Subscribe to the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal Subscribe Now!

Return of income : Defective/invalid return : S. 140 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Return signed by company secretary : Defect curable : Opportunity to rectify defect should be given.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. Return of income : Defective/invalid return : S. 140 of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Return signed by company secretary :
    Defect curable : Opportunity to rectify defect should be given.


[CIT v. Bhiwani Synthetics Ltd., 318 ITR 177 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95, the assessee company had filed its
return of income on 30-11-1994 declaring a loss. The return was signed by the
general manager (finance) and the company secretary of the assessee. The
Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that since the return was not signed
by the managing director or a director as provided in S. 140(c) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, it was non est. The CIT(A) held that the defect
was a curable defect and an opportunity ought to have been given to the
assessee to rectify it. He, accordingly, directed the Assessing Officer to
give such an opportunity to the assessee. The Tribunal upheld the decision of
the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) We are of the view that on the facts of this case,
since there is nothing on record to suggest that the assessee has disowned
the return that was signed by the general manager (finance) of the assessee
and on the contrary, a power of attorney was given by the assessee to its
general manager (finance) for signing the return, it would have been
appropriate if an opportunity had been granted to the assessee to have the
return signed by the managing director or its director in accordance with
the directions given by the CIT(A).

(ii) There is nothing to suggest that any prejudice will
be caused to the Revenue if this direction is complied with.”


 

levitra

Exemption u/s.11 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Exemption cannot be denied on the ground that it is not a trust: Filing of Form No. 10 : Revised form can be filed before completing assessment.

New Page 1

Reported :


  1. Exemption u/s.11 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 :
    Exemption cannot be denied on the ground that it is not a trust: Filing of
    Form No. 10 : Revised form can be filed before completing assessment.

[CIT v. Simla Chandigarh Diocese Society, 318 ITR 96
(P&H)]

The assessee, a charitable society, claimed exemption
u/s.11 r.w. S. 12(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer
declined the claim on the ground that the assessee was a society and not a
trust. The Assessing Officer also raised objection that revised Form No. 10
was not furnished with the return. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The assessee could not be denied exemption u/s.11 of
the Act on the ground that it was not a trust but a society.

(ii) The Commissioner (Appeals) had observed that the
assessee modified Form No. 10 in the course of assessment proceedings. The
modified Form No. 10 has been rejected by the Assessing Officer on the
ground that there was no provision in the Act for revising Form No. 10. It
was held that there was no specific bar prohibiting the assessee from
modifying the figure of accumulation. Form No. 10 could be furnished before
the assessing authority completes the concerned assessment.”

 

levitra

Depreciation : S. 32 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2000-01 and 2001-02 : User of asset : Asset discarded and written off : Depreciation is allowable on WDV after reducing scrap value of asset discarded and written off.

New Page 1

 Reported :


  1. Depreciation : S. 32 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys.
    2000-01 and 2001-02 : User of asset : Asset discarded and written off :
    Depreciation is allowable on WDV after reducing scrap value of asset discarded
    and written off.

[CIT v. Yamaha Motor India (P) Ltd., 226 CTR 304
(Del.)]

In an appeal filed by the Revenue u/s.260A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, the following two questions were raised before the High
Court :

“(a) Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
(hereinafter ‘Tribunal’) was correct in law in directing the AO to recompute
the depreciation after reducing scrap value of the assets, which have been
discarded and written off in the books of account for the year under
consideration from the WDV of the block of assets ?

(b) Whether provisions of sub-clause (iii) to S. 32(1)
r/w. S. 43(6)(c)(B) are applicable to the present case when the assessee had
not complied with the primary conditions for eligibility of depreciation ?”

The Delhi High Court held as under :

“(i) The crux of the matter is : what is the meaning to
be ascribed to the expression ‘used for the purposes of the business’ as
found in S. 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The provisions of S. 32 pertain
to depreciation. The contention of the Revenue is that with respect to any
machinery for which depreciation is claimed u/s.32, the same cannot be
allowed unless such machinery is used in the business and since
discarded machinery is not used in the business, therefore, with respect to
the discarded machinery no depreciation can be allowed.

(ii) As long as the machinery is available for use,
though not actually used, it falls within the expression ‘used for the
purposes of the business’ and the assessee can claim the benefit of
depreciation.

(iii) No doubt, the expression used in S. 32 is ‘used for
the purposes of the business’. However, this expression has to be read
harmoniously with the expression ‘discarded’ as found in clause (iii) of
Ss.(1). Obviously, when a thing is discarded it is not used. Thus ‘use’ and
‘discarding’ are not in the same field and cannot stand together. However,
if a harmonious reading of the expressions ‘used for the purposes of the
business’ and ‘discarded’ is adopted, then it would show that ‘used for the
purposes of the business’ only means that the assessee has used the
machinery for the purposes of the business in earlier years. It is not
disputed that in the facts of the present case, the machinery in question
was in fact used in the previous year and depreciation was allowed on the
block of assets in the previous years. Taking therefore a realistic approach
and adopting a harmonious construction, the expression ‘used for the
purposes of the business’ as found in S. 32 when used with respect to
discarded machinery would mean that the user in the business is not in the
relevant financial year/previous year, but in the earlier financial years.
Any other interpretation would lead to an incongruous situation.

(iv) Therefore, the Tribunal was correct in law in
directing the AO to recompute depreciation after reducing the scrap value of
the assets which have been discarded and written off in the books of account
for the year under consideration from the WDV of the block of assets.”

levitra

Educational institution : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Society running various educational institutions : Object of society also to serve church and nation : Not a ground for rejection of approval for exemption.

New Page 1

Reported :

  1. Educational institution : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : Society running various educational institutions :
    Object of society also to serve church and nation : Not a ground for rejection
    of approval for exemption.

[Ewing Christian College Society v. CCIT, 318 ITR
160 (All.)]

The petitioner-society ran various educational institutions
in the State of UP and it was not for the purpose of making profit. Its
application for approval for exemption was rejected by the Chief Commissioner
on the ground that the purposes for which the society has been established
were religious in nature and consequently the society could not be said to
exist solely for the purpose of education.

On a writ petition filed by the petitioner, the Allahabad
High Court held as under :

“(i) Merely because the object of the petitioner-society
was also to serve the church and the nation, that would not mean that the
educational institution was not existing solely for educational purposes.

(ii) Thus the order passed by the Chief Commissioner
could not be sustained and was set aside. The Chief Commissioner was
directed to pass a fresh order.”

 

levitra

Charitable purpose : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Petitioner-foundation created for imparting, spreading and promoting knowledge, learning, education, etc. in fields related to profession of accountancy : Clearly falls in category

New Page 1

Reported :

 

  1. Charitable purpose : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : Petitioner-foundation created for imparting, spreading
    and promoting knowledge, learning, education, etc. in fields related to
    profession of accountancy : Clearly falls in category of institutions which
    are devoted to research and are of charitable nature : Petitioner entitled to
    exemption u/s.10(23C)(iv).

[ICAI Accounting Research Foundation v. DGIT
(Exemption),
226 CTR 27 (Del.)]

The petitioner-foundation was set up by the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), the main object of the petitioner being
to make it an academy for imparting, spreading and promoting knowledge,
learning, education and understanding in the various fields relating to
profession of accountancy, like accounting, auditing, fiscal laws and policy,
corporate and economic laws and policies, economics, financial management,
financial services, capital and money markets, management information and
capital systems, management consultancy services and allied disciplines. The
petitioner’s application for exemption u/s.10(23C)(iv) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 was rejected stating that the petitioner-foundation did not qualify for
exemption.

On a writ petition filed by the foundation the Delhi High
Court directed the Director General of I.T. (Exemption) to grant exemption to
the petitioner-foundation and held as under :

“(i) The objective of the petitioner-foundation would
fall within the expression ‘education’, as appearing in the definition
u/s.2(15).

(ii) On the basis of the activities of the foundation,
there is not even an iota of doubt that the petitioner-foundation is
involved in education and, thus, meets the description of ‘charitable
institution’.

(iii) Services provided to various Government bodies were
the research projects which were given to the petitioner-foundation having
regard to its expertise in this field. Therefore, these activities per se
would not bring out the petitioner-foundation out of the ambit of S. 2(15).
It can be said that the activities amounted to ‘advancement of an object of
general public utility’, which also appears in the definition of charitable
purpose in S. 2(15).

(iv) The only aspect, in this backdrop, which needs to be
considered is as to whether charging of amount from the MCD, KMC, etc. for
undertaking these research projects would make the activity commercial.
Merely because some remuneration was taken by the petitioner-foundation for
undertaking these projects would not alter the character of these objects,
which remained research and consultancy work. The important test is the
application of the amount received from those projects. It is nowhere
disputed that the receipts are utilised by the petitioner-foundation for the
advancement of its objectives. It is clear that most of the amount received
qua these projects was spent on the project and surplus, if any, is used for
advancement of the objectives for which the petitioner-foundation is
established.

(v) The amended definition of ’charitable purpose’ would
not alter this position. No doubt, proviso to this definition clarifies that
advancement of any other object of general public utility will not be
treated as charitable purpose if it involves the carrying on of any activity
in the nature of trade, commerce or business. However, what is not
appreciated by the respondent No. 1 is that merely on undertaking those
research projects at the instance of the Government/local bodies, the
essential character of the petitioner-foundation cannot be converted into
the one which carries on trade, commerce or business or activity of
rendering any service in relation to trade, commerce or business.

(vi) The impugned order of the respondent No. 1 is,
accordingly, set aside. Direction/mandamus is given to the respondent No. 1
to accord requisite exemption to the petitioner-foundation u/s.10(23C)(iv).”

 

levitra

Bad debts : Deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Disallowance u/s.14A : Exemption u/s.80HHC allowed : Deduction of bad debts cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.

New Page 1





Reported :

  1. Bad debts : Deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act,
    1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Disallowance u/s.14A : Exemption u/s.80HHC allowed :
    Deduction of bad debts cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.

[CIT v. Kings Exports, 318 ITR 100 (P&H)]

The assesse was engaged in manufacture and export of
engineering goods. The assessee’s claim for deduction of bad debts
u/s.36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was disallowed by the AO on the
ground that the assessee had claimed deduction u/s.80HHC and the claim for bad
debts would be hit by S. 14A of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim.

On appeal by the Revenue the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“U/s.80HHC and u/s.14A, the expenditure incurred from
export income could not be held to be for earning income which did not form
part of total income, which concept was dealt with u/s.10 of the Act. S.
80HHC deals with deduction of the element of profit from export from taxable
income. Therefore, the claim of bad debt could not be disallowed.”

 

levitra

Business expenditure : Disallowance u/s. 14A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : In the absence of nexus between exempt income and expenditure in question established by Revenue, the provisions of S. 14A cannot be applied.

New Page 1

 

Unreported :

  1. Business expenditure : Disallowance u/s. 14A of Income-tax
    Act, 1961 : In the absence of nexus between exempt income and expenditure in
    question established by Revenue, the provisions of S. 14A cannot be applied.


[CIT v. M/s. Hero Cycles Ltd. (P&H), ITA No. 331 of
2009 dated 4-11-2009]

The assesse is engaged in manufacturing of cycles and parts
of two-wheelers in multiple units. It earned dividend income, which is
exempted u/s. 10(34) and u/s.(35) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO made an
inquiry whether any expenditure was incurred for earning this income and as a
result of the said inquiry, addition of Rs.3,48,04,375 was made by way of
disallowance u/s.14A(3) of the Act. The Tribunal deleted the addition and
observed as under :

“(i) We find that the plea of the assessee that the
entire investments have been made out of the dividend proceeds, sale
proceeds, debenture redemption, etc., is borne out of record. One aspect
which is evident is that the interest income earned by the main unit exceeds
the expenditure by way of interest incurred by it, thus obviating the
application of S. 14A of the Act. Even with regard to the funds of the main
unit, the fund flow position explained shows that only the non-interest
bearing funds have been utilised for making the investment.

(ii) Thus, on facts we do not find any evidence to show
that the assessee has incurred interest expenditure in relation to earning
the tax exempt income in question. Therefore, merely because the assessee
has incurred interest expenditure on funds borrowed in the main unit, it
would not ipso-facto invite the disallowance u/s.14A, unless there is
evidence to show that such interest-bearing funds have been invested in the
investments which have generated the ‘tax exempt dividend income’.

(iii) As noted earlier, there is no nexus established by
the Revenue in this regard and therefore, on a mere presumption, the
provisions of S. 14A cannot be applied. In fact, in the absence of such
nexus, the entire addition made is required to be deleted. We accordingly
hold so.”

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon S.
14A(2) and Rule 8D(1)(b) to submit that even where the assessee claimed that
no expenditure had been incurred, the correctness of such claim could be
gone into by the AO and in the present case, the claim of the assessee that
no expenditure was incurred was found to be not acceptable by the AO and
thus disallowance was justified. We are unable to accept the submission.

(ii) In view of the finding reproduced above, it is clear
that the expenditure on interest was set off against the income from
interest and the investment in shares and funds were out of the dividend
proceeds. In view of this finding of fact, disallowance u/s.14A was not
sustainable.

(iii) Whether, in a given situation, any expenditure was
incurred which was to be disallowed, is a question of fact. The contention
of the Revenue that directly or indirectly some expenditure is always
incurred which must be disallowed u/s.14A and the impact of expenditure so
incurred cannot be allowed to be set off against the business income which
may nullify the mandate of S. 14A, cannot be accepted.

(iv) Disallowance u/s.14A requires finding of incurring
of expenditure. Where it is found that for earning exempt income, no
expenditure has been incurred, disallowance u/s.14A cannot stand. In the
present case finding on this aspect, against the Revenue, is not shown to be
perverse. Consequently, disallowance is not permissible.”


 

levitra

Income : Excess cash received at cash counters of bank : Liable to be repaid to the real owner : Not income of assessee.

New Page 2

6 Income : Excess cash
received at cash counters of bank : Liable to be repaid to the real owner : Not
income of assessee.


[CIT v. Bank of Rajasthan
Ltd.,
326 ITR 526 (Bom.)]

The assessee-bank claimed
that the excess cash received at the cash counter is liable to be repaid to the
real owner and therefore it cannot be treated as income of the assessee. The
Assessing Officer did not accept this contention and treated the excess cash as
income of the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal
held that the liability on account of excess cash received at the cash counters
of the bank represents the liability to pay the customers as and when they may
demand payment. The Tribunal, therefore held that it can not be considered as
income of the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Before the Tribunal
reliance was placed on the cash manual of the assessee which provides that the
bank has to make a record of the excess cash, this has to be considered as
liability of the bank and the collection is required to be handed back to the
real owner in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

(ii) The reasoning of the
Tribunal has not been demonstrated to suffer from any perversity.

(iii) The question raised
does not give rise to any substantial question of law.”

levitra

Income : Accrual of : Amount due to assessee in terms of royalty agreement : Dispute between parties and arbitration proceedings pending : No accrual of income : Assessment only on completion of arbitration proceedings.

New Page 2

5 Income : Accrual of :
Amount due to assessee in terms of royalty agreement : Dispute between parties
and arbitration proceedings pending : No accrual of income : Assessment only on
completion of arbitration proceedings.


[FGP Ltd. v. CIT, 326
ITR 444 (Bom.)]

The assessee had a royalty
agreement with one M/s. UPT, under which certain amounts were payable to the
assessee. The assessee company had not received any amount as UPT had denied
that any amount was due and payable by it to the assessee-company and
arbitration proceedings were pending. The Assessing Officer added the amount to
the total income of the assessee holding that the income has accrued. The
Tribunal upheld the addition.

On appeal by the assessee,
the Bombay High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The real income of
the assessee can be assessed and the test before the income can be taxed is
whether there is real accrual of income.

(ii) There was no real
accrual of income. There was dispute between the parties which was pending in
arbitration during the assessment year. The income received by the assessee
would be liable to be assessed only after passing of an award.”

levitra

Charitable purpose : Registration u/s.12A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Rejection on the ground that amended deed not produced : Amended deed is not a pre-requisite condition : Matter remanded.

New Page 2

4 Charitable purpose :
Registration u/s.12A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Rejection on the ground that
amended deed not produced : Amended deed is not a pre-requisite condition :
Matter remanded.


[CIT v. R. M. S. Trust,
326 ITR 310 (Mad.)]

The assessee, a charitable
trust, came into existence on December 1, 1995. On 10-3-2006 the assessee-trust
filed application for registration u/s.12A. The application was belated by more
than 10 years for which condonation petition was filed stating that the delay
was due to ignorance of law. The Commissioner of Income-tax noticed that the
requisite clause indicating that any amendment to the trust deed would be
carried out after obtaining approval from the Commissioner of Income-tax, has
not been incorporated, and on that ground directed the assessee-trust to file an
amended deed duly registered along with notes on the activities of the trust
with regard to various expenses debited in the income and expenditure account.
The assessee did not respond to the letter. Therefore, the Commissioner held
that the assessee-trust was not entitled to registration u/s.12AA and exemption
u/s.80G(vi) of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The amended trust
deed is not a pre-requisite as required by the Commissioner and it is also not
a pre-requisite condition for registering the applicant as a trust as per the
provisions of the Act. The requisition made by the Commissioner is an
extra-statutory requisition.

(ii) Hence, the Tribunal,
by reason of the impugned order, had set aside the rejection made by the
Commissioner and remitted to decide the issue afresh after affording a
reasonable opportunity of being heard.

(iii) We do not find any
reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal.”

levitra

Charitable or religious trust : Exemption u/s.11 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Additional condition by way of Explanation to S. 11(2) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2003 is to apply only to accumulations in excess of 15% u/s. 11(2) and not to accumulation

New Page 2

3 Charitable or religious
trust : Exemption u/s.11 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Additional
condition by way of Explanation to S. 11(2) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2003 is to apply
only to accumulations in excess of 15% u/s. 11(2) and not to accumulations up to
15% u/s.11(1)(a).


[DIT Exemption v. Bagri
Foundation,
192 Taxman 309 (Del.)]

The assessee was a trust
duly registered u/s.12AA and duly recognised u/s.80G(5)(vi) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. For the relevant year, i.e., A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee had
shown certain gross income and deducted therefrom the amount applied for
charitable purposes by way of donation to another charitable trust, BLB, as
corpus donation and to others. The source of the amount over and above the
income of the year was the accumulation of income of the past. The AO added the
amount of donations to the income of the assessee, holding that owing to the
Explanation appended to S. 11(2) with effect from the A.Y. 2003-04, any donation
made out of income accumulated or set apart during the period of accumulation or
thereafter to any trust or institution registered u/s.12AA was liable to be
added in the income of the donor-trust. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals)
deleted the addition holding the donation by the assessee to BLB trust was made
out of excess of income over expenditure and not out of amount accumulated
u/s.11(1)(a). The Tribunal affirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) It is clear from S.
11(1)(a) that the income applied for charitable purposes is not to be included
in the total income for the relevant year. In CIT v. Shri Ram Memorial
Foundation,
(2004) 269 ITR 35/140 Taxman 263 (Delhi), the Court has held
that when a donor-trust, which is itself a charitable and religious trust,
donates its income to another trust, the provisions of S. 11(1)(a) can be said
to have been met by such donor-trust and the donor-trust can be said to have
applied its income for religious and charitable purposes, notwithstanding the
fact that the donation is subject to a condition that the donee-trust will
treat the donation as towards its corpus and can only utilise the accruing
income from the donated corpus for religious and charitable purposes.

(ii) Explanation to S.
11(2) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2003, provides that the amount accumulated cannot be
donated to another trust. The Explanation to S. 11(2) is nothing but an
additional condition attached to accumulation in excess of 15% permitted
u/s.11(2). It cannot be held as a condition on accumulation up to 15% as
provided for in S. 11(1)(a) also. There is no rational classification for
imposing the restriction as contained in the Explanation to the accumulation
up to 15% also when there is no such restriction to donating the entire income
of a year to another charitable trust.

(iii) If the Legislature
intended to completely ban/discourage inter se donation between trusts,
it would have changed the position as existing in law, as noticed in the case
of Shri Ram Memorial Foundation (supra). The Legislature did not do so.

(iv) Even after the
insertion of the Explanation, if a trust donates its entire income for a year
to another charitable trust, it would still be entitled to exemption
u/s.11(1)(a). It defies logic as to why such donations cannot be permitted out
of 15% accumulation permitted u/s.11(1)(a) itself.

(v) There is, however,
rationale for imposing the restriction as contained in the Explanation to
accumulations in excess of 15%. Such accumulations, but for the conditions
imposed in S. 11(2) and in the Explanation aforesaid, would have been liable
to be taxed. One of the conditions in S. 11(2)(a) is the purpose for which
accumulation in excess of 15% being made is to be notified; another condition
is of the accumulation being permitted for a period not exceeding 5 years; yet
another condition is as to the modes in which the accumulation can be
invested. There are no such restrictions on accumulation u/s.11(1)(a).

(vi) The scheme of the
Section indicates that the additional condition by way of the aforesaid
Explanation is intended to apply only to accumulations in excess of 15%
u/s.11(2) and not to accumulations up to 15% u/s.11(1)(a). The Explanation is
not found to be intended to take away something from the accumulation up to
15% permitted without any condition whatsoever u/s.11(1)(a).

(vii) It also followed
that even if the donations by the assessee were to be out of accumulations
from previous years and not out of surplus reserves, the same would still not
be liable to be included in the total income as assessed by the Assessing
Officer and the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal would
still be upheld. It was nobody’s case that the said accumulations were beyond
the accumulation of 15% permitted in S. 11(1)(a).”

levitra

Charitable purpose : Exemption u/s.11 : S. 11, S. 12A and S. 13(1)(d) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Interest-free loan by assessee-society to another society : Loan neither ‘investment’, nor ‘deposit’ : Both societies having similar objects, re

New Page 2

2 Charitable purpose :
Exemption u/s.11 : S. 11, S. 12A and S. 13(1)(d) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y.
2005-06 : Interest-free loan by assessee-society to another society : Loan
neither ‘investment’, nor ‘deposit’ : Both societies having similar objects,
registered u/s.12A and approved u/s.80G : Loan later repaid : Assessee entitled
to exemption u/s.11.


[DIT (Exemption) v. Acme
Educational Society,
(Del.)]

For the A.Y. 2005-06, the
Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee-society for exemption
u/s.11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the assessee-society had
given a loan of Rs.90,50,000 to another educational society, whose president was
the brother of the president of the assessee-society. The Assessing Officer held
that there was a violation of S. 13(1)(d) read with S. 11(5) of the Act. The
Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim and held that there was no
violation of S. 13(1)(d) read with S. 11(5) of the Act, as both societies had
similar objects and that the Assessing Officer had not brought anything on
record to show that the advance of Rs.90,50,000 was a ‘deposit’ or ‘investment’.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

In appeal by the Revenue,
the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) The interest-free
loan of Rs.90,50,000 given by the assessee-society to another society did
not violate S. 13(1)(d) read with S. 11(5) of the Act, as the loan was
neither an ‘investment’, nor a ‘deposit’. Moreover both societies had
similar objects and were registered u/s.12A of the Act and had approvals
u/s.80G.

(ii) The fact that the
loan was interest-free and had been subsequently returned was also
significant.”



levitra

Appellate Tribunal : Rectification u/s.254(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Appellate order u/s.254(1) gets merged in rectification order only on issues raised in rectification application and not on other issues decided by Tribunal in appeal,

New Page 2

1 Appellate Tribunal :
Rectification u/s.254(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Appellate
order u/s.254(1) gets merged in rectification order only on issues raised in
rectification application and not on other issues decided by Tribunal in appeal,
Appellate order u/s.254(1) survives and is available for rectification again on
any other issue on an application filed by either of parties : Once
rectification application filed by one of parties is considered and decided by
Tribunal rightly or wrongly, another rectification application on same issue is
not maintainable.


[CIT v. Aiswarya Trading
Co.,
192 Taxman 385 (Ker.)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95, while
deciding the appeal, the Tribunal did not consider one of the grounds raised by
the assessee pertaining to the levy of interest u/s.220(2) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. Therefore, the assessee filed rectification application before the
Tribunal to rectify the Appellate order, which was allowed by the Tribunal. The
Department thereafter filed a rectification application for rectifying the order
issued by the Tribunal in the assessee’s rectification application. The Tribunal
held that the Department’s rectification application was on the very same issue
agitated by the assessee in its rectification application and allowed by the
Tribunal and, therefore, it was not maintainable u/s.254(2).

On appeal, the Revenue
contended that by virtue of the merger of the rectification order in the
Appellate order, the application filed u/s.254(2) by the Revenue was still
maintainable.

The Kerala High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) The second
application on the very same issue is not maintainable before the Tribunal.
In fact, merger applies only on issues decided in rectification proceedings
and the Tribunal’s order issued u/s.254(1) will remain unaffected on all
matters other than those covered by the rectification order issued
u/s.254(2). In other words, even after the Tribunal rectifies the Appellate
order u/s.254(2) on any issue raised, still the original order can be
rectified on any other issue decided by the Tribunal.

(ii) However, if the
rectification application filed by one of the parties is allowed or rejected
by the Tribunal, the very same issue cannot be agitated in another
rectification application by the opposite party. If this is done and allowed
to be entertained by the Tribunal, then what happens is that the Tribunal
gets an opportunity to review its own order for which it has no powers under
the statute. Therefore, once the rectification application filed by one of
the parties is considered and decided by the Tribunal rightly or wrongly,
another rectification application on the same issue is not maintainable
against the order issued by the Tribunal u/s.254(2).

(iii) In the instant
case, the question of liability for interest payable by the assessee u/s.
220(2) rightly or wrongly was decided by the Tribunal in the rectification
application filed by the assessee in its favour and, therefore, the
Department could not seek to rectify the very same order again u/s.254(2) by
filing another application.

(iv) Consequently, the
order of the Tribunal was to be upheld.”



levitra

Valuation of closing stock : Change in method of valuation as per AS 2 : Resultant variation in income : Not taxable.

New Page 2

11 Valuation of closing stock : A.Y.
2001-02 : Change in the method of valuation as per Accounting Standard 2, which
is mandatory : Resultant variation in income : Not taxable.


[CIT v. George Oakes Ltd., 303 ITR 357 (Mad.)]

For the A.Y. 2001-02, the Assessing Officer made an addition
representing the reduction of profit due to change in the method of valuing the
closing stock. In the relevant year the closing stock was valued in accordance
with the Accounting Standard 2, which is mandatory. The Tribunal deleted the
addition on the ground that that the change of accounting method was bona
fide
.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) When the change of accounting method is bona fide
and is recognised in accounting principles, the resultant variation in income
cannot be forced to be taxed upon the assessee.

(ii) Being compulsory, the company had adopted the
Accounting Standard (AS-2) as per the guidelines prescribed by the ICAI. There
was a specific finding that the assessee valued its opening stock in one way
and the closing stock in another method, during the relevant year when the
Accounting Standard (AS-2) had come into effect in the earlier year. The
change in the accounting method had not been found to have been made with a
mala fide
intention. Such a change in the method of accounting was bona
fide
and was made mandatory by the ICAI to be followed in the preparation
of financial accounts. Under such circumstances, in the year of change, some
discrepancy was bound to happen in the profitability of the company as
compared to the previous year. However, in succeeding years, there would not
be any discrepancy on this account.

(iii) The reasons given by the Tribunal were based on valid materials and evidence, and did not warrant any interference.”

levitra

TDS : Works contract : S. 194C : Purchase of packing material carrying printed work : Essentially a sale/purchase : Not a works contract : Purchaser not liable to deduct tax at source.

New Page 2

10 TDS : Works contract : S. 194C of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Purchase of packing material carrying
printed work : Essentially a sale/purchase : Not a works contract : Purchaser
not liable to deduct tax at source.


[CIT v. Dy. Chief Accounts Officer, Markfed, Khanna,
304 ITR 17 (P&H)]

The assessee had purchased printed packing material, but did
not deduct tax at source on the payment therefor. The Assessing Officer was of
the view that the transaction was a works contract. Therefore, he levied penalty
and interest for not deducting tax at source u/s.194C of the Income-tax Act,
1961. The Tribunal deleted the penalty and the interest.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) There was no dispute that the main purpose of the
assessee in buying packing material was to obtain goods for the purpose of
packing its finished products. The factum of such packing material carrying
some printed work could only be regarded as the work executed by the supplier
incidental to the sale to the assessee. The fact of some printing being done
as a part of supply was of no consequence to the contract being essentially of
a sale of chattel. The predominant object underlying the contracts was
sale/purchase of goods and the only intention of the assessee was to buy
packing material.

(ii) Admittedly, the raw material for the manufacturing of
such packing material was not supplied by the assessee. Thus, it was a case of
sale and not a contract for carrying out any work.

(iii) The purchase of particular printed packing material
by the assessee was a contract for sale and outside the purview of S. 194C.”

 


levitra

Investment allowance : S. 32A : Dumpers, tippers and hydraulic excavators are construction equipment vehicles, not road transport vehicles : Eligible for investment allowance

New Page 2

8 Investment allowance : S. 32A of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1992-93 : Dumpers, tippers
and hydraulic excavators are construction equipment vehicles and not road
transport vehicles : Eligible for investment allowance.


