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[2014] 36 STR 288 (Cal.) Mohta Technocrafts Pvt. Ltd. vs. CESTAT, Kolkata

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Stay application disposed by Tribunal on the reasons of non-coooperation with the adjudicating authority and new grounds taken before it for the first time, was held to be inappropriate.

Facts:
The Appellant filed writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal rejecting the application for waiver of predeposit on the reasons of alleged non-cooperation at the time of adjudication and since new pleas were raised for the first time before it.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court, held that the alleged noncooperation was absent and that the Tribunal’s finding was contrary to the records available and also reason for new plea was perverse. It was held that it is a settled position of law that Tribunal while dealing with application for seeking waiver of pre-deposit shall record the prima facie case and unjust financial hardship and thus the matter was remanded for consideration afresh.

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[2014] 36 STR 271 (Cal) Naresh Kumar & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI

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The High Court may entertain a writ petition in spite of alternate remedy being available, if it is filed for enforcement of fundamental right or actions/proceedings initiated, are in violation of the principles of natural justice or without jurisdiction.

Facts:
The Appellant preferred writ petition against the issuance of Show Cause Notice demanding service tax under “Business Auxiliary Service” (BAS) without mentioning the sub-clause of BAS under which service tax was alleged to be leviable and extended period of limitation was invoked on account of suppression of facts and contravention of provisions with intention to evade tax. Department took preliminary objection to the maintainability of petition since Appellant had an equally efficacious alternative remedy of adjudication before adjudicating authority.

Held:
It was held that normally High Court does not entertain a writ petition where an alternate remedy is available. However, if a writ petition is filed for enforcement of fundamental right or if it proves that actions/proceedings initiated are in violation of the principles of natural justice or without jurisdiction, High Court can intervene and pass appropriate orders. From the records, it was observed that facts of the case were known to the department from beginning and a mere failure to declare does not amount to willful suppression. The initial onus of providing materials to invoke section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, is with the department. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the assessee. In the present case, department failed to discharge their initial onus. The Show Cause Notice even did not mention the relevant sub-Clause of BAS. Accordingly, the Show Cause Notice was held to be issued without jurisdiction and was set aside.

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[2014] 36 STR 269 (All.) CC Customs & Ex. Kanpur vs. J P Transformers

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The Tribunal does not have power to extend the Stay beyond the statutory period of 365 days.

Facts:
Revenue preferred the present appeal challenging the order of Tribunal extending period of Stay beyond 365 days ignoring the third proviso to section 35C (2A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Further, no reason was given for not disposing appeal within 365 days.

Held:

The third proviso undoubtedly bars and prohibits Tribunal from extending the interim Stay Order beyond 365 days. It stipulates deemed vacation and imposes no fault consequences in strict terms. In the instant case, Tribunal had recorded finding that it could not dispose appeal for no fault of the assessee. The Supreme Court in case of Kumar Cotton Mills P. Ltd. 2005 (180) ELT 434 (SC) held that the amendment in third proviso to section 35C(2A) of the Central Excise Act, cannot be interpreted to give powers to the Tribunal to extend the Stay Orders indefinitely. The Tribunal was directed to dispose of the Appeal expeditiously.

(Note: On an identical issue, the Karnataka High Court in CIT, Bangalore vs. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading P. Ltd 2014 (35) STR 320 and the Delhi High Court in Comm. of Income Tax-II vs. Maruti Suzuki (India) Ltd. 2014 (35) STR 284 had held that the Tribunal cannot extend the Stay beyond statutory period of 365 days.)

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[2014] 36 STR 241 (Bom.) Tech Mahindra Ltd. vs. CCEx. Pune-III

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No refund of CENVAT Credit on the onsite services not provided from India, since it does not fulfill the conditions of export of services.

Facts:
The Appellant, an Indian entity entered into a contract to develop software for a US based customer. The offsite activities were performed in India and onsite activities were carried out by the Appellant’s US based subsidiary. There was no privity of contract between the US based subsidiary and the customer. The subsidiary billed the Appellant for the work done by it. The services provided to the customer were claimed to be export of services. For the payments made to its subsidiary, service tax was discharged considering it to be import of services and was claimed as CENVAT Credit and being unable to utilise, applied for refund.

Department after allowing refund claim in totality for initial years, rejected the claim proportionately to the extent of onsite services for subsequent years stating that onsite activities were not provided from India and therefore, there was violation of condition of Rule 3(2)(a) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005.

It was argued that if the onsite services were held to be not provided from India then the same would not take colour of import of services and therefore, service tax pad thereon should be eligible for refund u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Held:
High Court observed that onsite services were admittedly rendered by the US subsidiary to the customer and there was no privity of contract between them and hence could not be regarded as export of services since the condition that the services should be provided from India, was not fulfilled and thus no refund proportionate to onsite services was granted. Further, the alternative argument in respect of refund was not entertained by the Court since an application for refund under the same was not made.

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[2014] 36 STR 3 (Guj.) Sadguru Construction Co. vs. Union of India

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Payment between 01-03-2013 and 10-05-2013, i.e., till enactment of Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme, 2013 (VCES), could be covered within the definition of “tax dues” under VCES in view of express statutory provisions.

Payments made under duress are in the nature of deposits till crystallisation of tax liability by way of passing an adjudication order, Circulars, contrary to statutory provisions, are bad in law.

Facts:
Petitioners faced an inquiry on 08-03-2013 and deposited some amount under duress between 09-03-2013 to 15-04-2013 in respect of service tax liability upto 31- 03-2013. To get immunity from interest, penalty and other proceedings, it was claimed that payments made between 09-03-2013 to 15-03-2013 were covered within the definition of “tax dues” and should be considered as made under VCES, since it remains unpaid as on 01- 03-2013. The department, following CBEC circular No. 170/5/2013-S dated 08-08-2013, contended that the amount deposited before enactment of VCES i.e. 10- 05-2013 cannot be included in the declaration under VCES. It was argued that the department cannot rely on a circular which overrides statutory provisions of the law i.e. definition of ‘tax dues’ under VCES.

Held:
Having regard to the definition of “tax dues” and provisions pertaining to the person eligible to make declaration, the Hon’ble High Court observed that the position of a declarant vis-à-vis his service tax dues would have to be ascertained as on 01-03-2013. If any proceedings were pending on 01-03-2013, then declaration cannot be accepted. Further, the arrears of tax dues between 01-10- 2007 to 31-12-2012, unpaid till 01-03-2013 could only be declared. Since there was no inquiry pending and the tax dues were unpaid as on 01-03-2013, the benefit of VCES could not be denied. The amount was under duress and was in the nature of deposit in absence of crystallisation of tax liability by passing an adjudication order. Further, clarification cannot override statutory provisions of the statute and if they are contrary to provisions, the clarifications would be invalid.

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Sale in course of export, whether within the purview of the Local Act?

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Introduction
The sales or purchases taking place in the course of import/export are immune from sales tax as per Article 286 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, such transactions are exempt from sales tax (VAT). The transactions of export sales and sale in the course of export are defined in section 5(1) & 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act,1956 (CST) as under;

Section 5. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export. –

(1) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the export of the goods out of the territory of India, only if the sale or purchase either occasions such export or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods after the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in s/s.(1), the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.

Controversy
A controversy that had arisen and still remains, is as to whether the export sale is to be first considered as effected within the State in which the goods for export are ascertained and then categorised as ‘export sale’? If the sales are first considered as sales within the State from which export is made then they will form part of the turnover in the said State and then deduction will be given towards export sale. This will have a number of implications as per provisions of the Local Act. On the other hand, if it is considered that they are outside the purview of the Local Act then they will not form part of the turnover in that State and will remain outside the turnover. This may also have its own repercussions as per provisions of the Local Act.

Issue before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court
A controversy arose before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in respect of interpretation of Rule 42H of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules (BST). The Hon’ble Bombay High Court has reproduced the rule, the relevant portion of which is reproduced below:

“R. 42H. Drawback, setoff etc. of tax paid on goods purchased by a dealer liable for levy of value added of sales tax on goods specified in Schedule C.

(1) While assessing the amount of tax payable by a Registered dealer (hereinafter, in this rule, referred to as “the claimant dealer”) in respect of any period starting on or after the 1st October 1995 on his sales of goods (being goods in respect of which the deduction from turnover of sales has not been allowed under sub-section (1) of section 8 because of the provision contained in s/s. (3) or, as the case may be, in sub-section (3A) of section 12A, the Commissioner shall, subject to the provisions of sub Rule (2), grant him drawback, setoff or, as the case may be, a refund of aggregate of the sums determined in accordance with the provisions of Rule 44D in respect of purchase of such goods including the goods used for packing of such goods.

Provided that, drawback, set off or, as the case may be, refund under this rule shall not exceed the tax payable on the sale of such goods, not being sales against any declaration or certificate prescribed under the Act, Rules or as the case may be, any entry of Schedule to the notification issued u/s. 41:

Provided further that, if the dealer effects any sales by way of a delivery of goods as hire purchase of any system of payment by instalments, then the amount of drawback, setoff, or as the case may be, refund under this rule shall be in proportion to the purchase price of that instalment.”

The appellant dealer has sold goods against form 14B, so as to claim exemption u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act,1956 r/w Rule 21A of the BST Rules.

The department interpreted that since the sales covered by section 5(3) cannot be said to be disallowed because of section 12A of the BST Act,1959, the set off is not admissible on the purchases relating to such sales under rule 42H. On the other hand, the dealer was canvassing that first it is a local sale covered by BST Act, 1959 and since resale is not admissible, he has sold the goods against form 14B and hence, set off is admissible.

After noting the controversy, as above, the Hon’ble High Court observed as under in relation to nature of sales effected u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act:

“13) A bare perusal of this Rule would indicate that a dealer may make a claim that he is not liable to pay tax under the BST in respect of his sale of goods on the ground that the sale of such goods is a sale in the course of export of the goods out of the territory of India within the meaning of sub-section (3) of section 5 of the CST. He can therefore produce a certificate in the Form referred by us above along with evidence of export of such goods and claim exemption in respect of the liability to pay the Sales Tax. Pertinently, this form has to be filled in and signed by the exporter to whom the goods are sold. Section 5 of the CST contains s/s. (3). Section 5 has been inserted in the CST so as to determine as to when a sale or purchase of goods can be said to be taking place in the course of import or export. Sub-Section (3) was inserted therein with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1976, which reads as under:

“(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in s/s. (1), the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.” 14) A bare perusal thereof would indicate that the same has been inserted so as to take out of the purview of the provision namely, section 5, the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India. That is also deemed to be in the course of such export, provided such last sale or purchase took place after and was for the purpose of complying with an agreement or order for or in relation to such export. Ordinarily this would not have been within the purview of sub-section (1) of section 5. Therefore, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 5, such sale or purchase is also deemed to be in the course of the export. This aspect becomes clear if one peruses section 75 of the BST, which specifically excludes, from the purview of the BST, certain sales and purchases. This section reads as under:

Section 75 Certain sales and purchases not to be liable to tax.
Nothing in this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be deemed to impose or authorise the imposition of a tax on any sale or purchase of any goods, where such sale or purchase takes place (a) (i) outside the State; or (ii) in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India, or the export of the goods out of such territory; or (b) in the course of interstate trade or commerce, and the provisions of this Act and the said rules shall be read and construed accordingly.

Explanation. For the purpose of this section whether a sale or purchase takes place
(i) outside the State, or
(ii) in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India or export of the goods out of such territory, or
(iii) in the course of interstate trade or commerce, shall be determined in accordance with the principles specified in section 3, 4 and 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.”

15)    Therefore, the sales and purchases which are not liable to tax under the BST by virtue of section 75 have been rightly excluded or taken out of the purview of Rule 42H and that is the only interpretation which can be placed on the said Rule. If one peruses section 5 and particularly s/s. (1) and s/s. (3) of the CST together with section 75 of the BST, Rule 21A of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, Form N14B harmoniously and together, it would be apparent that what is not within the purview of the BST can never be brought in for the purposes of claiming a deduction or setoff under Rule 42H. If that is the intent of legislature and it has been given effect to by the Tribunal in the impugned order, then we do not find that its conclusion  is vitiated.”

Conclusion

From the above  observations,  an  inference  arises  that the sales covered u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act cannot  be considered as within the purview of Local Act. The implication is that it cannot be clubbed into turnover under Local Act at all. However, there are earlier judgments like M/s. Onkarlal Nandlal vs.State of Rajasthan (60 STC 314)(SC) and also N. D. Georgopoulos vs. State of Maharashtra (37 STC 187)(bom), wherein it was held that the situs of export sale is in the State, from where the sale is effected i.e., from where the export is made. In other words, it is first considered to be within purview of the Local Act and then the deduction.

The above judgment of the Bombay High Court creates a different scenario. This will certainly be a pointer for debate and a further judgment may have to be awaited to get the clarity.

TIME LIMIT FOR AVAILING CENVAT CREDIT

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Preliminary
For the first time, since the introduction of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR, 2004) with effect from 10-09-2004, time limit has been introduced (with effect from 01-09- 2014) for availing CENVAT Credit on inputs and input services. Similar time limit was introduced under the erstwhile MODVAT Rules in the year 1995. However, the same was withdrawn in the year 2000 when CENVAT Rules were introduced in supersession of MODVAT Rules.

An analysis of implications arising from the newly introduced time limit under CCR 2004 and related larger issues are discussed hereafter.

CENVAT (earlier MODVA T) is a substantive right

Some important observations by the Supreme Court, in the context of erstwhile MODVAT Scheme, are very much relevant for CCR 2004 as well, are as under:

Observations of Supreme Court in Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. UOI (1999) 106 ELT 3 (SC)

In the context of specific provisions that were introduced under the erstwhile MODVAT Rules for lapsing of unutilised credit in specific cases, the following observations were made by the Supreme Court

Para 5
…………

In 1995-96 Budget Modvat Scheme was liberalised/ simplified and the credit earned on any input was allowed to be utilised for payment of duty on any final product manufactured within the same factory irrespective of whether such inputs were used in its manufacture or not.…….. The stand of the assessee is that they have utilised the facility of paying excise duty on the inputs and carried the credit towards excise duty payable on the finished products. For the purpose of utilisation of the credit all vestitive facts or necessary incidents thereto have taken place prior to 16-03-1995 or utilisation of the finished products prior to 16-03-1995. Thus, the assessee became entitled to take the credit of the input instantaneously once the input is received in the factory on the basis of the existing scheme….. the right to the credit has become absolute at any rate when the input is used in the manufacture of the final product. The basic postulate, that the scheme is merely being altered and, therefore, does not have any retrospective or retro-active effect, submitted on behalf of the State, does not appeal to us. As pointed out by us that when on the strength of the rules available certain acts have been done by the parties concerned, incidents following thereto must take place in accordance with the scheme under which the duty had been paid on the manufactured products and if such a situation is sought to be altered, necessarily it follows that right, which had accrued to a party such as availability of a scheme, is affected and, in particular, it loses sight of the fact that provision for facility of credit is as good as tax paid till tax is adjusted on future goods on the basis of the several commitments which would have been made by the assessees concerned. Therefore, the scheme sought to be introduced cannot be made applicable to the goods which had already come into existence in respect of which the earlier scheme was applied under which the assessees had availed of the credit facility for payment of taxes. It is on the basis of the earlier scheme necessarily the taxes have to be adjusted and payment made complete. Any manner or mode of application of the said rule would result in affecting the rights of the assessees.

Para 6

We may look at the matter from another angle. If on the inputs the assessee had already paid the taxes on the basis that when the goods are utilised in the manufacture of further products as inputs thereto then the tax on these goods gets adjusted which are finished subsequently. Thus, a right accrued to the assessee on the date when they paid the tax on the raw materials or the inputs and that right would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed.

(emphasis supplied)

Observations of the Supreme Court in CCE vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC)

Para 17
………..
It is clear from these Rules, as we read them, that a manufacturer obtains credit for the excise duty paid on raw material to be used by him in the production of an excisable product immediately it makes the requisite declaration and obtain an acknowledgement thereof. It is entitled to use the credit at any time thereafter when making payment of excise duty on the excisable product. There is no provision in the Rules which provides for a reversal of the credit by the excise authorities except where it has been illegally or irregularly taken, in which event it stands cancelled or, if utilised, has to be paid for. We are here really concerned with credit that has been validly taken, and its benefit is available to the manufacturer without any limitation in time or otherwise unless the manufacturer itself chooses not to use the raw material in its excisable product. The credit is, therefore, indefeasible. It should also be noted that there is no co–relation of the raw material and the final product; that is to say, it is not as if credit can be taken only on a final product that is manufactured out of the particular raw material to which the credit is related. The credit may be taken against the excise duty on a final product manufactured on the very day that it becomes available.

Para 18

It is therefore, that in the case of Eicher Motors vs. Union of India (1999) 106 ELT 3 this Court said that a credit under the MODVAT Scheme was “as good as tax paid.”

(emphasis supplied)

Observations of judicial forums under erstwhile MODVAT Scheme when no time limit was prescribed

In CCE vs. Mysore Lac & Paint Works Ltd. (1991) 52 ELT 590 (CEGAT), it was held that six months is a reasonable time for taking CENVAT Credit.

In one case, it was held that in the absence of any time limit, CENVAT Credit can be taken any time – even after three or four years. – SAIL vs. CCE (2000) 41 RLT 706 (CEGAT) – followed in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. CCE (2001) 129 ELT 459 (CEGAT).

In Coromandal Fertilizer Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 239 ELT 99 (Tri – Bang), it has been held that, when the law is settled on the issue, there is no justification to deny the credit on the ground that it is availed after three to seven years from the date of receipt of inputs. Further, since the CENVAT Credit Rules do not prescribe any outer limit, the Revenue’s contention that credit should be availed within reasonable period is not acceptable.

Useful reference can also be made to judicial rulings in J. V. Strips Ltd. vs. CCE (2007) 218 ELT 252 (Tri – Del) where credits taken after a considerable delay was denied to the assessee and Essar Steel vs. CCE (2008) 222 ELT 154 (Tri – Ahd).

It is evident from the above that in the absence of specific provisions in regard to time limit for availing credit, judicial authorities did consider time limit for claiming refund under Central Excise (viz., six months at the relevant time) as a reasonable time for taking credits. However, it needs to be noted that, the time limit for claiming refund under Central Excise/Service tax has since been increased from six months to one year.

Observations when time limit was prescribed under erstwhile MODVAT Scheme

Supreme Court Ruling in Osram Surya (P) Ltd. vs. CCE (2012) 142 ELT 5 (SC)

Prior to the introduction of the second proviso to Rule 57G i.e., prior to 29-06-1995, a manufacturer was en- titled to withdraw the said credit at any time without there being a limitation on such withdrawal. On 29-06- 1995, second proviso to Rule 57G was introduced by substituting the then existing proviso and the newly introduced proviso read thus : “Provided further that the manufacturer shall not take credit after six months of the date of issue of any of the documents specified in first proviso to this sub-rule:”

In the said case, the appellants who had received their inputs for the manufacture of their respective products, had taken credit under the Modvat Scheme, admittedly, six months after the date of issue of the documents specified in the said proviso to Rule 57G. Therefore, the said credit was disallowed by the authorities. This action of the authorities was questioned by the appellants before the Tribunal, contending that the benefit of the credit which had accrued to them prior to the introduction of the second proviso to the said Rule, cannot be taken away by introduction of a limitation because it was a vested right accrued to them prior to the coming into force of the said proviso to the Rule. They also contended that, the said proviso is not retrospective in its operation and is only applicable to the inputs received by a manufacturer after the introduction of the said proviso. Further, since the said proviso did not specifically state that it is taking away the vested right of a manufacturer, the proviso should be read to mean that the same is not applicable in regard to the credit accrued to a manufacturer prior to the introduction of the said Rule.

On behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that the language of the newly introduced proviso is very clear and admits no ambiguity, therefore, the question of interpretation of the Rule contrary to the said language does not arise at all and on a plain reading of the Rule, the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that after the in- troduction of the said proviso to the Rule, no manufacturer could avail of credit subsequent to a period of six months, as stipulated in the said proviso.

The observations and findings of the Supreme Court are as under:

Para 6

At the outset, we must note that none of the appellants have challenged the validity of the said proviso, therefore, we will have to proceed on the basis that the proviso in question is a valid one. In that background, the sole question that we will have to consider will be: whether the proviso to the Rule in question is applicable to the cases of manufacturers who had received their inputs prior to the introduction of the said proviso and are seeking to take credit in regard to the said inputs beyond the period of six months.

Para 7

……….by introducing the limitation in the said proviso to the Rule, the statute has not taken away any of the vested rights which had accrued to the manufacturers under the Scheme of Modvat. That vested right continues to be in existence and what is restricted is the time within which the manufacturer has to enforce that right. The appellants, however, contended that imposition of a limitation is as good as taking away the vested right. In support of their argument, they have placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. Union of India [1999] 106 ELT 3 (SC)] wherein this Court had held that a right accrued to an assessee on the date when it paid the tax on the raw-materials or the inputs would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed ……. In the facts of Eicher case (supra) that was a case where- in by introduction of the Rule a credit which was in the account of the manufacturer was held not to be available on the coming into force of that Rule, by that the right to credit itself was taken away, whereas in the instant case by the introduction of the second proviso to Rule 57G, the credit in the account of a manufacturer was not taken away but only the manner and the time within which the said credit was to be taken or utilized alone was stipulated. It is to be noted at this juncture that the substantive right has not been taken away by the introduction of the proviso to the Rule in question but a procedural restriction was introduced which, in our opinion, is permissible in law. Therefore, in our opinion, the law laid down by this Court in Eicher’s case (supra) does not apply to the facts of these cases. This is also the position with regard to the judgment of this Court in Collector of Central Excise, Pune & Ors. vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. & Ors. [1997 (7) SCC 448].

Para 8

It is vehemently argued on behalf of the appellants that in effect by introduction of this Rule, a manufac- turer in whose account certain credit existed, would be denied of the right to take such credit consequently, as in the case of Eicher (supra), a manufacturer’s vested right is taken away, therefore, the Rule in question should be interpreted in such a manner that it did not apply to cases where credit in question had accrued prior to the date of introduction of this proviso. In our opinion, this argument is not available to the appellants because none has questioned the legality or the validity of the Rule in question, therefore, any argument which in effect questions the validity of the Rule, cannot be permitted to be raised. The argument of the appellants that there was no time whatsoever given to some of the manufacturers to avail the credit after the introduction of the Rule also is based on arbitrariness of the Rule, and the same also will have to be rejected on the ground that there is no challenge to the validity of the Rule……………

Para 9

……..in our opinion the language of the proviso con- cerned is unambiguous. It specifically states that a manufacturer cannot take credit after six months from the date of issue of any of the documents specified in the first proviso to the said sub-rule. A plain reading of this sub-rule clearly shows that it applies to those cases where a manufacturer is seeking to take the credit after the introduction of the Rule and to cases where the manu- facturer is seeking to do so after a period of six months from the date when the manufacturer received the inputs. This subrule does not operate retrospectively in the sense it does not cancel the credits nor does it in any manner affect the rights of those persons who have already taken the credit before coming into force of the Rule in question. It operates prospectively in regard to those manufacturers who seek to take credit after the coming into force of this Rule………..

(emphasis supplied)

Gujarat high Court Ruling in Baroda Rayon Corporation Ltd. vs. UOI (2014) 306 ELT 551 (GUJ)

The main challenge in the petition was to the Notification No. 16/94-CE (NT), dated 30-03-1994. By virtue of the said notification, gate pass issued under Rule 52A of the MODVAT Rules as it stood prior to 01-04-1994, has been prescribed as a document for the purpose of Rule 57G of the Rules. However, the notification also provided that the documents should have been issued before 01- 04-1994 and the credit under the said Rule should have been taken on or before 30-06-1994. It is this part of the notification was challenged in the petition.

The Court observed and held as under:

Para 8
………. the right to avail of credit is conferred under Rule 57A of the Rules. Rule 57G only provides the procedure to be observed by the manufacturer. Thus, while exercis- ing powers under Rule 57G of the Rules, the Central Government is not empowered to curtail any right conferred under Rule 57A of the Rules. In the circumstances, the impugned notification issued in exercise of powers under Rule 57G of the Rules insofar as the same prescribes a time-limit for taking of credit, being in excess of the powers conferred under the said rule is ultra vires the same and as such cannot be sustained to that extent.

Para 9

Another aspect of the matter is that by curtailing the time- limit within which the credit taken is to be availed, in effect and substance the said notification provides for lapsing of the credit that has already accrued in favour of the pe- titioner. In this regard it may be noted that the petition pertains to credit taken in the year 1994.    Hence,
the present case would be squarely covered by the deci- sions of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Pune vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd, (supra) and in the case of Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. Union of India, (supra) Court.

Para 11

In view of the above discussion, the petition suc- ceeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned No- tification No. 16/94-C.E. (N.T), dated 30th March, 1994 to the extent it provides that the credit under Rule 57G of the rules has to be taken on or before 30th June, 1994 being in excess of the powers conferred under Rule 57g of the Rules is hereby quashed and set aside.

Illustrative cases where credit was allowed after six months from the date of issue of specified documents

•    Alembic Ltd. vs. CCE (2013) 293 ELT 119 (Tri – Ahd)

•    CCE vs. Ford India Ltd. (2012) 284 ELT 202 (Tri – Chennai)

•    Banner Pharma Caps Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 246 ELT 364 (Tri Ahd)

Illustrative cases where credit was denied when taken after 6 months from the date of issue of the specified documents

•    BHEL vs. CC & CE(A) (2007) 219 ELT 609 (Tri Bang)

•    NVK Mohammed Sultan Rawther & Sons Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 237 ELT 741 (Tri – Chennai)

Validity of time limit introduced under CCR 04 with effect from 01/09/2014.

Vide Notification No. 21/2014 CE (NT) dated 11-07-2014, two new provisos have been inserted in Rule 4(1) & 4(7) of CCR 2004 respectively effective 01-09-2014, providing that a manufacturer/service provider shall not take CEN- VAT credit on inputs/input services after six months from the date of any of the documents specified in Rule 9(1) of CCR 2004. As such, no reasons have been provided by the Government for the sudden introduction of time limit, 10 years subsequent to the introduction of CCR 2004.

It would appear that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Eicher Motors & Dai Ichi discussed above, would be relevant in the context of CCR 2004 as well inasmuch as CENVAT Credit is a substantive right  of a manufacturer/service provider. The applicability of the aforesaid principles is strengthened in the scenario of substantial expansion of erstwhile MODVAT Scheme. The prevalent CCR 2004 covers the manufacturing sector substantially and more importantly services sector post introduction of Negative List based taxation of services with effect from 01-07-2012.

Hence, on the basis of principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Eicher Motors & Dai Ichi, provisos inserted in Rule 4(1) & 4(7) of CCR 2004 with effect from 01/09/2014 providing for time limit for taking CENVAT credit on inputs / input services can be challenged before a Court of law inasmuch as it curtails the substantive rights of manufacturers/service providers. Observations of the Supreme Court in Osram Surya’s case support availability of this option to a manufacturer/ service provider.

Without prejudice to the above, it would also appear that the time limit introduced with effect from 01-09-2014 could be regarded as retrospective to an extent it imposes re- strictions on CENVAT Credit entitlement in regard to duty/tax paid documents issued prior to 01-09-2014. Hence, it does curtail the substantive rights of manufacturers/service providers. Despite, the observations of the Supreme Court in Osram Surya Case, it would appear that, a strong case on this ground also can be made to advance an alternative proposition that time limit introduced with effect from 01-09-2014 should apply only to duty / tax paid documents issued on or after 01-09-2014.

Applicability of time limit to Re – Credits
Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 allows CENVAT redit in respect of input service on or after the day on which the invoice is received by a manufacturer/service provider. However, third proviso to the said Rule 4 (7) reads as under:

“Provided also that in case the payment of the value of input service and the service tax paid or payable as indicated in the invoice, bill or as the case may be, challan referred to in Rule 9, except in respect of input service where the whole of the service tax is liable to be paid by the recipient of service , is not made within three months of the date of the invoice, bill or, as the case may be, challan, the manufacturer or the service provider who has taken credit on such input service, shall pay an amount equal to the CENVAT Credit availed on such input service and in case the said payment is made, the manufacturer or output service provider, as the case may be, shall be entitled to take the credit of the amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier subject to the other provisions of these rules:”

(emphasis supplied)

With effect from 01-09-2014, the sixth proviso has been inserted in Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 which provides as under:

“….the manufacturer or the provider of output ser- vice shall not take CENVAT Credit after six months of the date of issue of any of the documents specified in sub-rule (1) of Rule 9.”

Hence, a very important practical issue arises for consid- eration is as to whether the time limit of six months would apply to cases where initial credit has been properly taken within six months but re-credit in terms of third proviso  to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is taken after a period of six months from the date of issue of the tax paid document.

According to one view, in cases where re–credit taken  by the manufacturer/service provider is after the expiry of six months from the date of invoice upon payment, in light of the sixth proviso inserted with effect from 01-09- 2014 prescribing a six month time limit for availment of credit, the manufacturer/output service provider would not be entitled to take re-credit of the amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier. This view is supported by the terminology “subject to the other provisions of these rules” appearing in the third proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004. Hence, the sixth proviso inserted with effect from 01-09-2014, would apply in full force in such cases.

However, according to a second view, “re-credit” allowed as per the third proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is not taking CENVAT Credit, but it is re-credit of an “amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier” and hence, the sixth proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is not appli- cable to such cases. The time limit of six months applies to taking of CENVAT Credit for the first time and not to subsequent re-credit upon payment. Thus, once credit is validly taken within the permitted time limit of six months, subsequent re–credit upon payment pertains to reversal of amount equivalent to CENVAT Credit reversed and not taking of credit.

This view is supported by judicial rulings referred above in cases of Alembic Ltd. (supra)., Ford India Ltd. (supra) and Banner Pharma Caps Pvt. Ltd. (supra) earlier. Though in a different context, useful reference could also be made to ruling in CCE vs. Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. (2010) 259 ELT 13 (GUJ)

Rightly considering the above uncertainty, the Govern- ment has issued Circular No. 990/14/2014-CX-8 dated 19th November, 2014 whereby it is clarified at para 3 that if credit is taken for the first time within six months of the issue of the document under Rule 9(1) of CCR,2004, the condition of taking credit within six months is fulfilled. The limitation period of six months therefore would not apply for taking re-credit of amount reversed. The said clarification is also provided in respect of two more situations viz.
a)    when the value of input or capital goods on which CENVAT Credit taken is written off or such provision is made in the books of account, the manufac- turer or service provider has to reverse the credit taken (Rule 3(5B) of CCR, 2004)
b)    When inputs sent to job worker are not received back within 180 days, the manufacturer or service provider, in the first instance has to reverse the credit taken.

Thus in all the three situations, while taking re-credit, the limitation of six months would not apply if credit in the first instance is taken within the prescribed time limit of six months of the receipt of eligible document.

