of the view that the Appellant-bank is liable to discharge service tax liability not only on the amounts received towards rent for the lease of the factories but also on the expenditure incurred by the lessees towards maintenance and repair on the grounds that such activities are undertaken by the lessees on behalf and on account of the appellant.

The appellant contended that the action of letting of the factories cannot be construed as renting of immovable property per se but should be considered as recovery of outstanding loans. As regards, maintenance expenses incurred by the lessee, it submitted that, this cost has been incurred by the lessees and the service provider is the person who actually undertook the maintenance and repair services and not the bank, therefore the appellant is not rendering any service towards management, maintenance or repair.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that, in the lease rental agreements, the appellant is treated as a lessor and therefore, lease rentals received by bank are prima facie liable to service tax. As regards the maintenance and repair costs incurred by the lessee, the Tribunal expressed a prima facie view that the Appellant is not the service provider and there is no liability on the appellant in respect of those transactions. Considering the fact that, the appellant had already discharged entire liability of rental income under protest, the waiver from pre-deposit of balance taxes was granted by the Tribunal.

levitra

[2014] 43 taxmann.com 259 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) – SOS Enterprise vs. CCE&ST

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether, a service provider can be directed to pay differential service tax if the recipient of his service is found to have claimed credit in excess of that paid by the service provider? Held, no.

Facts:
The Appellant provided services as direct selling agent to its principal and raised invoices on the principal for such services. In a proceeding against the principal, on verification of records, it was found that, the principal has taken the CENVAT Credit more than service tax actually paid by the Appellant. On this ground demand was confirmed against the Appellant to the extent of excess CENVAT Credit and penalties were imposed. The Appellant explained that the differences arise because the Appellant paid the service tax on “receipt basis”, whereas the Principal may have taken the CENVAT Credit on the basis of invoice.

Held:
The Tribunal held that, if the department has to make out an offence case against the appellant, it is the responsibility of the department to show that the appellant had received the amount but did not pay the service tax. In the absence of any evidence to show that the Appellant has not paid the tax on the amount received and in the absence of specific allegation in the show cause notice or in the findings of the lower authorities, requirement of pre-deposit of taxes was waived.

levitra

[2014] 43 taxmann.com 42 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Balaji Tirupati Enterprises vs. CCE

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether a contract of maintenance can be held as divisible if material portion and service portion is separately mentioned in the Contract between the parties? Held, yes.

Facts:
In this case, the issue before the Tribunal was that in terms of works contract of repair of transformers, whether the goods deemed to be sold in the execution of works contract were liable for Service Tax.

Held:
The Tribunal on the perusal of the Works Order executed by the Appellant with the power supply authorities categorically observed that, both parties to the contract were conscious of the terms which involved both sales and service. The composition of the goods used for repair contract of transformer is patently clear. Tribunal relied upon the decision in the case of CCE vs. Kailash Transformers [Final Order No. ST/A/402/12-Cus, dated 23-05-2012] in which the Tribunal assigned weightage to the manner how the parties operated with the understanding of sale of goods as well as service provided to effectuate the contract. Accordingly it was held that the Finance Act, 1994 is not a Commodity Taxation Law. As a result of which the goods which were deemed to be sold in the execution of works contract shall not enter into the purview of the levy of the Service Tax.

levitra

Amendment in Mega Exemption Notification- Sponsorship of sports events Notification No. 1/2014-ST dated. 10th January, 2014

fiogf49gjkf0d
Vide this Notification, the scope of Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012 dated June 20, 2012 has been widened by inserting the words “or country” in the opening paragraph, in entry 11, in item (a) of the said Notification. With such insertion, the exemption scope of sponsorship of sporting events organied by a national sports federation has been widened by covering teams or individuals representing any Country instead of representing only district, state or zone.

levitra

2014 (34) STR 225 (Tri.-Del.) Neelav Jaiswal & Brothers vs. CCEx.,Allahabad.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Valuation: Whether the remittance of contribution towards Provident Fund should be included in gross amount charged for supply of manpower services? Held yes.

Facts:
The Appellants engaged in providing manpower supply agency services received provident fund contribution with respect to personnel deployed by the Appellants with M/s. Hindalco Industries Ltd. The Appellants contested that since provident fund contribution was separately paid and the same did not form part of consideration for providing taxable services, the amounts would not be leviable to service tax. Relying on the decision delivered by the Delhi High Court in case of Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI 2013 (29) STR 9 (Del.), the Appellants argued that value of taxable services shall only be gross value received for providing taxable services and nothing more.

Held:
Though the Appellants had statutory obligation to contribute towards provident fund, M/s. Hindalco Industries Ltd. not only remitted the remuneration of the personnel but also remitted the contribution to provident fund. Therefore, both these amounts constituted gross amount charged for providing taxable services.

levitra

2014 (34) STR 205 (Tri-Chennai) Faizan Shoes Pvt. Ltd. vs. Comm. Of ST, Chennai.

fiogf49gjkf0d
In case of amendment in refund notification, whether provisions existing on the date of export of goods should be considered or provisions existing on the date of filing refund claim should be considered?Held provisions on date of claim should be considered.

Facts:
The Appellants exported goods and claimed refund of service tax paid vide Notification No. 41/2007-ST dated 06-10-2007. The department rejected refund claim on the ground that the exporter did not satisfy the following conditions of the said Notification, existing at the time of export which were modified at the time of filing refund claim:

• The exporter should not have availed drawback of service tax
• The refund claim should have been filed within 6 months and

Further, the amount of commission should have been declared on shipping bill.

The Appellants relied on the decision of Mumbai Tribunal in case of WNS Global Service Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Mumbai 2008 (10) STR 273 (Tri.-Mum.) and contested that in case the refund claim is filed post the amendments of the notification and if the amended requirements are satisfied, refund claim cannot be rejected. Since the conditions were modified and there was no condition for non-availment of drawback and time limit was extended to 1 year at the time of filing refund claim, the Appellants were required to fulfil the amended conditions. Further, since SCN was silent with respect to non-declaration of commission amount on shipping bill, the order travelled beyond SCN and in any case, the same was a procedural lapse.

The revenue relied on the decision of Chennai Tribunal in case of CCE, Madurai vs. Shiva Tex Yarn & Others 2012 (25) STR 56 (Tri.-Chennai) wherein it was held that the amendments to notification has prospective effect only.

Held:
Decision cited by revenue is a Single Member Bench decision whereas decision cited by the Appellants is a Division Bench decision including the Single Member who had rendered the decision. Having regard to the objective of duty and tax free exports and Circular dated 12-03- 2009 clarifying that pending claims to be dealt with by applying amended provisions, it was held that the provisions as applicable on the date of filing refund claim needs to be followed. Non-mention of commission amount in shipping bill was a mere procedural lapse. Accordingly, if documentary evidence is available with respect to payment of service tax on commission, refund claim is to be granted.

levitra

[2014] 44 taxmann.com 149 (Bombay) – Saswad Mali Sugar Factory Ltd. vs. CCE.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether invocation of extended period and imposition of penalty u/s. 78 go hand-in-hand? Held yes.

Facts:
The Appellant is receiver of Goods Transport Agency (GTA ) service during April 2005, to October 2006. Adjudicating authority confirmed the demand and penalty. Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the service tax liability on the ground that there was suppression of facts but deleted the penalty u/s. 78 on the ground that the Appellant proved a reasonable cause for the failure. Thus the case is squarely covered by section 80 of the Act. Revenue did not contest deletion of penalty. Assessee’s appeal before Tribunal was dismissed for non-deposit of service tax.

Held
Hon’ble High Court held that the condition for invocation of extended period of limitation as provided in section 73 and the condition precedent to imposing penalty u/s. 78 are identical viz. there should be fraud, collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention with intent to evade payment of service tax. Once the Commissioner (Appeals) has come to a finding that there was genuine cause for non-imposition of penalty then the same cause is also to be factored to conclude that extended period of limitation cannot be invoked. This finding will also apply to determine whether there was any intent to evade payment of service tax. High Court also observed that, revenue has not preferred appeal against deletion of penalty. High Court set aside the order of Tribunal and directed it to take up the matter on merits without requiring any pre-deposit.

levitra

VAT liability of developers – computation – Trade Circular 12T of 2014 dated 17-04-2014.

48. MVAT Trade Circular

 VAT liability of developers – computation – Trade Circular 12T of 2014 dated 17-04-2014.

By this trade circular, the Commissioner has clarified certain queries raised by the trade and associations in respect of computation of tax liability of developers.

T. Subramanian vs. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Ettayapuram, [2012] 50 VST 410 (Mad)

fiogf49gjkf0d
Sales Tax – Interest-Tax Paid As per Order Of High Court- In a Writ Petition Filed- Against Recovery Proceedings- Demand For Interest – Not Permissible, section 24(3) of The Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Facts
The father of the petitioner had filed writ petition before the Madras High Court against the recovery action taken by the Department for recovery of assessed dues. The High Court directed him to pay the dues in six equal installments, which he paid without any default. Thereafter, the Department issued demand notice claiming interest as per section 24(3) of the act for the belated payment of due amount. The petitioner filed writ petition before the Madras High Court against such demand notice for payment of interest.

Held
Indeed, ordinarily, there is no discretion vested with the authority under the act to desist from levying interest or reducing the same. Also, no notice or providing reasonable opportunity to the assessee is no essential. In law, there is no estoppel against a statute. But in the present case, the High Court in the earlier writ had permitted the petitioner to pay due amount in installments. At that time, on both sides, no plea was raised for payment of interest for the delayed payment by the assessee and admittedly no writ appeal is filed against the said order of High Court. Hence, the order of High Court became final and binding between the parties. When the High Court had permitted to pay due amount by way of installments by exercising its judicial discretion, then the invocation of section 24(3) of the Act for payment of interest, for payment made as per order of the High Court, is neither justifiable, nor valid and not prudent one. The High Court accordingly allowed the writ petition and set aside the demand raised by the department for payment of interest to promote the substantial cause of justice.

levitra

M/S. Frostees Exports (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCCT, Corporate Division, Kolkata and Others, [2012] 50 VST 392

fiogf49gjkf0d
Sale of Motor Vehicles- Recovery Of Road Tax,
Insurance Charges And Registration Cost- Post Sale- Not Forming Part of
Sale Price, section 2(30) and (31) of The West Bengal Sales Tax Act,
1994

Facts
The petitioner a private limited company
engaged in the business of selling motor vehicles sold motor vehicles
and collected, over and above price of motor vehicles, cost of
registration, insurance premium and road tax payable by the buyer under
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989. The Company claimed collection of such sum
as not forming part of sale price being post sale services, whereas the
department treated it as forming part of sale price and levied tax
thereon. The Company filed appeal before the West Bengal Taxation
Tribunal against the order of appeal confirming the levy of tax by the
assessing authority on such sum.

Held
Under the Motor
Vehicles Act, delivery to the owner is a pre-condition of a sale and
sale was complete with the issue of sale certificate. Under the Act, it
is the liability of the owner to get it insured before registration.
Therefore, the registration of the motor vehicle is a post-delivery
event. The insurance premium is payable by the owner before
registration. Likewise, the owner of motor vehicles has to pay road tax.
So therefore, there is no scope for debate that the payment of road tax
is a post delivery event and hence it should not form part of sale
price.

Neither of the sides asserted whether after the sale the
physical possession of the goods was retained by the selling dealer.
Even if retained, it was retained by him as bailee for the purpose of
service of registration, insurance and payment of road tax. This
possession is a possession on behalf of the person to whom the goods
were sold. Any amount spent in respect of those retained goods during
such possession was spent on behalf of the buyer and as such it would
not form part of sale price as defined in section 2(31) of the Act.

The
Tribunal further held that it is settled law that, in the composite
transactions also, the value of service cannot be included in the sale
and taxing the service rendered by the Dealer after sale of the goods is
beyond the scope of Entry 54 of List II, Schedule VII read with Article
366(29A) of the Constitution of India. The Tribunal allowed the appeal
and held that the collection of sum by way of road tax, insurance
premium and registration cost not to be included in sale price of the
goods sold and not liable for tax.

levitra

State of Tamil Nadu vs. Karnataka Bank Ltd., [2012] 50 VST 93 (Mad)

fiogf49gjkf0d
Sales Tax – Import of Goods by Bank – Under the Master Lease Agreement – Followed by Supplementary Lease Agreement-On Facts – Sale in The Course of Import – Not Taxable, section 5(2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and section 3A(2)(a) of The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act,1959

Facts
The assessee, a Bank entered into Master Lease Agreement with Hindustan Power Ltd., for importing and leasing of machinery on rental basis. The Bank accordingly ordered machinery as per the specification of the Company from the foreign manufacturers. While the goods were in transit, the Bank and the Company entered in to a Supplementary Lease Agreement which was stated to be a part of the Master Lease Agreement. Since, the Master Lease Agreement made no reference as to the purchase order placed with the foreign manufacturer, the revenue took the stand that the Supplementary Lease Agreement is un-connected with the Master Lease Agreement and rejected the claim of the assessee for exemption from payment of tax as sale in the course of import u/s. 5(2) of the CST Act, 1956. The first appellate authority as well as Tribunal allowed the claim and revenue filed revision petition before the Madras High Court.

Held
The bank had placed a purchase order on the manufacturer at the request of the lessee Company towards purchase of the specified equipment and in the event the lessee was unable to firm up with the manufacturer for the equipment to be leased within the stipulated time, it was open for the lessor bank to withhold for payment and canceled the same. Once the arrangement between the assessee and the lessee, as regards lease agreement, got finalised for the purpose of import of machinery, the subsequent documentation was merely a follow-up action and it is difficult to read each one of the documentation in isolation. When the first of the documents viz., the Master Lease Agreement got dovetailed into purchase order placed by the assessee with the foreign manufacturer, the subsequent documentation completes the balance of the transaction the assessee bank had with the lessee. On facts of the case, the High Court held that there was an inextricable link between the Master Lease Agreement and the Supplementary Lease Agreement on the one hand and the import of specific goods based on the purchase order on the other. Accordingly, the High Court rejected the revision petition filed by the revenue and allowed the claim of the assessee bank for exemption from payment of tax on the lease of the imported machinery to the Lessee company being sale in the course of import.

levitra

2014] 44 taxmann.com 113 (Delhi) CST Delhi vs. Ashu Exports (P) Ltd

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether vocational education courses not recognised by Statute or Authority like AICTE etc. were liable to service tax prior to 27-02- 2010? Held, No.

Facts:
The Respondent – ran courses to impart procedural and practical skill based training in areas such as export import management, retail management and merchandising and claimed exemption vide Notification No.9/2003 as well as 24/2004 dated 10-09-2004 under “Commercial or Coaching Services” provided by vocational/recreational training institute. The courses provided by the assesse were not accredited or certified by any Central or State Government or statutory authority such as AICTE

The revenue alleged that, the exemption Notification applied in terms only to vocational training imparted by Institutes such as ITI and State sponsored or recognised educational training institute generally imparting technical and vocational skills immediately after the 10+2 grade and not to Assessee’s institution which imparts managerial and management skills akin to MBA.

Held:
Tribunal decided in favour of the assesse. On appeal by the Department, the Hon’ble High Court affirming the decision of the Tribunal held that, the term “vocational training institute” included the commercial training or coaching centres providing vocational coaching or training meant to “impart skills to enable the trainees to seek employment or to have self-employment directly after such training or coaching”. The notion of such training institute having been recognised or accredited to nowhere emerges from such a broad definition. Further, Notification 3/2010- ST dated 27-02-2010 substitutes the existing explanation to the term “vocational training institute” and narrowing it to those institutes affiliated to National Council for Vocational Training offering courses in designated trade in fact supports the assessee. Had the intention been to exempt only such class or category of institutions, the appropriate authority would have designed such a condition in the original Notification of 2003 and Notification No.10 of 2004 which had been relied upon in this case.

levitra

[2014] 44 taxmann.com 287 (New Delhi – CESTAT)- New Okhla Industrial Development Authority vs. CCE&ST.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether long-term lease of immovable property (99-years) is outside the purview of the definition of renting service in section 65(105) (zzzz)? Held, No.

Facts:
The Appellant, a statutory Development Authority, created by the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 had entered into long-term leases with third parties whereunder vacant lands were leased to such third parties, inter alia, for business or commercial purposes on long-term leases (of 99 years duration). The Appellant’s contention was that a long-term lease would not amount to renting of immovable property as such leases are substantially in the nature of transfer of ownership and consideration received on such transfers would not amount to consideration received for providing the taxable service enumerated in section 65(105)(zzzz).

Held:
Tribunal disagreeing with the argument of the Appellant held that, provision of section 65(105)(zzzz) neither marks nor accommodates any distinction between long-term and short-term leases. On a true and fair construction of this provision, it is clear that a service provided in relation to renting of immovable property for use in the course of or in furtherance of business or commerce is the taxable service. The provision does not restrict the ambit of the taxable service to only short-term leases nor identifies or classifies leases in terms of the duration. Tribunal further held that, in the absence of any restrictive signification in section 65(105)(zzzz), of a legislative intent to exclude long-term leases of immovable property from the purview of the taxable service defined and enumerated in the said provision, there is no authority to hold that long-term leases (so-called) are outside the purview of the taxable service-“renting of immovable property”. While coming to this conclusion, Tribunal also observed that what is a long-term and what is a short-term lease cannot be an open-ended, ambiguous and inchoate concept and that no authority, statutory or otherwise brought to the attention of the Tribunal which would provide a guidance to classify leases into long-term and short-term so far as section 65(105)(zzzz) is concerned.

b) Whether introduction of clause (v) in Explanation 1 to section 65(105)(zzzz) w.e.f. 01-07-2010 is prospective in nature? Held, Yes.

Held:
Tribunal held that, normally an inclusionary clause does not limit the plenitude of an enacting provision couched in broad terms. Thus the illustrations of what are “immovable property”, set out in the inclusionary clause in Explanation 1 would not derogate from “vacant land” being comprehended within the expression “renting of immovable property”. However, clause (zzzz) has an exclusionary clause as well, enumerating the subjects excluded from the ambit of “immovable property”. On a true and fair construction of the exclusionary clause, the legislative intent is compelling that vacant land whether having facilities clearly incidental to its use as such or otherwise does not constitute immovable property. As a consequence of the interplay between the enumeration of renting of immovable property as the taxable event read with the inclusionary and exclusionary clauses (in particular subclause (b) of the exclusionary clause) in section 65(105) (zzzz), renting of vacant land was clearly outside the purview of the taxable service, prior to 01-07-2010.
Tribunal also relied upon Clause 75 of the Finance Bill 2010. The Board Circular No. No.334/20I0-TRU, dated 26/02/2010 (in paragraph 3) and statement of objects and reasons accompanying the Finance Bill, 2010 to hold that, transactions covered by this sub-clause (v) of the Explanation have only the prospective operation.

levitra

[2014] 44 taxmann.com 18 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT)- Quintiles Technologies (India) (P.) Ltd vs. CST

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether, refund of CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of CCR is admissible even if some of the services exported are otherwise exempted from service tax by exemption notification? Held, Yes.

Facts:
Appellant engaged in providing I.T. enabled services included taxable as well as exempt services. All its services were exported and no service was provided in the DTA . While calculating refund of CENVAT as per formula mentioned in Rule 5(1) of CENVAT credit rules, 2004, the Appellant added all services exported, whether dutiable or exempted to both “Export Turnover” and “Total Turnover” as specified in Clause 5 of Notification No. 5/2006- CE (NT) dated 14-03-2006. The contention of the revenue was that, while calculating refund, although services exempted by exemption notification were to be included in “Total Turnover”, it should be deducted from “Export Turnover” on the ground that, no service tax credit is admissible against exempt services.

Held:
Tribunal held that as per Clause (D) of Rule 5(1) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, in the definition of ”Export turnover of Services”, there is no distinction with respect to payments received from export of services. Further, there is no evidence on record that Appellant has taken any input service tax with respect to exempted services exported out of India. The logic of giving cash refund of taxes used, in relation to export of goods/services under Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, is to have ‘Zero rated’ exports and in case of the appellant, no exempted service is provided in the domestic tariff area.

Therefore it was held that even exempted services will be added to the “export turnover of services” and all the unutilized service tax credit pertaining to exported service (including otherwise exempt service) will be admissible as refund under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

levitra

2014 (34) STR 236 ( Tri-Del.) Commr. Of C.Ex., Allahabad vs. Shiv Engineering & Ors.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether activity of repair/testing of transformers and replacement of coil, transformer oil and supply of other items could get benefit of Notification No.12/2003 prescribing deduction of value of material in valuation of service tax liability under Management, Maintenance or Repair service? Held yes.

Facts:
Respondent provided service of repair of old and damaged transformers under composite agreement with the customers and discharged service tax liability on the labour component under Management, Maintenance or Repair service and not on the value of various items replaced but the department challenged the orders contesting that the Respondent provided service of repair or maintenance of transformers under composite contract and was obliged to replace certain parts which were used/ consumed during the repair and that process of replacement was only ancillary to main work of repairs. Moreover, exemption claimed as per Notification 12/2003 was not applicable as replaced parts were not sold by them.

Held:
The Tribunal held that, the total repair cost constitutes cost of labour charges and cost of goods LV leg coil, transformer coil and other supply items. Value for parts were shown separately in the contract and thereby condition of documentary evidence indicating value of goods/ material as per the Notification No.12/2003 was fulfilled. VAT was paid on goods/materials value. Therefore, Revenue’s contention was rejected.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 238 ( Tri-Del.) Commr. Of C.Ex., Ludhiana vs. Forgings & Chemicals Industries

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether commission paid to overseas agent for procuring orders from overseas is input service eligible for CENVAT credit? Held yes.

Facts:
The respondent had overseas agents for procuring export orders and claimed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on commission paid to them. The department has denied CENVAT credit. The First Appellate Authority held that the Business Auxiliary service of procuring export orders received from overseas agent has to be treated as an input service, as the definition of “input service” is to be interpreted in the light of requirement of business and it cannot be read restrictively so as to confine only upto factory or upto the depot of the manufacture and setaside the order. An appeal was filed by Revenue against that order.

Held:-
Rejecting revenue’s contention, the Hon’ble Tribunal held that the definition of ‘input service’ covered the activities of advertisement or sales promotion and also the activities related to business. The service of procuring export order is clearly covered in marketing and sales promotion services and it is also an activity related to manufacturing business of the applicant. Thus, it is input service eligible for CENVAT credit.

levitra

2014 (34) STR 90 (Tri.-Mumbai) CCE, Goa vs. Asia Pacific Hotels Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether CENVAT credit allowable signifies its availability or its utilisability?

Facts:
Respondent was engaged in the hotel business and provided services such as beauty parlour, health club & fitness centre, dry cleaning, internet cafe, mandap keeper services etc. Respondent also provided non-taxable services such as hotel accommodation, restaurant & bar services. Respondent availed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on certain services which were utilised for taxable and non-taxable services as per provisions of Rule 6(5) of CCR. Revenue contended that the said Rule permitted taking of the credit and not permitted its utilisation and accordingly the demand was raised to the extent of credit was utilised by the Respondent. In the appeal proceedings, Revenue had a single ground that Rule 6(5) of CCR allows assessee to take the credit and therefore ‘taking’ of credit is distinct from ‘utilisation’.

Held:
Tribunal held that the purpose and objective of CCR is to allow a manufacturer/service provider not only to take credit but also to utilise the same. Therefore, if Respondent is allowed only to ‘take’ the credit without allowing it to ‘use’, the basic objective of CCR would be defeated. The Revenue’s appeal was rejected.

levitra

2014 (34) STR 58 (Tri.-Del.) DSCL Sugar vs. CCEx., Lucknow

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether a place where goods are stored after
clearance from the factory on the payment of duty can be considered as
“place of removal” for the purpose of “input service” definition and
therefore whether CENVAT credit is allowed in respect of services
consumed at such place of removal? Held yes.

Facts:
Appellant
manufacturing sugar paid excise duty at the specific rate as per
section 4A of Central Excise Act, 1944 (CEA). Appellant cleared sugar
from the factory and stored the same at its place of storage at Agra and
Farukhabad. Appellant availed CENVAT credit of service tax paid in
respect of godown rent of Agra and Farukhabad, sugar handling charges
and security charges at these godowns, for insurance of sugar and cash,
vehicle hire charges, vehicle insurance etc. Respondent was of view that
since the services availed were after clearance of goods from the
factory, these cannot be qualified to be “input services” within the
meaning specified in Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules 2004 (CCR

Held:
Tribunal after referring to the definition of “input service” under the
said Rule 2(l) and after referring to the definition of “place of
removal” as defined under CEA held as under:

CCR does not define
the expression “place of removal”. However as per Rule 2(p) of the said
Rule, the terms defined in the CEA or Finance Act 1994 will apply for
the purpose of the said Rules.