[CIT v. Gotan Lime Stone Khanij Udyog, 170 Taxman
442 (Raj.)]

The assessee was engaged in the business of running
hydraulic excavators and tippers for cement companies on hire basis by
realising rent for operation of the same. For the A.Ys. 1989-90, 1990-91 and
1992-93, its claim for investment allowance on the hydraulic excavators and
tippers was declined by the Assessing Officer on the ground that they were
road transport vehicles and, moreover, the same were not used by the assessee
for its own business. The Commissioner(A) and the Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989, the dumpers,
tippers and hydraulic excavators are construction equipment vehicles within
the definition of Rule 2(ca) of the 1989 Rules and are non-transport
vehicles by virtue of Explanation attached to this definition, and cannot be
categorised as road transport vehicles for the purpose of entitlement of
investment allowance u/s.32A.

(ii) The construction equipment vehicles like dumpers,
tippers and hydraulic excavators are not road transport vehicles and profit
gained out of it by letting them out on hire basis to a cement producing
industrial undertaking could not debar them from claiming investment
allowance u/s.32A.”

Penalty : Concealment of income : S. 271(1)(c) : Estimated addition : No evidence of concealment of income : Penalty could not be imposed

New Page 2

9 Penalty : Concealment of income : S.
271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1992-93 : Estimated addition : No
evidence of concealment of income : Penalty could not be imposed.


[CIT v. Sangrur Vanaspati Mills Ltd., 303 ITR 53
(P&H)]

For the A.Y. 1992-93, the assessee had filed return of
income disclosing income of Rs.65,18,970. The Assessing Officer rejected the
accounts, estimated the sales and made an addition of Rs.66,16,865. The
Assessing Officer also imposed penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 for concealment of income. The Tribunal deleted the penalty on the ground
that there was no conclusive evidence that sales estimated by the Assessing
Officer were made outside the books of account.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
held that the Tribunal was justified in cancelling the penalty.

 


levitra

Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Separate accounts maintained for export sales and domestic sales : Deduction not to be on basis of total turnover of all business : Assessee entitled to deduction fully on export

New Page 2

6 Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Separate accounts maintained for export
sales and domestic sales : Deduction not to be on basis of total turnover of all
business : Assessee entitled to deduction fully on export profits.


[CIT v. M. Gani and Co., 301 ITR 381 (Mad.)]

The assessee was a manufacturer of garments and fancy items
and an exporter. For the A.Y. 2001-02 the assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHC
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the export turnover ignoring the results of
domestic turnover. The Assessing Officer considered the composite turnover
comprised of both export turnover and domestic turnover and recomputed the
deduction u/s. 80HHC. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“The assessee having maintained separate books of account
for export business and domestic business, it was entitled to deduction
u/s.80HHC of the Act fully on the export profit.”

 


levitra

Income : Dividend : In whose hands to be taxed : A sold shares to B : Change in ownership of shares not registered : Income from dividend assessable in the hands of A and not in the hands of B

New Page 2

7 Income : Dividend : In whose hands to be
taxed : A.Y. 1994-95 : A sold shares to B : Change in ownership of shares not
registered : Income from dividend assessable in the hands of A and not in the
hands of B.


[CIT v. Aatur Holdings P. Ltd., 302 ITR 92 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95, the Assessing Officer made an addition
to the total income of the assessee as dividend income. The CIT(A) found that
the shares were not registered in the name of the assessee and deleted the
addition holding that the dividend income had to be received by the registered
share holders only. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Merely because a person may have purchased or been in
receipt of shares, in the absence of the shares being registered in his name
in the books of account of the company, such a person is not entitled to
receive the dividend. The dividend has to be paid by the company in the name
of registered shareholders and it is the registered shareholders alone who
can claim dividend u/s.27 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act,
1956.

(ii) Nothing was brought to show that under the provisions
of the Companies Act or the provisions of Securities Contracts (Regulation)
Act, 1956, there were any other standard or statutory rules under the
Income-tax Act by which dividend could be taxed in the hands of the assessee.
Moreover, the burden of proving that an amount received in the year of
account was taxable lies on the Department.”

 


 


levitra

KVSS : A.Y. 1993-94 : On 29-12-1998, the assessee AOP filed KVSS application in respect of appeal pending before Tribunal on basis of tax dues of Rs.24,04,600 : Rejection of application on ground that tax dues have been adjusted on 30-11-1998 against refu

New Page 1

 

Unreported :

  1. KVSS : A.Y. 1993-94 : On 29-12-1998, the assessee AOP filed
    KVSS application in respect of appeal pending before Tribunal on basis of tax
    dues of Rs.24,04,600 : Rejection of application on ground that tax dues have
    been adjusted on 30-11-1998 against refund in case of a member of AOP :
    Adjustment of tax dues and rejection of KVSS application invalid.

[M/s. Asia Corporation and Ors. v. CIT and Ors. (Bom.),
W.P. Nos. 782 and 783 of 1999, dated 14-9-2009]

Pending an appeal before the Tribunal for the A.Y. 1993-94,
on the basis of the tax dues of Rs.24,04,600, the assessee AOP had filed an
application under KVSS on 29-12-1998. The application was rejected by the
Commissioner on 24-2-1999 on the ground that there are no tax dues as on
30-11-1998, since in respect of one of the members of the AOP, namely,
Petitioner No. 1, refund had been ordered by the Assessing Officer for the A.Y.
1997-98 and that refund had been adjusted on 30-11-1998 against the dues of
the AOP.

The members of the AOP filed two writ petitions, one
challenging the adjustment of refund and the other challenging the rejection
of the KVSS application. The Bombay High Court allowed both the petitions and
held as under :

“(i) The grievance of the petitioner is that the order of
adjustment was passed without complying with the mandatory requirements of
S. 245 of the Income-tax Act. Our attention is invited to the provisions
which mandate that the refund can be adjusted against the dues of the
persons to whom the refund is due after giving intimation in writing to such
persons of the action proposed to be taken under the Section. It is
submitted that no notice as required u/s. 245 was served on the petitioner
proposing to make adjustment. This it is submitted would render adjustment
illegal, and consequently the order making adjustment has to be set aside.
Reliance for that purpose is placed on the judgment of this Court in
Suresh Jain v. A. N. Shaikh,
165 ITR 151 (Bom.) which was confirmed by
the Division Bench in A. N. Shaikh v. S. B. Jain, 165 ITR 86 (Bom.).

(ii) After considering the language of the Section and
the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, we find no reason to
take a different view than the view taken by the Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court, namely, failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of S. 245,
would result in the adjustment made becoming illegal.

(iii) As the application under KVSS was rejected solely
on the ground that there were no dues pending, and once in W.P. No. 783 of
1999 the order of adjustment passed on 30-11-1998 has been set aside,
consequently we will have to set aside the order under KVSS dated 24-2-1999
and consequently this petition will have to be allowed.”

 

levitra

Revision : S. 263 : Commissioner should consider explanation offered by assessee and not set aside assessment order for consideration by AO

New Page 1

9 Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1992-93 :
Commissioner should consider explanation offered by assessee in response to
notice and decide the question : He is not to set aside the assessment order for
consideration of the explanation by the AO.


[Smt. Leela Choudhury v. CIT, 167 Taxman 1 (Gau.)]

For the A.Y. 1992-93, the assessment of the assessee was
completed u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Commissioner found that
the Assessing Officer had not made enquiry as regards the investment in the
house property. Therefore the Commissioner issued a show-cause notice to the
assessee in exercise of his power u/s.263. The assessee contended that the house
property in question was owned by her and the investments made therein from her
own sources. She submitted the yearly investments made by her in the house
property in question along with her return for the assessment year in question,
balance sheets for the period 31-3-1988 to 31-3-1992, showing the position of
her assets and liabilities; and the details of the funds available with the
assessee. The Commissioner, after considering the explanation of the assessee
and documents brought on record, by his order dated 1-11-1996, directed the
Assessing Officer to examine the matter in proper manner and complete the
assessment in accordance with law.

The Gauhati High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
assessee challenging the revision order passed by the Commissioner u/s.263 of
the Act and held as under :

“(i) The foundation for the exercise of the power being the
formation of an opinion or conclusion, there is no escape from the view that
the Commissioner must record his conclusion in the matter before setting aside
an order of assessment in exercise of the powers conferred u/s.263. It will
again be futile to embark upon any discussion as to the ‘intensity’ or
‘strength’ of the conclusion that must be reached by the Commissioner before
setting aside an assessment u/s.263, as the answer to the said question would
really depend upon the facts that may be confronting the Commissioner in any
given case. The position can be best resolved by saying that, in certain
situations, the opinion or conclusion recorded would be the final opinion,
while in other situation, it may be ‘less than final’. What would be necessary
is to take note of the fact that there has to be an opinion that the
assessment which has been set aside is, indeed, erroneous and prejudicial to
the interest of the Revenue. Furthermore, the power u/s.263 being
quasi-judicial, such conclusion must be reached after hearing the assessee,
which is mandated by the statute itself and after recording the reasons for
the conclusions reached, a requirement, imposition of which would be
consistent with the well-settled principles for exercise of quasi-judicial
powers.

(ii) It could be noticed from the impugned order of the
Commissioner that the Commissioner had not recorded any opinion that the order
of assessment of the assessee for the A.Y. 1992-93 was erroneous and
prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The said opinion was recorded in
the show-cause notice issued to the assessee and the same must be understood
to be a highly rebuttable view. Such view/opinion was required to be recorded
after hearing the assessee and after holding the necessary enquiry.

(iii) On receipt of the show-cause notice the assessee
submitted an elaborate reply laying material before the Commissioner to show
that sufficient proof of her income was laid before the Assessing Officer to
enable the said authority to come to the conclusion that the investments in
the house property were made from the known sources of income of the assessee.
The said materials were in the form of balance sheets and details of the funds
available to the assessee from time to time. In the above facts, the assessee
contended that the assessment order in question was not erroneous and
prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

(iv) The Commissioner, on receipt of the reply of the
assessee, could not have ignored the same. Rather, it was incumbent on the
Commissioner to consider the explanations offered and on that basis to record
his opinion/conclusion as to whether he still considered the assessment order
in question to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue
and, if so, reasons therefor. The Commissioner did not do so. Instead, in its
order, the Commissioner had recorded that the assessee had filed a written
submission giving an exhaustive explanation and enclosing copies of various
deeds, certificates, etc., which were required to be verified in detail. The
Commissioner, in the above facts, set aside the assessment order and directed
the Assessing Officer to make a fresh assessment after examining the
submissions and contentions advanced by the assessee and after due scrutiny of
the documents adduced.

(v) The course of action adopted by the Commissioner was
clearly impermissible in law in the absence of a finding that on consideration
of the explanation submitted and for reasons shown, the assessment had to be
treated to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.
Unfortunately, the Commissioner did not do so, which omission would have the
effect of rendering the impugned order legally fragile.

(vi) In view of the above, the instant writ petition was to
be allowed.”


levitra

Refund : S. 119, S. 240 and S. 244A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1998-99 and 1999-00 : Refund payable consequent on appeal : Application not necessary : Assessee entitled to interest on refund : Chief Commissioner has no power to deny interest on groun

New Page 1

Reported :

34 Refund : S. 119, S. 240 and S. 244A of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Ys. 1998-99 and 1999-00 : Refund payable consequent on appeal :
Application not necessary : Assessee entitled to interest on refund : Chief
Commissioner has no power to deny interest on ground of delay in filing revised
return.

[S. Thigarajan and ors. v. ACIT, 322 ITR 581 (Kar.)]

In respect of the A.Ys. 1998-99 and 1999-00, the Deputy
Commissioner (TDS) held that the shares allotted to the assessee employees were
perquisites and tax had to be deducted on their value. Therefore, the employer
deducted tax and remitted it to the Department, and issued revised Form No. 16
to the assessee employees for claiming credit for the deduction. This was
followed by the assessee filing revised returns, though beyond the time
stipulated u/s.139. The order of the Deputy Commissioner was reversed by the
Tribunal. The Assistant Commissioner gave effect to the order of the Tribunal
and directed the assesses to claim credit of the TDS by filing Form No. 16, as
the employer was not entitled to the Refund of TDS. The assesses filed revised
return with a request to refund the TDS amount. The assesses also filed
applications to condone the delay in preferring the revised returns. In exercise
of the jurisdiction u/s.119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Chief
Commissioner condoned the delay, but declined admissible interest on the ground
that the claims were belated and the petitioners had forgone their claims.

The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition filed by
the assessee petitioners held as under :

“(i) The first and the second revised returns along with
the application to condone the delay in filing the same, were rendered
infructuous, by the law declared in the matter of allotment of shares to the
employees, not being a perquisite, attracting TDS. Hence, the question of
exercise of jurisdiction u/s.119(2)(b) of the Act did not arise. The order of
the Chief Commissioner was arbitrary, without jurisdiction and illegal and as
a consequence the orders of the Assistant Commissioner, giving effect to the
orders of the Chief Commissioner were unsustainable. They were liable to be
quashed.

(ii) Where a refund is due to the assessee consequent on an
Appellate Order, an obligation is cast on the Revenue u/s.240, to effect the
refund without the assessee having to claim it. U/s.244A, the Revenue is bound
to pay interest at one-half percent on the amount of refund.

(iii) It is no doubt true that the Revenue had the benefit
of the monies belonging to the petitioners, up to the date of refund, and
there are a catena of decisions of the Apex Court over payment of compounded
interest on refund, which the petitioners are entitled to press into service.
Without, however going into the merits or demerits of the quantum of interest
or compounding either quarterly or half-yearly, the request of interest at 18%
per annum compounded monthly, is kept open for consideration by the first
respondent, to be decided within a period of four weeks from today and effect
payment immediately thereafter.”

levitra

Co-operative society : Deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 1995-96 : Society engaged in procuring raw silk and marketing to its members: Interest received from members for supplying materials on credit : Entitled to deduction.

New Page 1

  1. Co-operative society : Deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of I.
    T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 1995-96 : Society engaged in procuring raw silk and
    marketing to its members: Interest received from members for supplying
    materials on credit : Entitled to deduction.



 


[CIT vs. Tamil Nadu Co-operative Silk Producers Ltd.;
311 ITR 224 (Mad)].

The assessee was a cooperative society engaged in the
business of procuring raw silk and twisted silk and marketing it to its
members. The assessee received interest from its members in respect of
material supplied on credit. For the A. Y. 1995-96 the Assessing Officer
rejected the claim of the assessee that the interest so received from the
members is deductible u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The
Assessing Officer held that the activity of the society in procuring and
supplying raw silk and twisted silk on credit to its members could not be
considered as “carrying on the business of banking or providing credit
facilities within the meaning of section 80P(2)(a)(i)”. The Tribunal allowed
the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held that the assessee co-operative society was
eligible for the benefit of section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act in respect of the
interest received from its members for supplying the materials on credit.

levitra

KVSS 1998 : Rectification u/s.154 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1993-94 : During the pendency of appeal before the Tribunal the assessee preferred an application under KVSS 1998 : After issue of certificate under KVSS a rectification order demanding addi

New Page 1

Reported :

33 KVSS 1998 : Rectification u/s.154 of Income-tax Act, 1961
: A.Y. 1993-94 : During the pendency of appeal before the Tribunal the assessee
preferred an application under KVSS 1998 : After issue of certificate under KVSS
a rectification order demanding additional interest u/s.234B cannot be validly
made.

[CIT v. Goel Lottery Centre, 323 ITR 262 (All.)]

During the pendency of appeal before the Tribunal for the A.Y.
1993-94, the assessee preferred an application under KVSS 1998. Pursuant thereto
the designated authority issued certificate u/s.90 of the KVSS 1998. Thereafter,
on 31-3-2000 the Deputy Commissioner passed an order of rectification u/s.154 of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 and raised an additional demand of interest u/s.234B.
According to him the demand of interest calculated earlier was low. The
Commissioner (Appeals) set aside the order and this was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) In view of the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act,
1998, which lays down the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, it is apparent that the
order passed u/s.90(1) determining the sum payable under the Scheme shall be
conclusive in respect of all the matters stated therein and no matter covered
by such order shall be reopened in any other proceeding under the direct tax
enactment or indirect tax enactment or under any other law for the time being
in force. It further contemplates that only in a case where the certificate is
found to be false, the designated authority at any stage can withdraw the
same.

(ii) After the issue of the certificate u/s.90 of the KVSS
1998, the assessing authority had no authority to sit over the certificate.
The rectification was not permissible.”

levitra

Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Computation : Adjustment of brought forward losses and depreciation set off in earlier years : Only the losses of the years beginning from the initial assessment year ar

New Page 1

Reported :

32 Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Computation : Adjustment of brought forward losses
and depreciation set off in earlier years : Only the losses of the years
beginning from the initial assessment year are to be brought forward and not the
losses of the earlier year which have been already set off against other income
of the assessee.

[Velayudhaswamy Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. v. ACIT, 231
CTR 368 (Mad.)]

For the A.Y. 2005-06, the assessee had claimed a deduction of
Rs.1,70,76,945 u/s.80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer
disallowed the claim on the ground that the eligible income is a negative
figure. CIT(A) allowed the claim and held that since the A.Y. 2005-06 is the
initial assessment year, unabsorbed depreciation and the losses of earlier
years, which had already been absorbed, cannot be notionally carried forward and
taken into consideration for computing deduction u/s.80-IA. The Tribunal
reversed the order of the CIT(A) and restored the order of the Assessing
Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Losses and depreciation of the years earlier to the
initial assessment year which have already been absorbed against profits of
other businesses cannot be notionally brought forward and set off against the
profits of the eligible business for computing the deduction u/s.80-IA.”

levitra

Depreciation : Business expenditure : S. 32 and S. 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Closure of business due to riots : Closure for reasons beyond control of assessee : Assessee entitled to depreciation and business expenditure.

New Page 1

Reported :

30 Depreciation : Business expenditure : S. 32 and S. 37 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Closure of business due to riots : Closure
for reasons beyond control of assessee : Assessee entitled to depreciation and
business expenditure.

[CIT v. Blend Well Bottles P. Ltd., 323 ITR 18 (Kar.)]

The assessee was engaged in the manufacture and sale of
Indian-made foreign liquor. In the financial year ending 31-3-1994 the assessee
had not carried on the manufacturing activities as the business was closed on
account of local problems. The Assessing Officer therefore disallowed the claim
for depreciation for the A.Y. 1994-95. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim
and held that the assessee is entitled to depreciation and business expenditure.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The business premises of the assessee were situated in
Punjab. On account of riots and other activities in the place, where the
factory of the assessee was situated, the assessee was forced to close down
the activity till peace was restored in the locality. This fact was not
disputed by the Revenue.

(ii) If for reasons which were beyond the control of the
assessee, its business activities were closed, such a closure could not be
treated as a closure with an intention to close the business once for all and
such closure had to be treated as an act of God or vis major. The assessee
would be entitled to claim depreciation as well as business expenditure u/s.32
and u/s.37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, respectively.”

levitra

Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Trial production in A.Y. 1998-99 and commercial production in A.Y. 1999-00 : Therefore initial assessment year is the A.Y. 1999-00 in which there was commercial producti

New Page 1

Reported :

31 Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Trial production in A.Y. 1998-99 and commercial
production in A.Y. 1999-00 : Therefore initial assessment year is the A.Y.
1999-00 in which there was commercial production and not the A.Y. 1998-99 in
which there was only trial production : Therefore, the assessee is entitled to
100% deduction u/s.80-IA in the A.Y. 2003-04.

[CIT v. Nestor Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 231 CTR 337
(Del.)]

In the Goa unit of the assessee’s industrial undertaking
there was trial production in the A.Y. 1998-99 and the commercial production
commenced in the A.Y. 1999-00. Therefore, the assessee claimed that the initial
assessment year is the A.Y. 1999-00 and accordingly claimed 100% deduction
u/s.80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the A.Y. 2003-04. The Assessing Officer
was of the view that the initial assessment year is the A.Y. 1998-99 in which
there was trial production and accordingly restricted the deduction to 30%. The
Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Initial assessment year for the purpose of S. 80-IA is
the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the commercial
production is started and not the A.Y. in which there was only a trial
production.

(ii) There was only a trial production in the A.Y. 1998-99
and commercial and full-fledged production commenced only in the A.Y. 1999-00.
Merely the trial production will not be regarded as beginning to manufacture
or produce articles. The Tribunal was therefore justified in holding that the
benefit of Section would be allowed in the year in which commercial production
started i.e., A.Y. 1999-00 and, therefore, would be extendable up to the A.Y.
2003-04.”

levitra

Assessment : Notice u/s.143(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1997-98 : A valid notice u/s.143(2) can be issued only after the AO examines the return filed by the assessee.

New Page 1

Reported :

29 Assessment : Notice u/s.143(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 :
A.Y. 1997-98 : A valid notice u/s.143(2) can be issued only after the AO
examines the return filed by the assessee.

[DIT v. Society for Worldwide Inter Bank Financial,
Telecommunications
, 323 ITR 249 (Del.)]

In an appeal against the assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 for the A.Y. 1997-98 the Tribunal found that the assessee
had filed the return of income on 27-3-2000, whereas the notice u/s.143(2) was
issued on 23-3-2000 i.e., before filing the return of income. The Tribunal
therefore held that the notice was invalid and hence the consequential
assessment order is invalid.

In appeal before the Delhi High Court, the Revenue contended
for the first time that the notice was issued on March 27, 2000 and not on March
23, 2000. The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) In the memorandum of appeal, the Revenue had stated
that the return was filed by the assessee on March 27, 2000 and the notice
u/s.143(2) was served upon the authorised representative of the assessee by
hand when the authorised representative of the assessee came and filed return
and that the date of the notice was mistakenly mentioned as March 23, 2000.

(ii) Even if it was true, the notice was served on the
authorised representative simultaneously on his filing the return, which
clearly indicated that the notice was ready even prior to the filing of the
return.

(iii) The provisions of S. 143(2) make it clear that the
notice could only be served after the Assessing Officer had examined the
return filed by the assessee. Thus, even if the statement of the Assessing
Officer is taken at face value, it would amount to gross violation of the
scheme of S. 143(2) of the Act.

(iv) That being the case, no interference with the impugned
order is called for.”

levitra

Appellate Tribunal : Powers and duty : A.Y. 1990-91 : Assessee filed cross-objections in appeal filed by Revenue : Revenue’s appeal dismissed without considering cross-objections of assessee : Cross-objections should be disposed of on merits.

New Page 1

Reported :

28 Appellate Tribunal : Powers and duty : A.Y. 1990-91 :
Assessee filed cross-objections in appeal filed by Revenue : Revenue’s appeal
dismissed without considering cross-objections of assessee : Cross-objections
should be disposed of on merits.

[Ram Ji Dass and Co. v. CIT, 323 ITR 505 (P&H)]

In an appeal filed by the Revenue before the Tribunal the
assessee had preferred cross-objections. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed
by the Revenue but the cross objections of the assessee were not considered on
merits. Therefore the assessee applied for recalling the order and requested for
decision on the cross-objections on merits. The Tribunal rejected the
application observing that the Tribunal had already dismissed the appeal of the
Revenue and that while deciding the Revenue’s appeal the Tribunal had already
considered the question relating to the rate of profits and had upheld it and it
could not be re-examined thereafter in the assessee’s cross objections.

On reference at the instance of the assessee, the Punjab and
Haryana High Court held that the cross-objections of the assessee were required
to be heard and decided on merits.

levitra

Disallowance of loss u/s.94(7) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : The conditions spelt out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) are cumulative and not alternative : Purchase of units within a period of less than three months from the record date, but sale be

New Page 1

Unreported

26 Disallowance of loss u/s.94(7) of Income-tax Act, 1961 :
A.Y. 2004-05 : The conditions spelt out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) are
cumulative and not alternative : Purchase of units within a period of less than
three months from the record date, but sale beyond a period of three months :
Loss cannot be ignored.

[CIT v. Smt. Alka Bhosle (Bom.), ITA No. 2656 of 2009
dated 9-6-2010]

In the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 2004-05 the
assessee had purchased certain units within a period of less than three months
from the record date, but the units were sold beyond a period of three months
from the record date. The Tribunal held that the provisions of S. 94(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are not applicable and there would be no disallowance of loss.

In the appeal filed by the Revenue, the following question
was raised :

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case
and in law, the ITAT was right in holding that clauses (a), (b) and (c) of S.
94(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are to be satisfied independently or
cumulatively ?”

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under :

“(i) The question that falls for consideration is as to
whether the conditions spelt out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Ss.(7) are
cumulative.

(ii) The contention of the Revenue is that though the units
were, as a matter of fact, sold beyond a period of three months of the record
date, the provisions of S. 94(7) would apply since they were acquired within a
period of three months from the record date.

(iii) There is no merit in the submission. Ss.(7) of S. 94
spelt out three requirements; these being (i) The purchase or acquisition of
any of the securities or units should take place within a period of three
months prior to the record date; (ii) The sale or transfer should take place
within a period of three months after the record date; and (iii) The dividend
or income received or receivable should be exempt. In the event that these
three conditions are fulfilled, the loss, if any, arising from the purchase or
sale of securities or units has to be ignored for the purpose of computing the
income chargeable to tax, to the extent such loss does not exceed the amount
of dividend or income received or receivable.

(iv) Ex-facie, all the three conditions that are spelt out
in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Ss.(7), must be fulfilled before the
consequence that is envisaged in the Section comes into force. The conditions
prescribed in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Ss.(7) are intended to be cumulative
in nature.

(v) In the present case, the sale of the units has taken
place after the expiry of a period of three months from the record date.
Hence, the second condition spelt out for the applicability of Ss.(7) would
not come into force.

(vi) In the circumstances, the appeal by the Revenue is
lacking in merit and does not raise any substantial question of law. The
appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

levitra

Appellate Tribunal : Power and duty : Third proviso to S. 254(2A) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : The Tribunal has power to grant stay of recovery for a period of 365 days only : The Tribunal is therefore under a bounden duty and obligation to ensure that the a

New Page 1

Reported :

27 Appellate Tribunal : Power and duty : Third proviso to S.
254(2A) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : The Tribunal has power to grant stay of
recovery for a period of 365 days only : The Tribunal is therefore under a
bounden duty and obligation to ensure that the appeal is disposed of within that
period: Fact that same issue was pending before the Special Bench cannot be a
reason for the Tribunal not to dispose of the appeal.

[Jethmal Faujimal Soni v. ITAT, 231 CTR 332 (Bom.)]

In an appeal preferred by the assessee before the Tribunal,
the assessee’s application for stay of recovery was allowed by the Tribunal and
the recovery was stayed for a period of six months. On a subsequent application
the stay was extended by a further period of six months. The hearing of the
appeal was adjourned from time to time for the reason that the issue in the
appeal was pending before the Special Bench. The Tribunal rejected the third
application for stay dated 4-11-2009 for the reason that the third proviso to S.
254(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prohibits the Tribunal from granting such
stay.

On a writ petition filed by the assessee, the Bombay High
Court directed the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal within a period of four
months. The counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue informed the Court that
the Revenue shall not take any coercive steps for enforcing the demand during
that period. The High Court held as under :

“(i) A stringent provision is made by the third proviso to
S. 254(2A), as a result of which even if the delay in disposing of the appeal
is not attributable to the assessee, the stay has to stand vacated in any
event upon the lapse of a period of three hundred and sixty-five days. Having
regard to the nature of the provision which has been enacted by the
Parliament, the Tribunal is under a bounden duty and obligation to ensure that
the appeal is disposed of, so as not to result in prejudice to the assessee,
particularly in a situation like the present where no fault could be found
with the conduct of the assessee.

(ii) The fact that an issue was pending before the Special
Bench was not a reason for the Tribunal not to dispose of the appeal,
particularly since the consequence of the inability of the Tribunal to do so
would result in vacating of the order of stay, which was passed originally in
favour of the assessee.

(iii) It is unfortunate that the Tribunal simply adjourned
the appeal merely on the ground of the pendency of an identical issue before
the Special Bench. The state of affairs which has come to pass could well have
been avoided by the appeal being taken up for final disposal.”

levitra

Exemption : S. 10(11) : Interest income accrued in provident fund account of employees after retirement : Continue to qualify for exemption u/s.10(11).

New Page 2

4 Exemption : S. 10(11) of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 to 2004-05 : Interest income accrued in the provident fund
account of employees after retirement : Would continue to qualify for exemption
u/s.10(11).


[Subhash Bansal v. ITO, 170 Taxman 601(P&H)

The petitioner was a senior citizen and an employee and a
retired employee of the Punjab State Electricity Board. In this case, in the
writ petition filed by the petitioner, the question before the Punjab and
Haryana High Court was as to whether interest income, that had accrued on the
credit balance in the provident fund governed by the Provident Fund Act, 1925
after the retirement, would continue to qualify for exemption from income-tax.

 

The High Court held as under :

“(i) A perusal of S. 10(11) would show that any payment
received by an assessee from a provident fund, to which the 1925 Act applies,
would not constitute a part of total income. In other words, it would, thus,
qualify for exemption from income-tax. It is, thus, obvious that since payment
of interest is received by the assessee-employee from provident fund, it would
also qualify for exemption from income-tax, provided the provisions of 1925
Act apply.