Conclusion

According to the Budget Estimates for the year 2014-15, collection from service tax (Rs. 2.16 lakh crore) is likely to exceed Central Excise (Rs. 2.05 lakh crore) for the first time. Further, as per the stated taxation policy of the Government, we are moving towards a GST Regime in due course of time. Hence, in that perspective, it is imperative that we have seamless flow of credits and a robust input tax credit regime in line with GST/VAT Systems prevalent worldwide. To advance this cause, the following is recommended:

a)    The time limit for availment of CENVAT credits should be done away with.

b)    Alternatively, if the time limit is to be continued, it should be increased to one year (so as to be consistent with time limit for claiming refund) and the same should be made applicable to duty/tax paid documents issued after 01-09-2014.

c)    Linkage of CENVAT Credit availment with payment to suppliers was relevant prior to the introduction of POT Rules when service tax was required to be paid to the Government after realisation from the customers. The said linkage is not required subsequent to the introduction of POT Rules. Hence, the same should be done away with.

M/S. Lawrence and Mayo ( India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. S.T.O. and M/S. Sokkia India (P) Ltd. vs. C.S.T.,West Bengal and Another, [2012] 51 VST 423 (WBTT)

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VAT – Classification of Goods-Surveying Instrument- Covered By Entry Relating to Plant –Taxable at 4%, Entry No. 54B, 83 (c), Part I, Schedule C, of The West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003

FACTS
The dealers filed petition before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal against the order of the Commissioner of Sales Tax holding sale of surveying instrument covered by Schedule CA of the act and taxable at 12.5%.

HELD
Survey is an integral part in the entire process of construction. In fact, the execution of work is done on the basis of data furnished by the surveying instruments. As indicated in the brochures, the surveying instruments, in India, are not just used for taking measurement only. It performs multifarious functions; taking measurement is one of its functions. Judging this aspect, it cannot be called to be a ‘measurement tool’ simpliciter. In view of amplitude of the definition of “plant”, as held in several cases, the surveying instruments squarely come within the extended meaning of ‘plant’ and would be covered by Entry No. 54B, Part I, of Schedule C of the Act. Therefore, it is taxable at 4%. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the petition filed by the dealers and set aside the order of the Commissioner.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 135 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Hema Engg. Indus. Ltd. vs. CST, New Delhi.

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Whether services provided on job work basis and exempted under Notification No. 8/2005 – ST are considered as “Exempted Services” for the purpose of Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit rules, 2004 requiring reversal of CENVAT Credit? Held, No.

Facts:
The Appellant was engaged in undertaking a job work by way of electroplating/painting on the semi-finished goods and claimed exemption in service tax vide Notification No. 8/2005 – ST. The Appellant availed the credit of service tax on various services so received for their job work and utilised the same for payment of service tax on taxable services provided by them. The Revenue contended that Appellant is providing taxable as well as exempted services hence cannot utilise CENVAT Credit more than 20% of the tax payable in terms of the provisions of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules (CCR).

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal held that clearances effected in terms of the provisions of Notification No. 8/2005-S.T. cannot be held to be exempted clearance so as to invoke the provisions of Rule 6(2) of CCR. It further held that, this issue is no more res integra and stands decided by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sterlite Industries India Ltd. vs. CCE 2005 (183) ELT 353 (Tri- Mum.)(LB) wherein it was held that if no duty was payable in respect of goods manufactured in terms of Notification No. 214/86, i.e., job work Notification, the final product cannot be held to be exempted so as to attract the provisions of the erstwhile Rule 57CC inasmuch as the Notification No. 214/86 is pari materia to Notification No. 8/2005-S.T., the ratio of the said decision would apply.

Note: Readers may note that, same principal is also applicable in the case of exemption granted in Entry 30(c) of the mega exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012.

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Sales vis-à-vis Free supply of goods

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Introduction
Sales tax is leviable, when there is sale of goods. The term ‘sale’ is defined in the sales tax laws. The Hon. Supreme Court has also analysed the said term in number of judgments. The landmark judgment is in case of Gannon Dunkerly and Co. (9 STC 353)(SC), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under in relation to ‘sale transaction’:

“Thus, according to the law both of England and of India, in order to constitute a sale it is necessary that there should be an agreement between the parties for the purpose of transferring title to goods, which of course presupposes capacity to contract, that it must be supported by money consideration, and that as a result of the transaction property must actually pass in the goods ……”

From above passage it is clear that to be a ‘sale’ following criteria need to be fulfilled.

(i) There should be two parties to contract i.e. seller and purchaser,
(ii) The subject matter of sale is moveable goods,
(iii) T here must be money consideration and
(iv) Transfer of property i.e. transfer of ownership from seller to purchaser.

Therefore before levying sales tax, fulfillment of above criteria is necessary.

Amongst others, it is also clear from the above that the consideration is one of the requirements for constituting ‘sale’ and in fact that is the measure of tax, normally referred to as “sale price”. Determination of sale price is debatable issue.

Free supply by customer
Sometimes, the buyer supplies certain items like moulds, tools and dies etc. to the supplier. The said supply is for manufacturing goods which are eventually to be sold to the said buyer who has supplied such items. Since such items belong to the buyer, the buyer may be writing off such items in their books of account by way of amortisation (also can be equated with depreciation). For purpose of excise payment such amortisation may be added to the cost of such items supplied by the supplier. However, question arises whether such amount is required to be added in the sale price of the supplier and whether supplier is liable to pay tax on such higher value.

Consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
The Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with such situation in case of Ts Tech Sun (India) Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (15 VST 559)(SC). The facts as narrated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 11 are as under:

“Department, in this case, has sought to load amortized cost of the moulds supplied by its customer to the sale price of auto components in the hands of the appellant herein. According to the department, under section 4(1) (a) of the 1944 Act, value has to be the normal price, which has to be the sole consideration and if the price fixed is without consideration for the moulds then, according to the department, it cannot be said that price was sole consideration. In other words, according to the department, if the consideration for moulds is not taken into account then under the excise law, price, which is the measure of value, cannot be said to be the sole consideration. According to the department, in this case, price of auto components sold by the appellant was fixed or to be fixed by inter se negotiations. That, without the price of the moulds being taken into account, the price of the finished product would not reflect the real assessable value. According to the department, without the supply of moulds from its customer, final product could not be made. By use of the moulds, the appellant was able to manufacture the auto components. Therefore, according to the department, some money value was required to be attributed on account of usage of moulds as such moulds contributed to the value of the final product, namely, auto components. Therefore, by not taking into account the money value of moulds supplied by the customer, the price stood depressed. In the circumstances, according to the department, amortised cost had to be loaded to the price charged or chargeable by the appellant for the finished products.

On the above case of the department, the question which arises for determination in this civil appeal is whether section 4 of the 1944 Act read with rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 (“Excise Valuation Rules, 2000”) can be read into section 3 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948?”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court thereafter analysed the legal position with reference to Excise law and Sales tax. The relevant observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court are in para 16 as under:

“Before analysing section 3 of the 1948 Act, it is important to keep in mind that in income-tax cases, tax is exigible on “real income” which means the actual income received by or which accrues to the assessee. In case of sales tax, tax is exigible on real price received or receivable by the dealer in respect of a sale. A dealer is entitled to frame his price-structure in a manner conducive to the type of his business or with a view to withstand the competition. In a given case, cost may be more than the price. The dealer may base his price-structure to give an incentive to his clients, agents, distributors, etc., particularly if he is a manufacturer. In such cases, his price-structure has to be scrutinised by the department under the sales tax law to find out the real sale price receivable by him. There may be cases where he is required to give a discount on account of defect in quality or delay. The important thing to be noted is that “price” is the amount of consideration which a seller charges the buyer for parting with the title to the goods. It comprises of the amount which the dealer himself has to pay for the purchase of the goods, the expenditure, which he is to incur for transporting the goods from the place of purchase to the place of sale, the duties, if any, levied on the particular goods bought by him, the octroi duty, which he may have had to pay and his own margin of profit after meeting handling charges including interest on the capital invested. The cost price of the goods actually paid by him under various heads of accounts would no doubt constitute the consideration for which he would part with his title to the goods. The entire amount of consideration, including the sales tax component, which the purchaser pays, would constitute the price of goods. To this extent, there is no difficulty. The difficulty comes in when by law or by legal fiction the department seeks to introduce a notional concept as an element of the “real price”. This is particularly important when there is no rule to that effect in the sales tax law. Even under the definition of “turnover” in section 2(i) one has to take into account only the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold. It is this aggregate amount which is taxable under section 3 read with section 2(i) of the 1948 Act.”

Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has drawn the conclusion in para 19 as under:

“U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 is a self-contained code for levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods in Uttar Pradesh. Clause (bb) of section 2 defines the expression “trade tax” to mean a tax payable under the Act. Clause (h) of section 2 defines the expression “sale” to include transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose for cash or deferred payment or other valuable with section 3F of the 1948 Act. Section 3, inter alia, provides that every dealer shall for each assessment year pay a tax at the rates provided under section 3A, section 3D or section 3H on his turnover of sales or purchases or both, as the case may be, which shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed. Section 3F provides for tax on transfer of right to use any goods or goods involved in execution of works contract. The definition of “sale” in section 2(h) is in two parts. The first part covers the normal sale and the second part covers deemed sales. In the present case, we are concerned with sale of auto components to the buyer. It is a normal sale. The aggregate amount for which these auto parts/components are sold constitutes the turnover relating to such sales within the meaning of turnover in section 2(i). Therefore, it is on such turnover that liability of tax under section 3 of the 1948 Act has to be determined. Therefore, sales tax or trade tax under the 1948 Act is leviable on sale, whether actual or deemed, and for every sale there has to be a consideration. On the other hand, excise duty is a levy on a taxable event of “manufacture” and it is calculated on the “value” of manufactured goods. Excise duty is not concerned with ownership or sale. The liability under the excise law is event-based and irrespective of whether the goods are sold or captively consumed. Under the excise law, the liability is there even when the manufacturer is not the owner of raw material or finished goods (as in the case of job workers). Excise duty, therefore, is independent of ownership (see: Ujagar Prints vs. Union of India [1989] 3 SCC 488(1)). Therefore, for sales tax purposes, what has to be taken into account is the consideration for transfer of property in goods from the seller to the buyer. For this purpose, tax is to be levied on the agreed consideration for transfer of property in the goods and in such a case cost of manufacture is irrelevant. As compared to the sales tax law, the scheme of levy of excise duty is totally different. For excise duty purposes, transfer of property in goods or ownership is irrelevant. As stated, excise duty is a duty on manufacture. The provisions relating   to measure (section 4 of 1944 Act read with the Excise Valuation Rules, 2000) aim at taking into consideration all items of costs of manufacture and all expenses which lead to value addition to be taken into account and for that purpose rule 6 makes a deeming provision by providing for notional additions.

Such deeming fictions and notional additions in excise law are totally irrelevant for sales tax purposes. Therefore, in any event, these notional additions cannot be read into clause 5.1 and clause 5.2 of the general agreement for purchase of parts dated July 31, 1997.”

Conclusion
Thus,  the  legal  position  that  gets  settled  is  that  for sales tax purpose the parameters about ‘sale price’ are different. it is the actual amount, received from the buyer, that is relevant and not the notional value, if any. There may be number of such similar situations like supply of parts to be incorporated in the goods to be ultimately supplied to the buyers. In such cases also the value of such parts may be considered for levy of excise duty, but it cannot form part of sale price for sales tax purpose, as there is no receipt of such notional value from buyer. The above judgment will, therefore, serve as a good indicator for deciding the ‘sale price’.

Controversy: whether renting of vehicle & hiring of vehicle different for service tax?

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The question posed in the caption was answered as
‘yes’ recently by the Uttarakhand High Court in August 2014 whereas
Gujarat High Court in 2013 had ruled that they are not different
concepts. The service of “rent-a-cab” was introduced initially in 1997.
The service providers are more often than not individuals or small time
firms and often found to be from semi organised sector. Rounds of
litigation is not achieving finality for a service that carries 60%
abatement on its value. Prior to the above two decisions, there have
been two to three judgments of different High Courts involving
taxability of transportation service under rent-a-cab scheme and/or tour
operators which also included widely followed decisions in First
Secretary Federation of Bus Operators vs. UOI 2001 (134) ELT 618 (Mad)
and CCE, Chandigarh vs. Kuldeep Singh Gill 2010 (18) STR 708 (P&H).

Decision of The Uttarakhand High Court:
Recently,
the Division Bench of the Uttarakhand High Court, dismissed revenue’s
appeal in 2014-TIOL- 2039-HC-UKAND-ST, Commissioner of Customs &
Central Excise vs. Sachin Malhotra & Others, taking a view that
unless control over vehicle is passed to the hirer under the rent-a-cab
scheme, there cannot be a taxable transaction u/s. 65(105)(o) read with
section 65(91) of the Finance Act,1994 – (The Act).

It is also
observed, “Though both rent and hire may in different context, have the
same connotation, in the context of rent-a-cab scheme and hiring, we are
of the view that they signify two different transactions. What the
lawgiver has chosen fit to tax by way of imposition of service tax is
only transaction relating to business of renting of cabs”. While
deciding as above, the Hon. High Court expressly stated “we are unable
to subscribe to the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
(supra) which is relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant. We
would think that the said Court has not considered the aspects, which we
would think were absolutely relevant in arriving at a conclusion”. The
aspect the Court referred to while concluding as above is section 75 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which contains provisions relating to
empowering Central Government to notify a scheme for renting of motor
cabs. The Rent-A-Cab Scheme,1989 has been formed under these provisions
and which contemplates licensing of the operator under such scheme and
other incidental matters. The counsel for the revenue discussing all
relevant issues and rulings on the subject matter also pleaded to the
Court to ignore the provisions of section 75 of the Motor Vehicles Act
yet, probably did not bring to the attention of the Court that when the
service of rent-a-cab scheme operator was introduced for the first time
in the net of service tax with effect from 16/07/1997 the definition of
rent a cab scheme operator read as:

“Rent-a-cab scheme operator
means a person who is the holder of a license under the Rent-a-Cab
Scheme, 1989 formed by the Central Government under the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988”.

The said definition was substituted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1998 to read as follows:

Section 65(19) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act):
“Rent-a-cab scheme operator means any person engaged in the business of renting of cabs”.

In
turn, taxable service as per section 65(105)(o) of the Act is defined
as “any service provided or to be provided to any person by a rent-a-cab
scheme operator in relation to renting of cab.”

While
considering revenue’s appeal the Hon. High Court in addition to the
P&H High Court’s decision of Kuldeep Singh Gill (supra) also
discussed at length the other two important decisions viz. Secretary
Federation of Bus Operator Association of TN (supra) and L. V.
Sankeshwar Proprietix Vijayanand Travels vs. Superintendent of Central
Excise 2006-TIOL-340-HC-KAR ST in addition to discussing CIT vs. Madan
& Co. (2002) 174 CTR (Madras)-172.

However, according to the
High Court, each one was distinguished or differed with as the facts of
each of them did not help revenue’s case.

In view of this, it is desirable to briefly summarise at least two of these decisions.

In
case of Kuldeep Singh Gill (supra), the assesse provided transport
service to a corporate on contract basis and contended that since they
did not hold any kind of permit including the tourist permit issued
under the Motor Vehicles Act they were not liable for service tax as
rent-a-cab service provider. In addition to this, no other valid ground
was put forth for non-taxability. The court therefore observed that
section 65 of the Finance Act,1994 does not talk of tourist permit
issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, but only talks about user of the
tourist vehicle by tour operator. Merely, because the Motor Vehicles Act
provides for granting tourist permit, it would not automatically mean
that section 65 also contemplates only a tourist permit and not
otherwise. The court observed and followed the judgment in Secretary,
Federation of Bus Operators (supra) “mutatis-mutandis” which clearly
concluded that ‘tourist permit’ is not required to attract provisions of
section 65(52) of the Finance Act”. Therefore, transport service
provided by the Respondent in this case is a taxable service. In turn,
in case of Secretary, Federation of Bus Operators (supra), the Hon.
Madras High Court examined the issue of service tax applicable to tour
operators u/s. 65(52) and rent-a-cab scheme operator u/s. 65(38) of the
Act & dealt with each category separately. As regards, rent-a-cab
service, the court categorically, interalia held as follows:

“We
have already pointed out that the scope of amended provision, which is
as per Section 65(38), has been widened by deleting the requirement of
holding a licence under Rent-a-cab Scheme,1989. Under the amended
provision any person engaged in business of renting of cabs becomes a
rent-a-cab scheme operator.

(53) we have, therefore, no
hesitation in holding that if the petitioners are plying the motor cabs
or maxi cabs and the services are provided by them to any person in
relation to the renting of the cabs, such service becomes a “taxable
service” and therefore, comes within the ambit of Section 66(3) of the
Finance Act.

Decision of the Gujarat High Court:

As opposed to the above, another recently reported de- cision of the Gujarat high Court (although decided on 10/05/2013 as against the above order of 6th august, 2014, of the uttarakhand high Court) in CST vs. Vijay Travels 2014 (36) STR 513 (Guj) again in appeal by the revenue, the hon. Court has held that there is no difference between renting and hiring of vehicle for levy of service tax. In this case, it was contended in assessee’s case that while the assessee provided passenger vehicles like ambassador, Swaraj mazda, 56 Seater luxury buses etc. to a State Government Board on hire and charged for the same on kilometer basis. It was argued that vehicles were not on rent and the activity did not amount to hand- ing over possession of vehicle to a person who wished to rent it and to drive it himself or through his own driver or to keep it at its disposal and regardless the rent would be payable. as against this, in case of hiring, the passengers are carried for a fare and possession of the vehicle remains with the driver and the entire responsibility would be of the car owner. The counsel for assessee also discussed provisions of section 75 of the motor Vehicles act and contended that only licensed persons under the said section are targeted under the tax net whereas transportation service providers were not intended to be taxed by the above provisions. further, distinction was sought to be made by the assessee’s counsel with the madras high Court’s decision in federation of Bus operators (supra) by stressing that the said judgment dealt with the question of tour operators which is a wholly different service from rent-a-cab service and the judgment did not deal with the issue as to what constitutes renting of a motor cab. He further urged that the judgment of the P&h high Court (supra) also did not deal with the said issue and therefore it was not a binding precedent. Summarily, the case of the assessee was that they operated trips to various places where the management continued with themselves and payment was made on kilometer basis and they did not give vehicles to the Board for operating under Board’s management. the ahmedabad tribunal on the basis of these details had held that no service tax was leviable on this. in fact, this very tribunal at a later date also in Shri Gayatri Tourist Bus Service vs. CCE, Vadodara 2013 (29) STR 499 (Tri.-Ahmd) by a majority decision (the matter was  referred  to  the third  member  on  account  of  difference of opinion) has decided in a similar situation that when vehicles are used for transportation of personnel and delegates of client and the assessee is paid on the basis of log book maintained for the purpose, the vehicles are held as not rented to the client.   This is because in case of renting, the driver of property is depossessed and possession passes on to person who has taken it for usage. When the payment is not on a monthly fixed rent but based on usage means that vehicle is not let out on rent and hence service is not taxable as rent-a-cab service. Coming back to the case before the Gujarat high Court, the above factual matrix was examined vis-à-vis the statutory provisions of service tax law including the definition of cab in section 65(20) of the Act which reads as:

“‘Cab’ means –
(i)    motor cab, or
(ii)    a maxi cab, or
(iii)    any motor vehicle constructed or adapted to carry more than twelve passengers excluding the driver for hire or reward”.

Motor cab, maxi cab in turn have been given the mean- ings under the service tax law, as given under the mo- tor Vehicles Act. For the definition of motor vehicle also, the meaning given in the motor Vehicles act was referred to. The issue consequently was therefore to examine who can be said to have been engaged in the business of renting of a cab and whether renting and hiring of vehicle as contended by the assessee is con- templated by the statute to exclude latter category from tax net?

The Court noted that the requirement of having minimum 50 vehicles and a license as required under the rent Cab Scheme 1989 was done away with the substitution of  the definition of rent-a-cab in 1998 and therefore it would amount to artificial requirement of statute if only those persons are taxed who give away their vehicles without retaining  any  control  personally  or  through  driver.  The Court observed that the concept of lease and license was brought about by contending that lease would have insurable interest which is absent in license.

For this  purpose, the Court examined various dictionary meanings of ‘rent’, one of which provides as “A tax or similar charge levied or paid to a person”. Simultaneously, the Court found that the word ‘hire’ means “payment under contract for the use of something” or “a bailment by which the use of thing or the services are contracted for, at a certain price or reward.” On examination, it was observed that both in renting and licensing de facto pos- session of the thing is enjoyed and came to the conclusion “conceptually and essentially if the nature of service provided is the same, natural corollary is that such service is taxed under the taxing statute.” It was also observed that concept of providing transportation service where de jure control remains with the owner of the vehicle and the driver and yet it functions in accordance with the wish and desire of the person hiring it. In the absence of any specific exclusion in the statute of such service from taxing net, a large portion of such services cannot be held to be non-inclusive by any artificial interpretation and therefore escape the liability on the ground that hiring is differ- ent from renting and such distinction does not find favour with the court. This is because there is nothing to read into the taxing statute that only those persons owning the vehicles and providing on rent with exclusive control of the customer only would be charged was held by the hon. high Court while deciding this case, the hon. high Court relied on the P&h high Court decision (supra) as well as heavily relied on the madras high Court decision in Secretary, federation of Bus operators assn. t.n. (supra).

Conclusion:

It is quite evident at this point that the controversy may or may not end soon on the above issue at least for the period prior to the negative list based service taxation. However, yet another significant concept required to b examined is whether or not a contract of renting and/or hiring a motor vehicle for the use of hirer irrespective of duration of usage of the vehicle amount to “transferring of goods by way of hiring, leasing or licensing wherein transfer of right to use such goods occurs and therefore a transaction would be considered one of ‘deemed sale’ under the Vat laws as decided in landmark decision of the andhra Pradesh high Court in M/s. G.S. Lamba & Sons & others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT, [analysed in november 2012 issue of BCAJ]. In this case, the issue before the court was whether hiring of transit mixers was contract of transportation service or transfer of the right to use goods.under the contracts, the transit mixers were never transferred to hirer/user Grasim as the effective control over running & using, disciplinary control over drivers, obtaining route permits, to maintain & upkeep vehicles in good condition responsibility for damage during transportation etc. as well as registration of vehicles remained vested in petitioner, the claimant of transport service provider. After a very detailed examination and analysis of terms of contract vis-à-vis all relevant statutory provisions  of  Vat/Sales  tax,  Sale  of  Goods act,  along  with article 366 (29a)(d) of the Constitution of india etc. and considering law laid down by various relevant judicial pronouncements including landmark decision of BSNL vs. UOI 2006-TIOL-15-SC-CT-LB, it was held that tax is not levied on delivery of goods used but on the transfer of the right to use property in goods. This is for the fact that all the tests laid down in BSnL decision (supra) are satisfied cumulatively viz. goods are available for delivery, there is consensus ad idem as to the identity of goods, the transferee has a legal right to goods including the use of licenses, permissions etc. available, for the period during the use, the transferee has the legal right to the exclusion of the transferor and lastly the owner/transferor does not have the right to transfer the same right to others during the period the transferee having legal rights to use the goods. Further, this is irrespective of the length of the duration. Thus, it was held to be the case of ‘deemed sale’ involving transfer of right to use goods and not one of transportation service. It may sound like the opening of Pandora’s box but do the facts of hiring/renting a cab not appear analogical to the contract of hiring of transit mixers (along with drivers)? at this point, however it is to be noted that education Guide published by the Government at paras 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 while clarifying scope and coverage of the declared service of transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing etc. without transferring the right to use goods, after discussing the test laid down by BSNL (supra) has clarified at illustrations 1 and 4 that when a vehicle is given on hire along with driver where the charge is recovered on mileage basis or when all responsibility is of the owner to abide by the laws, the right to use is not transferred as the car owner retains permissions and licenses relating to cab and therefore effective control and possession is not transferred and thus it is a declared service. Readers may ponder over the same depending however on the relevant facts of each case.

Constitution Amendment Bill for introducing Goods and Services Tax

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1 The Government of India introduced the
Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty Second Amendment) Bill, 2014 in the
Lok Sabha on 19th December, 2014. The Bill has proposed various
amendments to the Constitution of India to enable the Centre and States
to introduce the comprehensive Goods and Services Tax (GST).

2.
Before the key proposals of the Bill are examined, it would be
worthwhile to recap the framework of the proposed GST. The broad
contours of GST were outlined in the First Discussion Paper on Goods and
Services Tax in India, released by the Empowered Committee of State
Finance Ministers in November, 2009. The broad framework of GST
envisaged in the First Discussion Paper was as follows.

(a) Levy of Dual GST on all transactions – Central GST (CGST) and State GST (SGST);

(b) T he following indirect taxes should be subsumed into GST –


Central levies : Central Excise Duty, Additional Excise Duties, Excise
on Medicinal and Toilet Preparations, Service Tax, CVD and SAD of
Customs, Surcharges and Cesses;

– State levies : VAT /Sales Tax,
Entertainment Tax (unless levied by local bodies), Luxury Tax, Taxes on
lotteries, betting and gambling, State Surcharges and Cesses, Entry Tax
not in lieu of Octroi;

(c) A ll goods and services should be
covered under GST except Alcoholic beverages and Petroleum products,
i.e. crude, motor spirit (including ATF ) and HSD. While Tobacco was to
be included in GST, decision on coverage of Natural Gas was kept open;

(d)
I nter-State transactions would be subjected to Intermediate GST (IGST =
CGST + SGST) by the Centre. IGST would also be levied on consignment or
stock transfers;

(e) Exports would be zero – rated with similar benefits to SEZs. GST would be levied on import of goods and services;

(f) Credit of IGST, CGST and SGST would be available to the receiver of the goods and services;

(g)
U tilisation of input tax credit would be against corresponding
liability i.e. CGST against CGST and SGST against SGST. The rules for
taking input tax credit and utilisation of suchcredit would be aligned.
Cross utilisation would not be permitted;

(h) Concurrent jurisdiction for administering GST to the Centre and the States;

(i) U niform threshold of Rs.10 lakh and Rs.1.5 crore for registration and liability for payment of tax for SGST and CGST.

3.
T he First Discussion Paper was followed by the report of the Task
Force set up by the Thirteenth Finance Commission in 2009 and comments
on the First Discussion Paper released by the Department of Revenue in
2010. However, for the purposes of the intended framework, the First
Discussion Paper may be taken as the starting point.

4. T he
amendments proposed in the Constitution Amendment Bill may be analysed
with reference to the intended framework outlined above.

5. New definitions
– The Bill proposes 3 new definitions in Article 366 of the
Constitution 366(12A) : ‘Goods and Services tax’ to mean any tax on
supply of goods or services or both except tax on the supply of
alcoholic liquor for human consumption. 366(26A) : ‘Services’ which
means anything other than goods. 366(29B) : State’ for the purposes of
articles 246A, 268, 269, 269A and 279A to include a Union Territory with
Legislature.

5.4 Concept of ‘Supply’: Presently, tax is
being levied on manufacture (Excise), on Sale or Purchases of goods or
on provisions of services. The proposed amendments introduce the concept
of ‘supply’. ‘Supply’, however, is not defined and one will have to
interpret this in terms of the common parlance meaning or its dictionary
meaning.

5.4.1 Presently, amongst the laws likely to be
subsumed, the Centre is empowered to levy tax on import and manufacture.
The powers of the States are in respect of taxation of sales and
purchases of goods. ‘Sales’ has been interpreted to mean ‘sale’ as
defined under the Sale of Goods which, amongst others, pre-supposes a
transaction between 2 parties. The powers of the States, in respect of
deemed sales under Article 366(29A), also presupposes existence of two
parties for the purposes of the transactions enumerated therein.

5.4.2
‘Supply’ on the other hand, conveys something more than sale. ‘Supply’
means to make something available to someone; to provide.

5.4.3 T
he question which arises is whether ‘supply’ could be read as a
transaction for the purposes of levy of tax even in the absence of two
parties. In the context of the Indian tax laws and the Constitution
entries interpreted so far, ‘supply’ may still be read as one between
two parties. The intention on the other hand, obviously is to enable
levy of GST on consignment and stock transfers, where transfers between
branches, depots, factories, offices, etc. do not necessarily involve
two distinct parties.

5.4.4 ‘Supply’ in the proposed amendments
will now cover not only consignments and stock transfers but also
despatches, deliveries, supplies, etc. without the intention of passing
of property, entering into or effecting a transaction. The following
will also constitute ‘supply’ and could be subjected to tax, if so
provided by the Central or State GST laws.

(i) dispatches to job workers for job work, processing and return;
(ii) deliveries for the purposes of repairs, testing, etc;
(iii) delivery of free samples;
(iv) movement of goods for exhibition or demonstration and return;
(v) dispatches on sale or return basis;
(vi) free issues or supplies to manufacturers, contractors, etc;
(vii) gifts and free supplies.

5.5 ‘Consideration’:
Another important aspect is the omission of reference to
‘consideration’ as an important element to constitute a taxable
transaction. So far, powers of the States were saddled with the
requirement of ‘consideration’ in order to levy tax, in so far as tax on
sales or purchases of goods was concerned. Even ‘deemed sales’ under
Article 366(29A) required consideration for the purposes of levy of tax.

5.5.1 T he omission of the requirement of ‘consideration’ will
not only allow taxation of consignment and stock transfers, but also
various transactions enumerated above. It would now be open for
Governments to provide for levy tax on any or all supplies with a view
to garner revenue. This may include –

(i) gratis or free supplies, such as a desert provided free at a restaurant for deficient service;
(ii) partly developed software handed over to a service provider for further development;
(iii) free parking at a theatre or a mall;
(iv) donations and charity;
(v) free products or services in lieu of loyalty points;
(vi) consumption by employees of goods or services; etc.

5.5.2
T he immediate fallout of an attempt to tax a transaction in the
absence of consideration would be the valuation of the goods or services
for the purpose of levy of tax. Substantial valuation disputes have
been witnessed under the Excise law and the Customs Law or at a State
level, on the levy of Entry Tax or Octroi.

‘Services’: The
definition ‘anything other than goods’ appears to be too broad to have
been intended. Immovable property, money, actionable claims, etc. would
be services. ‘Goods’ are defined under Article 366(12) to include all
materials, commodities and articles. Courts have interpreted this to
include tangible as well as intangible properties. Accordingly,
intangible properties such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc.
would continue to be goods.

5.6.1    The  ongoing  disputes  in  relation  to  transactions involving supply of software, packaged  as  well as customised, franchisee agreements, rights to record or broadcast events, etc. would therefore continue. This will particularly be so in the context of the levy of additional tax, discussed in para 7.