Section 4(c) of CEA defines the
“Place of removal” to include a depot, premises of consignment agent or
any other place, or premises from where the excisable goods are to be
sold after their clearance from the factory. Therefore the said premises
are to be considered as “place of removal” as also affirmed by the
Tribunal in case of L.G. Electronics (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE 2010 (19)
STR 340 and by Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of Ambuja
Cements vs. UOI 2009 (14) STR 3 (P&H). The credit was thus allowed
for godown rent of Agra and Farukhabad. Credit in respect of other
expenses were allowed considering them relating to manufacturing
activity and supported by a number of High Court decisions.

levitra

2014 (34) STR 47 (Tri-Del.) CCE, Bhopal vs. Sonali India

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether free material supplied by service receiver needs to be included in the value of taxable services provided by the service provider? Held no.

Facts:
Respondent entered into contract with IOCL for erection of tanks and pumps. The tanks and pumps were supplied by IOCL. Respondent supplied other materials and rendered erection service. Respondent discharged service tax liability after claiming the abatement of 67% on the gross amount charged under Notification No. 1/2006 dated: 01-03-2006. The dispute was while allowing the abatement of 67% whether the value of tanks and pumps were to be included in the taxable value.

Held:
Rejecting Revenue’s appeal held that, the gross amount charged by the service provider need to include the value of plant, machinery, equipment, parts etc., only when the same were sold by the service provider in the course of providing the service. Since nowhere it was alleged that the tanks and pumps were sold by the Respondent. In the course of rendering the service appeals filed by the Appellant (revenue) was dismissed.

levitra

2014 (34) STR 235 (Tri.-Bang.) Esskay Shipping (P) Ltd. vs. CCE, Visakhapatnam

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether penalty is leviable u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 when service tax with interest is paid before issuance of SCN and the same is intimated to Central Excise officer? Held no.

Facts:
The Appellants paid service tax with interest for the period from October, 2010 to March, 2011 before issuance of SCN. Penalty u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 was imposed under SCN.

Held:
As per section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994, if the assessee has paid service tax and intimated to the Central Excise officer, Central Excise officer cannot issue SCN u/s. 73 (1) of the Act. Further, Explanation 2 to the said section provides that in a case of payment of service tax and intimation to Central Excise officer, no penalty is imposable. Therefore, the order was set aside.

levitra

Controversy: cenvat: Commission Paid to Agents Abroad

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction:
In a landmark decision of Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune-III 2009 (242) ELT 168 (Bom), the Honourable Bombay High Court categorically held that credit was admissible of service tax paid by the concentrate manufacturer on advertising service used for marketing of soft drinks removed by the bottling company. Any activity relating to business could be covered under the definition of input service as per Rule 2(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) provided there is a relation between the manufacturer of concentrate and such activity. Service tax paid on advertisements, sales promotion and market research is admissible as credit for payment of excise duty on concentrate especially when such expense forms part of a price of a final product which suffers excise duty. Within a short time frame of this decision, yet in another landmark case viz. CCE, Nagpur vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 577 (Bom), the Court held that the scope of the definition of input service is very wide and it covers not only the services used directly or indirectly in or in relation to manufacture of final products, but also various services used in relation to the business of manufacturer whether prior to manufacture or post manufacturing activity, whether having a direct nexus or integrally connected with the business of manufacturing the final product. All services in relation to business of manufacture of the final product are covered. When these two well reasoned decisions were pronounced in quick succession, it largely appeared that many disputes relating to the CENVAT credit of service tax paid on various services used for business purposes would be settled based on the observations in the above cases. In many decisions as a matter of fact, the Tribunals have relied upon or followed the above decisions. Nevertheless, litigation for the CENVAT has been continuing for services such as transportation for employees, mobile phones, group insurance health policies, outward freight, outdoor caterer’s services, travel agent’s services etc., used by a manufacturer since these services and many others are not used directly in relation to the activity of manufacture. The nexus theory is often interpreted very narrowly by the revenue authorities both vis-à-vis manufacturers and service providers.

Nevertheless, the activity directly related to sale of a manufactured final product liable for excise duty or in the course of exports appeared less questionable for admissibility of credit particularly considering the definition of input service provided in CCR at least prior to the amendment made with effect from 01-04-2011 read as follows:

“(l) “input service” means any service, –

(i) used by a provider of taxable service for pro viding an output service; or

(ii) used by the manufacturer, whether directly or indirectly in or in relation to the manufacture of final products and clearance of final products, upto the place of removal, and includes services used in relation to setting up, modernisation, renovation or repairs of a factory, premises of provider of output service or an office relating to such factory or premises, advertisement or sales promotion, market research, storage upto the place of removal, procurement of inputs, activities relating to business, such as accounting, auditing, financing, recruitment and quality control, coaching and training, computer networking, credit rating, share registry, and security, inward transportation of inputs or capital goods and outward transportation upto the place of removal.”

[emphasis supplied].

Controversy:
It can be seen that the above definition specifically includes the expression “sales promotion” in addition to advertisement and market research. Prima facie it hardly appears controversial that when a manufacturer of an excisable product pays commission to agents domestically or abroad, whether it has any nexus with the sale of such products as the services of agents are directly used for effecting or augmenting sale. The service of the commission agents is exigible to service tax as business auxiliary service considering it a service in relation to sale or promotion of client’s goods under the erstwhile section 65(19)(i) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) since 09-07-2004. When a manufacturer pays commission to an overseas agent for executing sales abroad, the manufacturer is liable to pay service tax on such commission under reverse charge mechanism applicable u/s. 66A of the Act since 18-04-2006. Since the commission paid directly is related to the sale of the final product, the CENVAT credit of service tax so paid under reverse charge has been available to such exporter-manufacturer.

When the Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana filed an appeal [reported in CCE, Ludhiana vs. Ambika Overseas 2012 (25) STR 348( P&H)] against ruling of the Tribunal that the assessee was entitled to avail credit of service tax paid to the foreign commission agents for services of procuring orders as these services were input services, the Punjab & Haryana High Court found no reason to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal as revenue failed to establish illegality or perversity in the order of the Tribunal. As against this decision, in a detailed order passed in the case of Commissioner of C. Ex. Ahmedabad vs. Cadilla Healthcare Ltd. 2013 (30) STR 3 (Guj), the question that was raised before the Court for consideration that whether the service of a commission agent for promotion of sale of final products of the assessee which is categorised as business auxiliary service (u/s. 65(19)(i) of the Act) would fall within the purview of “input service”. According to the assessee, the commission agents find buyers for the assessee’s goods and thereby they promote sales of the assessee’s goods. The definition of input service specifically includes services in relation to sales promotion whereas according to the revenue, the commission agent is a person directly concerned with the sale and purchase of goods and is not connected with sales promotion. In view hereof, the meaning of the expression “sales promotion” was examined by the Court in detail and at the end of which, a fine distinction was made between services in relation to ‘sales’ and “sales promotion” to hold that the service of commission agent was observed as one in relation with ‘sale’ and therefore not falling within the purview of the main or the inclusive part of the definition of input service in terms of Rule 2(l) of CCR. Arriving at the above conclusion, reliance was placed on the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Mohd. Ishaque Gulam 232 ITR 869 wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court distinguished expenditure made on the sale promotion and commission paid to the agents and held that commission paid to the agents cannot be termed as expenditure on sales promotion. Further, for the contention that in any case, the service provided by the commission agent was in relation to business activity of the assessee and the list of activities in the inclusive part of the definition of input service was illustrative as the words “such as” preceded the said list of services, it was observed that unless the activity was analogous to the business activity, it could not be considered input service. Since the service of the commission agents was found not analogous with accounting, auditing, recruitment, coaching and training, credit rating, quality control, share registry, security services etc., it was held that it did not qualify to be “input service.”

The logical questions to every person studying legal provisions arise are:

• Whether the activity in relation to ‘sale’ is less
akin to being an “input service” in relation to
manufacture than the services of share registry,
security services, credit rating etc.? Is it simply
because such services find specific place in the
definition?

• In the context of definition of input service
whether there exists a material difference between
sales promotion and sale in relation to
manufactured goods? Is sale promotion not
carried out to achieve sale?
• Is the commission agent not helping to execute
sale after identifying the buyers?
• Does the cost of final product sold and subjected
to excise duty not include the cost towards
commission payment and therefore is it not a
cost incurred before the goods are removed
from the place of removal?
Despite knowing the replies to all the above questions,
the decision of the Honourable Gujarat High Court is a reality. However, very importantly, it is
required to note here that the following relevant
facts were not placed before the Honourable Gujarat
High Court in the said case of Cadilla (supra)
while the service of commission agents was not
interpreted as input service.
(a) After the amendment of the definition of “input
service” with effect from 01-04-2011, in response to
some prevailing doubts in the trade, as to availability
of credit in respect of certain items, CBEC
issued Circular No. 943/04/2011 dated 29th April,
2011. In reply to a question that whether the credit
on account of sales commission be disallowed after
the deletion of expression “activities relating to
business”, a clarification was issued at para 5 as,
“the definition of input service allows all credit on
services used for clearance of final products upto
the place of removal. Moreover, activity of sales
promotion is specifically allowed and on many occasions,
the remuneration for the same is linked to
actual sale. Reading the provisions harmoniously it
is clarified that credit is admissible on the services
of sale of dutiable goods on commission basis”.

Thus, it is clear that the credit is available even
in the post-amendment period.
(b) Secondly, in order to provide benefit to exporters
of various goods, the services provided
by commission agents located outside India for
causing sale of goods exported by Indian exporters
are exempted vide Notification No. 42/2012-ST
dated 29-06-2012, of course, subject to fulfillment
of certain conditions laid thereunder. (The said
exemption existed earlier under Notification No.
18/2009-ST dated 07-07-2009. Prior to bringing this
Notification also, vide Notification No. 41/2007-Service
Tax, exemption by way of refund was available
to exporters in respect of this service with
effect from 01-04-2008). Since the commission paid
abroad directly relates to sale of exported goods,
instead of asking assessees to pay service tax and
then allowing the claim of refund, the exemption
is allowed on fulfillment of conditions and following
prescribed procedure. This is clearly indicative of
the fact that the service provided relates to goods
sold in the course of exports and the services are
input services for the said sales.
(c) Thirdly the two benchmark decisions referred
above viz. Coca Cola Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Ultratech
Cement Ltd. (supra) which broadly laid principles
interpreting the scope of input service were not
considered. The instant decision of the Gujarat
High Court now poses a question mark on these
two widely followed decisions of the Honourable
Bombay High Court.

Conclusion:
Consequent upon the above decision of the
Gujarat High Court in case of Cadilla Healthcare
Ltd. (supra), the authorities at various levels of
litigation in the State of Gujarat would be required
to follow the decision in respect of dispute relating
to the CENVAT credit of service tax paid on commission
to agents. However, the credit as per the
Circular No.943 remains available. The benefit of
Notification No. 42/2012-ST also continues in case
of commission paid in respect of export sales. In
the States of Punjab & Haryana, certainly Ambika
Overseas (supra) would be followed and elsewhere
in the country, the authorities follow either of the
two decisions found convenient. The fact however
remains that the service provided by an agent of
procuring sales order was used before executing
the order by the manufacturer and therefore the
cost of which is already factored into the cost
of the final product on which the excise duty is
levied. Hence, the service should qualify to be
an input service and the CENVAT credit therefore
should be available. However, to put an end to
the controversy and frivolous litigation, if the
CBEC considers issuing a further clarification in the
matter, it would mean a proactive step in larger
interests of law-compliant assessees.

SERVICE TAX IMPLICATIONS OF REDEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY ON OR AFTER 01-07-2012

fiogf49gjkf0d
Synopsis

In this article the author analyses the relevant definitions and typical terms and concepts used in documentation of redevelopment of housing and commercial societies.

He explains the Service Tax implications on existing Society/members and on Developers on construction of Rehab flats/units and also analyses the valuation of rehab construction services and valuation of development rights in light of Circular issued by the Service Tax authorities.

He also dissects the provisions of point of time rules applicable and CENVAT eligibility in respect of input services and capital goods used in redevelopment projects.

1. Preamble:

1.1. Acute shortage of land, rising population, ever increasing demand for housing and its sky rocketing prices has brought about an innovative concept of redevelopment of old properties in Mumbai. Re-development is a unique feature typical to the real estate sector in Mumbai. One rarely finds redevelopment projects in other cities due to availability of ample land and possibility of expansion of city in all directions.

Re-development has become a necessity in Mumbai, as countless buildings have outlived their estimated useful life and such buildings are beyond repair. Most property owners or societies are financially incapable of undertaking extensive repair or restoration. In a redevelopment project, the developer exploits the development potential and existing members get reconstructed flats/units with modern amenities, additional area, corpus and other allowances. Redevelopment is, therefore, a win-win solution for society, members and the developer.

1.2. Redevelopment is a complex economic transaction having far reaching implications under the Income-tax, VAT, Stamp duty, Service tax and other such laws. This article covers only the Service tax implications for the society, its members and the developer in respect of redevelopment of society property on or after 1st July 2012.

1.3. The reference to the following phrases/abbreviations in the article would mean:

• The Act – The Finance Act, 1994
• Valuation Rules – Service tax (Determination
of value ) Rules,2006
• POTR – Point of Taxation Rules, 2011
• CCR – CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004

2. Typical documentation and terms of redevelopment of housing and commercial societies:

2.1. A Developer normally executes following agreements:

• “Development Agreement” with the society.
• “Permanent Alternative Accommodation Agreement” with existing members for allotting flats/units in redeveloped building (“Rehab flats/units”).
• “Agreement to sale” with purchasers of  new flats (“Saleable flats”).

2.2. The society appoints a developer for reconstruction of specified area for its members. In consideration, the society transfers the balance development potential (FSI and rights to load TDR) to the developer for constructing saleable flats/units.

2.3. The usual terms of a redevelopment project are as under:

• Developer pays cash consideration for development potential (popularly known as FSI) to society.

• Developer allots flats/units in a redeveloped building to members.

• Developer may allot flat/unit to some members in his other project.

• Developer may purchase flats from existing members for consideration.

• Developer pays the following to the members

Lump-sum consideration to compensate consequential increase in maintenance and property tax on redeveloped building (popularly known as “Corpus allowance”)

Rent allowance to cover rent for temporary accommodation.

Shifting allowance to cover shifting cost such as transportation etc.

Reimbursement of brokerage for temporary accommodation.

Hardship allowance

• Developer may provide temporary alternative accommodation to members:

In his other project; or
In flats/units taken by him on rent.

2.4. Developer may sell additional area to existing members at concessional or market rate.

2.5. Developer sells saleable flats/units to Purchasers who will be admitted as members by society at later date.

3. Crux of redevelopment transaction:

Redevelopment transaction is a barter trans action between society/members and developer, the particulars whereof are tabulated below:

Question arises whether above-referred transactions are liable to service tax? If yes, when are such transactions taxable and what is the value of such services?

4. Relevant definitions, terms and concepts:

4.1. The relevant extract of definition of “Service” u/s. 65B(44) of the Act:

“‘Service’ means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include

(a) An activity which constitutes merely,-

(i) a transfer to title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale , gift or in any manner; or

(ii) ………
……”

4.2. The relevant extract of section 66E of the Act:

Following shall constitute declared services, namely:-

(a) ……..
(b) Construction of a complex, building, civil structure or a part thereof, including a complex or building intended for sale to a buyer, wholly or partly, except where the entire consideration is received after issuances of completion certificate by the competent authority
(c) ……
(d) ……
(e) agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act
(f) …….
(g) …….
(h) service portion in the execution of a works contract

4.3. “Works contract” is as defined u/s. 65B(54) to mean a contract wherein:

• transfer of property is in goods involved in the execution of such contract; and
• such contract is leviable to tax as sale of goods; and
• such contract is for the purpose of carrying out construction of any movable or immovable property.

4.4. The service tax implications for builder, developer, labour contractor and works contractor differ from each other. It is essential to understand these terms and the meaning of the word “immovable property”. The service tax legislation does not define these terms. One may have to go by the definitions in the General Clauses Act or common parlance meaning of such terms.

4.5. The term “Immovable Property” as defined under Clause (26) of General Clauses Act, 1897 includes land, benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.

4.6. “Builder” should mean a person constructing the building on land owned by him with intention to sell the flats/units.

4.7. “Developer” should mean a person who acquires development rights in the land and constructs the building thereon for sale.

4.8. Contractor constructs building on the land owned by another person. The contractor can further be classified as “labour contractor” or “works contractor”. The labour contractor undertakes a pure “service” contract and uses material provided by the principal. The “works contractor” undertakes composite contract and uses his own material in execution of the contract.

4.9. The issue is whether the developer is a “builder” or a “works contractor” vis-à-vis construction of rehab flats/units for a society and its members. The effective tax rate, date of service tax applicability, valuation and relevant Rules and notifications etc., are different for builders/ developers and for works contractors. In a society redevelopment project, the developer usually does not get title to or rights in land pertaining to rehab portion. The developer gets the development rights or right to construct saleable portion on society’s land.

The contractor or works contractor constructs
the building on the land belonging to its principal.
The construction material (belonging
to and used by the contractor) passes from
contractor to the client by the principle of accretion.
As far as construction for rehab flats/
units in redevelopment project is concerned,
the developer does not have the rights in the
land. He constructs on the land belonging to
the society. One can, therefore, safely conclude
that the developer is a “works contractor” for
construction of rehab flats/units in a redevelopment
project.
The society grants development rights (balance
after utilisation for rehab construction) to the
developer for constructing saleable portion. The
developer gets valuable rights in land pertaining
to saleable portion. The developer acts as a
“builder” selling the flats/units to the purchasers
along with underlying rights in the land.
In most of the redevelopment projects, the
developer acts in a dual capacity i.e., “Works
contractor” for rehab portion and “builder”
for saleable portion. However, it will be advisable
to examine the redevelopment agreement
minutely, to determine the exact scope and
role of the developer for assessing Service tax
implications.
5. Service tax implications for Society and members:
5.1. A Society/members transfer development rights
to developer for reconstructed flats/units and
other consideration in cash.
In the absence of a definition of the term
“Immovable property” in the Service tax legislation,
one may adopt the definition of “Immovable
property” given under Clause 26 of
General Clauses Act, 1897. Development rights
are squarely covered under the above referred definition of immovable property. Transfer of
such immovable property is outside the ambit
of Service tax.
5.2. Members usually get Corpus allowance, rent allowance,
shifting allowance, hardship allowance
etc. Two possible views as to the taxability of
such allowances are as under:
• All the above referred allowances are
consideration for a single deliverable i.e.,
transfer/relinquishment of rights in the
property by the members to the developer.
It is a transaction of immovable property
not liable to Service tax.
• Such allowances are a consideration for
different deliverables by the members. It
is not a consideration for transfer or relinquishment
of members’ rights in immovable
property. Such allowances are received by
the members for having agreed to vacate,
shift and tolerate the hardship associated
with shifting during the reconstruction
of the society’s building. Even lump-sum
compensations received by members (for
compensating them for consequential increase
in maintenance and property tax on
redeveloped buildings-popularly known as
“Corpus allowance”) may be regarded as
consideration for agreeing to tolerate the
financial burden in the future. There are all
chances of the Service tax authority treating
these to be declared service u/s. 66E(e) of
the Act. In such a case, members receiving
such allowances would be liable to Service
tax, if the total value of all services (including
these allowances) provided by them is
above one time threshold exemption limit
of Rs. 10 lakh.
5.3. Sometimes, the developer may provide temporary
alternative accommodation to members in
his other project or in flats/units taken by him
on rent. As the transaction between developer
and members is not in cash, the issue would
arise as to the taxability of these transactions in
the hands of members. It is a barter transaction
and consideration received in kind is liable to
Service tax, if the transaction is that of service is
taxable. The taxability of such service is already
discussed in the preceding paragraph.
6. Service tax implications for developer on construction
of residential flats allotted to existing
members in redevelopment project on or
before 30-06-2012:
Prior to 1st July, 2012, the construction of a
residential complex was taxable either under
“Construction of complex” category u/s. 65 (105)
(zzzh) or under “works contract service” u/s.
65(105)(zzzza) of the Act. The term “Residential
Complex” was defined u/s. 65(91a) of the Act.
The construction of a complex for personal use
was specifically excluded from the definition of
“Residential Complex”. Hence, any construction
of a Residential complex for personal use was
not taxable under any of the above referred
categories.
The Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC),
vide their circular 151/2/2012- ST dated 10th February,
2012, clarified that re-construction undertaken
by a building society by directly engaging
a builder/developer will not be chargeable to
Service tax as it is meant for the personal use
of the society/its members. The relevant extract
of the aforesaid circular is reproduced for ready
reference.
“Re – construction undertaken by a building society
by directly engaging a builder/developer will
not be chargeable to service tax as it is meant
for the personal use of the society/its members.”
The developers, therefore, were not liable to
Service tax till 30-06-2012 in respect of residential
flats allotted to existing members of the society
in redevelopment project.
7. Service tax implications on construction of
Rehab flats/units allotted to existing members
of the society in redevelopment project on or
after 01-07-2012:
7.1. The service tax legislation has been revamped
w.e.f 01-07-2012. Section 65 (105) listing out
taxable services and section 65(91a) defining
residential complex is no longer on statue book.
Circular no. 151/2/2012-ST dated 10th February,
2012, being inconsistent with the new Service
tax legislation, is no longer valid and subsisting
after introduction of negative list based levy.
In view of a substantial change in the law, it is necessary to revisit the issue whether developers
are liable to Service tax in respect of rehab
flats/units allotted to members of the society.
7.2. India has adopted the ‘Negative List based
service taxation’ w.e.f. 01-07-2012 wherein any
activity is liable to service tax, if such activity
is:
• Covered under definition of “Service” as
defined u/s. 65B(44) of the Act; and
• Not falling in “Negative List of Services” as
listed u/s. 66D of the Act; and
• Provided within the taxable territory; and
• Not covered under Notification no. 25/2012
dated 20-06-2012 or any other exemption
notification.
7.3. As discussed in para 4.9, the developer is a
“works contractor” for construction of rehab
flats/units in redevelopment project. The service
portion in a works contract is a declared service
u/s. 66E(h) of the Act and is a “service” as
defined u/s. 65B(44) of the Act. Such service is
neither in the negative list of services (as listed
in section 66D of the Act) nor is it exempt under
any of the exemption notification. In view of
this, any such service provided within taxable
territory (whole of India except Jammu and
Kashmir) is liable to Service tax w.e.f. 01-07-2012.
The Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry
(MCHI) has sought clarification from the Service
Tax Commissioner, Mumbai-I on the issue whether
Builders/Developers are liable to Service tax in
respect of rehab flats/units allotted to society
members in redevelopment project. The Commissioner,
vide his letter F.No.V/ST-I/Tech-II/463/11
dated 31-08-2012, clarified that Service tax is leviable
on construction of such rehab flats/units.
8.
Valuation of rehab construction service :
8.1. In a redevelopment project, the developer receives
consideration in the form of development
rights for constructing Rehab flats/units. Any
activity carried out by one person for another
person for consideration (whether in cash or in
kind) is a service. Section 67 of the Act requires
a service provider to include the monetary value
of consideration in kind in the value of taxable
services provided by him.
8.2. Section 67 of the Act deals with determination
of value of taxable services:
8.3. Developer receives consideration in the form
of development rights for constructing rehab
flats/units in a redevelopment project.
Section 67(1)(ii) is applicable when value of
consideration received in kind is ascertainable.
Section 67(1)(iii) applies when the value of
consideration is not ascertainable in ordinary
course.
An erroneous notion which prevails is that the
value of development rights is not ascertainable
and hence, the construction service in respect
of Rehab flats/units are to be valued u/s. 67(1)
(iii) read with Rule 3 of Valuation Rules. The Service tax authorities, relying on Circular
No.151/2/2012-ST dated 10-02-2012, value the rehab
flats/units at the rates at which similar flats are
sold by the developer. This is not a correct proposition,
as the Service tax is leviable on the value
of consideration (i.e. development right) received
by the developer and not on the value of flats
which is a consideration received by members/
society for granting development rights to the
developer. The construction of the rehab portion by the developer is a “Works Contract” service.
Such service cannot be valued at the market
value of rehab flat/units arrived at, by applying
the rate of saleable flats as sale rate of saleable
flats includes the land value. In a Redevelopment
Project, the land attributable to rehab flats/units
belongs to the society/members and it is never
transferred by the developer to the members or
the society. Hence, the land value should not
be included while ascertaining the value of the
construction service for rehab flats.
Development rights are liable to stamp duty and
market value of such rights (for the purpose
of stamp duty) is prescribed in the Government
reckoner of majority of the States. The value of
consideration (i.e Development Rights) is, therefore,
ascertainable and hence valuation is to be
done u/s. 67(1)(ii) of the Act. A very strong view
is prevalent that the value of development rights
(consideration received in kind by builder for
construction of rehab flats/units to members)
should be taken at stamp duty valuation.
8.4. The monetary value of development rights is
gross consideration for works contract executed
by the developer for the society. It is a gross
consideration for works contract which comprises
of material and service value. One has
to segregate the service portion from the total
value of the works contract. Section 67(1) of
the Act read with Rule 2A of Valuation Rules
prescribes following two valuation methods for
valuing the service component in the works
contract:
• Specific Valuation Method [Rule 2A (i) of
Valuation Rules]
• Presumptive Valuation Method [Rule 2A (ii)
of Valuation Rules]
Under the Specific Valuation Method, the value
of service portion is worked out by reducing
value of goods (material) used from gross
contract value excluding VAT. The service value
should not be less than specified overheads
relating to the project.
It is practically impossible
to work out the value of service portion
under this method for redevelopment project.
Under Presumptive Valuation Method, the value
of service portion in the works contract for
new construction (original works) is deemed
to be 40% of gross consideration/contract value
excluding VAT. Thus in the redevelopment
project, the effective service tax rate under
presumptive method would be 4.944% of the
value of development rights.
The developer is eligible for Cenvat Credit of
input services and capital goods irrespective
of the valuation method followed by him.
9. Point of Taxation for construction of rehab
portion:
9.1. The question arises when Service tax on rehab
portion is payable by the developer? Point of
Taxation Rules, 2011 determines the point of
taxation (‘POT’) i.e., the point of time when
service shall be deemed to have been provided.
The provisions, rules, notifications and circulars
subsisting on POT should be applied for determining:
• Taxability of transaction
• Applicable tax rate
• Valuation
• Cenvat eligibility
• Due date for tax payment
9.2. Works contract service is a continuous supply of
service. In case of continuous supply of service
where the provision of the whole or part of
the service is determined periodically on the
completion of an event in terms of a contract,
which requires the receiver of service to make
any payment to the service provider, the date
of completion of each such event as specified
in the contract shall be deemed to be the date
of completion of provision of service;
Explanation to Rule 3 of POTR provides that
whenever any advance is received by the service
provider towards the provision of taxable
service, the POT shall be the date of receipt of
such advance.
9.3. The point of taxation arises when service provider
is legally entitled to receive consideration
(development right in land) from service recipient
(society). The point of time when developer
receives irrevocable rights in the land is a point of taxation for rehab construction. The taxable
event occurs at such point and service tax liability
triggers on such date for developer.
One has to examine the development agreement
carefully to determine the point of taxation
and it could be any of the following probable
dates:
• Date of execution of development agreement.
• Date of developer getting vacant possession
free from all encumbrances.
• Date on which developer gets necessary
permissions (IOD, Commencement Certificate
etc) from local authority or government
to commence the construction.
• Date on which developer completes the
construction of area earmarked for original
occupants/members.
• Date on which full consideration for land
rights is paid to the society.
• Any other relevant date, specified in development
agreement, on which the substantial
rights in land are unconditionally and
irrecoverably bestowed on the developer.
The POT is a date on which developer have
received Sale Consideration (in form of development
rights) in advance for flat to be allotted to
the society/members. The liability to discharge
Service Tax arises on such date even if construction
is not started on such date.
The Redevelopment project for residential
complex in respect of which POT has already
arisen before 30-06-2012 is not liable to service
tax even if:
• Construction is started on or after 01-07-
2012.
• Construction is started before 30-06-2012
but completed on or after 01-07-2012.
• Possession of Rehab units given on or after
01-07-2012.