(ii) The reply given by the CBDT in its letter dated
15-6-2006 clarified the issue that interest on GPF is exempt from income-tax
as per the provisions of S. 10(11) and no TDS is required to be deducted from
the payment of interest on GPF after the date of retirement of an employee.

(iii) The petition succeeded and the Revenue was to be
directed to extend the benefit of exemption from income-tax to the interest
income that had accrued to the employees of the Board on the credit balance
which had been retained by them by exercising option in their provident fund
account after their retirement in terms of Regulation 38.”

 


levitra

Charitable Trust : Certificate u/s.80G : Renewal of certificate denied on the ground that one particular expenditure is for an activity termed as spending for a particular religion : Not justified.

New Page 2

3 Charitable Trust : Certificate u/s.80G of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : Renewal of certificate denied on the ground that one
particular expenditure is for an activity which may be termed as spending for a
particular religion : Not justified.


[Umaid Charitable Trust v. UOI, 171 Taxman 94 (Raj.)]

The assessee trust was granted exemption certificate u/s.80G
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the period from 1-4-2001 to 31-3-2004. However,
renewal of the certificate for a further period was refused on the ground that
the assessee had incurred expenditure exceeding 5% of its total income on a
particular religion, namely, colouring and repairing of Lord Vishnu’s temple.

Allowing the writ petition filed by the Trust, the Rajasthan
High Court held as under :

“(i) Mere one contribution by the assessee trust to another
trust which carried out repairs and renovation of Lord Vishnu’s temple, did
not disentitle the assessee from renewal of its exemption certificate u/s.80G.
The line of distinction between the religious purpose and a charitable purpose
is very thin and no watertight compartment between the two activities can be
very well established. Unless the objective of the charitable trust in
question itself is of spending its income for a particular religion and it is
so found in the trust deed, the Income-tax Department cannot reject the
renewal of the trust as a charitable trust u/s.80G, merely because one
particular expenditure is for an activity which may be termed as spending for
a particular religion.

(ii) In the instant case, the repairs and renovation of
Lord Vishnu’s temple did not necessarily mean that expenditure in question was
for a particular religion only. All people, who have faith in Lord Vishnu’s
temple, belong to different sects and have faith in different religions and
also visit the temple of Lord Vishnu. The Revenue had not shown that entry in
the said temple was restricted to the persons of one particular community or
sect following one religion. Hinduism is not one particular religion and
different sects following Hindu philosophy do visit temple of Lord Vishnu, be
that Jains, Sikhs, Brahmins, etc. There is no watertight compartment between
different castes or sects following one particular religion. Freedom of
religion is guaranteed by the Constitution of India under Article 25.
Therefore, by taking such a pedantic and narrow approach, it could not be said
that character of the charitable trust was lost if one particular expenditure
was made for repairs and renovation of Lord Vishnu’s temple and that too by
way of contribution to another trust.

(iii) A perusal of the trust deed of the assessee produced
on record showed that the objective of the trust was clearly charitable one
and was not for any particular religion even wholly or substantially. Nothing
had been pointed out in the impugned order that the assessee had been
constantly spending money for a particular religion.

(iv) There was no leaning in favour of any particular
religion in the trust deed of the assessee-trust and, therefore, once such
exemption was granted to the assessee upon scrutiny of its application and it
held for at least three years, as was shown by the impugned order itself and
the trust deed indicated that the said trust was constituted long back on
27-8-1963 and had been carrying on such charitable activities, there was no
justification for rejecting its renewal u/s.80G, which is a matter of right.”


levitra

Business deduction : S. 43B : Deposit with customs authorities as per demand notice under the head Special Value Branch (SVB) is deductible in the year of actual payment.

New Page 2

1 Business deduction : S. 43B of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1999-00 : Deduction to be allowed on actual payment : Deposit
with customs authorities as per demand notice under the head Special Value
Branch (SVB) is deductible in the year of actual payment.


[CIT v. Hughes Escorts Communications Ltd., 170 Taxman
571 (Del.)]

In the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 1999-00, the
assessee company had paid Rs.26,60,128 by way of Special Value Branch (SVB)
deposit as per the demand notice issued by the Customs authorities. The said
amount was not claimed by way of deduction before the AO. The claim for
deduction was made for the first time before the CIT(A) by way of additional
ground. It was the contention of the assessee that the additional payment was
called a deposit pending final determination of the actual duty and it is an
amount that is to be paid on demand to the Customs authorities, that the
assessee really had no option but to make the payment. The CIT(A) allowed the
claim for deduction and held that if the whole or any part of this amount is
found to be not payable to the Customs authorities on the relevant goods, then
such amount shall be brought to tax u/s.41(1)(a) of the Act, in the relevant
year. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held :

“(i) The assessee really had no option but to make the
payment as per the demand notice issued by the Customs authorities. At the
time of making the payment it was not known whether the demand would fall
short of the actual liability or in excess of the actual liability. Taking
this into consideration, the Tribunal felt that it would not be appropriate to
limit the claim of the assessee only to the extent of the actual liability. It
was found that there is no error in directing the Assessing Officer to make a
verification with regard to the excess payment, if any, and to tax the amount
if it has not already been taxed. The Tribunal also limited the liability of
the actual amount to the assessment year under consideration.

(ii) We cannot find any fault in the view taken by the
Tribunal primarily because the liability was required to be discharged by the
assessee on demand and the assessee had no option but to make the payment.
This clearly falls within S. 43B(a) of the Act.”

 


levitra

Business expenditure/bonus : S. 37(1) and S. 36(1)(ii) : ‘Good work reward’ paid to employees, not dependent on profit/loss : does not constitute ‘bonus’ u/s. 36(1)(ii) : Allowable as normal business expenditure u/s.37(1)

New Page 2

2 Business expenditure/bonus : S. 37(1) and
S. 36(1)(ii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : ‘Good work reward’ paid to employees, not
dependent on profit/loss : Does not constitute ‘bonus’ u/s.36(1)(ii) : Allowable
as normal business expenditure u/s.37(1).


[Shriram Pistons & Rings Ltd. v. CIT, 171 Taxman 81
(Del.)]

The assessee had claimed the deduction of the ‘good work
reward’ paid to the employees as business expenditure u/s.37(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal considered as to whether it constitutes
‘bonus’ within the meaning of S. 36(1)(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal held that it
does not constitute bonus.

 

In reference, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) There is nothing to suggest that the ‘good work
reward’ given by the assessee to its employees has any relation to the profits
that the assessee may or may not make. It appears from the order of the
Tribunal that it has relation to good work that is done by the employee during
the course of his employment and that at the end of the financial year on the
recommendation of a senior officer of the assessee, the reward is given to the
employee. Consequently, the ‘good work reward’ cannot fall within the ambit of
S. 36(1)(ii) of the Act as contended by the Revenue.

(ii) The ‘good work reward’ is allowable as business
expenditure u/s.37(1) of the Act.”

 


levitra

Scientific research expenditure : Deduction u/s.35 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Research not restricted to applied or natural science but includes any scientific research which may lead to or facilitate extension of business.

New Page 1

Reported :

20. Scientific research
expenditure : Deduction u/s.35 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Research not restricted
to applied or natural science but includes any scientific research which may
lead to or facilitate extension of business.

[CIT v. Engineering
Innovation Ltd.,
327 ITR 392 (HP)]

The assessee was carrying on
the business of manufacture and sale of metal components. The assessee decided
to manufacture and market automatic coffee machines. It imported an automatic
coffee machine from abroad and engaged the services of an engineer for
indeginising and copying the machine in such a fashion so as to make it suitable
for Indian conditions. In the A.Y. 1992-93, the assessee claimed the deduction
of the cost of the imported machine and the retainership fees paid to the
engineer as scientific research expenditure u/s.35 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that the expenditure was not
incurred on research work. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Himachal Predesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under :

“(i) The definition of
scientific research in S. 43(4) is comprehensive, but the use of the word
‘include’ in every clause of the Section clearly implies that the definition
is inclusive and not comprehensive. Therefore, the contention of the
Department that scientific research must be in the fields of natural or
applied science, could not be accepted.

(ii) Any methodical or
systematic investigation based on science into the study of any materials or
sources, is a scientific research.

(iii) The investigation
done by the assessee to improvise, indigenise and improve the imported machine
to suit the Indian market would have resulted in expanding and extending its
business and therefore fell within the meaning of the term ‘scientific
research’ as defined in S. 43(4)(iii) of the Act.

(iv) The assessee was entitled for
deduction in terms of S. 35(4).”

levitra

Penalty : Failure to get accounts audited in time : S. 44AB and S. 271B : Condition precedent : Tribunal to record a finding whether assessee deliberately failed to submit audit report in time : Matter remanded

New Page 1

19 Penalty : Failure to get accounts audited
in time : S. 44AB and S. 271B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Condition
precedent : Tribunal to record a finding whether assessee deliberately failed to
submit audit report in time : Matter remanded.


[Gramin Vidyut Sahkari Samity Maryadit. v. ACIT, 305
ITR 89 (MP)]

For the A.Y. 2001-02, the assessee, a co-operative society
did not get its accounts audited as required u/s.44AB of the Act. The Assessing
Officer therefore, imposed a penalty of Rs.1,00,000. The CIT(A) deleted the
penalty. The Tribunal upheld the penalty order and held that there was no
illegality or infirmity in the order of the Assessing Officer.

 

On appeal, the Madhya Pradesh High Court remanded the matter
back to the Tribunal for fresh decision according to law, and held as under :

“(i) An order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a
statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding and penalty
will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted
deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or
dishonest or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. The penalty will
not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether the penalty
should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of
discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on consideration of
all the relevant circumstances. Even if minimum penalty is prescribed, the
authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to
impose penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the
offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the statute.

(ii) It is obligatory on the part of the Tribunal to record
a finding whether the assessee had acted deliberately in defiance of the
provisions of S. 44AB of the Act and is guilty of conduct contumacious or
dishonest, warranting imposition of penalty by the AO u/s.271B of the Act.

(iii) The Tribunal, apart from stating that there was no
denial by the assessee that the provisions of S. 44AB were not applicable to
it and there was delay in getting the accounts audited, had not applied its
mind and recorded any cogent or germane reasons as is imperative in law.
Therefore, the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside and the matter
remitted to it for reconsideration.”

Penalty : Failure to deduct tax at source : S. 194A and S. 271C : Bona fide belief based on opinion of senior counsel : Penalty not justified.

New Page 1

18 Penalty : Failure to deduct tax at
source : S. 194A and S. 271C of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1994-95 and
1995-96 :
Bona fide belief based on opinion of senior counsel :
Penalty not justified.


[CIT v. Wishwapriya Financial Services and Securities
Ltd.,
303 ITR 122 (Mad.)]

The assessee was engaged in retail and financial services,
corporate and advisory services and securities trading. An advertisement was
given in the newspaper in the name of the assessee, stating that the return on
the investment made with the company would not attract tax deduction at source
and accordingly, the assessee did not deduct tax at source on interest paid on
such investments. For the A.Ys. 1994-95 and 1995-96, the Assessing Officer
issued show-cause notice proposing to impose penalty u/s.271C of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 for failure to deduct tax at source u/s.194A on interest paid on such
investments. The assessee replied that he had acted under the bona fide
belief that the income received from the investments did not attract the
liability for deduction of tax at source and therefore, when the amounts were
distributed among the investors, no tax was deducted at source. It was also
contended that an opinion from a senior counsel was obtained before devising the
scheme to the effect that no tax need be deducted at source on the payments made
to the investors. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention and imposed the
penalty. The Tribunal deleted the penalty.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as :

“(i) The mere fact that the bona fide claim stood
disallowed did not itself lead to the inference that the company consciously
and deliberately flouted the provisions of the Act. The assessee thought that
there was no relationship of debtor and creditor or borrower and lender and
that, S. 194A, S. 201(1), S. 201(1A) read with S. 2(28A) of the Act were not
attracted. It was clear from the order of the Tribunal that it had accepted
the explanation and given a finding that there was a reasonable cause for not
deducting tax at source.

(ii) The assessee acted in a bona fide manner on the
basis of the opinion obtained from a senior counsel before devising the
scheme. The finding that there was a reasonable cause was a finding of fact
and it was not perverse. The concurrent findings given by both the authorities
below were based on valid materials and evidence and did not warrant
interference. The Tribunal was justified in deleting the penalty levied
u/s.271C of the Act.”

Penalty : Deposits/loans in cash in excess of prescribed limits : S. 269SS, S. 269T, S. 271D and S. 271E : Finding that the amounts were mere book entries and transactions on behalf of family members : No violation of S. 269SS and S. 269T : Penalty could

New Page 1

17 Penalty : Deposits/loans in cash in
excess of prescribed limits : S. 269SS, S. 269T, S. 271D and S. 271E of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1991-92 : Finding that the amounts were mere book
entries and transactions on behalf of family members : No violation of S. 269SS
and S. 269T : Penalty could not be imposed.


[CIT v. Natwarlal Purshottamdas Parekh, 303 ITR 5 (Guj.)]

The assessee was carrying on the business of money-lending
and trading in jewellery. For the A.Y. 1991-92, the AO imposed penalty u/s.271D
and u/s.271E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of receipt/repayment of
deposits/loans otherwise than by way of account-payee cheque. The Tribunal found
that most of the amounts represented book entries except amounts of NSCs of
family members which had matured and which were reinvested. The Tribunal also
found that the assessee had acted under bona fide belief in view of the
opinion of an advocate and income-tax practitioner of standing of 33 years who
had opined that the assessee would not violate the provisions of S. 269SS and S.
269T of the Act if the assessee receives amounts from the family members and
repays to different family members. Accordingly the Tribunal cancelled the
penalty.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The Tribunal had found on the facts and in the light
of the evidence on record that there was no violation of either the provisions
of S. 269SS or S. 269T of the Act.

(ii) The Tribunal had further found that there was
reasonable cause, assuming that there was any violation by the assessee.

(iii) Hence the Tribunal had rightly deleted the penalties
levied u/s.271D and u/s.271E.”

 


levitra

Penalty : Deposits in cash in excess of prescribed limits : S. 269SS, S. 269T, S. 271D and S. 271E : Firm accepting cash from partners in belief that it was not different from them : Reasonable ground : Penalty could not be imposed.

New Page 1

15 Penalty : Deposits in cash in excess of
prescribed limits : S. 269SS, S. 269T, S. 271D and S. 271E of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1990-91 : Firm accepting cash from partners in belief that it was
not different from them : Reasonable ground : Penalty could not be imposed.


[CIT v. Lokhpat Film Exchange (Cinema), 304 ITR 172 (Raj.)]

In the A.Y. 1990-91 the Assessing Officer had levied
penalties u/s.271D and u/s.271E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of
transactions between the assessee-firm and its partners described as deposits
from the partners. The assessee had claimed that in view of the fact that the
partners and the firm are not independent of each other and the firm is not a
juristic person, these transactions cannot be considered as intra-person, but
were only for the purpose of carrying on partner’s own business. The fact that
under the Income-tax Act, the firm and the partners of the firm are recognised
as independent units, the same cannot be treated for all purposes to be separate
and independent. The assessee had contended that in that view of the matter,
they had not violated the requirement of S. 269SS and S. 269T while conducting
these transactions. However, the Assessing Officer did not accept this
explanation and imposed penalties u/s.271D and u/s.271E. The Tribunal relying on
a decision in CIT v. R. M. Chidambaram Pillai, (1977) 106 ITR 292 wherein
the Supreme Court had said that there cannot be a contract of service, in strict
law, between a firm and one of its partners, so as to consider the salary paid
to the partner as income from salary held that for the purpose of S. 269SS and
S. 269T also the firm and partners cannot be considered to be separate entities
and deleted the penalty.

 

The Rajasthan High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue and held as under :

“The assessee had acted bona fide and its plea that
inter se transactions between the partners and the firm were not
governed by the provisions of S. 269SS and 269T was a reasonable explanation.
Penalty could not be imposed.”

 


levitra

Penalty : Deposits/Loans in cash in excess of prescribed limits : S. 269T and S. 271E : Repayment of advance towards share application money : Neither deposit nor loan : Bona fide belief : Penalty not justified.

New Page 1

16 Penalty : Deposits/loans in cash in
excess of prescribed limits : S. 269T, and S. 271E of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y.
1990-91 : Repayment of advance towards share application money : Neither deposit
nor loan :
Bona fide belief : Penalty not justified.


[CIT v. Rugmini Ram Ragav Spinners P. Ltd., 304 ITR
417 (Mad.)]

The assessee is a closely held company. For the A.Y. 1990-91
the Assessing Officer imposed penalty of Rs.5,90,416 u/s.271E of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 on the ground that during the year of account the assessee had repaid
some of the share application money which it had received earlier in cash. The
Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

 

The Madras High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue and held as under :

“(i) The assessee had received cash over a period of time
as advance towards allotment of shares from 16 persons without stipulating any
time frame towards return/refund of money without interest, in case of
non-allotment of shares either fully or partly. The money retained by the
company was neither deposit nor loan, it was only share capital advance.

(ii) The advance of share application money and repayment
of such advances had not flowed from any undisclosed income of the assessee or
the concerned persons. The assessee had not paid any interest at all on any of
the advances repaid after some time. If the intention was to receive them as
loan or deposit, then certainly the lenders would not have made the advances
gratuitously. The assessee was not called upon to explain the default
u/s.269SS of the Act on receipt of the advances of the earlier years, which
would show that the assessee’s case was not governed by the said provisions.

(iii) Penalty u/s.271E is not automatic, and a bona fide
belief to the effect that the receipt of the advance against allotment of
shares would not be termed as loan or deposit, would be sufficient to drop the
penalty leviable unless and until the material on record positively showed
that the money received was only a deposit or loan.

(iv) There was no dispute that the advances were
only against allotment of shares and not by way of loans or advances. In this
case the reasonable cause was that the assessee was under bona fide
belief that the money received was only for the purpose of allotment of
shares. There was no material or evidence or any compelling reason produced by
the Revenue to prove that the money received was a deposit or loan.”

 


levitra

Penalty : Concealment of income : S. 271(1)(c) : No penalty proceeding initiated in the preceding year on similar issue : Finding by Tribunal that a case of difference of opinion and not concealment of income : Proper.

New Page 1

14 Penalty : Concealment of income : S.
271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1983-84 : No penalty proceeding
initiated in the preceding year on similar issue : Finding by Tribunal that a
case of difference of opinion and not concealment of income : Proper.


[CIT v. Sood Harvester, 304 ITR 279 (P&H)]

For the A.Y. 1983-84, the Assessing Officer imposed penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for concealment of income. The
Tribunal found that in respect of the addition made on the same issue for the
A.Y. 1982-83, the AO had not initiated penalty proceedings. The Tribunal
recorded that the assessee had disclosed complete facts before the AO along with
the return, as well as during the course of assessment proceedings and held that
it was a case of difference of opinion and not concealment of income. The
Tribunal also held that there was no reason for the Revenue to take a different
view for the A.Y. 1983-84 on the same set of facts and without assigning
reasons.

 

The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the appeal filed
by the Revenue and held as under :

“(i) The Tribunal had followed the correct approach by
concluding that it was a case of difference of opinion and not concealment of
income on the reasoning that in the preceding year the facts were almost the
same and still no penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) was initiated.

(ii) The Revenue had to maintain consistency for the
purpose of finality in all litigation and a decision on the same question
would not be re-opened unless some new facts were found with material
difference in the subsequent years.”

 


levitra

Penalty : Concealment of income : S. 271(1)(c) : Cash compensatory support not included in original return, but in revised return : No concealment of income : Penalty could not be imposed.

New Page 1

13 Penalty : Concealment of income : S.
271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Cash compensatory support not included in
original return : Amount included in revised return: No concealment of income:
Penalty could not be imposed.


[CIT v. Mentha and Allied Products P. Ltd., 304 ITR
214 (All.)]

In the original return of income the assessee had not
included the cash compensatory support amounting to Rs.65,61,640. Subsequently,
the Finance Act, 1990, brought about an amendment, with retrospective effect,
that the cash assistance was taxable. In view of this amendment, the assessee
voluntarily filed a revised return and included the cash compensatory support
therein. The Assessing Officer levied penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty. In appeal before the High Court,
the Revenue contended that the Tribunal had cancelled the penalty wrongly on the
basis that the assessee has voluntarily filed the revised return when in fact
the revised return was filed after issuance of notice u/s.142(1) on 30-1-1991.

 

The Allahabad High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue and upheld the decision of the Tribunal.

levitra

Penalty : Concealment of income : S. 271(1)(c) Expl. 1 : Surrender of income by assessee : No separate enquiry necessary before imposing penalty : Assessee to explain about bona fides in penalty proceedings : Matter remanded

New Page 1

12 Penalty : Concealment of income : S.
271(1)(c) Expl. 1 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1989-90 and 1990-91 : Surrender
of income by assessee : No separate enquiry necessary before imposing penalty :
Assessee to explain about
bona fides in penalty proceedings:
Matter remanded.


[Dy. Director of Income-tax v. Chirag Metal Rolling Mills
Ltd.,
305 ITR 29 (MP)]

For the A.Ys. 1989-90 and 1990-91, in the course of
assessment proceedings the assessee offered incomes of Rs.74,92,919 and
79,00,198 by way of disallowance u/s.40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The
Assessing Officer made the additions and also imposed penalty u/s.271(1)(c) for
concealment of the added amount. In appeal, the CIT(A) cancelled the penalty.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madhya Pradesh High Court
remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh decision according to law,
and held :

“(i) The combined reading of Explanation 1 to S. 271(1)(c)
of the Act and the verdict of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Sir
Shadilal Sugar and General Mills Ltd. v. CIT,
(1987) 168 ITR 705 and K.
P. Madhusudhan v. CIT,
(2001) 251 ITR 99, it is crystal clear that prior
to Explanation 1, the position of law was if the assessee agrees for addition
of his income to buy peace, then it will not follow that agreed amount to be
added was concealed income and the Revenue was required to prove the mens
rea
. Because of this view taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of
Sir Shadilal Sugar and General Mills Ltd. v. CIT, (1987) 168 ITR 705
Explanation 1 to S. 271(1)(c) of the Act was added to the Income-tax Act and
after taking into consideration the Explanation, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in
the matter of K. P. Madhu-sudhan (2001) 251 ITR 99, has laid down that no
separate enquiry is necessary for imposing the penalty. However, from a plain
reading of the Explanation, it is evident that some sort of enquiry is
necessary, therefore, the proceedings initiated by the Revenue for imposing
the penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act shall be treated as proceedings and the
assessee is at liberty to show his bona fides in that proceedings. If
the assessee fails to show his bona fides, in that case penalty can be
imposed by the Revenue.

(ii) This Court is of the view that the learned Tribunal is
not justified in holding that the onus is on the Revenue to prove mala
fides
, even when the primary onus was on the assessee to prove that there
was no concealment in view of Explanation 1 to S. 271(1)(c) of the Act. In
view of the answer to the first question, it appears that no separate enquiry
is necessary before imposing the penalty. In the penalty proceedings itself,
initiated by the Revenue, the assessee can explain his bona fides and
that all the facts relating to the same and material to the computation of his
total income have been disclosed by him.”

 


levitra

TDS : S. 194C(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Payment to sub-contractors : Assessee a registered co-operative society constituted by truck operators : Contracts with companies for transportation of their goods : Contracts executed by member truck operators :

New Page 1

17 TDS : S. 194C(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Payment to
sub-contractors : Assessee a registered co-operative society constituted by
truck operators : Contracts with companies for transportation of their goods :
Contracts executed by member truck operators :

Companies make payment to assessee after deduction of tax u/s.194C : Member
truck operators are not sub-contractors : Assessee not required to deduct tax at
source on payment to member truck operators u/s.194C(2)



[CIT v. Ambuja Darla Kashlog Mangu Transport Co-op. Society,
188 Taxman 134 (HP)]

The assessee was a registered co-operative society
constituted by truck operators. It entered into contracts with companies such
as cement manufacturers for transport of their goods. The company, which had
entered into contract with the assessee, deducted tax at source u/s.194C(1) on
payments made to the assessee. Thereafter, the assessee-society paid that
entire amount to its members, who had actually carried the goods, after
deducting a nominal amount of Rs.10 or Rs.20 for administrative expenses known
as ‘parchi charges’ for running of the society. The Assessing Officer held
that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source from the amount paid to
the members/truck operators in terms of S. 194C(2). The Tribunal held that
since there was no sub-contract between the society and its members, the
provision of S. 194C(2) was not attracted.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Himachal Pradesh High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The main contention of the Revenue was that since the
assessee had a separate juristic identity and each of the truck operators, who
were members of the assessee, had separate juristic identity, they were
covered within the meaning of S. 194C(2). It was urged by the Revenue that
since the assessee was a person paying a sum to the member-truck operator who
was a resident within the meaning of the Act, TDS was required to be deducted.
That argument did not take into consideration the heading and entire language
of S. 194C(2) which clearly indicates that the payment should be made to the
resident who is a sub-contractor. The concept of a sub-contract is
intrinsically linked with S. 194C(2) and if there is no sub-contract, then the
person is not liable to deduct tax at source, even if payment is being made to
a resident.

(ii) In the instant case, the assessee-society was created
by the transporters themselves who formed the societies or unions with a view
to enter into a contract with companies. The companies entered into contracts
for transportation of goods and materials with the society. However, the
society was nothing more than a conglomeration of the truck operators
themselves and had been created only with a view to make it easy to enter into
a contract with the companies as also to ensure that the work to the
individual truck operators was given strictly in turn, so that every truck
operator had an equal opportunity to carry the goods and earn income. The
society itself did not do the work of transportation. The members of the
society were virtually the owners of the society. It might be true that they
both had separate juristic entities, but the fact remained that the reason for
creation of the society was only to ensure that work was provided to all the
truck operators on an equitable basis. A finding of fact had been rendered by
the authorities that the society was formed with a view to obtain the work of
carriage from the companies since the companies were not ready to enter into a
contract with individual truck operators but had asked them to form a society.

(iii) Admittedly, the society did not retain any profits.
It only retained a nominal amount as ‘parchi charges’ which was used for
meeting the administrative expenses of the society. There was no dispute with
the submission that the society had an independent legal status and was also a
contractor within the meaning of S. 194C. It was also not disputed that the
members had a separate status, but there was no sub-contract between the
society and the members. In fact, if the entire working of the society was
seen, it was apparent that the society had entered into a contract on behalf
of the members. The society was nothing but a collective name for all the
members and the contract entered into by the society was for the benefit of
the constituent members and there was no contract between the society and the
members.


(iv) For the
foregoing reasons, S. 194C(2) was not attracted and the assessee-society was
not liable to deduct tax at source on account of payments made to the truck
owners who were also members of the society.”



levitra

TDS : S. 194A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Interest other than interest on securities : Once a decree is passed, it is a judgment and order of Court which culminates into final decree being passed which has to be discharged only on payment of amount due unde

New Page 1

16 TDS : S. 194A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Interest other
than interest on securities : Once a decree is passed, it is a judgment and
order of Court which culminates into final decree being passed which has to be
discharged only on payment of amount due under said decree : Judgment debtor is
not liable to deduct tax at source on interest component of decree.




[Madhusudan Shrikrishna v. Enkay Exports, 188 Taxman
195 (Bom.)]

In this case the dispute was settled and while passing the
order and decree, the counsel appearing on behalf of defendants raised a query
regarding deduction of TDS on the interest component of the decree.
Apprehension was expressed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
defendants that under the provisions of S. 194A of the Income-tax Act, on the
interest component which is payable, tax has to be deducted at source and if
it is not so done, the person who does not deduct tax at source on the
interest component would be liable for prosecution and penal consequences
under the provisions of the Income-tax Act. It was, therefore, submitted that
the defendants had withheld the payment of the amount which is payable to the
Income-tax Department as TDS and a certificate to that effect was also kept
ready.

The Bombay High Court held as under :

“Once a decree is passed, it is a judgment and the order of
the Court, which culminates into final decree being passed which has to be
discharged only on payment of the amount due under the said decree. The
judgment debtor, therefore, cannot deduct tax at source, since it is an order
and direction of the Court and, as such, would not be liable for penal
consequences for non-deduction of the tax due. Tax, if payable, can be decided
by the ITO after the amount is paid to the decree holder. The defendants,
therefore, were not entitled to withhold the payment on the pretext that it
had to be deducted as tax at source. Defendants would, therefore, pay the said
amount to the plaintiff and for that purpose they would not be liable for
non-deduction of tax at source as that issue had to be decided by the
income-tax authorities and if tax was payable, the same would be paid by the
plaintiff.”

levitra

Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Computation of eligible amount to be on the basis of the profits of the eligible unit : Adjustment of loss of other unit not proper : Deductible amount not to exceed the

New Page 1

15 Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Computation of eligible amount to be on the basis of
the profits of the eligible unit : Adjustment of loss of other unit not proper :
Deductible amount not to exceed the total income.