5.7    The proposed amendments do not provide clarity to the treatment of composite transactions or deemed   sales.   the   question   arises   whether composite transactions will be subjected to tax. At present, composite transactions have been defined under article 366(29a). While this clause (29A) has not been omitted, the phrase ‘tax on one sale or purchase of goods’ which it defines finds no mention in the amendments relating to GSt. the only indication would be use of the word ‘both’ in the definition of ‘goods and services tax’. Will the use of this word ‘both’ be adequate to cover within its scope composite transactions otherwise defined under article 366(29a)? Would separate principles be required to classify composite transactions as goods or services? even otherwise, transactions involving repairs, annual maintenance contracts, photocopying, printing, etc. Which are composite contracts would suffer the perils of interpretation as to the taxing powers with reference to the rates of taxes as well as the place of supply for determining the appropriate State to levy the tax. Similar would be the predicament in the context of works contracts or catering contracts. Should these be transactions of supply of goods or of services? another area  of debate would be in respect of other deemed sales such as leasing of tangibles or intangibles, hire purchase transactions as also treatment of licences relating to tangible or intangible property. Question will also arise regarding treatment of additional charges for anything done to the goods before or at the time of delivery such as packing, freight, transit insurance, installation charges, etc. which may be separately charged on the bill or invoice. Should these charges be treated as components of the supply of goods or as distinct services?

5.8    It will therefore, be imperative to define ‘supply’ as well as introduce the requirement of ‘consideration’ for taxing transaction. Exceptions may be carved out for specific instances such as inter-State stock transfers and consignment transfers. As will be seen  from  the  stated  framework  discussed  in Para 2 and the taxing powers discussed in para  8, inter-State consignments and stock transfers are the only instances where tax is expected to be levied even in the absence of two parties, transfer of ownership or consideration. Under these circumstances, the requirement of ‘consideration’ should be a pre-requisite while defining the taxing powers of the States and may be omitted only so far as the Centre is concerned.

5.9    European   union:   the   Sixth   directive,   which prescribes the guidelines for the member States to levy VAT on goods and services, clearly defines ‘supply’ and also incorporates the requirement of ‘consideration’. Article 2 of the directive provides for taxation of supply of goods, intra-community acquisition of goods, and supply of services, all for a consideration only. It also provides for levy of Vat on importation of goods.

5.9.1    Under article 14, ‘supply of goods’ means transfer of the right to dispose tangible property as owner. It is under article 17 that transfer of goods to another member State is treated as a supply of goods for consideration. Special provision has been made under article 16 for self-supply or use of goods by staff is treated as supply of goods for consideration.

5.9.2    Similarly, provisions have been made under article 24 for ‘supply of services’ which means any transaction which does not constitute supply of goods and, for self-supply and use of services by staff under article 26.

5.10    Australia: under the new tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act, 1999 ‘taxable supply’ is defined as a supply which is made for consideration (Section 9-5). ‘Supply’, on the other hand, is defined to mean supply in any form including supply of goods, services, etc. (Section 9-10).

6.    Amendments to Sixth and Seventh Schedule : the following amendments have been proposed to the Sixth and Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

6.1    Sixth Schedule – Paragraph 8 – under the provisions  for  the  administration  of  tribal  areas in   assam,   meghalaya,   tripura   and   mizoram, the power to levy of taxes on entertainment and amusements is proposed to be granted to the district Councils.

6.2    Seventh Schedule List 1 – Entry 84 – this entry has been amended to restrict the powers of the Centre to levy excise duty only on manufacture or production of petroleum crude, high speed diesel, motor spirit (petrol), natural gas, aviation turbine fuel and tobacco and tobacco products.

6.2.1    While tobacco and tobacco products would also be subjected to GST, petroleum products and natural gas would be brought within the coverage of GST at a subsequent date (further discussion in para 8).

6.3    Seventh Schedule, List 1, Entries 92 and 92C – these entries are proposed to be omitted. these  relate  to  taxes  on  sale  or  purchases  of newspapers and on advertisements therein and tax  on  services.  these  levies  will  therefore  be subsumed under GSt.

6.4    Seventh Schedule, List ii – Entry 52 – this entry relating to tax on entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein is proposed to be omitted. accordingly, entry tax, octroi and LBT would be subsumed under GST.

6.5    Seventh Schedule, List ii – Entry 54 – this entry is proposed to be substituted to enable States to levy tax on sales or purchases of petroleum crude, high speed diesel, motor spirit (petrol), natural gas, aviation turbine fuel and alcoholic liquor for human consumption, other than sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of international trade or commerce.

6.6    Seventh Schedule, List ii – Entry 55 – this entry in relation to taxes on advertisements other than advertisements published in newspapers and advertisements broadcast by radio and television is proposed to be deleted. These levies will now be subsumed under GST.

6.7    Seventh  Schedule,  List  ii  –  Entry  62  –  the existing entry relating to taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling is proposed to be substituted. The new entry is proposed to enable levy of taxes on entertainment and amusements to the extent levied and collected by a Panchayat or a municipality or a regional Council or a district Council. the power to levy tax on betting and gambling has been omitted.

6.7.1    The exception carved out for tax on entertainment and amusements by local bodies and authorities may be undesirable. While the total revenues of these bodies and authorities from these sources of taxation is not immediately known, such as exception distorts the GSt regime. for example, if such services are provided from other States to the areas under the jurisdiction of local bodies and authorities, iGSt will be levied. how will claim of input tax credit of such IGST be available? on the other hand, should such services be provided from these areas, will there be no levy by these bodies and authorities, as inter-State transactions can only be taxed by the Centre (see para 8).

6.8    From the above, the following may be noted:

(a)    alcoholic Liquor for human consumption would be out of the purview of GST and will be the subject matter of taxation by the States. This includes tax on manufacture as well as sale of alcoholic liquor;

(b)    Excise on tobacco and tobacco products would continue  to  be  levied  by  the  Centre.  therefore, these  will  be  subjected  to  GST  in  addition  to excise duty;

(c)    Luxury tax would be subsumed into GST;

(d)    The  powers  to  levy  tax  on  betting  and  gambling has been omitted. While services in relation to betting and gambling, such as services by bookies, etc. may be taxed under GST, there is no provision to  enable  taxation  of  winnings  from  betting and gambling.

(e)    Entertainment tax and tax on amusements can also be levied by Panchayat, municipality, regional Council or district Council. There is no bar on these levies being introduced in future by these bodies.

7.    Levy of ‘Additional Tax’ – the Bill, vide section 18, proposes to levy ‘additional tax’ on the supply of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce at a rate not exceeding one percent for 2 years or such other period as the GSt Council may  recommend.   This  tax  would  be  levied  and collected by the Centre and would be assigned to the States from where the supply originates and the proceeds would not form part of the Consolidated fund.   The   Parliament,   would   formulate   the principles for determining the place of origin.

7.1    The most striking aspect of this proposed section is that this does not amend or introduce any article in the Constitution for the purposes of levy of additional tax. Therefore, this may be read to be a statement of intent and not an enabling provision in the Constitution.

7.2    Another aspect of this proposed levy is the lack of specific provision for assignment of this levy to the States. article 268 and 269 provide for assignment of stamp duties, tax on medicinal and toilet preparations, central sales tax and tax on consignment of goods to the States and such levies do not form part of the Consolidated fund. However, no specific provision has been made in respect of this additional tax in the Constitution. The  question  is,  will  a  separate  provision  be required for assignment of ‘additional tax’  to the States?

7.3    It may be noted that this levy will only be on supply of goods and not on services. further, this will also apply to stock transfers and consignment transfers and  will  not  be  creditable.  Therefore,  this  levy will be a cost. this will therefore increase the tax burden on inter-State transactions and will require businesses to restrict stock movements since every movement of stocks will attract this non creditable  levy.  This  will  also  be  levied  on  other movements discussed in para 5.4.4. movements of goods for job work, repairs/testing, exhibition, etc. would attract this levy on each movement. the levy is against the stated objectives of GSt and is unlikely to be well received by business.

7.4    Also, this levy will be for a period of two years or  such  other  period  as  the  GST  Council  may recommend. There is no time limit prescribed for the levy and the levy can continue perpetually.

8.    New Article 246A – this new article is proposed to   be   inserted   to   provide   for   levy   of   GSt simultaneously by the Centre as well as by the States. It further provides that the Parliament shall  have  the  exclusive  powers  to  levy  GSt  on supply of goods and services taking place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Under an explanation, the provisions of this article in respect of petroleum crude, high speed diesel, motor spirit (petrol), natural gas and aviation turbine fuel shall take effect only from the date recommended by the  GSt  Council.  this  explanation  will  enable introduction   of   GST   at   a   subsequent   date. However, the taxing powers of the Centre and States in relation to these products under the Seventh Schedule (discussed in paras 6.2 and 6.5) has not been made subject to this article. Therefore, it will be possible for the Centre and the States to continue with the levy of excise and Vat on these products even after introduction of GSt on these products.

9.    Article 268 : This article provides for assignment of stamp duties and duties of excise on medicinal and  toilet  preparations  to  the  States.  Reference to excise on medicinal and toilet preparations is proposed to be deleted so as to bring these products under GST. Stamp duty on the instruments covered in List I of the Seventh Schedule would continue to be assigned to and therefore levied by the States.

10.    Article 269 :
this article provides for assignment of taxes on inter-State sales and purchases of goods and on inter-State consignment of goods to the States this has been made subject to levy of tax under new article 269a.

11.    New Article 269A – this new article provides for levy  of  GSt  on  inter-State  supply  of  goods  and services by the Centre. this tax shall be apportioned in the manner provided by the Parliament on the recommendation of the GSt Council.

11.1    Under this article, supply of goods and services in the course of import into the territory of india shall be deemed to be inter-State supplies. Parliament may formulate the principles for determining when a supply takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.

11.2    This article  will  enable  levy  of  GST on  import  of goods and services. appropriate provisions will have to be made for determining the levy of iGSt on such imports particularly where the rates of taxes may not be uniform across all States. for e.g., if goods are imported at JNPT by an importer based in Bhopal, how should the IGST (CGST + SGST) be calculated?  Should this be at the SGST rate of maharashtra or of madhya Pradesh. Similarly, for services, how should the IGST rate be calculated for multi-locational business? Should this be the SGST rate prevalent in the State when the office is situated and which receives the invoice from the foreign service provider ?

12.    Article 270 : This article provides for distribution of taxes collected by the Centre and forming part of the Consolidated fund. this article is proposed to  be  amended  to  include  any  GST collected  by the Centres on inter-States supplies and which has not been apportioned to the States under the new article 269A.

13.    Article  286:  this article  imposes  restrictions  on the powers of the States to levy tax on transactions taking place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, import or export. amendments have been proposed to substitute reference to ‘sales and purchases’ and ‘goods’ with supply of goods or services.

13.1 Sub-article (3), which imposed restrictions on taxation of goods of special importance (declared goods) is proposed to be deleted to enable levy of GSt at a higher rate.

14.    New Article 279A : GST Council: New Article is proposed to be inserted for enabling constitution of  the  Goods  and  Services  tax  Council  (GST Council).  The  GST Council  shall  be  constituted by the President within 60 days from the date of commencement of the amendment act. It will comprise  of  the  union  finance  minister  as  the Chairperson. The union minister of State in charge of revenue or finance and the State finance and taxation ministers will be the members.

14.1    The  GST Council  would  make  recommendations to the Centre and the States on the taxes to be subsumed into GST, the goods and services which should  be  taxed  and  exempted,  the  model  GST law,  principles  of  levy,  apportionment  of  IGST, place of supply principles, threshold limits, rates including floor rates with bands, special rates for raising additional resources during any natural calamity or disaster and special provisions for arunachal Pradesh, assam, jammu and Kashmir, meghalaya, manipur, mizoram, nagaland, Sikkim, tripura, himachal Pradesh and uttarakhand.

14.2    The GST Council would also recommend the date from  which  GST  should  be  levied  on  petroleum crudes, high speed diesel, motor spirit (petrol), natural gas and aviation turbine fuel.

14.3    The article prescribes the modalities of functioning of  the  GSt  Council.  the  decisions  of  the  GSt Council would be by a majority determined on the basis of prescribed weightages.  the GSt Council would also decide about the modalities to resolve disputes arising out of its recommendations.

14.4    The GST Council would thus play a recommendatory role and its recommendations would not be binding. it will not be resolving disputes on GST but would only lay down the modalities for resolving disputes.

15.    Compensation to States: Section 19 of the Bill provides for compensation to the States for loss of revenue on account of implementation of GST for a period upto 5 years.  The Parliament will provide for the compensation on the recommendation of the GST Council.

15.1 Section 19 of the Bill does not amend or introduce an article for providing the compensation. therefore, this may be read only as a statement of intent and will have no binding effect to grant any compensation unless a law to that effect is made.

16.    Transitional provisions:
Section 20 of the Bill states that any provision of any law relating to tax on goods or services or on both in force in any State immediately before the commencement of the act, which is inconsistent with the amendments carried out the Constitution, shall continue to be  in force until amended or repealed by the State Legislature or other competent authority or until expiration of one year from the commencement of the act, whichever is earlier.

16.1    Transitional   provisions   are   common   in   every amending enactment. however, this section provides the savings in relation to State enactments. moreover, it states that the provisions of the State enactment, which are not consistent with the amendments to the Constitution, shall continue to be in force until repealed or for one year after the commencement of the amendment act. Therefore, it appears that all existing enactments which are inconsistent with the amendments will become ultra vires at the end of one year even if GST is not introduced.

16.2    A question has arisen regarding the proceedings arising out of the existing laws, namely assessments, appeals, recoveries as well as refunds. a view has been expressed that such proceedings cannot be taken up or pursued after the repeal or the expiry of one year in the absence of the taxing powers under the Constitution.

17.    Transactions taking place from,  to  and  within the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of india – no provision has been made to provide for levy and collection of GST on transactions taking place from, to and within these areas. india does not have sovereignty over these areas though it has the right to extend any Central enactment to these areas (the income tax, Customs, excise and the Service tax laws have been  extended  to  these  areas).  transactions  of supply of goods and services to these area will not be inter-State transactions. how will GSt be levied on these transactions? moreover, in respect of transactions taking place in these areas (production of crude, construction, repairs and maintenance by contractors, catering at the rigs and platforms, etc.),  how  will  GST  be  payable  and  who  will  be the taxing authority? how will tax be payable on supplies from these areas to the landmass of india (movement of crude to refineries, movement of capital equipment from the rigs and platforms or movement of old and obsolete assets, scrap, etc.)?

The  Constitution  amendment  Bill  was  much  awaited to  pave  the  way  for  introduction  of  GST.  While  this  Bill signals the intent to introduce GST from 1st april, 2016, there are various aspects which need detailed review, deliberations and guidance from Constitution experts. Businesses and professionals would critically evaluate these proposals seeking clarity in the taxing powers of the Centre and the States which should translate into clear, concise and unambiguous GST laws.

2014 (34) STR 546 (All.) Indian Coffee Workers’ Society Ltd. vs. CCE & ST., Allahabad

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Whether supply of food, edibles and beverages to persons within a canteen provided by the company would attract service tax as outdoor catering services? Held – Yes.

Facts:
Appellant entered into agreements for running and maintenance of an administrative building canteen. Appellant supplied food, edibles and beverages to the individual customers in accordance with the rate specified in the agreement. Appellant was provided a place for running the canteen by the Company. Department had contended that Appellant was providing “Outdoor catering services.”

Held:
The High Court held that supplier was an outdoor caterer by plain and literal construction of the provisions and definition, which included service provided by the caterer at a place other than his own. Once, the services of an outdoor caterer was provided to another person, its chargeability gets attracted, irrespective of extent of its consumption by the person who have engaged such service. The charge of tax in the cases of VAT was distinct from the charge of tax for service tax. VAT was paid on the sale of goods involved in the supply of food and beverages by the assessee would not exclude his liability for the payment of service tax in respect of taxable service was provided as an outdoor caterer.

levitra

SECONDMENT/DEPUTATION OF EMPLOYEES SERVICE TAX IMPLICATIONS

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Introduction
Secondment/Deputation of
employees within group companies has been a very common feature in
almost all major business houses in India. The globalisation of the
Indian economy has resulted in substantially increased presence of
Multi-National Companies (MNC) in India and Indian companies in the
markets abroad. This gave rise to cross-border secondment/deputation of
employees within a group.

Several issues have arisen as regards
service tax implications on secondment/deputation of employees within a
group (either based in India or abroad) resulting in extensive
litigation. The same is being discussed hereafter.

Relevant Statutory Provisions
a) Provisions Prior to 1/7/12


“manpower recruitment or supply agency” means any person engaged in
providing any service, directly or indirectly, in any manner for
recruitment or supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise, to any
other person.”

Section 65(105)(k) of the Act

“taxable service means any service provided or to be provided –

to
any person, by a manpower recruitment or supply agency in relation to
the recruitment or supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise, in any
manner.

Explanation

For the removal of doubts, it
is hereby declared that for the purposes of this sub-clauses,
recruitment or supply of manpower includes services in relation to
prerecruitment screening, verification of the credentials and
antecedents of the candidate and authenticity of documents submitted by
the candidate.”

b) Provisions with effect from 01/07/2012

Section 65B (44) of the Act


“Service” means any activity carried out by a person for another for
consideration, and include a declared service, but shall not include –

……..
(b) a provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment.”

Rule 2(1) (g) of Service tax rules, 1994 (Rules)


“Supply of manpower” means supply of manpower, temporarily or
otherwise, to another person to work under his superintendence or
Control.”

Relevant Extracts from Draft CBEC Circular No. 354/127/2012 TRU dated 27-07-2012

A. Scope of Manpower Supply

2.
After the negative list coming into force, the erstwhile definition of
the manpower recruitment or supply agency is no more applicable. Thus,
the words manpower supply would have to be given their natural meaning.
The manpower supply is understood to mean when one person provides
another person with the use of one or more individuals who are
contractually employed or otherwise engaged by the first person. The
essence of the employment should be that the individuals should be
employed by the provider of the service and not by the recipient of the
service.

3. There could be certain contracts in which such
manpower is made available to execute another independent contract by
the service provider. For example, a person may agree to carry out
construction or a manufacture for another in which certain manpower may
be engaged. As long as such manpower is not placed operationally
under the superintendence or control of the recipient, it shall not be a
case of manpower supply, though it will continue to be judged
independently whether it comprises any other taxable service.

4. There
are also cases of secondment whereby certain staff belonging to an
organisation is placed at the disposal of a subsidiary company or any
other associate company. Such cases will be covered by the definition of
manpower supply as the contractual employment continues to be with the
parent company.

B. Joint Employment

5. T here
can also be cases where staff is employed by one or more employers who
normally share the cost of such employment. The services provided by
such employee will be covered by the exclusion provided in the
definition of service. However, if the staff has been engaged by one
employer and only made available to other for a consideration, it shall
not be a case of joint employment.

6. Another arrangement could
be where one entity pays the salary and other expenses of the staff on
behalf of other joint employers which are later recouped from the other
employers on an agreed basis on actuals. Such recoveries will not be
liable to service tax as it is merely a case of cost reimbursement.

Service tax implications

As regards the provisions applicable prior to 01-07-2012, most of the
litigation is centered around applicability under the taxable service
[section 65(68) /65(105)(k) of the Act] of “manpower recruitment or
supply agency service”. Under the said provisions the following
conditions had to be fulfilled so as to bring the subject activities
within the scope of taxable service viz.:

The service provider
should have been engaged in providing the service of recruitment or
supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise to any other person; and

the
individuals had to be contractually employed by the manpower supply
agencies and there was no employee – employer relationship between the
individual and the service recipient.

• Under the negative list
regime, introduced with effect from 01-07-2012, service tax is payable
on all activities for consideration carried out by one person or another
for consideration, except those excluded from the definition of
‘service’ or specified in the negative list of services and the
exemption notifications. The services provided by an employee to the
employer, if provided in the course of or in relation to employment,
have been specifically excluded from the definition of ‘service’.

Further,
since the categorisation of taxable services has been done away with,
the condition of a person being engaged in the business of supply of
manpower is no more relevant. However, Rule 2(1)(g) of the Rules,
defines “supply of manpower” for the purpose of reverse change
provisions. .

Considering the specific exclusion from the
definition of service, the aspect of employer-employee relationship
assumes greater significance, insofar as the applicability of service
tax is concerned.

Employer – Employee relationship and Joint Employment
In
case of secondment/deputation of employees of an overseas based company
to an Indian company, the concept of joint employment becomes relevant,
provided the expatriate is also employed by the Indian company, in
terms of the relevant Indian laws are concerned. The issue which is
being deliberated is, whether the concept of joint employment can help
MNCs to arrange their affairs in a lawful manner so as to get the
benefit of exclusion from the definition of service. Hence, it is very
important to analyse and understand the concept of employment and
thereafter the concept of joint employment.

The Honorable
Supreme Court has from time to time expressed a view that the test of
supervision and control is a crucial point for determining the employer –
employee relationship. [Refer Shivanandan Sharma vs. Punjab National
Bank AIR 1955 SC 404]. However, it needs to be noted that the Honorable
Supreme Court has also held that since the nature of supervision and
control varies from business to business, it becomes difficult to
precisely define the degree of such supervision and control & lay
down a single formula or test for the same.

The Gujarat High Court in Satish Plastics vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner – 44 FLR 207 (Guj.) has summarised the tests for ascertaining master-servant relationship as under:

i) Was he doing the work for monetary payment?

ii)    Was the work done by him the work of the establishment or had a nexus with such work?

iii)    Was the payment made as wages, in the sense of being remuneration for the physical or mental effort in connection with such work?

iv)    Was the work such that it had to be done as directed by the establishment or under its supervision and control to the extent that supervision and control are possible having regard to the specialised nature of the work or the skill needed for its performance?

v)    Was the work of such a nature and character that ordinarily a master–  servant  relationship  could  exist and, but for the agreement styling it as a contract, common sense would suggest a master– servant bond?

vi)    Was the relation indicative of master–servant status in substance having regard to the economic realities irrespective of the nomenclature devised by the parties?

vii)    Was he required to do the work personally without the liberty to get it done through someone else?

The above can serve as a useful guide for ascertainment of employer–employee relationship.

In overseas jurisdictions, the test is that of the economic reality rather than various factors discussed above. however, no single or uniform test has been laid down by the Courts to determine the economic reality. Many factors such as the extent of the skill and initiative of an employee being an  integral  part  of  the  employees  business,  the permanency of their relationship, the nature and degree of employer’s control, etc., have been considered by the Courts in the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case.

The absence of defined principles for the application of the test of economic reality has posed challenges before the Courts in determining the existence of employment relationship. Apart from the principle of economic reality, the Courts have also considered the principle of mutuality of obligation for determining the presence of a contract of service.

The  concept  of  joint  employment  has  been  recognized and given effect to in many overseas jurisdictions including US & UK in particular. However, the concept of joint employment and economic reality is comparatively new in india. further, the variety of tests propounded for establishing the employer- employee relationship has brought in more uncertainty. draft CBeC Circular referred above does briefly cover the concept. However, it does not provide any finality as to the Government’s perspective on the concept & service tax implications arising therefrom. the joint employment concern is necessarily an application of the principle of “substance over form”. But how far such relationships can actually sustain in employment laws is a difficult question for which there are no ready answers.

Analysis of some decisions:

•    Ruling in Volkswagen India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. CCE (2014) 34 STR 135 (Tri – Mumbai)

The brief facts of the case were that the appellant was a manufacturer of passenger vehicles and was registered under service tax for various taxable services like, management or business consultant’s service, consulting engineer’s service, etc.

Due to nature of the business, the appellant required people with specialised skill and experience and accordingly, the appellant employed many foreign nationals (called as global employees), who were previously employed with other group entity. there was an “inter Company employment agreement” between the appellant and its holding company namely Volkswagen AG, a company registered in Germany, which facilitatesd employment of personnel from other group companies. The  said  personnel  were  relieved  by  the  other  group company and were put at the disposal of the appellant and they function as whole time employees of the appellant– indian company and worked solely under the control, direction or supervision of the appellant in accordance with its policies, rules and guidelines generally applicable to the employees of the appellant company during the period  of  such  employment.  The  terms,  conditions  and place of employment of such global employee and their designation was in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed between indian company and the respective global employee. In particular, following agreement terms need to be noted:

•    The employment of such global employee shall be in his personal capacity only and not for and on behalf of the foreign company. the appellant also have a right to promote/discipline/suspend/take any action/terminate the services of such global employee at any point of time in accordance with its applicable policies without seeking any permission from the foreign company;

•    The other group company/foreign company will not have any obligation towards the appellant with regard to the performance of the global employee nor the foreign company shall enjoy any right, title to or interest in or be responsible for the work of global employee or assume any risk for the results produced from the work performed by the global employees while under employment with the appellant;

•    During the period of employment with the appellant, the holding company shall not in any way interfere with the working and/or the terms and conditions of such employee nor such employee shall be subject to any instruction or control of the foreign holding company;

•    The salary (including other entitlements) of such global employee shall be the liability of and decided and paid by the indian company i.e. the appellant based on its policies and guidelines and in case of default by the appellant, the foreign/global company will not be liable towards such global employee;

•    If the foreign/global company makes any payment to any third party (salary, etc.) in the home country of the global employee on behalf of the indian company, the foreign company will be entitled to be reimbursed by the indian company to the extent of such payment;

•    The foreign company will not be under any obligation to replace any of the global employees in the event the employment of any of the global employees is terminated by the global employee or the indian company, for any reason, nor the foreign company    is responsible for any loss or damage caused to the appellant or any action of such global employee;

•    The agreement does not create any service provider and client relationship between the foreign company and the appellant nor it would be construed that the foreign company is providing any type of  services with regard to employment of the global employees with the appellant;

•    Clearly provided that there is no direct or indirect consideration/charges (in cash or kind) payable by the indian company to the foreign company or vice-versa in this connection;

•    The remuneration clause provided is as follows:-
Your remuneration will be paid as follows:-
F Part of your net salary will be paid by the company into your valid account in Germany (through the disbursing agent, (VW aG) at the end of each calendar month).

F The  balance  part  of  your  net  salary  as  mutually agreed upon between you and company will be paid by the company into your valid account in india at the end of the calendar month.

Details of your remuneration will be communicated to you separately. your salary to be paid to Germany as above, would be paid subject to approvals as may be required under the indian exchange control regulations. the gross remuneration is subject to statutory withholding/indian income taxes as applicable.

The   company   shall   deduct   the   applicable   individual income-tax payable at source and make payment of the same.  The  company  shall  furnish  you  with  necessary certificates and any other documents evidencing the payment of this tax to the authorities as may be required by law.

…………..

•    The Visa clause of the agreement shows that such global employees are in the control and disposal and also command of the appellant and there is employer– employee relationship between them.

The revenue treated the aforementioned arrangement as “supply of manpower” by the foreign holding company to the appellant and issued show cause notice demanding service tax etc.

For  the  appellants,  it  was  submitted  that  there  was  no supply of labour or manpower, and/or recruitment service provided by the holding company of the appellant. as  per the requirement and request of the appellant, for skilled personnel, the holding company  facilitated  in  the identifying such foreign personnel, who were then employed by the appellant under separate agreement with each employee as aforementioned. Such global employees worked under the control and supervision of the appellant as its employees. Salary for such work done by the global employees was directly paid by the appellant and such income earned by the global employees was taxable as salary under the provisions of the income-tax act, 1961. Further, the appellant deducted income-tax at source from the salary of such global employee of the appellant as per the provisions of the income-tax act. the appellant had also issued necessary TDS certificate in capacity of employer.

Further,  a  part  of  the  salary  of  such  global  employees was remitted abroad in their home country, the same was done using the services of the holding company or other group companies as applicable and such amounts were reimbursed to the other company. It was further contended that apart from the part salary of the global employees (by way of reimbursement), the appellant had not paid any amount to their holding/foreign company. Merely because a part of the salary of such global employee was paid in their home country through the holding/foreign company, it could be said that the foreign/ holding company rendered supply of manpower or labour to  the  appellant. Reliance  was  placed  on  the  decisions in the case of ITC Ltd. vs. (2013) 29 STR 387 (Tribunal) and Paramount Communication Ltd. vs. (2013) 29 STR 317 (Tribunal).

It was further contended that the holding/foreign company was not a “manpower recruitment or supply agency service” as required u/s. 65(105)(k) of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, reliance was placed on C.B.E & C Circular No. 96/7/2007-S.T. dated 23-08-2007, wherein it has been clarified that in the case of supply of manpower, individuals are contractually employed by the manpower recruitment  or  supply  agency.  The  agency  agrees  for use of the services of an individual, employed by him, to another person, for a consideration. Employer–employee relationship in such case exists between the agency and the individual and not between the individual and the person who uses the services of the individual.

On  behalf  of  the  revenue,  it  was  contended  that  the indian entity should have paid full salary directly to the employee of the appellant company and not routed through the foreign/holding company. It is also the contention of the revenue that after a period of 3-4 years such global employees go back to the foreign/holding company and even during the intervening period, during the employment in the appellant company, the social security liability was discharged in their home country. Accordingly, it was submitted that the transaction is one of supply of labour/manpower by the foreign company to the appellant – indian company.

The tribunal held, “in view of the clauses of agreements noticed herein above and other facts, the global employees working under the  appellant  are  working  as their employees and having employee-employer relationship.  Further  there  is  no  supply  of  manpower service rendered to the appellant by the foreign / holding company. the method of disbursement of salary cannot determine the nature of transaction. Further, in view of the rulings relied upon by the appellant as aforementioned, we find that the facts are covered on all four corners and accordingly, the appeals are allowed and orders–in– original are set aside.”

•    Ruling in CST vs. Arvind Mills Ltd (2014) 35 STR 496 (GUJ)

In this case, the issue in brief was whether the respondent is a manpower supply or recruitment agency.

The  brief  facts  were  that  respondent  had  a  composite textile mill and was engaged in manufacturing of fabrics and readymade garments. in order to reduce its cost, the respondent deputed some of its employees to its group company, who were also engaged in similar businesses. Reason for such deputation was also on certain occasions stipulated work arising for a limited period. The tribunal recorded that there was no allegation  of  finding  that the respondent had deputed employees to any other concerns outside its own subsidiary companies and also recorded that undisputedly the employees deputed do not work exclusively under the direction or supervision of the subsidiary company and upon completion of the work they were repatriated to the respondent company. On such basis, the tribunal held that the respondent could be said to be manpower supply recruitment agency and, therefore, not exigible to service tax.

The Revenue contended that the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency was very wide and would include range of activities of supply of manpower either temporarily or permanently and submitted that sizable manpower was required for the respondent from the group companies for deputation of the staff and also drew attention to the amendment of such definition to contend that after the amendment, the definition was widened.