10. Sale of additional area to members and sale of
saleable flats/units:
The developer acts as a builder in respect of
saleable portion of project. Sale of under construction
flats/units are liable to service tax @
3.09% or 3.708%.
11. Cenvat eligibility on or after 01-07-2012:
The developer is liable to Service tax on rehab
and saleable portion. Both are taxable activities
and hence, the developer is entitled to claim
Cenvat in respect of input services and capital
goods used in redevelopment projects subject
to provision of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

12. Conclusion:
It is the duty of the Government to provide
affordable shelter to citizens. Instead of encouraging
redevelopment activities through tax
concessions, Government levies service tax on
redevelopment projects. The levy is harsh and
unjust but it is often said that tax and equity are
strangers. Developers will have to factor tax
incidence in their project cost. In order to avoid
future dispute or litigation, it will be advisable
to incorporate a clear clause in agreement as
to who will bear the service tax incidence on
rehab flats/units.

[2014] 41 taxmann.com 259 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) Indofil Chemicals Co vs. CCE.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Refund claim by SEZ Unit – What constitutes sufficient evidence for establishing services received and consumed in SEZ?

Facts:
The Appellant in SEZ received GTA services during the period April to September, 2009 and filed a refund claim. The adjudicating authority as well as the first appellate authority rejected the refund claim only on the ground that the Appellant did not produce documentary evidences in respect of taxable services provided to SEZ and consumed partially or wholly outside the SEZ.

Held:
Tribunal observed that the refund application is supported with the bills of transport companies, which indicate the consignors or beneficiary of the services as the Appellant in a particular Clause which is in SEZ. From the records, the Tribunal also observed that the said transport company is for transportation of the goods into the SEZ unit and also taking up the goods from the SEZ unit. These documents were held as sufficient evidence before the lower authorities to justify his refund claim and accordingly the claim was allowed.

levitra

[2014] 41 taxmann.com 318 (Gujarat) CCE vs. Neel Pigments (P.) Ltd

fiogf49gjkf0d
The claim of rebate be allowed even if duty-paid goods are not exported ‘directly’ from the factory/ warehouse, provided documentary evidence establishing direct co-relation between duty-paid goods manufactured/cleared by assessee and those exported by assessee is placed on record.

Facts:
The Assessee – a manufacturer from Gujarat, filed different rebate claims in terms of Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 and Notification No.19/2004 dated 06-09-2004. Rebate claims were granted as such claims were found allowable. The department filed appeal before the Appellate Commissioner, which was rejected. Aggrieved by the order, the department preferred writ before the High Court.

The primary objection of the department for not allowing claim was that, manufacturer had breached condition 2(a) of the Notification dated 06-09-2004, by not directly exporting the goods from factory or warehouse at Gujarat, but first by supplying the same to a trader exporter and thereafter, exporting from Maharashtra.

Held:
The High Court observed that the revenue authorities as well as the revisional authority have concurrently come to the conclusion that there was a direct corelation between goods manufactured in the factory with the goods exported and when such fact was established through reliable, undisputed and contemporaneous documentary evidence, there was no infirmity in granting refund.

levitra

[2014] 41 taxmann.com 377 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Delhi Public School Society vs. CST, New Delhi.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Merely calling an agreement as “Joint Venture Agreement” would not make the parties joint ventures or partners unless there is sharing, both in profit and losses and a community of interest among the parties.

Facts:
The assessee entered into agreements with distinct entities which intended to establish schools in different areas (within India and overseas as well) in collaboration with the assessee. The assessee was experienced in establishing and managing schools that provided quality education and had a brand image in the area. The agreements were named as “Education Joint Venture”. As per the agreement, the schools were to be established, run and managed by Board of Management comprising of nominees of assessee and the other entity in each case. The Assessee provided academic, operational and managerial expertise for establishing and running the school and allowing the use of the name DPS, its motto/ logo, subject to assessee retaining right, interest and title therein and other reasonable restrictions. The obligation of the other party was to provide land, buildings and all infrastructural amenities like furniture, laboratory, library and sports materials etc. for the school including residential accommodation for the principal, teachers and staff including meeting the revenue deficit, budgeted expenditure, to raise loans for all running expenditure and to meet the consequent financial liability. The assessee was specifically indemnified from any claims in this regard. The assessee, under the terms of the agreements was to receive an annual fee from the other entity.

The department contended that, the services provided by the assessee to the other party constitute a franchisee service. The assessee contended that, since the agreements between the assessee and the other parties are “education joint ventures”, the services provided by the assessee thereunder would not constitute taxable services.

Held
The Tribunal held that, on a true and fair analysis of the agreements between the parties, it is clear that the assessee is wholly immune from any losses arising out of the enterprise i.e., the educational institution to be established pursuant to the agreement and also no entitlement to any share in the profits arising therefrom, hence the normative ingredients of a partnership or a joint venture are absent. Hence, in the totality of circumstances neither the indicia of a partnership or a joint venture is discernable from the terms and conditions of the agreements between the parties. The participation of the assessee in the management of the schools is calibrated only for effectuation of the assessees perceived expertise and experience, in establishing and running quality English Medium Schools and is in furtherance of effective execution of the franchise service provided by it for which the assessee receives remuneration as clearly indicated in Clause 3 of the agreement and therefore, would not tantamount to the assessee being a joint venturer. The Tribunal therefore held that, since all the ingredients of ‘franchisee services’ are fulfilled, the service is taxable under the category of franchisee service.

levitra

[2014] 41 taxmann.com 260 (Bangalore – CESTAT) Inox Air Products Ltd. vs. CCE, Hyderabad

fiogf49gjkf0d
In absence of specific allegation in the SCN for levy of penalty for a specific purpose, no penalty can be levied.

Facts:
The
appellant had one manufacturing unit (Unit-I) and one service providing
unit (Unit-II). During the period from April 2007 to April 2008, Unit-I
took the CENVAT credit on certain input services though it was not
eligible to do so. This credit was, in fact, meant for Unit-II. The
irregular availment of CENVAT credit by Unit-I was noticed by the
department in October 2008, whereupon the credit was reversed forthwith
on 16-10-2008. For this, a Show Cause Notice was issued in April 2009.
The Appellant paid interest in February 2010. In the Show Cause Notice, a
penalty of Rs. 2,000/- was imposed under Rule 15(3) of the CCR, which
was also paid by the Appellant.

Subsequently, order was reviewed
by the department for non-imposition of penalty under sub-rule (4) of
Rule 15 of the CCR, 2004 read with section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994
and accordingly an appeal was filed with the Commissioner (Appeals) who
allowed the same and imposed penalty under 15(4) of CCR.

This
higher penalty was challenged by the Appellant contending that, no
ground for imposing penalty under Rule 15(4) was alleged in the Show
Cause Notice.

The department contended that, such penalty could
not be resisted by the appellant by mere reason of non-mentioning of
sub-rule (4) of Rule 15 or of section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 in the
Show Cause Notice. Further, the wrong mentioning of section 11AC of the
Central Excise Act is also not fatal to the Revenue. It was further
contended that the demand confirmed against the appellant by the
original authority by invoking the extended period of limitation was not
challenged by it, it was precluded from resisting penalty under Rule
15(4) read with section 78.

Held:
It was held that
Para 5 of the Show Cause Notice contained an allegation to the effect
that the appellant contravened certain rules with intention to evade
payment of duty, but such allegation was made for the specific purpose
of invoking the extended period and not for imposing a penalty under
Rule 15(4). It further observed that irregular availment of the CENVAT
credit as alleged for invoking Rule 15(3) and not for invoking Rule
15(4) and that though the Show Cause Notices invoked Rule 15 of the
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, any sub-rule was not specified therein. The
Tribunal held that, since the different sub-rules of Rule 15 covered
different factual situations and, it was incumbent on the department to
specify the particular sub-rule which they wanted to invoke in a
particular Show Cause Notice. Relying upon Amrit Foods vs. CCE 2005
(190) ELT 433 (SC), the penalty under Rule 15(4) was set aside.

levitra

[2014] 41 taxmann.com 254 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Jaika Motors Ltd. vs. CCEST, Nagpur

fiogf49gjkf0d
Valuation –Cost of spare parts sold by an Authorised Service Station, whether as sale simplicitor or under the composite contract, is not to be included in taxable value, if sale price of sales tax/Vat is separately shown.

Facts:
The Appellant, an authorised service agent for Hyundai Motor cars undertook maintenance/service of motor cars. It also supplied spare parts of these vehicles. During the course of scrutiny of the records, it was noticed that the Appellant was selling spare parts for motor vehicles during the course of providing repair services on which it was paying VAT. However, the value of these spare parts was not included in the consideration received for repair services and Service tax liability was not discharged on the value of such spare parts.

The department demanded Service tax on sales portion on the grounds that, any goods used in the course of providing service has to be treated as inputs used for providing the service and accordingly, the cost of such inputs formed integral part of the value of taxable service. The Appellant contended that the sale figure in the balance sheet included sale of spare parts simplicitor as well as sale of spare parts that may occur in the course of repair of motor vehicles. It also relied upon Circular No. B. 11/1/2001-TRU, dated 09-07-2001, wherein it was clarified that the cost of parts and accessories supplied during the course of repair and servicing of vehicles would not be includable in the taxable value if such cost was shown separately in the bills/ invoices. Further, they discharged Sales tax/VAT liability on the sale of spare parts.

Held:
The Tribunal referring to above circular held that, if a transaction involves only sale of spare parts, the question of levying Service tax would not arise at all. It further held that, even in a case of composite transaction involving sale of goods and rendering of service, if the bill/invoice issued clearly shows payment of Sales tax/VAT on the spare parts, then the value of such spare parts would not be included in the gross consideration for the service.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 372 (Bom) Space Age Associates vs. UOI

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether in order to claim deduction for sale/supply of goods under Notification No. 12/2003 –ST dated 20-06-2003, only sale invoices are to be considered? Matter remanded.

Facts:
The Appellant provided services of erection, commissioning and installation of power stations to various electricity boards. The contract entered with customers were composite contracts where supply of goods and services were involved. The Appellant was registered with the Service tax department and discharged Service tax liability. The revenue confirmed the demand on account of mismatch between the figures reflected in the ST-3 Returns and those in the P & L A/c. also invoking longer period of limitation. The plea that supply of goods was part of sale figure was not taken cognizance of.

In the Appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal dropped demand beyond the period of limitation but upheld the demand for normal period on account of  non-availability of deduction under Notification No. 12/2003 –ST on account of the Appellant’s failure to produce sale invoices and directed to pre-deposit Rs. 1 crore. The Appellant contended that it had already produced sample copies of running bills, its sales tax returns etc. which were sufficient for claiming deduction under the said Notification.

Held:
Notification No. 12/2003 is a conditional notification which extends the benefit only upon the Appellant producing the documentary proof, indicating the value of goods supplied while rendering the service. The above condition does not mean that the goods have to be necessarily shown separately under the invoices. If the Appellant is able to show from the documents such as running bills, contract copies, returns filed with Sales tax authorities, it would be held that it is complying with the conditions. The Tribunal committed a fundamental error in insisting only upon the production of invoices as evidence of goods sold and ignoring the running bills, sales tax returns, contract terms etc. to arrive at value of goods. The High Court, accordingly, set aside the Order and remanded the matter to consider the petition afresh and pass the appropriate order on merits.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 357 (Kar) United Telecom Limited vs. CCEx, Bangalore –I

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether the share broker’s service used by a manufacturer of telecom equipments for sale of its investment in shares of another company is an input service?

Facts:
The Appellant was engaged in the manufacture and sale of telecom equipments and was paying excise duty on the same. In the month of November 2008, the Appellant had availed the services of a Stock Broker for selling its investment in the other company’s shares. The Appellant availed Service tax paid on said stock broker’s service treating the same as input service. The Revenue authorities and Tribunal disallowed the claim of the Appellant by contending that the same was not integrally connected to the business of the Appellant.

Before the High Court, the Appellant contended that the stock broker’s service was used for the purpose covered by the inclusive part of the definition of “input service”.

Held:
The High Court observed that, though the Appellant’s activity of investing in the shares was one of the incidental objects as per its Memorandum of Association, the claim for CENVAT Credit of Service tax paid on stock broker’s service was not against any liability arising out of the business activity of the Appellant and not relatable to the business activity and hence the High Court found no scope for making any interference with the Tribunal’s Order and as such, the appeal was dismissed.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 153 (Guj) Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs vs. Ashish Anand & Co.

fiogf49gjkf0d
No powers to reduce penalty below minimum prescribed limit by invoking section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Facts:
The short question under consideration was whether penalty u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) be reduced below the minimum limit prescribed by invoking section 80 of the Act. The department argued that the Commissioner (Appeals) and CESTAT had no authority to reduce the penalty as provided in the law.

Held:
Applying the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Port Officer 2010 (19) STR 641 (Guj), it was observed that section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 had an overriding effect over sections 76, 77, 78 and 79 of the Act (the Act) and no penalty was imposable in case of reasonable cause for failure to comply with laws as provided in respective sections. The authorities, Commissioner (Appeals) and CESTAT however, do not have powers to levy penalty below minimum prescribed limit and therefore, it was held that penalty u/s. 76 could not be reduced below the minimum prescribed limit by invoking section 80 of the Act.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 142 (All) K. Amand Caterers vs. Union of India

fiogf49gjkf0d
If the assessee was eligible for VCES and had taken benefit of VCES, recovery proceedings cannot be initiated until application under VCES is decided.

Facts:
On 31st May, 2013, a search was conducted wherein it was detected that the petitioners were liable to pay service tax. Consequently, an order was passed on 7th June, 2013 u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 which was challenged on the ground that they had filed declaration of such tax dues under Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme, 2013 (VCES) on 20th June, 2013. Having regard to section 106 of the Finance Act, 1994, it was pleaded that they were eligible for VCES since the date of notice or order of determination was not prior to 1st March, 2013 and therefore, the order was illegal and arbitrary without deciding the application. The department claimed their right to initiate recovery proceedings and argued that unless the application under VCES was found valid and in time, the petitioners were not entitled to any relief in the writ petition.

Held:
The petitioners had prima facie demonstrated that they were eligible to take benefit of VCES u/s. 106 and 107 of the Finance Act, 1994 and unless application under VCES was decided, proceeding u/s. 87 shall not be continued. The object of VCES would be defeated if the recovery was allowed to proceed. An interim order was passed directing Competent Authority to decide the application under VCES within 60 days of passing the Order.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 137 (Mad) Commissioner of S. T., Chennai vs. Sangamitra Services Agency.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Reimbursable expenses not in the nature of remuneration/ commission cannot form part of gross amount for clearing and forwarding agent’s services.

Facts:
The substantial question put forth before the High Court was whether reimbursable expenses such as freight, labour, electricity, telephone etc. received by the assessee at actuals should not be added to the taxable value related to clearing and forwarding agent’s services in view of Rule 6 (8) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, providing for service tax levy on gross amount of remuneration.

Held:
In the absence of any material to show the understanding between the principal and the client that the commission was all inclusive, it was difficult to hold that the gross amount/commission would include expenses for providing services and all incidental charges for running of business. Receipts in the nature of reimbursements would not take colour of remuneration or commission. Rule 6(8) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 referred to gross amount i.e. receipts in nature of remuneration or commission.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 124 (Guj) Commissioner of C. Ex. & Customs vs. Stovec Industries Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
The Department has to follow prescribed monetary limits for filing appeal in various Courts having regard to the Circulars in place which are binding on the department.

Facts:
The respondents were engaged in the manufacture and export of Rotary Screen Printing Machines and parts thereof. Aggrieved by the order of the CESTAT with respect to rejection of CENVAT Credit of around Rs. 2,02,472/-, the department was in appeal. The appeal was filed on 5th August, 2011. The respondents contested that vide Circular dated 20th October, 2010, the Central Excise department was not allowed to file an appeal if the duty involved was less than or equal to Rs. 2 lakh with equal mandatory penalty and any other penalty. The limit of Rs. 2 lakh was increased to Rs. 10 lakh vide Circular dated 17th August, 2011.

Held:
In view of Circular dated 17th August, 2011 taking effect from 1st September, 2011, the appeal could not be preferred by department in the High Court. The appeal, therefore, was dismissed without going into the substantial question of law since the department was bound by its own Circulars.

levitra

Liability of Builders and Developers vis-à-vis New Rules

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction
Whether builders are liable to tax under MVAT Act, 2002 has been a burning issue since 20th June, 2006. The matter has been ultimately decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of judgment in case of Larsen & Toubro & others (65 VST 1). In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the tax can be levied from the stage of agreement and thereafter. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that the tax can be levied on the value of the goods only and no tax can be levied on the value of immovable property. So far as Maharashtra is concerned Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed to align the provisions in tune with above observations.

Amendment to MVAT Rules, 2005
As a follow-up to the above Supreme Court judgment, the Government of Maharashtra issued notification dated 29-01-2014 by which certain rules are amended. The short gist of amended rules is as under:

i) In Rule 58(1) an amendment is made so as to provide that the deduction as per the table will be available after the reduction of land value from the contract price.

ii) Rule 58(1A), which is related to the calculation of land value, is amended and a proviso is added. It has now been provided that if a higher value is proved before the Department of Town Planning and Valuation then the dealer can take that higher value instead of ready reckoner value.

iii) Rule 58(1B) is inserted to provide that if the agreement is entered into where some work is already done, then the value of the goods, after taking deduction for labour and land, will be as per the following calculation:

(b) For determining the value of goods as per the above Table, it shall be necessary for the dealer to furnish a certificate from the Local or Planning Authority certifying, the date of completion of the stage referred above and where such authority does not have a procedure for providing such certificate then such certificate from a registered RCC consultant.

(1C) If the dealer fails to establish the stage during which the agreement with the purchaser is entered into then the entire value of goods as determined after deductions under sub-Rules (1) and (1A) from the value of the entire contract, shall be taxable.

Certain issues

In light of the above new rules and the Supreme Court judgment, various issues arise. Some of them are discussed below:

In the above judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Constitution of amendment bringing works contract in the sales tax net did not prohibit that if in addition to labour and material, if a third element like land is involved, there cannot be a taxable works contract. In other words, the Supreme Court has decided that even if in a contract, a third element like immovable property is involved, it can still be a taxable works contract under Sales Tax Laws. Accordingly, liability in case of builders can be attracted from the date of amendment in constitution, i.e., 1983, though in Maharashtra it will be enforced from 20th June, 2006.

The other fall out is that the contract with the builder is also to be treated as a normal contract. A normal contract can take place even by a mutual understanding and without a written document. Similarly, in the case of builders, a contract may arise by any action for the effecting transaction, though the actual agreement for sale may be registered subsequently. For example, the builder may issue an allotment letter, though agreement may be registered subsequently. In light of the interpretation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the works contract will take place from the date of allotment letter itself.

An issue may also arise about the deduction for cost of land. In addition to the purchase cost, there are other expenditures like registration fees, TDR purchase cost etc. The issue will be whether, in addition to working as per Rule 58 (1A), such additional expenses will also be allowable. It is to be noted that Rule 58(1A) provides for deduction for probable sale value of the land involved in the contract. The value is to be worked out as per the ready reckoner rate.

Therefore, there cannot be further deductions on account of TDR etc. If at all, because of TDR etc., land value is increasing, the builder will be required to get a certificate from the Department of Town Planning and Valuation. Without such certificate, it will be difficult to get the extra deduction.

An issue may also arise for set-off. Although, tax is payable as per slabs given in Rule 58(1B), i.e., as per the completion stage, there is no provision requiring reduction of set-off in any given proportion. Therefore, as per the Rules that are in force today, the set off will be allowable fully, though tax may be payable on given percentage. To avoid litigation it is better that the department clarifies the above issue at the earliest.

It is also be noted that the builder now becomes a normal dealer. Therefore, he can claim set-off as any normal dealer. As per the normal provisions, set-off is allowable on effecting purchase and entering it in the books. The restrictions and negative list will be operative as applicable to a normal dealer. If Rule 53(6) is not applicable to the builder, he can claim set-off on all purchases. If at all ultimately, part of the premises are sold as immovable property, i.e., after completion of the building/unit in the building, there will still not be any adverse effect on the set off already taken.

As per Rule 58(1B), tax is payable according to the completion stage. One of the issues will be that even if the cost of work completed prior to agreement is higher, the tax will still be payable as per the given percentage. In other words, tax will get paid even on the completed portion.