[CIT v. Accel Transamatic Systems Ltd., 230 CTR 206
(Ker.)]

The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s.80-I of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee had two units. In the relevant year i.e.,
A.Y. 2000-01, there was profit from one unit and a loss from the other unit.
The assessee was eligible for deduction of 25% of the profit of the eligible
unit. The assessee computed the eligible amount at Rs.18,12,770 being 25% of
the profit of the first unit and limited the claim for deduction to
Rs.8,51,697 being the total income. The Assessing Officer did not accept the
method of computation adopted by the assessee. The Tribunal accepted the
assessee’s method.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Revenue relied on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Synco Industries Ltd.; 299 ITR
444 (SC) wherein the disallowance of the claim for deduction was upheld on the
ground that the total income was nil and claimed that the eligible amount
should be computed on the basis of the net figure of first unit after setting
off the loss of the second unit. The Kerala High Court explained the judgment
of the Supreme Court and held as :

“(i) U/s.80A(2) total deduction under Chapter VI-A have to
be limited to the gross total income of the assessee computed under the
provisions of the Act. Therefore, the assessee cannot claim deduction
u/s.80-IA in excess of gross total income computed, no matter eligible amount
may be higher than such income.

(ii) The procedure to be followed for the purpose of
granting deduction u/s.80-IA is to first compute the profits and gains of the
eligible unit and then to determine the eligible deduction therefrom in terms
of S. 80-IA(5). Thereafter, in the computation of total income under the
provisions of the Act, the eligible deduction has to be reduced and if the
total income computed is less than the eligible amount, deduction has to be
limited to such amount.

(iii) Since there have been variations in the total income
computed by virtue of disallowances and later orders of the higher authorities
allowing it, the Assessing Officer is directed to rework the total income and
therefrom allow eligible deduction u/s.80-IA(5) with reference to the profits
of the eligible unit, but limiting it to the total income, if the claimed
amount is higher than such amount.”

levitra

Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80-I of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1992-93 to 1995-96 and 2000-01 : Computation of eligible amount to be on the basis of the profits of the eligible unit : Adjustment of loss of other unit not proper.

New Page 1

14 Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80-I of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1992-93 to 1995-96 and 2000-01 : Computation of eligible
amount to be on the basis of the profits of the eligible unit : Adjustment of
loss of other unit not proper.




[CIT v. Sona Koyo Steering Systems Ltd., 230 CTR 251
(Del.)]

The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s.80-I of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee had two units, one making profit and the
other incurring losses. The assessee computed the amount deductible u/s.80-I
on the basis of the profits of the unit making profits ignoring the loss of
the other unit. For the A.Ys. 1992-93 to 1995-96 and 2000-01, the Assessing
Officer did not accept the computation and computed the eligible amount after
setting off the loss of the other unit. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Revenue relied on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Synco Industries Ltd.; 299 ITR
444 (SC) wherein the disallowance of the claim for deduction was upheld on the
ground that the total income was nil. The Delhi High Court explained the
judgment of the Supreme Court, upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under :

“(i) In view of S. 80-I(6), the quantum of deduction is to
be computed as if the industrial undertaking were the only source of income of
the assessee during the relevant years. In other words, each industrial
undertaking or unit is to be treated separately and independently. It is only
those industrial undertakings, which have a profit or gain, which would be
considered for computing the deduction. The loss-making industrial undertaking
would not come into the picture at all.

(ii) The plain reading of the provision suggests that the
loss of one such industrial undertaking cannot be set off against the profit
of another such industrial undertaking to arrive at a computation of the
quantum of deduction that is to be allowed to the assessee u/s.80-I(1).”

levitra

Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80-IB of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Sum offered to tax by assessee to cover up certain discrepancies : Is income from industrial undertaking eligible for deduction u/s.80-IB ?

New Page 1

13 Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80-IB of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Sum offered to tax by assessee to cover up certain
discrepancies : Is income from industrial undertaking eligible for deduction
u/s.80-IB ?




[CIT v. Allied Industries, 229 CTR 462 (HP)]

The assessee was in the business of manufacturing tractors
and automobile components. The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s.80-IB of
the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the course of the assessment proceedings for the
A.Y. 2001-02, the assessee offered a sum of Rs.2,50,000 for taxation to cover
up all discrepancies. The Assessing Officer added the amount but disallowed
the claim for deduction u/s.80-IB in respect of this amount. The Tribunal
allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the amount offered by the assessee
as addition for the purposes of taxation would amount to profits and gains of
business and were entitled for deduction u/s.80-IB.

On appeal filed by the Revenue, the Himachal Pradesh High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Additional income surrendered by the assessee firm having
been added to the income of the business itself, is to be considered while
work-ing out deduction u/s.80-IB, in the absence of any finding of any
authority that the said income was derived from any undisclosed source.”

levitra

Income : Statutory and contractual interest awarded by arbitrator accrues from year to year

New Page 1

5 Income : Accrual of : A.Y. 1996-97 : Compensation/interest
awarded by arbitrator : Statutory and contractual interest accrues from year to
year : Other compensation is not taxable.


[Konkan Barge Builders P. Ltd. v. ITO, 297 ITR 39 (Bom.)]

The assessee had signed two contracts with MDL for
fabrication of panels from steel plates and for erection of panels. There was a
dispute between the assessee and MDL, pursuant to which an arbitrator came to be
appointed. The arbitrator passed an award in favour of the assessee in an amount
of Rs.1,12,66,929 as compensation and interest. The Assessing Officer treated
the interest awarded of Rs.43,99,404 as a revenue receipt and added it to the
total income for the A.Y. 1996-97. The Tribunal confirmed the addition.

On appeal by the assessee the Bombay High Court held as under
:

“(i) If interest were awarded and the arbitrator was not
seeking to give effect to or to recognise a right to interest conferred by the
statute or contract, it would not be taxable. On the other hand, if the
interest arose by virtue of the statute or by agreement and the arbitrator or
the High Court merely gives effect to that right in awarding of interest on
the amount of compensation, then it would be a revenue receipt which would be
taxable.

(ii) The amount of interest was assessable as income.

(iii) Interest was awarded at the rate of 12% per annum
from July 31, 1989, till payment or the date of decree on this award,
whichever was earlier. The interest income accrued from year to year and the
entire amount of interest could not be assessed in the year of receipt.”



levitra

House property : S. 23 : Annual value is the rent received/receivable by owner from tenant, even if tenant receives higher rent by subletting property

New Page 1

4 House Property : Annual value : S. 23 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : Property sublet by tenant : Annual value is the rent received or
receivable by the assessee-owner from the tenants, irrespective whether the
tenants have received higher rents by subletting the properties.


[CIT v. Akshay Textiles Trading & Agencies (P) Ltd.,
214 CTR 316 (Bom.)]

In the appeal filed by the Revenue, the following questions
were raised before the Bombay High Court :

(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case and in law, the rent paid by ultimate user will be treated as Annual
Letting Value of the property as against rent received by the assessee ?

(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case and in law, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the annual letting
value has to be determined with reference to the annual rent received by the
assessee and not what has been received by its tenants from the ultimate
users ?

The Bombay High Court held that the annual value of the
properties let out by the assessee is the rent received or receivable by the
assessee-owner from the tenants, irrespective of whether the tenants have
received higher rents by subletting the properties.

levitra

Expenditure on lease rent : S. 37 : Lease rent paid in lump sum for 20 years : Revenue expenditure

New Page 1

3 Expenditure on lease rent : Capital or revenue : S. 37 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1997-98 : Lease rent for premises paid in lump sum
for 20 years : Revenue expenditure.


[CIT v. UCAL Fuel Systems Ltd., 296 ITR 702 (Mad.)]

For the A.Y. 1997-98, the assessee claimed as revenue
expenditure sums of Rs.30 lakhs and Rs.8 lakhs paid for taking land and building
on lease for 20 years for the purpose of setting up the new unit at an
industrial estate at Pondichery. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim
treating it as capital expenditure. Tribunal allowed the claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held :

“Had the assessee chosen to pay the rent annually for each
and every year of lease, such expenditure would have to be regarded as revenue
expenditure. The fact that the payment was made in a lump sum for the entire
duration of the lease did not alter the character of its being a revenue
expenditure.”


levitra

Capital Gain : Compulsory acquisition — If compensation award and major part of compensation received in later years, capital gain cannot be assessed in year of handing over possession

New Page 1

2 Capital gain : Accrual : A.Y. 1984-85 : Compulsory
acquisition of land : Land acquired and possession taken on 23-12-1983

i.e.,
A.Y. 1984-85 : Small part of compensation received by assessee in
A.Y. 1985-86 : Compensation award was given on 18-9-1986 : As-sessee
received balance compensation on 3-9-1987 : Capital gain cannot be assessed in
A.Y. 1984-85.


[CIT v. Prem Kumar, 214 CTR 452 (All.)]

The assessee’s land was acquired under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. The land acquisition notification was issued on 15-11-1975. S. 17(4)
of the Land Acquisition Act was applied. Possession of the land
was taken on 23-12-1983 (i.e., in A.Y. 1984-85). A small part of the
compensation that is Rs.25,000, was received by the assessee on 11-7-1984 (i.e.,
in A.Y. 1985-86). Compensation award was given by the
Collector/Land Acquisition Officer on 18-9-1986. The balance compensation of
Rs.1,77,708 was received by the assessee on 3-9-1987. The Tribunal held
that no capital gain is exigible to tax in A.Y. 1984-85.

The Allahabad High Court dismissed the reference application
filed by the Revenue and held as under :

“(i) In substance relying upon the aforesaid authorities
and also relying upon the definition given in S. 2(47) of the Income-tax Act,
1961, the contention of the Department is that for determining the assessment
year in which capital gain should be taxed, it is the date of transfer which
has to be considered and because u/s.16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the
title passes to the Government upon taking the possession, therefore, the date
of transfer in compulsory land acquisition would be the date on which
possession is taken.

(ii) We have considered the matter and we are of the
opinion that the contention of the Department in respect of the A.Y. 1984-85
overlooks the vital facts, namely, that where S. 17 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 has been invoked for the purposes of acquisition of land, possession
can be taken even where no award of compensation has been given.

(iii) If we accept the contention of the Department, it
would mean that the assessee whose land has been acquired will have to file a
return disclosing the amount of capital gain arising to him without even
knowing what the amount of that capital gain would be, because that amount can
become known to him only after the award has been given. ‘Lex non cogit ad
impossibilia
’ is age-old maxim meaning that the law does not compel a man
to do which he cannot possibly perform. Requiring the assessee to file a
proper and complete return by including the income under the head ‘Capital
gain’ would be impossible for the assessee, in cases of the nature referred
above.

(iv) The assessee was required to invest the capital gain
in the specified securities, like capital gain bonds issued from time to time
or in a residential house under the various provisions of the Income-tax Act,
1961, from S. 54 onwards within the time specified therein as computed from
the date of transfer. It is obvious that in order to invest the money in the
specified items, the assessee must first receive the money. Therefore,
accepting the contention of the Department would mean depriving the assessee
of those benefits or tax relief in all cases where S. 17 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, has been applied.

(v) The Tribunal was justified in holding that no capital
gain is exigible to tax in A.Y. 1984-85 on the facts and circumstances of the
case.”



levitra

S. 239 & S. 140 : Return claiming refund signed by authorised signatory other than managing director : Defective return : Assessee to be given opportunity to cure defect

New Page 1

36  Refund : S. 239 and S. 140 of Income-tax Act, 1961 :
A.Ys. 2000-01 to 2002-03 : Return claiming refund signed by authorised signatory
other than managing director : Defective return : Refund is not to be rejected :
Assessee to be given opportunity to cure defective return.


[Hind Samachar Ltd., 169 Taxman 302 (P&H)]

For the A. Ys. 2000-01 to 2002-03, the assessee company had
filed returns of income claming refund. The verification of the returns was
signed by one ‘K’ who was neither the managing director, nor the director of the
assessee company, but was authorised to sign by a board resolution. The
Assessing Officer processed the returns u/s.143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
and computed the refund payable to the assessee. Subsequently he issued notices
u/s.154 requiring the assessee to justify the genuineness of the returns in view
of the fact that ‘K’ who had signed the verification in returns did not fall in
the category of persons authorised to sign the return u/s.140(c). In response,
the assessee submitted that owing to an impass going on in the board of
directors of the company, a resolution was passed duly authorising ‘K’ to sign
and file the returns on behalf of the assessee and further, that the non-signing
of the returns by the managing director or any other director was at best a
curable defect. The assessee prayed for an opportunity to rectify the defect.
The assessee company also filed fresh returns duly signed by the managing
director and pleaded that the defects stood rectified. The Assessing Officer
rejected the assessee’s plea and held that the returns earlier filed were
invalid and accordingly withdrew the refund earlier allowed. The Commissioner
(Appeals) reversed the said order holding that if the returns were not signed by
the person mentioned in S. 140, it was only a curable defect. While giving
effect to the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), the Assessing Officer
rejected the plea of the assessee that the defect has been cured by filing new
return forms duly signed by the managing director on the ground that the same
were filed beyond the time permissible under the Act. Accordingly, the Assessing
Officer refused to grant refund.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the writ petition
filed by the assessee and held as under :

“(i) The return is required to be signed mandatorily by the
managing director of the company and in his absence, due to certain reasons,
by the director thereof.

(ii) S. 139(9) specifies the circumstances in which a
return would be regarded as a defective return. The list of defects mentioned
in the Explanation thereof is illustrative and not exhaustive.

(iii) S. 292B provides that no return of income shall be
invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission, if such return
is, in substance and effect, in conformity with or according to the intent and
purpose of the Act. The Section has applicability to those cases where purely
technical objection without substance arises in a case of a return of income.
S. 139(9) contains a non obstante clause, namely, ‘notwithstanding
anything contained in any other provision of this Act’ and would, therefore,
override the other provisions of the Act including S. 292B. If any curable
defect is noticed in the return, the Assessing Officer is required to provide
an opportunity to the assessee to rectify the same within the stipulated time
and in a case where any of the specified defects is not removed within the
time allowed u/s. 139(9), the return shall be treated as an invalid or non
est
return.

(iv) However, a different situation would arise where a
return is not at all signed and verified. The question of rectifying of defect
in such a situation does not arise as the defect goes to the very root and
jurisdiction of the validity of the return.

(v) In the instant case, the return was signed by an
employee, who had been duly authorised by a resolution of the board to do so,
as there was litigation going on between the management. Thus the return was
not signed by the person authorised u/s.140(c). However, the return was got
signed and verified by the managing director and was filed along with a letter
dated 13-10-2003. Even on an opportunity provided by the Assessing Officer to
remove the defect in pursuance to the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), the
managing director attended the office of the Assessing Officer on 8-3-2005 and
signed the verification of the return. In such circumstances, the return filed
by the assessee could not be treated to be invalid or non est return.

(vi) The Assessing Officer, having failed to raise any issue
with regard to the plea of S. 239 at appropriate stage and the Commissioner
(Appeals) having remanded the case for purposes of getting the defect cured and
to give effect to that order, could not raise a new plea inconsistent with the
remand order. Still further, in the instant case, the provisions of S. 240 would
be attracted whereunder an obligation is cast upon the Revenue to refund the
amount to the assessee without having to make any claim in that regard in case
of refund arising on account of appeal or other proceedings under the Act.”

levitra

New Industrial Undertaking — Special deduction — The gross total income of the assessee has first got to be determined after adjusting losses, etc., and if the gross total income of the assessee is ‘nil’, the assessee would not be entitled to deductions u

New Page 2

2 New Industrial Undertaking — Special
deduction
The gross total income of the assessee has first got
to be determined after adjusting losses, etc., and if the gross total income of
the assessee is ‘nil’, the assessee would not be entitled to deductions under
Chapter VI-A of the Act.


[Synco Industries Ltd. v. CIT, (2008) 299 ITR 444
(SC)]

The appellant-assessee is a company incorporated under the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. It is engaged in the business of oil and
chemicals. It has a unit for oil division at Sirohi District, Rajasthan. It has
also a chemical division at Jodhpur. The appellant had earned profit in the
A.Ys. 1990-91 and 1991-92 in both the units. However, the appellant had suffered
losses in the oil division in earlier years. The appellant claimed deductions
u/s.80HH and u/s.80-I of the Act, claiming that each unit should be treated
separately and the loss suffered by the oil division in earlier years is not
adjustable against the profits of the chemical division while considering the
question whether deductions u/s.80HH and u/s.80-I were allowable.

 

The Assessing Officer noticed that the gross total income of
the appellant before deductions under Chapter VI-A was ‘nil’. Therefore, he
concluded that the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of deductions under
Chapter VI-A. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant carried the matters in appeal
before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who confirmed the view of the
Assessing Officer by dismissing the same. Therefore, the appellant preferred
appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

 

The Tribunal held that gross total income of the appellant
had got to be computed in accordance with the Act before allowing deductions
under any Section falling under Chapter VI-A and as the gross total income of
the appellant after setting off the business losses of the earlier years was
‘nil’, the appellant was not entitled to any deduction either u/s.80HH or S.
80-I of the Act. In that view of the matter the Tribunal dismissed the appeals
filed by the appellant. The High Court also dismissed the same by judgment dated
July 23, 2001.

 

On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that Ss.(1) of S.
80A lays down that while computing the total income of an assessee, deductions
specified in S. 80C to S. 80U shall be allowed from his gross total income. This
Section has introduced a new concept of ‘gross total income’ as distinguished
from the ‘total income’ i.e., the net or taxable income.

 

Clause (5) of S. 80B defines the expression ‘gross total
income’ to mean the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of
the Act before making any deductions under Chapter VI-A of the Act. It follows,
therefore, that deductions under Chapter VI-A can be given only if the gross
total income is positive and not negative. If the gross total income of the
assessee is determined as ‘nil’, then there is no question of any deduction
being allowed under Chapter VI-A in computing the total income.

 

The Assessing Officer has to take into account the provisions
of S. 71 providing for set-off of loss from one head against income from another
and S. 72 providing for carry forward and set-off of business losses. S. 32(2)
makes provisions for carry forward and set-off of the unabsorbed depreciation of
a particular year. The effect of the abovementioned provisions is that while
computing the total income, the losses carried forward and depreciation have to
be adjusted and thereafter the Assessing Officer has to work out the gross total
income of the assessee.

 

Ss.(2) of S. 80A specifically enacts that the aggregate of
deductions under Chapter VI-A should not exceed the gross total income of the
assessee. If the gross total income is found to be a net loss on account of the
adjustment of losses of the earlier years or ‘nil’, no deduction under this
Chapter can be allowed.

 

As noticed earlier clause (5) of S. 80B of the Act is that
‘gross total income’ to mean the total income computed in accordance with the
provisions of the Act without making any deductions under Chapter VI-A. The
effect of clause (5) of S. 80B of the Act is that “gross total income” will be
arrived at after making the computation as follows :

(i) making deductions under the appropriate computation
provisions;

(ii) including the incomes, if any u/s.60 to u/s.64 in the
total income of the individual;

(iii) adjusting intra-head and/or inter-head losses; and

(iv) setting off brought forward unabsorbed losses and
unabsorbed depreciation, etc.

 


The Supreme Court therefore held that the High Court was
justified in holding that the loss from the oil division was required to be
adjusted before determining the gross total income and as the gross total income
was ‘nil’, the assessee was not entitled to claim deduction under Chapter VI-A
which includes S. 80-I also. The proposition of law, emerging from the above
discussion is that the gross total income of the assessee has first got to be
determined after adjusting losses, etc., and if the gross total income of the
assessee is ‘nil’, the assessee would not be entitled to deductions under
Chapter VI-A of the Act.

levitra

Business expenditure — If income from an activity is assessed as an income, expenditure incurred in respect of that activity should be allowed.

New Page 2

1 Business expenditure — If income from an
activity is assessed as an income, expenditure incurred in respect of that
activity should be allowed.


[Kerala Road Lines v. CIT, (2008) 299 ITR 343 (SC)]

The assessee entered into an agreement with M/s. Peirce
Leslie (India) Ltd. on September 27, 1983, for purchase of 466 cents of land
with buildings thereon at Calicut. It was agreed that the sale deed will either
be got executed in favour of the assessee or its nominees. As per the agreement,
if the purchase price was not paid within the specified time, the assessee was
liable to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum. The buildings standing on
the lands were demolished and the scrap materials were sold for Rs.5,88,001.
This income was treated as business income. Under the agreement, the assessee
had to pay an interest of Rs.4 lakhs for the delayed payment of purchase
consideration.

 

The assessee claimed this amount as a revenue expenditure.
The assessing authority disallowed the claim of the assessee on the ground that
the payment of interest on the purchase of the property would be in the nature
of capital expenditure and not revenue expenditure.

 

This order of the assessing authority was confirmed by the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). It was held that the intention of the
assessee was to enter into an adventure in the nature of trade and ultimately
the assessee had retained only 65.57 cents of land with it and the remaining
land was purchased by the sister concerns of the assessee in small pieces. It
was held that since the assessee was only an intermediary for the other sister
concerns, the part of interest referable to the lands sold to the sister
concerns could not be allowed as revenue expenditure. Thus, the Commissioner of
Income-tax gave part relief and allowed the interest referable to 65.57 cents of
land retained by the assessee. The assessee, being aggrieved, filed an appeal
before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

 

The Tribunal accepted the appeal, set aside the order passed
by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). It was held that the assessee had
entered into an agreement to purchase the entire property including buildings
standing thereon. The buildings were demolished and structures standing thereon
were sold as scrap material for Rs.5,88,001. This sum was offered for assessment
as business income and assessed as such. The payment of interest of Rs.4 lakhs
for the delayed payment of purchase consideration has been provided in the
agreement and thus, the payment of interest was a contractual obligation. It was
held by the Tribunal that, the payment of interest was to be viewed as an
expenditure u/s.37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, especially when the sale
proceeds of the scrap materials from the demolished structures have been treated
as business income and ultimately allowed the claim of the assessee for
deduction of interest.

 

The High Court, without answering the question as to whether
the expenditure is capital or revenue in nature, reversed the decision of the
Tribunal by holding that the assessee was not doing the business in real estate;
that the business of the assessee was transport only and, therefore, the
expenditure would not be covered by the provisions of S. 37(1) of the Act.

 

On appeal to the Supreme Court by the Department, it was held
that once the Revenue has accepted the sum of Rs.5,88,001 (being sale proceeds
from the scrap material of the structures standing on the lands) as business
income, then correspondingly the assessee would be entitled to claim the sum of
Rs.4 lakhs as revenue expenditure paid as interest on the delayed payment of the
purchase consideration.

levitra

Business expenditure — Interest on borrowings — Assessee has to establish, in the first instance, its right to claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38 and in the case of the firm if it claims special deduction, it has also to prov

New Page 2

5 Business expenditure — Interest on
borrowings — Assessee has to establish, in the first instance, its right to
claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38 and in the case
of the firm if it claims special deduction, it has also to prove that it is not
disentitled to claim deduction of applicability of S. 40(b)(iv).


[Munjal Sales Corporation v. CIT, (2008) 298 ITR 298
(SC)]

In August/September, 1991, the appellant-assessee granted
interest-free advances to its sister concerns which were disallowed by the
Department on the ground that the said advances were not given from the firm’s
own funds but from interest bearing loans taken by the assessee-firm from third
parties. Accordingly, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) was
disallowed by the Department for the A.Y. 1992-93.

 

However, the Tribunal deleted the disallowance, saying that
the assessee had given such advance from its own funds. In the next A.Y. 1993-94
, the same situation look place. During the A.Y. 1994-95, no further advances
were made by the assessee-firm in favour of its concerns. However, during the
A.Y. 1995-96, a small interest-free loan of Rs.5 lakhs was advanced by the
assessee-firm to its sister concern and during the year in question the assessee
had profits of Rs.1.91 crores. The said advance/loan got finally repaid in the
A.Y. 1997-98.

 

For the A.Y. 1994-95, the Department disallowed the claim for
deduction u/s.40(b)(iv), saying that in this case there was diversion of funds
by raising of interest-free loans. The Assessing Officer did not accept the
submission of the assessee that advance(s) made by the assessee were out of
income of the firm. According to the Assessing Officer, the said interest-free
advances to sister concerns were out of monies borrowed by the firm from third
parties on payment of interest, hence the assessee was not entitled to deduction
u/s.40(b) of the 1961 Act. This view was confirmed by the Tribunal.

 

For the A.Ys. 1995-96 and 1996-97, the Tribunal held that
during the said years, no interest-free advances to sister concerns were made
and, therefore, there was no nexus between ‘interest-bearing loans’ taken and
‘interest-free advances’. However, the Tribunal found that there was no material
to show that advances were made to sister concerns out of the firm’s own income
and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.40(b)(iv) of the
1961 Act.

 

The Supreme Court after analysing the scheme of the Act and
in particular the provision of S. 36(1)(iii) and S. 40(b), held that every
assessee including a firm has to establish, in the first instance, its right to
claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38 and in the case
of the firm if it claims special deduction it has also to prove that it is not
disentitled to claim deduction by reason of applicability of S. 40(b)(iv).

 

The Supreme Court on the facts held that for the A.Y. 1992-93
and the A.Y. 1993-94, the Tribunal held that the loans given to the sister
concerns were out of the firm’s funds and that were advanced for business
purposes. Once it is found that the loans granted in August/September, 1991
continued up to A.Y. 1997-98 and that the said loans were advanced for business
purposes and that interest paid thereon did not exceed 18/12% per annum, the
assessee was entitled to deductions u/s.36(1)(iii) read with S. 40(b)(iv) of the
1961 Act.

 

Further, the Supreme Court observed that during A.Y. 1995-96,
apart from the loan given in August/September, 1991, the assessee advanced
interest-free loan to its sister concern amounting to Rs.5 lakhs. According to
the Tribunal, there was nothing on record to show that the loans were given to
the sister concern by the assessee-firm out of its own funds and, therefore, it
was not entitled to claim deduction u/s.36(1)(iii).

 

The Supreme Court held that finding of the Tribunal was thus
erroneous. The opening balance as on April 1, 1994, was Rs.1.91 crores, whereas
the loan given to the sister concern was a small amount of Rs.5 lakhs. According
to the Supreme Court, the profits earned by the assessee during the relevant
year were sufficient to cover the impugned loan of Rs.5 lakhs. The Supreme Court
accordingly allowed the appeal.

levitra

Business expenditure — Interest on borrowed capital — Prior to insertion of proviso to S. 36(1)(vi) w.e.f. 1-4-2004, an assessee was entitled to claim deduction of interest on capital borrowed for the purposes of its business, irrespective of its use bein

New Page 2

4 Business expenditure — Interest on borrowed
capital — Prior to insertion of proviso to S. 36(1)(vi) w.e.f. 1-4-2004, an
assessee was entitled to claim deduction of interest on capital borrowed for the
purposes of its business, irrespective of its use being for capital or revenue
purpose.


[Dy. CIT v. Core Health Care Ltd., (2008) 298 ITR 194
(SC)]

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of
manufacture and sale of intravenous solutions. For the A.Y. 1992-93 the assessee
claimed deduction towards expenses aggregating to Rs.2,12,05,459 which included
interest on borrowings of Rs.1,56,76,000 utilised for purchase of machinery.

 

During the assessment year under consideration the assessee
had installed new machinery. The Assessing Officer, disallowed the amount of
Rs.1,56,76,000 placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Challapalli
Sugar Ltd. v. CIT,
(1975) 98 ITR 167, inter alia, on the ground that
during the assessment year under consideration the assessee had installed new
machinery on which production had not started.

 

On appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) confirmed
the addition of interest amount on borrowings of Rs.1,56,76,000. The matter was
carried in appeal by the assessee. The Tribunal held that the Department was not
justified in adding Rs.1,56,76,000 in the income of the assessee. This decision
was confirmed by the High Court.

 

On appeal by the Department, the Supreme Court noted that
before the High Court it was not the case of the Department that a new business
was set up or commenced during the assessment year under consideration. It was
undisputed before the High Court that three additional machines were installed
by the assessee during the assessment year under consideration for the
production of intravenous injectibles.

 

The Supreme Court upon reading the provisions of S.
36(1)(iii) held that interest on moneys borrowed for the purposes of business is
a necessary item of expenditure in a business. For allowance of a claim for
deduction of interest under the said Section, all that is necessary is that,
firstly, the money i.e., capital, must have been borrowed by the assessee;
secondly, it must have been borrowed for the purpose of business; and, thirdly,
the assessee must have paid interest on the borrowed amount. All that is germane
is : whether the borrowing was, or was not, for the purpose of business.

 

The expression ‘for the purpose of business’ occurring in S.
36(1)(iii) indicates that once the test of ‘for the purpose of business’ is
satisfied in respect of the capital borrowed, the assessee would be entitled to
deduction u/s.36(1)(iii). This provision makes no distinction between money
borrowed to acquire a capital asset or a revenue asset. All that the Section
requires is that the assessee must borrow capital and the purpose of the
borrowing must be for business which is carried on by the assessee in the year
of account.