The Court observed that the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency was wide and would cover within its sweep range of activities provided therein. However, in the present case, such definition would not cover the activity of the respondent as rightly held by the tribunal. to  court  observed,  “the  respondent  in  order  to  reduce his cost of manufacturing, deputed some of its staff to its subsidiaries or group companies for stipulated work or limited period. All throughout the control and supervision remained with the respondent. As pointed out by the respondent, company is not in the business of providing recruitment or supply of manpower. Actual cost incurred by the company in terms of salary, remuneration and perquisites is only reimbursed by the group companies.” There was no element of profit or finance benefit. The subsidiary companies could not be said to be their clients. deputation of the employees was only for and in the interest of the company. There was no relation of agency and client. it was pointed out that the employee deputed did not exclusively work under the direction of supervision or control of subsidiary company. All throughout he would be under the continuous control and direction of the company. The court further noted:
“We have to examine the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency in background of such undisputable facts. The definition though provides that manpower recruitment supply agency means any commercial concern engaged in providing any services directly or indirectly  in any manner for recruitment or supply of manpower temporarily or otherwise to a client, in the present case, the respondent cannot be said to be a commercial concern engaged in providing such specified services to a client. It is true that the definition is wide and would include  any such activity where it is carried out either directly or indirectly supplying recruitment or manpower temporarily or otherwise. However, fundamentally recruitment of the agency being a commercial concern engaged in providing any such service to client would have to be satisfied. In the present case, facts are to the contrary.”

In the result, the Court held that no question of law was involved.

Conclusion
•    For the period prior to 01-07-2012, as analyzed and held in judicial rulings, in order to be made liable to service tax, it would be essential to satisfy the test of existence of a manpower supply or recruitment agency as defined under the Act at the relevant time.

•    After introduction of negative list regime with effect from 01-07-2012, since the term ‘service’ has been very widely defined, it would be essential to satisfy  the test of employer – employee relationship so as    to be excluded from the definition of ‘service’. As discussed, the Courts have held that it is very difficult to lay down a single test or formula in this regard. hence, though guidance may be available from Court rulings, existence of employer–employee relationship would have to be determined considering the facts & circumstances of a given case.

•    It is  unfortunate  to  note  that  despite  the  fact  that a draft circular dated 27-07-2012 was issued by CBEC clarifying scope  of  Manpower  Supply  &  Joint Employment, CBEC has not issued a final Circular setting out Government’s perspective, in particular, as regards taxability of secondment/ deputation of employees. It is felt that issue of a CBeC Circular, would provide finality on the issue and avoid extensive litigation.

Place of Provision of Services Rules

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Notification No. 14/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 were provided in the principal Notification No. 28/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012 vide number G.S.R. 470 (E), dated 20th June, 2012. The same are now amended vide this Notification No. 14/2014. These amendments are going to bring a major shift on the liability of service tax in respect of some services.
Commission Agent service: Under the amended rules, commission agent is covered under Rule 9(c) of the POP Rules, which means, the place of provision of service will 89 be the location of service provider. So, if an overseas agent provides commission agent service to an Indian exporter, it will not attract reverse charge as the location of service provider is in non-taxable territory. Consequently, if any commission agent renders service in India for any foreign goods, the commission agent is liable to pay service tax, even though he may receive the commission in foreign exchange.

Hiring of Aircrafts or Vessels: Rule 9(d) of the POP Rules, 2012 has been amended to exclude Aircrafts and Vessels from the scope of this rule. Before this amendment, Aircrafts or Vessels taken or hire from abroad up to a period of one month did not attract service tax under reverse charge. But, now that these two modes of transport are excluded from Rule 9(d), the place of provision is the location of service recipient as per Rule 3. Therefore, from 1st October 2014, if Aircraft or Vessel is taken on hire from a non-taxable territory for a period up to one month, it attracts service tax under reverse charge.

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Changes in Point of Taxation Rules, 2011

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Notification No. 13/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

The Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 were framed by the principal Notification No. 18/2011 – Service Tax, dated 1st March, 2011 vide number G.S.R. 175 (E), dated 1st March, 2011 and amended by Notification No. 37/2012-Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012 vide number G.S.R.479 (E), dated 20th June, 2012.

Now, by this Notification No. 13/2014, certain amendments have been made to the earlier notifications as summarised below:

1. Determination of point of taxation in case of specified services or persons: Rule 7:

The point of taxation for the services specified in section 68(2) that is services falling under the ambit of reverse or partial charge mechanism shall be the month in which the payment is made to the vendor, subject to a condition that such payment is made within six months from the date of invoice. If the payment is not made within six months, the point of taxation shall be determined as if this rule does not exist.

However, the point of taxation shall be date immediately following three months if the payment is not made within three months from the date of invoice. Hence, effectively the time period has been reduced from six months to three months.

2. Rule 10: POT for instances where invoice for reverse or partial charge has been issued before 01-10- 2014 and payment is pending as on said date:
The new rule provides that notwithstanding anything contained vide first proviso to Rule 7, if the invoice in respect of a service for which POT is determinable vide Rule 7 has been issued before 01-10-2014 but payment has not been made as on the said day, the POT shall be:
i. If payment is made within a period of six months from the date of invoice – POT Is the date of invoice; ii. If payment is not made within a period of six months from the date of invoice – POT shall be determined as if this rule does not exist.

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Interest on delayed payment of service tax

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Notification No. 12/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Vide this notification, varying rates of interest on the basis of extent of delay in payment of service tax have been provided as under:

New rates shall be applicable w.e.f. 1st October, 2014.

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Service Tax (Determination of Value ) Rules, 2006- Changes

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Notification No. 11/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

In Rule 2A of the Service Tax Valuation Rules, category ‘B’ and ‘C’ of works contract i.e.,

(a) the services of maintenance or repair or reconditioning or restoration or servicing of any goods;

(b) maintenance or repair or completion and finishing services such as glazing or plastering or floor and wall tiling or installation of electrical fittings of immovable property; are merged into one single category, with service portion as 70%. This change will come into effect from 1st October, 2014.

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Reverse or Partial Charge Mechanism- Changes

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Notification No. 10/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

In this connection, the principal notification notification No. 30/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012, vide number G.S.R. 472 (E), dated 20th June, 2012 was last amended by notification No. 45/2012-Service Tax, dated 7th August, 2012 vide number G.S.R. 621 (E), dated 7th August, 2012.

Now, by this Notification No.10/2014, certain amendments have been effected in percentages of service tax payable by the service provider and service recipient for certain specified services, which are summarised as under:

In relation to services provided by a recovery agent to a banking company or financial institution or NBFC – the recipient of service has to pay 100% of service tax.

In relation to services provided by director of a company or body corporate – the recipient of service has to pay 100% of service tax.

In relation to services provided or agreed to be provided by way of renting of a motor vehicle designed to carry passengers on non-abated value to any person who is not engaged in the similar line of business – the percentage has been revised from 60:40 to 50:50 by service provider and service receiver respectively.

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E-payment of service tax made mandatory

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Notification No. 09/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

With effect from 01-10-2014, electronic payment of service tax is made mandatory for all assessees. However, a proviso has been added wherein the powers have been given to the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to allow the assessees for reasons recorded in writing to deposit service tax by any mode other than internet banking.

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Abatements – changes

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Notification No. 08/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Various abatements have been granted by the principal Notification No. 26/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012, vide number G.S.R. 468 (E), dated the 20th June, 2012 and amended by notification No.9/2013- Service Tax, dated the 8th May, 2013 vide G.S.R. 296 (E), dated 8th May, 2013. Now this Notification No. 08/2014 makes further amendments as follows :

1. For services of GTA in relation to transportation of goods:

The condition of non-availment of CENVAT Credit on inputs, input services and capital goods is required to be satisfied by the service provider. The ambiguity whether the same is not to be availed by the service provider or receiver is ironed out by inserting the phrase ‘by service provider’ in Entry 7.

2. For services provided in relation to Chit:
The following condition has been added stating that CENVAT Credit on inputs, capital goods and input services, used for providing the taxable service, has not been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

3. For services of renting of any motor vehicle designed to carry passengers:

i. The phrase ‘motor vehicle designed to carry passengers’ is replaced with ‘motor cab’. Hence, effectively the services of renting of motor cab is only covered under this entry.
ii. The following conditions are substituted for the existing conditions:
CENVAT Credit on inputs and capital goods are not to be taken;

CENVAT Credit of input services of rent a cab has been taken as under:

Full credit if received from a person who is paying service tax on 40% of value; Upto 40% of such credit, if service tax is paid on the entire value,

CENVAT Credit of input services other than above shall not be taken.

4. For services of transport of passengers by a contract carriage other than motor cab:

i. A new entry since the services provided by contract carriage is brought into tax net in this notification. The abatement specified for such services shall be 60% subject to a condition that CENVAT Credit on inputs, capital goods and input services, used for providing the taxable service, has not been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
ii. Further, this entry also covers the services provided by radio-taxis from the date the phrase ‘radio taxi’ is deleted from the negative list to be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette.

5. For transport of goods in a vessel:
The abatement has been increased from 50% to 60%.

6. For services provided by a tour operator:

The credit of input services received from tour operator is being made available which is not allowed hitherto.

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Changes in exemption procedure for SEZs

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Notification No. 07/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Services provided to developer of or unit in SEZ are exempted by adopting certain procedure laid out in the principal Notification No. 12/2013 – Service Tax, dated 1st July, 2013, vide number G.S.R. 448 (E), dated 1st July, 2013 and amended by Notification No. 15/2013-Service Tax, dated 21st November, 2013 vide number G.S.R. No.744 (E), dated 21st November, 2013.

In order to remove certain time delays and simplify certain benefits, Notification No. 07/2014 makes following amendments in the earlier notifications:

(a) Central Excise Officer would issue Form A-2, within 15 days from receipt of Form A-1;

(b) Exemption would be available from the date when list of services on which SEZ is entitled to upfront exemption is endorsed by the authorised officer of SEZ in Form A-1, provided Form A-1 is furnished to the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer within 15 days of its verication. If furnished later, exemption would be available from the date on which FormA-1 is so furnished;

(c) Pending issuance of Form A-2, exemption will be available subject to condition that authorisation issued by the Central Excise officer will be furnished to the service provider within a period of three months from provision of service;

(d) For services covered under reverse charge, the requirement of furnishing service tax registration number of service provider shall be dispensed with;

(e) A service shall be treated as exclusively used for SEZ operations if the recipient of service is a SEZ unit or developer, invoice is in the name of such unit/developer and the service is used exclusively for furtherance of authorised operations in the SEZ.

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Changes in Mega Exemption Notification

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Notification No. 06/2014-ST dated 11th July 2014

The
exemptions to certain activities are governed by the principal
Notification No 25/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012 have been amended by
Notification No.04/2014 – Service Tax, dated 17th February, 2014, vide
number G.S.R. 91(E), dated 17th February, 2014.

Now, by
this Notification No. 6/2014-ST dated 11-07- 2014, amendments have been
made to the said principal notification. Such amendments are summarised
below :

(a) E xemption to Services by way of technical testing
or analysis of newly developed drugs, including vaccines and herbal
remedies, on human participants is now withdrawn;
(b) E xemption to Services provided for transportation of passengers by air-conditioned contract carriage is withdrawn;
(c)
E xemption in respect of services provided to the Government or local
authority or the governmental authority, will be limited to services by
way of water supply, public health, sanitation conservancy, solid waste
management or slum improvement and upgradation;
(d) S ervices provided by common bio-medical waste treatment facility operators to clinical establishments are exempted;
(e)
S ervices by way of transportation by rail or vessel from one place in
India to another of the following goods are exempted : i. organic
manure, ii. cotton, ginned or baled;
(f) S ervices by way of
transportation by GTA , by way of transport in a goods carriage the
following goods are exempted : i. organic manure, ii. cotton, ginned or
baled;
(g) S ervices by way of loading, unloading, packing, storage or warehousing of rice, cotton, ginned or baled are exempted;
(h)
Life micro-insurance products as approved by the Insurance Regulatory
and Development Authority, having maximum amount of cover of Rs. 50,000
are exempted;
(i) S ervices received by the Reserve Bank of India,
from outside India in relation to management of foreign exchange
reserves are exempted;

(j) S ervices provided by a tour operator
to a foreign tourist in relation to a tour conducted wholly outside
India are exempted;
(k) T he concept of ‘auxiliary educational services is omitted and exempted services are notified as under:
(i) transportation of students, faculty and staff;
(ii) catering services including any mid-day meals scheme sponsored by the Government;
(iii) security or cleaning or house-keeping services in such educational institutions;
(iv) services relating to admission to such institution or conduct of examination;

(l) T he exemption of renting of immovable property service received by educational institutions, stands withdrawn;
(m)
S ervices provided by hotel, inn, guest house, club or campsite, by
whatever name called, for residential or lodging purposes, having
declared tariff of a unit of accommodation of Rs. 1,000 or more per day
are taxable. The word ‘commercial’ has been deleted to cover the
services provided by dharmashalas or ashrams or any other such entities;
(n)
Selling of space or time slots for advertisements has been excluded
from negative list with the exception of selling of space for
advertisements in the print media.

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Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 2014

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Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 2014 published after having received assent of the governor in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 26-06-2014.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/CR 46/Taxation 1 dated 11-07-2014

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By this notification, the government of Maharashtra amends Schedule A and C with effect from 01-08-2014.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/C.R.44/Taxation-1 dated 09-07- 2014

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By this notification Government of Maharashtra has exempted late fees above Rs.1,000/- for dealers who have not filed any returns for the period up to February, 2014 on condition that they file returns up to 30-09-2014 along with payment of tax and interest applicable.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/CR 30/Taxation 1. dated 23-06-2014

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Draft rules for Border Check Post published for the information of all persons and to invite objections or suggestions if any.

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Professional Services vis-à-vis works contract

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Introduction
The issue about nature of transaction as to whether it is sale, service or works contract, is always debatable. This is because there are no pre-set guidelines about deciding the nature of transaction, as to whether sale, service or works contract. There are a number of judgments from various forums but still the issue has remained unresolved.

Constitutional amendment
By the 46th amendment, works contract transactions were made taxable under sales tax by insertion of Clause (29A) in Article 366 of the Constitution of India. Thereafter, the issue of deciding the nature of transaction has become much more complicated. Prior to above amendment, there were normally two types of transactions, i.e., normal sale or works contract. Since works contract was not taxable, no further demarcation used to be made. After the amendment, works contract transactions are taxable. However, all the transactions involving goods cannot become taxable works contract transactions under sales tax laws. In other words, if it can be substantiated that if in a transaction, goods are used, but such use of goods is only incidental to providing service and that the said use is not as sale of material itself, then the transaction can be classified as a transaction for rending service, not liable to tax under the sales tax laws. Therefore, after the amendment, in addition to classifying the transaction as works contract, the further classification can be made as taxable works contract under sales tax laws and non taxable transaction (involving use of goods), but which can be termed as service transaction.

Case study
Reference can be made to the judgment in case of Dr. Hemendra Surana vs. State of Rajasthan (90 STC 251)(Raj). In this case the appellant, a doctor by profession, took an X-ray of the patient and gave his report with an X-ray film. The transaction was treated as works contract by sales tax authorities, whereas the Hon. High Court held that it is not a works contract. It was held as ‘service transaction’ implying that transfer of X-ray film is incidental to professional services.

In the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91), the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed about deciding nature of sale vis-à-vis works contract, service transaction. The relevant observations are in para 46 which are reproduced below.

“46.. The reason why these services do not involve a sale for the purposes of Entry 54 of List II is, as we see it, for reasons ultimately attributable to the principles enunciated in Gannon Dunkerley’s case [1958] 9 STC 353 (SC), namely, if there is an instrument of contract which may be composite in form in any case other than the exceptions in Article 366(29A), unless the transaction in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts and is discernible as such, then the State would not have the power to separate the agreement to sell from the agreement to render service, and impose tax on the sale. The test therefore for composite contracts other than those mentioned in Article 366(29A) continues to be—did the parties have in mind or intend separate rights arising out of the sale of goods. If there was no such intention there is no sale even if the contract could be disintegrated. The test for deciding whether a contract falls into one category or the other is as to what is “the substance of the contract”. We will, for the want of a better phrase, call this the dominant nature test.”

In light of above, one can look into the intention of parties, the scope of work and decide the nature of transaction. The ‘dominant nature test’ was evolved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the BSNL judgement.

Judgment of Larger Bench in case of M/s Kone Elevators (71 VST 1)
In this case, the Hon’ble Larger Bench (5 judges) of the Supreme Court has discussed about nature of transaction of installation of lift. The judgment is by majority of four judges to one judge. The minority judgment has confirmed the original judgment that supply and installation of the lift is ‘sale’.

However, the majority judgment of four judges has held that the lift installation transaction is a ‘works contract.’ Therefore, the binding judgment will be of the majority and transaction of installation of lift will be considered as ‘works contract.’

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this judgment, has discussed the entire historical background of works contract transaction. And after making observations about the legal position, the Hon’ble Supreme Court turned to facts of the case.

As per the larger bench, in case of lift, the lift comes into existence on installation. Therefore, the Larger Bench has considered service part as also equally important and hence lift installation transaction is held to be a composite transaction of sale and service, i.e., works contract. This position is clear from the paragraph reproduced below.

“63. Considered on the touchstone of the aforesaid two Constitution Bench decisions, we are of the convinced opinion that the principles stated in Larsen and Toubro (supra) as reproduced by us hereinabove, do correctly enunciate the legal position. Therefore, “the dominant nature test” or “overwhelming component test” or “the degree of labour and service test”are really not applicable. If the contract is a composite one which falls under the definition of works contracts as engrafted under clause (29A)(b) of Article 366 of the Constitution, the incidental part as regards labour and service pales into total insignificance for the purpose of determining the nature of the contract.

64.    Coming back to Kone Elevators (supra), it is perceivable that the three-Judge Bench has referred to the statutory provisions of the 1957 Act and thereafter referred to the decision in Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. (supra), and has further taken note of the customers’ obligation to do the civil construction and the time schedule for delivery and thereafter proceeded to state about the major component facet and how the skill and labour employed for converting the main components into the end product was only incidental and arrived at the conclusion that it was a contract for sale. The principal logic applied, i.e., the incidental facet of labour and service, according to us, is not correct. It may be noted here that in all the cases that have been brought before us, there is a composite contract for the purchase and installation of the lift. The price quoted is a composite one for both. As has been held by the High Court of Bombay in Otis Elevator (supra), various technical aspects go into the installation of the lift. There has to be a safety device. In certain States, it is controlled by the legislative enactment and the rules. In certain States, it is not, but the fact remains that a lift is installed on certain norms and parameters keeping in view numerous factors. The installation requires considerable skill and experience. The labour and service element is obvious. What has been taken note of in Kone Elevators (supra) is that the company had brochures for various types of lifts and one is required to place order, regard being had to the building, and also make certain preparatory work. But it is not in dispute that the preparatory work has to be done taking into consideration as to how the lift is going to be attached to the building. The nature of the contracts clearly exposit that they are contracts for supply and installation of the lift where labour and service element is involved. Individually manufactured goods such as lift car, motors, ropes, rails, etc., are the components of the lift which are eventually installed at the site for the lift to operate in the building. In constitutional terms, it is transfer either in goods or some other form. In fact, after the goods are assembled and installed with skill and labour at the site, it becomes a permanent fixture of the building. Involvement of the skill has been elaborately dealt with by the High Court of Bombay in Otis Elevator (supra) and the factual position is undisputable and irrespective of whether installation  is regulated by statutory law or not, the result would be the same. We may hasten to add that this position is stated in respect of a composite contract which requires the contractor to install a lift in a building. It is necessary to state here that if there are two contracts, namely, purchase of the components of the lift from a dealer, it would be a contract for sale and similarly, if separate contract is entered into for installation, that would be a contract for labour and service. But, a pregnant one, once there is a composite contract for supply and installation, it has to be treated as a works contract, for it is not a sale of goods/chattel simpliciter. It is not chattel sold as chattel or, for that matter, a chattel being attached to another chattel. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to term it as a contract for sale on the bedrock that the components are brought to the site, i.e., building, and prepared for delivery. The conclusion, as has been reached in Kone Elevators (supra), is based on the bedrock of incidental service for delivery. It would not be legally correct to make such a distinction in respect of lift, for the contract itself profoundly speaks of obligation to supply goods and materials as well as installation of the lift which obviously conveys performance of labour and  service.  Hence,  the fundamental characteristics of works contract are satisfied. Thus analysed, we conclude and hold that the decision rendered in Kone Elevators (supra) does not correctly lay down the law and it is, accordingly, overruled.”

It can be seen that, ultimately the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided the issue on the factual position.

OUTCOME
As per above judgment, the dominant nature test etc.,
are irrelevant. It appears that the basic nature of the transaction is required to be seen and if it is works contract then the dominant nature test or overwhelming component test etc., are not relevant. Thus, one is again in a dilemma about deciding nature of taxable works contract transaction vis-à-vis service transaction, where some materials may be involved.

By virtue of BSNL decision, dominant nature test could have been applied. In fact, in this case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that doctors, lawyers cannot be liable to tax as the basic nature of transaction is rendering service, though some goods may be involved and transferred. In the judgment of Kone Elevators, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the dominant nature test is not relevant. Thus, someone may take a view that the doctors and lawyers can also be liable, as the service nature of transaction is not relevant.

This will be an extreme view, which cannot be justified. Though, the dominant nature test is not relevant, still the issue will arise whether services of doctors and lawyers can be considered to be works contract. We have to look into the basic nature of transaction to decide whether it is a works contract? But as discussed, the position has become more fluid and the issue of above nature may crop up. In fact, this is the guidance expected from the judicial pronouncements from the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In any case, in light of direct observations of the Supreme Court in case of BSNL, it can be said that, the services of doctors and lawyers are still out of purview of sales tax laws.

In fact in recent judgment in case of International Hospital Pvt. Ltd. (71 VST 139)(All), the Hon. Allahabad High Court has held that use of stents and valves in heart procedure of patient at hospital is not works contract. However, there can be contrary judgment and the situation will remain uncertain. In above judgment of the Hon. Allahabad High Court itself, there is reporting of contrary judgment of the Kerala High Court in case of Aswini Hospital Pvt. Ltd. (51 NTN 29)(Ker), wherein the hospital is held as liable to works contract tax.

CONCLUSION

In case of International Hospital Pvt. Ltd., the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kone Elevators, i.e., (71 VST 1) was not available. Therefore, one may be tempted to say that the above judgment may require reconsideration in light of above judgment in case of Kone Elevators. However, it appears that the judgment in case of International Hospital Pvt. Ltd., will still hold good as the same is based on basic nature of transaction and will be saved even by judgment of Kone Elevators. In the future, reconfirmation of above judgment of the Allahabad High Court will certainly helpful in deciding correct nature of transaction, more particularly the service transaction where some material is involved in the rending of service.

TAXABILITY OF TAKE AWAYS AND HOME DELIVERIES

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Background
Service tax levy on Air Conditioned Restaurants (with license to serve liquor) [“ACR”) was introduced, w.e.f. 01-05-2011, with an abatement of 70%. The said levy has been continued under negative list based taxation of services introduced w.e.f. 01-07-2012, with few minor changes in the scope and rate of abatement.

However, the scope of ACR Services, was substantially expanded w.e.f. 01-04-2013, whereby the condition of license to serve liquor was done away with. Far reaching implications of the amendment were discussed in April, 2013 issue of BCAJ. In this feature, the contentious of issue of taxability in case of take aways / home deliveries in regard to which inconsistent practices are being followed, is discussed.

Constitutional Validity of the levy
The constitutional validity of service tax levy on ACR was challenged before various Courts in the country. The Kerala High Court in the case of Kerala Classified Hotels and Resorts Association & others (2013) 31 STR 257 (KER) had held the levy constitutionally invalid. However, the Bombay High Court in India Hotels and Restaurant Association & Others vs. UOI (2014 – TIOL – 498 – HC – Mum – ST) and the Chhattisgarh High Court in Hotel East Park & Another vs. UOI (2014 – TIOL – 758 – HC – CHHATTISGRAH – ST) have upheld the constitutional validity of the levy.

Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 65 B (44) of the Finance Act, 1994, as amended (Act)

“Service” means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include –

(a) an activity which constitutes merely, –

i) A transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or

ii) Such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be a sale within the meaning of Clause (29A) of article 366 of the Constitution; or

iii) A transaction in money or actionable claim.

(b) A provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;

(c) Fees taken in any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force.

………………….

Declared Services (section 66E of the Act)

The following shall constitute declared services, namely
…………

(i) Service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as a part of the activity.

Article 366 (29A) (f) of the Constitution of India
Sale includes –

“Supply, by way of or as a part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.”

Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012 – ST dated 20-06-2012 (as amended)

Entry No. 19

Services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having facility of air conditioning or central air heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year.

Relevant Extracts from CBEC – Education Guide dated 20-06-2012

Para 8.4

Valuation of service portion involved in supply of food or any other article of human consumption or any drink in a restaurant or as outdoor catering.

In terms of article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India supply of any goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) in any manner as part of a service for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration is deemed to be a sale of such goods. Such a service therefore cannot be treated as service to the extent of the value of goods so supplied. The remaining portion however constitutes a service. It is a well settled position of law, declared by the Supreme Court in BSNL‘s case [2006(2)STR161(SC)], that such a contract involving service along with supply of such goods can be dissected into a contract of sale of goods and contract of provision of service. Since normally such an activity is in the nature of composite activity, difficulty arises in determining the value of the service portion. In order to ensure transparency and standardization in the manner of determination of the value of such service provided in a restaurant or as outdoor catering a new Rule 2C has been inserted in the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 116 2011, amended by the amendment Rules of 2012. This manner of valuation is explained in the points below.

Para 8.4.1 Are services provided by any kind of restaurant, big or small, covered by the manner of valuation provided in Rule 2C of the Valuation Rules?

Yes. Although services provided by any kind of restaurant would be valued in the manner provided in Rule 2C, it may be borne in mind that the following category of restaurants are exempted –

• Services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year, ……………..

• Below the threshold exemption.

Departmental Clarifications
Circular D.O.F NO. 334/3/2011 – TRU dated 28-02-2011 (Relevant extracts) Para 1.4

The new levy is directed at services provided by highend restaurant that are air-conditioned and have license to serve liquor. Such restaurants provide conditions and ambience in a manner that service provided may assume predominance over the food in many situations. It should not be confused with mere sale of goods at any eating house, where such services are materially absent or so minimal that it will be difficult to establish that any service in any meaningful way is being provided.

Para 1.6

The levy is intended to be confined to the value of services contained in the composite contract and shall not cover either the meal portion in the composite contract or mere sale of food by way of pick-up or home delivery, as also goods sold at MRP…………….

Circular No. 173/8/2013 dated 07-10-2013 (relevant extracts)

Taxability – Supply of food at outlets, take aways, delivery etc.
Various restaurants, hotels or coffee shops sell food items, beverages, ready-to-drink products, including food pre-packaged at their outlets. The arrangement may be sale at outlet for consumption within the premises or sale over the counter or sale of MRP products.

The scope of declared list entry (i) of section 66E of the Act is very wide and covers service portion of an activity of supply of food or any article of human consumption or any drinks in any manner. Hence, service tax will be payable whenever supply of food involves any service element and the transaction is not merely a “transfer of title” in goods. The issue which requires consideration is whether supply of food items and beverages is a transaction of

merely “transfer of title” in goods or involves any service element as part of supply of goods and beverages. As regards the determination of what is ‘sales’ under article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India, various judicial rulings have evolved a law to the following effect:

• the predominant transaction is a ‘sale’ or ‘service’ must be determined from the facts of each case;

• where supply is made in a restaurant and if the customer has the right to take away the food or dispose it off at his discretion, it may qualify as ‘sale’ and providing of services in this situation would be incidental;
•    further, in relation to “over the counter” sales, it may qualify as sale of goods, as the services are not significant.

Though the above evolution of law is before the introduction of negative list based taxation of services, the same would be relevant, to determine what constitutes ‘sale’ as contemplated in the exclusion clause in the definition of ‘service’. [section 65 B(44) of the Act] under the negative list regime.
The CBEC circulars issued at the time of introduction of levy as reproduced earlier, have clarified that mere sale of food by way of pick-up or home delivery as well as goods sold at MRP will not attract service tax. Though these circulars were issued in the context of “ACR Services” the principle contained therein would be relevant under the negative list based regime. Further, as ‘sale’ is covered under the exclusion clause in the definition of ‘service’, there can be no levy of service tax as “Declared Services”.

•    Whether the service tax is attracted even where the air-conditioning facility has operated for a part of the year or in any part of establishment. In particular, cases where A/c is not installed in the restaurant area where food is supplied for consumption by a customer but in Manager’s cabin or a Cold Storage area in a kitchen which is a part of the restaurant establishment.

•    Whether self–service or pick up or home delivery/ supply of food or beverages, ice cream/food served outside the area of restaurant/eating joints or mess having facility or air–conditioning etc. will come under the purview of service tax or not?

In terms of Clause (i) of section 66E of the Act, service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or other articles of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as a part of the activity is a declared service.

Further, Entry No. 19 of the Notification No. 25/2012- S.T. dated 20-06-2012 as amended vide Notification No.3/2013–ST dated 01-03-2013 (w.e.f. 01-04-2013), has exempted services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air–heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year.

?    According to one school of thinking:

•    In light of the Exemption Notification No. 25/2012– S.T. (as amended) the specific exclusion of the premises which have or had air–conditioning facility in any part of the establishment (including Manager’s cabin or Cold Storage area in a restaurant) at any time during the year, it would appear that, exemption may not be available

•    The service tax has been levied on the activity    of supply of goods etc. in any manner and the exemption has been granted to the services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air-heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year. The exemption, is based on the condition of the restaurant, eating joint or the mess as to whether or not they are    or were having air-conditioning or central air– heating facility in any part of their establishment, at any time during the year. It is not based on the manner in which food, etc. is supplied. Therefore, it is appears that service tax could be leviable    on the food etc., supplied by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess if they have or had the facility of air-conditioning or central air-heating in any part of their establishment during any part of the year irrespective of the fact whether the food is served, outside the restaurant premises, delivered or taken away.

?    According to a second school of thinking :

•    Based on settled principles of harmonious & rational interpretation laid down from time to time, in order to attract service tax under ACR Services, it would appear that A/c /air heating facility should exist in the restaurant area where food is supplied.

•    In cases where, food is prepared by an A/c outlet, restaurant etc. and the customers have an option to consume food/beverages etc., within the premises of such A/c outlet, restaurant etc., supply of food may get covered under entry (i) of section 66E of the Act and hence become liable to service tax.

However, in cases where no particular place is provided by the A/c outlet, restaurant etc. where such food/beverage can be consumed, the activities could be considered as being in the nature of sale of goods and hence may not attract service tax.

•    In cases where, A/c outlets, restaurants sell goods  on MRP basis (like coffee packets, cold drinks etc.),  it would be a good case to hold that goods supplied under MRP are mere sale of goods and do not involve any service element so as to attract service tax.

•    In cases where, food items are supplied by A/c Outlets/Restaurants as take aways or home delivery, the activities can be regarded as being in the nature of sale of goods and hence would not attract service tax.

CONCLUSION:
It would reasonably appear that, second set of contentions reflects a better view. CBEC clarifications in the context of ACR services reinforce the same. However, considering the scenario that at a practical level  in  many  cases take aways & home deliveries are being subjected to service tax by owners of A/c outlets, restaurants etc. as a conservative measure to avoid prospect of tax liability at a future date, the matter needs to be appropriately clarified by the CBEC so as to reduce burden at the end Consumer.