In case of K. Raheja Development Corporation vs. State of Karnataka (141 STC 168)(SC), the Hon. Supreme Court has observed that if the sale agreement is after completion of the premises, then Sales Tax cannot apply. From the new Rule 58(1B) it appears that even if the building is fully complete, but occupation certificate is not received, the builder will be liable to pay tax on 55% value of the goods. This is contrary to the above judgment delivered by the Supreme Court. Thus, there will be a situation where tax will get attracted on sale of immovable property portion also, because of above mentioned Rule.

This will be unconstitutional. It is expected that an alternative scheme to grant higher deduction, as per completion stage, should be framed based on the records of the builder. Further the taxation after completion of building, but before getting occupation certificate, should be revisited by the Government.

Conclusion
There may be many further issues in respect of the taxation of builders. As per the ordinance dated 03-03-2014, the time limit for assessment for the year 2006-07 for the builders is extended to September, 2015. We hope that before such completion date, the above referred issues will be clarified by the department.

levitra

2013 (32) STR 657 (Tri.-Mum.) WNS Global Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. ex., Nashik

fiogf49gjkf0d
Leasing of telecom lines are eligible input services when services are exported electronically.

Prior to 2006, there was no requirement to take input service distributor’s registration.

When data is transmitted electronically, it has to be transferred first to the server of telecom authorities in India and thereafter, it is transmitted to recipient abroad. Though delivery of services is routed through server of telecom authorities in India and is not exported directly, the services are still export of services subject to receipt of payment in convertible foreign exchange.

Facts:
The refund of CENVAT credit was rejected on the grounds that part of CENVAT Credit was distributed by Head Office as input service distributor (ISD) without registration as ISD and that the balance CENVAT credit was disallowed on the ground that services of providing leased telecommunication lines was not eligible input service. Further, the appellants have not directly exported the output services but have routed through telecom authorities located in India and therefore, the definition of export is not satisfied.

The appellants contended that they are eligible for refund as there was no statutory requirement to take ISD registration prior to 2006 and the leased telephone lines were instrumental in exporting output services and therefore, were eligible input services. Even though services were first delivered to telecom authorities in India, it was an essential exercise for processing of data which was required to be transmitted to service recipient abroad for which amount was received in convertible foreign exchange and therefore, the transaction was of export of services only.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the dedicated lines from office to telecom authorities were essential to export services electronically and therefore, leasing of telecom lines was eligible input service. Prior to 2006, there was no requirement for ISD registration. Accordingly, if input services were used for providing output services, the same would be eligible input services. The view taken by the department, that the output services were not exported since the services were transmitted through telecom service providers in India, was held to be completely irrational. In case of electronic transmission of data, firstly the data has to be transferred to server of telecom authorities in India and thereafter, it is transmitted to abroad service recipient. Since in the present case, the service recipient abroad has received services and payments were made in convertible foreign exchange, the output services were nothing but export of services. However, the appeal was remanded for limited purpose of verification of payments received in convertible foreign exchange at the Head Office situated in other jurisdiction and refund claim was allowed.

levitra

2013 (32) STR 625 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Vishal Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad

fiogf49gjkf0d
Tendering of order manually by handing over the documents to the assessee is valid delivery to the assessee.

Facts:
The order-in-original was passed on 30-12-2010 and the same was served personally before 06-09-2011. The appellants argued that the order-in-original was not served through registered post with acknowledgment due (RPAD) upon the person for whom it was intended. Accordingly, procedure as required u/s. 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was not followed and therefore, the order-inoriginal cannot be deemed to have been received by the appellants before 06-09-2011.

The respondents contested that section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 prescribed two methods namely; tendering the decision or sending the order by registered post with acknowledgement due. Accordingly, department had very well delivered the order personally. The same was also evident from the letter dated 05-09-2011 received from the appellants demanding duplicate copy of the order-in-original since the original order was misplaced during shifting of office.

Held:
Referring to section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Tribunal held that tendering of order can be done manually by handing over the documents to the appellants and the requirement is not strictly to be sent through RPAD only. The fact, that the order-in-original was received by the appellants, was accepted by the appellants themselves vide letter dated 05-09-2011 demanding duplicate copy of the order-in-original since the original order was misplaced. The decisions relied upon by the appellants were not applicable to the present case in view of the receipt of original order by the appellants and therefore, the order-in-appeal passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) on limitation was upheld.

levitra

2013 (32) STR 622 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Nirma Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & S. T., Vadodara – I

fiogf49gjkf0d
CENVAT credit on garden maintenance services, manpower services for garden maintenance was statutory obligation and therefore, is eligible CENVAT credit.

Construction service for compound wall of factory is to demarcate the factory, for completion of the factory and to save goods from pilferage and clandestine removal and therefore, is in relation to manufacture of excisable goods. Therefore, these services are eligible for availment of CENVAT Credit.

Facts:
The appellants took CENVAT credit on pest control services, manpower supply services required for maintaining a garden in factory premises and construction services utilised for making the compound wall of the factory. The appellants were compelled to develop 33% of the factory area to mitigate the effects of emissions around the plant vide permission by Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forest. Further, to maintain garden, the plant had availed services of maintenance, garden development and manpower supply services for garden maintenance. The appellants relied on the decision of CCE, Bhavnagar vs. Nirma Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 346 (Tri.-Ahmd.) and with respect to construction services for compound wall of the factory, the appellants relied on the decision of CCE, Pune – II vs. Raymond Zambaiti Pvt. Ltd. 2010 (18) STR 734 (Tri.-Mum.).

Held:
Relying on the decisions cited by the appellants, the Tribunal held that services in relation to garden maintenance were to fulfil a statutory obligation and therefore, the same were eligible for CENVAT credit. Further, compound wall was essential to demarcate the factory premises and to save manufactured goods from pilferage and clandestine removal and therefore, the same was for completion of factory and an activity in relation to manufacture of excisable goods. Accordingly, CENVAT credit in respect of all disputed services was allowed.

levitra

2013 (32) STR 610 (Tri.-Ahmd.) AIA Engineering Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad

fiogf49gjkf0d
New grounds cannot be taken in the revisionary SCN issued by Commissioner.

Facts:
Original adjudicating authority sanctioned refund of terminal handling charges and repo charges. However, Commissioner started proceedings to revise the order issued by the original adjudicating authority and after issuing SCN, refund was held to be sanctioned wrongly vide Commissioner’ order on the ground that the appellants were providing services which were not specified in Notification No. 41/2007-ST dated 06-10-2007. The appellants contested that the SCN issued by the Commissioner for revision u/s. 84 travelled beyond the SCN issued by the original adjudicating authority and therefore, Commissioner’s order was liable to be dropped. However, as per revenue, the Commissioner relied on the same documents as were verified by the original adjudicating authority and reached the conclusion that the services were not specified in the said notification.

Held:
Relying on the decisions of Viacom Electronics (P) Ltd. vs. CCE Vadodara 2002 (145) ELT 563 (Tri.-Mum.), Aero Products vs. CST Bangalore 2011 (22) STR 522 (Tri.-Bang.) and Sands Hotel Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Mumbai 2009 (16) STR 329 (Tri.-Mum.), the Tribunal held that new ground cannot be taken in the revisionary SCN. In the present case, the original SCN was based on insufficient documentation for grant of refund, however, the revisionary SCN was on a totally new ground about ineligibility to claim refund and therefore, the appeal was allowed.

levitra

2013 (32) STR 756 (Tri,-Ahmd) Atwood Oceanics Pacific Ltd vs. Comm. of Service Tax, Ahmd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether activities of drilling, completion or abandonment of exploratory wells would be classifiable under category of “Survey & Exploration of Mineral, Oil & Gas service” Or “Mining of mineral, oil & gas service” Or “Supply of tangible goods service”?

Facts:
The Appellant entered into an agreement for drilling, testing, completion at exploratory wells as per directions of its client. Appellant obtained service tax registration in February, 2009 under the category of “supply of tangible goods service” and started paying service tax. The Revenue entertained a view that Appellant’s activities could be classified under “Survey & Exploration of Min- eral, Oil & Gas service” from November, 2006 to May, 2007 and under “Mining of mineral, oil & gas service” from June, 2007 onwards. After verification of documents by the Respondent, Appellant deposited service tax along with interest for the period June, 2007 onwards. Thereafter, the Revenue demanded service tax for the period 2006 to 2009. The Appellant challenged the demand before the Commissioner (Appeals) and argued that their activities were post-exploration activities and as per CBEC Letter F. No. B2/8/2004-TRU dated 10-09-2004 the activities pertaining to survey and exploration were covered under “Survey & Exploration of mineral, oil & gas service” and not the activities relating to actual exploitation of mineral, oil & gas. The Commissioner (Appeals) dropped the demand pertaining to the period November, 2006 to May, 2007 under “Survey & Exploration service” but confirmed the demand from June 2007 under “Mining of mineral, oil & gas service” and consequently, Appellant as well as Respondent both preferred appeals before the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the activities undertaken had direct nexus with the mining as the activity undertaken is drilling of wells for exploration of minerals, therefore the said activity is classifiable under “Mining Service” from June 2007 onwards. The Tribunal observed that, even if the classification of service as interpreted by the Tribunal is held otherwise owing to the complexities involved, extended period was not applicable and service tax could not be recovered for the period prior to 01-06-2007, as SCN covering the period before June, 2007 was issued in April, 2009. The Tribunal held that the service tax was applicable from June, 2007 onwards under category of “mining service” and thereafter under “supply of tangible goods” service from 16-05-2008 onwards. The Tribunal set aside the penalties on the ground that Appellant’s act of depositing service tax along with interest before issuance of SCN shows Appellant entertained bonafide belief and intent of evasion was absent. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected Respondent’s appeal while allowing Appellant’s appeal.

levitra

2013 (32) STR 738 (Tri-Del.) CCEx., Chandigarh vs. U. B. Construction (P) Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether explanation added on 01-07-2010 to section 65 (105) (zzzq) and 65(105) (zzzh) for expanding the scope of construction services are prospective in nature and otherwise?

Facts:
Revenue had challenged the Order passed by the Appellate Authority allowing the appeal of the Appellant which held that construction services rendered to prospective buyers of flat were to be regarded as self–service by the builder for the period upto 30/06/2010 and therefore service tax was not applicable on the amounts received till this date.

Held:
After considering the judgements quoted by the Appellant such as G. S. Promoters vs. UOI -2011 (21) STR 100 (P & H), MCHI vs. UOI-2012 (25) STR 305 (Bom) and after referring to the Board Circular No. 334/4/2010 dated 01-07-2010, Tribunal held as follows:

The Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected the challenge to the constitutional validity of the said explanation in G. S. Promoter’s case. The issue whether the said explanation is retrospective or prospective in nature was not considered nor decided by the High Court whereas the Bombay High Court in MCHI’s case considered the issue whether the said explanation is prospective in nature or otherwise. Bombay High Court held that the said explanation was specifically legislated upon to expand the concept of taxable service as prior to explanation view was taken that a mere agreement to sale does not create any interest in the property and title to the property continues to remain with the builder, no service was provided by the builder, that the service, if any would be in the nature of a service rendered by the builder to himself. The explanation inserted with effect from 01-07-2010 expands the scope of the taxable service to include the service provided by the builder to buyers pursuant to an intended sale of immovable property before, during or after the construction and therefore the provision is expansive of the existing intent and not clarificatory of the same and is consequently prospective. In view hereof, the Tribunal held that since the construction was undertaken for the period before the insertion of the explanation, there is no liability to pay service tax and the Appeal was dismissed.

levitra

[2013] 40 taxmann.com 185 (Delhi HC) Freezair India (P) Ltd. vs. CCE, Delhi

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether successor company was liable to be assessed for the liabilities of the predecessor who was a sole proprietor and now the director in the company, under Central Excise Act, 1944? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant succeeded a sole proprietorship firm M/s. Freezair India (FI) and took over all the assets and liabilities. The proprietor subsequently became the director of the said company. The department issued a show-cause notice including the duties and liabilities in respect of manufacturing and clearing operations effected by M/s. FI on the ground that prior to taking over, the Appellant company was known as M/s. FI situated at the same address and also that the proprietor had become the director. The Tribunal held that the liabilities inherited by the company from the proprietary concern included the liability to be assessed and to pay the duty of excise.

Held:
Holding that the duties and liabilities of the predecessor were not liable to be paid by the appellant, the Hon. High Court observed that a company in law was different from its subscribers of the memorandum and the promoter directors and that its independent existence was of great significance except where lifting of the corporate veil was required against the promoter directors, directors or others in charge and responsible for day to day work of the company, to enforce obligations of the corporate identity and seek performance or penalise the natural person behind the corporate cloak which had no application in the present case. The high court further observed that Rule 230(2) of the Central Excise Rules was also inapplicable since no determination of duty on the predecessor and a finding to invoke and make recovery from the successor was made by the revenue and that there had been no assessment of duty on the predecessor either before or after transfer/take over.

levitra

2013-TIOL-1038-HC-KOL-ST Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata vs. M/s Vesuvious India Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether outward transportation of finished goods from place of removal covered under the definition of “input service” before 01-04-2008? Held, No.

Facts:
The revenue preferred appeal against the order of the CESTAT, Kolkata allowing CENVAT credit of the amount paid towards outward transportation of finished goods from the place of removal upto the point of delivery relying solely on the case of Commissioner of C.E & S.T., LTU, Bangalore vs. ABB Limited in 2011 (23) STR 97 (Kar)

Held:
Diagreeing with the judgment of the Hon. Karnataka High Court in ABB Limited (supra), the Hon. Kolkata High Court allowing the appeal of the department held that the definition of “input service” would not include the expenses with regard to post-manufacturing stage except for the purpose of transportation of goods from one place of removal to another place of removal. They further stated that although a Board circular was issued, it cannot be to amend the rules and thus neither the services rendered to the customer for the purpose of delivering the goods at the destination was covered by the definition of input service prior to 01-04-2008 nor is the same covered after 01-04-2008.

levitra

2013 (32) STR 530 (All.) Commissioner of Cus. & C. Ex. vs. Balaji Tirupati Enterprises

fiogf49gjkf0d
If goods are deemed to be sold in the execution of works contract, service tax cannot be levied on the same.

Facts:
The substantial questions put forth before Hon’ble High Court were as under:

Whether composite contract of repairs can be

segregated into goods and services portion on the basis of payment of VAT on goods used during repairs?

Whether Notification No. 12/2003-ST dated 20/06/2003 is applicable when bifurcation of cost of various components is available in the contract?

Whether service tax is to be paid on total cost of repair under present composite contract?

Held:

Agreeing with the decision of Tribunal, Hon’ble High Court summarily dismissed the appeal and held that the goods which were deemed to be sold in the execution of works contract shall not be leviable to service tax.

levitra

Film Distribution Rights, Whether Liable to Vat?

fiogf49gjkf0d
Synopsis The authors continuing their coverage of transactions which have been subject of levy of dual taxation of sales tax and service tax, have in this feature discussed about taxability of film distribution rights in light of recent decision of AGS Entertainment Pvt. Ltd.(Mad.). The authors discuss and concur with the views of the Court that in case of temporary transfer of film distribution rights, what is transferred is only the ‘use of the goods i.e. copyright in films’ and not ‘transfer of right to use goods’, so such transaction shall be subject to service tax and not sales tax.

Introduction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Association of Leasing and Financial Services Companies vs. Union of India & others (2 SCC 352) has observed as under;

“Today, with the technological advancement, there is a very thin line which divides a sale from service.”

In this scenario, it is very difficult to decide as to which tax will apply to the transaction/s i.e., VAT or Service Tax. One such issue arose in respect of film distribution agreements.

The film producers and distributors were under an impression that on their agreements for distribution of films with distributors, as well as between distributors and sub distributors or with theatre owners etc., they are liable to tax under State Value Added Tax Act.

However, Service Tax department also claimed tax on the said transaction under sub-clause (zzzzt) of clause (105) of section 65 as ‘transferring temporarily’ or ‘permitting the use or enjoyment of, any copyright defined in the Copyright Act,1957, except the rights covered under sub-clause (a) of the clause (1) of section 13 of the said act.’

The film producers and distributors challenged the levy of Service Tax before the Hon’ble Madras High Court. The Hon’ble Madras High Court has now delivered judgment in AGS Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. & Others (Writ Petition no. 29398 of 2010 & others dated 26.6.2013.)

Facts
In the Writ Petition, the Hon’ble Madras High Court has raised following issues for its consideration.

“17. Upon consideration of the rival contentions and averments in the Writ Petitions and counter statement, the following points arise for consideration in these Writ Petitions:-

1. Whether the taxable event provided under Section 65(105)(zzzzt) of the Finance Act, 1994 is covered by Article 366 (29A)(d), which is a “deemed sale of goods”?

2. Whether the Petitioners are right in contending that the levy of service tax on “temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of copyright“ provided u/s. 65(105)(zzzzt) of the Finance Act, 1994 is covered under Entry 54 of List II and whether it amounts to transgression by Parliament into the exclusive domain of the State Legislature?

3. Whether the Petitioners are right in contending that the copyright is goods and transfer of copyright of cinematograph films is only delivery of goods for consideration and is absolute transfer and no service element is involved?

4. Even assuming that there is an element of service involved in the nature of transaction done by the Petitioners, should the dominant intention of the transaction being transfer of goods has to be only taken into consideration?

5. Whether the Petitioners are right in contending that Parliament has no authority to dissect a composite transaction as in the case of the Petitioners and levy service tax?

6. Whether Section 65(105)(zzzzt) levying service tax on the temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of copyright is ultra vires the Constitution.”

The Hon’ble Madras High Court referred to a number of judgments about validity of levy of Service Tax and levy of tax on deemed sale by way of ‘transfer of right to use goods’. As stated above, the argument of producers was that their agreements were for transfer of right to use goods and not for rendering services. The argument of the department was that allowing temporary use was falling under the service category.

Judgments referred For arriving to the meaning of sale by way of ‘transfer of right to use goods’, amongst others, the Hon’ble Madras High Court referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (119 STC 182). Hon’ble High Court quoted the following paragraphs from the above judgment:

“26. Next question that arises for consideration is, where is the taxable event on the transfer of the right to use any goods. Article 366(29-A) (d) empowers the State Legislature to enact law imposing sales tax on the transfer of the right to use goods. The various sub-clauses of clause (29-A) of Article 366 permit the imposition of tax thus: sub-clause (a) on transfer of property in goods; sub-clause (b) on transfer of property in goods; sub-clause (c) on delivery of goods; subclause (d) on transfer of the right to use goods; sub-clause (e) on supply of goods; and sub-clause (f) on supply of services. The words and such transfer, delivery or supply … in the latter portion of clause (29-A), therefore, refer to the words transfer, delivery and supply, as applicable, used in the various sub-clauses. ………..

In our view, therefore, on a plain construction of sub-clause (d) of clause (29-A), the taxable event is the transfer of the right to use the goods regardless of when or whether the goods are delivered for use. What is required is that the goods should be in existence so that they may be used. ……….

27. Article 366(29-A)(d) further shows that levy of tax is not on use of goods but on the transfer of the right to use goods. The right to use goods accrues only on account of the transfer of right. In other words, right to use arises only on the transfer of such a right and unless there is transfer of right, the right to use does not arise. Therefore, it is the transfer which is sine qua non for the right to use any goods. If the goods are available, the transfer of the right to use takes place when the contract in respect thereof is executed. As soon as the contract is executed, the right is vested in the lessee. Thus, the situs of taxable event of such a tax would be the transfer which legally transfers the right to use goods. In other words, if the goods are available irrespective of the fact where the goods are located and a written contract is entered into between the parties, the taxable event on such a deemed sale would be the execution of the contract for the transfer of right to use goods. But in case of an oral or implied transfer of the right to use goods it may be effected by the delivery of the goods..”

Thereafter, High Court referred to the scope of section 65(105)(zzzzt) about ‘temporary transfer’ under Service Tax in para -37 as under;

“37. Section 65(105)(zzzzt) seeks to tax viz., “temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment” of copyright which is a service provided by the producer/distributor/exhibitor. Service Tax is a levy not on the “transfer of right to use the goods” as described under Article 366(29A) sub-clause (d); but on the temporary transfer” or “permitting the use or enjoyment” of the copyright as defined under the Copyright Act, 1957. In the case of Sales Tax Act, there would be “transfer of right to use the goods”. Whereas under the Service Tax Act what is levied is temporary transfer/enjoyment of the goods. The pith and substance of both enactments are totally different. “Temporary transfer” or “permitting the use or enjoyment of the copyright” is not within the State’s exclusive power under Entry 54 of List II. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that the taxable event provided under Section 65(105) (zzzzt) is covered by Article 366(29A)..”

Regarding nature of transaction about transfer of right to use goods, Hon’ble High Court referred to the judgment in case of B.S.N.L. vs. Union of India (2006)(3 SCC 1) and quoted the following paragraphs.

73. No transfer of right to use:- As held by the Supreme Court in the decision of B.S.N.L. vs. Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 1, to constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods the transaction must have the following attributes:

a.    There must be goods available for delivery;

b.    There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

c.    The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal conse-quences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefor should be available to the transferee;

d.    For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor – this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute – viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a licence to use the goods; e. Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.”

Observations of the High Court about nature of transaction

After referring to various different kinds of agree-ments entered into in the film industry in para-65 & 66, the Hon’ble High Court observed as under;

“65. Even though it was contended that the transaction is between the producer and the distributor and the distributor gets the absolute right over the cinematograph film, in reality, the distributor does not get the absolute rights. The distributor only gets few positive prints or cubes of the picture for the exhibition of the picture in the specified area. In other words, it is a temporary transfer of the copyright or permission to use or enjoyment for the limited period in the specified area. As rightly contended by the respondents, exclusive right of copyright ordinarily vests with the producer of the film. Even in outright assignment, the transfer is not absolute. In the case of a lease, it is for a given period. The levy of tax on any transaction is based on the criterion whether the transfer of right is permanent or temporary. So long as the producer does not fully relinquish his right over the copyright held by him, transfer of the right to use is purely temporary and in those cases, levy of service tax for such transfer of copyright would apply. The Service Provider is the Producer, who is the owner of the Intellectual Property and the service receiver is the person who temporarily gets the right to use the Intellectual Property who is the Distributor and service tax is leviable on such temporary transfer of copyright.

66.    Normally, producer of a movie exploits the film in many ways i.e., assigning copyrights to distributor(s) for exhibition in theatres; or the producer himself exhibits the film by engaging the-atres; exploitation of satellite rights, T.V. channels, audio/video, etc. The right given to the distributor is restricted to exploiting the contents of the film through a film/digital format through exhibition in theatres in a specific area and for specified time. Even though the copyright of the film is assigned to a distributor for a specific area for a limited period, the producer reserves his right to exploit the film in other media. So long as the transaction does not amount to sale or permanent transfer, it is only a temporary transfer of copyright or permit its use by another person for a consideration. The Service Provider is the Producer who owns the copyright of the film and Service receiver is the

Distributor who temporarily owns the copyright of the film for consideration.”

In paras 75 & 83 Hon’ble High Court has held as under;

“75. In our opinion, none of these attributes are present in the agreement between the producer and the distributor and the distributor and the theatre owner. Even while the films were in use by the distributor/exhibitor, the same are under the effective control of the producer. The distributor is not free to make use of the same for other works like satellite rights, T.V. Channels, exploitation of song, audio/video, D.V.D. etc., The distributor can-not make use of the film according to his wishes, but there is only temporary transfer or permission to use or enjoyment for consideration as per the terms of the agreement.”

“83. Considering the nature of various arrange-ments between the producer and the distributor, distributor/subdistributor and theatre owner, we are of the view that there is only temporary transfer or permission to use or enjoyment for consideration on certain terms and conditions in a specified area. Irrespective of the arrangement of rights to the distributor to a specific area for a limited period, the producer retains the original copyrights. The sale of goods can be said to have taken place only when the producer relinquishes his right and title over the goods; but when he keeps grip over the goods transferred for temporary use or enjoyment on certain terms and conditions. When the transactions are not sale or deemed sale, the same cannot be brought under Entry 54 of List II or Entry 92A of List I.”

Conclusion

The Hon’ble High Court analysed the nature of transaction of deemed sale in relation to film distribution. It is held that unless there is case of full assignment of the copy right, whereby a producer does not retain with him any right only then can it be liable to VAT. In other words, unless it is a case of permanent assignment of the film as a whole, no liability can be attracted under MVAT Act, 2002. Today in Maharashtra, the VAT authorities are levying VAT on the film distribution agreements, considering the same as transactions of transfer of right to use goods. In light of above judgment, the said levy can be said to be illegal and unjustified. The judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court being under Central Enactment, it is binding on authorities in Maharashtra also. As there is no contrary judgment of the jurisdictional High Court, we hope above precedent will be followed.