 

What clause (iii) emphasises is the user of the capital and
not the user of the asset which comes into existence as a result of the borrowed
capital unlike S. 37 which expressly excludes an expenses of a capital nature.
The Legislature has, therefore, made no distinction in S. 36(1)(iii) between
‘capital borrowed for a revenue purpose’ and ‘capital borrowed for a capital
purpose’. An assessee is entitled to claim interest paid on borrowed capital
provided that capital is used for business purpose irrespective of what may be
the result of using the capital which the assessee has borrowed.

 

Further, the words ‘actual cost’ do not find place in S.
36(1)(iii) of the 1961 Act. The expression ‘actual cost’ is defined in S. 32,
32A, etc. of the 1961 Act, which is essentially a definition Section which is
subject to the context to the contrary. S. 43(1) defines ‘actual cost’. The
definition of ‘actual cost’ has been amplified by excluding such portion of the
cost as is met directly or indirectly by any other person or authority.
Explanation 8 has been inserted in S. 43(1) by Finance Act, 1986 (23 of 1986),
with retrospective effect from April 1, 1974.

 

It is important to note that the words ‘actual cost’ would
mean the whole cost and not the estimate of cost. ‘Actual cost’ means nothing
more than the cost accurately ascertained. The determination of actual cost in
S. 43(1) has relevance in relation to S. 32 (depreciation allowance), S. 32A
(investment allowance), S. 33 (development rebate allowance), and S. 41
(balancing charge). The ‘actual cost’ of an asset has no relevance in relation
to S. 36(1)(iii) of the 1961 Act, the Supreme Court however observed that in the
present appeal it was concerned with the A.Ys. 1992-93, 1993-94, 1995-96 and
1997-98.

 

The Supreme Court noted that a proviso has been inserted in
S. 36(1)(iii) of the 1961 Act which denies deductions of interest for the period
beginning from the date on which the capital was borrowed for acquisition of
asset till the date on which the asset was first put to use. The Supreme Court
held that proviso has been inserted by the Finance Act, 2003, with effect from
April 1, 2004. Hence, the said proviso will not apply to the facts of the
present case. The Supreme Court therefore held that the said proviso would
operate prospectively.

 

The Supreme Court held that the Assessing Officer was not
justified in making disallowance of Rs.1,56,76,000 in respect of borrowings
utilised for purchase of machines.

 


Note : The said decision was followed in the following
cases :

1. Jt. CIT v. United Phosphorous Ltd., (2008) 299
ITR 9 (SC)

2. ACIT v. Arvind Polycot Ltd., (2008) 299 ITR 12
(SC)

3. Dy. CIT v. Gujarat Alkalies & Chemicals Ltd.,
(2008) 299 ITR 85(SC)

 


In United Phosphorus Ltd.’s case there was another question
regarding option in law to claim partial depreciation in respect of any block of
assets. The matter was remanded back to the High Court.

 

Method of Accounting — Chit fund — Chit discount accounting on completed contract method cannot be rejected especially when it is revenue neutral.

New Page 2

3 Method of Accounting — Chit fund — Chit
discount accounting on completed contract method cannot be rejected especially
when it is revenue neutral.


[CIT v. Bilahari Investment P. Ltd., (2008) 299 ITR I
(SC)]

The assessees are private limited companies subscribing to
chits as their business activities. They were maintaining their accounts on the
mercantile basis and they were computing profit/loss, as the case may be, at the
end of the chit period following the completed contract method, which was
earlier accepted by the Department over several years.

 

However, for the A.Ys. 1991-92 to 1997-98, the Assessing
Officer came to the conclusion that the completed contract method was not
accurate in recognising/identifying ‘income’ under the 1961 Act, and according
to him, therefore, in the context of the ‘chit discount’, the correct method was
deferred revenue expenditure calculated on proportionate basis. In other words,
the Assessing Officer has preferred the percentage of completion method as the
basis for recognising/identifying ‘income’ under the 1961 Act in substitution of
the completed contract method.

 

According to the Department, chit dividend had to be
subjected to tax on accrual basis as the assessees were following the mercantile
system of accounting. As far as the chit dividend is concerned, the Department
rejected the completed contract method as suggested by the assessees, which has
been accepted by the Tribunal and the High Court. However, in the matter of chit
discount, the High Court, overruling the Tribunal, has held that the completed
contract method of accounting adopted by the assessees was valid and that the
Department had erred in spreading the discount over the remaining period of the
chit on proportionate basis.

 

In the matter of chit dividend, the assessees accepted the
view of the Tribunal and the High Court that the completed contract method was
not correct.

 

Before the Supreme Court the limited controversy was whether
the completed contract method of accounting adopted by the assessees as method
of accounting for chit discount was required to be substituted by the percentage
of completion method. The Supreme Court noted that Chit funds are basically
saving schemes in which a certain number of subscribers join together and each
contributes a certain fixed sum each month, the total number of months being
equal to the total number of subscribers. The subscriptions are paid to the
manager of the fund by a certain prescribed date each month and the total
subscriptions to the fund are auctioned each month amongst the subscribers. At
each auction, the lowest bidder is paid the amount of his bid and the balance
received from out of the total subscriptions received is distributed equally
amongst other subscribers, as premium. The manager is paid a certain percentage
of the collections each month on account of expenses and charges for conducting
the auction. In the auction, a maximum amount, which the highest bidder agrees
to forgo, is the amount, which is distributed to the other members, subject to
deduction of the manager’s commission.

 

Before the Supreme Court, it was the case of the assessees
that, profits (loss) accrued to the assessees only when the dividends exceeded
the discount paid and that the difference could be known only on the termination
of the chit when the total figure of dividend received and discount paid would
be available. That, it would be possible for the assessees to make profits only
when the sum total of the dividend received exceeded the sum total of discounts
suffered which is debited to the profit and loss account. According to the
assessees, the Department has all along been accepting the completed contract
method and, therefore, there was no justification in law or in facts for
deviating from the accepted practice. According to the assessees, a chit
transaction has been treated by the various Courts as one single scheme running
for the full period and, therefore, according to the assessees, the completed
contract method adopted by it over the years was not required to be substituted
by any other method of accounting.

 

The Supreme Court observed that recognition/identification of
income under the 1961 Act is attainable by several methods of accounting. It may
be noted that the same result could be attained by any one of the accounting
methods. The completed contract method is one such method. Similarly, the
percentage of completion method is another such method. Under the completed
contract method, the revenue is not recognised until the contract is complete.
Under the said method, costs are accumulated during the course of the contract.
The profit and loss is established in the last accounting period and transferred
to the profit and loss account. The said method determines results only when the
contract is completed. On the other hand, the percentage of completion method
tries to attain periodic recognition of income in order to reflect current
performance. The amount of revenue recognised under this method is determined by
reference to the stage of completion of the contract. The stage of completion
can be looked at under this method by taking into consideration the proportion
that costs incurred to date bear to the estimated total costs of contract.

 

The Supreme Court held that it was concerned with the A.Ys.
1991-92 to 1997-98. In the past, the Department had accepted the completed
contract method and because of such acceptance, the assessees, in these cases,
had followed the same method of accounting, particularly in the context of chit
discount. Every assessee is entitled to arrange its affairs and follow the
method of accounting, which the Department has earlier accepted. It is only in
those cases where the Department records a finding that the method adopted by
the assessee results in distortion of profits, can the Department insist on
substitution of the existing method.

 

Further, in the present cases, the Supreme Court noted from
the various statements produced before us, that the entire exercise, arising out
of change of method from the completed contract method to deferred revenue
expenditure, is revenue neutral. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not wish to
interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court.

 Before concluding, the Supreme Court noted that u/s.211(2) of the Companies Act, Accounting Standards (‘AS’) enacted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India have now been adopted. The learned counsel for the Department, had placed reliance on AS-22 as the basis of his argument that the completed contract method should be substituted by deferred revenue expenditure (spreading the said expenditure on proportionate basis over a period of time). He also relied upon the concept of timing difference introduced by AS-22.

The Supreme Court observed that all these developments were of recent origin and it was open to the Department to consider these new accounting standards and concepts in future cases of chit transactions. The Supreme Court however expressed no opinion in that regard, stating that these new concepts and accounting standards had not been invoked by the Department in the present batch of civil appeals.

Salary — Perquisite — Stock option issued subject to conditions is not a ‘perquisite’ — Law amended by insertion of S. 17(2)(iii)(a) in the Act w.e.f. 1-4-2000 is not retrospective.

New Page 2

10 Salary — Perquisite — Stock option issued
subject to conditions is not a ‘perquisite’ — Law amended by insertion of S.
17(2)(iii)(a) in the Act w.e.f. 1-4-2000 is not retrospective.


[CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd., (2008) 297 ITR 167
(SC)]

The respondent-assessee, a public limited IT company based in
Bangalore, to implement the Employees’ Stock Option Scheme (‘the ESOP’), created
a trust known as Technologies Employees’ Welfare Trust and allotted 7,50,000
warrants at Re.1 each to the said trust. Each warrant entitled the holder
thereof to apply for and be allotted one equity share of the face value of Rs.10
each for a total consideration of Rs.100. The trust was to hold the warrant and
transfer the same to the employees of the company under the terms and conditions
of the scheme governing the ESOP. During the A.Ys. 1997-98, 1998-99 and
1999-2000, warrants were offered to the eligible employees at Re.1 each by the
Trust. They were issued to the employees based on their performance, security
and other criteria. Under the ESOP scheme, every warrant had to be retained for
a minimum period of one year. At the end of that period, the employee was
entitled to elect and obtain shares allotted to him on payment of the balance
Rs.99. The option could be excised at any time after 12 months, but before the
expiry of the period of five years. The allotted shares were subject to a
lock-in period. During the lock-in period, the custody of the shares remained
with the trust. The shares were non-transferable. The employee had to continue
to be in service for 5 years. If he resigned or if his services be terminated
for any reason, he lost his right under the scheme and the shares were to be
re-transferred to the trust for Rs.100 per share. Intimation was also given to
the BSE that 7,34,500 equity shares were non-transferable and would not
constitute good delivery. Till September 13, 1999, all the shares were stamped
with the remark ‘non-transferable’. Thus the said shares were incapable of being
converted into money during the lock-in period.

 

For the A.Y. 1999-2000, the Assessing Officer held that the
total amount paid by the employees, consequent to the exercise of option was
Rs.6.64 crores, whereas the market value of those shares was Rs.171 crores. He
held that the ‘perquisite value’ was the difference between the market value and
the price paid by the employees for exercise of the option. He, therefore,
treated Rs.165 crores as ‘perquisite value’ on which TDS was charged at 30%. It
was held that the respondent-assessee was a defaulter for not deducting TDS
u/s.192 amounting to Rs.49.52 crores on the above perquisites value Rs.165
crores. Similar orders were also passed by the Assessing Officer for the A.Y.s
1997-98 and 1998-99. These orders were confirmed by the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals). No weightage was given by both the authorities to the
lock-in period. Both the authorities took into account the ‘perquisite value’ as
on the date of exercise of option. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decisions, the
respondent-assessee carried the matter in appeal to the Tribunal, which took the
view that the right granted to the employee for participating in the scheme was
not a ‘perquisite’ u/s.17(2)(iii) of the Act. This decision of the Tribunal
stood confirmed by the judgment delivered by the Karnataka High Court on
December 15, 2006. On civil appeals by the Department, the Supreme Court noted
that during the A.Ys. 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000, there was no provision in
the Act which made the benefit by way of ESOP taxable as income specifically. It
became specifically taxable only with effect from April 1, 2000, when S. 17(2)(iii)(a)
stood inserted. However, the issue before it was not with regards to the
taxability of the perquisite, but was with regards to the value of perquisite.
The Supreme Court held that a warrant is a right without an obligation to buy.
Therefore, a ‘perquisite’ cannot be said to accrue at the time when warrants
were granted. The same would be the position when options vested in the
employees after a lapse of 12 months, as it was open to the employees not to
avail of the benefit of option. It was open to the employees to resign and there
was no certainty that the option would be exercised. Further, the shares were
not transferable for a period of 5 years (lock-in-period). If an employee
resigned during the lock-in-period the shares had to be retransferred. During
the lock-in-period, possession of the shares remained with the trust. The shares
were not transferable and it was not open to hypothecate or pledge the said
shares during the lock-in-period. During the said period, the shares had no
realisable value, hence, there was no cash inflow to the employees on account of
mere exercise of options. On the date when the option was exercised, it was not
possible for the employees to foresee the future market value of the shares.
Therefore, the benefit, if any, which arose on the date when the option stood
exercised was only a notional benefit whose value was unascertainable. The
difference in the market value of shares on the date of exercise of option and
the total amount paid by the employees consequent upon exercise of the said
option therefore cannot be treated as perquisite. The Supreme Court further held
that S. 17(2)(iii)(a) inserted by the Finance Act, 1997 w.e.f. 1-4-2000 was not
clarificatory and retrospective in operation because till 1-4-2000, in the
absence of the definition of ‘cost’, the value of the option was
unascertainable. The Supreme Court held that the Department was not justified in
treating Rs.165 crores as the perquisite value for the A.Y.s 1997-98 to
1999-2000 and the assessee was not in default for not deducting tax thereon.

levitra

Export — Deduction u/s.80 HHC — Export profits in the business of growing, manufacturing and exporting of tea — Deduction u/s.80 HHC to be computed after apportionment, only against 40% of proportionate income

New Page 2

8 Export — Deduction u/s.80 HHC — Export
profits in the business of growing, manufacturing and exporting of tea —
Deduction u/s.80 HHC to be computed after apportionment, only against 40% of
proportionate income.


[CIT v. Williamson Financial Services & Ors., (2007)
297 ITR 17 (SC)]

Rule 8(1) of the Rules provides that 40% of the composite
income from sale of tea, grown and manufactured, arrived at on making of the
apportionment “shall be deemed to be income liable to tax”.

 

The assessee exported tea in the accounting year. They were
entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC, in respect of the export. They were in the
business of growing and manufacturing tea. Since they earned composite income,
their case stood covered by Rule 8(1). In the returns, the assessee claimed S.
80HHC deduction against the entire composite income before application of Rule
8(1). This working was rejected by the Assessing Officer who took the view that
the deduction u/s.80HHC can be allowed after the 60 : 40 apportionment as 40%
income was the gross total income. However, in appeal, the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) reversed the decision of the Assessing Officer by holding
that the Assessing Officer should have first granted the S. 80HHC deduction
against the entire tea income before applying Rule 8(1). Against the said
decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the matter was carried in
appeal to the Tribunal who took the view that the Assessing Officer was right in
allowing S. 80HHC deduction only against part of the income from tea, which was
taxable under the 1961 Act, namely, 40% of the income. This view of the Tribunal
stood reversed by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
‘Agricultural income’ falls in the category of exempted income. It is neither
chargeable nor includible in the total income. On the other hand, deduction
under Chapter VI-A is for ‘income’ which forms part of total income but which is
tax-free. Rule 8(1) segregates agricultural income which is exempted income from
business income which is chargeable to tax. Therefore, to the extent of 40% only
the income is chargeable and computable. In this view of the matter, the
assessee cannot claim S. 80HHC(3)(c) deduction u/s.80HHC(3)(a) against the
entire tea composite income and can claim only against proportionate income.

Export — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Amendment made by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991, in S. 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, with effect from April 1, 1992, to the effect that for the purpose of the special deduction thereunder business profits will not inclu

New Page 2

9 Export — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Amendment
made by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1991, in S. 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
with effect from April 1, 1992, to the effect that for the purpose of the
special deduction thereunder business profits will not include receipts by way
of brokerage, commission, interest, service charges, etc., is only prospective
in nature.


[K. K. Doshi & Co. v. CIT, (2008) 297 ITR 38 (SC)]

The Bombay High Court in CIT v. K. K. Doshi & Co.,
(2000) 245 ITR 849 (Bom.) had held that amendment in law from the A.Y. 1992-93
that the business profits would not include receipts by way of brokerage,
commission, interest, rent charges or any other receipt of a similar nature was
clarificatory in nature and therefore retrospective in operation. On an appeal,
the Supreme Court following its decision in P. R. Prabhakar (2006) 284 ITR 548
(SC) held that the amendment in question was prospective in nature.

levitra

Substantial Question of Law — Whether reassessment made without issue of notice u/s.143(2) of the Act is invalid, is a substantial question of law.

New Page 1

 13 Substantial Question of Law — Whether
reassessment made without issue of notice u/s.143(2) of the Act is invalid, is a
substantial question of law.


[L. N. Hota and Company v. CIT, (2008) 301 ITR 184
(SC)]

The Assessing Officer issued a notice on 3-12-1998 to the
assessee u/s.148 of the Act, requiring the assessee to file the return of its
income for the A.Y. 1997-98, which was served on 7-12-1998. The assessee filed
the return of income on 5-1-1999, whereafter the AO issued a notice u/s.142(1)
on 28-6-2000. The AO, vide his order dated 27-11-2000, completed the assessment
estimating the income of the assessee from the business by applying the
provisions of S. 145 of the Act. The assessee’s appeal was dismissed by the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) vide his order dated 4-1-2002 without
adjudicating the issue of legality of the assessment. An application u/s.154 was
also rejected by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) vide his order dated
25-2-2002. The Tribunal vide its order dated 13-4-2004, rejected the priority
prayer of the assessee that assessment made without issuance of notice
u/s.143(2) within a period of one year was invalid, but on the merits of the
case, remanded the matter to the AO. On appeal, the Orissa High Court in its
order dated 14-8-2006 dismissing the appeal held that as the assessment order
had not come about by way of scrutiny, the provisions of S. 143(2) would not be
applicable. On an appeal by way of special leave to the Supreme Court, it was
held that though the question of the applicability of S. 143(2) was specifically
raised throughout, prima facie, no finding based on law as it stood, had
been recorded. The Supreme Court therefore remitted the matter to the High Court
for a fresh decision in accordance with the law.

 

 

levitra

Depreciation — Membership card of Bombay Stock Exchange is an ‘intangible asset’ on which depreciation is allowable u/s.32(1)(ii).

Glimpses of supreme court rulings

12. Depreciation — Membership card of Bombay Stock Exchange
is an ‘intangible asset’ on which depreciation is allowable u/s.32(1)(ii).


[Techno Shares and Stocks Ltd. v. CIT, (2010) 327 ITR
323 (SC)]

The assessee-company filed its return of income for the A.Y.
1999-2000, disclosing a loss of Rs.10,77,276. The return was processed
u/s.143(1) on November 8, 2000. The case stood re-opened u/s.147 and the notice
u/s.148 was issued to the assessee on July 16, 2002. The assessee filed its
return of income under protest. The assessee filed its return of income pursuant
to the notice u/s.148 once again declaring loss of Rs.10,77,276, the same as was
in the original return of income. The main reason for reopening of the
assessment u/s.147 was the claim of depreciation by the assessee on the BSE
membership card amounting to Rs.23,65,000. The claim of depreciation of the
assessee was based on S. 32(1)(ii) which stood inserted by the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 1998, with effect from April 1, 1999. However, the said Section deals with
claims for depreciation of items acquired on or after April 1, 1998. The
assessee claimed before the Assessing Officer that the BSE membership card is a
‘licence’ or ‘business or commercial right of similar nature’ u/s.32(1)(ii) and
is, therefore, an intangible asset eligible for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii), the
submission of which was not accepted by the Assessing Officer. It was held that
membership is only a personal permission which is non-transferable and which
does not devolve automatically on legal heirs and, therefore, it is not a
privately owned asset. That, there is no ownership of an asset and that what
ultimately can be sold is only a right to nomination. Further, according to the
Assessing Officer, in the case of BSE membership, there is no obsolescence, wear
and tear or diminution in value by its use, hence, the assessee was not entitled
to claim depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii). This decision of the AO stood affirmed by
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved by the said decision of the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals), the assessee carried the matter in appeal to the Tribunal
which took the view that since the assessee had acquired a right to trade on the
floor of the BSE through the membership card, it was entitled to depreciation
u/s.32(1)(ii) of the 1961 Act. That, the said card is a capital asset through
which the right to trade on the floor of the BSE is acquired and since it is an
intangible asset the said assessee was entitled to depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii).

Against the said decision, the Department carried the matter
in appeal to the High Court which came to the conclusion, following certain
decisions of the Supreme Court, that the BSE membership card is only a personal
privilege granted to a member to trade in shares on the floor of the stock
exchange; that such a privilege cannot be equated with the expression ‘licence’
or ‘any other business or commercial rights of similar nature’ u/s.32(1)(ii);
that, there is a difference between acquiring a know-how, patent, copyright or
trade mark or franchise; that the expression ‘business or commercial rights of
similar nature’ in S. 32(1)(ii) of the 1961 Act would take its colour from the
preceding words. Namely, know-how, patent, copyright, trade mark and franchise
which belong to a class of intellectual property rights and applying the rule of
ejusdem generis, the High Court held that the expression ‘licence’ as well as
the expression ‘business or commercial right of similar nature’ in S. 32(1)(ii)
of the 1961 Act are referable to IPRs such as know-how, patent, copyright, trade
mark and franchise and since the BSE membership card does not fall in any of the
above categories, the claim for depreciation was not admissible on the BSE
membership card acquired by the assessee u/s.32(1)(ii). Consequently, the
appeals filed by the Department stood allowed.

On civil appeals against the decision of the High Court, the
Supreme Court observed that the question which it was required to examine was —
whether the right of nomination in the non-defaulting continuing member comes
within the expression ‘business or commercial right of similar nature’ in S.
32(1)(ii) of the 1961 Act ?

The Supreme Court held that on the analysis of the Rules of
the BSE, it was clear that the right of membership (including right of
nomination) got vested in the exchange on the demise/default committed by the
member; that, on such forfeiture and vesting in the exchange that the same got
disposed off by inviting offers and the consideration received thereof was used
to liquidate the dues owned by the former/defaulting member to the exchange,
clearing house, etc. (see Rule 16 and bye-law 400). It was this right of
membership which allowed the non-defaulting member to participate in the trading
season on the floor of the exchange. Thus, the said membership right was a
‘business or commercial right’ conferred by the rules of the BSE on the
non-defaulting continuing member.

The next question was — whether the membership right could be said to be owned by the assessee and used for the business purpose in terms of S. 32(1)(ii). The Supreme Court held that its answer was in affirmative for the reason that the rules and bye-laws analysed hereinabove indicated that the right of nomination vested in the exchange only when a member committed default. Otherwise, he continued to participate in the trading session on the floor of the exchange; that he continued to deal with other members of the exchange and even had the right to nominate a subject to compliance with the Rules. Moreover, by virtue of Explanation 3 to S. 32(1)(ii) the commercial or business right which was similar to a ‘licence’ or ‘franchise’ was declared to be an intangible asset. Moreover, under Rule 5, membership was a personal permission from the exchange which was nothing but a ‘licence’ which enabled the member to exercise rights and privileges attached thereto. It was this licence which enabled the member to trade on the floor of the exchange and to participate in the trading session on the floor of the exchange. It was this licence which enabled the member to access the market. Therefore, the right of membership which included right of nomination, was a ‘licence’ which was one of the items which fell in S. 32(1)(ii) of the 1961 Act. The right to participate in the market had an economic and money value. It was an expense incurred by the assessee which satisfied the test of being a ‘licence’ or ‘any other business or commercial right of similar nature’ in terms of S. 32(1)(ii).

The Supreme Court however clarified that the present judgment was strictly confined to the rights of membership conferred upon the member under the BSE membership card during the relevant assessment years. This judgment should not be understood to mean that every business or commercial right would constitute a ‘licence’ or a ‘franchise’ in terms S. 32(1)(ii) of the 1961 Act.

Business expenditure — Foreign exchange borrowings — Loss on account of fluctuation in rate of foreign exchange on the last date of balance sheet — If the borrowings are on revenue account, the loss is allowable as deduction u/s.37(1) and if the same is o

New Page 1

 25 Business expenditure — Foreign exchange borrowings — Loss
on account of fluctuation in rate of foreign exchange on the last date of
balance sheet — If the borrowings are on revenue account, the loss is allowable
as deduction u/s.37(1) and if the same is on capital account, prior to its
amendment of S. 43A w.e.f. 1-4-2003, even if the repayment is not due, the cost
of the asset acquired is to be increased.

The assessee, a public sector undertaking, substantially
owned by the Government of India, was engaged in capital intensive exploration
and production of petroleum products for which it had to heavily depend on
foreign loan to cover its expenses, both capital and revenue, on import of
machinery on capital account and for payment to non-resident contractors in
foreign currency for various services rendered. The assessee had made three
types of foreign exchange borrowings : (i) in revenue account; (ii) in capital
account, and (iii) for general purposes, partly utilised in revenue account and
partly in capital account. As per terms and conditions of foreign exchange
borrowings, some of the loans became repayable in the year under consideration
but the date of repayment of some loans fell after the end of the relevant
accounting year. The assessee revalued in Indian currency all its foreign
exchange loans in revenue account, capital account as also in its general
purposes account, outstanding as on March 31, 1991 and claimed the difference
between their respective amounts in Indian currency as on 31st March, 1990 and
on March 31, 1991 as revenue loss u/s.37(1) of the Act in respect of loans used
in revenue account, and also took into consideration the similar difference in
foreign exchange on capital account loans as an increased liability u/s. 43A of
the Act for the purposes of depreciation. The foreign exchange loss incurred by
the assessee in the revenue account, on account of repayment of these loans made
in the year under consideration was allowed by the Assessing Officer as a
deduction u/s.37(1) of the Act, and he also took into consideration an increased
liability of foreign exchange loans taken in capital account and repaid in the
accounting year, for the purposes of depreciation, u/s.43A of the Act. He,
however, did not allow to the assessee its claim for foreign exchange loss
claimed on such foreign currency loans both in revenue account and in capital
account which were outstanding on the last day of the accounting year under
consideration and were as per the terms of borrowings repayable after the end of
the relevant accounting year. Similar treatment was given to the foreign
exchange loans for general purposes, used partly in revenue account and partly
in capital account. Thus, the assessee’s claim for foreign exchange
loss/increased liability on revaluation of these foreign exchange loans at the
end of the accounting year under consideration both in the revenue account and
capital account as also on loans used partly in revenue account and partly in
capital account, made on the ground that it had followed mercantile system of
accounting in this regards, was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. According
to the Assessing Officer, such a loss could be allowed to the assessee on
discharge of liability at the time of actual repayment of these loans.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeal before the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Inso-far as the assessee’s claim for
foreign exchange loss in revenue account was concerned, the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) affirmed the view taken by the Assessing Officer on the
ground that it was a notional liability and the same had not crystallised or
accrued in the relevant assessment year. However, as regards the adjustment for
increased liability made by the assessee for the purposes of S. 43A of the Act
in respect of foreign exchange loans in capital account, which were outstanding
as on March 31, 1991, the Commissioner accepted the stand of the assessee and
directed the Assessing Officer to allow the benefit of such increased liability
for computation of depreciation allowance on plant and machinery purchased out
of such foreign exchange loans for the assessment year under consideration.

Being dissatisfied, both the assessee as well as the Revenue
carried the matter in further appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (for
short ‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal observed that the method of accounting
adopted by the assessee right from the A.Y. 1982-83 is mercantile system; it has
been consistently claiming loss suffered by it on account of fluctuation in
foreign exchange rates on accrual basis; in respect of the A.Y. 1982-83 to
1986-87, the assessee’s claim on this account had been allowed by the Assessing
Officer himself; in respect of the A.Y. 1997-98, the assessee had shown a gain
of Rs.293.37 crores on account of fluctuation in foreign exchange because of the
Indian rupee had appreciated as compared to the foreign currency and that the
said amount was taxed as the assessee’s income. Taking all these factors into
consideration, the Tribunal held that the loss claimed by the assessee on
revenue account was allowable u/s.37(1) of the Act. The appeal preferred by the
Revenue on the question whether the assessee was entitled to adjust the actual
cost of imported assets acquired in foreign currency on account of fluctuation
in the rate of exchange, in terms of S. 43A of the Act, was also dismissed.

For the A.Ys. 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1997-98 similar
findings were given by the Tribunal. The Revenue took the matter in further
appeal to the High Court. By a common judgment pertaining to the A.Ys. 1991-92
to 1994-95 and 1997-98, the High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal on
both the issues. Terming the order of the Tribunal as perverse, having been
passed without any material on record and against the statutory provisions, the
High Court held that the foreign exchange loss by the assessee being only a
contingent and notional liability, it was not allowable as deduction u/s.37(1)
of the Act. Insofar as the applicability of S. 43A of the Act was concerned, the
High Court observed that the said provision is confined only to those
liabilities which have become due as per the terms and conditions of written
agreement between the assessee and the foreign creditors but since in the
present case, no such agreement was made available by the assessee at any stage
of the proceedings, the claim of the assessee was not justified. According to
the High Court, the variation in foreign exchange was neither quantified, nor
had it become due or repaid and, therefore, deductions on that account had been
allowed by the Tribunal without application of mind and were, therefore,
illegal.