[2014] 46 taxmann.com 97 (Chennai – CESTAT) Mallika Jeyabalan vs. CCE, Madurai

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Whether training given relating to various procedures and statutory compliances to be made in relation to export of goods can qualify as “vocational training” and exempt under Notification No. 24/2004-S.T.? Held, Prima facie, Yes

Facts:
The Appellants are providing training relating to various procedures and statutory compliances to be made in relation to export of goods and claimed exemption vide Notification No. 24/2004-S.T. contending it would qualify to be “vocational training.” For this, the Appellants relied on the following decisions:

• Ashu Export Promoters (P) Ltd. v. CST [2012] 34 STT 47 (New Delhi- CESTAT )
• Wigan & Leigh College (India) Ltd. v. Jt. CST [2008] 12 STT 157 (Bang. – CESTAT )

Revenue argued that “vocational training” would only cover courses with specific syllabus and approved by Government and hence sought to tax Appellants’ activity under the category of “commercial training and coaching” for the period 01-04-2004 to 31-03-2009.

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal gave a prima facie view that, the decisions relied upon by the Appellant will apply to the training impugned in this case also and granted waiver and stayed collection of all the dues arising from the impugned order.

Note: In Ashu Exports Promoter’s case, Appellant was engaged in the activity of imparting training in the field of export-import, merchandising and retail management. The Hon’ble Tribunal while considering dictionary meaning of the term ‘vocational’ held that it means “relating to an occupation or employment”. Further, in relation to education and training it gives the meaning “directed at a particular occupation or its skill.” The Tribunal held that when engagement in occupation or employment becomes outcome of vocational training pedantic approach as that is made out by Revenue by restricting its meaning is undesirable.

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Online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company

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Whether online reservation services by overseas company to foreign company liable under reverse charge?

In
a recent decision in relation to reverse charge mechanism in British
Airways vs. Commissioner (ADJN), Central Excise, Delhi
2014-TIOL-979-CESTAT -DEL, the Tribunal by majority set aside the demand
of service tax on British Airways, India (BA India) the branch of
British Airways PLC, U.K. (BA UK) at Gurgaon.

Background in brief
The
Appellant as branch office provides air transportation services for
passengers and cargo and on these services has been paying service tax
under (zzn) and (zzzo) of section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the
Act). BA UK like airlines all over the world have agreements with
Central Computer Reservation System service providing companies such as
Galileo, Amadeus, Abacus, Sabre etc. (CRS companies) all located outside
India. These CRS companies facilitate reservation and ticket
availability position to air travel agents in India and all over the
world through online computer system. None of these service providers
has branch or an establishment in India. Accordingly, they maintain
database of BA UK as regards flight schedule, fares, seat availability
on flight etc. on real time basis and make information available to all
IATA agents across the world. In terms of the agreements with BA UK, CRS
companies provide hardware and connectivity with their network. Based
on the ticket sale by the IATA agents using their database, these
companies receive their fees from BA UK. The IATA agents do not have to
pay any fees. The services provided by CRS companies were considered
“online database access or retrieval service” by the department as
contained in section 65(105)(zh) read with sub-Clause (75) and (36) of
section 65 of the Act and since the services are used by IATA agents of
BA India in India to sell tickets, they were treated as received and
consumed in India by BA India. Hence, service tax was demanded on the
remuneration received by CRS companies from BA UK from the Appellant in
this case BA India, under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66A of the Act
read with Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The
Commissioner confirmed the demand and imposed penalties against which
this appeal was filed.

The dispute in the appeal hinges around
the main issue viz. whether the Appellant BA India, a BA UK branch can
be treated as entity separate from its head office, BA UK in terms of
section 66A(2) and therefore the Indian branch be taxed as recipient of
services of CRS companies. Additional issue involved was whether or not
service provided by CRS companies be considered an online service since
both the members were in agreement with treating the service taxable as
online database access and retrieval service contained in section
65(105)(zh) of the Act read with section 65(75) thereof; not much
discussion is provided herein.

The Appellant contended that
service was provided outside India as the CRS companies and their parent
company were situated outside India. Therefore there cannot be tax
liability for the Appellant, BA India. The Appellant’s view of
non-taxability of service tax was based on the grounds that CRS
companies abroad provided services to their head office in London. CRS
company’s server was connected with the server of the head office of the
Appellant and thus the head office received those services abroad. In
terms of section 66A(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act), the branch
and the head office are to be treated as separate entities. Relying on
Paul Merchants 2012-TIOL-1877-CESTAT – Delhi, the Appellant also
contended that service recipient is the person on whose orders the
service is provided, who is obliged to make payment for the same and
whose need is satisfied by the provision of service. Further, they
advanced the argument that had they paid service tax, it was a revenue
neutral case as they would have got CENVAT credit of the same. They also
contended that longer period of limitation did not apply to them as
they bonafide believed that they had no tax liability.

Revenue
discarded this plea finding that CRS companies even if situated outside
India were providing services to the Appellant having establishment in
India which enabled their appointed IATA agents to use the system for
booking tickets and thus derived benefit therefrom and therefore the
Appellant was ultimate service recipient in India from foreign based CRS
companies of online database access or retrieval services u/s. 66A of
the Act from 18/04/2006. According to revenue, since BA UK was permitted
by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to operate in India, the head office of
the Appellant and the Appellant cannot be two distinct entities under
law. Section 66A(2) of the Act did not apply to them. Existence of
Appellant in India without its head office was impracticable and
existence in India was only to fulfill object of its head office in UK
and act on its behalf in India under limited permissions granted by RBI
which in essence and substance is the same. The establishment in India
was created on temporary basis to carry out business in India. On the
above pleas made by the Appellant and the revenue, the two members of
the Division Bench of the CESTAT , Delhi had different views.
Consequently, the matter was referred to the Third Member. The views of
both the members along with those of the third member are summarised
below:

Conclusion: Member (Judicial):
The learned Member
(Judicial) after considering the case of the adjudicating authority and
examining relevant statutory provisions, examined the letter issued by
RBI to BA UK and the agreement between BA UK & Galileo, the CRS
company. RBI ‘s letter contained permission to carry out air
transportation business in India regulated by FEMA in view of the
foreign currency transactions involved.

• The Bench observed
that BA UK had its place of business in India in terms of section
66A(1)(b) of the Act during the impugned period. As a participant of CRS
agreement, the Appellant at its own cost was required to provide
Galileo complete data, timely and accurate in order that the CRS company
would be able to maintain and operate the system to provide access to
the IATA agents the services of reservation, seat availability etc. on
real time basis for a consideration payable by BA UK. According to the
Member, BA India was in no way different from its head office and
therefore the contention that BA India was not party to the agreement
was not correct.
• Air travel agents appointed by the Appellant
received and used the services of CRS and Appellant having place of
business in India is the recipient of services from foreign based CRS
companies.

• Who makes payment to the service provider is not material and no free service is provided by the service provider.


When the Appellant is covered by section 66A(1)(b) of the Act as
recipient of taxable service u/s. 65(105)(zh) of the Act, their plea
that they are immune from service tax in India is ill-founded as their
existence in India is only under the RBI permission whereas 66A(2) of
the Act recognises only different situs under law, but the said s/s.
does not grant immunity from taxation in India once incidence of tax
arises in India. What is charged by revenue is services received in
India and the Appellant has consumed them in India and not the services
received by its head office outside India.

• Appellant’s plea of
revenue neutrality would not exonerate them from the liability it has
under the law and reliance on Paul Merchants (supra) is misplaced as it
related to export of service.

•    Since the Appellant failed to register and file Returns periodically, they committed breach of law which cannot be eroded by lapse of time. Bonafide should be apparent from conduct and a mere plea does not render the adjudication time-barred and thus extended period could be invoked.

Conclusion: Member (Technical) the   member   (technical)   differing   from   the   above conclusion drawn by the member (judicial) made following observations. He however agreed on the issue of classification that services were classifiable as online/ access/retrieval services:

•    Since the term ‘service’ was not defined during the period under appeal, not only there must be an activity provided by a provider of service to the recipient thereof, but there must also be flow of consideration, cash or other than cash, direct or indirect from recipient to the provider and the provision of services must satisfy some need of the recipient which may be personal or business.

•    Under Rule 3 of the Export of Service Rules, 2005, when a service provider is in india and the recipient thereof are outside india, no service tax is chargeable and when the provider is located abroad being a person having a business or fixed establishment outside India and the recipient is located in india being a person having a place of business, fixed establishment in india, he is a person liable for service tax in terms of section  66A read  with  rule  2(1)(d)(iv)  of  the  service tax rules.

•    U/s. 66A(2), when a person carries out a business through a permanent establishment in india and through another permanent establishment in another country, the two establishments  are  separate  persons  for the purpose of this section. second proviso to section 66a(1) is that when a service provider has his busies establishment in more than any one country, the establishment which is directly concerned with the provision of service will be considered service provider.   This  principle  in  the  hon.  Member’s  view would apply to determine as to who is the service recipient in the instant case when provider of service is located abroad and it will be reasonable to treat the establishment most directly concerned with the use  of the service provided as recipient of such services provided by the person abroad.

•    Unlike the transaction of goods, receipt and consumption of a service goes together, as the provision of a service satisfies the need of recipient, the service stands consumed. Accordingly, if service recipient is located in india, the service is received and hence consumed in india but if the recipient is located abroad, there is no liability for the person in india to pay service tax. This is in accordance with the principle of equivalence mentioned in the apex Court’s judgment in the case of all India Federation of Tax Practitioner 2007-TIOL-149-SC-ST and association of Leasing and Financial service companies 2010 (20) STr 417 (SC).

•    Conceptually, Export of Service Rules, 2005 and taxation   of   service   (provided   from   outside   india and received in india)  rules, 2006 put together are the rules which determine the location of service recipient.  thus, when the provider of service is located in india and the recipient thereof is outside india, in accordance with rule 3(iii) applicable to the services other than these in relation to immovable property and performance based services and when they relate to business or commerce, these will be export services and there would be no taxation in india whereas in  the reverse scenario, there will be import of service   in respect of which the service recipient is located in india. However, if both service provider and receiver  of category (iii) for use in his business are also located outside india, there would be no import and therefore no taxation in india.

•    As regards services of CRS companies located abroad, whether they can be treated as received by the appellant in india is to be determined based on the above legal provisions.

•    As regards letter from RBI, it was observed as follows:

i)    BA UK and Ba india are separate establishments and that the branch was not in the nature of a temporary establishment as contended by the department.
ii)    the   agreement   was   between   BA  UK   and   CRS companies abroad which did not have any branch or establishment in india.
iii)    entire payment to Crs companies was made directly by Ba uK outside india and no part was paid by Ba india.

Thus,  the  services  provided  by  CRS  companies  were received by BA UK as both Ba UK and Ba India are to be treated as separate persons in view of the provisions  of  section  66a(2).  They  would  be  treated as received in india only if it has been received by the recipient located in india for use in relation to business or commerce.

Reasoning why the Branch is not the recipient of service.

According to the hon. Member (technical), the revenue’s view that Ba india was the recipient of the services of CRS companies was incorrect for the following reasons:

•    In a transaction of service, the recipient consumes the service simultaneously with the performance of service. thus recipient of a service is the person who is legally entitled for provision of service.  further, consideration in some cases can be direct or indirect. applying this criteria, Ba india can be treated as recipient only if the service provided by CRS companies is meant for the BA india and if BA UK had acted as only facilitator and there was flow of consideration, direct or indirect from BA india to CRS companies. In the instant case, neither BA India is recipient nor is there a flow of consideration, direct or indirect form Ba India to CRS companies.

•    CRS companies did not provide any branch specific service.   The   job of BA india is only to appoint iata agents, collect sales proceeds of tickets sold by agents, fares and remitting the same to h.o. and nothing showed that key business decisions were taken by them for the entire company. applying the principle of second proviso of section 66A(1) discussed above,    it is BA UK – the H.O. office which is to be treated    as directly concerned with the services provided by CRS companies as it cannot be said that the indian branch was the sole beneficiary or that H.O. acted   as a facilitator to enter into the agreements with CRS companies on behalf of branches for providing services to them. The business needs of H.O. are satisfied and therefore h.o. is the recipient of service.

•    There is no evidence or even allegation that BA India made any payment to CRS companies directly or indirectly and there is an accepted position in the order that payment was made abroad by the h.o. directly   to CRS companies and that the two establishments   of BA india and BA UK their h.o. have to be treated   as separate persons in terms of section 66A(2), the transaction of provision of service has to be treated as  taken  place  outside  india.  therefore,  the  service received by BA UK cannot be treated as service received by Ba india.

•    Merely because IATA agents appointed by BA India used the services of CRS companies from abroad, the appellant does not become the recipient of service.

•    The only situation in respect of which service tax can be levied on the branch of a recipient company in india would be wherein the services provided by a service provider located outside india against an agreement with head office of a company incorporated and located outside India and when the head office has entered into a framework agreement with the service provider by way of centralised sourcing of service, the provision of service at various branches located in different countries and the service is provided at the branch in india and the role of the h.o. is only of facilitator. in the instant case of Ba india, from the agreement, it cannot be inferred that the Crs companies were to provide location specific service to the branches of BA UK all over the world.

•    As regards applicability of longer period of limitation also, it was found not available to the department in view of the fact that intent to contravene the provisions of the act could not be attributed when collection of tax would have been a revenue neutral exercise.

Reference to Third Member:
Briefly stated, the points of difference referred to the Third member were:

•    Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellant permitted by reserve Bank of india to carry out air transport activity in india was a branch in india and was recipient of “online database access or retrieval service” from Crs service providers abroad and liable for service tax in terms of section 65(105) (zh) read with section 65(75) under reverse charge mechanism u/s. 66a with effect from 18/04/2006 or exempt in terms of 66a(2) and also whether longer period of limitation was available to the department for recovery of tax.

•    The learned Third Member acknowledged various undisputed facts among others that the Crs companies were located outside india, the agreement was between Ba uK and them and payment for the said service was made by Ba uK and in the light of these facts, what was to be considered was whether Ba india was the extension of Ba uK or they had to  be treated as separate legal entities. She noted the contentions of the revenue that various provisions of the Companies act, 1956 which interalia included that the entire accounts from the indian operations stand debited by the head office along with the expenses incurred by the corporate office in relation to operations in india and which also included the payment of CRS debit for tax sold in indian ticketing.  Further, that there was no legal distinction between foreign companies with its parent office abroad and their local subordinate branch office in India and under these circumstances that Ba uK was given permission to open its branch office in India.

She nevertheless, discussed the provisions of 66A read with explanation to s/s. (2) in her observations and found herself in agreement with the observations and finding of Member (Technical) analysed above that services provided by a foreign based company to a foreign based head office cannot be any liability of the appellant to discharge its service tax in as much as service tax being a destination and consumption based tax cannot be created against the non-consumer of the  services.  Likewise  she  also  concurred  with  non- availability of longer period of limitation for recovery to the department as she found revenue neutral situation and also that the issue involved being complicated issue of legal interpretation which cannot be held to be a settled law also found favour with the appellant’s bonafide belief.

Conclusion:
The above decision allowing appeal by the majority will serve as a guiding decision for disputes relating to cross border transactions and particularly those relating to liability of service tax under reverse charge mechanism. the  decision  however  relates  to  the  period  prior  to introduction of definition of ‘service’ with effect from 01-07-2012 and also place of provision of services

M/S. Shriya Enterprises vs. Commissioner Commercial Taxes, Uttarakhand, [2012] 51 VST (Uttara).

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VAT – Classification of Goods- Potato Chips – Covered by All Kinds of Processed Vegetables – Taxable at 4%, Entry 6, Sch II(B) of The Uttaranchal Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

FACTS
The dealer had purchased Potato chips from M/S. Pepsico India Holdings (P) Ltd. by paying 4% VAT thereon and paid 4% vat on sales made by him. The assessing authorities levied tax @12.5% by treating ‘Potato Chips’ covered by residual entry attracting 12.5% tax. The appellate authority including Tribunal confirmed the assessment order levying 12.5% tax on sale of potato chips. The dealer filed revision petition against the impugned order of the Tribunal confirming the assessment order before the Uttarakhand High Court,

HELD
Entry 6 of Schedule II (B) of the Act, indicates that all processed and preserved vegetables would be covered by it and taxable at 4%. Unless the department can establish that the goods in question can by no conceivable process of reasoning be brought under any of the tariff items, resort can not be had to the residual category and if there is a conflict between entries, then the residuary category should not be taken into consideration. The High Court further held that it can not be disputed that potato is a vegetable after going thorough the process of slicing, frying and spicing the potato chips does not cease to be a vegetable. It is irrelevant as to whether it becomes a snack item or not. A processed vegetable can also be a snack item but then it does not take the snack item outside the entry of processed vegetables. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the revision petition filed by the dealer. The assessing authority was directed to levy tax on sale of Potato Chips at 4%

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2014 (35) STR 586 (Tri. – Mumbai) Commissioner of C. Ex., Aurangabad vs. Nagar Taluka SSK Ltd.

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If the assessee paid service tax belatedly after being informed by department, whether penalties may be waived on the grounds of lack of knowledge regarding service tax liability? Held, Yes.

Facts:
The respondents availed of Goods Transport Agency services on which service tax was to be discharged under reverse charge mechanism which was not known to them. On being pointed out, they demonstrated their inability to pay tax but assured to pay tax along with interest in future which was subsequently paid. The Adjudicating Authority, however, confirmed demand along with penalties under the Finance Act, 1994 on the grounds that intentionally payment was not made. Penalty levied was dropped by the Commissioner (Appeals) against which the department filed the appeal contending that tax was not paid on time and hence, mandatory penalty was imposable as per Hon’ble Apex Court’s decision. The assessee pleaded lack of knowledge and also requested for benefit of section 80. Respondent’s case was that they paid tax along with interest without availing input tax credit and therefore, requested to set aside penalty levied and allowing input tax credit.

Held:
Agreeing with the contentions of the respondents, benefit of section 80 was granted and penalties were waived.

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2014 (35) STR 564 (Tri. – Chennai) Shriram RPC Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

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Is penalty leviable when service tax along with interest is paid before issuance of Show Cause Notice? Held, No.

Facts:
On being pointed out by departmental auditor, service tax along with interest was paid. However, Show Cause Notice was issued imposing penalties. Since tax along with interest was paid before issuance of Show Cause Notice, the appellant claimed entitlement of benefit of 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 and also requested for benefits of section 80. Relying on the decision in case of CCE & STC, Bangalore vs. First Flight Couriers 2007 (8) S.T.R. 225 (Kar.), the revenue denied benefit of section 73(3) considering the case as one of suppression.

Held:
Section 73(3) of Finance Act, 1994 was issued with an intention to encourage immediate realisation of short payment and avoid unnecessary litigations. Karnataka High Court in case of ADECCO Flexione Work Force Solutions Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 3 (kar.), had held that unless there is any active suppression, section 73(3) should be applicable considering First Flight Couriers (supra) on a different footing and not finding even bonafide error or doubt regarding legal provisions, the penalty was set aside.

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2014 (35) STR 529 (Tri. – Ahmd.) Patel Air Freight vs. Commr. Of C.Ex. & Service Tax, Vadodara

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In case of invoices paid after availing discounts, is CENVAT Credit available in full or proportionately? Held in view of facts, full credit would be available.

Facts:
The appellants had availed full CENVAT Credit on discounted invoices. The Revenue contended that CENVAT credit should be allowed proportionally. The appellants relied on Circular No. 877/15/2008-CX, dated 17th November, 2008 and Circular No. 122/3/2010- ST, dated 30th April, 2010 which clarified that CENVAT Credit will be available for such amount which has been paid as Excise Duty/Service tax whether at full value or proportionate value.

Held:
There was no evidence brought to prove that reduced service tax was paid. Also, CENVAT credit was availed of amount paid as service tax, full credit was held as available in view of the above refered circulars.

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2014 (35) STR 397 (Tri.-Del.) Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Comm. of C.Ex., & ST, Allahabad

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Whether denial of CENVAT Credit on the ground that invoice did not contain service tax registration number of service provider is valid? Held, No

Facts:
CENVAT credit was denied on the ground that service tax registration number of service provider was not mentioned on the invoice. Adjudicating authority though observed the fact of deposit of tax by service provider in the ST-3 returns denied CENVAT Credit.

Held:
In view of production of ST-3 returns, the defect in the invoice had become a rectifiable defect and accordingly, Tribunal allowed CENVAT Credit.

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2014 (35) STR 459 (Del.) Indus Towers Ltd. vs. UOI

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Whether limited access granted can be considered as transfer of right to use, chargeable to VAT? Held, No

Facts:
The petitioners provide access to telecom towers, to telecom operators as well as provide passive infrastructure services and related operations and maintenance services on sharing basis. The active infrastructures are owned by the telecom operators. The sharing operator has a non-extensive right of site access availability on “use only basis” for installation, operation and maintenance of active infrastructure. Passive infrastructure provided was considered to be transfer of right to use goods by VAT department. It was contested that it is leviable to service tax under business support services and that the order for levying VAT was ultra vires Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 265 of the Constitution of India. The decision of Indus Towers Ltd. 2012 (285) ELT 3 (Kar) delivered in its own case by Karnataka High Court wherein it was held that providing services in relation to site access cannot be considered to be transfer of right to use goods was relied on. However, the respondents contested that the question framed before the High Court was erroneous and therefore, the matter should be decided afresh.

Held:
No right, title, interest or any similar right was created in favour of telecom operator and it was the responsibility of the petitioners to ensure that the passive infrastructure was functioning efficiently. The limited access made available to telecom operators was inconsistent with the notion of “right to use” and it was only a permissive use for very limited purposes with very limited and strictly regulated access. The substance of the decision of the Karnataka High Court was thus followed.

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2014 (35) STR 433 (Chhattisgarh) Hotel East Park vs. Union of India

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Whether VAT is leviable on service portion, in sale of food and drinks, which is considered to be value of services under service, tax law? Held, No.

Facts:
The points for determination in the writ petition were whether any service tax could be charged on sale of an item or vice-versa and whether under Article 366(29A)(f) of the Constitution of India, service is subsumed in sale of food and drink. Further, whether section 66E(i) of the Finance Act, 1994 was violative of Article 366(29A)(f) of the Constitution of India?

Held:
Relying on the decision of T. N. Kalyan Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India & Others 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC), it was observed that section 66E(i) read with section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, only charges service tax on service portion and not on sales portion and was held intra vires the Constitution. Article 366(29A)(f) separates sale and service portion and the valuation should be done as per Rule 2C of the Service tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. Generally, service tax is charged on presumptive basis i.e. on 40% or 60% of the bill value. However, VAT is charged on total bill value. VAT shall not be charged over the amount determined as service portion and the which can be agitated before the State VAT authorities. VAT authorities were directed to issue necessary directions.

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2014 (35) STR 257 (Allahabad) Naresh Kumar & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCEx. & ST

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Whether Show Cause Notice (SCN) issued under 73(1)(a) of erstwhile provision for a reason of failure to disclose all material facts was valid when SCN was issued on the basis of details gathered from earlier two notices on same issue for the same period? Held, No

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in handling operations (cutting/bending iron & steel products and transportation) for TISCO from 1998 onwards and were under a belief that service tax was not applicable on the said activity. However, due to persuasion of the authority, they obtained service tax registration under C & F agent, filed returns and paid service tax on remuneration under protest. Further two notices were received for the period 1999 onwards which were duly complied with. Subsequently, a third Notice was issued u/s. 73(1)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 demanding service tax and penalties for the same period. Apart from submitting the details, validity of Show Cause Notice was challenged. The Commissioner confirmed the demand and penalties. On appeal, the Tribunal, also upheld tax and also the penalty.

Held:
For invoking section 73(1)(a) of the Act, there must exist material to form the belief as to failure to disclose true and full material facts. On perusal of Show Cause Notice, it was observed that material available on record was used to infer the escaped assessment. No case was made for non-disclosure of primary facts relating to transactions and hence invocation of section 73(1)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 was held illegal.

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[2014] 48 taxmann.com 232 (Gujarat) – Cema Electric Lighting Products India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise

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Whether assesse is entitled to the CENVAT Credit in respect of catering services received when consideration is recovered from the beneficiaries/assessee’s own employees? Held, No

Facts:
The appellant, a manufacturer availed CENVAT Credit of entire payment made to the canteen contractor even though the amount is recovered from its employees/ beneficiaries of canteen service. The demand was confirmed under Rule 14 of the CCR in respect of the amount recovered. Both Appellate authorities confirmed the demand.

Held:
The appellant is not entitled for CENVAT Credit if the amount is recovered from the beneficiaries/its own employees while running the canteen. Further, it was held that concurrent finding of facts by both the authorities below, that full details were not furnished and entire amount was recovered, justifies the invocation of extended period of limitation

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[2014] 48 taxmann.com 79 (Allahabad) Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax vs. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Ltd.

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Whether in the light of the principle of unjust enrichment recipient of service can claim refund u/s. 11B of Central Excise Act if ultimate burden of service tax liability has been borne by him? Held, Yes

Facts:
An assessee, a service recipient, received services of transport of natural gas from M/s. RGTIL falling under “Transport of Goods other than Water through Pipeline or other Conduit Services.” Transmission charges payable are fixed by a regulatory body. Invoices are raised on the basis of the provisional rates notified. Later, the tariff was approved with retrospective effect resulting into a downward revision. The adjudicating authority allowed refund claim of the assessee for the proportionate excess service tax remitted by RGTIL and borne by him. Appellate authority reversed this order in appeal filed by the Revenue on the ground that claim was filed by the service receiver and that the expression “any person” in section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 did not include the service receiver. The Tribunal allowed the refund. The Revenue raised two additional contentions before the High Court namely limitation for applying refund and principle of unjust enrichment.

Held:
The Additional issues raised were not accepted on the ground that they were not raised before and the observations of adjudicating authority allowing refund go in favour of assessee. The High Court relying on the decision of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India 1997 (89) ELT 247 held that the assessee is entitled to claim a refund of excess service tax paid.

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2014 48 taxmann.com 39 (Madras) Core Minerals vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

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Pre-deposit – Whether Rule 3 of Service Tax
(Determination of Valuation Rules) 2006 (“Valuation Rules”) is
attracted, when monetary consideration for service is specified in the
agreement and department has alleged suppression of value without
following procedure in Rule 4 of Valuation Rules? Held, No.

Facts:
The
appellant had entered into two agreements with the persons holding
mining licenses, one for providing mining services and the other for
purchasing the goods (i.e. extracted minerals) exclusively by the
appellant from the license holders. Department resorting to Rule 3(b) of
the valuation rules included certain expenses from the Profit and Loss
A/c such as “Over Burden Removal; Raising and Stacking Charges; Hire
Charges; Mining Expenses, Screening Charges; Sampling and Analysis;
Power and Fuel; Wages; Maintenance, etc.” in the value of taxable
services. Appellant contended before the Tribunal but did not succeed
and appealed before the High Court.

Held:
When there
are two agreements independent of one another, and a specific amount is
charged by the service provider under the agreement, that agreement has
to be tested on its own merits in terms of section 67(1)(i) of the
Finance Act, 1994 and invoking Rule 3(b) of the Valuation Rules, may not
be justified. Further, Rule 3(b) comes into play only when Rule 3(a) of
the Valuation Rules fails, and prima facie, there is no cogent reason
shown in the adjudication order as to how Rule 3 of the Valuation Rules
is applicable when there is a specific agreement. In this context,
Tribunal observed that, no provision under the Act or the Valuation
Rules, 2006 calls upon the assessee to prove the cost of services in any
manner and that the Revenue has also not followed the procedure
prescribed under Rule 4 of the Valuation Rules. It reduced the amount of
pre-deposit setting aside the order of the Tribunal

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[2014] 48 taxmann.com 235 (Allahabad) Touraids (I) Travel Services vs. Commissioner of Central Excise.

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Whether the amendment in definition of “Tour Operator” u/s. 65(115) by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, enlarging its scope to include other supplementary services like ‘planning’, ‘scheduling’ etc. is only clarificatory and hence includible in value of taxable services provided prior to 10-09-2004 also? Held, Yes.

Facts:
The Assessee, a tour operator, entered into a contract with various Principal Tour Operators (‘PTO’), for providing transportation services by tourist vehicle and paid service tax only on transportation charges received by claiming an exemption up to 60% of the gross amount charged vide Notification No. 39/97-ST for providing package tour. No service tax was paid on the supplementary services provided of Air and Railway Ticket booking, food and lodging, guide services etc. contending that these were incurred on behalf of the PTOs for which reimbursement was made on actual basis and that the definition of “Tour operator” including such services was amended with effect from 10-09-2004. The Tribunal upheld the levy of service tax holding that treating entire tour contract as a package proves that he was fully aware that in a package tour, supplementary services are also included. Hence, this appeal was filed.

Held:
From a combined reading of definitions of “taxable service” in 65(105)(n) and “tour operator” u/s. 65(115), it is clear that the former definition is wide and includes all the services rendered relating to tour. While determining the scope of taxable service, it was held that, the phrase “in relation to” the tour means “in the aid of tour” also. Circular No. F.B.43/10/97-TRU, dated 22-08-1997 also clarifies that the value shall be the gross amount charged for services in relation to a tour and includes any supplementary services provided in relation thereto. The said clarification was reiterated by the Board in the years 2001 and 2007. The High Court therefore held that, the amendment in the definition is only clarificatory.

Further, since u/s. 67 the reimbursement does not fall within the purview of exclusion clauses, being a part of the gross amount, they are to be treated as value of taxable service.

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[2014] 48 taxmann.com 227 (Delhi) Travelite (India) vs. Union of India

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Whether Rule 5A(2) of Service Tax Rules, 1994 is ultra-vires section 94 as the only type of audit contemplated under Finance Act is under section 72A i.e. special audit? Held, Yes.

Facts:
The appellant challenged the letter of Commissioner seeking records for scrutiny by audit party under Rule 5A (2) of the Service Tax Rules 1994 and the validity of the said Rule as well as the CBEC instruction No. F. No. 137/26/2007-CX.4 dated 01-01-2008. Department contended that the rule authorising audit was made pursuant to power conferred u/s. 94 of the Finance Act, 1994 and not u/s. 72A. It was contended that the Rule must conform to the statute under which it was framed and must be within the rule making power of the authority and that Instructions/Circulars cannot widen the scope of law.

Held:
The provisions related to scrutiny and audit of the assessee are provided only in section 72A of Finance Act, 1994 which envisages audit of assessee’s records under special circumstances, the High Court considered Rule 5A(2) as an attempt to include provision for such a general audit through back-door is ultra-vires the rule making power conferred u/s. 94(1) and hence, struck the same down. Consequently, any notice, circular, guideline etc. contrary to statutory laws issued under Rule 5A is also held unenforceable. For this proposition, the High Court relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh vs. Honourable Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council [2004] 8 SCC 747 elucidating concept of delegated legislation.

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Branch transfer vis-à-vis dispatch against estimated demand

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Introduction
In the last issue of BCAJ, the issues arising in relation to branch transfer vis-à-vis estimated demand from the customer (also referred to as standing order) was discussed. The judgment of Hon. Tribunal in case of Ina Bearing India Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (VAT APPEAL No.20 of 2010, dated 25/2/2014) was analyzed.