Whether Outbound Tours Are Taxable Under Service Tax?

fiogf49gjkf0d
Synopsis The authors in this feature have highlight the scope of the definition “tour operator” for taxability of outbound tours and evaluated the definition in two parts i.e. operating and arranging tours and planning, scheduling, organizing or arranging such tours. The authors analyse how the principles of apportionment are essential to determine the taxability of several operations in the composite transactions which have some operations in one territory and some in others.

Introduction:

The service of tour operators was introduced as a taxing entry in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) with effect from 01-09-1997. ‘Tour’ in section 65(113) of the Act is defined as:

“A journey from one place to another irrespective of the distance between such places”.

The definition of tour operator however underwent amendment thrice of which the last two definitions are reproduced below:

10-09-2004 to 15-05-2008: 65(115) “ “tour operator” means any person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangements for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport, and includes any person engaged in the business of operating tours in a tourist vehicle covered by a permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 (59 of 1988) or the rules made thereunder.”

16-05-2008 to 30-06-2012:

65(115) “ “tour operator” means any person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangements for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport, and includes any person engaged in the business of operating tours in a tourist vehicle or a contract carriage by whatever name called, covered by a permit, other than a stage carriage permit, granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988) or the rules made thereunder.”

Taxable service in relation to this service as contained in section 65(105(n) reads as follows: “

“taxable service” means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by a tour operator in relation to a tour.”

Typically in travel and tourism industry, a bouquet of services is provided to a variety of customers. There are different taxing entries in relation to these services viz. air travel agent, tour operator service, travel agent, rail travel agent etc. Tours are often provided by way of a package also. These packages can be broadly classified into domestic tours, inbound tours and outbound tours. Whereas the first two categories do not pose much debate as service tax is by and large paid by the tour operators for these kind of tours; it is the third category of outbound tours requires examination of relevant legal provisions and analysis thereof as in this case, the service provider viz. the tour operator organizes tours outside the territory of India for tourists from India. The tour is entirely performed outside India and on account of this, the disputes arise as to their taxability. Therefore the questions that require determination are:

• Considering the scope of the definition of “tour operator”, whether “outbound tours” are outside the purview of the taxable service as described in section 65(105)(h) of the Act?

• Whether the provisions of the Act have an extra territorial jurisdiction?

• Whether outbound tours amount to export of service? If the payment for the service is not received in convertible foreign exchange, whether the service is liable for service tax?

2013-TIOL-1907-CESTAT-DEL

Recently, in a set of five appeals filed with the Principal Bench, Delhi-CESTAT reported at 2013-TIOL-1907-CESTAT-DEL, Cox & Kings India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, New Delhi, the Division Bench comprising of President CESTAT and another technical member had an occasion to analyse the above questions, the discussion of which is summarised below:

In addition to the relevant definitions reproduced above, the Hon. Bench took note of the scope of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 (service tax law or the Act) provided in section 64(1), the charging section 66 and section 66A of the Act and provided due consideration to various circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC or the Board) on outbound tours brought on record by the appellants and/or dealt with in the orders-in-original, enumerated below:

• Madurai Commissionerate issued Trade Notice No.110/97 dated 28-08-1997 based on TRU clarification of 22-08-1997 to the effect that outbound tours would not attract service tax and that in case of composite tours combining tours within India and outside India, service tax will be levied only on services rendered for tours within India provided separate billing in such respect is done. It is to be noted here that the service of tour operator was exempted during 18-07-1998 to 31- 03-2000. So, after its reintroduction, TRU issued Circular No.1/2000 on 27/04/2000 clarifying again that outbound tour would remain outside the ambit of service tax liability.

Note: The original circular of 22-08-1997 was withdrawn vide Circular No.93/04/2007 of 10-05-2007 but Circular No.1/2000 of 27-04-2000 continued to remain.

• Board’s Circular No.36/4/2001-ST clarified that levy of service tax extends to the whole of India except Jammu & Kashmir and that the expression ‘India’ includes territorial waters of India (which would extend upto twelve nautical miles) and that Chapter V has not extended the service tax levy to designated areas in continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of India. Therefore services provided beyond territorial waters of India are not liable for service tax as service tax was not extended to such areas so far.

• Commissioner (Service Tax), CBEC vide his letter dated 12-10-2007 addressed to Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi (in response to the latter’s inquiry) clarified the subject of levy of service tax on outbound tourism that the Board is of the view that tour operator located in India provides services to recipient located in India for planning, scheduling and organizing in relation to outbound tours. Such services would be taxable under the category of tour operator service as both service provider and service receiver are located in India and the service flows within the country. Accordingly, the place of supply of service is India and hence the service is taxable.

• On a somewhat different footing from the above reply dated 12-10-2007, the Board issued Circular No.117/11/2009 in the context of Haj and Umrah on leviability of service tax on tour operator’s service that Haj and Umrah pilgrimage is for service provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia and tour takes place outside India; that as per Rule 3(1)(ii) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005 (Export Rules), tour operator’s services would be treated as performed outside India if they are partly performed outside India and no service tax is chargeable on such tour undertaken outside India considering this as export provided they fulfil other conditions as provided in the said Export Rules.

The adjudicating authority found that in the ordersin- original, the Board’s clarification vide letter of 12-10-2007 (cited above) was not binding. However, the clarification being consistent with the service tax regime, outbound service was taxable from 10-09-2004. Since the service provider and the receiver are located in India, the service is deemed to be delivered to the recipient-tourist in India. Therefore, the condition of Export Rule is factually not fulfilled and thus the tour operator was not entitled to benefit under the Export Rules and consequently invocation of extended period of limitation, penalty, interest etc. also were confirmed.

In the background of the above dispute, the substantive issues that fell for consideration of the Hon. Bench were;

•    The scope of “tour operator” defined in section
65(115) post its amendment from 10-09-2004 and whether the amendment altered the contours of the expression and to what extent.

•    Whether “outbound tours” fall outside the pur-view of taxable service defined in 65(105)(h) of the Act.

The Tribunal’s observations are summarised as follows:

•    Prior to 10-09-2004 and during 01-09-1997 to 31-03-2000 considering the definitions of tour and tour operator (provided above), the taxable activity was a service provided or to be provided to any person by a person who holds a tourist permit granted under the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) for undertaking a journey from one place to another of any distance. During 01-04-2000 and
09-09-2004, the definition of “tour operator” was expanded to mean that operating of tours viz. activities/services of facilitating a journey by any other person from one place to another in a tourist vehicle covered by a permit under the MV Act or rules made thereunder was a taxable service.

•    On further expansion of the definition of tour operator from 10-09-2004, a person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangement for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport is a taxable service. The amended definition also has an inclusive clause whereby a person engaged in the business of operating tours in a vehicle covered by a permit granted under the MV Act would come within the fold of “tour operator”. Thus, the first part of the definition does not include the business of operating tours by any mode/all modes of transport. If it was included, in view of the Bench, there was no necessity to incorporate the specific inclusionary part or it would amount to a surplusage and attribution of surplusage in legislative drafting must be avoided. Consequently, the only possible interpretation of the definition would be that where a person is engaged in a composite activity of operating tours as well as planning, scheduling, organising or arranging such tours by any mode of transport other than a tourist vehicle, such activity falls outside the scope of the definition of “tour operator”. However, the activity of “planning, scheduling, organizing or arranging tours” including operating tour in a tourist vehicle covered by the permit under the MV Act falls within the ambit of tour operator as a consequence of the inclusionary clause.

•    In the case under examination, the concerned assessees are engaged in a composite activity of both “planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours” other than by a tourist vehicle (permitted under the MV Act) and in operating such tours as well. The outbound tours whereby Indian tourists are provided services in relation to tourism outside the Indian territory, no part of the journey would be in a tourist vehicle as defined in the law. The commencement and conclusion of the journey is generally by air-transport and besides scheduling the tour package, operating the tour, fixing probable dates and venues, the itinerary, booking accommodation in hotels abroad, travel arrangements for various destinations, sightseeing, boarding, providing guide, air-ticketing, arranging visa, travel insurance etc. clearly constitute operations of tour in addition to planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours. The nature of the composite services in relation to outbound tours is thus outside the ambit of the definition “tour operator”. The Bench specifically observed that the nature of composite services provided by the concerned assessee in relation to outbound tours fall clearly outside the first facet of the definition; as amended from 10-09-2004.

•    As regards the issue of extra-territorial reach and operation of the Act, the Tribunal’s view point is summarised below:

In All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. UOI 2007 (7) STR (SC), it was clarified interalia that service tax is a value added tax and which is a destination based consumption tax in the sense that it is on the commercial activities and not a charge on business but on the consumer and would logically be leviable only on services provided within the country and that performance based services like tour operators provided services outside India. The Tribunal similarly observed that Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Home Solutions Retails (India) Ltd. vs. Union of India 2011

(24) STR 129 (Del) reiterated the doctrine that service tax is a levy on the event of service. The Tribunal in detail examined the judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay vs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. (1950) SCR-335 as well as the Supreme Court’s observations in Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. vs. Director Of Income Tax, Mumbai 2007 (6) STR 3 (SC) and the judgment in a recent case of G. D. Builders vs. UOI & Others 2013-TIOL-908-HC-DEL. It was observed in each of the judgments viz. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai (supra), Ishikawajima-Harima (supra) that it is essential for determining the taxability of several operations to apply the principle of apportionment to composite transactions which have some operations in one territory and some in others.
To bring home this point, the recent judgment in G. D. Builders vs. UOI & Others (supra) was referred to wherein as a corollary of the said position was followed that a composite contract involving labour and deemed sale of goods could be vivisected to levy service tax on the element of service.

Summarising its conclusion, the Hon. Bench held that qua the text and context of the provisions of the Act, it is clear that service tax is a destination based consumption levy. Taxable event in all events, qua the provisions of the Act and specifically the provisions of section 65 is on the provision of taxable service.  Therefore, when a service is provided and consumed outside the territorial locus of the Act, the consideration thereof would not be exigible to the levy of service tax under the substantive and procedural provisions. The final remarks in para 17(m) are reproduced below:
“(m) On the aforesaid analysis we conclude that the consideration received for operating and arranging outbound tours, even if falling within the scope of the amended definition of “tour operator”; (provided by the assessees and consumed by their tourist customers beyond Indian territory), is not liable to levy and collection of service tax, under provisions of the Act. We hold that provisions of the Act do not have an extra territorial operation. The conclusion and analysis on this issue [Issue No. (b)] is without prejudice to our analysis and conclusion on issue No. (a), that since the assessees had provided a composite service, of operating outbound tours apart from engaging in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging such tours; and by a mode of transport other than in a tourist vehicle, the service falls outside the definitional locus of “tour operator” (vide the analysis on Issue (a), at para 17 supra).” [emphasis supplied].

Nevertheless, the Tribunal noted that whether the outbound tour amounts to export of service and is thus immune to levy service tax under the Export Rules is not decided and is left open or not found necessary in the ruling on the core issue.

Conclusion:

The issue is undoubtedly painstakingly dealt with by the Tribunal. Having allowed the assessee’s appeal, it remains to be seen whether the Revenue accepts the same or further litigates the matter. However, the above would be of little help to tour operators in the scenario post July 01, 2012 i.e. negative list based taxation because under the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (which have been brought in operation in place of Export Rules and Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006), tours performed outside India are considered as provided in taxable territory and therefore liable for service tax.

Exemption – Schedule D amended

fiogf49gjkf0d
Notification No. VAT 1513/CR 106/Taxation 1 dated 24-12-2013

levitra

Audit Report to be filed by developers for F.Y. 2012-13 Trade Circular No. 1T dated 04-01-2014 & 2T dated 07-01-2014

fiogf49gjkf0d

Developers other than those opting for Composition Scheme are given one more month after due date to file MVAT audit report in Form 704. Thus, if audit report is filed on or before 15th February, 2014 then penalty u/s. 61 shall not be imposed.

levitra

Service Tax on services provided by Resident Welfare Association Circular No. 175/1/2014-ST dated 10th January, 2014

fiogf49gjkf0d
Vide this Circular clarifications have been provided regarding certain doubts raised over the scope of the exemption & CENVAT Credit available to RWA to its own members under the negative list approach.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 704 (Tri- Kolkata) Sen Brothers vs. CCE, Bolapur

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether penalty u/s. 76 would be leviable where service tax was deposited along with interest before issuance of show cause notice? Held, no.

Facts:
The appellant provided taxable services of commercial or industrial construction services and manpower recruitment agency service. The appellant was registered under Service Tax and was filing Service Tax returns. Due to the acute shortage of funds, the Appellant could not deposit the Service Tax. The department initiated proceedings for the non-payment of taxes. Later on, the appellant deposited Service Tax along with interest. A show cause notice was issued demanding service tax, interest and penalty u/s. 76.

According to the appellant, when the Service Tax along with interest was deposited before issuance of the show cause notice, then issuance of SCN itself was not warranted and further imposition of penalty u/s. 76 also was not called for in view of section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994. The Appellant relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CCE, ST, LTU, Bangalore vs. Adecco Flexione Workforce Solution Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 3 (Kar) for issue of SCN post deposit of service tax with interest and also relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in case of Comm. of ST vs. Master Kleen – 2012 (25) STR 439 (Ka.) for non-imposition of penalty u/s. 76 where service tax was deposited with interest and intimation was given to department. In both the cases, the High Court held that if the assessee has paid service tax along with interest before issuance of SCN, the department should not waste its time in issuing SCN.

Held:
The Tribunal relying on the above stated decisions of the High Court held that where Service Tax was deposited along with interest before the issuance of SCN, penalty u/s. 76 was not invokable.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 701 (Tri- Ahmd) Patel Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Rajkot

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether service would be applicable on the toll collection on highways under the category of business auxiliary service? Held, no.

Facts:
The Appellant collected toll charges from the users of highways. The department demanded service tax under business auxiliary services on the entire collection of toll. The appellant relied upon the judgement in Intertoll India Consultants (P) Ltd -2011 (24) STR 611 (Tri-Delhi) and contended non-applicability of service tax on toll collections.

Held:
The Tribunal relying upon the above stated decision held that the ratio laid down was squarely applicable to the present case and set aside the demand.

levitra

2014 to (33) STR 711 ( Tri-Bang.) Freightlinks International (I) Pvt Ltd vs. CCEC& ST, Cochin

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether an Order-in-Original which does not consider or discuss various decisions cited by assessee and provides no finding regarding invocation of extended period and penalty imposition is a no speaking order? Held, yes. Matter remanded.

Facts:
The appellant was a steamer agent for a shipping company and also used to book space in the ships belonging to other companies and was collecting ocean freight from customers on behalf of the principal as well as from other shipping companies. The department took the view that service tax should have been paid on the ocean freight and confirmed the demand of service tax. The appellant argued that the lower authorities did not consider their submissions on judicial pronouncement available on the same set of facts in the case of Gudwin Logistics vs. CCE – 2010 (18) STR 348 (Tri-Ahmed), also not offered any explanation on invocation of extended period of limitation and levied penalties without any reasoning.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the appellant in its written submission and in personal hearing relied upon number of case laws which were not at all considered by the lower authorities in the Order-in-Original. In view of the absence of findings in relation to the applicability of services tax, invocation of extended period of limitation, imposition of penalties, the Tribunal remanded the case to pass a considered and well reasoned order.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 696 (Tri-Ahmd.) Essar Projects (India) Ltd. vs. Comm. C. Ex & ST, Rajkot

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether the value of free supply material be included in the gross amount charged for the purpose of calculation of Service Tax in respect of contracts executed prior to 7th July 2009? Held, no.

Facts:
The appellant entered into two contracts with its customer on 24-08-2007. One of the contracts was for supply of equipment and materials (supply contract) and the other one was for the construction/erection/ installation of the plant (construction contract). In addition, the customer also procured imported equipment and materials which were also supplied to the appellant. The department contended that as per Rule 3(1) of the Works Contract (the Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax) Rules 2007 gross amount for the purpose of payment of Service Tax should include the value of the cost of free supplied material and accordingly service tax demand was issued on the value of free supplied material.

Held:
The Tribunal relying on the clarification issued by the CBEC Circular No. 150/1/2012-ST dated 08-02-2012 held that Rule 3(1) of the Works Contract Rules, 2007 was applicable to contracts entered after 07-07-2009 and not to ongoing contracts and accordingly held that service tax would not be applicable on the value of the free supplied material.

levitra

2014 (33) S.T.R. 514 (Tri-Mumbai) Talera Logistics Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether on facts of the case, the storage of spare parts for motor vehicles/their transportation/dispatch etc. would be treated as Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Service? Held, yes.

Facts:
The appellant’s services to M/s. Ford India Ltd. were considered Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Services by the department. However, according to the appellant, they were business support services. The spare parts of motor vehicles were kept in the godown of Ford who would manufacture motor vehicles. Further, the computers were provided to the appellant for their day-to-day operations and the appellant was not engaged in arranging transport for receiving or dispatching goods. Since the appellant was under the bonafide belief that their activities did not fall under the Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Services, the appellant contested invocation of extended period of limitation. Demands were computed on the basis of bills raised and not on the basis of receipt. Since the appellant did not collect service tax, extension of cum duty benefit was pleaded for.

The department in terms of the agreement between the appellant and Ford, the appellant was engaged in receiving service parts, packing, etc., carry out inventory control, to maintain customer relations, to do distribution, handling shipping, documentation and outbound transportation etc. Thus, the activities were essentially in the nature of Clearing and Forwarding Services. Further, since there was no registration at Tamil Nadu and the appellant had centralised registration at Pune, the case was within the jurisdiction of the Pune Commissionerate. Since the appellant had not paid service tax and filed returns, the appellant had suppressed the facts with intention to evade service tax.

Held:
Considering the activities were to receive goods, warehouse the goods, receive and arrange dispatches, maintaining records for delivery etc. and the provisions of law, it was held that the services were Clearing and Forwarding services and not business support services. Further, the delayed registration, non-payment, non-filing of returns and disputing service tax liability at a later date post registration were the core reasons proving suppression of facts and wilful intention to evade tax. Therefore, the extended period of limitation and penalty was held justified. Since all payments were received though belatedly, the delay in receipt would not affect service tax liability except shifting of dates. Since the amounts collected were for various components of services, it could not be considered as inclusive of service tax and therefore even benefit of cum duty was not extended.

levitra

2014 (33) S.T.R. 522 (Tri.-Del.) DCM Engineering Products vs. Commissioner. Of C. Ex. & S. T., Chandigarh-II

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether service tax paid for insurance of company’s vehicles used by senior officials of the company for official work and for commuting between residence and factory eligible CENVAT Credit? Held, yes.

Facts:
The appellant, a manufacturer of Iron Castings had a factory in a remote area. They provided vehicles to their senior officials to commute between residence and factory. The appellant availed CENVAT Credit of service tax paid on insurance of such vehicles. Taking a view that there is no nexus between such insurance services and manufacturing activity, the department denied CENVAT Credit on insurance services.

Held:
Tribunal observed that the vehicles were used for company’s work as well as for commutation of senior officials and it was not a welfare activity but was an activity related to business and therefore, CENVAT was held admissible.

levitra

[2014] 43 taxmann.com 34 (Gujarat) Central Excise vs. Inductotherm India (P.) Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether the exporter-manufacturer is entitled to CENVAT Credit in respect of cargo handling service under rule 2(l) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) being input service used up to “place of removal.” Held, yes.

Facts:
The assessee, manufacturer – exporter claimed CENVAT credit in respect of cargo handling services. The department denied the credit on the ground that, in absence of express mention of such service in the definition Clause in Rule 2(l) of CCR, the same cannot be termed as “input service”. Both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. Before the High Court, Revenue contended that cargo handling service cannot be treated as input service since the place of removal cannot be said to be the port of shipment. The question before the High Court was that, whether the input credit of Service Tax paid by the assessee-respondent on the cargo handling service would be admissible and whether the same would fall under the purview of the definition of “input service.”

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed that the cargo handling service is rendered on clearance of the final product from the port for the purpose of export. In light of the various decisions rendered in this area, the High Court adopted such interpretation to hold that in case of export of the final product, place of removal would be the port of shipment and not factory gate and therefore, the manufacturer would be entitled to avail the amount claimed towards cargo handling as ‘input service’ under the CENVAT Credit Rules. Considering the expression used in the ‘means’ part of the definition of “input service” in Rule 2(l) of CCR, i.e., it includes services used by the manufacturer directly or indirectly in or in relation to manufacture of the final product and in relation to the clearance of the final product from the place of removal, High Court held that, the definition is very wide in its expression, since number of services used by manufacturer are included in the same, whether used directly or indirectly.

levitra

[2014] 43 taxmann.com 257 (Madras) CCE vs. Rajshree Sugars & Chemicals Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether, accumulated CENVAT Credit of one unit can be utilised for discharging duty liability of another unit, if both the units in fact constitute single factory and had erroneously obtained two different registration certificates in the past? Held, yes.

Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer in sugar was running two units viz. the sugar unit and the distillery unit situated in the same premises adjacent to each other. The assessee had obtained separate registration certificates in respect of both the units, although both units are under one management. The by-products arising on the manufacture of sugar in the sugar unit, namely, molasses was again used by the assessee in the manufacture of Ethyl Alcohol in the distillery unit. The assessee cleared molasses on payment of duty and availed credit of the same for the distillery unit for payment of duty on the dutiable Ethyl Alcohol. Over a period of time, there was huge accumulation of credit in the distillery unit and the same remained unutilised. Thereafter, the assessee requested the department to grant a single registration in respect of both the units and on getting the same, it sought to utilise the unutilised credit in respect of the distillery unit against the duty payable on the manufactured sugar.

The department denied credit on the ground that, there is no provision for transfer of unutilised CENVAT Credit of one registered unit to another registered unit. It further denied the CENVAT benefit on the grounds that credit of duty paid against molasses cannot be utilised for payment of duty paid against sugar since sugar was not manufactured in the distillery unit.

Held:
The High Court observed that, (i) the sugar unit and the distillery unit belonged to the self-same management and they are in the same premises. (ii) the resultant molasses from the manufacture of sugar on which duty was paid and credit was claimed was used by the assessee in the manufacture of denatured Ethyl Alcohol which is a dutiable product. (iii) although in respect of two activities, it had maintained two accounts, yet, it related to the business of the same assessee in respect of two activities, which are interconnected too. In the circumstances the High Court held that, the mere taking of a single registration as against the two registrations, would not imply that there was a merger or amalgamation or transfer to hold that the assessee would not be entitled to any credit adjustment on the duty payable on the sugar manufactured. Both before and after the so called transfer, the same management continued to be in charge of both the units and hence the alleged credit is available. The High court further observed that the credit of duty allowed in respect of any input be utilised towards the payment of duty on any other final product, is available irrespective of whether such inputs have been used actually in the manufacture of such a final product. The only condition is that the inputs should have been received and used in the factory. Hence, the revenues appeal was dismissed.

levitra

[2014] 43 taxmann.com 363 (Madras) CST vs. Sangamitra Services Agency

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether, reimbursement of expenses paid by Principal to C&F Agent on actual basis are includible in the value of clearing and forwarding service? Held, no.

Facts:
The issue before the High Court was, whether various charges towards freight, labour, electricity, telephone etc, which were reimbursed by the principal to the C & F Agent on the basis of actuals, were required to be added to the value of the taxable service in relation to the clearing and forwarding services provided by a C&F agent of the Principal.

On behalf of the respondent, nobody represented the matter. The Revenue contended that, in terms of the provisions of Rule 6(8) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, the value of taxable service in relation to the services provided by the Clearing and Forwarding Agent to the client for rendering services of the Clearing and Forwarding operations, in any manner, shall be deemed to be the gross amount of remuneration or commission (by whatever name called) paid to such agent by the client, engaging such agent and considering this, the charges collected towards freight, labour, electricity, telephone etc., in connection with the Clearing and Forwarding Services, would form part of the remuneration/commission.

Held
Rejecting the revenue’s contention, the Hon’ble High Court held that the gross amount referred to in Rule 6(8) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 would apply to receipts of such sum, which would bear the character of remuneration or commission in that. In the absence of any material to show the understanding between the Principal and the Client that the commission payable by the principal was all inclusive, it is difficult to hold that the gross amount of remuneration/commission would nevertheless include expenditure incurred by the assessee providing the services; that all incidental charges for running of the business would also form part of the remuneration or commission (by whatever name called). The phrase “by whatever name called” must necessarily have some link or reference with the nature of the receipt of remuneration or commission. Thus, if a receipt is for reimbursing the expenditure incurred for the purpose per se, would not justify that the same had the character of the remuneration or commission.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 621 (Guj) Comm. Of C. Ex & Cust. Ahmedabad-III vs. Fine Care Biosystems

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether CBEC Circulars/Instructions which are administrative in nature are binding on the department? Held, yes.