On an appeal by the assessee, the Supreme Court was of the
opinion that the ratio of the decision in CIT v. Woodward Governor of India P.
Ltd., (2009) ITR 254 (SC) squarely applied to the facts at hand and, therefore,
the loss claimed by the assessee on account of fluctuation in the rate of
foreign exchange as on the date of balance sheet was allowable as expenditure
u/s.37(1) of the Act.

The Supreme
Court further held that all the assessment years in question being prior to the
amendment in S. 43A of the Act (made with effect from April 1, 2003), the
assessee would be entitled to adjust the actual cost of the imported capital
assets, capital assets acquired in foreign currency, on account of fluctuation in
the rate of exchange at each of the relevant balance sheet dates pending actual
payment of the varied liability.

 

[Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. CIT,
(2010) 322 ITR 180 (SC)]

Loan in foreign currency for acquisition of capital asset — Forward contract for obtaining foreign currency at a pre-determined rate — Roll-over charges paid to carry forward the contract have to be capitalised in view of S. 43A.

New Page 1

 

24 Loan in foreign currency for acquisition of capital asset
— Forward contract for obtaining foreign currency at a pre-determined rate —
Roll-over charges paid to carry forward the contract have to be capitalised in
view of S. 43A.

The assessee was engaged in the manufacture of gears and
mechanical handling equipment. It procured a foreign currency loan for expansion
of existing business. Since the repayment of loan was stipulated in instalments,
the assessee wanted to ensure that foreign currency required for repayment of
the loan be obtained at a pre-determined rate and cost. Accordingly, the
assessee booked forward contracts with Citibank for delivery of the required
foreign currency on the stipulated dates. The contract was entered into for the
entire outstanding amount and the delivery of foreign currency was obtained
under the contract for instalment due from time to time. The balance value of
the contract, after deducting the amount withdrawn towards repayment, was rolled
for a further period up to the date of the next instalment. The assessee filed
its return of income for the A.Y. 1986-87 on June 30, 1986. A revised return was
filed by it on March 27, 1989, declaring a total income of Rs.2,10,08,640. The
Assessing Officer disallowed an amount of Rs.8,86,280, being the roll-over
premium charges paid by the assessee in respect of foreign exchange forward
contracts to Citibank N.A. on the ground that the said charges were incurred in
connection with the purchase of a capital asset (plant and machinery), hence, it
was not admissible for deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) or u/s.37 of the Act. On appeal,
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the roll-over premium charges
incurred by the assessee were allowable as they were incurred by the assessee to
mitigate the risk involved in higher payment because of adverse fluctuation of
rate of exchange. According to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals),
roll-over premium charges constituted an expenditure incurred for raising loans
on revenue account, hence, the said expenditure was allowable under the Act.

The Tribunal held that roll-over premium charges (carry
forward charges) were required to be paid to the authorised dealer as
consideration for permitting the unutilised amount of the contract (balance
value of the contract) to be availed of at a later date and in the circumstances
the roll-over premium charges had to be capitalised under Explanation 3 to S.
43A of the said Act. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the order of the
assessment.

The High Court came to the conclusion that the roll-over
premium charges paid by the assessee were in the nature of interest or committal
charges, hence, the said charges were allowable u/s.36(l)(iii) of the said Act.

The Supreme Court observed that S. 43A, before its
substitution by a new S. 43A vide the Finance Act, 2002, was inserted by the
Finance Act, 1967, with effect from April 1, 1967, after the devaluation of the
rupee on June 6, 1966. It applied where as a result of change in the rate of
exchange there was an increase or reduction in the liability of the assessee in
terms of the Indian rupee to pay the price of any asset payable in foreign
exchange or to repay moneys borrowed in foreign currency specifically for the
purpose of acquiring an asset. The Section has no application unless an asset
was acquired and the liability existed, before the change in the rate of
exchange. When the assessee buys an asset at a price, its liability to pay the
same arises simultaneously. This liability can increase on account of
fluctuation in the rate of exchange. An assessee who becomes the owner of an
asset (machinery) and starts using the same, becomes entitled to depreciation
allowance. To work out the amount of depreciation, one has to look to the cost
of the asset in respect of which depreciation is claimed. S. 43A was introduced
to mitigate hardships which were likely to be caused as a result of fluctuation
in the rate of exchange. S. 43A lays down, firstly, that the increase or
decrease in liability should be taken into account to modify the figure of
actual cost and, secondly, such adjustment should be made in the year in which
the increase or decrease in liability arises on account of fluctuation in the
rate of exchange. It is for this reason that though S. 43A begins with a non
obstante clause, it makes S. 43(1) its integral part. This is because S. 43A
requires the cost to be recomputed in terms of S. 43A for the purpose of
depreciation [S. 32 and 43(1)]. A perusal of S. 43A makes it clear that insofar
as the depreciation is concerned, it has to be allowed on the actual cost of the
asset, less depreciation that was actually allowed in respect of earlier years.
However, where the cost of the asset subsequently increased on account of
devaluation, the written down value of the asset has to be taken on the basis of
the increased cost minus the depreciation earlier allowed on the basis of the
old cost. U/s.43A, as it stood at the relevant time, it was, inter alia,
provided that where an assessee had acquired an asset from a country outside
India for the purpose of his business, and in consequence of a change in the
rate of exchange at any time after such acquisition, there is an increase or
reduction in the liability of the assessee as expressed in Indian currency for
making payment towards the whole or part of the cost of the asset or for
repayment of the whole or part of the moneys borrowed by him for the purpose of
acquiring the asset, the amount by which the liability stood increased or
reduced during the previous year shall be added to or reduced from the actual
cost of the asset as defined in S. 43(1). This analysis indicated that during
the relevant assessment year adjustment to the actual cost was required to be
done each year on the closing date, i.e., year end. Subsequently, S. 43A
underwent a drastic change by virtue of a new S. 43A inserted vide the Finance
Act, 2002. Under the new S. 43A, such adjustment to the cost had to be done only
in the year in which actual payment is made. The Supreme Court noted that in
this case, it was not concerned with the position emerging after the Finance
Act, 2002. Under Explanation 3 to S. 43A, if the assesse had covered his
liability in foreign exchange by entering into forward contract with an
authorised dealer for the purchase of foreign exchange, the gain or loss arising
from such forward contract was required to be taken into account.

According to the assessee, S. 43A was not applicable in this
case as there was no increase or reduction in liability because such roll-over
charges were paid to avoid increase or reduction in liability consequent upon
change in the rate of exchange.

The Supreme Court held that during the relevant assessment years, S.
43A applied to the entire liability remaining outstanding at the year end, and
it was not restricted merely to the instalments actually paid during the year.
Therefore, at the relevant time, the year-end liability of the asessee had to
be looked into. Further, it could not be said that the roll-over charges had
nothing to do with the fluctuation in the rate of exchange. In the present
case, the notes to the accounts for the year ended December 31, 1986 (Schedule
17) indicated adverse fluctuations in the exchange rate in respect of
liabilities pertaining to the assets acquired. This note clearly established
the existence of adverse fluctuations in the exchange rate which made the
assessee opt for forward cover and which made the assessee pay the roll-over
charges. The word ‘adverse’ in the note itself pre-supposes increase in the
liability incurred by the assessee during the year ending December 31, 1986. In
the circumstances, the Supreme Court found no merit in the contention of the
assessee that roll-over charges had nothing to do with the fluctuation in the
rate of exchange.

 

According to the Supreme Court, roll-over
charges represented the difference arising on account of change in foreign
exchange rates. The Supreme Court therefore held that roll-over charges
paid/received in respect of liabilities relating to the acquisition of fixed
assets should be debited/credited to the asset in respect of which liability
was incurred. However, roll-over charges not relating to fixed assets should be
charged to the profit and loss account.

Charitable Trust — For claiming benefit u/s.11(1)(a), registration u/s.12A is a condition precedent.

New Page 2

7 Charitable Trust — For claiming benefit
u/s.11(1)(a), registration u/s.12A is a condition precedent.


[U.P. Forest Corporation & Anr. v. Dy. CIT, (2008) 297
ITR 1 (SC)]

The U.P. Forest Corporation, the appellant, was constituted
by a Notification issued u/s.3 of the U.P. Forest Corporation Act, 1974. In the
year 1977, the Income-tax authorities issued a notice to the corporation to file
its return of income for the A.Y. 1976-77. The corporation challenged the said
notice by filing writ petition which was disposed of by the High Court by
holding that the corporation was a local authority u/s.10(20) of the Act and was
entitled to claim exemption. Since the said order was not challenged by the
Revenue, the same became final and remained in force till a contrary view was
taken by the Supreme Court in respect of the A.Ys. 1977-78, 1980-81 and 1984-85
in the case of CIT v. U.P. Forest Corporation, reported in (1998) 230 ITR
945.

 

For the A.Y. 1977-78, the corporation’s income was assessed
by making some additions of income and deleting some deductions claimed in the
return of income. On an appeal being filed, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld
that the corporation was exempt from paying tax, on the ground that it was a
‘local authority’ within the meaning of S. 10(20) of the Act. Insofar as the
relief sought regarding additions of income and deleting of deductions is
concerned, the Commissioner declined to decide the said issue. The Tribunal set
aside the said order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the corporation
was not a ‘local authority’ and remanded the appeals to the Commissioner
(Appeals) for rehearing on the merits on the issue of grant of relief relating
to additions/deductions. Since the corporation was also assessed for the A.Y.
1984-85 as was assessed for the A.Y. 1977-78, the corporation preferred writ
petition before the High Court of Allahabad which was accepted, and the High
Court declared that the corporation was a ‘local authority’ and was entitled to
exemption u/s.10(20) of the Act. It was held that it was entitled to exemption
u/s.11(1)(a) of the Act being a charitable institution.

 

Aggrieved by the said order, the Department chose to file
special leave petition before the Supreme Court, wherein leave was granted and
ultimately the appeals were accepted and order passed by the High Court was set
aside. It was held that even though S. 3(3) of the U.P. Forest Corporation Act
regards the corporation as being a local authority for the purpose of the Act,
it would not, in law, make the corporation a local authority for the purpose of
S. 10(20) of the Act. On the question whether the corporation was to get itself
registered u/s.12A of the Act for invoking the provisions of S. 11(1)(a) of the
Act to claim exemption being a charitable institution, it was held that since
the question had not been raised before any of the authorities below, the High
Court should have remanded the case back to either the assessing authority or
the Tribunal for a decision. The Supreme Court, under the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, directed the assessing authority to consider the
claim of the appellant-corporation as to whether the appellant was not liable to
be taxed in view of the provisions of S. 11(1)(a) of the Act as a charitable
institution.

 

In the meantime, following the decision of the High Court in
W.P., the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeals of the corporation in
respect of the A.Ys. 1977-78 and 1980-81 allowing exemption u/s.10(20) and S.
11(1)(a) of the Act.

 

The appellant-corporation, on July 11, 1988, moved an
application before the competent authority for being registered u/s.12A of the
Act, which was rejected after a gap of nine years on March 18, 1997.

Against the said rejection, the corporation filed writ
petition before the High Court during the pendency of which the corporation
filed another application for the purpose on May 4, 1998. The High Court allowed
the writ petition and set aside the order of the competent authority rejecting
the application of the corporation for registration, on the ground that the
Commissioner had passed an order in violation of the principles of natural
justice inasmuch as the appellant-corporation had not been given an opportunity
of hearing and directed the Commissioner to redecide the corporation’s
application for registration after giving an opportunity of hearing to the
corporation. The Commissioner decided against the corporation against which
order an appeal filed by the corporation before the Tribunal at Lucknow is
pending decision.

 

After the matter was remanded by the Supreme Court in the
case of CIT v. U.P. Forest Corporation, (1998) 3 SCC 530, the assessing
authority held that the appellant was not a charitable institution and assessed
the income in respect of the A.Ys. 1977-78, 1980-81 and 1984-85 to tax. The
Commissioner (Appeals) partly allowed the appeals of the appellant-corporation
granting some relief on issues of additions/deductions. The
appellant-corporation as also the Revenue filed appeals against the said order
before the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeals filed by the Revenue and
set aside the relief granted to the corporation on the issue of
additions/deductions, on the ground that this Court had remanded the matter only
to decide one issue. Being aggrieved, the corporation filed an appeal u/s.260A
of the Act before the High Court. The High Court remanded the matter to the
Tribunal for considering the matter afresh. Aggrieved by the said order, the
corporation filed appeal before the Supreme Court. The Revenue also filed an
appeal against the said order. The Revenue also challenged a subsequent order
passed by the High Court, wherein the above question had not been decided in
view of the pendency of the aforementioned appeals. The Supreme Court held that
for claiming benefit u/s.11(1)(a), registration u/s.12A is a condition
precedent. Unless and until an institution is registered u/s.12A of the Act, it
cannot claim the benefit of S. 11(1)(a) of the Act. Keeping in view the fact
that the appellant-corporation had not been granted registration u/s.12A of the
Act, it was held that the appellant was not entitled to claim exemption from
payment of tax u/s.11(1)(a) and u/s.12 of the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed
the appeals filed by the corporation without deciding the merits of the dispute.
In view of the dismissal of these appeals, the appeals filed by the Revenue were
also dismissed. However, in order to protect the interest of the assessee as
well as the Revenue, the Tribunal was directed to take up the matter on priority
basis and decide the same as expeditiously as possible without being influenced
by any of the findings recorded by the High Court in its order.

National Tax Tribunal — Petitions to be heard after the amendments in the provisions of the Act were made.

New Page 1

15 National Tax Tribunal — Petitions to be heard after the
amendments in the provisions of the Act were made.


[Sandeep Goyal v. UOI, (2008) 298 ITR 10 (SC)]

The Supreme Court noted the various provisions which were
under challenge in the petitions filed and the contents of the affidavit filed
by the Union of India stating that it would make appropriate amendments in the
Act in this regard. The Supreme Court was of the view that it would be proper to
examine the matter after such amendments as the Government may think appropriate
are made. Liberty was granted to mention the matter for listing after the
amendments in the provisions were made.

levitra

Diversion overriding title — Whether the payment of citizen tax payable to the employees who were Japanese citizens constituted an overriding charge on the salary and therefore would not be income of such employees and consequently no tax was to be deduct

New Page 1

23 Diversion overriding title — Whether the payment of
citizen tax payable to the employees who were Japanese citizens constituted an
overriding charge on the salary and therefore would not be income of such
employees and consequently no tax was to be deducted at source — Matter remanded
to the Tribunal.

The assessee, a Japanese organisation set up for transmission
of news and broadcasting, paid salary to its employees. It also paid some
housing allowance.

The Assessing Officer included citizens tax as a part of the
income of the expatriates employed by the assessee-company in India as part of
the employee’s income on the ground that it was an amount paid by the assessee
to its employees. According to the Assessing Officer, the assessee ought to have
deducted tax at source at the time of payment.

On appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that
citizen tax was a statutory levy in Japan on the Japanese citizens and such tax
constituted an overriding charge on the salary income and, therefore, the same
had to be excluded in computation of taxable income. This view of the
Commissioner (Appeals) was upheld by the Tribunal.

The High Court took the view that in view of the concurrent
finding of fact, no interference was called for and the appeal was dismissed
accordingly.

The Supreme Court was however of the view that the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) ought to have examined the provisions of
the Citizen Individual Inhabitant Tax Act which was a Japanese law and it ought
to have analysed the provisions of that law, particularly when it was required
to decide the question as to the nature of the levy being an overriding charge
on the salary income, as stated hereinabove. The controversy in the present case
was that whether citizens tax was a statutory levy in Japan on the Japanese
citizens constituting an overriding charge. If it was an overriding charge, then
of course the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was right in saying that it
would not be an income. However, according to the Supreme Court, since the
provisions of the Act had not been examined, the matter needed to be considered
afresh by the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remitted the matter to
the Tribunal for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The Supreme Court
did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.

[CIT v. NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation, (2010) 322
ITR 628 (SC)]

 

levitra

Heads of income — Business income or income from other sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank of surplus fund — Income from other sources — No deduction u/s.80P is allowable as it is not a part of operational income.

New Page 1

 22 Heads of income — Business income or income from other
sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank of surplus fund — Income
from other sources — No deduction u/s.80P is allowable as it is not a part of
operational income.

The assessee, a co-operative credit society, which provides
credit facilities to its members and also markets the agricultural product of
its members, during the relevant assessment years in question, had surplus funds
which it invested in short-term deposits with banks and in Government
securities. Interest accrued to the assessee on such investments.

The Assessing Officer held that the interest income which the
assessee had disclosed under the head ‘Income from business’ was liable to be
taxed under the head ‘Income from other sources’. According to the Assessing
Officer the assessee-society had invested the surplus funds as and by way of
investment by an ordinary investor, hence, interest on such investment has got
to be taxed under the head ‘Income from other sources’. Before the Assessing
Officer, it was argued by the assesssee that it had invested the funds on
short-term basis as the funds were not required immediately for business
purposes and, consequently, such act of investment constituted a business
activity by a prudent businessman; therefore, such interest income was liable to
be taxed u/s.28 and not u/s.56 of the Act, and, consequently, the assessee was
entitled to deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. This argument was rejected by
the Assessing Officer as also by the Tribunal and the High Court, hence, the
civil appeal was filed by the assessee before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the assessee-society regularly
invested funds not immediately required for business purposes. Interest on such
investments, therefore, could not fall within the meaning of the expression
‘profits and gains of business’. Such interest income cannot be said also to be
attributable to the activities of the society, namely, carrying on the business
of providing credit facilities to its members or marketing of the agricultural
produce of its members. The Supreme Court was of the view that such interest
income would come in the category of ‘Income from other sources’, hence, such
interest income would be taxed u/s.56 of the Act.

The Supreme Court further held that to say that the source of
income is not relevant for deciding the applicability of S. 80P of the Act would
not be correct because weightage need to be given to the words ‘the whole of the
amount of profits and gains of business’ attributable to one of the activities
specified in S. 80P(2)(a) of the Act. The words ‘the whole of the amount of
profits and gains of business’ emphasise that the income in respect of which
deduction is sought must constitute the operational income and not the other
income which accrues to the society. In this particular case, the evidence
showed that the assessee-society earned interest on funds which were not
required for business purposes at the given point of time. Therefore, on the
facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court was of the view, such
interest income fell in the category of ‘Other Income’ which had been rightly
taxed by the Department u/s.56 of the Act.


[Totgar’s Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. v. ITO, (2010)
322 ITR 283 (SC)]

 

levitra

Head of income — Business income or income from other sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank — In the absence of factual matrix, matter remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication.

New Page 1

21 Head of income — Business income or income from other
sources — Interest on short-term deposits with bank — In the absence of factual
matrix, matter remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication.


The assessee was an exporter. The Tribunal held that the
interest income was generated by way of keeping the ‘advances’ received by the
assessee in the course of its regular business activity. According to the
Department, it was the case of surplus being invested in FDR, whereas according
to the assessee it was the case of advance having been received from the
exporter which was in FDR for short duration.

The Supreme Court observed that in the present case there was
no factual data to decide the aforesaid issue. The nature of the receipt was not
discussed. The High Court while disposing of the matter had also not examined
the factual basis. In view of the absence of factual matrix the Supreme Court
was of the view that to decide the question as to whether the receipt fell
u/s.28 or u/s.56, the matter was required to be remitted to the Tribunal for
fresh consideration in accordance with law.

[CIT v. Producin Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 322 ITR 270 (SC)]

 

levitra

Business expenditure — Interest on borrowings — Assessee has to establish, in the first instance, its right to claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38, and in the case of a firm if it claims special deduction, it has also to prove

New Page 1

18 Business expenditure — Interest on
borrowings — Assessee has to establish, in the first instance, its right to
claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38, and in the
case of a firm if it claims special deduction, it has also to prove that it is
not disentitled to claim deduction by reason of applicability of S. 40(b)(iv).


[Munjal Sales Corporation v. CIT, (2008) 298 ITR 298
(SC)]

In August/September, 1991, the appellant-assessee granted
interest-free advances to its sister concerns, which were disallowed by the
Department on the ground that the said advances were not given from the firm’s
own funds but from interest-bearing loans taken by the assessee-firm from third
parties. Accordingly, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) was
disallowed by the Department for the A.Y. 1992-93. However, the Tribunal deleted
the disallowance saying that the assessee had given such advance from its own
funds. In the next A.Y. 1993-94 , the same situation look place. During the A.Y.
1994-95, no further advances were made by the assessee-firm in favour of its
concerns. However, during the A.Y. 1995-96, a small interest-free loan of Rs.5
lakhs was advanced by the assessee-firm to its sister concern and during the
year in question, the assessee had profits of Rs.1.91 crores. The said
advance/loan got finally repaid in the A.Y. 1997-98. For the A.Y. 1994-95, the
Department disallowed the claim for deduction u/s.40(b)(iv) saying that in this
case there was diversion of funds by raising of interest-free loans. The
Assessing Officer did not accept the submission of the assessee that advance(s)
made by the assessee were out of the income of the firm. According to the
Assessing Officer, the said interest-free advances to sister concerns were out
of monies borrowed by the firm from third parties on payment of interest, hence
the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.40(b) of the 1961 Act. This view
was confirmed by the Tribunal. For the A.Ys. 1995-96 and 1996-97, the Tribunal
held that during the said years, no interest-free advances to sister concerns
were made and, therefore, there was no nexus between ‘interest-bearing loans’
taken and ‘interest-free advances’. However, the Tribunal found that there was
no material to show that advances were made to sister concerns out of the firm’s
own income and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to deduction
u/s.40(b)(iv) of the 1961 Act. The Supreme Court after analysing the scheme of
the Act and in particular the provision of S. 36(1)(iii) and S. 40(b), held that
every assessee, including a firm, has to establish, in the first instance, its
right to claim deduction under one of the Sections between S. 30 to S. 38 and in
the case of the firm, if it claims special deduction, it has also to prove that
it is not disentitled to claim deduction by reason of applicability of S.
40(b)(iv). The Supreme Court on the facts held that for the A.Y. 1992-93 and the
A.Y. 1993-94, the Tribunal held that the loans given to the sister concerns were
out of the firm’s funds and that were advanced for business purposes. Once it is
found that the loans granted in August/September, 1991 continued up to A.Y.
1997-98 and that the said loans were advanced for business purposes and that
interest paid thereon did not exceed 18/12 per cent per annum, the assessee was
entitled to deductions u/s.36(1)(iii) read with S. 40(b)(iv) of the 1961 Act.
Further, the Supreme Court observed that during A.Y. 1995-96, apart from the
loan given in August/September, 1991, the assessee advanced interest-free loan
to its sister concern amounting to Rs. 5 lakhs. According to the Tribunal, there
was nothing on record to show that the loans were given to the sister concern by
the assessee-firm out of its own funds and, therefore, it was not entitled to
claim deduction u/s.36(1)(iii). The Supreme Court held that finding of the
Tribunal was thus erroneous. The opening balance as on April 1, 1994, was
Rs.1.91 crores, whereas the loan given to the sister concern was a small amount
of Rs.5 lakhs. According to the Supreme Court, the profits earned by the
assessee during the relevant year were sufficient to cover the impugned loan of
Rs.5 lakhs. The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the appeal.

levitra

Assessment — Prima facie adjustments — When there are conflicting judgments or interpretations of a Section, prima facie adjustment contemplated u/s.143(1)(a) was not applicable and in such cases there was no liability to pay additional tax u/s.143(1A).

New Page 17 Assessment — Prima facie adjustments — When
there are conflicting judgments or interpretations of a Section, prima facie
adjustment contemplated u/s.143(1)(a) was not applicable and in such cases
there was no liability to pay additional tax u/s.143(1A).

[Kvaverner John Brown Engg. (India) P. Ltd. v.
ACIT,
(2008) 305 ITR 103 (SC)]

During the relevant assessment years, the
appellant claimed deduction u/s.80-0 in respect of qualifying income brought
into India in convertible foreign exchange. In its return, the appellant
indicated the qualifying income as the gross figure. By way of adjustment
u/s.143(1)(a), the Income-tax Officer restricted the qualifying income to the
net figure. In other words, the assessee claimed the gross income earned in
foreign exchange as the qualifying income, whereas the Income-tax Officer
granted deduction by restricting the claim of the assessee to the net income.

On December 17, 1997, whether the eligible income
should be taken at the gross figure or net figure, was the question for
interpretation. There were several conflicting decisions on this point.
Therefore, according to the appellant, S. 143(1)(a) was not applicable and
consequently the appellant was not liable to pay the additional tax
u/s.143(1A).

The Supreme Court observed that the only point
raised by the appellant was that it was not liable to pay additional tax, as
S. 143(1)(a), as it stood during the relevant year, was not applicable to the
facts of this case, because a moot point had arisen which could not have been
a matter for adjustment under that Section and which point needed
consideration and determination only under regular assessment vide S. 143(3)
of the 1961 Act. The Supreme Court held that for the A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1997-98
with which it was concerned, one of the main conditions stipulated by way of
the first proviso to S. 143(1)(a), as it stood during the relevant time,
referred to prima facie adjustments. The first proviso permitted the
Department to make adjustments in the income or loss declared in the return in
cases of mathematical errors or in case where any loss carried forward or
deduction or allowance which on the basis of information available in return
was prima facie admissible, but which was not claimed in the return or
in cases where any loss carried forward or deduction or allowance claimed in
the return which on the basis of information available in the return, was
prima facie
inadmissible. In the present case, therefore, when there were
conflicting judgments on interpretation of S. 80-0, the Supreme Court was of
the view that prima facie adjustments contemplated u/s.143(1)(a) were
not applicable and therefore the appellant was not liable to pay additional
tax u/s.143(1A) of the Act.

levitra

Method of Accounting — Chit fund — Chit discount accounting on completed contract method cannot be rejected, especially when it is revenue neutral.

New Page 1

16 Method of Accounting — Chit fund — Chit
discount accounting on completed contract method cannot be rejected, especially
when it is revenue neutral.


[CIT v. Bilahari Investment P. Ltd., (2008) 299 ITR I
(SC)]

The assessees are private limited companies subscribing to
chits as their business activities. They were maintaining their accounts on the
mercantile basis and they were computing profit/loss, as the case may be, at the
end of the chit period following the completed contract method, which was
earlier accepted by the Department over several years.

 

However, for the A.Ys. 1991-92 to 1997-98, the Assessing
Officer came to the conclusion that the completed contract method was not
accurate in recognising/identifying ‘income’ under the 1961 Act, and according
to him, therefore, in the context of the ‘chit discount’, the correct method was
deferred revenue expenditure calculated on proportionate basis. In other words,
the Assessing Officer has preferred the percentage of completion method as the
basis for recognising/identifying ‘income’ under the 1961 Act in substitution of
the completed contract method.

 

According to the Department, chit dividend had to be
subjected to tax on accrual basis as the assessees were following the mercantile
system of accounting. As far as the chit dividend is concerned, the Department
rejected the completed contract method as suggested by the assessees, which has
been accepted by the Tribunal and the High Court. However, in the matter of chit
discount, the High Court, overruling the Tribunal, has held that the completed
contract method of accounting adopted by the assessees was valid and that the
Department had erred in spreading the discount over the remaining period of the
chit on proportionate basis. In the matter of chit dividend, the assessees
accepted the view of the Tribunal and the High Court that the completed contract
method was not correct.

 

Before the Supreme Court the limited controversy was whether
the completed contract method of accounting adopted by the assessees as method
of accounting for chit discount was required to be substituted by the percentage
of completion method.

 

The Supreme Court noted that chit funds are basically saving
schemes in which a certain number of subscribers join together and each
contributes a certain fixed sum each month, the total number of months being
equal to the total number of subscribers. The subscriptions are paid to the
manager of the fund by a certain prescribed date each month and the total
subscriptions to the fund are auctioned each month amongst the subscribers. At
each auction, the lowest bidder is paid the amount of his bid and the balance
received from out of the total subscriptions received is distributed equally
amongst other subscribers, as premium. The manager is paid a certain percentage
of the collections each month on account of expenses and charges for conducting
the auction. In the auction, a maximum amount, which the highest bidder agrees
to forgo, is the amount which is distributed to the other members, subject to
deduction of the manager’s commission.

 

Before the Supreme Court, it was the case of the assessees
that profits (loss) accrued to the assessees only when the dividends exceeded
the discount paid and that the difference could be known only on the termination
of the chit when the total figure of dividend received and discount paid would
be available. That, it would be possible for the assessees to make profits only
when the sum total of the dividend received exceeded the sum total of discounts
suffered which is debited to the profit and loss account. According to the
assessees, the Department has all along been accepting the completed contract
method and, therefore, there was no justification in law or in facts for
deviating from the accepted practice. According to the assessees, a chit
transaction has been treated by the various Courts as one single scheme running
for the full period and, therefore, according to the assessees, the completed
contract method adopted by it over the years was not required to be substituted
by any other method of accounting.

 

The Supreme Court observed that recognition/identification of
income under the 1961 Act is attainable by several methods of accounting. It may
be noted that the same result could be attained by any one of the accounting
methods. The completed contract method is one such method. Similarly, the
percentage of completion method is another such method. Under the completed
contract method, the revenue is not recognised until the contract is complete.
Under the said method, costs are accumulated during the course of the contract.
The profit and loss is established in the last accounting period and transferred
to the profit and loss account. The said method determines results only when the
contract is completed.