In continuation of that discussion we now analyse a judgment on similar issue by the Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority (CSTAA). The said authority has analysed legal position in detail and has given observations which will be useful in deciding correct nature of branch transfer vis-à-vis interstate sale.

Judgment in case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Haryana (72 VST 1)(CSTAA-New Delhi).

The facts leading to the litigation as narrated by the CSTAA are as under:

“The appellant, a Central Government public sector undertaking, was engaged in the business of refining, distribution, marketing and sale of petroleum products. In pursuit of its obligation to maintain uninterrupted supply of petroleum products, storage points were set up across the country to cater to the needs of various markets/ consumers including general public. The appellant made supplies of aviation turbine fuel to the Air Force and the Army at various locations outside the State under contract for supply by first branch transferring aviation turbine fuel to its bulk petroleum installations, which were large storage facilities at Air Force stations and then making supplies to aircrafts on demand by designated officers. The assessing officer rejected the claim of stock transfer by the appellant. By an assessment order passed pursuant to an order of remand in appeal, the claim of stock transfer of aviation turbine fuel was allowed in respect of sale to private airlines at the receiving locations and rejected in respect of sale to the Air Force and the Army. An appeal against this assessment order was dismissed as not maintainable. An appeal before the Tribunal was dismissed by a majority of two Members, out of the three Members’ Bench. The minority view was that the levy of Central Sales Tax in respect of supplies to the Air Force at various locations outside State was bad in law but the majority held that the levy was correct. On appeal, to the Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority, by the appellant contending that the supply order was only confined to quality and pricing of the product and there was no obligation upon the Air Force to purchase any particular quantity of the product from the appellant-corporation as the supply was only to be made on a requirement placed by designated officers and the payment was only to be made for such supply:”

Thus, there was dispatch of goods for meeting requirement of customer and there was over all contract about rate and quality etc. However, there was no obligation on the buyer to purchase particular quantity. The buyer used to purchase as per his requirement from time to time. Under such circumstances the learned CSTAA observed that contract is in the nature of standing order.

After reproducing section 3 of the CST Act, the learned CSTAA has observed as under;

“A perusal of the provisions, extracted above, shows that it raises a presumption of law and that is—a sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, if the sale or purchase . . . (a) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another, or (b) is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another. For purposes of clause (b) of section 3, Explanation I says that where goods are delivered to a carrier or other bailee for transmission, the movement of the goods shall be deemed to commence at the time of such delivery and terminate at the time when delivery is taken from such carrier or bailee.

Explanation 2 deals with a situation where the movement of goods commences in one State and terminates in the same State but in the course of movement it passes through another State, and enjoins that it should not be treated as a movement of goods from one State to another State.

It would also be relevant to note section 6A of the Act. It provides that if any dealer claims that he is not liable to pay tax under the Act in respect of any goods, on the ground that the movement of such goods from one State to another was occasioned by reason of transfer of such goods by him to any other place of his business or to his agent or principal, and not by reason of sale, then the burden of proving that the movement of goods was so occasioned shall be on the dealer. It also provides the mode of discharge of that burden of proof. To discharge the burden the dealer has to furnish to the assessing authority, within the prescribed time, a declaration duly filled and signed by the principal officer of the other place of business, for his agent or principal, containing the prescribed particulars in the prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority, along with the evidence of dispatch of such goods. On production of such a declaration, if the assessing authority is satisfied, after making such enquiry as he may consider necessary, that the particulars contained in the declaration furnished by the dealer are true, he is authorized, either at the time of, or at any time before, the assessment of the tax payable by the dealer under the Act, to make an order to that effect and on his so doing, the movement of the goods, to which the declaration relates, shall be deemed for the purpose of the Act to have been occasioned otherwise than as a result of sale.”

After, observing as above learned CSTAA stated the General principles about branch transfer and interstate sale in following words;

“General principles for determining any transaction, as “inter-State” sale are as follows:

(1) That an inter-State sale takes place when there is movement of goods from one State to another.

(2) That such inter-State movement must be the result of a covenant, express or implied in the contract of sale or as an incident of the contract.

(3) That such a covenant need not be specified in the contract itself, and it would be enough if the movement was in pursuance of and incidental to the contract of sale.

(4) That there should be a conceivable link between a contract of sale and the movement of goods from one State to another.

Following factors are necessary to constitute a branchtransfer:

(i) The branch office looks to and estimates the bulk requirements of the area falling in its circle.
(ii) It requires the head office/terminal to supply to it such estimated bulk quantities.
(iii) The head office/terminal sends the quantity accordingly from time to time to meet out the said requirement of its branch office.
(iv)The appropriation of goods to customers takes places in the branch office only.
(v) The branch office has always a choice to supply/sell goods in the branch which means that it has the option of diversion of goods.
(vi)The movement of goods in case of “branch transfers” is from head office/terminal to the branch office and there is no appropriation of goods to a particular customer at the time of such movement from head office.”

Thus, certain principles are now available to distinguish between branch transfer and interstate sale. We hope that it will be useful for future guidance.

Conclusion

Thus,   though 
 the 
 issue   about   branch   transfer   and
interstate sale largely depends
upon facts of each case, the above guidelines will
certainly help in determining the
nature of transaction. the overall
legal position appears
is
that though dispatch may be in relation to demand from customer, if there is no obligation on the buyer
to purchase particular
quantity and the actual ascertainment of the goods to be sold
and delivered is done at the branch,
then there will be branch transfer
and not interstate sale.

 

The judgment of the Hon. Tribunal cited above is required
to be seen in the light of the above judgment of the   Hon. CSTAA.

C. V. Cherian vs. CA Patel, [2012] 51 VST 71 (Guj)

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Sales Tax – Recovery Of Dues Of Company – Director Of Company – Not Liable To Pay Personally, The Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1970 and The Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003

FACTS
The Sales Tax Department held auction of personal property of a director of Private Limited Company to recover arrears of tax of the Company. The director filed writ petition against the impugned auction before the Gujrat High Court.

HELD
The attachment and auction of the residential building of the director can not be made to recover dues of the Private Limited Company in which he is a director. The High Court followed the Judgment of division bench in case of Choksi V. State of Gujarat [2012] 51VST 73 (Guj). Accordingly, allowed the writ petition filed by the director.

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State Of Tamil Nadu vs Therman Heat Tracers Ltd, [2012] 51 VST 69 (Mad)

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Sales Tax – Turnover – Liquidated Damages – Deducted From Contracotr’s Bill – Does Not Form Part of Turnover Of Sales -Not Taxable, The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

FACTS
Certain amount was deducted from the bill of the contractor by the employer. The assessing authority determined gross amount before deduction of liquidated damages as turnover of sales and levied tax. The Tribunal in appeal allowed the deduction of liquidated damages from total turnover of sales. The Department filed revision petition against the impugned judgment of Tribunal before the Madras High Court.

HELD
The Tribunal had correctly found that the liquidated damages were to be borne by the contractor and the payment was reduced to that extent. Therefore, such amount received after the contractual deductions can alone be treated as turnover. The High Court accordingly affirmed the judgment of Tribunal and revision petition filed by the Department was dismissed.

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M/S. Century India Ltd vs. Asst. Commissioner (Ct), [2012] 51 VST 130 (Mad).

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Sales Tax – Rate Of Tax- ‘Halls’ – Ayurvedic Medicine – Not A Confectionary Item, S/s. 17, 28A and Schedule I, Part C, of The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

FACTS
The assessment of the dealer company was completed by treating ‘Halls’ as ayurvedic medicine based on clarification issued by the Commissioner. Later on the Department initiated revision proceedings on the basis that ‘Halls’ is not an ayurvedic preparation and it is only a confectionary taxable at 12%. The dealer filed writ petition before the Madras High Court against impugned notice for revision of assessment.

HELD
The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes has issued clarification that ‘Halls’ is an ayurvedic medicine and assessment is completed on that basis. Further, he had revised assessment on earlier occasion and concluded it and also levied penalty for excess collection of tax. Another assessing authority, by mere change of opinion, cannot propose to revise the assessment treating the said product as confectionary.

Pudina and Nilgiris Thailam, etc. are generally used for ayurvedic preparations and that is why, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chennai, had clarified that ‘Halls” tablets is taxable at 4%. The extent of medicament used in a particular product and the fact that the use of the medical element in the product was minimum that would not detract that the same being classified as Medicament. It is also not necessary that the said item must be sold under doctor’s prescription and that the availability of the product across the counter in many shops is not relevant.

In view of binding precedents of the circulars, issued by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, in favour of the dealer, the High Court set aside the notice for revision of assessment. Accordingly, the High Court allowed writ Petition.

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2014] 47 taxmann.com 108 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Masicon Financial Services (P.) Ltd vs. CCE

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Where section 80 is invoked by the Appellate Authority and penalty u/s. 76 & 78 is reduced, even reduced penalty u/s. 76 and 78 is not tenable in law.

Facts:
Appellant was selling agent of ICICI bank and provided marketing services to it, which were taxable as ‘business auxiliary service’ (BAS) w.e.f. 01-07-2003. However, appellant did not obtain registration under service tax and no service tax was paid under ‘BAS’. SCN was issued confirming service tax demand for the period from 01- 07-2003 to 01-07-2004 invoking extended period of limitation u/s 73(i)(a) of the Act. On appeal, Commissioner (Appeals) invoked section 80 and reduced penalty u/s. 76 & 78 and waived penalty u/s. 77. The appellant disputed invocation of extended period and levy of penalty before Tribunal on the ground that Commissioner (Appeals) has invoked section 80.

Held:
Hon’ble Tribunal held that longer period of limitation correctly invoked u/s. 73(1)(a) since, in terms of section 73 as it stood during the period of dispute, for invoking longer limitation period existence of fraud wilful mis-statement, suppression of facts and deliberate contravention of the provisions of Finance Act, 1994 or of the rules made there under with intent to evade tax was not necessary and what was required was reason to believe on the part of the Assistant /Deputy Commissioner that on account of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to file return u/se. 70 for any prescribed period or to disclose wholly or truly all the material facts required for verification of assessment u/s. 71, some value of the taxable service has escaped assessment or has been under-assessed or service tax has not been paid or has been short-paid or any sum has erroneously been refunded. In this case, during the period of dispute, the appellant did not file any return and did not register and hence in terms of the section 73(1)(a) as it stood during that period, longer limitation was correctly invoked.

However as regards penalty u/s. 76 and 78, Tribunal held that, since the Commissioner (Appeals) gave a finding that the Appellant may not be aware of service tax rules and regulation and invoked benefit u/s. 80 of the Act by reducing quantum of penalty, his decision to retain even reduced penalty u/s. 76 and 78 was set aside.

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[2014] 47 taxmann.com 148 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) CCEST vs. Aarti Industries Ltd.

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Whether CENVAT credit of excise duty paid on capital goods i. e., cylinders can be claimed even if such cylinders were moved temporarily out of factory for the purpose of refilling of gas? Held, yes.

Facts:
Assessee purchased cylinders for storage of hydrogen gas used in the manufacture of various chemicals. The gas is procured from various suppliers, and the empty cylinders have to move out from the factory for refilling of gas. The said cylinders were installed on hired vehicles for ease of their use, movement within the factory and transportation from factory to gas supplier’s premises. Assessee claimed CENVAT credit of excise duty paid on such cylinders being capital goods used for the purpose of manufacture. Denying the same, revenue contended that the cylinders were not installed within factory and procedure under Rule 3(5) relating to reversal and recredit was not followed although such capital goods were removed outside factory.

Held:
It was held that, the only condition for availing CENVAT on capital goods as per Rule 2(a)(A) of CENVAT CREDIT Rules, 2004 is that it must be used in the factory of the manufacturer of final product. There is no such requirement for the capital goods to be installed in the factory. The Tribunal observed that, it was not disputed that the cylinders are not capital goods and it was evident that the gas cylinders were used within the respondent’s factory although cylinders move out temporarily from the factory for the purpose of refilling of the gas. Therefore, it held that, the requirement of use of capital goods within the appellant’s factory in terms of the said Rule 2(a)(A) is fulfilled and credit cannot be denied. It further held that, the temporary to and fro movement of cylinders for the purpose of refilling of the gas is otherwise covered by Rule 4(5)(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

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[2014] 47 taxmann.com 37 (Bangalore – CESTAT) Hyundai Motor India Engineering (P.) Ltd vs. CCEST.

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Prior to introduction of POTR, the “relevant date” u/s. 11B Central Excise Act 1944 for the purpose of claiming refund under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with notification no. 5/2006-C.E. (N.T.), dated 14-03- 2006, in case of export of service shall be the date on which payment for exported service is received.

Facts:
The appellant a 100% EOU of applied for refund of CENVAT credit for the period 7th December to 9th August for service tax paid on input services. The claim was rejected on the ground of time-bar as refund application was made beyond one year from the date of export. Relying on notification no. 5/2006-CE (N.T) revenue contended that section 11B of the Central Excise Act 1944 governs the time limit for filing refund claim and as per the said section refund claim should be filed within one year from the date of export of services. It was also contended that there was no nexus between the input services and the output services and when the appellant is not eligible for CENVAT credit itself there is no question of refund.

Held:
Relying on the decision in case of CCE vs. Eaton Industries (P.) Ltd. [2011] 9 taxmann.com 185 while examining section 11B of the Central Excise Act, it was held that, without clearance of goods, the liability to pay tax does not arise and in the absence of liability to pay tax, further proceedings also would not happen. Thus, if the taxable event is manufacture, the calculation of tax took place after removal than it is the date of removal which is relevant. In the case of goods exported, the relevant date would be the date of export of goods but the same may not apply for the purpose of refund [(sic) in case of services] as the liability to pay tax arises under service tax till the law was amended, only when the consideration was received. Therefore, it is appropriate that the relevant date for calculating the time limit u/s. 11B also should be the date on which consideration is received.

As regards nexus with output services and the admissibility of CENVAT credit, the matter was remanded for calculating the refund claim following the decision of the Tribunal in Infosys Ltd. vs. CST [ST/2045/2011, ST/1912/2012 & ST/26109/2013, Final Order Nos. 20282, 20294 & 20293/2014 dated 26-02-2014] wherein the definition of input services is considered and admissibility of CENVAT credit in respect of various services and the rationale to take such a view has been discussed.

[Note: Readers may note that this decision pertains to period when Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 (POTR) were not in place and liability to pay service tax was on “receipt bases”. However, principle laid down in this case as regards “relevant date” u/s. 11B of CE Act for the purpose of claiming refund in case of export of service is equally applicable even today in the light of POTR]

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 140 (Tri – Mumbai) Hotel Amarjit Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & Service Tax, Nagpur

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Whether supply of food along with provision of Mandap keeper services is liable to service tax under Mandap keeper services?

Facts:
The appellants provided “Mandap Keeper Service” and ‘Catering Services’. Prior to April, 2005, the appellants were charging one lump sum amount and service tax was levied on combined receipt. With effect from April, 2005, the appellants started splitting the bills, one for banquet hall and another for supply of food and discharged service tax only on banquet hall charges considering the same to be Mandap keeper services. Objecting to splitting of bill, the department confirmed demand on food charges collected as well. The appellants contested that food charges were collected separately on which VAT was levied. Since the transaction was of sale of goods, the same was not leviable to service tax. They further contested that Joint Commissioner of Central Excise of their other unit had accepted their contention and service tax was levied only on hall charges. Accordingly, since department had knowledge of the activity undertaken by the appellants, extended period of limitation also was challenged. The appellants further challenged some calculation errors of the department. On the other hand, relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kalyana Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC) and Sayaji Hotels Ltd. 2011 (24) STR 177 (Tri.-Del.), the department contested that catering charges were includible in taxable value of Mandap keeper services and contended that though in another unit, the case was dropped, a wrong decision could be perpetuated.

Held:
Having regard to the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assn. (supra) and Sayaji Hotels Ltd. (supra), the services rendered by Mandap keepers as caterer were also liable to service tax under the category of Mandap keeper services since price charged for food formed part of consideration of Mandap keeper’s services. Service tax demand beyond 5 years was quashed. Since every registered premise is considered as a separate assessee under service tax law, dropping of demand at one unit was of no relevance to decide whether extended period of limitation may be invoked or not. The appellants cannot take plea of bona fide belief as Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held catering services were liable to service tax. Also, according to the Apex Court’s judgement in the case of Fuljit Kaur and Chandigarh Administration 2010 (262) ELT 40 (SC) if a wrong decision has been passed at a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the superior court for repeating the same irregularity. In the present case, the appellants did not disclose consideration received from catering services in bills and ST3 Returns. Hence, it was a case of mis-statement of fact with intent to evade taxes and extended period of time was justified. In light of the above analysis, the matter was remanded back for re-quantification. Penalty u/s. 76 was held imposable for default in payment of service tax since mens rea was not required to be proved to levy such penalty. In view of contravention of provisions in the present case, penalties u/s. 77 were sustainable. Splitting of bills from April, 2005 was a deliberate act to evade Service tax payments and therefore, penalty u/s. 78 was confirmed.

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92. 2014 (35) S.T.R. 94 (Tri. – Del.) Computer Sciences Corpn. India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of S.T. Noida

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Whether service tax is payable under reverse charge mechanism under ‘manpower supply services’ being secondment of foreign employee from group companies?

Facts:
For furtherance of business operations in India, the appellants hired certain overseas employees who either directly employed by the appellants or were transferred from other group companies situated overseas. During the period of the secondment of these employees, they were treated as employees of the appellants and accordingly, the appellants gave social security benefit such as provident fund. TDS was deducted on their salaries and issued Form 16 and Form 12BA under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appellants also remitted certain social security and other benefits for these employees as required under foreign laws to its group companies. The appellants also contested that the amounts remitted to overseas group companies were without any margin. However, lower authorities treated remittance to foreign group companies as gross consideration paid for availing manpower recruitment and supply services (import of services) covered under reverse charge mechanism.

Held:
Relying on Mumbai Tribunal’s decision in case of Volkswagen India (Pvt.) Limited vs. 2014 (34) S.T.R. 135 (T), the appeal was allowed. Since Assistant Commissioner, (appeal against which lies only before Commissioner (Appeals)), had ordered adjustment of refund claim against this demand, Tribunal could not pass an order directing the refund. However, Tribunal declared that the petitioner was entitled to refund claim ex debito justita. Consequentially, Tribunal also held that the petitioner was at liberty to apply for refund which shall be disposed of by appropriate authority expeditiously.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 88 (Tri.-Mumbai) B4U Television Network (I) P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Can excessive service tax paid be adjusted against future service tax liability or the assessee needs to file a refund claim?

Facts:
The appellants adjusted excess service tax paid earlier was objected by service tax department. Relying on various Tribunal decisions, the appellants contested that service tax was not collected by them from their clients and they had complied with Rule 6(3) of Service Tax Rules, 1994 and therefore, such adjustment of excess service tax paid was justified. The Department submitted that the case was not covered by Rule 6(3) and that the appellants should have filed a refund claim for claiming back such excess payment.

Held:
Delhi Tribunal in case of Nirma Architects & Valuers 2006 (1) STR 305 (Tri.) had held that if adjustment of excess Service tax paid would not be allowed against future payments, Rule 6(3) would become redundant. Relying on the said decision, Tribunal allowed such adjustment of undisputed excess Service tax paid.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 78 (Tri.-Mumbai) Shobha P. Bhopatkar vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Pune-III

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Whether composite contract of plantation i.e. landscaping including beautification may be treated as providing advice or consultancy, taxable under interior decorator service?

Facts:
The appellants undertook the activity of plantation of grass, trees, shrubs in the factory area along with maintenance of lawns. On the basis that the appellants had directly or indirectly provided advice, consultancy and technical assistance in respect of beautification of space, Commissioner (Appeals) held that the activities were covered u/s. 65(59) i.e., interior decorator’s service. The appellants contested that they had executed the work and there was absence of any advice or consultancy for beautification of the space and therefore, the activity was not covered under interior decorator services. The department contended that there was a composite contract covering landscaping which included beautification by way of plantation and landscaping was covered under the definition of interior decorator.

Held:
Allowing the appeal, it was held that the work orders were for execution of various works and did not involve advisory, consultancy or technical assistance.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 77 (Tri.-Mumbai) Jyotsana D. Patel vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Nagpur

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Can refund be claimed of amount paid as service tax by mistake beyond 1 year?

Facts:
The builder had collected and paid service tax on residential unit. However, the Hon’ble High Court in case of K.V.R. Constructions vs. CCE 2010 (17) S.T.R. 6 (Kar.) held that service tax was not leviable on residential unit during the period under consideration. Accordingly, the buyer of residential unit, being ultimate sufferer of service tax filed a refund claim of the amount deposited by builder with service tax authorities. The adjudicating authority sanctioned the refund claim which was appealed by revenue before Commissioner (Appeals). The refund claim was rejected by Commissioner (Appeals) on the grounds that it was barred by limitation. Accordingly, the appellants filed the present appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:
The appellants were not required to pay any service tax on acquisition of residential unit in view of favourable decision delivered by the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court. Therefore, the amount paid by builder did not take colour of service tax and, therefore the provisions of section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, including the time limit of 1 year, are not applicable in the case on hand. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.

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[2014] 47 taxmann.com 116 (Bombay) – P. K. International vs. CCEx.

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Bombay High Court has given general direction to Tribunal not to dismiss any appeal for non-compliance, if appeal filed against order directing pre-deposit is pending for admission before High Court, and give reasonable time of about a couple of weeks to the appellant to obtain urgent orders from the Court where the Tribunal is informed of such pending appeal before Court at the admission stage.

Facts:
The Tribunal directed the appellant to pre-deposit 50% amount of duty and part amount of penalty vide order dated 29-10-2013. The appellant filed appeal before Hon’ble Bombay High Court against the said order for hearing the same on merits. While the matter was pending before High Court at admission stage, the appellant communicated the fact to the registry of tribunal by a letter in writing and requested adjournment of hearing of compliance. However, no adjournment was granted and matter was posted for compliance in the regular course. In the course of hearing, the fact of pending appeal before High Court was mentioned before the Tribunal, however Tribunal did not grant any adjournment and dismissed the appeal for non-compliance.

Held:
(i) H on’ble Bombay High Court expressed serious concerns in following words, about Tribunal dismissing the appeal for non-compliance even after bringing to its notice that, appeal was pending at admission stage before High court.

“Before we deal with the merits of the appeal, we are shocked to note that time and again the Tribunal has been dismissing appeals of the appellants for non-compliance with the order of pre-deposit even in cases where the owner directly pre-deposits, the Tribunal is informed about the appeal was listed before this Court for admission…. it is most unfortunate that the Tribunal did not wait for admission hearing of this appeal by this Court…”

(ii) H igh Court also pointed out similar instances on two other occasions and relied upon decisions of another Division Benches in the cases of Jaiprakash Strips Ltd. vs. Union of India 2009 (243) ELT 341 (Bom) and Saswad Mill Sugar Factory Ltd. vs. CCE [2013] 40 taxman.com 504 (Bom) and directed Tribunal as under:

“13. Having regard to the fact that this is the third instance which is brought to our notice where the Tribunal has dismissed an appeal for non-compliance of the said order of the Tribunal in spite of having been informed about the appeal before this Court being on board or it is adjourned to a near date for admission, we direct that henceforth the Tribunal shall not dismiss any appeal for non-compliance on the above ground and give reasonable time of about a couple of weeks to the appellant to obtain urgent orders from this Court where the Tribunal is informed about the appeal pending before this Court at the admission stage. The Tribunal shall at least give the parties 2 weeks time to move this Court for early hearing of the appeal before this Court.”

(iii) A s regards the merits of the case, The High Court refused to go into the merits for the reason that, issues raised were in respect of the factual aspects of the controversy and hence subject matter of the appeal was before the Tribunal. However, as regards order of pre-deposit was concerned, it held that pre-deposit was restricted to 50% of the duty confirmed    and    the    order    of    pre-deposit    was    set    aside    granting interim stay against coercive recovery during pendency of the appeal before the tribunal.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 305 (Allahabad) CCEST vs. Garg Aviations Ltd.

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Whether, training and coaching in field of flying of aircraft for obtaining commercial pilot license from Director General Civil Aviation (DGCA) tantamount to qualification recognized by law and hence qualifies for exemption from service tax? Held, yes

Facts:
Assessee provided training and coaching to individuals for flying of aircraft for obtaining Commercial Pilot License (CPL) from Director General Civil Aviation (DGCA). Assessee was also engaged in providing training for obtaining Basic Aircraft Maintenance Engineering Licence (BAMEL). Department demanded service tax under Commercial Training or Coaching Services. The Tribunal, in view of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Indian Institute of Aircraft Engg. vs. Union of India [2013] 34 taxmann.com 191 concluded that service tax could not be levied on the assessee. Aggrieved, revenue filed appeal before Hon’ble High Court.

Held:

The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court concurred with the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court (supra) on following grounds and dismissed Revenue’s Appeal:

(i) “Commercial training or coaching centre” defined during the relevant period in section 65(27) of the Act excluded from its domain “any institute or establishment which issues any certificate or diploma or degree or any educational qualification recognized by law for the time being in force”. This clause was omitted with effect from 01-05- 2011 from the definition and included by exemption Notification No. 33/2011-ST, dated 25-04-2011. The Delhi High Court expressed a view that, the only plausible reason for exempting from payment of service tax those training or coaching centres, even though commercial, whose certificate/degree/ diploma/qualification is recognised by law, can be to exclude from the ambit of service tax those training or coaching centres which are otherwise regulated by any law inasmuch as recognition of certificate/ degree/diploma/qualification conferred by such training or coaching centres will necessarily entail regulation by the same law of various facets of such training or coaching centres.

(ii) I t was observed that that, when institute is approved by DGCA, its activities are very much regulated by the Aircraft Act, 1934, Aircraft Rules, 1937 and Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) and the instructions/ regulations issued there under from time to time. Thus, the certificate/training/qualification offered by approved institutes, has by the Act, Rules and the CAR been conferred some value in the eyes of law, even if it be only for the purpose of eligibility for obtaining ultimate licence/approval for certifying repair/maintenance/airworthiness of aircrafts. The Act, Rules and CAR distinguish an approved institute from an unapproved one and a successful candidate from an approved institute would be entitled to enforce the right, conferred on him by the Act, Rules and CAR, to one year relaxation against the DGCA in a Court of law. Based on the observations of Hon’ble Delhi High Court, the Allahabad High Court held that, training and coaching for flying of aircraft for obtaining CPL from DGCA and training for obtaining BAMEL license are not liable as they are qualifications recognised by law.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 220 (Guj.)Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs vs. V.M. Engg. Works

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Whether penalty levied u/s. 76 can be reduced by invoking section 80?

Facts:
Since the respondents delayed the payment of service tax, adjudicating authority levied penalty u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994. Being aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) who reduced the penalty by invoking provisions of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994. The matter was appealed by revenue before the Tribunal, but they did not succeed. According to the revenue, it was mandatory to impose penalty u/s. 76 and discretionary powers to reduce penalty was not vested with the authority and neither the Commissioner (Appeals) nor the Tribunal were justified in reducing the penalty. Further to support its contestation, Revenue placed reliance on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs vs. Port Officer 2010 (19) S.T.R. 641 (Guj.).

Held:
Relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in case of Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs vs. Port Officer (supra) it was held that in case it is proved by the assessee that there was reasonable cause for failure, penalties may not be levied vide section 76 read with section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994. Accordingly, though discretionary powers are granted, the powers are restricted to waive off the total penalty and penalties cannot be reduced below the minimum limit prescribed u/s. 76. Therefore, the appeal was allowed and the Tribunal was directed to decide the matter afresh in light of the said decision after providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 204 (Mad.) C. Adhimoolam vs. Registrar, CESTAT, Chennai

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Whether the assessee is allowed to challenge the order before High Court when the appeal is pending before Tribunal?

Facts:
The Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise passed an order against the petitioners to pay service tax along with interest and penalties but the said order was got rejected on the ground of limitation. Hence, the order was further challenged and was pending before the Tribunal along with stay application. However, simultaneously the departmental authorities started taking action to recover tax from the petitioners and hence, the petitioners filed writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court.

Held:
Since the appeal was pending before the Tribunal, only Tribunal would have to decide the appeal on merits. In case, the Tribunal does not waive the condition of predeposit, the petitioner would be required to deposit service tax with interest and penalties. According to Article 266 of the Constitution of India, it was not open for the petitioner to challenge the very same order before the High Court when the appeal was pending before the Tribunal and initiate parallel proceedings before various fora. The writ was thus dismissed.

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 65 (P&H) Barnala Builders & Property Consultants vs. Dy. CCE & ST, Dera Bassi

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Is an order passed with respect to service tax Voluntary Compliance Encourage Scheme appealable?

Facts:
Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme (VCES) was introduced vide Finance Act, 2013 for service tax defaulters which is part of the Finance Act, 1994 i.e., part of service tax statute itself. The defaulters were required to pay service tax dues in instalments as specified and were granted immunity from interest and penalty. Vide Circular No. 170/5/2013–ST, it was clarified that the order for rejection of declarations under VCES were not appealable. The petitioners filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the said clarification. The petitioners prayed that the writ petition to be dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file appeal and that such appeal should be directed to be decided within fortnight.

Held:
After incorporation of VCES into the Finance Act, 1994, all provisions except specifically excluded applies to the scheme. Impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise was appealable vide section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994. In view of the request of the petitioner, writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn with a liberty to file an appeal and that the appeal shall be considered and decided within a fortnight.

(Note: The decision that VCES rejection order is appealable is noted. However, the appealability vide section 86 appears incorrect as the Order of Rejection is passed by the Deputy Commissioner. The appeal against this is to be filed under section 85 of the Act according to the authors).

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2014 (35) S.T.R. 28 (Uttarakhand) Valley Hotel & Resorts vs. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Dehradun

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Whether VAT is leviable on amount, leviable to service tax, on presumptive basis with respect to restaurant services?

Facts:
The revisionist was engaged in the business of hotel providing lodging, boarding and restaurant services. Food served in the restaurant was liable for VAT vide Uttarakhand VAT Act, 2005 which was duly discharged. From 1st July, 2012, Service tax was leviable on 40% of the bill amount vide Rule 2C of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. The revisionist, hence, made an application to VAT authorities requesting not to charge VAT on such 40% of billed amount which would suffer a burden of service tax. However, Commissioner as well as Tribunal of Commercial Tax rejected the application

Held:
Value Added Tax can be imposed on sale of goods and not on service. Union Government, which is the competent authority to impose service tax, has imposed service tax on restaurant services which is not challenged by the State. VAT cannot be imposed on the element of service. Thus, the revision was allowed.