Facts:
The department preferred an appeal against an Order of CESTAT dated 14-07-2007 rejecting appeal filed by the department. The issue involved was the demand of refund of Rs. 89,476/- sanctioned by the Tribunal under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

The department filed this appeal challenging the order passed by the CESTAT and on 25-02-2010 by way of an order the High Court formulated questions on the issue. The CBEC on 20-10-2010 issued Circular/ Instruction F. No. 390/Misc./163/2010-JC providing for monetary limits in respect of filing of appeals by the department in the Tribunal, High Court and Supreme Court. The said instruction had prescribed monetary limit of Rs. 10 lakh of tax and penalty in case appeal to be preferred by the department to the High Court. The respondent argued that, though the said Instruction was issued after the formulation of questions by the High Court in the present case, the department could not violate the CBEC instructions and since the present case is below prescribed monetary limits, department’s appeal should be dismissed.

Held:
The High Court held that the department was not authorised to prefer an appeal where the same is the below prescribed monetary limit. Though questions were framed in an earlier hearing, the High Court refrained from considering the merits of the case and dismissed the appeal as it was in violation to CBEC instructions.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 619 (Uttarakhand) Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut –I vs. Usha Breco Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether provision of transportation service which is an ancillary to main business activity would be classified as “Tour Operator’s Service”? Held, no.

Facts:
The appellant was operating two ropeways at Haridwar at two different places. The appellant was charging fees from pilgrims for the use of the said ropeways. The distance between these two ropeways was about 3.75 kms. For those interested in using the ropeways at both places, the appellant provided transportation from one ropeway to the other by road against consideration of separate fees. The department demanded Service Tax on these fees charges for transporting pilgrims from one place of ropeway to another under “Tour Operator Service.” The appellant contended that the said service was not exigible to tax under ‘Tour Operator service’ and the appellant was not a tour operator. The Tribunal held that the appellant could not be regarded as tour operator as the transportation was not a main business of the appellant.

Held:
Since there was no change in the facts and these were considered by the Tribunal, the High Court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal filed by the department.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 609 (All) A C L Education Centre (P) Ltd vs. UOI

fiogf49gjkf0d
Is Rule 5A(2) of STR 1994 which prescribes for an access by authorised officer for verification etc. and for submission of records by assessee for Service Tax Audit ultra vires? Held, no.

Facts:
The Excise Department had issued intimations on various dates under Rule 5A(2) of STR 1994 calling for certain documents for conducting the EA-2000 audit. The appellant challenged the said intimations on the vires/legality of the said intimations under the ground that the same were contrary to the provisions of section 72 of the Finance Act. The appellant further argued that, the said Rule was arbitrary and it did not provide for details like the period of audit, the qualification and manner in which the said audit will be conducted, no provisions to furnish audit report to the assessee etc. The appellant also brought to the notice of the High Court that, in an identical case, the Delhi High Court in the case of Travelite India vs. UOI WP 3774 of 2013 had passed an interim order to maintain status quo.

Held:
The High Court observed that, section 72A of the Act is applicable when the assessee is not maintaining the books of accounts properly to ascertain the Service Tax liability and to determine the correct tax, the books will have to be examined and if need be, be audited by a qualified Chartered Accountant. Rule 5A only facilitates the provisions of section 72A, as Rule 5A( 2) states that every assessee shall on demand make available records, trial balance, income tax audit report to the audit party and audit will be conducted by the qualified Chartered Accountant/Cost Accountant as deputed by the Deputy Commissioner.

In view of this, it was held that, Rule 5A of STR 1994 is not ultra vires and it is in consonance to section 72A of the Finance Act and accordingly the High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 501 (Guj.) Commissioner of C. Ex. & Customs vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether Service Tax paid on insurance of vehicles used for the residents of worker’s residential colony is eligible input service for availment of the CENVAT Credit? Held, no.

Facts:
The respondents, cement manufacturers availed the CENVAT Credit of Service Tax paid on insurance services for the residential colony and of the vehicles specially used for travelling of workers from their colony to the factory. Placing reliance on the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of M/s. Triveni Engg & Industrial Ltd. vs. CCC, Meerut, 2008 (12) S.T.R. 330, the Tribunal had upheld the assessee’s contention that the phrase “activities in relation to business” used in the inclusive part of the definition of input services was wide enough to cover such services.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed the case of Commissioner vs. Gujarat Heavy Chemicals Ltd. 2011 (22) S.T.R. 610 (Guj), wherein the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court had analysed various decisions and had held that if providing residential quarters and security services was voluntary, the activities were not covered within the definition of input services and therefore, the CENVAT Credit was not available. Relying on this, the CENVAT was not allowed as not in relation to business.

levitra

Stainless Steel vis-à-vis Rate of Tax Under MVAT Act, 2002

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction

The Commissions of Sales Tax, Maharashtra, has recently issued a Circular bearing No. 11T of 2014 dated 04-04-2014, by which it is informed that the sale of stainless steel wires will be liable to tax as non-declared goods i.e., at 12.5% in residual category, due to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bansal Wire Industries Ltd. (42 VST 372). The declared goods are covered by entry C-55 of the MVAT Act, 2002. If the goods are so covered, the tax is 5%. However, if they get excluded from above entry, the rate becomes 12.5%. Therefore, it is necessary to see the implication of above judgment and circular.

Background
The facts in this case are that the issue arose under the UP Trade Tax Act, 1948. Originally, the dealer was assessed to tax at 4% on the sale of stainless steel wires on the grounds that it is declared goods. However, the said assessment was revised, so as to levy tax on the sale of stainless steel wires at a higher rate, considering that it is not sale of declared goods.

The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court confirmed the view of the department. Therefore, the issue was raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The question which was referred to the Hon’ble Supreme Court is reproduced in the judgment as under:

“Whether stainless steel wire, a product of the appellant, on a proper reading of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act along with the qualifying words ’that is to say’ would fall under the category ’tool, alloy and special steels of any of the above categories’ enumerated in entry (ix) of Clause (iv) or under entry (xv) of same Clause (iv)?”

Consideration by Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court has analysed the position about declared goods. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has reproduced section 14(iv) of the CST Act, 1956 which enumerates declared goods. The said section is reproduced below for ready reference.

“14. Certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce.—It is hereby declared that the following goods are of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce,—

. . .

(iv) iron and steel, that is to say,—

(i) pig iron and cast iron including ingot moulds, bottom, plates, iron scrap, cast iron scrap, runner scrap and iron skull scrap;

(ii) steel semis (ingots, slabs, blooms and billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes);

(iii) skull bars, tin bars, sheet bars, hoe-bars and sleeper bars;

(iv) steel bars (rounds, rods, squares, flats, octagons and hexagons, plain and ribbed or twisted, in coil form as well as straight lengths);

(v) Steel structurals (angels, joists, channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections);

(vi) sheets, hoops, stripe and skelp, both black and galvanised, hot and cold rolled, plain and corrugated, in all qualities, in straight lengths and in coil form, as rolled and in riveted condition;

(vii) plates both plain and chequered in all qualities; (viii) discs, rings, forgings, and steel castings;

(ix) tool, alloy and special steels of any of the above categories;

(x) steel melting scrap in all forms including steel skull, turnings and borings;

(xi) steel tubes, both welded and seamless, of all diameters and lengths, including tube fittings;

(xii) tin-plates, both hot dipped and electrolytic and tin-free plates;

(xiii) fish plates bars, bearing plate bars, crossing sleeper bars, fish plates, bearing plates, crossing sleepers and pressed steel sleepers, rails-heavy and light crane rails;

(xiv) wheels, tyres, axles and wheel sets;

(xv) wire rods and wires-rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper;

(xvi) defectives, rejects, cuttings or end pieces of any of the above categories.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the back ground of the above entry. The Supreme Court held that each sub-group in above section 14(iv) exhaustively enumerates the kinds of goods covered by each sub-group. In this respect, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment viz; State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/s. Pyare Lal Mehrotra (1976)(1 SCC 834).

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the stainless steel can be covered by sub-entry (ix) and therefore the items covered by (i) to (viii), if of stainless steel, they can be covered. However, the wires are mentioned in sub-entry (xv) and said entry is separate. The sub-entry (ix) being not applicable to entry (xv), the stainless steel wires cannot be covered by any of the entries in section 14(iv). The reasoning of the the Hon’ble Supreme Court is contained in para-28 of the judgment and further elaborated in para-33. Both paras are reproduced below for ready reference.

“28. The expression “of any of the above categories” appearing in entry Nos.

(ix) and (xvi) of Clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Act would indicate that they would each be items referred in the preceding items. Therefore, even the expression “of any of the above categories” in entry No. (ix) of Clause (iv) would only relate to steel and alloy produced for any of the materials mentioned in item Nos. (i) to (viii). Thus, “stainless steel wire” produced by the appellant cannot be read into item No. (xv) which reads as “wire rods and wires-rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper”.

33. It is thus clear, that the language used in entry No. (ix) is plain and unambiguous and that the items which are mentioned there are “tool, alloy and special steels”. By using the words “of any of the above categories” in entry No. (ix) would refer to entries (i) to (viii) and it cannot and does not refer to entry No. (xv). However, entry (xvi) of Clause (iv) would be included in entry (xvi) particularly within the expression now therein any of the aforesaid categories. Therefore, the specific entry “tool, alloy and special steels” being not applicable to entry (xv), the contention of the counsel for the appellant has to be rejected. It is, therefore, held that the stainless steel wire is not covered within entry (ix) of Clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act.”

Conclusion
The above referred circular has taken into account above mentioned observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Accordingly, it is clarified that the items made from stainless steel mentioned in subentries (x) to (xv) will not be covered u/s. 14(iv) of CST Act, 1956 i.e., they will not be considered as ‘declared goods’ and will also not be covered by entry-C-55 of the MVAT Act, 2002.Thus, the same are liable to tax at 12.5%. Some of the items affected by the above interpretation are melting scrap, skull, turnings, borings, specified tubes and tube fittings etc., if they are of the stainless steel. The stainless steel pipes will also get excluded from entry C-55 but they will be eligible to be covered by entry C-72 which is regarding pipes of all varieties. Therefore, for stainless steel pipes, the rate will still remain 5%. However, for stainless steel tubes, the rate will be 12.5%.

The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding. However, an issue still remains about interpretation of the scope of the main heading of section 14(iv) i.e., ‘iron & steel’, whether it covers stainless steel itself? Steel is not qualified by any particular quality. Therefore, it can be argued that the above heading itself covers stainless steel also. This issue is not considered in the above judgment. Therefore, the dealer community will be required to wait till some more light is thrown on the above aspect from none other than the Supreme Court itself in some future  judgment.  Till  then,  the law will be guided by the above judgment of the Supreme Court and the circular issued by the Commissioner  of  Sales  Tax  of  Maharashtra State.

In  the  circular  the  position  as  per  the  above  judg- ment  in  the  case  of  M/s.  Bansal  Wire  Industries Ltd.  (42  VST  372)  is  sought  to  be  applied  from the  date  of  judgment  i.e.,  26-04-2011.  Therefore, dealers  will  be  liable  to  pay  a  higher  rate  from the  said  date,  which  may  attract  an  unforeseen liability  for  the  past  period  from  26-04-2011.  In fact,  the  impact  of  the  above  judgment  may be  from  the  inception  of  the  section  14(iv)  and hence  revised  rate  can  apply  even  prior  to  26-04- 2011.  However,  it  is  stated  in  the  circular  that  the matter  is  referred  to  government  for  period  prior to  26-04-2011.  It  is  common  experience  that  the dealers  have  collected  tax  at  4%  and  5%  in  respective  periods,  considering  the  impugned  goods  as ‘declared  goods’.  They  are  also  assessed  accordingly.  Therefore,  it  is  genuinely  felt  that  in  spite of  the  above  judgment,  the  government  should give necessary relief by administrative measures or by  introducing  changes  in  the  entries  and  should apply  the  law  prospectively  i.e.,  from  the  current date after giving sufficient time to the dealer com- munity  to  adjust  to  new  tax  rate.  In  fact,  by  looking  at  the  importance  of  goods,  the  rate  should be  continued  at  5%  by  introducing  new  entries as  they  are  getting  out  of  the  entry  C-55  only because  of  technical  interpretation  of  the  entry. We  expect  that  the  government  will  consider  the above  situation  and  grant  necessary  relief.

Controversy: Interest on Cenvat Credit Wrongly Taken and (or) Utilised

fiogf49gjkf0d
Background

The issue whether interest is leviable at the point of time when the CENVAT Credit is wrongly taken or at the point of utilisation has been a matter of extensive judicial considerations. Further, an important amendment was made in Rule 14 of the CENVAT Rules through Notification dated 17-03-2012. This subject was discussed in the June 2012 issue of the BCAJ in the backdrop of an important ruling of the Karnataka High Court. However, subsequent to the said ruling, divergent views have been expressed by different judicial authorities (in particular recent ruling of CESTAT – Mumbai). Hence, since the issue has become highly controversial, the same is being discussed hereafter in the backdrop of divergent judicial rulings.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

• Rule 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (“CCR”)

” Where the CENVAT Credit has been taken or utilised wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same along with the interest shall be recovered from the manufacturer or provider of the output service and the provisions of the sections 11A and 11AB of the Excise Act, or sections 73 and 75 of the Finance Act, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries.”

[Note – The words “taken or utilised wrongly” have been substituted by the words “taken and utilised wrongly vide Notification No. 18/2012 – CE(NT) dated 17-03-12]

• Rule 4(1) of CCR

“The CENVAT credit in respect of inputs may be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in factory of the manufacturer or premises of provider of output service………..”

• Rule 4(2) (a) of CCR

“The CENVAT Credit in respect of capital goods …….. at any point of time in a given financial year shall be taken only for an amount not exceeding 50 % of duty paid on such capital goods in the same financial year.“

• Rule 4(7) of CCR

“The CENVAT Credit in respect of input service shall be allowed, on or after the day on which payment is made of the value of input service and service tax paid or payable as indicated in Invoice…………”

Analysis of Credit ‘wrongly’ ‘taken’ / ‘utilised’

To understand the difference (if any) between the terms ‘wrongly’ ‘taken’ and ‘utilised’, the meanings attributed to these words used in Rule 14 of CCR is given hereafter for ready reference :

• ‘Taken’ means “to gain or receive into possession, to seize, to assume ownership” (Black’s Law Dictionary).
• ‘To take’, signifies “to lay hold of, grab, or seize it, to assume ownership etc.” (Advance Law Lexicon – 3rd Edition).
• ‘Utilise’ means “to make practical and effective use of” (Compact Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus).
• ‘Utilise’ means “to make use of, turn to use” (The Chambers Dictionary).
• ‘Wrongful’ – “characterised by unfairness of injustice, contrary to law” (Concise Oxford Dictionary)
• ‘Wrong’ – “any damage or injury, contrary to right, violation of right or of law” (P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s Law Lexicon)

Reversal of CENVAT Credit before Utilization – Settled Position

• In a landmark ruling in Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd. vs. CCE (1996) 81 ELT 3 (SC), it has been held by the Supreme Court that, when the MODVAT Credit taken is reversed, it would mean that the MODVAT Credit has not been taken at all. This principle is relevant for the CENVAT Credit as well. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter :

Para 7

In view of the aforesaid clarification by the department, we see no reason why the assessee cannot make a debit entry in the credit account before removal of the exempted final product. If this debit entry is permissible to be made, credit entry for the duties paid on the inputs utilised in manufacture of the final exempted product will stand deleted in the accounts of the assessee. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the assessee has taken credit for the duty paid on the inputs utilised in the manufacture of the final exempted product under Rule 57A. In other words, the claim for exemption of duty on the disputed goods cannot be denied on the plea that the assessee has taken credit of the duty paid on the inputs used in the manufacture of these goods.

The above stated principle laid down by the Supreme Court has been followed in a large number of cases. [For e.g. CCE vs. Ashima Dyecot Ltd. (2008) 232 ELT 580 (GUJ)].

Similarly, the said principle was also asserted by the Hon. Supreme Court in CCE, Mumbai vs. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. 2007 (215) ELT 3 (SC) wherein it was held “whenever duty is paid on the input, the assessee is entitled to credit under CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 however availment of credit takes place later on when the assessee makes adjustments of duty paid on input against duty paid on final product. In the present case, before the account could be debited and before the assessee could avail CENVAT Credit, assessee has reversed CENVAT Credit which would amount to the assessee not taking credit for duty paid on input. Learned counsel submitted that the assessee was free to reverse the credit before utilization of such credit.” This decision was also accepted by the Gujarat High Court in CCE vs. Dynaflex Ltd. 2011 (266) ELT 41 (Guj).

Department clarification

The CBEC had vide Circular No. 897/17/2009 – CX, dated 03-09-2009 has clarified as under:

“The Tribunal decision and the High Court judgment referred to above, was delivered in the context of erstwhile Rule 57 I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and that the Supreme Court order under reference is only a decision and not a judgment. Since, the Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, is clear and unambiguous in the position that interest would be recoverable when CENVAT Credit is taken or utilised wrongly, it is clarified that the interest shall be recoverable when credit has been wrongly taken, even, if it has not been utilised, in terms of wordings of the present Rule 14.”

It may be noted that erstwhile Rule 57 I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 did not specifically provide for any interest payment along with reversal of wrongly taken credit while present Rule 14 of CCR provides for payment of interest along with the reversal of wrongly taken credit.

Interest on Credit taken but not utilized – Judicial Views

• In CCE vs. Maruti Udyog Ltd. (2007) 214 ELT 173 (P & H)], the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana Court agreed with the views of the Hon’ble CESTAT that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as entry in the MODVAT record and was in fact not utilised. The SLP filed by the revenue against this order of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (2007) 214 ELT A 50 (SC) on 10-10-2006.

In the case of Maruti Udyog, the assessee claimed the Modvat credit which was not allowable in the absence of the requisite certificate under Rule 57E of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 being produced within six months but still the assessee claimed the same and credited the amount in RG – 23A Part II. The authorities disallowed the Modvat credit relying upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Osram Surya (P) Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore (2002) 142 ELT 5 (SC).

The Tribunal, however, had held that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as an entry in the Modvat record and was not in fact utilised. The Tribunal held that in absence of utilisation of credit, the assessee was not liable to pay interest.

The P & H High Court held as under :

“Learned Counsel for the appellant is unable to show as to how the  interest  will  be  required to be paid when in absence of availment of Modvat Credit in fact, the assessee was not liable to pay any duty. The Tribunal has clearly recorded a finding that the assessee did not avail of the Modvat Credit in fact and had only made an entry.

In view of this factual position, we are unable to hold that any substantial question of law arises”.

•    Attention is particularly drawn to the ruling of the Punjab & Haryana High  Court  in  the  case of Ind – Swift Laboratories Ltd. vs. UOI (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H), relevant extracts from which, are reproduced hereafter for reference:

Para 9

•    The Scheme of the Act and the CENVAT Credit Rules framed thereunder permit a manufacturer or producer of the final products  or a provider  of taxable service to  take  the  CENVAT  Credit in respect of duty of excise and such other duties as specified. The conditions for allowing the CENVAT Credit are contained in Rule 4 of  the Credit Rules contemplating that the CENVAT Credit can be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in the factory of  the  manufacturer or in the premises of the provider of output service. Such CENVAT Credit can be utilised in terms of Rule 3(4) of Credit Rules  for payment of any duty of excise on any final product  and  as contemplated in the aforesaid sub-rule. It, thus, transpires that the CENVAT credit is the benefit of duties leviable or paid as specified in Rule 3(1) used in the manufacture of intermedi- ate products etc. In other  words,  it  is  a  credit of the duties already leviable or paid. Such credit in respect of duties already paid can be adjusted for payment of duties payable under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. U/s. 11AB of the Act, liability to pay interest arises     in respect of any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded from the first day of the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. Interest is leviable if duty of  excise has not been levied or paid. Interest can be claimed or levied for the reason that there is delay in the payment of duties. The interest is compensatory in nature as the penalty is charge- able separately.

Para 10

•    In Pratibha Processors vs. Union of India, 1996
(88)  ELT  12  (SC)  =  (1996)  11  SCC  101,  it  was  held that  interest  is  compensatory  in  character  and is  imposed  on  an  assessee  who  has  withheld payment  of  any  tax  as  and  when  it  is  due  and payable.  Similarly,  in  Commissioner  of  Customs vs.  Jayathi  Krishna  &  Co.  –  2000  (119)  ELT  4(SC) (2000)  9  SCC  402,  it  was  held  that  interest  on warehoused goods is merely an accessory to the principal  and  if  the  principal  is  not  payable,  so is  it  for  interest  on  it.  In  view  of  the  aforesaid principle,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  no  liability of  payment  of  any  excise  duty  arises  when  the petitioner availed the CENVAT Credit. The liability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisation. Even  if  the  CENVAT  Credit  has  been  wrongly taken, that does not lead to the levy of interest as a liability of payment of excise duty does not arise  with  such  availment  of  the  CENVAT  Credit by an assessee. Therefore, interest is not payable on  the  amount  of  the  CENVAT  credit  availed  of and  not  utilised.

Para 11

•    Reliance of respondents on Rule 14 of the Credit Rules that interest u/s. 11AB of the Act is payable even if the CENVAT Credit has been taken.  In our view, the said Clause  has to be read down  to mean that where the CENVAT Credit taken and utilised wrongly. Interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that the CENVAT  credit has been wrongly taken as such availment by itself does not create any  liability  of  payment of excise duty. On a conjoint reading of section 11AB of the Act and that of Rules  3  and  4  of the Credit Rules, we hold that interest cannot  be claimed from the date of wrong availment   of the CENVAT Credit. The interest shall be pay- able from the date the CENVAT Credit is wrongly utilised.

•    In an important ruling the Supreme Court,  in  the case of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (2011)  265 ELT 3 (S.C.)], set aside the order passed by the  Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court  (2009)  240 ELT  328  (P  &  H)]  on  the  question  of  charging interest  on  the  CENVAT  Credit  wrongly  taken, but  not  utilised.  By  interpreting  the  expressions and  words  used  in  the  provisions  of  Rule  14  of CCR,   the Supreme Court concluded that interest is  payable  on  the  CENVAT  Credit  wrongly  taken even  if  such  Credit  has  not  been  utilised.

The issue for consideration is whether an assessee can be made liable to pay interest for taking wrong credit if such credit has not been utilised inasmuch he has not derived any  benefit  out  of his wrong action.

The more important observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

“17. Xxxxxxxxxx In our considered opinion, the High Court misread and misinterprets the aforesaid Rule 14 and wrongly read it down without properly appreciating the scope and limitation thereof. A statutory provision is generally read down in order to save the said provision from being declared un- constitutional or illegal. Rule 14 specifically provides that where the CENVAT Credit has been taken or utilised would be recovered from the manufacturer or the provider of the output service.  The issue is  as to whether the aforesaid word “OR”  appear- ing in Rule 14, twice,  could  be  read  as  “AND” by way of reading it down as has been done by    the High Court. If the aforesaid provision is read    as a whole we find no reason to read the word “OR” in between the expression ‘taken’ or ‘utilised wrongly’ or has been erroneously refunded’ as the word “AND”. On the happening of any of the three aforesaid circumstances such credit becomes recoverable along with interest.

18. We do not feel that any other harmonious con- struction is required to be given to the aforesaid expression/provision which is clear and unambigu- ous as it exists  all by itself. So far as section  11AB    is concerned, the same becomes relevant and ap- plicable for the purpose of making recovery of the amount due and payable. Therefore, the High Court erroneously held that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of the CENVAT Credit and that it should only be payable from the date when the CENVAT Credit is wrongly utilised. Besides, the rule of reading down is in itself  a Rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is generally utilised to straighten the crudities or ironing out the creases to make a statue workable. This court has repeatedly laid down that in the  garb of reading down a  provision  it  is  not  open to read words and expressions not found in the provision statute and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. It is also held by this Court that the Rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute.

The interpretation made by the Honorable Supreme Court considering the specific circumstances of a case involving evasion of duty,  has been a matter  of extensive deliberation by the experts and rightly so inasmuch as, if the same is applied generally, it would mean unsettling the settled law.