 

On the other hand, the percentage of completion method tries
to attain periodic recognition of income in order to reflect current
performance. The amount of revenue recognised under this method is determined by
reference to the stage of completion of the contract. The stage of completion
can be looked at under this method by taking into consideration the proportion
that costs incurred to date bears to the estimated total costs of contract.

 

The Supreme Court held that it was concerned with the A.Ys.
1991-92 to 1997-98. In the past, the Department had accepted the completed
contract method and because of such acceptance, the assessees, in these cases,
had followed the same method of accounting, particularly in the context of chit
discount. Every assessee is entitled to arrange its affairs and follow the
method of accounting, which the Department has earlier accepted. It is only in
those cases where the Department records a finding that the method adopted by
the assessee results in distortion of profits, the Department can insist on
substitution of the existing method.

 

Further, in the present cases, the Supreme Court noted from
the various statements produced before them that the entire exercise, arising
out of change of method from the completed contract method to deferred revenue
expenditure, is revenue-neutral. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not wish to
interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court.

 

Appeal to the High Court — Finding of facts recorded by the Tribunal that machinery was not idle for the entire block period — hence it was not necessary to go into the connotation of the word ‘used’ appearing in S. 32 of the Act.

New Page 1

6 Appeal to the High Court — Finding of facts
recorded by the Tribunal that machinery was not idle for the entire block period
— hence it was not necessary to go into the connotation of the word ‘used’
appearing in S. 32 of the Act.

[Dy. CIT v. N. K. Industries Ltd., (2008)
305 ITR 274 (SC)]

The Supreme Court was concerned with the block
period April 1, 1988, to February 24, 1999. The main contention advanced on
behalf of the Department was that for allowance of deduction for depreciation,
the asset must not only be owned by the assessee but it must also be used for
the purposes of business or profession of the assessee. It was the case of the
Department that the word ‘used’ in S. 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, refers to
actual use of the asset; that having regard to the scheme of the Income-tax Act,
1961, and particularly, after the introduction of the concept of ‘block of
assets’, actual use is the only requirement apart from ownership for allowance
of depreciation u/s.32. It was also the case of the Department that an important
question of law arose for determination before the High Court; that the High
Court has failed to examine the said question; and that it had erred in
dismissing the tax appeals only on the ground that no substantial question of
law had arisen.

The Supreme Court observed that in the present
case, the Tribunal had examined the statements of certain witnesses and after
analysing the material on record, it had come to the conclusion on facts that
there was nothing to show that the machinery, namely, expellers remained idle
for the entire block period April 1, 1988 to February 24, 1999. The Supreme
Court after having examined the record itself, agreed with the view expressed by
the Tribunal on the facts of the present case. The Supreme Court was of the view
that hence, it is not necessary for it to go into the larger question of law
regarding the connotation of the word ‘used’ appearing in S. 32 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for the aforesaid
reasons. The question of law was however kept open.

levitra

Depreciation — Higher depreciation could not be allowed on the motor trucks used in business of running them on hire, unless there is an evidence that the assessee was in the business of hiring out motor vehicles.

New Page 15 Depreciation — Higher depreciation could not
be allowed on the motor trucks used in business of running them on hire,
unless there is an evidence that the assessee was in the business of hiring
out motor vehicles.

[CIT v. Gupta Global Exim P. Ltd., (2008)
305 ITR 132 (SC)]

The Assessing Officer (AO) took the view that the
assesseé was, during the relevant assessment year, in the business of timber
trading and it was only occasionally that the trucks owned by the assessee
were given out on hire to outside parties and, hence, the assessee was not in
the business running the trucks on hire and, therefore, the assessee was not
entitled to claim higher rate of depreciation at 40%. This finding of the
Assessing Officer was reversed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). It
was held by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) that the transportation
income of 12,50,639 by way of running the subject vehicles on hire was an
integral part of the assessee’s business and that its inclusion under the head
‘Business income’ was not disputed even by the Assessing Officer. This finding
of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was affirmed by the Tribunal. The
High Court had refused to interfere on the ground that the matter involved
essentially questions of fact. On an appeal to the Supreme Court, it held that
generally, the Supreme Court does not interfere with the concurrent finding of
facts recorded by the authorities below. However, in this case, the Supreme
Court was of the opinion that a neat substantial question of law arose for
determination which needed interpretation of the depreciation table given in
Appendix I to the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

The Supreme Court held that under item (2)(ii) of
heading III, higher rate of depreciation is admissible on motor trucks used in
a business of running them on hire. Therefore, the user of the same in the
business of the assessee of transportation is the test.

According to the Supreme Court, in the present
case, none of the authorities below (except the Assessing Officer) had
examined the matter by applying the above test. The Assessing Officer had
given his finding that the assessee was not in the business of transportation
as he was only in the business of trading in timber logs. That, the burden was
on the assessee to establish that it is the owner of motor lorries and that it
used the said motor lorries/trucks in the business of running them on hire.

In the view of the Supreme Court, the entire
approach of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was erroneous when he had
stated that the transportation income of Rs.12,50,639 by way of running the
subject vehicles on hire was an integral part of the appellant’s business and
its inclusion in the head ‘Business income’ is not disputed even by the AO.
According to the Supreme Court, mere inclusion of Rs.12,50,639 in the total
business income is not the determinative factor for deciding whether trucks
were used by the assessee during the relevant year in a business of running
them on hire. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the judgment of the High
Court and remitted the matter to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) for
de novo examination of the case in accordance with law.

levitra

Business Expenditure — S. 42(1) — Special provisions for prospecting for mineral oil — Production sharing contract accounts is an independent accounting regime — Foreign exchange losses on account of foreign currency transaction is allowable as a deductio

New Page 14 Business Expenditure — S. 42(1) — Special
provisions for prospecting for mineral oil — Production sharing contract
accounts is an independent accounting regime — Foreign exchange losses on
account of foreign currency transaction is allowable as a deduction.

[CIT v. Enron Oil and Gas India Ltd.,
(2008) 305 ITR 75 (SC)]

The respondent-Enron Oil and Gas India Ltd. (‘the
EOGIL’), a company incorporated in Cayman Islands was engaged in the business
of oil exploration. In 1993, the Government of India through the Petroleum
Ministry invited bids for development of concessional blocks. EOGIL offered
its bid for the development of concessional blocks. A consortium of EOGIL with
RIL was given the contract. Later on, ONGC joined. EOGIL with RIL and ONGC
executed a production sharing contract (PSC) with the Government of India.
EOGIL was entitled to a participating interest of 30% in the rights and
obligations arising under the PSC. RIL was also entitled to participating
interest of 30%. ONGC was entitled to a participating interest of 40%. EOGIL
was designated as the operator under the said PSC.

Vide Notification No. 1997, dated March 8, 1996,
u/s.293A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the 1961 Act’), each co-venturer was
liable to be assessed for his own share of income. They were not to be treated
as an association of persons.

EOGIL filed its return of income for the
assessment year 1999-2000 declaring its taxable income of Rs. 71,19,50,013
u/s.115JA.

During the year, EOGIL debited its profit and
loss account by exchange loss of Rs.38,63,38,980. The Assessing Officer
disallowed this loss on the ground that it was a mere book entry and actually
no loss stood incurred by the assessee.

The decision of the Assessing Officer was
challenged in appeal by EOGIL before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals),
who after analysing PSC held that each co-venturer in this case had made
contribution at a certain rate, whereas the expenditure incurred out of the
said contribution stood converted on the basis of the previous month’s average
daily means for the buying and selling rates of exchange which exercise
resulted in loss/profit on conversion. Under the circumstances, according to
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), it could not be said that the
assessee had incurred notional loss. In fact, during the course of
proceedings, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) found that during the
A.Ys. 1995-96 and 1996-97 the assessee had earned profits which stood taxed by
the Department. He further found that one co-venturer (ONGC) had gained
Rs.293.73 crores during the A.Y. 1997-98 because the Indian rupee had
appreciated as compared to foreign currency and the Department had taxed the
same, but when during the assessment year in question there is a loss on
account of such conversion, the Department has refused to allow the deduction
for such conversion losses. According to the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals), the Department cannot blow hot and cold. Consequently, it was held
that just as the foreign exchange gain was taxable, loss was allowable
u/s.42(1) of the Income-tax Act in terms of the PSC. Therefore, the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed as deduction, the loss of Rs.
38,63,38,980.

Aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner
of Income-tax (Appeals), the Department carried the matter in appeal to the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal objecting to the deletion made by the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on the ground that the loss was only a
book entry. Before the Tribunal the matter pertained to the A.Ys. 1999-2000,
199899, 2000-01 and 1996-97. However, for the sake of convenience, the
Tribunal focussed its attention on the facts and figures given for the A.Y.
1999-2000. Before the Tribunal, the Department contended that the assessee
borrows in USD and repays in the same currency for the preparation of the
balance sheet. The loans, according to the Department, were stated at
prevalent exchange rates and the loss arrived at was charged to the profit and
loss account. Therefore, according to the Department, the said loss was a book
entry and it was not an actual loss in foreign exchange caused to the assessee.
This argument of the Department was rejected by the Tribunal. It was held that
the assessee was a foreign company. It carried out business activity in India.
It had to maintain its accounts in rupees for the purpose of income-tax, that
the PSC had to be read with S. 42(1) of the Income-tax Act, which entitled the
assessee to claim conversion loss as deduction, particularly when the said PSC
provided for realised and unrealised gains/losses from the exchange currency.
According to the Tribunal, the assessee was maintaining its accounts in rupees
and such accounts had to reflect the loan liability under consideration as the
loan had been taken for the Indian activity. Therefore, according to the
Tribunal, the liability arising as a consequence of depreciation of the rupee
had to be considered both for accounting and tax purposes. Accordingly, the
Tribunal refused to interfere with the findings returned by the Commissioner
of Income-tax (Appeals).

The above concurrent finding stood confirmed by
the judgment delivered by the Uttarakhand High Court.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed
that the only question which needed consideration was whether the assessee was
entitled to claim deduction for foreign exchange losses on account of foreign
currency translation. In other words, whether loss arising on account of
foreign currency translation is allowable deduction or not and conversely
whether the gains on account of foreign currency translation is to be treated
as a receipt liable to tax. Analysing the provisions of S. 42(1), the Supreme
Court held that it was clear that the said Section was a special provision for
deductions in the case of business of prospecting, extraction/production of
mineral oils. S. 42(1) provides for admissibility in respect of three types of
allowances provided they are specified in the PSC. They relate to expenditure
incurred on account of abortive exploration, expenditure incurred before or
after the commencement of commercial production in respect of drilling or
exploration activities and expenses incurred in relation to depletion of
mineral oil in the mining area. If one reads S. 42(1) carefully, it becomes
clear that the above three allowances are admissible only if they are so
specified in the PSC.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court noted that the PSC
in question provided for both capital and revenue expenditures. It also
provided for a method in which the said expenses had to be accounted for. The
Supreme Court held that the said PSC was an independent accounting regime
which included tax treatment of costs, expenses, incomes, profits, etc. It
prescribed a separate rule of accounting. In normal accounting, in the case of fixed assets, generally when currency fluctuation results in an exchange loss, addition is made to the value of the asset for depreciation. However, under the PSC, instead of increasing the value of expenditure incurred on account of currency variation in the expenses itself, EOGIL was required to book losses separately. The said PSC prescribed a special manner of accounting which was at variance with the normal accountingstandards. The said ‘PSC accounting’ obliterated the difference between capital and revenue expenditure. It made all kinds of expenditure chargeable to the profit and loss account without reference to their capital or revenue nature. But for the PSC accounting there would have been disputes as to whetherthe expenses were of revenue or capital nature. In view of the special accounting procedure prescribed by the PSC, Accounting Standard 11 had to be ruled out.

The Supreme Court observed that Appendix C pre-scribed the manner in which a contractor is required to maintain his accounts. It stipulated that each of the co-venturers had to follow the computation of Income-tax under the 1961 Act. Clause 1.6.1. of appendix C referred to currency exchange rates. It stated that for translation purposes between USD and INR, the previous month’s average of the daily means of buying and selling rates of exchange as quoted by SBI shall be used for the month in which revenue, costs, expenditure, receipts or incomes are recorded. The Supreme Court therefore, held that clause 1.6.1 of appendix C provided for translation. The Supreme Court noted that subsequent to the award of the concession, EOGIL along with RIL and ONGC executed the PSC with the Government of India. Under the said PSC, each co-venturer remitted money, known as cash call to the bank account of the operator in the USA. The expenditure for the joint venture was made out of the said account. The trial balance was required to be prepared at the end of the month in USD, which was then required to be translated on the basis of accounting procedure mentioned in Appendix C to the PSC. The Supreme Court held that the cash call in other words was not a loan. Cash cali was a contribution. It was made by each co-venturer at a certain rate, whereas the expenditure against it had to be converted on the basis of the exchange rates as provided for in the PSC, which stated that the same had to be converted on the basis of the previous month’s average of the daily means of buying and selling rates of exchange. The above analysis showed that the capital contribution had to be converted under the PSC at one rate, whereas the expenditure had to be converted at a different rate. This exercise resulted in loss/ profit on conversion. Under the PSC, the respondent had to convert revenue, costs, receipts and incomes. If EOGIL had a choice to prepare its accounts only in USD, there would have been no loss/profit on account of currency translation. It is because of the specific provision in the PSC for currency translation that loss/profit accrued to EOGIL. The Supreme Court further held that in the PSC, the foreign company provides the capital investment and cost and the first proportion of oil extracted is generally allocated to the company which uses oil sales to recoup its costs and capital investment. The oil used for that purpose is termed ‘cost oil’. Often a company obtains profit not just from the ‘profit oil’, but also from the ‘cost oil’. Such profits cannot be ascertained without taking into account translation losses. Moreover, taxes are embedded in the profit oil. If these concepts are kept in mind, then it cannot be said that ‘translation losses’ under the PSC are illusory losses.

Appeal by the Revenue — Merely because in some cases the Revenue has not preferred appeal that does not operate as a bar for the Revenue to prefer an appeal in another case where there is a just cause.

New Page 12 Appeal by the Revenue — Merely because in
some cases the Revenue has not preferred appeal that does not operate as a bar
for the Revenue to prefer an appeal in another case where there is a just
cause.

[C. K. Gangadharan & Anr. v. CIT, (2008)
304 ITR 61 (SC)]

By order dated March 13, 2008, a reference was
made to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court and the order, of reference,
inter alia,
read as follows :

”In view of the aforesaid position, we are of the
opinion that the matter requires consideration by a larger Bench to the extent
whether the Revenue can be precluded from defending itself by relying upon the
contrary decision.”

The Supreme Court made it clear that it was not
doubting the correctness of the view taken by it in the cases of Union of
India v. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal,
(2001) 249 ITR 219, CIT v. Narendra
Doshi,
(2002) 254 ITR 606 and CIT v. Shivsagar Estate, (2002) 257
ITR 59 to the effect that if the Revenue has not challenged the correctness of
the law laid down by the High Court and accepted it in the case of one
assessee, then it is not open to the Revenue to challenge its correctness in
the case of other assessees, without just cause. The Supreme Court after
noting its decisions in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of India,
(2006) 282 ITR 273 (SC), State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC
683, Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347,
State of Bihar Ramdeo Yadav,
(1996) 3 SCC 493 and State of West Bengal
v. Devdas Kumar,
(1991) Supp (1) SCC 138, observed that if the assessee
takes the stand that the Revenue acted mala fide in not preferring
appeal in one case and filing the appeal in other case, it has to establish
mala fides
. The Supreme Court accepted the contention of the learned
counsel for the Revenue that there may be certain cases where because of the
small amount of revenue involved, no appeal is filed or where policy decisions
have been taken not to prefer appeal where the revenue involved is below a
certain amount. Similarly, where the effect of the decision is revenue
neutral, there may not be any need for preferring the appeal. All these
provide the foundation for making a departure.

The Supreme Court held that merely because in
some cases the Revenue has not preferred appeal that does not operate as a bar
for the Revenue to prefer an appeal in another case where there is just cause
for doing so or it is in public interest to do so or for a pronouncement by
the higher court when divergent views are expressed by the Tribunals or the
High Courts.

levitra

Exemption — Local Authority — Marketing Committee to provide facilities for marketing of agricultural produce in a locality is not a ‘local authority’ and there fore its income is not exempt u/s.10(20) (after amendment by Finance Act, 2002). Its income is

New Page 13 Exemption — Local Authority — Marketing
Committee to provide facilities for marketing of agricultural produce in a
locality is not a ‘local authority’ and there fore its income is not exempt
u/s.10(20) (after amendment by Finance Act, 2002). Its income is exempt
u/s.10(26AAB) from 1-4-2009.

[Agricultural Produce Market Committee,
Narela v. CIT & Anr.,
(2008) 305 ITR 1 (SC)]

The appellant-Committee was established under
the Delhi Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1998 (the 1998
Act). The provisions of the said 1998 Act enjoined upon the appellant to
provide facilities for marketing of agricultural produce in Narela, Delhi.
This is apart from performing other functions and duties such as
superintendence, direction and control of markets for regulating the
marketing of agricultural produce.

For the A.Y. 2003-04, the appellant-Committee
claimed exemption from payment of tax on the income earned by it, on the
ground that it was a ‘local authority’ within the meaning of S. 10(20) of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the 1961 Act). It relied upon the definition of
‘local authority’ in S. 2(1)(l) of the said 1998 Act. The Assessing Officer
rejected the appellant’s claim for exemption relying upon Circular No.
8/2002, dated August 27, 2002 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes.
The view taken was that the amended provisions of S. 10(20) of the 1961 Act
were not attracted to ‘Agricultural Produce Marketing Societies’ or
‘Agricultural Market Boards’ even when they may be local authorities under
the Central or State legislation.

Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant
filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who upheld
the view taken by the Assessing Officer and declined the exemption claimed
by the appellant.

A further appeal by the appellant, before the
Tribunal, also failed.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the
appellant moved the High Court by way of an appeal u/s.260A of the 1961 Act.
The Delhi High Court following its earlier judgment in the case of
Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Azadpur v. CIT,
(ITA No.
749/2006), dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court noted that
prior to the Finance Act, 2002, the said 1961 Act did not contain the
definition of the words ‘local authority’. Those words came to be defined
for the first time by the Finance Act, 2002, vide the Explanation/
definition clause.

After hearing the parties, the Supreme Court
observed that u/s.3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, ‘local authority’
was defined to mean “a municipal committee, district board, body of port
commissioners or other authority legally entitled to the control or
management of a municipal or local fund. The words ‘other authority’ in S.
3(31) of the 1897 Act have been omitted by Parliament in the
Explanation/definition clause inserted in S. 10(20) of the 1961 Act, vide
the Finance Act, 2002. Therefore, it was not correct to say that the entire
definition of the words ‘local authority’ was bodily lifted from S. 3(31) of
the 1897 Act and incorporated by Parliament, in the Explanation to S. 10(20)
of the 1961 Act. This deliberate omission was important. The Supreme Court
noted that various High Courts had taken the view prior to the Finance Act,
2002, that AMC(s) is a ‘local authority’. That was because there was no
definition of the words ‘local authority’ in the 1961 Act. Those judgments
proceeded primarily on the functional tests as laid down in the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of R. C. Jain [(1981) 2 SCC 308].

In the case of R. C. Jain, the test of ‘like
nature’ was adopted as the words ‘other authority’ came after the words
‘Municipal Committee, District Board, Body of Port Commissioners’.
Therefore, the words ‘other authority’ in S. 3(31) took colour from the
earlier words, namely, ‘Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port
Commissioners’. This is how the functional test was evolved in the case of

R. C. Jain. The Supreme Court held that
Parliament in its legislative wisdom had omitted the words ‘other authority’
from the said Explanation to S. 10(20) of the 1961 Act. The said Explanation
to S. 10(20) provides a definition to the words ‘local authority’. It is an
exhaustive definition. It is not an inclusive definition. The words ‘other
authority’ do not find place in the said Explanation. Even according to the
appellant(s), AMC(s) was neither a Municipal Committee nor a District Board
nor a Municipal Committee nor a Panchayat. Therefore, according to the
Supreme Court, the functional test and the test of incorporation as laid
down in the case of R. C. Jain, was no more applicable to the Explanation to
S. 10(20) of the 1961 Act.

However, the Supreme Court felt that the
question still remained as to why Parliament had used the words ‘Municipal
Committee’ and ‘District Board’ in item (iii) of the said Explanation.
According to the Supreme Court, Parliament defined ‘local authority’ to mean
— a panchayat as referred to in clause (d) of Article 243 of the
Constitution of India, Municipality as referred to in clause (e) of Article
243P of the Constitution of India. However, there was no reference to
Article 243 after the words ‘Municipal Committee’ and ‘District Board’. It
appeared that the Municipal Committee and District Board in the said
Explanation were used out of abundant caution. In 1897 when the General
Clauses Act was enacted there existed in India, Municipal Committees and
District Boards and it was quite possible that in some remote place a
District Board still existed. The Supreme Court in conclusion observed that
having taken the view that AMC(s) is neither a Municipal Committee nor a
District Board under the Explanation to S. 10(20) of the Act, it refrained
from going into the question : whether the AMC(s) is legally entitled to the
control of the local fund, namely, Market Fund, under said 1998 Act, because
vide the Finance Act, 2008, income of AMC(s) is exempted under sub-section
(26AAB) of S. 10 with effect from April 1, 2009.

levitra

Capital or revenue expenditure — Development and prospecting expenditure — The question is to be considered in the light of the provisions of S. 35E(2) and not in the context of S. 37(1).

New Page 1



  1. Capital or revenue
    expenditure — Development and prospecting expenditure — The question is to
    be considered in the light of the provisions of S. 35E(2) and not in the
    context of S. 37(1).

[Rajasthan State Mines
and Minerals Ltd. v. CIT,
(2009) 313 ITR 366 (SC)

In the assessment orders
passed for the A.Ys. 1998-99 and 1999-2000 in the case of the assessee, a
public sector undertaking of the Government of Rajasthan, the Assessing
Officer disallowed the expenditure towards developments and prospecting
charges treating it as capital in nature. The Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) referred to the provisions of S. 35E(2) which provide that any
expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively on any operation relating to
prospecting for any mineral or on development of a mine in the year of
commercial production and any one or more of the four years immediately
preceding that year shall be allowed as deduction equal to one tenth of the
amount of expenditure starting from the year the assessee is specifically
covered u/s.35E(2). The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) observed that
the assessee had claimed write off over a period of time and therefore the
claim should be more. It appears that Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)
had upheld the disallowance for the reason that prospecting expenses were
incurred on expenditure of corporate plan which did not pertain to
prospecting expenses. Before the Tribunal it was contended by the assessee
that this expenditure was incurred for orientation of the administrative set
up and this was revenue in nature, whereas, the Departmental Representative
had contended that this expenditure was of capital nature because corporate
plan expenditure was of enduring benefit to the assessee company. It appears
that Tribunal rejected the assessee’s appeal. On a further appeal, the High
Court, also appears to have rejected the appeal of the assessee with
reference to the provisions of S. 37(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court, on
assessee’s appeal, observed that it could not be disputed that, had the High
Court considered the claim of the appellant in the light of S. 35E(2), it
might have arrived at a different conclusion. The Supreme Court, therefore,
set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the matter back to the
High Court for considering the assessee’s appeal afresh on merits.



levitra

Penalty S. 271(1)(c) Explanation 5 : Assessee admitted acquisition of asset in statement u/s.132(4) : Immunity to be granted

New Page 1

6 Penalty : S. 271(1)(c) Explanation 5 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A. Ys. 1984-85 and 1988-89 : In statement u/s.132(4), assessee admitted
acquisition of asset in A.Y. 1987-88 and offered income of Rs.3,50,000 spread
over 5 years from A.Y. 1984-85 to 1988-89 : Immunity under Explanation 5 should
be granted.


[CIT v. Kanhaiyalal, 214 CTR 611 (Raj.)]

In the course of a search action, in a statement u/s.132(4)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee accepted the acquisition of the asset
of value Rs.3,50,000 in the A.Y. 1987-88 and offered the amount to tax spread
over in the A.Ys. 1984-85 to 1988-89. The Assessing Officer imposed penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act and refused to grant immunity under Explanation 5, on
the ground that the whole of the amount should have been offered in the A.Y.
1987-88. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held that the assessee is
entitled to immunity under Explanation 5.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Immunity under Explanation 5 of S. 271(1)(c) is not taken
away for the simple reason that income disclosed by assessee in his statement
u/s.132(4) for a particular year was spread over in the returns of several
years, more so, when the Assessing Officer had also made assessment in
assessment years as returned by the assessee, though after making some quantum
reshuffling.”



levitra

Interest on excess refund : S. 234D of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Section came on statute books w.e.f. 1-6-2003 : Provision not retrospective : Interest u/s.234D cannot be charged in respect of refunds granted prior to 1-6-2003.

New Page 1

Unreported :


12. Interest on excess
refund : S. 234D of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Section came on statute books w.e.f.
1-6-2003 : Provision not retrospective : Interest u/s.234D cannot be charged in
respect of refunds granted prior to 1-6-2003.

[CIT v. M/s. Bajaj
Hindustan Ltd. (Bom.)
, ITA No. 198 of 2009 dated 15-4-2009]

In an appeal by the Revenue
the following question was raised before the Bombay High Court :

“Whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case and in law the ITAT was right in holding that the
interest u/s.234D cannot be charged in respect of refunds granted prior to
1-6-2003 ?”

The High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“It is seen that the
subject provision came on statute book w.e.f. 1-6-2003. If that be so, the
said provision does not have retrospective effect. In this view of the matter
we do not see the appeal giving rise to any substantial question of law.”

levitra

Reassessment : Power and scope : S. 147 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1994-95 and 1995-96 : If the AO does not assess the income, which he had reason to believe had escaped assessment, then the reassessment order will be invalid.

New Page 6

13. Reassessment : Power and
scope : S. 147 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1994-95 and 1995-96 : If the AO
does not assess the income, which he had reason to believe had escaped
assessment, then the reassessment order will be invalid.


[CIT v. M/s. Jet Airways
(I) Ltd. (Bom.),
ITA No. 1714 of 2009 dated 12-4-2010]

In an appeal by the Revenue
the following question was raised before the Bombay High Court :

“Where upon the issuance of
a notice u/s.148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 r/w. S. 147, the Assessing Officer
does not assess or, as the case may be, reassess the income which he has reason
to believe had escaped assessment and which formed the basis of the notice
u/s.148, is it open to the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess independently
any other income, which does not form the subject matter of the notice ?”

The High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) S. 147 has the effect
that the Assessing Officer has to assess or reassess the income (such income)
which escaped assessment and which was the basis of the formation of belief
and if he does so, he can also assess or reassess any other income which has
escaped assessment and which comes to his notice during the course of the
proceedings. However, if after issuing a notice u/s.148, he accepts the
contention of the assessee and holds that the income in respect of which he
has initially formed has reason to believe had escaped assessment, has as a
matter of fact not escaped assessment, it is not open to him independently to
assess some other income. If he intends to do so, a fresh notice u/s.148 would
be necessary, the legality of which would be tested in the event of a
challenge by the assessee.

(ii) We have approached
the issue of interpretation that has arisen for decision in these appeals,
both as a matter of first principle, based on the language used in S. 147(1)
and on the basis of the precedent on the subject. We agree with the submission
which has been urged on behalf of the assessee that S. 147(1) as it stands
postulates that upon the formation of a reason to believe that income
chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, the AO may
assess or reassess such income ‘and also’ any other income chargeable to tax
which comes to his notice subsequently during the proceedings as having
escaped assessment. The words ‘and also’ are used in a cumulative and
conjunctive sense. To read these words as being in the alternative would be to
rewrite the language used by the Parliament.

(iii) In that view of the
matter and for the reasons that we have indicated, we do not regard the
decision of the Tribunal in the present case as being in error. The question
of law shall accordingly stand answered against the Revenue and in favour of
the assessee.”

levitra

Interest for non/short payment of advance tax and on excess refund : S. 234B and S. 234D of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Interest not chargeable u/s.234B where short payment of advance tax is attributable to non/short deduction of tax at source :

New Page 1

Unreported :

11. Interest for non/short
payment of advance tax and on excess refund : S. 234B and S. 234D of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Interest not chargeable u/s.234B where short payment
of advance tax is attributable to non/short deduction of tax at source : S. 234D
applies only for the A.Y. 2004-05 and onwards and is not retrospective.