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Branch transfer vis-à-vis dispatch against estimated demand Introduction

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Interstate sale of goods is liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CST Act). However, there can be certain dispatches from one State to another i.e. branch transfers, etc., which are not be considered as interstate sales. The responsibility to prove, that such dispatches are not interstate sales, is on the ‘transferor’, and amongst others, the transferor has to obtain ‘F’ form from the transferee branch. It is also a legal position that in spite of such ‘F’ form being produced, the authorities are entitled to go beyond the forms and find out the real cause of dispatch. If it is established that such dispatch is due to pre-existing sale order then in spite of ‘F’ form being produced, it can be disallowed and subjected to tax under the CST Act. The disputes on this aspect are very intricate.

It is possible that in respect of standard goods, the dealer may receive tentative requirement for future period. These documents are normally referred to as rate contracts. The dealer stocks the goods in respective states and gives delivery upon receiving concrete delivery requirement. So, actual ascertainment takes place in such state. However, the dealers while sending the goods in lots, may refer to number of orders received as rate contracts. There are judgments on both the sides stating that such a transaction may or may not amount to branch transfer. Hon’ble Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal has recently decided such issue in the case of M/s. Ina Bearing India Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (VAT APPEAL No.20 of 2010, dated 25/2/2014). The brief facts, as narrated in the judgment are as under;

(I) The appellant regularly transferred the finished goods from its Talegaon factory to the branches at Gurgaon in the state of Haryana and at Hosur in the state of Tamilnadu, where the stock of goods was maintained for local as well as inter-state sales. All the branch transfers were declared while filing the returns under the CST Act. The appellant had maintained proper records of all branch transfers such as excise invoices, lorry receipts, etc. The appellant had received all the declarations in Form-F from the branches in respect of the transfer made to the branches.

(II) The purpose for which these branches were opened is as follows :- (a) The customer industries did not want to pile up inventory at their end and wanted the suppliers to deliver the goods to them on daily basis. Therefore, the appellant was compelled to open godowns near to the production base of the customer. In these godowns, they had to keep inventory based on the estimate/ expectation of orders from the customers so that on receipt of customer’s delivery schedule, it could supply goods promptly at a short notice. This required stock transfers to branches in a big way. (b) The customer gave his tentative requirement of quantities based on his planned production programme. The customer was at liberty to alter its sourcing pattern and delivery schedule without any liability on itself and therefore, though the supplier undertook production and transfers goods to his godown/branch, it was still not sure of the time when the customers will actually lift such goods. It can be on the next day of arrival of goods at the branch or it can be even after three months or so. This uncertainty of final sales to the customer made it necessary for the appellant to have the goods in stock in the godowns at the branches for meeting the delivery schedule decided by the customer.

(III) The appellant effected the transfers of bearings to its branches and sales of bearing so transferred at branches as follows:-(a)The appellant made planning and production plan based on the market forecast for short/medium term demand for about two or three years. The estimates of market requirements for next six to twelve months based on the trend analysis were used for monthly production plan. The production planning, therefore, started much in advance and at the beginning stage of production planning, the appellant had no idea of customers’ orders. (b)The appellant manufactured according to international standards. These standards specified the outer and internal diameters of the bearing as well as its width or thickness. These basic dimensions and feature remained valid all over the world and the product had very wide range of applications. There were various manufacturers of a single type of bearing and the customer was at liberty to purchase from any of them. In a few cases, such standard products were made more suitable for a range of application as needed by customers and such differentials were denoted by suffix or prefix with the basic bearing number. Even in such cases, basic dimension and technical features remained as per the international standards. Bearings produced by the appellant could be sold anywhere in India to any branch /any dealer/customer depending on his requirements. (c) The appellant sent the goods to its own branch in big lots under the cover of branch transfer note and lorry receipts which were made out in the name of branch after payment of applicable excise duty. (d) The branch had to maintain sufficient stock of all the varieties of bearings, which would possibly be required by the customer. Till the customer approached the branch for purchase of goods, the branch or the appellant had no information about customer’s exact order with quantities and delivery schedules. (e) The branch office sold the goods to customer from its stock on hand as and when required against the customer order/schedule, under the cover of sales invoice. The branch charges applicable local sales tax of the respective State in the sales invoice. The branch issued excise invoice to its buyer so that the buyer got the credit of excise duty paid at the time of branch transfer from its manufacturing unit at Talegaon in Pune District. (f) The appellant, after transferring the goods to branches in the State, as above, had affected local as well as interstate sales at the branches and had paid the local tax and central sales tax in the respective States. The appellant had been assessed for Gurgaon branch in Haryana for the Financial Year 2006-2007 and for the Hosur branch in Tamil Nadu for the Financial Year 2004-2005.

Based on above facts, the assessing authority observed as under and considered the transfers as interstate sales.

“The goods are dispatched against the firm purchase orders from the customers outside the State of Maharashtra. On the dispatch documents the customer’s part number is mentioned. Specific goods are meant for specific customers. The dispatch and the sale are so related that the contract of sale could not be executed without dispatching the goods from the State of Maharashtra. The dispatches from the State of Maharashtra are for sale to the outside customers. Thus, the claim of the dealer that the dispatch is otherwise than by way of sale cannot be entertained in view of the clear facts and circumstances of the case and also having regard to the law well settled in this regard at the level of the Apex Court of India.”

The Hon’ble Tribunal after discussing the issue, made following observations;

“(iv) The appellant has also furnished before us a copy of purchase order placed by m/s. maruti udyog limited, Gurgaon at page no.62 of the compilation, a copy of purchase order amendment by m/s. maruti udyog limited at page no.63 of the compilation, the copies of delivery schedule placed by m/s. maruti udyog limited, Gurgaon placed at page nos.64 to 67 of the compilation, the copies of sales/excise invoices raised by the appellant’s Gurgaon branch on m/s. maruti udyog limited, placed at page nos. 68 to 83 of the compilation, the copies of stock transfer invoices with the copies of lorry receipts placed at page nos.84 to 87 of the compilation and a copy of finished goods stock register placed at page nos. 88 to 121 of the compilation. The details necessary for the purpose of appreciation of the issue as culled out of the documents are as follows;

1.

Sr.No

2. Purchase order No. & Date

3. Part No. & Design

4. Stock Transfer/ Excise
Invoice No. & Date issued on the gurgaon Branch

5. Transferee Branch

6. Excise Invoice No.
issued by gurgaon Branch

7. Customer/ Buyer’s Name

1.

1306582 Dt.11/10/03

KF-217084-HLA-

302155
Dt.22/02/06

Gurgaon

418004

M/s.Maruti
Udyog

 

 

09263M25053

 

 

Dt.03/04/06

Limited, Gurgaon

2.

1306582 Dt.11/10/03

KF-217084-HLA-

302155
Dt.22/02/06

Gurgaon

418005

M/s.Maruti
Udyog

 

 

09263M25053

 

 

Dt.03/04/06

Limited, Gurgaon

A perusal of documents namely purchase order, stock transfer invoices, excise invoices being sale invoices raised by the appellant’s Gurgaon branch on the customer m/s. maruti udyog limited, Gurgaon shows that all the sales effected to m/s. maruti udyog limited, Gurgaon, pertains to the purchase order no.1306582 placed by m/s. maruti udyog  limited,  Gurgaon  on  11/10/2003.  this  is  clear from a copy of delivery schedule which is furnished to us. though there are subsequent amendment to the purchase order, the original purchase order is of 11/10/2003. all these stock transfers are affected subsequent to the said purchase order. these transfers can be said to be pursuant to the purchase order with a view to ensuring delivery of the  goods  to  the  customer  m/s.  maruti  udyog  limited, Gurgaon. the transfers are pursuant to the purchase orders and the goods are delivered subsequently. The impugned transactions, therefore, effected by the appellant to m/s. maruti udyog limited, Gurgaon, by raising sales invoices by Gurgaon branch are interstate sales. the appellant has not furnished before us the documents namely copies of sales invoices in respect of sales affected from 07/04/2006 onwards  till  31/03/2007  to  m/s.  maruti  udyog  limited. Hence, we are unable to draw any inference in respect of the transactions effected from 07/04/2006 onwards.

(v) Excise invoice dt.30/05/2006 issued by the appellant’s branch at hosur to m/s.tVs motors Co. ltd. in respect of sales of 5600 bearings refers to the purchase order no.100242  placed  by  tVs  motors  on  the  appellant’s branch. the purchase order shows that it is of 31/10/2002, valid for the period 31/10/2002 to 31/03/2015. it is for the goods of the description, “n8010170-roller assy rocker”. the  excise  invoice  dt.30/05/2006  also  refers  to  the corresponding stock transfer/excise invoices nos.400468 dt.28/05/2006 and 400478 dt.27/05/2006 issued by the appellant at pune to its hosur branch. one can infer that the sales of bearings, effected by hosur branch under invoice dt.30/05/2006 are in compliance with the purchase order dt.31/03/2002, which were received by the branch under stock invoice/excise invoice dt.28/05/2006 and 27/05/2006 issued by the appellant’s branch at pune. the movement of the goods effected by the appellant’s branch at pune to its branch at hosur in tamil nadu under the above stock transfer invoices and sold subsequently pursuant to the order dt.31/10/2002 can be said to have been occasioned pursuant to the earlier purchase order dt.31/10/2002 and are therefore interstate sales.” hon’ble tribunal also referred to following judgments;

a)    Union of india and another V/s. K.G.Khosla and Co. ltd.  (43 stC 457)
b)    Sahney steel and press Works ltd. and another V/s. Commercial Tax Officer And Others (60 STC 301),
c)    Hyderabad engineering industries V/s. state of andhra pradesh (39 Vst 257)
d)    Tata  engineering  and  locomotive  Co.  ltd.  V/s. assistant    Commissioner    of    Commercial   taxes, jamshedpur and another        (26   stC   354),   and from this judgment, following para is also reproduced.

“Instead of looking into each transaction in order to find out whether a completed contract of sale had taken place, which could be brought to tax only if the movement of vehicles  from  jamshedpur  had  been  occasioned  under a covenant or incident of that contract, the assistant Commissioner wrongly based his order on mere generalities. the assistant Commissioner, on whom the duty lay of assessing the tax in accordance with law, was bound to examine each individual transaction and then decide whether it constituted an inter-state sale exigible to tax under the provisions of the act”.

Thus,  the  hon’ble tribunal  considered  such  dispatches as interstate sales. however, it also observed that each transaction is required to be examined separately and therefore, remanded the matter back to lower authority.

Conclusion

Such an uncertain position may cause several difficulties for dealers. against estimated requirements, the dealers are required to stock the goods in other states.   There may be reference to the documents for such estimated requirements and even for logistic purposes, there may be reference of such numbers on dispatch documents. however, there are a number of factors on account of which goods are not sold or are sold after long interval. There is no firm order in advance. The actual sale takes place only when ascertainment is done after receipt of firm requirement from the buyer. Therefore, merely because the purchase order number is quoted, it cannot be said that there is firm order. Therefore, there is certainly the other view that such dispatches cannot be considered as interstate sales. however, these are all judgment based facts and dealers are required to take proper precaution in such kind of transactions.

[2013] 39 taxmann.com 7 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Jetking Infotrain Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Whether mere omission to declare activity before department would amount to suppression of fact and attract penalty u/s. 78 when there no suppression is alleged in the SCN.? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant running computer coaching centres imparted computer education at different locations in India. They entered into agreements with persons to provide computer training on franchisee basis and from the fees received, they transferred the amount to the related franchise’s account after retaining 15%. The department treated this as a “franchise service” and confirmed service tax and imposed an equivalent amount of penalty apart from penalties u/s. 76 and 77 of the Act. The appellant did not contest the demand as the issue was decided against the appellant in another decision of Tribunal in similar case. For the penalty the appellant pleaded bonafide belief that the services as to non-taxability as franchise service.

Held
The penalty u/s. 78 was dropped on the ground that there is no specific allegation in the showcause notice for suppression of facts with intent to evade Service Tax and that mere omission to declare the activity would not amount to suppression of fact.

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2013 (32) STR 423 (Tri-Ahmd) Matrix Telecom P. Ltd. vs. CCE, Vadodara –II

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Whether penalty is imposable when service tax was paid before issuance of SCN and was a revenue neutral exercise.

Facts:
Appellant engaged in manufacturing of excisable goods paid the duty. Appellant received services of marketing & management consultancy from certain foreign service providers located out of India. During the course of audit, audit party pointed out the applicability of service tax on the receipt of the services from out of India. Appellant obtained the service tax registration and paid service tax with interest. Show Cause Notice was issued levying service tax, interest & penalty and were confirmed in the Order. Appellant challenged the imposition of penalty.

Held:
Since imposition of tax on import of services was under dispute at various fora and got final after the Bombay High Court gave decision in Indian National Ship Owners Association [2009 (13) STR 235 (Bom)], the Appellant deposited service tax after being pointed out by the Revenue.

Also the payment of service tax was revenue neutral exercise since it was available for credit against excise duty and therefore penalty was set aside.

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Whether reimbursement of electricity could be included in the taxable value for the purpose of renting of immovable property service?

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Facts:
Appellant provided renting of immovable property service to the tenants. Appellant charged service tax on the amount received from tenants except for reimbursement of electricity. Respondent confirmed the demand on the reimbursement of electricity.

Held:
Tribunal observed that electricity is regarded as goods as per Excise Tariff Heading 27 of CETA and as per Schedule A-20 of the Maharashtra VAT Act. Also Notification No. 12/2003 provides exemption for supply of goods and hence, service tax was held not applicable on reimbursement of electricity.

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2013 (32) STR 430 (Tri-Chennai) Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd vs. CCE ST-LTD Chennai.

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Whether passing of credit entry in the accounts tantamount to refund of money?

Facts:
Appellant an insurance service provider adjusted the service tax refunded to the intermediaries on the cancelled insurance policies against the service tax liability on the insurance premium for subsequent period. Revenue objected to the adjustment after noticing that in case of intermediaries, Appellant did not refund the actual amount of cancelled premium and service tax by way of cheque but had passed credit entries in the balances appearing in its books of accounts. Respondent considered this to be unsatisfactory, confirmed the demand.

Held:
Tribunal observed that, prima facie a credit in the account of intermediaries amounted to refund of money, however for the purpose of verification of the claim, the matter was remanded for de-novo adjudication.

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2013 TIOL 1727 CESTAT Mum, Atlas Documentary Facilitators Co Pvt. Ltd vs. CST, Mumbai

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CENVAT credit cannot be denied if claimed on the basis of debit notes capturing the details in annexure to the said debit note. Further denial of CENVAT credit on the basis of all the premises from where taxable services were provided, make the provisions of centralised registration redundant.

Facts:
The Appellant provided “Business Auxiliary Services” (BAS) and had centralised registration. It provided BAS services to banks and therefore was allotted part of the bank premises and the bank charged rent plus service tax to them. The bank issued debit notes on the Appellant and all the details as stipulated under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 2004 and Rule 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 were provided in the annexure to the debit notes issued by the bank. The Appellant availed the credit based on the said debit notes. CENVAT credit was denied on the grounds that all the details were not mentioned on the debit note but in the annexure and the annexure cannot be treated as CENVAT document. Further that the Appellant had not registered bank premises from where the taxable service was provided.

Held:
The details as required under the provisions of law for claiming the CENVAT credit were provided and also the provisions do not lay down any particular format for the CENVAT claiming documents thus the CENVAT cannot be denied if all the details are provided as required under the law. The Appellant had obtained centralised registration and thus seeking registration of all the premises from which it provides taxable service will make the Rule 4B of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 granting centralized registration redundant and therefore the CENVAT credit cannot be denied on the grounds as implied by the department.

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2013 TIOL 1734 CESTAT – Kol, UCO Bank vs. CST, Kolkata

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CENVAT credit cannot be disallowed on adhoc basis without verification. Payments made vide wrong accounting code cannot be demanded again as tax is already paid and moreover when the department regularised the subsequent payment under the wrong code.

Facts:
The Appellant is a bank registered under centralized registration under service tax and discharged all its liabilities from its head office i.e. centralised registered premises. The Appellant took the CENVAT credit based on invoices pertaining to the head office kept at the head office and that pertaining to branch office was kept at the respective branches. During the CERA audit, invoices on which CENVAT credit was availed were demanded and the Appellant offered the invoices available at the head office but on account of huge volume, no checking was done and the CENVAT credit was denied. Secondly, the Appellant paid the service tax liability under the wrong accounting code and therefore they was asked to pay the said service tax again. Relying on the case of Arcadia Shares & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Goa 2013 TIOL 1044 CESTAT Mum, the Appellant pleaded bonafides regarding use of erroneous code. However, they informed that the department itself regularised such a subsequent irregular payment and on intimation by the department and produced the relevant documents as evidence.

Held:
CENVAT credit cannot be denied without verification only because the volume is huge. Joint effort be made to conduct verification and case is remanded for verification. The payment made under wrong accounting code cannot be demanded and remanded the case for verification of the Appellant’s case that the subsequent payment was regularised by the department.

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2013 (32) STR 474 (Tri-Mumbai) Golden Tobacco Ltd vs. CCEx, Mumbai – V

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Whether Mobile/Telephone service installed at the residence of the Directors eligible for credit?

Facts:
Appellant preferred the appeal against order of Revenue denying the service tax credit on mobile/ telephone installed at the residence of the Directors of the Appellant on the reasoning that the same did not qualify as input service definition.

Held:
Tribunal referring to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ultratech Cement Ltd.-2010 (260) ELT 369 (Bom.) which held that services used by the manufacturer of excisable goods in the course of its business activity would be entitled for credit, allowed the appeal of the Appellant.

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2013 (32) STR 525 (Tri-Chennai) Central Bank of India vs. Comm. of Ex & ST, Chennai.

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Whether is there any time limit for availing the CENVAT credit?

Facts:
Appellant had taken CENVAT credit in the year 2009 for the period pertaining to year 2004 to 2009. Respondent issued SCN and denied the credit and imposed the interest and penalties.

Held:
Tribunal observed that neither the Central Excise Act nor CENVAT Credit Rules prescribed any time limit within which credit should be taken, although it was prescribed that CENVAT credit would be available immediately. The appeal was allowed with consequential reliefs.

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2013 (32) STR 451 (Tri-Mumbai) Anand Construction Co. vs. CCEx, Kolhapur

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Whether service tax on construction of a hostel building can be confirmed on the ground of non-production of evidence for the use of the said building without any factual allegation of its commercial use?

Facts:
Appellant constructed a hostel for an educational institution which was to be used for stay by the students of the said institution. Respondent issued SCN and demanded service tax on the activity of construction of the said hostel building. Appellant contended that since the building was constructed for the purpose other than commercial purpose, service tax was not applicable and Respondent did not dispute the facts. Revenue considered it taxable as no evidence of the claim of noncommercial use was produced.

Held:
Tribunal held that since the said building was constructed for the purpose of residence of students and there was absence of allegation that building was being used for any other purpose, set aside the demand and granted the relief.

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2013 (32) STR 418 (Tri-Delhi) Indusind Media & Communication Ltd vs. CCE, Delhi

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Whether carriage fees charged for providing desired frequency for broadcasting channels signals would be classifiable under BAS or BSS?

Facts:
Appellant provided broadcasting & cable TV services and were registered as such. SCN was issued raising the demand of service tax on carriage fees received for providing desired frequency for broadcasting channels signals under business auxiliary service. Also demand was raised under Lease Circuit service for amount received for providing voice & data circuit service. Demand was confirmed with interest and penalties.

Held:
Carriage fees charged from different channels for providing desired frequency for broadcasting their channel’s signals which facilitates better quality view of channel. Better quality of channels enhanced the viewer-ship of channel and thus amounted to promotion of broadcasting channel and therefore classifiable under business auxiliary service.

Original authority classified voice & data circuit service under Lease Circuit service for a certain period and under telecommunication service for subsequent period. Appellate authority in its Order classified the said service under telecommunication service. Both the departmental authorities have not given any findings on the applicability of the said classification and therefore this issue was remanded to original authority.

Since no finding was recorded on the issue of invocation of extended period and penalties, the Appellant’s claim that proper disclosures were made in the service tax returns in respect of carriage fees, voice & data circuit fees received, the matter was remanded to the original authority.

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2013 (32) STR 407 (Tri-Bang) Ace Credit vs. CCEx, Mangalore

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Whether services of Direct Sales Associate/Agent of bank is classifiable as “provision of service on behalf of client” or “promotion/marketing of services provided by client”.

Facts:
Appellant challenged service tax under one of the sub-clause of the definition of Business Auxiliary Service (BAS) and applicability of extended period of limitation and levy of penalty.

Appellant was appointed as Direct Sales Associate/ Agent of ICICI and HDFC banks for promoting various products of these banks at relevant times. Appellant obtained service tax registration by disclosing the nature of services rendered by it under BAS category under sub-clause “provision of service on behalf of client” which was made taxable from 10-09-2004 started paying taxRespondent issued demand on the basis that the services provided by Appellant were covered not under the clause of “provision of services on behalf of client” but under sub-clause “promotion/ marketing of services provided by client” which was taxable from 01-07-2003.

Held:
Tribunal after referring the agreement entered between Appellant & Banks held that Appellant by using its expertise, staff, infrastructure was marketing the products of Banks and these were nothing but the services provided by Bank. Hence services of the Appellant were classifiable under sub-clause “Promotion/marketing of services provided by the client” which was taxable w.e.f. 01-07- 2003. Further, non-disclosure of services rendered at the time of obtaining service tax registration in the year 2004 amounted to suppression of material facts for the period prior to year 2004 and hence invocation of extended period was justified. However, since Appellant filed an application under “Extra-ordinary Taxpayer-Friendly Scheme” in the year 2004, the case was considered covered u/s. 80 for setting aside the penalties.

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2012 (32) STR 392 (Guj) C C Patel & Associates Pvt Ltd vs. UOI

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Whether refund claim for services tax paid twice can be rejected on the ground of limitation?

Facts:
Appellant preferred refund claim for service tax paid twice (second time at the instance of department) against the Order of CESTAT rejecting the appeal filed by Appellate.

Appellant deposited service tax on billing basis instead of receipt basis that too before the due date. Respondent passed the orders raising the demand of service tax on the receipts realised in subsequent period, without adjusting the service tax paid at the time of billing. Appellant deposited the service tax demanded with interest and preferred a refund claim. Respondent rejected the refund claim on the ground of limitation and also due to possibility of unjust enrichment.

Held:
High Court after referring to provisions of section 68(2) & 68(3) of the Finance Act as existed at the relevant time, held that, Appellant had already deposited the entire tax on billing basis thus had complied the requirement of section 68. The logic advanced in the Order of Respondent while demanding the tax was fundamentally incorrect. Question of limitation in case of retention of service tax which was paid twice would not arise and such retention was without authority of law. Appellant has deposited the tax separately and second time under insistence of Revenue which was the subject matter of refund, hence principal of unjust enrichment was not applicable. Appeal was allowed with direction to refund the tax paid.

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 69 (Madras HC) – CCE vs. Salem Starch & Manufacturers’ Service Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd.

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Whether, co-operative society providing platform for the sellers and buyers to meet in a common place, providing a storage facility to the manufacturer, and organising of the sale of the products etc is liable for service tax under “clearing and forwarding” service? Held, No.

Facts:
The respondent a registered co-operative society formed with the object of improvement of tapioca cultivation and tapioca sago and starch industry and of the economic condition of tapioca cultivators and sago and starch manufacturers in some area. Their activities involved in the case were as under:

Members of the society sent their products to the society’s premises by making their own arrangements for loading, transport and unloading of the goods. The said goods were weighed and sent to the godown maintained by the society. Samples were drawn for quality testing as well  as for display in the tender hall. On receipt of the tenders from the registered merchants, who also happened to be members of the society, the higher rate offered for each lot was displayed. On confirmation of the price by the principal, the buyer was intimated suitably to make his arrangements to lift the stock. Thereupon the society prepared the statement of bill to the members, wherein, deductions were made towards advance paid, interest payable, godown services charges, godown rent, unloading charges, marking charges, bank service charges and courier charges etc. According to the society, it acted as agent between the members and buyers; provided warehousing facility and gave advance money to the members before sale if so requested by the members

As contended by the Revenue, the society received the goods from principal, effected sales only after obtaining the concurrence of the principal; they maintained the records for receipts, despatches and the stock available with them in the warehouse and therefore tax was sought to be levied under “clearing and forwarding service” and it was confirmed in the first appeal.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal holding that the consignments of sale were brought by the principal to the premises of the society for auction and that the society did not clear the consignments from its premises. After the sale, the goods were delivered to the buyer at the sales premises by the owner/principal. As such there was no forwarding took place. Referring to the decision in Mahavir Generics vs. CCE [2007] 6 STT 523 (New Delhi-CESTAT) the Tribunal held that the assessee was not doing forwarding services and consequently, there was no liability to pay the service tax. Before Hon. High Court, the Revenue placed reliance on the CBEC Circular in F.No. B/43/7/97 TRU dated 11-07-1997 which the society contested and placed reliance on section 65A(2) (b) of the Finance Act that even assuming that there is a combination of different services, the Revenue must find out the essential character of the service to bring the society within the framework of the activity of clearing and forwarding.

High Court held as under:

• There is no evidence to show that the assessee had a responsibility of arranging despatch of goods purchased by the buyer in the auction nor had responsibility to collect the goods from the principal’s premises. It is only the principal who brought their products on the society’s premises to make use of the common market platform of the Society for its members and on the request of the principal, the society offered the storage facility.

• On reading of the nature of activity rendered by the society, it is clear that except for receiving the goods which were brought to its doorsteps by its principal and displaying the goods received for sale, practically, nothing else was done by the society in the matter of taking the goods from the principal and for further despatching of the goods to the buyer by engaging transporter or on its own. The conduct of the society, handling the goods on receipt raising invoices on sale or maintaining records as to the stock availability, rate at best, indicates it only as an agency offering storage facility. This act, per se, does not convert the assessee’s transaction as that of a clearing and forwarding agency. The essential character of the activity of providing a platform for the sellers and buyers to meet in a common place, providing a storage facility to the manufacturer, the financial help etc. do not, take the society anywhere near the activities discharged by a clearing and forwarding agent. The incidental services offered in the transaction in arranging the transporting of the goods to the buyer would not, decide the nature of the transaction as one of clearing and forwarding agency.

(Note: It may be noted that, decision of Mahaveer Generics relied upon by the Tribunal has been approved by P&H High Court in the case of CCE vs. Kulchip Medicines 2009 (14) STR 608, however it has been subsequently reversed by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Commissioner of C.Ex (Bangalore) vs. Mahaveer Generics 2010 (17) STR 225 (Kar) distinguishing the said decision of P&H High Court (supra).

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2013 (32) STR 388 (Kar.) Prakash Retail Private Limited vs. Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Tax (Audit), Udupi

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Whether charges for transportation and installation included in the “Sale Price” of goods is subjected to VAT?

Facts:
Appellant was engaged in the trading of household articles, electrical and electronic goods and sold these goods to its customers by placing orders with various manufacturers. The terms of sale were on ex-factory basis and the sale price was charged as per price list issued by the manufactures. Thereafter Appellant arranged for the transportation from the place of manufacturer to the customers by collecting transport charges. Further Appellant charged for the installation of these items at the place of the customers. The invoices raised by it had three components – sale price, transport charges and installation charges. Appellant deposited VAT on the sale price and paid service tax on the transport charges and installation charges. Authority demanded VAT on transport and installation charges for which the present writ is filed.

Held:
The High Court after referring to section 2(36) of KVAT Act held that, the said section specifies the term ‘turnover’ which means the aggregate amount for which goods are sold shall include any sum charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of goods sold at the time of or before the delivery thereof. If the transfer of title to goods is to be at the place of seller then the subsequent charges for transporting goods & installation do not form part of the amount for which goods are sold. From the price lists and sale invoices of the Appellant, it becomes clear that the sale prices are on ex-factory basis and do not include the installation. Therefore the sale price of the goods at the ex-showroom price attracts sales tax/VAT. Subsequent to the transfer of title in goods at the place of seller, Appellant acts as agent of customers for transportation of goods and installation. Therefore the transportation and installation charges do not become part of the sale price of goods. In this case, Appellant has collected transport & installation charges and deposited service tax thus Appellant has discharged its legal obligation of paying service tax. The State Government cannot be enriched by wrongly bringing the transport and installation charges as part of sale price of the goods. Thus the writ was allowed and the order was quashed.

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Branch Transfer, Inter State Sale vis-àvis Dispatch of Semi-finished Goods

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Introduction
Under Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CST Act), the transaction of ‘sale’ (inter- state sale) is liable to tax. A transaction of sale becomes inter-state sale, if because of such sale, there is movement of goods from one State to another State. In other words, if there is link between inter-state movement of goods and the pre-agreed sale between the transferor (seller) and the buyer then there will be inter-state sale.

However, there can be inter-state movement of goods (otherwise than an agreement to sale), like; when goods are sent from one branch in one State to another branch in other State of the same entity or to the agent or principal as the case may be (commonly known as ‘consignment transfer/branch transfer’).

There is a lot of litigation about claim of branch transfer vis-à-vis inter-state sale. The transferor branch may be transferring goods to another branch for compliance of requirement of a local customer of the transferee branch. Whether there is conceivable link between dispatch to branch and ultimate sale to the local customer will decide the nature of transaction. If there is conceivable link then the branch transfer will amount to inter-state sale. If there is no such conceivable link, then it will not amount to inter state sale and claim of branch transfer will remain allowable.

Whether there is conceivable link between branch transfer and ultimate sale will depend upon facts of each case. Therefore, there can not be any general ratio for deciding the nature of transaction.

Dispatch of Semi-finished goods
An interesting issue arose before Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal (MSTT) in case of Multi Flex Lami Prints Ltd. (Appeal No. 61 of 2008 dated 29.7.2013).

Facts were that the appellant/dealer was engaged in the activity of supply of packaging pouches. The packing pouches were to be supplied to one particular customer and they were printed accordingly as per his specifications. Appellant had manufacturing unit at Mahad in Maharashtra. There, on the raw materials, processes like colour separation, cylinder making, printing and lamination were carried on. After above processes, the processed goods were sent to Silvassa the unit. In the Silvassa unit, processes like slitting and pouching were done. Thereafter the pouches were supplied to the customers.

In the assessment, the branch transfer claim was allowed. However, in revision proceedings, the said claim was disallowed holding that the transfer is interstate sale. The fact of manufacturing the goods as per specification of customer in Mahad and dispatch to Silvassa was considered as the determinative factor for holding the transfer as inter state sale.