•    Important judgment of Karnataka High Court in CCE & ST vs. Bill Forge  Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 26 STR 204 (KAR) [Bill Forge Case]

?  However, observations of the Karnataka High Court  in  the  Bill  Forge  case  are  very  impor- tant,  inasmuch  not  only  has  it  distinguished facts  of  the  case  of  UOI  vs.  Ind-Swift  Labo- ratories  Ltd.  (2011)  265  ELT  3  (SC)  but  it  has made  a  fine  distinction  between  making  an entry in the register and credit being ‘taken’ to  drive  home  the  point  that  interest  is  pay- able  only  from  the  date  when  duty  is  legally payable  to  the  Government  and  the  Govern- ment  would  sustain  loss  to  that  extent.

? In the Bill Forge case, the High Court referring to the Apex Court’s judgment in case of UOI vs. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. observed as under:

Para 18

“In fact, in the case before the Apex Court, the assessee received inputs and capital goods from various manufacturers/dealers and availed the CENVAT Credit on the duty paid on such  materi- als. The investigations conducted indicated that the assessee had taken the CENVAT Credit on fake invoices. When proceedings were initiated, the assessee filed applications for settlement of proceedings and the entire matter was placed before the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission held that a sum of Rs. 5,71,47,148.00 is the  duty  payable  and  simple  interest  at  10%  on  the CENVAT  Credit  wrongly  availed  from  the  date  the duty became payable as per section 11AB of the Act till  the  date  of  payment.  The  Revenue  calculated the said interest upto the date of the appropriation of  the  deposited  amount  and  not  upto  the  date  of payment.  Therefore,  it  was  contended  that  inter- est  has  to  be  calculated  from  the  date  of  actual utilisation  and  not  from  the  date  of  availment. Therefore,  an  application  was  filed  for  clarification by  the  assessee.  The  said  application  was  rejected upholding  the  earlier  order,  i.e.  interest  is  payable from  the  date  of  duty  becoming  payable  as  per section  11AB.  Therefore,  the  Apex  Court  interfered with the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court  and  rightly  rejected  by  the  Settlement  Com- mission  as  outside  the  scope  and  they  found  fault with  the  interpretation  placed  on  Rule  14.”

“It is also to be noticed that in the aforesaid  Rule, the word ‘avail’ is not used. The words used are ‘taken’ or “utilised wrongly”. Further the said provision makes it clear that the interest shall be recovered in terms of section 11A and 11B of the Act………”

Para 20

From the aforesaid discussion what emerges is that the credit of excise duty in the register maintained for the said purpose is only a book entry.  It might  be utilised later for payment of excise duty on the excisable product……… Before utilisation of such credit, the entry has been reversed, it amounts to not taking credit.”

para 22

“Therefore interest is payable from that date though in fact by such entry the Revenue  is  not put to any loss at all. When once the wrong entry was pointed out, being convinced, the assessee has promptly reversed the entry. In other words,  he did not take the advantage of wrong entry. He did not take the CENVAT Credit or utilised the CENVAT credit. It is in those circumstances that the Tribunal was justified in holding that, when the  assessee has not taken the benefit of the CENVAT Credit, there is no liability to pay  interest.  Before  it  can be taken, it had been reversed. In other words, once the entry was reversed, it is as if that the CENVAT credit was not available. Therefore, the said judgment of the Apex Court* has no application to the facts of this case It is only when the assessee  had taken the credit, in other words by taking such credit, if he had not paid the duty which is legally  due to the Government, the Government would have sustained loss to that extent. Then the liability to pay interest from the date the amount became due arises u/s. 11AB, in order to compensate the Government which was deprived of the duty  on  the date it became due.”

•    The ruling of Karnataka High Court in Bill Forge case, has been followed in large number of subsequent decided cases For e.g.:

?  CCE  vs.  Pearl  Insulation  Ltd.  (2012)  27  STR  337 (KAR)

?  CCE vs. Gokuldas Images (P) Ltd. (2012) 28 STR 214  (KAR)

?  Sharvathy  Conductors  Pvt.  Ltd.  vs.  CCE  (2013) 31  STR  47  (Tri  –  Bang)

?  CCE  vs.  Sharda  Enargy  &  Minerals  Ltd.  (2013) 291  ELT  404  (Tri  –  Del)

?  Gary Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd vs. CCE (2013) 297 ELT  391  (Tri  –  Del)

?  CCE  vs.  Balrampur  Chinni  Mills  Ltd.  (2014)  300 ELT  449  (Tri  –  Del)

However, in many cases, [For e.g., CCE vs. Kay Bouvei Engineering Pvt. Ltd.  (2014)  301  ELT 100  (Tri –  Mum- bai)], the Bill Forge case has not been followed and instead,  the  position  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  in Ind  Swift  case  followed.

Important amendment in Rule 14 of CCR

In  a  very  significant  amendment  in  Rule  14  of  CCR, with  effect  from  17-03-2012,  the  words  CENVAT Credit  has  been  “taken  or  utilised  wrongly”  has been  substituted  by  the  words  “taken  and  utilised wrongly”.

This amendment strongly reinforces the interpreta- tion placed by the  Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court in Maruti Udyog & Ind Swift Laboratories and Karnataka High Court in the Bill Forge case to the effect that, no interest can be recovered in cases where the CENVAT Credit has been wrongly taken but not utilised by an assessee.

Recent  Tribunal  Ruling  in  Balmer  Lawrie  &  Co.  Ltd vs.  CCE  (2014)  301  ELT  573  (Tri  –  Mumbai)

This  ruling  is  very  important  inasmuch  as,  it  not only  distinguishes  the  Karnataka  High  Court  ruling in  the  Bill  Forge  case,  but  it  also  discusses  the applicability  of  the  amendment  in  Rule  14  of  CCR vide  Notification  dated  17-03-2012.

In  this  case,  the  appellant  is  a  manufacturer  of lubricating  oil  availing  the  Cenvat  Credit  on  various inputs  and  capital  goods  as  provided  for  under (CCR).  They  availed  the  Cenvat  Credit  amounting to  Rs.  1,61,04,675/-  of  the  CVD  paid  on  imported base  oil.  The  base  oil  so  obtained  on  which  credit was  taken,  was  returned  by  the  appellant  to  M/s. VCL  and  M/s.  Ultraplus  Lube  Pvt.  Ltd.  and  the  ap- pellant  paid  excise  duty  equivalent  to  the  credit taken  on  such  base  oil  returned.  The  department was  of  the  view  that  the  taking  of  credit  by  the appellant  was  not  permitted  under  law  inasmuch as  the  goods  were  not  intended  for  use  in  the manufacture  of  excisable  goods  and,  therefore, credit  was  not  admissible  under  CCR  ab  initio.  Ac- cordingly,  a  show  cause  notice  dated  02-06-2008 was  issued  to  the  appellant  proposing  to  recover the  credit  taken  along  with  interest  thereon  under the provisions of Rule 14 of the CCR read with Sec- tion  11A(1)  and  section  11AB  of  the  Central  Excise Act,  1944.  It  was  also  proposed  to  impose  penalty on  the  appellant  under  Rule  15  of  the  said  Rules read  with  section  11AC  of  the  said  Central  Excise Act.  The  said  notice  was  adjudicated  and  duty  de- mand was confirmed by denying the Central Excise credit  of  Rs.  1,61,04,675/-  and  interest  on  the  said credit wrongly taken was also confirmed. A penalty of equivalent amount was also imposed on the ap- pellant  under  Rule  15  of  Cenvat  Credit  Rules,  2004 read  with  section  11AC  of  the  said  Act.  In  addition, a  fine  of  Rs.  1  crore  was  imposed  on  the  goods i.e.,  base  oil  on  the  grounds  that  the  same  was liable  to  confiscation  and  hence,  fine  is  imposable u/s.  34  of  the  Central  Excise  Act,  1944.

The Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that inasmuch as the appellant had reversed the credit taken at the time of clearance of the base   oil to M/s. VCL and Ultraplus Lube Pvt. Ltd., the question  of  reversal  of  credit  once  again  does  not arise and, therefore, the demand is not sustainable. It  was  further  pointed  out  that  the  appellant  had reflected  the  taking  of  the  Cenvat  Credit  on  base oil  received  from  VCL  in  their  monthly  ER-1  returns and,  therefore,  the  department  was  aware  of  the fact of taking of Cenvat credit by the appellant and hence  no  suppression  of  facts  on  the  part  of  the appellant could be alleged. It is also argued that the said  credit  was  available  in  the  books  of  accounts of  the  appellant  during  the  entire  period  and  the appellant  had  never  utilised  the  credit.  Therefore, the question of liability to pay any interest thereon would  not  arise  at  all.  Reliance  was  placed  on  the decisions  of  the  Hon’ble  Karnataka  High  Court  in the  case  of  CCE  &  S.T.  vs.  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  (2012) 26  STR  204  (KAR);  CCE  vs.  Gokaldas  Images  (P)  Ltd. (2012)  28  STR  214  (KAR);  &  CCE  vs.  Pearl  Insulation Ltd.  (2012)  27  STR  337  (KAR.)  and  the  decisions  of the  Hon’ble  High  Court  of  Allahabad  in  the  case of  CC  &  Central  Excise,  Meerut  vs.  Rana  Sugar  Ltd. (2010) 253 ELT 366 (ALL). The Learned Counsel has further contended that Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules,  2004,  was  amended  vide  a  Notification  No. 18/2012-C.E.  (N.T.),  dated  17-03-2012  WHEReby  the phrase  “Cenvat  credit  has  been  taken  or  utilised wrongly”  was  substituted  by  the  words  “Cenvat credit  has  been  taken  and  utilized  wrongly”.  Since the  words  have  been  substituted,  the  substitution will have retrospective effect and, therefore, unless the  appellant  utilises  the  credit,  the  question  of recovery of Cenvat credit or interest thereon would not  arise.  Reliance  was  placed  on  the  decisions  of Supreme Court in Indian Tobacco Association (2005) 187 ELT 162  (SC) and W.P.I.L. Ltd. vs. CCE  (2005)  181 ELT  359  (SC)  in  support  of  this  proposition.
 
The  Honorable  Tribunal  held  as  under:  Para  5.2
The  next  issue  for  consideration  is  whether  the appellant  is  liable  to  pay  any  interest  on  the  credit taken.  During  the  period  involved,  Rule  14  of  the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 provided for the recovery of  interest  on  the  Cenvat  Credit  taken  or  utilised wrongly under the provisions of the said Rule read with  section  11AB  of  the  Central  Excise  Act,  1944. The issue also came up for consideration before the Hon’ble  Apex  Court  in  the  case  of  Union  of  India vs.  Ind  –  Swift  Laboratories  Ltd.  (2011)  265  ELT  3 (SC)  (2012)  25  STR  184  (SC).  The  question  before the  Honorable  Apex  Court  was  “when  interest  on irregular credit arises, is it from the date of availing of  such  credit  or  from  the  date  of  utilisation?”  The Hon’ble Apex Court held that Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit  Rules,  2004  specifically  provides  for  interest on  the  Cenvat  Credit  taken  or  utilised  wrongly  or erroneously refunded. Therefore, interest on irregu- lar  credit  arises  from  the  date  of  taking  of  such credit.  Accordingly  it  was  held  that  if  the  Cenvat Credit  taken  is  irregularly,  though  not  utilised,  the liability  to  pay  interest  would  arise  from  the  date of  taking  of  the  credit  till  the  date  of  reversal  of the  credit.  In  view  of  the  above  decision  by  the Hon’ble Apex Court, the ratio of which is applicable to  the  present  case,  it  becomes  evident  that  the appellant  is  liable  to  discharge  interest  liability  on the  Cenvat  Credit  wrongly  taken  from  the  date  of taking  of  the  Cenvat credit  till  the  date  of  reversal. The  reliance  placed  by  the  appellant  on  the  deci- sion  of  the  Hon’ble  Karnataka  High  Court  in  the case  of  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  (supra)  and  the  other decisions  will  not  apply  to  the  facts  of  the  present case.  In  the  case  of  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  (supra)  the appellant  therein  took  the  credit  and  also  reversed the  credit  within  the  same  month,  i.e.,  before  any liability  to  pay  any  duty  arose.  It  was  in  that  con- text  the  Hon’ble  High  Court  held  that  if  a  credit has  been  taken  but  reversed  before  any  liability to  pay  duty  arose  then  no  interest  liability  would accrue.  Those  are  not  the  facts  obtaining  in  the present  case.  It  is  not  the  case  of  the  appellant that  between  the  date  of  taking  the  credit  and the date of reversal when the base oil was cleared, liability  to  pay  duty  did  not  arise  at  all.  In  fact  the clearance has been spread over several months and years.  Therefore,  the  facts  of  the  case  before  us are  clearly  distinguishable  from  the  facts  involved in  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  cited  (supra)  and  hence  ratio of  the  said  decision  would  not  apply.  Since  Pearl Insulation Ltd. (supra) and Gokaldas Images (P) Ltd. (supra)  also  follow  the  ratio  of  the  Bill  Forge  Pvt. Ltd  they  would  also  not  apply  to  the  facts  of  the present  case.  As  regards  the  reliance  placed  in  the case  of  Rana  Sugar  Ltd.  (supra),  it  is  true  that  the Hon’ble  Allahabad  High  Court  had  held  that  if  the reversal  of  credit  has  been  done  before  its  utilisa- tion, demand of interest would not arise. However, the said order was passed much before the decision in Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (supra) by the Hon’ble Apex  Court  was  pronounced.  Therefore,  the  ratio of  Ind-Swift  Laboratories  Ltd.  would  prevail  over all  the  other  decisions  of  various  Courts.

Para  5

As regard the argument advanced by the appellant that  since  the  expression  “Cenvat  Credit  taken  or utilised  wrongly”  had  been  substituted  effective from  17-03-2012  WITH  the  words  “Cenvat  Credit taken  and  utilised  wrongly”,  the  same  would  have retrospective  effect  and,  therefore,  inasmuch  as the  appellant  has  not  utilised  the  credit  there  will not  be  any  liability  to  interest,  this  argument  is misplaced.  Rule  14  of  the  the  Cenvat  Credit  Rules, 2004 was amended by a Notification No. 18/2012-C.E. (N.T.),  dated  17-O3-2012  and  amendment  effected in  Rule  14  of  the  Cenvat  Credit  Rules,  2004  read follows:-

“In Rule 14 of the said Rules, with effect from the 17th  day  of  March,  2012,-

a) For the words “taken or utilised wrongly”, the words “taken and utilised wrongly” shall be substituted;

This  amendment  rule  makes  it  absolute  clear  that the  amendment  is  with  effect  from  17-O3-2012  (in- advertently  mentioned  as  17-03-2004  in  the  ruling) and  not  before.  In  view  of  the  express  provisions in  the  Amendment  Rules,  the  argument  of  the appellant  that  amendment  being  in  the  nature  of substitution would have retrospective effect cannot be  accepted.  It  is  a  trite  law  that  every  statutory provision  is  prospective  only  unless  it  is  explicitly provided  that  it  is  retrospective  in  nature  and  the legislature  provides  for  such  retrospective  operation. In the present case, no such retrospective view has  been  provided  by  the  legislature  in  respect  of Notification  18/2012  –C.E.  (N.T.),  dated  17-03-2012 and, therefore, the argument of the Counsel in this regard  and  the  decisions  relied  upon  in  support  of the  same  cannot  be  accepted.

It appears that, the factual position that appellants claimed credit to which they were not  entitled  at all, could have had a bearing on the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal.

Conclusion

The Honorable Supreme Court in the Ind – Swift case has unsettled the judicially settled principle under the MODVAT (relevant for CENVAT Credit) that no interest is payable in cases where MODVAT Credit is wrongly taken but not utilised. Possibly, the specific circumstances of the case involving evasion of duty, had a bearing on the conclusion arrived at by the Apex Court.

It would appear that,  it  was  correctly  observed  by the Honorable Punjab & Haryana High Court in Ind – Swift case that, interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on nonpayment/delayed payable. No liability of payment of any excise duty arises when the CENVAT Credit is availed. The li- ability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisa- tion. Even if the CENVAT Credit is wrongly taken, that does not lead to levy of interest as liability of payment of excise duty does not arise with such availment of the CENVAT Credit by an assessee. Availment and utilisation of credit cannot be placed at equal footing for the purpose of charging inter- est. Availment of credit is only a book entry and does not result in any gain for the tax payer. The  use of the credit results into benefit and  that  is the time which is relevant for charging interest.

With  due  respect,  the  judgment  of  the  Honorable Supreme  Court  in  the  Ind  –  Swift  case  which  has generated  extensive  judicial  controversy,  needs  a serious reconsideration more particularly to advance the  cause  of  the  CENVAT  Credit  Scheme  which  is essentially  a  beneficial  piece  of  legislation.  Pending judicial resolvement of the controversy, Government could  consider  a  clarificatory  amendment  to  the effect  that  the  amendment  in  Rule  14  of  CCR  vide Notification  No  18/  2012  –  CE  (NT)  dated  17-03-2012 would  have  retrospective  operation.

Exemption from late fee u/s. 20(6) of the MVAT Act Trade Circular 8T of 2014 dated. 11-03-2014.

fiogf49gjkf0d
By this Circular, the Commissioner has explained different contingencies in which late fee would be exempt.

Notification No. VAT 1513/CR-109/Taxation-1 dated 13-01-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry D-11 has been amended to add more areas.

Notification No. VAT 1514/CR-8/Taxation-1 dated 20-02-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry A-9A: paddy rice, wheat, etc.; A-51: papad, gur, etc.; A-59: raisins and currants, C-108: tea in leaf or powdered form etc., have been amended by extending the period up to 31st March, 2015.

Notification No. VAT 1514/CR-10/Taxation-1 dated 20-02-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry B-1, B-2 has been amended by reducing rate from 1.1% to 1 % again.

levitra

Revised returns to be filed by developers Trade Circular 7T of 2014 dated. 21-02-2014

fiogf49gjkf0d
In terms of amendment in Rule 58 of the MVAT Act, the developers can file revised returns for the period from 20-06-2006 to 31-12-2013 up to 30-04-2014. The developer who have already been assessed can make their claim before the Appellate Authority. In case of cancellation of the assessment u/s. 23(11), they can claim, before the Assessing Authority passing, the fresh assessment order. Developer can revise the returns even in cases where notice of assessment is received.

levitra

Extension for filing Audit Report in Form 704 for F.Y. 2012-13 by developers

fiogf49gjkf0d
Trade Circular 6T of 2014 dated 21-02-2014

In case of the developers (Other than those opting for composition scheme), if MVAT Audit report for the F. Y. 2012-13 is filed up to 31st March, 2014 it is decided administratively not to levy penalty u/s. 61(2) of the MVAT Act.

levitra

Exemption w.r.t. rice

fiogf49gjkf0d
Notification No. 04/2014-ST read with Circular No.177/03/2014 – ST dated 17th February, 2014

This Notification has been issued by CBEC for implementing the changes proposed in the Interim Budget presented by the Finance Minister.

The Notification amends Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST to provide that service tax would not be payable on rice from the staple’s loading to the storage stage. It may be noted that rice was originally exempt from service tax. However, later, the Finance Ministry had taken a view that only paddy is an agricultural produce, while rice is a processed item.

This notification also exempts services provided by cord blood banks by way of preservation of stem cells or any other service in relation to such preservation.

levitra

Hotel Ashoka (Indian Tour. Dev. Cor. Ltd) vs. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Another, [2012] 48 VST 443 (SC).

fiogf49gjkf0d
Sale in Course of Import or Export – Sale of
Goods In Air Port – By Duty Free Shop – Is Sale in Course of Imports,
section 5 (2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS:
The
appellant dealer is managed by the Indian Tourism Department
Corporation having duty free shops at all major international air ports
in India. At the duty free shops, the dealer sold several articles
including liquor to foreigners and also to Indians, who are going abroad
or coming to India by air. The dealer claimed the sale of goods to
customers as sale in course of Import and the goods were delivered
before importing the goods or before the goods had crossed the customs
frontiers of India. The Karnataka sales tax authorities levied tax while
passing an assessment order on such sales made by the duty free shop at
Bengaluru. The dealer filed writ petition before the Karnataka High
Court against the said assessment order. The Karnataka High Court
dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground that the dealer had not
exhausted equally efficacious alternative remedy available to it under
the provisions of the Act. The dealer filed a special Leave Petition
before the SC against the said judgment of the High Court.

HELD:
It
is an admitted fact that the goods were imported by the dealer from
foreign countries and were kept in a bonded warehouse and they were
transferred to duty free shops situated at the Bengaluru International
Airport, as and when the stock of goods lying at the duty free shops was
exhausted. When the goods are kept in bonded warehouses, it cannot be
said that the said goods had crossed the customs frontiers of India. The
goods are not cleared from the customs till they are brought in India
by crossing the customs frontiers. When any transaction takes place
outside the customs frontiers of India, the transaction would be said to
have taken place outside India. Though the transaction might take place
within India but technically looking to the provisions of section 2(11)
of the Customs Act and Article 286 of the constitution, the said
transaction would be said to have taken place outside India.

The
SC further held that submissions of the department with regard to the
sale not taking effect by transfer of document of title to the goods are
absolutely irrelevant. The Transfer of document of title to the goods
is one of the methods whereby delivery of goods is effected. The
delivery may be physical also. At the duty free shops, goods are sold to
the customers by giving physical delivery, it would not mean the sales
were taxable under the Act. Accordingly, the SC allowed the SLP filed by
the dealer and quashed the assessment so far as the transactions which
were the subject matter of the litigation.

levitra

Larsen & Turbo Limited vs. State of Orissa And Others, [2012] 48 VST 435 (or Orissa)

fiogf49gjkf0d
Value Added Tax – Works Contract – Taxable Turnover – Deduction Provided For Other Like Charges – No Rules Framed to Prescribed “Other Like Charges” –Provisions Uncertain and Unworkable, section 11(2) ( c) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and R 6(e) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Rules 2005.

FACTS:
The dealer filed a Writ Petition before The Orissa High Court to declare Provision of section 11(2) (c) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Act, 2004 as well as rule 6(e) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 unworkable.

HELD:
Section 11(2)( c) of The Act provides for deduction towards labour, service charges and other like charges, the Rule 6(e) provides for deduction of labour and service charges only from the gross turnover to arrive at the taxable turnover in respect of works contract. Thus, even though section 11(2) (c ) provides deduction towards “ Other like charges” besides labour and service charges, the rules do not provide any such deductions. When the statute provides that something is to be prescribed in the rules then that thing must be provided in the rules with a view to making the provision workable and valid. Thus, if the measure of tax is not provided either under the Act or under the rules, the levy itself becomes uncertain and such uncertainty proves fatal to the validity of the taxing statute. To avoid such uncertainty, the State Government was directed by the High Court to amend rule 6(e) to bring in line with judgment of the SC in the Gannon Dunkerley’s case [1993] 88 STC 204 (SC) and the Commissioner of Sales Tax was directed to issue suitable instructions to all the taxing authorities to allow various deductions from the gross turnover to arrive at the taxable turnover in respect of the works contract in terms of decision of the SC in the Gannon Dunkerley’s case. The High Court allowed writ Petitions with the aforesaid directions/observations.

levitra

Commissioner of Trade Tax U. P. Lucknow vs. Project Technologist Pvt. Ltd. [2012] 48 VST 406 (All)

fiogf49gjkf0d
Central Sales Tax – Penalty- Issue of C Form- Representation That Goods Purchased are Covered by Registration Certificate-No Mensrea- Penalty Not Justified, SS 10(b) and 10A of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS:
The dealer purchased cable and light fittings against Form C, thereby giving a declaration that the goods purchased are covered by a registration certificate. The department imposed penalty u/s. 10A read with section 10(b) of the CST Act on the ground that the goods were not covered by a registration certificate issued to the dealer. In appeal, filed by the dealer, the Tribunal set aside the order levying penalty. The department filed a revision Petition before the Allahabad High Court against the said order of the Tribunal.

HELD:
In view of provisions of sections 10(b) and 10A of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, a penalty can be imposed if the dealer has made a false representation. Where there is a bona fide act of the dealer, being under a bona fide belief that the goods in question are covered by the registration certificate then the provision for imposing penalty u/s. 10(b) does not apply. Thus, no penalty can be imposed. Though, under the registration certificate the dealer was authorised to import ‘consumables’, the items “cables and light fittings” were not specifically mentioned in the registration certificate, still the use of the word “ consumables” in the registration certificate showed that the dealer did not import “cables and light fittings” under any mala fide intentions. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revisions petition filed by the department and confirmed the order of the Tribunal knocking off the levy of penalty imposed by the lower authority.

levitra

[2014] 42 taxmann.com 396 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Aksh Technologies Ltd. vs. CCE.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether CENVAT credit can be disallowed in the hands of the service receiver on the ground that it was subsequently held that the input services were not liable to tax – Held, No.