[DIT v. M/s. Jacabs Civil
Incorporated (Del.)
, ITA No. 491 of 2008 dated 30-8-2010]

The assessee is a foreign
company. For the A.Y. 2001-02, the assessee had filed return of income declaring
income of Rs.96 lakhs. The assessee had claimed that it is not liable for
interest u/s.234B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in view of the fact that it was
not liable to pay advance tax since whole of the tax liability was deductible
u/s.195 by the payee. The assessee had also claimed that S. 234D is not
applicable since it is operative only from the A.Y. 2004-05. The Assessing
Officer rejected the assessee’s claim and levied interest u/s.234B and u/s.234D
of the Act. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) U/s.209(1)(d), the
tax ‘deductible or collectible at source’ has to be reduced from the advance
tax payable. S. 195 puts an obligation on the payer to deduct tax at source.
Therefore, the entire tax is to be deducted at source which is payable on such
payments made by the payee to the non-resident. The non-resident recipient is
not liable to pay advance tax. Though in Anjum Ghaswala 252 ITR 1(SC), it was
held that S. 234B is mandatory, the present is a case where S. 234B does not
apply at all. Accordingly, it is not permissible for the Revenue to charge
interest u/s.234B.

(ii) S. 234D inserted by
the Finance Act, 2003 w.e.f. 1-6-2003 is in the nature of a substantive
provision and applies only for the A.Y. 2004-05 and onwards. It is not
retrospective.”

levitra

Salary : S. 14, S. 15, S. 16 and S. 17 of Income-tax Act, 1961 and Article 164(5) of Constitution of India : A.Y. 1996-97 : Chief Minister of a State : Pay and allowances received is assessable under the head ‘salary’.

New Page 1

  1. Salary : S. 14, S. 15, S. 16 and S. 17 of Income-tax Act,
    1961 and Article 164(5) of Constitution of India : A.Y. 1996-97 : Chief
    Minister of a State : Pay and allowances received is assessable under the head
    ‘salary’.

[Lalu Prasad v. CIT, 316 ITR 186 (Patna)]

For the A.Y. 1996-97, the assessee was the Chief Mininster
of Bihar and he filed his return of income wherein the pay and allowances
received by him as the Chief Minister was shown under the head ‘Income from
other sources’. The Assessing Officer assessed the amount under the head
‘Salary’. The Assessing Officer allowed the standard deduction of Rs.15,000
and disallowed the claim for deduction of the incidental expenditure. The
Tribunal confirmed the assessment order.

On appeal by the assessee the Patna High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Article 164(5) of the Constitution of India expressly
provided for payment of salary to the Chief Minister. The assessee in his
return had himself stated that he was the Chief Minister of the State and
received salary from the Government of Bihar. The Assessing Officer had not
erred in changing the head of income to ‘Salary’.”

levitra

Depreciation : Additional depreciation : S. 32(1)(iia) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Increase in installed capacity of final product is not a requirement for claiming additional depreciation.

New Page 5

  1. Depreciation : Additional depreciation : S. 32(1)(iia) of
    Income-tax Act, 1961 : Increase in installed capacity of final product is not
    a requirement for claiming additional depreciation.


[CIT v. Hindustan Newsprint Ltd., 183 Taxman 257 (Ker.)]

The assessee was engaged in manufacture and sale of
newsprint. It claimed additional depreciation in respect of de-inking plant in
which pulp was made from waste paper. The Assessing Officer disallowed the
claim on the ground that the installed capacity of final product of the
company, viz., newsprint remained unaltered even after installation of
de-inking machinery. The Tribunal held that there was increase in installed
capacity of pulp and pulp though, an intermediary product is also marketable
and, hence, the assessee was entitled to additional depreciation u/s.32(1)(iia).

On appeal by the Revenue the Kerala High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The provision of S. 32(1)(iia) was modified
dispensing with the requirement of increase in installed capacity as a
condition for eligibility for additional depreciation.

(ii) The fact that pulp is an intermediary product and is
generally consumed captively in the manufacture of newsprint does not mean
that pulp is not a product that can not be marketed by the assessee as and
when it desired. There is no dispute that pulp is a marketable commodity. If
there was reduction in the manufacture of the final product on account of
any reason, necessarily the assessee would have to market the excess pulp
produced.

(iii) The view of the Tribunal that pulp being marketable
commodity produced by the assessee, the increase of the installed capacity
of the pulp plant on account of the installation of de-inking machinery
would entitle the assessee to the benefit of additional depreciation was to
be accepted. The finding of the Tribunal that there has been increase in the
installed capacity of the production of pulp in terms of the requirement of
the provision in the statute was not disputed by the revenue.

(iv) On the other hand its contention was that the
installed capacity of an industry should always be understood with reference
to final product manufactured and sold by it, which was newsprint in the
instant case; that contention of the revenue could not be accepted.

(v) The intermediary product, viz., pulp produced
by the company being a marketable commodity, the increase in the installed
capacity for claiming benefit of additional depreciation under the above
provision could be in the production of intermediary, viz., pulp.
Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal was to be accepted.”


levitra

Depreciation : User of asset : Assessee in leasing business : Lease of machinery in accounting year : Lessee installing machinery in subsequent year : Not relevant : Assessee entitled to depreciation.

New Page 5

  1. Depreciation : User of asset : Assessee in leasing
    business : Lease of machinery in accounting year : Lessee installing machinery
    in subsequent year : Not relevant : Assessee entitled to depreciation.

[CIT v. Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd., 317 ITR 236 (Bom.)]

The assessee was in the business of leasing. In the
relevant accounting year the assessee had leased out breakers to TECL. The
lessee installed the breakers in the subsequent year. The Assessing Officer
disallowed the claim for depreciation on the ground that asset was not put to
use in the relevant year. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’e claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The assessee, admittedly had supplied the machinery
before the end of the financial year and the assessee had received the lease
rental for the same. Whether the lessee had put to use the lease equipment
would be irrelevant as long as the machinery in fact had been given on lease
before the end of the financial year, as then it could be said that the
assessee for the purposes of business had ‘used’ the leased equipment.

(ii) The assessee was entitled to depreciation.”

levitra

Business expenditure : S. 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Assessee civil contractor : Constructed Hockey Stadium in the Collectorate Complex for securing DRDA contract : Expenditure on stadium is business expenditure allowable u/s.37.

New Page 1

  1. Business expenditure : S. 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y.
    2004-05 : Assessee civil contractor : Constructed Hockey Stadium in the
    Collectorate Complex for securing DRDA contract : Expenditure on stadium is
    business expenditure allowable u/s.37.

[CIT v. Velumanickam Lodge, 317 ITR 338 (Mad.)]

The assessee, a civil contractor, wrote a letter to the
District Collector to secure the DRDA contract from the office of the District
Collectorate, expressing its willingness to construct a hockey stadium in the
Collectorate Complex and after receipt of the letter the DRDA contract was
awarded by the Collector to the assessee. In the previous year relevant to A.Y.
2004-05 the assessee constructed the hockey stadium and the expenditure on the
construction of the hockey stadium of Rs.24 lakhs was claimed as revenue
expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim treating the
expenditure as capital expenditure. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim
holding that the assessee volunteered to construct the hockey stadium for
generating goodwill and for promoting its business activities, especially
where such construction of the hockey stadium was for the welfare of the
public, which was not prohibited by law. The Tribunal observed that the mere
willingness expressed by the assessee to construct the hockey stadium in the
District Collectorate Complex for a value of Rs.24 lakhs could not be
construed as bribe to a person or as contribution for a private fund or for
the benefit of any individual which could be regarded as a form of illegal
gratification.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“The construction of the hockey stadium by the assessee
was in the regular course of business apart from the fact that such
construction came to be made on property belonging to the District
Collectorate meant solely for the use of public at large. Thus, the
investment made by the assessee for construction of the hockey stadium was
in the regular course of business and such investment could be construed as
one made with a view to enlarge its scope of business and could be termed as
business expenditure.”

levitra

Assessment : Cross-examination of witnesses : A.Y. 1996-97 : Assessment based on statement of witnesses : No opportunity afforded to assessee to cross-examine the witnesses : Matter remanded.

New Page 2

  1. Assessment : Cross-examination of witnesses : A.Y. 1996-97 : Assessment based on statement of witnesses : No opportunity afforded to assessee to cross-examine the witnesses : Matter remanded.

[CIT v. Land Development Corporation, 316 ITR 328 (Karn.)]

The assessee was carrying on the business of real estate and building apartments. For the A.Y. 1996-97, the assessee had claimed depreciation on certain machineries used for the purposes of the business. In the course of survey conducted at the premises of the assessee and the seller of the machinery, statements of different persons were recorded. On the basis of such statements the claim for depreciation was disallowed. The assessee contended that the witnesses whose statements have been relied on were not allowed to be cross-examined by the assessee and therefore the disallowance can not be sustained in law. The Tribunal accepted the contention.

On appeal by the Revenue the Karnataka High Court held as under :

“The matter was to be remanded to the Assessing Officer for affording an adequate and proper opportunity to the assessee for cross-examination of all the witnesses whose statements were recorded earlier and whose statements had been already supplied to the assessee.”

levitra

Assessment : A.Ys. 1993-94 to 1995-96 : Business expenditure : Disallowance : Not to be based only on admissions of assessee : Admission not conclusive evidence.

New Page 1

  1. Assessment : A.Ys. 1993-94 to 1995-96 : Business
    expenditure : Disallowance : Not to be based only on admissions of assessee :
    Admission not conclusive evidence.

[Ester Industries Ltd. v. CIT, 316 ITR 260 (Del.)]

For the A.Ys. 1993-94 to 1995-96, the disallowances made by
the Assessing Officer were reversed by the CIT(A) and the additions were
deleted on the ground that the assessment order did not justify the additions.
The Tribunal reversed the order of the CIT(A) and restored the order of the
Assessing Officer on the ground that the assessee both in its original as well
as in its revised return had made admissions which formed the basis of the
additions made by the Assessing Officer.

On appeal, the assessee contended that had the assessee
been given an opportunity by the AO, it could have demonstrated that no
additions or disallowances were called for. The Delhi High Court allowed the
appeal and held as under :

“(i) The Tribunal ought to have examined the issue as to
whether the fact that the assessee had made an admission with respect to an
addition in its original return or in the revised return would ipso facto
bar the assessee from claiming an expense or disputing an addition, if it is
otherwise permissible under law.

(ii) The Assessing Officer did not call upon the assessee
to furnish any explanation at the time of making additions. The Tribunal
should have examined the matter based on the point that an admission is an
extremely important piece of evidence but it could not be said to be
conclusive. It was open to the person who made the admission to show that it
was incorrect.

(iii) The Tribunal’s order was to be set aside and it was
directed to rehear the parties.”

levitra

Appeal : Right of payer to appeal : S. 246(1)(i) and S. 248 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1997-98 : Even if tax is not effected by the payer, the payer has every right to question the tax liability of the payee to avoid vicarious consequences : Payer is

New Page 1

  1. Appeal : Right of payer to appeal : S. 246(1)(i) and S. 248
    of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1997-98 : Even if tax is not effected by the
    payer, the payer has every right to question the tax liability of the payee to
    avoid vicarious consequences : Payer is entitled to prefer appeal.

[Jindal Thermal Power Company Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, 225
CTR 220 (Karn.)]

In this case the appellant had made payment for which it
had not deducted tax at source. It preferred appeal disputing the tax
liability of the payee in respect of such payment. Dealing with the question
of the locus standi of the appellant to file appeals the Karnataka High Court
held as under :

“The decision (relied on by the Revenue) does not lay
down that the person who is obliged to effect TDS u/s.195 has no right to
question the assessment of tax liability. Since in law, if TDS is not
effected by the payer (Jindal), the payer would be ultimately responsible to
pay the tax liability of the payee. The conjoint reading of S. 195, S. 201
r.w. S. 246(1)(i) and S. 248 makes it clear that Jindal as a payer has every
right to question the tax liability of its payee to avoid the vicarious
consequences. Therefore, the contention that Jundal has no right of appeal
is to be rejected.”

levitra

Arm’s length price : Determination : S. 92CA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Amendment w.e.f. 1-6-2007 : Transfer Pricing Officer must give an opportunity of hearing : Assessee must be given opportunity to inspect material available with Transfer Pricing Office

New Page 1

  1. Arm’s length price : Determination : S. 92CA of Income-tax
    Act, 1961 : Amendment w.e.f. 1-6-2007 : Transfer Pricing Officer must give an
    opportunity of hearing : Assessee must be given opportunity to inspect
    material available with Transfer Pricing Officer and file further material.

[Moser Baer India Ltd. v. Addl. CIT, 316 ITR 1
(Del.)]

In this case the petitioners challenged the orders of the
Transfer Pricing Officer(TPO) on the following grounds :

(a) The TPO has not granted an oral hearing before
determining the arm’s length price in respect of international transactions
entered into by the petitioners with their associated enterprises; and

(b) There has been failure on the part of the TPO to
consider documents and information filed by the petitioners, as also,
non-disclosure of information and documents obtained by the TPO which were
used by him in the determination of the arm’s length price.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petitions and held as
under :

“(i) S. 92CA was inserted w.e.f. 1-6-2002 and was amended
w.e.f. 1-6-2007. Prior to the amendment, the Assessing Officer on receipt of
an order passed by the TPO under Ss.(3) of S. 92CA, would proceed to compute
the total income of the assessee u/s.92C(4) having regard to the arm’s
length price determined by the TPO. After the amendment, the Assessing
Officer is required to compute the total income of the assessee u/s.92C(4)
in conformity with the arm’s length price determined by the TPO. Thus, prior
to the amendment, the Assessing Officer while computing the total income of
the assessee, having regard to the arm’s length price so determined by the
TPO, was required to give the final opportunity to the assessee before
computing the assessee’s total income. This is clear from the language used
in Ss.(4) of S. 92CA prior to its amendment, as the determination by the TPO
was not binding on the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer was thus
empowered even at the stage of computation of total income to look into the
issues pertaining to the determination of the arm’s length price by the TPO.

(ii) Authorities which have power to decide and whose
decisions would prejudice a party, entailing civil consequences, would be
required to accord oral hearing even where a statute is silent. The
provisions of Ss.(3) of S. 92CA cast an obligation on the TPO to afford a
personal hearing to the assessee before he proceeds to pass an order of
determining of the arm’s length price in terms of S. 92CA(3).

(iii) Since such a requirement flows from a plain reading
of the provisions of S. 92CA(3), the determination of the arm’s length price
by the TPO could not be sustained by recourse of the fact that the assessee
did not demand an oral hearing.

(iv) To obviate any difficulty in future the show-cause
notice issued by the TPO just prior to the determination of the arm’s length
price u/s. 92CA(3) should refer to the documents available with the
Assessing Officer in relation to the international transaction in issue. The
show-cause notice should also give an option to the assessee: (a) both, to
inspect the material available with the Assessing Officer as also the leeway
to file further material or evidence if he so desires, and (b) to seek a
personal hearing in the matter.”

levitra

Company : Book profits : S. 80HHC and S. 115JA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : In case of MAT assessment amount deductible u/s. 80HHC has to be computed on the basis of adjusted book profits and not on basis of profit computed under the normal provisions.

New Page 1

12 Company : Book profits : S. 80HHC and S. 115JA of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : In case of MAT assessment amount deductible u/s. 80HHC
has to be computed on the basis of adjusted book profits and not on basis of
profit computed under the normal provisions.




[CIT v. SPEL Semiconductor Ltd., 188 Taxman 130 (Mad.)]

The assessee-company was engaged in manufacture and sale of
integrated circuits. For the relevant year, the assessment was completed u/s.
115JA. The assessee claimed that the amount deductible u/s.80HHC has to be
computed on the basis of the adjusted book profits and not on the basis of the
profit computed under the normal provisions. The Assessing Officer rejected
the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal following its judgment in the case of CIT v.
Rajanikant Schnelder & Associates (P) Ltd., 302 ITR 22 (Mad.).

levitra

Capital gains : Cost of acquisition : A.Y. 2003-04 : Interest on loan taken for purchase of property : Interest to be included in the cost of acquisition for computing capital gain on sale of property.

New Page 1

11 Capital gains : Cost of acquisition : A.Y. 2003-04 :
Interest on loan taken for purchase of property : Interest to be included in the
cost of acquisition for computing capital gain on sale of property.




[CIT v. Sri Hariram Hotels (P) Ltd.; 229 CTR 455
(Kar.), 188 Taxman 178 (Kar.)]

The assessee company had purchased an immovable property
out of borrowed funds. On sale of the property, for computation of capital
gain the assessee company included the interest on the borrowed funds in the
cost of acquisition of the property. The Assessing Officer held that the
interest on the borrowed funds does not form part of the cost of acquisition.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court followed
its decision in the case of CIT v. Maithreyi Pai, 152 ITR 247 (Kar.) and
upheld the decision of the Tribunal.

levitra

Capital receipt or income from other sources : Interest on share capital during pre-operative period : A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 : Due to legal entanglement with respect to title of land to be acquired for the assessee, share capital contribution put in f

New Page 1

10 Capital receipt or income from other sources : Interest on
share capital during pre-operative period : A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 : Due to
legal entanglement with respect to title of land to be acquired for the
assessee, share capital contribution put in fixed deposit with bank : Interest
earned on fixed deposit is capital receipt liable to be set off against
pre-operative expenses : Not income from other sources.




[Indian Oil Panipat Power Consortium Ltd. v. ITO, 230
CTR 199 (Del.)]

Due to legal entanglement with respect to title of land
which was sought to be acquired by the Government for the assessee, share
capital contribution was temporarily put by the assessee in fixed deposit with
bank. Interest earned on fixed deposit in the A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 was
assessed by the Assessing Officer as income from other sources. The CIT(A)
accepted the stand of the assessee that the interest was in the nature of
capital receipt which was liable to be set off against pre-operative expenses.
The Tribunal reversed the decision of the CIT(A).

On the appeal filed by the assessee, the Delhi High Court
reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The test is whether the activity which is taken up for
setting up of the business and the funds which are generated are inextricably
connected to the setting up of the plant. The clue is perhaps available in S.
3 which states that for newly set up business the previous year shall be the
period beginning with the date of setting up of the business. Therefore, as
per the provisions of S. 4 which is the charging Section, income which arises
to an assessee from the date of setting of the business but prior to
commencement is chargeable to tax depending on whether it is of a revenue
nature or capital receipt. It is clear upon a perusal of the facts as found by
the authorities below that the funds in the form of share capital were infused
for a specific purpose of acquiring land and the development of
infrastructure. Therefore, the interest earned on funds primarily brought for
infusion in the business could not have been classified as income from other
sources.

(ii) Since the income was earned in a period prior to
commencement of business, it was in the nature of capital receipt and hence
was required to be set off against pre-operative expenses.

(iii) On account of the finding of fact returned by the
CIT(A) that the funds infused in the assessee by the joint venture partner
were inextricably linked with the setting up of the plant, the interest earned
by the assessee could not be treated as income from other sources.

(iv) The Tribunal misdirected itself in law in holding that
interest which accrued on funds deployed with the bank could be taxed as
income from other sources and not as capital receipt liable to be set off
against pre-operative expenses.”

levitra

Business expenditure : A.Y. 2004-05 : Premium paid by assessee-firm on keyman insurance policy of partner is business expenditure allowable as deduction.

New Page 1

8 Business expenditure : A.Y. 2004-05 : Premium paid by
assessee-firm on keyman insurance policy of partner is business expenditure
allowable as deduction.




[CIT v. M/s. B. N. Exports (Bom.); ITA No. 2714 of
2009, dated 31-3-2010]

The assessee is a partnership firm. For the A.Y. 2004-05,
the assessee’s claim for deduction of the premium paid by the assessee-firm on
the keyman insurance policy of the partners was disallowed by the Assessing
Officer. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The Circular No. 762, dated 18-2-1998 issued by the
CBDT clarifies the position by stipulating that the premium paid for a keyman
insurance policy is allowable as business expenditure.

(ii) In the present case, on the question whether the
premium which was paid by the firm could have been allowed as business
expenditure, there is a finding of fact by the Tribunal that the firm had not
taken insurance for the personal benefit of the partner, but for the benefit
of the firm, in order to protect itself against the setback that may be caused
on account of the death of the partner.

(iii) The object and purpose of a keyman insurance policy
is to protect the business against the financial setback which may occur, as a
result of a premature death, to the business or professional organisation.
There is no rational basis to confine the allowability of the expenditure
incurred on the premium paid towards such a policy only to a situation where
the policy is in respect of the life of an employee.

(iv) A keyman insurance policy is obtained on the life of a
partner to safeguard the firm against a disruption of the business that may
result due to the premature death of the partner. Therefore, the expenditure
which is laid out for the payment of premium on such a policy is incurred
wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business.”

levitra

Deemed dividend : S. 2(22)(e) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Loans and advances from one company to another with common shareholder with substantial interest : Deemed dividend to be assessed in the hands of the shareholder and not in the hands o

New Page 1

9 Deemed dividend : S. 2(22)(e) of Income-tax Act, 1961 :
A.Y. 2003-04 : Loans and advances from one company to another with common
shareholder with substantial interest : Deemed dividend to be assessed in the
hands of the shareholder and not in the hands of the recipient company.




[CIT v. Universal Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (Bom.); ITA No.
2264 of 2009, dated 22-3-2010]

An amount of Rs.32,00,000 was transferred from the bank
account of a company CSPL to the bank account of the assessee in the Chembur
branch of the State Bank of India. There was a common shareholder holding the
number of shares in the two companies as specified in S. 2(22)(e) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The amount was misappropriated by an employee of the
assessee and the transaction was not entered in the accounts of the assessee.
The Assessing Officer treated the said amount as deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e)
of the Act and made the addition of the said amount. The Tribunal held that
the amount was part of a fraud committed on the assessee and the transaction
was not reflected in its books of account. The Tribunal therefore held that S.
2(22)(e) was not applicable. The Tribunal further held that even otherwise,
the amount would have to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder who obtained
the benefit and not in the hands of the assessee-company.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The Tribunal has found that as a matter of fact no
loan or advance was granted to the assessee, since the amount in question had
actually been defalcated and was not reflected in the books of account of the
assessee. Consequently, according to the Tribunal the first requirement of
there being an advance or loan was not fulfilled. In our view, the finding is
a pure finding of fact which does not give rise to any substantial question of
law.

(ii) Even on the second aspect which has weighed with the
Tribunal, we are of the view that the construction which has been placed on
the provisions of S. 2(22)(e) is correct.

(iii) The effect of clause (e) of S. 22 is to broaden the
ambit of the expression ‘dividend’ by including certain payments which the
company has made by way of a loan or advance or payments made on behalf of or
for the individual benefit of a shareholder. The definition does not alter the
legal position that dividend has to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder.
Consequently, in the present case the payment, even assuming that it was a
dividend, would have to taxed not in the hands of the assessee, but in the
hands of the shareholder.”

levitra

TDS : S. 199 : TDS on interest on Deep Discount Bonds — Payment on behalf of ‘owner of security’

New Page 1

20 TDS : Credit of : S. 199 of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2002-03 : TDS in relation to interest on Deep Discount Bonds is
required to be treated as payment on behalf of ‘owner of security’ or ‘unit
holder’.


[CIT v. Smt. Sonal Bansal, 167 Taxman 311 (P&H); 215
CTR 65 (P&H)]

On 1-1-2001, the assessee had purchased Deep Discount Bonds
1997 of IDBI at the rate of Rs.9,700 each from one ‘V’ who had originally
purchased the same at the rate of Rs.5,500. On maturity, the IDBI deducted tax
at source of Rs.91,800 on the interest income of Rs.9 lakhs. In the A.Y.
2002-03, the assessee had declared the income of Rs.1,07,140 which included
Rs.60,000 being interest on the said Bonds as the secondary purchaser. The
assessee had also claimed credit of the said tax deducted at source of Rs.91,800
on the said interest of Rs.9 lakhs. The Assessing Officer allowed credit for TDS
of Rs.6,120 only, proportionate to the interest income of Rs.60,000 offered by
the assessee and disallowed the balance. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the
full claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) A perusal of the provisions of S. 199 shows that any
deduction made of tax at source and paid to the Central Government is required
to be treated as payment of tax on behalf of the person from whose income the
deduction was made. However, with effect from 1-4-1997, amendments were
introduced by Finance Act, 1996, which resulted in addition of words
‘depositor’ or ‘owner of property’ or ‘owner of security’ or ‘unit holder’, as
the case may be. Therefore, it is clear that any deduction made of tax at
source and paid to the Central Government is required to be treated as payment
of tax on behalf of ‘owner of security’ or ‘unit holder’.

(ii) In the instant case, it is obviously the assessee-secondary
purchaser who was owner of security and, therefore, tax deducted at source had
to be regarded as payment made on her behalf. Moreover, certificate u/s.203
had also been issued to the assessee.”

levitra

Refund : S. 119, S. 237 : Belated return for refund : Delay condoned due to genuine hardship to assessee

New Page 4

19 Refund : Condonation of delay : S. 119 and S. 237 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1997-98 : Belated return for refund : Delay should
be necessarily condoned in case of genuine hardship to assessee.






[Pala Marketing Co-operative Society Ltd. v. UOI, 167
Taxman 238 (Ker.)]

The assessee co-operative society was entitled to exemption
u/s.80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A.Y. 1997-98, the assessee had
filed return of income claiming refund of advance tax and TDS. There was delay
in filing the return as there was delay in audit of the accounts. The Assessing
Officer rejected the return as time-barred and, consequently declined the
refund. The assessee’s application u/s.119(2)(b) for condonation of delay in
filing return was also rejected by the Board.



The Kerala High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
assessee and held as under :

“(i) If delay is not condoned by the Board u/s. 119(2)(b),
such application cannot be processed u/s.139(1) or u/s.139(4). Therefore, in
order to consider belated return for refund on merits, delay has to be
necessarily condoned by the Board u/s.119(2)(b).

(ii) In S. 119(2)(b), it is stated that if the Board
considers it desirable or expedient for avoiding genuine hardship to the
assessee, it should condone the delay. In other words, what the Board should
consider is hardship to the party if delay is not condoned. The Board should
condone the delay if failure to condone the delay causes genuine hardship to
the assessee, no matter whether the delay in filing return is meticulously
explained or not.

(iii) Strangely, the Board had stated in its order that it
was not possible to investigate (scrutinise) the return of income because the
statutory time limit had already elapsed. It is not clear on what basis that
statement was made, because even in a case where a claim of refund is made,
the Assessing Officer has to examine the liability for Income-tax of the
assessee and refund is made only if tax is not payable or the amount paid is
in excess of the tax, interest, etc., payable.

(iv) The delay in audit by the auditor was not attributable
to the assessee. Besides showing sufficient cause for delay in filing the
return for refund, the assessee had also established its case of genuine
hardship inasmuch as it had suffered losses in the five succeeding years. The
genuine hardship contemplated u/s. 119(2)(b) obviously is financial hardship
caused to the assessee if delay is not condoned. If delay in the instant case
was not condoned, the assessee would be deprived of Rs.10 lakhs and odd, which
it was otherwise not liable to pay by virtue of the exemption u/s.80P.

(v) In the circumstances, impugned order was quashed
declaring the assessee’s entitlement for condonation of delay u/s.119(2)(b)
and, the Assessing Officer was directed to process assessee’s claim for refund
u/s.237 and grant refund to the extent eligible.”









levitra

Charitable trust: Assessee, a marketing committee entitled to registration u/s.12A/12AA and exemption u/s.11

New Page 1

II. Reported :



 


17 Charitable trust : Registration u/s.12A
and u/s.12AA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Assessee, a marketing committee eligible
for exemption u/s.10(29) : Exemption withdrawn w.e.f. 1-4-2003 : Assessee not
disentitled to registration 12A and 12AA and exemption u/s.11.

[CIT v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, 215 CTR 54 (MP)]

The assessee, a marketing committee, was entitled to
exemption u/s.10(29) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The exemption was withdrawn
w.e.f. 1-4-2003. The assessee made application for registration u/s.12A and
u/s.12AA of the Act. The Commissioner rejected the application, on the ground
that the exemption u/s.10(29) has been withdrawn. In appeal the Tribunal
directed the Commissioner to permit the registration.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madhya Pradesh High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The first contention raised by the counsel for the
appellant is that the intention of the legislature in deleting S. 10(29) and
introduction of S. 10(20) itself shows that the legislature did not want to
extend the benefit of exemption to Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti. This argument is
without any force because S. 10(20) and S. 10(29) provide for exemption to all
the local authorities and exemption under this section was a blanket exemption
without fulfilling any condition. S. 11 provides for exemption on certain
conditions. Thus, the intention behind the amendment was to remove the blanket
exemption to the local authorities and provide exemption only if they fulfil
the conditions u/s.11.

(ii) As per S. 11, the exemption can be granted to the
marketing committees provided that they spend amount for charitable purposes
as required by S. 11(2). Marketing committees are bound to spend their income
as per S. 39 of the 1972 Adhiniyam and as per said Section, the amount could
be spent only for public amenities like construction of roads, market, etc. S.
2(15) provides that if the amount is spent towards public amenities, it will
be deemed that the amount is spent for charitable purposes. Hence, by virtue
of S. 2(15), it will have to be deemed that the amount spent by the marketing
committees is spent towards public purposes.

(iii) Respondent marketing committees fulfil all the
requirements of S. 11 to get exemption and therefore, are entitled to
registration u/s.12A and u/s.12AA and hence, the Tribunal has rightly allowed
the appeals and set aside the orders passed by the CIT.


levitra