Judgment of Hon’ble Tribunal
Before the Hon’ble Tribunal, several arguments about legality of the revision order were taken. However, Hon’ble Tribunal considered the revision action as valid. On merits, Hon’ble Tribunal held that the revision is not correct. The observations of Hon’ble Tribunal are reproduced below:

“It was explained in the said letter that the processes, namely colour separation, cylinder making, printing and lamination had been carried out at the factory in Mahad and thereafter, the laminated films were dispatched to Silvassa Unit of the appellant for further processing such as slitting and pouching. It was then explained by the appellant to the revising Officer that the goods sent to Silvassa Unit were Semi finished goods and thereafter they were slit according to the specification of width given by the customer. The slit films were then stretch-wrapped and packed, which is known as primary packing. The said film rolls were thereafter put in corrugated boxes which are known as secondary packing. It was also explained by the appellant to the revising Officer that in case the customer requires the material in pouch form, the laminated/slitted films is converted into pouches of types/sizes as per specification of the customers and after quality check and packing they are dispatched to the customer. It also appears that it was explained by the appellant to the revising officer that, although the goods become identifiable to a particular customer at the time of leaving Mahad Unit but in a Semi finished condition. It was explained by the appellant that the semi finished goods received by the Silvassa Unit were subjected to further processing of slitting and pouching at Silvassa unit and were thereafter dispatched to the customers at various places outside Silvassa in finished form. It would appear that it was the case of the appellant before the revising officer that the goods sent to the branch were not delivered/ sold as such by the Silvassa branch, but they were different goods from the goods sent to the Silvassa branch. A perusal of revision order shows that the revising officer had not controverted this factual submission of the appellant and thus accepted the contention of the appellant that the goods sent by the appellant to the Silvassa unit were the goods manufactured up to lamination stage and further process such as slitting and pouching were done at Silvassa unit and the goods ultimately delivered to the buyers outside Silvassa were after slitting and pouching made at Silvassa. In support of the claim that slitting and pouching of laminated and printed packaging film amounts to manufacturing activity, the appellant has relied upon the judgment dated 24th September 2012 of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Appeal No.741 of 2010. The revenue has however relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Faridabad Iron and Steel Traders Association v/s. Union of India in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 7595 of 2001 and 94 of 2002 decided on 21-11-2003 to support it’s case that slitting of laminated films does not amount to manufacture. The concept of manufacture envisages that the processes to which the goods are subjected to should not only bring about change in the goods but the change should be such that the goods after subjecting to processes emerge as a different commercial commodity. In Faridabad Iron and Steel Traders Association, it was held by the Delhi High Court that mere cutting or slitting of Steel Sheet does not amount to manufacture because the identity of the product remains unchanged. We are of the view that in the context of the facts of the present case it would be most appropriate to decide the issue relying upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Appeal No.741 of 2010. We agree with the appellant that the nature of goods actually delivered to the buyers by Silvassa unit are different from the goods sent by the appellant’s factory at Mahad to it’s Silvassa Unit. This fact is borne out from the description in the stock transfer invoices raised by the appellant on its Silvassa branch and the sales invoices issued by the Silvassa branch to the buyers.”

It is further observed as under;

“In the present appeal before us, the goods manufactured and ultimately delivered to the customer by the Silvassa branch of the appellant are made as per the specifications of the customer. Manufacturing involves the processes namely, colour separation, Cylinder making, printing, lamination, slitting and pouching. Processes upto lamination stage are done at Mahad factory in Maharashtra. The goods manufactured upto lamination stages are sent to Silvassa branch. But they are not delivered to the customer in the form  in which they are received by Silvassa branch because the goods in the form in which they are received by Silvassa branch are not ready to be delivered/sold to the customers as per their requirement/orders. The goods received by Silvassa branch are subjected to further processing of slitting and pouching so as to make them appropriate for delivery to the customer as per his specification. Slitting and pouching is done at Silvassa. Thus, it is clear that the goods delivered by Silvassa branch of the appellant to the customer is a different commercial commodity from the goods sent by Mahad factory of the appellant to Silvassa branch and therefore it is difficult to hold that there is an inter-State sale of the same goods which were manufactured by the Mahad factory of the appellant and dispatched to Silvassa branch. In the case of Bharat Electronics Ltd., (46 VST179), The petitioner had manufactured night vision devices at its Machilipatnam Unit which were transferred to other units of the petitioner outside the State to be incorporated in the equipment to be manufactured at the other units which were eventually sold there from to end customers. It was held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that it is only if the goods which move from one State to another are sold as they are would the question of such transfer of goods attracting levy of tax under the C.S.T Act as an inter-state sale arise.”

Conclusion
The above judgment will be useful for deciding the nature of transaction, when there is branch transfer of Semi-finished goods. However, the nature of processes carried out at relevant places is also required to be seen before arriving to conclusion. It is expected that above judgment will provide guidelines.

Notification No. 1513/CR 150/Taxation 1 dated 24-12-2013

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Notification No. 1513/CR 151/Taxation 1 dated 24- 12-2013

By this Notification No. 1513, sales of wine covered by entry 3A of Schedule D by certain dealers subject to conditions is made exempt with effect from 1st January, 2014.

The other Notifications are also for amending Schedule D.

Refund to Diplomatic Authorities

Notification No. VAT 1513/CR 110/Taxation 1 dated 24-12-2013

By this Notification, the earlier Notification No. Vat.1509/CR-89/Taxation -1 Dated 5th November, 2009 gets amended.

Notification No. 1513/CR 124/Taxation 1 dated 01-01- 2014

By this Notification, the late fee for filing returns for certain class of dealers has been exempted subject to conditions.

Vehicles for handicapped persons

Notification No. 1513/CR 130/Taxation 1 dated 27- 12-2013

By this Notification Entry No. 63 is inserted in Schedule A for motor vehicles having engine capacity up to 200cc adapted or modified for use by handicapped persons reducing rate of tax at Nil. Such vehicle should be certified as “invalid carriage” in the certificate of registration issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

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Exemption under Focus Market Scheme (FMS) on export of meat and meat products, cotton and cotton yarn

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Notification No. 17/2013-ST dated 26th December, 2013

Vide this Notification, Notification No. 6/2013-ST dated 18th April, 2013 has been amended by way of adding additional categories like Meat & Meat Product, Cotton & Cotton Yarn in the list of exports not eligible for exemption under Focus Market Scheme duty Credit scrip issued to an exporter by the Regional Authority.

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Physical submission of Audit Report in Form 704 for the financial year 2012-13

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Trade Circular No.10T dated 16-12-2013

In this Circular, the Commissioner has prescribed the list of physical documents to be filed after electronic uploading the vat audit report . The last date for electronic uploading of Form e704 for the financial year 2012-13 is 15th January, 2014 and the last date for submission of physical documents is 25th January,2014.

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Supreme Food Industries vs.. State of Kerala [2012] 47 VST 487 (Ker)

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VAT-Sale – Supply of Deep Freezers – By Ice Creame Manufacturing Company To Its Distributors Against Deposit – Up to full value of Cost- To be Adjusted Against Wear and Tear- In Four Equal Annual Instilments – Amounts To Sale – And Liable to Pay Tax – As well As Eligible to Input Tax Credit of Tax Paid on Purchase of Deep Freezers – The Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Facts:
The petitioner company is engaged in manufacturing and sale of ice cream made purchase of deep freezers as an incentive and delivered same to the distributors against collection of security deposit almost equal to the value of deep freezers from each distributors. The assessing authority during the assessment for the years 2005-2006 and 2008-2009 treated such delivery of deep freezers as sale and levied tax thereon and did not grant input tax credit of tax paid on purchase of it being capital goods. The appellate authority as well as the Tribunal confirmed the assessment orders. The petitioner company filed revision petition before the Kerala High Court against such assessment orders.

Held :
The High Court rejected contention of the petitioner that there is no sale of deep freezers to the distributors because in fact it is a sale on deferred payment basis and the cost is recovered at 25 % each for the four years from the date of delivery. The transaction is a pure sale but on credit basis against payment in four installments.

As regards claim of input tax credit, the High court held that Deep freezers purchased and delivered are used for storage of ice cream by the distributors, and so much so, were capital goods for them and trading goods for the petitioner, who has purchased and sold the same to the distributors and is eligible to claim input tax credit on purchase thereof. Accordingly, the High Court allowed revision petition partly by directing assessing authority to grant input tax credit as per provisions of the law.

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State of Kerala vs. Yenkay Complex Pvt. Ltd. [2012 ] 47 VST 288 (ker)

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Sales Tax – Rate of Tax – Based on Star Hotels – Given By Tourism Department – Government of India – Special Rate Applies From Date of Approval of Star Granted – And not From 1st Day of Financial Year – Section-5B and Entry 46 of Schedule I of The Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.

Facts:
The respondent is a resort hotel having three star approvals by Tourism Department of Government India with effect from 11-09-2002. Accordingly, the respondent paid license fee for the period up to 11/09/2002 and from 11-09-2002 paid tax on sale of Cooked Food @ special rate of 8% applicable to star hotels under Entry 46 of Schedule I of The Act.

However, the assessing officer having treated classification of three star hotels from 1st day of April 2002, applied special rate of tax of 8% from that date. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the respondent. The Department filed revision petition before the Kerala High Court against the said judgment of Tribunal.

Held:
Liability for tax on sale of cooked food which is generally served in hotel is fixed under the Statue with reference to the classification of hotels. In fact, only bar attached and star hotels are specifically covered by Entry 46 of Schedule I, attracting special rate of tax of 8 %. Other hotels are covered by section 5B, which provides for collection of license fees. The Tourism Department of Government of India is the agency constituted to declare star status of a hotel. Therefore for the purpose of Entry 46, star hotels mean only those hotels so classified by tourism department of Government of India. Therefore, the respondent is liable to pay tax at special rate of 8 % from 11-09-2002 onwards, when the approval of star was given by the tourism department and for earlier period the respondent is liable to pay license fees u/s. 5B of The Act. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the State and approved the order of Tribunal.

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2013-TIOL-1806-CESTAT-MUM Kumar Beheray Rathi, K K Erectors, Kumar Builder, Kumar Builders vs. CCE, Pune-III

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Builders/Developers are not liable to pay service tax on “one-time maintenance charges” collected from buyers under the category of “Maintenance or Repair Services”.

Facts:
The Appellants were builders/developers of residential flats and various commercial premises and recovered one-time maintenance deposit from each of the customers to whom they sold the flats. The department contended to levy tax on the said amount under the category “Maintenance or Repair Services” along with interest and penalty. The Appellants contended that they were only working as an agent/trustee of the funds of the flat owners and was statutory obligation under Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of construction, sale, management and transfer) Act, 1963.

Held:
Analysing the agreement, the Hon. Tribunal held that the Appellants were not providing any maintenance or repair service to the buyers of the flats and thus allowed the appeal.

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2013-TIOL-1838-CESTAT-MUM Sodexho Pass Services India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Whether Sodexho meal vouchers promote sale of goods/services and are similar to credit/debit cards?

Facts:
The Appellant is in the business of issuing meal/gift coupon vouchers after entering into an agreement with affiliates such as restaurants, eating places, other establishments etc. and issue such coupons to the customers, generally in corporates who in turn would distribute among its employees as fringe benefit. The Appellant received service charges from its affiliates as well as from customers which the department contended to levy tax on and thus issued a show-cause notice on 28-04-2006 which the Commissioner partly confirmed by dropping the demands on amount received from customers. The department and the Appellant both were in appeal against the said order of the said Commissioner.

The department held a view that the assessee promoted the business of the affiliates inasmuch a user/employee had to purchase goods and services from one of the affiliates and cannot use these vouchers in any other establishments or for any other purposes and thus taxable under “Business Auxiliary Services”. The assessee contended that their services were similar to debit/credit cards and therefore, such transactions were covered under “Business Support Service” and thus not-taxable prior to 01-05-2006. Further, they also contended that providing a list of affiliates would not amount to promotion or marketing of affiliates as it was merely a facilitating mechanism.

Held:
Affirming the commissioner’s view and observing the definition of “Business Auxiliary Services” effective from 10-09-2004, the Hon. Tribunal also upholding penalty held that the service charges received from affiliates were taxable and rejected the contentions of the assessee that the same were similar to credit/debit cards.

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Grant of Refund ITC denied due to purchase from non-filers supplier.

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Trade Circular No.9T dated 11-12-2013

In this Circular the Commissioner has explained the procedure to grant refund to those dealers who were denied refund on account of purchases from non filers of returns and in whose cases the supplier has subsequently filed the returns and paid the due tax.

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Applicability of Set-off to developers of SEZ and units in Special Economic Zone Trade Circular No. 8T dated 29-11-2013

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In this Circular Commissioner has explained that the developer of SEZ and units in processing area of SEZ will be entailed to set-off in respect of their purchase as per the New Rule 55B inserted wef 15-10-2011.

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Correction of mistakes made by the dealers or miscellaneous refunds of excess payment of taxes

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Trade Circular No. 7T dated 21-11-2013

In this Circular the Commissioner has laid down procedure for correction of mistakes made by dealers and the banks while making e-payment.

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Vces- Clarifications Circular No.174/9/2013 – ST dated. 25.11.2013

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The Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme (VCES) has come into effect from 10 -05-2013. Most of the issues raised with reference to the Scheme have been clarified by CBEC vide circular Nos. 169/4/2013-ST, dated 13-05-2013 and No. 170/5/2013-ST, dated 08-08-2013. In the recently held interactive sessions, at Chennai, Delhi and Mumbai, which were chaired by the Hon’ble Finance Minister, certain queries/issues were raised by the trade/industry. Certain issues which have not been specifically clarified hitherto or clarified adequately, have been clarified by this Circular.

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Lowering of threshold limit for mandatory e-payment of central excise duty and service tax to Rs. 1 lakh – Notification No. 16/2013 – ST dated 22nd November, 2013

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Notification No. 15/2013 – CE (NT) dtd 22/11/2013 as well as this Notification have been issued to lower the threshold limit of mandatory e-payment from Rs. 10 lakh to Rs. 1 lakh for both Central Excise and Service Tax payment with effect from 1st January, 2014.

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Time limit prescribed for filing form A-3 BY SEZ UNIT / SEZ DEVELOPER – Notification No. 15/2003-ST dated 21st November 2013

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Notification No. 12/2013 exempts the services received by units located in SEZ or SEZ Developers for authorised operations subject to condition that the SEZ unit or SEZ Developer has to furnish declaration in Form A-3 on quarterly basis providing details of the specified services received by it without payment of Service Tax.

Notification No. 15/2003 – ST has amended the above condition by providing the time period by which such quarterly statement is to be filed. Accordingly SEZ unit or SEZ Developer is required to file Form A-3 by 30th of the month following the particular quarter. Further, the Notification also provides that Form A-3 pertaining to period July 2013 to September 2013 shall be furnished by 15th December, 2013.

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State of Tamil Nadu vs. Essar Shipping Limited [2012] 47 vst 209 (mad)

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Sales Tax – Sale – Transfer of Right to Use – Time Charter Party Agreement – To Hire Out Ship – No Transfer of Possession or Control – Not Taxable.

Sales Tax – Location of Goods at The Time of Contract of Sale Entered – Sale of Named Ship – Not in State – Sale outside the State – Not Taxable – Section 3A of The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959

Facts :
The assessee company, owner of ships, had let on hire 11 ships to various parties, within and out side the State of Tamil Nadu and collected charges on rendering services. The assessee had entered into Time charter party agreement for letting ship on hire to transport goods mentioned therein. The assessee had also effected sale of old ships. The assessing authorities treated time charter party agreement as transfer of right to use ships and levied tax on charges collected thereon and also levied tax on sale of named ships as local sale although ships were not in the State at the time of sale. The Tribunal held that time charter party agreement is taxable as transfer of right to use goods but accepted the plea of the assessee that the transactions is in the course of inter-State trade as such not taxable u/s. 3A of The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. The Tribunal in respect of sale of Ships held that it is not taxable as at the time of sale it was not located in the State. The State filed revision petition before the Madras High Court against the Judgment of Tribunal.

Held :
A reading of the various clauses enumerated in the charter shows that the contract is not for the hire of the vessel but hiring of the services to be provided by the owner as a carrier to carry goods which are put on board of the ship by the time charterer. The Tribunal committed a serious error in its understanding of what possession would mean, in the face of the time charter agreement. The High Court accordingly held that the time charter party agreement is one for services, hence not taxable under the provisions of the sales tax act.

As regards sale of named ships, the High Court held that the location of the goods at the time of sale determines the jurisdiction of that State to levy sales tax under the local Act. Thus, in the case of ascertained goods, the place where goods are at the time of contract is the State which has the jurisdiction to assess the transaction. Admittedly on the date of sale, the agreement was for named ships which were nowhere near the jurisdiction of the State of Tamil Nadu. The mere fact that the contract was entered into in the State of Tamil Nadu or for that matter the assessee had sought for registration under the State act, by itself, would not confer jurisdiction on the State to impose tax on the sale of assets located outside the State. The Tribunal found that at time of sale of Ships, all the named ships were positioned out side the State as such the Tribunal was right in holding the transaction not taxable in the State of Tamil Nadu.

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the State.

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India Exports vs. State of U.P. and others [2012] 47 vst 126(Allahabad).

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Sale – Sales from SEZ – Not a Sale In The Course of Import – Taxable, Section 5(2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956

Facts:
The Petitioner having a unit in Special Economic Zone, cleared furniture manufactured therein, for sale to Domestic Tariff Area (DTA Units) under section 2(i) of The SEZ Act, 2005. The petitioner claimed exemption from payment of tax on such sale of goods u/s. 5(2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, being sale in course of import as whole of India excludes areas of SEZ under the SEZ Act. The assessing authorities imposed tax on impugned transactions, against which petitioner filed writ petition before the Allahabad High Court.

Held:
The SEZ Act, 2005 has provided for amendment of various taxing statues or modified them for fulfilling object and purpose of the Act. Section 57 of the said Act amends the enactment specified in the Third Schedule, which are amended by SEZ Act, 2005. The Central Sales Tax Act is not included in any of these Schedules. The sales from SEZ Unit to Unit in DTA cannot be deemed to be imports. No such presumption can be drawn from section 5(2) of The CST Act or any of the provisions of SEZ Act as such it is taxable. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner.

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 9 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Kamal Engineering Co. vs. CCE, Lucknow

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Whether, filing of fresh appeal beyond the prescribed time, after removing defects pointed out by office of Commissioner (Appeals) in the Original appeal which was otherwise filed in time, is liable to be dismissed as ‘time barred’ in the absence of application for condo nation of delay? Held, No.

Facts:
The Appellant filed appeal before Commissioner Appeals in time. However, on defects being pointed out by the office of Commissioner (Appeals), the appeal was filed afresh removing those defects, which led to 10 days delay. The Appellant did not file any application for condonation of delay. The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation.

Held:
Tribunal held that, since there was no delay in filing the original appeal and the new appeal was filed only to remove the defects pointed by office of Commissioner (Appeals) there cannot be said to be delay and matter was remanded to Commissioner (Appeals) for adjudication on merit.

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 37 (Delhi HC) Indus Towers Ltd. vs. Union of India

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Whether, in the facts and circumstances, the provision of passive infrastructure services by the applicant to sharing operators would tantamount to ‘Transfer of right to use goods u/s. 2(l)(zc)(vi) of the Delhi VAT Act, 2004 liable to VAT.? Held, No.

Facts:
Indus is a company registered with the Department of Telecommunication for providing ‘passive infrastructure services’ and ‘related operations and maintenance services’ to various telecommunications operators in India on a shared basis. Its business is to provide access to the telecom operators, on shared basis to the telecom towers installed by it and to a shelter which is a construction. It would also provide diesel generator sets, airconditioners, electrical and civil works, DC power system, battery bank, etc. All these are known as “passive infrastructure”.

Inside the shelter the telecom operators are permitted to keep and maintain their base terminal stations (BTS), associated antenna, back-haul connectivity to the network of the sharing telecom operator and associated civil and electrical works required to provide telecom services. This is known as the “active infrastructure”.

Whereas the active infrastructure is owned and operated by the sharing telecom operator, passive infrastructure is owned by Indus. There could be several operators who may use the tower and shelter which are parts of the passive infrastructure by keeping their BTS, etc., therein and sharing the entire passive infrastructure on an agreed basis.

The active infrastructure which is owned and put up by the sharing telecom operators needs certain conditions for proper functioning and uninterrupted telecom network/signals. These conditions are maintenance of a particular temperature, humidity level, safety, etc. which are ensured by the passive infrastructure made available by the petitioner to the sharing telecom operators.

Issue:
The issue involved in the case was in the context of section 2(l)(zc)(vi) of the Delhi VAT Act, 2004 that, whether, in the facts and circumstances, the provision of passive infrastructure services by the applicant to sharing operators would tantamount to ‘Transfer of right to use goods.

VAT authority considered the entire amount of consideration received for providing access to the passive infrastructure as one for “transfer of the right to use goods.

The Petitioner contended that there was no transfer of the right in any goods by the petitioner to the sharing telecom operators and therefore the levy of VAT on the assumption to the contrary was wholly untenable.

Held
On examination of various clause of sample Master Service Agreement (MSA), High Court held as under:

• The right to use the goods—in this case, the right to use the passive infrastructure—can be said to have been transferred by Indus to the sharing telecom operators only if the possession of the said infrastructure was transferred to them. They would have the right to use the passive infrastructure if they were in lawful possession of it. There has to be, in that case, an act demonstrating the intention to part with the possession of the passive infrastructure.

• Various aspects in the MSA clearly provided that Indus had to be in possession of the passive infrastructure and cannot part with the same in favour of the sharing telecom operators.

• The High court also referred to various provisions in the agreement while examining the contents of the agreement and observed that with several restrictions and curtailment of the access made available to the sharing telecom operators to the passive infrastructure and with severe penalties prescribed for failure on the part of the Indus to ensure uninterrupted and high quality service provided by the passive infrastructure, it is difficult to imagine how Indus could part with the possession of part of the infrastructure.

• Therefore, it was held that, the limited access made available to the sharing telecom operators could not be considered transfer of “right to use” the passive infrastructure when the possession of the said infrastructure always remained with Indus. The sharing telecom operators did not therefore, have any right to use the passive infrastructure. The High Court placed reliance on decision of Indus Towers Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT (2013) 29 taxmann.com 301 (Kar)

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 8 (Mumbai – CESTAT) CCE, Pune – III vs. Maharashtra State Bureau of Text Books Production & Curriculum Research

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Whether, letter rejecting application for centralised registration stating reasons therein is an appealable order? Held, yes

Facts:
The respondent’s request for centralised registration as service receiver in respect of GTA service was rejected by the department. CCE (Appeals) admitted appeal against the impugned letter of rejection and allowed centralised registration to the respondent on the ground that in respect of GTA service, the recipient of the service has to discharge tax liability and if the recipient maintains centralised accounting system in the head office, such office can be allowed to be registered with the department for discharging service tax liability.

The Revenue filed appeal against this order before Tribunal on two grounds viz. the letter rejecting respondent’s request for centralised registration is not an appealable order and therefore the appellate authority should not have entertained the appeal. Secondly, as per Rule 4(2) of the Service Tax Rules, only service providers are eligible for centralised registration subject to certain conditions and not service recipients.

Held
As regards the first ground, it is the settled position of law that if a letter conveys the ground of rejection and also the rejection, the same can be treated as an order eligible for appellate remedies. In Bhagwati Gases Ltd. vs. CCE 2008 (226) ELT 468 (Tri – Delhi) in a similar situation, this Tribunal held that “where the order impugned determines the right of the party or is likely to affect its rights, communication thereof cannot be said to be a communication simplicitor” and appeal against such communication should be maintainable. As regards the second ground that the respondent being a service receiver is not eligible for centralised registration, it was observed that it would defeat the objective of registration. The purpose of registration in indirect tax laws is to identify the taxpayer. In this particular case, the taxpayer or the person liable to pay tax is the receiver of the service and for making the payment of service tax, the respondent is required to get registered with the department. Hence there is no reason that the benefit of centralised registration cannot be granted, if the person satisfies the conditions for such centralised registration.

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2013-TIOL-1765-CESTAT-MUM Swapnashilp Travels vs. CCE. Nagpur & CCE., Nagpur vs. Swapnashilp Travels

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Whether payment on per kilometre basis attracts service tax under the category of rent a cab operator services?

Facts:
Appellant provided services of transportation of answer sheets from various district collection centres and delivered to Nagpur University and consideration was received on per kilometre basis. The lower authority held that the Appellant provided ”rent a cab operator’s services” and liable for service tax for the extended period also but restricted the penalty u/s. 78 upto 25%.

Held:
No evidence was provided by the Revenue that the Appellant was hired on monthly, weekly or daily basis and therefore the services of transportation of answer sheets could not be termed as “Rent a cab operator’s services”. Thus the demand as well as the penalty was set aside.

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2013 (32) STR 481 (Tri.-Bang.) Jumbo Mining Ltd. vs. CCE, Hyderabad

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Whether rebate claim can be rejected on the failure to mention details of exporter’s details on lorry receipts?

Facts:
Appellant, an exporter of goods, paid service tax on the transportation of goods from its mine to port and on stockyard rent and filed rebate claim. The claim was rejected for service tax on transportation on the ground that the exporter’s Invoice details were not mentioned on the lorry receipts which was in contravention to condition mentioned in the Notification No. 41/2007 ST as amended by Notification No. 3/2008 ST and further there was no co-relation between stockyard rent and export of goods.

Held:
Though the exporter’s invoice details were not mentioned on the Lorry receipts, the compliance with the conditions of the above Notifications could have been done by broad correlation of evidence of transportation with the service tax paid thereon and quantity exported and hence the Appellant was entitled to the rebate of service tax on transportation. For the rebate of service tax on the stockyard rent, it was held that, since the Appellant was unable to establish nexus between the input service (stockyard rent) and exported goods, the claim was not admissible. Thus claim was allowed partially.

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2013-TIOL-1805-CESTAT-DEL M/s Bansal Classes vs. Commissioner of Customs & Excise, Jaipur

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CENVAT credit of catering and photography services for encouraging students succeeded in coaching is inadmissible.

Facts:
The appellant provided commercial training and coaching services and availed input services of catering, photography, tent, maintenance & repair, rent for hiring examination hall and travelling expenses. The department contended to disallow the same and issued a show-cause notice demanding service tax along with interest and penalty.

Held:
Partly allowing the appeal, the Hon. Tribunal disallowed the CENVAT on photography services and catering services held that the said services cannot be said to have received in the course of providing the services as the same were used for encouraging the students who had already succeeded in the coaching.

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2013 (32) STR 577 (Tri.-Kol.) Karamchand Thapar & Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd. vs. C.S.T., Kolkata.

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Any services in connection with clearing and forwarding operations are covered by the definition of clearing and forwarding agent’s services. Mere inaction is not sufficient but some positive action with intent to evade payment of service tax should be present for invoking extended period of limitation. The burden to prove malafide intention is on the revenue.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in providing various services relating to movement of goods from collieries to clients at pre-defined destination. The demand with penalty was confirmed by the Commissioner considering the services to be clearing and forwarding agent services. Accordingly, the appeal was made on the following grounds:

• The branches billed from respective locations and they did not opt for centralised registration as there was no centralised accounting system but the accounts were merely consolidated. Therefore, territorial jurisdiction was challengeable. The appellants were engaged in supervision and liaisoning work with respect to loading of coal. Accordingly, they provided business auxiliary services of procurement of goods or services which were inputs for clients except two special clients; namely; for Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board (TNEB) at Paradip Port, the appellants provided composite services of cargo handling services and for Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB), the appellants had a pending at CESTAT, Mumbai.

• Relying on the clarification vide Circular F. No. B43/7/97-TRU dated 11-07-1997 it was contended that their services were not in the nature of clearing and forwarding agent’s services since at no point of time they took custody or possession of coal and the transaction of sale was directly between the purchaser and seller and the destination for delivery was also known to both the parties and the appellants had no role to play in any of the activities of clearing and forwarding.

• In case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs. Commr. Of Central Excise, Chennai 2006 (3) STR 321 (Tri.-LB), the Larger Bench had held that the words ‘directly’, ‘indirectly’ and ‘in any manner’ used in the definition of clearing and forwarding agent should not be read in isolation. Further that the decision of Coal handlers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE 2004 (171) ELT 191 (Tri.-Kol.) did not apply to them as it was based on Prabhat Zarda Factory (India) Ltd. vs. CCE, Patna 2002 (145) ELT 222 (Tri.) which was specifically overruled by the Larger Bench in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. decision (supra).

• The appellants received service charges from freight financing activity in the form of prepayment of railway freight under separate and independent contract and transport of goods by rail was covered by the service tax net only in the year 2009 and therefore was not subject to service tax.

• The case was barred by limitation as they had a bonafide belief as to non-taxability based on trade notice and legal opinions.

The department contested the appeal on the grounds that the point of jurisdiction was never raised in reply to SCN or before the adjudicating authority. Since it was a mixed question of law as well as facts and the facts were not determined at adjudication level, the appellants were not to be allowed to raise the point directly before Tribunal. In any case, the appellants had centralised accounting system and therefore, the Commissioner at Kolkata had full jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. Further, the words ‘directly’, ‘indirectly’ and “in any manner” employed made the gamut of definition very wide and it covered all services connected with clearing and forwarding operations.

Held:

The Tribunal observed and held that issue of jurisdiction could be raised at any stage of proceedings. However, since territorial jurisdiction is a mixed question of facts and law, the same should be raised before adjudicating authority to record findings on the facts. However, since the facts were not in dispute and were available on record, the Tribunal taking opportunity to deal with the issue observed that necessary data was provided by the appellants at Kolkata from time to time and consolidated profit and loss account and balance sheet were prepared at Kolkata and held that there was centralised accounting system and the option given for centralised registration was only for administrative convenience and to avoid overlapping of jurisdiction and conflicting views in assessment. Accordingly, it was held that the Commissioner at Kolkata had jurisdiction to decide the matter of all branches of the appellants. Referring Halsbury’s Laws England (Fourth Edn. – Vol. V), the Tribunal observed the scope of forwarding agent and concluded that there was no need to have custody or possession of goods to be a forwarding agent and the person acting as an agent for movement of goods can be regarded as forwarding agent. The Larger Bench in case of Larsen & Toubro (supra), had concurred with the width and amplitude of meaning of ‘directly’, ‘indirectly’ and “in any manner”, laid down in Prabhat Zarda Factory (Pvt.) Ltd.’s case (supra) and only had not agreed to the conclusions arrived at by the Bench of the facts of the relevant case. Therefore, principle laid down in Prabhat Zarda Factory (Pvt.) Ltd.’s case (supra) and followed later in Coal Handler’s case (supra) was absolutely valid. The instant matter being identical to Coal Handler’s case (supra) wherein it was concluded that even indirect services connected with clearing and forwarding operations i.e. services rendered for movement of coal would be clearing and forwarding services. The services mentioned in Circular and Trade Notice were illustrative and therefore, any service satisfying all ingredients of the definition as discussed in the Circular were covered under clearing and forwarding agent’s services. Freight financing was connected with clearing and forwarding operations and hence, should be chargeable to service tax. The amendment in section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 with effect from 10-09-2004 was significant and accordingly, relying on various decisions, it was held that mere inaction is not sufficient but some positive action with intent to evade payment of service tax should be present for invoking extended period of limitation and the burden to prove malafide intention is on the revenue. In absence of any evidence and reasoning by department and having regard to the facts of the case, it was observed that although the appellants were negligent while merely placing reliance on the Circular or Trade Notice, the receipts were recorded appropriately in the books of accounts and therefore, no attempt of suppression existed and the appellants were bonafide. Accordingly, extended period of limitation was not invokable.

With respect to certain computational issues on TNEB and MSEB contracts, the matter was remanded to the Commissioner with appropriate directions.

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