Facts:
The three issues involved in this case were, (i) whether the appellant was required to pay Service tax on services received prior to 18-04-2006 when section 66A was introduced in the Finance Act, 1994 (ii) whether Service tax liability in such cases could have been discharged through the CENVAT credit (iii) whether the appellant could have taken credit of the Service tax paid by debiting the CENVAT account (since the services itself were not liable to Service tax).

Held:
The first two issues were decided in favour of the assessee relying upon the decision of Indian National Shipowners Association vs. Union of India [2009] 18 STT 212 (Bom.) and Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. [2012] 35 STT 391 (Punj. & Har) respectively. As regards the third issue, the Hon’ble Tribunal held that, there was no dispute that the impugned services were input services and then in such circumstances, the credit taken under CENVAT Credit Rules cannot be disputed for the reason that later it was decided that the appellant need not have paid the service tax.

levitra

[2014] 42 taxmann.com 51 (Allahabad) – CCE vs. Juhi Alloys Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Rule 9(3) of CCR- What constitutes reasonable steps to ensure the validity of the CENVAT?

Facts:
The Assessee took credit of duty paid on inputs based on invoices issued by the First Stage Dealer (FSD). Inputs were used for the manufacture of final products which were cleared against the payment of duty. The Department sought to deny credit on the ground that original manufacturer of said goods was found to be non-existent.

The Commissioner (Appeals) observed that in terms of Rule 7(4) read with Rule 9(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 (CCR), the assessee submitted Form 31 issued by Trade Tax Department, the ledger account evidencing payments by cheques made to the FSD and Form RG 23-A, Part-II. It was held that the assessee had received goods against the invoices of FSD for which payment was made by cheque and that the manufactured goods were cleared against the payment of central excise duty. He, therefore, allowed the Appeal on the ground that the transaction was bona fide and a buyer can take only those steps which are within his control and would not be expected to verify the records of the supplier to check whether, in fact, he had paid duty on the goods supplied by him. Tribunal also observed that, the fact that FSD is a registered dealer is undisputed and held that, it would be sufficient for the assessee to buy the goods from the FSD whose status he has checked and verified and dismissed the Revenue’s Appeal.

Before the High Court, the Revenue contended that the assessee ought to have made an enquiry which would have indicated that the original manufacturer that had supplied the raw material was a fictitious entity.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court while examining the provisions of Rule 9(3) of CCR held that, the Explanation to Rule 9(3) provides a deeming definition as to when a manufacturer or a purchaser of excisable goods would be deemed to have taken reasonable steps. However, even in a situation where the Explanation to Rule 9(3) is not attracted, it would be open to an assessee to establish independently that he had in fact taken reasonable steps. Whether an assessee has in fact taken reasonable steps, is a question of fact. The High Court observed that both fact finding authorities found that assessee have duly acted with all reasonable diligence in its dealings with the first stage dealer and held that, the assessee has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the inputs for which the CENVAT credit was taken were the goods on which appropriate duty of excise was paid within the meaning of Rule 9(3) of CCR.

levitra

[2014] 42 taxmann.com 64 (Jharkand HC) – CCE vs. Tata Motors Ltd

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether the CENVAT Credit on inputs can be denied to the receiver of input on the grounds that supplier of raw materials did not deposit duty to the Government? Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee claimed the MODVAT credit in respect of the inputs supplied to the assessee on the strength of invoices issued to it. The full amount of invoices was paid by the appellant to the supplier. The inputs supplied were excisable items was also not in dispute. The MODVAT credit was denied only on the ground that the supplier did not actually deposit the excise duty payable on the said inputs supplied to the assessee. The Revenue relying upon Rule 57G contended that, unless the duty was paid on inputs, no MODVAT credit can be availed by the assessee. Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of IDL Chemicals Ltd. vs. CCE 1996 (88) ELT 710 (Tri – Cal.).

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court held that, once a buyer of inputs receives invoices 17 of excisable items, unless factually established to the contrary, the buyer is entitled to assume that the excise duty has been/ will be paid by the supplier on the excisable inputs. It would be most unreasonable and unrealistic to expect the buyer of such inputs to go and verify the accounts of the supplier or to find out from the department of Central Excise whether duty has actually been paid on the inputs by the supplier. No business can be carried out like this and the law does not expect the impossible. The High Court overruled the decision in the case of IDL Chemicals relied upon by the Revenue holding it as incorrect.

levitra

[2014] 42 taxmann.com 347 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Umasons Auto Compo (P.) Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
In respect of services covered under RCM, if service tax is undisputedly paid by the service provider, whether it can be once again demanded from service receiver? Held, No.

Facts:
Both the adjudication authority and the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the demand on the ground that the appellant being recipient of GTA service is liable to pay Service tax. The Appellant contended that, he has paid Service tax to the service provider and service provider in turn has paid the same to the Government. The revenue submitted that, in such case, service receiver was not discharged of its statutory liability and if the Service tax is paid by service provider he can seek refund thereof.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that there is no dispute regarding payment of Service tax by the provider of GTA service and therefore held that once the amount of Service tax is accepted by the Revenue from the provider of GTA service, it cannot be again demanded from the recipient of the GTA service.

levitra

[2014] 42 taxmann.com 343 (Chennai – CESTAT) (LB)- Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether the CENVAT Credit can be utilised for payment of Service tax on GTA service under reverse charge for the period post 19-04-2006? Held, Yes

Facts:
The Assessee received goods transport agency’s (GTA) service and paid Service tax thereon under reverse charge utilising the CENVAT credit during the period April 2006-September 2006.

The Revenue’s contention was that since the GTA service were not output service, they are not entitled to use the CENVAT credit for payment of Service tax on such services. The Revenue further contended that since the issue was from April, 2006 to September, 2006 and the legal fiction given to the said service to treat as output service, as defined in Rule 2(p) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) was withdrawn with effect from 19-04-2006 inasmuch as Explanation thereto was deleted, the ratio of Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. [2012] 35 STT 391 (Punj. & Har) (which was in the context of pre-amended period) is not applicable to this case. The Revenue also relied upon the decision of Single Member Decision in the case of Uni Deritend Ltd. vs. CC&CE [2012] 34 STT 356/17 taxmann.com 102 (Mum) rendered in the context of post amendment period in support of its contention.

The Assessee contended that, the fact of withdrawal/ deletion of explanation to Rule 2(p) of CCR did not have much effect inasmuch as no amendment was made in the provisions of Rule 2(r) “provider of taxable service” of CCR which included a person liable to pay Service tax. Assessee submitted that, since the assessee was liable to pay Service tax in respect of GTA service received by him, he is a provider of taxable service and consequently he is covered by the definition of output service. He also relied upon the decision of Division Bench in the case of Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. 2011 (24) STR 670 (Tri-Del).

Held:
Accepting the assessee’s contention and approving the decision in the case of Shree Rajasthan Syntex (supra), it was held that the assessee being recipient of services from the GTA was liable to pay the Service tax and as such, he is provider of taxable Service in terms of Rule 2(r) and consequently gets covered by output service definition as appearing in Rule 2(p) of the Rules. It further held that deletion of explanation with effect from 18-04-2006 from Rule 2(p) of the CCR would not make much difference.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 422 (Tri-Chennai) Uniworld Logistics Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether profit earned on ocean freight is exigible to Service tax under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’?

Tribunal took a prima facie view that, Service tax is not applicable on the profit earned on ocean freight by Appellant and its foreign counterparts while granting unconditional stay against Order of department demanding Service tax under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’.

levitra

2014 (33) STR 376 (Tri-Delhi) Ester Industries Limited vs. CCE, Meerut –II

fiogf49gjkf0d
Whether shortage of materials in an internal statement of stock taking is a ground for denial of CENVAT credit?

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer of Polyester Films, availed the CENVAT credit on various inputs and capital goods. During the departmental audit, Revenue noticed shortage in raw materials as per internal stock statement and accordingly, demanded the duty to the extent of credit involved in the differential value of materials. The Appellant contended that there were no actual shortage and offered to provide the reconciliation.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the entire case was on account of shortage of cenvatable inputs as per statement of the Appellant and there was no allegation or evidence that the said inputs were not received or cleared without duty payment, hence the order was set aside.

levitra

[2014] 41 taxmann.com 287 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Roca Bath Room Products (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE, Jaipur

fiogf49gjkf0d
Pre-deposit waiver – Reversal of CENVAT credit in respect of inputs, input services used in manufacture of non-dutiable capital goods used and thereafter sold as scrap.

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer of sanitary-ware made Plaster of Paris (POP) moulds. For the manufacture of POP moulds, it used propane gas and input services in respect of which the CENVAT credit was taken. After its use, the POP moulds were sold as waste. The department was of the view that since, in respect of manufacture of POP moulds, CENVAT credit on inputs and input services has been availed, as per the provisions of Rule 3(5A) of CCR, 2004, at the time of clearance of such scrap, an amount equal to excise duty on transaction value shall be payable. The Appellant contended that, Rule 3(5A) of CCR, 2004 is applicable only where the CENVAT credit taken on capital goods have been cleared after use, as scrap, while in this case, neither any duty has been paid on POP moulds nor credit of that duty has been taken; that POP scrap is non-excisable and hence in any case, no duty is payable on POP scrap.

Held:
Tribunal held that, prima facie, Rule 3(5A) of CCR, 2004 applies to those cases where the CENVAT credit was availed on capital goods after use in the factory are cleared as scrap and waste and only in such situation an amount equal to the duty on transaction value of such scrapped capital goods is required to be reversed. In this case, POP moulds cannot be said to be cenvated capital goods, as the CENVAT credit has been taken of the duty/service tax paid on inputs/input services, not of excise duty on POP moulds. Accordingly pre-deposit of duty, interest and penalty was waived.

levitra

[2014] 41 taxmann.com 311 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) – Dilip Parikh vs. CST, Ahmedabad

fiogf49gjkf0d
Pre-deposit Waiver – Threshold Exemption is prima facie available to each Co-owner separately.

Facts:
The Appellants were co-owners of a building which was rented out to a person. The said person issued separate cheques to individual Appellant as they were co-owners of the property. The amount received by the individual Appellant was within the threshold exemption limit and therefore no Service tax was paid. The department contended that, for individual purposes and for the purpose of benefit of individual co-owners, the Appellants sought the payment individually, hence the Service tax liability should be considered after taking into account collective rent received by the Appellants.

Held:
The Tribunal after perusing the threshold Exemption Notification and agreements between the parties held that, amount of rent received by individual Appellant is specifically mentioned in the agreement so as to make it specific that individually they are renting out the property to a person. Hence, individually, each of the Appellants would be considered as provider of such service, whose aggregate value did not exceed the threshold limit. Complete waiver of pre-deposit was granted.

levitra

(2011) 23 STR 265 (Tri.-Chennai) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Coimbatore v. Lakshmi Technology & Engineering Indus Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Cenvat credit — Renting of immovable property services provided by manufacturer of excisable goods — Manufacturer used credit from a common pool of excise, customs and service tax —Rule permit taking of such credit under a common pool and permit use of such credit for different purposes and thus the utilisation held valid.

Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer of satellite components and aircraft components, also provided service of renting of immovable property. They used the credit in Cenvat account for paying excise duty on the goods cleared by them and also for paying service tax on service rendered under the category of Renting of Immovable Property. SCN was issued alleging that capital goods, inputs and input services on which credit was taken had no nexus with the renting of property service and thus Cenvat credit could not be utilised by them and demanded service tax accordingly along with interest and penalty.

Held:
It was held that a manufacturer of excisable goods is entitled to use the credit from a common pool to which different categories of specified excise duties, customs duty and service tax are allowed to be taken of.

levitra

(2011) 23 STR 263 (Tri.-Del.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad v. Azzam Rubber Products Ltd.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Refund — Double payment of service tax by recipient of GTA services — Tax incidence paid by present respondent — Disclaimer certificate produced from transporters — U/s.11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 not necessary that person paying tax has to claim refund — Revenue’s appeal rejected.

Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer of footwear, availed the services of goods transports agency i.e., for transportation of inputs and final products. The respondents while depositing service tax mentioned the name of the transporter inadvertently on the challan instead of their own name. On realising their mistake, remitted the tax again vide TR6 challan. The respondents filed an application for refund of tax paid by them earlier and submitted a disclaimer certificate from the transporter stating they have no objection in the said amount being refunded to the respondent. The Department contended that the refund could be granted only to the transporter who made the actual payment as per TR-6 challan and not to the respondent.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that any person was authorised to claim the refund if the applicant is able to furnish documents to establish that duty of incidence has not been passed on. It was held that in the present case, the duty of incidence was paid by the respondents and hence the Revenue‘s appeal was rejected.

levitra

(2011) 23 STR 254 (Tri.-Del.) — Desert Inn Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Madap-keeper service — Valuation — Parking charges collected from clients includible — Section 65(105)(m) of the Finance Act, 1994 — Suppression of facts — Extended period of limitation can be invoked — Penalty — Option of 25% of penalty within 30 days to be provided.

Facts:
The appellants were providing services of mandapkeeper and paid service tax for the said activity. They also had parking space for which they charged separately from by their clients who enjoyed the services of mandap. A service tax was demanded on the charges for the said parking charges along with interest and penalties.

The appellants contended that they issued separate invoices for the charges and the same was reflected in their balance sheet separately. Also, the major portion of the demand was time-barred. Relying on the judgment in the case of Merwara Estates v. CCE, Jaipur 2009 (16) STR 268 (Tri.-Delhi), the appellants submitted that the penalties are not to be imposed in cases involving interpretation. Further, extended period of limitation was not invocable as suppression could not be alleged on the basis of balance sheet. The appellants relied on the judgment in the case of Martin & Harris Laboratories Ltd. v. CCE, Gurgaon 2005 (185) ELT 421 (Tri.-Delhi). The respondents submitted that without the parking space the mandap could not have been enjoyed by the clients and the car parking charges were not being collected from the persons parking their cars.

Held:
Taking into consideration the definition of ‘Mandapkeeper services’ u/s.65(105)(m) of the Act and the nature of services provided by the appellants, it was held that the services of car parking was in relation to use of the mandap as the car parking was a necessary facility for the use of mandap. The fact of separate collection of car parking charges was not coming clearly in the balance sheet. Extended period of limitation was held invokable as the appellants suppressed the facts from the Department. As regards penalty, it was observed that the appellants were not granted the option of paying 25% of the penalty within 30 days of the order of adjudication as held in the case of K. P. Pouches (P) Ltd. v. UOI, 2008 (228) ELT 331. Also, penalty once imposed u/s.78, penalty u/s.76 is not maintainable. Accordingly, demand of service tax was confirmed along with interest. As regards penalty, an option to pay 25% of the penalty within 30 days of the communication of this order was granted to the appellants.

levitra

(2011) 23 STR 221 (Tri.-Delhi) — Instrumentation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-I.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Work contracts — Liability before 1-6-2007 —
Even in indivisible contract — Lump sum turn key (LSTK) work contracts
or EPC projects — Services provided as part of such contracts liable to
service tax — No mention that service tax is leviable in respect of only
stand-alone activity u/s.65(105) or 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (the
Act) — Service tax attracted if service is taxable — Consulting
Engineering Service — Engineering drawings separately charged in
contract — Activity covered under Consulting Engineer services — Failure
to obtain registration — Returns not filed — Non-payment of service tax
since 1997 — Assessee guilty of suppression — Extended period of
limitation invokable and liable to penalty.

Facts:
The
appellants engaged in the manufacture of telecommunication equipment,
UPS Systems, and primary and secondary instruments, etc., chargeable to
Central Excise duty. In addition, the appellants also designed,
installed and commissioned the electronic control systems, provided
operational training to the customer’s employees and also undertook
repair and maintenance of these equipments as per the contract with
their customers. Pursuant to the introduction of ‘Consulting Engineers’,
‘Installation & Commissioning’ and ‘Repairs and maintenance’ as
taxable services under section 65 of the Act), the appellants took
service tax registration for ‘Repair & Maintenance’ on 1-8-2003 and
for ‘Installation & commissioning’ and ‘Repairs & Maintenance’
on 20-1-2004. A show-cause notice was issued against the appellants in
respect of the ‘Consulting Engineer’ services provided prior to 1-8-2003
for service tax amounting to Rs.40,71,946 along with interest and
penalty.

Key contention of the appellants:
The
appellants did not provide any Consulting Engineer’s services but
executed lump sum turnkey contracts for design, engineering,
manufacture, supply, erection, testing and commissioning of control
systems. The lower Appellate Authority overlooked the law laid by the
Tribunal in the case of Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CCE, Vadodra 2003
(155) ELT 457 and a plethora of other cases holding that “lump sum
turn-key contracts for design, engineering, manufacture, supply,
erection, testing and commissioning cannot be vivisected to levy service
tax on the service components”. The view taken by the Tribunal in the
case of CCE, Raipur v. BSBK Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (253) ELT 522 (Tribunal-LB)
that after 46th Constitution amendment, the service part of a turnkey
contract can be separated from the goods part for levy of service tax
did not apply in the present case as the legal fiction under Article
366(29A) cannot be applied to the laws other than sales tax. The
appellants relied on a plethora of cases such as BSNL v. Union of India,
2006 (3) SCC 1, Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v.
Electricity Inspector, (2007) 5 SCC 447, Geo Miller & Co. (P) Ltd.
v. State of M.P., 2004 (5) SCC 209, etc. Relying on the decision in the
case of Patnaik & Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1965 SC 1655, it was
submitted that drawing and designs prepared were to be treated as
service provided by the appellant to themselves and not a consulting
engineer’s service provided to clients. Separate amount indicated in the
contract for ‘drawing/designing or engineering’ was only for a
milestone payment to be released on preparation and approval of drawings
and could be treated as value attributable to the drawings and
designing. The contracts in the case were indivisible turn-key contracts
with single-point responsibility which could be treated as severable
contracts. Such contracts became taxable as ‘Work contract services’
w.e.f. 1-6-2007 under 65(105)(zzza) of the Act and any activity under
work contract was not taxable prior to that date. The longer period of
limitation for demand of allegedly non-paid service tax was not
available to the Department as they were aware of the activities of the
appellants since 1991.

Key contention of the respondent:
The
services rendered as ‘consulting engineer’ were clearly distinguishable
as the clauses of the contract showed the intention to provide the
services and to charge separately for the same. The Tribunal in the case
of Transformers & Electricals Kerala Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 (1) STR 233
(CESTAT-DB) held that the engineering consultancy component of EPC
contracts was taxable. Further, the terms of the contract clearly
indicated that service tax was rightly demanded on the charges for
drawing, designs and other technical assistance. There was no provision
in the Act that taxable service mentioned in section 65(105) will not be
taxable if provided under a lump sum turn-key contract (LSTK) or as a
work contract. There was no documentary evidence produced to show that
charges for drawing, designs, engineering assistance, etc. in the
contracts and invoices were not the actual charges for these contracts. A
work contract is a service contract and if that service was taxable
w.e.f. 1-6-2007, the same would attract service tax prior to 1-6-2007,
even if it is provided as a lump sum work contract. In addition it was
contended that the decision of Daelim (supra) did not lay down any law
as SLP was summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Karnataka High
Court decision of Turbotech Precision Engineering Pvt. Ltd. was not a
binding precedent as no reasons were provided in the said judgment for
holding works contract as not liable for service tax.

Held:
The
Tribunal held that the preparation of basic and detailed engineering
drawings, on the basis of which erection and installation work was done
and training of clients was technical assistance provided to the clients
and it had to be held as consulting engineer’s services. As regards the
issue of subjecting lump sum turn-key work contracts to service tax
payment and the levying of the same prior to 1-6-2007, the Tribunal
observed that a contract will attract service tax if the service is
taxable u/s.65(105) of the Act and the legal fiction of Article 366(29A)
was of no relevance in this case. Service tax shall be chargeable in
case of a work contract for a particular service which is taxable
u/s.65(105) of the Act, regardless of it being divisible or indivisible.
The meaning of work contract being a contract for work and labour i.e.,
a service contract prior to 1-6-2007 and hence service tax would be
levied on the same prior to 1-6-2007. The contract and the invoices
indicated that the clients were charged for drawings/designs,
engineering and technical training and hence the contracts contained
component of activity covered by ‘Consulting Engineer service’. Hence,
service tax was chargeable. The longer period of limitation of five
years for unpaid service tax was rightly invoked in the light of the
appel-lant’s failure to furnish any explanation for non-payment of
service tax and for not obtaining registration. Penalty imposed u/s.76,
77 and 78 were also rightly imposed as the facts were suppressed.

levitra

(2011) 22 STR 591 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Flex Art Foil Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Daman.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Transfer of CENVAT credit on conversion of partnership firm to Pvt. Ltd. — Credit reversed on audit objection but re-credit taken — Whether permission is required to be taken under Rule 10 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Facts:
The partnership firm under the name and style as M/s. Sushmit Packaging was converted into a private limited company under the name of M/s. Flex Art Folio Pvt. Ltd. (the appellants in the case). The appellants took the credit in terms of the provision 10 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and informed the Revenue. On an audit objection that credit could not be availed suo motu, the appellants reversed the credit taken. However, it was again taken on realising that no permission was required under the said rule. According to the appellant, it was not the case of suo motu refund in accordance with the Rule 10 of the said rules and relied on the decision in the case of Hewlett Packard (India) Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2007 (6) STR 155 (Tribunal). The Revenue contended that even if no permission was required under the said rules, admissibility of the credit on merit was not adjudged by the lower authorities.

Held:
It was held that the denial of credit on the ground that formal permission from the Central Excise Officers was not taken was not justified. However, the matter was remanded to the proper Central Excise Officer since the availability or otherwise of the credit on merits was not adjudged by the lower authorities.

levitra

(2011) 22 STR 583 (Tri.-Bang.) — Durferrit Asea Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Guntur.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Refund of unutilised CENVAT credit — Whether the appellant is eligible for the refund of claim of the CENVAT credit accumulated despite the nonregistration of appellant’s head office as a service tax distributor and non-distribution of service tax credit as per the laid down procedures — Rule 5 and Rule 7 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Facts:
The appellants claimed refund of unutilised credit of Rs.77,150 for the invoices in the name of the head office which was not registered as service tax distributor. The Adjudicating Authority vide order-in-original rejected the refund claim on the ground that in the absence of registration, head office could not distribute the CENVAT credit to the appellant which was an EOU. The appellants contended that the non-observance of procedure of distribution of credit will not come in the way of the refund of the amount of the credit.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the appellants had no other units in the relevant division. There was no requirement to follow Rule 7 (Registration as ISD), wherein the appellants had only one manufacturing unit. The eligibility of the appellants as regards availment of the CENVAT credit on the service tax paid on the input services was not questioned by the Commissioner (Appeals). Further, the provisions of Rule 7 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 come into play only if the appellants wished to get themselves registered as the input service credit distributor, which was not the situation in the instant case. Therefore, the appellants’ claim was allowed by the Tribunal.

levitra

(2011) 22 STR 581 (Tri.-Del.) K. S. Transformers (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-I.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Refund — Unjust enrichment — Section 11B of the Central Excise Act — Service tax on job work found not leviable during specific period. Service tax was however charged by the job worker — Manufacturer did not claim CENVAT credit but issued debit note after a gap of time — Refund claim denied as assessee did not claim immediately — No investigation done to prove debit note wrong — No tax liability without letters of law — Assessee’s appeal allowed.

Facts:
The principal manufacturer issued debit note to the appellant who was a job worker on finding that the service tax on the job work was not leviable during the material period. The appellant was denied refund on the ground that the debit note was issued by the manufacturer after a long time. According to the appellant, they should not suffer by not getting back the money wrongly paid to the Revenue and if the assessee could show that the burden was not passed on or it was reversed, the claim of refund could not be denied. The decisions in the case of Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Shiva Ciba Analyticals (I) Ltd., 2009 and Union of India v. A. K. Spintex Ltd., 2009 (234) E.L.T. 41 (Raj.) were relied upon. According to the Revenue, the appellant was disentitled to the refund as they did not immediately claim the refund and relied on the judgment of the Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II v. Adarsh Gaur Gum Udyog, 2000 (120) E.L.T. 138 (Trib.).

Held:
It was held that the Revenue’s plea does not sustain in light of the failure on part of the Revenue to prove that the debit note was wrong. Further, it was held that when there is no liability to pay tax, the appellant should not suffer and that no taxes can be realised without the letters of law. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

levitra